BELGIUM

COUNTRY READER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

James Cowles Hart Bonbright 1939-1940 Second Secretary, Brussels
Smith Simpson 1945-1947 Labor Attaché, Brussels
Ralph S. Smith 1951-1953 Political Officer, Brussels
Robert Lyle Brown 1954-1958 Economic Officer, Brussels
Sheldon Vance 1954-1958 Political Officer, Brussels
Arthur T. Tienken 1955-1960 Economic Officer, Brussels
Nancy Ostrander 1957-1960 Administrative Officer, Consular Officer, Antwerp
William C. Sherman 1958-1960 Belgium/Luxembourg Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Donald C. Tice 1959-1961 Administrative Officer, Consular Officer, Antwerp
Howard Meyers 1959-1962 Political Advisor, European Atomic Energy Community, Brussels
David Brombart 1959-1964 Labor Secretary, World Assembly of Youth, Brussels
Morton A. Bach 1960-1964 Economic Officer, Brussels
John J. Crowley, Jr. 1960-1964 Assistant Labor Attaché, Brussels
Margaret Joy Tibbetts 1961-1963 Political Officer, Brussels
Douglas MacArthur, II 1948-1949 Consular Officer, Brussels
1961-1965 Ambassador, Belgium
Thomas W. Fina 1963-1965 Political Officer, Brussels
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William C. Harrop</td>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>Economic Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Shostal</td>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>Economic Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert M. Beaudry</td>
<td>1963-1966</td>
<td>Political Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward L. Killham</td>
<td>1963-1967</td>
<td>Political-Military Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley D. Schiff</td>
<td>1964-1967</td>
<td>Negotiator - Trade issues, US Mission to the European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arva C. Floyd</td>
<td>1964-1967</td>
<td>Political Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967-1969</td>
<td>Political-Military Counselor, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Koenig</td>
<td>1964-1973</td>
<td>Agricultural Attaché, US Mission to the European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theresa A. Tull</td>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>Vice Consul, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John T. McCarthy</td>
<td>1965-1967</td>
<td>Political Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridgway B. Knight</td>
<td>1965-1969</td>
<td>Ambassador, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Shellenberger</td>
<td>1965-1970</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer, USIS, US Mission to the European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Edward Dillery</td>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>Economic Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Anthony Gillespie, Jr.</td>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>Supervisory Security Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>Administrative Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
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<td>1968-1970</td>
<td>Administrative Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Robert Schaetznel</td>
<td>1966-1972</td>
<td>U.S. Representative to the European Community, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert A. Martin</td>
<td>1967-1969</td>
<td>Political Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clint A. Lauderdale</td>
<td>1967-1970</td>
<td>General Services Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Van Heuven</td>
<td>1967-1970</td>
<td>Civil Emergency, Planning, and Arms Control Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond L. Garthoff</td>
<td>1968-1970</td>
<td>Political-Military Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philip S. Kaplan</td>
<td>1968-1970</td>
<td>International Relations Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John W. Kimball</td>
<td>1968-1971</td>
<td>Political-Military Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Zuckerman</td>
<td>1968-1971</td>
<td>Information Officer, USIS, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Harrison Marsh</td>
<td>1968-1972</td>
<td>Political Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald Helman</td>
<td>1968-1973</td>
<td>Political Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Leovich</td>
<td>1969-1971</td>
<td>Ambassador’s Aide, US Mission to the European Economic Community, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanton H. Burnett</td>
<td>1969-1974</td>
<td>Information Officer, USIS, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold W. Geisel</td>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>Budget and Fiscal Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert M. Beecroft</td>
<td>1971-1973</td>
<td>Deputy Political Advisor, SHAPE, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas M. T. Niles</td>
<td>1971-1973</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George A. Anderson</td>
<td>1971-1974</td>
<td>Labor Officer/Political Counselor, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Marks</td>
<td>1971-1974</td>
<td>Economic/Commercial Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecil S. Richardson</td>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>Chief, Consular Section, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theresa Healy</td>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>Political Section, Embassy, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Brayton Redecker</td>
<td>1972-1974</td>
<td>Executive Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen J. Ledogar</td>
<td>1973-1976</td>
<td>Political Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark C. Lissfelt</td>
<td>1973-1976</td>
<td>Assistant Director, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce W. Clark</td>
<td>1973-1977</td>
<td>Special Asst to Ambassador, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John H. Trattner</td>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William V.P. Newlin</td>
<td>1974-1976</td>
<td>Political Officer, US Mission to the European Community, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Lesser</td>
<td>1974-1977</td>
<td>Economic Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank H. Perez</td>
<td>1974-1977</td>
<td>Political Advisor, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Lore</td>
<td>1974-1978</td>
<td>Economic/Commercial Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorothy M. Sampas</td>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>Administrative Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne O. Cary</td>
<td>1976-1978</td>
<td>Political/Economic Officer, US Mission to the European Community, Brussels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
John O. Grimes 1976-1978 Labor/Political Officer, Brussels
Miles S. Pendelton, Jr. 1976-1979 Political Officer, USNATO, Brussels
John T. McCarthy 1976-1980 Economic Counselor, Brussels
David T. Jones 1976-1980 Executive Officer, USNATO, Brussels
Jack Mendelsohn 1977-1979 Political-Military Affairs, USNATO, Brussels
Perry J. Stieglitz 1977-1980 Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Brussels
William A. Weingarten 1977-1981 Economic Officer, Brussels
Anne Cox Chambers 1977-1981 Ambassador, Belgium
Arnold Denys 1977-1981 Consular Officer, Antwerp
Maynard Wayne Glitman 1977-1981 Deputy Chief of Mission, USNATO, Brussels
Teresa Chin Jones 1978-1980 Consular Officer, Brussels
Archie M. Bolster 1978-1981 Consul General, Antwerp
Edward L. Killham 1979-1982 Deputy Chief of Mission, Brussels
Robert J. Wozniak 1979-1983 USNATO Public Affairs Officer, Brussels
James D. Walsh 1981-1983 Director, European Logistic Support Office, Antwerp
Dell Pendergrast 1981-1985 Director, USIS, US Mission to the European Community, Brussels
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stephen J. Ledogar</td>
<td>1981-1987</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James L. Morad</td>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John M. Evans</td>
<td>1983-1986</td>
<td>U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildred A. Patterson</td>
<td>1983-1986</td>
<td>Consular Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Jaeger</td>
<td>1984-19857</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Political Affairs, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudolf V. Perina</td>
<td>1985-1987</td>
<td>Political Officer &amp; Deputy U.S. Representative, NATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lange Schermerhorn</td>
<td>1985-1988</td>
<td>Economic Officer, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig Dunkerley</td>
<td>1987-1991</td>
<td>Deputy Political Advisor/Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Barry Fulton</td>
<td>1987-1991</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer, USNATO, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John P. Harrod</td>
<td>1987-1992</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynard Wayne Glitman</td>
<td>1988-1991</td>
<td>Ambassador, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Ashley Wills</td>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Brussels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JAMES COWLES HART BONBRIGHT
Second Secretary
Brussels (1939-1940)

Ambassador James Cowles Hart Bonbright entered the Foreign Service in 1927. His career included positions in Ottawa, Washington, DC, Brussels, Belgrade, Budapest, Paris, and an ambassadorship to Portugal. Ambassador Bonbright was interviewed by Peter Jessup in 1986.

BONBRIGHT: My memory is gone on that. I couldn't say. He could have been. I thought he had been in Dublin. In those days the ambassador to Belgium and also his staff were assigned to Luxembourg as well. The office in Luxembourg of course, was a very small one, and one man was there as chargé. I went up with Mr. Cudahy when he presented his letters to the Grand Duchess, and had a pleasant day or two at Luxembourg, a lovely little country. The Charge was a courtly Virginian named George Waller, who still believed strongly in the divine right of kings, and if not of kings, of the Grand Duchess. I remember after the ceremony, Cudahy said to Waller on the side, "The Grand Duchess is a very nice, charming woman." I thought Waller would faint that he should speak of her in such familiar terms.

Most of that winter, of course, the winter of the "phoney war," was spent responding to different alerts. There was a great fear that the Germans were going to attack in November. There was another bad scare in January and another in the spring before it actually came. Nobody thought that they wouldn't come. The May 10th attack, my wife and I had made plans to go up to Holland at the height of the tulip season, and we wanted very much to see this, but Hitler spoiled that for us. The morning of the tenth of May was absolutely beautiful, and word came through that the
invasion of Belgium and the low countries had started. A few planes came over, but not much that we could see where we were. Incidentally, I lived outside of Brussels in a suburb called Rode St.Genese, 13 kilometers away. It was a lovely farm with a very large house spread out. The owner had lots of interests in the Congo and he was going down there and wanted somebody to live in it, watch over it for him and particularly wanted an American if he could get one from the embassy. So we got this place for very little. It was much too big for us, but we worked over one wing of it, and it was very attractive, a lovely place. From the bedroom on the second floor I could see the line of Waterloo in the distance. Then at that time I took to bicycling into the office.

Q: Thirteen kilometers?

BONBRIGHT: Thirteen kilometers did me good, except in the dead of winter. Brussels is noted for its very raw in winter. The temperatures for days on end will hover between 33 or 34, so you get this drizzle which covers everything in the day and will freeze up at night. You can't move. I haven't seen anywhere that's as bad this way. But when I could bicycle, I did. At the end of the day, Sybil would drive in and we'd tie the bicycle on the back of the car and ride home.

Q: Would you subscribe to the idea that the country of Belgium, with Ghent and Bruges and Antwerp, is prettier than the people?

BONBRIGHT: I'm afraid so.

Q: The people are rather stolid?

BONBRIGHT: I don't frankly feel any warmth about any Belgians. Of course, they have a problem there. It's like Canada. So many countries that have these different races, the differences between the Walloons and the Flemish are constantly bubbling. So it's not something that makes for a happy, easy situation at all.

Q: Is the French spoken by educated Belgians immediately detectable as Belgian French?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I think there is a little difference. I'm no expert, but there are some words. I will say for them, bar none in the world, it's the best food and wine I ever drank. I put on 15 pounds in the 11 months that I was there. If that hadn't ended then, I would have blown up, I think.

Q: You would have looked like Henry VIII.

BONBRIGHT: Very likely, because I was making great strides in that direction and loving it. Absolutely marvelous food.

Q: Describe the actual invasion. When did you first see German troops? Were they elite units, armored divisions?

BONBRIGHT: A day or two after that, parts of the British Expeditionary Force came through
heading towards the east where the fighting had started, all new-looking equipment and very high-spirited, everybody cheering them on in the streets. It was fine. But each night the sound of the artillery, you could hear it getting closer. The Germans actually arrived, although we didn't see a great many of them in Brussels itself, just a week after the invasion, on the 17th of May. So it didn't take them long to get there. Soon after, everything fell apart. King Leopold (1901-1951) surrendered, which greatly annoyed Mr. Churchill and a few Belgians, too, who compared this very unfavorably with the way his father, King Albert (1875-1934) had behaved in the first war. But he was under pressure, and it was clear that everything had fallen apart. I'm sorry to say that a lot of the officers who were seen back in Brussels looking after their families and trying to get them away some place, had left their troops. Not good.

At about this time when the Germans came in, we were sort of isolated out in St.Genise, and the ambassador invited us to move into his residence where he had lots of extra room, which we did, and we stayed there for a week or two. The electricity was off. It was a little hard to get some things, but on the whole it wasn't too bad in the town. Just before the Germans came in, they hung a sign for Belgian civilians to keep a watch on the embassy all the time. We'd see them standing outside on the street. In fact, we used to play a little game in the evening with them, childish, but it amused us. If there would be six or more of us at dinner, when it was time to go home, everybody would gather at the door and we'd all rush out together and go off as fast as we could walk in different directions. We enjoyed watching the confusion as to who should they follow, these people.

Q: Did that Quisling -- Degrelle -- did his name emerge that early, or had nobody heard of him?

BONBRIGHT: I don't think he'd been heard of much before that at all. He was another unsavory fellow.

Q: Pretty bad. Franco hid him for a while. Maybe he still is in Madrid.

BONBRIGHT: I doubt it. I guess he probably died.

One interesting brief visit, my boss went to call on the commanding general of the German forces who had an office there in Brussels for a while. He was a good-looking and talented man and spoke good English. He indicated to me that they were not surprised that they had come through, but surprised that everything went so fast. When we asked him about the future, he indicated that without any doubt there would be an invasion of England and that that campaign would take about six weeks.

About three weeks after Dunkirk, four of us drove down there in my car, my wife and I, Frances Willis, and a fellow named Gilbert, who was a consul. When we got within a few miles of the coast, we were struck by the devastation and damage of all British equipment. The ditches on each side of the road were absolutely filled. They'd just driven all these things right next to each other, right -- bang -- into the ditch. I think all of it could have been salvaged, though. Then they made their way on foot the rest of the way.

When we got to Dunkirk itself, it was still smoking in spots from the fires. We, of course, went
to the beach where that miraculous escape had been made. To this day I can't picture quite how it could have happened.

Q: You mean the successful evacuation.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. The only thing that I can see is if the Germans just were so busy and anxious to bypass it, to finish off the French, that they didn't finish off the job. The beach itself had no cover at all. You couldn't hide a mouse on it, let alone 340,000 men. Why the German Air Force couldn't have destroyed the whole thing, I don't know. Certainly the British weren't that strong. The only thing that was left there were some trucks that they drove. The water was very shallow at the coast and slides off very gradually. They drove these big trucks in and turned them sideways and put flags on top and made a couple of piers that went out far enough so that there was maybe four or five feet of water, maybe a little more at high tide, so that some boats bigger than cat boats could get in and take off men. I suppose quite a few went on in. It certainly was a wonderful feat. I think the Germans played that one wrong.

Q: There were no smashing air raids like the Germans did to Rotterdam, were there?

BONBRIGHT: No. The damage was bad at Dunkirk, but nowhere else that we could see along the way. The place was deserted. After looking at the beach, we drove down and crossed the border of France and went a certain distance. We met nobody on the road. We never saw a soldier at any time. The only time we were stopped was when we came back out of France into Belgium. There was a little customs station. I remember one little fellow standing there asking for papers -- useless. But otherwise nothing. History had gone by it.

Q: What about streams of refugees? Or did it happen so quickly, there weren't any streams to go?

BONBRIGHT: That was it. Of course, the Germans were pretty ruthless. They fired up the roads pretty well, so people got out of their way fast. I think it was much worse in France than it was in Belgium.

Q: People heading south toward Vichy.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. In fact, there had been quite a few Americans who had not left when the war started, but when the invasion began, then they wanted to go in a hurry. There was nothing that they could do. At the embassy we organized a train with the help of the embassy in Paris, and with considerable effort, we got a large number out of this thing. Unhappily, it never got beyond the border and was forced to turn back with them all. They weren't hurt, but they were not able to get through.

Q: How did you keep abreast of the news, by radio?

BONBRIGHT: There was nothing in the press to speak of. We'd listen to the BBC. There wasn't much for us to do in those days, but it didn't last terribly long. In July, the Germans decided to get rid of us and ordered us to close the embassy and the consulate. They didn't want us around
when they were going to put their occupation policies in force, didn't want us looking over their shoulder and reporting. So they gave us a date and time table and a route. The only way for us to go was by car. My wife and I each had a car, and everybody else in the embassy had a car, so we formed sort of a caravan. My wife and I loaded up with our two cars and everything that we could carry or need for our trip, and the rest of the stuff we'd been able to get a warehouse in Brussels to store it. I never thought we'd see any of it again, but as it turned out, not a stick of it was ever hurt. We got it all back after the war, untouched.

Q: It wasn't hidden; it was just warehoused?

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: I mean, it wasn't buried underground?

BONBRIGHT: No. Only our shotguns. I buried those for a while under a hen coop. The ambassador, I think, was going back to the States. Frances Willis was reassigned to Switzerland, and I was reassigned to Belgrade. We all started off together and the early part was not very pleasant. A lot of the troops were coming home. This was late July.

Q: The defeated troops?

BONBRIGHT: No, these were jubilant, victorious troops who had been through the fall of France. They were in high spirits, and, of course, through all the villages that we passed, everybody was out cheering them on and throwing flowers at them, which we all found rather offensive. The first night we got to Cologne, spent the night in Cologne in a hotel.

Q: I don't understand. What was your destination?

BONBRIGHT: We were going to Switzerland.

SMITH SIMPSON
Labor Attaché
Brussels (1945-1947)

Smith Simpson entered the Foreign Service after serving on the faculty of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. His career included assignments in Greece, Mexico, India, and Mozambique. Mr. Simpson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy and Ambassador John J. Crowley in 1991.

SIMPSON: So I asked for Brussels, because this, in a very small area, presented a cross section of Europe, economically with agriculture, industry, and mining, politically with Communist, Socialist, Liberal and Conservative parties and socially with all the liberation and post-war problems of the larger countries. Moreover, it was a crossroads. People were going back and
forth between England and Germany, which would help to keep me in touch with many European developments. Added to these features, I could get around, I could get a real feel for the country and what was happening in it and perhaps do something effective with the underground.

So I went to Belgium.

Q: When was that?

SIMPSON: That was in early 1945. I was scheduled to go in November '44, but the Battle of the Bulge occurred. The military said no more civilians; it didn't know whether it was going to be able to hold on to Belgium for a while. That situation didn't clear up and transportation wasn't made available until early '45. As a matter of fact, I left on one of the old Pan American Clippers on Valentine's Day, so that was February 14, 1945.

Q: Were you accompanied by Mrs. Simpson?

SIMPSON: No. Oh, no. No one was allowed except working civilians.

We took off from Baltimore Harbor. When I looked at that old sea plane, I wondered if it was going to be able to make it. But it got into the air and landed us safely in Bermuda for the first night, where we refueled. Then the next day we set off for the Azores, where we were supposed to refuel but were unable to land. "Land" is a poor word for a sea plane, but anyway, we couldn't settle down there because of a heavy swell, so we went on to Lisbon.

And I well remembered that, on the Tagus River about a year before, one of the Clippers had capsized, throwing everybody into the water. A young Foreign Service officer had been aboard. He rescued a young lady who was a passenger, and she turned out to be an actress, so he shortly married her, abandoning his Foreign Service career for a life in Hollywood.

I also was mindful of the fact that one of the planes from Lisbon to Britain had been shot down sometime before, the Germans thinking that Winston Churchill was on board.

Q: Leslie Howard was on board instead.

SIMPSON: And that was the end of Leslie Howard. So I wondered whether I was going to survive this last leg of the journey. But we settled down on the Shannon River in Ireland and then picked up a plane to take us into London. There I had to wait for ongoing transportation to Brussels. Eventually, I got to Brussels, and when I passed across the threshold of the embassy in Brussels, my antennae told me that I wasn't exactly welcomed with wholehearted fervor.

The first question which the embassy wanted to know was whether I represented the AFL or the CIO. It took a little time to reassure them that I was actually a representative of the same government they were and was only interested in serving my government with objective reports and conduct.
Q: Had you actually ever belonged to a labor union?

SIMPSON: No.

Q: You were more of a scholar and an expert in labor law and labor affairs.

SIMPSON: I had what you might call an academic connection. Some of the labor people in Philadelphia, where the University of Pennsylvania is located, wanted me to work closely with them and even to live in one of their housing developments, to bring a little culturization to the working man. I didn't do that. I felt I could be most useful if I were impartial and objective. For the same reason I decided not to join the American Federation of Teachers.

Another interest of the Embassy Brussels was awakened by the fact that I was consulting with employers and employer organizations as well as labor leaders and labor organizations. This greatly mystified them; but it did reassure them in the end. One of my best friends in Belgium, as a matter of fact, was the leading employer of the time in Belgium, Maurice Van der Rest.

Q: Who was the ambassador there then?

SIMPSON: Charles Sawyer. Sawyer was an Ohio businessman, lawyer, politician, and had served as governor of Ohio. So Sawyer well understood the labor factor. There was never any problem in his mind -- as soon as I reassured him that I wasn't either CIO or AFL. And of course this had some influence on the staff.

The first DCM there was Julian Harrington. Julian was quite a remarkable officer. He had came up through the consular branch and his feet were on the ground. He had no pretense, no jealousy of turf, anything of that sort. Julian was a very fine colleague of mine, with a wry sense of humor. This helped, too.

The problem there, personnel-wise, came from the political section and from the economic counselor, who was an old Herbert Hoover trade commissioner. His first foray into foreign affairs had been as a trade commissioner for Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, so he shared the prevailing mentality of the 1920s, when it had all been Keep Cool with Coolidge, and Prosperity Through the Great American Businessman and his Leadership, etc. He was never convinced of the need for a labor attaché and never sympathetic with my work.

Q: In the organization of the embassy, where was your position? Were you independent, or were you in one of these sections?

SIMPSON: They didn't know what to do with me. They didn't know whether I belonged in the political section or the economic, so they asked me, "Well, where would you like to be?"

I said, "It makes no difference to me. As long as I can get my job done, I don't care where you put me."

The political section was just as glad at this reply, and so I wound up in the economic. The
economic counselor never understood why there should be a labor attaché. Nor did he ever understand anything about labor. To him labor was just a problem, a headache, one of those things you had to endure in life.

Q: When Ambassador Kirk came, did that affect your relations there at all?

SIMPSON: No, Kirk was neutral. He was neither for a labor attaché at his embassy nor against him.

But by Kirk's time I had established contacts all over the country. And this was an interesting innovation, too, in the Foreign Service, because no officer in the embassy traveled outside of Brussels except two of us: the agricultural attaché and myself. The rest depended on sources in Brussels. So the agricultural attaché and I were picking up information and insights around the country as to what was going on, what people were thinking and what was brewing, what crisis was likely to erupt next. All of this the embassy recognized as highly useful, which helped to make the labor attaché program more acceptable, although I found out later that acceptance was not reflected in efficiency reports in which old attitudes and prejudices found expression.

When the issue of the King's return reached a climax, I happened to be in Paris attending some conference, probably of labor attachés or maybe the IFTU Congress. I had to get back to Brussels in a hurry because the embassy wanted to know what the labor movement was going to do. The labor movement was threatening to strike if the king came back, and the embassy wanted to know, if this was for real. Getting back to Brussels in a hurry was something of a task, but I won't go into that.

When the war came to an end, the auxiliary was abolished and its labor attaché program terminated. We were offered appointments to the Foreign Service Staff. After things shook out a bit the program entered the Foreign Service itself on a permanent basis, as we attachés received appointments as FSOs through the Manpower Act. I took the oral examination for the Foreign Service in early 1947 and was appointed shortly after I arrived in Greece in May of that year, as our first labor attaché there.

Q: As well as the labor attaché.

SIMPSON: As well as labor attaché.

Q: In Belgium, in my time, there were still a few Communists left in the miners' union. And that's where they were when you were there?

SIMPSON: Yes, they were there. In my time they were active in a number of unions and on a number of fronts throughout the country, including the political. You have to remember that was a transitional period in Belgium and things were very fluid.

One of the films that I used effectively in Belgium was one produced and directed by John Ford on the Tennessee Valley Authority project.
Q: Yes, I know that one.

SIMPSON: You know that one? It's a beautiful film. It showed how a government can, if it's so motivated, use a public works program to educate people and improve their standard of living. This film had a terrific impact on Socialist workers in Belgium. I can remember showing it one time at my house to the leaders of the FGTB, and seeing tears in the eyes of some of the young Socialists from Liege--because this was something of social improvement that a capitalist society would do. It had never occurred to them that capitalism could be that social minded. My educational effort in the labor movement there had an effect not only for the embassy and the United States, but for capitalism itself and the West. We have to remember that European labor movements came out of the underground fed up with war. And how had this war come about? Through fascism and Nazism, and these had developed in capitalist societies, so in their view there was something wrong and rotten about capitalism. In order to orient this emerging underground towards the West, we had to take on this issue of capitalism and show that capitalism could do good things, things that were directed to the elevation of living and labor standards.

RALPH S. SMITH
Political Officer
Brussels (1951-1953)

Ralph S. Smith was born in Yonkers, New York in 1921. He joined the Foreign Service in 1948, retired in 1953 to pursue a career in journalism, and then joined USIA in 1959. His career included positions in Greece, Belgium, and France. Mr. Smith was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1992.

SMITH: From there I went to Brussels, the Embassy in Brussels.

Q: In what capacity?

SMITH: I was Third Secretary, later Second Secretary, in the political section. During my tour in Patras the FSO appointment had finally come through--hence this new assignment. Of course, the way the Foreign Service was set up at that time it was a perfectly normal transition from an information assignment to a diplomatic one; and I've always felt it should have remained that way. It was while I was in Brussels that USIA became a separate agency; and I felt that by putting information people in a different tribe, it placed them at a considerable psychological disadvantage. I remember that our DCM in Brussels--a perfectly kind and decent man, but traditional--privately referred to the USIS staff as "those poor dears," and didn't seem particularly surprised or concerned if they didn't understand Embassy policies.

Incidentally, I might mention that as a junior officer in the political section at Brussels I also served as protocol officer--which had a kind of interesting sequel a few years later.

Q: Was there anything else significant that you would like to talk about regarding your Brussels
SMITH: Well, besides covering Belgian internal affairs, I would say the main subject we dealt with was the project for a European Defense Community -- which of course was eventually vetoed by France.

Robert Lyle Brown entered the Foreign Service in 1944. His career included positions in Morocco, Japan, Taiwan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles S. Kennedy in 1990.

Q: After Kobe, you went to Brussels for four years as chief of the Economic Section.

BROWN: I had been assigned by the Department as assistant commercial attaché in Paris. That was a big Embassy in a nice city. I was thrilled. I came back to Washington, went to briefings, did all the things one does to get ready for their next assignment. Three or four days before we were ready to get on the ship, the head of the Inspection Corps, Ray Miller -- who had inspected in Kobe when I was there -- called me and told me that the Embassy had just put another officer in my job in Paris. I would be therefore the low man on the totem pole and he didn't think that was fair. He had gone to Personnel and had told them that they couldn't do that to me. He had also told them that if Paris wasn't going to give me the assignment that I was supposed to have, it didn't need me. He had in fact negotiated for me to become the chief of the economic section in Brussels and the assistant commercial attaché. He had served in Brussels and thought this was far better assignment. His intervention was a blessing. If it hadn't been for him, my career might have been entirely different. It was a good assignment because while I was there we closed the Foreign Economic mission and I had to pick up the residual responsibilities. The World's Fair took place while I was there and more importantly the establishment of the European Common Market. That presented me with the opportunity of getting the American businessmen adjusted to the new challenges.

Q: Who was the Ambassador then?

BROWN: Fred Alger was the first Ambassador. He was the former Treasurer and Governor of Michigan. He had money and was a political animal. After him came Mr. Clifford Folger of Folger, Knowland and Co, a business firm in Washington, D.C. Although both appointments were political, it worked to my advantage because they felt more comfortable and at ease in talking to someone who knew finance, banking and business. Fortunately, I had a great rapport with both of them.

Q: What were the principal issues you dealt with?
BROWN: One was putting an end to the economic assistance program which surely was becoming redundant but for the recipient was hard to imagine how to manage without it.

Q: How do you put an end to something like that?

BROWN: What you do is to build other bridges that will assure the host government that you are not abandoning them. You get people to business conferences, economic conferences, financial meetings -- you get them to go to the United States -- and then they start to feel secure. As long as you give them things, that was fine. But the Belgians had pride; they were smart; they knew the program had run its course. But we had to convince Washington to have the courage to close the program. We had to suggest to Congressmen when they came through Brussels that maybe the assistance program should end. It was a little campaign. The man who was running the program outranked the Economic Counselor because he was a Minister. That didn't help. We got the Ambassador on our side. We nibbled away, little by little. Some thought that we couldn't discharge the residual responsibilities. They were absorbed with no problem and no big deals. The other aspect -- and this was a real promotion program--was to get Belgian and American businessmen better acquainted. There was in fact a sort of a triangle with the Congo being the third point. Then there was the development of the World's Fair which was a big deal. I was given no money, no authority, no personnel, although the powers-to-be had decided that a World's Fair was an economic matter and had assigned me to pick up the chips. The Kennedy Center in Washington was designed by Edward Stone. It was Stone who did our Embassy in New Delhi. I was acting on behalf of the United States to arrange our participation in the World's Fair. No one in Washington was interested in the very early but necessary preparatory work; it was just added work on somebody's desk -- you had to get legislation and money. It was a bureaucratic problem without much profit. While Washington was doing its thing, I was picking out the site. Ed Stone came out and I met with him. He undertook this initiative pro bono. Our respective wives went into one room; Ed and I met in the dining room. I described to him the Europe as I saw it, including Russian participation in the Fair. The Europeans knew we had lots of money, lots of cars and material things. What we had to show them was that we had some cultural savoir faire, some couth. As I described the situation, he asked what the Pavilion should be like. I remarked the Russians were bringing everything, but an Army tank -- heavy cars, heavy agricultural equipment, etc. They were going to emphasize their "things." We wanted to show another side. It was then that Ed decided the U.S. Pavilion should be light and airy. He designed in rough on the dining room table what was to become the basic outline of the Pavilion. Subsequently I became the Acting U.S. Commissioner-General to the World's Fair. Soon Congressmen were coming to Brussels and Washington moved in. They named a political appointee to be the Commissioner-General, Congress appropriated money and staff was sure to follow. They came and took it all over. I was never subsequently consulted -- as if I hadn't existed.

Another good lesson that I learned was from my experience in Noumea where I worked alone. One doesn't learn from oneself or at least it is the hard way. When I got to Casablanca, we didn't have the greatest Consul Generals of the Service. They were nice gentlemen and I do not mean to demean them, but they were not intellectual giants. In Japan again, I was my own boss; I was given a free rein. I was put in charge of the Osaka office, giving me two offices to worry about. But in Brussels -- the first time I had worked in an Embassy -- I discovered that working under a
smart person, finding out how they operate, how they write, how they set their priorities, how they communicate and then trying to help them to be successful -- you don't have to worry about yourself -- you are really learning and they will make you successful. That was my lesson from my Embassy assignment. I am grateful that I had the other experiences, but there were no career rewards from them except those I had in my memory.

**Q: Who was your mentor in Brussels?**

BROWN: The man who will always stand out in my mind is Charles Adair, who became an Ambassador to the OECD, to Ecuador and to Panama. He was indeed a scholar, a gentleman, knew the priorities, knew when to give you leeway. He became a father figure to me.

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**SHELDON VANCE**

Political Officer

Brussels (1954-1958)

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*Ambassador Sheldon Vance entered the Foreign Service in 1942 after graduating from Harvard Law School. His assignments included positions in Washington, DC, the Congo, Ethiopia, and as ambassador to Zaire. Ambassador Vance was interviewed by Ambassador Arthur Tienken in 1989.*

**Q: Having entered the Foreign Service, you spent a fair amount of your career involved in what was then the Belgian Congo, later Zaire. You first presumably were initiated to Congolese affairs when you became country desk officer for Belgium in 1951. Was there much interest at that time in the then Congo in the Department of State?**

VANCE: Not a great deal, but the fact that the Congo was a very huge country and enormously rich potentially in raw materials interested it mightily to form Belgium to the Belgians. Therefore, I began to learn something about the Congo, although the affairs of the colonies in Africa were then handled by the Bureau of Middle East, South Asian, and African Affairs, rather than the Bureau of European Affairs, where I was. But nonetheless, I began to be exposed to it.

Then having been transferred from Washington to Brussels, where I became chief of the political section in 1954, I had that position from 1954 to 1958. In the very beginning of 1958, I visited the Belgian Congo and Rwanda and Burundi as the aide and translator and advisor to our then ambassador to Belgium, Clifford Folger. We spent five weeks touring the three colonies. That resulted in my really being bitten by the Africanist bug. I was fascinated by what I saw.

**Q: What were your chief impressions during that visit?**

VANCE: There was a very paternalistic policy on the part of the Belgians. The then Governor General, briefed the ambassador and me when we arrived in Leopoldville the very first days of January 1958. He explained to us that the Belgian policy was that they were going to wait to give self-government to the Congolese until they had educated a very large percentage of the
population, in order, said he, to avoid the mistake that had been made, in their opinion, by the British and the French and the Portuguese, who had educated a small elite, then at independence, which had already begun in the early sixties, a dictatorship of the small elite. They were going to avoid that. So here he was talking to us in January 1958, and saying that Belgium would be there as the colonial power for a number of years. They had just had the first very minor elections about a month before we arrived, in about eight or ten communes or sections of major cities. A gentleman by the name of [Joseph] Kasavubu had been elected burgomaster of one of the communes. When I discovered that the Belgian hosts did not intend for the ambassador to meet any Congolese, I advised the ambassador, and he insisted that he meet the elected burgomasters of the Leopoldville area. I therefore met the gentleman who later became the first president of the Congo, Mr. Kasavubu. That was the last encounter that the ambassador or I had with the Congolese, other than as servants, during the remaining five weeks of our visit.

Q: Your time both as desk officer in Washington and your position as chief of the political section in the embassy at Brussels spanned a period of time when U.S. policy towards evolving Africa was being developed. One of the things that a great deal was made of was the fact that the United States had not been a colonial power, as opposed to European countries. At what point in time did you begin to detect a definite individual policy on the part of the United States towards the evolving African countries?

VANCE: It was developing very slowly. I think one of the reasons was that we had a relatively small number of Foreign Service officers stationed in colonial Africa, and also Africa was part of the Middle East and South Asian bureau. That, I think, tended to give a lower priority, I believe, in the minds of senior officials in our government because of the tinderbox type of situation that has been in the Middle East for many years. I didn't detect a great deal of interest in what Ambassador Folger and I had seen and learned in the Congo on the part of the Department of State after we returned to Brussels.

Q: There was a school of thought, if I remember correctly, at that time that the United States tended to support the European colonial powers as a general thesis. Would you call that valid?

VANCE: I believe there was a certain amount of validity to it. I think the United States was in favor of stability and careful transition so that wild-eyed revolutionaries, communists, would not ensconce themselves in the former African colonies.

ARThUR T. TIEKEN
Economic Officer
Brussels (1955-1960)

Q: I would like to just concentrate there on your view of Africa. I mean, how did you see Belgians looking at their African possessions, which were extensive at that time?

TIENKEN: The Belgians were fairly authoritarian in Africa as well. Their colonial system wasn't quite as strict as the Portuguese, but it was fairly strict. But the Belgians, unlike the Portuguese, had a little money. And the Congo was a wealthy, comparatively speaking, colony as opposed to Mozambique, which was not. So they had done a fair amount of exploitation, I think is the proper word. But they had also given the Congo a certain amount in return such as infrastructure. What they hadn't done to speak of, was to given them any political education.

And the time I was in Brussels, I was more interested in the economic side of the house, copper and that sort of thing. The embassy as a whole was also interested in the beginnings of the political developments in the Congo. But there wasn't very much you could put your finger on other than there was obviously restlessness that was building up because it was also building up elsewhere in Africa, particularly in the French colonies. The embassy tended to see the Congo in terms of Belgian interests, as opposed to the Department, which saw it more in terms of emerging nationalism and individual and independent countries in those days. And as a result, the embassy in Brussels did not necessarily see eye to eye with those in the Department, of which Fred Hadsel was one, who were interested more in political developments and eventual moves toward independence.

Q: Was there any effort on our part to sort of nudge the Belgians and say you are not educating these Congolese or Rwandese? Because we did have the example of both the French and the British, who had rather extensive nativization programs, if you want to call it, or something, but at least they were having quite a few of the people coming back and getting degrees and all this.

TIENKEN: I think the short answer to that is no. We didn't, to the best of my memory, encourage the Belgians to educate the Congolese, for example. I think you probably know at the time of independence, there weren't more than twenty to thirty Congolese who had ever received more than a high school education. They were basically an uneducated country. But we hadn't made any move, to the best of my knowledge, to encourage the Belgians to do that.

On political terms, the French were the best of the lot in training the Africans in political developments. The British did some of it, but the French were much better at it.

NANCY OSTRANDER
Administrative Officer, Consular Officer
Antwerp (1957-1960)

Born in Indiana in 1925, Ambassador Nancy Ostrander received her BA from Butler University. She was posted in Santiago de Cuba, Havana, The Hague, Antwerp, Mexico City and Kingston and was the Ambassador to Suriname. On May 14, 1986 she was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin.
Q: So you then became an FSO-6.

OSTRANDER: I was to remain where I was until they found a job for me, and it was the following year. I, of course, was dreaming of tropical climes. It was wonderful. Nobody asked where I wanted to go, and I kind of liked that because it just sort of leaves you thinking it could be anywhere. When the cable finally arrived, it was a direct transfer to Antwerp, Belgium, which was eighty miles down the road.

Q: Same climate. [Laughter]

OSTRANDER: The one thing that I had liked about The Hague was that when I came on the train up from Paris, from arriving on the boat, I would go through Antwerp and I would look out the window and say to myself, "This looks like Pittsburgh and at least I don't have to live here."

Q: "Thank God I'm not there." [Laughter]

OSTRANDER: Exactly. I remember that "Doc" Matthews had left The Hague and we had a new ambassador, whose name was Philip Young. He was head of the Civil Service Commission, a political appointee. Ambassador Young came to my goodbye party, and nobody had told him where I was going. He was a new arrival, and he gave the longest, saddest speech about how sad it was to lose friends that you had just met, and we would probably never run into each other again in this big, wide world, and people tried to judge him, to get him to stop, but he didn't. Finally, he said, "Where is it you're going?" I told him, and he said, "Then you're going to come back for lunch?"

I said, "Yes, and I intend to do so often." [Laughter]

So I moved down to Antwerp, where I was to be administrative officer.

Q: So you were admin. Before we get there, could you just fill me in on what was the time frame for this language examination and so forth? Do you recall when you took that? You took that examination back when you were in The Hague.

OSTRANDER: Yes, and it would have been just at the time they were announcing the Wriston program.

Q: 1955 or so, maybe? It finished in '56, that I remember.

OSTRANDER: Maybe the end of '55 or sometime during '55. Then, of course, they would have had the results of that. Then the promotion list would probably have been drawn up, but not announced yet, about the middle of '56. Then I went on home leave, so they got me when I came on home leave. So it looks very much like they knew what they were doing in those days.

Q: Sure did. When you went on home leave, do you recall when that was? When you had your first home leave? Was that in the spring of '56 or the summer of '56?
OSTRANter: Yes, because I went on direct transfer and sailed in July of '54, and was expecting leave the next year, but they lost things. I complained, so they sent me on home leave in April of '56. So it must have been in about July of '56. When did the Andrea Dorea go down? I was at sea when the Andrea Dorea went down.

Q: On your way back?

OSTRANter: Yes. It was pretty awful to think of.

Q: That was July 1956, because I was coming back from Japan and we heard about that while we were at sea.

OSTRANter: I was on the Atlantic and you were on the Pacific. I remember that when we arrived in Le Havre. Wasn't it the France that picked up the survivors? I saw the France and realized then that she was on her way to pick up the survivors. We crossed at sea. Ships that pass in the night.

Q: Now we've got you in Antwerp and you are an admin officer.

OSTRANter: An admin officer, which I knew nothing about, either! [Laughter] It was kind of a nice transfer, because as soon as I knew I was going to Antwerp, I got in the car and drove down there and started looking for a place to live, and found one. I was able to go back and forth. It was new apartment and nobody was in it, so I was able to measure for the curtains. The only time I was ever able, really, to arrive at a place knowing what to do about the furniture and whether the rugs would fit and all that sort of thing.

Q: You were dragging your own things around, of course.

OSTRANter: Oh, yes.

Q: Did you have enough allowance, or was that ever a problem for you? Single people, I understand, sometimes do have a problem.

OSTRANter: I used to watch it on books a lot, because at that time, for a single person, if you had too many books, you weren't going to have a bed to sleep in. [Laughter] So I always kept the book population down. Otherwise, I had rented a furnished apartment in Havana; I got to The Hague without really having any furniture, and I got a furnished place there. So Belgium was going to be the first unfurnished place that I had, and I was kind of picking up everybody's castoffs. Then I did buy some Danish furniture in the Netherlands on one of those deals where you didn't have to pay the import duty.

Q: From the catalog?

OSTRANter: Yes. I still have it! Good stuff, teak things. They're light and they can come apart, too, for shipping. They look pretty good no matter where you go. They're plain enough so that if you use the dining room table in the breakfast room it's fine.
Q: You mentioned that you drove down to Antwerp. You had an automobile?

OSTRANDER: I bought my first car, a 1954 Hillman, hardtop convertible, $1,100.

Q: Was that the Minx?

OSTRANDER: The Minx. I had to borrow all the money for it. The Dutch do not approve of borrowing for anything, and to have a woman borrowing was just almost all they could put up with. I had to get all these letters from the embassy proving that I did have a job, and they worked out a two-year method for me to pay for it, and I had to go into American Express every month and give [the payment to] a man I called "Piggy," because he just hated me for getting this loan. I finally paid that loan off in something like thirteen months; I couldn't stand going in to "Piggy." But I hated owing money. I have never borrowed for a car since. I have always had the money before I bought it. I didn't even buy a pair of stockings in those months without thinking, "Oh, I should be putting this on the car. I'll never do that again as long as I live."

Q: I'm surprised a Dutch bank would give it to you.

OSTRANDER: Well, apparently I was the exception. I wonder how many underwriters I had at the American Embassy. Probably the whole U.S. Government's aid. [Laughter] Because they sure didn't want to do it.

Q: Do you think it was because you were a woman? Plus they don't believe in borrowing.

OSTRANDER: They just don't believe in borrowing to buy something like that. You would save your money in a sock somewhere, I guess. This was 1954, of course. Just buying things on credit was not a Dutch thing to do. I suspect it still isn't.

Q: Did you enjoy Antwerp?

OSTRANDER: I loved Antwerp! I spent four years there, after dragging my feet, thinking I was going to this dull place, and I just had a wonderful time. It was a marvelous group of people. What can I tell you? Well, I spent two years being an admin officer, and I think the bottom line of that is I was never cut out to be an admin officer.

Q: What did you do?

OSTRANDER: Everything. This is anything that's in an admin section, from general services, to budget and fiscal, to security, to anything you'd think of in the way of administration. I had a big section of about thirteen locals, if you include the servants of the consul general. So it was a big section.

Q: Were you called a GSO?

OSTRANDER: I was called the administrative officer. That's it.
Q: You were "it?"

OSTRANDER: There wasn't anybody else.

Q: What a wonderful opportunity!

OSTRANDER: Yes, it was, except you never please more than 90 percent of the people at best, and I got tired of this after a while. No matter what you did, somebody was--

Q: Carping.

OSTRANDER: The salary and expenses, all the personnel work, the local program. Whew! It was a plateful. Of course, Antwerp was the port at that time for Western Europe. I think it's probably switched on up to Rotterdam later.

Q: More than Le Havre was?

OSTRANDER: Oh, yes. It was the port. All household effects for all Western Europe came through there. We had a very busy office. Also, this was 1957, now; 1958 was the Brussels Fair, so, of course, we had all of the things coming for the fair. So we really had a big job to do.

Q: Did you have to handle the automobiles?

OSTRANDER: All the automobiles.

Q: Ambassadors' and all?

OSTRANDER: Exactly. All of that.

Q: That's an awful big job.

OSTRANDER: It was. And for your first job. It did teach me that I never wanted to go near administrative work again. [Laughter] A consul general, whose wife wanted to redecorate the entire house and kept changing her mind about it; I really got the administrative tasks. What would you call it? Being thrown into the fire. That's all there was to it. But it was very interesting. I wouldn't change it for anything. However, after two years they were trying to find a consular officer. Antwerp did all of the immigrant work for Luxembourg and all of Belgium. There were no immigrant offices in Brussels. Brussels did diplomatic visas and tourist visas. Of course, Luxembourg did its own. The rest of it was Antwerp. It was a good consular job and you had a terrific staff. When they couldn't find a consular officer, I let Washington know that if they could find another administrative officer, to go ahead and do that, and I would be happy to move. And that's just what happened. Don Tice was sent. Don came as junior officer, administrative officer; his first post. We had a grand group in the consulate itself, which was very small. There were thirteen locals in the administrative section, but I think all-told, there were thirteen Americans there, too, and a lot of single people and young-married. We would all just sort of get
together and go out to dinner about three or four times a week. Had a wonderful time. Just the other night we had an Antwerp Night here, and a bunch of us got together and went out to dinner.

Q: What's coming through here very clearly is how much you enjoyed your life and the people you met.

OSTRANDER: Is it? Because it really is quite true. Antwerp stands out to me not only for the work there, which I did like, and the people, but also because of Brussels' World Fair of 1958. What a marvelous thing! Besides getting all of this stuff in and out and setting up the fair and working very closely with it, we were each given a pass to the fair and a ticket for each theatrical function. We never missed a one, so we saw the best of Broadway every night. It was just a dream! Immediately after work, we would get in our cars (it was about a half hour away) and drive to the fairgrounds, park in the diplomatic section, have dinner at the Czechoslovakian Pavilion or the Japanese, whatever we felt like eating. I remember we always went to the Czech place for beer because they had good pilsner beer. I'm not a beer drinker, but that was out of this world. Then we would go for after-dinner coffee to the Turkish Pavilion. We just had a ball. Then, of course, to the plays. I remember Carousel. It was a summerlong of just all the best that Broadway could put on, and it was marvelous. My season ticket, next to me was Peter Townsend, if you remember.

Q: Indeed, very well.

You had trouble with some of the families, I believe.

OSTRANDER: The families, of course, and I suppose that's always the case, to try to get the families to understand that it's an ugly picture and not to come and expect to find the remains of their dear ones looking as if they had died peacefully in bed and an undertaker had laid them out. It's not going to happen. They are not realistic about it and cannot understand what you're trying to tell them.

Q: Didn't you say that one man wanted to see--

OSTRANDER: Right. He brought his children. There was no way to stop him from wanting the coffin opened. Then he was so upset. How had I allowed him to do this? And you wish you'd had a tape recording of all the begging and pleading. "Do not do this." But I learned a lot through consular work as to what next-of-kins expect and how unrealistic they are. I suppose there is an art. There must be a very diplomatic art as to how to tell them what to expect, without being terribly blunt, but sometimes you have to be very, very blunt. I did learn that it's a Pollyanna-sounding sort of thing, but what a consular officer just try to provide in the way of services for American citizens who get in trouble overseas, you must look at the citizen who is in trouble and try to think of that person as the person who is nearest and dearest to you, and ask yourself, "What would I want the consul to do for my husband, for my wife, for my mother?" This sort of thing. That sounds, as I say, very Pollyanna-ish, but that is exactly what they're expecting, and you shouldn't lose sight of that. You should try to provide that as best you can. I have spent a lot of time in my career as a consular officer writing back, telling people what the funeral services
were like, describing everything from the church service to the burial, this sort of thing. I don't think I've ever gotten many thanks for that. People seem to think that's what is owing to them. There have been a few who have said "thank you," but I think mighty few. Mighty few, indeed. That goes over a long career of consular work. You get so you don't expect it, and it's always a good surprise. But, you know, I put myself in their place, too, and I think I would understand that somebody had gone out of their way.

Q: Exactly.

OSTRANIDER: They never seem to see it. They hate what has happened and have to take it out on somebody. What they want to do is take it out on the American government. Somebody has got to be to blame, and you happen to be the American government, so you're going to take it. I think that's too bad.

Q: Did you ever have welfare cases where American people were stranded and came in and expected you to put up money?

OSTRANIDER: Oh, that's daily, absolutely daily.

Q: Where do you suppose they get that idea?

OSTRANIDER: They pay their taxes. This is what they say. "I always heard that if I got in trouble, the American government would take care of me." There are, of course, loans, but loans in desperation. Mainly what you do is, "Who can I get in touch with to send you money from your family?"

Q: Where is the money from in the fund for the desperation loans?

OSTRANIDER: The government does provide, I think, a pittance that you have to repay if you're ever going to get another passport, this sort of thing. I'm not really up on this because I haven't done consular work in many, many, many years. That's where the work-a-ways would come in handy. But you've got to exhaust all possibilities of getting any money before you can make a loan. There are very, very few people who don't have other ways, that there isn't somebody that they can contact and get some money from. But, also, if you're lucky, if you're in a city where there's a large American colony, they often have a fund that the American consul can draw on for particularly worthy cases, but they're not going to support some bum, that's for sure. There are worthy cases, and in Antwerp I had that. In Mexico City, we had it.

Q: People who are starving, in other words?

OSTRANIDER: Yes, and even then there are church groups in Antwerp. Also there was a seamen's association, so if these people were people who had missed their ships or something like that, they could be helped out. Church groups. The Salvation Army would usually take somebody for a few days for next to nothing. A good consular officer, of course, is always well connected with those groups.
Q: **Did you yourself have to go down to the port and do things for seamen who were in trouble?**

OSTRANDE: In Antwerp we were very lucky. We had a Coast Guard officer assigned. The U.S. Coast Guard had an office in Le Havre, I think, and also in Antwerp. I think that office later moved to Rotterdam. I can remember one case that a seaman, who was in jail--and I never went to see those; I always sent the Coast Guard, because they understood the cases--I can remember one case in particular where the seaman did not want to see anybody from the U.S. Coast Guard; he wanted the consul. He didn't ant to talk to anybody who knew anything about the sea. I suspect that's it. Or about his case. But I remember when I walked in, he said, "Oh, my God, it's a woman! Send me back the Coast Guard officer." This was early on, as you can recall, and he wasn't prepared for that at all.

As usual, if you get consular officers talking about consular cases, it can go on forever, because you never have the same one twice--ever.

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**WILLIAM C. SHERMAN**
Belgium/Luxembourg Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1958-1960)

William C. Sherman was born in Kentucky in 1923 and raised in Pennsylvania and Ohio. He attended the University of Louisville until he joined the U.S. Navy in 1943. His career included positions in Korea, Japan, Italy, as well as other State Department positions in Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on October 27, 1993.

Q: **You left INR in September, 1958. I gather you could hardly wait to get out. How did you manage to be assigned to the Belgium-Luxembourg desk?**

SHERMAN: I was delighted to leave INR. My reassignment was probably the responsibility of John Burns, who had inspected me in Yokohama. I therefore knew him as a friend. He was in 1958 the Executive Director for the Bureau for European Affairs. When the Belgium desk was about to become vacant, I think that John suggested that I be assigned to it. I knew nothing about what was going on. One day, Bill Magistretti called me into his office and said: "As you probably know, there are some efforts being made to assign you to the Belgium desk". I could barely believe my ears; I had never heard of such a plan and furthermore I thought that my chances would not be very good since I knew nothing about Belgium and had no special qualifications for the job. I was not unhappy to go to EUR, but it certainly came as a major surprise. I don't know that Bill ever believed me, but I had nothing to do with that assignment. I only found out later that it was John Burns who had suggested the transfer, based on his review of my performance in Yokohama and later.

Q: **Let me ask you about the structure of EUR in 1958. Who was the Assistant Secretary? What was its structure?**
SHERMAN: The Assistant Secretary was Livingston Merchant. The Bureau was organized around European regions: West Europe, East Europe, North Europe, etc. We also had an Office of Regional Affairs, headed by Lane Timmons. The Soviet desk, also part of the East Europe Office, operated as a self-contained unit. It took care of its own personnel and operated pretty much independently of all levels below Assistant Secretary. The Office of Western Europe (WE) was headed by Bob McBride, who succeeded Tully Tolbert when the latter went to Rome as the Political Counselor. WE was divided into sections: Italian-Iberian Affairs, Benelux and Switzerland Affairs, French Affairs. In the Benelux section, we had an officer-in-charge, an economic officer, a desk officer for Belgium-Luxembourg and another for Holland-Switzerland.

I had to bring myself up to speed on Benelux affairs in a hurry because shortly after I took over the desk, King Baudouin visited the United States. I suspect that it was the first time that any senior level of the U.S. government had to become knowledgeable about Belgian affairs. Belgium was a small country, but I found it very interesting. I had a lot of fun on that desk.

Belgium and Luxembourg did not have a very high priority on the list of foreign policy issues facing the Bureau of European Affairs or even the Office of Western European Affairs. De Gaulle was at his orneriest forcing the Office Director and Deputy Director to focus essentially on France. After that, for them, the important agenda items concerned Italy and the Iberian Peninsula. Benelux did not appear on their screen very often. Our division ran itself, largely unsupervised. So, as an FSO-4, I was left pretty much to my own devices.

The Belgian and Luxembourg Embassies in Washington were accustomed to dealing with the desk officer. Their Ambassadors did not demand to see the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary every time they had a request. We at the desk officer level were able to handle most of their concerns. The Belgian Ambassador, Bobby Silvercruys, rarely came to the Department. At one point, he was the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, a position which goes to the ambassador with the longest service in Washington. He had married Rosemarie McMahon, the widow of the late Senator. So he knew his way around town quite well and didn't really need the Department's assistance. Occasionally he might wish to see Bob Murphy, the Under Secretary, or another high level Department official. On those occasion, I would accompany the Ambassador on his call, but that was the extent of the services we had to provide the Belgian Ambassador.

The Luxembourg Ambassador changed while I was on the desk. George Heisbourg, who had been the principal secretary of the Foreign Ministry, came as the Ambassador from Luxembourg. He went about making all his calls, which we had arranged for him. I accompanied him to these meetings. He could not have been nicer. We were frequent dinner guests at his Embassy. The Luxembourgers were known for their pro-American attitude and were always warmly received wherever they went. I made one trip to Luxembourg and Belgium at the end of a fiscal year to use up some leftover funds. I spent a week in Belgium and three or four days in Luxembourg. When you walk passed the Foreign Ministry in Luxembourg, the windows were wide open; anyone could have reach in and taken all the papers off the a desk. I, a lowly desk officer, called on the Prime Minister one morning. In the afternoon, I attended a parliament session and sat in the VIP gallery. The Prime Minister walked in, looked up and waved at us. Luxembourg was very casual.
Of course, there is a long history of US-Luxembourg relationships, made immemorial by Perle Mesta. Even before that, we had as Charge a career Foreign Service officer, George Platt Waller. He was "crown happy" as Wiley Buchanan used to describe him. He emphasized his relationship with the Grand Duchess, not just the Duchess. He used to caution everyone to use the correct title for the lady. He wrote a despatch that was preserved at the FSI for a long time in which he described at some length the extreme conditions that were imposed on Luxembourg when it was invaded by the Nazis. He stayed there, maintaining a presence. We often read George Platt Waller's despatches because they were so typical of an era long past. In one, he wrote; "To the Honorable Secretary of State: Sir: I have the honor to report that yesterday the remains of St. John the Blind, were returned to their historical resting place, the Cathedral in the Grand Square of Luxembourg City. As the Department will recall, St. John the Blind died in 1539........I remain your obedient servant, George Platt Waller”. That was his style and he was one of the last to write that way!

It was these episodes that led me to say that "I had fun on the desk". I had some contacts with other agencies, but they were somewhat limited. For example, when the French Defense Minister came, I took him over to call on the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy. Then Colonel Vernon “Dick “ Walters was the translator. I became acquainted with some of the other agencies when I took Ambassador Heisbourg around on his calls. The government had not at that time established a Country Director system so that my contacts with other agencies were somewhat limited.

One event that I can still recall was the tenth anniversary celebration of NATO. The headquarters were still in Paris. The anniversary celebration was held here in Washington and was attended by all the head of governments. That was a major event, which kept us busy for some weeks.

DONALD C. TICE
Administrative Officer, Consular Officer
Antwerp (1959-1961)

*Born in Kansas in 1932, Mr. Tice received his BS from the University of Kansas and served in the U.S. Air Force from 1954 to 1956 as a second lieutenant. His foreign assignments included Antwerp, Montreal, Sofia and Belgrade. He was interviewed on February 10, 1997 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

Q: So then you went to Antwerp in 1960?

TICE: I left Washington in November, 1959, on the SS UNITED STATES, bound for Le Havre, France. Nobody had ever told us that you should avoid crossing the North Atlantic Ocean in November of the year. [Laughter]

Q: You were in Antwerp from 1959 to 1961. What was your assignment?

TICE: I was first assigned as a Consular Officer, but they did a little shuffle at the post and I wound up as Administrative Officer for the first year [1960]. Then I was assigned as the Passport
Officer in the Consular Section for the second year. That really was fascinating for me, because this was a time when our passport and citizenship laws were such that they provided that a naturalized citizen lost American nationality if he or she didn't lived in the United States for "x" number of years after naturalization before going overseas, and all that kind of thing. Along with Haifa, Israel, Antwerp had been the center in Europe of the diamond trade. There were many, many Jews living in Antwerp. When the Nazi-directed "holocaust" was descending on Europe, they decamped to a third center of the diamond industry in the New World, in New York. Many of them stayed in New York for five years, or long enough to be naturalized as American citizens. Then they came back to Antwerp. There was an effort made to try to "catch" people who had come back to Europe on a permanent basis at that time, after naturalization in the United States. We called them "passport citizens." I always had a very uneasy feeling about that period because our instructions were to pick up the United States passports of anybody who had lived abroad for "x" number of years if they were presented at the Consulate. Then the case would be adjudicated by the Department. I felt a great sense of relief, years later, when that whole set of laws was "wiped out" by the Supreme Court. People whose passports I had taken up could then get them back. [Laughter]

Q: That was very difficult. I assume that the people in Antwerp who were involved in this kind of situation would present certificates from doctors that they couldn't leave, and that sort of thing.

TICE: Oh, yes. They would try to prove that they had been back to the U. S. and this kind of thing, but there was no notation to this effect in their passports. You remember, in the old days the immigration officials used to stamp entries into the U. S. in your passports.

Q: Could you talk a little about the Consulate General in Antwerp?

TICE: Yes. It had been one of our major Consulates in Europe because of the events of World War II. When the invasion of Normandy took place [in June, 1944], there were two ports which were candidates for the huge movements of incoming materials for the rest of the campaign in Europe. One was Rotterdam, and the other one was Antwerp. The Allies didn't have enough anti-aircraft defenses to cover both ports against the low level, "buzz bombs" fired by the Germans. These were called "V-1" bombs [or “Vengeance weapons," as the Germans called them]. So the Allies concentrated anti-aircraft guns around Antwerp, the more modern of the two ports, and it suffered only minor damage during the V-1 campaign. Lightly-defended Rotterdam was heavily damaged as a result. The result of that decision was that Antwerp and Brussels were two of the "best defended" cities in all of Europe. Even as late as late 1959 and 1960 Europe was still pretty much in a recovery phase. However, Belgium, with less recovering to do and the revenues created by having the only fully-functioning port in Northern Europe, had the highest cost of living in Europe at that time. Although it was a nice place to live, the "down side" was that a junior Foreign Service Officer like myself found it hard to make ends meet. By that time I was making, I think, about $4800 a year.

Q: Who was the Consul General when you were there?

TICE: That's another story. George Falconer Wilson had been Administrative Assistant to Senator William Knowland [Republican, California], who was Chairman, I think, of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in a Republican-controlled Congress. Wilson was one of the "triumvirate" who came into the State Department to "clean out the communists." They included Scott e, who "found" the "communists" as head of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs; George Wilson, who was then Chief of Personnel and "fired" them, and Frances Knight, Chief of the Passport Office, who kept them from traveling.

Wilson had finally been "exiled" to Antwerp as Consul General. He was basically not a "mean" person. He was just ideologically so far off to the Right that he was a little "weird." However, his wife was really "mean." [Laughter] I remember one time sitting in their house, drinking too much, and listening to them talk about how Dean Rusk [then Secretary of State] was a communist. This was a "disturbing" experience for a junior Foreign Service Officer.

We survived two years at the Consulate General in Antwerp [1959-1962]. However, the Department was still having trouble getting people assigned onward. I left Antwerp with no onward assignment. I was told by the Department: "Well, go on home leave, and we'll have an assignment for you at that time." I repeated a request that I had made before. I said that I came into the Foreign Service with the idea of concentrating on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I made it clear that that was what I wanted. I had a telephone call while I was on home leave in Kansas in which the person who talked to me said: "Well, we have an assignment for you. It's to the Consulate General in Montreal [Canada]." I was again assigned as Administrative Officer. I said: "Well, all right, I'll go to Montreal but if I don't get Eastern European or Russian language training in an onward assignment following that, I'm going to resign." What effect that had on anybody I had no idea. My comment probably went into the personnel record. However, 18 months later I was sitting, fat, dumb, and happy and having fun in Montreal, because it's a marvelous place to live. I got a telephone call saying: "You have four weeks to finish up in Montreal and get down to Washington for Bulgarian language training." [Laughter]

Q: I'd like to go quickly back to Antwerp before we leave it. Could you describe the political situation in Belgium from your perspective and how you dealt with the Belgians?

TICE: This assignment was during the early days of the Flemish and French cultural and particularly linguistic difficulties in Antwerp. I suppose that Antwerp was about 80 percent Flemish, although I don't have at my fingertips the statistics on the matter. Certainly, Antwerp was heavily Flemish, and there was a lot of tension. The situation wasn't "nasty," though there were occasional demonstrations. You would hear a lot of snide remarks among the French about the Flemish, who worked in most of the shops, stores, and that kind of thing. If you spoke to them in French, they wouldn't respond or would respond in Flemish or English, because they seemed always to be able to figure out that we were Americans. They would rather speak English with us than French. I learned a little Flemish, but not much. I had trouble practicing my French there. There was a hidebound, holdout group of French speakers, composed of Walloons [French speaking Belgians] and Francophiles.

There was an organization called the American-Belgian Association which was sort of the social center for many of the diplomats assigned to Antwerp. Not surprisingly, it was very anti-Flemish and very much run by the Walloons. This was quite an experience for my wife and myself because it was supposedly a "high society pick-up joint." [Laughter]
Q: Did you have the feeling that the Consul General and other senior officers were caught up in dealing with the "high society" in Antwerp, which sort of absorbed the consular officers there? This often happens when you get into one of these things.

TICE: Yes. That was very much the case with the senior officers in the Consulate General, who were part of the "elite" in the town. No question about that. To a lesser degree, young couples in our Consulate General got invited to social events in "high society" in Antwerp. It was a pleasant existence.

We did have something called the Vice-Consular Corps, which, in effect, was another club. Its members were all pretty hard-working consular officers who were busily involved with the port and that kind of thing. That was where the "real fun" was, because most of us were under 30. We had a lot of fun at the monthly "bashes" at the Vice-Consular Corps.

Q: What about problems with seamen and all of that? Did you get involved with seamen's problems?

TICE: Very much so, signing them on and off and disciplinary problems on the ships. There were also problems with indigent Americans coming through, looking for "handouts" and that kind of thing. That was a good part of my activity.

Q: How did you deal with seamen? Could you get the Belgian authorities to help you do things?

TICE: Oh, yes. Handling these matters was actually fairly simple because, if you had a "beached" seaman on your hands, you didn't give him any money. We arranged with the Scandinavian Seamen's Home, where it cost $0.75 a day for a seaman to live until he got another ship. They had very strict rules. A seaman had to be out of the Home at 8:00 AM and couldn't come back until 6:00 PM. He had to be in by 9:00 PM. We had been able to set up a fund to cover this. I ponied up the $0.75 a day to keep a seaman there but never gave them any money, because they would just drink it up or take off on a spree. It was interesting work.

Q: Were there any "protection and welfare" cases that particularly come to mind?

TICE: No really "wild" ones. During a fair part of my time doing consular work in Antwerp, I was responsible for somebody in jail. The only "protection and welfare" case that really gave me fits involved a prominent judge from Hawaii and his wife, who were visiting Antwerp. He died unexpectedly. In his will he had said that he wanted to be cremated, and his widow wanted to follow through on that. However, there were no facilities for cremation in Belgium at the time. I had to make all the arrangements to send the body to Germany to be cremated. We had the judge's widow on our hands for the several days that took. She sort of became part of my family. We had lunch or dinner with her nearly every day and persuaded others in the American community to give us a hand in keeping her occupied and as content as could reasonably be expected. This was sort of "what you did." [Laughter]
Howard Meyers was born in New York on May 5, 1917. He attended the University of Michigan, where he received his AB in 1937, and Harvard Law School, where he received his LLB in 1940. He served in the US Army in World War II from 1942 to 1946. His career has included positions in Japan, England, Belgium, and Switzerland. He was interviewed by Peter Moffat on March 31, 2000.

MEYERS: It was one of the glorious experiences that I had in all my time abroad, although I had something somewhat similar the second time I was in Japan, many, many years later. Anyhow, I ended my London tour more than abruptly. I didn’t realize but there had been long discussions going back and forth between London and Brussels and Washington. Walton Butterworth insisted that I was the man that he wanted for a couple of practical reasons and nobody else, and there was some dispute over my fair body as a result. The European Communities, as they then were, had moved to Brussels for the first time. The U.S. Mission was the executor of a very complicated and as I thought far too ambitious program for nuclear cooperation with the EURATOM Commission, in power reactor development. It was a strange business. The French opposed this strongly. They didn’t oppose a program, but they did oppose the extent of this program. They did that for their own reasons, but in the end I came to think that the French were right, not for their reasons, but for our reasons. So I was not the most popular member of the U.S. Mission. At any rate I had one week’s notice to get from London to Brussels, to be there by the first of August.

Now anybody who knows Europe knows that there is nothing going on the first of August! Almost everybody, almost all the senior representative officials, anyway, are off on their own holidays. But I was a personnel problem, because of the level at which this had been discussed and particularly because my revered Loy Henderson was involved and our Administrative Counselor, Mace was his name, wanted to avoid problems for him. So off I went and I said to the Administrative Counselor in my departure, “I will be consulting with the damn files!” and that is what I did, for that month. But we made it through. I paid more for the storage of my goods than the State Department did. This is why I have always had a reserved view about the administrative side of the State Department, but I leave that to one side. Brussels was a marvelous place to be at that time. I saw the city change from a provincial city to a vibrant, culturally, artistically, politically interesting place. I very much enjoyed meeting the people that I saw there. The extent to which, for example, the Germans sent the finest career people you could imagine, including people like descendants of the Von Moltkes, who had been hung up from meat hooks by the Nazis - that is a serious comment, it’s not an idle description. The quality of the other delegations, particularly the French, who had simply superb people...

Q: Who was the American?

MEYERS: Walton Butterworth.
Q: *Through your whole time there?*

MEYERS: Yes. The collegiality, almost, of relationships between members of the European Communities delegations and the central representatives, that is to say central in the sense of not the missions of the countries, but the staff of the five, as they were then, European Community authorities, the collegiality between these groups and ourselves was very marked. Even when we disagreed, for example, with the French, and I had a couple of, to me, absolutely hilarious negotiations with the French - they could not see the forest in some instances because of the trees of their singular approach to the relationship between the European Communities and the United States, that being the forest and the trees being the basic interests - but there was a real sense of community, of collegiality, because it was so clear that the United States was, I think objectively, the strongest supporter of the European Community concept of any state not a member of the Community.

I saw this from two sides, because the British were negotiating to join and they had a very distinguished team known as the Flying Knights, because they had all been knighted by the British government, as it does to recognize seniors who are professionals and distinguished. One of them was a very close friend of mine, so that we saw him regularly when he came over from London. We entertained him and he entertained us. Indeed I communicate even today with his daughter, who was my daughter’s closest friend and who is the wife of the European Community representative to the United Nations’ offices in Geneva. Time does pass. I think that my description of our relationships with the concept of the European Communities is an objectively fair one. I did think and unfortunately probably for me it was described in a few official communications, that the relatively small group in our State Department which was pushing ahead so strongly in support of the European Community was moving ahead too fast too hard, and they were wrong, simply wrong in thinking that the European Community would rather quickly become a United States of Europe. Since everybody knows who these people were and two of them I regarded as friends, I won’t mention them.

I think this was a genuine failure to appreciate that, at that time, the European Community was simply an expanded customs union. The difficulties which exist today, in my view, of enabling an adequate balance of power between different sides, different groupings - grouping in this case means a government organizational grouping were not adequately comprehended. I had, not that long ago, a fascinating conversation with an unnamed Justice of our Supreme Court, who is very knowledgeable on the institutions of the European Union, as it is now known, on one aspect which was the ambit, or the reach of the European Court. This was a very recent conversation in the last month. I raised the same questions that I had raised officially and unofficially, with this group of important people in the State Department and expressed my concern that the jurisdictional ambit of the European Court was too broad to avoid running into conflict with the other European institutions and particularly the lack of real power in a European legislature, rather than those which existed, and found that this distinguished Justice with rather more recent experience than I, substantially agreed with me. That is the sort of thing that I was concerned with in an entirely different framework a couple of decades earlier, even though there has been much progress. But the United States was still the best supporter the European Community had outside of itself. Anyhow, that gets me to when I went back to Washington.
DAVID BROMBART  
Labor Secretary, World Assembly of Youth  
Brussels (1959-1964)

Mr. Brombart was born, raised and educated in Belgium. At an early age, he became National Secretary of Youth Trade Union in Brussels, which was the beginning of his lifetime career in International Trade Movements. During his lifetime he was closely involved in the activities of the AFL/CIO, the International Trade Organization (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), of which he was Executive Secretary. He also worked with the World Assembly of Youth, the African-American Leadership Council and the ORT Charitable organization. Mr. Brombart was interviewed by Don Kienzle in 1998.

Q: How long were you Labor Secretary?

BROMBART: From 1958 to 1964.

Q: If I recall correctly, that would have been during the period of the Vienna Youth Festival in 1959?

BROMBART: Yes.

Q: I attended it as a heckler.

BROMBART: Prior to the Festival, I remember meeting with Prime Minister Kautsky to dissuade him from holding such a festival for the first time in a non-Communist country. His reaction was from someone who wished to protect the so-called neutrality of Austria. But it meant also that anti-festival activities took place as well, and the World Assembly of Youth was, of course, involved in those kinds of operations.

Q: I had the impression that the Austrians presented the festival at that time as something they had more or less agreed to at the time of the Soviet withdrawal?

BROMBART: I don’t know. That was sometime later. It was part of the beginning of an German Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) involving areas of contact.

Q: It was Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

BROMBART: It was part of a policy which can be characterized today as a foolish one, but it had some facets which were interesting in terms of having a lot of politicians and others going to the East and learning more about the conditions existing in the Soviet Union and in the satellites, which were, of course, conditions which lead to their downfall.
Q: I would make a case--not that I should be making a case on this tape--that a lot of Westerners who went East were turned off in a big hurry.

BROMBART: Sure. When I was a youth leader, we were supposed to go to the Soviet Union and to send delegations also to China. I think I was one of the very few who refused to go. Until today, I have never been to a Communist country. I refused to go to Spain and Portugal until there were some changes. Speaking of Spain and Portugal, this was one of the political differences that the Socialist youth had with our party, because we were saying, “Why don’t you boycott Franco or Salazar?” They never did it. It was the hypocrisy of the Europeans at that time.

Q: Did you have any feeling that the United States was manipulating the policy of these organizations? Or was it just that funding was being received and people were doing what they would otherwise do anyway?

BROMBART: As a staff member active in the international youth field, I became aware of the U.S. Government assisting a great number of international organizations financially. Only in 1967, three years after coming to the United States, I learned through the media that entire covert operations had been run for decades by the CIA, an agency of the U.S. Government.

Q: 1967 in that famous article of what was . . .

BROMBART: Ramparts Magazine.

Q: Ramparts.

BROMBART: But as a student of that period of time, I recognize that there was no other alternative. A definite strategy was used to have non-Americans elected to the top positions. The American staff was to make sure that policies [intended] to engage the non-communist left and the nonaligned were adhered to.

Q: And people were committed to that policy and where the funding came from was irrelevant?

BROMBART: There were some rumors all the time about the European Youth Campaign and all that, but really we were not in the position to argue. We didn’t know the facts. Why I didn’t question it is because as a leader of the Socialist youth, it took me one or two years to discover that actually my salary was not paid by the Socialist Party. It was paid by the Ministry of Education, which had a budget for helping all youth organizations. I also realized that salaries in the World Assembly of Youth were not covered by genuine foundations but by a foundation in New York serving as a conduit for the CIA.

Q: Any conclusions you want to draw for the record?

BROMBART: The prime consideration was to win the Cold War. Immediately after I joined the World Assembly of Youth in 1958 and because of my function in the labor field, I monitored not only the working of the ILO, but also of the ICFTU, WCL, and WFTU. In the early 1960s, I began to cooperate with Irving Brown on various labor issues of common interest and including
the tensions between the AFL-CIO and the ICFTU. In 1963, Brown mentioned the AFL-CIO's intention to establish a center dealing with Africa based on the experience of the American Institute for Free Labor Development. He asked me to join him in New York in November 1964 and my wife Henriette, my three years old son Eric and three months daughter Sara moved a month later into an apartment made available at one of the ILGWU cooperative buildings in Manhattan. The African American Labor Center (AALC) was established at the end of that year.

Q: I see. So, you weren’t working at the ICFTU? You were still working out of Paris?

BROMBART: I was then working for the World Assembly of Youth in Brussels after moving from Paris in 1959, the World Assembly of Youth having been expelled from France by General de Gaulle.

Q: Was this roughly about the same time that the NATO headquarters moved?

BROMBART: No, NATO moved later, I think.

Q: So de Gaulle expelled you?

BROMBART: Yes, he expelled the World Assembly Youth because of our involvement in the Algerian independence movement. This was based on a precedent as France had expelled the World Federation of Democratic Youth in the 1950s.

Q: So this in effect was providing parity?

BROMBART: Sure.

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Q: I have two quick questions about your early history. When you were active with the Belgian Socialist Youth, how much contact did you have with Africans from the Congo at that time? It’s one of those intriguing questions, because the Congo seemed to be particularly unprepared for independence when it came.

BROMBART: My exact title was National Secretary of Educational Youth Organization of the Socialist Party. I referred earlier also to my activity as an elected leader of the Young Socialist Guard.

Q: That is a separate organization?

BROMBART: Yes. Education was the official youth wing of the Socialist Party. The other was a fringe organization from the party, which was finally expelled from that party.

The activities with the Congo were absolutely zero at that time. I was an activist before my military service in 1952 and when I joined the organization from 1954 to 1958, there were practically no relations with the colony. It was a continuation of Leopold II's private domain. The
Socialist Party was excluded from any influence in the Congo and traveling to the Congo was subject to visas. It was a business empire. Any French citizen could travel to the French Empire, but that was totally different in Belgium. As far as the Socialist Youth is concerned, contact began in 1955 when there was an international fair and some Congolese came. This was also when Congolese students began coming to study in Belgium. Those students were not to be trained in diplomacy or in engineering. They were mostly in the social services, health, and education. The Belgium colonial theory was that you must have a base to have a nation; they must be fed; they must have primary education; they have to have social services, but they are not ready to lead. Of course, then came the African dimension, the Algerian situation, and then there was an opening. I think it wasn't until the 1960s that the Belgian Government changed the title of the ministry dealing with the Congo. It was called the Ministry of Colonialization (Ministère des Colonies). Then it became the Ministry of Overseas Development. It was in 1959 or 1960, when I was in WAY, that the Belgian Government called a "table ronde," a roundtable, in Brussels of all those political parties, and we came into contact with all of them. Suddenly the Congo had 60 parties. It was just another attempt to divide. Then came Lumumba, and the dramatic changes in the relations between Belgium and the Congo.

In 1962, the World Assembly of Youth a General Assembly in Accra, Ghana, and I met Nkrumah and Lumumba. There was a large delegation of the Congolese at that time. A few weeks later, Lumumba was assassinated. That is the history.

Q: So there really was very little contact.

BROMBART: Very little.

Q: People to people?

BROMBART: No, there was practically no contact. They were regarded as non-human.

Q: And there weren't many of these students in Brussels until 1959?

BROMBART: Yes, there were a lot of priests, who came. This was because there existed in the Congo a public school system and a Catholic school system, which did a lot of good work. There was no problem with that. Even today, the best musicians and artists are products of Catholic art schools. But this was another totally different approach to colonization. It was a commercial colonization.

MORTON A. BACH
Economic Officer
Brussels (1960-1964)

Morton Bach was born in New York City in 1904. He worked with the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps from 1942, and afterwards was posted in Bern, Seoul, The Hague, Vienna, Luxembourg and Brussels. Mr. Bach was interviewed by
Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: You left there in 1960. Where did you go then?

BACH: To Luxembourg, Luxembourg. The main office of the U.S. Common Market mission was in Brussels, but the original U.S. Common Market mission was in Luxembourg at the time of the Coal and Steel Community. Then it moved up to Brussels, but they maintained the Luxembourg office.

Again, stuck in a hotel.

Q: That gets a little bit weary after a while.

BACH: It does. We were in Luxembourg and I know that Foreign Service families with children thought it was ideal, which it is. It is the size of a postage stamp with woods, picnics, and all the rest of it. But professionally, there wasn't that much of interest - at least to me - although we got to know a number of the Luxembourg officials, one of whom told a story that he was on an official mission down in Ghana or one of the African countries. He said, "As usual, you go to the airport. They tell you to get there and then you stretch out and you hope a plane will arrive." He was stretched out and all of a sudden, three military people with bayonets drawn said, "Get up. You're under arrest." "Why am I under arrest?" He said, "The band at the other end of the airfield is playing our national anthem and you are lying down." But there wasn't that much interest in Luxembourg, so I was very pleased to move up to Brussels. I was assigned responsibility for the former colonies in Africa.

Q: The newly independent countries.

BACH: We still use that expression. The policy at that time out of Washington was, in my area, tropical products, cocoa, peanuts, and coffee. So, you can imagine the pleasure of an officer like me going down, calling on the ambassador of Senegal, for example, and all he wanted to talk about were coffee, peanuts, and cocoa exports to the United States. I had to explain to him, "Peanuts? We have the state of Georgia. Coffee? We have Central America." It was an interesting period.

Q: You were there from when to when?

BACH: Until late 1964 when I reached mandatory retirement.

Q: Did you get involved in any of the ripples that were coming out of the Congo at that time? The Congo was made independent at about the time you arrived there.

BACH: No. It was fairly obvious... The French mission, for example, to the Common Market was the predominant one vis a vis their former colonies. The Belgians similarly. So, we were sort of the periphery, trying to cover the overall, but not getting directly involved. I personally was involved in negotiations for the Trans-Cameroon Railway, negotiations which took place in Paris. There is an employee of the building here now. I asked him if it was ever built. He said he
wasn’t sure. He is a native of the Cameroon. The U.S. wasn't putting money into these various things. There was the Common Market for such.

What was a most interesting period was when I was moved up from Luxembourg to Brussels. Again, there was no housing. We were in the Metropole Hotel. We would go down for cocktails. This was at the time when one of the major mission interests was whether the Brits were going to be joining the Common Market. On this particular evening, the whole place was jumping and all sorts of British correspondents and other correspondents were there. It was very amusing and innovating. Finally, above the din, there was a voice of a British newspaper man: "Will somebody please explain to me what this GATT business is?" There was a lull and all of a sudden an American stood up and gave one of the best presentations that I had heard in ages. When he sat down, I went over and introduced myself. He turned out to be Ed Dale, who for years was a New York Times correspondent. We became friends over the years.

In covering the Foreign Service, it turned out that we were able to make friends in every one of these countries who later on somehow our paths crosses and they were fruitful outcomes of mutual interest - not socially, but professionally. For example, I will go back to the Swiss days. In the early stages, the people on the economic and the financial side were an elite, if you will, and the minister, Minister Stucki, who was the main negotiator in the 1946 negotiations when I was part of the U.S. delegation, brought these people along. They later became top officials in the government and then also professionally after they left the government. For example, Paul Jolles was in Washington for the negotiations. He later became the Swiss minister of economics. We were friends. Another one was Olivier Long. He was the head of GATT. Every time I would come over for the drug negotiations, we would always have dinner together. The wives knew each other, of course, from the earlier days. I am using that as an example of how entrenched friendships work. These were not just passing.) work out because it helped me in my GATT contributions when I would be able to contact Olivier. With the Swiss later on, we maintained those friendships. I will say that at one stage on one of the visits, I was in Geneva as a member of the U.S. delegation for the annual meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. I wanted to touch base with Jolles. The four of us had lunch together. I had called on him at the foreign office. Then I went down to the American embassy and told them, "I don't want you to read anything into this. This is friendship pure and simple." It didn't go down very well. They were sensitive. There may have been other issues at that time.

Q: You never know.

BACH: But we didn’t discuss any U.S.-Swiss issues. The same thing with Eberhardt Rheinhardt, who went out of his way to come down to have lunch in Geneva when we were there for the annual meetings.

JOHN J. CROWLEY, JR.
Assistant Labor Attaché
Brussels (1960-1964)
Ambassador John J. Crowley, Jr. entered the Foreign Service in 1952 after serving on the faculty of the University of Puerto Rico. His assignments included positions in Lima, Washington, Quito, Santo Domingo, Caracas, and an ambassadorship to Suriname. Ambassador Crowley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: You were in Brussels from 1960 to '64. What was the situation there as far as you saw it? I mean, what were you dealing with?

CROWLEY: Well, I'll describe my arrival. I arrived with a wife and two small babies in New York to go on to Brussels, and in those days, we could travel on foreign airlines. We were booked on the Sabena, which is the Belgian line. We arrived in New York and we called them up, and they said, "Well, all of our flights are canceled."

And we said, "Why?"

"Because we have diverted every available aircraft down to Leopoldville to evacuate our people." As it turned out, not only the whole Belgian air force and Sabena was down there, but we had sent our transport planes down from the old Wheelus Air Force base in Libya. There was a huge airlift going on out of Leopoldville up to Brussels.

So we finally, after a day or so, we got on another line and made it via London, and we were quite exhausted by the time we got to Brussels. But when I did report to work, they said, "The highest priority around here is to go out to the airport and work in these 24-hour shifts to receive the evacuees as they come in, because we haven't had time to document them in Leopoldville."

So I went out to the airport. My French was rather poor at that point, so I got some fast practice. We were basically making a record of these people, because it was expected that we would send them bills for their transportation, the ones that came on U.S. planes. [Laughter] But after we did all this work, it turned out in Washington someone made a decision that it was a humanitarian operation and they wouldn't have to pay after all, but that was my introduction to Brussels.

I went to work there as the assistant labor attaché to Arnold Zempel, who was one of our leading -- he was a real labor expert, had come out of the Department of Labor. He assigned to me the local socialist labor group and the local Catholic labor group, and he dealt mainly with the ICFTU, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the other one which was then called Christian, and which now they've taken "Christian" out because they have affiliated so many people in Asia and Africa who are not necessarily Christians, but who have the same kind of ethical philosophy.

So that was quite an education. I learned about the international labor movement by helping him, but I was also more specialized in learning about Belgium. At the same time, of course, we had the Congo blowing up occasionally, and we got called in to do things there.

Q: Let me deal with the Congo thing a bit first. What was your impression of the people coming out of the Congo? Had they understood what was happening?
CROWLEY: In the first place, there was not an awful lot of sympathy. I was surprised. There was not an awful lot of sympathy in Belgium for these people because it was assumed that they had been down there making a lot of money over the years and there were tales about how they had exploited the natives. The socialists, in particular had put this out. They had been exploiting the natives and they kept the natives under their heel and they had made all this money, and when they were finally getting thrown out, there was a large sector of Belgium's public opinion didn't care very much.

On the other hand, of course, the government did, and we worked with them on the coordination of the later U.N. operation movement that came in to try to keep the peace. But, in general, there was not a terrible outcry until later, when the U.N. forces at Elisabethville, actually took aggressive action and some Belgians were accidentally killed in that operation. That caused quite an emotional outcry, and there were photos that were shown over and over on television in Belgium, so it whipped up a lot of public outcry. That was basically an Indian force that was serving under the U.N., but we got part of the blame for it because we were looked on as one of the chief sponsors of the U.N. operations in the Congo.

Q: Then back to the labor side, what did you do? Say you had the socialist side. These interviews are being done for people who don't really necessarily understand what people do at an embassy.

CROWLEY: Surely. We had some routine kinds of reporting, including studying the wage levels in the different industries and reporting them here so that the people in the Department of Labor in Washington would have a good idea of the international picture, helping them make union directories, getting together the numbers of people in the unions, and the names of the officers and so forth because they publish an international directory here. We also contributed to studies made in the economic section, to present labor costs and labor influence and so forth. That was the technical part of it.

The political part I always found more interesting. For example, in 1961, the socialist labor confederation called a general strike in protest against some legislation that had been passed. The government was a Catholic government. This general strike grew to the point that practically all of Wallonia, which is the southern half of the country, was involved in it. Stores were shut down, factories, schools -- it was really a highly effective thing. It seemed likely that if the Catholic unions were to join with the strike that the government would have to fall because it would e such a ferment.

Nobody in the embassy was able to find out what the Catholic unions had in mind at the top, so they called me and said, "See what you can find out." And I remember going over to the headquarters and talking to some of my contacts. They all assured me that the Catholic unions had no interest whatsoever in joining the strike at all at that point. So I went back, and this was reported to Washington. Fortunately, we made the right prediction, [Chuckles] and I had a certain feather in my cap because I was able to ascertain that.

Q: Did you feel that you were serving two bosses? I mean, was there the United States, i.e.,
Department of State policy, and the AFL-CIO Labor Department policy, or not? Did you feel yourself caught between these?

CROWLEY: Well, not usually, because George Meany came frequently -- the late George Meany -- to the meetings of the ICFTU and he basically had no great discrepancy with U.S. policy. In fact, he was, you know, rather conservative, and very anti-Communist. He was in favor of higher wages overseas so that foreign workers would have more purchasing power. And second, because the cost of production would rise so that our expensive goods would be more affordable in those countries. I never saw any particular conflict.

Q: So you didn't feel any tug. Well, for political reporting and all, you say that maybe we would have very little influence on the communist union and the communist movement, but at the same time, there often are areas of cooperation, I mean, mutual interest. Sometimes they just dovetail or would want to know which way they're springing or what's going to happen so that it is handy to have contacts within the communist's, i.e., often the workers' world. Were you inhibited from doing this or did we have these, or was this a problem?

CROWLEY: What we had was the socialist movement which had a spectrum from, you know, right to left, and at the left end of the socialist unions, it sort of transitioned off into the communists. I used to go out to that edge, and I dealt with a lot of people. In fact, my ambassador one time chastised me for my association with a guy there.

Q: Who was your ambassador?

CROWLEY: This was Douglas MacArthur.

Q: Douglas MacArthur II, I believe.

CROWLEY: The second, exactly. The nephew of the general.

Because the fellow I was dealing with, Ernest Glinne, who later became a socialist labor minister and was really quite respectable, was somewhat radical and he talked a lot about socialism and the bourgeoisie and that kind of business, but I found by dealing with him that he was basically anti-totalitarian, so he drew the line at getting in bed with the real Marxist-Leninists. In fact, he later promoted U.S. investment in his district in Wallonia.

The socialists and the Christians in their unions had done a pretty good job in Belgium of purging themselves of the really totalitarian types, both right and left. The communists were only strong in a couple of very minor unions where they were largely isolated. So I more or less agreed with the ambassador's policy that since they were isolated and since the majority of the union people didn't want to have anything to do with them, it did not serve our purposes to be seen associating with them. On the other hand, by keeping up with the far left of the socialist party, you could know pretty much what the Communists had in mind.

Q: How did you see the communist movement within the international labor movement at the time? We're trying to get somewhat the perception of how we saw the world, and in your
particular sphere, how did you see it?

CROWLEY: Well, I must say, I agreed pretty much with George Meany that there are no free trade unions in communist countries. They're all government organizations, and if the union doesn't have enough independence to be able to bargain and to be able to speak freely, then, it's not free. I can understand why we agree that they should be in the International Labor Organization for political reasons. We accept it. But I think one also has to say they're not really unions. It's like their amateur athletes. We compete with them, but we know they are not amateur athletes. There were many front organizations that they presented as unions which were not in my definition of a free trade union. What we were trying to deal with and trying to promote was free trade unions.

Q: So moving on, how effective do you think American policy, as you saw it, was with the labor organizations? Did you feel that we had a role and influence, or was this sort of an amateur operation?

CROWLEY: Well, in Europe, after World War II, the AFL-CIO helped to create the anti-Communist labor movement in France, because the CGT was communist-dominated -- the main confederation of labor -- and we helped to create force Ouvrière. U.S. labor was also active in helping unions in Germany and Italy. If there hadn't been some outside help, the communists could have tried to wreck the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Western Europe.

In Belgium, we didn't have to do that, fortunately, because the Belgians themselves defeated the communists -- they purged a lot of them out of important unions, and they ended up in, as I said, in some of these small, isolated places. So I don't think there was any resentment, except among the far left and the communists. We were helping the free trade unions, just as the Marshall Plan was helping the economies.

Q: Were we giving any support to them? I mean, I'm thinking of financial.

CROWLEY: Yes. Well, I know at least we gave office equipment. Irving Brown, who has been on the international side of the AFL-CIO for many years, and I think is still head of the --

Q: He just died.

CROWLEY: Did he die?


CROWLEY: I didn't know that. Well, God rest his soul. He was the one who led the campaign to start the Force Ouvrière, and I remember him saying he had to get typewriters for them and desks and set up an office and get them telephones. [Laughter] I don't know that it was a very big expenditure, but it was pretty important at the time.

Q: How would you characterize the Belgian labor leaders compared to some of the other ones? I mean, did you find them different?
CROWLEY: The division was pretty strong based on the religious line. You know, if you were a socialist labor leader, I suppose you could go to church, but you couldn't talk about it very much. On the Christian, Catholic side, they expected to see you in church. So this divided Belgian political life and the parties, and the labor unions followed the parties pretty much. There's more politics involved in it, because a lot of people in the Parliament and other politicians come out of the labor movement much more than they do in this country, so it's more political.

On the other hand, they're quite professional, too. I was impressed by the organizations. They had good organization, good systems of education, teaching the local union how to keep its books, how to conduct meetings, techniques to use in bargaining, that sort of thing. So I would say the main difference, probably, is that they are more openly political.

MARGARET JOY TIBBETTS
Political Officer
Brussels (1961-1963)

Ambassador Margaret Joy Tibbetts was born in Maine on August 26, 1919. She received a bachelor’s degree from Wheaton College and a master’s degree and Ph.D. from Bryn Mawr College. Ambassador Tibbetts’ career included positions in London, Leopoldville, Brussels, and as ambassador to Norway. She was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin on May 28, 1985.

TIBBETTS: Oh, the nuances. Well, this is an anecdote I've told and repeated before, but when I was in Brussels -- the constant argument in Belgium is the question of the language, etc., and it's of importance to us only because it is a governing factor in Belgian politics. Ambassador MacArthur said to me, "Do we fuss about this too much?"

I said, "If your friend, Spaak [Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister], is out on his ear next week because of a vote in the language issue, you'll be interested." He said, "Well, that's true."

One of the areas which was of most concern was the Waterloo district. There was a large supermarket in that district, and one morning I said to the young men who worked for me (there were three of them), one Monday morning I said, "Did you all go to the Libre Service Supermarket?" And they said, "Yes."

I said, "What language were they talking?" Because that was the issue in the paper night and day -- the election was coming up -- was what was the language in Waterloo. And they all looked at me. Not one of them knew.

I said, "Well, when the people were telling the children not to get in the candy or buying meat?" No, they'd been thinking of themselves, which is what young men tend to do.

Q: Sure.
TIBBETTS: And I said, "Well, just for an experiment . . ." And I called up their wives, and every one of their wives could tell me what the majority of the people were speaking.

Q: Is that right?

TIBBETTS: Well, they said immediately that they were all speaking French. Some of them were Flemish people speaking French. Now, as I say, the men were wandering around, thinking of themselves; that's the sort of thing they tend to do. And if you had said to them, "Go out and report," if I said to them on May Day, and the Socialists are having a parade, "Go downtown and look for this and this and this and this and this," they'd all come back with it. But if you didn't say, they'd all go down and watch the parade, but they wouldn't pick up some of these things.

But that's why you train them. After they'd worked for me, then they knew what I wanted. Whether or not they thought I was justified is a different question. I think women's intuitions are very good. On the other hand, you've got to watch it, in this sense that your intuitions are very good, but if you're dealing with men -- after all, it's their opinions and their views which are governing them; that is, if you're dealing with a foreign man and you want to know what he is thinking, you apply your woman's intuition to what sort of a person he is and what it is, but don't forget what the optic is from which he is looking.

Q: That's true.

TIBBETTS: So you can't overdo it. I mean, you can't read things into it which aren't there, and that sort of thing.

Q: But I seem to remember when you came back from the Congo and you predicted great problems if things weren't done, didn't that -- wasn't that sort of a novel idea in the department?

TIBBETTS: Oh, yes. They all thought that I was -- but that wasn't because I was a woman; that was because I was one of the better trained officers that had been sent to the Congo. Thirty years ago, the people they were sending to Africa were not always the outstanding officers in the Foreign Service by any means. And also I'm articulate, so when I was debriefed, I wasn't afraid to say what I thought.

I had a lot of friends in the Congo that the consul general didn't have, because I made friends with the professors at the university. He was strictly -- the consul general, and this is inevitable in his position; I mean, you can't criticize anyone -- was strictly in the Rotary, upper businessman class, and the governor general and so forth. What the governor general tells you is what he thinks the United States government is going to be interested in hearing.

I had a lot of friends at the university. One day a young man came in the office, and he said he'd written an article about some sociological researches he'd made in the eastern Congo and he wanted it translated. It had been accepted by a journal in Great Britain, and they had told him he had to have an English translation. But like many people, he could speak English well, but he couldn't write it. He'd gone to the British consulate and they had said, "Don't waste our time." And he wanted to know if I'd recommend a translator. Well, I was interested in the nature of the
article, and I said, "I'll do it myself."

He said, "Well, you're not professionally trained."

I said, "Try me."

And I made the translation, and I was very interested in the substance of the article. He sent it off to the British Institute, by which it was accepted; and from then on we were friends. He was a professor at the university. And that led -- one thing leads to another. So I think I had much better contacts.

Q: And they didn't tell you what they thought the United States wanted to hear.

TIBBETTS: Well, they had no use for diplomats; they thought we were all sort of stupid -- and we've had some that were. Really, in the not-too-distant past, in Africa at that time we'd had some real prizes. I mean, the Congo wasn't the place in those days -- African posts weren't staffed well.

Q: Well, you know, as a bright woman, I suppose you got it from both sides, didn't you? Or am I wrong? That women who were not as bright as you wanted to use the women's issue to get ahead instead of --

TIBBETTS: Yes, I did get it from both sides in a way. When I first went to London and Frances Willis invited me out to tea, she asked me if I was much interested in the women's issue, which, in 1949, was not very burning.

I said, "No." I'd never paid much attention to it, because I'd always been too interested in getting ahead on what I was doing, and when I was in college at Bryn Mawr, everyone was a woman. It was the stronghold. I mean, the question never would arise. And I just wasn't much interested.

She said it had been her experience, and she would give me some advice, which was that you did most for women by becoming a competent officer. Well, that's what I was interested in anyway, so to that I was receptive; she was pushing at an open door.

When I first went to Brussels, I was replacing Stanley Cleveland, who was a very old friend of mine; it was as head of the political section. And Stanley said to me, "Your problem is not going to come from any of the men at the embassy. You're an old EUR hand, and that's what they like." But he said, "One of the women in one of the other sections has been agitating for two or three years on the grounds that she's not a section chief because she's a woman. And to have someone -- a woman -- come in as section chief, that's going to give you problems."

Q: Did it?

TIBBETTS: In the sense that -- although we personally got along well -- she was always completely convinced that what had worked for me had not worked for her. She would have liked to use the woman issue very hard.
Q: Yes.

TIBBETTS: I've never been sympathetic with it, because I think a woman has to be competent to get there.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, II
Consular Officer
Brussels (1948-1949)

Ambassador
Belgium (1961-1965)

Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II entered the Foreign Service in 1935. His career included positions in Canada, Italy, and France, and ambassadorships to Japan, Belgium, and Austria. Ambassador MacArthur was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1986.

Q: After this period, you were then reassigned to Washington, is that correct?

MACARTHUR: No. In 1948, I was reassigned to Brussels. The department said -- Ted Achilles, one of our Foreign Service officers who was in charge of western Europe, said that he wanted me to come back to the department to head up the western European bureau, but he wanted me to serve in another country before I went back to that position, because, except for Canada, I'd been tied up with France and the aftermath thereof. With the exception of Canada and Italy, I'd been tied up with France almost continuously for eight years. Of course, being tied up with France, I was tied up with other countries, too, because the peace negotiations and the whole business of Europe that had been occupied by Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium and Luxembourg, and all of it was part of our overall hold.

So I was assigned to Brussels, and I went there, and that is where I had the great good fortune to meet one of the great statesmen of that period, Paul Henri Spaak, Belgium's great foreign minister. When I was there, he was both prime minister and foreign minister. I used to have lunch with him occasionally. I was chargé d’affaires when Alan Kirk was away a couple of times, before he went to Moscow. Admiral Kirk was our ambassador, under whom I served. (Inaudible) was the number two guy, but his wife was very ill, and he was gone for quite a single period of time, so I had the great good fortune of being the chargé d’affaires there on occasion, and got to know Spaak awfully well and some of his people, which helped me a great deal later, when I went as ambassador to Belgium. Spaak was still very much "Mr. Belgium" in terms of foreign affairs. I was in Belgium just under a year. [telephone interruption]

Q: When you were back in Belgium. We're talking about Henri Spaak.

MACARTHUR: Well, about Spaak. You remember he was the first person that had the guts to
face up to the Soviets in the United Nations in 1946, when he made his famous speech. He was a brilliant orator; he never read a speech in his life; he never wrote a speech in his life. He made notes, and he had a mind that worked like a computer; everything fed in and came out in orderly fashion, in the way he wanted it to come in. He made his famous speech to the United Nations, in which he said, "Mr. Vishinsky, we are afraid." It was on what the Russians were doing and the way they were behaving in 1946, moving in and pushing into eastern Europe, toward Czechoslovakia and the like. "Monsieur Vishinsky, nous avons peur," was the way he put it in that famous speech.

Then in about May of that year, I was brought back to Washington.

Q: You had served in Japan for the normal time for an ambassador, and a new administration had come in. We're talking about 1961. Had you made any requests for another post or indicated what you would like?

MACARTHUR: No. When I was ready to leave, the treaty had been ratified, and a post-treaty election had been held in Japan, where the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which had negotiated the treaty, increased its strength, and the time had come for me, I had been there for more than four years, to move along. I did not request a transfer, but I certainly expected it. When the elections came in November of 1960 and a Democratic President replaced a Republican President, I expected in the normal course of events to go.

It so happened that the Democratic President that replaced President Eisenhower was Jack Kennedy, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and I had known Jack Kennedy since he was a Harvard student when I was a young third secretary in Paris. His father was ambassador to London. He used to come over to Paris very frequently and spend a lot of time in our apartment playing bridge and one thing or another, so I'd known him, and then I'd known him later when I served in Paris after the war, when he was a congressman. He came over on several trips, and I was the principal point of contact and set up arrangements for him to see people and everything else in France in that post-war period. He came over once with Tobbert MacDonald, his Harvard roommate. I think he was also on the Harvard football team with him.

So I got a message from him that he had decided that with the treaty and everything else, the time had come for another ambassador to come along, a view with which I thoroughly subscribed. I think four to five years is the maximum that an ambassador should serve in a post. Why? Unless there are extraordinarily special circumstances. Why? Because the first two years are learning years if you're an ambassador in a post. By the third year, you're still learning something, but you begin to think that you know a great deal about the country, and in the meantime, any of the people whom you learned from, senior members on your staff, have been transferred, and by the end of the fourth year, you're probably the oldest Foreign Service officer, if you are a Foreign Service officer, inhabiting the embassy. So you're sort of a senior guy in terms of longevity in that post, and you begin, in your subconscious, you can't help but think that you know pretty much what the situation is. And furthermore, that driving energy that keeps you in your first two, two and a half to three years to want to know more and more and more and acquire more information begins to slow down, because you have, by that time, acquired a very considerable amount of information and understanding, not just about issues and views, but
about personalities and so forth and so on. So inevitably, I think the drive, the intellectual curiosity that spurs you on when you're earlier in your post and all that begins to slow down a bit. So I've always been somebody who says unless there are extraordinarily special conditions, somewhere between four and five years should be the maximum.

Then I got a message saying that the President would like me to go to Belgium, where we were having some problems with Belgium as a result of developments in the Congo. I accepted that appointment with great pleasure, because as a member of General Eisenhower's staff in Normandy, Assistant Political Advisor for French Resistance Affairs, I had not only participated in the liberation of Paris, but on the eve of the liberation of Brussels by Marshall Montgomery's forces, General Eisenhower called me into his office and said -- I say on the evening; it was actually about lunchtime -- and said, "MacArthur, I want you to go up and see how Monty does liberating Brussels tomorrow." So I went forward. It was only a two- or three-hour drive with military escort, and participated in the liberation of Brussels, which was, to me, not as emotional as the liberation of Paris, where I'd spent years before the war, retreated before the Germans, then been in Vichy, and so forth, but it was a very emotional experience.

Then in October, I was reassigned from General Eisenhower's staff -- the Brussels liberation was September 3, 1944 -- I was reassigned to the embassy to head up the political section in the embassy.

Q: I would like to move on to Belgium. You said you had had acquaintances with Belgium before, one with Eisenhower. You also were sent there as first secretary.

MACARTHUR: I was sent there as first secretary after I finished my tour of duty in Paris in '48. I went to Belgium as first secretary. While I was there, Paul Henri Spaak was both prime minister and foreign minister, one of the free world's great post-war statesmen. I was chargé d'affaires when Admiral Kirk was gone a considerable amount of time; that's when he was being considered for the Russian post.

Q: Admiral Kirk at that time was the American ambassador.

MACARTHUR: He was the ambassador. He had commanded the American elements of the Navy in the invasion of Normandy, the cruisers and ships that did the bombarding and preparatory work, had a very brilliant and gifted wife intellectually, Lydia Kirk, who later wrote a book or two. So I served there. As I say, I was chargé d'affaires on several occasions when he was away.

Then in May 1949, I had been there less than a year, I got word that the Secretary wanted me to become Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.

Q: You were well prepared.

MACARTHUR: So I had a background of Belgium. Now, let me go into Belgium now.

Q: Yes, what was the situation like when you were going to Belgium?
MACARTHUR: The situation, when I was named to Belgium, American and Belgian relations were on the lowest plain they had been on, I believe, in the history of the relationships between our two countries, because going back to World War I, you may remember Belgian-American relief was a great thing.

Q: *Herbert Hoover was God there.*

MACARTHUR: Yes. There was a warm feeling on the part of both Belgians and Americans, but the situation had deteriorated very seriously beginning in '59 because of what happened in the Belgian Congo. To explain what happened, I will have to give you a minute or two on how Belgium ran the Congo.

Q: *Certainly.*

MACARTHUR: And decolonialization. I think it was clear to all of us -- and certainly by the time I went to Belgium in 1961, and certainly clear to Britain and France and the Dutch, although they didn't care for it -- that decolonialization and the emergence of new states that had formerly been colonies was a fact of life and was going to happen no matter what anybody did. In the first place, if the former Western European colonial powers, namely, Britain and France, France had some 17 or 18 colonies in Africa and Britain, when it was whacked up at the Berlin Conference of 1885, when Africa was whacked up, Britain had its colonies all over the lot. These were already going by '61 or had gone. The Belgian Congo was still operating just as it had operated before the war.

The Belgian system was totally different from the British or the French system. The Belgian system of colonialism ran the whole show virtually from Brussels. It didn't have the type of governor general setup with a local assembly of some sort, where views could be expressed and things of that kind. It was operated from Belgium, and it was operated not just by the government alone, but by the companies, the important Belgian companies -- agricultural and mineral companies -- Union Miniere, from whom during the war we got uranium for our atomic bombs that we used in Japan.

These companies who were operating up in this vast area of the Congo frequently handled all the postal services, such as they were, communications, postal services, because they had that network, and you sent letters and packages and things up the river in their ships, and they were distributed by the company people to the inhabitants to whom they were addressed and so forth and so on. But it was basically a paternalistic system operated from Brussels. The Belgians looked around and saw all these things happening to the British and French colonies in Africa, but they persisted in the belief that they had 20 to 30 years to decolonize, that they needed that time to get started in setting up some kind of the beginnings of a local assembly system so there could be an orderly transition from this very paternalistic system operated from Brussels to a more democratic system with people who had absolutely no training equivalent to the training that the British and French had given the native inhabitants of their colonies, not just in Africa, but in the Middle East and elsewhere.
**Q:** Why did the Belgians, alone of the powers, not see that they didn't have 20 years? Is this wishful thinking?

**MACARTHUR:** The system was operating, and I think there were a great deal of pressures from important companies like Union Miniere, which was a big hunk of the Societe Generale, which is Belgium's largest company that has been in contention recently because an Italian is trying to take it over, because it operates or is the key to 500-and-some major industrial companies that are operating in Belgium. I think there were pressures from them. They didn't want to give up probably their prerogatives. I was not there at that time, but I understood later that there had been pressures from them. But basically, the system seemed to be going all right. It continued to operate all right. There didn't seem to be any outbursts of riots or things for emotionalism.

Then all this changed in 1959, when suddenly there was an explosion, and Lumumba and other people led the business. Then the Belgians panicked. They had to send their armed forces in 1960 -- I think it was '60 -- to restore order, because there were tens of thousands of Belgians in the Congo working. In the meantime, the United Nations got into the act at the request of some of the other African nations and the Soviet Union China, and the Belgians sent their troops in to restore order, which they did, but a series of United Nations resolutions were passed that were highly critical of Belgium, and Belgium then panicked and said that they could have their independence in less than six months. I think it was on June first or something of that, of 1960, when there was no preparation. There had never been any preparation of any kind. As you know, the situation is complicated in Africa because of tribalism, because when the European powers whacked up Africa, they didn't whack it up along tribal and linguistic boundaries of tribes; they simply, as far as they advanced their explorers and forces, they declared that along this river or that mountain range or this desert their business, and the result was that the African colonies consisted not of homogeneous tribes that had worked together or lived next to it. There isn't a country in Africa that didn't have four or five or even six different tribes, chopped up bits and pieces of different tribes, and some of these tribes had been hostile to each other from the beginning of time. So within the new African states, they had a tremendous burden. When you never have had a system of government above the tribal system, you've never had a national system, you've had a Middle East and Asia and the Far East, in Europe, you've never been above tribalism, and there's these fierce tribal rivalries, and in one newly independent country that was formerly a colony, you throw together five or six tribes, some of which have been basic enemies from the beginning of time, you have problems. And that's been one of the burdens that these newly independent nations of Africa have had to bear, and the principal reason for the tremendous instabilities that have plagued them.

But in any event, then there was a resolution calling the Belgians to pull their troops out, and some of the resolutions of the United Nations were very, very crudely or brutally, in terms of diplomatic language, accusatory of the Belgians, and we voted right down the line. Understandably, we were for decolonialization. We were once a colony ourselves, we always had been, and so forth. The Belgians, who were cooperating with us in NATO, and we were Allies in NATO, thought for some of our people, like Governor "Soapy" Williams, who was Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, to make these speeches or make comments that were then reported in the press, that seemed to be very anti-Belgian.
MACARTHUR: Yes. Then by the time I went there, there had been all these votes before in the United Nations, there had been the criticisms, and we seemed to be siding constantly with the Russians, the Chinese, and the other newly independent nations that had formerly been colonies, and on the Belgian side, they considered us an ally in NATO, which we were, and they felt that we had gone beyond what we had to do, if we supported decolonialization, in the vigor of our support for some of these resolutions and so forth. So there was a psychological problem on the part of the Belgians, a feeling of bitterness that they had been faithful allies and done what they could to work with us, and we had had friendly relations, and now suddenly, for reasons of our own, we had turned on them and gone further than we had to go in voting for resolutions and statements and one thing and another.

So as I say, when I arrived there, there was considerable bitterness, and it was particularly reflected in certain important companies of the Societe General, like Union Miniere. Now, I don't want to get into a whole history of the Belgian Congo.

Q: Before you went out to Belgium, did you run into conflicting advice instructions? You were going to a European country which was under EUR, which had its own concerns -- NATO and all. And then you had the African decolonization problem and a new administration which was probably more ideological at that point than it would be later on.

MACARTHUR: Well, from the end of World War II, when the movement for decolonization started as a spontaneous movement in the colonies, encouraged, of course, by Moscow -- there's no question about that -- a growing divergence of views within the Department was evident between the European Bureau and the African Bureau. I had been basically in the European Bureau all my life until I came back in the end of 1952, when General Eisenhower named me Counselor of the Department. And as Counselor of the Department, I had to deal with the whole world, literally. I went I don't know how many hundreds of thousands of miles with the Secretary, to South Asia, to the Far East, to here and there and the other place. I mention this only because I had excellent relations with the European Bureau as Counselor, but when I was Counselor from '53 until '57, when Eisenhower took over in January of '53, I went out and saw what was happening in the former colonies and the decolonialization movement. Livy [Livingston] Merchant, a very able and wonderful man, one of the finest I've ever worked with, used to always invite me to come back and give an hour or an hour and a half or two hours to the key people in EUR on my impressions and feelings as a result of these trips, and because I'd worked with most of these guys, you know, from '35 until '53, they knew me.

Well, I remember when I came back and started telling them that whether they liked it or not, decolonialization was here to stay. If I'd come back from a trip to Southeast Asia, they would take their fingers and put them on the corner of their eyes and pull their eyes into a slant position, as if I'd suddenly become a turncoat and abandoned Europe and turned over and become an advocate of another side. Now, this is understandable to an extent, because you must remember that after the war, we were in the midst of the Cold War, our European Allies were the basis of any balance that we could have that would preserve military power, strategic power, that would preserve war, and to the European people, with the threat of Moscow's expansion and so forth
and so on, NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, and our military structure which had been set up by that time, SHAPE and the like, this was the most important thing to our national security, because the threat came from the Soviet Union. And they recognized, as Eisenhower recognized -- that's why every morning I briefed him in '51-'52, before he came home to run for the presidency, on what was happening in the world. The EUR bureau realized that what happened in their colonies and the position we took with respect to decolonialization and their problems, which were not just problems of decolonialization, losing a colony, but important economic and trade and other interests in that thing, that their actions in support of us and NATO and one thing and another could be affected by it. So I could understand why they had the fix on it.

On the other hand, the African people, in effect, had the position, "Well, to hell with these European guys. The ball game is over, and we don't have to pay any attention to their concerns or their problems. We're building a new world of independent states that are on the basis of freedom and democracy, on the basis of which our country was founded, and we were once a colony and achieved our independence like they are," and so forth and so on. So between the African Bureau in the Fifties, when I was Counselor -- and this is going back before, because it continued, of course -- there was this complete disagreement and very little that I saw, ability of the two bureaus to try to work together and sort of compromise things that would take care of both sides.

I admit it is very, very difficult, if you oppose decolonialization, to compromise. I remember when Winston Churchill came over once to have lunch with General Eisenhower at SHAPE in late '51 or '52, I've forgotten, when General Ike was SACEUR, a little luncheon of General Eisenhower, General Gruenther, myself, the British ambassador, somebody he'd brought from London, one of his key people from London. There were six of us. Winston Churchill said the greatest mistake that England had ever made, which he could never forgive it for, was giving independence to India. Well, how could any of the European countries, with their resources exhausted, their political clout to nothing, their tremendous economic problems of reconstruction and the like, if they'd wanted to hang onto these places, they didn't have the resources or the power or the energy or the ability to do it. But I mention it only because somebody as sensible as Winston Churchill was still speaking, in 1952, about how India should have never been given its independence. He was very critical of Mountbatten and Lady Mountbatten in this private luncheon.

Q: Were you getting mixed instructions from Washington?

MACARTHUR: I don't think when you've been Counselor and you go out, you get instructions. I think that's a poor word to use for an ambassador that's a career ambassador and has already held two presidential appointments. What you get is throughout the Department, you get the input of all the things. Then you get what our policy is, and our policy is to favor the decolonialization and independence for what is now Zaire, which was the Congo then. There was the Congo then and the Congo Brazzaville, which was a Russian satellite.

Q: It was the old French Congo.
MACARTHUR: Yes, that's right. And my instructions were to work this thing out and try, if you call them instructions, to let the Belgians understand why we were doing these things and what our views of the future were, that projection, and also where it was possible to be of assistance then and ease this tension that had developed and the like, to do that, which I would have done normally.

So I went there with a clear mandate. I mean, the Congo's independence was here to stay at that time, but the problem when I went there was not the Congo's independence; it was the fact that a civil war had broken out, an insurrection had broken out, and that insurrection was a very dangerous thing, because it was being supported by the Soviet Union through Congo Brazzaville, which was a client state, if you will, where they had strong influence with resources and the like. The former Belgian Congo, Zaire as it now is, occupies a key position in the heart of Africa. It's surrounded by about eight states, and if the Congo went bad, went the wrong way, that is, went the way where it became an Ethiopia, a Soviet client state, the emanations, exactly what can happen from Nicaragua if it's strong enough, going out to the neighboring Costa Rica, Guatemala, and all the rest, the spreading out of a cancer from the center of Africa, it could spread out on both sides -- east, west, north, and south. So this was something that we felt should not happen and that I should work with the Belgians and try to see what we could do to do this thing.

Well, I arrived in Belgium, I had the greatest of good fortune. Seldom do ambassadors have the good luck that I had. I arrived there, and the foreign minister was Paul Henri Spaak, with whom I had worked as foreign minister and prime minister when I was chargé d'affaires, a man I admired greatly, a lucid man, one of the most lucid men I've ever seen, probably the best orator that this century has produced, in the sense that he never used a written text, and yet he used notes that he'd make sometimes when he was listening to an account or argument. I developed a working relationship with him which he mentions in his memoirs, where he says that from a relationship of ambassador to foreign minister, a close personal relationship developed, where I saw him virtually every day, and when there were crises going on, I saw him several times the same day.

Now, Spaak was a very sensible man, and he did not approve of certain of the things that some of the companies politically, of the Societe General, which was divided on this subject primarily because of Union Miniere, basically they wanted the Congo to be split up, because Katanga, where the heart of the mineral resources were and so forth, was where they had their operations, and that was part of the dissident rebellious part of the Congo that was trying to break away. So there were complications for Spaak and the Belgian Government of an internal domestic order, which had very important economic and political implications for the government and the party.

The situation with Spaak and the relationships -- and he said it in his memoirs that he felt that I had always spoken to him with the greatest frankness about our concerns and the depth of our concerns and our basic feelings and commitments, but on the other hand, he felt that I was transmitting to Washington an accurate portrayal of his problems, too, and the kinds of dilemmas that Belgium faced in this insurrection of what to do about it.

They had withdrawn their troops, the insurrection was going on, and then the thing finally came.
I won't go into all the things that happened over a three-year span, but it finally came when Lumumba seized about 2,000 foreign hostages.

Q: Was it Lumumba at that time, or had Lumumba been killed? Was it Gazinga?

MACARTHUR: Lumumba was the one that declared that Americans and Belgians were to be seized. He may have been bumped by that time, but in that period leading up to the seizure of the hostages, he had encouraged the idea.

Then as it became clear that the hostages were seized, we became concerned. Why? Because we had somewhere in the neighborhood of 100-plus or more Americans -- we didn't quite know -- that probably had been grabbed, missionaries, people of various kinds. So on a unilateral basis, we started some contingency planning in the Pentagon about what we would have to do to go in and grab the hostages.

Q: By the way, these hostages were in Stanleyville?

MACARTHUR: Stanleyville and Polis. There were about 1,700 in Stanleyville and about 300 in Polis. So we started contingency plans, and then I started a series of things with Spaak, talks with Spaak about what the Belgians could do. I said that I did not think, given Korea and Vietnam, that we would send any troops there. And as we hashed over the alternatives, Spaak said, "Well, we can send troops. We can send paratroops in, but we've got no aircraft that can take them there. None. We've got short-range stuff, nothing that can get down there, even with stops, that has the capacity to airlift what you would need."

So Spaak and I came over to this country, the United States, in '64, Spaak allegedly to make a speech in Bermuda and then come on here for some private thing, and I came back on consultation. Spaak and I had put together by this time the idea that American planes could airlift Belgian paratroopers in to smash the rebellion. I say smash the rebellion -- to smash in and recuperate the hostages, but on a basis that we agreed that it would not be a military operation, which would immediately bring the majority of the United Nations against us, saying that we were in there militarizing, trying to overthrow the thing and recolonize and imperialism. It would be a pure humanitarian rescue operation, where we would go in, pick up the hostages, and get the hell out. If it had the effect, if we had to smash some of the dissidents, that would be a side effect, but the basis business is a humanitarian rescue operation that we couldn't be accused of in the United Nations, that we would go in there. And Americans wouldn't say, "Gee, they've gone into the Congo. It's another Vietnam."

Q: Was this our insistence or was this agreed upon?

MACARTHUR: No, no, this was something that Spaak and I talked about before we came over, about the nature of the operation and what you would do, because we discussed would they go against the forces that were trying to split up the Congo, the so-called rebels? Would they go against them or what? And this was a basic part of what the mission would be.

Then we came back here and met in the Department with the Secretary, I believe, and that night
we had a dinner at Averell Harriman's in Georgetown, and Spaak had, I think, Robert Rothschild and maybe Stevie Davignon, later commissioner of the AEC, a brilliant chef de cabinet. We put the proposition -- I don't remember who was at the dinner; it was a very small one -- to Harriman and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and I guess we had EUR there, too, because of Spaak, and Liv, maybe, that this would not be a commitment of American troops, we would simply provide the airlift to rescue hostages.

So it was agreed we'd meet again the next morning in the Department after there had been time to consult the President.

Q: *This was President Johnson.*

MACARTHUR: Yes, President Johnson. We went to the Department, and there we got the word in that afternoon, I think, they'd cleared it with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and everybody and the President, and we would go ahead and start planning for a joint operation, American aircraft and Belgian paratroopers.

Q: *Was there any opposition? I have heard that Wayne Fredericks and Governor Williams were unhappy at having American military involvement in something which was against the Africans.*

MACARTHUR: I think that's correct. They were unhappy about it, and they were unhappy about it because to them, black Africa was the only thing that counted and so forth. But I heard they were unhappy, too, but when the decision was taken, it was made and was a considered judgment. But the interesting thing is that while I was back here, I went over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to see how they were coming on their contingency plan, and the first contingency plan, which I'd not seen, called for six battalions. Six battalions would require a wagon train of airplanes about five times around the world. Then they limited it to the absolutely irreducible minimum of four battalions that would be necessary to do this job. Well, this business was U.S.-eyes-only business and was not imparted to the Belgians.

So Spaak and I returned on the same plane. I remember the trip very well, because I always flew back and forth to conserve money for the Department -- it's only a seven-and-a-half, eight-hour trip -- economy class, Spaak, of course, with Rothschild and Davignon, was in first class. So we were only about 15 minutes out -- it was a Sabena plane -- when the stewardess from first class came back and said, "There are extra places in first class, and the foreign minister wants you to ride with him first class." [Laughter] So I went up and rode with him first class, while we talked a lot about some things, and then I said, "I'm going back to economy."

He said, "Why?"

I said, "Because there are several places with four seats across the back, and I can pull up the arms and lie down and go to sleep." [Laughter]

But in any event, we got back, and the Pentagon agreed to send over within 48 hours four of their best planners as tourists with civilian tourist passports, and they arrived the day after we got back, and they went to work right away. They worked all that day, and they worked that night
until about 2:00 o'clock in the morning. They were going to meet again at 8:00 o'clock the next morning, and I had left word with them -- I had been coordinator on the American side to work with the Belgian Government -- I wanted them to meet with me before they went back to the Belgians. I wanted to hear exactly what had transpired.

Well, in the first place, they made out a line of flight directly down to the Congo, which went across Libya and other countries that would never give us right of passage, and we would be violating air space and creating endless problems for ourselves. So I said to them, "First you've got to go back and find another way. You've got to find another way by Spain and somewhere where we can go, where we're not violating with American aircraft and Belgian paratroopers the inviolable air space of countries who would not give us permission if we asked, so we don't ask, we just violate their air space anyway with a military operation, what they will call a military operation.

Then they said -- I'll never forget it -- "You know, these goddamn Belgians. They say they can use one battalion. Some guy Laurel, Colonel Laurel, do you know Laurel? He said we can do it with one battalion."

I said, "Well, Colonel Laurel, in 1960, jumped five times in combat in the Congo. He knows it intimately." And I said, "Furthermore, Colonel Laurel has jumped over 1,000 times."

They looked at me, and they said, "Jesus Christ! We've got nobody that's done that." [Laughter]

So they went back, and then they came up with the idea that we'd pick up the Belgian -- they gave the code name for the operation Dragon Rouge, Red Dragon. I've forgotten the origin of it, but it sounded like a great name. They had worked out a business where we'd have to get some permission, where we would pick up the Belgian paratroopers at a small air base in northern Belgium. We would fly them to Spain to refuel, then we would fly all the way down to Ascension Island, under British business, and then we would regroup and fly over, when the operation was on, to the Congo. So it was up to our governments to get permission from Spain for a refueling flight and Britain for a refueling flight and a rest. We got the permission, and the flight -- everything went according to plan, except that when they got to Ascension Island, deep in the South Atlantic, some string British journalist sent off a wire -- there was no censorship or anything -- to a paper in London, saying that American planes with some uniformed characters had landed in the Ascensions. Well, this got a very low play. We had some cooperation from our British friends.

But the operation, then they rested. It's a long flight, I think an 11-, 12-hour flight, something like that. And the interesting thing about the operation is that going down -- Colonel Graggle told me this later -- Colonel Graggle commanded the American squadron of six or seven planes, because we had jeeps, we had all the armament, jeeps, equipment for these guys. Maybe it was five planes; I can't remember, somewhere between five and seven. He said, "As we flew down from Spain, I got Colonel Laurel up in the co-pilot's seat, then we moved back to a little office place I have in the plane." And he said, "I want to talk to you about the operation itself. What height do you want to jump at -- 1,200 feet? That's what we use for maneuvers, and even then we break a few legs. And I remember Colonel Graggle saying so well, 'Twelve-hundred feet? Twelve-hundred feet? If we drop my men at 1,200 feet on these tiny little airfields, they'll be
scattered in the brush all around, and the Simbas will cut their throats one by one. We must jump at 550 feet."

Graggle said, "550 feet? There's hardly any time for the parachute to open."

He said, "We've done it before. We jump at 550 feet." Now he said, "It won't be a jump where we empty the plane. It's going to take maybe four or five passes. I'll be in your plane, the lead plane. I will jump with at least 12 men, 14 if we can get them. Four of them will have light machine guns. We'll hit the ground and center this place. The next plane will come along and drop a packet of 12 right on the area; the next one will. We'll make three or four passes, whatever is necessary. When our first unit hits the ground, we'll start spraying the jungle automatically, and the operation must be exactly at dawn, because at dawn the Simbas, the natives, are very, very nervous. They're edgy, they're jumpy, they're not in control. So we jump at dawn, 550 feet in packages of 12 to 14, so that we all hit on the airfield, and then as soon as we're down, the two planes with the jeeps come in, and we load up and go into Stan."

Well, that's the way the operation was conducted. Graggle told me, he said, "From the moment the first guy hit the ground until the first jeep loaded with ten Belgian paratroopers started pulling away was 23 minutes." Twenty-three minutes! An incredible operation. He said, "We could learn a lot from the Belgians." So we got into Stanleyville.

I should have mentioned that while we were waiting in the Ascension Islands, then we flew over to a base in the Congo, the question came up each day, "Go or no go?" There was about a three-day hiatus between the time we landed in the Ascensions and finally went, when we were in the Belgian side. We had a direct line from the embassy to the White House, using a NATO setup, and every night after the planes were in Ascension, the prime minister, whose official residence was only a block away, would walk over all alone to the embassy, the defense minister, whose defense ministry was a block and a half away, would walk up along the edge of the park and come in, and Mr. Spaak, who lived about a mile and a half away, would drive his car down and park in the boulevard just above the embassy and walk the block. The "go or no-go" room was the small upstairs library in the embassy, where we had the direct wire to the White House. The "go or no-go" depended basically on weather, because in those areas, you can have tropical storms suddenly or thunderstorms, things of that kind, that can screw up the whole business. They had to have a fix on the weather. And with the time, there was a slight time difference.

So we were hooked right through to the State Department and the White House. We talked to the President, the Secretary first and then he was on the wire, and we talked to the President. We got the go signal, and they went. I described the operation. They got into Polis. When the Simbas understood what was happening, they started lining these people up, and some of them started shooting, and there were a number of the hostages wounded, but none fatally wounded. We lost not one single person killed in that operation. It was extraordinary. It's the only good one we've done since the war, where we haven't had a problem of one kind or another.

Then there was a sigh of relief. We rescued about 1,700 hostages there, including 1,500 to 1,700 -- I've forgotten the exact numbers. Spaak gave me a call and said he had to see me right away, and he came over. He said, "The prime minister wants to have us continue this operation to Polis,
which is about 300 miles to the north, where their 300 people will certainly be butchered."

Spaak and I, as part of the business of the announcement, when the operation was go and the planes had left, we informed the United Nations' Secretary General, the U.S. and Belgian Governments did, we informed everybody, we issued a great press release and said this was not a military operation, it was a humanitarian operation to save hostages, and that we would withdraw upon completion of the mission of saving these hostages.

Well, then Monsieur Le Fevre, the Belgian prime minister, wanted to go on a second target. Le Fevre had no foreign affairs experience at all. Spaak and I were very reluctant, even though the lives of 300 hostages were involved, because we said, "We committed ourselves to this operation, and then we say we're going to get out. We've done it successfully, we've picked up 1,500 to 1,700 hostages and saved their lives. They're not going to die, they're being tended to and everything, and now we're going on another one. The Africans, spurred on by Moscow and Peking, will say, 'This is just the first of a beginning of things. They're out to reimpose colonialism,' and all the rest of it."

So we were very reluctant, and the prime minister was very insistent, so I finally said, "Well, I'm not willing to recommend this to the President unless you give me your commitment, Mr. Prime Minister, that this will be the last. If we go in Polis, it's Polis and out. Otherwise, I will recommend strongly against it. There's got to be a cutoff and so forth."

Spaak approved immediately and said, "That's the only way we can preserve our position." So we then got on the thing with Mr. Saggers, the defense minister, and Spaak, and I think Stevie Davignon, who later became quite famous as commissioner of the European Community. He was Spaak's deputy chef de cabinet. Robert Rothschild, later ambassador to London, who was chef de cabinet, myself, my DCM, in this little room, about half again as big as this.

Q: This room we're talking about is about 15 by 15.

MACARTHUR: Yes. I would think that this one, the one we were in, was about 22 by 15, but it wasn't cluttered up as this one is. We got through to the Secretary and the President. Le Fevre spoke no English to speak of, so I explained the situation to the President, and also said that there were thought to be perhaps as many as 15 or 20 Americans in this group, that we recognized that this could only be a final move, that we had made a commitment to the United Nations that it was a rescue operation and we'd get out after it was completed. This could be considered as the second stage of an operation which was in two stages, and that I had the solemn commitment of the prime minister and the foreign minister that after the Polis operation, we would pull out immediately.

The President said, "All right. Did you get it in writing?" [Laughter]

I said, "No, sir. I will if you want."

He said, "Did they give you their word or something like that?"
I said, "They gave me their word of honor."
He said, "Well, all right, Doug, but this is the last, the very last, the last I want to hear of any more operations." [Laughter]

So we were very nervous about the Polis operation, because it's in an area where there are sudden literally downpours, buckets of water, storms come and so forth, and the field was an earth field, and if you get one of those things, our planes could get down and get stuck in the mud and couldn't get out. So we signed off with the President saying, "The operation is going to go tomorrow morning unless there's a weather thing, in which case we'll call back and say it's been postponed."

Well, the Belgians watched the weather, and they knew it fairly well, and the operation went off well. We saved 300 more people up there, including several Americans, and we brought them back and we pulled out, and the operation was over.

Q: What was President Johnson's initial reaction to this? Not the second operation, but when it was first sprung.

MACARTHUR: I had worked with President Johnson when I had met him and been his escort officer when he was Vice President. President Johnson was a very skilled American political operator, but he knew virtually nothing about foreign affairs, but he surrounded himself with some very good people, you know, solid people, people with good judgment and common sense. We didn't go through this business of having, like President Reagan has, five National Security Advisors in six or seven years.

Q: Most of whom are not really very skilled.

MACARTHUR: And he had skilled people, and they were people, basically, of good judgment. I think if I were picking out a guy to advise me, or if I were picking out an ambassador, I would give perhaps the highest rating not to his brilliance or his intellect, but to his basic good judgment and common sense, because it is judgment and common sense and weighing all the factors, and then arriving at that balance, where it's either yes or no that counts. "Soapy," of course; Livy Merchant, the European guy, was a guy of balanced judgment, even though they had the European interests at heart; Bob Bowie, who was head of the policy planning staff, a superb balance of judgment in the Department; Dean Rusk, a very balanced man, but he had good people around him of balance and judgment. On foreign affairs, the President did not know enough himself and did not have enough experience to be able to make those judgments.

You asked me what President Johnson's reaction was. I would say his reaction was a grudging, "Well, I guess it's the right thing to do." I don't mean those words, but that was the spirit of his reaction.

Q: We're not talking about somebody who was eager to get out and try his military muscles.

MACARTHUR: Absolutely not. We're talking about somebody that's thinking of the political implications, who is thinking about our heavy involvement already in Vietnam, who is thinking
that the American people don't want another adventure in a dark continent, as it were, and so forth. I think that the operation went superbly well. I mean, you know, there have been a couple of other brilliant operations that have been carried out, one by the Israelis and another by the West Germans, but this operation, none of the (inaudible), they've been basically operations against hijacked planes or something, but this was an operation involving thousands and thousands of miles, when you think of down to the Ascension Island and then all the way back over to the thing, back up and around, one battalion, the way the operation went, the coordination between the Belgian and American commanders later on.

Q: This, by the way, bypassed NATO, I take it.

MACARTHUR: No, we informed NATO. We informed NATO of what we were doing. We kept them fully informed. I should have mentioned that. When we informed the United States, before we did it, we informed NATO and so forth. The British, of course, already knew from our visits, but we were very careful. I think Spaak himself went and informed the NATO council of what we were up to before we took off. So that NATO was fully informed about the nature of the operation, the commitment that it was not a military operation as such, but a humanitarian rescue operation, the commitment to withdraw afterwards and so forth. As I say, the only itchy point that came up is when Le Fevre suddenly said he wanted to go in Polis, took Spaak and myself completely aback, because the other thing had gone just like the pictures in the book. As a medical doctor once said to me when I asked him how my operation had gone, he said, "Just like the pictures in the book." And that's the way the Dragon Rouge went. But I think I could have been elected vice mayor of Brussels.

Q: I was going to say how did this sit after it was all over.

MACARTHUR: Well, with the Belgians, they were just ecstatic. You see, this operation saved over 1,500 Belgians that would have been butchered, and that's quite a little when you think that we get concerned about 100 or so. And also it had the double effect, although that was not the primary objective by any means, it broke the back of the resistance. This operation smashing in, taking Stanleyville, going up to Polis, broke the back of the insurrection and led to the reunification of Zaire, as it's now called, the Congo. So there was the mission which was accomplished, and the side effect which was every bit as valuable in the longer term or more valuable in the longer term politically, the smashing of the back of an insurrection supported by Moscow and so forth to break up the Congo into things where you could pick up a few client states that you could operate around the surrounding eight countries that surrounded, and expand the influence and so forth.

I would say that it goes down as one -- and not just because I happened to be U.S. coordinator for the operation with the Belgian Government, but just because the conception by our military people and the execution was 100%. You couldn't possibly improve on it.

Q: Did this turn things around as far as American-Belgian relations were concerned?

MACARTHUR: Oh, sure. As I say, as American ambassador, I could have almost run for mayor of Brussels and won.
Q: Did we have other concerns with Belgium?

MACARTHUR: This was the big thing that dominated the four years. That's why we spent so much time on it. We had no problems with Belgium as such. I mean, we had no trade problems with them of any serious consequence. We had a deep interest, because of Spaak's influence, two things that we spent a lot of time on, of course, were working and keeping informed of the Belgian views and positions on European unification and on NATO. Because Spaak, you must remember, had been a former secretary general of NATO, so the business of notifying NATO about this operation, as a former secretary general, he was the person to do it and did it magnificently. But we really had no serious problems.

We had a problem where I had a prise de bec, a beak-to-beak confrontation with the head of Union Minière, because we discovered through intelligence that they were giving some aid to the Katanga rebels or they were encouraging them and giving them some kind of resources. But that did not involve the government, because Mr. Spaak was 100% on my side on this thing. In fact, it was in support of what the Belgian Government was doing. That was on the business side.

On the economic side, we were trying to keep the economic policies of the common market, particularly in the agricultural field, I must say without too much success, because agriculture is so important to the political parties in Western Europe that are in power. We were trying to keep the discriminations that are built into the common agricultural policy within limits that were bearable. But as I say, when you are fortunate enough to have such close personal relationships with a foreign minister or prime minister, where you can talk with complete frankness and they talk with complete frankness, so that you can expose their considerations, because very frequently -- you have worked in the Department and so have I -- we keep thinking of our policy and our point of view and our problems, domestic and foreign and international or whatever they may be, but the other guy's problems, he's got political problems, too, of a very serious nature. And we know our Congress; their number one motive is not the national interest of the United States in the first instance. Their primary objective is to get re-elected. Sure. They say they're both the same, because "When I get re-elected, I will support the national interests of the United States." But when they vote for things, and you see some of the add-ons and some of the amendments that are proposed, those are not in the perceived interest of the United States by its government or by, in some cases, a very substantial majority of the Congress.

So they have their political problems of a comparable nature. They are people who have interests in getting re-elected, and who depend on support, money, and votes from certain groups and so forth. They have in-fighting within administrations, as we do. If Washington understands all these things, and you can give them a feel of the nature of the problems and what the government is up against, I think it makes the possibility of arriving at some sort of a compromise, it makes you a little less dogmatic about your own position.

I've had positions until I've understood, really, more about the other thing, where I modified my recommendation, because I modified it in a way in which I thought would not at all impair the fundamental problem, the national interest and the problem we were doing. But it would help and perhaps give them a fig leaf to cover a certain area of nudity that they had if it just weren't
the way we originally proposed.

Q: How was the Vietnamese War playing? It must have been rather difficult, wasn't it? We were beginning our buildup at the time you were there.

MACARTHUR: Yes, the buildup began with President Kennedy, when he sent 16,000 combat troops to Vietnam early in his administration -- '62, I think it was. President Eisenhower refused to do that. I think I've already recorded the fact that when the French asked us to bomb the Viet Minh around Dien Bien Phu, Admiral Radford said that he could do it, he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he with his two carriers off there, President Eisenhower pointed out -- and I think it's a lesson that every President should remember, the position he took -- he pointed out that for us to go in and bomb in the jungles around Dien Bien Phu would not in any way break the stranglehold they had. People just pull back until the bombers go away; then they move right back in. But that once we had committed our military forces, even the Air Force, to a military operation, we then had only one of two choices if it failed -- to retreat with our tail between our legs and show all our friends and allies that we were all bluff and we conducted these operations, but when they didn't work, we pulled out and abandoned, or to go in and pursue it to the end with as much force, ground forces and everything else that was required. President Eisenhower said in that luncheon meeting, which I was one of a very small group, which included the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State, "Never while I'm President will we go in with ground troops into Vietnam."

Q: But how did the Belgians feel about this? In a way, we were supporting a colonial war of a nature in Vietnam. Or was this not as much of an issue while you were there as it became later?

MACARTHUR: This wasn't much of an issue. You know, the thing that we so often forget in the Foreign Service is that to most people in Europe that don't have direct interest -- and France had a direct interest, Britain had an interest in Hong Kong -- but to the rest of the continent of Europe, the Far East and the Pacific, what happens there is not their business. They've got no commitments there, they're not going to get involved there, and "that's America's problem; let America deal with that." That's a fact of life that you have to do. They couldn't care less. I say they couldn't care less; that's perhaps not quite fair. But what I mean is they don't feel any involvement, they don't feel anything; that's somebody else's problem. "We've got problems of our own in Europe with the Russians here along the line there, the Iron Curtain, and we've got problems with our decolonialization, we've got problems with this, that, and the other. What happens in the Pacific, to hell with it."

Q: One last thing, and then I think we might come back another time to pursue this.

MACARTHUR: Yes.

Q: During all this time, there was one set of initials that wasn't mentioned at all -- the CIA. Again, this is an unclassified interview, but at that time, did they have much intelligence or much input on the Congo?

MACARTHUR: I don't remember anything coming to me that I can recall that was significant
coming from the CIA. Perhaps they didn't send it to me. I don't recall it. But the basic source of our information of what was happening there was from Belgian sources who were there, and, of course, the Belgian sources, they put the military in 1960, when they put down the insurrection, because when the lives of so many tens of thousands of Belgians were threatened, many of whom returned after that, but after that, they gave the Congo their independence. I'm sure we had CIA operatives there, but the Belgians, who still were operating these very large almost -- I wouldn't call them communal farms, but these huge agricultural installations and Union Miniere's operations and the business operations, their people were going back and forth all the time with information about Spaak and his government sometimes coming to see me, with what was happening in that particular area and so forth.

They were still running these things, because the Congolese had never been prepared for independence, and they didn't have any people capable of administering and running industries or these huge collective farms and things of that kind. So there was a constant flow of information coming in from different parts of the Congo that we got in Brussels, and that the Belgian Government got 1,000 times of what we got in the embassy. Spaak would pass it on to us.

But I don't remember the CIA being a significant information factor. Certainly it wasn't insofar as the operations were concerned of Dragon Rouge or our decision to go in there. As I say, I'm sure they had people there, and they probably had information on the assistance that was being channeled through Congo Brazzaville and so forth, and attempts made to do it through Burundi by the Russians that some Chinese aid was filtering in. But the station chief in Brussels, whom I liked and admired very much, he was a very bright guy, he picked up all sorts of information from his various contacts in Belgian intelligence and the like, but all that was made available to me as part of my embassy input. It isn't like some CIA station chiefs, you send it back to Washington without letting the ambassador know anything about it.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, the last time we met, we discussed your time in Belgium. I'd like to move to your reassignment to the United States as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, often known as "H," in Department of State lingo. How did this assignment come about?

MACARTHUR: I must go back just a little bit. When I was still ambassador to Belgium, shortly before President Kennedy's assassination, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, whom I had known since my days as counselor of the Department, made an official visit to Belgium. Lyndon Johnson was supposed to know very little about foreign affairs, but his Belgian trip was a very considerable success, both in the personal way he handled it, and with the press reaction over there to his visit. He had an excellent meeting with the King and struck it off very well with Paul Henri Spaak.

Indeed, after one formal dinner, he had Spaak, who was the foreign minister, one of the great statesmen of that time, one of the fathers of the European Community, come back to the embassy. Vice President Johnson took him down into the kitchen, where we scrambled eggs for the foreign minister. It was a good human visit, and he enjoyed it. I had known him, as I say, and had contacts with him before.
President Kennedy was assassinated. Johnson became President. On New Year's Eve 1964, I got a telephone call from the Department, from the Secretary for Administrative Affairs, saying that I was to return on the next available flight, because the President wanted to see me on January 2nd about a new job. I got away on New Year's Day, the next day, January 1, 1965, and flew back. On the next day, January 2nd, I think it was, I went in to see the President.

The President said that he wanted me to give up the ambassadorship to Belgium and come back and be Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. So I said to him, "Mr. President, my whole life has been spent in the formulation or execution of foreign policy. Why do you think I have the capability of doing this job?"

He said, "You know an awful lot of people on Capitol Hill from your days here in the Eisenhower Administration. You also hosted two successive American delegations to the Inter-Parliamentary Union in two successive years, and briefed them and their wives and everybody. You're extremely well thought of on the Hill. Furthermore, with your name, the people on the other side of the aisle, the Republicans, with the name Douglas MacArthur II, you certainly have a psychological business there. Your wife being the daughter of Alben Barkley, the great senator and former Vice President of the United States under Truman, gives you an entre on the Democratic side. Your general knowledge and the great assistance you gave me makes me think that you can do the job."

I said to him, "I'm very reluctant to take it, Mr. President, because I'm a professional man, and my profession is formulation and execution of foreign policy. It's exactly as if you asked a distinguished gent in another profession, say the medical profession, about my age, in his fifties, who had gone fairly high in his profession, to abandon the practice of medicine and become a lobbyist for the A.M.A."

He said, "I want you to take it."

I said, "I will take it for two years. That is the life of a congressional tour. But beyond that, I really don't want to spend the rest of my life doing congressional relations." I said, "My life is in the foreign field."

And he said, "All right, we've got a deal. You take it for two years."

Well, two years came and went, and nothing happened. After two and a half years, I reminded him of our agreement. After about two years and eight or nine months, I went back into the field again to another embassy.

CHARLES HIGGINSON
Generalist, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels, Belgium 1962-1966

Born in Massachusetts, Mr. Higginson graduated from Harvard University and
entered law practice before joining the Foreign Service in 1961. During his career he served in Brussels, Algiers, Rome and Luxembourg, dealing primarily with international organizations such as the European Community (EC), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the OECD. In Washington Mr. Higginson again dealt primarily with international organizations and issues. Mr. Higginson was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

HIGGINSON: Then my first assignment was to the embassy in Brussels. Ambassador Doug MacArthur was reigning at that time. He was in Washington and I duly visited him and paid my respects. Then I left after the Fourth of July holiday for Brussels to go to the embassy. When I arrived in Brussels, I was told that, no, I wasn't at the embassy, that I would be at the U.S. Mission to the European Community, which was my desire all along, so I was delighted. This was an FSO general assignment. The idea was that I and a couple of other FSO classmates would rotate between the U.S. Mission and the embassy in Brussels. That way, you could get visa experience and commercial work and the whole gambit. However, the agreement to do this, which had been carefully worked out by the DCMS of the embassy, the Belgians, and the U.S. Mission, collapsed and the two ambassadors, Doug MacArthur and Walt Butterworth were in a rival situation and would not discuss it any further. Therefore, I spent two years at the U.S. Mission to the European Community and was very glad of the chance.

Q: Doing a variety of things probably.

HIGGINSON: I was by far the most junior officer by about three grades and was working on economic matters primarily, since I was a lawyer, the European Communities Anti-Trust Program, which was my chief interest. I also worked on the entry of third countries into the European Community, the enlargement. The big issue at that time was the English negotiations to enter the Common Market. One recollection I have is that, as an FSO generalist, I didn't really have a desk and was moved around through various offices. The political counselor, Jack Larson, who I couldn't think more highly of, was off on home leave, so I took over his desk for two months. I remember going through his files and reading up on the reporting on the U.K. entry and was less than surprised when Mr. de Gaulle vetoed their entry. I think we and the English were rather optimistic when we thought they would be allowed to enter at that time. This was a good time to be in the U.S. Mission to the European Community because we were very much in support of the success of the Community. George Ball, who was Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, had quite a substantial influence in the original drafting, especially the anti-trust provisions of the European Community, the Rome Treaty. We worked very closely with the Community as a beneficial member mostly in urging the rest of the European Community countries to stand up the French.

Q: Were we working primarily with the Commission, in effect, the executive staff of the Community at that time or more with delegations from other member countries?

HIGGINSON: We were involved very closely with the Commission. My first ambassador, Walt Butterworth, and then later for three years, Jack Tuthill, worked very closely with Walter Holstein and the European Community staff. Almost all of my contacts were with the European Community staff. The other members of the U.S. Mission worked with the various perm reps of
the six member states of the European Community, some of whom were very helpful in keeping us informed.

Q: Who was the DCM while you were there?

HIGGINSON: Most of the time, Russell Fessenden was the DCM. He is one of the best career Foreign Service officers I know. He knew all of the substance. He took care of run of the mill work of the mission, (inaudible) concentrate on the overall policy and do think pieces. Russ Fessenden also paid close attention to what the various members of the mission were doing and was very helpful and a friend of mine. I can't speak highly enough of the man.

Q: It looks to me from something you've said already that you were in Brussels at the Mission to the European Community for four years. Is that right? If so, that's a very unusual first assignment.

HIGGINSON: Yes, that is so. I was reassigned for two years. The Department of Justice wished to send a Department of Justice official to the U.S. Mission to follow the new European Community legal issues. The powers in the State Department did not wish to have the U.S. Mission encumbered with any more outside agencies than possible. Therefore, my legal background was of use to the Department and I got reassigned specifically to follow the anti-trust law. Also, at that time the American Bar Association was having a meeting there and they, too, were extremely interested in the anti-trust law, so it was important for the Mission to follow that very carefully.

Q: The anti-trust legal framework of the Community was just being developed at that time or was it already in place and being implemented?

HIGGINSON: The Rome Treaty, George Ball did a lot of drafting. Obviously, it copies a lot of U.S. anti-trust provisions. But they had not been implemented. Commissioner Van Der Groeben, Director General Fore was the anti-trust man there, and the way he implemented the Rome Treaty was to make it necessary for all appropriations to file any agreements they had with other corporations and also notify on all merger agreements. So, therefore, those rules were just being published while I was there and U.S. lawyers were extremely interested and U.S. law firms were beginning to come into Brussels in some numbers.

Q: The people at that point who were primarily interested were U.S. law firms, the Department of Justice. What about U.S. multinational firms themselves? Were they coming around to the Mission or not so much yet?

HIGGINSON: Yes, some of them would come around. But it was just beginning. Ford Motor Company set up their international office in Brussels. They were around a fair amount. Lykes Lines, the shipping company, came around. They were interested in the European Community making common rules for the dimensions of barges in Europe. This affected future building plans of Lykes Lines. International Telephone and Telegraph was located in Brussels. But the big move to Brussels really occurred after I was there. They were coming and it was obvious what was going to happen, but most of them weren't there yet. Brussels was still a reasonably sleepy
town. Cleary Gottlieb was the lead U.S. law firm in the town. That was George Ball's old law firm. The senior representative there, Andy Newburg, had been in Brussels for some time. He knew both the Belgian side and the European Community side. By the time I arrived, I knew him and he introduced me to both, but I never knew most of the players on the Belgian side the way you did. Nobody that I know ever came to the same situation he did.

Q: This was, as you say, kind of an early period in the Community. The Commission, the staff, was still relatively small and manageable compared with what it later became. I assume it was easy to move around without a lot of bureaucracy and difficulty.

HIGGINSON: The European Community staff was pretty large. It must have been at least 1,000 people. However, the relationship was very much different. We had ready access at all levels of the European Community staff and really knew the ones that we had to deal with on a first name basis. They were just implementing their rules and they were fascinated by what the U.S. had done in integrating our country. They had a lot to learn and we had a lot to offer them.

Q: We were not a member. We were not inside the tent of the six. Certainly, as you say, George Ball, the connections with somebody like Jean Monet, they were looking to us in larger issues, but also in smaller ones as well.

HIGGINSON: We weren't in the tent officially, but unofficially, we were very close to being a member. In those days that it was alright to be a real supporter of the European Community and the Department set up an area of Atlantic specialists, people who would just concentrate on the U.S.-European issues and economic issues.

Q: But still, the French were very difficult and probably rather resented that kind of an American role.

HIGGINSON: Oh, absolutely. The French knew perfectly well that some of the perm reps were telling us exactly what happened at each meeting and were not appreciative of it. The French sent some unbelievably capable diplomats as their permanent reps to the European Community and had a tremendous influence. I take my hat off to the Quai d'Orsay.

Q: Is there anything else we ought to cover about this four year assignment to the U.S. Mission to the European Community?

HIGGINSON: From a very young Foreign Service officer point of view, I was the chief of the mission up in Luxembourg for a short period of time when the member of our delegation who lived up there following the Coal and Steel Community went on vacation and I went up there. Nothing much happened except that one of the High Commissioners died and the issue was what level do you correspond? Does the President do it to a High Commissioner or is it the Secretary of State? I remember all sorts of problems in trying to resolve that issue. I think they ended up with the President writing, which was not exact protocol but was another sign of the U.S. trying to foster and support this new supranational European organization.

Q: When you covered this responsibility in Luxembourg, you were part of the embassy. You were
not the chargé. You were just doing the Coal and Steel part of the embassy's responsibilities.

HIGGINSON: Originally, the U.S. Mission to the European Communities was located in Luxembourg because the Coal and Steel Community was the oldest European institution. Then when the Common Market was created, the Mission and finally the ambassador, all before I arrived, moved to Brussels. By the time I was there, there was only one person in the U.S. Mission to the Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg. That, too, ceased to exist by a year later. Everything was handled from Brussels.

Q: At that point, that officer was, in a sense, part of the U.S. Mission to the European Communities and was resident in Luxembourg, not part of the embassy?

HIGGINSON: Correct, being supported by the embassy, but not part of the embassy. That was closed down as a budgetary move some time ago. My chief accomplishment, one that I feel most proud of, was working with the Department of Justice and the Assistant U.S. Attorney Generals for Anti-Trust. They had to come to Paris to the OECD anti-trust meetings twice a year. Usually, they would come up to Brussels to talk to the European Communities. I worked upon and finally drafted a letter of cooperation. My chief fear was that the anti-trust provisions would be used to discriminate against large American firms. That has turned out to be a legitimate worry, but only about 15 years after I left. The agreement provided that before either anti-trust division would take an action against a company of its states, it would notify the other and hold discussions if there were any questions.

Q: That was an agreement that you negotiated or helped prepare between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Commission of the European Communities?

HIGGINSON: Yes. It was an exchange of letters from Van Der Groeben and Assistant Attorney General Turner, head of the Anti-Trust Division. One of our more famous judges now is Leon Heginbotham, who was an early Assistant U.S. Attorney for Anti-Trust Affairs. He came up from Paris and I was going to meet him at the airport. I said, "I'm quite tall. I'll be wearing a dark suit so that you'll be able to recognize me." He laughed and said, "Don't worry, I'll be the only black man getting off of that airplane." It showed how he had risen above that issue. He was a great man.

Q: Still is. I think he's at the Kennedy School or Harvard University, has a connection there now. You had mentioned earlier that one of the reasons for the extension of your assignment in Brussels to a second two years for a total of four years was to preempt the need for the Department of Justice to have their own person in the Mission. How did you get along with Justice overall and did they feel that you were meeting their needs for the kind of work that they had wanted done there?

HIGGINSON: I got along very well with a total of three U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Anti-Trust Affairs, some of whom I've kept in touch with. I'm not sure that I was quite so popular with the Justice Department staff, who would have loved to have come to Brussels, but luckily my contacts were almost exclusively with the Deputy Assistant Secretaries so that I had no problem and they couldn't have been more helpful to me.
THOMAS W. FINA
Political Officer
Brussels (1963-1965)

Thomas W. Fina was born in Pennsylvania on March 25, 1924. He served in the U.S. Air Force for two years. He received a bachelor's degree and a master's degree from Harvard University. His career included positions in Paris, Bologna, Luxembourg, Brussels, Milan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Fina was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 21, 1992.

Q: What was the name of the mission in Brussels?

FINA: The Mission to the Communities was called USEC. And when I arrived, the Ambassador was W. Walton Butterworth.

Q: Walton Butterworth.

FINA: W. Walton Butterworth. Although I only knew him from afar (Luxembourg!) he was a very impressive man, with a wonderful knowledge of the subject, a professional diplomatist, of whom the United States could be proud. He and his wife were regal figures but very considerate of staff and very kind to my wife and myself.

Eventually I was summoned to move to Brussels, which was where the main mission was located. I moved there in 1963 to become assistant to Jack Myerson, the very astute and experienced Political Officer, a career Foreign Service Officer. Jack was very knowledgeable about trade problems as well as about US-European affairs and enjoyed the full confidence of both Butterworth and John Tuthill who succeeded him as Ambassador just as I arrived in Brussels.

Tuthill, another career officer, had formerly headed our mission to the OECD, and had made some of the major changes in the OECD -- in fact, changed the OEEC to the OECD. Like Butterworth, he seemed to be at the peak of his powers and authority during the heroic phase of the development of the European Communities.

In Brussels I had three main jobs -- four main jobs. I was chief of protocol. That was kind of a funny experience, I enjoyed it very much at the time, and it suddenly came into its own when President Kennedy was murdered, and then I actually worked hard. I learned that questions of protocol are genuinely important not only to diplomats but in daily living as well.

More demanding of my time and stimulating, was that I served as speech writer for an Ambassador who had a lot to say and wanted it said well. Additionally, I followed political questions with the Commission, that's the executive body of the European communities. Political questions in the sense of, what the European communities were doing in the big political picture,
what their policy objectives were, or what they were going to do. While my boss, Jack Myerson, was the overall political advisor to the Ambassador, he was especially focused on trade policy which, of course, was the center of our relations with the Communities. This was especially true during the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations.

I tried to know people throughout the three Communities, the Parliament and the related bodies just as a good journalist would. They were a stimulating group of people, almost all men, excited about creating a new world. These were heady times. Perhaps my most useful and rewarding relationship was with Emil Noel, who was then the Secretary General of the European Communities, a French protégé of Guy Mollet. Noel was one of the most impressive, able, civil servants I have ever met anywhere, and we had a very good relationship. And I must say I benefitted enormously from my working with him.

So that was '63 to '65, and working for Jack Tuthill was just a continuous education. He was a very stimulating man who gave me lots of opportunities, gave everyone an opportunity, was appreciative and a good critic. I have been a great admirer and warm friend of his ever since. He was one of our great ambassadors as far I'm concerned.

Q: Well now, as you were there, I'm talking about you and the American delegation look at this, view the major countries as far as their cooperation? I mean were there some that gave annoyance all the time as far as where we felt things should be going? I'm thinking obviously of France, Germany, and Great Britain, particularly.

FINA: This was the period before the British had been admitted to the Communities and the issue of their admittance was a central political issue between the French (General De Gaulle) and the others.

Q: But they were a factor all the time, weren't they?

FINA: They were always the factor. They were always just over the horizon. We wanted the British in the Communities, and we made no bones about it. The French wanted them out, and made no bones about it, and they had a vote. The British sometimes wanted to be in, and sometimes wanted to be out. While I was in Brussels, we were still supporters of the concept of European unification. I might say that ended with the Nixon administration, but that's down the line. At this point we were committed to doing everything we could to bring about European unification, behind the scenes, before the scenes, while protecting our immediate political and commercial interests. Well, the French, the French Government, were always difficult from our point of view. French officers, who were seconded to the European communities, or who were direct employees of the European communities, were a different kettle of fish. the French had, and may still have, the most able, best prepared, cadre of civil servants of any of the European countries, as far as I could see, very possibly including the United States. French civil servants and diplomats were of the first water, well educated, sophisticated, with a great sense of the state, which I think is something that often is lacking in American diplomats, and lamentably, in American presidents, but not so in the case of French civil servants.

Q: Excuse me, when you say "a sense of state"?
FINA: I mean a sense of the responsibility of the individual for the collectivity of the state, not as seen from the point of view of one political party or another, but the state as the collectivity of Frenchmen, or Americans, which has a stature that overarches the individual political parties, and the political institutions. A sense that one has a loyalty to the community that one represents, and that requires comportment of a certain dignity. The state is important. It has not only a juridical existence, but it has a philosophical and ideological existence as well which you, as a statesman, or as a politician, to some degree represent. And in doing that, you carry some of the historical burden of the state, and your actions are informed by a recognition of the past of that community. It means the sense that you represent something more than this morning’s cable that you’ve gotten from Paris about what you’re supposed to do. And that you're invested with a certain dignity because you represent a historical community tradition. That's what I'm talking about.

Anyway, the French have that, or at least the ones with whom I dealt, had that to a degree that practically no one else did, except, perhaps, the British. So they were very difficult, very effective people if you were in conflict, as was the case when they were opposing the admission of the British. They were very effective. On the other hand their people in the Commission were very effective in carrying out the goals of the Commission. So the French, and France, are two different things, and sometimes they were our best friends, and sometimes they were the people we most regretted.

The Germans, I think, were almost uniformly the good guys. They were very much in favor of European unification without protectionism. They supported the enlargement of the community. They wanted it to work. They made sacrifices for it to work. A lot of their people were absolutely first rate, not quite of the glittering skill, I would say, of the French but very impressive.

The Italians were totally committed to the success of the European community. They were committed on ideological and political grounds. They believed in a united Europe. There's a long tradition of Europeanism in Italy that goes back to the 1800s. Carlo Sforza, the first post-war Italian Foreign Minister, had been a great advocate of European unification. So they had the political will, and this includes the Catholics of course, who have a vision of a Catholic Europe. They also saw it as economically advantageous to Italy, and the Community has given the Italian economy a shot in the arm, and has helped to bring it to the very high level of efficiency and prosperity that it knows today.

But in terms of the personnel with whom I dealt with at the time, I'm sorry to say, they were poorly represented. Italians don't really want to leave Italy, and Italian politicians especially don't want to leave the home playing field where all the plums and all the careers are made. No one would dream of leaving Rome, which is where political intrigue boils from morning till morning. You know if you turn your back, you've had it. So you could never get a political figure of any significance to go to the European Community institutions. Not even as a reward for after you've been thrown out of something, could you get any Italian politician...a guy with political savvy, and skills, to come up there. Their best representatives were their top career diplomats like Prince Colonna. Otherwise, there were a lot of second string people. When it came to the
recruitment of civil servants, the Italians really don't want to leave home. It's a much too nice place to be, so it was difficult to employ people even at the secretarial, or the middle levels, as well. That isn't to say there weren't some good ones, there were. But it was a genuine problem.

So when you attended a meeting of the Council of Ministers, which I did all the time as an observer, you'd see the French delegation come in and there would be Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, big, handsome, striding into the room followed by a series of experts with briefcases, each one more brilliant than the predecessor. And eventually the Italian ambassador would arrive because the Minister couldn't make it, the plane broke down, or he couldn't come. So the Italian ambassador would arrive, and he'd come with somebody from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

And that was sort of the way it ran. The French fielded a brilliant team on every occasion, at every level. And I'm afraid that the people who brought up the rear were the Italians who always came...they were charming, and they knew what they wanted lots of times, but they didn't pack the clout that their vote would have given them.

The Germans were in between. They were the real heavyweights. They got a lot of the things they wanted, but they weren't quite at the level of the French.

The Belgians, I think, were pretty good although they knew that they were a small power. The Dutch were very strongly committed to European integration, they did a good job. They would, I suppose, rank close to the French in terms of their competence, and their commitment, but they weren't a great power. That makes a difference in the kind of clout you have.

Q: Was Greece in it at the time, or not?

FINA: No, my period was when there were only the six. The three Benelux countries, France, Germany, and Italy.

Q: The instructions that were coming from Washington, George Ball was pretty well calling the shots, wasn't he for most of that time?

FINA: Yes, he was in general terms. But no single individual really dictated all of our activities because so many government agencies and interests were involved.

Q: Were there some feelings at all among the delegation that George Ball being a colleague and a disciple of Jean Monnet, was almost too pro-European? I mean, did you feel sometimes that maybe the United States was selling out the store, or something like that?

FINA: Not in our team. We were all Ball supporters.

Q: Ball-ites.

FINA: Ball-ites. We thought he was great. We thought that what he was doing, and what we were trying to do, was profoundly in the interest of the United States. That it was the enlightened
thing to do for the interests of our country, bearing in mind the events of the First World War, the Great Depression of which we were all very conscious. We were of an age where most of us had grown up during the Depression and the Second World War which most of us had seen at closer hand than the First World War. So that we thought that what we were doing was really the right thing, and we were absolutely delighted. I don't remember ever hearing any criticism from our group about George Ball although there was plenty of criticism in the US about our support for European integration on the grounds that it would be contrary to our economic and political interests.

Now, there were other people, other parts of the government, that felt differently. But we fought them with serried ranks, and it was a time when Mr. Ball's writ ran far. And when we ran into problems, it was Mr. Ball who had the clout to cut through.

Q: There is one question that I didn't cover in our last time when you were in Brussels working with the European community. How did you and the others view Japan at that time, '63 to '65?

FINA: I don't think that Japan figured very largely in our thinking. Japan was a member of COCOM, and played a pretty minor role in that, and, of course, wasn't a member of NATO. The Japanese were present in Brussels, but they weren't really significant players. It wasn't until I got into the White House in 1971 that I suddenly became aware of Japan in a big way.

Q: Then in '65 to '68 you went to the Department. What were you doing there?

FINA: I went back to be the Officer-in-Charge of European Integration Affairs. That was an office that covered European communities, the Western European union, and EFTA, as well as the... 

Q: EFTA being?

FINA: EFTA was the European Free Trade Area which had been the British-backed counterweight to the continental European unification of the European Communities, the Common Market. But EFTA by that time had pretty much faded out and had lost any real future so that my job boiled down to support for the Mission in Brussels, our Mission to the European Communities - that meant the Coal and Steel Community, the European Common Market and EURATOM, which during my period then became the European Communities.

Another aspect of that job was support of the economic aspect of the NATO Assembly. That was something every now and then, but the heart of the job, and the thing that was the most interesting for me was our support for the movement toward European political unification. And that was what really drove our activity. We saw economic integration in Europe as a stimulus to the world economy, and therefore to our own economy, and strengthening the long-term vitality of the world economy, and of our own economy. But we also saw it as the way of bringing about European political unity which we thought would create a major pole of stability with which the United States could collaborate on more or less equal terms, particularly in view of the continued power of the Soviet Union and its allies. So we saw the creation of this other pole as a very important objective. And I think that was really the consideration that drove everything we did.
WILLIAM C. HARROP  
Economic Officer  
Brussels (1963-1965)  

Ambassador William C. Harrop was born in Maryland in 1929. He received a bachelor’s degree in English literature from Harvard University. Prior to joining the Foreign Service in 1954, he served in the U.S. Marine Corps and studied for a year in the graduate school of journalism at the University of Missouri. Ambassador Harrop’s career included positions in Italy, Belgium, and ambassadorships to Guinea, Zaire, Kenya, and Israel. He retired from the Foreign Service in 1993. Ambassador Harrop was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: You went out to Brussels in 1963. You were basically the "African" man in the Economic Section [of the Embassy]?  

HARROP: No, I did more than that. I dealt with Belgian national accounts and I did a good deal of commercial work and followed Belgian economic relations with the United States and the EC. I was the number two man in a three-man Economic Section.

Q: Who was the Economic Counselor?  

HARROP: Chris Petrow, who later became Economic Minister in the Embassy in Paris and Director of Mexican Affairs in Washington.

Q: Did you get a different perspective or did you find yourself the "African man" sitting in a sort of hostile field? Particularly coming from where you had been, in the Bureau of African Affairs.  

HARROP: There was no sense of that, really. I may have overstated the degree of bureaucratic hostility. There had been tempers that flared. There had been some real feelings and fights. People were accused of disingenuous modification of language in cables. It had been heated at times, but not to the extent that I might have had any feeling of being in the “enemy camp” when I went to Brussels.

Q: I understand, but, after all, this is how issues are thrashed out. The Foreign Service has a tendency of trying to "smooth them over." Once in a while they don't get smoothed over. Did you see the Katanga issue from a different perspective when you were in the Embassy in Brussels?  

HARROP: No I don't think so. Several things occurred when I got to Brussels which did not lead to a change in my viewpoint. One was a confirmation of the cynicism of the Belgian financial interests in their whole relationship to the politics of Africa. I had a sense almost of horror when I realized that. The Belgian colonial system was the most inhumane and selfish colonial regime of any in the world. It was an appalling situation, to which most Belgian participants were able to
close their eyes.

Q: Like "The Heart of Darkness."

HARROP: Yes, it was really appalling. So that feeling was underlined and confirmed in Belgium. Also, however, I developed a much better understanding of the way in which Belgians saw Africa and rather loved Africa. There was a real difference. The French, who had the most colonies and probably the largest presence in Africa, tended to go there for short periods of time. They still regarded themselves as citizens of Metropolitan France. They went to live there [in Africa] for a time and then returned [to France]. The Belgians also took a relatively short term view of Africa -- even more than the French. Most of the Belgians did not stay in Africa for any length of time. There always was a certain number that set out roots, but, on the whole, they would go to Africa, establish plantations, work in the mines or something else, frequently remain for most of their lives, and then return home. The British were very different. The British really had become Kenyans and Rhodesians. Of course, those parts of Africa have climates which are most attractive to people from the temperate zones. But the British attitude was very different. I think that the Belgian sense of impatience with the Africans was more marked. There was almost no effort in the Congo to bring the Africans into Belgian or European culture and society at all. Nor was there really an effort to develop the tools and machinery of government, as the British so emphatically did with their police forces, their judicial systems, and their administrative schools in all of their colonies.

The French really tried to make the Africans culturally French. They emphasized French culture, language and French law, "Epanovissement". There was a lot of integration under the French, less so with the British, and almost none at all with the Belgians. The Belgians, in my view, were the most paternalistic and, therefore, the most patronizing.

Q: Did you get any feel as to why the Belgians were so different?

HARROP: Well, I think it's partly the fact that Belgium is such a small country. A lot is explained by that. They don't think of themselves as a distinct culture or civilization, as the French or British do. The French and the Flemish languages are not "their" languages. It's a quite different psychology under which they live. They don't think of themselves as large enough or important enough to have that sort of influence, although, in fact, in many ways, the [Belgian] Congo was the largest and richest of all the European colonies in Africa.

Q: Your Ambassador [in Belgium] for most of the time you were there was Douglas MacArthur II.

HARROP: In Brussels, yes. But Ridgway Knight was also Ambassador for part of the time. Ambassador MacArthur was there for about a year and a half, and Knight, about a year and a half. I guess it was about half and half.

Q: What was your impression of Ambassador MacArthur?

HARROP: He was a man of extraordinary personal energy, dynamism, drive, forcefulness, and
ambition. I would say that he was a man without as good "ears" as he might have had. He was not a sensitive person. That was a case in which a Diplomat's wife was really a liability to him because of her very erratic behavior.

Q: She was one of the well-known "dragons" of the Foreign Service.

HARROP: Well, I could tell you anecdotes about that, but there's no particular reason to repeat them. Some really extraordinary things happened to us there [in Brussels]. However, I did feel that Ambassador MacArthur was an accomplished professional diplomat. I remember, in particular, one incident in his office when we were trying to work out something which had to do with the Congo. We were at odds with the Belgians on an issue there, as we usually were, since, I would say, the world view of the Bureau of African Affairs was the one that prevailed generally in the end over the views of the Bureaus of European Affairs. We found ourselves increasingly in confrontation with the former colonial powers.

We were working out a way to express to the Belgians that we simply did not agree at all with their point of view and wanted to insist on its being changed. I remember watching and listening in great admiration as Ambassador Douglas MacArthur dictated a memorandum to Foreign Minister Spaak. This was diplomacy in its purest form: language which simply and completely rejected what the Belgians were trying to achieve, but with such grace that you couldn't say that here he was contradicting them, or there, he's thrown it back in their face. Not at all. It was a masterful draft. I felt that I had learned a great deal that afternoon.

Q: This was part of your experience. Later on, you were an ambassador. Were you looking in particular at chiefs of mission but others as well, picking up little practices...

HARROP: Certainly. I was not consciously thinking of myself as an ambassador at that time, but I learned different things from many people. As you go along, you see approaches that succeed and those that do not. I guess Ambassador Marshall Green was the most important to me subsequently in that regard.

Q: How about Ambassador Ridgway Knight? He was another professional diplomat, wasn't he?

HARROP: Ridgway Knight was a professional diplomat, although somehow he did not seem to be as much of a professional. Ridgway Knight had been raised in France and, throughout his life, spoke English with a French accent. He was quite an effective ambassador. He lacked the ostentatious self-confidence of Douglas MacArthur, but both of them had great grace in dealing with Belgians. I think that both were very effective. After MacArthur had an unsuccessful tour in Congressional Relations and went to Iran for a couple of years, he subsequently retired in Belgium. Their daughter had married a Belgian while they were there. The MacArthur's lived in retirement in Belgium for some years. Knight had a sense of cultural affinity with Europeans and with Belgians. Knight was not a "man of the people" and did not easily pick up popular currents. I remember that he was particularly grateful to me on one occasion. I was writing a speech for him. The two leading Belgian football [soccer] teams were and are "Anderlech" of Brussels and "Standard" of Liege. At some point in the speech [which I was writing for him] I used the metaphor of Anderlech and Standard. Ambassador Knight really didn't understand it, but the
audience roared, applauded, and laughed. Afterwards he asked me to come up and see him. He thanked me for that brilliant remark. He said, "By the way, what was it all about?" He wasn't really aware of the nitty-gritty of Belgian life. I enjoyed working for him. He was an attractive and intelligent person.

PIERRE SHOSTAL
Economic Officer
Brussels (1963-1965)

Pierre Shostal was born in Paris in 1937. He graduated from Yale in 1956 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1958. His postings include Leopoldville, Kinshasa, Brussels, Lilongwe, Moscow, Kigali, Hamburg and Frankfurt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 16, 1997.

Q: So, you caught hepatitis and were brought back to the States?

SHOSTAL: No. I was sent to Rome and was in the hospital there for several weeks and then convalesced. In the Fall of ’63 I was reassigned to Brussels rather than brought home and spent the next almost two years in Brussels.

Q: This would be in ’63 to ’65?

SHOSTAL: ’63 to ’65, yes.

Q: What was the situation in Belgium when you arrived there? What was the political situation?

SHOSTAL: It was dominated by the perennial language issue. It was a period in which the political dominance of the Flemish majority was beginning to make itself felt. The Foreign Minister was someone who was quite a major European figure and a Francophone, a French speaker named, Paul Henri Spaak. Nevertheless, it was a time of transition between that older generation of French speaking dominance in Belgium typified by Spaak to dominance by the Flemish speakers. Today the country has to a large extent split along linguistic lines.

Q: What was your job?

SHOSTAL: I started out for a very brief period in the Consular section and eventually moved to the economic section. In between I had a brief stay in the political section.

Q: Who was the Ambassador then?

SHOSTAL: The first Ambassador was Douglas MacArthur. Then, Ridgway Knight came just before I left in Summer of ’65.

Q: Well, Douglas MacArthur has a reputation of being a rather difficult person and his wife had
even a greater reputation. Could you talk a little about the impact of a couple of this nature on the Embassy?

SHOSTAL: That was definitely a fact of life, and I think to a very large extent Mrs. MacArthur was the problem. She was a person of very strong views and very strong likes and dislikes. Very quickly after somebody arrived at the Embassy, one knew whether Mrs. MacArthur liked or disliked that person. I was one, and I have no idea why, one of the people she liked. But, there were several other people, in fact some very talented officers whom she strongly disliked. She had a lot of influence on her husband, there was no doubt about that. The relationship or the attitude that Mrs. MacArthur had toward different people was reflected in the way he would deal with those people. He, I think, had great admiration for his uncle, the General, and very much tried to mold himself on his uncle. He tried to be a decisive, very policy-minded person. In some respects he was a very intelligent person, but I think frankly somewhat overrated his own abilities. He would give a very impressive talk about Belgium, to American visitors. After the third or fourth time of listening to this, I really had the feeling that there wasn't an awful lot of active thought continuing to go on. Perhaps, a lot more of resting on his laurels and image building. So, as you can guess, I was not a great admirer of MacArthur as an Ambassador. I don't think he was one of the better Ambassadors that I worked for. Certainly he was no match intellectually for Ed Gullion who was a very creative, insightful, and intellectually impressive person.

Q: Having gone from the Congo up to Belgium, were you picking up, even at our Embassy, a different view of events in the Congo and all?

SHOSTAL: Oh, yes. The conflict between the Africanists and Europeanists was very present there and I was getting a very different perspective, because there was resentment in the Belgium government at Americans muscling in on what they saw still as their territory, even after independence. Our Embassy was confronted with this Belgium resentment and saw American activism in the Congo and Africa generally as a complicating factor for what we were trying to accomplish with the Belgians in the NATO and the European Community context.

Q: Did you find yourself playing the role of an Africanist thrown into this European center of attention?

SHOSTAL: Yes. I hope that I was able to bring at least some on-the-spot expertise and insight to the Embassy from having just been there. There was still quite a lot of time devoted to what was going on in Congo at the Embassy. So, I think I did play a role in trying to explain regional differences, who some of the political figures were, maybe also some of the ways that the Belgians were operating there, too.

Q: What about particularly, you spent most of your time in the economic section, is that right?

SHOSTAL: That's correct, yes.

Q: Were you taking a look at Belgium economic influence in the Congo, I mean among other things?
SHOSTAL: Actually, no. My boss in the economic section was somebody who knew those issues very well, Bill Harrop. Bill had served on the Congo desk; had been the Economic Officer for the desk and was interested in Africa. So he kept that portfolio, so I found myself working much more on domestic Belgium economic issues, particularly energy. I wrote a long report on the future of the Belgium coal industry and prospects for being able to sell American coal and also, worked on telecommunication issues. This was when we were beginning to talk about color television with the Europeans; satellite communications was also on the horizon. Those were the things that I worked on there and then I did the general economic roundups, the monthly economic reports. So, it was good training but much less exciting than what I had been doing in Kinshasa.

Q: What was your impression of how Belgium was responding to one, the demise of its colonial empire, and two, the integration of Europe. Essentially there was a still incomplete recovery from World War II?

SHOSTAL: Well, those are three different issues. On the decolonization process, there was really a political split within Belgium. The conservatives, and it was largely the Catholic Christian Democrats, were still resentful. On the other hand, the Socialists were more favorable to independence. Foreign Minister Spaak had been in favor of decolonization, although he wanted to see a more orderly and less rapid decolonization process. So, there was that political split. If you were talking to conservatives you'd run into quite a lot of resentment. If you were talking to the Left, there was more sympathy for the American policy. On Europe, Belgium was peculiar in one way in that it suffered relatively little destruction during the war. There was little combat, except in the Ardennes. So, Belgium came out of the war in better shape physically than most of the rest of Europe.

Q: And with that big port too.

SHOSTAL: And with the big port of Antwerp, which was a tremendous asset. The Belgians, having a small country and having been marched through several times earlier in the century, were very much in favor of European integration. They saw it in terms of security and also, I think realistically in terms of economic viability, they were simply too small to be significant as a nation state in modern times. So, right from the beginning they were very much in favor of integration.

Q: Did you find, I mean this is crossing from the economic into the political side, that we had any particular problem in dealing with this increasing divide between the French and the Flemish speaking thing or did we duck?

SHOSTAL: I think we largely ducked it. I think there was a problem and there is still a problem of languages. Our officers going to Belgium should be trained in both languages if they are to be optimally effective. Brussels is largely a French speaking city. Most government business is conducted in French, but a lot of the people who count in politics and in the economy are Flemish speakers. Now, when I was going around talking to economic contacts, they were quite ready at that point, in the mid-’60s, to use French. A few of them would use English, but many
of the Flemish speakers of that generation had been educated in French, but the younger were more nationalistic minded Flemish speakers, who clearly did not like using French. So, the problem that we had was that our foreign language training was in French, but a lot of the people we were talking to or should be talking to were Flemish speakers and very sensitive on that point.

Q: Looking at this as a practical measure, Flemish, what is it, between Dutch and German or something like that?

SHOSTAL: It's really Dutch. It's the same language as Dutch with some differences in vocabulary.

Q: Do you have any idea how we're treating that now?

SHOSTAL: I think, and I'm a bit out of touch, I know that we have sent a few Flemish speakers to the Embassy in recent years. But, what exactly the situation is now I just don't know.

Q: By the way, did the operation Dragon Rouge happen while you were in Belgium?

SHOSTAL: This is the air drop on Stanleyville. No. It happened in November of '64 and I was on home leave at that time. I was very much involved in some of the runup to that, however. For example, we would try very hard in the second half of '64 to find out what was going on to the Americans in Stanleyville. The best way we could find out about it was through Belgian ham operators. We finally found a ham operator in Stanleyville, whom we regularly talked to. The local Congolese rebels, called the Simbas wouldn't understand Flemish. So, to inquire about the two consuls whom we had there, we gave them the names of Mr. Vereenigte which sounds like a Flemish name, but which means “united” and Staaten, which means states. So, we would regularly ask this ham operator there, how are Mr. Vereenigte and Mr. Staaten getting along and he would tell us. So, I got involved in a bit of that, liaison with these ham operators. Finally, Belgium paratroopers dropped on Stanleyville and freed the city from the rebels.

Q: When you left in '65, you left Belgium?

SHOSTAL: That's right. Summer of '65.

Robert M. Beaudry entered the Foreign Service in 1946 after serving in the U.S. Army during World War II. His career included positions in Ireland, Morocco, Switzerland, and Italy. Mr. Beaudry was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.
Q: Then you left Washington and went to Brussels where you served from 1963-66. What were you doing there?

BEAUDRY: I was head of the political section. In the course of time in this Office of Swiss-Benelux, as economic officer I was number two. I covered all the countries and the only one other than the guy who ran the office, Galen Stone. Then Galen moved up as a deputy in Western Europe and I sort of moved up to be the director, or whatever, and still carried the economic job. So I got to know MacArthur when he came through.

Q: This is Douglas MacArthur II.

BEAUDRY: He was moving from Tokyo to Brussels as Ambassador. I was his den mother in the Department for the transfer. Not that he needed one and not that he was around much. He spent most of his time on the Hill explaining to the Members of Congress why he had recommended the cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Tokyo. But we established a working relationship.

Then Margaret Tibbetts, who was head of the political section was selected for senior training and so that job came open. One distinguished citizen turned it down because he would rather not work in that atmosphere.

Q: Douglas MacArthur was known as a difficult man to work for.

BEAUDRY: Yes, with a difficult wife.

Q: With a very difficult wife.

BEAUDRY: I was ambitious at the time so I agreed to go. I also had a thing that I found was very valuable with MacArthur. I had been in the Department then over three years and knew everybody. I could call people. That was very important to MacArthur. I could tell him when something would come up..."Well, the Under Secretary thinks such and such because I talked to so and so." And that helped. That made my time with him.

The big thing we had then in our relations with the Belgians, was the Congo (Zaire). When I came back in 1959 to take on the job, the Congo had blown up and they were giving it independence in June or July, 1960. The Department selected Clare Timberlake to be the first Ambassador. So he was in for briefings. Well, all of Francophone Africa was covered by two men in the Department. This extensive territory, increasingly complex and it had no support in the Department. AF just didn't have any people. So I ended up doing a lot of the briefing because at least from the economic side and from the Belgian political side, I was more knowledgeable. We were always part of the task force in the Department working on the Congo.

The other man in this in the very beginning was Bob Miller, the Belgian political desk officer. He and I were on these task forces, he more than I as time went on.

When I got to Brussels the Congo was still a major issue.
But then we had things like the nuclear relationship in the Alliance. Remember the MLF, the multilateral nuclear force? Those were the kinds of issues we had. We didn't have any direct bilateral problems. We were slightly concerned whether Belgium might fragment because the Flemings and Walloons were very much head to head. Now they have worked it out where they have devolved all kinds of political power at lower levels. I would really have trouble grasping where they are today, but in those days it was the Flemings and the Walloons. And it created an instability in the government and we didn't want that in NATO. Again, it wasn't an issue that kept us up nights.

If the Socialists were in or out of the government, or the Christian Democrats, that didn't really bother us either. They were both very pro-NATO and pro-European, etc. So the big problem was the Congo and we ended up by mounting that rescue mission. This was quite interesting because all we did was provide transportation. The Belgians provided a 500-man combat battalion of paratroopers and we dropped them over Stanleyville. In a way it was a marker for other people in Africa that even though you weren't on the coast, the 20th century gunboats could get you if you weren't careful.

It was done at the behest, pretty largely, of Averell Harriman. MacArthur had been in Washington when they decided to do it. A number of people quailed a little bit when the explosion took place at the UN over this because there was outrage on the part of the Third World. Yet we ran the second one. We had about four or five rescue missions planned.

*Q:* Basically these were rebel units that were threatening a group of Europeans, including some Americans at the Consulate at Stanleyville.

BEAUDRY: Yes. There were 40 or 50 Europeans who were about to be slaughtered, we understood. It was a rebellion against the central government.

*Q:* Massambas I think they were called.

BEAUDRY: That is right and they had this mystical thing that they were impervious to bullets. They got that way because none of the local constabulary could shoot.

*Q:* Since you mentioned Douglas MacArthur, who was the nephew of the General and a Career Ambassador at many posts, he had a reputation of being a very difficult man to work for himself and his wife even more so. How did you find being in that atmosphere?

BEAUDRY: My wife gets along with people very well, and she also had to deal with the MacArthurs when we were in Brussels. The DCM's wife was Dutch and the economic counselor's wife was French. Well, my wife was the first American wife in the rank order and Mrs. MacArthur set great store by that. So she and Jackie got along pretty well. Except for one night when Averell Harriman was there and my wife sat on one side and Mrs. MacArthur on the other at dinner. We are from Maine and Harriman had a place in Maine and lots of background on it. Jackie and Mr. Harriman started talking Maine politics and Mrs. MacArthur didn't like that. It wasn't so much the politics but the fact that she was ignored by Harriman.
Edward L. Killham was born in Illinois in 1926. He received a bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University in 1949, a master’s degree from Columbia University in 1950, and a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University in 1957. Mr. Killham joined the U.S. Army during World War II and served from 1944-1946 in Europe. His Foreign Service career included positions in the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Austria, and Spain. Mr. Killham was interviewed by Robert Martens on December 18, 1992.

Q: And from there, where did you go?

KILLHAM: I went to Brussels to be Political-Military officer.

Q: I see. First time at Brussels?

KILLHAM: That's right. A fascinating time. As Pol-Mil officer, I had the great or ill fortune to serve under two Ambassadors, both of whom thought they had invented the political/military function -- Douglas MacArthur and Ridgway Knight. So I got a lot of close supervision -- most of it helpful, but at times it made my life very complicated.

I tried to keep up my interests in communist affairs by doing a lot of reporting on the fight in the Belgian Communist Party between the Soviet-aligned and the Chinese-aligned factions.

Q: This was when?

KILLHAM: In the mid 1960s.

Q: When the Sino-Soviet conflict was really heating up.

KILLHAM: We had good contacts in the intelligence community in Brussels and with the Taiwanese. The ROC Naval Attaché happened to be a Dutchman who somehow had acquired Chinese nationality and he and I got together from time to time. And, of course, I kept in touch with the people at the Soviet Embassy, too, as much as I could.
Stanley D. Schiff was born in New Jersey in 1925. He received his Bachelor’s degree from Rutgers University in 1948, and his Master’s Degree from Columbia University the following year. He served as a First Lieutenant overseas in the US Army from 1943 to 1946. Entering the Foreign Service in 1949, his postings include Baden, Strasbourg, Liverpool, Trinidad, Pakistan, and Brussels. Schiff was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 9, 2000.

Q: By this time, you were formally in the economic specialty?

SCHIFF: Yes.

Then in ’64, I went to Brussels to work in our Mission to the European Communities. My specific assignment was the Kennedy Round negotiations. I was working on trade issues.

Q: This was ’64 to when?

SCHIFF: ’67.

Q: Could you explain what the Kennedy Round meant?

SCHIFF: The overall objective was to lower tariff barriers worldwide on a nondiscriminatory basis. Tariffs at that time were still fairly high, particularly in certain sectors. In our tariff structure, we had certain sectors which were fairly modest in terms of the percentage of tariff, but there were others, chemicals being one and some particular sectors within the chemical area, which were very high. The Europeans had averaged their tariffs, so they didn’t have the highs and lows that we did. And of course, we wanted the Japanese involved. The major agricultural exporters - the Canadians, the Australians, the Argentines - shared our concern about the highly protective arrangement for agriculture the European community had put in place and our interest in maintaining effective access to that larger market.

Q: To catch the times, by this point, were tariffs basically to protect internally or were they to raise money?

SCHIFF: In most cases, it was to protect. Some of these, as in the case of this chemical area that I was talking about, were a holdover from something that happened during World War I where we were concerned about protecting our organic chemicals industry. It was the Germans who dominated the market at that time. This was done to protect a sector of American industry. It was seen by others outside the United States and perhaps even many within the United States who were not particularly interested in this protected sector as outdated. It was something that became an important target especially for the Europeans. This was just one example. There were others in other countries, too. On the other hand, as I just mentioned, the agricultural exporters were quite apprehensive about being able to compete in the European community market because of the highly protectionist regime they had for their farmers.

Q: What was the state of the European Community when you were in Brussels from ’64- ’67?
SCHIFF: A work in progress. There was a serious disruption at one point, about 1965, when the French walked out for a period of time and totally disrupted the internal community business. Of course, it had a paralyzing effect.

Q: *This was just about the time that they opted out of NATO, wasn’t it?*

SCHIFF: I can’t remember the date. One of the things they were concerned about was majority voting. At that time, the Community operated on the basis of unanimity. When they vacated the premises for a time, it had a very profound effect on the negotiations. In time, they came back. They were, particularly with respect to agriculture, much more protectionist than other countries. They were a main obstacle to doing more ambitious things in agriculture. As you know from subsequent history, the European Union put up stiff resistance to liberalizing the agricultural market…

Q: *I’ve been told that while the French put up this great display, which is heartfelt, the Germans very quietly smuggled out underneath it and didn’t let the French carry their water.*

SCHIFF: That’s very true. German agriculture was higher cost and therefore higher priced, than French agriculture. Within the Community, the French were the most efficient agricultural producers. As they saw it, the original internal community political bargain was French agriculture for German industry. They felt that the Germans were not doing their part. But this has been a continuing problem. The French had what they consider a more socially responsible view with respect to the agricultural policy. In the United States, the technological revolution in agriculture gave impetus to a massive displacement of people working in agriculture, both labor and smaller independent farmers. We paid a heavy price for this in the ‘50s and ‘60s because many of these people did not have the skills for industrial jobs and also had to move into urban areas, which created social and racial tensions. The French, as they perceived the same situation, recognized that change was coming and that increasing productivity in agriculture meant need fewer people would be needed, but they wanted that movement of people off the farms to be much slower so that they could accommodate them socially and economically. You get these two competing visions of how society should operate. We emphasize efficiency. The French are somewhat more compassionate about this. So, the game is to try to strike a balance between these two things.

