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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walter Roberts</td>
<td>1943-1950</td>
<td>USIA, Austrian Service, New York</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1950-1953</td>
<td>Austrian Desk Officer, Washington DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halvor C. Ekern</td>
<td>1945-1955</td>
<td>Assistant to the High Commissioner, Office of the High Commissioner, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denise Abbey</td>
<td>1945-1947</td>
<td>Programmer, Radio Free Austria, USIS, Salzburg</td>
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<td>1947-1952</td>
<td>Educator, Austro-American Institute of Education, USIS, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hugh G. Appling</td>
<td>1947-1950</td>
<td>Consular Officer, Vienna</td>
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<td>Frank E. Maestrone</td>
<td>1948-1949</td>
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<td>Clinton L. Olson</td>
<td>1948-1952</td>
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<td>Robert B. Houston</td>
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<td>Horace G. Torbert</td>
<td>1950-1954</td>
<td>Coordinator of Intelligence, Vienna</td>
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<td>William Lloyd Stearman</td>
<td>1950-1955</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arthur A. Bardos</td>
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<td>W. Tapley Bennett</td>
<td>1951-1955</td>
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<td>Mary Seymour Olmsted</td>
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<td>Chester H. Opal</td>
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<td>Robert J. Martens</td>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary, Allied High Commission, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lloyd Jonnes</td>
<td>1953-1956</td>
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<td>Hendrik Van Oss</td>
<td>1953-1956</td>
<td>Economic Officer, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alfred Puhan</td>
<td>1953-1957</td>
<td>U.S Secretary in the Allied Commission for Austria, Vienna</td>
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<td>William J. Galloway</td>
<td>1956-1959</td>
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<td>William M. Woessner</td>
<td>1956-1959</td>
<td>Consular Officer, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrence Catherman</td>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>USIS, Monitor of East European and Soviet Media Output, Vienna</td>
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<td>Robert Gerald Livingston</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Consular Officer, Salzburg</td>
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<td>Douglas G. Hartley</td>
<td>1958-1959</td>
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<td>Russell O. Prickett</td>
<td>1959-1961</td>
<td>Administration Officer, US Mission, IAEA, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dwight J. Porter</td>
<td>1959-1963</td>
<td>Economic Counselor and Deputy Representative to The International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Propst Blane</td>
<td>1960-1962</td>
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<td>Gerald B. Helman</td>
<td>1960-1962</td>
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<td>Yale Richmond</td>
<td>1961-1963</td>
<td>Special Projects Officer, Vienna</td>
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<td>Jack A. Sulser</td>
<td>1961-1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ray E. Jones</td>
<td>1962-1964</td>
<td>Secretary to the Deputy Chief of Mission, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Bodde, Jr.</td>
<td>1962-1966</td>
<td>Rotation Officer/Staff Aide, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawrence Norrie</td>
<td>1962-1966</td>
<td>Country Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Austria</td>
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<td>Clinton L. Olson</td>
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<td>Kenneth P.T. Sullivan</td>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>Labor and Political Officer, Vienna</td>
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<td>Douglas MacArthur, II</td>
<td>1967-1969</td>
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<td>Anthony Geber</td>
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<td>Alfred Joseph White</td>
<td>1969-1972</td>
<td>Italy, Austria, and Switzerland Desk Officer, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Dwight J. Porter</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Representative to The International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna</td>
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<td>George F. Jones</td>
<td>1971-1974</td>
<td>Political Advisor, IAEA, Vienna</td>
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<td>Roger Kirk</td>
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<td>Alfred Joseph White</td>
<td>1972-1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jonathan Dean</td>
<td>1972-1981</td>
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<td>William N. Harben</td>
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<td>S. Douglas Martin</td>
<td>1973-1976</td>
<td>Director, East-West Trade Center, Vienna</td>
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<td>Halvor C. Ekern</td>
<td>1974</td>
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<td>Philip S. Kaaplan</td>
<td>1974-1975</td>
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<td>George A. Anderson</td>
<td>1974-1979</td>
<td>Political Officer/Labor Attaché, Vienna</td>
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<td>Clarke N. Ellis</td>
<td>1975-1977</td>
<td>Economic/Commercial Officer, Vienna</td>
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<td>Susan M. Klingaman</td>
<td>1975-1977</td>
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<td>Aurelius Fernandez</td>
<td>1976-1980</td>
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<td>C. Arthur Borg</td>
<td>1977-1983</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission, Vienna</td>
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<td>Woodward Romine</td>
<td>1978-1980</td>
<td>Chief of the Political Section, Vienna</td>
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<td>Philip M. Kaiser</td>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
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<td>Sol Polansky</td>
<td>1979-1983</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission/Chargé d'Affaires, Vienna</td>
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<td>Harriet Curry</td>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>Secretary to Ambassador Kaiser, Vienna</td>
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<td>Ward Thompson</td>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td>Austria and Switzerland Desk Officer, Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gerald B. Helman</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Deputy Head of U.S. Delegation, U.N. International Conference on Outer Space, Vienna</td>
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<td>Morton I. Abramowitz</td>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>Head of U.S. Delegation, Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction, Vienna</td>
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<td>Vladimir Lehovich</td>
<td>1983-1986</td>
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<td>Lawrence Dunham</td>
<td>1983-2005</td>
<td>Diplomatic &amp; Consular Liaison, Office of Protocol, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Maynard Wayne Glitman</td>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td>Chief U.S. Representative, Mutual and Balanced Forces, Vienna</td>
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<td>Harry Joseph Gilmore</td>
<td>1985-1987</td>
<td>Director, Office of Central European</td>
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WARREN ZIMMERMAN
U.S. Delegation, CSCE, Vienna
1986-1989

DAVID M. EVANS
Committee on Security and Cooperation, Vienna
1987-1989

MICHAEL H. NEWLIN
Resident Representative to UN Agencies, Vienna
1988-1991

JOHN A. BUHCE
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Vienna
1989-1992

RUDOLF V. PERINA
Deputy Head of US Delegation to CSCE, Vienna
1989-1992

ROY A. HUFFINGTON
Ambassador
1990-1993

CRAIG DUNKERLEY
Deputy Head, US Delegation to CSCE, Vienna
1992-1995

PHILIP C. BROWN
Regional Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Vienna
1994-1996

WALTER ROBERTS
USIA Austrian Service
New York (1945-1950)

Austrian Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1950-1953)

A naturalized American citizen of Austrian birth, Mr. Roberts in 1942 joined the US Coordinator of Information engaged in analyzing Nazi Germany’s internal propaganda. His subsequent career concerned primarily US Government information activities with the Voice of America, The United States Information Service (USIS) and the Department of State. His service abroad centered primarily on European Affairs, and particularly Yugoslavia. Mr. Roberts was interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1990.

ROBERTS: The most important date in terms of establishing an Austrian service was the Moscow Declaration of October 31, 1943, in which the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union declared that Austria was an occupied country that deserved to be liberated after the end of the war--"provided," et cetera and so forth.
I remember at that time there were about three or four of us who were doing Austrian material, but always under the guidance of the chief of the German section, Hans Meyer. I had the highest respect for Hans intellectually--a very good editor and writer. But Hans was an emotional person, and so were a number of other people, particularly Martin Fuchs, who was later to become the first head of the Austrian desk. He and Meyer often disagreed regarding the thrust of the broadcasts to Austria. I remember after the Moscow Declaration Martin Fuchs proposed that a separate Austrian desk be created, and indeed some time in 1944 the Austrian desk was established as a separate unit, but still within the German section. The people I remember who worked on the Austrian desk were Martin Fuchs, Robert Bauer, myself, and, on a purchase order basis, General Julius Deutsch --

Q: A general on purchase order?

ROBERTS: A general on purchase order. He had been a general of the Social Democratic paramilitary organization, the Schutzbund, and one of the leaders of the Social Democratic resistance in 1934 against the then authoritarian Austrian government. The Austrian government won out over the Social Democrats and he left Austria, went to Spain and became a member of the general staff of the Spanish Loyalists. After they were defeated in the Spanish Civil War, he came to the United States, I think via Paris.

I have a little anecdote. It was late May 1944, and we were all certain that there would very soon be an invasion of Western Europe, the so-called Second Front. I was a youngster at that time, in my twenties, and I reverently asked Deutsch one day, with map in hand, where he thought the Allies would land in Western Europe. He replied that I was right to ask him that question, because, after all, he had been in charge of the coastal defenses in Spain. He solemnly then ruled out one area where he was absolutely sure the Allies would not land, and that was the Normandy coast. (Laughter)

To the best of my knowledge, the original broadcast to Austrian workers was transformed in March 1943 to a broadcast aimed at all Austrian listeners. A second Austrian show was added at the time of the Moscow Declaration. We had one broadcast at 9 a.m., which was 3 o'clock in the afternoon in Austria--not a very good time--and I don't know when the other one was on the air. But I don't think we had more than 30 minutes to Austria until May 1944. I do not remember when the Austrian desk was completely separated from the German section. When Martin Fuchs left VOA and returned to Austria to join the Austrian foreign service at the behest of the then chancellor of Austria, Leopold Figl, Robert Bauer became the head of the Austrian desk and I moved up to number two.

Q: Given the fact that there was this separate broadcast, and the fact that the Austrians were to be considered occupied rather than enemy listeners, clearly there had to be distinctive differences between the approaches of the two programs, to Germany and to Austria. Tell me about those differences. Tell me what the Austrian program consisted largely of.

ROBERTS: I remember this: At the beginning, in 1942 and 1943, the Austrian broadcasts were hardly different in tone and theme from the German programs. Indeed, the news summary was always taken from the preceding German broadcasts. What distinction there was, was in terms of
language; the Austrian announcers—Jens Friedrich, for instance—stressed the difference in terms of accent. But thematically, the thrust was similar to the German broadcasts—perhaps sometimes recalling the Austrian heritage, etc. What really changed the output was the Moscow Declaration.

The Austrian declaration was a document conceived in the British foreign office some time in the spring of 1943. The record shows that the British draft was forwarded to the State Department and to the Soviet foreign office some time in the summer, and with very minor recommendations it was then accepted at the Tripartite Conference in Moscow in October 1943. I mention this only because this was not an American initiative, and whatever directives we had—I always add, to the best of my recollection—made very little distinction between Germany and Austria, because before the Moscow Declaration was published, there was no policy propounded in the State Department to have Austria treated separately.

What we did, however—after the Moscow Declaration was issued—was to latch on to it, and we started writing more targeted scripts. We had a tripartite declaration which clearly indicated that after the end of the war Austria shall be an independent country. It also gave us a great deal of working room, because the Moscow Declaration said that Austrians must contribute to their liberation and that whatever Austria will do towards her own liberation will be taken into account when the final settlement is made. So it opened up a lot of possibilities, and all our intellectual acumen was brought to bear. My recollection is that we did not get very thought-provoking directives; what we did was basically on our own initiative.

It wasn't always easy. Here I come back to our problem: We were still part of the German section, and we still had to clear our scripts with Hans Meyer and his staff, who were not all that happy, quite frankly, with a separate thrust toward an independent Austria. They didn't like the idea that we were suddenly sort of walking with higher heels in the corridors of 224 West 57th Street. I remember once a shouting match between Meyer and Bauer, when Meyer said to Bauer that the trouble was that Hitler was an Austrian. Whereupon Bauer answered that the trouble was that while in Austria Hitler was a paperhanger, as soon as he came to Germany the Germans made him Chancellor! I give you the flavor of the situation.

We started all sorts of new programs. We would, for instance, interview Bruno Walter, the famous conductor, who was a former Austrian. We would interview the film actress Hedy Lamarr—she went to school next to mine in Vienna; Hedy Kiesler was her name. I remember, for instance, the well-known writer Fritz Torberg wrote a poem about a famous Austrian soccer player, who committed suicide after the Nazis came to power in Austria in 1938; we broadcast that. We gave the broadcasts a more typical Austrian flavor, and I have no doubt—knowing my old friend, Jens Friedrich, who was a superb announcer; he had a wonderful voice that carried—that he probably stressed even more the Austrian accent after the Moscow Declaration.

So there were distinctions made and the Austrian flavor was there. There was also Konrad Maril—I don't know exactly when he joined us—who wrote some beautiful scripts with a very heavy Austrian tinge. And so it became rarer that we used German material as time went on.

Q: So how long were you in the Austrian service?
ROBERTS: I was in the Austrian service until early 1950.

Q: At which point you did what?

ROBERTS: At which point I was transferred to the State Department proper. And there again, I always say that most of my jobs occurred as a result of chance meetings in elevators or in Harvard Yard, or...

Q: You never did go back to Harvard?

ROBERTS: I never did go back to Harvard.

In 1949, the Austrian treaty talks were located in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. These were the talks that the foreign ministers of the Big Four arranged for "deputies," as they called them--though they were not really the deputies of the foreign ministers--to draft an Austrian state treaty. Again, you know that was the difference between Germany and Austria. In the case of Austria, it was the reestablishment of the state, and not a peace treaty. I was designated by Foy Kohler, who was then director of the Voice of America, to cover these talks for the Voice of America, not only for the Austrian desk but also for the news desk. So on the days the meetings took place, I went over to the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, where Sam Reber was the American "deputy," Gyorgy Zarubin the Soviet "deputy," William Mallet the British "deputy," and Marcell Berthelot the French "deputy."

Anyway, throughout the fall of 1949, these talks took place--which of course resulted in nothing. This was the famous "Nyet" period of the Soviet Union. Very soon Sam Reber, with the concurrence of Foy Kohler, employed me also as a spokesman for the delegation. He wanted me to handle the press, who waited outside because the negotiations were closed. I was not only, as I said, a reporter but also became, for all intents and purposes, a member of the delegation. One day Reber asked me whether I would be interested in another job, other than being a VOA reporter. I said yes, I would be. He wrote a letter to his colleague, Tommy Thompson, Llewellyn Thompson, who was then deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs. A few days later, I got a telephone call from Tommy Thompson, asking me to come down to Washington to see him.

You know, one sometimes remembers little episodes. I recall that I walked into Tommy Thompson's office, very awed. Here was a deputy assistant secretary of state who said to me that I came highly recommended by his close friend Sam Reber. He added that if he were Dean Acheson--who was then Secretary of State--and were to show me a table of organization of the Department of State, what job would I like to have? I was stunned. After a second or so, I said that I would be very happy to serve on the Austrian desk of the State Department. He replied that he would see what he could do.

A few weeks later, Martin Herz--the Austrian desk consisted at that time of political, economic, and public affairs officers, and Martin had the public affairs job--was to be transferred to Paris.
Tommy Thompson obviously must have said a nice word about me because I was asked whether I would like to have that job. I jumped at the opportunity and became a member of the Austrian desk of the State Department.

Q: In those days, VOA--indeed the whole information program--was still under the State Department.

ROBERTS: Of course it was. So it was an internal transfer. However, it wasn't easy. In September, 1945, the overseas branch of the OWI was lock, stock and barrel transferred to the State Department as the Interim Information Administration, but the personnel system was kept separate. So the transfer at that time from an information position, which moreover was located in New York, to the regular State Department personnel system presented a major problem. It looked at times as if the transfer would never take place. But in the end, the bureaucratic problems were overcome and beginning the first of July 1950, I was a permanent member of the Austrian desk of the State Department.

My first job was to go to Vienna and organize the transfer of all information and cultural functions of the military high commission to a normal USIS operation within a civilian high commission. USIS in Austria consisted then of more than fifty Americans and over a thousand Austrian employees--we published a daily newspaper, the Wiener Kurier, and were responsible for a three-station radio network, Red-White-Red, with stations and transmitters in Vienna, Linz and Salzburg.

HALVOR C. EKERN
Assistant to High Commissioner, Office of the High Commissioner
Vienna (1945-1955)

Halvor C. Ekern was born in Montana in 1917. He served in the U.S. Army from 1941-1947. Mr. Ekern entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Austria, Iceland, Sierra Leone, Germany, and Washington, DC. Mr. Ekern was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

EKERN: I was then transferred to the Allied Commission for Austria which was sitting there waiting to go into Vienna. I worked for the US element of the Allied Commission which was called the Quadripartite Directorate.

Q: You did that for almost ten years.

EKERN: That is right. The State Department took this over in 1950. The Allied Commission was still there and they took me over too. After a bit I was integrated into the Foreign Service.

Q: This is a very interesting period. What was Austria like when you went in and what was your attitude towards Austria? Was it different than towards Germany?
EKERN: Well, you may remember that Germany was a conquered country, but the four allies decided that Austria was a liberated country. In Germany they had the nonfraternization policy, a very stern attitude, but in Austria we were free to make friends. The city was devastated having been bombed very badly. The Russians got in there first. The Allied Authority in London had decided where the demarcation lines between the four zones were as well as the four portions of the city, to be divided among the British, French, Russians and US. We were supposed to move in, but the Russians weren't quite finished looting the place and they stalled. Mark Clark was our High Commissioner and Commanding General. The Russians wanted to come in, but he said not until they sign the agreements on access, something they didn't bother to do in Berlin. Al Gruenther the Deputy High Commissioner, and went in and talked to the Russians and said that his Commissioner was not coming in until they sign the agreements for access by rail, air and road. A smart decision. So we got there in August.

The city was totally demoralized, looted and violated. They had really sacked that place. It was a terrible chapter that had been sort of passed over. We got the High Commissioner operating by September 1.

Q: We are looking at this in the field of foreign affairs. In the first place, what was your particular rank and position?

EKERN: I was a major. The Allied Commission head was General Sasman and General Floree. I served Clark in the Allied Commission meetings as an assistant.

Q: He was a very controversial person. He seemed to have rather an imperious air.

EKERN: He did.

Q: Mark Clark, George Patton and Douglas MacArthur seemed to be the triad of great actors in the American general scene. Could you describe how he operated from what you saw of him their as High Commissioner?

EKERN: The good side was that probably what we needed was a man on horseback there. He didn't take too much back talk from the Russians and the Austrians were prepared for a deliverer, which they saw in Mark Clark. He did a tremendous amount of grandstanding. He had a public information section that was first class.

Q: His ability to have a photographer with him everywhere was one of the great stories.

EKERN: And you photographed him from the left side only. The photographer was Okimoto, a 2nd lieutenant in the Signal Corps. He later became Lyndon Johnson's photographer.

Q: He was used to dealing with tall, imperious people.

EKERN: Yes, the same thing. Clark had a tremendous ego. In two years Clark left and Jeffery Keys came in, a very modest, devoted, pious man and down to business. Probably what we needed then was a quiet, thoughtful figure to get the country out of the hole it was in.
So the Allied Commission operated as a member of the Four Powers which had an Executive Committee of their deputies and then 12 Four-Power Directorates for internal affairs, economics, finance, political, military, etc. They met weekly and the Council met twice a month. The work went on and our objective was, of course, to get a treaty and get out having established a democratic government. But the Russians had no intentions of leaving.

The first negotiations on a state treaty began in 1947 and we thought by ’48 we would be out of there for sure. Well, we left in ’55 because of the Russian intransigence. They were not prepared to leave and they stalled on the treaty. So I worked on that treaty from 1947 until 1955.

We had several High Commissioners there. After Keys came Walter Donnelly who was also High Commissioner in Bonn later. Then Llewellyn E. Thompson who in my view was probably our finest statesman.

Q: You are not alone in thinking that. You say you worked on the treaty, but here you are there for ten years. A treaty is not that big a thing. How does one work on a treaty when you know the other side is not going to do anything with it?

EKERN: Well, by diplomatic persistence and patience. Meeting whenever we could get them to come. Article 35 was the question of disposition of German assets. Since Germany literally owned everything, they took over the country lock, stock and barrel, the Russians were free to choose what they wanted to seize in their zone as German assets...including the unbuilt autobahn, for example, which they seized as a German asset. So we could not leave them there with an unchallenged territorial position or we wouldn't have had an independent country. So we whittled away at these other articles trying to get them squared away, all the time chewing away on Article 35. We even had a special Austrian treaty commission come in, mostly to deal with the disposition of the oil fields. An American lawyer came in and worked for a year and gave up.

I would have to look in the book to find out how many meetings we had of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Deputy Foreign Ministers, plus special negotiations. Finally, what I think led to the treaty, was that the Russians at that time, 1953, ’54, were trying to get a neutralized Germany if I remember. They made an attempt to get Germany out of NATO but we didn't think a neutralized Germany would work. So Molotov decided to set an example and have a neutralized Austria, to show them how it could be done. So it was in early 1955 that they called Chancellor Rabb and suddenly said they wanted this treaty. It shocked us all. I remember Llewellyn Thompson got the telegram and called us in and said that we must be prepared for 30 days of hard work. He was right.

By that time the German scene had changed. Germany was more integrated into NATO.

Q: Adenauer was well in place.

EKERN: Yes. And it became clear even to the Russians that the neutralization of Germany was not going to work.
They had called for this treaty and they were stuck with it. We hammered out a treaty. It was not as easy as Llewellyn Thompson predicted because on the last day, mind you, the Foreign Ministers were scheduled to come to Vienna on May 15, 1955 and I think even Molotov was in town and they were stuck on this issue of extraterritorial privileges for the Russians having to do with properties. We refused. They went into a one plus one meeting and Thompson picked me to go with him. You could see that the British and the French were ready to cave, their Foreign Ministers were on their way. It would be hard to pick up a phone and tell them not to come. Even, Leopold Feld, at that time the Austrian Foreign Minister was silent.

*Q: The Austrian Foreign Minister.*

EKERN: I think he would have caved. The pressure was tremendous. The people were gathering in the streets and everything. But Thompson said, "No. I am prepared to tell my Foreign Minister not to come." And the meeting broke up.

*Q: This would have been Dulles.*

EKERN: Yes, Dulles. He was in Paris. Thompson put me on a plane and told me to go see Dulles and tell him what is up and what we have done. But while I was in the air the Russians caved in so the treaty was signed.

*Q: Could you explain a bit how you saw Thompson, who is one of our preeminent diplomats of this area? How he operated as you saw it.*

EKERN: Tommy Thompson was a very quiet, modest man, always seeking the background. He didn't want accolades. While he was High Commissioner in Vienna he spent a year in negotiating the treaty between the Yugoslavs and the Italians over Trieste and finally obtained it. He was a modest man of great ability. Later he was adviser to four Presidents on the USSR. I found him nice to work with, a gentleman of the first order; if you produced what he wanted he was most amicable.

*Q: Did he ever comment on the Soviets, either as a government or as negotiators, in the moments when you were all sitting around?*

EKERN: There was such agreement on that that there wasn't too much to discuss, namely that the Soviets were in an aggressive mode; had a lot of military power and would probably use it; that they were leaders of an evil empire; and it was evident every day in our dealings with them that they were untrustworthy and tough to deal with and there were no allusions about this.

*Q: And, of course, you had the example of what they did in the rape of Austria right in front of you. As a group you were probably as realistic about what you were dealing with as any.*

EKERN: Exactly. There just wasn't much room to debate about it except some of the finer points. Did you know Martin Hertz?

*Q: Oh, yes.*
EKERN: Martin was there. He was a major like myself.

_Q: For the record, Martin Hertz was later ambassador to Bulgaria, but he is a Foreign Service officer of considerable repute as far as his political acumen is concerned._

EKERN: During this period General Balmer [ph] was the Deputy Commission under Keys and a statesman of the first order. He has really never gotten the recognition he deserved. He was really the one who ran our policies there. He gathered together what he called his Operations Committee which included Martin, myself, Ted Kaghan, and a couple of others, whom he relied on for his policy assistance.

Back to Thompson. He was a true statesman and a gentleman of the first order.

_Q: Did you ever develop any personal contacts with the Soviets or was this not...?_

EKERN: Oh, yes indeed. Quite a lot because part of my job was to run the Four Power Allied Secretariat. I knew a lot of them and later as I got to thinking probably knew more of them personally than any other American of that period by virtue of my tenure there. To help build a biographic sketch of them we trained our interpreters and other people around there to ask the proper questions of their counterparts, etc. They were divided into the KGB and the actual diplomats. But it was easy to distinguish them.

_Q: What were the roles that the French and the British were playing in this?_

EKERN: The British, of course, sent some very fine people. They had some outstanding generals and statesman. Lord Cotchia was their first civilian High Commissioner. General Sir John Winterton was their Deputy Commissioner and I think he became High Commissioner for a while. He is an outstanding man and still alive.

_Q: Cotchia later was ambassador to the United States wasn't he?_

EKERN: I think so.

The French, of course, were dealt into the picture about the time the war ended because they asked for a zone. So a zone was taken out of the American zone and given to the French.

We had a number of civilian relief programs in which the French and British were unable to participate in because of their own shortages at home.

_Q: How quickly did we install the Austrians government into the various zones_

EKERN: An election was called for in the European Advisory Commission Agreement which came out in November, 1945. The Russians thought they had prepared their constituents well. But the Communist Party got under 5 percent of the vote and the Russians were absolutely devastated. They couldn't believe it.
Q: At the time you left did you go right into the Foreign Service?

EKERN: They had a system where I went from a Lt. Colonel to FSS, Foreign Service Staff, which did not require an exam. Then there was the Wriston program under which I was pulled in as an officer.

Q: You came in when?

EKERN: It was 1955. I came in as an FSO-3. After the treaty was signed I stay on and helped the transition to normalcy and was transferred January or February, 1956 back to the Department.

DENISE ABBEY
Programmer, Radio Free Austria, USIS
Salzburg (1945-1947)

Educator, Austro-American Institute of Education, USIS
Vienna (1947-1952)

Denise Abbey was hired in 1944 by the Office of War Information to work as an Executive Secretary for the War Information Program (WIP). Her career included positions in Italy, Austria, Germany, and France. Ms. Abbey assisted with radio broadcasts and cultural programs for the successor to the WIP, the USIS. She was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1988.

ABBEY: On the 14th of June, another 14th of June, six of us went in another station wagon bus up over the Brenner Pass and on the way we had a rare experience. We met the German Army in retreat under a couple of MPs. There would be a long train of German vehicles with German officers of every rank in them. And at the front was an MP and at the end was an MP. They were surrendering. They were prisoners of war. That's all the guards there were. We'd have to somehow share the road and get past them. Then we began to overtake the American army going up in trucks, up into Austria and Germany. The trucks would be full of these dusty soldiers sitting there, you know. And the one on the tailgate would look and see the station wagon and yell "girls!" Then everybody in that truck, everybody in the next truck would pick it up and stare and cheer. We went by to a constant stream of greeting and wolf whistles.

Well, we got to the Brenner Pass proper, the line of demarcation, the Americans were in charge. Two weeks later we would turn it over to the French because we shared our territory with them when they demanded to be recognized. But at that time we were in charge. And the man in charge there was absolutely floored. He hadn't had any women through before. We said, we need a restroom. And he was floored again. So he grabbed two MPs and put one on either end of the hall and we used the restrooms.

We had some lunch and went on through the Brenner Pass and went down into Innsbruck and
then turned and went on to Salzburg. We came into Salzburg at sunset, of course, one of the most beautiful sights in the whole world. Salzburg had been bombed a little but not very badly. It had been saved, of course, by the man who later became the head of military government. Because he said like he said of Rothenburg, there's no point. It's not a military place. So only an accidental bomb or two had hit it. One hit the cathedral. We came in there and for once we had a decent hotel. I don't know how it happened. But it did. It was the Bristol Hotel right by the Trinity Church, and we stayed there.

I was assigned, as I say, to the radio section under Hans Cohrssen. Well, I knew nothing about radio. Hans Cohrssen didn't know anything about radio either. And he told Minifie that when Minifie said, will you come to Austria as head of my radio? He said, but I know nothing about radio. And Minifie said, no, but I can trust you. And I soon learned what he meant. Because there was more chicanery, more ex-Nazis doing this and that and the other thing. Because Salzburg was of course the greatest centerpiece of Nazism there was.

But it was true. Hans Cohrssen was and is the finest American citizen I have ever known. He had come from Germany as a young man, brought his family over, married, had two children. Later in Austria he fell in love with an Austrian girl. Instead of just shacking up he went back home, told his wife. They arranged a divorce and to this day he supports members of that family. He married the girl and they have lived very happily ever since. She is a well known actress. And I think they had one or two children at any rate.

Well, going back further. Let me finish on Hans Cohrssen. When he left us a year later he went into the founding of Radio Free Europe and he was with Radio Free Europe for a number of years. He finally did not like their policy and he left them. But he is still working to build up a better radio TV connection between Europe and America, and he has arranged different programs, especially with the culturally inclined U.S. stations.

Q: Has he stayed on then in Austria or Germany ever since that time? He never came back to the States?

ABBEEK: Yes, Hans Cohrssen stayed on. That of course presented certain difficulties in the early days because he was a naturalized citizen. I had occasion to write a letter on two occasions asking that his citizenship not be removed because he was doing a job that was badly needed. And he was such a fine citizen. Then, of course, the law was changed and he was not endangered. He makes his headquarters in Frankfurt. He comes back and forth a great deal. He's over 80 now. But he's still a bundle of energy and that hair is still as bushy as ever. And I imagine he still has the temper. But he is a devoted and dedicated American citizen for the promotion of America. And I have never known a finer one.

He set up the radio in Austria on the 6th of June in 1944. And of course they had nothing to program. But they just had to put something on the air somehow. Now, it was radio in the German language because that's the language of Austria radio under the American control in the American section. Each nation had one. And when we divided our territory and gave France Voralberg and Tyrol they set up radio down there, Radio Dornbirn. The Russians, of course, had the main ones in Vienna. But they also had the whole of the --
Q: *This was in Salzburg?*

ABBEY: No, this was Austria.

Q: *I mean, Salzburg, Austria.*

ABBEY: Salzburg, Austria, yes. That was the American headquarters. We had Salzburg and Upper Austria. And the Russians had Lower Austria and Burgenland and the British had Steiremark and Tarnten. Each section had a radio in German language supervised by that particular country. Salzburg was until that fall the headquarters for Red White Red which then moved to Vienna and has been there ever since and the branch stations continue in Salzburg and Linz.

There was very little programming material available. The Americans came in with records and things. But we found in those stations something which we had never had in America, and that was tape recorders. I became introduced to them the first day I went to work in radio in Austria. They were a source of wonder to us, because we had wire recorders like that. We used great 16 inch records. But the tapes, of course, became the thing and have grown naturally ever since. The thing that Mr. Cohrssen did which was unique and which had a tremendous effect for all America, was that he dreamed up the idea that there was not anywhere in Europe helping all of those thousands, even millions, of lost people who had been separated from their homes, their families, everything, by the German treatment of the Jews and others like that. How were they going to find their people? So he set up what was called Such meldungen. That is searching calls. And three-quarters or more of the programs on Red White Red in the early days consisted of people coming in and saying, I am Hans Friendman. I come from so and so. And they would broadcast that information. And from somewhere the answer would come back. And literally millions of people found their homes, found their people, found some connection through that Such meldungen.

It was first in Austria. It was taken up by other nations because it was too impossibly important.

Q: *Did you then act as the clearing house? Or once you had established the contact between the people, did they find their own way to get back together?*

ABBEY: They found their own way. All we could do was provide a place where they could get the information as to where somebody was or where they were so the people would find out. And that service went on in declining length of period for years. Because they didn't solve the problem anywhere in a hurry.

But our office, and I sat in the middle of that for weeks, was full of people coming in and going to a desk and telling about themselves or saying I'm looking for so and so. We would get letters from America. We are trying to find so and so. We broadcast the information and then passed it on. Mostly it was done by word of mouth and mostly it was done by the people themselves. But we provided a place where it could be broadcast. And shortly after Hans started it then it was done in other countries of Europe, but probably never as greatly and fully as it was done in
Austria because it was our brain child you might say. The "our" is Austrian, not mine.

Q: Did you ever have any tangible expressions of appreciation for this kind of service that was given to you by the Austrians and/or other people that were utilizing your facilities to make these contacts?

ABBEY: We had an endless verbal danke schon (thanks) or danke viel mals (thanks very much). I didn't understand -- it was "dunk a field mouse" to me and I couldn't see what was happening to the poor mouse for months until I found out it was "thank you very much." I'm sure there were written records. But it was a verbal thing. It was an enormous thing. It was an intangible that became tangible more by expression. But there was one young German, Helmut Dantine, who had come over to America as a movie actor. He found his parents through us, and he was so grateful because he had no way -- he couldn't get to the country and find them. Of course, that was one of the major difficulties. There was so little physical contact. That was the main thing.

Q: Did some of the contacts that you established and the people who found each other then come from Germany as well as from Austria? Although technically you were broadcasting over Austrian facilities?

ABBEY: Well, yes. I would say that some did. We were handling for Austria and probably Munich was handling for Munich. But for the people there's very little distinctive line. There's no physical line. And so, yes, we would say we had a certain amount of it. And certainly a lot of the people in Austria would have come from Germany or they would have lost their people in Germany because of the Nazis moving everybody hither and yon. And between the armies and the rest of it. Yes. But we were handling for Austria primarily.

We brought in American programs. We brought in recorded programs. But of course we had to translate. The first thing we did was set up a news program. Of course, Hans's German was flawless. He kept a sharp eye on the news because that would be a place where it could be doctored. And we had a certain amount of problems because we had to have experienced employees, and most of them had been working with the Nazis. And, of course, there "wasn't a Nazi in Austria," in quotation marks. But I'm afraid there were many certainly in intent.

We had certain problems. We would get orders from CIC to fire somebody because he'd been a Nazi. And we had very little recourse. I had one case though where I objected. I received orders to fire the head of my news section and the head of my business section. Those men I knew had been in concentration camps. One had lost a leg there. There was no question about it. So I took the one course that might be open to me. I asked to see the evidence. And the evidence came in the form of telephone monitor clippings because all telephone calls of course were monitored. And I read the clippings. And then I had my answer.

The Americans had restaurants or hotels where any employee of the Army could get a mid-day meal. The main one for our section happened to be in a restaurant called Est! Est! Est! which is from a famous story of this place which has the most wonderful wine: "it is, it is, it is." But the monitor was unaware of that. And all he heard was I'll meet you at the SS. So I said I did not feel that attendance at an army mess hall was occasion for firing him.
Q: They had mistaken that for the SS.

ABBEY: Surely. The monitor simply didn't know that. So when I said I did not feel that dining at an army mess hall was a reason for firing the person, I kept my two people. The programs -- I was shortly after I got there assigned a job of providing one hour a month, an American program which we would create there. And I created them for a couple of years. The first time I did a program called "This Is America."

Q: And you were writing the programs.

ABBEY: Yes. This was something I had never done. But I wrote the program. I had it translated. I had to double over them to be sure they got the translation correct because my German was non-existent. And then I watched the direction of it to be sure that they got it done. And I did "This is America." It was 13 shows, 13 divisions of America including music, history, folklore and other things. And that was one year. The second year I did a series of programs, plays, radio plays, on the -- well, the history of the United States beginning with the first Thanksgiving and working right down through the Matanuska Valley in Alaska and doing a program for each one. As I've said often since then, when I think how many people it takes to make a radio program or a TV program today, and there I sat and did the whole works for a whole country for two years! At any rate, they were appreciated. Some of them were copied and used elsewhere.

The work largely, of course, I had to do it through an interpreter. And that led to something. I wanted then to learn German. And so I was trying very hard. At that time we were having very rapid changes in our commanding officers. General MacCrystal had never come up to Austria. We kept getting this man or that man. And we had a certain Colonel Grogan. And he hauled me on the carpet. I didn't know what I had done. He said, you're learning German. I said, yes. He said, what do you mean by learning German? You've got interpreters. I said, but I have 120 employees almost none of whom speak English. Well, they should work with interpreters. Well, I happen to know how many of the interpreters were ex-Nazis -- if there was an "ex." He didn't flatly refuse to let me learn German. He didn't order me not to. He certainly thoroughly disapproved of it. But I continued to learn German and I went on with it because I didn't see how I could deal with 120 people who didn't speak English if I didn't speak any of their language. And so I did learn to speak German. I made many Austrian friends and learned German with them.

In the end when I came back here [Washington] and had to take the test on foreign languages, I left the instructors so dazed they didn't know what had happened. They had never heard more German in less time, more vocabulary and less grammar in any of their experiences. I'll tell you that I did later have a chance for five years of instruction in the language, and I cleared up a great deal. But I never will speak German perfectly because I learned it by ear. They said why don't you speak more slowly? I said, I can't. I don't know what I'm saying unless I say it fast.

At any rate, I made many Austrian friends and I still have many Austrian friends. I go back almost every year. I was transferred to Vienna finally. And I became associated with the Austro-America Institute of Education which had been founded in 1926 by a Dr. Dengler and still serves
as one of the great sources for exchange between the two countries. I set up a lecture series there, gave courses towards easier English.

I had with me an English woman because all of the Austrians had learned English from English people and the American accent was kind of strange to them. So by having the two of us we could explore the differences in the language. And that is also one of the difficulties when they had learned from this one teacher then they could understand the teacher perfectly but they didn't know what anybody else was saying. So that helped to solve that problem.

I worked with the Austro-American Institute of Education all the years I was in Austria. I have continued ever since then. A group of former American officers in Austria formed the Friends of the Austro-American Institute of Education and Cultural Affairs, Dr. E. Wilder Spalding, D. Emil Spitzer of the International Bank, and Robert Bauer, and others of the group who formed the Friends. I'm meeting with them this Wednesday, as a matter of fact. I'm probably the only survivor of the original group. Because Dr. Spalding has agreed to stay on but Dr. Spitzer is not well enough. And we have tried to promote the better understanding through the Austro-American Institute of Education.

I served in Salzburg that summer temporarily, then I was hastily called up to Vienna again on the 14th of September there's something about the 14th! And I had a funny experience on the way up. They said you have to come. You have to come. We're crazy. Come. Get any transport. So I found a major who was going up to Vienna on Monday and I rode up with him in his jeep. We went through the Russian lines of course, and two or three times between inns and Vienna a Russian soldier came out on the road and held up his hand, touched his wrist and held up five. He would give me $500 for a wrist watch, any watch. I didn't have one to spare. But that was going on and it happened. And it was $500 not $5. The watches were absolutely incredibly in demand. Even Mickey Mouse would have paid a fortune.

I got to Vienna. I went into our office which was in what is now the Wiener Kurier Building. (We founded the Wiener Kurier there) and said here I am! Where's all the work. And Don Minifie who was there in charge looked at me. And he said, oh, yes, yes, yes. Take a letter. And I got a pencil and my book and he said, address it to Colonel Charles Beauchamp, the British Information Officer. And he said, "Dear Charles, thank you for two bottles of mustard." And that was all the work I did for ten weeks. I nearly went mad. So after two or three days finding that there was nothing happening I asked Mr. Minifie if he'd have any objections if I went to Berlitz and took German lessons. He said, no. In fact, I'll go with you. So we went to Berlitz for some weeks.

Then Don had a coronary and he was in the hospital. He had taken ill on the train and was taken to a hospital in Linz. And then they transferred him to Salzburg which was the leading hospital. He had been going to go down to Rome. Because before the war he had been in Rome with his family and they had a lot of stuff in storage and he wanted to get it moved. So I went down to Salzburg to visit him, and I said, Don, would it help any if I went to Rome and supervised the moving? And he said, yes. So I got the orders.

Q: Let me ask you. I'm not quite clear what his position was now.
ABBYEY: Don Minifie had come up as deputy for General MacCrystal, chief of all the PWB which after the war was called ISB -- Information Services Branch.

Q: Was he still in the military at that time?

ABBBEY: No.

Q: He was a civilian.

ABBBEY: Like me he was in uniform but he was a civilian.

Q: I see.

ABBBEY: He was born a Canadian. He came up with the English. And he came up to us because he had served so long in America and General MacCrystal wanted him. I think MacCrystal trusted him. He was a very great patriot. So let me see. I got orders to go down to Rome and I was to pick up material for the Christmas. We were going to make Christmas for the children.

I was given a truck and an American sergeant to drive down to Rome, especially to get oranges for the children for the Christmas party. We drove down to Rome. It was December. We stayed in Rome for three days where I did what I was supposed to do for Don, get his materials. And I also used the Red Cross telephone to telephone home which was very interesting. Because I used my three nights until after midnight sitting there trying to -- not that I didn't have my turn on the phone. But they couldn't get the word through. And finally on the last possible call when they were shutting up shop I did get through. And so I had my Christmas greetings home.

We started back with several crates of oranges and a lot of other surprises and drove up to Florence and then on to Verona. At Verona we stopped on the outskirts of town where there was a gas point, and picked up gasoline. And it was a December night. The moon was rising. Under the tailgate of that truck we heated some water on an alcohol stove. And I thought, well, this is one kind of Romeo and Juliet!

Then we started up and we ran into a snow storm. We were trying to reach a place in the hills, San Silvestro, where there was an Army rest stop. It was snowing heavier and harder and harder. But we somehow found a way, and we finally got to the place. The sergeant in charge was dumbfounded because we were the only people there. And he said, well, you can have all the blankets you want at any rate. And we needed them. Oh, it was cold there. The next morning was brilliant sunshine. We started out and got back on the main highway. That at least was partially cleared.

We had not gone very far when we ran into a convoy, the first convoy of German POWs being returned to Germany over the Brenner, which is the lowest pass. One of the trucks had slid around in the snow, and was off the side. And a large crane by the name of "Violet" was trying to get it out. So the men in charge got their trucks to one side and we went on to the Brenner.
Of course, the French were in charge up there. And they were always very persnickety. They didn't know -- pardon me. We were on the English side of the lines because that was the English side, and they didn't know our credentials. We didn't have this pass they wanted and we didn't have that thing which we should have. First of all the officer wasn't there. He was out at lunch. So we had to wait. Then when he came back he wasn't sure either. All of a sudden a messenger came in. He said, there's a German convoy and it's stuck down the road. And we could have driven a heard of elephants through from that point on. The man just shoved us out and we went on and came down into Austria.

We came to Innsbruck and went on to the French border, and had to stop and produce our papers. By that time it was dark and quite late. Well, not really I suppose. It was six or seven o'clock. But the dark came early. I stayed in the truck, and my driver went in. And I heard motion in the back of the truck. And he came out. And I said, look, somebody's in the back of the truck.

He went back and opened it up. They'd stolen our suitcases and some other things. I didn't know I knew so much French. But I demanded to see the officer in charge. Well, he's gone. I said I demand to see him. I'm an American officer. So finally to get rid of me he took me over. The man was in his bedroom slippers, having dinner with his family. And I just stormed at him -- in French -- here we are allies. I come to you and I get robbed. I said, I was robbed. And I just raved. He finally got on his clothes and got busy. And on the way back to the post my sergeant had found our suitcases on one side. Well, then the man believed me. And he rapped out two or three orders. And I want to tell you in no time at all our things were brought back.

Q: Had they taken any of them?

ABBEEY: Well, they didn't have time for anything. I lost three shirts and what looked like a wallet but was actually a bunch of pictures of my baby nephew. But other than that, the stuff came back. Oh, I was furious. I just raved. I didn't know I knew that much French. And three days later, I must tell you, the French liaison officer in Salzburg came and apologized. We got into Salzburg that night, and we had a wonderful Christmas party and that was all right. I stayed in Salzburg until February of '47 at which point I transferred up to the radio office in Vienna.

Now, when we first came in, in June of '45 the great event in Austria, musical event, had always been the Salzburg Festival. And so we undertook to get it underway somehow and arranged to broadcast it all over Europe. We offered it free. Well, of course, there weren't that many programs. Nobody was going to refuse it. So they managed to put on a Salzburg Festival. We got an American girl to be a pianist. We brought her up from Italy. And she played. So we had an American artist at the thing.

And then the next year, Hans Cohrssen was gone. And I was in charge of the recording and placing of the Salzburg Festival. The third year I went to Belgium and France and London to place it with different radios. And so we did place it there. Of course the festival was improving all the time, and it still was historically very famous.

And then at that fall our chief was down in Italy or someplace like that. And his assistant, whom I will not name for obvious reasons as I go on, called me in the office. He said, Ms. Abbey we're
not satisfied with your work. I'm not going to discharge you but I'm going to transfer you. Since I had just received and was continuing to receive letters from all over Europe thanking for the efficiency with which the Salzburg Festival had been handled and everything else I didn't take him too seriously. But I certainly was not improved in feeling. And then he said you can report to Captain Wilson on Tuesday morning because it was Labor Day weekend.

So I went back to Red White Red and I called my officers together. I said I have been transferred under circumstances which mean I will never enter this office again except on invitation. It has nothing to do with you. But I will never come in here again except on invitation. I cleaned up my whole desk and on Tuesday morning reported to Captain Wilson in what was still called the "prop shop" (propaganda).

But that wasn't the right name for it. But it was the information center in its beginning. Jack Wilson was a man who knew a great deal about publicity and things like that. When I came in he said, Denise, I think you've had a raw deal. I'd like you to enjoy yourself here. What do you want to do? I said, well, what do you need? He said, what I need is an English secretary. I said, I'll do your secretarial work but please don't call me that because it reduces me in rank. And he said, well, no. I'll be grateful. Because I only have a German language secretary.

So I did for two or three days. He gave me a desk in the middle of a very large room which was the reading room of the information center where all the newspapers and books and everything were. We at that time were having between 30 and 60,000 people a month come into that place to get books and magazines or to read the papers. It was the busiest place that I'd imagine.

Q: Now, whose library was this? Was this a native library?

ABBEY: This was the American library. The information center. It was the outgrowth of the old prop shops.

Q: I see.

ABBEY: And the newspapers and the books that we had. And at that time we were just beginning our translation program. They were just beginning to put things out. And we would get the publisher and then he would bring out a book. Then of course we'd keep a certain number of copies in the library and the rest would go on sale.

Q: Now, were they -- the books then that you had were entirely in English up to that point.

ABBEY: Yes, except certain books usually by American authors -- Jack London, Hawthorne, Mark Twain, etc., from German libraries which we put in because, of course, the people didn't speak that much English. But all during the years we kept getting more and more books translated into German. The translation program was really enormous.

Q: Pardon me. But how did they -- you said they had thousands of people coming in. If they didn't understand English what did they get out of it? How did they manage it?
ABBÉY: Two things. The newspapers which we had and the German language newspapers which we were publishing. Of course, we brought them in from different places where they could get American background papers. Then books in English because a lot of people, the older ones especially, did read English. And as the time went on more and more of the young people knew English. And so they came and read them. And then some of them came frankly to keep warm in the winter. We might as well be honest. But they came. And we had a tremendous requirement for the books.

It's rather interesting. The very first book which the Americans put out in German was put out in the newspapers as soon as they started in Austria. It was Gone With the Wind. And it was also the first book we then published. And to this day it remains the most popular book. We never had enough copies on the shelves.

Q: At this point, I gather that all the newspapers that were being published either in Germany or in Austria were those that had been originated after the war by American sponsorship.

ABBÉY: Yes, they were, or by other allies. I don't know if there were any older papers but if there were they were under new management obviously. But mostly they were entirely new names which of course by today are old names. And in Austria we had the Wiener Kurier. It was then the Wiener Kurier. Today it's just the Kurier.

And then we had, of course, papers the British, the French and the others put out so we'd have more variety. And one day, I had not been there very long when Jack Nelson came to my desk and he dropped three big envelopes of photographs on my desk. One thing we were always getting from America were photographs. Also we had a big photographic section which produced quantities of photographs of Austrian activities that had an American association or American background.

What he put on my desk were three big envelopes of 8 X 10s about the aluminum industry. Now, Austria has some of the biggest aluminum deposits in the world. And they had been opened up and were working. And these three envelopes, one was the mines themselves, two was the development and use of it and the third was the transport and export of aluminum.

He said, I want you to make three windows out of that. Well, I'd never made a "window" in my life. And he said, go on. Just take the picture. Make your windows with that. So I sorted the pictures and I worked them out. And I finally sketched out and put on his desk what I planned. And he said, fine. That's your job. Do the windows now.

Well, we had about ten windows in that big corner shop which is right behind the opera in Vienna. And we had that always as the information center until Austria became a nation and we then gave up that big development. But that corner of Karntnerstrasse and the opera was one of the busiest corners in Vienna. And it had these great windows.

He gave me the job and I had a studio. And I had very good artists. I had to design and do the windows. My main project was showing either American influence in Austria or America itself.
Q: You had this position after you had left the radio station?

ABBEY: Yes.

Q: As a result of your having been -- I won't say fired -- from the radio program, you got into this cultural and information work in Vienna.

ABBEY: Yes. Well, now this is where things really began to develop. Because in those days since nobody knew exactly what we were supposed to do, if you had a good idea you could try it. And we did. From those pictures I developed my first windows. And I almost always used pictures in there and something using the pictures. But I soon had a tremendous stock of pictures. And I had a very conscious and conscientious assistant. A German woman by birth, an Austrian citizen then. And she said the teachers are desperate for learning material. Suppose we should set up a loan of these pictures. Because all we do is just collect them by the thousands. And that was all right except of course all the captions were in English. So I soon had a translation section. And we translated all the captions into German and typed them and put them on the racks. Then we notified the teachers and they would come in and they would go through our stacks of pictures and borrow them in quantities and take them out for a week or a month, whatever they needed and bring them back. If I needed more copies then I went to our photographic section. And we ended up with over 60,000 photographs, and an enormous loan section.

Then we had films. They were the American films and almost always, of course, in English, but they were available. So I had a whole film section set up. And we had a little priest who came in who lived in the Russian section. He came in on a bicycle. And he said, I want to borrow films and I will show them in the Russian section. Marvelous. So he did. And when we wrote up our annual report we were so pleased to tell about how the little priest from Stinkenbrunnen had done all this work. And we got a rap from headquarters. You don't have to be funny about a serious thing. Funny about Stinkenbrunnen? Means just what it sounds like of course. But it was the real name of the place, we couldn't change it. There's an Oberstinkenbrunnen. So we wrote back and said that we were not going to make a liar out of the man.

Q: Were these all commercial American films?

ABBEY: They were documentaries.

Q: I see.

ABBEY: All documentaries. We didn't have any what you would call commercial films, or entertainment films, at all. They were coming into the Austrian market very slowly because, of course, of the language problem. But later they did get them translated, and they did commercially bring them out. But ours were in English and they were documentaries, but of many, many kinds.

Q: How did you manage to make them comprehensible to the Austrians? Was there over voicing?
ABBEEY: No, they were just played. Usually the person who took them explained about them. The people were so fascinated. And the pictures -- documentaries are so often self-explanatory. In some cases I think we did put a photo with it or a sheet with it to cover material. But it was generally speaking they just were hungry for films. They were hungry for books.

Then another program was started and I had a double hand in that. Warren Robbins, who later was the founder of the African Museum here was one of our cultural officers there. And he started a magazine for teachers of English. It was a small publication but it was very, very popular, and we had really a tremendous list.

He came to me one day and he said, Denise, would you do a section in English for the younger people? Of course all my life I'd wanted to write and that thrilled me. So I did. And I named our section "Young People." Not a children's or things like that. Because young people of any age can read that, and we often saw it in the hands of old men and old women, young people. I put that out for two years. Then in the book translation section they decided that they would do a special section on children's books. And that is a whole field. Let me see how I'll start with that.

HUGH G. APPLING
Consular Officer
Vienna (1947-1950)

Hugh Appling was born and raised in California. He received a bachelor's degree in biology from the University of California at Berkeley and then served in the U.S. Army. In 1945, Mr. Appling entered Stanford University for graduate studies in political science. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Austria, the United Kingdom (England), Germany, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, and Washington, DC. Mr. Appling was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Your first assignment was to Vienna. It must have been a fascinating time to be there.

APPLING: It was romantic, right out of a Strauss operetta. Then again, "The Third Man" was not just a movie to us either.

The city was in terrible state, the two winters after the war were cruel, the economy was in a desperate state, the Russians occupied the half of the country and were beginning to be very disagreeable about it.

The work atmosphere was wonderful, especially for me, the most junior officer. We still had a staff small enough that we could participate in everything. We could go to the opera for 35 cents, and there was a PX for the necessities. Our two children were both born in Vienna. Those were effervescent years for us. Minister Jack Erhardt was the Chief of Mission. He was particularly concerned in developing young officers. He and Mrs. Erhardt were disciplinarians, and had
codes of behavior that were to be observed, but they were gentle, happy people.

Q: How did the legation view the Soviets at that time?

APPLING: Interesting point. We really crossed the line. I came into the Service with the dream that, with the end of the war we could build a peaceful new world. However, while we were in Vienna, the Soviets began to destroy the free governments of Eastern Europe. One of my assignments concerned care for those who crawled under the barbed wire at night and to get them into shelter. My view of the situation changed so much.

I'm still embarrassed by the following story but three years after I went home, a service club of my hometown asked me to speak at a dinner. I spoke of the immense Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and what they had done to free institutions there. I guess I overdid it because our hometown newspaper came out the next day with the big black letters stating "Appling PREDICTS WAR". I was not particularly worried about the Oakdale Leader getting to the State Department, but....(laughter).

The world view changed as we entered the Cold War period. The obstinacy of the Soviets destroyed the dreams of others and we were face to face with them during that change.

FRANK E. MAESTRONE
Consular Officer
Vienna (1948-1949)

Ambassador Frank Maestrone was a military government officer in Wurzburg, Germany at the end of World War II. He entered the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included positions in Vienna, Austria; Hamburg, Germany; Khorramshahr, Iran; Cairo, Egypt; and an ambassadorship to Kuwait. Ambassador Maestrone was interviewed by Ambassador Horace G. Torbert on June 6, 1989.

Q: In your first posting in Vienna in 1948-49, you were present when the occupation ended and the Austrian peace treaty was concluded. Could you reminisce a bit about U.S.-Soviet relations in Vienna and the general political atmosphere from an American Embassy perspective?

MAESTRONE: The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Vienna were cool but correct, in that we were already entering, more or less, the period of the Cold War, although people, perhaps, didn't really appreciate that this was occurring. We were, for example, at the legation. This was an American legation at the time. We had not exchanged ambassadors with Austria, because Austria had been a small country. It's only after the war that every small country had to have its relations elevated to the level of embassies.

We were, for example, not permitted to travel freely through the Soviet occupied zone of Austria. We had to obtain a gray card from the Soviet authorities, which had to be applied for
and generally, at least a week ahead of time, if you wanted, say, to drive down to the American zone in Salzburg, for example. Sometimes it was given to you fairly readily, and other times, it was a delay that might cause you to cancel your plans. The members of the legation were recommended not to venture into the Soviet zone unless they were doing this, of course, on official business.

So relations were rather tense, but not overly so, at the time. One was suspicious of the Soviet intentions even at that time, in that particular area.

Q: It has been said that first the American occupation government, then later the American diplomats, dealt with former Nazis, Austrian Nazis, because they seemed to be able to pull the reins of government together a little easier than those who didn't have experiences. What was your view, at that point, in terms of the Austrians with whom you had to work?

MAESTRONE: Well, in the first place Austria was not an occupied country in the same sense as Germany. It was considered a liberated country, at least by the Western Allies. I assume the Soviets subscribed to that as well, although they carried out their occupation as they felt that they needed to, in the same way that they did in Germany.

The political situation there was pretty much dominated by socialists, so that there was very little role for any former Austrian Nazis. I don't recall that being a problem in Austria. Of course, we did not have the kind of control that we had in Germany and where we, for example, could legislate law number eight, which set standards for the employment of German Nazis, particularly in government positions, etc. You have to remember that under the circumstances in Austria, there was an Austrian government actually functioning. Germany was quite different. It was divided into separate zones. There was no central authority.

CLINTON L. OLSON
Economic Officer
Vienna (1948-1952)

Ambassador Clinton L. Olson was born in South Dakota in 1916 and moved to California when he was 15 years old. He received a bachelor’s from Stanford University. While pursuing an MBA in graduate school at Stanford, Ambassador Olson was called into active duty as a U.S. Army Reserve Officer in 1941. His Foreign Service career included positions in Austria, Iran, Russia, Martinique, England, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Ambassador Olson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 17, 1996.

Q: What was your first assignment?

OLSON: Vienna.

Q: This was the high time of Vienna, wasn’t it?
OLSON: This was the "Third Man" days.

Q: There's a movie called "The Third Man." Could you tell me somewhat about the atmosphere there and what you were doing?

OLSON: My first job was as an Economic Officer in the East-West Trade Control. I was involved in that always.

Q: When were you there?

OLSON: I was there from 1948 to the end of 1952.

Q: So the Cold War had started. Czechoslovakia had happened, NATO was put together.

OLSON: The Cold War was very much there and Vienna was a tricky place to live in at that time. Especially if you were doing the kind of work that I was doing in the East-West Trade Control. I've got some newspaper articles there from those days in Vienna in which the Communist press were always attacking me. I became known as "Marshall Commissar."

Q: Did that feel a little bit ironic? You had moved from trying to push supplies into the Soviet Union to keeping supplies out of the Soviet Union.

OLSON: That was a bit ironic.

Q: How old were you when you started in 1948?

OLSON: I was 32 years old.

Q: At that time, we didn't have an Ambassador there, did we?

OLSON: No, we had a Minister, Jack Earhart. Well, of course, we had military occupation and we had a Military High Commissioner, Lieutenant General Jeffrey Keyes, and the legation was operated as a normal diplomat establishment, except there was a big argument about who was really in charge. Was it the Military High Commissioner or was it the Minister? It was sort of left in the open as to what they would be. I got really involved in that because I was made Political Advisor to the Military High Commissioner. I spoke pretty good Russian at that point. During the Russian attempts to take over Austria. I was up to my ears in that. I was Political Advisor to Lieutenant General Keyes. That used to drive my diplomatic colleagues crazy in the Embassy because I had the simulated rank of Major General and I was a class five Officer. There were some people who didn't appreciate that very much.

Q: How did Keyes approach the situation in Austria? It was a divided country the same way Germany was at that point into zones.

OLSON: We had five zones, British, French, American, Russian, and Vienna. The control of the
latter changed every month; it was rotated. The Russians were very much in control of their area. There were shootouts every night all over the place.

Q: Who was shooting at whom?

OLSON: Russian agents against American agents and British and French. Did you see the movie "The Third Man?"

Q: Yes.

OLSON: That's the way it was. We dragged bodies out of the Danube canal practically every morning. It was like the Wild West.

Q: What was Keyes' approach to this whole situation?

OLSON: As the U.S. High Commissioner, his mandate was to just be in charge, to represent the Americans in all of Austria, but to be in charge of the American zone. And to meet with the other Commanders of divided Vienna and governing Vienna. The so-called High Commission. They had a very well-organized arrangement. They had a Secretariat for signals for all of the military aspects, for transportation, for all of the different functions.

Q: When you were wearing your other hat at one time or another of working on East-West Control Trade, where would you get your information?

OLSON: We had a good intelligence operation there. The best was with the Intercept System. Intercepts of all communications! This information was screened and we got so we could read between the lines on those beautifully.

Q: Your job is really much more of an Intelligence Analyst than doing the traditional economic job of going around and visiting people and talking to them.

OLSON: Yes, exactly.

Q: I'm surprised that you didn't get absorbed into the CIA during this period.

OLSON: Well, I was offered a fairly senior appointment in the CIA when I left the Army. But I had had two years of leading a double life in Iran and I decided that wasn't for me.

ROBERT B. HOUSTON
Consular Officer
Vienna (1949-1953)

During World War II, Robert Houston was a radio engineer at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, DC. He entered the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in Accra, Ghana; Bremen, Germany; Vienna,
Austria; Edinburgh, Scotland; Warsaw, Poland; Vancouver, Canada; Sophia, Bulgaria; Moscow, Russia, Helsinki, Finland; and Washington, DC. In 1961, Mr. Houston received a master's degree in Soviet and Eastern European Studies from the University of Indiana. He was interviewed by Ambassador Horace G. Torbert in 1990.

HOUSTON: I was in what now would be called the consular cone, although they did not have cones in those days. I had been assigned to two consulates and while I was now in an embassy I was in the consular section of the embassy. I was specifically the officer in charge of the visa part of the consular section. The supervising consul then was Bill Affeld, an officer I very much admired who did a lot to steer me out of trouble in Vienna. Vienna was beginning, in those days, to be part of the exodus route for refugees from Eastern Europe. A Refugee Relief Program was established there, primarily, I guess, to get around what was seen in Washington as the slow-moving pace of normal consular work. We performed a full range of consular activities. Vienna was an exciting place to be in in those days. The inner city of Vienna was still under Four-Power occupation, with a different one of the Four Powers assuming control every month. There were appropriate military ceremonies, bands, the hoisting and lowering of flags, parades and so forth. Vienna was the center for spy activities in those days, the Third Man film came out, and it was really an exciting place. Plus, Vienna is one of the most charming cities, I think, to be assigned to. It was still suffering from the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire, a city without a real mission in those days. Being behind the Soviet lines, tourism had not really developed. You could still get a seat at the opera for a dollar. I remember at the Rathauskeller, run by a fellow with the name of Otto Kaserer. So his initials were "OK" and one could get an "OK" steak dinner for one dollar -- 26 schillings, which is what the dollar bought in those days. A delightful place to be. Of course, don't try to go there today and try to get a dinner for a dollar. We went back to Vienna several times since then, and we know how it has changed -- still a delightful city, however.

Q: You stayed until the end of 1953.

HOUSTON: Before we left, I was reminded of some of the work I had done in Bremerhaven regarding shipping. I was brought back to the U.S., at the expense of the Justice Department, to appear as a witness at a trial in the Federal Court House in Alexandria, Virginia. Some surplus merchant ships had been sold, and the law required that these merchant ships be sold to American companies. It was alleged in this trial that foreign companies hiding behind American dummies has purchased some of these ships. It so happened that one of these allegedly foreign-controlled ships put into Bremerhaven during my time and there had some crew trouble. I had written what was called a despatch in those days reporting the crew trouble. When the Justice Department was researching how to make a case, they came across this despatch and decided that I would make a fine witness to put on the stand. The Court House in Alexandria was not air conditioned, and this trial was in July. The judge and jury, the Justice Department feared, might have a tendency to doze off in the afternoon if the testimony were dull. I was kept as their surprise witness to be used if it looked like the judge was dozing. This was perhaps the only time that any of my reporting work in the Foreign Service had any impact. [Laughter]

Sure enough, I was put on the witness stand when they thought the judge was dozing. The defense lawyer, as I recall, got up and said, "I object to all this hearsay testimony". I was able to
beat him down, saying that I had been on the ship, I had seen the ship's articles under which this foreign crew had been signed on, etc. Later on the Justice people told me I had been a very valuable witness. It does show the untold consequences of something you write, sometimes it may mean something.

HORACE G. TORBERT
Coordinator of Intelligence
Vienna (1950-1954)

Ambassador Horace G. Torbert grew up in Washington, DC. He received a bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1932 and attended Harvard Business School. His Foreign Service career included positions in Vienna, Rome, Budapest, Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Somalia and Bulgaria. Ambassador Torbert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988.

Q: I notice that you were closely involved with Austrian affairs, really from 1950 until 1955, both in Vienna and then as principal officer in Salzburg.

TORBERT: Then for two or three years in the Department.

Q: Yes. What was the situation in Vienna at the time, and what were you doing within that framework?

TORBERT: I went to Vienna, again assigned theoretically as an economic officer, and arriving in early October 1950. The timing was that the commanding general who had been the High Commissioner for Austria was just leaving, and a civilian High Commissioner, who was going to be Walter Donnelly, who was not there yet, was on his way in. I drove in with my family from Spain, having gone back there to pick up a car, and as we drove down the road, we listened to reports of Communist demonstrations and riots in Vienna, which didn't sound very healthy as a place to be bringing a wife and two small children. But we kept on going, and got there.

As it turned out, the Communist strike was stubbornly resisted by most of the Austrians, with a little help from the Western powers, particularly us. The strikes fizzled, and there never was a serious threat to the stability of the coalition government in Austria after that.

Q: Austria was still in different zones.

TORBERT: Austria was an occupied country. Our zone was the sort of center of Austria, with its headquarters in Salzburg. The British had the southern part of Austria south of the Kaertner Alps, with headquarters in Klagenfurt. The French had the Alpine part of the Tyrol and the Voralberg, with headquarters in Innsbruck. The Soviets had everything east of Linz and north of the Kaertner Alps, so that they surrounded Vienna. Their headquarters was in Baden.

When I got to Vienna, as I say, Donnelly had not yet arrived. Walter Dowling was in charge, and...
we were just about to take over an absolutely immense occupation government, which involved something like 3,500 civilian Americans. There was a small American military group in Vienna, also British and French and Soviet. It was a quadripartite city, but just at the edge of the city was completely surrounded by the Soviet zone. Of course, the Korean War had just started a few months previous. We were feeling probably unduly excited, and a lot of people got very nervous.

I arrived with the assignment, technically, as an economic officer, but very soon after I got there, "Red" Dowling asked me to go to a briefing session with the military with him, with a military G-2, who was a very able officer who, on retirement, spent a long term in the CIA. He told Dowling that he thought it was absolutely imperative that he have a coordinator for intelligence, because there were so many intelligence activities in the town. He said, "Do you have anybody that can do that?" And Dowling said, "Yes, Torbert here." And this was the first I had heard of it. I knew nothing about intelligence. I was thunderstruck, but it sounded interesting. I started in and organized it on a very small scale.

As I say, the atmosphere was a little difficult at the time. Intelligence was certainly the largest single industry of Vienna.

Q: As seen in the movie The Third Man.

TORBERT: The Third Man, I think, had just come out, or it was about to come out. It came out after we got there, but it was about that time. It was, of course, romantic, but the atmosphere was very much there.

One of our early problems during that winter -- Donnelly arrived a few weeks after I did, and we set up business. We only had, I think, about a dozen Foreign Service officers to take over and manage this whole thing. The military, about that time, ordered all their dependents home because of the Korean War and this caused a good deal of uneasiness in the Austrian population. I remember one device that Walter Donnelly, who was a very great leader, tried. He wasn't one of the most profound foreign affairs men that we ever had, but he had a great sense of leadership and color -- and the first thing he did when he felt the uneasiness growing was to enter his two daughters in dancing school, and let the word get around that he had done so. This was a very significant thing, because in the first place, dancing school was something the Viennese all appreciated. This gave them sort of a sense that at least the civilian part of our mission was there to stay.

I worked very hard at trying to get a handle on this whole problem. I identified about thirty more or less autonomous U. S. intelligence units operating in or through Austria. The CIA was just being reorganized and consolidated. They had two branches, one of which was the psychological warfare and dirty tricks department, and the other was collection of intelligence. They were unified shortly after I started under a very able officer named John Richardson. The man who had been in charge of the other department of it was Laughlin Campbell, who still lives here in Washington, who I see a lot and became a lifelong friend.

Q: We're talking about in Vienna.
TORBERT: In Vienna. Vienna was important from the intelligence point of view, not only for what went on there, but because of all of the things that went on through Vienna. We were right in the middle of Eastern Europe. A lot of defectors and many refugees, of course, came out that way. I got a little bit over being scared by going up in December on a trip to Germany, to inspect their immense establishment which was supposed to compare to mine. I think they had 50 or 60 officers working for the man who was my counterpart up there. I had, at that time, nobody except a secretary. (Laughter) Eventually I got two or three people, but I never had a very big staff.

When I got to Germany, I met people in Frankfurt, which was then the headquarters, ladies saying, "How are we ever going to get back across the Rhine if there's an attack?" (Laughter) Then I went to Berlin and found everybody was quite calm there. So I decided there wasn't any point in fussing about that, and from then on, I and my family were reasonably confident. We were reasonably comfortable psychologically, and I can't say we ever had a problem.

Our job in Vienna developed to where I was almost chief of staff for the High Commissioner, because I was monitoring all of the political, intelligence reporting, propaganda activity and, in a sense, security. Eventually I became the Assistant Deputy High Commissioner, which meant that I presided at some of the High Commission meetings.

At that time, Vienna was the only country in which we were meeting regularly with the Soviets. The quadripartite arrangements in Germany had broken down, but for some reason, the Soviets were willing to continue them there. Every month while I was there, we had a meeting of the Allied High Commission preceded by the meetings of executive committee and various subcommittees. It was an exercise on our part in trying to keep the Austrian Government able to run Austria, because some bright man early on -- and several people have claimed credit for this -- had put in our agreement with the Soviets that anything the Austrian Government decided on would be all right, unless it was vetoed unanimously by the Allied Control Commission.

Our object was to take any question that the Soviets raised and bury it as far down as possible in the bureaucratic process of the High Commission subcommittees. Then when it got up to the top of the High Commission, if it was something that we didn't want, we'd all vote against it, the British and French, and then we tried to construct the record. We had an agreement that we never published anything until it was finally acted on by the High Commission itself, the top body. But then we would blast out as a propaganda exercise in the Wiener Kurier, which was the biggest newspaper in Austria, which we operated at that time, and on the radio network, and tried to gain psychological advantage from it.

A great deal of this operation during this time was a matter of psychological warfare.

Q: Aimed at the Austrian population?

TORBERT: Well, aimed not only at the Austrian population, but at the international population, the world population, really, the whole European population, I would have to say. Because the Soviets liked to use Vienna and Berlin as seats for their great popular movements, such as the World Peace Council. You name it, they had an international group for almost everything. They tried to have big meetings, usually run by a noncommunist, but a fellow traveler. We would
spend time trying to make those meetings as ineffective as possible, actually, in one case, trying to prevent people going through Austria, Western fellow travelers, for meetings in Berlin and other Eastern European countries.

So there was a lot of work along that line, which I worked on myself as far as the oversight went and the embassy could do anything about it, and also worked closely with the various intelligence agencies. I got quite close.

Of course, we had a great many problems. Our job was to keep the Austrian Government in control of Austria, pending negotiation of the state treaty, which was being negotiated for many, many years, and was finally concluded just at the end of my stay in Salzburg later on.

In late 1952, Walter Donnelly was moved up to Bonn as ambassador and the high commissioner there, and Tommy Thompson came in from Italy. This started one of the great friendships of my life, because he was my man that I worshiped. I was very fond of Donnelly, too, but Thompson was the *par excellence* diplomat, for my money, and we became very good personal friends. I was a godfather to one of his daughters, so this was a great relationship for me.

He came in, and he had, before he came, already picked Dick (Richard Hallam) Davis to be political counselor of the embassy, which, in effect, was the job I was filling, although I didn't have the title. But we got so well acquainted, he said, "Dick is coming," and I couldn't agree more. Dick was an absolutely great man, and I got to be a good friend, too. He later died rather early, unfortunately, of a heart attack, but he was a good Kremlinologist, spoke fluent Russian, fluent German, and was a great fellow.

I, incidentally, didn't speak a word of German, had never taken a course in it when I arrived there. Of course, this was one of the great disadvantages in having to expand the Foreign Service so fast. I studied German madly, but I never really mastered it until after I left there, and then it got to be fairly useful.

But anyway, Tommy said, "We need somebody down in western Austria, U.S. military headquarters in Salzburg, to provide liaison political advice." One of my three titles was POLAD to the commanding general, who at that time was a fellow named Duke Arnold.

*Q: POLAD is the acronym for political advisor.*

TORBERT: Political advisor to the commanding general, which was not a well-known concept at that time, although, in effect, Bob Murphy had had it for Eisenhower during the war, and there were some others, but it later became a regular thing. I was given that job, plus a sort of working supervision of our zone of Austria, that is, relations with land (state) governors and that sort of thing. And, also, to run the consular establishment, although I had always a very good officer, first Oscar Holder, who was killed in an air crash in the Himalayas a few years later, and Frank Maestrone, who followed him. They ran the consulate, which, it's hard to believe now, was even one of our largest visa mills in the world. There were about 4 or 5 million refugees in Austria at one time, they weren't all there at one time, I guess, but they went through there. It was a big job. I didn't have anything to do, really, with the running mechanics of the consulate, but I did have a
lot to do with working with the voluntary agencies, AJDC, National Catholic Welfare and various others. There were about 15 of them, really, altogether. It's one of the most politically loaded welfare activities there ever was, and there was always a great deal of in-fighting between agencies, so it was a diplomatic job.

Also at that time, the Salzburg Seminar, which is one of the most successful of American cultural efforts abroad, was just getting organized. It had been going for two or three years, and although I didn't have too much to do with that, I did help them out occasionally on some of their problems. It was a meeting place for future leaders, many of whom got to high places both in Western Europe and eventually in Eastern Europe. So that was interesting. Anyway, after home leave in the summer of '53, I was there in Salzburg doing that.

The summer of 1955, one of the last things that I did was to go down to Vienna to be present, at least, at the occasion of the signing of the state treaty. As you know, the Soviets finally agreed and finally gave up all their opposition, although there was a very difficult ending negotiation which Tommy Thompson completed brilliantly, which formed the state treaty and made Austria an independent country.

WILLIAM LLOYD STEARMAN
Political Officer
Vienna (1950-1955)

Dr. William Lloyd Stearman was born in Wichita, Kansas in 1922. He studied math and history at the University of California at Berkeley. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Navy in the Southwest Pacific. Following the war, he attended the Graduate School of International Affairs in Geneva, Switzerland. He joined the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in Vienna, Berlin, Bonn, and Saigon. He served on the National Security Council in 1971 and in 1981. He also served as Deputy Assistant Director for International Affairs at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Dr. Stearman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: You were in Austria from 1950-53. What were you doing there?

STEARMAN: Actually I spent a lot of time in Austria from 1948 on. I was transferred to Berlin in 1955. I had a fascinating job in Vienna. I was in the political section and represented the U.S. in a subcommittee of the Political Directorate dealing and negotiating with the Soviets. I did that for four and a half years. I also started something which became quite an operation, to help both our people and correspondents to report on Eastern Europe. I set up my own sort of peripheral reporting operation. There was a classified and an unclassified part. The unclassified part I made available to the press. I would say at one time that little office, with a very small staff, was, at any given time, the source of about a third of everything that appeared in the non-communist press in the world on Eastern Europe.
Q: How did that operate? Where did you get your information?

STEARMAN: I set up a little FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) operation. We got newspapers from our various legations and embassies behind the Iron Curtain. I had a small staff of people who translated interesting press items. We also did some radio monitoring. In addition, we had an unbelievable source of intelligence and information. Because of a Four Power arrangement, there was agreement that all communications going outside of Austria to any foreign country would be monitored by all four powers who got transcripts of everything, letters, telephone conversations, and telegrams. So we got copies of all of this coming out of Eastern Europe. Then we had many refugee interrogation reports. I would take these items and sanitize them. I would delete the names of all the parties on both ends or anything that would identify them. But the information was still there and now being unclassified, could be used by correspondents or anyone else.

Then I set up an unclassified archive. This was useful not only to the media, but also to government agencies like VOA, etc. For example, there was a mine accident in Hungary, the AP wanted to report on it, so they sent over a messenger, and I gave him a file on mining in Hungary, most of it from Hungarian sources. With all this material they could do an in-depth story, after which the file was returned.

Every single day of the year, Reuters’ worldwide service carried at least one piece from us on events in Eastern Europe. It was a shoestring operation, cost the USG practically nothing and was remarkably successful.

Q: Did you think what you were doing was appreciated by the powers-to-be in Austria and back in Washington? Did they understand how useful this was?

STEARMAN: Not fully, because it was so unorthodox. The main reason I did this was because correspondents were trying to cover Eastern Europe from Vienna, and I realized that if they could be helped, it could substantially increase the coverage and knowledge of Eastern Europe. But bureaucrats have little appreciation for unorthodox procedures and operations -- I am sure you have found that out a long time ago -- this operation was well known in Vienna, and it was widely called the "Stearman Service" by unhappy authorities in Eastern Europe. It was giving them problems.

Q: Speaking of the Soviets, you worked for four and a half years dealing with them in trying to settle issues. What kind of issues were you working on and how did you find one dealt with this group of officials?

STEARMAN: That is a very good question. You learn a lot in that length of time about how to deal with the Soviets. I came up with what I call an original Stearmanism: You had to be precise, patient, perseverant and powerful to deal with the Soviets. This required an enormous amount of patience. I remember once arguing for six hours on whether there should be a comma or hyphen between two words which would substantially change the whole meaning of the sentence. But you have to slug it out with them and be persistent. I would come in with a couple of bottles of soda water...I was a pipe smoker then and would also pull out three or four pipes, and they knew
I was settled in for the day. They would try to wear you down. But you have to persevere and also be precise. Most of the problems we had dealing with Soviets were the result of imprecision in agreements that we concluded with them. They were not bad about observing the exact letter of agreements, I will say that, but we were very sloppy in the way in which we formulated a lot of agreements.

I never realized what our problem was until at one point I was going to buy a house here in Georgetown and I looked at the contract as if I were dealing with Russians. I rewrote the whole thing because I thought there were a lot of loopholes in the contract, even though it was written by lawyers. As a result, I lost the house. I later asked a lawyer how the real estate lawyers could draft a contract with so many loopholes in it. He replied, "Well, we have a concept in English common law called equity. These things are resolved through the concept of equity. We don't have to dot all the i's and cross all the t's." I then realized where we had gone wrong. The people who draft these treaties and agreements are our friends from L for the most part.

Q: "L" being the Legal Division of the Department of State.

STEARMAN: They are lawyers trained in the American concept of English common law with its principle of equity. So, I believe, they didn't think they had to dot all the i's and cross all the t's, but dealing with the Soviets, you had to; so it was finally revealed to me much later what our problem had probably been all along.

Here are specific examples of how precision can work for us and imprecision against us. Our access to Berlin was never spelled out in great detail because it was assumed that, if we were going to have a sector of occupation in Berlin, obviously we would have a right of access to it. This was thinking in American legal terms. This imprecision, however, made it easier for the Soviets to impose a blockade in 1948 because technically they weren't violating any written agreement. We did, however, have an agreement on air access, for reasons I never fully understood, which was a detailed, good agreement. This may be one of the reasons the Soviets didn't try to block air access to Berlin in 1948. General Clay's people dealt with that situation in Berlin. Clay thought detailed agreements on Berlin would be too restrictive.

But as far as Vienna was concerned we took the opposite approach. We had one of the brightest general officers in the US Army, Alfred Gruenther.

Q: He was later chief of NATO.

STEARMAN: Exactly. He took the opposite approach. He really crossed the t's and dotted the i's as far as access to Vienna was concerned. This may well be why we didn't really have the access and other problems with the Soviets we had in Berlin. We did have a few minor problems with the Soviets trying to interfere with access, but we could always nail them because we had such a tight access agreement.

At one point early on, they were stopping and boarding our train...the Mozart Express which ran between Vienna and Salzburg in the American Zone. In early 1946, the American High Commissioner told the Soviet High Commissioner that they must cease and desist from doing
this. Once, in January, 1946, when the train had to stop in the Soviet Zone to take on water, a party of Soviet troops boarded headed by a senior lieutenant and two enlisted men. That car was guarded by Tech Sergeant Shirley B. Dixon of Toledo, Ohio, who ordered them to get off the train and stay off. One of the officers made the mistake of reaching for his revolver and Dixon beat him to the draw and shot and killed him, badly wounded another soldier and the other Soviets ran away. That was the last time they tried to board a U.S. train in Austria.

We had also some early interference with air access to Vienna because that was not spelled out in as great detail as it was with Berlin. Our High Commissioner said that if there was any further interference with U.S. flights, we were going to escort all our planes with fighter aircraft ordered to shoot down interfering aircraft. Soviet air interference immediately ceased.

Now, this all demonstrated how to deal with the Soviets. We had many tests of will. One had to be tough. You have to have at least the willpower, if not actually military power, which, in our case, was evaporating rapidly as you know. By 1947, the West didn't have one single combat ready infantry division in Western Europe. We had only constabulary forces. By 1947, all the Red Army needed to reach the English Channel were shoes, as the wags were wont to say. All of this is germane to what we were discussing because that was the atmosphere which was one of the overweening Soviet military strength in Europe. We did not have the feeling that the atom bomb gave us that much of an advantage. I learned many years later that we had no atom bombs at that time, and I believe the Soviets knew that.

Q: I think we were all a little overconfident, but we really didn't have any.

STEARMAN: From Nagasaki to rather late 1947, we had no atom bombs at all. We assembled two for tests on Bikini Atoll in 1946, but apart from that, we had no assembled atom bombs in our inventory. The United States in 1947 did not have one combat ready infantry division, nor one combat ready Air Force wing. We had gone from 13 million in uniform in 1945 to 1.7 million in twenty months. So we unilaterally disarmed. This weakness was felt in Europe and was, I believe, one of the factors that encouraged the communists to take over Czechoslovakia.

Q: What was the atmosphere at the embassy? What did people think of Soviet intentions?

STEARMAN: We didn't think that their intentions were very benign as far as we and the rest of the West was concerned. There was considerable worry. When the Marshall Plan was announced and agreed to, the Soviets waged war against it by forming the Cominform in 1947 and by fomenting strikes, riots and disturbances in France and Italy through the local communist parties. That was a very, very disturbing time.

Q: Were you looking towards the elections in Italy in 1948?

STEARMAN: That was a turning point and was extremely important. Many of us went down for that. The Christian Democrats won, but the Communist Party was extremely strong. The Communists, in a way, had blotted their copy book, by so obviously acting as Soviet catpaws and by trying, principally for political reasons, to carry out actions mainly aimed at overthrowing the government. The concept of the Marshall Plan was a popular one because these countries
were in such terrible shape. The Communists in France and Italy didn't cover themselves with glory and their putsch attempts had largely fizzled by the end of January, 1948. Then the Soviet offensive against Western Europe had failed. The Soviets then began to be concerned about holding on to that over which they had already established hegemony. The events of 1948 can be read as a process of consolidation. This began in February, 1948 with the Prague coup, which was engineered in large measure behind the scenes by the Soviets. The Czechs had initially accepted the Marshall Plan. I happened to be in Prague in June, 1947 when the Czechs were told that they had to withdraw from it. That was the first time most Czechs realized how much influence the Soviets still had. Stalin was no doubt convinced that he had to get Czechoslovakia under tighter control. Then you had Soviet pressure on Tito to allow the infiltration of his institutions by the NKVD and also to set up joint stock companies as had been done in Romania. At that time, Tito was actually the most militant communist leader in Europe, was very loyal to Moscow and the one who was giving us the most problems...

Q: Shooting down our planes.

STEARMAN: You are right. A couple of our planes were shot down near Trieste, two unarmed transport planes. His troops went into Austria, and we and the Brits were about to do battle with them when Stalin told him to pull the troops out of Austria. He was the idol of the young left throughout Western Europe. Left-oriented students, especially young women, even built little altars to Tito. He had this international railroad and all these kids...

Q: They were working on the railroad and the road there too.

STEARMAN: Yes, it was the international youth railroad to Sarajevo. A fellow student, who was the daughter of the President of the Chase Manhattan Bank, got pneumonia there from sleeping in unheated box-cars.

Q: Well, a Foreign Service officer, Owen Roberts, worked on it.

STEARMAN: Tito had great appeal. He was a real activist, aggressive and, in a way, more Stalinist than Stalin. Then, as you know, he was thrown out of the Cominform in June, 1948.

I was on the Orient Express going to Vienna and in the compartment next to me was Jacques Duclos, who was head of the French Communist Party and was going to the conference in Bucharest that excommunicated Tito. Try as I would, I couldn't get in to see him. He had a six foot three body guard who kept us all away from him.

I was in Prague just after Tito's excommunication and there he was a big hero. The Yugoslav student brigades which had been in Czechoslovakia, were marching around and everywhere were greeted with flowers and cheers. This was one way the Czechs could defy Moscow.

Then there was also Soviet pressure on Finland in February, 1948. About the time of the excommunication of Tito the Soviets began the full imposition of the Berlin blockade, which had started piecemeal six months earlier.
There is an interesting little sidelight to this. As you know, there has been a long standing debate as to whether the blockade could have been broken with ground forces. Clay wanted to go in with tanks before we resorted to an airlift. Truman ruled this out; however, Clay may have been proven right by an interesting little incident that occurred in 1948 on the border between the British and Soviet Zones of Austria. Just before the Berlin blockade, the Soviets began imposing new restrictions on British troop transit from their zone in southern Austria to Vienna. The Soviets insisted on IDs with photographs, which apparently the British didn't have. So they started to prevent the British from going up to Vienna. I believe, they were going to see if the Brits could be intimidated, and if so, they would later try it with the Americans. Anyway, that is my conjecture.

The first time they were challenged by the Soviets, the British turned back. The second time, however, they came up with a long convoy of troops in battle dress and tin hats, to the Soviet barrier with the British captain in charge in the cab of the lead truck. Again the Soviets raised the identification issue and refused to let them through. The captain then came out to the side of the column and commanded, "Fix bayonets!" and all up and down the line there was the click, click of bayonets being fixed to rifles. Then he walked up to the Soviet barrier, lifted it and the convoy went through without further incident. That was the last time the Soviets tried to block a British convoy.

This incident tends to lead one to believe that if we had tried that on the ground in Germany, we probably could have gotten away with it. One has to bear in mind that we did not know, in 1948, how weak the Soviets were or the extent to which they had been bled white in the war. We did not yet know the extent of the vast destruction in the USSR. We had, for example, only a very vague idea of how many people in the Soviet Union were killed because at that time the official Soviet figure was something between 6 and 8 million. The latest figure is now 28 million killed.

Q: When you think of it, they could have marched to the Channel but couldn't have done anything.

STEARMAN: They, having suffered so much in the war, didn't want to risk war with anybody. I once asked Tommy Thompson, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, one of our most famous Sovietologists, why the Soviets didn't try harder to make a satellite out of Finland? He said he thought Stalin was convinced the Finns would go to war with them a third time. Remember the winter war in 1939-40 when Finland, then with a population of less than 4 million, inflicted such heavy losses on the Red Army?

Q: They barely won.

STEARMAN: The Soviets barely won and took tremendous casualties. In 1940, they didn't even want to take a chance of fighting Finland. Of course, this also might have made Sweden drop its neutrality and side with the West. Mostly, the Soviets just didn't want to fight anybody. They could have marched to the Channel but that would have gotten them into some kind of hostility with us, the British and the French. They would have won, granted, but they would have been in a major war again. We just had no idea how reluctant they were to get into any war. Had we known in 1948 how badly the Soviets had been bled in World War II, and had we somewhat
more troops at our disposal, I think history might have been quite different.

All of this was going on in 1948 and, of course, so was the Berlin airlift which I and nearly everybody else thought wouldn't work. Feed 2,250,000 Berliners by air? You have to be kidding? We had only those C-47 "goonie birds" in those days.

Q: Well, they were using C-54s.

STEARMAN: They started bringing those in later but we started off with the C-47s. The Air Force was very reluctant to get involved in an airlift because they didn't want to tie up most of their transport aircraft which also had to have fighter escorts available in case anything happened. It was to everyone's amazement that it worked. That set the Soviets back quite a bit in terms of prestige. After the blockade ended in May 1949, they then went over to a kind of detente policy.

Q: Most of the time you were there the Cold War was in full sway. There was no doubt what our goal was, it was to stop the Soviets. Is that correct?

STEARMAN: Always. And the closer you were to it, the larger loomed the threat. In Vienna we were 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain and surrounded by Soviet forces who were active in all sorts of nefarious ways throughout Vienna, even in the American Sector...One event that really had enormous impact in Europe, I think more than most people now appreciate, was outbreak of the Korean War.

Q: Starting June 25, 1950.

STEARMAN: Many people thought that the attack on South Korea was a gambit in a worldwide Soviet offensive and that they were going to do something in Europe. Europe would come next. We had people in the Legation in Vienna who sent their wives and children to France, Spain, etc. to get them into Western Europe and out of Vienna. I sent most of my possessions back to my parents in the U.S. There was a great feeling of uncertainty. We didn't realize that Korea was an aberration. I have long believed that the Korean attack probably wasn't primarily Stalin's idea, that he gave the green light to Kim Il Sung thinking that taking South Korea would be a piece of cake, that we wouldn't do anything about it and that it would be over within a short time. That is, I believe, how the Soviets calculated that we had pretty much written off South Korea in several ways. MacArthur in March, 1949 left it outside of our defense perimeter and Acheson in 1950 did the same thing. Moreover, by June 1949, we had pulled out all our troops, except for an assistance group.

Q: Dulles, I think, also made a statement when he was Special Assistant.

STEARMAN: And we almost cut off economic assistance too. When you look at all these things, the Soviets had to think the Americans didn't really care about South Korea; therefore, when Kim Il Sung asked if the Soviets would back an attack, Stalin probably said something like, "Be my guest."
Q: Did you feel it in Vienna?

STEARMAN: Oh, yes. There was a great feeling of uncertainty and feeling that the Soviets might strike there next. An attack may be imminent.

Q: What about when the United States went in, how was that received by our Legation?

STEARMAN: From a psychological point of view it would have been infinitely worse if we had not, and South Korea had been taken rapidly. As it was, we almost lost anyway, even though we went in very soon after the attack, as you recall.

Q: Are we going to do it or not?

STEARMAN: So we acted fairly rapidly. That was enormously important for the Western Europeans, to a degree which I think is still very little appreciated in the U.S. Had we not intervened then, the Europeans could well have concluded that they couldn't rely on the Americans, and that the Russians can go in anywhere and the Americans won't lift a finger. So it was very important from the European's point of view, what we did.

Q: Did the mission that you were part of change while you were there? Was it first military and then became more diplomatic?

STEARMAN: Yes. Initially it was a military high commission. The legation was really an integral part of the US High Commissioner's organization. He was High Commissioner for all of Austria. The legation was sort of a political component of the US High Commission. It was commanded by a general at that time. By General Keyes at that time, and previously by General Clark. Then in 1952 or '53, we became an embassy. The High Commissioner then became a civilian, Walter J. Donnelly, who became Ambassador.

Q: Did that change your method of operation?

STEARMAN: Somewhat. The military has different ways of doing things, and I think there was somewhat more political sophistication in our approach to things. But you also have to bear in mind a very important thing that happened shortly thereafter. I have incidentally written a book about Soviet policy towards Austria, which is in the Georgetown University library.

Q: What is the name of the book?

STEARMAN: "The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria" which is still being quoted thirty years later. It was originally my Ph.D. dissertation which I turned into a book.

Shortly, thereafter, Stalin died. He died on March 5, 1953, and things started to change. Fairly soon interesting things started to happen. They embarked then on their second detente campaign as a reaction to our Korean buildup.

Q: And NATO was finally organized.
STEARMAN: As a result of Korea, NATO became a military organization, prior to that it was a political organization and didn't have any military structure. As a result of the Korean War, our defense budget went from $12.7 billion in a year to $50 billion. Then we deployed several divisions of combat troops to Europe. We set up a NATO High Command, with Eisenhower the first Supreme Allied Commander, and it became a military organization for the first time. And then, of course, there were efforts to bring the Germans in somehow, and all of that story.

Work kind of changed, and we were making somewhat more progress with the Soviets because they became somewhat more reasonable in this detente period. Things happened that never happened before. Agreement was reached with them on various issues that had been difficult or impossible to resolve before. Ultimately, and this was a keystone of that whole detente operation, they agreed to sign a state treaty for Austria on terms much better for Austria than they were willing to accept a year before. That treaty was signed May 14, 1955 and the following...no wait, it was on May 15, because on May 14, the day before, they formed the Warsaw Pact to give them a legitimate reason to maintain troops in Hungary and Romanian. They are very legalistic and they felt if they hadn't done that why they wouldn't have had any legal reason to maintain troops in Romania and Hungary. (The Soviets had previously justified keeping troops in these two countries as "line of communication" units supporting Soviet forces in Austria.)

That was really the high point of the detente which was soon to have quite an impact on the cohesion of NATO. The Soviets did a number of other things: a rapprochement with Tito; giving up their naval base at Porkkala in Finland, and Dairen and Port Arthur in China, and the Khrushchev-Bulganin goodwill tours. The Soviet image was changing radically and this was having an effect in the West. One of the early effects was having the Icelandic parliament "in view of the changed situation", ask us to remove our forces and bases from Iceland. There were also other evidences of the breakdown of the NATO cohesion. And then the whole detente which was working so beautifully went down the tubes as a result of the Hungarian Revolution.

Q: October, 1956.

STEARMAN: October, 1956. I got involved in that.

Q: Before we move to that I want to go back a little. What were our concerns when the Soviets began to loosen up? Did you feel that the communist movement sponsored by the Soviets had taken like a vaccination in the Soviet Zone, or was it pretty well assumed that once they left they were out of it? Were they going to be leaving cadres behind in order to have popular support?

STEARMAN: They had zero popular support. They actually agreed to free elections in November, 1945 and got only five percent of the vote to their utter astonishment. They had set up a provisional government, too, in which they had a lot of control...control of the police as well as the ministry of interior. They had no idea in the world that they were going to get wiped out to the extent they did. The same thing happened about the same time in Hungary. They had free elections and got 15 percent of the vote -- the combined communist and socialist vote. The Small Holders party got 75 percent of the vote. They were anti-communist. The Soviets finally took care of them by arresting the secretary general of the party in February, 1947 and the party fell
apart. Austria posed a more difficult case, since it was under Four Power control, and the people were totally opposed to the communists who never got more than five percent in an election.

*Q:* While you were there we were still going through the Denazification period in Austria. Did we follow through on that or let up after the war?

**STEARMAN:** We carried out Denazification there just about to the extent that we did in Germany. It was remarkable considering we always regarded Austria the "first victim of Nazi aggression." But the percentage of Austrians in the Nazi party was about as great as in Germany. It was annexed at that time. I will say this, I think a point ought to be made that the Nazis never got more than 16 percent of the vote in any free election in Austria. I don't think they would have ever got more than 20 percent under any circumstances. Also, probably not more than a third would ever have voted for an Anschluss. Schuschnigg was putting that to a vote in March, 1938 which prompted Hitler to march in to prevent that vote. Then he had his own final vote after the country had been occupied. Then it was all over.

Many people welcomed Hitler when he came into Vienna, filling the (Helden platz) square where he made a speech. That probably accounted for about 150,000 people. Greater Vienna then had a population of over 2 million. I know the situation fairly well because I married into an Austrian family. They were anti-Nazi as were most of the aristocrats. To them the Nazi's strength was in the worse part of the population, called the "black coated proletariat." As it turned out my father-in-law, and I didn't know this until after I had been married, saved a number of Jews because he was the director of a plant that had branches in Hungary, Slovakia and Austria. He could move people around and save them. But he never mentioned this. He had been a naval officer in the old Imperial Navy and hated people who went around saying how they had helped the Jews, etc., often such people had been notorious Nazis. So I had to find this out from other people. He risked his life. I had never thought of him before as a person who had much civil courage. You can never tell about people.

It was a very mixed picture in Austria, and some of the worst Nazis were Austrians. My wife told me stories of the "Kristallnacht" of November, 1938. For example, there was a Jewish couple who ran a little shoe store in Modling, a small suburb where my wife's family lived, and the Nazis made the couple sit in the window of their store while people broke the windows and stole shoes out of the store, a lot of "respectable" burgers grabbed shoes out of the window and store. She said there were a lot of really nasty episodes like that.

*Q:* What about our dealings with the French and the British while you were there? How did the joint occupation work?

**STEARMAN:** That's a very good question. Most of the time we would work out an Allied position. We tried to keep our positions coordinated and present as much of a solid front as possible. Earlier on, the French were not too keen about working with us and tried to maintain a certain amount of independence. They were much more tolerant of some of the things the Soviets were trying to get away with. The Brits, generally speaking, were very solidly on our side. In fact, when I was stationed in other places in Europe, the Brits were always very close allies. This broke down during the Suez War in the fall of 1956. That was a major rupture of the Alliance
and close ties we had with the Brits. Normally I worked very closely with them. I was often personal friends with my British colleagues. But I also worked fairly harmoniously with my French colleagues. I spoke fairly decent French in those days and that always helps with the French. I would say that generally it was three to one, but with the French more apt to opt out and do their own thing.

Q: Did you become part of USIA while you were in Austria?

STEARMAN: That is a very sore point. It is a long and boring story. I came in as an FSSO political officer in the State Department. I was told that really what I should do was to go back to the Department and get a higher level GS grade and then come back as a higher ranking FSSO or FSR, or whatever, until I got up to a certain level and then "lateral in" as an FSO. You probably never heard of FSSOs.

Q: They were generally specialists.

STEARMAN: Foreign Service Staff Officers is what they were. Well, you had to take almost the same exam including a language exam. It was not much different from the Foreign Service exam. As it turned out, I made one of the bigger mistakes in my life. I was going to outwit the system as a number of people had succeeded in doing, but I wound up being host with my own petard.

Well, what happened is that when USIA was created in 1953, I was part of the political section, as I told you, but then I had set up this operation which was servicing the press, our information people, and a number of substantive people as well. That operation was, alas, given to USIA and me along with it. At the time I said, "What the hell, this will all blow over and is temporary." Well, every time that I would try to move back to State and lateral in, something would happen. There were several nearly successful efforts. At one time, the papers had all gone in and were just about to be signed by whoever made the final decision when there was a freeze. I won't bore you with this, but suffice it to say that I never spent a single day in USIA ever. I had some assignments that were kind of quasi USIA, but I never had a typical USIA assignment. So I was in a strange, indeed unique, situation.

Finally I again had everything all set up. I was then in SOV and had orders to go to Hamburg as deputy principal officer under Coburn Kidd, who was going to retire, and I thought I had a fair chance of taking over a consulate general bigger than most of our embassies. It was a 35-officer post. I knew a lot of people in Hamburg and was bilingual in German. The papers were going ahead for my lateral entry and everything was right on track. I was thinking that I was finally getting free of USIA which, to be perfectly honest, I always held in rather low regard. I think it was a big mistake to have created it in the first place. What ruined the Information Service was losing the FSO political officers. They left, of course, some after it was created. I was a holdover because I wasn't an FSO. So I always had wanted to get out of it and felt it should have been abolished as an agency of the government, and still think so.

But anyway I was all set and I was then asked to go to Saigon to work for JUSPAO (Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office) which was directed by a USIA officer. Well, again, I wound up in a billet
which had little to do with normal USIS work.

ARThUR A. BARDOS
Radio Austria
Vienna (1951-1955)

Arthur A. Bardos was born in 1921 in Budapest, Hungary. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951, serving in Vietnam, Belgium, Turkey, Washington, DC, Austria, and with the Voice of America in Germany. Mr. Bardos was interviewed by Hans Tuch on January 25, 1990.

BARDOS: No. I was hired in Washington for Austria.

Q: Oh, yes.

BARDOS: The civilian Army operations were taken over by the State Department, and they needed people to take care of information activities. There was a very large USIS post there with about 45 officers. Maybe I should say something other than just about radio, because it was an incredibly pervasive USIS operation, such as there never will be again, I hope.

Q: When was that?

BARDOS: This was in 1951.

Q: In Vienna?

BARDOS: In Vienna. The turnover by the Army to State was, I guess, in 1950, starting in 1950.

Q: You were hired directly?

BARDOS: I was hired to be radio program officer in Vienna. So we had there this radio network, Vienna, Salzburg, and Linz, and this was by far the most listened-to radio in Austria.

Q: Called?

BARDOS: Called Rot-Weiss-Rot, "Red-White-Red," which always bothered us because we were flying the Austrian national colors as an American-operated station. It was a little bit embarrassing at times. But that's what the Army had done, and there was no way we could change it at that point.

We had the country's largest newspaper, called Wienerkurier, which still exists under Austrian management, named Kurier, simply. It is a fairly direct successor. We had every kind of operation imaginable. I don't think that most people are aware of the degree to which we were really running the information machinery in Austria. Whether one considers this a good or bad
thing, it was, I think, enormously effective. For instance, in all the industrial enterprises in Austria, which is a heavily trade unionized country, there was a trade union picture newspaper, poster newspaper, photographs with captions. Even in all the factories that were under Soviet management, they had to have these newspapers on their walls. I don't know whether the Soviets knew, but they may very well have known that these newspapers under the Austrian Trade Union Federation label were put out by USIS, with the unions' agreement, of course.

Once I looked into it after the fact, because I was trying to do something similar in another country: we had footlockers with book collections circulating around the country, and I asked for a report on how this worked because I hadn't had anything directly to do with it in Austria. I found out that there were at one point--I am pretty sure I am right on the number--6,000 of these circulating.

Q: Footlockers?

BARDOS: Footlockers. Each had about 100 books, would spend two weeks in a given location--village school, restaurant, union hall, whatever. People could read the books they were interested in out of the collection.

Q: There were no libraries then in Austria.

BARDOS: There were no libraries, except USIS libraries.

Q: Yes.

BARDOS: So we had a pervasive influence on what happened. When I arrived in Vienna, it was explained to me, more or less, that this was a very popular radio station, but it had a very bad reputation for cultural integrity.

My predecessor, who was, incidentally, a very good man in his own way, was formed by American commercial radio and did something for which I was very grateful, but which was not calculated to endear him to Austrians: namely, he introduced the exact timing of programs. This was not new for Europe, but certainly for Austria, where programs usually ran as long as they ran, and then there was, in the old Austrian radio, the sound of an alarm clock ticking, until the next program, which might have started five minutes or fifteen or half an hour later. Stu Green was this officer's name. As a good American commercial radio man, he found the alarm clock appropriately horrible, and trained people to plan their programs in advance to eliminate these pauses. In the process of training, he sometimes cut off the last ten measures of a symphony or the last three speeches of a play when somebody had made a mistake in timing. All this did not contribute to the cultural reputation of the station.

Q: Typically American, they say, right? [Laughter]

BARDOS: Yes, of course. So I had an easier time in that I was in the position to be a little more flexible on these things. [Laughter] At the same time, the necessary and good system of timing had been introduced.
So I was instructed to improve the reputation of the station, but not to lose its popularity, of course, and I was instructed to stay out of Austrian politics. I immediately asked, "Is that possible, if we broadcast news 14 times a day, every hour on the hour? Can we stay out of Austrian politics?"
"You have to. Those are your instructions."

Q: We are still in 1951?

BARDOS: Yes, 1951 to '55, I guess. It didn't change that much, really. I violated, I am afraid, the second of these instructions on a regular basis, because you obviously were considered as playing politics, whatever you did.

There was a coalition government in Austria. There were altogether four parties. The two big ones, that mattered, the People's Party, which was a Christian Socialist party, and the Social Democrats, who were called Socialists, were in coalition. But it was not a very heartfelt coalition; it was tense, sometimes hostile. Every time we reported something about one party that may have been useful and favorable to that party, the others would complain and demand equal time. They would go to the Ambassador--High Commissioner--to complain. The Socialists felt we should include the mass, which we broadcast every Sunday morning, as one of the party broadcasts of the People's Party. Obviously, the trade union broadcasts were considered by the latter as being Socialist broadcasts.

So, much of the thankless task of Americans working in Rot-Weiss-Rot was to somehow keep our heads down in some of these cross-fires in which we were constantly caught.

Q: Just to put this into a larger context, your radio work with Rot-Weiss-Rot was part of the USIS operation, right?

BARDOS: Yes.

Q: Who was the PAO at that time?

BARDOS: When I first went there, it was Charlie Moffly, who was a State Department Foreign Service Officer, a very good PAO. Then he was followed by the information officer, who was my boss when I went there and became public affairs officer, William Harlan Hale. Then it was, for a while, the Marshall Plan information man, who inherited the job when Bill Hale left under some implied pressure from the [Joseph] McCarthy Committee, though I do not think that he was charged with anything. The Marshall Plan man was Daniel Madden. Then it was Hank Arnold, and, finally, Jack Fleisher. I left in that period.

Q: Was Walter Roberts there?

BARDOS: No, he was never stationed in Austria, though he had, in various capacities in Washington, much to do with the program, and often went to Austria on TDY assignments.
Q: I see. But Gerry Gert was stationed there?

BARDOS: Gerry Gert came to Vienna to fill in for me when I came on home leave, after almost three years. He came from Berlin to replace me. Since everybody understandably liked him, nobody wanted to let him go, so the job was split, and that made sense. Since our competition hated me personally, as well as institutionally, because we were beating them all the time, Gerry was put in charge of being radio officer to the "enemy."

Q: The Soviets?

BARDOS: Well, not really the Soviets, but Austrian Radio, the station controlled by them. I became program officer again.

Q: The Austrian Radio was controlled by the Soviets?

BARDOS: The old Austrian Radio. This was one of our constant problems there, but it made the job more interesting, actually. The old Austrian Radio, which was one of the very venerable radio organizations formed in the 1930s, which gave the United States (CBS) its best radio engineer--inventor of long-playing records and various other things--remained. It had become part of the "Reichsrundfunk" under the Germans and then it became the Austrian Radio, run by two public administrators. But the Soviets were in the building because the building was in the Soviet sector of Vienna. They didn't run the station. We ran Rot-Weiss-Rot. They didn't run the RAVAG, as it was popularly called.

Q: What was it called?

BARDOS: That was the old pre-war name of it, Radio--I forget now what it abbreviated.

Q: RAVAG?

BARDOS: Yes. Anyway, the Soviets insisted on certain hours of air time for programming which they prepared. Their programs were called "Russische Stunde," Russian Hour. That was helpful to us, because it contributed to the popularity of our station, because the "Russische Stunde" turned everybody off. The Soviets also insisted on certain standards in the Austrian Radio news, and in emergencies, they could take over the whole station. They did that in October 1950 when the tiny Communist Party of Austria called a general strike. [This strike is also mentioned in the Interview of Hans Cohrssen in this Oral History Series.] The idea was that the strike would paralyze at least Vienna and the Soviet zone of Austria, and the Russians would then have an excuse to intervene. Immediately, the Austrian Radio started broadcasting that the strike was a success and that everybody was respecting it, which, of course, was an almost certain way of making it a success. At that point--this was before I ever got there--Rot-Weiss-Rot turned itself over to the Austrian Government, and there was a Cabinet member in the station at all times, broadcasting constantly, "The strike is not being observed by anybody, only a few communists. Go to work. Function normally. Forget about it." So that the strike was broken very rapidly.
Q: When was this?

BARDOS: This was in October 1950, I think. There is a letter from then Chancellor Figl to the radio station, thanking them for their role in breaking the strike.

The Soviets also insisted, for instance, that news from the Soviet zone be broadcast in the "official" version, and this drove Austrians up the wall. A typical news story might have been, "A person in the uniform of an officer of one of the occupying forces last night in such and such village, shot an Austrian gendarme. Investigation proceeds." And Austrians found it outright refreshing to hear, over our station, "A Soviet officer, drunk, shot an Austrian gendarme in such and such village," which was the truth and everybody knew to be the truth.

Q: There was very little competition in that sense.

BARDOS: In that sense, there was little competition. Otherwise, Austrian Radio had much more money, it had a much larger staff. It was a much better equipped station in a vast radio building. We broadcast from a large middle-class Vienna apartment. But the content was on our side.

Q: I would imagine that a number of the people, the Americans who worked in Rot-Weiss-Rot, would somehow end up or be seconded after a while by the Voice of America in New York.

BARDOS: Yes. I was supposed to be transferred to the Voice of America directly. Well, I was supposed to be transferred to various places. In the end it was something totally different.

W. TAPLEY BENNETT
Political Counselor
Vienna (1951-1955)

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett was raised in Griffin, Georgia. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Georgia and participated in an exchange fellowship to Germany before completing his law degree. Ambassador Bennett’s Foreign Service career included positions in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic; Vienna, Austria; and Athens, Greece. In addition, he served as ambassador to the Dominican Republic and to Portugal. Ambassador Bennett was interviewed by Ambassador Horace G. Torbert in 1988.

BENNETT: I followed Dick Davis. That's who it was, because Dick went on to Moscow with Tommy Thompson. But Murphy explained to me. He said, I want you to go to Vienna. Because, he said, you have five children and I want you to have a job that will enable you to spend some time with your children. He had had that tragedy of his daughter. And he said, you can go to Bonn, it might sound more important. But, he said, you'd just be working around the clock. And I'm going to see that you have the extra time to be with your family.

So I went to Vienna as number three. And we were there for almost four years. It was a
marvelous assignment. This was 1957 when we arrived there.

Q: It was Jimmy Riddleberger was it?

BENNETT: No. Tommy Thompson was Ambassador when I was assigned there. But he had already left for Moscow. And Doc Matthews, Freeman Matthews.

Q: Ah yes, of course.

BENNETT: Who had been Murphy's predecessor as Under Secretary of State. So he knew what kind of work I'd been doing. We hit it off from the very beginning. But he at the time was the ranking officer in the Foreign Service and was one of the first four career ambassadors, as was Bob Murphy. So I went there. It was the depths of the Cold War. It was also the emergence of Vienna and Austria as a prosperous country. The State treaty had been signed just less than two years before.

The Hungarian Revolution had taken place in the fall of '56. I went to Vienna at the end of the summer in '57. A lot of our work had to do with the refugees who had come over from Budapest and from Hungary. I was there for the foundation of the International Atomic Energy Agency and served as the Embassy's liaison to that. I was on that delegation for two years. That was, of course, in a sense calling on my United Nations experience. I had had another look at the U.N. in 1950 when I was assigned up from ARA to be one of the ARA liaison officers on the delegation for the General Assembly.

That was a three month assignment in New York at the end of the Korean War. We started with high hopes that the boys were going to be home by Christmas, as MacArthur was talking. Then came that ill-fated expedition to the north and the Chinese intervention and our people reeled back. I remember the enormous disillusionment and depression that settled on us. I came home from that session and was physically ill for a few days. It was like the taste of alum in your mouth, what had happened on what had seemed such a promising operation. Then we later regrouped and, as you know, a year or two later got a final, not a final, but a solution and a line which has endured to this day. Although it's still one of the most neuralgic points in the world in my opinion.

Q: And we're not through there yet.

BENNETT: That's what I mean. It still endures as a problem.

Anyway, my years in Vienna were rich professionally. That, as I say, was the period of the Cold War. All of the correspondents, or so many of them, lived in Vienna and traveled behind the Iron Curtain. And we had a remarkable camaraderie. We didn't have the adversarial relationship that now seems so often to characterize the media's approach to the Foreign Service or to our government abroad. And so we had a lot of extremely good evenings together with correspondents of the New York Times and the then-Herald Tribune and Newsweek and Time. I remember all those correspondents to this day. And we also saw a lot of the opera stars. So Vienna was a thoroughly good place to be. Although those who'd been there a few years earlier
said, well, you don’t know the real Vienna now that the Russians have gone.