Q: *What part of this business did your job and your colleagues have?*

SCHIFF: I was the one in our mission who was assigned the task of following the Kennedy Round. I was the one who performed the liaison between our mission in Geneva, which is where the trade negotiations went on, and the European Community officials. My contacts in Brussels were with both the community’s staff who worked on these problems as well as with the missions from the individual country members of the organization. Then I would go down to Geneva and sit in on the negotiations there. I was the liaison with Ambassador Mike Blumenthal, who was the head of the delegation at that time. So, it was a fascinating job.

Q: *Who was the ambassador of the EC mission?*
SCHIFF: Jack Tuthill. Excellent.

Q: He had come out of Brazil, where he had been involved in Operation Topsy, which was to cut down on the number of Americans in our mission in Brazil, which was successful for a year or two.

SCHIFF: He didn’t have to worry about that in Brussels because we had a small mission with an excellent caliber of people. Very professional. Highly regarded by other countries. But he also had been ambassador to the OECD. So, he had varied European experience.

Q: When you were going between Brussels and Geneva, what was your role?

SCHIFF: Eating well. The dining in Brussels was fabulous and it was equally fabulous in Geneva.

No, I was a source of information to our mission and to Washington about the thinking of the European community on the major trade issues. That was my principle task, to be the reporter and the analyst of European views and positions. Then conversely, to pass on to the Europeans who were following this the views of the U.S.

Q: When the French pulled out of this, was everybody standing around with their mouths open?

SCHIFF: I can’t remember specially what transpired, except that the thing slowed down to a crawl. I don’t remember how long they stayed out, but it wasn’t forever and it was in sufficient time that we could complete the negotiations within the time established by U.S. legislation – with some cliff-hangers along the way.

At one point, there was a headline in the paper that Secretary of State Dean Rusk was about to fly to Geneva to try to get these negotiations settled one way or another. That didn’t happen.

Q: What about some of the other delegations? How about the British? How were our relations with them?

SCHIFF: Good. They were probably closer in their thinking to us than they were to the European Community. The agricultural exporters were much closer in their thinking to us. Agriculture was a real stumbling block. The European Community and particularly the French felt they had not been a community for terribly long. It was established in 1958. It was still a fragile structure. But the Australians, Argentines, and Canadians’ objectives were similar to ours. The British in the industrial area similarly. I didn’t follow the negotiations with the Japanese, but one thing I do remember was that when the agreement was finally signed, there were still bilateral negotiations going on between the Japanese and our guys.

What we learned in later years or came to appreciate more keenly was that there were so-called “non-tariff barriers” which were a lot more or certainly equally significant with tariffs. What you might call “non-tariff barriers” frequently had to do with institutional arrangements or attitudes that were internal to a society and they were after much more difficult to deal with.
Q: Speaking of that, did you have the feeling that, looking back at our own system, we talk in big terms of freeing things, but we have a pretty heavily subsidized agricultural system of our own?

SCHIFF: Yes, we do.

Q: Was that on the table, too?

SCHIFF: Yes. That was part of the negotiations. What we were talking about on the European side was similar, but they had introduced a very complex system of protection at the border, which was designed basically to limit competition on price. We became very much the residual suppliers. We wanted an opportunity to compete and we were being screened out. Our opportunities were limited. That was what the negotiation was really all about. No, we were not totally pure then and I doubt that we are today – not only with agriculture, but with other things as well.

Q: The agricultural side was a little earlier on, but the great war between the United States and Europe became known as the Chicken War. Was that a factor? Could you explain what it was?

SCHIFF: I wasn’t in Brussels at that time. That happened shortly before I got there. It had been settled by the time I did get there. What I did see was the legacy of this episode. The Chicken War was a case of the Europeans using a form of protection which made it very difficult for American poultry exporters to get access to the European market. We had become very efficient poultry producers. This had led to a serious dispute between the countries. As you might expect with episodes like this, there was a lingering effect, which as I perceived it, was distrust on both sides. Each side accused the other of having misbehaved, not having been trustworthy during the negotiations. It took some time to work on that, to try to overcome that. It was an intangible, but an important intangible. In time, it was overcome.

Q: When you left there in ’67, do you think things were moving along? France was back in.

SCHIFF: This had been a very successful negotiation. I think it was one from which everybody could take satisfaction. When I came back to Washington, I remember saying to one of my colleagues something to the effect that, “Well, with this negotiation over, the next logical step would be monetary unity, and it would not be long off.” I was only off by about 30 years.

Q: As we speak today, the euro is taking another step. It’s next year that the franc and the mark will disappear.

SCHIFF: I just saw in an article that the Greeks have decided to abandon the drachma and will join. I think it’s 2002 that it becomes an exchangeable currency. I think one of the things which the Kennedy Round did was to strengthen the cement of the European Community structure. They had a common external policy. They had adopted certain common policies internally as well. They had a single tariff structure for the entire community. They had a lot going for them. It seemed that the inescapable next step would be the monetary union.
Q: How was life in Belgium in those days? Did you have much contact with the Belgians?

SCHIFF: No. My contacts were just about exclusively with people from the European Community, the so-called “permanent delegations” or the bureaucracy. I had no contact with the Belgians except their restaurants and pubs.

Q: In ’67, whither?

SCHIFF: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Fort McNair.

Q: That would be ‘67-’68?

SCHIFF: Yes.

Q: This has always been an interesting experience for Foreign Service people, to rub up against another... How did you find it?

SCHIFF: Fascinating. It happened to be a very tumultuous year in America. Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King were both assassinated during that year.

Q: ’68 was a year of revolution in Europe, too.

SCHIFF: One of my more poignant memories of that year was, a discussion came out of what I believe was our final class seminar. It was on the use of the military in civil disturbances. If you looked out the window of our classroom, you could see Washington burning. Had that discussion taken place early in the academic year, the sentiments and thoughts expressed would have been - in my judgement- quite different. [But] no one endorsed the rioting and looting.

Q: This was after Martin Luther King was assassinated.

SCHIFF: It was a very enlightening experience. One of the things which I got out of it was to learn not to think in terms of a uniform mindset, a military mindset. It was just folly to think of the military in this way. These were intelligent, mostly thoughtful people. They differed among themselves just like the rest of us did. For them, it was more of a learning experience than it was for those of us who came from civilian agencies and particularly for us coming from the State Department. I found it a fascinating experience.

Q: All these great promises were made, that if you go to the War College, you’re specifically selected, so this means an assignment will be ready and waiting for you. Most of us who’ve gone through this process have found “out of sight, out of mind.”

SCHIFF: I did have an assignment waiting for me. I had no problems in that respect. I went to the Economic Bureau. I became the director of Commodity Affairs.

Q: You were there from when to when?
SCHIFF: By the time I got there, it was almost ’69 – probably fall of ’68. I stayed there for about two years and then moved to take over the Regional Affairs Office in NEA. That was from ‘72-’74, so this would have been ‘70-’72.

Q: Was Jules Katz...

SCHIFF: Jules became the deputy assistant secretary and I took over this job.

Q: He was the towering figure in the economic side. What were you doing?

SCHIFF: There were about three categories of commodities that we dealt with. The most difficult ones at that time were cotton textiles and steel. We dealt with metals and minerals. Chrome was a concern at the time. We also dealt with tropical products like coffee, cocoa, and tea.

We were still in the Johnson administration. In the Johnson administration, one of the key struggles was over steel. There was enormous pressure from the domestic steel industry as well as the unions to cut down on “the flood of imports” from outside the country. What was ultimately done (I can’t say I was a party to this. The actual engineering took place just before I got there) was a so-called “voluntary restraint” arrangement. That is a real misnomer because lots of arms were twisted. The result was that major steel exporters “voluntarily” agreed to restrain their exports to the U.S.

Q: You were making a real adjustment from going out and trying to break down these barriers in Brussels and Geneva and came back and found yourself trying to keep the bastards out.

SCHIFF: Yes. There was a lot of pressure for them. Of course, the same had been true for textiles. There had been a separate deal worked out on textiles when George Ball got trade authority approved by Congress. That made the Kennedy Round possible. So, textiles were highly protected. The basic problem was working out bilateral trade agreements under that general arrangement. Jules Rutz had been intimately involved in the negotiations of an international coffee agreement. So, he tended to watch over that. But there was an interest on the part – and discussions never came to much – with respect to cocoa and tea… Then in the metals and minerals area, the main problem was chrome. This was because there was a ban on imports of chrome from Rhodesia, which made it difficult for our domestic users to get supplies of chrome. The two sources were Turkey and Russia. Getting supplies from the Soviet Union raised political questions. So, those were the things that occupied much of my attention in the two years that I was there. It wasn’t a terribly enjoyable experience for reasons which you mentioned.

ARVA C. FLOYD
Political Officer
Brussels (1964-1967)

Political-Military Counselor
Brussels (1967-1969)

Arva Floyd was born and raised in Georgia and educated at Emory University and the University of Edinburgh. After serving with the US Army in World War II and in the Occupying Forces in Austria after the war, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Djakarta, Indonesia in 1952. His foreign postings include Indonesia, South Africa, Martinique and Brussels, where he dealt with matters concerning NATO, European Security and Disarmament. In his Washington assignments Mr. Floyd also dealt with these issues. From 1978 to 1980 Mr. Floyd was Foreign Policy Advisor to United States Coast Guard. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

FLOYD: ‘64 to ’69. I had, in effect, two assignments in Belgium; they were two entirely different functions.

Q: What was your first assignment?

FLOYD: I was a political officer.

Q: There’s always been this division between the two parts of the country. What was the situation in ’64, when you were there in Belgium?

FLOYD: That’s an ongoing problem for the Belgians; I don’t think they’ll ever resolve it totally. It in a sense it defined everything. People considered themselves either Francophone or Flemish. The Socialist Party, as did all the political parties, had their two different wings – one Flemish and one Francophone or French-speaking. But at the same time, things were worked out to the point where there was a quite systematic division of responsibility in the government among the French-speaking and Flemish-speaking Belgians. There was no violence while I was there.

Things were basically worked out with the exception of one issue, which was the issue of Brussels and how to deal with it. Brussels was a basically French-speaking city located in Flanders, the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium. Like most large cities, it was growing, so it was a dynamic element, which made it hard to work out any sort of permanent modus operandi. But I think that’s about all you need to say about it. It complicated life for the Belgians, in terms of governing the country in a variety of ways. In most respects, they worked out an arrangement that they could live with and was acceptable to both sides.

Q: How did we work it? I assume most of our officers didn’t speak Flemish. Was that a problem?

FLOYD: Not really. The Flemings, the older ones, people of about my age or older, and most of the educated Flemings spoke French. The younger people were consciously avoiding learning French, to a certain extent: they were very oriented toward English. Most educated Flemings spoke quite good English, as well.

Q: What slice of the political spectrum were you dealing with?
FLOYD: Domestic politics up to a point, but also following Belgian-U.S. relations – the triangle we had with the Belgians and the Congolese. I was basically reporting on what the Belgians were doing.

Q: Belgium and its issues related to colonies were not settled at this time, were they? There were problems in the Congo.

FLOYD: There were enormous problems. I arrived in Brussels right after the independence of the Congo, which was a very chaotic time. We were cooperating with the Belgians in trying to rescue Belgians and others who were being held in Stanleyville, essentially as hostages, by the political group which controlled the area up in the north. And there was a rescue attempt of these people, in which Belgian parachutists …

Q: This was Operation Dragon Rouge [Operation Red Dragon].

FLOYD: Yes.

Q: Did you get involved in this sort of thing?

FLOYD: It was well along, when I arrived. I was following it, along with other issues, in the political sector. I was not very directly involved.

Q: The ambassador, when you arrived, was Douglas MacArthur?

FLOYD: Yes.

Q: What was your impression of his operation?

FLOYD: Well, he’s a very strong-willed, self-centered man. I think he basically did a pretty good job. He was difficult to work with. He had a very idiosyncratic personality, and was very domineering toward his subordinates, but he wasn’t there long after I arrived. He left.

Q: Who took his place?

FLOYD: Ridgway Knight, who was much more suave and easy-going. He was a very active ambassador, but not nearly so domineering as MacArthur.

Q: Was there a bureaucratic battle within the State Department between the African bureau dealing with the Congo and the European bureau dealing with Belgium?

FLOYD: To a point, I guess; but, there was not very much of it. The Belgians had no real interior ambitions for Africa. King Leopold had found himself a colony, which he then passed on to Belgium. They had some interest in it, but once there was a prospect that there would be violence if Belgium wanted to hang onto the place, the Belgians lost interest quickly. Belgian companies played a prominent role in the Congo; Union Minière was the biggest of the mining companies.
down in Katanga Province, so they had that interest.

Independence arrived very chaotically, as you remember, and with a good deal of local violence; and Belgians fled in large numbers. So there was a Belgian population there after everything settled down, but it was much smaller than it had been. The Belgians, basically, were interested in preserving and protecting to the extent they could, their economic interests there. They also did not want the Congo to “become communist”. They were partners with us in the North Atlantic Alliance. Kennedy, who was in office then, tended to take Africa and the threat of communist domination or influence in Africa much more seriously, at least during the beginning of his administration, than the previous republican administration had taken it, and the Belgians welcomed this.

Basically, we got along pretty well with the Belgians, and therefore there were no real conflicts with the African desk. I mean, the African desk couldn’t, wouldn’t have had the kind of parochial concern they might have had if the Congo then had been any kind of functioning political entity. It wasn’t; it was terribly torn apart; it was a huge, gigantic sore in the middle of Africa. Everybody wanted to try to stabilize things, and to get some sort of acceptable and responsible, effective government in power. So that’s the long answer.

Q: Within Belgium, were there any reverberations within the Belgian body politic from the disassociation of France from NATO and the movement of the NATO structure there, other than the physical thing of all of a sudden ending up with some more embassies?

FLOYD: There wasn’t much, frankly. The Belgians deplored anything which would call into the question the integrity of the Atlantic alliance, and the effectiveness of NATO. They were a small country, and they’d been invaded many times over – that’s all an old story. As small countries go, they had a fairly strong residual sense of the need to protect their security with respect to involvement with outside countries. Belgium was also a neighbor of France, and the southern part of Belgium, the Walloons area, had long-standing cultural, sometimes family, ties with France. So the Belgians simply just wanted to stay out of trouble and to maintain what they could of the security environment.

The things the French did were disruptive up to a point, but it was in large measure, in my opinion, a matter of posturing. The French recognized that they needed the United States in Europe; they wouldn’t admit it, but they would occasionally acknowledge it. However, they wanted to take some distance from us symbolically and politically and so forth, without really undermining the security arrangement which existed.

In dealing with Belgium, you’ve got to remember that Belgium is not really a nation-state at all; Belgian national pride, national assertiveness and so forth, almost doesn’t exist. You’ve got these two separate communities we talked about. So any Belgian government is likely to be a government which simply tries to make do. That was their attitude during the trouble with France over NATO.

Q: Did you go to party meetings and things of this nature much?
FLOYD: I didn’t too much, no. We had an officer in the section who did a good deal of that, but I did not. I saw these people a lot, but I was not directly concerned with party political stuff.

Q: Were we at all concerned about the communist party in Belgium at the time?

FLOYD: No.

Q: There wasn’t the third of the vote going to the communists that there was in France, or Italy was there?

FLOYD: They had one or two senators and maybe five deputies, but that was the extent of it. They wouldn’t even have had that except for the proportional representation system. They were not a factor.

Q: A lot of countries were having the chicken wars and various trade confrontations. Sounds like things were on a pretty even keel.

FLOYD: There were no serious commercial squabbles of that nature. What there was, and there wasn’t much, it would have been sorted out within the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) organization.

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Q: You said you had two jobs while you were in Brussels from ’64 to ’69. What was the second?

FLOYD: A second tour. I came back as political-military counselor. My biggest responsibility was to negotiate logistical arrangements for using Belgian territory in one way or another, replacing the logistical facilities we had lost in France. Partly, it was a line-of-communications matter. By line-of-communications, I mean a supply line into a possible central front. We wanted authority and some sort of understanding with the Belgians, that if war should break out, we could come in and supply either through ports or, if necessary, over the beach, quote unquote; that we would have staging areas that could be set aside for our use, and that this would be part of Belgian war planning. We weren’t looking for bases or anything of that sort. It was a matter of cooperating with the Belgians. These were basically military questions, and the negotiations were done jointly by the embassy; usually me or the ambassador if necessary, on the one hand, and the European Command on the other. In other words, as you remember, we had dual hats in that the U.S. Commander of Europe was also the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR). But, under his U.S. hat, he had a large American staff, which were concerned with logistics, supplies, training, and so forth, of the American forces in Germany. So, that’s the way we handled it. All these things were highly sensitive areas for the Belgians of course, which is why the embassy insisted that we lead the negotiations, at least nominally and that the American embassy person present would present the U.S. side. Belgium is a very small country, they’re sensitive to anybody who is not conscious of their prerogatives and their rights and so forth.

Q: So, in many ways, you were working with the Belgians and with our military – it was almost a dual negotiation, wasn’t it?
FLOYD: That’s right. With our own military, we didn’t have any serious problems, really; it was a matter of coordination, understanding and so forth; I wouldn’t call it exactly a negotiation. With the Belgians, we did want some fairly specific assurances that were not at the treaty level, nor even government-to-government agreements. These were just understandings within the NATO context as to what areas and routes we could use, and where we could store things which would be needed in the event of a crisis. For example, trucks: if we had had to use Belgian territory to supply essential fronts, we would have needed transportation, so we wanted to place in Belgium large numbers of vehicles of all sorts which could be used when needed. Of course, it had to be worked out with the Belgian military as it has implications for Belgian war planning including in their planning for how they would protect and look after the needs of their citizen population in wartime and related areas. So, it got fairly complicated at times; but, basically, these were business-like talks without much suspicion or animosity.

Q: What was your and your colleagues impression of the Belgian military at this time?

FLOYD: I don’t think any of the small European countries had any military establishment that could compare to ours or that anybody would take very seriously. The Belgians had elite paratroop units and Air Force units, which were first-class; these were small elites, that were not amorphous, draftee-oriented military establishments. And, as I’ve said before, as there was no national sense in Belgium, Belgium has almost no military pride. They were proud of their heroism during World War I and so forth.

Q: In World War II, the king let the Belgians down by surrendering rather quickly didn’t he?

FLOYD: The king saw what was going on and drew the necessary conclusion. There was no bitterness about that, to my knowledge.

Q: Were there any problems that resulted from having to deal with a country that almost has a split personality or a lack of a cohesive national identity? Did you have to make sure that you paid attention to one group and then to the other group all the time?

FLOYD: Yes, some; but, given the fact that power was very much divided in the Belgian government and in Belgian politics between the two groups, if you dealt with the people who had authority and counted, you were going to be, ipso facto, dealing with the right people. No, that wasn’t really a problem. The suspicion and low-level conflict between these two groups didn’t extend to that level. Obviously, we’d only seen French-speaking people, but that was never an issue.

Q: So you left Belgium in ’69.

FLOYD: Yes.
Agricultural Attaché, US Mission to the European Economic Community
Brussels (1964-1973)

Ernest Koenig was born in Vienna, Austria in 1917. He received a bachelor’s degree from Masaryk College in Czechoslovakia. He migrated to the U.S. in 1948 and received a master’s degree from. His Foreign Service career included positions in Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, Paris, and Washington, DC. Mr. Koenig retired in August 1990. He was interviewed by Quentin Bates on August 19, 1995.

Q: When did you leave Germany?

KOENIG: In 1964. I was transferred to the U.S. Mission to the European Economic Communities in Brussels. I was first Assistant Agricultural Attaché and then Agricultural Attaché. At about that time, the EC Commission in Brussels began to apply the first market regulations for various agricultural products, first for fruits and vegetables, then for rice and then for pork. In the course of the following years over 90 percent of the agricultural commodities produced in the six common market countries were subjected to detailed and strict market regulations. These were accompanied by numerous implementing regulations. At that time English was not one of the official languages of the EEC. I therefore translated many of the important laws and regulations. Almost all of them aimed at assuring domestic producer prices exceeding world market prices; protected them by restrictive import devices that consisted largely of non-tariff measures and provided for market intervention and export subsidies. It was difficult to keep abreast of this legal labyrinth and required close contacts with Commission and Member states officials, diplomats of third country Missions and embassies, and also with trade organizations which out of self-interest followed closely the never ending flow of laws, and endeavored to understand all its intricate details and all its many loopholes. The common agricultural policy was so intricate because it was the result of heavy bargaining. Any concession made to one member country had to be often repaid by concessions to other member states. The loopholes in this legislation led to widespread fraud amounting to hundred millions of dollars. For instance, export subsidies were paid when, in reality, the export in question was merely from one to another member state; import levies were sometimes evaded.

The progressive expansion of the common agricultural policy led to trade conflicts between the Community and most third countries. However, none of the latter had as big and as variegated an agriculture as the United States. Hence there were constant frictions followed by protests and the exchange of notes between us and the EEC. I believe at the end of my stay in Brussels, there were few U.S. farm products which were not unfavorably affected by the common agricultural policy.

The work in Brussels became further complicated, when the EEC concluded a number of so-called Association Agreements with third countries, such as Israel, Spain and the Maghreb countries. These were, in fact, preferential agreements in favor of these countries, but initially they affected our trade interests to a minor degree like the so-called Yaounde Agreement which gave trade preferences to the former colonies of the European countries which participated in the common market.
In the years 1965-67 the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations took place in Geneva. These negotiations affected strongly trade relations between the EEC and the United States. The U.S. Mission in Brussels was actively involved in these negotiations, and Mission officers traveled frequently to Geneva in order to assist our negotiators. I, too, spent a considerable time in the agricultural groups of these negotiations. The agricultural negotiations in the Kennedy Round were difficult and protracted because the EEC feared that concessions to third countries would unravel the painfully achieved construction of the common agricultural policy.

Q: What was the outcome of the Kennedy Round?

KOENIG: The Kennedy Round brought no solution to the many trade problems that had been created by the Community's agricultural policy. They remained unsolved. An International Commodity Agreement for Wheat was -- so to say -- imposed on American agriculture contrary to the judgement of our experts. Its price provisions were quite unrealistic, and it broke down a few weeks after it had come into force.

Q: What were the so-called "monetary compensatory amounts?"

KOENIG: Brussels was not a place where one could remain idle. The common market was very dynamic, and every so often new issues arose. For instance, originally the system of uniform prices was based on stable exchange rate. As soon as these began to diverge, and this was -- I believe -- for the first time in the summer of 1969, the common price system threatened to break down. It was, so to speak, repaired by superimposing on it a system of so-called "monetary compensatory amounts." These were additions or subtractions to the common prices expressed in local currency which were supposed to have the effect of restoring the purchasing power of the common prices to what they had been before the exchange rates started to fluctuate. This system was often modified. It became so complex that only a few experts in the Commission and in the member states understood it and were able to manage it. It probably introduced considerable arbitrariness in the EEC's agricultural system.

Q: What happened when the EEC was enlarged?

KOENIG: At the end of the sixties, the U.K., Denmark and Ireland joined the EEC. They accepted the system of common farm prices to which they gradually adjusted in the course of a transition period. This transitional system brought new complexities in our dealings with the EEC and in their dealings with each other. The increase in protection in these countries, the implicit preferences which they granted henceforth to their new EEC partners and the incentives they gave to increasing production worked all to the further disadvantage of U.S. agriculture. Moreover, the new member states, particularly the U.K., had previously granted important trade concessions to the U.S. The amount of compensation due to the U.S. for the loss of these concessions remained in dispute.

Q: There were many debates between us and the EEC regarding soybeans. Can you speak about this?

KOENIG: This is an interesting topic. After the U.S. had acquiesced in the system of EEC
variable levies on grains and other products, the EEC spokesman pretended that there had been a deal: in exchange for American acquiescence on certain NTB’s, they had agreed on zero tariffs for soybeans. This was not true. However, after a while, they found out that their farmers considered soybeans and soymeal to be an excellent substitute for grains, due to the price distorting effects of the variable levy system. Imports of soybeans and soymeal increased and tended to displace domestic grains. The EEC tried to counteract this by playing with the idea of imposing an internal tax on soy products. This was so strongly resisted by the U.S. that the EEC desisted from this idea. Later on, however, the EEC encouraged the domestic production of soybeans and of other oilseeds, whose output increased greatly. The agricultural relations between the United States and the EEC were ripe for a major collision or, in order to avoid it, for a major negotiation.

**Q:** You mentioned before problems arising from food legislation.

KOENIG: While in Brussels I was more and more occupied with a problem, which I had already encountered in Germany. The Germans had promulgated a new food law, which diverged from ours in several respects. Already during the chicken war, the Germans had alleged that our poultry was particularly susceptible to salmonella or that we were feeding hormones to chickens. This was pure propaganda, but had nevertheless a certain effect and impacted on the sale of American products in Germany. However, food legislation that influenced sales from third countries became a serious trade issue, when the member states of the Community were obliged to harmonize their own food legislation, in order to avoid that food norms and standards become an obstacle to intra-community trade. All U.S. fresh, dried and canned fruits, citrus, poultry, meat offals, wine and many other products were affected by these measures. There were even threats to stop imports of American grain, unless it was accompanied by a certificate indicating that it was free of DDT residues.

I was, of course, able to understand and handle all the legal and trade policy aspects of these new developments, but I was not competent to discuss their scientific merits. FAS therefore appointed an ARS scientist as Assistant Agricultural Attaché to the Brussels office, who dealt exclusively with food law problems. The new food legislation did not only cover the wholesomeness or risks entailed by additives and pesticides, but also the labeling of food products and the standard sizes of packaging. The problem of labeling became easier, when English became one of the official languages of the Community.

I spent a lot of time on food legislation, the more so as many American business representatives visited our office and solicited our assistance in this field. (At that time the Commission did not accept petitions or advice involving food legislation from domestic or foreign industries, but was open to diplomatic representations. Hence, representations by my office (not in the form of protests but as expression of our opinion) became an avenue of approach for U.S. food industries in order to convey their views and ideas to the EEC Commission.)

**THERESA A. TULL**

*Vice Consul*
Brussels (1965-1966)

Ambassador Theresa Tull was born in New Jersey in 193, and received her bachelor’s degree from the University of Maryland. She was posted in Saigon, Da Nang, Laos, and the Philippines, and served as ambassador to Guyana and Brunei. On November 9, 2004 she was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You were in Brussels from ’64 until when?

TULL: ’65 and ’66, ’64 was spent in Chicago, and in language training.

Q: Oh, I see. So, ’65 and ’66. How was Brussels when you got there in ’65?

TULL: It was a fun place to live. You were perfectly situated for enjoying Europe. Brussels even today its sort of a little hub. You can go out in many directions just for a few hours and go to interesting places. Paris was three hours by train. Amsterdam I think two or three hours. So, from that point of view it was very nice. I had visited Europe before. I had gone in 1961 for five weeks on my own and had a really good, a good experience with Europe so I wasn’t cold to the idea of being over there, but it was great. At the embassy, the ambassador was Douglas MacArthur, II and I recall being very impressed that even though I was just a brand new junior officer when I called on him he spent about a half an hour outlining U.S. relations with Brussels, what the issues were that they were facing and I thought that was pretty decent. He was very tough. He was not very well liked at the embassy. He had a bad temper but overall was impressive. His wife…

Q: Wahwee.

TULL: Lord help us. Wasn’t she the speaker of the house’s daughter or something?

Q: Barkley’s daughter.

TULL: Alben Barkley’s daughter. She was a piece of work. I was, I guess I was one of only a few women officers at the embassy. I think they were a little unsure of what to do with me in terms of protocol. At that time every new spouse of all new officers had to pay a formal call on the wife of everybody who outranked them on the diplomatic list. In my case since I was at the bottom of the list and was an officer, not a spouse, I didn’t know, should I do this or not? The word came back yes, you should make these calls. In the meantime start doing your work, running out and doing all these calls as your work permitted. I did that. It was in a way kind of useful because I did get to meet people I wouldn’t have met, otherwise. The wives welcomed me into their homes. The bosses back in the embassy were not too happy that I would be walking out in the afternoon to pay calls, but, you had to do that. Again, what was the name of the ambassador’s wife? Wahwee or something?

Q: I’m not sure, but she’s known as Wahwee.
TULL: Once a month she had a coffee for the embassy wives and they decided to invite me. The residence was utterly gorgeous, an old chateau right next to the embassy. Coffee and tea were served, with lovely little cookies. Mrs. MacArthur, however, drank champagne which she did not offer to her guests. For me, that was not good breeding. In my home, my mother taught us that you offered what you had to your guests and you didn’t sit there and drink something or eat something if you couldn’t offer it to your guests. I found it strange hostess behavior.

Q: Did you get caught in any of these things with Mrs. MacArthur calling on you at the last minute to come and almost wait on her? You hear these stories that have come out that she could be very difficult at times.

TULL: She was known to be very difficult and the word was that she was an alcoholic. I didn’t see her drunk. I saw her drinking champagne when the rest of us were offered coffee, but, no, I wasn’t called over for anything extra like that. Then later Ridgway Brewster Knight became the ambassador and he was different.

Q: Was there an interesting political situation in Belgium at the time you went there or not?

TULL: Yes, to an extent there was. Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, had not been free very long. We’re talking ’65 and ’66 and I remember one day pretty early on in my stay where everybody got quite concerned because a demonstration was storming toward the embassy. It turned out it was a demonstration to thank us for sending an airlift to get some of those people out of some beleaguered spot in the Congo.

Q: I think this was Operation Dragon Rouge if I recall. I interviewed Ambassador MacArthur some years ago and talked about that where we used our air facilities to drop Belgian paratroopers.

TULL: We did something and I was thinking, what is this? It was the peak of Vietnam and I was expecting anti-Vietnam demonstrations, which we did get occasionally, and we had extra police guards at the embassy, but this was a thank you America. This was nice. That was good. I had an interesting experience though that I might mention.

Q: Yes?

TULL: Three weeks into my tour in Brussels I was living in a hotel, I hadn’t found a place to live yet. I was in a hotel about six blocks from the embassy and I was made the duty officer which terrified me three weeks in, what do I do? Well, okay, they must know what they’re doing. About 2:00 a.m. on Sunday morning I get a phone call from the embassy commo people and they said there’s a Niact immediate. I knew enough to know that I had to go in immediately. I flipped through the pages of the duty book to confirm this, and yes, I have to go in. I went in by taxi. I didn’t like as a woman hailing a cab at 2:00 a.m. but I did. At the embassy, I read the cable. For one thing it was sent to us as an information copy; we weren’t action. It was from Lubumbashi to whatever the capital was.
Q: It was Leopoldville at the time. You were doing consular work for about a year then. What sort of work were you doing?

TULL: Visas. Mostly visitor visas, but some immigrant visas. Not much citizenship. Citizenship services, but it was mostly visas. We had in Brussels two officers, the consul and vice consul, usually a rotational junior officer. For three months we were sent to Antwerp, a constituent post and that was interesting, but we had to take the train every day. They didn’t have housing accommodations there. We did a broader array of consular work there. They had shipping problems and things like that that we’d get involved in. It was visa work that made me decide. If I ended up being in consular work I would ask to transfer to be a secretary in the political section. I could not stand it.

Q: In Antwerp did you get involved in dealing with seamen and shipping?

TULL: Yes. Nothing too exciting, but they would come in. There were certain things they had to have done. I guess the captain had to have certain things certified and all.

Q: No mutinies?

TULL: No mutinies, no. Maybe a missing seaman or someone who needed help.

Q: Did you get involved with prison visits and things of that nature?

TULL: No.

Q: Just pretty routine stuff.

TULL: Never did that. In Brussels when I would have the consular duty I did go to the hospital a few times to visit to his great shock and delight I would have to say an American gentleman who was sick and alone. He’d been on a tour and had had a heart attack or something. We were notified and I went over to visit him. He was so grateful and was just astounded that anybody had come. I had one fascinating consular case in Brussels. I was vice consul.

Q: Let me just.

Q: This is tape two, side one with Terry Tull. Yes?

TULL: I was starting to talk about this particular consular case that was quite exciting. This gentleman came in looking very harried and sits down and says, “I want to talk to a man.” I said, “Well, sir, I’m the vice consul.” A lot of people just assumed I was a secretary. They’d see a woman and think “secretary”. He said, “Well, I need to talk to a man.” I said, “Well, sir, my boss is also a woman and she looks to me to handle these initial interviews and in fact, she’s on leave just now. What is the problem? Maybe we can help you; just feel free and relax.” He sat down with the wildest story you ever heard. He said he had discovered a sunken Spanish ship off the coast of Florida, and had retrieved some gold coins and perhaps jewelry. He had mortgaged his home to get money to go to Spain. He had gone to Spain and had tried to interest the Spanish...
government into coming up with money to salvage this vessel but they weren’t interested.
According to his story he had gone through all his money and he had sold some of the coins to
finance the trip and he was now absolutely destitute in Brussels with a wife and I think six
children ranging in age down to about three years old and they were there, desperate for funds to
return to the U.S. in our waiting room.

It would have been the biggest repatriation case I’ve ever handled. But he didn’t want to give up.
He said, “My wife is Mormon, if you can get us to a Mormon group they’ll help us.” I said,
“Well, I know there are Mormons in Brussels” I’m thinking to myself, but I don’t know that
they’re going to want to take in eight people, but he insisted. I called, but first I told the
gentleman his options. I said we can process you right now for repatriation to get you all back to
the States and you will have to eventually pay it off as a loan. He said, “No, I’m sure the
Mormons will help.” I got in touch with the head of the Mormon group in Brussels. They said,
“What?” I said, “Yes, there’s this gentleman here and his wife who is a very devout Mormon.
I’m offering to do a repatriation loan to get them back to the States, but they insist that you will
help.” He says, “Well, all right, send them over and we’ll see what we can do.” What the
Mormon’s apparently did was, they gave them enough money to go to Rotterdam. They told the
man that he could probably get passage on a ship. I got a call from Rotterdam, I don’t know
whether we had a consulate there or not, from Holland somewhere, saying, “What did you
people do, dumping your repatriation case on us?” I said, “What do you mean?” I didn’t even
know it happened. I said, “These people wanted the Mormons to help them. I offered to do the
repatriation.” He said, “Well, they’re up here now.” The distressed American thought that if the
Mormons gave them enough money to get the family on a train to Rotterdam he could try to get
his way back to the States on a ship, as the Mormons had suggested. Anyway, that was wild and
woolly consular case. This man, I think he was serious. He might have actually found a treasure
ship, I’ll never know. But he had to talk to a man, none of this talking to a woman.

Q: Well, usually, when that is, its “I was caught in a whorehouse and they took all my money.”

TULL: That’s right. The truth is stranger than fiction.

JOHN T. MCCARTHY
Political Officer
Brussels (1965-1967)

John T. McCarthy was born in New York, New York in 1939. He received a
bachelor’s degree from Manhattan College in 1961 and entered the Foreign
Service in 1962. His career included positions in Belgium, Thailand, Pakistan,
Lebanon, and Washington, DC. Mr. McCarthy was interviewed in 1996 by
Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You were in Brussels from 65 to 67, what were you doing there?

MCCARTHY: When I got there so early, they came up with a very interesting assignment for
me. They sent me to Antwerp for 4 months because there was an election coming. I think the
election was going to be in June. This was one of the periods when Flemish-Walloon relations
were very exacerbated. There was a Flemish party running in the elections and people thought
that it might be going to do well. Up until then they really hadn't done very well.

So I was assigned to go there, meet some people, do some reporting on this Flemish party. It
turned out, coincidentally, that the chairman of the party lived on the same street where I'd found
a temporary apartment so we saw each other a few times. I got to go to places like Ghent and
Bruges, very interesting cities in Flanders. That was fine. We enjoyed that. Then after 4 months
we moved back to Brussels.

I was working in the embassy, the first year or so, as the ambassador's staff assistant. This was a
very good ambassador, a man named Ridgway Knight. After that I was in the political section
mostly following youth issues and a little bit of an African angle as well. I knew a lot of young
African students. I was keeping an eye on them. And I was working with the youth branches of
the different Belgian political parties. So it was largely a youth-oriented, definitely a domestic
political reporting job.

Q: *This was still sort of an aftermath of the Kennedy time, youth officers. There was a big play,
there had to be youth officer, which meant you had to be young.*

MCCARTHY: I was still young. I definitely did about half of my job working with both African
and Belgian young people and young people's organizations.

Q: *Can you explain a little about how you saw your role and what we were trying to do with
youth because this is not something that continued on much later on, per se.*

MCCARTHY: It continued, there was a period, it was my second time back in Brussels when it
had gotten a more formalistic air. We were worried about what we called the Successor
Generation in Europe. We had gotten along very well with the people with whom we fought
World War II together, our allies, all of the politicians in the ‘50s and the ‘60s with whom we'd
built NATO. And by the late ‘70s we were worried about who was coming next.

But, you're right, it was a more cerebral, less pounding the pavement kind of thing. I think the
youth officer, and certainly what I was doing, was I knew all -- every Belgian political party had
a youth wing -- I knew the leaders of all of those youth wings. Belgium was a good ally and a
very comfortable kind of place so they didn't mind inviting me to their party conferences and
conventions. And I was pretty obvious, pretty evident. Once in a while people would sort of look
at me and say: what are you doing here? But it didn't come up that often. This was still a period
when -- God, you would run into it in such funny kinds of ways, such open kinds of ways -- my
wife and I went into a bar in Liege and people started buying us drinks because we were
Americans and we had liberated the city. This was in 65, 20 years after it had happened. But
everybody who lived through the war was still young and still very active, still active enough.

I think you couldn't have done that, in fact, in the ‘70s and in the ‘80s. People would have said
you came from the Agency and what were you doing, spying around.
The same with the Africans. They were trying to figure out whether they could parlay a relationship with me into some scholarship to the states. What I was trying to do was find out what they were sensing in terms of what was going on back in their own governments. It was basically Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi those particular countries.

Q: Particularly in the Belgian Congo, the Belgians were considered by most of the rest, as being terribly remiss. Something like 3 college graduates during the time that they ruled the Congo. How did you find the Belgians treating the Africans?

MCCARTHY: Two different things because by 65, 66, I think Belgium had been stung by that kind of criticism. They were being very generous in their scholarships to African students. So that Brussels in particular, but Louvain and the other university towns, had all sorts of African students who were studying on full scholarships. The place was full of them.

Belgium, and I guess again the Flemish get the most criticism for this, but it has aspects of racism built into the society so that a lot of the African students weren't very comfortable in their surroundings and they felt that they were being discriminated against. But, nonetheless, they were studying pretty much for free and the place was wide open for them at that time. So it was a mixed bag.

But the Belgians had, certainly, changed since the colonial days when there was more or less a conscious policy of not educating them beyond a certain level. The French didn't do a whole lot better. A little bit better in some of the colonies along the coast. But the Central African Republic also, a little less well-known perhaps, had no college graduates at the time of independence. The most the French had done was to build a high school. There was a Lycee in Bangui and I think that was it. That was a relatively new establishment, it had only been created 5 or 6 years before independence and most of its students were French.

Q: You're making these contacts with the youth groups and the African students and all, was this sort of a watching brief or something?

MCCARTHY: There were 2 big things going on in Brussels while I was there. I guess one of them almost came up overnight when De Gaulle threw NATO out of France, basically. His decision probably came, it seems it me that was mid-65. We had to scramble around to find some place to house the organization. Belgium was a prime candidate right from the start. We were probably looking at the Netherlands, maybe one or two other places.

When I got to Brussels, Douglas MacArthur was the ambassador. But by the time I got back from Antwerp, he had gone on. I served almost entirely with Ridgway Knight. Knight's job was to first get the Belgians to invite NATO to come. He did that rather quickly. They responded rather well. The foreign minister was a very famous Belgian, Paul Henri Spaak, who had really been around since the war.

The less attractive part of his job was to convince them that everything had to be pretty much duplicated the way it had been in France. Including commissaries and PXs and all of the
paraphernalia of a large American establishment. Some of which didn't make a lot of sense and some of which the Belgians didn't really like. But, nonetheless, he had to do that part of the job as well.

So, I would say that one thing we were all doing was looking at Belgian attitudes toward the Western alliance. They came through very well. It never really became much of a domestic political issue.

The other thing, this was the height of our buildup in Vietnam. There was one guy, a very ambitious political officer. The first year I was there, he was a staunch defender of our politics in Vietnam. He was going around to the different universities accepting speaking engagements which turned into debates. And you could do this over American policy in Vietnam. By the second year I was there, in other words moving into the second half of 66, you couldn't do that anymore. On the campuses if anyone tried to speak out in favor of American policy in Vietnam you would have had a riot.

Q: *Who was that?*

MCCARTHY: Arva Floyd. Arva had to stop what he was doing.

But my own job increasingly became caught up in a kind of polemic. I wouldn't necessarily want to defend, I mean my purpose in meeting with a bunch of people wouldn't be to talk about Vietnam but that was about all that any young Belgian wanted to talk about by the end of 66.

Someone a little older than I inherited my job as youth officer. We didn't really stay in touch but I did have a couple of conversations with him early on. I think he found it very hard. People didn't want to see anybody from the American embassy for a couple of years, young people in particular.

Vietnam caused us some -- we were very unpopular in Europe, in the late ‘60s, over Vietnam.

Q: *How did Ridgway Knight operate?*

MCCARTHY: He has one real distinct advantage which is that he's basically bilingual in French.

Q: *He lives in France now.*

MCCARTHY: He now lives in France.

He was very well plugged in Washington. I guess that's the first time when I recognized that you could actually use the phone as an instrument to diplomacy because in Bangui we really couldn't get anybody in Washington on the telephone in those days. I don't think we ever made any phone calls period.

Knight used to complain that people were calling him all the time and telling him what to do and wanting to know whether he had done yet what they'd asked him to do yesterday. So he was
maybe one of the first times when I saw that improved communications weren't always a positive thing for the local ambassador. I certainly could share some of that.

He was very effective. He knew everybody at the top of the Belgian decision making structure. He had easy access to them. I think he got an awful lot done even though he himself questioned things. I can remember the debate over the PXs and the commissary. His position was: you don't need that, the war is over, this place is booming. There were, even then, wonderful stores in Brussels that had these incredible delicacies. Anything you wanted you could buy on the local market.

The concept that we had to come in and recreate a system setup in the late ‘40s in a country still wracked by the aftermath of World War II was odd. But, nonetheless, the military, the Pentagon was having none of this. He had to do it and he got it done. Again, it may be a kind of lesson for me because I was his staff aide and the fact that you could disagree with aspects of your instructions but you could still, nonetheless, carry them out.

Q: Did...

MCCARTHY: Lots of visitors, as well, excuse me for interrupting. Lots of generals, lots of high-level people coming through. Because we really ran a pretty much full-court press on the Belgians until they had swallowed everything.

Q: Essentially, was the feeling that the Belgians wanted NATO there?

MCCARTHY: I think they saw that there wasn't any other good candidate, that the organization served everybody's purposes. The Belgian government is not dumb. They saw job creation. The NATO headquarters ended up in a depressed area of Wallonia, I'm sorry, the military armament, SHAPE, ended up in a depressed area of Wallonia.

I think that everything that was built was built with other peoples money. They extracted some advantages from it. But, nonetheless, it wasn't easy for them. Particularly because we insisted they take it exactly as it had been in France. It could have been downsized, it could have been done a little bit differently but we just wouldn't listen.

Q: How did you find the Belgian foreign ministry and bureaucracy from your perspective?

MCCARTHY: It was bigger than the Central African ministry, obviously, but it wasn't run too very differently, in some ways. Spaak was the foreign minister most of the time I was there. Then the government fell and some other people came in.

Spaak was the minister. He had a brilliant Chef de Cabinet, whose name was Etienne D'Avignon, who went on to become a commissioner of the European Community. I'm trying to recall whether he became Belgian foreign minister, I think he probably did at one stretch. He's had a variety of jobs, both at the European and the Belgian levels.

Those two guys were pretty much the people you had to see in the foreign ministry to get things
done. There was an American desk officer, he was the guy I saw most of the time. But, things would pretty quickly get kicked upstairs to the minister or to the Chef de Cabinet and most of the policy was right in their hands.

Q: Did you get any feeling towards Belgians attitudes towards the Germans?

MCCARTHY: In the street or with people, it didn't take much to get a lot of resentment. They were still mad about World War II. But, on the other hand, business, commercial relations were warm, were good. Antwerp, the port, was heavily used by German industry.

I guess the political answer to that is that Belgium and Holland both very much saw the European community as a way to make sure that there wouldn't be any new wars in Europe. And that Germany would be swallowed up in some larger mass where its ambitions would be realized and kept under control at the same time. So that the political answer was: Let's keep going, let's build Europe quickly.

I was there at the worst period. De Gaulle's biggest efforts to curb the community, in addition to throwing NATO out. Probably this was the time when the Belgians figured out that they couldn't allow themselves the luxury of being anti-German anymore. I don't really recall any particular problems but on the contrary I think it was probably a relatively cozy period for Belgian-German relations. France was the real problem.

Q: I was going to say, what was sort of, you might say the embassy impression and what you were getting reflected. Sounds like France could go in what in diplomatic terms could be described as a real pain in the a**. What was the feeling towards France, particularly De Gaulle’s France, at that time?

MCCARTHY: The Belgian feeling?

Q: What you were getting from the ambassador, obviously he must have been a Francophile over the first water. But also from the rest of the political section and then from the Belgians.

MCCARTHY: My answer to that has to be a personal one. I, too, am a Francophile. Most of my education, both cultural and historical, treated Europe as though it was a place that started in Italy, spread through France and the Renaissance and eventually got to England. A lot of my background sees France as a very central part of anything that's going on in Europe. A lot of my personal experience. The countries I like best to be in abroad are either France or Italy. My French is really very cozy, very comfortable, I think in the language when I'm there. I wouldn't imagine doing anything except in French. The same is true when I was in Belgium. I'm very easy with the place, very comfortable with it.

As I said before, I could see that I thought we were being a little overbearing in our request to the Belgians. And I think we certainly were, to some -- we're a big elephant to squeeze in under anybody's tent. We may have learned that lesson to some degree now. I think this was more of a problem in the ‘60s and the ‘70s, than subsequently.
Then we had the advantage of being the largest economy in the world. Of being the largest military power in the world and nobody could quibble with that. We could throw our weight around to some degree. I think, unfortunately, we did.

So I had a certain degree of sympathy for where De Gaulle was coming from. I think it's probably still good for our policy, that he stood up to us and forced us to moderate them to some degree. I think, some of that I sensed myself, some I would have gotten from Ridgway Knight and probably from the rest of the embassy. Because, thinking back to the individuals involved, they were all people who spoke French well, liked French culture, were comfortable with France. We probably were, to some degree, sympathetic with where De Gaulle was coming from. I certainly was.

Q: There were no great major events that impacted, were there during this time 65 to 67.

MCCARTHY: On the relationship? I think the need to do something with NATO dominated the relationship and it came up unexpectedly. I don't think we knew De Gaulle was going to throw us out. I think we suspected he was going to restrict us some and might have sort of gradually backed France out. He basically gave a speech and said you're out in 6 months. That was a real dominant moment.

The other element I mentioned in terms of Belgian internal politics, it really was how serious is this split between the Flemish and the Walloons going to be. How far are they going to drive it. There were some demonstrations, a couple of riots, it's still not over. But, I think in the mid-60s it was as serious as it's been before or since.

There was a lot to watch domestically in a country that we were asking an awful lot from on the international level. Then the European community. This was the time of the EEC and De Gaulle was not participating. From the Belgian point of view that was very important.

It was an exciting time to be in a small country. I went back to Brussels in 76 working in the mission to the communities. I knew everybody in our embassy then. I think by the late '70s the Belgian beat was a lot quieter. My friends at the embassy didn't have a whole lot to do.

Mid-60s it was kind of an exciting time to be in this country. Because we were making them swallow a very large dose of something.

Q: Was there a problem with the Communists or what the Soviets were doing at the time there?

MCCARTHY: Not a specifically Belgian problem. There was a small legal communist party that never won much more than a seat or two in the parliament. I knew a couple of left-wing socialists, pretty well actually. They were kind of fun.

Belgium is very much a meat and potatoes bourgeoisie country. There wasn't much going on there. Were there big incidents internationally? I can't remember any.
Ridgway B. Knight was born in Paris, France to American parents. He joined the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included positions in France, Germany, and Pakistan, and ambassadorships to Syria, Belgium, and Portugal. Ambassador Knight was interviewed by Kirstin Hamblin in 1993.

Q: After Syria, you went to Belgium. This was in 1965.

Knight: Yes. Belgium was very peaceful after Damascus. I forgot to say that during my stay in Damascus, I went through four revolutions, and if I count all the changes in governments, in those five years, I had dealt with sixteen different governments. So, as I say, Belgium was very peaceful. But I did have two major problems to deal with during my four years in Brussels. One was the expulsion of NATO from France by General de Gaulle, and helping convince the Belgians to accept NATO as an institution in their country. The Belgians were very happy to welcome the civilian institutions of NATO. But the Belgians are internationally timid, being such a small country. Even though they're no longer neutral, the spirit of neutrality is still in the country up to a point. They feel that to live happily, if you live a little hidden and out of the limelight, it's much better. Therefore they were most reluctant to accept the military headquarters. And it required a certain amount of cajoling to induce them to do so, but it was done in a friendly spirit. At a farewell official dinner when I left Belgium, Foreign Minister Harwell stressed that at no time had I sought to twist their arm, or to use the might of United States to intimidate them. The transfer was successful. As you know the NATO military headquarters are just near Mons alongside the French frontier. I might point out, just as far away from Brussels as they could possibly locate.

The other major problem I had to deal with was an uprising against the central government in Zaire, the old Belgian Congo. And as you know, there are many, many Belgian residents in Zaire. I recommended to Washington that we help the Belgians with air transport planes to get them out. I have a recollection of one of my friends from the Department coming out to see me in Brussels and saying, "Ridgway, we're going to accept your recommendation. But if something goes wrong, there has to be a scapegoat, and you know who its got to be." As a matter of fact, I think that's all right. I think that if you're in a policy job, in a policy making job, I think it's quite right that you rise or fall by the policy recommendations. Some of my Foreign Service colleagues think that they should have the right to make foreign policy recommendations, but be held blameless afterwards.

Q: Were you happy with your time in Belgium? You certainly accomplished a lot.

Knight: I was happy. Speaking particularly of my next assignment in Portugal, the people say, "You must have loved it, the beaches are so fine." People forget that most of us in the Foreign Service go into it for the work to be done, and for the challenges to be overcome. I know very few of them who go into it, excepting non-professional people, for the lush side of the career. The social whirl is quite secondary. That's why from the point of view of the professional
challenge, I was more stimulated by my assignment to Syria, than I was by any other.

JACK SHELLENBERGER
Public Affairs Officer, USIS, US Mission to the European Economic Community
Brussels (1965-1970)

Jack Shellenberger was born in New York on December 28, 1927. He received a bachelor’s degree from Western University. His career included positions in Nagoya, Moulmein, Brussels, Lagos, Tehran, Ottawa, and Tokyo. He also served in the Voice of America. Mr. Shellenberger was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on April 21, 1990.

SHELLENBERGER: And in Brussels I managed to learn French to a level that made me comfortable to use it. I introduced a program -- not introduced a program, I continued a program and reinforced it and expanded it, by which the Eurocrats would get international visitor grants to the United States. I considered that perhaps the most significant contribution to our work because for Eurocrats, in those days, America was not just a weekend trip, it was a major expedition.

One of the benefits of the USIS career is that you bask in reflected glory of superstars. That wouldn't happen very often in the U.S. mission to the Common Market, it was a more specialized kind of work, not as cultural but more dealing with economic and trade issues. But we did have a visit by a celebrity, Frank Borman. The Borman of those days was noted for his exploits as an astronaut. He was mobbed. It was something quite unusual to have these Eurocrats who were normally very staid and sort of standoffish and prim, and here they were busting the doors open and cramming into the downstairs of the Common Market headquarters and all, treating Frank Borman as if he were a latter-day Robert Redford.

In Brussels for four and a half years, I had seen my career develop in ways that I hadn't imagined. I remember Dan Oleksiw called me and wanted me to transfer to Tokyo to be the cultural attaché. And I said I would love to go back to Japan, but I would want to have at least two years language study, although I had studied Japanese part-time during my four years there as a junior officer. Well, Dan said, I don't know what I can do, you're on a list to go to Vietnam and this would take care of that. I said, I'll take my chances. And then sure enough I did get called, and I was told I was going to go to Vietnam, a very big job in PsyOps. I would be overseeing how many hundreds of people and it was the number three job and all that. I said, well, fine.

And then my -- I was at that time the deputy to the counselor for public affairs in Brussels at the U.S. Mission to the Common Market. My boss, the counselor, was Hunt Damon, who at that time decided that the USEC operation was not really congenial to his public affairs gifts. So he went to the Ambassador, Bob Schaetzel, saying I think I'm going to have to go back to Washington and retire, I don't believe this is really satisfying to me and I've after all had a pretty long career. And he then generously proposed that I be named his successor. And Schaetzel found that congenial.
So I became the counselor and that took care of Vietnam and kept me on for another year or two. Until Henry Loomis came by. Actually he came to Paris and said would I join him in Paris, which I did, and there he said, I'd like you to consider going to Lagos, Nigeria, which would be an altogether different physical and working environment.

Q: Before you go on to your Lagos appointment, I want to ask you two questions. One, would you spend just a few minutes telling us what the main thrust of your responsibilities were with the Common Market group, because I think that's largely misunderstood by people on the outside. What do you do in the information job in the Common Market assignment? And the other is, that when Henry Loomis proposed you for Lagos, he must have been Deputy Director of the Agency.

SHELLENBERGER: Yes, right.

As Public Affairs Counselor at the U.S. Mission to the European Community, our task was to present the U.S. view and/or U.S. record and the U.S. priorities on the economic issues facing Europe and across the Atlantic. Going on at that time was the Kennedy round of major international trade negotiations. Perhaps the most ambitious trade negotiation ever attempted. It took a couple of years or more to complete. During that time we were being observed and covered by some 70 people in Brussels, journalists who were accredited to the Common Market. And this was an international group to whom we carried and conveyed our message, issue by issue, whether it was the agricultural subsidies program which we had so many problems with, American soybeans, a whole range of issues that caused friction. Then on the political side, de Gaulle was taking France out of the institutions of the Common Market, boycotting them. And there was a very great question as to whether the Europe that Monnet and others had crafted was going to be realized, a European Community.

I remember President Nixon's first visit to Brussels right after his election in 1968, his first trip out of the U.S. was to Brussels to see the King, of course, but also to call on the EC Commission. George Vest and I -- George was the DCM -- were very concerned that the departure statement of Nixon be one that conveys the importance we attach to the Common Market. So we looked at the proposed communique that Nixon was to read or issue on departure and George and I both thought it was lacking in terms of a resolute affirmation of the Common Market process. I think the phrasing in the original was: we believe the Common Market is in the interest of Europe. So we changed the words from "in the interest of" to "indispensable to the future of Europe." And we got Jerry terHorst, the Deputy White House Press Secretary, because Ron Ziegler was not to be found. And Jerry rather reluctantly, approved it because there was no time to take it up with other parties. And the communique was issued. We heard later that Henry Kissinger was quite annoyed that the language had been changed to indispensable because he didn't want to annoy de Gaulle.

Q: He didn't like the thing very well.
CARL EDWARD DILLERY
Economic Officer
Brussels (1966-1967)

Ambassador Carl Edward Dillery was born in Seattle, Washington. He received a bachelor’s degree from Seattle Pacific University and a master’s degree from George Washington University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included positions in Japan, Belgium, Vietnam, England, and Cyprus, and as ambassador to Fiji. Ambassador Dillery was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: So you came out of this and where did they put you?

DILLERY: My next assignment was to Brussels as head of the Economic Section at the bilateral embassy. At that point the mission to the European Community was already there. NATO -- with its attendant U.S. mission -- came during my tour. In connection with Brussels, let me just note that I came into the Foreign Service in 1955, as an FSO-6, as we all did. Then in 1956 I had to be moved back to an FSO-7.

Q: As we all did. I had a hard time explaining to people that in a way it was sort of a promotion. They moved from six ranks (six being the lowest) to eight ranks. Those of us at the six level dropped to a seven, but at least we were one rank above eight.

DILLERY: Anyway, I got promoted back to six in 1968, to FSO-5 in 1961 and FSO-4 in 1963. So I was really rolling along at that point. The reason I mention this is that I went to Brussels and worked for a Chris Petrow, the Economic Counselor at the Embassy. My job there was bilateral economic issues with Belgium, but the most important and time-consuming subject was the developing independence of Zaire, specifically the copper business, and its impact on the U.S. So a large part of the work that we did was not just the bilateral economic work of Belgium, which we also did, but Belgium's relationship with the Congo.

But I was only in Brussels for eighteen months. It turned out that Petrow was very, very concerned about the Vietnam War -- as many were in the mid-1960's. And even though I wasn't taking any particular position on the war, every day he came to work he would discuss his unhappiness with the war. Finally, when there was a Department notice that came, I guess in 1966, asking for volunteers for Vietnam, my only way of responding to all these stimuli this was to volunteer. In retrospect, probably a big mistake.

Q: Back to Brussels. You were dealing with the Zaire question. What was the Belgian attitude at that time? Was the Katanga business, the separation of essentially the mining area, still being pushed? How were the Belgians looking at it and how were we looking at it?

DILLERY: The Belgians had not yet accommodated to the fact that Zaire no longer was Belgian. They still had all the technicians and major economic interests and continuing to try to utilize the Belgian Congo as their cash cow. The trade was still heavily oriented towards Belgium. Of course, Katanga...actually the separatist business had happened before, but there was still a lot of
rumblings about that during that time. But politically in Zaire during that time I think it was fairly quiet. It really just had to do with all these maneuvering as to who was going to get access to these minerals. And, of course, we were encouraging independence...Mobutu was appearing on the scene at that point and we had a close relationship with him. This was the early days of his regime. So probably we were being a little bit anti-Belgian there. It never reached the point where it was an irritant in the relationship or anything like that. But our goal at that time was to try to help develop Zaire into an independent country that was going to be viable and it almost looked like that might be possible.

Q: At that point we were pretty much optimistic. Were we going about this in a geopolitical sense or were there American firms we were trying to get in there for our own commercial interests?

DILLERY: I guess the main impetus of what we were thinking about was to keep the copper industry going and hopefully use that as a basis for a stable Zaire. A lot of people were working on this in and out of government...the famous Tempelsman, I remember that name...

Q: He keeps coming up again and again. He has his finger in everything. One of these international brokers.

DILLERY: There were a lot of international people. There was a lot of back and forthing and a lot of American interest, but there were no companies like an American mining company trying to get in for exploitation. Most of the exports would have been on commodity exchanges anyway. So there was not a single American company that we dealt with.

Q: How did you deal with the Belgians? How did you find them?

DILLERY: The Belgians as a group are fairly reserved people. First of all at that time the ethnic problems were very strong, the Walloons versus the Flemish. In fact I always kidded my Flemish friends because it was at this time that they were singing "We Shall Overcome" and by this time they had really gotten to the place where they had overcome, but they didn't realize it. The one thing they couldn't do to the Walloons was destroy the Walloon sense of superiority. So that dichotomy was very interesting. On an individual basis, we got to know people at my level at ministries and a few on the outside who were very friendly to us and very nice. Belgium as a country, if I were looking at this as a historian and cultural observer, I would say as a country that has been invaded by many other peoples over the course of the years, the people are kind of defensive.

In 1966-67 it was just at the beginning of Brussels becoming an international center and I am sure attitudes have changed somewhat now. But the Belgians were inward looking and not easy to talk to. They were very strict about everything; it was a tight society.

Q: Did you see a split in the Belgian bureaucracy between those uncivilized colonialists who still thought in those terms within the bureaucracy and a new generation that was coming up who were seeing things in a different light, or not?

DILLERY: I did not see too much of that at all in the bureaucracy. However I did observe the
old generation outlook more among the people. Our landlady's husband had been an official in a bank in Zaire, so her memories of Zaire and sense of how it was going down hill were very strong as well as the sense of loss. She felt independence had been a bad thing. But I think most of the bureaucrats I knew were really quite correct. It was clear that Belgium wanted to maintain a sphere of influence in Central Africa at that time. They had not yet reached that point where they disassociated themselves. That was the government policy so I don't think there was any dichotomy there.

Q: What was the Belgian feeling at that time regarding European unity, at least the economic field?

DILLERY: I think Belgium saw European unity as an advantage for the country. I think they felt their central location...they already did have the Common Market headquarters there and it was becoming very much a growth industry. I think they were quite proud of that. As one of the smaller European nations they saw economic amalgamation as something that would benefit them, they would be a receiver and not a giver in the whole economic equation if there was economic unity of some kind. So they supported it.

The headquarters of NATO also were moving to Belgium at this point. I think they felt that all these things were pluses. The European Community, while it was large in the number of staff, etc., didn't really make a big impact on the city. I wasn't there when NATO arrived and it could have made a negative impact on the city making the people of Brussels unhappy, but I don't know that. But when I was there it hadn't really changed anything.

Q: The Ambassador when you were there was Ridgway Knight?

DILLERY: Yes, Ridgway Knight.

Q: How did you find him?

DILLERY: He was a wonderful guy. He, of course, was very, very traditional. He had been born in France of American parents and actually probably spoke French better than he did English. He had gotten into the diplomatic service partly because his French was so good. He became a vice consul in North Africa during World War II and was involved in the clandestine landings of Murphy and Clark -- actually was one of the young men who carried them through the surf to secret meetings with the French.

Q: He was one of those vice consul observers. Murphy had a whole series of gallopers who went out and kept an eye on what was going on.

DILLERY: Precisely. Then he rose rapidly in the Foreign Service. He was fiercely American even though he had not spent a large part of his life in America. At the same time he was very old school. He was a wine connoisseur. He did things in the correct old fashioned way. But he insisted on good reporting. He had excellent relations with the Belgians. He was a very good reporter and negotiator himself. He was, I would say, the epitome of the old line Foreign Service officer. Totally political in his outlook and not very much on the economic side.
Q: How did this Vietnam thing develop for you?

DILLERY: As I said, Chris Petrow roiled me up so strongly...he was a wonderful person who later became head of Mexican Affairs in the Department. He was just a real idealist. He was one of the people who was prepared to speak his piece at any given moment. Very liberal in his thinking. He was totally opposed to the war and it was driving him bananas. Then he proceeded to drive me bananas. So when a telegram came out requesting volunteers for Vietnam, the thought came to me that this would probably be the biggest foreign policy development that would affect our country during my time in the Foreign Service and I really should know something about it. Probably the best way would be to go.

Q: Going to see the elephant, I think is the term.

DILLERY: Something like that. So I sent in my request to volunteer and I remember Ambassador Knight called me in and said, "I know that Brussels is not Paris or Rome, but why would you ever want to leave Brussels?" I sort of wanted to say to him at that point, "Mr. Ambassador, I am not going to Paris or Rome." I explained to him what it was.

That was Christmas of 1967 and I came back and took the training course at old Arlington Towers training center.

CHARLES ANTHONY GILLESPIE, JR.
Supervisory Security Officer, NATO
Brussels (1966-1967)

Administrative Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1967-1968)

Administrative Officer
Brussels (1968-1970)

Ambassador Charles Anthony Gillespie, Jr. was born in California in 1935, and received his BA from UCLA in 1958. He served overseas in the US Army from 1958-1962. His postings included Manila, Jakarta, Brussels, Managua and Mexico City with ambassadorships to Colombia and Chile. Ambassador Gillespie was interviewed on September 19, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

GILLESPIE: Exactly. He was from Ohio. So I went off to Brussels. The reason that I learned this is that I learned from Dikeos and from Gentile and his people that Brussels was a very popular place. I was told, "You can expect visits from members of Congress. You saw some Executive Branch people out in the Philippines. However, you're going to see members of Congress, and you're the Security Officer. You make darned sure that they're taken care of in whatever way they need to be taken care of. Take your lead from the Assistant Secretary for Administration,"
and so forth. The Assistant Secretary for Administration was a fellow whose name escapes me. He just died in 1995 - Frank Somebody. I can't think of it. It will come later, I'm sure. He was a very nice man. He had never been in the Foreign Service. He was a political appointee but had been in the job for years. Unlike today's political appointees, jobs like these were not in and out, short term appointments.

In any event, we arrived in Brussels. There I found that the Ambassador to Belgium was a career officer - Ridgeway B. Knight. The DCM was John McSweeney, another career officer. The Administrative Counselor, Ken Linde, was a career officer and a very nice fellow.

The Security Office was in a mess. The fellow whom I replaced had neglected a lot of the detailed work. That may have been one of the reasons why he had not lasted in the job or the Foreign Service, because he was actually relieved and let go from the service.

Then I found that there was a man named John Tuthill, who was the Ambassador to the European Community.

Q: *He is known as Jack Tuthill.*

GILLESPIE: He was a career officer. There was a change there and Bob Schaetzel took his place. However, this happened fairly quickly. In any event, I arrived and took up residence in Brussels in April, 1966. The first event I had to deal with - I'd actually been told about it in Washington - was the NATO Ministerial Meeting, which moved from capital to capital in those days. It was going to be held in Brussels and hosted by the Belgians in May or June, 1966.

Q: *At this point NATO Headquarters were in Paris.*

GILLESPIE: NATO Headquarters were in Paris. The North Atlantic Council met there. The military headquarters, the true military arm of NATO, was in Paris, although the military forces, for the most part, were in Germany. NATO was quite an establishment. It had been in Paris since the organization was created in 1949. However, Gen Charles De Gaulle had been President of France since 1958. In 1966 De Gaulle decided that France would no longer be the site of NATO Headquarters. The French representatives at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, with Secretary of State Dean Rusk present, made it clear that it would no longer be an active member of NATO. It would remain a member of the North Atlantic Council but would no longer have its troops under NATO command. That was the basic French position.

This was basically an eviction notice to NATO. To this day I have never gone back to find out the details of why this happened, but here I was, a brand new Security Officer, at post for a couple of months. The Secretary of State was attending the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, with his Executive Secretariat(S/S)staff and all of his support people. As we know, when the Secretary of State travels, he leaves someone in charge as Acting Secretary of State. However, the Secretary of State remains the Secretary and is never away from the job, just as our President does not leave the Presidency, wherever he goes. I had to deal with all of this stuff at a post which is not used to having the Secretary of State visit very often. This was the little American Embassy in Brussels, and it was quite a job supporting the Secretary of State.
That was quite an introduction to me. I fairly quickly found out what I thought that I was supposed to do. Apparently, all of that worked pretty well. Then I learned that the whole NATO operation was going to move to Brussels. Belgium offered to be the host, and the other members of NATO accepted the offer. They figured out how they were going to do it all. The idea was that NATO would be out of France by 1968 and established somewhere else, within a couple of years. This set off bells and whistles and set gears to turning, as you can imagine, in the capitals of the 15 countries which belonged to NATO, including Washington and, most assuredly, Brussels. That put a whole new twist on my assignment to Brussels. The European Community, which I was going to get to know, became a secondary consideration at this time. The move of NATO Headquarters became an overriding priority - getting it done and done right.

As an aside here, I might mention my introduction to Brussels and Ambassador Ridgeway Knight, who was my new, ultimate boss. The Security Officer reported to the Administrative Counselor, who headed what was called a Joint Administrative Office, because there are two Missions in Brussels. In fact, we served two masters, but there was one master, i.e., Ambassador who was the supervisor of the other Ambassador. That is, Ridgeway Knight, the Ambassador to Belgium, was my ultimate boss.

Ridgeway Knight is a person for whom my admiration will never cease and never diminish. He is the son of an American artist who took up residence in France at about the beginning of the 20th century. Ridgeway was raised in France and attended school there. He came back to the United States and went through a very traditional, establishment educational process. Although his father was somewhat Bohemian in behavior, I think that he was quite conventional in his views. I think that Ridgeway Knight's father went through a resuscitation in the art world in the 1980s. He has disappeared from vogue since then.

In any event Ambassador Ridgeway Knight joined the Foreign Service, if I remember correctly, just before World War II broke out. He worked as a wine merchant in France before he joined the Foreign Service, so he has had business experience. As I learned later, he is a true connoisseur of wines and knows the wine business up one side and down the other. Some time after he joined the Foreign Service, he was attached to the staff of Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at the American Embassy in Vichy [The capital of the part of France not occupied by the Germans during World War II], Consul General in Algiers, and a long-time Foreign Service Officer who had a distinguished career. He received a commission in the U.S. Army and joined the staff of General Mark Clark in connection with the invasion of North Africa by the Allies in November, 1942. He was subsequently involved in much of the political-military activity taking place in the Mediterranean area, including North Africa and the Italian campaign, where Gen Clark commanded the Allied Fifth Army Group.

One of Ridgeway's favorite stories, which he didn't tell often, but which was very moving, was when he and Murphy went with Clark to a very secret meeting West of Algiers just before the Allied landing in North Africa in November, 1942. Ridgeway and Gen Clark traveled to Algeria by submarine and then landed by rubber boat. Murphy, who was then Consul General in Algiers, traveled to the site by automobile. Knight was given the job of guarding the boats - making sure that they would be there to take them back out again when the meeting was over. I guess the
meetings were with various French military officers.

Q: Actually, the meetings were with French officers appointed by the Vichy Government.

GILLESPIE: Knight would tell this story and then show the scars on the back of his hand where he kept himself awake by stubbing burning cigarettes on his hands. They had to wait for many, many hours, and it was very difficult to stay awake on this occasion.

I have to describe Ridgeway Knight because he is not physically very big, although he has a tremendous presence. He speaks English with an accent which is not truly French, but you know that he is not a native speaker of English. It is soft English, and he is a very soft-spoken man. I watched him work both within our own bureaucracy and with foreign governments. He was smooth as silk and tough as nails. He was my ideal of a diplomat.

In any case the next big event was the move of NATO to Belgium. This triggered an explosion in our Mission in Belgium in every way. Ken Lindy, the Administrative Counselor in the Embassy in Brussels, was told very nicely that he was going to be replaced. If I recall correctly, the administrative people in the Department of State in the U.S. dealt with moving a couple of hundred State Department and other agency civilian employees. In view of the larger number of military people who were going to move into Brussels, many of whom were American, the State Department decided that it had to beef up the Embassy staff in Brussels. Ken Linde was replaced by Ralph Scarritt.

When I arrived in Brussels, the Administrative Section consisted of Ken Lindy, a General Services Officer (GSO), a Personnel Officer, a Budget and Fiscal Officer, a Security Officer, and the chief of the Communications Unit. That was about all. Within about a year, by some time in 1967, there was an Administrative Counselor, Ralph Scarritt, a very senior officer - in today's system, a Minister-Counselor - who had been the Director of Foreign Building Operations (FBO); a deputy Administrative Counselor, Michael Conlin, a very capable man; three Americans in the GSO office; and I, who was replaced in 1967 by a more senior Security Officer, Bob McCarthy. I must say that it was all handled pretty smoothly.

Ralph Scarritt, whom I met before I met Bob McCarthy, had apparently talked to various people about me. The way they handled the situation is that they told me, "All right, you've been the supervisory Regional Security Officer, covering this region for about a year. What we propose is that McCarthy will come in as supervisory RSO. However, you will be fully responsible for the U.S. aspect of the NATO move to Brussels. Your job is all of the security arrangements for the transfer of what is called the 'U.S. Mission to Regional Organizations' - USRO - to Brussels. It will be the U.S. Mission to NATO, as it was in the past in Paris." That's how the Department took care of the various egos and all of the other personal matters associated with this move. I turned the supervisory security officer job to McCarthy, but I still had a large piece of the action.

Q: What were the security requirements involved? In the first place you would think that when you think of security in Brussels, it is almost an oxymoron. After all, Brussels is not Beirut. What were the security problems in 1966-1967?
GILLESPIE: The problem involved espionage. We were involved in counter-espionage. At the time, two doors down from our Chancery in Brussels, was the USSR Commercial Mission to Belgium. It is now the Russian Commercial Mission to Belgium. There was no doubt that 80-90% of the inhabitants of that large building were either from the KGB, the principal Soviet civilian intelligence organization, or the GRU Soviet military intelligence organization. At that time in Belgium we had a very substantial intelligence presence. We had very close liaison contact with the Belgian authorities, who had their own intelligence service. This was a time when technical penetration and the recruitment of intelligence personnel loomed very large. At that time terrorism was really not a factor. However, violent demonstrations were a problem, because, even as I arrived in Brussels in 1966, the Belgian and other European Leftist groups and others were violently opposed to what was going on in Southeast Asia. President Lyndon Johnson was sharply criticized for this. Remember the slogan, "Hey, Hey, LBJ, How many kids did you kill today?"

One of my jobs as the RSO was to deal with not weekly but almost biweekly demonstrations directed at one or another of our installations, either the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Mission to the European Community, or an American-owned bank. For example, the Chase Manhattan Bank or another American bank would have people marching around in front of it. The United States Information Service (USIS) would bring in speakers to lecture at the University of Louvain or the University of Brussels to speak. They were denied platforms. Official American Government spokespersons were denied permission to speak by these demonstrators. I had to deal with this problem and tell people whether it was safe or not to speak on various occasions.

However, the real concern about the NATO move, in addition to arranging for both offices and people to be housed right and taken care of, was how to deal with the Eastern Europeans (the Soviets, the East Germans, and all of the others from the Warsaw Pact). They were directing their penetration devices at us, as well as at the Belgians, Germans, and French. Remember, NATO had a lot of shared secrets. This was a major problem and challenge. Without going into any of the detail, I had already had my first major counter-intelligence investigation. This involved someone associated with our communications activities, who had been in Eastern Europe. It seems that, in this case, he had been approached by the Hungarian intelligence service, who had been in Eastern Europe. It seems that, in this case, he had been approached by the Hungarian intelligence service, and might have been recruited. In this case the Hungarians were probably acting for the KGB.

In fact, that case put me into direct contact with our own intelligence and counter-intelligence community in a very intense and deep way. Through them I developed my own contacts with the Belgian intelligence, counter-intelligence, and police authorities. This later turned out to be both interesting and useful as we handled the NATO move. I had studied French in high school. As I think I told you earlier, I think that my language aptitude is pretty good. By the time I'd been in Brussels about six months my French was really quite workable. I was able to go off and deal on my own in French. I have to tell you that this was considered a little rare for a U.S. Security Officer. Unless a Security Officer was already bilingual by reason of birth or upbringing, there weren't very many linguistically qualified RSOs.

Q: This is true, and it represents almost a social class matter. I assume that your coming out of a military intelligence background must have enhanced your credentials. I mean that you were able to work that much more easily with our military and NATO military people. How did you
find NATO and also Belgian security?

GILLESPIE: Belgian security was always suspect. The whole Belgian scene, even at the time of World War II, had left itself open to infiltration. The fact was that there were a lot of Belgians who were willing to swing one way or the other for a lot of different reasons. Our U.S. intelligence people would say, in terms of the Belgians, "Be careful with this, be careful with that. You can reveal this, but don't reveal that." They gave me that kind of guidance.

NATO security was very interesting. You may recall what the situation was before the Cold War ended. We had a full-time U.S. Security Officer seconded to the chief of NATO security. The U.S. officer at this particular time was John Abidian. He was a Foreign Service Officer who had been a professional Security Officer for his whole career. Abidian, I guess, was of Armenian extraction. He spoke several languages: French, German, and, I think, Russian. He was highly qualified in that sense and was a very experienced Security Officer. As soon as the NATO move started to develop, I developed a routine. I would get on the Trans-European Express (TEE) every Tuesday and Thursday morning. I should say that we lived in the vicinity of the battlefield at Waterloo, South of Brussels. I would take a local train from Waterloo to the Gare Centrale, Central Station, change to the TEE, and make the run down to Paris, which took about two hours. I would get to Paris about 9:30 AM. Then I would work all day with our own U.S. people, especially a woman named Mary Mulloy Carmichael. She had been appointed the coordinator for the NATO move by Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, our representative to NATO at the time.

Ambassador Cleveland was a political appointee who had been the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs. He was a very big name in the field of public administration in the U.S. He had been the Dean of the Maxwell School of Public Administration at Syracuse University. He was a staunch Democrat and even today, almost 30 years later, is active in the Aspen Institute. He went on to become the President of the University of Hawaii and of the University of Minnesota. Really, he was a super gentleman and very much an intellectual.

I would go down to Paris in the way I described previously and meet with our people there every Tuesday and Thursday. I would get on the train and return home in the evening. I would spend about five hours to and from by the time I did it. I would put in about a four or five hour day in Paris, planning and preparing the security aspects of the NATO move. Some of the questions we dealt with included: how were we going to move the documents? Would we bring the old safes up to Brussels? Would we get new safes from the U.S.? What building arrangements did we need? A new headquarters was being designed for NATO. We needed to figure out what we needed in terms of space and how this space should be configured. It really was a major planning process covering the physical move of equipment, people, and activities from one place to a new environment.

I got deeply involved, both in the U.S. security side of it and how this fit into the NATO security side, how they meshed, and how this would go over in the Belgian context. I spent a year and a half involved, not exclusively, but heavily, on such matters. So that's how we worked it out with the security people. There was a lot of detail to it, and I spent a lot of time on it.

Q: What did you think of the intelligence people from the Soviet bloc countries? What were some
of the threats and actions taken? They must have had to beef up their operation, too. When they learned of this NATO move, they probably had to send a whole bunch of people down to deal with this.

GILLESPIE: Yes. At the time we thought that they saw this, both on the basis of our speculation, as well as something more than speculation, as a tremendous opportunity. We were all quite convinced of this. NATO Headquarters is a very complex organization, leaving aside our U.S. Mission to NATO and our own Embassy. It was complex then and is even more so today, I believe. NATO has what is called an international staff. That staff consists of nationals of member states of NATO who are seconded by their governments or are employed directly by NATO, with the approval of the respective governments. John Abidian, for example, the head of NATO Security, retained all of his U.S. Government employment rights but had been, in effect, seconded by the U.S. Government to this organization. We do the same thing with the United Nations and other international organizations.

I suspect that there were about 1,000 - and maybe more - NATO employees in Paris who were French nationals or nationals of third countries employed by NATO as an organization. They had no direct connection with their own, national governments. We knew that not all of those employees would move to Belgium when NATO Headquarters moved. That meant that there would be an employment boom in Brussels for the Belgians. So this was not only going to strain the employment market, because these positions were at white collar level, clerical type people, semi-professional or professional. There were also all kinds of custodial employees, janitors, cleaners, and people like that. As we knew that the Eastern Bloc intelligence services used a blanket approach, as they had when I was in Germany with U.S. Army Intelligence eight years earlier, we figured that they would try to penetrate the NATO Headquarters staff by recruiting Belgians and others to be employees of the headquarters organization and to do all of the things that low-level, intelligence agents do. For example, spotting people for recruitment, keeping track of people's movements, trying to pick up documents, learning the procedures, and doing all of those kinds of things. This would then allow the higher level recruiters or planners to figure out how they were going to penetrate or obtain top level secrets - including, in the case of NATO, real military secrets.

We might make a short digression here. Diplomatic secrets are something of an oxymoron. Secrecy in the world of diplomacy is a very transitory thing. A secret lasts until you want to make it public, hopefully under your own control. However, military secrets, including plans for a weapon and "what will you do if" kind of thing, are all supposed to be safeguarded. I think that those were some of the principal targets of the Eastern Bloc intelligence services.

So our concern was, first, how would NATO Headquarters be effective? The U.S. tended to take a paternalistic, or at least avuncular view, of an organization like NATO. We did not want to see NATO secrets compromised. We did not want to see problems of that kind. We knew that the Eastern Bloc intelligence organizations would be very actively engaged in trying to penetrate NATO. Every indication was that they were doing exactly that. The Soviet Trade Mission just a couple of doors down from our Embassy was increasing in size. There were indications that agents were entering Belgium under non- official cover. My contacts among the Belgians were concerned about this problem, some of them quite vocally worried that Belgians were going to
become involved in this kind of thing. This meant that there had to be a lot of security checks made and a lot of care exercised. In the security process there isn't a whole lot that you can do, after a certain point, to maintain security.

There was also concern about physical security. That is, how could we lock all of the doors and such matters. By that time these matters were fairly mechanical. Our Mission to NATO had its own communications facilities. We had moved to what is called the on-line encryption system. That is, it was no longer necessary to encode messages off-line as much as had been the practice in the past. In the Philippines the Embassy was still using relatively old-fashioned machine devices. You would type out a cable on paper. That would go to the communications center where a communications operator would copy the communication in the clear - that is, not in encrypted form on tape, much as if you were copying a teletype message. Then you would run that tape through one machine which handled the encryption process. You would get a tape from the other side of the machine, which was the encrypted message. Then the encrypted message was transmitted over radio facilities.

In Brussels I found that, by the time NATO was getting ready to move out of Paris, basically all communications were on-line. That is, you took the telegram, typed it into a machine, and the message went out automatically. You didn't have to do all of the other processing previously required. Eventually, a few years later, we went to a process involving Optical Character Recognition [OCR] technology.

The buildup of the Embassy in Brussels was substantial. The pending arrival of the U.S. Mission to NATO was a major development. Interestingly enough, I learned that the U.S. Mission to the European Community was also growing. There were people in that Mission from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of Agriculture who were not like the usual Agricultural Attaches from the Foreign Agricultural Service, as we call it. You had a lot of different people there, such as from the Treasury Department.

To deal with the problems which came up, we developed a cadre of junior officers - on their first or second tours in the Foreign Service. I'd just like to mention this because it was significant to me and may have been to others. We ended up with about two dozen officers on their first or second tour. In those days each Ambassador had a staff aide, and there were junior officers in the Political, Economic, Administrative, and Consular Sections. They were doing rotational tours serving relatively brief periods of a few months in each of the Embassy Sections. I was only on my second tour and really hadn't had much of a full, first tour.

I was tremendously fortunate because both the Mission management - that is, the DCM, Jack McSweeney, and the Ambassador to Belgium, Ridgeway Knight, plus the people from the U.S. Mission to the European Community (USEC), included me in everything. I was included at the professional level, because I was the Security Officer, and they included me as well with these other, junior officers. We would get together as junior officers. I forget whose idea it was - it may have been Harry Blaney's, who was very much of an activist. He used to say, "This is an opportunity we can't afford to miss. We have a lot going on here." As a group we came up with the idea of trying to figure out what the Foreign Service did - and how it did it. Our device was to go to Ambassador Knight and say, "Would you tell us what you do?" He responded positively.
and, in effect, helped us begin a process which lasted for the four years I spent in Brussels and into which each new group of junior officers fit.

To manage this process, monthly meetings were held in the homes of the various, junior officers with one of the senior officers of one or more of the Missions in Brussels. By the time I got through the process we had spent evenings, or afternoons, with the three Chiefs of Mission and the three Deputy Chiefs of Mission. At one time, I think, we had had the three Ambassadors and the three Ministers (because each DCM had to be a Minister). Then, in the NATO Mission we had what I saw for the first time, a Minister for Political Affairs and a Minister for Defense Affairs, who was the senior Department of Defense (DOD) official. If I remember correctly, we had 16 Counselors of Embassy - the heads of the various Political, Economic, Administrative, and Consular Sections. We also had the chiefs of the various offices of the intelligence community, in addition to the FAA people. We would go around, either at a dinner or a dessert kind of affair. By the time I left Brussels, we had met with each of these senior officers. Often it was an evening affair, but it was all business. We asked them, "What do you do, what does your organization do, why are you assigned here, and how can I fit into this?" It was one of the most wonderful experience that I had ever.

Q: That's done so seldom in the Foreign Service.

GILLESPIE: One marvelous thing about Ambassador Ridgeway Knight is that he chose to do this. He said, "Let's do two things at once." He didn't say it that simply. He probably said, "Well, I think that we can accomplish two objectives here. Why don't we do this? Why don't you come to the Residence two or three weeks from now? While we're talking about what the Ambassador does, let me expose you to some of the wines that I think Foreign Service Officers ought to know." He set up a very formal and very precise kind of wine tasting which went on while we were talking about what Ambassadors do. He then carried that forward with us, as junior officers. He said, "Any time you have a question about wine, please feel free to call on me." This was a really superb experience.

As an aside on a non-work kind of activity, at this point in the 1960s your spouse was rated at the same time as a Foreign Service Officer. Part of the efficiency report system was a LIMITED OFFICIAL USE portion which talked about your representational abilities and your family. The family was a big deal. We hadn't gotten into this in Asia, because I hadn't been around enough, and the situation was anomalous.

In Belgium I found that there were people who were called, quite frankly, European wives. The European wives were a force because the young and even not so young American wives were not always in total harmony with the European wives. Many of the American wives did not speak French with the appropriate accent, even if they spoke the language fluently. They often did not know European culture very well. We had a few British, Eastern European, and Germanic or Teutonic wives. I found out a lot about this from my own experience as Security Officer and from my own wife, Mrs. Colette Knight, who was French, was aware of these differences and managed them beautifully. She took care of all of these wives, particularly the newer, if not younger, American Foreign Service wives. I think she had her moments with some of her French sisters. She probably said, "Look, lay off these kids. They're new to the diplomatic game and
they have to do their job." It would not have been her style to say it that way, but I think that that is what she did.

This led to some tough moments. Handling that kind of thing was not easy.

J. ROBERT SCHAETZEL
U.S. Represent to the European Community
Brussels (1966-1972)

Ambassador Schaetzel was born and raised in California. He received his education at Pasadena College, Pomona College, Harvard University and the University of New Mexico. After working in the Office of the Bureau of the Budget in Washington, DC he joined the Department of State in 1945, working in its Office of International Trade. In his career in the State Department, the Ambassador held a number of senior positions, in which he dealt with matters concerning International Trade, Atomic Energy and Disarmament. In 1966 Mr. Schaetzel was named United States Ambassador to the European Community in Brussels, where he served until retiring in 1972. Ambassador Schaetzel was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: I keep bringing you back, but you went out to Brussels in 1966. Did you have any problem with your appointment?

SCHAETZEL: No. After the nomination had been made, the White House staff wanted to know sort of who did I know from the Hill that knew me. Hale Boggs was a very good friend. I just mentioned his name, and that was all the White House required. Hale Boggs was a Congressman and very much up in the Democratic hierarchy. But the point was that there was no problem. I appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee, and there obviously were so many coming through there were no problems. I might say one thing was, because -- going back to de Gaulle -- there were some questions that anyone associated with George Ball, that no one knew what de Gaulle would do. Of course, de Gaulle did at that juncture, not necessarily at this particular moment, sort of freeze everything. In other words, he sort of stopped the whole European Community from moving. There was a fear that he would take an action which would block all of these people from any other country being assigned, such as I was to be assigned to Brussels, and would bring that to a halt. Well, that was a fear but it turned out not to be reality.

Q: Prior to your going out, how did George Ball, you and others dealing with this European integration situation view the withdrawal by de Gaulle from the military side of NATO? Did you see this as being a real setback or what?

SCHAETZEL: Well, that’s right. It’s hard to overstate the influence of de Gaulle. That’s why I go back to the very interesting interview I had with the French television people. It really is absolutely extraordinary, because he had enormous capabilities and, of course, he played a remarkable role: what he did in Algeria, what he did when he was in London before going there,
and what he did after he went back to Paris in sort of reviving France and renewing the confidence of an almost destroyed nation. And none of that could be taken away from him. But the trouble was that he was one of the most opinionated individuals that, I suppose, the world will ever see. He was so dedicated to the fact that France was the greatest nation in the world, bar none, and the absolute refusal to be a part of anything in which he would not be the dominant person or France the dominant figure. Hence, on NATO, that was seen as a body in which France would merely be an element, probably with the United States being the major force within that institution. So his action on that was unsettling for everyone, other Europeans and people here. It’s a little hard to say how he could have tolerated the European Community at any stage whatsoever. I think the explanation for that is that he was not that interested in economics and he didn’t see the Community as being that much of a challenge. Therefore, he allowed it to move ahead. Now, later on, as I was referring to before, he would get concerned and would take actions which stalled everything, and the Community could not move ahead the way other people wanted to move. He obviously was a force that, because of his feelings about Britain, anything that looked in the direction of bringing Britain into this enterprise... So it was a strange pattern of being indifferent and then being hostile but never to the point of just saying that he was going to blow the whole thing up or take France out of the European Community.

Q: You're sort of giving the impression to the outside that here you were, a bunch of subversives in the normal political world setup, particularly the European/American system, sneaking in under the cloud of that dismal science economics, and all these politicians, the people who were nationalists and all, both in the United States, in the State Department and elsewhere, and in Europe, particularly in France, sneaking in under this thing of knitting together something sort of out of sight of the great nation-state thinkers or something.

SCHAETZEL: That’s right. You remember also -- and I can’t bring this back in terms of when it all happened -- he was voted down in an election in a critical period (1946) and was out of office and then, of course, came back later (1958). But you have an extraordinary individual, one who had great insight in one area and great ______ in other areas. Bear in mind, of course, in Algiers, Algeria, he was there but also Monnet was there. They were working closely together, and when they came back and de Gaulle took charge, Monnet was the one that helped put the French economy together. The extraordinary thing is that the relationship was close enough. Yet then when Monnet dedicated himself to the integration movement, which was exactly what de Gaulle __________, right to the end there was an alienation which was really fundamental. It was not the nature of Monnet to have resentment, but it was extraordinary, in the light of that background in Algeria and then in the reconstruction period, to have them together and then totally at odds.

Q: While you were still working on this in Washington before you went out in ‘66, were you and others in dealing with the French using the German card of saying, “Look, what we’re trying to do is to so integrate this so the Germans won’t be a threat to you again”?

SCHAETZEL: Yes, I think that was constantly there. It’s interesting, the question you ask here, is that that sort of lingers on. In other words, the French today still see the European Union as a way of keeping Germany under control. With the reunification of Germany and the fact that it is now bigger and much more powerful than France, these various meetings including those coming up on the convention, France is still desperately trying to hold to something. They want a
joint partnership of equals in the European construction between France and Germany despite what I’ve just said in terms of the greater power, greater population of Germany. It’s interesting that the Germans have been very willing to go along with this, they have not fought this, they have not tried to assert themselves as Germans. They could say that that day is over, but they’ve shown very good sense on this front. Again, it goes back to something absolutely fundamental -- this almost goes beyond conviction -- namely, that we, France, are the great European power and everyone else ought to defer to us, our language, our culture, our history and so forth. They have not reconciled themselves, following the pattern of de Gaulle, that it’s a new world; and that, if they are going to play the role they should, it ought to be within the framework of a very dynamic, active, well put-together European Union in which within that framework they can really exert influence; but that’s the hardest thing in the world. It’s very hard, I think, for countries to recognize that they can achieve objectives within the framework of another institution rather than nation-state, and that applies to the United States as well today. If we continue along this unilateralist line that we’re going to dictate rather than use international institutions to achieve our objectives, we’re going to be in real trouble.

Q: Did you find that while you were working on this -- again, we’re talking about the Washington period before we move on -- did you find that particularly the French were, through the media or maybe political speeches, particularly irritating and poking at the United States? This seems to be a constant.

SCHAETZEL: Well, not really. The European Community originated with the French, with Schuman, with Monnet. The people that I worked with, the French people, were among the ablest, most committed, and a number of them remain my friends now. Those that were a part of the European movement, whether they’re in Brussels or elsewhere, were as dedicated as any other people and certainly as dedicated as we were, so I was never thrown with the kind of de Gaulle French. They were just not a part of the operation in Brussels.

Q: Again, did you run across, or could you kind of avoid it because they didn’t deal with the same things you did, the French intellectuals?

SCHAETZEL: Not really. I would say that some of those that I knew would certainly fit the category of being intellectual, but if you’re thinking about sort of the cultural community and so forth, no, I did not have that experience.

Q: Again, they sort of disdained economics?

SCHAETZEL: That’s right. _______, that’s a different world.

Q: The chattering class is not strong in economics. Okay, well, we’re coming to your appointment -- you went out to Brussels in 1966 -- as the ambassador to the European Community at that time. What was the European Community when you went out there in ’66?

SCHAETZEL: I thought it would be the best appointment I could have thought of -- in terms I think the fascination of it. The challenge here was something totally new was being put together, which was not only a novelty but something we felt was enormously important for Europe and
for actually the rest of the world. I think the nature of that job was recognized. I was the third person; you had William Butterworth (1961-1962) and then you had my good friend Jack Tuthill (1962-1966). It was recognized as such a post and it was much sought after. We had a relatively small staff of about 40. Because the administrative support came through our embassy to Brussels, we did not have the sort of visa work and all the other things which are part of the normal embassy function. I am struck now by the fact that so many people wanted to be assigned to our mission. It was an extraordinary group of individuals, and I think we were charged up just because we were all drawn to the potentiality of the European Community. So for many reasons, first not having all these administrative responsibilities that normally go with an embassy but also, again, the quality of the people in the mission, I say it was an extraordinary post to be assigned to.

_Q: Who was your Deputy Chief of Mission and some of the people you had when you initially went out there?_

SCHAETZEL: George Vest was one.

_Q: But in a way were you crusaders or zealots or something?_

SCHAETZEL: Well, people thought we were. We were all drawn because of the challenge of the European integration movement, the potentialities of it. I don’t remember any individual that we had there who did not share that enthusiasm. I think people on the outside would certainly look upon us as zealots. I think we saw ourselves as people just involved in a major new element of international affairs, particularly as far as the American government is concerned.

_Q: Was there anyone there who was almost assigned to look at American economic interests or American political interests, always being kind of like George Ball and the Vietnam War, always saying, “Okay, we’re building a rival power, we’re building an economic power that may try to freeze American commercial interest out or that may be a potential rival to us with different interests than American interests politically”?_

SCHAETZEL: No, I don’t think so. I don’t remember anyone on the staff raising questions along those lines. I think that we were primarily concerned in seeing the development and supporting it where we should. What you cite is something that is quite a recurrent observation on the European Union today, as it has been in the past that something would come into being that would challenge the United States and, I suppose, try to challenge American dominance. That’s particularly evident today with the euro, in other words, people feeling today that the euro will become a currency which will challenge the dollar’s predominance.

_Q: The euro came into effect essentially as of the first of this year 2002._

SCHAETZEL: That’s right, absolutely, just a short time ago, and with more success than anyone really expected. You’re now raising a point which is certainly central to my feelings about the world, and that is that I don’t see and have never seen a European Community or European Union as something which would be a competitor. I see it as a partner. I think one of the most useful things we could possibly have would be a coherent, strong European Union working in
partnership, not as a competitor. I think that the people who see this as competition are those that really, I presume, want to be sure of American dominance, that we don’t want to have anything which would challenge that dominance. I feel that the one thing that would be most helpful for us in the world -- and this is a whole subject unto itself -- is to have that partnership with a united Europe which has the same values, the same general interests, which is certainly true. I don’t know where the basic differences are in our strategic interests. Now, there are various things that we see differently. In many cases, certainly today with the Europeans very apprehensive about the belligerence shown in the State of the Nation speech last Tuesday.

Q: This is Tape 3 Side 1 with Bob Schaetzel.

SCHAETZEL: Within our own democratic society, we obviously have sharp differences, things which are important but are not absolutely central. People are not proposing that we ought to have a different system of government, but there are improvements to be made. You can have an effective partnership here but still have elements about which one would disagree, debatable elements. One of the central points, which I think has been a core belief of all of us who have worked on this, is to envisage this constructive partnership.

Q: Were there any residues? It was during the Kennedy time, if I recall correctly -- I’m not sure the exact timing. There was a major war going on between Europe and the United States and that was known as the Chicken War. It would have been before the time you went out there, but could you explain what the Chicken War was. Did it have any after effects by the time you were out there?

SCHAETZEL: Well, I can’t remember that, but I can tell you now we’ve got something very similar to it in terms of conflict with the European Union on a series of subjects. The most serious right now is that we have tax provisions which permit American corporations to avoid taxation by operating through elements abroad. This has now been found to be in conflict with the rules of the World Trade Organization, and we could be subject to about $4,000,000,000 worth of penalties. Now, that’s characteristic. We’ve had it in other areas. We have it on hormones.

Q: Genetically modified, GM, something, genetically modified organisms, I guess.

SCHAETZEL: And what you’re raising here is an important point. Because of the importance of Europe and America to each other and the level of trade between Europe and the United States, you have a breeding ground for conflict. You must have a resolution; there’s no way of avoiding it. That was one of the advantages of the World Trade Organization, which could settle such issues without falling into damaging conflict. Having spent so many years of my life being involved in international trade, I know there’s no way you can avoid these conflicts. Hence, the indispensability of, first, GATT before and now the World Trade Organization. We’re very lucky, because now we have on each side representatives who are sophisticated, knowledgeable, and who recognize that an economic war between the two would do unbelievable damage to each side. I hope we’re going to be able to get through this, but -- I think you referred to the Chicken War. These were other conflicts like this. They had to take place, you see, without a World Trade Organization. You did have the GATT but we did not have the system that we now
have. I’m still optimistic that we’re smart enough, but, what we have to do to bring the Congress along. That’s difficult under any circumstances and particularly when you get into the field of international trade.

Q: When you got there in 1966, let’s talk a bit about your relations with the embassy in Brussels, the embassy in NATO? Those are the two other embassies. How did you get along with them?

SCHAETZEL: There really weren’t any problems. At that juncture, you see, the European Community was not into defense matters at all. As far as the embassy was concerned, it really worked quite well. Strangely enough, an ambassador to a country was still honored, no matter whether it was Luxembourg or wherever; that was an ambassador. I don’t think, by and large, these other ambassadors looked upon the ambassador to the European Community as being something which would undercut them or somehow reduce their prestige. You know, Eisenhower was there at one juncture...

Q: That’s John Eisenhower, as ambassador to Belgium.

SCHAETZEL: That’s right. They were competent individuals and went about their business. Now, the one thing I remember as far as NATO was concerned, which was interesting: NATO being so important, visitors coming to Europe from Congress or elsewhere would always want to meet and have discussions with the ambassador to NATO, and at the same time, being in the same town, there was an interest in coming around and finding out more about the European Community. It was very interesting. I wish I could remember all of the individuals that came through. It’s an endless list. One I remember most vividly was when Reagan came through.

Q: He was governor of California at the time.

SCHAETZEL: He spent almost a day there, and it was an extraordinary experience. He was very nice. He, I think, displayed something which was fundamental, and that is essentially a lack of curiosity, as contrasted with so many other people who came through there and were determined to learn as much as they could about something which was very new. My attempts to fill him in put him to sleep. I found that the only way to wake him up was to talk about myself as having been born in California and so forth. I’d do that, and he’d become the governor of California and would come to life. But it was a very revealing experience. I never changed my views on that particular individual. But Moynihan I had. I can’t remember all the distinguished individuals who came through, and that was, as I say, one of the interesting aspects of the job, to meet these individuals and have a chance to share with them what seemed to be going on within the European Community.

Q: In this sort of first half of your time there under the Johnson Administration, in the first place, what was the status of the European Community at that time?

SCHAETZEL: It was developing, you see. You had not moved onto a monetary unit, which became really a major threshold. I think you have to bear in mind that in ‘66 you were still in an early stage. This was still a novelty, and it was something to learn about. Nobody knew exactly what it was or what it was going to become, because if you stand back from that -- just think --
you had a totally novel international body. It was something that had never really been done before, and it had something of the elements of the European parliament with the council of ministers and with the commission. It resembled the United States. It really quite consciously was putting together a federal entity of that sort. But nothing had been done like this. Therefore, a person with intellectual curiosity was bound to want to know what is this, where is it going.

Q: *You had our embassy in Brussels. What was in Brussels of the European Community?*

SCHAETZEL: The embassy essentially did the normal business of an embassy, just handling the business of Belgium as a state, and we really didn’t have any conflict at all. When you have people like I mentioned, you get Reagan, the embassy would have its dinner or cocktails or something for these people who were going through. I would have my own social and other contacts with them. I think one of the interesting things is that I don’t remember having and real problems with the several ambassadors that were there.

Q: *I was really asking what did the European Community have in Brussels at that time? I mean, was there equivalent to a White House or to a parliament?*

SCHAETZEL: Our contact with them was with the Commission, the president of the Commission and other members of the staff of the Commission. They were located in Brussels, Parliament was in Luxembourg, and the House of Ministers was, again, in Brussels.

Q: *Was there anything in Strasbourg at that time?*

SCHAETZEL: That developed later.

Q: *So you’re really talking about...*

SCHAETZEL: The Parliament has evolved. It is much more important today than it was at that time. Our contacts were primarily with the Commission. They were a remarkable group of people to work with. I remember, for instance, accompanying some of the presidents to Washington. I remember particularly during the Johnson Administration Jean Rey, who was then the president, meeting with Bobby Kennedy. He obviously was not interested in Rey’s attempt to sort of tell him why he should be interested. He listened politely and so forth. My memory is very clear on this, the unsuccess of that attempt on Jean Rey’s part. It’s an interesting question you ask, because one could have assumed that, if you had a very active, ambitious ambassador to Belgium, he would have perhaps wanted to elbow his way into the business of the European Community, but certainly from my point of view I don’t remember anything of that sort.

Q: *I did interview somebody who was, I think, DCM to John Eisenhower, who was ambassador for part of the time you were there, who said at one point Eisenhower was sitting around afterwards saying, “You know, I don’t see what really an ambassador does. It doesn’t seem like much of a job to me.” The DCM obviously kept quiet but felt, well, you know, you’re not doing your job. In other words, John Eisenhower was not very engaged, which was handy for you in a way.*
SCHAETZEL: Well, he essentially was and continued to be a writer. That’s what he wanted to do.

Q: He’s written some very good military histories.

SCHAETZEL: For most of these countries and most of the time, you’re carrying out important but rather routine tasks. There was nothing very inventive going on. But that was not one of the real problems. I think the reason there was not that much in the way of problems with the embassies of the six member states, of the embassies in the capitals, is that, by and large, they didn’t feel that the European integration movement or the Community was that important. They thought that the world of the member states lives on, and that if you were an ambassador to France you didn’t need to worry about an upstart European Community, certainly the American representative of that European Community. So I would suspect that the ambassadors to the European states wouldn’t have more concern. On the other hand, the behavior of the embassies here in town is a further example of how the classical relationship lives on. The failure to recognize the importance of the process of European unification does not much bother the way the system works.

Q: What would you do as ambassador to the European Community? There’s the obvious reporting thing: what are these guys talking about and what are their concerns. But were you representing them as the American non-European power to this group?

SCHAETZEL: My responsibility was, on the one hand, to explain to Americans, whether they came from the government or the Congress or elsewhere, to explain to them what was going on. It was obviously novel, and at the same time to say, “This is our interest in this. This is why this phenomenon is something that is very important to us.” That was one. Now, the other -- as you say, the Chicken War other -- was to deal with problems that came up. They were bound to come up in terms of actions taken by the Europeans or actions taken by us, which created conflict or difficulty. I think that one of the most important things that I was able to do -- and I don’t know to what extent I was successful in this -- was to inform members of the Congress as to what was going on and for them to appreciate this. You have to bear in mind the enormous responsibility of a Senator or Congressman, the number of things that they’re supposed to be in touch with. It’s very easy for them in understandable ignorance not to know this and, therefore, if something came along which would be a source of conflict, to approach that without being aware of the context. So I saw my mission and our mission as being to inform these individuals, to widen their perspective so that they would see when conflicts came up within the context of something which is larger and of great importance to our country.

Q: I think, looking at the time, this is probably a good place to stop and to pick up the next time. I like to put where we are.

Oh, I think I ought to explain for somebody who’s looking this up, you can look up Chicken War, but basically, as I understand it, this was during the early ‘60s where the United States had developed a very sophisticated frozen chicken product and was selling it in Europe, which did not have that, and the Europeans, particularly the chicken farmers who were not as efficient or at least were producing a different chicken product, were screaming bloody murder, and there
were all sorts of impediments to this. This was something that had to be worked out, but it was the first almost major American-versus-Europe clash on something, and it was over frozen chicken.

SCHAETZEL: It’s really gone on, too.

Q: And it had continued. So in view of that, the next time we talk I would like to talk about agriculture and how we perceive, because this was often where...

SCHAETZEL: It still is.

Q: This is at the point of the bayonet. When you deal with agriculture, we’ll talk about that. Did culture come up, particularly we’re talking about France? You explained Elliot Richardson supported you in staying on, but let’s talk about the advent of the Nixon Administration and particularly Henry Kissinger and company and how they viewed that. And we’ll go on from there. And then at the end after your time there, I’d also like to talk about your subsequent career.

***

Today is February 15, 2002. This is the anniversary of the blowing up of the battleship Maine. Apropos, nothing. But let’s talk about agriculture. There are two phases. Let’s look at it before the Nixon Administration came in. What were sort of your marching orders and how did it work out and how did you perceive the other people regarding agriculture?

SCHAETZEL: I think one of the most interesting aspects of this subject is how little it changes. Here we are more than 30 years along and the problems we were dealing with then are around today. The basic point is that agriculture is as much as political problem as it is an economic or an agricultural problem. Therefore, rationality doesn’t really come into play or, if it does, very slightly indeed. What they have done within the European Community then and European Union now is produce a highly protective agricultural sector subsidizing production beyond internal requirements, dealing harshly with imports, and so forth. One ought to bear in mind, however, all of these indictments can be applied to American agriculture with equal force. The problem for people concerned with a productive and orderly international system is that they have to recognize that they’re dealing with just overwhelmingly powerful agricultural sectors of the society. It hasn’t really changed all that much. It gets mixed up with my old mind, because things that seemed at the top of the list back then are suddenly coming back again. The European policy with respect to agriculture has been brought to the forefront because of the expansion of the European Union. That has posed this issue dramatically because Poland and the other states of the newly applicant nations are something which has to be dealt with before they can really move on and bring in these other countries to the east. I don’t know how they’re going to be able to resolve all this. It’s not only a question of more competition for, for instance, particularly France but also finding the money to subsidize agriculture more or less in the same framework as the subsidies which now exist for the 15 member states. So you have that internal problem, and then, of course, you have -- this is an area of contention between ourselves and Europeans -- several factors here. One is just a desire to have greater access to the European market. Secondly, it’s the
concern of consumers, whether rightly or wrongly, in terms of crops that are treated, questions of health, apprehensions about crops and products that may have been so-called doctored...

Q: GMO, genetically modified organisms.

SCHAETZEL: That’s right; that’s what we’re talking about.

Q: But I’m trying to go back to the ‘60s and ‘70s. At that time were you sort of told to make sure you don’t allow a barrier to be created for our products and all?

SCHAETZEL: Well, it’s hard to sort it out. In my recollection of that period it wasn’t so much my being asked to do things which I disagreed with. I think a responsibility for anyone in the position I or others had was to be opposed, intellectually as well, I suppose from a policy standpoint, to a really highly protective system that involved what was called the Common Agricultural Policy. I think we saw this as something not only harmful to American interests in terms of capacity to penetrate the European market but also something which really wasn’t that beneficial in general to the European population. The remarkable thing to me now as we sit and talk about this is, as I said a moment ago, how little has changed. Efforts have been made to really bring about a modification of the CAP, but it’s been minimal and it’s been fought every inch of the way. I doubt, to repeat myself again, there’s been very little change from the ‘70s or ‘80s and this new century we’re in.

Q: Were you sort of keeping book? In other words, were you looking at how we subsidize our agricultural policy knowing that somebody else is keeping book in Europe? Everybody else is pointing the finger at everybody else and so you had to be aware of what we were doing. How did you find this balanced out? Could you in honesty go complain about certain American items that were being discriminated against and say that we’re not doing the same thing or the equivalent?

SCHAETZEL: It’s a good question, because that’s exactly right. The hypocrisy was pervasive; it remains pervasive, I think, the ability to stand up and criticize others while ignoring that we are doing much the same thing. I suppose that’s the heart of this particular subject. I have a very good European friend, whom I’ve worked with a long time, who’s now working for Fisher, the Minister for Agriculture within the European Union. I had a note from him and I kept thinking, you know, how can a man as rational as this friend of mine work as an advisor to Fisher in an area which is almost totally lacking in rationality. I can only say that the forces here on both sides of the Atlantic have not changed at all; namely, very effective, well organized agricultural sectors which carry a lot of political punch. You know now we’re considering this agricultural budget right at this moment, and it really is an outrageous budget indeed.

Q: Subsidies for cotton...

SCHAETZEL: Out of control, and efforts made to try to change the character so you don’t do something which is characteristic; namely, to produce more of a commodity which is already in overproduction. Both Europe and the United States are doing precisely that. I can only say I just thank God I’m not involved in this anymore, because if you pay any attention at all, it drives you
Q: Please correct me on this, but it seems to me that on this support of agricultural products you have sort of a different motivation. In the United States it has essentially turned into big business and you have an awful lot of money anyway in subsidies going to big enterprises -- although they keep talking about the small farm, that's not what's happening -- whereas in Europe there is a social imperative too and that is to keep these small little farms, which they're doing. It makes the countryside look great. Is that true?

SCHAETZEL: You're quite right on that. Here the advertising is false because they talk about the family farmer -- you've made that point. The difference in Europe, and I think it's understandable and commendable, is they really want to preserve an aspect of their society which has a vibrant rural element to it for all sorts of reasons related to conservation and a more wholesome atmosphere. So they do have that purpose in mind, and I think in a way there have been adjustments in the policy which tend to support that. The distinction between where we have been going and where they're going is true and important.

Q: Talking about preserving the small farms, did you see, as the European Community was developing, a growth of the bureaucracy that was going to be covering people, telling them what size pickles to grow? In other words, establish something and put a bunch of highly paid bureaucrats together and they'll make up regulations. It's the nature of the beast, and over-regulation seems to be the name of the game as one watches the European Union. Was this a problem as you saw this?

SCHAETZEL: I thought then and I think now there is a cliché in all of this which is important to identify: namely, to attack the European Community or the European Union today as being just a nest of bureaucrats really will not stand up under examination. If you compare, say, Brussels, against the bureaucracy of the member states, extraordinarily almost half of the budget goes into translation and interpretation. I don’t think that the figures I’ve seen most recently bear out that this is over-reading Brussels bureaucracy. Granted there’s a distinction between the United States and Europe. The Europeans, even before the European integration movement came into play, had societies which were much more inclined to have strong governmental entities used to regulation, expecting it and wanting it. It’s not anywhere near the same sort of vibrance or pressure in the United States. Even now every politician, when he turns, has to condemn Washington just to sort of maintain his credentials. I don’t remember that as being a major factor. I want to put it in the context of the fact that the Europeans are more tolerant, more willing, to have this degree of either European-level or national-level bureaucracy in play.

Q: Were you seeing a split between the way the United States does things and the way the Europeans do particularly to form a social safety net? I’m thinking of, as you were mentioning, the regulation of work hours, the great difficulty in closing down a nonprofitable business, the high cost of hiring people -- once you have them, you’re stuck with them, more or less. Whereas the United States can move quite rapidly, Europe doesn’t seem to be able to do this. Was this apparent when you were...?

SCHAETZEL: Absolutely, very evident, evident right now, because all of the things occurring
this moment in Europe, particularly the need on the part of Germany to make itself loosen up: in other words, not to be controlled by the sort of forces of bureaucratic behavior, but even more so in France, which has been suffering under this forever. Efforts are being made and have been made to try to get out of this, to loosen up the economy. It really is a distinction between Europe and the United States, and it’s funny -- not funny; to a degree it’s tragic -- how much it persists, how long it takes to root it out. For instance, both Germany and France now have elections coming up, which has brought to the fore the pressure groups which can use these elections as a means of not making changes. People are pretty pessimistic now about changes being made in Germany, or in France or elsewhere, just because of this overhanging process of elections coming up in the next few months or later this year. That, as we said before, is just absolutely characteristic of this particular aspect of the European and American economies.

Q: The French have recently decreed a 35-hour week and all. The thought behind it is to make more employment, but the net result is to make them less productive. I was wondering how it looked at the time, because it always seems in competition with Europe that we have a built-in maybe five percent advantage no matter what because we’re a more efficient country and we don’t have all these social costs and we can shuck an ailing industry and move on to a new industry, where they are trapped.

SCHAETZEL: Well, that’s right, but, as we said before, if you look at this current farm bill, farm budget, the same conditions exist. In other words, politicians are so anxious to keep certain interest groups behind them that we’re paying unbelievable amounts of money in agriculture which just comes close to being insane. When you have such an evenly balanced political situation here between Republicans and Democrats, no politician who has any hope of staying in office wants to get at odds with a very powerful group. This applies obviously to the Midwest but also to the South. Then, of course, dairy comes into play in the Northeast. It really is the similarity between then and now, and the fact that no one really has any bright ideas of how you break out of this. There are some forces for change in Europe that we’ve identified and it’s worth underscoring again; namely, to try to shift the money being put into this to having an agricultural sector which really preserves the environment. If that’s done intelligently, you subsidize people to keep them on farms and orchards and so forth which really are good for the environment, but that’s a policy which does not affect the international economy to the degree that the present system does. We’re doing a little bit on the same line. If you do this in a highly intelligent fashion, then you can have an increasingly effective agricultural sector in both parts of the world but also -- and this is really important -- open up opportunities for the underdeveloped world to have access to the European and American markets, and they would be for more effective and efficient than these two entities across the Atlantic.

Q: While you were at the European Community, ’66 to ’72, did you have farming delegations, farming interest delegations coming to see you?

SCHAETZEL: I don’t remember that at all. It may have but I don’t remember it.

Q: This was taken care of in Washington. [END TAPE 3 SIDE A]
Q: Was Japan at all a factor as the European Community was developing? Japan was beginning to come on line as an economic power. Were the Europeans looking over their shoulder or not at that time?

SCHAETZEL: Not really. Those were the days when Japan was just beginning to take advantage of its potential, and it was less concerned with penetrating the international market and bring to bear the latent resources, energy, a very orderly society and so forth, all the things which are unique. Not then but later -- I think it was actually in the 1980s and through the first part of the 1990s -- that Japan was looked as being absolutely a model. This was the political and economic system that would dominate the world within about five or eight years. It’s now looked at as a basket case, and indeed people lecture them to pull themselves together but nobody knows how to do it, including the Japanese. It is really absolutely extraordinary to see that change happening in such a short period of time but also a change, as I say, in which you search around for somebody who has a magic solution. Even the most aggressive -- I would say aggressive -- Americans like Paul O’Neill, they don’t know what they ought to do about it, but they shake a finger in front of the Japanese officials and say, “Now you put it together.” But that’s a different subject.

Q: I’m trying to capture the period. We weren’t looking, and the European Community wasn’t looking, at Japan.

SCHAETZEL: That’s right. I don’t remember that as being an important factor, at least what I was doing.

Q: Was migration from particularly Africa and the Middle East at all a factor in Europe at that time? We had the Turkish Gastarbeitiens, but other than that this was not...?

SCHAETZEL: No, I don’t remember that as being an important factor at that time. Mobility really came later. I suppose we have to remember that we weren’t that far beyond the end of the war and Europe after the war was such a disaster area it was not necessarily an area which attracted people looking for a better life. I would argue very substantially what converted it into a magnet was a result of the Marshall Plan, of the European integration process. That was a dynamic that led later to making it a very attractive place for Eastern Europe or for the Mediterranean countries.

Q: But it wasn’t...?

SCHAETZEL: I don’t remember that as being a particularly important or significant element when I was working there.

Q: While you were working there, were you essentially doing what most ambassadors do, and that is observe? They’re doing this, they’re doing that, looking out for American interests. You had had this long record of really wanting the European Union, something together, a European Community, later Union, to come together. Did you find that you had to fight localitis? In other words, this was a creature you wanted so much, that you and George Ball and all had created. Was there a sort of transition between all of a sudden promoting this and, you know, it’s friendly
but it’s not your country?

SCHAETZEL: Well, I think that’s right. I’m quite prepared to admit I got so intrigued by this, which was and is a unique phenomenon. In other words, just as, going back to the Philadelphia Convention, what the Americans did then in putting together a political system which had never been seen before, I would argue that what the Europeans then and now were trying to do was to bring together mature, historic national states into a new political entity reflecting the realities of the world. I got then and now so involved in this, so committed to it, that I annoyed some of my colleagues, I remember -- people like Chip Bohlen -- and I amused other people, as I said before, like Mac Bundy. I think they felt that those of us that were the sort of George Ball group were kind of slightly amusing, and our dedication was such that they were either, as I say, amused or bothered by it. I think that I would accept that. First -- we said before; it’s very important to underline this -- international affairs and the people involved in this are traditionalists and the nation-state is the heart of that. The high priest of this, of course, is Henry Kissinger, who never accepted the multilateral aspect of international affairs. He was certainly a part of the majority that felt that way -- that the whole sort of ethos of our country and other countries was to rest the whole process on the nation-state. For instance, during the six years that I was there in Brussels we had a constant stream of politicians, high-level people, coming over very curious about the European Community, and I welcomed this because I confess to have been a salesman. I was so convinced that this was the wave of the future. I think I was right, because these were so distant and improbable at that time and yet there was a pressure moving in this direction of greater integration. I’m still convinced that they’re going to move further in this direction, something which will work better. The structure of the European Union today is not far from what was done with six nations and coal and steel. Obviously the structure is inadequate for the tasks they now have, or they’re going to have in the future, or a European Union made up of not 15 but anywhere from 25 to 30 states.

Q: You raised Henry Kissinger. You were carried over through the intervention of Elliot Richardson. Now, Henry Kissinger is renowned when somebody says, “Well, we’ve got to take Europe into account on something,” he said, “What is the telephone number of Europe?” In other words, the nation-state is his model. Did you find yourself at odds with Kissinger or put off to one side?

SCHAETZEL: There is no question in my mind that Kissinger was an authentic 19th century philosopher, or whatever one wants to call it. In other words, all along he saw the world as a world of nation-state in classical and historical terms, and it wasn’t just the European Community. He had no particular interest in economics, no background in economics. He had no real interest in the United Nations or the other international institutions. I remember one of my last conversations with him. We were at some affair and he came up to me and said, “You know, Bob, I’m really not against the European Community.” That I put down as a kind of typical dishonesty on his part. The point is he never thought it was important enough really to put energy into fighting it, because he thought power rested elsewhere and he’d work with the power where it was. That classic observation of his is revealing but also correct: that the European Union has still not pulled itself together to take advantage of the power which is latent, and they will be unable to do the things they should do as long as they rest themselves halfway between the two: both have a European Union and, on the other hand, they have the nation-state. What’s going on
now will come to a head in the convention which begins the end of this month and then moves on to really basic changes which will take into account enlargement of membership but also, of course, as they move into these other areas. The euro is of extraordinary importance, because this means that they have transferred basic authority to the European Union in an area which is absolutely vital. At the end of the road -- this goes back to what Kissinger was saying -- the European Union ought to speak as one voice on these major international issues such as the Middle East, and yet they cannot give up the fact that they’re used to, and don’t want to give up, their national responsibilities in this area. It’s fascinating to me to watch this from the sidelines now. On so many issues you have the German embassy, the French embassy, for example, speaking out, writing letters to the editor on issues related to the EU. For a number of years, however, the European mission here is not being heard at all. Now, I’ve not seen these ambassadors from the EU for a number of years, but I remember one. I don’t remember his name now, but when we had lunch and were talking about this and I was inquiring as to, “What are your contacts on the Hill?” and he responded by saying, “Well, I can’t get at these people.” So, again, because of the activity of the member states in these areas of politics and international affairs, they persist in denying or not consolidating the power so they could be more effective. Therefore, they made Kissinger an honest man in this area.

Q: When you were there, was there a change in tone when Nixon came in at your embassy?

SCHAETZEL: I think the explanation is that the likes of Kissinger and Nixon didn’t see this development in Europe as being all that important. After all, you’re talking largely about economics but not even all economics and something which had a still weak institutional structure. It was sort of tolerated or ‘if it comes to my attention, I’ll deal with it,’ but it neither generated enthusiasm nor did it generate a feeling that somehow this is hostile to the nation-state system. I saw this when I would from time to time come back with senior officials, including the president of the European Commission, and meeting with the senior people in the government here in Washington. It was a tolerance rather than enthusiasm. The likes of Elliot Richardson were few and hard to find. After Ball left I don’t think there were any other people who came on the scene with anywhere near that kind of interest and dedication.

Q: When you left in ‘72, how would you at that time have prognosticated what was happening? What were the major strengths and the major weaknesses?

SCHAETZEL: I spent the first year of retirement writing a book on the Community, “The Unhinged Alliance” (Harper & Row) under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. It would be only a few copies. Because of the growth of the European Community and European Union, many, many elements in this country became increasingly interested in the process. It was not a matter of sort of fighting people who wanted something different from informing people and telling a country that largely did not know what it was going on and why it was in our interests. You want the vibrant, developing European Union as a partner. I have absolutely been convinced that the world needs this partnership -- equals may be too hard a word. In other words, we, Europe and the world would benefit by a partnership made of countries that have the same values and same interests working together. I’m deeply troubled by what is occurring now with Americans deciding that we are the one power, that we know better than anybody else--either come along with us or get out of the way. The harmful effect of this all around is just ground into
me each day.

ROBERT A. MARTIN
Political Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1967-1969)

Robert A. Martin was born and raised in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He received a degree in international relations from Yale University in 1954. He served in the U.S. Army from 1954-1956. His career included positions in Belgium, Vietnam, Iran, Germany, and Washington, DC. Mr. Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on September 8, 1994.

Q: Well, to move on, in 1967 you left EUR and where did you go?

MARTIN: I left EUR to go to our mission to NATO to replace a fellow by the name of David Aaron, who for a variety of reasons did not want to move with NATO from Paris to Brussels and wanted to come back to Washington to get into things more at this end of the line. He had proposed to Ambassador Cleveland that Cleveland might be interested in getting me to replace him, Aaron, and as it turned out, that is what happened. Cleveland did get me to replace Aaron and I arrived in Paris before the move in the latter part of September and spent almost a month there before we actually made the move to Brussels.

Q: I just want to put in that you were in NATO there from 1967-70.

MARTIN: Let me tell one story about the move from Paris to Brussels. The reason for the move, of course, was because de Gaulle had opted out of the military side of NATO the year before and one of the results of that was that NATO had to move and would no longer be welcomed to be housed in Paris. So the decision was made to move to Brussels. As it turned out, NATO closed down in Paris the end of the working day of Friday, October 13, 1967 and Harlan Cleveland, our ambassador, being someone with a flare for the dramatic, arranged to have a telegram sent from US Mission NATO, PARIS at 1800 Zulu on Friday, October 13th saying, "US Mission to NATO has closed in Paris. We have lowered the flag, etc., etc." He also arranged that Mike Newlin, who was the number two in the political section, would be in Brussels to make sure that we would be ready to open in Brussels the next Monday. And one of Mike's tasks was to insure that from Brussels a message went out at 1801 Zulu announcing the opening of US NATO in Brussels and that the flag has just been raised, etc., etc. I thought that was sort of cornball, but Harlan thought that was great stuff.

Q: What was the feeling towards the French at that time?

MARTIN: Against de Gaulle there was not much of a happy feeling, but he could play the way he chose and he chose and that was it. The French delegation saluted and carried out whatever instructions they got, but they felt certainly a little pinched it was clear on many occasions. We did work very closely with them in the NATO context at NATO, delegation to delegation, on
most issues and that was very harmonious and amicable. But they had their instructions and we had ours and frequently they were different enough that the differences would come out in sessions of the council. At that time, in following on behind David Aaron, what I was charged with was working all the security issues, all the arms controls, etc. and indeed as it turned out the most important issue was the initial consultations with the NATO allies within NATO on the preparations for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, SALT. That kept me very, very busy during the couple of years I was in NATO.

Q: By this time you were an arms controls and disarmament person with a very narrow specialty weren't you?

MARTIN: Indeed. And the reason that I was that was because in early days in the sixties, the State Department did not have much of a group with any particular background in the arms control, disarmament, national security scads of issues and the fact that I had spent three years involved in that with ACDA and then three years on the nuclear side within the Department in the European context, meant that I probably had more experience than most anybody else. So it would be a natural follow on until the Department got enough people with comparable relevant experience for me to continue doing that. And that is what I ended up doing the first half of my career almost entirely.

Q: What was Harlan Cleveland's mode of operation?

MARTIN: Well, Cleveland was a very, very shrewd, effective, bureaucrat. He had been brought into the Department initially as assistant secretary in the International Organizations Bureau because his prior experience in some measure had been related to the UN and some of the UN activity. Indeed, he had been involved in the Marshall Plan during the initial post-war period and setting that up in Paris, etc., so he was assistant secretary in the International Organizations Bureau. His deputies were Dick Gardner and Joe Sisco. In any event, something happened in the UN context and I can't recall precisely what that Lyndon Johnson, then President, found absolutely cutting across his bow and his instruction was to get rid of that man, Assistant Secretary Cleveland. Dean Rusk, thinking highly of Cleveland, and many others also, were able to get Johnson to agree that sending him to be our permanent representative at NATO would be far enough away and out of town so that Johnson could sleep more easily at night. That is how Cleveland got to NATO.

At that time, our ambassador in Paris was Chip Bohlen. I can remember both Cleveland and Mike Newlin, the fellow I mentioned earlier who was the deputy in the political section...one time when Newlin was in the car driving around Paris going to some meeting before we moved to Brussels, with Cleveland, they passed in traffic Chip Bohlen in his car and Cleveland made the comment that he felt so much more powerful and important than Bohlen because Bohlen only had one country to take care of and Cleveland had all of NATO. He was clearly the principal man in Paris at that time. Obviously Bohlen would have had a different view.

But it was an active time after we moved to Brussels. We were pressing ahead with the non-proliferation treaty and there was much consultation in the NATO context in that regard. We were preparing for the beginnings of the SALT process and that consultation was probably the
most important that we had ever had within NATO. We were able, because we understood from
the outset the need to insure, at least in the early days, that we were wholly forthcoming and fully
looking to the dialogue with our allies to be a give and take and that we were really interested in
their views and that they were important to us and that this was not a process such as had been
the thought occasionally in the past where the US being the biggest kid in the block and owning
all the athletic equipment was dictating the type of game and how it would be played. We were
honestly looking as we began preparations for this really new step in the arms control process
getting into the strategic side of the equation with the Russians, we were honestly looking for
allied input in the most thoughtful terms they could muster to help us make a success of this
activity.

Q: Did you notice any change when the Nixon administration came in which was January, 1969?

MARTIN: I can say several things. In terms of the effort in SALT, it intensified, in fact really
got started then. In terms of the other arms control activity they were sticking to more or less the
same substantial positions from the past. One thing that I did notice was that with the 20th
anniversary of NATO upcoming in April, 1969, and the decision that meeting would be held in
Washington and the importance of it for many reasons, both substantively and symbolically, the
new President, Mr. Nixon, had asked Ambassador Cleveland to stay on through that 20th
anniversary meeting as the permanent representative to be replaced subsequently. They felt it
was that important that Cleveland should stay through that period, which was delightful for all of
us in US NATO because we thought very highly of Harlan Cleveland. He had done an
outstanding job. He really was a superb bureaucrat.

He would from the field figure out precisely how he wanted to proceed on any and every issue
and would send in telegrams outlining all of this and mustering very forceful arguments to
support the positions that he wanted to be directed to follow. He then would go to Washington to
lobby and engage himself on the Washington end of the line in the process to insure that where
he wanted things to come out was where they would come out. Having insured that, he would go
back to Brussels and await the telegrams, many of which he had drafted in Washington,
instructing him what he should do. He was a consummate pro in that regard. He always made
clear that three months was maybe tolerable, but if you let six months go by without returning to
Washington, you might as well forget it. So he made sure he got back three or four times a year
to work the issues and insure that what he received in terms of instructions was consistent with
the instructions he was supporting. And I had the good luck to come with him on a couple of
those trips because of the SALT angle in one case and then in terms for need for support for the
20th anniversary meeting in another case.

In connection with that 20th anniversary meeting, there was a reception on the eighth floor in
honor of all the delegates. Secretary Rusk being a relatively new civilian at that point of several
months, was included, as he should have been. At the end of it, it turned out that a number of us
were still there having a nice chat -- Secretary Rusk and his wife, and Ambassador Cleveland
and Mrs. Cleveland, and a colleague, Alex, from the NATO mission, myself and a few others I
can't recall -- I vividly recall one of the well known waiters coming by the Secretary, Mr. Rusk,
and asking him as this conversation ensured if he wouldn't like another drink. Dean Rusk said
yes he thought he would. The waiter said, "The usual?" And Dean Rusk allowed how that was
the case. The man turned, having checked with other people to see what they wanted, if any thing, and as he was walking away Dean Rusk turned around and said, "Oh, gosh, I just forgot, cancel that, I can't have another drink, I have to drive home." The first time in eight years that he ever had to leave the Department of State and drive himself. His wife chortled and the waiter had the good grace to laugh too.

Q: As you dealt with your particular section of NATO, were there any particular problem areas, either because of country position or something? How did you view NATO, working within this environment?

MARTIN: Well, of course, for me it was extremely heady stuff. I was right at the center of all the consultation and prepared all the papers for the sessions that we had in the council and was involved in all the discussions that we had of various sorts and various sizes in our delegation with other delegations. I was involved with all the visiting firemen who came from Washington to lead the way on much of the substance and make presentations and so forth. I was charged to doing all the reporting telegrams. In fact that is how the acronym came to pass. I had to do these long telegrams and I took copious notes and ended up with 20 and 25 and 30 page telegrams so that we would get down every jot and tiddle and it became very quickly clear that to put down "strategic arms limitation talks" time after time after time was going to break my wrist so it quickly became SALT. Ambassador Cleveland was not very happy with that, he thought it was a little much, but he didn't push too hard. I subsequently heard from Adrian Fischer, the deputy in ACDA, that he had gone to a high level meeting in Washington during this period and was saying that we just can't use this cute acronym, it was a little much, it has to look serious. Whoever was representing the CIA at this meeting said absolutely not, we have set up our whole filing system based on SALT as an acronym. You are not going to destroy that now. At that point Fischer in the process gave up and SALT was enshrined forever.

So it was an intriguing period for me and indeed the successor to Harlan Cleveland, Bob Ellsworth, a former Kansas Congressman, a young fellow, was interested in the SALT process and realized how important it was. When the then Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, an Italian, a very esteemed and marvelous elder statesman, was going to make a visit in Washington early in July, 1969, not too long before I would end my two years at NATO, and whenever the PermRep went to Washington he generally took one staff person with him. So Bob Ellsworth said that he wanted me to come to Washington and focus on SALT because that is the most important issue we have going. So I went with him on this trip. His reason for going was because Brosio was going on a visit. The morning after we arrived, they arranged to have breakfast with Ellsworth in the State Department cafeteria. We were chatting and he made clear that he wanted me to come to every session that he had. So I went with him on this trip. His reason for going was because Brosio was going on a visit. The morning after we arrived, they arranged to have breakfast with Ellsworth in the State Department cafeteria. We were chatting and he made clear that he wanted me to come to every session that he had. I saluted figuratively and thought to myself okay. And I said, "But you can't mean the Secretary's luncheon with the Secretary General." And he said, "Well, maybe not that, but the meeting in his office, yes."

So a day or two later I found myself waiting in the anteroom outside the Secretary's office. I had the pleasure in March, 1962, of getting to know Millie Asbjornson, who was one of the great secretaries of the Secretary of State and in June, 1962 when Dean Rusk came back to Geneva principally to participate in a ministerial level session to end the Laos Conference and also taking the occasion to sit in on one of the disarmament conference sessions, I had met Jane Roth,
another one of the legendary secretaries of the Secretary. So I knew those two esteemed ladies and we were chatting away very happily. All of a sudden the group comes out of the Secretary's luncheon and files into the Secretary's office. I file in too and one of the European deputy assistant secretaries, George Springsteen, sort of looked at me and wondered why I was there. He couldn't figure that out and wasn't happy at all. He was the one who had to go out and get another chair so that there would be enough chairs. We got seated and I was sitting caddie cornered across the long coffee table from Secretary Rogers, who had the couch at his left, Secretary General Brosio with Ambassador Ellsworth in the middle and the various others around. Bill Rogers looked up and saw me and didn't recognize me from Adam. Ellsworth understood that there was something wrong and said, "Oh, Mr. Secretary, I thought you knew Bob." And Bill Rogers bounced up and with this totally broad grin on his face reached all the way across the coffee table and I bounced up so we could shake hands. He said, "Of course, of course, I didn't know Bob was coming with you." And he sat back down. I almost split. I didn't make a sound. It was just really well done on the part of Rogers to take the sting out of that. I just happened to look at George Springsteen and he was just foaming. He just couldn't believe this. Anyway, it was sort of fun.

If you will in terms of Secretary Rusk to go back to that June, 1962 time when he came over for the purpose of ending the Laos Conference, I was at that point among others the liaison officer for the Italian delegation. And one of the things that was to happen after the morning disarmament conference plenary session, which the Secretary would attend, was for him to have a meeting with his not quite Italian counterpart, Italian Under Secretary, Carlo Russo. This was just before the Secretary was to go off to the Soviet compound to have lunch with Andre Gromyko. The disarmament conference had not been a very stirring meeting, although it dragged on. It was not clear that there was going to be enough time for the meeting with Russo, so at the point when it seemed that virtually was not going to happen, the man on the Secretary's party who was going to take the notes in the Russo meeting left and that left me there. At the end of the meeting, I went up to Charlie Stelle who was sitting behind Arthur Dean, who was sitting next to Secretary Rusk, and said, "Gee, what are we doing to do? Are we going to meet with Russo?" Stelle says, "Well, you had better ask the Secretary." So I said, "Mr. Secretary, do you really want to have this meeting with Under Secretary Russo?" He said, "The main thing I want Mr. Martin, is a drink." So I said, "Yes, sir," and scurried out looking for the bar. The bar was closed and Dean Rusk was unhappy. We did get together with Russo. The note taker was not there, I had to take notes. I had no paper so I took notes for about 15 or 20 minutes on the cuff of my white shirt. From that point forward, to this day, I never venture out without a small pad to make notes or whatever might be necessary.

Q: Going back to NATO and SALT, was everyone pretty much on the same line?

MARTIN: Essentially in the formal sessions there was no glaring divergence to the degree that anyone might have had special views that they were interested in making. For example, the British did on a number of occasions and they would do that bilaterally and privately. The sessions, when we were in the council in NATO...the allies generally took the occasion to make the most use of them from the standpoint of learning themselves and trying to get visitors from Washington with technical background and particular expertise to give everything they had an educating process to help a greater understanding of the whole effort. There were some very,
very useful sessions both for us and clearly to the allies. And, indeed, occasionally they would have experts who came from capitals to participate in the discussion and that helped a lot too. You could not only have the benefit of the council discussion but it also meant that you could have luncheons or dinners around the edges of the formal sessions. Generally the case was that in the formal sessions there were not disagreements. The allies took the occasion to try to get the most nourishment from that part of it in terms of getting from us our thinking and trying to contribute to that from their perspectives.

Q: What were the major sticking points at the time you were there -- 1967-69?

MARTIN: That period was one where we were shaping our position and as with most efforts in this area the difficulties were much more manifest and much more deeply seated in terms of the interagency Washington scrum than they were with the allies, and indeed, frequently with the Russians. It was a lot harder to get something through Washington and into position to air "publicly" in terms of a particular negotiation, whether it was bilateral or multilateral, than it ever was to carry out the particular negotiation itself. That point had been evident from the early days in the Geneva disarmament effort that was far less important in large terms than SALT or any of the follow on strategic dialogue with the Soviets. With the allies there weren't sticking points. There wasn't much they could do other than to try and help shape our position. Clearly the British who are so dependent on us from the testing perspective, wanted to make sure that nothing was done, or were particularly sensitive to the possibility of anything being done that would limit our ability to help them on the testing side. The French would have had a comparable concern from the standpoint of French testing but not any problem from the standpoint of our helping them because we didn't do that. To the degree that we provided them any help that ended very early days and it was our link to the British that was key. So there weren't any really sticking points. It was so new an effort, we were treading ground that just hadn't been involved before in any formal negotiating dialogue. The effort which finally ensured mainly in the autumn of 1969 to put together what would be the US position, was mainly the work, in the initial sense, of Ray Garthoff.

Q: Yes, he has been interviewed.

MARTIN: During the autumn of 1969 by which time I had left NATO and was back in Washington in the office of Political/Military Affairs working on SALT and all the strategic and arms control disarmament issues, in fact was the State staff person on SALT from the beginning, Ray Garthoff put together four different options which were overlays to some degree variations on a core of themes to be address by the interagency process and it was one of those four polished up in various ways that was finally put forward as the US opening position in SALT. His efforts singlehandedly really to put together those four discreet positions was an absolutely incredible performance.

Q: Did you have any feeling from CIA sources or others that the Soviets were having the same problems -- the military saying they liked things as they are and the diplomatic side saying you had to come to some kind of agreement?

MARTIN: Over the years that I had been involved, it certainly became clear that a number of
people that I had worked with on the Soviet side and got to know were true believers in the sense that they really did hope and were working toward agreement as opposed to disruption and insuring that no agreement would ensue and therefore be no limitations whatsoever on their country's activities. So, yes, indeed, there were evident, if you will, soft liners, those who were interested in trying to work towards an agreement that would not be inconsistent with the goals and the interests of their side, but indeed did want to see an agreement reached. There were equally evident hard liners who wanted to insure that every roadblock conceivable was put in the way and that no agreement could ever be reached.

We had the same thing on our side, both in the uniformed military and in the OSD, the civil side. Indeed, the hardest liners of all was on the civil side and curiously enough over time it was not unusual to see the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the arms control side of the equation as opposed to the other because of the fact that they understood, as did we all, that the pot was not limitless. There were limitations to the amount of resource that could be used in developing weapons and systems, etc. and where hard choices had to be made, the military might well want to see something not pursued because they didn't think it was sensible from the standpoint of limited resources that would be available. But, if you were interested in a full blown ABM system, countrywide, for example, and various things of that sort that many of the hard liners were pushing, you found that the uniformed military were occasionally taking a different position. I found it interesting when it happened the first time and would aim to try to use it occasionally in the future when it became apparent that the military might have a slightly different view. In the end, they would make their case one way or other, but would obviously go along with the civil leadership because that is what they are trained to do. But at the lower levels it was frequently interesting in terms of the way the lineup developed on any particular issue.

CLINT A. LAUDERDALE
General Services Officer
Brussels (1967-1970)

Clint Lauderdale was born in 1932 and raised in Texas. He joined the U.S. Army during the Korean War, serving in Germany. Upon returning to the U.S., Mr. Lauderdale received a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of California at Berkeley. He has also served in Mexico, Germany, Brazil, and Spain. Mr. Lauderdale was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 16, 1964.

Q: Well then your next assignment...you stayed away from Washington, I see. You went to Brussels from ‘67 to ’70. What, now again, was this, did you ask for this or...

LAUDERDALE: No. I was assigned to Kinshasa. I didn't want to go, either. I had a diabetic son and I was really quite annoyed, because I put in a preference sheet or whatever it was called, it was completely ignored, they assigned me to Kinshasa. I called AF/EX on the phone one day and said, "Look, I don't know if I can go to Kinshasa. I have a son that's a diabetic." And they said, "Forget about it. We're going to send you anyway. Med says its okay." So I dropped it. Before I
left Rio, in the hustle-bustle of moving, of packing up at home, we forgot to give our son his insulin shot in the morning. Got up in the morning, 7:00, we're packing, drinking coffee standing up, and at noon he flips over and we rush him to the hospital, and then we remembered, we didn't give him his insulin shot. So he stayed in the hospital until evening, as I recall, came back home, scared us all. But in the process we contacted the Regional Medical Officer and it came out that we were going to Kinshasa. And he said: "You shouldn't go to Kinshasa." And I said, "Well, I told them that. They raised that and they said that Med said it was okay." So he said: "You go to see Med when you get to Washington. See the medical director. They're a big bureaucracy just like everything else. You just got lost in the system. You go tell him your circumstance and they're not going to send you to Kinshasa." So I said okay. When I got to Washington we went to FSI-French. Like most Administrative officers I could not be spared for the full program, which was 16 weeks. They said you can have 8 weeks. So I was enrolled at FSI for 8 weeks. For my son's medical exam they don't do them at the medical division, you do it privately. We took him up to Boston, to the Jocelyn Clinic, which is a world-famous diabetic clinic. We had lived in Boston, so we knew about it. We took him up to Boston for in-patient observation and insulin adjustment. He's a growing boy who's been overseas. We took him up to the Jocelyn Clinic and left him for five days. Then I went back to get him. When they got finished they wrote a two-page letter to Med. about his clearance. I gave the letter to Med., meantime I'm still assigned to Kinshasa. Med said, you're not going to Kinshasa. Mr. Hume Horan who was the Personnel Officer in AF, was nasty to me about that. He said "Oh, I notice you went to an out-of-town doctor, as if there was something sneaky about this whole thing. Anyway, they canceled it. So here I am in French, and no job. And the Personnel system was not centralized at that time. It was decentralized, each bureau had a personnel officer. They had a central coordinator and I went to see him. Because I went to AF and they said they didn't have anything for me. I went to the central coordinator and he said: "Well, we're planning an expansion in Brussels for the NATO move. We're going to create an additional job there as Embassy GSO. I've got three choices: Frankfurt, commercial officer; Lisbon, commercial officer; Brussels, GSO. Frankfurt, the guy extended; Lisbon, something else happened. Anyway, I went to Brussels as assistant GSO. New Position in anticipation of the NATO move. So after my 8 weeks in French I went to Brussels.

Q: Tell me, I know everything was in flux back then, but you would end up kind of being coned. In a sense you were typed as an economic, political, consular, or administrative officer.

LAUDERDALE: You became typed, but I hadn't been typed yet.

Q: How did you feel about concentrating sort of on the administrative side of this and that. What was sort of the atmosphere. Where did one want to be as a type of officer. I speak as...I found myself getting typed as a consular officer and everybody told me "Don't be one." But gee, I liked the work and I kind of stayed on longer than people thought was a good idea in those days.

LAUDERDALE: As I recall it was about two years later that the coning process occurred. As long as the question of coning didn't come up, I didn't really care. I would have preferred, for substantive reasons, either of the other two kinds of job. But for other reasons they didn't work out, so I wasn't unhappy about this one. While in Brussels, they came out with this system they're going to cone everybody and the first cut they're going to cone you in the work you're now in.
And under that formula I would become administrative cone, and you had a right to appeal. So
when I was next in Washington I went to see the central Personnel people about whether I should
appeal or whether I should accept it. So one of the things I asked them was... by then they had
the newly centralized Personnel system... one of the questions I asked them was about the role
and future of administrative people in the Foreign Service. Because they didn't have any tradition
of that. I asked them, for example, can I get to the top as an Administrative Officer? Can I aspire
to be an ambassador as an Administrative Officer? I got a lot of coughing. Coughing and
hhhmiming. I never got a straight answer. The answer was, it depends and so forth. So in the
end I accepted it. I didn't appeal.

Q: What was the situation in Brussels when you got there? it was not the Embassy to NATO at
that time, am I right? It was a straight Embassy?

LAUDERDALE: Right.

Q: And how did you find the Embassy, how it operated?

LAUDERDALE: There were two Missions in Brussels at that time: USEC, which was the
Mission to the Common Market at that time, kind of small; and the Embassy, which was
accredited to the government of Belgium, which was also kind of small. It was by and large a
sleepy...I would call it kind of a sleepy, unimportant Mission. The Administrative Officer, for
example, was an FSO-2, to give you an idea of level. By the time I arrived, it was getting ginned
up. And the next year was very, very hectic. We spent the year planning for the move of starting
in January of '67, and NATO was going to move in September of '67. So we had about nine
months to plan for that move.

Q: The Ambassador when you arrived was, what, Ridgeway Knight?

LAUDERDALE: Yes.

Q: How did you find him?

LAUDERDALE: I used to call him the Consul General, because that's how he acted. After
coming from Mexico City and Rio, where I was lucky even to meet the Ambassador, here I was
at a post where no detail was too small. I met the Ambassador every day, and he would tell me
where the flowers ought to go in the lobby. So I used to call him the Consul General.

Q: As a post, how did people like it there?

LAUDERDALE: The people who were there liked it. Brussels was very convenient living. Our
relationship with the Belgian government was very friendly, the issues with the Belgian
government were very few. We were both NATO members, the Common Market's there, so very
few strains, lots of amenities.

Q: The Congo had ceased to be an issue then? It had been, I suppose, five years earlier.
LAUDERDALE: We had broken relationships with Iraq, and the Belgians were the protecting power in Iraq, so one of our more important relationships with the Belgians was practically every day going to the Belgian Foreign Office about Iraq.

Q: This is after the '67 Arab-Israeli War and many of the Arab states broke relations with us.

LAUDERDALE: Right.

Q: So, how does one go about all of a sudden having NATO headquarters dumped on them?

LAUDERDALE: Well, they had to decide what kind of headquarters building to build. They couldn't build a permanent headquarters during the time allowed, so they found a site and decided to build a temporary headquarters, with the idea that they would later build a permanent headquarters in another part of the city. A permanent one being brick and steel and opposed to this one, which is stucco, low-rise, that looks kind of like an army camp, temporary building for NATO. That was for the office side of the house. We had to have a school. There was an American school in Brussels that was where most of the American business community and Embassy kids went, but it could not accommodate the great influx. They were going to get 200-300 more students and they couldn't accommodate them. And they didn't want to expand to that scope. So the U.S. Army decided to build a school. So NATO's out there building their headquarters, the Army's coming in, buying land to build a school. Then we've got the question of housing for all these people. We decided to go government lease. So in addition from the U.S. Mission moving from Paris, there's also a military committee of NATO that's headquartered in Washington, and they decided to move it to Brussels simultaneously with the NATO. Between the military committee and the U.S. Mission to NATO, we're going to get over 200 people, 200 employees. So the number of housing units, as I recall, was 213, so we decided to go government lease. So we had to lease and furnish 213 housing units. So you've got three things going simultaneously: headquarters office building by U.S. NATO, school by U.S. Army, Embassy and a joint administrative section -- of course NATO's not even there, so the Embassy Administrative Section has to do all the administrative work. We've got to locate 213 or so housing units, furnish them, all by September. I was scared!

Q: Also, you're in competition with all the other Embassies of NATO who were doing the same thing.

LAUDERDALE: I went out as assistant GSO. In the meantime I became the GSO, and by the summer I got two American assistant GSOs. I'll grant you, I was only an FSO-5 myself and they were FSO-6s, or something like that. Much too junior and much too few to do this massive job. So as I say, I was scared. And I never worked harder in my life, seven days a week, from January to December. I took no vacation that year. Nobody did. We were overloaded.

Q: How did the Belgians respond to this influx. Both at the government level and the real level, that is, the Belgians who were living in Brussels?

LAUDERDALE: The government responded positively. How the people felt about it? I don't remember exactly, but my recollection is favorably. The kind of aura at the time was that
Brussels was going to become the capital of Europe. With NATO here and the Common Market here, this is going to become an important business, commercial, diplomatic center, why we're going to be the capital of Europe!

Q: Was there a real problem with pricing? With the competition and all I'd imagine that you found yourself competing for housing and all, trying to outbid each other. Was this a problem?

LAUDERDALE: We had difficulty finding units, but price wasn't really the problem. Belgium was kind of expensive anyway. But I don't remember any great rent escalation and getting there first. It may be that we were ahead of the others, even though our numbers were so much greater.

Q: Were you getting help from the US Army, coming out there, or the NATO side, or did they depend on you?

LAUDERDALE: They depended on us. Most of the military help came later. After NATO was established, or just before or simultaneously with it, there was a NATO support group that came that was military that worked closely with the Embassy and helped a lot with visits and other things. But in this process that I'm talking about, they were not a player.

Q: Did John Eisenhower...when did he come there? After NATO was already in or not?

LAUDERDALE: After the election. The Nixon election in '69. Ridgeway Knight was summarily replaced... he read about his replacement by John Eisenhower in the wireless bulletin.

Q: How did he operate?

LAUDERDALE: Low key, kind of a loner. I don't mean loner in the normal sense of the world. He had no close associations. He didn't take up with the professional corps on a comrade basis, and he had no private friends. He felt alone, and he said so.

Q: It was sort of an odd...he was the son of the president, but it didn't fit one way or the other. Later he became...his son married Julie Nixon, but that wasn't in the offing at that time.

LAUDERDALE: No, she was a young girl in Brussels at that time.

Q: Did you get any feel for how Belgians felt about Germany and Germany was in NATO at that time. Was this a problem?

LAUDERDALE: I think that, at least on the surface, the animosities of World War II were pretty much behind them at that time. Now, I had been in Belgium earlier, when I was a GI in Germany in the ‘50s, and it was active then. The war memories were still fresh. But now in '69, I didn't hear anything about it.

Q: I think it was different, the Dutch harbored these things much longer, there may be reasons, but both suffered quite badly during World War II but the Belgians seem to be a different breed of cat.
LAUDERDALE: You're right about the Dutch. I was more aware of the Dutch sensibilities about it than the Belgian.

Q: There was another manifestation not on the German side but against us, about Vietnam. The Dutch were giving us a very difficult time, I'm talking about students, people on the streets and all, about our role in Vietnam, but you never hear about it in Belgium.

LAUDERDALE: You had some, they wrote graffiti on our building sometimes. It was not the way it was in some other countries, but there was some.

Q: What about the African business? Of course Belgium by this time had no Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, or Zaire. Did these play any role? Were things happening there where we were on one side and they were on the other, or were you...

LAUDERDALE: I'm not aware of any. My overriding memory of events during my time was the NATO side of the house and the invasion of Czechoslovakia that occurred while I was there. That kind of put NATO on alert, so they were on their toes there. And the U.S. forces along the East German border was a source of tension. It may have had some spillover in terms of the Belgians, but you know the Germans were now the front line. They were the guardians of liberty and the buffer between the Russians and the Belgians. So that may have influenced their attitude.

Q: What was the attitude about the Soviet threat at that time?

LAUDERDALE: I think we might talk about two parts of it: one, the Communist philosophical threat and the other would be the Soviet military threat. The Communist philosophical threat, by and large the Europeans, including the Belgians, thought the Americans were paranoid. Being Social Democrats, socialists they called themselves openly, they don't consider the Communist philosophy all that threatening or all that ominous, and they think the Americans are overboard about it. So they were never that greatly concerned about the non-military inroads of Communism or the threats of Communist domination of countries in Africa and so forth. They more or less shrugged and said, "So what? "What's the threat?"

Now on the military side there's obviously some concern, and events such as those that occurred in Czechoslovakia [the 1968 crushing of liberalization in Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and their satellites], brought to the fore realization that there is a significant military threat and that there is a big army on the German border, and we are all to some degree vulnerable, and we need NATO and we need the American forces in Europe.

Q: Did the Embassy in Brussels play any role in helping our Embassy in Luxembourg, by any chance?

LAUDERDALE: Marginally. Yes, I mean not so much that we were a regional support center or anything like that, but when they needed help they called us and we always responded. It could be supply or technical assistance or even advice.
MARTEN VAN HEUVEN
Civil Emergency, Planning, and Arms Control Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1967-1970)

Mr. Van Heuven was born in the Netherlands in 1932. He received his BA and LLB from Yale University and his MIA from Columbia University. His positions abroad included Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn and Geneva. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on January 31, 2003.

Q: Today is March 7, 2003. You’re off to NATO in 1967. You were there from when to when?


Q: What was your job?

VAN HEUVEN: Let me back up for one second. I mentioned earlier that I was a civil servant in the Office of the Legal Adviser. I had a GS rank. When I went to Berlin, I became a Foreign Service Reserve officer. The reason was that at the time I entered the Department of State, I could not have become a Foreign Service officer because under the law and regulations one needed to have been a U.S. citizen for ten years. I had been naturalized in 1953. I came into Washington in 1957. Direct entry into the Foreign Service was not an option for me, so I didn’t consider that. But by the time I got to Berlin as an FSR, it was 1963, and this restriction no longer existed in law. Knowing I didn’t wish to go back to L - or to law for that matter - I wanted to stick with the Foreign Service. I applied for lateral entry into the Foreign Service officer corps. I thought that being a Foreign Service Reserve officer would make that a little easier. Indeed, during the last inspection we had in Berlin, the inspectors very kindly picked up what had been an application that hadn’t been moving forward. When they went back to Washington, it did move forward and I was invited to take the oral. This happened at Embassy Rome. It was conducted by a panel of three, chaired by the then DCM in Rome, Frank Meloy, who as later assassinated in Lebanon. It was a short trip to Rome. The interview was easy. The results were positive. By the time I went to USNATO, I was an FSO. However, going to NATO didn’t happen in the normal assignment process either. In my time as a lawyer for the IO bureau, the assistant secretary at the time was Harlan Cleveland. Since I often attended the IO staff meetings, I had somehow come to his attention. In 1967, Harlan was ambassador at NATO. The NATO organization had just gone through the traumatic experience of having been kicked out of France, which meant that the NATO military headquarters moved away from Fontainebleau to Mons, in Belgium, and the NATO diplomatic establishment moved from Paris to Brussels. In the course of that upheaval, the French action gave rise to a claim for compensation to the other members of the alliance and to the organization for the costs it had to incur in order to be able to make the move. Therefore, there was a process that involved both a NATO claim against France and also a bilateral U.S. claim since there were a lot of U.S. forces involved. Harlan obviously was involved in that issue at a high level, and he needed a lawyer. He knew me because I had performed for him before as a lawyer. So, he was interested in having me join the delegation in Brussels in a legal capacity at least for the purpose of handling such legal issues as would
obviously have to be dealt with by him and by the Council in connection with the claim. When I arrived at NATO, Bill Cargo, the DCM, took me aside and asked me whether I knew what Harlan intended to do with me. I had to tell him honestly I wasn’t sure. It transpired that the NATO organization had also obtained the services of a lawyer, an American by the name of Peider Kunz, who was born and raised in a little village in eastern Switzerland, but who was an American. I know that some ambassadors on the Council wanted Harlan to assure them that he was not really a CIA employee and I know we gave that assurance. So NATO as an organization had this American lawyer and Harlan had me. In the event, I never did a great deal of legal work. The issues were handled elsewhere and eventually settled.

Q: Did the French ante up or not?

VAN HEUVEN: There was an anteing up. But there were complicated issues involving such concepts as negative residual value. In other words, the French would regain the use of an airstrip that had been used and maintained by American forces. So the demand on our part for compensation for the lack of use of such airstrip was met by a counterclaim for alleged French costs it would take to convert that airstrip back into normal pasture land. I don’t recall the sums that eventually were involved, but some money did pass. But to a large degree, these claims and counterclaims in the end offset each other.

Q: What did you end up doing?

VAN HEUVEN: My initial assignment was civil emergency planning. NATO had a lot of committees. Some of them were main committees. Civil Emergency Planning was one of the main committees but it was outside of the mainstream of NATO work. But civil emergency planning was a set of procedures that had been codified into an entire body of existing structures and organizations that had to do with anything from provisioning of energy in terms of crisis, to providing transport in terms of crisis, to taking care of civilian populations, and calamities of any sort. This big structure of committees was handled under the broad hat of a Civil Emergency Planning Committee on which the representative from Washington, who came from the Office of Civil Emergency Preparedness, filled the U.S. chair at high-level meetings. During normal times that chair was taken by me, sitting in for my ambassador. The ambassador could always take the American seat whenever he wanted to. But there were at the time over 200 committees in NATO and the ambassadors didn’t do that. So I operated with a bunch of colleagues, mostly at the second secretary level. Under the chairmanship of an Italian by the name of Deveglia, who was a NATO civil servant, we did our civil emergency planning work. I did this from a position in the political section, which was at the time headed by Ray Garthoff, and later by Ed Streator. I spent a year and a half learning something that was totally new to me but which did involve quite a few committee meetings and a lot of negotiations. At one point, we took the initiative - it was Ed Streator’s idea - to organize a symposium. Basically, it was an unstructured meeting at high level to kick a lot of these issues around. I’ll just give one more example of what civil emergency planning involved. Our whole CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] alert system was part of a wider NATO system that would have done the same thing for the civilian NATO aircraft in other countries.

Q: The French were in and out of NATO. Were the French in this particular area?
VAN HEUVEN: The French were in the Civil Emergency Planning Committee. The French role was handled by a schoolmasterish but nice civil servant, not from the ministry of foreign affairs, who had the advantage of having been there a long time and the disadvantage of having been there a long time. He also sat on some other committees. He fancied he knew English better than he did. One of my colleagues from DOD, a civilian by the name of Joe Loveland, an enormous guy who was himself married to a very tiny Frenchwoman, amused us one evening when Ruth and I were at dinner at the Lovelands and our French civil servant colleague was there. Joe would affectionately address him as “Old Fart,” a word which the Frenchman didn’t understand. He thought it was a compliment. Of course, it caused us all sorts of problems in having to keep our faces straight during dinner.

Q: Were there any disasters or things that you had to mobilize for?

VAN HEUVEN: No, but it was all planning for what if. The planning was quite advanced and the structure was a good one, and it still exists today. It involved a whole pipeline system for petroleum in Europe because it would have had to provide for the energy for the tanks and trucks of the armed forces. It involved everything having to do with transportation and taking care of civilians. It did interface with a lot of different parts of the Washington bureaucracy. So it was quite bureaucratic. But it was important because this would have had to function had it become necessary.

I recall one other amusing thing. Occasionally, Washington would provide political input not just in terms of direction but also in terms of people. At one time I found myself having to deal with the then lieutenant governor of Texas, Ben Barnes, who somehow came over as a senior representative on the meeting of the Civil Emergency Planning Committee. Barnes was full of stories. The one I remember is the description of his mother-in-law as a “bad, long ride on a rainy road.” Barnes later got into ethical difficulties back in Texas. They effectively curtailed his political career.

Q: What role did the Germans play in this? I would imagine that they would be right in the center of everything.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, yes, but so did the French, because the pipelines ran through France and the fighting would be in Germany. In fact, Germany was important. I don’t particularly recall the German representative on the committee. But I do recall vividly the British representative, Tony Morgan, who many years later turned out to become the opposite number of my wife in Zurich where he was the British consul general. I also remember the Norwegian, Kris Prebensen, who later became head of administration in the NATO Secretariat, taking the place once occupied by Lord Coleridge. And I remember Marino Deveglia, our chairman, who had all the strengths and weaknesses of the caricature of an Italian. The Germans would have been the beneficiary of a lot of the work of the Civil Emergency Planning but not exclusively, since the assumption was that, if the balloon went up, all of Europe would be affected and all European populations would have to be looked after and that would have to be done by governments.

Q: What was your impression of this segment of the NATO apparatus? I’ve talked with people
who worked with the UN and particularly during an earlier period you had mentioned that at that time after the Cold War the UN officials had to show results but during the Cold War it was better to keep your head down and be a bureaucrat. How did you find the NATO organization?

VAN HEUVEN: The NATO organization was impressive, not because of the building we were in, which is the building they are still in, although there is a decision now to construct something new. It was an advanced temporary building. It was big, with a lot of wings off the main corridor at three levels. We occupied an entire wing at all three levels on the western side. The U.S. delegation for the Military Committee was right across the main corridor, on the other side. The quality of the NATO staff, many of whom were seconded at senior levels from the national services of the members, was pretty good. NATO was important and countries saw to it that they sent good people to these jobs. So the various assistant secretaries - general were usually top-notch people, as were those working directly for them. I mentioned Lord Coleridge. I should also mention the NATO Secretary General at the time, who was an Italian by the name of Manlio Brosio, a diplomat of consummate skill whom I had a chance to observe a lot, because my role as a notetaker behind Ambassador Cleveland meant that every Wednesday I would be watching Brosio perform as chairman of the NATO Council. He did that with enormous skill. He was an old-fashioned diplomat. No raised voices. He knew his brief, he did his homework, and he managed wisely to sum up every discussion, so that the creation of the so-called decision sheet, which was in effect the decision of the meeting, would not be too difficult. I don’t recall his making any mistake, although I’m sure he made some. It was really wonderful to see such a man in action, and to see the style with which he could manage this very difficult job. Of course, the NATO ambassadors were all prima donnas. They did, however, know their place. NATO never voted. In theory everybody was equal. The reality, however, was that each ambassador knew roughly what his country brought to the table and would tailor his role accordingly. Iceland or Luxembourg, for instance, would not speak on many issues, or if they did, would make their remarks very short. The major countries, on the other hand, were quite different. Occasionally, you would have an exception, but the discipline of the group - and it was quite a tight group; there were 15 ambassadors - usually had a salutary effect on any diplomats with tendencies to be outside of the norm. There was the Dean, Andre DeStaercke, Belgian, a bachelor and a man who never could get over the fact that he had to move from Paris back to his hometown of Brussels because he had a wonderful apartment in the Cinquieme in Paris from which later on he could watch from his windows the student revolt in ’68. But DeStaercke also played a role in dealing with this issue of how the NATO Council should use Peider Kunz on the claims issues. I remember accompanying Mr. Kunz to lunch once at DeStaercke’s apartment. He was an erudite man. Because he was Dean and because he represented the host country, he could afford to take as much time as he wanted and no one in the Council really ever cut him short.

Q: How did Harlan Cleveland work within the Council?

VAN HEUVEN: Cleveland, in my view, was a prince and was seen as such by his colleagues. He was not a professional diplomat. He was seen as more than that, as an intellectual of extraordinary imagination and drive, and a capacity of turning ideas into concrete action. As a result, he commanded huge influence with his colleagues, who listened very carefully to everything he had to say. Working with Harlan did have occasional downsides, not because it
wasn’t exciting - it certainly always was - but Harlan was so devoted to his job and so cerebral about all the issues that it never mattered to him which day of the week it was. I recall his calling a staff meeting once for 3:00 p.m. Sunday. Tommy Wilson, his personal choice as political counselor and also a political appointee, said to him, “Harlan, it’s going to be Sunday” and Harlan in effect said, “So what?” We did spend a lot of time in the office with Harlan. I mean that literally. The hours at NATO were extremely long. We typically would find ourselves on Saturday mornings saddled with instructions - I’m slightly ahead of myself because this was not in Civil Emergency Planning, but on arms control issues - which Washington would have managed to disgorge late Friday afternoon and which would land in Brussels on our doorstep for execution Saturday morning. Our job was then to turn the cable into an actionable paper and get it around. Of course, we ran into the difficulty that about half of the delegations simply didn’t staff on Saturday mornings, which meant that we often had to get ahold of their duty officers, or in some cases just slip the envelope under the door. I think that today they probably have a similar problem because there are five more countries and some of them are thinly staffed and they simply cannot afford to be there all weekend. It was damned hard work. But it was hard work with really terrific people. I have mentioned Garthoff, who was involved with Ambassador Gerard Smith in the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and then START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) negotiations. I mentioned Ed Streator, who was a powerhouse and also very inventive. Bill Cargo and later, George Vest, were strong DCMs. Harlan had two right-hand men. One was Tommy Wilson, who was the POLAD, a job later held in my time by Larry Eagleburger. Tommy came from the outside. He was an author and a longtime friend of Harlan’s. Tim Stanley was the personal representative of the Secretary of Defense. That meant that Tim basically commanded all the folks who were on the U.S. Mission staff from the Pentagon, on the third floor. Tommy handled the political work. Bruno Luzatto, another academic pal of Harlan’s from World War II days in Italy, was the economic counselor. It was a tremendously talented team of erudite and worldly people who were quite comfortable in the very important roles that they had and who, by and large, worked very well together, something that is not always the case. There have been times at NATO when I’ve watched these relationships go pretty sour, but in those days they worked really well.

Q: The secretaries of defense from all these countries, minister and secretaries of defense have semianual or quarterly meetings.

VAN HEUVEN: Twice a year.

Q: During your time, did this change the dynamics? They’re a different breed of cat in a way.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, I remember Secretary Rusk coming for one of the meetings at ministerial level. In those days, we would always begin on a Thursday night with a non-NATO issue, namely, the Berlin group, which was traditionally convened in rotation by the bilateral embassies of the four members of the Berlin group in Brussels. These ambassadors normally had to do only with Belgium, but when the Berlin group met they had to throw a dinner which very often they did not attend themselves. On that occasion when somebody asked Secretary Rusk the next morning how the dinner had been - it had been at the German residence - he said, “Well, they served rabbit and the rabbit is still running around in my stomach.” There was, of course, always a tremendous bureaucratic run-up for these defense and foreign ministers meetings because there
was the natural drive that they should produce some result. So there was always a premium on coming up with yet another idea. One of those ideas in the Cleveland days was the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, also known as the CCMS, not really directly related to NATO work, but Harlan made it so. The organization followed. We got a new committee called CCMS. I think it’s still there. So, by accretion, the organization tended to grow as a result of this habit of periodic meetings. Nothing was ever subtracted. There was the usual frenzy of briefing papers and of course the exchanges with Washington to get all the ducks in a row. The meetings themselves would be the typical high-level visit with all the hassles that went with it. But it became so routine, and it is so routine today, that the admin staff in Brussels, which is actually located mostly in the embassy downtown, is completely at home dealing with those things. Things become different when the President comes. Then the magnitude of the complexity increases exponentially. But there’s been plenty of experience with handling presidents at NATO as well. It just makes for hard admin work. Over time potential problems, like which ambassador gets to shake the President’s hand first at the airport, got sorted out. Once the pattern was settled, that was it.

Q: While you were there, were there any civil emergencies or things such as earthquakes, floods, or things of this nature that challenged the organization?

VAN HEUVEN: Not that I recall. There must have been some. I did have to handle an emergency almost within a month after my arrival. It had nothing to do with civil emergency planning but it had to do with the fact that I was duty officer. It had to do with a potential outbreak of Greek-Turkish hostilities in November 1967. There was a very real possibility of war. On the evening of November 25, 1967, at Brussels airport, my job was to come up with 400 gallons of JP4 to fuel an aircraft to get Secretary General Brosio into the theater as soon as possible. The thought being that if he were there it would perhaps prevent war. War didn’t break out and his timely arrival may have had something to do with it. Within 24 hours, Washington also provided Cyrus Vance to back up Brosio in the Aegean theater. The rest is history. But I remember being at the airport, not really knowing my way around, and knowing nothing about what JP4 looked like or how much it cost. But I did get it and we got the plane off.

Q: What was your observation of the Greek and Turkish delegations?

VAN HEUVEN: I draw a blank on that. In civil emergency planning they didn’t really count, although maybe they should have. They didn’t attend all the time. My other year and a half at NATO, I was taken off civil emergency planning and was asked to do arms control work. So I had a very different life. Even in that life I don’t remember much about what was a virtually constant standoff. This was long before Turkey occupied Northern Cyprus. Greece was coming out of the colonels’ period. Neither country had strong governments. Turkey was still pretty far away in everybody’s mind, and simply not regarded as part of Europe. It was a NATO member, to be sure, and it was an important NATO member, but I’m generalizing now. The specific answer to your question is that I had no direct experience with either of them.

Q: How were the Soviets viewed by the NATO members? Were they going to do something? Had we learned to live with it?
VAN HEUVEN: The Soviet Union was what NATO was all about. That was clear. By the time I got there, it had already been four years since the assassination of Kennedy and longer since his American University speech in which he held out the prospect of a better relationship with Moscow. Consequently, the mood was different from the mood that I recall from my time earlier at the General Assembly, where the Russians were always vetoing, and there was really no common ground that we had with them at all, and in Berlin. That is not to say that anybody felt sanguine about the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet threat, the threat of mass destruction, the threat of nuclear weapons, but also very much the threat caused by the huge conventional preponderance of the Soviet forces that absolutely riveted the attention of the NATO countries. Everything that was done was related to that. During my time at NATO, there was an attempt to beef up the individual military efforts of the NATO countries. It was the first of a number of such American initiatives over time to increase national defense budgets. The Mansfield Amendment was out there as a constant reminder that, if the Europeans didn’t pull up their socks, the Americans might not necessarily stay. There was a lot of talk about burdensharing. At that time, NATO also was addressing nuclear defense. But by the time I got to do arms control, the doctrine of flexible response was in place. Member countries were becoming used - or reconciled - to the new doctrine, and became gradually more comfortable with the new NATO strategy. My occasional visits to SHAPE certainly reinforced the impression that this was about balance of power, that this was about readiness, that this was about a major political threat to the European continent and to the United States because of the nature of the Soviet weapons. There was a great feeling of solidarity within the Council, created not just by the common enemy but also by being together in one building for long, long hours on all these strategic and operational issues. Even though you might be hassling about individual details, being together and going through the same grinder produced very strong friendships. France was always a little bit on the sidelines of these things, not because it viewed Moscow differently but because the French were in an ambivalent situation. They were part of the political NATO but not part of the military NATO. So they were not part of the Defense Planning Committee but they sat on the Council. So they were either half in or half out. But everybody else was fully aboard and lived with that situation. Neither Harlan Cleveland nor his successor, Bob Ellsworth, worried overly about the French. Another PremRep, Will Taft, did years later. He made it his mission to see if he could really work with his French counterpart. But in the late sixties, most delegations had absorbed the shock of the move from Paris to Brussels.

Q: Speaking of the French, during May-June of ’68, there was a lot of unrest in France, student revolt and all that. De Gaulle made a very famous visit to the troops stationed in Germany. Did that have any repercussions within NATO?

VAN HEUVEN: Not directly, although everybody in Brussels, certainly those who had just moved from Paris, were fascinated by this popular explosion on the streets of Paris that seemed to have taken its cue from Berkeley, but had domestic roots. The French traditionally like to go to the streets whenever they feel strongly about something. French society in those days was still sufficiently inflexible so that the young people could feel that their only way out was to hit the streets and build barricades in the old tradition. But it was also a more basic challenge to the constitutional order of France at that time. Indeed it was the harbinger of the end of the Fourth Republic and the coming of the Fifth Republic. It made it easier for De Gaulle to institute the Fifth Republic. But the event as such did not produce direct political effects on other countries.
There had already been in Berlin - and I had witnesses that in 1966-67 - a very vocal student presence around the Universitat. The students liked to demonstrate and some of these demonstrations turned violent. In one case after the visit of the Shah of Iran, a student by the name of Benny Ohnesorg was killed during a demonstration. For about 24 hours, Berlin was on the edge of serious instability. So, street riots were already a feature of Europe at the time and ’68 in Paris was not anything new. It certainly was not an issue that the Council discussed in Brussels. But at NATO one could hardly not be aware of it.

Q: Was Vietnam a burr under our saddle while you were there?

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Political-Military Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1968-1970)

Ambassador Garthoff was born in Egypt in 1929. He received his BA from Princeton and his MA and PhD from Yale University. He served in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, was the NATO Negotiator on Brussels and was the Ambassador to Bulgaria. He was interviewed on June 22, 1989 by Horace G. Torbert.

Q: There's some mention about your being at Brussels, with NATO. But that was just a detail, was it?

GARTHOFF: No, that was my next assignment, which came January 1968.

Q: I'm sorry. I got my dates a little confused here.

GARTHOFF: But before coming to that, I might just mention a couple of things from this other period.

Q: Did you start going around to conferences and that sort of thing, international conferences, during this job, or did that come later?

GARTHOFF: I did attend a number of meetings of disarmament experts at NATO, as the State Department representative, along with people from ACDA, from the Pentagon, and so on. But I might just say a little more specifically that as the handling of arms control and disarmament developed, once the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had been created in 1961, it was, of course, in a sense, an arm of the Department. Its director during most of this period, Bill Foster, was an advisor to the Secretary, as well as the President, but at the same time it was an autonomous or independent agency. There was no purpose, of course, and no intent to duplicate it within the Department. As I say, while autonomous, it was, in a sense, closely coordinated, probably more so then than it has been since, with the Department. But at the same time, there was need to have someone in the Department directly, coordinating within the Department itself, positions on disarmament and arms control questions, because our positions, taking account of
the wide range of interests of the Department as a whole, were often very different from those of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

So I ended up performing that function, and this meant when a particular issue would come up,
you know, getting the views of the interested bureaus, the regional political-military affairs desk
in EUR, for example, and in many cases, where that was relevant in IO and elsewhere, as well as
having our own input for Alexis Johnson. And I was the--I guess, not the nominal, but I was the
actual State Department representative at the meetings of what was called the Committee of
Deputies, chaired by Butch Fisher, who was the Deputy Director of ACDA. I regularly
accompanied the Secretary to the Committee of Principals meetings, which was at that time the
senior body which the Secretary chaired, dealing with arms control and disarmament matters.

So that did involve a lot of--

Q: Bureaucratic interplay. It's very important. This is what you need to learn--how the
government works.

GARTHOFF: Yes. So doing this coordinating job, really, within the Department and being
involved in the inter-agency coordinating work, where I was representing State, while other
people from Defense and JCS and so on, were involved, along with ACDA.

Also while I was in G PM, apart from the arms control and disarmament, a special committee
was created in 1962 to deal with sensitive political, military, intelligence aspects of space
activities, which the Department, again, was represented by Alexis Johnson, its Chairman, and I
was the executive secretary of this inter-agency special--NSAM 156 Committee, it was called.
To avoid any descriptive title, it took the name of the NSAM that established it.

We considered such questions as what, if any, kind of public references might be given--and the
general answer was, "None"--to what was at that time an unacknowledged program in satellite
reconnaissance. We considered questions as to whether information from satellite photographic
reconnaissance could, or should, be made known to allies, and whether there were ways in which
it could be used indirectly, or directly, in confrontations with the Soviet Union.

Q: In other words, whether it should be subject to the NSAM restrictions, or treated that way?

GARTHOFF: Yes. It was partly a matter of simply considering such questions as--well, to take a
very limited, very precise example, whether we were prepared to support and accept the
implementation of a UN resolution calling for registration of satellite launchings, which would
have indirect relationship. Also more direct questions of whether, and how, we would handle any
kind of programs to try to get the Soviet Union, in particular, and the world, in general, to accept
the idea of overhead satellite reconnaissance as a legitimate activity.

Later, of course, this fed into ways in which such space means could be used as what came to be
called a national technical means of verification in arms control. So this had, in some instances, a
relationship to the arms control and disarmament field, but in most instances was not, really. I
merely mention it as another example of the sort of political-military function that happened to
fall in my bailiwick.

And there were other things. For example, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, again with my hat as Soviet bloc political-military affairs expert, apart from the arms control area, I was Alexis Johnson's staff man in a lot of the handling of the work that he was doing and the Department was doing in the EXCOMM during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Q: Now we probably better get back to Brussels and NATO. Or do you have something more to say about that period?

GARTHOFF: No. I had entered service with the Department in 1961 as a Foreign Service reserve officer, and was interested in entering the regular corps of the Service. Indirectly, I guess, this led me to be interested in assignment out of the kind of work I was doing in G PM. I did so on Harlan Cleveland's initiative. I got to know him when he was Assistant Secretary for IO, and when there were a number of arms control matters and various things that I'd come in contact and worked with him on. He was then our representative at NATO Council in Paris, and then after the fall of '67, Brussels. He asked if I would like to join his staff there as Counselor for political-military affairs, a new position in the staff. I was interested. That was, in due course, arranged, and I went there at the end of January 1968.

I had been involved throughout 1967 in our efforts to get under way negotiations that eventually became the SALT negotiations. In fact, in the spring of 1967, I had been slated as the State Department representative on a delegation that was formed on paper. It never developed further, because the Soviets never responded on readiness to sit down at any given time and place and begin those negotiations.

I mention this because it was to have quite an effect later in terms of my being borrowed away a good bit of the time from my NATO assignment in Brussels. Indeed, I had only been in Brussels for a few months when the Soviets indicated a readiness to begin those negotiations, in May and June of '68. I was called back to Washington to work in the preparations for the SALT negotiations. That was under way and, indeed, the positions had been decided on. We were on the verge of announcing a visit by President Johnson to the Soviet Union, at which time the SALT negotiations would begin, to begin on, I think, the date of September 30, 1968.

Literally the day before the announcement was going to be made, on August 20 Soviet tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia. Of course, the announcement was never made and the talks never began in that administration. There still was a desire by the President himself and in some quarters of the administration to see if those talks couldn't be started in a few months. No one wanted to do that in the immediate aftermath of Soviet-led intervention, invasion of Czechoslovakia. But at the same time, there was a feeling it was in our interest to have those negotiations, so the possibility of their going ahead at some point later was not abandoned. But by mid-September, three or four weeks after the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia, it seemed to me that it was absurd for me to be sitting around Washington, not doing anything particular, except waiting for what seemed to be the unlikely possibility that those SALT talks would get started. Meanwhile, there was a lot going on back in Brussels, where I was assigned and should have been, so I told them at one point that I thought I ought to go back to Brussels, and if and
when they needed me, they knew where to find me.

So I went back to Brussels. Sure enough, of course, things were very active there in the aftermath of the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia.

**Q:** Just a bureaucratic point. Where were the preparations for the SALT talks centered? Was that ACDA or the Department? A little of both? Who pulled it together, in other words?

GARTHOFF: It was in ACDA at that point. At the very beginning, it had been in the Department, in early '67. Then during '67, it got shifted into inter-agency consideration, and very close cooperation throughout, incidentally, very good cooperation during all that period between State and ACDA. But during '68, then, it was very much in the normal channels of the Committee of Principals and the Committee of Deputies and so on, in which both State and ACDA and Defense had very active participation.

In 1969, after--well, I don't need to go into—

**Q:** Well, what kinds of problems you faced, NATO, of course, is basically a coordinating-with-the-Allies job, isn't it?

GARTHOFF: Yes. Exactly.

**Q:** This is what you do there.

GARTHOFF: Yes.

**Q:** Were there particularly thorny problems that you had trouble with, with the Allies, or whatnot, during that period?

GARTHOFF: One interesting area during that time was in the Nuclear Planning Group, which had been set up, I think in late '66 or '67, as a way of bringing the Germans, in particular, into an association with our nuclear planning in a way that had not occurred when the MLF had fallen through. And that was intended to partly assuage feelings of any discrimination within the alliance, since they were not a nuclear power, unlike the United States, Britain, and France, and in view of the Non-proliferation Treaty [which] was in its final stages of negotiation during that particular period. In any event, that led [Robert] McNamara to take the lead in proposing the Nuclear Planning Group, which then got under way. Because it had a representation principally, at the top, of defense ministers, and therefore for most countries, of Defense Department personnel, that was also the situation in our case, but it also involved an active State Department interest, we worked that out on the spot.

The principal representative at the staff level for the NPG working group that met between the semi-annual meetings of defense ministers was the senior Defense Department representative in the US NATO mission, at that time, Tim Stanley. I served as, in effect, his deputy. When he wasn't there, I sat in the chair. But it was a mixed Defense-State staffing, and working on the problem, which was, of course, entirely appropriate. After all, we were the United States mission
to NATO, and it integrated State Department and Defense Department personnel. There were occasionally minor frictions, but it generally worked pretty well.

Q: *I always found that US Government integration in the field was infinitely easier than it was in Washington.*

GARTHOFF: Yes.

Q: *I tried to struggle with both.*

GARTHOFF: Yes. Another subject that came up for consideration at that time were the first studies that were made on mutual force reductions in Europe. Negotiations on that subject, the ill-fated MBFR negotiations, didn't get started until much later, 1973, but NATO first proposed such mutual force reductions in 1968. So we had to get under way some staffing on that, which had not really been done in Washington, and was then done to some extent in Brussels. Negotiations never got under way, so it was an exercise which didn't, at that time, lead to anything, but in a few years it would.

I might say that more generally, I think the coordination, certainly at that period, between the different elements, which is to say State and Defense, in the mission to NATO, worked quite well.

Q: *Did you have Cleveland the whole time you were there?*

GARTHOFF: No, Cleveland was there until some months into the Nixon Administration, when he was succeeded by Bob Ellsworth.

Q: *Ah, yes.*

GARTHOFF: So my time there was working under both of them.

I was, again, in the summer of 1969, back in Washington briefly, in connection with SALT, and when the SALT negotiations were then definitely scheduled for later that fall of 1969, I was called back to Washington again and named the executive secretary of the delegation, and was there for the preparations for that negotiation, and then off to Helsinki in November-December 1969. For that year, essentially, from the fall of 1969 through the fall of 1970, I was nominally assigned, still, in Brussels, and was occasionally there, but most of the time I was in either Helsinki or Vienna, where the SALT talks rotated for the first couple of years, or Washington, in connection with the preparation for them, and only intermittently back in Brussels.

Q: *Really, Brussels was just a place where you got your shirts laundered?*

GARTHOFF: Well, my wife was in Brussels, but I was just there sporadically.
PHILIP S. KAPLAN
Economic Officer, U.S. Mission to the European Communities
Brussels (1968-1970)

Philip Kaplan was born in New Briton, Connecticut in 1937. He graduated from the University of Connecticut (B.A., 1959) and the University of California (J.D., 1962). Mr. Kaplan entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Since 1989 Mr. Kaplan has served as Deputy U.S. Representative to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Prior to this, he served in the following positions at the Department of State: as a senior intelligence officer, 1987 - 1989; Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Manila, 1985 - 1987; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, 1981 - 1985; director of multilateral policy at the Bureau of International Organizations, 1979 - 1980; and as a member of the policy planning staff, 1975 - 1979. In addition, Mr. Kaplan has served on the U.S. delegation to the East-West negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna, Austria, 1974 - 1975; as political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, 1970 - 1974; and as an economic officer at the U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels, Belgium, 1968 - 1970. Mr. Kaplan entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Mr. Kaplan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2014.

Q: Well, you were off to Brussels then in, what, '68?

KAPLAN: '68.

Q: What was your job and what were --

KAPLAN: Well, before I went to Brussels I should tell you that I went up to Princeton. I don’t know if I mentioned this before, I met George Kennan?

Q: No.

KAPLAN: When I first arrived in the Foreign Service I had read his memoirs, I thought they were marvelous, literary gems. I’ve subsequently come to the conclusion that I didn’t agree with a number of the things he said. I never changed my mind about that even after having read this 800-page biography of him that was published by this Yale professor recently.

Q: John Gaddis.

KAPLAN: That’s right, who’s a very respected scholar, and Gaddis I think had it just about right. Anyway, I asked Mr. Kennan, very naively, what’s the secret to a successful Foreign Service career. And he was very gracious, he didn’t laugh at me. He said, “The secret is to be in places that matter when they matter.” I never forgot that. And I reached the conclusion -- for reasons I’ll explain -- that the place that mattered at that particular point in time the was center of Europe. There was a European integration movement going on in Western Europe, there was the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the attack on Czechoslovakia, which I’ll come to presently,
and Germany was in a process of redefinition in the aftermath of the 1961 raising of the Berlin Wall. So my purpose was to get to Europe, and I owed that to my trip to the filing system. I was assigned to Brussels. I took French at the Foreign Service Institute, and passed the course. We had a very highly professional mission there headed by Ambassador Bob Schaeetzel; George Vest was the DCM and John Renner was the economic counselor. I was put in the Economic Section as the junior officer. Investment policy was my beat. This was the time of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and the Le Défi Américain and all of that.

Q: The American Challenge.

KAPLAN: That’s right. I was told, “You’re going to do investment policy. Go get ‘em.” I had a couple of bosses. Renner was the big boss in the Economic Section. Ambassador Schaeetzel was very kind to me, as was George Vest. In the economic section I worked with Tony Albrecht and Tom Summers, who did trade and finance. I went around and developed a range of contacts at the Berlaymont building where the European Commission was quartered, and among the permanent representations of the EC-six original member-state: the French, the Germans, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Luxembourgers, and the Italians. I also made contacts among some other delegations, particularly the Swiss. They had a brilliant fellow there, Benedikt von Tscharner, who later became one of the superstars of the Swiss Foreign Service. Whenever I couldn’t figure something out, I turned to Benedikt.

After a few weeks in Brussels, I went up to see the DCM and I said, “I would like to apply to take German,” because I knew that’s where I wanted to end up. I wanted to get to Germany because in my mind -- and I still believe this -- the Cold War was essentially about who was going to have the greatest influence in Germany. Mackinder had said, “He who controls Germany controls Europe. He who controls Europe controls the world.” And so Mr. Vest kindly arranged to make that happen. I had just taken the French course. So the pedagogy of learning the language was very fresh in my mind, and there were certain words that I learned you’d use a lot. For example, the French word éviter means to avoid; the German word for avoid was vermeiden, I tucked that in quickly. My teacher – one on one – was a young German woman who would come at 8 A.M. three times a week for an hour, and I worked the tapes the way I learned to do in the Foreign Service Institute. My German wasn’t perfect, but I managed to get myself assigned to Bonn and once I got there, my vocabulary exploded.

Q: Let’s go back to Brussels now. How did you find -- I mean Brussels is a place -- how many embassies did they have there?

KAPLAN: Oh, a lot.

Q: Did we have there. I mean --

KAPLAN: Oh, we had our bilateral embassy, we had the mission I was in, to the European Community, and there was our mission, USNATO to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Q: And then we of course had one to Belgium itself.
KAPLAN: That’s it, the bilateral embassy, that’s right.

Q: And first place, were you --

KAPLAN: I might say one word if you don’t mind about the bilateral embassy. I worked there for six weeks when I first got there. It was the summer. The mission was -- and the Commission were basically out of commission. They put me in the consulate for six weeks because they needed extra hands during the summer. I was taught that the key criterion for granting non-immigrant (tourist) visas is whether the applicant was going to come back or not, whether they had sufficient ties to their home country, in that case, Belgium. There were two veteran Belgian locals, elderly women who were strong traditionalists. There was only one way to do things: their way. Well, I figured this was a short-term duty so I’m just going just go along with them. On the last day, the very last interview that I conducted before I left the consulate, a gorgeous young woman came in for a visa to the United States. I asked about her ties to the (Belgian) community, and she said, “Well, I’ve been working here for some time.”