Q: That's true. I was there during that period too. But I think I prefer the time you were there.

BENNETT: I remember that fall of ’57. There had been no traffic when we arrived. Suddenly the Ringstrasse just burst forth with complete -- what do you call this traffic that doesn't move?

Q: Traffic jams, gridlock.

BENNETT: Gridlock, exactly. And you saw Vienna come back to a prosperity it hadn't seen for a generation.

MARY SEYMOUR OLMSTED
Commercial Officer
Vienna (1951-1955)

Ambassador Mary Seymour Olmsted was born in Duluth, Minnesota and raised in Florida. She received a bachelor’s degree in economics from Mount Holyoke College and a master’s degree from Columbia University. Ambassador Olmsted’s Foreign Service career included positions in India, Iceland, Austria, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Papua New Guinea. Ambassador Olmsted was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

OLMSTED: I was sent there [to Vienna] to go into the commercial section. The Department of Commerce was considerably dismayed that the standard reporting that goes into Commerce, trade lists, trade opportunities, various forms that had to be filled out -- WTDRs -- had been quite neglected. And when I got there they put me to work cleaning up a backlog of nearly two years duration, and it was pretty dull work, I can tell you. As soon as I would finish one bunch of things, I would sigh, and think, "Now I can turn to something interesting," only to have someone open another drawer, and say, "And here we have...."

Q: Could you explain what a WTDR is?


Q: Could you explain for somebody, what did this type of work consist of?

OLMSTED: A World Trade Directory Report is prepared on an individual firm, and it gives basic information about the size of the firm, and the name and address, and the names of the leading figures in it, and what it produces, and in what quantities to the extent that it can be quantified. Its the basic information that a potential exporter...

Q: ...a banking report.
OLMSTED: Yes. That's right, the banking reports, and its credit rating, and basic things like that. These are on file in the Department of Commerce so if an American exporter, or importer, wants some information about a particular firm he can look for it there.

Q: As you say, its not the most exciting work.

OLMSTED: No, it's certainly not. A lot of the work is done by local employees, but it has to be reviewed, and somebody has to sit down and review these things, and sign them, and send them in. And the trade lists were lists of firms in a particular line of work giving their name, address, and just brief information about it. And there are trade opportunities as well, that was another form that provided a little information about possibilities for buying or selling a particular item, or a particular commodity.

Q: How did you find the trade situation, the commercial situation in Austria while you were there?

OLMSTED: Most of this work that I did was all internal work. I was not out very much talking to people about it. The trade situation was affected by the general malaise that still covered the country under Soviet occupation, the military very much in evidence. People being too afraid of the future to want to paint their houses and refurbish things, and wear their best clothes, or anything like that. Sort of a depressing atmosphere.

Q: The country was divided into zones?

OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: You were essentially looking at what private enterprise was doing. Did you find there was a different type of economy developing in the Soviet zone, than in the British, or American, or French zones?

OLMSTED: My impression was that the economic development in the Soviet zone was very, very much slower than it was elsewhere.

Q: I would imagine there that the Soviet Union was determined. It was really so different, you might say, from the normal.

OLMSTED: The Soviet Union was, I think, financing certain types of firms in the Soviet zone, and was tying them economically to the Soviet Bloc economy to the extent that they could. This was something that was being followed particularly by our intelligence people.

Q: Did you get out from under the trade reports and be able to observe the Austrian scene as a whole later on?

OLMSTED: Well, I moved into a very interesting job in another part of the economic section. The economic section was very large, but another part of it was being expanded to deal with problems concerning Austria's economic relations with the Soviet Bloc. A couple of the people
in that section were working on such matters as permits to export things to the Soviet Bloc. I was not involved in that work but I was following the broader economic picture. I was following the trade agreements that Austria was signing with the Soviet Bloc countries, analyzing them, each one as it came along. I was following the questions of trade and economic penetration. It was a very interesting job. I depended quite heavily on the CIA for information, but in addition to that I was talking to people as well. And we had quite a bit of statistical information which I analyzed.

Q: Was there concern about trade penetration because this had a Soviet intelligence component, or was it just that we wanted to keep the Soviets from getting involved in trade in the West?

OLMSTED: We were concerned that the Soviets would try, and perhaps succeed, in establishing domination over the Austrian economy through these trade agreements, and through these special arrangements that were made in bolstering certain types of firms. That was the main concern. There were intelligence concerns as well but this is what people were really focusing on.

Q: What section, sort of economic and political aspect, did the Soviets have?

OLMSTED: I'm sorry I don't understand.

Q: The Soviet zone, was it mainly the industrial part of Austria farming, and where did it fit in the Austrian economy?

OLMSTED: The Soviet zone was in the eastern part of the country which encompassed Vienna which of course contained a good deal of the heavy industrial production of the country. And then outside of Vienna, further to the east, it was largely farming.

Q: At that time were you watching union developments in the Soviet zone? Were they pretty well taking over the industrial workers?

OLMSTED: We had a labor attaché and he and his assistant were following that part of it, and I was only rather incidentally interested in that. The embassy was extremely large, and it had its finger in almost every aspect of the Austrian pie that you could imagine. We had a big USIS operation there. We had our own radio station and our own daily newspaper. We were the important element there except for the Russians. The French and the British didn't play a very large role.

Q: When you arrived there, did a peace treaty of a particular kind that would turn Austria into a relatively neutral country, seem at all in the cards?

OLMSTED: No, no. It looked as though it were a long, long way down the road. Nobody was talking about a peace treaty when I went there. I remember the night I arrived, I went into the Hotel Bristol where I was supposed to stay. I was met at the door by an American army infantryman who put up his rifle, and told me I couldn't enter without proper credentials, and it took quite a bit of argument before I set my foot in the American hotel there. There was a very, very strong military atmosphere around the place at that time.
Q: *In your work did you run across spies...I mean were you warned in having problems with the Soviets as far as compromising or following you, or anything like this? Was it a difficult place to work in because of that sort of thing?*

OLMSTED: Every now and then I would get very uneasy about things. I often worked after hours. My office was facing the street, I think I was on the third floor, and I can remember my phone would ring when I was working late and I might be the only person in that whole area of the building...my phone would ring, and when I would pick it up there was nobody at the other end. That always gave me a creepy feeling. And I usually left right then, I just felt I didn't want to stay around any longer. Once I was driving down to cover the industry's fair in Graz, which is in southern Austria, and I had a grey pass which entitled me to go through the Soviet zone in order to get to Graz. I was supposed to stay on the main road, and I got off the road -- I made a wrong turn someplace. And I tell you, I was just shaking when I got back on the road. I was by myself and by the time I found where I was supposed to be, and got back on the road, I was shaking.

Q: *What about the Austrians? What sort of contacts did you have with them, and how did they feel about the situation?*

OLMSTED: I didn't have a great deal of contact with the Austrians. That was a job that kept me in the embassy to a very large extent. I knew some of them socially, but I think I probably had fewer dealings with the local population in Austria than I had in any other post that I served in. Of course, the Austrians were cold and hungry, and depressed, and uncertain, and all the rest of it, and even though they liked us better than they liked the Soviets, they weren't all that happy with us either.

Q: *During the time you were there Llewellyn Thompson was the ambassador.*

OLMSTED: Yes, he was. He succeeded Walter Donnelly who was ambassador when I arrived there.

Q: *Although obviously it was a big embassy, and you were somewhat removed, how did people regard him as an ambassador? How did he operate?*

OLMSTED: The economic section was in a separate building several blocks away from the main building until the time I left, and we saw very little of Llewellyn Thompson. He was considered, I think, by the economic section to be a rather aloof figure, who just didn't play much of a role in what we were doing. He seemed very much interested in the political side of things, and not so much interested in the economic side. The major figure was the economic counselor. Also, the DCM. Walter Dowling was the DCM. I gathered that he held things very tightly in his own hand, and I know the political officers were quite resentful that he did not want them going down to the Foreign Office, he did not want them going to members of Parliament or other politicians to talk. I know the political officers felt that what they were doing was pretty routine work, and not of very much interest to anybody.
When Charles Yost came as DCM, I think he handled things somewhat differently. A very different personality. For one thing he came over to our building and talked to the economic section once in a while and we were amazed by that.

**Q:** Who was your economic counselor?

OLMSTED: First it was Ben Thibodeaux. He was succeeded by Woodbury Willoughby -- we called him Woody.

**Q:** How did you find these men handled the section? Did you feel part of the group, or did they take over most of the fun work?

OLMSTED: No, I didn't find that that was true. Ben Thibodeaux had a manner about him that put a lot of people off. Withdrawn isn't really the right word, but he just kept himself at a level higher than anyone else. I remember some of the men resented the fact that while he called them by their first names, he obviously expected them to call him Mr. Thibodeaux. It didn't bother me at all, but I know some of them resented it. Woody Willoughby was a much less formal person, and easier to get along with. I was not involved in the inner embassy feuding, but I gather there was quite a bit. People were jockeying for position all the time, and there was a lot of animosity and antagonism at higher levels. I've never enjoyed that sort of thing, and I didn't have to get involved in it, and I didn't.

**Q:** That's a nice thing about a large embassy, you can just duck it, and watch from the sidelines. The peace treaty came while you were there?

OLMSTED: Toward the end, and I give Llewellyn Thompson very high marks. Chip Bohlen was in Moscow, and he didn't see it coming but Llewellyn Thompson did. The Soviets made some statements about the future of Austria and Llewellyn Thompson said, "I think they mean it this time. I think we can move." And he was the one who carried the ball. He led our negotiating team, and I think he did a brilliant job on it.

**Q:** Again, you had a specific viewpoint looking at the economy. Did you find the Austrian business enterprises were beginning to respond as this thing went?

OLMSTED: Something happened before that. In '52 the stabilization program was enacted. Dean Acheson, then the Secretary of State, and his wife paid an official visit to Austria. That was while Walter Donnelly was still the ambassador. Secretary Acheson held talks with the government of Austria and he made it clear at that time that the United States was going to stay in Austria, and was going to support the Austrians in every way that we could. A stabilization program was announced, I guess it was a little after that, in which the shilling was devalued but was backed by American loans. That was what put the economy on a firm footing. There were these two things: the renewal of confidence that came, stemming out of Acheson's visit, and what he said to the Austrian government, and the stabilization program. That was when the black market started to die out, and when prices went up but then they stabilized.

**Q:** A black market is always a sign that there's disarray in the economy.
OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: Had there been this problem in Austria as there had been in Germany until '48 until the currency reform there, which really caused a lot of problems with the Soviets. But the restoration of Germany, at least West Germany, to a solid economy, had there been the same problem in Austria as far as the currency with the shilling?

OLMSTED: The shilling was very weak up until the stabilization program came. I can't quote you any figures at this time, but the black market rate was just far different from the official rate. Cigarettes were traded very widely, and things like that.

CHESTER H. OPAL
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Vienna (1952-1953)

Chester Opal was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1918. He attended the University of Chicago. He began his Foreign Service career in 1946. His career included positions in Poland, Italy, Lebanon, Mexico, Austria, Vietnam, and Washington, DC. In addition, Mr. Opal helped to found the NATO Information Service (NATIS). He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1989.

OPAL: The job in Vienna was as a public affairs officer but with a wide and undefinable range of operations. I operated under Charles Moffly, the Country public affairs officer, and later under William Harlan Hale, who was a historian, novelist and biographer and who had been a psy-warrior in World War II, famous as the operator of Radio Luxembourg. His German was perfect; mine, alas, was a rusty memory. His father had been a correspondent there, so Bill was quite familiar with German-speaking areas.

One of my jobs was to work on the political secretariat of the Allied Control Council, which was under the Allied Occupation. Bill Stearman prepared my materials for that work, but my main work had to do with policy coordination between the embassy, the public affairs division and CIC, counter-intelligence. I used to chair a weekly policy meeting of this group. The public affairs division was one of the largest in the world at the time. We had a radio network -- Red-White-Red -- which was under Fred Taylor who'd come over from Germany. We had the Wiener Kurier, which was the daily German language newspaper under Henry Reinert. Hale had first been information officer and later became PAO. Later we had Larry Dalcher there as information officer. We had a general manager, Sandy Marlowe. We had original motion picture production under an Austrian-born former child actor and protégé of Max Reinhardt, contacts and exchanges with the theater which he also handled, and a photography section which supplied our publications and the Wiener Kurier, under the great Yoichi Okimoto, who became Lyndon Johnson's presidential photographer.

Yoichi had an infamous picture of me at my desk with my feet up on it, a typical insouciant posture of mine. He said, "I'm going to make you famous." He made me very infamous, but I
was proud of the picture. I have it somewhere here. He was very imaginative and had many, many things that went out into the Austrian community that weren't devoted completely to USIS, but it endeared him to the Austrian people.

Bill Stearman, son of the aircraft inventor, handled peripheral reporting, which was set up within my office for reporting on developments in Eastern Europe. We studied the press and the FBIS reports on the Soviet satellites, and synthesized this stuff to get it out into our radio, into our press, and back to Washington for use there, too. It was called the peripheral reports program, which continued for a time after I left.

We had an evaluation program which had two purposes; one was simply to report on things that we were doing and to analyze them; and secondly, to run public opinion surveys, which were worked up professionally by Leo Crespi and his people in Bonn, with guidance, of course, from Washington.

What occupied me for a long time, though, was working with Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson not only on things pertaining to the political secretariat but also to matters like the restoration to the Austrians of our radio service network and the liquidation, eventually, of the Wiener Kurier. If we ever could end the occupation, our feeling was that if we got a neutral Austria, which is what we wanted, and we got the Russians out and we got out as well, we would have a standard USIS operation without any of the massive investment in men and materials that we had. When I was there, there were 55 Americans and 900 locals. It was an immense program. This was uncalled for. The only reason we had it there was that the Soviets had a huge program and the country was still occupied, even though it was considered a liberated country. The eastern half was where the oil was, and that was taken out by the Soviets.

We had several objectives in Austria: one, to promote positive American values; second, to counter Soviet propaganda, but not so stridently that there would be Soviet reprisals against our people or friendly Austrians. Also, much of the work we did with the Austrians was for restoration of their own pride and confidence. They had bought Hitler, and although we said they were forced to -- and many certainly felt they were indeed forced -- for all the pro-Nazi sentiment that existed before the Anschluss.

We had an interesting occupation policy. Unlike Germany, in Austria, unless everybody disagreed with an Austrian initiative, then it was possible. Only one approval in the Allied Control Council was necessary. In Germany all had to be for it or it was not permitted. This was the difference between liberation and conquest. In Austria, the Austrians could do anything, as long as one of us supported them. So the Russians were not able to veto their actions on press and so on, so we got a lot of free press kind of activity out of the Austrians. If we objected to something -- and there were many times we did, although I think we tended to be liberal -- it would be on the question of revival of neo-Nazi doctrine. In east Tyrol, around Innsbruck, and in parts of the Austrian that were occupied by Britain, Graz for example, there was some neo-Nazi sentiment. We expressed our objection to it, but we never put it down entirely, because we felt they would sit this out and eventually come to some sort of resolution. There was an awful lot of Nazi-like thinking still in Austria, but we felt that we should free them, let them find their own way.
The Soviets had absolute control in their zone, not only economically. In terms of dollars what we put into Western Austria, they were taking out of Eastern Austria. This was figured out by Hans Morgenthau. I remember going to a meeting, long before I came to Vienna or even knew I was going there, and Hans Morgenthau was head of a Marshall Plan study group, and this is the conclusion they came to, that we were putting in almost equivalent amount in dollars to what the Soviets were taking out of the Eastern Zone. So we were keeping things alive there. Eventually, the treaty came in '55, which was a year after my time.

Many of the things that I was doing were in preparation for that day when these things would go. These were tricky negotiations, and I must say they let me pursue them. We were considered diplomats like anybody else, and as diplomats, we could negotiate. So there was a good bit of that sort of thing going on.

The activities in Vienna are the kind that I describe in my pseudonymous novel about Vienna, *Men of Career*, which was published by Crown publishers in 1960. I suppose I might as well mention it, since it gives much of the atmosphere of Vienna at that time. The problems that we had are the kind that I've just been talking about. Turn-over of radio facilities, liquidation of the daily newspaper, and so forth, are part of the action around which some of the novel turns.

The chief thing, from the standpoint of American public interest, that I thought was of concern, therefore of concern to me as a novelist, was the effects of McCarthyism in these years of '52, '53. We even had meetings in the embassy about this. Walter Roberts from EUR in Washington came for one of them -- I told you he objected to our reporting "We shouldn't even be discussing McCarthyism," he said. I said, "I'll report it." I put this incident in the book, I might say, although I never named Walter.

We also had the visit of our facilities by Cohn and Schine. These were the two men who were called "junketeering gumshoes" by Ted Kaghan, who was deputy in Bonn. Ted went public with that and left the program shortly after that. It was an absolutely obscene show and should have been conducted in a water closet. People are saying now, with the two biographies of Roy Cohn, that nobody dared say he was a homosexual, nobody had the guts to say it. Read one paragraph of mine, you could easily derive this inference. I talked about how they had to have rooms next to each other with open connecting doors, and how they quarreled with limply wrapped newspapers. If anybody reading that didn't know what the hell I was saying, there was something pretty obscure about it. For one of the ironies of my novel -- which, typically, the reviewers never picked up -- was that a main character dies from motives having to do with repressed homosexuality, which was one of the weights upon his conscience because of Department security considerations, and the oppressors of the State Department on alleged security grounds were themselves "tainted". Incidentally, in the last pages of the novel, an eloquent tribute to the career service -- it's been cited as the best there is -- I take a view of homosexuality that in some respects was more than thirty years ahead of its time.

In the case of Cohn and Schine, I deliberately stuck very closely to exactly what they did when they were in Vienna -- in the event that I was ever sued for libel. I couldn't imagine these guys suing me for libel, but in case they did, I deliberately kept to the facts. William Harlan Hale, who
was a fine writer, wrote a dispatch on the visit which he was told was too good to send in. His DCM, I think it was Walter Dowling, refused to sign off on it as an embassy dispatch. He said, "This is too good." Also, frankly, I don't think he wanted to be identified with it. This is Walter Dowling, who was later ambassador to South Korea and Germany. At any rate, Hale did this report and sent it under his own signature.

I based what I did, made sure it was on the record somewhere so that it was in the State Department, so that nobody could say that it was not true. Cohn and Schine went to our library, of course; they were greatly interested in the books that we had. As I commented afterwards, until somebody discovered that General Eisenhower was a great literary critic and thought Hammett was a great writer, this scourge was tolerated, because Dashiell Hammett was a literary favorite of Eisenhower's. This whole business was thrown aside and said, "How could we tolerate this?" But until Ike said that, nobody dared oppose these McCarthy aides.

Another thing that I said in the book, which I know is true, McCarthy, like Rooney, would send over to the Department outside complaints that he didn't intend to act on, but he thought we ought to know about. This was stuff that was anti-McCarthy. I mean, this was evidence. It was, in a sense, inviting the Department to attack him if they wanted to. This was a kind of fair-mindedness that was backhand. It's the only thing I can say. I do mention that somewhere in the text of the novel. (I haven't looked at it in years). But it was there.

This was the peak of our reaction to McCarthyism, which completely, in terms not of its meaning to America -- although one of the fictional PAOs, who is a historian, does voice objections to it as an American -- but mainly because of its effect on how our missions operated abroad, our fears, and also because of the image of us that McCarthy created, that we had to overcome, and we were too afraid to overcome, most of us.

This was a terrible thing. I think the idea was to make the State Department explode from within. We had people spying on each other. If McCarthy had any purpose, I mean, it was as evil as that. I don't think he had any other purpose, except publicity.

HUGH G. APPLING
Austrian Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1953-1954)

Hugh Appling was born and raised in California. He received a bachelor's degree in biology from the University of California at Berkeley and then served in the U.S. Army. In 1945, Mr. Appling entered Stanford University for graduate studies in political science. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Austria, the United Kingdom (England), Germany, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, and Washington, DC. Mr. Appling was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: You were then back in Vienna in 1953-54?
APPLING: Not in Vienna but on the Austrian Desk, when the shape of the ultimate State Treaty was being designed. A very interesting time.

Q: Why do you think the Soviets were willing to give up some territory.

APPLING: That's one of the great debates since. Why did they do it? I think they thought Austria was not worth the candle. We were not going to let them take over the country. Some say it was a gesture preliminary to the negotiations on the German question. It might have seemed a nice thing to do. But I don't think it was niceness. I think Austria had become a kind of inconvenience to them and unimportant to their security.

Q: Were you on the Austrian desk?

APPLING: The files were replete with economic studies which concluded that free Austria would not be economically viable. We laugh now, when we see how well it has done. The Austrian television once interviewed me for a history of the State Treaty, and they seemed to have the preconclusion that we wanted Austria free so that we could manipulate it into an anti-Soviet position. My recollection is that this is entirely false. The concern most in our minds was whether Austria would be able to preserve its neutrality? Would their economy be strong enough to maintain independence in their geographic location midst countries occupied by the Soviets and with a strong Germany.

ROBERT J. MARTENS
Assistant Secretary, Allied High Commission
Vienna (1953-1954)
Assistant Secretary, Allied High Commission
Salzburg (1954-1955)

Robert Martens grew up in Kansas City, Missouri. He entered the U.S. Army in July of 1943 at the age of 17 and served in Europe. In 1949, Mr. Martens graduated from the University of Southern California. He entered the Foreign Service in January 1951. His career included positions in Italy, the Soviet Union, Indonesia, Burma, Austria, Romania, Sweden, and Washington, DC. Mr. Martens was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: Then you went to Vienna from 1953 to ’55.

MARTENS: Actually a year in Vienna, and six months in Salzburg. The first year was in the old Allied High Commission building. I was Assistant U.S. Secretary. The job of U.S. Secretary, which was held by Al Puhan, was merged with another position because of a tremendous cut-back in personnel that occurred early in the Eisenhower administration, and Al went over to the embassy building to take on other responsibilities which took up most of his time. So he let me
take over basically what he'd been doing before, and I reported to him once a week, but he gave me a lot of room to do the work.

Q: What was your work?

MARTENS: The Allied High Commissioners met once every two weeks. Tommy Thompson was the Ambassador and U.S. High Commissioner. On the Fridays in between, the Deputy High Commissioners met -- that was Charlie Yost, later Ambassador to the United Nations; and all through each intervening week there were various committee meetings on a number of subjects where lower level officials of the Four Powers met. My job was not substantive; my job was to arrange the meetings. I controlled three American -- controlled is the wrong word -- but I managed the assignments of three trilingual interpreters, various secretaries that took the minutes of the meetings. Then we had to meet with the other allied secretaries and compare our minutes so as to come to an agreed set of minutes. So there would always be two sets of minutes, the U.S. set, and then an agreed Four-Power set. The agreed set was not necessarily the verbatim record as the other was, but was putting down what the Russians and others -- particularly the Russians--would have agreed to because people like to change their minds, just as Congress does with respect to the Congressional Record. So there were a lot of meetings going on of an administrative nature that brought out substance as well. Before the Allied Commission meetings, for example, I used to meet with Ambassador Thompson and tell him things that I knew would come up suddenly in the Allied Council meeting because I had heard it from the other country representatives. There would accordingly be some forewarning as to what might happen in the coming debates that took place. I also was manager of the building for the Four Powers. That responsibility had always been given to the U.S. side, and I had about 40 Austrian personnel that cleaned up the building, and set out the flowers, or whatever had to be done.

Q: From your point of view, how did this commission work, and what were the issues involved? Again, as you saw it.

MARTENS: Well, as you know, up until the period just before the Austrian State Treaty was signed -- that was on May 15, 1955, by which time I had already left -- until that breakthrough, the relationship between the Soviets and United States was extremely bleak. This was also true for Austria itself since the eastern zone had been occupied by the Soviets. There was a totally hard line Soviet posture on all kinds of issues and we had given more freedom, more rights, to the Austrians in the western zones. We were generally on the side, as were the British and the French, of gradually decreasing the controls over the Austrian population. There were very rigid postures being taken by both sides, by the Soviets particularly. So little was being accomplished. On rare occasions the Soviets would give way. One case was when my -- actually Al Puhan's opposite number, but this Soviet Secretary was in the building working with me. In any event, this Soviet Secretary was a rather nice guy named Koptelov who had gone out with me and my British colleague several times to dinner. On a particular occasion, we were surprised to learn that he had been caught trying to subvert a Polish contact. From this, Koptelov obviously also had KGB duties and was caught in the act, and held by the Four Power jeep patrol, which also operated out of the building that I was managing. It was known that if this incident should become publicized, or was likely to become publicized, it would be embarrassing to the Soviets. After behind the scenes discussion, the Soviets offered to make some concessions on certain
substantive issues if Koptelov's escapade were not published. That in fact happened, and Koptelov was then sent back to the Soviet Union, and no one ever heard of him again. I later ran into Soviet officials in Moscow who had been in Vienna and when I mentioned Koptelov's name, he was a non-person and no one had ever heard of him. This was three or four years later.

\textit{Q:} Thompson, we'll come back to him again...this is Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, but how did you see him? How did he operate from your vantage point? He's one of the major figures in our post-war diplomacy.

MARTENS: That's right. Thompson had already become well known because of the Trieste Agreement -- which he was working on in Vienna, incidentally, during this entire period. He later also got a great deal of credit for the Austrian State Treaty, although the fact that the Austrian Treaty happened was because of certain high level changes in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he shepherded it through very Pull. Thompson was a very quiet, reserved and actually rather shy man. At the same time he was without airs or pretentiousness. These observations are also based on my service under him in Moscow later. He was much less outgoing than Chip Bohlen. Thompson was, in any case, a man that everyone had tremendous respect for, then and later.

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\textit{Q:} What was your second job?

MARTENS: I went to Salzburg in August 1954. Salzburg was the headquarters of the American zone at the time, so it was both a consular post and a POLAD. The man nominally Consul General there, Tully Torbert, was also the Political Adviser to the Commanding General of American forces in western Austria, a Lieutenant General. Torbert's office was in the military headquarters building across from the Consulate and he left the running of the Consulate itself to his deputy, a man named Oscar Holder. I was also in the headquarters building with Tully Torbert, and was the political officer with responsibility for political reporting in western Austria. It was not a terribly inspiring job from the standpoint that most significant events, as in most countries, were going on in the capital. One of two subjects of interest in the Salzburg area was the third party, the VdU, which many thought of as a neo-Nazi party, but which was basically a conglomeration of pan-German nationalists, neo-Nazis, and a certain number of people who were conservative but were opposed to the Catholic Church aspect of the People's Party, which was the leading conservative party. So the VdU was sort of a mishmash, and it was interesting to follow it, in part because I had a very good contact, namely the head of the VdU. He turned out to be a man who had been in a prisoner of war camp that I began guarding at the end of World War II, and we found it interesting to talk about his view from the inside, and my view from the outside. That common experience provided a basis for rapport.

The second subject of interest in Salzburg, although it was not a major feature of Austrian politics, was the Monarchist movement and this was also centered in Salzburg. There was a local brewery owner who was simultaneously the "Stellvertreter" or representative of Otto von Hapsburg in Austria. Otto himself was banned from entering Austria. I also got to know him pretty well, and it was kind of fun to follow the Monarchist movement. So these two right wing
movements were centered in Salzburg, and my job was to follow them.

Q: Just to get a feel about it, was there much concern in the early '50s about a resurgence of Nazism or Fascism, in Austria?

MARTENS: I think US concern over that possibility was much reduced by that time. I think US concern over a possible neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist revival had been somewhat greater in my earlier period in Naples, but by 1955 that was not as much of a concern anymore. There was some concern, but I think no one really thought that Austria was going to go that route. These two groups were minor fringe movements.

LLOYD JONNES
Economic Analyst, Economic Cooperation Administration
Vienna (1953-1956)

Lloyd Jonnes was born in Ohio in 1924. He received a bachelor’s degree from Antioch College in 1948 and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1943-1945. Mr. Jonnes’ career included positions in Switzerland, Austria, the United Kingdom, Libya, Turkey, Vietnam, and Indonesia. He was interviewed by W. Haven North on August 19, 1986.

JONNES: Yes, reassigned to Vienna. We came back on home leave in '52. My first task in Vienna was to do the balance of payments forecast for six months of 1953 for the Austrians. Lo and behold, their balance of payments had completely turned around and they received their last allotment of Marshall Plan aid in June, 1953. That was the end of the actual Marshall Plan as such. We continued on with a small mission for several years thereafter, primarily to wind up a number of programs, but more importantly to maintain a watching brief that the Austrians were making the transition out of occupation to independence.

Q: How did you find the Austrian economy at the time you started there?

JONNES: It was booming in 1953 for a variety of reasons. There was a high degree of domestic political stability. Second, the Germans had made substantial investments there during the war for obvious reasons. Third, the nation had received a large volume of American aid. The rest of Europe, too, by 1953 was growing rapidly which reflected itself in Austria's exports and tourism industry.

Q: Was it not so badly damaged as other countries?

JONNES: Not so badly. Yes, some parts had been bombed and fought over, but the physical damage was not at all that bad. One of the real shocks for the Austrian economy was the seizure by the Russians of all significant industrial establishments in the Russian zone after they had moved in. This conglomeration was called the USIA complex, having nothing to do with our USIA.
Q: USIA stood for what?

JONNES: It was an abbreviation, in Russian I believe, for the former German-owned industrial plants seized by the Russians in 1945. Consistent with anything that offered a chance for profit the Russians moved a great deal of machinery out to Russia. It was all part of the indemnification of the Russians for the damage inflicted upon them by the Germans, and Russians were determined they would make good from anything they could make good from.

In 1954, one of our principle operations in Austria were the sales under the Public Law 480 programs which had just come into being. One of my principal functions was working out these programs with the Austrians. Then, quite suddenly at the end of 1954, it was becoming fairly clear that there were going to be serious negotiations on the political status of Austria. There had been a series of negotiations in the immediate post-war period on an Austrian state treaty. These had come to naught because basically the Russians were not prepared to agree. But quite suddenly toward the very end of 1954 or very early in ’55, the Russians indicated that they would be prepared to negotiate seriously, and mirabile dictu the negotiations resulted in a state treaty which came into effect May 15, 1955, and Austria was independent in the most meaningful sense of the word.

One critical question for us as we were looking at the economic side was what would be the impact of the state treaty on Austria. Our colleagues in Washington people were quite concerned lest the successes of the Marshall Plan in Austria might be jeopardized by the tremendous costs of undoing the damage done by the Russians in their zone. We did a study of the economy that suggested Austria's economy should have little difficulty in the transition. We had lots of information available from miscellaneous sources on what was going on in the Russian zone economically, and the conclusion was Austria had reached economic viability.

Q: Did the Russian zone constitute a major share of the economy?

JONNES: In rough terms each of the three major occupying powers held a third of the country plus a share of Vienna. In terms of the size of the Austrian economy, I imagine Russian share was something less than a third. Vienna itself was under four power occupation with the central district being truly under international control, but then each occupying power had part of the city and the Russians in their segment had their hands on the economy quite literally.

Living in Vienna at that time was also fascinating. I think of the movie, “The Third Man” with Orson Wells. When we first arrived, we could not move out of the city except on one or the other of two routes, driving either on the one to the British zone or the one to the American zone. Other than on those highways we could not drive outside the city limits without special permission from the Russians. And even with the permit you would find yourself stopped at checkpoint and have Russians with their tommy-guns at your head even though you were perfectly legitimate. This tended to persuade one to stay at home.

Q: So you couldn’t travel around the country?
JONNES: You couldn’t travel around the Russian zones at all except when we drove all the way out by designated route.

Q: American zone? British zone?

JONNES: In the American and British zones we could travel of course.

Q: And that would roughly be a third?

JONNES: Yes, we had roughly about third. The French had a small area over by Lake Constance that we had given them as a consolation prize. We had the Tyrol and Salskammergut, and the Brits had Steiremark and Carinthia.

Q: Living in Vienna, you were describing that as being...

JONNES: We enjoyed our years there. Perhaps the adversity of being off on the edge of Western Europe under unsettled conditions added zest. The music of Vienna was marvelous even though the opera did not move back into its permanent home until 1955.

In that same year our modus operandi changed significantly after the state treaty. The American aid mission came to an end as such, and what had been the U.S. High Commission in Austria was transformed into the Embassy. In effect in those days under the High Commission, the High Commissioner had been our ambassador.

Q: Were there particular program areas that you were trying to promote?

JONNES: No, rather, we were concerned only to maintain a watching brief on the Austrian economy

Q: So there wasn’t any particular sector you were emphasizing?

JONNES: That's right.

Q: There must have been massive amounts of counterpart monies?

JONNES: There were massive amounts of counterpart monies. That’s absolutely correct.

Q: You were programming this?

JONNES: We were not programming, we were looking at it after the Austrians programmed it. You know we would take our 5%, I guess it later became 10%, under the Zablocki Amendment. The real question was where control of this should lie and obviously it had to be in the first instance with the Austrians. As long as inflation was under control I think we would not be too concerned.

Q: We were not dealing with the allocation by sector or anything?
JONNES: I think that in a country as sophisticated as Austria, there are so many devices to achieve effective allocation of financial resources that there was little point in debate. On the margin, perhaps our recommendations might have had some effect, for example in the amounts of local resources going to new tourist facilities. Perhaps.

Q: But then the counterpart, was that a major problem?

JONNES: No. But one aspect of the matter was a small problem, that of what we called "the price gap." There had been a shortfall in the deposits of counterpart by the Austrians against what we thought should have been deposited. This arose in effect because the Austrians were selling the goods being imported at a lower price than we had thought they would or could, so the amounts of schillings (as the counterpart of the aid) deposited with the National Bank were below the expected amounts, ergo, a gap, and of course the question was whether the Austrians would ever be called upon to deposit the full amount in the counterpart accounts. The gap was a de facto subsidy to the Austrian economy, and ultimately we acquiesced in accepting the de facto subsidy. We finally worked this out in the most general of terms.

Q: Why were we providing any assistance for them... food shortage?

JONNES: We were providing food aid largely because of our domestic concerns with surplus grain supplies, i.e., simply as a U.S. interest. The Austrian interest was in minimizing the foreign exchange costs of commodities they needed -- they were a large importer of wheat at that time from the United States. They were delighted to get it without spending dollars even though their foreign exchange situation had improved markedly. I would add parenthetically that one of the critical questions for all of the European countries was that once they reached a reasonable balance of payments how should they dismantle this great complex of import regulations designed to cope with the previous balance of payment problems. How do you liberalize? One of our constant concerns with the Austrians was to have them recognize our legitimate interests in exporting to them.

Q: Were there other conditions that you were implying in conjunction with your balance of payments?

JONNES: Not really. Until 1953, in that period from 1945 to 1953, the United States High Commission had been remarkably involved with the Austrian economy in extraordinary detail because of the universal view that the Austrian economy was a basket case. A personal note. In May, 1945, I ended up the war in Austria and even then it was very clear that there were serious, serious problems with the economy. We provided aid under the Government Assistance to Occupied Areas (GAOA) programs immediately after the war and then through the Marshall Plan. In part because of this, we had kept the economy going. Then we made the discovery that really the Austrian economy was in very sound shape. Tourism is also one of the great pluses because this is what put their balance of payments in order in the short run. As Europe began this slow process of recovery, tourism took off.

Q: Do you have any recollections of the general magnitude of the U.S. assistance?
JONNES I have full details in the attic. In the immediate post-war years, i.e., 1946-1952, US assistance to Austria was just over a billion dollars, of which $680 million came under the Marshall Plan.

Q: In our current parlance about graduate countries, was Austria a success?

JONNES: Yes, the Austrians believe it and we believe it. It worked very, very well for a variety of reasons. To my mind our aid certainly was a necessary condition for the rapid development of Austria, but the predominant reason for Austria's economic success was in the political stability they achieved in sharp contrast to the 1920's and 1930's when civil war had erupted. Another element explaining this success concerned the Austrian economy after annexation by Germany. The Germans considered Austria as an excellent site for much of its war production and invested heavily in these facilities, in steel-making, metal working, and machinery. Many of the investments made by the Germans remained in place after the war. Yet another factor in Austria's economic rapid growth lay in the simple fact that the other European economies had revived, and Austria benefited substantially from growth in demand for its exports and the phenomenal increase in tourism.

Q: Was there a lot of technical assistance activities?

JONNES: Yes. A large volume of technical assistance activities, but I knew almost nothing about these. By the time of my arrival in 1953, the volume was declining.

Q: How did you find working with the Austrians?

JONNES: Always instructive. There is a long tradition of imperial power in the Hapsburg Empire, one of the great empires of history.

Q: What was your title?

JONNES: I was a program economist.

Q: Was there a mission director then?

JONNES: The mission director when I went to Vienna was Clarence Meyer. When he left, Richard McCaffrey took over. Meyer was there for two years of our stay, and McCaffrey for one year.

HENDRIK VAN OSS
Economic Officer
Vienna (1953-1956)

Hendrik Van Oss was born in 1917 in Pennsylvania and graduated from
Princeton University. He joined the Department of State in 1942 and the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Austria, Uganda, Mozambique, New Zealand, the Congo, and Washington, DC. Mr. Van Oss was interviewed by Lillian Mullins in 1991.

Q: Today is June 16, 1992 and this is a continuing interview with Hendrik Van Oss concerning his Foreign Service career. Mr. Van Oss you served in Vienna from 1953 to 1956.

VAN OSS: I was assigned to Vienna right after Kuala Lumpur arriving there in November 1953. We stayed there until November 1956. I was assigned there as Transport and Communications Officer which was somewhat of a mystery to me because I never thought I knew anything about either transport or communications. I questioned the assignment and was assured that the powers to be knew what they were doing. I am not sure to this day that they did, but in any event the assignment stuck.

So as an unwilling economic officer I went off to Vienna. In those days Vienna was still occupied and I won't go through all that because it is part of well-known history. But briefly, the four occupying allied powers (U.S., Great Britain, France and USSR) each had a section of Austria and each had a section of Vienna. Then there was an international section in the middle of Vienna which was governed on a monthly basis by each of the occupying powers in rotation. To get to Vienna we had to go through a corridor from the American sector, which ended around Linz, through the Soviet sector into Vienna.

I found this assignment a somewhat humbling experience because in Kuala Lumpur I had been the officer in charge and while it was a small post it was a very exciting one, and a lot was going on. I was part of and on top of anything that was happening. I was the main American representative. Whereas in Vienna I was one of about several hundred members of the U.S. High Commission. Our Ambassador, Tommy Thompson, was High Commissioner. My exact position was Alternate Representative on the Quadripartite Signals (Communications) Committee, Transport Directorate and Air Directorate. That meant in effect that I sat in on Four Power Directorate meetings in those three categories of activities.

As I say I had no previous knowledge about any of these spheres. On civil air, in the early days, I was under a chap named Tom Carter, a very experienced civil aviation attaché. I learned a lot from him. But on transport and communications, railroads, post offices, etc...I was on my own. My only consolation being that nobody else at the Embassy knew much about these subjects either. Also, I had U.S. military people who were in theory under me, but who actually ran the operations in those respective areas in the U.S. zone of occupation.

Dealing first with the one I knew the least about, the Quadripartite Signals Committee, I don't remember too much about the details. I had a local employee, an Austrian national, who knew all about the subject and helped me greatly. I remember going to see the Austrian Post Office Director and being given a book of Austrian postage stamps, which I still have to this day. The only thing worth reporting is that we had, by Quadripartite agreement, the right to inspect the telephone underground terminals which were in the Soviet zone under guard of the Soviet occupying powers. I remember going down with an American Colonel who was my deputy for
this activity and an expert on communications...going down into the bowels of the earth under Vienna and seeing what seemed like mile after mile of cables and all sorts of electronic terminals and other equipment. I was trying to look knowledgeable. We "inspected" these facilities in order to retain our legal right to do so. If we had not exerted this right on occasion the Soviets might have tried to prevent us from doing it at all on the grounds that we hadn't shown any interest. So we inspected periodically.

On the Transport Directorate, the main thing we had to worry about was the Austrian railroad system. Here also I was in complete ignorance of what I was doing, except what I could pick up on the spot. Again I had military people helping me, people far more experienced in railroad management than I. But I was the representative of the Quadripartite Committee so in theory any negotiating that was done on the subject of railroads was my responsibility. We used to take inspection trips on the railroad. We would get the Austrian Director of Railroads' personal, private car and go tootling all over the railroad lines in the American occupied zone. There wasn't too much to inspect because all you see were railroad tracks and if the train slowed down for some reason or other I would try to look knowledgeable as if I knew what was happening, but I didn't.

The only other thing worth mentioning on these inspection trips was the extraordinary amount of food that we were expected to eat. I forgot to mention that the Director of Railroads, Maximilian Schant, accompanied us -- after all it was his railroad car. All the people at the various railroad stations we stopped at regarded him as their chief and they feasted, wined and beered him and the rest of us. We might have two full dinners in the space of an hour and a half. It reached the point that the American Colonel with me protested most vociferously and not too tactfully that the food situation was becoming intolerable. I found it equally so but managed to maintain a certain degree of diplomatic acceptance of all this stuff. I suppose we all put on about eight pounds apiece as a result of these trips.

Another thing of interest I don't remember too much about it although I did quite a bit of work on it at the time, was the Danube River. I worked with a chap by the name of Huber, if I remember correctly, who was head of the Waterways Department in the Ministry of Transport. The main thing of interest to report is that one of my colleagues at the Embassy, Paul Smith, and I took a trip from Passau, on the German border, down to Vienna in a zille, which is a cross between a canoe and a row boat. We paddled the whole distance. It took us about four days. We stayed at inns on the banks of the Danube on the way down. That gave us a good insight into the atmospheres of what was going on. I remember in one little inn at which we stopped, there were a number of working people who were eating there. We struck up a conversation with them. I was not fluent in German, but certainly had a useful knowledge of it and had no need for interpreters. We were asking these workmen about their political views and it turned out they were all National Socialists, Nazis. They said they were keeping their heads below the horizon for the moment, but expected their day to come again. There was no question about that. I must say that this was the only place that I saw neo-Nazi manifestations during my tour in Austria.

Q: When you were on this interesting four-day paddling trip on the Danube, do you remember whether there was much freight traffic?
VAN OSS: Frankly, I don't remember any. There may have been a barge or two that slipped by without our paying much attention to it. There were ferries that crossed the river in various places. One thing worth mentioning is that there is quite a powerful current on the Danube and the little zille we were paddling was not very maneuverable so you couldn't always judge when the current might bring you in on a collision course with one of these ferries. We had to be very, very careful indeed when we happened to come close to one.

The reason there was little or no traffic, of course, was that the part of the river we were on was mostly under the control of the Soviets from Linz on. Supplies could just not go through the Soviet sector without following very carefully outlined procedures.

I might digress a little bit and say something about the occupation...about our experience during the occupation when we were there. As I say, we got to Vienna through the Soviet zone via train and had to carry "gray cards" which were identification documents. Soviet officials would board the trains from time to time and check on these cards. After arriving in Vienna we were housed in the Bristol Hotel right across the street from the State Opera House and one of the finest hotels in Vienna. We had a small son at that point so the three of us had one large double room and one adjoining single room with two massive bathrooms each with a seven foot bathtub. We had a refrigerator. Our rooms had velvet brocaded wall paper and full room service. For these magnificent accommodations we paid the princely sum of 50 cents per room per day. The Bristol was an American occupying army billet, I suppose. We were there for at least six months.

After that we moved to a small house out near Grinzing, one of the famous wine villages on the outskirts of Vienna. The house was really too small for us, but we were ready for anything after six months in a hotel. Although the hotel was wonderful in its way. We had full maid service and babysitting service. We had concierges who knew all the casts of the operas, could advise us of the best operas to see, and could procure excellent seats. In those days in Vienna you could get the best opera seat in the house for something like $2.50. If you went to the best restaurant in town you could get the finest meal you could eat for about the same price. So it was really, in a fiscal sense, paradise.

We enjoyed Vienna very much as a place to live and it was also very interesting culturally. Another thing worth mentioning is that our two youngest children, our second son and our daughter, were both born in Vienna.

There was an American Club with a swimming pool and tennis courts; there was a PX -- the Army took care of its own very well. The High Commission was really part of the military structure so we benefitted from all these perks.

The other occupying powers administered their section in typical fashion. The American section of Austria took on an air of a pseudo-United States with lots of activity, business and reconstruction. The French concentrated more on the hotels and the food and that sort of thing. The British, well, there was nothing really worth noting about their section. But the Soviet section...you could go into the Soviet section with a blindfold, and when you took it off you would know at once that you were in the Soviet section, because it was drab, gray, buildings had not been repaired, the atmosphere was repressive. Perhaps it was that way because we expected
it to be that way, but I think we were perceptive enough to see what was actually happening.

Another thing about the occupation, the three Western powers, France, Britain and the United States, were trying to build Austria up and bring it back to economic and political viability. We were always trying to persuade the Soviets to negotiate an end to the treaty and loosen up their regulations. This really was the bulk of my work. Eighty percent of my work was with civil aviation. Most of the work was trying to train Austrians to take over their civil air activities after the end of the occupation. The Soviets opposed this all the way because they feared that the Austrian air force would be built up and would lead to the restoration of the Austro-German Luftwaffe. This was the excuse they used to keep a tight clamp on all civil air activities by Austrians.

There were several airfields in the American zone, both civil and military, which in theory were under my aegis. One of them was in Linz, another in Salzburg, another in Tulln, right outside Vienna. Then there was a little air strip in the American zone of Vienna itself which was right along the Danube Canal. This was really a little death trap. It was a very short and narrow runway right next to the Canal with a dog leg in it, following a bend in the Canal. Only small planes could use it, and these had to bend their flight pattern while taking off or landing. Various city streets led broadside into the landing strip. Wind would whistle through those streets and cause turbulence on the strip. There were a number of crashes; several young Air Force officers who worked with me, met their deaths there during my time in Vienna.

My activities outside of negotiations on the civil air directorate, were largely associated with trying to keep the Austrians flying. The way we got around Soviet objections was that we set up gliding schools and clubs. If you have a glider you need a small plane to get it in the air. So we had a number of small planes. It followed obviously that if Austrians were allowed to glide, they should be able to fly planes to tow the gliders up. So in this way we trained a steady stream of pilots who we envisaged would become the nucleus for the eventual Austrian airline after the occupation.

The Soviets knew pretty well what we were doing and they didn't like it but they really didn't have any legal basis for objecting to it. They interposed all sorts of obstacles. For example, they would announce arbitrarily that the air corridors were closed for a certain time. I might interject here that there were air corridors we had to follow when flying in and out of Vienna. One came up from the south which went through the British occupied zone and one that came in from the West went through the U.S. zone and, after Linz, went over Soviet occupied territory. These were very jealously guarded by us. The Soviets were always trying to get us to change these air corridors because at least one of them flew over Soviet military air installations. They assumed that we were taking photographs of these installations whenever we sent planes through the corridor, and I imagine we indeed were. But that was not my function.

Another thing we had to do was develop air traffic control personnel. For each airfield we had to have a control tower and it made sense to have Austrians in those towers. So this was how we trained Austria's air control tower operators. We also had an air rescue group which gave us another excuse for training and keeping Austrians in the air.
One interesting political matter I should mention is that the Minister of Transport and Nationalized Industries was a chap named Waldbruner, a socialist and Labor Party member. The Civil Aviation branch was under him. The head of that and my main Austrian government contact was Walter Watzek, a very nice, forthright person who had been wounded in the war and had lost his larynx. He breathed through a tube coming out of his throat and spoke with a very husky voice. But he was a fine fellow. He worked under Waldbruner.

Other people interested in civil aviation were with the other party, the National Volkspartei, Chancellor Rabb's party. Vice Chancellor Sharf was leader of the Labor Party. The National Party people who were involved with aviation were led by Fritz Polcar, a member of the Austrian legislature and a very slippery character indeed. The governmental backing for him came from the Minister of Finance who was under the control of the National Party. This was very significant because while my official dealings were with Watzek, I still had to contend with Fritz Polcar and his followers.

Fritz Polcar was president of the Austrian Aero Club which was the conservative's group that had to do with civil aviation. He was a real go getter and somewhat of a shyster, I suspect. He eventually ended up, I believe, in prison for some corrupt practice or other. But he was an interesting happy go lucky sort of fellow. He used to have a lot of parties at the local heurigen establishments. I had to go to many of those. There was a great deal of drinking on such occasions and I always tried to leave with my honor intact, which was not always very easy to do.

Polcar had a number of ex-Austrian pilots with him. One in particular I remember was Sepp Froeschl, a Luftwaffe pilot who had been shot down and severely burned. These people were all anxious to get back into the air. There was a constant struggle between the Transport Minister (Labor) and the Finance Minister (National) and Polcar to maneuver themselves into position to take over the Austrian airline and entire civil aviation activity as well, because as long as Waldbruner was Minister of Transport, the government side of civil aviation would be controlled by the people he was associated with, the socialists.

The eventual turning over of the air fields and installations to the Austrians after the State Treaty was signed, and I will go into the treaty itself later, was a very intricate business. We had to keep in mind at all times that there were two factions, each trying to get complete control over the air fields and the incipient Austrian airline. I spent almost all of my time trying to work out a process whereby we could give over these air fields to both sides so that they could all share equally in the turnover. Once the air facilities were in Austrian hands it was up to them to finally resolve their differences. I felt that we should not take it upon ourselves to hand the air fields over to one faction in exclusion of the other. And I thought that our military were lined up solidly behind this effort. I remember that we were slated to turn over all the installations on the afternoon of a certain date to representatives of both Transport and Finance Ministries. I was to pick up Watzek at an agreed upon place out at Tulln airbase. The turnover was all going to be symbolically done at the main American airbase near Vienna at a predetermined time in the afternoon. The Ministry of Finance was going to send representatives. There was to be a ceremony at which the signing over of air facilities would take place and the Austrian flag raised.
To my horror, on the morning of the day that this was supposed to take place, I got a phone call from my Air Force colleague who was in charge of operations at Tulln airbase, saying that they had "done it." I asked, "Done what?" Well, he said, "We turned everything over to the Austrians." I was astounded and horrified and said, "How could you have done this? We are supposed to do it this afternoon." He said, "Oh, well, the Ministry of Finance sent some people over this morning and we turned everything over to them." I said, "My heavens, what are you going to do about the Ministry of Transport and Watzek?" "Oh, well," he said, "we are going to have the flag raising ceremony this afternoon and he can come to that."

Well, of course, I transmitted all this to Watzek and I'm sure he thought he had been betrayed, that I had lied to him or misled him at the very least. It was a highly embarrassing situation. He came to the flag raising and they even started that ceremony off without him. It really was a terribly aggravating thing for me and for the Embassy and for half of the Austrian people we dealt with. At the time I was extremely angry with our Air Force. I felt that I had been betrayed, that they had gone against what we had all been so careful to arrange.

In retrospect I think probably that this was not just a casual mistake. I think there were a number of rather conservative colonels who were very closely involved in everything that was going on related to turning over facilities to the Austrians. It occurs to me that they were suspicious of Waldbrunner and his fellow Labor Party socialists. They were just not going to turn anything over to the socialists. They felt that it was better and more American to turn things over to conservatives. I had no axe to grind for either side. All I wanted to do was to be fair to both, and I felt that our military did themselves and our Embassy a great disservice by engaging in that little bit of unfair play. I certainly reported this to the Embassy, but I doubt it ever found its way into the historical archives. But it shows how despite the best efforts of men things can go awry.

The saga of the struggle between the two parties as to which would take over the Austrian airline continued long after the occupation ended. The result was that Austria ended up with two airlines. One was Air Austria, the one run by the National VolksPartei and the other was Austrian Airways, which was under the Ministry of Transport and Labor and run by a gentleman named Rudolf Trimmel, with whom I kept a Christmas card correspondence until he died several years ago.

As a postscript to all this, years later, about eight or ten years ago, Anne and I went back to Vienna on a nostalgia trip. I went to the Austrian Airlines office there -- by this time there was only one airline -- and asked to see a list of the Board of Directors to see if there was anybody I remembered, but there wasn't. Then the young lady who was helping me handed me a book in English on the history of the Austrian Airlines. I speedily rushed through the pages trying to find the era of the mid-50s in which I had spent most of my time worrying and working. I think I found only one sentence that covered the whole period of occupation. Something to the effect that during the occupation Austrian air activity was confined to gliding and after the occupation the Austrian airline came into being. Almost a complete ignoring of what had really taken most of my life during three whole years. So that was another humbling experience.

The only other thing I want to talk about was the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. As civil air officer, since the problems associated with aviation were fairly important, I was appointed a
member of the U.S. negotiating team. I participated in the preparations for the talks (at a very low level).

I was highly impressed with the negotiating ability of our Ambassador, Tommy Thompson, who incidentally was one of the finest ambassadors I have ever worked with if not the finest. He was one of the best negotiators our government has ever had, although he didn't do much actual bargaining. He was effective without seeming to be so. He knew when to stand firm and how not to say too much. He kept his remarks to a bare minimum.

But he was on top of everything and he knew that he had the Soviets over a barrel because the Soviets had determined to relinquish control. They had asked Chancellor Rabb to come to Moscow a month or so before the State Treaty negotiations began, and had at that time proposed certain procedures for ending the occupation. The Austrians were so anxious to see the end of the occupation that they agreed to various conditions which Ambassador Thompson was confident they need not have accepted and he was determined that he was not going to let Austria weaken itself in this way.

For example, the Soviets wanted to keep extraterritorial rights in Austrian oil fields and oil industry after they left the country. Tommy concluded from long experience dealing with the Soviets that they were determined to get out of Austria and would eventually knuckle under and accept any reasonable precondition that we might insist on. If they wanted Austria to be neutral, as they did, they had to live by that themselves, and couldn't retain extraterritorial rights. So he very cleverly and persistently held firm on this point and finally forced the Soviets to withdraw their demand.

It went right down to the wire as a matter of fact. Secretary Dulles was on his way over to sign the Austrian State Treaty. He was in Europe somewhere (perhaps London or Frankfurt) and Tommy sent one of his officers to Dulles to tell him not to come until he gave the word. Dulles knew what was going on and said publicly he would not arrive for the signing unless this point had been settled. So it was indeed settled.

Q: Was this 1951?

VAN OSS: It was 1955. I arrived in 1953 and left in 1956. The State Treaty was signed in Vienna, I think in May 1955.

Anyway, the negotiations ended successfully, the date of the signing of the State Treaty was set and the great day arrived. We had sent over a tremendous delegation of people led by Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and including all sorts of great names like Chip Bohlen, Livingston Merchant, etc. There were at least 50 personages, a large delegation.

I remember on the signing day we went in a motorcade consisting of 13 cars. I was in the 13th car, so I am glad there were 13. We rode from the Embassy over to Belvedere Palace where the treaty was to be signed. The streets were packed with Austrians. It was intermittently raining and sunny...sometimes you could see a sea of umbrellas and other times you could see smiling faces. People were throwing flowers and cheering. I felt as if I were participating in the liberation of
Paris or something like that. It was really one of the most heartwarming experiences of my entire time in the Foreign Service.

Anyway, we got to the Belvedere Palace. The signing was to take place in the ballroom on the second floor. The floor of the ballroom was supposed to be weak so the number of people allowed to be in the ballroom was severely limited. There was a long table for the five foreign ministers, including the Austrian Foreign Minister, Figl, and their immediate aides were behind them. The rest of us were supposed to stay in rooms off the ballroom and were allowed to look through the doors. But the minute the big five arrived and took their places at the table, as if by an unheard signal we all streamed in from the antechambers and grouped ourselves around the table. I found myself in the back row within a meter and a half of John Foster Dulles' pen. It was somewhat of a crush.

The signing took place and afterwards the foreign ministers went out on a balcony. There were great crowds in front of the Palace. Dulles, in the words of Chip Bohlen or Livingston Merchant, looked like a debutante after her ball because he was smiling and waving at the crowd. Not at all like the dour, rather crusty old fellow that we were used to. Molotov was a short, stubby character. He didn't smile at all but had his hands clasped together over his head in the classic gesture of a winning prize fighter. Macmillan was the ham actor looking over the crowd, pointing and waiving to people. So it was a great performance by everybody. That night we had a reception and dance in the ballroom at the Schönbrunn Palace, which was opened up to everybody for the occasion, reminiscent of the glorious days of the Austrian empire.

The final thing to say is that the next day the newspapers carried a picture of the long table with the foreign ministers and the people in back of them. This picture, as is often the case with newspaper photos was rather indistinct, but I thought as I looked at it that I saw a familiar hairline peering over the group behind the table of notables and thought it was yours truly. So I immediately ordered a dozen copies of the paper and put in a request to the newspaper for an actual positive print of the picture saying that I would like to get something to frame for my mother and posterity. The only trouble was that when the print finally arrived, the hairline was indeed familiar, but it was not my hairline, but that of a colleague in the Austrian Foreign Office. So much for fame.

_Q: You mentioned once when Tommy Thompson was concerned about what the Soviets demanded, that he knew that the Soviets wanted out. What did you mean? Were the Soviets anxious to bring this occupation to an end?_

_VAN OSS: You must realize that Tommy was in constant communication with his old Soviet hand buddies, Chip Bohlen and other people. All these things were being discussed and analyzed very thoroughly. The feeling was that the Soviets were anxious to find a solution to the Berlin question, and that they thought by giving in a little bit in Austria where they were not as deeply involved, they could kill several birds with one stone. If they could bring about a neutral Austria, or an Austria that was not in the Western camp, they felt they might be able to lighten the political climate and perhaps induce the occupying powers to be willing to negotiate something of comparable significance in Berlin. Possibly a neutral Germany. It was thus felt that the Soviets thought by bending in Austria they could get something favorable to themselves out of
the German situation.

Now there may have been other things involved. There may have been cost factors, who knows. I think you have to examine the records of that time to find out everything that was involved. But Tommy Thompson could analyze these things and he knew through his contacts with Austrians, what the Soviets had told them in their Moscow meeting with Rabb. So he knew the Soviets had made up their minds to end the occupation. And he knew that since they wanted to get out they probably could be persuaded to give up a number of the conditions they had forced the Austrians to accept...which the Austrians had been willing to accept because of their overwhelming anxiety to end the occupation as quickly as possible.

Throughout all the State Treaty negotiations the Austrians would become very nervous when we stood firm, when we insisted that the Soviets give up extraterritorial rights, for example. They were always afraid that the Soviets would say, "Well, if you won't give us what we want, we won't sign the treaty." But Thompson was a shrewd judge of Soviet character. He knew he had them over a barrel and that they would eventually knuckle under, and they did.

Through this whole process he displayed nerves of steel. He was patient, persistent. He must have been a brilliant poker player. He was always in complete control of everything, had his fingers on every aspect of the negotiations. He lost about 17 pounds in the process. It was a great performance. I might add that it was his second winning performance. Prior to this he had negotiated a successful outcome to the Trieste conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia.

I don't think there is too much more to say, unless you can think of something that I should talk about. I might mention one thing of interest. While I was duty officer at the Embassy at one point some people straggled into the Embassy...this was on a weekend as I recall...a young man and his obviously pregnant wife. They declared that they had just been in an air crash. It turned out that their plane had crashed on the Kalenberg, right outside Vienna. It had flown into the side of the hill and broken apart. A number of passengers had gotten out without a scratch, including this young frightened American woman who apparently became quite a heroine in the process. She ripped off her petticoat and helped bind the wounds of one of the men who had been hurt. One of our couriers was on that plane...I think his name was John Irwin, if I am not mistaken. He was severely hurt and got some kind of high military award for valor because he carried the diplomatic pouch or part of the pouch out of the plane with him and wouldn't accept pain killers or treatment until he had delivered the pouch into the hands of somebody qualified to receive it. It was quite a performance on his part.

**Q:** You have been telling me about the collegial atmosphere at the Embassy in Vienna. I wonder if you would like to put that on the record as well?

**VAN OSS:** Yes, I would like to. Posts are different. Vienna, I think, was one of the friendliest posts I have ever been assigned to. A very close spirit of cooperation and friendship developed among all the people who were in my type of work. In other words the officers at the Embassy and their wives. We were all doing work that we thought was important and interesting and, for some reason or other that can't be quantified or described, very warm friendships were made at this post.
I think we now have more close friends from our Vienna days than from any other post where we have served. I think other people who were assigned to Vienna at that time would corroborate this. It was most unusual. When Dick Davis, who was the head of the political section, left, he said in his final remarks at his farewell party, "You may not realize it, but this is a special post. The friendships that you have made here will last all of your lives." He went on in that vein for a few minutes and finally broke down in tears and had to stop. So it was an unusual post.

Q: Do you think the political situation had a lot to do with that?

VAN OSS: Yes, I think we were all working hard. We were up against formidable adversaries. We had fine people in charge...the Ambassador, his deputies and senior and junior officers were all able. It was just an unusual amalgam of things that made for a very interesting and friendly post. The gemütlich atmosphere of Vienna, the music, food, and historic buildings, the charm of the countryside, all contributed to the feeling of well being each of us had.

Q: This concludes Mr. Van Oss' remarks about his posting to Vienna from 1953-1956.

ALFRED PUHAN
U.S. Secretary in the Allied Commission for Austria \ Vienna (1953-1957)

Ambassador Alfred Puhan was born in Marianburg, Germany, (now Poland) of an American father raised primarily in Illinois. He was educated at Oberlin College, the University of Cincinnati and Columbia University. During World War II he was employed in radio broadcasting, first by the British Broadcasting Company and later by the Voice of America. In 1953 he joined the Foreign Service, serving in Vienna and in Washington, where he served as Executive Director of the European Bureau and Head of the Office of German Affairs. In 1969 he became US Ambassador to Hungary and served there until 1973. Ambassador Puhan was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

PUHAN: Well, if it hadn’t been for the fact that the very next day while I was still contemplating Murrow’s offer, I received my first Foreign Service assignment, to Vienna, Austria. Now, it had never occurred to me that Vienna might be a post I could get. But here I was a German language expert. I spoke German fluently. And the idea of going to Vienna in the ‘50s under Four Power occupation--my wife and I discussed this and a decision was made and that was the end of my tie with the Voice of America and the information program.

Q: I had a somewhat similar experience with it. This is not my interview, but because of that, I can understand what you went through. When you went to Austria, in precisely what capacity did you go? What was your assignment?

PUHAN: It was an assignment that was not particularly sought after by Foreign Service Officers.
You see, Lew, the problem I think ever since lateral entry into the Foreign Service came into being, the problem has always been: what do you do with a man who has had 900 people working for him as in my case? Where do you put him, what kind of a job? Yet, he’s had no foreign experience except with the Voice of America and he hasn’t been a political reporter in the sense in which the Foreign Service use that or an economic officer. So what do you do with them? And I think they’ve always had a lot of difficulty. And I was assigned to what I thought was probably a sort of an ancillary job which most Foreign Service Officers didn’t want. It was held at the time by Hal Ekern. It was U.S. Secretary in the Allied Commission for Austria.

Now, the Allied Commission for Austria, as you know, was in its eighth year when I got there. Two more years were to pass before finally the Austrian State Treaty was hammered out. Hal Ekern, I think he clung with his fingernails to that job because he came out of the military and eventually entered the Foreign Service through the Wriston program. But my coming sort of endangered his job for a while there. He went to the Political Section of the Embassy. I wasn’t even housed in the Embassy. I was in the Allied Commission Building and the biggest drawback was that I really couldn’t have any contact with the Austrians. I enjoyed it. I enjoyed working with the Soviet, British and French Secretaries.

And most important of all, it brought me into weekly contact with one of the finest ambassadors the United States ever had, namely Llewellyn E. Thompson. Thompson was a man who did not ask what was your background in the Foreign Service or what did you do? He was interested in people who could help him—and he found me very useful because he found out that I spoke German fluently. So I began to go with him on his calls to see the chancellor or the vice chancellor of Austria. And, of course, I always briefed him before the Allied Commission meeting. So this was a big plus for me. But as I say it was not a job which made use of my talents as a German language officer because I had no contact with the Austrians except when I went as interpreter, as reporter with the ambassador.

Q: I’d like you to make a few comments about what you think the mission accomplished in the years that you were there and do you think that you personally contributed something to those accomplishments? If so, what?

PUHAN: Well, the Allied Commission was in its last two years beginning its ninth year when I arrived there in June of 1953. It had been a very useful organization in that there was an article in the document which set up the Allied Commission which allowed Austria laws to become law even if there was one veto. It could not stop them from becoming law. It was sort of a shield behind which the Austrians could run their own country even though the four powers all had troops there in Austria.

When I arrived there the Allied Commission was marking time. There had been, oh, 300 or more meetings to try and get an Austrian state treaty and they had always broken down. It wasn’t until its tenth year that we received a signal that the Russians were prepared to go for a treaty provided Austria would accept neutrality and pay certain reparations.

I learned a great deal about the Russians for one thing. I dealt very closely with the Russian
Secretary, but not only with him but also with the top Russians in the Allied Commission because after every meeting we had a social reception, cocktail party if you like, and we showed movies to each other. I even took Russian language lessons at the time.

Well, my contribution to it—I don’t want to exaggerate that. I think I probably helped Ambassador Thompson, and even more so after he asked me to become his political counselor there, because I was able to keep him abreast of what the Austrians were saying and planning. The biggest accomplishment was, of course, under the Allied Commission, the final hammering out of the treaty. As you know—you probably have heard from others, how this process worked. In the morning the American Ambassador or High Commissioner, as the British and the French also were called, would meet at our Embassy and we’d have a strategy session. Then in the afternoon we’d meet with the Russians. This is where Ambassador Thompson showed his great skill. When he saw that the Russian was unable to move obviously because his position was hard and he couldn’t move beyond it, Thompson would suggest that we have a closed session with only two people from each of the four elements there. This gave the Russian a chance to select whomever he wanted to select from his element and you could find out what was the sticking point.

I learned personally more than I undoubtedly contributed because I watched at close range, worked with Ambassador Thompson on this. He came to accept me sort of as his aide and eventually even though I was not the number two man, I was to all intents and purposes, the last two years I was there, I was the DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission.

But the great accomplishment—the Austrian State Treaty of 1955—I think was still one of the finer bits of diplomacy since the end of World War II, because it got the Russians out of a part of the world that they had occupied, the little bit of Eastern Austria, something they haven’t done again until Afghanistan recently where they finally had to pull out. And, of course, even more recently, out of Eastern Europe and East Germany. So I really think that that was a great accomplishment.

Now it was Thompson I believe largely, Ambassador Thompson, to whom the credit goes for achieving that treaty. As you probably know he had also been instrumental in the Trieste settlement, although Clare Booth Luce took credit for that.

Q: What in your estimation caused the Soviets to soften their attitude and come around to a decision that maybe it was better for them to get out of Austria if they could get the kind of neutrality they were looking for?

PUHAN: This is the question of course that has been asked many times and only the Soviets know what the reason was. All kinds of theories have been advanced. The most likely one was that after ten years they had not been able to communize Eastern Austria. This was largely due to the work of that energetic Socialist Minister of Interior Oskar Helmer who prevented the police from being—prevented the Russians from infiltrating the police in Eastern Austria. While the Russians had troops, of course, in Vienna and in Eastern Austria we also were there in Vienna and Salzburg. And as you know that salient stuck right into what became the Soviet Empire, that is Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
Another theory is that they decided, well, if we move out they’ll have to move out too and that leaves Austria without the Americans, British, and French there.

There’s also the theory, as you probably heard, that they were considering the idea of a neutral Germany and that the idea of Austria accepting neutrality might become a model for Germany. I tend to put less credence in that theory because the Russians probably knew and know today that a neutral Germany is sort of out of the question. It’s not really feasible. Now, it’s possible for Austria to be neutral. In fact, Austria profits from that, but I doubt if they would have thought that that would also work for Germany.

One more thing. You know that their interpretation of neutrality was somewhat different than ours—neutral for us and against the other side. As it turned out they’ve learned the Austrians ideologically have always been on our side, but they have been very careful, like Finland, not to antagonize the Soviet Union.

So I think probably more likely than not the idea of getting us out of there, getting that salient out of the Soviet commonwealth there, was probably the dominant factor in accomplishing this. I might just say in 1980 the Austrian government invited me and my wife to come to Vienna to help them celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Austrian state treaty. I was a little nonplussed that they picked me and I asked why I was selected. There were other people who had higher rank than I did there. Thompson of course was dead but Jim Penefield is still very much around. And I was told that, well, when the academicians in Austria studied the files, the American files made available to them dealing with the making of the Austrian state treaty, they found my name repeatedly on cables. Well, that was because I was the drafting officer and of course the ambassador signed the cable.

So they decided that I was sort of a man who was on the inside, had the inside track. And in the discussions that followed with the Russians and British and French with Austrians... [End of Tape 1, Side 1]

Yes, as I was saying, the Russians gave no—this is 1980 now, 25 years after the treaty—gave no indication, no clear indication as to what motivated them. This is the pre-Gorbachev era and so there was no Glasnost at that time. They made all kinds of protestations that they were always for this treaty but the Austrians and we had not complied with what we should have and so on. That was their answer at that time. So there’s no clear answer to that question as to what motivated them to do it. But it remains to this day from my point of view an excellent piece of diplomacy.

Q: You mentioned that Tommy Thompson wanted you to be his political counselor and that you ended up as virtually DCM. Were you dealing extensively with the Austrians outside the official Austrian government? Or were you primarily dealing with the Austrian government officials? And if you were dealing outside, with whom were you talking?

PUHAN: Both. I had, of course, contact with, I knew and they knew me personally—I knew Chancellor Julius Raab, the Vice Chancellor, Schaerf. I knew Oskar Helmer. I knew Poldi Figl, Foreign Minister. I knew them all from the top on down. But I had also a wide range of contact with Austrians outside of government. There were the party people I dealt with—mainly with the
Christian–CDO–the Christian Democratic people. That’s probably the equivalent of our Republican Party, whereas my colleague Alex Johnpoll dealt with the SPO, the Socialist Party—the Socialist Party of Austria. I knew everybody from the Chairman of both parties—the equivalent of the Chairmen of the National Committees here. Then I had a number of friends among the journalists, Fritz Molden, Oskar Pollock and a number of others. I knew a good many of the theater people because I knew German. We went to the opera once a week because you could go to the opera for $4.00 a ticket and sit in the first two rows. And I attended the theater a lot. I got to know the artists, doctors, lawyers as well as the Parliamentarians and Municipal officials. The Mayor of Vienna was a good friend of mine. So I had a lot of outside contacts.

Q: I ask that question because I had a feeling that perhaps that also influenced the Austrian government in their giving you an invitation to come back for their 25th anniversary.

Since you said that you had a number of contacts with the journalists there, do you have any feelings or do you have any knowledge of what role the USIS played in the Austrian program and in the—well, I don’t suppose they influenced the Russians any, but do you think that they were an effective element in the program or don’t you know or don’t you think they were?

PUHAN: Yeah, I think they were. After all, they ran the Wiener Kurier, which was the first newspaper in Austria under American auspices. Rot-Weiss-Rot, the network, the radio network in Austria was supervised and controlled by USIA operations. Although I didn’t have as much to do with them in my Foreign Service duties, I always knew who the responsible people were and what they did. Yes, I think the answer to your question is: yes, I thought they did a very effective job in the post-treaty signing or even pre-treaty signing days in Austria.

Q: It’s a well-known fact, of course, that by the time Hitler moved into Austria there was a very pro-Nazi feeling in a large segment of the population among the Austrians. Did you determine to what extent there was any residual of that feeling after—say during the period you were there? I ask this because it seems under certain circumstances to have resurfaced a little bit in recent years.

PUHAN: Absolutely not! I say this sarcastically. There were no Nazis when I was there. I can still remember the first time I ever crossed into Austria and that was into Innsbruck in 1945 when I was at Luxembourg. When you crossed the border the Austrian flags were flying and everybody had been in the Austrian underground, and there were no NAZIS! While we all knew the acclaim which Hitler received when he entered Austria—when was it? In 1938. The Austrians thought Anschluss was the best solution for them. There was none of that in 1953 when I got there. There was no antisemitic feeling although antisemitism had been endemic in Austria going back into the 19th century. No, there was a complete denial of that.

MORTON A. BACH
Financial/Economic/Commercial Attaché
Vienna (1955-1960)
Morton Bach was born in New York City in 1904. He worked with the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps from 1942, and afterwards was posted in Bern, Seoul, The Hague, Vienna, Luxembourg and Brussels. Mr. Bach was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: You left there in 1955. Where did you go then?

BACH: There was home leave and then Vienna, Austria.

Q: You were in Vienna from when to when?


Q: What were you doing in Vienna?

BACH: Again, I was a financial-economic officer and then I was also the commercial attaché.

Q: This must have been a very interesting time. The peace treaty had just been signed. Austria was free and neutral.

BACH: I know. I was in on the tail end of the negotiations on the state treaty giving Austria perennial neutrality. They did very well.

One thing I neglected to mention in the Hague was that both my wife and I were fond of music. We subscribed to a concert series and entertained Dutch officials in that fashion, which I and apparently everybody else thought was very effective. We did the same thing in Vienna with the opera.

Q: During this 1955-1960 period, how was the Austrian economy?

BACH: Well, they had their political problems. There was a leftover from the earlier (I guess it was in the 1930s.) period when the socialists and the conservatives were shooting at each other. In subsequent years, they had a coalition government. It was always interesting, the interplay. The United States at that time decided that it wanted to develop commercial relations with the area. The Commerce Department constructed a pavilion. It wasn't finished when Ambassador Doc Matthews came over from the Hague. We were in the Hague during the period when he succeeded Seldin Chapin and then he was transferred to Vienna. So, of course, we knew each other. In the early stage of the pavilion, Doc arrived and being the commercial attaché, I stood up there and acted as host and introduced these various Austrian officials whom we had invited to the opening. It went off very well.

Q: What were the commercial possibilities in Austria during this time?

BACH: There were one or two subsidiaries of American firms who were active and then there were all sorts of possibilities. The steel industry was one that the powers we felt could be expanded to Austria's benefit. They had two different Commerce Department teams that came
out and went around the country. I was a member of the delegation. There were strategic materials - not in a military sense - that were being developed at that time that were of interest to American industry. Textiles, we always had a problem from the day that I entered the Foreign Service because of the situation back here. There was a sizeable textile industry. Cashmere sweaters were also predominant. They were doing a large business with the United States.

Q: What about the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956.

BACH: I am going to lead up to it. In 1956, I received a phone call from a former colleague from Bern, Switzerland, Francis Deak. Francis was air attaché in Switzerland. In Rome, he was minister counselor. He said, would I do him a favor? Deak is of Hungarian background. Throughout the whole war period, his mother and sister and other relatives were resident in Budapest. Francis had a top American security clearance, so he negotiated the air treaties after VE Day with all the former Soviet satellites. Anyway, would I meet her at the railway station and put her up and then put her on the train to go to Rome, where she could spend the summer? So, I said, "Of course." So, one night, after we finally found a place in Vienna to live. It was in the American sector, one of these big, old, substantial homes. This one was in the former home of the former Zuckerkoenig (sugar king) of Austria. They had departed. I was up on a ladder trying to get some curtains set up so we could start living again rather than in a hotel. The phone rang. It was a Marine guard: "There is a little old lady who is asking for you." I said, "Oh, fine. Just tell her to wait there and I'll come down." So, I went down and put her up in a hotel. I asked her how she had come out. She had come out in the car of the apostolic delegate. This was a week before the uprising.

I must ascribe that there was apprehension in the American embassy because there was one of those famous footnotes that always exists in treaties that if the Russians, who by that time had departed, were unsatisfied with some provision in the treaty, they had an open door to return. Here was this mass walking across the border from Hungary into Austria. The Austrians were doing quite a job of putting them up in what were formerly the stables (They had been cleaned up.) behind one of the big castles. We had sleeping on our dining room floor with blankets and pillows six members of the Deak family. I succeeded in getting them placed where the system would pick them up to process them. Much to our reluctance, most of them decided to go back, even though there was this enormous movement of Hungarians out of Austria to the United States. They were lined up in the snow at the crack of dawn waiting to get their visas. Of course, the embassy did all sorts of things to help - donuts, coffee, etc. I negotiated with the Austrian government and succeeded in granting American Express a license to do business in Austria - the first non-Austrian bank after World War II and an opening for an American firm. Twice while in Austria, I was assigned as deputy to the U.S. delegation to meetings in Geneva of the early ECE.

Q: Did you get involved in any of the spy game that went on?

BACH: No. I know there was considerable publicity of what was going on there. It was an ideal place for East and West.
WILLIAM J. GALLOWAY
First Secretary
Vienna (1956-1959)

William J. Galloway was born in Texas in 1922. He received a BS from Texas A & M University and served in the U.S. Army as a captain overseas from 1943 to 1948. His postings abroad have included London, Paris, and Vienna. Mr. Galloway was interviewed in 1999 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Today is the October 22, 1999. Bill, you are off to Vienna in 1956. What were you doing there?

GALLOWAY: This was my first traditional Foreign Service assignment. For the earlier period I had been through the NATO structure either overseas or back here in Washington. I was in the political section in the embassy as a first secretary. Al Puhan was the head of the political section. Tommy Thompson was Ambassador. Austria at that time was in the process of really shedding most of the WWII hangovers. It had recovered fairly well, was still suffering economically, but things were looking up. I could see that it was just a matter of time until it would be well back on its feet. During the post war period, it had been governed for the most part by a coalition of the two major parties. That was still the situation when we arrived.

Q: The parties were I assume the precursor to the Christian party and the socialist,

GALLOWAY: Yes. The Christian party was called the People's Party, and the socialists were the Socialist Party. Both had a number of good and aspiring leaders. At the time I was there, the People's Party was in the majority and Raab was the Chancellor. The Socialist Party was one of the staunchest elements of the whole government. It had come through the experience of really facing off against the Soviets. This was during the occupation when the Soviets attempted to win allegiance from elements in Austria. The Socialist Party didn't fall for that line, on the contrary, they were probably the strongest opponents of the Soviets and the indigenous communist party. The Socialists had some very strong leaders, some from the labor movement and some just intellectual and political adherents. There were and still are a number of strong socialist party leaders in central Europe.

In any event the government was a coalition of those two parties. They apportioned the governmental offices by a system known as “proports.” One party would have the foreign ministry, the other would have defense, etc., filling all of the cabinet posts and the senior subordinate positions in that manner. So, as embassy officers we dealt with members of both parties in the various departments. Representatives of both parties were very friendly toward the United States. Economic considerations probably were a main ingredient of that friendship. They were struggling toward a level of prosperity, and the economic assistance from the United States was one of the main building blocks.

As a member of the political section, I soon learned that there were only two or three main political issues that needed to be watched. Leading in political policy was the determination to establish and pursue a policy of independence and governmental neutrality in relation to other
states. Given the Austrian attitude of friendship and cooperation with the United States, we had no major problems with its basic orientation and could support its efforts to rebuild democratic institutions. Our position was to see it left alone to carry on its normal political activity.

Another prominent political consideration was Austria’s relationship to the Vatican. The Concordat was being renegotiated. That had some political aspects that bore watching. In fact that gave me an opportunity to form a friendship with Monseigneur Zacci, one of the attachés in the Papal Nuncio’s mission. My wife and I were valuable to him in that we were able to meet with him at diplomatic functions and at the opera and to form a sort of human shield behind which he could smoke a cigarette.

The third matter of general interest was their long-standing disagreement with Italy over the status of the South Tyrol which both countries had been claiming back and forth for many years and generations. That made their relations with Italy somewhat formal and brittle, but neither side seemed disposed to do much about their claims except to reassert them as occasion warranted.

Q: Did we take any steps on the south Tyrol issue at all?

GALLOWAY: No. We managed to control our initiative in that instance and left it to the two of them to settle if such were ever possible. It never seemed to get close to the point of armed conflict. There were elections and other political moves, and we refrained from any involvement. I think our position generally was the South Tyrol could decide its own future: whether to be part of one country or the other or to remain in its undecided status.

Q: How did we feel about neutrality? I mean other places we were picky under John Foster Dulles. Neutrality was not considered a good word particularly in India, Ghana and other places. What about was this an exception?

GALLOWAY: This was an exception, perhaps because of our role of occupation after WWII when we had the four power occupation pattern there the same as in Germany. Vienna was, of course, its own little enclave with the four powers rotating as chief for a particular period. The rest of the country was divided into four zones. The Russians, particularly, had stripped their zone of pretty much all of its economic goods, key machinery or wealth of any kind. But, we had begun earlier to pay our own occupation costs. We did not object to the move toward neutrality so long as it was accomplished in a democratic institutional format. Our main concern was that the political system worked and that it should work in a democratic way. It did. As a matter of fact, within the party coalition arrangement, it was more democratic than most other countries. So, we never took exception to the government’s declared policy, nor did we try to push them in another direction.

Q: Was there any reaching out with the People's party to the EEU or the Socialist Party to the SED in Germany?

GALLOWAY: Not much. They were pretty much occupied by their work at home. Despite the past relations between Germany-Austria and Austria-Italy, at this particular time, and I think still
to a considerable degree, the Austrians are a central European nation with elements of east and west. Neither of the other two countries had that makeup or complexion particularly. I don't think that there was any more than just normal camaraderie with the Christian and the socialist parties in the other European countries. The Austrian socialists, as I say, were a tough outfit. They really held their own. They were very experienced politically and also in their relations with Moscow. They didn't let themselves be wooed or whatever. As far as Germany was concerned, I think Austria was quite willing to sit back and hope first to get its own treaty. I think they were as surprised as others when, in a four power meeting, Molotov said unexpectedly we will agree to have a peace treaty with Austria. The treaty was concluded, and occupation forces were withdrawn. That was the situation when we arrived there right after the Hungarian revolution.

Q: That would have been in November or December '56.

GALLOWAY: Something like that, yes. The Austrians really did make a great effort to help take care of the refugees who had just streamed across the border. Of course, their relationship with Hungary was almost familial. So they set up camps, made housing arrangements and helped to provide food. We and the other western countries put a lot of aid in there. The embassy ladies set up a soup kitchen for the Hungarians who could get themselves at least one good hot meal a day. At the consular building there was always quite a following of Hungarians waiting for some word on what would happen in their particular cases or to be invited to move into the approved exodus or offerings of countries to take Austrian refugees as immigrants. The U.S. took quite a lot, as did other countries, but most of them were hoping to come to America. There were always many waiting around the consulate and that is where the ladies set up a soup kitchen so that they could have a hot meal while they were waiting. I don't know how many of them had actually been involved in fighting in Hungary which was very short lived when the Russian tanks came in. At least these people had gotten out through the gate. Better to get out than get hurt. The embassy ladies also ran a thrift shop, and under its auspices they started a Hungarian handicraft program. The Hungarians joined in with enthusiasm and they made things of all kinds that could be sold either there or elsewhere. That activity was carried on most of the entire time we were there, and my wife Betty took on an active role in it. Mrs. Thompson, the Ambassador’s wife, was its principal sponsor. All in all, the Hungarian refugee problem was the principal issue for the Austrian government, the international welfare agencies and the embassy, officially and informally, to deal with at that time.

Q: How did you find relations with the foreign ministry and all and with political figures? I mean was it quite open?

GALLOWAY: Very open. Very open for the American embassy. More so than for the others. In fact, there had developed before I got there, and which I inherited, a relationship with the chancellor's public affairs office. The head of that office was very pro-American. He sat in cabinet meetings. He was a pretty powerful figure in the People’s Party and was really a de facto minister. After every cabinet meeting, he would invite one of us to his office and tell us what happened. It was, of course, done very informally. We found ourselves as an embassy probably more informed about the government's activities than the foreign office itself, and the foreign office, although they were as cooperative as they could be, were able to sense that. Sometimes they came to us to find out what was going on in their government.
Q: This happens.

GALLOWAY: Nevertheless, we had very good relations with the foreign office people. Figl was foreign minister when we arrived and he stayed in office a long time. Gruber, who had been Ambassador to the U.S., later served as foreign minister. Anyway, the embassy enjoyed the closest relationship with the government without having to work to any great degree to carry it on. The requirements for reporting as such or for formal diplomatic activities vis a vis the government were very minimal. I can recall that most of our reporting was done in the old WEEKA, the old comprehensive format which missions were supposed to follow and send in weekly reports by airgram. That was the main vehicle for our reporting out of Vienna, which gives you an idea of the rather quiescent political status of the country. The Austrians were left to carry on their own affairs and time was in their favor. Eventually the two parties decided to abandon coalition government and began vying with each other for governmental control. That was after my departure. I would have to say we couldn't have wanted for a better, closer relationship with the government during its coalition period as such. We never needed to use it in any serious way as leverage because their policies certainly were not adverse to our interests and we hoped they would be able to prosper and achieve their main goals.

Q: What were the Soviets doing? I mean it was a neutral, but it couldn't have made them very happy.

GALLOWAY: I think the Soviets in the field were somewhat surprised when the Austrian treaty happened. I expect that occupation duty in Austria had been a plum assignment for all ranks of their military. Even in the early post war days, Austria was a country and people of music, song, fun, drinking bad wine and having good times no matter about one’s economic position. Whether one was just getting by or a plutocrat didn’t really dampen their spirits all that much. But the Soviets, well there really wasn't anything they could do. They had delayed the Austrian treaty for as long as they thought it was in their interest. They had not been able to stir things up to the point of creating unrest, they had nothing further to gain and were pretty much on the defensive at that time anyway in Austria. They had learned there was no prospect of their getting a strong communist foothold in Austria, so I suppose they decided they might as well cut their losses. Their later relationships with the government and with the political parties were practically nonexistent. The less the government had to do with them, the better for it. Once they agreed to the peace treaty and removed the occupation forces, the Soviets, when they said goodbye, it really was goodbye. They were left with a diplomatic presence which gained nothing. As far as I can recall, they really didn't attempt pressure tactics on the Austrians; they were pretty quiet.

Q: Was it a three or a four year tour?

GALLOWAY: It was a two year tour.

Q: During that period of time, the Hungarian revolution had just ended. There had been this massive outpouring of people. Were we monitoring the Hungarian refugees who stayed in Austria. Were we seeing them as perhaps forming a revenge party or something?
GALLOWAY: My own feeling was that they came out because of frustration and disappointment, sadly realizing they were misled in thinking that if they rose up against the repressors, help would be forthcoming from the west, primarily from the United States. After all, our occupation army was just across the border. I think some of the President's and the Secretary’s public statements and speeches during that period were probably open to inference by those oppressed people that if they created uprisings on their own, help would be forthcoming. Although our leaders certainly never went so far in their public pronouncements, to wishful thinking people living in dire straits it was not beyond hope. They thought they were being encouraged not to knuckle under, not to give way. In reality, when they came out of Hungary into Austria, they must have realized that there was no real possibility of military action against the Soviet Union for the liberation of Hungary. They probably saw the truth in Hungary when they were waiting for it to come, but it never came. In the West although some public sentiment called for military action, I don’t believe there ever was any such intention within Western governments. As an occupying power in Austria, neither we nor the UK nor French made any noises or moves which could be interpreted as militarily threatening.

Q: Did you get the feeling that the CIA was running around doing all sorts of things?

GALLOWAY: Well, they had lots of people around, but actually no, they were realistic. They obviously hoped as did the rest of us that the Soviets would not be as brutal as they were in dealing with the Hungarians, but I don't think there was any dogma, so to speak, in CIA policy at that stage to militarily liberate Hungary. I don't believe their people out in the field were off their thinking on that.

Q: But it was mainly the Soviets the KGB and the CIA were both trying to recruit each other and all.

GALLOWAY: Oh, yes. It was that sort of individual activity, which looking back, was completely unnecessary. I don't think either side gained a whit from it. It was to some extent because of the situation of Austria among east-west nations at that stage. Every other person was looking for an agent or a double, but nothing really worthwhile came out of it for either side. I think reading the newspapers would have been just as effective.

Q: Which usually is the case. How about I mean, we were just moving out of the four power occupation. Was there still a lingering unity between the French embassy, the British embassy and the American embassy?

GALLOWAY: Not so much. As always, the French tended to go their own particular way. It was not aimed toward continuation of a close relationship with the British and ourselves at that stage. Their occupation policy was muted because France didn't have adequate financial resources to help. They did take some refugees. The British were much in the same position, and they were always free to consult and talk. We had no differences with them.

Q: Did you, you came there right after the Hungarian Suez crises of ’56. The Suez crisis was noted by a sudden cutting off of all sort of communication between the British and the
Americans. It only lasted for a little while. This was really coming from the top. Did you find that put any breach in.

GALLOWAY: It was an anachronism strangely. The British and French had been consulting with the U.S. on the canal, but they suddenly went on their own with the Israelis. They half-heartedly tried to keep up the fiction of cooperation in Washington. We were not really affected very much in Austria. We were too far away. Eisenhower and Dulles were so perturbed that their disenchantment with the action of the British, French and Israelis came out in full force publicly. The U.S. had taken the lead in the United Nations condemning the Russians for their move in Hungary to suppress the budding opposition there with just blunt military force, undue military force. Most of the rest of the UN joined in and the Soviets really had taken it on the chin in the United Nations and world public opinion. The United Nations was the main sounding board and focus of international attention. That the British and French had joined the Israelis to move militarily on Suez at such close time proximity to the Hungarian event seemed so wrong-headed as well as outright aggression that it completely undermined the UN position vis-a-vis the USSR. I think the President and Secretary were particularly unhappy with the British. In all candor, it was not all that surprising that the French should go off on their own because such was more or less habitual, but for the British to do it was surprising. Murphy was in London talking to the British, but they apparently were not completely candid with him, carrying on actively on the side with the French. As the Suez action was continued with British and French forces moving sluggishly and ineffectively, I believe that word was sent through Murphy to Macmillan, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, that if they didn’t stop, there would be no more money from the U.S. Certainly the United States was not financially supportive. The story has it, although I have no firsthand knowledge of this, that when Macmillan informed Eden and also told him the UK did not have the wherewithal to do it without leaving themselves destitute, that brought a halt. You can imagine what influence that had on the relationship between Eden and Dulles.

WILLIAM M. WOESSNER
Consular Officer
Vienna (1956-1959)

William Mohrmann Woessner was born in New York in 1931. He graduated from Queens College and received an M.A. from Northwestern University. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his postings abroad included Vienna, Warsaw, Berlin, London and Bonn. He then served in the U.S. Army from 1954 to 1956. Mr. Woessner was interviewed in 1999 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

WOESSNER: had to go to the FSI German class because my German was 2+ and they wanted to get it up to 3 before I went out. There were openings in both Vienna and Munich and the man who made my assignment sent me to Vienna, thinking it would be better to have an embassy experience. It would be a broader experience than the consulate general. As it turned out, there was no JOT [junior officer training] program in those days. So, there was no rotation. I spent the two years in the consulate in Vienna. The consulate was physically separate from the embassy. I was well into my second year in Vienna before I even set foot in the embassy. But it was a
fantastic experience.

Q: You were there from 1956-1958?

WOESSNER: I was in FSI for the A-100 class, followed by German language. There was no consular training course at that time. I just went out. I went out in May. Sheila and I got married in March, so this was really our honeymoon. I was there from May of 1957 until July of 1959.

Q: Can you talk about Vienna in 1957?

WOESSNER: They were fresh out from under the Four-Power occupation. During that Fulbright year, I had actually taken a train into Vienna while it was still under occupation, so I remembered it from that time. But they were starting to spruce things up. The Opera had been restored. People were investing money in shop fronts and it was a lot of fun to be there. It’s a romantic city with the old fashioned schmaltz. Several things about the Viennese struck me. How resolutely they looked backwards. It was as if the Kaiser had died the year before. Fresh flowers were on the Kaiser’s statue. Franz Josef died in 1916. All the old traditions were still kept very much alive. The operetta was very good. We were on honeymoon enjoying everything. We traveled a lot, took in whatever we could afford on our limited budget. Our first son was born there. We named him after St. Stephens Cathedral, the Stefansdom. If it had been a girl, it would have been Elizabeth for the Kaiserin Elizabeth. That’s the kind of mood we were in. In fact, we saved the name for our third child. In the office, the first year I did immigrant visa work and then the second year non-immigrant visa work. It was a lively staff, a lot of fun. I found it very satisfying. The camps were still full from the Hungarian uprising.

Q: Did you get involved in refugee work?

WOESSNER: Yes, but only in the sense that the great movement of refugees had already taken place out of the camps and to the United States. Those who were left were the hardcore people with tuberculosis or people with particular placement problems. I dealt in that first year with the various relief organizations. HIAS was particularly effective. There was the National Council of Churches and a Catholic relief group and the Tolstoy Foundation. A lot of Hungarian refugees were still trickling into the U.S. Every case had to be processed very carefully. I got an enormous amount of personal satisfaction out of helping these refugees. I remember one man coming in. He was a rabbi and his whole family had perished in the Holocaust. In the course of the interview, he showed me a picture of his wife and four or five children, all of whom had been slaughtered. That was his first family. He had remarried and proudly introduced me to his new family. It brought home to me just what we had been spared in the U.S. The immediacy of the war, the aftermath. Everybody had stories whether it was those in the camps or those who had lived through the Soviet taking of the city when all the women were raped. There was an enormous reservoir of popular goodwill towards the United States, gratitude for all that we had done. But here it was 1957. The war had been over 12 years and in many ways it was still very fresh. That was something I experienced again at the next post in Poland.

Q: I was in the Refugee Relief Program for part of this time in Frankfurt. I got there in 1955. One of the things I got from this was a tremendous lesson in postwar and war history about
migrations, where people came from and all that. I imagine you were getting the same.

WOESSNER: Oh, yes. It was an exposure to a living history. For me, it was exciting.

Q: Were you getting any reflections of people leaving Yugoslavia?

WOESSNER: No, very little of that. The ones coming through primarily were from the Hungarian uprising.

Q: What was your impression of how the Hungarians were being relocated in the U.S.?

WOESSNER: No idea what happened to them afterwards. The INS played a key role in the processing of all these. But I had the sense from what I heard that those who were taken care of by the relief organizations were well taken care of. These were very effective, efficient operations from getting them cleared through the immigration hurdles to resettling them after they were in the U.S. But I didn’t have any personal experience of a resettling.

Q: How did you find the outlook of the consular officers? Who was running the Consular Section? Sometimes you have old hands who have been there, seen that, done that.

WOESSNER: Yes. It was a small section. This was not a visa mill. But those of us who were on the line and doing the actual processing, we weren’t at all jaded. We were too fresh. It was too new and it was very emotional in many ways. It gave me a great sense of satisfaction. The head of the Immigrant Visa Section was a woman who was the widow of an FSO who had died in internment by the Japanese in Shanghai, China, not through mistreatment but he had had an accident. She could be rather difficult. Her behavior was such that in this day and age…well, it was just outrageous. Talk about sexual harassment. We didn’t think in those terms then. She must have been 50 and took an unhealthy interest in her junior male officers. One young bachelor had a particularly rough time fending her off. It wasn’t easy for my wife either but we managed. That was another age. As far as her attitudes toward all this, yes, she had seen everything, done everything, and we had to listen interminably to how much better things had been in Shanghai.

Q: Sometimes you run across people who were very unsympathetic to the difficulties of clients.

WOESSNER: This was not true here. It wasn’t a question of lack of sympathy. She had an alcohol problem. She was very wrapped up in her own personal world. But she did not interfere in the way we conducted business. No, there was no lack of sympathy. The only time I ever noticed a lack of sympathy was when I was doing nonimmigrant work in the second year. One applicant who was mentally deranged would come to the counter every six months or so and give the locals a hard time and then some poor, unsuspecting vice consul would have to go up and deal with him. The consul general said one time, “Gee, if only he’d pull a knife on a vice consul once, maybe we could do something about it.” I thought that lacked sympathy, but perhaps that’s not the kind you meant.

Q: There is always one or two of those that the vice consul gets stuck with.
WOESSNER: But the staff was wonderful. We got to know them all socially and personally. A lot of those friendships lasted for years afterwards. (End of tape)

When we left post, the entire staff gathered outside the consulate. The baby was decked out in his Lederhosen and everyone fussed over him. As we drove off, I was weeping so much I couldn’t drive. Two blocks away I had to pull over. It was that kind of emotion. I think that probably nothing equals your first post in terms of emotional attachment.

Q: Did you have any contact with the ambassador?

WOESSNER: No. I didn’t set foot in the embassy until well into my second year. That’s something my boss discouraged. I did indicate several times that I would like to know what goes on in the Political and Economic Sections or something of how an embassy worked. She said, “What’s the matter, consular work not good enough for you?” It was that sort of an attitude. But despite her objections, at one point I was actually invited to come over and attend the ambassador’s staff meeting. He was a fine ambassador. I could see him lean over to the DCM and ask who that person was down at the end of the table there. I had been there 18 months.

Q: What were you looking forward to doing once you left? Did you have any choice? Did you know where you wanted to go?

WOESSNER: By that time, I had a real sense that the future of so much in Europe was going to revolve around Germany. That was self-evident. I was particularly interested in studying the Soviet-German relationship. I had taken some basic Russian during my Fulbright year. I indicated that was a field I would be interested in. The Department responded that Russian language and area studies were heavily oversubscribed and suggested I go for a year of Polish language to be followed with an assignment to Warsaw, again in consular work. I had hoped to do something different, but I didn’t have hang-ups on that. If that’s what the Department recommended, it sounded fun and exciting. That’s in fact what I did.

TERRENCE CATHERMAN
USIS, Monitor of East European and Soviet Media Output
Vienna (1956-1960)

Terrence Catherman was born in Michigan in 1925. He served overseas in the U.S. Army overseas from 1944 to 1946 and received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Michigan. His postings abroad have included Germany, Vienna, Israel, Yugoslavia, and Poland. Mr. Catherman was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1991.

CATHERMAN: I went to Vienna and spent the next four years in Vienna operating one of the more interesting things in my experience, a shop called the Special Projects Office in USIS Vienna.
Q: This was not an integral part of the regular USIS program.

CATHERMAN: It was not an integral part of the USIS program. My assignment there was to monitor the East European, what we called satellite, radio and press in those days, and also the media of the Soviet Union, and to get news items out of those media and give them to the Western press covering the Soviet empire from Vienna. In those days practically no journalists went into Eastern Europe, or if they did get in they couldn't do their job because of the Stalinist approach to the Western media. So we got information to them from the satellite and Soviet media. I also had access to Embassy reports and other information sources. I spent time briefing Western journalists, Americans and others about how we saw things developing in the satellite empire.

Q: Were you also furnishing any information to Munich radio and Radio Free Europe?

CATHERMAN: Yes. Although they had a far bigger monitoring effort than we did. We did supply a lot of information to them. We had a good working relationship with them and we got their reports back. Now they were much bigger and more complete. We were a quick moving operation. When we received a news report that looked good we got it out right away. Our advantage and our strength was that we could move fast. We were small. I think there were 15 of us in that shop.

Q: Did you then leave the Soviet Union for awhile and then go back?

CATHERMAN: Yes, I went back to my job in Vienna. I still had two years to go there. I came back to Moscow in 1960 to replace both Tom Tuch and Lee Brady while they went on home leave. I spent the entire summer of 1960 there. In the meantime my operation in Vienna was beginning to change its nature. The iron curtain was beginning to open a little bit and the USIS personnel who were by that time assigned to the embassies in the satellites and the Soviet Union were able to take selected information about the American cultural experience and get it into the hands of people in the Soviet Union who were willing to take the risk of getting this kind of information. I changed that operation, which had been a cold war effort in Vienna, around and made it more of a purveyor of cultural news about the United States for peoples in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We began to put out cultural bulletins. We began to build small exhibits. We had panel displays for show windows in front of the embassies in those countries and so on. That developed later on into a major effort. So I was happy to see that happen.

Then two days after the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna May of 1961, Dottie and I drove from Vienna to Moscow.

Q: Oh, you were able to drive?

CATHERMAN: We were able to drive. We were one of the first ones to do it and it took three days, but we made it. I remember that period very well because I was sleeping on my desk down at the press office during the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting--for two days--and Dottie was packing. A typical foreign service experience. She had the packers and I had all that going on.
That was a very exciting meeting--the young President, John F. Kennedy and the sort of grizzled, party stalwart Nikita Khrushchev. I was assigned to Pierre Salinger, who was Kennedy's press speaker and I spent most of the time in the kitchen of the ambassador's residence or in the waiting room of the Soviet Embassy when the meetings took place there. Pierre would come out and hand me something about what was going on inside and I would take that and read it to the press. Make sure AP and UPI got it and also that it was sent down to the press center where hundreds of journalists were covering that event. So I played my little role in that. I also got some pictures of myself taken by the CIA which they later presented to me. Ernie Wiener sent them to me. He was there with me also. Ernie and I are in several of those pictures together. Ernie and I sort of had a beat of keeping track of Pierre Salinger and making sure that the information he wanted relayed from the site of the talks to the press in fact was delivered. So that was my job there.

Then I went to Moscow for three years. Those were the years of the opening. The national exhibit in 1959 had set the scene. We concluded exchanges and cultural agreements after that. By the time I got to the Soviet Union in May of 1961 we already had a traveling exhibit in the Soviet Union and I took that over for the summer, that was an exhibit on plastics, we had 30 Russian-speaking American guides and I took that exhibit over for its showing in Moscow and Tbilisi. Dottie and I were on our way to Tbilisi on a hot August day of 1961. We had stopped off for two days in Sochi which is a Black Sea resort in the Soviet Union. We tried to get a little swimming in and actually spent almost all day trying to find food; it was tough standing in line trying to get something to eat there. We came back to the hotel on that hot August day. I turned on the radio and found that the Berlin Wall was being constructed. I found this out from the Soviets and it scared the devil out of me. I did not have my own radio along. I had to rely on the hotel radio and it had a spring loaded mechanism that kept the dial focused on Radio Moscow. But with the use of brute strength I could wheel the dial down to VOA and BBC and essentially get Western reports. I was a child of the cold war. I had been in Germany soon after the beginning of the real cold war. I ran a cold war operation in Vienna. In the Soviet Union I was alone with my wife, 1500 miles away from the nearest Americans and I was scared. I thought the red balloon would go up. I was sure we were going to war and I wondered what I would do there if in fact we did go to war. Well, what happened is that we got on a plane the next day and went on to Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia and set up this exhibit down there.

Well, I take pride in being in the Soviet Union in that opening era and I take pride in being the director of that first traveling exhibit. We had a very eventful time in Tbilisi. Those six weeks we were down there in the fall of 1961, that was the period when Khrushchev was trying to scare Kennedy and was blowing up 20 megaton hydrogen bombs in Novaya Zemlya to the north. One of the innumerable Berlin crises was in full swing and there we were down there hosting tens of thousands of Georgians and Soviet citizens on the floor of this exhibit everyday with all the attendant stress and hubbub and security and all of that that went on with those things.

Q: I want to ask a couple of questions. You got to the Soviet Union approximately a year after Gary Powers was shot down.

CATHERMAN: I was in the Soviet Union during that trial.
Q: But not when he was shot down.

CATHERMAN: I was there during the trial.

Q: I had been to the Soviet Union with the National War College group in 1960 when Tommy Thompson was still ambassador. Of course everything seemed to be going very well then. Just a few weeks after we returned to the United States, Powers was shot down and the curtain dropped even further.

CATHERMAN: Right.

Q: So I wondered what the status of the situation was when you got there in 1961. Had it loosened up again considerably after that?

CATHERMAN: Well, it loosened up for one thing because Kennedy came to power and Khrushchev, I think, felt that he could do something with Kennedy. They had their meeting in May in Vienna and it looked as though we could do some things with the Soviets for that initial period. As a matter of fact we did. We had those exchanges which I addressed. We got an academic exchanges program going. We had American students in Leningrad and Moscow and one or two outside of those principal cities. We were beginning to have exchanges of delegations. We had many major performing arts groups on both sides. So we had that starting and it was, of course, endangered in 1962 by the Cuban missile crisis. I was in Moscow during that period and it was very touchy. However, we did not miss a beat in our exchanges programs. Life became a little rough for embassy personnel because of surveillance, although from my point of view, I was able to move around as a representative of the cultural side of the house as freely as I ever did. And I did move around a lot.

Q: You were able to travel extensively within the Soviet Union?

CATHERMAN: Yes, I was able to travel extensively within the Soviet Union. I was subjected to the same regulations about closed areas, etc., and I had to get permission through the Foreign Office and all that, but I did do that and I traveled a lot. I was out in Siberia in mid 1962 with Ruth Adams, the editor of Ameryka magazine. We took, for me, a memorable trip through Siberia and down through Central Asia and into the Caucasus just prior to the eruption of the Cuban missile crisis. I think that those of us who were engaged in the cultural exchanges programs had an easier time of it in those days than did the people who were in the military and political affairs.

Q: I suppose you traveled by train as you went into the hinterland primarily didn't you?

CATHERMAN: Generally I would take a plane for the long distances. We just didn't have time to travel other ways.

Maybe I can give you a feel for the atmosphere in the embassy at that time. There were two people engaged in USIS work. We had a press operation; we had an academic exchanges program which we negotiated; we had a performing arts exchanges program, we negotiated all
the contracts with the Soviets on that and also accompanied the performing arts groups. We had to take care of the American academics and students who came. They were always having their problems and we had to go and negotiate with the Soviets about that. So it was a constant 18 hour day right straight through that period. So whenever either one of us took off—and we had to travel of course, we could not just sit in an office in the embassy and handle things—we had to make the trips as compact as possible with very little time for train trips. Although I did take some train trips.

Q: Was Rocky Staples there at that time?

CATHERMAN: Rocky Staples was my boss for the first two years I was there. Yes.

Q: He told me that he traveled quite a bit in the Soviet Union by train and he felt that he was able to speak more freely to the Soviet people in the train compartments than he could most anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

CATHERMAN: Well, that is right. You can do that in planes too. Actually they were good vehicles for conversations. I never had any problems speaking with Russians, or with Soviets. Occasionally I would note how worried they were. They would look over their shoulders furtively to see who was behind them and all that. That was standard treatment in those days. Rocky was a very hard worker. I don't remember that he took any long trips.

Q: He said he took one trip, the one out to Lake Baikal and beyond on the train and he had a better experience in conversation with the Soviets that time than any other time.

CATHERMAN: I don't remember that but certainly, if he said it he did it. He was a very good boss. A very hard worker. A very tough negotiator. A positive influence on Soviet-American relations.

No I had some great experiences in those days. For instance, I accompanied Benny Goodman on his first trip to the Soviet Union in 1962. I was with the New York City Ballet for a few weeks when Balanchine brought his group back in 1962. In 1965, by that time I had left the Soviet Union, but I came back with the Cleveland Orchestra under George Szell and spent six weeks touring. Those were marvelous opportunities to meet cultivated Soviets and to get out of the hot house atmosphere of the embassy.

ROBERT GERALD LIVINGSTON
Consular Officer
Salzburg (1958)

Robert Gerald Livingston was born in New York in 1927. He received a Bachelor’s Degree, a Master’s Degree, and PhD from Harvard University and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1946-1949. After entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his postings abroad have included Salzburg, Hamburg, Belgrade,
Bonn and Berlin. Mr. Livingston was interviewed in 1998 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

LIVINGSTON: That’s where things changed. I went to Hamburg and there I did first visa work, I think, and then I went to the economics section and there, you know as well as I do, in the early years in Germany when we had such a huge establishment. Wait, don’t let me forget, you said when we talked that, what, a third of the American Foreign Service...

Q: Went through...

LIVINGSTON: Yes, how did you know that?

Q: That’s just a guess on my part.

LIVINGSTON: A guess, I see.

Q: But we had huge establishments.

LIVINGSTON: We did, that’s right, and the AFL-CIO had labor attachés at almost every post. But by the time I got there at the end of the ‘50s, the union people they’d had there were all gone practically. They may have had a union guy in Bonn, but they still had the slot and so I was quote, “the labor attaché.” That got me in touch with all the Social Democrats and the labor unions, and I did my reporting on the opposition and the Social Democrats and the labor unions. I got to know a lot of labor union guys in Hamburg including one person who is still my friend to this day, who subsequently became the chairman of the board of Lufthansa, a man named Heinz Ruhnau, who was a young labor union leader. The labor unions, of course, and the SPD were anxious to show, right down to this day it’s the same thing, that they were friendly with the Americans. They weren’t anti-American, at least not the right-wing of the SPD. And these guys I saw were all right-wing, so they were happy to have me and I remember being outside the room while they were negotiating. It was very smart of this guy. He took me down to wage negotiations at the Kiel shipyards because he knew an American coming in with this trade union guy kind of pre-empted the management, the state management, but still it was management. And so I got to see a lot of interesting people. Basically, I always had the feeling in Germany even then, that the State Department dealt with the CDU, CSU; and the government and the CIA dealt with the opposition. I dealt with the opposition, too. There was also a big CIA office in Hamburg.

DOUGLAS G. HARTLEY
Consular Officer
Salzburg (1958-1959)

Douglas G. Hartley was born in England in 1934 and received his Bachelor’s Degree from Harvard University in 1955. After entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his postings abroad have included Copenhagen, Salzburg, Belgrade,
Milan, Rome, Athens, London, and two tours in Brazil. Mr. Hartley was interviewed in 1998 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

HARTLEY: In mid ’58, I got a telegram from the State Department saying I had been assigned to the Serbo-Croatian language training. I wasn’t actually entirely sure where they spoke the language! But I found out soon enough. But Satterthwaite wanted to keep me in Denmark so he said ”No, he should stay here.” So then I got another telegram about three weeks later saying that ”Well, if Hartley isn’t going to Serbo-Croatian language training, we’re sending him by direct transfer back to Salzburg.” And I was to be working with Hungarian refugees. Nursing a serious hangover from a surfeit of aquavit-flowing farewell parties, I drove down to Salzburg. My family flew in after I had gotten there. I remember that the consul there was a guy named John Reager. John Reager was one of Scott McLeod’s henchmen during the McCarthy era. His prize was principal officer in Salzburg. This was in late 1958. He had been there for a couple of years. My office was just out of town at a refugee holding camp, prefabs they were. I remember going to his office. The old consulate was in the old town right by the Winkler elevator, if you know Salzburg at all. Rieger was sitting there and he said ”Well, Hartley, who are you? I don’t know why you were sent down here. The only opening I have is as a communications clerk.” Of course, I wasn’t too happy about that. But it turned out--I don’t know whether he was being serious or whether he was just kidding me--he was probably just kidding me. But I ended up actually working in a special section called The Three Thousand program, in which we were working at one of the holding camps just outside of Salzburg. I worked with Roy Apel and Jim Mattson and the three of us were initially under the command of an old-line consular type called Kasimir (Casey) Zawadski. He had been around for a long time--a kind of eccentric old guy. He gave us no direction at all, so we were basically just three young FSO-8s running the section. In October 1956, during the Hungarian Revolution, there was a special program to waive all the requirements for visas for Hungarians refugees, so thousands of people came into the States. But later-arriving refugees stayed on in the camps in Austria. There were a lot of problems with these families. They were in camps, they had trouble getting jobs--there was a lot of TB, petty crime. They became a real problem for us, and above all, for the Austrians. This was recognized by the Congress, which authorized 3,000 visas for Hungarian families. We were in charge of processing the visas. These people would come to us from the camps. They would be held over in our camp for final processing. We worked with the refugee agencies - HIAS [International Rescue Agency], IRC [International Rescue Committee], Lutheran World Federation, and National Catholic Welfare, which is now called the Catholic Relief Organization. Zawadski fortunately left after a few months after having given us appalling efficiency reports. I remember he said that in those days the report form had six blanks on it, from zero to six, the latter being, of course, totally impossible. I remember him coming to me and saying, ”Hartley, You’ve got two choices here. We can either give you a three plus or a four minus, take your pick!”

On Christmas Eve, we moved into a broken down little 12th century little castle on the Munchburg above the old town of Salzburg. It was accessible by an elevator which surfaced on the other end of the hill, or by car, along a narrow and precipitous road which passed in front of the huge castle which dominates Salzburg. The view and atmosphere were spectacular, the amenities somewhat less so. Though it was Christmas Eve, there was no central heating and just enough coal for the ceramic stoves to last us through until the holidays were over. Then we had
failed to take into account the famous Salzburger schnauelrein, or rope rain which poured into our bedroom via a roof which probably was put together in medieval times! The garden was full of stinging nettles; but the view across to Berchtesgarten was quite spectacular and once settled in we were as happy as could be, although among the better grounded members of the consulate this simply reinforced their conceptions that we were oddities. Through all this, our little daughter Virginia prospered. She, aged barely two, and I used to march down the hill to the markets in Salzburg. Meanwhile, I had been promoted to FSO 7 and ended up in charge of the refugee visa section.

I was in Salzburg for about nine months. In the meantime, I had been reassigned to Serbo-Croatian language training, so that when my tour in Salzburg was up--which was in July of 1959--a short tour, I went back to the State Department. My mother had found us a little house in Georgetown (on 32nd St.) to rent.

**RUSSELL O. PRICKETT**

**Administration Officer, US Mission, IAEA**

**Vienna (1959-1961)**

Russell O. Prickett was born in Willmar, Minnesota in 1932. He entered the Foreign Service in 1959 and served in Austria, Switzerland, twice in Yugoslavia, and Japan. Mr. Prickett was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 24, 1999.

Q: You were in Vienna from when to when?

PRICKETT: ‘59 to ‘61 — a year and a half, roughly.

Q: What was your job there?

PRICKETT: I was the administrative officer to the US mission, and I believe it was a seven-officer mission. There was the chief, Admiral Foster; there was a senior scientific advisor; there was a senior political advisor — who was Mose Harvey, by the way, and he was chosen for his Soviet expertise, and he was definitely a hard-liner. He was one of George Kennan’s ideological opponents in the State Department. He was hired out of academe, I think, directly into an FSO-1 slot, which is not the FS-1 slot today.

Q: It’s equivalent to two-star general.

PRICKETT: Two-star general. Yes, and then there were two other scientific advisors and one other, no, two other political advisors, and I was the low man on that totem pole. Then there was a chief clerk and three or four very excellent secretaries.

Q: Well, what was the mission of the mission at that time? The American — what was it called?
PRICKETT: The big project — and it was an overriding project — was to create the system that we’ve heard quite a lot about lately, which was international atomic safeguards. And that was the big thing. The Indians were much opposed. The Russians hadn’t yet seen it in their advantage to have atomic safeguards, so the Indian representative would say, “This is paternalism, Mr. Chairman.” And the Russians were happy to fish in those troubled waters, and . . .

Q: This is Tape 2, Side 1, with Russ Prickett. Russ, you know, at a certain point we found ourselves on nuclear matters, that was one place where we were really with the Soviet at a certain point. We mainly wanted to keep other people from messing around in this field. It was too damned dangerous, so we had joint reason. But I take it we hadn’t reached that point.

PRICKETT: No. We did make some progress, but I don’t believe we completed the international safeguards. But I think we saw that we could. We’d had serious talks. The head of Atomic Energy in India, a man named Baba, was making a bomb. We knew it. The Russians knew it. We knew it was just a matter of time, so it was an awkward thing. Basically, the Russians were siding with the LDC’s who were opposed, and it was mainly the Indians. Nobody was paying attention to what the Israelis were doing, but I think the experts knew. So it didn’t happen, I think, until after I left Vienna.

We did have one other very interesting adventure while I was there. They borrowed some of us from the international organization mission to work on what was sometimes called the Zweiter Wienerkongress, the Protocol on Diplomatic Immunity, and we did negotiate that, and so I was again a very low-ranking gofer officer type on our delegation to the “Second Congress of Vienna.”

Q: Well, how did you find Austria? By the time you arrived it had been four years into its neutral role with the occupying powers gone. What was Austria like then?

PRICKETT: Well, it was very comfortable, of course. It was lovely. Their Autobahn was only in patches. There was still some residual pro-Nazi sentiment in Austria and one of the jokes was “When is the Autobahn going to be completed?” The answer: “Am nächsten Anschluß” [By the next Anschluss]. So Hilti and I rented a piano in Vienna, and we went to this great place that just had pianos all over the place, and the guy got to talking with us. Hilti, of course, her German was fluent, and mine was coming along. I finally got to the point where I could call the Bristol Hotel and I would make reservations for the VIP’s coming to town and I would persist in talking German until he finally abandoned English and talked German with me. That was a milestone in my take-off from the Foreign Service Institute German to a working level. So all this was going on in German, and he said business just had never been the same since the war. In the old days, why he just rented out and sold and so forth lots and lots of pianos, and you know, he said, it’s a shame that the right countries didn’t get together. Germany, of course, and the Scandinavian countries and England and America. “Das wäre ein Reich,” he said [That would be an empire!] It chilled my spine. Beim nächsten Anschluß they’ll finish the roads, and if only the right countries had got together, what a Reich that would have been. But all of the friends we made and the folks there, it was all very gemütlich, very friendly. We went on ski trips. My twins were born in Vienna, in Udolfinahaus.
Q: That’s Sophie and —

PRICKETT: Sophie and Suzanne.

Q: Suzanne, yes.

PRICKETT: All of our kids have names that work in both German and English, and all of them, when they started to speak, spoke both languages. Hilti talked German to them all the time, and I spoke English with them all the time, and they would switch just like that. And when Hilti and I would be dressed up to go someplace, I’d come down the stairs, and the kids would say, “Daddy, where are you going tonight? Daddy, where are you going?” — we were dressed up to go out — with a little quiver of the lip and so forth, and then Hilti would come down, “Mami, wo gehst du heute hin?” Just a quick switchover. Sophie is the only one who has really kept up her German, but she’s probably better at it than I am.

**DWIGHT J. PORTER**

Economic Counselor and Deputy Representative to
The International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1959-1963)

*Ambassador Dwight Porter, a native of the Midwest, graduated from Grinnell College in 1938. His Foreign Service career included positions in Germany, the United Kingdom (England), Austria, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Lebanon. Ambassador Porter was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1990.*

PORTER: When I arrived as economic counselor, I was also the last Marshall Plan chief for Austria. I think by that time all the Marshall Plan offices had closed down in all of Western Europe and only Austria remained because the Russian zone had only recently been evacuated and it was, of course, denuded by the Russians as they pulled out, they took everything with them. So the Plan kept going a little bit longer when I got there, but it was largely a matter of using counter-part funds rather than dollars. I think we ran out of dollars the first year I was there. We did have a continuing relationship with Austria in the economic field. The Austrians, I think, relied on us rather heavily, as you know, although they are a special breed and are a bit arrogant about their own capacities and potential. They chaffed a bit, I think, under the belief that we were still trying to run their economy, although we really weren't. We mainly wanted to make sure that the money was being used effectively and was not being frittered away.

There was another reason, of course, why we still were in business with counter-part funds, there was a very large counter-part package, close to half a billion dollars in schillings. But Doc Matthews, very rightly I think, refused to release the use of counter-part funds without American permission, until the Austrians cleared up certain outstanding issues. Among them was the oil claim, mainly Mobil Oil, that had been nationalized and not reimbursed, at least in most of the oil fields in Austria. The Nazis had taken them away and they had become Austrian government property after the war. Mobil had perfectly legitimate claims which were not being addressed by
the Austrian government. Matthews never made it a clear *quid pro quo* so nobody could say he was blackmailing the Austrian government, but the fact was that ultimately it sunk in that until the oil claims, I think they called it the Vienna memorandum business (?), were settled there would be trouble with the counter-part funds. Finally they were settled; there were a few other little odds and ends that were settled in the process.

It is amusing that one of the things that I did at that point was to insist on holding out enough money on counter-part funds to provide a sort of endowment for the Salzburg Seminar, which probably would not have continued its existence if this was not done. Of course it has been held ever since, and the Austrian government, which originally was rather unhappy about our U.S. insistence on this, later on they changed their views completely and came up with quite a bit of money themselves. They made it into a rather fascinating place, mainly for East-West exchange.

As an aside, since I have taught there several times, I got a notice from the Salzburg Seminar that they are terribly worried about their new role in life. For so long they worked to develop a bridge between East and West and now that the bridge has become superfluous, what are they going to do? There are plenty of things for them to do, but they may have more trouble with financing.

*Q: I have been following that for a long time too.*

PORTER: The Austrian experience was an extremely interesting one. I will go back a little bit. While I was economic counselor David Waynehouse, who was DCM left and Doc Matthews very kindly promoted me to DCM, so I had about five years in Austria in the two posts of economic counselor and DCM. It was an interesting period, it was shortly after the Berlin wall went up and it was much more difficult to get information about what was happening in Eastern Europe. So of course there was a great expansion of intelligence facilities in Vienna or developed from Vienna, is a better way of phrasing it.

*Q: We used to figure that five percent of the national income of Austria came from the intelligence activities that were paid by both sides for the same false information. It kept the coffee houses going very well.*

PORTER: There was a lot of the *Third Man* business which has remained to this day.

*Q: There were so many people from East Europe there, so many expatriates with connections.*

PORTER: Of course it was not only the CIA but also the embassy that was participating in this, it was called a debriefing exercise to find out what was going on in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Every time a senior Austrian would visit the Soviet Union I would be down at his desk the day after he came back to find out where the hell Khrushchev or Brezhnev might be and report that because there was very little contact between the Soviets and our embassy in Moscow in those days.

Doc Matthews, Murphy and Henderson were three of the first four career ambassadors in the career foreign service. I thought I was very lucky to have a substantial amount of experience working for them.
While I was in Vienna Doc Matthews decided to retire, he had reached age 65 and I was chargé for about a year after he left. That was an interesting year, it was about 1963. Then Jimmy Riddleberger came in, he was an old friend from German days, head of the political office of the High Commission and later head of the office of German affairs. I think he was the only person in the State Department who really stood up to McCarthy and McCarthy's henchmen. He showed great courage when courage was not worn on the sleeve. I, of course, always enjoyed working for him, he was delightful.

Q: Was it on your watch that the age-old coalition government disintegrated and you got Socialist government?

PORTER: It happened just after I left, it was still the Proportz. Kreisky was still foreign minister when Riddleberger arrived and I guess that did single the change. He was the first Socialist foreign minister. To show you how close the Austrian-American relationship was at that time Kreisky and I would be on the phone at least twice a week. He would keep trying to select who would be the next ambassador - American ambassador to Austria. I would come up with names and he would raise questions, two or three he accepted, but he really wanted Jimmy Riddleberger. Jimmy was a very good ambassador, he spoke very good German but his accent was really something. We had to write his arrival speech when he first arrived in Austria as ambassador. I could hardly understand him. He had learned all his German in Berlin and that accent is so different than the rather mellifluous Austrian accent.

I stayed another year with Jimmy and then left for my next assignment.

Q: You were in Austria and you mentioned while the tape was off that you some PL 480 [grain] programs and other economic things that were going on.

PORTER: The economy was indeed taking off dramatically during my last couple of years there. Of course you had the Austrian neutrality question which made it quite clear, whether the Austrians wanted to do it or not, and I am not sure they did, that they could not join the Western market, the Russians did not want that. That took a great deal of time; the European Free Trade Association was created and the Austrians needed a lot of hand holding, but it was their first major post-war attempt to come out of the isolation, which was not necessarily their fault. They had to become a part of a large Europe and to take a role in EFTA, which consisted of European neutrals, Scandinavia, etc. which was developed apart from the Common Market. A lot of my friends who were working on Austria, on the administration of the Marshall Plan were the people who continued on as the Austrian EFTA bureaucracy which developed in Geneva. Much as we did in Germany where we trained a lot of German bureaucrats, we also trained a lot of Austrians.

Q: Also I think on the public affairs side with the press and radio and that sort of thing.

PORTER: Yes, very much so. In those days too, you could go out to the ski areas and find Marshall Plan plaques all over on lifts and gondolas and the like. If you go back today you will find all of those have been removed.
PORTER: A lot were taken down when Austria decided that it was going, indeed, to stand on its own two feet. Austria was, of course, an area where the black-market, where the word schwartz described all sorts of economic activity where you could trade currencies, engage in illicit trade with the East, there was an awful lot of activity in enforcing U.S. trade restrictions and Pro-Com restrictions and the transfer of goods to the Eastern Bloc. It was quite clear that there were a lot of Austrian fortunes being made in a way that would not necessarily be approved by the U.S. government. The Austrians are not necessarily Puritan in their life, by and large.

Q: Any more than they were in their political life, as we discovered.

PORTER: Indeed, as we discovered documentarily. I remember uncovering one juicy little scandal in Austria. We kept trade statistics. The U.S. government had, at that point, an interesting program called triangular trade where one sell, say, grain to Austria at perhaps favorable prices. The schillings that would accrue from that sale would go to buy commercial diamonds in South Africa or Turkey or wherever, most of which were used for building up strategic stockpiles in the United States, or sometimes for other purposes. We found that studying the trade statistics, the U.S. was exporting a great deal more grain to Austria than the triangular trade income would indicate. We started to look into it and found that $25 million worth of grain had gone to Austria and had been reexported to Eastern Bloc countries, largely Hungary, I think. There were the usual payoffs and Austrian bureaucracy had kept this thing from reaching the public eye. It was interesting that by just an analysis of the statistics we found that this thing was going on. The Austrians had actually paid for the grain, but they had got it at concession prices. The real problem was that it was being reexported to countries that were not supposed to be getting it and those countries were not getting preferential price as the Austrians were charging more.

I got a totally new perspective on Austria by pressing that case. We finally got a lot of people put in jail; I am sure they got out rather quickly after we turned the other way. It was a little seamy and one could only conjecture what else was going on. In the early days one of the brightest sources of income of the recovering Austria was subterranean channel to the East. Also during that period the Refugee Program pretty much came to an end and the money we gave to Austria to feed and house and resettle, and a lot of them were resettled in Austria, many of them Hungarians from the 1956 revolution and quite few Czechs, those programs pretty much came to an end. There was one final program, it was probably the last one in Europe, which Doug Dillon was very kind to approve when he came over, and it settled about 12,000 refugees in Austria. That in a sense was the end of the refugee problem in Western Europe, with the U.S. involvement. From that point on the refugee problem began to shift to other points of the world.

JOHN PROPS BLANE
Consular Officer
Salzburg (1960-1962)

Ambassador John Blane was born in Alabama. He attended the University of
Tennessee and served in the US Army towards the end of the Korean War. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Somalia, Ethiopia, Austria, Cameroon, Chad, Kenya, and Rwanda. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 8, 1990.

Q: What sort of work were you doing in Salzburg, Austria?

BLANE: Typical consular work. During the summer, mostly welfare and protection. Because at that time probably half a million Americans a year came to Salzburg--probably a great deal more now--but still, it was a mob of tourists. And, as tourists everywhere, a fair number of them would get their tail in the crack one way or another. They'd get sick, or die, or get arrested, or you name it. So we did a lot of typical welfare and protection work taking care of our citizenry. And we were a full-service post, so we issued visas and renewed passports, did all that sort of thing.

GERALD B. HELMAN
Political Officer
Vienna (1960-1962)

Gerald B. Helman was born in Michigan in 1932 and received a B.A. and an L.L.B from Michigan University. After entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his postings abroad have included Vienna, Barbados, Brussels, and Geneva. Mr. Helman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Well, then you went from Milano to Vienna. You were there from ’60 to ?

HELMAN: ’62.

Q: And you were a political officer?

HELMAN: Junior political officer.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you were there?

HELMAN: Doc Matthews.

Q: He’s one of the major names of the old Foreign Service. I mean I’m speaking of the good side.

HELMAN: Oh, yes.

Q: You’ve got George Kennan and Chip Bohlen and then Doc Matthews. Did you have much contact with him or see him that often?

HELMAN: Not an awful lot. I think he could do that job spending about a half hour day.
(laughs) He was extremely, extremely good. I learned a lot from his deputy, David Wainhouse. But I think the guy whose mentoring was most valuable to me was my political counselor, Tap Bennett. He and his wife, Margaret, were really Old School Foreign Service. Tap was certainly old school and from Georgia. Margaret came from a distinguished Foreign Service background. They took an interest in Dolly and me, and we were deeply appreciative. I helped put together dinner parties and would seat people at the table and learned some protocol. And as you know, protocol in diplomatic life is terribly important, particularly if you want to pursue a career on the political side of the house. So their interest and their mentoring were immensely beneficial to us and we deeply appreciated it. I also used to tag along with Tap as notetaker when he went to the Foreign Ministry, and under his guidance established some excellent contacts there in the Minister’s Cabinet. Tap had “style.” Tap is someone with whom I maintained a relationship really down through the years, when he was our Ambassador to NATO and Permrep to the UN in New York. One of my proudest moments was when I was ambassador in Geneva I was able to give a dinner in his honor. That was terrific, and I think Tap felt pretty good about it, as well.

Tap was dedicated to the Foreign Service and because it was a small political section; there were, I think, only four or five of us, I generally was included in meetings and knew what was going on. This was of course in the aftermath of the occupation that ended only in 1955. The State Treaty had been signed. I was responsible for following the fringe parties, the Communist Party on the left and what is called the Freiheitliche Partei - I guess it’s now translated as the Freedom Party - on the right. They were both pieces of work, both of these parties.

Q: Tell me, as a young political officer, did you get much in the way of somebody sitting down and saying, “Okay, Gerry, you’ve written this up, now I’m going to show you how to really do it?” In other words, were you learning how to draft?

HELMAN: Yes. I was learning how to draft, I was learning how to go into a domestic political situation and handle myself. I accompanied Tap or his deputy, John Fisher, to call on the Foreign Ministry and make a presentation of whatever it was, take notes, write up MEMCONS (Memoranda of Conversation), write cables, write reports of various sorts. We used to the have the OMs at that time…

Q: That’s operations memorandum.

HELMAN: Yes, the format you used to submit material that may not have been worthy of a telegram. Telegrams, of course, were kind of special in those days. (laughs) And you almost never used the phone. At my next post, Barbados, I learned to encrypt and decrypt telegrams using a one-time pad. So it was very much a Service at that time that communicated through more formal written material. If you couldn’t put something in writing in a clear and convincing fashion, couldn’t analyze or derive a recommendation, you were lost. I mean you weren’t a very good political officer in that event. And so the typical skills that one had to learn as a political officer were available to me for learning when I was in Vienna because we did the full range of political, presentational and representational work. And when it came to attending an open political meeting, let’s say a Communist rally, I went alone because my German was reasonably good. Or I would go alone to a Bierhalle and attend a rally of the “Freiheitliche.” Watching these old Nazis in their old uniforms, holding their battle flags was quite an experience for a Jewish...
kid from Detroit. I learned to handle myself. Never felt much in danger even though I stuck out. And I learned to comprehend some of the Viennese regional dialects, which was no easy thing. I was rather pleased with myself.

I was given a special assignment to do a report on the implementation of one of the provisions of the State Treaty regarding certain rights accorded to the Slovenian minority in Carinthia. So I went down to Carinthia and visited with the local dignitaries and visited schools and talked to people. I thereafter wrote a pretty good report in an OM to the Department that covered both the Slovenian situation but also that of the Hungarian minority in the Burgenland, Austria’s easternmost province. So I got some pretty good experience. Made good friends among the a couple of the younger Austrian official. I never tried to establish close contacts with the principals of the parties I was following, although I got to know some of the individuals. My fringe parties were largely powerless, beyond a certain nuisance factor. I did get to establish good relationships with some of the younger Foreign Office officials. I got to know Foreign Minister Kreisky a bit, got to know some younger Austrian Foreign Service officers who later became quite prominent in their Foreign Ministry. One of them, Peter Jankowitch, was long-time ambassador of Austria to the United Nations (UN) at the time that I became fairly senior in the State Department on UN affairs. So that contact had staying power. Jankowitch subsequently became Austria’s foreign minister.

Q: You’re mentioning the border lands. Did you get involved with the South Tirol?

HELMAN: South Tirol was a constant issue. That wasn’t handled particularly by me but I did learn a lot about it and that was of course sort of a flashpoint in Austrian foreign policy. I also had some idea of Italian attitudes from my service in Milan.

Q: Well, you’d come from Milano, so did you find…I mean here you straddled the issue in a way. I mean how did you…

HELMAN: I never dealt with the substance of the issue when I was in Milano. I was handling consular affairs, which allowed me to travel up in that area - it’s a beautiful area - mostly to provide some consular services to American citizens who couldn’t travel to me. So I said I’ll go ride circuit. It’s a nice circuit to ride.

Q: Oh, yes.

HELMAN: But in Austria the South Tirol question was handled by either Tap Bennett or by his deputy.

Q: I’ve heard people say quite recently that the problem with Austria is that it used to be the center of an empire and that’s what its function was; and the empire is almost completely gone and it’s sort of a country without a role.

HELMAN: A capitol without a hinterland.

Q: Yes, a capitol without a hinterland; and that means that you’ve got essentially an awful lot of
people who really aren’t occupied by what they feel they should be doing or something like that. Did you see that?

HELMAN: I think that’s sort of a standard analysis of the Austrian psyche. And of course historically that’s understandable. Austria was the center of a polyglot empire that really was quite impressive in both its political structure, and its governance and its success over a considerable period of European history. Culturally that made Vienna an extraordinary capitol. Subsequently I became quite interested in Austrian, particularly Viennese, culture. Extremely rich, extremely productive, and contributed a great deal in terms of art, music, science, philosophy, literature and academics. There also were extraordinary personalities associated with this creativity. I knew where Freud lived, where Beethoven died, where Schubert held home concerts, where Mozart’s operas were originally performed. The Nazi takeover promoted a huge brain drain to the United States that greatly enriched our culture and sciences.

Q: Well, we really came out ahead on the whole expulsion of people.

HELMAN: I formed a somewhat different and more positive assessment of Austria after the war. They were stuck in a miserable situation in a sense that they had lost the war, had contributed to the Nazi cause and were occupied by the four victorious powers. Austria’s leadership adroitly developed the fiction that Austria was Hitler’s first victim rather than a willing participant in the Hitler phenomenon, the Nazi phenomenon. Austria’s leadership also deserves a lot of credit for developing the long-enduring post-war coalition between the Conservatives and Socialists, thus suppressing the kind of civil conflict that tore Austria apart in the ‘30s. They deserve a lot of credit for working together to achieve the larger goal of gaining political independence; political independence meaning the end of occupation in 1955. They adroitly manipulated the western powers and the Russians. A good history of this in English really hasn’t been written that I know of, and that’s too bad.

The two major Austrian political parties developed this so-called “proporz” system under which the two parties divided up governmental ministries and plum jobs on the basis of an elaborate formula and periodic inter-party negotiations. “Proporz” also allowed the leadership to avoid as much as possible the kind of politics of destruction that led to Austria’s takeover by the Nazis in the ‘30s. “Proporz” also had its downside which grew during and after the occupation. Not surprisingly, it turned into a large pork barrel and was used to sustain in power parties and a government that clearly had served their post-war purposes. But “Proporz” broke down over time and that’s healthy. But it was remarkably well-designed to serve a very important purpose. The labor unions I think were under the control of the Socialists and the latter kept the powerful unions away from the Communists. The labor unions were prepared to go to the streets and the barricades against the Communists - and they did, I believe in 1949. So I think the Austrians deserve a great deal of credit for bringing about their eventual independence and managing their economy. And at the same time they developed a foreign affairs posture whereby they had a special role to play as a bridge between east and west. Austria felt that it has a particular entrée to Eastern Europe, to Hungary, and the rest based upon the heritage of the Austro-Hungarian empire. I think there must’ve been some truth to that, but also overblown.

Q: Well, I think the peace treaty was in ’54, ’55. It really came about because the United States
realized we don’t care. I mean this was not a pivotal point here.

HELMAN: Yes, but it was not a peace treaty. The treaty’s name, the Austrian State Treaty was carefully insisted upon by the Austrians for that reason. There were lots of reasons for it, but mainly that Austria was Hitler’s victim, not his ally. They weren’t an enemy state. John Foster Dulles spent a lot of time on the Treaty. But one of the reasons why the Treaty and the consequential withdrawal of occupation forces was possible was because, unlike the German occupation, Austrians maintained an Austrian national government throughout Austria. Moreover, unlike the sectored Berlin, the center of Vienna was collectively patrolled by the four powers. There were no competing Austrian governmental authorities in Austria.

Q: How about anti-Semitism? Because Austria had a reputation way back of rather virile anti-Semitism; you know the court in front of Joseph and all of that. How did you find that? What was your impression of it at the time?

HELMAN: Oh, it was there, particularly in rural Austria, where there no longer were Jews. It was never acknowledged but it certainly was there in Vienna. I got to know prominent members of the Jewish community; it was small and of course most of them were remnants of the war years who survived the concentration camps and the like, or returned to Austria from the U.S. or the UK. It was a tight community there, but one that could not hold a candle to the Austrian Jewish community of the 19th and early 20th century, with its immense achievements in science, philosophy and the arts. The postwar Jewish community barely had the resources to maintain the educational, religious and social services needed. It had only one synagogue, in the old ghetto. I reached the conclusion that it was hopeless for a Jewish family to think that it could reestablish a comfortable life there. I’ve been proved wrong by what I gather is now a thriving Jewish community that has recovered quite nicely. They were helped, as were other remnant Jewish communities around the world, by the Lubavitcher movement, a quite remarkable Chasidic group headquartered in Brooklyn, who saw themselves as “missionaries to the Jews.” Quite a remarkable bunch that always managed to establish contact with me no matter where I was posted.

What was disturbing was the Austrian inability to admit to any overt anti-Semitism, though even that is now very recently changing. But they knew it and it was most evident in one extraordinary experience that I and others went through at that time. One of the saving graces of Austria’s sometimes perverse culture was the institution of the cabaret in which the performers took the gloves off in lampooning different aspects of Austrian life. (laughs) And there was one that was not so much cabaret, it was sort of a one man show and it was put on by an actor - a remarkable fellow by the name of Helmut Qualtinger - and his presentation was titled “Herr Karl.” Herr Karl was a lower middle-class Viennese, a typical small “kleinburger” who owned a small deli. This was a lengthy monologue covering Herr Karl’s life and experiences during the civil war in the late ‘20s and ‘30s between the various political parties and how and why he switched from one party to another, always following the path of least resistance, going along to get along. That’s why he ended up cheering for Hitler during the Anschluss and joining the Nazi Party but, of course, not meaning to cause anyone harm. Herr Karl really felt sorry when with others he forced Herr Goldberg to scrub the sidewalk with a toothbrush, and, no hard feelings, he was really happy to see Herr Goldberg when he came back after the war. And he couldn’t understand why
Herr Goldberg wouldn’t say hello. After all, they had been neighbors. The entire monologue, of course, was in Viennese dialect. And what was remarkable about this monologue and extremely telling was how it went deeply into Vienna’s anti-Semitic culture fostered in part by the small-mindedness or pettiness of Austrian social political culture. I think it went on for years, this show. Certainly when I was in Vienna it was always sold out. At the close of each performance there was never any applause, just silence. Extraordinary experience. It hit home.

Q: It sounds like a not-so-funny Archie Bunker of our time.

HELMAN: Yes, sure.

Q: In a way, showing the prejudice. It was called “All in the Family,” a TV show which ran for a couple years.

HELMAN: Oh, I remember Archie Bunker, yes. I guess there was some of that but it hit home so hard you couldn’t laugh, even though in retrospect if you did that again today you would laugh. If Qualtinger were performing today he would be talking to the children or grandchildren of the people who saw it back in the late ‘30’s and early ‘40’s.

Q: They wouldn’t have the same visceral reaction.

HELMAN: They might have laughed and applauded, and felt relieved that they could disclaim responsibility. Yes.

Q: What about the Freiheitliche Party? This was the far right, wasn’t it?

HELMAN: Yes.

Q: As we’re talking at the turn of the twenty-first century, there is a significant, maybe not neo-Nazi, but damn close to a neo-Nazi rightist party in Austria which has a significant political role. Were you seeing that or was this way off on the fringe?

HELMAN: No, no. It was at that time quite blatantly a party that tried to attract those elements of the Austrian population that felt excluded from, or didn’t want to join in, the two principal parties. They were strongest in Carinthia and in some other of the rural areas of Austria. They were also strong enough in Vienna but never amounting to anywhere near their strength today. But what was stunning about going to their meetings, as I did, was the nostalgia of their membership for their various Nazi military units, including the SS. It was never disguised in their meetings. They used to have their uniforms, their battle flags, their caps, and so on. It was quite an experience. (laughs) Of course they justified themselves as being simply soldiers doing their duty and all of the rest, but it’s hard to take.

Q: The Edelweiss Division and all of that?

HELMAN: All the rest of it. They used to have their own battle flags on the stage and it was pretty nasty.
Q: Did you find that in general when you were dealing with people that there was...because senior officials at that time, and not so senior, would've been involved in the Hitler state. Were they all fighting on the eastern front? Were they sort of making excuses, or not?

HELMAN: Well, except if you happened to talk to somebody of the Freiheitliche, the average Austrian didn’t want to talk. It was very difficult to get them to talk about their experiences during the war. They felt comfortable in the myth that Austria was Hitler’s first victim. Although I think the Austrians knew that Hitler was welcomed into Vienna during the Anschluss by huge crowds. It was not a subject that was easily broached or easily served as a subject of conversation at dinner.

Q: Either as observing, did Kurt Waldheim come across your orbit at all when you went?

HELMAN: Not at that time. Bruno Kreisky was the principal guy, the Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister. He was Jewish by birth, spent the wartime years in Scandinavia and returned to dominate Austrian politics during the ‘60s and ‘70s. He declared himself a non-believer and opted out of the Jewish Community. I got to know Waldheim later when he was Secretary General of the United Nations and, before that, when he was Austria’s UN Ambassador.

Q: Yes, but not at this time. At that time how would you describe American-Austrian relations?

HELMAN: Austria was a neutral country by necessity. They had to adopt neutrality as one of the steps necessary to persuade the Russians to agree to the State Treaty, but it was a neutrality that certainly contained a great deal of sympathy, cultural affinity to the West. Financially and economically, in terms of manufactures and exports, it was largely towards markets in Western Europe and the United States or elsewhere.

Q: Did the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet power, did it intrude much?

HELMAN: It was big. It was big.

Q: What were they doing?

HELMAN: Oh, I think probably doing KGB (Soviet State Security Committee) work as much as anything else. (laughs) Vienna at that time, because it was so difficult to move around in Berlin, really was sort of the spy capitol of Europe, or purportedly such. Of course we had a large KGB contingent, as I understood it, to contend with. We were briefed about that in the Political Section. I used to go to Eastern European receptions and kind of enjoyed it because they had their own culture and my wife and I rapidly learned if you wanted anything to eat at these receptions you had to get there on time because the Eastern European diplomats got there right on time and they mobbed that table and swept it clean of food. (laughs) And, of course, all Eastern Europeans countries I had embassies in Vienna, but the consequential one was that of the USSR. You know they had this marvelous practice at their receptions of having a reception for the hoy paloy, guys like me and most everybody else, and then a different room with better eats to which those who really counted were invited. (laughs)
Q: Yes, a good classless society type of thing.

HELMAN: The good classless society. (laughs)

The big event though, that led to a lot of time spent with the Soviet Embassy when I was there, was the summit between Khrushchev and John Kennedy.

Q: This was a very pivotal summit.

HELMAN: Yes, a very pivotal summit.

Q: Could you talk about your perceptions of this and what you were doing? Did you get involved?

HELMAN: Well, I served in a support role.

Q: Shining shoes or…

HELMAN: Basically that. If that’s what it would’ve required, I would’ve shined shoes. I helped around the fringes with the White House staff and the preparations for the summit, but I didn’t get involved in any of the substantive stuff. I had a glimpse of the President, of Mr. Khrushchev, the first lady - Jacqueline Kennedy - and my wife and I were invited to one massive reception for the whole crew, but you couldn’t see or talk to anybody there. (laughs) But that was about it. And it was only in retrospect that I, as everybody else, got an appreciation for the significance of that particular summit.

Q: Kennedy came back and Khrushchev had essentially challenged him and things really turned almost nasty after that.

HELMAN: It was downright dangerous.

Q: It was damn dangerous, it was. I mean this led to the Cuban missile crisis and all that. Did you all feel a lowering of the temperature? I mean a concern in Vienna about just general East-West relations at that time?

HELMAN: I can’t say that we did at the time. The usual courtesies were observed. No one at that time during the summit acknowledged that these two men had clashed head on. I don’t know if anybody suspected what consequences would flow from Khrushchev’s mistaken evaluation of Kennedy at that time. My only recollection of it was there was just a grand and glorious event that was widely reported and made Vienna the center of the universe and our embassy in Vienna one of the key sites. But it clearly was a historic event and I was lucky enough to be on its distant fringe.

At that time also the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was in the first years of its existence. It was headquartered in Vienna. It drew attention when I was there when Vyecheslav
Molotov was posted for a period of time as the Soviet Union’s permanent representative to the IAEA. I got to meet him. I chatted with him several times at receptions. It was just chit-chat but I was well aware of the man’s historical significance. He was accompanied by his wife and I believe that it was the first time she was ever allowed to go abroad with him. I was told that until then, even for as committed an underling as Molotov, she was held in Moscow as Stalin’s hostage when Molotov traveled. He was accompanied by his wife which in itself was a change from the past. She was Jewish and had been arrested in ’48 or ’49 in the purge that accompanied Stalin’s campaign against Jewish doctors. As I recall, Molotov lasted in Vienna for only a brief period of time, six to eight months. He was sent there during the Khrushchev thaw, when some persons were rehabilitated, and then for some reason his standing at home deteriorated and he was recalled. I can’t believe it was because of anything that he did in Vienna. I was just intrigued because of the man’s past. I knew where he was departing from - the Russians used to travel by rail through Vienna’s Ostbahnhof, the eastern train station. So I thought I’d go out there and watch it because this would very likely be the last time Molotov was in the West. I knew what time the train left. And it was… The older European railroad stations are special places, you know. Great on atmosphere. (laughs)

Q: Oh, yes.

HELMAN: This was very early in the morning and there were all the KGB types in their long green horsehide trench coats. You could tell them on the street because it was like a uniform. I stayed in the background and I just watched. He never emerged again.

Q: I thought he ended up in the Urals or something, in charge of some power station or something like that.

You mentioned that the KGB was all over the place; I assume that the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) was all over the place, too.

HELMAN: How would you guess? (laughs) Charlie Katek was fairly senior I think in the Agency at that time. He was Station Chief.

Q: As a political officer were you getting anything from the CIA? Was there any particular contact or anything like that, or were they doing their thing and you were doing yours?

HELMAN: No, we had contact. I’m sure they weren’t sharing anything particularly sensitive with me, but we tried to work together particularly when it came to social events and discussions of political events and with political personalities. I knew some of the guys in the Station and I thought it was a reasonably well-managed operation. I mean in terms of a relationship with the Political Section. It was, of course, much larger than the Political Section.

Q: You mentioned dealing with the Freiheitliche and also the Communist Party, but our antennae were sort of focused obviously on the Communists but also on the Freiheitlichen; are these guys going to come up again or was this just sort of a fringe outfit that you want to keep track of but you weren’t really thinking about a resurgence of Nazism or something?
HELMAN: Well, we were always concerned about the resurgence of Nazism and these guys certainly would have been part of it. But on the national level the danger was minor. On a provincial level, particularly in Carinthia, the Freiheitliche were quite strong and were in a governing role, as they are today. I believe Jorg Heider is or was the Governor of Carinthia.

Q: *Carinthia is which region? Where is that?*

HELMAN: Carinthia is Austria’s southernmost province, or state. Klagenfurt is its capitol. I think right wing politics have always been strong down there. Borderlands I find tend to bring out ethnic political extremes. By borderland I mean in the cultural sense, Carinthia representing Germanic culture confronting that of the Slavic world. In contrast, the Communist Party by that time was pretty small and pretty hopeless. They had been thoroughly trashed and beaten down and their efforts, supported and even spearheaded by the Russian occupiers, to gain electoral power in the eight or ten years after the war, were total failures except in the Russian sector and the leadership of that party was just a bloody disaster. We never really considered the Communist Party a real threat in Austrian politics. After the State Treaty, I recall they lost whatever representation they had in parliament. They were loud, they published a Party newspaper, the Volksstimme, they held rallies, some of them kind of interesting, as a matter of fact, but they were slavish, mimicking and repeating the Soviet line. Utterly predictable and utterly discredited in Austrian politics in general and in particular in the labor unions to which the Communists always looked as a source of hope for strength - but that never eventuated.

Q: *When you were there in ’60 to ’62 when the Kennedy administration came in, did they designate anybody as a youth officer or did this come a little later?*

HELMAN: I think it came a little later. I probably would’ve been the logical choice since I was closer to youth than any of my colleagues.

Q: *I mean they were sort of pushing us, I think it was probably a year later - ’63ish or later - by the time…*

HELMAN: Well, we were getting close to Kennedy’s assassination. Kennedy came in, in ’60.

Q: *’61.*

HELMAN: ’61, that’s right. He was elected in ’60. You know I don’t recall. The Embassy certainly in a sense fed off of him because he was such an immensely popular figure in Europe and that included Austria. He represented such a fresh, new generation, and one with idealism and style.

Q: *It really touched a chord which really surprised me. You know I’d go into little villages, about a year later I was in Yugoslavia and you’d find little pictures of Kennedy in the marketplace. Tito, and also pictures of Kennedy.*

HELMAN: He was hugely popular. Immensely popular.
Q: When did you leave in ’62?

HELMAN: I left in September of ’62. It was only a two-year tour.

Q: Just before the missile crisis.

HELMAN: Yes.

YALE RICHMOND
Special Projects Officer
Vienna (1961-1963)

Yale Richmond was born in Massachusetts in 1923. He received a bachelor’s degree in 1943 from Boston College, thereafter he joined the Army from 1943-1946. He then received a master’s degree from Syracuse. His career included positions in Germany, Austria, Russia, Poland, and Laos. Mr. Richmond was interviewed in June 2003 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Today is June 19, 2003. You were off to Vienna in 1961. How long were you there and what were you doing?

RICHMOND: I was in Vienna for 2 years from ’61 to ’63 as head of what was called the Special Projects Office, SPO, which was a great misnomer if I ever heard of one. In the Soviet Bloc, “special projects” always meant something to do with secret services.

Q: It sounded to me like you were in charge of assassinations.

RICHMOND: I don’t know why they called it that. We called it SPO for short. Its ostensible mission was to provide cultural and informational support to USIA posts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which did not have large staffs and didn’t have libraries and they couldn’t make exhibits, they couldn’t run photo shows. So what we did in Vienna, we had a large exhibit section of 15 or so Austrians who could put together an exhibit on anything that our East European posts requested. We also had a large photo lab which was at that time the largest photo lab in Vienna. They could dig up photos of almost anything to use in these exhibits. Then we had a very interesting monitoring operation which paralleled what FBIS was doing. We had on the staff people who could translate bilingually in Albanian, Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Russian, and they would listen to news broadcasts from those countries on their radios at home or in the office and we put out a daily bulletin on what the Eastern Bloc nations were saying about various things of interest to the West. That was distributed to Austrian readers in Vienna but mainly to the foreign press. The western press had a large presence in Vienna because it was first of all too expensive and difficult to maintain a staff in each of the East European countries and there wasn’t much they could gather in those days anyway. So, all of the Western press had the correspondents in Vienna who covered Eastern Europe from Vienna and
they were recipients of our daily bulletin. They would follow up on stories that we had tipped them off on. That was the stated purpose of SPO.

After I got there, I discovered there was another unstated purpose which unfortunately nobody had briefed me on. I was originally supposed to go from Warsaw to Bordeaux because I had French also. At the last minute, there was a shift and somebody had to be moved around and that caused a whole series of moves and I ended up going to Vienna because I was fluent in German. What I learned that SPO was doing, SPO was getting copies of all the telegrams and despatches sent in by our East European posts and Moscow and at my discretion we could sanitize them, cut out the parts that were sensitive, and give copies to anyone in the Western press that we thought could use it. When I first heard about that part of my job, I said, “This is very interesting, but if I make a mistake, will Washington back me up?” They said, “No, you’re on your own.” So, I did that for 2 years and fortunately never made a mistake, or one that anyone caught. We would regularly sanitize despatches and give them correspondents of the New York Times, the Viennese Press, the International Harold Tribune, etc.

Q: How did the press use these? Was this a press that was friendly to us?

RICHMOND: This was the Western press. These were all very friendly, even the Austrians, who were supposedly neutral. What they would do with it, they would frequently say, “Travelers from Sofia or from Warsaw report back” and then they would cite whatever we had said in these telegrams that was of interest to them.

Q: Were the embassies of these Eastern European countries or the Soviet Union figuring out what this was and coming around and protesting?

RICHMOND: No, there were no protests, but they were aware of what we were doing. Vienna at that time was the largest center of international intelligence and intrigue in the world. The Soviet Union had large KGB operations there and we had a large CIA station there. Everybody knew what everybody else was doing. It was part of the propaganda war.

Q: Going to a cocktail party, you would feel that you were surrounded by spies of various hues.

RICHMOND: That’s right. And we would have lunch with them, too.

Q: Did the Soviets have a counterpart?

RICHMOND: Well, the Soviets had for years been spreading what has come to be called “disinformation.” Our SPO stories were what our embassies were reporting to Washington. You had to believe if you were in the Foreign Service that what they were reporting was accurate. It may have been wrong sometimes, but it was accurate, whereas the Soviets were masters at spreading disinformation throughout the world. They were doing it from their diplomatic and intelligence posts around the world in various countries. There were several Indian newspapers that they often used. They would leak stuff to an Indian newspaper. Then they would report, “The Indian newspaper such and such says” and most of the people who read that around the world would not know that this Indian newspaper was in cahoots with the Soviets.
Q: When you say “Eastern Europe,” could you explain what that meant at that time?

RICHMOND: Eastern Europe at that time… The Soviet Union was considered separate. But Eastern Europe at that time included the other members of the Warsaw Pact – Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Q: And East Germany.

RICHMOND: East Germany was a special case. I never worked on East Germany, but it formally was not considered a part of Eastern Europe in the State Department. That would have meant that the West Germans had formally recognized having lost it. The same way Yugoslavia had a unique position. Yugoslavia was “communist” but was largely open to the West. You could buy all kinds of Western newspapers there. It was communism under Tito, who had his differences with the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was not a part of the Warsaw Pact, but it was considered Eastern Europe for the State Department, as were the 3 Baltic states because we did not recognize them formally as being a part of the Soviet Union. So, the 3 Baltic states were also in the State Department hierarchy in Eastern Europe, as was Albania, another special case.

Q: What sort of support would you give, what type of exhibits?

RICHMOND: Well, each of our embassies had a display board outside. It was a showcase outside the embassy usually attached to the wall of the building or in Moscow to the wrought iron gates that surrounded the embassy. They were illuminated at night. They had glass fronts. We would have photo exhibits about the U.S., various things that we thought we could present and which the Soviets would not consider dangerous for them, or too dangerous. We had these in all of the East European embassies. Romania also had an American library which the Romanians allowed us to open which was staffed by a USIS officer. Romania also had a special relationship with the United States in those years.

Q: These exhibits had to be crafted rather carefully so that you were getting across whatever your message was but not to upset the local populace.

RICHMOND: For example, if we had a new president or a new congress, there could be an exhibit. I don’t recall exactly what the exhibits were on. There were so many of them in each of these different countries. But the post would cable in or call us up and tell us what they wanted, what was of interest to that country. For example, if one of their leaders went to the United States on a visit, we would make a photo exhibit of that visit. Or if an American president or a vice president visited Eastern Europe, we’d do the same kind of exhibit.

Q: How did you find working in Austria?

RICHMOND: I had just come from Warsaw. I had to make the inevitable comparison. Vienna had an old history and was full of old museums and the city itself was one big museum. I found that the Austrians were living very much in the past. Warsaw had been lively, creative, imaginative, full of energy and creativity in the arts and sciences and everything. When I got to
Vienna, I found it rather dull. The Austrians were still living in their past and there wasn’t much new. They were living in their past glories and not much new was being created.

Q: Vienna had a real problem since the end of World War I in that it was the center of an empire and there was no longer an empire. It had too many people sitting there with nothing to do.

RICHMOND: True, so they gave them all jobs in the government.

Q: Did you get to travel around much?

RICHMOND: Yes, I made my first trip to the Soviet Union from Vienna, although we were not providing much support to the Soviet Union beyond our exhibits, but I wanted to look over Moscow and decide whether I wanted to study Russian next and have an assignment in Moscow. So I took a flight from Vienna to Kiev, saw Kiev, and then went up to Moscow and saw the USIS operation there and got hooked on Russian studies.

Q: Did you get to Romania?

RICHMOND: Yes, I got there several times.

Q: How did we treat Romania? Ceausescu was in control at that time.

RICHMOND: And for many years after that. Romania was a very interesting case. It was a member of the Warsaw Pact but they were the mavericks. You could always depend on the Romanians doing something differently and that’s part of their history and culture. The marvel of the Romanians is that they survived surrounded by Slavs and Hungarians. Really it’s a classic example of playing one off against the other in order to survive as Romanians speaking a Latin based language. It’s easy to learn if you have studied Latin in high school or college and have some Slavic to add to it. So the Romanians had a rather independent policy. They did not participate in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They allowed almost all of their Jews to emigrate to Israel. They were interlocutors. They were messengers passing messages from various countries to the United States. They were used as intermediaries between China and the United States, China and the Soviet Union when things were bad. Romanians are experts at this.

Q: Were you doing much in Austria itself?

RICHMOND: I did not, but USIS did. We had an Amerika Haus. We had a large American studies program. We had a Fulbright program there, an international visitor program. But I was not concerned with Austria except in my dealings with the Austrian press.

Q: Did you ever get involved with the CIA operation?

RICHMOND: Only once, twice. Once, when a Pole that I had worked with in Warsaw on the distribution of our magazine, Amerika, defected. He turned up in Vienna and the CIA station people asked me to have him to lunch and see whether he wanted to talk to them. In other words,
I was used as an intermediary. I took the guy to lunch. We had a very pleasant lunch. But he said, no, thank you, he did not want to talk to the CIA. The other occasion was when the chief Polish local employee of the “New York Times” in Warsaw was smuggled out of Poland and into Vienna. I got a call the next morning from somebody in the CIA operation asking me if I would go to the “New York Times” office in Vienna, talked to the bureau chief there, whose name was Clyde Farnsworth, a wonderful old experienced journalist, one of the best guys I ever worked with, and asked where this fellow was. His name was Tommy Atkins, which was an acquired name. He was really a Polish Jew who had spent the war years in England, fought with the British army during the war, and took the name Tommy Atkins. He had been working for the “New York Times” for years and somebody smuggled him out of Poland. I called on Clyde Farnsworth and said, “Clyde, was Tommy Atkins here?” He said, “You missed him by a couple of hours. He’s already out of Austria.” This was all set up in advance and the guy ended up in Israel and then the United States.

Q: Was there any movement in those days in Austria of Jews coming out of the Soviet Union or anywhere else using Austria and moving on either to the United States or to-

RICHMOND: No, that came later in the late ‘60s.

Q: Did you get involved in people getting out of Eastern Europe into Austria and then wanting to go somewhere else in the West?

RICHMOND: It was not a part of my job, but in Austria, you inevitably came up against some people. We had an American employee of the embassy in Bucharest who was a German, a Volksdeutch, an ethnic German who had lived all her life in Romania. You found these people throughout all of Eastern Europe. And she was bought out. The Romanians let a lot of those people go at so many thousand dollars a head. The German government, I suppose the Austrians, too, were paying to get these people out, those who wanted to leave. I had a long talk with her. I took her to lunch. It was very interesting.

Q: What intrigued you about the Soviet Union?

RICHMOND: It was the only other superpower and it was the big adversary and it was the most important of the communist countries in those years and even later and I thought it was going to be an exciting place.

Q: So did you put in? What happened?

RICHMOND: Well, I already had Polish, which is a Slavic language, which I thought was going to help me but actually Polish hurts you because Polish is so Western and has so many Latin, French, German, English words in it and grammar. It really screws you up when you start to study Russian. But I took lessons. USIA paid for it. I had a guy in Vienna come in a couple of times a week.

Q: This was while you were in Vienna?
RICHMOND: Yes, and he would give me one hour lessons. So I had a start on Russian. And a few years later when I got to the Russian program at FSI, they didn’t know what to do with me because I already had quite a bit of Russian, so they gave me a separate instructor and I sat there in a room with this Russian from 9 till 1, 5 days a week, just the 2 of us talking.

Q: Oh, boy.

Jack Sulser was born in Illinois in 1925. He served in World War II with the 106th division in the Battle of the Bulge. Following the war, he returned to his hometown to attend Augustana College and to work as a radio announcer. He then attended the Institute of World Affairs in Connecticut. He earned a master’s degree in political science from the University of Wisconsin. Mr. Sulser entered the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in the United Kingdom (England), Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

SULSER: . . . a couple of months after Kennedy took office, when Al Wells was transferred from the Austrian desk to London, to be David Bruce's staff aide, suddenly that job opened up. Jova, who said he felt sorry for having kept me in Personnel longer than the normal two years and having missed that Berlin desk job, said that if I wanted it now, I could take the Austrian desk position, rather than filling out a full third year there. I said I would do that, because by that time I was becoming rather frustrated with the job, which was running me ragged, and I was not feeling as effective as I had before. I felt like I was swatting at ghosts much of the time, spinning wheels and not really getting a lot done that was very satisfying. So I left PER then and took the Austrian desk.

That was April of ’61. As far as I knew, I was the only country desk officer in the Department whose Ambassador came to see him every week. The Austrian Ambassador had a standing appointment with me at a certain hour, it was a Thursday morning as I recall, where he could appear, usually with his deputy, to go over whatever questions he had in mind, communications he had received, issues the Embassy was considering, and I could go over with them things that were on our mind. It was Ambassador Platzer, whom I caught up with again later in London. He told me that when his predecessor was taking that job, while Tommy Thompson was Ambassador in Vienna, Thompson had advised this Austrian Ambassador coming to Washington that if he wanted to get business done in the State Department he should deal with the country desk officer and not, like most ambassadors in town, insist on seeing no one lower than an Assistant Secretary. Austrian ambassadors had followed that advice ever since -- by that time, it
was several years. They still consider it was an effective way to do business.

Q: How did you find this from your point of view?

SULSER: I enjoyed it, because I knew that none of my colleagues in EUR or other bureaus had that much contact with their ambassadors. For the most part, when their Ambassadors came in, the desk officer's role was to go down to the front entrance, meet them and escort them to the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretary, or Under Secretary or whatever, take notes and write up a memorandum of conversation afterwards; and, of course, draft telegrams going out to our Embassy in the country for approval at some higher level. Here I was, receiving the Austrian Ambassador weekly. In those days, a foreign ambassador could walk into the State Department and up to the desk officer's office. I didn't even have to go down to the front entrance to meet him if he didn't stand on protocol. Security was such that he could appear at my door!

Q: What were the type of things that you'd be talking about on a normal visit?

SULSER: We talked a lot about Austrian assets in the United States, which had been seized back at the beginning of World War II, when Austria was part of Germany after the 1938 Anschluss. All Austrian-owned assets in the U.S. were seized by the Alien Property Custodian, as being German controlled and therefore, enemy assets. After the War, indeed even after the State treaty in 1955, we were still holding on to those assets. Although we had negotiated a treaty, that treaty had not yet been ratified to return the assets to Austrian nationals. As far as the people in the Department of Justice, who administered the program, were concerned, the Austrians who on paper owned or controlled these assets were really front-men for German individuals or companies and therefore they were not truly Austrian assets.

There was also the question of the South Tyrol, in Italy, the former Austrian part of northern Italy where there was an agreement after the war between Gruber, when he was Austrian foreign minister, and de Gasperi, when he was the Italian foreign minister, extending certain rights to the German speaking minority in the Italian South Tyrol, which the Italians referred to as Alto Adige. The Austrians were dissatisfied with the treatment that the German-speaking minority there was getting, didn't feel that the Gruber-DeGasperi agreement was being fully observed. They suspected the United States was not putting pressure on Italy because Italy was now a NATO ally. The Austrians kept hoping that we would press the Italians to be more cooperative and give more rights to the German speakers in what the Austrians called South Tyrol.

Those were among the normal things we dealt with. Shortly after I was in that job, I was asked by the Deputy Assistant Secretary in EUR responsible for our area, Dick Davis, to call the Austrian Ambassador and ask him to see him. This was the first time in the couple of months I had been on the job that anybody higher up had asked to see the Austrians. I called Ambassador Platzer and asked, "Please could you come in and see Mr. Davies tomorrow morning?" On that occasion I did meet him and brought him up to Davies' office. The reason Davies asked to see him was to tell Ambassador Platzer that President Kennedy would like to meet with Khrushchev in Vienna if this was alright with the Austrian government. Ambassador Platzer replied immediately that he did not need to consult Vienna, he could say yes right then and there. That
began the whole process of arranging the first summit meeting, the famous one in Vienna, between Kennedy and Khrushchev, in which Khrushchev was supposed to have tried to intimidate this young American President and scare him that they were going to take over Berlin and all sorts of things like that.

As the desk officer, I was involved in the logistic arrangements for the visit. Immediately after getting Austrian concurrence that day, the White House travel and advance people began showing up, needing arrangements to be made for all the things that are involved in a presidential visit. One of the first sessions I had with the White House people involved looking at the layout of the American Ambassador's residence in Vienna to decide who was going to be in what room, and I was rather shocked to find that President Kennedy and his wife required separate bedrooms; and of course he required that this and that assistant be immediately at hand as well. The result was that we had to ask the American Ambassador, Freeman Matthews' father, to vacate the residence! "Doc" Matthews was one of our most senior career ambassadors, one of the first to be given the grade of career ambassador. This was rather a shock to me that a President, going to a meeting in Ambassador Matthews' country, would pre-empt the residence, partly because the President and his wife required separate bedrooms. My original thought had been, okay, President and Mrs. Kennedy can have the master suite and Ambassador and Mrs. Matthews can move into the guest room, and there are still enough bedrooms for the National Security Adviser and the press secretary, Secret Service, etc. But no, they required every single room there, and Matthews had to move out into other quarters. We had a lot of meetings with the Secret Service and the White House communications people, because of course they had to set up special telephone lines and all that sort of thing. Which had the little side benefit that I could call the Embassy in Vienna any time of day or night, through the White House switchboard and talk to people and get my business done!

As you know, the meeting happened, and everything seemed to go pretty well, except when the President got back, my gosh, we had a big program to build bomb shelters in our back yards and...

Q: It was a scary time. I think people forget about this. The reserves were called up in Berlin. I remember discussing very seriously with my wife whether it was a good time for her and the children to be in Washington. Maybe it was a good idea to get...I mean would we stay together because it sounded like there might be a missile exchange!

SULSER: It was a scary time. There were articles in the newspapers about bomb shelters and lists of companies that could build shelters that passed government requirements and were believed to be radiation-proof and all that. And about what kind of supplies you needed to store in your shelter and how long you should expect to be there. I even went to the extent of getting plans for one of these shelters, because the house that we bought when we came back for that Washington assignment had a very large hill behind the house that looked as though it would be ideal for digging in and making one of these underground shelters. The other side of the hill faced Washington, so I had the hill to absorb the radiation or heat blast that might come from the missile...we were only five or six miles from the Pentagon, so if that was one of the targets, well we were pretty close. It was a scary time and there were a lot of people in the State Department who were then involved in planning the relocation center out in the mountains, and with keeping
the central records and identifying the people who would be moved to that location when the emergency came. It had a big effect!

Q: In the long run, I guess it was counter-productive, because it got the President's back up.

SULSER: Yes, he obviously took Khrushchev's threats rather seriously and came back and mobilized the government in a way it had not been mobilized previously, at least since the Korean War. It was a frightening business.

The following year, in '62, the Austrian Chancellor, then Alphons Gorbach, was invited to visit Washington. That was the other highlight of my time on the Austrian desk. I had to prepare briefing papers for the White House. There was a man on the NSC staff responsible for that area, David Klein, whom I had known earlier in Germany, who was responsible for putting the briefing book together in the White House. I was responsible for getting it up to S/S, which was responsible for getting it over to the White House. The main issue at that time was the Austrian government's express desire to have some sort of arrangement with the new European Economic Community. Austria, like many European countries, is much more dependent on foreign trade than the United States was at the time, and probably still is to this day, and a very large portion of Austria's trade was with Germany. Germany was in the European Economic Community, and the Austrians feared that as the Community raised its external barriers while diminishing its internal barriers to trade, this would work against Austria's interests. So they wanted to have some kind of an arrangement, which they had trouble defining, because to a considerable extent European Community was linked with NATO and the members of the Community were members of NATO; and Austria had put itself in a perpetual state of neutrality in order to get rid of the four-power occupation in 1955. So they were reluctant and felt the Russians would make a lot of trouble for them if they moved too far toward becoming a part of this European Economic Community. They wanted some kind of association with the Community, and eventually Sweden and Switzerland and other major European neutral countries also sought something of that sort. Austria wanted the United States to be sympathetic toward this approach. There were a lot of people in the State Department, in particular George Ball, Bob Schaetzel, Dick Vine, who were all for maintaining the purity of the European Economic Community and for not watering it down to any extent that might be necessary to accommodate the interests of these neutral countries. In the process of trying to get agreement on briefing papers for the Chancellor's upcoming visit, these "Europeans," I guess you could call them, decided that Austria could be seen as a "special case." They were prepared to see some kind of arrangement made for Austria, but not for Sweden or Switzerland, on the grounds that Austria was not really voluntarily neutral. They rationalized that Austria had taken on this neutrality only to get rid of the Russian occupation (and in the process also the U.S., British and French troops). This was the position they wanted to work into the briefing papers.

Q: Jack, you were saying about the Europeanists, how they were coming around to the idea of making an exception for Austria into the European Economic Community.

SULSER: The Austrians were not sure how they should regard this. On the one hand, they wanted our blessing for some sort of association with the EEC; on the other hand, they did not want to be singled out as a "special case," because they felt that if the other neutral countries
were barred from any arrangement with the EEC, this would identify Austria as being not really neutral, being a little too associated with NATO, and that the Russians would cause problems and the whole thing could founder on Soviet objections. They were not very happy about this approach. Anyhow, that's the way it went forward. The man I knew on the NSC staff, David Klein, early on in preparation of these briefing papers, called me and said, "Where is such and such a paper?" I'd tell him, "Well, we drafted them and they're sitting over in RPE," (where Schaeztel, Cleveland, and Vine were), or they're hung up in the Under Secretary's office, or they're in S/S, or something." He said, "Well, you know I would like to see the papers in their draft form. Would you please bootleg to me every paper that you do, send me a copy directly. While it goes through the procedure and eventually gets over to me with all the necessary initials and approval, I want to see them in their unadulterated form." So I circumvented channels and sent him everything as it was originally drafted.

One benefit I got out of this personal connection was when it came time to prepare guest lists for the luncheon the President was to give the Chancellor, or who was to go over and brief the President before the Chancellor arrived, these things were done at higher levels than I because they included congressmen, etc. Klein called me to say these lists had been received and my name was nowhere on them. Wasn't I interested in coming over and participating? When the message came over from the White House about briefing the President in advance, it was specified that it was to be the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State, and me! And I was on the guest list for the luncheon following the President's meeting with the Chancellor.

As it turned out, the President's meeting with the Chancellor coincided with the semi-annual ministerial NATO meeting in Europe, so the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary were at the NATO meeting. Thus, the briefers were to be Acting Secretary George Ball, Acting EUR Assistant Secretary Bill Tyler, and myself. We went over about an hour before the Chancellor was due to arrive at the White House and were ushered into the Oval Office and met the President. I'm sure you remember the innumerable pictures of meetings in the Oval Office in Kennedy's time when they had these loveseats on either side of the fireplace and between them, facing the fireplace, a rocking chair on which the President sat. Ball and Tyler were on one of the loveseats and I was on the other, and the President was in his rocking chair between us. There was a coffee table in between and he had his feet up on the coffee table and was gently rocking himself while we were talking, which brought his feet just about in front of my face. I noticed that he had the most grubby looking stockings on, much worse than I would wear even to go to work, much less to a meeting in the White House. They had been laundered way too many times, were shapeless and faded. When we walked in, he shook our hands and invited us to sit down. He had the briefing book Klein had prepared. It was a big thick thing, it must have been three inches thick, full of biographic reports and all these briefing papers on numerous subjects, and he said, "I haven't had time to look at this, so you guys give me a quick idea of what this meeting is all about; and when we're with the Chancellor you take the lead, and when I get the feel for things, I'll chime in." All the work that had gone into preparing that briefing book, only to hear him say that he hadn't had time to look at it!

Ball and Tyler quickly reviewed some of the issues and how we felt about them, of which the question of the association with the EEC was the principal one. Before we had talked even 10 minutes or so, somebody came in with a beautiful teak box which he opened to show the
President. This was the present from the Chancellor to the President, which would be given to him later by the Chancellor. This staff person thought he might like to see it first, before he was given it officially. It was a boarding saber from an Austrian warship, because of the President's naval experience in World War II. The President reacted with great glee, snatching it out of the box and waving it around like a kid at Christmas. There was a plaque on the inside lid of the box saying it was a boarding saber from a vessel that had fought in the war of Schleswig-Holstein. The President turned to Ball and said, "Who were they fighting in the war of Schleswig-Holstein." Ball didn't know and he turned to Tyler. Tyler didn't know and turned to me. This was the first question in the briefing process that had gotten down to me. The rest were fielded by Ball and Tyler and I was just an interested onlooker. Of course, I didn't know either. When I got home, I looked it up in the history books and found that it was the German states, Prussia and Austria, fighting Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein before the formation of the German Empire.

By the time this little incident ended, another staff member stuck his head in the door and announced that the Chancellor and his party were arriving at the front entrance. The four of us jumped up and went down the hall to an elevator into the basement of the White House. We were walking down a long narrow corridor of the basement, and at one point Lyndon Johnson was standing in the corridor. As the four of us caught up with him, nothing was said to him, nobody even said hello. He fell in behind us, and we proceeded on down the corridor. We came to an elevator to take us up to the level of the front entrance. The elevator door opened, and the President and Ball, who were busy talking, and Tyler and I and the Vice President filed into the elevator and went up to the main floor. I was the last one to step into the elevator, so I was closest to the door. When we got to the main floor, the President's naval aide, Tad Shepard, was standing there waiting to escort the party to the front entrance. Nobody had briefed me on protocol in the White House. I didn't know whether being closest to the door I was supposed to step out, or whether the President was supposed to make his way through us and go out first. I didn't know what to do since no one else was moving. I began to teeter forward, teeter back, teeter forward again. Finally, I caught Tad Shepard's eye, and when I began to teeter forward again he shook his head as if to say, "No, No!" So then I knew I was supposed to wait. Sure enough, when the President got finished saying whatever he was saying to Ball, he wormed through the crowd and came out first. And then Johnson, then Ball, then Tyler and finally me. By this time the Chancellor and Foreign Minister Kreisky, Ambassador Platzer and Deputy Foreign Minister Steiner, who was a People's Party man, were at the front door. We went up and welcomed them and showed them down to the Cabinet Room, where the meeting was to be held. Nora Lejins, the State Department principal German translator, was waiting there, and the meeting progressed with the Americans on one side of the Cabinet table and the Austrians and Lejins on the other side.

Chancellor Gorbach did not speak English, but the other three Austrians did, so the discussion was a mixture of German and English. As the President had instructed in the Oval Office, Tyler and Ball did most of the talking and responding to the Chancellor's questions. After a time President Kennedy chimed in, more or less supporting what had been said and expressing his best wishes and best hopes, all that kind of business. It was agreed that Tyler and Foreign Secretary Kreisky should get together on a statement to be made at the end of the meeting. They went off into one corner of the room, and the Chancellor took the opportunity to present the boarding saber to the President. It had been rewrapped in the meantime. The President opened
the package and acted beautifully, as if he had never seen the thing before and again was obviously very pleased with his present, thanked the Chancellor profusely and said, "Come with me." He sort of grabbed the Chancellor's elbow and ushered him back into the Oval Office, I tagged along because Mrs. Lejins was busy working on this statement to be made in German for Gorbach to tell the press when he emerged later that day from the meeting. Since Gorbach didn't speak English, I went with him and the President back into the Oval Office. As we passed through Mrs. Lincoln's room, the President's secretary, between the Cabinet Room and the Oval Office, he told her to have the press come in. He wanted pictures taken with the Chancellor and the boarding saber. Moments after we got into the Oval Office, another door opened up and several newspapermen came in and photographers and Kennedy went through the business of flashing the saber around, shaking the Chancellor's hand, and the Chancellor would look at me for translation of what the President had said. For a moment I was the unofficial interpreter. Forever after, as long as Kennedy was alive, pictures that appeared in newspapers and magazines of him in the Oval Office, there was this saber and the scabbard it came in hung on the wall. He apparently did genuinely like it and had it mounted on the wall. I still have in my study at home a very large copy of one of the pictures taken of Kennedy and Gorbach with this saber. It was a nice occasion.

After the meeting was over, they had the luncheon in the State Dining Room. It was a sizeable affair and there were toasts and whatnot. McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Adviser -- I'd never met him -- came up to me and thanked me for including him in the guest list. I said, "This didn't have anything to do with me. This was done in the Protocol Office or somewhere." It seemed to me to be taken for granted the National Security Adviser would be there, but he came up and thanked me (erroneously) for getting him invited to the luncheon.

That evening the Austrian Ambassador gave a very nice black-tie dinner at his residence which the President did not attend. The Vice President was there and Ball and Tyler. It was a very pleasant day for me.

We had one other important visitor during my time on the desk, the Austrian Defense Minister, Schleinzer. He was People's Party and came with his deputy from the Socialist Party (Roesch), because they had what was called the "Big Coalition" at the time, the two main parties. They divided up all the Cabinet posts and each minister had a deputy from the other party. In the foreign ministry Kreisky was Socialist, his deputy was People's Party. The Defense Ministry was the other way around. They came over in connection with their request to borrow $50-60 million to buy more American military equipment for the Austrian armed forces. When the occupation ended in 1955, we had built up a large stockpile of military equipment for the purpose of equipping the Austrian Army when it was recreated. The Pentagon was scared there would be a hiatus between the departure of the foreign occupation troops and the build-up of an effective Austrian Army. In the meantime, if there was any kind of problem, the Russians would be able to re-occupy not only their zone but maybe the whole country with very little effective resistance. It would take so long to build up this Austrian Army.

One of the measures they took was to develop a stockpile of equipment, and the British and French turned over some small amounts too, but about 95% or so -- the new Austrian Army looked like the old American army -- their equipment, their helmets, everything was American.
By 1962 some of this stuff was wearing out. In any case, they wanted to get more modern equipment, particularly the new M-1 tanks the American Army had developed, and they wanted to borrow money. That was the other major issue I worked on during that time, to try to get a coordinated position within the U.S. government as to whether we wanted to extend credits to them and on what terms, because they didn't feel they could pay cash. The Pentagon, of course, was all in favor of selling the equipment. The Treasury Department was not in favor of giving the Austrians a free ride on a loan, wanted them to pay commercial interest rates. The Austrians thought it would look less like a non-neutral U.S.-Austrian military deal if the credit appeared more commercial, namely from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, rather than from the U.S. government as such. There were a lot of negotiations, and we finally arrived at an agreed position. The credit was extended to them and they bought the equipment, which made their forces look even more American, more up to date than it had before.

There were other military issues. In the State Treaty the Austrians were prohibited from having "guided missiles." By 1961-62, because of the improvement of aircraft that had ensued in the meantime, aircraft were firing rockets, and you needed some kind of guided missile for anti-aircraft defense. If the Austrians were to have any kind of effective air force and anti-aircraft equipment, they needed something that could be called guided missiles, although almost certainly the language at the time of the State Treaty meant some kind of ground-to-ground missiles, or something of that sort rather than anti-aircraft stuff. There was a lot of negotiation that never led to a great deal, but a lot of messages back and forth and consideration given to that kind of subject.

One of the things the new Kennedy Administration did that I was involved in at the beginning of my time on the Austrian Desk, they gave up the old NSC policy papers and developed a new series of operational guidelines that were to be State Department papers. Not through the NSC system, but would involve inter-departmental consultation and coordination. Al Wells had started drafting the Austrian operational guidelines before I took over the desk, but I finished them and coordinated them with the Pentagon and other government agencies. Those papers, instead of being discussed by the NSC, were then discussed and approved by the Policy Planning staff in the State Department. As it turned out the Austrian operational policy paper was the first one to go through the whole process and get approved. When I was called on to explain and defend this paper in the Policy Planning staff meeting, I found there were one or two people there, perhaps assigned the role of devil's advocate, I don't know, who argued against many of the points. Their principal argument was that the paper did not adequately reflect Austrian neutrality; that we were counting on the Austrians to be less neutral than they appeared to be on the surface. Such things as strategic trade controls, things of that sort, that we were counting on more Austrian cooperation than a strictly neutral position would seem to suggest. I was in a position of having to say, "Well, Austrian neutrality is defined by Austria, not by us. Anything the Austrian government is willing to do, that they feel is consistent with their neutrality, why should we object to it? Why should we want them to be more neutral than they want to be themselves?" The paper was approved and became official U.S. policy.

After I had been on the desk for about a year and a half, I was invited down to call on Jova, who was still the chief of personnel operations, to tell me that by this time I had been in Washington for five years, longer than the usual Washington assignment for my grade, and I was scheduled
for another overseas assignment. He was still grateful that I had stayed on for another nine months to provide some continuity when he was the new chief, so he was going to give me an opportunity to express a preference between two assignments. He said the number two political position in Vienna and the principal officership in Asmara, Eritrea were becoming vacant; which would I prefer? When I left Germany to come home after seven years in Europe, I did not expect to be going back to Europe again because it was the Department's policy to get experience in at least one other area. The job in Asmara was very tempting because it was known among Personnel insiders as one of the hidden "plums"...

Q: Nice place but also very important because of Kagnew Station.

SULSER: Yes, it was a nice place in Africa where the climate was decent because of the altitude. Here was the opportunity for a post of my own, an interesting place with a sizeable U.S. military presence. I had known one or two former principal officers in Asmara, who looked back on that assignment with fond memories. But Europe was the area of my greatest interest when I came in the Foreign Service, all my background there. Here was an opportunity that I felt I had wasted in my four years in Duesseldorf to really become proficient in the language. During all the time I was there I had sought out English-speaking contacts, and if I found a political contact could speak decent English I would speak English with him rather than improving my German. I had regretted that afterward and was happy at the Austrian desk to use some, or at least to read it. I thought here I've had a year and a half on the desk, I know something about the country, the opportunity to go back there. Rightly or wrongly, I chose the Vienna assignment.

I went to Vienna on a five-year assignment, which was the way it was set up at the time. The Department was being chastised for moving people around too frequently, chastised by Congress for the cost of transporting officers and their families and their household goods. In posts that were not hardship posts and you were a middle-grade officer, you were supposed to be getting longer assignments.

Q: I remember seeing a report by Congress of how much it cost to move officers, and I was sort of appalled because I was on that list, I was going from Saudi Arabia back to Washington or something and it was expensive. Congress was looking closely at that.

SULSER: Oh yes, the Appropriations Committee was giving the Department a very hard time. They always wanted to know the average length of tours of duty, and the average was under two years and the cost of these transfers was astonishing. I never appreciated it myself and I'm sure you didn't either, how much it cost to move you and your family and your household goods and your automobile...

In any case, they were then setting up assignments in places like Vienna on a five-year basis. Three years, then home leave and back for two years. I went off happily to Vienna, and in one respect at least I lived up to my promise to improve my language ability. When I got to Vienna and began to make political contacts there, I never asked an Austrian whether he could speak English; I always spoke German, and this had a beneficial effect on my language. In fact, in a few cases when I'd have a visitor from Washington and wanted to introduce him to some of these political contacts, I was astonished to find after dealing with them in German for years that some
of them spoke excellent English! But because I had approached them in German they spoke
German with me.

We still had six officers in the political section, including one man devoted to refugee matters
and one labor attaché, and I was the number two. My principal duty was contact with the
Socialist Party. After three years I had home leave. In the meantime, the Department had set up
these counseling branches that you referred to earlier. For the first time I went around to
Personnel and met with the head of the Mid-Career Political Officer Counseling Branch, who
was Bob Houghton. He went over my record and said he thought it was a mistake to spend five
years in a place like Vienna in a subordinate position because to become a senior officer you
needed to demonstrate executive management experience; I shouldn't be going back, three years
was enough. I said, "Well, I chose the post but I didn't make the decision to stay there five years.
If you are able to get a different assignment for me, rather than going back, fine." I never heard
any more about that and went back. After I had been there another year, four years at that point,
the political counselor, John Devine, left, and the Embassy suggested to the Department that I
move up into his position. I was still an 03 and the position was an 02, and they said they had 02s
that needed an assignment. They sent an 02 straight out of the National War College to be the
chief of the section. That was Rollie White. I did the full five years as number two. Meantime,
we lost a couple of positions, so it became a smaller operation. I had the pleasure of working
almost those whole five years with Jimmy Riddleberger as Ambassador, who had succeeded Doc
Matthews just before I went there in 1962. Shortly before I left, Riddleberger departed and
Douglas MacArthur II arrived as Ambassador. He did not speak German, as Riddleberger had.
Ken Sullivan, the labor attaché, and I were the best German speakers in the Embassy, so we took
turns accompanying MacArthur on his calls around the city, introducing him there. Then I got
notice I had been selected for senior training, and I did not try to get out of that as many had
when I was secretary to the selection panel for senior training. I was allocated to the Air War
College in Alabama; spent nine months there, my first civilian residence in a southern state,
which introduced me to golf. When I got down there, I found there was nothing much to do
outside of the school except hang out at the Officer's Club or take up golf, and I thought that golf
sounded a little healthier.

Q: Let me go back to Austria. You were there from '62-'67. How did you find...you had the
Socialist Party, were they out...?

SULSER: When I got there they were in that big coalition I mentioned earlier that divided up the
government. The Chancellor was People's Party, Alphons Gorback, and the Vice Chancellor,
who was head of the Socialist Party, was Bruno Pittermann. The other Cabinet departments were
divided up quite equally, with the Deputy being of the opposite party. It seemed to work very
well and we were all of the opinion, as most of the Austrian leaders and opinion-molders,
editorial writers, were, that this was a good thing for Austria. Given the pre-war, pre-Anschluss
state of politics in Austria, when these parties were more identified with ideologies, they were
literally at war with each other. Each had its own army, its own uniformed force, and did indeed
carry out military operations against each other. The best way to prevent any kind of
reoccurrence of this factional strife was to have the two major parties locked together in the
government. This had been the pattern since the War ended in 1945. The Communist Party had
been in the government briefly, until the first election, when they were virtually wiped out and
left the government. By the time I took over the desk in 1961, there were no Communists in Parliament any more, and the only other party outside the government coalition, was the Freiheitliche partei, which was sort of the equivalent of the FDP in Germany, called in English the Freedom Party. The Freedom Party included some of the remnants of the old Austrian Nazi Party. It was a little, almost meaningless faction in the Parliament, which was made up 90% or more by the two major parties. The President of Austria had been a Socialist since 1945 and the Chancellor from the Peoples' Party. Even at that top level the jobs were divided, and it was everyone's opinion that that must be the way the Austrian electorate wanted it because they kept electing Socialist presidents and the Peoples' Party, the largest party in the Parliament, appointed the Chancellor. While I was there, the Peoples' Party won a majority of the Parliament for only the second time since the War and promptly set up a one-party government under Josef Klaus. The Socialist party went into opposition. This was something new and to some extent people worried about it, was this going to renew the kind of factional strife they had had during the '20s and '30s? But in fact it didn't. It lasted for a few years and then the Peoples' Party lost their majority and went back into coalitions. In the meantime, the Freiheitliche partei, to some extent maybe because of age, some of their former Nazi people died off, they got younger leaders, although some of them are also extremely pan-German right-wing types too. But the Freiheitliche partei, to a considerable extent, has been rehabilitated.

It was an interesting situation there, and quite different from Germany. The different provinces in Austria had special political characteristics. The Socialist Party predominated the Burgenland, which had been part of the Russian occupation zone and was still the least developed, most primitive part of Austria, bordering on Hungary. If you went eastward from Vienna into the Burgenland, things looked different, looked poorer. Then you'd go across into Hungary, and that looked infinitely poorer than the Burgenland. The Austrians used to say that the boundary of Europe begins at the eastern boundary of Austria, and indeed there was a startling difference when you crossed the border. As poor as Burgenland was, it looked rich compared to Hungary in those days.

Q: How did you find the Austrians viewed the Soviet Union and its satellite neighbors at that time?

SULSER: I never met an Austrian who was friendly to the Soviet Union. They had bad memories of the Soviet occupation. The Soviet occupation zone was plundered for the benefit of the Soviet Union. All the Austrian industries were dismantled and hauled off to the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime there was extremely harsh and left a lot of enemies. As far as the neighboring East European countries were concerned, there was still a lot of nostalgia for the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Austria, particularly the eastern parts of it, than Voralberg, Tyrol and Salzburg Provinces, which are largely Germanic, were other provinces with very large Bohemian, Slovakian, Hungarian, Slovenian, Croatian minorities.

In the State Treaty and the other arrangements that were made to end the occupation, the Austrians were obliged to give considerable autonomy to those East European minorities in Austria: to permit them their own schools and other cultural institutions; and the Austrians often held up their performance under those agreements as an example of how the Italians ought to treat the German population in the South Tyrol. You'd go from village to village in the eastern
part of Austria, particularly in Burgenland, Steiremark (Styria), and Karnten (Carinthia), and villages would have different characteristics. One would be obviously Hungarian, one would be Slovakian, one Slovenian or Croatian in architecture, and had all their language schools, churches and whatnot. There were still a lot of personal and historical ties with the other East European countries. During the time I was there travel across what was known as the Iron Curtain increased considerably. Particularly from the neighboring countries. There was a lot of tourism from those countries into Austria, especially Vienna.

Every week I would call on the head of the press service in the Chancellor's office, who would review with me the communique issued after the Cabinet meeting, fill me in on the background of the issues that had been discussed and some of the personalities involved. This was a longstanding arrangement that went back through several of my predecessors at the Embassy. One day I was standing in front of the Ballhausplatz, as the Chancellor's office is called, which also houses the Foreign Ministry, waiting for an Embassy car to pick me up. One man with a camera came up to a policeman and asked if it was permitted to take a picture of the Ballhausplatz, because this was the center of the Austrian government and the scene of some famous incidents in the '30s, when Chancellor Dolfuss was murdered. The policeman looked at this man and said to him in German, "You must be from the east." And the man said yes, he was from Hungary. The policeman said, "Well this is the free West and you can take a picture of any building you want here." I thought this was an illustrative incident because here was this fellow from Hungary who was used to police controls and not supposed to take pictures of government installations; and here was this Austrian policeman who spoke in a very kindly way, using the familiar "Du" with this visitor, telling him: Look, this is a free country, you want to take a picture of the Ballhausplatz, fine!

Q: Did you have the feeling at the time that the CIA and the KGB were using Austria as their own personal sandbox, or something like that?

SULSER: Oh, definitely. Going back to the days of the "third man," the occupation in Austria, experienced lot of disappearances of agents and other people on both sides. This was indeed a battleground for intelligence agencies, and the Soviets used their long stay in Austria to develop background identities for agents operating all over the Western world. Picking up Austrian identities, some of which were genuine, people who had died in their occupation zone, and they would just take over their records, their names and so on to use as a basis for identities for their agents who would go out into other countries. There were not great Austrian targets for us or for the Soviets there, but there were the targets of other countries, third countries, to be worked on. This survived certainly as long as I was there. During that time too, one of our large FBIS monitoring stations in the eastern Mediterranean closed down and was moved to Austria.

July 7, 1994 - Sulser continued

Q: Jack, there were two subjects we mentioned, perhaps there is something else you want to mention about your time in Vienna, which was '62 to '67. First, was there any sort of tacit agreement, cooperation between Austria and NATO?

SULSER: The answer is not that simple. As far as I was ever aware, either as the officer in
charge of Austrian affairs in the Department or as Deputy Chief of the Political Section in Vienna, a period that stretches over 6 and a half years, there was never any formal arrangement or exchange of information. But equipping the new Austrian army in 1955 and extending credit in 1962 on somewhat better than commercial terms to buy more U.S. equipment, especially tanks, indicates that the U.S., acting on behalf of NATO you might say but never with NATO as an organization, believed Austria would resist a Warsaw Pact incursion; and we wanted to assist and encourage them in this expectation. Of course, we expected Sweden and Switzerland would also, but we didn't assist them, because they already had reasonably good military forces and had a tradition of neutrality. NATO planners would have taken this expectation into account, including an assessment of how effective Austrian resistance might be under two different circumstances, one being military action by neighboring Warsaw Pact countries without direct Soviet participation and the other with Soviet participation. I'm sure the assessment of Austrian effectiveness would have been very different in those two cases. But as far as I know there was no coordination between Austrian plans to resist and NATO plans, nor as far as I am aware any NATO plan to defend Austrian territory, although it seems to me in retrospect that it would have been logical for NATO to have at least a contingency plan to hold open the overland link between Italy and Germany via the Austrian Tyrol. If there was such a plan, I certainly never saw it or heard of it in those years from 1961 to 1967.

Q: Okay, the other one was talking about your ambassadors, Riddleberger and MacArthur.

SULSER: When I was on the desk, I had Doc Matthews, as I mentioned before. We only had telephone, telegram, and letter correspondence. I never dealt with him face to face. Almost the whole five years I was in Vienna I had Jimmy Riddleberger, who like Matthews was one of our most senior career ambassadors. He was very easy to work with, an absolutely delightful gentleman. He had almost his entire career background in that area. He had been in charge of Central European affairs in the Department, had been ambassador in Yugoslavia and U.S. representative to the Development Assistance Council, OECD, immediately before Vienna. He spoke German fluently, although like most of us learning it as an adult, he had an accent, but his language was perfectly capable to the job. His wife, who was born in Indonesia of Dutch parents, was bilingual in the language. Riddleberger customarily ate lunch in the staff canteen in the basement of the Embassy, frequently with his secretary, Francine Schaevaerts. There were usually two extra places at the table, and if you came in you were very welcome to join them and chat informally. He was very accessible, approachable.

Shortly after I got there and sized up the situation I decided I was going to take an interest in provincial affairs. Herman Schofield, who was also in the political section, had already staked out the Tyrol and Salzburg ski areas in Austria as he was an enthusiastic skier. He would combine ski trips with calls on the provincial officials in Innsbruck and Salzburg. The rest of the country was up for grabs. As a Political Officer I used to visit them, get acquainted with the provincial officials, governors of the various provinces, party leaders, editors, etc. I started within a few weeks getting out to those areas. Riddleberger, who had arrived a few weeks earlier, was also, as an old time Foreign Service officer, interested in getting acquainted with the rest of the country. I organized visits with Ambassador and Mrs. Riddleberger to several of the provincial capitals. I would spend two or three days at a time with them, and my wife, just the four of us, calling on provincial officials, organizing lunches, dinners, attending receptions given
by those governments. I had more informal time with him than one would typically expect of an Ambassador. They were always so easygoing and very nice.

During Riddleberger's time there, he had one of the best boxes at the Opera House, and he was not personally interested in opera; so the seats in the box were available to the staff on a first-come, first-served basis. My wife and I were both opera fans. While I was on the desk, I had become friendly with the Austrian who ran their cultural information center in New York. Just before I went to Vienna he was transferred back as head of the Austrian Theater Administration, the Bundestheaterverwaltung. So I had an excellent contact to know what was coming up in the Opera, new productions, guest conductors and singers, long before they were ever announced in the newspapers. I would sign up for the box and when the special event was announced, other members of the staff would try to get seats only to find that Sulser already had the box booked! The arrangement was that if you were using it for representational purposes you couldn't be bumped. Otherwise, if you were just going on your own, there was kind of a sharing arrangement. It was understood that nobody would hog the box and even if you had reserved a seat for yourself and your wife, for example, and somebody else came along who hadn't been to the opera as recently or as often as you had, they would ask you to step aside so that they could go. But for those special occasions I always arranged to take Austrian guests for representation purposes so I couldn't be bumped. As a result, we got to the Staatsoper very frequently. The first two years we were there more than 100 times, often more than two or three times in the same week. Riddleberger paid for the box on an annual basis. Once a year he would write a check for the whole thing, which was a very large sum, although prices then were a lot lower than they are today, and the people who used the box would only pay the pro rata cost of the seats. For the kinds of shows I chose to go to, the prices were always elevated because these were special events, new productions, first appearances of some famous singer. But we still paid the same rate every night all year around for the lowest priced performances. So that was a very nice arrangement. I think in the five years I was there with Riddleberger only once did he pre-empt me or anybody else from using the box because he suddenly had a visitor who was interested in going to the Opera.

When he would entertain a guest, just for a drink or something, to have a one-on-one conversation with some Austrian official as opposed to a big reception or dinner party at his residence, he was hesitant to ask people to come out to the Embassy residence in Hietzing, because it was out on the edge of town by Schönbrunn Palace. So he would use one of the apartments above the consulate, which was occupied by Ray Jones, a male secretary who had been with me in Duesseldorf and Vienna, initially as secretary to the chief of the political section. Then Ray moved up to be secretary to the DCM, which he remained the rest of the time in Vienna. Ray was famous in the Foreign Service for his art collection, his furniture, rugs and so on. He had a beautiful apartment, beautifully furnished. Riddleberger would use it to entertain people. Just an illustration of what an easy person he was to work for, and very likeable. But then his term expired and he came back to chair a career minister promotion panel for his last duty before retirement. He made a name for himself even in that respect. When the promotions to career minister were announced, he penned a letter to the Foreign Service Journal protesting because someone was promoted who had not been recommended by the panel. He and his board had enforced the rules at the time, that to be eligible for promotion to career minister you had to have served overseas. There were a few people who were very senior in the Foreign Service as a
result of the lateral entry "Wristonization" Program who never had served overseas. Joe Sisco was the person. The Secretary of State insisted that Joe Sisco should be promoted to Career Minister. Sisco was an extremely capable officer and held several top jobs in the Department in U.N. affairs and Near Eastern affairs as assistant secretary in both cases. But the fact was he never had an overseas assignment. Riddleberge felt that rules were rules. The Secretary of State put Sisco's name on the promotion list without the Board having recommended him, and Riddleberge made this fact public at the time.

After he left there were a lot of rumors about who might come to Austria. Bob Brandin was then the DCM, chargé during the interim. He and I and Ken Sullivan, who was then the labor attaché, were having lunch one day during this period in the staff canteen. Ken is given to very colorful language, a very outspoken fellow. We were discussing these rumors about who our next ambassador was going to be. Ken said, "Well, I don't give a ___ who it is as long as it isn't that *@*@* Douglas MacArthur." Brandin looked at him and said, "If you're going to say things like that, I guess I better tell you that we have received a request for agrément (from the Austrian government, which of course hadn't been announced, was still a secret because they didn't have the Austrian reply yet) "for MacArthur."

In due course we heard lots of stories about him and his wife, one of them from the wife of the British ambassador in Austria, who had been the British ambassador in the Philippines when MacArthur was ambassador to Japan. This good woman told my wife at a British Embassy party that they were saddened to hear that they were going to be in contact with the MacArthurs again, because when they were out there in the Pacific the Ocean was not big enough for the two of them even though they were not in the same country. People tell stories about the MacArthurs much more freely than I would expect. Much more freely than normal gossip.

Q: Well how did he operate and what were the problems?

SULSER: He was ambassador in Belgium when he was named to Austria. He had no background in the area, no knowledge of German. When we got a message from him about his arrival, they were taking the train from Brussels to Salzburg but wanted the Ambassador's car and driver to meet them in Salzburg instead of going all the way to Vienna on the train. The Ambassador's car was to be equipped permanently with a cooler to be kept stocked with a certain brand of champagne for Mrs. MacArthur. The cooler was to be maintained in the car, supplied with this brand of champagne at all times. When she was calling on foreign ambassador's wives or cabinet members' wives or going shopping or whatever, this brand of champagne was to be available in the car.

After they got established, she would occasionally have Embassy wives in for coffee. Coffee and orange juice and so on would be served to the wives, except Mrs. MacArthur who drank only this champagne.

As far as how he operated, with Riddleberger the regular Embassy staff meetings were such as I have experienced at other posts, where you go around the table and each one says what he is doing or what he is about to do, and the ambassador comments, gives guidance, reacts, whatever, to these things. The ambassador might also have something to say. But with MacArthur it was
very different. We still had the regular weekly staff meetings, with most of the American staff there, but they were all lectures. He did all the talking. It would be based on information telegrams from the Department. Based on his experience as counselor of the Department, ambassador in Japan, ambassador in Belgium, he had a very wide-ranging experience, and he would educate us about the significance and implications of what was going on around the world. By the time he would finish his lecture it was already overtime and hardly ever was it necessary for anybody to say what he was doing yesterday or today or planning to do tomorrow as far as U.S. activities in Austria were concerned.

Another request of a personal nature he made when he arrived, he wanted to be outfitted with a proper hunting costume. This was one of his interests. He wanted to go hunting chamois in the Austrian mountains. I knew the largest clothing manufacturer in Austria socially, and we were very friendly with them. So I said, well I can take care of that, this factory manufactures every kind of clothing. I arranged for the Ambassador to go to the head of this firm and be measured for a proper Gamsjaeger outfit, which had to be in certain traditional colors. He got that done.

Since he did not speak German, when he would make his calls on Austrian officials, Ken Sullivan and I (the two best German-speakers in the Embassy) would alternate going with him on his calls. In my case, since I only overlapped with him for six weeks, was not very many. Ken was there at least a year, so he had a great deal more of that duty to do. It was a very different sort of atmosphere, a different relationship. He was much more formal than Riddleberger, much less approachable. He was even a little bit formidable. Not as much fun to work for. But my experience with him was brief and I was not very unhappy about that.

RAYMOND C. EWING
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1962-1964)

Ambassador Raymond C. Ewing was born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1936. He graduated from Occidental College in 1957 with a degree in history. Ambassador Ewing’s Foreign Service career included positions in Japan, Pakistan, Italy, Switzerland, Cyprus, Tanzania, and Ghana. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1993.

Q: So you were in Vienna from 1962 to 1964. How did we regard the operations of the IAEA?

EWING: The IAEA was still quite a new agency in the United Nations system. It really came out of President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative. It was established in Vienna in the late 1950's and had not been there very long. So part of what we were involved with was essentially helping it through its initial phase, getting it organized and staffed, beginning programs of technical assistance in developing countries and holding international conferences. So a lot of it was fairly routine, administrative work. Part of it, though, was the initial negotiation of steps leading toward a nuclear safeguards system to make sure that the peaceful applications of atomic energy did not lap over into military uses. There were a lot of strong, political overtones to much
of what went on in the IAEA, both in terms of the Cold War and relationships with the Soviet Union, but also with the developing countries. They were trying to assert their rights to make sure that they did not lose out in this organization which, in many ways, they saw as dominated by the United States and the Western European countries. There were issues relating to South Africa, which was a very important part of the IAEA Board of Governors in those days.

Q: What about the Soviet Union? I would have thought that this would be one place where we were very strong allies, or did it work out that way?

EWING: As to an alliance between us and the Soviet Union, this was probably too strong a word to use for the IAEA in those days. We certainly had some common interests and were able to continue a dialogue on issues within the agency throughout that period. On the other hand, it was also the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which, of course, was followed to some extent by a period of limited detente. We were very much affected by what was happening elsewhere in the world but we did have an ongoing dialogue with the Soviets in Vienna. There was probably as cordial and productive a relationship with them as anywhere else in the world.

Q: What was your impression of how the Soviets dealt with this organization at this time?

EWING: I think that they took it seriously. They saw it, certainly, as an opportunity to score political points, but I think also that, as they had their own atomic energy program and wanted to use that in some of the developing countries, they saw opportunities to make some gains, if you will, through the agency. They had Soviet personnel in some key positions in the agency. It also was a time when Vienna was a place for interaction with the West in many respects, not just the IAEA, although the IAEA was of considerable importance for both of our countries. We put a fair amount of money into the IAEA and had some Americans in key positions in the Secretariat of the agency.

Q: Well, this was also a period which extended for quite some time. Atomic energy for peaceful purposes was considered the wave of the future, wasn't it?

EWING: We were probably pretty naive in some of the ways we looked at atomic energy, not sufficiently taking into account the health and safety aspects and the potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not enough attention was paid to the possibility of accidents like the Chernobyl affair, nor did we anticipate that at that time. There were some very good people involved in the IAEA. Vyacheslav Molotov [long time Soviet Foreign Minister] was actually the Soviet representative on the Board of Governors at the time I went there, except that he was never in Vienna. He was recalled to Moscow, and there were rumors that he was returning for the next meeting or the next session. He never did come again to Vienna and eventually was replaced by somebody else.

Q: How about the French? The French have always seemed to be the "odd man out" in our Alliance in various aspects. The French have gone in heavily for atomic energy projects. How did we view the French at this particular time?

EWING: We had a good, cordial relationship with the French in Vienna. However, EURATOM
[European Atomic Energy Commission], of course, was already in existence. However, in many ways, I think that the French played a much more independent role as far as the European partners were concerned -- as much with them as with us. We weren't the only ones for whom the French caused some difficulty. They were very talented, very able, very serious in the IAEA, as I recall.

Q: Two of the countries which became real problems later on were India and Israel. Did problems with them begin to loom at this particular time or not?

EWING: I don't remember very much about Israel. India and Pakistan were both extremely active in the IAEA. I don't recall any particular apprehension or fear that India -- or, for that matter, Pakistan -- were going to involve themselves in an atomic bomb program. The head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, always came for the key meetings of the IAEA. There was also a Pakistani, who was also internationally renowned as a theoretical physicist and who was extremely active in the agency. Of the countries that were the most active I remember particularly India and Pakistan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, and the United States -- and that was about it. A number of other countries were members, but they tended to be much more "low key" and didn't take initiatives.

Q: How did we feel about South Africa at that time?

EWING: I think that we generally didn't think about apartheid. South Africa was not yet a pariah in the IAEA. They were one of the original members of the Board of Governors, they took things seriously, and they generally played quite a positive role, as far as I can recall.

Q: So it wasn't a matter of glancing at them and wondering what they might do with this field? Did this come later?

EWING: I think that that came later. I don't recall any initiatives to expel South Africa. You mentioned Israel before. There were always political issues involving Israel and their status in the agency. I remember those issues more than anything to do with South Africa. But Israel involved political issues, as opposed to atomic energy problems as such.

Q: What kind of work were you doing?

EWING: I was called a Political Officer. Probably one-third of my time was really administrative work, both vis-a-vis the IAEA itself but also in terms of the Embassy. We were sort of part of the Embassy [in Vienna] for administrative support but if we needed something done, either for our offices or for our houses, people looked to me to deal with the Embassy General Services Officer or whoever else was involved in the Embassy. I would go to the staff meetings of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Another part of my job was helping the other political officer on political issues. Then part of my work was to function as a conference officer, making arrangements for delegations that came from Washington -- doing reporting on meetings of the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the IAEA. I did a number of different things. I was not expected to assume any initiatives or take on any major responsibilities.
Q: Who was handling contact with the IAEA, from the American side?

EWING: Dr. Hugh Smythe was a professor of physics at Princeton University and the author of the UNCLASSIFIED report on the Manhattan Project, the World War II atomic bomb project, which was published shortly after the war. He was the U. S. member of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. He would come to Vienna three or four times a year. He had the rank of Ambassador and represented the United States before the agency.

Then we had in Vienna a resident representative, with the rank of Minister. Most of the time that I was there he was Bill Cargo. Frank Hefner replaced Cargo. So the resident representative was the day to day head of the mission. We also had another political officer, who was more senior than I was, by quite a bit. This was Betty Gould, who had had a lot of experience with the United Nations, going back many years and who knew all the ins and outs of parliamentary procedure in international conferences and so on. We had two other officers who had more of a science background. One of them was on detail from the Atomic Energy Commission and one had the title "Science Advisor." He had experience in the atomic energy field. He went back to private life with the Bechtel Corporation and had been with Stanford Research Institute.

RAY E. JONES
Secretary to the Deputy Chief of Mission
Vienna (1962-1964)

Ray E. Jones attended the Lafayette Business College. After a year in Washington, DC working for the Department of Interior, he entered the U.S. Army. He served overseas as a court reporter in 1945. In 1946, Mr. Jones went to Berlin, Germany with the Department of the Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in Korea, Germany, Switzerland, Vietnam, Liberia, the Netherlands, Sudan, and China. He was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan on August 23, 1994.

Q: I see. Well, after your four years in Khartoum, Ray, I notice you were transferred to Vienna. Quite a change of pace. Tell me about your assignment there.

JONES: Yes. I received a direct transfer from Khartoum to Vienna. I was there from 1962 to 1964 and my position there was secretary to the DCM, Bob Brandon.

Q: Oh, yes. He had a good deal of background in central European affairs.

JONES: Vienna was a delightful spot because our Ambassador there was Jimmy Riddleberger. He was absolutely a delight. The staff adored him. Not only him, but Mrs. Riddleberger who was ha!

Q: As nice as they come.
JONES: Anybody who could serve with the Riddlebergers were indeed fortunate.

Q: I know having been under him in Berlin, I remember well how popular he was there. Did we have many problems in those days in Vienna with the Austrians?

JONES: Not at all. Not at all. Anybody who is assigned to Vienna should take advantage of all the amenities. Magnificent opera and delightful restaurants.

Q: Is that where you began your well-known art collection?

JONES: It was in the beginning, yes. Vienna was extremely good shopping.

WILLIAM BODDE, JR.
Rotation Officer/Staff Aide
Vienna (1962-1966)


Q: Well, you were in Vienna from when to when?

BODDE: I was in Vienna from 1962 to '65.

Q: What was your job?

BODDE: In those days junior officers were carried on a central compliment in Washington and rotated among the sections at post. Well, I started out in the Commercial Section. When I was finished my six month tour in the Commercial section and was moving to the Political Section I was also appointed staff aide to the ambassador. As a consequence the other junior officers were frozen where they were. Because I was staff aide I spent three years in Vienna instead of two years.

It was a wonderful assignment because. Among other things, they had a system in Vienna, whereby the staff aide was control officer for all visitors, no matter how high their rank or status. The appropriate senior officer would deal with the substance of the visit but the staff aide would make all the arrangements and accompany the visitor on most occasions. Vienna was a very popular place for VIPs to visit so I got to meet a lot of famous people.

Q: How did James Riddleberger, one of the major figures of the Foreign Service, how did he
operate?

BODDE: You know, he had seen it all. He had been Murphy’s deputy after the war, first in Frankfurt, then in Berlin. Later he was an Assistant Secretary and served as Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Greece. He was appointed the Director the International Cooperation Administration the precursor of AID. Riddleberger had seen and done it all, and he was a wonderful person. People told me he was much tougher and demanding when he was younger. If so, he had mellowed, and he was a great mentor and teacher. He was not able to steer my career because he retired after Vienna but he taught me so much that I will be forever grateful.

He would sit around and talk about World War II and the big political decisions such as the division of Germany into occupation zones, currency reform and the Berlin airlift. He was a very traditional Foreign Service officer, but he was just great. He had a secretary, Francine, who was sort of de facto DCM. It’s interesting, looking back, at his relationship with his DCM. I can’t imagine that he chose the DCM personally because they had a correct but not a warm relationship. The DCM wasn’t his alter ego or anything like that. In fact, the DCM would use me to find out what was happening or what the Ambassador was thinking. Riddleberger was a historical figure, and one of the high points of my career was that he was there when I was sworn in as Ambassador to Fiji.

Q: From your perspective, what was the situation in Austria in the ‘63-66 period?

BODDE: Well, of course, they had the State treaty where it became -

Q: ’55?

BODDE: Yes, while we were there they celebrated the tenth anniversary of the State Treaty. The “Big Four” Foreign Ministers attended the ceremonies. Of course we didn’t have a Soviet presence in Vienna like they did right after the war – the “four men a jeep” time. Yet it was still very much a player in the Cold War, and we had an enormous CIA station. The Soviets also had an enormous intelligence operation, so there was a lot of East-West stuff going on. I used the staff aide position to give me entrée and Ingrid and I made a lot of friends. I was able to establish a staff aide network that included the Chancellor’s and Foreign ministers staff aides. As is often the case in small countries these people ended up running the country twenty years later. This made it very nice when I would go back later when I was DAS in EUR and all my old friends had moved considerably up the ladder.

But Vienna was a delightful place, and of course, the dollar was King then. As a Third Secretary we didn’t have a tremendous amount of social obligations. That left us time to get heavily involved in the rich cultural life of Vienna. We had season tickets for a string quartet and went to symphony concerts all the time. The embassy had a box at the Vienna State Opera and the staff could buy tickets very cheaply when the senior officers weren’t using it for representation. Vienna has become very expensive. In the 1980s, when Ron Lauder, the heir to the cosmetic fortune, was Ambassador the embassy could no longer afford the box. But when we were there you could use the two back seats in the box for $20. So we saw a lot of operas. Got to see and hear many of the world’s great conductors and composers including Paul Hindemith, Leonard
Bernstein, Bruno Walter, etc. The Ambassador was a great opera fan and he gave lunches or dinners for all the American opera stars who appeared in Vienna. As my German got better I could enjoy the theater and cabarets. It was a unique cultural experience. We got there right after the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting.

Q: Were you getting any feeling about the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting? Were they talking about it?

BODDE: Sure they were, but not many people were in the room when the two met so after a while what you’ve read and what you heard gets mixed up. I think I’ve probably read more than I heard about what actually happened. It seems that Khrushchev completely misgauged Kennedy at that meeting. I remember one story I heard from the Consul, Dick Strauss. A native German speaker he was in charge of the motorcades. Just before Kennedy arrived Dick was doing a dry run with the Vienna chief of police. He noticed that the Chief didn’t have a radio in his official car. When he asked the chief how he would communicate with his policemen, “I don’t have a radio in my car because it would only make them nervous.”

Things were much simpler then. Could you imagine an FSO-7 being the control officer for the Secretary of State now? Dean Rusk had a security detail and a handful of staff with him on the plane. Jack Kennedy was assassinated while we were in Vienna and there was a tremendous outpouring of grief and sympathy.

Q: Could you give an impression of that. I happen to have been on leave from Belgrade in Graz, and somebody told me. “Are you an American?” he said, and he said, “Your president has been shot.” I couldn’t tell at first whether somebody had shot at him or- (end of tape)

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Today is the 5th of October, 1998. This is an interview with William Bodde, Jr.

BODDE: Right.

Q: But what happened in Vienna?

BODDE: My wife was pregnant at the time with our third child and the baby was born the day that Kennedy was killed, November 22, 1963. I visited her in the hospital shortly after the baby was born and went out to dinner with some people from the Embassy. We were eating when somebody from the Embassy came in and said the President has been shot. We went right home and I went over to my colleague Jack Sulser who lived close by. His wife answered the door, and she was weeping. The President was dead by then. One of my duties as staff aide was to serve as the embassy protocol officer. I went into the embassy early the next morning and from that time on we were so busy that I didn’t see my wife or the baby for ten days. All hell was breaking loose and there were arrangements to be made.

Ingrid was in an Austrian hospital and that evening, a nurse took her radio away. Ingrid didn’t think much of it as she though there might be a rule that you can’t have a radio in the room at
night. In the morning, the chief doctor and his senior staff called on her to express their condolences. She hadn’t heard what happened and at first she thought our baby had died. I had been a volunteer in the Kennedy campaign, and I had come down to Washington as part of the New Frontier so we felt especially sad about his death.

Austrians tend to be emotional, and the outpouring of sympathy was tremendous. Thousands of people came to the Embassy to sign the condolence book. In addition to protocol instructions, all Embassy officers were instructed by Washington to meet with their contacts to reassure them. The message was that there would be an orderly transfer of power in Washington and there would not be any drastic changes in official policy. A year or two later, when Khrushchev was forced out of power Soviet diplomats took a similar line.

One of my most vivid memories of that time was the memorial mass for Kennedy held in St. Stephen’s Cathedral. As protocol officer I was very involved. Austrian Cardinal Koenig officiated at the mass the huge church was packed. I set next to the Nobel Prize author John Steinbeck. He wept throughout the ceremony.

Q: What about the quote Soviet menace unquote? What was the feeling about it at that time?

BODDE: Things were very tense in Vienna when we arrived because it was during the Cuban missile crisis. We were on the brink of war with the Soviet Union. When the complete story was made public many years later it was clear that the U.S. was even closer to war than we had imagined at the time. The Austrians, by and large, were anti-Soviet. They accepted neutrality as the price for getting the Soviets occupation troops out of Austria. Austrians had vivid memories of life in Vienna before the State Treaty. They remembered well the Soviet terror. It was not uncommon for the Soviets or their henchmen to blackmail politicians, intimidate workers, and kidnap critics. They were taken behind the “Iron Curtain” never to be seen again.

Q: You must have gone there in ’62, then.

BODDE: Yes, we arrived there in ’62 in November, at the height of the crisis. The Cold War and the Soviet menace were very real. In fact my Foreign Service career (1962 to 1994) spanned the Cold War. It started with the Cuban Missile Crisis and ended not long after Germany was reunited. I think the Cold War defined world politics in those days.

Q: What about contact with the Russians, Soviets in those days?

BODDE: I had one Soviet contact whom I met frequently. He was the Soviet Embassy film attaché but I am quite sure that was just a cover and he really was a KGB officer. He held showings of the great Russian film classics such as The Good Ship Potemkin and other Eisenstein masterworks. I wrote memoranda of conversations whenever I saw him. One time the Embassy played the Soviet Embassy in volleyball. Our regular team, which was pretty good, included lots of Marines. However when we played the Soviets we had to substitute intelligence officers for the Marines and we lost. There was lots of East-West political intrigue in Vienna. Consequently there were many contacts between Embassy officers and the Soviets. Of course there were lots of things going on that I knew nothing about.
The political counselor I worked for was a very difficult boss. He resented my staff aide relationship with the Ambassador. I spent quite a bit of time with Riddleberger but he wasn’t the kind of Ambassador who needed someone to service him all the time. The night Khrushchev was forced out I had dinner with my Soviet friend. The dinner had been arranged some weeks earlier and we were surprised that he was going ahead with it. I am convinced that they wanted him to have contact with the Americans in order to carry a message of calm and stability. As soon as I got home I wrote it up because I thought Washington would be interested in what sort of line the Soviets were putting out around the world. In the morning I showed it to the political counselor, and he said, “Ah, that’s nothing, new. Don’t bother to send it in.” So I called upstairs to my friends in the Central Intelligence Agency and one of them came right down to my office. He looked at it and asked if it was ok for them to send through their channels. I said sure and they put it on the wires right away. Of course it was interesting. I didn’t find out any secrets, or any special insights into Soviet policy but it did show how the Soviets were trying to spin the story. Of course, we didn’t use the word “spin” in those days. My boss was unhappy that a junior officer would be one of the first people to have contact with the Soviets after the fall of Khrushchev.

Q: It had been a four-power administration. Were particularly close ties with the French and the British there, or had that pretty well disappeared?

BODDE: That sort of close cooperation had disappeared in Vienna by the time I got there. Years later when I was a liaison officer to the Berlin Government, I had a British counterpart and a French counterpart and we worked very closely together. I’m trying to think if I knew anybody at the British of French Embassies in Vienna. I must have but I don’t remember any of them. I did have close friends at the Canadian Embassy. My career has been a little unique as a political officer in that I generally covered internal politics in the countries I served in. As a result I spent little time with other diplomats or dealing with the Foreign Ministry. I spent much more time with Austrian or German politicians than I did with government officials.