I asked, “What kind of job do you have?”

She flashed me a winning smile and said, “I’m a dancer.” It was pretty clear to me what kind of a dancer she was (laughs).

Q: Yeah.

KAPLAN: I granted her the visa. As I left the consulate these two women, who I’d gotten along with, because I’d gone along with them, glared at me (laughs) --

Q: (laughs) Did --

KAPLAN: But your question was really about, I think about what were the conditions in Europe and how did I try to adapt to them. Well, I come back again to the fact that it was 1968 and everything was up for grabs. I was in Paris on one weekend where students were throwing paving blocks around and trying to bring De Gaulle down, and De Gaulle came back with that phrase telling them to go to the devil. This was also the time that Willy Brandt became West German foreign minister and then chancellor. He introduced the Ostpolitik, the eastern policy, his own kind of détente. It was basically a wager on his part that if you worked within these treaties, that over an extended period of time it would be possible to reunify the country. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger were skeptical about his goals and anxious that they might undercut their own détente policies.

So there were two great games going on in Brussels and in Europe, one was the effort to integrate Western Europe, and that that was our mission’s task, we were dealing with the European Community. We were very supportive because Ambassador Schaeftzel was really committed. He was close to George Ball, who in turn was very close to Jean Monet, the founder of the European movement. I had the extraordinary good fortune to be working for somebody who was right in the middle of all of this, right in the fray. Mr. Ball would come to visit the
mission, I would collect him at the airport. At the beginning of 1969, President Nixon came immediately after his inauguration to talk to the three missions.

Q: OK, going back, first place, ‘68, were you there when the Warsaw Pact essentially invaded Czechoslovakia?

KAPLAN: Indeed. I finished my A-100 course in the spring. In late July we flew to Stuttgart in Germany to buy a car. I bought a brand new Mercedes for $2,000 at a diplomatic discount. Not bad. Before we went on to our first posting in Brussels we took a little detour to Prague, where we had been a couple years before as tourists. We found the city absolutely beautiful. When we had been there in ’66, Novotny, the communist leader, was still in power. A young Czech guide took us around and made critical comments about Novotny. In ’68 on the way to Brussels we stopped in the Staré Mesto, the old town square, it was three weeks before the Red Army invasion. It was raining hard. And there was the statue of John Hus, the --

Q: Hussite leader.

KAPLAN: That’s right, was almost as though there were tears coming out of his eyes because of the rain falling on the statue.

Q: Yeah.

KAPLAN: And I said to my wife, “Every single person in this square knows that the Russians are coming.” We went next to Bratislava. The Slovak provincial capital, and walked around near the Hrad, their castle. A little old man came up to me, a World War II veteran with a wooden leg … tap, tap, tap on the cobblestones. I was wearing a blue blazer and he must have figured that I looked like an American. He said, “The Soviets are here.” We spoke in German and my German was at that point very elementary.

I said, “What do you mean?” I was a little nervous, I was going in my first assignment and I didn’t want my career to end before it started (laughs).

He slipped me a piece of paper. He said, “Those are the numbers of the Red Army units. They’re going around in Czech military trucks, they’re wearing Czechoslovak uniforms. But they’re here. And they’re coming.”

I had no way of knowing whether he was out of his mind or whether he was providing real intelligence. And then this big Soviet soldier came up to me. He was with his -- I guess he was with his bride and with a couple other Soviet soldiers and their wives. And he takes this piece of medal out, I thought he had a gun. And it turned out it was a small camera. And he said, “Can you take our pictures,” (laughs).

Well, I went back to Prague and our embassy and saw Ambassador Jake Beam, who was our former ambassador to the Soviet Union --

Q: Yeah.
KAPLAN: -- a man of considerable standing and experience. And I said “Mr. Ambassador, I’m a total novice, but this is what the man said and here’s the piece of paper with the unit numbers.”

He looked at it skeptically and he said, “Well, where are you assigned?”

And I said, “I’m on my way to my first assignment,” (laughs).

Q: (laughs)

KAPLAN: He said, “What do you suggest?”

I said, “Well, it’s not for me to tell a man of your standing what to do, but maybe one of your defense attaches can go to Bratislava and take a look around.”

Q: (laughs)

KAPLAN: He stood up and said, “Thank you for your visit,” and off I went, figuring I’d been admonished the way a diplomat would. The Soviet invasion took place about two or three weeks later; he had the good grace to send me a note thanking me for having come by. Which surprised me. So we ended up in Brussels and got started.

Q: This is a period where they were throwing rocks at our -- the Belgians were throwing rocks at our embassy, our consulate general in Antwerp I believe.

KAPLAN: I actually don’t remember that, but I -- there were all kinds of anti-Vietnam demonstrations going on.

Q: Were you -- did you get the feel for the anti-Vietnam movement in where you were, or not?

KAPLAN: Well, it was aimed at policy and here was Nixon who six months later was president and not particularly popular among the Europeans, and they were dazzled by Kissinger but didn’t always trust him completely.

Q: No.

KAPLAN: And so all that went together with the --

Q: You did mention there were several things with Nixon’s visit that --

KAPLAN: Oh yes. Before he arrived, Mr. Haldeman came. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were the two, two fellows who were closest to Nixon. They were basically PR (public relations) and advertising executives, but they were close to Nixon. Kissinger used to refer to them as the Germans, which is kind of strange because Kissinger was German by birth. Well, Haldeman came over to advance the president’s visit. I’d never been involved in anything like that before, but George Vest, the DCM, was kind enough to include me when we went around. We had
briefed Haldeman that the Belgians wanted to host a reception and to which the most important people in the kingdom would be invited, that there’d be a meeting at NATO and then the president would meet with the European Commission. Haldeman just sat there rolling his eyes. He said, “Wrong, wrong, wrong. You go back and tell the people at the palace that we’ll give ‘em 45 minutes.” They wanted 45 minutes for the cocktail party before the lunch started. We’ll go to NATO and EC people can come to our hotel for a little while.” I had the sense that this was my first diplomatic crisis (laughs).

Q: Yeah.

KAPLAN: We brought him to the chamberlain in the Belgian king’s palace. Haldeman was pretty brutal about it. The deal that emerged was that there wouldn’t be a reception, but there would be a lunch limited to an hour and 10 minutes. The meeting at NATO was longer because Nixon was interested in that.

Q: Yeah.

KAPLAN: With everything that was going on, the Czech invasion and all that. As for the EC, the president of the commission and two other commissioners come to see Nixon at the hotel for 15 minutes. And there were a lot of sore feelings --

Q: Oh yeah.

KAPLAN: -- as a result of that. On the way back in the car Mr. Vest said to me, “Now you’ve got your introduction to the way the White House treats foreigners.”

Q: Oh God. Well, I’m looking at my time.

KAPLAN: Yeah.

Q: I’d like to pick this up. When you left Brussels where’d you go?

KAPLAN: Well, there’s one, one last piece of that. I went to Mr. Renner, who was the economic counselor. He was a hard task master. I had reason to be indebted to him. He got me a double promotion, which I had never heard of before. My magnum opus on investment policy was a 12-page cable. In those days, , we had these green cable forms --

Q: Yeah.

KAPLAN: -- and about four or five carbons underneath it. And this was going to the secretary of state in Washington with copies to London, Paris, Rome, and the obvious countries. My secretary was somebody who was not inclined toward a lot of hard work and I was low man on the totem pole. Eileen typed this up, I proofread it and brought it to Renner and he read through all 12 pages. He said, “This is very good. Now, I’m going to teach you something now that you’ll never forget. You have to read from the top.” And the word Paris, Embassy Paris, in the info copy, instead of P-A-R-I-S, it was P-R-A-I-S. He took a crayon and drew a heavy line down
And I said to him, “How are you? Eileen is going to take her letter opener and put it in my throat when she sees this.”

Q: (laughs)

KAPLAN: She’ll have to do the whole thing all over again.

Q: Oh God.

KAPLAN: He said, “That’s right, but you’ll never forget what I’ve just taught you.” And I never have.

Now I said I was indebted to John Renner. Much earlier, I told him I was studying German and wanted to be assigned next to Bonn. He told me the key man in our Embassy was Jonathan Dean, the political counselor.”

JOHN W. KIMBALL
Political-Military Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1968-1971)

Mr. Kimball was born in California in 1934 and received his bachelor’s and master’s degree from Stanford University. He was positioned in Saigon, Sarajevo, Brussels and London. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 24, 1999.

Q: Being in NATO from ‘68 to ‘71, you must have been caught up in the removal of NATO. Where was NATO then?

KIMBALL: NATO had just moved from Paris, and was settling into its Brussels headquarters. The military people had just moved down to the new SHAPE headquarters near Mons, Belgium. The Harmel report had just been promulgated in 1967, and that gave everybody a fresh slogan to work with: “defense and deterrence.” Harlan Cleveland really pushed very hard on this idea that NATO is not only a defensive military alliance, but also a political consultative mechanism. The North Atlantic Council is not there merely to discuss defense against the Soviets: it is also a mechanism for coordinating North Atlantic policy among NATO members. He later wrote an excellent book entitled “NATO - The Transatlantic Bargain.”

STANLEY ZUCKERMAN
Information Officer, USIS
Brussels (1968-1971)
Mr. Zuckerman was born and raised in Brooklyn, New York and educated at the University of Wisconsin. After service in the US Army, followed by newspaper reporting and a position with the Governor of Wisconsin, he joined the USIA Foreign Service in 1965. He subsequently served as Information, Press and Public Affairs Counselor in Congo, Belgium, Mexico, Canada and Brazil. He also had several senior level assignments in Washington at USIA and the State Department. Mr. Zuckerman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Well then in '68 you were off to Belgium?

ZUCKERMAN: To Belgium.

Q: And you were there from '68 to when?

ZUCKERMAN: ’71.

Q: What job did you have and what were you doing?

ZUCKERMAN: I was the information officer at the U.S. Embassy. …

Q: Did we have, was there in fact an ambassador to an embryonic European Community?

ZUCKERMAN: Oh yes. We had a mission to USEC, the US Mission to the Common Market headed by Ambassador Robert Schaetzel, and a mission to NATO headed by Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, and we had a mission of course to Belgium headed at that time by Ambassador Ridgeway Knight. We had a three man USIS post at the Embassy, although our local staff helped us carry out administrative support for the USIS posts supporting USEC and NATO. At times I was asked to go over and help out at NATO when our mission was short-staffed during a conference, usually to cover the event and write a story for world-wide distribution on the Wireless File.

Q: Well you know there are periodic visits of the President.

ZUCKERMAN: There was only one presidential visit while I was in Belgium, but that was a big one – President Nixon’s first stop on his first trip abroad as President. It taught me a great deal about the needs of the traveling White House press corps, and it went off quite well. That was in 1969 and Nixon was greeted quite warmly by the Belgian press. We were worried on his arrival when he casually put his arm across the back of King Baudouin, who had greeted him at the airport, as they walked to the reviewing stand. It was a front page photo in the major newspaper, and to our relief the caption said that the President had engaged in a “typically warm American gesture of friendship” rather than treating it as an inappropriate act. Later on I was asked to go to Ireland to assist in working with the press on Nixon’s visit there, with Tom Tuch coming from Berlin.

Q. What does one do to please the White House press?
ZUCKERMAN: The principal tasks are ensuring that they have a good place to work, all the facilities they need to move their stories, and access to all but the most private events, such as meetings between the President and the Belgian Prime Minister. This was before computers so that stories were generally filed by telephone or telex from the press center. Today they would do it by a direct feed from their computers to the newsroom. But in those days we had to have a huge room for more than 200 newsmen with ample phone banks and several telex companies ready to move their stories. We also had to have a schedule for the newsmen mirroring the President’s own schedule, buses to take them where the President would be exactly when he got there, and access for photos to all events. If the press was unhappy, the White House would be unhappy, but from all reports both the press and the President’s party went away pleased.

Q. And what were your major concerns? Belgium was a dependable ally, wasn’t it?

ZUCKERMAN: Yes, but remember this was during the Vietnam war, and while a good number of Belgians remembered our role in liberating them during World War II, and gave us the benefit of the doubt, the younger people were very opposed to our policies. In fact, they seemed to be taking their cue from the behavior of people of their same age in the US and elsewhere. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a blow to the left in Belgium and elsewhere, but it did little to allay concern about Vietnam. We also had problems from our friends, who on the one hand were afraid that we were neglecting European security needs by getting caught up in a part of the world that was of less interest to them than it was to us. On the other hand our departure from Vietnam would certainly cause them to be concerned about our reliability should we be needed to defend Europe. There are some situations that are just intractable.

Q. Was the press hostile on the Vietnam issue?

ZUCKERMAN: Not uniformly. The Belgian press represented virtually all shades of political expression, and we had good relations with all of them. The Socialist Le Peuple was among our good friends despite differences over Vietnam especially, but their criticism was never cutting. That was one of the benefits of the tendency of Belgian institutions, that they were typically headed by people of a certain age. They had memories of when we were really needed. My major problem was with television, which had two branches. RBT was the Flemish channel, and they were generally very supportive. RTB was the French language channel, and they were the scene of bitter battles among pro- and anti-American factions. The best friend I had in Belgium was Henri Francois van Aal, who was the host of the Belgian equivalent of 60 Minutes. They called it Neuf Million – the Belgian population at the time was nine million. He was a very professional newsman, who later became Minister of Francophone Cultural Affairs, but while he was at RTB he treated us very fairly. We were able to help him become the first foreign TV newsmen to win a Neiman Fellowship at Harvard, and the Fulbright Foundation in Belgium was able to help finance it. Unfortunately the person who became RTB’s “expert” in US affairs was a fellow named David Lachterman who was truly expert in producing programs about the US that cleverly used material appearing in the US that was self-critical, without any balance by material showing, without cynicism, healthy aspects of our society. An example was the CBS program “Hunger in America” that showed American audiences something that shocked them because most Americans were not as aware as they are now of the pockets of extreme poverty that led
some families to live in actual hunger. Belgian audiences, however, were less sure that they knew as much as they might about the real America, and the program had a greater affect there than it did in the US, because it called into question the image of America that they had seen in movie theaters. So we did battle for three years with RTB, winning some and losing some, but overall we made a dent. Our space program was, of course, of major interest in Belgium as it was everywhere. The Apollo 11 astronauts came to visit and the Belgian foreign ministry and the city of Brussels agreed on a triumphal motorcade from the airport to the Palace. We were worried about making sure there was a good turnout on the streets, and went to RTB with the route map. They surprised us by taking a camera mounted on a car to show the entire route on their widely watched evening news show the evening before the event. The next day the motorcade route looked like motorcades of Lindbergh’s return from his Paris flight or of Eisenhower’s triumphal return from Europe – a parade I witnessed as a child.

Q. Was the experience in Europe beginning to make you question your decision to leave newspaper work?

ZUCKERMAN: It did, but a career in the Foreign Service didn’t seem likely given my earlier work in Democratic politics. I was serving on a five-year appointment as a reserve officer and that would end no later than the end of my posting in Brussels. But it was announced that the administration had decided to change the nature of the USIA Foreign Service by giving its members the title of Foreign Service Information Officers and the stability that the State Department Foreign Service enjoyed. The granting of career status would be determined by interviews with each officer by senior panels. I was sure there wouldn’t be room for me, since it would provide an opportunity to get rid of people who might have gotten hired because of their Democratic political connections.

I was vacationing with the family in Italy when I got a message telling me to fly to Frankfurt to be interviewed by the panel that had been sent to Europe. I had to fly from Ancona to Rome and than up to Frankfurt and got in late, but the panel was kind enough to give me more time to get to the Consulate. I was subjected to a long and thorough interview, and I think I enjoyed good luck because the other people they had interviewed that day were young officers whose early tours had been in Sweden, Paris, and other European posts. I guess my Congo tour must have impressed them, and I didn’t go out of my way to talk about the nice golf course or the good food and weather. Not long after I returned from vacation I was offered career status, and I was impressed by the fact that my political background had not been a barrier. We decided that the work I was doing gave me more time with my family than either politics or journalism ever would, and I was interested in the work. By this time I had become really involved and deeply absorbed. I was also mindful of my tendency to get bored with being in one place too long, and that – unless I was working for a newspaper with multiple bureaus – I would want to change jobs every few years. The Foreign Service allowed you to change scenery radically, to experience a dramatic cultural change every few years, without ever giving up your seniority. It was just unique in that respect.

Q: Let’s go back to your experience in Presidential visits. Let’s go to your first presidential visit. How did that go. This is Nixon’s first time as president. He had been vice president of course. Usually the staff around, particularly early on, is both amateurish and demanding. How did you
find this from the presidential staff?

ZUCKERMAN: Well, the first thing that happens to you is the White House takes over your life. They move in, and there is somebody assigned to the task of coordinating the public affairs side of it on the White House part and on our side. On our side, I was given the responsibility, reporting to our wonderful PAO Ed Brooke, of doing the basic liaison with the White House people and with the Belgian foreign ministry, usually in the company of Ambassador Knight and Embassy political, administrative and security people. They determined that the Hilton Hotel would be the headquarters, and we went over there with the administrative people from the embassy to work out the logistics of the press center. I pretty well knew what the press needed, where television cameras should go, where you could allow still photographers to go, where the writing press would go. I urged, successfully in that case, that the press center be joint, that the American press and the foreign press should share the same quarters. As time went on, the American government backed away from that because of complaints from the American press. I thought it was a big mistake, because the US press, particularly the TV prima donnas, often left a bad taste in the mouths of the local newsmen, and limiting our press center to US media could only color the press coverage in the press of the host country in a hostile direction. But the White House press office’s major concern was, of course, how the President was treated by the American media, and we were left to pick up the pieces after the circus left town. In Nixon’s visit to Belgium, however, that wasn’t the case, and the local press coverage was excellent.

Q: How did the Belgian Foreign Ministry people react to our requirements?

ZUCKERMAN: The White House people would insist on priority treatment for the press. For instance there was one part of the visit where the President would lay a wreath at the Belgian tomb of their unknown soldier, which is located at a very narrow, crowded area of the historic district of Brussels. The need was to maneuver the buses carrying the press so they could get the best pictures possible of Nixon laying the wreath. But there were crowds across the street behind barriers who would be witnessing the ceremony, and moving the buses to provide for our press would block their view. So what we devised was a system where we would be able to move the buses in just after the wreath was laid and before the president moved away, so the photographers could get their shots. There was also a press and photo pool close to the President so that should have been enough, but there was another reason to move those buses quickly. We had to get them to the next site, perhaps a couple of hundred meters away, where the president was going into the palace with King Baudouin. It was at that point in our discussions that my counterpart in the Belgian Foreign Ministry, press spokesman Jean Francois de Liedeclerq (who had a son born the same day as my son David in the same hospital, the Clinique Edith Cavell) made a wonderfully accurate observation. He said in front of the Ambassador, the Foreign Minister, the White House people and everybody else: “You know, I have just come to realize the difference between the American approach to such visits and our approach. We will permit any role for the press that does not interfere with protocol. You will permit any roll for protocol that does not interfere with the press.” That is a constant where ever you go, no matter which party controls the White House.

A year later, when President Nixon was making a visit to Ireland after leaving the Soviet Union, I was asked, because we had no USIS post in Ireland, to provide press support along with Tom
Tuch coming from Berlin and a young officer from Vienna. Congressman Rooney, who ruled over our budget for a long time said, “We don’t need a USIA mission in Ireland. We don’t have any enemies in Ireland.” He was probably right. I was tasked to go to Limerick where the press and White House party would overnight before going to Dublin. We had to look for a place to put 220 newsmen. There was no really suitable place. There was a beautiful hotel that was built by an expatriate Irish-American who had returned to Ireland, bought Dromoland Castle, and built the Clare Inn. But they wouldn’t give him a liquor license for the Clare Inn, and he refused to open it until they did. So we negotiated with the county, and they gave him a liquor license for one night. So he stocked the bar and then he brought in all the new help. Nobody had worked there before; it had never been opened. We had the bar opened at least for the reporters since there was nothing else to do in Limerick. But there was a to do because the White House reporter for the New York Times, Max Frankel, later its editorial page editor, wrote a brilliant series of limericks, datelined Limerick, about the Nixon trip. They were hilarious, and the piece circulated around the bar. Much of it was focused on the staff’s search for the birthplace of Nixon’s putative Irish ancestor, which was thought to be a place called Timahoe. The problem was that they found two Timahoes, and arbitrarily chose one for the Presidential ancestral home.

President Nixon’s staff saw the piece and didn’t like it at all, and to my surprise they succeeded in convincing the Times not to publish it. We left the Clare Inn and flew to Dublin the next morning where there was a parade during which someone threw an egg at Nixon and, by the grace of God, missed. We got to the airport without further incident. Now the night before, a dinner for the press was thrown at the Dromoland Castle by the man who also owned the Clare Inn. People had their choice of going to an Elizabethan dinner served by ladies dressed in Elizabethan costumes with all that they revealed, or to an old Irish country dinner. Well I went to the country dinner with some of the press, and other people went to the other dinner, and somehow I got very sick the next morning. I was in extreme distress on the motorcade going to the airport. I could barely make it until the President left. I went back to the hotel and was really having very a bad case of dysentery, worse than anything I had had in the Congo except for one bout of salmonella. I couldn’t go to a farewell dinner that was being held for us that night at the Russell Hotel, thrown by its manager.

As it turned out, I missed a great dinner but I learned a lesson that served me well for years. I called the front desk and asked if they had a doctor in the house. This was in the Gresham Hotel, a beautiful old Edwardian hotel in Dublin. The desk clerk said, “Well Dr. Murphy is our doctor, but he is not here now, what is your problem? Maybe I can help you.” I described my condition, and she said “Well I know what he does in these cases. I will leave word to give you his treatment?” I said, “I would trust anybody right now.” She said, “Get undressed; get into bed.” Shortly there was a knock on the door; she came in trailed by a waitress with a very large tray, and on it were two bottles of, as it turned out, room temperature 7-Up, two goblets, a canister, a silver bowl of sugar, a salt shaker and two hot water bottles. She opened one of the cans of 7-Up and poured it into the goblet. She put in two teaspoonfuls of sugar and shook some salt in and stirred it up. Then she put a hot water bottle on my stomach and a hot water bottle on my feet. She said, “Now you are to resist going to the bathroom as long as you can. Slowly sip this 7-Up and then fill it up again after you finish and try not to go to the bathroom.” I tried to follow her instructions as best I could, but I didn’t survive very long. I had to go to the bathroom. I drank more 7-Up. This time I held out for maybe 15 minutes, and continued drinking the 7-Up mixture. There was a knock on the door,
and the waitress came in, replaced the hot water bottles and left two more cans of warm 7-Up. I
continued the process until, after another half-hour, I was totally free of my ailment.

The phone rang and it was Dr. Murphy. He said, “How are you doing my boy?” I said, “I’m
doing fine and I don’t know why. I have had all kinds of cures for this condition but this one
doesn’t seem very scientific.” “Oh yes,” he answered, “this is very scientific. Dysentery is a
vicious cycle. You have got an irritation in the bowel that forces the release of liquid. The more
you lose the more you have to go to the bathroom. It’s a vicious cycle that has to be broken. So
we give you a bland liquid like 7-Up. We put some sugar in there because you have lost a lot of
strength. That releases the carbonations also, so the carbon dioxide won’t be an irritant. We put
some salt in so you will retain the fluid. The hot water bottle on your stomach relaxes the cramps
and help you resist going to the bathroom.” I said, “Well it makes great sense, but what about the
hot water bottle on my feet?” “Oh,” he said, “my mother always did that.”

I have used that cure whenever I have been afflicted again, and it has always worked.

Q: Well, you were in Brussels from ’68 to ’71. You certainly know about the problems we were
having in Amsterdam.

ZUCKERMAN: With drugs?

Q: Well no, I was thinking about anti Vietnam protests. I mean it got quite vicious against our
consulate general. How about the anti war movement Belgium? What was happening and how
did we deal with that?

ZUCKERMAN: It was contentious, but we were not the subjects of large scale demonstrations.
We were criticized in the press. There were the same images on Belgian television that were seen
here in the States. Yet I think Belgian feelings were tempered. The conservative party, in this
case as elsewhere in Europe called Liberals, was strong in Belgium, and I was once told by the
editor of Le Peuple, the Socialist newspaper, that all Belgians were basically conservative. He
said “We have Conservative conservatives, Socialist conservatives, and even Communist
conservatives, but we are all basically restrained in our behavior, except when it comes to the
linguistic divide.”

So while Belgians were generally critical of our actions in Vietnam, their real fear was that our
strength was being squandered on a war that didn’t really threaten our interests, which they, of
course, felt should be centered on the defense of Europe. At the same time, many also would
react to our defeat in Vietnam by a loss in confidence that they could count on us to defend them
in case the Russians came westwards. Nevertheless, there were still enough people around who
remembered WWII. Any taxi driver immediately, when he discovered you were American,
started talking about the kids who demonstrate on the university campuses. “They don’t
understand. They weren’t around during the war. They don’t know how we would be living now
if it wasn’t for the Americans.” So it was a period of declining popularity, but there was still,
even among the younger people, an identification with the rebellious spirit among young
Americans, the same identification that they had with the French youth during the 1968
demonstrations there. I remember seeing the film MASH with French sub-titles and not being
able to hear the English dialogue because of the constant laughter and applause of the young people in the audience and having to depend on the subtitles to know what was going on.

Q: It was a series about a military hospital in Korea.

ZUCKERMAN: Not the television show, the film. The film came out in ’69 or ’70.

Q: ’69. I saw it in Saigon.

ZUCKERMAN: I’m surprised the Army showed it to the troops in Saigon. The Belgian kids loved it. They loved it for its irreverence, and the fact that the Americans were criticizing their own war, that there was debate in America. Most of the tenor of the debate was identified as opposition from American sources, so they never lost respect for American democracy. They never were confused by the fact that American society was divided on the war. The Belgians didn’t like the war for different reasons; the kids for one reason – our interference in what they thought was a war of national independence --, and the older people for reasons I’ve described. But they did not respond, for the most part, in the same way as was the case either in the Netherlands, France, or even in the United States.

Q: In some ways the Belgians were really a different breed of cat than some of the other parts of Europe.

ZUCKERMAN: I think to some extent yes. They were different not so much in what they thought but in how they expressed it.

Q: How about the University or universities? Did you get into them? You know some places the universities in Europe particularly after ’68 which had stirred things up. It wasn’t just anti American, so it meant that the left had sort of taken over.

ZUCKERMAN: The Free University of Brussels was that kind of institution at the time. It didn’t mean that we were forbidden from being on campuses, but we were more welcome at the University of Louvain, or Leuven in Flemish, where the university was located. We had many opportunities to be there and we co-sponsored with their international affairs department a number of very good seminars on international affairs. We also had no problem reaching the press with serious seminars. We had a seminar for political writers on American elections before the 1970 mid-term vote. We didn’t have access as yet to videotape, but we asked USIA to make kinescopes of a number of the Sunday talk shows and of the ads that would be used in the congressional campaigns. We had about 20 journalists in attendance for two days, with a mix of speakers and films, and even the leftist press came. We had good relations with all elements of the press.

Q: How about the Belgian communist party How did we view it and deal with it or not deal with it?

ZUCKERMAN: The Belgian communist party was almost invisible.
Q: It wasn’t like the 27% or something in France?

ZUCKERMAN: Oh no, because there were strong socialist parties on both sides of the language divide. There was a Flemish socialist party and a Walloon socialist party. They were social democrats, social Christians, a Catholic party. They pretty much soaked up the energies of the left. The problem was that Belgium had this language problem, and it was by far and away the greatest focus of political energies. It wasn’t left and right; it was Dutch and French.

Q: Well did you find was it kind of almost the way it was in Canada where you had to make sure that you touch both bases on everything you did?

ZUCKERMAN: Sure.

Q: How about your employees?

ZUCKERMAN: They were very mixed, but you know, many Flemish names belong to French speakers and French names belong to Dutch speakers. Some leading French language TV journalists had Flemish names, like Henri Francois van Aal or Luc Vendeweghe. And the reverse was true in the Flemish language TV. There was a great deal of hypocrisy involved. The extremes got people stirred up. I think it eventually colored the entire political spectrum. It was tearing things apart. Neighborhoods were torn apart. This neighborhood would have to be Flemish and that neighborhood would have to be French. And some of the conflict arose not just out of language per se, but because there was apparently more collaboration on the Flemish side with the Germans during the war than by the French speakers, although I believe there were Belgian Nazis of both communities who formed units to fight on the side of the Germans on the eastern front. But the language battle was a fight in which we had no dog, yet it was a huge distraction. The real battleground for us was television because RTB, the French language television, produced the most effective anti-American content, although we also had friends in both their documentary and news divisions of RTB. The Flemish language television was far more pro-American; in fact much of their programming was American sitcoms in English with Flemish subtitles. Their news programs were generally professional and straightforward, as, for that matter, was true of the RTB newscasts. It was the occasional documentary in the hands of one of the firebrands that gave us problems, far more so, than any of the political parties.

Q: Was that driven by France too? Or was that local, I mean...

ZUCKERMAN: Home grown.

Q: Home grown.

ZUCKERMAN: Yes, it was more driven, surprisingly, by lingering anti-German feelings. The leading anti-American TV film maker was the son of Jewish refugees, who was motivated by his hostility to the American re-arming of Germany.

Q: Was there any competition there with the Soviets?
ZUCKERMAN: A little, but of not real consequence. I was once invited to a Soviet cocktail party and went with Henri Francois van Aal. It was the strangest reception I’ve ever attended. There were these security goons around the edges of the room. They could have had signs on their heads saying KGB. Van Aal picked it up immediately There were some Russian press and Embassy people who were being watched closely by the goons, who held glasses from which they never drank. The host was the Soviet press attaché, a rather decent man, who was clearly embarrassed. The Soviets tried to influence the press by appealing to the Belgian spirit of fairness, since we obviously had a lot more influence. And strangely the Cubans apparently were active, but didn’t seem to have much success at all. They were out of their familiar water.

Q: Well what happened. I mean did it have any effect on your work or anything in September of '68 when the Soviets and others in the Warsaw Pact went into Czechoslovakia?

ZUCKERMAN: Oh yes. Probably the most successful political film that USIA ever made was a film called Czechoslovakia 1968. It came out the following year. It was wordless. It was a mixed series of slides and film showing the history of Czechoslovakia from the birth of the nation, the pre-war years, the crush of Hitler’s boot, the joy of the liberation, the re-birth of life, the Communization, the Czech Spring and then, finally, the entry of the Soviet tanks. It was one of the few films that we produced that we were able to place on Belgian television. The Czechoslovakian episode was devastating, a devastating black eye for the Soviets. Reaction to it was as bad or even worse than Belgian reaction to our involvement in Vietnam because it was closer to home.

Q: What about, you are thinking about this. This is the time after the '68 invasion of Czechoslovakia. An awful lot of the “intellectuals” in France peeled off from the Soviet cause. Was there an equivalent intellectual group in Belgium and if there was, how did you deal with them?

ZUCKERMAN: The Belgian Communist party was such a non-entity that no one cared. Belgian Socialists were not at all pro Soviet. I think the Khrushchev revelations of the Stalin era had more to do with the loss of any remaining illusions about the Soviet Union than the Czech fiasco. It didn’t take Czechoslovakia to do that but it was obviously an embarrassment. We didn’t have to exploit it; the Belgians did a good enough job.

Q: In Belgium they didn’t have the same powerful intellectual group that they did in France.

ZUCKERMAN: There were of course people in the universities, and commentators in the press and well known writers who were leftists. But I just don’t think they had the institutional framework that made a pro Soviet point of view meaningful in Belgium. There were some of them in influential roles, but there never was a feeling that Belgium was ripe for subversion.

WILLIAM HARRISON MARSH
Political Officer
Brussels (1968-1972)

Q: Who were the ambassadors? This is ’68 to ’72.

MARSH: Well, we had six, seven months of a career man whose name escapes me right now, but he was succeeded by John Eisenhower, son of the President, and then succeeded by... isn’t this awful, I’m drawing some blanks here. I can see him now...

It was the beginning, in 1968, of a very intense phase of community conflict in Belgium between the Dutch speakers, or Flemings, and the French speakers, both those of Brussels and of Wallonia. What had happened was that it literally cut the University of Louvain in half. Every other library book was sent to the new French faculties of the university established about fifteen miles away from the original university. There was interest because there was concern that Belgium itself might split into pieces and that NATO would be harmed at a time when NATO was moving up from Paris, you’ll recall, because De Gaulle had handed them their walking papers.

So there was some interest, but not a great deal. But I think when you go from Vietnam to Belgium you are going from excessive U.S. interest in a place, to virtually no interest in a place. It was really like being put on starvation rations after a banquet, as it were.

Q: What does the internal political affairs officer in an embassy do? Who were you talking with?

MARSH: I talked with political party people for the most part, and parliamentarians. Those were my contacts. After all we did have a Labor attaché and a great percentage of Belgians are members of trade unions, probably about two thirds of the working population belongs to unions. So that he would look after that sort of thing, but I would look after parliamentarians. Belgians I found very accessible. The only thing was that at 37 and a second secretary, there was a general assumption that I was like those 38-40 year old Soviet second secretaries, who were clearly KGB. Because after all, why would someone 37 be a second secretary?

Q: You were going out to see... these were not government officials, these were politicians, and you were going out of the embassy to see them at party headquarters, or to have lunch?

MARSH: That is so, but many of them were members of Parliament, as well. I knew Ministers and that sort of thing. In those days I wasn’t supposed to see Ministers, but on the other hand they didn’t stop me from seeing politicians when they became Ministers. Also, I was supposed to identify for the future the coming politicians of that day.

Remember 1968 was a year of incredible turmoil in Europe what with the students riots in Paris....
Q: Absolutely.

MARSH: …explosions all over the rest of Europe. When people saw 1968 on the wall calendar, somehow the numbers changed into 1848 and expected revolution to be resulting from it.

Q: Even in Belgium there was a certain amount of turmoil.

MARSH: Absolutely. A great deal, a very great deal.

Q: Did you get involved with youth movements and youth organizations?

MARSH: Well, I did, as a matter of fact. There was of course a great conference in 1969 with representatives from the Department coming out with those of us from European embassies. People like Roz Ridgway coming over and Sandy Vogelgesang and other people and we all met in Bonn for a conference on youth affairs.

Q: Roz Ridgway and Sandy Vogelgesang what were they, were they in the Department?

MARSH: No, they were in the field, in Europe.

Q: Your counterparts?

MARSH: I’m saying that people were coming from all over to be addressed by these people from the Department. They were telling us that not only were we to put a great deal of attention to the coverage of youth affairs, but by youth affairs they meant high schoolers, as well as university people. They wanted to know what to expect in coming years.

Q: How did you do that? How does a 37-year-old second secretary reach out to high school students?

MARSH: Well, we couldn’t do it, of course we couldn’t do it. We couldn’t do it for the simple reason that we were too few in number and had too many things to do for that sort of thing. So it was just another time when we listened to people from State telling us the things they were saying because the real audience was back at home in the Department and White House and so forth, not the faces in front of them. And we listened to them…yes, right, sure…and none of us had the slightest intention of going to high school number one to go and snoop on what high schoolers were thinking about. We also thought that high schoolers weren’t entitled to political opinions, you had to be older.

Q: Let me take a flyer at this in another way. You are sitting in an embassy and you are trying to be in touch with and get to know youth leaders in Belgium. For example you would read in the daily papers that there had been a rally addressed by three or four different people. Might that for example give you a lead where you felt that you could call up one of these student spokesmen and ask if you could come around and talk with them a bit more about their views?
MARSH: No, it did not. Why, because there are some phony precepts at work here. And one of them is that one can ingratiate oneself across an ocean with people far younger than one and with entirely different notions and so forth and that somehow a trusting relationship will work out between generations, as it were. No, it simply doesn’t work.

In the first place the very high profile and visibility of American diplomats is such that they can’t just wander among the population, speak to people as they will. Not normally. Not usually.

Q: In this case you would be wandering around a university campus.

MARSH: Well, at that time, too, the Vietnam War is still on. My wife and I had been in a Rome hotel in ’65, when we were going around the world, when a huge, huge parade went down the Via Cavour, one of the main streets of Rome, and the chant is “U.S.-SS... U.S.-SS.” In other words, that the United States was the equivalent of the Nazi hordes.

Q: This is a little bit analogous to the difficulty that you might have had at Berkeley. That is to say that spokesmen for youth organizations and university student organizations in Belgium didn’t want to talk with you, you were the imperialist enemy.

MARSH: If they wanted to talk with us what they wanted to do was wag their heads and fingers at us. To condemn us and tell us in highly idealistic terms what we ought to do hither, thither and yon taking into account to no extent the United States’ responsibility for maintaining the peace of the world at that time. So the talk of high school and university students at that time was endless because talk was cheap. They could give us a lot of it and it was founded on nothingness except rather incredible notions.

I remember once at Scripps when a young man got up from Berkeley and said to me I had a lot of experience in Vietnam and I was telling them what was based on that experience but that my experience probably blinded me to reality. And thus, they, who had never been there, were probably better able to understand what was going on than I. I said that he had just condemned the academic and scholastic method totally and disproved everything that there was to learning.

Q: Bill, let me push you a little further on this. I assume that in the embassy in Brussels, as there are in many American embassies around the world, there was a USIS office with public affairs officers, cultural affairs officers, and press officers. The cultural affairs people would of course be in touch with universities and with people who wanted to use the USIS library. Was it possible, for example, to cooperate with USIS in sort of jointly reaching out to young people in Belgium and getting a better feeling of what sort of the average, the normal young person or student in Belgium was thinking about?

MARSH: No. My experience with USIS over many, many years has been one of continual surprise, on my part, over the narrowness with which these people in USIA have designed and described their jobs. So that sort of taking the initiative, that kind of ecumenism, no, I haven’t found that. I’ve found that instead if we wanted to get that sort of thing done we in the Political Section had to do it ourselves. There were exceptions, of course, but they were very, very rare. The Cultural Affairs people, for example, often it seemed to me, wanted to stay as far away from
anything with political content to it as humanly possible. And if you couldn’t hang it on a wall or listen to it perform they were not about to take it up, partly because they did not want to discourage their clientele. I can understand that.

What I have been distressed at over the years is the way we have eroded our staff within State who are to carry out these essential political tasks, not really that our brethren in other agencies don’t help us do that sort of work. One thing about contact work. It takes an enormous amount of energy and it takes an enormous amount of time and it takes a tremendous amount of probably damn-fool dedication. I say damn-fool dedication because it means going beyond. It means working weekends. It means taking on additional duties. What it does by no means mean is going home at 5 o’clock.

Q: Okay, all right, let’s explore in another direction. You worked in the American embassy in Brussels for four years. What other tasks was the Department of State or the United States government giving to the country team in Brussels? What were some of the objectives that you were being asked to meet in terms of promoting U.S. policy goals in this Western European country?

MARSH: It seems to me that the instructions and the definitions were more to be found in the breach than in the promise. In many ways we were there essentially to keep a lid on things, to be of some sort of use. But Washington, preoccupied with pressing questions of national security, was not terribly concerned about what might or might not be going on in Belgium. In particular the Department was not staffed to deal with possibilities and opportunities that might arise. In other words, there was so much management of exceptions and by exceptions in the Department, and particularly crisis management, that dealing with Belgium was just not on anybody’s list of priorities.

Q: What I’m probing for, what I’m asking for, what I’m pulling you towards is a description of how a relatively large American embassy like the one in Brussels, where you have an experienced deputy chief of mission and an experienced political counselor and economic counselor. These are the officers who are really running the embassy and directing and motivating the staff. In terms of your job as the internal political affairs officer, what kinds of things were they asking you to get into?

MARSH: I had become an FSO-4 on a scale of eight in 1967. They were giving me lots of CODELs to deal with. They were giving me lots of special papers, briefing papers and so forth to write. In other words the same sort of thing that I had been doing in the Vietnam Working Group, that I had been doing to a lesser extent but still doing in Saigon.

Q: Were you having fun? Were you having a good time? I would think that one of the things you would do a fair amount of as the internal political officer is to travel around the country, talk with provincial politicians, talk with municipal people.

MARSH: Yes, that’s so, and it’s a fascinating country to visit. There was a payoff later, when we reached 1984, I will tell you there was a payoff for the public interest in what I had been doing. At this point, frankly, what I want to deplore is that we have cut positions so rigorously all
around the world that we don’t have enough people who have the right talent and the right dedication to do this kind of contact work. To lay the tracks, as it were, so that the train can operate in years to come.

Q: When you went around were you using an embassy car or were you using your own car or were you taking public transportation?

MARSH: I never had an embassy car. The only time I ever had an embassy car until I became, later, a DCM and later chief of mission and had a car was in Saigon. We had jeeps in Saigon and I noticed that over the weekend sometime 200 miles had been put on these jeeps. I found out that the Foreign Service Nationals were using them and so I said the heck with that and handed them out, the four jeeps to people, and we drove ourselves around the place.

Q: Did you get per diem?

MARSH: Sometimes, if you were going to a provincial place.

Q: Sometimes. Belgium is small enough, I guess.

MARSH: It’s the size, all told, of Maryland.

Q: Yes. You could leave your home in the morning and visit one or two provinces and be back for dinner.

MARSH: That’s true, but, you know, he who is absent very much from the halls of an embassy is pretty soon disregarded. You have to be around to know what’s going on, and to participate in office politics is a very important thing if you are going to protect your job and, in fact, enhance it. And another thing is that the demands made by political appointees, as ambassadors, are often very great indeed in terms of personal service of all kinds.

Q: Not just CODELS.

MARSH: Oh, no. For example it so happened that a remote ancestor of mine had been Lincoln’s telegrapher, and wrote a book called Telegraphing in Battle. John S. D. Eisenhower, was a military historian, and as soon as I happened to mention this book, why, his eyes lighted up. I became an entirely different person. He wanted to talk military history. I had read a great deal of military history and every time that I was duty officer he would always say let’s jump in an embassy car and visit Verdun or something of that sort.

I had to talk him out of that all the time.

Again, one of the things the Department doesn’t do with political appointees, it really doesn’t give them very much of a foretaste of what their lives are going to be like. It doesn’t tell people, for example, that as chief of mission they are going to have to read more than they have ever read before in their lives. Many businessmen coming in have no experience of reading fifty pages of cable a day.
Q: Isn’t there an ambassador’s school now?

MARSH: Pardon my laughter. Let’s move on.

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GERALD HELMAN
Political Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1968-1973)

Gerald B. Helman was born in Michigan in 1932. He received a B.A. and an L.L.B from the University of Michigan and was a member of the Michigan Bar. After entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he was posted in Milan, Vienna, Barbados, Brussels and Geneva. Mr. Helman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 8, 2001.

Q: We’re going back to 1968 and you’re going off to USNATO. What was USNATO?

HELMAN: It’s the United States Mission to NATO. That is the Mission that represents the United States on the North Atlantic Council; it then was headed by a Permanent Representative with the rank of ambassador, and Harlan Cleveland was the ambassador at the time. It was still under Lyndon Johnson. This was in the summer, early fall of ’68 when I went over there. I knew Harlan Cleveland, he asked for me for that job in his political section. When I first knew Harlan Cleveland he was Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs while I was in UNP. I’d worked with him and we got along reasonably well. He went to the mission to NATO when it was in Paris and he was the U.S. ambassador who made the trek from Paris to Brussels when de Gaulle decided he didn’t want NATO headquarters in Paris anymore. I joined USNATO a few months after it migrated to Brussels, arriving in November, 1968.

Q: You were in USNATO from ’68 to when?

HELMAN: ’68 to ’73; it was a long tour. It was a double tour.

Q: It would be interesting. I mean being the new boy on the block in NATO just after they’ve made the move. Was there a feeling of resentment against the French? How would you say the attitude was at that particular point?

HELMAN: I think by the time I got there they had absorbed it as a “fait accompli.” The French relationship to NATO always made them the odd man out because while they participated in the political activities of the North Atlantic Council, they did not participate in the integrated military structure which was at NATO’s heart. There were sidebar arrangements which allowed some coordination in military activity and planning with the French, but generally the military work of NATO was conducted without the French, and France, on the political side, always had its own particular approach to issues and events. Same thing was true when I think NATO was in Paris. I don’t know what it’s like now but it probably has not changed dramatically.
Q: Were the effects of May and June of '68 in France - these were the months of student rebellion and all of this which eventually had de Gaulle leaving the government. Were these having any particular repercussions? Were the French rethinking or was there any thought that they might reintegrate their armed services?

HELMAN: Not really. Every now and then there was some discussion of that and some hint that the French in one area or another were willing to cooperate more extensively, but they never made the major decision to reintegrate their military forces and the other 14 NATO countries learned not to expect much change in the French position. The French always had their particular perspective on political issues and it was sometimes difficult to coordinate with France on a political level. I think the major event that had some impact on the France in NATO was not so much, at least as far as I know, the events on the streets of the '68 student rebellions, but the Soviet “pacification” of Czechoslovakia in ’68 and the subsequent formulation of the “Brezhnev doctrine.”

Q: Yes. This was August or September?

HELMAN: Yes, August or September; it was just about the time I arrived. I jumped right into the middle of it. It was a stunning event as far as NATO was concerned. It triggered a lot of the consultations and discussions and planning that NATO was designed to be the forum for. I wasn’t involved; I was really very much at the beginning of the learning curve. But there were a lot of political discussions going on, and certainly military discussions, and I learned a lot about the process of trying to integrate the political and the military. It was a time of substantial policy trauma for the French. Of course this was a graphic demonstration that the French aim for a roaring détente with the Soviet Union - was hardly matched by the Soviets when the discipline of its bloc was at stake.

Q: You arrived at a time, looking back on it there must’ve been sort of a significant change of mindset within NATO. The French having shown that they were vulnerable internally with this student thing, at least, and also, particularly with the Soviets, showing they were not a benign pussycat letting developments happen within the bloc. They weren’t going to allow any splintering off in the bloc at that point.

HELMAN: It’s the good old Brezhnev Doctrine.

Q: In a way did you see almost a revitalization of NATO or something? I mean looking and saying, this is a serious thing, and that.

HELMAN: It’s hard to say. It could be described as resulting in a revitalization but don’t forget there was a third, and perhaps most important factor, which led to a lot of perturbations in the Alliance. The United States was in the middle of its own trauma with the Vietnam War, where a lot of U.S. military resources were diverted as far as the Europeans were concerned and diminished the strength of the U.S. as a European land power. It took years for US military strength to recover in Europe in the aftermath of Vietnam. And the United States was going through a very rough electoral period in which you had Richard Nixon running against Hubert
Humphrey, if you recall, and the violence in the streets of Chicago during the Democratic political convention, and the sweep of the civil rights movement. It was scary for Europe; the Europeans had no better idea of where all of this was heading then we Americans. It was a time of very substantial trauma all the way around.

Q: *What piece of the NATO pie did you have?*

HELMAN: I was in the Political Section. I joined the Political Section when I first was there; Ed Streator was Political Advisor. I later became deputy political adviser when Larry Eagleburger came over to replace Ed. We dealt with those issues that came before the North Atlantic Council, generally how the alliance responds to political developments such as Czechoslovakia. The Council was the forum in which to coordinate the foreign policy of member states. Internal affairs such as those in the US and France were never on the agenda; but they were certainly lively topics of discussion in the corridor. But there were lots of Council discussions of Eastern Europe and the developments in Czechoslovakia, what NATO member response would be, what programs we would develop subsequently and so on. I’m trying to recall, at that time you had Willi Brandt in Germany and Egon Barr as his “eminence grise.” I got to know Barr subsequently fairly well. He was very influential and very smart and arguably the architect of Germany’s Ostpolitik.

*Q: Was there concern there about Brandt and the Ostpolitik (Soviet bloc eastern policies), or had that faded after the Czech business?*

HELMAN: No, no, no. This to be said, there was a determination on the part of the Germans to sustain an Ostpolitik and they did sustain it in years to come. There was a fairly substantial discussion within NATO about Ostpolitik. The Germans used the Council to both inform and coordinate Germany’s pursuit of that policy. There was an unwillingness to discard the détente concepts which were in fact part of the Ostpolitik. The ideas of a conference on security and cooperation in Europe and MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions), these were all themes that were constantly before the Council and were further developed and pressed in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia - in fact under the Nixon administration which came to power shortly after I joined USNATO.

*Q: Was there any concern within NATO ranks, including within our own mission, about the ascension of Nixon to be president at the time?*

HELMAN: Oh, yes. Some of us in the mission had some reservations about Nixon but we were all Foreign Service officers and we did our jobs, and did them I think reasonably well. In the corridor people would ask about Nixon and Humphrey and so on. You’d chat with them, but certainly not as a formal matter. They knew the U.S. was a democracy; they also understood the U.S. was going through considerable trauma at the time. We had our own riots in the streets, and demonstrations; we had Vietnam on our back. Vietnam,

*Q: Was the weakening of the American military presence discussed?*

HELMAN: In an indirect way, yes. It was in terms of how one met one’s commitments to the
integrated military structure of NATO to maintain one’s strength and readiness and so on. But it was never addressed - in my recollection- in terms of Vietnam. Part of the reason is that the Europeans themselves were always a bit behind in meeting their commitments. Still are. (laughs)

Q: I was going to say.

HELMAN: I think it’s that they were hardly in any position to criticize us. But of course they were worried when we couldn’t maintain the level necessary to confront the Russians, should they decide to move militarily, and there was always apprehension in Europe that a weakness in conventional strength would prompt Soviet use of greater military pressure on the Europeans to which our response would be to emphasize nuclear retaliation and that would’ve been of course a very unhappy situation in Europe. No one wanted to see it happen.

Q: As a political officer, how did you operate? What were you doing?

HELMAN: I was participating, one might say in a dialogue between USNATO and the other members of NATO and NATO’s professional staff on the one hand, and the State and Defense Departments also, because the U.S. ambassador to NATO, the permanent representative, essentially worked both for the secretary of state and the secretary of defense. He really worked for the President, but the U.S. ambassador to France, let’s say, took his instructions from the secretary of state, but the U.S. ambassador to NATO, given the particular nature of that institution, had to be able to talk to both SECDEF and the SECSSTATE. So one participated in that dialogue; we had our own policy recommendations to provide, some of which were really quite thorough and quite extensive. This was both under Harlan Cleveland, staunch Democrat, and under Ambassador Kennedy - he was a banker from Chicago, as I recall. He lasted about a year or so. No big deal. But he worked at the job.

The North Atlantic Council used to meet probably once a week and then there were the Council’s political committee, the political-military committee. They would each publish an agenda for which we had to prepare. I might have to prepare a briefing memo plus a statement for the Ambassador in the Council, meet in advance with other delegation members to discuss where we might want to end up on particular issues, and ferret out problems. We would send back fairly extensive reports on Council meetings, with comments, analysis and recommendations.

There were particular studies that were often conducted under either a political committee or the full North Atlantic Council, keeping track of what’s happening, for example in Czechoslovakia, and how the Allies should respond, if at all. We tried to develop a general meeting of the minds so that each ally could feel comfortable that all the allies, on a political level at least, were moving ahead in a fairly - not so much a coordinated way, but working off the same script, the same outlook. We also worked closely with NATO’s international staff whose members helped prepare drafts, chaired committees, did research, kept the files and often served as the organization’s institutional memory.

Q: Did you develop the feeling that the center of power, as you might say in foreign affairs, had moved from the State Department to the National Security Council under Kissinger, or not?
HELMAN: Very definitely. Of course we always got our instructions from the same sources, but one was never deceived where the real authority lay. We read the newspapers too - read the New York Times and the Washington Post and so on - and we understood that Secretary Rogers was not the inside force - Henry Kissinger was - and a lot of the ideas on European strategy, détente, or initiatives in NATO, came from the White House and Kissinger, particularly when Kissinger started developing his own back channels to NATO governments, for example - to Germany in particular. Egon Barr was the Advisor to Chancellor Brandt and was the great strategist of the time and the guru of Germany’s Ostpolitik. He was to Brandt as Hal Sonnenfeldt was to Kissinger. We used to joke that Hal was “Kissinger’s Kissinger.”

Q: I’ve finished interviewing Hal Sonnenfeldt.

HELMAN: Well, I’m sure he’d have a lot to say. By the way, his son is an attorney specializing in telecommunications. Very qualified. So it’s a small world.

But sometimes we would hear that Kissinger would be conducting discussions by backchannel; for example with Barr. We would never find out what was said and done between the two through our own channels, so what we would do was go to the German Delegation, explain the situation (they seemed to know in advance) and ask for their account of the Kissinger-Barr discussions). They cooperated.

Q: Or what they knew. (laughs)

HELMAN: Yes. My impression was there was a good deal more discipline, structure, within their service than there was often in ours. I did not have much to do with Secretary Rogers at the time; I got to know him quite well later on in the early ‘80s when he was back in law practice. Extraordinarily decent man. He put up with a lot.

Q: I was just going to say he was an extraordinarily decent man with Nixon and Kissinger, who one couldn’t describe in those terms.

HELMAN: Well, they were in charge of American foreign and security policy. There was no question about it. The bureaucracy of the Foreign Service, State Department, I suppose to some extent the Defense Department had to accommodate themselves to those realities.

Q: Well, did you find any disquiet within NATO ranks or the people you were talking to, by the fact that it became obvious that Kissinger was having secret meetings in the Kremlin and going behind places? I mean this sort of thing. I mean there’s nothing diplomats hate more than stuff going on that they don’t know about.

HELMAN: Yes, exactly. And there was a lot of concern, curiosity, puzzlement. Everybody acknowledged the U.S. was indisputably the leader of the alliance. NATO, on the political level certainly, was primarily a forum for consultation, for exchange of views, for exchange of information, and coordination of policy and action. A forum where would, through mutual understanding of what the objectives were, coordinate foreign policies and activities on matters
of common concern. And basically our ability to consult and work with our allies was limited because we didn’t know what our own leadership was doing and saying back channel. Sometimes our instructions on what to say about developing events were available to our allies in the news - the New York Times or Le Monde or the International Herald Tribune or something like that. But they were as dazzled by Kissinger as everyone else was. In addition, they saw him as a “European” who was finally imparting some sophistication our foreign policy.

Q: Was there a concern at that time that perhaps there could be the devil’s bargain in Ostpolitik, on the German side, that if Germany was united and became neutralized, this would really leave a tremendous hole in the alliance? Was this something that people were concerned about or was this just one of those things that just wasn’t going to happen?

HELMAN: I think from the standpoint of the United States, one of the things that a Foreign Service officer dealing in NATO affairs learned very quickly is that our relationship with Germany, and Germany’s future, and how we related, were absolutely central to our European and larger strategic posture. Germany was the heart of Europe; it was the strategic prize to be retained and to be extended. Everybody gave lip service to reunification; nobody really expected it to happen in our lifetimes. But Germany was all important and a lot of the strategy and politics of the NATO alliance centered around Germany - much more so than France, much more so than the United Kingdom.

The possibility of German neutralization as a price for reunification was always out there on the periphery. It arose in the context of the Austrian State Treaty back in the ‘50s when, as I recall, Khrushchev dangled a bargain: a reunified Germany in exchange for German neutrality. Some Germans were intrigued. One of the potential risks of Ostpolitik was always that it would come at the price of German neutrality and thus Germany’s loss to NATO. So the whole process of Ostpolitik and the negotiations that subsequently took place were extremely important to everyone conscious of the downside but willing to work with this strongly maintained German policy.

Jock Dean was, as I recall, our political counselor in the mid-‘70s in Bonn. I thought he did an absolutely brilliant job of tracking what was happening. I think by that time I probably had left USNATO and I was deputy director of NATO affairs back in the Department. So Germany was always a major topic and central player. The German delegation to NATO was always a strong one. The U.S. mission itself was always a strong one and I think that probably was one of the most impressive and intimidating aspects of being in USNATO: you were challenged by top-drawer people in your own Mission.

Q: Who were some of the people then?

HELMAN: Well, when I was there this was going into the Nixon years. Bob Ellsworth and then Don Rumsfeld were my ambassadors for a while there. David Bruce followed, but by then I was in NATO affairs in the Department. Larry Eagleburger was political adviser and I was his deputy. Dave Anderson, later ambassador to Yugoslavia and Tom Niles who was ambassador to Germany and Greece were staffers. Ray Garthoff was on the Mission’s pol-mil side as was Jim Goodby for a while...
Q: It’s interesting, the old Yugoslav hands; both Larry and Tom Niles and David Anderson were under me as vice consuls in the consular section in Belgrade and I took Serbian with Larry Eagleburger. (laughs)

HELMAN: Well, Larry pulled these guys together, you know, and took care of them.

Q: He had his coterie.

HELMAN: They were superb. Of course they went on to establish highly distinguished careers. I’m sure I’ll pull up more names. George Vest was DCM, so you were forced to operate at your best all the time.

Q: One of the things I find interesting is, and in a way almost continues to be, that here as you say Germany was central, not just geographically but in power too - industrial might, population, military, the whole thing - and yet it almost seems to have played a stealth role in foreign affairs. I mean you don’t find a heavy German hand where you find a very heavy French hand. And I’ve heard some people say that the Germans let the French do the heavy lifting and in a way work with the French, but keep a little behind them or something. Did you have any feel of that?

HELMAN: I’m not sure that was true in my experience in USNATO since the French weren’t part of the military structure. Germany was a very important actor in the military structure of NATO which provided an organic connection to US strategic strength. France couldn’t come close to matching this. The French didn’t pursue anything as sophisticated as Germany’s Ostpolitik, although they supported it and the Germans as far as I am aware didn’t seek any advance clearances from the French. The French were the principal proponents of détente and they presented a strong rationale for détente. But the Germans always understood that fundamentally the success of an Ostpolitik, or MBFR, of a CSCE, indeed, of fundamental security, depended upon the US and Alliance military strength and commitment.

Q: This is an interesting thing because the CSCE, which later became the OSC, it became actually...

HELMAN: It became a very important vehicle for the eventual dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet empire.

Q: Unraveling. You know I’m trying to pick up sort of the attitude there. When you got there was this something that...when did this start?

HELMAN: I’m trying to think. My recollection is it probably started in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia.

Q: I would imagine. It would make sense because it started picking up during the Nixon time. I guess the idea being let’s try to find a way to calm things down within Europe.
HELMAN: There was some of it, there was also, on our part, a desire to use it as - one might say a political propaganda weapon - that is to set the bar fairly high in terms of liberalizing actions such as free flow of information and other concepts such as that, speculating that these are concepts that the Soviet Union and its allies could not accept. And if they did, then they would be working with a set of principles and practices that were fundamentally contrary to their own political structure. These principles and the wording used were familiar to a large extent from prior UN practice. The Eastern Europeans knew that. I was one of the few on the US side that knew it - an example of where my experience with the UN paid off in NATO. The dynamic which this started up, which was understood by the Europeans and even many Eastern Europeans better than we understood it at the time, was intensely subversive to Soviet hegemony. The whole concept of CSCE and the dialogue that was initiated under that general umbrella increasingly provided the liberal elements in Eastern Europe with a device to achieve ever more wiggle room for liberalizing their civic life and easing the Soviet’s heavy hand. It gave them a way of achieving a certain greater margin of flexibility in the conduct of their policies and internal affairs. I think the fair evidence is that over time - this is over time during the ’70s - it did have the effect of considerably loosening some of the strictures internally within the East Bloc, and I think the Germans and the French and some of the other Europeans saw this rather more clearly than we did. Have you talked to George Vest at all?

Q: I’ve talked to George.

HELMAN: George did a brilliant job of managing the CSCE process.

Q: You’re talking too about how Henry Kissinger sort of undercut him while he was there.

HELMAN: Oh, is that right? (laughs)

Q: You’re shocked! (laughs)

HELMAN: Nothing every really shocked George. I used to ride home with him from work most days…

Q: George Vest was saying how Kissinger would denigrate the negotiations that were going on for the OSCE to the Soviet ambassador, Dobrynin, in these private meetings, would then inform his colleagues in East Germany, or they would be informed and they would inform somebody like the Swedes or something. And George was saying somebody would come up from one of our friendly delegations and say, “What’s this about your secretary of state,” or at that point national security adviser, “not paying much attention to…” I mean it was this type of thing. Rather frustrating. CSCE, the initials keep changing. It was Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

HELMAN: The initials kept changing but the concept was pretty much the same.

Q: The OSC later on. It’s become an integral part of the whole détente process.

HELMAN: There were ten years of discussions roughly before the Helsinki meetings. Maybe not
quite ten years but there was a tidal stream that gradually developed in the course of the ‘70s, leading to the CSCE.

Q: The other theme that was going on was the Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces.

HELMAN: MBFR, yes.

Q: How was that viewed? Was that viewed as going to happen or was it a good idea to have talks going anyway?

HELMAN: You had to look at it from two different perspectives. This was a subject that the Europeans approached with a certain amount of hope and a certain amount of trepidation. They certainly didn’t want to see a reduction of U.S. capabilities in Europe; at that same time, from the standpoint of their own public opinion, the idea of reducing the perceived conventional threat to Europe was attractive. Europeans in those days well recalled what damage conventional war could do.

I should add I was not actively involved in the discussions of MBFR, but it was like the CSCE - it was a concept which one found it both difficult to support and to oppose at the same time. We played it both for the political advantage that one gained through a conceptually meritorious arms control concept, and yet develop over time a policy dealing with the actual reductions which was far more hard-nosed. In the end a lot of these issues conjoined. The whole debate back in the ’80s, the reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe, was in a sense a resurrection of the BFR debate and involved some of the same concerns and considerations. But again this was not something had any responsibility for.

Q: Well, during the ’68 to ’73 period while you were in USNATO, on the political discussions, were the French fully recognized - the fact that they weren’t military members, does this mean that in a way they were half in and half out?

HELMAN: Oh, I think the French were recognized for their particular position within NATO. They certainly didn’t want to abandon that position in NATO; this would simply have left be the whole European security structure to the tender mercies of the United States and to some extent to the untrustworthy motives of Germany. France didn’t want NATO to become at its heart simply a U.S.-German alliance. At the same time they recognized the value of NATO, I think, as a vehicle for U.S. participation in European affairs - which in part meant making sure that Germany was a force in Europe that the other Europeans could live comfortably with. We played that role very consciously. Some Germans recognized and I think valued it as well.

At the same time within NATO, members didn’t worry much about the French because they couldn’t help you much very often; they occasionally came up with a good idea - and they really were, except for the fact that things were done by consensus and this sometimes caused trouble every half year when we were drafting the communiqué that normally would close a NATO ministerial meeting. Twice a year the North Atlantic Council met at the level of foreign minister. And you always had your communiqué and its drafting gave the French an opportunity to negotiate the nuances and changes they considered would tilt it in their direction. But day to day
they didn’t contribute an awful lot; they didn’t hinder an awful lot.

I was struck by the fact that they sent really first-rate people on the political side, in terms of their own Foreign Service. You had Francois de la Rose as ambassador there for a while; you had - I’m trying to think of his name; he was DCM under de la Rose. He was later the French ambassador in Washington. So they sent good people. It was a small delegation, as I recall, but then most French missions tend to be on the small side anyway.

Q: In our delegation, speaking of that, I’ve talked to people who’ve served on some delegations and say it’s almost embarrassing because sometimes we send rather large delegations and often these are not unified delegations; half the delegations are sort of spying on each other to find out - you know, we’re talking about State and Defense and maybe Treasury or something like this. Did you find that you had this type...particularly I would imagine Defense would be in there.

HELMAN: You did have some conflicts. I think that problem was not of any great concern when it came to the permanent delegation to NATO. That is, in the Political Section of the U.S. Mission to NATO and the Political-Military Section we were a part of the same team; it was like an embassy and you did the bidding of your boss who happened to be the ambassador. And you paid attention to the DCM who, when it’s George Vest, you paid attention to him anyway. And Larry Eagleburger could be relied upon to manage the whole process.

There was separate reporting to DOD on the part of some of the military members of the U.S. Mission. The situation was different when there was a foreign ministers’ meeting, a ministerial meeting, when the delegation was larger but manageable, or when it dealt with a specific issue on something difficult and contentious, such as MBFR. Most often on arms control issues, the confrontations and competing interests in Washington were carried over into the delegation. In fact, I think the problem that you mention was found perhaps more frequently in the UN context or bilateral arms control negotiations where I’ve had some experience as well. We would send a delegation, let’s say to an outer-space conference, or to a conference on the World Health Organization (WHO). There were lots of competing interests, including from the private sector. The phenomenon was often most acutely reflected in some of the large arms control conferences. It made it very difficult for an inexperienced head of delegation to manage things. I have seen discord result in competing positions being conveyed to other delegations. Such a breakdown of discipline is an example of how very difficult managing a delegation could be. There are ways of dealing with it if you know what your doing, but it’s tough.

Q: We’ve looked at the French and the Germans, how about the British? How did you find them during this time?

HELMAN: The British were good solid members; we always maintained a very good dialogue with them. As a matter of fact, I think we had fairly good relations with most of the delegations to NATO; we were close to the Germans. I’d say the Germans and the Brits were the ones who had the strongest delegations and those were the ones with whom we had the most dialogue, most definitely.

Q: The Italians, their temperaments are never terribly strong.
HELMAN: The strongest Italian, and one of the greatest diplomats I’ve ever met, was Manlio Brosio, who happened to be secretary general of NATO for most of the time I was there. Of course he didn’t speak for the Italian government, not directly anyway, but Brosio was superb and deserves a lot of credit for shepherding the Alliance through the very hard years of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s. With one exception, Italy never sent a strong delegation - but decent in my judgment. Brosio behind the scenes always made sure that Italy did the right thing. The exception was Rinaldo Petrignani, who subsequently was a long-time Ambassador to the U.S.

The Belgians were always strong, in part because of the personality of their perm. rep., de Staercke, who knew his country, who had been in that position for many years. He was Doyen, had almost total recall, and was utterly dedicated to the Alliance’s success. He was a strong personality. De Rose of France was a highly sophisticated diplomat and so was, interestingly, Ross Campbell, who was the Canadian perm. rep. Very smart, very direct, highly respected by all of his colleagues in NATO. He contributed in a very substantial way. Interestingly, we reestablished our acquaintance in recent years on a business level. He represented Arianespace, the French rocket launch company, in Canada. He claims he well-remembered me from NATO years. I was most flattered and prefer to believe him.

Q: Did the ministerial meetings more or less set the agendas? There would be foreign ministers and defense ministers and when they got together - did they get together, or?

HELMAN: No, separately. Every once in a while they would meet together but generally they met in different fora, each twice a year, and they had different agendas, the Foreign Ministers’ largely political, the Defense Ministers’ largely addressed issues such as force structure, command and control, infrastructure requirements, and the like. Usually the preparations for a ministerial would occupy our time for a month and a half, two months, sometimes longer, before each ministerial.

The Ministerials were where countries, members of NATO, used to present their big ideas. This was certainly true under Nixon and later when Henry Kissinger became secretary of state it was very much the forum in which new ideas were presented. So it was twice a year the centerpiece of a lot of our activities. The ministers used the NATO communiqués, as far as we were concerned, to frame the road map on specific policy matters for the Allies over the next six months until the ministers met again.

Q: Did President Nixon meet with NATO from time to time?

HELMAN: My recollection is that, while I was there, there was no NATO meeting at head of state level. Those were really quite rare in those years. Nevertheless, Nixon would address NATO issues in some of his speeches, and as I recall one of the initiatives that NATO adopted on environment - let’s see, what was the committee called? - on the challenges of modern society or something like that, which became a regular committee pulling in environmental experts and those on other issues common to industrial societies. It was a Nixon initiative, an effort on the part the administration at that time to breathe new political life and meaning into NATO. Some were a little cynical in their description of these initiatives, which some would say were designed
to divert NATO from its central theme so that Nixon and Kissinger could handle them bilaterally. Pat Moynihan, by the way, came up with the idea, and as I recall, Dick Lugar, then Mayor of Indianapolis, represented the U.S. at the Committee’s initial meeting.

Q: Was there concern within NATO that so much was going on outside the knowledge of...I mean deals with the Soviets and elsewhere. Was this a separate conversation or corridors?

HELMAN: Yes. I suppose this was a matter of constant concern prior to Nixon and post-Nixon. It’s almost built into the nature of our relationship to NATO, being, even then, a very major power and the only country in the West that could stand up to an aggressive Soviet Union. And the United States never allowed itself to be put into the position of uniformly withholding political or military action until a policy first passed through the NATO grinder. We retained a certain level of freedom of action and our allies understood that this was both desirable and inevitable. At the same time we tried to consult, that is inform and discuss some of our objectives with our allies, probably never enough to satisfy them, but probably a little more than we ever wanted to do and a good deal more than any other country similarly situated would have done. So there was a healthy and usually workable dynamic. And, of course, while not unique, it may have been a little more pronounced under Nixon; I would guess it probably was, given the nature of the president and of Henry Kissinger, but it couldn’t have been unique to Nixon’s administration.

Q: Do you or your colleagues from other countries feel that sometimes you were getting instructions from Washington that really set your teeth on edge? That sort of thing got much more political later on, I think.

HELMAN: Occasionally we were surprised by Washington but much of the time we maintained a pretty active dialogue with Washington and fed Washington a lot of policy proposals and analysis. I should add that I was, during my career, on both sides of the water. I was deputy political adviser to the U.S. Mission to NATO, and subsequently I was deputy director of RPM, which was the Department’s principal backstop for NATO. So I saw it from both angles. I would say that there was a pretty good dialogue. It was, in part, because of the dynamics of working in a multinational, multilateral institution such as NATO; and it was in part a matter of personalities, with strong and capable people.

If you had a strong mission, you had that mission probably writing its own instructions, and if you had a strong RPM, it was probably the other way around. It was a good dialogue. While I was involved with NATO affairs, the mission was very seldom surprised or shocked, maybe unhappy because we may not have always liked our instructions. Of course, if you had a strong ambassador, an aggressive ambassador such as Harlan Cleveland, Bob Ellsworth and Don Rumsfeld, if you had a strong DCM and a strong political adviser such as Larry Eagleburger, you had a powerful team and the Department, DOD and the NSC would listen. And later on, when David Bruce came along, we had a new level of authority.

Q: Sometimes I feel there’s a dynamic that when you have an administration that, particularly at the National Security Council these days, it’s possible to have almost separate little policies going on because some individuals grab the ball and there’s nobody at the top to sort of
supervise them or something. Ollie North being probably one of the worst examples, but there are other ones sometimes that…

HELMAN: My own impression is that as time has gone on, U.S. foreign policy has become increasingly fragmented into smaller power centers, each wanting to and/or in fact having an impact on foreign affairs. I don’t know that that was inevitable, but I find, looking at it from a rather uninformed vantage point right now, I find that certainly in national security policy there are independent power centers in the NSC and DOD and State and different segments of DOD, including the uniformed services, or CIA for that matter. These power centers have proliferated overseas, with their own communications facilities, and its hard to believe that our ambassadors have a clue as to what some of these agencies are doing in their countries. In foreign economic policy I doubt that State plays as significant role as before. You have the Trade Advisor, the Treasury, the NSC, Commerce and I suppose others. You now have offices within the NSC that deal with national economic policy. Environmental policy is all over the place, except State has its own assistant secretary for Oceans and Environmental Affairs and so on, but I don’t know that it plays a very strong role in setting our policies with respect to many of those issues. And now there is the growing phenomenon of the private sector organizing to influence foreign policy. The so-called NGOs - non-governmental organizations - were a familiar phenomenon in the UN context. Now they have spread into other areas, as have other more organized and better targeted corporate and private commercial and political interest groups. I know of instances in which a multinational corporation has had representatives on the delegations of three or four countries, including the U.S., at the same conference.

Q: Well, talking about the other side of the ocean, in ’73 you moved back to Washington?

HELMAN: I actually had my mid-career sabbatical, went to Princeton for a year from ’73 to ’74.

Q: What were you doing in Princeton?

HELMAN: I went to Woodrow Wilson School and I spent a year reading. I enjoyed it. (laughs)

Q: This was the period of Watergate, too, wasn’t it?

HELMAN: Yes. The whole period, I was really rather lucky to be living in Brussels, a rather calm environment, and then Princeton. Not so much because I had planned on it - we had three school-age children. And, certainly not by design, we were able to dodge some of the pressures of drugs and other activities that seemed to be overwhelming high school students in the United States.

Q: Your kids were in high school by this time?

HELMAN: Two of my children were in high school in Brussels. My older daughter completed her high school education at Princeton High and then went on to Smith; and my younger daughter completed hers at T.C. Williams in Alexandria a year behind my older daughter, and she went up to Michigan. And my son, who was a number of years younger, in time went to Yale. The point I wanted to make is that we were, in a sense, in very comfortable isolation from
a lot of the temptations and traumas that seemed to be upsetting American education at that time. There was Watergate, but I was a reader of newspapers at that time just as everybody else, particularly when I was sitting in Princeton.

Q: At Princeton did you get any feel about how the intellectual community was looking at American foreign policy and all?

HELMAN: Critically. (laughs) At that time the faculty was certainly on the liberal side of the political spectrum and with the developments over Watergate and the traumas of Vietnam, “Nixon” and “Republicans” were dirty words. I don’t recall anybody who wanted to stand up and support the administration, let alone most of its policies. The re was a certain element of envy of Kissinger on the part of the faculty; they knew him as a fellow academic and were convinced they could do a better job as National Security Advisor. To the extent that anybody was interested in listening, I could speak with some authority on European policy and certainly I was capable of justifying what we were doing in Europe. In the aftermath of Czechoslovakia, Europe looked like a rather well-managed segment of our foreign policy. The Middle East and its perturbations, captured much more attention, and of course Vietnam overwhelmed everything. As a Foreign Service officer, I was a “good guy.”

I enjoyed spending some time on subjects that didn’t have anything directly to do with foreign affairs; I figured I could do the lecturing on a lot of foreign affairs issues rather than paying attention to the professors – several of whom became good friends – and I enjoyed meeting with the students and talking to them, taking classes with them. They were certainly bright. Boy, it was a good school. I was deeply impressed by the quality of the student body. My often stated conclusion was that the decision to admit women dramatically improved the competitiveness and quality of the student body.

VLADIMIR LEHOVICH
Ambassador’s Aide, U.S. Mission to the European Economic Community
Brussels (1969-1971)

Vladimir Lehovich was born in New York in 1939 and received his Bachelor’s Degree from Harvard University 1961. He was positioned in Saigon, Brussels, Bonn and Vienna. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Lehovich on March 25, 1997.

Q: In ’69, whither?

LEHOVICH: In ’69, off to Brussels to work with the Common Market at the US Mission to the European Community.

Q: This was ’69 to when?

Q: This was your SAIS thing.

LEHOVICH: This was the price I had to pay to go to grad school for a year under an enlightened program by the State Department, which it should continue into the future, but is underfunded right now. My punishment was that I had to go and be an ambassador's aide at a very sophisticated and intelligent, rather small mission in Brussels. I did this and I do not like much being an ambassador's aide. My ambassador was a gifted man, but it's not a great job. I spent a fair amount of the first few months trying to figure out how to join the Political Section.

Q: I would have thought that being an ambassador's aide, you were moving on in the Foreign Service, and this would be- This was a great thing for a junior officer to learn their way around, but somebody who's moving into the mid-career, it gets awkward.

LEHOVICH: I thought it was awkward and I thought it was boring. It was not a terribly big mission. I don't think there was a hell of a lot to do. I eventually merged it with being a full-time member of the Political Section and moved out physically from the ambassador's environment.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

LEHOVICH: The ambassador was a gentleman called J. Robert Schaetzel. It's interesting to pause, in a sense, on what someone like Mr. Schaetzel symbolized at that time. Schaetzel, who was not a career diplomat, but had been in and out of the government for a number of years, was a true-blue, hard-core Europeanist. It was very interesting to see how strong the notion of European integration and European unification was in the United States at that time. It was the dominant idea among policy circles, policy thinkers, Council on Foreign Relations, all the folks who wrote books on foreign affairs at that time, and anything resembling a foreign affairs establishment. It was taken as self-evident. Its benefits were obvious. The United States to some degree was a cheerleader for European integration at that time.

Q: I would call it the cornerstone of American policy to keep the bloody Germans and French from going at each other.

LEHOVICH: Well, it had that underpinning. It also had evolved into a role, for example, in my mission at that time, of cheerleading, advising, and encouraging. We were encouraging a union, which was union political in the first instance. The underlying reasons for it were more political than anything else from the coal and steel community on. But by then it was becoming very strongly an economic union and was becoming very strongly a commercial and trade entity with which the US had a lot of disagreements. We were not members of it. Some at that time probably would have said, "Look, this is a body that is not of us. We're the outsiders. When we work with it, we're negotiating to a large degree against it. At the same time, when we stand back as the world's most powerful country, we're cheering it and we're pushing it." That indeed was happening. The mission was probably, on a man for man and woman for woman basis, as good a group of economic officers as one is capable of assembling, a remarkably good group. I was not one of the racehorses of that establishment. I had a very good time intellectually there. I don't think I made any particular contributions the whole time I was there.
Q: Was sort of the chicken war a factor? Could you explain what the chicken war was? I would have thought this would have been a shot across the bow of the American proponents of integration.

LEHOVICH: There were a number of trade skirmishes and wars going on at that time. There was an awful lot of lobbying and high politics on behalf of soybeans, American agricultural interests. It's no coincidence that Senator Percy of Illinois, which is a major soybean producer, was one of our constant visitors. In fact, anybody who was big in certain kinds of commodity region was very much on our list. The chicken war was indeed a war and it centered on different ways to keep chickens out of Europe, American chickens. Some of the ways of keeping them out was the finer points of how they're plucked and cleaned, and whether it's the most hygienic or the second most hygienic way of doing this. I don't want to get into whether we're talking about spin, chilled, or hot water cleaning or other things.

At that time, there was another wonderful thing, even more exciting than the chicken wars as a display of how governments make up great structures to do very simple things. The very simple thing is, I want to keep your products out of my area. The great structure I create is scientific. I get the Ph.D.'s out and I get the biochemists out. In the case of the French, one of the truly brilliant things at that time was to prove scientifically that if you drink hard liquor distilled from grape, you're doing your system something good physically. If you drink hard liquor distilled from grain, like whiskey, scotch, or bourbon, you're doing something pretty bad to your system. That fine scientific structure which the French created in that period, of course, was used to put tariff and non-tariff barriers on booze from America, from England. At that time, bourbon was very popular and beginning to be very fashionable in France. This was a good way to protect cognac and keep the other stuff out. A little like the chicken wars. A lot of that stuff going on. The story though of how one looks at European integration, economic integration in the case of the European Communities and the Common Market, political integration, the growth of a European strength in NATO, these are all recurring stories. This was a piece of it in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, but it's a long story for America.

What's really fascinating is how much of the period since World War II the United States has managed to keep a very long-term perspective on Europe. It waivers and then it gets strong and it gets weak. But it's something which has ups and downs, but continues to have strong life.

Q: Did you have the feeling in this that you, albeit carrying the briefcase of an ambassador or something, that we were part of an apparatus of the super power dealing with a bunch of local powers? I mean, this was no longer the Europe of what when we were kids we knew as the great Europe. Are we talking about a corner of the Eurasian continent now?

LEHOVICH: It's interesting, we were the super power and these were countries that had lost some of their clout. England at that time wasn't a member of the European Community, nor were a number of the other free trade area countries. But our punch and our influence with the European economic integration movement wasn't that great. It wasn't that great for a couple of simple reasons. We weren't members. We didn't have the big leverage. England wasn't a member. A lot of other people weren't members at that time. When one talked about NATO,
there was just no question. With NATO, the leverage was enormous. We were the leader. That wasn't the case with the European communities and it caused an interesting split at that time in the American community working on Europe.

There were those who sort of said that the traditional Europeanists, proponents of European economic integration, are the soft minded, are the tender hearted. The tough minded, the true thinkers, the stronger people, are the NATO people, the people who think that it's most important to strengthen NATO and not worry as much about other aspects of European integration. There was even sometimes a certain either/or quality - you can't do both at once type of quality. I wound up working on both of these things quite intensively - with the European communities for a couple of years and then for a number of years later with NATO. There always has been a bit of a rivalry in the American policy establishment. This becomes much clearer if one looks in the Department of Defense at the way various Secretaries of Defense will deal with these issues. Or someone like, for example, Robert Komer, who took over as the "NATO czar," for the Pentagon and basically liked to put down American activities with Europe that weren't NATO-centered. The logic was almost that energy spent on other things is bad because it's energy not being spent on NATO. So, a lot of cross currents there.

Q: Let's stick strictly to the Brussels time in the Mission to the European Community. What was your impression of the French and the German representation there?

LEHOVICH: They were good. The impression that I carry right now of nations there is that they really were very split. There was a Common Market commission, a commission of the European communities, which was in effect the central government, the central governing organization of the European communities. There were nationals of countries in there and there were commissioners in there. On the other hand, there were the permanent missions which were the national representatives responsible, say, to France, not to the Commission to the European communities. There was a lot of rivalry between those two. They had good diplomats there. They had some top people. The countries that always had top people, their top national figures working on these things, were the Benelux countries, particularly Belgium, and the Netherlands. In Belgium or the Netherlands, it was a fairly safe proposition that the very top people in a country in international affairs would do several things in their lifetimes. They might be foreign minister. They'd probably be prime minister as well. They would work with NATO and they would work with the European communities. That was just the way it was happening. Joseph Luns is an example of that type of person. You didn't have at that point quite the same thing with Germany, or France, and I don't think you had quite the same thing later when Britain entered. In Britain, you tended to have the elite of the foreign affairs establishment going off to NATO or going off to the United Nations. I would say that this is probably the same for the other major countries. Working actually in Brussels with the Common Market was, a lot of the times, not quite as heady. For the ministers, it was a non-stop set of visits. The Common Market at that time was really carrying to a remarkably fine point the art of making decisions all night long at the last minute, decisions which were arcane or decisions which were important (It's hard to remember which,), decisions which have to be made by midnight - which, if they aren't made by midnight, somebody physically stops a clock and then they go on to the point of exhaustion late at night or early the next morning. It's decision-making by locking people in a room and exhausting them. It's one way to do it. The survival is of the people who have the greatest ability
to stay up all night. We weren't in that particular game, but we've played that game. That's a fairly standard multilateral organization situation.

Common Market ministers, I think, dreaded their visits to Brussels for Common Market affairs and rather liked them for NATO affairs. That was an easy club. A few people did all the work and others enjoyed it.

MANUEL ABRAMS
Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to the European Economic Community
Brussels (1969-1972)

Manuel Abrams was born in Pennsylvania in 1919, and graduated from the City College of New York in 1939. His career has included postings in Frankfurt, Paris, The Hague, Rome, Brussels and Geneva. Mr. Abrams was interviewed in 1990 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: After Rome, you went to Brussels as the Deputy Chief of Mission to the US Representative to the European Community. This was in 1969 to '72. What were you doing?

ABRAMS: I was assisting in running the mission which meant all relationships between the US and the European Communities (EC). It's usually called the European Economic Community (EEC) for short but actually there were three communities involved. In addition to the Economic Community there were a group dealing with nuclear matters and the Coal-Steel Community.

The big problem that was facing the Community in 1969-72 was British entry. In addition here was the perennial issue of trade, particularly the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Earlier the British and their partners, the Scandinavians and Switzerland had tried to form a free trade area with the EC but this had failed. After much soul-searching the British applied for full membership in the Community. We were very much involved in this, probably more than we should have been but we tended to be extremely active in all matters connected with European integration.

Q: How were we involved?

ABRAMS: As a matter of fact, we were involved from the beginning. After the failure of the Free Trade Area negotiations, the British visited the United States and talked to George Ball, who was then Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. The British asked what the US thought the British should do and Mr. Ball said they ought to join the Community.

There were a number of reasons why we should have been involved, political, military as well as economic. We thought the European Community would be strengthened as a result of British membership. We also thought that the European Community would have more liberal economic policies, particularly with respect to trade, if the British were members. In particular, we thought the Community would have a much more open agricultural policy if the British were members.
We also thought that it would help to strengthen NATO. This was a period when the Cold War was moderately warm.

Q: If you got Britain and France fully involved it would act as an anchor to Germany?

ABRAMS: Yes, that always underlay our policy with respect to the Community. We wanted Germany fully anchored to the West.

We followed the negotiations between the British and the Community in great detail, on a day to day if not hour to hour basis.

Q: How was that working out. Were the negotiators running back and forth telling us what was going on?

ABRAMS: In a manner of speaking, yes.

Q: Did we ever get involved as an intermediary?

ABRAMS: No, we did not become involved in the negotiations as such. But we talked to the people in the negotiations, and we knew exactly what was going on.

Q: What difference did it make?

ABRAMS: It's a good question. I don't think it made as much difference looking back as we thought at the time. But again it's one of those activities that tend to be self-generating. Once you get started you keep doing it and it seems a good idea to keep on top of things and know exactly what's going on. But it didn't really make that much difference.

Q: But there were underlying instructions to steer things.

ABRAMS: To some extent yes. If in the course of the negotiations there would appear to be a development which we strongly disliked we might well make representations. That was certainly the case but that was exceptional. Most of the time it was just a matter of knowing exactly what was going on, and trying to encourage a successful conclusion. Because we did have strong views. We did want the negotiations to succeed.

Q: Did you feel that those who were negotiating were also keeping the United States in the back of their minds as far as if we do this, this is going to create a trade war?

ABRAMS: Yes, I wouldn't have used the word trade war. I happen to think it's been overused. But yes it would cause difficulties with the US if certain things happened. And there were differences within the Community and sometimes one of them would talk to try and exert some influence. So there was that as well.

Q: How did you view the French at that time. This was the time when we thought of them as the 

203
ABRAMS: From our viewpoint which very much paralleled the British viewpoint, the French were the difficult negotiating partner. The Benelux countries were very strongly in favor of British membership. The Italians wanted British membership. The Germans were not quite as strong but they were certainly positive. The French were skeptical. And looking back at it with the usual benefit of hindsight, the French were justified in being rather skeptical of what role the British would play. If you now look at the future of this, namely 1992, the brake on the movement of the community is the British. But that is of course another matter.

Q: *Your ambassador there was Robert Schaetzel?*

ABRAMS: Yes.

Q: *How did he operate? What was he doing and what was his interest?*

ABRAMS: He was keeping in close touch with the commissioners of the community and with the ambassadors of the countries, the European Community members plus the British, the Danes, etc. He was a very strong advocate in all this.

Q: *Was he put there because of this?*

ABRAMS: In part. I was not in Washington at the time. He went from Deputy Assistant Secretary for NATO and OECD Affairs in Washington to the ambassadorship there. He was not a foreign service officer. And this was his only overseas assignment. He was a career civil servant.

Q: *Did you find his being a career civil servant, did you find that you spent a lot of time in the running of the embassy?*

ABRAMS: To some extent, yes. But I wouldn't attribute it to his being a civil servant. It is fairly normal in many embassies that the DCM does more of the running and the ambassador spends more of his time seeing other ambassadors and high officials.

Q: *How did you feel about the reports coming from our embassies in Bonn, Paris and Rome, London and all of that?*

ABRAMS: Of course we looked at them. The reports, to a great extent, reflected the quality of the people preparing them.

Q: *Was the reporting from one post weaker than others?*

ABRAMS: Oh, yes. This is always been true.

Q: *Which ones?*

ABRAMS: It has varied. Since I'm going to say something complementary. When Joe
Greenwald was our number two man in the economic section in London, the reports from London were excellent, among the best I’ve seen. Other people, not quite as good. Same post, little later. This was a big factor. It also reflected the ability of the people in the posts to see the right people in the capitals who were not always available.

Q: How did you feel about the directions from the White House. This was the period when Henry Kissinger was in National Security Council. Did you feel any conflict between the National Security Council and the State Department as far as how they felt about this?

ABRAMS: Well there was a conflict toward the end of the time I was there between Washington and my ambassador which ended with my ambassador being fired. So, it that sense, I felt it.

Q: How did that come about?

ABRAMS: I might mention that supposedly he resigned. But as a matter of fact he was fired. And the reason he was fired was that he was making statements which were not in agreement with what was coming out of Washington. So your question is well put because there were differences at that time. Within Washington, and between Washington and the field. Theoretically there was no differences between Washington and the field since we get our instructions from Washington, but in practice there were.

Q: What was the issue?

ABRAMS: The issue was the degree to which Washington was prepared to support things in the European Community which people in Washington, some people in Washington felt, were not very useful for the US and therefore lessened support. Bob Schaetzel was a very strong pro-European, pro-integration. And in a sense the Europeans couldn't do anything wrong.

Q: Well are you pointing out one of the problems that had been dealt with by the Department of State and sometimes with justification? That is we tend to see things in political terms, sometimes to the detriment of our commercial, our economic interests.

ABRAMS: Yes, I would say that there is some element of truth to that. We sometimes tended to exaggerate political importance at the expense of economic detriment to the US.

Q: Do you think that the support of what the Europeans were doing was getting overly strong without really thinking about what America ...

ABRAMS: Yes, I think so.

Q: Were you there at the time that he left?

ABRAMS: I left just before him. I was there at the time of the break between Henry Kissinger and Bob Schaetzel occurred.

Q: Were you able to see if he was diverging?
ABRAMS: We tried to tone down the sort of things our ambassador was saying or writing. We did this to some extent but not enough. Later he did write a book that was highly critical of US policy.

Q: This is a major problem within State. We have political interests and we have economic interests and they are not always the same.

ABRAMS: On the other hand, some of our economic interests could not have prevailed. The prime example is the Common Agricultural Policy. Almost from the day it was born, we began to fight against it but we have had very little effect, except on some specific items. For a long time it was the major accomplishment of the Community. It was the one thing they put together in common. It was a great boon for their farmers, but not for their consumers, let alone our farmers.

Q: We are of course talking about politics. European politics. The farmers there are very important.

ABRAMS: A very potent force, far in excess of what you would expect looking at numbers. The number of farmers in Europe, as in the US, has diminished rapidly. Now it is a very small proportion of the population. Interestingly enough they have played a big role in the most industrialized country of Europe, Germany. The farm vote was extremely powerful in Germany.

Q: They tended to go towards the CDU, didn't they?

ABRAMS: Or in Bavaria, the CSU. So we would normally would have expected Germany to be our ally in the Community, because they were such an industrial country but it turned out to be wrong. They weren't. It was too big a political issue within Germany.

Q: Were you able to get this across to Washington, or was this not seen as...

ABRAMS: We got it across to State. We may not have succeeded with the Department of Agriculture. But we could not declare economic war against the European Community. And the other side of it is that the US has a great tendency to see the faults of other countries and not its own because at the same time we were inveighing against the European Common Agricultural Policy, we had agricultural and other policies that were pretty restrictive too. If you look at our press and listen to the Congress you would think that this country is completely open to exports from other countries, while evil people in other countries maintain restrictions on US exports.

There's an interesting anecdote that I could relate. We received an instruction to go see the Community and protest a specific Common Agricultural Policy. I called my Australian colleague, because we had worked together before on many protests. I told him that I had this instruction, and asked whether he would like to join us in protesting to the Community. He replied in an unusually jocular manner, "You know I'm always prepared to join the US in making a protest. I do hope you realize one thing though. The restrictions that the US has on its agricultural imports affect a larger proportion of Australian exports than do the Community's."
had never thought about that and he began ticking them off. And he was right.

So this was part of the whole problem, and it remains it to this day in dealing with US commercial policy. It happened to be a time when we had quotas on imports of meat, which Australia exports. We had, as we always do, restrictions on sugar, which Australia also exports. We were exporters of grain but never had any imports. We had then, as we still do now, restrictions on imports of dairy products. If you added it all together, it was pretty bad from the Australian viewpoint.

Q: This is always a problem, I know. When I was a consular officer and we used to protest vehemently the attempts to draft American citizens residing in a country who were originally of the nationality of the country, saying they're Americans and all that, and yet the Vietnam War was going on and we were rafting people on visitor's visas if they stayed too long.

Any other issues you were dealing with in Brussels?

ABRAMS: Aside from the negotiations between the community, the British and the others, there were the day-to-day issues of our economic relations.

Q: Did you find yourself tripping over some of the embassies in Europe? These extra embassies that were put in always seemed to be in a way a bit awkward. They made a lot of sense but then you also had an embassy in Brussels, one in Bonn, in Paris and others. Just from an operating side, was this a problem?

ABRAMS: No, it was no problem whatsoever. It so happened that at that time, and it may well be true today too, all of the people involved were a group who knew each other well. We had annual meetings of the senior economic officers in the embassies and the missions to the EC and the OECD, and we would review our common problems. Washington was present at these meetings and would give us their viewpoint. I think this was a case where the coordination was pretty good. There weren't any problems that I know of. There may have been a few individual cases, but it was not a general problem.

Q: But you did find it to be a different world.

GEORGE M. BARBIS
Political Counselor, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1969-1973)

Mr. Barbis was born in California and raised there and in Greece. He graduated from the University of California and served in the US Army in WWII. In 1954 he entered the Foreign Service and was posted to Teheran, Iran as Economic Officer. His other overseas assignments included postings in Thailand, Korea, France, Belgium and Greece, primarily in the Political and Economic fields. Mr. Barbis served on the US Delegation to the United Nations (1973-1975).
Washington assignments involved him in Southeast Asia matters and the US military. Mr. Barbis is a graduate of the National War College. Mr. Barbis was interviewed by Mr. Raymond C. Ewing in 1996.

Q: Today is October 29, 1996. George, we pretty well completed your assignment as principal officer in Bordeaux and your next assignment, I believe, was as political counselor at the US Mission to the European Community in Brussels, in 1969. How did that assignment happen?

BARBIS: It all came about because George Vest was the DCM at USEC [U.S. Mission to the European Community] at the time when I completed my two years in Bordeaux. George and I had taken early morning French together before he went to Brussels and I went to Bordeaux and we became good friends. He got to know my wife, Pat. George sold me to Bob Schaetzel, who was the US representative, the ambassador. The USEC mission was a special club and you had to be part of that to get assigned there because some knowledge of the community was essential. I went in cold, not only without any European Community or Common Market, as they still called it, background, but also I went as political counselor to a mission that was essentially concerned with economic questions and relations of the United States and the Europeans. But, an important part of that, even though the Common Market or, to go further back, the EURATOM Community, brought the six then nine together, increasingly the Community was moving in a political direction. The United States support for the Community, you will recall, was always because we primarily hoped that a united Europe could assume a greater share of the responsibilities in Europe in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity and our role could be diminished. But, it took a long time for the Europeans to get around to that and it started as a very informal arrangement, consultations in the political committee, as they called it then. But, it was the beginning of what now is the European Union and which someday hopefully will be an even closer integration of the European states, although enlargement beyond the present membership is going to create complications and difficulties. But, to go back to your question, that is how I got involved and in fact in my first efficiency reports Ambassador Schaetzel in reviewing would always make the comment that “although I had no background, I had done a terrific job.”

Q: How many member states were there when you went, initially there were six?

BARBIS: Yes. My main preoccupation for a good part of my tour in Brussels was with the initial enlargement negotiations which were Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. The first three joined and Norway declined in a referendum to join.

Q: Could you tell me a little bit about the mechanics of political consultation during this period? You mentioned the political committee, but we were not actually a member so you didn’t actually attend those meeting, but how did you consult in advance and how did you find out afterward what happened?

BARBIS: It was all done very informally in Brussels and to a great extent we relied on embassies in the six countries, and then the nine, to do the reporting. Essentially this political cooperation was in the foreign policy area, meetings of foreign ministers trying to reach not common positions initially, but consensus, understanding, close coordination of positions, etc.
So, my role was primarily through the Commission’s officials who dealt with this question and in particular with the chef d’cabinet, to the key commissioners and also other members of the senior staff, the secretary general, the late Emil Noel, with whom I became close friends. Our role was more to keep people informed of some of the administrative aspects of when meetings were going to take place, where and what the subjects were, which my section could get through its contacts in Brussels. But, for the main substantive kind of positions of governments, etc. part of it we relied on the embassies, including Brussels, which dealt with the Belgian delegation, of course.

Q: I assume you would deal with the permanent missions based in Brussels?

BARBIS: Yes. Each member country had its own embassy accredited to the government of Belgium and in addition had a permanent delegation assigned to or dealing with European Community matters and in which the ambassadors would represent their countries when Council meetings took place. The actual day-to-day operation of the Community was conducted by the Commission, by the Eurocrats, if you will. I forget now the number of commissioners at the time, I’m sure it has grown, but as I recall, the British, the French, the Germans each had two commissioners representing them and the other countries only one. Each would have an area of responsibility for trade relations, for finance, for agriculture, etc. USEC was structured the same as any embassy with political and economic sections and a USIS section. We would divide responsibilities correspondingly. Since agriculture was such a key area in our relations as well as in the Community’s preoccupations, the Department of Agriculture had its own people there as part of our mission.

Q: Some of those issues, particularly the common agriculture policy, had enormous political significance in each of the member states, particularly in countries like France. Did you get involved in the political dimension of trade issues, agricultural issues?

BARBIS: We did because all of these issues would come to the table in Council meetings which was the political section’s responsibility to report on. So, I was fortunate to have some very talented young officers working for me. One in particular, who went on to become economic minister, both in Paris and in London, would go to these meetings which sometimes wouldn’t break up until four or five in the morning. I wouldn’t go myself, but Bill would call me around seven in the morning and say, “This is what they decided an hour ago,” and then I was in a position to report that at our staff meeting early in the day and then get out a reporting cable based on input from all the sections depending on the subjects that were discussed by the Council.

Q: This officer would not exactly attend the Council meetings but would get a briefing immediately after it ended?

BARBIS: Exactly. There were always briefings and he had good contacts and would talk to members of the delegations and also officials of the Commission and be able to get a pretty good reading on what had been discussed and decided and what positions governments took. And, of course, if it were a critical issue involving the United States, soybeans, for example, which was controversial at that time, or chickens, etc., the various embassies would report to us in advance.
so that we had a pretty good understanding of national positions.

Q: And afterwards they would often report as well getting...?

BARBIS: And, people returned because frequently...there was an agricultural Council meeting, ministers of agriculture would come to Brussels and when all of these delegations from capitals returned, the embassies did an excellent job in following up and reporting.

Q: I know the European Union had a system of rotation of the presidency by some alphabetical order. Had that started in this period, so that a country would be the president...?

BARBIS: The council.

Q: The council on all subsidiary organs for six months?

BARBIS: Exactly.

Q: So, our consultation with that country would be particularly important?

BARBIS: Very key, both with respect to Commission activities, European Economic Community activities, but also in terms of the informal, at that time, political consultations.

Q: You say it was informal?

BARBIS: There was no structure yet. This all started through the initiative of Steven Donvion, the Belgian Commissioner.

Q: And who had been Belgian foreign minister.

BARBIS: Well, at that time he was more on the economic side, but a rising star in the Belgian political world and European too, because he was a very strong Europeanist. He pushed this idea, because the progress on the political side of the Europeans had been slow, and still is from an American point of view. It has taken them almost 30 years to get to where they are now, with more structured and institutionalized procedures. It was difficult to jumpstart on a formal basis, it had to be a gradual process where people got used to these consultations. They would deal with issues of common interest in foreign policy matters, bilaterally with some countries, but also in the UN they began coordinating their positions and eventually ending up with one position on certain issues. But, national sovereignty was still very important, still is, and that suggested that a gradual, moderate approach had more chances of succeeding, which I think they have. They have made a lot of progress in that respect.

Q: You mentioned the role that embassies played before and after Council meetings and generally making sure that our views were shared at the national level as well that we got different insides from various perspectives. Did you visit the various EC capitals? Obviously your responsibility was broader than just Brussels.
BARBIS: I did in some cases, not all. For example, early on in my tour we had a meeting in Bonn of political counselors from USEC and also from the member countries, where we all met. This was very useful because we got to know each other and I was taken around to the ministry of foreign affairs, of course, and to agencies of the federal government dealing with Community matters. But, the area in which I did spend more time was in London once the enlargement negotiations began. That was very useful because I was exposed for the first time there to the very informal relationship our embassy has traditionally enjoyed with the British government where people at my level, FSO-3 at the time, in the political section of the embassy were on a first name basis with the secretary for defense or the foreign secretary or leading members of parliament. I can recall being taken to parliament one day by the officer responsible for dealing with the Conservative Party and another day - I remember Jack Sulser was the one who was following the Labor Party at the time - and I was introduced to all kinds of people I had read about in the newspapers in cables. All was done very informally. They were willing to talk and give their views, etc. So, that was a great experience and helped me a lot in our approach to our reporting on the enlargement negotiations, which, in the case of Britain in particular, were not easy.

Q: No, they had many obstacles and lots of difficulty. But, generally the United States was supportive of the enlargement?

BARBIS: We were supportive as part of this--I guess it was a small group in our country who had the vision of a united Europe who believed in, worked with, and supported Jean Monnet and his efforts, sort of the patron saint of the European movement right after World War II. As a newcomer, what impressed me was how in some ways we were more European than the Europeans in trying to help them. But, I think it was done with moderation. We didn’t beat people over the head, but everybody knew that we supported their moving towards closer and closer economically, in trade and certainly politically. Our interests were primarily political in some respects, although the stakes on the economic side were very high, and still are. Obviously our interest is a little more mixed on the economic side, where to protect our own interests sometimes we got into some real tough hassles with them.

Q: I was in the economic section in Rome at about the same time and I can remember making representations, having lots of discussions about soybeans and aspects of the common agricultural policy. It seemed like at times we were certainly representing US economic interests, agricultural interests. My recollection is that at the same time we always were supportive of the idea of European integration and bringing the economies and the political systems into closer harmony in the belief that that would be to our advantage not only in avoiding another war in Europe, but in advancing our economic interests as well.

BARBIS: You have described it very accurately, I think. One area that didn’t get much publicity where I played a role was in assisting in the creation of a United States Congress/European Parliament link, which has grown over the years and is still going on. The initiative came through a visit of a CODEL [congressional delegation] and one of the staffers on that CODEL, Cliff Hackett, who worked for the subcommittee on Europe, House Foreign Affairs Committee, under Ben Rosenthal of New York, came to me. I had not known Cliff. He was a former Foreign Service officer with USIA. We met and he came to me with a proposal which I took up with
Ambassador Schaetzel, who grabbed it and we ran with it. The proposal was to start exchanges between members of the Congress and the European Parliament. Initially it was pretty much a one-way street. CODELs would come to Brussels and then we would go to Strasbourg, where the Parliament was located, and also to Luxembourg, where it was located certain months of the year. There were two driving forces behind this. I have already mentioned Ben Rosenthal, who was the chairman, and Don Fraser, who was a congressman from Minnesota at the time. Both were outstanding. And, a lot of other prominent members of the congress with a deep interest both in the economic side of our relations with Europe, but also the political.

Ambassador Schaetzel, who was ideal for heading our mission at that particular time, having the background and knowledge of the Community and having been involved with the earlier European Atomic Energy Community, gave it his full support and pretty much left it up to Cliff and me. Cliff worked with the Congress and I worked with the Commission and the Parliament. We would have at least two, sometimes three, visits a year from a CODEL of eight or ten headed by the two gentlemen I mentioned. I think this has evolved into a two-way exchange that takes place now. It is serious. People discuss issues, present papers, but more importantly it brings people into direct contact which creates better understanding and as a result better cooperation.

Q: Now this period in the early seventies, the European Parliament was not elected was it?

BARBIS: No, it was not, and I must say it was not a very influential body. In fact, its main power was the power of the purse, but that was seldom exercised and in some ways it was seen as something that they had to have but really didn’t pay much attention to and it certainly didn’t have much influence. It has grown since then in influence and in the role it plays. But, at that time they would gather in Strasbourg and sometimes the representative, say, of the British Parliament, would be... members were chosen by the various national parliaments. Later it became a matter of elections which they placed regularly and where you get a number of prominent politicians leaving the national scene and going into the European stage.

Q: You mentioned that the European Parliament met in Strasbourg. When it was in session, would you go down to deal with it, or was that done by our consul general in Strasbourg?

BARBIS: No, we were very protective of our role with the Parliament and with Council meetings, which didn’t always meet in Brussels but sometimes in Luxembourg. We would always send an officer from the political section to cover those meetings of the Council. There was also an officer on my staff who had responsibly for the Parliament and whenever the Parliament was in session, he was in residence in Strasbourg, or that one or two months a year when it was in Luxembourg, in Luxembourg. He would make frequent reports back to me. If it was something where it was important to have a larger US presence, I would go down. I would always go and accompany a CODEL, be it the congressional group that had the exchange with the Parliament or individual CODELs where a congressman or a senator came with an interest in the Community and wanted to see the Parliament.

Q: But if it was a matter involving the Council of Europe based in Strasbourg, that would not be handled by you but by the consulate general in Strasbourg?
BARBIS: Yes, by the consulate general in Strasbourg. We only dealt with the Brussels based organization.

**Q:** I have to ask you a little bit about your relations with the other US government people in Brussels. There was the embassy as well as a NATO mission. Did you have informal liaison with them?

BARBIS: We had very close relations. With NATO the relationship was primarily between me and my staff in the political section, and the political advisors which was the counterpart section. My counterpart initially was Larry Eagleburger, who knew and had a previous relationship with Bob Schaeetzel and [in whom] Schaeetzel had a direct interest. So, we did many things informally together where Larry and I would meet, sometimes the two of us, sometimes accompanied by a colleague from the section, and draft something jointly for Schaeetzel or participate in a dinner where we had a purpose of discussing certain issues. In this, it was great to have an ambassador like Schaeetzel who took a direct interest. I think our relations not only with USNATO but also with the embassy were very close and excellent.

**Q:** I think the negotiations had started for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was culminated in Helsinki in 1975. Was your mission involved in that?

BARBIS: We were not involved in that. That all began at the very end of my five-year stay in Brussels. I went there in September, 1969 and left in 1974.

**Q:** Was Ambassador Schaeetzel head of mission during all that time?

BARBIS: No, he was there most of the time and then Joe Greenwald succeeded him. They were two of the best ambassadors I worked with. I don’t see Ambassador Schaeetzel much now, but I do see Joe from time to time.

**Q:** His background wasn’t quite as strong in terms of European integration from the earliest period, but very strong in the trade-economic side.

BARBIS: Exactly, and Joe is a fast learner. He had a lot of background. He was not someone who had devoted a good part of his career to the Community or the European unification process as Schaeetzel had, but was a very knowledgeable and experienced ambassador on trade issues and was very popular in Brussels, as Schaeetzel had been.

**Q:** I worked for a while in the late sixties in the economic bureau in the Office of International Trade, and I think there was a little bit of a feeling at times, not so much on our part, but particularly on the part of some of the other agencies, including the Office of Special Trade Representative, which had just been established, that the mission in Brussels and the office in the European Bureau that backstopped European political integration, was sometimes more interested in Europe and bringing it together than it was in US economic goals. Did you sense that at times?

BARBIS: We were certainly aware of that and from the perspective of the groups you are
speaking of, certainly that was understandable. But still, I think, the mission did its damnedest to represent US interests. Perhaps in our approach we preferred to be more gentle than aggressive than some people would have liked. And within the mission too, the Agricultural Department representative, a very capable guy, who had been there longer than I—it was characteristic of that mission where officers tended to do longer tours, not just two or three years—he always on agricultural issues certainly defended the Department of Agriculture position very, very strongly.

Q: The length of tours were partly due to the fact that the work was interesting, challenging and Brussels was a good place to live. But, was there also a feeling that contacts with the Commission and knowledge of these sometimes very technical specialized issues was also important?

BARBIS: Absolutely. I think you can’t stress enough the importance of that. First of all, we were dealing with a very complex situation [with numerous] technical aspects and once you learned it you couldn’t afford to lose an officer and then have to train a new one. So, it made sense and most officers were willing to stay for more than three years. It made sense and I think it served the interests of the government.

Q: Ambassador Schaetzel was there for seven or eight years, wasn’t he?

BARBIS: I once knew exactly, but he was there for a long time.

Q: Was George Vest the deputy throughout your assignment?

BARBIS: No, George Vest had already moved to NATO as DCM and Manny Abrams came up from Rome, where he had been economic minister, to be our DCM and then Art Hartman took his place. Art had worked closely with Schaetzel in the Department on European questions previously.

Q: His background goes back even earlier working with Jean Monnet in Paris as they were putting together what became the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development].

BARBIS: Yes. And we were all just delighted, thinking it was the right move, when they took him away from the mission and made him assistant secretary for Europe. He had the right background at the right time to be in that key spot.

Q: Are there any other major issues that you were involved with while in Brussels that you want to talk about?

BARBIS: I think we have pretty well covered it. The role of the political counselor or any political officer in a mission like USEC was sort of unique, but it was, to use an over worked word, challenging and interesting and I was fortunate to work with people who helped me learn and fit into the team that we had there and be in a position to make a contribution which I like to think I did.
Multilateral diplomacy does not involve trying to guess who is going to win the next election or the strength of a political party.

BARBIS: Or forecasting who the next prime minister is going to be.

Q: But, it does certainly involve some very fundamental issues of interest to the United States as well as those that have an impact beyond whatever the borders are.

BARBIS: And, of course, as the Community became the Union and as it expanded and is going to continue to expand, it is a completely new ball game, a new landscape, compared to the five years that I was involved.

Q: But, some of the considerations are still pretty basic. Just yesterday the European Union took a decision in response to something that the United States had done in the Helms-Burton Act restricting trade with Cuba. And there always is a little bit of that feeling that they have to respond to what we are doing or what somebody else is doing. Is there a positive impetus that one feels in terms of when you were there of Europe coming together or is it that they recognize that together they have a little bit more clout and strength than they do as nine or six individuals?

BARBIS: My response would be a little bit of both. I think certainly there is quite a bit of the latter because in dealing with the United States the Europeans have always had admiration, affection, self-interest in maintaining good relations and at the same time a resentment given the place in history that Europe has held in the past over the centuries, that they are being left out and left behind more and more. So, united a lot of them would see that it would put them into a better and stronger position. At the same time, I think, widespread in Europe, especially among young people, there is a very strong current of believing in the unity of that family of nations.

Q: And as they travel, trade and interact increasingly with each other, that probably has been strengthened.

BARBIS: Exactly, although there are still pockets of resistance and opposition. Although in joining the Community, the British didn’t lose their famous breakfast, but there still are a lot of Brits who are not happy with the Community, as we know.

Q: They want to protect sovereignty, culture, language and all the attributes of nationhood.

BARBIS: Exactly. Whenever something is agreed to by the Council and the institutions of the Union to move even further down the road toward union, people resist it and oppose it and try to slow it down. And, I think that process will continue. It will be one of fits and starts with some very difficult questions looking at the future and further enlargement.

Q: You have talked a little bit about your contacts and the importance of the Commission as the point of continuity, preparation of action papers, etc. Was there the sense while you were there that the Commission was a pretty vital and exciting place? One has the impression at times these days that it has become very large, very bureaucratic, very top heavy with these people in
Brussels and an obstacle in some ways to integration.

BARBIS: I think there is considerable truth in that. I went back to Brussels for the first time a year and a half ago and was just astounded at the office buildings that have risen to house the staff and the personnel of the Commission. When I was there, the main building was just a block away [from where I lived] and [I] always walked by it on my way to USEC. Although the Commission had buildings all over the place, sort of like the State Department in previous years, and with the enlargement they had to obviously provide more space for personnel on the Commission staff, but it is just astounding. All of Brussels, it seemed to me on a tour that a friend took me on, seems to be Commission buildings. But, there are those who are very critical of the Commission, but the thing wouldn’t work without it. I think they have come a long way in creating a body of European civil servants and although they are much maligned and criticized when people’s interests are effected by decisions made in Brussels, I think they have contributed to the progress the member states have made in bringing together this new entity.

Q: Besides the member states and their delegations, and the delegations that come from capitals for Council meetings, there obviously are many other countries in Europe and beyond besides the United States who have a great interest in what was happening in the European Community. I assume you had contact with countries like Canada and Japan, but how about countries on the fringes of the EC of those days, some of which later became members, were they all represented in Brussels as well?

BARBIS: Yes, they were and followed Community developments very closely. I or my colleagues, except if a particular issue was coming up, really didn’t have the time or the opportunity to have close ties with them. Certainly, countries that later applied for membership or that had applied for membership had close ties with us and we were exchanging views and information on a regular basis, but our main focus had to be on the Commission, the activities of the Council and what the European Community, itself, was doing. There was just too much to do. There were certainly opportunities to do more of that and maybe they are doing a lot more of that now, but I’m out of touch. I presume the staff at USEC is pretty much what it was, certainly no larger, so that would put certain limits on how much contact and association is possible with non-member countries.

Q: You mention that the negotiations for enlargement were going on at the time with Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. Were you pretty involved in following those closely?

BARBIS: Very much so. We had frequent contact with the four applicant country delegations in Brussels and they were quite open in sharing with us their views and their concerns and where the negotiations were going and how they were going. It was a pretty open environment in terms of communication between us and the people involved.

Q: Was there a feeling at that time that that next step in enlargement was kind of it, or was there kind of an assumption that there would quickly be another round of enlargement?

BARBIS: Well, I think the member states were certainly aware of the great interest and desire of others to join and the pressure [to join] that. To sort of contain [pressures to join], the
Community did have a series of agreements with countries like Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and others, of association where the country in question was not be considered for immediate membership but was on the road to becoming a member. Some of them like Greece did become members, others have not made it yet although they would like to and are constantly pressing for commitments to come into the Community.

**Q:** But in the period you were there, the early seventies, for essentially political reasons, their internal political system, countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal were kind of ruled out, I suppose as potential members?

**BARBIS:** Oh, yes. At that time the Colonels were running Greece and both Spain and Portugal were not flourishing democracies yet and certainly that was a consideration. Through these association agreements, I think, the Community sought to contain greater pressures insisting on sort of a preparation stage that qualified for membership to precede it. But, once the three countries you mentioned shed their authoritarian leadership and moved in the direction of democracy, that made it easier for the Community to address membership for them. Although, in all three of the cases, the Community had to be concerned about the economic readiness of the candidate countries to become members, and that is something that they watch carefully. They have to since national interests are affected by responsibilities to the Community in terms of social programs and other programs of assistance to new members that are less advanced economically. So, they have to keep that as a very important criteria of membership. How new members are going to integrate or would integrate into the overall Community without doing more damage than bringing strength.

**Q:** At that time I assume Austria was ruled out because it was neutral, even though later on it did become a member. Was Ireland the first non-NATO country to become a member? How important was NATO membership in terms of joining the Community?

**BARBIS:** That created complications, especially as the political side of things evolved, but I don’t think it was a criteria that the Community considered important. At the time you had two parallel groupings in Europe. You had the Community and you had EFTA [European Free Trade Area], where many of the neutrals were members. Although the two groups dealt with each other, they were separate. There was no desire at that time, at least, as I recall, on the part of most EFTA members to become members of the Community and certainly the Community was moving cautiously in enlargement and started with the four we mentioned, although only three decided to join in the end.

**Q:** Of course, the European Free Trade Area was strictly limited and didn’t have the integrated goals of the European Community.

**BARBIS:** It certainly did not it was strictly...

**Q:** George, we have been talking about EFTA and the differences between EFTA and the EC. Have you pretty much covered that or is there something else that should be said?

**BARBIS:** I think I started to say something and I’ve lost it.
Q: Let me ask you something else. Secretary Kissinger, I am not sure he had become Secretary of State while you were in Brussels, but one of his innovations for the State Department personnel system was something he called GLOP (Global Outlook Policy), a belief that it was good to bring officers from Latin American to work in Europe, that they would have fresh insights or at least questions, and it was good to break up the cozy little China club, European Community club, etc. Was any of that talked about while you were still in Brussels or did that come afterwards? How did you react to it in terms of your experience as an outsider in that Community framework?

BARBIS: I think it started while I was still in Brussels. Secretary Kissinger brought it all up as a result of talking to an officer in Mexico City who didn’t know anything about China or didn’t know anything about NATO, and that made the Secretary think that something was wrong with the Foreign Service. I don’t know what happened to GLOP, whether it is still a hot program or policy.

Q: I don’t think it is and, of course, we have moved to open assignments so what happens to an officer’s career is much more up to the officer.

BARBIS: Well, I started my career, as we have discussed here, in Iran and then went to the Far East and spent a number of years working in that area, and then for reasons we don’t need to go into I went to Bordeaux and embarked on the next to the last phase of my Foreign Service career for twelve years on European affairs. Of course, I had background about Europe, both because of my having spent the war years in Greece, but also my academic studies, etc. And, Bordeaux was no problem, I was able to fit in. Going to Brussels and joining in the USEC staff, of course, required adjustments and learning. I wouldn’t put it in the GLOP context because the focus of USEC was primarily, as the name of the mission suggests, economic and trade, but certainly the political aspects were there and relatively important. Although it was different from reporting as a political officer from Seoul, Korea or from Thailand, being a political officer definitely made it possible for me to do the job, having had that political experience.

Q: I assume we would share views and consult and get reaction on occasion to something going on in the Middle East or Vietnam or perhaps in the UN. Would we be discussing issues like that or were they mostly issues related to Europe?

BARBIS: I think it is fair to say the political consultative process had not moved that far along where we got into those areas at USEC. Although, after all we were dealing with foreign service professionals, both on the Commission staff and in the various country delegations and so naturally in our contacts we discussed issues beyond the Community. But the focus was the Community.

Q: One more question about the composition, the make up, the kind of people who were working in the Commission at that period. Were they mostly people who had been seconded, had come for relatively short periods in Brussels, or were they people who were planning to make a career of work in the Commission?
BARBIS: The majority, I would say, were the latter and I think, although a lot of the people that I knew and worked with have since retired with the Commission, some have spent their entire careers there. For example, a young Frenchman, with whom I became close friends--his wife’s family was from Bordeaux and we lived next door almost to her parents so we became close friends. He started his career after university with the Commission and he is still there now. At one time he was here in Washington at the Community’s office in a senior position. Later he was the head of a delegation in Tokyo and now is back in the Commission in Brussels. Jean Pierre will retire from the European Community when he reaches that point.

Q: At that time the Community had an office here in Washington and I guess in some other parts of the world, Tokyo, perhaps...

BARBIS: [Washington] was the first one and then gradually they started establishing offices everywhere.

Q: To what extent were you aware of the Community’s office in Washington? Were they doing more or less the same thing you were or were they much more interested in providing information on what was going on in the Community and to some extent consulting with the State Department and others?

BARBIS: During my years the presence here was a smaller one than is the case now. Now, in fact, the head of the delegation, to show how they have attached more and more importance to it, is a former prime minister of Denmark, or was, I don’t know if he is still here. At the time that we are speaking of in the early mid 1970s, it was a small office and a German was in charge of it. His principal associate was an American who handled the public affairs aspects. They may still have Americans working for them, I don’t know. Their role started as one of selling the Community or explaining the Community to the American public and in particular to the US Congress. There was a very strong emphasis on congressional contacts, etc., but also in dealing with agencies of the government, the State Department, USTR [U.S. Trade Representative], Commerce, Agriculture, Atomic Energy Commission, etc.

Q: Let me ask one other question about the Commission, the Eurocrat. I assume that these people, even though some of them made it a career or were in the process of making a career in the European Community, still were very much French, British or Italian, and the national characteristics were quite apparent. There hadn’t yet become a European personality or had there?

BARBIS: It was certainly moving in that direction. The people I got to know best, French, Italian, from all member states, almost, were committed Europeans. They saw it as the future and were committed not as a Frenchman, or as a German, but because they believed in the idea of a united Europe. Now, that isn’t true of everybody and I should clarify that not everybody was a professional Eurocrat. Many of them were there for a short period and moved on to other jobs. This was true especially in the case of the personal staff of a Commission member where frequently the foreign office would assign someone to be the chef du cabinet. Lord Soames at one time was a British Commissioner. Roy Jenkins was from the Labour Party when he was a member of the Commission. And Commissioners came and went. They were not as permanent.
Some stayed longer than others. But, that cast kept changing depending on the government at home and the circumstances.

Q: Was there ever the sense that a government was sending somebody off to Brussels to kind of get rid of him, get him out of the capital for a while?

BARBIS: I don’t think that that was the case. I think they saw it as too important to do that, but there may have been cases. I think increasingly it has become more important to the member state governments.

Q: Was there ever an effort to instruct, to try to make sure that a Commissioner or somebody else on the Commission took instructions, took orders from the capital?

BARBIS: Well, certainly they would try to influence them. I think it was a delicate matter, though, and they were all on the same boat so people were careful in that respect. Who the president of the Commission is is always important and it started with a Belgian, Mr. Jean Ray, who was there for many, many years. And then there was an Italian and lately a Frenchman and now a Belgian, again.

Q: Five years in Brussels was not bad either, I guess?

BARBIS: No, it was an interesting time. There were interesting people and it was a pleasant country to live in, although it has its problems. We found it an interesting experience and look back on it with fondness.

Q: And overall, I guess any political counselor position really has this attribute, that you really need to get out and get to know people and talk and encounter a variety of people and points of view perspectives.

BARBIS: Although our world was a pretty limited one, the world of the Commission and those associated with the institutions of the Community, and I guess one regret would be that although we traveled on a personal basis around Belgium with our children and got to see some of the country, we really didn’t spend as much time with the host country people, although we did have friends who had nothing to do with the Community, through my wife or the building where we lived, or our children we got to know people outside that circle, but our main association was with Commission people, member state delegations and other missions like us with an interest in following what was going on. We had very close ties personally with the Swedish embassy counterpart, for example.

Q: And while you said you had good relations of course with the American embassy in Brussels, still you had to be a little sensitive that their area of responsibility was the Belgian government and generally what was happening in Belgium itself.

BARBIS: Exactly, so we didn’t get into that. The rules had been pretty much set by the time I got there in 1969 where it was known what the turf of USEC was and I don’t recall any jurisdictional difficulties with the embassy in Brussels. Once in a while there might be a problem.
with Embassy Luxembourg wanting to play more of a role when the Council or Parliament met there, but I would always call on the embassy when we went to Luxembourg and share with them anything they were interested in.

Q: Of course the embassy in Luxembourg was very small. There is only so much you can report on what is happening in the country of Luxembourg and its participation from the beginning as a charter member of the European Community was pretty important.

BARBIS: Very important to them and they had good people representing them.

STANTON H. BURNETT
Information Officer, USIS, USNATO
Brussels (1969-1974)

Stanton Burnett was born in Colorado on May 5, 1935. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington and a Ph.D. from the New School of Social Research. Mr. Burnett served in the U.S. Army for two years. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Bukavu, Kinshasa, Bujumbura, Brussels (NATO), Rome, and Washington, DC. Mr. Burnett was interviewed by Pat Nieburg on January 26, 1990.

BURNETT: I decided to leave the Agency. I sent a cable saying this was terrific, I'm going back to teaching. But George Vest, who later became Director General of the Foreign Service --

Q: Let interrupt you. When you said, "I decided at that point," what time was that?

BURNETT: Well, this would have been two years in. I came in in ’67, so this would have been the winter of ’68/’69. I had really enjoyed it. I saw no future for myself. I still didn't have any picture of what public diplomacy was, a term we didn't use then, of course. I wasn't all that interested in the work really.

I had a call from George Vest who from being DCM at our mission to the European communities had just been transferred over to be DCM at our mission to NATO. I had known him before, just a casual acquaintance. He called to say that they had just lost their IO, which was the number two man in the post, but they didn't have a number one man. So, he was the only man there -- and he was about to leave. He was Ernie Wiener, a friend of many of ours, who was ill at that time -- he had to leave.

George said, "Nixon says this is going to be an era of negotiations. If you want to come here, I can get you on some of the delegations. I think you'll find it interesting. Why don't you delay your departure and come up." It was one of those offers you just can't refuse. I remember sending a telegram saying, "Ignore previous about my decision to leave." George, sure enough, fixed it up.
So I went into Brussels -- left alone, having no idea of what my mission really was there either -- as for many months the only person on the ground for USIA at NATO.

There were some smart folks at the other missions. I remember both. Dean -- oh, boy, I forget his name. He was PAO at USEC, our mission to the European Communities. But the number two man was Jon Kordak.

Q: Oh, yes.

BURNETT: So, there was a lot of wisdom there. I remember that I decided to read the -

Q: It was Dean Clausson.

BURNETT: Dean Clausson. That's right. Thank you, Pat. He was the PAO. Art Bardos was at our embassy.

I remember reading the files. My two predecessors, each of which had stayed a year -- Ernie had stayed a year and before that it was Eleanor Green, who stayed a year. Neither of them had seemed to get their hooks into it that much. I couldn't really understand it but I went back for three years -- there was still stuff in the files -- to find the files of Jim Rentschler.

Rentschler had a clear idea of what he was doing. He and Harlan Cleveland had a good relationship. So I sort of went to school partly on Jim's old papers and talking to folks and slowly but surely got the idea of what we should be doing at NATO.

I had from the summer of `69 -- I extended one year so it was the summer of `74 then -- five of the grandest years imaginable at NATO. I had run the place for I think close to a year when the Agency decided it was time to send in a proper PAO. Remember, I was -- I think by then I'd come in as a -- I forget -- I think a 6 and I worked my way up to a 5. So, I was very junior and they decided they needed a senior officer. It was an important post, and they were going to send one in.

I thought that was my cue to leave because by that time I was used to running my own show. I was told to wait until I saw the cut of the jib of the new PAO, that they thought it was somebody that I would like and somebody who would respect what I had done there and that it would be a good relationship.

So, very skeptical and figuring that was my cue to go back to teaching, I waited. The officer they sent in was Bill Hamilton.

Q: Oh, yes.

BURNETT: Bill, who is -- there is no more decent man in all of our service and the relationship -- I hope he's saying the same thing if he's in this study -- the relationship was a good one from the beginning. Early on I said I'd be delighted to spend my time with this man as my boss.
So we just had a wonderful -- I had, as I said, five years there. George Vest was as good as his word. I got in on the very end of the Berlin negotiations and got in on SALT I. In those days they didn't carry a USIS officer with the delegations. You'd fly in on TDY when there would be events that would involve a lot of press, and NATO, where the consultations were taking place, was the logical place to fly the person in from.

I was in for all of the preparatory round and most of the first round of the European Security Conference, as it was called then. Finally Hans Holzapfel came in and took that job eventually, but I did the first two rounds -- all on TDY. I was there for the preparatory round and the first round -- I'm sorry, Hans came in to MBFR --

Q: Yes.

BURNETT: I forget. I guess nobody relieved me directly -- at CSCE in Helsinki. That's right, I remember writing a memo to George Vest, who at that point had gone up as head of our delegation to the European Security Conference in Helsinki for the round -- he had left NATO -- and I said, "You're the most natural press spokesman I've ever seen, you don't need anybody to do this work for you. I suggest you not have anybody," and I left.

Of course, he went on to be State Department press spokesman. But for MBFR I was there for the first two rounds; that's the one which Hans came in and took over.

So, I just had this glorious period, not only being in on all the delegations, but the series of excellent ambassadors that included Bob Ellsworth and Don Rumsfeld. What they wanted was they wanted me out around Europe talking about NATO issues to the European media.

Q: Was that also the period of the neutron device --

BURNETT: No. The neutron bomb came later.

Q: Later. I'm sorry.

BURNETT: Remind me of it later because I still have egg on my face for that.

Bill accepted that way of working so I got to be the cowboy out running around. My USIA colleagues were wonderful. Vic was the IO -- Vic Olason was the IO in Bonn. I kicked around. The big cities in Europe I must have been hitting once every six weeks simply to do nothing more than have a drink with the important journalists in those areas.

I got to know Michel Tatu and Andre Fontaine very well. I would work Fleet Street. In an afternoon I would probably see two dozen guys I knew, many of whom have remained good friends.

There was a lot happening at NATO at that time. The US policy was of interest to everybody. It was a terrific job.
Q: Let me ask you a question. To be the point man, sort of, in Europe and going out and meeting people, how did you, yourself, keep yourself abreast of policy and developments? I mean substantively so that you had something to offer to your interlocutors?

BURNETT: Well, that's an important point. The guidance we received from Washington by normal USIA or State channels was inadequate to that task. Your point is well-taken.

I felt that we were, either in terms of substantive policy unclassified and usable, or, in terms, more importantly, of guidance as to what was the strategy for creating the political climate that was necessary and the public diplomacy role, we received not much of anything.

That's why I mentioned the ambassadors. In general, the ambassadors there were important people well-connected in the White House with a lot of elbow room consequently. They weren't making policy but they were taking the policy that was there, devising what the public face should be, and working with us to devise our charge. We were writing a lot of our own menu there.

An example was that our US policy was to oppose the European Security Conference. It became clear at a certain point that that was going to be turned around, that we were going to wind up in the European Security Conference. I remember Bob Ellsworth giving me the charge.

We decided what the climate would be for going into a conference for the West to get what the West was interested in. We were thinking about -- we didn't use the term "baskets" because it hadn't been invented -- but we were thinking about human rights and so forth. So that became a part of my charge, a part of the thing informally, not in a way where I could be quoted.

We started laying the groundwork already for the sorts of things that would be the West's fundamental interest in heading into a security conference.

It was largely Ellsworth and Rumsfeld going out on a limb. Both of them were extremely shrewd about public diplomacy.

Q: Let me ask you a question so that we have this very clear. That means you had an opportunity to spend a good bit of time with Ellsworth and Rumsfeld and being briefed by them and getting your orders from them. Or, was this a hand-me-down -- how you received the charge for doing the point job that you did for NATO.

BURNETT: Okay. NATO is a combined mission. That is, there are as many Defense Department people at that mission as there are State Department people. Consequently, the makeup of the country team is something the ambassador is always very careful about, and all the agencies represented there are also carefully represented around the table.

But the personalities involved -- the key people were George Vest who was the DCM, and Bill Hamilton who was the PAO. They decided early on that since I was largely functioning as the spokesman, I should be there too.
So Bill and I were there every morning at the meetings and Ellsworth and Rumsfeld and Vest, who had long periods between ambassadors as the chargé, used those meetings carefully. So we were fully on top of everything that was on the platter in the mission at that time.

Then, to work out what the public line should be - what the ambassador should be saying, what I should be saying as I ran around, and what we also should be coaching the NATO spokesmen down on the international side to say. We spent hours alone with Ellsworth, with Rumsfeld, with Vest, working it out.

They had, all three of them, a belief that public diplomacy was half the game, that the political climate relative to NATO was what determined defense budgets, support in Europe for the Alliance, and everything else. They took it very seriously, were very good at thinking about it.

I was in an unusually good situation in terms of communication with the ambassador and ambassadorial understanding.

There was an -- I've got to tell you. Ellsworth left and then there was a long period with Vest as DCM. Those were great days because Vest understood it.

Then there was another ambassador that I haven't mentioned. They appointed David Kennedy, the former Secretary of the Treasury -- David M. Kennedy from Utah -- as ambassador. He was pretty much an absentee landlord. They also gave him the charge of selling shoes in Spain, or something like that. He had some trade negotiation responsibilities at the same time he was ambassador to NATO and he never was very interested in it. He was a wonderful man but Vest was running the mission. Kennedy never took hold and we never had this kind of relationship with him.

My one memory was that I got some sort of award from the Agency for this work and it was to be awarded on Kennedy's watch. The usual thing -- the family comes in, there's a photographer, and you get your plaque. I still remember Kennedy, who was a grandfatherly man -- my son was about four or five and Kennedy was warm and nice to him as we stood around afterwards holding champagne glasses. I could see my whole life and career passing before my eyes when this happened.

He said to my son, "What's your name?" He said, "My name is Matthew David Burnett." Kennedy said, "What a coincidence. I am David M. Kennedy. Would you believe the coincidence. What do you think the `M' stands for?" My four year old son says, "Daddy says it stands for money."

(Laughter.)

That was not a good day. I hope that Kennedy was deaf.

Q: I need to interrupt you once more because this has a great bearing that you will understand, especially in relation to the fact that you were later counselor of the Agency. Here you were, a USIA officer basically working out of Brussels on NATO, which is an area-wide responsibility. What was your relationship with the post?
Let me be specific. There were political problems with NATO or within the substantive areas of NATO in Belgium and Denmark. Each situation was somewhat different and some of them quite sensitive, if I recall correctly. Now here you come out of NATO and you come "charging" into a country. How did you work it out with the post? What was the coordination? How did it work? And how was it from your point of view?

BURNE: Well, you raise an excellent question, Pat, because with some posts it was difficult at the beginning. At the end, everything was very smooth.

I guess I mentioned Vic Olason (in Bonn) because he was the one guy who welcomed it from the beginning, understood how it could help, and meshed it perfectly with what he was doing. I don't remember who his PAO then was but he had support all the way up the line.

In most of the countries that were of concern to us - and I wasn't going throughout Europe the whole time. I never went to -- I guess I went twice to Lisbon. But we're talking about London and The Hague, Bonn, Paris, Rome. Interestingly enough, I went frequently into Madrid, though they were not a member of the Alliance at the time, but it was important to keep talking Alliance to the Spaniards.

There was usually somebody, whether it was the ambassador or the DCM or the PAO or the IO, that didn't like the idea for just the reason that was implicit in your question. "Why can't they just send guidance to the post, we've got people who are in touch with all these people."

There were some reasons for that. For one thing, we were dealing with the journalists who, for NATO ministerials and other big events, NATO would come in from the capital. So, we did have a relationship with them. I didn't see Michel Tatu only in Paris; I saw him in Brussels. But when I was hitting him was the times between ministerials.

It was a question of personalities because there wasn't a real -- there wasn't an SOP on all of this. I remember the first couple of missions in London in which I was really under wraps. I wasn't about to go wandering around Fleet Street. They had a few journalists in. We met in the embassy. The PAO and the IO were there.

It was not our immediate colleagues; the fault there was the DCM, a guy who later became my good friend. But he used the word "cowboy" and he really didn't like the idea of what I was doing. He was a very straitlaced State type and this just was outside procedures.

In some cases it would be Ellsworth talking to the ambassador and working it out. But it required tact, developing friendships. I didn't know a lot of people.

But you raised the right question. It was rocky sometimes because I got the cold shoulder in some places. In the end, it worked fine. We cooperated. We fed them material, we gave them the wherewithal so that they were good sources too.
Q: To what degree did you get feedback from your USIA colleagues in other countries? "Look, if you're talking about this substance on NATO in this particular country, that is the angle, that is the way --"

BURNETT: Regularly, and we wouldn't start at any place without every -- I developed a standard procedure that unless I could meet with the PAO or the IO at the beginning, I wouldn't do a thing. If their journalists were coming into Brussels, we'd talk to the post first. We helped them shape the angle.

But there was one compelling argument for all of this that I used. That was the question of whether or not the USIS officer in situations like that -- heavy policy, important substance -- is going to be a highly paid appointments clerk or is going to be an important substantive source himself. Would we get so on top of the subjects and would we have enough elbow room from our missions that the journalists wouldn't come to us just because they wanted an appointment with the ambassador - they'd come to us to talk policy.

I, for one - and I'm sure and most of our colleagues here - I didn't want to be a highly-paid appointments secretary. As our people in the different posts around Europe saw that by working with us they could move into those roles too and we could help them play that role, I think they saw it to their professional advantage.

But that was the game and I think if any relenting - if we hadn't pushed - it wasn't that people were falling all over themselves asking us to do this job - we were pushing to do this job. Had we not, we would have been appointment clerks because our political sections and our DCM and ambassadors' offices were generally filled by people who thought they were entirely adequate to talk to the European media themselves if only the USIS guy sets up the appointments and writes maybe a few talking points.

Q: Let me take you back to this because what you say is so important because you may remember there was a whole era in USIA when USIA officers were expected to be "impresarios" but not substantive people, --

BURNETT: Absolutely.

Q: - which drove a lot of us crazy and made us frustrated. Were you at that point swimming against the stream of the Agency or was this already kind of veering away? How did that work? I mean, what is your recollection of that part?

BURNETT: Pat, your knowledge of history is better than mine -- maybe there were two such periods because the period that you described was the Carter period for me. That's when I got those kinds of orders. I rankled the same way you did. It's terribly important about that period because I have since learned a great deal more about that period and what went into those orders, and I've seen John Reinhardt since.

I, for one, until very recently misunderstood that period and what went on. Let me hurry on
through this and get to that period quickly.

Anyway, that was this wonderful five years at NATO in which I thought I couldn't have had a better job because I was dealing with the direct meat of politics every day. Also, you notice, in the NATO mission they didn't have any important programs to run and we didn't have -- the amount of bureaucratic stuff we had to do was so minimal that at ministerials we still -- the bane of -- we were supposed to be substantive officers, we were supposed to be the front-line advocates and we were still the guys who had to arrange buses and all that crap every time there was an important visit.

But outside of that, these were wonderful days. The fact that they were, I think, is a tribute to the intelligence and the good conception of what we should be doing that people like Bill Hamilton and George Vest and Ellsworth and Rumsfeld had.

THEODORE WILKINSON
Political-Military Officer, USNATO

Theodore Wilkinson was born in Washington, DC in 1934. He received his BA from Yale and his MA from George Washington University. He served as a lieutenant in the US Navy from 1956 to 1960. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961, and his postings include Caracas, Stockholm, Brussels, Mexico City, Tegucigalpa and Brasilia. He was Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 11, 1999.

Q: So in 1970 you were assigned, what, to NATO?

WILKINSON: In early 1970, I got a letter from a friend saying that he was leaving his assignment in the American delegation to NATO, and he wondered if I’d be interested in succeeding him in his job. And of course I immediately went into full-court press to try to get that job, and in the end, I don’t know, I think there were some other people that were interested, but I was lucky enough to get it in the assignment process. That’s the first time I really pushed for an assignment and was able to get it. Previously, my assignment requests didn’t seem to have much relation to the assignments I got. Lee and I, our son “T” and the twin girls, Becky and Jenny were to go be transferred in mid-summer. I had been taking more graduate courses in the last four years and cleared the decks for Brussels by taking comprehensive field exams for a doctorate. Although I passed them all, I never found time afterwards to do the thesis.

Q: You were doing the NATO job from 1970 to when?

WILKINSON: ‘74.

Q: ‘74. Where were you stationed?
WILKINSON: Brussels.

Q: Brussels. Obviously, what you were doing was turning you into a political-military officer.

WILKINSON: That’s right.

Q: Was there such a field at that time, or was it -

WILKINSON: Absolutely, absolutely. In fact, I think the field of political-military officers thrived particularly during the cold war. I’d sensed that since 1990 the embassies’ political-military sections and the role of political-military officers has probably diminished from what it was in the days when almost everything we did was colored by optic of whether it had an equal and opposite effect on Soviet involvement in country X.

Q: Well, in NATO, you had four years there?

WILKINSON: Yes.

Q: What was your particular responsibility?

WILKINSON: Well, at the time, our mission to NATO, our civilian mission to NATO, had a political and a political-military section. The Political Section did issues of policy coordination in what - for want of a better word - could be called our Ostpolitik, how one dealt with the countries of Eastern Europe and how one dealt with other political issues of concern to NATO, sometimes on a more cosmic level, such as the Middle East crisis and the Cyprus crisis. And the Political-Military section did issues of disarmament and related political-military problems that were more clearly defined in scope. Larry Eagleburger was the political counselor at the time, and my boss was a man named Vince Baker, and there couldn’t have been two more different people, Larry Eagleburger being outgoing and, of course, at the beginning of a very illustrious further career, and Vince Baker being an older “Wristonized” person who really didn’t ever want to go abroad and had never previously served outside of the United States, but was an expert on disarmament and political-military issues from the European Policy Bureau. So under Vince’s supervision, I did arms control work, and there were three of us. The other person who was working with us at the time was Arthur Woodruff, who was senior to me and did whatever specific issues came up. But the general work on disarmament as it involved NATO was mine, and that included being assigned as the American member of a group which was just being formed to design mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. So I had an interesting new job, which was to represent the U.S. in a working group of NATO to design a plan to reduce forces bilaterally in Europe, for the NATO side to be reduced and for the Warsaw Pact side to be reduced in a balanced way. At this point in 1970, there was no agreement to have such negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, but NATO hoped there would be one.

Q: Well, when you arrived there, what was the attitude towards several elements, but about the mutual and balanced reduction of force in Europe? Was there a feeling that this could possible fly, or the Soviets were still sort of in our dog house as far as after Czechoslovakia went?
WILKINSON: That’s right. The West basically, the United States in particular, was already feeling the economic pinch of supporting American forces in Europe. We wanted our allies to pick up more of the burden. We wanted them to share the burden, contribute more to their own defense, and for the U.S. to maintain fewer forces in Europe and spend less. But we didn’t want to do this unilaterally because we felt it would be an invitation to Soviet meddling in Western Europe, that the withdrawal of American military, the winding down of American forces... As I recall there were something like 200,000 ground troops and maybe 100,000 others, navy and air force, in Western Europe, and the burden of supporting this large a contingent was pretty heavy.

Q: We were beginning to have balance-of-payment problems, I think. At this point they were beginning to become apparent.

WILKINSON: Yes, I think it was 1971, when we went off the gold standard, so that was driving us to look for ways to find a balanced reduction of forces in Europe. And the Germans had a sort of parallel interest in promoting a more peaceful, a more permanent situation in Europe. We were still living in an armed camp, which didn’t seem necessary 25 years after World War II. It seemed like it was time to move on to a more permanent and peaceful, less tense, confrontation in Europe, so they were pursuing what they called the Ostpolitik, which was basically a policy of detente.

Q: Now this was Willy Brandt’s-

WILKINSON: It was Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr and a German Social-Democratic policy basically, but one that was adopted and followed by the Christian Democrats as well. The Soviets, in turn, wanted reassurance that Germany basically would not seek revenge and change frontiers that had been established at Yalta and Potsdam, and what they sought was a conference that would ratify the new status quo - division of Germany in two parts, the Russian seizure of parts of eastern Poland and the eastern tip of Czechoslovakia, that these borders wouldn’t be changed, or at least that there would be no attempt to change them by force, some reassurance that Germany would not once more attempt to impose its will on Russia. So they were seeking a so-called European Security Conference. And it was Kissinger who, in the early ‘70s, met with the Soviets and Western Europeans and put together the compromise that eventually prevailed, which was that both of these initiatives would go forward in parallel, the mutual and balanced force reductions to satisfy the West and the European Security Conference to satisfy the Russians. I don’t remember the exact date - I believe it was in 1972 - that this compromise was first reached and formalized and publicized. And it was agreed that the two conferences would begin in 1973, and in fact they did.

Q: This was the beginning of what became known as the Helsinki Accords.

WILKINSON: The beginning of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation - “Cooperation” was added because the West felt that it shouldn’t be limited to just security issues and then in parallel, the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions. The CSCE, as it was called, actually met in preliminary sessions, all but the final session, in Geneva, and I ultimately was at the last round of that conference before the final act was signed in Helsinki in mid-1975.
Q: Well, could you talk a bit about the dynamics within Western Europe and the United States from your perspective on these Geneva talks, I mean, before and up through.

WILKINSON: Well, let me talk a little bit first about designing a position for going into these talks with the Soviet Union on mutual and balanced force reduction. Within the mission, really, the political-military side handled the preparations for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), and the political side that worked for Larry Eagleburger worked on the European Security Conference. Ultimately we were all amalgamated into one section under Larry later in my tenure in NATO. But MBFR was an effort to define a simple formula for force reductions in Central Europe that would leave the West protected against an overwhelming Soviet land power and at the same time satisfy the Soviets that their security was not diminished. Trying to find formulas that would do this was not easy. NATO’s forces were positioned to block an invasion of Western Europe through the north European plains. In exchange for Soviet reductions in Eastern Europe, NATO would reduce forces in Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium. The French said, “We don’t want to have anything to do with this; you’re not going to reduce forces on our territory.” Therefore, France was ruled out from the start. France had already departed from the integrated structure of NATO in 1965. They in effect said, We’re in NATO for political purposes and not for military purposes. Count us out when you’re talking about NATO-Warsaw Pact, bloc-to-bloc disarmament and military initiatives. And on the Eastern side, we talked basically about reducing Soviet forces basically in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. And there were innumerable discussions about what the formula for reductions would be, what kinds of ceilings had to be put on air power to make sure that air power wasn’t used to make up for what was reduced in terms of land forces, and we debated these issues among ourselves at NATO ad nauseam for the three years between 1970 and 1973 until we actually entered the negotiations in Vienna. When we did enter into negotiations, the allies also insisted for negotiating purposes, that Hungary be included on the Eastern side. And the Soviets said, “No, Hungary isn’t part of Central Europe; Hungary’s in Southern Europe.” Strategically speaking they said, it’s part of our “southern” group of forces. And we had a lovely argument about the geography of Hungary. Although I wasn’t there, Vlad Lehovich told me that he found a Russian lexicon defining Hungary as “a country in Central Europe.” But in the end it was agreed that Hungary would not be included in the area of reduction.

Q: How about within our delegation and as we worked on this? I would have thought that you would have found a rather sharp divide between our military members and our civilian members.

WILKINSON: Indeed. That’s very perceptive. The military, of course, did not like the idea of either (1) reductions or (2)(even worse) post-reduction ceilings. Of course, if you’re going to have reductions, it’s meaningless if you can move forces back in the next day, so you have to have some kind of a ceiling that is agreed to for the period after reductions. And the military said, Well, that restricts our ability to reinforce when there’s a political crisis and restricts our exercises and our maneuverability, and we don’t like this. We don’t want to have anything to do with it. But the motive for MBFR always was political and economic, to the extent that it was necessary, and in the end it proved scarcely necessary, because the Soviets were reducing faster than the agreement could decree. At the time it seemed that it would be necessary and that our
military would just have to swallow it, but there might well have been ratification difficulties.

Q: *What was the perception at that time, during the early ’70s, of the Soviet military threat?*

WILKINSON: Well, it was still the perception of the West that the Soviet army, which numbered in the millions, several million ground troops, was the overwhelming military reality of Europe, that the West, while much better equipped and technically more advanced, simply could not withstand the crushing numbers of the Soviet military if the Soviets had been motivated to roll through Northern Europe. And to the classic argument that the defender has an advantage that requires the offensive nation to invade or attack with a three-to-one or two-and-one-half-to-one advantage in order to win an engagement, came the obvious military reply; “Yes, but you can’t be sure, and that’s not a genuine formula because leadership matters, etc. So don’t assume that we can defend Western Europe without keeping our forces at our current level unless you have very strong reductions on the Soviet side and very firm limitations afterwards” - and even the NATO military people don’t like it because those limitations would also apply to us.

Q: *Well, I would think that also, looming over the whole thing, would be the fact that the Soviets have a land border and they can step back a little ways, and we’ve got an ocean. It’s pretty apparent when we come in, and they can sort of slip people in without making as many waves as we would.*

WILKINSON: Absolutely right. That was always an element in any equation, that the costs and logistics for our reinforcements were vastly more difficult than theirs.

Q: *Now we have this annual - what is it? - “Reforger” exercise of bringing troops from the United States. We did it every year to keep the sinews in exercise.*

WILKINSON: Right, exactly.

Q: *Was there implicit, when the people were talking about a war in Europe, that somewhere along the line somebody was going to use a nuclear weapon if it gets out of hand, one way or another?*

WILKINSON: Well, there is even today a debate with the new German Government, which took office a few months ago, the Schröder Government, proposing that NATO adopt a no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy to reduce further the risk of nuclear war in Europe. But in the past, it’s usually been the Soviets who wanted such an agreement. NATO resisted it because nuclear retaliation was a major element of our “deterrent.”

Let’s finish with these European disengagement action talks - which I worked at through mid-1973. When our delegation actually entered negotiations in Vienna we had a higher-level negotiator, Jock Dean, who came and became the chief negotiator for the Vienna force reduction talks. And the site of discussions moved from the preparatory stage to an actual negotiation on the site, where both sides were meeting in their separate seats, NATO in Brussels and the Soviets in the Warsaw Pact context. And so that was the end of the preparatory phase. And then we
entered the phase where the security conference met in Geneva and the arms reduction talks were meeting in Vienna.

Q: All right, well, we’ll pick that up, but first one question: was the Mansfield Amendment floating around at this time, which was to withdraw many of our forces.

WILKINSON: Absolutely, absolutely, and one of the principal efforts of the U.S. delegation in Brussels was to find ways to deflect the Mansfield Amendment, because we felt that any unilateral withdrawal, any kind of unilateral disarmament, would be destructive of our defense relationship and our basic security interests in Western Europe.

Q: Well, did the fact that you had this Mansfield Amendment, which every administration had opposed, but still, did this have the effect of making the Western European allies take our presence in Europe more seriously and realize that they’d better sort of shape up themselves?

WILKINSON: Absolutely, it had exactly that effect. It forced the pace for our allies, some of whom were more interested in MBFR than others. The Germans always were willing to go along with us on MBFR. Some of our other allies were very concerned about it, particularly the flank states, like Norway, and the southern flank, the Greeks and the Turks, felt that if we reduced forces in Central Europe, the Russians would station more forces on their borders and their security interests would suffer. So we had to wave the Mansfield Amendment flag all the time, on the one hand, to show our allies that we meant business when we talked about force reductions, and then go back to Washington and say the opposite, Defeat the Mansfield Amendment because it will break our alliance.

Q: One further question and then we’ll stop. What about, was there a certain amount of disquiet within our representation about Brandt’s Ostpolitik in Germany?

WILKINSON: I think the Republican Party never was quite sure. Certainly the more conservative elements in the Washington establishment were worried about the Ostpolitik. They thought it would lead to a rapprochement of Europe too fast and stimulate pacifism in Western Germany at a time when we were hoping that the West Germans would bear a greater defense burden, so it wasn’t universally welcomed in Washington. I don’t think Henry Kissinger saw it as necessarily a great policy, although he was clever enough to be able to work with it and manipulate it to our own satisfaction.

HAROLD W. GEISEL
Budget and Fiscal Officer
Brussels (1971-1972)

Ambassador Geisel was born in Illinois in 1947. He received his BA from Johns Hopkins and his MBA from the University of Virginia. After entering the Foreign Service in 1971, he was posted in Brussels, Oslo, Bern, Bamako, Durban, Rome, Bonn and Moscow and served as Ambassador to Mauritius. He was interviewed
GEISEL: My first assignment was junior budget and fiscal officer in Brussels. Now you know in those days, you know very well in those days, an assignment in EUR was different, especially Western Europe. And would you believe I had to be interviewed by the EUR personnel person as a brand new junior officer before they would agree to the assignment? But I made a good impression and I went. And I made such an impression that after a year they moved me out of Brussels to take over the budget and fiscal officer job in Oslo where after a few months I was having the time of my life socially, shall we say, as a bachelor but, I said this is ridiculous, you don’t need an American here, it’s a waste. And I forgot about that, as I had a better and better and better and better and better time and sure enough, ultimately Joan Clark figured it out and after a single year I went back to be the assistant post management officer in EUR/EX. Except that just before I got there, Joan fired the post management officer so I was acting post management officer with all of really two years under my belt.

Q: That’s a pretty responsible job, a very responsible job.

GEISEL: Oh, it was. In those days, I was an FSO-6, yes, I was a 6 in a 3 job. And this went on and on, month after month, and finally I just happened to notice in the traffic, which I wouldn’t have normally seen, maybe I was duty officer or something, a thing where they were offering the post management job to someone else, an experienced admin officer who was an FSO-3 and he turned it down, I saw that too, and I went in to Joan’s office on Monday and I said, I’d been there, I think about four months and I was killing myself. I would come in at 7:30-8 in the morning and I wouldn’t leave until 10 at night. I’d have my lunch and my dinner brought to me, I would work from 8:00 to 4:00 on Saturday and I would work three, four hours on Sunday. And I was annoyed. And so I went in to Joan and I said Joan, are you happy with the job I’m doing? And she said we’ve never had anyone like it, it’s wonderful. You know, I can’t believe you’re doing all this. I said fine, if you get me a boss, I quit. And Joan just smiled in her way of smiling and she said let me see what I can do. And of course they downgraded the job to an FSO-4 job and apparently a two-grade stretch was doable and then paneled me in to it. Then as soon as I left, Nick Baskey took the job from me and it went back to FSO-3.

Q: I want to go back.

GEISEL: Go.

Q: In the first place, how did you cotton to budget and fiscal work?

GEISEL: Oh, I was sort of a numbers guy. And I don’t remember who I spoke with but one of my more senior officers who I spoke with, perhaps even at that card party, saw what I was interested in and whatnot and he said you know, you could really do well because everybody, all admin people hate budget and fiscal, they leave it to specialists, and you could really go places as an FSO if you were into it. And I said sure, why not? And I did. And he was right except after two years of it I never went back. But at least I was always in the position that no budget officer I ever had could pull the wool over my eyes.
Q: What was working in Brussels like at the time? You were there, this would be 19?

GEISEL: ’71 to ’72. Well, it was a mighty big place. The ambassador was John Eisenhower who was a lovely guy but we didn’t see much of him.

Q: He had, you know, I’ve talked to people, he was, to put it mildly, disengaged.

GEISEL: Not only was he disengaged he was very unhappy there and he drank too much.

Q: Yes, I’ve heard that.

GEISEL: But he was a lovely, lovely nice person. His DCM, I can’t think of a better word than to call him an asshole. His name was, well, I won’t even say his name except we used to call him Luigi Di Roma. His first name was Lou. And he had been, I think he’d been DCM in Rome or, no, no, no he was economic counselor in Rome, I think. And I remember Eisenhower, I made the usual appointment to see him and he saw me and the DCM, it was put off I believe six times because he was so busy and that started my disdain for much political work because what the hell was going on at the bilateral mission to Belgium? I mean, give me a break. The only work that was being done in those days that was of significance was Embassy support for NATO and the Common Market in the admin section. And I mean, the place was full of political officers who were doing jack. I mean, you know, writing reports that no one ever read.

Q: Did you find yourself as an admin officer sort of the low man on the totem pole?

GEISEL: Oh definitely, definitely. That fact didn’t mean much to me. In fact I found it absolutely amusing. I had friends, including Belgian friends. My father’s uncle lived there, so I had plenty to do and I was bemused and amused by the pretensions at the bilateral mission. And I had a very nice girlfriend who worked at USEC, the economic mission, and so I was a happy camper. I remember I didn’t get an invitation to the Fourth of July and there were a few other junior officers who didn’t. I think the admin and consular officers, junior officers didn’t get it. Well surprise, surprise. That was sort of old Foreign Service. And I don’t think any of us cared, now that I think about it, but I know I certainly didn’t care. We had a very nice gang, actually. The young admin and consular all stuck together and it was a very nice gang.

ROBERT M. BEECROFT
Deputy Political Advisor, SHAPE
Brussels (1971-1973)

While Ambassador Beecroft served as Political Officer at a number of posts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, his primary focus was on Political/Military Affairs, both in Washington and abroad. Later in his career he served as Special Envoy to the Bosnia Federation and subsequently as Ambassador to the Office of Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) operating in Bosnia & Herzegovina. A native of New Jersey, Ambassador Beecroft served in the US Army and studied at
Q: What were you picking up, in the first place you were in Brussels from ’71 to when?

BEECROFT: To ’73.

Q: ’73. What were you picking up regarding the NATO forces at that time? This was a time wasn’t it when our military was under great strain to put it mildly I think.

BEECROFT: Yes, there was a lot of concern because of course this was early in the détente era. The military were very much focused on the possibility of a full-scale nuclear war with the Soviet Union. There was a lot of concern on the part of the European allies that the Americans were aiming at the wrong target by focusing on Vietnam. They wanted us to stay massively committed in Europe. They considered that we were frittering away our strength on the periphery instead. They had also heard reports, which were accurate, of serious morale problems and operational difficulties inside the U.S. military.

Q: What were you picking up there of the Soviet threat?

BEECROFT: Two words that summed up the whole thing were “Fulda Gap.” People at SHAPE had nightmares about massive Soviet armored forces crashing through NATO’s defenses there, in northern Bavaria, and heading for the Channel. Remember, it wasn’t just the Soviet Union either. There was the entire Warsaw Pact that had to be taken into account. The East Germans were taken with great seriousness, because the East German military was considered very effective, the others less so.

Q: What was your boss, what’s his name?

BEECROFT: McAuliffe. Eugene V. McAuliffe.

Q: McAuliffe. What was his background and how did he operate?

BEECROFT: Gene McAuliffe was a political-military expert and a Europeanist to his fingertips. He served in the Army in World War II, then became and FSO. His first job in the Foreign Service was as George S. Patton’s political advisor, or POLAD. Can you imagine being George S. Patton’s POLAD? He was a great Irish storyteller from the Boston suburbs. Gene would tell stories about arriving at SHAPE in France in 1944, when it was still SHAEF -- Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force – only to hear SACEUR, General Eisenhower say, “Okay, you look just like the kind of person I want to send out to advise Patton.” Everyone was snickering, advise Patton? When McAuliffe arrived at Patton’s headquarters, Patton said, “Well, I guess Ike must know what he’s doing” and gave him a large black Packard sedan with a single word on the license plate: “Official.” Patton directed him to drive around and report back on what he saw. So McAuliffe witnessed the closing stages of World War II from a black Packard. He spent a lot of time in EUR/RPM. He knew all the NATO issues. He came to SHAPE from an
 ambassadorship in Spain, and later became Ambassador to Hungary and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He was quite a mercurial, hot-tempered Irishman, as hot as Goodpaster was cool. He knew how to relate to the military and had Goodpaster’s respect and confidence. When you deal with the military, you must treat them as human beings and respect them as professionals. The Foreign Service tends to patronize them, and that’s a mistake.

Q: Oh, a terrible mistake. Well, tell me, in the first place how did you react to getting this wet behind the ears junior officer because I would have thought that this would be a plum PM job that would come to somebody who had been on a couple of tours in Europe or something.

BEECROFT: The Deputy POLAD job at SHAPE was a great job for a junior FSO. I learned a lot and felt very fortunate to be there. Sadly, the Department later handed the slot over to the Pentagon, so from then on the Deputy POLAD at SHAPE was a U.S. military officer. But in my time it was a job for an O-6 or O-7. Frankly, it was a huge opportunity. After I had been there for a year or so, McAuliffe became the DCM at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels and I became Acting POLAD to SACEUR for several months, as an O-7. Our Ambassador to NATO at the time was a certain Donald Rumsfeld. It took Washington quite a while to find a successor to McAuliffe. Ironically, I ended up writing Gene McAuliffe’s efficiency report, which was signed Goodpaster without changes. I just wrote what I thought would do him the most good.

One of the best learning experiences I had there, both under McAuliffe and his eventual successor, Ted Long, was to go up to Brussels once a week and poke around. McAuliffe had an official black Plymouth sedan. His driver would take me to the Embassy and NATO headquarters at Evere, just outside the city. My job was to glean what intelligence I could as a lowly junior officer, and report back. I was inconspicuous enough so that I could occasionally pick up some interesting information.

Q: Which embassy?

BEECROFT: The U.S. Embassy to Belgium. Then I would go out to USNATO. McAuliffe called this “spying on the enemy,” because there was, and still is, a certain amount of tension between SHAPE and NATO headquarters and between the POLAD at SHAPE and the people at NATO. I would check in with the Political Section at USNATO and talk with some of the people on the international side and get a sense of what was on their agendas. What was on their minds? What were their policy priorities? Were there changes in the works that hadn’t been officially broached with SHAPE yet? I would take this back and brief McAuliffe and sometimes go with him to brief General Goodpaster. It was heady stuff for a junior officer.

Q: What about, I mean, NATO was always you’ve got all these countries, but particularly at that time you had the Turks and the Greeks.

BEECROFT: Correct.

Q: Who really spent most of their time arming against each other. I mean there are a lot of political booby traps everywhere you read, the cables, obviously were you reading the cables to your principal and pointing out here comes trouble and that sort of thing?
BEECROFT: Yes. I soon learned that for a junior officer one of the most important tasks is to read everything, and also to know where it is filed. We had a wonderful, very loud Foreign Service Secretary – the term OMS didn’t exist -- named Mary Ann. You could hear her voice way down the hall. Sadly, Mary Ann became ill, and eventually it proved fatal. I ended up doubling as the de facto filer. We got the cables and reports from military channels and belatedly from civilian channels. I read through the stuff and would highlight it, pull out a dozen or so cables I thought McAuliffe would want to share with General Goodpaster or that I thought he should know about. It was a wonderful learning experience. Basically, in hindsight I was really cheeky. I didn’t know much of anything. You just have to use your instinct, wing it and hope it works.

Q: Were you also playing sort of the mole going to the officers’ mess listening to the gossip and bringing back?

BEECROFT: Not just the officers’ mess. There was an O club, but there was also an NCO club. Having been both an NCO and an officer myself, I knew that the NCO club would have better food and a livelier atmosphere.

Q: That’s a given.

BEECROFT: Yes. You could pick up a lot of stuff in both places. Because I had studied in Europe and spoke French, German and Danish, I got to know the other nationalities, starting with the Belgians and the French -- because there were French there. One thing that was never talked about much was that there was a French military liaison mission at SHAPE, even though it was only a few years since the French had kicked SHAPE out of Paris. The French military were always more loyal to NATO than the civilians in Paris. General Goodpaster was political to the tips of his fingers. He kept the French account in his office. He knew the French Chief of Staff very well. He knew everyone who mattered at the French Defense Ministry. The lines never got cut.

Q: Did he visit Paris?

BEECROFT: Funny you should mention that, I hadn’t thought of that in years. I heard that he used to dress as a civilian now and then and go down there.

Q: Well, I know later I talked, when I was in Naples, this was in the late ‘70s Admiral Crowell was the CINCSOUTH guy used to say that the French used to have naval maneuvers with the navy, but they were, I mean it was very close relations.

BEECROFT: The French military never wanted to get out of the game. Leaving the NATO integrated military structure was not a military decision. It was a purely political decision. Ever since then, right up to the present, it has been quite easy to work with the French military. The problem was not at the Ministry of Defense; it was at the Quai d’Orsay and the Matignon.

Q: That would be the?
BEECROFT: Presidency.

Q: Yes. Well, now, what I mean this is what five years, seven years after, well, no it was five years after leaving, you were saying that it was still considered to be sort of a temporary thing, but what were you picking up? Was there sort of a sigh when they were talking about the French? I mean I’m talking about really the French political position, the people there.

BEECROFT: No one understood why they had done it. No one could really see what was in it for them to expel NATO from Paris. After all, a French general commanded the central front of NATO. The French had a significant presence throughout the integrated military structure. After all, they were considered one of the victorious allies. They got there the hard way, but that’s the fact. It didn’t make sense from a military point of view, but it reflected de Gaulle’s determination to rebuild France’s self-confidence. It was also based on a visceral distrust of any alliance he couldn’t control, especially when the Americans were in the lead. There’s an anecdote about de Gaulle one day exclaiming in frustration, “Ah! If only I were the president of the United States.” Well, he wasn’t.

Q: How did you feel things integrated, the Germans, the British, Belgians, Dutch and others?

BEECROFT: This was a time when there was only one DSACEUR -- Deputy Supreme Commander -- and he was always British. This went back to the Eisenhower-Montgomery relationship. But there were the beginnings, just the beginnings, of German expressions of interest in the job, since they made the largest single military contribution to NATO after the United States. The eventual compromise that was reached well after my time was that there would be two DSACEURs (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe), one German and one British. I believe they rotate now, alternately British or German.

Q: Was there a German-British problem at the time did you see?

BEECROFT: No, it was a little bit too soon. Willy Brandt was the chancellor. Brandt still had a visceral affection for the United States, which had been reinforced when Kennedy came to Berlin in 1963 and Brandt was mayor. At the same time, Brandt was intent on opening doors to East Germany, the GDR. There were plenty of British bases in Germany then, but there were the beginnings of concern in London, especially since the Brits hadn’t yet made the fateful decision to take the plunge and join the EU.

Q: Was there concern at the time that you were picking up, I really that you were really at the end of the feeding chain.

BEECROFT: Yes.

Q: But concern that the Germans might make a deal for the unification of Germany that they’d be out, in other words, that they would go neutral that would really take the guts out of NATO.

BEECROFT: There may have been such concerns, but you’re absolutely right that I was not in a
position and certainly I was not at a level that would have allowed me to get into those sorts of high policy discussions. I may have heard things in corridors, but when it came to the military relationship, Germany was the perfect partner.

*Q:* But you were saying, here you were a junior officer equivalent to maybe a first lieutenant acting on behalf of a man who is equivalent to a two star general when your Polad was no longer there and I mean one just doesn’t go into this job. Things, rank means a lot, who talks to you and all that. There must have been a diminution of what you could offer Goodpaster during this time.

BEECROFT: I got no guidance from Brussels or Washington, none at all. All I heard from RPM was “We are looking for a successor to Ambassador McAuliffe, keep up the good work and we’ll let you know.” So I decided that I would in all discretion try to give SACEUR the kind of information I knew he was getting from McAuliffe. Gene was a very open and transparent person. He sent in memos to SACEUR when issues came to his attention from Brussels or things popped up in cables that would turn on a red light that he thought SACEUR should know about. I did my best to do the same, in kind if not with the same authority. This went on for four months. My understanding is that the word finally went out from Goodpaster to Washington, Beecroft is giving me good insights, I’m pleased, but I need a senior replacement for McAuliffe. Periodically, he would call me in and we would talk. It was pretty humbling for a guy who had been a Spec 4 not many years before and never rose above the rank of First Lieutenant, but I just figured I’m not going to be doing this man any good by hunkering down and doing the minimum; I’ll do my best to give him what I think he ought to get. I had just enough understanding of the political situation and the military side of it. Thank God I’d been in the army. I came out of it okay.

*Q:* Can you think of any of the issues that you would bring up?

BEECROFT: I remember one in particular that sounds kind of funny now. I got a request from him SACEUR day: he wanted to know what his responsibilities were, legal, constitutional and operational responsibilities, for the defense of Spitzbergen, also known as Svalbard -- the islands between Norway’s North Cape and the North Pole.

*Q:* They were kind of a big deal during World War II.

BEECROFT: Yes, they were. They remained a big deal because the sea lanes that Soviet submarines took out of Murmansk went right between Svalbard and the North Cape. That’s a couple of hundred miles. Well, I began researching this. It was almost like a graduate student exercise. It turned out that Svalbard is a sovereign part of the kingdom of Norway, but that there were more Russians than Norwegians on Svalbard.

*Q:* Coal miners.

BEECROFT: “Coal.” Apparently the quality of the coal is very poor, but it gave the Russians a pretext to stay there. The pretext based on the 1923 Treaty of Paris. That treaty gave sovereignty to Norway, but allowed any of about 20 treaty signatories to exploit it economically, which is
why the Russians could have their coal miners up there. Another thing the treaty did was to declare Svalbard perpetually neutral territory. So, after I checked it out -- I’m not a lawyer, but my father was and he influenced me -- I sent a memo in SACEUR saying that in my view, he had no operational responsibility for Svalbard. He could not put any NATO soldiers there. He could not use it as a base of operations. That didn’t seriously affect his NATO assets, which didn’t need to land on Svalbard to cover the gap. Apparently it was the answer he was hoping for. I remember that because his questions were usually operational, yes, but with underlying political overtones. One thing this taught me was when you are a really successful general, you are always weighing the political implications of what you do. You’re always factoring them in.

Q: How about the Norwegian component of NATO? Was this, did you consult with them or not?

BEECROFT: No. When you were working on the command corridor you did not go consulting around. You found another way to do it. If he had wanted a Norwegian opinion, he would have asked the Norwegians.

Q: Did anything change when you had the new POLAD came in?

BEECROFT: Well, for one thing I took a deep breath for the first time in about four months. I spent much of my last half-year at SHAPE breaking him in, because this was not a person who had a lot of NATO experience. He was a Latin America specialist named Theodore Long, Ted Long. He came from an ambassadorship in Colombia. I worked very closely with him and we bonded well. He had no ego problems and didn’t mind asking questions. That was in the winter and spring of 1973, just before I left.

THOMAS M. T. NILES
Deputy Chief of Mission, USNATO
Brussels (1971-1973)

Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles was born in Kentucky in 1939. He received his bachelor’s degree from Harvard University and master’s from the University of Kentucky. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1962, he was positioned in Belgrade, Garmisch, Moscow and Brussels, and also served as the Ambassador to Canada and later to Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 5, 1998.

Q: Where did you go in 1971?

NILES: I was supposed to go back to Washington. I was assigned to EUR/RPE in Washington. But sometime in June 1971, I received a call from George Vest, who was the DCM at U.S. NATO, then. He asked if I would be interested in coming to replace David Anderson at U.S. NATO. David was going off to work in the Political Section of Embassy Bonn. I said, “Sure, why not? It sounds interesting.” I swung by Brussels and had a few days there, and got a little bit of a feel for Brussels and U.S. NATO. Then, I came back on home leave, and we arrived in
Brussels around the 1st of September.

Q: *This was 1971 to when?*


Q: *I think we have time to do that, don’t we?*

NILES: Probably, not all of it, but we can start.

Q: *All right, then let’s start. Tell me, what did United States mission to NATO do, at that time? What was it?*

NILES: It was a large political/military mission. When I got there, we had no ambassador, and were without one for a good part of the time I was there. Robert Ellsworth, a former Congressman from Kansas, who was a close friend of President Nixon, left in August or so of 1971. Larry Eagleburger, who was the Political Counselor left to go to the Department of Defense, where he was a Deputy Assistant Secretary, working for Warren Nutter, who was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Jim Goodby came to replace Larry Eagleburger as Political Counselor. George Vest was the DCM, or frequently, the Charge d’Affaires of the Mission. U.S. NATO did essentially two things. On the one side, we had the interaction of the other Allies on political issues, particularly east-west relations in their various aspects. Then, we had the military relationship. There was a separate section, headed by a civilian with the title “Military Advisor,” which worked in the Military Committee of the Alliance, interacting with all the other allies except the French on the military cooperation among the 14 members, as we put it, of the Integrated Military Command. That was everybody except France. France was involved on the political side, but not on the military side. It was a large Mission. We also had a small Economic Section which participated in the Economic Committee of the Alliance and people working on emergency management issues and various other issues.

Q: *I would have thought you would have been paralleling the European Economic Community, it went through various changes at that time.*

NILES: Well, the E.C., at that time, was in the process of its first enlargement beyond the original six. At the end of 1972, the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined. In 1967, they merged the various communities: The Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), EURATOM, and the Economic Community (what we called the “Common Market” into the European Communities, headquartered in Brussels. It is interesting that you say that though. You raise the parallel between NATO and the European community. While I was at USNATO, the European Community began, for the first time, its work on political issues, what they called European Political Cooperation. It focused on what ultimately became the CSCE. We were working on CSCE, too, and as Jim Goodby has written, the largest part of what became the western position in Helsinki was produced in USNATO. The initial CSCE negotiations started in December 1972. All that work was done in the Political Section of the U.S. Mission to NATO, under Jim Goodby’s direction. Jerry Helman was involved. Leo Ready was the principal author of much
this stuff. He did some terrific work. I worked on it, too, but I didn’t do anywhere near as much as Leo did. Ted Wilkinson worked on the political/military side. The work of the USNATO Political Section became the western position at Helsinki, focusing on human rights issues, including the freer movement of people, and on confidence-building measures in the military area was really of enormous importance. We didn’t realize at the time how important this was. Subsequently, it turned out, that this was one of the elements, perhaps not the most important, but one of the key elements in the ultimate end of the Cold War and the destruction of the Soviet system.

Q: It gave that wedge, particularly between the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc allies.

NILES: It’s a classic example that you have to be careful that you will get what you want. The Soviets were the major proponents in a European security conference because they wanted to ratify their conquests in Eastern Europe. They wanted to get Western acceptance of the borders in Eastern Europe, particularly the division of Germany, but also the situation in Czechoslovakia, and so forth. We wanted to create a more fluid situation in Europe where we could use our strengths, particularly the attractiveness of our way of life, our democratic societies and free economies, to undermine their system. It was clear as day what we were trying to do. They knew what we were trying to do. We knew they knew what we were trying to do. Everybody knew what everybody was trying to do. There were no hidden agendas. We didn’t stand up and say that they wanted to undermine the Soviet system, and the Soviets did not say they wanted to ratify the accomplishments of the Red Army, but in fact, that was what was going on. In the end, of course, we accepted, more or less, the accomplishments of the Red Army, except for the occupation of the Baltic States. Obviously, we are not going to try to overthrow those accomplishments, at least by military means. But for the Soviet Union and the Communist governments of Eastern Europe, CSCE turned out to be a very difficult process to manage. Ultimately, they were unable to do it. Within a couple years after the Helsinki summit, which was in July 1975, we began to see reverberations in Eastern Europe of the positions on human rights and fundamental freedoms that those countries accepted. Courageous people in countries like Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, for example, with the “Charter 77,” said to Gustav Husak “Hey, you agreed at Helsinki, Mr. President, to respect these fundamental rights and freedoms, how about in our country?” It really started the ball rolling. We didn’t realize at the time what a tremendous ball we started rolling.

Q: I have an interview with George Vest, who talks about when he was dealing with these in Helsinki...

NILES: He did a fabulous job.

Q: That Henry Kissinger kept trying to undercut him because Kissinger would tell Dobrynin, “Don’t pay too much attention to that. The real business is SALT,” or whatever he was working on, “This other thing is a side show.” Vest would hear, say, from the Swedes, “We’re talking to the East Germans.” Kissinger didn’t think much of what he was telling them.

NILES: Not only that. We heard directly from Secretary of State William Rogers, or from Assistant Secretary for EUR Martin Hillenbrand, “You guys have really stirred something up.” It
was a fascinating process. George Vest was the key person in Helsinki. I was there with him for a good part of the time when he was head of our delegation to the preparatory talks from December 1972 through June 1973. The last day there, George and I went to dinner with Lev Mendelevich, the more flexible of the three Soviet negotiators, for dinner at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. We reminisced about what had happened and thought a little bit about what lay ahead. It was clear at the time that Mendelevich understood at least to some extent, whereas others didn’t, that we had laid some interesting groundwork here for the future in Helsinki. George Vest was a superb negotiator, totally unflappable, and did a marvelous job in shepherding this process along.

What happened in Helsinki? Well, let me go back, just a minute, to talk about what happened in Brussels, because that was really important. This was the period from the fall of 1971, until the fall of 1972 when the preparatory talks opened in Helsinki. NATO had essentially accepted that we were moving toward a European security conference, a long-time Soviet goal, but we had set two key conditions: the successful conclusion of the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin and the opening of MBFR.

Q: **MBFR?**

NILÉS: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations. MBFR would be separate, in our concept, from CSCE, but it had to be a parallel process to get at the heart of the military confrontation in Europe. The Soviet Union was unenthusiastic about this and never accepted the “M” in MBFR, which was our way of saying that if we withdrew 100,000 American troops from Germany and sent them to Fort Riley, Kansas, you have to take more than 100,000 Soviet troops out of East Germany. This was because the Soviet troops would presumably be in one of the western military districts of the Soviet Union, from where they could be back in Germany in 10 days. The Soviets never accepted that concept. They accepted “Mutual,” but they never accepted “Balanced.” The negotiations were always “MFR” negotiations with the Soviet Union, and for us “MBFR.” The French never accepted the linkage between MBFR and CSCE and never participated in MBFR, which they rejected because the negotiations were designed to be on a “bloc-to-bloc” basis. In their concept, CSCE was a “non-bloc” process.

The French did agree that beginning talks on a European Security Conference was conditioned on concluding a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. They loved those negotiations because they gave France “great power” status and relegated the Germans into a subordinate position. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was signed in September of 1971. Soviet agreement to start the MBFR talks was achieved in the summer of 1972. Henry Kissinger managed, I think in August of 1972, to sell them on that. Meanwhile, we were working on papers in NATO, which were to become the basis of the western position at the CSCE talks. This was when we found ourselves, for the first time, in the middle of the extraordinary interplay between the European Community and NATO. The EC at that time was in the process of moving from 6 to 9 members. Right up to the end of the enlargement process, we assumed that the EC would become a 10-member body, but the Norwegians said, “No.” The British, Irish, and Danes joined the first of January in 1973. So, it moved from six to nine. In 1971, the European Community began what they called “European Political Corporation,” which was focused almost exclusively on CSCE. At the same time, in NATO, the same six countries were working with the other Allies (the US,
the UK, Norway, Greece, Turkey and Portugal) on the same subject. In NATO, we put together papers on principles for interstate relations, human rights, on economic cooperation and confidence-building measures in the military area. As a consequence, you had this parallelism where the six EC members were working in NATO and at the same time working separately among themselves. The French, as always, were very keen on doing things outside NATO. How did we manage to hold this whole thing together? Well, we did it in a very unusual way. In September 1972, we passed our finished papers, so-called “Issue Papers” to the EPC (European Political Cooperation) through the Belgian Delegation to NATO. We had done most of this work in the U.S. Mission to NATO. The EC members then took those papers, as if they were a European Community product and approved them. They then passed them back to NATO, and NATO then approved them. It was a very unusual charade that we went through. The reason we did this was to keep the French more or less on board a common Western position. Had we refused to go through that process, the French had threatened to go on their own in Helsinki. But, basically, all the material that became the Western position at Helsinki, and was ultimately adopted, as well, by most of the European neutrals, was developed in the U.S. mission to NATO. As I say, Leo Reddy, Jim Goodby, Jerry Helman, Ted Wilkinson and I did this work. But, Jim Goodby and Leo Reddy were the principal creators.

Q: Was there much push from the Washington side?

NILES: Washington was largely uninvolved in the substantive work. I think we deliberately did not formally Washington what we were up to. Every now and then, we would ask for instructions. To a degree, EUR/RPM was involved through Arva Floyd, who saw the process through RPM. RPM at that time was headed by Bob McBride, who ultimately served as Ambassador to Mali, I think. Ed Streator was the Deputy Director. They understood what we were trying to do. Outside RPM and certainly outside the European Bureau, there was very little interest in Washington in what we were doing at USNATO, which was good, because if we had tried to get instructions, particularly if it had required NSC involvement, we would have never been able to do what we did. We just started plowing along and did our work in NATO, under George Vest’s guidance and Jim Goodby’s management.

Once the scene shifted to Helsinki, we not only had the support of the other NATO allies, except on occasion the French, for our positions, but very quickly the European neutrals came on board. The Finns, because they were hosts and due to their interpretation of their geographic realities, tended to be very careful. The Irish, literally for the first time in their independent national experience, became involved, and because as of January 1, 1973, they were members of the European Community, began to play an active role. The Austrians, Swedes, Swiss and Yugoslavs were also helpful. For the first time, those countries began to play an important role in an East-West event. In general, with the initial exception of our proposals for military confidence-building measures (CBMs), they looked at our proposals and said, “Hey, this is great, we like this” and joined the party. Later, they became strong proponents of the CBMs once they realized that those measures complemented rather than compromised their neutrality. This was a major setback for the Soviets and significantly complicated life for them. Indeed, the Soviets hated most of this. They hated the CBMs; they hated the “basket three” items, the humanitarian and human rights issues. They liked some of the principles, which we had put forward, particularly the principles which tended to recognize the immutability of the established
frontiers, which for them particularly meant the border between what we called “the two states in Germany.” We managed, however, to gain acceptance in the CSCE principles the concept of peaceful change, so that you could change frontiers peacefully, by mutual agreement. The Soviets initially said, “No, the frontiers can never be changed.” Obviously, that was ridiculous, and eventually even they accepted that if both parties agreed, then you could change frontiers.

Sometime in January or February 1973, the Soviets realized that they might be in for some tough times in Helsinki. What did they do? Among other things, they went to Washington, particularly to then-National Security Advisor Kissinger, and said, “Your guys in Helsinki, George Vest and company, are out of control. They are proposing all sorts of crazy things that we will never accept.” Dobrynin told everyone he could find that, “People in Moscow are very upset because of what you guys are doing in CSCE. They are never going to negotiate SALT II with you if you continue forward these ridiculous proposals on human rights and confidence-building measures. Get off this stuff.” So we began to receive instructions from Washington saying, “Hey, be careful. Kissinger is unhappy. Dobrynin is raising hell. You may have gone too far.” But, by that time, it was no longer under our control. The other members, most of them members of European Community, plus the European neutrals, had embraced our proposals. George Vest would send messages back to Washington and talk to Assistant Secretary Martin Hillenbrand on the telephone and say, “Hey, what can I do? It is not a unilateral move by the United States. We couldn’t withdraw these proposals if we wanted to because they have been endorsed by the other Allies and the neutrals, and they think they are great.” In the end, the Soviet Union bit the bullet and accepted the largest part of our proposals, obviously believing that they could find some way around most of them. There were a few things that fell by the way side, including one that I had developed on the basis of my Moscow experience which called for “Free Access to Foreign Establishments.” This meant that a country could not prevent its nationals from entering a foreign embassy to apply for a visa, which was standard procedure in the Soviet Union. The Soviet police regularly beat people who tried to apply for visas without official authorization. We gave in on that one. But, basically, the Western position on humanitarian issues won the day. It was very important.

Q: Was George Vest aware that, generally, he had started something, but was sort of hiding behind the fact that these were the Europeans?

NILES: There was some of that. George Vest was absolutely aware of what was going on. Before going to Helsinki in December 1972, we had hoped that Dr. Kissinger might see the Helsinki talks as a lower-level version of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, which he had written about. But, no such luck. He thought it was a big waste of time and a diversion from the main issues.

Q: To me, it sounds like, this wasn’t his thing. In other words, he wasn’t in control. You kind of wonder if the role of ego...

NILES: Well, I don’t know that it was ego. I think he thought it was a waste of effort that wouldn’t ever amount to anything. In addition, he had some really legitimate concerns. The US and the USSR had signed SALT I in May 1972. SALT II negotiations had begun. This was really important. There is no question that in terms of international peace and stability, in the short-
term at least, SALT II was much more important than getting this European security process under way. Ultimately, I think CSCE turned out to be of great importance. But, also, there is no question that SALT was important. So when Dobrynin came to Kissinger and said, “My guys are going crazy because of what your representatives are doing in Helsinki. It is going to have negative impact on the SALT negotiations,” Kissinger had good reason to be concerned. In the end, all the implied Soviet threats to abandon the SALT process turned out to be so much hot air. They weren’t going to walk away from the SALT talks because it was in their interest to have SALT II.

Q: Well, maybe we ought to stop at this point. I will put down here that we have talked, at some length, about your time with NATO on the Helsinki accords. I would like to talk to you a bit about what else you were doing, besides this, the next time. Also, about both Helsinki things and the role of the French. I think this is always interesting.

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Today is August the 4th 1998. Tom, first, why don’t we stick with the Helsinki accords when the French were involved. What was their perspective, their approach to these?

NILES: France had a unique approach to CSCE among the 14 NATO Allies. During the 1960s, they were much more positive than the other Allies toward proposals for a European Security Conference, which was originally a Soviet, or Warsaw pact, proposal. This became NATO policy at the December 1967 Ministerial when the so-called “Harmel Report” - “Detente and Defence” - was adopted. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968 put a hold on any developments in East-West relations. But by the fall of 1969, we were really back into it again. The French position was always somewhat different from that of the other allies. They were more positive toward CSCE and less enthusiastic about working with the other allies to develop a common position on CSCE. They were ready to discuss CSCE bilaterally with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern Europeans and less inclined to put conditions on holding a CSCE. There was one exception to that which was very important to the French position in Europe. They agreed fully with us, the British and the Germans that a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was a precondition for the CSCE. Of course, that was different for France because their position as one of the occupying powers in Germany and in Berlin was a key part of their claim to great power status.

So, the French agreed with us on that particular condition. Once we were at the Helsinki preparatory talks, which began in December 1972, the French were extremely difficult on matters of coordination at the site in Helsinki itself. In fact, they consistently refused to participate in meetings in the NATO caucus there, insisting that the CSCE was no “bloc-to-bloc” negotiation. They would coordinate positions at NATO Headquarters. In Helsinki, they did meet regularly with their European Community colleagues. They were very active in developing what came to be known as European Political Cooperation, which began with a focus on CSCE in 1970. So, it was difficult with the French. NATO coordination with them could only take place at NATO headquarters, and to the extent we coordinated with the French in Helsinki, it tended to be bilateral. George Vest, or one of the other members of the delegation, would talk with our French counterparts. It wasn’t so much that the French disagreed with us on the
substance of CSCE. It was really much more on the form. At the heart of the French position was
the fear that the United States would somehow dominate the action. They claimed not to like the
idea that CSCE could become a bloc-to-bloc negotiation, which it really wasn’t, because one of
the most important things about CSCE, was the role of the European neutrals, who as I said
emerged for the first time in a security-related negotiation.

Q: Austria...

NILES: Finland, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland. At Helsinki, the Swiss, led by Edouard Brunner,
who later served as their Ambassador in Washington, became active in European diplomacy for
the first time. The Vatican was there, as was Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was part of the caucus of
European neutrals in Helsinki. It is always a challenge to work with the French. Oft times, you
cannot do whatever you want to do without them, but sometimes you cannot do it with them,
either. I might say that we are not the only ones who have trouble with the French. They
frequently drive the other members of the European Union to distraction, too.

Q: Tom, you mentioned something that never occurred to me. I have done hundreds of these
interviews. Berlin has come up many times. While the French seem to deviate all over the place
with us, we were always having problems with the French. I guess the French were maybe
always having problems with us. I never heard it mentioned with Berlin. It seems as though on
Berlin, the Soviets were never able to use the French as a wedge in Berlin related issues.

NILES: No, as a general rule, they were not able to do that, although they tried constantly to do
so. The French were generally good partners as far as responsibility for “Berlin and Germany as
a whole” was concerned. The Soviets would try on all sorts of ploys, but they were never able to
get the French to play what would be considered a typical French role in the Berlin context. I
think the reason is very clear. France’s position in Berlin and as one of the four powers involved
with questions about “Berlin and Germany as a whole” was an important component of its
international, its great power standing. Why is France a permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council? Today, you can ask that question quite logically. But in 1945, France
was one of the victorious powers, and their occupation rights in Berlin were a key part of that
position. So, Berlin issues were always watched very, very carefully at the Quai d’Orsay.
Although we would disagree from time to time on some tactic, I cannot remember disagreements
on substance with the French on Berlin issues, and it was, relatively speaking, quite easy to work
with them in that context. I cannot recall occasions, for example, in the Quadripartite
Negotiations on Berlin, which successfully concluded in September 1971 and opened the way to
the convening of the multilateral talks in Helsinki in December of 1972, when the French really
left the reservation. They could be difficult, but on Berlin issues, they were good partners. The
other key condition that we set for beginning the CSCE preparatory talks was agreement to begin
the MBFR negotiations. The French didn’t like that because they didn’t participate in MBFR

Q: Could you explain what that is?

NILES: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. For the United States, certainly for Secretary
Kissinger, or then-National Security Advisor, Kissinger, CSCE was not a prime objective. This
was not something that he was inclined to see as very useful from the United States point of
view. I think he saw MBFR as a more useful mechanism to advance our security interests because it could, if we were successful, address some of the disparities in force levels that caused us anxiety, particularly the overwhelming advantage that the Soviet Union appeared to have, and probably did have, in armored forces, particularly in the central area along the frontier between the two states in Germany. Where we at USNATO differed with Kissinger was that we believed CSCE could also help. The United States objective in MBFR, by the way, which was adopted by NATO, was to reach agreement with the Soviets on what we called a “mixed package,” under which we would trade off reductions in United States tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for withdrawals of Soviet tanks. We never reached such agreement, but developments took care of both the preponderance of Soviet tanks and the United States tactical nuclear stockpile in Western Europe. That was our objective at the time in 1971/1972, at least at the U.S. Mission to NATO. The French refused to participate in MBFR, reflecting the fact that they were not part of NATO integrated military structure and claimed not to believe, in principle, in what they called “bloc-to-bloc negotiations.” They deeply resented the fact that the United States was successful in getting the other allies to agree that convening the MBFR talks was a precondition for convening the preparatory talks on CSCE. As I recall, it was only in July or August 1972 that Kissinger was able to secure a Soviet agreement to convene the MBFR talks. That removed the last impediment to beginning CSCE preparatory talks, which opened in Helsinki in December 1972. George Vest was named head of our Delegation and was replaced as DCM at USNATO by Eugene McCauliffe, who until then had been the Political Advisor (POLAD) at SHAPE in Mons.

Q: We’ve talked extensively about the Helsinki accords. This is during the Mission to NATO. You were with the Mission to NATO from when to when?


Q: Was this pretty much all consuming or were there other issues with NATO?

NILES: Well, no, there were many other important issues. I wasn’t involved in them because I was working primarily on CSCE and related issues. But USNATO was very much involved in all sorts of force structure issues, efforts to maintain the levels of NATO military commitments by the individual members of NATO, and trying to maintain our own military commitment to NATO. This was the time, as you recall, of the so-called Mansfield Amendment.

Q: The Mansfield Amendment was what?

NILES: As the name implies, it was sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana and called for a unilateral reduction in United States forces in Europe from 317,000 to around 200,000, as I recall. It reflected a combination of economic problems in the United States, the impact of the war in Southeast Asia, and the sense that we were spending too much on European defense. As I recall, the vote in the Senate on the Mansfield Amendment in the spring of 1973 was something like 47 to 46, or 48 to 47. To a certain degree, MBFR was a response to the Mansfield Amendment, the argument being that it would be crazy to reduce our forces in Europe unilaterally when we might be able to get something in return through MBFR, namely reductions in Soviet forces in Germany. As it was voted in the Senate, the Mansfield amendment was really a Sense of the Congressional Resolution. I do not believe that the
Mansfield Amendment itself had direct budgetary implications to reduce for the NATO commitment in the Defense Appropriation Act, but it was designed to pressure the Executive Branch to reduce the level of our forces in Europe, our commitment to NATO. It was also a signal to NATO that the United States felt that the burden sharing within the alliance was not satisfactory and the Europeans should spend more. That was a position that was generally accepted in the Executive Branch, in the State Department, Defense Department and U.S. NATO. We were constantly pressing the Allies to do more, to spend more on defense. At one point, we got a commitment from the Allies, which was never really met in practice, to spend a minimum of 3% of GDP on defense. Very few Allies actually achieved that. So, these were ongoing discussions. The Mansfield Amendment, I would say peaked in 1973 and gradually diminished after that with the passing of the Southeast Asia crisis, the end of our Vietnam involvement, the end of Watergate and the Nixon Presidency, and so forth. But while I was at USNATO, there was a real concern that the United States Congress might force us to reduce our NATO commitment significantly. That was a major concern on we were involved with the other Allies, working on ways in which we could demonstrate to the American people and to the United States Congress that NATO really was a collective defense organization and that the Allies were pulling their weight, which largely, they were. The reality was that the United States wasn’t in Europe to defend Europe. The United States was in Europe to defend the United States. We just redefined the United States security perimeter. That was a point that we stressed in our own public affairs activities at USNATO with a very large flow of visitors from the Congress and from the private sector who came through NATO. Today, people raise the question why we are in NATO since the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union doesn’t exist. Then, of course, the Cold War was at a high level and the Soviet Union very much existed but there were still people in the United States who said, “Hey, the war ended in 1945. What in the world are we doing in Western Europe with 300,000 troops?” This was a logical question, but I think we had a logical answer for it as well. So, we worked on those issues. We were also very much involved in the Berlin question. The Quadripartite Negotiations, of course, were conducted by our Embassy in Bonn, but they included an important NATO. It was important that the United States Mission to NATO, with the British, French, and German missions, kept the other Allies informed of what we were doing, not on all the details, and aware of the state of the Quadripartite Negotiations. We really needed their support and understanding of what it was we were trying to accomplish with the Soviet Union. In the event there were a breakdown in those negotiations, we would want to have the support of countries like Norway, Italy, Turkey, and the others. There was also the link NATO established between the successful conclusion of the Quadripartite Negotiations and the opening of a European Security Conference. We needed the support and understanding of the other Allies to maintain that linkage.

Q: An attack on West Berlin, was that an attack on NATO?

NILES: Absolutely. We had our Berlin Brigade in West Berlin. There were analogous troops there from Britain and France. All three Allies saw those troops as essentially trip wires which would lead to the full engagement of all our forces should the Soviets use force against West Berlin. I mean, nobody thought that our Berlin Brigade plus the British and French troops were going to be able to fight off the two Soviet tank armies that were essentially deployed around Berlin, but obviously, they would be able to give a good account of themselves should there be hostilities. That would be a signal for a general conflict in Europe between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, and almost certainly a thermonuclear war between the United States and the USSR.

Q: When you look at Berlin, 1945, the thing started, we are talking about a period not quite 30 years later, one would have thought that most issues would have been talked about, agreed to, and that it would have been business as usual.

NILES: That is true in a way. Really, from the time of the end of the Berlin blockade and the airlift in the spring/summer of 1949, Berlin was fairly calm, right up until the time of the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. There were serious disorders in East Berlin in June 1953, after Stalin’s death. There was considerable tension at the time of the building of the Wall in August of 1961. But, basically, the interaction between the three Allies and the Soviets in and around Berlin was fairly smooth, broken from time to time by “crises” around Berlin when the Soviets attempted to change the routines that had developed. Khrushchev regularly announced, beginning around 1958, that if the Western powers didn’t do such and such, and he was going to sign a peace treaty with the G.D.R. and turn responsibility for Berlin over to the G.D.R. As we now know, this was a bluff on the part of the Soviets. They regarded their rights in Berlin and Germany very much as did the French: a symbol of their Great Power status and of their triumph over the country they feared and respected most – Germany. There was no way they were going to give up those rights as long as they could maintain them. Our response to Khrushchev was that he could sign anything he wanted to with the G.D.R., but Allied rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole continued until we, together, signed a German peace treaty. We also told him that whatever he signed with the G.D.R. was between him and the G.D.R., which we didn’t recognize. There were many bluffs from the Soviets. The Soviets found the existence of West Berlin a very unsatisfactory situation because of what it did to demoralize the East Germans and make life difficult for Walter Ulbricht and then for Erik Honecker. But, of course, the construction of the Wall in August 1961 and partially solved that problem for the Soviets. It stopped the bleeding for the GDR and stabilized the situation in Central Europe. In retrospect, it established the basis for the peaceful reunification of Germany in 1989-90, although we did not see it that way at the time. Ulbricht and then Honecker, and, of course, all the Soviet leaders referred to the wall as a bulwark of peace and stability. We, of course, ridiculed that contention and said that the Wall was a sign of the weakness depravity of the Communist system. Everybody used that as an example of how the Soviet system, and the Communist system had failed. Ironically, both of us were right. All of our criticisms were absolutely true. But, at the same time, and in a peculiar way, so, too, were the Soviet and East German protestations about how the wall was a bulwark of security and stability. Once the Wall was built, it created a sort of stability. It imprisoned 17 million people in the G.D.R., but it did guarantee, in its perverse and obnoxious way, a sort of stability in a potentially unstable area. I happened, just by chance, to have visited Berlin in July 1961, just before the wall went up. It was chaos, as I remember it. People were streaming out into an enormous refugee camp set up by the Senat, the West Berlin government, and the F.R.G. with help from us and others, in the area not too far from Checkpoint Charlie. There was a sense of impending crisis, and it was a dicey situation. 2,000 to 3,000 people a day were coming across the line into West Berlin. That was obviously not sustainable. The people in the GDR had gotten wind that something was going to happen. They didn’t know what it would be but they believed, correctly, that this was their last chance to leave the GDR. The Wall put a stop to all of that in a tragic, inhumane way. Nevertheless, it did provide stability.
By the time I got to NATO in 1971, we in the West, including the FRG, had come to terms with this reality. Willy Brandt’s accession to the chancellorship in 1969 after the fall of the “Grand Coalition” that ruled Germany from 1966 to 1969 under Kurt-Georg Kiesinger was the watershed event. The SPD and the FTP formed a coalition government in 1969 with Brandt as Chancellor and Walter Sheele as Foreign Minister. That government ultimately negotiated the “Eastern Treaties: with the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia and the inter-German agreement with the G.D.R. It ultimately recognized the existence of the repulsive government in the GDR, and we finally followed suit. By the way, the GDR really was a dreadful entity. We didn’t realize at the time how dreadful it was. We didn’t realize at the time all the things the Ulbricht/Honecker regime was really up to, ranging from Stasi support for terrorism in the West and a massive state-run campaign of misusing performance enhancing drugs on their athletes. I recall that we wondered where the Baader-Meinhof people went when they weren’t killing German officials and German businessmen. We now know that they went to the GDR. and were taken good care of there. That was a repulsive government. But, Willy Brandt was a great figure for his time. Say what you will about his personal life, but he was a great statesman. He recognized reality. Under his leadership, the Germans established a new set of relationships in central Europe. As part of that process, the three “occupying powers” negotiated the Quadripartite Agreement (QA) on Berlin (the Soviets always called it the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin). Jonathan (Jock) Dean was our chief negotiator, assisted by David Anderson. Kenneth Rush, a former CEO of Union Carbide, was the Ambassador at the time, but Jock Dean really was the negotiator in Bonn. The QA codified all the practices that had grown up in and around Berlin, the movement of people and goods, and Allied officials into and around and through the city. It was enormously complicated. It was one of the most complicated negotiations in the postwar era because it described the ways in which we got around the anomalies of continuing occupation regime and the fact that we did not recognize the existence of the GDR, insisting, for example, that GDR documents didn’t exist. It was amazing.

Q: Don’t lower your tailgates, and that sort of thing?

NILES: It was really a question of finding ways to document the movement of people and goods through this system of railroads and canals that interlocked and ran throughout the Berlin area. We had all kinds of anomalies. For example, the fact that the East German railroad, the Reichsbahn, ran the railroads in West Berlin. The place was nothing but anomalies. If you scratched below the surface of Berlin, you found all kinds of strange things. These were aspects of the situation that had to be covered in the QA, which was designed to codify existing practices and to anticipate problems in the future so that we would not have Berlin crises. To a very substantial degree, it succeeded. If you think back, from September 1971 up until November 1989, which is a period of 18 years, there were basically no Berlin crises. We did have problems. I remember in 1984 or 1985, the Soviets, for reasons that weren’t entirely clear, began to impose unilateral restrictions on the flight paths for airplanes, going into Tegel. (Tempelhof was no longer in use for commercial airlines). They decreed that airplanes had to come in at a certain height and then almost dive bomb Berlin. Instead of going through a lengthy descent, which would begin halfway between the zone border and Berlin, you had to go at a height above 13,000 feet almost up to the border of Berlin and then begin a very steep descent into Tegel. The airlines, PanAm, TWA, Air France and British Airways felt that this was dangerous. It wasn’t
altogether clear why the Soviets were doing this at that particular moment. Perhaps they felt we were using the flights for intelligence purposes, which I am sure we were. Perhaps it was probably a Soviet way to send this little message saying that if we were uncooperative, they could pull our chain on Berlin issues. Berlin aviation was always sensitive, of course, because it reminded people of the blockade and the Airlift. But, basically, the QA was a success. It established a pattern for interaction among the three Allies and the Soviets and it complemented the “Eastern Treaties” between the FRG and the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well the Agreement between the “two states in the Germany,” the FRG and the GDR. It was a great accomplishment, and there was a key role in it for NATO and for US Mission to NATO.

Another important thing we did at NATO was conduct a very active political consultation process. The Political Committee of NATO would meet every week and share information about what was going on the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries. We received all the telegraphic reporting from our Missions in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, and we shared much of that with the Allies, who shared what their embassies reported. We were always the major contributors of information, but the others came up with very interesting material from time to time. One reason we were so generous with our reporting and analysis was we to encourage the others to come forward with their information. In addition to the value of the information exchange, per se, the process was very useful because it supported the spirit of common interest and common purpose. The NATO Political Committee was an important part of that, as was the Economic Committee, which did a lot of work on Soviet and Eastern European economic developments.

Q: In these things, I’m trying to focus on what you were doing, even what you were observing, if you were not the principal.

NILES: My principal work was on CSCE, Berlin and German issues and the Political Committee. We had a large Political Section. Larry Eagleburger was the Political Advisor until the first of August, 1971 when he left and was replaced by Jim Goodby. Ambassador Robert Ellsworth, a former Congressman from Kansas, left at about the same time. We then had a lengthy interregnum with George Vest as Charge d’Affaires before Ambassador Kennedy, who had been replaced as Secretary of the Treasury by John Connolly in July 1971, came out as Ambassador in April 1972. He spent very little time at USNATO, and simply disappeared around the time of the November 1972 election. It was rather surprising, and somewhat demoralizing for us, that Ambassador Kennedy spent much more time working on non-NATO issues such as negotiating restraints on shoe exports to the United States than on NATO business during his time as Ambassador. Our Allies shared that sense of disappointment.

But, in any case, Jim Goodby replaced Larry Eagleburger in August 1971. Gerald Helman was the Deputy Political Adviser. We had a large Mission, with what I thought was an excellent Political Section. There was a separate Political/Military Section under Vincent Baker, which included Ted Wilkinson and Art Woodruff. The lines of responsibility between the Political and Political/Military sections were somewhat vague, and on issues such as CSCE, this was a problem.

Q: I would have thought that would have been a peculiar thing, because your NATO was much
more than a bunch of troops sitting there, as you say, political, economic and all. At the same time, you are having this new organization (not new, but it is changing all the time). It was called the European Union, at that time, or what was it called?

NILES: Well, after 1967 it was called the European Community.

Q: It had other members, but how did these two organizations exist?

NILES: Coexist. They coexisted somewhat warily, I would say, rather like two dogs that meet while they are out walking, smell each other, and circle each other. When I got to NATO, the six were in the process of expanding, first 10, and then back to nine, when the Norwegians decided in a December 1972 referendum not to join the EC. At about that time, specifically in 1970, the European Community began the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC began, interesting enough, in connection with preparations for CSCE. That was the subject on which senior officials of the Foreign Ministries of the six original partners began to meet regularly. Gradually, the consultations spread out to encompass a wide range of political issues. From the very beginning, the appearance of EPC and its concentration on preparations for a possible European Security Conference (CSCE) created a delicate situation because as far as the United States was concerned, NATO was the place where we should conduct those consultations. The French, in particular, essentially hate NATO and insisted that the EPC was the place where this work would be done. Eventually, we were able to come up with a series of pragmatic compromises that maintained Western unity. Perhaps the most remarkable compromise of all occurred in the fall of 1972, just before the Helsinki Preparatory Talks began around December 1, 1972.

Both NATO and the EPC had been working on CSCE preparations, and the Belgian Delegation at NATO was the formal link between the two. We at USNATO had developed a very extensive set of proposals for CSCE - issues papers, as we called them - and by and large they were acceptable to the other Allies, including the EC members. But because of the French position, we could simply approve these papers in NATO. In the French view, that approach suffered two fatal flaws: it gave primacy to NATO, which they hated; and the papers had been largely done by the United States, which they also hated. By October 1972, when we had agreed to begin the Helsinki Talks around December 1, the question came up of how the Allies would reach formal agreement on this great mass of material, which included what became the Western proposals for in the four CSCE issue areas: 1) principles of interstate relations and confidence-building measures (CBMs); 2) human rights, or humanitarian issues as they came to be called; 3) economic issues; and, 4) the possibility of some “permanent machinery.” As I said, most of the basis work on those “issue papers” had been done in the U.S. Mission to NATO with contributions from other Delegations. But, overwhelmingly, it was our product. It was not a U.S. government product because Washington basically wasn’t involved. EUR RPM was consulted from time to time and cleared the papers. But, basically, the papers were all drafted and in our Mission. As I said, Leo Reddy and Jim Goodby were the principal authors. Leo must have drafted as many as many as 20 papers. The question arose as to how were going to reach agreement among the Allies on those papers given the fact that the EPC, consisting of the original six members plus the four applicants (UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway) were also working separately on the same papers. In the end, we worked out an agreement under which the
NATO “issues papers” were passed to the EPC via the Belgian Delegation to NATO, approved en bloc by the EPC, passed back to NATO by the Belgians and approved by the NATO Council around November 15, 1972. All of this procedure, I repeat, was developed solely to satisfy the French position which was based on a profound dislike of NATO and of the United States, at least in so far as we were an actor in European affairs.

In any case, in December 1972 the CSCE Preparatory Talks began in Helsinki. George Vest left his position as DCM at USNATO and was replaced by Eugene V. McCauliffe, who had been the POLAD at SHAPE. Leo Reddy and I alternated as members of George’s team in Helsinki, which also included an officer from Embassy Moscow, either Mark Garrison or Stape Roy, an officer from EUR/RPM (Arva Floyd) and an officer from ACDA. Theoretically, the head of our delegation was our Ambassador to Finland, at that time a former Governor of Nebraska Val Petersen. He was generally harmless. The Finnish MFA provided the secretariat, and several of the members were old friends from the Finnish Embassy in Moscow, Matti Hekkanen and Arto Mansala, both of whom subsequently became very senior Finnish diplomats.

It was a fascinating experience, particularly for elements such as the interaction of the two German states and the tentative steps by the other members of the Warsaw Pact to assert some small hints of independence from the USSR. It was also, as I noted, a very sensitive exercise in Alliance management, in particular the relationship between NATO and the European Community. George Vest handled that with real skill. But again, even recognizing that Irish neutrality might have been a small problem, the real obstacle to fruitful coordination in Helsinki was France. The French would not participate in NATO caucus meetings in Helsinki, although they would discuss the same issues at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

We concluded the talks around June 5, 1973 with agreement on the “Blue Book,” which was essentially an annotated agenda for formal negotiations which began in Geneva that fall. I went back to USNATO, and learned to my surprise that the Department had decided to send me back to Moscow after little more than two years away.

Q: Why did that happen?

NILES: The period of so-called detente between the US and the USSR led to a major increase in the size of Embassy Moscow, and they simply did not have enough people with Moscow experience and Russian language skills to staff it. The needed me, or so they said, to head the new Commercial Office, which was located outside the Embassy and was assigned the task of promoting US-Soviet trade.

The remainder of my time at USNATO coincided with Ambassador Rumsfeld’s first months at USNATO. He left the sinking ship of the Nixon Administration in March of 1973 and came to USNATO as Ambassador. It was his first real exposure to national security policy, but he was a very quick study and did a very good job as Ambassador. He was particularly adept in my time with him during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 when we went to DEFCOM III and may well have been on the brink of a war with the USSR in the Middle East. That required a great deal of careful management at NATO, and I thought Ambassador Rumsfeld handled it very well. He was a tough boss, but it could be fun to work with him. I introduced him to squash while we
were in Brussels. He was a fierce competitor.

GEORGE A. ANDERSON  
Labor Officer/Political Counselor  
Brussels (1971-1974)

Mr. Anderson was born in Nebraska and raised in Iowa. He was educated at the University of Missouri and the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. He also pursued studies in Brussels, Belgium. Entering the Foreign Service in 1957 Mr. Anderson had several assignments at the State Department in Washington, DC. His foreign posts include Copenhagen, Oslo, Saigon, Brussels and Vienna. During his career, Mr. Anderson became an expert in labor affairs, serving as Labor Officer and Labor Attaché at a number of these posts. He was interviewed by Don Kienzle in 1996.

Q: OK. Let’s talk about your Brussels assignment.

ANDERSON: I arrived in Brussels in 1971, I’ve already told you a little bit about that. That was quite a different labor situation, because there you had a divided, bifurcated labor movement. You had the Christian trade union movement and the socialist Belgian General Labor Federation (FGTB). The Christian trade unions, I forget their designations. Luis Mayor was just going out as leader of the FGTB. He had been had of the dock workers in Brussels after the war, and he was one of the few who thought it was best to let the communists into the organization and then defeat them from within. There was a lot of argument after the war as to whether you should do it, and he took the view that the only way you can control the communists was to take them within your organization and beat them.

But then an intellectual had taken over, De Buin, and he was a trade union intellectual, not a trade unionist in the old mold, and he took over the FGTB. Hoytois was head of the Christian Federation of trade unions. Each one had their own strengths. You had the Flemish versus the Walloons, the French-speaking versus the Dutch-speaking, and the old base of the socialist trade unions was in Wallonia and normally had Franco-phones as leaders, not always, because Luis Mayor was head to the dock workers up in Antwerp, and the language issue was always a big one there. But then the Christian trade-union strength was in Flanders.

Q: Were there subdivisions in each of the...? So you really had four different units?

ANDERSON: Yes. They actually were unified unions but in effect you always had... In all your ministries you’ve had a minister of one, you had to have a deputy minister of the other language. If you want to know about how difficult it is to get different ethnic groups together, go there. My house stood exactly on the linguistic frontier, between Wallonia and Flanders, literally on the frontier. And if I went left out of my house, I went to a little pub down there which was Dutch, and if I went right, I went to a “brasserie et rôtisserie” (bar and grill); and there I realized once again why the twain don’t meet.
You walked into the Dutch one and everybody keeps talking, someone comes up to you immediately and asks you who you are in English, you are introduced around and you stand there and drink much like you do in an English pub. You go to the brasserie and rôtisserie, you walk into the door as a stranger even though I know somebody who was living there -- I was very close with my landlord who was Franco-phone -- and everybody stops talking and immediately looks around; it’s absolute silence, nobody ever comes up until they find out where you are going to place yourself, and they go back into their talk. But they are totally different people. Charming in their own milieu, but if you get the grous working together like you did in Brussels, you get a very hateful situation. In any case, we had a very bifurcated labor movement there. That makes for extremely complex labor-market and negotiating situations. Some unions are strong in one industry, some in another; they have this internal division, the ministries are set up on a very complex basis.

The amount of money wasted in government administration is probably double that of any other country, maybe worse, because instead of having one and doing something, you have two doing nothing, and then it takes even more people to try and get something done. It was a very different situation. It was a different situation too from approach, because Brussels is an artificial city. It is in Flanders, but it was bilingual, mostly, 85% of its people speaking French.

At the time I arrived there, there were 22,000 passenger trains scheduled daily in that little country and about upwards of a million people coming into Brussels every day to work. And it was such a good transportation system that everybody lives at home. Now that means that your social life was not the same as it is in some other countries. All of your social activity takes place during the day at lunch, and people want to go home to mom and the kids and get on the train; so you don’t have the same kind of opportunities to socialize with people that you did in Scandinavian countries, or that you do in England, or practically any other country that I know of. That meant that you didn’t get to know their families and their kids like you did in all the others, and you don’t get invited into their homes. They are a little bit more like the French. They don’t entertain at home, they entertain in restaurants. I gained 40 pounds the first four months I was there. You go to lunch at one; by the time you’re done you have gone through two or three different kinds of wine, you’ve had sweetbreads, and you’ve had this and that, and they don’t break up until 4 or 4:30, and very few people go back into the office; they go on to other pleasures, if I may say so, and activities, before they go home to mom sometimes. Quite a different culture.

Q: Work productivity must be pretty low in a culture like that?

ANDERSON: It is very low. But, of course, it adds the fascination to the work, because you’re dealing with quite different cultures and different attitudes toward things. More militant socialism on the FGTB side and much more pragmatic position on the Dutch side. The Dutch, by and large most of them speaking English as well as Dutch, as most Dutch-speaking people do, speak English almost as a second language. Whereas the French, very seldom will they speak either Dutch or English. Except if they are intellectuals. But you don’t find that depth that you found in a Norwegian labor party, because they all went to sea at some point in their life; English is the language of their ships, on their ships they speak English to each other. English is spoken
way down in Norway. And it is in Dutch-speaking area, it is not in French area.

It is a very delicate position to be in, and there are all kinds of internal conflicts between the Franco-phones and the Flemish, and these make for very delicate situations to get into. You got to always watch your step. And I was working in the drug field as I had started to when I was on Laird’s operation in Vietnam Task Force, and I carried that on. The day I arrived, John Eisenhower, the Ambassador, called me into his office and said, “I see you have five children. We have a serious drug problem in American communities. That problem is yours, help me solve it.”

Q: Did he know you had worked on drugs in Task Force?

ANDERSON: Yes. He knew a little bit about it. Because I was on the inter-departmental group working for irregular practices, which was the drug business. When I went into Europe I flew with a Treasury International Operation guy to Asia, and I was the one who originally found them using, when I was the Military-Political Counselor out there, I was the one who first reported the use of drugs amongst the troops coming in. I put General Blanchard onto it, and then General Blanchard went out there specifically to look at it and blew the whistle on it. So I had a little effect that way too.

Q: Yes, that was quite an effect.

ANDERSON: But, anyway, I went to Belgium, and the Belgian situation was kind of unique. It had NATO headquarters, the EC headquarters were there, and I was the Labor Attaché and had the kind of dossier on, after Bill Marsh left, all the political stuff in the inside; and Buel left and for nine moths I took over as Political Counselor out there, I was the one who first reported the use of drugs amongst the troops coming in. I put General Blanchard onto it, and then General Blanchard went out there specifically to look at it and blew the whistle on it. So I had a little effect that way too.

Q: Meaning he wanted to exclude them?

ANDERSON: He was an exclusionary type. The FGTB situation was very difficult because, De Buin was very intellectually hostile towards the U.S., leaned toward the French leftist.

Q: This is the socialist?

ANDERSON: Yes. And I called, of course, on Luis Mayor and had good relations with him, and marvelous relations with Hoytois; but I had so much to do I never got into dealing with the individual unions because I was involved with so much broader areas of interest.
One of the very interesting things that happened to me was one day I got a telephone call from Luis Mayor, and he wanted to see me for lunch. Usually, we had lunch in a very nice restaurant in Brussels, but he wanted me to meet him way out toward Antwerp. I thought that was rather strange, but I drove out there and sat down to lunch, and he had a story to tell me. He said that his boys had been in the Antwerp harbor, as was their wont, dropped a sling of boxes being transferred off an Antwerp ship to other ships for consignment to Chile. On the exterior of boxes was written “agricultural implements”. But, in fact, they were all Soviet wire-guided, anti-tank rockets and weapons. He just thought this was of interest because the ships that they were all being transshipped onto were all consigned to Chile, to ports up and down the Chilean coast.

Needless to say, I went home and went up to the ambassador. I am not sure who it was at that time, whether it was Firestone. I went through three ambassadors over there. Strausz-Hupé was the last, I think; and Leonard Firestone was there, and John Eisenhower was the first. I don’t remember which ambassador it was right now, but I went up and told the ambassador this, and they called the station chief in, and we had a little talk about it, and that’s the last I ever heard of it. But before the three months was up, Allende was dead.

I presume, as you know, if you know anything about Latin American and Chilean history, that the military there had been the guarantor of the democratic process since the country was freed in the early 1800s. And they always had free elections. And with Allende, he more or less ceased the press, and closed them down, he ceased the radio, television stations, and the only things that stood between him and a Castro-like situation -- and I’ve since confirmed this with people in the Department of State -- was the military at that time and their tanks. And we knew what happened to those tanks in Israel. And I think it was a preemptive move by the military. They knew, they got at him before he got to them. It’s one of those things, you have influences, you are always trying to make your mark on the world. And the thing that surprises me now is that nobody makes a mention of this when the pro-Allende and Madam Allende comes up here and courts around the U.S., and nobody has ever pointed this out; there we were on the verge of a Cuban-like, Castro-like takeover in that area. Whether Pinochet was right, wrong is indifferent to me; but at this point, from the standpoint of this story, I think that it was a preemptive strike.

Other than that and cleaning up, we did clean up the serious situation with the kids in Belgium. We virtually ended that. I had a carte blanche from the three ambassadors, as I required before I would take it on. And I had total control to say who stayed and who didn’t. And after nine months I called in sixteen sets of parents with seventeen different children, who were the real kingpins in the whole drug business there and told them what was going on. They were all very helpful with the exception of one, whose son later nearly got in trouble in England. And he came crawling back to get his son out of trouble. But I got very great support from all the ambassadors. I told them that there was no second chance, that they were there as representatives of the U.S. government, that their parents’ jobs depended on them keeping their noses clean, and we were not going to accept any behavior. We did not have any facilities to treat them for drug abuse or to deal with them in counseling and that if it came to that, we would send them back to the U.S. immediately.

Some people thought we were exceeding our authority. This one fellow told me that, and then I had to call him one day, and I wanted to ask him where his son was. He was 14 or 15 years old
and was with a known drug pusher wandering around London, going to be used with his black passport as a mule to get the stuff back into the country. Needless to say he and his daughter took off for London, found the boy and got him separated and kept him from being in the clink. I did finally after about three months, I had won backslider, and he was removed from the country immediately, and his parents were told that they had to leave. He was another Agency guy, and we never had any more problems.

Q: That’s quite an accomplishment.

ANDERSON: I learned a lot, and I did a study. I took a master’s degree in education while I was there, at the university, as a side line and did a study on mobility and academic achievement. Because I was very concerned about counseling children in drugs and dealing with them, of the impacts of all this movement that we go through. And it is very difficult on families, in differentially depending on how many children and how, how widely spaced they are, whether they are girls or boys, what ages, and so forth. I did a more or less formal study for my master’s on that field there. But everything went along pretty well. A lot in the labor field was geared toward harmonization with rest of the European Economic Community (EEC). That was probably the big thing of interest in that labor area.

Q: Equal social benefits, North-South issues?

ANDERSON: Yes, and there were so many of us looking at that, because there was a labor attaché for the EEC, and there was a labor attaché for the country. I worked very closely with, I think, John Doherty was there at the time on the EEC side, and I was on that. Then after a while, I had to take over for nine months as political counselor, when you are more or less holding the fort. My two oldest children graduated from high school there, and then we took another assignment to Austria.

Q: Before we go to Austria, you want to summarize some of the highlights of your study of the effects on the Foreign Service children, moving around the world?

ANDERSON: I don’t know where that paper is. It got lost in all of my moves. Most studies that had been done before had found no correlation. I did it differently. I used the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test (P-SAT) scores at the International School at Brussels because these kids were more in the local cultures and not in the DOD school. And I found that large families move better than small families, and close together children, siblings, move better than the ones that are far apart. You get four years between the kids, you got two individual kids. And it’s much more difficult for a single child or widely spaced children to leave their friends and move. What we had found there, because it grew out of my interest in dealing with the drug problem, that when I looked at their P-SAT scores and the number of moves, for boys on math scores there was a direct correlation, downward. I divided it in two halves. If they moved in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th years, the first half, and then 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 in the second half. For boys moving in those first years was very reflected in their grades, particularly in math, but also in English. Girls seem to have no correlation at all. At the other end, there seemed to be less correlation with boys’ moves but more with girls’.
Then you had to go back and interview some people so you develop more anecdotal things, as to why is this. My conclusion is that little boys are peer-oriented when they are little boys; they are not father-oriented, and they don’t identify with their mothers. And, therefore, you move them frequently, it’s hard on them because they have to give up their friends, they have to get in with new friends?, so they become kind of loners. With girls, they identify with their mothers until they become teenagers, and in puberty they suddenly become peer-oriented. For them to have to give up a friend is a very traumatic experience, and they have to get readjusted. Whereas the boys, as males do, become a little more independent and more father-oriented, and his father takes more interest in him and he is less dependent on the other fellows at that age.

I came to the conclusion that the worst thing you can do is move the child, the Foreign Service family, early in the summer. Mom and Dad are busy going around to cocktail parties and those kids are sitting in the hotel room somewhere. I felt that the children will usually make the right decision for themselves, if they have an opportunity to make a decision. But if you bring a child or two or three kids into a country, and leave them sit in a hotel room while you are out making the circles, and you are looking for a house and doing all these things and the kids are on their own, some shark is going to find them. What we instituted in Brussels was, starting as soon as school was out, every other week we had a mixer for all of the new kids coming at some of our homes with all of the kids who were still in Brussels invited, so that they could get to know several people. Not just the sharks who are swimming out there looking for them. And that way they had a choice of friends. And no toleration, zero toleration of drug use.

Q: How about alcohol?

ANDERSON: Alcohol, we couldn’t do anything about that because in Brussels there are no controls on that. I did set up and we ran a youth place, movies, and we even had a beer seller, which was very controversial. You could buy beer and wine, you had to be in the 11th grade, just to buy beer and wine. But the ones who weren’t could walk right across the street and buy it in a tavern. My position was it’s better to control it in the house, and if anybody did drink too much, we’d call their parents to come and get them and saw that they were taken care of. Whereas otherwise they were off in a pub someplace getting drunk, and nobody knew what happened to them. But there wasn’t a lot of drunkenness. Alcohol really wasn’t the problem. But drugs was.

And that had come from Paris. Because when they closed up NATO in Paris and moved up there, everybody was unhappy moving to Brussels. And it was a complete change. The teachers were unhappy, the kids were unhappy, the parents were unhappy, and the drug situation got really out of hand. My oldest son had told me that every kid in his class was using drugs. He was a junior. And he came home to me after a month or so and said, “Dad, I don’t have a friend at school.” And why? He says, “Because they are all on drugs, and I won’t use them.” I said, “Well, you always said you want to be an individual. The difference, what makes you different from anybody else is what you say ‘no’ to, not what you say ‘yes’ to. ‘Yes’ is just another sheep, and what you say ‘no’ to in your lifetime is the most important thing in the development of your character and of your future. If you say ‘no’ people will eventually recognize it.” About two or three months later, he came home to me and said the younger kids, who were not so much into the drugs, had asked him if he would run for the president of the student body because the biggest pusher in the school was going to run. And they didn’t want him. And I said, “I told you
you’d get recognition. Step up to the plate.” He did, and he got elected. He was bright, he was a good football player, he was popular, and he didn’t use drugs. And neither did my second son. Around them coalesced an entirely different group, and it became acceptable you didn’t have to use drugs anymore. But at that point everybody was using drugs. It was terrible. I used my family in a way, but it made it very difficult, because I had five kids, and I made sure that I never used them for intelligence, I never asked them a question about drugs. If they volunteered something, fine, but I never got them involved in the process. I got badly beaten up there too.

Q: Is that right? Physically beaten?

ANDERSON: Physically beaten, coming out right in the neighborhood of that club one day. I got mugged.

Q: By kids?

ANDERSON: I don’t know. I just stepped out of my car, and that’s the last thing I know. I woke up underneath my car. The whole side of my face was bruised, and I’d been kicked in the side. It’s the only place I ever got mugged. There were quite a number of muggings and stabbings on the streets in Brussels on those days.

Q: You weren’t stabbed though?

ANDERSON: No, no; I wasn’t hurt, just somebody clobbered me. Nothing was missing, my wallet wasn’t gone, or anything like that. It happened on a Friday night, by Monday I was alright again. I was kind of bruised

Q: You must have been pretty shaken?

ANDERSON: I don’t know what they hit me with, but they must have hit me with something because the whole side of my face, I had a bad bruise right here, and a couple, on my leg, and one on my thigh, ribs. I suppose it may have been related to something in the drug field. One of the very interesting things that had happened to me there too was a young sergeant came to me and said that he had been approached in a bar to help smuggle drugs into the U.S. One of my jobs was to negotiate the agreement between the U.S. and Belgium on stationing of drug agency in Belgium, so I worked all that out with Davignon. The upshot of it was that, because I was involved all of the time in this drug affair and everybody knew it, that this sergeant came to me, and, of course, I passed him on to the other people. He was a sergeant on General Milton’s staff, he was a three-star, and he flew back and forth on that plane. They set it up that he accepted two footlockers, 200 kilograms of cocaine to go back to the U.S. They opened it there and replaced it all with talc, except for two, one in each, and then that led to that big hassle up in New York. Some weeks later he took it to the U.S., and it was given to this George and whoever it was up there, and, as a result, they arrested that whole group up in New York. It was a Cannes de Mean gang out of that. Few months later Cannes de Mean disappeared and came up floating down the Seine, in a box.

Q: He was a local drug dealer, pusher?
ANDERSON: Cannes de Mean gang was the French connection. But he lost working through this sergeant. The sergeant was given a 40,000 dollar reward. Incidentally, it ruined his life. It was one of those things. He got a divorce, bought a big car, it was a sad situation. I told him that he should take that now and invest it, and why he should invest it, and why it would continue to serve him well for the rest of his life. But it’s like winnings in lottery here.

Q: Some of the bonuses that they were given for re-upping...

ANDERSON: Yes, it was all that kind of stuff. It didn’t do the guy any good. There was one other thing that happened there that I was going to mention that was so interesting in Belgium that I got involved into, from labor point of view. It may come back to me.

JAMES E. GOODBY
Counselor for Political Affairs, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1971-1974)

Ambassador James E. Goodby was born in Providence, Rhode Island on December 20, 1929. He received a bachelor’s degree in geology from Harvard University and served in the U.S. Army. He served in Brussels and was ambassador to Finland. He also worked for the Atomic Energy Commission, the U.S. Disarmament Commission, the Policy Planning Council, the U.S. Mission to the European Community, the European Bureau, the Political/Military Bureau, European Affairs, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. Ambassador Goodby was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 10, 1990.

GOODBY: Anyway, the job I did finally land was with the US Mission to the European Community, in Brussels. And my job was to follow the activities of the European atomic energy community, which was called EURATOM. And that turned out to be a fairly interesting job, for a variety of reasons.

The boss there, the ambassador, was a man named Robert Schaetzel, who had been quite close to George Ball and who was a real...zealot I think is not too strong a word, about European unification. And he had a habit of calling the situation in Europe a "pre-federal Europe," as though it were going to suddenly become the United States of Europe. Of course, they may, but this, you remember, was 1967, and things weren't looking so good at that point.

And the deputy was George Vest, so that was my first experience at working directly with George Vest.

The interesting thing, I guess you could say, during that time there were two aspects, quite apart from the European Community, which is an interesting thing in itself. We went through one of the de Gaulle vetoes of British entry, and all those sorts of things. Common agricultural policy
was established, and the Community was taking shape in some interesting ways.

But, from my standpoint, the two interesting things were the fact that the United States was negotiating at that time the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). And that treaty established the International Atomic Energy Agency (which you remember I also had something to do with much earlier) as the instrument that would verify that countries that signed the treaty as non-nuclear powers were in fact not developing nuclear weapons. And the issue came up of whether that particular obligation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would overrule the responsibilities of the inspection service of EURATOM, because they had their own inspection service. And so I was involved in the negotiation, which led ultimately to EURATOM's inspection service being recognized by the IAEA and by the participants in the Nonproliferation Treaty as the responsible agent for monitoring the activities of EURATOM with respect to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

But that negotiation went on during the two years I was at the US Mission, and was one of the main things I did, and it was a very interesting operation.

Q: What were some of the objections? This would seem to be fairly straightforward, either you let A or B do the inspections.

GOODBY: Well, there were two things involved. One was, of course, can you have a regime in which some important counties in effect seem to monitor themselves, whereas everybody else has to go through the IAEA. It was a case of discrimination, and it wasn't clear...

Q: Would this be the United States and Great Britain?

GOODBY: No, it would be the European Community -- the six nations, at that time, of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Benelux. [That's five, unless Benelux is considered as two.] And they would have their own inspection service, you see, under this scheme, whereas everybody else that was in it, all the Third World countries that signed up, would have to go the poor man's route, if you will, and have the IAEA do it for them. Furthermore, the Soviets, who were the main party we were negotiating with, were not very enthusiastic about it either, because they thought that the Germans might somehow be able to circumvent the obligations through the EURATOM inspection service. So we had to be pretty careful about that.

I personally favored using EURATOM, because I was also a supporter of European integration and I felt that that was needed to help integration along.

The thing, though, that one should remember was that the Germans at that particular stage, especially those working on atomic energy matters, were very, very sensitive about being discriminated against. I don't want to suggest that they had an interest in keeping the nuclear weapons option open at that stage, because certainly the politicians did not. But there were, I think, some people in the German atomic energy program that had in mind maybe at some point they'd want to get into nuclear weapons. And they, in fact, were laying a very good basis for doing that if the politicians ever made that decision. So they were not very anxious to be discriminated against any more than they already were.
And so there really were some fairly sensitive things to deal with there -- on all sides in fact.

So that was a fairly interesting operation. It came out in the end of course that EURATOM did do the safeguards, and that was recognized by all the parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and that's the way it's still done.

Q: What was your feeling then? Because later it became quite an issue, of the European countries' industries that were involved in this type of work, and things getting to...one can think of, right off hand, Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, you know, perhaps Brazil or some other places.

GOODBY: Well, of course, some of those countries you mentioned never did sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. I think that the issue of EURATOM was not one of the major reasons they didn't sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. It was all very much local politics: Brazil versus Argentina; South Africa feeling hemmed-in by the black nations of Africa; Israel by the Arabs, and so forth; India and Pakistan. All of these nuclear issues turn, as most politics do, on local politics. And the fact that EURATOM had its own special privileged inspection service under the IAEA rather than an IAEA inspection service I don't think made any particular difference whether a country signed or accepted IAEA safeguards or not. If that was your point.

Q: But was there much concern that the business interests and imperatives of the industrial groups working on nuclear matters in these various European countries at that time would cause a leakage of this equipment or information?

GOODBY: Yes, absolutely. Not so much in the sense you're talking about, but... I guess I didn't emphasize this. One of the major concerns that the Germans and others had was that their nuclear industry, just from the commercial standpoint, would be compromised somehow through the IAEA. And they did, I think, feel that they had a major commercial stake in ensuring that this NPT regime did not make it difficult or impossible for them to have commercial advantages. And I think they felt that they'd be better protected under the EURATOM safeguard system than they would under IAEA, where all kinds of people from places that might be interested in having their own nuclear industry might be competing with the Germans and others. So the commercial side was a big factor, yes. Not so much from the concern about leakage of nuclear energy secrets as such, but feeling that somehow the ability to export reactors, the ability to conduct business in a normal commercial way, would somehow be compromised. And I think we persuaded them that that was not very likely to happen. And in the end, of course, the Germans did sign the NPT.

The other particularly technical thing that I was monitoring at that time was the issue of whether the United States was enjoying such an enormous superiority over the Europeans that the whole idea of a European Community was going to be impossible. This all came from a book written by a man named Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber, which was called Le Défi Américain.

Q: Yes, The American Challenge.

GOODBY: His thesis was that the United States had become so overwhelmingly superior in
technology and other things that essentially the United States was beginning to run Europe. And it was my job to follow that debate and so forth.

And it was a fascinating time, because, in fact, during that period from '67 to '69 when I was at the European Community, the United States did have considerable advantages and owned a lot of industries in Europe, and our technology at that stage did get most of the advantages that the Europeans lacked.

Well, the Europeans, of course, made up for it. They haven't quite caught up with us in many areas, but they did organize themselves so that that became a less important factor. And now I think you can see the European Community's really beginning to shape up into the kind of community that my friend Ambassador Schaetzel was hoping it would become back in the '60s. It's taken a lot longer than he anticipated, but it's moving that way.

Well, a lot of interesting issues in those two years, but I won't go into all of them because I think they're not of general interest. But I did, I must say, get a view of Europe that has always remained with me and has colored my thinking about Europe, namely that if the United States looks at Europe only through the NATO perspective, which is what a lot of us tend to do, you miss a lot of what Europe is about. And there really was this what they called the "European idea." And de Gaulle at that time was talking about "Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals." And there really is a strong sense of "Europeanness," which I was exposed to through my work in the two years I was with the US Mission to the European Communities. And that made a big imprint on me. I realized there is a strong sense of drive, not quite as strong as my friend Bob Schaetzel thought, I think, at that time, but nonetheless a powerful idea there that...

Q: But this is also an idea, I mean, you were getting it from where you were that it was also the United States delegation and those were also pushing this.

GOODBY: Yes, that is true. Bob was, as I've said, a very strong, almost zealotic, type of guy on European integration and tended to get people that were like-thinkers. I was one of those. I wasn't, I guess, quite as full of zeal as he was. Nor was George Vest. George Vest was a much more neutral kind of person on these things. There was a feeling that this mission had a special role to play.

Q: What was the imperative behind this? That this would take care of European wars, or that it would give us a strong ally in the long run against the Soviet Union? Because, I mean, obviously today we're concerned about it as a competitive rival.

GOODBY: Yes, well it was all those things. The idea, of course, Jean Monnet had was that you need to establish a United States of Europe, first of all, in order to put behind Europe the terrible civil wars that have damaged Europe so much over the centuries. And that process of putting wars behind began, of course, with the European coal and steel community, which in effect was the Schuman Plan, which said that the German and French coal and steel industries would be merged, and later other countries joined. And that then led to the European Economic Community, et cetera. And it was Monnet’s idea that you approach this thing through functional needs, and then it would develop into a political institution. So his first thought, and the thought
that we had too at that time, was that European integration will mean that wars between France and Germany and Britain and all these countries will be a thing of the past, because it would no longer happen that they could become a one-country, in effect.

And the other part of it was that we want a strong Western Europe to take over some of the defense burdens from the United States. And this was an idea that I think nearly everybody shared across the spectrum. We didn't have any special insights into that in the US Mission that other parts of the US government didn't have; that was a generally shared belief. Which I still believe; I think that we do need a strong Western Europe.

And of course there are going to be disputes between us. I would say at that time we were a little more willing to make concessions in order to promote European integration than we are now. And that, of course, is right. They were then just getting started, and now they're a very strong group, so we shouldn't be as easy on them now as we were then.

But, yes, if you're suggesting a little bit of "clientitis" involved there, you're right, there was a bit of clientitis. And not, I think, totally unjustified in that particular case, because we were dealing with something new under the sun. It's one thing to say you're too pro-French, for example, to represent the United States properly, but it's another thing to say, when you have this curious new thing emerging, that people shouldn't look at it with a certain amount of sensitivity and sympathy and understanding. And I guess that's what we were trying to do. I don't think we went too far in suggesting that we should be supporters of it. But that basically was our line, that we should be supporters of it.

And of course at that time we were already getting into some pretty vigorous disputes over agricultural trade. Chicken wars and all these other wars were already happening, so we were not, of course, rolling over and playing dead every time some trade issue came up.

But on the basic principle that yes, there should be a United States of Europe (even though some of us thought that was a little romantic), the basic idea was one we all would have supported in that mission and tried to promote as best we could.

But I'm glad you asked that, because that was a part of the ECO ethos of those times. I'm not sure whether it's still the ethos, but it was then.

Well, I went back to the United States in 1969 and took a job with the European Bureau, where I had not served before despite the fact I'd been working on European affairs quite a lot. And my job was officer in charge of defense policy affairs in what was called RPM. The initials originally stood for Regional Political-Military, and basically what it was doing was NATO. A fascinating two years I spent there before returning to NATO again to be the counselor for political affairs at the US NATO.

In those two years I suppose the thing that was most noteworthy was the episode when Mr. Brezhnev made a speech saying, "Come taste the wine." This was a speech that he gave in Tbilisi, and it had reference to the idea of US-Soviet negotiations on conventional arms reductions.
Now let me go into the background of this.

*Q: Please.*

GOODBY: Senator Mike Mansfield, by the time I got to the State Department's NATO office in 1969, had almost annually for some years been promoting something called the Mansfield Amendment. And the idea was to essentially say we don't need American forces in Europe anymore, they ought to be pulled out. And sometimes there were conditions attached to it, like the Europeans had to spend more, in fairness, or something of that sort.

In 1971, towards the end of my tenure there in the European Bureau at that point, there was a particularly strong sentiment in the Senate that the Europeans were not doing enough to take care of their own defenses, and that American forces probably ought to be pulled out. Of course, the scene, you may remember, was also during the Vietnam War, and there were feelings the Europeans hadn't backed us enough. And there was in general kind of an anti-military sentiment that had begun to build up in the Senate.

One of the ways in which we thought we could head off this sentiment would be to get into some negotiations with the Russians that would, instead of having unilateral US pullouts from Europe, have us negotiate pullouts, with the Soviets also withdrawing.

We did begin to talk to the NATO countries about that, and they did begin to send signals, but the Soviets seemed not to be interested and never really responded to these signals of ours. We had a Reykjavik communiqué, for example, in which we talked about it.

Various efforts were made, but, as of '71, in the spring, we were still not successful in getting the Russians to say yes, they'd negotiate with us on this, and pressure was mounting in the Senate that would have our American troops withdrawn from Europe.

So this speech that Brezhnev made about negotiations came in the midst of a very critical debate in the Senate about the latest version of the Mansfield Amendment. And it was really touch-and-go. In fact, in retrospect, if you look at all the numbers of senators that voted for one version or another of the Mansfield Amendment, it was a majority of the Senate. It was that close.

Well, as soon as I heard this speech that Brezhnev had made, I drafted a telegram to Jake Beam, who was then our ambassador in Moscow. And you may remember I worked with him earlier on in ACDA. And the telegram, I believe, was signed out by the deputy secretary of state, or Under Secretary of state. I think it was Elliot Richardson at that point. And it instructed Beam to go in and see Gromyko and tell him we're interested in getting into a negotiation.

*Q: He was the foreign minister at the time.*

GOODBY: At the very same time that we sent that telegram, Dave Abshire, who was the assistant secretary for congressional relations, and I worked together to make sure the Senate knew that we were beginning to get into a negotiation, or at least it looked that way.
So that particular episode turned the tide and meant that the Mansfield Amendment was defeated.

And more, perhaps, importantly for the long run, it was the beginning of the negotiation that just culminated last month in Paris, in November 1990.

_Q: And the world has turned a number of times._

GOODBY: Quite a few times, that's right. But this negotiation, in effect, began with that telegram. Or, maybe more importantly, with that speech by Brezhnev in the spring of 1971.

_Q: But essentially we have been sending out sort of signals for some time that we'd like to do something about this, but there's been no response._

GOODBY: There's been no response, no.

And we wondered at the time was this just a bureaucratic mistake, or was it a deliberate ploy by Brezhnev to encourage the Senate to vote against the Mansfield Amendment. I thought at first that it was probably a mistake, just some kind of bureaucratic momentum that had been built up. But I became convinced later on that in fact it was a deliberate plan by Brezhnev to try to intervene in the debate in the Senate, because, I concluded, he felt it was in the Soviet interest to have American forces stay in Germany and not to depart unilaterally.

I was talking just a couple of weeks ago with a Soviet researcher who contended that that speech had never been cleared with anybody in the Kremlin, and that it was a speechwriter's gimmick, and that when Jake Beam went in to see Gromyko, Gromyko didn't know what the speech was all about. So you can take your pick: Was it a choice or not?

_Q: You can take your pick. And, given bureaucracies and the way governments work, this can often happen._

GOODBY: It can often happen. But I'd love to know who that speechwriter was, because it made a dramatic difference in the whole course of history. If that speechwriter was just acting on his own, I must say he was quite a courageous man (or woman).

So that was one of the more interesting episodes.

Other things that I was doing during that time had to do with trying to build up NATO conventional defenses. This was President Nixon's particular effort to deal with the burden-sharing problem. It was something called AD-70, I guess it was called, which meant Alliance Defenses for the Seventies. And it led to, actually, some degree of improvement in burden-sharing, in the sense of the Europeans doing a bit more to build up the conventional side of their operations.

I also got involved during that time in the first SALT negotiations. Those negotiations led to an
agreement, you remember, in 1972. And there was a European angle, in the sense that the Soviets wanted an understanding that we would not transfer any information to any European country about nuclear weapons.

Well, we had a deal, as you know, with the British to help them with the Polaris and Poseidon missiles. And the other Europeans as well didn't want to be in a position where, at some point in the future if we wanted to help them, we'd be stopped from doing that by this SALT I Treaty.

So there was quite an elaborate negotiation, in which I was somewhat involved, to work out a kind of a noncircumvention formula that would let us in fact continue doing what we had been doing to cooperate with the British in giving them weapons technology. And it kept it open for other countries as well, if we wanted to. And indeed we did later use it in supporting France, for that matter. So I was involved in that aspect of it.

The other issue had to do with what were called forward-based aircraft, and the Soviets wanted to take those into account. Those were our American airplanes that we had deployed in Europe, and they were equipped with nuclear weapons. The Soviets wanted those to be included; and we said no, we need to have this negotiation limited just to the central strategic forces, the B-52 bombers and the ICBMs and the sea-launched ballistic missiles. And we succeeded in that.

So I was involved at those points in the beginnings of the SALT I, and the very, very beginnings of these conventional forces that, as I say, just led to an agreement, after many years, last month.

I left the job of officer in charge of defense policy affairs to go back to Brussels, in 1971, where I became the counselor for political affairs, and I stayed at NATO headquarters in Brussels from 1971 to 1974. I worked for George Vest, at first, who was in fact the chargé when I went there, and later for Ambassador David Kennedy, who had been the Nixon administration's secretary of the treasury. And after Kennedy left, I worked for about a year and a half or so for Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld, who later became the secretary of defense in the Ford administration.

Interesting people. Certainly Ambassador Kennedy's main interest was in shoe quotas, as it turned out. And just to show you how politics works and how the Foreign Service works, he had been, in effect, assured that his job at NATO headquarters would not be limited to dealing with NATO affairs, but rather would deal with establishing a kind of a managed trade, quotas on Spanish shoe exports to the United States in particular. And so his notion was he wasn't going to be around NATO very much; he was going to let that be done by one of his entourage that he brought with him. And we had a little bit of a bureaucratic tussle (which George Vest handily won, I should tell you), in the sense that Ambassador Kennedy understood after a time that the NATO job was a fairly serious one, and that if he was going to hand it off to anybody, it had to be handed off to the professional staff at the US Mission to NATO and not to somebody who was an amateur brought in by Ambassador Kennedy. Ambassador Kennedy accepted this. He never really did get very much interested in NATO affairs, and after, I think, less than a year, he left. It was not a particularly elevating time for me, at that point, in thinking about the way we run our foreign affairs.

Q: What sort of reaction were you getting to this type of attitude from your colleagues? I'm
talking about the members of NATO, other missions.

GOODBY: Well, they didn't talk about it very much, and we didn't raise it. There are some things one doesn't like to talk about. You know, the dirty laundry one keeps in one's own house basically, and we did it that way. So I can't say. I mean, I imagine they had the same sense that I had, but I don't know for sure.

Q: No, but I did want to bring out that...sort of the dirty laundry aspect. You work, I assume, sort of as a team to take care of the problems and bypass the nonworking, or noninvolved, ambassador.

GOODBY: Yes, yes.

Ambassador Rumsfeld, of course, was completely different. He was a youthful, quite conservative, very dynamic man that had been a congressman from Illinois and then had left the Congress to go into the White House and work for Richard Nixon. Nixon became rather fond of him, evidently, and named him to be the head of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Rumsfeld and Frank Carlucci had been roommates at Princeton, and so that's where Carlucci got his political start, too, working with Donald Rumsfeld in the Office of Economic Opportunity. Later on, Rumsfeld got involved in various other things, and as Watergate began to descend on the White House, Rumsfeld very cleverly managed to get out of that and become ambassador to NATO in something like 1973, I guess. So, in effect, always had clean hands so far as I could see. He was, in my opinion, a very fine, outstanding kind of public servant, and I regret that he hasn't reentered public life.

But his role in NATO was really quite important, because he did come to trust me and trust the other members of the staff, after a certain period of trial and error. This whole business of diplomacy was a little bit new to him. I was at that time involved in some fairly serious negotiations with our NATO friends, on two things. One was on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where the Europeans were interested in moving towards acceptance of some kind of a conference that would deal with security issues. The United States was much less interested. Henry Kissinger, in particular, had absolute zero interest...

Q: He was at that time head of the National Security Council.

GOODBY: Yes. He became the secretary of state, however, while I was at NATO headquarters. I suppose it was just after the end of the first term, so I think he became secretary of state in 1973. [Head of NSC 1969-75; secretary of state September 1973-January 20, 1977]

Q: Well, one of the things is, I had an interview with George Vest, when he was carrying on some of these negotiations, talking about Henry Kissinger in his role of national security advisor basically telling the Soviets on the side, "Well, we really don't care about this," which was helping to undermine Vest's negotiating position.

GOODBY: Yes, I think he probably was secretary of state, though, and not NSC. We can check the dates, of course, but I think it was shortly after the 1972 elections that Kissinger became
secretary of state, and the period I'm talking about was '70-'72. I guess Kissinger probably was still there at that time.

Q: Then how did you work in this environment when you were working on something but getting next to no support?

GOODBY: Well, the thing is, as you know, there are some areas where top political officials don't pay that much attention to what's going on, and the CSCE in its details was one of those things, frankly. So what I did was this, we launched a study in NATO not very long after I got there. In fact, I think it had just been started. My predecessor, incidentally, in this job was Larry Eagleburger, the deputy secretary of state, and he had been the political counselor until 1971 when I took over from him. And this project of a CSCE was not anything he had much of any interest in. He felt more or less the way Henry Kissinger did about it. I believe the study in NATO, however, had just gotten underway as Larry was leaving, and I, in effect, inherited the thing.

And I was much more interested in it; I really thought there was something to this idea. And so, when the thing began to really develop, mainly because of European countries' interest in it, the technique I used was to, in effect, work out a backstopping arrangement with a man named Arbor Floyd, who was then the officer in charge of political affairs in the NATO office in the State Department. And what we would do is that I, with the help of some of my colleagues, Leo Reddy, for example, in our staff in NATO, would dream up these ideas about how do you cooperate with the Soviets on human rights, for example, or on economic cooperation, or on security. And we would then send these ideas back to Washington -- in a telegram, all quite aboveboard -- and in effect we would say, "Unless you have serious reservations about it, we will probably float this next Tuesday." And Arbor Floyd would always come back; he always wanted to have a good paper trail showing that there was some response. And so he was quite good, he got us responses almost all the time, which in effect said, "No comments, go ahead," something to that effect. But, frankly, people were not paying any attention to it.

Q: Just for the historical record, this became sort of a framework for developments that happened in the revolutionary year of 1989 to 1990.

GOODBY: Yes, that is exactly right.

Q: But, at the time, this was considered sort of an up-in-the-air, airy-fairy type of thing.

GOODBY: Yes, that's right. For example, my friend Tom Niles, who later became ambassador to Canada and I was ambassador to the European Community, had just come to work for me at NATO headquarters from a job that he'd had in Moscow. And he commented to me not long after he arrived that in Moscow the embassy thought all this was a lot of hokum, and yet here we were at NATO headquarters, beavering away on this issue, and he was a little taken aback by the energy we were devoting to this project.

This, of course, was the period late '71 and 1972, for the most part. And during that time we did lay the basis -- between ourselves, in the political section at US Mission NATO, and our home
office, in effect the European Bureau -- for almost everything that's been done since in the
CSCE, because we were, in effect, the lead horse in NATO. Americans always are the lead
horse, in general, in NATO (nice thing about it). And we did have a lot of these ideas. The other
allies, of course, did make their contribution, but we had more horses than they did and we were
pretty active. And so a lot of these things that finally got into the negotiation when George Vest
took over later on in 1973 up in Helsinki, and then later on another American ambassador in
Geneva took on the job, a lot of those ideas had already been floated, you see, during that period
that I was at NATO headquarters.

In any event, I was telling you somewhat earlier that Rumsfeld sort of observed what I was doing
and, after being a little bit worried by it, finally decided it was okay, so he gave me the green
light. Occasionally, in fact not occasionally, about maybe once or twice, he would go into the
interpreters' booths and look through the glass window at what I was doing there, and kind of
monitor what was happening, just to get a sort of hands-on feeling about what it was. But he
came to trust me, and I liked him, and we had a good relationship. But he did give me a free
hand, and that was much appreciated by me.

Q: Because of its importance in later times, this sort of the borning of CSCE (a horrible
acronym)...

GOODBY: Yes, it is. It wasn't its first acronym either, but it came to be the last one.

Q: Did you find yourselves sort of becoming, you might say, ideologues? I mean, was this
something that was being generated within the American NATO staff in Brussels, with only mild
interest from different levels in Washington? Also, what were the attitudes that you were getting
from the other NATO delegations on this thing?

GOODBY: No, I don't think we were ideologues. In that sense it wasn't comparable to the period
I described earlier when I was serving with our US Mission to the European Community. There
was no particular ideology about the CSCE.

And just to give you an illustration of that, George Vest, as I mentioned earlier, was chargé when
I went to NATO in '71, and was still chargé when our ministerial meeting of December 1971
rolled around. And so he delegated to me the task of negotiating the NATO ministerial
communiqué. Usually the NATO DCM does this, but, since he was chargé, he came to me to do
it.

Well, one of the main issues was what attitude should the NATO ministers take about entering
the negotiations in Helsinki with the Soviets and others on this kind of a conference. The
secretary of state at that time was William Rogers. And the American position was one that was
certainly approved by Henry Kissinger and then the NSC staff, namely that we didn't want to go
to such a conference in Helsinki, we weren't ready for that. And so William Rogers wrote out for
me, in his own hand, what he thought the communiqué should say. And in effect it said, "No,
we're not going."

Well, I got into that all-night drafting session (they always last all night, those NATO
communiqué-drafting sessions). The French came in with a position that said, "We want to go right now." And most of the other Europeans said, "Well, we'll go at some point in the future when we're more ready to take on this kind of negotiation." That impasse went on all night long. And finally, the next morning, I presented to Secretary Rogers all these bracketed pages of disagreement.

Q: He was there at...

GOODBY: This was the NATO ministerial meeting, so he was there for that meeting along with all the other NATO foreign ministers.

He was not a man that liked to get into a lot of nitty gritty with his colleagues (and I don't blame him for that), and so when he saw these three pages, practically, of bracketed language, he was really quite upset. I remember I had labeled one of these "The US Position," because in fact he had written it down himself in his own hand.

And he was persuaded, mainly by George Vest who was brilliant at these things, that probably the thing to do was go towards the sort of middle-of-the-road position that all the other Europeans had had, which said, in effect, "We'll go to the meetings with the Russians and others in Helsinki, but not right now. But we're going to prepare very carefully for that." In other words, we then began to accept the position that we would indeed go to that kind of a meeting. And the secretary of state decided that was okay with him. And the French fell off their position that we should go right now, i.e., '71. And so we saved the day for Secretary Rogers.

In fact, he even made a statement in the ministerial section about the "so-called US language," which offended me somewhat because that was his damn language that I had been defending all night long. I should have been smarter and dropped off myself, but I thought it was an important enough issue that probably he should do it, and that is what he did.

But, you see, from then on, December '71, we were committed, in effect, to go to a CSCE at some stage.

Q: Well, I don't want to overdwell on this, but I'm still trying to capture the feelings at the time. What did we see as the Soviet reason for wanting this? Or what were they interested in doing?

GOODBY: Well, what I think most of us saw was what I really still see -- not now, under the Gorbachev administration, but up until 1984, '85 what I saw was a Soviet policy that thought pan-Europeanism worked in the Soviet interest. Because the Soviets were a European power, and to the extent that Soviet influence could be exerted over Western Europe, as well as Eastern Europe, through some mechanism like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, this would advance Soviet hegemony in Europe and reduce American influence (not to mention hegemony) in Western Europe. So I saw that as essentially an offensive action by the Soviets, designed to increase their influence and reduce ours.

Q: I mean, this was it, rather than establishing firm borders.
GOODBY: Well, no, I've been describing what I would call the offensive aim of the Soviets; I believe that was a part of it. The other part of it was a more defensive aim, namely to establish the borders that, in particular, divided the two Germanies. So I think there was a maximum and minimum objective. The minimum was simply to have a surrogate peace treaty ending World War II and establishing the division of Germany and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. And the more offensive aim, which I think was a part of their policy, was, in effect, to drive us out. Not necessarily drive us out, but to exert greater Soviet influence over Western Europe.

Well, since it was clear by the fall of '71 we were going to such a conference, the task then became one of trying to extract as many concessions as we could from the Soviets that would make the opposite happen, namely increase our influence in Eastern Europe and decrease chances for the Soviets to exercise influence in Western Europe. In other words, we, as often is the case, had a kind of mirror image, as far as I was concerned. I don't regard that as an ideological kind of point of view; it was an exercise in trying to see whose interests could be most served by something that we evidently were going to have to deal with. We could no longer, after December '71, ignore the fact that sooner or later there would be such a thing.

And so 1972 I spent in trying to devise a whole series of measures that would, if accepted by the Soviets, mean that society in Eastern Europe would basically, fundamentally change, namely human rights, freedom of expression, ability to travel without reference to borders.

The slogan we used at the time was: "Freedom of Movement of People, Information, and Ideas." And that was translated by us into all kinds of very specific and concrete proposals about the rights of newsmen, the rights of businessmen, the rights of families to be reunified, et cetera, et cetera. In other words, we took that basic notion that we want to influence Eastern Europe, and we expressed that policy in hundreds, literally hundreds, of very concrete obligations that the Soviets would have to accept if there was going to be an agreement that in effect would ratify the frontiers.

And even on the ratification of the frontiers, we said, first of all, that these frontiers can be changed peacefully if they wanted. And on that I might tell you that deal was finally struck.

Of course, I did not get into the negotiations in Helsinki and in Geneva; I left NATO in 1974, so my job was basically to set the stage and give our country, and the other NATO countries as well, the ammunition to deal with this.

And so, even on frontiers, in the end, the Soviets did not gain very much. Because there were several provisions that were negotiated which in effect vitiated their claim to these being the final frontiers. One was the ability to change them peacefully. One was that if any frontier had been imposed by force, i.e., the Baltic States, this was not something that was going to be recognized as binding and legitimate. And there was just a whole series of things that tended to undercut that Soviet claim that these frontiers were immutable.

And, in return, we got a whole lot of obligations, which of course one would have to be hopelessly naive to think the Soviets were going to accept, implement, or live up to.
But nonetheless what we hoped would happen in fact did happen, namely that people in Eastern Europe did become aware of these obligations on the part of their governments, because their governments all signed it, every last one of them. And these documents, as they're called, the final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, became passed around from hand to hand. People like Vaclav Havel, now president of Czechoslovakia, went to jail because of it, et cetera. So it became a kind of a Magna Carta in Eastern Europe. That's what we were hoping would happen, and that in fact is indeed what did happen.

Well, back to the '71, '72 period. So a lot of the work we did was below the level of visibility of people like Henry Kissinger and William Rogers, and was done by us bureaucrats, if you will, working on a lot of nitty gritty stuff, much of which ultimately found its way into the Helsinki final Act.

I should tell you also that at about this time the European Community was beginning its expansion into the field of political consultation. The French had a very good team at NATO headquarters. The ambassador there was a man named François DeRose, and the deputy chief of mission was a man named Jacques Andreani, who happens now to be the French ambassador here in Washington. And Andreani left Brussels in something like late 1972 or early '73, as I remember, to take over this job of managing political consultation within the European Community on behalf of the French government.

And what he did...I don't know to this day whether to be offended or to be happy about it, but he basically took all of these ideas that we had been developing in NATO, at least the ones he liked the most, skimmed them off like so much cream and put them into the European Community as their position. And so the first act of political consultation by the European Community was to steal all the ideas that we'd been working on for a year and a half or so in NATO and make them their own.

But, of course, in the end, that helped, because the European Community, when it finally did go to these negotiations with the Soviets, had a set of positions that were more or less like ours. So it was all right, but, you know, it was one of these things, you felt like suing him for breach of contract laws. But, anyway, that shows you that we were fairly successful in developing positions. You know, it really did work out.

One other thing I was doing matured mainly in 1973, and that was, these negotiations that I mentioned earlier, with the Russians on conventional force reductions, came to a head in 1973 when the Russians finally did accept there would be a negotiation. And it was because of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy that the date was set for beginning the CSCE talks sometime late in '73, as I remember, in tandem with what became known as the mutual balanced force reductions talks, the MBFR. The deal that Kissinger struck I don't think was a very smart deal, and it wasn't even necessary to have that deal, but, anyway, it was understood that we would have the MBFR, and the CSCE would begin about the same time. I think maybe MBFR a month before CSCE, something like that.

The bureaucracy in Washington had come up with a position on MBFR in the spring of 1973,
and it was decided to try to work the thing through NATO and see if we could come up with a NATO position, because the negotiations would not be just between the US and the Soviets, but between a NATO team and a Warsaw Pact team. So, along about March or April of ’73, this position was given to me to negotiate.

I was then, of course, the counselor for political affairs, and I was the US representative in something called the Senior Political Committee in NATO headquarters. And so it fell to me to try to negotiate this US position with the allies. And that's what I spent from March through October doing that year, meeting two or three times a week, almost every week, right though the summer, which, as you know, Europe, they lack communications.

Q: Yes, oh yes.

GOODBY: It didn't happen that year.

It was a very interesting negotiation, which took a lot of time and got into a lot of details, because each country had its own separate interests, you know. We used to joke about how the Turkish position was that all those Soviet troops in central Europe should be withdrawn to Siberia and beheaded. Because their worry was that these troops would finally find their way back to the Turkish frontier, you know, and that the Germans would benefit from this agreement and the Turks wouldn't. And the Norwegians had a similar stance. Every country had its own particular positions, so it was multilateral negotiation at its most intricate and most interesting, with fifteen NATO countries involved in it.

We did finally succeed in negotiating a common position. And I think that was probably the first and only time we've ever done that in NATO. Because, after that, they began to go the route of people coming from capitals and having special meetings. And so the job was taken out of the hands of the permanent delegations, which I always thought was a shame because I thought we probably should try to build up NATO headquarters to be an instrument that could do these things. But that was not the case.

Q: Was this just a purely bureaucratic fight rather than an attempt to say, okay, we're going to get more European "Communityish" and so let's work on the capitals?

GOODBY: No, it was mainly a bureaucratic power play. We're leaping ahead a little bit, but it came out in these negotiations on the intermediate-range nuclear forces, during the Carter administration in particular. Les Gelb, in 1977, became assistant secretary for political-military affairs, and, under his leadership, the idea of using the US NATO delegation as a place to negotiate arms control was abandoned. Over my opposition, by the way, but it was abandoned. And from that time on, people coming from their various national capitals were used to negotiate arms control, with the role of the permanent delegations in Brussels being greatly diminished. Which I thought was a bit of a loss.

And, before 1973, we hadn't really done much negotiation either, in Brussels, because these were bilateral negotiations we'd done up until that point, nuclear negotiation with the Russians. We had kept NATO informed though periodic briefings, and had kept countries like Britain and
France a little more closely informed, but there was never any negotiation.

So '73 was really the first and only time that we ever did negotiate an arms control position in NATO headquarters, which was later used when these talks began in October or November of '73, and remained the basis for the position almost to this day. It became the NATO position, which the Soviets finally accepted in large part. These positions of course changed later on, but for about ten or fifteen years those positions remained pretty much unchanged. And that's what I did in '73.

The other interesting thing that transpired during my time in NATO headquarters...well, there were quite a few things actually, but the other thing worth mentioning here, I think, is the Year of Europe.

The war in Vietnam having finally come to an end, Henry Kissinger decided (for reasons that I still don't quite understand) that he wanted to make a big deal out of Europe. I sometimes call it the "rectification campaign," because it seemed almost to be a case of his feeling the Europeans were getting out of line and they had to be brought into some kind of disciplined, more monolithic position. At least I got that kind of sense of it. I don't suppose that it was quite that bad, but a lot of Europeans thought it was that, and I have to admit a little bit rubbed off onto me, I guess.

The Year of Europe, I believe, was '74. I think he may have made the speech in '73 in which he announced this great plan. But, anyway, it created a rather bad impression.

Q: It was almost condescending, wasn't it?

GOODBY: It was quite condescending, you're right. It was as though, well, now it's Europe's turn, Kissinger will settle your hash and take you in hand, and, you know, we'll take care of things.

Well, one of the things that was mentioned by Kissinger, in, I guess, his very first speech on the subject, was a new Atlantic Charter. A lot of that was done privately behind the scenes by Kissinger, but a lot of it also was done at NATO headquarters, and I had a pretty big hand in that. It was an issue that Don Rumsfeld had an interest in because Henry Kissinger was directly involved. And so Rumsfeld and a man named Bob Goldwyn, an assistant from St. John's College that had worked with Rumsfeld in the past and that Rumsfeld had brought along to NATO, worked with him also on this. But I was the main, I guess you could say, lead horse on it. And so I cooked up a lot of language for it. We worked directly with the French and other delegations.

One of the main things that I did was try to put behind us this big issue about is it a good or bad thing that there are two countries in the alliance that have nuclear forces. It had been one of these big ideological disputes for a long time about whether it was desirable or not.

Q: These were the French and the British.

GOODBY: The French and British. And one of the reasons for the MLF that I probably didn't
mention earlier was we didn't want the Germans to have nuclear weapons, and we thought so long as the French and British did, that it would be almost inevitable that the Germans would have them. And so part of the MLF strategy was to prevent the French from getting nuclear weapons and to roll back the British, which in turn led to the Skibol episode and great political crisis. But I didn't cover that, so we might as well let it pass.

But, anyway, in this Atlantic Charter I worked out some language with the French that in effect endorsed these nuclear capabilities. I think it was a good thing to do. It's not one of those things that made a whole lot of splash, but in effect it did put behind us this whole issue of whether the United States endorsed the French nuclear capability or did not. And that Atlantic Charter did that if it didn't do anything else.

Q: You keep mentioning the French coming up with ideas in NATO. France doesn't belong to NATO, does it?

GOODBY: Oh, they belong to NATO. They don't belong to the integrated military side of NATO. I mentioned their team at NATO headquarters, they are represented in the North Atlantic Council. They have a permanent representative who was duly assigned by his government to NATO headquarters and took a full part in all the deliberations. As I said, his name was Ambassador François DeRose, and he was one of the ablest and most senior of French diplomats.

Q: Did you feel any inhibitions or any problems because the French have not put their military forces into the NATO command?

GOODBY: No, not because of that. I mean, we did feel inhibitions during that period because the French had a really obnoxious foreign minister for a time, whose name was Michel Joubert. And he had an American wife -- I don't know whether that has anything to do with it or not. But he was extremely nationalistic and extremely suspicious of the United States and its every act. He and Kissinger just had a bad time together, and it was unfortunate that, during this Year of Europe, Joubert, the foreign minister, was part of that period.

We had very good relations with DeRose, though I won't say he was pro-American, but he understood power relationships and how things stood, and he was a highly experienced man and a very sophisticated man. He and Rumsfeld, for example, hit it off very, very well.

So we had no particular problems with them over those issues, but you remember that it was 1973 we had the Middle East War, and also it was in, I think, 1973...

Q: For the record, this was October of '73, between Israel on one side and Egypt and Syria on the other.

GOODBY: Yes, that is right. And it was just as we had finished this MBFR negotiation that this Middle East War broke out in, I guess, late October of 1973. And it was also during that year that Nixon had signed an agreement with the Russians called the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement. And the French were highly suspicious of that, even my friend DeRose, who was
usually above such things. When this Middle East War broke out, we did a whole lot of things, including putting our forces on nuclear alert and so forth, without really consulting very effectively with NATO headquarters. And I can say that, because I was there and I noticed the absence of it.

Well, the French were really very much disturbed by this whole sequence of events, and DeRose and some of the French were putting all of these things together, as Europeans sometimes do -- the Year of Europe, the Middle East War, and this agreement on prevention of nuclear war -- and coming to the conclusion that the United States was going through some kind of reversal of alliances. I mean, that's exactly what we heard at NATO in those days, '73 and less so in '74, that the United States was going through a process of dropping its relationships with its NATO allies and shifting to a relationship, almost bordering on alliance, with Moscow. Despite the Middle East War, we went onto a nuclear alert because of what they were doing, and they still saw it that way. And they said, you know, you don't inform us of these things because that's the way you behave under these agreements you now have with the Russians. It was really a highly suspicious environment and one that was rather unpleasant. And the French were, I'm sorry to say, in the forefront in peddling that notion that we were somehow dropping the traditional links and going off with the Soviets arm and arm.

Q: I'm just putting this forward, but really, from the outside, not having dealt with them but just from what I've observed, it seems that the French are always trying to see patterns, and usually horrendous patterns and changes that just don't make sense to, you might say, the Anglo-Saxon mind. I don't know, did you find this?

GOODBY: This is right, but a lot of Europeans do this, too, and the French are especially prone to it. They think there must be some rational reason behind everything, you see, and usually there isn't any rational reason behind anything. But they always are looking for it, and when they saw things like the Year of Europe, which they always had some suspicions about, and these funny agreements that Nixon negotiated with the Soviets, and then the Middle East War, in which we didn't really keep them properly informed even though their lives were at stake in effect, they did find a pattern, as you suggest, and the pattern was reversal of alliances, not an unknown thing in the days of Metternich and Castlereagh and Talleyrand.

Q: And the new Kissinger.

GOODBY: And with Kissinger being expert in those things, I guess they thought, well, there it is, that's what he's up to now, he's becoming a modern-day Metternich.

In 1974 I left NATO headquarters. I'm happy to report that there was an Atlantic Charter signed and I had something to do with it -- I have an autographed copy at home -- and that period was put behind us. It was not a very useful thing, that Year of Europe, and the Charter itself was not of any great consequence.

But we did get started during that time on two negotiations that are very important now: one the CSCE, and the other the MBFR.
I might mention in passing that I was chargé at the US Mission in NATO in July of 1974, because the foreign ministers were meeting at that point in Ottawa, there to sign the Atlantic Charter and have one of their summer meetings. And it was at that point that Nixon came through on his last European swing before resigning. He resigned August 9, 1974, and this was July, I believe.

I went out to receive him at the airport and talk to his advance party and so forth and so on. And I was really shocked by his mien. Actually it was the first I'd seen Nixon close-up in quite a while. He had been at NATO headquarters and I'd seen him before, but this time he came through the receiving line and I shook hands with him. And his face was like a wooden mask. I mean, it was heavily painted, in effect, a kind of orange color, which I guess he liked because it made him look tanned. But it was just like a face carved out of wood -- no expression. And I thought, "My goodness, what this man is going through." It was obvious that he just was not himself and not sort of the former Nixon who was, as I had remembered seeing him, a much more animated kind of person. But this was a guy that obviously had in mind, you know, "Who is this guy? Is he for me or against me?" And that was kind of the sensation I had as he went through that receiving line.

Anyway, it was a short visit. He gave a talk and went on Moscow and then he went on to resignation. So that was the last time I saw him, and it was quite a shocking experience to see a president of the United States looking like that.

EDWARD MARKS
Economic/Commercial Officer
Brussels (1971-1974)

Ambassador Marks was born in Chicago in 1934, and received his BA from the University of Michigan. He served in the US Army from 1956 to 1958. Entering the Foreign Service in 1959, his postings included Nairobi, Nuevo Laredo, Luanda, Lusaka, Brussels, Lubumbashi and Colombo, with ambassadorships to Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 12, 1996.

Q: You left the desk in 1971?

MARKS: Yes, to go to Brussels.

Q: You were there from when to when?

MARKS: Three years, from 1971 to 1974.

Q: What were you doing there?

MARKS: I was an economic officer, in an economic-commercial section of five officers headed
by Ed Crowley as Counselor for Economic Affairs.

Q: Brussels has so many missions.

MARKS: Yes, in addition to the bilateral embassy, the American Embassy to the King of the Belgians, there was - and still is - the Mission to NATO and the Mission to the European Community [EC]. Embassy Brussels was a fairly quiet post, compared to the other two, much higher priority missions. We spent three years in Brussels, my first and only European assignment, which we loved. The work was all right but nothing exciting except the for OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] create global petroleum shortage of 1973-74. I learned that big European embassies are not terribly exciting professionally for most of the staff. I also learned that these large embassies operate on two levels: the overall embassy where most of the people are doing day-to-day tasks and a center core dealing with any hot subjects. The latter have most of the fun while the rest are doing regular 9 to 5 days, but with the privilege of living in Europe.

Q: And those other missions were booming I guess?

MARKS: NATO, of course, was the big shot mission, the high visibility and priority post. The Mission to the European Economic Commission, as it was called in those days, was still largely viewed as a technical post, but clearly had a bright future as the EEC itself went from strength to strength. Although the three U.S. diplomatic missions shared a single administrative section, there was contact between them. A few of us had personal contacts or friends at the other missions, and the administrative officers dealt with colleagues in all three missions, but by and large the three staffs went their own way. Each had a different host "audience" so to speak, and they had little to do with each other. Each mission pursued the usual diplomatic activities and contacts but the three communities - Belgian, NATO, EEC - lived completely separate lives.

Q: What was your main activity in Brussels?

MARKS: The section consisted of the counselor, two economic officers including myself, and two commercial officers. My reporting portfolio included the transportation, communication, and financial sectors, as well as current general economic reporting as directed. There were also the usual visitors to take care of, representation, and spot reporting on current developments. I spent a lot of time with the aviation industry and regulatory agencies, largely because of the OPEC petroleum crisis and the establishment of the American-sponsored international petroleum management organization. I was control officer for the American delegation to the conference which created that organization. A major subject my last year or so was the Belgian response to the oil crisis, which I later used as the basis of the thesis for my master's degree from the University of Nebraska. I had been worried about that thesis, wondering where I was going to find the time to do the research for my thesis, when a friend (and economic section colleague) dryly pointed out that I had in essence already written it in those long cables and airgrams on the Belgian response to the oil crisis. He was right, and it worked. I pulled several hundred pages of reporting out of the files, cut out anything classified, wrote some bridging language, and - Voila - I had a master's thesis which was accepted. The Belgians had actually responded to the petroleum crisis rather well; the government took fairly modest buy sensible actions, and the
private sector responded with its traditional pragmatism and good sense. However, it was interesting to note to what an increasing degree a country like Belgium was integrated into the regional and international economy. In essence, there was not - and could not be - a purely Belgian response to the economic challenge.

To return to my duties, we focused on three major topics: Belgian economic-social developments accompanying the Walloon-Flemish controversy; U.S. investment and trade; and the growing importance and implications of the European Common Market. The last subject was the primary responsibility of the U.S. Mission to the EC but we in the Embassy tried to monitor it from the Belgian perspective.

_Q: Coming from Africa, did you see a Belgian mindset about Africa at this time?_  

MARKS: Not too much, at this point most Belgians had washed their hands of Africa and walked away. However there were obviously segments of Belgian society - economic and political - that were still interested, for instance Union Minière, the big copper company. They were still the processors for Zairian copper and had many continuing links and connections. There were many missionaries and academics who had specialized in African sociology and politics. The African Museum in Brussels was and still is a major museum on African anthropology with a collection gathered over a hundred years. Actually there were three groups in Belgium with very direct and specific interests in Zaire: first of all, a Zairian expatriate community, some who lived permanently in Belgium, some who go back and forth. Then there was the community of ex-colonials who had lived in Zaire and who retained strong feelings of either fondness or resentment towards their former home. And finally, there was a still sizeable white community in Zaire, mostly of Belgian citizenship. Adding them all up meant that Zairian affairs remained a major subject in Belgian public life. However it was a relatively minor part of my professional concerns, although a more important one for our political section which include one "African watcher."

_Q: Did you see in your economic work conflict between the Flemish and the Walloons?_  

MARKS: Oh yes, the Belgians themselves called the "War of the Belgians." Belgium is a relatively recent nation-state, dating only from the early 1830s when they declared their independence from the Dutch where they had been put after the Napoleonic Wars. It is a merger of two peoples who speak a different language, although they have been intimately involved with each other for centuries especially in the long period when what is now Belgium, Holland, and parts of Northern France were called the "Low Countries" and ruled by the Spanish. The Flemish are Dutch, although might be equally accurate to say that the Dutch are Flemish, and the Walloons are essentially French. (There is also a small German speaking enclave, but it is really very small and does no play much of a political role.) It is a fascinating and complicated place especially as the Flemish are not really Dutch and the Walloons are not really French. In some ways there is a Belgian national character and they know that. So they call it the "La Guerre des Belges" and they squabble among themselves although they have, so far, stopped short of splitting up. By the way, the apparent origin of this "La Guerre des Belges" provides a very long range perspective to history and to many contemporary problems. After all why do these two peoples speak such a distinctly different language? The answer lies way back in history, back to
the days of the Roman Empire. The northern frontier of the Roman Empire ran along the Rhine River and over towards the coast where Belgium now lies. The Walloons therefore are the descendants of those Franks or other Teutonic tribes who were Romanized, while the Flemish, the Dutch, the Germans, and the others further north and west continue to speak modern versions of their ancestral languages. The "La Guerre des Belges" therefore is a modern-day legacy of the Roman Empire which leads to speculation about the permanence of history, an observation that has interesting implications for modern Africa, for instance.

However the early 1970s was an especially interesting period because it was then that the hitherto Walloon political and economic predominance was being seriously challenged. The Flemish were starting their rise to their current and economic supremacy. For over two hundred years the Walloons had been the dominant partner in the Belgian family, at least partially because of the dominance of French culture, the political and social dominance of the Walloon aristocracy centered in Brussels and, most important, the early industrialization of Wallonia in the 19th century. Belgium was one of the first countries to participate the industrial revolution, along with the English, and was a very prosperous and industrialized capitalist country in the 19th century, capitalizing on its large coal resources. Obsolete remains of that 19th century industrial plant could still be seen all over southern Belgium. So, for cultural, historical, social and financial reasons, the Walloons were the dominant partner and the Flemish were dismissed as provincial and somewhat dense farmers. I well remember a conversation after dinner at "Les Gaulois" (a prominent Belgian men's club, Francophone of course) when, over brandy, one Belgian commented reflectively that the mistake that had been made was the failure to "francophize" the Flemish population as the French government had done in French Flanders - in the 17th and 18th centuries!

However right after the Second World War, the situation began to change with the growth of the European Common Market and the expansion of new industry. Of particular note was the American automobile industry which moved into Europe, and located in areas where there was cheaper labor, and land. The Flemish part of Belgium was one of those locales, and by the time I was in Belgium most of the new and successful industrial activity was in Flanders and a new generation of well educated and prosperous Flemish were actively challenging the supremacy of their French-speaking compatriots. During my time in Belgium, the Francophones still had a slight political dominance but the relationship was clearly shifting towards the Flemish. Today it is the reverse, the Flemish now hold the economic and political high ground in a country which has gone far down the road of decentralization. In the early 1970s the political section of the Embassy was more involved in this issue than we were in the economic section as reorganization of the governmental structure along linguistic lines was a major item of political discourse, but we were all watching and commenting on the process.

*Q:* Who was ambassador when you were there?

MARKS: When I arrived it was John Eisenhower.

*Q:* How did he strike you, the son of the President?

MARKS: He was quite a nice man personally, but he was unfortunately under the influence of
alcohol a large amount of the time. I do not know if he was just not up to the job, or just not interested. Obviously, he had been taken care of by the powers that be and sent off to Belgium to this nice job. His marriage was going badly and he was drinking an awful lot. He once made the comment to some of his professional colleagues that he didn't know why anybody wanted to be an ambassador as it was a boring job. Certainly he didn't work very hard and showed very little interest. He left Brussels about a month after I arrived, and returned to the family farm in Gettysburg where he began to write military modern military history, including about his father. He has since become a reasonably well known military historian.

Q: *A nice man but in the wrong place at the wrong time. Who replaced him?*

MARKS: A very different person, a conservative professor of political science from the University of Pennsylvania by the name of Robert Strausz-Hupé. What a contrast. He was, and still although very ancient now, an intelligent and interesting man with a lot of style. He was Austrian originally, a young man who found himself after the First World War a refugee from the Austro-Hungarian Empire where he had grown up. He immigrated to the United States and ended up a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. After he retired from academic life, he wrote a fascinating and revealing autobiography composed equally of self-puffery and honesty. In the book he essentially admits that he at least partially became a conservative academic because there weren't many, most political science academics were liberal. He also pretty much admits that he had his first academic job Penn through his wife, an older, wealthy woman from the Philadelphia Main Line.

However after he retired from Penn, he began a diplomatic career under Republican administrations. First he went to Sri Lanka, then a few years later to Brussels to replace Eisenhower. Despite his age (He was in his early 70s at that time, I believe.), he was energetic, intelligent, and very knowledgeable about international affairs and, of course, about Europe. He was also an excellent linguist, to be expected from someone from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and by and large a good ambassador, I think. When he left Brussels he went to Sweden and was replaced by Harvey [sic; actually Leonard] Firestone.

Strausz-Hupé was the kind of ambassador that the Americans think they don't like: very formal. But he was also articulate, thoughtful and intelligent, and in fact interacted well with people, and not just Europeans. I didn't always agree with all of his views and opinions, but that is beside the point. After Brussels he continued for year as an American Ambassador: Sweden where he did very well in fact during a period where the Swedes were very upset with us about Vietnam; and then he returned to Brussels as the Ambassador to NATO.

Q: *What about Firestone?*

MARKS: When Strausz-Hupé left we were told we were going to get a man from the Firestone family.

Q: *Harvey?*

MARKS: Yes. It was really very funny. Prior to his arrival, we received information about him,
including his curriculum vitae which was distributed to everyone in the Embassy. The first impression was really very impressive, but upon re-reading you realized all it really said was he was born, went to several schools, had BA from Yale where he was a fine polo player, and after graduation joined a company called Firestone as West Coast Vice President for Sales and had held that job until the present day.

Q: But with lots of clubs.

MARKS: Well, yes. Actually he was a nice man with a charming wife. I have an image in my mind that I will never forget. Our ambassadors's residence in Brussels is located on one side of the Parc Royale which fronts the King's formal palace. New ambassadors are picked up at their residence by a carriage and horses and an escort of cavalry for the presentation of their credentials. Dress is white tie and the whole ceremony is quite formal. The carriage and escort proceeds from the residence to the palace, which in the case of the American ambassador is only a distance of two blocks or so, for the ceremony. It is all very traditional and great fun to watch. Anyways, when Ambassador Firestone's presentation ceremony day came there is the picture of Mrs. Firestone with her Kodak camera running along by the side of the carriage and then cutting across the park to get pictures of his arrival at the palace. All very old shoe and down to earth American, done naturally and not for show. They were a nice couple and by all reports, I left soon after he arrived, was well liked by this staff. He used his money for a lot of entertaining, including the extensive entertaining of staff both American and local. I gather, however, that the was not very substantive.

We loved Brussels in every way. My wife is a Francophone and this was her first chance to live in a French speaking environment since we had been married. We had a lovely apartment int the center of the city, short walking distance to the Embassy, and from the beginning we felt very much at home in Belgium. Although the Belgians have a reputation for brusqueness, I soon discovered that that was just the Brussellois style - they treated foreigners just as they treated each other. We were able to tour a lot and of course the living in Belgium - the food, the European styles, was a great pleasure for me. It turned out to be my only European tour so the memory is particularly vivid. Although we never again served in Europe we were able to transit and vacation from time to time, and often returned to Brussels and always with pleasure and a sense of "coming home." This feeling was later reinforced when a number of friends from Zaire returned to live in Belgium so our trips back enable us to see old friend from two different posts.

E. ALLAN WENDT
Financial Officer, U.S. Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1971-1974)

Ambassador Wendt was born and raised in Illinois. He was educated at Yale University, Institut d'Etudes Politiques (Paris) and Harvard University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1959, he specialized in international energy, Economic and Commercial Affairs at his various assignments in Washington DC and abroad. His foreign posts include Saigon, Brussels, Cairo and Ljubljana, where he served
as the United States Ambassador to Slovenia from 1992 to 1995. The Ambassador was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: Where did you go in ‘71?

WENDT: In ‘71, I went to Brussels.

Q: You were there from when to when and what were you doing?

WENDT: I had originally been assigned to our embassy in Kuala Lumpur. That was in 1970. But when Ambassador Berger persuaded me to stay a fourth year, that assignment was cancelled. Then the system came up with a position in Brussels that looked quite good to me, although I really wanted to go to Paris. I knew French before I entered the Foreign Service and I wanted to be assigned to a post where I could use the language. I did use it to a very large extent in Saigon, actually. Anyway, I was assigned to Brussels -- to the US Mission to the European Community, now the European Union. I was the Financial Officer, and French, though quite useful, was not a requirement for the job.

Q: You were there from when to when?

WENDT: ‘71 to ‘74. Just to come back briefly to Vietnam -- in 1973, I think it was December of 1972 to January of 1973, on my own and at my own expense, I flew from Brussels back to Hong Kong first and then to Saigon. I thought at the time I must be the first American employee of the US government ever to pay his own way to Saigon. I was just visiting friends in Hong Kong and Saigon. Anyway, back to Brussels. I spent three years there, and it was a very interesting tour of duty.

Q: Who was the chief of the mission there and what was your type of work?

WENDT: Robert Schaeftzel was the Chief of Mission during the first part of my tour, and then he was replaced by Joe Greenwald. Both, I thought, were very able, and I got along quite well with both of them.

The US Mission to the EC -- the European Community as it was then known -- was a lean mission by the usual US embassy standards, and the work was highly substantive. We didn’t have an administrative section -- administration was handled by the embassy, the bilateral embassy responsible for relations between the US and Belgium. My responsibility was to report on financial and monetary developments in the European Community. It was in many respects a technical job, but with a lot of political overtones. I really had to scramble to sharpen my analytical skills on financial and monetary issues. This was during the period of enlargement of the EU with Denmark and the UK joining -- I think Ireland was coming in as well.

It was an interesting period, not only because of enlargement of the EU, but also because there was a big push on towards monetary union, monetary integration, in the European Community. It’s surprising because it’s a big issue now just as it was over 20 years ago when I was there. And they really haven’t made that much progress.
Q: What was our feeling towards it? Were you with a group of true believers? European economic union is great and all...it has been sort of a cornerstone of our policy, but there is a reverse side to this. What was the attitude at the time?

WENDT: The answer to your question is yes, I was surrounded by true believers. That sometimes put me in an awkward position. I was not a true believer then and I am not a true believer now. It was a period of monetary turmoil. It was in August of 1971 that, as I recall, Nixon took the US off the gold exchange standard. Franklin Roosevelt had previously taken us off the pure gold standard.

Q: That was one of the Nixon shocks.

WENDT: That’s right. It caused real turmoil in Europe. It was August, 1971, and I had just arrived in Brussels. There was no one around -- you know how it is in Europe at that time of year. Everybody was on vacation. For us in the US Mission, it was a very difficult period.

Q: Were you quickly thumbing through your Samuelson textbook for what going off the gold standard meant?

WENDT: I had studied economics. I had taken the 26 week course at the Foreign Service Institute designed for people with no advanced knowledge of economics to give them the equivalent of a BA degree in the subject. And recall that after this course, I had a year -- actually, three semesters, of graduate work in economics at Harvard. From there, I went directly to Vietnam. So, I was prepared. I knew enough about the substance of the issues to deal with them. I should note that I was functioning not just for the State Department but also for the US Treasury, which was obviously paying a lot of attention to these matters at the time. I was under a lot of pressure because the Europeans were somewhat frantic in trying to resolve how to deal with the dollar being taken off the gold exchange standard and effectively devalued -- and I had to analyze and report on these developments.

In any event, monetary markets were constantly in turmoil, and the Europeans were trying to figure out how to react. There would be a run on a European currency, for example the Italian lira, and currency markets would be closed. The dollar lost a lot of value during this period, and this became a strain not only in currency markets but also on individuals because the value of the dollar had gone down so much. So, it was an exciting if somewhat trying time.

The challenge was to find out what was going on in the European Community, what the EC Council was doing, what the EC Commission was doing, and then report back to Washington on monetary developments, on what the Europeans planned to do, and on decisions taken at EC Council meetings. Sometimes these meetings would take place late at night and I would be up there at the Berlaymont building waiting for somebody to come out of the meeting who might be able to tip us off. I felt to some extent like a reporter, quickly phoning in the information to Washington if it wasn’t too late at night. Of course, the six hour time difference helped in this respect.
It was an exciting time. We were always trying to pick up documents that friendly European officials would occasionally give to us on a not for attribution basis. I sent in a lot of analytical reports. I met a lot of people. I learned a great deal about the European Community and made quite a number of friends. Knowing French helped a lot. I enjoyed Brussels. It’s a sleeper. It’s a much more interesting city than it’s given credit for. So, all in all it was a very fruitful stay.

Also, I should say that although we were under a certain amount of pressure from the U.S. Treasury, which wanted to put its own person there -- an actual Treasury Attaché -- they were satisfied with the work we were doing in their area. So, that was not really an issue the whole time I was there.

Q: What was the feeling on our side with Britain, Ireland, Denmark coming into the EC?

WENDT: We supported enlargement. We thought the idea of Britain joining was a healthy development and that with Britain in, maybe it would be easier for the US to deal with the European Community. You know, the lingua franca of the EC Commission in Brussels was French, even though informally a lot of people spoke English. Even the Germans who worked at the Commission had been brought up on French professionally. This suited me fine because I knew French. But with enlargement, the English language became more and more important within the EC. Anyway, we favored enlargement.

I want to come back to your earlier question about being a true believer or not.

Q: I’d better explain for the record what a true believer is in our context. As I see it, a true believer comes from the notion that since the earliest days after the Second World War, we believed that, in a way, our policy was based on the idea that if we get Europe unified (we’re talking about Western Europe), it really boils down to: We won’t have the French and the Germans going at each other again. Going from there, everything leading towards union is just tremendous. We have to be absolutely for it without regard to what might be legitimate American concerns about trade wars, trade barriers, this type of thing. Maybe there’s more to it than that, but I think that’s the basic idea.

WENDT: I think you make a very important point. You recall I said that I was not a true believer -- so, sometimes it was a bit awkward for me. I didn’t believe in monetary integration then. I don’t really believe in it now, although I must say, it’s entirely up to the Europeans. If they want to do it, if they find it in their interest and are able to do it, that’s fine. The US should just cheerfully go along. It’s the Europeans’ sovereign decision. What I don’t think we should be doing is going out and beating the drum all the time for European integration, a kind of supranational Europe. We’ve done that ever since the Second World War for the very reasons you cite. I think it was certainly quite legitimate for us to want a regime, an economic community, to arise in Europe that would put an end to Europe’s civil wars. There’s no question about that. That was an objective devoutly to be wished. But I think that objective was achieved. The question is not whether you have some kind of a community tight enough and having relinquished sufficient attributes of sovereignty to have passed beyond the point of no return as far as internal conflict in Europe is concerned. I think that’s wonderful. We can all rejoice that
that has happened. Whether the Europeans have to go the extra mile and really give up all their sovereignty in the monetary area is another matter.

I happen to think a monolith in Europe is not necessarily going to function in the US interest and is not going to be an easy partner for us to deal with. You can make a case that real integration would make it even harder for us to defend our trading interests and possibly even our political interests. So, why we go around pushing this concept I do not know. I don’t even understand why the Europeans themselves want it, and I’m not sure they actually do. The single market is one thing. I think that’s fine. That’s 85 or 90 per cent of what is needed. It’s that last 10 or 15 per cent which requires the real great leap forward to monetary integration. When you give up control over your currency, you really have given up one of the final, fundamental attributes of sovereignty, and that’s a very tall order. It requires the wealthier parts of Europe to be willing to transfer massive real resources to the poorer parts in order to sustain the system, just as we do in the United States, except that here, people don’t realize what real monetary integration entails.

The wealthier parts of the United States transfer huge amounts of resources to the poorer parts in order to sustain a monetary union that we achieved 200 years ago. I doubt that the people in Connecticut, which has, I think, the highest per capita income in the United States, realize how much of what they create and produce gets transferred to the poorer parts of the United States through taxation. If they did, they just might not want to be part of this economic and monetary union. Obviously, I’m not calling into question monetary integration in the United States. We achieved it over 200 years ago. But if we had to do it today and you left it up to the states, do you think they would all agree? I am not so sure. As for Europe, why would Germany be willing to continue to support Greece, for example, in the European Union? There are tremendous costs when you look at the problems the Germans already have sustaining their social welfare system and their social safety net. But the real point is, I don’t think it’s necessary from a European point of view. If they achieve the benefits of the single market as was agreed at Maastricht, they’ll be doing very well. From an economic point of view, they will have achieved a degree of prosperity that I think is highly commendable. They’ll gain the benefits of a rather high degree of economic association.

Q: Try to focus on the time you were there. Did you find yourself odd man out? Did anybody want to hear somebody saying, “Well, yes, what are American interests in European monetary integration?”

WENDT: We never actually had that kind of a debate. I don’t think I ever got beyond the point of maybe working a note of skepticism into my reports as to whether this was really going to be achieved or not. I don’t think I could have gotten away with suggesting that it wasn’t necessarily in the US interest.

Interestingly, later on, after the end of my tour of duty in Brussels in 1974, I was assigned to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York as the first State Department Fellow there. This was, in effect, a substitute for a formal senior training program either at the State Department’s Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy or the National War College. I decided that at the Council, I would focus on the issue of European economic and monetary union, which had been a major focus of my work in Brussels. During the last few weeks of my tour of duty in Brussels, the US Mission
kindly relieved me of my regular duties so that I could gather research for the paper I planned to write while at the Council. So, I was able to travel around Europe interviewing various personalities at ministries of finance and central banks. I even managed to meet with Raymond Barre at his apartment in Paris. He had been the EC Commissioner for Economy and Finance in Brussels and was between jobs, so to speak. He later became Prime Minister of France.

During this senior training sabbatical year at the Council in New York, I attended innumerable meetings at the Council, including a session on Vietnam chaired by William Bundy, who had been Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. At the same time, I prepared a research paper entitled “The Failure of European Economic and Monetary Union.” Although I think people appreciated the effort that went into my paper -- and even thought it was a commendable job in terms of analysis -- they did not accept its admittedly negative conclusions, which I thought on the other hand were quite defensible. So, the paper was generally viewed as an act of lèse majesté. I was waving a red flag in front of the true believers, and I caught a bit of flak as a result. I think the Council on Foreign Relations may have contemplated publishing my paper, but in the end, they didn’t. I suppose they didn’t really like the message.

The paper did get sent back to the people at our mission to the EC in Brussels. They, of course, took issue with my conclusions. Again, they were true believers. I respect them. People can disagree. But I want to underscore one thing. It’s fine if the Europeans want to do this. But I do not see why the United States should press it as something that’s in our interest, because I don’t think it is at all evident that it is.

Q: How did you find the principal member states? I’m thinking particularly of France at that time. Again, I’m not an economist and I haven’t served in that area. But France always seems to be the odd country out in almost anything from the American perspective. How did you find the role of France in the time you were in Brussels and how it was dealing with the main issues?

WENDT: The French were always very influential in EC circles, both in the Commission and in the staff that supported the EC Council. I think one reason they were influential was because from the very beginning, they made it a point to send top notch civil servants to staff these positions, and it showed. To some extent, they were the odd man out on many issues, but that was not quite so evident when I was there. De Gaulle died in 1969, as I recall, and I didn’t get to Brussels until 1971. So, the most militant forms of Gaullism, the empty seat -- when in a fit of pique the French boycotted the proceedings of Brussels -- all that was behind us.

One of the two French commissioners was Raymond Barre, who as I said previously later became Prime Minister of France, and in the interim, was a professor. But when I first encountered him in 1971, he was the EC commissioner responsible for the economic and monetary area, and we used to see him frequently. Jean Claude Paye, who is now the Secretary General of the OECD, was his Chief of Cabinet. These very senior people were always very constructive and, I thought, on the whole, quite helpful in our contacts with them. We had very good relations with the individual French civil servants who were at the Commission and the Council. Maybe they weren’t always quite as good a source of information as some of the others -- the Dutch and the Germans were particularly forthcoming. But on the whole we got along well with the French. It was not a period when the French were deliberately creating problems in
order to secure certain objectives, as they are often accused of doing. They were not playing the role of the odd man out at that time.

I think it’s fair to say we got along well with just about everybody at the Commission as well as the Permanent Representatives of the member states. When I say “we,” I’m talking about the whole American staff at our mission to the EC. We had very good relations and very good contacts with a tremendous variety of people.

I also thought our mission to the EC in Brussels was a first-class example of American professionalism. It was very well staffed -- and not just from the State Department but from other US government agencies as well. I believe that’s still the case. It was a first class operation, and I am very glad I served there.

CECEIL S. RICHARDSON
Chief, Consular Section
Brussels (1971-1975)

Cecil Richardson was born in New York in 1926, and graduated from Queen’s College. He served in the US Army from 1944 to 1947, and overseas from 1951 to 1952. Entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he was stationed in Dakar, Saigon, Lagos, Niamey, Paris, Accra, Brussels, Quito, Tehran, Lima, St. Paolo and Bahamas. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 5, 2003.

Q: Okay, 1972, you’re off to Belgium. You were in Belgium from when to when?

RICHARDSON: I got there, the last days of ‘71 and I left in February of ‘75.

Q: Alright, what was your job?

RICHARDSON: I was head of the Consular section there. It was a stand alone operation so I wasn’t in the embassy building or in the chancery. And had, except for the staff meeting, very little contact with the chancery, except when somebody wanted a visa for some V.I.P. [Very Important Person]. I was called to the embassy only twice, once because some Americans were stranded by a bankrupt charter flight and another time when I refused a visa to the personal doctor of the King’s sister.

Q: Well, was it at all complicated for you because you had something like three embassies in Brussels, didn’t you?

RICHARDSON: Yes. NATO and the European Community, any relations I had with them were social. They did not impinge on my operation at all.

Q: What was the main type of work you were doing as Consular Officer?
RICHARDSON: Well, the main operation of the office, we had modest consular operation. Very little in the way of I.V.s and I had a very competent staff. The biggest part of the operation was in American services because of the military presence there, they were forever registering births. And, as a matter of fact, the army even gave the office a full-time clerk, a military man who came in and assisted in the American services section to deal with the military side of our operation.

Q: Well, I had that same thing in Saigon where the army sent us a clerk who was a Harvard graduate, getting his Ph.D. and got drafted so it was a good place to put him, I guess.

RICHARDSON: I didn’t realize they were drafting graduate students.

Q: Well, they got them. They got them.

RICHARDSON: Because we got several people, I think they’re still in the Senate who got Ph.D.s in those ends [Laughter].

Q: Did you have many problems with arrest cases, seamen, shipping, this type of thing?

RICHARDSON: Seamen and shipping, no, because at that time, Antwerp was still open so if any seamen problems came up, Antwerp dealt with them. No, we had lots of Americans, one group insisted on sending Bibles to Muslim countries and their people doing the distribution would get in trouble in various Muslim countries. The headquarters of this outfit was in Brussels and so they’d come in and demand that the U.S. government do something about their people who were under arrest for distributing Bibles. But, the usual, you would get in a place like Brussels, and certainly it was true in Paris. You’d get people who are maintained abroad by their families ...

Q: Remittance men and women.

RICHARDSON: [Laughter]. Yes and some of them were quite delightful. I had one in Brussels who later turned up in Ecuador.

Q: Did they cause problems?

RICHARDSON: No, no. Sure they caused problems, but no. But no, no serious ones. They weren’t violent, they were eccentric. For instance, the one who later turned up in Ecuador had an amusing incident with a Vice Consul working for me who later distinguished herself in Bordeaux, Judy Heiman. She was taking this fellow out to the airport to put him on a plane. We were repatriating him and he was very tall, with a silky gray beard. The carpet at the airport there in Brussels is bright red and he thought it would look splendid if he stretched out, something like Christ on the cross, with his beard. Judy said he was a stunning sight. She had to speak to him in her most schoolmarmish fashion to persuade him to get up and get on that aircraft. [Laughter]. Yes, he later turned up in Ecuador when I was filling in for the Consul General down in Guayaquil. The Consul General had to take his wife up to the hospital in Panama so I went down to fill in for him and I got a report there that there was an American up at the last small port before you cross over into Colombia who was running down the street stark naked. Okay. I heard
about him and when he turns up in Guayaquil, he greets me like an old friend. It was this guy from Brussels who was then pleased to give me a photograph of himself because we were such good old friends. So, those were the kinds of things we had, there were no serious problems, I don’t think I had any serious, I had people under arrest, but that’s routine for most places.

Q: Did the Belgian police give you good access?

RICHARDSON: Excellent. I had very good relations with the police chief in charge of foreigners. And so I had no problem in terms of cooperation at all. As a matter of fact, you’d say it was an easy tour. There were interesting things. Russians turned up. This was back in the ‘70s and Russians turned up demanding to go to the United States. They were registered as refugees and things were moving too slowly for them so they came in, they wanted some action out of the embassy.

Q: Was there any, from the consular point of view, any sort of ripple effect from the fact that for so long Belgium had had the Congo, and Rwanda and Burundi… There were a lot of missionaries down there. Did that have any reflection ...

RICHARDSON: No because at this time, at this point something like at least a decade had passed ...

Q ’61 was essentially when the Congo blew up ...

RICHARDSON: Yes and by this time they, any things that might have turned up in Brussels as a result of their colonial activities were long since passed and the movement from the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, the migration seemed not to be very, very active.

Q: Things had pretty well settled down.

RICHARDSON: In fact, several years later when I visited Brussels I became conscious of the neighborhoods in which sub-Saharan Africans were very well represented.

Q: Did you, in your work and all, pick up any of the split between the Flemish and the, what was it the Flemish and French ... ?

RICHARDSON: Flemish and the French, yes.

Q: I mean in Belgium?

RICHARDSON: Oh, yes, you’re very conscious of that even in Brussels where the language is French. When, for instance, when I traveled in the Flemish area, I spoke more English than I spoke French. If I had to ask someone directions or was in any way approached in Flemish, I would speak in English. Half the time they spoke English so there wasn’t any problem, but if they spoke no English, they would initiate French, “Well, do you speak French?” And then we could go on from there. I wasn’t going to put myself in the spot of annoying anyone by starting off in French because I had seen that happen and I had heard, others had told me about it.
instance, Ken Brown… I was sitting in on a briefing Ken Brown was giving to some young diplomats in the Foreign Office. He initiated his briefing in French to the great annoyance of some of them who then reminded him that there were two languages in the country and all of them spoke English anyhow. [Laughter].

Q: How about, any of the staffing of the consular section, was it purely French speaking?

RICHARDSON: My staff was all French speaking Flemish, certainly the lady, the senior member who handled notarials and things of that sort, she was Flemish. She was from Antwerp. The three women doing visas, at least 2 were Flemish, I think the third one was Flemish also. And when I arrived, my receptionist was Flemish. She left and I got a young woman. Her mother was Argentine, her father was Austrian and she was fluent in French and spoke some Flemish and she was the receptionist. But, I would say I was not conscious of any division, but I realize I didn’t have any basis, I just realized I didn’t have any basis for that. I was not conscious of it in the embassy, but Ken who worked, actually worked in the chancellery could better tell you about this. The staff was bilingual French and Flemish as well as English. And several of them had German as well.

Q: When you left there, how did you find the social life there? Were the Belgians fairly open?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes because of the language I did better with any Belgian who spoke French and/or English, so my social relations tended to be more in the Walloon side, but I had lots of contacts, useful contacts, Flemish contacts. The police chief, I think was originally Flemish, but her English and her French were fluent.

Q: You left there in ’75. Where did you go?

RICHARDSON: Ecuador, which was very exciting because I had never been in the mountains before.

THERESA HEALY
Political Officer
Brussels (1972-1973)

Ambassador Healy was born in New York in 1932 and received her BA from St. John’s University. Her postings include Naples, Milan, Bern, Brussels and Wellington with an ambassadorship to Sierra Leone. She was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin on May 10, 1985.

Q: This brings us now to 1972, at which time you were assigned to Brussels.

HEALY: Indeed. This was probably the wrong assignment for me. It was 1972, so that means what? Sixteen years of European experience. I had tried now and again to get out of EUR. I knew I needed experience in another geographic area, but I was persuaded by the same logic that
sent me from the Swiss desk to Switzerland, to accept an assignment in Brussels. I shouldn't have done it, but everybody said, "Brussels is a wonderful city in which to be living and you know the work already." So when a job as political officer came open in Brussels, friends who worked with me in RPE said, "Go ahead Terry take it. You know you can do it, and you'll be in Brussels." So I took the easy way out. I should have been smarter career-wise. I should have been counting the pennies and the dollars and whatever and I should have avoided that assignment, but I took it.

And it was the wrong job. I was overqualified for the job. I was too senior for it. I discovered after the fact that the personnel officer, who realized this when I didn't, almost blocked the assignment, but didn't. [laughs] "Oh, what might have been, what might have been. Anyway. I didn't quite enjoy the work. I couldn't find a comfortable tennis situation, which always makes me a more agreeable person in the office. I just found that things weren't working out too well.

After a year I took myself back home for a family visit and came down to Washington, talked to some people and said, "Look, it's not working out too well. If there's a direct assignment that I'm qualified for, or whatever, I would like to get out of Brussels." Now what happened is that immediately, in fact I may have already done that before I got to Washington after the year, I'd already shortened the tour from three years to two-years. I knew I could not take three years in this job, so it was now a two year assignment. I was half way through it. And fortunately that was when the Geneva negotiations of OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] started.

The first Helsinki agreement in general was now going to be hammered into a concrete document in Geneva. I was assigned to work on the economic basket in Geneva. I enjoyed the work very much. I was working with George Vest, who's now the Director General [of the Foreign Service]. I was working with a bunch of people I liked and could learn from. It was an exposure to international organization work which had been always something interesting to me. I enjoyed living in Geneva. Unfortunately Brussels hadn't counted on losing me for that length of time.

At a certain point I received a phone call from Brussels which in effect said, "Terry, come back or don't bother coming back at all." [laughter] In other words, we've got to fill your position. Now either you come back to fill it, or just cut the ties and throw your lot in with the people in Geneva, and we'll find somebody else to fill the position. Well, I talked this over at length with some friends in Geneva and they all persuaded me, they were wrong in the end, but they did persuade me that the CSCE negotiations were very delicate and subject to termination, cancellation, suspension at almost any point.

Q: Yes.

HEALY: And that I could throw my hand in with the negotiations and find myself without a job. So reluctantly I went back to Brussels, and was fortunately much heartened within a matter of a couple of months by the knowledge that I had been selected for senior training, and would be going to the National War College. So I hung on for another six months in Brussels and came back to Washington for that training.
JOHN BRAYTON REDECKER
Executive Officer; US Mission to NATO
Brussels (1972-1974)

Mr. Redecker was born in Germany of American Foreign Service parents and spent his early years with his parents abroad. He was educated at Williams College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After serving in the US Navy and with the Aluminum Company of America, he joined the Foreign Service in 1964. Mr. Redecker served in Washington, dealing with trade and management issues, and Foreign Service posts abroad, where his assignments concerned economic, trade and a variety of other matters. His foreign postings include West Berlin, Brussels, Rabat, Madrid and Frankfurt. He also served as Diplomat-in-Residence at his alma mater, Williams College. Mr. Redecker was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: You were in this NATO office from when to when?

REDECKER: I was from 1971 to ’74. I first started out as a XO. The XO function...

Q: XO means Executive Officer.

REDECKER: Executive officer receiving deputized activity from the DCM to clear cables from the military side of U.S. NATO. A concern of the State people was that the defense organization, much larger than they, a defense advisor would be putting out documentation to the Defense Department which the State Department would have opposed. The way to solve that was to have control of everything that went out of the mission to both SecDef and SecState. We had a control that could be monitored if necessary. The individual that performed that somewhat boring function after a while, was the XO. I performed that job. It was interesting. NATO was a whole new world for me. Manuel d’Ambrosio was the secretary general. I was finding my way back into what was called “substance.”

Q: Who was the ambassador to NATO?

REDECKER: I will have to get that for you. ...who did not last too very long, and George Vest who was DCM, was chargé for a very considerable period of time when I was there. I talked with him and said the XO function is interesting, but my goodness, is an introduction to what you are going to be doing, but as a permanent type of activity, it’s really rather monotonous and not very intellectually stimulating and not very creative. He understood that.

I don’t know if you know a fellow by the name of Arthur Woodruff. He was my predecessor in that job. He moved into the political section afterwards and was delighted, like Atlas giving Hercules the orb to carry on his shoulders. He was delighted to pass it on. He said, “Bray, this is interesting to start with. You’ve never been around this unit. It’s very special. NATO is a very
special universe, but you don’t want to stay in it. You want to do something.”

I worked with the division chiefs -- the advisors -- and Larry Eagleburger who was political advisor. He left and was replaced by Jim Goodby who was a wonderful man. I really communicated with Jim Goodby. He was one of the most wonderful people I ever met. I explained my situation to him, and he said, “I understand completely. We’ll have to find a way to deal with this,” and he dealt with it by eventually putting me into the MBFR negotiating seat.

Q: The MB...

REDECKER: The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, the longest negotiations intended never to go anywhere ever to be mounted by anybody. It involved our mission in Vienna; it involved all of NATO; it was a very exciting business. The political committee and senior political committee decoded, both of them, they don’t want to deal with this on a day to day basis. It’s too absolutely mind-bending and soul destroying. They created a working group -- the MBFR working group -- to deal with this on a regular basis. The allies that had forces in Germany were participants in this MBFR meeting. It was a low-level venue, but it actually transacted quite a bit of business that eventually ended up in the senior political committee. Ted Wilkinson had done this job and was being replaced. He said, “It’s very interesting. You can make a name for yourself.” So Goodby said, “Yes, I’d like to put you in there.”

So I became an MBFR U.S. rep to the MBFR working group, and I spent two years doing that, happy to be out of the XO job. Somebody else received the orb to carry on his shoulders, but I had two very, very handsome and interesting years. We were engaged in fairly serious negotiating procedures with the allies. The purpose of the working group was actually to work out arrangements of who would cut what out of their forces that we could justify and that we would have allied consensus in NATO of the force reductions that we would be prepared to offer the Soviets in the Vienna venue.

Q: You were negotiating within the allied...

REDECKER: That’s correct. The allies, of course, were very suspicious at the time that the Americans wanted to find some sleazy way to reduce their troop levels without really telling anybody and still maintaining the facade vis a vis the Soviets by urging the Soviets to reduce their forces. There was an asymmetry in the forces so that the Soviets were required to take out two to three for every one we took out. To argue which one of our side was to be taken out was the raging debate around this working group.

Q: I would have thought in this working group there would have been an urge to cut. This was one of our big things ____ being the Europeans haven’t carried their weight vis a vis...

REDECKER: That was, indeed, going on at the time. But they were saying the Americans want to do a fast number on us. The whole question was not the principle of it. It was the accuracy of the numbers. What was the order in battle on the Soviet side? What were the forces? What kinds of forces were we asking them to reduce to compensate for our losses. A blue uniformed air force person is not the same as a combat Joe in the trenches. How did you work this? It was
enormously complicated but largely political undertaking, but I made a very nice name for myself and pleased the Defense Department by protecting the American position and not getting it down too terribly much. I think they wanted to get two brigades out, and we wanted to see what we could get for the three brigades.

Q: I would have thought that the feeling would be that nothing was really going to happen on this thing.

REDECKER: Yes, that was it all the time. MBFR and CSE was another. There were two multilateral negotiations going on with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union it was, first of all, CSE and MBFR.

Q: CSE, the Conventional...

REDECKER: Central Security in Europe.

Q: This is the Helsinki Accord.

REDECKER: Precisely that.

Q: I don’t know if you picked this up, but I interviewed George Vest who was saying that Henry Kissinger was red hot on the arms negotiation and was denigrating the CSE which George Vest was trying to run. Did you pick up any of this?

REDECKER: Oh, yes indeed! MBFR was seen as a political undertaking to take care of what they thought was the transitional problem and probably a problem that would resolve itself technologically rather than numerically, that there would be reductions anyway because the force configurations opposing each other would find it in their interest to reduce their number of troops because the technology would have advanced. CSC was seen as something up in the air. Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe. They said this was fine, this is how we want to do this, but there isn’t any hard stuff in there. The steel balls are not in the CSE rifle. But that was my business, and it was a very interesting business, and I performed reasonably well in it.

Q: Did you get any feel for the personalities or positions of some of the major allies in this?

REDECKER: Yes, indeed. The views of the allies was, “We are very suspicious of American intentions. We think that for numerous reasons, deployment reasons, budgetary reasons, the Americans want to reduce and are trying to find a way that will reduce and cook the books of the Soviet sides to justify the American reduction.”

The question was, “How do we minimize the American political imperative to reduce the number of troops in Germany?” That was basically the question. I had to talk in those discussions around the table with the six MBFR allies with beautiful, articulate instructions both from principally Defense. I was able to try and demonstrate as well as we could that we were not in that business and we were going to seek, for whatever we took out, double to triple equivalent removal on the Warsaw Pact side.
Q: Did you feel that we were dealing straight?

REDECKER: We were not dealing straight. No. There were competitive reasons even within Defense. I became almost a Defense spokesman. My principal backup in Washington was not State but was the Defense Department. They said, “You have to have a State person, not a Defense person,” so ___ as Wilkinson had been before. They were good boys, and we got patted on the head by Defense for protecting their interest. There was great tension inside of Defense and, indeed, the DOD had a committee -- MBFR committee -- in the Pentagon giving us instructions and later locked in all kinds of battles as well.

Q: The French weren’t in this. You had basically Germany, Britain, and Italy were your main.

REDECKER: The Germans were not in it because the Germans weren’t reducing. It was the NATO allies with troops assigned that were in, as I recall. As I recall, the Brits were there, and we had some other allies. The Dutch, of course, were there, and the Belgians were there. I guess perhaps the Germans didn’t seem to me a very major factor. I can’t remember at this point whether they were in it or not.

Q: The British, Dutch, the Belgians. Were there battles with you?

REDECKER: Principally with the United States. Again, it was something of a repeat of what was going on in the Pentagon as to which forces could be offered up for reduction. What combat capable forces might be reduced which is what made the other allies nervous, especially the British. What are the Americans doing? Are they actually going to take out combat troops? The Russians said, “You’ve got to take them out if you insist on us taking them out.” Then in Vienna, John Dean -- the American negotiator there -- with his boss. I was on the phone with John Dean all the time. They were dealing with the Russians but with the allies as well. What we were trying to do was to try to create a uniform NATO allied position for the delegations there to work from that they wouldn’t start arguing among themselves in Vienna.

Q: You were there from when to when?

REDECKER: ’72, ’73, and the beginning of ’74.

JOSEPH A. GREENWALD
Representative, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1972-1975)

Joseph A. Greenwald was born in Illinois on September 18, 1918. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Chicago and a law degree from Georgetown University. His career included positions in Geneva, London, Paris, Brussels, and Washington, DC. Mr. Greenwald was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert on May 16, 1989.
GREENWALD: But finally the Department decided that it was time to move, so in '72, I went from Paris to Brussels, and Schaetzel came back. I guess he actually left the Service, or maybe he did some special assignments and then left the Service.

Anyway, as I had anticipated, it was a very pleasant change because even though there were some interesting activities in the OECD, it still wasn't really where the action was.

Q: Just to divert a little bit there, how did the OECD get its assignments? Did you invent them yourself and sell them?

GREENWALD: Sometimes. You mean myself?

Q: No. I mean, I just wondered, who decided what the agenda was going to be in this sort of thing.

GREENWALD: Well, the way it went was that sometimes things would germinate, originate, in the permanent representatives, which was what we were in Paris. Sometimes, not all that often. Mainly they came from governments, and governments would be looking for a place to develop a policy, to get a joint policy among industrialized countries. That was the main function of the OECD. It was a kind of a pre-negotiation in broader organizations or sometimes where it only involved the industrialized countries, a program or a policy or a project would be put through like, say, the technological gap problem. That didn't affect the developing countries. It only affected the OECD countries, and they did what I call the demystification exercise. But governments would use the OECD for a kind of a caucus for broader organizations like the UNCTAD or the U.N. or the International Monetary Fund. That was one function. Kind of a pre-

Q: It had no real organizational relationship to the U.N., however?

GREENWALD: No. No organizational connection at all. Entirely independent, funded by the member countries. We paid 25% percent of the budget, which was good at that time. We were paying more in the U.N. We were up at 33%, 30%. We paid 25% there. It had, as I say, this kind of caucus function.

In addition, it had a very important function, depending on how it was used, in the financial and monetary field. For example, the famous group of seven that we have now really had its origins in the OECD. There was a group of ten. There was also a group of five. Economic policy committees. I remember in the time that I was there that people who were head of the council of economic advisors in the United States or chairman of the governors of the Federal Reserve System would use the OECD much more actively -- it isn't any more because there are other channels that have been developed. But the OECD was a place where they got together to discuss macro economic policy, interest rates, exchange rates, all the things that have become much more prominent now and which are done through similar kinds of groups, but it's outside the OECD framework. But at the time while I was there and through the 1960s -- the OECD, by the way, was only established in 1960 -- well, it was when Dillon was the Secretary of the
I think that was in the Kennedy Administration.

Q: Yes.

GREENWALD: Early 1960s. He and a man named Jack Tuthill and John Leddy were the ones who dreamed up changing the -- I should go back. The OECD was a conversion of the OEEC to a more permanent broader organization. The OEEC was set up in the Marshall Plan days in the 1940s and 1950s to play the role and did play the role of allocating Marshall Plan funds among the European countries. It was then the OEEC, which stood for the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. And that was its first task, to achieve the most efficient and effective use of Marshall Plan funds by all of the European countries coming together and deciding what to do.

It was also used to carry out a process of European liberalization, of getting rid of the quantitative restrictions, the quotas that all the Europeans had on for balance-of-payments reasons, and the controls that they had, financial and monetary controls that they had, again for balance-of-payments reasons. And by the early 1960s, convertibility had taken place. The European economies had come back, European currencies were now convertible, and most of the special restrictions that they kept on for balance-of-payments reasons were eliminated.

So Jack Tuthill, John Leddy, working with Dillon, decided that there was time to take this organization and make the United States instead of an observer, the United States and Canada, full members. Subsequently, Japan was brought in. Subsequently, Australia and New Zealand. It turned into, basically, a caucus of -- a club of the rich countries is what it was called.

Q: Well, excuse that digression, but I think there is often some uncertainty as to the area of responsibility.

Well, back to the EEC.

GREENWALD: Yes, well, okay. Then I went up to Brussels. As I say, the multilateral diplomacy in the OECD was all right, and it had some high spots, some of which I have mentioned. But it gets to be a drag to go to meetings all day long of twenty-four -- there were twenty-four countries in it at that time. I was very, very happy to move to Brussels where it was closer to a bilateral relationship, in a sense. I mean, I had never had a real country as an ambassador. But the commission and the bodies of the European communities acted with a single voice.

Q: It is a discreet political organization in a sense.

GREENWALD: Well, it wasn't a political organization yet. But economically under the Rome Treaty, there were certain responsibilities that were the exclusive domain of the European commission as an entity. There was a commissioner for external relations. In my day, happily, Sir Christopher Soames was involved, and he was the son-in-law of Winston Churchill -- the British were in by that time, by the way. It was closer to a classic mission, accredited to a national government, although it was a collective. Closer to it certainly than I had at the OECD,
which was just an international organization, where you mostly did a lot of talking. There wasn't much in the way of what I call serious, real negotiation. But I certainly had that in Brussels, and it was a very welcome change.

Now let me describe how things worked in Brussels in my day. I don't think it is true anymore, but I was very fortunate. When I first came in in '72, the Commissioner for External Relations, who would have been the equivalent of my Minister for Foreign Affairs, if I had been accredited to a national government, was a German named Rolf Dahrendorf, who went on to become the Director of the London School of Economics, and I think was a good socialist. It would not have been my first choice as Minister of Foreign Affairs, but I had him only very briefly because at the end of -- I came in in the middle of '72.

At the end of '72, the British were members, and at the end of each two-year period, the governments would nominate new commissioners. Commissioners were nominated by governments. They were political appointees, not civil servants. The British came in, and they appointed as the portfolio as its called, the portfolio of external relations was Christopher Soames.

Well, Christopher Soames is the best foreign minister that I could possibly have had. When we first met, he surprised me a little bit by saying we were going to have a lot of fun. As a career diplomat, I didn't look upon my relations with the commissioner for external relations as something frivolous -- in fact, I did have a lot of fun.

We also did a lot of useful work mainly in managing US-EC relations. This was a period when the British had just come in, along with Denmark and Ireland, and the community was more or less consolidating. It was, I would say, on a plateau. It was not really making any major steps forward like this new program of Europe 1992, for example, this 1992 program. It was on a plateau, and it was basically consolidating the enlargement that had taken place. So the three years that I was there, I would say my main function was in managing Atlantic relations, transatlantic relations, between the US and EC. In other words, to avoid the type of trade frictions that we get into periodically. You can't avoid them entirely, but to try to minimize the impact and basically try to keep the trade and economic issues from becoming political issues between the United States and Europe.

And in that context, Soames was absolutely invaluable, and I did enjoy my time with him. First of all, as a politician, he had been an MP, a conservative MP. Secondly, he had been appointed British ambassador to France by Harold Wilson so that he knew the French very well. The French were always the most, perhaps the most, difficult and most importunate in the community. And, of course, he knew the British. And, finally, he looked upon his job in Brussels as carrying out his father-in-law's (Sir Winston Churchill), special relationship between the United States and the U.K. In his case, because he was a committed European -- between the European Community and the United States.

So we had a framework within which we worked together extremely well. What we did was whenever we saw a problem coming up, to the extent that we could anticipate them, we would get together and map out a strategy, a joint strategy. He would take it in the European
Commission as far as he could and try to deal with the solution that we either --

Q: Had agreed to before.

GREENWALD: We had agreed to before either in anticipation to head off a problem or deal with a problem which had already come up which we hadn't successfully headed off. He would take it as far as he could with his colleagues in the commission. Each of the member states had either one or two commissioners. Then he would come back to me and say, "Well, I have taken it as far as I can. You," not me personally, although I had to do some of it, "the United States would now have to go to the member states, here are the issues that we have run into, here are the aspects of this problem that you are going to have to deal with, here are the countries that are causing the difficulty." We would then -- we, the United States -- use our bilateral missions in the member states to make representations and try to bring them around for the solution that we had reached an agreement on.

Well, that was rather unusual because you normally don't conspire with your opposite member country to find a solution. But it worked extremely well. It also worked very well because he had a special and direct relationship, which I sometimes wasn't very happy about but overall appreciated, with Henry Kissinger. He almost never went to Kissinger without telling me what he was doing, but he sometimes did it with --

Q: Although Kissinger may have gone to him without telling you. [Laughter]

GREENWALD: That is possible, too. There was a fair amount of use of the back channel. From his side, I was mostly aware of it but, as you say, maybe I didn't. There was Henry Kissinger and Hal Sonnefeldt, who were working with us. So that obviously helped, especially when Kissinger had both hats in the White House and in the State Department.

Q: Well, while you are at that, do you want to talk a little more about your relationships both with the Department and the US Government as a whole? I mean, what your channels were and how it worked.

GREENWALD: Well, as far as the Department is concerned, there is a -- I guess it is still there -- there is an office of RPE --

Q: Yes, the European Regional --

GREENWALD: European Regional Political and Economic Affairs.

Q: Yes. In the bureau. Which is in the bureau.

GREENWALD: Within the bureau, yes, in the bureau of European affairs. They were the backstoppers. As far as I was concerned, they did a first-class job. They were people devoted to the subject, followed it very closely.

Q: You really did most of your business on the political side of the Department, in this case,
rather than --

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: On the economic side.

GREENWALD: Yes, that is quite true. My backstoppers were in the regional bureau, although it was the economic part of the regional bureau, but those were the people who did the day-to-day backstopping. If I sent recommendations or messages, it went to them.

The Bureau of Economic Affairs got involved in it, but mainly when it became a multilateral issue that went beyond just US-EC relations. Some of them they had to get into, too. If there were problems with the Congress, for example, that would be done through the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Problems with other agencies was frequently done through the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Both of them, actually. Like Agriculture, needless to say, we had a lot of problems in the agriculture field. There had to be close working relations with the Department of Agriculture. Both RPE and the Bureau of Economic Affairs would help on that.

We had periodic high-level meetings when Henry Kissinger would come over to a NATO meeting, much as is still going on now, although it had more content in it. He would have a meeting with the commission and with Soames and with the rest of the commissioners.

Other agencies I would sometimes deal with directly mainly at the level of either Assistant Secretary or Secretary of the agency. Agriculture was the most important one.

Q: Did you have to commute a good deal to come back to the States to --

GREENWALD: Well, not an excessive amount. People tended to come over there. Also, the mission over there had a separate agriculture unit. At that time, that was really the only non-State -- now it has changed a lot. You've got people from the USTR, people from Fisheries, but they've got a lot of non-State personnel. I think in the mission, somebody gave me a figure that the State Department component of the US mission to the European community was something like 30% of all the personnel. I think that similar thing has happened in other missions.

Q: Did you have any particular interaction with the ambassador to the NATO council or was that a totally discreet and separate operation?

GREENWALD: No, no. What we worked out -- yes, that was another kind of liaison function. What we worked out was a periodic working lunch. Part of the time, I think the first one, Bob Ellsworth -- no, he was gone by the time I got there. He was there when I was at the OECD in Paris, and we did some work together on the economic side of NATO and the OECD. He was gone by the time I got to Brussels. And I think it was Don Rumsfeld who was there. He and the ambassador -- there were three ambassadors, as you know -- the ambassador to the king at that time was Robert Stausz-Hupé.

And then he left, and Leonard Firestone came. We had a regular lunch. Occasionally, we would
get the ambassador up from SHAPE then Al Haig was down in Monk as NATO Commander. So we kept in touch and had these periodic lunches to exchange information, try to coordinate our policies.

The other aspect of it was in coordinating the member states. And what we did then -- I think the budget has blown a hole in this but -- what we did was maybe twice a year, we would have a meeting of all of the ambassadors from the member states, along with myself, the man at the OECD, and someone would come out from Washington, either usually Deputy Assistant Secretary or head of the bureau or the office of RPE, plus Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. There we would have pretty regular coordinating meetings getting feedback from Washington and how they saw it, what the issues were, and talking among the member states to see what the problems were in relation to the part of the community in Brussels, the commission in Brussels.

JOHN T. DOHERTY
Labor Attaché, U.S. Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1973-1976)

*Mr. Doherty was born in Kentucky in 1928. His postings abroad included Mexico City, Lima, Buenos Aires, Brussels and Lisbon. He was interviewed by James Shea in the fall of 1991.*

Q: I can only recall one union which was under some Communist influence and that was the Chemical Workers Union. But I don't think they had any effect at all on the overall Argentine labor scene. After Argentina, John, what was your next assignment? Did you spend any time in Washington?

DOHERTY: In 1973 I transferred from Argentina to Brussels. I had been on home leave not long before that. I did come back for some French language training. The only French I had dated back to 1954 and 1955, when I was in Paris with the OEEC and much of it had disappeared, so I did go back to Washington for some French training before Brussels.

Q: I would say that your work in Brussels was completely different from that in Latin America in that you were dealing with many of the trade secretariats and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in addition to the Belgium unions.

DOHERTY: It was different. My job at the US Mission to the European Community basically had three parts. One was dealing with the international organizations, primarily the ICFTU and the Christian WCL. The Communists were there. They had a joint office between the French CGT and the Italian CGIL. I did not have liaison with them.

Another major part of my function in Brussels was [to cover the activities of ] the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), a relatively new body organized along the lines of EC membership. I also covered three or four secretariats. I recall specifically going frequently to
meet with [the secretariats of] the textile workers, the journalists, and the teachers unions, which were headquartered in Brussels. On top of that, I [followed] the European Commission, with [a special focus on] the Commissioner for Social Affairs and with anything that dealt with social affairs in the European Community.

Then my third function was covering the European Parliament which meant being either in Luxembourg or in Strasbourg every other month, reporting on developments and general liaison. I was also in charge of the annual exchange between the International Relations Committee of the [US] House [of Representatives] and the European Parliament, which took up maybe a month of my time each year. So there was more diversity. One thing that was the same, when I compare my work in Latin America with the job in Europe, was that just as the trade unions in Latin America were connected with a political party and had a political philosophy, the trade unions of Europe were as well, and in dealing with the trade unions of the Benelux [countries], particularly Belgium and Luxembourg, I was dealing with Christians or Socialists or with Social Democrats, and to that extent I had already experienced the philosophical or ideological aspects of trade unionism. I say to people who preceded me there and succeeded me there as labor attaché, "Listen, let's keep this a secret. Being labor attaché to EC Brussels is the creme de la creme of labor attaché spots, because of not only the tremendously broad scope of the work but the fascinating kinds of situations which would develop in the various aspects of the work there." I think that the most important aspect of the work while I was there-and also [during the tenure of] Harry Pollak, my immediate predecessor-was that the AFL-CIO had withdrawn from the ICFTU, and therefore there were no American [labor union] representatives in Brussels at that time. The labor attaché therefore was probably the best contact that our labor people had, certainly in the way of liaison. I recall Irving Brown coming often to Brussels, and I would be in contact with the Belgian Socialists or with ICFTU people or ETUC people and have meetings at my home or at some mutually agreed place, and I would be privy to the conversations that went on. These were very interesting and exciting times. I feel that the job in Brussels is an extremely important one from a labor point of view, even with the AFL-CIO back in the fold and taking a more active role in European and international organizations there.

Q: John, it has often been said that the CIA was involved in the activities of the International Trade Secretariats and the ICFTU. Would you like to comment on this?

DOHERTY: Well, I think allegations of CIA involvement in labor-in Latin America as well as with international or European organizations were greatly exaggerated. I'm not saying there was no CIA activity, but I think it was exaggerated in terms of all the sensational books in which you read about the CIA underwriting so many trade union organizations. I have no direct knowledge of what was underwritten by whom, but I do know that in my stay in each of those countries [that I served in], direct contact between the CIA and the labor organizations in those countries was minimal. It was practically nonexistent in Brussels. This [question of CIA involvement] stems from the post-war period when we were very much concerned about what directions the Soviets would be taking. With the Communists so dominant and growing so rapidly and strongly in France and Italy and elsewhere in Europe, I think we were unprepared for it. By "we" I mean American labor and the American government. In those days there was a lot of cooperation. Irving Brown was probably the point man on many kinds of things. We know that historically he became involved with the dockworkers' strike [in France]. I think a lot of the talk of CIA
involvement has to do with the early days, not the days when I was in Latin America in the 1960s, although there was some, and not the days when I was in Europe in the early and late 1970s, when I subsequently went to Portugal. I thought the CIA involvement in labor was minimal.

STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
Political Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1973-1976)

Ambassador Ledogar was born in New York in 1929, and received his BA from Fordham University. He served overseas in the US Navy from 1949-1952. Ledogar entered the Foreign Service in 1959 and was posted in Montreal, Milan, Quang Tri Province, Saigon, Paris, Brussels and Geneva. He was Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 1, 2000.

Q: You were in Brussels from ’73 to when?
LEDOGAR: ’76.

Q: What was your job there?
LEDOGAR: Let me talk about it in terms of the three different Ambassadors. When I arrived, Donald Rumsfeld was U.S. permanent representative. At that time, I was put in the mission’s large political section as a foot soldier. Just prior to my arrival NATO had a structure where there was a four-person political section and a separate four-person political-military section. This really didn’t make much sense, so the two were merged. After the merger we had a seven-person political section headed by Jim Goodby. This was under Rumsfeld. I was assigned to follow what they called the “flanks” of NATO. That meant political developments in the northern flank, which was Iceland, Norway, and Denmark, and the southeastern flank, which was Greece, Turkey, Cyprus.

Q: What a joy [laughter].
LEDOGAR: I got tangled up in a controversy very soon. It began with Iceland and the United Kingdom and their so-called “Codfish War.” The Icelanders were convinced that the British were overfishing in the waters around Iceland and they declared a quarantine zone of I think 50 miles. They told everybody, “Keep out of our waters. They are for Icelandic exploitation only.” Mind you, this was in 1973, before the Law of the Sea Treaty, back when territorial waters expanded out from national shores only as far as a cannon could fire; three mile limits, and the like. Of course, the British have an affinity for fish and chips and codfish is very popular in the U.K., especially in the northern parts of the United Kingdom near Iceland. The British reaction was, “The hell with this. These are free and open seas.” So, things started getting nasty. The Icelandic Coast Guard cutters began to come out and cut the fishing warps, or the fishing gear, of the British trawlers. The Royal Navy said they couldn’t stand for that, so they started sending
frigates to defend the trawlers, not with guns, but by what they called “shouldering,” ie, getting into a position where the Icelandic aggressor ship, the one trying to cut the lines, had to give way to the frigate according to international rules of the road.

**Q:** Basically muscling them away.

LEDOGAR: Yes. In nautical terms it was called “shouldering.” Matters got quite bitter. Then at one point there was a fatality. The ships were maneuvering so close they were bumping into each other occasionally, with each side playing “chicken.” An Icelandic sailor came out to repair some damaged equipment on the deck of one of the Icelandic cutters and he used an electric arc torch. A wave came along spraying the welding area and he was electrocuted. That was the first casualty and there was diplomatic hell to pay. Because of the alphabet, the Icelandic and U.K. representatives sat almost opposite each other at the big roundtables of the North Atlantic Council. The Icelanders called upon all the NATO allies to chastise the United Kingdom. It was really David versus Goliath. The population of all of Iceland back then was something like 275,000 if everybody was home. Iceland has no military forces other than a U.S.-manned NATO force at the NATO base in Keflavik. The U.S. had airplanes and underwater listening capability and so forth in Iceland.

Of course, the Icelandic Delegation to NATO was only two officers and a support staff of two more. NATO was one of only eleven Icelandic diplomatic posts in the world, and the Icelanders at NATO were also accredited to the Belgians and to the European Common Market. So, their’s was a pretty small operation. I made a couple of trips to Reykjavik to help cover events. I was only one of the people who were reporting for the U.S. on the Codfish War. I’m sure we had action officers at the Embassies in London and Reykjavik, but still there were only a handful of Americans really following this.

Eventually, the parties called upon the then-Secretary General of NATO, Joseph Luns, a very colorful fellow who had been around for ages, (formerly for 17 years Foreign Minister of the Netherlands), and requested his good offices to try to mediate the dispute. I don’t know whether it was he himself who thought up or whether he was just the agent to carry out what was a fairly ingenious compromise. If you can, visualize a circular zone including the waters around Iceland as a pie chart divided into maybe sixteen different pieces, each about 22 and a half degrees. The waters were declared closed except that each week there was an open slice that rotated around the circle. Thus, over the course of so many months, all of the area in question had been opened and over the course of so many months all of it had been closed. That was the compromise. I can’t recall all the details.

**Q:** Were we playing any role outside of going “Ta, ta, ta?”

LEDOGAR: No, the United States was taking the high and noble path of pointing out that NATO was an organization that was not designed to handle disputes between or among its own members. Rather, the alliance was designed to deal with external threats. We contributed nothing beyond rhetoric. We didn’t put pressure on anybody that I know of. That was one of my accounts.
Very soon thereafter in the summer of ’74, we were in deep trouble in the Aegean.

Q: I had been consul general in Athens until July of ’74. When I left, all hell broke loose.

LEDOGAR: Yes. In a way the Cyprus crisis was similar in style to the Codfish War but much more dangerous in potential impact. Two NATO members, members of the same club, were each trying to take advantage of a captive audience to plead their case and to enlist sympathies, if not support. The rest of us were saying, “You two are going to have to work this out.” Things actually got to a very dangerous phase where at one point in the summer of ’74, there was a signal heard by many people that a Greek higher echelon air forces command was saying that they had an “enemy” cruiser in their gunsights and they were requesting permission to shoot it, to sink it; they got permission, and sank it. The only thing was that it turned out to be one of their own ships. It was tragic. There was a terrible loss of life. The point is that we could have had a hot war within the Alliance except for that curious blunder.

The Turks invaded Cyprus in 1974 and there was all kinds of stuff going on. We Americans had to scurry around and make sure that the nuclear weapons that we had under dual key arrangements with each of these two allies were fully protected and in no way could they be compromised by either Greece or Turkey. There was a lot to that Cyprus crisis.

Q: Here you are, trying to be the person who is supposed to say what’s happening. I would imagine that in the normal course of events, you have to depend quite heavily on reporting out of capitals and you put it together. You must have found two different worlds in hearing what was being reported from Ankara and what was being reported from Athens by our own missions. And on Nicosia, too.

LEDOGAR: Yes. And the wags would say that if you served in Ankara at the U.S. Mission there, you wound up really hating the Turks and believing the Greeks; and vice versa if you served in Athens.

Q: I have no sympathy at all for the Greek cause. I don’t have any great pro-Turkish thoughts, but I do know that when I have talked to people that the Greeks were really very nasty to the Turkish peasant class. This was a dictatorship. There had just been a military coup in November the year before where the colonels were ousted and a new set of guys came in, including the head of the military police, who was very bad news.

LEDOGAR: Yes. I’m not suggesting that NATO was a central point for action. It was just a central point for a lot of conversation. There was this captive audience and both Greece and Turkey were vigorously represented. They couldn’t resist taking swipes at each other. People would roll their eyes and groan sometimes out loud when one side would start up the propaganda because you knew the other then had to give its own version of it in an equal length of time. And each of them would find some excuse no matter what we were talking about to try to whack the other. When we got around to drafting NATO communiqués, we could say nothing that made even an oblique reference to the crisis because the communiqué is drafted by consensus; therefore, you couldn’t get anything approved. So, having the flanks assignment in the U.S. NATO political section turned out to be quite different than it might have sounded. It sounded
like a peripheral job at first.

At the same time, there were other important events going on that I got involved in. After my first year there, Goodby was rotated to Washington and Rumsfeld couldn’t seem to make up his mind about who he wanted to replace him. So, I got to be acting political counselor until Frank Perez arrived as permanent political counselor. By this time, the political section was unified. I was acting political counselor for quite a while. That was under Rumsfeld.

Then Rumsfeld was called back permanently to be Chief of Staff at the White House. He had first gone TDY (Temporary Duty) to Washington to be a member of the small commission that chose the new vice president, Rockefeller, when Ford acceded to the presidency upon the departure of Richard Nixon.

Soon after, Rumsfeld was gone. In 1975, of all people we got none other than David Bruce, for whom I had worked in the Paris Peace Talks some years before. In the meantime, Bruce had gone to China as our first Ambassador there and had done a couple of other things outside the U.S. Government for a while. He came back in as head of the U.S. Mission to NATO for most of 1975, as I remember. At the beginning of ’74, Kissinger had declared the so-called “Year of Europe.” Kissinger was still at the White House as National Security Advisor. He called for a redefinition of our relationship with European friends, first of all within the Alliance, but more challenging to the members, a codification of the relationship between the United States and the European Union. The NATO self-reflection coincided with the 25th anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance, which was celebrated in Ottawa in the spring of ’74. There, NATO published a declaration that said a lot of important things. I don’t remember all the new departures, except that we agreed on the benefit to the Alliance of French and British nuclear weapons, and importantly for the future, managed to achieve agreement that events outside the NATO treaty area could have negative impact on the security of the Alliance. That had important implications later on. When you think that 25 years later on, about NATO’s role in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo (outside the NATO treaty area), the declaration proved to be very significant. But at the time, we were talking hypotheticals.

The effort to redefine a relationship between the United States and the European Economic Communities, the Nine, was filled with a number of problems. I’ll summarize them as follows. A fellow by the name of Christopher Soames, who had been in the British government but later on became an EC commissioner, was outspoken on the EEC side. In effect, he said, “Wait a minute. You Americans talk like you want to renew or review or put down on paper what the U.S./EEC relationship is, but I know that what you Yankee bastards are trying to do is trade off security considerations against concessions from us Europeans on frozen chicken or corn gluten or other economic products, and that’s not acceptable. Security has got to remain in the security area and foreign trade and so forth has got to be considered on its own merits.” Furthermore, the European Community said, “We are just beginning to take the first steps toward European political coordination and eventually political integration.” Kissinger and the United States replied: “We can understand your point about frozen chicken and so forth, but the U.S. has independent and friendly relations with each of the Nine. If you start moving, without taking into account our views, toward political coordination on subjects that we think should be discussed and coordinated within the North Atlantic Alliance or bilaterally, we Americans are going to be
confronted with a nicely, neatly, tightly-organized, non-negotiable consensus and no spokesperson to deal with. When is our point of view going to be taken into account if you pre-cook your views on matters of concern to America and Canada and other non-EEC members of the Alliance?” So, this became quite a sharp debate. The two sides couldn’t really resolve it. The final step was kind of the gentlemen’s agreement to approach any difficulties that might come up in what was called the “spirit of Gimnich.” Gimnich is a chateau somewhere near Bonn, where the Nine had gotten together for some final meeting. They said, “Look, we’re not going to sacrifice our frail first efforts at European political cooperation to the booming voice and demands of Washington. On the other hand, we understand your point. So, what we’ll do is, we’ll make sure that whoever is in the European Presidency will have a special vocation to talk to you, inform you, in advance of the European Commission meetings, during, and afterwards. You’ll have plenty of time to know in which direction our debate is going. You’ll have an inside wire to help us learn how you feel.”

So, that’s kind of the way it ended. Nobody was fully satisfied, but it was one of these things that just couldn’t be fully solved. But all of that, including the drafting of these documents, took an enormous amount of time on the part of each of the political sections. Of course, the Europeans started to try putting into practice their political cooperation in the CSCE Helsinki process. That irritated us, too, because we and the other non-EU Nine allies had depended on NATO caucuses for coordination in the Helsinki process. “The Year if Europe” was a kind of a busy period.

I continued working fairly closely with Ambassador Bruce because I was the officer assigned to support him for the weekly Permanent Representatives’ lunch. This is where the Secretary General and the Ambassadors lunched together every Tuesday, just the Ambassadors alone. Many delicate matters were handled in this forum with no notetakers or interpreters; also, many confidences exchanged and sensitive decisions were taken. There was no one there except the Secretary General and the sixteen Ambassadors. So, to be sure that Bruce was prepared for all likely subjects, I would sniff around and ask my counterparts supporting their Ambassadors, “What might your guy bring up at lunch?” The object was to give our respective bosses little white cards or something like that with the briefing points. Then when our tiger came back, we would debrief him and take his notes and put together a report. It was an excellent job and a chance to work pretty closely with Bruce. Also, in that period of time, the year that Bruce was Permanent Representative, a revolution was occurring in Portugal. The young officers who had returned from Angola overthrew Salazar-

*Q: I think Salazar died but the successor government said Salazar was overthrown.*

LEDOGAR: Yes. There was a question as to how far to the left Portugal was going to go. Eurocommunism was on everybody’s tongue. Here is one area where I think that Kissinger was mistaken. I heard this later from the Ambassador who was Portuguese Permanent Representative at the time. This was a couple of years later when I met him. He said, “You know, Henry Kissinger used the analogy that Eurocommunism and the loss of Portugal would inoculate and make Europe immune to Eurocommunists. The thrust of his analogy was right, but he took it too far. What happened was that the obstreperousness of the extreme leftist Portuguese military inoculated Portugal against Eurocommunism.”
It happens that Frank Carlucci was our Ambassador in Lisbon. On the election day itself, since he had been portrayed as being excessively interested, Carlucci left Portugal and came to Evére. He spent several hours with David Bruce in his office. I would love to have been a fly on the wall during that conversation. I know that Frank was down emotionally, and maybe in terms of spirit. Those of us who were around when he emerged from Bruce’s office thought he looked like a new man. He had gotten a real bucking up from the wise old man. At least that’s my “fly on the wall” take on the whole thing. Bruce never said a word about what transpired. We all know that Frank went back to Lisbon and did a splendid job.

Q: Also, he was able to stand up to Kissinger and Kissinger was ready to write off Portugal.

LEDOGAR: That’s it. That was what the Portuguese NATO Ambassador meant. Kissinger was ready to write off Portugal.

Q: And just cut them off from everything and Carlucci said, “Wait a minute. Let’s do something.” He worked with NATO to make sure that NATO would be nice to the Portuguese military. At the same time, in Portugal, they were getting quite a bit of support, the socialists, from the West European socialist “mafia.”

LEDOGAR: Yes, both of those are true. We later got into the business of the so-called American Brigade in the Portuguese military. That was sort of like U.S. special security assistance to a group in the Portuguese military that was playing it straight. There were a lot of deft maneuvers there. I always thought that Frank did a first-rate job.

Q: I think it’s one of the great moments in American postwar diplomacy. Luckily, he had had subcabinet status, although he was an FSO in HEW. He could have gone to Gerald Ford on his own. This was clear to Kissinger, who was in effect told, “Don’t try to cut us off until we’ve had the chance.”

LEDOGAR: Vernon Walters was around in Europe. Before he retired from the U.S. army, he had been military attaché in Paris. He was a superb linguist and an excellent intelligence gatherer. I knew him in Paris, although not terribly well. At any rate Walters was identified by Kissinger. Immediately after, the Portuguese Revolution broke out and he was sent on a mission to Lisbon, sub-rosa. The idea was to find out whether our team there headed by a political appointee could handle it. Walters reported back, “Sorry, you’d better get yourselves some new people.” Immediately, Carlucci was selected. He then was in Brazil. Frank picked Herb Oken as his Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).

Q: I think actually Carlucci was Under Secretary of HEW at the time.

LEDOGAR: Was he?

Q: Yes. That’s where he got his power.

LEDOGAR: At any rate, Carlucci sent Oken out there immediately with authority to clean house. Oken kept the political counselor, who was a classmate of mine and was my source for a
lot of this stuff - Charlie Thomas, recently deceased. He just said, “Goodbye” to almost everybody else and started reorganizing. Meanwhile, Carlucci worked the Washington scene. He went around to the head of every U.S. agency that had people on the ground in Lisbon. From each he got a commission and a mandate to do what he subsequently did. Then he arrived in Lisbon suddenly one morning on an overnight flight, immediately went to the Embassy, called a meeting of the country team, and said to them, “Now listen, I’m so and so and I’ve just been to see not only our Commander in Chief, but also the top dog in each of your agencies and services. I have it from that person eye to eye and handshake to handshake that I’m in charge. There will be absolutely nothing but 100% fidelity to the President through me. There will be no back channel reporting and nothing done by you that I don’t know about.” He just really read the riot act and at the same time enlisted the cooperation of the whole bunch. They proceeded to do a splendid job. Unlike the Spanish Revolution, the Portuguese Revolution had very little bloodshed.

Q: NATO was a prime ingredient, particularly keeping the Portuguese in the NATO thing and in a way attracting on the military side the Portuguese military officers to keep them from being frozen out. Were you aware of any movement within the NATO circles to rally around and do what they could for this?

LEDOGAR: Of course the allies had limited capabilities to interfere in the internal affairs of a fellow NATO member. The informal focus was to support the Portuguese military officers who had their heads screwed on right. For a while there, it looked very bad, as all military discipline seemed to break down. We were trying to support the organized Portuguese military, including its chain of command, as well as trying to isolate a bogus line of radical junior officers and non-commissioned officers who fashioned themselves as an extreme left shadow regime.

Q: These were low-ranking commissioned officers.

LEDOGAR: They were way off base. It took a while before the good guys got into position where they could really cut off the activities of the bad guys. As was said, it scared the bejesus out of the Portuguese that they were that close to a Communist takeover. They became very good citizens. But these developments were mostly outside of my direct area of responsibility.

Towards the end of my time there at NATO, Robert Strauz-Hupé came in and replaced Bruce, who had lasted just a year. Strauz-Hupé- was an interesting fellow. He just did not have as many interesting things happening during his time at the helm.

Soon, I was off on reassignment in mid-1976.
Haverford College and his MALD from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1959. He served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1954 to 1956. His foreign posts included London, Tel Aviv, Bamako, Brussels, Bonn, Berlin and Paris. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 22, 1998

LISSFELT: Van Campen went back and consulted with the Secretary General, and I got a call a few weeks later that I'd gotten the job on condition I could be at NATO in June so that they could train me up in time so they could all go off for their August vacations, which are, of course, sacred in Europe, as you know. We were pleased, reconciled to the job, and pleasing to go to Brussels, and off we went with four children and this time another dog, a big Irish setter. For the next three years, 1973 to 1976, we worked in a fascinating job for a wonderful and extremely amusing man, Joseph Luns, but under the direct supervision of the not terribly wonderful and not very humorous director of his private office, who had his problems.

Q: What's this, Van Campen?

LISSFELT: Yes, just to give you the setting, we worked in adjacent rooms. I probably saw him 200 times a day through a connecting door, speaking on everything imaginable. I think it took a year before he really began to trust me, and the sign was when he finally came in to me - I was very careful about not calling him Paul, but rather Dr. Van Campen. Then one day he said, "Mark, you may call me Paul, and your wife may call my wife Daphne," whom we almost never saw. I knew then I was accepted, that Paul then considered that, although he wasn't a hundred per cent sure, he thought that maybe he had one ally in the whole of NATO headquarters against the masses out there. He had a particular animosity against anybody in uniform, which was a rather bizarre fixation for somebody at a defense alliance headquarters. Anyway, it was three fascinating years, including traveling periodically with the Secretary General. When Van Campen didn't go, I could.

Q: Luns had a certain amount of humor and zest for life, didn't he?

LISSFELT: Oh, wonderful, wonderful man, just one of the most amusing and interesting people I've ever met in my life, and a great success as a politician. He'd been 19 years as, he used to say, foreign minister of a "not insignificant little country," The Netherlands, with this wonderful accent that he had. The closest time I ever came to having a fight or an argument with Joseph Luns came over the removal of Richard Nixon from the White House, by the way, in the summer of '74, the year after I arrived, I happened to believe that the right thing was being done and that the American Constitution was functioning; and I was, although shaken, relieved about this, having seen the hearings in the summer of '73 with Senator Sam Ervin. It was on television before leaving for my assignment in NATO, and I told Luns that I really believed it was the right thing. He was outraged, as Nixon, he said, was the only American president who consistently kept his word "to me" as foreign minister, who knew something about foreign policy and was interested in the world. "And you destroy him. You're mad." And he continued this argument with me periodically. He would appear looming over my desk from time to time with no warning. He never wore shoes in the office so you could not hear him coming. He'd come in in stocking feet, and suddenly I'd be aware of this six-foot five presence looming over me, as I said, at my desk with another argument he'd thought of, why I was a fool and the American system
hadn't worked. I would limply try to reply that, yes, in fact, the system had worked and that whatever Mr. Nixon's qualities, in my personal view and many Americans’, we were well off without him. But those were intense moments, amusing in retrospect.

Q: Bill Middendorf was the Nixon-selected ambassador at that time in The Netherlands, if memory serves.

LISSFELT: And Luns knew him well there.

Q: He recounts in his own oral history his close friendship and admiration for Luns.

LISSFELT: Whether they were close friends, I don't know. I think Luns admired his art collection. I saw no evidence that he admired his intellectual involvement or curiosity about foreign policy. I'll just leave it there. Let me think if there's anything else particularly about Luns, except it was fascinating times, fights over cod wars and things like that. And then the Cyprus crisis of ’74, when the Turks invaded Cyprus - two NATO allies practically at war - was a certain moment of truth.

In the American side, by the way, David Bruce was the permanent representative when I arrived, who had been my ambassador in London on my first assignment. Bruce was back from China, and this was 13 years later, very senior and aging, I must say, but a distinguished and revered man, after whom the staff at NATO named their conference room. It's still called the Bruce Room.

He was succeeded by Donald Rumsfeld, quite a different generation and quite a different personality, after whom, I assure you, there are no rooms named at the U.S. delegation at NATO - and many tales of unhappiness and unnecessary abrasions under his leadership. I didn't experience them because I was not part of the U.S. mission. My one major encounter with Ambassador Rumsfeld, by the way, was when I met him. Jack Maresca took me over to say farewell on his part and to introduce his successor, and he sat in his office in this headquarters that NATO was in then, and still is in, outside Brussels, at Evère. I sat beside an air conditioner that was roaring. I could not hear one word that Ambassador Rumsfeld said to me, and I kept saying, "I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I can't hear." And I'm sure it was as a result of that, which was a very brief encounter, that he must have thought, “What a damn fool is around the corner working for Secretary Luns. I won't pay any attention to this one.” It was very amusing, a little embarrassing, but still, I'll never forget it. A perfect Woodie Allen movie scene!

Q: But the lesson of the ’74 Cyprus crisis was really that NATO just wasn't set up to do much about squabbles between its own members. Is that not a fair reading?

LISSFELT: Yes, it was evident that they didn't know quite what to make of it and what to do about it. It clearly was a crisis provoked by the Greek government in its efforts to set up their own man in downtown Nicosia, and the Turks had had enough. The hatred that exists between those two people was shocking to me. I later worked on Southern European affairs - we'll get around to that later assignment - but you couldn't believe it. It was worse than the animosity that most French feel toward the British, which is saying a lot, you know.
Q: Were you involved in the NATO-French relations?

LISSFELT: No, not particularly. I mean I was involved at least peripherally in everything that the Secretary General was involved in, but more often not in important meetings, because Van Campen had to be there and there wasn't room for two of us. But I was well aware of how well represented the French were in NATO by a wonderful man, Ambassador François de Rose, truly one of the great French diplomats and thinkers on strategic matters, of whom the French didn't have very many these days. He had great skill at knowing when not to ask his government for instructions and when to speak in the NATO council without saying he was uninstructed, but everybody knew that he was being extremely careful and cooperative in every way that he could be because he believed in the North Atlantic Alliance. He was an Atlanticist. I think he's still alive, and I saw him in Paris later in my assignment, and I had a chance to pay tribute to him personally. He was very touched, but he was most interested in my French accent. He wondered where I'd learned my French, and I said, "Well, I spent a year in Paris at the Sorbonne." He said, "Yes, one can see that." That was a big compliment, coming from him.

Q: So, Mark, after three years, then, in Brussels, you returned to the Department. You were working under the director general, was that the case?

LISSFELT: Right, at the end of three years I was looking for an onward assignment. Arthur Hartman, who was then the Assistant secretary for European Affairs and who used to come to NATO meetings, I had known since London days and before that in the Department, when he was working for Under Secretary George Ball. Art had always been very cordial to me, although ours was not a particularly close friendship. On one of his NATO visits, Art asked, "What are you going to do next? What's your next assignment?" I said, "Well, I want to come back to the Department. I think it's time for the kids." By the way, we'd put our kids in the Belgian French-speaking schools all the time we were in Belgium, which was quite an experience for them and for us and something that I think has profited them all of their lives. We were driven away from the Department of Defense school, which was in a particularly bad state at the time, but also wanted to give our daughters the chance to learn a useful language. It was a struggle - the first six months were especially tough - but after awhile they really got ahold of the French, and as often happens in those foreign school situations, they became tops in their French classes, ahead of the Belgians, whose native language it was. But we wanted to come back to Washington because it was time for their high school years, and we wanted to get them back to Falls Church, Virginia, where we had a home and get them back in the very good school system there (Also, the age and health of our parents were important considerations.). It still is one of the best in the Washington area, and was then. So we wanted to leave. I said, "Arthur, I want to come back to the Department. Any jobs in the Bureau?" And he invited me to be his executive assistant. Well, when such an invitation comes and you're sitting in the cafeteria at NATO, you just practically jump for joy. Couldn't have been a better prospect so far as I was concerned.
Brussels (1973-1977)

Bruce W. Clark was born in Los Angeles, California in 1941. He attended Claremont Men’s College from 1958 to 1959 before transferring to Stanford University, where he received his BA in 1962. He also served in the U.S. Army Reserve before joining the Foreign Service in 1966. His career has included positions in countries such as Germany, Vietnam, Belgium, and Saudi Arabia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 4, 2002.

CLARK: Then I was assigned to the U.S. Mission to NATO, and arrived in Brussels in August 1973, following French language training.

Eagleburger talked to someone in USNATO, and they needed a guy to be special assistant to our ambassador - or permanent representative as he is actually called.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

CLARK: I had a new ambassador every year. George Vest had just left as the chargé, I think, and when I arrived Donald Rumsfeld was ambassador. Then he went back to Washington. Then came David Bruce, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Tapley Bennett just as I was leaving.

Q: Well now, where is USNATO located? In Brussels?

CLARK: It’s outside Brussels at the NATO headquarters in a suburb in a sort of industrial park toward the airport.

Q: How did you find this type of work?

CLARK: Really tiring. Very long hours. As a staff assistant, you’re not creating things or going to meetings or meeting people. You’re sitting in an office. NATO is like a foreign policy factory. It is not like a normal diplomatic post. Everything is right there in this one huge headquarters, so you don’t have to go out to meet and talk to people since they’re all right there. And the staff assistant’s job is completely non-substantive: pure paper pushing. But the officers, both FSOs and military, were really bright. The top floor of our wing was the office of the defense advisor, Larry Legere, and most of his staff later became admirals and generals. They were really good. It was a very bright group of people.

Q: Was there much concern about the "Soviet Menace" at that time?

CLARK: Well, yes. I think there was always a worry that if war ever came the Soviet Union would be a real problem, I don’t think I ever heard anyone mention that the Soviet divisions were 40% undermanned or badly equipped. Everyone took the number of divisions and all that at face value. And there was real concern that if war came the European allies wouldn’t have all the materiel and equipment and technology and so forth to hold the line.
Q: Did you get any feel for how NATO was looking at the role of France at that time?

CLARK: France was always a big problem. There was a real loathing for the French position. Jobert was really disliked.

Q: He was the former French Foreign Minister.

CLARK: They really stuck it to the United States all the time. You began to wonder if France was an ally. Though France didn’t participate in NATO military or defense planning, they had a permanent representative in the North Atlantic Council and played an often obstructionist role.

Q: Did you have any French counterparts that you worked with?

CLARK: No. I think the Americans had very little to do with the French.

Q: How about the Germans and British?

CLARK: Oh, yes, we had very close relations with the British and the Germans. And Luns, the Secretary General of NATO, was very pro-American.

Q: You were there from 1973 to 1977?

CLARK: ’73 to ’77. I was there when the war in the Middle East broke out in 1973, and we decided to resupply Israel with tanks and equipment committed to NATO.

Q: Yes, that was the Yom Kippur war in October.

CLARK: As I recall, we were ready to ship them out without even telling the Germans or NATO what we were doing. That, coupled with the Europeans’ reluctance to get involved in any way in that war in light of their own interests in the Middle East, caused a lot of problems for us with our NATO allies.

Q: That really must have been a very acrimonious period.

CLARK: Yes, there were some hot issues while I was there. And then there was the Year of Europe, which was designed to strengthen relations between the U.S. and Europe. The MBFR talks in Vienna. The founding of CSCE. The revolution in Portugal and how to deal with Portugal now that the government was socialist. And the overthrow of the Greek government and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Q: How about the British and German counterparts, did you deal with them very much?

CLARK: I didn’t, no. I suppose fellows in the political section did, but as a staff assistant I didn’t.

Q: Well, as staff assistant to Rumsfeld for a year and then to Bruce for a year, it doesn’t sound
like we were treating NATO as very important. High grade people, but they only had time to make the rounds before they’re out again.

CLARK: It wasn’t a very good to have a new ambassador every year. But they were top-notch people, and both had influence and easy access at the highest levels in Washington. Rumsfeld left to become Secretary of Defense. He was very bright and very secretive. He had very little to do with the other people in the mission and didn’t appear to be much impressed by his staff, though more so by the military officers than the FSOs. The staff had very little contact with him, though he bombarded them all the time with questions on little slips of paper called “yellow perils.” As far as I know, he discussed ideas mainly with his own special advisor, Robert Goldman, whom he brought over from St. John’s College in Annapolis. He and Goldman talked all the time, and the staff was excluded. He seemed sort of contemptuous of the people in the mission. I don’t know if that’s true or not, but that’s the way it came across. The mission did not like him. David Bruce was very likeable, but he also had little direct contact with the staff. On the other hand, he had remarkable access and contacts in Washington and Europe and could communicate directly to the most important people at the highest levels.

Q: What impression did you and your colleagues in the Foreign Service and all during this period in time have of Henry Kissinger?

CLARK: Very smart, very wily. I think most of us were happy that he was Secretary of State since for once we could be sure that the Department was on the inside instead of the outside of decision-making. I don’t think we thought much of him as a person. Several friends of mine had been his staff aides and they said it was absolute hell to work for him, that he was most arrogant person they’d ever worked for. He had a famous temper and so forth, but he was bright. I think that only now are some of his clever moves and ploys catching up with him.

Q: Thanks to Vietnam and NATO, you were sort of thought of as a political-military guy, weren’t you?

CLARK: Yes, everyone thought of me as a political-military officer. That had never been my original intention, but the jobs just sort of started shaping my career that way.

JOHN H. TRATTNER
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1974-1975)

Mr. Trattner was born and raised in Virginia and was educated at Yale, Columbia and American Universities. Joining the United States Information Service in 1963 he worked first with the Voice of America, then was transferred to Warsaw as Press Attaché. His subsequent assignments all in the press and information field include Strasburg, Paris, Brussels, and Washington, D.C., where he served as assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and finally as official Spokesman for the Department of State. Mr. Trattner was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.
Q: Well, let’s get back to your departure from Paris. You then headed for NATO in Brussels?

TRATTNER: As I mentioned, the U.S. mission to NATO had requested my assignment and I had gone to Brussels ahead of that, to talk with the public affairs officer who had offered me the job. Before the assignment was nailed down, however, USIA in Washington had to be persuaded to agree. That finally happened, but only after the public affairs officer at the U.S. mission convinced his ambassador to persuade USIA. That ambassador was none other than Donald Rumsfeld. We arrived in Brussels in September of 1974, and I went to work as the deputy PAO at U.S. NATO.

Q: You were there from when to when?

TRATTNER: From mid-1974 to January 1975. The public affairs officer who had asked me to take the job had once written a report on his time at the Johns Hopkins Center in Bologna. His report had been one of the things that had gotten me interested some years earlier in the subject of European integration and what its future would be. When the NATO assignment came along, I welcomed it even though it wouldn’t be focused as directly or closely on integration as another assignment would be, such as to the U.S. mission to the European Community, as was its title then. NATO was, of course, an expression of European and American military cooperation and common defense. That was very critical, but it was not as interesting to me as European economic and political integration and what the U.S. approach to that should be.

Q: Was the matter of the short or medium-range Soviet missiles a big issue while you were there, or was it later?

TRATTNER: I think you mean the controversy over the plan to put U.S. short-range missiles in western Europe and Europe’s fear that this would increase the Soviet incentive to target western Europe with its own missiles. No, that big argument came later, during the Reagan years. During the short time I was at NATO, one of our basic political preoccupations was France’s relationship to the alliance. As you’ll remember, De Gaulle had pulled the French out of the military wing of NATO—I think it was in the mid 1960s. And later, NATO moved its headquarters from Paris to Brussels. But the French remained part of political NATO and were intensely involved in its decisions and actions. Their half in, half out status produced a lot of ambivalence in their positions and this was the cause of continual minor frictions between them and the rest of the alliance. One of these was France’s so-called independent nuclear deterrent and how that fit or didn’t fit with NATO’s collective nuclear strategy and planning. That of course had been a U.S. concern for years, including the time we were in Paris. I don’t remember anything else of a really important nature at NATO, at least in my brief time there, but the mission was constantly attuned to the atmospherics emerging from the constant meetings and consultations that were at the heart of daily activity at NATO. One major project that we were trying to support as a mission related to the increasing awareness of the dangers of environmental deterioration. Sounds a bit tame in terms of today’s hyper focus on global warming and climate change, but in those days people and governments had just begun to talk about it. There was already considerable feeling in the United States that government ought to be doing a lot more. Military activities were seen as among the many sources contributing to the
problem. So at the directive of President Ford, the U.S. had been working to make environmental awareness and protection part of the functioning mechanism of NATO. Already, the U.S. had led the move to create NATO’s Committee on the Challenges of a Modern Society, and the mission, and especially we in the public affairs section, did a lot of supportive work in the form of conferences and press events.

I should mention here that Rumsfeld, our ambassador to NATO, was called back to Washington just after Gerry Ford succeeded Nixon in the White House. Rumsfeld left in about early October to be Ford’s chief of staff. His successor at NATO was David Bruce, a legendary U.S. diplomat in the final years of his career.

JOHN W. HOLMES
Trade Policy Officer, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1974-1976)

*John W. Holmes was born in Quincy, Massachusetts on November 3, 1935. He received a bachelor’s degree from Columbia University and entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included positions in Khorramshahr, Naples, Saigon, Brussels, London, Rome, and Washington, DC. Mr. Holmes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 18, 1996.*


HOLMES: Yes. I'd spent five years in Washington, which is a long stretch. I went to the Mission to the European Communities in Brussels. Before I went and before he became the Ambassador to the EC, Joe Greenwald, who had been in the EB as a Deputy Assistant Secretary and various things as well, said to me that nothing much was really happening on the international trade front or in the European Community, but somebody had to go to Brussels and I'd better do it. I went, and I was the Trade Policy Officer in our Mission to the European Communities.

Q: From when to when?

HOLMES: Less than a couple of years. From April of 1974 to January of 1976. It wasn't a very productive period within the Community, and it wasn't a warm period either in US-European Community relations. As Trade Policy Officer I had a lot of the bread and butter issues between the US and Europe as part of my bailiwick. But it wasn't a period when big things were happening. It tended to be one damned thing after another rather than anything earth shaking. Brussels was a good vantage point to get to know something about the European Community. It was also a good vantage point for European developments in general. One of the more amusing things I did, although one that made Joe Greenwald (who was by then the Ambassador) a little bit nervous, was to, at the request of the then STR, to write a couple of papers, on how the French and later on how the Italians arrived at their trade policy and why they took the positions they did. The STR couldn't our Embassies in Paris and Rome to do such an analysis. It was an interesting case. I think their unwillingness or inability had a number of causes, Including the
tendency towards clientitis that most of our Embassies suffer from to some degree or another. One doesn't like to say nasty things about the host government. It also reflects a widespread weakness in both synthesis and analysis; our Foreign Service too often restricted itself simply to reporting the facts.

Q: Did you find that being where you were you didn't, perhaps the OECD Mission took a little bit more objective point of view? You were closer to American interests and you didn't have a single client or not?

HOLMES: Well, I wasn't ever assigned to the OECD Mission (though I visited the OECD many times) but I certainly I spent a lot of my career in the Mission to the European Communities, or overseeing its work from Washington. The Mission to the EC is not like a mission to a multilateral organization. We were advancing American interests vis-a-vis the European Community. Still, the fact is that there wasn't a real, live, national government there that we were dealing with, but a strange collection of forces, the bureaucracy of the European Commission and then the member state governments, all of which had their representations in Brussels. It created some of the atmosphere of a multilateral organization. Fortunately for us because it is easier to pick up information when you have ten potential sources rather than one. So, yes, we probably escaped from the clientitis of a straightforward, bilateral mission. And another point. To me at least, the European Community and the European Commission was such an irritating and artificial construct that it was hard to develop any emotional identification with it, even though I was and am a believer in some form of European unity. I viewed the EC just as a lawyer would view the people on the other side of the courtroom.

Q: How did you view, and maybe, how did the members of the Mission view the principal players? I'm thinking of France, Germany and Great Britain.

HOLMES: Well, this was fairly recently after the entry of the UK into the European Community. The British there were the new boys on the scene. I guess my answer is the one most people would give, that the French seemed to be the dominant force within the Community but less dominant than they had been at the inception of the Community and less dominant than they now are within the Community. This was so because more recently because under De Gaulle, the French had halfway backed out of the European Community. Not quite as far out as they did from NATO but they for a while adopted a very "stand-off-ish" empty seat approach cost them some influence, just as it did in NATO. But they were clearly the strongest force and the most difficult for Americans to deal with. They made themselves our adversary. More than the others, they wanted the European Community define itself by its difference from the United States. The Germans wanted to be friendly. But at that time they always seemed to be neither terribly well organized or not quite as sharp as the French. The British were quite intelligent and were good sources but were still sort of outsiders. 20-odd years later they still are outsiders. I think one thing that has changed is that the Germans have shaped up in terms of turning their inherent, evident power into more effective power within the Community than was the case in the mid-1970's. Aside from that things have stayed more or less the way they were.

Q: What was the role of the United States in this? I mean, were you just observers or were you sort of hustling around saying, "God, if you do this, it will mean this..."
HOLMES: It depended. A lot of things did not matter very much, as far we could tell, to Washington. We were observers on some things. Where there was a specific US interest, we would hustle around and we'd try to get them to change what they were doing, once in a while with success. What we had ceased to be, by the time I was there, was cheerleaders. The US had, I think, through the 1960's been cheerleader for the European Community but by the mid-1970's that had ceased to be the case.

Q: When you left there, whither the unity of Europe did you see? This would be 1976 when you left.

HOLMES: I think, the years I was there were among the "trough" years. There have been several "trough" periods for the European Community but this was certainly one of the deepest troughs. There were the Presidents of the Commission -- even though I was there for a short time, there were a couple in my time -- whose names would not be recognized by anybody today. And as I said, the French had been taking a quasi-NATO position. They were less evident than usual. The Community came to life right after I left, at least for awhile. About the time I was leaving they started talking about the European Monetary System. Roy Jenkins came as President of the Commission. Giscard and Schmidt started taking an interest in the latter part of the 1970's. But in the early to mid 1970's, while it didn't seem as if the Community was going to come apart, I would have said it might stay forever in this sort of half baked form. But in fact, despite the fact that it hasn't developed into anything like a Federal Europe or the United States of Europe, it has made progress, it has moved in ways that weren't evident in 1974-75.

Q: Did the Soviet Union represent, sort of, the pressure from the outside that kept the whole thing going, or not? Or was the Soviet Union much of a factor at all?

HOLMES: I think that by then the Soviet Union had ceased to be worried about at least in Europe, that detente kept on being a good word in Europe. Certainly there had been worries about the Soviet Union in the 1960's, particularly during the time of the Berlin Crisis. The Prague events of 1968 had some impact but whereas the Nixon period in America was one of ambivalence about detente, so that the word was almost "verboten" even though in a way you could say that Kissinger practiced it...

Q: He invented it.

HOLMES: But, in Europe there wasn't any ambivalence. There was no feeling that the Cold War in the sense of the division of Europe was over. Nobody then ever thought that the division of Europe would come to an end. But that the danger from the East had ceased to exist. And Europe was mainly intent on getting richer and what they were really concentrating on was the fact that with the Oil Crisis of 1973 and other less evident developments of the 1970's, suddenly the European economic miracle of the Post War period had come to an end. But their focus was on their own economic concerns at that point. I agree that the movement toward European unity had had as one of its causes a fear of the Soviet Union. But by 1974-76 I think that had largely evaporated.
Mr. Newlin was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He obtained degrees from Harvard University and the Fletcher School and, after serving a tour with the US Army, joined the Foreign Service in 1960. A generalist, Mr. Newlin’s service took him to France, Guatemala and Belgium, where he dealt primarily with European Organizations and NATO. In Washington his assignments concerned Trade, Law of the Sea and other economic matters. Mr. Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

NEWLIN: All right. What came next? I went out to USEC [United States Mission to the European Communities]. In Brussels at that time, we had three ambassadors. We had a bilateral ambassador. We had an ambassador who took care of NATO affairs. We had an ambassador who took care of the European Mission to the European Communities, which had its headquarters in Brussels. Joe Greenwald was the head of that mission. The head of that embassy is another story. It’s not my story to tell. I was not involved with that embassy, but I’ll tell it anyway. It sort of bugs me. It was Ann Cox Chambers. Jimmy Carter was in the White House. Ann Cox Chambers was the scion of the Cox newspaper dynasty in Georgia. She was named for that reason to practically whatever embassy she wanted. What she got was Brussels. Her formal education stopped when she was graduated from Miss Porter’s School in Farmington, Connecticut. Miss Porter’s when my wife went there was not particularly high powered intellectually. My wife complained about that.

Q: It was a good solid finishing school.

NEWLIN: Yes. And it was more that way when Ann Cox Chambers went there. Lots of people who worked at that embassy would come back with horror stories of how embarrassing it was when she had to go in and present papers. In USEC, where I was serving, we had Joe Greenwald as ambassador. He was a very serious guy indeed. I thought highly of him. I had known him from the Department days. We had bumped into one another during this and that. He had asked me and asked for me to come out there. I was a political officer in USEC, but my job was going to be looking after energy and scientific stuff. He wanted a political officer who knew something about economics and numbers and things. I had graduated from Harvard Business School and had worked for a while in the Economic Bureau, so he thought that I was a political officer who could be trusted with economic stuff.

Brussels was a hard assignment for us. Our oldest son was having trouble at home. We didn’t take the boys with us.

Q: How old was he?

NEWLIN: He was about 14 or 15. He was in boarding school. I guess this is of some interest in
an oral history about Foreign Service officers. Why was he in boarding school? I wouldn’t have put him in boarding school otherwise. Although I went to boarding school and my wife went to boarding school and lots of people in our families have gone to boarding schools, we had decided that we would not send our children to boarding schools. We liked having them at home. There were plenty of good schools. But our son when we were in Washington came to us and called a family meeting, a family council, which the family could do. He said very reasonably and with no apparent rancor, “I have never spent more than two years in a school in my life. I would like to spend my four high school years in the same school.” It’s very hard not to think that’s a fair request, particularly perhaps because, as is so often the case in families, you have different kids who are all very different and have different strengths. Our second son was a little friend of the world. But our oldest son, who was the son who came to us with this request, was a bit of a loner and always had two or three very good friends where he was but not a very wide circle of friends. You could argue that the fact that he never spent more than two years in a school in his life contributed to that. So, we took him around to let him look at a bunch of schools. I’d have done it otherwise if I had been a little older and knew what I know now. I’d have chosen a school for him. I don’t think that a kid that age necessarily should be given a choice of school. But we showed him a bunch of schools. Of course, only ones that we thought probably would be all right. He chose the school that I had gone to and that his grandfather and grandfather and a whole bunch of uncles had gone to. When he goes to this school, he looks around at all those plaques on the wall, all the teams and honors and awards and things, and he finds names and he knows he feels kind of at home here before he’s even set foot on it. He went to St. Paul’s, which is where a lot of his family had gone. So, he didn’t come to Brussels with us. Then when it came time for his younger brother to decide where to go, it didn’t seem fair not to give the younger brother the same choice we had given Bill, and he, too, chose to go to St. Paul’s.

So, when we went to Brussels, the oldest boy was doing fine. He was an officer in his class, the captain of a couple of teams, his grades were fine. His grades were either outstanding because he’s very bright, or he’d take a term off and his grades would get flunky. But then his grades were fine. But we got a call from the headmaster at one point that said, “Bill has come to me and he has said that he is not doing the school any good and the school isn’t doing him any good and he’s decided to withdraw from school. He says he has some friends in the Boston area with whom he can go and live for a while. We think that’s a plan.” Well, from my way of thinking, that was so excruciatingly unconscionably irresponsible that I just couldn’t get over it. I’m sure that what that guy was thinking about was, “This kid is some kind of mixed up and he’s just the kind of kid who might take his own life. I don’t want that to happen on my campus, so let’s get him as far away from here as possible.” We spent a good bit of our time going back and forth to Washington and Philadelphia, where he ended up, and Concord, New Hampshire first, and trying to sort out the problem with our oldest son. One of the things that had happened was that he was going through some kind of a breakdown. It was probably induced by LSD. I don’t really know that.

Q: This was an era where kids were playing around.

NEWLIN: Oh, it was a very bad era and the school was rife with it. I think the school was not unique in that. I think all the boarding schools were in trouble with it. I think that the day schools
were in trouble with it, too. It was a bad time for that kind of thing. Anyway, we were very discombobulated all during the Belgium time. Brussels isn’t that much my kind of town anyway. It’s sort of a stodgy town. When we went to Brussels, people said, “You’re going to love Brussels. It’s three hours down the autoroute from Paris.” But when we went to Paris, nobody said that we were going to love it because it was close to Brussels. But we had our tour in Brussels, which was fine.