Q: Well, in Austria, were you doing internal politics when you were wearing the political officer hat?

BODDE: Yes together with the staff aide hat. I knew some Austrian diplomats but I didn’t go to the Foreign Ministry very often. As I mentioned earlier I became a close friend with the chancellor’s special assistant, Michael Graff, who decades later ran Kurt Waldheim successful presidential campaign. In the 1980s the U.S. banned President Waldheim from entering the United States because he had lied about his activities in World War II. As Deputy Assistant Secretary in the European Bureau I was very involved in the so-called “Waldheim Affair.” During a trip to Austria I went to see my old friend Michel and he told me that the U.S. had turned his greatest achievement to crap. He was very bitter because we turned Waldheim into an international pariah. He spent his term as President unwelcome in all but a few capitals. My friend had a point, you know. Waldheim was not a likable guy and he played fast and loose with the truth, but he was not a war criminal. He was a German Army Officer who served in the Balkans where many atrocities were committed. However, I have seen no evidence that Waldheim was directly responsible for any atrocities. The ban on Waldheim had to do more with
domestic U.S. politics then it did with human rights. The Nazi hunters in the Justice Department’s Office of Special Investigations, The World Jewish Congress, and other organizations conducted an aggressive campaign to ban Waldheim and the Reagan Administration gave into the pressure. The point was that it is easy to kick Austria around without fear of retaliation. With some justification Austrians said to me during that time that we would not have banned the President of Germany some of whom had been much more dedicated Nazis than Waldheim. They were right, Germany was simply too big and powerful and to vital to U.S. interests. The European Union is picking on Austria at the present time because the party, identified with a right-wing demagogue, is part of the coalition government in power. Some of the EU governments that are on their moral high horse have had fascists and communists in their own governments.

Austria was my basic training as a political officer. I had a wide range of contacts ranging across the political spectrum and I learned to do political reporting. Riddleberger taught me that to focus on those political developments that might affect U.S. national interests. The key was to not to get caught up in the political minutia no matter how interesting it seemed. I wish that some of our colleagues had learned the same lesson. There were times when the Department got more reporting about the various factions in the Shanghai Communist Party than it did about the economic situation in China. At our farewell party there were people from across the political spectrum, Viennese cultural life, and the media. Some were sworn political enemies going back to the Austrian civil war in the early 1930s. Others had been in Nazi concentration camps together. One elderly friend, a former Austrian Minister of War, served as the Commander of the Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War (his aide-de-camp was Clement Attlee). It was quite a gathering. An Austrian said to me as he was leaving, “you know, Bill, nobody but you could have gotten these people together in the same room.”

Austria had a coalition government at the national level since the State Treaty in 1955. If a Government Minister was a member of the Conservative Party, the Deputy Minister had to be from the Social Democratic Party and visa versa. Periodically relations between the parties would become tense. One wit said that relations were so bad in the government that the political officer in the American embassy who covered the socialists wasn’t talking to the political officer who covered the conservatives.” In reality I covered both of them. Vienna was a fascinating and lovely post. It was a great way to start off a career.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the secret war of the... It and Switzerland were the big centers. Espionage people would come back and forth. Did you get involved in any of this?

BODDE: I was, but accidentally. One of the things the staff aide did was to screen the unofficial mail addressed to the Ambassador. Much of it was from nuts but anything that looked like it might have an intelligence angle I would pass on to the Agency. Every few weeks we used to get a hand written letter that would say something like “the message is under the third rock at kilometers 14 on the road between Prague and Vienna.” I always thought it was from a nut but I later found out that it was a real intelligence-drop. Another time a man came into the Embassy who just returned from a tour of the Soviet Union the Soviets had arrested an American from the tour and the man wanted to report it. I immediately put the man in touch with one of our Agency people. When the political counselor learned about it he was angry. Vienna was a neutral
meeting ground for East and West so in one way or another everyone in the Embassy was involved. The Soviets were trying to recruit our people and we were trying to recruit their people.

LAWRENCE NORRIE
Country Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Austria (1962-1966)

Lawrence Norrie was born September 22, 1903, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He received a bachelor’s degree from Springfield College in Massachusetts. He later received a master’s degree from Columbia University. In 1945, Mr. Norrie became head of the reorientation of German youth program in Berlin, Germany. In the 1950s, he joined the Foreign Service. His career with USIS included positions in the West Indies, Ecuador, Austria, and Washington, DC. Mr. Norrie was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

NORRIE: In 1962, at the request of Edward R. Murrow, who was in Paris at the time, he phoned Washington and suggested I go to Austria as County Public Affairs Officer, and counselor of embassy for public affairs, and I did. That was, of course, another great experience. My wife enjoyed that a lot. In fact, wherever I went, she was part of the show. She is an accomplished artist in her own right, and immediately got close to the artists of the country, helped form art groups where they were not formed, promote art exhibits, etc.

Q: Thelma then provided the nucleus for the formation of this group?

NORRIE: She was one of the helpers at the start. There were also others who worked very hard on it.

Now, let's see. Where was I? I was just getting to Vienna. I served in that country for about four years, and then returned to Washington. In Vienna, we had a very strong Amerika Haus program, which had been thriving before I got there, but we developed other outlets for USIS material down in the Tyrol and in Klagenfurt and in Linz. We also had a very strong America House built in Linz. We had to fold it later, and we gave books from the library to the public library there, with the understanding that they would be placed on special shelves of the library, which they were.

Q: Was this terminated because of budgetary restrictions?

NORRIE: Yes. Terminated by Washington.

Q: When we were talking last night, I think you mentioned a couple of other programs that you had organized. Wasn't this the country where the ambassador was somewhat hostile to the USIS program?
NORRIE: In Austria.

Q: Yes. You said you brought some youth from other countries, to which he objected.

NORRIE: There was one particular program that he disliked, but then so did Washington. [Laughter] Our area executive didn't like it either. At no expense to the U.S. or USIA, we encouraged meetings between the Hungarian students and the students in one of the nearby cities of Austria, Graz. At one point, they came together for discussion and debate. It had a wide public acceptance and was televised and placed on radio by the Austrians. I thought it was a very successful thing, but some people took exception to having youths from a communist country meet the youth of Austria. However, in my mind, Austria served the United States great purpose in so many ways because it is neutral. The youth and people from other nearby communist countries were free to come into a neutral country from Hungary, in fact, all of the surrounding countries. Austria, being neutral, with a free press, a free radio, free access to all government processes, was a wonderful example.

As a matter of fact, we -- I say "we" rhetorically, the Americans -- made it possible for youth from other countries who were in Austria to fly to Berlin, see the Berlin Wall, and come back to Vienna. This was a great experience for them. I think in the long run, it's paying some dividends in these days.

But we also set up around Austria relay stations for Vienna Radio, which carried our stories on agriculture and other facets of American life.

Q: These are broadcasts that were audible in surrounding Eastern bloc countries?

NORRIE: That's right. We did spend money on developing America Days. For instance, we brought an American dance group from the plays in Munich that had an American folk dance group. We brought them on the borders of Hungary in a bus and they put on a program along with an Austrian group, and they both gave a show and folk dancing. We had an exhibit of American photography provided by USIS, very popular photographs of American life, big ones. We showed American films in the main theater, etc. The local radio and television used USIA material. It was a success.

Q: Did any students across the border come to these, too?

NORRIE: We wouldn't know, but we believe so. It was no problem. They probably did, because it was well publicized. We showed American films there and a lot of other programs, American music, and so forth.

CLINTON L. OLSON
Consul General
Vienna (1962-1966)
Ambassador Clinton L. Olson was born in South Dakota in 1916 and moved to California when he was 15 years old. He received a bachelor's from Stanford University. While pursuing an MBA in graduate school at Stanford, Ambassador Olson was called into active duty as a U.S. Army Reserve Officer in 1941. His Foreign Service career included positions in Austria, Iran, Russia, Martinique, England, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Ambassador Olson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 17, 1996.

OLSON: In 1962, I was asked if I wanted to be Economic Counselor in Vienna and I said, "Sure, but I'm supposed to stay as Administrative Counselor in London." Findley Burns was actually out looking for my job in London and so David Bruce asked me what I wanted to do. He said that I could stay in London as long as I wanted, that I could have the Consul General gob. I told him that I thought that I would like to go back to Vienna, get back out of the substantive side once again. That was in 1962.

Q: Before we move on, the DCM with Jock Whitney was Wally Barbour. He was sort of a character of the Foreign Service. I'm not using this as a disparaging remark, but he was different than many of the people that you would run across. Could you talk about your impression of Wally Barbour?

OLSON: Wally was an old bachelor and he seemed to have no particular interest in the female species. He had a sister who lived in London. She wasn't there most of the time, but she was with him when he went to be Ambassador to Israel. Wally was very old school Foreign Service.

Q: Not too long ago, you suffered a serious stroke and, every once in a while, words don't come.

OLSON: It's not just that. Sometimes, I can't see very well either, when I'm reading something. But, on the whole, I'm damn lucky. I came out of it very well.

Q: While you were Administrative Officer, were there discussions about closing any of the Consulates in England or the UK?

OLSON: At that time, there was no real push behind that. Years earlier, there had been, by Dulles who was then the Secretary of State. Of course then afterward there were also. But I think they had closed one, or had before I got there and that was the one in Wales.

Q: Then you went to Vienna in 1962?

OLSON: Right.

Q: The Peace Treaty had been signed in 1956. How did you find Vienna and Austria when you went back? What were the elections?

OLSON: They were unbelievable. First of all, you had the damn Russians out of there and the Austrians were taking over their own country and doing it quite gracefully. The Austrians always had a wonderful approach to things. One thing they always did was to say how thankful they
were to the United States for the help that we had given them and the aid we had given to them. I used to hear that so many times from the Foreign Minister, Kresky, who was a good friend of mine. I said, "You say this all of the time and our Congressmen love to hear it." It's nice to know that's appreciated. He would just smile and say, "It doesn't really cost anything, does it?" They were very clever. The Peace Treaty settled just about everything. They had a hell of a lot of rebuilding to do, of factories and that sort of thing. Because, in the 1950's and at the end of the war, the Russians had looted everything that they could get their hands on out of the eastern section of Austria. That was one of my jobs when I was in Vienna, to assess what the Russians stole from the so-called USIA Complex. USIA was an organization of all the old factories, ex-German assets that the Russians had taken over. I did a big study of that and you could look at that and see what they were facing in the reconstruction. Commercial affairs were getting back to normal. There was East-West Trade side, but there was little left to do on that. The normal commercial things were flowing fairly freely.

Q: Who was the Ambassador when you were there?

OLSON: James Riddleberger.

Q: He's an old professional. How did you find him?

OLSON: A great guy. A fine fellow. I found him to be very professional. He was replaced by Tommy Thompson, who I had been with in Russia in 1941 to 1943.

Q: What were American interests in Austria at that time?

OLSON: I would say that our principal interest was to deny the territory and the assets of Austria to the Soviets. Our powers were somewhat limited now that they were a free country, an independent country. We had various factories there that made ball bearings, tractors, automobiles, and we had steelworks. Many industries of every type.

Q: Were you involved in the center for East-West spying?

OLSON: Oh, God, in the years of the Soviet occupation, we were up to our necks in it. Then, afterwards, we had a fairly widespread network with the CIA using Vienna as the center for the operation, down into Yugoslavia and into Hungary and all of the curtain countries.

Q: Did Austria play any sort of a role as a window onto the Soviet system? Did we find them a little bit different than one of the West European countries?

OLSON: Yes, we had the tradition of keeping an eye on Eastern Europe. So it was easy to continue that. Jim McCargar used to work down there for a while. I was not involved.

SIDNEY FRIEDLAND
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1964-1967)

Sidney Friedland was born in 1932 and raised in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1955 with a degree in history. Following graduation, Mr. Friedland entered the U.S. Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in Austria, Canada, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland. Mr. Friedland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 1, 1993.


Q: What was your job there?

FRIEDLAND: This was an awful job, I was not at the Embassy, I was with the mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was a five-person post, headed up by a non-resident ambassador who was a world famous Atomic scientist. Henry D. Smythe, who was one of the inventors of the Atomic bomb. We had quarters outside the Embassy near to the secretariat of the IAEA. In those days it was a whole different operation. Back in the early ‘60s, we, the US of A. were the prime salesmen of Atomic power. Not polluting, cheap, the answer to all your power prayers, and all of you poor countries without coal, oil or whatever, just buy one of these and Westinghouse makes real good ones, and your power problems will come to an end. The only thing is that we want you to sign on to this nice agreement which we are in the process of drafting to show us that you won't try to make bombs out of these things. And that's basically what we did in Vienna foe two years. Absolutely fascinating.

Q: Did you get rid of your accent?

FRIEDLAND: Two months after my arrival in Vienna, we had Frankfurt send down a language instructor and my accent-free German was not quite accent-free, it had sort of shifted over to a Viennese accent. There are 22 districts in Vienna, each one of which has a recognizable accent, and I was able, by the time I left there two years later, to distinguish them.

Q: As you worked on this atomic selling business, were there countries that were concerned with, particularly India and Israel. Was this a problem at that time? South Africa? Were any of those on our horizon at the time?

FRIEDLAND: Yes, India was. Although I may be confusing things a bit, because to leapfrog slightly ahead, after I finished up at the mission in Vienna, in the Spring of 1966, I spent the year in the executive secretariat as a watch officer, and upon completion of that assignment, I was made desk officer in the International Organizations Office, for the IAEA. So I spent also ’67-'69, as the desk officer for my old outfit, and I was back and forth between Washington and Vienna which means that I was occupied for two, two year periods given my wobbling memory that I've developed in old age, I may jump from one to the other.

Q: It's sort of within the time period.
FRIEDLAND: The main thing was the Soviet Union, there were really three nuclear powers, the US the Soviet Union, and China, and of course we were vigorously excluding China from the IAEA. With Russia we did not have great relations, this was Cold War, although I must say, within the Atomic Energy community, our relations were not bad because we did not China or anyone else to acquire the bomb. Plus it turns out that the Chief of the Soviet delegation, whose name escapes me at this point, was an atomic scientist, as was ours, and both were very internationally well known. There was a shared scientific outlook and that sort of thing.

I remember India being particularly difficult. In fact, it is what lead to the Non-Proliferation treaty. Indians swore up and down that they only wanted to use this for peaceful purposes. Well, that means reactors, and what else can you use these for besides power? We intend to create new harbors and a big area of coastline because we are going to put in a device to create a new port. And where are you going to put these things? Oh, we've got lot's of coastline, don't worry. You're not going to put them in your pockets are you? Oh, no, that would be a bomb!

Q: What were you doing actually on this?

FRIEDLAND: Actually, I did almost all of the non-substantive stuff, I was a junior officer in a five-man mission, the resident rep was the chief basically, and he was a State Department bureaucrat, when I arrived there, and this fellow was succeeded by an atomic energy commissioner administrative, there was the chief scientific officer, who was a foreign service scientific type, there were a few of those, then the chief nuclear officer who was an Atomic Energy Commission International person, then there was a political officer, who was an IO type, and then there was me, and I was technically the junior political officer, but I was also the junior officer, so I was the admin officer, I signed the chauffeur's time cards, I got PX permits for people, I paid the rent, from housing for people, I did all sorts of stuff. Picked up the Ambassador when he flew in, made all of his arrangements. I was a gofer basically. I also did political reporting when we had to do various conferences, like most U.N. organizations these things work through conferences. Board of Directors and Governors that met three times a year, then a big general conference of all 150 member states once a year. I was with a real pro, this was one of the few areas of the department where women went anyplace was IO, and my boss, she gave me any political work that I had, whereas the resident rep was a state admin type gave me the most of the rest that I did.

She was my real mentor because up to this point, I had been in the Foreign Service for almost six years, as a political officer, and I never had any political work, really, whatsoever. She was one of the pros and her name was Betty Goff, and she was in San Francisco in 1945, drafted the original U.N. Charter, one of the drafting people. It is not the best way to learn political reporting because basically she knew all the actors, her main activities were to keep China and East Germany out of any U.N. organization and anytime there would be a situation which was meant to lead to that, the admission of China, East Germany, Betty would be sent off, she was damage control or the damage prevention officer, and it came up in the UNGA, she'd fly off to the UNGA and lead the forces, and draft the speeches.

She was one to close to half a dozen women political officers in IO and that was basically the only place that they were. But these women had come into the department during the early
forties, while the men were off fighting. Women were brought in where they hadn't been before, and after the war was over, you don't throw them out, although a number of them were thrown out, but the best ones got to stay. The main place they congregated was in IO.

KENNETH P.T. SULLIVAN
Labor and Political Officer
Vienna (1966-1970)

After serving in the U.S. Army, Kenneth Sullivan joined the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in the Sudan, Austria, Germany, Yugoslavia, and Washington, DC. Mr. Sullivan was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan on October 25, 1994.

Q: After that tour in Bonn you moved on to Vienna and there you were the labor attaché under several ambassadors.

SULLIVAN: And the second man in the political section. As a result of turnovers, which are too numerous to detail, I spent almost a third of my time there as the acting political counselor and probably half of that breaking in the person assigned to be the next political counselor, which was all right because Austria is a much smaller country than Germany. The trade union movement is very similar and it was not terribly difficult to do both.

Q: You had three ambassador there.

SULLIVAN: Yes.

Q: Were they interested in labor and the work you were doing?

SULLIVAN: I think you can say yes, but Mr. Riddleberger was ambassador when I was first there and although we didn't overlap much time I knew he was interested in labor. The second ambassador was a look-down-your-nose at labor type, a career man all the way.

Q: That was Ambassador MacArthur.

SULLIVAN: That's right. And it was mutual. The labor people looked down their nose at him too. The last man was a private businessman, John Humes, a fine personality from New York City and was interested in labor because he didn't know anything about it and he was interested in learning things he didn't know something about. He was also, to the extent that labor people had dealings with him, well received.

Q: That is an attitude we like to see in ambassadors. Were the other embassy officers useful or helpful to you?

SULLIVAN: Well, by that time I was running close to 20 years in the German area and I didn't
need an awful lot of help and Vienna always was somewhat a cold post. It is a delight to serve there if you like music, good food, cultivated atmosphere, etc., but there is a certain unreality about the place in two directions. One of them is the concern with this social and ethereal side of things and the other, mostly neglected in my experience by Americans, is the appreciation of the potential of Vienna, the place to find out about other places. It is a marvelous source of good intelligence if people will work at it. Unfortunately, the labor movement in Austria was very active in trying to exploit these sources because historically from the times of Russian occupation and because of the financing that the Soviet Union gave to the Austrian Communist Party, and to which was made available to some elements of the Austrian trade unionists that had communist leanings, there were cheap vacations for all Austrians that were association with trade unions, but all were in the Soviet area of control.

Q: *The Bulgarian beaches, etc.*

SULLIVAN: Oh, yes, that is true, and I was able to get the first group that the Austrian trade unionists decided to go to the United States, which was a fantastically interesting business, because when the group, all of whom were school teachers who taught English, got to New York, the bus line that was to take them for their whole trip was on strike and they had to travel in this scab-operated bus. They got a great view of America.

Q: *Did you find your labor contacts there were in favor of Austria joining the Common Market, or did they even discuss that?*

SULLIVAN: At that time, which was the late sixties, EFTA, European Free Trade Association, was the center of all discussion, to the extent there was discussion. Kreisky, of course, was at the peak of his powers at that time and had been a Swedish diplomatic, etc.

Q: *What about anti-Semitism? Was there much of it there?*

SULLIVAN: Well, yes and no. Perhaps I can tell you a story about that. I think it was the six day war that took place while I was there.

Q: *Yes, June, 1967.*

SULLIVAN: And on the morning after the Six Day War started, there were people with little baskets and blue and white flowers standing on almost every street corner in Vienna, soliciting donations for Israel. We received a circular message from the State Department which I assumed went to all the countries, at least in Western Europe, asking us to report on the local reaction to this outbreak. At a staff meeting the ambassador asked us to all fan out and check with our contacts, etc. What I found, probably because of the nature of my contacts that I worked on and at that time were all labor types, was a singular uniformity, they being much more open than most Austrians who tend to try to be diplomatic when talking to diplomats. They said to understand why Austrians are out soliciting funds for Israel and are giving them to Israel, it does not change their anti-Semitic attitudes. They have nothing against Jews, but they prefer them in Israel.
Q: That is a very telling point. What about neo-Nazism, was that a problem at all?

SULLIVAN: Not much more of a problem, I would say, at that time than hippies. There were known to be 16 hippies in all of Austria with eleven of them in Vienna. This is something, the hippies in particular, that does not comport with the Austrian's idea of dress or behavior. And, at the time, so far as the right wing leanings were concerned, they probably were always there, they probably are always everywhere except they did not come to the surface at that time as there were no particular problems and there was no charismatic figure at that time.

Q: What were their general attitude towards Germany and the Germans? Would they have liked an Anschluss?

SULLIVAN: No, the thing they tried to stress all the time was distinction, much as the Bavarians do. The Bavarians claim not to be Germans and the Austrians claim not to be Germans. I think it was Bismarck who described the Bavarians as God's unsuccessful effort to make a German out of an Austrian.

Q: Neutralism. Was that a main force when you were there?

SULLIVAN: Yes, pretty much. That does not mean much by itself. If you compare the Swedish neutrality, for example, the Swiss neutrality, Austrian neutrality is distinctly different. Two of them arm themselves to the teeth, namely, the Swiss and the Swedes. And Austria has been in almost all of the wars.

Q: You were there during the 1968 Czech crisis. What effect did that have on our embassy and you personally in your work?

SULLIVAN: I had a busy night. We had an administrative officer who I had not seen since my days in Berlin, Roy Nelson. He had been on post about two weeks and did not speak German. Our ambassador decided to give the handling of this mundane thing to the DCM who liked to emulate the ambassador and delegated it to Mr. Nelson. Actually, what the job was for us was mainly to try and be in touch with local Austrian factions that might be involved in trying to help a rather massive diplomatic evacuation from Prague which our embassy was trying to steer from that end. Most of the work was done by Austrians. They called for volunteers and they had practically every Viennese taxicab driver volunteer to drive to Prague and bring somebody back. They got the same response from bus drivers. The short distance to clear the railroad lines from the Czech border into Austria were cleared by the state run railways right away. The only problem was finding out when, if and how the people were going to get out of Prague essentially. They ultimately did it by train and by that time I had been working on that end of things because of my experience when they had the Hungarian uprising next door I knew some of the problems that happened out there with language difficulties. We were able to get together with other embassies who were interested and with the Austrians who had a pretty good organization to arrange it that when the trains came in a standard announcement would be made in a variety of languages to hang in there and we would come and get them one at a time and put them on transportation and find them a place to eat and sleep, etc. It all went pretty well, although we
were pestered pretty much by telephone calls from the United States which may be the reason that the ambassador and the DCM went home rather than answer the phone. So, I did most of the answering of the phone and found out that the phone lines were very unreliable and the connections get broke.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, II
Ambassador
Austria (1967-1969)

Ambassador Douglas MacArthur graduated from Yale University. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Austria, Canada, Italy, Belgium, France, Japan, and Belgium. Ambassador MacArthur was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1986.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, let's move on now to your time in Austria. How did this appointment come about?

MACARTHUR: First let me just say a word about Austria and my relationship with Austria before I went there as ambassador. My first visit to Austria was when I was third secretary attached to the ambassador's office in the political section in the embassy in Paris in 1938. When the Anschluss came, Hitler marched in. Ambassador Bullitt, our ambassador in Paris, said he wanted somebody from the political section to go down there and get a first-hand feel of how things were going and the way it would be done, because Germany had absorbed Austria and we had not yet recognized this. It would be simply a courier run.

Q: Our embassy was still intact?

MACARTHUR: No, we didn't have an embassy in Vienna then. We had a legation headed by John Wiley. But it was gone, because when Austria became part of Germany, John Wiley was there and his staff was there, but eventually the legation was absorbed into a consul general. Austria was absorbed, and that was one of the things that I wanted to mention, with the enthusiastic approval of the Austrian people, the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people.

I remember when I got there, being appalled, because it was just a few days after the Anschluss, and Hitler's appearance had always people running around with swastika bands on their arms, enthusiasm, and everything else. Why was Austria so eager to give up its sovereignty and become a part of Hitler's Germany? The answer, of course, goes back first to World War I. As early as 1915, when things were going very badly for Austria, there was an Austrian political Social Democrat or some such thing in the old days of the monarchy, I've forgotten his name now, but who wrote a document about the desirability of a greater Germany, in which the German-speaking people, that is Austria and the Germans, would be one. So when things started going very badly for Austria in World War I, a small minority that felt that Austria's future lay in the greater German world, of which it was a part, at the end of World War I. Austria which had been part of an empire was now a truncated state with few natural resources and major economic
problems -- it had been on the losing side -- reconstruction problems. I know it's fair to say that there was political unrest, there was social unrest, which you always have when you have economic privation. Then there was the period of the Thirties, with the assassination of Dollfuss and one thing and another.

*Q: The Austrian chancellor at the time.*

MACARTHUR: Yes, chancellor. And the growing conviction on the part of the Austrian people that they had no future at all, except with Germany. They were German-speaking, there was nobody around them. Czechoslovakia was an independent business and so was Hungary. So there was this feeling that the future lay with merging and becoming part of a greater Germany. So when Hitler moved in, there was overwhelming popular support for this joining Austria to Germany. I remember seeing the hotel, I think it was the Hotel Bristol, when I was there. It was pointed out to me that up in a room way up in the top of the hotel, the chancellor at that time, Schuschnigg, was being held by the Nazi authorities up there in a small couple of rooms until it was decided what would be done with him.

I remember also that there was a disturbing streak of anti-Semitism in Austria at that time. One of the most horrifying spectacles I saw were these flatbed trucks being driven around as the Gestapo and Nazi people with swastikas -- I don't doubt that some of them were probably Austrian -- were picking up Jews and loading them into cages on the back of these open trucks, cages that were about four feet high, so they were cramped in there and crowded together, squatting and cramped in these cages to be driven off to someplace to be held in deportation. Of course, many of them eventually died in the extermination camps. That was a thing that shocked me most at that particular time.

Then I had no further communication or relationship with Austria until I was Counselor of the Department. The war came along. When I was Counselor of the Department, I became a member of the Austrian peace treaty negotiation. Austria was still occupied at that time, '54, the eastern part by the Russians and the western part by the Allied powers.

In 1954, the Berlin Conference of the four foreign ministers, Russia, the United States, France, and Great Britain met in Berlin. One of the subjects on the agenda was the Austrian problem. Mr. Figl of Austria came and bravely put up a good performance, but the Soviets made very clear then that they had no intention of doing anything about Austria, lifting the occupation or anything else, until the German problem had been solved. By a solution of the German problem, they meant a solution of the German problem that would give the Soviet Union satisfaction. This was in January of '54, the Berlin Conference of foreign ministers.

The reaction of that in Europe, that the USSR was blocking giving the Austrian people freedom from occupational forces with all that that implies, was so detrimental to the general Soviet propaganda line, that the Soviets changed their position. Suddenly, we started getting feelers and word that we could talk about an Austrian state treaty on the basis of an Austria that would be neutral.

The Soviets obviously hoped to garner propaganda advantage from this change in their position,
but they also were giving up strategically and militarily absolutely nothing, because while we in the Western powers withdrew their occupation forces back to the NATO area, the Russian forces were poised an hour and a half from Vienna on the Czechoslovak and Hungarian frontiers. They could reoccupy all of Austria within a matter of hours almost if they ever had to. So they gave up nothing strategically or militarily by the Western withdrawal, and they still stood poised on Austria’s borders where they could be sort of a psychological influence on any decisions Austria was able to take within the status of neutrality.

I think one of the most moving experiences I ever experienced was when Secretary Dulles and Livy Merchant and myself flew into Austria for the final signing of the Austrian state treaty. The thousands and thousands of people that greeted us, waved to us, and many of them women in black, who had lost their sons and their husbands. And then at the signing a day or so later, the thousands of people had gathered in the Belvadere Palace, where the treaty was signed by Molotov, Dulles, I guess it was MacMillan, and Pinet, the British and French foreign ministers. Then there was this tremendous applause and shouting for Mr. Figl. He appeared on the balcony. These tens of thousands of people were absolutely hysterical with joy. Then he came back in, and they went on shouting and shouting. Finally, he came over and saw Mr. Dulles and the French foreign minister, Mr. Pinet, and Mr. MacMillan. Before that, he came back in and went out with the four foreign ministers, and there was more cheering. Then he went back in, and they still cheered. Then he went over to Dulles and Pinet and MacMillan and said why didn’t each one come out with him separately. But Molotov immediately saw what was up, so when Chancellor Figl took out Mr. Dulles, Mr. Molotov came right along and shared the cheers. (Laughs)

Q: Didn't want to stand on his own.

MACARTHUR: And did the same thing with Pinet and so forth, because if he went out alone, he was afraid there might be a deathly silence, so he went out with each of them and did not wait for a turn for himself to come out alone with Figl.

You asked how I came to go to Austria. When I finally wanted to either go back in the Foreign Service and be doing formulation or execution of foreign policy, or retire and go into some other line of foreign affairs activity, preferably economic, which I spent a great deal of time on, there were no posts available, except Austria.

I had warm memories of Austria. It was 1967, after the elections of ’64, the various posts had been filed, but Jimmy Riddleberger, our ambassador to Austria, indicated a desire to retire. So I went to Austria, basically, because I had had the background and been a member of the delegation to the Austrian state treaty, had some background on it. It was within the EUR bureau which I had worked with it. After almost three years of working with the Congress, I would say it was not the most arduous post that I had.

Q: You looked upon this as being at least a little bit of a place for some decompression while you kept your hand in the Foreign Service?

MACARTHUR: I did, very definitely. I went there, and I must say there was hardly enough -- I shouldn't say this, but compared with the posts that I had held, I had to think to keep myself
gainfully busy and doing things that were both useful and of interest.

Q: What were our concerns with Austria?

MACARTHUR: Our concerns basically, the only problem that ever came up where there was a bit of a problem were economic problems, trade problems. At one stage of the game, Austria, which, if I remember, was part of EFTA then, European Free Trade, that was set up. The people that didn't join the EEC, I think joined EFTA. I'm not sure if Austria was a part of EFTA.

In any event, it dealt with the EFTA people, the people who stayed out of the EEC originally, many of whom are now members of the EEC because it's been substantially enlarged.

The Austrians adopted a policy with respect to soybean products, soybean oil, soybeans themselves, and the like, which, in effect, closed the door on the market for American soybeans. Although the Austrian market was not a terribly important market, this was a problem, for us. It had been assumed that we would simply sit back and accept one country's position, because if you accepted such a position from one, then everybody else goes on and says, "They let them get away with that. We'll do the same thing because it's competing with our vegetable oil people." In countries that have substantial agricultural communities, this is an important point.

So when I did this, I went to the chancellor and the foreign minister, who happened to be Kurt Waldheim at that time, and said that if this was not lifted, I would have no choice but to recommend that we take a measured, but definite, response, and my recommendation would be that we would put prohibitive tariffs on the export of all their splendid, outstanding winter garments of various kinds, woolens and other things, all kinds of knitwear and so forth that people over here, particularly the big and expensive stores, were treasured, because they had the highest quality, and they're magnificent if you're a skier or like winter sports, or even if you like to walk.

So we solved this amicably by my not having to make that recommendation, and the Austrians now putting into effect the rule that affected our soybeans. That, frankly, is the only active matter that I remember ever having to negotiate with them.

On the other hand, my principal interest in Austria was that it was the finest listening post in Eastern Europe into the Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe, because of Austria's past history and the empire, the Holy Roman empire, then the Austrian empire. You look in the telephone book, and there's every nationality of Eastern Europe there. Every family has cousins in Czechoslovakia, Poland, what is now Yugoslavia, the various parts of it all around. These people were permitted to come over and visit their relatives in neutral Austria. You could get together with them in their family home and pick up the feelings and what was going on inside these countries, but not the stuff that you can read in the newspapers. What the people felt, what the flow of opinion was about things that were happening.

This was a fascinating experience for me, because sometimes there would be the Poles about what they were thinking about this and that and the other things, or the Czechs. Of course, the Dubcek matter was coming along in '68. Then there was the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, when the Dubcek power came to an end. The hundreds of people that had been
vacationing in Austria and in Italy gathered together all these cars with Austrian license, people talking whether or not they should go back to Czechoslovakia or declare themselves political refugees or something. But basically, what I'm talking about are the people that came out of Hungary, some of the Yugoslavs, although Yugoslavia was not part of the Soviet bloc. They broke in '48, as you remember. Tito broke with the bloc, although still a communist state. This was the most interesting and fascinating thing for me. Of course, the Austrian people are charming, warm, friendly people. I saw a great deal of the country. I did a lot of traveling, because I had the time in different areas, had different problems, different economic outlooks.

Q: You mentioned the charming Austrian people. Did you ever sometimes have a flashback to these flatbed trucks and the anti-Semitism that you saw?

MACARTHUR: Sure. The Austrians were leaning over backwards at that time to overcome that past, and it was a place where people were allowed from the Soviet Union. Emigres were allowed to go to Austria en route to someplace, because it was not aligned and had a status of neutrality.

I remember of all the states of Eastern Europe, the most brutally dictatorial state was Romania at that time, of Ceausescu. They allowed nobody outside the bloc to Austria. Finally, while I was there, they finally allowed a large motorbus with 72 people to come out to neutral Austria only, to sightsee and get a little change. Of the 72, 68 defected and became refugees, and the Austrians took care of these people from Eastern Europe until they could be placed elsewhere. So when I was there, I saw no vestiges of anti-Semitism in the various places that I went, because, I repeat, Austria was trying to overcome its past, just as Kurt Waldheim was trying to overcome his past by not mentioning in his biography, when he was U.N. Secretary General, his duties with the German Army down south of Austria during that critical period in Yugoslavia and Greece, when things were happening that he couldn't prevent.

I'm not one of those that say that because the Austrians fought with Hitler, they were all pro-Hitler, by any manner of means, because once a country's taken over by a ruthless, brutal system such as the Hitlerian system, you do what you're told and ordered to do, or the Gestapo comes and gets you, and you go to a concentration camp. But not only you may go to a concentration camp; your family can go, too.

I'm not sympathetic with collaborationists, for obvious reasons, having served in France during the German occupation. But I can understand how young Austrian men called up to the colors, under Hitler, to serve had no choice but to do that or go into a concentration camp.

It's also interesting that Hitler, an Austrian himself, didn't trust them too much. The reason that the parks were so full of old women in black, feeding the birds and squirrels on Sundays, sitting alone, all alone, or two or three of them huddled together, was that Hitler sent the Austrian divisions to the eastern front, where they were just torn to shreds by the Russians, and many, many, many families, there were only the women left. They lost their children, their brothers, their father. They lost everybody.

Q: Was the embassy well staffed to deal with the intelligence potential of Austria as a listening
MACARTHUR: I think we had a good system. We had the usual setup that one has. We had a CIA representative and so forth. The intelligence estimate, the interesting part to me was not the military intelligence aspects so much, because the Allies had poolings of information and different intelligence services, but it was the psychological feelings of people. Because down the road, if people feel certain ways and certain things happen, that influences mass movements in one way or another. We've seen that in Poland, with solidarity and other things.

Q: I was in charge of the counselor section in Yugoslavia in Belgrade much of the time when you were in Austria. We were dealing with people who were seeking asylum from other East European countries, and we played somewhat of a passive role there, being a Communist country, although the Yugoslavs were not trying to force people back to their own countries. How about in Austria? There was a tremendous flood at the time you were there of Yugoslavs who were going. You were receiving refugees from all over, and this was a burden on the Austrians. What role did we play? Were you saying, "Please do more, and we'll try to help you out?"

MACARTHUR: No. We welcomed the fact that they were so kind and good, if you will, to these refugees, because they were. They established places for them to stay and live while they were waiting to go further on. We thought that was fine. But I, frankly, don't remember. This was an initiative that was Austrian; we had nothing to do with the initiative.

As I said earlier, I think they have recollections that other people might remember how they embraced Hitler, and the disaster that that had been, and they themselves had been an occupied people by the Russians, and a lot of things that were very terrible happened in the Russian zone of occupation, as you can imagine. I'm not saying that there weren't incidents from time to time in any zone of occupation, but what I'm saying is that they'd been through an experience of occupation and having no country, no nationality, no government, being an occupied power. I say no government in the sense of no sovereignty. I think there was a genuine desire to be helpful, in addition to the fact that for some, certainly it was a desire to overcome any impression that they had welcomed Hitler's atrocities, rather than welcomed a greater German state.

Q: So your role and the role of the embassy was not one of intervening or saying, "Do the right thing."

MACARTHUR: No, we didn't have anything to do with that. That was an Austrian problem, their responsibility. Once you start going and intervening, they say, "Fine. Give us more help. You do more. Take more people," and all the rest of it. This was an Austrian initiative, and it was theirs, and they did an excellent and very fine job. They are a great people. They are a people that have some very sterling qualities.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, you were mentioning Kurt Waldheim, who was the foreign minister when you were there. He's a controversial figure that has certainly been on the center stage in the world for some time. At that time, what was your evaluation of him?
MACARTHUR: I had a very close and friendly relationship with Kurt Waldheim. I used to stop by almost every day at his office, not always to see him, but to see his chef de cabinet, to see if there were any problems, if anything was new, if they had anything on their mind, because I had a certain amount of time. Time wasn't as tightly scheduled as it had been here in Washington and certain other posts. My relationship with him and his wife, Sissy, and my wife, were warm and friendly. He was warm and friendly. We had no political problems between the United States and Austria, and it was just a very pleasant relationship.

Of course, the controversy that has arisen about him covered a part of his career about which none of us had any knowledge about at the time.

Q: For the record, at the present time Kurt Waldheim has become president of Austria. His role during World War II as an intelligence officer with the German Army in both Yugoslavia and Greece and its dealings with partisans and deportation of Jews has come under considerable scrutiny and criticism.

MACARTHUR: My own feeling is that the greatest mistake that Kurt Waldheim made was when his biography was published and his credentials and background were looked into before he became Secretary General of the United Nations, that the fact that he served in the German Army was not included in it. Because the choice was either go where you're called if you're called under the colors, or go to a concentration camp and the gas chamber and the oven. I think, from the very beginning, he's said he served with this unit and so forth. Some people would say maybe he wouldn't have gotten the U.N. job at that time. Well, maybe he wouldn't have gotten the U.N. job, but certainly he would have avoided a terrible situation which he presently finds himself in.

Q: This is somewhat similar to the one that probably Richard Nixon had in the Watergate situation.

MACARTHUR: I think it's very similar. If, at the very beginning, Waldheim had said, "Yes, this happened. I was there. I didn't contribute to anybody's death or deportation or anything else, but I was assigned and off I went. I was a mutineer and they could shoot me or do whatever they wanted with me."

ANTHONY GEBER
Economic Counselor
Vienna (1967-1971)

Anthony Geber was born in Hungary in 1919 and served in the U.S. Army during World War II. He joined the Foreign Service in 1949. His career included positions in Germany, Austria, Indonesia, France, South Korea, and Washington, DC. Mr. Geber was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1993.

GEBER: After six years in Paris I got another hardship post, Vienna. People raise their eyebrows
when I claim that these were hardship posts, but think how much cholesterol I consumed while I
was eleven years in Europe six, in Paris and five in Vienna.

Shortly before I left Paris I learned that the position of economic counselor at the Vienna
Embassy was coming open and it wasn't too difficult to get the assignment to Vienna. One of our
good friends from Germany, James Riddleberger, was ambassador in Vienna, who incidentally
was the first DAG chairman in Paris when I was there, and he was very pleased to welcome me
to Vienna. The assignment was as Economic and Commercial Counselor. Unfortunately, before I
got to Vienna, Mr. Riddleberger was replaced by Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, who had a
reputation of being a difficult boss. In fact, in Paris I was surrounded by people who worked for
him at various posts, and some of them suggested that I should try to get out of this assignment,
but I shouldn't do anything overtly about it because if I don't succeed, he would make my life
miserable. They figured that chances were that MacArthur would select his own man for the job.
Well, I got the job and I got along quite well with him.

Q: Did MacArthur take much interest in economic and commercial work?

GEBER: Very much so. He was a very good and able Foreign Service officer. It was not always
easy to work for him but I seemed to have made a good impression on him with the very first
cable I drafted and, as I said, I got along quite well with him. He and his wife were not
particularly interested in the cultural and artistic life, which was a handicap in Vienna, and USIS
guys had to suffer from it. But he took his political and economic tasks very seriously and he was
also very good at dealing with the American business community. He took a personal interest in
the activities of the American Chamber and met with them regularly which they appreciated very
much.

Q: Did you have any major problems during your time there?

GEBER: Let me say that Austria was a happy little island, stable and prosperous. In 1968 there
were huge demonstrations in the streets in Paris. Radical groups disturbed the societies in
Germany and Italy. Austria seemed to be immune to these viruses. Oh, there were some student
groups which staged a few "happenings", Chancellor Kreisky' son was one of the leaders. But
whatever demonstrations there were they were quite mild; when it rained the demonstrators went
home. Kreisky became chancellor about a year after I got to Austria. He was in his prime one of
the most astute statesman in Europe and was quite influential beyond the borders of Austria.
During my years in Vienna the big issue was the American involvement in Vietnam. Kreisky and
much of the Austrian press and public was skeptical of the American policy there, if for no other
reason, because they feared, with some justification, that it distracts the U.S. from giving enough
attention to Europe and that it judges relations with countries primarily on the basis whether they
support American policy in Vietnam. Kreisky was not going to let Austria's good relations with
the U.S. fall victim to the Vietnam problem. We also knew that he counseled moderation and
understanding for the U.S. on Willy Brandt and Olaf Palme.

Austrians were also among those who were still very grateful for the Marshall Plan assistance
and did not hesitate to say so often and publicly. They also credited the U.S. for their liberation
from partial Soviet occupation, until 1989 the only instance where the Soviets relinquished
territory they occupied. So, all in all we had a very good relation with Austrians.

For me personally it was particularly easy to be effective in my job. As I told you at the beginning, I attended the two year course at the Konsularakademie in Vienna as a young student. By the time I returned to Vienna some thirty years later the building where I went to school and where I lived as a student became the building of the American embassy. It was a very nice building, perhaps one of the nicest embassy buildings we had anywhere in the world. It was built in the neo-baroque style with an imposing staircase, large, airy rooms, high ceilings. It was opened in 1904 by Emperor Francis Joseph, specifically as the foreign service school for Austro-Hungarian diplomats, but the origins of the school went back, as so many institutions of Austria, to Empress Maria Theresia who ruled in the eighteenth century. Ambassador Humes, who succeeded MacArthur, occasionally introduced me to visitors to the embassy as the person who had his bedroom as a student where his office is now. That was not quite true but my obvious comeback to him was how does he know that I still don't have my bedroom there?

But, as I said, this background made my life very easy. When I arrived in Vienna Kurt Waldheim was the Foreign Minister.

Q: Your classmate.

GEBER: Well, school mate. He was a year behind me in school. He received me rather graciously. Incidentally I must say that Kurt Waldheim was never a Nazi. As I told you, I was in Vienna the day the Germans marched in in March 1938. The day after we knew exactly who were the convinced Nazis. There were only a few among my schoolmates, as there were also a few who heroically opposed them. Quite a few disappeared from school because of their Jewish background. Most of the students, as well as the professors, simply went along with events. I have not the greatest admiration for Waldheim for various reasons, but the best statement, in my judgment, about him and about his role as a junior army officer in the Balkans was in a letter by a British journalist to the London Economist, that his tragedy was that he neither had the skill nor the courage to get out of a very difficult situation. Waldheim obviously skipped over his service in the Balkans in his autobiography, presumably because he considered it embarrassing. I visited Vienna after my retirement just about the time when he was elected President of Austria, and some of my good friends, for whose democratic convictions then and earlier I can vouch without any hesitation, where distressed by the zeal of people in the American Justice Department which led to Waldheim's banishment from visiting America. Nor should his election as President of Austria be construed as a demonstration of pro-Nazi inclination of the Austrian people. The election was fought on the basis of purely domestic issues, and by then the Socialist party suffered several scandals and political set-backs. Furthermore the Socialists put up as candidate a nonentity. In contrast, Austrians viewed Waldheim, after his long tenure as Secretary General of the U.N., as perhaps the most prestigious Austrian diplomat since Metternich.

I had several other schoolmates in leading positions in government and in industry, among them the ranking Under Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. Although we had some battles with him, I always had easy access to him and that helped, for instance, to overcome his objections to allowing one of the big American insurance companies to do business in Austria.
Our main problem in Austria in the economic-commercial field was that Austria had the distinction of being the country where the United States had the lowest market share compared to any other country where we maintained such market share statistics; lower than in Germany, Italy or Switzerland, or for that matter lower than in Ghana, India or Egypt. Many of the lessons about trade I learned in Germany after the war I could experience in Austria. Germany had the overwhelming market share of both Austrian exports and imports. The Austrian spoke German and it was much easier for them to do business with Germany. But that still did not explain why our market share in Switzerland was three times higher than in Austria. We in the Embassy, from the ambassador down to our very able local employees in the economic section, struggled valiantly to improve the situation, but I must confess with little success. I came to the conclusion that a good part of the difficulty rested with American business community, and that export promotion should have focused as much on the American domestic scene than on overseas. I will give you some examples which will illustrate the point.

Few days after I arrived in Vienna I heard the booming voice of Ambassador MacArthur calling me to his office. The Austrian Minister of Trade, Mr. Mitterer, came to complain to him that he acquired a Buick car as his official car, and he went on an official trip to Yugoslavia. The Buick broke down on route. His English was halting and that of his driver was nonexistent, and they didn't have a German language manual for the car. I called the GM representative in Vienna, who was a thick headed Dutchman, and I told him about the complaint. He said to me on the telephone, "Well, why didn't the Minister ask for it?" I said that if the Austrian Trade Minister acquires a car from General Motors, I would have expected that he would be given a German language manual on a silver platter. After this exchange we agreed to get together for lunch where he could tell me his problems and I would tell him mine. It was quite an interesting lunch. He told me that he was selling about 80 American made GM cars a year. These were all luxury cars in Austrian eyes. They were big and gas guzzlers, and had high duties, taxes and insurance premiums. Each were practically custom built; one was green and convertible and had electric windows and the other purple with different specifications. He could not even afford to stock spare parts for this variety of cars in Austria. He did have a few ideas how sales could be expanded in Austria which he submitted to his headquarters in New York. The answers came back six months later saying that GM is selling 3 and a half million cars in the US market and simply answering his letters is a cost item.

This was an extreme case in many respects, but not the only one.

We were imposing some restrictions on Austrian textile exports and Secretary of Commerce Stans came to explain our policy to the Austrians. The Austrians were not at all pleased and suggested that instead of restricting their exports, America should make a greater effort to export some of its good quality textiles to Austria; there is a market for it.

Just about that time the sales representative of Dan River Mills, a big American textile company, came to the Embassy to tell us that he was quitting because the supply from the United States was unreliable, it didn't come on time and sometimes it didn't come at all. Dealing with the company was giving him ulcers. Ambassador Humes was a friend of the President of Dan River Mills, and he wrote him a letter in which he mentioned the Austrian reaction to the U.S. restrictions on textile exports and his firm's representative's complaint. The answer he got back
was exactly the reverse coin of what we heard from the Austrian side. Austria is such a small market for us, wrote the president of the textile company, that it is not worthwhile for us to exert ourselves with prompt filling of orders.

Q: I think what you are saying is that the customer is always right except when he is too small.

GEBER: Another example of the inadequate effort by American business, and this time by a major multinational firm with sophisticated international experience, was the loss of Westinghouse of the contract for the first Austrian nuclear power plant to Siemens, the German competitor. The Austrians' main concern was the safety of the plant to be built. During the long negotiations Westinghouse sent each time a different team. We in the Embassy urged them to open a small office in Vienna with a secretary and a telephone, so that the Austrian can feel that they have Westinghouse sitting near their elbow; they refused to do so. Toward the end of the negotiations the Austrians sent the bidding parties a 60-page questionnaire which was to be answered in a limited period of time. Shortly before the deadline I telephoned the Geneva office of Westinghouse to inquire where they stand, the answer I got they "Gee whiz, it is 60 pages and it is all in German!" The Germans won the bid. It can be only small consolation that the plant had to be dismantled some years later after the Austrians voted against nuclear power plants in a plebiscite.

American trade promotion efforts also suffered from the way we administered export controls. Although the Western allies coordinated export controls in an organization called COCOM, the U.S. maintained controls on items beyond those agreed in COCOM. But it was not even so much the trade that we lost to our competitors due to the differential controls that hurt us, but the inordinate amount of time it took to come to a decision in Washington whether to issue or deny an export permit. People in Commerce didn't seem to realize that if you hold up licenses on strategically insignificant items, it shakes the confidence of the importer in your reliability as a stable supplier and he will turn to another source even for non-controlled exports. At one point while I was in Vienna we had the visit of a high ranking official of Commerce to review our trade promotion efforts. We decided to have him meet with a group of prominent Austrian sales agents of American firms and general importers of American products. First these were hesitant to speak up but once one of them started, it was like a floodgate opened to their complaints. Most of it related to the handling of export controls. The gentleman from Washington was overwhelmed by what he heard.

Export promotion was our major preoccupation. We also had some mutual complaints on trade policies. The Austrians slapped a tariff surcharge on American oil cake exports, an important cow fodder. Just about the same time we placed a quota on Austrian cheese imports.

Q: Cheese imports?

GEBER: Yes, cheese exports to the United States; Austrian made Swiss cheese. The Austrians were very unhappy, particularly since the quotas were put on lower quality and lower priced cheeses and did not affect their Swiss competitors. So it was oil cakes versus cheese. The United States being a big country used its muscle and the Austrians had to abolish their tariff surcharge on oil cakes. The Austrians being a small country, they lost; the U.S. was unwilling to change its
quota regulations. But in the end the Austrians won too. The Austrians upgraded their cheese exports and ended up with exporting more in terms of value.

**Q:** I want to ask one question, Tony. Vienna was often seen in those days as the show place for the Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

**GEBER:** I was coming to that. Yes, Vienna was very much a listening post and an outreach towards the Eastern European countries. Even with the Russians we had a somewhat relaxed relationship. I knew my Russian counterpart and we could talk quite civilly. After all the SALT I negotiations were held in Vienna and the meetings alternated between our and the Soviet embassy buildings. Talking to the East Europeans was even less inhibited. I recall a conversation at a monthly get-together of commercial officers with my Hungarian and Israeli counterparts; the **lingua franca** was Hungarian. Mr. Schmitz, the then president of the Austrian National Bank was particularly anxious to cultivate the relationship with the East Europeans. He organized various symposiums and seminars with the participation of East European officials and economists. These meetings provided useful and sometimes amusing insights into the thinking of the officials from behind the Iron Curtain.

At one of those Austrian National Bank-sponsored symposiums, shortly after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Czechoslovak participant was called upon to report on economic conditions in his country. He admitted that conditions were not good, that there were shortages of raw materials and that it was difficult to maintain the morale of the workers because they often had to stand idle next to their machines because of the lack of raw and intermediate materials. An Austrian banker friend of mine, who told me the story, said that at that point one of the Hungarian participants sitting next to him whispered in his ear, "You see that is the problem. The government has lost confidence in the people, the people should resign."

There were a number of anecdotes of that nature. I was at a delightful Austrian institution, a yearly seminar that dates back to the early days of the reestablishment of the Austrian Republic, the Alpbach Forum. Alpbach is a lovely, picture book Tyrolean village where the Austrians from 1945 on, have organized international gatherings of every type, economists, literary figures, scientists, jazz musicians. The people who started this organization, several of them resistance fighters and exiles, felt that Austria was so much cut off from the cultural and political movements of the West during the Nazi period that they felt the need of invite intellectual leaders from the West to exchange ideas with their Austrian counterparts. Every year the program included an economic symposium. I attended most years while stationed in Vienna. One of those years, at a dinner hosted by President Schmitz of the Austrian National Bank, I sat next to one of the vice presidents of the Hungarian National Bank. The conversation started out by his saying that he had just come from Egypt. This was at a time when Egypt was very much under Russian domination. I don't think we had diplomatic relations with Egypt. He told me right off the bat that he found that the most disliked people in Egypt were the Russians and the most admired were the Americans. With that opening from a vice-president of the National Bank of Hungary we could...

**Q:** And this was an Hungarian communist.
GEBER: Yes, indeed. He said some very interesting things. By that time, it must have been 1970, Hungary has embarked on a course of economic reforms, away from a rigid centrally planned economy. My dinner partner told me that the most resistant to economic reforms were the old socialists. The Hungarian Workers Party, as the ruling Communist Party was called, consisted of the Communists and some of the Socialists who were forced to join the Communists in 1948, just like the SED was formed in East Germany. These old Socialists, always somewhat unsure of their standing in the party, were more afraid to depart from orthodox Marxist dogma.

I must tell you one more story. Again one of my Austrian friends told me that one of the Hungarian economists, known as one of the leading Marxian theorists, told him that "We Hungarians know what needs to be done. We have to get onto a sensible pricing system based on market forces. We have to open our borders to foreign trade so as to become competitive." When my friend then asked him what is then left of Communism and Marxism, the Hungarian answered, "Not very much. Some social control of the means of production."

Q: And this was 25 years ago. So even at that time it was very clear what was happening.

GEBER: I must return to Alpbach because that was the scene of my greatest success in Austria. In the summer of 1970 President Nixon announced a new economic policy in the wake of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. balance of payments. Elements of the policy were the introduction of temporary price and wage controls, a temporary imposition of import surcharges and a break with the remnant of a gold standard, i.e. the lifting of the obligation to settle official accounts with gold at the fixed rate of $35 for an ounce. The objective was to realign the exchange rates between the dollar and other, mostly the European currencies. As it happened, the economic symposium at Alpbach took place that year about ten days after President Nixon's announcement. The organizers of the symposium had the foresight to suggest as the topic of the symposium something along the lines of "Inflation, exchange rates and the balance of payments." Given the timeliness of the topic, the symposium was exceptionally well attended by leading officials and private sector figures. The symposium was chaired by the president of the German Bundesbank. The American discussants were three distinguished economists, professors Haberler and Machlup and Henry Wallich, one of the governors of the Fed (who all spoke English with different shades of a German accent). Most leading European bank presidents were present. In fact, it was the first European gathering of important policy makers and opinion shapers and the discussions were entirely focused on the implications of the new American policies for Europe.

The comments were rather critical, although somewhat self-righteous and self-serving. But the importance of this meeting was that it was the first broad based European reaction to the economic policies announced by Nixon.

Austria was not the country, certainly not in my time there, from where embassy reporting was eagerly read and awaited on the Seventh floor of the State Department. My reports on the proceedings at Albach seem to have been the exception. In fact we got a NIACT cable from the Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, Mr. Samuels, that he would like to have urgently the transcriptions of the discussions. (Because of the incompatibility of the Austrian and USIS tapes, it took couple of weeks before the transcripts could be sent).
Back at the Embassy in Vienna I told Ambassador Humes that my conclusion from the Alpbach meeting was that if we insist on the policy which Secretary of the Treasury Connally adamantly advocated, namely that all the exchange rate adjustment between the dollar and European currencies should be done on the European side, then we can expect at best a very limited adjustment. If, as I believe we should aim for a major adjustment in order for the currency realignment to be effective, then the dollar will also have to move downward from the fictional parity of $35 to an ounce of gold. The argument that Mr. Connally put forward, that we should protect the gold exchange standard, does not seem very persuasive now that we have suspended our last link to it, the obligation to settle official balances in gold at the $35 rate. It seemed to me that by moving the dollar down and the European currencies up, we can have our cake and eat it too. Ambassador Humes urged me to report my recommendations in a cable to Washington. I was somewhat reluctant, figuring that such a recommendation from Vienna would carry little weight since it was most likely that the whole issue was under active consideration by high level policy makers in Washington. In the end, I did do what the Ambassador suggested.

Q: This was Ambassador Humes?

GEBER: Yes. The cable went to Washington and we made some lateral distribution to the major European posts. It so happened that Graham Martin, our ambassador in Rome had as his house guest, Paul Volcker, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. Ambassador Martin showed him our cable and strongly supported our recommendation. I cannot tell how much impact our recommendations had, but the arrangement reached in December of that year in the so-called Smithsonian Agreement was very much along the lines of our recommendations. It was on the strength of my activities in connection of that Alpbach meeting that Ambassador Humes recommended me for the Superior Honor award which I received shortly after I returned to Washington in 1972.

Q: Well, I certainly think you deserved your award and I congratulate you.

GEBER: I just want to point out that I could have spent five pleasant but routine years in Vienna, if there would not have been the coincidence of President Nixon's new economic policy, the Alpbach symposium, Ambassador Martin's support of our recommendations and Mr. Volcker's stay in Rome at the Ambassador's residence.

Q: I partly agree that luck does play a role, but, after all, if your cable hadn't been there they wouldn't have looked at it. But the Department must have thought you needed some more education because I see when you left Vienna you were sent back to the Senior Seminar.

ALFRED JOSEPH WHITE
Italy, Austria, and Switzerland Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1969-1972)

Alfred Joseph White was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on August 16,
He attended Syracuse and Georgetown Universities and served in the US Army before entering the Foreign Service in 1957. His career has included positions in countries including Germany, Sudan, Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Venezuela. He was interviewed by John J. Harter on September 17, 1997.

Q: Can you tell us how that came about?

WHITE: That's rather interesting. Of course, I had a background in Italian affairs. I knew that by the summer of 1969 my two years at Commerce would be up, and I would be going somewhere else. Early in 1969 I got a phone call from the Department of State. The Country Director for Austria, Italy, and Switzerland wanted to see me.

Q: Who was that?

WHITE: That was Wells Stabler, who later became Ambassador to Spain. We had Country Directorates at that point. We no longer have them. A Country Directorate included a group of desks covering a group of countries. The Country Director in turn reported to an Assistant Secretary of State or a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Q: Did we have an Office of Western European Affairs at that point?

WHITE: I think that that had been broken down into directorates. We had acronyms for these offices. "WE" consisted of France and the Benelux [Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg] countries. Spain and Portugal had one Country Director. Greece and Turkey had one.

Q: Wasn't there an office called "EE" or Office of Eastern European Affairs?

WHITE: Yes. That was a different directorate. Scandinavia and the UK were grouped together as a Country Directorate [NE]. In many ways you could question how these Country Directorates were organized. For example, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland had very little in common with each other. Italy, of course, was a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] country. Austria and Switzerland were neutral countries.

Q: But they were members of EFTA, the European Free Trade Association?

WHITE: That's right. Anyway, I was interviewed for the job of economic officer for Austria, Italy, and Switzerland, even though it wasn't going to be open for some time. The long and short of it was that I was appointed as Economic Officer for those three countries in AIS [Country Directorate for Italy, Austria, and Switzerland].

Q: And Wells Stabler was your boss?

WHITE: Actually, I never really worked for him. By the time I got around to going over to AIS, after I had completed two years in the Department of Commerce, when I reported for work on July 1, 1969, Stabler had just left the Department to become Deputy Chief of Mission [DCM] in Rome. So there was a new Country Director for AIS. He hadn't chosen me, but there I was. The
new Country Director was Bob Beaudry. Bob had served in Switzerland, among other places.

Under Bob Beaudry in AIS was Chuck Johnson, a very senior Italian desk officer. He had a junior officer assistant on the Italian desk. We also had an Austrian-Swiss desk officer, Frank Trinka. My brief as Economic Officer covered all three countries. So I interfaced with all of the people in the office.

I held that job for three years. In many ways it was the most interesting and enjoyable job that I ever had in Washington. First of all, there was the sheer variety of it, which ensured that I never got bored.

**Q: How would you compare that job with your job in the Department of Commerce?**

WHITE: It was similar, in many ways, but also very different. The two Departments of Commerce and State, of course, are very different. I worked very closely with the Austrian, Italian, and Swiss Embassies here in Washington, much more than I had at Commerce. I also worked very closely with the three American Embassies in the respective capitals.

One of the things that I tried to do was to keep up a steady correspondence with the three Economic Counselors in our three Embassies, to supplement the flow of instructions by cable. I would send these Economic Counselors letters from time to time, maybe twice a month, giving them the background and heads up [advance warning] about what might be coming down the road or even to give them the background on some message that might have reached them out of the blue and left them wondering what it was all about. I think that that's one of the things that a desk officer should do.

**Q: Let them know what is useful.**

WHITE: Yes, an informal channel. Today, of course, you can do that easily by cable. I did it by letter. The material I sent them was not time sensitive, and I must say that they appreciated it. They found that kind of backstopping useful.

**Q: Would you do that by E-Mail now?**

WHITE: I'm sure they do, or something akin to that. Then, of course, communications were much more brief and restricted, because we didn't have the technology then which we have today.

The subjects were varied. It was on the Italian desk that I got my baptism of fire in aviation work, which loomed very large in my career after that.

**Q: We can get to that later. You had some exposure to aviation matters, though.**

WHITE: I remember very vividly the first issue that came up when I walked into the office to present myself to Bob Beaudry. He was very new, and I was also very new in the office. I think that it was officially his first day on the job.
Q: Was the first question, "What do you know about Alitalia?"

WHITE: He said: "You'd better read up on the civil aviation file. We're going to have talks with the Italians, and it's a very contentious issue." So I went out and spoke to one of our three secretaries in that Directorate. I said: "Can someone show me where I can find the Civil Aviation file on Italy?" One of the secretaries pointed to an entire file cabinet and said: "That's the file that you're looking for." It was a long, complicated, contentious matter.

Q: Can you briefly recapitulate what the issues were?

WHITE: Our aviation relations with Italy and other countries, unlike most other forms of business, are generally regulated by bilateral agreements. There is a long history about how that came about, but I won't get into that here. However, briefly, no airliner flew internationally, in chartered or scheduled service, without a bilateral, binding agreement which was signed, sealed, and delivered. These agreements had all of the usual features of executive agreements. They didn't have treaty status.

The aviation industry was very dynamic and was changing and growing. Problems were coming up all the time. The basic problem then, and I think even now, was that American airlines were in the private sector. They were lean and mean, they were aggressive, and were world-wide in their scope of operations. The European airlines were state-controlled. They were not as efficient as American airlines. They had very few cities that we were interested in serving. For the aviation industry France was what? Paris and Nice. Italy was Rome and Milan.

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Q: This is Wednesday, October 1, 1997. I'm John Harter, continuing the interview of Al White for the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Al, you were saying, when we broke off this interview that one of the first problems which you encountered as an International Economist in the Office of...

WHITE: The Country Directorate of Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. We were talking about aviation affairs. By the way, traditionally, and even now, aviation is handled in Economic Sections, and not by Commercial Sections in our Embassies abroad. I have always regarded aviation affairs as 100% a commercial issue. After all, you're dealing with American companies. They are airlines, rather than aircraft manufacturers.

In this context I don't see the difference between Boeing, which makes aircraft, and American Airlines, which flies these aircraft. As far as I am concerned, aviation was and, in essence, will always remain, a commercial matter. This is a rough arena, because American airlines by no means have the same interests. They fight each other, as well as their competition abroad.

With the Italians we had a particular problem, relating to multiple designations. This is a term in aviation which simply means that one government reserves the right to appoint whichever airlines it wants to fly in a given, bilateral market. Aviation agreements between governments
don't mention airlines by name. They only refer to airlines generically. For instance, it is stated that one government has the right for its airlines to do this or that, or not do this or that. As a practical matter, each European government has one airline, or did at the time we are talking about, anyway. In the case of Italy, this airline was Alitalia. In the case of France, it was Air France, and so forth. Of course, in the strict letter of these agreements, we were correct in the sense that we could designate any airline or airlines we wanted to service a given market.

Q: Which American airlines were interested in this market?

WHITE: Normally, the service at this time was provided by Pan American World Airways and TWA [Trans World Airlines].

First of all, the Italians would have preferred to have only one American airline to service a line to Italy. This was because, in their view of things, they only had one airline and, ergo, the U.S. should also have only one airline to serve the same market, so that there was a certain symmetry to this situation.

We could never accept this view. First, politically, we could never accept it. How could the U.S. Government tell Pan Am, "Well, we're going to give this route to TWA. Sorry about that." That was simply not acceptable politically. We always jealously protected our right to make multiple designations. We felt that we could designate any airline or airlines we wished to designate. That was our business, in our view. Under the law at the time, it was up to the President of the United States to make that determination. That shows you how politicized the whole area was.

The airlines vied with each other for influence with the government. First of all, the airlines fought with the CAB [Civil Aviation Board], which still existed at that time and which regulated domestic aviation. However, the key, route awards in international aviation were made by the President. He pretty much had carte blanche. He didn't have to explain why he chose one air carrier over another. He could simply say that that was his view of the national interest. So that was a critical question.

Another issue was what we called “beyond rights.”

Q: What was that?

WHITE: "Beyond rights" simply means that if you fly from New York to Rome, you also have the right to fly "beyond" Rome, let's say, to Cairo, and from Cairo to further points, or even around the world. We insisted that our airlines had that right. Indeed, that language was in the agreement.

In some cases it wouldn't have been worthwhile for Pan Am, say, just to fly from New York to Zurich, [Switzerland], and back. To be viable, they had to fly from New York to Zurich, say, and from Zurich on to New Delhi, and so forth.

This was an area of raw commercial competition, mixed very heavily with politics. So negotiations on air rights with Italy were my baptism of fire. They had gone on for a long time.
I might add that this assignment was really my first exposure to negotiations. You hear a lot about negotiating in the Foreign Service. In fact, very few people in the Foreign Service actually negotiate across a table. One of the things that fascinated me about aviation, apart from what we’ve been talking about in terms of its commercial interest, was that this was an area where you actually negotiated.

In these negotiations, each party had a delegation, headed by a Chairman. You lined up on opposite sides of the table and you went through an agenda. Behind you were the representatives of the airlines as a group. We never permitted individual airlines to sit in on formal negotiating sessions. The Air Transport Association represented the scheduled airlines as a group. Our charter airlines were represented by their own association.

Q: Who headed the U.S. delegation in these negotiations? We had the Office of Aviation...

WHITE: We had an Office of Aviation in the Bureau of Economic Affairs.

Q: Was Henry Snowden there?

WHITE: Henry Snowden was in the Office of Aviation before my time. I remember hearing of him, but he had left the State Department by the time I was in the Office of Aviation. The Director of the Office of Aviation was John Meadows, one of the most able people I ever encountered in the Foreign Service. He was a superb negotiator.

Q: Was the FAA [Federal Aviation Agency] involved, too?

WHITE: The Chairman of the delegation was always a State Department officer. We insisted on that. FAA would be represented if issues of interest to it were involved.

Q: That was John Meadows.

WHITE: That was normally John Meadows, in his capacity as the head of the Office of Aviation. Now occasionally, and for various reasons, the delegation might actually be headed by a higher level official, especially if the negotiations were particularly important abroad.

Q: Such as the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Economic Affairs?

WHITE: Exactly. Or it could even be someone higher ranking than that. However, that was very rare.

Now, sometimes negotiations were headed by the chief of the bilateral aviation division, who at that time was Mike Styles. Sometimes, the head of the multilateral aviation division [AVP] would head a bilateral negotiation, if it were a very particular type of negotiation. However, normally, the negotiations were headed by the head of the office or the head of the bilateral division.
The delegation usually included a representative of the CAB who was one of the Board Members of the CAB. He was, of course, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Q: You say that representatives of TWA and Pan Am were sitting right behind you?

WHITE: No, not in the formal negotiations. Under our system the Air Transport Association [ATA], which is the organization for all of our scheduled airlines, represents the individual airlines. Otherwise, it would be rather chaotic, with perhaps half a dozen individuals, representing half a dozen airlines, sitting behind you. And their interests rarely coincided. You really couldn't have that displayed in front of foreign representatives across the table.

Q: Of course, we had a comparable phenomenon in Geneva with trade negotiations. Frequently, there were industry representatives looking over our shoulders.

WHITE: Of course, we met with the individual airlines, time and time again, in getting ready for these negotiations, when we were hammering out our positions. That's where the input of the individual airlines would be presented. By the way, there was nothing secret about all of these negotiations. The ATA had a representative at the table, who was skilled in taking notes in shorthand. Verbatim transcripts were prepared on those talks, which were immediately turned over to the airline representatives. So, for example, TWA knew exactly what was said at the table.

Q: So these proceedings were transparent.

WHITE: There was absolute transparency. I think that that was required under the Administrative Procedures Act. We had very strict rules on that sort of thing.

Sometimes one of the American airlines would insist it had the lion's share in a particular market. They wanted to be at the table, or at least sitting behind the table. Our answer was always, "No," We said that they were represented by the Air Transport Association, the ATA, which in turn briefed them, sometimes after each session. That was the input on the airline side.

In any case, to go back to the Italian desk, that was one of the first things that I did.

Q: Where did these negotiations take place?

WHITE: They were held alternately in the two capitals. We would have one session with the Italians in Rome, usually for about a week. Then, maybe six months later, we would have another round of talks in Washington, in one of the conference rooms at the State Department.

Q: Did you operate a shuttle service? You would go to Rome to attend those sessions?

WHITE: No, I didn't.

Q: The officer regularly assigned to aviation affairs in the Embassy in Rome would attend those sessions?
WHITE: If we negotiated overseas, the local American Embassy always had one of its officers as an official member of the American delegation. Later, when I was in the embassy in Rome, I was always on the U.S. delegation for aviation negotiations. I represented the Embassy. To return to Washington negotiations, the Bureau of European Affairs was always represented on the U.S. delegation, when we sat down either with the Italians, the Austrians, or the Swiss. That was my role. The Office of Aviation Affairs had a junior officer assigned to the delegation, who was the staff man who saw to the administrative aspects and the logistics. He saw that everyone had his or her briefing books and all of that sort of thing.

So that's when I first saw how negotiations are really conducted. I saw one of the best negotiators in action, John Meadows. These negotiations could go on for hours. They could get very dicey and even acrimonious, because we were dealing with raw, commercial interests. There was nothing abstract about this process. We were talking about dollars and cents.

Q: Do I understand that you were right in the middle of the negotiations with Alitalia when you came into this job with AIS [the Country Directorate for Austrian, Italian, and Swiss Affairs]? And these lasted for a period of months?

WHITE: Oh, they were an ongoing thing. We were always reviewing...

Q: These negotiations had been going on for years?

WHITE: Oh, yes. As I said, the record of these negotiations occupied an entire file cabinet.

Q: So were you just negotiating amendments to existing agreements?

WHITE: Or interpretations of existing agreements. Very often we had problems with interpretations of these agreements.

During my time in AIS we also negotiated with the Swiss. The Swiss had a problem with our beyond rights.

Q: Regarding the Italian agreement, was there a particular set of negotiations in process when you first arrived in AIS? Did these negotiations reach some kind of conclusion, or were they already worked out?

WHITE: There were various problems which would come up of interpretation, as well as renewing the agreements. Now, all of these agreements, of course, had termination clauses. Since one of the first matters on my agenda was aviation talks with Italy, this meant that I had an awful lot to learn in a hurry. My boss didn't know much more about aviation affairs than I did. However, it was my job to brief him on these matters.

For the Italians the aviation negotiations were a very important issue. The Italian Embassy in Washington would weigh in very heavily on this matter. Of course, at a certain point and when the stakes were high enough, all of these foreign governments would always approach the State
Department at a very high level. They would say that this or that aviation issue was critical in terms of our overall relationship.

Q: How high would they go?

WHITE: They would often go to the Secretary of State or to the Undersecretary of State. This happened all the time. However, I'm getting ahead of my story at this point. Later on, we can talk more about aviation, when I was one of the Division Chiefs in the Office of Aviation.

Dwight J. Porter
Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1970)

Ambassador Dwight Porter, a native of the Midwest, graduated from Grinnell College in 1938. His Foreign Service career included positions in Germany, the United Kingdom (England), Austria, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Lebanon. Ambassador Porter was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1990.

PORTER: Then the Vienna thing popped up. This was the permanent representative to the International Atomic Agency in Vienna. It was a job that I knew quite well during the beginning of the Agency when I was in the embassy in Vienna. I had gotten to know some of the basic problems of the Agency and some of the principal characters in the States who were responsible for it.

Q: December 3, 1990. We were just getting to Vienna, do you want to pick up there? Did you go directly there from Beirut?

PORTER: Actually yes. We were so pleased at that point - things had heated up so much in Beirut and we had heard a lot of gunfire even then. I was rather anxious to get the kids in a more pacific environment for a while. The time was perfect, schools started in September and that is when we got to Vienna. For Mrs. Porter and myself, this was a very familiar environment and a school we knew very well. As a matter of fact I had raised the money to build the school in Vienna and so it was fun to come back a decade or so later to take advantage of it. Our eldest had been in the first graduating class in Vienna. The school itself had become quite an asset to Vienna as the Austrians tried to move UN agencies to Vienna. You remember, this was Kriesky's great dream to make this the second Geneva or New York. At that point he felt this was a bulwark from expansion from any side against an largely undefended Austria. We flew directly - that was the incident that a battalion of troops had to get us down to the airport.

I got there just in time for the first annual general assembly meeting of the Agency. I had to go back and be vetted by the man who was the ambassador to the IEA but who was resident in the United States but only came over for the big meeting.

Q: Was he primarily a technical man?
PORTER: It was Keith Glennen, he had just been appointed and he did not even know anything about Vienna, and I got his agreement to be in effect his alter ego on the scene in Vienna as he handled it in Washington. Glennen was a fascinating man whom I enjoyed working for. His history goes from being a Hollywood executive to being a college president to having been the first head of NASA, he was the man who started us going to the moon. He was appointed by Eisenhower. He had a variety of experiences and knowing people. He had also been a member of the Atomic Energy Commission - very knowledgeable in this field. He was devoted to the cause of the IEA, the effort to keep nuclear from proliferating. He was imaginative, and innovator. His health was not good. During the five plus years we stayed in this job, he was replaced at the end of the third year by a gentleman named Gerald Tape, who had also been a member of the AEC, a college administrator, a physicist of renown. So I was very fortunate to have these two knowledgeable and interesting colleagues while I was in Vienna.

My job was to learn as much as I could about nuclear power and energy economics. Fortunately I already knew a lot about it. I had been a devotee of nuclear power since the war and had studied a lot about it. As somebody who had started out to be a chemist I found it a little easier to understand the intricacies of nuclear power. I believed then and still believe today that if we are ever to have an energy policy that makes any sense it will be based on nuclear power. We will have to get over a lot of hangups before we can do that.

We settled back into Vienna very easily. The Viennese politicians and leaders whom we had known when they were younger were mostly retired or dead. But Kriesky, at that point, was the really dominating figure. We had all known Kriesky from the beginning. I actually did not have a great deal to do with the Austrian government except as a member of the IAEA, but I continued to have close relations with a lot of Austrians friends while we were there.

The job really involved a lot of diplomacy. The U.S. was the founder and the recognized leader of the International Atomic Agency and we were relied on by the staff of the agency as well as its director general, a very competent Swedish physicist, to really set the tone of the agency and set its agenda. The IAA had all the problems that had occurred in all UN agencies of the period, the feeling that if the U.S. was going to do the leading it ought to do most of the funding, and since we were dealing with the questions of nuclear weaponry the Soviets were very much involved. The Soviets had not for a long time understood the importance to them of non-proliferation of nuclear weaponry. The Chinese for a long period before they saw the light and decided that it might not be a good idea to have a few little bombs scattered about the world. The Soviets were not so clear either in their own mind. Finally they began to understand just how unsettling and destabilizing nuclear weapons would be, and they suddenly became rather stalwart allies of the U.S. in this endeavor. The non-proliferation treaty was legal instrument which the agency enforced. During a period of very sour U.S. - Soviet relations somehow at the IAEA in Austria we found common ground and a certain amount of camaraderie. We carefully consulted with the Soviets in advance about new policy initiatives. We almost always got their sanction and overt support for initiatives which we were working out. The Soviet Ambassador to the IAEA was one of the old-line Soviets named Markatiev [?] who had a long history of being cantankerous in relationships with the Americans. I found him fascinating, he had grown up in the pre-Revolutionary days in Russia and loved to talk about it. His church had the best wine and
sacraments on the Moscow River. He would reminisce about life in pre-revolutionary Russia.

Q: What were the mechanics of running the IAEA, was it something like the Security Council with limited votes, or was it something like the General Assembly?

PORTER: It had a director general who executed the decisions. Theoretically there wasn't a superbody such as the Security Council; the Great Powers did not have certain rights reserved to themselves, but in fact it pretty much worked that way. Six or seven powers, all of the nuclear states except for Canada, nuclear states either in a weapons or reactors, those were the states that really led the way and everybody else was hanging around trying to get something out of it. Which is quite understandable. Large nations like India and Pakistan and some of the threshold nuclear states were very often resistant to attempts to get them to indulge in self-denial in nuclear weaponry. This was particularly in states where they were confronting an enemy in close proximity, for example in the subcontinent, India and Pakistan.

Israel was, of course, the real example. Both Israel and India, particularly Israel have the capacity for utilizing nuclear weapons. One of the fights we had for years in Vienna was to keep Israel as a member of the IAEA and there were constant attacks on Israel. The typical kind of attacks one found in New York at the UN and elsewhere. It was even more difficult there because it was an open secret that Israel had nuclear weaponry and was not allowing the inspection of its facilities, not only by the agency, but by the United States, which was contrary to the original promises which were made. So it was quite a diplomatic job each year to keep Israel in the diplomatic fold. At that point the U.S. Congress not clearly understanding the value of the IAEA, with a few exceptions. It was lashing out to the IAEA for "its unfriendliness to Israel". That has subsided as the role of the IAEA has become more evident to the Hill. But for a long time it was treated as somewhat the step-child by the Congress. There were always members of Congress who understood it, but they were always in what, shall we say, was the small, educated minority.

Q: Did you have to do some of the lobbying of Congress on this, or was this usually handled by Glennon and others?

PORTER: Well, I did a lot. I had to come back each year for the authorization bill and appropriations bill. At that point Congress handled it differently, and it was very helpful in a way. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which was the committee of reference for the IAEA did not have to go to either of the Foreign Affairs committees. When I was confirmed for my job I was confirmed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, not by Foreign Relations. Unfortunately while I was there the Joint Committee was abolished. That was the time the IAEA sort of fell into limbo in Congress. That committee which had the knowledgeable members of Congress on it ..

Q: And the best security of any committee on the Hill.

PORTER: Indeed a good security system. Once that committee was abolished we really lost the thread of communication with Congress for a while.
Q: Who took over when it was abolished?

PORTER: Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs took over. We lost almost all of the expertise on the Hill as regards to atomic energy when that happened. Of course it happened primarily because of the basic attacks on atomic energy by domestic opponents to nuclear power. The result was that the international aspects really didn't work, all the staff, for instance of the Atomic Energy Committee, which had a great staff, was just wiped out overnight. They were never picked up by the Foreign Relations people.

That was an interesting transition we had to go through. I think that we did achieve a great deal despite some of these troubles we had with the Hill. No country has developed weaponry, nuclear weaponry, through the use of peaceful nuclear power. While it is also true that most countries that want to have such weapons do it by secret and dedicate facilities to the purpose, there is a great inhibiting value to the IAEA. We are seeing it right now on Iraq where the IAEA is inspecting at least the peaceful facilities in Iraq. Quite a bit of value comes out of their presence there. It is awfully difficult for the political leader of a country to go ahead and develop a weapons system when enough is known internationally about his peaceful program to make it pretty clear that somehow or other leaks are going to appear about what else is going on. Pakistan today is a case in point. In fact, for years they have been talking about making a bomb and had ready a long time ago if it had not been for the inhibiting presence of the IAEA and its peaceful nuclear program. It is not easy, in an uncertain world, to say that anything is a final determinant in the outcome of political affairs, but the IAEA has quite clearly paid for itself.

Q: Presumably they have some other more technical aspects? They run the inspection teams. Do they also act as a clearing house for atomic information?

PORTER: Very much so. These are safety matters, to assure safety. Ever since the awful Soviet accident in Chernobyl, the safety rule - this is subsequent to my time - has greatly increased, as it should. The Agency does not itself provide all the technical expertise that needs to be brought to bear on nuclear problems. When there is a nuclear problem the Agency will establish a team of international experts and get them over there quickly. It has now also developed a role of operating the massive relief efforts in the event of any serious accident. This is something new. Fortunately they have never been needed, but they have developed a mechanism to carry it out.

One of the things that has happened since I left Vienna is that other UN agencies have come in, in fact while I was there UNITO was there, and now the job in Vienna runs the gamut of UN agencies, I had resisted that. I thought my time was needed in the IAEA and the other agencies were so relatively unimportant as regards political objectives that I did not want to get involved. But that has changed now, and the resident ambassador in Vienna is representing the U.S. in several agencies. He has subordinates who specialize in each agency. His own time is probably less involved in atomic energy matters than mine was.

Q: What did you have for staff there? Did you have some real technicians?
PORTER: Yes we did. It was not a large staff. We drew from both the State Department, I had two political officers who worked with me on what I would call diplomatic initiatives, we would have to break them in and teach them about what they were doing in atomic energy matters. They would usually get a month or two briefing in the United States. The bulk of the staff was technical. We had about six or seven technical people, not all engineers or nuclear physicists, but they all came from the Atomic Energy Commission, which became the nucleus of the Department of Energy when it was created. As the AEC died out and the DOE came in the function continued. Their main job was to get help from the technical people in the States and also to recruit Americans for positions in the Agency. It was very important that American citizens have a substantial presence in the Agency. The Soviets at that point were staffing the Agency with KGB types, unfortunately. They were using it almost as much for an intelligence platform as a nuclear platform. It was easy to tell them all apart, the real nuclear types, who wanted to work closely with our people on peaceful nuclear matters, and the KGB types who were out just mouthing their lines on nuclear matters. I had the feeling that that has been gradually changing, particularly since the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviets have decided that that is something important to them and they had better put in real technical people. Obviously whatever has happened in the last year or so with the KGB would be fascinating, but I am not in a position to know.

Q: Do you have anything to say about the relations of this job or this kind of job with the embassy? You obviously did not have the same kinds of problems that they have in Paris in interfering in the economic side and in one thing and another.

PORTER: I had to walk something of a thin line for a while until it became clear to my Austrian friends that I was not going to get involved in anything internal. I got that sorted out very quickly and we had someone very sympathetic and pleasant human being in John Humes, the American ambassador at that point. He and I just hit it off fine. There were probably little, understandable, bits of friction between individual officers down the line - the perks and prerogatives - who gets the biggest house and so on. But this was almost irrelevant. The admin officer at the embassy had worked for me for years, the general services officer had been with me in Beirut so everything worked out just fine as far as I was concerned. It possibly might have been different if you had not had such a congenial person as John Humes. John was delighted to use me in some things. We needed to get additions on the school and needed to have the Austrian government put in some more money - at that point the school was a great asset to them. They could not put UN agencies in there without providing schools for the kids in English. I went to work with John's blessing to raising more money from the Austrians. I dealt with the Foreign Ministry to build another addition to the school, which was done. No frictions at all, the embassy people were delighted to have me do it, they did not have to do it.

GEORGE F. JONES
Political Advisor, IAEA
Vienna (1971-1974)

George F. Jones was born in Texas in 1935. He graduated from Wabash College
in 1955 and received a Master’s Degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Stanford University. His postings abroad have included Quito, Accra, Caracas, Vienna, Guatemala City, San Jose and Santiago, with an ambassadorship to Guyana. Mr. Jones was interviewed in 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: How long were you in Vienna?

JONES: From 1971 to 1974, three years. It was a very good job. It certainly was one of the highlights of my Foreign Service experience. I really enjoyed those three years in Vienna. I enjoyed working in the international environment. The larger countries had resident missions there, but at the time of the big conferences you had well over one hundred countries sending delegates to the General Conference of the IAEA. Working with that variety of different countries and doing the kind of lobbying and corridor politicking that goes on in international organizations was very new and very interesting to me.

Nonproliferation was also a field that was both new and very interesting. I tried very hard after leaving Vienna to get another job in the nonproliferation field. It's odd because I could have gotten another IO job quite easily, but there simply weren't that many jobs working on nonproliferation issues - despite its critical importance to our national security - and there were none that were available right then. I was never able again to make the right timing to get into a good job in that field, so I never came back to it after Vienna. Other than to write my paper on it at the National War College. I always regretted that because I thought it was something that was really important and that was really worthwhile to work on. So it was a complete change from Latin America, of course there were a few, just a handful, of Latin American embassies in Vienna and their primary mission was to the Austrian government. They spent only a fraction of their time on atomic energy matters. The people who did have full time specialists there were the major European countries and ourselves.

It was also my first contact with the Russians, I had never been a country where there was a Russian Embassy before and here they were a major player. Although we treated them with some caution, it was still the cold war after all, and we did a lot of speculating about who among the people we were dealing with was KGB and who wasn't. I think they were more unreservedly friendly toward us than we were toward them.

Q: Essentially, in this particular agency we were on the same side, weren't we?

JONES: Yes. I think some of our reserve in dealing with them stemmed from our doubts as to whether they could ever really be on the same side. But I think that very clearly they were. They shared our view that proliferation of nuclear weapons did not serve the state interests of the atomic powers. On nonproliferation issues they were our most solid collaborator. The people that we had the biggest arguments with, ironically, were the Western Europeans whose commercial firms were determined to sell nuclear equipment and materials. The same thing was true in the conventional arms field, that the American companies were more used to and more accepting of government regulation, than European companies were. The European governments had great difficulty enacting legislation that would restrict the export of nuclear supplies or arms.
Q: What were the major issues? Obviously nonproliferation was one, which was to keep nuclear weapons or the ability to make nuclear weapons out of other areas. I would have thought that, particularly in that time, in 1971 - 1974, that South Africa, Israel, India/Pakistan, and Brazil were the major players. Was that the case?

JONES: Certainly we were concerned about Argentina and Brazil and I'm not sure we had all of the evidence at that time, but we suspected and certainly later confirmed that both countries had nuclear weapons programs. India, South Africa, and Israel did too, and there was concern that new sales would add other people to the club. Sales to Argentina and Brazil would enable them to complete their programs, same thing with Pakistan and South Africa. So all of those were concerns. The day-to-day nuts and bolts work was completing the net of acceptance of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT. Getting as many countries as possible, getting all of the hold out countries into one form or another of acceptance of the treaty. One of our accomplishments in the Mission, not really mine, but of other people in the Mission was getting--the Latins had created their own treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to ban nuclear weapons. During the period that I was there, the first Tlatelolco country came to the IAEA to negotiate an agreement for inspections under the treaty, the country was Panama, and the Mission was successful in getting an agreement between the Agency and Panama which was essentially identical to the agreement that Panama would have entered into had it been a party to the NPT. So we avoided the specter of having two totally different regimes, and levels of inspection, and it became irrelevant whether a country was under Tlatelolco, or under the NPT. As a consequence, now most of them are under both.

Of course the developing countries were interested in technical assistance from the agency. Technical assistance in beneficial uses of atomic energy, and at that time the belief was much more widespread that there lots of beneficial uses, than it is today--including some very wild ideas about how atomic energy might benefit them. The developing countries wanted to make sure that they got in on the act and they thought of it in terms of, all right, we will accept these nonproliferation rules, but in return for that we want an ironclad commitment that we are going to get substantial technical assistance out of the agency. Their feeling was always that not enough funding was being provided for technical assistance and that the West wasn't living up to its commitment. So you had that argument going on endlessly and coming up at every major conference.

Q: In the international organizations--one of the problems that we often have is with France. Was France a problem in this case?

JONES: I think France and Germany were equally difficult. The British were fully on our side, but this was the early period of their membership in the European Union and the British representative, Freddy Jackson, got very upset with me one day because during an IAEA meeting I leaned over to consult with him (as we did constantly) and he felt that would be perceived by his European colleagues, as the U.S. and the U.K. once again going behind their back to consult on something and he felt that I had compromised him, simply by approaching him. [laughter] So the British were having to walk a tight rope between the policies that they had always pursued
jointly with the U.S. and what the European Union, very much driven by their commercial considerations, would permit.

Q: What about India? From my understanding India has always maintained the idea that they were not going to join the NPT unless we eliminated all nuclear weapons. Was that their stand at that time?

JONES: Yes, India and Mexico and any number of others felt that the West was not doing nearly enough toward disarmament. The main argument used against joining the NPT was that it was a grossly discriminatory document, that it gave absolute free reign to explode, test, use, nuclear weapons to the five publicly acknowledged nuclear weapons states but prohibited it for everyone else. You were in effect being asked to sign a document saying that you cannot do this, but it's perfectly okay if I do it. In the case of India, one could question the ultimate sincerity of this argument since they clearly had nuclear weapons. But there were others who used it with more sincerity, and others who--leaving aside the strictly nuclear issue, leaving aside any question of equality of treatment--who felt that the NPT did contain explicit pledges by the big powers to work toward disarmament. The argument was made that the West had not done nearly enough to fulfill those pledges. The NPT has a provision that every five years there will be an international conference to review progress under the treaty. At every review conference that argument was fought out.

Q: During this time, how did you view and how did we act towards Israel? We've always had this dual policy towards Israel on nuclear things, at least it seems to me that we know bloody well that they have developed the bomb and they have it but at the same time, we have to treat them with extra care. Was there a problem there?

JONES: Yes, it was something we were all conscious of. As you said, everyone knew that the Israelis had a or several nuclear weapons. But it wasn't something that you could prove and there were political reasons for not saying anything publicly even if you could prove it. It was not a major issue in IAEA conferences, it was not one of the boiling hot issues. One of the most difficult diplomatic issues that we had during that period was the Chinese seat. This was the period when Kissinger went to China and we suddenly shifted our whole Chinese policy. Part of the problem was that the White House did not send (perhaps for domestic political reasons) clear instructions down through the bureaucracy. So you had a new relationship being created with China but IO was still operating under the standing instructions that we were to oppose China's taking over the Taiwanese seat in all U.N. agencies. We had extended and acrimonious negotiations with the Romanians who were acting on behalf of the Chinese, in which the Romanians were very puzzled. They came into the negotiations all smiles and went out of them with very puzzled frowns because we were not caving in as they had expected. We were still following instructions to try to preserve the Taiwanese seat if we possibly could, working very closely with the Taiwanese Ambassador in Vienna. Ultimately of course, the Chinese came into the IAEA and all of the other U.N. agencies. Then we had a very complicated budgetary problem about what their assessment was going to be and how to construct the IAEA budget to end Taiwanese contributions and pick up the Chinese.
Q: How sincere did you feel the support was that you were getting from the Nixon/Kissinger administration towards this? Because Kissinger and Nixon were often playing almost a double game, they had other things going on, so they would make noises about one thing, but if they weren’t focused on that then you really didn’t get the support.

JONES: Kissinger playing a double game, I’m shocked. [laughter] On the nuclear proliferation issues, one of the things that made the work enjoyable was that there was a real community of people who believed in these issues. People at the Atomic Energy Commission, people in the State Department, people there in the Mission, most of them had been life-long specialists in this field; Ambassador Porter and I were among the rare drop-in’s. We all believed in what we were doing and adopted very much of a common front against the pesky Europeans. There was very little dissent, very little problem in getting what we wanted out of Washington in the way of support. To the extent that there was a problem, the problem was the lack of progress on disarmament issues. Which were going on, to the extent that they were going on at all, in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and that was a totally different set of people, the people who worked on disarmament. I think the calculations of Kissinger and the White House were related to those issues, so the progress there or the lack of progress affected the work that we were doing in Vienna.

ROGER KIRK
U.S. Representative to The International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1970’s)

Ambassador Roger Kirk grew up in a Navy family, and first became interested in foreign service when his father was sent to London in 1939 as a Naval Attaché. Ambassador Kirk’s career in the Foreign Service included positions in Italy, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Somalia, Austria, and an ambassadorship to Romania. Ambassador Kirk was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1991.

KIRK: And Warren Christopher, who was on the telephone, said, "The music is better in Vienna anyway."

So I then went home with the news that we weren't going to Africa, we were going to Austria. This was in the job of what they called resident representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency which was headquartered in Vienna, a UN system organization there.

Q: Yes, well I was somewhat familiar with that job because we used to have meetings in Vienna and we'd always talk with whoever was there in that job.

KIRK: That was an interesting job because...

Q: Who was your principal? The guy who was sort of the official ambassador there? Or by that time were you it?
KIRK: No. The U.S. representative on the Governing Board was Gerry Smith, Gerard Smith, who was based in Washington. There were meetings of the Board four times a year. Gerry came out for most of those. Then he got ill and for about a year he didn't come, so I just stood in for him.

Q: I think it has been that way for a long time but there was a period when you were deputy chief of mission.

KIRK: Well, that's right. It was a little tricky in that sense, except, of course, Gerry Smith was such a gentleman that he ended up having enough confidence in me so that he came just for two or three days at a time. Actually there was a mission to the International Atomic Energy and there was also a U.S. mission to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, another UN organization in Vienna. When the person heading that mission, who was a Counselor of Embassy in the U.S. embassy to Austria, left, I suggested that the two be combined into a single mission to the UN organizations, which was done. I was actually head of two separate missions co-located in the same building for a while, then they combined them into a single mission. This made much more sense because all of our foreign diplomatic colleagues were handling all the UN organizations and you would often trade-off an understanding, shall we say, in one organization on your part for an understanding in another organization on their part. It was very important to be able to do that, to be able to speak for the U.S. Government in all of these organizations. One thing certainly that struck me was that when you have permanent representatives doing a lot of the work, they develop a camaraderie, a mutual respect, and a mutual confidence that facilitate regional agreements. It makes it a lot easier.

Of course, multilateral policy is something entirely different, in my view, than bilateral diplomacy. It's much more like a legislature, at least multilateral diplomacy in the sense of diplomacy in one of these big international organizations. You have resolutions you want to pass, you've got to get the votes for them, you have to trade concessions on something that someone else wants, for something that you want. A lot of it is negotiation, almost all on the spot. The Department simply can do nothing more than give you general guidelines. I'm assuming we're not in a crucial world shattering negotiation in which case it's much slower and every single step must be monitored. But in these kinds of things your real decision, and your real negotiation, is done in the last three or four hours in any conference no matter how long that conference is -- be it one week, two weeks or six weeks. There's no way you can get instructions as that process goes on.

One of the interesting things about Vienna was that in the Atomic Energy Agency, for example, we and the Soviets were usually on the same side of any given question. We both had nuclear weapons, and we did not want other people to have them. We both wanted to keep the budget of the organization down. We both wanted the organization to be what we would call responsible, that is responsive to the things that we thought best. So we consulted regularly and amicably, even during bad periods in American-Soviet relations, and essentially were pushing the same points of view. Their negotiating techniques and ours, of course, were quite different. I would drive my Soviet colleague bananas by trying to find out what the other people wanted, and offering limited concessions fairly early in the process. He said, "You're giving things away too soon." I'd say, "Oleg, in the last two hours you'll give everything away. We don't want to do that."
You'll just cave." But between the two of us we managed.

Q: Did you have to use your Russian a good deal at that time too?

KIRK: Yes, a certain amount of the time I would. That kind of conversation I would have privately with him in Russian. Two Soviets were there during the five and a half years that I was there; one interestingly enough had been Molotov's private aide for ten or twelve years while Molotov was Prime Minister. He had seen, I'm sure, a great deal of the inner workings of the Soviet Union under Stalin. I asked him what time they knocked off work, and he said, "About 2:00 in the morning." And I said, "What time did he go back to work?" and he said, "About 10:00." He was followed by another very even more capable Soviet who had been deputy head of their treaty section, and a very skilled negotiator.

What else is there to say about the multilateral business? Certainly the importance of making up the U.S. position very early on so that you can persuade other people, have other people take it into account, or persuade them of it, before they form their own positions, and particularly before they form group positions. Increasingly most of the countries of the world get together in regional, or larger than regional groupings in these UN organizations, and hammer out a common position, which then becomes very difficult to change, because it means going back to five, ten, fifteen or fifty countries and trying to get them to change. For practical reasons alone, it is very important to get in there early to identify the two or three individuals who are key, persuade them of the rightness of your point of view, work out some sort of compromise with them, and then have that become their group's position. You're much more successful that way. It's often, of course, difficult to get Washington to make up its mind in time because they don't understand.

JOHN C. LEARY

U.S. Representative, United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Vienna (197?–1980)

John Charles Leary was born in Connecticut in 1924. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from Yale University and served in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1946 as a lieutenant overseas. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his postings abroad have included Cherbourg, Dusseldorf, Istanbul, Tokyo, Ottawa, Vienna, Sao Paulo, and Granada. Mr. Leary was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

LEARY: After Canada I went to Vienna, Austria, where I was the U.S. Representative to UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, which was headquartered in Vienna. This was, at the time, a small independent Mission. I had myself, one other officer, a secretary and a local assistant. We had our office in the embassy to Austria, Boltzmanngasse in Vienna, but we had our separate communications series and so on. And our own communications with IO [Bureau of International Organizations] and principle officers of IO in the Department.

Q: What about the IAEA?
LEARY: The IAEA was a separate Mission which was physically located elsewhere and dealt with the International Atomic Energy Agency. There was a history to this. UNIDO was established by a UN resolution in 1968. It was not a specialized agency of the UN the way the World Health Organization or the World International Organization was, but a unit of the New York Secretariat, physically based in Vienna, but being part of the UN general budget and so on. Its staff were hired by New York and paid by New York and so on. Once the Organization was established, and here again is a case where the United States had opposed establishment of UNIDO for a long, long time, but finally gave into the UN political pressures. We had felt that the industrial area was one where the private sector was much more important than government and we feared that UNIDO would turn into an organization promoting statist solutions to issues, which in fact proved to be correct to some degree. But in any event, the Organization was established and we appointed a representative to UNIDO with a separate small Mission in Vienna.

During my time in Vienna, the Austrian government completed construction of a new complex of office and conference buildings which became known as UN City. These were designed to house the IAEA and UNIDO and had several hundred offices left over and so when the Austrian government completed construction and they delivered the buildings to the UN for a token rent of one Austrian shilling per year, the UN vowed to fill the space with overflow from New York and Geneva. Of course, there was some debate about which particular offices would move. In the end, much of the work of the UN in the areas of social activities, women’s issues and children’s issues and that sort of thing moved to Vienna. Certain of the functions from Geneva, particularly those relating to drugs and narcotics moved to Vienna. And at the same time UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, which had been headquartered in Beirut was forced to move to a more secure location and they came to Vienna. And my office became responsible for relations with these various units. This did not put a great drain on our resources because they were still in the process of moving in and the issues were not in most cases terribly significant at that stage. But it was then decided that it would make much more sense for us to establish in Vienna the kind of Mission that we had in Geneva which was a Mission to the International Organizations of the various sections that dealt with the individual organizations. After my departure that was accomplished by establishing what was called USUNVIE, which is the U.S. Mission to the UN Agencies in Vienna.

Q: That includes the IAEA.

LEARY: That’s right. So now there’s one Ambassador to IAEA UNIDO and other UN activities there with people under him who are specialists in various areas. But during the time I was there, as I said, we were independent. It was quite an interesting experience to deal with a UN organization which in many cases was engaged in activities for which we had certain reservations. We involved ourselves in the questions of budget control and efficiency, as well as the substance of some of these issues.

Q: Yea. UNIDO was probably one of our least favorite international organizations.

LEARY: We have since withdrawn, but that occurred some time afterwards.
Q: We weren’t very happy that it was established as you said before. So I guess your main task was to try to limit the damage.

LEARY: That’s basically it. And to encourage to the extent that we could some positive things. One thing we were encouraging, and I’m not sure in the long run what the effect was, but we were encouraging the organization to deal with the private sector. They established a series of industry sector consultations, for example, in the steel industry. And various countries were invited to invite various representatives of their industries to come to meetings, sometimes in Vienna, sometimes at other locations, and meet with developing country counterparts to discuss the real issues of trade in these products. How markets were developed and what one had to do to develop markets, what was happening in terms of change in technology and so on. I think these had some positive impact. One of the problems was that in many cases the developing countries would send government bureaucrats instead of industry people and the bureaucrats simply insisted on repeating well-worn positions rather than listening to the good information that they were obtaining from the developing country spokesmen. But for the most part it was a matter of, as you said, containing the damage.

There was a great push on to convert UNIDO into a full-fledged specialized agency. The developing countries, I guess, had this at the top of their agenda. They felt that this could give the agency clout. Give them an independent budget, independent board of directors and so on. We engaged in a lengthy negotiation to develop a constitution for such a specialized agency and our objective was to have an agency which could be controlled to a certain degree in terms of budget and activities, but in particular, via budget, we didn’t want this thing to get out of control. As it was, UNIDO was part of the general UN budget and was controlled in virtually the same way that the general UN budget was controlled. If there was a 2% budget increase for the year, UNIDO got a share of that, and of course other offices. Whereas with an independent agency, the theory was that they sky would be the limit.

So we spent a lot of time negotiating provisions which provide for budget procedures, which gave an effective veto to enough countries in the developed country area, that if we could reach common ground, among basically the donor countries, we could have some control over the budget. This involved developing procedures and voting procedures and so on. We finally reached a satisfactory understanding on this and before I left Vienna we signed the agreement through UNIDO, which of course was ratified by Congress to become a member. We also wanted to include in that Constitution withdrawal procedures which would enable us to withdraw in the event things did not proceed to our liking. That proved to be the case a few years later and we decided that it was not worth the effort and we withdrew. It must have been sometime in the early ‘90s, I guess.

Q: I assume a lot of your effort in Vienna was in coordinating and working with the other developed country representatives.

LEARY: As in many of the UN organizations we broke down, and in fact this is in the rules of the organization, into groups. Groups “A” and “C” were the developing countries and they were specified in the law and rules. “A” being basically countries from Asia and Africa and “C” being
countries from Latin America, but who joined forces on most issues and became known as the Group of 77. Group “D” were the East Bloc Socialist countries and Group “B” were the Western Industrialized countries, including western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Much of our preparatory work was done in these groups. We had a very active and well functioning Group “B” and our Mission took a very active role in that Group. Many of the countries were represented by people who, unlike the U.S., did not have a special Mission for UNIDO. They were either from a Mission whose principal responsibility was the IAEA or in some cases the bi-lateral embassy had also the responsibilities for the international organizations. I discovered that by taking the initiative to get pieces of paper on the table, we could frequently move the discussion in our direction if there were going to be doubts.

I recall in particular, prior to the third general conference of UNIDO which took place in India in about 1979 or maybe ‘80, the Secretariat had come out with a number of papers on the individual agenda items, many of which took positions that were not pleasing to us or many of our developed country colleagues. We always had people, members of our Group however, who were prepared to avoid strong stands on these things. In part because their interests were not as directly affected as the interests of the major donor countries, and so on, and in part because of domestic political situations.

In preparation for that meeting our embassy established a small working group, of Group “B,” and our embassy undertook to review each of these agenda papers and prepare a commentary, which we did and tried to take into account the views we knew were going to be expressed by some countries, but being sure to include all of our own positions. By the end of the process we gotten considerable agreement on a position, which resulted for the first time, when the conference actually took place, in a solid Group “B” vote against the plan of action which had been presented by the developing countries. At first there were statements to the effect that the conference had been a failure, but we went back to Vienna and all sides began to reassess their positions and were much more amenable to compromise on issues. We passed through a period of exercising what was known as the “Spirit of Vienna”, which enabled us to get the organization moving again.

Q: Okay. Were you the Chair of Group “B” towards the end of your time in Vienna?

LEARY: Yes, Chairmanship rotated. During the UNCTAD conference that I mentioned, the Chairman was the Belgian Ambassador who was a woman, Ambassador DeBeir. A very capable lady. After the conference, she had done her time and I was approached about taking over the chairmanship. I think in part because of the work that we had done prior to the conference. In fact, the Group insisted during the conference that I spend a lot of time behind the Belgian table to advise Madam DeBeir when she was speaking on the Group’s behalf. I consulted the Department and was given authority to do this. We generally had shied away from this, but in this case they decided that it was alright. So, for the next six months I had the job of coordinating the Group and it was an interesting experience.

Q: You mentioned the history of why it was a separate Mission and then later all the UN agencies in Vienna were folded together as far as the United States representation was concerned. I suppose there were some real advantages that you could focus entirely on UNIDO
and maybe to a lesser extent some of these other agencies coming to Vienna.

LEARY: Yes, that’s true.

Q: And you had authority and were seen by others as having expertise.

LEARY: There were a couple other countries who had specialists in UNIDO. One was the West Germans and the Swiss also. They had a Mission which was accredited to both groups, but they had one person on the staff who was principally the UNIDO man. Since our three countries tended to have very similar interests, we worked very closely together.

ALFRED JOSEPH WHITE
Economic Officer
Vienna (1972-1975)

Alfred Joseph White was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on August 16, 1929. He attended Syracuse and Georgetown Universities and served in the US Army before entering the Foreign Service in 1957. His career has included positions in countries including Germany, Sudan, Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Venezuela. He was interviewed by John J. Harter on September 17, 1997.

WHITE: In due course John Humes went to Vienna as American Ambassador, about the time I was looking for an overseas assignment. Of course, I knew Ambassador Humes by this time, having participated in most of his briefings.

Q: So you think that he recommended you for an assignment to the Embassy in Vienna?

WHITE: Well, I think that he certainly supported my assignment. He was very gracious about that and very supportive. Of course, he knew me. You might say that I was a known quantity to him.

So in the summer of 1972 my wife, Gabriela, and I went off to Europe. Gabriela stayed in her family's home in northern Italy for the summer. We were expecting a second child, who was born that fall in Vienna. During that summer I had a lovely bachelor apartment in what was called the "Rathaus Apartments," right behind the Rathaus [City Hall], on the Ringstrasse in Vienna.

I had a whole summer to get used to working in the Embassy. Tony Gebor was leaving Vienna that summer. His number two man was Carroll Brown. I don't know whether you know Carroll Brown.

Q: I know him, yes.

WHITE: Carroll had moved up from the slot that I took over and became Economic Counselor
for one year. I was the number two officer in the Economic Section. We had a combined Economic and Commercial Section. There was the Economic Counselor, followed by me on the economic side. On the other side we had a Commercial Attaché. We had Joe Eblen first, who was then followed by Joe Lill. There was one other officer in the section, a junior officer. He did what junior officers usually do. That is, whatever needed to be done.

*Q: What was your impression of the Embassy in Vienna when you first got there?*

WHITE: I had previously visited Vienna, since I had already served in Europe. Vienna, of course, was a capital in search of an empire. It had been the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, one of the greatest in history, I suppose.

*Q: It was also known as the Habsburg Empire.*

WHITE: The Habsburg Empire indeed. Overnight, it seemed, this great, capital city, instead of being the capital of an empire, which had probably covered roughly about one-fourth of Europe, became the capital of a rump state. In the 1930s, it was not regarded as viable. I must tell you that the name of President Woodrow Wilson is not revered in Vienna, and I think that you can figure out the reason why. The Austrians really don't see him the way many people do, as a kind of enlightened savior.

*Q: I think that President Wilson's reputation has slid downhill a good bit since the end of World War I.*

WHITE: I think that it has.

*Q: In retrospect, the great tragedies in the settlement reached at Versailles after World War I really led directly to all of the problems which were involved in World War II.*

WHITE: I think that the moral in the tragedy of Woodrow Wilson is that it's one thing to take something apart. However, if you do that, you'd better have something ready to take its place.

*Q: Of course, my own sense is that, aside from his arrogance, one of his worst failings was a lack of understanding of economic factors in international relations.*

WHITE: Well, he didn't understand Europe, for starters. He was a great leader during World War I and a man of considerable vision. There's no doubt about that. However, one of his cardinal mistakes, which a head of government should never make, was to go off and get involved in the nitty gritty details of negotiating the settlement of World War I at the Versailles Conference. I don't think that there's any doubt about that. I think that it's generally recognized. That was a fatal mistake.

In short, Wilson should never have gone to the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Versailles. He should have remained in Washington and, at a distance, his prestige would have remained intact. As it was, he became fatally associated with the winners, as distinct from the losers in World War I. He walked into a hornet's nest of recriminations. Of course, you know the story of
the Treaty of Versailles which emerged from the negotiations. The United States initialed but
never signed the Treaty of Versailles, which turned out a complete failure. It was seen to be such
at the time. This was not hindsight. There were people at Versailles who saw this at the time. For
example, John Maynard Keynes, who was in the British Delegation, saw this.

Q: He wrote a book about that.

WHITE: Yes, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Herbert Hoover, who was attached
to the American Delegation, saw this. Many people at the negotiations at Versailles knew this at
the time. It may have been Herbert Hoover, who said: "This is not a peace. This will be an
armistice for 20 years." Of course, that's exactly what it was. It was an armistice in a 30-year
war.

Q: But Austria in particular was a victim.

WHITE: Austria was a victim, and the sad thing was that the countries which were part of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and were so eager to get their independence were also victims. This
particularly applied to the Czechs.

Austria-Hungary was called the "Dual Monarchy." Bear in mind that the Emperor of Austria was
also the King of Hungary. The Dual Monarchy was a kind of condominium in which both parties
were essentially equal. That could have evolved into a "Triple Monarchy," with a Czech state
acquiring equal status with Austria and Hungary.

However, the Czechs wanted their independence. Well, they got it. But what did they get with it?
Some 20 years later came the tragedy of Munich and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.
The Czechs would have been far better off to have remained in some loose confederation with
what was, in fact, an economically viable entity in the Danube Valley. You know, an empire like
Austria-Hungary just doesn't grow accidentally. There were very sound reasons why these states
were grouped together under the Hapsburgs. The Vienna where I served was a gracious, dowager
Empress in a sense.

Q: When I think of Austria and Vienna in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, before you were
there, the Orson Welles' movie, "The Third Man," comes to mind.

WHITE: Exactly.

Q: Things were very dark and gloomy at that time. Of course, by the time you were there, there
was considerable improvement. Things were developing well.