My work in Brussels I didn’t think was particularly interesting. I didn’t think what the Mission to the European Communities was doing was particularly interesting. In a funny way, we were kind of spies. I felt that that was part of what I was doing. We were trying to find out what the hell they were going to do. We were trying to influence what they were going to do. The first thing to do was to find out what they were doing. They had meetings and proceedings that we were not able to attend, of course. So, they’d have an important meeting. Before it was reported to the press and reported to anywhere else, the mission felt that we had to report back to Washington what had happened in this meeting that we knew was going to take place. Well, how do you find out? You make friends with people who attended the meeting and you tell them, “When the meeting is over, I’m going to want to know what happened.” You wait for them to call. If they don’t call, you call them. You hope that they will tell you what happened. You hope that they will give you the papers that were used in it and came out of it. You particularly hope that you can get the papers in English. If you get the papers in French, you are going to have to translate them yourself. Most of the time, that’s what I was doing. I was schmoozing with people who were going to be attending those meetings who would give me the papers in the areas that I was the most interested in. That’s sort of an uncomfortable kind of a job to have, I thought. I played squash with my British friends and I had a good relationship with a Swiss. The Swiss was in the same boat that I was in. We would trade stuff shamelessly. But he got his stuff in French mostly. I had good friend with the Irish, too. My friends with the Irish were through poetry. That’s how I stayed close with the Irish guy. But it’s a funny kind of a job to be meeting in the locker room before you play squash and have your squash partner hand you an envelope full of papers that is stamped “confidential” which you then were going to pass on to your embassy – and you’re not a spook, you’re a non-spook diplomat.

Q: An interesting aside on this is in an interview I did with Ambassador Ed Rowell, who was ambassador to Luxembourg and was a professional Foreign Service officer. He found that it was a wonderful place to find out what was going because hardly anybody pays attention to Luxembourg as part of the European Community, but they were quite willing to share and he’d get wonderful things. But the awful thing is that that embassy is usually used to dump Ann Cox Chambers-type people there and they just have neither the interest or the contacts or the knowledge to milk that for what it’s worth.

NEWLIN: A little aside on Luxembourg in that embassy. Periodically, they’d get a Foreign Service officer. right after my time in Belgium, the Luxembourg government asked our government if they could please have a Foreign Service officer. They thought they were due to have a serious ambassador. Jim Lowenstein was given the job. Jim asked me to be his DCM. DCM is a very good job for promotions. You’re thought to get managerial experience out of being DCM, which I think you don’t ever get credit for when you’re a consul general, which, of course, gives you much more managerial experience in a sense than being DCM because as a
consul general you have to make the final decision. As a DCM, I suppose you make the final decision on lots of things anyway. Anyway, Jim asked me to be his DCM. This was right after Brussels. We had cut our Brussels tour to two years from three to come home and deal with our family situation.

As another aside, that kid is fine. He did some funny things for a while, just curious things, not weird things. But he ended up going to Johns Hopkins, did beautifully there, and has a nice job as a publisher. He straightened all that mess out. But we were home at that time. It was very important that we be home at that time. I have no doubt how important that was. We moved back into our house in Washington. The kid had moved back to Washington. He was looking for a place to live. He wanted his independence. Our communication was very bad. He didn’t want to communicate with any grownups. He knew everything. Why would he do that? But we said, “We’re here for whatever help we can give you. Never forget one thing. Of course you can live with us at any time. But there is the basement apartment. In the basement apartment, you can have your own exit and entrance. It’s not a bad little apartment. It was built as a maid’s room. The house had been built in 1907. One wonderful thing about it is, it’s free.” He moved into the basement apartment. He rarely used that door. All the magazines that he liked to read we made sure to subscribe to and have them on the coffee table. All the food that he liked to snack on we made sure was in our refrigerator. During those couple of years, our communication got very good.

But Louisa was not going to leave to go to Luxembourg because she wanted to stay with him. Lowenstein was not married at the time and wanted to have a DCM who had a wife. I was reluctant to leave, too. So, that didn’t work out. Somebody else did that. I’ve always wondered whether my career might have been a little bit different.

Q: One always wonders making these choices. I’ve gone through this, too. You make certain choices in favor of your family. In a Foreign Service career, the run to the top leaves a good number of divorces. Jim and Dora Lowenstein got divorced. I knew them when we were in Belgrade together. Now it’s Johnpoll and Larry Eagleburger. Jim, Larry and I took Serbian together. But before we leave Brussels, what was your feeling and that of the people around you who were dealing with this about whither the European Community? Was this going to be a real entity or were we talking about a solid customs union more than anything else? What were we thinking? We’re talking about ’74-’76.

NEWLIN: Backing up a little bit, when I was in Paris, we were wondering what the European Community was going to be like. My boss then, Jacques Reinstein, was telling the Department that the European Community was going to be a truly serious customs union and that it was going to keep us out and that we were going to have to deal with this entity that was going to have free trade within its own borders and not with us. The Department didn’t want to hear that. Reinstein kept getting in trouble for being very blunt about how this entity was going to do what it wanted and that we weren’t going to have very much say in what it did. Certainly by the time ’74-’76 came around, the customs union side of the European Community was very clearly established, but where it was going to go beyond that was not very established. Among the issues that were on the table was how big it was going to be, who else was going to be allowed to join the European Community, and then what it was going to be, how much was it going to have a
political role? It used to have its summit meetings where it got a chance to play a political role. At the beginning, those summit meetings were very structured and not particularly useful. As time went on and they got more regularized, they became much more useful. The European Community was able much more to take useful positions on political matters. So, it was evolving during that time. My feeling of the U.S. position about that evolution was that we supported it, that we wished the European Community… My feeling was, when it was deciding whether to become a real trading entity or not, we didn’t quite so much support it. We wanted it to do that, yes, but us, too, okay? I thought that we not only said that we wanted the European Community to develop itself into an effective political entity that could play a real political role on the world scene. That was certainly our stated position. But my own understanding of it was that that was our position. I thought we saw things moving in that direction. You had at that time the European Parliament. It was meeting alternately in Strasbourg and Luxembourg. I was the guy at the mission who would attend the Parliament sessions. That was a sort of a waste of time. The Parliament had practically no power. It was not directly elected. The scuttlebutt was that if the European Parliament were directly elected, people would be prepared to give it some authority. But the other side was that it couldn’t be directly elected because it didn’t have any authority. Later, they did move to direct elections. It now does have some more authority. I’m not quite clear what that authority is. But when I was there, it did not have very much authority. I thought it was talking about funny regulations and it was interested in the environment but couldn’t do much about the environment.

Q: That seems to be almost its main thrust, trying to unify things within Europe, but a lot of things are environment… While you were watching the European Community at that time, who was keeping an eye on the common agricultural policy?

NEWLIN: We were. As far as I was concerned, we couldn’t do a bloody lot about it. We knew what we wanted. They knew very much what they wanted. Individual countries knew what they wanted. Each country wants to protect its own agriculture. The Community as a whole wishes to protect its agriculture vis-a-vis ours. That was the hardest nut to crack for them, the common agricultural policy. Each individual country is protecting its own farmers.

Q: In a way, the common agricultural policy has ended up with that’s it… Each country is protecting its own agriculture. It’s a common policy that they’ve all more or less agreed that they can’t do a damn thing about it except to protect their agriculture.

NEWLIN: Yes. All of this stuff, we watched it, we tried to influence it. But I just didn’t have the feeling that we were effective in trying to influence it. It would have been very hard to be effective. They had things they wanted to do and we didn’t have a whole bloody lot of leverage in making them do it the way we wanted to do it.

Q: Was there a divide at all between what we used to call the “true believers…” Were our people on the American side divided into true believers and Euroskeptics?

NEWLIN: Yes, I think so. But I don’t think that it really affected how we behaved terribly. Whether you were a true believer or a Euroskeptic, you weren’t going to be able to make your view prevail, so that was pretty much the way you felt about it. Your true believers and
JOHNSON: But not for long. EUR and Personnel had been hassling over selection of a new political counselor for the U.S. mission to the European Community (now European Union). I became the designated hitter for this assignment. I knew just about zero about what the EC did except for what you would pick up being in the EUR in putting together country briefing papers. At first, I was very surprised to learn they had a political counselor and I wondered what in the world a political counselor would do. I found out. I got there in the fall of 1974 as head of a four man section, including one officer who was a labor specialist who was the liaison to several European trade union organizations headquartered in Brussels. What this section did, in addition to steady contact with the European Trade Unions there, was to report on meetings of the Council of the EC. When the Council met at ministerial level, and it was usually the foreign ministers who convened every three to four weeks in Brussels, a special meeting might be convened at the level of agricultural ministers when they came to talk about aspects of European Common Agricultural Policy. These meetings were strictly like an inter governmental organization. The ministers came there in the guise of representing their countries, not as European officials. Of course the United States was not a part of this European community and this was the big challenge our mission as a non-member was to make sure we found out everything they were doing. But we weren’t under the tent so to speak. Certainly, it was very important to our interests because of the economic factors involved. Our trade with Europe, our exports, particularly in agricultural products, were important national interests involved in dealing with the European Union. The Political Section reported on the meetings of the Council and the officer who did that was usually a junior officer. He operated much like a newspaper man, hanging out at the Charlemagne Building in the press room trying to find out what was going on inside, usually by talking to national spokesmen. This was perhaps one of the most needed and important reportorial responsibilities we had because there were a lot of customers back in Washington who were interested in the decisions that would be made by the European Ministers there. The body we dealt with in Brussels, to a great extent, was the European Commission. These were European civil servants for want of a better way of describing them. They were representing the EC rather than the countries from which they came. These were our day-to-day contacts in trying to find out what the EC had in mind, what they were up to and what they might be projecting for next year on the economic front. The other point of contact for us there was the so-called perm reps (the permanent representatives of the EC member countries) in Brussels. They were all very large outfits. We tried to cultivate all of them to broaden our
knowledge of what was going on. The most interesting part of being assigned to the political side in Brussels was the opportunity to go to meetings of the European Parliament. These normally took place in Strasbourg, but every once in awhile they were held in Luxembourg since Luxembourg was still the titular home of the parliament. Everybody liked to go to Strasbourg because of the excellent restaurants and the delicacy of white asparagus in the springtime. I thought one of the more interesting developments in the EC at that time had been a study commissioned by the member countries to define what is European Union. What should a European Union look like and in essence - where do we want to go with all this? By that time they had nine members. An expansion was coming but I’ll take that up in a little bit. There had not been any momentum toward a greater degree of integration among the member countries for quite a while. What were they going to do with all of this, and where did they want to go? That was supposed to be explored in this report. A former Belgian prime minister, Leo Tindemans, headed the project and his report was delivered about a year after I arrived there. We examined it carefully for how it might reflect on U.S. interests. There were a lot of cynics around who thought it signified very little. I remember our ambassador at that time had a favorite expression to describe what he considered flights of ideological fancy and pie in the sky - “eurocrap.” This was Joe Greenwald, who was an excellent but realistic ambassador. His successor probably had more hopes for what the European community might become. That was Dean Hinton who was the ambassador during the second half of my stay. One of the things I remember about this report - tucked away in a rather long treatise - was a rather medium sized paragraph about defense cooperation. Obviously, this was way ahead of its time, but the American military was very sensitive to anything breathing the idea that the European Community might somehow engage in defense cooperation. This, they thought, could only lead to a diminution of the importance of NATO, and that bothered them. I’m not sure whether we specifically rapped anybody on the knuckles at this time but I’m sure later European visitors in Washington heard a lot along the lines of, “You know, this is great but what does this mean for NATO?” This issue is there, right down to today, because I get the impression that the U.S. military right now is still as opposed to having the Europeans cooperate militarily in any organized, effective way as they were 25 years ago. I find this incredible but that’s the way things are.

Another thing that developed in Brussels at this time, which also made the political section’s work interesting, was what they call political cooperation. This was a budding foreign policy coordination device which the Europeans developed after an earlier report drafted by a Belgian foreign ministry official, Devignon, who was looking for ways to deepen European cooperation and came up with the thought of coordinating foreign policy. So political cooperation - i.e., foreign policy coordination - became a rather standard part of the landscape there. At a certain level the political directors of all the foreign ministries would meet, either in Brussels or in member country capitals. They would discuss whether they could work out or express a common EC-9 policy on current issues of importance to them. As this EC practice developed, we decided it would be to our interest to keep in close touch with them as a means of avoiding surprises and perhaps influencing their policies before they were finalized. Also at the time I was in Brussels we saw the beginning of the Greek accession to the EC. This was the first step in expansion in the community since 1972 when the U.K., Ireland, and Denmark became members. By the time I arrived, the Brits, the Irish, and Danes had been pretty well integrated into the operation. With Greece, you had a country which had come out of the period of military rule by army colonels and there was a feeling among EC-9 members that they wanted to do something for Greece.
They might be able to contribute some measure of political stability if they encouraged Greece to move towards a closer relationship with the EC. We followed this brief closely, and were very much in favor of Greek association because we thought it contributed to stability in this area of the Mediterranean. Another country in the Mediterranean became a focus of EC attention. This was Portugal. With the disappearance of the Salazar regime there was an interim period (three years or so) when the government seemed to slip into the hands of left wing generals. We were getting very concerned, as we read telegrams coming out of Lisbon. The EC had a role here, which we encouraged, of urging moderation in Portugal and holding out the possibility of closer relations with and eventually membership in the EC. That period of instability in Portugal played out pretty much during the time I was in Brussels. It had a happy ending of course and the Portugese are members. The EC countries right down to today express their concern about the lack of democracy in European countries as witness their refrigerating their relations with EC member Austria when Haider’s right wing party entered the government.

W. ROBERT WARNE
Economic Officer, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1974-1977)

W. Robert Warne was born in Washington, DC on November 30, 1937. He attended high school in Iran, Hawaii, and Brazil. He received a bachelor’s degree from Princeton University in 1962. Upon graduation, he joined the U.S. Army. Mr. Warne joined USAID in 1962. His career included positions in Buenos Aires, Brussels, Kingston, and Paris. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy April 1, 1995.

Q: Well, then, was it about '75?

WARNE: No, '74, actually. Subsequently, I was stationed in Brussels with the European Community for three years. I was developing a specialty in finance and economic analysis. I had three tasks in Brussels with the European Community. First, was financial reporting, following monetary, tax, exchange rate and macroeconomic policies. The second was to handle our development cooperation policies with the Community, mainly the EC’s Lome convention with over 60 developing countries. I also worked on trade issues. The European Community at the time was going through a major transition. It was moving from six to nine members and was coming to grips with increased economic integration. Just a fascinating time to be there.

Q: What was our attitude? Did we see this European Economic Community as being just a wonderful thing? Or did we see it as a potential trade rival or a closed market?

WARNE: No, not at all. The U.S. attitude was positive about the Community. We were trying to assist in its evolution, strengthen it, and cooperate with it. We had trade problems, a chicken war, for example, and other issues. Those were normal commercial squabbles. Overall, we were determined to see the Community strengthened. We looked upon the EC as a means to integrate,
stabilize and develop Europe. If we could bring about a reconciliation, we would secure a longer-term stable environment for ourselves and the Europeans. These goals were achieved, the EC has been a been very positive force.

Q: Sometimes this gets lost when we talk about things. This is true of NATO and everything else. If there’s a war in Europe, everybody gets involved.

WARNE: That’s right. And not only that, but we benefit in other ways -- political stability, peace, a stronger Europe. These factors mean a better market for us. Europe has been a good market for us, both trade and investment. The U.S. had a unique role with the Commission of the EC during that time. I knew more about what was going on in the European Community than many of the Europeans within the Commission. I was horizontal, cutting across the activities if all the directorates. I followed everything that was of importance to the U.S. The Commission and Council --the member states’ decision-making body -- were accessible. They welcomed U.S. diplomats.

Q: You could talk to everybody.

WARNE: There were no problems. I had complete access. I met with the top people and the working level officials. I made sure to meet with all levels. I networked all over, filing two or three reports a day. For example, I followed the devaluation of key currencies. I knew as much about it as the bankers did. Or what the Community was doing on a certain specific trade issue or its regional and country specific development plans. I did my dissertation for a Ph.D. in economics at SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University. I completed the course work and passed the Ph.D. exam before leaving for Brussels on what I felt was a novel idea, the Lomé Convention. The Convention tied the former colonies of Europe into a network of aid recipients that would be given preferential aid and trade advantages. Recipients set up a governing board to help run the substantial aid program (which was a lot larger than our own). It was based on equality and collaboration. And they had a series of guidelines they followed. I felt it had some insightful ways of administering aid that we could draw on. So I spent quite a bit of time, on my own, studying the program. I hate to admit it to you, Stu, but I never received my doctorate. I finished a draft of the dissertation, but I gave the draft to my SAIS advisors who wanted me to rewrite it. I was put in another job and never had the time. I really regret never finishing it. The Europeans had a continuous flow into Brussels of leaders from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean into the Community. These talks had as much political content as economic. I would regularly assess European policies around the world, whether it was about Vietnam, China or South Africa. I did quite a bit of analytical work on the political side as well as the economic. The Lome Convention was a key vehicle to consolidate the EC hegemony in several regions.

Q: You probably had as strong an economic background by this time as one could get within the Foreign Service. How did you find dealing with the people who were putting together the European Community? How did they treat the Americans?

WARNE: Well, they treated us fine. I'll give you just three vignettes.
That was during the period when we had the first oil disruption by the Middle East; OPEC was showing its colors as a cartel. The U.S. and European-led initiative put together a coordinated response. It didn't work out well. I had a good relationship with several of the delegations that were working on this. The Community would coordinate its position, and then meet with the Americans and others in Paris. I gave the meeting insights into the European position and how the EU felt about the meeting. In fact, I got an award for doing the work. But all agreed OPEC was not serious about collaborating and could not be trusted. The effort collapsed. The consumer response was to organize the International Energy Agency (IEA) as a cooperative consumer group. The IEA began stocking oil to cope with an OPEC-caused crisis. The Europeans came out with something called the ECU (European Currency Unit). No one knew what the hell this was about. So I went trotting up to a couple of my friends (one headed up the Monetary Committee; another the Financial Committee), and I asked, "What in the world are you talking about? What is this ECU."

They replied, "Rob, it's nothing. It's just an accounting unit. We're trying to figure out how we can blend all of our currencies together in a basket for budget and accounting purposes. It's just a unit of account. Nothing more."

I responded, "Are you giving me a straight story? You sound like you've got something up your sleeve. "Oh, no, this is it." I filed a report: "The EC has come up with a new unit of account, officials say it is just a bookkeeping device to keep the accounts. Don't believe it. They've got other motives. This is part of the goal to strengthen the single market." Today of course, the ECU has evolved into the euro and is becoming the single currency. I also worked on European Monetary Union which was just beginning. Maastricht confirmed the goal, which will be achieved as planned. It took 25 years of hard work to overcome member country opposition. But it represents a major achievement.

A third vignette was my effort to expose the Europeans to the United States. The USIA international visitor grants were tremendous assets for State Department officers. I don't think we make enough use of them. I got to select three or four visitors a year -- the bright, young Europeans who were nationalistic. They spent a month traveling the United States.

One Frenchman, who's still a good friend, and a chef de cabinet for agriculture at the time, had almost a religious experience. He was dying to go to the Grand Canyon. He'd read about it and seen pictures of it. We arranged for him to fly over the Grand Canyon and to go down it. It was just a marvelous experience for him. He was just a different person when he came back. Surprisingly, many important Europeans were quite provincial.

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Q: Well, then you left Brussels when?
WARNE: I left in the middle of ’77.

LAWRENCE LESSER  
Economic Officer  
Brussels (1974-1977)

Mr. Lesser was born in New York in 1940. He received his BA from Cornell University and his MA from the University of Minnesota. He was in the Peace Corps in Enugu, Nigeria in 1964 and 1965. His foreign assignments included New Delhi, Ouagadougou, Brussels, Kigali, and Dhaka. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 12, 2002.

Q: “’74. Where did you go?

LESSER: I went to Belgium.

Q: What were you doing in Belgium?

LESSER: I was assigned as economic officer in the embassy. Brussels had three ambassadors there, the ambassador to NATO, the ambassador to the European communities and the ambassador to the Belgians. That was mine, the bilateral embassy. This was a medium- to large-size embassy and I was responsible for a number of portfolios including several commodities most particularly energy. I covered nuclear industry and nuclear non-proliferation, which was a major issue. I covered economic co-production of the NATO F-16 fighter. Obviously that was a big project and there were non-economic elements to it, but co-production was a big and sexy subject and I got that one. This and that, you know, you’re always doing a few other things that just come along.

Q: You were doing this again from ’74 to?

LESSER: From ’74 to ’77. Three years.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

LESSER: The ambassador for almost all of the time there was Leonard K. Firestone, political appointee, former president of Firestone Tire and Rubber.

Q: How interested was he in economic matters?

LESSER: He certainly didn’t have any day-to-day interest in economic matters and he wasn’t much more interested in political matters. He was an ambassador. He was a lovely man and of course a very wealthy one and he took a great interest in having things go well. He left the place an improved place. He was interested in morale of staff including the Belgian staff, but he was no scholar of Belgian affairs and Belgian politics, still less economics. Belgium of course was
my first and only experience living in a developed country, but Belgium was a growing concern. We saw a lot of Ambassador Firestone. He was quite active, but he was a very modest man personally and he didn’t pretend to know much about the substance of U.S. policy and U.S. interests there.

Q: I was wondering, in Belgium it’s such a sophisticated state in a way, I mean they have been dealing with economic, I mean they’ve survived on commerce really.

LESSER: Yes.

Q: Did you find that, how did, how were we reacting with them?

LESSER: Well, the Belgians regarded good relations with the U.S. as being very, very important. They had their own parochial reasons for that. They had economic reasons for it, too, of course because we’re an important trading partner and a very important investor. Politically, they wanted to be good friends of the United States so that we would support their side in quarrels with France. The French were regarded as a problem by the Belgians, and they saw good relations with the Americans as part of the answer, I think. We had a natural community of interest. They liked to be very frank with us. They liked to be helpful to us internationally on those international issues which were not of vital concern to them, but like small countries they know that they can make themselves useful. So, working with the Belgians was generally speaking a very pleasurable thing.

Q: On nuclear matters, we were building nuclear things at that time, too, weren’t we?

LESSER: We were, yes.

Q: So, I mean nuclear energy was seen as a solution to an energy problem, wasn’t it?

LESSER: To some degree, yes and the Belgians thought so more than we do as Europeans I think continue to. They were strongly interested in advancing the development of their own nuclear power industry and they were also interested in developing nuclear waste for reprocessing facilities as a commercial possibility. They were interested in competing with France in those areas as well and wanted to show that they were a more trustworthy partner.

Q: In looking at the economy of Belgium at the time, did the division between Wallonia and Flanders show up in economic terms or not?

LESSER: In gross terms, yes. There was a sense in the country in the mid-’70s that the technological revolution was tilting the balance in favor of Flanders and against Wallonia, and Flanders was flourishing with new high tech industry and Wallonia was basically a region of coal mining and smoke stack industries. So relatively speaking the balance was shifting. I haven’t followed it closely enough to know how significant that's been in the 20 years since.

Q: Well, I think it’s still going on. I’ve talked to somebody who was just DCM there five years ago and saying that this continued. What were some of the major economic issues with the
Belgians? Any?

LESSER: Of course there were. Oh, here’s one I didn’t even mention before. One of my areas was transportation and we had issues over scheduled and charter air flight routes and frequencies. In the three years I was there we had annual negotiations with the Belgians over bilateral air arrangements. The deal was essentially that the Belgians wanted to promote themselves to the extent possible as an entry point for tourism to Europe from North America. It makes perfect sense that if people come in to Brussels or Antwerp or Ostend - to an international airport in Belgium - then they’ll spend some money there. They’ll spend a night or two. They might go to Bruges, they might go to the Grand Place in Brussels, and if instead they come in to Paris or Amsterdam or London or Rome, they probably will never go to Belgium at all. So, their strategy was to make it as attractive as possible for American charter flights to land in Belgium. They were extremely generous in competing with other European countries to be the landing site. They also wanted the national airline Sabena (no longer in existence) to have as many points of entry to the United States as possible, but that gets negotiated on a basis of strict reciprocity. Pan Am and TWA, neither of which is still in business, were not interested in allowing them more access, because Belgium was after all a very small market for them. So, the negotiations were a kind of balancing act where they would think they offered a good deal in macro terms to the United States by being generous to the U.S. charters, and the American scheduled airline said, well, we don’t care what you’re doing for the charter carriers. We don’t get anything for that. So, we’re opposed; it’s a bad deal. All three of our annual negotiations ended up in stalemate, which didn’t provoke a crisis because unlike the baseball players and management, the Belgians understood that if they lose they still are better off playing under the old rules than they are provoking a crisis. They would really lose if they tried to battle it out. So, that was a nice bilateral issue. It was a real honest to God bilateral issue and I got to work on it.

Q: How about the French? Did you get involved with the French?

LESSER: On industrial co-production. The issue there was four NATO countries - Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark - were leaning towards jointly getting the same lightweight fighter plane to meet their NATO obligations. When I arrived in ‘74 there were several candidates. Two or three of them (three at first and then two) were American primary contractors, which complicated our role as American diplomats because there was no single American candidate that we could support. The other contenders were Sweden with the Viggen (even though Sweden wasn’t a member of NATO), and France with a version of the Mirage which they were developing. France was not a very good member of NATO from the American perspective because they weren’t in the unified command, but they were members in every other sense. They were legitimate candidates and they were putting a lot of pressure on Belgium to go for the French candidate, and pressure was widely believed to include under the table of payments. Anyway, this was the ‘70s and the law wasn’t as clear as it is now on what was legitimate. We knew that the French were important competitors there and we knew that the Belgians would feel very much pulled in at least two directions. The Swedes would put their pressure on Norway with mixed results, and Denmark and Holland with probably less; those countries were going to go with an American plane unless the four-nation consortium fell apart. So, how were you going to influence the Belgians? Well, one way was by performance obviously; by convincing them that you had the best plane, you had the best lightweight fighter
and could deliver it for the best money. You couldn’t know that for certain because it wasn’t in production yet. But, okay, we probably had the better of the argument there, especially when we came down to one candidate.

But the other thing that was going to swing in the balance was that, yes, it’s going to cost us a lot of money, but it wouldn’t cost us as much and we would get side benefits in technological know-how in addition to cost if we were producing some of the parts for the plane. So there was this massive unprecedented negotiation from the primary contractors and the secondary contractors to license Belgium and the other countries to produce important parts of the chosen plane in their own countries. The primary contractor is the one who makes the airframe, but the ones who make the engines and the numerous ones who make the electronics also are in this game. The question is how much can you promise the ones who buy it will also be producing part of it, will be benefiting from being on the technological cutting edge and of course, will create jobs and reduce the foreign exchange loss. That was a very complex thing and it was being discussed on many different levels. I was the point man for that vis-à-vis the Belgians. It was ultimately successful for the Americans.

**Q:** It ended up with the F-16 didn’t it?

**LESSER:** Yes. General Dynamics became the primary contractor.

**Q:** General Dynamics. How did you find they worked with you?

**LESSER:** They were careful about how they dealt with us and again one can suspect that, for one thing I think as a matter of general faith big business is leery of getting too close to embassies. Okay, they know what they know and they’re probably right. We’re leaky. We have an agenda, which isn’t always in their interest, and so they’re a little careful there. They don’t tell us everything and a more subtle concern is they may be doing things that they think it’s in our interest that we not know about. This is on the question of how they induce local officials to support them. It was universally believed, but maybe more than the facts warranted, that there was funny business going on.

**Q:** On all sides.

**LESSER:** We were generally protected from that. Actually I did have a glimpse of it at one point. A representative of one of the American contenders came to my office. (Keep in mind that I’m not very senior. I’m not even the section chief.) He wants me to look at a document that shows that one of our rivals, the French, are using improper means to press Belgian decision-makers to decide in favor of the French plane. He said, “Do what you like with it. I’m leaving it here with you.” So, very excited, I went to my boss and she went with me to the DCM, her boss, and I said, “Look what I’ve got. This is real evidence that our French rivals are cheating, and what are we going to do with it? How are we going to report it?” After a discussion, he said, “Well, we’re not going to report it. It’s up to the American company that showed you the document, not us. They’ll know what they need to do to get this information out. They’ll figure it out, and Larry, you can enjoy knowing the story before it hits the press, but it’s not going to hit it out of here.” Indeed it was a matter of a couple of weeks and the story hit and it was a scandal. It
did damage to French chances and it was developed by detective work by one of their competitors whose fingerprints weren’t visible at the time that the story got out, and it didn’t happen through U.S. government sources. I guess they found journalistic sources, which is the natural way to go.

Q: Did you get involved with relations with other missions?

LESSER: On energy matters particularly, I did because the international energy agency was established during that period. It was based in Brussels. A Belgian viscount, Etienne Davignon, was the first secretary general of it and so I worked fairly closely with my counterpart at the USEC mission on energy matters, and a little bit with the NATO mission. Of course, Ken Brown [now President of ADST] was in the embassy in Brussels at the same time in the political section.

Q: There was a European community when you were there?

LESSER: Yes, European communities.

Q: Communities. Were you looking at this at that time as being a potential for really getting together in what became the European Union or did you see too many centrifugal forces?

LESSER: It wasn’t my business to have an opinion on that, but occasionally you’d hear from the Belgians on related subjects. During one discussion with a Belgian foreign ministry guy, he said, well, we’re going to support you on this, blah - I don’t even remember what the issue was because what I remember was he said, “You should understand, Mr. Lesser, that we Belgians are the best Europeans.” I knew in the context what he meant was best Europeans in the sense of a unified Europe. “We Belgians are the best Europeans… with the possible exception of the Irish.” At that I had to laugh because they’re the best Europeans for the same reason as the Irish are the best Europeans. They’re good Europeans as a defense from the French. The Irish are good Europeans as a defense from the British and this was something you always had to remember in talking to the Belgians about European issues.

Q: It’s interesting in looking at the situation that so often it was France. Was it that Germany was playing and keeping quiet and in a fairly modest role or letting the French carry the water?

LESSER: Well, certainly Belgium doesn’t have a soft spot in its heart for Germany, but they don’t worry culturally about Germany. When we talked earlier about the Walloons and the Flemings, the underlying point is that Walloons speak French and although they’re not culturally French, they’re culturally deeply influenced by France, and the Flemings aren’t. The Flemish are not culturally influenced to the same degree by the Dutch (I think) although their language is Dutch. They’re themselves. And there is a very small German speaking population in a little corner of Belgium, but it’s not politically important. So, Germany is not an important factor in that the best I can tell. Ken Brown or somebody else who was doing Belgian internal politics might put another spin on that, but that was the impression I came away with.

Q: Was anyone looking at sort of the economic American circles? Was anybody saying you
know, if the European communities developing the prognosis where they’re going and all, we’re kind of big trouble down the road in the next 20 or 30 years or so as a rival to the United States?

LESSER: Well, why would that be trouble, Stu?

Q: Well, as an economic rival, you know.

LESSER: Well, look, here we are in 2002, in a unipolar world with the Untied States unrivaled as an economic power and is it good, is it bad, would we be better off?

Q: In the ‘70s, the prognosis was not necessarily the United States was going to be at this economic peak where we are now and all. You know, there would be other countries that would come up and the Japanese are beginning to look pretty fancy and other ones. I was just wondering.

LESSER: It was U.S. policy to support much greater unity in Europe and that was the view by people who understood that you could succeed beyond your wishes and that you could be creating a monster in effect and we supported it throughout. Essentially I think the underlying idea there was it’s easier dealing with self-assured, self-reliant partners even though inevitably we’re going to have points of conflict. We’d still prefer that to a Europe which is unstable and poor and is a never-ending source of trouble and can’t keep its own house in order. I think that remains.

Q: Yes. Oh, I agree with you. Well, you left there in 1977?

LESSER: I did.

Q: Okay, well, we’ll pick this up the next time whither in ‘77?

LESSER: Then I went to Rwanda. I went from Belgium to an old ex-Belgian rural country.

FRANK H. PEREZ
Political Advisor, USNATO
Brussels (1974-1977)

Mr. Perez was born in Washington, D.C. in 1924. He received his Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree from George Washington University and served in the US Army from 1943 to 1946. He was posted abroad in Brussels, Geneva, and Ankara.

Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Mr. Perez on February 15, 2006

Q: You were then assigned, I think to...NATO?

PEREZ: Yes.
Q: And you were there from ’74 to ’77. What were you doing in NATO? This would be in Brussels.

PEREZ: I was the Political Advisor on the delegation. That was a job that was held by Jim Goodby when I took over, and before him Larry Eagleburger had held it. The job was to serve on the NATO Senior Political Committee and to work with the various delegations on mutual problems, as well as to run the Mission’s political section.

Q: In other words, you weren’t used as sort of the Nuclear Advisor. This was a much broader scale. This being ’74 to ’77, at that time how did we view the Soviet threat in Europe?

PEREZ: We viewed it as very serious and as a growing threat because of the continuing deployment of nuclear weapons, the growing imbalance in ground forces and that sort of thing in Eastern Europe.

Q: This was before the great crises when the SS-20 was put in?

PEREZ: Right.

Q: That maybe upset the whole mutual policy at that point or at least it was about to.

PEREZ: Yes.

Q: How did you find working with other nationalities in NATO? Was this a different way of working?

PEREZ: Pretty much so, yes. It was very collegial, but then there were problems. For example, when I got there we had the crises over Cyprus involving Greece and Turkey. We had to work with their representatives separately, and we couldn’t deal with them in the normal manner. The French were somewhat of a problem, particularly with regard to such things as Ministerial communiqués.

Q: On the Turkey-Greece thing, I had been in Athens As Consul General. I left in July of ’74 just before all hell let loose, and there was a Greek sponsored coup in Cyprus, and the Turks responded by inserting troops, and here were two NATO countries sort of at loggerheads. How was this resolved in Brussels?

PEREZ: It was solved by a delicate diplomacy working with both sides. They cooperated, I think, as much as one could expect under the circumstances.

Q: There must have been sort of a feeling under the other NATO countries where you were, “Oh, my god! We’ve got to worry about the Soviet Union with so many divisions sitting on [inaudible]”, and you’ve got these two little countries on our flank going to war over a small little island, and it seems more like a tribal dispute or something. That must have been a certain attitude.
PEREZ: Yep, when you had North Atlantic Treaty council meetings, and the Greeks and the Turks went at each other, it wasn’t a very allied thing to do.

Q: You get that. Especially a [inaudible] issue when you deal with those people. It’s hard for us to empathize. You mentioned the French. The French were not on our Military but on the Political side, but in some ways their military had to be kept involved.

PEREZ: Oh, yes, they were. They were involved. They knew what was going on. They were fully involved in all the NATO activities, except the military side, but they were fully aware of what we were doing military-wise.

Q: I image there was quite a bit of really understand that despite what the political masters were saying in Paris and other European capitols, and the French were not in the military side of NATO had sort of military command, military commander, there was quite a bit of cooperation. So it was more a dispute that seemed to...

PEREZ: They had a mission in SHAPE headquarters, so they were fully informed and aware of what was going on militarily. They saw the need for it because of the need for full integration of NATO forces in the event of wartime situations.

Q: As things played out, did you find that the Germans, the Netherlands, Norway and all, Italy, were there disputes or differences between these various countries on what we were going to do in NATO?

PEREZ: No, I didn’t really discern too much difference in views on the various issues that came up before us. The Soviet threat was growing and the allies saw a clear need to work together to confront it.

Q: You weren’t there at the time that the Neutron bomb came up? That came a little later or not?

PEREZ: That became quite an issue. I don’t specifically recall much about it since it was an issue that would be handled by the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The one thing we did was to keep the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear Planning Group fully updated on all these issues. We didn’t want them to feel that we’d left them out of any of these sensitive matters.

Q: I’m looking at the dates, ’74 to ’77, nothing particular was happening on the Soviet side. The Czech invasion was back in ’68, but...

PEREZ: There were no major crises while I was there. One of the areas that I worked on was the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talk that were being conducted in Vienna. In Brussels, at NATO, we put together the Allied policy on MBFR. That was one of the important areas I worked on as head of the Political Section.

Q: Watergate was being played out, the crisis there with President Nixon I think while you were there.
PEREZ: Yes.

Q: Did you see with your colleagues, did that have any impact at all?

PEREZ: It had a direct impact on our mission because Donald Rumsfeld was the Ambassador. President Ford called him back to be his White House Chief of Staff not very long after I arrived in NATO.

Q: Who took his place?

PEREZ: David Bruce, a prince of a man. He was called back from retirement by his friend Henry Kissinger.

Q: He kept being called back from retirement. Poor man! They never let him go.

PEREZ: As soon as he got there, there was the Portugal crisis and I can remember being with him during the wee hours of the morning as the crisis unfolded. We had the Red admiral in charge of Portugal, so this created a lot of problems for the alliance.

Q: Yes. I think it’s one of the major stories. I have Frank Carlucci’s account about what to do with Portugal. While you were there, this was when basically relatively junior officers who were leftist in Portugal had their coup and took over, and the feeling was that... I think Henry Kissinger to all accounts was about to write the Portuguese out of NATO practically, and Carlucci and others were saying, “No. Let’s let this run its course.” Were you getting into the debate?

PEREZ: Not directly. Carlucci came up, and we spent a couple of days with him and Ambassador Bruce. We felt that the best thing to do was to keep Portugal in, but we had the requirement to cut off their access to highly classified materials such as Nuclear Planning Group materials and other sensitive materials.

Q: What was the Portuguese role in NATO at the time? They must have been off to one side at that time.

PEREZ: They didn’t play a major role, no, but they were a full member of the Alliance.

Q: Basic thing was, of course, they had the Azores, I think.

PEREZ: Yes. For us.

Q: How did the other countries look upon Portugal at this time, the other countries in NATO? Were they more supportive of Portugal?

PEREZ: I think they were equally concerned as we were about having a government that was leftist and they worried about the security of the NATO information and the commitment of Portugal to the alliance.
Q: Did you get any feel for how Rumsfeld was as our ambassador to NATO?

PEREZ: Yes, I did. He was very positive, and he felt very confident in his role. He felt that he needed to take a leading role in the key activities in NATO to include both the political and the military. He was highly respected by the people in our mission and well liked by his colleagues on the NAC.

Q: Did you find in NATO that we were working hard not to force our will on NATO? In other words, trying to allow all countries to have their say and not appear that this is just an American instrument. Was this a problem?

PEREZ: That’s always a problem because we had a much larger presence there than all of them, and we had Alexander Haig as NATO Supreme Commander, plus a very active crowd in Washington seeking to push their agenda in NATO. In general I’d say we tried to be even-handed and not to give the impression that we were the bully on the block so to speak. We worked closely with these countries and took into account their concerns as best we could. Obviously we worked the closest with our key allies to develop a consensus that we could then push in the larger arenas.

Q: Was the Mansfield Amendment Proposal on the table at that time, which was to the NATO countries weren’t fulfilling their troop and financial quotas, and we should start withdrawing? Was that an active issue?

PEREZ: I don’t really recall that, but yes our allies always worried about any reduction in the U.S. commitment to defend Europe, both in terms of our troop strengths and the coupling of our nuclear deterrent.

Q: I’m not sure when it came up, but it was sort of to make the European countries live up to their commitments more.

PEREZ: We constantly urged these countries to meet their NATO commitments. Of course, there were annual reviews of each country to determine if it had met its commitment to NATO.

Q: Had any?

PEREZ: In most cases yes. When they hadn’t, NATO would seek a commitment from them to do more.

MARK LORE
Economic/Commercial Officer
Brussels (1974-1978)

Mark Lore was born New York in 1938, and graduated from Bowling Green State
University. He served in the US ARMY from 1961 to 1964 as an overseas captain. His positions include Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Luanda, Rabat, Brussels and Lisbon. Lore was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 26, 1998.

Q: You went then to Brussels. You were in Brussels from when to when?


Q: So I take it, once you were there you adjusted.

LORE: Right.

Q: Or your wife adjusted you.

LORE: Well, I was assigned to the commercial section and did not like it. We had the usual problem of too many people for too little work. Even in the best of times it seems to me that a country like Belgium and the business sector in a country like Belgium can do business fairly easily without having to come to the commercial section of the American Embassy. American businessmen could usually find their way using virtually every multinational you can think of including headhunters and accountants and banks and all the rest that were in Brussels. I felt at the time and continue to feel that big commercial sections in Western Europe are a pretty marginal activity. Moreover, this was a period when the U.S. economy was going through some tough times, exchange rates were out of line and there wasn't a lot of new trade being generated for macroeconomic reasons. So there wasn't a lot to do. After almost a year of that I was asked to come upstairs into the economic section to be the financial reporting officer and I found that a lot more interesting.

Q: On the economic side. Was Belgium... was this almost the premier international economy? Because this is where almost every European corporation seems to have its headquarters.

LORE: The European Community Headquarters were in Brussels. Belgium itself proved to be a very successful place to invest because there was ample land and excellent road and water transportation. Geographically it was situated right between the big markets. Labor was relatively cheap. The northern part of the country boomed with incoming foreign investment particularly from large petrochemical firms and others who really valued those transportation advantages. So Belgium did very well by the European Community. Belgium itself always regarded the Community as a way out of its language problem. The country is an uncomfortable amalgam of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking peoples. The general prosperity that the EC brought helped to sublimate Belgium's ethnic problems -- Belgians could see that supporting some sort of a Belgian national identity was in the interest of stability. So it has been a very lively place for American business and continues to be. In fact, during my time there, we were beginning to see a great deal of reverse investment from large Belgian firms and banks into the United States.

Q: Did your embassy play any role in this reverse investment? Or were these people...they knew what they were doing, they did it?
LORE: No, we didn't play any role. It's kind of tricky for an American embassy to be out actively encouraging people to take their money out of the country and send it to the United States. You know, at that time Europe was entering a period of very low growth, low job creation, heavy hand of the state, state companies, state social insurance schemes which proved tremendously expensive and so European economies were stagnant. In the late 70's, there were already trends in the U.S. leading towards the so-called Reagan revolution. The new focus on deregulation and liberalization of our economy was very attractive to European entrepreneurs who were frustrated by the lack of opportunities within Europe. So the conditions were already present for reverse investment. All the U.S. government had to do was stay out of the way.

Q: Who was your ambassador? I imagine you had several?

LORE: Yes. The ambassador when I arrived was Leonard Firestone. He was one of the Firestone brothers and died a year or so ago. Firestone was obviously a political appointee, but in an embassy like Brussels it doesn't make a lot of difference. Political and commercial channels between the U.S. and Belgium are well established and the Belgians were happy to have somebody who had some clout at the White House. Leonard Firestone was a very courtly gentleman, very courteous with his staff, low key, accessible. It wasn't unusual to go down to the embassy cafeteria at ten o'clock in the morning and see him sitting around drinking a cup of coffee, chatting with his secretary or with somebody from some section of the embassy. He had no pretensions. He let his staff, particularly his DCM who was John Renner, an experienced Foreign Service officer, pretty much run things.

Q: When the Carter administration came in '77 who came out?

LORE: When the Carter administration came in, Anne Cox Chambers who was from the Cox communications empire replaced Firestone.

Q: Based in Atlanta, wasn't it?

LORE: Yes, she was from Ohio. My recollection is that this family and this conglomerate has strong bases both in Atlanta and in Ohio. There was a Cox who was vice president of the United States, from Ohio. She came from the Ohio branch. There was no southern accent, which people often remarked on because they expected to meet an Atlanta belle. She was also a wealthy contributor and supporter of the political party, in this case the Democrats. That's not to say she was in the Firestone class - Leonard Firestone took over the whole Hilton Hotel every Christmas to throw a big party for all the embassy staff. When you talk about the embassy staff in Brussels it's enormous because there is both the normal embassy, a mid-sized embassy accredited to the king, added to an enormous joint administrative section which serves the three missions we have in Brussels - the bilateral embassy, the NATO mission, and the EC mission.

Q: As financial officer what were you particularly looking at and how did you go about it?

LORE: We did some coverage of the Belgian economy, but relatively little. We did some reporting on Belgian trade issues and Belgian trade policy, but again, even at that time the
Belgians were among the first to sublimate their national policies to EC rules. So I dealt much more with my colleagues in the EC mission in trying to understand what Belgium was doing, than with other parts of the embassy. We spent a lot of time working with certain Belgians who had national positions and thus were our property, so to speak, but who were very much involved with the then nascent EC move towards monetary union. We had access to the thinking and plans of these people and to their reporting on meetings that Washington and USIS found very useful even though the issues were essentially non-Belgian. That was a particular opportunity for economic reporting in Brussels at that time. It probably continues to some degree because the Belgians are so well fixed in the EC bureaucracy.

Q: Well, there really are in many ways, you have the feeling that they have the engine that's driving most of this, at least this is where sort of a lot of the apparatus is recruited from and all that.

LORE: Well, their own government doesn't give them a lot of room. It's a small country and a small government. It has relatively few resources to work with, so the most talented people obviously are working the EC agenda. Belgians have no problem with this orientation; the bigger, better, more active, more intrusive, and more powerful the EC apparatus is, the happier the Belgians are because they see themselves more as citizens of Europe than as citizens of an entity called Belgium.

Q: Did you find yourself up against any sort of jurisdiction, rivalry, suspicion or problems? I mean, here you are a financial officer at one of our three embassies in Brussels which I would think would be sort of...particularly the EC. I imagine the NATO one was not a [problem?].

LORE: Yes, my EC mission colleagues down the street, literally just several doors away, were aware of this and with only occasional transgressions, observed the line. I tried to work with them; if I was going to be seeing a Belgian of interest to them, I'd call and offer to ask any questions they had. As long as they could count on my doing that, they pretty much kept their distance. Now, you can never inoculate the process totally and probably shouldn't try to. People would see each other socially, they would meet at various kinds of meetings, they would exchange words, that was okay. What we didn't want, obviously, was to have these Belgian officials sought out by EC mission people on a regular basis. For their part the Belgians also wanted to observe this line, and so they were cooperative in this.

Q: I'm trying to catch sort of how we looked at things at this particular time, we're talking around, in the '75-'78 or so, concerning the development of the EC. Because I would assume, you're an economic officer, you're sitting around with your colleagues who are working with the EC. Others, I mean, you're looking at this thing as it developed. EC has always been sort of the key element in American foreign relations in a way. Somehow getting the Europeans so they don't fight each other. Yet at the same time I would think by this time there might be some growing concern about, "Yes, this is fine, but what's it going to mean for American trade, and are we building up a rival structure that's going to freeze us out?" I was wondering, try to go back to that time and figure out how were we thinking.

LORE: Well, yes, I mean this was a period of growing trade discussion with the EC. The post-
war period was long gone -when the U.S. economy was healthy and dominant while Europe's economies were recovering from the war. The emphasis in those days was all political; the political value of a thriving EC overcame any concerns about rivalry on the commercial side. Well, those days were passing quickly or had passed. There was concern about unfair practices by the EC in commercial matters. Of course these issues concerned my colleagues in the EC mission more than me. We told Washington very frankly that there wasn't much we could do to encourage a Belgian voice for diluting EC disciplines or subsidies. The Belgian government was focused on building a prosperous EC and just would not carry our water in these areas.

Q: This was to make it easier for American goods to enter the market.

LORE: That's right. The Belgians had nothing against American goods but they weren't about to take up the cudgels for U.S. interests in this respect. Their interest was more a harmonious and growing EC in which the interests of France and Germany, particularly, were more important. France, Germany and Holland were Belgium's major trading partners. So it's understandable that while the Belgians were very polite and very helpful, within the constraints of what they could do, they didn't feel they could do much. They didn't have any appetite for adventurism in trying to test EC disciplines in the councils of the EC by arguing for anything different.

Q: Did Ambassador Chambers show much interest in the economic side of things?

LORE: No, I wouldn't say so, no.

Q: Firestone?

LORE: No. He would occasionally call, and one of the charming aspects of the way he operated, he would just call you on the phone, rather than send notes down or anything else. Every once in a while he would ask you to come up and give him a briefing on this or that - for instance when there was a story out about an exchange rate crisis or problems with "the snake," the band of European currencies. He would want to be briefed but his demands were minimal.

Q: How did you find Washington? I assume you were reporting to the Treasury too, but I would suspect that Treasury probably had their own person right there, didn't they?

LORE: Treasury didn't have a person in Brussels. There was a Foreign Service Officer who did the financial stuff out of the EC mission. I worked, as I say, closely to help him on these matters. Treasury's interests in Belgium as such was minimal. Most of the reporting on the larger EC financial picture was out of the EC mission. This was very early in the move towards monetary union so even EC wide, you wouldn't call it a big story.

Q: Were there any events that come to mind outside of sort of the regular reporting work you were doing during this period?

LORE: It was a fairly routine assignment. There were not any major events. You did a lot of carrying of the mail - every time Washington wanted something to come out of the EC. Most of this is economic in nature. So we'd get cables before council meetings. before a chiefs of state
meeting of the EC, or before various kinds of subcommittee meetings. There was always some sort of meeting going on in the EC. The U.S. wanted to achieve certain things so it would send out these shotgun messages to every capital in the EC asking us to go in and make a representation. I found that I spent inordinate amount of time, as I did later in Portugal when it joined the EC, carrying these messages. One can argue about how effective all this effort is, given the amount of manpower that goes into it.

Q: When you carried the messages what did you get? Sort of play, well this is it or (inaudible)?

LORE: Yes, you didn't get much reaction because again, the Belgians with very few exceptions were not willing to take a stand against the Germans and the French. Now, where the Germans and French differed, they had to pick sides, but in most cases that wasn't very useful for the United States.

Q: Did you get any feel for the German and French missions to the EC while you were there, particularly on the economic side?

LORE: No. I had no contact to speak of with other embassies. The nature of the work didn't require it. Occasionally you'd meet people socially. Interestingly enough there was a side activity that I think of often these days. It was called the tripartite gold commission. This was a commission created at the end of the Second World War to adjudicate the claims of various countries in Europe who had had their holdings of gold raided by the Nazis. This was a large operation in its day, set up in Brussels for reasons that I've forgotten now. It was a regular commission with people assigned to it from capitals who had full-time jobs operating it.

Over the years the activity dwindled down to become a residual activity by embassy officers from the French, British, and American embassies. The commission's secretary general, by the time I arrived, was an elderly gentleman in his 80s. He is long dead now. He had started off as a relatively young man in the mail room, but over the years had become the commission's font of institutional knowledge. During my time, the British Embassy had given him a back room, he had some files and we had occasional meetings to discuss the commission's last remaining cases. We embassy officers would, in sort of Peter Ustinov style, play our national identities. We would talk about the dispersal of the last remaining parcels of gold - some of which didn't get released for one reason or another, and may not be released to this day. The Tripartite Commission sometime later on was disbanded and left to capitals. Probably some of it is now bound up in the current controversy over money and other asset claims from World War II.

ARTHUR JOSEPH OLSEN
Political Counselor

Born in Oregon in 1920, Mr. Olsen received his BA from the University of Santa Clara and his MS from Columbia University. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942 to 1946 as an overseas captain. His positions upon entering the
Foreign Service in 1966 included Stockholm and Brussels. He was interviewed by Tom Dunnigan on February 24, 1997.

Q: Were you there when Ambassador Strausz-Hupé came? Tell us a little bit about that and how that worked out.

OLSEN: Okay. That was when the ice broke and Henry... decided they were going to have an ambassador here. Strausz-Hupé then was the ambassador of Belgium, so they chose him to be the man who would open things up. I went down to Brussels to sort of brief him on the situation and how things were going and so forth. Then I returned, and he brought with him his DCM.

Okay, that's the end of my tour in Sweden. And, curiously, it was a kind of a trade-off, so to speak, because I was sent down to Brussels to be the political counselor there.

Q: Was that an assignment you asked for?

OLSEN: There were some options they offered me, and I thought that was a better one.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you arrived there?

OLSEN: Leonard Firestone. He arrived almost identically with me, and with our new DCM there.

Q: Who was the DCM, by the way?

OLSEN: John Renner.

Q: John Renner, oh yes. Well, what were the issues that you faced when you got there as political counselor in Brussels?

OLSEN: We didn't have any serious issues. We had a big problem about organizing the embassy, because there were some real problems with the administrative section, the people who had been there. They brought in a new admin. counselor, and there was a kind of a housecleaning.

Q: So everybody was new in the top echelons of the embassy.

OLSEN: That's right, including most of my staff as the political counselor. Two of them arrived at the same time I did, and the one who was there left about the same time. Anyhow, we had... in those days, but, as you pointed out, we didn't have any really significant...

Q: Bilateral relations.

OLSEN: Bilateral problems at all.

Q: I wanted to ask you what were the complications of having three American missions in one city -- the Common Market, NATO, and the embassy?
OLSEN: Well, you know, the embassy was number one in the pecking order. I think NATO was probably looked upon as number two, and the EC ambassador was number three.

We did have a little problem about who was in charge of making big decisions. For example, we would get a major visitor from the State Department.

Q: Or a senator.

OLSEN: Or a senator or something like that. And the embassy was the one that took charge of these kinds of things. Actually, we never had any serious difficulties, but we did have to...

Q: Coerce.

OLSEN: Kind of negotiate with...

Q: Well, and it also depended upon the chiefs of mission in each one, too. Some are a little more sensitive than others about these matters. Speak a little bit about the corrosiveness of the language problem in Belgium, and how that affected things that you did and what was going on.

OLSEN: Almost all Belgians were able to speak English, particularly the Flemish, because, for them, that was more important... Flemish... And they didn't much like to speak French, but some of them had to do so. Now, on the French side, the Walloons, they are kind of like the French, they like to speak French. You know, I was about a Class III French-speaker, which means you could carry on an ordinary conversation, but you can't really negotiate big business. So I had some contact with the French side of the game. But I had one political officer, Andre Havez, who was brought up speaking French, and so he was a really first-hand French-speaker in the embassy. The others were like myself, or maybe a little better than that... French. But I can also say that most of the people that I dealt with at the high levels tended to be good English-speaking types. So that's the way things worked.

Q: Yes. Did military sales take much of your time?

OLSEN: Oh, yes, particularly during the whole period of time they were selling the F-16s. John Renner took that to be his own problem. There was an awful lot of going back and forth. The MAG people were there, working hard on the job. It took an awful lot of time up for the embassy to carry on these negotiations.

Q: Meanwhile, the Belgians are keeping an eye on what the Dutch were doing, I know, and vice versa, so that they went in that together.

OLSEN: Exactly.

Q: Were you there when the Lockheed scandal broke? Do you remember, there was... Certainly, in Holland, Prince Bernhard was taking money. And I gather, in Belgium, there was somewhat the same situation.
OLSEN: Not exactly, no. At least not when I was there.

Q: Did you have to deal any with Belgium's colonial problems?

OLSEN: A little bit. Mobutu had a residence in Brussels, and he spent some time there. The Belgian Foreign Ministry had a major officer whose whole job was to deal with the Belgian situation. And I was also was in a relation with him. I never met Mobutu. I met some of his henchmen. So, yes, there was some back and forth, particularly regarding the misuse of funds and that kind of thing. We were instrumental in finding a German specialist in financial affairs, who was invited to go down there and look over the books and see if he could straighten things out. He was down there for about six months or a year. He came back and said, "You can't do anything with this crowd. There is no way in which you can balance the books or anything like that." So he resigned.

Q: We're talking about a period 20 years ago, and I gather things haven't changed that much in that regards.

OLSEN: I think you're quite right.

Q: During the course of your tour, you moved up to become DCM in Brussels. How did this happen? Tell me a little about that.

OLSEN: It was getting toward the end of my three-year tour, and I was about to be relieved. The new ambassador succeeding Len Firestone was a lady ambassador.

Q: Mrs. Chambers.

OLSEN: She did not get on well with John Renner. He made some mistakes in terms of handling...

Q: I've always thought, Art, to interpose, it isn't the ambassador's duty to get along with the DCM, it's rather the reverse. Excuse me for interpolating.

OLSEN: Do you want me to talk...

Q: Of course.

OLSEN: Well, she flew into Paris, and then she was going to stay there for a day or so, and then come in by train...

Q: Good idea.

OLSEN: To Brussels. There was the annual, or biannual, air show going on at that time.

OLSEN: Renner was acting chargé at that time, because Firestone had left, and she hadn't quite arrived yet. And so he went down there to represent the United States at the air show. He was very, very pleased to be doing that. He didn't tell Mrs. Chambers anything about it.

Q: And she was in Paris at the time?

OLSEN: That's right. She arrived in Paris when he was down there, and he didn't bother to get in touch with her. So she took the train up. And so I mobilized the whole embassy. We all got...

Q: Go down and meet her at the station, yes.

OLSEN: At the station, we all were standing there, 10 people in a row, to greet her. But Renner was not there. So I rose to the occasion and escorted her into the embassy, and had her meet the staff who were there, and got things organized a little bit. So she settled in. Renner showed up about two days later, I guess, when the air show was over with. When she found out that she had been bypassed, she didn't like that at all. Furthermore, as time went by, a very short period of time, he was managing the embassy before she got there. And he realized that she was not an experienced diplomat, so he thought, well, I'll continue to run the embassy, and she can do as she wishes...

Q: As long as she agrees, that's fine.

OLSEN: Yes, well, she didn't like the idea that he was going to run the store. I was having a farewell party; I was going to be leaving. It was an evening party, and I got a phone call about 10 o'clock, from her, and she said, "You are my new DCM."

Q: I haven't had a drink, have I? Well, bowl me over.

OLSEN: It really did, because here I am, saying farewell. There was a kind of an embarrassment, I must say. Anyhow, she got rid of Renner, to put it in a hard way.

Q: It's not surprising. Art, you've had two non-career ambassadors you worked for in Brussels, Leonard Firestone and Anne Cox Chambers. Discuss how effective they were, and contrast them, and their relation to the Belgians, and what they were sent there to do.

OLSEN: Leonard Firestone knew that he was not an experienced diplomat, and he relied heavily upon Renner and myself, in particular, to help him... He was pleased to see that we were carrying him along and making sure that he was out in front at all times. He dismissed a couple of people that he thought were not up to it. One of them was the military attaché. I guess he just didn't take a liking to him; I'm not sure why. He wasn't doing any harm. Anyhow, Firestone was a pleasant, friendly fellow, who was ready to talk to the Belgian people and officials and people like that, particularly those who could speak English. So we got along quite well.

Q: So he'd meet with the prime minister and foreign minister and people like this.
OLSEN: Yes, he could get along with people. He was a cordial gentleman, so there weren't any real problems at all.

Anne Chambers was a little different. She wanted to be seen as the boss, and she made sure that the admin. counselor and the econ. counselor and myself, particularly, her...

Q: *Her team, in other words.*

OLSEN: Her team were just kind of holding her up. So she was very active and... things like bringing in her friends from Atlanta and that kind of stuff. And she had some rather dubious friends, dubious from our point of view, friends who were around the embassy. One of them I ... can't stay here any longer. He wasn't cleared for any classified stuff or anything like that, so we didn't want him around at all.

Q: *Did she accept that?*

OLSEN: She accepted it. I tried to explain to her that you really can't... a person like that. She understood that.

Q: *She had a journalistic background, hadn't she?*

OLSEN: Oh, she was a Cox.

Q: *Of an Atlanta newspaper chain there, the Cox newspaper. Had she been active in journalism herself, or only on the owner's side?*

OLSEN: She was... the owner, but she was also kind of a hands-on owner, because she inherited this Cox Communications, which is a huge... position. She was a millionaire, I would say.

Q: *I guess my question was, did she take a particular interest in what USIS was doing and our public relations aspect there?*

OLSEN: To some extent, the answer is yes. The cultural counselor, for example, kind of stepped forward and kind of led her around in the cultural world. So she did pretty well on that. She was not terribly interested in making friends with people at the Foreign Office, for example. I can think of one or two who she kind of struck a friendship with... But, by and large, in things like the big negotiating on the F-16, that kind of stuff, she didn't want a hand in that in that. But she was watching what was going on.

Q: *She wanted to know what you were doing. Did she go around the country making a speeches, or was she asked to?*

OLSEN: She was asked to, but she couldn't do it in French. In Public Affairs, she was a constant... and told that she had French, and so he came by and spoke to her in French. And we found out that she was pretty weak in French. She had learned it 23 years ago, and didn't have much. And so he said to somebody, which she overheard had been... to her, that she was not
useful as a French speaker at all. She didn't like that one bit. And so it didn't take very long for her to say, on your way. She threw him out.

Q: Things were taken personally there.

OLSEN: That's right. She was used to running a big store, and she was not up to being maltreated. So, anyhow, I stayed... for most of my three-year tour as the...

Q: In 1978, President Carter paid a visit to Belgium.

OLSEN: Yes, he did.

Q: Can you say something about that?

OLSEN: Yes. President Carter had an entourage who were basically not very experienced in traveling abroad, but he brought him with him anyhow. And there were a few interesting contretemps. He went first to France, and he went out to the Normandy area. This was in January, I think, when he made this tour. He went out there with Giscard D'Estaing. Giscard knew it was cold, so he had a heavy coat on. Carter was there just in a suit, and he was freezing. The next stop was Belgium, and he was greeted at the airport. By then, the weather had changed quite a bit. But he wasn't about to make any more mistakes, so he was there with a heavy coat, and everybody else was... That was a kind of a curious thing.

Anyhow, I had two experiences. One was Nixon's last trip before he got brought down. He was just traveling around Europe.

Q: This was Nixon coming to Brussels, I guess.

OLSEN: That's right.

Q: On that famous last tour he made.

OLSEN: That's right.

Q: In '74.

OLSEN: That's right. And so I was one of those who was standing in the line, so to speak, greeting him and sort of escorting him and Kissinger... The ambassador at that time, I guess, was still Firestone. So Firestone was to be his... I remember the new ambassadors to NATO and EC were a little bit burned when they weren't up in the top row of anything that was going on. Anyhow, Nixon was just going by, I think. Then the Carter came in... Mrs. Carter, Rosalynn, she wanted to do a number of things. And so... was interested to be her escort through all of this... Brussels... one thing or another, I forget all... Anyhow, she had more to do with the royal family than I did it.

Q: It often happened that way.
OLSEN: Anyhow, Carter handled himself quite well.

Q: Well, he was a friend of Mrs. Chambers, anyhow, I gather.

OLSEN: That's right.

Q: So that helped him.

OLSEN: Exactly.

Q: Well, during your period there, the Belgian prime minister kept coming and going, I gather, as a result of the language problem, basically.

OLSEN: Yes. During the time that I was the political counselor, I made friends with Martens and with Tindemans. Both of them at that time were rising politicians, but not yet prime ministers. Martens was the head of the Christian Democratic Party, and Tindemans was also in that party, and he was the first one to come up as the prime minister. Even before he was prime minister, he and I would go to have lunch every once in a while. He was much interested in the United States, what were we doing and how he felt about things, and how they felt, and how we felt about Brussels. Anyhow, we had pretty good friendly relationships. A similar good relationship with Martens, who obviously was an ambitious leader, and, as it turned out, later on, he became prime minister for a long period of time. So those two were, you might say, my good friends from the point of view of establishing relationships with people encountered.

Q: Yes, I think you did very well in that regard. You picked two out of the three prime ministers while you were there as good friends. Apparently, they had no problems with the U.S.-Belgian relationship.

OLSEN: Never very serious ones at that time.

Q: While you were there, I gather, toward the end of your tour, the Belgians approved what they called regional autonomy, which really sets in concrete what everyone knows had been going on for years, I guess, that there are a couple of regions there.

OLSEN: That's right.

Q: Could you say anything about that.

OLSEN: Well, that wasn't achieved by the time that I left. But I knew what they were working toward. To this day, they haven't really resolved this question. Things were tilting in favor of the Flemings, because that's where all the big industry was, and the demographics were heavily on the side of the Flemish. And so the even balance that they've been working on for all these years, with Brussels city being the biggest problem about how do you separate..., the balance of power was switching towards the Flemish. And to this day, I think that's still the case. I don't know how that will come to an end.
Q: That's what I wanted to ask you. I guess my last question is what do you see for Belgium's future? I mean, will it be saved by being folded into Europe? Or will it eventually be torn apart on the language problems?

OLSEN: I don't think it will ever be torn apart. They created Belgium out of old duchies and that sort of thing, and it's hung together for 100 years or more.

Q: Yes, since 1830. So it's been quite a while.

OLSEN: That's right. So I don't see that Belgium is ever going to collapse. And their relationship with the other two countries, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, will remain a triumvirate.

Q: Benelux is going to stay.

OLSEN: Benelux is going to stay. I don't see it collapsing, particularly if Europe becomes EC, so all over. Benelux will just fit nicely in..., which probably will somewhat ease the tensions between the Walloons and the Flemings.

Q: Well, those were six exciting and interesting years you had in Belgium.

OLSEN: That's right.

DOROTHY M. SAMPAS
Administrative Officer
Brussels (1975-1979)

Ambassador Sampas was born in Washington, D.C. in 1933 and received her BA from the University of Michigan and her PhD from Georgetown University. She entered the Foreign Service in 1957 and was posted in Hamburg, Paris, Keflavik, Ottawa, Beijing and Brussels, and later became the Ambassador to Mauritania. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 27, 1998

SAMPAS: Let's see, it was '64 to '66.

Q: It's in that period. You were sort of going your own way, which in a way kept you, by doing your research and all - were you able to pick up the French view of how at least the people you were dealing with looked upon the United States at that time?

SAMPAS: Yes, I had a friend from my school days in Paris who was there at the time, and she was in the Foreign Ministry. And once in a while we were able to get together and talk about it, but I had sensed for quite some time that there was an echelon of French society people that really still looked upon Americans like backwoods people - and others who appreciated some of the developments that we had made, but still didn’t think of us as a highly civilized people. But
then, of course, came the moment when De Gaulle forced NATO out. I think it was hard for Americans really quite to believe that he was doing that. I guess we thought that the NATO establishments in France hired enough people and inserted enough cash into the French economy that we were worth something. Well, much to our surprise, NATO went, and the French, of course, got along very well without us. They hadn't needed our cash, they hadn't needed the bases, and Brussels, I think, was happy, by and large, to have these people. But the embassy in Brussels was certainly not prepared to take the enormous inundation of NATO people. They just weren't prepared for it.

Q: And you came back into the Foreign Service in '73, so what happened? How did this work out?

SAMPAS: While I was working in Washington, my career activities were completely separate from those of my husband. I was in one bureau; he in another. The only time we needed to coordinate was early in 1975 when we needed to bid on overseas jobs. Jobs in Brussels worked out well for both of us - he at NATO, I at the embassy.

Q: In Brussels, are you talking about '74-75, something like that? I don't have to be right on the button. I just want to sort of in general get an idea. But in the mid-'70s you went off to Brussels?

SAMPAS: Yes, yes, 1975.

Q: And then what happened? By that time were they able to accommodate you all?

SAMPAS: Yes, we were both well accommodated. I went to work in the Joint Administrative Section, which was most closely affiliated with the embassy, the bilateral embassy. Up the street a couple of blocks was USEC, our mission to the European Community, and then there was NATO. My husband was out working at NATO. So we were both busy in the same city, but our professional paths didn't really ever cross. So there was no thought of favoritism on either side. Somebody had asked for me - the head of the administrative section, Bob Gershenson, another one of our genius administrators.

Q: Oh, yes.

SAMPAS: And he asked for me, and I was happy to go work for him. So I did. I went into housing, became the housing officer for the three missions in Brussels. They were still suffering from the influx of NATO years before.

Q: It's a small country, and a hell of a lot of people arrived, but relatively affluent.

SAMPAS: Yes, Belgium is relatively affluent. A number of people have made their living renting out houses or space, and they have some of the strictest rules in the world as to the control of that space, quite apart from what you can get away with in the United States when you rent space. Before a tenant moves in, an expert will measure every scratch on the wall, every spill on the rug, everything that is the slightest damage. When the tenant moves out, the differences (i.e., additional stains and scratches) are measured, and the tenant pays for all those.
There is virtually no concept of “wear and tear.” A coat of paint is supposed to last for nine years; a rug for 20. And, of course, Americans are by no means accustomed to that. We repaint on a moment's notice. But anyway, a number of Americans were getting hurt in the housing market, and we tried to apprise them of the dangers of renting so that they'd be aware before they moved into a place of what they'd be held accountable for.

Q: Were you, what, under the - although it was joint - you were part of the bilateral embassy - I mean, is that where your line of control went?

SAMPAS: Yes. It was joint in that we had responsibility for all three missions, but upwards, our responsibility was to the bilateral ambassador.

Q: What was your impression - because sometimes dealing in the housing area you catch an awful lot of the strife that goes on in this - how did these three missions - one to the European Community, one to Belgium, and one to NATO - how did they get along?

SAMPAS: Well, there was always a good deal of jealousy between them, and the people out at NATO were the furthest away, and they felt that they were the most neglected. Actually, which mission you came from didn't make the slightest difference in housing. You got the same treatment. You looked at the apartments that were of the right size for your family. You looked at all of those immediately available; you chose one; you were assigned to that one; end of report. But just the distance added to the psychology of neglect that the NATO felt. And I suppose that another part of the problem was that NATO was in a newer area, and they did not have all of the apartments for rent right close by that you had in the older parts of the city. So people never got quite as close.

Q: You were there, what, until towards the end of the '70s or so?

SAMPAS: Yes, that's right, 1975-1979. We left in '79.

ANNE O. CARY
Economic/Political Officer, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1976-1978)

Anne O. Cary was born in Washington, DC in September of 1952. She received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Wisconsin and entered the Foreign Service in 1974. Her career included positions in Brussels, Port-au-Prince, Paris, Addis Abba, New Delhi, Casablanca, and Washington, DC. Ms. Cary was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 30, 1995.

CARY: I went to Brussels and to the US Mission to the European Community. Deane Hinton had been named ambassador and I had always been interested in the European Community as a concept. So, when he was named, I asked if I could go. After some haggling Personnel created a rotational position at my level. USEC is a unique mission with only economic and political
sections, no admin or consular sections. I got an opportunity to work in both. I did three months in the consular section in the Embassy at because junior officers were required to do some consular work. I left for Brussels in July, 1976.

Q: You were there from when to when?

CARY: From July, 1976 to August 1978, two years.

Q: You saw Deane Hinton both in the Under Secretary’s Office and in Brussels. He became later a Career Ambassador and was a trouble shooter all over the place and one of the stellars of the Foreign Service of this era. How did he operate and what was your impression of him?

CARY: He is a very direct person and you either liked him or you didn’t. He was very smart. Smart, rather than intelligent. He had very good sense of what was going on and could size up the situation quickly. He did not put up with any nonsense. If he said something he didn’t spend an awful lot of time explaining it or expounding it. He said it and if somebody asked why he said it, he would present his arguments. He was very much a rough type of a personality. He wore cowboy boots and smoked cigars and would put his feet up on the desk and drop ashes all over the place. He would yell at people in front of other people, which I don’t think is a good management approach. But he would apologize as well, publicly if he had made a mistake.

He took my small cubbyhole of an office when he came into Robinson’s office but in USEC he had a beautiful suite and a gorgeous house. He dealt well with the Europeans. We have an adversarial relationship in dealing with the Commission.

Q: This is the European Commission which was still in its formative years, would you say?

CARY: Well, this was during what most would call Eurosclerosis. The Commission was not doing anything, not managing to move things forward. The European economies were all stagnant. Whereas the United States traditionally has been a great advocate of European integration, most Europeans were not. You would see efforts to do things in the European Commission that were undercut by other member states. We used it minimally, but it was the trade negotiating entity for negotiating the Tokyo Rounds. So trade issues were the main concern that we had. They had just started the idea of political cooperation but it there was no reason for us to deal with the Europeans on any political issues through the Commission.

Q: Essentially the political side was taken care of by the various embassies and the issues were basically trade.

CARY: Yes, trade. We had automobiles, chilled chickens, and brandy wars. Bob Strauss was Special Trade Representative at that point and he would come through very frequently to discuss various issues with the Europeans almost always of a negative nature. I remember once he had just come back from negotiating a car agreement, a restrictive agreement, with the Japanese and the Europeans had wanted to get one and couldn’t. He more or less rubbed their noses in it publicly. The Europeans at that point were feeling very much that they were second class and with Japan building up they felt maybe they would be third class in the future. They were trying
to do things, Stevie D'Avignon, Belgian Commissioner for Industry, was one of the closest collaborators who we worked with on a regular basis.

Then you got involved with the German Commissioner, and his mistresses and it was really just a different world.

Q: What type of work were you doing?

CARY: As a rotational officer I spent six months in the economic section and six months in political. So in the political section I did an in depth report on the European Court of Justice, which is a separate branch of the European Community sitting in Luxembourg. It was more or less an academic exercise. However, the court is important as it has been, as the Supreme Court has moved US policy further along than perhaps any other entity.

Q: In other words we were looking at the European Court as saying if we have a problem here we are going to take it up to the highest law of the Community and we being a legalistic country feel we could do something.

CARY: Yes, there is very little you can do if you are not a member state to bring a case before the court. The Court was used very effectively to make progress on the social front. Workers’ rights, in which the court set the policy that has to be followed in all the member states and at that point there were nine members.

Q: What was our interests with workers’ rights?

CARY: We thought the Europeans went too far. The Europeans had legislated more vacation, maternity leave, paid leave, etc. Also there was the question of the ability to have more say in management which was one of the things they were talking about then, the workers’ council idea which would allow the workers to have somebody on the board. It took the European Community a long time to do anything, so you usually had the ability to put some input into it.

Q: Why would we care?

CARY: Because American workers would say that the European workers had such and such and since they are our main competitors you can’t say we would be at a disadvantage if we did that.

Q: We always had this dual policy of wanting them to do well for our own security, to mainly keep the Germans and French from going to war, and that this was very nice but we are going to price ourselves out of the markets.

CARY: The workers’ situation was one small part, the real issue was the trade, their regulations kept us out of markets and it was a time when people were just beginning to get in. So, agricultural products were a major issue for us because they were not covered under the GATT. They had to deal with agriculture on a case by case basis and most of our great issues were access for US products. That really was what we spent most of our time on. Cranberries and blueberries were an issue. Cranberries and blueberries are not grown in Europe but they grow
arielle and myrtilles which are little berries, one red and one blue, so the Europeans argued
indeed they did have cranberries and blueberries because these are red and blue berries that grow
on bushes. So they would put a tariff on imports. We kept arguing that they were not the same
and finally won so today cranberries and blueberries can go into the European market duty free.

Q: As I recall it, soybeans were not a European product until all of a sudden they started using it
as a way to use up surplus land or something.

CARY: A lot of people will say that we really caused the problem because we cut off the sale to
Europe in the ‘60s ...it is used as soymeal for animals. Europe started growing soybeans and
paying farmers a subsidy and introduced the variable levy based on the community price vs
world price. It was a major market displacement for US soybean growers. Later the EC started
exporting. The US and Brazil were the real soybean exporters of the world and we took real
exception and have been fighting on soybeans ever since.

Q: What was the mood of the mission towards the various big nations?

CARY: The French were a pain in the neck. The French Mission was in the same building that
we were and there was remarkably little interaction. With the Brits we always had a very good
relationship. This was again when the Commission was dominated by the French language which
has changed over time as more and more people prefer to speak English than French. But in 1977
you had the Brits, with whom we traditionally had good relations. The Italians were a joke as
were the Germans. Their philosophies seemed to be to name politicians who were in trouble or a
liability at home to the EC. So their commissioners were always people who for one reason or
other were not wanted in Bonn or Rome. Consequently, they were not as powerful. Again at this
period the Germans were really being rather soft, not trying to make a ruckus or flex their
muscles in any respect. They would always hid behind the French. You knew that the French
position was not always disadvantageous to the Germans but they always blamed unfavorable
Community action on the French.

Q: The Germans as well as the Brits have a highly subsidized agricultural side.

CARY: There was no majority voting at all. Everything was done by consensus. The French
were more than happy to stand up and say no. It didn’t bother them in the least.

Q: I would think Deane Hinton would have problems dealing with a French technocrat.

CARY: He did all right with the French. Each country had both an embassy and a mission to the
Commission. The Commission was run politically like the UN. You balance exactly by grade
who is doing what and have to have the same number of people at the director level and that sort
of thing down to the staff. Every document had to be translated into all official language...one
third of the EC budget was for translation of documents. This was ridiculous because really there
were two working languages, English and French. The Italians tended to prefer French, the
Germans, English. I can remember a dinner party for most of the Commission and some of the
people from NATO...that was the other thing, in Brussels you had three US ambassadors,
NATO, Bilateral Mission to Belgium and USEC, so it was an interesting way of relating one
thing to the other...I remember going to a black tie dinner party for most of the Commission when Mrs. Hinton stood up and said, as they were passing out the cigars, “Ladies shall we go.” I wasn’t sure what to do, I was there working, not as a spouse, so I stayed with the men, which was perfectly fine. Hinton offered me a cigar, which I turned down, but I did take the brandy. That was really the last time I can remember a dinner with the ladies formally withdrawing to a separate room.

A quirky thing about language was when the mission hosted the premier of “Stars War”. We invited all of the Commission and needed a subtitled version. The question of what language for the subtitles arose. But we ended up with the French subtitle version. The Europeans really didn’t appreciate the movie, and seemed bewildered when the Americans responded with cheers, and laughter.

Q: How about the Netherlands and Belgium in this mélange?

CARY: The Belgians were very good, as a matter of fact. They tended to send their best people to the Commission so they had a more important role than their size would indicate. Clearly they felt that their future really was in making the European Community work and you could see that in the people. There was not the huge negative feeling towards the Commission. The fact that the Commission was in Brussels hiked the prices up tremendously for apartments, parking, food. It was also interesting because the language differences between French and Flemish were very strong. There were riots and whatnot. The Commission helped put things in English. Rather than have everything put into two languages, it was a lot easier to use English, because if they used French they would have to put it in Flemish too. Putting things in English was a much better way.

Q: What about the Netherlands?

CARY: The Dutch sent very competent people. I can’t remember any major problem that we had with the Dutch. They were for more open markets.

Q: Were you getting the feeling that the British were really in this thing yet?

CARY: No, they, again, seemed still to be of two minds. They had only been in six years or something and Community membership remained a political hot point. A lot of the Brits who were seconded to the Commission never went back. The Commission paid very well with lots of benefits, better than they could get working for the British government. So, you didn’t have the back and forth between the top levels of government and Brussels that you need for it to work well. It has started now. But back then you had people who were just there. The people from the Mission were real diplomats and would go in and out, like any other posting.

The journalists were another part of the equation. The local “Economist” staff, the British weekly, were the best if you wanted to know what was going on in the EC. It was one of two relied upon sources, the other was a little pink sheet that came out every day which everybody read religiously and that told you what the issues were of the day and who was doing what.
Q: You left there in 1978. What was your feeling whither the US to the European Community and whither the European Community?

CARY: I am a Europeanist. I felt it was the only way to go. Protectionism among member states was striking, but you could see that people were beginning to realize that that it couldn't continue. Unemployment was a problem and you can’t continue to be protectionist when you can see clearly that you can get some more jobs if you allow some more trade.

I didn’t see that political integration was going to happen. The monetary union, yes, because you can’t have a totally integrated economic community without monetary unity. But political unity, no, the European interests were conflicting. There were NATO and non-NATO interests, special relationships with Russia, with the Arabs, and the developing world.

Q: Did you ever get the feeling that your Mission was looked upon with a certain amount of suspicion back in the Department or Washington?

CARY: No, because I think what we were doing was so clearly in the US interest. On the political side there simply wasn't much. A group from Congress maintained loose contact with a group from the European Parliament. The European Parliament was going to have direct elections the whole time I was there and never had them. So, that part was not a threat to anybody. The Mission and USTR worked very well together and Commerce as well. Treasury just regularly dismissed the European Community until recently...The relationship between the OECD and the European Community was an interesting one. There were a lot of things we were doing within the OECD to try to work with the Europeans at the time.

JOHN O. GRIMES
Labor/Political Officer
Brussels (1976-1978)

Mr. Grimes was born and raised in Alabama and educated at Notre Dame University. After service in the United States Marine Corp he joined the State Department and served as Diplomatic Courier until being commissioned as a Foreign Service Officer in 1962. A specialist in Labor Affairs, Mr. Grimes served in Glasgow, Valetta, Port of Spain, Kinshasa, Brussels, Tunis and Paris (twice). He had several tours of duty in Washington, DC and a year of Labor Studies at Harvard University. Mr. Grimes was interviewed by James F. Shea and Don Kienzle in 1996.

Kienzle: What about in Belgium?

GRIMES: In Belgium, there was a constant conflict between the Christian, or Catholics, really, and the socialist unions. The society was divided really four ways. You had socialists and Catholics, and then you had Flemings and Walloons. So, on either side, socialist or Catholic, you had a Flemish contingent and a Walloon contingent. You talk about a mess, that really was.
Kienzle: Was there much coordination across the ethnic divides?

GRIMES: No, great animosity all the time. There were parts of Belgium that were trying to pull out of the Flemish-dominated area, and come back down to the Walloon areas, that is administratively, within government. That was a constant source of contention. On specific labor issues, I remember one thing that both impressed and depressed me. In Belgium their welfare setup, I had never seen any country that was so profligate, I guess is the word for it, in their welfare payments. You know, a kid getting out of high school there, what is he, 18 or something like that? Part of his briefing as he leaves school is how to apply for unemployment compensation. He’s never been in the workforce, but he’s told, “Here is what you do; you go down and get on the rolls, and once on the rolls, you can stay there forever.” I mean, that was literally true.

Kienzle: There was no cap or time?

GRIMES: No cap or time; it was just “Big Daddy.” I couldn't believe it.

Kienzle: How about the labor federations; were there four labor federations; were there two or how...

GRIMES: There were quite a few. The Christian one, what do you call it? I forget the name, they had a Dutch designation and a French designation, but anyway there was a Christian confederation. Damn, I can't remember his name … I do remember the man who headed the socialists and that was Georges DeBrun.

Kienzle: He was a Walloon?

GRIMES: No, he was a Fleming believe it or not, but he spoke French and Dutch and English. He seemed to personify the bridge between the two in his group. There were technically only the two groups. Within the socialists and within the Christians there were Walloon and Fleming. They had different designations for the name in Flemish and in French. They were very peculiar about language. If you met a trade union leader from the Flemish area, although he might speak French and not very good English, he wouldn't speak French with you, and he wouldn't want you to speak French. You had to speak English to him although there may be some problem in communicating.

Kienzle: Did you learn any Dutch?

GRIMES: No. I tried, but I just wasn't there long enough to do it. Actually, I guess, it wasn't that necessary because most Flemings can speak English. As a matter of fact, the embassy in communicating with the Foreign Office did all our notes in English, which seems strange, but it did keep us out of trouble with either the Flemings or the Walloons.

Kienzle: Any issues in Belgium that come to mind?
GRIMES: I wish I could remember, but it has been so long ago, I'm afraid I can't.

Shea: How about did you deal with the ICFTU.

GRIMES: You know, we had a labor attaché from the EC as they called it, the European Community, that was … what was his name … I wish I could remember these things. He is married to an oriental girl. Bob Sensor! A very nice guy and terrific man to work with there. On issues, we didn't have anything really to do with one another because he was following the community and I was just watching the local movement.

Kienzle: So the division of labor was very clear and there was no problem of overlapping jurisdictions or coordination.

GRIMES: No, nothing like that. His predecessor there, I can't remember his name, was Irish … John Daugherty … I think he is the one, bless him, that recommended that the Netherlands be covered from ____________. That is the only real bone I had to pick with the EC.

Kienzle: Was that practical?

GRIMES: Very impractical. If they had relieved me of the internal political responsibilities, that would have been fine, but there just wasn't enough time to do that. I asked the Embassy, I said, “I am picking up labor, I can't do the internal political.” They countered, “You have to.” So, well I did, but my successor there … I can't remember his name, a black fellow …

Kienzle: Wilbur Wright.

GRIMES: Wright, yes, he just covered labor in the two places, and they somehow absorbed the internal political. I guess somehow, because the political counselor didn't do a damned thing. He just read; he wasn't really producing anything. Maybe they put him to work.

Kienzle: What was the Embassy's attitude toward labor issues?

GRIMES: They seemed to think that labor … well, they weren't very interested in it, really. They were more interested in having the political parties covered. So I used to do a lot of traveling around to interview people on the political side of things, Jean Gauld, and people like that.

Kienzle: Were the trade union federations tied-in with specific parties?

GRIMES: Yeah, the socialists were connected with the Belgian socialist party, and the Catholics, with the conservative wing. I can't really think of anything.

Shea: Was the ambassador a political appointee?

GRIMES: Yes, the ambassador was a political appointee, a woman by the name of Cox Chambers. She was a friend of President Carter, and he appointed her.
**Kienzle:** So you were there then for three years, 1976-78?

**GRIMES:** That's right.

**Shea:** What about the standard of living of the people there?

**GRIMES:** They were well-off. People who weren't well-off from their work, were well-off because of the government. The welfare program that I was trying to describe earlier was just fabulously, fabulously generous. They did have unemployment, but it didn't bite the way unemployment here might.

**Kienzle:** The safety net worked in other words.

**GRIMES:** That's right. It worked almost too well, because a lot of them didn't bother to look for work. They could receive their unemployment checks while on holiday down in Tunisia, or wherever they went for the sun, you know.

**Kienzle:** Were there a bunch of rampant government budget deficits as a result of the generous welfare payments?

**GRIMES:** I don't remember that. They must have been able to make ends meet, but I know in France it was clear that they were going to have to pull up their sox and do something about it because they were killing themselves. The Belgians, too, because the Belgian welfare program was even more generous than the one in France. France had this practice of paying for every child you had, you got so much money, you know, for each one.

**Shea:** Family allowance.

**GRIMES:** And it didn't matter. Gosh, you got it just like the poorest family in France; you were entitled to it, you know. They blew a lot of money.

**Shea:** How about your political counselor in Belgium?

**GRIMES:** Interestingly enough, my political counselor in Belgium later became my political counselor in Paris, too, when I was there. His name was Francis Gatar. In Belgium, while I was there, he was just feeling his way in because he had come in to replace a man named Olson who had been a journalist for the *Los Angeles Times* and had come in from the political section in Sweden. For some reason or other he had to take over as DCM, so he got assigned down there as political counselor and later became DCM in Belgium. That is when Gatar came in, to fill his shoes. Our relationship was fine. He would do just as I said was his main job -- reviewing reports created by other people. He would just check them over, and then pass them along.

**Kienzle:** Was he actually a political appointee or had he integrated?

**GRIMES:** Gatar? No, he was a regular Foreign Service officer. Olson must have been an appointee; that is, he must have come in through the FSR.
Kienzle: Lateral entry.

GRIMES: I think so. That is the way they often bring people in when they want to do a favor or something … give him FSR and then integrate him into the regular Foreign Service. He was a damn good officer, Olson. He wrote beautifully; of course he was a journalist, that helps.

HARMON E. KIRBY
Political Counselor, United States Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1976-1979)

Ambassador Harmon E. Kirby was born in Ohio on January 27, 1934. He received a bachelor’s degree from Harvard University in international relations and served in the U.S. Army overseas for two years. His Foreign Service career included positions in Geneva, Madras, New Delhi, Brussels, Khartoum, Rabat, Lome, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Kirby retired on September 29, 1995. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 31, 1995.

KIRBY: I arrived in August of 1976, in Brussels to become political counselor at the U.S. Mission to the European Communities, now known as the European Union.

Q: You were there from when to when?

KIRBY: From the summer of 1976 to the summer of 1979.

Q: We got you in Brussels, 1976-1979. What was the NATO situation in that period? Was this the year of Europe or something like that?

KIRBY: I think the year of Europe came later. The question is a good one. I suppose for Europeans, any year since World War II has been an interesting year in the development of Europe. The period we were in Brussels had a number of fascinations for us. There was a lot going on within the Common Market context or within the European Communities context as they were called. During those three years, I would pick out three things that were especially interesting in regard to the development of European institutions which we were tracking.

One was that the negotiations were going forward for the enlargement of the Community. Greek negotiations for accession to the Community were in their last year when we arrived, and during my period there the EC opened negotiations with Spain and Portugal as well, looking forward to their potential accession.

The second thing of interest was that during that period, for the first time, the European communities decided to go for direct elections to the European Parliament, one of the institutions in the Communities framework.
And thirdly, this was the early stage of the attempt by the member countries of the European Communities to forge a common foreign policy. Their phrase for it was "political cooperation". This was the early period in "political cooperation," and by that they meant cooperation in the foreign policy field. Those three developments were taking place during those years. It was also a very interesting time in terms of U.S. relations with the European Communities. Of course that's an on-going saga. Trade relations are always important, and we were very much involved in a variety of trade matters, discussions, negotiations with the Europeans at that time. And then, another thing that has always been of interest to our USEC mission, but with the dossier being particularly "ripe" during our time, is Europe's relations, trade and aid relations with the developing world. The so-called Lome II Treaty with forty plus countries in Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean with which the Europeans have trade and, particularly, aid relationships was negotiated and signed during that period. So taken all together, there was quite a lot to observe and report on. I mentioned that I was political counselor. The European community had a large political dimension despite the overshadowing economic dimension or dimensions, so both the political and economic sections in USEC were in effect involved in observing and reporting on both political and economic affairs. I used to think at the time that my section's work on some days was maybe 70% political and 30% economic, and then the next day, it would be the other way around, since we were doing all the reporting to Washington on all the major EC institutions and the decisions taken within those institutions including on economic matters.

Q: First, a bit about the mission. Who was the Ambassador and how did it fit into the complex you had in Brussels?

KIRBY: There were three U.S. missions in Brussels at the time, as there are now: the Embassy to the Kingdom of Belgium, the U.S. mission to the European Communities (where I served), and then the U.S.-NATO mission. The Ambassador at USEC during my period was Dean Hinton, a very senior American diplomat. He had successively as Deputy Chief of Mission, Bob Morris and then Denis Lamb, who were also extremely able, capable officers. It was a mission of roughly 20 officers, with some additional supporting staff. Included in the officer complement, were two USIA officers, as I recall. It was, if I may say so -- and this sounds a little self-serving - - a first-class mission. People on the staff were extremely competent, extremely well-versed on their dossiers. We were able to concentrate on the substance of what we were supposed to be doing, the substance of the emergence of modern European institutions and U.S. relationships to them. We didn't have any administrative or other kinds of roles that we had to play. Fortunately, the U.S. Embassy just down the street from our Mission, the Embassy to the Kingdom, handled administrative matters including housing, communications, budget for all three of the American missions in Brussels. My perception was that the Embassy handled those matters very well. It was a big task. They kept us all reasonably well satisfied. Maybe there were some who weren't well-satisfied, but it seemed to me that administratively that it all ran pretty well and that the intermeshing of the three missions was pretty successful. But that meant that at USEC we didn't have to do our own administration, and so we could concentrate on the economics and politics of Europe. I should also mention labor developments as well, which was in my section.

Q: How did Dean Hinton operate?

KIRBY: I liked his operating style very, very much. Dean was obviously very much in control of
things, and very self-confident, as one with his years of experience and background would be expected to be. Yet he gave an almost amazing amount of latitude, I thought, to people on the staff. He handled some of the very senior contacts at Berlemont, at the European Commission headquarters and those with his fellow ambassadors. He held daily staff meetings and was always available if one needed guidance. But if I may quote him, his comment to me as I arrived as political counselor (with a chuckle) was, “I expect the counselors to run the mission, if you need me, I'm here, but I won't be looking over your shoulder all the time.” And he was as good as his word. And the two DCMs, taking their cue from Dean, were first-class, and their style was excellent as well. It was very much a matter of their allowing their political and economic counselors to sign out, to authorize the transmissions to Washington of the great preponderance of reporting and analytical cables. The political and economic sections also had major representational responsibilities. But clearly we had to exercise judgment as to when we needed the front office on something. I felt that because of the daily staff meetings, and the quality of the Mission's people that it all meshed amazingly well.

Q: The EC was talking about the admission of Greece into it, shortly to be followed to it at that time a very poor Portugal and particularly at that time a very poor Spain.

KIRBY: Spain was in better shape than Portugal.

Q: This was obviously inviting...sort of like having public housing coming into where you were living. I mean, these were poor neighbors. What was the feeling that you were getting from your European colleagues about the arrival of these people at that time and also how did we view it?

KIRBY: Well, I think those are very good questions. My feeling then and now, has been that the Europeans -- on this issue -- were to be complemented on what was essentially for them an act of faith. They swallowed hard. They recognized that the economic cost and the cost of Community administration and coordination were likely to be very, very high for a considerable period of time as the Community would begin to absorb first Greece (which also was not in very good economic shape) and then Spain and Portugal. They recognized the cost would be high. There was, however, a strong feeling in Europe at that time -- i.e., in Western Europe and particularly in the core countries of the Common Market that Western Europe had to be made whole, that the Iberian Peninsula at long last had to be brought into the mainstream of political and economic life in Western Europe, and that Greece, as the original "cradle of democracy" should be brought in to stabilize its political moorings. And there was a belief that if you could get Spain in (they never that I can remember considered taking in one Iberian country without the other) democracy would be shored up in Spain, and it would be bound to the Western system. It hadn't been so very long before that Franco had died and that, later, there had been a military coup attempt. So there was a strong feeling that if you could get Spain into the major western institutions, NATO and the Common Market, that this would stabilize the country and bind it to the West. And, it was generally recognized that it would be very hard to sell NATO membership in Spain. Many Europeans and Americans were actually more concerned about getting Spain into NATO than into the Common Market, but it was generally understood that there would be resistance in Spain about bringing them into NATO alone. You would have to bring them into the major political and economic grouping as well. And then there was also the feeling that you couldn't just leave Portugal twisting alone, which had been a very early member of NATO going back to the early
1950's. Wait a minute; they were a founding member, weren't they, in 1949? Yes, Portugal was a NATO founding member in 1949 and had experienced its own recent emergence from decades of dictatorship with some ensuing initial political instability. So there was a strong sense that it was important to get Portugal into Western Europe's main economic and political institutions, as well. It was an act of faith by the Europeans, but with full recognition that there would be some future bumps in the road in terms of smooth functioning of Community institutions. Above all, the major Community core countries, particularly Germany, France, and the others, would have to pay a considerable amount of money during a prolonged transition period to bring these countries in. You asked how the U.S. viewed it. We supported enlargement on roughly the same grounds as the Europeans. We felt the West would be stronger with all of these countries in the major Western European groupings.

Q: _Was the feeling as we were doing...but actually we had been right from Dean Acheson on strong supporters of getting Western Europe together. Was there in back of things, the feeling that we got dragged into two wars because of the bloody-mindedness of different countries in Western Europe and this is a security apparatus that will keep us from foreign involvement?_

KIRBY: Absolutely. I think that was a very strong American feeling then and I hope and believe it is now. Earlier I commented that I thought the Europeans were to be complimented for their act of faith, even though in dollars and cents terms it would be costly for a while. I think that I may suggest that Americans are also to be complimented for their act of faith in supporting the enlargement of European institutions. We did it for reasons that you have just stated, feeling that if Europe could create the institutions that would keep Europe from having more of what Dean Hinton used to refer to as its "civil wars", that would be in American strategic and broader interests. We took this stand even though we knew at the same time that this could be creating a trading entity that would prove somewhat costly to the U.S. in the external trade field. But as we worked out a balance of U.S. interests, we concluded it was in our broader interests to be supportive of these institutions. And I think that manifestly has been a correct decision all along, the way we supported those institutions.

Q: _How did we find, again at that time, the role of France? France as far as America was concerned is always the odd man out._

KIRBY: The role of France in the enlargement of institutions and EC membership? France, my memory of it, is that France took a positive and supportive role in terms of enlargement, that they were in favor of bringing Greece in and they were in favor of bringing in the Iberian Peninsula countries. France also supported the development and extension of Community institutions -- direct elections to the European Parliament and to development of political cooperation.

Q: _Were you pretty much a reporting officer on this going around, making your calls, finding out how people felt? Or was the United States pushing something which you were involved by saying, 'I hope you'll do this...sort of thing?_

KIRBY: In terms of the political section's work, I think it was both of these. Certainly, we did a lot of reporting and analysis. The European Community institutions are so far-reaching and are making so many decisions all the time on economic, trade, agricultural support matters that
arguably affect American interests or at least are of interest to us, that the Mission has always been required to do a lot of reporting on trends in the community, community law and community decisions, etc. But at the same time, there is a fair amount of representational work, representing U.S. positions to the EC. I'll give you one example of something I got drawn into. I mentioned earlier in these interviews, that before going to Brussels, I was responsible for U.S.-Turkish relations in the State Department and that I had something to do with Cyprus and Greece, as well. Without boring you with a lot of detail, within the Community, the Cyprus set of issues were highly salient during the time that I was in Brussels. What trade policies the European Community should adopt towards Cyprus, what assistance, monetary and refugee assistance they would give them, etc. and Washington had a set of views on those issues. We wanted to work along parallel lines on Cyprus because of a European and American joint interest in Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. So Washington wanted to make sure that in trade and aid matters, as well as on political issues, we were not working at cross purposes with the Europeans. Since I was supposed to have knowledge of that area, I was asked by Ambassador Hinton and by Washington, to keep a very close eye on the development of community policies towards Cyprus, particularly Cyprus refugee assistance, and to weigh in and make sure that our views were regularly known. And so I found myself representing our views on Cyprus, Greece and Turkey at high levels in the community. There was also a question of what the EC should do about Turkey. And that tricky question is still roiling the European waters with Turkey even today. Turkey and Greece both became associate members of the Community long before I went to Brussels, although I've forgotten exactly when it was. Greece has been a full member of the Community since about 1981 and Turkey would like to be a member of the Community but has not been able to get in. So, again, there were questions about the European Communities' relations with Turkey about how the Europeans planned to make their non-accession to the Common Market palatable to them. We would weigh in with a fair number of representations. While the U.S. could not force the EC to take Turkey in as a full member, we could, and did, emphasize to the West Europeans Turkey's reliability as a NATO partner, its dedication to the Western cause, and its hope that its concerns would be addressed equitably by the other Europeans.

Q: Was there any feeling going to the Turkish side? To me, countries who come into the European Economic Community have a veto power. Is it a one veto?

KIRBY: Essentially, yes, they do.

Q: It doesn't take a genius to figure out that the Greeks, once they were in, would do anything they could to keep the Turks out. I mean out of visceral reflexes or something.

KIRBY: That happened over the years. You are quite right. Although, in strict fairness to everybody, I'm inclined to think that even if Greece had not been a full member of the Communities these past fourteen years, Turkey would still not be in. Purely apart from Greeks blocking the forward movement of the Turkish dossier in the EC, there are still strong feelings elsewhere in the European Community today that Turkey has not met the full democratic test, particularly on human rights for admission to the Common Market. So they would be having some difficulties with full membership even if Greece didn't exist.
Q: Going back to this time, I've never dealt with Europe. What countries were not in?

KIRBY: France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries were the six original EC members. And then in the 1970's you had the accession of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark. That took it to nine. There were nine members when I arrived in Brussels. Then the Greeks concluded their negotiations for accession and, as I mentioned, sometime in the 1979-81 period the Spanish and Portuguese began their negotiations with the Common Market and came in as full members during the 1980's. So with the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain it brought the Community to twelve -- which was where things stood until the recent expansionary round.

Q: Were we making any moves to try to encourage the Scandinavian countries to come in, or Austria?

KIRBY: I don't know that we, the U.S., were making any moves to try to persuade them to come in. People who worked in Washington at the time would know more about that than I would. There was at that time, in any case, the beginnings of a closer working relationship between the two main European trade bodies, the Common Market and EFTA, which grouped the Scandinavian countries. They were beginning to talk to each other and engage productively during that period, and my memory is that we did encourage that. We thought it was a good idea for all these European countries to be taking this step toward each other. Then, eventually if it did evolve into something more than that, then fine.

Q: How did we feel and what reactions did you get from the other people about the British coming in? I mean the French had kept them out for a while and the British had not come in with any great enthusiasm on the part of many of its citizens and this was still sort of the teething stage.

KIRBY: There were tensions between Britain and the EC at the time revolving around some of the same issues that have been roiling the waters for them again recently. The British in the late 1970's were complaining very vocally, very vociferously, that they were paying more into the Community than they were getting out of it. The balance was an unfavorable one, and in every negotiation with the rest of the EC, the British were trying to get more of a return flow of funds from Community organs than they had gotten up to that time. And there was still great ambivalence about EC membership among the British public. I mean, the referendum to join had won in Britain, but there was still considerable sentiment in Britain against membership, and so it was an issue in domestic politics. That then caused any British government of the day to insist very hard in Brussels that it get its full benefits and rights out of the Community. Although it was not a day in and day out acrimonious set of relationships, there were tensions in the Community, which was still "digesting Britain" at the time, if you will.

Q: How were you all received? Was there any time when you found them saying why don't you Americans just butt out while we just do our thing? How did this go at that time?

KIRBY: Obviously, my overall response to that would be that with occasional grumbling, community practitioners understood very well why the Americans were interested in what they were doing in Europe and in what was happening in Europe, and they saw it as a two-way street.
They themselves saw a need to work as constructively and harmoniously as they reasonably could with the Americans. But certainly on these issues that they considered their private preserve -- e.g., what their relations were going to be with the ex-colonial world for example and the nature of their trade and assistance therewith -- they took a somewhat proprietary air. We used to bicker over such issues a bit. They would frequently, in effect, tell us to "butt-out". But on the broad philosophical issues of whether the Americans and Europeans should be talking to each other on how the Western world was going to hang together generally, and to trade with the rest of the world, they recognized it as a common interest, I think.

Q: Was there any talk at the time about what has now taken place in the Western Hemisphere...the NAFTA?

KIRBY: There was certainly not anything that we were discussing with the Europeans, I don't believe. I don't have a strong memory of that. I think that at the conceptual level it was probably one of those things that was floating around in Washington and elsewhere -- "You know one day, we could do the following..." I don't think it was a stronger gleam in anybody's eye at that time. I don't think it was a subject of real policy debate -- at least not as far as I was aware.

Q: What were you getting on the reception of the Carter Administration? You were basically there during the Carter Administration and they came in as having been out of the Presidency for some time and they came charging in and there were some things like the so-called "Neutron bomb", and the Olympic business -- maybe that didn't happen during your watch there, but like all new eager administrations they went off in one direction and then kept moving around...there was sort of an uncertainty there. Did you find this as a problem?

KIRBY: Europeans were a little puzzled at times. I think they felt that the Administration during at least part of that period, with good will to be sure, was involved in a learning exercise, and I think they were a little bit concerned from time to time about how we and they were going to "gel" and forge common policies toward the Eastern Bloc. Let me digress to say that thoughtful Europeans, the ones who knew something about American politics and the American national psyche were probably, as I recall, prepared to "cut us a little slack". In a sense, they recognized that we were, as a people, recovering from the twin traumas of Watergate and the Vietnam War. And I think they understood to some extent, although imperfectly...Europeans don't totally understand American politics anymore than we do theirs, but the thoughtful ones understood that Carter's election was part of that...an attempt to emerge from the trauma and move off in new directions. I think they, the Europeans, probably felt that we hadn't yet wholly found our way. But, then, the Europeans weren't showing a lot of leadership on anything either at that time. They were coming out of some of their own traumas, and not quite sure how to deal with the end of dictatorships in Spain and Portugal which had occurred in the mid-1970's. And Greece posed its set of problems. While by the late 1970's things looked somewhat better in Greece and Cyprus than earlier in the decade, the West Europeans had a lot of preoccupations about the Eastern Mediterranean. And, the Europeans remained uncertain about ongoing developments in Eastern Europe. And so, as I said earlier, there was a very strong sentiment in Europe that we have heard in other periods of history: "Why doesn't somebody show some leadership around here, in our neighborhood, in the West?" It's not a new or startling idea -- such criticism occurs regularly. I remember that on one occasion in a seminar with some senior Europeans, Americans were being
criticized for something and at the end of the day, the most thoughtful European present looked across the table at the Americans and said, "This has been a heavy afternoon, but don't take it badly. Remember that for you Americans, it's part of your role in the world...it's the way we Europeans will always treat you." He continued: "When you don't show leadership, we're going to sit around demanding that you show it and criticize you for being feckless and spineless and what have you, and then when you snap to and show leadership, with an equally high decibel count we'll claim that you're brutish and overbearing and trying to railroad us...you can't win. That's the price of leadership." And that particular man's view was that (and maybe that's why his words appealed to me so much) if you Americans don't show leadership, nobody will. And without being unkind to Europeans which I don't mean to do, I had the very strong feeling at the end of the 1970's, and used to say so to Congressional and other U.S. visitors to Brussels, that despite serious European attempts to forge a common foreign policy in the EC, I did not think that in the near term we could expect Europe to be able to take major political and political-military initiatives. And, indeed I feel that way in a sense today. Despite all that's happened in Eastern Europe and so on and all the good things that have happened in Europe in the intervening period. I think Bosnia, which has been difficult for all of us, is a case in point. The West Europeans, even with a common policy under the EC, often work at cross purposes with each other, which is what we saw three or four years ago in Central Europe.

Q: Really at a certain point if we're going through it as of today, the United States trying to turn the whole mess of the break-up of Yugoslavia over to Europe and after a couple of years and a bloody civil war, we eventually had to step in and I don't know how it will work out but certainly nobody else, I mean, we're "leading the pack".

KIRBY: That is right. When this (Yugoslavia's break-up) all began, in 1991-92, my wife and I deliberately thought ourselves back to 1978-79 and said the Europeans wouldn't have been able to do it then and they can't now. This was not because Europeans are deficient in any way; it has more to do with their institutions, ongoing national rivalries, and all the things that roil them historically.

Q: What about the role of Germany? I mean, Germany is sort of the "black star" of things in European affairs. You hear about the French yelling and taking an opposite tack and the British being reluctant to do this or sometimes that...but Germany is still the major power in that block and yet one is never particularly aware of their taking leadership. How did you find, this is my impression from a distance now, the role of Germany during this period?

KIRBY: In the Common Market and European Council? Well, certainly during my time in Brussels (1976-79) and based on everything I've read and heard since, the Germans have played a prominent and constructive role in EC affairs even if they have usually been reluctant to assert broad leadership in Europe. I say this with great admiration for the role they have played in the Common Market. I think they have worked hard, indeed worked overtime, to prove they are good Europeans. They have a past, of course, and they worry about their past. They know how they are perceived in Europe. The French have always believed, and this was evident in the late 1970's, that the way you corral Germany...the way you keep it from doing things it has done in the past, is by binding it into institutional relationships where it has to be a good citizen. Well, the Germans accepted that approach and said, in effect, "You're probably right. The way we all
avoid being "bad" citizens is that we embrace each other so tightly that out on the margins miscreants can't do bad things." So, the Germans worked very hard, I think, at making EC institutions work. The bureaucracies of the European institutions are peopled by bureaucrats from all the member countries, and the Germans, like the French, send very, very able people to those institutions. As I talked with them at that time, and talked with people in "think tanks" back in Bonn, I got the impression that they really meant it when they said, "We've really got to make this thing work, this is how we live together and ensure that nobody in Europe does anything that takes us back to the bad old days." Now, again, you put it as the "black star". Germany is, in a way, a 600 lb. gorilla. Their weight...they overshadow everything because of their economic muscle and they have to be taken into account; it is understandable that their partners scrutinize their every move to ensure they are remaining good Europeans. But today the feeling around the European community is that the Germans have played a very constructive role in Community institutions.

Q: How did we view, and again your contacts and the growing European community...Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Did this play any role at all, I mean, just knowing it was there?

KIRBY: I used to call fairly regularly on some of the upper level officials in the European Commission, (the executive body of the EC) who dealt with Eastern Europe because in the late 1970's, and on into the 1980's, the Common Market was consciously reaching out to the East to establish communications and to try to establish a network of working relationships. Specifically, they were trying to initiate negotiations with COMECON, the economic organization of the Warsaw Pact countries. The two sides would meet every so often and issue reasonably hopeful and forward-looking communiqués which had very little substance. During my period in Brussels they never got into real negotiations. The EC was trying to see if it could work out some limited trade arrangements with the East which would somehow bind the East closer to Western Europe and make the East less inclined to go to war. The EC kept a very close watch on Poland and those Eastern European countries that they felt were the most fragile in terms of relations with the Soviet Union. The EC was extending certain types of aid and trade assistance to those countries at that time, and we used to spend a lot of time, in our discussions with EC officials, speculating on how the Soviet empire was going to go.

Q: Also, it was part of the Carter policy if I recall to try to have some trade openings to the Soviet Union. We sent Arthur Watson to Moscow, who was basically a businessman, and this was until the Afghanistan thing in December of 1979. This was not inconsistent with...

KIRBY: We and the Europeans were working on parallel lines to see if we could create some new relationships that would point in a peaceful direction away from the Cold War.

Q: How much, as this whole thing developed, did trade problems, obviously this is of great interest to us...and I'm thinking of Congress and farmer groups, etc., how did that play as far as your operation went?

KIRBY: Well, I don't have total command of all the details at this remove. Then, as today, there were areas in which our trading policies and those of the European Community were in conflict. We felt that the Common Market's Common Agricultural Policy (called the CAP), which posits
very high support prices for almost all agricultural products, was contrary to international trading patterns and that certainly it kept a lot of our products out of the Common Market countries. This was a fairly regular bone of contention. And sometimes in negotiations, it would come to..."if you're going to send your cognac into the United States, then we should be able to get Florida's orange juice and California's raisins into your markets." There was sometimes a fair amount of acrimony which broke into the press. The EC would counter by arguing that we unfairly subsidized our wheat farmers and took markets they might otherwise have gotten into. And so it went. There were substantial trade issues that we were in contact on all the time. The EC's TABEX arrangements -- stabilization funds they tried to set up for certain commodities in some of the old colonial countries with which the Europeans still had major relationships -- was another area of friction. Or perhaps coffee and soybeans, we felt that some of the stability exchange arrangements skewed the patterns of world trade, and so on. We and the Europeans joined in very serious discussions on those issues and so there was regularly enough to keep us all hopping. Not all of these issues were totally resolved to our satisfaction, of course, but these were the kind of negotiations and discussions that went on fairly regularly.

Q: Were there any issues particularly dealing with Africa where the United States and the EC were sort of "at odds"?

KIRBY: I think there were no issues where we were at odds on Africa that came into the Brussels context at that time. Again, I may be missing something on this, but simply going from memory, I don't recall that we had any great concerns about the aid and trade relationships (apart from some of the Stabex arrangements that I mentioned) that they were establishing or maintaining through the Lome Convention agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific developing countries. Certainly there would have been at that time some differences of emphasis on how we and the Europeans viewed certain critical political issues in Africa. There were some differences on South Africa, and some on Angola, for example, but these differences would have been played out largely in other arenas, especially the UN. The Common Market institutions and our exchanges with them at that time were not as such, designed to handle this kind of issue. I should say, however, that the European Parliament to which I referred before, considered its brief to embrace the entire world...economic, political, and social issues included. They could debate any issue in the Parliament. The Parliament wasn't a decision making body, it was a debating body that adopted a lot of resolutions. It would sometimes adopt a resolution on one African issue or another, as in other parts of the world, that wasn't totally "in line" with the U.S. way of thinking. We used to weigh in with the European Parliamentarians to try to make sure our views were reflected. That was part of my job and that of USEC's Political Section, which I headed.

Q: A little bit about the way we dealt with the UN in a way.

KIRBY: Yes.

Q: How did we view this movement that you mentioned at the beginning of our talk today? About having this Parliament elected directly and all?

KIRBY: Well, it wasn't ours to decide. But as a general proposition, I remember that the U.S.
applauded the move. We thought it was a step toward greater democracy in EC institutions and therefore a desirable thing.

Q: Well, is there anything else we should cover about this particular period? Were there any events...

KIRBY: I don't think so. During that period there was a visit by President Carter, a very quick one-day visit in Brussels as part of a European trip. I can't remember which year it was. He visited all the important institutions in Brussels...visited NATO, visited with the EC Commissioners (the EC executive body) and I think had a meeting with the King of Belgium, though I'm less certain of the latter. But the President's going personally to EC headquarters, and meeting with the Commissioners even for a short time, was designed to show that we, the United States, continued to consider important our relationship with the Community, purely apart from our important bilateral relationships with EC member states. We had a lot of U.S. visitors. Some would come for NATO reasons, some for EC reasons, some for both. There were a lot of Congressional visitors during that period. I remember, also, that Chief Justice Warren Burger came to visit the European Court, one of the institutions of the European Community. Daniel Boorstin, who was then the Librarian of Congress, came to meetings with the European Parliamentarians. I cite this as evidence that the Washington firmament tended to see these EC institutions as important and felt we should make the gestures designed to keep the U.S.-EC dialogue fruitful and important.

Q: You left there in Summer of 1979, where to?

KIRBY: I came back on leave and had a little bit of training here, and then at the end of the Summer of 1979 became the Deputy Chief of Mission in Khartoum.

Q: So you were in Khartoum from when to when?


Q: How did you get the job? This was somewhat out of your bailiwick, wasn't it?

KIRBY: Yes and no. There's a certain logic to it in a way. First of all, I think it had more to do with the old NEA network than anything else. There was a time, long ago of course, when the Sudan was handled out of NEA. More importantly, I thought I wanted to be a DCM and get back to the developing world. I saw that one of the jobs coming open was DCM in the Sudan, and so I applied for it, as did many others. The Ambassador in Khartoum at the time was Donald Bergus, a senior, respected Foreign Service officer who had been our Deputy Chief of Mission in Ankara when I had had the Turkish desk here in Washington. He had been Chargé in Cairo after the 1967 war, and had previously been head of the Egyptian Country Directorate in the mid-1960's. But I had really gotten to know him during our joint Turkish period. When I used to go to Turkey, I would visit with him and so when he saw that I was one of the applicants for the job he very kindly invited me to come out to Khartoum from Brussels and take a look at the place and job to make sure I really wanted to do it. It was a rare and unique opportunity, so I took him up on it. I flew out and saw it visually as a pretty austere place, but I felt that the professional
challenge was there and I would like to take it on. In the Winter-Spring of 1979 I had the choice of going to Khartoum or of staying on for a fourth year in Brussels, which I liked very much by the way, far more than I had expected to; I liked the USEC mission enormously. As I said, I had the choice of staying in Brussels or going off to Khartoum. When I opted for Khartoum, as nearly as I remember it, 50% of my colleagues and close friends in Brussels said that I had lost my mind, and the other 50% said that they understood my decision. So with that divided counsel ringing in my ears, I took my family and went off to Khartoum.

MILES S. PENDLETON, JR.
Political Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1976-1979)

Born New Jersey in 1939, Mr. Pendleton received his BA from Yale and his Masters from Harvard University. His foreign assignments have included Ghana, Tel Aviv, Bujumbura, Brussels, London, and Paris. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 22, 1998.

Q: In this period, ‘76 to ’79, how did we from the NATO side see the Soviet threat?

PENDLETON: Well, we were (and almost everybody at NATO headquarters was of course) quite preoccupied with the Soviet threat, and particularly the naval threat. There was a moment when the naval threat seemed to be the most acute, and we were really afraid of being outdistanced. That possibility was given a great deal of attention, and the sense that there was a naval threat (it proved to be less severe than we had thought, needless to say) was increased by the sharing of the spy satellite pictures I previously mentioned, which had a dramatic way of capturing one’s attention. I hoped that we weren’t showing the same picture 12 times, but who knows. At any rate, these were shared with European cabinets in capitals and with officials at NATO and others (at very high levels) and they tended to have a dramatic impact, and helped in the process. At the same time, we began to make progress in getting not only Italy to accept missiles but Belgium as well. As a matter of fact, Alfred Cohen, who was the political director of the Belgian foreign ministry at that point, came to my house for dinner, and our most industrious deputy chief of mission, Mike Glittman, was there (this was a dinner party, about 20 people) and Mike looked extremely happy at the end of the dinner but wouldn’t tell me why. It wasn’t just the wine and the good meat; it was that Alfred had told him that Belgium would accept our missiles. That was a big breakthrough from our point of view.

JOHN T. MCCARTHY
Economic Counselor
Brussels (1976-1980)

John T. McCarthy was born in New York, New York in 1939. He received a bachelor’s degree from Manhattan College in 1961 and entered the Foreign
MCCARTHY: I went to Brussels.

Q: 76 to 80.

MCCARTHY: That's right, as economic counselor, in particular, for the last 2 years. Strauss would frequently come to Brussels trying to pin down the very difficult set of issues involved in this Tokyo Round of negotiations. And always telling me, when he would land at the airport, that he knew the commission, the people he was dealing with, couldn't give away the store. His real job was to figure out what they needed, what he needed and to try to make a match so that both sides could go back home and say we did the best we could and it ain't that bad. I enjoyed working on trade issues because it solved for me the question that sometimes arises, I think, in the mind of any diplomat. Is what I'm doing really real, what's happening here. But I think on trade issues the answer is apparent. Yes. You can increase the exports, you can contribute to job creation in the United States. There is reality in all of the trade issues.

Another famous quote which is from Bob Hormats who was a guy who was working as a deputy trade representative and later became an Assistant Secretary. Bob used to say that arms control policy was clean foreign policy and that trade policy was dirty foreign policy. But I like the trade issues, you always have to remember where they fit in the overall relationship. But you had to deal with them on their individual merits. In either Washington or Brussels I did a lot of stuff with textile people. Those American textile manufacturers are tough, you had to listen to them, you had to figure out where they were coming from but then you had to try to get them to listen to the other side's positions issue as you understood them anyway. Deals were possible, deals have been made. None of these issues have led to an irrevocable breakdown between us and the European countries. But each of them has to be dealt with to some degree on its own merits. You can't hurry too quickly to put it in the overall context of the relationship. Or you'll get screwed over by the Europeans or attacked by your own constituents.

Q: I suppose part of this, but both sides were the same but you just don't understand our domestic situation.

MCCARTHY: Sure, sure. And again there was truth to all of that but what the countries of Europe have successfully managed is the transition from a situation where say in France there might have been 25% of people living on the land in the 50's and you might get 5, 6, or 7% of that population now. When I was doing the industrial stuff a lot of coal and steel I mean you had hundreds of thousands of people working in the coal mines or the steel mills. Those are practically nonexistent industries these days in Europe. But the job for the European leader was the same way it had been decades earlier for the American politician, was to manage the transition of these industries from enormous employers to relatively marginal employers in terms of numbers.

Q: First let us talk about RPE, and then we'll move to Brussels. How did you see your role, were
you kind of putting together the arguing points and all for the negotiator and assembly? How did this all work?

MCCARTHY: Well, it was very much of being one part of a fairly large bureaucracy concerned with these issues. And what I mean by that is first of all the economic bureau in the State Department, you had to build alliances with the people in that bureau. You had to rely on them for a lot of the economic expertise. And you had to add what you got from the mission in Brussels and what you knew on your own of what the European politics would bear. And then you had to really establish your credibility and work at maintaining it in the domestic agencies involved in these issues. The Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, and Labor Department to some degree. And the Trade Representatives Office. So you were really one element in a relatively large bureaucracy. And these other bureaucracies were controlled by people who were political appointees, very often chosen because they represented the particular domestic group whose issues were at stake.

I remember the first time I met him he was a Deputy Trade Representative, Clayton Yeutter, who later went on to become Secretary of Agriculture and was the Trade Representative for awhile too. I guess when I first met him he was an Assistant Secretary at Agriculture. But this was a guy who came out of a farming background and he represented farming interests from Nebraska, I think. But at any rate a guy who really was new to the ways of Washington and I think arrived thinking agencies like the State Department had been selling him down the river for years. You had to get Clayton, I remember one of our inauspicious beginnings was that Clayton was going off to Brussels to negotiate. He had a few people with him as part of his team, I was one of them. We arrived in Brussels after a long flight, we transited through London. My luggage arrived and his didn't and he was really mad. And I thought this was really too bad because we had just begun on the trip over developing a kind of relationship where I think I was convincing him to trust me. And here I go and get my bag and he doesn't, but he got over that.

But the job was to understand where the Europeans were coming from and to convey that to the people in Washington putting together the policy. Without having them conclude that you were just a patsy to the Europeans. My job was to try to convince them that you had to take the European concerns into account. And that being said you had to craft a position which would appear to do that and at the same time get at least the minimum you needed for American issues and interests.

It really was a fascinating job, and a lot of fun. Again I have lots of friends who complain about the interagency clearance process and the morass of Washington bureaucracy. But I never found it that way, I really liked working with these people. I thought it was kind of fascinating to start out with an idea and to work it through, have a dozen meetings with people from six or seven different agencies and emerge with something that really wasn't your original idea. But still represented enough of it so I never felt that I was betraying my own intellectual ideals or anything. But to have achieved consensus behind something that in fact you more or less began with, it was something you started. And it was maybe going to work, it was really going to achieve a result with the other side.

There can be gray days in the bureaucracy and grim plugging along. But to me when it is
working well, the interagency process is very good because it means that unlike some of the countries where I have worked where the government position is whatever the minister dreamed about the night before and woke up and decided he would do. By the time you get a US government position on an issue of importance it is a considered position. It probably really does represent what the domestic constituents want and probably is good for the United States and it probably does not disregard the interests of the country we are dealing with either. In other words, it was a valid compromise. So, I always liked it. It was a good job, I thoroughly enjoyed it.

Q: How did you find, I mean you were in these interagency business, and I get various impressions from people I have interviewed. Similar places like the Department of Commerce, Agriculture and Treasury, how did you find response there and how was the State Department seen by these people?

MCCARTHY: I think initially the State Department, the general perception of the State Department was a bowl full of jelly, of Jell-O. A bunch of guys whose main pleasure in life is telling you that you can't do something because in this instance the Europeans won't like it. So, I think you always began against a background of very low expectations from your fellow bureaucrats. They always assumed that you were going to come in and tell them they couldn't have what they wanted. It wasn't easy, in fact to establish some credibility at the moment that you began convincing them that that wasn't exactly where you were coming from, that you were open to be persuaded, that was one element.

At least in those days this is from mid ‘70s into the early ‘80s. After that, I didn't do European community issues anymore. But I went on in the economic bureau for another three years and still did issues that involved a lot of the same players. Seventy-three to eighty-three I worked with the other agencies in the economic community pretty frequently. My sense of them was that Treasury on the foreign policy side was very strong, if very thin on the ground. I mean very few people, but very good ones. USDA has the foreign agricultural service, and at least in those days was full of very competent people. A pleasure to work with, people who really knew their business quite well and were perfectly willing to share it with you.

Commerce I never really had much luck with. I thought that Commerce was bloated and very bureaucratic in the way that all bureaucracies in the US government are supposed to be. And as I said to my pleasure I didn't find the others to be that way. You had to get some Assistant Secretary in Commerce to sign off on anything. Nobody below that level seemed to be able to speak for the agency. It would drive me crazy. They would go through endless reorganizations and give themselves a whole bunch of titles generally, twice as many as they had before. And still as far as I can tell they were never capable of coming up with decisions.

Q: It seems to be the weakest of the agencies.

MCCARTHY: To me it was.

Q: And this is right from the beginning when I came in '55, and all along.
MCCARTHY: Well, I only worked with it for about those ten years. Well, more recently sure on bilateral issues in Tunisia in particular and some of the stuff from the Middle East. It seems that way, I mean Ron Brown is a class act and a great big one man show. And I think that he speaks with a lot of force. Because of his own position in the Democratic party but the bureaucracy isn't behind him. When I dealt with the Mandela issues they were almost always disappointing, they just weren't there. USTR again very strong, my impression from my more recent days was that it stayed that way. It has found a way, by and large, to escape what happens to most bureaucracies which is growth and then layering. Maybe because it has always been in the White House, and somebody in the White House, at a higher level, has not allowed them to have more than a very limited number of positions. And you generally have very confident people who come in for 2,3,4 years, and run away with several issues, make a real impact and go on back into the private sector or somewhere else and do something else. But it can be annoying because it has almost no institutional memory. Few of the guys I liked the best over there could ever find anything in their files. Or they didn't have files -- they just stacked some paper on their desks in sort of a mess. But very creative good people to work with. I always found that I could trust the people I worked with and that I think they felt they could trust me. So I enjoyed it, I felt like it was a great several years.

Q: What was your impression of the French and Germans particularly and maybe the English?

MCCARTHY: Well, the British were new at the time and they were beginning to make their own way, and what I think they were trying to do was to forge an alliance with the Germans. Not exactly against the French but here we are speaking largely of agriculture. To forge an alliance that would recognize that the common agriculture policy was too expensive and costing too much money to subsidize so many crops and that it had to be gotten under control. The French in the early days resisting that very ferociously, that I think that moderated little by little but this is already past my time. All the time I was there the French resisting that as strongly as possible. Although in some ways the issues, the more you examine them always get a little bit less clear than when they started out.

The Germans really weren't subsidizing just a lot of French farmers. There were a lot of inefficient southern German farmers who were being subsidized by the common agricultural policy as well. So it wasn't quite a negative outflow as it might have looked in the first instance on the part of the Germans. But when the British came in they had a more modern kind of agriculture in the sense that I think only 2 or 3% of their population lived on the land that made its living from farming. The profile of English agriculture was much more like the profile of American agriculture. And the British didn't like seeing all this money going to support basically other people and other countries. So once they were in we had a much stronger element within the community to listen to us. And not just the Brits, the Danes pretty much went along with that line of argument.

The Dutch were quiet on these issues largely because I think they were profiting pretty well as well. In one sense, I think I may have said this is an earlier part of the interview and I certainly think it, the French often emerge as our foe in a lot of issues, be they agriculture or trade or how to organize your self-defense largely because they are perfectly willing to speak up. Other smaller countries like the Dutch may sit silent on agriculture. But it isn't because they agree with
us, it is because the status quo in the ‘70s was benefitting a lot of their farmers as well.

The Italians cleverly never assumed much of a profile on these issues. But Italian agriculture was doing quite well from the common agricultural policy.

Q: We’ll move on, you went to Brussels. I mean although it seems part of the same seamless web more or less.

MCCARTHY: Well, this was my most logical onward assignment in the sense. Because after all I had gone to Harvard to do Atlantic Affairs, I went EUR/RPE, and from there I went to one of the two embassies that that office services. The other being the OECD mission in Paris, and I did some OECD work when I was in RPE as well, we didn't talk about that but I worked with the Trade committee there. I went to Brussels, I was recruited by one of the people I had met in my early days at RPE, Deane Hinton. Who was then working at the Council of Economic advisers at the White House and went on to be our Ambassador in Brussels to the European community.

Q: You say, just to make this clear, that we have two embassies in Brussels is that right?

MCCARTHY: We had three, the NATO mission as well. But I was assigned to USEC, which is now USEU I think, US mission to the European Union. I was assigned as Trade officer in the summer of ’76. I had remarried in the summer of ’75, so my new wife went along with me as well as my two children from my first marriage. Deane, as I said, recruited me for the job, and it was doing from the Brussels angle what I had done in the last several years in Washington. So it really was a nice progression.

The main change in focus was instead of dealing on a constant basis with people from all other agencies in Washington, I was supposed to get to know people in the European commission who dealt with these issues. They had a Foreign Policy directorate, and Agricultural directorate, they had an Industrial directorate, and they had some others as well but those were the three. And the developing countries was part of my portfolio so there were three or four directorates of the commission, bureaucracy that I needed to ingratiate myself with.

I also needed to get to know each of the member states of the community who maintained a permanent representation, not an embassy but a kind of mission in Brussels. I needed to get to know the people who dealt with my issues at those missions and that generally meant either the number two, at the smaller ones, or there would be an economic counselor or some equivalent at the larger ones. It was always easy to do this with the English and Germans and the other smaller countries, the Italians, a little more difficult with the French. But one of my great points of pride was that after a while, and although nobody in our mission had good contacts with anybody in the French mission except the ambassador to some degree, in fact the economic counselor and I struck up a good friendship and it turned out we could help each other on a lot of issues. That was a little feather in my cap and I was very glad about that.

And then to know people from a few, like ourselves, a few key embassies interested in European issues. Some of the best that come immediately to mind are the Canadians, the Australians, the Swiss, the Japanese, and the Swedes. Countries that like us needed the community and had bones
to pick with them on certain issues. It was basically that sort of international cast of characters whom I was supposed to get to know from these two jobs, first Trade officer then Economic counselor.

Q: When you say get to know, essentially were you going out getting to know where they stood and passing it on, or how did this?

MCCARTHY: Well, we were really more into influence. Certainly you had to know what the position was. There was a meeting that took place, well I think probably twice a month minimum, something called the Article 113 committee meeting. And this is Article 113 of the European community charter which basically talks about coordination of policy between the commission and the members states. And this was a meeting which dealt with trade only. The commission and the members states would get together at these 113 committees and talk about things like the community's position on government procurement in the Tokyo round negotiations.

Now, when the meeting was over I would need to find out what happened at that meeting. I would call around and go off and maybe have a lunch prearranged with one or two people as well. But, I would try to get the commission take about what happened at that meeting and the take of several of the members and put it all together and there was an eager audience back in Washington ready to consume whatever I could get. Sometimes by phone, I mean if we were at a particularly critical juncture in the negotiations, the quicker I could get the information the better. If a little less urgency in the moment I could take several days and do a cable trying to wrap it all up. But yes, some of it was developing information. And some of it was selling positions, moving beyond the information gathering to take what was coming from Washington and see how it was going to reverberate.

I mentioned Denmark once. But the Danish number two, he went on to do a number of interesting things, he may have gone on to become Ambassador at one stage to Brussels as well. But this is a guy who wanted to know what we thought about issues. And if I explained it convincingly enough to him, he would change his own thinking and he could get to work on his ministers.

The European Community is an interesting place because people like this guy, whose name was Eric Tygeson, work closely with a lot of the ministers who come to Brussels but do not necessarily stay with the issues day in and day out. They need to rely on technicians and this was a guy who understood how Brussels worked. If I could get my thinking or Washington's thinking through his filters, he would, in fact, apply that stuff directly to whatever minister was coming next to town and it could be very helpful.

So, there was a lot of talking going on in Brussels, it was just a great big talk shop. I think a lot of what we were trying to do was influence the dialogue among the different members of the community and the commission. We had natural allies, mostly the external relations people in the commission tended to see a lot of issues similarly to us. Plus, we would talk about how we could advance given issues over a period of time.
Q: Were there any particular, I'm not sure if commodities is the right word, because commodities has specific things, any particular items on your agenda that were particularly difficult? Let's say the Brussels period.

MCCARTHY: Well, soy beans were always the key one because the community had probably made a mistake during the Kennedy round of negotiations back in the ‘60s. They had agreed in the GATT that they would never apply any kind of duty to soybeans, because at the time they saw them as a wonderful raw material input to their own livestock and poultry industry, and they could see no reason where in any sense this could be a negative factor to them.

By the late ‘70s and late ‘80s there wasn't so much of a soybean production in Europe but it was possible to produce alternate crops, different oil seeds. The French were always coming up with different kinds of gimmicks for subsidy programs that would violate our zero duty bindings, some sort of taxes on soybeans, this that or some other thing. Anytime the soybean issue raised its head, no matter how convoluted the way, bells would go off in Washington and we would be told to go in and remind people that we had this zero duty binding and they weren't suppose to touch it. So, that particular commodity was always a key issue.

Textiles were a major factor in those days. The US textile negotiator in those days, Mike Smith, who you mentioned before when the tape was off, would come frequently to Brussels. I knew his counterpart in the commission very well. And there we were very frequently trying to coordinate issues toward given developing countries, or we were trying to work together on the overall agreement in covering trade in textiles.

The other commodity that I picked up when I became Economic Counselor, where we were mostly cooperating very closely with the community, was energy, petroleum. This was a different directorate and it wasn't a trade issue. But by the late 70's the energy crisis was still at its full tilt and we and the Community were trying to develop ways to manage the trade in petroleum and the price of petroleum for the given future.

Q: Did you see, I mean on energy, I can't remember the exact date but it happened during your time when all of a sudden energy the OPEC because of really clamped down and there was a fuel shortage all over.

MCCARTHY: 73 and then in 79 Iran doubled the price of oil and gas. So there were two jolts. The second one occurred while I was running the energy portfolio in Brussels.

Q: Everybody can have a joint thing until all of a sudden, you're really up against it. I would think it would be sort of everybody looking out for themselves. How did you find this? Was there a panic during the second oil crisis as far as who was going to get served? The United States was seen as an over-consumer of energy, it was unfair and all that. How did this...

MCCARTHY: Well, in fact, no. Those kinds of pressures were there and, of course, we do have different interests on petroleum. But, by and large, to me the interesting thing in the 79 increase was the fact that the international community, or the developed world, responded more or less in harmony. I think that's because after the first price increase, the real jolt in 72 & 73, the oil
embargo, we had put together the international energy agency in Paris, we had developed the strategic oil reserves, at least in theory although there wasn't much oil in them by the end of the ‘70s. All of the agreements were in place for cooperation. Although it had been anticipated that there would be an ugly scramble to tie up the supplies of oil among the consuming countries, and although there were exceptions and there were issues, I think, by and large, international cooperation on petroleum issues in the late ‘70s and into the early ‘80s, was exemplary. Probably that is the reason why 15 years later, the price of oil is very low, in relative terms.

I think the whole way we eventually dealt with petroleum, with energy, indicates the merits of cooperation versus conflict on economic issues. Had we scrambled, had we tried to tie up all our sources of supply, I think the people who were predicting, and one of the things that didn't come to pass, is that in the late ‘70s people were predicting oil of $100 a barrel by the mid-90s. Of course, that's not what the price of oil is at all. It's considerably lower than that. I think things worked out okay on energy despite lots of fraying back and forth. It's a good example, it would be almost a textbook model, I think, of international cooperation being smarter than the alternative.

Q: You were right in the middle, for 10 years, of the United States and the European Economic Community getting together, in many ways, the most crucial issue - trade. Did you note, you started out in the Nixon administration, you went through the Ford administration, and then the Carter administration, we'll just take it up to there, did you note any difference, particularly between the Nixon - Ford administration and the Carter administration, dealing with European community and trade?

MCCARTHY: I could even take us one administration further, the Reagan administration.
Where were we? I was in Washington. I came back in the summer of 80 to the economic bureau. The election took place in the Fall, so I was there as the Reagan transition team moved into the first floor of the state department, and announced that there were going to be drastic changes across the board. We shouldn't do anything, we shouldn't move forward with anything that we were doing because everything was going to be different after the inauguration.

My point being that Nixon into Ford through Carter into Reagan on trade issues -- the individuals changed because this is a very politicized part of the US government. The people who run trade policy generally have very close relations with whoever the President happens to be, and very close ties back into their political party. Into whatever political party is represented. Plus very close ties to the industry or to the producing states in a particular commodity.

So the individuals change but the issues are so clearly of national interest that people may have differences, the whole thrust in the Nixon years for instance was getting out of subsidizing. People will have different approaches but rarely fundamentally different ones. So I think what I picked up on trade policy was that after the dust had settled from one administration into another, our positions on things like government procurement, standards, tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers to trade, countervailing duties -- all of those things tended, after the dust had settled, to go pretty much to where they were before. In part because the positions we had hadn't been political issues. They had been positions arrived at by taking into account what the domestic industry needed or wanted, and by trying to figure out how much we could sell to the Europeans in this
instance.

Even the Reagan people, who in advance announced that no holds were barred; everything was going to change; policy was going to be stood on its head -- by the time, it seems to me, by the time they had taken over it turned out that most of their policy on trade issues, and most of their policies on the European community, were not going to be terribly different at all.

So, I was always impressed with the continuity of policy from administration to administration on economic issues.

Q: In dealing with your foreign counterparts, did you find that they would almost say: McCarthy, you've got a new administration coming in, let's wait awhile and, as you say, let the dust settle and then let's get back to business. Were they aware of the same things in their countries? Sort of the professionals sitting around, waiting for the...

MCCARTHY: Well, elections always affect time tables of how you treat with individual issues. Not always by delay. Sometimes, if an American negotiator can say: "Look, we've got a window to settle this thing between now and next summer. Because after that everybody back home starts campaigning and we won't be able to get anything through the congress." And there is the possibility of making a deal and the issues are ripe enough on both sides that a deal is possible. Sometimes that is enough of a catalyst to get something settled.

If, on the other hand, people aren't terribly interested in giving in to what we want. Trade issues are complex. It seems to me that you can hardly ever push them too fast. There's a kind of ripening that has to take place. All of the people involved, the furthest rim of the circle has to have a sense that what's being considered is really going to be all right for them. So you can't go too fast on trade either.

So, if the stage hasn't been set and an election is coming, very often you'll get a delay. But I think that's what happens. Elections either speed things up or slow them down. If the issue is important, it will not be dealt with in isolation from the election. Ours or theirs. If something is happening in one of the big European countries, the same thing can happen.

Q: Did you get involved at all in what today is called the problem of intellectual property, which is often, it gets included into cultural dominance and all that, because this sometimes comes up. TV, movies, all that sort of thing. Was that an issue?

MCCARTHY: I'm trying to recall. Not so much in these years, although I think the answer is a little bit in terms of counterfeiting of goods, that had probably become an issue in my last couple of years in Brussels. I wish I could be sure. I hesitate because the next job I did, I was Director of the office of investment in the economic bureau. There was more discussion of intellectual property. The issue came up more often there.

I think probably counterfeiting of goods was already -- Levi Strauss jeans and things like that, video tapes was already a bigger issue, a growing issue. Not so much between us and Europe but something that was worrying with southeast Asia and east Asia often at the heart of the concerns.
Q: Although you were dealing with the US and the European community, did the growing economic power of Japan, was it a role at that time or not?

MCCARTHY: Oh yes, because this was already a trilateral world. Jimmy Carter, I remember, came out of the trilateral association. There was a very crusty Brit who ran the external relations bureaucracy in Brussels at the time, his name was Sir Roy Denman. Denman became famous because he went off to Japan at one time. He came back and said something like, "Oh, how can we be worried about a bunch of people who live in houses that aren't any better than rabbit hutches." This offended the Japanese. But, he had encapsulated what still goes on, in a lot of ways.

Japan is a society which concentrates on exports and somehow has been able to convince its citizens to accept a low standard of living. Their houses are small. They're not rabbit hutches anymore. But, they're small, they're poorly built. They're expensive as anything. When a Japanese goes out to buy a TV or a car, even if it was made in Japan, he pays a fortune for it. We can buy it for much less here in New York or in Europe.

Yes, the answer is, two ways. First of all, in Brussels I knew the Japanese embassy people very well. We often tried to coordinate our approaches to the community on some of these larger issues of international trade that we were taking about. And both we and the Europeans were talking together, were puzzling together over how to deal with Japanese export imbalances, trade surpluses.

And then, fairly often, to go back to textiles. When our negotiator came to town, or the Japanese negotiator came to town generally they would meet together. Sometimes in Brussels, sometimes here, sometimes in Tokyo. We were coordinating textile policy very happily among the three of us. So, we competed, we coordinated, we teamed up, too, against the third one. But, there was a great big trilateral operation underway. Japan was very much a factor, in my thinking, in my work all the while I was in Brussels.

Q: How about Canada?

MCCARTHY: On the agricultural side, Canada, Australia and we shared many of the same objectives. We are basically cheap producers of grains. We were always puzzling together about how to bring our influence to bear on the Europeans to open up their market a little bit more. Or to stop competing with us on what we felt were unfair terms on Third country markets. The Europeans would grow some bad wheat and subsidize its export into Argentina. We, or the Canadians or the Australians would see a very nice market. Argentina is a bad example, Chile, say, a very nice market disappear overnight.

The Canadians who were in Brussels at the time happened to be wonderful people. I had great friends at the Canadian embassy and we spent a lot of time trying to figure out what to do next.

Q: Did your role change at all when you became Economic Counselor during your last two years?
MCCARTHY: The portfolio got more complicated, the main element being petroleum and finance. Because, again, one of the areas that we didn't discuss, monetary affairs, one of the things that we didn't talk about at all so far were monetary relations and this is the whole question of the creation of the European currency, dollar-value vis-à-vis European currency value, movement on the foreign exchange market. Things that we were often coordinating very closely. So I added energy and I added monetary affairs to my portfolio.

But still, as economic counselor, or had I been ambassador or had I been DCM, I'd say that most of what drove US interest in Brussels tended to be trade issues most of the times. Because a lot of these other issues were dealt with at the national level anyway. The main item on my plate remained trade.

It was just that I had easier access, maybe, to high ranking people. It didn't make a lot of difference. When I got to Brussels in '76 as Trade Officer, it became pretty clear to me that the Ambassador, my boss and myself were often together and when we were it was because the issue that we were dealing with was very hot in Washington's eyes. I moved up a notch but the trade officer, who was a good friend, was very much involved in what we were doing still.

It may have changed some, although I wonder, in the last 10 years but I think, still, the trade aspect of what's done in Brussels is the dominant one.

Q: What about, can we talk just a bit about the financial matters? What was the main issue at the time you were dealing there?

MCCARTHY: It was a relatively quiet time, I think, in terms of fluctuations among the different European currencies. I don't think there were any great currency crises while I was there. Nothing comes particularly, it's amazing, I almost draw a blank.

David T. Jones was born in Pennsylvania in 1941. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania and served overseas in the U.S. Navy as first lieutenant from 1964-1966. After entering the Foreign Service in 1968, his assignments abroad included Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Ottawa. Mr. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: You left there in '76 and went where?

JONES: I went to the U.S. Mission at NATO. My job in RPM was a combination of training ground and recruitment center for people at NATO. It was time for me to go overseas. I had been back since ’71. This was a good opportunity to go overseas. I was “well and favorably known”
by the people at NATO. I had visited some of them. The DCM at NATO, Ed Streator, had been
the head of RPM at the time that I was working there. He made it clear to me that he was
interested in bringing me to NATO under those circumstances.

Q: You were in Brussels from ’76 to when?

JONES: 1980.

I should also step back at least at one point to note that it was at this juncture, the ’74 timeframe,
that my wife entered the Foreign Service. Her first tour was with the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. She was endlessly helpful to me on the arms control side,
bringing me up to speed on technical issues associated with arms control and disarmament
points. There was a major ongoing effort at this juncture to work on a comprehensive test ban, an
issue that we in RPM followed somewhat tangentially. There was also the ongoing SALT
discussions again an issue that in RPM we followed tangentially but always needed to be aware
of because of its prospective NATO angles. All of these efforts were subject to endless
consultation with the Allies. This was being done at every level. You could not consult with the
Allies more often. It became a ritual: what is it that we haven’t done lately? Well, we have to
consult with the Allies? Is it on SALT? Is it on MBFR? It is on Comprehensive Test Ban? Is it
on nuclear non-proliferation? We were endlessly sending out teams of briefers and discussants
on just about any topic under the sun. So, midlevel officers were always preparing briefing
papers, talking points, background material, etc. Teresa was always giving me good insights on
how things would work on a purely technical side for arms control issues.

Q: When you started out in ’76, what aspect were you working on at NATO headquarters?

JONES: I was what they call the executive officer. It’s a curious, almost NATO, phenomena type
of position. It’s not the ambassador’s staff assistant. It’s closer to being the DCM’s DCM, where
you were the general controller for virtually all paper within the mission while at the same time
you were also giving support to the ambassador. I also had a couple of dossiers associated with
the political section but which fell under my special purview anyway and they were the nuclear
dossiers. I was able to retain them and follow on the work that I had been doing in RPM at
NATO.

Q: The Carter administration came in in early ’77. You like everyone else was watching the
campaign. How did you feel before the Carter administration came in? This was quite a
difference between the Ford and the Nixon administration and Kissinger. Here comes Carter.

JONES: This was my first change of administration in the Foreign Service. I had come in in ’68
just as the Nixon administration was about to arrive. Here it was, ’76. The juncture in which I
arrived at NATO was also the point at which a new ambassador arrived, Robert Strausz-Hupé,
who had just gotten the assignment that he had hoped for and sought throughout most of his life
and been extremely interested in obtaining. He had slid from Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, to
Belgium. He had spent a couple of years in Belgium. Then he had been sort of bumped out of the
ambassadorship in Belgium and gone to Stockholm. His wife died while he was in Stockholm
and he arrived in NATO just a little bit ahead of the time in which I arrived. I had known
Strausz-Hupé previously as an undergraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. I had met him occasionally subsequently. I had been, because of that association, his control officer when he was preparing to go out to NATO but had been in Washington. I had been something of his control officer while he was there. Then I was arriving at NATO at the same time he was breaking in at NATO. Certainly Strausz-Hupé and, as a result, the rest of the Mission overtly and to the degree that I could sense personally were quite satisfied with the Nixon-Ford administration. Although almost every Foreign Service officer is pretty careful about expressing political views or associating themselves in any direct way with a political party, there was no active dissatisfaction that I recall with the Nixon-Ford administrations and certainly a general willingness, if not enthusiasm, to continue on with Ford as President through the rest of the decade. Certainly Strausz-Hupé obviously wanted that to happen. To the extent possible, he tried to work to make sure that he was viewed as an effective ambassador at NATO at this period.

Q: Following the political campaign, was there disquiet about where Carter and his administration would stand on NATO or not?

JONES: A transition is always one in which you don’t know what’s going to happen. I suppose in strategic terms, yes, you know what’s going to happen. Carter wasn’t going to pull the U.S. out of NATO. But what would happen with the projects and the programs that were going forward whether it was NATO modernization, nuclear modernization, what our attitudes would be on specific individual issues, it’s much harder to say. In retrospect, I don’t think we thought that Ford was going to lose. You can get pretty divorced from reality even with polls and things of that nature. We tended to expect that Ford was going to win and that Carter was not viewed as tremendously able. After all, he’s this former governor from an end of the world kind of state. What was his background? Things like that. I won’t say that we were shocked that he won because you saw the polls, you saw the numbers, you saw that Carter was leading, you saw that Ford could lose. But I don’t think we really thought that Ford was going to lose and that Carter was going to win. We thought that way just because it was, if anything, because it was easier to continue with what we were doing with the leadership that we had and with the directions that we had. You always find that our allies are just as happy to continue with the leadership that we have on the “devils we know” basis than the angels we don’t.

Q: After Carter won the election and was setting up shop in ’77, did you find that there was a lot of consultation at least unofficially with European allies coming to you all and saying, “Who the hell is this guy and what does it mean?”

JONES: Yes, there were people visiting. There were people who were coming from Washington quickly to consult with the allies to reassure the allies. We had then Vice President Mondale. We had people like this very quickly coming to NATO in early 1977 to consult, which was really to reassure and to say all the right things so that people would – not that they didn’t expect us to say the right things, but to actually hear the right things being said. That was fine. So, this was part of the “get together with the allies, tell them that they’re all loved, that we’ll continue to be reliable partners.” This was how we were trying to work the process. Since I hadn’t gone through it before, it was new to me. It was an incumbent ambassador who was going to be replaced, a political ambassador who was going to be replaced but didn’t really want to go. So, Strausz-Hupé was trying to demonstrate to Washington how bright his work was, how many fresh, clever
ideas he and the mission had. We had a series of “big think” projects. They were thoughtful, intelligent, coherent pieces of work that Strausz-Hupé inspired to the Mission to go off and write. Individual people worked on them. God only knows what they said. But I remember them in these general terms as being intelligent, thoughtful, coherent pieces of work in which Strausz-Hupé hoped to be allowed to stay on perhaps six months at least to give him a full year at NATO. It turned out pretty quickly that he had wasted his time and energy, that they were not going to leave a senior post like NATO filled with what they considered to be a Cold War Republican hawk. Everyone, including Strausz-Hupé, who thought that he had a ghost of a chance of staying on under those circumstances, was woolgathering. He didn’t. He was told, in effect, to vacate by the end of March of ’77. He did with some of the unnecessary ill grace associated with these kind of departures. I was much involved in his effort to write a final speech to the North Atlantic Council. This is a traditional farewell address in which they offer and give the ambassador a memento, an award, a plaque, a plate, things of this nature. I was involved in some of the drafting but it was Strausz-Hupé’s speech that he wrote and that he sent to Washington for clearance. Well, the people in the European Bureau were equally nervous about anything that was being said. They didn’t know whether they were going to be replaced or how they would fit in with the new administration. They were very touchy over what Strausz-Hupé was saying or what they thought Strausz-Hupé was trying to say, Strausz-Hupé arguing back, saying, “I wasn’t trying to so this” or “What I’m saying is exactly what the new administration is in the process of saying.” But it turned out to be one of those gritted teeth exercises on both sides where you had a man who was then about 74 and was trying to say what he expected would be almost his final statements. It was not that. He finally did give a presentation which in many respects was brilliant. He gave a speech that was close to an hour long in which he made not a single verbal misstatement, not the tiniest little verbal slip or blip. It was a remarkable thing in that manner. Most of us can’t speak two minutes without an “Ah” no matter how hard you work on your own speechmaking. It was something of which I remember the format and not the content. But the *tour de force* presentation that he gave was remarkable in its own way. The commentary that EUR had made on the speech with a perspective of about 20 years (I reread it all last summer when I was working through Strausz-Hupé papers) was silly but it reflected the angst of transition. Nobody knows what’s coming and the more senior you are, the more worried you are about what’s coming – because you’re the ones under the gun, while people at midlevel come and go. For young major lieutenant colonel equivalents such as I was at the time… Okay. It was just a question of who your boss was going to be. You hoped that there would be decent guys rather than crazy guys.

Q: *I would imagine that the neutron bomb, enhanced tactical weapon, became a hallmark of the Carter administration. Could you talk about that? Explain what the issue was and particularly with Helmut Schmidt and how we were seen at your level.*

JONES: In many respects, this was something that I was involved in from the very beginning. I was involved in it to a degree on the Washington side. It was something in which I was engaged throughout my NATO career and in which I followed on and which was one of the major strands of my entire Foreign Service career. It goes back to the question of nuclear weapons being one aspect of NATO’s modernization program. It is part of the entire three percent real increase in budget and improvement of NATO’s defensive capabilities. One element of this effort was tactical nuclear force modernization, “TNF modernization.” There was a full range of discussion
of what was needed, how it was needed, and under what circumstances it was to be used. Part of it was based on the problem that we foresaw of using aircraft as the major delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons. These aircraft were vulnerable in certain ways. We had dual capable aircraft which theoretically delivered conventional weaponry during the conventional battle but were also being reserved for the potential of delivering nuclear weapons. There was a conceptual problem. You were going to use all of your aircraft to fight the war on the conventional basis. But you assumed you were going to be losing aircraft and losing ground during the conventional war. You had to reserve in your mind and plans a certain number of aircraft for the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons. What would happen at the juncture when the war itself was raging and perhaps even in the balance but you had drawn down your conventional aircraft, your dual capable aircraft, to the point in which you only had enough left to give your nuclear strikes? Would you then have to pull all of those aircraft out of the battle in order to prepare them for using nuclear weapons? At the same time, it would mean that the conventional war that was perhaps at a tip point was now going to be lost, forcing you to go nuclear. At the same time, was this the type of signal that you would end by giving to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces that your aircraft had now been withdrawn, so you were about to go nuclear? Would that preempt nuclear strikes on their part to avoid getting a nuclear hit from us? This was a very serious conceptual problem. At the same time, we were reluctant to go through the political and military upgrading of our tactical nuclear missile force in Europe. This was at the time when the Soviets were beginning to deploy SS-20s. The deployment of Soviet SS-20s was seen and viewed as an increasingly serious threat by the Europeans, particularly by the Germans. They were saying, “We have to have a response to this. We have to have an American response to balance the Soviet missiles.” Otherwise, the Soviets might come to the conclusion that the Americans would be willing to sacrifice existing forces in Europe to preserve the United States from any nuclear strikes while only if the United States deployed nuclear weapons in Europe would we be able to threaten the Soviets appropriately with intermediate range weaponry that would assure that if a war started there wouldn’t be a “burnt space between two green spaces.” Well, our first response was essentially a political-military reaction rather than a political reaction. Our first reaction was that our existing strategic forces and nuclear forces in Europe were more than enough to counter the increase in Soviet intermediate range nuclear weapons and their SS-20 deployments. We were hypothesizing at that point that the SS-20s might be just a replacement for their SS-4s and 5s, which were obsolete by that time for a number of technical reasons. They were much more vulnerable than the 20s would be. The 20s were mobile, the 20s had multiple warheads, the 20s were solid fueled or better fueled, all of these aspects that made the 20s a clear modernization. We sent a couple of high powered briefing teams to NATO in the late summer of ’76 in an attempt to convince the Europeans that our strategic systems, our SSBNs, submarine based ballistic missiles, which were nuclear submarines that were actually allocated to SACEUR, were sufficient NATO responses, committed dedicated forces to counter the SS-20s. We thought we had convinced them. We seriously thought that we had convinced them. Until Helmut Schmidt spoke in London. I can’t remember the date of it. He forced us to conclude on a political level that the force deployment that we had, our current strategic forces, were not sufficient to respond to the new SS-20 deployment. So, we then got into and began discussions on both a military and a political level with the Europeans. What became the High Level Group and the Special Consultative Groups began to meet and work out a question of how we would respond.

Q: This was approximately when?
JONES: This is around ’77. After a great deal of effort and consultations with the Europeans, we had gotten their technical acceptance of these weapons. Whether they expected them to be used, I have no idea. But the credibility of NATO nuclear use was always regarded as one of the key elements of deterrence. I did not hear demurs from my European colleagues and other NATO diplomats about the use of these weapons or necessarily other nuclear weapons. On nuclear weapons specifically, the only system about which they appeared to be unhappy was the atomic demolition munitions. That concern devolved into a long argument about “prechambering” for specific areas and whether you would drill the holes ahead of time for the use of atomic demolition munitions. There was reluctance to do this; it was more political than military reluctance. It would drive home to the guy in the neighborhood that the likelihood of using a nuclear weapon was right there. On the flip side of it, the Germans had developed special equipment that would allow the drilling of emplacement chambers for atomic demolition munitions on relatively short order. But the technical decision that we could move ahead with enhanced radiation weapons was one that had been made. It had been endorsed. It had been approved at the various levels within NATO. My recollection sense is that it had been endorsed at a ministerial meeting by the acceptance of the report. The study being done on these weapons and the general NATO approval as a result meant that the alliance was regarding enhanced radiation weapons as part of its military capability.

Q: I did an interview with Vlad Lehovich, who was in Bonn. He was saying that the neutron weapon was viewed with a certain suspicion by the left within Germany and other places because supposedly it destroyed people, not property. This sounded very capitalistic as opposed to communistic, where it’s much better to destroy property and if people go, that’s too bad. Helmut Schmidt, who was a socialist, had been reluctant for political reasons to endorse this. Jimmy Carter as our President was pressing him very hard all the time. Were you aware of this?

JONES: This was certainly an element of it. You had Schmidt in power and you had Schmidt and the Socialists for the first time in many years in power in Germany. There was concern about the left side of the ruling party. No matter where you went in Europe, the left was hostile to nuclear weapons, was hostile to NATO, was hostile to the neutron bomb, or fostered the “ban the neutron bomb” exercise. Indeed, your recollection is correct that the communists said that the neutron bomb was the perfect capitalist weapon, that it killed people and preserved property, our response was that the neutron bomb was the perfect communist weapon because it would kill capitalists and preserve the means of production. But that was a propaganda tit for tat exercise. There was a clear expectation that the Europeans were not only going to be on board… We had argued and persuaded them that they should accept these weapons and this philosophy and this report. Yes, we had. Lehovich’s recollection is also perfectly clear that on the left in Germany and on the left everywhere, they were not enthusiastic about nuclear weapons. They were certainly not enthusiastic about nuclear weapons that looked as if they could be used. They were even less enthusiastic about nuclear weapons that looked as if they might be useable in their neighborhoods. There was a “not in my backyard” view of nuclear weapons. Whether these people were no longer screaming, “Better red than dead,” we thought of them as exactly the same type of people that would find any excuse to surrender. Well, we were also in the situation where we couldn’t force the allies to take these weapons. They had to invite us to make these deployments. This was orchestration, in that they knew that they had to ask; and they knew that
if they asked, we would make the deployments. So, Schmidt got far enough out on a limb that he endorsed the deployment. This is my sense, that there was indeed no question that Schmidt, who had to be the leader on this subject because the key deployment of nuclear weapons presumably would be in Germany, whether there were ER weapons in other areas. The most likely storage facilities would be in Germany, so Schmidt had to make this kind of endorsement. He did. Then Carter decided to rethink it all. His decision to rethink it was a type of decision that was completely inexplicable at the time. I had one ambassador for whom I later worked, Reg Bartholomew, who was in the NSC at that point and was dealing with this issue. He said to me years later that he received an endless stream of phone calls, and he answered none of them. He said that somebody came to him and said, “Yes, Reg, your lack of an answer was profound.” We had no answer. There was no explanation. There was no defense for what the President had done. We got Helmut Schmidt out on a limb, and we sawed it off and left him standing there in midair. There was no way in which you could figure this decision on Carter’s part. It left one speechless. All we could do as a result was say, “Well, we’re rethinking it. It’s delayed rather than stopped. We’re reconfiguring.” Try to make some sort of rational explanation out of what was going on in his mind. It was, “Well, what’s the parallel? Paul on the road to Damascus? This Rose Garden decision…?” This decision left us with no idea on how it had happened. At that point, there was the general expectation that European confidence in Carter just disappeared. Ostensibly, they met with him, everyone was very straightforward, we were all together, one for all, all for one, but there was the feeling that Carter had lost essential trust or essential appreciation in his decision making, that he was not reliable, and that everything that followed after that, what happened in his reactions to the Russians in Afghanistan, in his reaction to the seizure of American hostages, the Europeans always said the right thing and could be bulldozed into doing things like not participating in the Olympics in Moscow, okay, but it was that they were going through the forms with us because they had no other choice than to continue to play on our team. But the team captain was just not reliable.

Q: How did this affect you all? Did you have the same feeling?

JONES: It was one of these situations where, when Carter was elected, I said, “What we really need is a successful President. We have had a series of terrible problems. We had Kennedy assassinated. We had Johnson destroyed in office. We had Nixon’s Watergate. We had Ford who was never considered presidential timber before he became President, almost a caretaker President. Whether you’re in favor of Carter or you voted against him, what we really need is a successful presidency, whether it was four years or eight years.” I had some serious hopes for this. I thought that Carter was a very bright man. I’m always in favor of people that know something about nuclear energy and, as a result wouldn’t have had, I thought, an implicit fear or terror of nuclear energy as a conceptual basis of use. It was something for which I had serious hopes. As it was, his steady deterioration in the polls was, even with the foreign policy failures that I thought he had engaged himself in and been involved in, still puzzling. I couldn’t understand why his standing in the national polls declined as much as they did. Some of it I could see. Well, we really did have much higher rates of inflation that anyone wanted. We had had difficulties of that nature. But at the same time, I was saying to myself, “We don’t have domestic upheaval in the way that we had when our cities were burning at the end of the ‘60s. We don’t have real depression. We have an economic recession. We aren’t engaged in a foreign war overseas. We’re just out of Vietnam. Why is this man so far down in the polls?” NATO was
in Brussels with an endless flow of visitors that we had and the total ability to get just about anything in the media provided total information. I could see what was happening factually and not have a feel for it. On one visit, I came back to the United States as an Army reserve officer on a two week active duty tour. I saw two of my friends who were liberal Democrats. I went through the litany that I went through with you and said, “Is he really a 26% President?” They said to me, Dave, he’s worse than that.” Then the each gave me little vignettes on the level of his scheduling play at the White House tennis court and rewriting dedications badly on memorial plaques that left people with the sense that he was a good man and would have been great as your next door neighbor or your Sunday school teacher, but as a President, he was failing and just failing steadily. This was the impression that seeped out slowly but steadily wherever you were.

Q: This must have been rather disquieting as you moved ahead with NATO. Was there a feeling that we weren’t as strongly led a nation as we might be?

JONES: It’s something of a leading question. The fact is that the allies continued to play on our team because this was the only team in town, and they didn’t have any other choices. There were areas in which people were trying to push ahead. We thought we had brought the SALTII treaty to conclusion. This was a great success. I was involved with at least moving documents back and forth to Vienna in the last days and bringing material back to NATO so we could have briefings to explain what was happening to the allies. The allies were enthusiastic about the prospects for SALTII. They hoped to be able to move on to a SALTIII that was more tactically nuclear engaged or intermediate range engaged rather than the strategic arms reductions which SALTII was to be. We had hopes at least that MBFR was going to make some progress. We were regularly engaging the Russians with packages of proposals even though this was seen as a very long range slugging match in Vienna. These were exercises in which we were engaging the Warsaw Pact and trying to find ways in which to move beyond the confidence building measures of CSCE into something that would be real conventional force reductions. There was a nuclear package in the MBFR proposals that were being worked, the so-called Option 3. But these were areas in which, at least on the political-military side, aspects of NATO strategy were being steadily worked out. It was an incredible, and incredibly busy time.

Before I came over to talk to you, I thought I was going to have more time to prepare for this than I did in reading my diaries for the era. What I did was to get my diary from 1977. What I remember from reading this material is that a lot of it is just strictly personal. Our third child was born at NATO. Our children were about eight years old at that juncture. There are things of that nature. But looking at it, I see again the appalling hours which we worked, where regularly I was at the Mission until 9:00 PM and it was early when I left at 6:30. We worked every Saturday at least half a day. The relentless pace of this work was completely and totally exhausting. I have to say that it was one of these situations where I was in my mid-30s and by the end of the first year, I was beginning to think I was an old man. The only way I realized how totally exhausting the pace was was when I went back to the States for two weeks for an Army Reserve tour and worked from 8:00 AM until 5:00 PM and found that I had incredible amounts of energy. I went out and saw my friends and we went to dinners. I had all sorts of energy. I recognized that it wasn’t that I was getting old at 35. It was that NATO was so all consuming, so totally exhausting, so completely engaging, that there was nothing left of virtually any of us at the end
of a given working day. To have anything left over for family, for personal life, for much of anything except sleep was rarely available.

*Q:* How did the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan hit us? Was this just an affirmation that it was really an aggressive force?

JONES: It was a real shock. NATO certainly didn’t expect or predict that this was happening. We thought that Afghanistan was a sufficient enough Russian puppet that there was no need for them to do anything of this nature. We were more concerned that they were about to invade Poland and seize and overthrow the Polish government. We called emergency meetings and pulled people together and had consultations. Then we issued sanctions and things of that nature. My feeling was that we thought the Russians would make short work of anything in Afghanistan; that it wouldn’t be any serious problem for them. We never predicted that Afghanistan would become as politically brutal for them on any level of equivalence as Vietnam had been for us. If anyone had said, “Afghanistan will be Moscow’s Vietnam,” we would have laughed at them. Of course, it was never at that level of societal equivalence for them, but it became a brutally draining exercise. In some respects, we learned nothing from the Russian experience just as they had learned nothing from our experience in Vietnam, that trying to pacify a nasty, well armed, bloody minded people is a hell of a fight. We didn’t learn from the Russian experience in Afghanistan when we tried to impose our will in Somalia. So, that element of it, that portion of it, had much less effect on NATO than any of the other combination of events then in play. The seizure of our people in Teheran, the fear that the Russians were going to invade Poland and do to the Poles what they had done to the Czechs – these were more immediately pertinent than what was happening in Afghanistan.

*Q:* The Poles at this point had been going through reform.

JONES: Yes. This was communism with a more human face. This was Jaruzelski in control but seen as a more liberal Polish communist. There seemed to be some question about the Soviets’ perception of the Poles as a reliable ally. There was some perception that they were worried that their lines of communications through Poland might be less secure under the type of Polish government that was evolving. The entire question was one of how much strength Solidarity was gaining and whether Walesa was going to be a destabilizing figure so far as communist rule in Poland was concerned. There were flat predictions from very competent intelligence analysts that the Russians were going to move, that there was just no question, that it was just a matter of whether they moved today or tomorrow or next week or whenever. They just felt that the Russians were going to move on Poland.

*Q:* Was this accepted that if they did move, we would not intervene?

JONES: Yes. There would certainly be no military intervention. We would leap and scream politically, we would offer new sanctions of one sort or another, would take them to the UN, and would denounce them pillar to post. We would make them look as black as we could around the world to make political points wherever there was somebody who was a doubter that the Soviets were the unmitigatedly nasty SOBs that we all knew them to be. That sounds pretty hard line, doesn’t it? But there were no peaceniks at NATO.
You have to let me spend a minute or so talking about the Mission itself. This was not an embassy. This was a giant political-military section. It was a 90-person political-military section, of which the diplomats were only one portion of it. There was an entire floor’s worth of some of the most capable mid-rank military officers I have ever encountered. This was an exercise on their part of preparing for war, of preparing with the feeling that the military had throughout this period that they were going to have to fight outnumbered and win or there was no future for the West. Day after day, you got this reflection not necessarily from what they were saying or from the people out in the field, but they planned… When they ran their exercise, it was not always known whether this was for real or this was an exercise. Were the Russians going to come through the Fulda Gap? Were we going to be able to hold them? Was there any chance of holding them conventionally rather than having to go nuclear? Although we were morally, intellectually and politically prepared to go nuclear, this was nothing that anyone looked forward to. There was always the fear that the Russians were 10 feet tall. There was always the endless recollection of what their units were like, how tough their armored forces were, how much artillery they had, how capable they were in military terms. All the numbers were always recounted straight out so it was obvious that their numbers were always much greater than ours, let alone adding in their Warsaw Pact forces. It was a source of constant tension in a way that recedes into the background like a dull headache that only becomes a migraine occasionally, but you always knew it was there if you spent a little bit of time thinking about why we were there. It was a regular worry. The NATO mission, as an operation, as a result was really driven by the United States. We were the locomotive that was hauling the entire apparatus all the time. As a result, our meeting schedules were amazingly intensive and frequently intrusive. The schedules were such that we had a major meeting every Thanksgiving Day. It was impossible to prepare for the ministerial meetings that were later early in the month of December unless we had a wide range of preministerial meetings. That required for us, as Americans, to be meeting on Thanksgiving Day every single year – not all day long, fortunately, but every single Thanksgiving Day, we were running tough, infinitely detailed preparation meetings where every single word and phrase was struggled over and consulted upon, trying to get 15 NATO nations to agree. It was a very, very detailed task requiring just endless patience, endless consultation, endless flexibility and discussions with Washington, with key allies, with the NATO international staff, and good leadership and good fellowship.

Q: Was there the feeling there by 1980 by the time you left that America had pulled up its socks and its military was getting better or was there concern about the capabilities of our military?

JONES: By the time I left NATO, there was no reason to know one way or another whether Carter was going to win and continue nor were we out of the “America held hostage in Teheran” problem. We were just at the beginning stages of INF deployments, which was one of the things with which I was much engaged for an extended period of time leading up to a 12 December 1979 combined ministerial decision.

Q: Could you talk a bit about that?

JONES: Let me back off on that and give that to you the next time.
Q: Today is May 3, 1999. INF. What does that mean and what were you doing? This is the ’76-’80 period.

JONES: Yes. The INF issues were the intermediate nuclear range force issues. They were a spin-off, an evolution, from theater nuclear force modernization topics, about which we have had a little bit of discussion already. The entire exercise was designed to bring matching U.S. intermediate range nuclear forces into Europe on a modernized basis to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments during this time period. There were long, convoluted, and extremely agonized-over political set of decisions in Europe throughout this entire period. The Europeans were probably even more nervous concerning it considering the problems that they had had with the neutron bomb exercise, and it took them a long time to convince us that they were truly serious about the requirement for a U.S. counter to SS-20s. We had argued during this earlier timeframe that U.S. strategic forces, that U.S. SACEUR committed ballistic submarine missiles were sufficient to counter the modernized SS-20s. The Europeans, however, did not believe that and believed that it was indeed necessary to have a visible U.S. component on the ground, something that would not be able to fly or float away, something that was not an aircraft, not a submarine, but a visible commitment by the United States on the ground. The exercise then began throughout 1979 to work on a series of Special Group [SG] and High Level Group [HLG] analyses of what would be a proper and sufficient counter to the Soviet SS-20s. The HLG effort was to examine what the hardware would be, what appropriate mix of ground launched cruise missiles [GLCMs] and Pershing IIs, which was a follow-on with longer range and greater accuracy, to the Pershing I, which had been deployed in Europe for many years. After a great deal of discussion within the HLG and examining various mixes of missiles, they came up with a final combination of Pershings and GLCMs. GLCMs had a “TERCOM” guidance, a terminal ranging guidance, that followed contours of the earth and allowed for much more precise targeting than had ever previously been the case.

Q: What were you doing?

JONES: I was an action officer at NATO doing a good deal of the support for the SG, the political side of this effort. In this case, it was an effort for us to locate substantial European basing countries, countries that would accept U.S. cruise missiles. The Germans did not wish to be the only European host for INF. They wanted another host that was actually on the European continent. That is, a host that was not the UK. So, we had an extended ongoing persuasive diplomatic exercise with each of our European allies to determine who else would accept cruise missiles or Pershings.

Q: You’re saying the Europeans said we should have something that’s not going to fly or float away. At the same time, we were trying to persuade people to accept them.

JONES: Yes, that’s a good point. The point essentially was the politicized concerns that we were getting from the European populations at the same time. The officials who were at senior levels in the European governments, also wanted to make sure that that it was being done in a way that their populations – or at least the left side of their political spectrum – could be forced into
accepting rather than the deployments being viewed as something that the Americans forced on them. The Germans, while they were willing to do this, didn’t want to be the only target in Europe. As a result, they were an object for Soviet pressure. So, we spent a good deal of time on this. Fortunately, about in May 1979, the Italian government, which we had not expected to be forthcoming and be receptive for a basing agreement because of the relatively strong presence of an Italian Communist Party (CP), indicated to us that they would be willing to accept INF basing. So, with the Italian agreement, we then were able to work harder on several other European allies to be willing to accept basing. We worked in particular for the Belgians and the Dutch to accept these systems. It was this type of process which also, then from the Dutch side, led to a second parallel track. The first track would be the deployment track of the systems. But the second track would have to be, in the Dutch view (and this had quickly become the general European view), that we had to have a negotiating track as well, that we had to be able to offer to the Soviets a proposal that we would not deploy if they did certain things. The primary requirement on our part was that they would have to withdraw, destroy, do something with their SS-20 missiles, or severely limit them in some manner. This was not by any matter being spelled out at that point, but there was perceived a need to have a political negotiating track for the INF effort as well as simply a deployment track to counter the SS-20s on the ground. We also recognized that it would be easier to sell deployments to European populations if we deployed in the face of Soviet recalcitrance to negotiate meaningful agreement. The expectation was not that the Soviets would agree. I don’t think anybody expected the Soviets to agree to anything. But for us to have a better and more effective political cover for our own deployments, the political track was regarded as vital.

Q: Did you sense that this deployment was almost being forced on the Americans because of the SS-20s? Or were they saying, “I’m glad they did it because now we can put these things in?”

JONES: This was a curious ambivalence. Certainly at the beginning in about 1976, we argued vigorously to the Europeans that we didn’t need anything more. This was going to be an expensive exercise. Making these systems was not going to be cheap. At the same time, there were people within our own structure that wanted to deploy more effective modernized theater nuclear forces because of the problems that I’ve explained a little bit earlier on what would happen if you used aircraft to provide your nuclear strikes. As a result, there were certainly people in the U.S. when these systems were being developed that wanted to be able to deploy them and deploy them fairly extensively to give themselves, in their argument, a better ability to handle any conventional war that might evolve. At the same time, there were also people that saw these as better, more effective nuclear systems with far better guidance and accuracy as a consequence and that viewed them as prospectively a heck of a lot more effective than the nuclear systems that we had in Europe at that time – old Pershing Is and only the aircraft that were able to deliver nuclear strikes at an intermediate range. As it evolved, it came to this more or less famous 12th of December 1979 decision in which all of this effort was supposed to be brought together and everybody was supposed to be agreed at that point and sign off on a deployment decision. This first group was the defense and foreign ministers meeting together at NATO for a Defense Planning Committee. It turned out to be perhaps the most chaotic meeting that I ever was involved in in my career. As it evolved, neither the Dutch nor the Belgians were finally agreed on their willingness to accept INF deployment.
Q: I assume before you had the meeting that they were supposed to be all on board.

JONES: Yes. Again, that was our expectation. We were having Special Group and High Level Group meetings about once a month or once every other month as this evolved. Indeed, as far as I ever had the sense going into the meeting, we thought that it was ready.

Q: This meeting was in December 1979.

JONES: What happened at that meeting was that, without recalling the details precisely, both the Belgians and the Dutch were not as decided as we believed them to be. There was enormous effort put on them. Reg Bartholomew, who had become the head of the Special Group meeting, tells a story of how he had one of these senior foreign ministers in a corner and was pounding away at him and somebody came up behind him and said, “Say, old chap, you really shouldn’t be pushing him quite so hard. Let me.” It was the British foreign minister who wanted to put him to one side and hammer on the Dutch. So, this was a meeting that ran on and on and on. As a consequence, the special celebratory vin d’honneur at the end of it was never held. For me, this was particularly interesting in its own way because it was my 15th wedding anniversary. The very first thing in the morning I got up early. I went to the store. I got chocolates and then went to the airport to meet David Aaron. I met him at the airport at something like 7:00 a.m. in order to get back to this meeting. At the meeting itself, we then struggled for hours and hours and hours on this session. The meeting itself broke up sometime well past 8:30 p.m. in the evening with what they believed then to be agreement and actually was sufficient agreement. Then I spent another two and a half hours or so writing my portions of reporting telegrams on this meeting, after which I liberated a bottle of champagne from this never held vin d’honneur and took it home, and my wife and I had chocolates and champagne at 11:30 at night on our wedding anniversary. But we did get enough of an agreement for it to go forward and to have it announced that we did have an agreement for deployment. It was clearly designed to be one that would be held in conjunction with negotiating proposals that would be eventually created, eventually devised, to work with the Soviets. That is how the INF agreement itself got started.

From there on, for the rest of the time that I was at NATO until the summer of 1980, we worked on the evolution of the Special Group, which had then become the Special Consultative Group. We began and continued to design possible hypothetical proposals that could be made to the Soviets and how deployments would be arranged and in what timing sequences. Our own deployments. How the agreed upon new INF systems, the GLCMs and the P-IlIs, would eventually be made. What countries would get them in what timeframe, when they would arrive, what would arrive at different times, which countries would be the last to have deployments. In each of these countries as years went by and the negotiations were very slow and there were ruptures in the negotiations that were held eventually with the Soviets in Geneva, the negotiations were very complicated and very slow. There were efforts on the part of the Russians to come to some sort of an agreement to prevent U.S. deployment efforts and, on the Allied side, to get parliamentary agreement in each one of the countries for the deployments. What you had on December 12, 1979, was a commitment to do so, but, as time went on, each of the countries involved in effect had an election. The election was fought at least partially on the fact of the existing commitment to accept INF deployments. At each juncture, the Soviets and their sympathizers within the individual countries attempted to put enough pressure on the electorate
or offer blandishments of one sort to counter their threats that there would be a change of government, which would have reversed the NATO decision.

Q: It wasn’t completely Soviets and their supporters, but also the indigenous socialist left-wing groups in Europe who just didn’t like nuclear weapons.

JONES: I agree with you completely. These were members of the old left and members of the new left. When I said Soviet sympathizers, it means that to the extent that these people sympathized with the Soviets on this particular issue, I would say that they were Soviet sympathizers. Again, throughout this entire period, what I was doing was working on some of these issues simultaneously, both the end of SALT II, which had come to a conclusion in early 1979 and which I provided a tiny little part of the drama by flying to Vienna to pick up the text of the SALT II agreement and bringing them back to NATO for distribution. We need to demonstrate the small degree to which they had anything to do with the Allies so that the Allies would be able to see that the text of the agreements did not threaten their interests or NATO interests.

I also worked and continued to work through 1980 when I departed on MBFR, that is, conventional force reductions in Europe to match conceptually, at least, the nuclear reductions, about which we were talking to the Soviets at all times. But MBFR has now been lost from memory and is one of the failures of negotiating history. But for quite a number of years, it was a primary focus of our negotiations with the Soviets and, for that matter, with the Warsaw Pact as well. Since it dealt with conventional forces throughout Europe, we had a NATO Warsaw Pact negotiation in Vienna. I vaguely remember it started in ’73. You can see that it had already been running for six years by the end of the ‘70s. There also there were elements of a nuclear package involved in these MBFR negotiations, a so-called Option 3, an option which would have withdrawn a certain number of nuclear weapons and reduced a certain number of aircraft and missile systems. But, for me, for the most part, I was working on the MBFR Working Group. This dealt more with technical studies that were being prepared for the negotiations for our side. Some of these negotiations lasted internally for more than a year. We worked on what was called Associated Measures Paper. That system and discussions of it within the Alliance ran for probably about a year and a half. I remember arranging a birthday party for the Associated Measures Paper at its one year mark. The measures that were being discussed are those that were linked to what kind of an agreement you might have in the way of confidence building of one sort or another, notifications, types of inspection routines, what kind of inspections might be held, how they would be held. We had another major paper that was called a Flank Security Paper, which was a special concern to both the Nordics and of very special concern to the Turks, who were convinced for any number of reasons that if the Russians reached agreement on force reductions in Central Europe, they would pull them back to threaten the northern and southern flanks. So, the Turks and the Nordics in particular wanted agreements to any MBFR presentation that would guarantee that the Soviets did not simply reschedule their forces and put them in positions that would create greater insecurity for Greece and Turkey, more prominently for Turkey, and, for Norway in particular, in the north.

Q: What was the attitude during this period? This was the Carter administration, which came in a little bit starry eyed as far as thinking things could happen. At least this is my impression. Was
there concern in NATO that the United States might not show sufficient will and be too interested in agreement?

JONES: Well, I’ve already gone through with you in some detail the associated elements of the neutron bomb fiasco. My feeling is that there was a spillover into extraordinary, convoluted, detailed discussions that literally went on for more than a year and a half on some of these papers and some of these studies. There was and had been for many years also the feeling that MBFR’s negotiations were really designed to prevent what were then called “Mansfield Amendment reductions.” Senator Mike Mansfield had, in effect, said, “If you don’t reach agreement, we should withdraw forces.” Partially to stave off the Mansfield Amendment reductions that would have been unilateral U.S. reductions, The U.S. and NATO started the MBFR reductions, negotiations at least, to hold off congressional pressure to take unilateral force cuts. Unilateral U.S. forces cuts would have been seen as an indication that we were losing a commitment to Europe and/or stimulated Europeans not to build up their forces in response but to cut their forces as well, which, in theory, would have made all of Europe more vulnerable on the one side to a potential Soviet conventional attack but at the same time might have made the prospect of a nuclear war in Europe more likely if the Soviets had attempted a conventional attack and we had been even less able to withstand a conventional attack and had to respond with nuclear weapons sooner rather than later. But there was also always the feeling that there was a good deal of a “place-holding” operation going on in Vienna to talk a great deal about these reductions without a true expectation that they would come to fruition. An analyst in INR named Robert Baraz, who since has died, used to think that we might find ourselves out-clevered by the Russians by eventually presenting them with the proposal that we didn’t expect would be accepted but the Soviets would say, “Done.” He used to put it this way. “If you stand in a shower bending over looking for the soap long enough, somebody is going to….” But that never happened with MBFR. MBFR despite efforts by its leadership, which apparently took it more seriously than other people within the establishment, continued to flail vigorously during the late ‘70s/1980.

Q: We’re talking about December 1979. Our embassy had been taken over in Iran. We were worried about that falling apart. And then the invasion of Afghanistan. I would have thought this would have stiffened the spine.

JONES: Well, we did immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have a frenzy at NATO of senior people coming for consultations and a very high level of effort to determine what could be done and what we could do. This led to more sanctions being placed on the Soviets and an effort to do things. This was the stimulus to stop holding the 1980 Olympics. But in NATO, there was a sense of shock in this regard. We did not expect this type of action against Afghanistan. We believed that the Soviets had as much control over Afghanistan as they had any need to or desire for, that we had been in effect pushed out of the competition in Afghanistan, and that we had lost the influence battle in Afghanistan to the Soviets. When the Soviets invaded, it was our sense that they would make rather short work of any afghani resistance. We just didn’t think that the Afghans would be able to hold up against them very long. Yes, there would be places in the Khyber Pass that nobody would be able to go to in small units, but, so far as actually controlling everything of Afghanistan that needed any controlling, the Soviets wouldn’t have any trouble doing that. At the same time, we were also extremely incensed about what had happened in Iran. Of course, as diplomats, we felt even more angry that these were our people
that had been seized, were being held, and that nothing was going on. We felt that nothing was being accomplished, that we were acting weak. I personally felt that we should indeed make far stronger threats against Iran to force the return of our people under whatever circumstances were necessary to get them back. I felt that all we were doing in the long-delayed exercise over our captured hostage diplomats was to set up a circumstance where the same kind of incident would happen again and again and again. We were unable to respond effectively. Then when we attempted and failed in Desert One to actually do something, it was an even less happy an incident and episode.

Q: Particularly seeing what the Soviets did in Afghanistan, did this change the equation as far as you all were concerned about stiffening NATO as far as accepting cruise missiles and Pershings and that sort of thing?

JONES: It was at least a momentary endorsement of the decision which literally had been made only days earlier. The point was that over a period of time this stiffening softened and wore down and we had to refight the battle in every election campaign that was held in each of the perspective basing countries with the Soviets at the same time having started in their discussions in Geneva to urge us to push for a variety of freezes and no deployments that would leave them with very substantial numbers of SS-20s and us with nothing in the way of deployments. There were complicated proposals put forward that still would have left us with a handful of deployed INF but we would not have equality with the Soviets and that also was the bottom line on our proposals. Whether we built up to these ceilings or not, our agreements with the Soviets had to be based on equality in the way of deployments.

JACK MENDELSOHN
Political-Military Affairs, USNATO
Brussels (1977-1979)

Mr. Mendelsohn was born in California in 1934. He received his Bachelor’s Degree from Dartmouth College and his Master’s from the University of Chicago. His foreign assignments include Port-au-Prince, Warsaw and Brussels. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on February 12, 1997.

Q: And you were in NATO from when to when?

MENDELSOHN: ’77 to ’79, two years.

Q: And when you say NATO, what do you mean?

MENDELSOHN: I was assigned as a Political-Military Affairs Officer to the U.S. Mission, NATO, in Brussels, Belgium. I worked in what would be in effect the U.S. Embassy to NATO. There is a U.S. Embassy to Belgium, and there is a U.S. Embassy to the, at that time, Economic Community, now the Economic Union. So we actually have three Embassies in Brussels. One of them is NATO. That was considered the most important one. Belgium is a small country so it
was important, but the big action of course was the Multilateral Headquarters at NATO. I was one of about eight or nine officers in the Political Section. At the time most of us were FSO-3s.

Q: That’s about the Colonel level in the old...

MENDELSOHN: There may have been one junior, and then there was one senior, and there was of course a Counselor for Political Affairs. At the time the Counselor was Orme Wilson and the Ambassador was Tap Bennett. I can’t remember his real first name.

Q: William Tapley Bennett.

MENDELSOHN: I guess it was William Tapley Bennett. Right, thank you.

Orme Wilson was a friend of Tap’s. He sort of asked him to come on. They both have died, I guess, since then so maybe I can speak freely.

Q: ...leadership and our mission at NATO and the approach and all.

MENDELSOHN: Right. Our Deputy was Mike Glitman, Maynard Glitman, who went on to be Ambassador to Belgium.

Tap Bennett was a sweet guy. He was not into the nitty-gritty but there was too much nitty-gritty. I mean there were thousands of different things going on. It was impossible for anybody except a specialist to keep up with each of those individual specialty items. You had a lot of officers there. But Tap was very good at getting briefed and going in and doing what you told him to do.

He was also a people-person. He was an old-fashioned diplomatic type. When he put his arm around you, you felt really good. He could talk you into almost anything. He was very reasonable and perfect from a junior officer’s point of view. You know, you’d say he took instructions very well! He did a very good job. He was not a brilliant strategist. He was a good tactician. He ran the Embassy well. He was very likeable. I think his colleagues among the other ambassadors or representatives, as they were called to NATO or the NATO Council, liked him very much and he did a very good job for the U.S.

Mike Glitman was very sharp. He was kind of the brains and the ‘sparkly’ part of the operation. He was a very good Executive Officer for Tap. If Tap got instructions, you know, to draft a *communiqué* that reflects the following seven points, Tap would give it to Mike Glitman. Mike would do a terrific job, protect everybody’s interests and do it very well. I liked Mike very much and I, as an action officer for arms control, worked very closely with Mike. And of course whenever those issues came up it would be my job to brief the Ambassador in the morning meeting before he would go to the Council meeting. He was very good. You had to write up everything for him and he would follow them. You know, he ‘took instructions very well.’

The person that I had the most trouble with and who was in a way largely responsible for my leaving early… I got a four-year assignment, which I wanted. I left after two years because it was boring in the following sense. The Political Counselor, who was Tap’s man, Orme Wilson, was
way too conservative for my tastes. This was a guy who would never make a recommendation that hadn’t already been made so he would be sure not to cross a wire. Each of the action officers had various committees that they dealt with. I dealt with what was called the Special Political Committee, which was the one that managed the MBFR negotiations for Jock Dean, who was in Vienna at that time.

Q: Mutual Balanced Force Reductions.

MENDELSOHN: Which turned into the Conventional Forces in Europe Reductions. It eventually turned into a very successful and important agreement. At the time it had been marking time for six years and was going to mark time for another six years before we really turned it into something serious.

But if ever I made a recommendation at the end of a meeting of the Special Political Committee saying, well, nobody around the table seems to care about this approach, why don’t we try this approach, Orme would always try to stop it. He would say, “Are you sure this will be well received in Washington?” I would say, “Well, I don’t know, let’s give it a try.” It was always a fight to say anything because he was afraid of being criticized or of getting the Ambassador criticized.

If he wrote a cable back to Washington I’d come into his office and he would have out the chrons from the last two years, making sure he didn’t say anything that hadn’t been said before. For someone who had just been wheeling and dealing on the SALT delegation as the Special Assistant to the Ambassador, who had been hawking his wares at the Naval Academy where no midshipman is going to stand up and criticize, well to come and find a guy who was so unwilling to think big... Mike Glitman was not, but you had to get your stuff through Orme Wilson. Sometimes, to Orme’s credit, sometimes he would just let me deal with Mike directly and there it was a lot better.

But I just found that so inhibiting, you know. I felt I was a big high flyer and I got there and I was one of half a dozen FSO-3s. It was a comedown in a sense in my own mind. Although NATO is a very good assignment and it is a very interesting place and I liked it very much that was the only, and I repeat this, it was the only Foreign Service assignment that I wound up really not liking as much as I could or should have. I basically liked everything else I had to do in the Foreign Service. This one I didn’t because I felt there was no premium for initiative and there was an awful lot of structure. It was a little bit confining.

Q: Jack, one of the things on a job like this, you couldn’t fly but at the same time you were learning a structure, you working on an alliance. This obviously played up in later times. This was one of those times when one may be spinning one’s personal wills but enhancing one’s knowledge of the system.

MENDELSOHN: Absolutely.
PERRY J. STIEGLITZ  
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS  
Brussels (1977-1980)

Perry J. Stieglitz was born and raised in New York. He entered USIS in 1961. His career included assignments in Laos, Paris, Marseille, Thailand, and Brussels. Mr. Stieglitz was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in May of 1992.

Q: Well, we shall leave Bangkok now and proceed to Brussels.

STIEGLITZ: Jim McGinley's advice to stop being a CAO came sharply to mind soon after I arrived in Brussels. The PAO there was, if anyone can be so described, truly anti-cultural.

Q: Who was that?

STIEGLITZ: You are asking me all the names, Lew, of people I would rather not identify by name, but here goes -- it was James McIntosh. He had a shaky reputation. When he was serving at a certain African post, his staff went on strike -- they could no longer stand him. But he had some powerful friends in the Agency, including our woman now in Rome, Jody Lewinsohn.

At the Brussels cultural center, there is a beautiful space for art exhibits, in the handsome library. I naturally was eager to make use of it, and when a cable came from the art section of the Agency offering us a traveling Motherwell exhibit, I immediately drafted a cable saying, "As soon as possible." The cable had to be approved by the PAO, that is, McIntosh. My draft was returned the following day with his note on it stating, "Let's have no more such dilettante stuff."

The problem: the American Ambassador to Brussels was a remarkable woman by the name of Anne Cox Chambers. She is the head of the Cox family and the Cox Foundation of Atlanta, and her newspapers had supported Jimmy Carter for the presidency. Carter chose Anne to be his ambassador to Brussels, and she was determined to be the very best ambassador possible -- nothing was to stop her from this goal. Some at the embassy, including McIntosh, looked down upon her as a political appointment.

The Ambassador was seriously interested in art. She is active in the Atlanta Art Museum and on the board of the Museum of Modern Art in New York. She found herself with a PAO who was completely negative to her suggestions. She had heard from a mutual friend that I was coming out, and when I arrived she greeted me and would from time to time call me to her office to discuss cultural programs.

Knowing the suspiciousness of the PAO's mind, each time I met with her, I would report to his office and tell him that the Ambassador had asked me to see her and wanted this or that programming. He would sort of mumble, "Why isn't she telling me? Why is she telling you?" I tried to be discreet, but knew there was an obvious relationship problem.

Finally one of his actions caused her to ask Washington for him to be replaced. Then I learned that McIntosh had been telling his friends back in the Agency that I had been under- cutting him.
trying to knife him. He made me out to be the villain in the piece. Although I had previously received excellent fitness reports, his parting gift to me was an unsatisfactory fitness report. Anne Chambers in her statement appended on to it flatly contradicted his appraisal of me, claiming that I was outstanding.

This is the sort of thing that is apt to happen in any organization, and it surely did happen within the Information Agency. I can laugh about it now, but I wasn't laughing then -- it was thoroughly unpleasant.

However, I stayed on in Brussels for four years. Having the great support of the Ambassador meant that I could do things in a big way -- for instance, have Van Cliburn play for her dinner guests, or put on an exhibit in my center of Saul Steinberg that received a three-column story and photo in the Herald Tribune. Those were heady days.

Q: Was the Ambassador there during the entire period you were there?

STIEGLITZ: Yes, the entire period.

Q: It concluded, I presume, with the demise of the Carter administration.

STIEGLITZ: As soon as he was defeated, she resigned. Moune and I continue to see Anne Cox Chambers -- we are good friends. Knowing her and working with her was a great joy. But the McIntosh part -- and he was supported by the Agency -- left a bad taste.

Q: Yes, I had one experience like that that I documented in my interview. Was Brussels your last Agency assignment?

STIEGLITZ: It was. I was just sixty, and they were cutting back on the retirement age.

WILLIAM A. WEINGARTEN
Economic Officer

Mr. Weingarten was born in New York in 1936. He received his BA from Colgate University and his MSFS from Georgetown University. He served in the U.S. Army overseas from 1958-1961. His postings after entering the Foreign Service in 1962 included Paris, My Tho, Belgrade, Brussels, Canberra and Ottawa. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 29, 1999.

Q: So you went to Brussels in '77, and you were there till when?

WEINGARTEN: '81.

Q: And what was your job?
WEINGARTEN: I was at the embassy there, and I was again -

Q: Which embassy?

WEINGARTEN: Oh, the embassy to the Belgians. I was one of the three economic officers, and I did pretty much the same things that I did in Yugoslavia and got into energy a little bit more, did science work. I did science, labor, economic-commercial stuff. That was the time when the commercial service was split off from the economic part of the house, and we resented that because we thought that we'd provided very good service to American businessmen. Everywhere I'd been we had. And I remember somebody from the Commerce Department coming in looking at my office and at one point saying to me, "Well, this is going to be a nice office. I'll really enjoy working here." And as it turned out they didn't have the guns, couldn't do it. They got a huge number of posts, including most of the ones with a lot of largely commercial posts in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and they couldn't staff them. And they finally gave them back to the State Department, minus, of course, the positions. And the State Department had to staff those places from static resources. The Commerce Department kept the places in Europe, nice posts, but they were still, in our view, very weak on the basics, and they could not give really good advice to businessmen because they weren't experienced enough, didn't know enough about the countries they were in, both developed or undeveloped. Now I can tell you a story later about that when we get to Australia.

Q: How did you find Belgium at this particular time? It's always been sort of in the heartland of the economic world and all, but what was your impression there?

WEINGARTEN: Impression of Belgium? It was very highly developed, was crippled by the linguistic divisions and also was a very high-cost place, and at that time - '77-'80, '81 - it was very, very expensive to live there on a dollar salary. The exchange rate was low the entire time. It struck me the more you got into the Belgian economy, the more you realized it was just an adjunct of the German economy. It was the supplier of one thing or another to the German economy, and it was tied to kind of an informal Deutschmark grouping within the European Community. And the Germans pretty much dictated the level of interest rates. If they raised interests rates, everybody else was obliged to do so. But it was a very comfortable society. People were very capable and highly developed. Terrific infrastructure, roads, railroads, telephone system - the whole thing worked much better, as I recall, in terms of infrastructure, than France in the '60s. It was a pleasant place to be, very easy to live there - great food, very friendly people.

Q: Did you find that the Flemish-Walloon division inhibited the economics?

WEINGARTEN: Of the country?

Q: Yes.

WEINGARTEN: Oh, yes. It made for a great deal of inefficiency because they really did have two of everything - at least two of everything. They would have two postal services sometimes,
in areas like Brussels, which had a mixture of Walloons and Flamands. They'd have two different postal systems working the same street. They had, in Brussels anyway, which was one of the truly bilingual places of Belgium, and most of the shopkeepers and a lot of the people who worked there were Flemish but spoke really good French and were happy to speak French with you as an American. When you got out into the Flemish part of the country, people wouldn't speak French with you. Sometimes when you're overseas and you have a foreign language, that's the foreign language that comes out first wherever you are. But if you came out with French in Flanders, people would stare at you. They knew it perfectly well, but they didn't want to speak it. But then you'd speak English, and they were really good at English. That was another thing that was extraordinary in that country, that virtually everyone spoke English, and good English, and in higher levels of their army and bureaucracy they all spoke English, and in some cases in the army, rather than speak either French or Dutch, higher commanders would speak English to one another and write memos in English to one another. And so it was really a thing. It seemed to be a country that was at least coping with this problem. But it also had some other serious problems. They had a lot of dying industry down in the Walloon part. I followed the steel industry very closely with a lot of interest in the steel trade back in the States. And that was really a rust belt industry and way overmanned, underinvested, and just a pure loser. And they had a lot of restructuring to do, but it really was a highly developed country.

Q: Were you sort of carrying on a watching brief? I know in so many of my interviews when we get into Africa we get the Union Minière, and that and its influence in the Congo/Zaire. Was that at all a factor by this time?

WEINGARTEN: Oh, yes. I was the guy in the embassy who was charged with that, and I had a lot of contacts at the Union Minière, people that I got to like, saw fairly frequently, and these were the people that had a lock on the cobalt supply, and the cobalt was necessary to make jet engine rotors, and there apparently was no real substitute for it. Cobalt was very expensive, and these guys kept a monopoly on the production with their Zairois friends or colleagues or co-conspirators or whatever you want to call them, and they kept the price high, and a lot of people made a lot of money off that, and a lot of it was sort of misspent down in Africa. But we kept very close tabs on them.

Q: Were we trying to do anything to loosen them up on that, or we letting that sort of monopoly work its way?

WEINGARTEN: No, I think we sort of faced the facts. It was a monopoly. It would be hard to break it up - break it up into what? The Zairois company was called Gecamines. Gecamines was controlled by Union Minière and it worked in Katanga, the old breakaway part of the Congo. I don’t know that we could see any alternative at the time to the Union Minière, and what finally broke the monopoly, in effect, was that they kept the price too high, and so people started to search for substitutes for cobalt and they found some to make jet engine rotors for commercial jets, that didn't have to be made out of cobalt. The still needed the cobalt for fighter jets, much higher temperature rotors, I guess. We've never had a really conscious policy, as I remember, of trying to dismantle this monopoly.

Q: Who was the ambassador at the time?
WEINGARTEN: Anne Cox Chambers.

Q: How did you find her and her interest in the economic side?

WEINGARTEN: She didn't have all that much interest in the economic side of it. She was a Carter appointee who had been very influential on getting Carter known nationally and financed him very substantially in his election campaign.

Q: She was a publisher in Georgia, was that it?

WEINGARTEN: Yes, the Atlanta Constitution and the big investment is Cox Enterprises - cable TV systems, worth billions of dollars. And she and her sister owned the thing - they're both billionaires, and unlike a lot of people with that kind of money, she's very generous, so that the staff would get the benefit wherever it could. We had representational funds the ambassador never used. The embassy's representational funds would have disappeared in a New York minute the way she spent money, but she left it all to the troops, so I had a very large representation account, so I was able to entertain a lot of people - and always got repaid for it. She was very generous. She really liked being a part of the activity, seeing and meeting famous people, participating in meetings with the President and that sort of thing. And she was very jealous of her ambassadorial prerogatives, too. She had problems in keeping DCMs. We had three DCMs in the four years I was there. A couple of them were canned for getting too far into what she considered her zone, her prerogatives. But she was a good person. As I say, she was generous.

Q: I realize we had an embassy there dealing with what I guess was the European Union at the time, or was it the European Commission?

WEINGARTEN: The European Commission.

Q: The European Commission, but it went through several manifestations. But what was your impression of the Belgian connection to the European Union?

WEINGARTEN: Well, the European Union was very important for them and it gave them more of a voice in European affairs than they would have on their own, the size of the country and so on. They derived a lot of benefit from having it located in Brussels. A lot of money was spent by the European Commission in Belgium, in terms of salaries and building buildings to house these guys. They got far more out of it, I think, over all, than they were able to put into it. They were happy to have the European Commission there, although they complained about all the allowances and perks that people who worked for the Commission got - no taxes, breaks on cars, very substantial living allowances.

Q: I must say that looking at this whole European thing, they live quite well, don't they, these European representatives. What was your impression of the role of controls, bureaucracy, on the economy? I have the gut feeling that by the time the Europeans are through they'll strangle themselves by over-controls, particularly coming from the German and the French side, but how about Belgium?
WEINGARTEN: Yes, they had a lot of control, but the Belgians were used to this, and they were pretty good at evading needless restrictions. The whole country, where it could, it ran on a cash economy so people wouldn't report a lot of income. As a matter of fact, on their national accounts, they could never balance the national accounts because they always had a tremendous imbalance between what was produced and then what was reported as paid for. Any kind of personal service - you know, you get your car fixed, furniture repaired - people would always quote you a price in cash and a price if you wanted to pay by check. And so it always made sense to pay cash, and so they evaded it that way. There really was a lot of tax evasion.

Q: Did the political parties play much of a role in the economy, or even the royal family, or was this pretty much a business-run economy - business people running the economy?

WEINGARTEN: Yes, parties had major roles in business. Any kind of public contract was pretty much determined by the parties, and just before we left - I thought it was '81 - when they had big contracts. We sold them the F-16. We were in competition with the French, who wanted to sell them the Mirage, but we won it, and we think we won it fair and square, although I'm not so sure any more. I think there was a lot of money passed. We sold it. I was involved in doing some of the offset work. The Belgians and the Dutch all wanted to buy the plane, but they wanted to have the costs of these things offset by work that would be given them by General Dynamics.

Q: This is General Dynamics.

WEINGARTEN: General Dynamics, the maker of the F-16's. And so the embassy worked very closely with General Dynamics, so we won that contract, and we won it basically because General Dynamics realized that the people who ran the Belgian Air Force were all fighter pilots, and the F-16 was an incredibly quick airplane. And so what they did was they'd arrange things, they'd have all these guys out to the airport, and they'd have an F-16 on one runway and an F-4, which at that time was the first-run aircraft, and they'd have them both take off at the same time, and the F-16 would take off so much faster, and then it would loop, while the F-4 would take off. And the F-16 would already be on its tail. And the F-16 was so highly powered that if you revved the engine up on the ground you had to tie the wings down. So these guys loved this. This was just like riding a rocket as far as they were concerned, so that's what they had to have. So they persuaded the government that they had to have it. But there was a tremendous scandal with the helicopter contract, where the Italians sold them Bell Agusta choppers. And there was a tremendous amount of bribes paid for that. And somebody who was involved in it was a socialist politician, a Walloon politician involved in this, and he got murdered, and they never found out who did it. And a socialist who became the Secretary General of NATO, Willy Claes, a very capable guy, was forced to resign from fall-out years later from this helicopter scandal. But any big contract, anything that went out to bid, would quite probably have a kind of pot-de-vin attached to it, a kind of bribe. It was a very small country and very rich. It had a lot of public expenditure. And as we've seen since, it's a very carelessly run place. People escape from jail. Some very strange things go on in Belgium.

Q: Was there a large émigré group, say from the Congo or from Rwanda or the Belgian colonies, and did they play much of a role?
WEINGARTEN: No, not much of one. They had a lot of guest-workers, *Gastarbeiter*, from all over, but they had a lot of North Africans, Zairois, Rwandans, but they didn't play that big a role in the economy, it seemed to me. They weren't that visible in the economy, and they were mainly factory workers.

Q: *What about the unions? You think of France and the unions are into everything.*

WEINGARTEN: Yes, well, there are very strong unions in Belgium, too. They're tied to the political parties. They have French-speaking unions and Flemish-speaking unions. You get the impression, as I recall, that the unions were stronger in the Walloon part of the country because that was the declining region. The declining region is where the jobs were being lost, and they had some really derelict towns, towns which were one-industry steel mill towns, and they were really looking pretty bad by 1980-81.

Q: *You've been following this at this time. Why was it that the big steel complexes in the United States and Western Europe and all were going downhill at this time? Was the demand for steel going down, or was it being picked up somewhere else? I mean, what was causing this?*

WEINGARTEN: Well, partially it was technological and partially it was wage costs. And the wage costs were too high in the Western countries and the United States. And then the U.S. steel industry just didn't keep up with the technology of steel-making, and people like the Japanese and the Koreans did, and so they were able to undercut, sell steel at a much lower price, and so that's what caused it. But basically it was technological, because now, the United States is among the most competitive producers of steel in the world, beating out the Japanese and Koreans because we dismantled the whole old steel industry, closed it all down, and now we've got steel mills that use the technology, the oxygen furnace, which uses scrap iron and produces steel much, much cheaper than the old furnaces. And all sorts of technology. I don't know that much about the -

Q: *And a lot fewer people, too.*

WEINGARTEN: Lots fewer people, and they're non-unionized. And they're just leaner, and they're more fixed on producing steel that their customers want and when they want it.

Q: *I was consul general in Naples around this time, and there were a couple of steel mills outside of Naples, one in Taranto, and the problem was that the government couldn't shut them down because in those days they employed a hell of a lot of people, and so they were running them at a loss because they couldn't afford to throw 5,000 people out of work.*

WEINGARTEN: Well, it was a big problem back here, but they finally, in the '80s, shut down those big West Virginia and Pennsylvania mills, and really, we had the most competitive steel mills in the world.

Q: *Really?*
WEINGARTEN: Yes. So you could see all of these steel mills declining in Belgium for basically the same reasons. They were heavily unionized, high-cost, and high-cost raw materials and outdated technology - poor management too. The steel mills didn't benefit, basically, from very advanced management. They really were not in the vanguard.

Q: What about the port of Antwerp? That must have been a major engine in the Belgian economy.

WEINGARTEN: Yes, it sure was, no doubt about it.

Q: Were you watching this and how things were going there?

WEINGARTEN: We had a consulate general up there, so they would keep track of it. Pretty much everything on northern Europe either comes through Antwerp or Rotterdam, and both are gigantic ports. Both are very efficient ports, and they've got this tremendous infrastructure of roads and railroads that tie into them, and airports. But the whole thing is really integrated and really works.

Q: Were we watching that and picking up... I mean, were we looking at, say, a complex like this and passing on ideas, saying, Gee, this would work - why don't we do this in the States? Or do we just let industry pick this up for themselves?

WEINGARTEN: Where we would come across something that we thought was interesting and could be used in the United States, since I was the science officer there and was later science officer in Australia, you would see sometimes I really got to like the idea of reading obscure journals and going out and seeing things. One of the things I tried to push from Belgium was in situ coal gas, where you'd fire up some coal underground and then draw off the gas and use the gas, draw off this natural gas. And I used to write airgrams and send the documents about this process back to the Department of Energy, and I finally got them so upset that they wrote me and said, "Stop sending us this stuff. This wouldn't work in the States. The coal seams are different." But that sort of thing. Where we would find an innovation and report it back to the government, but then the government doesn't do very much with information like that back here. In Australia I remember finding somebody who had invented a natural replacement for red dye number two, the food color. Instead of costing $1500 a pound, which is what it costs to make it artificially, it cost $50 dollars a pound. So I wrote that up and sent it back. But once it goes back to the Department of Commerce, what do they do with it? You know, that's one of the poorest outfits in the U.S. government. I'm not sure they can get out of their own way, those people.

Q: Well, I'm told it's the most political -

WEINGARTEN: Commerce, yes.

Q: - Commerce, not so much that it's doing anything, but it's just a good place to put people, so it's loaded with political appointees who are sort of third-class people.
WEINGARTEN: Well, I tell you, it worked all the way down through the ranks of professional people, they were not held in very high esteem.

Well, anyway, we enjoyed Brussels. We really had a grand time, and we still have friends that we stay in touch with.

Q: Well, then in '81, whither?

WEINGARTEN: Australia.

Q: You were there from '81 to -

WEINGARTEN: '84. When I left, Washington in '77, I used to tell the story that I swore on the heads of my wife and kids that I wouldn't come back to Washington again, and so we went straight from Brussels to Australia and came back on home leave. That was another terrific post.

Q: Did your kids go away to school while you were in Brussels?

WEINGARTEN: No they all were in school in Brussels, at the American School there, which became my project. We got there and the school was terrible, the American school. It was a military school - a military school in the sense that it was an overseas school and had a lot of military kids in it, small school, but it was really badly run. So after a year or so I got on the school board and later became the president of the PTA, and we tried to get the State Department to pull the State Department kids out of it. It was drug-ridden; it was very badly run. And we got two of the ambassadors, Ambassador Chambers and Dean Hinton, who was the ambassador to the European Commission, supported the effort to get the State Department kids out of the school and get them an allowance that would enable them to go to one of the other two schools, the Brussels American School in Brussels and St. John's. Both were good schools, but the NATO ambassador didn't want to do that because he thought that the military kids would then have to go to a boarding school in Frankfurt and he wouldn’t get topnotch officers to work at NATO. So we finally wrote a memo or a telegram that was made into a memo and presented to Ben Reed, who was the secretary of the Department or whatever.

Q: Yes, he was the head of administration, I think.

WEINGARTEN: And it had the three alternatives, and as you always do, he was supposed to pick the middle one. That's the way it was written, like a Confucian essay. You're supposed to pick the middle one. He didn't pick the middle one; he picked one of the extremes. The extreme he picked was to give the military another chance, and so the military pumped all kinds of resources into the school, new people, new money, and so on, because we had a four-star general who was a kind of ally of mine, Bill Knowltan, who was at NATO, and four-star generals have amazing clout. So on a back-channel basis, he got all sorts of people in the Pentagon interested in this, and so he really transformed the school. And so the first year they did that it did have a major impact on it. They fired the principal, fired some dud teachers - you know, fired in the sense that they just moved them somewhere else within the Overseas School system. But the school turned around. They got a really tough principal who reinstilled discipline in it in a very
tough, no-nonsense kind of way. So the school still wasn't any kind of an intellectual... didn't really nurture kids in that respect, but at least we got rid of the drugs, we got a policy in force that people who had kids using drugs were themselves sent back to the States or the kids were sent back. I can tell you, the culture of the school - I had all three of my kids in it - and I couldn't afford to send them elsewhere - that's what really annoyed me. I didn't make enough money to pay the tuition, and you didn't get any support from the government if you did. And it really annoyed me because these other schools were much better. And so anyway we stuck it out with the school, and I was on the school board and was the president of the PTA in my final year. We did the best we could with it. Anyway, that's the one project I got into over there that I was really kind of wound up in, that I was really into in a big way.

ANNE COX CHAMBERS
Ambassador
Belgium (1977-1981)

Ambassador Anne Cox Chambers was born in Ohio. She graduated from Finch Junior College. She was involved in political activities in Georgia and worked for President Carter’s campaign. Ambassador Chambers was interviewed in 1985.

CHAMBERS: Because of plane schedules to Brussels -- at that time there was only a night flight -- I would have arrived, ruffled, in early morning. I decided I didn't want to arrive that way, so I flew to Paris and rested and then came on a train. I got in late in the afternoon, with a great friend of mine, who came with me as my staff aide. She was there almost a year, and that was invaluable, too, to have someone in the house just to talk to. Anyway, we arrived at the station in Brussels and the DCM and his wife met me, and we went in and had a glass of champagne with the station master.

Q: With the station master?

CHAMBERS: Yes; and that was all. Then I went back to the residence and was introduced to the domestic staff and then John Ritter said, "Your first appointment is at a certain time tomorrow." Apparently my secretary, who was standing in as secretary and then I later requested that she remain as my secretary, said that she went to him that morning and said, "Aren't you going to go to the residence and escort the ambassador?" "Oh," he said, "she can find her way." And so that is the way it started off.

Ambassador Firestone had left nine or ten months before I was appointed, so you see John Ritter had been in charge. I think he thought, first, [with] a political appointee (I had no experience, obviously), and a woman, that he was going to continue to be in charge.

Q: He cut you out of things? He didn't tell you what was going on?

CHAMBERS: Oh, no. He would just sort of announce what was to be done. I felt, I don't know if hostility is the word, but, certainly, I didn't feel any respect.
Q: No, a terrible lack of respect.

CHAMBERS: I felt no cooperation, and I didn't feel that I was informed. As I say, he'd just say, "You're doing this and this." But the thing that really decided me, and it was a little less than two weeks because one of my first appointments was to go down and see General Haig at Shape. I had my schedule and it said I was going with Dick Lawrence, who was the military attaché, who I liked very much. Well, that morning Sharon, my secretary, said that Mr. Ritter was going along. I said I didn't understand that; I thought it was just Colonel Lawrence. She said he just decided he wanted to go. So when we got near Mons, the driver said, "Would you like the flags on the car?" and John Ritter said, "No, that won't be necessary." I said that I would like the flags. I realized that was just really the last straw. It was a morning appointment and then I was to stay for lunch. So I got there, and very quickly the secretary came and said General Haig would like to see me, and John Ritter got up at the same time. The aide said, "The General will see the Ambassador alone." We talked for an hour and a half and he cooled his heels. Then Al Haig said, "We'll go and have lunch," and he added, "I must say that I was quite surprised to be notified that your deputy was coming along." That was when I realized there was just no way.

But it's strange how vibes are. We've all had to fire people. Haven't you found that sometimes the situation will have been so intolerable, and then suddenly, you haven't said anything -- but the first morning he ever smiled coming into my office was the morning I told him. How could he feel those vibes?

Well, about my secretary: when I was going back and forth to Washington, I was told I would have to choose a secretary; there wouldn't be one there. There were two women suggested, neither of whom I could interview, and the department recommended one woman. She was younger and apparently she spoke French, but I'd never seen her; I'd never even talked to her on the telephone. Well, she could not arrive until after I did, so Sharon Stilke was brought up from the floor below to fill in. I immediately liked her. She was from Oklahoma, and we really worked well together. The whole four years she called me, "Mrs. Ambassador." Everyone else, you know, said, "Madam." I really liked Sharon. Well, then, this other woman, Barbara, arrived, and I really didn't care for her. If I had met her I never would have selected her. Again, you see, I was such an amateur. She was very sort of prissy and uptight and she would flirt with John Ritter. I had the feeling that she didn't like working for a woman at all. I had the feeling she would have preferred a man. I felt that she was much more in his camp than in mine. Maybe if I hadn't gotten on so well with Sharon, but the difference was just striking. With Sharon, there was respect and asking me what I'd like to do. With Barbara, it was, "Well, this is the schedule." I'd say, "But I'd rather do it that way." Very soon I decided I wanted Sharon back, so I talked to Tim Towell whose secretary Sharon was. He was the protocol guy. He said if I wanted Sharon, that was fine, and he understood why I wanted her. I told John Ritter that Barbara really was not working out, and he said, "There are secretaries and there are ambassador's secretaries, and Sharon is not that." "Well," I said, "she's going to be, starting right now." She stayed the whole four years. She was just absolutely wonderful.

Q: She's devoted to you.
CHAMBERS: You just can imagine the difference it made. I told her the only thing that she ever forgot in the four years, and she was mortified by this: I wanted to sent a box of Belgian chocolates by a friend who was coming back to the US, and she forgot to have them picked up. That was the only thing.

Q: Is that right? Well, that's a pretty good record, isn't it?

CHAMBERS: Really! I talked to Tap Bennett. George Vest was my immediate boss, and Tap said, "You just tell George Vest what's going on." So that's what happened. But Tap gave me the strength to do it [to ask for Ritter's transfer].

I arrived in June and then in October, the then prime minister, Leo Tindemans, who is now the foreign minister, was going on an official visit to Washington, and so of course I went with him. When I arrived back in Brussels, I, again, arrived by train. All the officers were there; at least ten people with their wives, and I said, "But this is wonderful; what's going on?" They said, "This is the way your arrival should have been, and we all knew that." They were just appalled by John Ritter's reception of my arrival.

Q: You mentioned having called Jody Powell. He always answered you, but this particular time he called you from Air Force One. What was the problem? Can you recall why you had to get in touch with him?

CHAMBERS: Yes, I think there was a Belgian day at the Paris Air Show, and there was a Chinese official and they were talking about buying the F-16. They needed some advice from the embassy, because they didn't know which way to go. It was Dick Lawrence who was the military attaché, and we were out at the air show. So I said I would get somebody at the White House.

I guess Dick made the call; we were all sitting around. I said to ask for Jody Powell, because he was the one I would call, and we were told, "He's en route with the President to the talks in Vienna." Dick said, "Oh, dear, we really must talk with someone immediately." "Oh, well," they said, "We'll put you through to Air Force One." That was very good for all of the career people; they were very impressed that in ten minutes I got him.

Q: This is the advantage of a political Ambassador. How soon was that incident? Can you remember?

CHAMBERS: No. It must have been the following summer; at least the following summer, because the Air Show was always in June.

Q: Did you have any goals, sort of roughed out in your mind, of what you wanted to achieve while you were there?

CHAMBERS: No, no.

Q: You just wanted to tell what Carter was --
CHAMBERS: I often cut out quotations, and I was looking at one last night. It bears on what you just asked me, so let me go and get it.

"I never intended anything in my life. People don't understand that, but I've just drifted in and out, in and out. I had no star that I looked for or followed. My whole life has been an event."

Q: Really. And that sums yours up, too.

CHAMBERS: Well, really, I had no star that I looked for or followed. The girls of my generation, as my roommate at school said, "Nobody ever told us to be somebody, so we didn't."

Q: So you didn't.

CHAMBERS: Really. Of course, there were some people our age who did have a star, who did have a goal.

Q: Yes, but it was the exception.

CHAMBERS: Yes. I had no thought of a career. Everything has just sort of happened.

Q: Were you given instructions by the [Belgian] desk, before you left, to pursue any particular line?

CHAMBERS: No.

Q: Nothing crucial going on at the time that you were going to have to pick up?

CHAMBERS: No, because the F16 had been settled; that was it. The last two years, though, we were, even in my embassy, as well as NATO, busy with the decision of putting missiles in Belgium.

Q: That was the big thing then?

CHAMBERS: You know the Belgians are very influenced by the Dutch Parliament, and so they wait for them to vote. Then you know how those European countries just close down in the summer. We'd say, "We really must have a decision by the 15th of July." Well, then the Prime Minister is on holiday.

Q: I know exactly what you mean. They didn't make the decision before you left, did they?

CHAMBERS: Yes, finally.

Q: They did?

CHAMBERS: Yes, but then it was tentative, depending on Holland. Tap was just totally immersed in that.
What was I going to say, something about -- oh, yes, my friend, Natasha Spender, made a remark last summer -- we're about the same age -- talking about youth, or being the age we are, and she said, "Each era of my life has been better than the one before." And I thought about it, and I realized that I could say the same thing. I never thought in those terms at all. Again, I just relate everything BB, before Belgium and after. One thing that is sort of amusing about Coca Cola: I was elected to the board of Coca Cola, and then shortly after, Don McHenry [former US ambassador the U.N.] was also elected. And he calls the two of us "the odd couple;" which is true. He said, "You know it was just very good timing for us that we both got out of the Foreign Service when big companies were deciding they should have a woman and a black on the board." And it was true. But, as I say, I can't believe I would have been chosen as that woman if I hadn't had that experience in Belgium.

Q: To give you that high profile.

CHAMBERS: Even though I lived in Atlanta. Well, that's just my guess.

Q: We spoke before about the presentation of credentials and how your son rode along on his bicycle and waved at you, and then we moved to the restaurant and I didn't pick up on the end of that. Could you give me a little picture of how exactly you presented the credentials? How long it took? Did you withdraw Firestone's credentials before you presented yours?

CHAMBERS: No.

Q: You did not?

CHAMBERS: Oh, no. It really was very exciting. Our residence faces the Parc Royale. At one end of the Parc is the Parliament and at the other is the palace, and so whenever a new ambassador was presenting his credentials, the horses, with the riders, went by the residence and it is the most beautiful sight. If I had a guest or guests staying and we'd hear the horses, somebody would go and knock on their door and say, "Look out the window. Here they come, all in their uniforms, with beautiful horses." The fur was brushed in a checkerboard pattern and they would just gleam. It was just marvelous. So the Grand Marechal came to escort me in the King's Mercedes, which was practically like sitting in this sofa with two chairs. It was in the morning. I wore just a short dress, but my staff were all in white tie.

Q: Did you wear a hat?

CHAMBERS: No. I asked about that, but they said, no. We were received and then the King took me in the room by myself. He had really done his homework. He's very impressive; his knowledge, and such dedication. President Carter had, just before I came, made his speech at Notre Dame on human rights, and he mentioned that and he said that he hoped to meet the president, because his whole philosophy on human rights was so impressive and so the way he himself felt. I think I told you before I always felt that Carter's stand on human rights, on the Panama Canal treaty, and Camp David, all were far more appreciated in Europe than in this country.
Q: You mentioned that; yes. Don't you think as time passes they will be more and more appreciated here?

CHAMBERS: Yes, yes. Certainly, human rights will. So the King mentioned that. Then, of course, I called on the prime minister. Every person in the government mentioned that speech. Since it was June, there were several new ambassadors and the one, oh maybe a day or so after my presentation, was the ambassador from Thailand, and so at everything official we sat next to each other for four years. He had the dearest little wife. I'd never really had Thai food, so I used to go to their embassy.

So I was in Washington just a couple of weeks ago, and Perry Stieglitz, who was my cultural attaché said, "The new ambassador in Thailand would like to see you. Would you come and have drinks?" I said, "Well, that's very nice, but why does he want to meet me?" He said, "It's your old friend and he's just come to Washington as Ambassador." So that's a nice reconnection. Then the interesting thing, I had gone up to Washington for the Meridian House Ball because the Coca Cola company sponsored it this year, and I mentioned the fact that that was the reason for my coming, because of Coca Cola. He said that his family was one of five families who started the first Coca Cola bottling plant in Thailand.

Q: Isn't it odd, these coincidences?

CHAMBERS: Oh yes. His brother apparently is still very active in it, so he is very anxious now to come to Atlanta to do a presentation to the Mayor and to the city, the business people. We're setting that up for the spring. I told him I'd never been to the Far East, but the Coca Cola Company's October meeting will be in Japan. I said, "I finally now will be going there, so I want to travel around and go to other countries." Oh, he said, "That's wonderful."

Q: Was there any delay to your presenting your credentials? Was that within a week of the time that you arrived?

CHAMBERS: It was, I would say, ten days. I arrived in Paris at the time of the air show and I said I would like to go to it. Well, that was a problem because I would not have presented my credentials and it would not have been proper for me to go. So I didn't do that. June was a good month, before the King went on holiday. The National Day is July 21st, so that's why there were several new ambassadors at the same time. About the first week in July, we went to tea at Leghen Palace, which is just on the outskirts, where the King and Queen actually live. They had a tea for the new ambassadors, which was very nice. I think there were about nine of us. Then I remember meeting some other new ambassadors who arrived during the summer, and, of course, they really couldn't do anything; they couldn't start attending anything, so mine was good timing.

Q: And you took your country team with you?

CHAMBERS: Yes, I remember Gene Champagne all done up in white tie.

Q: How did the Belgians react to having a woman ambassador? You were the first woman
ambassador. Did they not care, because what was important is the fact that you were the [US] ambassador?

CHAMBERS: Yes, I don't think they did care. There was an article in a Brussels paper, maybe the Chamber of Commerce magazine, I can't remember what it was, but there was an article about me before I came. One of the things the article said was how much I liked shooting, and that was a great plus, because immediately I had invitations for that coming fall, and every weekend I went on these wonderful shoots. They were very pleased about that. No, I was told and I repeated it several times as a joke -- the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg is the sister of King Baudouin and neither of those families have much sense of humor, so I doubt this -- but the story was that the Luxembourg Royal family called and said, "If you don't want a lady ambassador, we can tell you how to get rid of her." Apparently, when a new ambassador was being appointed to Luxembourg they said, "We've had enough women. We want a man." And that's when Jim Lowenstein was appointed. But the King, supposedly said, "Oh, no, we don't object; we've never had a woman, and so that's perfectly fine."

Q: US relations with the Belgians were, as they usually are, very good at the time you arrived?

CHAMBERS: Oh, yes.

Q: What was the size of the mission? How many people did you have working for you? Was it a couple of hundred?

CHAMBERS: Oh, more than that.

Q: More than that?

CHAMBERS: Yes. Does 350 sound reasonable?

Q: That sounds reasonable, yes. That big a mission?

CHAMBERS: Yes.

Q: There are an awful a lot of Americans in Belgium, aren't there?

CHAMBERS: Oh yes, the American companies. At that time there were more than 1500 American companies. The Singer Sewing Machine Company had been there since the beginning of this century.

Q: Did you spend much of your time with the American business community?

CHAMBERS: I visited all of the big plants. The Chamber of Commerce is very anxious for the Ambassador to be involved in that. That's very important. And the Fulbright Commission, too. I was on that board; I think it's the custom for the ambassador. I was very interested in that, being educational, and Perry Stieglitz was as well, so we would go to those things together.
Q: Were you able to develop a close relationship with the prime minister? Or doesn't one do that in a country like Belgium?

CHAMBERS: They're very formal people, you know. I would say that I had a warmer relationship with [Prime Minister] Leo Tindemans than with Mr. Martens [the subsequent prime minister], and I think it was their personalities. Mrs. Tindemans was charming. I never met Mrs. Martens.

This was little amusing bit about the Belgium problem: Mr. Tindemans had been away in the summer, so I hadn't had him to dinner in the residence. We were then getting ready to go to Washington together on his visit, so I asked if he would like an official dinner or would he like to come just with his wife and my husband and me. He said he preferred that, so I asked him to come to my little house that I rented in the country, outside of Brussels. He was very pleased, because it was the last Flemish area near Brussels. It was surrounded by the French-speaking part of the country, and he was very pleased that I chose it. (It just happened that that little house was there.) I remember I served brussels sprouts and he refused to eat them because of the word "brussels."

Q: Really, they are that touchy? Was he the foreign minister?

CHAMBERS: He was the prime minister. He's now the foreign minister. I had a closer relationship with Henri Simonet, who was the foreign minister. His was the opposition party, and I was amazed when the prime minister went to Washington on that official visit, Henri Simonet as the leader of the opposition insisted on coming along. He said that their views had to be presented to the president, to the Department. To me, with our form of government, this was just amazing. You know, would the leader of the Democratic party have gone to Reykjavik? I found that very interesting.

When we got back, Henri Simonet said he wanted to invite me to come either for breakfast or lunch in his office. I said I really didn't like breakfast meetings; I would be delighted to come for lunch, so we did have lunch in his office. He has quite a sense of humor, and he said, "I understand you resisted my offer of breakfast?" And I said, "Yes, Mr. Minister, I did. I really like to have breakfast alone." He said, "I wanted to ask you to come for lunch because I feel, and this is my fault, that you have not been presented with the policies of my party. As I say, I feel it has been my fault, and I just wanted to tell you how we feel and what our differences are." I said I'd enjoyed the lunch and I hoped he would come to the residence. Well, then he was campaigning for re-election, and I thought he was probably too busy, so I didn't ask him for some time. I ran into him somewhere, and he said, "You have not returned my invitation."

Q: Blunt, isn't he?

CHAMBERS: Oh, very. I said, "Well, I just felt with the campaign that you would have said no." "Now the campaign's over," he said. So this became a regular exchange of visits. He did then come, and maybe six weeks later he would invite me back again.

Q: Do you find getting to know these people is more a question of personality than it is of what
they are minister of?

CHAMBERS: To a great extent.

Q: It's a person-to-person thing?

CHAMBERS: I mean there was no reason for him to [exchange visits]; it wasn't required. Again, it's vibes. With some people there's more rapport.

Q: So the personal touch is really very, very important?

CHAMBERS: Yes, yes. And the thing you asked about how the Belgians felt, well, certainly at the beginning and, in a way, all through my years, people would constantly say, "You seem to enjoy being here so much."

Then some people, oh, after I'd been there three years, would still ask if I liked being there, if I liked my job? I would just say, I wouldn't still be here. You know that was just sort of a dumb question.

Q: I imagine the enthusiasm that you show opens a lot of doors.

CHAMBERS: Well, I would assume in any country, but maybe more in Belgium, being a small country. You know, they do have a feeling of being smaller than our other allies, like France, Germany, England.

Q: Sure. Overwhelmed.

CHAMBERS: Yes.

Q: So they're touchy.

CHAMBERS: Yes. I think that maybe they were more pleased and surprised by how much I liked being there.

Q: Did the press report on your activities much? The Belgian press?

CHAMBERS: Well, the custom was for the ambassador to address the first meeting of the Chamber of Commerce in the fall, and that was always reported but not to a great extent.

I don't know if I told you my terrible faux pas when President Carter came. That was very much reported, and on television. He had been, I think, to seven countries, and Belgium was his last stop. The three US ambassadors, naturally, were at the plane, and I was first in line since I was with the King. When he got off, he kissed me. The next day at my staff meeting, one of my officers said, "We were very proud to see you were the only ambassador on this trip to be kissed by the President." Well, obviously, I was the only woman. I said, "There's nothing queer about our President."
The next day was Saturday, and I was at a shoot near Antwerp and there was a man who was always kind of teasing me and sort of flirting and he said, "Oh, I know what you were up to last week." We were at lunch in the middle of the shoot, and we were speaking French. He said, "Ah, I saw you being kissed by your President as he stepped off of the plane." Then I said, in French, "Oh, yes, my country team was very proud that I was the only ambassador to be kissed by the President." Well, I said the word in French, and you know the difference between the -- [In French "kiss" is a euphemism for sex.]

Q: Yes, I do.

CHAMBERS: I didn't know what I had said, and everyone was laughing. I mean there were these hoots of laughter, and my husband, who was at the other table, said, "What in the world did you say?" "Well, I said something awful."

On Monday my French teacher came. Brigitte Verbeek was a darling young Belgian woman, and we really became friends. I said, "Brigitte, your reputation is ruined. You're never going to have another pupil. This is just terrible." And when I told her, of course she turned beet red.

Q: (Laughs) Of course, she did. Well, they ought to tell you that the word baiser doesn't always means what it's supposed to.

CHAMBERS: Well, that was the worst. But, of course, that was the most widely reported occasion. Oh, and then this one: the Carters got along very well with the King and Queen, so they spent the whole day in Brussels and then they were leaving. They were going to fly back to Washington that night. The King and Queen came to the airport and the President said, "Oh, but your wife speaks the most beautiful English. This is very impressive. She speaks really without an accent." Brzezinski was standing there, and he said as a joke, "Well, you know there are a lot of people in Washington who have a hard time understanding you. You know, with your southern accent there are a lot of us who don't really get every word you're saying." President Carter laughed.

Q: You have mentioned the Chamber of Commerce in Belgium. Did they actually consult with you about business problems? Or with your economic counselor?

CHAMBERS: Yes. And Bob Kaufman was really good. He left. I lost him and I lost my political counselor, Francis De Tarr, I think in the same month. I said they were both "stolen." Francis went to the same job in the embassy at Paris. He's retired now, but his whole interest and his career has been France. He wrote a book, I think, about the liberal party in France. That has been his whole dedication, so to have that as his last post was wonderful. I couldn't argue.

Then Bob had -- he was funny. He used to say he was a ladies' man, because he had worked for Anne Armstrong before me. He was asked to come back to the U.N., and his immediate boss was a woman. She wasn't the head of the mission there, because that would have been Don McHenry or Andy Young. He was terrific. As I say, there are so many American companies in Belgium, a very active Chamber of Commerce.
Q: Did you place emphasis on one particular area? How did you divide your time? On political, or public affairs, or economic development, or what was your major interest?

CHAMBERS: Well, I tried to divide my time. Incidentally, I heard that when Ambassador Price was in Belgium, he, having been a banker, was very interested in the Chamber of Commerce and the business life of Brussels.

One thing I started doing, which apparently hadn't been done, was to say to each section chief; Francis De Tarr, Bob Kaufman, Gene Champagne, each department head, "Ask who you want," and then we had sort of working lunches in the residence. The labor man, for instance, said he'd never been asked to do that. My whole staff was very pleased about that.

Q: I can imagine. Nobody ever turns down an invitation from an ambassador, so they could get people they wouldn't otherwise see.

CHAMBERS: Yes, and these were the, as they said, people who wouldn't have been invited to the Embassy otherwise. I know it was interesting for me.

I think, because of all of the American involvement in Brussels as well as the whole country, I was asked to attend openings, in the World Trade Center, and the book fair, and the automobile show; everything, because there was always an American emphasis in all of these. As I say, I went all around the country to the plants, and I loved that.

General Motors, I think, has been there fifty years. I was at a dinner with the head of General Motors in Belgium and someone asked him if the labor prices weren't terribly high in Belgium. He said, "Yes, they are, but the quality of workmanship is also very high." But then, of course, particularly the last two years, we had to face the fact that some American companies were moving to the Far East, because they had to. I mean, computers . . .

ARNOLD DENYS
Consular Officer

Arnold Denys was born in West Flanders, Belgium on March 6, 1931. He emigrated to the U.S. during the Cold War. He attended Gonzaga University in Washington and the School of Foreign Service in Georgetown University. Mr. Denys served in Panama City, Alexandria, Athens, London, Hermosillo, Halifax, Antwerp, Tijuana, and Washington, DC. He retired in July, 1984. This is an excerpt from his memoirs.

DENYS: I feel that it was my destiny to become a foreign service officer, but it was also my desire to give something back to my adopted country, the United States of America. In this elite corps of professionals, I felt that I could make a difference. Where else could I make such a
contribution to the United States than in my native Flanders, where I was familiar with local
history, customs, and languages.

When the State Department sent me to the US Consulate General in Antwerp, Belgium, as
consular officer, I knew that this was, besides being a great honor, the opportunity I sought to
represent the US in my native Belgium. But I also realized that it was a call to discharge special
responsibilities. When I entered the US Foreign Service there was a strict policy that Foreign
Service employees were not sent for duty to their country of birth. When I arrived in Flanders, I
realized that US-Belgian relations were at a high point, but that there were new NATO-US
military priorities taking place, and that Belgium would play a pivotal role in the military
security of Europe. Brussels was already the center of NATO and also the European Common
Market (EEC) now called the European Community (EC).

When we arrived in Antwerp we stayed at the Euro Studio hotel until we found permanent
quarters. Gerard Viaene, Consulate driver, was very helpful in driving us where we needed to go
to do the essential errands of settling in.

May 1, 1977, Consul General John and Judith Heimann made us feel right at home at a luncheon
at their residence, where I met other American officers and Consular Officer Bea Hemingway, of
the Embassy in Brussels.

The next day we went for orientation to the Embassy where Eugene Champagne and Steve
Hayden, of Administration, helped us to enroll Rebecca at the Antwerp International School, in
Ekeren, near Antwerp. John Heimann was a likable principal officer and one of the most
intellectual Foreign Service Officers I ever worked for. He said, “Your key goal here will be to
develop political reporting with Flemish leaders in West Flanders.” He felt confident that my
Flemish language skills and Flemish cultural acumen would be an asset in developing those
contacts. He also pointed out that the weekly staff meeting with the Ambassador in Brussels was
crucial for Consulate Antwerp to intertwine information and operation procedures. Antwerp was
a constituent post, and we enjoyed considerable independence, but in major decisions we
depended on the American Embassy, in Brussels, for guidance on political reporting and for
administrative and protocol support.

May 6, I accompanied John on one of these Embassy staff meetings. I met Deputy Chief of

I had barely settled into the hotel when I received orders to go to Vienna to attend the Consular
Officers Conference. This was an opportunity to exchange ideas with other American consular
officers in Western Europe. On May 9, the first day of the conference, Assistant Secretary of
State for Consular Affairs Barbara Watson, in her opening remarks, referred to the fact that
Americans were traveling abroad more than ever before. The US Congress had given her a
priority mandate to give maximum consular assistance to Americans traveling abroad. “This is
gaining nationwide acceptance,” she said. She was an impressive diplomat, and made her career
championing the cause of American citizens’ services and human rights. In 1980, Secretary
Watson was appointed as American Ambassador to Malaysia.
At a dinner that evening I met some of my consular colleagues: Jim Lassiter, Consul in Brussels; Mr. Berg, former Vice Consul in Antwerp; Theodore B. Dobbs, Consul General in Edinburgh; and Paul McCarthy, Consul in Dublin.

The meeting in Vienna also permitted me to visit the Rubens collection at the historical art museum. The baroque churches added to the splendor and elegance of the Austrian capital.

In Antwerp I issued many B1 and B2 visas (business and pleasure). Many Flemish travel agents sent lists of Flemish travelers who wanted to visit the US. Since the dollar was fairly low against the Belgian Franc, it was advantageous for Belgians to travel to the US. The depreciation of the US dollar affected Americans living in our Consular District. Many Social Security pensioners were affected by the drop in the dollar. It also made it more difficult for our American staff to entertain additional guests, due to the inflated expenses.

There was a substantial increase in the issuance of nonimmigrant visas (B1 and B2) and crew lists. Through my personal intervention with the ministries of labor and justice, I was able to obtain an extension of the resident permits for American businessmen. I was also able to reduce the sentences of some Americans in prison, and to integrate an American Fulbright professor into Flemish cultural life during his two-month lecture tour at Antwerp University. As administrative officer, I was responsible for disbursing, the administration of consular fees, and general maintenance problems and security. FSN Jack West was my able, administrative right-hand man in this area.

During my first month I called on other consular colleagues accredited to Antwerp: Louis Simao, Chancellor and Consular Officer of the Netherlands; John Kelly, Vice Consul of England; and Consul Jacques Sourdy and Vice Consul René Mennevée of the French Consulate General. I also paid courtesy calls on Sven Kristoffersen, Chief of Antwerp Police, and H. Berebroucks, Director General of Customs. In the evening, I attended a reception given by the Port Authority of the Port of Houston at the Crest Hotel. I met Mrs. Perry, Board Chairwoman; George W. Altvater, Executive Director of the Port of Houston; and C. A. Rousser, Director Trade Development. These Houston managers developed good contacts with Antwerp port officials.

In late May, I also paid a call on Colonel Robert Bellenger, Commander of the Rykswacht (police) in Antwerp and Limburg provinces. In his presentation about the police organization he explained its ties to the ministries of War, Interior and Justice.

I was not long on board in Antwerp before the government of Belgium underwent a serious crisis. Leo Tindemans, of the CVP party (traditional Catholic party), attempted to form a coalition government of four parties: CVP, BSP (socialists), FDF (French linguistic party), and VU (Flemish Nationalists), with the PVV (Liberals) in opposition. Leo Tindemans, who later moved on to the European Parliament, was a well-versed and experienced Prime Minister and former foreign minister. Consul General John Heimann knew him personally, and we continued to cultivate this rapport. In spite of linguistic (French and Flemish) and cultural differences, Belgium had been fortunate to produce effective political leaders to bridge the gap and to lead a national government.
On May 26, I called on Commander Colonel Gabriel Bogaerts of the Rykswacht (police) in Antwerp. Our first courtesy call developed into a long-term friendship. He was an excellent student of history. He said, “Western civilization is going through a transition. It should be a peaceful one to keep institutions intact.” He was very enthusiastic about my assignment to Antwerp.

I did not wait long to develop political contacts in the Province of West Flanders (one of the nine provinces in Belgium - to the north). On May 27 I called on Jan Piers, Mayor of the City of Ostend, and Chief of Police Van Walleghem. Oscar Vermeulen, Chief of Immigration and Mr. Vromant, Chief of Customs, joined us for lunch at the Thermidor. One of the topics that came up was that the Beyaert Company of Antwerp had been guilty of polluting the waters, and that this had affected the fishing industry. Later, we visited the Ostend Airport terminal where Mr. Willems, Deputy Director showed us the Radar Room. Mr. De Wilde, head of the control tower, was also present.

May 29, the Consul General and I attended Memorial Day services at Flanders Field, in Waregem, and the graves of World War I Americans. This is an annual rite which is taken very seriously in Antwerp and by the US Embassy in Brussels. Deputy Chief of Mission John Renner and Mayor Coucke, of Waregem, were among the dignitaries.

In June, Rebecca and I attended a basketball game between Belgium and the US We were the guests of Mayor Masure, of Merksem, Antwerp, and Hugo Tops, Alderman for culture. Secretary Jules Simkens, of the Brussels Basketball Federation, joined us at a reception at the Quality Inn Hotel.

In my visit to Pierre Van Outryve d’Ydewalle, Governor of West Flanders, we discussed the commercial future of the Port of Zeebrugge. I also met Roger de Bree, Chief of Police in Bruges. We discussed the political situation in Bruges in the aftermath of the defeat of CVP Mayor Michel Van Maele. He led me around the new police headquarters and introduced me to several prison directors of penitentiaries in Bruges. Visiting such installations are helpful to a consular officer.

We attended a reception by the new US Ambassador to Belgium, Anne Cox Chambers, who was appointed by President Carter. They were personal friends. She showed us the private quarters at the residence and her social secretary pointed out a painting of the Ambassador’s son by American portraitist Elizabeth Shumatoff, who painted Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson, Mrs. Henry Clay Frick, and others.

In mid-June, I represented the Consul General at the graduation of the International School of Antwerp, held in the General Motors auditorium. I met headmaster John Evers and Herman De Croo, former Minister of Education, who talked about the role of education and the advantages of international schools.

June 17, I paid an official visit to Joseph Lambrecht, Mayor of the city of Kortryk (Courtrai). He showed me the old City Hall and presented me with a souvenir of the golden spurs, which symbolized the defeat of the French by the Flemings.
Mayor Lambrecht complained of the lack of foreign investment in Kortrijk, and that the city had to rely on small family businesses. I learned more about Flemish politics at a lunch with Luc Van Steenkiste, a member of Parliament (VU party). The VU party represented Flemish nationalist goals. He said, “The purpose of the VU will be to act as a watchdog to ensure that Flemish interests are protected at the national level.”

Later in the month I made a courtesy call to Daniel Coens, Mayor of Damme and CVP member of Parliament. Daniel and I became good friends and we saw each other from time to time to review political trends in Flanders.

At a reception of the Consulate General of West Germany for departing Consul and Mrs. Hellmut Friebe, I met Vice Consul Siegfried Rapp, Commander De Wilt, military commander of Antwerp, and Mr. Jacques Vinckier, of the Maritime Authority in Antwerp. A few days later I met British Vice Consul Kelly and Consul General Peeters.

On June 28, I was invited to lunch at the Residence in honor of Ambassador Anne Cox Chambers. The guests included: Count Daniel Le Grelle; Earl Shank, Kenneth W. Deters, of Tradox; A.O. Hamon. of the American Chamber of Commerce; Laurence Schwartz; and John Evers.

In June I met Mrs. Mathilde Schroyens, Socialist Mayor of Antwerp, and Consul General Keulen, Dean of the Consular Corps in Antwerp.

In July, I had a meeting with Frank Van Acker, Socialist Mayor of Bruges, who also served as a member of the Belgian Parliament. He was a somewhat shy, but business-like, politician. He was born to politics. (His father, Achiel Van Acker, had twice served as Belgian Prime Minister, and was a supporter of the Socialist labor unions and major social legislation in Belgium.)

From time-to-time US ships would come into the port of Antwerp. On July 5, I had lunch with Commander Williamson on board the USS Semmes.

On July 21, I attended the Independence Day ceremonies of Belgium in Ostend. Others in attendance at the mayor’s office were the Consul of Senegal and Monaco, and Clinton Thomas, Consul of England.

Deputy Chief of Mission Renner left the Embassy and Ambassador Chambers appointed Arthur Olsen as his replacement. Francis Tarr and John Grimes continued in the political section.

In August I had a long talk with CVP member of Parliament, Marc Olivier, in his home district of Kortrijk. His views on Belgian and Flemish politics were similar to that of Daniel Coens. He said, “The CVP (Catholic) party is a party of the right for which support is flowing from the middle classes, farmers and Christian workers belonging to the Christian Labor Unions (ACW).” He showed less interest in linguistic cultural programs and felt that the Flemish and Walloons should get along together.
I also visited some of the US military bases in the provinces of Limburg and Antwerp. At Kleine Breughel I met Commander Robert Baker and Captain David Creamer. This was a NATO munition support installation. In Hoogbuul I visited a US transport unit where Major Wesley R. Ostergren introduced me to his staff. West and I became good friends. He and his wife were very interested in promoting American-Belgian relations. They made a concerted effort to learn the Flemish language, and therefore, were able to entertain Flemish guests at their home.

I would often coordinate my consular projects with Consul Jim Lassiter in Brussels. One of these cases was of Philip Vockth, an Indian born on Diego Garcia Island. I contacted Mrs. L. Biacsko-Harts, of the Ecumenical Social Protestant Service. Since Vockth was asking refugee status I referred the case to that office.

Early in my tour of duty at Antwerp, I had a long visit with Fernand Traen, President of the Bruges-Zeebrugge Port Authority (NBZ). Traen was a powerful man of the Port of Bruges, and had harbored some political ambitions to become mayor of Bruges. We talked about the US-Belgian Ammunition agreement for Zeebrugge. He did not think that it would be practical to renew it because of the gas terminal that would be in operation. “This would be hazardous to the Belgian coastline,” he said. He favored continued US investment in Flanders and Belgium, but expressed concern about political uncertainties in Western Europe.

In September I met Francois Van de Weyer, head of the foreign police in Antwerp. He and his assistant, Eugene Dhont, would often assist me with passport problems affecting American citizens.

Our arrival in Antwerp coincided with the 400th anniversary of the birth of Peter Paul Rubens, the famous Flemish Baroque painter (1577-1640). No one living in Antwerp could escape this cultural event. We in the consulate had a private viewing of these Rubens masterpieces in the Antwerp Museum of Fine Arts. On September 6 we had a private viewing of the Rubens paintings for the consular corps of Antwerp.

September 9, Maïté and Rebecca joined me in ceremonies honoring those killed at the Breendock concentration camp near Antwerp. A representative of the King was there. It was a poignant reminder of Nazi atrocities during World War II. Antwerp was also a haven for Jewish refugees who were fleeing the persecution of the Holocaust.

Ambassador Cox Chambers was interested in Flemish art and would often ask me to accompany her to cultural events, such as American Day at the Ghent (Capital of the province of East Flanders) Fair. At that occasion, the Ambassador gave a reception at the Flemish International Club in St. Peter’s Abbey. I met many interesting people from the Ghent area: George De Ronne, Curator of the Abbey; Mr. Wyffels, Cultural Center Director; Mayor De Paepe, of Ghent; Nellie Maes, VU party member of Parliament (St. Nicholas); Senator E. De Facqu (VU Party), Member of Parliament; and Timmerman and Jacques Verhé, Town Clerk of the City Hall, in Ghent.

September 30 a reception was held at the residence of the Consul General for Ambassador to NATO and Mrs. Bennett, which I attended.
West German Vice Consul Rapp and Vice Consul of Sweden in Ghent, Philip Madou, often called on visa matters or other issues relating to investments or travel to the United States.

In October, I visited some American prisoners in an Antwerp penitentiary. I knew Dr. A. Thiry, director of this facility, very well, and this helped me in dealing with problems affecting US citizens and their special needs.

My duties in protocol and political reporting increased as time went on, and I had many options from which to choose, to decide which social events to attend, always giving consideration to invitations that would enhance American-Belgian political interests.

In an official visit to Mayor Albert Biesbroeck, of Roeselare, West Flanders, we talked about George Rodenbach, a well-known Belgian poet whose grandfather had been Consul General and Ambassador to Greece. He showed me some mementos of the Polish liberation of Roeselare. There were paintings in the City Hall of famous Flemish painters such as Permeke, Blomme, and Verbaere.

In the afternoon I drove to the old city of Torhout (near Bruges) where I had a meeting with Mayor Carlos Daled. We talked about the Flemings who emigrated to the New World in the early part of the century. Many of them settled in Michigan, particularly in the areas of Detroit, and in Ontario, Canada. When I visited these small Flemish towns, I discovered that many townspeople had family ties with relatives in the US and Canada.

On October 12, I attended the graduation ceremonies of the Maritime School in Antwerp. I met J.P. Van Dyck, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Navy. Professor Wilmet spoke of the advances of research in US communications.

Arthur Olsen, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Brussels, encouraged me to explore new contacts in Flanders. He, like other Embassy officials, considered our presence in Antwerp vital to US foreign policy and national security interests. NATO and US plans to introduce cruise missiles in Western Europe were their main concerns.

On board the U.S.S. Whitney I met with USMC Brigadier General A. M. Gray. He was the commanding general of the Fourth Marine Amphibious Battalion.

In October, we gave our first reception at home for members of the Consulate General and Belgian officials. We also represented the Consulate at the Flemish Ballet of Flanders, and saw Porgy and Bess at Elizabeth Hall. Besides consular business, Antwerp offered many opportunities to learn about Flemish art and culture.

Ambassador Cox Chambers was again our guest for lunch at the residence in Antwerp, and I was able to introduce Minister Daniel Coens to her. After lunch, I accompanied the Ambassador to a reception at Rockox House, which is administered by the Krediet Bank. I met Mr. L. Wouters, President of the Krediet Bank, as well as the former Belgian Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens. Ambassador Cox Chambers was interested in the furnishings and paintings of the Rockox House. Nicholas Rockox was a Mayor of Antwerp during Rubens life and a patron of the arts. In this
capacity, he sponsored many of Rubens’ diplomatic ventures abroad.

On October 27, I acted as Escort Officer for the Ambassador on her official visit to Bruges and Kortryk (second largest city in West Flanders). Our first call was to Pierre van Outryve d’Ydewalle, Governor of West Flanders. Consul General John Heimann was also present. Our party was received in the lovely drawing room of the Governor’s palace. We had lunch with officials of the N.V. Bekaert firm (steel wire and cord), in Zwevegem. In the afternoon we called on Mr. J. Lambrechts, the mayor of Kortryk.

Barbara Wilson, Social Security representative in Frankfurt, and I had lunch at the American Belgian Association.

During November, I prepared for my final oral exam at George Mason University, but many events preceded my departure on November 19.

On the U.S.S. Finback, a nuclear submarine docked in Zeebrugge (Port of Bruges), I talked with Commander P.M. Heath. I also visited US citizen, Jim Schumann, at Stuyvenberg Hospital, who had been in a car accident in Antwerp. At commemorative services at Marie Jose, the French Lycee, I met the director, Andre Van Fracken. The Consuls General of Argentina, Colombia, and Haiti were also present.

Maïté and I went to the Sabat Mater, by Antonin Dvorak, in the Charles Borromeus Church, in Antwerp. These church concerts were unforgettable experiences.

When I returned after a good outcome of my Master’s degree test in history, I was just in time for the Ambassador’s Christmas party for the staff at Chateau St. Anne in Brussels.

After Christmas I went to the Central Police Station in Antwerp to meet a US citizen who had been detained for illegally practicing medicine in Belgium. I also visited a US citizen in the prison of Ghent, and talked with the director of that prison in connection with another detention case.

On January 6, 1978, President Carter arrived in Brussels to deliver an address to the European Common Market. Every visit to Brussels by an American president was carefully planned in advance because of the importance of Brussels as the headquarters of NATO and the European Community (EC). The Belgian Prime Minister and his cabinet, US embassy officials, and other dignitaries, were at the Zaventem International Airport, in Brussels, to welcome President Carter.

I met Emmanuel De Sutter, CVP member of Parliament and former Mayor of Knokke-Heist. Although this fashionable beach city had been a traditional PVV (liberal party) stronghold, De Sutter had put Knokke-Heist in the CVP column in 1977. He believed that the elections for the European parliament were of great importance. He did identify some Flemish leaders, such as Leo Tindemans and Wilfred Martens, who would serve well. It so happened that both serve (to this day) in the European Parliament. Karel Van Miert, former leader of the Flemish Socialist Party, whom we befriended, is also an influential Flemish leader in the European Parliament.
A consul in Antwerp has many responsibilities related to the Port. On January 18, I called on Customs Inspector Buyst on behalf of American citizen Rexford Smith, who was the manager of Sea-Land Belgium. His wife’s car papers were not in order and I was able to help by cutting red tape.

During my tenure as US Consul in Antwerp I became acquainted with Mr. Serrien, President of the American Field Service (AFS). This group was instrumental in finding hospitality and homes for American students studying in Belgium. Mr. and Mrs. Serrien lived in Aertselare and were very active in AFS. One evening we attended a benefit concert at their home, given by musician Jos. Van Immerseel.

One night I received a call from the police in Harelbeke. The Van den Driessche family informed me of the death of their American son, Joe, in Oran, Algeria. Since there were no details on the cause of death, I immediately sent some cables to our Embassy in Algiers to request the circumstances of his death and to facilitate the shipment of his remains to Belgium.

On 30 January we attended a buffet at the home of German Vice Consul and Mrs. Rapp. The King’s attorney, Van De Hoeynants, was guest of honor. Consul Wiegand of West Germany and French Vice Consul Mennevée also attended.

Many art and music groups came to Flanders. One night I met Cliff Keuter, Director of the Cliff Keuter Dance Company of New York. During the intermission of his show at the Flemish Opera House in Antwerp, I was introduced to Colonel Lismont, Vice President of the Belgian Red Cross, and other local officials.

On February 19, 1978, our daughter Rebecca was confirmed by Monsignor William Van Kester in the chapel of St. Joseph’s Mission in Antwerp. We had a family reunion afterwards. Both the first communion and confirmation are considered important milestones for children in the Catholic faith.

During the late 1970s, the State Department had earmarked the Consulate General, in Antwerp, for closure, in order to meet Washington’s budgetary cuts. The Flemish people, Belgian officials, and US consular officers, were very much opposed to closing the post. Antwerp is the most important port city in the northwestern part of Belgium on the River Schelde. It had been one of the vital posts during both world wars. In the 1970s, because of the community and linguistic problems in Belgium, our foreign policy goals were to keep close contact with both Flemish political leaders and Walloon (French speaking) officials. Antwerp’s metropolitan and historical importance provided an ideal site for an active American consular presence. During this evolutionary period, many Flemish leaders were favorably disposed to support US plans to place short-range missiles in Belgium and other European countries to counter-balance Soviet missile superiority in the European theater. There was no disagreement about the importance of the Antwerp Consulate General’s role in the political affairs of Europe and NATO. Our job was to convince foreign service inspectors, who made occasional visits to Antwerp. We tried to do this during several such inspections, and we were able to keep the Consulate General open until the early 1990s. Even today, people in Flanders (which represents 60% of the Belgian population) would prefer doing business with consular officials in Antwerp rather than with the Embassy in
Brussels. Our closing of the Consulate General in Antwerp, on July 1, 1992, was a setback for our strategic presence in Flanders, and traditional rapport with Flemish power brokers. In spite of the vicissitudes of Belgian regionalization policies, Flanders is now the stable political cultural force in Belgium.

My friend, Jacques Guffens, Judge of the Appellate Court in Antwerp, and now President of the North Atlantic Organization, in Belgium, knew of the importance of NATO, and was influential in keeping the post open.

March was a busy month. The U.S.S. Potomac came into port. There were some morale problems with the crew and I was asked to go on board to talk with the ship’s personnel.

Maïté started a temporary assignment at the US Embassy in Brussels. The daily commuting was no easy task, but we managed.

March 7, a diplomatic incident put Antwerp in the world spotlight. The well-known Baron Bracht, Honorary Consul of Austria and Antwerp, was kidnaped. The kidnapper was just interested in cash. The Baron was killed on the spot while the kidnaping took place, but the assassin gave the impression that the Baron was still alive. Three weeks later they discovered the Baron’s body and the assassin was arrested. It was not a act of terrorism, but a criminal act that caused widespread consternation in Belgium. I visited an ill US citizen at the city hospital in Roeselare. Mr. Reynaerts, Administrator of the hospital, took a special interest in the case. When I returned to Antwerp I attended a reception by the Navy (NATO Sea Sparrow) with Vice Admiral J. P. Van Dyck as host.

A few days later I tried to clear up some problems for a distraught American businessman in Waasmunster who was concerned about the whereabouts of his family.

One of my duties as Consul was to identify some outstanding Flemish political leaders who would qualify as international visitor grantees. Mark Olivier, a member of the Parliament of the CVP, in Kortryk, was one of those leaders. So were Flemish Minister of Education Daniel Coens and Manu De Sutter, of Knokke-Heist, and Marcel Colla (now Minister of Pensions in the de Haene government), of Antwerp. The ambassador wanted to meet these selected candidates individually before putting her stamp of approval on them.

One day we drove to Namur and Liège, (two interesting historic cities in Wallonia, in southern Belgium). In Namur, the Sambre and Meuse Rivers converge and offer impressive scenery. At Our Lady’s Institute we admired the Reliquary of St. Peter by Hugo Oignies (1280), one of the wonders of Belgium. Liège is a steel manufacturing city. The baptismal fountain in the Romanesque St. Bartholemeus Church is another Belgian treasure. In this part of Belgium my French proved useful.

March 29, I met Marc Bourry, the (BSP-Socialist party) Mayor of Harelbeke. He showed concern that the VU and FDF parties (linguistic parties) did not share the broad political vision of Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, and were only interested in nationalistic issues, whereas the Belgium Socialist Party (BSP), Mr. Bourry’s party, and the CVP (Christian Democratic party),
wanted to tackle pressing economic issues, such as the national budget deficit. Belgium provided a generous social safety net to its workers and families, and they began to talk about reducing some of the family allocation benefits and unemployment compensation. He stated, “Belgium cannot afford the luxury of prolonged linguistic fights when the economy is in serious recession.”

On the international spectrum, Bourry felt that Belgium’s role in Africa and the Third World should be one of helping accelerate socioeconomic development.

On April 10, I attended the Consular Conference in Paris, which was chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs Robert Hennemeyer. Consul General Morgan explained the visa operation in the US Embassy in Paris. The next day we all went to the American Ambassador’s residence for a reception given by Ambassador and Mrs. Arthur A. Hartman. Ambassador Hartman held the Paris post from January 1977 through October 1981. The residence was formerly a Rothschild mansion.

During this trip to Paris, I visited the Pompidou Museum (named for the late French President Georges Pompidou) near City Hall, and La Bastille. The museum has grown into an important center for visiting artists and tourists. The importance of the Paris consular conference was to get to know key persons in visa and special consular services of the State Department in Washington.

On my return I had a full day of activities in West Flanders. I had lunch with Dries Vandenabeele, Municipal Counselor in Bruges; paid a brief visit to see the Ensor paintings in Ostend; and then attended the 175th anniversary session of the Belgium Bank of Commerce and Industry at the Casino in Ostend. King Baudewyn and Prime Minister Leo Tindemans honored the event with their presence. We tried to have a US Consulate representative at all of these functions.

April 23, I attended the Memorial Day ceremony by the American Legion at Flanders Field, in Waregem, West Flanders. In the name of the Consul General I delivered a speech in Flemish honoring veterans of World War I and II.

My consular staff, Ed Carnas, Josie Stoffels, Gilberte De Bruycker, Ludo De Bell, and Patty Verschuren were capable of handling large visa loads, crew lists, and social security cases. Whenever we had Social Security or Internal Revenue Service representatives visit Americans, these able associates would prepare their files.

April 28, I went to a reception for Ambassador and Mrs. Deane Hinton, US Ambassador to the European Community (Ambassador Hinton also served as US Envoy to Panama), followed by a dinner at the American Belgian Association.

In May, I attended a concert for opera singers at Elckerlyc, which was under the auspices of the Ministry of Flemish Culture. I met Jo Ella Tod, an American who had won the opera singing contest.

Problems with the Zaire (a former Belgian colony) government and the disastrous violence in Shaba created tensions within the Belgian government. Prime Minister Leo Tindemans and
Foreign Minister Simonet were at odds on how to deal with the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa.

May 26, Consul General Heimann departed the post and Ambassador Cox Chambers put me in charge of the Consulate General. It was made known to the Dean of the Antwerp Consular Corps that I would be Acting Consul General. It was an awesome experience for a few days. I was in charge of the Consulate General’s affairs for about three months. FSN Lydia Van Hove had been the Consul General’s secretary for a long time. She was a great help to me during these busy months. Besides my regular consular duties I attended several staff meetings in Brussels, and my social schedule and official representation tripled. At that time I learned how to become an efficient manager and allot my time according to priorities.

Ambassador Cox Chambers, Consul General Heimann, and I were again in Waregem to attend Memorial Day services May 28. It was a beautiful, sunny day in Flanders Field, where the poppies grow. The Mayor of Waregem quoted from the famous Flanders Field poem, “If you break faith with us who die we shall not sleep - though poppies grow in Flanders Field.”

May 31, Rebecca and I attended a concert given by Romanian-American singer Hermina Petrescu-Stowell, at Arenberg Hall. She sang folkloric songs, and was very popular with the audience.

One of my duties as Acting Consul General was to attend the British Queen Elizabeth’s birthday parade at the military camp of Emblem. We sat on the Honor Tribune (stand) with British Ambassador to Belgium Sir David, and Mr. Moller, President of the British Legion.

In June I made an official visit to Ieper (West Flanders), the historic battle city of World War I. Mayor Albert De Hem and I talked for several hours. We were joined by CVP Alderman Paul Breyne, of Ieper (who later became a member of Parliament in Belgium). Later we visited a memorial chapel that honors the fallen heroes of World War I. There are about 250,000 British graves in Ieper. I took time out to visit the American firm, Klippan (which manufactures seat belts and suitcases), and talked with its manager, Irman Hoorweghe. Later I paid a courtesy visit to Albrecht Sansen, Mayor of Poperinge (near Ieper). The visits to Klippan and H. D. Lee confirmed the good relations between Ieper City Hall and US plant management.

On June 14, 1978, Leo Delwaide, Alderman for the Port of Antwerp, and often referred to as the “Lion of Flanders,” died. I sent condolences to Antwerp Mayor Mathilde Schroyens. On the same day I talked with Count Daniel Legrelle, manager of Continental Bank SA, following a lecture at Cercle Royal in Brussels. He stated that Jan Huyghebaert, CVP Municipal Councilman, and a member of Prime Minister Tindemans’ cabinet, would be chosen to replace Delwaide. Mr. Huyghebaert was a young and independent political leader without any strong ties to the unions. Legrelle believed that this was important.

The real power of the Port of Antwerp was Manager Robert Vleugels who was appointed by the City Council for life. His job was of an executive nature, and wielded behind-the-scenes influence in policy-making, affecting the Port of Antwerp.
In Antwerp, we also had the Regional Logistical Office (ELSO) for transshipment of household effects of foreign service personnel worldwide. It was a forwarding office and our Consulate General provided administrative support to them. ELSO fell under our diplomatic umbrella. I developed good contacts with Director Warren Nixon and Eugene Trahan. Officers assigned to ELSO also participated in the consular duty schedules on weekends and holidays, and were part of the protocol events taking place in our consular districts.

As had been predicted, Jan Huyghebaert was nominated CVP Alderman of the Port of Antwerp, which was probably the most influential job in the city. I talked with him at length during an official visit to City Hall. Mr. Huyghebaert was a rising star on the political scene in Belgium. He was the alter ego of Prime Minister Leo Tindemans. Both Huyghebaert and Tindemans thought in a broader European context. He told me that he wanted to be even-handed in his policy on the Port of Antwerp. He also said he would encourage multinationals to use the port, and stated that he wanted to find new customers for the port in the developing areas of Africa and Asia to counterbalance the strong Soviet presence in Antwerp. The Soviet Consulate let their presence be known in Antwerp, but were very inconspicuous about it. At a party, one day, I met Boris Ivanov, Vice Consul of the USSR. Huyghebaert is now President of the Almany Holding and Sabena Airlines, and is still a person to be reckoned with on the political scene. My frequent conversations with Flemish political leaders provided valuable biographic material for our political experts at the Embassy.

Late in June I was the guest speaker at a Rotary Club meeting in the Eurocrest Hotel, followed by a question and answer session on the US Foreign Service. The Rotary Club has been, over the years, a good forum for speakers on international affairs and amity among people.

The Plantin Moretus Museum, in Antwerp, had a special exhibit on the Flemish painter Jacob Jordaens. Director Conservator Leon Voet and his adjunct Conservator Miss Francine De Nave, accompanied me throughout the exhibit. Conservator Leon Voet spoke with enthusiasm about his contacts at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, and of his visits to the Capital to establish contacts in cultural circles. I also went to the opening of the Jordaens exhibit at the Antwerp Museum of Fine Arts and met curator Dr. Gilberte Gepts.

At a reception at the City Hall of Kortryk in honor of visiting Belgian Consul General in New York, René Van Hauwermeiren I got acquainted with Minister Duquae of Boerenbond (Flemish Farmers Union), Baron de Bethune, and CVP member of Parliament of Kortryk, Antoon Steverlynck. Afterwards, we were invited for dinner by Member of Parliament Mark Olivier invited us for dinner.

On June 26 I went to the Embassy to attend a special meeting of the International Visitors Program in Belgium. As Acting Consul General, I was a guest at the home of Mr. and Mrs. P.N. Ferstenberg, Director and Dean of the Antwerp diamond industry. It was the most elegant social affair I had ever attended. I met Belgian Ministers Segers and Frans Grootjans; Consul General Picard Moya, of the Dominican Republic; and other Belgian and foreign guests. We were also guests at a private dinner at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Mahendra Mehta, in Antwerp, who were well-known diamond dealers and were involved in philanthropy. They told me that when Mother Theresa travels to Belgium, she is an overnight guest in their home.
Socialist Mayor of Herentals, Carl DePeuter, arranged for me to visit officials of the General Biscuit Company. After lunch I saw the art work of sculptor Fraiken. In the evening I attended a concert in the picturesque hills of Dorp-Beersel of the Province of Flemish Brabant. It was a convivial cultural event in which Sylvia Traey and Robert Groslot, laureates of the International Queen Elizabeth Recital participated. I met them afterward and was also introduced to Minister of Flemish Culture, Rita De Backer, and Economic Minister Willy Claes (who is a musician in his own right and later became Secretary General of NATO).

June 30, I drove to Wondelgem to attend a reception for the Michigan Fine Arts Symphony. The next day I was a guest at a concert in Antwerp by a Michigan Bluegrass group.

In July, I was a guest at a reception at the Norwegian Seaman’s Club given by the Consul General of Norway on the occasion of the birthday of the King of Norway. Later in the day I was asked to raise the US flag and gave a US Independence address for the American community gathered at their annual picnic on the Brown estate in Ekeren-Kapellen (near Antwerp). I also met Mr. Hendrickx, the new director of Antwerp Customs.

On July 4, I attended the annual Independence Day reception at the residence of Ambassador Cox Chambers.

July 6, I visited the Flemish poet Karel Van de Woestyne exhibit in the Museum for Flemish Cultural Life in Antwerp, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of his birth. The exhibit provided a comprehensive overview of Flemish culture, folklore, music and literature.

July 11 is a famous Flemish holiday (Battle of the Spurs in Courtrai, in 1302) celebrating a Flemish victory over French invaders. We were invited to an Elizabeth Hall recital where Antwerp Mayor Mathilda Schroyens spoke on Flemish rights.

July 21, I represented the Consulate General at the Belgian Independence Day ceremonies. We reviewed the parade at the Leopold I Monument, followed by a reception at City Hall and a TE DEUM at St. James Church.

Later I received an impromptu invitation from the Ambassador to accompany her for lunch with Mr. Chambers at Fornuis Restaurant, in Antwerp. I also went with the Ambassador to the diamond headquarters where the manager of the Ferstenberg firm showed us the private diamond collection of Mr. P.N. Ferstenberg, dean of the Antwerp diamond industry. The Ambassador and I then visited Rubens’ home and the Cathedral of Our Lady, where Rubens’ “Descent of the Cross” is on permanent view.

The following day I introduced VU Member of Parliament of Kortryk, Luc Van Steenkiste, to the Ambassador. She invited me for lunch at the residence in honor of the President of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

I paid a courtesy visit to the newly appointed Bishop of Antwerp, Monsignor Godfried Danneels. He had come from humble origins in West Flanders. His theological studies proved to be a
stepping stone to his nomination as Archbishop, and he is now Cardinal of Belgium.

August 14, 1978, the Royal Petroleum Belge (RPB), owned by Occidental Petroleum, closed down its operations, resulting in some union marches that were disruptive. Mr. Armand Hammer was concerned about the exhibit of his private paintings in Brussels which was to open in a few days. We recommended that the exhibit not take place. The RPB difficulties continued for a time and caused a general petroleum strike in Belgium.

August 22, Archie Bolster arrived at post to become the new Consul General. We worked together for about three years and were an excellent team serving US-Belgian interests. The next day we gave a reception at our home to introduce Archie and Anne to Belgian officials.

As consular officer, I was responsible for taking depositions, which were legal documents notarized by American consuls, and later introduced in US courts. These documents were usually requested by US lawyers on behalf of shipping companies in Antwerp. In early September I was also involved in a tedious, time consuming Court of Appeals case of an American citizen on a drug-trafficking charge. The court decision finally brought the matter to a satisfactory conclusion. I was on close terms with Dr. A. Thiry, Director of the Antwerp prison, and also with the Reverend Christiaan Vonck, who was the Protestant chaplain at the penitentiary. At that time we also had a student from Louvain University imprisoned for drug possession.

On September 18, 1978, when President Carter mediated the successful Camp David accords between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, of Egypt, we all received a lift. Any success story emanating from the White House helps us in our political contacts in the field because the prestige of the United States is at stake.

On October 2 the U.S.S. Furer sailed into the Port of Antwerp. October 7, the U.S.S. Francis Marion docked. I went aboard to see Lt. Self, and discussed some of the routine morale problems on board US Navy ships. We notarized many crew lists in Antwerp. I also solved a local dispute with Mrs. Peters, of the Domino bar, in Antwerp. Some GIs had caused damage to the bar and a financial settlement was made. I also went to Ghent to visit a US citizen who was in prison there. I talked with Director Swinnen about the case.

October 11, Prime Minister Leo Tindemans resigned in Parliament over a confrontation with Socialist André Cools on constitutional questions resulting from the Regionalization Egmont Accords. Mr. Paul Van de Boeynants formed an interim government. King Baudouin wanted the government to examine the Articles of the Egmont Accords, which needed revision in Parliament. The Egmont Accords were the basis for setting up three autonomous political and cultural regions - one for Flanders, one for Wallonia, and another for the city of Brussels (where both Flemish and Walloons reside). Representatives of the three communities created mechanisms that would allow regional parliamentary power in each of the three areas without denying the Belgian central government in Brussels the right to act in matters of diplomacy, defense, and national issues, which affected all Belgian citizens. The Egmont Accords were finally implemented in the early 1980s and, to date, in Belgium, there are three autonomous political governments, which is a situation complex enough to confuse most foreign observers, but allows the linguistic Flemish and Walloon groups to fulfill their individual cultural identities.
Besides Ambassador Cox Chambers, Minister-Counselor Arthur Olsen also expressed great interest in our job in Antwerp. They often called us and drove over for lunch. Some sensitive issues were ironed out before staff meetings at the Embassy on Fridays.

I was invited November 3 to the Concorde Club of Antwerp. Ambassador Cox Chambers was the guest of honor. Others present were: Baron Kronacker, Minister of State and head of the Belgian Tierlemont Sugar Refinery; Belgian Ambassador to the United States Mr. Le Bac; and Antwerp sculptor Willy Kreitz.

November 19, I was at the City Hall of Antwerp on the occasion of the opening of the academic year of the Antwerp Naval Academy. Professor Suykens spoke about port problems in the Third World.

I joined Consul General Bolster on a visit to Bell Telephone Company in Genk (Province of Antwerp). It had about 11,000 workers, and we were told that, because of the revolutionary technological changes taking place in the industry, they needed one engineer for every three workers.

December 5, Mr. Newlin, State Department Country Desk Officer for Benelux, stopped in to see me on his way to Luxembourg. We reviewed some aspects of Flemish politics and the parliamentary elections to be held in December. December 17, the Belgians went to the polls to elect new members of Parliament. The CVP held its own, but Flemish socialists lost some seats, VU (Flemish Nationalist party) suffered heavy losses, liberals in Flanders made some gains. The Belgian political spectrum looked more complicated than ever after the fall of the Tindemans II government.

On January 9, 1979, Wilfred Martens, president of the CVP (Catholic majority) party was appointed by the King as Formateur (a position which attempts to form the basis for a new government). At the time, Manu Ruys, who worked for the Flemish daily, De Standaard, was optimistic about Martens’ chances to form a new government. His predictions proved to be true.

My social life was a hectic one. There were no evenings that I was not invited out, but I was often at cultural events where I met political people who became solid contacts. Political and cultural events often intertwined.

The evening of December 18 was very foggy. We (employees of the Consulate) shuttled to Brussels to attend a Christmas dinner given by the Ambassador at the Chateau St. Anne. It was a great dance party, but because of the fog, the trip back was hazardous.

On January 15, I was asked to attend a press conference in Ghent, organized by the Eggermont Model firm. They introduced Eileen Ford, fashion show director of the Ford model office in New York. She had come to Belgium to interview some new model candidates. I got to know the challenges of her job over lunch.

In March I was a guest at the Rotary Club Academy, where Governor of Antwerp Mr. Andries
Kinsbergen, Mayor M. Schroyens, and Attorney General Van Roeyland were present.

I traveled to Ostend to handle the Cope Estate case (Mr. Cope was a US citizen pilot who had died in England). His sister came to Ostend to settle his financial affairs. The US Consul uses its facilitative services to help out in such estate cases.

Belgian explorer Fons Oerlemans and his wife came to my office. He presented me with a copy of his book on his travels. I issued him a tourist visa to travel to the Bermuda Triangle. Quite often I would have US tourists who wanted to say hello to the American Consul. This happened in April when New Jersey Game Commission inspectors Dennis Furlong and D. Marrow visited.

On April 17, CVP Wilfred Martens formed a coalition government with the Socialists and the FDF.

On May 6, 1979, I flew to Rome to attend the Consular Officer’s conference. It was good to be back in the Eternal City. Since I stayed at the hotel Dei Principe I was able to take a long walk through Parco Borghese, Via Veneto, where the US Embassy is located.

The next day, Barbara Watson, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs (1968-1974; 1977-1980), opened the conference. We got an overview of Italian politics by Ambassador Richard N. Gardner, and Ambassador Ronald D. Palmer spoke about personnel matters. In the evening I went to a meeting at St. Paul’s American Episcopal Church.

We also had a briefing on citizenship services by Carmen Placido. Mr. Purcell and Ron Summerville, of Administration, were on hand to assist with problems in that area. We had the afternoon free. I visited Galleria Borghese where I saw beautiful Caravaggios, Rubens and sculptures. I also walked near Church Triniti Del Monto. In the evening I attended a reception at the home of Counselor of Embassy Jim Riley.

I went to the Vatican to see the Last Judgment of Michelangelo. Pope John Paul II rode through St. Peter’s Square in his jeep, where we could all see him. It was an impressive, emotional experience. My friend, Johannes-Maria, a Franciscan monk, who worked at the Vatican Office of the Propagation of the Faith, was correct that every diplomat should visit Rome because it is the cradle of civilization. Wherever one goes in Rome, one is reminded of Roman history and civilization, and its impact on contemporary times.

The next day I joined other employees at the American Embassy to greet First Lady Rosalynn Carter and her daughter, Amy. We met them in the courtyard, shaking hands and exchanging pleasantries. In the evening I had a visit with my friend, Father Philip, in his convent on San Teodoro.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and US Customs officials, in a closing briefing, made reference to pending plans between the INS and US Customs to cooperate more fully in combating illicit drug trafficking on the US-Mexican border, and the interception of drug shipments in the Caribbean.
On my return home we attended the famous folkloric parade, “Pageant of the Cat,” in Ieper, West Flanders, a folkloric highlight for me. There I met Wilfred Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium, Karel Van Miert, President of the Flemish Socialist Party, and Mr. Hugo Schiltz, President of the Volksunie (Flemish Nationalist Party).

In May, I paid an official visit to Turnhout (near Antwerp). Mayor J. Proost received me at City Hall and showed me the Romanesque St. Peter’s Church. I visited Carta Mundi, a factory that produces well-known Belgian playing cards. Later on I met archivist Harry De Kok, who was in charge of history and cultural affairs.

I joined Deputy Chief of Mission Arthur Olsen and Consul General Bolster at the Memorial Day services at the US military cemetery in Waregem, West Flanders. It was a privilege to be present at this ceremony honoring our military heroes. Since Flanders was liberated by American and Canadian forces in World War II, the townspeople felt grateful and appreciated the visit by American diplomats.

The elections for the European parliament were the political highlight in June 1979. I had a chance to discuss the events with Senior Belgian CVP Senator Marcel Van de Wiele. The Senator said, “It was Europe’s first exercise in macro politics.” He also said that there was a consciousness of change and that this could be seen in the young voters as they viewed the future of Europe. He listed creating jobs for younger workers as one of the priority items on the European agenda.

I was impressed by the his in-depth knowledge of world affairs. “The Third World will force us to stick together,” he remarked, “because as they put restrictions on their resource allocations, the industrialized nations will have to adopt a common strategy of conservation.”

Van de Wiele advocated a North-South dialogue that would eventually lead to a sort of Marshall Plan for the Third World. He believed that Belgium, because of its historic neutrality and linguistic heritage, would be able to look at global issues more dispassionately than France or West Germany.

June 22, I accompanied Ambassador Cox Chambers to the opening of the Rubens-Rembrandt etchings (from the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York) at the Antwerp Fine Arts Museum. Minister for Flemish Culture Rita de Backer and Socialist Member of Parliament Jos Van Elewyck also attended. Cultural events in Flanders usually drew huge crowds of tourists.

I handled details related to the trial of a US citizen at the Palace of Justice in Antwerp, and visited another family in Bruges regarding a child custody case. There was a lot of follow-up with interested parties.

Maïté and I attended the Golden Jubilee dinner for Mr. P.N. Ferstenberg. A few days later we drove to Cologne, Germany, to visit the Gothic Cathedral, stopping in Bonn (capital of West Germany) and Aken to see the treasures of Charlemagne in a church with Byzantine features.

I had a long meeting June 1 with George Derieuw, National Secretary ABVV/FETB and
Secretary of Flemish “Interregional.” (Note: Abbreviations above refer to Flemish and Walloon terms for Socialist and Christian unions.) I was particularly interested in his views on TNF (deployment of US cruise missiles in Western Europe). He said that, in spite of the fact that American prestige had declined after the loss of Iran, he favored immediate production and early deployment of US cruise missiles to counterbalance Soviet SS-20 rocketry. “The Soviets are sure of their present nuclear superiority and will not let this opportunity to maintain their superiority slip away through compromise,” he said. When I asked him whether regionalization would succeed, he replied that ABVV would accept Brussels as a region, but not on an equal footing with Flanders and Wallonia.

On June 6, King Baudouin delivered an address at the occasion of the 150th anniversary of Belgium. I also visited with famous Belgian heart specialist and surgeon, Dr. Jacques Bleyn, who assisted me in bringing an Afghan refugee to Belgium for a kidney transplant. Dr. Bleyn said that he had worked with Dr. Michael DeBakey in Houston.

In June, I attended a reception at the Belgian-American Club in honor of American author Joyce Carol Oates and her husband. They expressed great interest in all aspects of life in the foreign service. Later Rebecca and I traveled through France. We stopped in Rouen where we visited the gothic cathedral. We also stopped at the Basilica of St. Teresa of Lisieux and the Cathedral of St. Maurits in Angers, famous for its precious woodwork in the nave and its stained glass windows. In the chateau of Angers we admired the tapestries of the Apocalypse (Mille Fleurs). We then drove to Royan and spent a few days with Rebecca’s maternal grandparents in Le Verdon sur Mer.

In July, I drove alone to Toulouse and Albi to visit the Toulouse Lautrec museum. I visited the Church of Saint Cecile in Albi. On the way back to Belgium I saw the Romanesque church of Cahors and Chateaux of Chenonceaux and Amboise.

I represented the Consulate General at the French Independence celebration at the French Consulate General in Antwerp. At a lunch for Marcel Colla, socialist alderman of Deurne (Antwerp), and member of the European Parliament, he stated that he shared Karl Van Miert’s (President of the Socialist Party) and W. Tobback’s (floor leader) opposition to the TNF. He conceded that his party was also committed to spending more for social legislation, and that this would not be “a negligible factor in wanting to delay TNF.” Colla was quick to point out that the latest American position on possible talks with the Soviets on strategic nuclear weapons proved that the Belgian Socialist Party’s position was a sanguine one.

I assumed charge of the Consulate General from July 17 through July 19, 1980, and met Mr. La Fosse, new director of Customs, who had replaced K.F. Hendrick. Whenever Consul General Archie Bolster left the Consul district, I assumed charge.

For Belgium’s Independence Day celebration I attended a “Te Deum” ceremony in St. Peter and Paul Cathedral in Ostend.

When a terrorist group leader attacked a Jewish children’s school on Lamorinie Street, in Antwerp, there was widespread outrage by the Jewish community, and people of Antwerp. Extra
security was posted in the Jewish district to guard against further violence.

On October 29, I met and talked with Jean Luc De Haene, Chief of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Wilfred Martens, at the Prime Minister’s residence in Brussels. Mr. De Haene is currently the Prime Minister in Belgium. I was asked by the Embassy to get a feel for his views on the regionalization plans in Belgium and on the official position of the Martens IV government on TNF. It was a crucial assignment for me. He reassured me of the Martens III cabinet’s official statement of support for TNF - if East-West negotiations proved unproductive. He told me that the incoming Reagan administration might force a decision on TNF. Prime Minister De Haene was very careful not to say anything negative about the socialists as coalition partners. He was of the opinion that despite the Socialists (including Karl Van Miert and W. Tobback) advocacy of their pro-disarmament policies, they were not necessarily to be interpreted as anti-American.

Jean Luc De Haene was born in Bruges and we reminisced on our common Flemish roots.

On October 30, the Consul General and I had lunch at the Circle Royal Philataxc with Judge Van Camp and Raymond Smith, Benelux desk officer.

In early November, we attended a consular dinner at the home of Mr. and Mrs. P. N. Ferstenberg.

November 12, Socialist Mayor of Bruges, Frank Van Acker, received me at City Hall. We had a one-hour exchange about political conditions in Belgium and Tobback-Van Miert’s opposition to US rocketry modernization in Belgium. Van Acker, unlike his socialist counterparts, took a more centrist and moderate position on the cruise missiles issue, and felt that a strong military posture in Western Europe was to NATO’s advantage. My friend, Dries Vandenabeele, convinced me that Mayor Van Acker and Economics Minister Willy Claes followed the traditional socialist line, but wanted Belgium to live up to its NATO commitments.

November 20, Virginia Schafer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations in the State Department, visited our post.

I was also invited to a Flemish-Japanese evening at Rubens House. Besides the Japanese Consul General and German Consul Johann Stenglein, I met Mr. Fleerackers, President of the Rubens House, who was also a member of the Constitutional Committee on linguistic problems.

In late November I was received by Monsignor. Paul Vandenberghe, Bishop of Antwerp. We talked about the tense East-West relations. He felt that the US should not use a grain embargo as a weapon against the USSR. “Too many poor people are affected by this,” he stated. He added that there were more effective ways in the psychological warfare area to counteract those who violate international law and human rights.

I was the guest of Dries Vandenabeele, President of ICOMOS, at the Palace of Congress in Brussels. Prince Albert (now King Albert II) of Belgium presided over the event. Besides Minister for Flemish affairs, Gaston Geens, I met some diplomats, such as the Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy of Iraq.
A few weeks later I met Andre Goossens, President of ACV (West Flanders Christian Union). He was convinced that the Martens IV government would be successful in clearing the economic austerity (such as a salary freeze) plan through Parliament, regardless of the Unions’ objections. On the proposed US missiles plan in Western Europe, he said that Belgium had no choice but to fully cooperate with NATO’s modernization requirements.

December 30, 1980, I paid an official visit to J. Van Roy, Mayor of the City of Mechelen (Malines). We talked for an hour in his office about US-Belgian ties. First Alderman Albert Stiers and Frank Geys, of the Municipal Council, joined us.

January 2, 1981, Deputy Chief of Mission Ed Killham came to the Consulate General. Jim Minyard and I prepared an informal lunch for him, which gave us an opportunity to go over some Consular business.

January 16, Ambassador Cox Chambers gave a farewell party at the residence for the Embassy staff. Many tributes to her were given for her work in improving US-Belgian relations during her tenure as US Envoy to Belgium.

There was an academic session at the Courthouse of Turnhout (old city in the Province of Antwerp) in January where my friend, Harry De Kok, the city’s archivist, presented his new book on Turnhout. It was an occasion to mix with local townspeople and officials, such as the Judge of the First Instance and First Alderman Dademans. It was in the small towns of Flanders that I learned about the intricacies of Flemish politics.

January 20, Ronald Reagan became the 40th American President. His inaugural message stressed a revival of the American economy. In international affairs he advocated a strong military buildup in Western Europe to force the Soviet Union to negotiate on nuclear arms cuts. Reagan also stressed developing strong relations with Latin America and new plans to combat international terrorism. President Carter received his farewell gift: Iran freed the American hostages - ending a painful chapter in international diplomacy.

January 23, I was lunch guest of Luc Martens, Director of the Training Institute of the CVP Catholic Party (IPOVO), which trains young political leaders. Martens worked closely with former Prime Minister CVP President Leo Tindemans (who is also in the Christian EVP Party of Europe), and gave me an overview of the Belgian political scene. He said that Parliamentarians were often briefed by IPOVO before they made policy statements on domestic and international affairs. On the anti-cruise missile stand by some members of the Belgian Socialist Party, he felt that there was some change of heart, of late, due to the Soviet Union’s policies in Afghanistan and Poland, and that Western European policies of detente with the Soviets needed to be reviewed. I felt that Luc Martens would play an important role in Flemish regionalization politics.

January 28, 1981, I received a call from former Belgian Ambassador to Washington, Mr. Caulewaert (who is retired in Antwerp). He made a concerted appeal to the US because Armed Forces Radio Network (AFRN) had been jammed in Europe these past days. The ambassador
claimed that the Soviets were responsible for this as an attempt to cover up their interference in Poland. I told the ambassador that I would raise this issue with the embassy in Brussels.

I visited someone in Zolder, a province of Limburg, who was a potential witness in a denaturalization case, and required a statement in front of a consular officer. In spite of my urging him to cooperate, I was unable to obtain the information needed to forward the case to Washington.

February 21, I had a meeting with CVP Member of Parliament Senator Roger Windels, who expressed keen interest in stimulating small businesses.

On March 3, Mrs. Murdoch, an Internal Revenue Service representative, came to the Consulate General to assist American citizens with the filing of their income tax returns.

Since Antwerp is only a short distance from Brussels, I visited the Horta Museum there. It is a perfect replica of a turn-of-the-century (art nouveau) house. I had lunch with Mayor J. Proost, of Turnhout, and with Luc Martens, of IPOVO. He gave me a feeling that the split within the CVP party between the Martens and Tindemans factions could lead to a fall of the Martens IV government.

March 30, 1981, President Reagan was shot following a talk before the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) at the Hilton in Washington. There was consternation throughout the entire world. We were worried who would handle foreign policy in the interim. Fortunately, the President recovered and went on with his great goals of national security. Consul Johann Stenglein, of the German Consulate in Antwerp, called me to express his concern about President Reagan’s condition.

Discussions between his coalition government (Martens IV) and the Unions over indexation led to the fall of the Martens government. The Prime Minister submitted his resignation to the King. Around that time I traveled to Ostend to attend a lunch for the new Mayor, Julien Goekint.

April 6, Belgian Finance Minister Mark Eyskens (son of former Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens) was appointed Prime Minister. He promised to support the same platform as that of the Martens IV government. Mr. Vandenputte, former Governor General of the Belgian National Bank, replaced him as Belgian Finance Minister.

April 14, Ambassador Thomas O. Enders, a permanent representative to the United States Mission of the European Community (USEC), was appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (Ambassador Enders passed away in 1996), and former actor John Gavin became the US Ambassador to Mexico.

VAKA Belgium and Holland were anti-Junta groups participating in marches in front of our Consulate and at SHAPE and NATO Headquarters in Brussels, in protest against the Junta dictatorship in El Salvador. Antwerp police increased security for us.

April 24, I attended an evening concert by the Seaford High School Band of New York, at
General Motors Auditorium, in Antwerp. Director Mansel asked me to address the students following their great performance. The following day I went to Antwerp City Hall where a reception was held by the City Council for the Seaford Band. They gave us another performance on the main square. Socialist Alderman Posson and Colonel Lauwers (Councilman) hosted the event. There was always wide coverage of cultural events in the Flemish press.

April 26, Consul General Bolster and I attended the annual dinner for the veterans of Flanders Field Post II at the Rodenbach Restaurant, in Roeselare, West Flanders. We were presented farewell gifts (both Archie and I would depart the post in the summer). Many local officials attended, as did acting Mayor Van Eekhoute.

On May 1, 1981, Minister of Flemish Culture Rita De Backer and I met again - this time at a farewell dinner by the Tyle Uilenspiegel Club at the Luchtbal in Antwerp. It was a typical Breughel feast. Minister De Backer presented medals pro musica to Mr. Mansel and his colleagues. Minister De Backer pointed out that we have more private support for the endowment of the arts in the US. She was aware that the high quality of our museums was due to the fact that American financiers had invested in many cultural projects. “This was not the case in Flanders,” she said, but mentioned that Italy had similar private investments. During the dinner I had a chance to talk with Mr. J. De Boeck, a representative with Sabena (Belgian Airlines).

May 5, US Secretary of State General Alexander Haig, paid a courtesy call on King Baudouin of Belgium and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ferdinand Nothomb. He also visited NATO Headquarters. Having worked at NATO, General Haig’s theme during the visit was devoted to issues of European security.

On May 10, Socialist Francois Mitterrand defeated Valery Giscard d’Estaing for the Presidency of France with 52% of the votes. Inflation, unemployment and the austere personality of Giscard were cited as reasons for his victory. The attempted assassination of world leaders was repeated on May 13 when Pope John Paul II was shot by a Turkish national in St. Peter’s Square. Both President Reagan and the Pope are victims of an increasing terrorism war.

Although Archie and I had already said goodbye to some of our good Flemish friends and contacts, we kept in close touch with political developments in Flanders, and President Reagan’s decision to introduce cruise missiles in Western Europe.

May 14, Archie and I attended the opening of a “Painters of the West” exhibit at the Fine Arts in Brussels. The works came from the Anschutz collection in Colorado. We saw the best of Frederic Remington, George Inness and George Catlin. Chargé d’Affaires and Mrs. Edward Killham were also present. (When Ambassador Cox Chambers had departed the post, Mr. Killham was put in charge of the embassy.)

Archie and I were guests at a dinner at Oestrich House (Bank of Paris and the Netherlands) on the Meir in honor of Delaware Governor Pierre S. Du Pont IV. I was seated at a table with the Secretary of State of Delaware, Mr. Kemtin, and also with the Consul General of the Netherlands, Mr. Van Der Kraan. Governor du Pont spoke of the need to do away with indexing
and excess taxation on industries. “This is a new era to produce more and create jobs,” he stated. He encouraged cities like Antwerp to do business directly with individual states, such as Delaware, to avoid the complex federal bureaucracy in Washington. The dinner had been organized by the Flemish Economic Union and European Transport following the Governor’s visit with the King.

May 24, 1981, I represented the Consul General at the annual Memorial Day services at the American Military Cemetery of World War I servicemen, in Waregem, West Flanders. I accompanied the Chargé d’Affaires Ed Killham to the monument on the main square in Waregem and then to the cemetery. Although the weather was bad, Air Force planes stationed in West Germany flew over the ceremony site as is the custom for Memorial Day services. Afterwards we attended a reception where I talked with Mayor Coucke of Waregem; Van Dierendonck, President of the Overseas Cemeteries; Mathys, president of the ceremony, and representatives of the Belgian military forces.

Later in the month I attended the opening of etchings by Karl Roelands at the Plantin Moretus Museum in Antwerp. At the exhibit ceremony I talked with Eugeen Dhont, Deputy Commissioner of the Foreign Police, in Antwerp; Mathilde Schroyens, Mayor of Antwerp; and Dr. Leon Voet, curator of the museum. I was also interviewed by Editor Jean Herreboudt, of the Brugsch Handelsblad, a weekly in Bruges. It covered my four-and-a-half years in Antwerp.

On June 1, Charles Price II, of Kansas City, was appointed by President Reagan to replace Anne Cox Chambers as American Ambassador to Belgium. On June 10, Mr. Harry De Kok, of Turnhout, came to see me to present his second book about the city. I was also invited for a farewell luncheon by Colonel Willy Van Geet at the headquarters of the Mobile Brigade, in Wilryk, near Antwerp. I saw the brigade installation and museum, and we reminisced on our contacts over the past four years.

Chargé d’Affaires Ed Killham hosted a farewell luncheon for Consul General Bolster and myself at his residence in Brussels. Archie and I also went to the art exhibit of Flemish painter Gustaaf Van De Woestyne at the Museum of Fine Arts, in Antwerp. It was there that I met the son of Gustaaf, who is also a painter.

On 16 June Consul General Bolster and I received Reverend Christiaan Vonck, Chaplain of the Antwerp prison, and presented him a certificate of appreciation for his extraordinary services to American citizens in the Antwerp penitentiary.

June 19, I had lunch with CVP Member of Parliament Marc Olivier, of Kortryk. In the evening I was the guest of honor at the Single Music Hall for the 30th Anniversary of the “Strangers” music group of Antwerp. Afterwards, at a reception at the Crest Hotel, I sat at the table of honor with the wife of the Governor of Antwerp, Mrs. Kinsbergen, Minister of State and Mrs. Frans Grootjans (of the PVV Flemish liberal party); and Mr. Strielings, Manager of the Nieuwe Gazet, an Antwerp daily.

In preparation for my onward assignment to Tijuana, we moved to the Theater Hotel, in Antwerp. In the evening I gave the commencement address at the graduation ceremony of the
June 25, I attended the farewell reception for German Vice Consul Siegfried Rapp at his home in Ekeren.

June 30, I addressed students at the Middle School of the Eucharistic Heart, in Essen (Province of Limburg), who had been hosts to American students of Oak Lawn High School, in Chicago.

On July 2, I went to the city of Ieper, where Mayor De Hem received me at City Hall. He had organized a farewell reception for me. It was a day I will long remember. We said goodbye to Jim and Peggy Minyard at their home in Brasschaat.

There was a farewell reception and Independence Day buffet at the residence of Consul General Bolster. Our new Ambassador to Belgium, Charles Price, came to meet us.

Maïté and I were guests at the home of Antwerp artist Gaston Roelands. He is a well-known contemporary Belgian painter who had first-hand knowledge of Mexican landscapes. He told us about his many trips to Mexico and exhibits in European capitals. Assistant Commissioner Eugeen and Mrs. Dhont also attended the farewell dinner. Before leaving Belgium I said goodbye to my friends Robert and Christiane Fonteyne, Gerard and Monique Pintelon, Florentina Van Riet Janssens, Ivo and Eveline Van De Weyer, and many other friends.

with them. And it was a one-day trip. An Air Force plane flew me to Ottawa. The airplane stayed there, I did my business and I came back that night. That was quite an eye opener.

In addition to that, I felt that the atmosphere at the Pentagon was a good deal friendlier. Working in the State Department you have your friends and your colleagues, but there was something about just walking down the corridors in the State Department, which didn’t become clear to me until I got over to Pentagon, and until years later when I read a letter in the State Department magazine. People said “Hello” in the Pentagon, even if you didn’t know them, as if you were in some small town together. There was cheerfulness in the atmosphere. In terms of making your work easy, I just gave one example of how that was done, with the airplane. And the State Department doesn’t have its own air force, but still the military had that capacity and they used it. There was also this sense of willingness to find solutions, to cooperate, and to resolve problems. I just had trouble what to attribute this to. But there was definitely that sense of being in a sort of more friendly community.

I mentioned, years later there was a letter to the editor of the State magazine. The headline, the title on the letter was “That look away look.” It was a letter from a military officer who had been sent over to the State Department to work. And he described walking down the halls at the State Department and he’d see people he knew there but rather then make eye contact with him, they’d look away. He found that most peculiar. I though about it and I said, “My Gosh, he’s right. It does happen.” I wouldn’t say all the time but it did happen there. And that was another contrast. I found out also working there later in life, that the military really do have a greater sense of their esprit de corps, than the Foreign Service does. Maybe that’s in part because they literally depend on one another for their very lives. And maybe that sort of creates a sense of working together, helping one another. I found in retirement that the military officers genuinely helped one another in terms of finding jobs or contacts, what have you. Far more than I find with the State Department and the Foreign Service.

In any case, even though the Pentagon was a large building, with lots of people in it, one did find that more friendly atmosphere even though it was a huge bureaucracy. In my job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, there was one stop between me and the Secretary, and that was my boss, Assistant Secretary, in this case Gene McCauliffe, also an FSO. That ability to get in touch directly with the head of the organization was far greater in Pentagon for me than it was at an equivalent job at the State Department.

As for the substance, this began with the Ford administration. We were working on ways to try to help the Defense Department get back on its feet, and our forces in Europe in particular, after expenses and the cost of the Vietnam war. We began that program. I also participated in a briefing of NATO Permanent Representatives, which Secretary Rumsfeld set up, he having earlier been Ambassador to NATO, about the Soviet military buildup. It was on that occasion that I had my first introduction to what later became a major part of my life’s work, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces issue. We for the first time showed the allies the situation we were together beginning to face as a result of the Soviets coming up with some very powerful new missiles. After the change of the administration, I stayed on in that position, working on the same questions with David McGiffert as the Assistant Secretary of Defense and Harold Brown as the Secretary of Defense. I worked very closely also with Bob Komer and our efforts there were
to revitalize NATO, to ensure that the alliance would be able to meet its defense commitments with sufficient revenues, new equipment, etc. It was very serious, very important effort to try to get NATO back on its feet after the Vietnam war. I stayed at that job until the summer of 1977. At that point I had an opportunity to go overseas again and to serve as Deputy Chief of Mission at NATO, with William Tapley “Tap” Bennett, Jr. as our Ambassador. That brings us to the next phase.

To round it off, this was a job that I very much enjoyed. I think I made some useful contributions to national security on the job. In a way I was sorry to leave, but on the other hand having an opportunity to deal with these problems in the field, and meet directly with our allies at NATO headquarters was also an important challenge, so I looked forward to moving to Brussels.

The DCM at NATO, in Brussels, had a house assigned to him. We had no need to find a place to live. Very pleasant place. Nice large yard and a lawn. Obviously made for entertaining downstairs. We did a lot of work to make some improvements to the reception room. It was not far from the Forêt de Soignes, which was a large remnant of the European forest that had covered the continent, and it was not too far from where we lived. As I mentioned earlier I very much enjoy the outdoors and one of the pleasures of living in that particular place was that I was able to go out the door, and Chris with me, and the dog, or children, and within a short couple of blocks we were in the forest. You could walk miles and miles in this forest, once you got to know the paths. There were highways that bisected it in some areas, but you could find out where the tunnels were to walk under them, so it was nice to have something so close to your home for the weekends at least when we weren’t working, it was, as I said, very pleasurable. We had to drive to work but at this point I did have a driver. Certainly after I got there, thanks to the security situation we began to drive with armored cars. In the beginning these were make-shift, large lumps of plastic over the windows, I suppose some sort of steel in the doors, etc.

Q: Had there been some problem that brought this about?

GLITMAN: No problems specific to Belgium, but a worldwide problem at this point. It did make a difference in our lives. From there on we would be living in that kind of situation. On the weekends we had our own vehicle and would just go. We had purchased a Jeep Wagoneer, which wasn’t the smartest thing to have at that point, but we bought it before we knew we were going overseas, it was with the idea that we would use it to drive home to Vermont. It would have been a good thing. But it was not to be, so we shipped the car over to Belgium. It would have been a good thing. But it was not to be, so we shipped the car over to Belgium. One of the things we went through, with that particular car was that in order to meet Belgian rules and regulations we had to change some of the wiring. Belgians with their fog insisted on a separate fog lamp in the back and they didn’t like yellow lights that we had in the front, parking lights, whatever you call them. And they had to be white. They made some other changes in the wiring. I’ll finish the story about this vehicle. We then, you’ll find later, moved from Brussels to Geneva and we took the Jeep with us, and the Swiss had different wiring regulations, and so all the wiring was done over for Swiss specs. Then we went briefly to Vienna, took the Jeep there and Austrians had their wiring arrangements. And then just to make everything nice and cozy the vehicle went back to Brussels when we returned there later. We did finally ship it home to the U.S. We paid for that ourselves on this occasion. It finally died in Vermont, and you can guess how. The wiring harness burned out. It was too bad, that was the end of the poor car. So many
times, with these different rules and regulations. That was another side of life in the service.

While we are still on the more social side, and then I’ll get to the substance, we had a very heavy social schedule. Again, social life is work in another form. But at Brussels, at NATO I should say, there really was a lot of activity. One nice thing about NATO events and particularly the dinners, they started at eight and they ended at 11, and everybody arrived on time and everybody departed on time. So you could pretty well count on it. Again, as was the case in other places, the dinner parties and the receptions were opportunities to continue the work that had been going on during the day at the office, but at least in a more informal setting. These events, and particularly the dinners could be difficult for Chris or any of the other spouses. I could see that often she’d be seated between two diplomats, or a diplomat and a military officer, or two military officers, people who were working together all day and had more business to transpire during the evening. She would just find herself sitting there while they talked past her. There was nothing I could do about it and even today, even thinking about that, I feel badly about it. I probably was guilty of doing it myself on the occasion. But it was just the intensity of the work that I think lead into that situation.

The work itself covered just about every problem in the world. It’s not the UN, it’s NATO, but when you begin to look at the issues that the NATO countries are interested in and the way the organization is set up, sooner or later almost any problem would find its way there, if only for experts’ discussion. So NATO doesn’t deal say with Latin America or the Far East, but it was not unusual for NATO Latin American experts or NATO Middle Eastern experts to come to a meeting at NATO headquarters to discuss the subject. And you could see why, given the nature of the alliance and its security role, this would be a perfectly sensible thing for it to do so that the countries could cooperate on issues. It’s well beyond the boundaries of the NATO countries or the continents that they were located on. It doesn’t mean that we’d actually have a defense arrangement involved, we didn’t. But there was at least a discussion of these kinds of issues.

There were fixed meetings, defense ministers, foreign ministers, they would meet twice a year. In addition, the defense ministers would meet as something called the “Nuclear Planning Group.” It was smaller, not all the defense ministers participated in that, but most did eventually on a rotational basis. That was another set of meetings, which defense ministers did. Incidentally while I was at the Pentagon working on NATO issues, I would be going to those meetings as well, so I had continuity from that which carried over.

We worked on a number of key issues during this time. One was continuation of building our forces back up after the Vietnam war; in keeping with what was clearly a buildup in Soviet forces. We were actively engaged in that. Something we put together in which Bob Komer played a key role, was the long-term defense program, which he helped shepherd through NATO. Setting specific goals, targets, both for results and for spending, 3% of GNP to go for defense for all of the NATO countries was the expenditure goal. Then there were specific goals each country agreed to meet to improve their forces. Committees and groups were set up to monitor the progress in doing that. It was a pretty thorough operation. I think it proved to be successful in helping NATO not to get back on its feet but to compensate for its forces being drawn down during Vietnam, and now to help deal with matching the Soviets, countering the increasing Soviet expenditure. The other thing we got involved in, and I got deeply involved in
was on the nuclear side. That culminated in a key decision NATO reached on December 12, 1979.

Perhaps I could say something about daily routine at NATO, give you some kind of idea of the amount of activity that we had there. We had a staff meeting every morning when we came in to work. Went over the activities that were expected that day. Practically everyone had one or two committees that they were charged with following and attending, representing the U.S. at. Some of these committees would meet on a weekly basis, some a little less frequently, but it gave everyone an opportunity to participate directly in the affairs of the alliance because of the fact that there were enough committees for everyone to have a role to play.

The permanent representatives, perm reps, had two scheduled events every week. One was a perm reps lunch, which took place on Tuesdays. The purpose of the lunch was to allow informal discussion of subjects which were likely to come up during the week in a more formal setting and for countries to try to get a sense of how well their position will be received or what kinds of changes they may have to make in it, what sort of changes they may want other to make in theirs, and the U.S.; ambassador or myself, one of us would always be at these perm rep lunches.

Wednesdays were formal North Atlantic Council meetings. We’d always call that of course, the NAC. The perm reps would be present for that meeting. This was formal occasion, as I said, and countries could put their position on, forward it as a formal country position. The agenda was usually set during the preceding week, or during the first part of the week, but normally you’d have heads-up that such and such items were on the agenda. The international staff, NATO has international staff as well as country representatives, and the international staff would sometimes be tasked with the job of coming up with the agendas. They would discuss these issues with the countries delegations, national delegations, to get some sort of idea what different countries might be proposing to put up. Those were Wednesdays.

Other days of the week the special political committee, made up of delegation political officers, would meet. There was an economic committee, and those meetings would be once a week. Lot of public affairs activities would go on. We would have frequent visitors from Washington. We welcomed them, particularly from the Congress. I felt that when they came to NATO they came for serious work. We tried very hard to give them a clear picture of what was happening at the alliance, how it would affect the U.S. and how they could help the U.S. in its efforts at NATO. By and large I found most of the congressmen and senators helpful and anxious to be of the assistance to the alliance.

Twice a year there were the ministerial level meetings, for both the political issues, State Department and foreign ministers and for defense ministers. For each of those meetings there was always a formal communiqué. Larry Legere, the officer who headed the defense side of our mission to NATO, and who was formally the Secretary of Defense’s representative in Europe, and people working directly for him in our mission would be responsible for putting together the communiqué for the defense ministers activities. I would clear all of those, as would our Ambassador Bennett at this time. We would clear those communiqués, and would make sure that they were in keeping with the broad policy. We never had any serious problems with this. And those would be hammered out by the staffs from the various NATO countries, usually at night.
The next morning the ministers would pass on them.

For the foreign ministers’ communiqués, the head of the political section would work on the communiqué, during the lead up to the final night and then I as DCM would represent the U.S. at the final session. These sessions usually didn’t start till about eight or nine o’clock at night and they habitually went into the small hours. I only know of one occasion, a meeting in Ankara, when we were not able to finish. We heard the call to prayer at night as the sun went down and we heard to call to prayer in the morning as the sun came up. We didn’t make it that night, as I recall. Remember, the key issue had to do with a CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe question. I don’t remember the details, but I do remember that my British and French colleagues had very differing views on how to deal with this problem. And exceptionally, they exchanged a few sharp words during the course of the discussion. As always, these things tended to work out. Normally, we’d be done at three, four in the morning.

My task was to get the communiqués to the Secretary of State as soon as he woke up, so that he could read the communiqué at breakfast and then after he had read it I would usually be called in and asked questions about it, why this was that way and how we came to that position and so on. I enjoyed those all night sessions. I did have an advantage, I am more of a night person then an early to rise person, so as the night wore on, others wore out but I was still going.

There were times when there were disagreements between ourselves and the French. Fortunately, I had a very good relationship with Jacques Jessel, who was the French number two for most of time that I was at NATO. There were occasions, one in particular, where he and I had reached an agreement between us on how to deal with a problem and it felt we had resolved it. But, the person chairing the group, who was normally one of the senior NATO staff members, at the last minute, as Jacques and I were coming to agreement, you could see where the compromise would arise, jumped in with his own solution; which got both of us angry at him; because we could see that we were about to settle it. The Chair was trying to be helpful, but it would have been good time for the person chairing the meeting to sit back and let the two who were causing the problem, so to speak, settle their differences. We did. Working with Jessel was very helpful later, particularly as we got into some of the nuclear issues. And let me turn now to those questions.

The Long Term Defense Program that I had mentioned, where Komer had done a good job in getting it going, dealt largely with conventional systems. This caused some of our allies to wonder whether the U.S. was going to start downplaying its nuclear commitment to NATO. And I made a point when this began to crop up to make sure that Washington was aware of this sensitivity. As a result we decided to add another element to the Long Term Defense Program, which was to take a look at NATO’s nuclear requirements. The effort to get that element properly included into the Long Term Defense Program took up a huge amount of time and became extremely sensitive. The Allies, particularly some of the German leaders, had evidenced concern that we were possibly going to give up the prospect of having cruise missiles in the context of our bilateral SALT negotiations with the Soviets.

We conceded to the allies that there was a great concern there, that we might be backing away from our nuclear commitment and that our negotiating on strategic weapons could have the effect of not making it possible for the allies or us to field new systems in Europe with which we
could directly protect the allies and directly counter new Soviet missiles, particularly the SS-20; three war heads, about 4000 kilometers range; being deployed in Soviet Union in rather considerable numbers. We had nothing to really counter it as such. Cruise missiles were a possibility, and just to repeat myself to make sure it is clear, the allies were saying, “Yes, but it looks as if you may giving up on them in order to get your strategic treaty with the Soviets, but that’s going to leave us in a bad situation.” We tried very hard to persuade the allies that there was no reason for concern here. That we could take care of their needs on the nuclear side with what we had. We were not going to give up everything in order to satisfy the Soviets on the strategic side, that we had their concerns in mind; the targets were covered and so on. We made a major effort to do that but it didn’t work. The concern was there.

But then, in one of those ironies of history, at about the time that we began to say, alright, maybe they’ve got a point, the Europeans, maybe if they are concerned we ought to try to have some nuclear systems to back them up against the Soviet threat. At this point, the Europeans began to have somewhat different views. And part of this change on their side links back to the so-called “neutron bomb affair.” About the time that I left the Pentagon, an article appeared in The Washington Post, concerning a new war head for U.S. weapons in Europe. The very name itself was questionable. It was dubbed, by The Post, “the neutron bomb.” That was a pejorative name for any kind of nuclear bomb, or any weapon, period. If you start talking about neutrons, very unpleasant images will be flashing in your mind, including the prospect that other parts of you could be “neutronized,” so to speak, could be radiated. The purpose that the military had in mind with this particular weapon, it was not a toy, was to reduce the blast effect of the weapon. When you reduce the amount of blast, you reduce the damage to surrounding properties and people. The neutron effect was not the goal, the goal was to reduce the blast. Other effects of reducing the blast was to concentrate neutron waves. Those are dangerous things, but again, it doesn’t cover a large area. What that means is that you could use these, or threaten to use these weapons in somewhat more crowded areas. Because you wouldn’t be blowing up houses and people. If you were looking for Soviet tanks you could get the tanks and sort of limit the damage around it, “collateral damage” as the military call it. I have to back off for a moment and say there is obviously an element of unreality, lack of reality in all of this. One wonders about the value of these systems. But that’s the theory that we were looking at and working from.

The Soviet propaganda machine seized on these articles, they went five days in a row in The Washington Post, it was the headline story, and I must say my favorite was a headline that read “Killer Bomb.” And I had to say, what did you expect this thing to do? Tickle them to death? But you can get from that headline, the mood that they were in when they used that phrase, “killer bomb.” Again, the image was there. This got picked up in Europe, and the flames were fanned by the Soviet propaganda machine. We had some evidence of that having been in effect. Much of this activity was centered in the beginning in the Netherlands. Chris and I went up one weekend, just to look around and see, and we both noticed large full color posters in windows, “Stop the neutron bomb.” And there was this awful American weapon, the neutron bomb had to be stopped. We also picked up on a corner, a pathetic mimeographed 8x10 sheet that read “Stop the SS-20 Rockets,” but you could see that the heavy funding was going to the opponents of U.S./NATO deployment and not to opponents of Soviet missile deployment. As I said, history articles came out which corroborated the fact that the funding was coming out of the Soviet Union.
There was an effort, still, underway at NATO to go ahead with this weapon, and the U.S. put a lot of effort, and our embassies did, secretary of state did, secretary of defense did, with their colleagues in NATO-Europe to support this particular program. Ambassador Bennett and I were scheduled to have a meeting on this topic with perm reps, I think it was going to be on a Monday, it was unusual, to discuss this, to reach a final conclusion. We sent a telegram in, saying that it was going to be a tough fight, there were some concerns with various other countries, whether they would go through with it in the end. But we believed that we did have the vote, there would be support for this if we wanted to go ahead with it.

I received a phone call, the night before Bennett and I were scheduled to go over and see the NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, and lay out our posture for the meeting, and get his support for what we were going to do during this meeting with the perm reps at which this decision was to be made. That night, Friday or Saturday night, before the meeting was to take place, I got a phone call from Washington, late at night, I was still up but Chris had fallen asleep, it was after midnight. Person on the other end, I remember who it was but I won’t go into it, said to me, “Are you sitting down?” I said, “No.” He said, “Well, you’d better because when I tell you this you are going to want to be sitting.” And he just said in effect, this was double talk but I knew what he was talking about, and he just said, “It is all off. The position has been changed, you’ll have a message in the morning. We know you are going to see Luns, you’d better read this message before you talk to him.” And of course the message told us that President Carter had effectively said that this was going to be delayed. We eventually had the meeting with the allies.

I reported back that there was a lot of rancor and anger on the part of the Europeans at the fact that we have gone this far along with them, they were ready to move, and here we were, backing away, delaying the process which in effect meant killing it. That day the Soviets, I think, drew the conclusion that if they could get the European “peace movement” on their side, through a major propaganda effort, they could in effect turn NATO around on issues of this sort. And that had a major impact on our program to improve NATO’s defense posture and to include a nuclear element to that. So it was in my view a very costly move by President Carter. From what I can tell, his cabinet secretaries were not aware that he was going to do this either. I have read the president’s memoirs and he suggests that they were all on board and that the Europeans were on board with his move. But from my research, I don’t see that and from talking to people who were working for other cabinet officers at this time, involved, they also told me that cabinet officers were caught totally off base by this. That so called neutron bomb affair was a very costly one for us. I tried to get the name changed, and tried very hard to get at least ourselves, the U.S. officials talking to one another, to stop calling it the neutron bomb, we could call it the reduced blast bomb, because that was what the scientists were aiming for. But, despite using it myself I could never get anything back from Washington, rarely get anything back from Washington trying to change the name. It was probably too late to do that anyway.

With that in the background, we were still continuing to try to work with the Europeans to determine what we were going to do about the Soviet nuclear build up and how we were going to handle it. Our initial effort was to try to persuade them that there wasn’t a problem. We then came around and realized that if they thought there was a problem, then there was. We were dealing here with perceptions as much as reality and if their perception was that we were going
to abandon them, then we had a problem we had to work on together. Because, as I said, as we began to move in that direction, the Europeans, particularly the Germans began to wonder just how much they could do. The way that we dealt with this, and I think this was really a very crucial decision, was not to say, “Well, this is our negotiation, we are going to do it all ourselves, with the Soviets.” It was essential to say to the Europeans, “We were in this together, we are going to have full, complete consultations, we will set up a separate, new body in NATO. It will be chaired by an American, but it will be wide open for every country to be represented and all of their views will be taken into account.”

This began with something called the “High Level Group,” which was going to look at the deployments, possible deployments and the “Special Consultative Group” which would look at the diplomatic arms control side. So we began, I attended most of these meetings in my capacity as the DCM. One of the things I did early on was to suggest that there be dinners, which I would host at our house, before the actual meetings, so that we could sit down and have an informal discussion amongst ourselves, all the allies. And if there were any specific concerns or suggestions that countries wanted to try out in an informal session, we could do that. The other idea I had in mind was to create a club. To make this like a club. We had a very small dining room, but we made changes to this so we could accommodate more people, so that we had enough room at the table for everybody. We would usually start off, there were a couple of countries that would have particular issues for us, we would have them come over little bit before for drinks or something, before the dinner. That would be an opportunity for that sort of smaller group to discuss things. The whole point was to make this thing true consultations. The SCG met usually at NATO. Richard Pearl headed up the HLG. Richard had a reputation, I think “Prince of Darkness” was his nickname. That may be how he appeared to some people but I can only say that in his capacity as the chairman of this international group, he was not anything like the caricature that had been created of him. He was a superb chairman. I must say there were times when I would have been harder nosed than he was in dealing with some of the suggestions. But he bent over backwards to bring people along with him. There was never any sense of threat or that you were going to walk out or arrogance on his part. And he was good company. Because the military had bases here and there, instead of coming to Brussels all the time, he would arrange for these meetings of the High Level Group, defense side, in places like Naples or Garmisch, and so on. And again, he was building a club. People felt that they were a part of this group and that they were building this thing, they wanted to work together. So it was very effective. On the foreign ministry side, State Department side, again they didn’t travel outside of Brussels but we continued the events at our house. We always had those dinners that were some sort of social get-together before they actually went to the conference table.

Now, on the substance. We had a lot of alternatives and objectives. And they had to work together. What sort of missiles would we agree to deploy? How many? And where? And defense, on the arms control side, what sort of arms control regime did we want to field with this? This process took until, as I mentioned earlier, December 12, 1979, when it came together. We came up with, effectively, here is what we are going to deploy: we are prepared to take everything out if we get, everything out from the Soviets’ side. It was from the beginning an effort to try to get to zero. Or at least the lowest possible number. But we didn’t want to put out a huge number. We tried to keep it low. Our own forces to start with. All that had begun, I can’t emphasize enough how important it was, that it all be done in consultation. The numbers were
agreed by all of us, the U.S. didn’t impose anything on the others. On the contrary, some of the smaller countries had extremely good representatives. Johan Jorgen Holst of Norway, who was later instrumental in the Oslo Peace Accords for the Middle East, was their representative on the HLG I think, and the SCG. And even though Norway doesn’t have any nuclear weapons, and doesn’t host any nuclear weapons, he had some good ideas. So those ideas found their way to a position. Fred Ruth, the German representative on the SCG, again an important country with great interest in this. But again, his personality, his knowledge, abilities, were put to full value in this kind of circumstance, so you can see his ideas are in there. I could go on and mention many others, but I don’t think anybody would say, “This is mine.” The club put it together. The group put it together. And that was the position that we carried with us into the INF negotiations. Again, the strength of being able to say to the Soviets, “You can’t split this alliance, all of us agree on this.” It wasn’t just the U.S., it’s all of us. And then we will see that Soviets tried their best to split it, but for an American negotiator I had the 1979 decision, in writing, published and those were the principles that we were going to follow. It was an important moment. I think we set the standard for what consultations were supposed to be in that process.

I don’t want to leave the DCM at NATO without saying a few words about Tap Bennett, who was the Ambassador during my entire time there. He was a remarkable man. He was always very calm and went about his work in cheerful way. Calm and cheerful. He knew what he wanted and he had a remarkable way of using his low key approach to get it. His wife Margaret was also an exceptional person. Very cultured. She wrote beautifully. We know that because her Christmas cards were, and are, a delight to receive. In part because of the quality of the writing that she does, in something as simple as that. Tap was very good at dealing with senior people. With the secretary of state and especially with the congressmen and the senators. He just had a marvelous way of making them feel comfortable and himself being comfortable around them. I wish I had that quality myself. I used to look at that and say, “Well, that’s really a wonderful trait.”

Q: Where there quite a few congressional visits to NATO while you were there?

GLITMAN: Yes. And I think I may have mentioned earlier that, when they came to Paris when we were there, we had a fair number of visits there and part of it was work but part of it was not. I’d say it was part work and part other stuff. When they came to NATO, they came to work. They came to learn about the organization, how things were proceeding at that time, they had specific questions to ask. Obviously it was of importance to us that they came away from NATO with a correct view of the organization. Its flaws as well as its qualities. And how they might be able to keep it working properly and in America’s interest. There were lots of visits and I think by and large, as I said, these were serious visits.

There are a couple of other aspects of this that I would like to mention at this juncture. First, I think it is useful to know who was in charge of the HLG and the SCG during this period leading up to this important decision of December 1979. Dave McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, headed up the U.S. team going to the HLG. And Reginald Bartholomew, I don’t know precisely what position Reggie was holding at that time, but he headed up the SCG team. Both of them did a superb job. Indeed, we were very fortunate throughout the period of negotiations beginning with this period, this lead up to the ’79 decision and continuing until the ratification. The people who represented and chaired the meeting for the
U.S. side of the HLG and the SCG were all superb. Each one of them had their special qualities and it just seemed that the right person, with the right qualities, was in the right job at the right time. That was, to give those two people credit for having brought that decision to fruition.

The decision itself merits a little more discussion. I pointed out that it became the basis for the U.S. negotiating position. It had several principles which we carried with us into the negotiations and which we would not and did not abandon. Among these, perhaps, was that we made clear that any future limitations on U.S. systems, principally designed for theater missions, should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems. In other words, no unilateral disarmament. Limitations on U.S. and Soviet long range theater nuclear system should be negotiated bilaterally, we said in the SALT-3 framework in a step-by-step approach. There was no SALT-3, but the key here was that it would be a bilateral negotiation between us and the Soviets. That also remained part of the process. A very important issue. The immediate objective of negotiations should be establishment of agreed limitations on U.S. and Soviet land based, long range theater nuclear missile systems and what we were doing here was defining what systems we believe we should be negotiating on. You will note that aircraft are excluded and anything that has to do with ship-based systems would also be excluded from the negotiation. And we stuck with that principle throughout the negotiation. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights, and that was the key crucial principle. The Soviets had a lot more systems at the beginning of the negotiations than we did. And one of their constant themes was “We have to reduce more to get down to a low number.” And our counter to that was, “It doesn’t matter who has to reduce how much of what. There should be no bonus for having produced more and going first. What really matters is, we end up at an equal number for the U.S. and the Soviet Union.” In addition, we talked about adequate verifiability and we made verification a very important principle for us throughout the negotiation. Those were really the basic guidelines if you will, that the American negotiators took into the negotiations. I think we can say without any doubt that at the end of the negotiations all of those principles were found in the treaty, all of those were maintained. And the fact that they came out of this process of consultation strengthened our hand enormously, in insisting upon these principles forming the backbone of the treaty itself.

While we had these principles and a strong agreement within the alliance, we could not move forward to negotiate, unless we had a negotiating partner. Unfortunately, in December of 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. That put a whole new light on the prospects of negotiating with them. I should have added that we also made a move on MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions negotiation, in December of ’79, to try to give some impetus to that negotiation which dealt with conventional weapons in Europe. That negotiation, the prospect of an INF negotiation both looking good as we came off the December 12 decision, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put them both in sort of a cold storage for a while. We continued to try to persuade the Soviets to respond to our initiative, to see if they would come to the table; throughout 1980, even with the Afghan thing in the background. But it really wasn’t until Helmut Schmidt, German Chancellor visited Moscow in fall of 1980 that the Soviets began to show interest, began to hint that there could be some negotiation. I think it is important to note that it was the German Chancellor’s visit that acted as a catalyst for the Soviet response. Germany was crucial in the entire INF picture. Soviets spent a lot of time and effort to try to
persuade elements of the German public to take a friendlier view towards them, and more
eegative views toward NATO. It was a form of battleground in a way for people’s support. We’ll
see in the end that the ballot box was more important than the people out in the streets. But the
Soviets at this point were not persuaded of that yet. We’ll see that eventually they did become
persuaded.

In any case, following Schmidt’s discussion with Brezhnev, it took a while but eventually the US
and the Soviet Union agreed to preliminary talks, talks about talks, which would involve INF, or
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, systems and they agreed to begin in Geneva in October of
1980. These talks only lasted for a month. We had an election, as you may recall at this point.
But they did cover a good deal of ground. I went back and read all the memorandums on their
conversations, verbatim text from both sides that were exchanged, in preparation for going to
Geneva. Anything that we had to cover for the rest of the negotiation came up at these
preliminary talks, so they were useful in helping define where the sides positions were to start
with. Of course, after only a month we couldn’t get too much further along.

As I said, there was an election, and Ronald Reagan became the president of the U.S. The change
of administration, of course, meant a new look at all policies, which is a normal thing in the U.S.,
and among the issues that came up for a new look was the INF issues and whether there should
or should not be negotiations. There was indeed some question, whether there would be
negotiations. There were some in the administration, who were opposed to the negotiations. But
in the end, the decision was made to move forward and to conduct negotiations with the Soviet
Union. It took another year after the election, before those negotiations did begin. But they
would be a major element of the rest of my career.

TERESA CHIN JONES
Consular Officer
Brussels, Belgium 1978-1980

Mrs. Jones was born in the Soviet Union of Chinese diplomatic parents. She was
raised in the USSR and the United States. A specialist in Scientific Affairs, both
civilian and military, Mrs. Jones’ Washington assignments were primarily in the
fields of international nuclear and scientific matters and included non-
proliferation, arms control, East-West Trade as well as general Political/Military
subjects. Her foreign assignments were in the scientific and consular fields. She
holds two degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. Mrs. Jones was
interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Well in ’78 you started the consular thing at the embassy.

JONES: At the embassy. I was the sole vice consul. The consul was Jim Lassiter, and he had a
family emergency, so two months after I was there, I was in charge. The family emergency back
took him months to resolve. Then he was back just a few months before going onto another
assignment in Bucharest. While he was in the US, one of my first tasks was to ban his wife from
the section as she had been using the consular employees to take her dogs 60 miles to SHAPE in Mons or Bergen Belgium for vet care. That is a no-no. So I decided if ever I was canned by the foreign service it would be because I was doing the right thing not tolerating the wrong thing. Fortunately he was actually grateful that I had done it. I did endless visa interviews, visits with prisoners. We had wonderful Foreign Service Nationals. It took them awhile to figure out that I could understand their rapid fire French. Fortunately by the time they figured it out I had also figured out that two groups had not on speaking terms for 15 years and had been passing notes to each other in the section.

Q: Within the section.

JONES: Within the section - the Flemings and the Walloons did not get along well. I also realized that not only could I save money if I eliminated overtime during the summer months but I wouldn’t have to work overtime. Fortunately, I was able to offer the FSN’s early departure to catch their trains if they finished their work. Amazingly enough, we only had two hours of overtime for my entire tenure. I would say production went up about 30%.

We had one logjam at the old Automated Visa Lookout Systems (AVLOS) which no one wanted to do. You basically typed out the information and send it on a tape to the Department - the way communicators used to send cables. So I suggested that we all do it. Any time somebody walked by that pile of passports, we did ten of them. First, I did the first ten and kept doing it as promised -- eventually, we completely eliminated backlogs and made the whole system much faster.

But consular work was very much about just running things and doing the best you could. You know that you had a real impact. I was glad that I kept my word to the Assignments people and did not jump at an offer from the DCM at NATO to take a science position on the Committee for Challenges in Modern Society.

So the Consular work was very interesting. I now have a lifetime of consular stories, none of which I would dare write up because I am sure they would recognize themselves.

Q: One of the things I try to gather here are some of the consular stories. Let’s take arrest cases. You don’t have to mention names.

JONES: I probably don’t remember the names. Ever since I have done things where other people’s privacy is involved, I try very hard to forget all the names.

Q: Which is a very good practice.

JONES: So nothing is ever going to slip because it has long since been erased. OK, one of my arrest cases convinced me that the master criminal image is definitely wrong. A young man decided to go to Amsterdam, picked up some hashish which he was going to take to Germany where he was living. He was an American. He planned to sell it to the troops. He did not want to cross the German-Belgian border which had anti terrorist patrols all over the place after a group of Japanese Red Army people had killed people at the Rome airport. So he decided
to cross into Belgium at a place called Vise, and then into Germany. Well hiding eleven pounds
of hashish under your VW floor mat doesn’t work, especially since Vise is one of these border
crossings where they catch them all the time. I am not even sure the people who sold him the
stuff didn’t sell his name to the Belgians, so they got him. I did go to his trial and discovered the
difference between the European system and ours. There is no such thing as questioning or
witnesses. A prosecutor got up and said, “Maximum penalty. This person deserves it. He is
swine.” The defense got up and said, “think of his poor mother, mercy.” Anyway they sentenced
him to five years, which, with good behavior, was more like three years. I visited him in jail in
Liege. He could get work in prison and earned $150 a month while there. The only complaint he
had was he was getting detergent hands from scrubbing the toilets, so I was able to convince the
prison to please give him rubber gloves.

For some reason my counterpart in Antwerp had really bad arrest cases. He had pedophiles.
Mine were really pretty harmless in comparison. I had another one who was a scam artist. He
had convinced Belgians to give him their black cash, cash they had hidden from the revenue
people. He told them he buy and sell them in Africa, making tremendous amounts of money.
What he really did was take the money. He was very careless and he didn’t pay his rent. In
Belgium that is something they would arrest you for. He didn’t know any French. So when they
arrested him for not paying his rent - he had no idea why they arrested him as he spoke no
French or Flemish. So, at the police station, he said, “I confess.” That, they understood, and they
let him go through the entire confession before they called a consular officer. By then he had
implicated, I don’t know, a couple of hundred Belgians. So the Belgian prosecutor was delighted.
I noticed that they held him about full 71 hours and 52 minutes before they called me. We
fielded a number of calls from worried Belgians. Eventually he was deported from Belgium. He
ended up in Austria, and, the last I heard, he was running some scam there.

Q: Oh yes, well once a scammer, always a scammer. How about distressed Americans out of
cash and that sort of thing, though it was a bit more in Antwerp.

JONES: Antwerp got a harder crowd basically.

Q: Well in Antwerp was there the equivalent of what they have in Amsterdam, a red light
district?

JONES: They did in Brussels too.

Q: That always creates, well anywhere, go get robbed.

JONES: We had a certain number. The problem was with pedophiles-especially gay pedophiles.
The first major visa refusal I had to make was against a man who wanted to import his Algerian
adoptive, a little boy, to the U.S. It sounded so fishy, I called the DEA people and said, “Look, is
there any information, just informally. I am not going to cite it.” They told me this man was a
professional. He had bought the boys regularly through legal adoptions No one checked. No one
cared. And then he would pretty much turn them out into the streets when they developed a
mustache. So I tuned him down. He was furious and said because of my turndown it was going
to cost him an enormous amount of money. He had to anchor offshore outside the limit. But
clearly there was a serious pedophile problem in Belgium and it often surfaced in other nasty cases.

**Q:** Was there a system, I mean you ran across this is an American pedophile isn’t it?

**JONES:** No, it was a Belgian pedophile. They had a seasonal trek. During the winter season in Miami when rich Belgians went there, they went with their little boys.

**Q:** Was there a system in place where you cold tell the immigration people, I mean sent out essentially we turned him down but OK this guy is a really bad guy?

**JONES:** What I did was in many cases I would tell the DEA people this person tried to leave Belgium to go to the U.S. for this, and they would pass it on to their police contacts. I mean I don’t know what Belgian law was, but they certainly didn’t seem to be doing anything about it. I think in the past few years they have had enough scandals in that area.

**Q:** I follow the French/Belgian news and they have had some real pedophile problems.

**JONES:** Oh yes. It is very much a class thing. If you are upper class you just thought you had rights. We had one person we did a background check and ended up with a police record a yard long. But he had all sorts of titles, had been invited to the ambassador’s parties, had invited the ambassador to his chateau. In consular work, you began being suspicious of everything after awhile. We also had the Holzman Amendment - in which was that anyone who had been a Nazi, supported Nazis or suppressed others during WWII was denied visas for life. Well, we had a large number of Belgians who had been sentenced to death after WWII. The Belgians did it in a very interesting way, first they sentenced everyone to death, and then they went through each case and commuted the ones that shouldn’t be executed. We had one man saying that yes he did do all sorts of awful things, and he had a criminal record, but he did it as a criminal not as a Nazi. So he robbed banks regardless of the racial or ethnic origin. He also robbed houses; he robbed people.

We ended up with a person at NATO a German. It was really tricky to tell. We regularly had the fallout still from WWII. We had a very nice Belgian woman who had an arrest record for running cat house after WWII. Then she as ran a very good restaurant instead. She had grandchildren in the U.S as her daughters had married the nice American soldiers who used to bring her hams. Every time, she went to the U.S. we had to get a waiver because she was 212 A-9 (felony record). One time I had to translate and explained that she had run a bordello to INS office. Their reply, “What is a bordello?” So I had to spell it out. They still didn’t get it. I asked them to look it up in the dictionary. They didn’t have a dictionary on hand. So I had to explain bordello. All this time I had forgotten we had gotten one of these cheap lowest bidder microphone amplified every sound on either side of the bulletproof glass. So when I finally finished the interview, I came out and saw a whole group lined up at the window waiting for the next act.

Our consul at the time, he came back from the states he had his dogs. One of them was named Pita. He would let his dogs out via a sliding door to an inside garden but weren’t very obedient
when he called. With this two way system we could hear this male voice screaming, “Lie down, I told you stay on the couch, Pita.” They would wonder.

Q: Oh, boy. Did you have any problems as consular officer with the rest of the embassy saying, well this is the nephew of the prime minister’s secretary who is my best contact. You can’t turn him down or something like that. Did you get into this?

JONES: Yes, I had no problems with the political section. They just asked me any time I got a Zairian politician who was usually supported in Belgium by one of their parties for an interview, to also bring them in for the interview. That was easy. I had a requirement that they put it in writing. In other words, if they wanted special courtesy reasons they had to write it down.

The only time I had problems was a Filipino general and his 16 year old secretary who was gorgeous. They wanted a visa for her so that she could accompany the general on a trip to the States. I said, “You have to put it in writing. I am not going to issue and then find out this girl has disappeared and is being a working girl in New Orleans.” So holding their noses all the way, I got this extremely cautiously worded request.

Another time I had two Afghans who were automatic refusals: i.e. out of district, no ties to Belgium, but they actually were connected to another part of the embassy. When I refused them, they finally said, “But we have a name we are supposed to call.” Finally, they did get to the right section and I never heard from them again.

Belgium was a very easy consular posting, especially when we got a large number of Iranians who came out after the Shah fell. At this time, the U.S. hostages were still being held in Iran. My decisions were made easier because Iranian who made it to Belgium could benefit from all the Belgian refugee protections. No one was going to expel them or shoot them. I could handle cases on a case by case basis, without the feeling that I was condemning someone to death. Belgian Iranians were no problem as we had been issuing them visas on their Belgian passports for decades.

As for the others, at worst I was costing someone a week in New York City. Unattached males with passports that had been over written by the provisional authority with just a stamp were not good bets. Usually, the minute I turned them down they would threaten to cut my throat, and go into an anti American tirade. My rule was if I were going to call for help I was going to call for the Belgian Guard. Better a Belgian Guard beats them up than a U.S. marine.

Q: I was interviewing a lady, Janet Folk, who was in London about this time. She was saying sometimes it was the flavor of the month with the Iranians, young men trying to get the hell out to the United States and not get into the Iranian army during the war with Hussein. They heard that Iranian Christians were getting special permission to go to the United States. She had one who came and said he was a Christian. She said, “I am a little bit confused because I see by your passport that your first name is Mohammed.”

JONES: We had a legend that there was a Farsi speaking officer who had left Tehran right before the hostage take over because he had suffered a nervous collapse from the stress of dealing with
Iranian visa fraud. They sent him to London. Then of course the hostages were taken, and there he was in London under a window that said, Farsi speaking officer. He had a chance to see all of his old cases. I do remember that we had had no guidance from State although the hostages had been taken months ago. Every post that had Iranians coming was sending requests for guidance in vain. It was not a decisive administration in Washington.

Q: I was consul general in Naples at the time. We were left on our own.

JONES: Oh yes, so we refused and we refused. Every refusal was a congressional. We had a rule then you had to answer a congressional within 24 hours; the cables were often classified. So that meant that - moi - my little ten fingers had to type the cable. My cable skills were awful. In those days, if you had to delete a letter that you typed one star after it; two stars for a line; and three stars for the whole paragraph. My cables went into the communications with a field of stars.

Q: Well then in 1980, whither? In the first place how did you find I mean this is your consular assignment, there you were pretty much it for a good part of the time. How did you find your consular training helped or was it just a matter of having books and manuals and you looked up the problem.

JONES: It was very helpful. They taught things you could not get from a book. The consular officers who did the training in the course provided sort of a basic ethical framework - which is fairness, honesty. When it came to U.S. citizen cases which are really difficult because the U.S. citizens that often need help are not our finest examples. He gave us a special lecture saying, “This is the deal. A U.S. citizen with a U.S. passport is owed this by you. It doesn’t matter if they are crazy; they are an murderers, whatever. It doesn’t matter how poor they are, how old, whether they are the dregs of society. It doesn’t matter. You have a duty. You don’t just blow it off because this is a person you would never want to have anywhere near you normally.” I found that helpful.

The local employees were extremely intelligent, all university trained, and in our section bilingual in Flemish and French. On the phone the person couldn’t tell if you were a native Flemish speaker or a French speaker. That helped a lot. They new the Foreign Affairs Manual ten times better than I did. I was only useful to them because I was a toxic waste dump. I only needed to see the bad cases. For things like a plane load of Belgian weight watchers going to New York City to buy cheap big sized clothes, they didn’t need me. By ’79 or a little before ’79 I had a new consul.

Q: Who was that?

JONES: That was Robert J. Bel. He died a few years ago when he was consul in Jerusalem. His wife was Belgian. He had been a communicator and a former marine. In his earliest assignment in Belgium he had been hit by a tram. The NATO hospital people assumed he was inoperable since he had been hit in the head, and that he was going to die, but his girlfriend at the time, and later his wife - I think her name is Marianne - found the best neurosurgeon in Belgium and saved his life. He was very good professional consular officer. He didn’t want to be a DCM. He didn’t want to be an ambassador, but he knew how to run things. He had a fund of great stories.
He had two sons. Occasionally I would give him a ride home because it was right on the way back to Everberg. I would see his boys waiting for him. It was really very sweet. He was subject to epileptic attacks, because of scars from his operation and was careful to prepare me for any attack. He was sort of very proper, very correct. I was always grateful that when there was a consular conference in Rome, he sent me. He said that he had an assignment in Rome for years, gave me the name of his favorite restaurant which was wonderful.

So David came as the spouse to Rome - the Hotel Flora. I went to the consular conference where you learned a great deal, not so much from the formal program but from the way people dealt with things. You need people to teach you. The same is true in science, it is an attitude. It is not just the technique.

ARCHIE M. BOLSTER
Consul General

Archie M. Bolster was born in Iowa in 1933. He received his BA from the University of Virginia and served in the U.S. Navy from 1955 to 1958 as an overseas lieutenant. His foreign postings included Cambodia, Tabriz, Tehran, New Delhi and Antwerp. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 24, 1992.

BOLSTER But, anyway, I was present at the creation and in the midst of things I got a call saying that there was a chance to go out to Antwerp as Consul General.

Q: How was that as an assignment?

BOLSTER: Well...

Q: You did that from 1978-81.

BOLSTER: That was extremely enjoyable and worthwhile from a career standpoint. I had actually asked to be assigned to Belgium for years. Having come into the Service with both French and Dutch it seemed logical that at some point I should serve in a country that has both of those languages. In fact, I had been at one time close to being assigned there but then the job was abolished during one of our periodic cuts. I think that was a BALPA cut...balance of payments cut.

Here was my chance to go to Belgium and get out of the developing world where I had spent my whole career and get to Europe. I took it in a moment.

Q: Were there any points we might hit on here? Antwerp may have fit your language ability and all, but it must have been somewhat of a quieter time?
BOLSTER: It did take a certain amount of adjustment because there is a sort of tight little island mentality there. They are lost in their very detailed Flemish/Walloon differences and battles. Sometimes tiny little problems occupied tremendous amount of space in the press. It was a little hard to get used to how people could get so excited about such very minor problems when I had been dealing with matters of life, death, heat, happiness, survival in these poorer countries.

But it was eye opening to see how complicated Europe is. How historical peoples' attitudes are. They immediately go back to things that happened hundreds of years ago. Of course, people in the Middle East do too, but there is so much of a psychological background in the Middle East. In Europe it seemed to be so much emphasis just on history.

The people were all well off, they don't really have that many economic issues by comparison with developing countries. But political issues have enormous depth and variety.

_Q: I am sure the Flemish/Walloon problem did not raise much of a blip on the Department of State radar._

BOLSTER: No it didn't.

_Q: Were there things that we did that would somehow set this problem off?_

BOLSTER: No, that was really something that was separate. It could cause governments to fall, etc., so in that sense it affected us, but not in a day to day sense. At the same time we had this theater nuclear force issue where we were going to modernize the weapons that had been based in Europe all these years. That became a cause celebre because it found much more opposition as time went on. There were constant demonstrations, press stories, etc. against...

_Q: This was during the Carter Administration in which Carter, himself, was waffling on this. We had the so-called neutron bomb and then we withdrew it. It must have been a rather difficult time to get up there and make pronouncements and then not be quite sure what kind of support you would have?_

BOLSTER: Yes. Of course there were some very practical consequences of the theater nuclear force modernization. There were going to be bases right near Antwerp, built to take these newer rockets. So it was going to have even an economic affect. But there were a lot of people opposed to the idea even though there would have been economic benefits to their area. So there was a lot of debate back and forth. Of course, since then it has faded from view because we never did do it.

_Q: How did you find the opposition? Was there sort of a right and a left or did this cut across the normal political spectrum?_

BOLSTER: I think it pretty much cut across. There were somewhat more opposition from the Socialists, less from what they call Liberal, which is really Conservative in Belgium. Also it is a very strong religious issue. The Catholic church was in many cases very much opposed to it.
Sermons and so on were against it. There was a lot of conscience examining by Belgians in this period. At the same time they were worried about the Soviet Union. They were all well aware of the power that was behind the Iron Curtain. Belgium was doing its part in NATO. They had exercises every year to practice reinforcing Europe to fight against a possible Soviet invasion.

At the same time they were living very well economically. Belgium was doing quite well. There was plentiful food in the stores. Even people who were laid off from jobs were paid almost full salary for up to almost a year and then gradually phased down. It was a very socialistic country in that sense. It had a high degree of social welfare protection, health insurance, etc. Even a fund to save money for your vacation every year. They had a fund that took money from your salary every month and then gave it to you in April so you could take it and go on vacation for a month.

Q: As Consul General, particularly with this nuclear force issue, did you find yourself out on the hustings giving talks, or were we just keeping our heads down?

BOLSTER: No, I made talks, not specifically on that, but talks of general interest. I got questions about nuclear issues. I got questions about whether the US would ever come to Europe's aid again in the case of a war or would we just give up and let them be conquered. All that kind of question would come up on occasion. I just handled it as best I could. I had some demonstrators once at a talk in Antwerp but I just kept talking, I delivered my speech in Dutch, and tried to ignore these people. They quietly moved away from the podium after making their point.

DENIS LAMB
Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1978-1982)

Ambassador Lamb was born in Ohio 1937. He received his BS from Columbia University and MS from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1964, he was posted in Fort de France, Paris and Brussels. He was interviewed by Ray Ewing on September 19, 2005.

LAMB: The time I spent in Brussels was a good period for me. Over three and a half year years I had an opportunity to work for three top-flight ambassadors, all Foreign Service officers. Each was different. Deane was difficult; he managed by intimidation, although he spared his DCM. EC Commission President Roy Jenkins described Deane’s diplomatic style as “ponderous but well informed,” which it was. He was a stickler for detail. The only time he lost his temper with me was when I paraphrased something he wanted put into a cable. Tom Enders was tightly wound, but when he came to USEC he shifted into a lower gear. Somewhat to my surprise, he proved easy to work with. While Tom was in the Department awaiting confirmation -- his previous posting had been ambassador to Canada -- I involved him in filling some key vacancies on the mission staff. Equipped with my recommendations, he interviewed the candidates who were in Washington and reviewed the files of others. Then, in consultation, we made our picks. In contrast to Deane, Tom was happy to leave the day-to-day management of the mission to me, a task for which I was by now fully qualified. He set the tone and direction, worked the outside,
and left the rest to me. Tom once asked me how many cables the mission had sent over the past 12 months. It turned out that we had originated 4,000 messages. Some of them were routine -- travel arrangements and the like -- but many were substantive. I signed off on most substantive cables.

On first meeting him, Jenkins sized Tom up as “an impressive, self-confident, over-tall Yale man,” whom he thought would be “probably very good.” When they met again over dinner at Jenkins’ house, the president found Tom “intelligent, detached, and perhaps slightly self-seeking…” Tom, in fact, saw his time at USEC as “between jobs.” After six months or so, he was selected as assistant secretary for Latin America.

George Vest was very smooth, very low key. But his bonhomie disguised an ability to make cold-eyed judgments about people and issues and to act decisively. By the time George arrived, Gaston Thorn had succeeded Jenkins, so George did not come under Jenkins’ scrutiny. Finally, during my tour I was chargé for about a year.

We had a very strong staff, better versed in the issues than I was at the outset, and so I played more of a management role initially, inserting myself into substance gradually. However, from the day I arrived I worked the circuit of contacts that the DCM traditionally cultivated.

Q: And you also had three ambassadors, three United States representatives, who were very strong on substance as well.

LAMB: Exceptionally so, I would say.

Let me say a word about how the EC makes decisions. The decision-making body is the Council, which is composed either of foreign ministers or ministers with particular portfolios such as agriculture or finance. Council meetings are prepared by the COREPER (Comité des représentants permanents), on which the resident ambassadors of the member countries sit. Their deputies meet as COREPER II and prepare COREPER meetings. All clear?

My job was to track COREPER II, or junior COREPER as it was sometimes called, while the ambassador staked out his counterparts. COREPER II was important to us because following its agenda gave us advance notice of decisions headed to the Council that we might wish to influence. The tracking was done by cultivating relationships with several deputy permanent representatives whom the mission had found to be reliable and forthcoming. My closest relationship was with the German deputy, who was a Finance Ministry civil servant. Interestingly, although we occupied offices in the same building as the French mission, which would have facilitated interaction, I never had useful contacts with the French. They changed deputies once but the new man was just as distantly polite as his predecessor.

Of course, prospective Council decisions did not just pop up on COREPER agendas. They emerged from the EC’s bureaucracy. Mission officers assigned to follow particular sectors were responsible for tracking issues as they moved toward the decision phase.
I learned early on that, at times and on certain issues, other non-member countries were often better plugged into the EC apparatus than we were. The agricultural exporters in particular -- Canada, Australia and New Zealand -- usually had good intelligence on agriculture policy, and the Swiss tracked financial issues particularly well. Pooling information with the deputies of those missions proved to be very valuable. In fact, I probably obtained more and better information than I provided. Accompanying the information gathering -- really an integral part of it -- were efforts to exert influence. The member state deputies wanted me to believe that we had nothing to fear from pending decisions; I wanted to shape decisions to protect our interests or bring the U.S. a benefit. The deputies of the agriculture exporters sought to enlist us in their campaigns to subvert one or another element of the community’s Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). I was often a willing accomplice.

Q: Did you have those contacts with the Canadians and the others that you mentioned mainly sort of bilaterally, one by one, or did you all come together as a group occasionally?

LAMB: Pretty much bilaterally: over lunch, by telephone, and at social events.

The DCM is also responsible for maintaining contact with the chiefs of staff of the commissioners. I developed a good relationship with Alex Schaub, chief of staff to Wilhelm Haferkamp, who was responsible for external relations, including trade policy. Alex is now a director general responsible for the internal market. I have stayed in touch with him over the years. I also kept in close touch with Eric Larsen, who looked after Finn Gundelach, the commissioner for agriculture and with Hugo Paemen, chief of staff to Stevie Davignon. Stevie’s portfolio was industry policy, including steel, where we had problems from time to time. Paemen later became the EC ambassador in Washington. The ambassador and I shared responsibility for contact with Crispin Tickell, the top aide to EC Commission President Roy Jenkins.

I inherited another key contact. This was the Commission’s senior civil servant, Emile Noel. He was a soft-spoken, pro-American Frenchman, with the air of an intellectual. He made a point of having a regular lunch with the U.S. DCM to promote EC policies. Broadly stated, his main argument was that we should go easy on the EC in order to support European integration, which he contended was in our overriding interest. Despite his demeanor, Noel was reputed to be a tough bureaucratic infighter. His mentor, Jean Monnet, once remarked that his tenacity matched his modesty.

Q: At that time, ’78 to ’82, the European Community had how many member states?

LAMB: There were nine. Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the original six in 1973. When I arrived in Brussels, enlargement negotiations with Greece, Spain and Portugal were about to begin. Enlargement was another issue on which we did not have a policy and did not need a policy, although within the mission there were strongly held views. Ambassador Hinton thought the community should integrate more closely rather than expand.

Q: Deepen before...
LAMB: Deepen before widening. Our political counselor, Harmon Kirby, and I thought otherwise. The socializing and growth-inducing benefits of adding the three prospective new members were more important, we thought, and we were not overly concerned about the deepening part. While waiting for integration to take place, the U.S. could conduct relations with individual member states as well as the central organs of the community. Which is what we did and, incidentally, what we do to this day.

Although Harmon and I proved to be right, the situation in the late 70s was murky. All three countries were western in some sense (Greece and Portugal were members of NATO), but all three had been under authoritarian governments in the early years of the decade. All were linked in various ways to the northern European economy, primarily via remittances and tourism. But their living standards were far below those in the north and more on a par with those in Eastern Europe. So the EC was making a big bet. In the end it paid off, particularly over the nine-year period that it took to bring Spain and Portugal in. The reforms entailed in aligning their legislation with Community legislation, the so-called aquis communitaires, jump-started their economies and democracy took firm root.

Q: You mentioned the contacts you had, particularly with the chiefs of staff of the commissioners. How big was the Commission at that time? It was limited in size, too, compared with what it is today.

LAMB: Yes, the large member states each had two commissioners; the smaller members one each, for a total of 12. These days, the Commission employs about 18,000 people and has a budget of $90 billion, about 45 percent of which goes to fund the CAP. In my day those numbers were smaller. I believe that the Commission staff numbered about 12,000 in the late 70s.

Q: To what extent did you have instructions, guidance, views from Washington that you were also sharing or was that pretty much left up to you all at the mission?

LAMB: We received a steady stream of instructions from Washington on a range of issues, agriculture and steel prominent among them. So we were making representations to the commissioners on a regular basis.

On other matters of interest, such as the enlargement negotiations, where we were alert to developments that might impinge on our interests, we more or less operated on our own. This brings to mind a general observation. What Foreign Service officers do in the field is trade information with contacts, some of it drawn from classified documents. How much can you say? Should you say? It all comes down to personal judgment; there is no manual on the topic. New officers have to observe and learn by doing. I closely calibrated how much I “gave” to how much I “got.”

Normally, the mission would have received regular instructions on trade policy, but these were few and far between when I arrived in Brussels because the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations was coming to a conclusion. The interaction between the Washington and EC negotiators was continuous and we could only contribute at the margins. Regular visits to Brussels by our top negotiators, Robert Strauss, then the USTR, and his deputy, Alonzo “Al” McDonald, ensured
that we stayed reasonably well informed about the state of play. After the round was concluded in 1979, the normal rhythm of demarches and reporting resumed.

Speaking of Bob Strauss, I am reminded of something that happened while I was working with Chris. Apparently, at that time, Cabinet officers had to go through hoops to fly the Concorde and one of those hoops was State Department approval. For reasons I do not recall, I was asked my opinion about a flight Strauss wanted to make. The justification looked weak to me and I said so. That was enough to kill the flight. Strauss was beside himself and went to the president. The flight was approved and Strauss was absolved from asking permission in the future. Thankfully, my name did not come up. (When Strauss arrived in Geneva after taking that controversial Concorde flight to Paris, a reporter asked him whether he would fly on the supersonic plane again. “Yes,” he replied, “until they come up with something better.”)

The Concorde rule was part of a presidential effort to cut back on perks that, initially, denied Chris and one or two other senior State Department officials the use of a car and driver to take them to and from work. Effort was expended to overrule this dictum. After a short time it was dropped.

I learned a lot about agricultural policy and agriculture trade while I was in Brussels. One thing I learned is how stubborn agriculture policy is, how difficult to change. Since farmers can’t adjust their “inventories” in the course of the year in response to market conditions, they are exposed to significant risk. Societies that can afford to do so offset the risk with price floors or direct subsidies or both. These policies become entitlements. When they are not adjusted they lead to overproduction. The need to dispose of surpluses spawns export subsidies and food aid schemes. With these in place, trade disputes inevitably ensue.

Over the period that I served in Brussels the Commission was trying to impose a tax on soybeans. It would have had the same effect on U.S. exports as an import tariff. They sought to nullify an overlooked provision, or a provision that only became important later, in an early GATT agreement that allowed free entry of U.S. soybeans into the EC. This was important to them because one key element of the CAP is to apply tariffs to bring the price of imports up to the EC’s internal target price. Free entry of soybeans disrupted markets for competing animal feed and markets for vegetable oil.

There was another factor in play. In June 1973 President Nixon imposed an embargo on soybean and soybean meal exports. (The 1971 devaluation of the dollar was sucking soybeans out of the U.S. and raising prices to domestic buyers.) The soy embargo seriously damaged the U.S. reputation as a reliable supplier of animal feed protein. As an aside, note that the Nixon embargo put Brazil in the soybean business in a big way. Brazilian production, fueled by Japanese investment (the Japanese may have been even more unnerved by the embargo than the Europeans) increased from 5 million metric tons in 1973 to about 52 million metric tons in 2002, the latest number I was able to find. Today Brazil is the world's second largest soybean exporting country. Lesson: beware of the law of unintended consequences.

To plug the hole in the CAP and generate a homegrown source of animal feed protein, the Commission kept trying to sneak the tax through. Periodically, the commissioners would
consider proposing a tax to the Council (all community legislation must formally originate with the Commission) and we would have to go to battle stations and fight it off. The tax proposal was revived yet again during one of the periods when I was chargé. When you become chargé you quickly learn, if you did not already know it, that you simply do not carry anywhere near the weight of an ambassador. You’re a placeholder, essentially, holding the game together while awaiting the arrival of a personal representative of the president.

So, I surmised, the commissioners who favored the tax (not all did) thought they could sneak this one by on my watch. I had an instruction which was fairly open-ended to indicate our opposition, but it did not specify what tactic I should use. I chose the nuclear option: a letter to the president of the Commission and each commissioner, which stated our opposition to the measure in strong terms. It fell short of an ultimatum, but it was forceful. Several commissioners were outraged. The upshot was that action on the measure was deferred yet again and Stevie Davignon called me in for a dressing down. He read me the riot act, which included this colorful turn of phrase: “Denis,” he said, “we came out on the field to play baseball and you turn up with a hockey stick and start beating us over the head with it.”

When George Vest arrived as ambassador shortly thereafter and we discussed the episode, he struck his forehead with his hand and said, “What were you thinking of?” in writing such a strong letter and sending it to the entire Commission. I said, “George, I wasn’t going let it happen and this is the only way I felt certain that I could stop it.” George questioned my judgment on that one. And in truth an ambassador with good working relationships with key EC ambassadors and commissioners could have achieved the same result without breaking so much crockery.

Since I brought up embargos, I should mention President Carter’s January 4, 1980 decision to suspend delivery of all U.S. grain sales to the USSR in excess of the eight million tons guaranteed under the terms of a 1975 bilateral agreement. His purpose was to punish the Soviets for the December, 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. No other exporter followed our lead. Worse (or better, depending on one’s viewpoint), the U.S. had no way to enforce the embargo. Once a grain shipment left a U.S. port, we had no way to control its final destination or to prevent a buyer from using our grain to replace grain that he shipped to the USSR. Once elected, President Reagan lifted the embargo, fulfilling a campaign promise. Later, in the Department, I tried to convince Secretary Shultz to approve a generous loan to the Soviets to buy wheat and burnish our reputation as a supplier. Apparently I was not attentive enough to the state of U.S.-Soviet relations at the time. The memorandum I sent (carrying a strong counterargument from the European bureau) came back with a big “NO!! opposite the decision block. I think he even underlined the “no” a few times for added emphasis.

One of the other issues to arise while I was chargé concerned oil imports. In the wake of the 1978-79 oil crisis and price spike, agreement was reached at a G-7 Summit to adopt oil import targets. The Commission, for internal political reasons, took the view that the target should be EC-wide. The U.S. insisted that the targets apply to individual countries so that North Sea production could not be used to offset imports. I was instructed to call on President Jenkins and make our view clear. The appointment duly granted, I went to his office and delivered my “talking points,” which spelled out our understanding of the Summit agreement and asked the
Commission to fall in line. Jenkins responded by reiterating the Commission’s view of the matter. I left a “non-paper” containing my talking points, returned to the office, and sent a reporting cable. Our side looked pretty good in the cable; Jenkins got the message.

Some years later Jenkins published the diaries of his years in the presidency. I acquired a copy and looked up my name in the index, where I found one entry. It refers to a paragraph on the meeting I just described. Jenkins’s take on the meeting was, in effect: “Lamb now understands our viewpoint.”

Q: Beautiful. It helps to write the report.

LAMB: It does, indeed. As Henry Kissinger said in his memoirs, “Perhaps in a meeting with no witnesses it is impossible to capture the truth exactly.”

Q: Okay, I’d like to ask you a couple more questions about this period. Want to talk just a little bit more about the structure of USEC. You were the deputy, the DCM. There were people from lots of different agencies. You mentioned there was a political counselor.

LAMB: We had political and economic sections and a public affairs (USIS) section. John McCarthy was economic counselor when I arrived. Ed Casey succeeded him. I had worked with both in RPE. Dick Monson headed the USIS unit. The political section was staffed by State. The economic section included two officers from Agriculture, the senior of whom was later elevated to counselor rank, and a trade officer on loan to us from USTR. One way to think about the EC and OECD missions is that they are just very large economic sections. There is no consular section and administrative support is supplied. They are compact, tightly integrated operations and, for that reason, relatively easy to manage, compared to an embassy.

Q: And you therefore presumably had a good relationship with the Embassy Brussels DCM and perhaps other people in the embassy. How about with NATO, USNATO?

LAMB: We did need to work closely with the embassy DCM, Ed Killham, and his administrative counselor, because we depended upon them for support. We had fewer dealings with the NATO mission. Brussels is a very stimulating city to work in because you have NATO people and Community people and bilateral embassies, but our contacts with the NATO international staff and the staff of our mission to NATO were primarily social. It was good to exchange information in a general way, but we did not do business together.

Q: And you had a lot of visitors from Washington.

LAMB: Yes, quite a few and of course we welcomed that. Part of the way you know you’re doing your job and doing it right is through contacts with people coming from Washington. I met Malcolm (“Mac”) Baldridge and Bill Brock during one of the periods when I was chargé, just after Reagan was elected. They came on orientation trips and stayed in my residence with their wives. I was able to get to know them in a relaxed setting, which turned out to be useful when I returned to Washington and worked in trade policy.
Charles Z. Wick, having been named by President Reagan to head USIA, also visited us. He was quite a fellow. He came in wearing a bulletproof raincoat, which meant he wasn’t able to sit down.

Q: Was it raining?

LAMB: Rare for Brussels, it wasn’t even raining. So he stood up -- maybe he leaned against the wall -- in the ambassador’s office and we tried to get to know him.

Q: The other interesting question, I think, in terms of process and U.S. entities working together in Europe involves the relationship between USEC and embassies in the capitals of the member states and who does what and where demarches are made and so on. Want to talk about that a little bit?

LAMB: I’m glad you raised that because of something that had slipped my mind. There was a regular consultation between the principal ambassadors in Europe: USEC, NATO, the UK, France, Germany, and Spain, as I recall. I participated a couple of times as chargé. I found these meetings very useful.

As you know, Ray, one important thing ambassadors do is coordinate Washington. A query or recommendation from an ambassador can spur the government to get its act together. The six ambassadors discussed the quality of Washington policy support and agreed on a common line that they might want to take to encourage the agencies to coordinate and resolve problems.

Often demarches were made simultaneously to the Commission and in capitals. When the Commission’s involvement was marginal, as it often was on strictly political matters, we would drop off a paper with the appropriate commissioner or Crispin Tickell and use the rest of the meeting to discuss matters of greater salience.

If the ambassador or anyone else in USEC planned to travel to a member country on business, say to give a speech, we always obtained “country clearance” from the embassy.

Q: Did you have visits while you were there by the secretary of state or the president?

LAMB: Secretaries of state met with the Commission every year in December. These consultations were scheduled in conjunction with a recurring NATO ministerial meeting. The drill called for a private meeting between the secretary and the president of the Commission, a general meeting with other commissioners, and a press conference. The mission contributed to shaping the agenda of these meetings and supplied material for the briefing books prepared in Washington by RPE. The Ambassador, accompanied by mission staff, briefed the secretary and his staff before the meetings. If appropriate, we would meet again with the secretary to discuss follow-up.

On one of these occasions, I met Secretary Haig’s plane and drove into town with him. I used some of my time to urge him to secure the appointment of a new ambassador in the mold of Hinton and Enders. Not long thereafter, George Vest got the nod. Note that I am not alleging
cause and effect. (George told me later that Judge Clark had played a key role in securing his nomination after the White House had turned him down for Bonn and Brasilia.)

There were no presidential visits during my tour. Vice-President Mondale visited in January 1977, during the same trip that saw him launch the Christopher mission to Brazil. President Carter visited in January 1978.

*Q: Vest certainly was experienced in terms of Europe. He didn’t maybe know trade policy or other things.*

**LAMB:** A little known fact about George Vest is that he spent a year at USEC as Bob Schaetzel’s deputy in the late 60s. His tour was cut short when he was transferred to the NATO mission. So he knew the EC machinery at first hand. With support from the staff he quickly got up to speed on the issues.

*Q: Let me come back to the internal structure. You mentioned various elements. What did the political counselor and political section do? This was basically an economic organization, of many dimensions. What about, had political cooperation started at this point? What kinds of things did the political section do?*

**LAMB:** The issues we were interested in at the time were trade, the CAP, the internal market (mainly the various plans to downsize the steel industry and control national subsidy programs), the EMS, energy policy, and development assistance (the bulk of EC member country aid was disbursed by the Commission). In part, having two sections was just an artful way of dividing up the work under two counselors. The political section dealt with enlargement, institutional issues, labor, development, and the parliament. The economic section dealt with the rest. We had a labor attaché in the political section whose remit extended to the European and international labor organizations headquartered in Brussels.

Perhaps I should say a word about steel and what the U.S. and the EC were quarreling about. When developing country steel producers began to make major inroads in developed country markets, the U.S. responded with a series of voluntary export restraint measures. While these agreements slowed the rate of increase of steel imports, the pressure on the U.S. steel industry to downsize was maintained. In contrast, the Europeans responded by nationalizing some large producers and subsidizing others. They wanted to protect jobs in a deteriorating labor market. Because EC firms could sell at a loss and remain afloat, the growth of imports was curtailed. For the Commission, the problem was that member state subsidies (termed “state aids”) were distorting the internal market. For us, the problem was that the protection afforded by subsidies was “diverting” developing country exports to the U.S.

Political cooperation was launched in October 1970, but it was still nascent during my time in Brussels. Existing outside the EC treaty structure, it was strictly intergovernmental. Although the Commission president participated in the political cooperation meetings of EC foreign ministers, he was not a major player. We met with Jenkins on various issues and delivered our talking points, but without much discernable effect on outcomes. Political cooperation assumed its current form in 1993 when it was brought within the treaty structure and some permanent
Brussels machinery was put in place. (The current “face” of EC foreign policy, Javier Solana, carries the unwieldy title of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union.) During my tour the action on political cooperation lay primarily with our embassies in member state capitals.

Q: Now there’ve come, over the years, to be a structured relationship between the United States and the now European Union (the European Community before), at the cabinet level, periodic meetings in Washington or Brussels. Had that started at the time you were there or did that come later?

LAMB: That came later. You had, as you do now, the rotating six-month presidency, but there was no formal structure for interchange with the U.S. administration. The creation of such a structure was an initiative of Secretary of State James Baker. Baker’s approach, quite brilliant, was to have the U.S. be a “member” of all the important regional groupings: Europe through NATO and a mechanism to link up with the EC; the Asian-Pacific Cooperation forum that he initiated to connect to Asia; and a Western Hemisphere trade arrangement to bind us more closely with Latin America. It’s an organizing concept that did not survive Baker’s tenure at State. Perhaps, with the rise of India, China, and Islamic fundamentalism, its time is past. I don’t hear people analyzing our approach to the world in Baker’s terms anymore.

Q: Now you mentioned the rotating six-month presidency, rotating among the member states of the European Community. In terms of our contact with the presidency, you would meet, perhaps, with the deputy at their mission in Brussels. We would meet, exchange views at the capital. Had the idea of a troika started yet or did that come later as well?

LAMB: That was a later development.

Q: So we kind of every six months, well, the European Community, every six months, would have a new president who would kind of start from scratch, continue as best they could and it was a little harder for Luxembourg than it was for, say, Germany but it was probably a little difficult for everybody. How about in terms of our interaction? Did we, did you at the U.S. mission, kind of think that was something that you ought to mainly do or did you kind of look to our embassies in capitals to kind of pick up the ball every six months in a different way?

LAMB: Most of the work was done in capitals because the presidency involves all the agencies of the presidency government. The ministers heading the agencies or departments would become the chairmen of the specialized Councils. It was possible to pick up a bit on their agendas in Brussels but the real nuggets could only be dug up in capitals.

One additional comment. “Troikaism,” to coin a word, is now rampant in the European Union. They do a lot of things in threes. On foreign policy issues, for example, EU delegations are frequently composed of a representative of the presidency country, a Commission representative, and a representative of Javier Solana. There are endless variations.

Q: I think, as I understand it, there’s now a position at the U.S. mission to the European Union that basically, I don’t know at what level it is, I think it’s in the political section, which actually
moves every six months from one embassy to another to augment the resources of that embassy. It nominally is on the staffing roll of the mission in Brussels but I don’t think that person spends much time there. That hadn’t even been conceived of during your time there.

LAMB: No, it had not.

Q: And had elections to the parliament started?

LAMB: The first elections to parliament took place in 1979.

Q: The Europarliament met in Strasbourg, which is a ways from Brussels. How did you handle that?

LAMB: They met in Strasbourg and occasionally in Luxembourg. (They now meet frequently in Brussels.) The ambassador would attend their sessions occasionally and so would I. But the officer in the political section assigned to the parliament supplied day-to-day coverage. The parliament was and is a relatively weak institution, yet it does have influence and we wanted to stay in touch with it and on its good side.

Important people would turn up in parliament from time to time. I remember being invited to debate Giulio Andreotti, the seven-time prime minister of Italy (now, at 87, living under a cloud because of mafia-related corruption scandals), who was head of the Christian Democrat group at the time. I don’t remember what we talked about; I do remember that he treated me gently. His English was heavily accented, but fluent.

Q: Did you try to make a point of moving around occasionally, traveling to some of the other member state capitals?

LAMB: Not often. Too much travel would have crossed the line with our colleagues in capitals. They didn’t want us mucking about in “their” countries and I think they were right. I did make speaking trips to Lille and Lyon in France, and to Berlin, but I had to explain what I was planning to say, why I wanted to say it, and get clearance. Travel within the EC was scrutinized fairly carefully by the embassies. We’re very territorial people.

Our embassies were not the only ones on alert. When I gave a talk on trade to the Chamber of Commerce in Lille I was shadowed by a young énarque (i.e., a graduate of the elite École Nationale d’Administration) from the préfet’s office. The discussion was pretty lively until he started asking pointed, somewhat aggressive questions. The audience clammed up. I have to admit that speaking on trade policy in Lille, a textile center, was somewhat provocative.

An amusing incident from that trip comes to mind. I had arranged to meet with some political science professors at the university. The discussion was going well, with much of it focused on the pernicious effects of the concentration of power in Paris. Then, about 5:00 pm, I noticed my interlocutors looking at their watches. It turned out that, it being Friday, they were anxious to catch their trains to Paris for the weekend.
Just one more story. This took place in Paris while I was ambassador to the OECD. I was seated next to the wife of the head of Airbus at an embassy dinner. As we talked, she extolled the virtues of Toulouse, where Airbus is located. Finally, I asked “How long have you lived in Toulouse?” She replied, “I don’t live in Toulouse, I live here.” Mais oui.

Q: So you liked the idea of the European Community being transnational and integrated, but we still want to respect the boundaries of the member states.

LAMB: That’s right. One interesting anomaly is that the member states still maintain embassies in each other’s capitals, which is very strange when you think about it. Shall I mention bureaucratic inertia again?

Q: To what extent had they, had the European Community begun to have their own missions in Washington and elsewhere?

LAMB: This was developing. They had a mission in Washington and of course there was a rivalry over where business would be conducted. The mission in D.C. wanted to work directly with the U.S. government and we wanted to do business exclusively in Brussels. No doubt this was healthy competition. I can’t really remember now how developed their diplomatic service was at that time. Of course, they had a mission in Geneva. They opened offices in the countries that were going to become members for education purposes. Beyond that I’m not really sure now where they were present.

Q: Perhaps Tokyo?

LAMB: Oh, yes, Tokyo, absolutely, yes.

Q: Okay, anything else about your time at USEC, we’ll still call it that?

LAMB: That pretty well covers it except for three things. The first concerns the U.S. business community. U.S. business was amply and, for the most part, ably represented in Brussels. I had a major role in the mission’s dealings with the American Chamber in Brussels. I met frequently with individual members and I addressed their meetings from time to time.

The second is about promotion. I received good performance reports from the deputy secretary and shortly after my arrival was promoted to minister-counselor rank, whereas Bob Morris, who was a Deane Hinton protégé, was not promoted. Hands down, Bob was more qualified than I was to do the kind of work I was doing at the time. The ambassador could barely contain himself. Bob was promoted the next year and it all smoothed out.

The third concerns “representation,” official entertaining. The first thing to be said is that I was very fortunate that Helen was skilled at managing an official household and staff and was a gifted hostess. In these jobs, DCM and ambassador, you essentially “live above the store,” in houses with formal living and dining rooms and family quarters upstairs. Nice, but not homey. We had a live-in couple -- great for babysitting -- and a cook. The couple was Portuguese, the cook American. David had been in the army, working in Mons, Belgium for generals attached to
the NATO staff. He met and married a Belgian girl and stayed. When we hired him he had been executive chef at a Belgian bank. The only problem with David’s cooking was portion size. If you specified roast chicken and did not supervise him carefully, guests would find a half chicken on their plates.

Helen received good training during our first assignment to Paris, so she knew the ropes. (In those days, wives were “rated” along with the officers. My career received a boost as a result of this nefarious practice.) As the wife of the DCM she was also the chief morale officer to the other Mission wives and their families. In a country where it seems to rain interminably, this was a major assignment, which she carried out with élan.

While looking through my (meager) files in preparation for this interview, I came across a letter that Helen received in 1964 from the director of the Foreign Service Institute. The letter welcomed her to the official family and said that “Your primary job as a wife will always be, of course, to maintain a happy home and to be sure that your husband and children are fit and happy, ready for their work.” My how times have changed. The only indication I have of Helen’s reaction to the letter is that she underlined “their work” and added a question mark. No doubt she was concerned about just what tasks the little tykes were expected to perform, gratis of course, for Uncle Sam.

Q: Let me ask you, to come back to substance a little bit. We talked a little bit about enlargement and the U.S. attitude towards that. To what extent did you get involved in the enlargement that was taking place: Spain, Portugal, Greece, in the early Eighties?

LAMB: I remember the issues as being largely technical, as opposed to political. I had good relations with the Commission negotiator, Roland de Kergorlay. We were just looking for things that might end up discriminating against us, very basic, nuts and bolts, trade-related concerns. As I recall, we may have found a few items but they were easy to straighten out. Turned out not to be a difficult matter for the United States.

Q: I’m sure the issues were technical and detailed. The fact of that enlargement was very political, linking Southern Europe, Spain, Portugal, Greece, more closely with the rest of Western Europe.

LAMB: Both political and economic, and the two are not easily separated. If enlargement did not spur economic growth, it would have been judged a failure by the nine and the new entrants. Franco died when, ’75? So by ’78 the EC had already begun the process that eventually linked Spain much more tightly to the rest of Western Europe. Portugal got a strong economic boost and EC membership eased tensions between it and Spain. But Greece got a pass on the hard steps it needed to take to benefit from EC membership. The northern Europeans may have forgotten that they were dealing with a Balkan country. Greece is finally getting some benefit in terms of structural reform and growth but it took years, actually decades, for that to happen.

Q: And certainly politically, linking democratic Greece to Western Europe, was certainly important in the post-military period of Karamanlis and then it was actually Papandreou who
finally brought Greece into the European Union and that was good to have that solid linkage to the socialist government of Greece.

LAMB: For good or ill, politics trumped economics in the case of Greece. And because it was so poor, Greece did very well, on a cash basis, as an EC member. From 1985 to 1989 alone the EC transferred almost $8 billion to Greece.

Q: The British had not been members of the European Community for too long when you were there. You want to say anything about your relationship with your British counterpart?

LAMB: The UK joined in 1973, fulfilling a Foreign Office dream. UK membership was the work of Edward Heath, who was committed to Europe. George Pompidou, who welcomed British membership as a counterweight to Willy Brandt’s eastward-leaning Ostpolitik, abetted him. Representing the new member, the Foreign Office types were concerned to prove just how “European” the British were, which I found off-putting. My ambassadors had close relationships with their ambassadors, but the deputies were less accessible. Relations were cordial but somewhat cool and distant. Of course, for most of my stay in Brussels, the commission had a British president who was reasonably accessible. His chief of staff, Crispin Tickell, was a British FSO who later became their ambassador to the UN. The ambassadors and I had close relations with (now Sir) Crispin.

Q: Roy Jenkins being the president.

LAMB: Jenkins being the president, yes, so some of our access to what the British were doing or thinking really came through our Commission contacts, rather than through their permanent delegation, although as I say the ambassadors had good relations with their chiefs of mission.

Q: Did you use English pretty much in your dealings in Brussels or French?

LAMB: With British entry, English became the dominant working language and we used English primarily. Aside from my periodic lunches with Emile Noel and one occasion when I translated for Secretary Haig during a press conference, I can’t remember doing much business in French. Occasional conversations with members of the French delegation were also conducted in French. (What a difference a couple of decades make. In 2005, French officials virtually insist on speaking English with American counterparts.)

EDWARD L. KILLHAM
Deputy Chief of Mission
Brussels (1979-1982)

Edward L. Killham was born in Illinois in 1926. He received a bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University in 1949, a master’s degree from Columbia University in 1950, and a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University in 1957. Mr. Killham joined the U.S. Army during World War II and
served from 1944-1946 in Europe. His Foreign Service career included positions in the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Austria, and Spain. Mr. Killham was interviewed by Robert Martens on December 18, 1992.

Q: Well, why don’t we go on to your period in Brussels. This was what year?

KILLHAM: This was from December 1979 to the autumn of 1982.

Q: You were Deputy Chief of Mission. Who was the Ambassador?