WHITE: They were, indeed. Austria had basically recovered economically. The kickoff for
Austrian recovery, if you will, was the Austrian State Treaty, which was signed in 1955. There
are people who still argue about why the Russians actually withdrew from Austria. However,
they voluntarily got out of Austria. Everyone always assumed that, wherever the Russian Army
went, it would stay, until it was forced out. For whatever reason the Soviet leader, Khrushchev,
agreed to the neutralization of Austria in 1955. Until that time, if you'll remember, there were
zones of occupation. Vienna, like Berlin, was under Four-Power Occupation. There were British, French, American, and Russian Zones. The Russian Zone was in the East and was economically very backward.

All of that structure changed very rapidly after the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 was approved. It was signed by Secretary of State Dulles for the U.S.; Harold Macmillan, I believe, for Britain; and I forget who signed for France and for the Soviet Union. However, this treaty really involved the recreation of post-war Austria, after a 10-year period of occupation.

Q: So what was the political situation in Austria when you were there?

WHITE: Politically, Austria was quiet. The country was prosperous. The Austrian Chancellor [Prime Minister] was Bruno Kreisky, a very colorful, and in my mind, a very able man. Kreisky was a Socialist, but not the old, pre-war type of European, Marxist Socialist. He was very much a Socialist after the model of the British Socialists. That is, of the British Labour Party.

Bear in mind that between World Wars I and II Austria was a scene of unrelieved gloom. The country had split, very much as Germany did, between extremists of the Right and Left. There was street fighting. The Socialists were militant. The Opposition was equally militant. Those are some of the factors that made it so easy for the Germans simply to walk into Austria in March 1938.

However, Austria was back on its feet in 1972, and it was again prosperous. It had a very viable, two-party political system. There were two major parties: the Socialist Party, a very temperate kind of Socialism, not like the pre-World War II, ideological Socialism. The Opposition party was the Austrian People's Party, which actually was something of a misnomer. It was actually a Conservative Party. It was the traditional, Conservative Party of Austria, the party supported by the farmers. It was comparable to the Christian Democratic Party in Germany.

There was a third party, the Free Democratic Party. It was more to the Right than the Austrian People's Party, but not to the extreme Right.

Bruno Kreisky was an interesting man. First of all, he was Jewish in a country which, as you know, had a rather traditional, anti-Semitic bias. Some Austrians tried to belittle this, but it was, in fact, there. However, Kreisky was an immensely popular figure. He was an extremely gifted politician and a very good speaker. He spoke English fluently. I often saw him speak. I remember in particular that I once saw him speak to the American Chamber of Commerce in Vienna. He spoke without any prepared text and did so very forcefully and very effectively. His theme was, “We need American capital and know-how. It's in our interest that you come, and we will do everything possible to make Austria an attractive country for American investment.” I don't doubt that he was sincere in that respect, and his policies demonstrated that.

He supported a pragmatic policy. It was very much like the Democratic Party in the United States. The "Old Guard" of the Austrian Socialist Party had been pretty much shoved aside by the war, by death, and by the changing times. The Austrians had finally buried the hatchet among themselves, bearing in mind that between World Wars I and II the Right and the Left were
fighting against each other. They had learned lessons from that.

Q: They had a rough time in the 1930s.

WHITE: Terrible. Well, even in the 1920s. The country at that time was simply not viable. That's why many Austrians, who were otherwise patriotic Austrians, maintained that, without its historic connections, the country had no recourse but to come to some economic terms with Germany. In the end, that is what Austria did. However, this was in the context of postwar, multilateral economic development.

The Austrians had a problem. They could not join the European Common Market. They could not do this because they believed that it would violate their neutrality. Now, neutrality was really the price that the Russians exacted for permitting Austria to become unified in 1955, though they did not say so in so many words. The Austrians were always very sensible about this. You could argue that neutrality was imposed by the State Treaty. However, the Austrians always said: "Yes, we have to be neutral, but we are the ones who determine what neutrality shall mean." I don't think that they ever admitted that the Russians had the right to prevent Austria from joining the European Common Market. Austrians are very realistic people, and they weren't about to test how far they could go. So it was accepted, and we accepted, that the Austrians could not join the European Community. However they established various ways of doing this, in a sort of de facto movement toward membership in the European Community which was nonetheless short of full membership.

Q: Of course, Austria joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

WHITE: That's exactly right. That was kind of a halfway house. American prestige stood very high in Austria, and Americans were well liked. The Austrians still appreciated what we had done, and they had a very realistic sense that, without the American commitment to Europe, their own independence would have been in jeopardy.

Bear in mind that the word "Austria" in German is "Oesterreich," which means the "Eastern Realm" or territory. Austria has always been a border land. Of course, geographically, it still is. It is the traditional borderland between the East and the West, in a European context. Metternich was the great Austrian statesman at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. He used to say: "The East begins at the 'Rennweg.'" The Rennweg is a major street in Vienna.

What was happening when I arrived in Vienna was summed up in one word: "Detente." Nixon was President of the U.S., and Kissinger was his National Security Adviser. Nixon had embraced detente with the Russians.

Q: That was in 1972. All of this was a recent development.

WHITE: Exactly. Detente was the name of the game, and the Russians, for their own reasons, were also great champions of detente. Now, both sides saw this concept in different ways, but both accepted it and both touted it.
In that context Vienna assumed an importance which it hadn't had even a few years before. It was a natural meeting place between East and West. Remember that we not only had an Embassy in Vienna, but it was also the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to which we had a Mission. It also was the headquarters of UNIDO, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, where we also had a Mission.

**Q: When was UNIDO established? It wasn't much before then.**

**WHITE:** I think that it was a relatively recent creation. [It became an autonomous organization within the UN Secretariat in 1966, replacing the Centre for Industrial Development.] By the way, the U.S. wasn't all that fond of UNIDO. We joined it, but not enthusiastically. In any case, we had three diplomatic Mission in Vienna. That tells you something of the flavor of Vienna.

**Q: Each U.S. Mission was headed by an Ambassador...**

**WHITE:** An Ambassador or a Minister. We had three Chiefs of Mission in Vienna. We also had something else. We had the MBFR negotiations. It stood for "Mutual, Balanced Force Reductions." This was part of detente. This was an endless, virtually a perpetual meeting.

**Q: When was CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] established?**

**WHITE:** That came a little later. The MBFR negotiations had a narrow, military context: ground forces. Of course, all of our NATO allies were members of the MBFR negotiations.

The MBFR negotiations did not involve an organization. It was an ongoing series of negotiations in which each side presented lengthy papers. Frankly, I don't think that the MBFR negotiations ever really accomplished anything. I'm not sure that it was ever really intended to accomplish anything. However, it was a sign of an attempt to come to some accommodation on the ground, by limiting the size and equipment of ground forces in Europe.

We even had a separate Mission, in effect, to the MBFR talks. I recall that a colleague of mine was in our Mission, to the MBFR Talks, however we defined it. This Mission had its own communications equipment, for example. Vienna was also the venue for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT].

**Q: Were the SALT talks going on while you were there in Vienna?**

**WHITE:** They were intermittent. I think that the major aspects of those talks were over by that time. In fact, right around the corner from our Embassy in Vienna was the building in which the SALT talks were held.

We had all of these activities going on in Vienna. Before I left the Austrian desk the Department of Commerce, looking at this process from afar, came up with the idea of establishing a Trade Center in Vienna and calling it the "East-West Trade Center." This seemed to be an idea whose hour had come. I recall that when I was still on the Austrian desk in the Department of State (not when I was in the Department of Commerce), this idea suddenly emerged. It was controversial
and was being pushed by a political appointee in Commerce, one of those hard-charging fellows who come into government service, determined to do something different.

Q: Do you remember his name?

WHITE: I don't recall his name, it was so long ago. Anyway, he latched onto this idea. There was opposition to it in the Department of Commerce. Not the concept, but whether it was feasible at that particular time and under those circumstances. I remember that we looked at this idea in State, and we concluded that it was a nice idea but it was premature. However, Commerce insisted on going ahead with it. Bear in mind that Maurice Stans was Secretary of Commerce at the time.

Q: He was close to President Nixon and had raised a lot of money for his campaign. So much so that it became something of a scandal.

WHITE: Stans was certainly influential. He backed this concept and, during my first year in Vienna, this was very much an issue. Indeed, the "East-West Trade Center" was established. You know, we never do anything in half-way terms. We always go whole hog. Commerce found a prime location for this center, just off the Ringstrasse. This was a storefront kind of Trade Center. It was very impressive. It had been agreed that the Director would be a State Department officer. It was Doug Martin. I still see him occasionally. Doug was the first and, as it turned out, the only Director of the East-West Trade Center.

Doug Martin's deputy was a Commerce officer, a very competent man who was very skilled in the techniques of building exhibits and that sort of thing.

The East-West Trade Center was launched with great fanfare. Of course, in the context of detente, the Nixon administration seized on this concept as a kind of concrete example of what might be done. I remember that the President of Austria was there for the opening of the Center. It was launched with great hopes for its success. The staff consisted of the Director, the Deputy Director, and two of our Economic Section local employees, who were top notch people.

So the East-West Trade Center was launched, and they had a series of trade exhibitions.

Q: Did it accomplish much?

WHITE: The concept was that as detente emerged, trade between East and West would naturally grow. However, bear in mind that even when we had detente, there was still an iron curtain across Europe. Not much had been done to relieve the rigidities of that separation. For example, it was still extremely difficult for anyone in the Embassy to travel to Eastern Europe, even as tourists. The process was complicated. We managed to go to Budapest once while we were in Vienna. Detente was in the air, but the Cold War hadn't been magically whisked away. It was still very much with us.

The concept was that Eastern European governments could send their representatives to Vienna and use Vienna as sort of a meeting place with representatives of American companies. After all,
it seemed that almost everybody else was meeting in Vienna at that time. So why not have a meeting place for American businessmen and the various business interests in Eastern Europe? Of course, we're talking about government business interests in Eastern Europe.

However, it didn't really work out that way. First of all, businessmen like to deal directly with their customers. In this case the customers were essentially Eastern European governments. The Eastern European governments also preferred to deal directly with American businessmen. They didn't see the point in going to Vienna to do this. They felt that they didn't have to do that. I think that our own Embassies in Eastern Europe weren't all that keen on the East-West Trade Center in Vienna.

In any case, the center was launched, very professionally. A lot of good exhibits were staged. Of course, we always had receptions to open these exhibits. However, after a while we found an interesting pattern. We found that our Soviet colleagues went to the Center, in force, all the time. We began to get the impression that maybe they were there, less for reasons of commerce, and more for reasons of doing what we always assumed that they did in those days.

**Q:** *For intelligence purposes?*

**WHITE:** Exactly. By the way, my assignment to Vienna provided me with my first, real opportunity to see the Russians in action as diplomats.

The Russians still had the old Czarist Embassy building. It was a palace, a real “palazzo,” as the Italians say. It had huge, gleaming marble columns. It was vast, impressive, and imposing. It glittered with Czarist opulence, shall we say. They would often invite us to their Embassy. You see, detente was the name of the game, and we would see them often, both socially and professionally.

It was very amusing. Every now and then we would compare notes in the Embassy. We would find out that each of several officers in our Embassy had been invited to lunch, suddenly and in the same time frame, by different officers in the Soviet Embassy. We were always amused by this because when we compared notes after lunch, we would find out that the Soviets had all said the same thing. We always assumed that a telegram had come from Moscow, saying: "You will invite the Americans this week and you will make the following points." And that is what they did.

The East-West Trade Center didn't last, because new people in Commerce looked at it and didn't really see the utility of it.

**Q:** *He was presumably given an outline of the costs involved.*

**WHITE:** That's right, the costs. They were extremely high. As I mentioned, the location was just off the Ringstrasse in the high rent district in Vienna. The Ringstrasse is like the Champs Elysees in Paris. I think that the Center may have been open for about two years. Then, different winds blew in the Commerce Department, and it was decided to phase out the Center.
Detente was the mood of the time. Now, just before I left Washington for assignment to the Embassy in Vienna, I had read in the newspapers a bizarre little item about a break-in at the headquarters of the Democratic Party at the Watergate complex in Washington. Of course, this thing grew...


WHITE: It continued to grow.

Q: Contrary to everyone's predictions.

WHITE: Yes. While Vienna was a very pleasant place to live, professionally this cloud of the Watergate Affair got larger and larger. However this incident may have been looked at in the United States, diplomats abroad represent their country. In our case we represented the President. It was not a pleasant time for American diplomats serving abroad, because we were always being asked about the Watergate Affair, about which we knew very little. The Soviets were fascinated by this event. They simply could not understand or believe that any American President like Nixon, and by the way they saw Nixon as a strong President, could be toppled from power. This couldn't have happened in the Soviet system...

Q: I don't think that any Americans perceived this event, either contemporaneously or retrospectively, as really possible, either.

WHITE: Exactly. In addition to detente we also had this growing cloud of the Watergate Affair over our heads. This came to a head while I was still in Vienna. President Nixon was forced to resign in August of 1974.

Q: On August 9, 1974.

WHITE: I remained in Vienna for another year after that. Not only the Russians, but other Europeans couldn't understand this either. The Europeans have a longer tradition than we do, and perhaps a more cynical tradition. Their attitude was: "Fun and games? Tricks? This is what all politicians do all the time. So what's the problem?"

Q: It was like an onion. You peel it back, and there are so many layers. The initial break-in was utterly inconceivable. Here were these five former employees of the CIA who had been much involved in anti-Castro activities. What were they doing in the office of Larry O'Brien, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee? That was never adequately explained.

Then, beyond that, this seemed to be an operation of the plumbers based on the White House, trying to stop leaks in the White House. This activity appeared to have been overseen by the most senior officials of the Nixon reelection campaign. Then, once people began peeling back that aspect, many other things seemed to be lumped under the umbrella term of "Watergate." All of this seemed utterly inconceivable.

WHITE: It certainly did from a European standpoint. I don't think that the Europeans understood
then and I don't think that they understand now why it was enough to bring down a President.

Q: Did you understand it?

WHITE: Not really. I think that we lost a lot of prestige as a result of this. Perhaps if I had been back in the U.S. at that time, I might have perceived it differently. However, I was abroad, representing the U.S. Government, and the American President was regarded as a man of great strength. Remember Nixon's trip to China. Nixon's reputation stood very high in Europe.

Q: Nixon's reputation stood very high in Europe, partly because of the opening to China and partly because he had won the election of 1972. So here was a huge mandate for a second term of Nixon as President. However, it all came tumbling down.

WHITE: Exactly. I always felt sorry for Ambassador Humes in Vienna. He was a wonderful man, a great gentleman, and he owed his job to President Nixon.

Q: So what were your responsibilities in Vienna?

WHITE: I was the number two officer in the Economic Section of the Embassy. I was responsible for most of the reporting done in the economic area. We had the CERP [Combined Economic Reporting Program] reports to prepare and submit to Washington. We had quite a heavy schedule of CERP reports at that time.

Among our local employees, we had an Agricultural Unit which, curiously enough, reported to me, because the Agricultural Attaché position in the Embassy had been abolished. However, the Department of Agriculture wanted to keep a reporting program going in Vienna. This agricultural unit had two excellent local employees. At first the Department of Agriculture was going to close down the whole operation. However, I think that cooler heads prevailed. All of this happened just before I arrived in Vienna. I think that when people in the Embassy explained to the Department of Agriculture that there were two good, local employees in the Embassy who could essentially keep the reporting program going and that an American Embassy officer could be assigned to oversee their activity, Agriculture changed its mind. The Department of Agriculture had an Agricultural Attaché resident in Bern, Switzerland.

Q: You don't often think of Austria as an agricultural country.

WHITE: I'm sure that the Agricultural Attaché in Vienna was also accredited to Eastern European countries. That was probably the rationale for this assignment. In any case, the Department of Agriculture reorganized its services. It gave up the attaché position in Vienna. The Agricultural Attaché in Bern would visit Vienna about two or three times a year to oversee the operation. But, as I said, the local employees in the agricultural unit reported to me.

By the way, that happened again to me later on in Turkey. The Agricultural Attaché position in Ankara was abolished, and, in effect, I wound up as a kind of de facto Agricultural Attaché.

Q: Do you think that it makes sense to have agriculture covered in countries like Austria and
Turkey? There is so much published material on those places. The FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization, a specialized agency of the UN] puts out an enormous quantity of published material.

WHITE: Remember that the Department of Agriculture is very active in the field of foreign reporting. It has its own Foreign Service and a very active export promotion program.

Q: That is more intended to promote American agricultural exports than to report on agricultural developments.

WHITE: Basically, the agricultural reporting program was export driven, although the Department of Agriculture always had a very good and very thorough program of reporting on world agricultural conditions. Because that, in turn, impacts on American agricultural prospects.

One of the things that happened while I was in Vienna was that the Department of Agriculture, believe it or not, imposed an embargo on U.S. exports of soybeans. This did the American farmers no good because if you don't have a reliable supplier, importing countries go to another source of supply.

This was a very foolish move. What it did, of course, was to stimulate the production of soybeans elsewhere in the world. This was one of those measures dictated by short-term, political considerations. This boomeranged badly, I think, in terms of our reputation for reliability of producing soybeans and meeting export requirements.

Monetary reporting was also my responsibility, as well as all of the usual bilateral issues on the economic side. We had a very competent woman, a Foreign Service National, who did a lot of the monetary reporting. She really knew the banking system.

Civil aviation was another of my responsibilities. Pan American was the principal, scheduled airline servicing Vienna. While I was in Vienna, Pan Am gave up the Austrian market, for some reason, and TWA took over service to Vienna.

Problems would come up with Austria from time to time. As I say, we had excellent relations with Austria, and there were no serious difficulties outstanding. There were no "consuming" issues on the front burner with Austria.

Q: Would you recall any specific event as representing the proudest moment of your service in Austria?

WHITE: We had two presidential visits to Austria while I was there. President Nixon came in 1974 and President Ford a year later.

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Q: This is Tuesday, October 7, 1997, at about 2:40 PM. I am John Harter interviewing Al White on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Before we resumed this
interview, you were discussing the visit of President Nixon to Austria in June, 1974. You were responsible for...

WHITE: I was responsible for the State Department contingent accompanying the President. Henry Kissinger, of course, was Secretary of State at that point, but also still, I believe, the National Security Adviser to the President.

If I had to designate any one or two events as the highlights of my three years in Austria, the first would certainly be the visit of President Nixon in June of 1974, followed by that of President Ford a year later. Of the two, the former was the more dramatic because of the Watergate crisis that was fast coming to a head. In both cases the President stayed at Schloss Klessheim just outside Salzburg as the official guest of the Austrian Government. In both cases the President stayed only a day or so in Austria. In both cases, my job was essentially the same, to back-stop the Department of State's traveling Secretariat and the several senior Department officers in the President's entourage. In both cases, we set up shop in a basement room of the Schloss, which was normally used as a class room for an Austrian tourism school. On the grounds of the castle was a large building which served as a hotel training school, where most of the Presidential parties and Embassy staff, including myself, had rooms.

President Nixon was already in deep trouble at the time of his visit to Salzburg. He was en route to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Israel in a trip which he no doubt hoped would recoup his fortunes. We expected of course that the visit would entail a lot of work, but I don't think any of us were prepared for the enormous logistical task that the visit became. Salzburg was a long way from Vienna and the Embassy; by the time of the visit most of our Embassy personnel and vehicles were in Salzburg. There were the inevitable advance men, young for the most part, and often arrogant and demanding. Then there were the hangers on who came with or before the actual Presidential visit, many of whom had no connection with the visit as far as we could tell. This was the heyday of the Imperial Presidency and it was painfully clear that the trappings surrounding Presidential travel had reached ridiculous proportions. In Salzburg, a medium size city, the number of Americans swarming all over town for the visit was so conspicuous that it became a joke among the Austrians.

The Schloss itself was a magnificent building in the grand Imperial manner of the Hapsburgs. It sat in a spacious park just outside the city. Hence security could be more easily provided, which may have been one reason why the Schloss was selected for these visits. Not only guards but dogs as well were used to patrol the grounds. From the main entrance of the building one entered into a huge, imposing salon that soared several stories, with cream and gold walls and glittering crystal chandeliers. Directly ahead was an imposing stairway. To the right and left, at the far ends of this salon were large double doors that lead to the two main wings of the building.

I did not see the President and Mrs. Nixon on their arrival. They were given the wing to the right of the main entrance, which provided a private suit. Secretary Kissinger had a room upstairs that was spacious and regal with an enormous ornate bed. Adjoining it was another smaller room converted into an office for his chief aide, who guarded like a hawk access to the inner chamber. Coming and going in my own duties, I often passed through the grand salon and I often looked at those doors behind which the President and his wife stayed for two nights and a day. It soon
became apparent that they did not want to be disturbed, nor did they ever emerge during the visit to mingle with their large entourage. Nor do I recall seeing anyone other than a Filipino house boy enter or leave the Presidential quarters. I began to realize why the President was considered a loner.

Only once did I see him he appear prior to his departure. He came out to greet Chancellor Kreisky, his host, who came for a very brief courtesy call. I was taken aback by the President's appearance. I had read that he was having bouts of phlebitis which caused him to limp slightly at times. On this occasion the limp was very noticeable. He had a haggard, grey, drawn, exhausted look and seemed in pain. The agony of his situation was plainly evident. He seemed a bent and broken man in those ghastly few minutes. His Presidency was crashing down around him, and it showed.

In happier days, in May, 1972, President Nixon had stayed at Schloss Klessheim en route to Moscow. He was still basking then in the glory of his February 1972 visit to China. Now, two years later, the atmosphere in the great castle was funereal. Officials from Washington moved about in hushed tones. The tension of impending doom was heavy in the air. I saw Secretary Kissinger at one point coming down the stairs with some aides. He looked somber, angry and made no pretense of smiling. Reports on the political situation back in Washington were coming in by cable, and their contents (to which I was not privy) only seemed to deepen the gloom.

I did not fully grasp the reason for Kissinger's anger at the time. Busy in my own duties, I heard that he gave a press conference during the visit, but only years later when I read his memoirs did I realize how desperate for a time his own situation was. The feeding frenzy of the media, roused by the Watergate scandal, had turned at last on him. Nasty charges had surfaced that Kissinger had lied about wiretaps. In his Salzburg press conference held June 11, he threatened to resign if he was not cleared of the charges. Kissinger's account of this incident and of the Nixon visit to Austria and the Middle East makes chilling reading.

When it was time for the Presidential party to leave for the airport, the entire staff of the Schloss, including maids, cooks, bus boys, etc, in all about 25 people stood in a semicircle in the great hall. The President and his wife emerged from their suite, and I saw a transformed Nixon. He and Mrs. Nixon, beautifully dressed, were all smiles and relaxed affability as they moved along, stopping for a few words and a hand shake with each member of the staff, giving mementos to each: pins to the women and tie clasps or similar items to the men, with the Presidential seal mounted on each. Completely gone was the limp and the haggard look I had seen on the President's face a short time before. Courage has been defined as grace under pressure. By that definition, Mrs. Nixon was a very courageous woman. Her face betrayed nothing of the ordeal she must have been suffering. They were every inch the politician and his supportive wife, working the crowd to the end. They then disappeared through the main entrance doors to their waiting limousine, I never saw them again.

I had seen Nixon only once before his stop-over in Austria. During the Eisenhower years, ! had stood at the corner of 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue while a motorcade swept by on its way to the White House, with a smiling Nixon, then Vice President, sitting beside the President, both waiving back at the crowd. Nixon had just returned from a disastrous riot in Caracas,
Venezuela where a mob had almost killed him. The President had gone out to the airport to greet him. That had been years earlier, in happier times. "How the mighty have fallen."

On August 9th of that year the long agony of Watergate came to its crisis and Nixon was forced out of office in disgrace. I heard of his resignation when we were on vacation in San Martino. I was not among those who reveled in his fall. I see nothing to cheer in the fall of any human being. Nixon had played hard ball in politics, giving no quarter. His enemies played hard ball as well and gave him no quarter. Some would say it was rough justice. My own view was and has remained that his punishment was far out of proportion to his misdeeds. Nor do I think the country was well served by his ouster. Europeans were appalled at the treatment meted out to a man they regarded as a strong and able President. They did not understand how it could happen, for what they regarded as the usual tricks of the political trade, and they were deeply unsettled and scared I think by the spectacle. I felt sorry for our Ambassador, a Nixon appointee. It must have been painful for him to endure the long night of Watergate, but he never let it show and carried on with great dignity through it all.

A year later, June 1 and 2, 1975, as my tour was coming to an end, President Ford came to Schloss Klessheim where he met with Egyptian President Sadat for the first time. I have a vivid memory of them standing off in a corner of the great central hall of the castle, talking earnestly by themselves, Sadat puffing professorially, thoughtfully on his pipe. The mood was in striking contrast with the Nixon visit of the year before. President Ford was relaxed and affable, and his mood infused the entire atmosphere. He went off at one point to do some golfing. The senior officials from the Department with whom I had close contact were similarly relaxed and chatted amiably among themselves. Secretary Kissinger never appeared in the basement room where we had set up shop and his top aides gathered. Occasionally he would send for one of them, and the official summoned would go upstairs to see him, return, and be followed by another. Perhaps because we were literally housed in a school room I had the impression that I was watching these very senior officials being summoned like school boys by the Principal. They took it all in good humor.

A half dozen years later I would hear one evening in the Ambassador's Residence in Ankara that Sadat had been assassinated. For making peace with Israel he payed the supreme price. Ten years later an Israeli leader, Rabin, would be assassinated for making peace with the Arabs. Nixon had made peace with the Chinese. Leaders with a vision are so often ill starred. As the old saying goes, a prophet is without honor in his own country.

Q: Kissinger was still Secretary of State?

WHITE: Yes. He was appointed in August 1973. I was transferred from Austria in the summer of 1975.

It had been a very varied three years. On the personal side our second daughter was born in Vienna. Our Ambassador had an opera box. Of course, with his private income he could certainly afford it.

Q: The opera is a very big thing in Vienna.
WHITE: Very big thing, indeed, and we had an awful lot of congressional visits to Vienna, as you could well imagine.

Q: That's surprising.

WHITE: The Ambassador, John Humes, knew how to entertain. He had taken his box at the opera for the whole season. He had program notes with the ambassadorial seal and a synopsis of each opera. One night I sat in the opera box with former Vice President Hubert Humphrey. A lot of celebrities came to Vienna at that time. Of course, there was a lot going on at that time.  

Q: Hubert Humphrey was in pretty bad shape by that time, wasn't he? He had cancer. I think that it was visible by that time.

WHITE: That's not my recollection. He looked very hale and hearty.

Q: By some time in the mid-1970s he seemed to be showing his illness.

WHITE: He was well enough to be there and to go to the opera. His son was with him, if I recall correctly. Was it Hubert Humphrey, Jr.? Well, it was one of his sons.

During intermission at the Vienna Opera House you promenade around between acts. Humphrey was doing that and, of course, ever the politician, he was shaking hands with people who would come up to greet him. He seemed to be enjoying it all, so that night he appeared to be in very good condition. He was very humorous. For some reason I remember that the opera was "La Traviata." Humphrey was joking about the plot with his son in the Ambassador's box.  

We saw a lot of opera in Vienna. The Ambassador had a very interesting system for his opera box. Of course, professional use always came first, to entertain visiting Congressmen and visiting VIPs. The Ambassador's secretary had a system whereby anybody on the Embassy staff could request seats for the opera, including local employees of the Embassy. Every seat in the Ambassador's box was always occupied by someone.  

We traveled a great deal when we were in Austria.  

Q: That's a very efficient use of Ambassadorial time and resources, too, to cultivate relationships.

WHITE: The Ambassador was a lawyer. I would often go with him on his calls. I remember going once with him to call on the Austrian Minister of Trade. We had a trade problem of some sort with Austria. The Ambassador had mastered the brief and carried it off beautifully. He didn't need any assistance from me. He had done his homework and studied the briefing papers. He made it a point to visit every provincial capital in Austria. In every one of them he would host a big reception. He spoke German. I think that when he was growing up, he had a German governess. He was an extremely conspicuous and effective representative of the United States.
I know that there is a tradition of disdain among some of my colleagues about political Ambassadors. However, I have to say that the political Ambassadors that I have served with, and maybe I have been lucky, have brought a dimension to the Foreign Service which, frankly, career Ambassadors often do not have.

Q: I served under two outstanding political Ambassadors. I also served under a couple of very mediocre, career Ambassadors. The best of the political Ambassadors are often better than many career Ambassadors.

WHITE: Well, to jump ahead, when I was in Rome, we had Ambassador Rabb. He was a personal friend of President Reagan. You know, the Italians know how to add and subtract when it comes to calculating who's important and who isn't. They knew that in Ambassador Rabb they had someone who could pick up a telephone and call President Ronald Reagan directly.

Q: Is there anything else that you would want to say about Austria, Al, before we go on?

WHITE: I think that we've pretty well covered the waterfront.

Q: Did you have any particular impression of Kurt Waldheim [former President of Austria and Secretary General of the UN], any insights into his character?

WHITE: Not really. He wasn't on the scene in Vienna in those days.

Q: Was he Secretary General of the UN at that time?

WHITE: I think so.

Q: You didn't have any contact with him?

WHITE: No, I had no dealings with him. He later became President of Austria, but he was not President of Austria when I was in Vienna. The President was Kirschlager, a very fine man.

I should mention that OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] was also headquartered in Vienna. While I was in Vienna, something very important happened.

Q: That's right. This was the period when we were having trouble with oil at the beginning of 1973.

WHITE: When I went to Vienna, OPEC had its headquarters there. The headquarters were in a building which I often passed, right down near the Ringstrasse. But OPEC was not considered any great or terribly important force in the world in 1972.

Q: At the time it wasn't.

WHITE: It wasn't. If you'll remember, war broke out in the Middle East, in the fall of 1973.
Q: Wasn't it in October, 1973?

WHITE: I think you're right. Suddenly, we had an explosion of interest in the whole question of oil. There was an Arab boycott of oil exports to the U.S. and a rapid rise in the price of oil.

Henry Bardach was the Economic Counselor of the Embassy in Vienna. Caroll Brown had served in Vienna as Economic Counselor for one year and was replaced by Henry Bardach in 1973. He and I made many a trip across Vienna to the Austrian Ministry of Energy, because cables regarding oil were flying across the Atlantic. The U.S. Government was trying to line up support for the creation of the International Energy Agency in Paris. You remember those days?

Q: Very well.

WHITE: It was kind of a scary time. All of a sudden, interest in OPEC, which had seemed to be zero in Washington, shot up to the point where we were besieged with phone calls every time that OPEC met. We'd get nervous calls from the Operations Center in the Department asking what had happened. We'd say: "They're meeting behind closed doors." They'd ask: "What's going on?" Well, it's easier to ask that than to get to someone who was attending the meeting.

Within the Embassy staff we had Joe Lill covering OPEC developments. Joe had come from a previous assignment in the Arab world, in Baghdad, I believe. He had a good sense for Arab relationships and had developed very good contacts among the Arab OPEC delegates. He would go down to the Imperial Hotel and sit out there, along with all of the journalists covering OPEC, and wait for bulletins on what was going on in OPEC. So, all of a sudden, OPEC became very important. It seemed that everyone in Washington had developed an intense interest in OPEC.

There also was a very nasty terrorist incident there. Some terrorists came to Vienna and seized up some of the people in OPEC. That got ugly and put Chancellor Kreisky on the spot. I think that he cooked up some deal that allowed the terrorists to leave the country. It was a situation you could second guess if you wanted to. Anyway, Kreisky was the man who had to handle this matter.

In summary, my tour in Vienna was a good three years. Professionally, I was ready to move on.

Q: Did you leave Vienna with something of a heavy heart?

WHITE: We had enjoyed this period of time, but it was time to move on. By that time I had come to a fork in the road and unfortunately you can't just do what Yogi Berra said: "If you come to a fork in the road, take it." You have to make a choice.

JONATHAN DEAN  
Mutual Balance of Force Reduction Negotiations  
Vienna (1972-1981)
Ambassador Jonathan Dean was born in New York City and graduated from Harvard College and Columbia University. He served in the Canadian and United States Army during World War II. His postings abroad included various stations in Germany, Prague, Congo and Vienna. Ambassador Dean was interviewed in 1997 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

DEAN: I came back to Washington where Ken Rush was deputy secretary of State. I asked him if he would help me get assigned to the NATO-Pact force reduction talks that were just getting under way. He did designate me as the official in charge of the preparations for the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I was interested in doing this because I felt this was the military component of ending the Cold War which the Berlin agreement had been the first political part.

Q: You did this from ’72 until when?

DEAN: It was a good idea, but it did not come to fruition in my time. I was involved in MBFR from 1972 to 1981, a long stretch. Most of it was in Vienna itself. The first part of ’72 was taken up with negotiations first among the Washington agencies, then with the NATO countries, and then preparatory talks with the Warsaw Pact in Vienna. The MBFR negotiations proper then got started in the fall of 1972.

Q: In ’72 when you arrived on the scene, what was the status of the MBFR talks?

DEAN: They didn’t exist. We started up an interagency group in Washington, developed a position, and then started to talk inside NATO about what we should do. The talks were encouraged by a statement by Brezhnev in Tbilisi that in this issue of force reductions we “should taste the wine.” That encouraged the Western countries to move ahead. This was the period of the first SALT talks, as you know. The Germans were quite intent that if there was going to be a military detente or any form of disarmament between the United States and Russia on the strategic level, that they too should benefit and that there should be also a conventional force reduction. They were the chief instigators on the NATO side, together with the smaller NATO countries, Netherlands and Belgium. They wanted force reductions and they wanted to be part of detente if it was going to take place.

This was the first NATO alliance negotiation with the Warsaw Pact and it started off rather badly. Donald Rumsfeld was our NATO representative at that time. I went over to NATO to present preliminary Washington views on the Western negotiating position for discussion in the Alliance. We had tentatively agreed with the Russians that we could meet in Vienna. This caused a great furor among the NATO ambassadors, because NATO had decided that the venue of the negotiation should be Geneva. The Soviet Union had proposed that the venue should be Vienna. I personally thought Vienna would be better than Geneva because the Austrian government could do better by us than the Swiss government for these talks. The Austrian chancellor was trying to build up, as he later explained to us, an Austrian involvement in the outside world and prevent provincialism. He went out of his way to be a very constructive host to these negotiations. Anyhow, we tentatively said it could be in Vienna and this caused enormous reaction from the NATO ambassadors. They said this was our first negotiation between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact and that it had been inaugurated by NATO’s defeat over the venue.

Q: What was the theology behind Geneva or Vienna?

DEAN: The theology was that NATO had on the basis of not very serious criteria decided that Geneva was better. Possibly because the SALT talks were moving there, although they had taken place in Vienna earlier. In any case it was NATO’s decision which was being contravened or not carried out by us. I had to go and talk with the ambassadors. Ambassador Spierenberg, the Netherlands ambassador, was very strong on this as was the Belgian ambassador. I had to reassure them that we weren’t going to cave to the Russians and that we would be tough. Maintaining NATO coherence and unity in this first negotiation was an extremely important value, probably higher in the minds of many of the governments, including the U.S. government, than making any progress on these negotiations. We did a fair job, although the Belgians walked out of the talks at one point.

The cohesion issue arose at the very outset. Yuri Kwitzinski, later the Russian ambassador in Bonn and the acting foreign minister at the time of the anti-Gorbachev coup, and a member of the central committee, had been my opposite number in the Berlin talks. When we arrived in Vienna I called Kwitzinski and he said sure let’s get together and we’ll deal with these preliminaries. I said I am part of an alliance here. I am not authorized by them to do this on my own, and as a matter of fact, they have decided that the Netherlands representative should be their intermediary. “Pish” he said, “we don’t want these small guys interfering with us.” This was kind of embarrassing for me, so I finally arranged that both I and the Netherlands ambassador would see him. We used this system of dual intermediaries for quite some time to discuss the preliminaries.

For months in these talks, we were unable to hold a plenary session because of another issue of controversy between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The NATO Council had first decided that Hungary should not be among the countries whose own domestic military forces should be reduced as well as Russian forces and then had reversed itself and said Hungary should be included. The Russians in Hungary were not forces intended for the central front if war broke out. The Hungarians wanted Russian forces there reduced but they couldn’t break ranks with the Soviets. Anyhow, the problem was that, at the outset, NATO and the Pact disagreed over a division of the participants into countries which would reduce their forces and those which were so-called flanks, like Turkey and Norway on our side and Bulgaria on the Russia side. The flanks would not be called on to reduce their forces.

Q: Italy?

DEAN: Italy was an observer. In any case, there was no agreement with the Pact on this issue and on the status of participants, other than those on NATO’s central front. On the first occasion in which we all met under the then Austrian Foreign Minister Kirschschlager (later president), it was really kind of diplomatically ridiculous, objectively ridiculous, the NATO delegates stood and the Warsaw Pact delegates sat. We stood because we had been assigned alphabetical positions and I ended up next to Bulgaria in the German alphabet or whatever they were using.
So we started off with a controversy about the status of Hungary which went on for six months and because we hadn’t agreed what category the delegates should fit into, it prevented us from having a single plenary session of these negotiations. The Belgians who were very strong for progress in these talks, insisted there should be plenary sessions. We insisted there couldn’t be any plenary sessions until we established the status of these countries, these representatives, and whether they were going to reduce their forces or not reduce their forces. We were insisting that Hungary and forces in it should be reduced; Russia said no.

Q: *Obviously, the Hungarian military was of no particular importance in the equation.*

DEAN: That’s true for clear historic reasons, but the Hungarians deeply wanted the Russian forces reduced there.

Q: *Was this a procedure on the part of the Soviets to block the negotiations?*

DEAN: No. Allied intelligence authorities had concluded that the Group of Russian forces in Hungary would not be used on a direct attack on Germany which was the main access of potential attack but in fact had functions in Yugoslavia and northern Italy. For those reasons, the original NATO position had been not to invite Hungary to be a so-called direct participant.

This is going back in time, but in the preliminaries among NATO members, the Turks went to Ken Rush as undersecretary and said they would leave the alliance if they were not permitted to be present at these negotiations. We did not intend to have observers from other NATO countries but we ended up with observers with all of these countries. Italy decided it wanted to be there too. Then they increased their status.

Q: *And Greece if Turkey went in had to be I’m sure.*

DEAN: Greece had to be there, exactly, so it was. We ended up with a more unwieldy group with all countries except France, and these so-called flank participants or special participants exercised enormous influence on the specific day-to-day tactics of the NATO participants. In the case of Italy they were represented by a brilliant Ambassador Cagrati, and by a very good staff of men who later ran the disarmament section of the Italian foreign ministry. They were a distinct thorn in the side of the United States.

Q: *What were they after?*

DEAN: They had a very conservative agenda: no concessions, no mistakes in these talks; maintain Western unity and preferably let’s not have any results out of these negotiations unless the Pact wants to surrender. In any case we ended up with these special participants. They were all massed there at this first session with the Austrian foreign minister and that was when the issue of alphabetical order and what groupings arose.

At the end of six months, I was told by Ray Garthoff, who was then in Political Military Affairs in the State Department, that before the preparatory talks began, Kissinger had made a secret deal with Brezhnev to accept that Hungary would not be a direct participant and the Hungarian
forces and the Soviet forces in Hungary would not be reduced in these negotiations. The whole thing had already been cooked up and nobody had bothered to tell me. Anyhow, the tension of not having formal negotiations was beginning to tell. The Belgian delegation walked out and I had to go as a supplicant to Davignon of the Belgian foreign ministry and beg him to return his delegation. He sent an observer.

Q: One gets the strong feeling that Kissinger was probably more willing to give in than one normally credits him for and also this enjoyment of sort of undercutting the regular diplomatic process. But often there really were principles at stake which he was not that interested in.

DEAN: I think he had a strong feeling of contempt for the regular Foreign Service, at least that was my strong impression from various reports that we made to him, verbal reports. He was a person that placed great weight on establishing the subordination of everybody around him. He made the crudest remarks about Eagleburger, Sonnenfeldt and so forth, at the beginning of these reporting sessions and seemed to demean them ritually as a part of his satisfaction in life. I thought he was personally abominable for this reason. Otherwise I never had any personal complaints.

Anyhow, he had made this deal with Brezhnev and rather typically I think had failed to inform anyone about it because that was one of the real characteristics of his modus operandi was keeping all the details to himself and nobody else would interfere and bureaucracy couldn’t block the deal. That’s what happened in this case. In the case of the Berlin agreement, the back channel operation that he had also with Ken Rush broke down when he was out of the circuit and was not available. I think he was on one of his China missions and the State Department ordered us at the end of the negotiation not to sign the agreement because we had not fulfilled all of the conditions which the State Department desk officer, Jim Sutterlin, had agreed on with the National Security Council on these negotiations. The outcome was okay with Kissinger, it later emerged, but we were ordered not to proceed. Rush told me to inform the State Department that we had already signed the agreement. That was another case in which Kissinger’s failure to maintain contact caused considerable difficulties.

Q: In the first place could you talk about what was the goal of MBFR at the time? What was this supposed to do?

DEAN: The basic purpose was to reduce the very large numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces to a position of equality slightly below the level of the NATO forces. We proposed to lead off with quite a minor reduction of American forces of about 20,000, in return for a reduction of many more Russians. We pursued this goal in vain for over 16 years. I was with it for eight or nine years.

When the successor CFE talks were held, Shevardnadze as the Russian foreign minister stated that the purpose of the talks should be equality at a level lower than the level of the weaker side. He accepted our MBFR objective. Since the Russians then for the first time exchanged data on their forces showing huge Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in the first session of that negotiation, he conceded the point that we had been vainly attempting to get for 16 years in these prior negotiations.
Q: **You were involved in this process at the beginning. Was there a feeling that this was going to go somewhere?**

DEAN: The Germans wanted some progress and I thought it would be good because it was time to do it. Most Western experts were extremely skeptical that the Russians wanted anything. It became quite clear in the course of the talks that the Russian military wanted nothing. Foreign Minister Gromyko seemed to want to move not immoderately. The Foreign Ministry would make small concessions, but they never could break through to the central issue which I’ve already mentioned and that was to bring about an exchange of information on these forces on both sides, their numbers and armaments. We thought this would be a natural beginning for any kind of talk. Of course that would have documented our point that the Warsaw Pact was superior numerically and should be reduced.

We could have taken a different approach. We could have argued that both sides had formations with a certain amount of firepower and tried to equalize that. That approach probably would have made a somewhat better case for the Soviet forces. But we had started out with the idea that both sides should produce the total figures on their manpower and equipment. We did produce ours but they never produced theirs. We even produced some of our own figures on Pact forces in the effort to get a reaction and comment from them.

Q: **We must have had a pretty good fix on what they had, didn’t we?**

DEAN: When the Pact finally produced their data at the beginning of the CFE talks, it was fairly close to what we had indicated we thought they had. However, our figures were based on extrapolation and estimates. We had very little information on specific units. The contested Soviet security had been too effective. But data exchange was a basic question. That, and verification, if reductions were agreed. They wouldn’t give an inch on that either. That too came in with Gorbachev. He permitted the first on-site verification of the Soviet Union at the Stockholm CSCE talks.

Q: **There was the beginning of what was known as the Helsinki Accords at this time too.**

DEAN: That was parallel.

Q: **Because these things became far more important later than I think anybody realized at the time on either side, I was wondering what was the attitude towards them from the people who were negotiating which sounded like much more of the big game effort?**

DEAN: That’s right. For the U.S., the force reductions were the main thing and the administration was not willing to go ahead with Helsinki and “detente,” a word later forbidden by President Ford, unless the Soviets gave us dates for the beginning of the force reduction talks. Brezhnev turned out to be considerably more interested in the Helsinki talks, which in his view were supposed to lead to the political acceptance by Western countries of the legitimacy of the Warsaw Pact governments, than he was in the force reduction talks. Even though he had encouraged Helsinki to begin, I think that was all just part of reestablishing his credibility after
this invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians were more interested in that subject, and the U.S. was more interested in the force reductions, not as a route to doing anything, but in terms of the seriousness of the negotiations.

Q: You keep pointing to something that I think is often lost, how badly the Soviets felt about how their prestige and all had been wounded by the Czech thing rather than this is just an exercise in might and we can do what we want. They felt that they really had to do things elsewhere to make up for that.

DEAN: That’s right. That is how we saw it at the time. But the dominant Soviet motive at Berlin and Helsinki could have been to consolidate the legitimacy of the Pact governments, including the GDR. In fact, I think the Prague invasion was a weighty decision that they didn’t want to have to take. It was just that they felt that, ideologically, continuation of the Dubcek approach would cause the dissolution of the system if they permitted it.

Q: You started this in ’72, and you said you kept with this more or less until ’81?

DEAN: Yes. I was first in charge of the interagency talks here in the State Department, then of the preparatory talks in Vienna, and then the negotiations proper took place. Stanley Resor was designated as the head of the delegation and I was his deputy and remained that until ‘78 when I became the head.

WILLIAM N. HARBEN
Mutual and Balanced Reduction Negotiations
Vienna (1973-1974)

William N. Harben was born in New York in 1922. He graduated from Princeton University and joined the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in Germany, Colombia, Rwanda, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, Mexico, Cambodia, and Washington, DC. This excerpt is from his personal memoir.

HARBEN: The "Mutual Balanced Reduction of Troops and Armaments in Central Europe and Associated Measures" was the subject of talks which began in Vienna in 1973 after a prior discussion of the subjects covered. As frequently happened in negotiations with the Russians, disparities in translation, usually deliberate on the Russian side, affected the course of the talks. The title of the talks in Russian was "Vzaimnoye Sokrashchenie Voysk i Vooruzheniye v Tsentral'noy Yevrope i s nim Snoshennye Mery". The two little underlined words meant "with it," i.e. reduction, and were omitted from the English version. When the NATO side attempted to discuss large-scale maneuvers of armies close to the borders of contiguous states - a method of intimidation used by the Russians against Romania - the Russians replied that they were authorized to discuss only measures associated with reduction, not maneuvers. The NATO side made its presentation anyway. Agreement was, in any case, as unlikely on the subject of reduction as on the subject of maneuvers.
I cite it only as an example of the sacrifice of precision in language in order to achieve an agreement which looks well in headline just before an election, but which contains linguistic loopholes rendering it useless. The most flagrant instance was the Nuclear Test Ban Agreement, the crucial clause of which reads differently in English than in the equally valid Russian. The Russian version prohibits only those tests which result in fallout, whereas the English version prohibits any test which contaminates the environment. The Russians maintained a testing ground on the island of Novaya Zemlya, where ground and sea water were contaminated. The meaningless of Mr. Kissinger's Paris Accords on Cambodia has already been noted.

Such negotiations had a value beyond the possible achievement of agreement on the subject of the talks, however. By maintaining contact with the Russian colossus at as many points as possible, its twitches and sensitivities noted at one or more of such points of contact might give advance warning of the intentions of Moscow. In the case of MBFR NATO faced the problem of growing popular pressure for unilateral reduction of armaments. This section of public opinion was soothed for a while by the hope for corresponding Russian reductions through negotiation. The frequent contact of so many Russian officials and their KGB "watchers" with so many Western diplomats abroad must also have had the effect of dispelling some of the suspicion and ideological suspicion of the Russian "establishment."

Shortly after the beginning of the talks I could see that there was no possibility of an actual agreement to reduce forces. This was indicated by two small words in the Russian proposal for a token reduction of 5-10% as an evidence of good faith: "including firepower." Alarmed by the rapid development of defensive weapons which might soon negate their immense superiority in tanks and aircraft, the Russians hoped to freeze this development. It appeared to be a halfhearted hope. The Russian military seemed to view the talks with disgust, and sent only an alcoholic colonel as its representative.

In one private conversation a Russian delegate pointed out, with disarming frankness, that the populations of Russian-occupied Eastern Europe might think that the millennium had arrived if they saw Russian troops packing up to go home. A repetition of the events of 1956 in Hungary or 1953 in Berlin might result. This view was mentioned also in a column by Times correspondent Sulzberger, who, however did not cite a source.

For whatever reasons, however, the task assigned to negotiators is to negotiate in good faith, and the NATO MBFR delegations, the U.S. in particular, assiduously explored every possible angle.

The hints by Russian intelligence sources that even a partial withdrawal might set a match to the Eastern European powder keg seemed to assume that NATO would be just as alarmed by such a prospect as they. After all, in the case of the Berlin uprising of 1953, the Hungarian-Russian war of 1956 and the Prague events of 1968 the West could only stand by and watch, its impotence revealed for all to see.

This little episode also seemed to reveal the tight compartmentation of Russian decision-making. While it was clear to me that there would be no agreement, it might not have been so clear to some sectors of the Russian foreign affairs establishment. We now know that Brezhnev was hardly more than a vegetable at that time. No one could be sure what mad instructions might
reach the Russian delegation. So some Russian intelligence people probably feared that some sort of agreement might be possible. The Russian representative Khlestov had slyly proposed a "token" reduction. Some people apparently feared that NATO might just accept it.

As I have noted above, the Pentagon seemed to take the talks seriously, and fretted about the loss of barracks and officers' clubs.

In the midst of the talks a Vienna newspaper published an expose of a Russian plan to use Vienna as a staging point for an invasion of Yugoslavia. The KGB agents, masquerading as "Croatian partisans" would leave Vienna in ambulances full of arms, allegedly to seize power in Yugoslavia. The Russians would then invade to suppress "fascism." The source was a Czech general who had defected with a satchel full of plans in 1968. Khlestov took time to denounce this "plant" as a scheme to sabotage the talks. It seems inconceivable that the CIA was responsible - they had people on the U.S. delegation. Was it possibly Khlestov's own worried intelligence people? At any rate the delegations shrugged off this flea bite and continued as before.

The impossibility of obtaining from the Russians accurate figures on their troops and arms in Central Europe proved the greatest problem. Even if the Soviet Government had desired to present us with the true figures, I doubted that its negotiators would do so, since it was punishable by death under Article 58 of the Penal Code and many had been shot in the 30's for acts authorized by the Soviet Government.

The French, moreover, viewed MBFR as still another bit of American foolishness and would have nothing to do with it. Nor would they provide any information on their troops and arms on German soil, which included tactical nuclear weapons capable of causing immense losses to Russian forces attempting to cross the Rhine. Since the Russian goal was a race to Gibraltar to preclude the establishment of a NATO redoubt in Spain, the absence of France from the Hofburg negotiating table robbed MBFR of any interest it might have had for the Russian marshals.

Despite the stagnation of the talks it was deemed necessary to conceal the fact from the press. Although there was little work to do, the U.S. delegation was maintained at its initial strength. Meetings at the Hofburg, at first twice a week, at which each side made a presentation, were changed so that only one side made a presentation at each meeting. Later the frequency was reduced to one per week.

Press awareness of the stagnation might have resulted in ignorant charges of lack of zeal on the part of the NATO side (and nothing could be further from the truth) and popular pressure for concessions to the Russians which would increase the danger of war.

My role was limited to following the "Warsaw Pact" (i.e., Russian) position by maintaining a loose-leaf book containing excerpts from the Russian statements on every conceivable aspect of the talks and to translate, along with a young British diplomat, each Russian presentation. The latter involved the compilation of a glossary of the special terminology which had developed in the course of the talks so as to ensure accuracy and general agreement between both sides as to the meaning.
There were some interesting details which I observed during the talks. On several occasions the Russian chief delegate, Oleg Khlestov, whom I had known in Moscow, decided to respond immediately to some new NATO approach. He first scribbled his response on a slip of paper, gave it to a subordinate, who carried it to the East German representative for his approval.

On another occasion Khlestov made a statement praising the Soviet Union for ending racial and religious animosity. This had absolutely nothing to do with the talks, and I realized that Khlestov was of Jewish origin and felt the need to demonstrate publicly his loyalty. His son was also in the diplomatic service.

Russian discipline on contacts was everywhere evident. At a reception I ran into Smolin, with whom I had had frequent friendly contact in Moscow. He cut me dead in Vienna. In my hotel two young women - secretaries on the Russian delegation - sat at my breakfast table. When they realized I was an American, they froze, and I never saw them again.

When I went to the British Embassy to collaborate on the translation with Richards, the British "Sovietologist," I was "tailed" when I left [as I had been in Bangkok during my infrequent visits there]. Typical Russian surveillance people. I assume that in Vienna they were trying to observe my contact with members of their delegation.

The talks dragged on for another fourteen years and the Russian Empire collapsed before any agreement could be reached. I retired in February of 1975.

S. DOUGLAS MARTIN
Director, East-West Trade Center
Vienna (1973-1976)

S. Douglas Martin was born in New York in 1926. During 1945-1945 he served overseas in the US Army, upon returning he received his bachelor’s from St John's University in 1949 and later received his law degree from Columbia University in 1952. His career included positions in Germany, Washington D. C., Yugoslavia, Poland, Laos, Austria, Turkey, Nigeria, and Cameroon. Mr. Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 1999.

MARTIN: I stayed there until 1973. I was transferred to Vienna, 1973 to ‘76. In Vienna I was the director of the East-West Trade Center. This was the time of detente, and up until then (and I had done that kind of work when I was in Zagreb and in other places too) we were doing export controls, trying to prevent trade with the East. Now there was a switch. We were trying to promote trade with the East. Trade centers were big with the Department of Commerce, and they were coming up with the idea that there should be more State participation. They shouldn’t be exclusively Department of Commerce operated trade centers doing catalogue shows and strictly trade promotion. There should be some State control over it.
In Moscow it was exclusively State, but in Vienna it was supposed to be a joint effort. My deputy was a Civil Service guy who had been in the Department of Commerce. He was Danish but spoke German and had spent his life doing shows, putting on exhibits, and he would travel in the East, because the Communist countries were big on trade fairs. We would have exhibits at these trade fairs, and he would go a couple of weeks earlier to set it up. We had something called a modular system, which you could put on the back of a truck and go and assemble it and have an exhibit. He was good at that, and in Vienna he set up a system of information and trade promotion to help American companies that wanted to do business with the East. They were encouraged to come to us.

I had a fellow doing market research on different countries. You can’t do market research in the East, but he had a system by which he developed a judgment as to what he believed the market would be by figuring what American exports to the OECD were and that if we had 10 per cent share of the OECD market, we should have a 10 per cent share of the market in Eastern Europe and Moscow. He did a whole lot of stuff on that and came up with a whole lot of information and judgments about what the market for, say, refrigerators would be in Hungary. Some people thought it was kind of silly, but he could produce a lot of paper saying that we have a market for widgets in Russia or the Soviet Union, with $12,432,000.15. The guy couldn’t realize that that’s a nonsense number. You can come up with something that’s ballpark, but the way he did it, he would come up with a precise number, and then he would stick with it.

I stayed there for three years. My wife’s mother was born in Vienna. Her family owned a villa, which was about five blocks away from where we lived in the 13th District, which is Issing, the classical residential district in Vienna, equivalent to the 16th arrondissement in Paris. If you didn’t live right down by the Hofburg, the 13th was where to live. Most Americans lived in the 18th or 19th Districts, which was where the American School was. People didn’t want to live in the 13th District, although the ambassador lived there and we had one other villa there. We had basically two apartments, because nobody wanted to live in the downstairs. There was a basement apartment and a first-floor apartment, and so we had, really, two apartments. We could have people in. The furniture was classical furniture that had come from the embassy in Paris. It was really a great setup.

My children went to school in Vienna. My wife used to drive them. The nuns at that school were some of the same nuns my wife had had when she went to the Sacred Heart School in Budapest as a girl. During the time of persecution in Hungary these nuns were told to go back to their houses, they were not nuns any more. But the Vatican somehow was able to negotiate and get them all out to Vienna where they reconstituted the group. Since the number of nuns was declining, even then, most of the nuns in these various schools were Hungarian.

My wife used to work in the study hall as a volunteer teaching the kids English and math (because my wife has a degree in chemistry, and she’s very good in math). They don’t have the same church and state situation that we have. Even though they’re nuns, These teachers are all licensed under Austrian law. It was very much Hungarian nuns, and they liked my wife, because she was Hungarian. There was an opening for a teacher doing what my wife did as a volunteer in the study hall. The nun in charge of the school said, “There’s an opening. Why don’t you go down and apply for that job?” And she said, “But they’re complaining that there are too many
Hungarians here.” “Don’t tell them you’re Hungarian.” Well, my wife went down and applied, and the man was very polite to her and listened to her and accepted her as qualified and approved her to be a teacher in the Austrian schools. And then he escorted her to the door to say goodbye, and he said, “Mrs. Martin, you’re really Hungarian, aren’t you?” He knew.

A lot of my ideas of how women should be treated in this country come from Austria. They have a shortage of people there very often. When the economy is booming, they allow refugees and immigrants to come in. When the economy turns down, they try to get rid of them. But one of the things, they do is try to get women out of the families into the workforce. Here you have to have 40 quarters of employment to qualify for Social Security; there a housewife, while she’s a housewife, qualifies for Social Security. I think we should have that here, and all the family allowances they have there.

Q: In the East-West Trade Center, did you have much contact with the East?

MARTIN: I traveled all the way to the East and the East was very interested in us. We were right next door to the office of a Russian delegation to international organizations. Right across the park, a few blocks away, was the Russian embassy, and it was headed by somebody who was a member of the Central Committee in Moscow. All their key ambassadors, generally speaking, including the guy who was here, Dobrynin, were members of the Central Committee and so was this guy. The Russians from the Soviet Union, officials, would come in. Let’s say we had a catalogue show for three weeks. They’d have a guy come in every day for three weeks and copy stuff out of our catalogues. They were using it as an information database. I had this guy from the Department of Commerce. He had a secretary, and then we had people who were in the Commercial Section. We had two of them working for me; the one from the Department of Commerce, the market research guy I spoke of, worked for me, too.

I had a secretary. It was always hard to find secretaries because the educational system in Vienna trains people in languages, but not in typing. Or they train people in typing but not in languages. To find somebody who knew English and who could type was not very easy. I had to fire somebody who just couldn’t type a letter. It would take her all day hunting and pecking like this to do one letter. I got another secretary who was very nice but she wasn’t there too long. I got a call to see the security officer. He said, “You know, that person working for you. I didn’t want to believe it when I first saw it, so I had it checked out again.” He said, “But there’s no doubt. She’s an Israeli spy.” So we had to get rid of her. I said - you know, she’s a very nice person, middle aged lady, Catholic, married to a Jewish guy. She was going on leave in about two weeks, “I’ll wait until then.” He said okay. When she was going on vacation, I said, I want to see you before you go on vacation after work today. She came in to see me. Everybody had gone home. I said, “You know, I like you very much, and I want you to know that we appreciate all the work you’ve done for us. People like you here.” She looked kind of glad. I said, “That’s what makes it very difficult for me to tell you what I have to tell you. We’re going to have to let you go. I can’t tell you specifically why because I don’t know specifically why, but I’ve been told that we can’t retain you as an employee here.” She cried, and then she left. She knew what I was saying. She did not argue with me. She knew why she couldn’t work there. She was a middle-aged woman, past the age of having a baby. She came in some time later after she had gone and said, “You know, I told people that I had a baby and gave it up for adoption while I was away, and that’s
why I had to stay away.”

We had about 50 American companies come to us, and I described our relationship with the East and gave them pointers. We also were getting after the people in the embassies in the East that they should be promoting trade more actively, because this was the time of detente. Our ambassador was great, John P. Humes. Whenever they mentioned him in the paper, they’d always add that he had contributed $100,000 to the Nixon campaign when he was in the primaries. It was true, but he was also a very good ambassador in that he realized that what he could do would be promote trade and representation. He never got too much into the political. The political reporting from Vienna wasn’t all that interesting to him.

Cardinal Mindszenty left Hungary at that time and went to Rome, but I guess he didn’t want to stay in Rome, or maybe they didn’t want him to stay either, so he came back to Vienna. He had been in effect a prisoner in the American embassy in Budapest, and here he was right next door to us, because what had been the consular academy was our embassy in Vienna and it was right across the street from the university, and right next to it was something called the Pazmaneum, which was a residence college for Hungarian priests studying at the University of Vienna at one time. We didn’t really have contact with him, and he died a couple of years later. He was operated on for a prostate problem, and then I guess he threw a clot and died the next day.

I traveled around Austria, and I went to Moscow twice. I went to all the countries. At the mission in West Berlin was a guy named Felix Bloch.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: And Felix Bloch came down to Vienna a couple of times, and something interesting happened. I kid with people or I say some outrageously things at times. The two of us were walking on Karntnerstrasse, and he went in and bought these brandy snifters at this famous place where they sell glass and crystal in Vienna. These were gigantic brandy snifters, he bought a dozen of them. I said, “Hey, Felix, what are you doing? You can’t afford that.” I couldn’t afford to buy them. He looked at me in a strange way, kind of shocked. But I was just talking, and I didn’t say anything to anybody. Later on they said they traced him back to the ‘70’s, and I’m sure he must have been doing something when he came through there.

Q: We’re talking about Felix Bloch who was later deputy chief of mission in Vienna and was accused - he still hasn’t been convicted - -and dismissed from the Service for being paid by the Soviets.

MARTIN: Right. I knew Felix quite well, and the two of us went to the Leipzig fair. I spent three days with him that time, so I knew Felix quite well. He was a close friend of Henry Bardach, who was the chief of the Economic Section there. And he used to stay with Henry when he came to Vienna. When the thing broke, Henry is not the kind of person you want in a firefight on your side. I said to him, “Hey, Henry, your friend Felix Bloch’s in trouble.” He said, “Your friend, your friend.”

Q: Well, to give Henry due credit, he landed in a glider on D-Day.-
MARTIN: By mistake. He landed a glider on D-Day because he didn’t volunteer to be a paratrooper, and they said, “You guys that didn’t volunteer to be paratroopers, you’re going to be in the gliders.”

**HALVOR C. EKERN**

**Mutual and Balanced Reduction Negotiations**

Vienna (1974)

_Halvor C. Ekern was born in Montana in 1917. He served in the U.S. Army from 1941-1947. Mr. Ekern entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Austria, Iceland, Sierra Leone, Germany, and Washington, DC. Mr. Ekern was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992._

_Q: Then you move from there to Vienna. What were you doing there?_

EKERN: The negotiation of the so-called Mutual and Balanced Reduction. Actually it stemmed from the Mansfield Resolution in the seventies to withdraw our forces from Germany. There was tremendous pressure. Since I knew the Senator very well, (he was my professor in college), I would make trips to Washington to reason with him and he came there at least once. But he was adamant. He wasn't going to change. It came within one vote in the Senate. So the State Department said, "All right, we will reduce but together." Well that was pretty smart because it kept it going for another fifteen years.

Jonathan Dean was the spark plug there and the meetings were in Vienna. I had come home to retire, but Dean said I had to go with him to Vienna and open the talks. I stayed for the first year and then retired.

The Treaty was finally signed last year.

_Q: Did you feel you were going through almost a political charade in order to keep from unilaterally withdrawing, or did you think something could be done?_

EKERN: I think both. I really think Jock Dean, Stan Risner [ph] was the leader of the delegation, hoped that someday it would come to something. But for the moment the thing was, I believe, to keep our forces from being removed. I think State was absolutely right on that. Had we moved our forces out, we would have a different picture today.

_Q: Did you get any feeling how the Soviets were approaching this at this time?_

EKERN: Well, I had dinner with them every other night. It was my impression that they were told not to give the thing away, but keep talking, which they did. We made very little progress during the time I was there, but we kept talking and hammering away. It took 15 years or so, but they finally got a treaty.
Q: So it does show that diplomacy is not necessarily full of great leaps forward but often a steady, hard slogging process and keeping lines of communication open.

EKERN: Yes. One does have to be prepared for a lot of tedium at times. Anybody who wants to rush in and find a quick solution really shouldn't be in the Foreign Service.

Q: Did you find that you were getting conflicting instructions from the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the State Department, etc.? Was it hard to tell where your master was?

EKERN: Not too much because we would come back and meet with the NSC, the State Department and the Defense Department. They would bang heads here in Washington until there was some kind of consensus and then you had, of course, to sell it to the Allies. You couldn't change your position vis-a-vis the British without going back home and go through the process all over again. There were differences, yes, but we usually hammered them out.

Q: But there weren't tremendously different divergences on this?

EKERN: The ISA and the State Department always had hard times together. Sometimes they didn't speak. So there were problems. This probably held us back, too, with our Allies. But they were smart, they sensed what was going on. They knew darn well what the trouble was. They would be patient.

Q: Well, then you retired. When was that?

EKERN: I retired in 1974 and became involved in Northern Virginia politics. Then I went to work for a think tank over here, as so many people do. I did that for about eight years.

PHILIP S. KAPLAN
Political Counselor
Vienna, Austria (1974-1975)

Philip Kaplan was born in New Briton, Connecticut in 1937. He graduated from the University of Connecticut (B.A., 1959) and the University of California (J.D., 1962). Mr. Kaplan entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Since 1989 Mr. Kaplan has served as Deputy U.S. Representative to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Prior to this, he served in the following positions at the Department of State: as a senior intelligence officer, 1987 - 1989; Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Manila, 1985 - 1987; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, 1981 - 1985; director of multilateral policy at the Bureau of International Organizations, 1979 - 1980; and as a member of the policy planning staff, 1975 - 1979. In addition, Mr. Kaplan has served on the U.S. delegation to the East-West negotiations on mutual
and balanced force reductions in Vienna, Austria, 1974 - 1975; as political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, 1970 - 1974; and as an economic officer at the U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels, Belgium, 1968 - 1970. Mr. Kaplan entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Mr. Kaplan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2014.

Q: OK. Today is April the 9th, 2014, with Ambassador Phil Kaplan. And let's start at the -- Jock Dean got you, not completely willingly, to go to Vienna --

KAPLAN: Right.

Q: -- rather than the delights of Washington. And you were in Vienna from when-to-when?

KAPLAN: I went there in 1974 through 1975.

Q: OK, what was your job?

KAPLAN: Well, there was a negotiation called Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, MBFR, with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact on one side, and NATO on the other.

Q: And what were you doing with it?

KAPLAN: Well, I was the political counselor there. Jock Dean was the DCM and a gentleman named Stanley Resor was the ambassador. He was a friend of President Ford. He’d been secretary of the army and went to Yale with Cyrus Vance and Gerald Ford. Our political section was responsible for the working level negotiations and contact work with the other 22 delegations, all the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. It was a bit of a circus.

Q: OK, so let's -- where did these negotiations stand when you got there?

KAPLAN: Well, they were barely standing (laughs). They began with preparatory talks to define a mandate. The key focus on the NATO side was on Germany because most of our forces were deployed there and the Bundeswehr was one of the larger forces in Europe. Britain obviously had its own armed forces, but the British Army on the Rhine, the BAOR, was not as big as the Bundeswehr as a whole. Moreover, the main prize in the Cold War was going to be whether the Americans or the Soviets would have the main influence with the West Germany, the Federal Republic.

Q: Well, looking at this just from the outside, I mean the Soviets had such a huge preponderance, I would think, in troop levels compared to the NATO side that it would be very hard to get them to cut -- think about even coming back. Why?

KAPLAN: Well, you’re absolutely right, Stuart. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies had a preponderance, if my memory serves me, of somewhere between 200,000 to 250,000 conventional forces over the U.S. and NATO in the area of reductions, which was in Central Europe. Of course the core of Central Europe was Germany.
Our position was that we wanted to bring about what we called a common ceiling, that is to say that both sides could have no more than the same number of forces on both sides. Obviously there were a lot of sub-issues and complex characteristics to all of this. But that was the core of our position, and we negotiated this at great length. I had not the slightest doubt that the NATO consultations were leaking to the Soviets and they had a very good idea of what we were going to be coming in with. I got to Vienna after the preparatory talks concluded, fairly near the start of the negotiations. Our people were confident that, having done elaborate NATO pre-consultations and observing that the Soviets weren’t showing much knowledge of the subject, that we were way ahead of them. That of course was self-deception.

When the negotiations began, the head of the legal division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry arrived as lead negotiator. Oleg Khlestov was a cheerful fellow, he was always smiling and grinning all the time, and he was just as smart as can be. He had developed their own position with full knowledge of what we were coming in with. He never budged one inch from it in the entire course of the MBFR negotiations. Basically their position was, just as you surmised, that we would take equal quantitative reductions, which would retain and legitimize by treaty their conventional force advantages. There were other issues such as collateral constraints, you could only move your forces in certain ways, and regional questions -- you could only keep certain percentage of your forces in central Europe, and but you couldn’t just move them across the border of the area of reductions, from where you later could get them back right away. It was a highly complex technical negotiation. It was like negotiating the Internal Revenue code.

Q: Well, I mean what was -- OK, you’ve just arrived. But you’ve been involved with -- I mean you knew the issues and all that.

KAPLAN: Yes, I’d been working on the details for some time.

Q: So what was your thought, I mean when you discovered that OK, the Soviets have got a strong position and they’re not going to move, I mean that must have become rather apparent.

KAPLAN: It was very apparent. I went in 1974 to Vienna, which is of course a delightful city; there was the opera, and I like classical music, and the Vienna Philharmonic, and wonderful restaurants and a beautiful city.

Q: Lots of spies.

KAPLAN: Right out of Graham Greene. And I told my wife that when we arrived there, “This city looks like a beautiful woman who had lost some of her cosmetics.” It looked like the capital of an empire, which it had not been since the end of the Habsburg Empire in 1919. Now it didn’t have any power anymore. It was, in the German phrase, the “Gastgeber,” the host. That’s what they did, like the Swiss.

Q: Yeah.

KAPLAN: They offered hospitality, they performed that function superbly. But they didn’t have
any particular authority or power of their own.

**Q:** I mean looking at -- still, it’s going into a poker game where you realize that the other guy has got all the aces and you’ve got all the threes or something.

**KAPLAN:** Well, it wasn’t quite that simple. Yes, you’re right, they had a quantitative advantage and no incentive to give it up. We wanted asymmetrical reductions, for the them to reduce far more than us, and we knew that was quite a challenge. So when I arrived I told my friend Jack Dean, “There’s no point in driving our people crazy. This is not going to happen for a long time.” I said, “I don’t think we’re going to get this result for 20 years.” My wife reminded me of that the other night. And sure enough, it’s exactly what happened. But we’ll get to that later. “So therefore, I think that we should do our job in a very professional way, but show not the slightest hint that we’re the demandeur or we were anxious or eager or in some urgent way to get an agreement.”

In fact, there was a very famous private exchange at the time between President Nixon and Prime Minister Ted Heath of Britain. Heath came to the White House, we found out later on, and said to Nixon, “I’m a little worried about this MBFR. There’s no way we can get a good result for the West. And so my question to you, Mr. President, is it your purpose to travel or to arrive?”

supposedly laughed and said, “Of course it’s only to travel. There’ll be no arrivals.”

But Jock Dean made clear to me that he was there to arrive. So we will work.” He had this system in Bonn, when we served together, that the staff at the embassy could only take off a holiday when it was both a German and American holiday, which came down to pretty much Easter and Christmas. If it was a German holiday you’d work, if it was an American holiday you’d work. They had to both come together. It was in his DNA and work ethic that you worked all the time and you just kept pressing, pressing, pressing, and maybe there’d be an opening and you’d get through. I had a lot of admiration for that philosophy, but it seemed to me that in the context of Vienna, we were just going to bang our heads up against the wall. Not only that, remember, it was only a few years since the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

**Q:** That’s ’68, yeah.

**KAPLAN:** ’68. I just didn’t think the circumstances were propitious for the kind of progress he had in mind. But you see, we had just come through détente and Ostpolitik negotiations with Brandt, we had racked up these extraordinary successes. There was nothing like it again until 1989. There was the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement, there was the Moscow Treaty. There were the German agreements with the Czechs and the Hungarians and the Pole. There was the Inner-German Agreement. There Nixon’s SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Agreement. It just went on and on. Nothing had been like it for a long, long time. So he saw this MBFR as the crown jewel. This was going to be, in his mind, the de facto World War II Peace Treaty, delayed all those years because of the Cold War. Well, you know, I’ll tell you Stu, it happened. But it happened in 1989, not on his watch.

**Q:** But, but on a treaty like this did you need the underpinnings of Jock Dean and you and others
that your efforts in order to get it, or were you basically looking back on it -- this was a stalling operation?

KAPLAN: He didn’t think for a minute that it was a stalling operation. He was totally serious. And so was Ambassador Resor. I was there to support him. I was a small fry compared to the two of them. But we were making an effort to make this happen. I never hesitated to tell them that this wasn’t going to happen in this time frame, that it should happen, but the conditions weren’t right to secure a good result at that time.

Q: Well, what was the attitude of the Soviets? Maybe not at the top, but at your level where you were dealing with -- I mean were they kind of snickering, or?

KAPLAN: Oh no, there, they were, they were quite professional. They had a line of march and they just kept going. There was a fellow named Vladimir Shustov, an immensely capable, talented, and charming man. His mother was an opera singer in Moscow. He was a disarmament expert, and he believed in it. But he was also a Soviet apparatchik, and he stuck by the positions.

Q: Yeah.

KAPLAN: We became friends and when Resor and Dean, and/or Khlestov wanted to explore what was possible on a particular tactical issue, the two of us would get together and then each of us would report back. There was one really amusing incident where, you know, these -- the meetings were taking place in the Hofburg Palace. I looked like --

Q: Did you waltz?

KAPLAN: Well, it looked like a movie set of a European palace. And there were these tapestries, extraordinary tapestries all around the walls, and an immense chamber with the 23 nations. Delegations would sit together. At least at the outset it was dramatic to be in that chamber, participating and meeting the professionals working on national security issues from across the continent, from both alliances. The European neutrals were not in the room but they were coming around to find out what was going on. On one particular occasion Shustov and I, having heard the formal statements delivered by our ambassadors over and over, decided mischievously that he would write the American statement and I would write the Soviet statement, and not tell our bosses. (laughs).

Q: (laughs)

KAPLAN: That’s what happened. Resor reviewed Shustov’s statement and made a couple of minor edits. Khlestov just put a check on the top of my draft, and that was it.

Q: Oh God. Well, how about the others first on the NATO side? What were some of the react -- I mean were the other people on board, or were they also saying what the hell’s this all about, or?

KAPLAN: Well, there were several strands, there were human beings who had different points of view, but their governments all had a pretty good fix on what this was about. We were there to
try to lend some sense of continuity to the détente process. And if it were possible for us somehow to bring the Soviets around to the idea of an equal outcome, then that would be a good thing. But there were also those who distrusted anything the Soviets said, and others who were scared to death that there could be any result because it could only be a bad result. We encountered all of those.

The key countries in our side were the British, the French, and the Germans. On the other side, it was the Soviets. The others were basically taking orders from the Soviets. Occasionally some big-wig would come in from Moscow, senior military officer or political person, and he would meet with the Warsaw Pact Caucus. I had contacts among the East European delegates and they would often come to my house directly from the Warsaw Pact Caucus and tell me what was said. There were people who were there representing their countries and whose wives were kept back in the capitals so they wouldn’t get any funny ideas of, of taking off. There was a GDR ambassador who I had contacts with, and he was pretty careful. But occasionally he’d open up. So at a human level it was interesting. These people might be under instructions, they might mimic every word that the Soviets said, but they were still people and when you got to know them you’d pick up things that you wouldn’t find by reading Pravda and Izvestia.

Q: Were you seeing any differences between the countries, the Warsaw Pact countries and their allegiance to the Soviet Union?

KAPLAN: Sure. There probably wasn’t a one of them who was loyal to the Soviets. These were people who were obviously carefully selected to come out there. There was a Bulgarian ambassador who was almost a total lackey, but most of the rest of them in one way or another were professionals. They were selected in part because they knew the subject matter, but probably in much larger part because they could be counted upon to tow the line.

Q: Well, did we have any card to play -- you know, saying all right, we’ve got this discrepancy in forces, but we can do this and something that would make it interesting for the Soviet side to say well, maybe there’s something there?

KAPLAN: The president did not believe a good result was possible at least in that time frame. And therefore he and Heath and the others were not encouraging clever ideas. The issue came up in a different way, which was from the standpoint of defense policy, the strategic equation, more along the lines that we have this asymmetrical disadvantage in personnel (army soldiers, airmen and the navy were excluded), and therefore, the question was what do we do to try to counterbalance that. That all goes back to Kissinger’s book, The Necessity of Choice, where he advocated the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons along the Fulda Gap and right along the borders. That was the equalizer. If it were only strategic nuclear weapons then the credibility that we would use then against a conventional attack, well, no one would ever know for sure whether we’d do it. But although tactical nuclear weapons were extraordinarily destructive, it would be something that might be able to be used if the circumstances truly warranted it.

So we were here in the middle of a disarmament negotiation, we didn’t think we’d succeed at that time, even though the leader of my delegation, the de facto leader, was determined to do it at all costs, although very professionally and he wasn’t about to cut a bad deal. He was still hoping
it would be able to build on his remarkable triumphs in Bonn. From the standpoint of the Pentagon, they regarded TacNucs as the balancing card -- and Kissinger I think shared that view.

Q: Well, did you find, as we were developing our position and all, that the representatives of our Armed Forces were digging their heels in and not giving you much flexibility?

KAPLAN: Actually, curious thing occurred. We went back during the recess to get instructions. At that stage I did not have all that much standing, but on one occasion Dean took me back with him. We went to the Pentagon and we met with Secretary Laird, Mel Laird. Then he -- Jock went off to meet with the Joint Chiefs and he asked me to meet with a couple of DOD civilian deputy assistant secretaries. When I arrived, they were sitting around a table, and then they said, “Great news. We think the Mansfield amendment will pass.” And I couldn’t believe my ears, because the Mansfield Amendment, as you will remember, would have mandated withdrawal of a substantial number of U.S. forces from Europe. The amendment was proposed by Senator Mike Mansfield, of Montana, the majority leader of the Senate, a Democrat who later became ambassador to Japan, a very smart fellow. But I thought he was completely wrong on this issue. We already had this asymmetry, that would not have exactly helped our leverage in the negotiations. And these guys in the Pentagon were saying, “Great, we think it’s going to pass.”

I said to myself, “This is the Pentagon. It’s going to be their armies that are going to be reduced. Why wouldn’t they be totally against it?” Fortunately it was not American policy. It didn’t come up in our meeting with Secretary Laird.

Q: No.

KAPLAN: But it certainly had resonance in the Pentagon. And it was more that these two guys at the table who felt that view.

Q: Oh boy. Well --

KAPLAN: Be careful what you wish for.

Q: Yes.

KAPLAN: (laughs)

Q: Well, I mean did you have a hard -- I mean obviously you’re busy. OK, you’re busy. What are you doing?

KAPLAN: All right, let me give you the basic drill. We would meet two or three times a week with the NATO Caucus, to consult, to make sure that everybody was on board with the positions, to wordsmith the statements that were going to be present; the various delegations reported on their bilateral contacts with Soviet or East European delegations, or on any other intelligence that had been picked up. Second, once a week we’d get together formally at the Hofburg and present statements. The American and Soviet didn’t read off these statements every week; it was the Dane or the Norwegian or the Italian or whatever, various member of the alliance. The same
thing happened on the other side, with the Czechs or the Poles rather than the Russians reading off the statements. Third was bilateral contacts, informal exchanges over lunch or otherwise, with the Soviet ambassador or his colleagues or the representatives of other Eastern European countries. So there was plenty to do -- the only limitation was time.

Q: Of our allies, did you feel there were any that really wanted something out of this, or, or were they nervous that anything that happened would mean less American support?

KAPLAN: I think you’ve got it right. They were -- MBFR was seen by most of them, and by most of us, and by the White House more importantly, as a way to defeat the Mansfield Amendment and keep the troops in Europe. I got in the car once when I was in Bonn, and I went with Ambassador Hillenbrand, a superb career diplomat who knew Germany cold.

Q: He was our ambassador to Germany.

KAPLAN: He was our ambassador to Germany. When he first arrived he went for a meeting with Egon Bahr, the key advisor to Brandt. And he came back and he picked up a dictionary, a German-American dictionary. I said, “Sir, why are you doing that? Your German is flawless.”

He said, “Well, I think I found -- I think I caught Bahr in a grammatical error in German.” He wasn’t joking; he said this in all seriousness. Anyway, we went up to the so-called Harthöhö, which was where the Defense Ministry was in Bonn for a meeting with Helmut Schmidt, who at that point was the defense minister; he later became chancellor after Brandt departed in the Gunter Guillaume affair.

In the car, I explained to Hillenbrand, who had many other things to worry about, the common ceiling, that both sides would end up if this worked at 700,000 forces, personnel each in the central projection area. And he said, “Let me see if I understand this. You call that the common ceiling. But it isn’t it the common floor?”

I said, “Bingo, Ambassador. You’ve got it right on.”

You know, he had not studied this, but he was such a clever fellow and got it right away. In other words, our purpose was not so much to have a common ceiling, although we wanted that, so that the Soviets could not go over -- and the Warsaw Pact could not go over that ceiling. It was aimed more at ourselves that we and our allies would not go below 700,000. And we would then go to Congress and say, “Senators, look, we have an international agreement that says 700,000 is the minimum that we can keep in Europe,” and that was the objective of it. And it remained the objective when we did the follow-up CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) negotiations many years later.

Q: Well, so you do this, you’re working very hard, and you were there two years about?

KAPLAN: I was there one year.

Q: On year.
KAPLAN: Because I concluded that this could not succeed in that time frame. And about halfway through the year I got a call from a fellow named Reginald Bartholomew who invited me to come back to Washington to work for the policy planning staff, the office George Kennan established in 1947 at the direction of Dean Acheson and George Marshall. At the time I joined the staff it was chaired by Winston Lord who was one of the closest associates of Henry Kissinger, who was then secretary of state. I was going to be the guy working on Europe, and I thought for a minute, “I’m going to give advice to Henry Kissinger about Europe? That’s a joke.” But upon reflection I thought it would be a fantastic opportunity and the MBFR negotiation was going nowhere, and so I agreed.

That’s what led me back to Washington. We had had six years before Vienna in Europe on my first two assignments, nice places, but my son was in junior high school and he’d never been an American school!

Q: Yeah.

KAPLAN: And so I said, “The time has come.” And as I explained earlier, my friend Mr. Dean decided that the time had not quite come yet (laughs). And so when I got this offer from the secretary’s office I told Reg Bartholomew there might be a problem. He said, “Don’t worry about it.”

About 20 minutes later I got a call from John Burns, who was the director general of the Foreign Service. He said, “Your assignment is done,” (laughs). I never had to argue with my bosses at all. It was done.

JONATHAN B. RICKERT
Staff Assistant, US Delegation to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
Vienna, Austria (1974-1976)

Jonathan Rickert was born and raised in Washington, DC and educated at Princeton and Yale Universities. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1963, serving tours in both Washington and abroad. His foreign posts include London, Moscow, Port au Spain, Sofia and Bucharest, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission. In his Washington assignments Mr. Rickert dealt primarily with Eastern and Central European Affairs. Mr. Rickert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

RICKERT: We went on home-leave, and while I was on home-leave I was contacted by personnel about the possibility of going off to Vienna to MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions] as sort of a staff assistant. To the MBFR delegation, Stan Resor a political appointee, former Secretary of the Army, was the U.S. rep. John Dean was the de facto DCM who made MBFR the latter part of his career. The opening occurred because the incumbent resigned from the Foreign Service, which to me, less than totally diplomatic, might have been a
clue to me as to what was waiting. It was a good place geographically. It was dealing with East-West issues, which I was interested in, so I happily accepted the assignment and went to Vienna. The U.S. delegation there was a strange bird. It was made up of people from a number of different agencies including several different parts of the Defense Department, plus State. There was a PAO [Public Affairs Office] operation. I would guess about two-thirds of the people on the delegation were TDYers [Temporary Duty]. The negotiations took place in sessions in three months or what have you, depending on when Easter, Christmas and summer vacation fell. Then the TDYers would go home. Those of us who were assigned permanently would mostly stay on. So it was unlike any other diplomatic organization that I ever had anything to do with.

Q: It was a big operation?

RICKERT: It was a big operation. As I mentioned, I was called Secretary of the Delegation, which meant that we had weekly meetings and sometimes more often, of the ad hoc group which was the NATO representatives, some of them ... a couple had separate delegations, most of them had their bi-lateral ambassador. The Danes were going to have a separate delegation for MBFR. They would meet at least once a week. There would be punnaries with the “other side.” What the U.S. would do would be scripted at these ad hoc group meetings where the U.S. was very much not in control, but took the lead. Anyone reading or hearing this who knows John Dean will know that they were dealing with a whirlwind of activity and creativity and tactical guile and everything else. He was a hard man to keep up with.

I performed normal staff assistant duties and had thrilling tasks like making up the duty roster, which may be one of the popular or unpopular people in the mission depending on how the duty fell. I did a lot of xeroxing, a lot of carrying of these documents. We would take the talking points over in advance of the ad hoc group meetings so that a small representation from the NATO secretariat there would look after them and distribute them. I spent a lot of time in cars going back and forth. The one good thing that came out of it was that I had a little bit of high school and college German but was not at all fluent in the language. I used those long trips back and forth in Vienna to work on my very bad German and make it somewhat less bad and the drivers were more than happy to accommodate me. As time went on, I was able to pick up the really routine and boring tasks that nobody else wanted to do. By the time I left after two years, I assumed a fairly large portfolio of very routine reporting, but it didn’t make life more interesting than it would have been otherwise.

Q: Were you the note-taker and the minute-writer for some of these meetings?

RICKERT: I did some of that. In addition to the ad hoc group meetings, there were what were called “informals,” which were also highly scripted meetings between essentially the U.S. and the Soviets but on the U.S. side, on the NATO side, there would be two other NATO members, perhaps the Canadian and the ____ or something like that. And on the Soviet side it might be a Romanian and then a ____. The ad hoc group approved the talking points that were used for those meetings. So, it was very much a scripted event. John Dean personally composed the initial draft of much of that. One of the tasks that I had, was to take after the meeting – Dean would do a reporting cable which was routinely 20 to 30 pages long. I often wondered ... his hope was that it would be so long that nobody would read it and he would get things through that might not get
through otherwise. One of the ways we did this cable, he dictated much of it. No note taker would go to these meetings of the Informals. He would have ten pages of talking points, double-spaced and he gave them to me and he said, “Put them in indirect discourse.” So I had to change the tenses on all the verbs so that they can then go in to the cable: “He said that ...” and so forth. Which wasn’t really challenging, but it was one of the things I did.

Q: Were these talking points in the various formats _________ actually handed over or were they actually talked?

RICKERT: No, they were talked. Now, since I was never at the meetings with the “other sides,” it was called. I don’t know what exactly happened, but they were for oral use. I suppose that there were some non-papers exchanged in the course of this because ... Non-paper, I’m a great believer in non-papers. I think it’s a wonderful way to make sure the exact words get to the people who need to have them with complete deniability should it ever be necessary to do so. I’ve never seen a case where it’s been necessary but I made extensive use of non-papers in Romania when I went back as DCM. I’m assuming that this was done but I don’t know from personal experience.

Q: Is it fair to say, looking back on this period in the mid-‘70s that the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks were serving a purpose? A larger purpose and there was lots of detail and perhaps it helped understanding between the two sides of what was going on but it didn’t amount to much?

RICKERT: Oh, I think you’re being generous. [laugh] I wasn’t privy to all the ins and outs. I know that there were prolonged – or I understood that they were prolonged – by both sides in order to avoid facing certain other issues that would be inescapable, had the talks not been on going and had both sides not been able to point to them and say, “We don’t need to deal with this because we’re talking about force reduction in central Europe at Vienna.” There was a lot of play-acting on both sides, but as an optimistic person, I tend to look at the brighter side. One thing, in those days, whenever you’re talking with your opponents in a constructive way, even when you’re not making progress, I can’t see that as entirely a lost effort. This is all the return on the investment, but a lot of people from Eastern Europe, including the Soviets, were exposed to what we wanted and why we wanted it and why we thought it was justified, and they weren’t getting it filtered through Prov Eresdetaire or Abel Agescodelo or some other party paper. That was good. It was an intense atmosphere because, in a way, as it was in Bucharest, as you got to know your diplomatic colleagues very well as in ways that you might not have in many other posts, these were often up and coming people. They’re arms control experts from the different countries, they’re people who ended up in prominent positions later even when they were relatively junior in the Warsaw Pact delegations at the time. I think that U.S. and the Soviet Union were in the process of figuring out how to make a long term relationship work, even when the agreement wasn’t possible. In that sense, I think that MBFR talks contributed positively to that. Although I used to comment on if anyone were really serious about getting a result out of these delegations, they should have been held in Godthab, Greenland rather than Vienna, because in Greenland, there would be a quick agreement or we would have gone all home. Vienna was like being in heaven for many of the Eastern Europeans, and they had zero incentive to get the negotiations over, successfully or otherwise.
Q: It wasn’t so bad for the Americans and the British?

RICKERT: We didn’t suffer so much either. But for the Eastern Europeans, many of them, it was their only chance to spend an extended time in a Western environment and for Americans, Brits and Germans they had other chances.

Q: ... still talking about your assignment to Vienna, to the MBFR U.S. delegation from 1974 to ‘76. You were telling an anecdote, or story.

RICKERT: Yes, about Hubert Humphrey. One year, Gerd – my wife – and I were invited to the marine ball. One of the marine guards in Vienna had been with us in Romania on a previous tour and was kind enough to invite us. As it turned out, Senator Hubert Humphrey was in town at the time of the ball and was invited to attend and was the guest of honor. A very nervous marine gunnery sergeant had the task of introducing him, which he did extremely well, except he introduced him as the former president of the United States and there was a gasp and titters, but Humphrey, I don’t remember exactly how he did it, but he defused that with such grace and such humanity and such kindness that what could have been a great embarrassment for the gunny ended up being a plus. He complimented the gunny on his perspicacity and said, “You and my mother are the only two people who really saw it as it should have been,” or something along those lines. It was very nice; he put the pressure on himself and took it off the gunny, which I thought showed great humanity.

Another thing out of Vienna that was a sideline, but very enjoyable for me, was ... I was called back to Bucharest twice on TDYs because they had a shortage in the consular section. I was a Romanian-speaking consular officer an hour and a half away, so I went back for a week one time and two weeks another time, which was a great pleasure. The second time, as a bonus for having done the consular work, I was allowed to stay for the visit of President Ford, which was the first time I’d ever seen a president, and it was a fascinating experience. Ford had just come from Helsinki, where he had signed the Helsinki accords. I wasn’t involved much in the substance of his visit, but I got very much involved in the logistics and was an event officer for a stop at the military academy. I got to see the whole machinery of presidential visits. Henry Kissinger was there, and they went off to Sinaia, which is the summer palace of the former royal family, which is one of the architectural delights and curiosities of Romania: late 19th century Bavarian palace, a big castle, in the tradition of Mad King Ludwig of Bavaria. Of course the Romanian royal family was German, and it was recreated there and the Carpathians took right in.

I also learned to ski while we were in Vienna, which was a great delight. Another minor Romanian connection was all three consular FSNs came to Vienna during the time that I was there. One by one they were let out for “hoped up trainings” ... it was a little benefit that we had for them. One of them, who was single, asked my wife if she should defect while she was out, which was one that my wife very carefully sidestepped. There was obviously a strong temptation not to go back. The woman did eventually go back, married the Pan-Am rep, and now is living in Connecticut. The other two came out, and it was a delight to see them outside of their Romanian environment and to be able to do something for them. Each one we took to a concert or the opera or a ballet or something and took them out to dinner and did things with them, which was a great
Towards the end of my tour there, I would have ended up being three years doing the same thing, which was too much of a good thing. We love Vienna, it’s a delightful place to live. Gerd, my wife, had gotten herself a job at UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] as a secretary, and was very happy with her work. But we both agreed it was time to move on, so I asked to curtail. I was told that I couldn’t curtail unless I was willing to accept to go someplace where there was a service need and I asked where that might be and was told that there was a shortage of labor officers. If I would agree to undergo labor training, which meant the terrible suffering of a year at Harvard at that time, then go to some place unknown, personnel could curtail my tour. So I did accept that offer. Harvard sounded wonderful, and I wasn’t going to worry about what happened beyond that. So we left after two years.

GEORGE A. ANDERSON
Political Officer/Labor Attaché
Vienna (1974-1979)

Mr. Anderson was born in Nebraska and raised in Iowa. He was educated at the University of Missouri and the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. He also pursued studies in Brussels, Belgium. Entering the Foreign Service in 1957 Mr. Anderson had several assignments at the State Department in Washington, DC. His foreign posts include Copenhagen, Oslo, Saigon, Brussels and Vienna. During his career, Mr. Anderson became an expert in labor affairs, serving as Labor Officer and Labor Attaché at a number of these posts. He was interviewed by Don Kienzle in 1996.

Q: If it comes back, we can add it. Shall we move then to Austria, your next assignment. This would have been 1974?

ANDERSON: Yes, 1974 I moved to Austria. There I followed, I don’t remember who. Who was the labor attaché in Austria? Sullivan had been there and had gone on.

Q: Paul Bergman.

ANDERSON: Paul Bergman; I followed him, right. That was a very nice move, because it was the first time I was in a position to take my family down and see where we were going to live, and where they were going to move to, and size up the situation before I went. Moving just from Brussels to there was a very easy task. The object of my going there was primarily, at that time it had been common for the person, Bergman did not, but Sullivan had gone from there to become Consul General in Bremen. I went there with the idea that I would be two years, and then Frank Trinkat, who was political counselor, would be leaving in two years, and I could move into his job. That’s what other people had done. Because I was told by no other than Margaret Joy Tibbetts, that at some point you got to get out of the labor-attaché field if you want to stay in the Foreign Service. She felt strongly that that was kind of a dead end, and that I should get into pure
political work.

Q: Why don’t we cover that later, after the assignment?

ANDERSON: I looked forward to being there for two years, and then maybe being a political counselor for two, and then maybe moving on to consul general-ship or some DCM job in some little country, you know, some kind of reward you are supposed to get after that. But career-wise a lot of things happened then. We ran into the Suit over age 60, and that put us stymieing on all, everybody leaving the Foreign Service, remember?

Q: That was a Class Action Suit that said in effect that people could not be mandatorily retired at 60?

ANDERSON: Yes. So I ended up doing five years in the country, and Frank Trinkat stayed for four of them. I wasn’t going to stay there any longer then I had to then, because I wanted to get at least out of Vienna, and the job above never opened up; so I was labor attaché in effect for five years there.

Q: That was what, a two- or three-person Political section?

ANDERSON: Just two people in Political section, just Frank and I. I ran through three ambassadors, and I think four DCMs, and that is terrible situation for a Foreign Service officer to be in. It was kind of a constant education program going on. Not with the first one; obviously, he knew more about the country than I when I got there. That was Portner Humes. John Portner Humes. But then, I think, Wiley Buchanan came, Milton Wolf was next, then came new DCMs, three of them. One went through there rather quickly, for some reasons that are probably best left undiscussed here. I just stayed there as a labor attaché and political officer. That was the smallest Political section I was ever in, and I think the big problem that we had there was that as the second man, everything that Trinkat didn’t want to do, that went to me. I pointed out to another inspector that I had within one sixty-day period, I received 22 requests for full blown studies of something or else. You can’t do that. You have to develop an entirely different system. The trade unions were very settled there. Benya was President of the Federation of Trade Unions, Chernitz was President of the Lower House, and, I think, he was also President of The Council of Europe. Kreisky was Chancellor.

Just before I arrived the Traiskirchen incident had happened, where they raided the train of the Jewish émigrés. They had all that, and terrorism was a big item. One of the things I got involved in, because Trinkat was not particularly interested in it, and Chernitz was big in... Well, if you know anything about the Jewish people that are Austrians, most of them got out before the war. Because after Hitler takeover they took off, and they went primarily to two or three areas. They went to England or they went to the U.S., some went to Sweden. They came back then after the war, and there was a bifurcation there too between the Fabian socialists out of England, the more radical socialists in the labor movement and the political, labor, social democratic party, SPU, and those who were in the U.S. and Sweden, who were more pragmatic social democrats. Kreisky being among those, Chernitz being on the other side, Benya being not Jewish at all, but there was always this problem. Then they had the Jewish émigrés coming out, and it was a big
question for the U.S. and for our embassy. That got handed off to me from the political point of view. I dealt with almost all these people in Political.

Q: Did the Jewish émigrés come form Eastern Europe?

ANDERSON: From Eastern Europe. That became my problem along with Ray White. He handled the counselor aspects of it, and I handled political aspects of it. The labor movement was very settled there. The government was in solid, Kreisky ran everything all the time I was there; it was a unified movement and there was so many things to do that as a labor attaché you were really overwhelmed, as a second man in a two-man section. You are servicing so many different agencies in the U.S., the welfare, the health, labor department, you’ll even get things from veterans’ affairs. They are all interested in other countries are doing and consequently you get these circulars that go out to all the missions. And, like I said, in one sixty-day period I got 22 requests for full-blown studies.

Q: Did you have staff that could have helped you?

ANDERSON: I had a labor assistant, I had one guy who did some translation work because if you don’t have somebody doing press summaries, you can’t expect people to sit there and wade through the local press and understand what’s going on. So I’m dealing by now with my fifth language. I am a triple commanded language specialist, and I found out after I learned all these languages that it correlates inversely with your promotions in the Foreign Service. You are better to get into an area and stay there. I should have stayed in Scandinavia. Or I should have gotten into German area or the Latin America where you only have to learn one language and Portuguese once in a while. In other words, I had too small a staff to do everything, and we couldn’t possibly keep up with all these things. And these just came in constantly. So every week I would sort out what I thought were really important ones, and I’d put them on in inverse order and I would start at the top, and we would work on as many as we could, and we’d say, “Yes we can do this, and we can’t do that.” After about three months, if it was left in there and nobody had questioned me -- you throw it out, into the files, and forget about it. Because there was no way you could answer everything that’s requested of you. So you are constantly kept hopping with things that are in demand that are being placed upon you, without the resources to handle them, in these small posts. Labor attachés in small posts are really put upon.

Q: They get quite a variety of things, don’t they?

ANDERSON: In any other post, like Germany, they would go to all kinds of specialists. I mean they even have a veterans’ guy in Bonn, and they have an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guy there; you get pawned all this stuff off on you in the small post where there is no one to help you. It was again a very stable situation.

The highlight of the time was certainly the Jewish emigration situation, from Eastern Europe. When I went there my very thing was to go over and beat on the desks in the Foreign Ministry and tell them that they should give these émigrés a chance to go where they want to, because right then, up until the Traiskirchen incident, the trans-center had been run by the Israeli secret service. And they landed there, come out by train, and the next day they were in Israel. This
displeased many of the orthodox Jews in the U.S., and the people coming out of Russia at this time were not Zionists by and large. They were apostate Jews, and there were all kinds of semi-pogroms that had been launched against the Jews and they were coming out. But they were by and large well educated people; they were engineers, and dentists, and doctors, and lawyers and things like that. An awful lot of them wanted to go to the U.S., but they found themselves down there, and this was getting back to the Jewish communities in the U.S.; so my very first job was to go over and tell them they ought to be allowed and get some choice. And Kreisky assured us that they were going to get some choice now that they were running it. And, indeed, they did. Within the next two or three years, the worm turned, and 96% of them coming out wanted to go to the U.S. Nobody wanted to go to Israel. Immediately the pressure started to go over and work out some system and make sure that Israel got their share of the people. It was a delicate situation, because there were four basic Jewish organizations in the U.S., two on one side of the issue, two on the other. One more or less in favor of letting them...

Q: Which ones...?

ANDERSON: Well, there was B’nai B’rith, Jewish Defense League, Jewish American League -- JAL, one of those? Three or four different organizations, anyway. The government got very unhappy here, the Congress, because it became a political football immediately, with pressures from both sides. Some wanting to more or less railroad them into Israel as fast as you can, and the others who wanted to give them a choice. Then the Congress decided that they were going to cut off the funds for anybody who wasn’t going to Israel. Then Kreisky got high on his horse. He wasn’t ready to, Austria wasn’t ready to accept responsibility for this. And they didn’t have the funds to pay for all of this either. Because in those days they came out, and the Austrians asked them, “Were do you want to go?” And they said, “We are going to the U.S.” or Canada or some place. Then they went over to the Tolstoy Foundation. If they didn’t, they went to Traiskirchen, and then the Israelis picked them up and sent them back to Israel that way. They stayed there, in pensions, and eventually went to a holding station down in Rome, and then on to wherever to they were going, the U.S. and so forth. Then they started pushing around for where they were going to send these people. Kreisky just put his foot down. He wasn’t ready to give on it. They were going to be given a choice, and he wasn’t going to be involved any more. Then they started looking around for some other country to do it. But no other country would accept it either.

Fortunately at that point we got Milton Wolf over there, who was himself an orthodox Jew from Shaker Heights, and that area of Cleveland, and he came over there as an orthodox Jew, expecting more or less that he would more or less become a part of the local Jewish community. Shortly after he arrived, Chernitz came to me, asked me out for lunch, and he said, “I have a very delicate problem to discuss with you. Your new ambassador is very welcome in the Jewish community here, but he has a passion for wanting to know how we managed to survive the war, what happened to us during the war.” Approximately a third of the 15,000 Jews in Austria at that time had survived in situ, that was within the Third Reich, including Simon Wiesenthal. A third of them had immigrated to the U.S., and a third went to Sweden or Britain.

Q: And none of them went to Israel?

ANDERSON: I don’t know how many went on to Israel. Chancellor Kreisky’s brother, for
example, and nephew were in Israel. So was Mrs. Kreisky. She is Swedish-Jewish. And some of her relatives were also in Israel. And Kreisky explained to me; of course, I had studied European history and knew a lot about history of Eastern Europe and of the pogroms and of the anti-Semitism within the old empire and within Austria and the other countries, and the land exchanges and stuff. Milton Wolf was really rather uninformed about this, surprisingly, when he came there. But anyway, he said that this was very embarrassing within the Jewish community. That a veil had been drawn across the past and that nobody discussed this. And it was causing a lot of ill will within the Jewish community. So I went home, back to the embassy. I went to Frank Trinkat and told him, and I said, “Somebody’s got to talk to the ambassador about this because this could cause problems for him.” He wouldn’t do it, for reasons I didn’t quite understand. I went to Frank Meehan, I think, and Frank Meehan said, “No.” He wasn’t going to mention it to him. And I said, “Somebody has got to tell the ambassador!”

Q: What was Frank, the DCM?

ANDERSON: He was the DCM. And he said, “You may, if you wish, George.” That’s what Frank told me. So I made an appointment, went across to his secretary over there, and said, “I would like to talk to the ambassador if I may, I have something very personal that I want to talk about.” He said, “Come on in.” I went in, sat down and explained this. And he was so thankful. Yes, he said, he was collaring all these people, “Where were you during the war? How did you manage to survive?” Well you know how Germans ran that during the war. They put Jews in charge of other Jews, and they had to select who was transported and who wasn’t. In this kind of a situation it is almost an “every-man-for-himself” kind of situation. And he didn’t know any of this. He knew very little about the history of German and Russian Jewry, where they came from in the U.S., and why and what times, why they came through the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He didn’t even realize that Poland had been truncated, that East Germany had been truncated. So he just asked me, “Sit down and tell me all that stuff.” So I got in very close with the ambassador. I wrote all of his messages on this area. But he really was open to education it this field. So with him directly, that’s why I ended up handling it all the rest of the time.

And there were apparently some sensitivities in the Embassy at that time, because of Buck Borg’s departure, that I was unaware of. So there may have been valid reasons for everybody else not wanting to touch a situation like this. But Milton Wolf and I were very close. We discussed these matters at the time. And because he was a businessman and I had businesses in the U.S. that I was developing on the side, my farming and agricultural implements business in Iowa, we had a wave-length and things that we talked about. He was Mr. Coffee. He made millions on coffee. Just a very, very charming person, he and his wife both. But I worked very closely with him and that’s how I got into that and dealt with it constantly.

It only came up one time in the labor context, and that was when Lane Kirkland came to visit. With his wife, who was from Czechoslovakia. She was a twin, she survived Auschwitz, went to Israel and then emigrated to the U.S. He came for an eight-day visit, in which Benya was his host. It was a great visit. We had a marvelous time. But, one of the very last days that we were there, Kreisky asked to see them. I took them over to call on Kreisky. This is probably the most difficult situation that I ever got in, in my life. Because Kreisky wanted to talk to them about the situation in Israel. And he felt that because of the cache that the American trade union movement
has with Israel, and the U.S. has, that the American labor movement should be taking more of a leading role in getting the Israelis to see the light. That they were living in the sea of Arabs and that you had to make some kind of accommodation. And that this problem that they were having with, he felt that the intransigence of the Israelis, according to Kreisky, it’s all written up some place in a dispatch. Lane was going to become head of the movement, he was just coming. Kreisky felt that Lane and the American labor movement should really take the lead in trying to bring the Israelis to come around a bit, to recognize that they have to be more flexible.

Q: Kreisky felt the American labor movement should persuade the Israelis? I can imagine how that one went over....

ANDERSON: It did not go over very well, and it even went over less well with Mrs. And they really got into a set-to. I guess it’s not too early to talk about this, because I think it’s rather important. She said she didn’t think anyone had the right to speak for Israel. And he said, “I quite agree with you, but I have a brother there, I lost nephews in the war, my wife has lost nephews in the war.” Although he was an apostate Jew himself and was non-believer, he still felt that somebody had to say this. That the future of Israel was not going to be decided by some rabbi sitting out on a kibbutz with his finger in the Old Testament saying, “But it says here this belongs to us.” That’s what he said. And she told me later that it was all she could do to keep her from walking out. I mean it would have been a real incident had she done that. It was scheduled for 15 minutes, it went on for 45. I was never so happy to get out of any place in my life. I went back and talked to the ambassador and explained it to him. Lane and his wife went on their way. But it was a very delicate situation.

Q: Was that Ambassador Wolf at that time?

ANDERSON: I believe it was Ambassador Wolf who was there. That situation with regard to the immigration of Russian Jews out of Soviet Union was a continuing problem all the time. Kreisky eventually stood his ground and said, “No, it will be done our way, people will be given a choice; I don’t care if you cut off the money, we will not pick it up.” The word got back. The guy who was the head of B’nai B’rith at the time I believe was from Atlanta. Very nice guy. These four agencies were all over. Eileberg came with Ms. Vinsky and Holtzman on a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) there. They ran over that. The whole CODEL was more or less devoted to working out that situation, and Kreisky just dug in his heels, and they couldn’t find anybody else to do it, so they continued to provide the money. After I left there I never paid a bit more attention, of course, to that problem, but it certainly occupied an awful lot of my time. Because Wolf was personally interested in that, and Congress was up to their ears in it. Then the things went very well. I took a ten-men group on a month tour in 1979; it was a bunch of labor people. I took them around the U.S. for 30 days, had to fight the State Department’s Visitors Bureau Operation tooth and nail, because I wanted to get them in... They had them in “the usual” things, you know.

Q: Was that on IVP?

ANDERSON: Yes, the IVP, International Visitors Program. We were going to all the major cities, and they did throw in San Francisco and Chicago, and New York and Washington, of
course, and New Orleans. But I wanted to get them to a city of Germanic background about the size of Vienna.

Q: Milwaukee maybe?

ANDERSON: Milwaukee. That’s exactly where I wanted to take them. And they said, “Well, if you want to take them there, you have to arrange it.” So I called the National Laboratory CIO (NLCIO) Council directly, said I want to bring this group there, we’re going to spend four days there, over the weekend and two days on either side. I think we were there Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday. I wanted these people to really see Milwaukee, I wanted to try to get them into a home; and they went off on the weekend, individually, to homes of Austrian immigrants, who had immigrated from Austria, that could speak German with them and everything, went to all those good German restaurants up there, like Maize and all these up there. That was the highlight of the trip. They really enjoyed it. And it was a city about a million population. It relates a lot more to the Viennese problems. Besides it was a Polish city and a German city and they understand that, because there is a lot of Polish and Eastern European ethnic influences in Austria yet today. It was a place they could really relax. They learned more about the U.S. and the opportunities and the people from talking, in their homes. They had a ball. They were interviewed on local stations. Pewaukee, and places I have never heard of.

Q: Where is Pewaukee?

ANDERSON: Some little town on the side there. But they were all out in these little towns. They didn’t go to homes in Milwaukee, they went to homes out in small towns around Milwaukee rural areas. That was a very interesting time. In those days, you can imagine how many... Kissinger came, Ford came, everybody came. They were constantly holding one thing or another in Vienna. The nice thing was they were also making movies. They made “Holocaust”, and they made “Little Night Music”, and they made “Steiger”; Elizabeth Taylor was part of our community. It was a kind of an eclectic group of Americans there at that time. Charming city. Difficult first year, and I think I could have stayed there the rest of my life and been happy. I was just back for a week now in November, saw my old assistant, and so forth. Had a grand time there. My wife taught...

Q: Was that your labor assistant?

ANDERSON: Yes, my labor assistant. She is retired now. Reli Langer. My wife taught all five years that we were there. My two kids graduated from high school there, and the other one finished 10th grade and was really ready for college at that time. The school was superb. I was sounded out, after I had been there about a year, if I wanted to follow Francis Shesenick in Bremen. But I went up and looked at the school and talked to her, my kids were just blossoming. I had two at Yale and two more at least were going to graduate there, and the fifth one was there, and middle school kids don’t always do as well as the first; they were just blossoming. My wife was teaching, and we loved it so well we just decided to stay there. And we would forego that. I was looking forward to becoming political counselor. But, of course, the 60 age thing came on, and so nobody moved, they just blocked up the whole Foreign Service for years. So Frank Trinkat stayed there four years after I got there, so there was no place to move. When I turned
that one down nothing else really came up. So I just stayed there. By that time I had already made up my mind that I was going to leave as soon as I could, at age 50. So that would be my last post abroad. I stayed another year, and Woody Romein came as political counselor then the last year I was there.

But with all those visits you could imagine the amount of time we spent on that. The most famous, or infamous one was Carter’s. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II signing ceremony, for which I handled all the administrative side in Brussels. Handling the Secretariat, and where they were going to be, and what they were going to do. We had staff meetings.

I can remember the first presidential visits I did. We sent two or three advance people; two from the White House, two from us, and they took care of the whole thing. One Secret Service man, and that was it. By the time Kissinger arrived, you had whole plane-loads of people there. He had over 40, I believe, just Secret Service people with him. They were looking behind tapestries, it was... I suppose maybe it is necessary, some of this, but in the five years that I lived in Vienna the entryway was reworked for security reason five times.

I will tell you, though, that I had a bomb placed under my car there. And we had four others. I was the duty officer the day that happened, one Sunday morning. Somebody walking by the embassy saw an embassy WD4 vehicle there, or 5, whichever one was ours, the other one was Canada’s. They saw some wires, and they went down to police station and they came back; there was a gasoline bomb under it. It was a Sunday morning, 6:30 when the marine guard called me. I had one duty car sitting out in front of my house. He called me and I said, “I’d better check my own.” Indeed, it had wires on it too. What to do? By that time we were so security-conscious that we were not allowed to have telephone books. They were classified documents, we weren’t supposed to take them home. What I did was I told the Marine, I will call the people that I know. Because I had other, I had a school book and various other things I could use. You start calling people and you tell them that we have found bombs under WD5 embassy vehicles, and they’ll want to be very careful. Because it was Sunday morning, they would be going to the mass, church or something like this. Tell them to call other people, everybody they know and continue to call other people until everybody says that they’ve heard or they know no more people. So we started a Round Robin, and there were four of them bombed, with bombs under them. Plus the Canadian’s ambassador’s vehicle, who is around the block from me, a block away. Fortunately he got a call from somebody or heard of it and checked his vehicle. It makes you a believer.

CLARKE N. ELLIS
Economic/Commercial Officer
Vienna (1975-1977)

Clarke N. Ellis was born in Boston, Massachusetts. He graduated from the University of Redlands in Salzburg, Austria, and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. After entering the Foreign Service in 1962, his postings abroad included Munich, Naples, Asmara, Vienna, Zurich and Taipei. Mr. Ellis was interviewed in 1998 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.
Q: In 1975, where did you go?

ELLIS: I went to Vienna as an economic officer in the economic-commercial section. It was still a unified economic-commercial section.

Q: You were doing that from 1975 to when?

ELLIS: I was there until 1977.

Q: What was the political-economic status of Austria at that particular point?

ELLIS: Austria was in that time frame still considered a turntable for East-West trade. There was representation by both sides in the Cold War there. It was a time when Vienna was trying to play an East-West role still quite extensively. My main responsibilities were macroeconomic reporting and, then, helping in the negotiation of a customs cooperation agreement.

Q: What did a customs cooperation agreement consist of?

ELLIS: Well, it meant that there would be cooperation between the two customs services in terms of investigations. There had been some problems from time to time of U.S. Customs investigating cases in Austria and running afoul of the Austrian authorities. This was to regularize the situation so that they could carry out their investigations.

Q: Was there much trade with Austria either way?

ELLIS: I can’t recall any major problems in the trade area that came up. There may have been some problems in steel. The Austrians were very advanced in steel. There was a controversy on whether the Austrians should build a nuclear power plant at the time. They got a good way along and then decided they wouldn’t.

Q: Were you involved at all in promoting trade?

ELLIS: There was a commercial officer. It was all part of the economic-commercial section but that was not my primary area of responsibility.

Q: Who was our ambassador at the time?

ELLIS: It was Wiley Buchanan, the former chief of protocol, a political appointee.

Q: How did you find him as an ambassador?

ELLIS: He was a very decent person, very friendly, low key. On most of the substantive matters he relied a good deal on the DCM.
Susan Klingaman was born in Albany, New York in 1937. She attended Oberlin College. She then received a Fulbright Scholarship and went to Germany. She then attended the Fletcher School in 1960 and entered the Foreign Service in 1963. She held her first post in Dusseldorf, Germany and later served in the Philippines, the INR, and Denmark. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: Well then you left there in what, ’75?

KLINGAMAN: September of ’75. I could have stayed in Bonn two more years and I debated whether or not I would do so. But I was given an opportunity to take the job as Austrian and Swiss desk officer. The job opened up unexpectedly and it was in the office of Central European Affairs (EUR/CE) in the Department, the office that included East and West Germany as well as Austria and Switzerland. The director was David Anderson. I welcomed the opportunity to (a) have a desk officer job, and (b) work again with David Anderson. So I accepted that job.

Q: Great.

KLINGAMAN: I was the desk officer for Austria and Switzerland in the Office of Central European Affairs from September of ’75 to June of ’77.

Q: What was David Anderson there?

KLINGAMAN: EUR/CE was the initial of the office. David Anderson was the country director. There was a deputy director. And there were at that time three officers working on West Germany, one officer working on Berlin, one on East Germany and myself working on Austria and Switzerland.

Q: ’75 to ’77. Let’s take Austria first. Were there any particular issues dealing with Austria in that time?

KLINGAMAN: Not many. Actually about 90 percent of my time was spent on Switzerland curiously enough. But there were a few issues involving Austria. One was a trade issue that was of importance to the Austrians. We had imposed quotas on Austria’s specialty steels so that involved some back and forth with other agencies. As I recall I think we were able to work out something that satisfied the Austrian concerns.

The major event that I remember involving Austria was the visit to Washington of Chancellor Kreisky who was quite a figure on the international scene. He was trying to make the most of Austrian neutrality, “an active neutrality”, he said. For example, he was trying to be a mediator on Middle East issues. At that time Austria was also trying to persuade more international
organizations and agencies to set up offices in Vienna; Austria wanted to make Vienna “a third UN city” along with New York and Geneva. Kreisky came to Washington and I was in charge of coordinating his visit.

Q: What was your impression of Kreisky?

KLINGAMAN: Very favorable. He was a very dynamic man. I remember him as a very friendly and down to earth person. I was invited to a very small dinner party at the Austrian ambassador’s when he was here. I have very fond memories of that evening because I sat at the end of the table where Kreisky was seated. On the other side of the table was Katharine Graham of the Washington Post. I think this was in the fall of ’76. Kreisky spent quite a bit of time talking to me. He was very interested in the fact that I was a female diplomat. He said he felt that Austria should have more women in its diplomatic service. I’m not at all sure right now whether they had any at all at that time. He just struck me as a very personable, genuine person. Katharine Graham struck me the same way. She was very down to earth, very interesting.

Q: She is the publisher of the Washington Post.

KLINGAMAN: Yes, of course, and she has just written her memoirs. I have read a portion of her memoirs but not the whole thing. I heard her interviewed on National Public Radio about a year ago after her book came out. It struck me first of all because I had met her on that evening, but secondly she was talking about the women’s issue during the ‘60s and ‘70s and how bemused in a way she had been by it, wondering where she fit into it all. That is in fact the portion of the book that I recently read.

Although Katharine Graham is at least ten, maybe twenty, years older than I am and in a totally different position our experiences were somewhat the same in the sense that she felt the rhetoric of the movement, which we talked about last time, was overly dramatic, overly hyper. Yet looking back on it she thought that the rhetoric was perhaps necessary for consciousness-raising, and I think she was probably right. She became more involved intellectually and emotionally in this issue earlier than I did. She became involved in the late ‘60s. I was off in the Philippines at that time and I didn’t know much then about the women’s issue.

She writes in her book about how she was asked to give a speech on the women’s movement in the late ‘60s and she didn’t want to give it. I think I mentioned last time that in the mid-‘70s I was asked to do the same in Bonn and I didn’t want to either. In a sense all the rhetoric flying around at that time, in her case earlier and in my case probably seven or eight years later, did give us the chance to sort out in our own minds where we were on this issue.

Q: I think it is important as we do these oral histories to also pick up the social trends and all that because we are talking about the United States and an elite corps dealing with problems. I think it would be unconscionable not to cover these things. Who the people are and how they felt about things.

KLINGAMAN: I agree.
Q: So any time you want to move into that do.

KLINGAMAN: Sure.

Q: Were we trying to keep Kreisky from meddling in what we considered our affairs in the Middle East and that sort of thing?

KLINGAMAN: I think that Kreisky was tolerated. Let’s put it this way. Kreisky was a figure in his own right. He had been foreign minister. And first of all his democratic credentials were very good. He had left Austria after the Anschluss (the union of Austria with Nazi Germany) and went to Sweden. He was a good friend of Willy Brandt’s, I believe, and they were of the same political stripe. He had been Foreign Minister and then became Chancellor. Austria was neutral by virtue of the Four-Power Treaty after the Second World War and Kreisky felt that Austria should exercise “active neutrality,” that Austria should play the role of an active neutral.

Now maybe Henry Kissinger and others didn’t think too much of it, but they tolerated him. I don’t think he was a nuisance. Kreisky was somewhat like the German parliamentarian Wischniewsky, who was a Social Democrat who also was always trying to involve himself in Middle Eastern matters because in his case he had some credentials in the Arab world. I don’t know enough about what went on at the high levels to know whether Kreisky was considered to be a nuisance, but I would say he was tolerated and respected.

Q: While I think of Switzerland and Austria as both being neutral countries being right in the middle of this huge Cold War that was still waging, did you get involved in you might say Cold War things, spy things or did that impact at all?

KLINGAMAN: Not really. Austria and Switzerland were different in their neutrality. As I said, Switzerland was sort of the neutral banker type and Austria was Kreisky the mediator. Austria was also of course geographically right there on the edge between eastern and western Europe and a gateway for refugees coming in and also abuzz with spies. I did have of course dealings with our embassies in Switzerland and Austria and our DCM (deputy chief of mission) in Austria at the time was Mr. Felix Bloch. But at that time no one knew of his alleged dealings.

Q: Have to keep saying ‘alleged’ because the man has never been convicted but it was under highly suspicious circumstances that he was doing something.

KLINGAMAN: Well he was the DCM during part of my time on the desk. I had known Felix before that, vaguely. He had served in Dusseldorf before me. We had some mutual friends so I had met him as early as the late ‘60s. As I say he was DCM. As for the East-West spy game in Vienna, I didn’t have much knowledge of it from my vantage point on the desk. I’m sure those in the embassy in Austria did and in the CIA and so on. But I personally was not informed.

Q: It is highly compartmentalized, which it has to be. I was just wondering whether anything blew up in your face?

KLINGAMAN: No. You mean in terms of spy game things? No. No. Going back I guess to
Bonn…I was never really involved in spy issues. But as I said Willy Brandt fell because of the Guillaume affair, the East German spy in his office. In Bonn I was called upon once to be sort of a message carrier regarding an East-West spy exchange. When the political counselor was on home leave he left that portfolio to me for reasons that are a mystery to me; I guess it was probably because of my German proficiency.

You may have heard of Wolfgang Vogel?

Q: He was sort of a Sol Barak of spies.

KLINGAMAN: Vogel was an East German lawyer, and both sides used him as a go between so to speak. Anyway I just have a memory of meeting him by appointment in a restaurant some place in Bonn, passing on messages exploring the possibility of an East-West spy exchange. I was not substantively involved and I really don’t remember any details. That was the closest I ever got to the spy world.

Q: How about in Austria, Jewish migration? Was that an issue that you had to deal with? I’m really thinking of the Soviet Union.

KLINGAMAN: I do remember. I’d totally forgotten about this until you mentioned it. The Jews coming out of the Soviet Union through Austria. I was aware of that but not deeply involved. The office I worked in, EUR/CE, was directly across the hall from the Soviet desk in the Department. It was the Soviet desk that dealt with that issue for the most part. We followed it but it was their portfolio.

Q: You straddled two administrations, the Ford administration and then the Carter administration. What about the care and feeding of political ambassadors? Austria and Switzerland are renowned places where you stick your political appointees.

KLINGAMAN: That actually took a good portion of my time at different periods on the desk. I nurtured the process of seeking agreement (acceptance by the foreign government) and Senate confirmation for one ambassador to Austria by the name of Wolff. He was a businessman in the construction business from Ohio. And there were two to Switzerland. One was career Foreign Service officer Nathaniel Davis. A businessman succeeded him by the name of Marvin Warner. All of those took quite a bit of time.

Of course the desk officer traditionally briefs the incoming ambassador on the country. Ambassador Wolff, ambassador-designate at that time, was very interested in Austria. He really studied the issues. He was particularly interested in trade issues and he was really a pleasure to work with. Ambassador Davis was a little difficult. Not personally, I don’t mean that he was difficult personally. I mean that obtaining agreement for him was difficult, as was the process of Senate confirmation because he had been ambassador in Chile when Allende was overthrown.

Q: I was going to say that in many ways this was trying to get him out of the line of fire.

KLINGAMAN: Out of the hot seat, yes. But the Swiss were reluctant to accept him. The left
wing in Switzerland was not happy with his coming. In any event he did become ambassador there. Marvin Warner was a businessman and very personable. I don’t remember briefing him very much on Switzerland. His swearing-in ceremony was on the Hill, which gives you some idea of where his political base was. He became ambassador to Switzerland in 1977, shortly before I left the Swiss desk, and he served there for about four years. Later he was convicted of some fraud-related charges and sent to prison for awhile. I don’t know anything about that.

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**GALEN L. STONE**  
International Atomic Energy Agency  
Vienna (1976-1978)

Ambassador Galen L. Stone grew up in Massachusetts. After attending Harvard University and serving in the U.S. Army, he joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, France, India, Vietnam, Laos, Austria, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Cyprus. He was interviewed on April 15, 1988 by Malcolm Thompson.

STONE: Ambassador Tape had been the principal U.S. delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency and he had called on me at one point when I was Chargé d’affaires in Paris. He had been given a list of three names to be the resident Chief of the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. I think that my name was the only one which looked familiar to him. The result was that eventually I was assigned to Vienna as the U.S. Resident Representative to the international Atomic Energy with the personal rank of Ambassador.

**Q: And how long did that last?**

STONE: That lasted just exactly two years, from February of 1976 to February of 1978. It was an interesting assignment and at that point career officers were being encouraged to get involved in multi-lateral diplomacy. I must say that I found multi-lateral diplomacy to be a fairly frustrating experience. This was particularly true in an organization which had a Board of Governors of some thirty-three countries, the majority of whom were from the Third World. The thing that made that assignment most interesting was that of all the organizations in the world, this was the one where our interests most closely paralleled those of the Soviet Union. Neither the Soviet Union or the Unite States wanted to see other countries get their hands on nuclear weapons. So both the Soviets and ourselves were doing as much as we could to beef-up the inspection side of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which sends inspectors out to visit nuclear plants all over the world. Of course the inspections are subject to the willingness of the particular host country to place their plants under such inspection.

We had a practice of sitting down with the Soviets before each major meeting of the Governing Body and at least not pulling any surprises on each other. The Soviets would at times tell us that they were going to have to say nasty things about us in regard to certain political positions, but by and large our relations were reasonably cooperative and complementary.
AURELIUS FERNANDEZ
Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks
Vienna (1976-1980)

Aurelius Fernandez was born in New York in 1931. He graduated from Bowling Green University, received an M.I.A. from Columbia University and served in the U.S. Army from 1953 to 1956. His postings abroad have included Bucharest, Vienna, London and Paris. Mr. Fernandez was interviewed in 1997 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

FERNANDEZ: I remember the CSCE final act in 1975 signed in Helsinki.

Q: Would you explain what the CSCE is?

FERNANDEZ: Well, the CSCE is the Council on European Security and Cooperation. It’s related to something we’re going to be talking about later, too. The Mutual Imbalance Forces Action talks, that I worked on in Vienna. But the CSCE came into being...the preparatory talks began in 1972, it must have been, when they had [what were called the] three major baskets, issues dealing with, security, economic, and then sort of cultural and informational. It was basket three that was of course of interest to me and my work. I remember working on the first draft of that even when I was the Romanian and Hungarian desk officer in USIA.

After long, long negotiations the Council on European Security and Cooperation signed what was called the Final Act in Helsinki. I think it was in July of 1975. President Ford, as you said, at the time, [Romania] was the first country that was visited by a U.S. president after the signing of the Final Act. Henry Kissinger was with him and [Helmut] Sonnenfeldt and [there was] all this business [about promoting] open societies. In a way, this CSCE was sort of remotely envisioned by some as settling the borders between East and West and Germany and its neighbors for all time. The CSCE did not run at its own line. The MBFR, I think, which has conventional arms control, we’ll talk about later, was related to this. At any rate, the Final Act was to set the tone for things. Now, one of the things about the Final Act is that commitments were declaratory. They really weren’t contractual and codified in that sense. Nonetheless, they opened up- (end of tape)

-commitments that were declaratory and that contractual, in the sense of the treaty, but they opened up a wide. This is the whole thing about U.S. policy, where it succeeded, in that it started to open up these societies and loosen up the Soviet Union and lead to the implosion that then occurred with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Well, on Romania, I’ll get into more details on the security side of that, when we talk about MBFR.

But on the basket three side, I don’t think there was really any great change in the way the Romanian government and the Securitate handled the whole matter of facilitating contacts between people. I have mentioned the basket three was supposed to be the free flow of ideas and people, something along those lines. Romania didn’t make any measurable contributions to that
objective after the signing of the final act.

Q: Hal Sonnenfeldt was what?

FERNANDEZ: He was the counselor of the State Department for Henry Kissinger. Now Hal’s statement really threw the Romanians into a tizzy. "What is this organic relationship part? We are an independent country...we don’t interfere in the foreign affairs of other countries, we don’t want them interfering in ours. We’re not..." You know, well, back and forth. I could remember our getting our talking points together but "organic," you know, it’s like gardening, you really never have [a clear idea of its meaning. But] it was interpreted as another Yalta. That’s just as...turning down...not giving Romania membership now in NATO is looked upon by the Romanians to go more into your heart and soul and psyche, as Yalta all over again, you see? So, during this period we had this one issue, I remember with this organic relationship business, but then on the other hand, we had the trade agreement that was reached, and had a goal, it seemed to me, by 1980 we were to have a billion-dollars worth of two-way trade.

All of this was to open up, not just for Romania, but...I haven’t used the word "demonstrative" much of what we were doing in Romania had to be looked upon as being demonstrative for other countries, what kind of openness we would seek to make out of those societies. Now that trade agreement was signed...I think we signed that at Sinaia, S-I-N-A-I-A where president Ford and Ceausescu met. I can remember how cynically we were going over this. We had a Sunday morning meeting to determine where should the two meet, and just throwing out the..."Well, why don’t we go to Sinaia?" one of the guys, "I can hear it now, the spirit of Sinaia." This is a Hohenzollern castle that Ceausescu was taking over. At any rate, it was a very important time in our moving forward our relations and our interests, and that whole thread that leads to the state we’re in today where all these countries have opened up and they’re seeking to join our military alliances and our expanding economic and cultural and other relations with us.

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FERNANDEZ: Whither to Vienna. To the mutual and balanced force reduction, MBFR talks where I remained from 1976 to 1980. This is a particularly interesting time for security affairs for lo, these twenty years after World War II we still had facing each other on each side a million men. We used to sit there and say this, very hopefully in the briefing I would give to the press. That was the situation. There were these armaments. There were nuclear weapons. It was a very unstable situation. There was a border situation that hadn’t been clarified despite CSCE and all the declarations we wouldn’t attack one another. We still needed a more secure situation. You needed to end the war.

Now, the talks as early as 1971, it seemed to me, NATO was seeking to engage the Soviet Union in some kind of arms control talks of a conventional nature on continental Europe. Now, these did not come about the first time that they tried. There was a NATO secretary general in 1971, an Italian, who first approached the Soviets about this. I can’t remember the reason why they did not come to pass at that time. There was some event in that period of ‘71-’72 that it didn’t come about. It was really not until I think about 1973 that they had preliminary talks in Vienna which then led to the talks. But it seems to me from May to December along there about 1973 there
were the preliminary talks.

Well, all this came in the MBFR talks. The Chinese didn’t like them at all. They said, "MBFR meant more battalions for Russia." They feared that you’re going to make a deal with the Soviets then they’d transfer them all to the Chinese border. Well, that’s anecdotal, but it’s not unimportant. Now, what came of this? By the time I got there, the talks had been underway for two or three years. I should be more precise than that. They had a very interesting name. The Mutual Imbalance Force Reduction Talks. The technical name for them was the Vienna Talks on...I was going to look this one up...but we can get this in easily enough I’ll get this, because it had to with reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. That’s what the East called it. We said East and West were talking, East, Warsaw Pact, West, NATO.

Now, we called them simply the MBFR talks. The East didn’t accept that designation for it. "These are the talks about the armed forces and arms in Central Europe." Now, despite that, we went ahead because we worked with other fictions, too. One thing was, we said Central Europe also included the Netherlands. We had what we called the NGA. The NATO Guidelines Area, which covered the Benelux countries and Germany. So we had on the Western side, you had the reduction area [with] the Benelux countries and Germany. That was it. Then in the East, you had Poland, Czechoslovakia, yes, that was Eastern Europe. But involved in these were the Soviet Union, you didn’t have the Belorussians and the Ukrainians in those days, Romania, Bulgaria, the Yugoslavs were involved in that. On the Western side we had the Brits and the French and we had Iceland and then the Danes and Norway sat in on the talks, too.

Q: Italy, Greece, Turkey?

FERNANDEZ: Okay, Italy was there. Italy was very important as far as the atmospherics of the talks. The Italian ambassador was well prepared. They sort of had this city-state mentality to great power America and Soviet perspectives on what to do in the world. They were very bright and I enjoyed these men. Ambassador Kajaffe, [the Italian ambassador], who then went on to London, where I was later [stationed] and who was ambassador there. At any rate, the Italians were very active in this. Now having mentioned the Italians, the Italians and the Hungarians were not within the NATO guidelines. Because they couldn’t come to agreement on this. So these were the fictions that went with the whole thing. You just narrowed down a certain area of a problem and got to work on it. So with all of those fictions that went with it both sides learned a great deal about each other’s security concerns.

Now, as far as the positions of the two sides, the secretive Eastern bloc, of course, it was only the military people who really knew the figures of what their forces were. When the Russians finally put down figures of those forces, the United States did... the West did from the start put down figures of the size of forces of East and West. It was in the West, 777,000, if I remember correctly, in manpower in the area including the French at the time. In the East it was 902,000 or something. What I would really like to focus on is sort of the atmospherics to use the word you always use, which I think is the important thing about this. Now, part of those atmospherics was [that the Eastern Bloc] would never come out.

Q: I’m not quite sure what you mean.
FERNANDEZ: They were not included in the area.

Q: *But they were sitting there.*

FERNANDEZ: Sitting in there by all means. Now the reasoning...we have air forces and such, and Italy...and in Hungary, Soviet troops armed to the teeth. But I really am convinced, and I think experience, "life shows," as the Russians say, that this is a worthwhile endeavor to really try to isolate the problem as much as you could and really work on those aspects of it that were really [essential]. Now, the talks had a curious structure, because you did have the numbers I’d have to get straight on both sides, NATO and Warsaw Pact, you did have a structure mysteriously enough. We had on the Western side, the NATO ad hoc group, as it was called in Vienna. Now, I was the press spokesman for them, although I was in the U.S. delegation.

There was also another talk where just three of the U.S. delegations would meet with the Russians and however many of them, and two out of the three on the other side. That was a much smaller discussion of the technical details of the negotiations. Then we would have these weekly plenary sessions of which there were about 25 or so a year, where you would make one of these speeches that was almost in the end, public.

Then there was another thing called the trilateral, which was just the Germans, Brits, and the Americans. They’d meet on Friday afternoons. All the other delegations would meet after in the Hague, but they were going. This was an enormously vigorous and complex negotiation. The U.S. delegation consisted of the CIA, an office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ACDA, and the State Department, and I was the only USIA person there. I had my support from USIS Vienna. I was sort of freestanding there. It wasn’t a negotiation of that much concern on a weekly or daily basis to USIA.

What was interesting when I arrived with sort of an angle of vision to this experience that’s unique, is that when I arrived, there had been a practice of my predecessor, the first U.S. delegation ad hoc group spokesman, of briefing the press after each of the Thursday plenaries. There would be approximately thirty [meetings in the three plenaries during the year]. He would go out and on his own would brief the Eastern and Western press. When I arrived, there was to my horror, immediate Eastern pressure to say, "We want to be part of this briefing that you give." Obviously, they didn’t like the result that they were getting from us. Well, my instinct was foolishly, to resist. Jock Dean and Sam Reesers’ instinct was, you know, you’ve got to; this is only equity, you should really do this. What terrified me, you had to go do this with an Eastern spokesman. But we did, find the ad hoc group, NATO...

What we ended up doing, then, was I would go out after the plenary sessions, and give a press briefing from the second to the penultimate briefing of the round and I would have an Eastern spokesman. Now, I was the Western spokesman. The East would rotate its spokesman every week. They would have a different guy. It was these guys who were working on commercial affairs, and everything. I had the luxury of that brilliant delegation with all those different agencies [providing] very firm guidance and a lot of information about the NATO position that the Eastern guy would not. They would come there and say the most ridiculous things because
they weren’t up to date, they didn’t realize what the implications of what they were saying for their own position. So they looked kind of silly more often than not. There were a couple of good hard liners like the East German. He was very good. He really knew his position. The Russian was a buffoon. He never really understood half of what he did up there and said. You couldn’t get him to speculate about any of these things.

But at any rate, those weekly briefings, and also at the beginning of a round you’d have a briefing, or a real press conference, as we’d call it. At the end of the round we’d have a press conference. We would do those separately, East and West, but all during the rounds we’d do them jointly and it was a real crane dance. Like the whole negotiation itself. But here and there there would be mention of it and the feeling was that this thing was just going sort of sideways or going nowhere and that it was too complex a negotiation and there were reasons why. There were differences not only within countries within delegations, but between delegations on both sides. So it was very difficult to move this forward.

There are two points I would hasten to make. One is that this led, ultimately, to the foundation for the CFE agreement, the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, and that certainly is no small achievement. The second thing was that the whole process of negotiation was, if you will, a sort of hostage to SALT. That the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were really the first priority that they were working on. But every day in those trenches during those rounds on the conventional side we were in there trying to get more data, comparing it and so forth. Of course, the Russians were so secretive and evasive about the whole thing. It was very difficult to reach any kind of specific agreements within the negotiation at the time. But we did agree, on the Western side, we agreed on the design for a necktie for men. Maybe I should have worn it today. But that was...and I don’t like to say that too much whenever I’m asked about this because there’s no way to describe it other than we took our work very seriously, not ourselves. It was a lot of work and very capable people trying to get these data out of the East and to really have a give and take on that sort of thing. But it did result in the CFE agreement later in the ‘90s.

Now, there are a couple of other things I want to say about the position. You know, we went into this maybe going back to the fiction of this. We were sort of offering 1,000 nuclear warheads, so many, 36 or so, Pershing ballistic missile launchers and I’ve forgotten the number, 1,000 of nuclear warheads. In exchange for this we were asking for a Soviet tank army. It turned out during the course of the negotiation, this reorganization, that Soviet tank army was no longer really there, and secondly, we were going to withdraw these 1,000 nuclear warheads anyway. We did quietly do so. I think it might have been completed even before I left.

So what is the lesson of all this? It seems that I come out where I came in. I think in spite of all these things one could say, none of which I say in a pejorative sense about fictions you work with and so forth. This is a very important and worthwhile negotiation. I came to appreciate more and more the complexity of it. The dedication of the people involved in it. The complexity of the societies in the East we were dealing with on these matters. The differences within our own...within the United States between agencies was just enormous. So it was a hard slide.

Q: Let me talk a little about a couple of things. You were there ‘76 to ‘80. In 1976 Jimmy Carter was elected, came into office in 1977. Jimmy Carter came in professing looking at a new way to
look at the Soviet Union. Thinking that we could do business with them. Many people thought he was a bit naive when he came in, but he had a national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was as hard line as they come. Did you feel any of that, particularly the initial period and then sort of the learning period? You were there until pretty much the end of the administration.

FERNANDEZ: Right. His coming on, of course, the expectations would be so the United States would look at this whole position again and come up with something entirely different. But what they started off with, was talking to the Russians about strategic arms. Off they went to Moscow. Now it seems to me there was some little side sidelines that just don’t come to mind about period but it did scare the hell out of the Russians when I guess, when Secretary [of State Cyrus] Vance went, and made these proposals, and they were not acceptable to the Russians and it was just going back to the drawing board and pounding out the SALT agreements with the Jim Lindies and others to get to a position where you signed SALT II, which was signed by Carter in Vienna in ‘79.

I remember that because I was in the room, in that same room when we had plenary sessions. Brezhnev came out into this room which was absolutely jam-packed. Somebody from the Austrian foreign ministry got in a seat up in the press gallery, which was very, very small. I can remember the Financial Times correspondent sitting next to me. He said, "Look at Brezhnev. He looks like a big 400 pound gorilla." You could see barely moving, Brezhnev at the time, and the SALT II being signed and all the [details] of one of these big meetings like that. Others of which I attended. None of that really impacted instantly on the positions in MBFR because it was so incredibly difficult to reach agreement in the West, as well as to some extent in the East because it’s the military that was driving them, and the Russian military at that, and they wanted no part of this reduction.

It might be something interesting to talk about the Eastern delegations and their attitudes toward this. One of the first things that comes to mind is how open the Poles were about this. The Polish delegation was just so open about their concerns, including about Russia. They made no secret about the Eastern position. They would tell you what they felt was right or wrong with it. You had the same thing on the part of the Czechs, [who were also] very open. They’d say, "You know, we totally agree with this position." As far as the West, you look at that map and look at the problem. It used to be the German problem. This is our ancient problem with Germany and Russia. You look at the map you have here. The dilemma I faced in my school for international affairs is whether I’d study Germany or Russia. You know, that this is really what the problem is about.

Q: Did France play any role in this?

FERNANDEZ: The first time around the French weren’t at the negotiations at this time. I had absolutely no contact with them. I remember I used to brief the Japanese which was very interesting for me. But France, when they first put down...the West first put down this figure of 777,000 personnel they had acquiesced to this. There was a story told about how the [French] representative up in Brussels must have fallen asleep, so they let these numbers go forward. When we put down new numbers, in about 1979, ‘78-’79, the French numbers weren’t included in the total. So they were not involved in my time directly in this negotiation in any way that was
visible to me. They of course were at NATO headquarters and it was there at the NAC, NATO Advisory Committee. I can’t remember the name of it, the NAC up in Brussels would really be the one that would formulate the position which was then sent down to Vienna to the ad hoc group to negotiate with the East. There is a story told about how at these stages, the first stage is to get agreement within the U.S. government. Of course in the U.S. government different agencies and different interests involved, there were always leaks about what [they] would share.

Q: I would think the Pentagon, which didn’t want to give up any of its toys...

FERNANDEZ: That was probably where the main leaks were coming from. This would affect what was being thought in Europe and throughout the East and West. So you’d reach agreement here, and it would go then to the NAC in Brussels. There you would have to reach agreement, that would be the second step. Then the third step was to send it down to Vienna then Vienna would present it to the East. They said that was always the easiest phase of all, to dealing with the position. But they were long, knocked down dragged out battles about the position. A lot of technicalities I just never understood. But at the time [there were] two things that they were after. For example, about inspections. You had problems in the south of Germany when, say, all right you want to have so many inspections over such and such a period. Well, you going to do these by helicopter, but you know, that’s all sort of fogged in so many times a year. Well, that’s just an illustration of the kinds that they had to face with us. There was, of course, the ghost at the back of all it was the matter of equivalency. Was one Czech worth one German soldier or one American soldier worth five Polish soldiers? But these equivalencies were matters that were not really dealt with, but were always present in the minds of the [negotiators].

Q: Did you ever find that you’d be giving a briefing and all of a sudden you’d hear the Pentagon spokesman in Washington would cut you down or anything like that?

FERNANDEZ: No, not really. I’ll tell you, I was on a very tight leash and was very, very cautious, extremely cautious. We had...sort of interesting atmospherics here...a multilateral negotiation as viewed from the standpoint of a spokesman. In the time I was there because I always wanted to make sure I knew what the hell I was talking about, I gradually put together a big notebook of questions and answers and eventually we took these questions and answers to the ad hoc group and they approved, they’d say, "Geez, you might as well" ...is they would debate these over in the ad hoc group, there would always be somebody wanted their major hobbyhorse included in your answer to the question.

The example I would always give is about the Turks. They wanted to determine flank security, well, whatever you said. So as a result of the exegesis of time and everything they would write these things or approve these things and some of them would come out and they didn’t even sound like English. You’d use them, they’d say, "What do you mean by that?" You’d just have to read it back to them. But that’s all part of the give and take of the public affairs. You can’t go down to the mat about these things all the time. Some of the points are extremely technical and they just had to be gotten through.

But on that point of the guidance and this was a marvelous assignment to learn how to prepare for a press conference or just presenting a position. I used to make up some of the questions that
would come up and I would take them into Jock Dean every Thursday morning, go upstairs in the morning on which we had plenaries. That was always more difficult than the press conference. Because Jock would say, "You know you realize if you answer this they’re going to ask you [about that]." These were really very finely honed or creatively ambiguous sorts of statement which would make no mistake about what your position was. But in preparing some of this material I remember at one point the representative of the office of the Secretary of Defense. We were chatting about it and the way the questions were written it said "possible situation," " suggested response," and "if asked." So he says, "I give you a possible situation, and the suggested response will be ‘yes’ and then the ‘if asked’ would be ‘no.’"

While I was sort of working with this there is something about that little story that always suggested to me, I kept my papers and all the debates, there is a story to be told there about what it is like to prepare press guidance and to use it, especially in a setting where you have a spokesman who could counter, an opposing spokesman right at your heel and in the audience you have the Eastern, you know, the Pravda and Izvestia and that, they were just haggling and hectoring me all the time. Although we became sort of good friends but very sort of cynical sort of stuff that you could always sort of blow off with just stating your position. But that is one reality of a multilateral negotiation.

Q: While you were there two things happened. First was the Soviets introduced the SS-20 missile, an intermediate range missile which was perceived to threaten just Europe and was considered to be a destabilizing element. How did that affect you all?

FERNANDEZ: It affected us very dramatically, in that as part of the response to this there were two things. One was if I’m not making the wrong connection, one was to upgrade the Pershing, the Pershing I’s would be made into Pershing II’s. Partially in response into the SS-20, I think. But the other thing was the relation of the neutron bomb. Now that really created an atmospherics that were just enormously important at the time, particularly in Germany. There was a debate about this throughout Europe. Of course our response to that was this was not a neutron bomb, it was a munition. You know, it was one variant of the...the same thing as the old time bomb and that what was attached to it as they said, "This will destroy buildings but not people."

Q: Considered the ultimate...it destroyed people not buildings.

FERNANDEZ: No, it would destroy buildings.

Q: I thought it would destroy people because of the way it is...

FERNANDEZ: Maybe you’re making me hesitate here a minute. But the thing about this was that would be a certain humanity to it. Now I better really look this up, through again. I think you got it right.

Q: Because the idea was that it was considered the ultimate weapon by the East. The idea was, it would give out rays which would destroy tanks but would not leave a long term residue of...
FERNANDEZ: Gosh, I don’t how this, I hadn’t thought about it, I guess in so long, and it’s such an important issue at the time, but the neutron controversy really was not part of the negotiations. So much of this, as you would with SALT, you’d say, it wasn’t part of the negotiation. But the neutron atmospherics lasted for a long time. The credibility of the Eastern and the Western position at this negotiation was always questionable to a lot of observers because of the larger issues of SALT. The larger issues of the neutron and so forth.

Q: Let’s say we were talking about the neutron bomb enhanced weapon. The Soviets introduced the SS-20 at the time which was then considered destabilizing. What was the mood on the part of our delegation about how serious the Soviets were on this?

FERNANDEZ: The question was, what were the reactions of the Soviets to the neutron? The Eastern propaganda to this was pretty intensive. What they could say at the negotiation, it just wasn’t on the table. That was how we would handle it, that this is something independent of the negotiations. What we always want is a serious and positive response and we said two of the proposals we have on the table, to diminish the tensions because of the armed forces, really the conventional forces there.

Q: The SS-20. Was there the feeling that the Soviets were just playing for time? What was the atmosphere as far as how serious did we feel they were about mutual balance reduction?

FERNANDEZ: Well, there were times you could question it because of these other issues. You know, they were almost exogenous to the subject matter of that particular negotiation. But the SS-20 was obviously escalating the threat to the West. Shortened the time from six minutes to bomb, or something you could get one of these things in. It was obviously something to which the West had to respond. Then the response came in what was originally called theater nuclear forces, and then became the intermediate range nuclear force negotiations that were aimed at reducing this threat of the SS-20.

Q: What about when the Soviets went into Afghanistan in December of 1979? What did this do to you all?

FERNANDEZ: It sort of kept the negotiations going sideways. The negotiating didn’t stop. I don’t recall exactly that we would even address that sort of thing in our press conference.

Q: But I’m wondering about the mood. Was it a feeling that the Soviets were on the march?

FERNANDEZ: My recollection at the time is that it destabilized the situation further, obviously, in securing the whole area. But my feeling at the time was a horrible mistake had been committed. As I recall, “How in the hell could they get in that kind of a fix, to pick up something like this?” Which is to this day is unresolved, yes. Well, I guess there were all kinds of reasons that the experts could give, but gosh, it was very scary. I remember we were off, it was during our ski vacation, that suddenly I heard on the radio that they had gone in there. I was quite scary. When you look back it really...you know, this is probably the end of January [and in] early February we picked up negotiations again. By then this thing had a life of its own. Any kinds of questions that I would get, if a correspondent would call me, I would say, “This is not just
something we are dealing with in the negotiations." It was always a great escape hatch. It made me look kind of dumb, but, well it was true, but you really didn’t have to deal with that stuff.

Q: By the time you left there in 1980, you had four years watching this develop. What did you feel about these negotiations?

FERNANDEZ: I thought they were a little tired. Because obviously, projecting myself. I certainly enjoyed, because I learned at the time, including very much involved in learning more about security matters than I ever thought I’d ever care to know. But the least generous you could be is to say they weren’t doing any harm. But the fact was the negotiations were point of contact. I know of no other big thing that was negotiated through there. Obviously there were channels of communication through there that could come to the talks every once in a while. So, you’d keep up with them. But they certainly were a forum in which you could learn about each other’s security concerns that it was worth it to me. But the least generous you could be is to say they weren’t doing any harm. But the fact was the negotiations were point of contact. I know of no other big thing that was negotiated through there. Obviously there were channels of communication through there that could come to the talks every once in a while. So, you’d keep up with them. But they certainly were a forum in which you could learn about each other’s security concerns that it was worth it to me. I certainly could think of no substitute that could do what MBFR was doing at the time in 1980 when I left. Any substitute for that forum... You know, there was the West-West aspect to it, the East-West aspect to it, the East-East aspect to it all. But I think it focused attention in mutual ways that eventually led to CFE as I said, and I don’t think CFE ever would have occurred if they didn’t have the MBFR experience to lean on.

C. ARTHUR BORG
Deputy Chief of Mission
Vienna (1977-1983)

C. Arthur Borg came to the Foreign Service in the mid-1950s after graduating from West Point Academy in 1948 and serving in the Korean War. His Foreign Service career included positions in Japan, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Austria. Mr. Borg was interviewed by Hank Zivetz in 1990.

Q: You went to Vienna in 1977 as DCM. Did you ask for this assignment or was it offered to you?

BORG: Well, when I came back from....let me get my years straight. I was at the Senior Seminar from 1974-75 and was with the Secretariat from 1975-77. Okay. When I had gone to the Senior Seminar many promises were richly made to those of us who were students about receiving senior assignments with great responsibilities, which all of us overfreely translated to mean, chief of mission. I was informed at some point at the beginning of ’77 that, as Director General, Carol Laise put it, "it just wasn't in the cards for me to get a post at that time." So I was feeling rather frustrated about that and had been hoping to have my own embassy. The Vienna assignment came up as a possibility. It did intrigue me because Vienna, while technically a class-III embassy, is a rather large embassy in terms of total personnel and breath of responsibilities. So when it was apparent I was not going to have my own mission, that seemed to be a reasonable way to go for an assignment and would take advantage of my fluency in German and knowledge of things German.
Q: Who was the ambassador then?

BORG: A political appointee named Wolfe.

Q: Did anything of great import happen in our relations with Austria or Austria’s relations with other countries at that time?

BORG: The main thing of political interest was that the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, was playing games with the PLO and trying to develop a role for Austria to play in the Middle East situation. We at that time, of course, were under very strict rules not to become involved in this. You may remember Ambassador Andy Young losing his job in New York essentially over an unauthorized meeting with a PLO representative. Unfortunately, our ambassador in Vienna began to develop notions under the influence of Mr. Kreisky that perhaps he, the American Ambassador, could play a similar role. This was a pretty dangerous game. It involved a number of fairly shady, if not shady, questionable, contacts either PLO or close to the PLO residing in Vienna, Cairo, etc. In the end, nothing disastrous happened because I was able to avail upon the ambassador the importance of reporting to Washington any plans for any sort of meetings that smelled in any way of a contact with the PLO. So his record on paper, therefore, was kept pretty clean and he avoided some of the problems that Andy Young got in to. But it was a continuing problem for me as DCM because he was being tempted into a role that was simply unsuitable at that time and place.

WOODWARD ROMINE
Chief of the Political Section
Vienna (1978-1980)

Woodward Romine was born and raised in Indiana. He graduated from Wabash College and later pursued studies at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. His primary assignments in the State Department were as Political Officer in Washington and abroad. His foreign assignments, all European, include Warsaw, Paris, Strasbourg, Vienna and four posts in Germany. In Washington, Mr. Romine dealt with French relations as well as Refugee and Management matters. He is a graduate of The Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Mr. Romine was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 1998.

Q: And time did go by. The next year you headed off to your final post in Vienna as head of the Political Section.

ROMINE: Yes. That was a very interesting two years. One of the things that was interesting was the Austrian government at that time was headed by one of the grand old men of European manners, Bruno Kreisky, not only a very successful administrator of his country but a highly successful politician who had a great feel for his country and who had, because he was of Jewish origins, passed his war years in Sweden. He was an interesting man, because he was very interested in the Arab-Israeli problem, and he was also quite sympathetic with, or at least willing
to talk to, the leaders of the Palestinian Liberation Force, Mr. Arafat. This did cause a certain amount of concern in the Department of State, who wanted us to stand back from all of this, which we did to some extent, but the Ambassador's relationship with Mr. Kreisky was so good and so close.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

ROMINE: His name was Milton Albert Wolf. He was a political ambassador from Cleveland, but he had pulled together his knowledge and his act of what was going on there, and he worked very hard and he did very well in Austria. He too was a man who was very generous in letting his subordinates in the Embassy pursue their work. We didn't have any very great problems with Austria at this time. Some of the things that we had suggested or wanted to do, such as give Austria a bit more military assistance and that sort of thing, didn't go very far. They had a modest program, but Vienna was an interesting place because it really was the center of a neutral country, very much as Switzerland had once been before World War I, and during that period it was, of course, bordered by Switzerland, Italy, West Germany, and then by Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Yugoslavia. The Viennese handled this really tough and delicate relationship very well. They never made any secret at all that they were very pleased that they were all one country, not divided as the Germans were, but they went to great lengths to point out that, in addition to the Americans having made this possible, it was always also the Russians. I never talked to them on anything but what there wasn't this very careful balancing act--quite understandable. As one Viennese said to me one time, "This is fine for you people who are a big power sitting on the other side of the Atlantic, to take certain very strong attitudes vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but we are within 30 miles of the Czechoslovakian frontier and the same amount from the Hungarians, and you have to remember there are Russian troops in those countries, and we are very sensitive to this kind of thing," and indeed they were, although it was interesting that their relations with the Hungarians were always quite easy, and none of them ever ceased talking about the old Austro-Hungarian empire. On the other hand, their relations with the Czechs were often quite difficult, and the Czechs were often quite hostile to them. That too probably was a reflection of the old Austro-Hungarian empire.

Probably the most difficult time we had was when the President visited Vienna to sign the MBFR agreement with Brezhnev, and this led to a very close working relationship with the Soviets there. The whole meeting went off quite well, meetings at the Austrian Embassy, at the American Embassy, and then the huge signing ceremony. All had gone well, and then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One of the more interesting things in our experience there was the question of Austrian participation in the Olympic games that were scheduled for Moscow. As soon as the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan, we were urged to urge the Austrians, which we did for a long period of time, not to participate in the games, and they tried everything that they could. First, they told us that we would have to talk to the Olympic Committee about it, that the Austrian government really couldn't do that and whatever the Olympic Committee decided was all right with them. We did talk to the Olympic Committee, and the Olympic Committee told us they had no intention of getting into deep trouble with the Austrian government by leaving the games, and it went back and forth and back and forth. In one very telling thing with, if I'm not mistaken, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he said the Austrians had cautioned us at the time the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed their non-aggression treaty, that they felt this had great
dangers for the independence of Afghanistan and that we should do something about it, take some sort of measures, because this absolutely would happen. They pointed out that they didn't feel we had done anything and that at this point, given their position as a neutral, they just were not going to offend the Soviet Union by not participating in the Moscow Olympics, and they did participate. That was probably the most interesting and irritating matter that came up during my short time in Austria.

DAVID G. BROWN
U.S. Mission to the IAEA
Vienna (1978-1981)

David G. Brown was born in Massachusetts in 1940 and graduated from Princeton University in 1964. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1964, his postings abroad have included Taipei, Saigon, Yokohama, Tokyo, Vienna, Beijing, Oslo, and Hong Kong. Mr. Brown was interviewed in 2003 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop, but where did you go in '78?

BROWN: I went to the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. I spent three years there.

Q: All right, we'll pick it up at that point. Great.

BROWN: Okay.

Q: Today is the 4th of March 2003. David, 1978, you're off to Vienna, Vienna with the, what was it called?

BROWN: The U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. At that time it was a separate office in Vienna with six or seven people.

Q: Was this part of the UN?

BROWN: The IAEA is related to the UN, and it is housed in a UN complex, but at that time our office that was representing us to the UN agencies there was separate from the IAEA mission. Subsequently they've been merged together into one office.

Q: What brought about your going there? Did you have, was somebody looking at your background?

BROWN: It wasn't entirely accidental. I was looking for something different to do outside of Asia, possibly at an international organization job. Through my work on the Taiwan desk on the nuclear issue, I had gotten to know quite a few people in the non-proliferation field in the U.S.
government and that I think helped my credentials in applying for the IAEA job. Of course when I got to Vienna, the work only occasionally was directly related to non-proliferation. It was normal, rather routine international organization work related to the quarterly board meetings of the IAEA and the budget process within the agency and helping to get American people into the key jobs in the IAEA.

**Q:** You were doing this from '78 until when?

**BROWN:** Until '81.

**Q:** When you went there, this was your first sort of international organization, wasn't it?

**BROWN:** First and only.

**Q:** How would you, sort of as the new boy on the block for this sort of thing, how would you describe the atmosphere when you came in both within our delegation and beyond?

**BROWN:** Well, I came in at about the same time that Roger Kirk, our new ambassador to the IAEA came in. He was a very dynamic and thoughtful ambassador with a very strong background in European, Eastern European and Soviet affairs.

**Q:** He also had been to Vietnam I think hadn't he?

**BROWN:** Yes, we had met each other in Vietnam. I think he had been handling external affairs in the embassy when I was there.

**Q:** Yes, he was there when I was there.

**BROWN:** The most significant non-proliferation issue that came up during my time at the IAEA was the Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor.

**Q:** Well, did you find I mean was the organization, was there a lot of as I would think a lot of sort of bureaucratic jockeying, I'm thinking not in our delegation particularly, but in the overall one, I mean more people looking out for titles, jobs, that sort of thing?

**BROWN:** Oh, within the UN system, there is a great deal of that. Countries naturally look after their nationals in the UN. Countries looking after their particular interests. Our principal interest was to make sure that the safeguards part of the agency's work was as strong as it could possibly be and that we had our people in the key positions to work on safeguards. We also had a strong interest in the IAEA's external affairs and budget offices. We wanted the agency to spend increase funding and resources for safeguards, whereas the LDCs.

**Q:** Less developed countries?

**BROWN:** Yes, the LDCs on the board were primarily interested in what the agency could do to help them with development of various kinds of atomic energy programs such as assistance with
regulatory matters, medical isotopes, food irradiation, technical assistance and so forth. That's what they wanted the agency to spend its money on. So, there was a constant jockeying between ourselves and those members on how the budget was split up and whether it was going to grow or not grow, and in which areas.

Q: How from our delegation and sort of the point of view in '78, how was nuclear energy viewed at that time?

BROWN: It was very controversial internationally. It just so happened that when I was there, Austria, the host country, was conducting a referendum on nuclear power. They had built a nuclear power station, completed it and then decided to have a referendum on whether or not to operate it. The government was defeated, and they had to mothball the plant without ever having operated it. Sweden was going through the same process. I'm trying to think whether Three Mile Island had happened or not happened at that time.

Q: I think Three Mile Island was around that time. It was of course before Chernobyl, which really put the last nail in the coffin. How did you find, let's say we want to get people into the enforcement side of things. How did you go about doing this and how did we do?

BROWN: I mean there aren't great secrets on this. There is a lot of bargaining that goes on behind the scenes in the agency and a lot depends on making sure that the head of the agency is responsive to American concerns. The U.S. put forward good candidates and talked to director general to get their appointments. The Director General had to take into account the balance of forces within the Board of Governors, to which he was responsible. The Russians had their particular interests, as did the Europeans and others. When we had good candidates for key jobs of interest to us, we were usually successful.

Q: At this particular time the United States and the Soviets in this particular field were pretty much on the same wavelength weren't they?

BROWN: Yes, we were. The real trick was how to coordinate with the developing countries on the board. That meant a lot of consulting, paying attention to what they wanted, working with them at times to ensure that they in turn did not block our key objectives.

Q: Where did the nuclear powers such as France and Great Britain fall on this thing?

BROWN: They played a major role on the Board of Governors. One key issue during my tenure was pressure from the LDCs for more representation on the Board, which would dilute the strong position which the Western Europe and others group, of which we were a part, had on the Board. We pretty successfully contained that effort. On such issues, the Europeans and ourselves plus the Australians and the Canadians were all pretty much lined up on the same side. It happened that the Secretary to the Board the whole time I was there was a delightful Frenchman with whom I worked very closely. If you wanted things to go smoothly, you had to have his cooperation. He likewise knew that if you wanted things on his board to go smoothly, he didn't want to misjudge where the Americans were coming from.
**Q:** How was Israel handled at that point?

BROWN: Israel was a constant target of others in the Agency. Their opposition prevented Israel from ever getting on the Board of Governors. So, we ended up speaking for their interests from time to time. That proved to be very awkward, when Israel conducted the preemptive air strike that destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. France had sold the reactor to Iraq. Iraq was a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty and the agency had a safeguards agreement with Iraq that covered the reactor, which at that point was soon to become operational. So you can imagine the outrage over the Israeli attack. There were intense discussions about what position the Board should take concerning the attack. Should the Agency take the lead or was this a matter for the UN Security Council.

**Q:** Was there the feeling that on the Iraqi side that this reactor and all that was being put up was a legitimate process or was it the feeling that this was going to turn into a weapons producing plant?

BROWN: Well, the reactor was ideally suited for producing weapons grade plutonium and Iraq was seeking to obtain reprocessing equipment from France. That was one perspective. The other was that the reactor was covered by IAEA safeguards, which many saw as making its eventual operation legal. Another question was whether the safeguards were effective. Were the Iraqis declaring the facilities and the material in the facility properly to the agency?

**Q:** You mentioned in Israel's nuclear program. Could you explain what that was, and what the agency might be trying to do there?

BROWN: Israel is not a party to the non-proliferation treaty. So the agency didn't have any role there, but that didn't stop countries in the Middle East who were concerned about Israel's nuclear program from asserting that the agency ought to be involved and ought to be going out and trying to clarify what Israel was doing.

**Q:** How did you find people lined up or countries lined up on this Israel thing? Were we kind of alone?

BROWN: All I remember is that we were successful in preventing the Board from condemning Israel. Just how we got to that outcome I would have to go back and do some checking.

**Q:** Then did you, how did working in the international organization field, did that interest you or was it an interesting sideline?

BROWN: It was something I was glad that I had done so that I understood the processes and how these organizations functioned and how business got done in them, but it didn't fascinate me enough or entice me to apply for a job at the UN. In fact, quite the opposite. Once was enough.

**Q:** Well, in a way these things are intensely political. It sounds like working in or being in a legislature of some state or something like that. You're trading, you're working, you're cajoling, the whole thing.
BROWN: Yes.

Q: Well, then you say, '81?

BROWN: '81, yes.

**PHILIP M. KAISER**  
Ambassador  
**Austria 1979-1980**

Ambassador Phillip M. Kaiser was born in New York City in 1913. He received his bachelor’s degree in 1935 and then went on to study as a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College at Oxford University. In Washington D.C. he served many positions in the State department and also served as the Special Assistant to the Governor of New York, Averill Harriman. He has had ambassadorships to Senegal and Mauritania, Hungary, and Austria, as well as different positions in London. Ambassador Kaiser was interviewed by Morris Weisz in 1992.

Q: Did you get into the problems that existed within the American labor movement when Rudy Faupl, the AFL-CIO International Representative, who was a Hungarian who believed in this business of a little bit of an opening to Hungary on the part of the Austrians. He had very good contacts with the Austrians. In conversations with me, he criticized this hard line official AFL-CIO attitude; he was more sympathetic to the Austrian idea of opening up a little bit to them.

KAISER: Well, I had talked when I got to Austria with Benya.

Q: Benya was head of the trade union movement and the vice...

KAISER: Yes. He was also President of Parliament and he knew about what we had done to help in the reconstruction of the Austrian trade union movement. He still remembered our exchange program. There were still some men around whom we brought over as trade unionists.

Q: Did you know Kienzl?

KAISER: Yes, we brought over others as well and Benya mentioned it a couple of times. On a relate subject, he said, "I don't understand the policy of the AFL. We receive these Eastern European so-called trade unionists. They don't subvert us. We have an impact on them. They don't change us. They learn much more from us than we learn from them." He was very cute about it. He valued very highly his relationship first with Meany and then with Lane Kirkland.

Q: Was Vienna considered a more important post?
KAISER: No, about the same. As a matter of fact, Hungary was in a real way more challenging, more interesting. Austria was a new, vibrant democracy. It was really quite extraordinary the job they did considering their immediate pre-war history and it was a Social Democratic Government, a Socialist Government. Chancellor Kreisky liked my background. The first meeting I had with him he said to me, "I have letters about you from Jim Callaghan, from Denis Healey, from Harold Lever and from Kitty Carlisle. He knew Kitty Carlisle, and like everybody else who knows her, was very fond of her.

Q: Oh, because of her Vienna background.

KAISER: He said, "How do you know Kitty Carlisle?" He didn't ask me how did I know the other people who wrote him. "How do you know Kitty Carlisle?"

Q: Well, I am not asking you for the details, but how did you know Kitty Carlisle?

KAISER: She was the wife of Moss Hart, and I knew Morris Hart when I was a kid. We were in the same camp together. We were friends.

Q: Well, you have a chapter on Vienna too. At the end of that period which coincided with the Reagan Administration coming in, you came back to the United States and you have been active here keeping your contacts pretty well with the labor movement. What I want to do now is go over a couple of subjects with you and please stop whenever you wish. We have a number of things that have come up in other interviews that you might be able to shed some light on. One of the questions is the problem in this international labor field between the U.S. Department of Labor and the State Department. At the time you were involved, the Labor Department had a higher status on international labor issues than it has now. You were an Assistant Secretary.

KAISER: That was George Shultz's doing by the way. He was the one who abolished the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs.

Q: They had another Assistant Secretaryship that they wanted to establish.

KAISER: Steve Schlossberg told me that they are now trying to reestablish the old arrangement.

Q: In the State Department your counterpart was not a person at [the Assistant Secretary] level and then both of you would go to the ILO What were the issues between State and Labor that created problems? How was the working relationship there?

KAISER: Well, the working relationship was good.

Q: Who was your opposite number but at a lower level there?

KAISER: Otis Mulliken was head of the division. We had a good personal relationship. He always came as an advisor to the ILO and then there was Walter Kotschnig who was head of the Office of International Organizations.
KAISER: Mostly in the Labor Department on all the substantive issues. Whenever there were political overtones, State would get involved but the agenda of an ILO Conference, as you know, was all social-labor. We in the Department of Labor did the donkey work in developing the position papers. A big problem was always the damned budget. The State Department was always on our backs to keep the budget down. There were house-keeping problems. For example, we never had any money for representation. The most pathetic party given at the Conference was by the American Delegation because they gave us very little for entertainment.

Q: What about the designation of labor officers in the Embassies? You had a whole lot to do with that.

KAISER: There was a great expansion of the Labor Attaché Corps at that time and I tell the story quite frankly, the fact. . .

Q: This is in your book too?

KAISER: . . . the fact that I was an Assistant Secretary. . . We had David Morse first, and then I was Assistant Secretary of Labor and that gave us access to the highest levels of the State Department. We became good friends, Morse and I, with Acheson. We had a warm personal relationship. There are a lot of stories about that that I don't tell in my book. But in any case the big thing really was our membership on the Board of the Foreign Service, and its sub-board called the Appointments and Assignments Board, which approved every assignment in the whole Foreign Service. Under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, the Board of the Foreign Service consisted of three assistant Secretaries of State plus the Under Secretary for Administration, who was always Chairman and of one each from Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. I had the advantage after a while of being the senior member in terms of service. I was the Assistant Secretary of Labor for almost five years and there was a big turnover in the State Department. During my time, I served with all the top people including Dr. Freeman Matthews, Jimmy Riddleberger, George Allen, Bill Benton and I can't remember... Was Dean Rusk?. Yes, he was on the Board.

Q: He was an Assistant Secretary.

KAISER: Assistant Secretary for the Far East and on the Board of the Foreign Service. I had a very warm personal relationship with Jack Peurifoy. He was the Under Secretary and Chairman of the Board. We had to clear all promotions. We set up the promotion boards and we were the ones--Labor and Commerce--in 1948 who insisted on public members being on the Foreign Service promotion boards. It made a big difference. Later on even old time Foreign Service Officers appreciated that it was a smart idea.

Q: Politically it is a way at getting at a constituency on the domestic side. I am surprised that that idea was not accepted earlier.
KAISER: Well, at first the old timers didn't want it. And then of course the most important thing was that we used this leverage of Board membership to get additional labor attachés. On more than one occasion, State wanted my vote on something unrelated directly to the Labor Attachés, so I would shamelessly use it and say, "Well, I'll do it, if you will give us a Labor Attaché here or a Labor Attaché there, which they knew was justified and badly needed where we were fighting to get an additional assignment.

Q: What about the pressures on you from the trade union movement to nominate people for jobs?

KAISER: Well, it wasn't easy and we tried to get the right people with background but if they didn't have it we... We didn't consciously take any lemons. We took a fair number of people who hadn't been in the trade union movement. As they say at Harvard, "If you have two candidates who are equally good, one whose father went to Harvard and one whose didn't, we'll take the one whose father went to Harvard." Well, if there were two candidates equally good, one from the trade union movement and one not, we'd tilt toward the trade union guy.

Q: Comment on that aspect of the Marshall Plan operation. Did you also have some influence on the selection of labor persons there?

KAISER: Yes, they turned to us for some advice and what we did do, which was important and I tell this story, was to assist the Greek-Turkish program the first time they set up a labor section.

Q: Was this under Point Four or the Marshall Plan?

KAISER: The Greek-Turkish aid preceded the Marshall Plan.

Q: This was the Point Four thing.

KAISER: No, Point Four was different, entirely different.

Q: Oh, really. This was the Turkish-Greek thing?

KAISER: Aid. Point Four was world-wide technical assistance. We had set up this Trade Union Advisory Committee when there were still two trade union movements in the United States, the AFL and the CIO. David Morse did this with Secretary Schwellenbach's backing, which was really crucial. Morse set it up just after the CIO had rid itself of the Communist influence and so it became possible. There were ten members, four from the AFL, four from the CIO and we had two from the railways. We had Art Lyon of the Railway Executives Association and then we had a man named Harkin, who represented Whitney of the trainmen and the engineers. It was a very active and a very effective group. We met regularly every month and it consisted of George Meany, Mat Wall, David Dubinsky, Jack Potofsky, Clint Golden, Jim Carey and two international representatives, Delaney of the AFL and Mike Ross of the CIO. They knew about the Greek-Turkish program before it was even public. Dean Acheson came over and spoke about it. He later spoke about the Marshall Plan and solicited their support. And when it came to appointing a man to run the labor section, George Meany - which was really absolutely precedent shattering - came up with the proposal of Clint Golden of the CIO. Clint then - I tell the story in
the book. It is one of my favorite stories - Clint then picked Alan Strachan of the U.A.W. as his deputy. Meany was up in arms. I said, "George, you just gave Clint Golden this vote of confidence and then you are going to tell him that he can't pick his own deputy." Well, it was one of the few times that I got George Meany to back down.

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The following are excerpts from an interview of Ambassador Kaiser by Charles Stuart Kennedy conducted in 2005.

Q: I think talking to Arafat, considering everything that’s gone on since then, we’ve had Arafat a guest of the White House a couple of times. It’s not, they were early days and people were doing things. I’m not trying to pry a name out, but I don’t see that this has any opprobrium at this point.

KAISER: I will say this, that Kreisky did everything he could (laughs) to get an American ambassador to talk to Arafat. He made a big deal out of his Arafat relationship. It was a big thing and I remember once I said to him, “If, as you’re saying, Arafat wants to make peace with the Israelis, why don’t you get him to say so publicly?” I could talk to him, Kreisky, the way I’m talking to you. He said he couldn’t do that. His extremists would assassinate him if he publicly announced it.

Q: Well, I think the issue for so long was that we refused to talk to the PLO until the PLO renounced its idea of, the PLO would not recognize Israel as a state. The PLO rhetoric at the time was that they would sweep the Israelis to the Mediterranean and take over. This is extremist talk, but it didn’t, it was in a way our excuse for not talking to Arafat.

KAISER: I want to say something here that I should have mentioned when we talked about the emigration of the Soviet Jews. The contrast between the way we treated Soviet Jews’ immigration to the United States and the way we treated German Jews who tried to get in here is absolutely very striking. A very striking difference. Makes us look really pretty bad.

Q: Are you talking about before the war?

KAISER: Yes.

Q: Oh, yes, it was terrible.

KAISER: A terrible chapter.

Q: Well, it was part of our whole immigration policy, plus there was a strong anti-Semitic feeling in the United States.

KAISER: In the State Department.

Q: In the State Department, yes.
KAISER: The number of Jews in the State Department, you could count them on the fingers of one hand. But they had one guy whose name was Herbert Feis, you know that name? He was a key economic advisor on the Board of Economic Warfare, brilliant.

Q: He was very much involved in Spanish wolfram. I’m not sure what wolfram was, but it was an important.

KAISER: A very important method, I know, during the war. It was something you needed for making sophisticated equipment.

Q: I know this was a big subject and he was the expert on it.

KAISER: The guy in charge of immigration was a bad apple. The difference - Scoop Jackson had a great deal to do, Senator Jackson, with the different attitude about emigrating Jews, but we went out of our way to get the Soviets to allow Jews to enter.

Q: This was the Jackson Vanik Amendment, which dominated our relations with the Soviet Union. This brought, it basically said, “Let your Jews that want to, leave.” And essentially it worked.

KAISER: And we’ll give you MFN.

Q: Yes, most favored nations, yes.

KAISER: When I went to Russia with Tip O’Neill, have I talked about that? It was long after I’d left the Foreign Service. Tip asked me to go along with him as his special consultant on a congressional mission to Moscow. and he had a list. Special Jews, that he wanted to talk to, that he did talk to, top Soviet officials. We didn’t have any list that we talked to Adolf Hitler about.

Q: Well, it was a whole different world. What about the Soviet presence at the time you were and this was ’79 to ’80, the time you were ambassador in Vienna. What was the Soviet presence like there?

KAISER: That’s a good question. In contrast to Hungary, in contrast to Senegal, I don’t remember having any special relationship with the Soviet ambassador to Vienna. The Viennese feeling toward Moscow was not very friendly. After all they had lived under Soviet occupation for quite a while, and it was not an agreeable chapter. I don’t remember, to be perfectly frank, any special relationship with the Russian ambassador. I had a very good relationship with the one in Budapest, who was the dean and a very good one. In Dakar, his son became a leading dissident, the poor father had a document how his father was treated after his son openly became a dissident. His father was treated like the scum of the universe. It was documented in The Sun Came Out which was written by his son describing what had happened to his father because he had become a dissident.

Q: Well, it probably is significant that you don’t recall because in other words they weren’t
playing much of a role there. I think by this time Austria had except in name sort of shut all this neutrality stuff and was basically in thought, word and deed part of the West.

KAISER: I think you put it very well. They were not loathe to make it clear that they really belonged to the free world. At the same time, Kreisky tried to exploit when Nixon visited. Did he have visits with the Soviets? I think he did, Nixon. On one or two occasions they met in Austria with Kreisky acting as host.

Q: There were Iranian students all over the United States and Western Europe during the takeover of our embassy and all. Were they causing trouble, Iranian students?

KAISER: Not to my knowledge. I don’t know if I told you this. I was in Budapest when our colleagues were taken hostage in Tehran, and we got instructions to go see the foreign minister and tell them to put pressure on the Iranian government to release the hostages. I always dealt with the deputy foreign minister who was in charge of the West. The foreign minister himself was of very little value. The deputy was a very able cookie with a lot of influence. He was the top brass and very good English. He went to a high school which specialized in the teaching of English. So, I made this plea on behalf of our colleagues in Tehran, and he listened very well. He said, “You must remember, there are two sides to this question.” Well, I let loose, I gave him a blast of criticism, just really. I said, “You are a professional diplomat and you are telling me and you are saying that the two sides to an issue where the host country does what Tehran has done?” And I whiplashed him. I really whiplashed him. And he backed away. The following week I was having lunch with one of his ministers and this minister was a good friend of mine. The deputy foreign minister had said to him, “Whatever you do, don’t tell the American ambassador that you think there are two sides to the question.”

Q: Is there anything else we should cover on Vienna before we end this session?

KAISER: No, except the story where Kreisky associated himself with Disraeli as a Jewish person who made it to the top. Also, a self-serving story where I net him that Mitterrand was going to going to defeat Giscard D’Estaing, and he sort of made some remark about “You may know something about American politics, but you really know nothing about French politics.” Then I saw him as a private citizen afterwards to collect my 10 shillings. All he could say was, “Well, you were more optimistic than I was.”

Q: Yes, because Mitterrand was a socialist and Kreisky was a socialist, but nobody was sure who was going to win in that election.

KAISER: I betted with his protégée who is today president of Austria. Fischer. But Fischer paid me the 10 shillings; Kreisky never paid.
Ambassador Polansky was born in New Jersey and raised in California. He served in the U.S. navy in World War II. He attended the University of California at Berkeley and Columbia University. His overseas postings included USSR, Poland, Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. Ambassador Polansky was interviewed in 1992 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You left there in 1979 and served for four years in Vienna?

POLANSKY: I was in Vienna from 1979 until 1983. I was DCM and then when Phil Kaiser I became Charge for sixteen or eighteen months until Helen van Damm came. In effect I was running the Embassy for that time.

Q: What were American interest in this period?

POLANSKY: They were to make sure Austria knew our interest in keeping Austria neutral as they had proclaimed themselves and at the same time, make sure it was really pro-Western in its attitudes and policies.

One of the first thing I remember was the Iran hostage situation and the impact it had on us personally in trying to get the Austrians to understand what the situation was. We were also concerned about whether the Austrians would buy Russian, Eastern European, or Western European fighter planes. We spent a certain amount trying to convince the Austrians to buy US fighter planes. It was not clear by the time I left what they were going to buy. There was also a time when martial law was declared in Poland and there was some concern as to what kind of refugee flow that would create in Austria, what they would do with the Polish refugees that were there, and the efforts of some of them to come to the United States and under what circumstances. In general it was trying to make certain that Austria was a neutral state and pro-Western in its foreign policy and open to American investment in a way that we could do business.

Q: Looking at it as an American diplomat, how did you view Austria? Where did they stand? What were their interests?

POLANSKY: A lot of the first part of it really relates to Bruno Kreisky as Chancellor and that the role that he played and the role that he saw himself playing, particularly in the Middle East and certainly there was no desire on the part of the Administration to cede him a role as arbitrator or guide for what our policy should be in the Middle East.

Q: You are talking about the American administration. What was Kreisky's interest and what was he trying to do?

POLANSKY: He was trying to play the hand of Arafat and the PLO and trying to get us to accept his perception of the role of the PLO as force in the Middle East; as an organization that we ought to deal with in trying to solve the Middle Eastern crisis. I think he felt that he understood the Middle East and that we did not. He had delegated to himself the role of
spokesman and thought that we should essentially understand his perspective on the Middle East as a way of bringing peace to the area.

Q: Here you have the Prime Minister of a neutral state, Austria, who is advocating recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is not only an anathema to powers that be in Israel but also to the Jewish community and its lobby in the United States. You are the American representative having to deal with this. You must have been under an awful lot of pressure to tell him to "knock it off."

POLANSKY: I didn't feel any great pressure. I didn't have any sympathy for his point of view. I think it became fairly clear to Kreisky that the United States was not going to accept his viewpoint. It was done in a candid but polite way. He was realistic enough to know that whatever my personal views were, I was carrying out orders that didn't affect our relationship, which was a good and open one. He was a hard headed politician from his perspective. He didn't particularly like it, but he understood when he was being told no. It didn't have any great impact on his feeling toward me.

Q: Did you have any assurances that Austria really was neutral, or was it a paper neutrality and Austria was leaning East or West?

POLANSKY: The concern was, at least with respect to Kreisky, was even though he proclaimed neutrality and he was clear in what he said about the Middle East, he was, in someway, more inclined to be sympathetic to and responsive to Soviet positions more than he was with respect to American and NATO positions. He realized that whether we liked it or not, we were prepared to take fairly strong stands on issues with respect to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He could say what he wanted to, but it really wouldn't have an impact on what we did.

Q: Was he coming from the Socialist side of the political spectrum?

POLANSKY: Absolutely. He was head of the Socialist Party and he was President, Vice-President, or Chairman of the Socialist International in his international role. There was no question of his political orientation.

Q: How did the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan hit him? That was in December of 1979.

POLANSKY: He was opposed to it and said so. I think he was forceful in his condemnation of the Soviets at that time. He was not an apologist.

Q: Did you find the change over to the Reagan Administration causing a certain amount of anxiety? Here was Reagan, an arch-conservative and here you have a left-wing Socialist government. Was that a problem?

POLANSKY: It was a problem in the sense that Kreisky and others were condescending toward Reagan. How could a movie star become President. An attitude that was limited not only to Kreisky and the Austrians. At the same time, it was quite clear, because of what Kreisky wanted
to do in terms of his foreign policy interests, that he wanted to meet with Reagan. It didn't come off until 1983 when he came to Washington on an unofficial visit and was received by Reagan at the White House. It was a short meeting; really just a courtesy, but it took him that long to get into the White House. One of the things that Reagan told him at that time was that Helene van Damm, who had been his personal secretary and then Head of Personnel at the White House, was going to become the new Ambassador to Austria. Whatever Kreisky thought personally, he welcomed since she came out of Reagan's inner circle.

HARRIET CURRY
Secretary to Ambassador Kaiser

Ms. Curry was born in Annapolis, Maryland, daughter of a Marine Corp family. She was reared at military posts throughout the United States. She was educated at The George Washington University, after which she worked with a number of non-governmental organizations. After joining the State Department she served as Secretary and Assistant to United States Ambassadors in Brazil, Senegal, Israel, Jamaica, Ireland, Hungary, Austria, Syria and Pakistan. She also had several assignments in Washington. Ms. Curry was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

CURRY: From that, working for a Republican appointee, Walter Joseph Patrick Curley, Jr. Then, Jimmy Carter came in and Ambassador Kaiser got back in. He went to Hungary, Budapest. I went with him there. Then, another year, it was Vienna. After that year in Vienna, I went back to Washington, and worked for Joan Clark as the director general’s secretary, which was not very good. There was very little to do. I was unhappy finding a civil service person doing all the work I had been doing for ambassadors.

Q: But, you kept working for Kaiser, is that right?

CURRY: I worked for him for eight years; in Senegal, for three years, and London for five years. Then, after eight more years, when he was not working in the Foreign Service, he came back in, and then I worked for him for another four years.

Q: You can work for a man who is difficult for other people to work for, is that it?

CURRY: I don’t know how difficult he was for other people. Ambassador Kaiser was probably difficult to work for, and other people thought that. I think probably the last four years were a mistake, in a way.

Q: Is this in Hungary?

CURRY: Yes, and after that the year in Vienna.
Q: In Vienna, this idle European experience, how did you find that, as compared to other places?

CURRY: I liked it. I liked the Hungarians. It wasn’t as sophisticated as London, of course, Nothing really was. But, it was interesting tome. I was glad I went to Budapest and then Vienna, rather than the more sophisticated country last.

WARD THOMPSON
Austria and Switzerland Desk Officer

Ward C. Thompson was born in New Hampshire in 1941. He graduated from Brown University and received an M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1963 to 1966 as a captain overseas. After entering the Foreign Service in 1966, his postings abroad included Copenhagen, Seoul, Helsinki and Gothenburg. Mr. Thompson was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1999.

Q: Either that or he disappeared for snuggling up to a capitalist. Well, your interesting years in Finland came to an end in 1980 when you were assigned back to the Department, where you became, as I understand it, Desk officer for Austria and Switzerland.

THOMPSON: Yes.

Q: How did this come about? Did you request that assignment, or—

THOMPSON: Yes, I think we were by that time in the stage where you could bid on jobs, and it was rudimentary, as I recall, but I did bid on that job and was accepted for it.

Q: Who was your superior in that position?

THOMPSON: Well, that was the Office of Central European Affairs, which was the German directorate. And when I arrived there, Tom Niles, who was later assistant secretary for European affairs, was the director. He moved up eventually during my tour to become deputy assistant secretary, and he was replaced by John Kornblum, who was another of the well-known German hands, a brilliant guy. The Swiss-Austrian Desk was an anomaly, of course, in that directorate. Everybody else was working on Germany, and I was working on these two countries which were not of that great concern either to the country director or to the government as a whole in Washington. I think this complemented very well my experience in the Nordic countries, because I was dealing with small countries, again with two neutrals.

Q: Yes, I wanted to ask you to contrast the neutrality of Austria and Switzerland and Central Europe as compared with the Nordic brand of neutrality.
THOMPSON: Well, of course, Switzerland is unique among neutrals and remains so to this day. It's uninvolved in principle, but the Swiss, perhaps unlike the Finns, who never said that they were neutral in terms of attitudes, Switzerland is a Western country, but it's neutral militarily to the extent that it will not participate in the United Nations or the European Union or very much of anything else. Austria was under an imposed neutrality, again as a result of World War II and the Austrian State Treaty. Contrasting those two countries is very easy. They are very different, and very briefly, I think from the perspective of the Desk, the relationship between Switzerland and the United States takes place in Washington. You have a very competent, very well-staffed Swiss embassy here, which cultivates its relationship among the military, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, wherever there is interaction on the policy side in Switzerland. The Austrian relationship is conducted primarily in Vienna. You have an embassy here which is not very well staffed, doesn't have that much authority. That said, I do need to acknowledge that one of the ambassadors of Austria when I was here was Thomas Klestil, who is now the president of that country, but I think he himself probably was frustrated.

[interruption]

I was contrasting Switzerland and Austria. In terms of neutrality, I think that Austria in many senses was hiding behind its State Treaty relationship, probably like some of the Nordics, added to the fact that certain areas of foreign policy were beyond its control. Switzerland could always point to the fact that its voters would not allow it to participate, but basically, I think the Swiss are very well plugged in to what they're doing. One issue that came up during my watch was the proper relationship of the United States with Switzerland. I found out as desk officer that one thing that desk officers do is draft the efficiency reports of the ambassadors, and looking in the file, I saw that our ambassador to Switzerland when I arrived was a career officer, Dick Vine. I looked at the report that have been done earlier on him, and it said that he had very well maintained the American policy of—I don't recall the exact words, but in effect—"keeping a low profile," respecting Switzerland's neutrality and so forth. And this struck me as kind of odd. And then the Reagan Administration came in, a political appointee was named, who was not a contributor but a political activist, Faith Whittlesey, and at the same time the Reagan head of the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that the SEC was going to be very aggressive against insider trading. Well, suddenly this was an issue which involved Switzerland. And we had to decide whether to keep the gloves on or go after the Swiss. And we decided to go after the Swiss, and I think this was the beginning of the end of bank secrecy and a lot of things that the Swiss had maintained simply because nobody challenged them. At the same time, we had this development in NATO affecting Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF), and we were trying to drum up support in Western Europe for our position. And Ambassador Whittlesey didn't really understand the issues, but she learned. And she wanted to get out there and make the point that ambassadors were making to the host country audiences, and again, there didn't seem to be any real reason not to do this. And interestingly, she was approached at her hearing, before it was called to order, by one of the Swiss diplomats, and he told her that he expected that this would be an important issue. I was with her. It was at that point that she decided she'd better learn quite a lot about it. I visited her twice in Switzerland, and one time, I traveled with her around Switzerland, and she was making speeches which were Reaganesque, talked about the free enterprise system and things like that, and some of these could have been construed as rocking the boat. But the Swiss welcomed them, and I think that she was very well received. Now after my watch, she went back.
again. She had come to the White House, didn't like working with the Washington environment, and resumed her post after John Lodge had been out there. And I really don't know how she did then.

Q: Oh, so it went Whittlesey, Lodge, Whittlesey.

THOMPSON: Right.

Q: I see.

THOMPSON: I don't really know how she did the second time, but the first time, I think it was a breath of fresh air. Dick Vine obviously was a competent professional, but I think the contrast was helpful in our relationship with Switzerland.

You asked about how the Central European neutrals compared with the northern European neutrals. I think in both cases, as I indicated, the Central Europeans, one by choice and one by no choice, were locked into their neutral personas, whereas the Nordics were, by comparison, more flexible. And the CSCE process, I think, brought out the contrast, because the four of them—the Swedes, the Finns, the Swiss, and the Austrians—were in this neutral nations group in the middle of the East-West constellation. There was a bloc called the "N plus N," which was the neutrals plus Nonaligned. The Nonaligned included a lot of the mini-states in Europe and Yugoslavia, in the middle of this CSCE, but it was the four neutrals which carried the water, and the Swiss, with the Swedes, had been members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee in Korea, so they had that in common, both as an experience and as a credential. But I think the Finns and the Swedes were using Neutrality in a more dynamic way. They saw the CSCE as something that would enable them to assert themselves and carve out an area in the East-West relationship. The East-West confrontation was more of a threat to the Nordics than it was to the Swiss, certainly, and probably to the Austrians. So in that sense, they regarded their neutrality differently. Now today, of course, Austria has joined Finland and Sweden in the EU, but at that time neutrality meant something to the Austrians.

Q: But today the only true neutral is Switzerland, in a sense.

THOMPSON: In a sense, yes, as a non-participant.

Q: Well, one of the services that the Swiss provide is to represent us in areas where we can't be represented ourselves. On your watch, one of the most important of those was in Iran, in Teheran. Can you tell us anything about that and whether that caused any problem?

THOMPSON: Well, I can't tell you anything about the Swiss functions there. Now you mentioned hostages. Of course, the negotiations for the release of our colleagues who were being held hostage were going on, and the Swiss were dealing directly with the Middle Eastern Bureau, NEA, but I think the fact that the Swiss had that rule was important in their general relationship, and certainly it gave them a lot of access generally to the US Government, which helped this activist role that I talked about, and it gave them certain credentials internationally. I think that in a way it was too bad that they were out of bounds. Naturally the most important thing was that
they were doing what they were doing, but in terms of support for sanctions and isolating the government of Iran, they were not a player, because they had that special relationship, and so we didn't get to deal with them there.

I might mention that I was on the desk when Jimmy Carter was president, and then we had the change in administrations, and much has been made of the fact that Jimmy Carter micromanaged a lot, particularly in the area of nuclear weapons, because he was by training a nuclear scientist and so forth. And I was impressed that an issue came up which had to do with controlled materials, and we had to do the paperwork and send it to the White House and get the okay for the Swiss to deal with certain nuclear materials, and this little briefing memo that I had written came back with Jimmy Carter's initials on it. I never saw that again.

Q: A Thompson-to-Carter sort of thing.

THOMPSON: Yes, but actually, I think the relationship of the Desk with small countries whose importance can be left to others, but the fact that they're smaller than other countries means that we don't have the resources in Washington to devote to them that we do to other countries. And the relationship of the Desk is a very worthwhile one and a very interesting one because on a day-to-day basis, there is nobody else in the US Government up the chain of command dealing with those countries, and there are people who are responsible for knowing about these countries, but again, they have to leave the daily contact to the Desk. And so my routine was to call the DCM or receive a call from the DCM in each of these two capitals virtually every day to discuss the issues. Usually, the deputy assistant secretary or the assistant secretary wouldn't necessarily be available for a phone call from the ambassador, so this was the connection. And in terms of staffing the issues, we would of course have to get the Secretary of State or the National Security Council to agree to something, but a Desk officer could write a position paper and have it go virtually untouched up to whoever the decision-maker was, and then it would come back, again untouched, with either a yes or a no. This was sometimes an advantage and sometimes not so because to the extent that a desk gets involved in policy, it was a very small team, indeed, working on these issues. But I think, having been on the other end—you know, working as political counselor in Finland and Denmark—I realized that there were very few people back in Washington that you can turn to when you have a problem. But It's very good for the desk officer, and I think it led to my working very closely with the two embassies here in Washington, which is something that I know wasn't happening to my colleagues on the German Desk, simply because there were so many of them, and the Germans had the attention of many people higher up in the government.

Q: Fast forward to present day. Many of our problems with Switzerland in the last several years have resulted from the reaction to World War II, the Holocaust victims, the money that was put in Swiss banks. Was any of that foreshadowed in your day? Could you see the problem coming, or not?

THOMPSON: No, I don't think so. I think that was in the day when those countries who had been able to provide a haven for individuals under the occupation of the Nazis were generally highly regarded because they had provided that haven, and you didn't look to closely at what some of the trade-offs had been.
Q: Now, in 1981 we sold to the Austrians some F-16 airplanes, and that was reputed to be the first sale of high-performance planes to a neutral country. Was it difficult getting that decision reached, because you probably had to deal with a number of agencies getting there?

THOMPSON: Well, I don’t really think it was difficult getting approval to sell the aircraft. What was difficult, particularly for the Desk officer, was finding enough time to devote to the companies that were trying to sell. This sale depended on extensive negotiations, because the Austrians, like most Europeans, are used to offset arrangement, and a national industry such as the French Mirage, can come in and provide all kinds of offsets so that every amount of money that is spent on the aircraft will come back to the country buying the aircraft. And we can do this, but it's very difficult because usually you have to get a conglomerate or coalition of companies to negotiate the offset at the same time that they're competing with each other. For example, you had both GE and General Dynamics competing to sell the aircraft engines for the F-16, so they were dealing both in a sense together and in a sense separately with the same Austrian Government officials who were reviewing offers made by other countries like the Swedes and the French, particularly. All right, but I think that we needed to sell the F-16 to as many countries as possible to help our own industry as well as our security relationships in Europe. We were looking at the question of NATO compatibility and so forth, and this was an important consideration, even involving the neutrals.

Q: All right, I noticed that in 1981, Theodore Cummings was named our ambassador. What was his background?

THOMPSON: Well, Ted Cummings was a Republican supporter from California, and he apparently had been a member of the so-called "Kitchen Cabinet" of Governor Reagan. His function specifically was as a fundraiser within the Jewish community, and Cummings had been a successful grocer. He was a multimillionaire based on a food chain that he had built up in California, and the other relevant thing about his bio is that he had been born in what was then the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

You know, President Reagan appointed a lot of ambassadors back to countries of their birth, and I think basically that this was better than appointing them somewhere else, if you're going to have political appointees. In Cummings' case, I think that where he was born is now a part of Hungary, but he also was old, and he could recall when his mother took him to the funeral of, I guess, Emperor Franz Josef, when he was a teenager, and this was a background that very few FSO's could offer.

Q: 1916—I would say it was that.

THOMPSON: But I got to see the inner workings of some of the political process, and this is something that, I guess, is inevitable for a desk officer—not so much an eye-opener as an important lesson in political science in this country. Cummings, as I said, was a fundraiser among the Jewish supporters of the party, and this was a frank niche that he filled, and as a result, he made the rounds in Washington of the fellow Republican Jews among the political appointees, and he took me with him. We had some very nice meetings. We also went up and
met with the two senators from California, Senator Hayakawa and Senator Cranston. And these were courtesy calls. And I recall Senator Cranston revealing that he had been a college student working as a stringer in Europe, and he went to cover the Dollfuss trial and was the only American journalist accredited to it. So you never know what these contacts are going to lead to.

Q: *Interesting point. 1933. That was some time ago.*

THOMPSON: So Cummings—I think it's worth noting that he was a very decent person and a very conscientious appointee. I had prepared the normal briefing book for him. He had his wife with him in Washington, but he also had a staffer from California, and he spent long hours in his hotel room with the staffer going over this briefing book. And I tried to tell him that I thought the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be friendly, but he said he did not want to embarrass President Reagan, and he was going to learn absolutely everything.

Q: *Excellent.*

THOMPSON: And I had put into the briefing book many, many things, of course, everything that he could possibly want, and one of them was the fact that in 1980, at some point, the United States had had to point out to the Austrians that a shipment of sniper rifles had been transshipped, instead of going to Austria had gone to the PLO. And this, at the time, was an issue where we cautioned the Austrians that we would take them off the list of countries that could receive this particular weapon if they didn't behave themselves. And this was in there. And Cummings fielded a question from this very friendly panel on something that was totally innocuous, and he thought that he would bring this matter in, too, and he did, and that was all right, and then I was besieged by the press afterwards. They said, "What is this?" and I said, "Well, if you'll go to your files and look at the press releases from the US Department of State from about six months ago, you'll have all your answers. And of course they don't do that research.

Well, Cummings got appointed, and he went out to post, and he was there for three months, and then he left post. And he didn't tell the US Government, but was diagnosed with terminal cancer, and so it was my sad duty one day to call up Sol Polansky, who was our chargé and tell him that his ambassador had died. This was totally without any warning. So Sol ended up as chargé there for a long, long time, interspersed with Felix Bloch, and we didn’t get an ambassador out there again while I was on the Desk. Cummings had developed a good initial relationship with Bruno Kreisky, who was the chancellor, and it looked like because of his ties and his age that, as political appointments go, this was a pretty good one.

Q: *Well, it's a sad story. Well, your career on the Desk ended in 1982 when you moved sideways in the Department into the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).*

Gerald B. Helman
Deputy Head of U.S. Delegation, UN International Conference on Outer Space
Vienna (1982)
Gerald B. Helman was born in Michigan in 1932 and received a B.A. and an L.L.B from Michigan University. After entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his postings abroad have included Vienna, Barbados, Brussels, and Geneva. Mr. Helman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

HELMAN: For example I was named deputy head of the U.S. delegation to the second UN world conference on outer-space that took place in Vienna in the summer of ‘82. It was an interesting event that required considerable effort to organize. The U.S. delegation was very large, numbering close to 100 as I recall. There were arms control issues involved, so DOD was represented. So was NASA, of course, and State as well as a variety of agencies with scientific competence. The White House also used the occasion to award politically deserving types, as well as representatives from the private sector. The delegation included Ursula Meese, the wife of Ed Meese, who proved quite helpful. We had a large exhibit in an outer space exposition that accompanied the conference. It was put together by USIA and attracted participation by Charlie Wick. That was my first exposure to Charlie with whom I worked quite closely later when I got involved with public diplomacy. He carried a certain notoriety, but I liked him.

By the time I returned from Vienna, Larry Eagleburger was Undersecretary for Political Affairs, as I recall, and Larry had his own way of organizing things. I had gotten to know Larry quite well as his deputy when he was political adviser to the U.S. mission to NATO back in the early ‘70s. Larry had created a couple of positions which he called deputy to the undersecretary of state for political affairs, and I took one of them. So I embarked on a variety of activities that had fairly sizeable scope. I was able to function reasonably well within the Department and national security bureaucracy generally from that position. I remained in that job basically throughout much of the ‘80s.

Q: So we’ll pick this up in late ’81 when you came back, and you’d mentioned that you were dealing with outer-space. We might talk about if there are any issues there that were of interest and then we’ll talk about when you were working with Larry Eagleburger in political affairs and all of that.

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I’m not sure where we left off so we are going to start with your Washington assignment in ’81. How did you leave Geneva in ’82?

HELMAN: (laughs) I hope not in disgrace. I was assigned to Geneva somewhat short of two years and I was the first non-political appointee to that job as ambassador to the UN there. I did not expect to be retained by the new administration and of course I was not. The first rumored replacement was Senator Javits, who at that time either had retired or was about to retire from the Senate because of illness. He had something similar to Lou Gehrig’s Disease that gradually diminished his ability to move - it was a muscular disease. His name was withdrawn and I was not surprised; I had visited him in New York and clearly physically he was incapable of performing. Then they replaced me later that year with Geoff Swaebe - he also was subsequently our ambassador in Belgium.
In any event that was life in the Foreign Service and I came back to Washington sometime in the second half of 1981 with no particular assignment, no specific assignment, and I was lodged rather handsomely on the first floor where the transition team ordinarily is lodged. The first rather interesting job I had was to organize, manage, and participate in the second UN international conference on outer-space. I knew a bit about that from earlier assignments, and I certainly knew how to manage our participation in UN conferences. Reagan’s NASA Administrator, Jim Beggs, was the head of delegation. He was a solid fellow, an engineer with a successful career in the private sector. The conference was in Vienna and I knew Vienna and the Austrian conference organizers from an earlier Foreign Service assignment And I knew the issues. It was a conference in which the United States had no particular substantive interest but it was a good way of demonstrating our competence in outer-space. There was the usual competition with the Russians. So this took a good bit of time over the course of three or four months, beginning in early ’82.

Q: I would think that we were sort of preeminent in space, so that we would have an issue there.

HELMAN: Well, we didn’t have any substantive issues at stake, though we wanted, first, no damaging decision, and, second, some reasonably positive conference statements. There was an outer-space exhibition in connection with the conference. We also had a former astronaut on the delegation, I think it was Chuck Schmidt, who later was a Senator from Arizona or New Mexico. Great guy and a big hit with other delegates. He was very generous with photos and autographs. In those days, it was still a big deal to say you had met with a man who had been on the moon. We had that. There were a number of issues that were on the agenda on the future uses of outer-space, none of them were difficult to manage.

Q: Nobody was challenging putting up satellites and things like that? Because that would’ve cut to the quick.

HELMAN: No, it wasn’t that. The Conference was one in a series of UN activities that promoted the peaceful uses of outer-space. The exploration and use of outer space, almost by the laws of physics, is a global activity, one that inevitably attracts the interest, opposition, help, cupidity and contributions of other countries. The UN served as a forum through which to channel a lot of this and make sure the interests of others were benign or even positive in their expression. If you look back to the record of the UN’s actions on outer-space, they involved the Outer-Space Treaty, that probably remains a keystone of international law to the extent that it governs the uses of outer-space both for military and commercial purposes. So that has been a useful document and still pertains and still sets the standard. There were some follow-on treaties dealing with the safety and rescue of astronauts in distress and responsibility for damage caused by de-orbiting space objects. So the United Nations had a historic role and the United States would certainly not contest that historic role.

Q: Were you picking up any of the contempt for the United Nations that was one of the themes that ran through the early Reagan administration?

HELMAN: To some extent. There was some considerable initial debate in the Administration on
whether the US should participate. This was before I got involved, though I speculate that there was concern that the Conference would somehow deprive us of something important. Once we decided to go, there was precious little time to pull together position papers, assemble a delegation and find the money to design and mount an exhibit. I probably was pulled in because they were desperate to find someone who at least pretended to know what he was doing. In the event, the Conference was pretty much a celebration of outer-space and our contributions to its development. There were some military issues, some arms control issues, but those were fairly easily dealt with.

Q: But what you’re saying about the delegation, including the wife of the attorney general, it sounds like it was sort of a nice thing to go to. (laughs)

HELMAN: Sure, it was in Vienna. (laughs) One of the hottest summers anyone could recall in Vienna. And little air conditioning. But we survived. It was nice. It was nicely done and the delegation seemed reasonably happy with the results. Ours was a huge delegation, close to 100 people.

Q: And something like that, as sort of the top professional person, did you find you’re having to ride herd or something like that?

HELMAN: I managed. I had a fair amount of credibility with everybody. I think they understood that I probably knew more than they were ever going to learn. I got a lot of support from our delegation chief, Jim Beggs. All the career people from NASA, from DOD, from State, who were on the delegation were very cooperative. My main management problem was how to have all of the many delegation members feel they were participating but keeping them away from the controversial issues or those that involved sensitive material. Not too many of the delegation members had security clearances, as far as I recall. I organized a technique for keeping everybody informed. Rather than hold delegation meetings where some of the sensitive issues might be raised, and from which I would have to exclude most of the delegation, I simply put together a small team with which I would consult and discuss, off-line, the classified issues that were of concern. But in terms of a formal structure of the delegation, everybody was a part of the team; everybody was welcome. Every morning everybody had a chance to talk. It worked. My recollection is - and it’s been a number of years - that people were satisfied; they felt they were participants, they felt they were playing a role. We had the usual receptions and there was our outer space exhibit.

Q: Did you find yourself also acting a certain amount as a teacher or missionary and other to this disparate group, you know, saying international relations matter, the United Nations matter?

HELMAN: Yes, certainly I was doing that but it was not as if I had to take the initiative to overcome a palpable sense of opposition. Most of the people were fine. They were good American citizens; they wanted to do a good job for their country. They recognized that this is what we were involved in and they certainly were going to be on their best behavior with foreign nationals. There was an outer-space exposition associated with it that showed the glory of the U.S. and its achievements in outer-space. There was a competition with the Soviet Union that
always excites enthusiasm and cooperation on the part of the Americans. I think they accorded me a fair amount of respect with my background and my knowledge. They were eager to learn whatever I had to say about the UN and the conference. I don’t think I had any opposition, any backlash in terms of negotiations, in terms of procedure, organization of the delegation. I tried to make it as inclusive as possible.

Obviously when it got down to the nitty-gritty in some negotiations towards the end, I handled that personally. I didn’t take along teams of people with me. I had the information I needed and I usually included one or two others from the delegation. I knew the subject matter fairly well so I was fairly confident. We weren’t dealing with the kind of high profile issues where we had to have a decision by the National Security Council.

Q: *Did the rivalry with the Soviet Union show up in any of this?*

HELMAN: Well, in a couple of substantive issues, but mostly in the exposition; you know, we’re better than you are. But they had a very fine display, the Soviets. As did we, as did France, as did some others. It was fine. The Austrians enjoyed putting on these kinds of shows and we participated. I think my only complaint was we got started late on our exhibit because of indecision over whether to participate in the conference so didn’t commit quite enough money to put up the kind of exposition that we should have. But we still did a good job.

MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

**Head of U.S. Delegation, Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction**

*Vienna (1983-1984)*

*Ambassador Abramowitz was born in New Jersey and educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 after service in the US Army. A specialist in East Asian and Political/Military Affairs, the Ambassador held a number of senior positions in the Department of State and Department of Defense. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and as US Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981) and Turkey (1989-1991). He also served in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vienna. Ambassador Abramowitz was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2007.*

ABRAMOWITZ: Soon after Shultz became Secretary of State in mid-1982, he asked me to come to his office. I assumed that some people in whom he had confidence had suggested that he talk to me. I didn’t know Shultz at all. We talked about China mainly; the meeting took about 45 minutes during which he listened carefully and made a few comments; there was never any discussion about another assignment. In this period our relationship with China was still rocky. Although I had not published anything recently on China, I had continued to follow events closely.

Sometime in this period, I talked to a number of people about China, including Paul Wolfowitz, then in DoD. I think Paul may have talked to Shultz about me. However there seemed to be very little movement in trying to find a job for me. Rick Burt, the assistant secretary for EUR, called
me to tell me that he would like to nominate me to be our ambassador to Spain. That sounded pretty good to me at the time, even though I knew precious little about Spain.

Then, in a complete surprise to a lot of people, the administration fired all the leadership of our arms control efforts, the chief U.S. delegation to the START talks, the head of ACDA, and the chief of the delegation to MBFR. In one fell swoop, all the leading figures on arms control were eliminated. Ken Adelman became the head of ACDA. Max Kampelman became the chief of our START delegation. Before all this was announced, Shultz called me and asked me to head up our delegation to the MBFR negotiations.

I told the Secretary that I thought I was under consideration for the ambassadorship to Spain. He said that Spain was no longer available. That left me little choice and I told Shultz that I needed to talk to my wife first. I said I would call him the next day. The choice was really MBFR or retirement. In truth, I knew a little about MBFR – from my days in the Pentagon when the negotiations began – and furthermore, I never much liked long drawn out multi-lateral negotiations. Sheppie urged me to accept the Secretary’s offer and after further reflection I accepted the assignment. I also discussed the offer with some friends. I knew that the talks had become a ritualistic exercise and the possibility of reaching some acceptable agreement was remote. Everybody encouraged me to take it.

Q: Any idea how the Secretary came to his decision?

ABRAMOWITZ: I didn’t know, probably that I was available and had, except in the White House, a pretty decent reputation. I am sure there were people around him urging him to give me another ambassadorial assignment. I also suspect that MBFR did not rank very high on the Seventh Floor agenda. There was very little movement in the negotiations, but increased enormously the Department’s paper flow. Our delegation sent volumes of cables back to Washington. I can’t say that I looked at the assignment with relish. In fact, later when I was the head of INR, I issued instructions to my staff assistants that I wanted to see important material on all subjects except: MBFR and Cyprus. Ironically, I subsequently became ambassador to Turkey where I had to become quite familiar with the Cyprus problem, which has also produced endless reams of paper.

I guess I viewed the MBFR offer as the last opportunity to stay in the Foreign Service, which I had until then enjoyed, and I decided to accept the appointment. Had Sheppie advised against it, I probably would not have taken the job. So in 1983, I became the head of the U.S. delegation to the MBFR with the rank of ambassador. In retrospect, I am glad I stayed in the Service, although I quit after a year.

Q: You said you resigned from the MBFR assignment after a year. Why so soon?

ABRAMOWITZ: The work was boring and left me quite distressed. When I took the assignment, I knew about the difficulties of making progress and the lack of interest in both the U.S. and Russian governments. Nevertheless, I was determined to take the whole issue seriously, I quickly immersed myself in the present and past situations and got up to date. The subject matter was not of great interest to me; it was not one to which I could have devoted my career.
But I did learn as much about it as I could.

Q: Do you remember what you did in preparation for that tour?

ABRAMOWITZ: It was a new field for me and I took the assignment very seriously. I tried to learn all of the arcane truth and myths surrounding the negotiations; I read voluminous correspondence and lengthy treatises on the subject. If I had a choice of assignments, I don’t think I would have spent more than two minutes on the choice. I studied hard and talked to many.

One day, I went to Rick Burt to talk about some of the issues facing MBFR. Before I got very far, he said: “Mort, you know more about this stuff than anyone else here.” It was a big educational job on an arcane subject.

When I landed in Vienna, the negotiations had long been frozen. Meetings were held which were ritualistic recitals of the various positions each side had maintained for years. Basically we insisted the basis of the negotiations be on counting manpower and the Soviets insisting on counting armaments. We never could reach agreement on that basic difference. It appeared to me that this could be a lifetime job.

During my tour, the situation did change somewhat. Our delegation developed a proposal which gave something to the Soviets in the hopes of enticing them to agree to a very small interim deal to advance the negotiations. Our proposal led to two NSC meetings, both chaired by Ronald Reagan. I was the chief briefer. State supported the proposal (State loves agreements by nature); DoD opposed it, because essentially it was opposed to reaching any agreement with the Soviets. The Pentagon was perfectly happy to carry on negotiations leading nowhere. I thought our proposals protected our basic interests, while paying obeisance to the situation, and making a small step forward.

In the final analysis, the talks made no progress while I was the head of the U.S. delegation. The process revolved around “rounds” which lasted for about eight weeks. Each week started with a plenary session. Then we would consult with our allies to prepare our positions for the next plenary. After each eight week period, there was a hiatus of about four weeks, theoretically for each government to review what had happened and to formulate its plans for the next round. I used the four weeks quite fruitfully; Sheppie and I traveled through many countries of central Europe. We managed to see a lot of Europe and to learn about a continent with which I was not as familiar as Asia or even Latin America.

One night during our effort to mount a new proposal, Sheppie and I went to the Vienna opera. In the middle of the performance, I got a call from Ken Dam, the deputy secretary of state. Or rather, Dam called the embassy who sent the duty officer to the opera house to get me out. I called Dam from the opera house pay phone; he wanted me to come back immediately to Washington to discuss our new proposal.

During the sessions, we were busy with “make-work.” I consulted with our allies, I consulted with the Soviets. There was constant social interaction. I spent a lot of time just meeting with
Austrian officials and foreign diplomats stationed in Vienna and with visitors. I did learn one important thing about the Soviet delegation. I was struck by their extraordinary feeling of inferiority when they compared themselves to us and our perceived capabilities. They at least saw us as “seven feet” tall, incredible omnipotent. That was a revelation.

I never saw any hope of the MBFR negotiations coming to a successful resolution or even a partial agreement. It would have taken a _deus ex machina_ to change the environment. I didn’t see that happening, but in fact, it did later on, and that was the end of the Soviet Union. Incidentally we changed our position on conventional forces in Europe when the Berlin wall came down and the Soviet Union became Russia. Both sides wanted an agreement and we adapted armaments on the basis of the agreement.

I developed some close friendships with members of the allied delegations, some of which have continued to this day. Since the numbers of people working on MBFR was rather limited, we were a small fraternity pretty much left to its own devices, and we developed a close camaraderie. In the end, for me it was a wasted year. As I mentioned earlier, after a year, I simply told the Department I was leaving. I didn’t ask for the Secretary’s permission; I just told them I was through with MBFR. That produced a certain amount of consternation in Washington.

My year in Vienna was a turbulent period for me intellectually and emotionally because I didn’t see that I was doing much of any use.

**VLADIMIR LEHOVICH**

*Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks*  
*Vienna (1983-1986)*

_Vladimir Lehovich was born in New York in 1939 and received his Bachelor’s Degree from Harvard University 1961. His overseas postings included Saigon, Brussels, Bonn and Vienna. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Lehovich on March 25, 1997._

Q: When you got out in ’83, you went to where?

LEHOVICH: I went to Vienna with the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR), which are the conventional European force reduction negotiations.

Q: You were there from when to when?

LEHOVICH: I was there from the summer of 1983 until the summer of 1986 - basically, three years.

Q: That's a long time to be dealing with one issue.
LEHOVICH: That's a long time. I was the deputy head of our delegation, the deputy US representative. We had a fairly sizable delegation there, about 25 or more people, most of them professionals, one a two-star general, one a Pentagon GS-18, and all sorts of other personalities and folks. But three years is a long time to spend not only with one subject, but with one subject which at that time already had a well-deserved reputation of moving slowly, albeit gracefully, very slowly indeed.

Q: Let's talk about the delegation first and then about the issues. What was your impression of First, who was the leader of the delegation, our leaders, and then the sort of currents that came from, I suppose, particularly State and the Pentagon, that were during this ’83 to ’86 period, the Reagan years?

LEHOVICH: I was there with three heads of delegation. I came out with Morton Abramowitz, who brought me out. Mort stayed somewhat over a year and was replaced by Maynard Glitman, Mike Glitman, who stayed six or seven months and then left me with the delightful job of running that delegation for about six months. Then Robert Blackwill, Bob Blackwill, came out. These were three very bright people. These were also three people who had been skeptical of this negotiation before, as had I. All three, however, for at least a significant part of their time as ambassadors, experienced a change of heart and concluded that this was a very important negotiation and one which had prospects for success... for success on their watch. I think they were all three wrong. I don't think it was an important negotiation. I think there were no prospects of success on their watch. I shared my views with Mort Abramowitz the first time we ever spoke of the negotiation, well before he asked me to come out with him. Neither he nor the others minded a bit of philosophical disagreement.

Q: But do you think this is part of being number one, you really get engaged; number two is able to sit back a little bit and not get, you might say, as caught up in the thing, do you think?

LEHOVICH: There’s another, more important point. Without being fundamentally cynical, which I’m not, I had been there 10 years earlier to the year with the first round of these talks in 1973. When you come back 10 years later and you get back in the same canoe and they give you the same paddle and you paddle in the same water and you're not terribly far ahead of ten years before, you do get a certain sense of history. I had that sense of history and my overall sense of the Soviets and NATO was that neither one was in a terrible hurry to do this, nor was the US. As I think we mentioned earlier in this series, what I've learned in the last three or four years since the collapse of the Soviet Union is that serious arms control, not to speak of serious disarmament, happen when life is ready for them and then they have to catch up with life. Serious arms control is not decided by negotiators who decide to do something. Events cause it and the negotiators then catch up with it.

My three leaders all thought that they were in a position of perhaps shaping events and moving them faster. Sometimes people are in such a position - but in this case, I think, they were honorably off the mark.

Q: Was there a split between State and the Pentagon? I would think the Pentagon representing the military forces would be delighted with the slow pace and State would be, as you say, hoping
for a breakthrough, at least on the leadership side? Did you find this?

LEHOVICH: We did get into an interesting question, and it's worth generalizing about, with both State and ACDA. People who work, who see themselves as working intensely on arms control sometimes get a little program-oriented on disarmament. They get program-oriented and they want success.

Q: Could you explain "program oriented?"

LEHOVICH: Yes. They think that they have a program and that this program has as a goal -to conclude an agreement. That agreement would place certain limits on existing arms and activities, or might lead to disarmament. There are a lot of folks who think that their job is to produce such agreements. Let's call that for a moment an arms control community. That exists within the State Department, within the Arms Control Agency, and in a few other places. There is another group of people who will work generally on security issues who are remarkably neutral about this kind of thing. They don't view an arms control agreement with the Soviets is terribly exciting in one way or another. It's symbolically very important. But it may be a good idea, it may be a bad idea, or it may be a great big irrelevancy or a charade. Actually, most of the responsible levels, the senior levels, of the State Department tended to think that way.

Q: This was where we fell in.

LEHOVICH: That's more or less where I fell in because that's sort of where a professional NATO worker and watcher would fall in, but I think the senior management of the State Department tended to see it that way, too. The arms control folks didn't always, and our negotiators out there, for at least a while, would tend to see that there was a program objective of getting an agreement or moving toward one and that they had a real role in it. The Soviets didn't make it easy because they had staked out a fairly dishonest position for several years in these negotiations. They had basically lied about some important military data years before and that caused an enormous problem that just sort of never went away. The other thing that didn't make it easier was that, at that time, NATO was proceeding with the deployment of medium-range weapons in Europe. What the Soviets did was, at one point, and this I think was in late '83, they canceled various arms control negotiations. They had called off the strategic arms talks, which was the really important thing they did. But then they also canceled the Vienna negotiations, which actually was a very stupid thing to do on their part.

Q: Could you explain a bit of the background on this?

LEHOVICH: The background is that there was a decision by NATO to move in ground launched cruise missiles and Pershing missiles to various parts of Europe, which would be able to strike the Warsaw Pact and parts of the Soviet Union. The reason that NATO decided to do this was because the Soviets had escalated their own strategic arms some years before that. This was a very openly planned step to restore the balance and also to teach a lesson, which is that no bad deed remains unpunished and if the Soviets are going to be putting in a major new weapons system, there is going to be a step in response. What the Soviets did is, they made this into a sort of do or die issue, “you can't let this happen,” and they were very threatening and very ominous
and threatened that relations would be damaged with the West and, as part of that, to prove that relations were being damaged, they would cancel various activities. They've done this on occasion.

Q: *This seems to be a real tactic, doesn't it, to make a step forward and there is a response to get mad as hell?*

LEHOVICH: That's right. With the Soviets, at that time, and in a sense, continuing with today's NATO debate, the debate about expanding NATO in 1997, the Soviets have this old habit of screaming that the sky is going to fall in if something happens. They're doing it less in 1997 than before because they're hurt, they're a weak country. But they could do it a lot better in the early '80s. They had done it before when NATO was being enlarged to include Germany, and on various occasions before.

Q: *Currency reform in Germany even before that.*

LEHOVICH: "End of the world. The sky is going to fall in. History will be changed and you will regret it." They talk that way. To prove it, they would do some things. The things that they were doing in this period was to cancel arms control negotiations. So, they canceled the Vienna talks, which means they and the other Warsaw Pact countries walked out. There was sort of an under reaction on the NATO side. Some countries said "This is awful." Most countries were much more practical. They said, "Look, what do we do? Do we close our delegations? Do we keep renting hotel rooms?" The answer there, and I played a part in formulating this response because I had a fairly clear idea of what we should do, was to do nothing. Don't cancel your hotel rooms. Make them look as silly as you can for a step like this. Then we had a wonderful time in Vienna for three to four months with no negotiations.

Q: *I was wondering, were any budgeteers coming around from the various things?*

LEHOVICH: No, we were very prudent people and we, first of all, decided there were going to be no unusual or forward-looking expenses made, no investments, no anything. We're going to run down capital and trim our sails and cancel any kind of discretionary spending of one or another kind. But if we had canceled and walked out, if the West had canceled and walked out, then it would have been a mutual thing and very hard to walk back. We were right because they came back and then they looked awfully silly when they came back. What we did in the time that the talks were shut down is, we basically stayed busy. We started a series of studies, analyzing military events, political events, we did demographic studies on Eastern and Western military, things that we found weren't being done elsewhere that we were aware of and we did them with our own resources. We basically kept busy so as not to get stale and not to feel demoralized. Then they came back. They looked awfully stupid. They felt awfully stupid.