KILLHAM: At first it was Mrs. Anne Cox Chambers, who had been appointed by President Carter. She left immediately after the 1980 elections, departing early in January the following year. We didn't get a new ambassador until June or July, so I was Chargé for five or six months.

Q: That is always interesting.

KILLHAM: Yes, it was fascinating. The new ambassador was Charles Price II, with whom I worked for about a year. Shortly after I left he went on to be Ambassador in London.

Q: What was his background?

KILLHAM: He was a businessman. He was into a number of different things...insurance and banking. His family had owned a couple of companies and he moved in to manage them. He was a good manager.

Q: I would have thought so if he went on to London.

KILLHAM: Yes. He was very close to the President. As a matter of fact his wife, who was a very outspoken lady on occasion, commented several times that he, Charlie, knew Ron a lot better than this guy who was in London. She wanted London and eventually got it. She generally got what she wanted.

I went from there to Madrid to serve as Max Kampelman's deputy on the U.S. Delegation at the CSCE conference, that is, the second half of the Madrid CSCE meeting.

Q: Any observations about your tour in Brussels as DCM, which obviously was a big job?

KILLHAM: The most important thing we were doing during the time I was there was trying to get the Belgians into line on the INF missiles. They were waffling to some extent. I was confident that eventually they would do it, but there were a lot of difficulties. To be fair, however, the government did have genuine political problems.

Q: Was my namesake, Martens, already Prime Minister?

KILLHAM: Well, he was the once and future Prime Minister frequently. He is caretaker now and I am not sure whether this is the eighth or ninth time. But he is a very decent guy, very
capable. I got to know him very well indeed, especially when I was Chargé, but even before then because we would get these rockets in the middle of the night from Washington, which had heard that the Belgians were backing out again. I would have to chase down the Prime Minister, which I did repeatedly. His assurances usually were that they hadn't made a decision yet, but not to worry about it too much. Somehow they would work it all out. He was a very capable politician.

Aside from running the Embassy, INF was my particular charge. Fortunately, I had a very good staff. It was a big job from the management point of view because the Embassy supplied administrative support for the other two missions -- NATO and the European Communities. So we have an enormous administrative structure there, which is part of the Embassy.

That was my third time in Brussels and by that time I was pretty well up on Belgium's complicated linguistic affairs. But I did manage, I think, to stay out of the political section's hair as much as I could, except for the missiles.

ROBERT J. WOZNIAK
USNATO Public Affairs Officer
Brussels (1979-1983)

Mr. Wozniak was born in Michigan and educated at the University of Chicago, William College and the University of Indiana. After service in the U.S. Navy in WWII, he joined the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1963. His service included several assignments at USIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. as well postings abroad as Public Affairs Officer (or Deputy) in Athens, Nicosia, Damascus, and Rabat. Mr. Wozniak was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2001.

Q: The public affairs officer at U.S. NATO is very different than Damascus or Cyprus.

WOZNIAK: Totally different. It was an exhilarating and taxing, demanding time. Totally unlike the prior experience in Syria. There, I think we did make a difference. 1980-83, the years that I was in Brussels were pretty much coterminous with what was called the intermediate range missile crisis that was driving deep fissures into the alliance. The deploying states, those that had committed to deploy these weapons to offset the Soviet SS-20 missile program, let’s see, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany England, Italy, all had great domestic political problems as a result of this commitment they had made. So the European press, and the American press for that matter, were daily consumed with questions on how this program would go forward. What would happen to the alliance? Would it fracture, etc. I personally believed that the alliance would not fracture and that the program would go ahead, simply because I didn’t see any of the deploying countries had any alternative. I didn’t see any of them leaving the alliance or causing the alliance to fracture. But nonetheless, even if that ultimate result could be foreseen, public affairs had an important role to play indeed with media critics and answering media questions. I must say that the three years of being steeped in the arcana of missilery resulted in totally useless knowledge for all subsequent purposes in other assignments and in other aspects of life, but it was an
exhilarating time.

Q: As I recall that period certainly the question of deployment was very important, but there was also a second track, a so-called dual track we were negotiating with the Soviets on the SS-20 side as well.

WOZNIAK: That is right. How did that resolve itself? After I left Damascus I can’t recall.

Q: I think eventually an agreement was reached.

WOZNIAK: Well there was this famous walk in the woods, Paul Nitze and his counterpart and was an agreement reached? I can’t recall.

Q: Well, why don’t we go back and talk a little bit about how you went about this on the public affairs side with the critics, the media. I mean you were at NATO, an international organization, the headquarters. Obviously some journalists would come there, but there were journalists in Italy and in Britain. How did you work through the USIS programs in those countries?

WOZNIAK: We worked closely with all the public affairs officers and their information people in all the alliance countries, especially of course, in the deploying countries, but in all. There is a large and very professional correspondent corps in Brussels. They don’t cover NATO exclusively. They cover EEC matters as well as NATO and bilateral interests. But I would deal with that corps on a daily basis, either answering their questions or briefing them or arranging for briefings with some of our heavy hitters in the mission. It was frequently visited by top U.S. government officials, state and DOD, who almost always would be available for backgraders after attending meetings in Brussels. So those were the prodigious tools one used. But we also would host visits, arranged with the posts in the alliance, with the USIS posts in the alliance, by journalists, parliamentarians, scholars. Once a year we would mount a major two day symposium in one or another allied capital. Those were the tools that we used.

Q: And you worked closely with the public affairs people on the international staff, the NATO headquarters.

WOZNIAK: Sure. Several of them were American. Some we still see, good friends. Yes, but of course the international staff would plug the alliance position. They were not going to promote U.S. policies per se although in terms of the deployment issue they were one and the same.

Q: At that time NATO headquarters was in a building on the outskirts of Brussels, and the U.S. mission had kind of a wing or a part of that overall complex. Is that where you were located?

WOZNIAK: Yes. What did we have? Three floors I guess. We were on the first floor with the communications unit and the admin unit. The second floor was the ambassador and political section, econ officer. The third floor was entirely DOD. I agreed to stand a Marine watch once a year so the Marines could work off their hangovers from the Marine ball the prior day. I went into the mission on a Sunday afternoon for three or four hours. Bored reading, I decided to walk around the mission and see what was going on, if anything. I characterize the staffing of our
mission as one that was full of fast dancers. Every guy who wore a uniform was shooting for his stars, first star. On Sunday afternoon the first floor which was USIS except for communicators, was empty, second floor, the State Department floor was empty. The third floor was half full of DOD officers working at their desks.

Q: Sunday afternoon.

WOZNIAK: Hard at work in Brussels. Relentless. The work load was onerous. My wife, we were just newly married, later said after we left Brussels, it is a miracle our marriage hung together because she saw me so little in those three years. They were 10 hour days, 12 hour days every day.

Q: But a lot of that was the pressure of interacting with others in the mission, not so much that you had so many journalists.

WOZNIAK: No, but copious documentation one had to read and absorb coming in from capitals, from Washington, instructions, to say nothing of monitoring the media. We would look every morning at probably 20 European dailies, digest them, and have a summary ready for the ambassador’s daily staff meeting which I think was at 9:00 in the morning.

Q: You had to get an early start.

WOZNIAK: This was in the day before faxes and Washington, Reggie Bartholomew and Richard Burt, and the Prince of Darkness, Richard Perle, all loved this document and wanted to have it in Washington.

Q: The press summary.

WOZNIAK: In the press summary, but we already were putting in two hours a day on it and to cast it into cable form would have taken another hour or so. So I resisted and offered to make it available by fax. There was only one fax in the mission. It belonged to the Department of Defense wing. That was something different. That fax machine was as big as the table we are sitting at, which is about a meter and a half in all directions, and which was only for I think it was told, only for classified use. No one in the mission knew what a fax was. Can you believe this is only 20 years ago.

Q: So a fair amount of what you were doing was in effect reporting, summarizing, analyzing.

WOZNIAK: Well, for the morning meeting you report to the ambassador’s country team, the ambassador’s staff meeting, what was on the media’s mind and what we might do to deal with it. That was the first tranche of the day. Then one would see what one could do for the rest of the day.

Q: Did you travel a lot within NATO?

WOZNIAK: Quite a bit. We would of course go to all the ministerial meetings that took place
outside of Brussels. On occasion I would also travel to other countries to participate in university seminars or things of that nature.

*Q:* Was television and that media pretty important in that regard?

WOZNIAK: Sure. We would always have television coverage of press conferences. And the NATO information services had those facilities in addition to those the networks would bring in. But you remind me that during my tenure there, Weinberger had been pressed by his ministerial colleagues to make available publicly some of the information that he would share with them in council about Soviet military programs.

*Q:* The threat.

WOZNIAK: The threat. They found the evidence he would present to them very compelling and wished they could present it to their publics. So the Department of Defense came up with the first of what would continue for a number of years to be a publication called Soviet Military Power. Charlie Wick who was the director of USIA at the time wanted to launch this thing with a big bang. So in 1982 or 1983 satellite communication for television was in its infancy. What later became WorldNet, the USIA TV capability to project information world wide got its start with the launching of Soviet Military Power which took place simultaneously in Washington and Brussels. In the Brussels headquarters in the large amphitheater briefing room. Putting that together was a pretty demanding task because no one had ever done anything like that to have television coverage from Brussels available throughout the continent and back here I suppose.

*Q:* When we think of defense, national security, arms control issues there seems to be always a tension between those who want to restrict dissemination of information because it is sensitive, because it might affect negotiation, and those who want to be very open, very public, make everything available to the public so that they can form decisions and so on. Was that the case in this period, or was there a very wide acceptance that the intermediate missile situation and crisis in Europe was essentially to a large extent a public affairs perception issue, and therefore it had to be primarily to a large extent waged at that level? Did you find people resisting that because it was too delicate or too sensitive? The public couldn’t be trusted with too much information.

WOZNIAK: No, I don’t think so. All of the players by that term I mean the key officials in our mission, and those who visited from Washington, were always eager, or always willing to make themselves available to meet either on background or in press conference circumstances with the media and be as candid as possible I think. Obviously there are aspects of diplomatic exchanges with allied counterparts and aspects of military capability that one couldn’t get into, but those limitations aside, they were very supportive, recognizing as you just said, that it was largely a public perception issue and had to be dealt with.

*Q:* Just to go back again to some of the mechanics of the USIA-U.S. operation at NATO. You mentioned you were on the first floor, you were the public affairs officer. Were you there by yourself or did you have a staff? Could people walk in? Did you have a library or information center?
WOZNIAK: No. One of the joys of multilateral diplomacy is in that context, as was well said to me by my successor, Sam Burnett, one of the stars. He said you had no distractions to deal with the raw meat of foreign policy. The embassy in Brussels rendered us all administrative support. That included budget and personnel questions. It also had its own open door policy. There was a library and things of that kind for the Belgians and others that were made available to make use of those kinds of services. We had none of that, and of course there was no public access to us, only by invitation.

Q: Did you have an assistant?

WOZNIAK: Oh yes. When I got to post there were two other officers, a so-called deputy PAO or information officer and two American secretaries because the volume of classified, and it was almost all classified, correspondence, was enormous. In my time a fourth officer was added because when we launched for the first time one of those annual symposia. It was in Denmark the first time we did it; Washington liked it so much they wanted us to do more of it. They offered us, and we took a fourth officer to take on that kind of activity. I don’t know what the size of the mission is today. I have no idea. It is probably reduced.

Q: You mentioned at the embassy in Brussels there was a library. Presumably there was a public affairs officer and a USIS program. Was there also one at the mission to the European communities?

WOZNIAK: They may have had, I am sure they did have a reference resource kind of library, but not anything as grand as at the embassy itself.

Q: Did you meet with your counterparts at the embassy and elsewhere regularly or were your areas of responsibility so different that there really weren’t any problems in terms of overlap or conflict.

WOZNIAK: Except for the PAO to Belgium’s concern about the deployment issue because Belgium was one of the deployment states, there wasn’t a whole lot of overlap with his and the concerns of the PAO at the Common Market. But we would get together oh maybe every quarter for lunch and talk about in house concerns. But there was no real need to consult more frequently than that.

Q: Who was the U.S. representative to NATO.

WOZNIAK: Tapley Bennett. The late Tapley Bennett. [editor: Bennett served from April 1977 to March 1983]

Q: Was he there the whole time that you were there pretty much?

WOZNIAK: Yes. I had first known him, although he didn’t remember me, in Athens when he was DCM, when I reported there for my first assignment. Bennett was the chief of mission for my entire three years at NATO. He was very unhappy when I told him I had been assigned to Athens. He said, “What you are leaving already? You are going to leave me before I leave?” But
I simply had to go to Athens.

Q: Before we go on to Athens I need to ask you in addition to the missile issue in the three years you were there, do any other NATO issues stand out that were challenges or ones that you had to spend a lot of time and effort with the media or on the public dimension. I wonder about the Greek-Turkish issues that are always a strain on the NATO alliance.

WOZNIAK: Not that issue per se. I mean it was on the alliance’s burner of course. More immediately it was the problem of Andreas Papandreou who was then prime minister of Greece and very disruptive of the business at NATO. I can’t remember the details now, but at one ministerial meeting which he attended, it must have been a summit. It couldn’t have been a summit. The summit wasn’t there. He held a press conference that was very unhelpful. I can’t remember the details of what the issues were at the time but he was just not a team player in the NATO context. Just heightening public awareness of how serious the overall Soviet military program was and the threat it posed.

Q: Now of course at this period in the early 80s the Soviets had recently gone into Afghanistan. Looking back now 20 years on, I think we realize the Soviet threat wasn’t quite as great as it seemed at the time. Was there sort of any sense of that? That you were in a very momentous period as it turned out, the beginning of it.

WOZNIAK: The Soviet incursion into Afghanistan began before I got to Brussels. It was very much on the alliance’s mind, certainly on the U.S. mind when I got there. We were boycotting the Moscow Olympics at the time. And you know I think there was a genuine apprehension that I could perceive in the mission that were the Soviets to succeed in Afghanistan, it was just a first step in dominating the region. In hindsight of course, as you say, knowing what the Afghan resistance was capable of, those fears were probably over stated, but they were real.

Q: When I was doing another oral history interview, the fellow recalled that Secretary Vance expressed concern in the fall of 1979 that we had indications that the Soviets might go into Afghanistan. Another of his colleagues, I think it might have been Lord Carrington who was then British foreign secretary said, “Well that would be great. We know Afghanistan. We have had experience there. If they go in there, it will be a terrible mistake and it will be the end of them.” He was perhaps right.

WOZNIAK: This is a question from me. What really brought down the Berlin wall? What really affected the collapse of the economies in the Soviet Union? I think the NATO successful implementation of a policy on intermediate missiles contributed to that. I think Afghanistan certainly contributed to that. But I guess really it was the Reagan military budget. We were just going to spend them into the ground. But Afghanistan certainly played a part too.

Q: Could you talk just maybe a few more words about the missile issue because I think that is one you were directly involved with. It was in the end a real show of alliance solidarity and determination.

WOZNIAK: Absolutely. Had the Soviets been successful in what was their attempt to split the
alliance, divide us, it would have been a catastrophe for the West. Who knows, the Soviet Union as miserable as it would be might have continued to exist. It was imperative that the alliance cohere and proceed in a manner to reduce them. When the Soviets realized we were going to do that, then negotiations to back off mutually was possible. I guess the further lesson for the Soviets was that the alliance was going to be around, and they weren’t going to be.

Q: And I think it was also the fact, the recognition that, as you have said before, the media, the way the public perceived it was almost as important as what the governments said.

WOZNIAK: Absolutely. I wasn’t around when the decision was made on the missile deployment program, but I wonder if the deploying countries’ governments realized the depth of the angst the program was going to create among the republics. I don’t know if it did. But they were certainly consumed with dealing with that problem in my time there.

Q: And dealing with its various facets including the public dimension.

Okay, Bob, I think we are just about finished with your three year assignment from 1980 to ’83 as PAO at U.S. NATO in Brussels. Is there anything else that ought to be said about that period?

WOZNIAK: Nothing that comes to mind. We hit the salient points I think.

REUBEN LEV
International Administrative Officer, USNATO
Brussels (1980-1983)

Mr. Lev was born and raised in Brooklyn, New York and educated at New York University. After service in the US Navy in the Korean War, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Santiago, Chile as Administrative/Personnel Officer. Returning to the State Department, Mr. Lev was assigned to the Bureau of International Organizations working on UNESCO matters. He later served at the US Mission to NATO in Brussels, after which he rejoined the Bureau of International Affairs, again dealing with United Nations Affairs. He also served briefly with the Civil Service Commission. Mr. Lev was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: In 1980, you went where?

LEV: Okay, after 1980, I was assigned as an international administration officer to the U.S. mission in Brussels, USNATO.

Q: Brussels. So you were there from ’80 to when?

LEV: ‘80 to ’83. First they put me into language training for 20 weeks.
Q: French?

LEV: French, and so you go to an organization with 20 weeks of French where they all speak English and you live in a Flemish area. Other than that it was fine.

Q: All right, next time we’ll pick it up there.

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Today is the 6th of August, 1999. Reuben, what are we off to, and what are we doing?

LEV: Okay, should we start with the NATO operation or just bring us up to date now?

Q: Oh, no, the NATO operation.

LEV: In NATO it was a three year assignment.

Q: So you were there from when to when?

LEV: 1980 to 1983. I was assigned as international administrations officer. I was responsible for what they called the Civil Budget Committee where I was the U.S. representative (rep). I was also the U.S. rep on the Coordinating Committee of Government Experts, which dealt with administration and budgetary policies for NATO and for other international organizations co-located in Europe, such as the European Union, the European Patent Office, and the European Space Agency. Because I was the only one in the mission who knew how to deal with the issues, I was able to develop my own policies – with approval, of course, from EUR/RPE. And it worked out very well. It was very exciting; in an embassy you’re working one-on-one with someone in a specific ministry; here I was working with 15 other counterparts. It led to some fascinating give and take; we all had to give, and we all had to take. I also established an informal group of five consisting of representatives – all senior bureaucrats – of Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and France, the major contributors at that time to NATO. We just compared notes on the areas of interest to one or the other of us and where we needed support of others in proposing a particular national policy, whether concerning international operations or personnel administration or the budget. And whatever the Five decided, the other eleven followed suit. I was the only member of a diplomatic service. The others came out of their civilian ministries.

I also got involved with terrorism. I was sort of an adjunct to NATO’s Special Committee concerned with how each of the member states was dealing with terrorism. At that time it was comparatively quiet. But while I was there, there were several attacks by terrorists, most of them of North African descent. Belgium itself, I think, was an excellent place to be. It drove Marilyn crazy because the so-called “eight-to-five” hours, were nonexistent, and work on the weekends, of course. One day we had to wake up the ambassador at about four o’clock in the morning when a telegram informed us that the U.S. is going to announce that we have a neutron bomb that will kill people but not destroy property. And then our poor fellows in USIA had to do quite a bit of political wordsmithing and to say it’s not all that bad. But it came out at the wrong time because
in 1982-83, that’s when the Marine building in Lebanon was blown up. And there were a couple of other terrorist activities involving Lebanon, and a few of our embassies got hit.

Q: Who was our ambassador?

LEV: At that time it was Tap Bennett, and I had the good fortune to serve with Tap for the full three years that he was there. I think he finished up his tour about the same time I did.

Q: Was he interested in what you were doing?

LEV: He was very interested in it. He was a fascinating man. He knew what was going on and he was interested in what was going on. During the morning meetings, the equivalent of the country team meetings, we all had to report on what we were doing. If something struck him, he would say, “I want you to see my secretary and make an appointment for x o’clock. I want to go into greater depth.” He was very interested in the administration of international organizations and NATO: Were we getting economies of scale? Were we really getting our money’s worth? Were these people really doing what they’re supposed to be doing? And he was a people-oriented ambassador, which made it somewhat easier for me.

Q: When you came to NATO, were you getting suggestions in the corridor or anywhere else of concern that the administration wasn’t doing too well? Questions about how well the organization was being administered, and whether we were getting our money’s worth?

LEV: Well, this was one of the responsibilities of the Coordinating Committee of Government Experts. Each of the 16 member states had representatives on this group which was supposed to make sure that we were truly getting the value of what we were contributing. Plus, there was an independent body of auditors consisting of five or six members from each major contributor. The U.S. member headed the group, and I dealt quite a bit with him. He had a problem with the others. It was a matter of auditing techniques. Their approach was that if you spend a dollar on pencils, show me the pencils. And our view was, we spent a dollar on pencils, however, were all these pencils really necessary? Our approach was to determine whether a given action was necessary. Is this item necessary? Are additional people really required to perform XYZ functions? Where the others were more straitlaced in determining when you spend something, show me the receipt. When you go to a gas station, and you put in for mileage, show me the receipt.

Q: It was more a straight auditing rather than an efficiency test.

LEV: I guess that would be it. Quality control was the approach we pushed. By the time I left they were starting to more in that direction, and the U.S. auditor and I were very successful in persuading the others that auditing is not only counting pencils but also examining necessity and quality.

Q: But did you find that on the whole, was there a major problem with NATO, or was it rather working with an operating system that wasn’t out of control?
LEV: It wasn’t out of control. It helped that there were then only 16 states. It worked very, very well, in comparison to the UN. There was a common goal, a specific purpose, as opposed to the UN’s more generalized objective. And the experts working on NATO affairs all had specific programs to deal with.

One of the developments at NATO – while I was there and in which I had a hand – involved civilian programs. This was unusual; the usual concerns were with weapons, tactics, oil reserves and so forth. Under this civilian program, Science for Stability, the Southern Tier countries – at that time it was Greece, Turkey, and I believe Portugal – were helped to develop graduate courses in international affairs and science. There was some opposition among NATO members. Somebody said it was “Science for Stupidity.” But supporters – the British, Dutch, and the U.S. – prevailed. It was inexpensive –$5 million for three years. Members sent educational experts to help develop graduate courses in science and international affairs. So we were successful in that. There was also a committee on modern society, which helped members develop NATO infrastructure including common road signs and driver’s tests. Belgium at that time was either the first or the second in the world in automobile-caused deaths. Everything had to be decided by consensus, so diplomatic skills were important. It was almost like playing Monopoly, I’ll give you Boardwalk for two railroads. At times it did end up with horse trading. But in my little group of five we understood the problems the members were facing at their own ministries, so we were able to work things out before we got into formal conferences and council meetings. There was no bloodletting or questions of who did what to whom. I’m sure it’s been your experience that when you hear about communiqués that they are developed long before the leaders ever meet. And the communiqué itself is a matter of give and take and negotiations.

Q: Oh, yes, that’s where the negotiations go on. Well, now, tell me, as you were dealing with this, what were the characteristics of some of the groups that you dealt with? I’m sure somebody could say, “Well, that Lev was very American, and he said such and so and worked in such and such a way.” Let’s talk about some of these, the French for example.

LEV: By this time, the French were technically not involved with the military, but they stayed in what they regarded as the civilian, dealing for example with the non-military infrastructure.

Q: How about the French delegate in your committee?

LEV: The French delegate was a fascinating person. He was a member of their diplomatic service. Unfortunately, he didn’t have enough training in dealing with people. I believe he was a consular officer, which surprised me, because consular activity, day to day, is with people. But he was from somewhere behind the scenes, and either he had a problem understanding what NATO was about, or his instructions were fuzzy. But when he was replaced in 1981, and succeeded by a woman, things turned around 180 degrees. Working with her, we had a better understanding of the problems she faced with getting certain proposals across or supporting a U.S. initiative or a Dutch initiative or a German initiative. So the French all in all were very, very much involved and after her assignment there were no real arguments or battles. We all understood where we were, what the limits were from a budgetary point of view. We all knew what we wanted from the infrastructure, what we wanted the NATO infrastructure to do for us as a whole, and how we could improve its operations. Could we streamline it any more? Could we
bring in more electronic support, whether it was moving away from the electronic typewriter to bringing in computers? There was some opposition to computers. But about ‘81-82 we started to bring in computers, and in 1983 we were all finally hooked up to a mainframe.

Q: What was the role of the Germans? How did you find the German representative?

LEV: The German, Karlheinz Karl was a fascinating man. He was from their Ministry of the Treasury, and working with him was no problem. He would look at me, and I would look at him, and he knew I was Jewish, and he understood what the situation was from 1933 to 1945, but we had an excellent working relationship. We also had a wonderful personal relationship with him and his wife. His wife, I believe, was a pediatrician.

Mrs. LEV: She was a brilliant lady.

LEV: A brilliant lady, and it worked out well.

Q: From what you’ve said, it sounded like the Dutch representative was sort of a spark plug there.

LEV: Robert Smits. He wasn’t exactly a spark plug. I think he would act as a mediator if thought that things weren’t going the way they should be or if everyone was starting to sing together and then somebody was off key. He would say, bring in the bass and bring in the sopranos. He was from the Treasury Ministry detailed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was also a lawyer and a colonel, and part of the queen’s front office. So he felt that he was responsible for helping things along. But I think it was almost like a five-cylinder Audi: all of the five cylinders worked together. There were difficult days, as in everybody’s life. But basically we all had a feeling for each other. There was not only a working relationship but also a personal one and deep friendships developed. Even after all these years, we’re still in touch with some of them. It was an unusual group.

Q: In ‘80-83, what was the feeling about the “Soviet menace” at that point, because, as you know, it waxes and wanes?

LEV: Well, at that time we felt the threat was very, very real. And then we also believed at that time that they were the ones that were funding the mess in the Mideast, that they were behind the bombing of the Marine barracks and the terrorist groups that were wandering around Western Europe. The feeling was that if it came to a military showdown the two sides were in balance because we all had the bomb and other capabilities. So everybody was concerned, we all felt the threat was real. There was constant debate going on within NATO about what do we do if an atom bomb hits, how do we prepare? Do we dig deeper down into a Maginot Line, or do we send airplanes up?

Q: And of course we had the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of ‘79. Did you get any repercussions during this early period from our hostage situation in Iran? Was that a major concern or not?
LEV: It was a concern, but I think the general feeling was that it was an isolated situation reflecting that the Iranians, feeling their muscles, were taking on what they called the Great Satan. And that if there were to be any kidnapping of any NATO member it would be in order to extort money. There was an incident where a terrorist shot a bazooka at one of the U.S. generals, but fortunately the general was in a well armored Mercedes, and all they ended up with was broken glass. The attack was traced to Soviet-supported East German terrorist groups that had gotten into West Germany.

Q: On the terrorism side, did you feel that any of the members were a bit soft on this?

LEV: Well, one of the things that we were concerned about was the attitude of the Belgians. The Belgians felt that they had an unwritten agreement to provide “safe haven,” in exchange for good behavior in Belgium. But then terrorists started to shoot up of synagogues and private offices and to take hostages. I think then the Belgians realized that terrorists don’t play by the book. So the soft attitudes at that time became very, very hard locally. At that time Belgium was the only so-called soft spot. Everybody else was in the real world.

Q: And of course the Germans had the Bader-Meinhof, the Italians had the Red Brigades, and the French had the Charles Martel Group, so they had been inoculated against this complacency.

LEV: As far as personal security itself is concerned, we worked very, very closely with the security folks at the various embassies. The American security officer was Greg Bujack, who was a real expert whose views had great weight. He strongly recommended that those living outside the so-called international compound, which was basically at Waterloo, secure their houses with appropriate types of locks and have bars on their windows. He said you can never protect 100 per cent, but improve what you have now. He dealt with the entire American diplomatic family, which included the embassy, those of us at USNATO, and the representative to the European Community. We also exchanged with the other NATO members. It was to make sure that we all were as secure as security would permit. There was some argument about how to deal with NATO security. We were right near the international airport, and a plant manufacturing the Lada, the Russian equivalent of the Fiat. We’d drive by this Lada plant, and you’d see antennas galore. This had its positive aspects because NATO was able to jam the transmitters or intercept their messages. But there was concern, for example, that a pickup truck could stop outside NATO with an 80 millimeter mortar, throw in about five mortar shells in about 10 seconds, and flee down the road. So steps were taken to prevent cars from stopping and for the first time guards patrolled with their FN rifles off-safety and loaded and ready to go.

JAMES D. WALSH
Director, European Logistic Support Office
Antwerp (1981-1983)

Ambassador Walsh was born and raised in Pennsylvania and educated at the following institutions: Cordoba University (Argentina); University of Scranton;
University of Virginia; Maxwell School (Syracuse); and DiTella Institute (Argentina). He entered the Foreign Service in 1972, serving several tours of duty at the State Department and elsewhere in the United States. His overseas posts include Mexico City, Nairobi, Antwerp, Harare, Kingston, Halifax, Buenos Aires, Ottawa and Madrid. In 2000 he was named United States Ambassador to Argentina, where he served until 2003. Ambassador Walsh was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: Well then, after this assignment, '81 whither?

WALSH: '81? Back to the shipping business. But this time with a little bit more background and a little more knowledge. '81 we went to Antwerp where I went as director of ELSO, the European Logistic Support Office, which essentially is the despatch agency in Europe. It's an operation that is located in Antwerp, Belgium, and it was a consolidation point for incoming shipments and household effects, and outgoing household effects. Obviously there weren't shipments going back to the States of official goods because they were consumed abroad. Basically, for Europe, most of Africa, and most of the Middle East.

Q: Oh boy. That's quite an operation.

WALSH: It was quite an operation.

Q: Well you did this from '81 to when?

WALSH: '81 to '83. We lived in Antwerp. We were in Belgium but we didn't fall under the purview of the bilateral ambassador. There were three ambassadors in Brussels: NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), EU (European Union), and the bilateral ambassador. And while we were official Americans in his country, in that sense we felt under his purview, but I had no reporting relationship, no chain of command relationship with the embassy in Brussels. I reported directly back to the Bureau of Administration, the Office of Transportation Services here in Washington. We were a fairly big operation, about 30 people in Antwerp. We had a branch office in Bonn called RPOB Bonn, Regional Procurement Office in Bonn, which did regional procurement, bulk procurement for European posts. They were able to get better deals. We had a freight expeditor at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris. He was resident in the U.S. embassy, but he was our employee. And then we had a storage facility outside of Genoa, Italy, for storing household effects for the southern European area. It was a multimillion-dollar operation. We would negotiate special air rates with all cargo air carriers, and sometimes belly cargo on big passenger aircraft into West Africa. For example, if you were assigned to Ouagadougou, Bamako, N'Djamena, Nouakchott, places like this, the way you received your household effects, at least back then, if you were traveling from the States they would generally come by sea to Antwerp and we would fly them. We were able to get rates that were so advantageous that sometimes not only was it safer to do it that way, but quicker, and it was sometimes actually cheaper, because we would negotiate bulk rates with these airlines and we would fly the stuff in.

Q: I can see where flying things in would have great advantage over... So many of these ports
can get tied up from cargo getting... in other words, demurred, or really get tied up for a long time.

WALSH: Yep, and that's what was happening. That's why we went to the air. It's one thing if you're in Nouakchott where the port is the destination city as well, but usually the port cities for places like the Sahel are in other countries, like Accra, Abidjan and so forth. So you've got to deal with the bureaucracies of a couple of African countries before the stuff gets to you. So flying it directly in on Air France or Air Afrique turned out in the end to be financially viable.

Q: Well then. Were there any particular problems of dealing with any particular governments and this thing that you find yourself up against, that sort of thing?

WALSH: No, not really. Because we dealt with the freight forwarders and it was their responsibility to deal with the governments. If there were any kind of problems it was usually at the destination, because we were operating out of northern Europe, where things worked very well. I suspect probably better than they do in the United States. So we didn't have any issues from our end. But at the other end from time to time there might be an issue of, for example, an airline coming in and the embassy's expeditor not being made aware of it and therefore surcharge is accrued. Usually if there were any issues of that sort it happened at the destination. It was our job to make sure that we let the embassy know when the stuff was coming and how so these sorts of things wouldn't happen. But we didn't have too many dealings with the foreign governments except for the countries in which we were operating, of course, which were Italy, Belgium, France, and Germany.

Q: These countries are prone to have strikes fairly frequently but they only last a day or two. Were they a problem for you?

WALSH: I don’t know that while we were there we had any kind of a port strike in Antwerp. We had a contractor in Bremen, in Germany, the Karl Hartmann Company. They were a good outfit. We used to have freight coming in to that area, northern Germany, Scandinavia, were handled by our contractor up there. Occasionally we would have problems with some of the air carriers into Africa where if there was an Air France strike, for example, then our freight would back up and people would be anxious about getting the stuff. We would try to shift it to another carrier if we could, but oftentimes what would happen is that carrier would be overloaded because of the strike. So yeah, there were problems, but not overwhelming. No big deal.

Q: How'd you find life in Antwerp?

WALSH: Loved it. The weather was terrible. But the Belgians are wonderful people. The Flemish Belgians particularly are lovely people. It's one of those jewels. It's not on the tourist route the way that Brussels or Amsterdam is, although it's about halfway between the two. But it's every bit as interesting. Less expensive because it isn't as discovered I think. At least it was less expensive then. No, it was great. One of the nice things is you're not in the capital city so you're not under the thumb of the embassy, although there was a consulate in Antwerp at that time. It's since been closed. We had very little dealings with the consulate. We were operating separately and we were physically located up in the port.
Mr. Pendergrast was born in Illinois in 1941. He received his BA from Northwestern University and his MS from Boston University. His positions abroad included Belgrade, Zagreb, Saigon, Warsaw, Brussels and Ottawa. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on June 24, 1999.

Q: Well, then, by 1980, where did you go?

PENDERGRAST: Well, I went off first to language training in French, to take on for the first time a Romance language after all the years with Vietnamese and Slavic languages, and then in the summer of 1981, I went to Brussels, Belgium, to become the head of the USIA office at the U.S. mission to the European Community, the predecessor to the European Union, the massive bureaucracy that runs the European organizations there. It was, I think, a logical step from my previous job, because it kept me engaged with the new and evolving relationship between the United States and its principal allies in Europe. Our experience with the European Community demonstrated that the dynamic of transatlantic relations had definitely changed - permanently - into a complex mix of cooperation and competition and tension and affinity. We were not quite equals, certainly in a military sense, but economically and politically there was a greater sense of partnership than had been true before. The old patron-beneficiary relationship really was dead. So it required a lot of creative diplomacy for the United States and for Europe to manage the relationship and work out their differences. It was not easy. It was a time, of course, when the Reagan Administration had arrived in Washington reasserting confidence in American power and American preeminence in the world. It was not easy to deal with Europe from a Washington perspective, but it was something that we had to do, and there were day-to-day problems, such as all sorts of commercial disputes over steel and pasta and wine and something called corn gluten that probably no one will ever want to hear much about because you feed it to pigs, but the bottom line is that these were major explosive, complicated issues. There was a major dispute over the famous European gas pipeline to the Soviet Union, which the U.S. adamantly opposed in the post-Afghanistan period, but the controversy aptly showed how the two sides of the Atlantic were indeed beginning to look quite differently at the world.

And all of this imposed a great deal of work on what our Mission was doing in Brussels, particularly dealing with the European media in Brussels, a very sophisticated, savvy press corps that knew these issues and knew everything about how the United States and Europe viewed those issues. It was very hard to conduct private diplomacy because, in the end, everything was public there; everybody was leaking all over the place, especially in the European Community bureaucracy. It was a challenge to keep up and try to deal with it. Our big advantage and, indeed, the joy in working those four years in Brussels was our extraordinary chief of mission, Ambassador George Vest, probably the most impressive career officer I've known in my 30-plus years in the Foreign Service, a person of flawless professionalism with a keen knowledge and
understanding of the transatlantic relationship - he had been an assistant secretary for Europe - from his many years of experience in Europe. He knew Europe like the back of his hand. But even more important, he was a genuine, warm, sincere human being. People instantly relaxed with him and it was a real asset in dealing with the sometimes difficult Eurocrats or journalists we encountered at the Mission. I don’t think postwar America has had a finer Europeanist than George Vest and I know that puts him above some pretty distinguished company.

Q: I had a long interview with George and have the highest regard for him, as does everybody who’s dealt with him. Well, in a way, I would think that the USIA basically, I take it, was mainly press functions, what you were doing, because you were dealing in a capital with bureaucrats who were assigned to a place, and so it’s not a country type thing.

PENDERGRAST: Well, you're right, and this is in fact one of the things I tried to do in my four years, to move the traditional media-oriented operation of USIA at USEC Brussels into a more proactive, goal-centered institution featuring exchange activities with Europe. It wasn't easy because people in Washington and in the capitals around Europe - the USIA people - mumbled, "What are you doing talking about a Fulbright Program with Europe? Why have exchange programs with Europe when we have programs in each country?" But I think that it was important to do this and affirm the fact that the United States was comfortable and realistic with Europe and the emergence of unified European institutions. We were indeed one of the principal architects of European unity. Through the Marshall Plan and other initiatives, we had deliberately fostered the type of cooperation that resulted in the Treaty of Rome and the European Community.

Q: It's been the cornerstone of our policy for the last 50 years.

PENDERGRAST: And we felt particularly - and here it gets back to the successor generation - we recognized that young Europeans considered themselves European as much as they did German, Italian, or French. It was important, I concluded, to adapt our programs to this new European generation. And, so I initiated a number of programs along these lines, including the Fulbright Program, to the European Community. One specific exchange was that we launched an internship exchange where European and American interns on both sides of the Atlantic would exchange positions.

Q: When you say interns, what do you mean?

PENDERGRAST: The European Commission had an internship program and we arranged to have many of these young people spend a period of time in the States, primarily visiting federal and state government offices, to get a solid, substantive American exposure. A number of Americans also came over and worked an entire year as interns at the European Commission. We also developed a speakers program bringing over U.S. specialists of all kinds to address seminars and other forums before audiences of European Community officials. There was also the College of Europe, a celebrated academic institution connected with the European Community and located in Bruges, Belgium. We were actively involved in a variety of programs there, too. The whole purpose was, indeed, to develop a series of exchange initiatives aimed at Europe and the emerging European institutions rather than only through individual countries. Obviously we
never had the size of a program comparable to USIS in France or Germany or Italy. It was modest, but I think an important step, particularly with the benefit now of having seen the further evolution toward European unity.

A second area emphasized during my four years was to try and see the U.S. relationship with Europe as being not compartmentalized - security here and economic here - that we worked on having Europeans and Americans thoughtfully examine how the economics and the security dimensions interacted and were dependent on each other. I did this in close collaboration with my colleagues out at the U.S. mission to NATO, which was right across town but for years might as well have been a continent away. There was little interaction between USIS operations at the U.S. mission to the EC and the U.S. mission to NATO. But I think we made some progress there. We had several major conferences which brought security and economic specialists together to look at these problems in a broader, more open-ended way. And, we profited at the time in having strong support from George Vest and on the NATO side from Ambassador David Abshire. Both had forward-looking, unbureaucratic perspectives on U.S.-Atlantic relations. And, the same could be said by our PAO at USNATO, Stan Burnett, a USIA colleague whom I respected a great deal. He was also actively engaged in this new effort to bring together and address the security and the economic dimensions in the same context.

Q: You arrived there when, in early '81 or so?

PENDERGRAST: Yes.

Q: I would have thought that one of your prime tasks to begin with would be the selling of President Reagan, because President Reagan was considered. . . . I mean, people had seen him as not a . . . sort of a class B movie actor, and he had the reputation of being kind of a cowboy and a rather unpredictable person, and I would have thought that it might not have been spelled out but this was the task. They say, you know, this is a-

PENDERGRAST: I don’t think we ever had any instruction or guidance to "sell" Ronald Reagan. I think he did it quite adequately by himself. He was a splendid communicator and his natural charm and affability and sincerity did come across to the Europeans. There may have been initially some skepticism about this movie actor turned President, but that bias did not endure long. By 1981, the Europeans had become distressed by what they viewed as a certain paralysis of American leadership, a result largely of Iranian hostage crisis, the perceived erosion of American power in the world, and the perception that Jimmy Carter was regarded as a lightweight in terms of leadership. Ronald Reagan, whatever one may think of his policies, exuded a confidence and sense of purpose that impressed Europeans as well as Americans.

There were a number of issues that did, of course, strain U.S.-European relations, a product of the differing perspectives and priorities on the two sides of the Atlantic. One, of course, the most serious perhaps in that period, was the proposed European gas pipeline into the Soviet Union, which the Reagan Administration saw as a violation of the embargo with the Soviet Union after Afghanistan. And there was clearly tension in terms of the policy toward the Soviet Union, but I don't think it was ever reduced to a personalized criticism of Ronald Reagan. It was more an attitudinal divergence between Europe and the United States more than a personal one.
Q: Did the European Parliament in Strasbourg exist at this time?

PENDERGRAST: Yes, it did, and it was part of our portfolio. We did a limited amount of exchange work with the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress. I went down to Strasbourg several times a year, but there was not a great amount of effort, because the European Parliament at that time had still not yet developed into a very active legislative forum and was in session only for relatively brief periods.

Q: What was your impression, as the European Union was forming? It seems to me in 1999 that, while in the long run it's "a good thing," it seems to be too much bureaucracy and it seems to exist to put a lot of controls in the economy and all that.

PENDERGRAST: There's no doubt that the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Community and now the European Union, was a large, heavily bureaucratized institution. A major philosophical divide between Europe and the United States has been the European readiness to accept a larger government role in society, whether in terms of regulation or a more proactive force in employment and welfare programs. The United States, by virtue of its history and its tradition, has been less comfortable with the idea of big government. And I think that this is really at the heart of many differences we've had over the years with Europe, and particularly the European Community. Agriculture is an apt case, because they have what they call the Common Agricultural Policy - enormous subsidies that maintain European farmers far in excess of even the relatively modest subsidies that we give our own farmers. And this was a critical issue because American farmers had to compete with these heavily subsidized, largely inefficient European farmers - who work mostly small plots of land rather than the large-scale farming in the States. But Europe was and remains absolutely trapped by the entrenched social policy of wanting to support its own agriculture at any cost. It often amazed me that European consumers accepted artificially inflated food prices so readily, but that explains the basic philosophical and psychological differences involved.

Q: Were there any issues that particularly grabbed you - you mentioned the pipeline - and other ones that caused real problems?

PENDERGRAST: The pipeline issue was undoubtedly the most dramatic which involved a great deal of tension and time during that period and, as indicated, reflected a basic divergence of approach to the Soviet Union. There were also a series of commercial disputes that took place. One major issue was the fact that the American dollar was so heavily valued and tended to distort the economic relationship. It hurt U.S. exports, which only exacerbated the European-U.S. trade relationship. Our trade deficits soared higher and higher, which intensified the pressures in the United States against the alleged European infractions in the trade area. And this came down on a day-to-day basis with some real knotty problems involving the United States and the European Community.

Q: What was your method of operation? I mean how did you go about on a daily basis? What did you do?
PENDERGRAST: I mentioned the various non-media activities that we tried to develop with various European institutions, and that was operationally something we tried to do differently than had been done before in that office. But there was a steady flow of policy and commercial issues taking place on a day-to-day basis, which emphasized the media relations of our work. Early in any working day, we had to have close coordination with other elements of the U.S. mission, including the ambassador, to identify the most pressing problem, the approach we wanted to take, and then in phone calls and personal meetings or press briefings, tried to get out our position to the European media, the press community that specialized in European affairs. It was a difficult, knowledgeable audience to deal with, a real challenge. We worked on it very hard. We also coordinated closely with our USIS missions elsewhere in Europe, in other countries, and tried to work with them in terms of mobilizing support for the U.S. position on a particular trade issue.

Q: Did you get involved in the missile situations where the Soviets put in the SS-20 and we were putting in Pershings and all, or was that more on a country-to-country basis?

PENDERGRAST: That was primarily addressed on a country-to-country basis and, of course, through NATO. It wasn’t something directly involved in the U.S. relationship with the EC. But the public debate about the medium-range missiles was also the background in Brussels for an eruption of a major terrorist threat from extreme left-wing elements adamantly opposed to Pershing missile deployment. I remember on a number of nights being abruptly awakened by large explosions that shattered windows across Brussels, and they were aimed at American official targets. Fortunately, it didn’t happen at our mission or any of our homes. One American company, I think, was also bombed. No one was hurt because the bombings took place in the middle of the night, but we were naturally edge for some weeks in Brussels.

Q: Were they identified? I mean, were these part of the Red Brigades or-

PENDERGRAST: There was part of this European-wide-

Q: Bader-Meinhof-

PENDERGRAST: Bader-Meinhof, Red Flag - they came with various titles and identities that crossed national lines, but it was clearly an extreme left-wing phenomenon hostile to NATO and the United States.

Q: What was your impression of the European press that you dealt with? I mean, was it professional? Was it ideological? Or all of the above?

PENDERGRAST: No, my experience was dealing with the Brussels press corps - he Europeans representing newspapers and media institutions from elsewhere in Europe - that these people were almost universally professional, bright, not really signaling any ideological bias. I was never conscious of any anti-Americanism, at least in this particular media community. Now obviously in the European national capitals, the media often did have an anti-American bias-

Q: L’Humanité and that sort of thing.
PENDERGRAST: The people that I dealt with on a day-to-day basis in Brussels - and these were from essentially the mainstream press of Europe, *The Financial Times, Le Figaro, Frankfurter Allgemeine* - these people there were first-class journalists, and I enjoyed and was challenged working with them. These people knew their business and the issues. One of great tasks was just being on top of the technical details in these trade issues. The intricacies of a steel dispute between the United States and Europe normally would not engage my interest and certainly in many ways went beyond my competence, but I had to force myself to deal with those issues because as the spokesperson for the mission, it was my responsibility to address and respond to questions from people who knew what they were talking about. But I basically felt pretty good about the journalist community in Brussels.

Q: Well, then, in 1984 you moved on?

PENDERGRAST: 1985. I was there four years, from '81 to '85, and then returned to Washington, where I spent a delightful year in the State Department Senior Seminar, a rewarding experience, mainly from the standpoint of getting acquainted, almost for the first time, with my own country, because I had spent so many years away from the United States or working in Washington. A major priority for the Senior Seminar was travel and study related to what was going on in the United States. I really profited from that opportunity.

Q: What particularly struck you about the United States from this experience?

PENDERGRAST: Based on the Seminar travel to every region of the United States, I came away more enthusiastic and more confident than ever before about the strength and vitality of our country. Visiting cities from Atlanta or San Antonio or Seattle or Detroit - I was impressed by the quality and work of local community organizations and community leaders, which I don't think is found anywhere else in the world. I really believe we underestimate the vitality and energy of our local political institutions and the various community groups in the local orbit. It was very encouraging, even inspiring. I think a second impression, clearly evident in the mid 1980s, was that the United States was moving aggressively into the new technologies, into the new information world, and that our industries and communities were adapting and changing much more rapidly than they were in Europe - a process that of course accelerated going into the '90s. We were on the cutting edge of this third industrial revolution. So I came away from the year invigorated and enthusiastic about what was ahead for the United States, because we had such tremendous resources to build upon, both economically and politically. I think another impression was the major impact of immigration on the United States. Europe, at that time, and in later years, has always seemed to resist immigration. They somehow are not comfortable with the idea of different peoples and cultures coming into their society. The United States generally has been more receptive, and certainly in the last 20 years, starting in the '70s and moving into the '90s, we have welcomed from Asia and Latin America in particular an enormous number of people who have enriched our society. And, that reality was also evident in the mid-'80s, a society that was more dynamic, more flexible, more accommodating to both technical and social change. It was the foundation for the spectacular growth we have seen in the 1990s.
LEDOGAR: Of course, the Reagan Administration, a new administration, had begun in early 1981. The two-track decision on Euromissiles had advanced to the point of deployment and the Soviets were calling for nuclear negotiations in Geneva. Early in the first year of Reagan’s Administration, there was a summit meeting, at which it was agreed that the U.S. and the USSR would return to the table and have another whack at strategic arms reductions talks and a first whack at medium-range nuclear missile talks. Still in Washington, I had been offered a couple of jobs and they were pretty good jobs, but not in my judgement as good as DCM of U.S. NATO. But Mike Glitman was holding down that NATO DCM job. Washington wanted him to become Deputy in the U.S. Delegation to the Euromissile talks in Geneva. But Mike had certain conditions. He just wasn’t interested in having his family in Washington while he went on trips back and forth to Geneva. Also, he wanted to be sure that he wasn’t just the State Department representative on the U.S. INF Delegation, but rather that he would be truly the Deputy and the alter ego to our Chief INF Negotiator, Paul Nitze. Mike’s negotiation with the State personnel people was going back and forth, and I was being yanked towards a job in the African Bureau or alternatively towards a job in Vienna on the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) Delegation. But I managed to hold on. Suddenly, Glitman was gone to Geneva and I was told to get to Brussels immediately. It was just six weeks before the December ‘81 ministerial meeting time. I did that. I wound up serving five and a half more years in Brussels as the DCM of the U.S. mission to NATO.

Q: This was from ‘81-’87.

LEDOGAR: That’s right. There were three U.S. ambassadors to NATO during my time as DCM. The first year and a half of it was Tap Bennett. Then for about three years from mid ‘83 to late ‘86 it was David Abshire. Right at the very end of my time, a fellow by the name of Alton Keel came in, but Keel and I overlapped only a short time. I left for my own ambassadorship shortly after he arrived.

Bennett, who had been at U.S. NATO a long time by the time I got there as DCM, was looking forward to his retirement and he knew that I knew the stuff and had been doing NATO for quite a bit of time. So he was quite content to let me handle an awful lot of the top stuff. Then David Abshire came. He was the founding director of the then-called Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, a big think tank guru and a very effective guy. He brought to NATO a whole different vocation, much of which was to continue the type of Foreign Affairs research
and analysis work he had carried on in Washington. So, he added this on to the responsibilities of the Ambassador there. Again, I was left doing much of the Ambassadorial-level day-to-day stuff. Abshire didn’t speak French and he didn’t have a keen interest in a lot of the minutia. So I got to go to an awful lot of the Ambassadorial meetings. I spent a lot of time as Chargé because Abshire was off organizing conferences or doing a lot of special work for Reagan back in Washington.

Q: Taking think tank extension courses?

LEDOGAR: No, he was being briefed. He would organize big international conferences and symposia in Brussels to which he’d get visiting U.S. Senators and Congressmen, senior European statesmen and businessmen, and every think tank director that he could identify from around the world to come together. Abshire would get USIS to put up some money. He was always a master at leverage - “So and So’s going to be there. You’ve got to be there. So and So is putting in money. Don’t you think you ought to match that?” U.S. airlines would be told that it would be wonderful if they would supply all the transportation.

Q: I’m not exactly sure what NATO... [laughter] This does bring out the question... You’ve watched NATO. We had professionals in there and we’ve had other people come in there who have had their strengths and weaknesses, but sometimes it doesn’t seem to be listed as an absolutely top assignment. Sometimes it gets rather political.

LEDOGAR: Bennett was the first career guy to get the job of Ambassador to NATO in, by then, almost 30 years of the Alliance history, and yet he got his job the same way all of his political predecessors did. He was a good old boy from Georgia. He was a friend of Jimmy Carter and all the guys around him. Abshire, Keel, and Taft followed Bennett. It was years before we had another career guy, Reggie Bartholomew. Then recently we had Sandy Vershrow. In my opinion, the U.S. assigned a mixed bag of political Ambassadors to NATO. Some were quite good, and some were near disasters.

Q: By the time you were back there, did you find that the equation had changed? You had a gradual growth of the European Union. This must have been something that had a certain dynamic. In a way, it’s a counterforce and sort of a new solar system.

LEDOGAR: There are two sides to that. The European Union members were becoming more and more organized and beginning to coordinate more and more on political matters, but both the United Kingdom and France were loath to get into military cooperation if such European coordination in any way touched the fact that they were nuclear powers. They wanted to keep the nuclear vocation quite separate and play that with the United States directly, and with Russia and China. Also, the U.S. and the EU were beginning to understand each other more and feel less threatened. Some of the complication of the so-called “Year of Europe” and the idea that U.S. trade concessions would be balanced off against mutual security concessions - people realized nobody was going to play that game. But gradually, the European Union was becoming more of a power as regards coordinating European political positions. At first, it was sort of a joke when these people representing the European Commission would sit down at Western group meetings, semi-camouflaged in National Delegations. The rest of us asked ourselves: “Who is this person?
Who does he represent?” But then gradually one realized that as EU political cooperation coalesced and Brussels became more powerful, there was a real reason for an overall EU point of view, especially when they started making modifications to their internal rule of consensus. That made decision-making in the political field easier for them. So, in a sense, yes, there were changes.

But in another sense, pure security matters always remained the furthest away from the likelihood of European political cooperation. More “Pol” and less “Mil” was the gauge for better success for the EU when trying to deal with “Pol-Mil” issues. One reason for that was the particular attitude of France. Since 1973 we had East-West “alliance-to-alliance” conventional disarmament talks going in Vienna: the MBFR talks. France and a couple of other countries didn’t play on the basis of “our side, your side.” In MBFR, positions were fully coordinated in advance. That was because the underlying problems with which both East and West were trying to come to grips - conventional force in balances and disparities - were all viewed as bloc-to-bloc. We also had quite a bit of East-West security negotiating experience by that time in the various aspects of the Helsinki process, i.e. the security basket in CSCE. Its spinoff entities started to coalesce and spawn new negotiating forums. They touched on security and cooperation in Europe, as the name CSCE indicates. But, the whole question of trying to organize East-West confidence and security building measures had to be undertaken with the assistance of France. But Paris insisted on the basis of a the committee of the whole, 35 nations under the Helsinki Process. Bloc-to-bloc approaches were discouraged by France. The Americans and several others asked, “How were we going to address the fundamental problem of whether there was a balance or imbalance between the forces of the two sides, or whether there was parity or disparity, or whether there was symmetry or asymmetry in our force postures, without considering the negotiations in terms of NATO versus Warsaw Pact?” After all, each military alliance was committed to maneuver, and if necessary, committed to fight together. That was the core issue. It was our alliance against the Soviet alliance in time of conflict.

In our view, the East had too many tanks. If we were going to have equal security at lower levels of confrontation, we would have to get at the question of the heavy concentration of equipment on the basis of what their alliance had and what our alliance had. Furthermore, the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe, especially Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Ireland, did not wish to negotiate about their force levels or their territory. But no! The French would not accept this logic. A bloc-to-bloc view is heresy to a Gaulist. It lead to what France hates about Atlanticism, or dependence on American leadership. So, conventional force reductions had to be done somehow on the basis of what each individual country had. There was an intellectual impasse. NATO decided to take a fresh look at it within the Alliance. At the NATO ministerial in the Spring of 1985, ministers put together a High Level Task Force on conventional arms control (HLTF); we started to debate amongst ourselves how to organize a new approach. Shortly before, both the French and the Russians began to talk about how Europe, for security measures, should really be seen in the geographical context of the Atlantic to the Urals, and address the common security problem for the whole European tectonic plate - the whole Eurasian entity, instead of taking the bloc-to-bloc approach. A broad consensus emerged on the basis of this geographic view that there ought to be a new approach towards the conventional arms control in Europe: one that would take into account all of Europe, East, West, neutral, or nonaligned.
Eventually we got the French to agree that NATO would have to organize some combination of the two approaches. While one might have the trappings of the Helsinki process and be associated with the Helsinki way of doing things in one sense, we weren’t going to allow Sweden and Switzerland and the other neutral or non-aligned states to deal themselves into an Alliance versus Alliance perspective and still remain neutral. If they didn’t have anything to put on the table, then they didn’t have any place at the table. We were going to count everybody’s forces whether they wanted to be counted or not if they were potentially confronting entities. This went on and on and on. We had terrible fights within NATO in which the opposing views were championed by the United States, especially me, against the French negotiator, namely, Benoit D’Abouville. He overstepped his authority at one point and spent part of the year trying to retract an agreement that he had made. We wouldn’t let him; and gradually we worked out an agreement. I was the chief U.S. negotiator, under Washington instruction; the French foreign office even tried to personalize things and suggest to Washington that I, Steve Ledogar, was the problem because I was a Francophobe! Washington didn’t buy any of it, so they of course backed me.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the French proposal was mainly to make France a major player or were they on to something that we were missing?

LEDOGAR: There was an awful lot of old-fashioned Gaullist emotion and theology in their position. On the other hand, I do think that France had some real problems with trying to project Europe as Eurocentric with themselves in the lead. They also had difficulties with the whole North Atlantic concept of the U.S. and Canadian presence in Europe as a World War II holdover. While they wanted American troops in Europe and the U.S. nuclear umbrella extended over Europe, they did not wish to suffer the consequences of a predominant U.S. role. They said they wanted to have Europe for Europeans.

Q: How did the British, Germans, Dutch, and others feel about this?

LEDOGAR: For the most part, if you got them aside where there were no public consequences, they would admit that they agreed with the United States on the need to approach the question of European conventional arms reduction on an Alliance-to-Alliance basis. But they would quickly add, “Don’t make me choose in public.” They knew that for the longer term their vocation to a unified Europe would be threatened if they were made out to be disloyal to European unity. It was important to understand that. We Americans had to take a lot of heat and listen to disappointing silence from those others. Occasionally you might hear quiet encouragement, an occasional note of understanding or something like that, but the British, Germans, Dutch, Italians, etc., did not want to be forced to come out publicly in front of others as favoring the U.S. position over the French position. It was quite a dicey thing.

Q: It was important to have the continuity to understand from where everybody was coming and you could take your hits from the French and all that and not take them as seriously. I mean, you’re not out to win France over in a brilliant burst of oratory.

LEDOGAR: No. A curious thing happened years later when I was U.S. disarmament negotiator
in Geneva. I was getting along splendidly well with my French counterpart there. Our two delegations were working especially well together. Once, in a friendly private conversation, he asked, “Where did you ever get this anti-French reputation?” I said, “I was never anti-French. In fact, I’m part French myself. In fact, I love France. My wife is of French descent, my children were both born in Paris, and my daughter’s godmother is French. What I despise is the French attitude towards NATO. I’ve always made that clear.” I argued vociferously back in 1986 against the French approach to HLTF, because I thought it was contrary to my own country’s interest and to the interests of the Alliance. This guy, the French Ambassador in Geneva, who became a very good friend, said, “I think I understand.”

Q: You were dealing with NATO affairs for quite a while now. I’m not sure exactly when the Helsinki Accords started. But it was during the Kissinger period. George Vest was involved. What was the attitude looking at NATO towards the Helsinki Accords as it developed? In a way, particularly the “third basket” turned into a major key in unlocking Eastern Europe. Were you seeing a development of this being a peripheral thing, a growing awareness of how important this was?

LEDOGAR: For the U.S. the CSCE started out under a cloud because Henry Kissinger had absolutely no use for the whole Helsinki process. He thought it was a bunch of gibberish. It was “mush.” To him it was all softness and sloppy thinking - the antithesis of “Real Politik.” He particularly saw no utility in the humanitarian “third basket.” Indicative of his disdain, in order to assuage some elements in Congress Henry even agreed to the establishment of a U.S./CSCE Commission - a joint U.S. executive legislative commission - that dealt in a lot of these matters. That’s how far Kissinger regarded CSCE from being a useful instrument of U.S. foreign policy. With the commission in operation, when we had review conferences of CSCE processes, the U.S. Delegation had great problems because some U.S. congressman wanted to come to the negotiations to make speeches - uncoordinated personal speeches - to win brownie points with immigrant constituents. They would make their own policy on humanitarian affairs, on hostage release, on human rights, and so on.

On the other hand, U.S. diplomats who understood the Helsinki Process and learned how to work it realized gradually, and sometimes to their surprise, that what the founders had hoped for was really becoming true. In many East European countries, despite repressive Communist dictatorships, there was a lot of attention to the third basket and to the whole Helsinki process. CSCE represented an international entity, seven of whose members were states of the Soviet Bloc. Citizens of the East could quote CSCE statements, and CSCE communiqués had weight. You could not flout the dictatorship that was ruling you on other things, but you could say, “Hey, look, the CSCE communiqué has said so and so. How come we are not measuring up?” There have been a lot of interesting things written about what the U.S. learned later on. East European defectors started coming out saying, “Keep up the pressure on the CSCE because that makes our critics’ voices legitimate.” In reality the Helsinki Process had a significant impact on the events that led to 1989, and the breakup of the Iron Curtain.

Q: Czechoslovakia and other places. When it first came out, the main thing was that this would solidify the lines. Everybody agreed to what the boundaries of Europe were, that sort of thing. That’s what the Soviets were after.
LEDOGAR: That’s exactly what they were after. In CSCE communiqué negotiations they had to agree to pro-human rights passages in exchange for what they required in the security basket: inviolability of 1945 borders, etc.

Q: And they got it and then they got this bowl of mush, which really came back to haunt them.

LEDOGAR: It sure did. The French were looking ahead perhaps more than we were and they saw that the Helsinki process was a thing to support, and that if you could figure out some way to do the conventional armed forces negotiation under the Helsinki process, that would have its advantages. Of course the main advantage for France was that CSCE was not bloc-to-bloc and thus did not leave the United States in a position of commanding leadership. Paris may have been right about that from their point of view. They might indeed have come out better from the point of view of their current national interests because they didn’t have to follow the U.S. lead.

Q: More and more as one looks at this, the United States is put into the role of the leader of things like human rights, coming out for anti-corruption on business, what have you, and the other countries’ representatives may privately think, “Yes, that’s a good idea. We really have to do that,” but we were sort of designated as the tough guy and they would kind of sit there and watch.

LEDOGAR: Yes. And also, we were the tough guy who had to bear the heavy defense spending bills. They had other things that they wanted to emphasize.

Q: Were you feeling the pressure or concern about things such as withdrawing troops from NATO and so on? Was this a sword that was hanging over all of you all the time?

LEDOGAR: Yes, it was. It found many expressions. Many Americans were instinctively opposed to the U.S. continuing to bear such a heavy burden so long after World War II with 300-some odd thousand U.S. troops and so many billions of dollars per year to defend Europe. Why weren’t the Europeans doing more themselves? That issue was constantly before us. We were constantly having to respond as best we could to questions about continued U.S. presence in Europe. The standard response was that since we perceived that the threat to our national interests originated with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, we’d much rather confront that threat far from our shores rather than have our troops back here in North America where in the event of WWIII, we would have to fight our way back onto the Continent yet a third time this century.

Then when you asked about how much it was costing us, I can remember at one point the answer that was given in congressional testimony was, “Well, Senator, our bill for our commitment to NATO is either $3 billion or $4 billion or $9 billion, depending upon how you count.” That was a perfectly defensible answer. What do you count? Do you count all the supply tail of deployed forces back at Fort Bragg, for example? Do you count all the support structure that’s there in Germany, but which is backup so we can deploy forces all through the Middle East in the event of an extra-NATO crisis? There were so many different questions that needed to be answered before you could begin to answer the question as to what NATO cost us. That was a constant
theme. We were proactive in congressional relations about U.S. troop levels in Europe when we were at our best. Certainly under Abshire we were. We would say, “Senator, you come on out to NATO. We’ll give you a thorough exposure to the issues, walk the terrain, and talk to some of our allies” and so forth. Our objective was to get them to begin to appreciate the realities, not to change their minds.

That proved to be a very important approach in the arms control negotiations. Once the U.S. got to sit down with the Soviet Union in Geneva on SALT and START and INF, we then started in Vienna with the Conventional Talks in Europe. Paul Nitze, who had left the INF talks in the hands of Glitman to finish them off, stayed back in Washington as a special advisor to the Secretary of State on arms control matters. He made a special point of encouraging the Senate to appoint from its membership arms control observers. These folks at Paul’s urging would take periodic trips to Geneva and stop by Vienna on the way just to be kept exposed and up to speed with what was going on. In the meantime, key staffers were given cables and kept current with developments in the negotiations. It was sometimes a hell of a drag in terms of timing, when the Senate Arms Control observers arrived on short notice, but when it came to earning support and, more importantly, consent to treaty ratification, it really paid off.

Q: Oh, yes. Congressional and media visits can seem sort of like a fruitless exercise, but in the long run, they are essential.

LEDOGAR: We should have done something like that during the later chemical weapons and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiations, but did not, and therefore we have had this mess with the ratification of those treaties.

Q: Yes. What about the NATO military command? How did this work?

LEDOGAR: Well, you became very aware of it especially at the Ambassadressial and DCM level, when periodically, at least twice a year, we had big military exercises that would last for a week or so; war games, if you will, but ones that were played out as a command post exercise.

In these NATO military exercises, the scenario always had the Warsaw Pact being the aggressor and prevailing in the early weeks of the conflict, especially if you wanted to get to a level where NATO nuclear weapon release procedures would be exercised. The Pact would be winning rapidly, so the issue would arise that the only way we were going to stop them was if we gave authorization to the military authorities to release battlefield nukes. In the exercise scenario the military had to request political release of so many nuclear weapons to give us a rough idea where they wanted to use them. The North Atlantic Council would have to approve it. So, the exercise usually went on just to the point of actual nuclear employment and then the exercise was over. That was once a year. The other big semi-annual exercise of the command structure usually was a more simmering political exercise. There were many other times when you were exposed to the NATO military because they sat in, had a representative at all the big meetings, and we frequently made trips to visit troops in the field. We were quite close to our folks on the international military staff: the U.S. military representative to the NATO Military Committee, and his staff. The NATO Military Committee is the senior military body. That’s at NATO headquarters in Brussels. They supervise the three Major NATO Commanders (MNC). One
MNC is at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe) and that’s the one that people think is the biggest because that’s where the American top dog is based and where most of NATO’s military might would most likely be attached in time of crisis or war. There is another major NATO field commander, also an American, based down in Naples at CINCSOUTH (Commander in Chief, Southern Command). A third MNC always a Brit, commands all forces in the area of the English Channel. These three report to the NATO Military Committee at NATO headquarters. The U.S. representative on the headquarters committee is a four star flag officer and he has a staff of U.S. military folks who are right there in NATO headquarters.

I forgot to mention that in 1982 we had the very interesting phenomenon of our NATO ally the United Kingdom going to war with Argentina over the Falklands. That was fascinating, to see how a real crisis worked. The British quickly called a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee and announced that while the attack on them did not involve NATO directly, being outside the NATO treaty area, the U.K. would be sending substantial British military assets from the Northern Hemisphere to go to the South Atlantic to defend the Falklands. Thus British contingent reinforcement to deal with a possible full NATO mobilization in the event of an East-West crisis would be temporarily degraded. From time to time, the NATO military authorities would be asked to brief the North Atlantic Council ambassadors. On other important conflicts outside NATO’s direct area of responsibility, like the Iran-Iraq war or other events that were of potential danger. I also did not mention the 1982 accession of Spain to NATO.

**Q:** The Spanish people voted for it, didn’t they? It was not considered a sure thing.

**LEDOGAR:** No, it was not. For a long time, the United States was in favor of it and the Spanish authorities were interested, but not yet ready to take the issue of joining NATO to the Spanish people. They did, however, want to study the implications for Spain of acceding to the NATO treaty. So the U.S. used to have kind of a special relationship with the authorities in Madrid that after each semi-annual NATO ministerial meeting, someone would be spun off from the U.S. Delegation from Washington to stop in Madrid on the way home. The idea was to give the Spanish a first hand insight and expert reporting on what we were doing. That job fell to me for four years between 1977 and 1982. While I was NATO Director in Washington I always came home from ministerial meetings via Spain.

**Q:** What were you gathering from the Spanish? What was in it for them and what was in it for us and how were they reacting?

**LEDOGAR:** They were acting very businesslike. Having been holding NATO for so many years under Franco at arms length, when King Juan Carlos and the Socialists came in and started to consider NATO membership, the Spanish obviously had to climb a steep learning curve. When the U.S./Spanish NATO working group was formed, I must say the Spanish put good people on the job and these people did their homework. At first they couldn’t comprehend some of the arcane things like NATO common military infrastructure, which is very complicated. And yet you’d find out the first time they came back they had studied their papers and they were asking very intelligent questions, and the next time they were asking very penetrating questions. In the process, the Spanish were building up a cadre of people who became very well informed about even NATO minutia, though it was not yet politically ripe to make the public move. Then once
they decided to put the issue to the people, things moved rapidly. In fact, the lead up consultations had been so quiet that we had a curious period when the issue of potential Spanish accession became very active; we, the 15 existing allies, had to turn around and kind of reeducate ourselves as to what were the values of having Spain join up. The inclinations were to look only at political problems. Some allies were overlooking the geostrategic considerations: the territory and the population, the GNP, and the military forces, the navy and air forces and so on. I think Spain moved when the time was right. There were certain Spanish leaders that deserve a lot of credit for making that move. Fifteen years later, a Spaniard became the Secretary General of NATO.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover up to ’87?

You were saying that you had a problem which was part of the support system, which was the Department of Defense school, where the children of our military and also our diplomatic service go.

LEDOGAR: In Brussels there was a fairly substantial community of American government employees accredited to Belgium, to the European community, to NATO, and to the international organizations. Because of NATO there were a lot of military personnel. But there was no regular U.S. military base. When in 1966 NATO headquarters left France and moved to Belgium there was established in Brussels a Department of Defense school. At that time, any U.S. government employee in the community could use the DOD school. Children of civilian U.S. government employees, while not required to go there, had to pay tuition if they went anywhere else. The U.S. government would not support education of children of its employees assigned to Brussels other than at the DOD school. Thus, if you were a State Department officer or a CIA officer, you couldn’t get reimbursed for any school other than the DOD school. The theory was that the U.S. taxpayers were supporting one government school. Why should they pay “again” to reimburse parents who wanted to send their kids to a non-U.S. government school?

But it turned out that the DOD school that was right there in Brussels, not being on a base, therefore was not enjoying the infrastructure support from a U.S. military establishment, the maintenance personnel, all of the plant material, etc. It was pretty far down the line in terms of priorities for the European DOD school system. It was not drawing good teachers, and the school was just kind of sinking in standards and becoming worse and worse. The American civilian families said, “Look, I didn’t join the Foreign Service to go overseas just to be put into a ghetto situation where my kids have to go to a second class school with only Americans. What little advantage my kids can get from being with us abroad is that they can go to school with the foreign kids they play with next door.” Then the U.S. military parents’ answer would come back, “You’re just fancy pants diplomats and you don’t like your kids going to school with kids of sergeants and corporals. That’s your problem.” “No, it isn’t that. It’s blah, blah, blah.”

It became an elitist question and very divisive. The allegation was made that if the civilians were given freedom to go elsewhere with government support, suddenly 25% of the student body would be pulled out and the critical mass necessary to keep the school in Brussels would dissolve. In that event, the Brussels military kids would have to be bussed all the way down to
SHAPE, where there was a big U.S. DOD school that was quite reliable but about 45 miles away. It got to be quite bitter, with parents getting all emotional and flying off the handle, and senior people getting involved.

It didn’t help that at the beginning of the Reagan administration, the president appointed a Conservative U.S. businessman to be U.S. Ambassador to Brussels. There were three different English language schools in Brussels that the American community (both business and government) used. Two of them were private and the third was the DOD school. It happened that all three were attended well below capacity - there was more capacity than there were students. The U.S. Ambassador, with his businessman’s approach, said, “Look, why don’t we close one of the three and fill up the other two? Then instead of all three being at 2/3 capacity, we’ll have two schools that will be at full capacity and the redundant resources could be shared.” He sort of suggested that the worst of the three schools was the DOD school and he asked, “Why don’t we just close that one?”

Well, then the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe — a senior four-star general — came out of his cavalry saddle. He really got very excited and in effect replied to the Ambassador saying, “We make a deal with American servicemen when we order them and their families to leave the United States and the advantages of the American system that they have there. According to that deal, we’re going to make family life abroad as much like the United States as we can. There are lots of morale advantages for our people and there are advantages for U.S. policy. It keeps our guys off the streets. There is less friction with the local community. And yes, our people can go to an American commissary and buy canned Chef Boyardee spaghetti even though they are based in Verona, Italy.”

There were just these two cultures, U.S. military and U.S. foreign service, clashing. I, being the deputy chief of our mission to NATO, with a delegation that was half military and half civilian, sort of wound up in the middle of this thing, being lobbied by both sides. The curious thing is that the solution came not locally, but with the stroke of a pen in Washington, when someone said, “Well, we don’t see why American civilians in Japan or Italy or anywhere should have to go to DOD schools. Why don’t we just give U.S. civilian agency parents their allowance and let them choose?” Suddenly the issue was resolved. It turned out that many of the non-military students who were in the Brussels DOD school decided, “Why should we get out now and start in another English language school when we have just one or two more years to graduation?” There was no abrupt drop-off. Also, the DOD realized its Brussels school was not first rate and threw some more money in and upgraded it. So all three schools survived. But the thing I remember was how passionate parents get when the issue is schools for their kids.

Q: You’re talking about the kids.

LEDOGAR: That’s right.

Q: A good friend of mine, Tom Stern, was DCM in Seoul, Korea, and got into one of these things. He had the people from the Embassy whose kids were going to DOD schools saying, “Well, there are not enough college preparatory courses” and some of the military side said, “We don’t have enough vocational training.” It was a battle. It is a cultural problem.
LEDOGAR: In my own family when my wife heard that I was angling to go back to Brussels for our second tour she said, “I’ll go to Brussels, but our kids (then eleven and nine) are not going to go to that DOD school.” That’s the first thing she said. The reason was that she had played tennis for years over in Brussels with American wives and then back here during my following five years in Washington with the same folks that we knew from our first Brussels tour. The kids of my wife’s tennis partners, who had all gone to the DOD school, all seemed to have had problems in later schooling. The mothers were constantly blaming the DOD school, saying that their kids didn’t learn good study habits, they didn’t have sound foundations in this and that. So I had strict instructions when I went back to Brussels to find another solution for our two kids that was not the DOD school. I was not looking forward to paying tuition for a private school. As a matter of fact, I was very fortunate to be able to get them on a space available/tuition free basis into the European Common Market school, (the English language section), which was a superb school. It was only after our kids had been a couple of years in the European school that this big American community blow-up occurred. Then the Washington Worldwide Ruling provided allowances for USC civilians regardless of proximity to DOD schools. After that policy change, we would received reimbursement for tuition like anybody else, but ours were already in the Common Market school, effectively on scholarship, and doing well.

Q: Is there anything else we should talk about?

LEDOGAR: I had some theories that I developed on the basis of a lot of multilateral political work. I used these thoughts in counseling young officers, especially political officers, when they would arrive for a tour of duty at NATO. My objective was to alert them as to how different a tour in multilateral affairs would be from any previous tour of duty they might have had as a political officer in a bilateral post. A lot of people have attitudes about multilateral diplomacy versus bilateral diplomacy. Any one of us can have prejudices. Mine favor multilateral diplomacy as a profession, but I respect those prefer bilateral diplomatic work. The point is that there are some fundamental differences that one should expect, especially in NATO work. When we would get new political or economic officers arriving, and especially if they had experience in a bilateral post, I thought it was important to warn them from the very beginning, “You’ve just come from a place where your job was was to get out of the office, learn what’s important, learn who is important, what’s going on, and then analyze things and report back to Washington those things that affect U.S. interests.” If you were doing your job, you were probably not around the Embassy very often. You would have to develop your contacts and you’d have to nurture them and exploit them on your own initiative.

Here, you’re going to find political work is quite different. You can have a very successful tour of duty at NATO headquarters and never leave the building. All your contacts are already made. Your committee counterparts from the Netherlands and Norway and so forth; those are your contacts. The fact that a scheduled NATO meeting takes place means it’s important to the United States. You’ve got to make decisions. You may decide how important the meeting is and how much space to devote to it, but you’ve got to report it. It’s an Alliance event that was scheduled here. You will learn how to draft cables here like you’ve never done before. We produce an enormous amount of reports. We do it at a very high speed. But one thing you will get here in abundance that is very hard to come by at a bilateral post is experience in multilateral
negotiation. It has little to do with experience in bilateral negotiation - selling a car or a house, settling a two party dispute, and so forth. Multilateral negotiation is not zero sum. It’s not winners and losers. The whole business is moving ahead in a common enterprise to extract the highest common denominator, and getting it right. You should start with the recognition that there are differences. Multilateral diplomacy is different. If you accept that, you’ll have an easier time of it. I still feel that that’s true.

Another thing, and this is a prejudice of mine, but I did some bilateral work and found it to be true, is that a lot of the bilateral issues were what I call “garbage on the neighbor’s lawn” kind of issues. They are not very important in themselves but they take on an importance in the local context. U.S. radio transmitters and magazines are spilling into Canada and sucking up advertising dollars that Canadian radios and pubs would rather have for Canadian media. That kind of stuff. You’ll find that in multilateral diplomacy, the issues, while often fuzzy and less clear-cut than bilateral ones, are of a higher caliber.

Let me just run by quickly the remaining events of my five and a half years as U.S. NATO DCM. In ’87, during the last few months that I was in my second tour of NATO, I began commuting to Vienna once a week to represent the United States at the CFE [Conventional Forces, Europe] negotiations. Recall that within NATO the allies were hammering out an agreed approach by the sixteen of us to try to engage the seven member Warsaw Pact states. For a while, I was going back and forth every week between Brussels and Vienna between two pretty big jobs. Indeed, for three months in the winter of ’86-’87, I was U.S. Chargé ad Interim in NATO between Abshire, who left to be Reagan’s Iran-Contra advisor, and his eventual replacement Alton Keel. Keel suddenly came out of the NSC staff because of some political upheaval in the White House.

Beginning in early 1987 with Monday morning working breakfasts at 23 in Vienna, we gradually got going on CFE. Then after a period of time it became clear that this was going to take off into a full-fledged negotiation and that the U.S. would have to have an Ambassador and a full time Delegation there. About that time the U.S. Ambassador who headed our Delegation to the MBFR post was transferred to a new assignment.

Now, funding for the MBFR team came out of the State Department budget. State also had first dibs on controlling the new U.S. CFE Delegation, but it had not budgeted for it. Having been U.S. Representative all during the NATO in-house deliberations, I was a likely candidate. As this new approach to East-West reductions of conventional armed forces in Europe wound up, the older forum, MBFR, continued, but would be wound down. There were other strong candidates for the new position. I did not hesitate to point out to Washington that if I got the nod for CFE we could do both CFE and MBFR with one team.

That’s the way it worked out. Ledogar was the low bid. In the middle of ’87, I moved to Vienna; and shortly thereafter, I was appointed as an Ambassador by President Reagan to be in charge of the U.S. Delegations to both CFE and MBFR.
JAMES L. MORAD  
Public Affairs Officer, USIS  

Mr. Morad was born in California in 1934. He received his BA from the University of Southern California and his MS from Columbia University. His foreign assignments include Rio de Janeiro, Madrid, Fortaleza, San Salvador, Madrid, Brussels and Paris. He was interviewed on June 9, 1994 by Allen C. Hansen.

MORAD: Then I went to Brussels as PAO. Brussels, while it's a small country, was not seen to be a small PAOship at the time because it was the headquarters for NATO, the European Community and, in general, seen as the capital of European institutions, although that is debatable. It had a lot of high level traffic: Secretaries of State and Defense came through twice a year along with a continuous parade of Washington VIPs which gave it a lot more importance than a small post like that normally would have. Also, that was the period during when the United States was trying to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe or I should say, NATO was. This became a very controversial political issue in the five countries where deployment was designated, Belgium being one of them. The two countries that had the most domestic local opposition to deployment were Belgium and Netherlands. And so it became a public affairs issue more than a political issue because the government supported the employment; but in Europe you had these weak coalition governments that could fall at the drop of a hat and you could not put too much pressure on them or they collapsed. These issues were of such tremendous intensity with public opinion polls showing nearly 70% of the population opposed to deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil. In engaging in these arguments with the Europeans, we would ask "Well, why should the United States protect Europe with nuclear weapons when Europe is unwilling to have nuclear weapons on its own soil to protect itself?" The common European response: "Oh, yes, but that is different. You see, you are a huge country. You can have your nuclear weapons out in the desert near Utah, Idaho or Montana, and if they became a target, those are sparse population areas and there would not be much heavy damage. In Holland, all it takes is one bomb to obliterate the country and the population." We would reply: "The people of Montana, Idaho and Utah don't necessarily feel that they should be vulnerable for the sake of European security." Anyway, those were the kinds of issues that you would get involved in with an incredible rationalization concerning why they shouldn't have nuclear weapons on their soil. They also argued that just having the weapons made them Soviet targets when they would not be targets otherwise.

Q: Yet we won that argument in the end, didn't we?

MORAD: We won. The deployment took place in all of the countries, and it was uneventful after that. Once the decision was made and deployment took place, we never heard anything more about it.

Q: Like the Panama Canal issue?

MORAD: Exactly. Before deployment there were parades and demonstrations. Thousands of
people marching through downtown Brussels, organized by the leftist parties and various kinds of peace groups opposed to it.

Q: This was a major effort on the part of USIA?

MORAD: Correct. Throughout Western Europe, including Belgium, that was the issue we dealt with most. One exception to that was the military coup that took place in Poland; Charlie Wick, who was the Director of the Agency, created this television extravaganza "Let Poland be Poland" to muster world opinion against the cause and this was shortly after I had arrived. But let me go back a couple of steps. Charlie Wick's major priority project at the time was getting Worldnet launched. That global television network was basically being launched country by country, primarily in Western Europe at the time, and Belgium was one of those early launch countries. Unfortunately, before Charlie Wick arrived, European posts for a number of years had written off television. Television was considered an activity that we should no longer be heavily involved with because we couldn't compete with or place programs on sophisticated European television stations and because there was no need to program to European mass audiences. We couldn't get our programs on local T.V. We were dealing with sophisticated countries and therefore the decision was to use our resources in more people to people exchange programs, and that sort of thing, rather than mass media. As a result, we lost a lot of our contacts with television people, both on the programming and the political sides; then suddenly Charlie Wick comes along and wants to get these major commitments of programming in cooperation with mostly state-owned television operations, highly politicized themselves often headed by leftist political executives. To get their cooperation was a very difficult challenge for PAOs in Western Europe. There was incredible pressure coming from Washington to get Worldnet set up and none of us really knew what Worldnet was, or what it was going to offer, yet we had to get these commitments from the directors of local television...people we didn't really have much contact with any longer. So we moved along gradually, little by little developing their cooperation, getting their interest. But we were still a long way from the close relationships USIS officers often have with journalists, editors and broadcast executives that they have been doing business with for years. Then all of a sudden Charlie Wick conceives "Let Poland be Poland," a specific program that he wants on the air internationally in prime time on a specific date. He wants major European stations to carry it in the middle of their evening programming schedule. We thought what he wanted was unbelievable. We're not talking about little third world countries. It was like going to CBS and asking them to give us a block of time from 8 to 9 p.m. in the U.S. The French Embassy would never do that. So we were pulling our hair out. It was incredible and so frustrating. We could not get a 100% commitment from Belgium television to carry the program, and, of course, everybody in Europe was laughing at us. It was a ludicrous situation. The whole idea was such a joke with sophisticated Europeans, but we continued to cajole and plead with them. "Don't look on it as a program, I argued; "look on it as Belgium-American cooperation. Help USIS out with this and we will do a favor for you when we can. We have this crazy guy back in Washington, and I am sure if you do it, one way or another you will get credit down the line." That sort of thing. On and on. Finally they agreed to carry it, but on a delayed basis. The delay was only about two hours however. As it turned out, Belgium was only one of, I think, three or four European countries that actually carried the program within prime time. Many of them didn't carry it at all, others carried excerpts of it on their newscasts, three or four minutes, but others carried it in non-prime time the next day.
As I recall, the program was originally supposed to have occupied an hour of satellite time, but at the last minute it was changed to an hour and a half.

MORAD: I don't remember that part of it. But anyway, the whole thing was a joke; it was embarrassing. The program had no quality to it whatsoever. It was like one long infomercial, you know, the kind that you see on cable television pushing hair replacement and just not appropriate for a sophisticated European audience.

But out of that came Worldnet eventually.

MORAD: Fortunately it didn't torpedo Worldnet and gradually we established a working relationship with television in all these countries. In Rome, in fact, Worldnet became so successful that it quickly wore out its welcome because its software quality couldn't match its hardware capability.

Just like United States television?

MORAD: Exactly. Worldnet was reaching its prime in Europe when I left Belgium. I moved to France, where we had an even more difficult audience to deal with. We were still in the initial stages, and had a lot of work to do on the format. Worldnet initially was composed essentially of press conferences with American officials. It featured an American official on a given subject in Washington or somewhere in the United States and a collection of journalists locally. It was one-way video, where they would ask questions and the figure would reply. That was essentially the format. The problem with it was that Charlie Wick, or the powers that be in Washington--I wasn't there at the time--decided to offer us, one, two, three or four of these talking head formats. They must have figured that if one was successful, two would be more successful, and four would even be more successful than that.

Like Eisenhower's press conferences?

MORAD: Same idea. There weren't enough issues of interest and they required journalists to take time off in the middle of their workday, to attend. If we didn't have a real breaking story for them, they couldn't care less. They didn't care about background stuff or the Assistant Secretary of State, unless it was something really unique. You may get one or two journalists who would be interested in the background of some economic issue, but for the most part they looked at Worldnet as a source for a breaking story, and if we could not produce the goods, they became disappointed and disgruntled. That is exactly what happened more and more frequently, and as a result, fewer and fewer journalists attended. George Shultz was Secretary of State at the time, and, for some reason, some misguided people talked his into going on Worldnet too often. We were getting him sometimes two and three times a month, and you know Shultz, he never really had much to say or was willing to say it in a public forum. So we had to go to all this trouble to attract journalists. "The Secretary of State is going to speak on such and such a subject," we would call up and tell all these guys. They would show up and ask a question and the response more often than not would be "no comment". He invariably had little to say in his opening remarks, and he rarely would answer their questions candidly. Inevitably, the journalists asked
"Why did you call us here, we thought you had something to say?" Because that wore out Worldnet's welcome as a press conference device, we began urging the agency to stop the regularly scheduled Worldnets. We don't need them on a regularly scheduled basis. We argued that less frequently and more substance would gain greater credibility. People would then see Worldnet programming as an important event.

Q: Also, you had a staffing problem at the time?

MORAD: Oh, a tremendous staffing problem. It was eating up so many of our resources. We ended up having two Americans on Worldnet alone. We couldn't afford it.

Q: After you were Public Affairs Officer of USIS in Brussels for a while, then you moved over to the United States Mission to NATO.

MORAD: I was fired from my job as PAO in Brussels.

Q: That's a harsh term.

MORAD: Well, that is essentially what happened.

Q: What happened?

MORAD: I wasn't fired from the Agency nor from my career but at the demand of the ambassador to Charlie Wick, who caved in, I lost my job there.

Q: Because the ambassador wanted one of his friends there?

MORAD: No. The curious thing about it was that the reason for my dismissal was never explained to me. To this day, no one has ever told me. Not the ambassador and not the people on the Washington side who were involved, namely, Jock Shirley, Len Baldyga, who was the new Area Director nor Barry Fulton, who was the Director of Foreign Service Personnel. Neither did I receive an explanation from Charlie Wick, whom I saw frequently during my tour in Paris.

Q: They never told you why?

MORAD: The person I dealt with primarily about the matter was then Counselor Jock Shirley who called me from Washington one day and said, "I've got good news and bad news. The bad news is that you are losing your job in Brussels. The good news is that you are going to be Deputy PAO in Paris."

Q: How does that make you I.O. in the United States mission?

MORAD: What happened was notice of my dismissal came in January of 1983 but the ambassador agreed to let me stay on until the summer so my daughter could complete the school year. So I stayed and worked for him for six months despite the difficulty of knowing that I was working for somebody who had me fired. John Gardner, who was the Deputy PAO in Paris, was
supposed to transfer that summer, but he received an extension. The post was in temporary quarters; the Talleyrand Building in Paris, our headquarters was being renovated, and the post was in a disheveled state. So he extended for a year to deal with that situation as the Deputy PAO and Executive Officer. The question of what to do with me during that year arose. The Agency already made the commitment to give me Paris, which was very important to me because Paris is where I always wanted to be--as do many people, often to their own disadvantage, but not to mine. The Paris assignment softened the blow of losing my job in Brussels, but then it looked as though it wasn't going to work out. Jock said: "Come back to Washington for a year and then you can go to Paris." I said: "There is no way I am going to take my family back to Washington for a year and then go to Paris. Either I stay here or I go back to Washington to stay for a full assignment while I decide what I'll do as far as my career is concerned." Coincidentally, Steve Strain, the Information Officer at NATO, was two years into a three year assignment there; he had one more year to go. He hated the assignment, the job, and Brussels. He was an Eastern Europeanist and wanted to go back to Eastern Europe. He kept negotiating with Washington but couldn't seem to find anything. Well, I had learned through the grapevine that the Assistant PAO position in Sophia, Bulgaria was opening up unexpectedly, but it was such a lowly position in what seemed to be the worst country in Eastern Europe, that I didn't think he would be interested in it. I talked to Steve about the opening and said: "Look, I can do you a favor. I can get you an Eastern European assignment and you can do me a favor by accepting it, which will allow me to replace you here for a year." This was all of my own making and...

JOHN M. EVANS
U.S. Mission to NATO
Brussels (1983-1986)

Ambassador Evans was born and raised in Virginia and educated at Yale University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1971 and became a specialist in Soviet and Eastern European Affairs. His foreign posts were Tehran, Prague, Moscow, Brussels, St. Petersburg, Chisinau (Moldova) and Yerevan, Armenia, where he served as Ambassador from 2004 to 2006. In his assignments at the State Department in Washington, the Ambassador dealt primarily with Russian and former Soviet states’ affairs. Ambassador Evans was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

Q: All right. Today is the 17th of November, 2009, with John Evans. And John, you have left Moscow and you're going to where, NATO?

EVANS: The U.S. Mission to NATO.

Q: NATO. That's in Brussels.

EVANS: In Brussels.

Q: What year was that?
EVANS: That was the summer of 1983.

Q: Okay.

EVANS: U.S.-Soviet relations were in a very bad way at that point, from a combination of factors. The big political shift that had occurred in the previous elections here which brought in Ronald Reagan and a lot of very conservative thinkers, Cap Weinberger of the Defense Department and so on. And then there had been the troubles in Poland.

Q: Had martial law been declared at that point?

EVANS: Yes, it had been. And there was the invasion by the Soviets of Afghanistan.

Q: Yes, in ’79.

EVANS: Right. So all of these things and a few more were adding up to very bad state of relations.

Q: Well let’s just take sort of an overall look of when you arrived there; I mean, you were looking at the other side of the moon, having been in Moscow. But how did we view “the Soviet menace”? I mean, did we feel that this was something that, I mean, they launched out in Afghanistan and things were perking up in Africa and all. I mean, how did we view it at that time?

EVANS: Well, our view was getting worse and worse. That is, our sense of what the Soviets were up to was getting more and more dire and I arrived just before… I arrived at NATO just before the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner, which must have been in September ’83.

Q: It was over the Kamchatka Peninsula.

EVANS: Exactly. And that, of course, was an atrocious thing to have happen; 260-some people perished in that. Now, that was during the Andropov years. Well, it was a very short time that Andropov was in power but he was the former chief of the KGB and Washington’s view of what Moscow was capable of and intent upon was very, very negative. And it was reciprocated by a view in Moscow of the United States as having ill intentions towards the Soviet Union. The détente of the previous decade was completely dead at this point. Carter had shelved the SALT agreement; we were not talking to the Russians at that point about strategic arms and the Soviets had walked out of the arms talks, I think it was in December of that year probably.

Q: Had they introduced the SS-20 at that time?

EVANS: That was one of the issues. Yes they had, and we were responding -- we had reached a decision at NATO in 1979 to place ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershings in Europe but also to keep the way open to negotiating. And we went ahead with the implementation of that missile decision in the first six months that I was at NATO.
Q: Well, when you arrived there what was your job?

EVANS: Well, I had to take a compromise. I’d just been promoted in Moscow for my work there but I wanted very much to be at NATO and for my first year I took the job as executive officer, which was really a kind of glorified staff position.

Q: Yes.

EVANS: It meant moving all the telegrams and making sure they made sense and that…

Q: It’s like being the head of the secretariat-

EVANS: That’s right. And so for a year I did that with the payoff that for the next two years I was in the political section of the mission.

Q: Well in the first place you were just hot out of Moscow; were you finding your colleagues in NATO, and I say NATO as a- what the hell’s going on out there?

EVANS: I considered myself very lucky at that time because I was just coming from Moscow; I knew the players, I knew what the thinking was in the Western group of diplomats in Moscow and so I was looked to at the U.S. mission as the authority on what was going on, even when I was XO and participated in staff meetings I was often asked what I made of certain recent developments and I was asked to write memos for the ambassador and so on.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

EVANS: When I first arrived it was Tap Bennett -- right at the end of Tap Bennett’s tenure -- he was followed in very short succession by David Abshire and Steve Ledogar was the DCM.

Q: Well what were you, you know, did you sort of keep... this was before the era of emails and all but were you able to keep up with your Moscow connections or-?

EVANS: Absolutely. Embassy Moscow was, and still is for that matter, a very productive shop and every day, by the time we opened in Brussels, there was already a take from Moscow, which kept us fully informed, and for that matter there were fairly frequent occasions when people from Moscow came through Brussels on their way to Washington or London or wherever and we followed things through their eyes as well.

Q: Well was there a feeling, well, actual, were we cranking up our defenses; were we putting more tanks in the Fulda Gap? What were we doing?

EVANS: The main thing we were doing of course was implementing this decision from 1979 to put the Pershings and the ground-launched missiles in Europe, Germany being the main host country for the Pershing missiles. But we were also leaning on the other allies to increase their defense spending, aiming for four percent of their budgets. And there were some very serious
exercises that NATO ran at that time which even contemplated…they went right up to the nuclear threshold and there was a lot of talk about what would happen if we really did end up at war with the Soviet Union.

Q: Well was there the thought that NATO as a military force could actually stop the Soviets without going nuclear?

EVANS: You know, the conventional imbalance in Europe was always in favor of the heavy armored divisions that the Soviets maintained mainly in what was then East Germany. And we had never ruled out the possibility of first use; we did have tactical weapons in place and I think there was a general understanding that without the nuclear card to play Western Europe was not defensible.

Q: What was your impression, let’s talk about, I mean, you were sort of- you’d been in it all the time so you were coming to a new organization; what was your impression of say, let’s take the Germans first, the German staff, the German military.

EVANS: Of course I dealt mainly with the diplomatic side, rather than the military side. Each of the NATO delegations has, of course, both civilian and military components. My main point of contact with the other delegations was through the NATO political committee, which some dismissed as a talking shop but it actually did do some very useful work in terms of analyzing trends, looking at policies and coordinating the thinking of people from the various NATO capitals.

Q: Well, I mean, as point of fact, one has to only look at the question of the era was what about these response to the SS-20s? And that essentially was a political diplomatic matter.

EVANS: That’s right, that’s right.

Q: To get it right with the people in the various countries.

EVANS: That’s right. The other thing that was very much a front burner issue at that time, of course, was President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, and I remember one of the things that I was called upon to do in those years was to go out to various European destinations and talk about the Strategic Defense Initiative. One of the most memorable of those meetings was one called by the French but since the French were skeptical about SDI they actually had it take place in Monaco, so it wasn’t really under French sovereignty although we all knew that it was a French operation or conference, and I actually did that talk in French, although I fear that my audience was not too impressed with my level of French, which was definitely “schoolboy.”

Q: Well how did you feel, what was sort of your attitude towards the SDI which was also known as “Star Wars?” That was, you know, that we could come up with missiles to stop incoming missiles that would completely knock out the missile element in any war.

EVANS: I have to confess that I had a certain skepticism about whether this was going to be practical in the short run but at the time I think most of us felt that at least developing the
program was a reasonable thing to do under the circumstances. There would be spinoffs, we would learn a lot, as we had from the program to go to the moon, and there were all kinds of different options being bandied about about how you could combine technologies in different ways and whether you used it for stopping short range or long range and so on, so there was quite a literature, a growing literature and debate about this. And so despite a certain amount of skepticism about it I was following it very carefully and it was no difficulty for me in doing what I had to do.

Q: Well also too, it scared the hell out of the Soviets, didn’t it, because, you know, they- although we were expressing skepticism, I mean, we had done- we had gone to the moon, we’d done a lot of stuff and the idea that oh, they can’t ever do that, I don’t think was part of the Soviet thought process.

EVANS: Well, the Soviets had for a long time been thinking about missile defense. They had, after all, the only ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system in existence around the city of Moscow. We had decided not to put one around Washington, although we had something out in the missile fields in the West. But they were seriously concerned about it. First of all, their military establishment was eating up a huge proportion of their national wealth; estimates of what went into their military establishment ranged as high as 40 percent of GNP (gross national product) and so they were very concerned about this new pressure on their own defense effort that SDI represented.

Q: Well let’s talk about sort of the diplomatic side of things. How would you- let’s box the compass; how about the Germans? What was your impression of the Germans in NATO?

EVANS: The Germans were very ably led at that time by a fine ambassador who went on to be the head of their Bundesnachrichtendienst, the equivalent of the CIA, and they were strong right down the line; they were a very good delegation.

Q: What about the British?

EVANS: The British likewise were superb and I ought to mention that at that time Lord Peter Carrington was the secretary general of NATO and his immediate assistant was Brian Fall, who later came here as ambassador to Washington. They were very good.

Q: The troublesome people, the French.

EVANS: Absolument.

Q: How did that work out?

EVANS: Well the French indeed were at their most troublesome during those years. It was always a prickly relationship, particularly between ourselves and the French. But oddly enough, on the military side, particularly the navies got along perfectly well. The military people understood each other and, for example, French and American vessels, naval vessels, exercised in the Atlantic without even…they knew exactly what they had to do and there were no problems
whatsoever.

*Q:* Well did- The Dutch and the Belgians; they had a problem, particularly with the missile defense.

EVANS: That’s true. The missile deployments were not popular in either Belgium or the Netherlands or for that matter in Germany, and there were some massive demonstrations that happened. But of course it was judged a major success when the first of the Pershings arrived and were in place. That would have been, I think, about December of 1983.

*Q:* Well did the Italians play much of a role? They were not really on the- what would appear to be the major front.

EVANS: The Italians, I think, always suffered from the feeling that they were not in the Big Four, and they were very jealous of the French for that reason. But they did certainly contribute, and one of their diplomats went on to be deputy secretary general. So they did plan an important role and of course you mentioned Naples and that dimension of Italian participation was very important.

*Q:* Portugal was, by this time, was in good order, wasn’t it? It had been, in the mid ’70s it had had its revolution and flirting with extreme socialism and then...

EVANS: And the Spanish had just been brought in. I mean, Portugal had been in for longer and of course the main consideration had been the Azores. The United States had wanted Portugal in NATO because of the Azores. But Spain was a different question. Spain did enter NATO, it must have been in the late ’70s after the king was restored and brought about a democratic transformation.

*Q:* Did the introduction of the SS-20s and the reaction to it in a way reinvigorate NATO, would you say? I mean, it would seem that here was a purpose which NATO really had kind of drifted away from.

EVANS: I think it was a combination of factors. The growing apparent threat from the Soviet Union with the invasion of Afghanistan and the other things that happened went hand in hand with the determination of NATO to deter -- by deploying what was deemed necessary -- to deter the SS-20s. And I think the major emotion, once we succeeded in bringing off that decision, in implementing that decision, was one of great relief. Because it had been a tough fight with the public opposition to it in so many European capitals, when we actually did it, it was seen as a victory.

*Q:* Well in many ways this is really, looking at it, it’s almost the last hurrah of the Soviets, wasn’t it, as far as really constituting a threat to anybody?

EVANS: The Soviet Union was in the midst of a generational shift, which turned out to be a very significant one. Gorbachev was in his 50s; the average age of the Politburo member in the early 1980s was something in the 70s. Now, Andropov, who succeeded the long-serving Brezhnev,
had wanted to jump directly to Gorbachev but with the old ways very much still in force it was a kind of a “seniority rules” kind of system so they went to Chernenko. But significantly one of the old guard, one of the longest serving Politburo members, was Gromyko, and it was Gromyko who eventually, after Chernenko died, put Gorbachev’s name in nomination to be the next general secretary, and that brought about the big change, the generational shift in the Soviet leadership.

Q: Were you in NATO when Gorbachev became-?

EVANS: Yes, I was. Chernenko was sick from the start-

Q: I mean, he could hardly breathe.

EVANS: He could hardly breathe; there were several times he lost his breath as he was giving a speech and had to start over. And it was obvious to everybody. I remember writing a memo for Ambassador Abshire when Chernenko was clearly… I think we had heard that he had died, in fact, and the question was who would succeed him. And one of the old guard was still contending to be next.

Q: Suslov?

EVANS: Well, Suslov was there and Suslov had been very active on the Polish issue. But it was Viktor Grishin who had come out of the Moscow Party apparat; we in the Moscow embassy called this the “Grishin formula,” thinking that Grishin might indeed be the next one to succeed, but it was Gromyko, as we now know, Gromyko put Gorbachev in nomination and we learned that it was Gorbachev when he was named to head the funeral committee.

Q: Were we seeing, from your optic in NATO, were we seeing Gromyko as being a real change in the situation or just a more efficient cast to the Soviet machine?

EVANS: You probably meant to say Gorbachev.

Q: I meant Gorbachev, excuse me.

EVANS: Yes. You know, at first we didn’t know what to think of Gorbachev and one of the great things about being at NATO and being a Soviet specialist of sorts was the demand for discussion and theorizing and it was a wonderful place to be in those years. There were so many meetings of the political committee and various other briefings that we gave and participated in. People didn’t know at first about Gorbachev and it was really when Gorbachev went to the UK and met with Margaret Thatcher; it was his first major… I think he was not yet general secretary but he went to the UK, took his wife Raisa, which was so unusual for a Soviet leader to do, and they went out to Chequers with the Thatchers, with Margaret and Denis Thatcher, and afterwards she said “this is a man we can deal with.” And then the British shared with us their assessments and eventually this all worked up to the first summit that Reagan and Gorbachev had.

Q: In Geneva.
Q: Well you mentioned the discussion that’s going on, something that’s always struck me as I’ve been doing these oral histories and sort of monitor some of the things that are coming out of the academic world is almost the chasm between the academics who are dealing with the subject like the Soviets and the practitioners like yourselves. I mean, was there much sort of academic participation, somebody coming around saying did you hear what Professor So-and-So thought about this or-?

EVANS: We were all absolutely attuned to what was being said by experienced academic experts but the real cleavage, I would submit, was within the Reagan Administration, where you had on the one side Caspar Weinberger and one of his assistant secretaries was Richard Perle. On the other side you had George Shultz, who was just as horrified as anyone else when the Korean airliner was shot down but who still believed that we needed to deal with the Soviets, we needed to have arms control talks, but there was a huge fight within the administration between the hawks and the, I wouldn’t even call them doves, but the hawks and the moderates, you might say. This was the period when, for example, Ambassador Nitze, once the arms talks got going again, Ambassador Nitze had his famous walk in the woods with Kvitsinsky to try to fashion an arms control agreement and what they came up with in that walk in the woods was too…was unacceptable in both capitals, as it turned out. It was killed by the hawks in Washington and there were hawks in Moscow as well. And so they, in a sense, the hawks in the two capitals really fed each other.

Q: Well in a way- You mentioned the shoot down of the Korean airline but you were in a military atmosphere and if there’s anything one knows when you’re dealing with the military it is that things really can screw up. And it seemed to me like this was, you know, a screw up; it was not a calculated decision up and down. But how did you all feel?

EVANS: Well, at the time we didn’t know everything that we know now. The Soviets had said that they thought the…First of all, right after it happened they said nothing and they denied…they were in a terrible state of denial and putting out half-truths and so on which just deepened our suspicions of what had gone on. There was a famous…We overheard, apparently, from one of our outposts, we overheard the pilots talking, and one of the most quoted lines was, “the target has been destroyed,” and that seemed like a terribly crude way to characterize the shoot-down of a 747 which, as we all know, has that very characteristic dome and should have been recognized by almost anybody as a civilian airliner. It’s a huge thing; I mean, it’s not…it doesn’t look like any military aircraft. But as we now know there had been some very aggressive maneuvers that we had carried out in that part of the Northwest Pacific, testing Soviet defenses, and some of the Soviet military men who were charged with intercepting anything that came over their border had been severely dressed down earlier that year, 1983, and were fearful of being accused of laxness, of laxity, I guess is the word, in defending the Soviet border. It was dark, it was foggy, and there was another…apparently we did have a military reconnaissance aircraft in that area at roughly the same time and it’s conceivable that the Soviet radar, which were trying to track the military craft, then latched on to the civilian one. We don’t know exactly, even today, exactly what happened, but it does seem to me that it was not an act of cold-blooded murder as we were
portraying it at the time.

Now, at that Geneva Summit that took place a year or so later the two sides did agree on some better rules for air transport over the Pacific routes to prevent that kind of thing from ever happening again.

Q: And of course the Korean airliner was on the wrong course, too.

EVANS: The Korean airliner was way off course, was to the north of where it should have been.

Q: Yes.

EVANS: You know, George Shultz I think was very wise, and I would never characterize him simply as a dove, but he used to say “U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union needs to be able to take account of both the best and the worst of Soviet behavior.” And I think Shultz and Reagan, actually, better understood Gorbachev than Caspar Weinberger did. Weinberger perhaps was getting advised by Richard Perle and some very hard-line types who actually thought...And then there was Casey, who was in charge of the CIA, and it seems to me that they were trying to argue that Gorbachev was a fake, despite his preference for nice suits and a presentable wife and those sorts of things that this was all for show and that in fact he was just trying to strengthen the Soviet positions.

Q: How stood the Scandinavians in NATO at the time?

EVANS: Well of course the Danes and the Norwegians were members of the Alliance; there had been a period of time during which the Danes were known for taking footnotes to virtually all NATO documents.

Q: A footnote being?

EVANS: Being an objection to, or a distancing from, some element in a report. But the Danes came more and more -- it depended a lot on their internal politics -- but they came more and more aboard. The Norwegians were always staunch members of NATO and one of my best contacts was Kai Eide, who these days is in Afghanistan as the UN representative there. The Swedes, of course, were neutral. They were not there at NATO and the Finns were completely neutral in name but in sentiment they were quite, shall we say, they knew what was what with the Russians and had there been -- had the flag gone up -- there was no doubt about where the Finns would have stood.

Q: What about the Swedes? I mean, were the Soviets playing games with their submarines during this time, both in Finland- I mean both in Sweden and Norway?

EVANS: There was a famous incident called “Whiskey on the Rocks,” in which a Whiskey class, that was our designation, of course, a Whiskey class submarine was basically found on a reef right outside Stockholm, if I’m not mistaken. It was very close; it was definitely in Swedish territorial waters. That must have happened in the very early ‘80s when I was in Moscow
because I remember it as an issue and again, the Soviets’ inability to confess to anything undermined their credibility and undermined any status they may have enjoyed as a believable partner.

Q: Did you see a change by- when you left in ’86?

EVANS: Yes. The worst time was right around ’83 when negotiations broke down and we placed the Pershing missiles and it was in the wake of the Korean airliner and so on and Afghanistan was raging. This was a terrible, terrible time. But after the first summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, and I should also say Shultz made a special trip at one point to Moscow to set up the summit and got the dialogue going again, and in particular the arms control talks resumed in Geneva and we got regular reports from the negotiators in Geneva who would come to NATO to brief the permanent council there and there was a committee of people from the Senate, senators, who were very close to the negotiators and they would also come traipsing through Brussels. But the sense that there was a negotiating track, that people were working on trying to solve the various security problems, that sense was recovered with that first Reagan and Gorbachev summit.

Q: Was there any sense by ’86 and all that you might say. I don’t know, depending on your point of view the poison or the good or whatever it is, of the Basket Three of the Helsinki Accords in right of dissidents’ ability for the media to attend meetings and you know, I mean, in other words these sort of human rights things; was this- did we feel that this was having any effect on the satellite nations?

EVANS: Yes, I think we did. The most notable case, of course, was Poland. Now Poland was under martial law for most of those years of the ‘80s but there was a culmination of factors again; there was also a kind of an economic slowdown going down in Eastern Europe which was having its effect. There were more and more reports of things going wrong in the whole Soviet domain as Gorbachev tried to loosen things up.

Now, one imagines that Gorbachev was trying to save the system by reforming it. He certainly was pursuing Soviet interests as he saw them but it was seen as a general sort of breaking down of the old Stalinist monolithic political system.

MILDRED A. PATTERSON
Consular Officer
Brussels (1983-1986)

Ms. Patterson was born and raised in Kansas City, Missouri. She graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and entered the Foreign Service in 1976. Her postings abroad included Copenhagen, Brussels and Ankara. Ms. Patterson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

PATTERSON: Marc and I dated several years and we were married in May of 1982. He was the
Jordan desk officer in 1981 to 1983 while I was the Hungarian desk officer. Then we were both looking for an onward assignment together and Bob Blackwill, who was then one of the deputy assistant secretaries in EUR, helped us get two assignments in Brussels. I became the chief of the consular section at the bilateral mission in Brussels. Marc went first to the political section at the U.S. Mission to NATO.

Q: This is still in the relatively early days of the tandem couple, wasn’t it?

PATTERSON: I think at that point tandem couples made up about 10% of the Foreign Service.

Q: So, it was a significant number?

PATTERSON: It was becoming more, yes.

Q: Just to sort of a social note, it has to be a certain amount of calculation on both your parts on how this thing is going to work.

PATTERSON: Well, the personnel assignments people were saying that one or the other of us had to have the lead. That is to say, we had to specify whose assignment was more important than the other’s. I don’t remember in that case which one of us we designated, but anyway, we ended up with two very good assignments in Brussels and we arrived in Brussels in August of 1983. I should add here that the alternative assignment offered was Kinshasa, and that was actually where we thought we were going for quite a while, but then the AF Bureau and the Ambassador in Kinshasa decided that there was another tandem couple they preferred to send. The wife in that case was a Foreign Service nurse and AF concluded that Embassy Kinshasa needed a nurse and her economic officer spouse more than they needed a consular officer and her political officer spouse.

Q: So, you were in Brussels from ’83 until when?

PATTERSON: ‘86.

Q: ‘86. In the first place, you were where, I mean Brussels has so many missions. What was your?

PATTERSON: I was at the embassy, the bilateral embassy.

Q: This is the embassy to the Belgians.

PATTERSON: Right.

Q: What was the situation in Belgium at that time although you weren’t dealing with political affairs, you were part of the team and all that.

PATTERSON: Well, the political situation was pretty boring. Their system allows for many, many small parties and so as I recall there were five or six French speaking parties, and five or
six Dutch speaking parties. The relations between the two language groups and the various political parties were uneasy. French is the language of Brussels. I remember that for the Ambassador, the DCM, and the political counselor it was often frustrating, because dealing with the government, which worked very cautiously within the context of so many parties, was difficult. This was still when we had a consulate in Antwerp, which closed in 1987 or so. We were still represented in Antwerp at the time and the officers there covered the Dutch-speaking parties based there.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

PATTERSON: When I arrived the Ambassador was Charles Price, a political appointee from Kansas City, which is where I’m from. My parents and the Prices knew each other. My mother and Ambassador Price attended the same elementary school. The DCM was Charles Thomas. Soon after I got to Brussels, President Reagan named Ambassador Price to the Court of St. James. At Ambassador Price’s request, the Department’s Office of Protocol gave permission for me to swear him in as Ambassador to the UK, and he and Mrs. Price moved on to London. They were succeed by Geoffrey Swaebe, who was also a political appointee, and the former head of the May Department stores in California. He and his wife, Mary, came from Geneva where he had been the U.S. Representative to the UN.

Q: How did these two ambassadors operate from your perspective?

PATTERSON: I enjoyed working for them both. Charlie Price had tremendous confidence in Charlie Thomas and really had learned to seek Charlie Thomas’ views on things before he, Charlie Price, would make a decision. At country team meetings, Charlie Price would turn to Charlie Thomas and say, “what do you think?” It was a wonderful example of how the Foreign Service can support a political appointee ambassador. The ambassador was always in charge, there was no question of that, but it was really a terrific partnership and it made it easier for the rest of us on the country team to pursue the mission’s goals because the two men made them so clear. The same was true for Ambassador Swaebe and I enjoyed working for him, too. I liked working for businessmen. They tend to be active, they don’t like to be passive. They were interested in getting things done. They were always glad to have me report if there was something that I needed to report on, but otherwise they had confidence in me and let me run my little section. Actually, my first year, Charlie Thomas, who was a wonderful guy, but a very taciturn man, gave me no inkling of what to expect in my evaluation report. He never had an EER counseling session with me. I had absolutely no idea what words were going to go down on that EER. For all I knew he thought I had done a terrible job. As it turned out, I got a very nice report from him, but it was a complete surprise. I had no idea what to expect, but I certainly liked the independence I had to run my section.

Q: What was consular work like there?

PATTERSON: We had the gamut of problems. It was a lot of fun. I had an excellent staff. I’d say we interviewed, oh a third, we did about 30,000 visas a year so we interviewed maybe a third of them, mostly non-Belgians. We saw quite a number of Iranians, because this was still in the wake of our closing and shutting down relations with the Iranians and therefore there were
Iranians trying to get to any country where they could apply for a visa. We had a lot of Iranian applicants, a fair number of Haitians, because so many Haitians studied in Belgium, and a fair number of Africans because of Belgium’s relationships with various countries in Africa, particularly Zaire. We had the gamut of visa problems, visa issues.

We certainly saw a range of crazy Americans who would get on an airplane in New York with not a penny to their name and sometimes barely a stitch on them, arrive in Brussels and show up at our gates destitute and frequently unstable. We had destitute backpackers as well, whose cases were easily solved with calls home for money. We had a fair number of prisoners, one of whom to this day would do me in. Most were in for drugs or kind of petty offenses, theft. The one who I think is forever my mortal enemy was picked up because he had committed murder in the United States and had escaped from prison in Massachusetts and had fled to Morocco. He had doctored his passport so that it looked like it had been extended for a longer period than it had. He made the mistake of coming into our consular section to try and get a new passport. We found a lookout on him and we immediately called Washington to find out if the lookout was still valid. This was towards the end of our afternoon. The Consular Affairs Bureau told us to stall for time by saying the computers were down while they checked with the Justice Department and the State of Massachusetts to see if he was still wanted, which he was. The man came back unsuspecting the next day and two Belgian policemen arrested him up. Then of course, having gotten him arrested, I had to go and visit him in jail. We had the gamut also of American citizens services cases. We had a grandmother who abducted her twin grandchildren. Both the Foreign Service National who was the passport assistant and I remember that case to this day, because we still can’t believe how that grandmother hoodwinked us. She made it sound like it was perfectly reasonable that she had the two girls in her care. She was taking them to Israel to see their parents, which proved to be a complete lie, and we were completely taken in by her. It’s amazing how the one case that you handle badly stays with you instead of the hundreds of cases that you handle well. All in all, it was a busy three years.

Q: Tell me, you got these Iranians, I mean, the revolution is on and Iran is not a place to go back to. Iranians asking for visas to visit the United States, there’s a huge chance that they’re not going to come back. How did you deal with that?

PATTERSON: I was a liberal visa issuer, to my vice consul’s chagrin. He was tougher. I gave them the benefit of the doubt, especially if I thought that they would be good students in the United States. There was one boy whom I’ll never forget. He was 12, had been educated throughout his elementary school years at the Tehran American School, and spoke English like any American kid, including with an American accent. He was Jewish, a fact that he volunteered as we began the interview. He had an extremely engaging personality for one so young and his interest in studying seemed very genuine. I figured he was going to be a great American citizen and I gave him a visa.

Q: Well, we did have a policy that we were granting Iranians of Jewish extraction more leeway because the idea being that they would be in trouble in Iran.

PATTERSON: Right. Those guidelines were helpful, but there were plenty of Iranian visa applicants who did not necessarily match the human rights profiles to whom I issued visas who
probably still live in California. They were students who were horrified at what was happening in their country.

**Q:** As an old consular officer, how at this point were you dealing with Americans who were just to show up, I mean how did you get them back?

**PATTERSON:** Well, we were lucky because there was a direct flight on TWA between Brussels and New York, which at least made it easier to send them back to the U.S. Sometimes we were able to get money from families. More often than not the cases we saw were deadbeats whose families had long given up on them and weren’t interested any longer. We did have a couple of American organizations who would contribute funds and help us send them back and then sometimes, even though we knew that they would never repay it, we’d have to get a repatriation loan from the Department to send them back. Some of those Americans were wonders at foiling all of the safeguards put in place to prevent repatriated Americans from getting a new passport until they had repaid the debt, and it was amazing how fast they would be back on our doorstep. The repatriation loan system is so helpful, though. There truly are times when a consular officer just has to get a derelict American out of the country or his or her presence becomes an issue with the host country.

**Q:** I know. What about people who were mentally disturbed, had the sort of the regulations you had to observe all of the, I’m showing my prejudices, but the niceties of taking care of because in my day you’d get a doctor maybe give a nice shot and get somebody to go back with them and then when they woke up they’d find they were in New York airport.

**PATTERSON:** We couldn’t do that, no, we had to have them voluntarily walk into a doctor’s office, but we did not discourage offers from the Belgian authorities to pick them up. The Belgians would then deport them.

**Q:** How about the Belgians themselves? There really wasn’t much immigration from Belgium was there?

**PATTERSON:** Very little. We did the equivalent of one immigrant visa a day. We did about 300 immigrant visas a year and they were by and large Vietnamese joining families in the United States. There would be a couple of Belgian investors every year, the dreaded “E” visa cases. As a consular officer, if you didn’t see an investor visa or treaty trader case very often, it was hard to adjudicate them and it generally required seeking guidance from Washington.

**Q:** Quickly run to that book and say, just a minute, you go in the back office and figure out what to do.

**PATTERSON:** That’s right. Depending on the nature of the case I would sometimes call Paris or London, because both of those Embassies did many “E” visa cases. On Iranian visas I would call Germany. Bill Ryerson was the Consul General in Bonn and his consular section had developed a useful second form that would help when adjudicating an Iranian visa. So, I would call around to my colleagues. At the same time, the consular section staffs in Luxembourg and Amsterdam would often call us for help.
Q: Did you also serve as the consular officer for the other missions in Brussels?

PATTERSON: Yes.

Q: Well, I was wondering about military visas and things like that.

PATTERSON: Well, we did a lot of NATO visas.

Q: Yes, I was going to say.

PATTERSON: Yes. Brussels is probably the only mission in the world that issues NATO visas in any significant number. Yes, we were the one place that people had to come if they needed a consular service of some kind.

Q: Was this a fairly calm time? I guess it usually is calm, but in Belgium in this period, were there any big incidents or anything like that?

PATTERSON: Belgium had some odd terrorist incidents, explosions, hold-ups, people escaping from prison, and city halls being broken into and blank Belgian passports stolen. The Belgian passport system was decentralized and the blank books would sit in some drawer in some little prefecture and so many were stolen it seemed like the Belgians never even locked those drawers. There was always concern that Belgian passports could be used by bad guys to get into the United States.

Q: Was terrorism a word that you were concerned with in those days?

PATTERSON: A little bit yes because of the anarchist groups blowing up supermarkets and other places.

JACK SEYMOUR
Political Counselor; US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1983-1987)

Mr. Seymour was born in the Philippines, the son of a U.S Navy family. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Dartmouth University in 1962. He joined the Foreign Service in 1967 after serving in the U.S Army for three years. His career included postings in Canada, Yugoslavia, Poland, Germany, and Belgium. Mr. Seymour was interviewed by Raymond Ewing on November 20th 2003.

Q: Okay. And then in 1983, you went to Brussels?

SEYMOUR: Yes to serve at the U.S. Mission to the European Communities, as it was known then. I was drawn there partly because George Vest was the ambassador. Also, I had formed
early on the notion that, being a Europeanist, I should either know about military matters or economic matters and therefore serve either at NATO or the EU mission. I first took notice of the EU while in Warsaw where I saw the way the EU member-state embassies interacted very closely. Ambassador Davies would grumble that they had already discussed together the questions on the agenda of the NATO ambassadors’ monthly meetings, which made discussions in that forum anti-climactic. I also got to know the German DCM, who had served in their permanent representation in Brussels and spoke a lot about the EU and its structure and procedures. That gave me the feeling the EU was both complicated and likely to become increasingly important in Europe, and hence to US policy, and I should learn about it. So when an opening in Brussels came up, actually in an off-cycle, I went for it.

Q: What was the position?

SEYMOUR: It was political counselor, which seems an anomaly in a way, like being an econ counselor at NATO. Ken Yalowitz was that and he actually had a lot to do there, as I did at USEC, following the political aspects of the European communities in their many forms. This meant keeping up with the politics of the Commission, the politics of the member-states and their interaction in a political sense, and also the activities of the European Parliament, which met in Strasbourg but had offices in Brussels. The Econ section followed economics and finance and trade and so on, and our large agricultural section followed farm policies, which were also a big issue, because of EU tariffs and import regulations and the EU Common Agricultural Policy and its effects on US interests in global trade.

In the political section we had an officer who covered each Community Council meeting, whether they were in Brussels or not. They usually had some meetings in Luxembourg, some in Brussels, and some in the presidency capital. There were General Council meetings of the foreign ministers and individual specialized council meetings—finance, agriculture, fisheries, transport, and so on—in which the ministers responsible would gather. About three times a year they held European Council meetings, the gatherings of heads of state and government that put the final stamp on many key decisions. This was all within the “Community” framework.

In parallel, they had a ‘political cooperation’ process that, at the time, worked informally outside the Community framework but had already become quite structured, with a hierarchy of decision making similar to the Community process from the lower-level meetings of political representatives, to political directors in capitals and up to the foreign ministers who met informally in “Gymnich” sessions after the castle in Germany where “political cooperation” first began. These meetings often would coordinate politically the policies that would form or implement decisions taken on a Community basis. They were often conducted on the margins of Community meetings with the foreign minister of the presidency simply announcing that they would now put on their political- cooperation hats. With subsequent reforms, this political-cooperation, foreign policy process, was incorporated into the, now, European Union structure, but it began rather informally to meet a perceived need. It was also a source of tension with the Community structure, represented by the European Commission, which was always on guard against encroachment by member states as political entities into the Community process and prerogatives or against their circumvention of that process. It was a power struggle and a birthing struggle.
It was all very confusing to American diplomats in EU member-state capitals, I use the current term, and to this diplomat upon arriving in Brussels. One of the first notions I discarded was that the European Union was something monolithic, because its policymaking was quite disparate at least on any political or economic issue in any way contentious. Still, it would be a mistake to compare it with our more centralized foreign policy because we too have the Pentagon and the State Department with their different viewpoints, not to mention the Congress or even the White House.

Consequently, I sought out a lot of different people in the early days, mostly to learn the ropes but, of course, later many were informative contacts. One, in particular, became a mentor in the sense of explaining the community; he was a very intellectual fellow who was a director-general in the European Council secretariat staff, the Council being the collection of member-state governments, as opposed to the European Commission, the executive arm of the Community. This gentleman was in charge of the budget, sort of like OMB, or rather a congressional budget office, because, as this man explained the Council actually functioned more like a legislature to the Commission’s executive function.

I looked this man up in the directory, because the British budget rebate was a big issue at the time. Prime Minister Thatcher was demanding recalculation of member-state payments to the Community to compensate the UK its excess revenues over payouts which resulted in a net deficit for the UK as opposed to France and others that received a net surplus in Community benefits, say to farmers, compared to their contributions taken from a percentage of value-added taxes and other items taxed to pay into the Community budget. Besides his responsibilities for the budget this official also represented the Council in European Parliament meetings, so he seemed a good person to know, and no one from USEC had been in touch with him as far as I could tell.

In the first meeting, he gave me a little tutorial, and one thing he advised is not to think of the Council of governments as an executive but rather as a legislature with authority to approve or reject what the executive, the Commission proposes. The Parliament, he added has the form of a legislature, being composed of representatives elected from member-states, but it acts more as a consulting body, with binding authority only in approving budgets and nominations for Commission president and commissioners. Beyond that nothing, it could only recommend.

We also had an officer who followed parliamentary activities, because their foreign policy recommendations often dealt with issues of importance to the US. That officer would go to Strasbourg to attend their monthly meetings, which lasted a week. I went several times and had some fascinating discussions with members, including Otto von Habsburg, the crown prince and son of the last Austrian Emperor, who was a very active and visionary member (CSU) from Bavaria. He could not then return to Austria or Hungary, as I recall, although that has since changed. Another was a very interesting younger German CDU member, Hans-Gert Poettering, who is now President of the Parliament.

Also, midway through my four-and-a-half year tour, we instituted a “rover” program with a new permanent slot for an officer to cover more intensively the “political cooperation” meetings. He
would go on assignment to the presidency capital, working out of our embassy there and meeting virtually daily with the three representatives of the past, current, and future EU presidents for political cooperation. This gave him superb continuity, because when the presidency shifted six months later to a new capital, he had already worked six months with the officer in the Foreign Ministry of the country currently in the chair, who would go on to serve with a counterpart in the next presidency foreign ministry who had been part of this “troika” in the previous capital and was already by that time well-known to the rover. And he would have met and worked with the officer from the previous presidency who would go to the next one as part of the troika, and so on.

I believe our rover system continued at least until the political cooperation function was subsumed into the EU after the Maastricht Treaty. We would supplement the rover’s reporting with the EU Commission view obtained through our own contacts in Brussels.

This operation gave us a strong insight and some influence in the EU “political” or, really, foreign-policy process. I believe it was unique among non-EU embassies. It also took a big burden from our embassy in the presidency capital. There was some tension with some of our embassies, mild turf issues, because our rover required support from them and at the same time could be seen as encroaching on their turf. Big embassies seemed more receptive, as I recall, but a small one like Luxembourg would have mixed feelings because, though short-staffed, they often welcomed the excitement of being in the presidency capital and it became a full-time preoccupation during those six months.

But there were no serious problems, because essentially our rover was supporting them. He was detailed to them to strengthen their ability to report was going on with their host country’s presidency, which was their responsibility. Most came quickly to see it that way. This duality, though, did reflect as well that we in USEC, or USEU now, were assigned to the European Communities, not to any one capital. In any case, the officer who was our first “rover,” a polished, personable, and highly capable diplomat, easily handled any such difficulties. He went on to serve as staff assistant on the Seventh Floor, DCM in Paris and recently as an ambassador and chargé for awhile, at USUN.

Q: How much time would that officer spend in Brussels?

SEYMOUR: Not that much, really. Depending on the workload and what was happening, when in the political cooperation process, he might be with us for a couple of weeks and then a month in the other capital, perhaps returning for a few days to coordinate with us and prepare for the next round of meetings. It was not always easy for him, shifting around so much but he managed it well.

Q: I remember seeing in Bonn where you’d just come from a pretty big staff.

SEYMOUR: Yes, but there were only one or two to handle the political cooperation and extra Community business, although some of the latter could be taken up by other sections, depending on their particular responsibilities—Econ, Agricultural. The political cooperation was quite intense, as the EU had numerous committees for the world regions and a number of functional
categories, like the UN, CSCE, in which they coordinated policy through the hierarchy up to the foreign ministers. It was through this process that they would coordinate EU positions on world issues, and we worked hard to get US views into that process and to report decisions emerging from it.

I mentioned earlier that from my time in Bonn one of the first things I began realizing was that in working with the EU or a member-state there was always the question whether we should address the member-states or the community and, if the member-states, whether we were doing so bilaterally or in their capacity as EU members. The answer, of course, was both, but we had to be mindful of the context, and often we had to make the formal approach to the presidency capital, or to the EU Commission in order to get the right address. We worked it on both tracks, but we had to demonstrate that sensitivity to the Community process.

Some presidencies were easy, even announcing that before they got down discussing a topic, they wanted to share what the American views with their colleagues. Some, in particular France at that time, were sensitive to this, grumping that the US had so much influence it was a virtual EU member. Sometimes, we heard that out of sensitivity to such complaints, the presidency chair would use circumlocutions to the effect that he or she had an additional perspective on the issue to put on the table. Others would say “our friends” think thus and so; some would simply lay on the table a copy of the US “non-paper” they had.

There was also the sensitivity of the European Commission, which exerted strong proprietary pressure regarding its responsibility for Community business, for anything covered by the treaties. In the Commission secretariat was an office that dealt with political relations with member-states, which always sent a representative to political cooperation meetings with whom we in Brussels were in contact. So we double-tracked demarches and got their take on the meetings and the decisions that were taken.

During my time in Brussels the Commission President Jacques Delors established an eponymous “commission” to explore ways to integrate the Community and reform other procedures. Its work led to the “Single European Act” that, among other things, took a big step toward merging political cooperation (foreign policy coordination) with Community policy.

Q: Can we stop at that point because I think it's about the time we agreed on and we'll pick that up next time.

SEYMOUR: Okay. Sounds good.

Q: This is an oral history interview with Jack Seymour. It's the 18th of May, 2005. We're resuming this after an interruption of maybe 10 months so we're a little hazy on exactly where we left off but we're going to start with your assignment to the United States Mission to the European Community in Brussels, which I think was from 1983 to 1987. And Jack, why don’t you say what your position was and what some of the main issues were in that four-and-a-half year assignment.

SEYMOUR: I was the political counselor. The main business of the mission certainly at that
time was economics, agriculture, trade, finance and all the sub-issues related to those. But the political section was busy and a rather large. It essentially focused on the institutions and the players, the politics of the EU and its interaction with the member-states. It was fascinating to follow, because the EU was becoming a pretty significant institution and a very significant experiment in supranationalism and harmonization of policies among many states. It is constantly evolving and having to adapt and develop new policies and procedures to deal with new situations, especially with its recurring expansions, and as its influence expands accordingly.

I’m amazed at the change in the EU today from two decades ago when I served in Brussels. For one thing the distance between the EU as an entity and the member-states has narrowed considerably. At that time, as I mentioned, the “political cooperation” or foreign policy process was quite separate from Community business, and for the Community to get into defense policy was a big no-no. The closest link I’m aware of at that time was a customary breakfast meeting once a month between the Commission President and the NATO Secretary General to informally compare notes. The concern, of course, was that the Community would encroach on and undermine NATO. We certainly held that view as did a few member-states, notably the British. The French, I believe, were surreptitiously pushing for it but they also had reservations.

To illustrate the distinction between the European Commission as the Community executive and the member-states, I recall a conversation with a Commission secretariat official soon after Prime Minister Thatcher had visited Hungary and, among other things, promised the Hungarians that she could get a better deal for them in terms of Community quotas that had long existed on their wines, ceramics, and other things. They were, of course, not yet a member of the European Union. When I mentioned Thatcher’s promises, this Commission official stopped me short and said Prime Minister Thatcher has no business talking about trade with the Hungarians, that’s a Community matter and she is out of line.

In another instance, though, an Israeli embassy officer filling me in on recent EU-Israeli talks about renewal of their financial protocol made the point that the discussions with the Commission were the crucial point of negotiating because the Commission would formulate a mandate to propose to the Council, the member-states, and when the Council approved this mandate for “negotiations,” the negotiations for all practical purposes had ended. So these preliminary talks with the Commission were in his view crucially important as the opportunity for Israel to get its views incorporated into the process and final document. For as he said, “negotiations would end when the Council approved the ‘mandate,’” and with that, Israel’s real influence over the outcome.

In addition, I remember my first fall in Bonn carrying out there the usual round of démarches to host countries regarding US positions on various issues for the upcoming UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). We had a long list of talking points from the Department to convey to the Germans in a cable that had gone to all posts for similar purpose. I met with the fellow in charge of UN affairs at the foreign office, and he was very gracious and very happy to hear what we had to say, but he did remind me at the outset and also at the end of our discussion that this was all unofficial and informal because our formal démarche had to be delivered to the Community itself, to the presidency country, because UN matters were a subject of Community
policy in keeping with their aim to “harmonize” policy in the intergovernmental political cooperation process that I described earlier. Therefore it wasn’t enough to go to a particular member state or even all member states but we should approach the current presidency capital and foreign office, which, of course, we were doing. To observe the niceties, though, our diplomats there would, or should, specify that they were communicating to that foreign office as the representative of the Community presidency.

Q: Let me kind of pick up that in terms of your assignment as political counselor at the mission to the European Community at that time or communities. If there was such a démarche that the United States wanted to convey views, it would be done by the embassy in the presidency capital rather than by you at the mission to the communities?

SEYMOUR: Yes, yes that’s correct, because this was essentially then still an intergovernmental matter. We would of course inform the Commission secretariat official who followed EU political cooperation, and we often got good feedback from him because of his Commission viewpoint, which was often different. It was not necessarily objective because he was there to protect Community equities, but it often provided a useful perspective.

Q: So you’re main contacts, people that you worked with in Brussels at the mission were the commission, the staff of the communities, and the delegations, part of a council of ministers who were permanently based in Brussels and I guess anybody else that happened to be interested in the European communities in Brussels non-governmental organizations or-

SEYMOUR: Yes, that’s correct. And also the secretariat of the council of ministers. There was also in Brussels a permanent secretariat for the Council, the governments, and those governments had their “permanent representation” as well, in the form of quasi-embassies, usually head by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank, and staffed by representatives, experts, from the relevant ministries, in addition to the foreign ministries, to deal with finance, trade, agriculture, industry, and so forth..

Q: Separate from the Commission?

SEYMOUR: Separate from the commission to manage those Community matters for the governments, the floating councils of ministers, say, agriculture ministers meeting on agriculture issues, or finance ministers on currency and exchange rate issues, or trade ministers on trade. There was then a whole structure that has since expanded even more to include such things as home affairs and other issues.

Q: Environment.

SEYMOUR: Environment and so forth. But then the foreign ministers when they met in general council took up any Community issue and generally kind of put the final stamp on things. And also of course they did foreign policy, or “political cooperation” as it was called then.

Q: Did you travel around the communities or were you pretty much locked into Brussels so to speak?
SEYMOUR: We did travel quite extensively. One of my first own first and more interesting trips was to Athens after the Greeks had recently joined. I think they joined in January 1982 and were to take the rotating presidency, as almost a brand-new member in July of 1983 for six months. That meant our embassy in Athens would be responsible for reporting and also making the demarches on...-

Q: To the presidency.

SEYMOUR: To the presidency. And since it was the first time Greeks had done this, it was also the first time our embassy had done their bit, so we in Brussels thought it would be good to send somebody from our mission to consult with the embassy to prep them and work out how we would coordinate. I spent three or four days in Athens, a very delightful time there, and I think it helped to prep the embassy and establish a working relationship with it for its coming duties.

Other officers in the political section, and elsewhere in the Mission traveled frequently. We sent somebody to all of the European Parliament meetings, which took place mostly in Strasbourg and once a quarter in Luxembourg or in Brussels, because the Parliament was passing resolutions on different issues of interest to the US. Although not binding, their resolutions resulted from considerable study and effort by the responsible committees, and they had a significant public relations or public diplomacy impact, so we had someone there for every monthly session for about a week. We had very capable officers for this, but I went down on occasion and found it quite fascinating. In fact, I met or saw in operation some very interesting European politicians there—Simone Veil and Le Pen of France, for example, and Otto Van Hapsburg, whom I’ve mentioned.

We also had a political-section officer designated to cover the whole series of council of ministers meetings. That meant traveling to those sessions to cover them with the press corps and also through private meetings with the EU diplomats whom he knew from Brussels and other capitals. Those sessions, and there were many of them, too many to cover them all, were in the presidency capital but also once a quarter in Brussels and Luxembourg. Our officer, again a highly capable diplomat, was on the road often. Each presidency concluded with a European Council “summit” meeting as well. As I described with the political cooperation “rover,” this officer sent his reports through our embassy in the respective capital or he returned to Brussels to file, or often telephoned information of critical importance, but he was assigned to USEC rather than being detailed to the embassy, as was the “rover.” His role since we weren’t members was a bit as an onlooker, but he knew a lot of people in the delegations and also the journalists who covered the Community who were always at these meetings and got good information through these contacts.

Q: And that person would work with the relevant embassy, say in Athens if he was in Greece.

SEYMOUR: Yes, that’s right, he would use their facilities. There were sometimes turf questions, but he was so obviously a great boon to them in their reporting that it never became a problem. He was in effect parachuted in for these meetings but he wasn’t there the whole time during the presidency, so they had plenty to handle on there own and there had to be had to be close
These three officers who covered the council of ministers meetings, the political cooperation process, and the European Parliament had some of the best assignments in Europe. Because of their travel and scope of issues and the rotation through the member countries, they could visit and work in six or more countries during a three-year tour in Brussels. And they acquired deep knowledge of the workings of the institutions and also the internal and foreign policy issues of Europe. Their coordination with our embassies helped establish a much smoother, more seamless system of reporting on many issues that were rather important to us in terms of transatlantic cooperation and on specific issues where we were trying to influence EU views on different issues. At the time I was there Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Central America in general were big, the Middle East always was big, as was Eastern Europe at times, and there were many other questions too.

I’d like to make a couple more points about this and perhaps then we should then move on. The first point is to illustrate what the EU means to the member country. For example, when any particular country, say, the Germans had the presidency, the presiding chairs of all the different committees from the council of ministers on down through the bureaucracy to the political directors and office directors below them would be from the German foreign office and the responsible ministries—finance, agriculture, trade, industry, or whatever. They would set the agenda, run the meetings, and see to all the preparations and paperwork.

Q: At all levels?

SEYMOUR: Yes. This meant they had to be knowledgeable not only about the issues in Germany but also in the other EU countries and would have to interact rather intensively with their counterparts in the member-states. At one point a man became agriculture minister in Germany who spoke only German, which is not or was not a working language of the Community. It recognized only French and English as “working languages.” Although formal documents were translated into all and major meetings had interpretation in all, for expediency many less formal, “working” meetings were conducted only in the two working languages. So there was considerable grousing from the others at first about how a German, even a minister, could function speaking only German.

Well, it worked out somehow, but it illustrates what I would call the “Europeanizing” of the bureaucracies of the different member states. So that for people in the ministries and even the ministers themselves it’s not enough to know all about, for example, German agriculture and German problems and procedures but one must know all about the European Community agricultural policy and what the positions or interests are of all of the member states. So each minister and bureaucrat automatically assumes works in an extra dimension beyond his or her own country in all of these matters, and as this is multiplied through bureaucracies of the member countries, you get a parallel “European view” that develops. This happens even in the UK, which was often criticized for not being “European” enough, but whose bureaucracy at home and officials in Brussels were extremely effective and efficient in the way they worked the process, coordinating closely with London. So in all this, you can imagine that the officials around the Community, or the Union now, get to know each other very well; they know what the
positions are, what the various countries’ “red lines” are, how much negotiating room they have, what they can give, what they need to bring back home for political reasons and things like that.

Q: And I would think that everything you say applies certainly to all of the member-states. It works pretty well for the larger member-states, but for a small state like Luxembourg or Ireland it’s quite a burden to take on all these responsibilities.

SEYMOUR: It’s a tremendous burden which pretty much captivates the whole government, the foreign office for sure and a lot of the other ministries, too, throughout the whole six months and even a bit before as they are preparing for it.

Q: And even after.

SEYMOUR: And even after as they are sort of cleaning up and so on. But fortunately the system allows them to pass unresolved questions on. You mentioned the two that are perhaps hardest hit by the burdens of running things as presidents: Ireland and Luxembourg. But interestingly sometimes they got good marks for their performances, I guess, partly because they realized it was going to be a full-time commitment and gave it a more than full-time effort and also because their own bureaucracies were smaller and more streamlined. Sometimes the bigger ones had the clearance problems or perhaps inner political differences to work out and were hindered by those complications from performing as well as they might in the presidency. And there was always the press scrutinizing the prospects for each presidency and giving marks like C+ or B at the end of each country’s tenure in the chair. But for the need for officials in all governments who were dealing with EU issues to get and stay knowledgeable has only increased as the EU has extended its sway over the years.

In this respect, I would like to elaborate on the Community/Union legislative process that I mentioned, that is, EU legislation. One of the first things I learned is that the European Parliament is not really the legislature. It is an important sounding board for decisions that are being made and it’s a way of bringing public opinion to bear on issues and the performance of the Commission and member-states, and these are important things. There is still talk, though, about a “democratic deficit,” that the people of Europe don’t really understand what the EU is about and don’t feel they have a say in what’s being decided about things like regulations on commerce, transport, industry, farming, fishing and numerous things that affect their activities and their lives. So at least the parliament is a sounding board; it does have power to approve the budget, to approve appointments of the Commission President and the Commissioners, to approve treaties, and to have Commissioners defend their policies regularly before it. But it does not approve the regulatory and other decisions made daily by the Community bureaucracy. Ultimately that authority rests with the member-states and their permanent representatives in Brussels, for routine matters, and on up the hierarchy for more important questions.

Also, I want to say something about how U.S. policy has evolved to adjust to changes in the Community. I’m hazy on details but when I arrived in Brussels in the winter of 1983, there was a sharp distinction between the Community business, economic mostly, and the political cooperation or foreign policy process. But in 1985, I think, they passed an agreement called the Single European Act, which was an effort to sort of bring these two things together. Since then
they have passed treaties, notably the Maastricht treaty to advance that marriage significantly, creating among other things the European Union, amalgamating the several Communities (Economic Community, Euratom, and Coal and Steel Community, which no longer exists). Now, after a mishap or two—and significant expansion—they are trying to “deepen” the Union still further through another intergovernmental treaty process.

**Q: The constitution?**

SEYMOUR: The constitution, which is bringing the political foreign policy and economic policy closer and closer together. They now have a permanent secretariat that deals with foreign policy. Its chief, Javier Solana, is an informal foreign minister for the Union, although that function is divided a bit because there is also the director of external affairs in the Commission, which means trade, and there are of course the foreign ministers in their council of ministers who willy-nilly get involved in foreign-policy issues. But Javier Solana seems gradually to speak and act more and more for the Union on foreign policy and its execution on the EU plane.

This has brought the US into more direct engagement with the central EU structure rather than solely with the member-states as it used to be when foreign policy was an intergovernmental matter for the then European Community. To illustrate, when I was in Brussels we had an annual high-level US-EC meeting, usually a lunch tacked onto the NATO ministerial in December. On our side, in addition to the Secretary of State there would be secretaries of commerce, treasury, agriculture and the trade representative who would meet with their Commission counterparts. And that was it in terms of our dialogue at the upper level.

I recall that the morning after the US-Soviet “breakthrough” summit in Reykjavik took place I think in the fall of 1985 or so (I would have to check the details), Gunther Burkhart, then Commission President Jacques Delore’s *chef de cabinet* and recently EU “ambassador” in Washington, called me rather urgently to say that now we needed to get political issues on this agenda for the ministerial in December. He proposed some political subjects to talk about, and we reported this to Washington. We must have leaned out a bit too far, though, in passing this on, because the next day we got a cable slapping us down saying that the US-EC dialogue was strictly economic, there will be no political issues on the agenda.

**Q: At the ministerial level?**

SEYMOUR: U.S.-Yes, and that’s the way it was for, I think, several more years, but, gradually, as the political discussion has become much more accepted and integrated into Community or EU business, it is, I believe, routinely on the agenda of these high-level talks. In fact, now there are regular meetings of the EU president and Commission president once or twice a year with the US president to discuss a range of issues in transatlantic cooperation.

**Q: That’s at the presidential level.**

SEYMOUR: Yes, it’s gone to the presidential level and so we’re, I think, treating the European Union with more of the respect that they’ve been claiming for many years.
Q: Before we go on, would you want to just say a word about the internal organization of the mission? You mentioned, roughly how large was the political section? Was George Vest the ambassador, the U.S. representative during your entire period? Who was, was there a DCM, like a normal embassy?

SEYMOUR: George Vest was there for a year. Unfortunately he did leave about a year or so into my tour to become Director General of the Foreign Service. Subsequently, we had a succession of two political appointees. Both were interesting characters, but they were in my view not really the right people for the time. We could go into that if you like.

The DCM when I arrived was Bill Barraclough, an economics specialist, as tended to be the case at USEC: the ambassador would be, if career, more politically experienced and the DCM would be an economic-commercial specialist, with perhaps trade experience as well, even outside of Europe. Then we had, two large operational sections: Econ (commerce and finance) which included two or three people who actually came from the STR, the trade representative’s office, and a large agriculture section. There were constant turf problems between them, exacerbated, I’d say, by a bit of unfortunate personal chemistry between the Econ and Agricultural Counselors there at the time. I recall as Political Counselor being in a neutral position in most respects and kind of becoming an informal mediator between the two incumbents over different things.

We also had a two-officer public affairs section which was very busy and very active, because the relations with Europe very often involved contentious trade issues and other frictions that we in Brussels would have reason to comment on and to know about and to try to put the best foot forward for the U.S. My political section had six people. One followed the European parliament, another the European Council in its various manifestations, and, later, the “rover. I described these earlier. There was a Labor Counselor and also an officer who followed EU development activities, an active portfolio of considerable interest in Washington, and…

Q: In the political section?

SEYMOUR: In the political section. That was something, I don’t know quite how that happened but it was there when I got there. There was one sour note toward the end. In my last six months we had a replacement, an economic officer, who was unhappy to be in the “political” section.” She followed a very good economics office and a good political officer, who went on to serve as ambassador and a deputy assistant secretary, but she was unhappy about being slotted to her mind improperly. Despite my efforts to demonstrate to her that it would be a broadening experience, she protested pretty much the whole way, and I can’t remember, but possibly she did switch afterwards.

The development job was actually a pretty big one because the European Union is a big, world-class donor, and development was also very much an external affairs matter because of the clear foreign policy aspect to their work with countries all around the world. During my tenure the EU were reviewing and extending Lomé Convention, which was one of a series of treaties which kind of regularized their relations with the developing countries, in this case those of the ACP countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific that had been former colonies of the EU member-states. There was quite a science to all that and it was good for an economic officer We
also had annual consultations between our Administrator of USAID and the European Commission counterpart and his staff for development in Directorate General VIII, as it was then. And, of course, we did a lot of regular reporting on EU development activities, development questions. The underlying issue in our relations on this subject was how well we could coordinate, fill in, augment, and enhance our common efforts around the world. Occasionally some questions of turf would arise. At the time, for example, the French were sensitive about political implications of what the US was doing in Africa. It was a big portfolio, and we needed a strong officer to handle it.

Another experience illustrating in that connection the distinction between the member-states arose when we were trying to get some data about EU aid worldwide. We had to get some of it directly from member-states. We approached the Commission first, and they gave us information about aid from the EU itself, cautioning that it was only part of the picture and we should go to the member-states for data about their individual aid programs. Then those Commission officials added that they had a hard time getting that information from, say, Germany or France themselves. They joked about it so I don’t think it was impossible for them, but I believe it wasn’t easy. Anyway, it was just as well for us to ask our Embassies in capitals to help out. The point is that the European Union budget provides for a substantial amount of development assistance but that is quite separate from what the member-states themselves might be providing, and for their own reasons. So again it shows that “Europe” is indeed multifaceted, with the EU being an additional, though international and in many respects supranational entity in and of Europe.

A final cultural comment and then maybe we should move on. I recall meeting with someone, I think in the external affairs directorate, to discuss some issue, and we got talking about his dealings with EU representatives abroad. The EU has, in effect, ambassadors in a number of countries, as we do in Washington. This man, a Belgian, was commenting for some reason on something that they had just learned in a report from an EU representative somewhere in Africa. He observed that it can be really difficult dealing with the different nationalities staffing their representations in countries all around the world. He observed to me that one has to know, for example, whether the head of the representation is, let’s say Italian or English, because, this Belgian “eurocrat” said, if he’s Italian and he’s just done something wrong, then we have to make sure our cable remonstrating with him is emphatic enough so he will get the point. We figuratively jump up and down and pound the table, asking how he could be so stupid and so forth, the official continued. Whereas if it were an Englishman, he could be quite offended by that, so we have to employ a more subtle, understated tone. This Belgian official just noted this as an observation on the culture of working in the European Union, which is quite fascinating and illustrates that those national differences persist in subtle ways that we Americans may not always appreciate.

Q: It’s probably a lesson that you had learned also.

SEYMOUR: Yes, we did have to learn these things in working with the many nationalities in the Commission. I had thought on going to Brussels that I really knew a lot about Europe but I learned fairly quickly how much more had to learn and I did learn a lot in the four years I was there.
Mr. Jaeger was born in Austria and raised in Austria, England and the US. Evacuated from Austria to Holland and England, he immigrated to the US. After serving in the US Army he was educated at St. Vincent College and Harvard University. He joined the State Department in 1951 and the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1953. Primarily a Political Officer, Mr. Jaeger served in Washington several times as well as in Monrovia, Zagreb, Berlin, Bonn, Geneva, Paris, Quebec (Consul General), Ottawa (Political Counselor) and Brussels (Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Political Affairs. His final assignment was Diplomat in Residence at Middlebury College. Mr. Jaeger was interviewed by Robert Daniels in 2000.

Q: Well, that sounds like an exciting turning point in your career. When did you take up your new job in Brussels?

JAEGGER: Pat, Christina, by now a young lady of thirteen, and I arrived in Brussels in April ‘84 and were assigned a lovely large house on Val de la Futaie, off Avenue Franklin Roosevelt near the Bois de la Cambre, a quiet charming little square where we only gradually met our somewhat retiring well-off Belgian neighbors. Christina was enrolled in St. John’s International School, one more challenging change, and dealt with it by rapidly exchanging her Quebecois for a Bruxellois accent and making new friends.

The NATO building where I was to work, was the same vast former military barracks, converted to accommodate the then sixteen NATO delegations and the Secretary General’s large headquarters staff, to which NATO transferred after de Gaulle asked it to leave France. Its nondescript appearance did not adequately convey that this was the nerve center of the great alliance which fought and was shortly to win the Cold War.

Q: Tell us a bit about your new job.

JAEGGER: The Deputy Assistant Secretary General’s (DASG) job in the NATO Secretariat’s Political Division has traditionally been an American position, its role and importance depending a great deal on the incumbent, the effectiveness of his boss, the Assistant Secretary general (ASG), and the extent to which Secretaries General wanted to make use of these resources.

Q: Maybe we should first take a quick overall look at how NATO is organized, to get this right?

JAEGGER: OK. NATO has, from the outset, had a Secretary General who chairs and leads Council Meetings at the Ministerial and Foreign Ministers levels and is generally responsible for the management and operations of the alliance. To this end he has a Secretariat, which, in my
time, consisted of the Deputy Secretary General, their small, powerful shared front office assistants, known as the ‘Private Office’ and, below them, a number of major functional Divisions: The Political Division - my new niche, a Division for Defense Planning and Policy, another for Defense Support, a Nuclear Planning Directorate a Division of Infrastructure, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning, a Scientific Division, an Administrative Division and an Executive Secretariat, all headed by ASGs or equivalent.

The purpose of these Divisions was to backstop the Secretary General with briefing papers, suggested talking points etc., to represent him in chairing regular and ad hoc meetings, to help coordinate and resolve pending issues within the alliance and to carry out a variety of critical operational functions, i.e. the alliance’s public relations, the coordination of NATO’s military and nuclear planning, NATO security, as well as the administration of this whole large enterprise. The organization has, of course, undergone several major changes since my time, so that some of the things I will be describing may no longer be the same.

Q: Well, so how did it look then from your vantage point?

JAEGGER: The Political Division in my time had three parts, the Political and Economic Directorates and a large Public Affairs Office headed by a German diplomat. Although I was nominally the across-the-board DASG, my boss, ASG Fredo Dannenbring was particularly interested in Public Affairs, since he and his German colleague had a close relationship.

Q: So what did you actually do?

JAEGGER: My political and economic staffs and I provided Lord Carrington, the Secretary General and his Deputy, with constant flows of briefing papers, talking points or recommendations on all the major issues before NATO to help him deal with all these complexities in chairing NATO Councils, making public statements, receiving high-level visitors, visiting NATO countries, etc..

To do all this my Political and Economic Divisions had six and five officers respectively, all seconded by NATO’s member countries; a large enough staff in theory, but of very uneven quality, as is often the case in international organizations where some unqualified people get plum jobs because of their connections.

By far the best was my British political staffer, David Miller, a modest man of great ability, who could turn out polished memoranda on complex subjects at amazing speed. Also excellent was my French economist Jean-Claude Renaud, and the invariably reliable and good-natured German diplomat Guenther Seibert, There were others who were much less effective and some downright disastrous, like my otherwise charming Turkish friend who shall remain nameless, who spent his time smoking and looking at girlie magazines and produced virtually nothing. There were two even more serious staff problems, of which more later.

Q: You also chaired NATO’s Political Committee, no?
JAEGER: That’s right, that was the other half of my brief. The DASG traditionally chaired NATO’s Political Committee, technically on behalf of the ASG, although in my time neither Ambassador Dannenbring, nor his successor Henning Wegener chose to do so. I was therefore de facto chairman, responsible for the Committee’s effective operation.

Q: Who were the members and at what level?

JAEGER: Each of the then16 NATO member nations - whose delegations, actually quasi-Embassies, were all housed in the NATO Headquarter building - had a representative at the Political Counselor level. We met regularly twice a week for two or three hours and discussed a wide range of issues, some which we’ll get into later.

Hierarchically, the Political Committee and the higher-ranking Military Committee were subsets of the NATO Council, which usually met weekly at the Ambassadorial level under the Secretary General’s Chairmanship, and from time to time at the level of Heads of State or Foreign Ministers. The chairmen of the Political, Military Committees and other NATO organizations transmitted reports and studies prepared collectively through the Secretary General to the Council to indicate our collective judgments on a wide range of issues. In the case of NATO’s Political Committee these ranged from the then rapidly evolving state of affairs in the Soviet Union, to various disarmament questions, the overall economic situation in the Soviet Bloc etc. The Political Committee also addressed, and when possible resolved alliance differences on a range of narrower issues, some of which were referred to us by the Council.

Q: What was your relationship, as an American diplomat, to the US Mission to NATO? Did that pose difficulties, since you could obviously be accused of bias?

JAEGER: I followed in the tradition of having a very limited relationship with the US Mission, since this strengthened my credibility as an independent international official. I therefore did not even read (and wasn’t invited to read) the American cable traffic, except when they felt that it was important that I be informally shown some message or document, lest I misunderstand what they were about. By contrast, other senior people in the Secretariat were constantly spending time at their Missions reading traffic and being briefed. This included my boss, Ambassador Dannenbring, who would often spend half his mornings at the German Mission, and sometimes tried to nudge NATO papers and positions in directions favored by the Germans. Even so, I think my effort to be as independent as possible, was appreciated and occasionally paid real dividends.

Q: I have been wondering, why this DASG job, if I am right, is the highest traditionally American position in the NATO Secretariat?

JAEGER: This dates back to the decision that an American should be NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander. Given the importance of this job, the US made major concessions on the civilian side. Apart from an influential but otherwise junior staffer in the Private Office, Marc Grossman during Lord Carrington’s tenure, the DASG job is therefore the highest position at NATO Headquarters which Americans traditionally occupy.

Q: Does that weaken the American role in NATO?
JAEGGER: I don’t think so. The real power lies with the member nations and their Missions, among which the American Mission to NATO is clearly the first among equals.

Q: Who headed up the US Mission at that time?

JAEGGER: David Abshire, a distinguished Reagan political appointee, who had founded the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and then returned to it after his tour at NATO. He was thoroughly equipped for the job and had a firm grasp of the full range of East-West, disarmament, as well as European and alliance questions, all of which were critical to NATO at that time.

Q: Let’s stay on this theme a bit and talk about some of the senior people you worked with, Dannenbring, Wegner, and, of course, Carrington and his team. What were they like and how was it working with them?

JAEGGER: Fredo Dannenbring, a German career diplomat who had been Minister at their Embassy in Washington, was a friendly, but very careful and adaptable senior bureaucrat, who was easy to work with, but hardly inspiring. He was invariably polite and kind, gave me lots of scope and wrote enthusiastic efficiency reports. At the same time, he stayed closer to the German Mission where he kept his bureaucratic lifelines in good repair, which undoubtedly helped in obtaining other international jobs after his retirement. While his caution - he almost always wanted to know which way the wind was blowing before making major commitments - kept him out of trouble, he also paid a price. Carrington and his immediate staff, Brian Fall and Marc Grossman, saw him as a bit of a fuddy-duddy and made no secret of the fact that they wished for someone more energetic and courageous who would move more imaginatively on organizational and substantive issues.

In his successor, Henning Wegener, another German Ambassador, who arrived in October 1986 they got their wish. A brilliant, fast worker, Henning had studied in the United States, spoke English almost like a native, knew virtually everything about everything and if not would find out, had an extraordinary amount of energy and was determined to lead and push issues to solutions.

At the same time he was utterly Germanic, showed his frustrations and instinctively barked at people when he wanted to get things done. Being a multi-tasker, one of his less agreeable habits was to read papers, talk on the phone and carry on a conversation at the same time. Indeed that was the scene when I first met him in his office. Juggling his phone, he said, “You can start”, continuing to read and talk to someone else. I decided we had to get this straight right away and told him, “Ambassador, I’m an American diplomat and your Deputy. I think it would be better if we spoke after you have finished reading and talking on the telephone.” He looked startled, and then said, “Hah! So you have guts! I like that!”

Q: [Laughter]
JAEGGER: Two days later he was just moving into his office and hung up some water color sketches. When I went in to talk to him about something (we had adjoining offices), he said, “George, come and look at my grandfather’s water colors!” I looked at them, and was absolutely appalled. They were sketches of German submarines unmistakably sinking American tankers in World War I. I said, “Henning! These are German World War I paintings in which Americans have been killed, and you put this up in your office at NATO? The American Ambassador will be outraged when he comes here. Henning looked surprised and said: “Oh! Do you really think he’ll be thin-skinned about that? It’s so long ago!”

Q: Laughter

JAEGGER: The next day they were gone.

Even so, after a few critical moments, we gradually built a close relationship based on sincere mutual respect and together got a great deal done. Everybody in the building came to respect Henning’s drive and determination, but, since he didn’t suffer fools or routine bureaucrats gladly, he also began offending people. After watching this for a while, I went in to see him one day, closed the door and said: “Henning. I must tell you, as your loyal deputy, that you are offending too many people and developing a reputation. How do you expect to get your next German Ambassadorship if you make so many enemies in so short a time?” He actually took this in good grace, looked at me and said, “Well, George, I can’t help being a German and I know I behave like a German. But I have an idea. You sit next to me at these meetings, and when you think I am about to misbehave, kick me under the table and I will shut up.”

Q: Laughter

JAEGGER: This Wegener-Jaeger coordinating system produced a distinct improvement, although I think his shins showed a certain amount of wear and tear as a result of our relationship!

Even so, we parted friends, to the extent that, when I was Diplomat-in-Residence at Middlebury College in my next assignment, I invited him to give a lecture. He produced one of his characteristically brilliant ad lib performances to a packed house of faculty and students, awed by his spectacular understanding of East-West affairs.

Q: I am sorry I missed that. How about Carrington, what was he like to work for?

JAEGGER: He was an absolutely delightful, brilliant but somewhat short tempered man, full of energy and enormous wit, a quintessential representative of the British upper class, who conveyed the sense that running the world was a very normal thing for a fellow like him to do. Although he had had to resign as Foreign Secretary over the Falklands war, he was quite unbowed and vigorously, often impatiently led the NATO alliances through its many challenges.

Q: The old imperial tradition. What was he like to work for?

JAEGGER: He set very high standards, was appreciative of good work but loved upstaging us. We were continually preparing memos or lengthy briefing books, sometimes covering fifteen or
twenty major fast-moving issues for any one NATO meeting or trip, often with very short lead
times. Normally, when he was pleased we would get little notes back thanking us. But there were
exceptions. I particularly remember one ‘briefing book meeting’ in his office which he opened,
with his briefing book firmly closed, saying, “Actually, I’ve just talked to Helmut Schmidt about
this and he tells me so and so. Have you heard?”, a somewhat rhetorical question since none of
us could call up Helmut Schmidt and ask him what he thought about something. In short, he was
very well informed and constantly kept in touch with all the major players.

Q: He was playing the game at all levels....

JAEGGER: ...and letting us know it. Even so, he knew he had to be prepared for a constant stream
of demanding events and relied on us to do the staff work in coordinating alliance views and
providing the huge stream of paper necessary to keep him prepared and on track.

In this connection either the ASG or I would often attend his morning meetings, where he and his
staff rapidly went over upcoming issues and events. He insisted on absolute confidentiality,
although I always wondered how secure a setting he was working in, for all the superb ‘Victoria
and Albert’ paintings on loan from the Museum on his walls. NATO Headquarters with sixteen
in-house Missions was a porous place.

Q: You said the Secretary General had a staff of his own?

JAEGGER: He had an absolutely first-rate, senior officer, Brian Fall seconded from the Foreign
Office, who was the Director of the Private Office. Brian was Carrington’s most immediate
advisor, his eyes and ears, speechwriter and for practical purposes the supervisor of the
international staff, although Carrington kept a close eye on it and made final staff and
management decisions himself.

Urbane, fashionable, amusing and invariably poised, Brian was, at the same time, extraordinarily
productive. To cite just one example, he awed me one evening when he produced a flawless ten-
page speech for Carrington on two hours notice. He was, of course, on top of NATO’s
multiplicity of issues and often surprised me with the extent to which he followed them in detail.
It was probably this ability to match wits with all comers and to keep NATO’s many tigers sitting
on their stools which made him less than popular, Ambassadors and other senior potentates often
being thin-skinned creatures. Even so, he succeeded brilliantly in his first priority of serving
Carrington effectively.

Q: Did you ever have any trouble with him?

JAEGGER: Because of his barely concealed impatience with Fredo Dannenbring, he, at one point,
tried to reorganize the Political Division which would have put it in effect under his direct
control. We had a bit of a tussle over this, since I did not think this would work in the longer run.
There was also some fuss over his initiative to have Murray Feshbach, the famous Georgetown
Soviet and Russian health expert, appointed as Carrington’s own Sovietologist-in-Residence.
This caused some organizational confusion since the members of the Political Committee, which
he attended, took their direction on these issues from their governments. Eventually, however, we
worked it out, particularly after Wegener became ASG and robustly represented our interests. As I expected, Brian, now Sir Brian Fall, has gone on to a brilliant career, first as British High Commissioner in Canada and then as British Ambassador in Moscow.

Q: You mentioned a second more junior officer in the Private Office?

JAEGGER: Yes, Marc Grossman, then a mid-level American Foreign Service officer, who later became Director General of the Foreign Service, and Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Bush II administration. He was bright, flexible, manipulative and highly effective and, I thought, amused Carrington, because, as a personality, he was everything Carrington was not.

Q: Did you sometimes have a chance to work directly with Carrington?

JAEGGER: Occasionally, when either Dannenbring or Wegener were unavailable, I would be asked to sit to the left of Carrington at NATO Councils, in the seat traditionally assigned to the ASG for Political Affairs. The idea was to be available if the Secretary General needed information, advice or some document. Although sometimes very important, these meetings were often less sexy than one might imagine, with Ambassadors “rabbiting on” endlessly, as Carrington would say, while he would be solemnly writing notes. As often as not, he would actually be composing limericks, which he would then pass to the ASGs to his right and left, making it look to the mystified Ambassadors as if he were soliciting comments on some critical question. While the “Ambos”, as he called them, were trying not to watch too intently, one could, if one had the courage, write a counter limerick and pass it back to him, something along the lines “There was an Ambo from Greece, whose speeches would never cease, ...”

Q: Laughter

JAEGGER: ….that sort of thing.

I particularly remember one occasion when I was sitting next to him at a Council and the Greek Ambassador was again droning on about the latest Greek-Turkish incident, which we all knew about in detail. Carrington, who was a very kind and generous man, handed me a little note, which simply said, “George, I have just been thinking. It must be absolutely awful to have had to start at the bottom like you. I started as a Minister.”

Q: Laughter

JAEGGER: I think I wrote back something less than brilliant like, “I am afraid that’s right.”

Q: Laughter. What was he like when things when wrong?

JAEGGER: Carrington was almost invariably controlled and courteous, but could be sharp and demanding, and even loose his temper under pressure. I particularly remember a press conference at which he was to comment on a Ministerial Council Communiqué, I think it was the Brussels Communiqué of December 1986. Because of some glitch, copies of the communiqué
were not ready for distribution when Carrington appeared on the podium before a hundred or so journalists. When he realized that he was commenting on a text no one had seen or read, he had what these days might be called a public meltdown. He ended on the note that this would never happen again, which it didn’t.

Q: Sounds like the sort of thing Henry would do.

JAEGGER: Not really, because it happened rarely, and then only when he felt seriously let down. Carrington, unlike some very senior people I have met, was a genuinely big man. He understood the world at the highest levels, understood how to handle his peers and himself, knew what he wanted and was, at the same time, generous, thoughtful and kind. He helped me several times in difficult situations, which he could have delegated to his Deputy or staff, after we had discussed them in private. He and Lady Carrington frequently included Pat and myself and others on the international staff at elegant lunches at their residence and were invariably warm and gracious. To put it simply, it was an honor to serve under him.

Q: I know its hard to summarize the political work of the alliance over several years, but give us a sense of the issues you all were working on.

JAEGGER: I think one could break this down into two parts, the many wide-ranging short-term projects I became involved in and the underlying issue, which the Political Committee and ultimately the whole alliance, worked on during this entire period, to wit: What was Gorbachev all about? Was he for real? And what did all this mean for NATO and the West?

Q: Let’s start with a sampling of the more specific projects, OK?

JAEGGER: To give a sense of the variety and range, when I arrived the NATO nations’ positions on the CDE’s (Conference on Disarmament in Europe) efforts to agree to Europe-wide confidence-building measures, were all over the place and badly bogged down in a Committee. I won’t go into all the technical details and differences involved, but one of the first things I was asked to do was to try to get these differences resolved so that the NATO Council could send an agreed NATO guidance to the NATO reps who were urgently waiting for this in Stockholm. I am glad to say that after a few weeks of energetic work we succeeded.

Q: How did you actually do this?

JAEGGER: Obviously international staff can’t change national positions. I could, however, impart a sense of urgency, convene frequent meetings, reiterate Carrington’s wish that we get this done pronto, and occasionally, when we had reached an impasse, suggest and, in side conversations with delegations, sell compromise language. It was invariably an untidy but necessary process.

I was soon in a similar position at NATO’s Lisbon Ministerial in June 1985 when, in Dannenbring’s unexpected absence, I found myself chairing the alliance’s communiqué drafting committee, where after some tough bargaining, particularly on the paragraphs concerning INF deployment (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces), from which Greece and Denmark abstained, agreement was hammered out. I always found it puzzling, particularly after negotiating texts like
these, that the media were rarely inquisitive enough to find out where the fault lines had been and who, in the end, had yielded to whom.

The Brussels Ministerial in December 1986 involved another tense and difficult Communiqué negotiation, particularly with the French, at which I assisted the ASG and then took over for the final hours, when he was called away, and helped hammer out the agreement.

In retrospect, these communiqué drafting and major negotiating exercises were perhaps the most exciting part of this assignment. Meetings often started at 10 in the morning in the pious hope that agreement would be reached quickly. When by eight o’clock in the evening only partial progress had been made over minor differences, usually between the French on the one side and the British and the Americans on the other, and the rest splitting in various ways between, one might well ask what the ASG or I could do to bring the parties together.

Well, we had some important weapons. One was time itself. They all knew that sooner or later, they would have to agree to a text since failure to do so could not be concealed, and would be perceived as a crisis in the alliance. Many delegations, therefore, actually hoped that, at the critical point, which usually happened very late at night when people were exhausted and tempers frayed, we would suggest alternative language which could bridge the differences and become the basis for agreement. The test for us was whether we had sensed the limits of the conflicting positions carefully enough to be able to draft just the right few sentences which would produce consensus. It was tricky, and exciting, even though the end product, to the outsider, invariably sounded bland.

Q: This was a time when a whole gamut of east-west arms control negotiations were in play, and we had countered the Soviet SS-20 intermediate threat to Europe with our Pershings. How was this all dealt with in the Political Committee?

JAEGER: Incrementally, because, and this is important to stress, neither we nor the governments involved had the benefit of hindsight. So the process, by definition, was not like an academic seminar, but a constant groping, based on fragmentary information and developments, of trying to correctly understand.

One of Carrington’s constant interests, in this connection, was to get people thinking and not to let the humdrum routine of big organization set the pace. So, besides our bi-weekly general discussions, in which delegations brought up and commented on current developments, I constantly pushed for and often got agreement to collectively prepare what turned out to be a longish series of papers; for example on the state and prospects for CSCE, on successive developments in the Warsaw Pact, which was showing strain, on the then on-going UN discussion on non-use of force and, again and again, on various aspects of the great changes which seemed to be underway in Moscow and their implications for the ongoing arms control talks, like MBFR, INF, etc.

The limiting factor, of course was, that this was not a free-wheeling discussion of intellectuals. Rather, each of the Political Committee’s members spoke on instruction from his government,
reported back what others had said and then, at the next meeting, hopefully took the process a step further.

So writing even fairly short substantive papers really meant coordinating the resources and views of sixteen governments, to the extent they were willing to share - a sometimes a tedious, frustrating process. I tried hard to stimulate the discussions, but was sometimes curtly reminded by my French representative, that the role of the Secretariat was to facilitate, not to express views or positions.

Q: What was the quality of the reps on the Political committee?

JAEGGER: Well, it ranged from the outstanding to the mediocre and, in one case, the almost hopeless. Another limiting factor which may surprise you, is that governments did not always share their own best intelligence and analyses but often contributed bland and uninspired national drafts, which I then had to craft into a, hopefully, more incisive composite text. This was then circulated, commented on further tweaked and, sometimes after a whole series of meetings, finally approved.

Q: Why didn’t NATO always get member countries’ best political analyses?

JAEGGER: I suspect because some Foreign offices were afraid of leaks and no one really wanted NATO’s Political Committee, or even the NATO Council to become the intellectual nerve center of the alliance. Even so, Lord Carrington and many others again and again expressed their appreciation, privately and at the NATO Council, of the quality of work we were able to produce.

Q: The central question through this whole period, as you said, was the significance of what was happening in the Soviet Union and among its Eastern European satellites. Did the Political Committee or anyone in the NATO alliance get it right?

JAEGGER: The issue came to the fore as soon as Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko, the last of the USSR’s petrified dictators, in March 1985. Almost from the outset he launched tantalizing but fragmentary reforms. He began with vague proposals for economic reform, which became more programmatic as his efforts intensified to overcome the stagnation of the Brezhnev era; as well as startlingly new concepts like ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’. He bravely tackled the USSR’s massive alcohol problem, with economically calamitous results and, to everyone’s surprise, replaced Gromyko, who had been a nay-saying fixture on the world scene for twenty eight years, with the diplomatically inexperienced but more open minded Shevardnadze.

By February ‘86, glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ were, as you know, among the various reform ideas legitimized by the 27th Party Congress. The real bombshell was the Chernobyl disaster, during which the Soviet hard-liners had blocked the flow of accurate information, which would have been so useful to minimize the health risks for the millions in eastern and western Europe who were likely to be affected by its radio-active cloud. Gorbachev publicly demanded ‘glasnost’ and so gave further credibility to his efforts at reform. By December of ‘86, in another symbolically highly significant event, Andrei Sakharov was invited back to Moscow from his exile somewhere in Siberia. And by January ‘87 Gorbachev’s program of major political reforms was adopted by a
Central Committee plenum, including startling proposals like multi-candidate elections and the appointment of non-party members to government jobs.

At the same time the tension between Gorbachev and the old Stalinist hardliners, as well as with Boris Yeltsin, increased visibly, while Gorbachev rehabilitated some anti-Stalinists. It was not till November, a few months after I had left NATO, that he published his pathbreaking book ‘Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World’ which in a way put it all together.

Q: That’s a fair summary of some of the key events on the domestic side. Can you also sketch out the foreign policy sequence to help set the other side of the stage.

JAEGGER: The first thing everyone noticed was the change of style. Instead of the often bellicose negativity of previous Soviet rulers, Gorbachev tried to reduce tensions and improve relations with the West and managed to form good personal relationships with people like the Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl and even President Reagan. He took a major concrete step toward detente in April ‘86 when he suspended SS-20 deployment, (the massive mobile intermediate range missile deployment begun in the late ‘70’s) to begin to resolve the intermediate-range nuclear weapons (INF) issues; and some months later proposed that both the US and USSR cut their nuclear armaments in half. He made his first trip abroad to France in October and then met President Reagan at the Geneva Summit in November. In January ‘87 he again astonished the international community when he proposed the complete elimination of INF systems in Europe and of all nuclear weapons by 2000. This led to the surprise agreement in principle at the Reykjavik summit with President Reagan in October to remove INF systems from Europe and to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 1996! Quick agreement foundered on Reagan’s insistence on Star Wars (SDI), but the INF Treaty, with the most comprehensive verification and on-site inspection system, was signed in the fall of ‘87.

Q: So that was the background. How did you all interpret it?

JAEGGER: Looking at it in hindsight, when we know how the story actually came out, we missed by a mile. No one, neither governments nor any of the experts foresaw that Gorbachev would bring about the imminent demise and disintegration of the Soviet Union. The key would have been to ask whether, when push came to shove, Gorbachev would use force to preserve the Soviet system. since without coercion the unity of the Warsaw Pact and of the various components of the Soviet Union would simply and abruptly evaporate.

But that was not obvious or foreseeable as the Gorbachev story and its attended events in the satellites unfolded in a long series of discrete events. So, when you visualize the reps of NATO’s sixteen governments sitting around a table twice a week, you have to take into account that they were trying to digest and integrate successive developments as they were occurring and could not foresee with any confidence how it was all going to play out. What’s more, perceptions were complicated by the fact that Stalinist resistance to Gorbachev was not extinct and that Soviet negotiators in various fora were still putting forward positions which were a mixture of forward looking and traditional hardline Soviet positions, particularly their initial foot dragging on serious verification ....
Q: Which could to some extent reflect the three way political divisions in Moscow between Gorbachev, the hardliners and the radical, impatient reformers.

JAEGGER: That’s right. Moreover, one has to emphasize that at the time, and even today perhaps, we were not really sure as to the extent to which these were divisions between Gorbachev and others, or reflected conflicts within Gorbachev’s own mind...

Q: ...that debate is still going on among Sovietologists as to the real answer to just these problems.

JAEGGER: So, conventional opinion, that we were all stupid not to foresee the collapse of the USSR overlooks the context in which we were all working.

What’s more military intelligence throughout much of this time was reporting continuing expansion of some Soviet military programs which complicated analysis. In retrospect these, of course, turned out to be the death rattles of the Soviet system, but at the time nobody could be quite sure. What’s more, the SDI initiative, Reagan’s Star Wars, complicated the picture, since the Soviets saw American missile defense then, as now, as a threat to their deterrent capabilities. Although that scuttled the idea of nuclear disarmament at Reykjavik, it had little bearing on the basic question, “Is Gorbachev for real?”

Q: Paradoxically it may have been President Reagan who first came to the conclusion that Gorbachev was for real, well before his immediate advisors and the foreign policy establishment were ready to accept that fact.

JAEGGER: I think that’s possible, and culminated in the extraordinary events at Reykjavik, where he was willing to go to the point of offering to agree to abolish all nuclear weapons, which sent the military of the entire alliance into total shock and was then promptly reversed.

Q: Reversed only because Gorbachev insisted on the U.S. giving up the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) project, and Reagan packed up his briefcase and walked out of the meeting room at that.

JAEGGER: To sum this, up, the Political Committee carefully followed and endlessly discussed the many twists and turns of the Gorbachev saga during these years. Draft conclusions were vigorously discussed, sent back to capitals, then rediscussed, a time consuming and emotionally wearing process of trying to integrate various governments’ nuanced positions on these ongoing developments in the USSR without depriving our conclusions of all consistency.

As a result our reports were sometimes almost overtaken by the time we were able to reach agreement and send a text to the NATO Council. They were also often rather watered down, although, from time to time, we were able to produce texts that were received with appreciation by the NATO community. Even so, by the summer of ‘87 when I left, we had not wrung our way through to a clear appreciation of Gorbachev’s historic significance and no one foresaw or was willing to predict that the Soviet Union was about to fall apart.
Q: Well, no one knew that, not even the Soviets! Getting back to the main issue, how did your thinking stack up against the popular argument that Ronald Reagan won the cold war simply by outspending the Russians on hardware and arms?

JAEGGER: I think that greatly oversimplifies the fact in the end, as Kennan had expected, it was forty long years of containment, against which Moscow pushed and struggled, which eventually exhausted them, overstretched their system and led to their collapse.

The immediate cause of this denouement was their massive deployment of SS-20s, beginning in the late ‘70s, whose 1200 independently targetable nuclear warheads were meant to neutralize our ability to offset the USSR’s massive conventional advantage in Europe by targeting our nuclear deterrent systems in Europe. The idea was to weaken European confidence in American reliability as strategic partners by raising the question in the European minds whether in a crisis we would really use our strategic nuclear missiles and bombers to defend Europe and so put America at risk. So the ultimate aim of the huge SS-20 deployment was to ‘decouple’ Europe politically and psychologically from the United States.

We regained the psychological advantage and won this great confrontation by persuading European parliaments, in the face of massive, ultimately in large part Communist-triggered demonstrations to permit American counter-deployments of Pershings and Tomahawks. As Gromyko is reported to have said, “the SS-20 was our last card.” His debilitated and weary Soviet system had been stretched to the limit. They had no more resources left for another try. In retrospect it was the collapse of their SS-20 campaign, which in the end enabled Gorbachev to preach detente, as the only remaining viable alternative.

So rather than giving all the credit to President Reagan’s big military budgets, important as they may have been, the real credit goes to George Kennan, all those who built the alliance system which contained the USSR and those who followed them.

Q: What was the reaction at NATO headquarters after the Reykjavik summit in the fall of ‘86 where there was almost an agreement on nuclear disarmament?

JAEGGER: I think Carrington’s opening statement to the December Ministerial Council, which I had drafted, summarizes the range of reactions at the time. “I suspect you will be concerned,” he said, “about all the talk about the consequences of Reykjavik, public reactions that range from initial disappointment that no agreements have been signed, through excitement over the business which we’re all about to open up, to a somewhat cautious reaction from some sectors of opinion which after years of clamoring for progress in arms control appear to be frightened by the prospects now that there is a chance of real hope.”

Carrington then went on with his own reflections on this situation. “I think we should take care not to be too negative about the developments of Reykjavik even though in reality we may suspect that they would take much more time to refine, develop, and negotiate. Few of us had expected anything very substantial to emerge from this meeting, which after all was billed only as a summit to discuss a summit. That so many elements in a possibly far reaching …. negotiating package had emerged from President Reagan’s conversation with General Secretary
Gorbachev was, I think, a quite remarkable accomplishment. For after years of frustration, they opened up a broad new vision of arms control in which substantial reductions of strategic nuclear systems have become a real possibility.”

“The vision”, Carrington continued” was only a first step. The ideas developed at Reykjavik would evolve under expert study at Geneva and in allied consultations. More obviously still, much would depend in the final analysis on the Soviet Union’s willingness to accept a degree of verification,” and this was the heart of the matter, “which will be necessary to establish confidence.”

Q: That being a problem in arms control from the very beginning.

JAEGER: That’s right. Carrington then went to suggest that were the Soviets also to drop linking an INF (Intermediate-range nuclear force) agreement to SDI, Reagan’s Star Wars project, the linkage which had led to the breakup at Reykjavik, a “satisfactory INF agreement might well be negotiated…”.

He even thought that it should not be “impossible to agree to a fifty percent reduction in strategic arms if the necessary modalities of their implication can be agreed,” a rather daring statement given the resistance the Reykjavik discussion had generated in some US and allied quarters.

The Ministerial communiqué issued at the end of that meeting echoed many of these points, although it made no specific reference to Star Wars which clearly was not universally accepted in the alliance at the time.

Q: So NATO was on the whole sympathetic to drastic reductions?

JAEGER: In principle yes, although verifiable INF, MBFR and other arms control agreements were more immediate objectives. In the end, the key was the achievement of enduring stability and security in Europe.

Q: How did the media react to major statements like that and to NATO communiqués? Was there sophisticated coverage?

JAEGER: Neither the media nor the public was aware of the intensity of the negotiations which often went into the hammering out of communiqué texts. Opinions ranged from the French who were generally closest to the Russian side, to the Scandinavians, particularly the Danes, who wanted to see and hear no evil and usually pushed for conciliatory language, to the more sturdy allies, like the UK and Germany, who were more attuned to the strategic realities and tended more often to be on the US side; although as particular issues arose in many of these very complicated negotiations each nation, particularly Germany, which was on the front lines, reacted in accordance with how they thought they would be affected.

Delegations also split in other ways, for instance when anything Mediterranean was involved, you could expect the French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italians to work as a bloc. Turkey, whose
military made a huge contribution on the southern flank, was usually helpful, except of course when Greece and Cyprus were concerned. It was a complex scene.

Q: Did the media seem to understand these differences?

JAEGGER: Rarely. It was always a source of puzzlement to me how consistently the mobs of reporters who turned up at Ministerial Communiqué press conferences missed the issues which had involved the most difficult intra-NATO negotiations. Communiqués by definition make dull reading. The first reaction usually was, “Well, there’s nothing new in this,” when, in fact, there always was something new, particularly if you understood the issues and had followed them over time.

Q: One last question on this theme. Was George Shultz at this or other Ministerials you attended? What was he like?

JAEGGER: Yes, several times. He was somebody I respected and admired greatly, a person of great directness, great honesty, who understood the importance of words, did not use them lightly, and who, throughout, had the respect of his professional partners in the diplomatic world.

At the Brussels Foreign Ministers meeting we just discussed he arrived visibly exhausted after an overnight flight. The Council was debating one of the major arms control issues, and, while Shultz was dozing off, Foreign Ministers were giving lengthy speeches suggesting lack of unanimity. When Carrington thought they had talked enough he turned to the Secretary of State and said: ”Well George, what do you think?” Shultz bolted upright and with a strong voice simply said: “The United States of America is for this text.” And that was the end of that, and they all fell in line.

Q: Well, Shultz was by profession a labor negotiator. It’s a form of diplomacy.

JAEGGER: It certainly showed.

Q: You have talked about the French several times. De Gaulle had pulled them out of the military aspects of the Alliance but they remained on the NATO Council and continued to participate on the political side of the Alliance. How did they behave?

JAEGGER: My years in Paris had not really prepared me for the frequent intractability and occasionally shocking rudeness of the French at NATO. The issue went far beyond their insistence that everything written and spoken had to be simultaneously available in French, an, in principle, reasonable demand; even though it would, at times, paralyze my Political Committee, when for some reason the French version of a text was temporarily unavailable - even though the personally very cultivated and polite French representative spoke almost perfect English. I gradually came to understand, that, the core objective of French policy was to assure that France be taken seriously as a major player, that they would not be perceived to buckle under Anglo-American pressure and really saw American influence at NATO as the obstacle to their assuming their rightful place as ‘chairman’ of the European world.
So this battle for French influence was carried on constantly, daily at many levels, although it was, in the first instance, a language question.

_Q: I was going to ask you whether French and English were the languages in all NATO proceedings and how this actually worked?_

JAEGGER: All documents were issued in French and English. At Council and other meetings there was simultaneous translation, so that the French did not have to hear English and the English did not have to hear French. You have to visualize the NATO translation staff, inundated and sometimes overwhelmed by endless papers, doing its best to issue them on time in both languages. Inevitably there were mistakes, slip-ups and delays. So, if a Political Committee text was not issued simultaneously in French and English, or if there were French mistakes, or if something had been left out of the French version and didn’t precisely match the English version, you could count on the French delegate spending ten minutes or more complaining how the French are again being discriminated against and, in more serious cases, threatening bureaucratic reprisals at higher levels. Needless to say there was also intense haggling and negotiation on the precise translation of certain phrases which were important substantively.

_Q: How was all this reflected on the substantive level?_

JAEGGER: Substantively, French policy usually hewed a shade closer to Moscow than the rest, which Paris thought improved their leverage on both sides. The practical effect was that the French would often work to water down positions which they considered too harsh on the Soviet Union and its allies, sometimes with tough tactics in the political Committee and the Council. There was a degree of bitterness in the French delegation’s attitude and behavior...

_Q: Was this tactical or genuine?_

JAEGGER: Probably a mixture, but bitterness bordering on hostility nevertheless, which drove them to be competitive and difficult, particularly with the Americans. You get this determination that France must, at some point, get on top again, and that the Americans and their European partners were the obstacle.

All that said they never drove things to a critical rupture, although there were some very tough and nasty moments.

_Q: Were any of these people whom you had known in Paris in the mid ‘70s?_

JAEGGER: It’s interesting you should ask that. One of the young stars on the Quai d’Orsay’s Policy Staff in Paris at that time, who had been one of Warren Zimmermann’s interlocutors, was Benoit d’Aboville; a brilliant, powerful, enormously energetic young officer, a sort of junior Henry VIII type, clearly destined to become a star. By the mid-eighties d’Aboville had risen like a rocket and become the Quai’s Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and so the boss of the French NATO delegation, among others. In that capacity he would show up at NATO Council meetings, and even at Communiqué negotiating sessions, when issues of special importance to Paris were in play.
His tactic, when faced with NATO majorities, as he usually was, was to become harsher and harsher, to the point of throwing absolutely inexcusable tantrums. I particularly remember one Council meeting, when d’Aboville strode into the room halfway through the meeting, got the French Ambassador out of his chair with a gesture which implied, “if you were doing your job I wouldn’t have to come down here to do it for you,” and berated the Council in angry and impolite terms. When he failed to move anyone, D’Aboville, stormed out, slammed the door behind him, and left all of us, including Lord Carrington, shocked and open-mouthed at this inexcusable behavior.

*Q: Rather strange allies!*

JAEGGER: Well, he made enemies, and never made it to the top of French diplomacy. We met again in 1990 when he was French Consul General in New York - a plush but certainly not a very influential position - where he received me with open arms. We had a drink together and joked about the vigorous old days at NATO. Now all he was seeing was New York millionaires who liked to drink French wine.