Q: *It is kind of hard to storm out and then sort of come back in the door.*

LEHOVICH: It's even worse if you do it in two or three negotiations at once. You basically, to use a splendid old Irish term, you look like a schmuck when you've done it. And they felt that way. Anyhow, the talks resumed about three months later. I don't think the quality of the
dialogue got much better or much worse after they resumed. The rhythm of the talks was that there were sort of a lot of bilateral discussions that happened every week among all the different countries. There were 19 countries involved in these talks, 12 from NATO and seven from the Warsaw Pact. There were two or three formal or semi-formal sessions every week which were sort of scripted. On the NATO side, a very important activity in which the US played a very prominent role was to keep the NATO group meeting regularly (This would usually mean at least twice a week), a group of ambassadors and staffs from the involved NATO countries. Sometimes these were the bilateral ambassadors. Sometimes they were special arms control ambassadors. There were also various subgroups of the NATO caucus that would be working at all times. This was serving several goals. One, it was keeping in shape. Two, it was keeping a common frame of information among all the NATO countries so that when they were talking to their capitals, they were all in a similar thought process. And, as someone once put it, it was good work therapy for everybody. It kept everybody busy and actually kept us intellectually, I think, way ahead of the Warsaw Pact side.

Q: Something like this, if things are moving so slowly, I imagine that there really is a problem keeping people up to speed rather than just getting so bored they-

LEHOVICH: There is a problem of negotiation management, the 19 countries. I kept very busy. I did not have to work weekends or enormously long weeks, but I kept very busy because I felt my role and the role of a number of people on the Western side was, one, to keep in touch with all of the Western delegations in a very positive way. Cynicism is a big enemy in these things. I was a very positive creature. We all were very positive creatures at that time. We had ideas, we had programs, we had a thing to do each week and each month. Two, I kept in touch with all of the Eastern delegations, had very good relations with them. One of the interesting things for me, which made it a good investment of time, is, I spent an awful lot of those three years getting to know people from the Warsaw Pact countries in a way that I would probably not have done any other way. Some of them I got to know really very well. They always welcomed interest from and a conversation with the United States. They took it seriously. I treated them with great interest and with a lot of respect. Very good relations with the Soviets, who like nothing more than to be listened to. An awful lot of the time, these conversations would run out of steam on the subject of arms control because how often can you talk about something that's standing still? Politics is a strange subject. Sometimes the awkwardness - sit there talking with a Soviet about politics when they've just had, say, the downing of the Korean airliner - they can't talk about anything relating to that. It's too difficult for them. Or supposing, as happened a year or two after that, they just had the Chernobyl event, where their exciting new leader, Gorbachev, waits about three weeks before he speaks publicly about that. You have an event like that - you can't even talk about those things unless you want to ruin a conversation. You can, but it becomes embarrassing. A lot of the time we spent discussing sort of philosophical, artistic, aesthetic subjects. We would usually begin and end a particular session with some arms control and strategic subjects. I found that there was a lot of energy that I was spending and that the US was spending in keeping different delegations productive and happy.

Q: Did you notice in your contacts any difference between the component parts of the Warsaw Pact?
LEHOVICH: Very little. I would say that the Soviets at that time- First of all, I don't think they were a top flight delegation. I would even go further. I would say they were distinctly not a top flight delegation compared to others that they had fielded in other places. They weren't awful, but they weren't top flight. By that time, thinking Soviets had gotten so cynical that these guys had real trouble figuring out where their country should be going or where they should be going. I'm not talking about arms control, but in a much broader way. This is why the Gorbachev phenomenon took hold so quickly. Soviet society was just very cynical by then. We had, during this period, the death of Andropov, Chernenko and Brezhnev. It was sort of one after the other. It's one duffer after the other collapsing.

Q: This is as uninspiring a crew as.. though Andropov is somewhat interesting.

LEHOVICH: He was somewhat interesting, but he was ill and he croaked very soon after entering. It was very demoralizing for the Soviets because they felt that they were representing a country that looked and felt ridiculous on the world stage, and they did. There was no question that this Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko phenomenon is one of the things that clarified Gorbachev's own thinking.

Q: Did you find the Warsaw Pact trying to understand Ronald Reagan? Ronald Reagan came across initially as a cowboy, not well-informed, and particularly coming out from Hollywood and all that. You were pretty early on in the Reagan time. I would have thought that there would have been a great deal of interest of "Where is this guy coming from and who is in command?"

LEHOVICH: There were a couple of interesting points with Reagan. One is, Reagan was, I think, viewed with considerable spontaneous dislike by the Soviets because he was very anti-communist. Now, that's perfectly fine. We were all very anti-communist. But he had a really very personal way of saying that, a very belittling way of saying that - "Evil Empire" type of discussion - and a lot more of that kind. So, in one sense, there was a real dislike of Reagan. But that changed very dramatically when Reagan was shot.

Q: That was in the spring of '81, if I recall.

LEHOVICH: I don't remember when, but there was a very, very interesting change when that happened because after Reagan was shot, one, it was a different kind of sympathy for him, and two, the guy recovered and within a short time, was shown in his undershirt cutting wood out at his ranch, with bulging biceps. At the same time, you were watching these Soviet leaders die off one after the other. That's where the contrast came in. The other contrast was the whole image of the US at that time was also of a Reagan economic revolution and of a new attitude toward military spending and military power and a lack of inhibition about wanting to be strong militarily, which everyone felt over there. We were at a very sensitive place in terms of feeling a growth in American military presence.

Q: During these talks, was there an underlying thing that the Soviets had a hell of a lot of stuff, but the quality was not up to the same standard, particularly in electronics? Was there a perception of that, that maybe the great Soviet advantage of quantity was being supplanted by quality?
LEHOVICH: No, we didn't have that sense. I think one could argue that, but I wouldn't make that.

Q: That wasn't part of the...

LEHOVICH: No, I don't think it was. There were a couple of things that were always in the thinking of the Western side as we discussed the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. There were really two considerations. One is, there are an awful lot of them and they were poised in a way to get through certain places like the north German plain very quickly. There was just no question about that. The other thing is that everyone knew that their economy was creaking and working badly and there comes a point when your inability to make toilet paper or certain other commodities which other societies make effortlessly will reflect on your war effort. Their economy was lousy enough so that the concept of successful, prolonged war was much more difficult for them than it would have been if they had a good economy. So, mainly, Stu, the notion of a hot Soviet threat at that time was pretty remote.

Let me go back to one other thing you had said. How did the Soviets and the other Warsaw Pact countries think about things? The other Warsaw Pact countries, I think, with a couple of exceptions, were a gloomy bunch (I'm generalizing). I think they were just generally beaten down in terms of any independence in international affairs. Hungary was always being very lively and creative and they had a very gifted two or three people who were working on their delegation. Unlike the Soviets, the Hungarians had their best people there. I had heard of them before. I knew they were good. They were good then, and since then the ones who were young are at the top. There's no question about it. Hungarians put their first team out there. They were coming up with bright ideas and they were a lot of fun to talk to because they were reading Western literature and they were making a deliberate point of not thinking in the same mold as the Soviets. The East Germans had a very good delegation, but for what purpose? For absolutely no purpose because the East Germans were locked in so totally with the Soviet line that the quality of their delegation was basically irrelevant. The others didn't really care. The Czechoslovakian government service, civil service, foreign service, and others, had deteriorated dramatically since 1968. I say this because I had dealings with them from the early ’70s on. They had gone downhill. We didn't have a terribly good Czechoslovak group over there, and it tended to be Slovak rather than Czech oriented in leadership. The Bulgarians didn't really care too much. As for the Poles, there was a communist in charge of the delegation, not a very loud or militant one, but man who, in his quieter moments, would acknowledge that he was a communist and an atheist. That's not a very interesting Polish representative at a time when you had Pope John Paul and Lech Walesa changing the landscape so basically. He was the man from yesteryear, although a very nice fellow.

Q: Let's talk about the NATO side. First, were there any splits, desires, within the NATO side? How did you all proceed?

LEHOVICH: On the NATO side, because this wasn't a very active period, we proceeded in a pretty civil way. The Germans had to take these talks seriously whether they were going somewhere or not. The top levels of the German government were well-informed about what
was actually happening in these talks. The top levels of the American and most other allied
governments were really not very informed. They sort of knew that this year things were this or
that, but they weren't tactically informed. The top levels of the German government were
actually tactically informed reasonably well on what was going on. The Germans took the stuff
very seriously and they always wanted the NATO side to look as forthcoming as possible. It
didn't mean they wanted anything surprising to happen quickly, but they wanted to look good
and to look positive. That's in contrast with sort of a typical British position, which sometimes
changed. Basically a typical British position was not to look any more positive than one had to in
this kind of a setting and sort of give it the back of the hand. That was partly sort of a national
attitude, character, but also partly, I think, a way to make sure the United States wouldn't get
ahead of itself because there had been some times in the preceding 10 years when the US would
get excited about these talks for one reason or another. It happened with Kissinger, as we
discussed earlier in these interviews. It happened afterwards. Occasionally, American
ambassadors, including the three that I mentioned and their predecessor, Jonathan Dean, would
get terribly excited about these talks and try to move them forward. That was one additional
reason why the British were displaying zero enthusiasm for this process and didn't really want it
to look any more positive than it had to. Most of the other countries were neutral. There were a
couple that had very particular interests. The Italians were always interested in not having Italian
forces covered by this agreement. There are some historical reasons for that. The Greeks and
Turks were always interested in any issues affecting forces on the flanks. Incidentally, I have yet
to meet a Turkish diplomat whom I don't consider to be first-class. Maybe they exist; I just
haven't run into them. Their diplomats at these talks were excellent. The Italians happened to be
excellent, too.

Q: Did you find that the Greeks and Turks were sort of saying, "Make sure that we don't reduce
something which would give the Turks advantage over the Greeks or the Greeks advantage over
the Turks?"

LEHOVICH: That wasn't an issue, but they didn't want anything that would affect force
capabilities in the flank region. Otherwise, they had no antagonisms in these talks in any way
that I ever observed. They also didn't want what they would have considered naive or silly
visionary movement to a premature agreement. I'm saying it about the way they would have said
it. The Greek would have put it that way. The Turk would have said, "Why do stupid things
now?" They didn't want any nonsense. They were very happy to be sitting there. We also had a
very reasonable representative from NATO headquarters who was part of this NATO caucus, a
Belgian gentleman called Philippe de Burlet, who reported to the Secretary General of NATO on
what we were doing. He was a very bright fellow. Each delegation had a military representative,
most delegations did. American and British and Dutch delegations had general officers. At
various points, the Germans would have a general officer or a colonel. Our general officer, Major
General Adrian St. John, was retired and had been called back for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
was one of the brightest arms control minds working for the JCS at that time. The others were
military generals who were plugged into their establishments. There was a NATO military
representative who was always present. This was good because as the civilian negotiations
progressed interminably, the really productive work was probably being done by the military
representatives. Let me just dwell on that for a minute because I think this is less understood.
The Western military group at Vienna, the military members of delegation, met regularly and at
an early point in its existence in these endless negotiations had taken up the task of doing certain military studies on the effects of arms control or disarmament and on ways to do it, ways to verify it, and what steps actually need to get taken. They did a lot of work. Some of this work was voluminous and some of it was intellectually rigid, meaning it was good stuff. It wasn't nonsense. At some point, they began working jointly with military representatives from the Warsaw Pact. They began to share this type of thinking, sometimes with agreement from the other side, sometimes without. But basically, by the time that we were in the mid-1980s, the serious work that had been done toward an agreement was in large degree done by the military, who had some steps actually worked out for what you do and who had exchanged these so that there was a common vocabulary, a common database - not a database on how many bodies there are, but a database on how to work. Very important work. I felt that at the time that I was there, if we had to conclude an agreement, we could have concluded one quite quickly (quite quickly means a couple or three months) without nearly as many mistakes as we would have made if this military process hadn't been going on. The same can be said for the civilian process, but I think the military process at that point was less obvious and was more important.

Q: What about France? Was France part of the equation?

LEHOVICH: France was never part of the equation. They didn't bother anyone, they didn't really care, and they weren't terribly relevant. Nobody minded them and nobody thought of them.

Q: Obviously, even though it was far away, you had to have sort of an end game. Suppose you ended up with something, an agreement, what was envisaged by, say, your delegation that might be a way of coming to an agreement?

LEHOVICH: The big unknown, and something I never tried to envisage because I didn't believe in agonizing needlessly, concerned reductions and numbers. Would there be reductions? Would there not be reductions? Hard to foresee. What was pretty obvious is that there would be limitations on forces. Maybe it would be a freeze. Maybe it would be something that would not best be described as a freeze but that in effect was a freeze. But at a minimum, what happens if you have an agreement on conventional forces on two sides of a dividing line in Europe is, you have restrictions on future military activities. So, what I was interested in were questions of what kind of limitations there would be. In the Western side, this means basically how forces can move into Germany or not from places like America, Canada, England, France, but also Belgium and Holland. Those were the stationing forces. The worst thing imaginable would be to create some kind of naive, ambiguous or stupid regime that would then limit the ability to reinforce. We weren't thinking about the next year. We're all familiar with the history of the century. We're thinking 10 or 20 years in the future. So, that was one important concern which is what kind of limitations you have. The other concern was verification. Here we get into a really sort of difficult subject because when you look back at the early '80s. Let's go to Poland for a minute and the death of Father Popieluscu. Then to Germany and the death of Major Anderson.

Q: Could you explain this?

LEHOVICH: I will get to this in a minute. There were two very different cases, but to me, they were a key part of verification. Father Popieluscu was a Polish priest. Father Popieluscu had a lot
of political enemies from the government, from the security services, and he was killed. He was killed in a crash, as I remember, with a snowplow on a day that it wasn't snowing. His body was thrown into a well. Father Popieluscu was a case that was disturbing because it was a very public case. The American major was someone who was part of the American military liaison group that had a mandate to circulate in East Germany. They were trapped physically by Soviet forces. One large truck was in front, one large truck was behind and they basically closed in on this jeep and crushed Major Anderson, who basically observing their troop movements - in other words, verifying. The reason I mention these two cases is that the notion at that time of having on sight verification of conventional force reductions aroused a lot of skepticism. It was a very controversial notion. I for one was very skeptical that it could work. In fact, I was absolutely sure it couldn't work. I was probably wrong. I was probably too pessimistic. But the reason I and others were very pessimistic at that time was because of cases like those of Father Popieluscu and Major Anderson, and the actual physical violence done in different parts of the Warsaw Pact by the organs of the security services or by military intelligence.

To get back to the main theme, the main theme was what kinds of things was one preparing for. Well, on the one hand, one was preparing for freeze or force limitations, which was one obvious thing that happens. The second thing, one begins to prepare for verification. Verification was a political requirement as well as something that a reasonable person wants. A political requirement because the American political system, the Congress, and much of the Western political system made clear that verification would be a key to the acceptability of any agreement that we came up with. A lot of people, I think, were interested in using verification as sort of an impossible test, a test so impossible that it would have to fail and therefore, there could never be any movement. But verification was the other big concern other than force limitations. I have to say, at that time, we were all very skeptical about a good verification system. We were thinking that if we had to move to an agreement, we would either have to rely on national technical means, which had their ups and downs, but they're not commonly shared, or we would have to rely on some kind of pretty inhibited on sight verification, which would not work well. So, we were pretty skeptical. That was the other part. Those were the two main things one thought about. I didn’t think a lot about how many forces would be withdrawn or not because that varies.

Q: I would have thought, too, that you were, in a way, dealing with an apples and oranges situation in that, particularly armed forces, but I imagine that most of the NATO armed forces were going through what essentially was a professionalization of the military, whereas the Soviets (and this is true even today) have shown they don’t really have that professional an army. They have an awful lot of recruits who are poorly trained and that's what they've relied on and do today. It's just a different type of army. I think it's been shown by actual performance that he smaller professional army is far more proficient in doing what it's supposed to do than the large not as well trained universal military service type unit.

LEHOVICH: These are very useful thoughts. Here is what happens when one thinks about the Soviet military. Basically, you go back as far as you can. Go back to the Napoleonic war, the war with Napoleon in 1812, the Crimean war, World War I, World War II, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, and tell me one time when the Russian army was in shape to fight any one of those military engagements. They never were. They aren't now. They never have been. Maybe they never will be. Maybe someday they will be. But basically, the history there is always of getting
creamed at the beginning of a campaign, looking terrible, and then catching up afterwards. The difference in the Central European situation was that the kind of forces that were available, their tank forces, to move through could have moved through. There is little doubt about it. But after that, if it's a campaign that will last more than a couple of months, the Soviets are going to begin to look awful. I think people generally thought that. But, you know, we're speaking right now in a pretty detached way. If you spoke that way to some ideologically excited American analyst working on Soviet military affairs, they would say that you were wrong. They would say that they're much better than that, the 10 feet tall business. The point is, there is just no question that two things have been constants in Russia for 70 years plus. One is that the army tends to be in lousy shape most of the time and unprepared when something bad happens. Two is that the economy is lousy. That's the way it is. That's the way it has been. It's even worse today than usual.

Q: Leaving this exercise - I won't say in futility, but anyway, this exercise-

LEHOVICH: It's an exercise in international dialogue which is extraordinarily useful because- Let me just say something so that we don't get too cynical. There was a wonderful American congressman who came out, Jack Brooks. He was on one of the key committees that worked on military money. He came out to our delegation. He was a horrible budget cutter, this guy. He was very mean about budgets. He came out to Vienna and our whole delegation met with him. We thought he was going to tear us apart because he started to say, "I want to know how much you've spent. I want to know how much you spend every month. I want to know how much you spend every year. How much does your delegation spend? How much do you spend on housing and everything?" We told him all this stuff. He sat there adding it all up and then he said, "Just as I thought. You guys cost less than one Abrams tank. You people are a terrific bargain!" I'm serious. That was a Representative Jack Brooks, and he kept things in perspective. Our delegation did cost less than one Abrams tank.

Q: Which is our main battle line tank.

LEHOVICH: Which is our main battle line tank and whatever its cost was more than it cost to keep our delegation going for a year. It's not an exercise in futility. It's an exercise in alliance management for the NATO alliance. My motto with these MBFR negotiations was very simple and I said it very quietly to people on the Western side when they would lose the big picture. The motto was "The right course to take in these negotiations is the course that keeps NATO cohesive and happy. The wrong course is any other course." That's absolutely true. That's the way it was. We were carrying out that type of political function.

LAWRENCE DUNHAM
Diplomatic & Consular Liaison, Office of Protocol

Mr. Dunham was born and raised on Nantucket Island, Massachusetts and was educated at Catholic University and George Mason University School of Law.
After working briefly in the United States Customs Service in Washington, DC, he joined the Department of State’s Office of Protocol in 1983. He worked in the Office of Foreign Missions as Diplomatic and Consular Liaison until 2001, at which time he was appointed Assistant Chief of Protocol, serving in that capacity until 2005. Mr. Dunham was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Well let’s start with your first job, what sort of things were you dealing with?

DUNHAM: Generally as I said, the issues related to immunity. It is hard to remember specific cases, but I will tell you of one, which for some reason always stood out in my mind, and it happened early on when I got there. Of course it took me a little while to read in and to learn certain things, so I started with some pretty mundane stuff. But at one point, Dick Gookin gave me a note which had come in from the Embassy of Austria, where the son of the ambassador had received a notice to register for the selective service. Although there was no draft in effect, they still had a process where young men had to be registered. Of course this is inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. So it was my job to research the convention and find the appropriate provision, and to prepare a letter for the Selective Service Administration advising that sons of diplomats can’t be required to register for the draft, and also prepare a note to the embassy informing them that the matter had been taken care of. The reason that it stands out in my mind is because subsequently that ambassador eventually became the president of Austria. It is one of those little things that sticks with you, probably because it was one of my first diplomatic cases. After that, I became involved with occasional landlord tenant disputes, mediating matters between the parties; cases involving immunity, where a diplomat or family member breaks the law. The State Department has a well established procedure for dealing with those cases. They are not swept under the rug by any means. I also got involved with some of the representation work of the office, meetings, greetings and escorting ambassadors to the White House when they presented their credentials. Occasionally greeting high level visitors at C Street, helping out at receptions or dinners or things like that. So very early on I was engaged in the overall operations of the office.

MAYNARD WAYNE GLITMAN
Chief U.S. Representative, Mutual and Balanced Forces
Vienna (1984-1985)

Ambassador Maynard Wayne Glitman was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his BA from the University of Illinois and his MA from Fletcher School of Law and diplomacy MA, and served in the U.S. Army in 1957. His postings abroad include Nassau, Ottawa, Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Vienna, and served as the ambassador to Belgium. James S. Pacy interviewed the ambassador on April 24, 2001.

Q: We now move to the year ’84 and you are the Chief U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.
GLITMAN: Right. We moved to Vienna essentially by car. I mentioned that Jeep Wagoneer that we had, with all the changes in the wiring. This was one of those moves when everything was going to be changed again. We drove over the Alps to Vienna from Geneva, probably had the dog with us. There we had quarters ready, I think it was Abramowitz’s, he had found a wonderful apartment, not far from the Opera and the Karntnerstrasse, which is the main walking street, the cathedral, all within a walking distance and above all the Musikverein were within walking distance. It was a nice place. It was kind of a spooky building in some ways. It was half empty and there were Hungarians also located in one of these apartments in this building. Not very clear. But, the apartment itself was quite interesting. The building had been spared from bombing, the front of it had, but the rear parts had been bombed and had been reconstructed. We were across the street from a palace and one of the main museums. Not too far from one of the churches where there was music every Sunday at mass. So it was all within walking distance, lots of shops and so on, the Asch-Markt was also within the walking distance.

There were some security problems with the place, in addition to the Hungarian representatives, essentially the terrorism aspect. Again, this had become a great problem. There was only one way in and one way out of the building. I searched for back doors and was unable to find any. One thing I could vary was where I picked up the car. Usually I would try not to be picked up right in front but I might get out, walk out the door, quickly walk in a preselected direction and then the driver would know where to pick me up. Coming home I could reverse that, not necessarily be driven to the front door, I’d be dropped off somewhere else and just walk back. We never had any problems, thank goodness, but again the threat was there and we were aware of it.

MBFR has been in existence at this point for 12-13 years almost. Many people felt that it was a waste of time and money. I didn’t. I thought that it was useful just being there, just taking place. It was one of the venues where we and the Soviets, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, had an opportunity to discuss important and serious issues; the goal being to try to effect a reduction in mutual balanced forces. Reduction by its very title. But it had been going on long enough that there were already people wondering, voices questioning the value of these talks were getting particularly louder.

I tried to make a few changes in the way we proceeded there. One of them was to try to have a little more opportunity for informal discussions after the plenaries. They had the same sort of arrangements that we had in Geneva. Once or twice a week there would be a plenary meeting, in the largest room in the palace. Then there were efforts at informal meetings, but they just didn’t work as well as those in Geneva. So I tried, by then the Vienna talks were almost stilted. We’d be sitting across a formal table from one another, rather than at ease, and I tried to introduce an additional session which would be similar to the informal post-plenaries we had in Geneva. The Soviets were not very interested in doing that, and particularly didn’t like the idea that the military might somehow not sit with the diplomats. That kind of right down troubled them. I guess they really wanted to just check on one another. There were various efforts going on, trying to configure the talks. But I learned that there was going to be another meeting in Vienna, of another European body dealing, coming out of the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki final act. There was yet another set of actors, if you will, including Americans, who were going to come to Vienna and there would be a conference to talk
about the future activities in that particular operation, which was looking at mutual confidence building measures, ways to try to watch one another’s exercises and so on. And it really sort of overlapped with MBFR. There was no question that there was some overlap with MBFR.

As I began to think what the future for MBFR held, it seemed to me that the fact that these two organizations dealing with so much similar matter, both going to be meeting in Vienna at the same time, could quite rightly focus attention on the fact that MBFR had been there for all these years and obviously hadn’t reached any fruition. I decided to call the staff together and discuss this a bit with them and concluded that what we ought to do is prepare a rather full paper, essentially looking at the options for the future of the MBFR, recognizing that it would come into question. Leo Reddy was the Political Counselor there, Vlad Leovich was the DCM, both of them had been there with Mort Abramowitz and they stayed on with me. I’d met them before and they both were very able. I asked Leo to undertake the job of preparing this paper. It was a major effort and a very thick paper. It’s nickname was “Fat Paper” because it got so big. But Washington was interested in receiving something like this.

What we did was lay out all these various options. We gave them all names. One of them we called “Quick and Dirty.” That was an option which would have the U.S. and the Soviets agree to a 10% reduction in forces and that would be the achievement and that would be the end of the negotiations on MBFR, and we could move on to some other approach. Another I called, “Fold, Spindle, and Mutilate” was just a clear “It’s not working, let’s leave.” My favorite I called “Death and Transfiguration.” And that was an option which would allow MBFR to come to a sort of conclusion, but would effectively transform it into a new negotiation with perhaps somewhat different guidelines. That is in fact what happened. It did end, and it was replaced by the CFE, which was the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations, and that negotiation achieved a treaty. And we do now have agreed levels of reductions, where forces can be stationed, etc., in Europe, both with former Warsaw Pact and with NATO.

At about that point (we arrived in Vienna in August and this was probably somewhere in November or so), meetings had begun at a senior level between the U.S. and the Soviets about rejuvenating INF, about bringing it back together. I was obviously aware of this, and interested in them, but I didn’t lobby for anything. I had been assigned to Vienna, I had a job to do and I would not try to do otherwise. Out of the blue, totally unexpected, I received a phone call from Secretary Schultz. Asking me if I would be willing to go back to Geneva. Of course I said, “Yes, sir, I would.” Subsequently I received a phone call from President Reagan, following up on this and adding he knew that we had just moved to Vienna from Geneva, and this would be a move back and he appreciated that, and I told him I would be more than happy to serve as his representative to INF negotiations again. That I appreciated the opportunity.

The only one who was unhappy about this was our daughter Becky, our youngest daughter. She had been reasonably happy with the school in Geneva, but it was British and run under British rules, so to speak, and some of this bothered her. She really liked the American school in Vienna and the day that I got the phone call from the secretary and then the president, we were at a reception that night. Becky had gone off to a party at the school. I was able to tell to Chris, whisper to her about this, but we couldn’t say anything in the car, because I didn’t want the driver to know anything about it. So Chris and I got in the car, the driver was going to take us to
the school, pick Becky up, and then bring her home. So we did that, picked her up, asked her how the party was. She was bubbling with joy, how much fun it had been and how great this school this was, and we had to contain ourselves. I couldn’t say anything to her until we finally got out of the car and back into the apartment. Then I had to tell her I had some bad news for her. But she is a good trooper, and obviously agreed and back we went to Geneva.

HARRY JOSEPH GILMORE
Director, Office of Central European Affairs

Ambassador Harry Joseph Gilmore was born and raised in Clairton, Pennsylvania in 1937. He attended the Carnegie Institute of Technology (Carnegie Mellon University) for a year before transferring to Pittsburgh University, where he graduated in 1960. From there he went onto graduate school at Indiana University’s school of Russian and Eastern European studies. While applying to a National Defense fellowship, Gilmore took and passed the Foreign Service exam and was accepted into the Foreign Service soon after in 1962. He served in the United States and at posts abroad including Ankara, Turkey; Budapest, Hungary; Moscow, Soviet Union; Munich, Germany; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Berlin, Germany; and Armenia, where he served as Ambassador. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 2003.

GILMORE: In early 1987, the U.S. Government decided to review the file on Kurt Waldheim, President of Austria and former U.N. Secretary General. His file was put under review because in his 1985 published biography in which he indicated he had been discharged from the Wehrmacht in 1942 and had spent the rest of the war years finishing his law degree at the University of Vienna. Meanwhile, other documents indicated that his Wehrmacht service continued until 1954 and that from 1942 to 1945 he served in Wehrmacht units which had been involved in atrocities against civilians in Yugoslavia and sending Greek Jews to death camps. Although there was no proof he participated personally in the atrocities, there was clear evidence he concealed his role in the units which did. The question was whether the Department of Justice would put him on the watch list which would make him ineligible for a visa to enter the U.S. as a private individual.

On a Saturday morning in April 1987, Secretary of State Shultz met with Attorney General Meese to consider the issue. The office of Central European Affairs was informed by Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Bodde, that Meese and Schultz decided to put Waldheim on the watch list. We were instructed to be very careful how we announced it. We were to announce it first to the Austrian ambassador in Washington, Tomas Klestil and then inform our ambassador in Vienna, Ronald Lauder [Ed: Lauder, a political appointee, served as ambassador from May 1986 to October 1987]. The decision to put Waldheim on the watch list was a very heavy blow to the Austrians. Many interpreted it as a black mark against their state. In our contacts with Austrian officials we tried to make it very clear that we respected the institution of the Austrian presidency and did not intend our decision to put Waldheim on the watch list as a signal to the
Austrians about U.S.-Austrian relations. Still, the decision meant the U.S. embassy staff in Vienna, the ambassador above all, could no longer have contact with Kurt Waldheim, the President of Austria. It also meant that Waldheim personally was unwelcome in the U.S. It was probably one of the lowest moments in U.S.-Austrian relations in the post-WWII period. That being said, Shultz and Meese took the decision in full knowledge of the facts and I’m sure George Shultz, who was in my view a model of probity, took it after very careful consideration.

Q: Now, how did this affect your relations with your Austrian embassy colleagues? What were you hearing back from our embassy?

GILMORE: First, let me say that I had good professional and personal relations with the staff of the Austrian Embassy in Washington. I had served in Budapest and Munich earlier in my career and had traveled to Austria quite often. I admired Austria’s principled approach to providing sanctuary for refugees from neighboring Warsaw Pact member states, and my Austrian colleagues knew this.

The officers of the Austrian Embassy in Washington were crestfallen and very sad when they learned of our decision to put Kurt Waldheim on the Justice Department’s watch list. An Austrian journalist resident in Washington asked me and my wife to dinner to discuss our decision. He expressed his keen disappointment with it and made it clear that he believed Austrians would see our action as an affront to Austria and Austrians, and it they would resent it and remember it.

Our ambassador to Austria, Ronald Lauder, did not welcome the decision, but I don’t know whether he was surprised. He had met Waldheim during Waldheim’s tenure as U.N. Secretary General. Lauder’s mother, the famous Estée Lauder, had entertained Waldheim and his wife at her Long Island home while he was serving as U.N. Secretary General. In Vienna, Ambassador Lauder found it very difficult to avoid all contact with Waldheim as Secretary Schultz expected.

I would add, though, that a significant development was slowly unfolding in U.S.-Austrian relations. I can’t date it specifically by day or month, but by 1987 in the Office of Central European Affairs and at our embassy in Vienna we were looking more closely at what Austria had done in its treatment of its Jewish citizens during WWII and what it had or hadn’t done in terms of restitution for Austrian Jews after the war. I made a visit to Switzerland and Austria as Director of the Office of Central European Affairs some months before we put Waldheim on the watch list. I asked our embassy in Vienna to arrange for me to call on the head of the Jewish community, who turned out to be a young real estate broker. He said he was very glad to see me and noted that I was the first U.S. official to call on him. When I asked about the situation of the Jewish community in Austria, he emphasized in particular the failure of the Austrian authorities to make restitution for property and art, including some very valuable paintings, seized from Jews during the Nazi era. Ambassador Lauder, who had just arrived in Vienna, pursued a vigorous dialogue with the Jewish community during his ambassadorship there.

Meanwhile, Jewish organizations in the United States, particularly those seeking restitution of Jewish property seized by the Nazis, had been maintaining that in sharp contrast to the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria had not really made restitution to Austrian Jews and had been
given a free ride by the international community. So, the issue was coming to a head, and it was a touchy one for some Austrian officials. The Austrian embassy in Washington dealt with it very professionally. The ambassador at that time, Tomas Klestil, subsequently became President of Austria, so this was a very high-powered Austrian embassy.

Q: My understanding...please correct me if I’m wrong...Number one, Austria...going back to the Empire...had a very virulent strain of anti-Semitism there and it showed itself with the Anschluss.

GILMORE: I understand that’s quite the case.

Q: I’ve talked to people who served in Austria later, including up to the present day, and they say it’s still there in some cases. Unlike other places that made a serious effort to get rid of this nonsense.

GILMORE: I think there was truth in that. Scholars who’ve followed Hitler’s career closely remind us that Hitler was born near the Austrian-German border, in Braunau am Inn, Austria. He was a housepainter in Vienna as a young man, and a budding artist, or a would-be fine arts painter. They maintain that Hitler learned his anti-Semitism in Austria, in Vienna.

Jews were very important in the cultural, journalistic, and other achievements of Austria. In music alone, the role of Jews was fantastic. There’s a parallel, by the way, in Budapest, and some other cities in Central Europe. In any case, there was a virulent strain of anti-Semitism on the streets in Vienna and in certain organizations. I must say, the Austrian ambassador to Washington at the time, Thomas Klestil, didn’t at all like his President being put on the watch list, but he handled himself with considerable restraint. Klestil subsequently became Austria’s president and was, I think, an able representative of the Austrian state internationally. John Whitehead, who was Deputy Secretary of State during the time we put Waldheim on the watch list, had a close personal relationship with Ambassador Klestil. They played tennis. But nobody budged when it came to putting Kurt Waldheim on the watch list.

Q: What about Russian-Jewish refugees coming through Austria and all? Was this still going on?

GILMORE: Well, the Austrians had been, by and large, magnificent in the way they would handle refugees. They were a model. It’s a small country, and they still do it...by the way, they were getting a little more selective in some cases, particularly those involving refugees who were clearly coming for economic purposes and who may even have a shady or even criminal background. But the Austrians were doing well by refugees throughout this period.

It was an important chapter in U.S.-Austrian relations, although at times an uneasy one. The journalist that I was speaking of, Klaus Emmerich, was a very distinguished journalist with good contacts in Washington. When my wife and I went to dinner with him and his wife after Kurt Waldheim was put on the list, I remember just how downcast he was. He was reviewing in his own mind the whole question of whether Austria’s record, in handling the Jewish restitution question, and Nazi war criminals question, was going to come under review. And I think, in a way, it has. There were people in the U.S. government who felt very strongly, and with some
considerable evidence on their side, too, that Austria had been given a free ride. Austria really wasn’t held to anything like the same standards as the Federal Republic of Germany, which, by the way, made full restitution and went out of its way, and continues in many ways to go out of its way to accept responsibility, if one can ever accept responsibility, for the Holocaust.

Q: In the 1985 to 1987 period did relations with Hungary come up? Were you seeing a change in Hungary that was affecting Austria?

GILMORE: I had served in Hungary, so I cared about Hungary. I knew about the Austrian-Hungarian connections. The Deputy Chief of Mission at the Austrian embassy in Washington was very much into the whole question of reconstituting Central Europe, which would have given Austria, and of course Hungary, the Czech lands, and Slovakia, a special kind of satisfaction, a kind of reaffirmation of an historical identity. I could see the Austrians were doing everything they could, bilaterally, to try to work out good relationships not only with the Hungarians, but also with the Czechs and the Slovaks, particularly the Czechs. There were issues. In the case of Czechoslovakia, which had not yet split into two countries, there was a nuclear power plant near the Austrian border that the Austrians didn’t believe was safe. But, by and large, the Austrians went more of their share of the distance toward rapprochement with these countries, and I think deserve credit for it. Of course, I would also say it was very much in their enlightened self-interest.

Q: During this time, were there any reflections coming out of Czechoslovakia? Czechoslovakia was still pretty hard line at that time...

GILMORE: Yes, we could see it on the cultural side, and Vaclav Havel was pretty much a dissident at that time. The independent Czech intellectuals and dissidents never went to sleep, but they were pretty well muted by the regime, not by their own actions at that time. Of course, the Prague Spring 1968 had been almost two decades earlier, but it still was a powerful memory.

WARREN ZIMMERMAN
U.S. Delegation, CSCE
Vienna (1986-1989)

Ambassador Warren Zimmerman was born in Pennsylvania in 1934. He graduated from Yale University, received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Cambridge and served in the U.S. Army in 1959. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1961, his postings abroad included Caracas, Belgrade, Moscow, Paris, Madrid, Vienna, and Geneva, with an ambassadorship to Yugoslavia. Ambassador Zimmerman was interviewed in 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: So just to get the time frame you were working with CSCE from when to when?

ZIMMERMANN: I started in the summer of 1986 with CSCE. I left the Geneva talks, I guess the spring round of ’86 was the last time I was there. I spent some of the time learning some
German because the talks were going to be in Vienna. We went to Vienna in September of '86 for what was called a preparatory meeting. These meetings don't have an ending date because they all work on consensus which means that any one of the 35 countries has a veto power. The meeting can't end until all 35 are prepared to have it end. So the best guess was the entire meeting would last about a year. Some optimists thought it would last six months. As it turned out it lasted over two years. We finally did get a result, but it took us nearly two years and a half to get it. So it ended actually on the day on the last day of the Reagan administration in January '89.

Q: In the first place was there a sort of hearings before going before Congress or not? Was this an appointment?

ZIMMERMANN: I had to be confirmed, and I was with no difficulties at all. Claiborne Pell was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and there were no questions about it at all. I don't even think I had to appear. At least I don't remember appearing so if it happened it was very pro forma. The commission on security and cooperation in Europe was created to be a kind of a watchdog group of the Helsinki process. It was created by Dante Fascell a Democrat of Florida who later became the head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It was created over the strong objections of then Secretary of State Kissinger. There was a lot of bad blood between the State Department and the commission. The commission had members who were both Senators and Congressmen from both parties, and a large staff which participated in all of the CSCE meetings including the one for which I was the head of the American delegation. Without that commission staff we would not have been able to find enough good people from the State Department who were available to go to these long and very complex negotiations, so they did a very good job. The commission in its Washington embodiment in Congress was always there. It was always pushing us very hard for general and specific human rights progress and sometimes actually criticizing us, the delegation, if that progress wasn't apparent. This, I think, was what Roz Ridgway was talking about primarily when she said that no professional foreign service officer should have to deal with that because it is such a political thing. Fortunately, the heads of the commission were both reasonable people. Steny Hoyer from the House and Dennis DeConcini from the senate. They were people you could talk to; they would listen. They might disagree, but they both had a good deal of understanding of the process and understanding of what is possible and what is not possible. I think we were very fortunate that they were there.

Q: What was the status when you arrived in the fall of '86 of the CSCE negotiations?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, it was in a kind of shambles because there had been an earlier meeting in Bern on human contacts which was a human rights related subject. This is one of these satellite meetings.

Q: We have these baskets or so.

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, and this was a satellite meeting that had been mandated by the previous review meeting, the one in Madrid. We had a head of delegation named Michael Novak who was a very prominent American theologian and one who has written copiously on human rights, but he had no diplomatic experience. This meeting which was a very short meeting, three or four
weeks, had come to the end with a final document which needed approval. Novak had been a party to drafting the document as had the representations of all of the major states. All the western European countries had the strong view that the document would be approved. As it turned out when Novak looked at it the last time, he decided he would have to recommend against it, would rather have nothing than have a document which he felt was too weak. So he recommended against it, and it caught Washington, on a holiday weekend, not a lot of people there, and a decision had to be given back to Bern very quickly. It turned out that the thing fell apart. There was no final document; the meeting ended with nothing. The United States was blamed by the Europeans for mishandling it, for going back on its word, all of that. That had been only a couple of months before we went to Vienna, so we had that problem. We had a bigger problem which was a generic problem because the CSCE process traditionally functioned on the basis of balancing off the major western interests which were human rights and the major Soviet interests which was conventional arms control. In this case, the general view was there was nothing we could give up on conventional arms control that would bring us a human rights result. Therefore, the normal tradeoffs would not be available to us and the Vienna meeting would end in failure. As it turned out, there were several reasons why it didn't end in failure. One was I think, very strong western representation on human rights issues. This had been the fruit of what Goldberg and Kampelman had done in the past in focusing the west on this issue of the importance of human rights. So, we found in Vienna that other than the traditional countries which were with us on human rights like the UK, you had Scandinavian countries like Norway and Denmark, very strong on human rights, even Sweden, the Germans tougher than they usually were on this. A number of countries that had not been very vocal in the past.

Q: Where would France fit in?

ZIMMERMANN: France was often very strong on human rights but France was not a team player and didn't much enjoy working things out particularly within NATO which is how we had to do it because we and the Canadians were not members of the European community. So the French were sometimes with us and sometimes very eloquently with us, and sometimes they weren't. We could never be quite sure. So we had a lot more western solidarity and focus on the importance of human rights; that was one thing. The other thing was that we had a Russia that was coming under...

Q: It was then Soviet Union.

ZIMMERMANN: Soviet Union coming under very intense pressures not only from the west but internally as well, and with a leader, Gorbachev, who was prepared to move further on these issues than any of his predecessors had been. Not that the Soviet delegation didn't fight tooth and claw against every concession that we asked of them, but at least by the end which was over two years later, they were ready to concede on quite a lot of things. Particularly on a thing that we wanted the most which was not a piece of paper at the end but actual release of dissidents, Jewish refuseniks and improvement in internal movement and so forth.

Q: Well, the initial signing of this treaty in Helsinki had the Soviets had received what they wanted and that was recognition of their borders, so that was no longer an item.
ZIMMERMANN: That was no longer an item although a number of columnists like Bill Safire kept talking about how this was an enormous sell out and was a terrible process and should be abolished. He later reversed himself.

Q: We wanted human rights, they wanted...

ZIMMERMANN: They wanted a fuzzy document that provided fora new, conventional arms control negotiation that would be very weak on things that would be important to us like verification. They wanted in other words to turn the CSCE into a Soviet style disarmament conference in which disarmament would all be unilateral and nobody could really verify it. It might turn out that the ones being disarmed were the critics of the Soviet Union in the western world.

Q: As you went for seeing this sort of balance the way things were, how did you think we were going to get human rights if we couldn't allow a fuzzy disarmament?

ZIMMERMANN: This is very complicated. There were the MBFR talks going on in the same city at the same time, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions of conventional armaments. Those talks were supposed to be merged into a new disarmament conference which would take some elements from the old MBFR and some elements from what was in the arms control planks of the CSCE process. That in itself was very difficult because the MBFR negotiator who was Steve Ledogar and I had a lot of difficulty seeing eye to eye on what the trade offs would be. I think it was a natural difficulty, and in the end we worked it out. It wasn't easy. So you had that layer of complexity on top of the whole human rights aspect of it. You had to come to an end simultaneously on the same day with a document which provided for a new comprehensive conventional arms negotiation, a whole new negotiation which contained some elements in the CSCE final document which would be totally consistent with that and also with language in the CSCE final document on human rights and human contacts and freedom of information and that kind of thing. All of this had to happen simultaneously on the last day. You didn't get an agreement until all these pieces came together. And you had to get 35 countries in the CSCE phase, every one of which has a veto.

Q: Talking about the European powers, I would have thought that you would have run up against things like military something just to show their stuff and going off in different directions in Greece, not to say France. How did one sort of keep one's sanity and unity?

ZIMMERMANN: You have named the correct usual suspects I would say. Malta is a traditional spoiler in CSCE. It is the smallest, weakest country. They are constantly holding out for stupid concessions. They were not that bad in the Vienna meeting. They had been much worse before that, so they were not a serious problem. The Greeks and Turks were big problems when there was some kind of a problem between them that flared up. They would take it right into the CSCE and stonewall on everything else until they got their satisfaction, and of course, they weren't going to get satisfaction. And that happened right near the end. A Greek and Turk problem that tied us up and kept us up several nights running trying to resolve it. The French were not a member of the MBFR negotiations, so they were very strongly opposed on a whole list of ideological issues which I won't go into, to approaches that the rest of NATO was taking. They
didn't like to be members of a team, and if they had to be members of a team, the team was going to be the European Community, not NATO. We always had back to back caucuses with the European Community caucus and the NATO caucus. It turned out that the biggest spoiler of all in this meeting was Romania because the document we were working on on the human rights side of it actually was very far reaching. It was by far the most intrusive and far reaching document on human rights that had ever been negotiated up to that time. It has been superseded since because Russia got so liberal after that, but up until that time. It appears to me that the Romanian dictator, Ceausescu who it turns out was in his last year of life, hadn't paid much attention to what was going on. So his delegation was not objecting to anything very vehemently. We got into the end game toward the end, December of '88 and January of '89, the Romanians began to wake up that this document would involve all kinds of very far reaching commitments on things like freedom of religion on which their record had been absolutely horrendously bad. So, they decided to block the whole thing. They gave indication of preparing to sit us out until hell froze over, until we changed. There was, of course, the usual scurrying around trying to get, particularly the United States, to change its views to accommodate Romania. We simply refused. So we got right down to the wire, and we finally worked it out. I don't think it ever happened in CSCE before, we worked it out. The 34 of us were going to sign the document and the Romanians could do whatever they wanted. Effectively we undermined the whole consensus principle to get the Romanian off our plate. They looked very bad in the end.

Q: I was going to say if you have to have an enemy or a problem, Ceausescu is about as good as you can get.

ZIMMERMANN: That's right. He didn't have a lot of support anywhere. Actually I think we won a bit with that because it made it clear that this was a document that had real bite because he was prepared to go to the wall to try to get it watered down.

Q: You must have had some very nervous Romanian delegates didn't you?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, I was literally afraid that some of them would be killed. I mean it could be that serious because they were obviously not bringing home the document that their maximum leader wanted. They were visibly nervous. You were put in a terrible position of trying to do what you could for them personally but not being able and not wanting to do anything to change the document. So as far as I know they weren't killed, but there was always that danger.

Q: Very much so. I was wondering whether you were contemplating saying there is always room in the United States if you have to pull out or something.

ZIMMERMANN: We thought about it actually. We made some informal plans for political asylum if the Romanian diplomats felt it was just getting too hot for them.

Q: Were you sensing any, you had been through this other negotiation, did you sense a difference in the caliber or the outlook of the Soviet people there. We are talking about things were beginning to move all over the place.

ZIMMERMANN: The Soviets were represented by professionals not politicians. They were not high level party people, so they were very dependent on instructions. They had no flexibility.
You just eventually learned to live with that. There was nothing you could do to change them until the time was right and Moscow would tell them to move. Then when Moscow would tell them to move, they moved very quickly. So, they were not an enormous factor in the negotiations in a funny way because they were puppets on a string. This was even true of their military people.

Q: How did you deal with this? I mean were you negotiating with somebody, you talk to somebody across the table. Because they were calling the shots on the other side. I mean the Soviets it was Western Europe essentially against the Soviets and their satellites wasn't it?

ZIMMERMANN: Actually it wasn't like that. The Soviets began to experience some defections within the bloc. Of course they ran the Warsaw Pact meeting because the Warsaw Pact would caucus a lot- (end of tape)

Q: Could you repeat that last question?

ZIMMERMANN: Yes. The question had to do with whether the Soviets controlled their Warsaw pact allies. They would run the Warsaw Pact caucuses, they would be the nominal leaders. Nobody challenged that, but the Hungarians and the Poles would come to us routinely, would come to the west and say look we can accept any language on human rights that you put together. Don't worry about us; we can fight. So, that was a pretty significant defection. The Soviets couldn't even use the Hungarians and the Poles to be their running dogs, to be their front people, to challenge western proposals, because they wouldn't do it. They had to use the East Germans and they had to use the Czechs, and they had to use the Bulgarians. Of course the Romanians would never do it for them. As time went on, those rifts became more wide. Those two eastern European countries, the Poles and the Hungarians became much more overt and unguarded about siding with the West on a lot of issues. Sometimes they would even do it in speeches and plenary sessions. So the Soviet monolith was definitely beginning to crumble, even then. This was three years before the liberation of Eastern Europe. You could see that it was beginning to come.

Q: What about on the arms business. How was this turning out?

ZIMMERMANN: I had two deputies. One was Sam Wise who was the executive director of the commission. He came from the Congress, but he was a former foreign service officer, very easy person to work with. He basically worked on the human rights side of things. Then we had Bob Frowick who was a foreign service officer with a lot of experience in Western Europe and with NATO. He did the arms control things. He had a delegation of his own with eight or ten people. They were from ACDA; they were from the Defense Department; they were from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They worked very well. They had the problem I told you about, that they had to interact also with this totally separate negotiation was going on, the MBFR negotiations when that was going on, to make sure everything was in sync with that. The rhythm of these things was often you would have weeks in which nothing much would happen. You would be working feverishly but there would be no results. There would be no concessions made on either side. Then a concession would come from somewhere and there would be a lot of feverish activity and that would be absorbed. Language would be written. None of this language would be final until
the last day, but language would be written and set aside. So gradually you built up on all sides of the negotiations including the military side, you built up a draft document. It was the rule was nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Agreement could be withdrawn from elements of the draft document although that was harder to do. Once you agreed to it, the precedent is very strong that it should be set aside and then just brought back on the final day and inserted as part of the final document. But, one of the things I learned was that if you don't feel you are up against a deadline, you have a lot better chance of getting what you want. The Soviets tended to, Soviet negotiators in general tended to be very slow moving, very relaxed. They like it in western cities. They never had any problems with that The whole Moscow approach is to wait the other side out. That started with Lenin, and they still do, the Russians still do. So, the west had to over-come its natural tendency to be businesslike, to get things out of the way, to get on with the next thing. That's why this negotiation lasted two years. I worked very hard at giving the sense that we had all the time in the world. In fact, by November-December of '88, I was told by George Shultz the Secretary of State, who followed these negotiations very closely, that we really should wrap it up before the end of the Reagan period. So, we had to manipulate the idea of patience with the idea of kind of setting a deadline. But by then the Russians, I think, were ready to settle. They realized they weren't going to do any better than they were doing. They had one thing that they really wanted which we had refused to give them up until that time. It was in Shevardnadze's opening speech at the conference in 1986. It was the big surprise, and this was supposed to show that Gorbachev regime was different from anybody else, any previous regimes. They were going to have, they proposed to host a big human rights conference in Moscow. Of course that drove a lot of the conservatives in the United States up the wall. How can you have a human rights conference in Moscow, the heart of human rights violations? George Shultz I believe was a great Secretary of State and was a brilliant negotiator. He was sitting here listening to that because all the foreign ministers were there at this meeting. He had a meeting with our delegation afterwards, he said, "This is a really good idea. We are not going to accept it, but you know if we have to do it, we can give them all kinds of embarrassment right there in Moscow. So we shouldn't see this as something we never can accept. We will use it as a bargaining chip, but in the end, if we have it, it is not going to hurt at all." So, having that in mind, we went right through opposing it, and finally right at the end, the last week, we gave way on that. But then there was an issue of who would come to it. Of course the strong American view is when you have human rights conferences of the CSCE, a lot of private organizations and individuals should be allowed to come and should be accepted as part of the conference.

Q: Amnesty International and all of that.

ZIMMERMANN: All of that. Human rights groups, former dissidents, everything. We had that in Vienna. Vienna was just packed with these groups, and they played an enormous role.

Q: They were also in Madrid in ’88.

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, they were that is true. So we agreed to the human rights conference in Moscow, but the Soviets were going to limit access. I knew that was a deal breaker, so a lot of the western countries who didn't care too much or wanted to finish or were a little bit weak on this would come to me, I checked with Washington of course, and said can't we give a little bit on this access question. I said, "No, I’m sorry. We just go on and on, but we can't give on that.
We are not going to agree to the conference unless it has got this full access, the kind of access we have in Vienna." They came around finally because they wanted the Moscow conference. It was a big initiative. It had been publicized in their press. They didn't want to lose it. So we got that. There is an interesting coda after all of this. So the Vienna meeting ends. The day before the Reagan administration ends George Shultz comes to the final session where the foreign ministers come. It was a great celebration because it was a very good ending. We had gotten a lot of Soviet dissidents out of jail and refuseniks to the west because of the pressures of this meeting. When I was nominated for Yugoslavia, I was asked by the new president, George Bush, to come around and talk. This is a couple of months after Vienna ended. He said, "One thing I really want to talk to you about, I think you never should have agreed to that Moscow human rights conference. You should have simply refused to agree to that. It was the wrong thing to do." He was a member of the administration that was prepared to agree to it, but he personally was opposed to it. The first thought I had was to try to explain to him why it wasn't such a bad idea, which I tried to do. The second thought I had was if we had slipped into his presidency, and he had had this view of the Moscow human rights conference we would probably have been negotiating another year or two. So, it was lucky in a way that we finished. As it turned out, by the time they got to the Moscow human rights conference which was about two years later, it was scheduled very late in the cycle, everything had collapsed in the Soviet Union, and it was almost a non event because there was so much else going on that was so much more important by then.

**Q:** I would have thought Bush would have been on the "liberal" side on the human rights conference, the idea of having it in Moscow is a good place to do it if you could kind of display everything there. The whole idea of openness of showing the Soviets up and how we can do it.

ZIMMERMANN: Well, that is the way I thought about it, and certainly that was Shultz's view. But, you know, there was another view which is understandable too. Why do you reward a country which has a terrible human rights record with a conference which in their manipulative press, they can use to give them propaganda advantages? There is also the feeling that it is symbolically wrong to discuss the virtues of heaven with the devil in hell.

**Q:** During this whole time, I mean as a foreign service officer you are somewhat down the food chain as far as you are not a private person, you have all sorts of layers of technically you are responsible to. How did you find the hand of Washington, how heavy the hand of Washington, and whence cometh the hand of Washington?

ZIMMERMANN: I think I had the luckiest situation of any negotiator I know could have had because I had terrific backup. Max Kampelman always said to me you know the first thing a negotiator does has to do, is secure his base. With the American people if you can do that, with the Congress if you can do that, and certainly with the government. I reported immediately to Roz Ridgway who was assistant secretary for European affairs, who knew this is a complex issue. A lot of people didn't understand it, but she did. She was consistently supportive, sympathetic. She had working for her very good people like Avis Bohlen who was in charge of the office in the State Department at that time that staffed our negotiation and coordinated and sent out our instructions, and Shultz himself. Every time I went back, Shultz saw me. We discussed it. We stayed on the same page. I had a very clear idea of what he wanted, and I think he understood what the realities of Vienna were. So and frankly, when it came time to give some
things up in order to get some things, I had some problems with Steve Ledogar on that. He wanted to keep things going because he didn't think they had gotten quite enough. I felt it was time to cut it. We were getting about as much as we could get. I had the ear of a Secretary, and he didn't. That was an enormous advantage.

Q: *Did the President play a role in this by statements or gestures or anything else like that?*

ZIMMERMANN: No, I'd say none at all. I suppose he issued a statement or two, but he was not at all involved. I had no reason to think he understood or cared about what was going on. I did get my photo opportunity with him, but it was one minute or less, and wasn't substantive. I am trying to remember if we had any problems with the White House itself. Toward the end, of course, everybody always gets nervous when you are getting to the finish of a negotiation. But I don't recall that the White House gave us any difficulty at all, and I think that is a testament to Shultz.

Q: *Well, also the White House was in the National Security Council a certain amount of disarray at that time wasn't it?*

ZIMMERMANN: Yes. I am trying to remember who the National Security Advisor was then. That I can't remember. It was probably Frank...

Q: *Carlucci was at one time the chief of I don't know, but I mean there was still the Iran Contra affair, so it wasn't a very powerful apparatus that it had been. How about reaching out to the American public, either in the press or speeches or interviews or anything else? Did that come up?*

ZIMMERMANN: I did a lot of that. Again this is a precedent set by Max Kampelman. I traveled to a lot of American cities, particularly cities with a large ethnic minorities who followed these negotiations very carefully. I did a number of op-ed pieces. We invited NGOs and individuals who were interested to the State Department. Every round, I would come back, and we would have a couple of hundred people, some of them came from very far parts of the country, who would come in for a half a day briefing on what we were doing in Vienna. It gave them a chance to air their concerns and ask questions. We took a lot of care with this because we did see this as a major public issue. Of course the Congress did it also through the Helsinki commission.

Q: *What about I think just because looking at this as an historic document as we go. Some people may not understand, we use the term human rights, but what essentially are you talking about?*

ZIMMERMANN: What I am talking about and the basic western view is that human rights have to do with political rights. They are rights that are not conferred by governments but are innate. They are natural rights. Free speech, free movement, freedom of ideas, those kinds of rights. The eastern definition, the Soviet Warsaw pact definition of human rights was much broader because they would throw in economic and social rights. You had to have the right to education; you had to have the right to health care which of course, we would accept too, but we would definitely put those rights on a lower level because those are rights that are conferred by governments. In
our view, if you look at the Declaration of Independence for example, rights come out of the creator.

Q: Certain inalienable rights.

ZIMMERMANN: That's right. We would have enormous debates at Vienna over the definition of rights. The Soviets would say you can't have the kind of rights you think about unless you have a good health care system like we have, you know, those kinds of debates. We finally pulled the chain on them. I got a very good young officer that was a good writer, John Schmidt, to research and write a speech which contested the Soviet performance comparative to ours on the rights they thought were important. So we compared our health care system to their health care system and our education system to their education system and so forth. We didn't do too badly, of course.

Q: Did you mean there were other Europeans, but did you yourself and your delegation realize that you were preparing in one regard almost the poison pill that was going to destroy the Soviet Union?

ZIMMERMANN: I can't say that we did. I mean we knew that we had a real opportunity to get individual cases of individual progress going. We could get prominent dissidents out. I have a letter that I have framed from Andrei Sakharov, the great Soviet physicist and human rights advocate thanking me for the work that the U.S. delegation did in Vienna in getting him out of his exile in Gorki. We could do things like that. I think the pressure that we generated could do things like that. I don't think any of us felt we were going to have an enormously comprehensive effect on destroying the Soviet Union. I don't think we had that. We weren't visionary enough to see that.

Q: It is interesting. I mean all this is going on and it was very, I think, it was the equivalent to the atomic bomb which ended the WWII in a way. I mean, you want to put it to almost anything, this is opening up the Soviet Union.

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, I don't want to exaggerate what the Vienna meeting did. Jack Matlock who wrote a very good book, he was ambassador to the Soviet Union when it broke up. He wrote a very good book about the breakup. There is not a single word about the Vienna CSCE meeting. But I think he under rated it. I don't want to over rate it though. I think the Soviet Union broke up primarily for internal reasons. I think western foreign policy helped a lot, the motivating force was internal contradictions which had been there since the very beginning and finally got too great to contend with.

Q: As far as the background it was the human rights.

ZIMMERMANN: That was enormously important. I think many people who write about the CSCE process under rate the degree of importance it had in eastern Europe. Because these were small countries that were very susceptible to outside pressures in a way the Soviet Union wasn't. I met Havel, the President of Czechoslovakia for the first time in Paris at a CSCE anniversary meeting in 1990. I was introduced to him, and he said, He knew who I was which surprised me.
He said, "You know, what you did with your delegation and the British and some of the others did was enormously important in overthrowing the communists and making it possible for us to get in." I think the same would be true of Poland and it would be true of Hungary. Even Bulgaria. Bulgaria wanted at Vienna to have a meeting approved that would be on the environment. My instructions were don't give Bulgaria anything. They are beyond the pale; give them nothing at all. We got to the end game, and things worked out so it seemed that maybe we had to give Bulgaria something to get other things that we wanted, so I asked Washington for permission to do it, and they reluctantly agreed, so we gave Bulgaria an environmental meeting. That environmental meeting as it turned out became an enormous rallying point for every human rights advocate in Bulgaria and they helped to overthrow the communist regime as a result of that. It was the catalyst for all of that. We had no idea.

Q: Could you talk a bit about some of your colleague delegations and all, the British, the French and maybe some other ones that you thought were particularly useful.

ZIMMERMANN: We were closest to the British. This is the Thatcher period of course. She was very strong on human rights. She wanted to be very tough with the Soviets. We had a meeting of the minds on that. The Canadians had a very ideological but very eloquent anti-Soviet head of delegation. Very unusual for the Canadians who tend to be soft on this. He was very hard line, and he was very good because he gave flaming speeches and he was terrific. I would say were and the British and the Canadians were the furthest out in front, but as I mentioned earlier, some of the smaller western delegations, they were all run by career diplomats. There wasn't a single political appointee that I can remember in any of these delegations, running any of these delegations. These smaller delegations like some of the Scandinavian delegations, they had people who cared personally very much about individuals and the fate of individuals and individual freedoms. They were very good. These are the delegations that the Soviets normally used to be able to break down and discombobulate, but they couldn't here. So it was really a group effort I think. NATO had the usual difficulties of having to deal with the European Community. The European Community would caucus first; then NATO would caucus. If the European Community had reached a decision it would be very hard to change it in the NATO meeting even though it was mostly the same countries, but usually people were reasonable enough so that you could work things out. That usually happened. So, I think what the Soviets saw was a pretty united western front against them, and some of the neutrals were against them, too. The neutrals being neutrals tended to be somewhat soft on these issues, but there were some neutral delegations that were quite strong like the Finns and the Swedes and the Austrians. The Austrians were very strong. Even though they were the host country and had an added incentive to make sure that everybody was happy, they were quite strong. So I think it was the ultimate conclusion of people in Moscow that the west was not going to be divided, was not going to break down that led them to make the concessions they did.

Q: Did this agreement have to be ratified by the Senate?

ZIMMERMANN: No. In fact, these are very strange agreements because they are not politically binding. They are statements of intention. They don't get ratified by anybody although some countries put them in their constitution. That tended to be communist countries that went in for show. But a politically binding agreement is in many ways just as strong as a treaty. As weak as
a treaty and as strong as a treaty. It is not a drawback to me that they are not solemnly signed and ratified.

Q: When you came back to the Department, did you find that there were any division within the European bureau or anywhere else about where this thing came out or was it generally...

ZIMMERMANN: I think there was a general view that it was a big success. The conventional arms people may have been somewhat less enthusiastic about it, but as it turned out, the conventional arms negotiation which our concluding document had made possible and which began early in the Bush administration produced the first real success in foreign policy for the Bush administration. This was after the President and I had this conversation. So, I think that gave even the conventional arms people the view that this had been an all around success.

Q: I was wondering the change in administration from the Reagan administration to the Bush administration both being Republican administrations, this is not the most friendly changeover. It was almost as though there were Democrats taking over from the Republicans or vice versa. I also sense that you know, Baker who was very close to Bush. I mean they had always been close, would have carried over some of the feeling of Bush about this same reservations and all, there would have been a coolness there.

ZIMMERMANN: Well, he might have. On the other hand it was a done deal. It was too late to do anything about it. It was finished. There might have been some sighs of relief in the Baker office and around that they didn't have to deal with it anymore. It was set to one side. They had plenty on their plate to worry about, so I don't know. I was getting ready to go to Yugoslavia then and so I didn't have any sense of recrimination on the part of the Baker people. You are right. It was an entirely new State Department. They brought in different people. The old familiar ones like Roz Ridgway were gone. The people who had been involved in this were basically gone. Most of the academic writing that has been done about the Vienna has meeting have given it extremely high marks as sort of a watershed in East-west relations and progress for human rights. Dennis DeConcini was was very critical of us in the end game in the fall of 1988. We were beginning to get some very sharp criticism from the commission to the point where our allies in Vienna began to worry whether we could hold up under it. We stuck with it, finished, and then the hearing following the end of Vienna which was already in the Bush administration DeConcini very magnanimously said to me in open hearing that he had been wrong. We got the best result we could have and he had been wrong, that and the academics have seen it that way too. Safire had reneged on his views that the CSCE process was just a tool to be manipulated by the Soviets. I think it came out very well. Obviously none of this would have happened or at least not the way it happened if it hadn't been for Gorbachev.

Q: Was there any feeling, you came back before you got involved in Yugoslavia, that, okay, now we have got this what are we going to do with it?

ZIMMERMANN: Yes there is some of that. Of course, they went right into a conventional arms negotiation. There was to be a CSCE summit down the road. I forget when that happened. But the process continued. I was replaced by Jack Maresca in Vienna. The meetings went on. CSCE began to broaden its mandate to deal with a lot of different things that it had never dealt with
before, creating centers for human rights, high commissioners for minorities, voting monitor groups and so forth. Peacemaking efforts, mediation efforts. It became an entirely different process because the cold war that had spawned it was over, and it needed to find a new set of things to do. I think it is beginning to do that and doing it quite well.

DAVID M. EVANS
Committee on Security and Cooperation
Vienna (1987-1989)

Mr. Evans was born and raised in Philadelphia, PA and was educated at Harvard University and the University of Belgrade Law School. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1963. As an Economic Specialist, Mr. Evans served in Warsaw, Belgrade, Moscow and London. In addition to his economic assignments, he served in senior level positions dealing with International Security and Counter-Terrorism. He also served as Political Advisor to the Commander-in Chief, US Naval Forces in Europe. Mr. Evans was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: Okay, well then, we will pick it up next time with when you were a CSCE in 1987. You already mentioned that you were there basically to hold down the Germans. We haven’t talked about what the issues were and what you were doing.

Q: It is the 7th of January 1998. In the first, place, I would like to get the dates. Where you in 1987?

EVANS: We are in the fall of 1987 in Vienna. I was detailed from EUR to the U.S. delegation to the then, CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which subsequently became the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in about 1993 or 1994. In any event, it was the CSCE at that time. This was before the fall of Soviet communism, and before the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was still an East-West confrontation situation, somewhat ameliorated by Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika efforts. Nevertheless, we had essentially a tripartite set up in the CSCE which had existed since its beginning: the East, the West, and the neutral, and then the non-aligned. All the meetings were held in one or the other of the neutrally aligned capitals, such as Belgrade or Madrid -- before it became a member of NATO -- Stockholm, Vienna (frequently), Geneva, Malta, occasionally, subsequent subsidiary meetings. The feeling was that this meeting, which had started in early 1986, would last almost a year and a half. It was nearing its end, maybe in three months. When I went out in September of 1987, I was strictly on TDY (Temporary Duty) assignment from EUR.

Q: TDY meaning?

EVANS: Temporary duty assignment. As I said earlier, to take over at a senior officer level the second basket, which was the economic, scientific, environmental basket. That is what we called the things. The first basket being security. The second basket being human rights, which was
where much of the interest in the CSCE has been, of course. I was looking, and we all were looking, to wind up by Christmas 1987. Needless to say, that deadline was not met. We came home for Christmas and went back in January of 1988. The meeting continued on for another year and longer. It did not end until January of 1989.

Q: Who was leading the delegation?

EVANS: Warren Zimmerman was the head of the delegation with rank of ambassador. There were two deputy heads. One was Bob Frowick, who had the rank of ambassador. I had known Bob from East European work earlier. The second deputy head was Sam Wise, of the Congressional Helsinki Commission. I should not say, “Congressional”. Everybody thinks of it as Congressional, when in fact, it’s an interagency commission heavily dominated by, located in and run by the Congress. But, in fact, legally it is an inter-agency commission with representatives from the State, Defense and Commerce departments as well as a major contingent from both the House and Senate. Sam Wise was there to handle Human Rights, basket three. Bob Frowick handled the Security and Principles basket. Principles were divided up. Bob handled a number and Sam handled some of the others.

Q: What do you mean when you say “principles?”

EVANS: “Principles” were like the 10 Commandments or the Bill of Rights in our Constitution. The “principles” were the essential guidelines about the conduct of states that were written down and agreed to in the original Helsinki Final Act. It was signed by 35 original countries in Helsinki in 1976, I guess it was. Anyway, Bob Frowick was in charge of Basket One, Security. I was in charge of Basket Two, Economics. Sam Wise was in charge of Basket Three, Human Rights. The three of us, of course, reported to Warren Zimmerman. Each of us had contingents underneath us. I had the smallest contingent, which was one individual. He was a very good individual from the Helsinki Convention and a State Department middle-grade officer who came out from time to time. As I said earlier, my major initial focus, anyway, was on the German issue. That preoccupied a lot of my tactical efforts. The rapporteur for our group was Swiss. Each of these baskets of groups had a neutral or non-aligned rapporteur. In our case, we had a very good, quite colorful character from Switzerland, a Swiss diplomat. He made my job easier because he was a French Swiss and he hated the Germans with a passion. We connived together, to some extent. The Germans did not help their case by having as head of their Basket Two team a very obnoxious individual. He was very pompous, just personally extremely obnoxious. In the end, we succeeded in the mission of trying to keep the Germans from hosting a major economic conference. Although by the end, the mandate changed in the year and a half I was there. We wound up in January of 1989, with a number of changes along the East-West fault line and some concessions by the Germans. The so-called “Bonn Economic Conference” was agreed in the final document. But it was not as far reaching as the Germans had originally wanted.

Q: When we are talking about the Germans, we are talking about West Germany?

EVANS: Yes, that’s right.

Q: What were the issues? What were we concerned about with the Germans?
EVANS: Mostly, it was a sense in Washington that the Germans wanted to host this economic conference and play too large a role in taking over and controlling economic and commercializations with the East Bloc. That was the major concern. The whole point of the economic conference was not for other Western countries. It was to bring the East Europeans and Soviets to Bonn, in this case, for a conference. The American Administration -- this was the Reagan Administration -- felt that they did not want the Germans playing such a major role in having such a platform as this conference would give them to take over economic relations with the East Bloc. We had no way of foreseeing that the East Bloc would disappear in a year or two. That was really the essence of it. Unless you want to say that German economic penetration of the Eastern Bloc was strategic. There were some individuals in the National Security Council who felt the Germans were getting much too cozy with and extending much too favorable terms to the Eastern countries.

Q: As we saw it at that time, was it more a problem that the Germans might make too many concessions to what we would consider our adversary, the Communist Bloc, rather than concern about beating us out economically in Eastern Europe?

EVANS: Yes, I think that is a good point. There was a feeling that they would not hold the line on our export control regime. That they would both grant credits and permit the transfer of technology, which was a problem throughout the time I was there. Also, undercut us by extending better financial terms, better government backed credits than we, in our system, could manage. It was a combination, I think, of not wanting them to get the markets, and, not wanting them to make concessions which, in many cases, were viewed as strategic.

Q: How did you feel about it? As you were talking to your German, and I use the word advisedly, “adversaries”, was this perception in Washington a valid perception or was it modified by what you were doing as you were dealing with it on the ground?

EVANS: To be honest with you, I was sort of amused by it because I didn’t think the Germans holding an economic conference would affect either our trade or security interest that much. A fact that was eventually agreed to, I think showed that. Since that was the mandate I had, I rather enjoyed it because it gave me a specific focus. Some of the other members of my team didn’t have this. In the area of Human Rights, we were pressing for certain concessions, along with a whole range of criminal, civil and legal arrangements: voting, freedom of trading, freedom of movement, guarantees from various kinds of arbitrary government treatment, and that sort of thing. This was unique in the sense that there was no other case in the whole CSCE on the Western side, at least, where one country was known to be out to get the other. It was quite obvious when I was introduced. Warren Zimmerman made it quite clear to the Germans that evidence was coming in, not only to hold the line against their proposal, but to beat it down, and keep it from taking place. That was my mission. To the extent that remained policy from Washington, I fulfilled it. The first evaluation I got from Warren was full of praise about how I had maneuvered the Germans into a position where their case had been shelved. That was the first year. As I say, in many cases, throughout the years, when one knows instinctively that Washington policy doesn’t make all that much sense, either you follow it, or you don’t, I guess. In this case, partly because my German “adversaries” were so obnoxious, it became more
enjoyable. If they had been personally more pleasant perhaps, more reasonable, it would have been a harder job. Beating up on the Germans was a pleasure, I must say. Partly, also, to be honest with you, the Economic, the Basket Two, was always the weak sister of the three baskets. Everybody was interested in Security. Everybody was interested in Human Rights. Very few people were interested in economics. Eventually, as the conference wore on, the environmental part of that mandate became much more important. We can talk about that in a minute. I got much more involved in environmental issues in the last six months of the conference than I did in economic issues.

Q: Back to this German thing. Here you had the United States, the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, and the European Economic Union all in there. What about the Brits or the French, as far as your job of stopping this conference from being in Bonn?

EVANS: A lot of the dynamics depended on who was in the chair of the then EC, the European Community. When the Danes, or the French, or the British were in the chair, it made life easier. When the Germans were in the chair, and had the rapporteur been Austrian, it would have been much more difficult. The key factor was the rapporteur, who determined the agenda, who did all the drafts, who organized the secret little meetings and the working sessions. Being anti-German, as he was, made my life much easier. I could have had a Viennese diplomat, as such was the case in Basket One. Then it would have been more difficult. We had these groups within groups. Of course, every morning, before the main meeting, the EC would have its caucus. Twice a week the NATO group would have it caucus. So, the EC would meet first. Then, they would come in with a position to the NATO group. The NATO group was where we had some initial leverage, of course, and we were trying to set up a united Western position before we went into the full meeting with the East, the neutrals, and the non-aligned. The Norwegians played a key role in the NATO forum in supporting us and were very much against the Germans. As I say, they were privy to things that they passed on to us, which were very helpful in that regard. I think a lot of these countries felt sort of awkward because they were in the European Community, and, to that extent, there was a need for solidarity with the Germans. On the other hand, they knew the United States was against Germany. Most of these countries had no great love for the Germans. Those were some of the dynamics.

Q: Did these other countries see the issue at the same way we did? At this stage I find it hard to envisage what the real problem was of having Germany host an economic conference. There are conferences, conferences, and conferences.

EVANS: Yes, that is a very good point. The real reason was that Washington didn’t want the Germans to take the lead in this area. They didn’t want them “out front,” so to speak, making both trade and perhaps strategic concessions. I think many of the West Europeans were amused by this, puzzled. They didn’t particularly see the reason for our position. I felt like I was a Darth Vader when I came into the room because everybody knew that I was going to veto and talk against every single proposal the Germans put forward and language that would lead up to an agenda. It wasn’t just the conference. There were a lot of other areas that the Germans were pushing to liberalize trade and strategic trade, particularly technology trade, that I was also under instructions to oppose. It was a game obviously. When the Germans spoke, everybody looked at me, waiting. When I spoke, everybody looked at the Germans, knowing their reaction. If the
West Europeans were going to throw in their lot, they basically felt they would throw in their lot with the United States, I think, although they were constrained by this European Community solidarity with the Germans. You are right. Of course, the East Bloc knew of this. Everybody knew of this confrontation, which generally took place most heatedly in our NATO caucus. Naturally, we tried not to let it boil over into the general meetings. Both neutral and the non-aligned knew very well. The East Bloc got a whiff of it too. They were amused by it. It got so bad at one point, that the West German complained about me to Warren Zimmerman. We had a big showdown at the OK Corral. Of course, Warren supported me, and said that was what I was under instruction to do. Also, that this was our position. The Germans said, “This is ridiculous.” It escalated at one point very heatedly. Both Warren and the German who was head of their delegation, got involved in the thing.

Q: *Did the Germans at any point, try to, sort of woo you, or not?*

EVANS: Yes. Absolutely. They were constantly inviting us to very expensive luncheons and very nice restaurants with very nice wine, that sort of thing.

Q: *As these meetings progressed, was there a sudden shift because Washington was no longer interested in preventing this meeting or not? How did this play out?*

EVANS: Yes. I think I should put this German campaign in better perspective. This was the original reason for my being assigned. This was for the first three months I was there, from September through December of 1987. This was the main focus. When we got back in January of 1988, things were developing in the East that made it clear that in fact the East was less of a threat, less hostile, and things were moving in democratic ways. Many of the Eastern countries, notably the Hungarians, even the Bulgarians, although not the East Germans nor the Czechs, were moving toward many of our positions. The Hungarians were overtly flirting with the West and defying the Soviets on many occasions. The dynamics did change during the spring and by the fall of 1988. This German crusade was largely over, but not entirely, because we had spent so much time in months before, digging our trenches and setting up our battlements, that we simply couldn’t back down completely. The main thrust of the mandate changed as circumstances changed. My interest and the focus of our discussions evolved more into environmental issues in the fall of 1988. A year after I had arrived there, I was, in many cases, doing battle with my own government about environmental issues. That was one of the bigger changes, that and working in the corridors and restaurants and coffee bars with some of the East Bloc representatives to try to get concessions from them in certain areas, which I can go into in a minute.

Q: *What were the environmental concerns that you were dealing with?*

EVANS: They were reminiscent of this global warming issue that is going on now. Pollution of the air, pollution of the sea were the main issues. Here, I was, again, under instructions from Washington to hold the line against the European community. Now, our main adversary was the British, no, the Norwegians and the Danes, particularly the Danes, who were determined to push through very progressive, strict emission controls for air and water pollution. I was wrong in saying the British. The British were very reluctant to take steps and were totally out of sync in the European community meetings with their EC colleagues. They were under very strict
instructions from London not to make any concessions on both water and also air, particularly water pollution. The Germans were very much to the fore and pushing for strict emissions controls and setting standards and dates that would have to be adhered to. The Danes and most of the neutral and non-aligned were totally for this. A lot of countries didn’t really care. Of course, the East Bloc and the Russians, the Soviets, were against it, knowing that they couldn’t commit to stopping the awful pollution that was in their country. It didn’t really seem to matter to them that much because it was something everyone knew they wouldn’t adhere to anyway. So, the dynamics changed.

In this case, I would like to relate one story that I was actually very proud of. At one point, I think it was on water pollution. It doesn’t matter. Let’s say it was water pollution. We were in a full meeting and there was virtual unanimity around the table that we should adopt strict language against certain types of water pollution. I went back to Washington with urgent cables and telephone calls trying to see if there was any wiggle room. Couldn’t I escape from this strict mandate that I had from Washington, not to agree to these? Anyway, I remember, I took it upon myself to say that the United States would agree to the language that had been worked up. There was, as I recall, practically a round of clapping, applause for my doing this. I then had the task of going back and selling it to Washington. Eventually, they did cave in. So, my position was justified. I knew that the opposition was, from some bureaucrat in some cubby hole who represents Washington and has his feet dug in, refusing to move on an issue. Nobody else really cares that much. On this particular issue, I guess, there was a certain amount of that. In any event, I felt emboldened by the fact that I had been there a year and I could agree to a few things that I felt should be agreed to, and then worry about what Washington would say afterwards. It was easier to do that in the environmental area where I felt very strongly about it than it was with the German area. It shows the personal element, the human factor in all of our work.

There is another issue that I would like to mention that was also in the environmental area, which I was really proud of. If I had to name some of my achievements during my whole diplomatic career, this is one of the top ones. As we were getting to the end of the negotiations in the fall, I guess, November 1988, one of the issues was agreeing to the so-called “follow up” meetings in various areas. The German economic conference was one. The Bulgarians had also proposed an environmental conference in Sofia, to be held in the fall of 1989. This was also not something the United States was particularly eager to see take place because we basically didn’t want any of these East Bloc proposals to take place. We were reluctant to have the Bulgarians host an environmental conference where things might get out of hand, from our point of view. I had lunch with my Bulgarian counterpart, Toger Cheroff, in a very nice, little Viennese restaurant on a little side street, not far from our embassy. We both were trying to work out our positions. Basically, everybody left it up to the two of us to work out the language. We had by this time reluctantly agreed to a meeting in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians wanted language that would accommodate the transfer of technology, which it turned out, was agricultural technology, although that was not clear initially. We wanted to insert a provision that the meeting be open to the public. That would have to be the concession that the Bulgarians would make. It was a major concession for them because events at that time were already showing that the situation in the Eastern countries was getting a little out of control and the hardline Communists were on the run in many of these countries. The populations were getting restive. The appeal of democracy in the West was getting overpowering. We worked out a deal that the Bulgarians agreed the meeting
would be open to the public. In exchange for that, I agreed that we would agree to the language permitting the transfer of agricultural technology. I had to sell that to Washington which eventually I did. I argued that it was a very useful, very good trade off with having this open meeting. The result of this was that the mandate for the Sofia environmental meeting included a provision that it was open to the public. That meeting was held in, I think, October of 1989. There were huge crowds of people from the West and locally that flocked to that meeting, environmentalists being also democrats and anti-communists by large. The meeting was open to the public. The meeting got stormed, virtually, by all these people. That, in turn, lead to demonstrations against the government. The Communist government fell. I really felt that by working out this language to permit the meeting to be held, I had directly played a role in the overthrow of the Communist government in Bulgaria. Interestingly enough, my colleague, this Bulgarian Toger Cheroff, who I suspected was himself not a very hardline Communist Bulgarian, went on to become the Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria under the new democratic government. That was a very satisfying incident.

Q: The Bush Administration came in toward the close of your time?

EVANS: Well, that gets into the dynamics of the closure of this meeting. We are in now, let’s say, late 1988. There was a sense of the Communist glacier receding or the Communist structure cracking up, but nobody foresaw what would happen a year later. In the 1988 election, George Bush had been elected President. We knew that a similar mandate and instructions would probably flow from Washington. In mid-December of 1988 . . . I might mention a historical note - that two young women came to see me were friends of my secretary. I chatted with them because my secretary said one of them was studying Russian or something. I guess two days later, I got word that PanAm 103 had been blown up. These two girls were on the plane. We were very concerned that some of our staff was on the plane, but they weren’t. That was an experience that hit us very hard.

Q: This was a plane that was blown up apparently by Libyan agents?

EVANS: That I guess is the best analysis people have come up with. There was some evidence that they had used transit facilities in Malta, as I recall. There was also evidence that the Popular Liberation Organization of Palestine had been involved in this. I forget why. I had, as you know, from my previous discussion, spent four and one-half years working in London with the Navy and dealing largely with ending terrorism. I forget how I saw them, but I did follow the fact that these PFLP cells were operating in Germany. The Germans had made some arrests shortly before. To me, it is still a murky issue. There is some thought that the Iranians might have been behind it or have sponsored it in retaliation for the shoot down in the August of the Iranian passenger Airbus over the Persian Gulf. I don’t think we ever knew for sure. Officially, it was the Libyans who did it. Anyway, that was a defining moment because it was a great concern to us. There were a lot of late-night frantic calls back and forth. Everybody was trying to account for staffers because at that point, our conference had more or less come to an end and some of those staffers started going home for Christmas break.

On a personal front, I might say that this period was very meaningful to me because having been divorced about 10 years before, I had met someone I became very fond of and invited her from
Boston over to Vienna. We decided to get married in November of 1988. So, Vienna was very special to us. When we broke for Christmas, I suggested and indeed urged that we get married quite promptly during the holiday break so that when we came back, she could come back as my wife. We were anticipating being there for at least another six months into the summer of 1989. In an extraordinary effort, my fiancée managed to arrange a wedding in Boston on the eighth of January, nine years tomorrow. We did get married and left the next day to come back to Vienna. We had set the date for the wedding, thinking that we would have a week or 10 days after the wedding, without the necessity of rushing back to Vienna to get on with the work, because there was no firm deadline. But around Christmas time, George Shultz suddenly focused on the CSCE and the fact that he would no longer be Secretary of State in the new Bush Administration. He decided that he wanted to wind up the CSCE meeting on his watch. He wanted to come out to Vienna to conclude the thing with a big ceremonial meeting of foreign ministers. This would be the great happening event of his career as Secretary of State. That was the driving force that forced the Vienna meeting to come to an abrupt close on the 17th of January, or whatever it was, two days before the official inauguration of the President. George Shultz did come out to Vienna. He danced and had a great time. George Shultz came out to Vienna at the head of the delegation and we had a huge ceremony at Schoenbrunn Palace, put on by the Austrians who are certainly unrivaled in this ability. The meeting concluded with many quick compromises. You know, when you are told you are going to finish a meeting, all of a sudden you make accommodations right and left. So, a lot of these things that floated for years and months suddenly were given up. On the Eastern side, they were suddenly making compromises that we could not have foreseen a few months ago. The Vienna Concluding Document, for the Vienna follow up meeting in January 1989, was a very far reaching document. It included major concessions from the East on Human Rights, particularly. Certain security issues established the groundwork for the conventional arms mechanism in Europe. It had all sorts of provisions for economic exchanges. The Bonn Agreement went through. The Sofia Agreement went through. Of course, within nine months after that, the whole political situation changed and the agreement that we thought was so fantastic and far reaching was, in fact, left in the dust by events.

Q: What was the role of the Soviets during the time you were there? Were they calling the shots?

EVANS: The Soviet delegation, at least in our basket, had completely lost control of things. Their client states in Eastern Europe were going way out on limbs and it was interesting to observe that. They were getting conflicting signals themselves and agreeing to things that we thought they never would agree to. Across the board, the old fault lines of east and west were starting to disappear. The Soviets, compared to previous Soviet behavior that I experienced, were remarkable.

MICHAEL H. NEWLIN
Resident Representative to UN Agencies
Vienna (1988-1991)

Ambassador Newlin was born in North Carolina and was raised there and in the Panama canal zone. After graduating from Harvard he joined the Foreign Service
in 1952 and was posted to Frankfort, Oslo, Paris, Kinshasa and Jerusalem, where served as Consul General. During his distinguished career, Ambassador Newlin served in several high level positions dealing with the United Nations and its agencies and NATO. He served as Ambassador to Algeria from 1981 to 1985 and as US representative to the United Nations Agencies in Vienna, 1988-1991. Ambassador Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.

Q: You were in Vienna from when to when?

NEWLIN: Let’s see, I got there in ’88, late in ’88. Then I left in ’91.

Q: In Vienna what were you doing?

NEWLIN: I was the resident representative to the UN agencies in Vienna. It was a rather complicated situation. Vienna decided, of course you have the UN headquarters in New York; you have the European headquarters in Geneva, the old League of Nations complex, and the Austrians decided that they would become the third UN city. They lobbied and got quite a few UN affiliated agencies to come to Vienna, and they built a very nice enclave for them on the other side of the Danube from the main city. The main one was the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, which is interesting in itself because even during the cold war which is when it was established, ourselves and the Soviet Union had a very strong interest in seeing that nuclear non proliferation did not take place. There was UNRWA, the UN Relief and works agency for Palestinian refugees. There was something called UNIDO, the UN Industrial Development Organization, which later was phased out. It was quite a large thing when I got there. It was a center for the UN agency to combat the drug trade. And then there were social issues, the commission on the status of women. I think those were the main ones. The main job was of course, with the IAEA. That was structured so that you have a governor as the chief representative, but he is not resident there. The governor is not resident. Then you have the resident representative, who is also an ambassador who then attends to the ongoing business between times when the main body consisting of the governors is in session. Like some other cities, Paris and Brussels, we had four ambassadors resident in Vienna. There was the bilateral ambassador, myself, and then the ambassador to the CSCE, conventional forces, and then there was another ambassador assigned as head of delegation for developing a chemical weapons treaty. All four of us were there.

Q: Who was our bilateral ambassador to the Austrians?

NEWLIN: Henry Grunwald, the former editor in chief of Time Magazine was the ambassador when I arrived. His term came to an end, and he was replaced by Huffington, and an industrialist who was an oil tycoon.

Q: An oil man from Texas.

NEWLIN: We all did our own thing. It used to be prior to my arrival that on the Fourth of July, each of the four would hold receptions for their respective colleagues. Grunwald suggested that all of us come over to his residence and had a five ambassador receiving line. That worked out
Q: First before we get into what you were doing and what the issues were, I mean although you weren’t bilateral, being a bilateralist at this point with the Austrians. I mean you were a foreign service officer. What was going on in Austria at that time, and how did we see that? Was Kurt Waldheim an issue at the time or not?

NEWLIN: Waldheim was an issue at that time. I had two encounters with Waldheim. Of course we have covered earlier my time when I was political counselor at the mission when he was elected Secretary General. Then later when I was in the bureau of consular affairs. We understood when he was elected that he was in the German army and that he was on the Russian front, that he was wounded, and he came back to Vienna and practiced law. The facts came out much later that while he was in the army he was an intelligence officer, and he served in the Balkans. So the people in the Justice Department that were in charge of finding war criminals alleged that he was in a unit that was responsible for certain atrocities that took place. So I was summoned over to the Justice Department.

Q: This is when you were in consular affairs.

NEWLIN: This is when I was in consular affairs. I was summoned over to the Justice Department. They were all ready to go ahead on the basis of the information they had collected and place Waldheim on the watch list which meant he could not get a visa. Waldheim’s lawyers were saying that Waldheim at least ought to have a chance to defend himself and have legal representation. I supported that strongly. I said, yes, you may have a very strong case, but it is not American to go ahead just on this basis and not afford him a fair hearing. So that process did go forward. They did find that they were going to put him on this particular list. When I was in Vienna there he was President of Austria. This meant that no really high level meetings could take place. For instance, no Presidential visits or Vice Presidential visits. I think Grunwald had permission that he could attend the President’s New Years Day reception. But other than that there was no formal contact with him.

Q: What was your impression of your sort of the political situation in Austria at the time?

NEWLIN: Austria at the time was doing very well indeed. They had succeeded of course in getting rid of the four power occupation after the war. They were doing very well economically. They had a very capable prime minister, and things were going excellently.

Q: Did you get any feel for, I think it came a little later, but this I want to say Halder, but I am not sure that is the right name. But this right wing...

NEWLIN: Oh Heider.

Q: Heider and the right wing movement within Austria.

NEWLIN: That was not as pronounced as it became later. But there was probably no doubt that that part of Tyrol down around Innsbruck and in that area, that there were plenty of Nazi
sympathizers and that kind of thing.

Q: But that didn’t intrude into your work.

NEWLIN: Oh no, that didn’t affect us at all

JOHN A. BUCHE
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
Vienna (1989-1992)

Born and raised in Indiana, Mr. Burch studied at St. Meinrad Seminary, Purdue University and the University of Tubingen, Germany. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service, where he served primarily in African countries, including Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger and Zambia. Other assignments took Mr. Buche to Canada, Germany, Austria and Switzerland as well as to the State Department in Washington. He was an Amharic language specialist. Mr. Buche was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

BUCHE: To 1992 with the Mission. Then I retired.

Q: What were you doing there?

BUCHE: I was the DCM at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The agencies for which we were responsible were the Vienna-based UN organizations. These were the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the formal name for the agency responsible for the care and maintenance of the Palestinian refugees who had fled or been expelled from Israel beginning in 1948, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). We also had responsibilities for the UN Women’s Commission and the UN Drug Agency. There were some smaller offices, but our main business was with the above-mentioned organizations.

Q: What was your main job?

BUCHE: The main job was helping Ambassador Michael Newlin run the Mission. There were a dozen officers and support staff assigned to the Mission. Mike wanted me to handle the administration and personnel issues, and to be the focal point for official visitors and to monitor incoming cables, and to work with the various officers in drafting/editing our reporting cables. Since I had responsibility for all of the Vienna-based agencies when I was in Washington, I knew them quite well. I had more political, financial, and institutional expertise than the staff at the Vienna Mission or my replacement as the IO/T Office Director, Tom Martin. Accordingly, I could work confidently with the officers in Vienna or Washington. Admittedly, I did not have the technical expertise of the nuclear scientists and technicians seconded to the IAEA from the US Department of Energy. They had the technical background, and I provided the political guidance.
Since the Cold War was coming to an end and the Iron Curtain was crumbling, there were large numbers of official visitors coming to Vienna from Washington. I believe many of our visitors had themselves accredited to a UN conference or study group, so they could take the opportunity to visit Prague or Budapest from Vienna. Unless the visitors were Congressmen or Senators, or high-ranking State Department officials, Mike Newlin asked me to take care of them. (Accordingly, I made many trips with the visitors over the weekends to Prague and Budapest.) Some of the most demanding delegations were those for the annual meetings of the UN Women’s Commission. The delegations were completely female and were selected by the White House as rewards for political contributions in behalf of President Bush. The visiting women attended all the sessions (from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M.), but looked forward to the evening or weekend activities. We were asked to obtain opera tickets, reservations to some of the best restaurants, and to make arrangements for excursions to Budapest and Prague. I was requested to accompany them to Budapest. Fortunately, the State Department sent along a seasoned professional, Sharon Kotok, to help the Mission on the substantive business of the Commission, namely to prepare for the Cairo Conference on Women and Children. Sharon, Greg Sprow, the Mission officer responsible for the Commission, the Ambassador, and I did whatever was required to carry out our policy objectives for Cairo.

Michael Newlin had been the Principal DAS in Consular Affairs before his Vienna assignment. Before that, he was at the United Nations as the DCM to the Ambassador, the Permanent Representative. During most of Newlin’s posting to the UN, the Permanent Representative was George Bush. So he was on very good terms with President Bush.

Ambassador Newlin chose me, in part, because we got along together very well on both a personal and professional basis, as he was being briefed by my staff and myself in Washington in preparation for taking charge of the Mission. Once he was installed in Vienna, he appreciated the way I supported the Mission. Also, I had an excellent reputation from my previous experiences as a DCM. So when Mike considered the various candidates proposed to him by the Foreign Service Personnel Office as his DCM, he quickly settled on me. Mike headed a successful, proactive, and dedicated team. It was also a happy and cohesive group of professionals. Vienna, from my first days there, was my most enjoyable and interesting posting since Addis Ababa. For professional, cultural, and family reasons, it was the zenith of my Foreign Service career.

Q: You had been involved in budget paring. What was your impression of the UN agencies that your mission was representing? How were they run?

BUCHE: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was considered one of the best run of all the agencies. It was an independent agency that was an absolute necessity because of the Cold War. Its purpose was twofold: to inspect for violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to provide technical assistance for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was one of the few international agencies where the Soviets, Chinese, Americans, Brits and others would really concentrate on the business at hand. It was to the major powers’ interests that the agency be well-run and highly professional. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was temporarily located in Vienna. The UNRWA headquarters was moved to Vienna from Beirut because of the security situation in Lebanon. (In the late 1990s, the headquarters was
moved to Amman, Jordan.) I was responsible for UNRWA matters between 1984-87, when I was in RP. I had visited the camps and met on several occasions with the UNRWA leadership. A career Italian diplomat, Giacomelli, was the Director General, and a distinguished Foreign Service Officer and former Ambassador to Syria and Algeria, Bill Eagleton, was his deputy. It was a huge agency with over two million refugees in its care in five different countries. The leadership had to walk a narrow line because of the political sensitivities of the refugees and the host countries. An ongoing problem was the constant need to obtain more funding from the donors to provide the refugees with education and health care, and for some of the particularly vulnerable, food and shelter. We were impressed with the ability of Giacomelli and Eagleton to keep the many disputes, protests, and demonstrations localized and eventually to work out solutions. We did not like UNIDO’s performance when I was in Washington, and when I was in Vienna and saw the organization and its newly-elected Director General, Domingo Siazon, up close, my evaluation was confirmed.

Q: UNIDO being -

BUCHE: United Nations Industrial Development Organization. The Reagan Administration and Alan Keyes were determined to get rid of the previous head of UNIDO, an Algerian named Abdul Rahman Kahane. He was a strong advocate of socialism as the preferred system for the development of industry in the third-world. Our chosen candidate was the Philippine Ambassador to Vienna, Domingo Siazon. He was an outspoken advocate of capitalism and was favorably disposed toward the United States. Our Embassy in Manila had worked with him and gave him rave reviews. The UNIDO election was hard fought and bitter. The Kahane had strong support from most of the Africans, some Middle Eastern countries, the USSR and Eastern Europe, plus France and a few Scandinavians. We (and the Philippines) lined up the Latins, some of the Middle East and Africa, and all of Asia. For Keyes and the White House, the battle was ideological. Our Mission Vienna had the task of much of the day-to-day campaigning. The Algerian was not a good manager, regardless of his political leanings, so that was an effective talking point. UNIDO fell into even greater disarray as the campaign progressed. The final tally was close, but Siazon won. There were strong feelings and much bitterness within the organization and in the Vienna embassies and missions over the election. Many of Kahane’s supporters were waiting for Siazon to make a serious mistake in order to pounce.

After Siazon won, he replaced many of the top officials in UNIDO. Because of the UN staff regulations, the buy-outs were quite costly. The US decided to give a little extra money to make up for some of the funds lost when the member states supporting the Algerian cut back on their contributions. (Funding for UNIDO was voluntary.) Siazon decided that he had to mend fences with some of the third-world countries which had supported Abdul Rahman Kahane, so he offered jobs to their nationals, although their qualifications were weak. He also gave some study or feasibility contracts to politically important persons. He brought in a dozen Philippine nationals (about half in staff-support jobs). Siazon’s wife obtained a job with the IAEA. It was widely assumed in Vienna that he used his influence in her behalf. Despite the poor condition of the organization when Siazon took over, there was the expectation that after a year of transition, he and the new team would put UNIDO on the right track. We expected Siazon’s principal deputy (an American, the brother of Senator Warner of Virginia) to play a major role on the administrative side. Unfortunately, there was no quick turn around in UNIDO. (I came into IO/T
at this point.)

Our mission was quite aware of what was happening and reported accurately, not only on what was happening in UNIDO, but about the hypercritical attitudes of the diplomats in Vienna. When IO had to make cuts, there was no way we could justify exempting UNIDO from a heavy hit. Siazon was “our man”, but he was failing in our eyes to manage the organization the way we expected. That may have been an impossible task for Siazon, given the prior history of the organization, but when forced to choose between such well-run and vital organizations such as the IAEA, ITU, WHO, and a few others and UNIDO, the latter had to be put in the lowest category. Of course, word got out that the USG was cutting back on its usual voluntary contribution to UNIDO. That made Siazon’s task even harder. Ambassador Newlin in Vienna and we in Washington spoke with Siazon and with Warner about what we wanted, but only part of our message sank in. The organization was drifting. We wanted greater transparency in the financial aspects of UNIDO. We wanted the operational funds to go for real market feasibility studies, and not for “pay-off” writings that had no value. We proposed that a few additional experienced Americans in key middle-manager jobs would help. We were paying roughly a quarter of the budget and wanted more positions, something between ten and fifteen percent of the professional slots. Congress was quite insistent that American representation in UN bodies be roughly proportionate to our contributions. The rule of thumb was that we should have about ten percent less in jobs than our percentage contribution. Under the Algerian, almost all the Americans had practically been squeezed out of the organization. When Siazon took over, we had around seven percent of the positions. We thought it was catch-up time. Despite offering some well-qualified candidates, we were turned down in most cases. Siazon used the vacated slots to hire his own preferences. As I mentioned above, these persons were only minimally qualified. Our criticism of Siazon was both very parochial on the jobs issue, as well as broader on the achievement of the goals and objectives of the organization.

When I went to Vienna, I was determined to be objective in reporting on UNIDO. I could see mitigating circumstances for Siazon’s actions and appreciated the Mission’s nuanced reporting. There were, however, some decisions (and statements) by Siazon that bothered the Ambassador and me. We were finding ourselves in the difficult and uncomfortable position of defending the Siazon and Warner against the criticism of the Europeans, particularly the French, Belgians, and Nordics, when we, too, were critical of what was happening. The longer I stayed, the more critical I became. I learned so much of the inside, day-to-day activities of the organization from our superb Mission UNIDO officer, Greg Sprow. He was observant, had developed valuable contacts, and could communicate so clearly. Mike Newlin was more patient, but he, too, eventually realized that Siazon was falling down in the job and that the USG had made a mistake in pushing his candidacy.

The Europeans were really honing in on UNIDO. They uncovered some uses of small discretionary funds and some procurement policies that were not clearly illegal, but did not pass the “smell” test. Siazon apparently had decided to mend his fences with the African embassies, but not with the Europeans. He was like a ward politician. He calculated who could be bought off and who could be ignored. He put the Europeans in the latter category.

The first major confrontation developed over UNIDO’s decision to upgrade the computer
capabilities of the organization. They had several systems of computers, and they did not function as a network. Siazon and Warner, along with some in-house advisers decided to purchase a big mainframe computer. To make the US happy, they chose an IBM. There were many computer specialists inside and outside the organization who were saying that a large mainframe was not the way to go. It was not only too expensive, but using PC’s was the wave of the future. Siazon was not technically minded, and his insistence on a large mainframe seemed to be rooted in wanting a machine as large as the IAEA’s computer. (The IAEA, as an organization dealing with nuclear issues, needed a large mainframe.) There was no need for UNIDO to have a mainframe for 99% of its tasks. If there were a need now and then, UNIDO could make arrangements to lease time on the IAEA machine, since the two organizations were in the same building. UNIDO’s plans were attacked by the Europeans as financially and technically unsound. We were caught in a bind. We had to defend Siazon, Warner, and IBM. When Siazon and Warner insisted on moving forward with the IBM purchase despite the European objections, the Europeans were enraged. They threatened to withdraw funding, and eventually forced Siazon to agree to a re-study of the issue. Outside consultants (including some Americans) were brought in, and they recommended going the PC route. UNIDO had no choice but to comply. Warner worked out a deal with IBM that resulted in only a nominal penalty for voiding the contract. The entire affair was embarrassing to us. We had to use so much good will and “political capital” to save Siazon from being publicly censured and forced out of office. Although he survived, his reputation in Vienna was tarnished, and UNIDO as an institution suffered. Canada announced that it was leaving the organization and gave the necessary one-year’s notice. Australia and Belgium threatened to follow.

We were in the awkward position of defending our protégé, Siazon, when we, too, had lost trust in him. He seemed to be oblivious to criticism from the USG or the Europeans. Washington was by now also quite concerned because of the financial condition of UNIDO. Washington was afraid that we would have to contribute more than our customary amount to keep the organization afloat. (UNIDO was supported almost entirely from voluntary contributions, and the Europeans had reduced their funding to show their displeasure at Siazon.) Several officials came from Washington to see at first hand what could be done. I hosted a lunch for the officials and Siazon. Siazon came a few minutes late. He explained that he was on the phone with his personal banker and was delighted to announce that he had just made several thousand dollars profit from a speculation involving a foreign exchange transaction. Although there was nothing illegal about what he had done, it was so incongruous to us that he would boast about a personal speculative gain when his organization was making plans for layoffs because of financial difficulties and he was asking the USG to increase its voluntary funding of UNIDO.

The Europeans did not give up their efforts to force out Siazon. We decided that we were not going to waste any more capital propping up the institution by increasing our funding or defending the indefensible. Siazon saw the handwriting on the wall and resigned to become the Philippine Ambassador to Japan. (He had served there before, had a Japanese wife, and spoke Japanese.) When the Philippine Government changed, he left Japan to become the Foreign Minister. Apparently his mismanagement of UNIDO had no effect on his subsequent career. Mike Newlin and I had to spend so much time on UNIDO that we sometimes delegated responsibilities to other members of our staff for carrying out a few tasks with the IAEA or UNRWA that perhaps should have been handled by us. Of course, that all changed with the Gulf
BUCHE: The Gulf War catapulted the International Atomic Energy Agency into strategic importance. The UN Security Council gave the IAEA the responsibility to conduct the inspection missions in Iraq to determine the status of that country’s nuclear program. Our Mission was the focal point for carrying out Washington’s instructions for discussions and negotiations with Hans Blix, the Director General, and the other top officials of the IAEA regarding the mandated inspections. Our Mission staff was augmented by two officers from the CIA and several nuclear-detection specialists from the Department of Energy. They provided us with the technical expertise we needed in our discussions with the IAEA on the modalities, interpretation of findings, communications, security, logistics, and other aspects involving the inspections. Our reports of the meetings with the IAEA were read by the top policy makers in Washington and shared with our Coalition Partners. (For the sake of efficiency and clarity of purpose, Washington obtained the concurrence of our major Coalition Partners that the US Mission in Vienna would be the focal point for discussions with the IAEA on the inspections.) The IAEA was sending its own reports to the UN Secretary General of the discussions. To avoid any confusion or misunderstandings in the reporting by the IAEA or ourselves, we informally compared notes at the conclusion of each of our discussions. The inspections took place, and the results were spectacular. The IAEA team discovered the secret laboratories and the infrastructure used by the Iraqis to construct nuclear weapons. The conclusions of the IAEA were that the Iraqis were about a year away from their first bomb. The IAEA had the mandate from the UN Security Council not only to seek out the clandestine nuclear program and to report on the findings, but also to destroy the Iraqi capabilities to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. The IAEA succeeded brilliantly. The Security Council accepted the report by the IAEA that the Iraqi program had been uncovered and dismantled. The inspections by other organizations for chemical and biological weapons in Iraq were not so successful and thus were not accepted as conclusive by the UNSC. The success of the IAEA resulted from many factors. First of all, the IAEA was a superb organization and organized the inspection teams carefully. The IAEA inspection teams were augmented by some outside specialists and helped by intelligence data from several major powers, including the Soviets, and the USA. Also, the nature of constructing a nuclear weapon required larger facilities and more machinery than would be required for chemical or biological weapons. Thus, the facilities would be harder to hide. Washington was paying close attention to the developments over the six months of the various IAEA inspections. We received daily telephone calls and cables from Washington. I know on three occasions, President Bush himself phoned Ambassador Newlin to discuss the inspections. Our IAEA reporting was commended frequently by Washington.

After the IAEA inspections were completed, Ambassador Newlin decided to retire. He had done a superb job and had also thoroughly enjoyed his tour of duty in Vienna. With his friendship with President Bush and his excellent professional credentials, he could have asked for and received another ambassadorship, but he and his wife, Milena, wanted to enjoy their retirement. They had a daughter in the Washington area, and wanted to see her more often. I was the chargé ad interim for a month, and then the new Ambassador, Jane Becker, arrived. She came from IO, where she was the principal DAS. We got along quite well together. There were no major crises involving
our organizations in the time we were together. After the UNIDO debacles and the strategic demands in connection with the Iraqi inspections by the IAEA, I was pleased with this relatively calm period. My successor, Tom Martin from IO/T, arrived at post in August 1992, so I handed over to him my office and my responsibilities. I formally retired from the Department of State on September 30, 1992, after thirty three years in the Foreign Service. My career was exciting, challenging, and successful, but above all, interesting and fulfilling.

After I retired, Anike and I found a small, furnished apartment near St. Stephan’s Cathedral. She continued working with the Representative of the Department of Defense to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I went to the University of Vienna as a post-graduate student in a special course on Eastern Europe and the European Union. Given my diplomatic background, I was asked by the Chairman of the International Relations Faculty, Professor Neuhaus, to mentor three students from the Baltics. They were on a scholarship given by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was delighted to help them during the year, and in doing so, we developed friendships. I also had become a member of one of the most prestigious choirs in Vienna, the Augustinerchor (Choir of St. Augustine). I now had time to take special singing lessons and devote the necessary hours to private practice and group rehearsals. Our son, John, moved to Vienna upon his graduation from Northwestern University, so we were with him again. In July 1993, Anike and I departed Vienna for me to take a position (pro bono) as an Adjunct Professor of History at St. Meinrad College. I returned to the institution, which had meant so much to me in my formative teenage years. I was invited to return by my former classmate, Bob Sweeney, now Archabbot Timothy, O.S.B.

During my two years at St. Meinrad (August 1993 to June 1995), I twice taught a two-semester course in U.S. Foreign Relations from the founding of the Republic to the Gulf War. I used Walter LaFeber’s *The American Age* as my text. I also taught a seminar on the United Nations, with emphasis on the specialized agencies. For the latter, I used several texts, plus my own notes and recollections and many articles from periodicals and journals. I arranged a symposium at St. Meinrad in November 1993 on Russia and Eastern Europe with guest speakers from the German and Hungarian Embassies, plus the Department’s Policy Planning Staff. There was heavy conflict in the Balkans at this time, so interest was high for the event. In January 1995, I conducted an intense, two-week, inter-term seminar on U.S. economic development policy, with particular emphasis on Africa. Retired Ambassador Ed Korry came to address the students on the African portion. He had served four years in Ethiopia, and had been asked by President Johnson to formulate a new approach for the USG’s economic development policy toward Africa. He helped me celebrate my 60th birthday, when I gave a wine-tasting party for the faculty.

I was considering a third year at St. Meinrad, but Anike wisely counseled a return to Washington instead. Her point was that I had successfully put together several courses and had enjoyed the challenge of teaching college students. If I stayed a third year, I would be repeating much of what I had done before. She emphasized that I needed further challenges, and these were not to be found at St. Meinrad. Admittedly, my students were, for the most part, motivated and intelligent, but their educational and cultural horizons and personal goals did not involve foreign policy and international relations. The same could be said of the faculty. Anike and I enjoyed being with the monks, faculty, and students at St. Meinrad. We broadened our own knowledge and benefitted both spiritually and intellectually from the experience. Our time at St. Meinrad
was a positive and fascinating interlude, but both of us wanted to return to a more cosmopolitan setting.

While my post-retirement activities are not a part of my Foreign Service career, they involve foreign policy and may be of some interest to readers and researchers. I will describe briefly my activities after returning to Washington from St. Meinrad in the summer of 1995. After settling into our house, I began to look around for something to do. I had the idea of working with Gene Dewey at the Hunger Coalition on a voluntary basis. Gene was my supervisor when I was in the Refugee Bureau of the Department in 1994-97. I admired him immensely and figured he could use some assistance. I spoke with him and he was enthusiastic.

Several days before I was to begin, however, I received a call from Mark Freeman with a fascinating offer - pro-bono work as an adviser in the newly-reopened Cambodian Embassy in Washington. (Mark was a mutual friend of Richard Kochan and myself and was currently heading the Asian Section of Meridian House, an NGO involved with exchange visitors and technical assistance with developing countries.) Diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia were broken in 1975, when the Khmer Rouge took over the country. After years of widespread starvation, torture, and murder by the Khmer Rouge against their own countrymen, the KR leadership turned against their traditional enemies, the Vietnamese. The KR met their match, when the Vietnamese, fresh from throwing out the Americans, turned their military against the upstart Cambodians. After years of guerilla warfare, the KR were driven into the western mountains of Cambodia. The Vietnamese were not intent on remaining in Cambodia for the long term, so through a series of international negotiations, the United Nations took over running the country for two years.

The country was totally devastated, first by the genocidal Khmer Rouge and then by the incessant warfare between the Vietnamese Army and the KR. Few educated Cambodians escaped slaughter by the KR. When the Vietnamese and then the United Nations took over governing the country, some Cambodians returned from abroad to take positions in the new Cambodia. The Cambodian King, Sihanouk, returned from asylum in China to serve as a symbol of national unity and constitutional monarch.

There was a UN-sponsored national election which resulted in a two-way split in power, including two Prime Ministers. The First Prime Minister was Prince Raniridh, a son of King Sihanouk; the Second Prime Minister was Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge official who defected and subsequently worked with the Vietnamese. The two parties were bitter rivals and were intent on gaining undisputed hegemony. All the government ministries, including the embassies, had officials appointed from both parties.

The Embassy in Washington had reopened in August 1995, after being shuttered and sealed for twenty years. The Embassy staff was eager to serve their country, but lacked the education, experience and language skills to function effectively in Washington. Mark told me that Ambassador Var Houot at the newly-reopened Cambodian Embassy in Washington was eagerly seeking a retired diplomat to help him and the staff establish themselves with the USG, Congress, journalists, investors, travel agents, et al. Ambassador Var told me that only two persons on his staff had ever served overseas in an embassy and that he had no diplomatic
experience. Only one official at the Embassy spoke fluent English. The rest, including the Ambassador, had only an intermediate working command of the language. He wanted someone to advise him and his staff on almost every aspect of running an embassy. I told him I was interested, but knew very little about Cambodia. He said that was not important. What he wanted was someone experienced in diplomacy and with knowledge of how the U.S. Government functioned. I checked with the Department’s Cambodian Desk Officer, Deborah Kingsland, to see how she viewed the offer. She responded positively, since I could help resolve some of the inevitable misunderstandings and miscommunications between the Department and an inexperienced Embassy staff whose English was limited. I agreed to help Ambassador Var for several months pro bono.

My first task was to prepare for the visit of the Cambodian Foreign Minister. In making the preparations, I became better acquainted with the Embassy staff and how the officials interacted with one another. I did not handle the briefing papers from the Cambodian side, since they were written by the Foreign Minister’s staff in Phnom Penh. I made the appointments and conferred with the American officials handling the visit in State, AID, Treasury, and Commerce. I asked the Ambassador what were the main points the Foreign Minister wanted to raise. I then passed these on to my contacts so that they could prepare their bosses to respond. In turn, they told me what was in the briefing papers on the American side. This was standard procedure for any high-level visit. The basic rule is that there must not be any surprises for the principals. The Foreign Minister’s trip went well and was followed by an official visit from the Minister of Defense and then by other ministers. We followed the same procedures. At the time of the early visits, there were no divisive major bilateral issues between the two countries, and so the talks were positive.

Ambassador Var and his staff were quick learners. Their English improved significantly. They constantly sought help from me in understanding some fine points or colloquial uses of English from their reading or from conversations with Americans. They depended on me to write their letters and diplomatic notes, but as their English improved, I asked them to do the first draft as a learning exercise. I would then correct or re-write their draft and explain why I changed their wording. I also published a monthly newsletter about economic and commercial developments in Cambodia, emphasizing U.S. investments and potential opportunities in the country. I really enjoyed my work. I was a combined teacher and adviser.

As Ambassador Var and I got to know each another better, we could frankly discuss the increasingly, negative impact on Cambodia’s relations with the USA resulting from the internal political rivalries and violence between the two Prime Ministers and their parties. Not only was the State Department concerned about the increasing violence in Cambodia, but potential investors began to re-think their plans.

Even more ominous for Cambodia’s economic development was the displeasure shown by several influential Senators and Congressmen at the mounting numbers of human rights violations. They threatened to block passage of a law that would restore Cambodia’s normal trading rights with the US. (After we broke relations in 1975, practically no items from Cambodia were allowed to enter the United States.) The Department of State and the Agency for International Development decided to cut back economic assistance to Cambodia in reaction to the increasing number of human-rights abuses.
After several egregious examples of human rights abuses against journalists and harassment against the well-known opposition figure, Sam Rainsy, became public, Senator McCain wrote a letter to Prime Minister Raniridh, with copies to Hun Sen, stating that he was greatly disturbed by the news and implying that his support for legislation to grant Cambodia ‘Most Favored Nation’ status (normal trading rights) was in doubt. McCain asked for an explanation and a commitment to safeguard the rights of dissenters. Raniridh responded with a high-handed letter to Senator McCain denying any abuses in Cambodia and mentioning some American sins of commission and omission in the human rights area. Raniridh challenged McCain’s right to criticize what was happening in Cambodia. The PM’s letter arrived by diplomatic pouch at the Embassy and the Ambassador was asked to deliver the letter personally to the Senator.

I saw the letter and was aghast. I told Ambassador Var that if he delivered the letter as written, there would be terrible consequences, further cuts in assistance from the U.S. and no chance of passing legislation for MFN for Cambodia. Var was torn about what to do. He was a Hun Sen supporter and owed his appointment to him. Var intensely disliked Raniridh. He would have been personally delighted to see Raniridh publicly excoriated in the Senate and in the U.S. press if the original letter were delivered. On the other hand, he was a patriot and was working for the good of his country. He asked me to edit out or soften the most offensive portions of the letter. I did so. Var then had the problem of convincing someone very close to Raniridh to suggest he have the letter re-written, possibly along the lines I suggested. Var hesitated for several reasons. He was in the ‘opposition party’ and did not have working contacts with the inner circle of Prince Raniridh. Secondly, it was not in Cambodian culture to question a decision, or in this case, a letter from a higher official. I saw things quite differently and so I urged him to do his duty as an ambassador and quickly, since the reply to the Senator was long overdue. After several days of intense reflection, Var made a series of phone calls to Phnom Penh. A new letter arrived. It was less offensive, but still had a tone that would likely upset McCain. The text was certainly not what I would have written, given the importance of MFN to Cambodia and the powerful position of the Senator on the issue. Var took the letter to McCain and did a superb job of talking away (and apologizing for) the actual words of the letter. McCain lectured Var about human rights and how the actions of Cambodia’s feuding Prime Ministers were rapidly dissipating the support of the United States for a nation that had suffered so terribly over the past two decades. In the end, he assured Var that he still supported MFN. McCain then wrote a sharp letter back to Raniridh, with copies to the Embassy and Hun Sen. I told Var that he should strongly advise his Prime Minister to acknowledge the McCain letter, but write nothing repeat nothing further. Fortunately for all concerned, that is what happened.

I had been with the Embassy for five months and was also concerned about the direction Cambodia was heading. I was becoming queasy about defending the Cambodian Government’s actions. I spoke to Var about my misgivings and told him that I had fulfilled my promise to help out for about a half year. I told him I would leave in several weeks, but that Anike would continue to come to the Embassy several times a week to help with English lessons. He had no choice but to accept, since I was working pro bono.

The next day I received a call from the State Department asking whether I would be interested in
a three month special mission to the Philippines. I asked a few questions and replied affirmatively. I had to report to the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (the old RP) the following day. Little did I realize that the three-month mission would be the beginning of a series of assignments with PRM lasting years.

On April 15, 1996, when I showed up in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Evelyn Whittaker greeted me and told me she had the responsibility for helping me complete my paperwork and making sure I was on the Northwest Air flight to Bangkok two days later. I was to participate in the kick-off workshop in Bangkok for Operation ROVR (Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Returnees). I was pleased Evelyn was handling the administrative formalities since she knew all the shortcuts, as well as the people who gave the approvals. I recognized many people in PRM from my days in RP in 1984-1987. Foremost were Doug Hunter, Judy Chavchavadze, Jim Kelley, Norm Runkles, Terry Rusch, Paula Lynch, and Jim Lawrence. Doug and Judy were instrumental in recommending that I be brought out of retirement and entrusted with heading the mission to the Philippine camp on Palawan Island for rejected Vietnamese asylum seekers. (The Assistant Secretary, Phyllis Oakley, had confidence in Judy and Doug, so my interview with her a few months earlier about future work in PRM took place in a positive atmosphere.) After two hectic days of briefings, I boarded the plane to Bangkok.

In Bangkok I met up with the other members of the Palawan ROVR team. I was to be supported by a junior consular officer at the Embassy in Manila, Jim Mullinax, and two contract personnel, Babes Katima, a Filipina from our Vietnamese Processing Office in Bangkok, and Phu Dac Ninh, a Vietnamese refugee settled in Canada. Jim spent only a few days on Palawan before returning to Manila. He was to be my link with the Embassy and thus the “outside world.”

Electronic communications were so irregular and of such poor quality between Palawan and Manila that almost all my messages were delayed and garbled in transmission. The initial telegrams to Washington sent from Embassy Manila with my progress reports read differently from what I wrote on Palawan and faxed to Jim. (When I finally received the come-back copies, weeks later, I asked him about the differences in the two texts. He told me he had given my faxes to his local secretary to be typed into cable format. What she could not read because of the garbles, she reconstructed to the best of her ability! Subsequently, he personally took charge of the transcribing.)

The refugee camp on Palawan had about 2,000 Vietnamese registered, but since it was an open camp, many were living outside. In fact, they were living on other islands and were engaged in trading. They came back to Palawan occasionally to celebrate Vietnamese holidays or weddings and funerals. Shortly after arriving, we announced the details of the ROVR program. Basically, the program offered a second chance for U.S. resettlement to those persons who had left Vietnam and had been turned down in their request for refugee status by combined UNHCR and national authorities. The USG, in conjunction with the refugee-hosting nations of Southeast Asia, had reached a compromise that promised resettlement in the USA for those refugees (and their immediate families) who had served in the U.S. or Vietnamese military or in the civilian government, provided they returned to Vietnam for processing. The important element was that they did not have to convince the U.S. authorities in Vietnam that they were refugees, but only
that they had served in the civil service or the military. There was great skepticism among the
refugees about what would happen to them if they returned to Vietnam to await their turn for
processing. This is where the ROVR teams played a role. We were to answer questions,
encourage the would-be refugees to inquire from family or friends in Vietnam, or to seek advice
from the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), or from other sources.

While the choice for most of the Vietnamese in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Thailand was go home voluntarily or under duress, the Vietnamese in the Philippines had a
broader choice. They could also opt for resettlement in the Philippines. A group of Philippine
Catholic bishops, clerics, and nuns had gone to the United States and had raised sufficient funds
to build simple housing for those Vietnamese who wanted to remain on Palawan. With that
incentive, there were few takers of the option to return to Vietnam and await processing for the
US.

It should be noted that while the Catholic chaplain (an American with decades of service in
Southeast Asia) and a Vietnamese nun leaned in some cases toward encouraging the return
option, there were several groups of Vietnamese from the U.S. who came to the Palawan camp to
denounce the ROVR program. They cited many examples of alleged arrests, persecution, and
violence involving Vietnamese who had returned. I noted the particulars and asked Washington
for information. The response was quick. These were old allegations. Our Embassy, the
UNHCR, several NGOs, and the International Red Cross had investigated the charges, but could
not find substantiating evidence. Reading between the lines, it was clear to me that the examples
were either made up or exaggerated to serve the purposes of the anti-ROVR groups. After
several months on Palawan, I realized I had accomplished whatever was possible under the
ROVR program. I returned to Washington on June 10.

After returning from the Philippines and spending a week being debriefed by various PRM
officers, I went on a long vacation with Anike. Before leaving, I was asked by Doug Hunter
whether I would be interested in eventually filling in for one of the officers who was expecting a
baby and planned to take several months of maternity leave. I very definitely was interested. Her
portfolio was the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM).

Before I got very deeply into her work, a crisis erupted in Northern Iraq when some units of
Saddam Hussein’s army invaded (at the invitation of one of the Kurdish factions) to attack
another Kurdish clan. We hastily withdrew most of the Americans working in the region. The
White House then made the decision also to withdraw the Kurds (and their families) working for
the USG. A civilian airlift was ordered and Operation “Quick Transit” began. A dozen PRM
officers spent the weekend trying to arrange through the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) for charters of civilian aircraft.

The officers also began the search for a destination to receive them for processing before they
entered the USA. The European Bureau (EUR) and the Near Eastern Bureau (NEA) worked with
PRM on the political aspects. No European country wanted to host the Kurds, even temporarily.
The solution was to pick them up in a Turkish Air Force base, Diyarbakir, and fly them half way
around the world to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. There they would be processed by the
US Immigration and Naturalization Service, and after security checks were completed, they would be flown to the US for resettlement. Our Embassy in Ankara had a hard sell to obtain permission from the Turkish Government for the uninhibited transit of thousands of Kurds from Iraq to Diyarbakir. IOM ran into problems with the first charters, since the aircraft provisionally chartered were not certified by the FAA, and thus could not land at the US Air Force Base on Guam. The PRM officers were unfamiliar with the requirements to obtain over-flight clearances from all the countries between Turkey and Guam. The two Air Force officers in the Department of State’s Operations Center were called in on Sunday evening to assist. Operation “Quick Transit” would last for several months, so someone had take charge of the logistics. PRM Assistant Secretary Oakley selected me.

I went to the Department’s Operations Center on Monday Morning, September 16, 1996, to take charge of the Task Force. I relieved several bedraggled PRMers who had spent much of the past two days attempting to activate the process of extricating from Northern Iraq those Kurds who were U.S. Government employees. I was told that there would be other members of the Task Force from PRM, the Near Eastern (NEA) and European (EUR) Bureaus, from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in the Agency for International Development (AID/OFDA), and from the Consular Affairs Bureau (CA). We were to operate around the clock. For the first several days, a technician from the Ops Center was assigned to our group to help us master the complex communications equipment at our disposal. We could reach Embassy Ankara and the small detachment at Diyarbakir, as well as Andersen AFB with a secure phone. Also we could reach our liaison officers in Northern Iraq with satellite phones, but the messages were not encrypted. We could also hold secure video conferences with all the other players in the USG involved in the operation: FBI, CIA, INS, HHS, DOD, and the NSC. Within a day, the NSC set up a regular video conference at 5 P.M. each day. Eric Schwartz, the NSC Officer for Humanitarian Affairs, chaired the discussions.

I began to work twelve-hour shifts. I would come in for the last four hours of shift A, work my own shift for eight hours, and the stay for the first four hours of shift C. The team members had little experience in Kurdish affairs, logistics, aircraft charters, etc. It was a learn-by-doing operation. We knew what we were doing was essential to save lives. We were determined to succeed. We were confident that by asking questions from people in and out of the government, we could fill in the many gaps in our knowledge. IOM was of enormous help, particularly Michel Tonneau and his boss, Jorg Stuwe. Those two ran their own task force. We were in communication with them practically round the clock. So that I knew what was happening with IOM and to minimize contradictory instructions, I decided that I would be the prime contact for IOM. That meant I was also on call round the clock.

The initial snafu by IOM with the charters was rectified and the first plane, a charter Boeing 747 from Corsair with 325 Kurdish refugees aboard, landed on Guam on September 17. The Kurds had made their way out of Northern Iraq by car, truck, or on foot to the Turkish border where they were met by Embassy and US military officers and then bussed to Diyarbakir. They were allowed to bring only one suitcase per person. They had to leave their homes, cars, furniture, household pets, etc to be disposed of by friends and relatives. A three-star general of the US Air Force and dozens of US military personnel welcomed them as they deplaned. Before the exhausted Kurds could be taken to their temporary housing, the Guam Customs officers wanted
to search all the luggage. After an hour of searches and the clearance of only the first several dozen travelers, the AF General pleaded for some common sense and humanity. Customs relented and did a spot check of every twentieth person. The Kurds were delighted to be halfway to their new homes in America, but were startled to see a huge welcoming sign at the AFB in English and Turkish, the language of the country against which many of their kinsmen were fighting. The need for quick action in leaving Northern Iraq meant that there was great flexibility by the American officers at the border in determining the definition of a “nuclear family.” Our Kurdish employees interpreted the concept quite liberally. Thus they brought with them parents, grandparents, nephews, cousins, and assorted in-laws. Regarding those men with multiple wives, they were advised to list them on the INS entry forms as cousins. In fact, some of them were cousins! Four other chartered aircraft followed. The first phase of “Quick Transit” was completed by September 19. A total of 2,137 Kurds were flown to Guam for processing by the INS and HHS before being transported to their new homes in the United States. Once the four planes landed on Guam, I began to plan for the extrication of the second group, as well as work to resolve problems that came up during the processing of the first tranche. We learned that several members of a family were separated during the move from Northern Iraq. They showed up at the Turkish border several days after the departure of the last aircraft. They were offered shelter by an Embassy officer (on the Iraq side of the border) until they could be flown out in the next tranche. The Kurds on Guam who were USG employees wanted their back pay as well as word on whether they would continue to be paid while on Guam, since they were legally still on the Government payroll. I was able to hand the payroll issue off to AID, the employer of the Kurds. As we began the preparations for the next flights, we had the advantage of additional time and the experience gained from the first phase. I personally took charge of obtaining the flight clearances. The process was more orderly. We did not have the need of telephoning our embassies with frantic requests asking them to plead with their host governments for urgent over-flight clearances. The second tranche of Quick Transit was aimed at extricating some 600 Iraqis who fit in the category of “oppositionists” to the Saddam Hussein regime. These were members of various opposition groups such as the Iraqi National Group, the Iraqi National Accord, and the Iraqi National Congress. This was not a group as well-defined as Quick Transit I. Some were supported directly or indirectly by the American Government; others were known to us, but received no monetary compensation. The White House determined that this group also was in grave danger if a second attack were launched. The order was given to fly them to Guam. Leasing two charter aircraft was relatively simple. The main problem was identifying the right people and assisting them to cross into Turkey and conversely, making sure that people not on our list were spotted.

One unexpected glitch that took hours to resolve and resulted in delaying the first flight by a day was a misunderstanding by the top leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Party as to the timeframe for the departure. As a result, the evacuees were not allowed to cross into Turkey at Habur Gate by the lower-level KDP security forces. It took dozens of telephone calls between the Task Force, New York, London, Ankara, and Northern Iraq to resolve the problem.

As expected, some people showed up at the border who were not on our list, but had papers and some strong vocal support from other members of the “Oppositionists”. This necessitated calls back and forth between the Ops Center and our people on the border, followed by conference calls in Washington to decide whether to allow them on the plane. Most were rejected because
we really did not know who they were or their backgrounds. The Tower Air and Air Outre Mer charters took off from Incirlik Air Force Base (instead of Diyarbakir because of dust problems at the latter). They landed on Guam the night of October 23, with a total of 601 “Oppositionists.” Quick Transit II was successfully concluded.

The CIA arranged a separate flight after the close of QT-II to take out a special group of people. Some of the CIA assets were included in Quick Transit II, but not all. My task force was not asked for direct assistance.

Attention was now focused on the most contentious issue, whether the USG should evacuate the Kurds working for American NGOs or for USG-funded European NGOs. The Department was ambivalent about recommending such an evacuation. Saddam’s forces had not re-entered Northern Iraq since the first thrust in September. Of course, no one in the USG would state that the security situation would likely remain stable. While the NGOs were lobbying hard for an evacuation, there was, nevertheless, the realization that if the locally-hired Kurds departed the country, most of the services provided by the NGOs to the population would diminish or disappear. The United Nations personnel and most of the European NGOs did not plan to leave unless conditions changed. In the end, the White House decided in the affirmative to move out the Kurds working for American NGOs or USG-funded European entities. (It was election time!)

We, therefore, prepared for Quick Transit III. This phase turned out to be the most difficult.

One of the tasks that had to be completed before movements out of Northern Iraq to the Turkish border began was the identification and security clearance of the potential evacuees. Unlike the two earlier phases, where there was reasonably complete data (full name, date and place of birth, family members, etc.) on the principal “anchor” member of the family group (USG employee or identified “oppositionist”), the NGOs did not have similar data on their employees. Also there was a dispute about whether part-time or contract employees of the NGOs should be included. Since the USG had not previously vetted the NGO employees on security grounds, basic background checks were ordered. Before the security checks could begin, the NGOs had to obtain the personal data. Since the American NGO field reps had been evacuated from Northern Iraq, there were doubts about the accuracy of the data being gathered on the Kurdish employees by other Kurds and third-country nationals. There were many rumors of NGO employees “selling” their identities to other Kurds desirous of being resettled in the US. Eventually we got the lists from the NGOs of their employees and their families and turned them over to the CIA and FBI for security checks. We were also receiving reports almost daily from our intelligence agencies, from Kurds, or from other sources that employee X, Y, or Z was an agent of Iraq’s intelligence service or that employee A, B, or C had committed murder, rape, or some other heinous crime. None of the accusations could be verified, so the decision by the NSC was to evacuate the persons and conduct in-depth interviews on Guam during the processing for U.S. resettlement.

On December 2, 1996, the Quick Transit III Task Force formally started operating in the Ops Center. (We had been working out of PRM since the last flights.) American Field Liaison Teams were in Northern Iraq to assist and prioritize the movements of the evacuees to and through the border at Habur Gate. Chartered busses were to take them to the airport at Batman (instead of Diyarbakir). IOM had chartered fourteen flights, with the first to depart on December 6.
It was not an easy task for our team on the ground at the Turkish border crossing point of Habur Gate to identify and process (preliminarily) the streams of Kurds coming out of Northern Iraq and bus them to the Batman field. The team made life easier for us in the Ops Center by making most of the decisions on its own and referring only the policy issues to Washington. There were attempts by Kurds using false documents to bring along distant adult relatives or friends as family members. Some were detected. The Americans were aided by Kurdish officials to check the authenticity of documents. With the concurrence of our Ambassador to Turkey, Marc Grossman, if adults in a family group were discovered with forged papers in an attempt to be included, the entire family was struck off the list for evacuation. It was a draconian measure, but it seemed to be effective as soon as the word got out. Since the original lists submitted to Washington by the NGOs did not include the names and dates of birth of infants, there were some confusion and delays at the border as the team amended the official lists. There was concern that some of the infants were probably nephews, nieces, and cousins of the principals, but there was little that could be done short of DNA tests to disprove the relationships. None of the infants had papers from the Kurdish authorities.

Other problems were the refusal of the Kurdish authorities to allow the departure from Northern Iraq of some dozen physicians working for the NGOs; whether to evacuate former NGO employees; and what to do with stragglers from an NGO who arrived at Habur Gate after the departure of the NGO head (who could identify them). There was also the question about how many planes would actually be needed. With the doctors, the decision went around and around. Washington, the field team, and Dahuk (the administrative center for the Kurdish authorities) discussed the issue. Most of the doctors were eventually allowed to leave. On the employees who formerly worked with the NGOs, some were identified by NGO heads at the border and urgent clearance requests were made to Washington. They also boarded. Most of the stragglers were finally accepted after the NGO heads were located and urged to return to the border to identify their employees. The first plane departed on schedule on December 6 with 340 passengers. Because the number of evacuees was less than the NGOs had anticipated, IOM canceled contracts for several planes (and the USG paid the required financial penalties). The last flight (number eleven) arrived at Andersen AFB on Guam on December 15. 3,780 persons were evacuated in QT-III. That made an overall total of about 6,520 over the three-month period.

I was delighted and greatly relieved with the successful completion of the Quick Transit exercise. When I was suddenly asked by A/S Oakley to take over the PRM Task Force, I was out of touch with many of the recent developments in the Department and in PRM. Also, I no longer had the personal contacts throughout the building and in the other agencies that are so necessary to do the work involved with a task force. I succeeded in the assignment because of my prior experience, the ability to think through the problems as they arose, and the willingness to work twelve-hour days to make sure we were covering all the bases. I recall mentioning to Doug Hunter toward the very end of the exercise that I was just becoming comfortable with the task assigned to me, since so many aspects of the job were entirely new or quite different from previous experiences. He replied that was the reason I was chosen. No one in the Bureau had first-hand knowledge of all the tasks required for the job, and so the decision was made to choose the person with the broadest Foreign Service career. That was me.
I stayed on in PRM after QT. There were always more than enough refugee crises, maternity leaves, TDYs, resignations, high-level visits, and gaps between assignments to keep me busy and in high demand. I worked almost exclusively in the Office for Multilateral Coordination and External Relations headed by Doug Hunter. My portfolio was largely the Red Cross Movement (the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and the American Red Cross). My supervisor was Nick Miscione. He had served for years overseas in refugee camps with various NGOs. He came into the Department several years earlier.

The Department’s relationship with the American Red Cross normally required only occasional attention from our office. The Secretary of State was ex officio a member of the Board of Governors by virtue of a Presidential appointment. Four times a year we prepared briefing papers for the Secretary or his/her designated representative, usually the latter, to participate in the meetings. Except for the activities of the International Services Committee, the Board spent most of its time on domestic issues.

The relationship between the Department and the American Red Cross changed after Dr. Bernadine Healy was chosen to fill the position of President and CEO vacated by Elizabeth Dole. Dr. Healy publicly attacked the exclusion of the Israeli National Society, the Magen David Adom (MDA), from the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The reason for the exclusion was the wording of the Geneva Conventions, which stipulated that the only recognized symbols of national societies were a red cross or red crescent. The Star of David was not mentioned. The Red Cross Movement was acting to amend the Geneva Conventions to include a third symbol, a red circle, diamond, or square, for optional use by the Israeli National Society. Healy’s attack accused the Movement of anti-Semitism. The U.S. press took up her attack and was soon joined by Congress. Our role was to explain what the ICRC and the IFRC were doing to facilitate the entry of the MDA into the Red Cross Movement and to refute the unjust and unwarranted accusation of anti-Semitism. The bottleneck in amending the Geneva Conventions to make the admission of MDA possible was not the Red Cross Movement, but many Arab or Muslim states.

The Movement had a detailed plan to amend the Conventions and had successfully negotiated the preliminary steps leading to an international diplomatic conference scheduled for November 2000 to complete the process. The renewal of hostilities in the Middle East in October of 2000 made further negotiations on the issue futile. The ARC Board sacked Healy in late 2001, but the MDA issue had taken on a life of its own.

Congress had included a paragraph in the Department’s budget authorization requiring the Secretary to certify that the MDA was not being denied “participation” in the Red Cross Movement. We could prepare a certification document for the Secretary’s signature because the Movement had frequently taken that extra step to include the MDA in many of its activities.

Other notable Red Cross activity I was engaged in was the 1999 International Red Cross Conference. This gathering is held every four years and brings together all the national societies and the governments signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Heading the US Government delegation was retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili. He was an ideal
choice for the mission. The idea came from our Assistant Secretary Julia Taft. She had worked with him a few years earlier on humanitarian issues.

I was his contact and assistant during the last two weeks of preparations in Washington for the RC Conference. “Shali” is how he wanted to be addressed. He was such a delight. He asked very little from me in the way of care and maintenance. We used the time together in taxis and between meetings to discuss so many issues other than the Conference. He was teaching a seminar at Stanford University on international relations for the first time, and when he heard that I had taught diplomatic history and international relations for two years at St. Meinrad College, he asked me how the students and I interacted. Shali recognized that we shared a wealth of experience in the international area, but were novice teachers. He was interested in discussing how practitioners of international relations could better convey their knowledge to a younger audience with a minimum of personal experience in the field.

He carefully studied his briefing books and took an active role in formulating our policy positions. There were initial disagreements between State and DOD on issues, but Shali helped bridge many of the gaps. (In the end, however, it was Doug Hunter who reconciled the outstanding differences in Washington, and then played a key role on the USG delegation in the drafting sessions at the Conference to negotiate acceptable language for the final documents.) I remained in Washington as the backup to the delegation during the Conference.

Working again on the Red Cross portfolio in PRM has been one of the most rewarding and positive assignments in my career. (When I was in Geneva, I was responsible for liaison with the Red Cross for two years.) From observing the ICRC staff in the field during my years in Africa and at the Headquarters in Geneva, I developed a deep admiration for them and their organization. I am proud of the long and close relationship between the United States and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

On that note, I will end my narrative account of my career in diplomacy.

Q: That's great. Well, John, I want to thank you very much. I appreciate this.

BUCHE: Thank you.

RUDOLF V. PERINA
Deputy Head of US Delegation to CSCE
Vienna (1989-1992)

Ambassador Perina was born in Czechoslovakia when that country was under communist control. He escaped with his family to Morocco, then Switzerland and finally the United States. The ambassador was educated at the University of Chicago and Columbia University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1974, Mr. Perina specialized in Military-Political Affairs at posts abroad, including Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna and Belgrade. In Washington he served on the
Q: OK, in 1989 you’re going to the CSCE in Vienna. Can you explain what that was and what you were doing there?

PERINA: We discussed the CSCE earlier because I had worked on that during my first tour in Washington. Since I had this experience, I was chosen by Jack Maresca to be his deputy for the CSBM talks in Vienna. He was the Ambassador, and I was the deputy with the title of Representative. He had been one of the original negotiators of the Helsinki Final Act and was really an expert on the document. And the CSBM talks were a parallel negotiation to the CFE talks in Vienna, which were under the CSCE umbrella but involved only the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Have I lost you completely by now?

Q: No, but explain what the CFE was.

PERINA: CFE stood for the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe, and that was a negotiation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce conventional forces on the continent. It developed from the old Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks or MBFR that had hit a dead end. At the same time, the CSBM talks were intended to be for all 35 CSCE countries, including the neutral and non-aligned countries, in pursuing confidence-building military measures. The talks had to be separated because the participants were different and also the CFE concerned reductions whereas CSBM talks were largely confidence-building. The head of the U.S. delegation to the CFE talks was Jim Woolsey, later to be CIA Director.

I was in Vienna three years with Jack Maresca, and we negotiated a CSBM agreement but also then initiated the talks on transforming the CSCE after the end of the Cold War into the OSCE or Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Before it had been the Conference and then it became the Organization. This was actually an important development because the U.S. had long resisted any institutionalization of CSCE. We had always feared that if it became institutionalized it would become like the UN, a big bureaucracy. We wanted it to have more of a political impact from periodic conferences, high visibility conferences rather than permanent sessions which after a while nobody pays attention to. Also, a permanent organization could have been more of a competitor to NATO, as the Soviets originally intended. So we had resisted institutionalization but the Europeans always wanted it to promote detente and the Soviets wanted it as well. Once the Cold War ended, we relented and the whole process was transformed into an organization with a permanent secretariat and seat in Vienna. Our delegation was tasked with negotiating this transformation. So while we negotiated CSBM’s we also in the last year negotiated the whole initial architecture of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the various institutions and the bodies and how it would function and so on. Many of these meetings took place in Prague, so we were often going back and forth between Vienna and Prague.

Q: When you arrived in Vienna shortly before the Berlin Wall came down, how would you describe the Soviet attitude and the East German attitude? Were they playing their normal
PERINA: I would say in the CSCE they were playing the normal game. None of the Eastern delegations suspected that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was coming. No one expected it. The Soviets were a little easier to deal with because of Gorbachev and perestroika but the East Germans, for example, were very hard-line. The Hungarians were the easiest to deal with, and the Poles were mixed. No one sensed that anything significant was imminent.

Q: The Czechs were pretty hard-line, weren’t they?

PERINA: Oh, yes. They were quite hard-line. But the worst were the East Germans. One story on the many ironies of this period. We had a rotating chairmanship in the CSCE at that time. Different delegations would take turns chairing every meeting of the Permanent Council. By coincidence, I was the acting head of the U.S. delegation and in the chair on the day that the two Germanys merged. This is jumping ahead a little bit. It was toward the end of my assignment in Vienna but on the day that we took the GDR nameplate off the table and East Germany disappeared and West Germany took over. It was remarkable because on the same day the East German Ambassador, or rather former Ambassador, since the country no longer existed, asked to meet with me. He knew I had worked in West Berlin, and he asked if there was any chance of getting employment with the U.S. Mission in Berlin as an expert on East Germany and on a reintegration process. This was the man who for the previous two years had always been the harshest critic of the U.S., the West and West Germany. But clearly he was desperate. German Foreign Minister Genscher, as you know, made the decision that every East German diplomat would be fired. There was not a single one that was integrated into the West German Foreign Ministry, and they were all out of work. But knowing what this Ambassador had been saying about us and the West Germans over the previous two years, it was hard to feel sorry for him.

Q: Were you dealing with issues like freedom of movement, freedom of the press and that sort of thing during your time in Vienna?

PERINA: Not in the CSBM negotiations, which were pretty technical and concerned things like observation of military maneuvers and so on, but certainly that was the case in the CSCE and OSCE. Toward the end of my tour, our delegation really had two parallel negotiations going, and the broader CSCE/OSCE ones were the more interesting and productive. Ironically, the CFE talks, which had been Washington’s primary focus when I arrived in Vienna, really found themselves in a lot of confusion when the Warsaw Pact came apart because they had been premised on negotiations between the two military blocs. Many things were just turned upside down in those three years. But you are right that in the OSCE context we became very much involved in human rights issues. I remember dealing with the overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania, the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, all of these things started bubbling up.

Q: How was the working relationship with the Western Europeans?

PERINA: This was an issue because of the growing role of the European Union within the OSCE. When I first started working in the CSCE, there was the NATO caucus and that was it. There would be a meeting of the NATO countries prior to CSCE sessions, they would decide on
strategy and approach, and that was the limit of Western coordination. Gradually, however, the EU countries decided that they should be meeting as well, and an EU caucus developed parallel to the NATO caucus. By the end of my tour, there was a clear rivalry beginning to develop between the two and an institutional problem as well. The problem was this: the EU caucus would usually meet prior to the NATO caucus and try to develop a common strategy among EU countries. Sometimes this was a grueling process that took many hours. At the end, they would emerge with a fragile consensus and go to the NATO caucus and not be in a position to be very flexible. In effect, the U.S. would get a fait accompli in whatever the EU had decided. The U.S. would not necessarily accept the EU conclusions, and then there would be a standoff between the EU and the non-EU countries, primarily the U.S., within the NATO caucus. There was steadily growing tension between the EU and the U.S. because of this problem.

Q: How did you feel the role of France in particular but also of Germany in this dynamic?

PERINA: France was always France, and France was always difficult to deal with in the OSCE. They had some good ambassadors there but still they took the French position of generally trying to diminish the U.S. role and to increase the profile of the Europeans. They were the moving force, I think, in getting the European Union to play a more independent role through its caucus. The Germans at that time were still very much dependent on the United States. This was, after all, the time when the negotiations on reunification of Germany were beginning, very sensitive negotiations in which the U.S. played a central role. So the Germans often tried to bridge differences between the U.S. and the EU.

Q: What about the role of the Turks and the Greeks?

PERINA: It was very predictable that at almost every CSCE meeting there would be a confrontation between Turkey and Greece as well as Cyprus regarding the Cypriot question. Very often, Cyprus would threaten to withhold consensus on a document because of this issue, but at the end it always relented. It was a periodic ritual that the delegations had to go through, and it always prolonged meetings though usually it did not disrupt them. Most other delegates went for coffee breaks when these three delegations started to speak.

Toward the end of my time in Vienna, after the Soviet Union actually disintegrated, there was another interesting dynamic in the OSCE, and that was deciding whether all of the former republics of the USSR should become members of the organization. The OSCE was by definition a European and trans-Atlantic organization, and many of the newly-independent states, particularly the “stans,” were in Asia. There was a certain debate within the U.S. Government about whether all these Asian states should be admitted. In the end the decision was affirmative, primarily because OSCE was seen as an organization that could draw them to the West and help them to develop democratic institutions. This was how a new, post-Cold War role started to be developed for the OSCE. But of course during the time I was there none of these countries or very few of them were prepared to send delegations to Vienna. They didn’t have the personnel, experience, anything. So for the most part their chairs were empty but at times they asked the Russians to represent them for important votes and so on. I remember once that a poor fellow from the Russian delegation ran from chair to chair around the conference room representing each of the countries as we went around the table on an issue. He represented Kazakhstan, and
then changed seats to represent Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and so on, giving the consensus of each country. There were some incredibly bizarre things happening in those years.

Q: Let’s go back to early on when the Warsaw Pact started falling apart. How was this being viewed by the U.S. delegation?

PERINA: Well, we were all intensely following the news, initially from Hungary, where there was this build-up of East German refugees who were being allowed to go to the West by the Hungarians. Then, of course, the demonstrations started in East Berlin, and shortly thereafter the wall came down. I remember the next day the East German Ambassador was just as white as a sheet when he came in, and it was clear that he could not believe that this had happened. None of us could believe it had happened, although we still did not realize the full impact— that it would lead to the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. However, events moved very quickly. We had the Velvet Revolution in Prague and so on. Interestingly enough, no one seemed to fear that the Soviet Union would intervene and try to stop or reverse developments. It was clear that something fundamental had changed that could not be reversed. The Brezhnev Doctrine was dead. At the same time, nobody seriously thought at the time that in the next few years we would achieve the reunification of Germany with a united Germany remaining in NATO. Many people thought the more likely scenario was that Germany would leave NATO in order to achieve reunification, if that was the price that Moscow insisted on.

Q: This was always that fear for a number of years.

PERINA: Right. The fear was that the Germans would be lured out of NATO with the promise of reunification. Very few people thought that we could attain reunification with the new Germany remaining in NATO. James Baker did pull it off. It was a remarkable achievement.

Q: Were you instructed or knew instinctively to be very careful and not indulge in what is sometimes called triumphalism? In other words, here you are sitting in negotiations between supposedly equal powers including the very mighty Soviet Union and the other side is collapsing. This is a tricky time.

PERINA: Well, it was a tricky time and, of course, we did try not to become as you say “triumphalist”. At the same time it was the highpoint during my career of America’s position in Europe, and really the world. Everyone recognized what had happened. We had won the Cold War and the Soviet Union had lost. Then it merged with other things like the first Iraq War which also happened at that time. This showed America’s ability to project military power. We were clearly seen as the one great power in the world and a very important country, a very important delegation. Strange to say, but other delegations did treat us differently, almost immediately. They recognized that there had been a strategic shift in the world.

Q: You see a power such as Poland which is a major country in Eastern Europe. Did you see it begin to exert itself more while you were there?

PERINA: I think it was too early. That happened a little bit later. What I saw in my time was the delegations of these countries begin to change. Initially, the delegations were still composed of
the same Communist personalities because non-Communist diplomats were not ready to take over. But gradually the delegations began shifting to new ambassadors. Interestingly, however, even the old Communist diplomats very quickly changed their tune. Almost as soon as the Berlin wall fell, it was hard to find a real Communist defender around. By the end of my tour, you could see the advent of ambassadors who came from the ranks of the dissidents in previous years. Then you could clearly see a difference of perspective among the East European diplomats, and it often manifested itself as a very strong anti-Russian attitude.

Q: What about the Russian delegation? How did their delegation respond during this difficult time?

PERINA: I think they were all conflicted. I mean, they put the best face on it. They were among the ones who quickly changed their tune and started saying that this was all good, that they wanted more democracy, that they supported the changes and so on, but you could tell that for the older ones it was very difficult to accept. It was a hundred and eighty degree shift in their world. I think they realized that to survive they had to change as much as they could, and I’m sure for some of them the change was sincere. But then the real shocker for them was the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which no one still expected at this point. Most of them were in shell shock when it came.

Q: How did you find your instructions from Washington? Was it sort of a confused period?

PERINA: On the issues we were dealing with, our instructions were generally okay. The State Department bureaucracy did continue functioning. Jack Maresca was in any case the type of ambassador who didn’t really care for instructions very much and relied on his own judgment. So I think we managed fairly well. Of course, it was a difficult time just to keep up with events because they moved so quickly and brought so many surprises.

Q: Well, was there a point when somebody pushed the button and said, “Okay, let’s have a permanent OSCE organization?” How did this happen?

PERINA: This happened a little more gradually. The Europeans had long been pressing for a permanent OSCE, and we went along gradually. We were still brought along kicking and screaming on some issues. We were always arguing for the minimal amount of institutionalization: the fewest meetings, the least bureaucracy and so on. I think Washington figured “Look, we just won the Cold War. We don’t have to be worried about competition to NATO.” I think also there was the beginning of finding a new role for the OSCE. The CSCE, as such, had really become a Cold War institution, a tool that the West used to advance human rights issues in the Soviet bloc. Now people started thinking that an organization would be more useful as a tool for integrating Europe and strengthening democracy in the newly-independent states. A more permanent, empowered institution was necessary for that.

Q: You’re thinking of democratizing the Soviet Union?

PERINA: Well, all the successor states of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. The former at least had the structures of independent states but the latter didn’t even have that. The OSCE came to
be seen as an organization that could help build institutions, democracy, civil society, civilian control of militaries, respect for human rights, all of the things that the CSCE had advocated. So we started coming up with various mechanisms for this. One was to establish OSCE missions in a number of these countries, missions that would monitor human rights problems and minority problems, particularly in the countries that had large ethnic minorities and potential for conflict, of which there were many. Another task was to help organize elections and monitor elections in all of these countries. And of course, there was the former Yugoslavia that had also splintered and the same forms of assistance were required by the newly-created states there.

Q: But was there still concern about excess bureaucratization in this process?

PERINA: There was always such concern. The bad model was the UN. In Vienna there was a big UN mission with all of the duty-free shops and fancy cafeterias and huge bureaucracies and that was what people really wanted to avoid. But also the business of passing resolutions that nobody paid attention to-- that was also something we wanted to avoid. We wanted the OSCE to be lean, flexible and practical in its work. I think to a large degree we succeeded. To this day, the OSCE is leaner than the UN or EU bureaucracies. NATO is difficult to compare because of the military component.

Q: I’m always interested in French diplomacy. As things were changing, did the French show any different face or not?

PERINA: A lot of that played out within the EU caucus and wasn’t always visible to us. I think that French policy objectives remained unchanged in the sense of limiting U.S. influence and strengthening European institutions. But it was harder for them to implement this because the U.S. position had been so strengthened by the end of the Cold War. We had a whole new set of allies within the OSCE in the Central European countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary who saw us as their liberators from Soviet domination. They had historic distrust of Western Europe and really looked to the United States as their new ally. So all of this made it difficult for the French to be too assertive in trying to limit U.S. influence.

Q: Did you have good moles within the European caucus?

PERINA: Yes. We did. We had a lot of good moles and that helped us in dealing with the EU. As I mentioned earlier, we had these scenarios where the European Union would come out of its caucus and say that it took them 5 hours of negotiations to reach agreement on some text, and if we changed a single dot it would all come apart. Well, then of course, we changed the dot. And then the whole thing came apart and then there was a new negotiation where we could be genuine players and not just recipients of what the EU had devised. Generally the Europeans were too tired to go back into another EU caucus so we just thrashed it out in the NATO caucus.

Q: While you were doing this was it becoming apparent that the new newly-independent states would at some point come into NATO and the EU? Was that on your minds at all?

PERINA: That came a little bit later. As I said, in our time we were just amazed that Germany was able to reunify and remain in NATO but it was too difficult to envision at the time that the
other states would be coming into NATO and the EU in the near future. In fairness, I think thought was being given to this at NATO fairly quickly because these NATO partnership programs for the newly-independent states began appearing. In some circles, this again led to the unfortunate view that there was some sort of competition between NATO and the OSCE. This perception has plagued OSCE from the very beginning.

Q: Was there concern among other European delegations about Germany unifying and again becoming a threat to its neighbors?

PERINA: I think there was a little concern among some delegations like the Poles but it was not significant. I think most people felt that the U.S. presence in Europe and Germany’s integration into NATO and the EU really mitigated any German threat to the continent. A much greater fear of these countries remained Russia. It was not seen as a democratic country, it still had a lot of military power, and the danger of its resurgence was perceived as the real threat by the Central and Eastern Europeans.

Q: Did Austria play a special role as the host of the OSCE?

PERINA: The Austrians were good hosts but did not have an exceptional diplomatic role in this period. What Austria did provide just thanks to its location was the first glimpse of the West for many East Europeans. In the first few weeks after the borders opened, it was fascinating to see on weekends these convoys of hundreds of buses bringing Hungarians and Czechs to Vienna just to stroll for the day. The buses would park in stadiums because there were so many of them and literally thousands of these people would walk up and down Mariahilferstrasse and other streets looking at the shops, and I mean just looking because they did not have money to really buy much. It was a very direct reminder of the end of the Cold War.

Q: Did you ever make any contact during this period with relatives in Czechoslovakia?

PERINA: Oh yes, I had been in steady contact with them, and my uncle and a number of cousins and their families came down to Vienna for short visits. I, of course, had been traveling to Prague regularly, both on private visits and for OSCE meetings. My parents also came from the U.S. to visit us in Vienna and made visits to Czechoslovakia—in my father’s case, his first visit since he left over 40 years earlier.

Q: Did the Italians, the Spanish, the Portuguese play any particular role?

PERINA: I can’t tell you that I recall any particular role by these delegations. It probably played out within the EU caucus. The two countries that were consistently very helpful as coordinators were the Dutch and the Norwegians. Both had very skilled diplomats with a lot of OSCE experience. The Dutch were also particularly helpful on human rights issues.

Q: Their diplomatic corps is remarkable.

PERINA: It really is. They played way above their weight in CSCE and also in providing developmental assistance.
ROY A. HUFFINGTON
Ambassador
Austria (1990-1993)

Ambassador Roy A. Huffington was born in Texas in 1914. He graduated from Southern Methodist University in Dallas and received an M.A. and a PhD from Harvard University. He was in the oil business and appointed as ambassador to Austria in 1990. Mr. Huffington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Well, when you went to Austria, how did you get prepared for it? And did you have any problem with the nomination?

HUFFINGTON: I got prepared for it because I had the company. I guess we were dealing with probably over 65 other countries around the world, on all the continents. I would spend time negotiating with them. I negotiated personally with 30 out of the 34 Asian countries. With one government, sometimes three or four different governments. A lot of times we couldn’t do it because it was too rough. Other times too much corruption. Like in Nigeria, too corrupt. I just had a lot of experience negotiating with other countries in Africa and Asia, South America. I had no worry about dealing with people.

If you got into a country you better know the top people in a hurry, because that’s where you know if something’s going wrong. I could always keep in touch. In Indonesia Sutowo used to like for me to come by and report to him on what’s going on with the LNG all over the world. So I had no fear about what could I do.

I had been, at that time, recently been a member of the team that gave $100,000 to the Republican Party. When Baker heard that, he said, “Oh my gosh, you may have a problem with your hearing before the Senate.” Senator Biden and a couple of them are pretty tough people at that affair. But I looked at the people that were on the Senate.

There were four of us who went through the hearings at the same time. They quizzed the others quite a bit. I was a little bit nervous. No one asked me a question, and it was getting sort of toward the time. Senator Biden was in charge of it. It was before that a couple of the Democrats had come down and shook my hand and said, “Congratulations. We can’t stay in the meeting; we’ve got other things we’ve got to do.” That was a comforting feeling. To make a long story short, they were about to shut down the whole thing. And it was embarrassing; no one had asked me a question. Senator Lugar was sitting there, a Republican, and he asked me one question. Sort of a quick question. It had a simple answer. And with that the whole thing was over. So I had absolutely no [trouble] on that. But I felt I knew more about dealing with international relations than anyone I saw on the other side of the table.

Q: I’m sure you did. What about the dealing with the State Department, which is always more
difficult than dealing with foreign relations. The Ambassadorial Seminar, did that help at all?

HUFFINGTON: That was interesting; I enjoyed that very much. I went out and took about six weeks worth of German, also at my expense, out at Monterrey, California, to their set-up. I had had a couple of years in college, but couldn’t speak it. It was very helpful. I got to where I understood it very well.

No, I didn’t have any problem with the State Department. Having been an independent man, and having run my own company and it was a one-man operation and in tough, tough circumstances, I never had any problem worrying about my job or anything. If I wanted to talk to someone, I’d knock on their door. I wanted to see them like that, so I could talk to anybody in the State Department.

When I got over to Austria, of course, one big problem that both Bush and Baker really said to me - they knew my background - but they said, “Let’s see how you handle the Waldheim situation.”

Q: In the first place, you were in Austria from 1990 to 1993. Could you explain what the Kurt Waldheim situation was at that time.

HUFFINGTON: Kurt Waldheim had been Secretary General of the United Nations for a bunch of years, I think a couple of terms. Couple of years before this he had been put on the ‘watch list.’ When he was running for president in Austria, he had neglected to put on his resume that he’d been in the Nazi Army. He’d been down to Greece or someplace.

Q: And Yugoslavia.

HUFFINGTON: And Yugoslavia. And a lot of people began to be suspicious since he didn’t put it on his - then when he ran for president, to which he got elected, that he was hiding something. So they began to investigate. This gets into maybe some things that I can’t get into that much. But somebody was convinced, made a political tradeoff, that maybe he might have been involved in shipping some Jews to Auschwitz.

Q: This was in all the papers and all that I guess by this time.

HUFFINGTON: It was. There wasn’t any secret about that. I came to be convinced from all the information I saw and everything that he had to witness that. But what could you do about it? He went in a 2nd Lieutenant in the Nazi Army; he didn’t want to go in. But he went in a 2nd Lieutenant and he came out a 2nd Lieutenant. There was plenty of opportunity for a promotion if he wanted to go up on that deal, because they were losing a lot.

So when I first got to Austria, [getting off] the plane, had a V.I.P. meeting at the airport with 25 different people: all the different press, the microphones there. The very first question they popped to me was, “What are you going to do about Waldheim?” And they sounded belligerent. I said, “The first thing I’m going to do is we’re not going to talk about Waldheim at this meeting. We can talk about any and everything else, but we are not going to talk about Waldheim at this
meeting today. I’ll talk to you about him later any time you want to. We’ll talk about other stuff.” So I cut that off rather quickly, and then we got into an hour’s discussion about other things going on which were pretty simple to handle.

Later, I got the press, I would invite them to come to the embassy or to the residence and visit with them about other things. There was one individual with one of the papers with the biggest circulation over there. He was pretty belligerent about this “Ambassador Huffington had come” and all that sort of stuff. To make a long story short, within six months I had everything under control. I got to be quite well-liked.

Other than that I didn’t follow protocol. I did what I would do as a businessman on meeting people. I went out - there were about 90 ambassadors there - and I visited those ambassadors on my own and spent an hour with them at times. I didn’t wait. Some of them came to see me, but if they didn’t in between, I went out to visit them. Then I spent time going out in all nine provinces, visiting the governors, the lieutenant-governors, the mayors of the cities. I talked some at universities, sometimes even at grade schools a time or two. But I wanted to get out and mix and meet with all these people.

I developed a very friendly relationship with everyone out there. They later made me the ‘Ambassador of the Year,” and gave me an award for that. They said they would have done that the first year, except “you just came.” So they couldn’t do it. But it was mainly because you went out and dealt with these people. You sat in their place and talked to them about what their problems were, and “what we see and what you see.” What should we all be doing. I found it to be quite enjoyable working with a lot of different people. I established a lot of friendships over there.

Q: Well, in the first place, how did the Waldheim thing come out during your tenure?

HUFFINGTON: It came out fine. When I got there the DCM, the number two man, when I was going to present my papers he said, “It’s sort of likely you can’t go anywhere and party for awhile,” big presence and stuff like that. I told him, I said, “Look, I’m the ambassador and I’m going to do this and run this job the way I want to do it. If the State Department doesn’t like it, they can call me out any time.” In matter of fact, when we had that VIP meeting at the airport, I told the people, “I will promise you one thing. I will always be honest with you. I will tell you the truth. If I can’t tell you the truth, I’ll tell you I can’t talk about it. And sometime I might tell you something that my own government might not like; and if that’s the case I may not be around here very long. But I will tell you what I think we should do.” And I think that sort of gave some reassurance that I was a credible individual.

So, when it came time to present the papers I’d been told my wife couldn’t go in with me. She had to stand on the outside and it happened to be a rainy day. So she was on the outside where the embassy staff had put her. I drove up in the car, being escorted up in the Hofburg, in the President’s Palace offices up there. One of that group from the President’s office saw her and said, “Come with us.” And so he took her up there, and she said she told him something, “I didn’t think I could go up.” And he says, “They would like to have you come up,” like that. I later asked, and someone said that was the first time in 12 years that that had happened. Escorted
up there, so she got to witness all this at that time.

We had a pleasant meeting for about an hour. Later I got to know Kurt Waldheim quite well. He wanted to know if I could be of any help, and I said, “Kurt, you did it to yourself. No way that anyone can help. Congress passed this and put you on the Watch List. If you had mentioned being in the Nazi Army,” as everybody knew, if he had mentioned it, “when you were running for President, probably the suspicions wouldn’t have come up all right. So you’ve got to live with it.” And he did do that.

Our relationship with the Chancellor and everyone else was top notch. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office and I used to have lunch; I guess we had lunch about once a month. He’d buy one month and I’d buy another. We’d talk about all the affairs of the country and what was going on. Just developed a lot of good friendships.

The Austrians gave me a medal about a year ago. Not because of my ambassadorship, but because of what I did working with the country, for the country, and for the U.S. I set up these Danube Basin Conferences when I got over there, in which we would invite U.S. companies to come over and sort of like a business conference. I would go and spend time with the ambassadors in the six Warsaw Pact countries to find out where are these little companies that need money, aid and all of that.

We would get a number of those selected and bring them to Vienna. I’d fly U.S. companies over here and fly them around at my expense, in our own Phantom plane. Make companies around the U.S. come to Vienna. We would match them up, and put the Romanians in one room with a bunch of desks around and people who wanted to deal with Romanians, Hungarians in another, Czechs, Polish, Yugoslavs.

The first year, the Yugoslavs actually had the best economy. I was quite unhappy when the Austrians later on began to encourage the Croats to come out of Yugoslavia. That was because Croatia had been part of their Austro-Hungarian empire. And I said, “Look, we have Milosevic sitting over there itching to start a war, [Bosnia Herzegovina] and Serbia. And he’s a Hitler-type dictator.” I couldn’t convince Mark, who was the Foreign Secretary, or Foreign Minister, at that time. “Well, don’t you think they deserve independence?” I said, “What we need to do is keep all of Yugoslavia at the conference table if it takes ten years, until they are sick and tired of each other. Then maybe peacefully you can break it up.” But if the Croats can not start a civil war, and the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman... Franjo Tudjman, in my book, was no better than Milosevic. He was ready to start something, too.

Q: Terrible combination of those two.

HUDDINGTON: Well then, that’s why later they wanted to divide up Bosnia. Those Muslims down there weren’t like Middle Eastern Muslims or anything. These were just the same as the rest, nationality-wise. But under the Turks for 400 years, they suddenly became Muslims as people do wherever they live. But that was a mistake, and unfortunately nothing was ever done about that.
Q: Were you given any suggestions or directions from the Department of State, during this critical period, to work on the Austrians to try to keep Yugoslavia together? Or to use their good offices to do that or not?

HUFFINGTON: No, I think the State Department at that time had a number of people, Eagleburger for instance, the number two man, who had a lot of experience down in the Balkans and all. So there were people that felt that they were pretty good experts, and they were. I talked to Mark a little bit. I wasn’t in the position to do anything with the Germans. That wasn’t my territory. But I could talk to Mark and say, you ought to talk to the Germans. The Austrians felt the same way. I think they felt more secure because of the Warsaw Pact countries splitting up. I think they thought, well, maybe some of the Yugoslav entities could break out... And it turned out that was not correct.

Q: How about the embassy? You knew your own companies so well. How did you find the embassy served you, and your relations with them?

HUFFINGTON: They were fine. There were a lot of good people there. Of course, the Ambassador is the boss; he’s the personal representative of the President, and other than the military [contingents] who might be stationed there, everyone else in the country is under your jurisdiction. We worked well. I had good people and I was a little different sort of ambassador, as I found out from a lot of them. It was funny; I had time for everyone. When they said you don’t have time to see these people. I said, “I want to know everyone that comes to this door. And I’ll determine whether I can see them for 30 seconds or five minutes or something like that.” So, quickly they found out I liked to talk to the people. So it worked fine.

Q: Who was your deputy?

HUFFINGTON: Michael... Oh, I’m getting Alzheimer’s.

Q: Well, these things don’t always pop up right away.

HUFFINGTON: He went to Germany as a Political Officer. They brought back to the States and then sent him to Germany as a Political Officer. He’s retired now.

Q: Anyway, sometimes the marriage between the ambassador coming from outside and a Foreign Service officer as a DCM doesn’t work.

How did it work with your deputy?

HUFFINGTON: My deputy and I worked very well together. He was more like the old-line State Department employees were under the normal State Department ambassadors. You do certain things certain ways. I was a little bit different from that, in that if I was the man in charge, I was going to go at it the way I thought was best to get the results that we in the State Department and the U.S. government wanted. My technique has always been to get to know all of the people that you're dealing with very well and on a first-hand, first-name basis and never lock your door and sit behind it when you're too busy to do something, see as many people as you can. In fact, my
My deputy was the one that said, "You can't see Waldheim." And I said, "I will see Waldheim. I'm not going to stay away from something just because he goes to that." And so when I met him and I saw him later, we were always courteous and friendly, polite. We'd be approached at times about what could I do about his position on the March List, and I finally convinced him there was nothing I could do, and that really it was his fault that he got on that. If he hadn't done that, I don't think it would have happened.

Q: Yes. Speaking of the embassy, were there any repercussions while you were there about Felix Bloch, who had been-

HUFFINGTON: I could never find out very much about Felix Bloch. Apparently he was well liked by a lot of people around Austria. That's one thing that everyone seemed to be sort of quiet about. I never could find out very much about Bloch.

Q: Well, he had been the Deputy Chief of Mission and all and was accused but never convicted or even tried for being a Soviet spy. It's sort of a very foggy thing.

HUFFINGTON: Well, it was one of those things, it may have been that he was in a position he knew something that if they'd gotten into a trial might not have worked out right. I never did know anything about him; I just later knew some people who knew him, said he'd been a very pleasant individual who didn't get around too much, who restricted where he went and what he did.

Q: How did you find the Austrians were responding to the breakup of the Soviet Empire and all that? I would have thought they would have been in an ideal position to use their entrepreneurial talents, openings and all, or did you find they were doing this?

HUFFINGTON: Yes, in fact, the nice thing about Austria having been a neutral country, they were actually doing some business with the Soviet Bloc all during this period of time, just like they were working with us. So they had a lot of contacts over there, and they were very pleased to see the breakup take place. I mean, as you remember, the East Germans had been to Austria through Czechoslovakia.

Q: And the Hungarians opened up the border.

HUFFINGTON: That's right. The Hungarians actually opened the border. The time I was there, there were a lot of people. It was a problem. There were a lot because of no food and other things in the old World War zone bloc. And a lot of those people would come across the border, I guess illegally. They were gathering in places where they would try and buy some items in Austria and then take them back to their countries and sell them at a higher price, so they were starting barter and sales so they could make a little money. It's the type of thing I used to see while I was there.
I went over to Moscow one time, and I got a call from, I think it was, who said, "Why don't you come on over to Moscow and help work with the Russians over there? They've got holes in their pipelines." And Bob, an attorney in Washington, DC, that we had, who was ambassador there in Moscow-

Q: Strauss?

HUFFINGTON: Yes, Bob Strauss. A good friend of mine, too. Bob Strauss said - I called Bob because you're not supposed to intrude on anyone else's territory - he said, "Sure, come on over." Went over to see Turner Rayden, and the day I got there, Turner Rayden went in the hospital. Four days later he was still there, and I said, "I can't stick around here; I'll have to see him sometime later." I went back to Austria and later got involved with Russians, but that's another long story that's after everything sort of broke up. But I never did see Whitmore on that original deal. But I guess we created a fair amount of business into those Eastern Bloc countries by companies from the US. They were the ones we were really trying to stir up business for. And that was very much appreciated in Austria. They liked it very much, at last the businessman was coming to Austria.

Q: Were the Austrians good business people, did you find?

HUFFINGTON: They're good business people. They do business all over the world. Europeans do more of this business of any sort and variety all around the world than U.S. people do. We go over trying to do just our kind of business, in my case the oil business, and they're into a half a dozen different businesses.

Q: How were your relations with the State Department?

HUFFINGTON: Relationships were great. I only came back maybe a couple of times. I came back when the Chancellor of Austria - got that set up to come over to see President Bush. I came over at that time and sat in the Oval Room with an hour's interview and Chancellor's visit, and then the State Department - as a matter of fact, Jim Baker and I, I think, rode over to that interview together at the same time. I came to see Eagleburger a couple of times to talk about certain things that needed to be done. We were having, in a way, some difficulties with the Commerce Department. They weren't really cooperating as much on this business stuff as I thought they should be. I wanted to check some of those things out with Eagleburger. Eagleburger was great to work with, and Baker was always off handling much bigger things than that. Larry had to handle all the ambassadors that came by. But I found the relationships great. I could go in any place time and, no problem, just got a great reception, and I think I sold every point I was trying to make...

Q: Did you have any congressional problems?

HUFFINGTON: No, problems at all. I just met one or two congressional groups that came over. We prepared the embassy to give them a full morning's briefing if they wanted, or an hour's, whatever they wanted. Of course, the wives came along and the wives were more interested in [museums] and going shopping and all that stuff. We had all that stuff prepared, too. And usually
by the time we'd had about an hour's meeting with the people from the House and Senate, wherever they may be from, why they were ready - they'd absorbed it all by then. It was good for them, but I did realize this: it's good for them to get out and see those countries, because the majority of these people in Congress, at least up until recently, had never been out of the country.

Q: I know it.

HUFFINGTON: They didn't know what it was like. They had no concept. Sometimes the questions were ridiculous.

Q: I'm a professional Foreign Service officer, at thirty years in, and I think most of us agree that, even though sometimes these Congressional trips are difficult, the big thing is it is a chance to sit down and talk to a Congressman and explain what's going on in the country, and Not many people have a chance to do this to a Congressman.

HUFFINGTON: This is correct. And I developed some really good relationships with several Democrats who came over like that because I could tell them not only about Austria, I could tell them about all of Europe, I could tell them about the Middle East, I could tell them about the rest of the world, too - things that were going on - that I knew were going on - in different countries, like dealings with [India?] and with other places like that. I think they found it interesting. They probably forgot it the next day.

Q: Something sticks.

HUFFINGTON: But at least you did something like that. The only problem I had with the actions that we took, and I've had a number of discussions with people about this since, was in the Iraqi campaign and stuff like that. Those last couple of days, as someone who had been in World War II and had witnessed what happened in Korea and other places, when you go in and you've got as bad a snake as you had in Saddam Hussein - he'd been killing his own people from the day he took over or killing his people doesn't mean anything to him - well, we just needed to go a couple of more days to Baghdad. I kept saying we've got to go, and Europe was adamantly set against it. I got [in touch with] the Prime Minister again, and I said, "We really need to go on up there and get that man," and he said, no, we shouldn't because the Arabs didn't want that to happen either, and neither did the State Department nor the White House. And years later I talked to Powell about it and others, you know, do you think we did right when we stopped, and I said based upon what I've seen in my wartime experience, when you've got somebody who's been bad and this fellow has, killing his own people before, he will rise again and grow two or three more heads on that snake, and you're going to have to get him out of there sometime someplace. He's going to kill his own people, and he doesn't care.

Q: I agree with you. I really feel that you might say the "television politics" got to Bush, Baker, and Colin Powell and they called it off two days too soon. And we could have bullied through. You know, you could have talked and said, "We're working on it," tell off the Republican Guard.

HUFFINGTON: We could have done it. That's just a personal difference. Had I been in charge, I would have done that. I was a flunky way down the line on it; I had nothing to do with it. That's
my observation and what I thought would happen, and it did turn out that way, not that I'm proud of it, that aspect of it. I had really just this experience before, and I'd run into people that knew when Saddam Hussein took over the government, he'd gathered a lot of intelligentsia and wealthy, prominent business people and all, he took them out and killed them all. And I ran into families, I ran into a young fellow that was maybe 27, I think in Abu Dhabi or in the UAE, way back there after Hussein had been in. This fellow said that one night the police came by and picked up his brother, who was a couple of years younger and, he said, took him away. He said, he had done absolutely nothing, nor had he or anyone in the family, but they took his brother away and they never could find out where he was, and after about a week or so his family smuggled him out. They were worried, and he said they've never heard from his brother since then. My son knew a young lady in England, her family, her mother brought I think two girls and a boy as I recall. Her husband had been killed by Hussein, and they had left Iraq. It was just one of those things that everything was bad and he could kill whoever he wanted to kill.

Q: He's a monster.

HUFFINGTON: I came out, I guess, on an inauguration flight from Pan American from Houston to London. I went on with the president of Pan Am, the CEO of Pan Am, took about 10 of us on over to the Intercontinental Hotel in London on that inaugural nonstop flight, and when we were getting ready to come back, I'd gone down to check on the driver, who had been a former policeman that actually worked for Brown and Root. They were having him take us out to the airport. I went down. We were all packed. I was going to call my wife upstairs. I went in to call my wife, "Every thing's okay, I'll have him pick up the luggage." When I went back out, a couple of minutes later, I guess a former Iraqi ambassador had stepped out on the steps next to this driver of ours, and a lone assassin came up and pumped some bullets into the Iraqi ambassador, killed him. The driver said, "I looked right into his eyes; he looked into mine," and said, "I thought, I'm dead because he knows I would recognize him." But instead he turned and ran and ran across the street to a hotel, a well-known little hotel, right across the street. The doorman at that hotel had been in the British commandos, and he heard the shots, could see this. This fellow I was with was chasing a little bit at that stage. As I recall the story, I think he had some sort of a little convertible and ran and was going to jump in - it was open - he was going to jump over into the seat and roar off on that. But when the commando and this driver, named Thackeray, the commando got him under control, and our driver came back over and drove us out. He was still shaking...

Q: Oh, my God!

HUFFINGTON: ...When he drove us out to the airport. But there were a lot of experiences like that with Saddam Hussein that I thought, This man is crazy. I mean, he doesn’t care. He's one of those individuals who doesn't care about other people's lives. I don't know what the psychiatrists call an individual like that, but you need to get someone out of the deal.
Ambassador Dunkerley was born in Wisconsin and raised in several states in the Midwest. He was educated at Amherst College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In 1970 he entered the Foreign Service, serving abroad in Da Nang, Tokyo, Yokohama, Fukuoka, Brussels and Vienna. During his career Mr. Dunkerley became a specialist in NATO and International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control matters, and served as Special Envoy for Conventional Forces in Europe from 1997 to 2001 with the personal rank of Ambassador. He also had several tours of duty at the State Department in Washington, DC. Ambassador Dunkerley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: What were you doing?

DUNKERLEY: As deputy head of the delegation, a DCM sort of role, I did a lot of negotiating; together with John Kornblum I did a fair amount of the advocacy of U.S. positions in these exchanges that we had in Vienna on an ever growing number of issues. I had basic management duties for this delegation that had about sixty to seventy personnel with a rather healthy spread of interagency representation – but which had been previously separate delegations. Now we were melding them.

Q: As this moved was NATO threatened? Was it a bridge organization, did it have a life of its own?

DUNKERLEY: The CSCE in Vienna very quickly developed a life of its own. It would be a mistake to approach the issue of European security architecture or the roles of European institutions in terms of neat, clean and bureaucratically tidy organizational boxes. The nature of the European polity and the complexity of the issues very quickly lead to a rather messy table of organization. There were, and still are, all sorts of potential ambiguity and overlap. But this notion of competition among institutions as a fundamental driver can be overstated. In fact, I would suggest that in practical terms this was much less of a problem at that time and indeed, in looking back, the situation suggested all sorts of opportunities for constructive collaboration.

Q: What about the European Union or was it European Community at that time?

DUNKERLEY: It was the European Union by this time and its members were trying to find ways in which they could manifest a common foreign and security policy. The CSCE was explicitly identified as a particular arena in which they should seek to do so. The problem in Vienna was that, given the premium that the EU members attached to developing a common position among themselves and given their own diversity of interests, this effort at times had the effect of delaying – or diluting --the contribution that they could make in terms of the most effective policy positions.

Q: Looking at it from your perspective, France and the United States are sort of like siblings who don’t get along. How did the French-American thing work in this particular context?
DUNKERLEY: It was intimate and intense. It ran the gamut from close cooperation to expressions of sharp difference at the table. There was a very able French Ambassador to the CSCE in Vienna, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, who enjoyed fencing with us on occasion but could also be an excellent collaborator.

Q: *Were you always concerned about the French exception?*

DUNKERLEY: It was a fact of life. Certainly there were all sorts of Franco-American differences of approach on various issues, as there were with other states, but I would not want to over dramatize this phenomenon. The interesting thing about the diplomatic interplay among national delegations in Vienna was that this period also represented the coming out of the new diplomats, the new policy makers for a whole range of newly independent states. This was, for example, the first time that entirely new governments in countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and the like were fielding their own diplomatic teams. The quality and commitment of some of these new diplomats was quite impressive. It was an interesting and positive experience to work with them as colleagues in Vienna at this formative moment in their histories.

Q: *During part of this period, I recall that we were helping to train some diplomats. I remember talking about consular affairs to a group of Albanian diplomats. At one point I went to Kyrgyzstan to talk to them about how to set up consular operations. Were there any major issues that you felt at that time?*

DUNKERLEY: All of this was in the period of 1992-1995. It was playing out against the backdrop of the dramatically deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia. As Dick Holbrooke points out in his book and Ivo Daalder describes in his own, well before we got to the point of an eventual Bosnian peace settlement in Dayton there was a long period during which there was a painful split between the U.S. and its European partners about what to do in Bosnia. We were perhaps more sympathetic than some about the Bosnian plight; we were justifiably skeptical about the UN effort; but nonetheless, we were not initially prepared to make the investment of political energy and military effort that a more effective strategy to end the fighting might require. As a consequence, this was a very difficult and unfortunate time in our CSCE exchanges on these problems.

Q: *What was the feeling? At one point Europe essentially said, ‘this is a European problem.’*

DUNKERLEY: I believe you are referring to Luxembourg Foreign Minister Poos’ unfortunate statement early on in the process when he said that ‘the hour of Europe has struck.’ In the initial part of this crisis, in the final year of the Bush administration, it is perhaps not surprising that, having gotten through the trials of German reunification and Desert Storm, the U.S. did not immediately leap in to lead the charge to solve the Yugoslav situation. Certainly the same was true in the initial year of the Clinton administration following the unsuccessful trip by Secretary Christopher to Europe to win European acceptance to possible steps like lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnians. There were lots of reasons why it seemed easier for the U.S. not to get more deeply engaged at that particular time. All of this provided for a running divergence of views in the CSCE debates and discussions of the Yugoslav crisis.
Q: Tell me again: When did you go to Vienna and what was your job?

DUNKERLEY: It was the summer of 1992 and I was the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) of the new organization that had formed there. As I mentioned before, this was to be a single, integrated interagency U.S. mission to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). Prior to that point the CSCE had been a collection of periodic conferences and separate negotiations. So as a consequence, U.S. representation to those various conferences was often ad hoc and separate. Several things happened as a consequence of the diplomacy surrounding German reunification. One was general agreement by all concerned that in a post Cold War Europe one of the institutions that should receive an increased role and backing would be the CSCE. There was a Helsinki Summit in 1992 of CSCE nations; one of the conclusions from that session was that the CSCE, which previously had been something of a wandering circus with periodic meetings in different cities, would have more of a permanent base in Vienna.

Q: Did the OSCE have any relation to this?

DUNKERLEY: The CSCE eventually morphed into a follow-on stage as the Organization – vice Conference – for Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE. The genesis of all of this lay with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which itself flowed from any number of years of preliminary back and forth and eventual negotiations. In brief, this Final Act was an agreement by all of the countries of Europe and North America, including not only NATO and Warsaw Pact members, but also those then called neutral and nonaligned: such as Austria, Sweden, Finland. It laid out a set of basic principles governing peaceful state-to-state relations in Europe but also suggested how governments ought to interact with their own populations. It set out a series of periodic review conferences and negotiations on different sets of issues related to how these principles were being observed. That essentially was the initial CSCE.

It was, in effect, a process: more a series of ongoing dialogues and negotiations than an institution or organization in the way that the UN or NATO were. What changed in 1991 with all the end of the Cold War was the recognition that a strengthened CSCE might have a potentially special role, precisely because it was pan-European and transatlantic, and accordingly could be a useful diplomatic tool. The second Helsinki Summit in 1992 agreed on that basic objective but in fact provided only relatively broad direction as to how it might be achieved in practical terms.

So the larger context of my Vienna assignment was, first, an opportunity to participate in the beginning of this experiment marking CSCE’s transition into something more of an international institution. Second, this development required a change in the nature of the U.S. representation and engagement in that changing institution. Third, we – the U.S. – needed to craft a new strategy for making effective use of this new situation.

On a personal note, I found it one of the more interesting engagements in my Foreign Service career precisely because there was a very modest degree of “present at the creation” quality to it. It was also at a period when attention in Washington to this effort was not overbearing. This was a relatively new body and attention was elsewhere, so there was perhaps slightly more latitude.
for creative thought and freedom of maneuver out in the field to help shape that new strategy.

Q: What was CSCE’s use for us?

DUNKERLEY: Let me jump ahead into the history. It is useful to think of this on a two or three decade timeline. As I mentioned before, this began its essence as a détente era set piece summit that led to a process: initially a series of periodic conferences accelerating in both frequency and substantive intensity which eventually lead to a point where this conference, CSCE, begins to take on more of an operational nature with a standing base in Vienna. In the period of 1992-95, the CSCE increasingly became a tool for our use in dealing with new problems arising in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. It became clear during that period that even more had to be done to give the CSCE the characteristics and capabilities of a serious multilateral institution. At that point, one of the major decisions at a Summit in Budapest in late 1994 was to further transform this body into an international organization – what came to be known as the OSCE.

All of this represented something of a challenge for American policy because, if you wanted an organization that could actually do something and was more than simply a talk show, that required serious institution building, larger budgets and staff, and increased expertise. At the same time, however, it was important for the United States that this evolving CSCE/OSCE body not simply become a mini UN with all the potential problems of an expensive, multinational bureaucracy. There was a constant tension between those two objectives. At various points, we’ve had to recalculate the balance and adjust.

This gets into the question of our strategy. What do we want this new and evolving institution to do? How can we use it? How can it best serve American policy making? One of the things that became apparent in the 90’s was that the CSCE/OSCE could offer opportunities and instruments for diplomatic engagement in trouble spots in a fashion that did not carry some of the costs and difficulties that a major UN operation might entail or the political stakes that a NATO operation would involve, but nonetheless could provide us with a useful degree of multilateral cover and burden sharing.

At that time we were facing what some colleagues in Vienna sometimes referred to as ‘aftermath of Empire.’ That is to say, some of the problems that were reemerging after the stasis of the Cold War period could be said to reflect distant legacies of the Hapsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov/Soviet Empires. We saw latent problems with long histories beginning to resurface in places like Nagorno Karabakh, Moldova or Georgia – and others which at that time were just on the horizon of most of the policy community. Things were local ethnic tensions, separatist movements, emerging conflicts and the like. There seemed to be a need for international engagement to tamp these down – or to seek to prevent their escalation or spread. The OSCE provided an opportunity to seek to do that at relatively low cost, low expectations, but with a degree of operational flexibility.

Q: So you arrived there in 1992? What precisely were you doing on the delegation and what was the state of things at that time?

DUNKERLEY: There was a lot of internal housekeeping – Not surprising given it was to be a
new, integrated mission bringing together under a new chief of mission different delegations and agency offices accustomed to operating independently.

Q: They must have enjoyed that.

DUNKERLEY: There were moments when all of this seemed like rewriting a table of organization from hell, and I was sure at some point FSI could teach a course about the experience in terms of what to do and what not. We had the usual sorts of start up problems with any new mission, including new offices and operating procedures, but these were overlaid with the pitfalls accompanying any sort of consolidation and transition to a new successor generation and different style of leadership.

Q: What did you do?

DUNKERLEY: I suppose that I did what any good DCM is supposed to do. I spent a lot of time trying to make internal management work. Also, this was Vienna and, like Brussels, the city hosts several different U.S. missions. There is a bilateral embassy, the U.S. mission to the various UN agencies like the IAEA and then our crowd dealing with the CSCE/OSCE. Even under the best of circumstances, ensuring administrative support to meet all our special needs took some time and effort.

As we discussed before, all this was happening at a time when things were starting to go very badly in Yugoslavia. The Bush administration had come through the fall of the Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, German reunification, the whole drama of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This had demanded a tremendous political effort. One sensed a certain degree of exhaustion on the European side as well. From the Vienna perspective, there was in the last months of the Bush administration and in the first months of the Clinton administration a sense that the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, could be seen largely as a European problem.

Q: I think Europeans were touting that too.

DUNKERLEY: Yes. That was fed by a certain common sentiment at that moment. In Vienna, given its all-inclusive membership and broad agenda, the CSCE was one of the first places where you would see these new or fragmented states begin to assume a new role on the international stage. We had the various Yugoslav successor states – the Bosnians, Croats, and others – all playing out their respective agendas in the Vienna discussions, competing for international legitimacy and support. It was also clear that actions were being taken in the former Yugoslavia that were directly counter to the Helsinki Final Act principles. The dilemma was, of course, that given the worsening dynamic of the situation and persistence of differing Western views, our initial options were limited.

One of the things we started to explore in the fall of 1992 – this began under the Bush Presidency, but was picked up by the following Clinton administration – was the notion of dispatching teams of international observers to troubled spots under the CSCE aegis. The advantages of doing this in a CSCE context, as opposed to relying solely on the UN, may have been – at least from the American perspective – greater flexibility and responsiveness. You did
not have the Security Council and the institutional bureaucracy in New York to navigate, you did not have the problems that the UN Special Representative might pose. By comparison, within the CSCE some of these actions could be launched rather quickly. So we scrambled around trying to come up with how the international community – through the CSCE – could generate a small but effective multilateral presence for monitoring events and crisis prevention in a place like Skopje in Macedonia, for example, where things were very tense at that time.

Q: I am trying to capture the spirit of the time. Was there some feeling on your part that at the UN you have to worry about the Middle East disputes, you have to worry about Africans, Asians, Latin Americans trying to have their say, and the CSCE was just Europeans. It was a smaller stage and group of people who responded to the same things.

DUNKERLEY: It was remarked by a number of colleagues at that time that there appeared to be a different sovereignty threshold in terms of discussion within the UN and for our exchanges in the CSCE community. Don’t forget that the starting premise, going back to the Helsinki Final Act, was that peace and stability depended not just on how European states interact with each other, but how governments might interact with their own people. Much of what the CSCE was about in the subsequent years was a constant, sometimes painful reaffirmation of the legitimacy of concerns of the international community as to what might be happening in what was previously characterized as internal affairs. That consideration came to be very much ingrained in the CSCE – such that there turned out to be a greater ability to address those “domestic” issues in Vienna.

Q: Was there a feeling of triumphalism? The Helsinki Accords had the unforeseen effect of helping break up the Soviet Empire.

DUNKERLEY: There are two narratives to the Helsinki Final Act story. Both have a good deal of truth, but by themselves are incomplete. The first narrative one hears a lot among Americans. It’s the story that, almost by serendipity, the West stumbled into this particular instrument and process that – over a long time – came to give heart to courageous dissidents and activists within the Eastern camp to be able to use Helsinki’s emphasis on human rights and freedoms as a means of helping to dismantle the Soviet Empire. There is certainly enough validity to give this a real narrative appeal.

But there was another phenomenon going on at the same time that in many respects was no less important. This was that the CSCE process arising out of Helsinki was slowly building up a credible and eventually thick web of political and military confidence-building measures through continuous engagement, and promotion of the principles of equality, inclusiveness and reciprocity among the states of Europe. These weren’t directed against any bloc or single state, and through constant regular review and gradual legitimatization created a more supportive political context for cooperation and security matters. That’s a story you are more likely to hear in Europe. So both these phenomena were happening.

Q: Who was your ambassador?

DUNKERLEY: It was John Kornblum with whom I had worked at NATO.
Q: He was a German hand wasn’t he?

DUNKERLEY: Very much so. He was a career officer. As I suggested earlier, what made Vienna professionally interesting was that it happened at a point not only when major events were happening and there was a sense of institutional potential to be tapped, but there was also a certain degree of latitude for creative thought out in the field. As a mission, there was a sense among us of being able to help create and shape what might happen next. There seemed more such potential opportunities than in other more established missions, like USNATO, with well dug-in Washington constituencies. John gave a great deal of thought to those sorts of issues and encouraged the people who worked for him to do so as well. As a consequence, as we saw certain things developing in the East, a lot of the initiative – as, for instance, in the development of multilateral CSCE missions out to Moldova or to the Baltics – was as much generated out of Vienna as it was in response to policy directives from Washington.

Q: In a way during your time there two big things were happening: Yugoslavia dissolving and dealing with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, for example, Moldova, the ‘Stans etc. With the Clinton administration your number two man at the State Department was Strobe Talbott who didn’t have much interest in any particular area.

DUNKERLEY: This was not a static period. The story I have started to tell is this: I think with time the CSCE came increasingly to the attention of those people in Washington who were working in European affairs as this potential vehicle to use. Because of the reasons I have described, it offered the possibility of one more item in the tool box – one that was not that expensive, might be a bit more flexible, and so forth. I already gave you one very early example: you will recall as things got bad in Yugoslavia in the early 90’s there were various UN sanctions against Belgrade. Those sanctions were difficult to implement. Much responsibility fell on the neighbors of Serbia and this was an economic hardship for them. It also strained their own customs services. The idea was generated that there should be some means of international, multilateral support and monitoring for the neighbors’ customs efforts. The U.S. and the EU agreed to take a lead as the two key players on this. The OSCE was already in the region, and we didn’t have to jump through incredible bureaucratic hoops to move rapidly. So we ended up using the OSCE as a vehicle by which the U.S. and EU with a certain amount of NATO support were conducting multilateral operations in support of UN sanctions. That’s a table of organization that looks complicated and rather Rube Goldberg – but that was precisely that ad hoc quality that helped to make it work.

Q: You could also go and recruit professionals or volunteers. Like myself monitoring an election.

DUNKERLEY: This was a challenge. Recruitment of the right people for such missions and activities was a constant concern. I am delighted to hear that you are a CSCE veteran, an alumnus in that regard. The pool was never large enough.

Q: When you arrived how did the various elements of the CSCE fit together? Who were some of the major players?
DUNKERLEY: From a professional point of view, it was fun precisely because of the broad cast of characters. Everyone was there. The United States and the European Union occupied critical roles there. As we discussed earlier, the European Union was at that time still very preoccupied with finding ways that it might express its common foreign security policies. The CSCE was a designated area in which they tried to achieve that unanimity.

But there were also a number of the traditional neutrals – Sweden, Austria, Switzerland – all active and speaking out. All of the Eastern Europe states were there. The fragmented Soviet Union generated a tremendous new cast of diplomatic personnel. Many of these new diplomats were having their first time on the international stage.

For instance: The Albanian Ambassador in Vienna at that time was a very bright young man who, during the bad days under Hoxha, had squirreled himself away in the bureaucracy of the postal service of that country: one of the few places where he could have legitimate contact with the outside world. Now – suddenly – he was in the role of one of Albania’s new (and very effective) ambassadors. We saw a number of such examples.

At the same time, we also saw a lot of traditional tensions and rivalries played out as well in our deliberations.

Q: One thinks about the role of the French.

DUNKERLEY: Again…The French role, not surprisingly, involved intense engagement with us. There were lots of debates and discourse, sharp negotiations, but often very productive collaboration.

Q: You had European Union and then the separate states. Did the French and the British speak through the EU or on their own?

DUNKERLEY: They often did both as they do now. Obviously, the EU caucus would develop a particular common position that would be put forward as such. But quite often, as discussion of an issue moved further into details or into a new direction entirely, there might also be a distinctive French, German, or British voice at the table. One of the most interesting players at that time was Moscow. CSCE initially presented an area where the Russian Federation had a legitimate and equal seat at the European security table. That situation has evolved since then and deliberately so – but it is for that reason of its all-inclusive nature, and especially with regard to Russia, we saw particular value in CSCE at that particular time. It was important to keep them engaged. From our perspective in Vienna in these early years, we saw our Russians counterparts, in a period of some confusion and disarray in Russian policy, with conflicted feelings about this operation. On one hand, they saw the CSCE as a potential opportunity to assert their role within a European institution that might have the chance of superseding organizations like NATO at some point. That was an unrealistic hope. At the same time they were naturally suspicious of CSCE because so much of its political attention was pointed to their part of the world.

Q: You were there at the beginning of the thing. How did you all see the debates about dealing with the very dangerous situation in Yugoslavia? A war was going on. You were there when it
got started.

DUNKERLEY: Yes …and as it continued to deteriorate. Everyone shared considerable frustration.

Q: What were some of the debates and issues at the beginning?

DUNKERLEY: I would have to go back to my notes. But in brief….there were several factors in play, beginning with all the long-standing differences and competitive tensions inherent in the Yugoslav concept that seemed to be released without check with the end of the Cold War. And, as we discussed before, in the aftermath of our efforts on German reunification and the Iraq war, there was a hesitation on the part of the U.S. to rush to the lead in addressing the complexities of Yugoslavia’s collapse. There was uncertainty for us that, I suppose, increased in having a EU and UN lead as to opposed to U.S. and NATO role at those initial stages. In our discussions in Vienna, there were still differing attitudes among some states as to the relative responsibility of the different Yugoslav actors for the violence. It is easy with retrospect to see the degree to which specific Serbian actions represented a significant and dangerous campaign against its neighbors and different ethnic groups. At the time, however – this was in ’92 for instance – there were some who argued more of a moral equivalence between all of the players: Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. As a consequence, there was sometimes resistance to actions which seemed punitive vis-a-vis the Serbs. Not least, I recall, there was a profound debate over the possible use of force in seeking to curb the fighting and bring about a resolution. Our own views were energetically matched by those, such as the British and French, who unlike the us at that time had peacekeeping troops of their own in potential jeopardy on the ground. There were serious questions: If external military force were to be applied, what would be the consequences, would the use of force – such as bombing – be effective? Not surprisingly there was hesitation on the part of many parties, not least on the part of some of the UN peacekeeping decision-makers.

Q: Was there a feeling within our delegation or in others about a growing horror? I think it got pretty nasty there.

DUNKERLEY: In Vienna we were in a position where we were acutely aware of such developments from official USG reporting and that of the press out of the region, from the reports of diplomatic colleagues from the region. Certainly the personal sympathies on the part of the U.S. delegation were very much that of “Friends of Bosnia” (or “FOB” as it was known at the time). The problem for American diplomacy in that period was that, as a government, we had not yet taken a decision that our own strategic and political interests would be so overwhelmingly affected by a continuation of the Yugoslav situation that would warrant us to take a lead in bringing that conflict to an end through both force and active diplomacy. Without that sort of political readiness, our ability to affect European policy – or rather the situation on the ground in Bosnia – seemed to be, in some important instances, self-limited.

Q: Did you have the traditional problem of a DCM where the senior officers in a mission see things in big terms and the junior officers were up in arms that ‘we’ve got to do something?’

DUNKERLEY: Not to the extent that you perhaps saw within the Department at that time. I
think there was concern throughout the U.S. delegation over these Yugoslav-related issues and their implications, but I didn’t see it as quite as stark a problem for mission management as you characterize.

During this time there were also issues playing out in the former Soviet Union. Many of our junior officers were very deeply involved in those issues; that their individual sympathies were with the small newly independent states was quite clear and understandable. There I was more conscious of the need to be a little bit cautious in managing their work: it was easy to sympathize with the notion of “a plucky little country versus the Russian bear” but inevitably almost all of these situations were a good deal more complex.

Q: Particularly the Baltics.

DUNKERLEY: Particularly the Baltics. Our strong support and sympathies for them were accompanied by a realization that it would be very much in their own interests that some pressing issues needed to be seen to be addressed … For instance, as with regards to the treatment afforded residual ethnic Russian communities within those countries.

In terms of mission leadership, John Kornblum was there for the first year. He was then replaced—and there was some difficulty in naming his replacement, so there was a protracted period when I was Charge d’Affaires. It was in my final year of three in Vienna—’94 to early ’95—that Sam Brown came out, a former head of the Peace Corps and a political appointee. Since he had trouble with Senate confirmation, he came out without an ambassadorial title.

Q: Did that cause a problem?

DUNKERLEY: Not really in Vienna. Certainly there was no more than the usual need for all of us to handle many tasks at once.

Q: While you were there, were we sending these observer missions to the Baltic States?

DUNKERLEY: We had multinational missions to assist the governments in Estonia and Latvia. We also had one in Ukraine dealing with national minority problems in the Crimea.

In the former Soviet Union, we had a CSCE mission in Georgia seeking to deal with separatist problems there and then a similar one in Moldova. We had a standing brief known as the Minsk Process seeking to reinforce a fragile ceasefire in a conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia arising out of Nagorno-Karabakh’s military effort to break away from the former. Further to the east, we had a CSCE mission in Tajikistan.

In the Balkans, we had for a time—until they were kicked out by the Serb government—a monitoring presence in troubled areas such as Kosovo, Sandžak and Voivodina where there were significant ethnic tensions. CSCE also had a presence in the former Yugoslav province of Macedonia and in Albania, eventually Croatia and certainly in Bosnia.

Q: Was the CSCE running these posts? Was your organization running them?
DUNKERLEY: These were multinational teams launched by decisions of the participating states and operating under the authority of CSCE (or OSCE as it became), and they reported back to the CSCE as a whole in Vienna. One of the institutional developments during this period of the early 90’s were the ever-increasing number of meetings for consultation and, when needed, action on these missions – what became, in fact before in title, a permanent council in Vienna where all of the countries were represented. Its discussions and decisions provided the basic authority and operating mandate for each of these operations.

In the day to day business of supporting such missions and managing the growing agenda of the CSCE, the practice developed of assigning increasing independence and authority to the CSCE’s “Chairman in Office.” The formal Chairman in Office or CIO was the foreign minister of a country that would be selected by consensus on a rotating annual basis. At the start, this would usually turn out to be one of the neutrals or smaller countries. The CIO in turn would assign a very senior and experienced diplomat to serve as a standing representative of the chair in leading the Vienna deliberations.

This was, as course, very different from the UN practice where, for example, you have a Secretary General who has a lead on various efforts and is essentially the public face of the organization. In CSCE, by contrast, that role is largely that of the CIO – while the post of CSCE Secretary General subsequently came to be established largely as a chief administrative officer or operating officer in support of the CIO.

This practice of the Chairman in Office had, by the way, the useful effect of providing an early opportunity for a number of the East European and newly independent states to showcase their effectiveness and credibility on the international scene. This was at a time in the early 90’s when the whole issue of their prospects for eventual accession to both NATO and the EU was still up in the air. So, for instance, it became very important for the Hungarians – who assumed the OSCE chairmanship in 1994-95 and were still viewed with a certain amount of suspicion by neighbors like the Romanians (given past history over Transylvania) – to be able to demonstrate this role of leading the CSCE in an especially balanced and effective manner.

The Chairman in Office and the Chair’s representative in Vienna came to serve as a primary interlocutor for the U.S. To ensure continuity and effectiveness, a useful practice grew up in which the incumbent Chairman in Office would rely on his or her immediate predecessor and successor national counterparts to form a sort of de facto troika. In Vienna they would enjoy frequent consultation with a small informal group consisting of the U.S Delegation head, the head of the EU caucus, their Russian counterpart and those states with a special stake in whatever particular issue under discussion. These actors would consult on an almost daily basis in Vienna.

*Q:* How did the Russians play in this at the time? There must have been some management of trying to protect the minorities and at the same time making sure they didn’t re-exert their authority.

DUNKERLEY: They seemed at times conflicted. Their policies and their actions in Vienna
suggested this for some of the reasons that you just alluded to. On the one hand, the OSCE and its potentially wide-ranging mandate did provide them a seat at the table which, if they played their cards right, could be of particular importance. In the back of the minds of some, there was probably a hope that this particular institution would come to supersede others. On the other hand, however, because of this same broad mandate as to security, cooperation and human rights principles, the CSCE’s attention and actions often came to focus on questions that they saw as cutting across their interests: dealing with not just the status of Russian minorities in newly independent countries but, more sensitively, the overall Russian role in Georgia, in Moldova and elsewhere – and further, the monitoring of the conduct of their own electoral politics within Russia itself. This latter consideration came increasingly to the fore as time passed.

One of the more difficult projects we had to undertake came with the outbreak of the first war in Chechnya within Russia in the spring of 1995. This was a situation where not surprisingly there were powerful political sensitivities on the part of the Russians to resist any sort of international involvement. At the same time, we were rapidly approaching the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe; President Yeltsin had very high expectations for an upbeat summit-level gathering in Moscow to celebrate that event. The political question arose for U.S. and Western leaders how they might participate in Moscow even while a bloody war in Chechnya was still underway – one over which there were mounting human rights concerns.

The CSCE/OSCE provided a lever to help finesse this dilemma that the Russians themselves eventually reached for – which was to have an CSCE multinational observer presence invited into Chechnya to monitor the situation there. That was, however, easier said than done.

There was a great deal of Russian reluctance in all of this. But after much debate and backstage negotiating, we eventually managed to get a meaningful multinational CSCE observer presence into Chechnya. It did not bear fruit immediately or directly in that difficult situation. But in the political negotiations that followed in the year following, the mission’s work helped in the winding down of the first Chechen war. By a number of reports, the activism of the Swiss head of that OSCE mission – and the degree to which his group had developed credibility as a go between among differing groups on the ground – helped to play a useful role.

I’d note that sort of experience has not been repeated in the subsequent outbreak of Chechen fighting in the late 90’s. No such follow-on mission has been possible – not least because of Russian policy.

Q: Essentially your tool was moral suasion, wasn’t it?

DUNKERLEY: There was a fair amount of that, I suppose, but as the OSCE has evolved we have gotten other tools. All of this has not been not a straight-line process – but to cite an instance jumping slightly ahead, one of the OSCE efforts that I became engaged in subsequent to my tour in Vienna involved how to encourage and facilitate the withdrawal of Russian military equipment out of a separatist province in Moldova. At a certain point, scarce resources – money – became a factor. The degree to which we could use the OSCE to generate resources both to assume particular removal costs and to provide a monitoring arrangement for verifying such withdrawals proved important in making such actions possible.
So in answer to your question: There were a variety of instruments that came to be used. Certainly yes, the OSCE is at the lower end of the policy spectrum; it is not going to be involved in the exercise of force to deter or resist aggression. Neither is it going to be a peace enforcement instrument. But as we saw in Bosnia following the Dayton Accords, the OSCE can be a useful vehicle for doing a number of things in terms of political presence and international observation, all in an inclusive multilateral context. You can call all of that moral suasion, but to my mind, OSCE involved a lot of traditional diplomacy and traditional political bargaining.

Q: What about Armenia versus Azerbaijan? Was there a problem with the Armenian international community particularly because they have a strong lobby in the United States?

DUNKERLEY: Diaspora support was to a certain degree a factor as Nagorno Karabakh separatist aspirations emerged in the late 1980’s-early 1990s. But there have been many problems involved in that conflict and a number still continue. At various points over the years, we – that is to say, international negotiators – got close to agreement on certain points among the parties to the conflict, but were never able to get them the full way to a durable resolution. In my time in Vienna in the early 90’s, two major inhibitions to progress seemed to have been: first, we had not yet reached a point where both sides were sufficiently convinced their gains could not be achieved or sustained through unilateral action – at certain moments one or the other side still thought, ‘ah if we only do x or y we can win; we can hold out long enough.’ They may have reached more of a state of mutual exhaustion later on when tough political decisions might begin to be envisaged, but during this early period they continued their focus on taking, holding or retaking disputed territory.

The other problem at that early stage seemed to be the Russian role. Nagorno Karabakh posed a set of issues perceived by the Russians as very much within their purview. For the first year or two, there was jockeying and elbowing between the Russian negotiators and the international negotiation effort through the CSCE (known as the “Minsk Process”). Of course in such a situation, the local parties concerned were delighted to forum shop and play each effort off the other. That was subsequently eased by a more formal merger of the Russian and OSCE negotiating efforts – by and large a recognition of reality that neither effort had much chance of succeeding without the other.

Q: Working with the Russians at that time, were their diplomats lost? What did they want in the world? Once you’ve had an empire and then it goes peacefully without a military disaster...

DUNKERLEY: We’re jumping ahead in the story. A lot of what I did subsequently as Special Envoy for the CFE renegotiations can be said to involve the issues contained in your comments. Yes, one could see evidence of that larger question: how the Russian role might come to be defined not just in terms of European security writ large, but more specifically and immediately vis-a-vis their close neighbors. This was brought very much to the fore in the CSCE context because this was a forum within which all the actors were present and participating as sovereign and independent states. Of course, some countries concerned – such as Georgia – were acutely sensitive to any suggestions from the Russians as to spheres of special interest – as when they spoke of the notion of “Russia’s near abroad.” (I recall there were, at times, conversations with
Russian colleagues in Vienna that sounded a little like hearing Victorian officers during the time of the Raj speak of indigenous peoples.)

Q: Can you think of any particular issue that might seem obscure?

DUNKERLEY: Sometimes they all seemed pretty obscure or arcane given the nature of CSCE and its broad scope.

Q: Were there any problems that particularly engaged you?

DUNKERLEY: Getting the CSCE team into Chechnya in ‘95. Much of what we were engaged in with that particular task related to working around Russian sensitivities to admitting third party presence into this situation while protecting the rights and capabilities of that mission to do its job….

Q: Were there other missions? Did the Swedes, for example, have a similar mission?

DUNKERLEY: Yes, they all had delegations to the CSCE, some were large, some were small. The Swedes were particularly active as Chairman in Office during an early part of this period, fielding some excellent people instrumental in the development of the role of the CIO.

Q: Was there a sense of collegiality? The missions unlike many where you’re dealing with supposedly the Western European powers and the United States had unlike many other times a unanimity of trying to keep these unruly people together?

DUNKERLEY: There was certainly a general sense of collegiality. As I noted earlier, the interesting thing about the Vienna situation was the breadth of participation by many nations at a time when the new actors were coming relatively fresh to the scene. It was a time when all sorts of new diplomatic problems were emerging – so a sense of both promise and dangers. There was even an element of tabula rasa in terms of an opportunity for the delegations and governments concerned in coming up with possible responses.

One of the things gradually apparent from our meetings in Vienna came to be the CSCE’s emerging role as a sort of early political warning network. That is to say, from our regular discussions and debates we would sometimes get hints and glimmers on certain issues sooner rather than later. These included potential problems at an early stage that normally wouldn’t command much attention in other fora. For example, I recall a series of exchanges at the table and in the corridors in Vienna in the early 90’s that had the effect of highlighting Greek and Albanian frictions regarding some of each other’s schooling requirements. They were suggestive of an impending spillover exacerbating particular ethnic sensitivities. It was serious for the players directly concerned – a problem that you didn’t want to fester – and it was useful to learn about that potential for trouble sooner rather than later. Sometimes it may also useful be able to have discussion of that sort of issue in a more neutral and politically supportive multilateral context than simply left to competitive public statements.

There were a variety of issues like that. There were discussions in which concerns, more tonal or
thematic in nature, came across. I recall from the preparatory discussions for the Budapest Summit in late 1994 were mounting expressions of anxiety on the part the smaller countries to the East over impact of the EU’s then new Schengen regime governing free travel – what the unintended strategic implications might prove to be for these countries in terms of the movement of their own peoples and resulting perceptions of new dividing lines in Europe.

Q: The Greek-Albanian conflict, for example, were you able to call our embassy in Athens and say, 'hey, get the Greeks to cool this.'

DUNKERLEY: No, I have difficulty imagining saying that to our embassy on Athens or our embassy saying that to the Greek government. But we were in frequent contact with many if not all of our embassies. Without overstating the utility of CSCE, during this time it was able to provide a modest number of additional tools for U.S. embassy efforts in various countries. Take the question of reporting, for example. In places like the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or Moldova and its separatist areas, having the CSCE multinational team of observers on the ground offered an opportunity to significantly increase the ability of the U.S. government to get reporting on developments where our local embassy might have limited resources or access. There was often close, informal cooperation on the part of the OSCE teams with our local embassies. At the same time, the leadership of many of these OSCE teams would make an effort to have good U.S. personnel on them. These were quite often either former FSOs, or talented FSO-2’s and ‘3s.

Q: What about after Strobe Talbott came on? This was his area. He spent his life doing this. Did this enhance the American side of this?

DUNKERLEY: Yes. We worked very closely with him. He knew and understood what this set of diplomatic instruments could and couldn’t do. He saw OSCE’s potential utility early on and understood what was required. We saw him as a supportive friend in court.

Q: What about our embassy in Moscow? It really gets infected to one degree or another with "localitis." Did you find that they felt you were meddling in their patch?

DUNKERLEY: Not so much that, but being precise about the time period is important. In the early to mid 1990s I think the one area where I could see some divergence – and it wasn’t necessarily between Moscow and our delegation but between Embassy Moscow and Embassy Tbilisi, especially during the fighting when Abkhazia broke away with apparent Russian connivance and support. Not surprisingly the perception from Tbilisi was one of a small, new state under siege. Whereas the Moscow perception seemed a little less stark in that regard. As I indicated before, within the U.S. delegation in Vienna, we tried to be conscious that few of these new issues were simple or a straight-forward black and white. We had to be careful not to fall into a situation of perceiving all of the issues arising within and among the newly independent states simply as the result of Russian recidivism. That may have been a factor – but there were other dynamics and local complexities to account for as well.

Q: I would imagine in the case of Georgia the fact that Shevardnadze who was sort of a hero in the West because of his connection to making the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union, there
may have been more bias in his favor than in other places.

DUNKERLEY: I wouldn’t necessarily overstate the case, but there was no question that the presence and role of Shevardnadze attracted much more positive Western attention to Georgia at that time than that country would have excited normally – had it been, for example, Moldova. My own meetings with Shevardnadze came later in the late 1990s in the context of my CFE work.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover?

DUNKERLEY: I do have to refresh my memory; this was all quite awhile back.

Q: Please add them as you look at your notes because the more detail... it’s a very interesting overview of the work. Afterwards where did you go?

DUNKERLEY: I then came back to Washington, DC to head up RPM (the Office of European Security and Political Affairs) within the bureau of European/Canadian affairs. Richard Holbrooke was Assistant Secretary at the time. I was asked to take over that particular position in the late summer of ’95.

Q: How long were you there?

DUNKERLEY: I recall that I was RPM Director from mid-95’ to roughly mid-’97. Two big sets of issues were coming to a head as I arrived. One was the worsening war in Bosnia. Shortly after I had departed Vienna but immediately before I came on board in EUR and began my new responsibilities, there was the Srebrenica massacre. That set of events came to serve as a catalytic turning point in terms of U.S. policy in the former Yugoslavia.

PHILIP C. BROWN
Regional Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Vienna (1994-1996)

Mr. Brown was born in Massachusetts and raised primarily in Pennsylvania. He was educated at College of Wooster (Ohio) and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. After serving with the Voice of America, in 1965 he joined the United States Information Agency Foreign Service (USIS), where he served several assignments at its headquarters in Washington DC. His foreign posts include Dakar, Douala, Yaoundé, Paris, Vienna and Moscow, where he served twice. At these posts his assignments ranged from Assistant Branch Public Affairs Officer to Counselor for Information, Press and Cultural Affairs. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2012.
BROWN: Then someone asked me about RPO/Vienna. I hadn’t ever given it much thought. RPO stood for Regional Program Office, Vienna, Austria. Historically many, many organizations, government and otherwise, had set up offices in Vienna to serve programs in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, given the proximity, the ease of working in Vienna. Of course, I was familiar with RPO from my Moscow years. It had provided us programs and materials. If you wanted a brochure printed, if you wanted some technical support, you could find a really competent staff in Vienna.

So I mulled it over and I accepted it. It was a challenge because my wife was now settled in Chevy Chase. She had a teaching job at Sidwell Friends School. She did not want to pack up and move overseas again. We agreed that I would go by myself and she would stay here and do her thing.

At the time, I put down on paper two pages of thoughts about the job, what it meant for me. Why I was doing it and what the challenges and what the prospects were. It worked out. It stands up pretty well. It did not turn out to be four years. I was only there for two years, less than two years before I retired.

In July, 1994, my last year at the Foreign Press Center, there was a presidential visit to Riga, Latvia. President Clinton was going there and the Lithuanian and Estonian heads of state were coming in to meet with him. The White House was shopping around; they wanted some staff. They needed people to go to Riga to help out with press operations and people were turning it down. It was the wrong time of the year. I accepted.

Basically what the White House did was to rent the town for a few days. We, the U.S., paid for everything. We purchased rights to the center square. There were outdoor activities. Of course, the Latvians loved it. They were in the news and we injected a lot of dollars in the economy.

So I asked to go through Vienna on the way back. I wanted to see the job and I am so glad I did. They had set aside an apartment for me in a place far from the center of town. I would have needed a car and I would have been isolated. I knew I didn’t want to live out there. They said there is nothing else we can think of right now. Nothing available so you’ll have to live in a hotel. So when I got to Vienna, I did live in a hotel for well over a month but I ended up with a wonderful apartment on Josefstadterstrasse, an easy walk from our office, just up from the Ring Road. I was near the old historic part of town and for 21 months, I took full advantage of that.

I had an apartment with a mansard roof. At first, I thought I would be ducking my head all the time but it had great charm. I could lie in bed and look through the skylight right up to the sky. The downtown location, city center location was what was great.

One challenge was the fact that I didn’t speak German. I wished that I had worked harder on that. I learned enough German to order meals and do the basic necessities but not having conversational competence was a handicap.

One of the ways my wife and I stayed in touch was e-mail. This was the first time, 1994, that e-mail was taken for granted. We both got the user IDs that we use today.
RPO was housed in a building that had been -- at one time I think prior to or during the Second World War -- a hospital running by a Jewish family with a big garden in the back. They lost the hospital during the war and after the war, it was turned over to Americans. It was part of our diplomatic presence in Vienna.

There were many multilateral organizations in Vienna. During most of my Foreign Service career, talk about “the agency” meant the CIA. In Vienna, the “agency” meant the International Atomic Energy. They had a huge presence there.

We had an embassy but I was really not part of the bilateral mission at all. Never in my Foreign Service career overseas, except when I was in Garmisch studying Russian, did I have less involvement in the bilateral relationship. No evening activities. I was not involved in the bilateral program at all.

RPO had an outstanding staff of some 40-50 Austrian employees, many of whom have served there for many years. I informally restructured the operation so that I met with three of them every day – Hannes Schmiedt, who handled all the budgetary and administrative support that we gave to the field; Marie Stephen, who headed the unit that provided program support to the field; and Joe Kocsi, who directed the printing operation.

Marie was actually Czech-born and I recall going to Prague with her one time in connection with a meeting of the USIA Advisory Commission. She was going to offer them a side trip and when they turned it down, she and I went instead to the town of Cesky Krumlov. What a treat it was to go there with someone like Marie. I made return trips with both my wife and my parents.

Once again, I did a lot of traveling. One of my jobs was to go to all the posts served by RPO, meet with the PAO and see what their needs were and how we could help. By now, we were setting up embassies in all the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union so I went back to all those capitals that I had been to when I was in Moscow. I also had a chance to return to Moscow, my first trip back there in five years.

In addition to going back to Moscow, and in spite of budget cuts, I was still involved in presidential visits. President Clinton went to Ukraine in May, 1995, to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. I was there when he was in Kiev. I was smart enough to say to myself, on the one hand you are just a little cog in the big machinery but on the other hand, outside my hotel, I watched this victory parade marking the 50th anniversary of the Second World War with all these elderly Ukrainian veterans bedecked with medals. I thought a lot about what this meant to the people of Ukraine.

I was present when Clinton visited Babi Yar, the spot outside Kiev where in 1941, Jews were massacred. The Russian poet, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, wrote a poem called, Babi Yar. Jews were lined up and shot and the bodies fell into a mass grave. Clinton, wearing a yarmulke, made appropriate remarks. I thought to myself here I am this guy who grew up in western Pennsylvania and now I am standing on this historic site near the President of the United States.
The ambassador to Austria was a woman named Swanee Hunt. She was the daughter of H. L. Hunt, the big oil magnate from Texas. She was part heiress to that fortune. He was a very conservative Republican, she was anything but. She was a Clinton appointee, very progressive in her ideas and particularly focused on women’s issues. This was also the time of the war in the Balkans and she became very, very involved in raising money to restore the library in Sarajevo, this kind of thing.

She had a staff meeting at her house one day, at the residence, that I was invited to attend. Something I said caught her attention and from that day on, she included me in the country team meetings and treated me very nicely, as if my opinion counted. Up to that point, RPO had not really been a part of the country team. I appreciated that.

But the elections in 1994 produced a big shift and a government shutdown. Al Gore came out with his reorganization of government plan and all of a sudden, our mission changed. Printing and publishing were passé. Budgets were being cut. It seemed almost as soon as we had the opportunity to open libraries and cultural centers in Eastern Europe, we were being told they were no longer needed. We’d won the Cold War; we needed to save money, etcetera, etcetera.

Our mission was changed to include training for some of the newly hired Foreign Service national employees in Eastern Europe and that seemed to me a very legitimate enterprise. We’d bring in these very bright, very talented people we were hiring from everywhere from Riga to Vladivostok and give them training. That was good to see but on the other hand, it was hard to swallow cuts and reductions in some of the more traditional activities.

Somewhere along the line in late 1995 with the government shutdown . . .

Q: This was a dispute between the executive and Congress. It was not a nice period.

BROWN: It wasn’t. It was discouraging.

RPO was faced with severe staff reductions. I now had 30 years service, I was over 50 years of age and I was thus eligible for retirement so when one of the telegrams came out offering retirement, I decided to retire. Before I left Vienna, I put down my thoughts in a two-page paper that I titled “Challenges and Resources: Some Parting Thoughts.” In it, I contrasted my second tour in Moscow, where we had enormous challenges but very limited resources other than the excellent staff and RPO Vienna, where we had wonderful resources but where the challenge was primarily to fend off ideas such as moving the operation to Vilnius (to save money) and demands that we reduce the excellent staff.

The penultimate paragraph read: “And so, to my USIA colleagues, especially to those assigned to the world’s hot spots, to those FSOs and FSNs struggling to keep ahead of the game and wishing for just a bit more support, I say count your blessings. When it’s all over and you look back, you will probably have achieve most of what you sent out to accomplish and your sense of satisfaction will be great. At the same time, pity your colleagues who have the desire and means to take on a demanding assignment but who don’t have the challenge.”
End of Reader