*Q: Did the French position at NATO draw any sympathy for other NATO members?*

JAEGGER: Yes, depending on the issue. The Spanish and Italian delegations often supported them, although they were sometimes ready to compromise after making their obeisance to Paris as a result of allied pressures applied elsewhere. You have to keep in mind that exchanges on the whole range of alliance issues were not only going on at NATO but also bilaterally across Europe and with us in Washington. So that, for example, an issue, blocked by whoever, might also be discussed bilaterally in Bonn and the Germans might then ask their people in relevant NATO countries to further push for compromise. When you visualize that this sort of thing was going on continually across the whole range of major and sometimes minor Embassies, you get a sense of the complexity and scope of alliance discussions, which ultimately reduced themselves to concrete decisions.

*Q: Can you give me an example of how this might work, let’s say, if one were the Political Counselor at the American NATO Mission?*

JAEGGER: Well, one would attend meetings and talk to people in the corridors and over lunch, until one had a pretty good fix on where the various countries stood on some particular issue, how much flexibility there was by whom and on what terms. One would then write a telegram to Washington, copied to all our Embassies in NATO countries….

*Q: …and they would then comment on that from their perspective…*

JAEGGER: Precisely. Depending on the question, still other Embassies, like Moscow, Geneva or Tokyo might be copied and contribute. As a result all our people in our major embassies would be as ‘au courant’ of almost everything that occurred at NATO as we were and be part of the discussion.
Q: Did Lord Carrington sometimes discuss specially sensitive matters with individual Ambassadors or more restricted groups than the NATO Council?

JAEGGER: Frequently, since the Secretary General can’t really serve as an intermediary or negotiator or discuss certain particularly sensitive or neuralgic issues when he is on the record as the impartial Chairman in the NATO Council.

Q: I would think that the ongoing quarrels of the Greeks and Turks, both NATO allies, would be one such subject requiring frequent handholding and intervention?

JAEGGER: Exactly. That was even true for me as Chairman of the Political Committee. You would think that Gorbachev and disarmament would have taken up the majority of my time and effort. Not so. The most time consuming and frustrating issue continually plaguing us during these years was the Greek-Turkish conflict, which had crystallized over Cyprus but found practical expression in constant recriminations in our Committee and at the NATO Council over alleged air space or naval violations by one side or the other, or all sorts of other slights, real or imagined.

Obviously this took up a great deal of Committee and Council time, since protests were constantly registered by one side or the other, then rebutted at length, leading to long, emotional exchanges. Our main interest was that this bilateral bickering not become so ferocious as to sour the whole atmosphere or interfere with the main business of the alliance. So we would try to get the Greeks and the Turks to come in and register their grievances to us in private, rather than carrying on endlessly in the official NATO bodies.

To an extent that worked, although not without cost. I still remember the many, exhausting meetings with our passionate and inflexible Greek representative, followed by the resigned, sad looking Turk, each delivering or reinforcing protests and telling me diametrically different tales about the latest outrage committed by one side or the other. Even though we tried to provide sounding boards and to conciliate, the issue still bubbled up constantly in the NATO Council, and sometimes even at the Ministerial level, when NATO’s Foreign Ministers convened.

Often, when the back and forth over some alleged incident went on too long, Carrington would call in the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors successively and ever so diplomatically suggest that they had made their points, and that NATO had to get on with its agenda. Even this didn’t always work, since, when things got to a real boil, there were passionate long speeches in Council by the Greek Ambassador, and the otherwise kind and wise Turkish Ambassador would rise to remind the alliance that they were providing sixty divisions on the USSR’s southern flank, and on one occasion, that there were Turkic speaking people all across Western and Central Asia who would someday make us all sorry that we were not taking the Turks and their concerns more seriously.

Q: Did the Kurdish and Armenian questions come up in your dealings with the Turks?

JAEGGER: While these are important, they are not directly relevant to NATO’s work and would just have added to the list of combustible inter-allied issues. Obviously everyone was aware of them as part of the background.
Q: Did you ever go to the Foreign Ministers meetings when they were held elsewhere? Any interesting anecdotes?

JAEGGER: Yes, to your first question, in Lisbon in ’85 and in Halifax in May ’86. At the Halifax Ministerial I was asked to be in charge of the advance team which makes sure that all the arrangements are in place.

Q: So what happened?

JAEGGER: We got there a few days before the meeting, checked into a huge barn of a hotel right on the harbor (now demolished), which had great views and lots of atmosphere and went about our preparations. All went well, until one of the NATO security people came to me and said, “Did you know that there is a Soviet merchant ship docked within a few hundred feet from this hotel, with quite a few antennas.” I had somehow overlooked the dreary-looking, rusting hull, but now realized that it was indeed sprouting a remarkable number of antennas. So I phoned the Operations Center at the State Department, was patched through to the Pentagon’s expert on Soviet intelligence ships and, bingo, had confirmation that our neighbor was a very powerful and well known member of that fraternity, clearly sent specially to Halifax to record our meeting. I was assured that they would easily be able to listen in to everything within, I think I remember, a half mile distance.

Q: Well, that was exciting and a challenge!

JAEGGER: Oh yes! The question then was what to do. I first tried to get the Canadians to move the ship, to have the harbor master tell them to anchor 10 miles down the river or wherever. To my amazement the Canadians did not want to risk an incident, and worried over the possibility that they might have to use force if the Russians refused to move, which they were not prepared to do.

So I got word to George Shultz, who was underway to Halifax, outlined the situation and suggested that we only had two options, pressure the Canadians to move the ship or move the NATO Ministerial, unless we wanted to give a verbatim record of all the proceedings to the Russians on a silver platter. He chose the second option, and we moved the Ministerial on something like six hours notice to Government House, a safe distance away. I always wondered what the KGB folks on the ship thought when they realized they had made the trip to Canada for nothing.

Q: We haven’t yet discussed the military and their role at NATO?

JAEGGER: The operational command, as you know, was and still is in Mons, some way outside of Brussels, the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), by tradition always an American four star general. Overall military policy questions are decided in NATO’s Military Committee, chaired by a three star, whose members are normally two star officers. The Military Committee, like the Political Committee reports to the NATO Council and so is part of the Secretary General’s domain.
Although the Political and Military Committees had a liaison mechanism our work tended to be discrete. I was occasionally invited to Mons for briefings and had good personal relations with a number of key people on the military side, notably Admiral Jonathan Howe, the Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee, later Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe and Deputy Assistant to President George HW Bush for National Security Affairs; as well as with my old friend from Quebec, General Francois Richard, the Canadian Military Representative at NATO, who, a soldiers’ soldier, found the high-level bureaucracy trying, in spite of all the perks.

The most gripping military exposure came in the annual Top Secret WINTEX exercises, an annual NATO wide war game, played as a paper exercise at NATO headquarters, but involving many real exercises by NATO units in the field. The scenario always began with a growing number of incidents suggesting that something unusual was afoot, building up to a crescendo that there was a possibility of Soviet attack. It was at that point that the actual exercise would start.

Q: Who were the players at the top level?

JAEGGER: Everyone, first meeting separately in their respective committees, then jointly under Carrington’s chairmanship in a specially equipped large conference room where new developments were displayed on a large screen. As it became clear that the Soviet armies were on the move, there were increasingly realistic discussions as to how the alliance should respond, since we theoretically had the whole gamut of western resources at our disposal. Real time mock decisions would be made involving military movements, preparedness, civil defense etc, and mock communiqués of increasing urgency and seriousness were drafted, agreed and issued, warning the Soviets to desist or face serious, in the end nuclear consequences. So over the three week period of the exercise, tension would gradually rise to a climax, until, after more and more serious incidents, the scenario would have Soviet armies actually cross into NATO territory.

At was at this point that the alliance was, of course, faced with the issue of nuclear use, since it was understood that our conventional forces were not sufficient to repel them or even to hold them at the Rhine. This meant that targets and the numbers and sizes of nuclear strikes had to be picked, a wildly eerie exercise which brought home the utter seriousness of what we were facing and about to do. Even though everybody knew this was an exercise, we had all, by this time, been living in this imaginary scenario for over two weeks and, in this large room full of generals, admirals and diplomats, the crisis had become intensely real.

I had always naively assumed that the political people just give the go ahead, and that the military would do the rest. Actually, it makes a huge difference whether you, for example, decide on one minimal nuclear strike as a signal to the other side that we are serious, or whether we go blasting off with all barrels, precipitating global nuclear war.

Since the point was to get the Soviets to go home, the calibration of the responses at this stage were therefore crucial - what targets, how many kilotons, by what delivery means and for what reasons.

Q: Incidentally, I assume that the French were not involved in these exercises?
JAEGGER: Besides their diplomatic representatives, the French always had a military observer, a French two star general, who sat on the Military Committee. So they were in effect participants whose views counted and observers at the same time.

Q: Oh, I see.

JAEGGER: So these really chilling decisions had to be made, and made very rapidly, since the scenario would continue to show massive Soviet forward movement, accompanied by increasingly damaging sabotage operations across West Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Proposals would be made for a few low-kiloton strikes on air fields and other non-civilian targets, let’s say, in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, preceded by “final” warning messages to the Warsaw Pact.

What was riveting was that the ensuing rapid discussion did not only focus on the likely military effectiveness of this response, but on member countries’ interest in and relations with the targeted countries. Thus the Germans would press vigorously for eliminating or reducing East German targets to a minimum, even though that’s where the bulk of the Warsaw Pact forces were, and preferred strikes elsewhere among the Soviet satellites. The French diplomats wanted to go easy on the Poles, and so forth. But time pressure forced conclusions, since the Generals and Lord Carrington would force a decision lest we be too late. The exercise ended when, after further escalations and warnings, nuclear strikes were actually ‘ordered’ and the scenario, rather unrealistically, concluded that this had persuaded Moscow and its Allies to withdraw. It was hip hip, hurrah, and NATO wins again!

And so we would leave this confined world of nuclear horrors into the daylight of the ‘real’ world, blinking at the bright lights like the prisoners in Fidelio emerging from their prison, much more keenly aware of what a real showdown would involve if mutual deterrence failed.

One of the many unanswered questions was, whether in case of a real attack, governments would actually wait for NATO to have its meetings in a flimsy headquarters building susceptible to easy sabotage or attack.

Q: Obviously war games like this would expose NATO’s most secret nuclear capabilities and plans. Were people afraid of Soviet and Warsaw Pact espionage?

JAEGGER: That’s a fascinating question. Since a military alliance of, at the time, 16 nations involved thousands of people who to varying degrees were privy to security matters, the issue of espionage and Soviet or Warsaw Pact penetration was obviously on people’s minds; although, psychologically, the normalcy of headquarters life tended to dull one’s instincts.

NATO did have a security division under an American security expert, who presumably liaised with the alliance’s security and intelligence services. Since he reported only to the Secretary General in private, it was hard to know how effective this was and what was going on. There were rumors from time to time that someone had been dismissed for security reasons, but that could have been for anything from alcoholism to more serious indiscretions. Most of the time
they dealt with routine things like documents being left out at night, safes or doors being left unlocked, risky personal behavior, this kind of thing.

**Q: Did people think that NATO was penetrated?**

JAEGGER: That, of course, was the real question, since KGB and other Warsaw pact agents had, very occasionally, been uncovered in the past. While this was the continuing worry, there was an interesting counter-theory that this might actually not be a bad thing. The message their spies would take back to Moscow would be that, yes, NATO really was committed to using its nuclear deterrent if attacked, thus reinforcing the deterrent message, but had no plans for its part to attack the Warsaw Pact, as Soviet propaganda had long claimed in describing NATO as an aggressive alliance.

**Q: Were any Warsaw pact agents uncovered during your time there?**

JAEGGER: No, but some years after I had left NATO I learned to my amazement that Rainer Rupp, one of the people in the economic section of my Political Directorate had ben arrested and tried in Germany as the Warsaw pact's arguably most successful spy at NATO. I knew Rainer quite well. He was nondescript, retiring, did solid, but far from brilliant work, punctually handed in all his assignments, never drew attention to himself and volunteered to go on occasional trips to give speeches about the alliance or to attend conferences as our representative. I remember approving several of these trips, including an unusual one to Tokyo. Rainer had persuaded me on the grounds that NATO officials don’t often get to Japan, and that it might be good thing for them to hear something about NATO. What none of us knew was that all this was simply the cover for his real work as a highly gifted and productive East German agent, who, I heard, also directed a network of other agents at NATO, including his wife who for a time worked as an assistant or a secretary for our Security Chief!

**Q: How did they find out that he was a mole?**

JAEGGER: I don’t know beyond the accounts I have found in researching this recently, one of which, from Wikipedia, is excerpted as follows:

“Born in East Germany, Rupp grew up in West Germany with strong leftist political leanings. In 1968, as a student in Mainz, work as a spy for the GDR was suggested to him, and he agreed out of conviction. He continued his studies in Brussels, was trained as a spy in East Berlin and was hired by NATO in 1977. He rose quickly in the ranks and provided photographs of some 10,000 pages to his bosses, including the precise location plans for the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II rockets in Western Europe, as well as the central MC 161 document (Cosmic Top Secret) which summarized the NATO strategy as well as NATO’s analysis of the Warsaw Pact and its intentions. These documents were promptly transferred to the KGB.”

“He would photograph documents in his office, or take them home and photograph them in his wine cellar. He met contact persons all over Europe and received instructions via number stations, radio programs broadcasting messages encrypted as number sequences. His British wife
knew about his activities and tried to persuade him to stop. He later said “At the time I did it, I believed it to be my moral duty.”

“NATO did not have any knowledge of the existence of Topaz until GDR officer Heinz Busch defected in 1990. Busch however did not know the identity of Topaz. Several meetings of the secret services of a number of countries ensued with the aim of identifying Topaz, who took part in some of those meetings. With the help of GDR files that had fallen into the hands of the CIA after the dissolution of the GDR, Rupp was caught in 1993, while on vacation in Germany. He confessed and received a prison sentence of 12 years in 1994. He was released early in July 2000.”

“In an interview for the Channel 4 programme ‘1983: The Brink of Apocalypse’, about exercise Able Archer 83, broadcast in the UK on 5th January 2008, he said that he had transmitted the message that NATO was not launching a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR during the exercise to his KGB controllers. He did this by way of encoding a message on a device disguised as a calculator which then turned the message into a short electronic burst which could be transmitted to a set telephone number. He viewed this as vital to preventing a Soviet pre-emptive strike against NATO forces. It was also stated that he chose the code name TOPAZ himself. More can be learned about Rupp’s shadowy history from www.rickhyatt.freeservers.com, where photos and other evidence is presented that he actually was “Turned” by the CIA in 1977. The net effect is that he was kicked upstairs to NATO economist so as to pass over false information to the KGB. Thereby, he got much less jail time than he would have otherwise.”

In retrospect, our theory that credible Soviet awareness that NATO was not planning a first strike was actually useful to us, was borne out. Even so, its a strange experience to have had a top Warsaw Pact agent in your own office. As to the veracity of the claim on the cited web site that Rupp may have been a turned US agent, I have no idea.

Q: Did you ever run into any other spies in your career?

JAEGGER: The only other one was the alleged spy Felix Bloch, the Vienna-born Foreign Service officer reportedly caught by the French in Paris passing a leather bag to a known Soviet agent. Pat and I had known him and his wife in Washington, where I had carpooled with him for a number of months. Stiff, punctiliously dressed and a bit haughty in bearing, Felix was highly competent but never much fun or a good sport.

Strangely, I almost became his successor as Deputy Chief of Mission In Vienna after my NATO assignment, where Felix had served under both Reagan’s former Assistant Helene van Damm and Ronald Lauder. I went there for an interview and had dinner with Felix and his wife at their house in Doebling. He was friendly and reasonably outgoing as always and raised my antennas only by his almost manic pride in his vintage silver Mercedes, which stood spotlessly polished and gleaming in his garage.

As it turned out, Lauder and I didn’t hit it off, since he seemed to be looking more for a PR man than a DCM.
Q: I remember the case well. Bloch was reported to have been into kinky sex, is that how he was entrapped?

JAEGGER: That’s the story. The most prevalent hypothesis is that he was blackmailed by the STASI, the East German Intelligence Service, over his sexual proclivities during an earlier tour in East Berlin, since, being an aristocratic type, he clearly detested communism and the Soviet system and would not have worked for them for ideological reasons. At any rate, the FBI never managed to make a case against him, since they couldn’t prove what was in the leather bag. When last heard from he was driving a school bus in Georgia.

Curiously, in neither the Rupp nor the Bloch cases was I ever contacted by the FBI, although I obviously knew both well.

Q: What other memorable types cropped up during this assignment?

JAEGGER: Although in no way related to espionage, my most difficult personnel problem at NATO involved an Italian diplomat, a tall, sad-looking, elegantly attired man, who was for a time head of my economic section. Although of a famous family, highly cultivated and well read, he embodied the challenges international staffing poses in organizations like NATO and the UN.

In brief, he arrived, each day, attended my staff meetings, passed on the assignments, closed his office door and often did nothing further until he left in the evening. When I gave him direct personal assignments, the product was almost always pedantically detailed and for all purposes useless. After some months his small staff rebelled and asked me to intervene, since they felt they were unfairly carrying his part of their sometimes heavy workload. When repeated efforts to motivate him failed to produce results, I took the fateful step of asking the NATO personnel system to transfer him to another job.

Then things got sticky. Within days the Italian Ambassador to NATO invited me to lunch at his residence, and after an elegant meal and expressions of admirations for America and myself, made it clear over coffee and cordials that, on this little matter of my Italian staffer, I needed to understand that his wife was related to the Foreign Minister, that he came from a distinguished family and was a very nice man, none of which I disputed. He then explained rather less subtly that I needed to reverse course, since otherwise my own career might suffer. The Mafia couldn’t have done better.

What’s more, when I didn’t budge, he took the matter to Lord Carrington, and to the American Ambassador. Both called me in, and Carrington, in particular, listened very carefully. Shortly thereafter my Economic Section chief left NATO. What followed was, to me, the most incredible part of the story. He was given a major promotion and made Deputy Chief of the Italian Mission to the European Communities! If I am correctly informed he eventually rose to be an Italian Ambassador in two important Mediterranean countries. I hope, for their sake, that he made up in charm and diplomatic grace what he so sadly lacked in drive and motivation.
It all drove home the difficulties of international organizations whose staffs are seconded by governments. Although some are excellent, the whole is diluted by nepotism, as in this case, and by the tendency by others to slough of weaker people. Still, we somehow managed.

**Q:** On still another front, did you job involve much public relations work, since this was, if I remember correctly, part of the Political ASG’s domain?

**JAEGGER:** Yes, a great deal. Since there were only a few of us at the higher political levels in the NATO structure, I was continually being asked by our information people to give briefings to academic groups, members of Congress, media types and miscellaneous groups of students, interested organizations etc. There were often requests as well for speeches in other NATO countries, which offered opportunities for travel. It was a very enjoyable part of the work.

**Q:** Which ones stand out in your memory?

**JAEGGER:** One was my trip to speak on NATO issues at Marmara University in Istanbul. Before me in the auditorium sat several solemn rows of Turkish generals, officials and professors, behind which were a crowd of journalists and students. I gave my talk and all went well until, toward the end of the question period, a student got up and asked how NATO managed to keep its 16 nations coordinated, working in lockstep.

I didn’t think of the implications and gave him a very dumb answer: “Well,” I said, “running NATO is a bit like it must have been running a Turkish harem,...”

**Q:** Laughter

**JAEGGER:** “… obviously quite the wrong thing to say!

**Q:** And the Turks don’t have a sense of humor, at least about harems.

**JAEGGER:** That’s right. But it seemed to have passed off all right and everybody said I gave a pretty good speech. So I went back to my hotel feeling generally pleased. However when I was leaving the next morning, the concierge said, “Oh sir, I think you should know there’s a demonstration against you outside! Perhaps you would like to leave by another door?”

**Q:** Laughter

**JAEGGER:** When I peaked through a curtain I saw Turkish ladies marching around before the entrance carrying large signs saying, “NATO opposed to women’s liberation!” and various journalist and photographers recording the scene! Needless to say, I used the hotel’s rear door!

When I got back to Brussels and attended the Secretary General’s staff meeting the next meeting, Lord Carrington gave me a searching look and said, “I hear, George, that you had quite a good time in Istanbul!”

**Q:** Laughter
JAEGER: Which was as close to a reprimand as I ever got.

Q: Well you survived that scrape. Were there any others?

JAEGER: There was a NATO tradition that about once every 10 years one of the senior people would visit Iceland, the smallest member of the alliance, to call on people and give some talks. It being about time, and partly at the instigation of my very effective Icelandic staffer, Gunnar Palsson, I promoted the idea that I should make a 10-day trip to Iceland.

Q: Was Iceland a military member of NATO?

JAEGER: Its a bit of an anomaly. Iceland is a Charter member of the alliance, but has no military of its own, and, by agreement, is under US military protection.

Q: And we had the important naval listening post at Keflavik...

JAEGER: .. which enabled us to detect Soviet fleet movements into the Atlantic.

Q: So you made a NATO trip to Iceland?

JAEGER: I did and was received most warmly on my arrival. I made, not just the front page, but virtually the whole front page of the main newspaper with my first speech!

Q: Like in the Magdalene Islands in Quebec?

JAEGER: That’s right. I was wined and dined and gave talks all around the island, including one at the very northern end of Iceland in a pleasant arctic port called Akureyri, the second city of Iceland, where there is a famous bird sanctuary nearby.

Q: How did your speeches go?

JAEGER: Well, I would give whatever the standard NATO briefing speech was, which went well, but found that the same question always popped up afterwards: “If there were war with the Soviet Union,” they would ask, “would the NATO navies use nuclear weapons which would kill all of our fish?”

Nobody had prepared me for this! I had no idea how many fish an underwater nuclear blast would kill and in what radius. Moreover, if I gave the impression that the price of being a good ally would be the loss of their main industry, NATO in Iceland would be in serious trouble. So I had to think fast on my feet.

I assured them, making it up out of whole cloth, that while the nuclear weapons were deadly against Soviet naval vessels, they had a very limited effect on under water fish! Even in case of war the Icelandic fishery industry would therefore be perfectly all right. I promised, that I would
of course tell the Secretary General of their concern and that we would do our best, in case of nuclear war, to make sure that not too many fish got killed!

In retrospect it was the only occasions in my career when I lied deliberately to avoid what might have been a significant NATO crisis. I apologize to Iceland!

_Q: Before we move on, what was it like to live in Brussels?_

JAEGGER: Brussels was a delight. Although a large city, it has huge gardens and parks, and competes favorably with Paris as a culinary nirvana. What’s more its close to Bruges, Ghent and other more or less preserved mediaeval towns and villages, is not far from the channel coast and near the great battlefields of Flanders where so much blood was spilled in the world wars.

I often went there and drove around among the myriad war cemeteries, which offer powerful lessons why statecraft must, above all else, creatively preserve the peace. I was specially moved by the famous battlefield at Vimy Ridge, where something like 200,000 men lost their lives in the course of World War I and 10000 Canadian casualties were incurred in a few days in their famous offensive in April 1917. I had represented the US on a number of drizzly Armistice Days in Quebec City when their memory was honored at the memorial below the Citadel.

On a lighter note, official entertaining in Brussels was intense, since so many countries have not one but two or three Embassies there, one accredited to Belgium, and others, as applicable, to NATO and the European Community. So, adding all the other invitations one tended to get in the higher levels at NATO from military colleagues and local contacts and friends, the amount of entertaining was sometimes overwhelming, since one tended to be on everybody’s guest lists.

_Q: Too much of a good thing._

JAEGGER: Since waiters tended to come from only a few catering establishments, it got to the point where they would greet you at the door of whichever Embassy you happened to be invited to and say things like: “Messr. Jaeger, the Martini as usual, with just a little Vermouth?”

_Q: Laughter_

JAEGGER: So if one wasn’t involved in the endless bickering between the Walloons and the Flemish, it was an atmosphere of delightful corruption!

_Q: All in all, it sounds like another rich and fascinating tour. When did you leave and what happened next?_

JAEGGER: My tour ended in the late spring of ‘87 and after a certain amount of back and forth with Senior Personnel I accepted an assignment as Diplomat-in-Residence at Middlebury College in Vermont. There had again been talk of a small African Embassy, but Christina, now a young adolescent lady, needed a bit of stability. So we thought it wisest not to go overseas again, but to do a state-side assignment and Middlebury clearly filled the bill.
We had a lovely send-off. Lord and Lady Carrington graciously gave us a splendid goodbye lunch at his manorial residence and Marcello Guidi, the kind, gentle, and rather unhappy Deputy Secretary General, who had become a friend, offered a large reception. It was a good feeling for Pat and myself that, despite occasional ups and downs, our work really had been appreciated. In the meantime I had also received a further promotion to Minister Counselor in the Senior Foreign Service. So it was with a sense of accomplishment that we headed home for, what turned out to be our last assignment in the Foreign Service.

RUDOLF V. PERINA
Political Officer & Deputy U.S. Representative, NATO
Brussels (1985-1987)

Ambassador Perina was born in Czechoslovakia when that country was under communist control. He escaped with his family to Morocco, then Switzerland and finally the United States. The ambassador was educated at the University of Chicago and Columbia University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1974, Mr. Perina specialized in Military-Political Affairs at posts abroad, including Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna and Belgrade. In Washington he served on the National Security Council, specializing in Soviet issues. From 1998 to 2001 Mr. Perino was US Ambassador to Moldova. Ambassador Perina was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006

Q: So from 1985 until 1987 you were at the NATO Mission in Brussels. What did you do there?

PERINA: I was a political officer and the Deputy U.S. Representative to the Political Committee of NATO. I had a number of other portfolios, among which were the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. President Reagan started this negotiation. The talks were basically three simultaneous negotiations on START, INF and SDI, headed by Max Kampelman on our side. Kampelman was the overall delegation head and did the SDI talks, Mike Glitman headed the INF discussions, and Senator John Tower headed the START team. It was intended as a comprehensive arms control discussion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Because the talks were bilateral but related directly to NATO policies, the three negotiators regularly came up to Brussels from Geneva to brief the North Atlantic Council. At the beginning, they came every month or two, though the pace slackened as the talks started bogging down. Nonetheless, I was always the control officer for these visits, as well as for a number of visits by President Reagan, who came to NATO several times for summit-level meetings of the Council.

As I said earlier, this is where I saw further evidence of what an important issue SDI was to the Soviet Union. Everything that Max Kampelman and the negotiators reported to NATO bore this out. The Soviets were very afraid of SDI and wanted desperately to find ways of stopping or restricting it. But it was something that Reagan—rightly or wrongly—believed in very strongly and would not negotiate away.
Q: I recall that at one point Reagan made a proposal to share the technology with the Soviets so that we could each stop the other’s missiles.

PERINA: Right. But the Soviets were convinced it was a trick. They could not believe that we would really share such technology with them, since they would never share it with us if tables were turned.

Q: Were you getting the sense that the advent of the computer age and high tech was playing into this?

PERINA: This is exactly what I was going to say. You have to put this in the context of the revolution that was taking place in the United States and in the West, with average people starting to acquire personal computers, and kids growing up at home and in school with computer skills. The Soviets saw all this, and they were terrified. Their own kids were still working with an abacus in most of their schools. They saw themselves falling behind technologically in a way that would be qualitative and devastating. They never expressed it that way but one could sense it in talks with them. I was not an expert on SDI. I didn't know if it would or would not work. But I saw it as a useful ploy to motivate the Soviets to change to a freer, more open system that could keep pace with Western technological development. Their closed, authoritarian system just could not do that. In conversations, they always tried to pick up on Western skepticism and say “Well, SDI won't work and even your own experts say it won’t work.” But I would answer something like “Well, you know, if you can build a missile that can fly 5000 miles and hit a square block, don't you think it would be easier to find some way to throw that missile off course?” They were very scared that this was indeed true and we would beat them to doing it.

Q: What was your impression of the NATO apparatus? You had been working with two other allies in Berlin but this was now the entire Alliance trying to work in tandem.

PERINA: My overwhelming impression from NATO was that this was basically a U.S. run organization. One could really sense that. Most of the Allies were quite deferential to the United States, the French always being a certain exception. In fact, most of the delegates at NATO tended to be even more pro-American than their governments, or at least they tried to give us that impression. In my time, we never had a really heated discussion at NATO, even though I think many Allies were skeptical of some of our policies such as INF deployment and SDI. Whenever Kampelman and his colleagues came up, the questions were invariably softball in nature. NATO was a club and largely our club. It was a very friendly environment for the U.S.

Q: What was your impression at the time of how much chance the nuclear and space talks had of succeeding?

PERINA: The talks never got very far. The Soviets could not stop either SDI or INF deployment. The major obstacle to INF was Western European resistance, not Moscow. Eventually arms control talks were all overtaken by events when the Warsaw Pact and later the Soviet Union came apart. It was a whole new ballgame.
Q: From your vantage point, how did you view Reagan and his presidency?

PERINA: When I was at NATO I didn't know that my next assignment would be the National Security Council where I would work with him much more closely. At NATO, I had mixed views. He certainly came into office with very hardline, conservative views that gave me concern. The Iran Contra scandal, which happened while I was at NATO, was likewise cause for worry about his presidency. But I also felt that some of his ideas, like SDI, were quite astute tactically, whether or not they could actually be implemented. So it was a mixed picture, and I had mixed views. But I did not feel I really knew him well until I worked on the National Security Council staff, to which I was recruited from NATO in 1987.

LANGE SCHERMERHORN
Economic Officer
Brussels (1985-1988)

Ambassador Schermerhorn was born and raised in New Jersey and educated at Mt. Holyoke College. Entering the Foreign Service in 1966, she had several assignments in the State Department in Washington dealing with a variety of administrative and political matters. Her overseas posts include Colombo, Saigon, Teheran, London, and Brussels, where she served twice. In 1992 she was named US Ambassador to Djibouti, where she served until 2000. Ambassador Schermerhorn was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Did you have a feeling that your reports back to Washington, that our EB (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs) bureau was changing or using it? How did you feel about that?

SCHERMERHORN: We got very little feedback, as I said. Like the tax treaty you dealt with somebody in the Treasury Department and then we did something, which I don’t know if it’s still being done, called an economic trends report twice a year and we had an FSN who put this together and it went back and got printed by the Department of Commerce and they sell it to people or whatever they do anymore. There was a traditional format for that and that talked a lot about the economy of the country, the GNP (Gross National Product), the budget issues, the debt situation and that kind of stuff. We did that kind of traditional thing. But in terms of advocacy we were getting into, as I said, very specific issues like export controls, which of course had a security dimension. This was really a security issue but we were talking about products, dual use products as it was. This was still a function because the entities that dealt with this were in economic format or structure.

Another very interesting area, which again was in the economic section but makes it seem like kind of a hash, we had a regional organization called Euro Control, which was the air controllers for Europe, and their headquarters were in Brussels. So when we had aviation policy issues we’d talk to them. We did that as the bilateral embassy because it was a regional organization in our host country; it was not at that time part of the EU structure. It may be folded into that now.
Q: From an economic perspective, were you or others of your ilk concerned about the development of the European Union? Did we see this as a good thing or a potential real problem for us as a trade rival and all of that?

SCHERMERHORN: I think no. The policy seemed to me to be we were in favor and I think that we thought that it would be easier to deal with people. I think at that point it was still so new we weren’t sure where it was going. You could see that it had moved off the dime that it had been on for a long time. Where it was going to go, I don’t know. However, there were some voices who were talking very favorably about it, I think, and one of them was Mike Calingaert, whom I’ve mentioned earlier, who had just retired. He wrote a monograph on this whole question of the European Union and where it was going and he came to Brussels and we set up some appointments for him. He did it for something called the National Policy Association, I think it is. He had just retired at that point.

Q: We were watching the development from an American perspective of overregulation coming out of the European community.

SCHERMERHORN: At that point the perception wasn’t that it was overregulation. Of course what was so interesting about this, and still is, is at one point we were saying harmonization, but we have a very low level of harmonization in the U.S. We’re not a centralized community at all in this regard. What we were finding, interestingly enough, which reflects on Belgium as the classical north south fusion of…They did a study – this is when I was there the second time, so it’s jumping ahead a little bit – when they are talking about harmonization they found that they did a league table and there were some states that had a high ratio of bringing their legislation into conformance with these EU guidelines. Then there was another table of the countries that actually were enforcing what you were doing; and of course Belgium was very high on bringing it into conformance and they were almost at the bottom with implementing this and making it stick; and this is very classical because people describe Belgium as a country that legislates with Teutonic precision and enforces with blatant laissez faire.

Q: How did you find the social life there, including the beer drinking and all of that?

SCHERMERHORN: As I said, it’s probably for Americans more like living in America than any place can be. There’s this sufficiently large American community and an international school which is largely run along American lines. Also, because we have military there, there’s also a DODDS school, Department of Defense school, and that became an issue because they used to say they would only pay the education allowance to go to that school. However, because it wasn’t a very big school it didn’t offer as many things for the high school level so people wanted to use the international school. That became quite a cause celebrate apparently. That was before I got there.

We have military there not because we any longer have line troops stationed there, but we have so many staff people at NATO and we have a defense attaché in the embassy and so forth. When I was there, there was a base called Floren which is where these INF missile things were and we had a unit there but that’s all gone now.
Q: You left there when?

SCHERMERHORN: In the summer of ’88.

Q: You were to come back later on, but did you see Belgium going any way?

SCHERMERHORN: When I was there the minister of plan was a thirty-three year old from the right wing party, Guy Verhofstadt – a becoming man – and there was increasing agitation from the Flemish region for more autonomy. In fact, there was a very hard right minority that wouldn’t say they were Nazi at that point but some people have accused it of being a lunatic fringe minority, which has grown as it has in all of the countries of Northern Europe; it’s gotten larger since then. There was increasing agitation for autonomy, decentralization, devolution – whatever they were calling it – although there hadn’t been any measures yet.

Another part of it, was economic because the Flemish said, “Okay, we were downtrodden for years; now we’re on the upswing. We have the skills [and whatever]. Why should we put into a central treasury and transfer money to those lazy Walloons down there?” So it gets down to finances. But you know in Belgium they always used to complain about the confiscatory tax structure, but you have to laugh at that. It would have been confiscatory if they had paid them; tax avoidance was a great art form and a sport, as it is in most of these countries in Europe. They complain about it, but in fact…I used to say after a while, “Yes, you don’t have as much discretionary income, but on the other hand I don’t hear you talking about what every middle class person in the United States talks about: how to pay to educate their children and how to pay for their healthcare. So you have a choice.”

MICHAEL E.C. ELY
Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1987-1990)

Michael E. C. Ely was born in Washington, DC on August 26, 1929. He received a bachelor’s degree from Princeton University and a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University. He served in the U.S. Army for two years. Mr. Ely’s career included positions in Kuala Lumpur, Algiers, Mogadishu, Rome, Tokyo, Paris, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Today is April 22, 1993, and we continue. Mike, you went to Brussels from ’87 to ’90. What were you doing?

ELY: I was deputy chief of the US Mission to the European Community. As I mentioned during our last conversation, because of the supercomputer episode I thought that my utility in Tokyo was going to be restricted. When the director general of the Foreign Service asked if I was interested in becoming deputy chief of the US Mission to the European Community, I decided, yes, this was probably a good thing to do. Also, I found working in Japan strenuous. I enjoyed it
and found it stimulating, but it was a struggle. Each day, every day was fight, fight, fight, either within the embassy or with the Japanese.

Q: *One question about with the Japanese. Did you find that you had to go out a lot at night to sort of business dinners and things like that? I speak from my experience in Korea, and these were a little bit difficult, because it meant a lot of heavy drinking.*

ELY: With the Japanese it was not the same. American businessmen had to do the drinking business, both the locally resident and the visitors. We foreign officials were considered in a different category. We had to participate in all kinds of official entertaining, but not in going out, eating and drinking and taking our hair down with our Japanese counterparts. So that part of the work was not particularly onerous.

However, I became friends with Karel von Wolfran, who was one of the founders of the revisionist school of analysis of Japan. I found that I was then, and am now, in full agreement with von Wolfran in his characterization of Japan as a country where everybody collectively and nobody individually is in charge. Dealing with the country is very difficult. An individual can hardly engineer a common appreciation of what he's trying to do among people whose agreement will be necessary for decision. Accordingly, you end up chipping away with individuals and making very little progress.

I found it (and I'm not the first) quite a frustrating experience -- Bill Clinton being the latest member of this club, with the Japanese saying yes, but they really mean no. The Japanese are very embarrassed by that but know there's some sort of American truth in it.

Anyhow, I left Japan after two years, glad to have been there, wiser, maybe a little bit sadder, and went off to Brussels.

And that was a different kind of sad experience.

I was told by the ambassador to whom I was reporting that I could not take any time in transit, I had to come immediately. I took two days leave. When I arrived in Brussels, I was met by a junior member of the mission, went home and a telephone call came in from the ambassador's secretary: Was I planning to come in right away? I did. And that began a long process, which I don't think is appropriate for me to go into.

Q: *Well, I think it's interesting. I don't want to overpress you, but I do want to press you a bit. We're trying to get not just the foreign relations, but how the system works or doesn't work and all that. So, however you feel. Who was the ambassador?*

ELY: His name was Alfred Kingon. He'd been the secretary of the White House Cabinet committee on the economy. His successor was Eugene McAllister, who's just leaving as assistant secretary for economic and business affairs in the Department of State. Both men are quite difficult and are not thought to get along very well with other people, or be effective with them.

Kingon was parachuted into the job [in Brussels]. He was the second political appointee to have
that position. It is not suitable for political appointees. Foreign Service officers say that about all jobs, but this particular one it is true.

**Q:** Yes, I would think. I mean, you're dealing with a big bureaucracy, one where you really have to know the territory.

ELY: That's right. Your political connections in the party do you little good. Your ability to understand and express complicated ideas, to be on top of a whole series of areas where the US and the European Community were interfacing -- trade was the most important, but there were lots of others -- transportation, finance, regulatory considerations, trade rounds -- and to penetrate the complicated European institutional structures, to understand them and become influential with the Europeans, is very difficult.

George Vest, who was the ambassador minus two before, although not a specialist on economic matters in any respect was very effective. He'd had political skills with people, understanding them and getting their trust, conveying to them ideas and situations. Vest was also an intellectual who could win their respect.

Kingon had none of these abilities. He's an extraordinarily insecure man. He trusts no one. I thought I could gain his trust over time by being responsive and by being unthreatening, by being loyal. But this made no difference. In his eyes it made me more dangerous. It meant that I was being very skillful in trying to conceal my true purposes.

He changed his mind all the time. He would bring the staff in and make elaborate plans for travel programs, and then scrap them. Or the night before he would leave, he'd start making telephone calls to his secretary to change the reservations. She would change them several times. The next day, he'd decide not to go.

Kingon was both very insecure and self-important. He considered himself an extraordinarily important person, and wanted to be treated that way. At the same time, he was obsessively suspicious of his two ambassadorial colleagues in Brussels -- the bilateral ambassador and the ambassador to NATO -- and saw in everything they did elaborate schemes to achieve procedural preeminence over him, and of their missions over our mission. He would have nothing to do, in substance, with the other two chiefs of mission, and he forbade or would try to restrict contact between our staff and their staffs. A bad idea, I thought.

**Q:** Well, how did this affect the staff?

ELY: I tried to be the buffer between the staff and this strange and difficult man, who had the habit of calling all the section chiefs in several times a day to have long meetings to discuss his travel plans or his social schedule, at the expense of their work output.

Indeed, one of the small fragments of guidance I got from Washington was that they hoped that I could get the work of the mission back up to snuff; it seemed that everybody was spending their time in meetings. It turned out that there was something to that.
I was not successful. For a while, I blamed myself. I now think that it was mainly the person that I was dealing with.

It was one of these classical no-win situations. If you try hard, you are interfering, you are taking over his prerogatives and getting on his territory, and you become threatening. But if you pull off, then you are derelict in your duties, you're not on top of the job, and you should be replaced. Either way, you could never get it right.

The more senior the people, the poorer his relations with them. He got on best with the younger officers, whom he would bring in without the participation of their superiors, the section chiefs, and have long talks with them about the work of the section, trying to get complaints from them to find out what they thought could perhaps be criticized. These were good young officers. They were puzzled and troubled by this process, but by and large, they did not get taken in by it.

Anyhow, Ambassador Kingon fired his DCM, his secretary, his gardener, everybody he could fire. He fired his social secretary, his housekeeper. He would screw up the accounts and then accuse his housekeeper of having mishandled them. It would have been amusing if there weren't people involved and livelihoods.

It was a bad period, probably the most disheartening period I ever had, professionally. There seemed to be no way out of it. I was at the point where I was ready to quit, and he was dissatisfied and ready to fire me. We tried and we smiled weakly at each other. He never took me into his confidence, and he would seldom accept any advice I gave him.

For example, he used to write bad telegrams. He wouldn't take people along with him when he would go out calling, and he was not a good writer. He prided himself on his writing, because he'd been editor of some financial papers in the New York financial area, but he wrote in a very inchoate, disorganized way. He would send these telegrams off to State, for Shultz, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; to Treasury, for the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; to the White House, for various people, for the vice president and the head of the NSC. And after a while, I said, "Well, you know, that's not really the way it's done. You can slug your telegrams, but you have to be careful, because very senior people don't read telegrams. That's done by their staffs."

His answer was, "Look, you don't know anything about this. You've never been a senior person like me. You've never served in these high levels. So, come on, don't give me your advice. Your advice is incorrect. It is not wanted."

So I stopped giving him advice.

Meanwhile, these telegrams were being put up at the Operations Center as jokes. This guy thought he was sending them all over the US government with the idea that they were going to be read avidly by those senior people. He would put on 17 slug lines.

After a while, he began to complain that he wasn't hearing anything from the recipients. And once again, I said, "Well, very senior people don't read telegrams, or very rarely. They have
staffs that read telegrams for them, and bring to their attention, usually in memo form, sometimes sending in the telegram, those important items that require their attention."

He never acknowledged any merit to this argument but after a while reduced the number of slugs and stopped covering the ridicule, to some extent.

He had been lined up with a member of the European parliament to make a protocol visit in Germany. The day before, he cancelled, leaving this fellow high and dry, who begged me (I don't speak a word of German) to come along as a substitute. I did and had a wonderful time, learning a lot about Germany. He had to keep introducing me as an ambassador. I would say, "But, but..."

And he'd say, "Mr. Ambassador..." and I had to help him out.

Ambassador Kingon was invited to a big conference by the European University Institute in Florence, to discuss US-European Community relations. He cancelled at the last moment. I went down and covered for him on that.

This was a behavioral pattern.

He didn't get on with the US-European Community Association. He didn't get along with the Atlantic Visitors Association. These were both American-sponsored organizations. He always wondered what their basic motivation was, why they felt that they could include him in their plans without his permission, et cetera.

He was not a wicked man or a bad man. He had a handicapped son to whom he was devoted. His wife and he had a close relationship. But basically he was a person so deficient that if I didn't dislike him so much I would pity him. An inferior person. Not unintelligent, with enough intellectual capacity to make him intrusive and unpleasant. You could not disregard him. He was untrustworthy, suspicious, poorly educated. He could not acknowledge that he didn't know anything, that there were areas that escaped his knowledge. He was always lecturing people on how wise he was and how much more he knew than other people.

He gave me two wretched efficiency reports. There was nothing I felt I could do about it, just litigate with him, and I was not going to do that.

After Reagan was defeated and Bush came into office, most people thought that he would leave. He didn't. He stayed on and on. It became clear that he wasn't going to be asked to remain, but he didn't leave. Eventually, this became the subject of some merriment. He allowed, well, he didn't know whether he was going to stay on or whether he would take a big job in the next administration.

Eventually he called everybody in and, with his usual tight little smile, said, well, he and his wife had been talking this over and decided that they had put up long enough with this official business. They were going to really put down this burden and go back to private life, with a sigh of relief. Lies, lies, lies. Quite characteristic.
He'd put together an arrangement with one of the public relations firms there, trying to play this period of representation into a substantive career. I think he got there halfway. Then his lack of skills with people eventually caught up with him. The last time I heard, he'd changed three secretaries in his tiny little office in New York, where he had an associate arrangement with a public relations firm.

Anyhow, that was a bad time. He eventually left and was replaced by his opposite, Thomas M. T. Niles, one of the best of our professionals.

Q: My problem with Tom Niles is that he was a junior officer with me in Belgrade, serving what I believe was his first tour overseas, and I always think of him as a young kid, just learning the trade.

ELY: Well, he still kind of acts that way, except he's got a photographic memory that works 12 hours a day. He is absolutely straight. He is honorable, good humored and energetic.

Q: Well, Mike, before we go to Tom Niles, let's talk about the Kingon period. Normally, the system works so that if you get a real klutz for an ambassador, career or non-career, which can happen either way, there is almost a self-sealing thing, where people take over around the ambassador, reports go back that maybe he or she doesn't see, the word gets out, and the work basically gets done. And not just with the Department of State, but with your opposite numbers and all that. Did you see any of this, or was he sort of running around so much that it was very difficult to do this sort of thing?

ELY: Well, he was very suspicious of anything that went on without his knowing about it, and I didn't feel free to do matters that might be questionable.

For the first year, I was very active as the DCM in representation, getting around. And people, such as the Israeli ambassador, who couldn't talk to Kingon got to know me well. I got to know some of the senior people in the commission. I couldn't really deal with the Commissioners; it wasn't appropriate that a number-two guy do that, and that would also upset Kingon. After a year or so, however, I must say I got discouraged. He didn't like that; it made him uneasy. He didn't try to stop me, but the more active I was, the more problems I had.

Q: Things have sort of simmered down, but they seemed to be building up to a crescendo, with the European Economic Community turning into a superpower. And the United States' relationship with that superpower were hypercritical.

ELY: Well, that's true.

Q: So what was happening?

ELY: Well, you've got to remember that the assistant secretary for European affairs was Roz Ridgway. Roz is a very intelligent, principled person. She's a NATO loyalist, and she never really has thought much about the European Community. She doesn't today. She considered this essentially an arrangement among Europeans, for Europeans, which could have benefits for
them, but which would have few for the United States, and which could also have a capacity for mischief. So she never thought that the position was terribly important. She had Kingon's number; she wouldn't pay any attention to anything that he said or did, which was correct. The EC was very low on her priorities.

She was, at the time, virtually destroying her health in her attempts to keep the NATO alliance up and functioning. She was living in the period after the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, which almost wrecked NATO. And she worked herself almost to death in support of the ambitious and difficult campaign that we'd run with the Europeans.

So EUR was not particularly either concerned or sympathetic with my plight. I got winks and nods occasionally, and that was about it.

Q: But what was happening was the system then was saying, okay, just disregard this guy and really everybody else there, and we'll go our own way.

ELY: I tried to help the staff, which is full of capable officers who knew well what they were doing. The Economic Section was a mess, but the officers who were assigned to it were good. By and large, the work got done. Some initiatives were on our side, some were reactive. But as the EC-1992 suddenly loomed out of the fog, our response was to get everybody a personal computer, with word processing capability. And we doubled the output merely by applying technology. By the time I left, USEC was, from the standpoint of reporting, the most productive post in the Foreign Service. That is because it didn't have a Consular Section or have an Admin. Section, or any representation. USIS was very small. All we did was negotiate and report. And we were very good at that, and still are.

Anyhow, when Niles came, it was totally different. While with Kingon, I was in one kind of a no-win situation, with Niles, I was in a much better one, but it was also no-win, because he's so good he doesn't need anybody. Initially, he would take me along on some of his calls, and I would do the reporting telegram. I found that he could do the reporting telegram better than I could. I'm good; he's better.

He arrived there in August and worked 11 hours a day, which was his normal day. He'd get in at eight and leave at seven. His secretary would get in at seven so everything would be ready for him when he got in at eight. I explained to him that August, when everything was closed down there, was normally a time when people would slacken off a little bit. He smiled and thanked me and continued his eleven-hour days, which turned out, of course, to be very sensible, because, while the Commission was not working, there were lots of things for him to catch up on. He did that during that period.

He was a joy to work with, except that he didn't need a deputy. You could almost abolish the mission. He was so good on each of the issues, having a photographic memory (he really does have a photographic memory, incidentally), that he could digest and master almost any issue, pick out the critical points, and handle it extremely well. These were bravura performances that I found impressive.
In addition to that, he as a person is honorable, and friendly. A little bit distant, in a sense. He would never drink too much or tell you a dirty joke, which is good in a way, but you never really felt that you were terribly close to him. But this is not criticism; I admire him very much. I was disappointed to see the rumor this morning in the paper that he's going as ambassador to Sweden. I don't know what the Swedes are going to do to keep him busy. He could handle Germany very well. Niles was put in charge of the Office of German Affairs back in the early ’70s, when Germany was...well, it still is extremely important, but when GER was perhaps one of the most important offices in the Department of State. Niles took early-morning German so he could learn to speak the language, which he proceeded to do within a year or so. So now he speaks Russian, Serbo-Croatian, French, and German.

Q: What were the major issues that you were dealing with, with the EC?

ELY: There were issues over which the mission had very little control. The central one of these was the Uruguay round and the hesitation waltz between us and the Europeans on how it was going to be put together. The trade negotiators on both sides tended to dominate this process. Working with trade negotiators is difficult, and working with European trade negotiators is even more difficult.

You probably are aware of the way that these negotiations take place. Both sides send forth their negotiators, who are very tough, smart people who know the issues, and who each seeks to out-negotiate the other or to beat the other. They often have old scores to settle. And they will battle over symbolic points as well as substantive points. The negotiators go at each other for a long period and eventually they come to a point where they can go no further. Each goes as far as he is prepared to go and feels his or her instructions permit him or her. And at that time, the political people step in and say, "Okay, you fellows have done all you can. Strike a deal." Then it normally happens, except for the Russians. With the Russians, you try to strike a deal, and of the distance that's remaining, they want to take it all and you take nothing.

For the Community, there was nobody to step in. The negotiators reported to the Commission, who then reported to the Council. There was nobody who was accountable for the success or failure of the negotiations, as there was on the American side. Indeed, finding accountability on the European side was always difficult, and this caused resentment among the American trade negotiators.

Meanwhile, among the Europeans, there were negotiators, particularly some of the old-timers who'd been around in the ’60s, for whom the test of manhood was the ability to hang one on the Americans and out-negotiate them.

So there was always a lot of static among the trade negotiators. And even if people had good instructions and wanted to come to an agreement, these old animosities tended to make simple things difficult. And both sides, looking ahead, would put a lot of symbolism on solutions to simple problems.

We had one on EC subsidies on pasta, as a manufactured agricultural product. Since the EC internal prices for durum wheat are higher than world prices, the EC claimed the right to
subsidize pasta exports to make up for the price differential. We contested the whole idea, it was a manufactured product primarily, not an agricultural product primarily. We negotiated for months over how the subsidy was to be calculated and how it was to be monitored. We were being fairly fastidious, careful, untrusting and stubborn, while the Europeans were being devious and less than candid. So that the negotiators were trying to outsmart each other. Now in this atmosphere our negotiators were reporting right back to USTR...

Q: United States Trade Representative.

ELY: That's right. So the negotiations were 80 percent out of our hands. And the European negotiators were reporting back to their faceless bureaucracy.

I was surprised and troubled by the fact that little things like this that I thought should be quickly resolved could not be resolved. And it was not in the power of the mission to do much about it.

In addition, as the deputy chief of mission, I was responsible for the administration of USEC, as it's called. USEC had no administrative section of its own. The three missions shared the combined administrative section called the JAS (Joint Administrative Support) Section.

NATO, in point of fact, also had a military administrative section, because it was a joint mission. And the military, boy, they took care of their people in a way the State Department never dreamed of doing. I don't want to exaggerate that, but we had continual problems.

The JAS was dominated by Flemish nationalists who were entrenched. There would been periodic scandals there as these entrenched people eventually...

Anyhow, these guys really thought the ambassador from Belgium was the real ambassador, and that my ambassador wasn't a real ambassador at all. He had the title, but he didn't have a country and he didn't know the king and queen of Belgium. We consistently came off second or third best. This was a problem for me and it made my life unpleasant, because I was always negotiating with the JAS directorate. They always tried to cut us back, and they refused to acknowledge that what we were doing was important. Well, I don't think they knew or they cared to know what USEC did, which was infuriating. What we were doing was much more important than the bilateral embassy, which had little to do, particularly after the short-range nuclear weapons issue had been settled. We had almost no diplomatic business with the Belgians, while NATO was a world rather apart and didn't really depend on JAS. But we couldn't get very much from those people. And Kingon was such a loose cannon. Well, they would get to him and complain to him about me, that I was being unreasonable and pushy. Well, I was not. If got tough on the budget, that was a problem, if I didn't get tough on the budget, that was a another problem. It was a variant of the no-win scenario.

Anyhow, when Niles came, he immediately straightened those guys out. He'd say what he wanted. He didn't ask, he didn't even listen to their response, he just did it. And they said, Yes sir, and soldiered on, because they knew they were up against somebody who knew what he wanted and was going to get it. And he wanted it not for prestige, but in order to accomplish his mission, which he then proceeded to do superbly.
Q: Mike, you were there dealing with European affairs on the economic side at the time of the collapse of the Soviet empire. Eighty-nine was the great year of everything falling apart, and that had to have very strong reverberations in the EC and on what we were doing. Or did it?

ELY: Well, it did. In the Versailles Summit of June '89, as the East was coming...

Q: This was the economic summit.


Q: Which was major nations.

ELY: Yes, Mitterrand hosted it at the Arche in Paris, and put on a big celebration.

Q: Because it was the bicentenary of the French Revolution, the fall of the Bastille and all that sort of thing.

ELY: That's right. One of the main substantive results of that summit meeting was the decision to coordinate all aid to Eastern Europe -- Eastern Europe initially, and eventually others of the ex-Soviet Union -- through the European Community. All the European member states plus the United States agreed that we would work together jointly. This was done in part for reasons of efficiency and in part because the United States didn't have a lot of money, didn't know quite what it wanted to do, and felt that basically this was a European responsibility that would be best, at least in the first instance, assured by getting the Europeans to be formally responsible for it.

By that time, the EC-92 exercise was fully underway and the early fears of Fortress Europe were beginning to recede. We did a lot of indirect work on Fortress Europe.

Q: Would you explain what Fortress Europe meant?

ELY: Yes. The Europeans, as early as 1985, had decided that they would take the measures envisioned in the Treaty of Rome to form an economic union, and this they would do by the end of 1992. They didn't get agreement among all their national parliaments by '86, and the program didn't begin, in a serious way, until '87. Even then, it was hung up by the disputes among the Europeans, but particularly the British, over the budget and the financing of the agricultural program.

In Denmark, in the spring of '88, these issues which had been plaguing the Community for years were suddenly solved and fell away. People immediately turned to constructing the single European market, the unified market, with a target of implementing several hundred directives by the end of 1992. This involved basically converting the European Community into a single market for labor, goods, money, and people, which is a fairly complicated business. It involves dismantling of impediments to movement within the Community for these four factors. Indeed, there are still a few obstacles to the movement of people. For example, the British won't let
European Community citizens in unscreened in Dover, for reasons that I can understand.

The immediate reaction was, well, gosh, if the Europeans are going to turn the EC into one market, very much like the United States (the single market is as unified a market as the American; in some respects more so), how will this be done? When they have to make a decision about whose ox gets gored; will it be the foreigners, or an open system?

By and large, under the influence of the Germans and the British, the single-market exercise was liberal and outward-turned. There were and still are several areas which cause acute concern in Washington. One was the financial services directive, in which the Europeans initially specified that they would require reciprocal treatment in order to give liberal treatment to foreign banks and financial institutions. The use of reciprocity in financial services was bitterly resisted by the United States. Our Treasury has always held to the principle of national treatment: you treat foreigners the same as you treat your own people, and because of regulatory prerogative, you don't talk about reciprocity. For example, the states in the United States have considerable authority over banking and insurance. We could not give mirror-image reciprocity to the Europeans. They could take away access to their market on the argument that their access to the United States' market was impaired by the states. The Europeans winked and nodded and said, "Well, they were really basically aiming at the Eastern Europeans, the Chinese and the Japanese, not the Americans." That may have been true, but American banks were acutely concerned about the principle and the practice of this directive. Sir Leon Britton, who is now negotiating with Mickey Kantor, was the competition commissioner who had a big voice in framing this directive. He eventually intervened and watered it down to the point where there was a fig leaf of reciprocity but in such a way as to assuage the fears of the American financial community. Both sides seem to have come out all right.

There were several other issues, including European local content requirements for certain electronic components, particularly semiconductors; flirting with various kinds of industrial policies that took place (they were never actually implemented, but they appeared to be in the process of formulation); the fact that the Community maintained very substantial tariffs on electronic goods when we and the Japanese had gone to zero tariffs (this raised questions about their intentions).

On television broadcasting, the French pushed for and achieved the principle of national or European quotas, to assure European content to television broadcasting, a measure which we found both insulting, because it gave, say, the Portuguese better coverage in Europe than the United States, and protectionist, because it seemed aimed at the enormous quantity of movies we have stored away and which we were selling to the Europeans; and to reflect a French idea that American culture is basically bad, and Europeans should be protected from it and its corrupting nature by trade barriers.

Jack Valenti, the very powerful head of the Motion Picture Producers Association, visited Brussels several times. Dealing with Valenti is difficult; he's a very deft and skillful political operator with no particular interest in US-EC relations.

Meanwhile, the Europeans kept telling us, "Well, look, this is better than the 12 national systems
that its replaces. The intent is not protective. We had to compromise somewhere. We went a long way toward your viewpoint. This is going to do you a lot of good; it is not going to hurt you."

Then Valenti would come back and say, "Well, on the principle, we refuse the idea that because films are made in the United States they might be excluded on the basis of geography from the European market." Both sides have merit in their argument. It still has not been decided.

At that time, the Europeans were debating about government procurement. This has turned out to be the issue that Kantor and Brittan are now trying to work out among themselves.

It's an interesting example of, on the one hand, the American side rejecting the Europeans writing into their 1992 directives a small amount of exclusive protectionism. They'd always had a lot of protectionism, but none of it had been explicit. It had all been informal, in government procurement. They didn't have rules like we have such as "Buy American." On the other hand, they never bought anything from us. We had rules about how, with certain kinds of contracts, we provide advantages to American bidders. So the Europeans didn't win many contracts, but they won some. So they were basically doing better than we were: our sellers never won any.

They wrote this provision into their directive, and then offered to negotiate, to try to get rid of the "Buy America" stuff. This is trade negotiator footwork. They gave themselves a crowbar to pry open the American market, but they dared to be closed all these years. In these circumstances, it is very easy for both sides to become patriotic and assertive in defending their claims against the unreasonable foreigners.

This is, again, an example of small issues that, because of the footwork at the staff level, tend to escalate and become difficult to solve.

Similarly, the president reopened the Airbus issue.

The Airbus issue goes back a number of years. The Europeans basically shot their way into the international civil aviation market by heavy subsidies to a consortium of European suppliers that manufacture the Airbus. They did this in a way that was closely linked to industrial policy. They wanted the advanced technology that goes into making civil aircraft, as well as a part of the civil aviation market. It played to constituencies in France and Germany that were very strong. The Europeans just went ahead and did it.

Eventually, last July ['92], after years of negotiations, we came up with an agreement in which neither side agreed to the merit of the other's arguments but at least it settled the situation. The president reopened that in February ['93], in Seattle, when he accused the Europeans of causing unemployment in the American aerospace industry. A lot more unemployment came from the depressed state of the worldwide air transport industry than from Airbus. But also, he [Bush] settled that thing last July and he [Clinton] reopened it in February, accusing them of the same things that we'd been accusing them of over the years.

They responded with the same arguments, that we had been cross-subsidizing from our military programs, which gave us an overwhelming advantage.
We said that they had put in $36 billion in subsidies, a figure that they contest and have American lawyers employed to contest a figure that they contest vociferously. There we were the way we were a year before, yelling about the figures and who struck whom until we agreed to put the whole thing to bed and go on to something else.

Q: As you were sitting sort of at the hub of the economic thing, looking at overall Europe and all this, were we getting intimations of basically the economic collapse of the Soviet Union?

ELY: Certainly not in Brussels, not where we were sitting. The Community at that time didn't even have an office in Moscow, and had no formal mandate to look at the Russian economy. We did pick up a lot from their visiting missions. They would go to Moscow to talk about various projects, or to Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest. There were exchanges, impressions, and information, but none of this was strategic.

There was the beginning of talks on Yugoslavia which was falling apart when I left. The one big politically macro question that we did get mixed up in was the preparations for the intergovernmental modifications of the Treaty of Rome that took the form of the Maastricht Treaty, signed in December of 1991. The preparations for that were underway in 1990 when I left Brussels.

It involved essentially a two-track process of negotiating a Franco-German idea of an economic and monetary union, with a timetable, procedural steps on how this was to be arrived at, and a flanking set of measures which would lead toward a union with responsibilities for foreign policy and security and eventually defense.

Our colleagues in the NATO Mission were already getting uneasy about the defense aspects.

This is the one substantive issue that I'm still mixed up with today in my retirement activities with the Monnet Council.

The NATO alliance is probably the most successful alliance of its sort that we've ever experienced. And over a period of 40 years, the Department of Defense and the State Department had put their best people and their best efforts and a lot of money into making that alliance work. We provided people, leadership and money, but we were also careful not to dominate, not to run it like a bunch of Russians. We had and have an old-boy network, a unified command establishment, experience in working with each other, relationships of trust and understanding that have been built up over the years. And, indeed, NATO had turned into a really major asset for the Europeans and for the United States.

The only problem is it has no purpose. It has nothing to do now. It has succeeded. The reason for its establishment -- that is, to counter the Soviet threat -- has now disappeared; the Soviet threat is gone. There are other threats, different kinds, to which NATO barely responds, in some respects.

In 1990, my clash with the NATO loyalists in the State Department began when I sent off a
telegram, with the encouragement of Ambassador Niles, saying that, Europeans were moving
down the 1992 road, they're going into a Maastricht unification process, and sooner or later, they
were going to come up with an idea for their own security and defense establishment. This was a
long way down the road, but we should understand that it was coming. It would be a mark of
manhood for a European Union. So when the Europeans start saying that they wish to develop
for themselves a defense identity, we should understand this as a legitimate culmination of what
the Europeans have been doing for a number of years, and the culmination of a policy direction
in which we have either acquiesced or where we've encouraged them to move. In other words, a
separate European defense identity linked to or even within NATO was something we should be
thinking about.

Well, this turned out to be right, but the timing was off. The telegram never received a reply,
and, indeed, the lack of a reply was emphatic. I had said something that nobody wanted to say,
that the Europeans might want to get together a caucus within NATO, that they might want to
eventually put together some sort of arrangement within NATO. The NATO loyalists were
appalled at this idea. In other words, the thought was good, but it went to the wrong people.

Q: Well, you left about when?
ELY: I left in September of '90.

Q: How did you make your transition? Did you figure out what you wanted to do?
ELY: Well, I knew that I was probably going to retire the next fall, on time in grade, since I
hadn't gotten an ambassadorial nomination of any sort. I recognized that after Tokyo and then
after this telegram that I'd sent, saying indecent things (which are particularly bad when they're
true), that I didn't have any friends in the European Bureau. So I decided, well, might as well
be realistic. I got back and there were no jobs. It didn't surprise me. It made me a bit wry, because,
you know, I know a lot about international economics, more than a lot of people that are doing it.
But I was perhaps too proud to ask, and I was getting no offers. And so, when a think tank at the
National Defense University actively recruited me, I figured this was probably a very good
transition place to learn new ways of acting.

Anyway, I went down there and spent a year getting ready to leave. I didn't have a lot to do; I
didn't have any formal duties. I worked eight hours a day and turned out a number of
memoranda, but I was way, way down the line. I actually had the assimilated rank of colonel, I
think GS-15, which was way under my personal rank. But I understood that, down there, you
don't complain about your personal rank. You accept it. You don't take it and then complain
about it afterward. So I learned to use a word processor, which was a good thing. I'd had a
personal secretary for 25 years. And I learned to think of myself not as a cog in a larger system,
but as a person in my own right. I went house hunting and re-Americanized myself. By and
large, that turned out to be not too bad an idea. It worked out all right.

Q: And then, just to give a final thing, you went into what?
ELY: Well, I'd received my telephone call in January of '91, saying that I was being retired for
time in class in September. I wished I'd been able to stay on a little bit longer, because of the extraordinary pay raise that took place on the first of January, which I got nine months of. It would have increased my retirement by a very large amount.

I was approached in the spring of '91 by a former ambassador to the European Community; would I be interested in becoming the executive director of a small, nonprofit organization dedicated to the work of Jean Monnet, the father of the European Community, who had the vision of a united Europe in transatlantic partnership with the United States, an idea that I always felt had an element of truth to it that could not be denied. I still believe that if the world is to become a better place, it's going to be largely a function of the ability of the Europeans and the Americans to cooperate to make it that way, to pull in the Japanese, and to handle Russia and China and the emerging problems and threats.

Well, I was totally unprepared for that kind of a job. I've never been in the private sector. I don't know anything about fund-raising; I'm not good at it. I can write good memoranda and do excellent analysis, but it wasn't clear and it's still not clear that this is what is required for that particular job. And the pay was uncertain; still is. But it had the great advantage of having me work with people that I know and like and admire, on work that I find agreeable, congenial, which I think has significance.

I'm not sure the organization's going anywhere. I've been with them for two years now. It has kept me in the circuit, and I don't regret it for a minute. I may, in fact, however, just go into full retirement before too long and do the things that I said I was going to do; that is, learn German and take voice lessons, divorce myself from the Foreign Service and lead a completely different kind of life.

Q: Well, one last question, sort of going back to the EC period, and it's just a fill-in. Where did Canada come in on this? I always think of one of the great themes that I try to explore when I'm doing these oral histories, negotiating with the Canadians, which seems to be a particular problem all the time. And I was just wondering, did Canada fit into the EC thing at all?

ELY: Well, first of all, when Tom Niles came to Brussels, his previous post had been Canada.

Q: Ambassador to Canada.

ELY: He had been witness to the negotiation of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was a traumatic experience for the Canadians and still remains controversial in Canada. It was extraordinarily difficult on the American side to negotiate, because of the continuing conflicts within the US government about how everything was supposed to work.

CRAIG DUNKERLEY
Deputy Political Advisor/Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO
Ambassador Dunkerley was born in Wisconsin and raised in several states in the Midwest. He was educated at Amherst College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In 1970 he entered the Foreign Service, serving abroad in Da Nang, Tokyo, Yokohama, Fukuoka, Brussels and Vienna. During his career Mr. Dunkerley became a specialist in NATO and International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control matters, and served as Special Envoy for Conventional Forces in Europe from 1997 to 2001 with the personal rank of Ambassador. He also had several tours of duty at the State Department in Washington, DC. Ambassador Dunkerley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: You were in Brussels?

DUNKERLEY: We both were. I initially went for two years as the Deputy Political Advisor; I then moved up to become the Political Advisor, heading up the U.S. Mission’s Political Section for another two years.

Q: Could you talk about our mission to NATO. It sounds like a military thing, but it really wasn’t. Explain what our mission to NATO does, particularly at the time you were there.

DUNKERLEY: You’re quite right; USNATO was not a military entity. U.S. participation in the Atlantic Alliance as represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is reflected on the military side through our participation in NATO’s integrated military structure. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, always an American senior officer, is based in Mons in southern Belgium. That headquarters and related staffs deal with military and operational matters. The integrated military structure reports to the political authorities of the Alliance represented by the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters in Evere, just outside of Brussels. The North Atlantic Council meets occasionally at the summit level, regularly at the ministerial level (back then usually twice or more a year). On a weekly or even daily basis the Permanent Representatives of all of the member states meet at NATO headquarters. All of these Perm Reps are supported by national missions to NATO that include both diplomatic and military representation.

During that time I was involved in running the political section for the U.S. Mission to NATO. It was a large political section of ten to twelve State officers. There were also other offices within the U.S. mission, primarily representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense, FEMA, and USIS. The ambassador at the time I first arrived was Alton Keel; he was succeeded by William Taft, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Q: That’s William Howard Taft IV?

DUNKERLEY: Yes, that’s correct. He was one of the best in my Foreign Service career.

Q: You straddled 1989, the crucial year. How was NATO seen prior to that?

DUNKERLEY: It was, of course, a time of profound change in European affairs. The term “historic” is usually overworked, but in the case of the events that got underway in 1989, that
term is entirely appropriate. In 1987 and 1988 our focus was, at least in general terms, in continuing to take advantage of the openings for progress in arms control and the reduction of East-West tensions which had been generated by the policies of Gorbachev in Moscow. We were, for instance, continuing to negotiate for an INF agreement; that remained a major concern for the U.S. and the allies. But there was also the basic question – one that occupied most of my time within the USNATO Political Section in the first year or so – what comes next?

For example, internal Alliance debate over how this question might be answered was reflected in a lengthy negotiation among the allies in 1987-89 on the drafting of what was referred to in NATO jargon as a “Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control.” (Given the German parentage of this particular item, it was often called the “GazamptKonzept”). Some of this was rather straightforward in terms of suggesting particular principles and general objectives for the Alliance in pursuing arms control. But the details of how these might in practice be translated into daily policies or negotiations were at the heart of protracted discussions, eventually going up to the ministerial level. At issue was the degree to which – or relative priority with which – the Alliance would pursue the next round of arms control. It was the U.S. approach to consider arms control less as an end in itself, but rather as a complementary means, necessarily taken together with a healthy deterrent and defense effort, towards a more stable peace. At the time, there were marked controversies in two areas.

One revolved about how members of the Alliance should pursue a negotiating strategy and specific substantive proposals for conventional arms negotiations in Europe. Efforts in this direction, involving some but not all of the allies, had been essentially stalemate for a long time in the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) talks in Vienna. What was new was that, through his various policy announcements, Gorbachev had expressed a willingness to pursue actual reductions – potentially substantial reductions – in Soviet forces then stationed in Eastern Europe. This was seen as a major opportunity that the Alliance had to seize. But in doing so, we had to come up with an entirely new and substantively ambitious proposal.

Q: The fact that the SS-20 introduction and our response of the Pershing and Cruise missile, in a way created a crisis, but did it open up things saying ‘hey this whole thing is out of control?’

DUNKERLEY: No, I wouldn’t put it that way at all. What the earlier issues of the INF deployments and negotiations did, along with all the accompanying political controversies in the early 80’s, was create a situation which apparently made clear to Soviet decision-makers that previous approaches no longer were sufficient. It would, in that case, require not just limits but significant reductions on their side to be able to address the increased U.S.-INF deployments made in response to their SS-20 deployments.

Perhaps even more importantly, it also had the effect of reinforcing a rather close pattern of consultations among the Allies on these issues, and in doing so, conveyed a powerful sense of trans-Atlantic cohesion and solidarity. As I mentioned earlier: A sustained consultative dialogue between Washington and various capitols on these issues helped both the U.S. and Allied governments get through the domestic controversies that the nuclear issue generated. Later on, the period of 1987-88, those consultative patterns held and were instrumental, but only after extended and painful negotiations within the Alliance, in enabling us to come forward with the...
beginnings of a coordinated Alliance position on conventional arms.

There was an important contrast here between the earlier Alliance management issues posed by the nuclear negotiations and the prospect of conventional arms control. The former affected American and Soviet systems, affording us a privileged position in the formulation of negotiating positions. When dealing with limits on conventional forces, however, you have to deal more directly with the military establishments, budgets and force levels of almost all the members of the Alliance. Some countries such as France, which had previously stayed out of MBFR negotiations, now had to focus close attention on the possible details of any new negotiation. That was one set of issues that was very much to the fore. (And of course I had no idea I’d be returning with a vengeance to this field a few years later).

A second and perhaps even more immediately contentious issue in ’87-’88 related to those nuclear systems that were below the range level established under INF: SRINF (short range nuclear forces) to use the acronym of the time. Much of this revolved around the political problems posed by possible deployment of a follow on to the existing Lance missile system, a short range system now growing old. This was extremely controversial with the Germans on whose territory a number of these systems might be deployed. Foreign Minister Genscher had strong views about the inadvisability of moving forward with this and, together with some other allies, pressed the need to pursue negotiations to include these systems as well. They wanted a negotiated reduction, indeed elimination of those systems in Europe. From an American perspective, this began to raise concerns about an ever-cascading de-nuclearization of Europe that, absent a reduction of the conventional imbalance on behalf of the Soviet Union, might be seen as being potentially dangerous. At the time – 1987-88 – all of this was reflected at NATO in an almost weekly round table of rather tough back and forth with the Germans and with other Allies in trying to establish a construct that would enable possible decisions on all of these issues at the highest policy levels.

Q: Could you describe during the period of 1987-88 how as ‘the new boy on the block’ you saw the positions of the major allies within NATO?

DUNKERLEY: At that time under Mrs. Thatcher, the United Kingdom’s diplomacy within Alliance councils consistently advocated a steady, rather cautious approach demonstrating a fair amount of skepticism towards the Soviets. The German political approach, which had been strong on INF deployments, could be characterized as more open, at times eager to take advantage of opportunities that they believed were opening up through the Gorbachev’s advent. Among other allies, France fell in between. Given its unique position in the Alliance – not a full fledged member of the NATO integrated military structure but a very active participant in the political workings of the Alliance – its diplomats were not surprisingly concerned with how individual issues would affect French political-military interests.

Much of this eventually came to a head at a NATO summit in Brussels that President Reagan attended in the early part of 1988. Negotiations on the Arms Control Comprehensive Concept went from a year and a half of debate – first at my working level for months, then among the various national Perm Reps – to conclude at the summit where it went to a post-midnight session involving Secretary of State and the rest of the Foreign Ministers – in their shirt-sleeves –
thrashing out a compromise solution. The happy irony here was that – very quickly with the advent of a greater Soviet willingness to consider actual reductions in the conventional imbalance (fear of which was the driving force behind many Western concerns about retaining these short range nuclear weapons) – history quickly outpaced these issues and controversies.

One of the other issues that I recall – though it was of much less political prominence at the time – were early discussions within the NATO Political Committee (the regular standing body of political advisors) on the question of political stability within Yugoslavia. This was in 1987-88. In response to Washington interest, the U.S. Mission had urged a round of consultations --- an exchange of instructed views among the allies – about latent political and ethnic tensions within the Yugoslav state. This was well after Tito’s passing but in light of a spate of early disturbances in Kosovo. This was one of the first times that we really discussed this issue at NATO; most of the other allies noted the problems but thought at the time that such concerns were overdrawn – and of course no one at all at the table was thinking of the sort of break-up and violence that eventually occurred.

Another event of note during this period (at least to my mind in looking back) was a meeting of the NAC in the fall of ’87 to hear then Vice President George H.W. Bush following a series of visits that he had just made to various East European countries. What was struck me was the message that the Vice President was trying to convey to the NAC: that the Alliance should be looking towards ways to generate greater engagement with these states, hitherto viewed at NATO largely in the optic as steady but secondary members of the Warsaw Pact, and that, in fact, there might be a potential for a degree of positive internal change within some of these East European bodies politic. Again, not many observers at the Permrep level at NATO then seemed prepared to grant, let alone run with, this sort of view on Eastern Europe. (Which, as I think about it now, may have been in contrast with amount of time the lower-level Political and Economic Committees would devote to analysis and discussion of the course, and unclear implications, of perestroika then underway in Moscow).

During this time, one of my duties was to meet periodically with the Soviet Political Counselor at their embassy in Brussels – an individual who was one of their overt NATO watchers. We would meet periodically, I think once every two or three months, for a rather carefully staged luncheon conversation. At first these were rather predictable – but as we moved into 1989, I noted, with each month passing, my Soviet counterpart’s visible surprise and growing discomfort with the rapidity of events in Eastern Europe.

Q: What about the other, almost foreign power at that time, the Department of Defense? We talked about doing something with their toys. How did this work?

DUNKERLEY: Obviously there was State-Defense engagement and coordination on a variety of levels in NATO. The State Department components of the USNATO – in my case the Political Section – were in daily, sometimes almost hourly, contact with the various offices of the Secretary of Defense also resident in the Mission. We were on the second floor, they were on the third. We had a fairly good relationship there, with considerable transparency in our respective concerns and intentions in Brussels.
As we already discussed, certainly in the first term of the Reagan administration there was a
difficult and scratchy State-Defense relationship. It was at the Shultz-Weinberger level, it was
apparent in the competition between Rick Burt and Richard Perle in shaping policy, and so forth.
But the important thing was that by the final years of the Reagan administration, while there
continued to be strong views and strong interests held by the different elements of the
bureaucracy, the interagency process seemed to be working a good deal smoother. This was at a
time in which Secretary Shultz was having frequent trips and discussions with Gromyko’s
successor, then Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze. The team would include and involve
National Security Advisor Powell, and McFarland before Powell, Roz Ridgway, then Assistant
Secretary of the European Bureau, and senior members of the Pentagon team as well. And of
course, in the following administration of President Bush, interagency deliberations were
effective and collegial.

Q: What about some of the other players, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Spain? Where did they fit
within this?

DUNKERLEY: I would hesitate to go too far in trying to come up with impressionistic one-
liners, subjective characterizations of their policies because a lot would depend upon the issue at
hand, the politics and personalities involved, the strength of their representation at any moment
among their ministers and their permanent representatives. What your question does lead into is:
How does NATO work? How are decisions made and implemented?

NATO is, on the one hand, fundamentally a consensus organization. On the other, there is clearly
a difference in the weight and influence that particular countries bring on particular issues. There
is no question but that the United States has a special role and a special voice. Similarly, some of
the larger European powers, particularly in terms of the strength of their contribution – not only
to the common defense effort but to the common political effort – would also have influential
voices. The U.K. and Germany for example. Some countries such as the Netherlands, to use
Geoffrey Howe’s term, were able to ‘punch above their weight’ through the strength and
sophistication of their representation. They were very, very good in this regard. But again, all
this would vary with the issue. On some questions, the contributions of the Italians were quite
important and useful. As you moved toward Mediterranean matters, one always had to take into
account the balancing of concerns and differences between Greece and Turkey.

Q: Were they almost something you treated with a sigh or rolling of the eyes?

DUNKERLEY: Greek-Turkish issues were always a constant concern. There were a variety of
difficulties involved. No surprise there. But the whole point about NATO was that, however
strong particular voices might prove to be, you could not at the end of the day run totally
roughshod over individual members nor ignore allies, whatever their size or political weight, on
those matters they saw as vital to their own national interests. Indeed each country around the
table would have certain concerns held exceptionally dear – and to which you had to pay careful
attention if serious work was to be done.

And by and large, everyone recognized this. (One European colleague, who had had extensive
experience both in NATO and in EU councils, would, I recall, compare the North Atlantic
Council to one of the better clubs in London where within the club walls it was recognized that all of the members were inevitably a bit eccentric in their own ways and one simply worked around that fact of life in a gentlemanly manner. He’d go on to draw a comparison with “the more cutthroat zero sum quality” to decision-making within the EU when it came to something like fisheries or agricultural policy).

Q: In this time leading up to 1989, obviously you were all kind of looking at the phenomenon of Gorbachev and what was happening in the Soviet Union. What was your impression of how you and your colleagues looked at what was happening in the Soviet Union? Was this for real or not? Was this an opportunity? How did you see it?

DUNKERLEY: Probably all of the above. The ability to hold differing interpretations at the same time is perhaps the mark of some form of diplomatic acumen (Others of course might just call it cognitive dissonance).

Much of my time at NATO, particularly on the Political Committee, which supported the NAC at the Perm Rep level, was involved in a regular weekly discussion in trading information, opinion, and assessment on the course of events in the East. There was a lot of debate about the questions of just how far, how fast things might be going – the pace and scope, the implications of the policy initiatives underway on the part of Gorbachev. Let’s not forget that during this period, there were lots of starts and stops, ambiguities...in effect crab-wise movement on the part of Gorbachev and his political allies as they tried to wrestle with reform of the Soviet economy and polity.

Soviet developments were indeed a mixed picture. They generated mixed reactions. I think everyone at the table at NATO came to recognize during this period that significant changes were in fact underway. There were differing opinions about whether these might succeed. There were differing opinions about what effect they might have in terms of Soviet domestic politics and the Soviet role vis-a-vis the rest of Europe. As I think back to those discussions, and the opinions voiced within the Political Committee in the run-up to the fall of '89, I suspect just about every government represented demonstrated at one point or other a range of views running from deep skepticism to ever increasing interest in taking advantage of these opportunities.

Q: Was there any look at Eastern Europe to see (countries such as Hungary which was going through a major change) if there were opportunities or problems because if one of the Eastern European countries got overly liberal, maybe the Soviets might move in again like in Czechoslovakia in 1968?

DUNKERLEY: Yes, that was one strand of thinking. You identify concerns that some had at that time – just as earlier, I forget when exactly, Kissinger expressed his own concerns about the need for finding a de facto understanding with Moscow about the pace and scope of future change in Eastern Europe.

From the American perspective, it would be interesting to go back and trace the way in which our own interest in having serious discussions about European security with the East Europeans came to evolve. We had long pursued, of course, bilateral agendas with individual countries. But
previously – as I mentioned before – there had seemed to be a sense in some quarters that pursuing sustained exchanges with these capitals on European security issues, both general and specific, would likely be a rather empty exercise given their role within the Warsaw Pact (with Romania, of course, playing the occasional maverick).

I think several developments and processes during the 80’s started to change that perception. One was the fact that the Helsinki Final Act launching the CSCE had established a series of regularly-occurring conferences on different categories (“baskets” to use the term of art) of political, economic and military issues affecting European security writ large – and that individual East European states increasingly came to be seen as playing active and more distinct roles in this process.

Another factor came to flow, I believe, from our major diplomatic effort to address Allied governments’ and publics’ political concerns in connection with the contentious INF debate. Our sustained consultative efforts with Western Europe in the early 80’s made start-up of a very modest parallel effort with the East Europeans on arms control and other issues that much more natural as a secondary follow-on, as in our initial debriefs on the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva in the final days of Chernenko. But at no point was there an early expectation that things were going to evolve in the way that they did or with the pace and scope that they eventually unfolded.

Q: Back to Yugoslavia... I served in Yugoslavia from 1962 to 1967 and our concern there was the demise of Tito. Our feeling was that if Tito left and unless things were held together, it would cause a loosening there and offer an opportunity to the Soviets. In other words, we could end up in a hell of a war over this thing which neither the U.S. nor the USSR wanted, but there it was. What was the situation in 1987-88 period? Was that still a concern?

DUNKERLEY: You touch upon one of the more interesting of historical ironies. In any number of NATO tabletop exercises over previous decades, a favorite scenario had been something like the one that you described: what to do if there were an aggressive Soviet political-military incursion into a post-Tito Yugoslavia. The irony comes that in fact NATO’s first real exercise of military power in Europe eventually came in former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s – but, of course, under dramatically different circumstances (and indeed with Russian participation under American command in the context of NATO peacekeeping following the Dayton Accords).

The concern in 1987-88 was different from your question. It was generated by certain analysts looking at post-Tito political arrangements in Yugoslavia, noting signs of unrest among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and raising questions more about the dynamics of internal stability, less the likelihood of external incursion. As I mentioned before, and not to blow this out of proportion, this was one of the first things that I was instructed by Washington to raise in the Political Committee in ’87 when few others on the European scene seemed to think that this a major risk.

Q: How well were you served by the intelligence arm of the American government? INR, the CIA, defense intelligence, did they play much of a role in what was happening? Were you using this?
DUNKERLEY: We were certainly using them in terms of the ongoing discussions between the U.S. and the Allies that took place within the Political Committee and on a more rarefied basis in the North Atlantic Council. One of the major assets that we brought to these exchanges was the ability to share extensively, under proper guidance and circumstances, various forms of American analysis of the course of events within the East. There were a number of INR products on Gorbachev’s perestroika efforts that I can think back on. We relied quite heavily on the CIA and the Intelligence Community’s overall assessments vis-a-vis Soviet military power.

With the clarity of hindsight it is simple to think back on that period and to assume that so many things should have been dramatically clearer once Mr. Gorbachev got into office and set in motion various attempts at economic and then political reform. But of course, as you look back even more closely, it confirms just how very mixed a picture events in the East presented us then – one with all sorts of fits and starts, uncertainties and ambiguities.

Q: All sorts of things could have happened. Gorbachev was not necessarily an elemental force of nature, I mean, he didn’t necessarily have to happen or things got out of his control later on too. Were the Green Movement, the Left, the Labour Party in England working against you all?

DUNKERLEY: The high point of those particular concerns in Western Europe you mention came a little bit earlier in 1983-84 in connection with the INF deployments. Within many of the basing countries at that particular time, there were strong political concerns and expressions of opposition to the American deployments. Certainly the Greens in Germany were active in that regard. So was the Labour Party in the U.K. But recall that by the late 1980s – as the issue of assessing the implications of Gorbachev and his policies came to the fore – the Thatcher government had decisively defeated the Labour Party and Chancellor Kohl was still very much in command in Germany. So, as I think back on that latter period, discussion within the Alliance on East-West issues involved less a question of having to deal with policy opponents on the Left side of the spectrum than in pursuing more of a rolling internal debate amongst standing governments of the Alliance.

Q: In 1989 was there any feeling that times were changing?

DUNKERLEY: Of course there was. In early 1989 we had a follow-on NATO summit in Brussels. President George H.W. Bush used that opportunity to push forward a significant new proposal on conventional arms reductions within Europe on the part of the Alliance. This was an attempt both to seize the political initiative on this set of European security issues, in the face of popular interest generated by various forward-leaning statements by Gorbachev, and to jump over a number of the substantive obstacles that had previously stalled progress in this particular field.

By this time, conventional arms control discussions were no longer in format of the MBFR talks, but rather moving into a new set of negotiations: what became the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) negotiations. One important difference would be that CFE would involve a much broader cast of characters including all of the members of the then Warsaw Pact and all of the members of NATO – the major militaries of both East and West Europe.
There was a recognition that the new CFE mandate should not only be broader in terms of participating states and the military equipment that it would seek to cover, but that it should also aim towards much more significant mutual reductions than had previously been envisioned. This new conventional arms control initiative was conceived of as a major step on the part of the Alliance. I recall that at the time, the initial concept was parachuted in from the top – a Washington initiative that National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger flew over to sell on a very quiet basis to key Allies immediately on the eve of the summit.

All that was on the arms control side.

On the political side, yes, as signs of change increased, as problems continued to multiply for the existing regimes within Eastern Europe, there was a dramatic increase in discussion of these developments within the Alliance and within NATO committees in particular. Over the summer of ’89, with the Hungarian opening of their border to the West, with events in Prague and Warsaw calling into question the Communist monopoly in local politics, these became the stuff of almost daily consultation at NATO headquarters.

Q: Most policies and government people like the status quo: they know what they are dealing with. Was there concern that things were getting loose and things may get out of control? Or did you see the thought that if we have a resurgence of the Soviet Union, they might come in and squash things?

DUNKERLEY: There was obviously a concern about uncertainties and possible Soviet reactions, but I would not overstate the point you just made. I did not see the sort of nostalgia for a Cold War status quo, and any such ostensible stability, that you seem to be alluding to in that regard.

Of course the major issue came to be what all this might come to mean for Germany – or rather, for the future of the two Germanies as a possible single entity – and in turn what the broader implications of that prospect might be for European security. Yes. There was considerable concern, as you suggest, with the question of Soviet reaction and “firepower” – that is to say, its on the ground presence and influence – and what this might mean for Gorbachev’s policies in general.

But it was more than just the Soviet factor to keep in mind. These events affected a number of actors and Europe as a whole. Unlike the situation in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, in Germany there was also in place a longstanding quadripartite political structure, affording a defined role, rights and responsibilities to the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union with regard to Berlin. Though this was a limited structure dating well back into the post-war era, it now provided a useful vehicle by which at least one key part of a multilateral approach might be organized in response to events as they unfolded in East Germany. It eventually morphed in what was termed the Two Plus Four process.

But that’s to anticipate. All of this really only came to the fore with the torrent of change set in motion by the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th 1989 – which caught everyone by
I recall that during the course of the day the Wall fell, there was an emergency meeting of the Political Committee called by the A/SYG for Political Affairs in response to what was happening in Berlin and on the television. It paralleled a lot of corridor conversations and hurried telephone calls underway. But no one among colleagues – even, or perhaps especially, the German representative – had yet a clear sense as to what was likely to happen next, let alone how their respective governments might seek to manage what had been set in motion. What was apparent at that moment, I suppose, was everyone’s sense that this would now be the overriding issue for the Alliance in the year to follow.

In this regard, the fundamental concern among many seemed not so much the one that you identified in your question: would there be a resurgent Soviet snap-back or military incursion – but rather would the pressures, conditions and attractions of integration become such within the German body politic that it would lead to an eventual loosening of German ties, de facto or de jure, with such transatlantic institutions as NATO.

Another major dynamic that was in play from the start – and one we were acutely aware of within our daily discussions at NATO - was that the Germans quite understandably saw this as an issue of primordial importance. Their voice would need to be decisive – and there were periodic expressions of their sensitivity lest the role of others seem to suggest any dilution of that principle. At the same time, this was an issue that involved directly vital interests not only of the U.S. and other big European states, but no less importantly – perhaps even more importantly – the interests and concerns of the smaller European states, indeed of all of the members of the Alliance.

So an immediate question was how a sense of process might be generated and then sustained which could move discussions and decisions on the future of Germany forward in a stabilizing versus destabilizing manner. The objective would be to enable reunification in a way that would continue to anchor Germany well within the Alliance even while reassuring the Soviets. The process would need to be seen to give the Germans their proper lead role but no less to ensure that not only our own interests were met, but those of all the other European members of the Alliance. Both substance and perception would be critical for all parties. This was a diplomatic balancing act that President Bush and Secretary Baker spent a great deal of time on as the dominant issue in late 1989 to 1990.

Q: Was there a feeling that things were moving so rapidly that maybe NATO would become obsolete?

DUNKERLEY: At the time there were, of course, any number of questions about the future shape and details of Europe. Understandably so. With varying degrees of seriousness and depth, some in the public discourse questioned what this would mean for various transatlantic institutions, the foremost being NATO. But there seemed very little sympathy within Alliance discussions – or rather I should say meaningful resonance – with the notion that NATO should now simply go out of business. I don’t think it was ever a serious policy choice in most capitals, but it was one more factor that the Alliance would have to address in terms of popular
perceptions: reaffirming the rationale, role and continuing contributions of the Alliance amidst dramatically changing circumstances.

As a consequence, an important task in this overall process – as the Germans and the Quadripartite powers worked on the issues of reunification in a manner that might both reinforce the sense of consultations within NATO and reassure the Soviets – was for the U.S. and the Alliance to be able to put forward a sense of vision as to the future structure for Europe as a whole.

While I would have to think back for precise dates and sequencing, it was in December of 1989 that elements for such a concept began to come together. There was President Bush’s shipboard meeting with Gorbachev in Malta at the beginning of the month – which was useful in setting a positive, constructive sense of reduced tensions. On his way home, he swung through NATO Headquarters to debrief Allied counterparts in a very quick summit gathering. It was also at this time that the fundamental U.S. position became increasingly clear: strong support for German reunification in the context of a united Germany’s continued membership in NATO.

In mid-December, Secretary Baker drew on certain ideas that we had been working on at NATO in a major speech in Berlin. He described the notion of an “architecture” for a Europe whole and free built around three different but fundamentally complementary institutions: a transformed NATO, an expanding EU, and a revitalized OSCE. These were ideas that we already had in play within the Senior Political Committee at NATO (which we had earlier been able to feed into the Secretary’s advisors). Following his Berlin speech, which was broadly supported, these ideas were subsequently expanded and reaffirmed by all of the members of the Alliance in an important NAC Ministerial later that December. I was involved at that time in the negotiation of that ministerial Communiqué. All this laid necessary groundwork for what followed through the next spring and climaxing at the London NATO Summit in July ’90.

During the months that followed, a structure for negotiating the German issue emerged. I recall supporting the U.S. delegation, led by Secretary Baker, to a NATO-Warsaw Pact ministerial conference in Ottawa (ostensibly to launch negotiations on an Open Skies regime) at which the Two Plus Four formula was agreed – involving the two German states and Quadripartite powers – for negotiating conditions for a reunified and sovereign Germany. I recall this was not without some very sharp exchanges at the time between the German Foreign Minister and some of his ministerial counterparts in the NATO Caucus at Ottawa, notably the Italians and Dutch.

Later that spring, the Two Plus Four produced such an agreement on the outline and substance of unification, and Chancellor Kohl subsequently won Gorbachev’s agreement to a reunified Germany’s membership in NATO – albeit under certain particular self-restraints on the German military in the context of the broader and less specific notion of a transformed NATO.

The London Summit in July 1990 was thus important for two reasons. First, it provided a degree of political validation of the evolution of the Alliance and NATO in light of all these historic events – the “transformation of NATO” marked by, among other things, formal renunciation by the Alliance of the Soviet Union as the enemy and the launch of changes in NATO’s military strategy and defense posture. Second, it marked the first step of opening up the Alliance to a
working relationship with its former adversaries, both the Soviet Union and the East European states – which by this time were rapidly exiting a soon to be defunct Warsaw Pact. These states were invited to establish permanent liaison missions at NATO headquarters.

Q: As the events of November-December were taking place how did you find your NATO watcher at the Soviet Embassy? This must have been a time of flux. Was it collegial?

DUNKERLEY: He started worrying about his job. Clearly the local Russian diplomats, Soviet officials at that time, were caught off guard. One could see that. It was reflected in our discussions with them at various levels.

In the midst of all these events I’ve been recalling, one of the most symbolic and interesting was the visit to NATO Headquarters – really at his initiative – of then Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. This was in that crowded December ’89. Again it had unique atmospherics, watching as he was greeted by most of the NATO staff as he walked into and through the main building. I remember talking with a Soviet MFA colleague not too long afterwards who took pains to show off his “NATO insignia pen” he had picked up on that occasion while accompanying the Foreign Minister.

For many of us on the U.S. side, much of this related to dealing with misperceptions of what NATO represented and confusion – among the Soviets and many others – as to whether it was a purely military organization or a much more broadly political-military institution. But this also coincided with an increased interest and desire within the Alliance itself to think seriously about transformation in light of dramatically new strategic circumstances. So several dynamics began to come into play in the period leading up to the London NATO Summit that July.

I already alluded to one of those elements: opening up the possibility of a new relationship with former adversaries. In the run-up to the London gathering, we put forward some rough ideas that met with some Allied skepticism and no little uncertainty about what that might actually entail. But this eventually resulted in the invitation for these countries to establish liaison missions with the Alliance for an expanded degree of consultation. It may seem rather modest now, but at the time it was unprecedented.

But there were a number of other, even more difficult issues related to “transformation” addressed at London. Alliance leaders agreed to commission changes in NATO’s traditional military strategy – the document which up until that time had been known under the term “MC (Military Committee) 14/3” and which had constituted the basic military strategy for defending against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. They also set new guidelines for NATO force levels and postures: smaller and restructured forces, less emphasis on forward defense, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and so forth. They expressed forward-leaning intentions on a variety of arms control measures in the nuclear and conventional fields.

In sum, the London Declaration of July 1990 set out an ambitious work-program for adaptation of various Alliance policies – some quite long-standing. And not surprisingly, not without potential for controversy either. I recall that, in order to jump over extended haggling at the working-level in the run-up to the London Summit, Washington deployed an entirely new draft...
Declaration at the last moment at the Presidential/Head of State level. That led to no little grumbling among some lower down in the bureaucratic ranks at NATO Headquarters but in the end, it worked.

There were other processes underway during this period, also necessary parts of the overall process for managing the reunification of Germany and in the following year, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. These included bringing the negotiations on the CFE Treaty to closure within a year. As an Alliance project this involved an intense series of discussion at NATO about how to fill out the Alliance negotiating position and how to overcome the final differences.

One thing that I was struck with at the time – observing from my own position as a member of this process underway at NATO Headquarters – was the conceptual and practical contributions that Will Taft and his deputy, John Kornblum, made to some of these questions, particularly as they related to balancing German concerns with those of the smaller allies and the intense consultative effort in which Secretary Baker and the President were active.

Q: Looking at this after interviewing for a long time, I am struck by the effectiveness of the Bush-Baker work on this. Was there a feeling that you were on a strong team?

DUNKERLEY: Very much so. Being at NATO at this time was to be in a privileged position at a pivotal point in this larger process. As a consequence, we saw a lot of the Secretary, Bob Zoellick, Ray Seitz and other members of that Washington team. There was much interchange with them on their visits to NATO both on substance and on tactics.

Q: At the events of November-December and the fall of the Berlin Wall, was there an effort on instructions and on your part to be sure we weren’t indulging triumphalism?

DUNKERLEY: The tone was set by the highest levels. There was clearly a conscious effort to avoid any notion of triumphalism on our part; that was an example set by the President and read as such by everyone. But I don’t recall any specific Department instructions saying “don’t be triumphalist.”

Q: Did Condoleezza Rice, she was the Soviet watcher at NSC, did she come across your radar at all?

DUNKERLEY: Certainly by name, but not by direct engagement on my part at that time.

Q: You were there until 1991?

DUNKERLEY: Through the first half of ‘91. In August 1990, immediately on the heels of the German reunification project, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took place. This then became the dominant preoccupation at USNATO through the spring of 1991.

Here again, a great deal of consultation took place at NATO Headquarters on this particular issue. At the very first, there was some reserve on the part of some delegations about the degree to which formal NATO discussion revolved around Iraq – in those days, that part of the world
was still seen very much as “out of area.” But that sentiment quickly diminished as it became apparent the degree to which trans-Atlantic and European interests were directly affected by this issue. Not least, there was the fact that a NATO member, Turkey, bordered Iraq and was seen as potentially threatened. As Desert Shield/ Desert Storm played out, much of the attention was devoted to CENTCOM’s activities in the immediate region. But NATO and the European Command played an important role in terms of ensuring Mediterranean security and the use of Turkish air space, as well as a variety of anti-terrorist precautions.

Q: I recall that we were given the opportunity to take out significant military units and move them either to Iraq or to Kuwait and then eventually back to the States.

DUNKERLEY: Yes. There came to be a large movement of units, forces, and equipment from the European theater to the Gulf. What is noteworthy about that development was the degree to which all of those NATO plans and procedures for U.S. reinforcement from North America, practiced so regularly during the Cold War, worked quite well for a very different purpose and, in this case, going in a different and unexpected direction. Further, the degree to which individual Allies provided critical, if un-dramatic, support in facilitating that movement was a major factor. There was much that individual countries and the Alliance collectively did to facilitate success of the overall operation.

Q: Did your meetings take on a Kuwait oriented focus?

DUNKERLEY: To a certain degree – though there was still a good deal going on elsewhere in the world as well. The basic business of the Alliance remained East-West, and there was still much to be done with the Soviet Union and East Europe. But there was no question but that the Kuwaiti and Iraqi issues assumed increasing importance and that we had a particular interest in using NATO as one of the basic and proven vehicles of consultation with the Europeans (though we were of course talking with them bilaterally, through the EU and very much in the Security Council context as well).

I recall a particular example of such consultations came in January ’91 when Secretary Baker met with Tariq Aziz in Geneva for what some termed “the final warning.” Immediately following, Ray Seitz, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, flew directly from the session to give a verbatim read out to the North Atlantic Council. There was a special sense to that NAC. Seitz spoke and described in some detail Tariq Aziz’s unsatisfactory response to Baker. It became increasingly clear as he spoke that some last-minute diplomatic fix involving an Iraqi pull-back was not going to happen – that war was going to occur very shortly. You could look around the room at the various national delegations and see that recognition dawning with individual ambassadors and colleagues. I thought it a quiet and tense moment.

Q: Was there towards the end a feeling of concern within NATO that maybe the OSCE was going to supplant NATO because it had a broader enrollment than NATO did?

DUNKERLEY: Occasionally one would hear particular concerns in that direction, but in fact these did not develop very far. Obviously, at that time the Russians would like to have seen such a development; some of their statements argued for such a course of evolution in the
organization of European security affairs. At the same time, the Germans and other Europeans wanted to see a much broader role, an enhanced role for the OSCE in the future. And indeed, the U.S. itself – as in Secretary Baker’s Berlin speech on a future European security architecture – foresaw an important role and growing function for the OSCE process.

But the notion of OSCE somehow coming to replace NATO was really a red herring. That is to say, given that the OSCE was itself still finding its way within a new Europe, and NATO was clearly continuing to play a major role in European stability and security, this was not in fact a serious proposition – nor at the end of the day, a truly serious concern for U.S. and Allied policy-makers.

Q: By the time you left was there any official discussion about whether we would see Hungary or Poland in NATO?

DUNKERLEY: In the first instance, I think policy-makers in capitals, let alone the officials and working level in Brussels at that time, were still wrestling with immediate issues and implications of implementing what had just been determined and decided in this remarkable period of 1989-91. That is to say, the Alliance and its members faced tough questions that flowed from German reunification and the accelerating dissolution of the Warsaw Pact: a host of political, economic and military issues.

It would take, for example, some time for the Soviet forces in Germany and elsewhere to withdraw entirely. There was in addition a complex of issues related to how the newly signed CFE Treaty would be implemented, involving not only significant reductions and destruction, but also an unprecedented degree of verification and monitoring that would have to be undertaken – even as, I’d note, the Eastern bloc within this Treaty structure was breaking apart. One example of the sort of knotty operational issues that had to be thrashed out in NATO at that time involved finding practical ways for members of the Alliance to coordinate among themselves to ensure that this new network of national verification and monitoring responsibilities could work in the most effective manner – a highly technical question but with major consequences and political implications.

At the same time, there was a new Open Skies Treaty to conclude and implement. There were political consultations and preparations at NATO for a meeting of Alliance members and Warsaw Pact members resulting in negotiation of “The Charter of Paris” – in essence an occasion to draw a ceremonial political line under the Cold War and to lay the ground for a major follow-on CSCE Summit in Helsinki. There were new liaison arrangements to be worked between NATO and these former adversaries. And throughout all this, here was also much of NATO’s day to day political-military business to manage.

So there may have been some people thinking at that particular moment about eventual membership in the Atlantic Alliance on the part of countries such as Poland and Hungary, but this was a rather more of a vision than an immediate prospect.

At this same time, of course, in the aftermath of Desert Storm, policy-makers in capitals and officials in Brussels also had to face the drastic deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia. From
the perspective of being at NATO headquarters in the first half of 1991, one could only suspect
that one reason why the Western response to the violent unraveling of Yugoslavia was less than
effective may have been political and psychic exhaustion from all that had taken place in the
previous immediate two years: having to deal with German reunification, dissolution of the East,
and the whole Iraqi episode. By the time storm clouds had gathered over Yugoslavia, ministers
and governments may not have been able to give it their best.

Q: Was there concern on the part of our delegation in 1987 that the presence of so many
American troops that had been there since 1945 – their interaction with citizens, tanks roughing
up the country – were we concerned that the hospitality of the Germans was getting a bit
strained?

DUNKERLEY: What you describe was an ongoing set of issues that had always been there; both
the German authorities and U.S. military at EUCOM had over time developed a whole structure
of well-established procedures for dealing with these sorts of daily civil-military problems. It
was my sense that the more fundamental issues with Germany at this time were less on that local
or operational level but rather revolved about the constant tweaking required at the highest
political level to insure broadly complementary political strategies, especially regards the tone
and nuance of our respective dealings with the East.

Q: Bundestag members said ‘I can get those low flying, attack planes out of your area.’

DUNKERLEY: That’s always an issue – and not simply in Germany but elsewhere overseas -
and that is not to say that there wasn’t the political need to focus periodically on specific local
problems involving U.S. forces in Germany. But the point I would make is that as one looked at
U.S.-German relations in totality, and particularly in the context of the Alliance and Alliance
strategy during this important time, such problems tended to constitute constant background
noise; they were in themselves not the main issue.

Q: By the time you left, had the Poles, Hungarians, etc. established liaison missions?

DUNKERLEY: They were in the process. This was a new and strange relationship for all
concerned. Lots of practical housekeeping details – but the sense of significant history being
made. I particularly remember the excitement – no better word for it – on the part of some of the
East Europeans.

Q: You left in 1991?

DUNKERLEY: Summer of 1991. I came back for “Senior Seminar” at FSI that ran to the
summer of 1992. I then went out to Vienna to be the deputy head of the U.S. Delegation to the
CSCE.
FULTON: ’86, as I was concluding my four years in Foreign Service Personnel, then I was one of these people in Foreign Service Personnel bidding on an onward assignment. I decided to bid at grade. I followed the rules and bid on assignments, both hardship and other assignments, and I was paneled into an assignment as PAO in Vienna. That was, at that stage of my career, not the most attractive assignment despite the fact that Vienna’s a nice place to live, but that’s what the panel decided on. My nomination was sent forward to the then-Ambassador and the Ambassador said he was leaving in several weeks and did not want to act on it because he couldn’t commit his successor. The DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) who would then become chargé said that he would act on it when the Ambassador left, and so it sat there for four weeks. The DCM, when he became chargé by that time knew who the successor ambassador was going to be, and he said that he wouldn’t act on it either. He would wait until the Ambassador acted on it, and then the ambassador designate was then Assistant Secretary of Defense Ron Lauder, and so the nomination went over to Ron at the Defense Department, and he came back with one question: Is Fulton a fluent speaker of German? The answer to Ron Lauder was no, he is not. He said he’s unacceptable then because I want someone who will do drafting of my speeches in German. The Agency decided to persist and urged Lauder to meet with me and talk things over. So I met with Lauder, and he said he didn’t know why we were having that meeting if I weren’t a fluent speaker of German. He assumed I could not become a fluent speaker of German. I assured him that it was true, I could not. So he turned down the assignment. This took a period of several months for all this to happen, by which time there were no overseas assignments left. So there was the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel without an assignment. At about that time, when others were scratching their head, and I said, “This is above my pay grade, I can’t assign myself, somebody else has to do that.” The officer who was our Public Affairs Officer in NATO came in with the request to curtail for some reasons. That request was processed and that job was announced as an opening. There were two people who bid on that job, because most people were out of cycle at that time, it was late in ’86. There were two people who bid on the job. I was one of the two, and the other person who bid on the job was actually a close friend of the Director of the Agency, Charlie Wick. Since he was going to make that decision, I knew I didn’t get to make my own decision. It was widely assumed that he in fact would get the assignment, and I always thought if he had not called Charlie Wick at his home twice that he probably would have. I got that assignment and went to NATO in January of ’87, and I spent four and a half years there. Professionally, in terms of doing public diplomacy, it was the most exciting part of my career to be at NATO from ’87 to ’91 when the Berlin wall fell and NATO changed it’s policy, was absolutely exciting.

Q: I would have thought you would have been a bit dubious, apprehensive, or whatever you would want to say about an assignment as Public Affairs Officer to Vienna, because I talked to somebody who was the Desk Officer, Country Director for both Austria and Switzerland, and
Germany. And said, you know we talked a great deal about German affairs, and I said, “Well, what was your main job dealing with Austria and Switzerland?” He said, “It was really trying to keep our Ambassadors from making too much fools of themselves or becoming too much of a problem because these were political appointees who, Austria and Switzerland do not tend to get always the best political appointees. They have a bad reputation of…” Did you have any concern about that at the time?

FULTON: Well, I guess I should say in all fairness that I wasn’t at all disappointed when I was turned down. I found myself in this precarious position of putting my bid forward and knowing that the whole world is watching, and if I had not been in Foreign Service personnel I would have aspired to something else and fought for it. I put my wishes forward and I did not get my first couple of choices. One can’t complain about going to Vienna, but certainly I was not excited about going. I sort of thought that was probably a career stopper, to go to Vienna at that point. In retrospect it was a very awkward time to be there, you will recall that Ron Lauder didn’t stay very long at the post, and you will recall he had a DCM who was involved in some espionage…

Q: Felix Bloch.

FULTON: Bloch. This would have been a post without much intellectual excitement and with a great deal of administrative headaches, whereas NATO, I can’t imagine that there was a post in the world that would have been more exciting.

Q: You were in ’87 what, to ’92 about?

FULTON: Early ’87 to late ’91, ’91.

Q: Who was the Ambassador and sort of what did the mission to NATO do at that time?

FULTON: When I arrived at NATO…

Q: This is in Brussels, of course.

FULTON: In Brussels, of course. You know multilateral organizations in the Foreign Service are always kind of, the step-cousins of traditional diplomacy. Most officers have been at bilateral missions and bilateral mission activities and quite clear and multilateral activated, whether it’s the UN, New York or Geneva or EU or NATO, others look on not knowing exactly what they do. I didn’t know when I got there, I arrived when Dave Abshire was Ambassador, and Abshire was just on the verge of leaving. I mean literally a few days after I arrived. He had brought some distinction to that post because he was a name, at the time well-known in this town because remember, at one point to be coming back as secretary of defense and he was of that stature. He was succeeded by Alton Keel.

Q: How do you spell Keel?

FULTON: That’s K E E L. Keel, far well less known, had been the deputy to John Poindexter when Poindexter was head of the NSC (National Security Council), and as you know Poindexter
left in a rush along with Oliver North and others over the Iran-Contra affair. Alton Keel actually moved up for a couple of weeks to be acting director of the NSC, and then he was reassigned to NATO as Ambassador. Alton Keel was not a skilled diplomat, although he was a very smart person.

**Q:** *What was his background?*

**FULTON:** He was an engineer by training, and he actually was that person who led the investigation, he was the staff director of the investigation of the shuttle mission that blew up in the sky.

**Q:** *The Challenger.*

**FULTON:** Yes. He had worked at the Pentagon and then came over to NSC. Keel, as I say, not trained in diplomacy was nonetheless very skillful in understanding the issues. Somewhat less skillful in pursuing them with his colleagues. I think it would be generally acknowledged that he had a way of irritating some of his colleagues. But he was right on target for pushing the American agenda, and the American agenda at that period was very much in flux in 1987, it was not at all apparent to anyone what was about to happen in 1989. But we did have a very aggressive program of arms control, and those arms control problems involved both nuclear long range, short range weapons and conventional weapons. A lot of the policy was being formed with our allies at NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and NATO was the action point for those operations, and Keel with his background, Keel had a doctorate in Engineering, so he had really no equal when you were talking about the technicalities of some of the arms control issues. He was a very able Ambassador up to the point where his inexperience showed in dealing with some of the allies and also in dealing with his own staff. I enjoyed a good relation with him, and he was open to the press and did what I think a good Ambassador ought to do, kept the press well-informed, was willing on some occasions to take some risks, I think you must do that in dealing with the press. He debated at Oxford, he joined the floor with the reporter of the Economist and other major papers, he spoke in major conferences around Europe. He kept the American message in the European press and with European academics, so I couldn’t personally have been more pleased with my relations. Others in the mission would have a somewhat different take on that.

**Q:** *Did you find, you were saying that he wasn’t skilled in some of the diplomatic arts, which is often keeping your colleagues, other diplomats and all, happy and all. I take it that’s part of the situation.*

**FULTON:** At NATO.

**Q:** *At NATO.*

**FULTON:** Where there’s sixteen people with equal rank.

**Q:** *Well did you find yourself at all acting as sort of nudging his elbow or something like this, I mean trying to, when he wasn’t sort of one-on-one with the press on a subject he knew very well,*
but in helping him get over sort of the, get into the diplomatic niceties and the necessity to build a consensus and all, did you?

FULTON: I wasn’t the person who did that. I mean there were others who did, he had an extremely able DCM in John Kornblum, and he had a very fine political counselor, Bob Gray. Kornblum and Gray have both gone on to Ambassadorial positions since that time. In fact, you could go almost name by name with the NATO staff, half of which came from the Pentagon, and find the most able staff I have ever worked with. At the time I arrived there, there were a total of ninety-eight people in the mission from top to bottom from Ambassador down through the drivers. So given the size of the mission, it was a fairly small mission, no national staff. We had no national staff because of security requirements. There were a number of non-commissioned officers who did things that national staff might do in some cases. Fifty of those ninety-eight were from the Pentagon, and those fifty included three Rhodes scholars. That was a tough group in terms of their confidence, and he got good advice the whole way through, and I think it would be fair to give him mixed but overall fairly high marks for what he did there between two superstars, because Dave Abshire came out of Washington knowing everybody in Washington, being known by everybody. Then Alton Keel after two years was succeeded by William Howard Taft IV. William Howard Taft IV had just come out of the Pentagon where he had been a Deputy Secretary of Defense, and he moved from being Deputy Secretary of Defense to heading an office of ninety-eight people, ninety-five people. It might look like a step down, but as he found the U.S. mission at NATO doesn’t only execute policy, the U.S. mission at NATO, if it works wisely and if it works consummately with Washington, with both the State Department and the Defense Department, and it develops alliances with the other fifteen members of NATO, can play a very, very important role. From 1989 through the time I left, 1991, onward, William Howard Taft stayed there another year, and he was a very key player in the change of NATO policy and the execution of NATO programs.

Q: We’re talking about this ’87 to ’89 period before Germany sort of fell apart and pulled together again, did you find, I mean this was not particularly your expertise, I mean the military, the whole military side of things, you’ve been exposed to it. But did you find that you, one, had a problem with learning the military side of things, and also, did you have problems with the Pentagon spokespeople and all?

FULTON: I had a bit of expertise when I came into the job. I had spent, as I indicated earlier, I had spent three years in the military, and when I was in Rome as Deputy PAO (Public Affairs Officer) I had, for the USIA, I had the security portfolio. We were talking, and when the decision was made for the Italians to agree to the hosting of nuclear, short-range nuclear missiles on their territory. When I came back to Washington after that assignment, during the time I was working in Foreign Service Personnel, I had a detail to coordinate the overall USIA response worldwide to the question of short-range nuclear missiles. So I had that kind of experience which weighed in my favor in getting the assignment. Now having said that, when I arrived at NATO I of course discovered quickly that I was a mere amateur next to the people who, some of whom had spent a career there. The head of one of the offices in our mission from the Pentagon, Dr. Larry Legere, had been in NATO for about fifteen years, and he had no equal there or in the Pentagon in terms of his knowledge of NATO issues. So there was an awful lot of learning to be done, but I was very comfortable with that, was comfortable with the subject matter and I was eager to learn. I
think that the people who watched me found that for the first couple months I didn’t say very much, I was a very quiet person trying to learn a lot. I realized that unless I got myself up to a certain speed I’d basically be ignored in the mission. It’s an integrated mission so that the military, political, economy, USIA were all operated as one, and we more or less got called on to the extent that we had a contribution to make. I carved out my role and my staff carved out their role with the media in terms of being able to speak the language of NATO and interpret it into the language of the press.

Q: How did you find the press at that time?

FULTON: The press that covered NATO was very, very able. There were a couple of thousand people accredited to NATO that had press credentials to NATO headquarters. They would show up, but for the most part we dealt with maybe a hundred people. And most of those covered NATO part-time. At the time I was there the NATO press office was on a very short leash and basically had permission to say very, very little and was not much of a source for the press. We were very much in flux during that period even though the Berlin Wall, even though neither had it fallen nor had anybody predicted it would, but we were still very much in flux because it was clear that Gorbachev was changing things in the Soviet Union. And we, I went to support the economic summit in Venice right after I got to NATO in which President Reagan participated and then he participated in the NATO meeting as well. Then George Bush came there once as Vice President, and I think three times as President during the time I was there. We had during that period, totaled this up when I was leaving, we had fifty-odd ministerial meetings in the four plus years I was there, so we averaged a ministerial meeting once a month. Ministerial meetings were decision meetings. We therefore made a lot of news and the press came to depend on the U.S. mission for its major source of news, along with, after the U.S. mission, the British mission, the German mission, and to a lesser extent the French mission. We were their source, and we had to be, we had to be up on issues or actually we wouldn’t get called. We had to know what was going on, and I found it intellectually very exciting. I had a very able staff, small staff; there were just three of us. We worked long, and I told people after I left that I had the greatest respect for the press that was there, certainly most papers have their own angle and you could predict how this story might be represented here or there, two different lands, that’s fair it seems to me. We had a couple of inaccuracies in the press, only a couple, and when we did on every occasion we had, any major inaccuracy we managed to have a retraction on a subsequent day. That reflected, I think, on the good relations that my staff and I had with the press. That we could get the retractions, we offered good reporting to the European press.

Q: Let’s talk about this early period, maybe it carries over. Did you see any differences that you can characterize or examples of different approaches or relationships between the French and the Germans, the British, maybe the Italians, you know, their delegations or their missions?

FULTON: Oh, yes. That’s what made it so interesting. Their ambassadors were representing policies that were on some occasions quite at odds with the U.S. Each of the Ambassadors brought their own personalities to amplify or minimize those differences, as the case may be. If you talk about just in our own mission the difference between Alton Keel and William Howard Taft, you know after policy was made, and as I said, strongly influenced from the mission itself, because there aren’t a lot of places in the city where DOD (Department of Defense) and the State
Department sit down and come up with common policy. There is only one place that that happens and that’s in preparation for a NATO meeting, and that happens either physically on the ground at NATO or it happens with principals coming back to Washington, holding meetings. Because when a meeting is held, both DOD and Defense have to sign off on a particular issue. So each of those two Ambassadors took American policy and did their best to execute it. Now the difference between the two was that Keel would attend to a certain policy and pound the table and insist that others get in line, and with William Howard Taft the others weren’t quite sure what our policy was until they agreed to it. All of a sudden they were supporting something that Keel had, that William Howard Taft had worked diplomatically with great skill. I remember an occasion once, an issue not of great consequence, but it was an issue that I was involved in on a fellowship program that was being done, sponsored by NATO, managed by their public affairs office, and there was a council meeting on the issue because of some differences within the council. But it wasn’t one that the U.S. cared about deeply, and I was accompanying the ambassador to the meeting of the North Atlantic Council and I had prepared the briefing paper for him, and he had read the paper. We hadn’t really talked about it very much, and as we walked into the meeting, the Ambassador, our Ambassador ran into the French Ambassador. The French Ambassador said, “What position will the Americans be taking today?” And it wasn’t that the French cared a lot about it. Taft said, “We will take the same position you take.” The French Ambassador said, “And how do you know what position we’re going to take?” And Taft said, “We don’t know. But when you take it we will second it, we will vote for it. Whatever it is.” And the French Ambassador says, “Why are you doing this?” He said, “Because we respect your leadership in this area.” So the French Ambassador spoke up with some passion, he said we should do this. Taft raised his hand and said, “We agree completely.” And the chairman at the meeting said, “I think this is a first.” Those kinds of chips that he gathered with such actions paid off on things that we cared about.

Q: Was there the feeling of, particularly the French-American relationship, the French were in NATO but not in NATO at that time. It was still that very peculiar thing where the military forces technically weren’t in, but they’d been running exercises. Was there sort of a NATO view and a French view?

FULTON: Well, the French would, a representative here today would rapidly correct your assumption and say at no point did the French leave NATO, and the French were full members of NATO, and the French participated in all NATO meetings, except the military command.

Q: Which was what NATO was about.

FULTON: Well, NATO was about politics, first and foremost NATO was about politics. Secondly, NATO was about combining military command which had never, through that period of time, been used in hostilities, in exercises, yes, but had never been used. So what that meant in practice was that the North Atlantic Council, which is the supreme decision-making body, the French were not on the sidelines in any way, and they were full participants, and all decisions were made at the North Atlantic Council by consensus. This whole decision making process at NATO, just parenthetically, is just ripe for a whole host of doctoral dissertations on the decision-making process. It’s a very, very complex and very interesting situation. But the French as a consequence could, if they wanted, could become anything, and they did, in fact. Or for that
matter so could Iceland, or the Danes, or anybody. So these ministerials I talked about, half of those ministerials were meetings of Foreign Ministers, and the French were at all of those, and the other half were groups like the Defense Planning Group or the Nuclear Planning group, which were all command-related and those that were, the United States would be represented by Caspar Weinberger or Dick Cheney, and those the French did not participate in, because those were meetings of fourteen. The Icelanders did not participate either because they don’t have a Defense Department, so there’d be fourteen at the meeting at best.

Q: Did you feel that there was a special burden of trying to bring the French on board on a lot of things?

FULTON: Yes, the French exercised their political authority with great skill, they assigned people to NATO who were very, very fine diplomats. It was during that period that the French were in a position of entertaining change. There was talk then about them joining the Integrated Military Command. The French were very active in all the political decisions, but, yes, there was always the kind of French counterview to a lot of positions. You would often find that American-British agreement on issues, that did not need a lot of special nurturing. The whole question of, as the Berlin wall fell and the future of Germany was being considered, the U.S.-German, the British-German, the French-German, the everybody-German relations became very, very important. Because it was not at all clear from day one that we would end up with the consequence that we have now, an integrated Germany, all of which belonged to NATO. When that idea was first proposed, it was considered by the French, by the British and by many of the Germans to be preposterous. That was an American idea, and it was something which, I think it’s a story that’s not been fully written, but it’s a story that reflects very well on secretary James Baker and reflects very well on William Howard Taft and reflects well on the staff around Baker that managed to persuade a number of other players, including our allies, including the Russians that this was a stable, desirable option.

Q: When you arrived in ’87, Gorbachev was beginning his program. I mean it’s kind of pretty clear that things really were happening.

FULTON: Glasnost…

Q: Glasnost, Soviet Union. Was there, would you say, a certain amount of disquiet? I mean we’d gone for forty-odd years with a rather stable situation of two major powers glaring each other over a divided Germany and all of a sudden one of the major powers was going to change, and nobody knew exactly where it was going. Was this of concern or not, or was it delight?

FULTON: Well, it was a great concern. I suppose the height of the concern was the meeting in Iceland between Reagan and Gorbachev, because although they did not reach agreement, it was quite clear from the press reporting that Reagan was prepared unilaterally to overturn NATO policy. People at NATO were very nervous by that, and I assume, I assume we can read some of the accounts, people on the Reagan staff were nervous by that. If Gorbachev had been just a bit more daring, there would have been a major reversal of policy at that meeting. I think that meeting, nonetheless, although it ended in what was reported at the time as failure, changed the whole landscape for the future, and that is the kind of meeting then that gave real energy to the
conventional arms talks and the nuclear arms talks. The conventional arms talks in fact had been going on in theory for years and years, and as a consequence of the mood that was created there, then they became very, very active as well as the nuclear talks in Geneva.

**Q:** Was there a certain amount of discomfort that things were beginning to open up? You know, the bureaucracy group, I mean they’re comfortable with the status quo, and things were beginning, like arms control and all this which lip service had been paid to. But all of a sudden, I mean people were talking seriously about, not just arms control, but arms reduction, both nuclear and conventional. Were you dealing with a bunch of people kind of wondering, “hey, wait a minute, where’s this going?”

**FULTON:** Now interestingly not, and it comes down, I think, to the bureaucratic question, because bureaucracies can’t uphold the status quo forever. The reason, one of the reasons I think that NATO is such a right place for study in the decision-making process. NATO has a relatively small staff compared to say the EU across town. I don’t have the figures, but maybe it’s one percent of the size. Three percent or something. With the exception of a handful of people who have been grandfathered into permanent positions at NATO, if you get an appointment on the international staff at NATO, you get that appointment for three years initially. If you’re doing well, you can get it extended to four or five or maybe six years. You almost never can get it extended beyond six years, and the rule is that if you’re there seven years, then you can get permanent status. There was a period, I think, under Secretary General Luns, when he was there for a long time, where he extended a number of people, and there are a number of people got the permanent status, and those people are now at the cusp of their career. Some of them were retiring when I was there and by now a lot of them have retired. There are relatively few permanent members of the NATO bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, it’s important in the decision-making process that all of the decision makers are there on temporary assignment. The Ambassador stays three, four, five years. The Secretary General stays three, four, five years. Like all people who go to any assignment, people go in and want to make a difference. I think there’s the human tendency if you haven’t created the policy to want to improve it. Therefore you see at NATO without that permanent bureaucracy, you see the momentum to change things. When there’s an outside opportunity to change things, NATO moves very quickly. It doesn’t move quickly in the decision process because all the people who want to change things don’t necessarily want to change it in the same way. But if you have a skilled Secretary General and if the major Ambassadors are skilled in the art of diplomacy and the art of compromise, if they’re skilled in that, you can find very rapid change. From ’87 to ’91, I watched, and in some ways participated, because our relations with the press were very, very rich and we understood that the press was going to affect public opinion and affect the change. We watched NATO change. I’d not say a hundred and eighty degrees. We didn’t change that much, but I bet we changed ninety degrees.

**Q:** Well, when the Bush administration came, that’s when William Howard Taft IV came in?

**FULTON:** Yes, he came in then.

**Q:** Well, the events of ’89, first place, nobody sat, I mean, was there a policy that if Eastern Europe, the Soviet role in Eastern Europe collapses peacefully, this is what we’ll do?
FULTON: No, not... you know one of the great pleasures I had there was I inherited from my predecessors a pattern of the USIS staff sponsoring European-wide conferences. These conferences gave the whole mission license to think outside of the box, and to say what’s going to happen, which was something that was more difficult to do when you were making policy. But my predecessors thought that if you could have these kinds of open conferences, you could begin to, at the margins, affect the discussion of policy and begin to change the nature of the policy itself. So I had, as head of USIS at NATO, had been able to sponsor or co-sponsor about four major conferences a year, and we tried to have representation from all the NATO countries at least. We decided in the fall of 1989, before the Berlin Wall fell, but because there was a lot of movement, we decided to invite some East Europeans to the conference for the first time. That required some thought around NATO headquarters of whether that was a good idea and what signal were we sending. Everybody thought well, okay, it’s a good signal to send, if we find who can come, and we had a couple of East European participants. We sponsored a conference called “Values: East and West.” So it was well outside and beyond the usual security issues, but we thought that values were part of security issues, and we had as one of the keynote speakers a representative from Stern Magazine, German.

Q: West German.

FULTON: West German, a joint popular magazine, and he was posted in Berlin. We asked him to address the question of what Berlin would be like thirty years from now or something like that. This is in September, two months before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Stern is basically a left-wing paper, and in a way we knew this person would be a thoughtful person and we assumed in inviting him that he was going to describe a Berlin after unification. We didn’t ask him to do that, everybody chose their own topic. I remember, it was so dramatic when he started. He said, “Well, I thank the Americans for inviting me here, it was very nice of you to pay my air fare and it’s good to be among friends.” And he said, “In a way,” he said, “I’m kind of guessing, because the Americans are always doing this, but I was invited here today as the person who is going to describe the future of the united Berlin. Well,” he said, “I’m going to surprise you, there will not be a united Berlin.” He said, “This is an American fantasy.” And he went on to describe all the reasons why there would not be a united Berlin in our lifetime, why it wasn’t going to happen, why it wasn’t desirable. Of course, it happened after that. So we were trying to test the limits of what might happen in this quasi-official forum, because that was not NATO sponsored, it was sponsored by the U.S. Mission and we were kind of outside of official policy.

You asked earlier what it was like to deal with Department of Defense Public Affairs people. I found in my experience that Department of Defense Public Affairs people were far more open to thinking about alternative futures than the State Department. The State Department tended to want to hold the discussion within certain bounds. We had some real encouragement from DOD (Department of Defense) and we were able in doing our programs to call on DOD people. Paul Wolfowitz came and spoke at one of our conferences and talked about alternative futures. I simply found, perhaps it’s because military planners deal with contingencies of all stripes, that they were much more open to those discussions that the State Department.

Q: I’m thinking this might be a good place to stop, Barry, because we really want to talk, and I
like to talk in some depth, about the fall. I mean we’re starting, my first question will be, “How were we reacting when Hungary opened up its borders and the Czech business and looking at Poland and on how did we react at that time from your perspective and the people in NATO?” And then we’ll come to, after this momentous occasion, come to Operation Desert Storm and NATO. And then what we’re, by ’90, late ’91 there was time to begin to figure out what the hell NATO’s mission was.

FULTON: Indeed. Good time to stop and maybe just to remind both of us that we open up next time with a short discussion of my debate with a First Secretary from the Russian Embassy at this period. It will set the stage.

Q: Wait, Soviet Embassy at this period.

FULTON: At that period, Soviet Embassy, great, thank you.

Q: Great.

Today is the 24th of February, 2000. Barry, you want to talk about the, talking to the Soviet diplomat?

FULTON: Well as relations began to change, Gorbachev was practicing glasnost (openness) as Eastern European borders were becoming more porous. There was certainly a sense at NATO headquarters that a new world was in the making. The conventional arms talks were back on track, the discussions on nuclear weapons were going ahead in Geneva. At about that time, this must have been about 1988 or early ’89, there was a proposal from a university in Belgium that there would be an organized public debate between a representative from the U.S. Mission to NATO and a representative from the Soviet delegation. As it turned out, I was invited to represent the U.S. Mission in that debate. As it turned out, I was invited to represent the U.S. Mission in that debate. It was with some trepidation that I agreed to this knowing full well that there could be a good bit of press coverage (it turned out there wasn’t any.) Knowing their might be, and knowing the Soviets at least in the past had used these kinds of occasions to make charges and claims that were outlandish. So with a good bit of preparation I arrived at the University for the debate, and the moderator had maybe fifty, sixty students, faculty members, in the debate hall. Asked which of us wanted to go first, we each said well we didn’t care, it was up to him. So he asked that I go first, and I spoke, I thought convincingly, for ten or fifteen minutes on why it was in the interests of both the United States, NATO countries and the Soviet Union to try to reach agreements on reducing arms and why it was in the interest to try to reduce tensions, all those things that one might have said. Then the Soviet debater was called on to make his presentation, and he said simply, “Well, I agree with all that.” Period. “I agree with all that.” The moderator looked at him and said, “Do you have a statement?” And he said “No. I agree with all that.” So it was, at that point I was obviously bemused, the students weren’t clear what was going on, and the room was open to questions. There were questions and answers, and the debate which was scheduled to go on for most of the afternoon ended well short of the prepared time, because there was nothing to debate. In some ways, although he was ahead of his hard-line comrades in the Soviet Union, he was representing a very progressive delegation that had come to Brussels to see if they could do business with NATO.
Q: What was this delegation at that time? Was this an exploratory group or what? Had they established relations with NATO?

FULTON: At the time that I’ve just described, no, but it subsequently happened. It happened that Shevardnadze, then Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, was invited to NATO headquarters. It turned out that he was the first Soviet official, certainly the first Soviet official of any rank, to have been invited to NATO headquarters to meet with the Secretary General, Manfred Wörner. When he arrived, he was greeted in the entranceway by a hundred or so NATO international and delegation employees, and they applauded his arrival. He went up and met with the Secretary General. I am told that he asked the Secretary General if that applause was arranged or spontaneous, and he was told it was spontaneous. At the end of the meeting I’m told he asked again. He said he was surprised by this applause, and indeed was it genuinely spontaneous. The Secretary General again said yes, it was. What the Secretary General did not say, insofar as I heard the story was that in fact the NATO employees were asked to not assemble for the arrival, and it was genuinely spontaneous. On his way out he was greeted by the International Press at the front of the NATO building and he was told by the press that while the meeting was taking place that Ceausescu in Romania had ordered the military to strike back against the demonstrators and that so many people were killed and this and that. He was asked for a comment. Shevardnadze said on the steps of NATO, “Well I’m not thoroughly informed on what has happened, as I’ve been in here meeting for the last two hours, but if what you say is true, the Soviet Union condemns that.” This was news. That a fellow Warsaw pact member was being condemned on the steps of NATO by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

Q: At NATO you were all watching developments in eastern Europe. As I recall, one of the first major cracks is where the Hungarians said, “We’re going to open up our borders.” How was this, were there other things going on at that time? I think things sort of moved from there.

FULTON: Even my sense of dates and time isn’t good enough to comment on what was the first thing. I have a clear recollection of the sense of change around me, but whether it was the Hungarians opening their borders or not would be better left to people who are better informed on the dates and times. Then I recall, what I would want to convey is that the whole, starting with, say the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, aided by Gorbachev’s glasnost, certainly moved along by the near-agreement in Reykjavik between Reagan and Gorbachev. I suppose if there were any catalytic cause of the opening, it was as I observed it in NATO, an understanding by Jim Baker and his immediate staff of the window of opportunity that had come to United States and the NATO countries to try to change the old relationship, in particular as the Berlin Wall fell. Baker’s early seizing on the chance for a unified Germany, which many talked about, a unified Germany within NATO, which as far as I recall no-one else spoke about except the United States. I think, looking back on that, that that was a fairly small window. If he had not moved at that time, and engaged the allies with a team of his senior people who moved around Europe to very quietly develop support for this idea, I think we would have had a very different outcome.

Q: You know, looking at this, this trickiness of it, it was superb diplomacy. I’m not sure but I think the Hungarians sort of opened their borders to Austria, then the East Germans started coming into Czechoslovakia and going to, was it the German Embassy I guess, and you know
getting in the compound. The Czechs weren’t handling this, they didn’t know what to do. Then they started shipping out, and then the East German people started. Day after day there would be demonstrations, peaceful demonstrations in Berlin and elsewhere. This must have been a very nervous time in NATO, do you recall? Because I mean the conventional wisdom up until then was, well the East Germans will call out the troops, and you know they’ll shoot ‘em down, and we want to keep the German, the West German righteous anger from doing something, and you know this is always the fear I think that we had.

FULTON: It certainly was the fear. In retrospect there was every sense that the change that was happening was momentous. There was no sense that it would take place so quickly, that it would happen overnight, and in fact what one wonders even had the policy been no different than it was from the East German side an anxious or trigger-happy young East German soldier with a rifle in his hand killing a few people might have changed it all, it might have changed it all. So I think that the flow of history was with us, and luck was with us, and the fact that we had some very wise policy on the NATO side, and I think in fairness a wise policy on the Soviet side.

Q: Did you, at NATO, was there a sense of, I mean, first place, with the wall coming down, you know, what the hell did this mean? For years we’ve been concerned that something might happen, and a unified Germany, a neutral unified Germany would have torn the heart out of NATO. Was this something that was buzzed about in the corridors of NATO?

FULTON: I don’t think there was, certainly it was raised as the one scenario, but it wasn’t the scenario that was predicted by anyone seriously at NATO. We had in Manfred Wörner a German, West-German Secretary General. We, the Germans and Americans, British were very close on maintaining a NATO unity, and that was never in the cards. What was not at all clear was what status after the Wall came down East Germany would have and how long it would take for unification. As I said earlier, very few expected that the final outcome would be for East Germany as part of a unified NATO.

Q: I think we were fairly fortunate, too, that you had a politician such as Kohl, Helmut Kohl, rather than a Socialist, an SBD person, because the SBD’s always been a little softer in this. With Helmut Kohl, he was not a man to make concessions.

FULTON: Well, Helmut Kohl was very eager to establish his place in history and to preside over a unified Germany. It was probably earlier in his career only a dream that as it became close to reality, of course, there was no-one stronger than him. There was a sense of jubilation and hope at NATO during that time, and it was that I believe that, and the decision by the United States that helped move along this train much faster than it might have otherwise. I recall an occasion when after the fall of the wall, when the Soviets, and still then the Soviet Union before the breakup of the Soviet Union, when the Soviets were invited to have representation at various NATO meetings, first informally and then more formally. One of the conferences that USIA co-sponsored, we invited the Soviet Ambassador to Brussels and he’d speak at that conference. He had recently arrived in Brussels with a special portfolio on NATO matters. We were going to publish the speeches and transcribe parts of the conference, and of course I invited the press to these conferences. The night before the Ambassador spoke, one of his aides from the Soviet Mission that I came to know called me, and he said, “Could we ask you a big favor? Do you
have somebody who could type the Ambassador’s speech in English on a roman-character typewriter? We don’t have time to do that.” That signaled to me a kind of trust that would not have happened years before, and of course, we called somebody out and we did the typing, which gave us a number of things, the opportunity to see the speech twenty-four hours in advance, and a trust that worked there in a lot of ways because both sides wanted it to work, and both sides were fairly open to change.

Q: As the German thing moved rather rapidly towards unification and all, was there a sort of in everybody’s mind the question of the need for NATO? You know, I mean, if Germany were united, I mean obviously the Soviet army threat was essentially gone. I mean things were happening in Poland and all, and there were still troops there, it meant that the Soviet border, military border was moved back what, five-hundred miles or something like that?

FULTON: Well, immediately after the wall fell, all of these discussions began. Some of them continue through today, as you know. But the person who had enormous popular following in Eastern Europe and also the United States because of the role he had played was Vaclav Havel. Vaclav Havel’s early public position was that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO should fold. After some time, Vaclav Havel changed his mind, and that must have been over a period of six or eight months, when he said that he had come to understand that NATO was not an analog of the Warsaw pact, that NATO was a political organization whose purpose was to defend. He then thought, pronounced, that it would be useful, as the Warsaw pact was crumbling and by then I guess officially had crumbled, for NATO to continue certainly in its political role and its future role. He was invited to speak at NATO and he spoke to a meeting of the North Atlantic Council which I had the privilege of attending, as did Lech Walesa, and we heard from both of them about their division of being part of a united Europe and a united Europe that was protected by NATO. There is no question, or certainly there was no question after that in eastern Europe, nor in western Europe, with the exception of a couple of countries, about NATO’s future role. There was probably more discussion in the United States about that than there was in Europe.

Q: One of the prime reasons for our NATO Atlantic policy was to keep the French and the Germans from going at each other, and certainly to have a military and political command that keeps an arms race from developing, and sort of keeps both these people under control is to everyone’s advantage. I mean, once you strip away the initial rationale for this with the Soviet Union, but that was always only one part of it.

FULTON: Well, one of the first Secretaries General of NATO is reported to have said the purpose of NATO is to keep the Americans in, keep the Russians out and keep the Germans down. That, fifty years later, with a more sophisticated rendering, still has merit. Europe does not want a Germany that is the predominant power, and Germany does not want to be the predominant power in Europe. The United States and Europe have so many things in common that there is almost no need to argue the need for a close alliance. There is some obvious need to argue how that alliance should manifest, and what level of American commitment and American resources and American troops, that argument goes on. But as the then-Ambassador to NATO, William Howard Taft said frequently, and I believe very convincingly, that let’s suppose that we were starting with no American troops in Europe or Asia, and we nonetheless decided that we wanted to have a standing military, as we do, and somebody said to you, what are the chances
that you would require this military to be used in the United States? To defend our borders?
Might say, well, very, very, very, very small. What are the chances that you would require this
military to be used on some other continent? Well, they’re greater. Would you then like to have
some number, let’s say a hundred-thousand troops, pre-positioned in Europe and a hundred-
thousand troops pre-positioned in Asia with the host countries paying for a substantial amount of
the cost of the bases in which these soldiers serve? Would you want to have that? And he says,
yes, I think you would probably say yeah. I think that sounds like a good deal. And that’s the
deal we have.

Q: Well let’s talk about Desert Storm. Desert Shield, Desert Storm. You were in Brussels in,
what was it, August of 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait?

FULTON: Yes.

Q: How did this, I mean was this, initially, just something happening in a far-off land or
something like that, or did NATO see that it might get involved?

FULTON: NATO, the NATO allies conferred on a whole range of issues, both in and out of the
NATO area. NATO has always been a forum for exchange of information. I think all of the allies
welcomed that kind of exchange, so as soon as that happened there were any number of
emergency meetings at different levels from the North Atlantic Council to the Defense Council
and so on. To discuss the issue. There was no sense that NATO would send a NATO force, as
that was clearly outside of the NATO charter, as it was interpreted, but would NATO be
involved politically? Yes. And eventually, would NATO become involved logistically? The
answer was a resounding yes, and probably more so than was appreciated at the time, perhaps
more so than it was appreciated today, there, NATO served as a coordinating means for what
was a logistical exercise of nearly unprecedented magnitude and speed.

Q: Well, correct me if I’m wrong, but in a way we’re saying, okay, NATO wasn’t involved. But
these were people who were using all the instruments at hand, including the men and women and
equipment and the logistical things of NATO which you all had been holding in anticipation over
the years to put it into action.

FULTON: By this time, I would emphasize in what I said that NATO did not send a force, was
not involved in that way, but absolutely it was very richly involved in the logistics end. If you
look at that whole operation, that the movement of five-hundred thousand American troops and
armor in a relatively short period of time along with the contributions that were made by most of
the NATO allies in one form or another, with ships or with fly-over rights or what have you, and
then the whole, using the whole NATO logistical apparatus was a major contribution for NATO.

Q: Were there any, as this was developing did you see, were there problems with some of the
countries, were NATO members unhappy or slow to respond or not?

FULTON: There, I don’t think there was anything that has happened at NATO where some
countries aren’t unhappy with something or where some countries aren’t slower than other
countries. That’s always the case. The amazing thing about NATO, as you gathered from my
comments up to now, even after four and a half years, I was always surprised how NATO would, in a pinch, meet the challenge with a consensus that was often very wise. Now getting to that consensus was often very difficult, and there were moments of high frustration and moments of anger. I have seen people storm out of meetings. I have seen a Secretary of State sit at a meeting saying nothing for hours and hours and hours as the battle raged on around him and he decided, “I think our role here is to say nothing. Because eventually these two or these three combatants in this room are going to be very close to a decision and then maybe we can tip the balance.”

Q: Very astute, very difficult to do. I take it this was Baker.

FULTON: Yes, it was.

Q: What I’m gathering, you were coming away with a very solid impression of Baker as an able Secretary of State who dealt with a very confusing situation and helped bring things into proper order.

FULTON: He had a very strategic view, he and President Bush had a clear view. George Bush was, twice as President and once as Vice President at NATO headquarters, and also to a NATO summit in Great Britain. He was actively engaged, impressively engaged in the issues and in leading as has been traditionally the American role, leading the NATO alliance to make these considerable changes that were required when NATO put on the table conventional arms reductions and nuclear arms reductions. It wasn’t necessarily popular with every constituency in the United States. When NATO began its opening to the east, it wasn’t clear where that would go, and all of the questions that were first asked, some of them still are with us, well, why do you have NATO if everybody’s a member? I think if you watch what happens in the give and take of consensus building in Brussels, the answer is very, very clear, I don’t know that we communicate that clearly if you’re not present.

Q: On Kuwait, what was the French response? Because usually the French are often the odd-man-out, how did you find them?

FULTON: To tell you, I don’t remember the initial response of the French. The French, as I think I said earlier on, traditionally sent very able diplomats to NATO and played a very strong role in the political decisions. Their role as it developed was, it was very supportive. What their initial role was I just don’t recall.

Q: How about with the Germans? They couldn’t send their troops abroad and all that. Were the Germans uncomfortable?

FULTON: Yes. The question of deploying German troops outside of German borders was represented as a constitutional issue, and Germans on one side of that question had no doubt that the constitution forbade it. Germans on the other side of the question said no, the interpretation is wrong, it was not forbidden under certain circumstances. But at least through that period of time there were both political and military considerations about German deployment outside of German borders for any cause, for supporting the effort logistically or otherwise. Will the rest of the world think this is a new expanse of Germany? Will Germans think that’s their role? What
will the rest of the Europeans think of it? It was a huge debate which I understand has been resolved sort of since that time, and there have been of course German deployments outside of the area now, and the constitutional issue has been settled.

Q: As an aftermath of the Kuwait campaign, did you see any change? I mean, here in a way the weapons which had been developed which hadn’t been used, particularly American ones. Were you getting any concerns saying the Americans really have moved a quantum step ahead of the rest of NATO? Was this a matter of concern?

FULTON: I don’t think there’s any question about American capabilities even before Desert Storm. In the annual exercise of force planning, all the NATO allies know what each other country has. The United States traditionally talks about burden sharing, wants the allies to do more, wants them to pay a higher percentage of their GNP (Gross National Product) on defense. Some of them would like to spend more, have domestic constituencies or other constraints. The economies are not that strong in Europe right now. That means the change is very, very slow. But there were no surprises certainly among the military planners about American capability. Among the European public, on the other hand, to watch on CNN (Cable News Network) those missiles going down the streets of Baghdad and making a left turn at the stoplight, I should say astonished them, astonished all of us.

Q: Astonished the world, I’m told places in Africa, things stopped to watch this war on TV.

FULTON: So, yes, to see that happening in real time with live camera in downtown Baghdad surprised most people.

Q: The aftermath of this. When did you leave NATO?

FULTON: I was with NATO through the summer of 1991.

Q: So was there any disquiet about, you know we took a big hunk of our armor force and all, and then it didn’t come back.

FULTON: Well, that was in the cards before then. It probably would have happened a little slower. But at the time, at the height of our involvement in NATO we had over two-hundred fifty-thousand troops stationed in Europe. As we began to redefine the NATO role and the need for deployment it was clear before Desert Storm that that number would come down. It was clear through budget hearings. It was clear through statements of intention that that number would come down to the order of a hundred-thousand. It was convenient for some of the units that had moved out to not move back, as you say. But that was not a surprise, the timing was a little different.

Q: Are there any other issues we should talk about before you left NATO?

FULTON: The last thing I would want to say, because many of these questions that you could ask of some of our political and military planners who were inside these meetings, could give you a much better description of the subtleties of the give and take of decision-making than I
can. I was attending to the U.S. dealings with the European press, and cared a good bit about public opinion during this time. It was my role as Public Affairs Counselor. There are a couple of things to be said I think. One is the press itself, the European press, those that were not dispatched to the Gulf to cover the war, but those who were covering the U.S. political role as it was manifest in NATO, were surprising. I shouldn’t say surprising, were particularly careful and objective in their reporting. If you were a European citizen reading serious press in most of the European countries, and I don’t pretend to know what was written in Iceland or Luxembourg, but in the major European papers, you would have found a quite balanced view of the U.S. role, and the U.S. consultative process with its allies. The Americans are always in danger of being seen as a country so powerful that we make the decision to roll over our allies and inform them later. That did not happen. The consultation process was very, very rich, politically and militarily, from both DoD and the Department of State. I can’t imagine how it could have been better. We did our best on the Public Affairs side to make sure that was accurately portrayed. The Press had very open access to what we were doing. We kept them informed, and I think there were a few things that were going on apart from actual targeting in Desert Storm. There were few things that were going on that we didn’t know about as soon as decisions were made. As a consequence of this quite accurate reporting that we got, we found the American, the European public were very supportive of the NATO role and the U.S. role, with the exception of Greece and Spain. Spain was a in a period of transition during that time about its role in NATO. So with those exceptions there was quite grand support all across Europe, and as the threat seemed to increase to all of the allies because of Saddam Hussein’s invasion, we found support was very, very high for the American role. That was particularly comforting to me given the role that I was playing in public diplomacy.

Q: In Europe, as in the United States, but particularly in Europe, there were some visceral left-wing, and I’m not talking about far left, but I mean we have them in the United States, I mean anti-military, anti-government, what you tell us isn’t the right thing and all, and this is built up at that time. Did you find that because of what Saddam Hussein had done that this cynical anti-establishment spirit was dampened in the press, would you say?

FULTON: I don’t know if I could relate it in particular to Saddam Hussein. Certainly the trend in the ‘80s and ‘90s was for the public to be more supportive of the government position. These would be the Soviet Union and other perceived threats, in part because the threat level was seen to be decreasing with the Soviet Union. In part, people understood that even if you attributed to a particular time an event or leader, they understood that standing fast over a long period of time had a big payoff. And yes, Saddam Hussein’s threat was seen as very real, and government policies were backed. So this leftist cynicism that you described was not very much in evidence. I think if one had been there in the ‘70s and early ‘80s that would have been a major issue. It was not a major issue. I just wanted to give enormous credit to the responsible press in Europe for the way they reported these very dramatic changes. Europeans have a diet, practically every day, of such issues, far more than we have here. One does not pick up the paper every day and read about NATO. During that period, you certainly could read about NATO, at least a couple of times a week, in most European papers.

Q: You mentioned Greece. Was Greece at this time very much the odd-man out?
FULTON: The Greek public is not very supportive of NATO, has not been for years and years. Historically this takes us back to some very strong anti-American feelings. NATO means American. Takes it back to even stronger anti-Turkish feelings. Turkey is a key member of NATO. The Greeks wonder if they’re getting treated fairly vis-à-vis Turkey. There are historical reasons for the Greek public opinion. The Greek government has been largely supportive of NATO actions even when the public did not support the government. There were some difficult issues on conventional arms negotiations between the Greeks and the Turks, and therefore between the Greeks and the Americans and between the Turks and the Americans. On the western position on some of the arms negotiations, I would say that the Greek government, particularly because it did not have public opinion behind them, had to take some fairly bold moves in NATO to support and join the NATO consensus. When there is a ministerial meeting at NATO and a communiqué is issued, the first thing the reporters look at is whether there are any footnotes. The footnotes will signal that this country or that country did not agree with the consensus but decided not to break it. But it signaled that the country is willing to allow the consensus to go forward, but has not joined it. There was a time, if you look back over NATO communiqué when there were a fair number of footnotes. There were very few footnotes in the period ’87 to ’91 while I served there, and I’m not sure that there were more than one or two actually during that period, and that is one overt signal that there was a fairly broad consensus on NATO issues.

Q: Summer of ’91, where’d you go?

FULTON: I left NATO in August of ’91, came back to Washington as Deputy Associate Director of the Bureau of Educational Cultural Affairs of USIA.

JOHN P. HARROD
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Brussels (1987-1992)

John Harrold was born in Illinois in 1945, and received his BA from Colgate University. Having entered the Foreign Service in 1969, his positions included Moscow, Kabul, Poznan, Warsaw and Brussels. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: ’87. Whither?

HARROD: Whither? Whither was one of those issues that comes to all of us tandem people in the Foreign Service, tandem assignments being more and more common these days. My wife and I ended up in Poland in ’84, as I said, because our two bureaucracies essentially came to the same conclusion independently. Leaving Poland was a more complicated thing because there was not such a natural tug, and so we looked into several options where we could both go. By this point, by ’87, we had a two-year-old son. We wanted to go someplace together. Our bureaucracies were looking at things. USIA was suggesting places like the Philippines and Pakistan, and even Australia was one we looked at, but in all these cases, because of the
difference between Commerce and USIA, we would have been in different cities (except for Manila, we would have been together). But in Pakistan, it would have been Islamabad and Karachi, and in Australia it would have been Canberra and Sydney. And finally we explored Brussels, at least partly because Commerce had at least I think one, and they were thinking about opening a second, office in Brussels, and USIA had three different offices in Brussels, and two of them came open at the right time for me. So we started looking at Brussels. And ultimately, to make a long story short, we were both assigned to Brussels, the difference being that my wife’s job began in 1987, and my job was to begin in 1988. So I had a year to gap between the time we left Poland and the time my job started in Brussels. My wife was assigned as the number two person in the Commercial Section of the embassy, and I had originally looked at a job at the U.S. mission to the European Community, as it was at the time, but USIA in its infinite wisdom decided to assign me to the embassy to Belgium, essentially, they said, because of my administrative experience. The EC job had no staff, really, and it was more of an advisor. The embassy job was the administrative infrastructure for all three USIS posts in Brussels. It even had some wider implications. So I got assigned the embassy, but I had a year to gap. So we go to Brussels in 1987, in the summer, and my first five months or so I was an unemployed father of a two-year-old with no pay. I was off the books. That’s when they sent me back to Warsaw for a week or two to work on the Bush visit, and while I was there, my wife, God bless her, decided that I needed something to do, and so she paid for me to have, I think it was, twice-a-week Dutch language lessons. So I studied some Dutch, took care of the kid, and then in January of ’88, I went back on the payroll and went into an intensive five-hour-a-day French language program. French was required for the assignment - I didn’t have French - and they agreed to teach me the language at post. Dutch was not required, even though 57 percent of the population of Belgium speaks Dutch, not French, so I had studied Dutch on my own with my wife’s financial support, and so I studied French for six months and took over my job at the embassy in the summer of ’88 as public affairs officer.

Q: And you were in Brussels from, essentially then, say, ’88 to when?

HARROD: ’92.

Q: ’92.

HARROD: Four-year assignment, five years total because of the one year off. My wife, in the meantime, after two years at the embassy, was assigned to open the Commerce office at the U.S. mission to the EC, and so she actually had five years of gainful employment in Brussels in two different jobs, and I had my four years as PAO.

Q: Can you describe your role and the embassy? I mean, Brussels is a complicated place because you’re tripping over various missions and all that.

HARROD: Yes, there were three ambassadors, three missions, and it was a complicated thing. It was also a very unique assignment for me, something new. Because I had never worked in a Western European country, there were several things I found odd and difficult at the beginning. Belgium is a monarchy, so you had people who walked around with titles like Count and Viscount and this sort of thing, which I couldn’t take seriously, coming from the East, where
everybody was allegedly the same.

Q: Comrades.

HARROD: Yes, “Comrade” this and that. I found comrade hard to take, but also dealing with your counts and your viscounts and that stuff was equally difficult. There were some pleasant surprises. I remember very shortly after I took over my job, I had a lunch - my press attaché, Jim Findley set me up - with the press spokesman with the defense minister because we were working on a complicated idea. We had something called NATO tours, where each US post - each embassy, I should say - in Europe would put together a group of people in a particular area, whether they’re journalists or academics or whatever, and fund half the program (and the U.S. mission to NATO would fund the other half), and these people would go off and, you know, peer across the Fulda Gap at Soviet tanks and go to Berlin and see the Wall and do other things to sort of impress upon them the importance of NATO. And we did this both for countries that were in NATO and countries that weren’t. Anyway, we had this idea of sending some Belgian labor leaders on a NATO tour, and we had this strange idea that while they were there, why didn’t they look at the Belgian troops in Germany, because Belgium was one of the occupying forces. So we had this lunch with the defense minister’s press spokesman to float the idea - you know, what would he think of us sending some Belgian people on the U.S. taxpayers’ account, and they would actually deal with Belgians in Germany? We started our lunch, and we finally broached the idea, and he scratched his head, and he said, “Sure.” And I remember sort of momentarily stopping, and I said, Wow, I said, I’ve never worked with allies before. It’s easy. We did it.

It was an interesting time when I took over. I mentioned the administrative part of this job. I’m going to interrupt myself to - whatever I was starting there, I’m going to mention something else that was different for me in Brussels.

Having served all of my previous assignments either in the former Eastern Europe or in places like Afghanistan, Brussels was a quote “normal” unquote Western European post, and there was an awful lot of protocol - what some people would call public affairs - which to me was more the cocktail circuit kind of things than I had ever experienced before. I mean, we had an American Chamber of Commerce, I was being requested to appear at... There was an American Businessman’s Club - all these kinds of things that I had not been used to, and there was a lot more of that than I expected. I had to wear my tuxedo more than I had ever worn it in the past, and these kinds of things. It was something that was new to me, not always a lot of fun. It just seemed like you had to do these things as part of the - and I did a lot of speech-writing, which was not something I had done a whole lot of before. My job in Brussels also encompassed Luxembourg, where we didn’t have an American officer, and so one had to support the ambassador in Luxembourg, and sometimes I was writing speeches for two ambassadors at the same time. And there was a big administrative component. As I mentioned, we had three USIS posts in Brussels, but only one of them had an administrative infrastructure - the FSNs, the local employees - to do the budgeting, and I got contracting authority while I was out there to act as a contracting officer for all three posts and Luxembourg, and we also, because I had an extremely good staff of Belgian employees, who were very knowledgeable and into computers before a lot of the rest of the agency was into computers, we actually provided administrative support for posts as far away as The Hague, or even we had a method of printing out the Wireless File
electronically (back in 1988) that was fairly new, and in Bonn, the U.S. mission in Germany, which is the biggest one in Europe, adopted our way of doing it. So we were sort of an administrative infrastructure for a broader area. We had a very nice cultural center with a very modern, computerized what we used to call library (and then we changed the name to sort of “reference center” because it wasn’t a library in the old sense), and a lot of the things that the staff did in the library, the reference center, became models for other posts in Western Europe. So we were conscious of being a country post for a fairly small country but at the same time an administrative resource for the whole region, which was something I hadn’t properly appreciated.

Q: How were relations, ’88 to ’92 period, with Belgium?

HARROD: Quite good. I mean, the Belgians were an ally. They had a coalition government, which made it rather difficult for them to do bold things because they were always afraid about the coalition. This came to the fore in the Gulf War, but at the beginning, when I took over in ’88, the big issue for us was the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) withdrawal. My ambassador, who arrived, took over about the same time I did, was Mike Glitman, and Mike had negotiated the INF treaty in Geneva, and so he was the expert on the treaty, and the treaty went into force literally as I took over my job. I remember my predecessor left in July, and I was on leave and was coming back at the beginning of August to take over as PAO, and I figured August was a great time. It’s quiet. Belgium’s on vacation. I’ll have time to read in. The day I took over as PAO, the Soviets notified us of an inspection of the two U.S. facilities in Belgium where cruise missiles were stored, and so literally my first day on the job, I was in the car on the way to Florennes Air Base to be the point person for an inspection with attendant media hoopla. We had about 50 or 60 media people there because it was one of the first - I think it was the first - Soviet inspection on Belgian territory. Television cameras, whatever. And so for the first six months or so of my assignment, INF was the issue - we had repeated inspections - which in one way was great because I was immediately working with the press spokesman for the Foreign Ministry. And then we also had a visit by President Bush. Let’s see, when would that have been? It was not till ’89. We had Reagan in ’88; we had Bush in ’89. But the Bush visit cemented my relationship with the press spokesman for His Majesty the King of the Belgians. We also had - by my count, and I may be imprecise on this - but during my time in Belgium I think we had somewhere between 19 and 23 visits by the Secretary of State, or Secretaries of State. My first one was George Shultz at the end of ’88, and then we had Jim Baker up the wazoo for the remainder of my time. We had three presidential visits, and I was also pulled out of Belgium for two presidential visits to Moscow and the Madrid-Middle East Peace Conference. So I did lots of visits. My staff was superb at Secretary of State visits. When the first one happened on my watch, I was concerned. The Secretary of State is coming, his entourage. My staff was not concerned. And after the 15th or 20th such visit, I began to see why. We just simply said, oh yes, another secretary of State visit.

Q: Of course, they’re NATO-scheduled visits and all that, isn’t that right?

HARROD: They’re NATO-scheduled visits, but we were the administrative infrastructure for the USIS post at NATO.

Q: Yes, but I mean the point was, this had been going on for a long time.
HARROD: Not like we had them. Not like we had them, because at first the new administration, the Bush administration, Jim Baker came out for several early visits. Then the Gulf War began to heat up and it seemed like we got the Secretary of State every few weeks. It was quite something. The staff was good at it, but every time the Secretary would come, we’d have to set up the press center at the hotel downtown and handle all the movements of all the people. And the presidential visits, of course, one Reagan and two Bush, were major undertakings, which involved dealings. Even though the President is ostensibly coming to meet with NATO, he’s in Belgium, and we had a lot of work, and the king would always insist on some meeting with the President. It was fun working with the Royal Palace. At one point we had an advance party of 30-some people out there walking through the king’s palace. The king’s press guy made a point of the fact that he was doing an advance for the king’s state visit to Switzerland next week. He said, “Just me.”

Q: Were there any problems with these INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) inspections? Did you find these things worked fairly well?

HARROD: They worked fairly well. The two problems were, from our perspective, short notice - because under the terms of the treaty they only had to give you 48 hours notice-

Q: Well, that’s the whole idea of it.

HARROD: That’s the whole idea, but what it meant was ginning up to handle it was a sort of drop-everything. That’s when the Foreign Ministry press guy and I exchanged our home telephone numbers so we could call each other at two o’clock in the morning if the notification came in. And then the gaggle of press people. But I must admit, there was a certain sense of accomplishment with Mike Glitman as the ambassador, having negotiated this treaty, when the final inspection came of the last shipment of cruise missiles out of Florennes Air Base. We were down there with the Belgian defense minister and a lot of media to watch the last missiles be loaded onto the last C-5, or C-141, I forget which, and off they went into the distance, off the end of the runway, and I was thinking, Gee, you know, there are not too many people in the diplomatic service who actually get to see the results of their work, and for a guy like Glitman to have negotiated the treaty and then see it physically going into effect must have been quite something. So that took care of the first part, the INF issue. It was just a lot of scrambling around, but it was good.

And the presidential visits were fun and, as I said, cemented one’s relationships. I got to see how the Royal Palace worked and developed some good contacts. Western Europe is very different from Eastern Europe, but when I started working with the people at the Palace - the king’s role in Belgium is a very unique one, partly because Baudouin I had been king for 40 years and had established a role as sort of father figure to the country, and he dealt with politicians on a one-to-one basis. I took several visitors to see him, and I got some appreciation for how he worked and how his style worked, and then when there was almost a constitutional crisis in the country when the Parliament passed an abortion bill and the King had threatened not to sign it. And the whole embassy was reporting to Washington the opinion that the king, as a constitutional monarch, had no choice - he would have to sign it, there was no issue here. And my contacts in the Palace - it’s
sort of like Kremlinology in the East; I think that’s one of the reasons I picked up on this, because I had been in the East and you get used to these little signs - all my friends in the Palace said, you know, the king is serious about this, and so I said he’s not going to sign the bill, everything I know says he’s not going to sign the bill, but that would be a constitutional crisis, blah-blah. Well, it turned out he didn’t sign the bill. He essentially abdicated for one day, and then the bill was promulgated without the king, which you could do if His Majesty was indisposed or not there, and then the Parliament implored him to take back his throne, which he did, but it made a very short, small, gefuffle, but I took some credit. I was given some credit also, I must say, as being the only person in the embassy who believed that this would happen. That’s what you have when you have two presidential visits and you get to walk through the palace and talk to a lot of people and meet people that you can later chat with and find things out, because frankly the embassy didn’t pay much attention to the Palace except when the new ambassador would present his credentials. The king was seen as not a direct player in the political process, but in fact he was.

Q: How about the Gulf War? We’re talking about the ’89-90 period. How did that play out?

HARROD: Well, it preoccupied us almost exclusively, partly because it was Brussels and the headquarters of NATO; and because of this administrative role we had in my post as the sort of support for the other posts. Not too long after Saddam invaded Kuwait, there was established a Brussels Security Working Group, which was eight people representing the military community and the three embassies in town, and I was the public affairs person of the working group, and as the war built up, we spent more and more time meeting as this working group, which was chaired by a brigadier general who was on the U.S. military delegation out at NATO. But we had to basically develop public affairs plans, policies for what would happen when the shooting war finally started. We did some dry-run exercises. Anyway, it was very time-consuming, and when the shooting war did start, we went into full-time meeting mode and did many of the things that we had staffed out ahead of time. I must say, when one is in the Foreign Service, one ends up in the course of one’s career doing lots of these emergency drills. They even send out teams to embassies to run you through them. We did several of them while I was in Brussels, and the only one that was of any use to me whatsoever was the one we did ourselves as part of this working group. We ginned up our own exercise to test ourselves for what would happen if the war really does break out, in the sense of U.S. direct bombing of Iraq. And so we ran our own little exercise, and it pointed out to us several things that we hadn't really thought of yet, which we then incorporated into our planning, and when the war did break out, we were ready for it. It’s the only one of these that I’ve ever actually had to put to use, and it was one that was not imposed on us by a team coming out from Washington to test our readiness; it was one we did ourselves.

Q: How did the Belgians respond to the Gulf War?

HARROD: Well, initially - and this is another example of where public diplomacy can sometimes play a role - I can think of two instances in the Gulf War from my point of view, but one of them was that initially we were trying to get support from our allies for a common response to Saddam, and that included contributing military forces to the Gulf. The Belgians do not have a large military, but they had some things that were of use. They had C-130 transport
aircraft, and they had minesweepers. And so we had tried to put the persuasive arm on the Belgians to contribute some of these assets to the common good, and at least the way I remember it, the initial response on the political level had been “we’d love to, we’re allies, but it’s very delicate situation here, coalition government, divided public opinion, you know, we don’t want to be out in front,” blah- blah-blah. I had a good friend who was a security affairs correspondent for one of the major Belgian newspapers. Her newspaper ran a public opinion poll, which pointed out, finally, and this was not accidental, but something like, I don’t know, 80 or 90 percent of the Belgian public felt that Saddam should be hung from a lamppost, and so the newspaper publishes these polls and findings, which we then immediately take over to the Belgian government and say, “What’s controversial here?” And the Belgians ultimately contributed minesweepers and C-130s, once they were convinced that they had the public support from their people to do it.

The other example of where public diplomacy played some role, I remember, was really when the Gulf War had ended, and we had created the impression that we thought the Kurds and Shiites should rise up and rid themselves of Saddam Hussein, which the Kurds did. And then the Kurds took a terrible pounding from Saddam, and the public opinion and the press in Belgium and in some other Western European countries was immediately rushing to the conclusion that the Americans had left the Kurds hung out to dry. And I got on the telephone in this case to Washington and told them that we were going to take a terrible beating on this issue if we didn’t do something, and I was later given some credit by my superiors for having been the first one to tip them to this, which at least was one of the things that got that Operation Provide Comfort going so that we were air-dropping supplies to the Kurds and it looked like we were attempting to follow-up on the consequences of our earlier encouragement. So public diplomacy does take a role.

But during the Gulf War, I mean, aside from these couple of issues, the main focus for us was on the internal situation within Belgium, and the Belgians picked up a couple of suspected Iraqi terrorists in Brussels who might have been sent there. The general who was the commander of our little eight-member working group, in fact, when he was out of his house, his house had been broken into and his - I don’t know what he was - aide- de-camp or something had been drugged. So there were some signs that there were nasty things that could have gone afoot in Brussels, and that was the preoccupation there, was security. And I must admit, I had not spent a lot of time working with the military, given where my assignments were, but it was a good experience in Brussels working with this little group. Of our eight members, I think three were uniformed military, and a couple of others were American civilians working at NATO. But it was a good experience.

Another thing that Belgium drove into my consciousness on the military side was that in Belgium we had three U.S. military cemeteries, one from the First World War and two from the Second World War. Every Memorial Day weekend, the American ambassador or chargé would visit all three cemeteries for elaborate ceremonies, wreath-laying, flyovers. This was a big deal, and it was the first time I had had to participate in anything quite like that, and the first time you see the ten thousand crosses and Mogen David stretched out across the green field, it makes an impression on you, and it still makes an impression. I mean I took my son to see Saving Private Ryan, and the movie opens and closes in the Normandy cemetery, but it looks very much like the
cemeteries in Belgium, and it gets to you. You know, there are some shared experiences. I was
touched the first time I did this, which would have been, I guess, ’89, when the Belgian interior
minister, I guess, at the time, who was representing the king at one of these ceremonies - the
ceremony had officially ended and everybody was getting in their limos and leaving, and some
relatives of some Americans, who had relatives buried in the cemetery had come over to talk to
Ambassador Glitman and wondered if he would come with them while they went to look for
their relatives, and the interior minister was getting into his car (and he’d been educated at
Harvard or something) got out, came over, and joined them and walked around with them and,
you know, found Uncle Joe buried over here, and the Belgian took the little Belgian flag off the
grave and handed it to the family member and said, “Please take this as a symbol of our
remembrance of your loved ones.” And I thought, Gee, you know, this is a nice touch.
Unfortunately, just about every Belgian politician, including this guy, I think, has been
implicated in some sort of corruption and scandal over the years, but I was impressed by him and
thought he would be a good comer, but I think he’s been tainted along with everybody else. But
these were aspects - I mean, for somebody who had spent his or her career in France, Italy, the
UK, or whatever, it wouldn’t have probably been a big deal, but for me, coming from the East,
these are the things I remember from Belgium because they were new to me. I mean, we went
down to Luxembourg for Patton Day - General Patton liberated Luxembourg, not once but twice,
one in September of ’44 and then after the Battle of the Bulge they had to go back through
again - and so people have long memories. While I was in Brussels the Eisenhower Centennial
was taking place, 100 years since Ike’s birth, and we were trying to drum up support for a
commemoration of some sort, and of course the Belgians remembered Ike not as the President of
the United States necessarily, but as the commander-in-chief in the war. That’s really the role
that he’s remembered for. And we were having some trouble - and again at the political level
-getting people to do anything. There had been some approaches made to the Belgian Parliament
about some little commemorative thing, and they weren’t getting too far. And some of us
remembered that the king, who had been on the throne, of course, for 40 years, had in fact paid a
state visit to the United States in the late ‘50s when Ike was the President. And so I called one of
my friends at the Palace and told him how much trouble we were having getting something
ginned up here, and wasn’t it unfortunate because His Majesty was one of the few leaders who
actually remembered Ike. I believe the next day the speaker of the Belgian Parliament got a call
from the Palace that said you really ought to do something. And they had a commemoration, and
Ambassador Glitman and I were invited to sit in the gallery while they said nice things about Ike,
and it went into the record. We did it.

Q: Who was our ambassador or ambassadors in Luxembourg while you were there?

HARROD: The first one was Jean Gerard, who was the Reagan administration ambassador, I
believe. She’d been at UNESCO in Paris, I believe, before we got out of UNESCO, and moved
over to Luxembourg. She was followed by a person who has a cubicle just down the hall here,
Ed Rowell. Luxembourg is a fine little place, and being up in Brussels and having responsibility
for Luxembourg, I found it a pleasant experience. It was two hours down the road, and as Daniel
Webster said about Dartmouth College, it is small, but there are those who love it. And
Luxembourg has the advantage, as I believe Ed Rowell once said, of “doability.” You have not
resources there, but you can do just about anything if you have the resources because you know
everybody in the country. When Jean Gerard was leaving and had a farewell reception at her
residence, I went down for that, and I was standing there holding a drink talking to somebody who I think was a Paris friend of hers, and this gray-haired gentleman walks over and sticks out his hand, and he says, “Hi, I’m Jacques Santer.” He’s the prime minister, of course, now the head of the EU.

But it’s that kind of a country. You knew everybody. I went down with Ambassador Glitman. He was invited by Ambassador Gerard to talk about the INF treaty at one point, and so we went down and had a lunch. That tells you something about Mike Glitman. He’s ambassador in Brussels, and I found out from down in Luxembourg that he was being invited down to talk at a lunch. He didn’t tell me. So I went to him and said, “Ambassador Glitman, I understand you’re going to Luxembourg. Can I help you with the speech or anything.” And he said, “No, I think I can handle it.” And so I went down as an aide-de-camp, but he knew what he was doing. He didn’t need somebody to write his speeches for him - on that subject. If it’s INF, Mike knew it backwards and forwards. But I remember going down there for the lunch and being amazed. Even in Brussels it was hard to get the real high government officials to attend much of anything. And down in Luxembourg, for Ambassador Glitman’s presentation, they had the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister (such as he is, the commandant of Luxembourg’s tiny little armed forces), the Soviet, British, French and German ambassadors, I believe. It was quite an assemblage of the power elite in Luxembourg City. I was impressed. That was the doability quotient: you can get them.

Q: You were in Brussels during probably the momentous period of change - Germany united, the Soviet Union was at least beginning - I’m not sure if it had changed by that or whether it turned into Russia or not, but it was damned close to it. How did this play out in Brussels?

HARROD: Well, it left several indelible images. My colleague, who was the public affairs advisor out at NATO, one of his duties every year was a large academic conference that the U.S. mission to NATO co-sponsored, and one year I remember attending that conference, and sitting next to Manfred Woerner at the head table was the Russian ambassador, and this was quite an image. And then later a delegation of Eastern-

Q: Woerner being the head of NATO.

HARROD: Secretary general of NATO at the time. And to have the Soviet ambassador sitting there with him - and as a featured speaker at this conference - was quite something. And then my colleague out at NATO sponsored a visit by a bunch of Eastern journalist types who came, and Manfred Woerner was there, you know, hobnobbing and shaking hands, and the alliance is changing. And in fact, I was there, we had a press meeting when Russia emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union. The foreign minister arrived as the foreign minister of the Soviet Union for a meeting at NATO - again, the Soviet foreign minister being included in a meeting at NATO was something in and of itself - but he arrived as the Soviet foreign Minster, and he left as the Russian foreign minister, and while he was there, there was a one-on-one between him and Secretary Baker, and it was the Russians’ turn to host it, so they were going to do it at the Soviet ambassador’s residence in Brussels, but they didn’t have the foggiest idea how you handle a large press corps, and so the Russian/Soviet press attaché asked us for our help. And we went over to the Soviet embassy compound - Russian embassy compound (it’s hard to tell which one
it was at this point) - and got the run of the ambassador’s residence, helped them set up a public address system, you know, figured out where the holding area for the press would be, went through this whole elaborate rigmarole and essentially did all their press work for them. And when Secretary Baker arrived, the meeting went much longer than anticipated. We were sitting there in the holding room with all these journalists, and it was a unique experience. I mean, here we were on Russian embassy premises, which in my experience are always top secret, and in this case, the Russian press attaché - you know we’d done everything - I said, “Is there anything else we can do for you, Aleksei” (or whatever his name was), and he says, “Yes, Jack, would you introduce me to Ralph Begleiter” of CNN, because they watch CNN. So I called Ralph over and introduced him, and Ralph wanted to do a stand-up right out in front of the Russian embassy, on their property, and Aleksei said, “Sure, Ralph,” and they went out and set up their cameras, and all these things that in my experience the Russians would have said, “Nyet!” There we were. It was new.

Q: Was there anything else we could cover?

HARROD: I think as far as Brussels goes, the one other thing I would say, I had three years of Mike Glitman, who was a superb ambassador, and Mike was better than he even thought he was because during the Gulf War he tended to shy away - sorry, Mike - he tended to shy away from a lot of public things. He did not like to cut ribbons and make a lot of speeches and things like that. When the Gulf War broke out, there was an edict from Washington that ambassadors should be more public in articulating our message, and Mike, whose French was quite good, was invited to appear on two of the Sunday talk shows in Brussels, the French ones (there were two Dutch ones and two French ones), and so he appeared on both of them, turned out he was very, very good at it, and here I, as his public affairs guy, you know, had been trying for two and a half years to get him to do more of this kind of thing, and he was very good at it, and about five months later, he was gone, end of his term. But he was really very good, and he even had a great sense of humor, and his French was good, and it all worked out superbly. But in retrospect, my fourth year in Brussels - which would have been more of the same, four years with the same ambassador - my fourth year was made much more interesting by the fact that Glitman left and the new ambassador to Brussels was one Bruce S. Gelb, who had been the director of the U.S. Information Agency and had left that job under some controversial circumstances, I guess, and so suddenly the guy who had been my big, big boss in Washington, but with whom I had never really dealt except on one trip when he passed through Brussels and I just was out at the airport to get him from one plane to another, suddenly came out as my ambassador. So my fourth year was a lot more interesting because I had a new ambassador to adjust to, and Bruce was much more into the public aspect of things than Mike Glitman. Mike was a career diplomat who negotiated the INF treaty, whose credentials are impeccable. Ambassador Gelb came from a different background in business, and so he was much more interested in making his maiden speech to the Belgian-American Association, which was a huge hit, and then he took his role as the honorary co-chairman of the Fulbright Commission seriously and came to Fulbright Commission meetings, which Ambassador Glitman had never done because he didn’t know much about educational exchange and didn’t think he was qualified to do this. So Ambassador Gelb became much more of a public figure, and I became his public affairs advisor in the full sense of the term. I mean, we used to meet regularly, and it was quite a pleasure. And I must say (and again, sorry, Bruce), I had some fear and trepidation when he arrived as ambassador,
because of the track record at USIA and his perceptions of me, and we had a closed-door meeting shortly after his arrival, which ran into the evening hours, and we ended up shaking hands, and I think we made a very good team, and I learned a lot from him. And it made that fourth year, I think, a lot more interesting than if I had simply gone through a fourth year of the same stuff I had been doing.

MAYNARD WAYNE GLITMAN
Ambassador
Belgium (1988-1991)

Ambassador Glitman was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his BA from the University of Illinois and his MA from Fletcher School of Law and diplomacy MA, and served in the U.S. Army in 1957. His postings abroad include Nassau, Ottawa, Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Vienna, and served as the ambassador to Belgium. James S. Pacy interviewed the ambassador on April 24, 2001

Q: Okay, on July 15, 1988, you were appointed Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium. You presented your credentials on September 28, 1988. How was it that you received this appointment?

GLITMAN: The process of appointment is, in some way, a mystery to those who are not directly involved. I think in each case, there is some factor that you cannot account for. In this case, I was finished with the INF treaty, and the exchange of ratification had taken place, documents of ratification had been exchanged. That job was done. Just as an example, getting back to the factor of luck, when I was in front of the committees it would have been a very inopportune moment to be appointed to anywhere, because then there would be combination of the treaty and my appointment. The two would be seen as a single unit by some senators. And you really don’t want to mix the two. The treaty was far more important to have any side elements brought into it. So, there was no possibility of appointment during that time. But, that was over in May, certainly by June.

Geoffrey Swaebe, who was the Ambassador in Brussels, asked to be relieved. I was open, and the post was open. I believe that’s how it happened. I also, of course, knew Belgium, we have lived there for several years. And I visited there from Paris. I had some knowledge of the country. I met a lot of Belgians during my time in NATO. We lived in Brussels when I was at NATO. There was a lot of background which I had to bring to the job.

Q: The presentation of credentials to the king. Do you want to tell us what it’s like? Did the chief of protocol come to the Embassy to pick you up? What was the procedure?

GLITMAN: The chief of the defense staff accompanied me. I was of course told in advance what would happen. They came to the residence, which was within walking distance of the formal palace in Brussels. The king and the queen didn’t live there, they live in a smaller palace in Laecken, just a little bit outside, a nice little section of Brussels. He showed up with a very long
Mercedes, escorted by a horse cavalry unit. It was a short ride over to the palace. We were ushered in from the vehicle, taken up the formal staircase. The audience with the king was held at that time. As I said before, I felt very strongly about him, he was a wonderful person. The King represented Belgium extremely well, along with the queen. So we had a non-substantive talk, in a sense, but it was a pleasant meeting. That was it. They escorted me back to the residence.

Q: Was your conversation in French or both in French and English?

GLITMAN: I think we spoke in English mostly. I was very comfortable in French at that point in my life, we could have done that. Both Chris and I also tried to learn Dutch while we were there. And we made a little bit of headway with that. It’s a language that is, sort of, half way between English and German in many respects.

Q: Would you want to talk about some relationships, during your service there, the king and the queen, the royal family, aristocracy, what was the relationship like?

GLITMAN: We were obviously mostly on formal occasions. We were invited frequently to events at which the king was present, and the queen. On some occasions there were very few diplomats at these. Often we would go to music concerts, particularly if American orchestra was there, we always wanted to go to those, try to get some sort of arrangement to meet with the conductor, and if possible to make some sort of contact with the musicians at our residence. I know that there was more than one occasion where the king was at one of these concerts in Brussels, and the queen. Chris and I would often be brought up to the little area where he would be talking to people during the intermissions. So we would have a chance to discuss that. I remember talking to him about Tiananmen square, in China. He raised it with me and I discussed it a bit with him. And then before we left Brussels we went this time to the palace where they lived in Laecken, and we met with him there.

Q: Did the queen participate in any of these affairs?

GLITMAN: Oh, yes.

Q: Did she speak English?

GLITMAN: I’m sure she did. Again, language wasn’t an issue. Because I could go back and forth between English and French easily. As I used to put it, I could spend a whole day in French and wouldn’t know the difference. It reached the point where it was very comfortable.

Q: How about the Belgian aristocracy? Was there any opportunity for you to deal with them? Did they come to the embassy ever? Was someone in the Foreign Ministry a count or a baron?

GLITMAN: People of that rank in the aristocracy were in all walks of life. Foreign Ministry and banking and business and finance, so you are with them constantly. I think certainly many of them received titles as a result of prominence and inventions for example. I am thinking of the Solvay family. Chemicals, and the initial founder had made a major chemical discovery, I wish I
could remember exactly what it was. They had continued to run their business but they also had wonderful estates. Quite generous, some of them, in making their places available for NATO meetings and so on. Some interesting stories of how they managed to survive the Second World War, with their wine cellars in tact. They were really just a part of regular life fare for us.

Q: What about your relationship with the prime minister, the foreign minister, persons at the Foreign Ministry? Other Belgian government figures?

GLITMAN: I saw a lot of them. Either we had a demarche to make or a request to make of them. I often would go over to see the Foreign Minister and occasionally the prime minister. There was a lot of contact, and a fair amount of social contact as well. And the defense minister and the heads of the parties. And the journalists. We really entertained at the residence a lot. And tried to bring in as many people from as many different walks of life and many different types of activities as we could. We would often have small ones, Chris and myself, plus maybe the prime minister and his wife, things like that. It was all part of the normal work. Again, as I mentioned before, there were a lot of business people as well that we’d meet frequently. It’s a fairly small country. Brussels is a relatively small city, so you get to meet just about everybody, as American ambassador.

I should say a word about the residence. The building was put up in the late 1700s. We purchased it at a very nice price immediately after the Second World War. In the process, we purchased, with the house, land behind it, which actually fronts one of the main streets. That’s where the office building went, the Chancery. So we could walk from the residence over to the Chancery, through the basements, so to speak. You didn’t even have to go outdoors. The downside was that the office became an extension of the house. If you had any work to do late at night, you’d just go on over there, it was no different than, just a few more steps going down. The residence was a beautiful building. I think Americans should feel proud of it. It really showed off the U.S. in a positive way. It was a Belgian building, and we had taken a good care of it. It had been furnished very well over the years and while we were there of course maintenance goes on. There were several large reception rooms, all on ground floor, so for cocktail parties or occasionally we had a musical evening, rarely but once in a while a dance, it was set up so you could handle all of those things. If you had a large number of people for dinner, maybe a very large number of people for dinner or lunch, then the ball room could be turned into a dining room with some round tables you could probably fit 100 people there, seated. Then there was this other dining room that could seat about 20-30, separate from that one. Two reception rooms on the ground floor. Formal reception rooms. They are all tied in very nicely, good circulation during a cocktail party, reception or even at a dinner, it was easy for people to circulate from one room to another. And there was a winter garden. This was glass enclosed, the roof is all glass, which was wonderful for a very small lunch in there, or a breakfast. And then there was a roof garden, which had fallen into certain amount of disrepair and the roof had to be redone. Chris went ahead and thought, maybe Japanese garden or something like that. We had been to Japan earlier. So we worked that out, and it became even more usable, that roof garden. Brussels is noted for its gray weather. But there are plenty of nice days. This was a wonderful place to have someone over for lunch, in the middle of the city. We could sit outside and it was quite private where we were seated. There was only the Flemish social club across the street, so somebody in one or two of those windows might see us, but otherwise, we were quite private there. It was a
fine building.

I have to also point out, sometimes you’d find a sense, some people would say, “Why do you have this great place?” And I had to make clear, and I will now again, we didn’t live in those wonderful reception rooms. We didn’t even use the smaller set of reception rooms on the second floor which consisted of a bedroom, a living room and a small dinning room. Those were all used for smaller dinners of lunches, more intimate affairs. We lived on the third floor, our system. Second floor European. And essentially we had a bedroom, an office/sitting room and the TV and all that were in a corridor. At the end of that corridor, we had a small kitchen and a little table where we would have our meals on the weekends. We preferred not to have staff on the weekend and we’d ask them to prepare something in advance.

Q: Were there guest bedrooms?

GLITMAN: There were guest bedrooms available. The one on the second floor was the most elegant room. It was all wood paneled. Some guests would prefer that. Then we had a somewhat smaller room, also very nice, on the floor where we were. And then up again, the floor where normally the servants would stay, those were transformed into other bedrooms. I never counted how many people you could house at any time.

Q: Who were among your distinguished guests?

GLITMAN: We had lots of visitors come through and stay with us. Governors, the Bush’s relatives stay with us, when they were on a business trip promoting U.S. activities, so I thought that was good.

Q: Did you ever have a presidential visit?

GLITMAN: Yes, we did. That was with President Bush. Of course we all were deeply involved with that. Chris was very much involved with Mrs. Bush’s schedule, and held a large luncheon at the residence, for Mrs. Bush. She asked, “What are Mrs. Bush’s interests?” We heard a few things back. Then she found out where in Belgium we could find activities going on that corresponded to her interests. Then she went over and visited all of these places on her own, as the wife of the American ambassador, interested in this activity. Was able to get some sense of how it would work. After that she put together a schedule. People of course came from Washington to do finishing touches, advance team and so on. But she did put a lot of effort into that.

Q: Congressional delegations?

GLITMAN: Oh yes. Plenty of those. Again, they would come to NATO or the European Union. There are three missions in Brussels. And one combined administrative service, which was under me. We had to be careful and I instructed the head of the administrative side of the embassy to treat each one of these missions equally and fairly. And we did our best to do so. In an inspection report, inspectors wrote in a comment in fact, during the period that I was there, that it had been done well.
Q: What about major incidents while you were there as ambassador?

GLITMAN: There were two really large incidents, events, which occurred during the time we were in Brussels. One of them was the end of the Cold War, fall of the Berlin Wall, and so on. And there were enormous questions raised about how that would affect our relations with Europe. I commissioned a series of studies to be done by the political section and one by the economic section on our future relations in NATO. The first one I labeled, I called **Coping with Success**. We knew how to win the Cold War, now can we win the peace? There were large questions, what’s the future of NATO in this situation? I felt it ought to continue. With the Europeans playing a larger role, if they could do that. And what sort of new military arrangements should be set up between us and the Europeans, etc. There were a whole host of issues like that. I did, as I said, had several of these messages sent back. I know they were well received. At one point I was asked to represent the U.S. at a meeting of East-West foreign policy planners, from foreign ministries. Our planners, people from our staff, couldn’t make it from Washington, and I was called and asked, “Would you please go?” And I did.

As a sort of a side comment to that, I had been in Oberammergau talking to the Defense Department military school there, and there is a NATO operation there as well now. Chris was there with me, we thought we’d do some hiking, it was a weekend, after I gave my talk. I got a phone call from Washington asking if I would please go to a castle in Germany where a planning committee, policy planners were going to meet. I said, “Fine. My wife is here and I am not going to ditch her.” We may not be able to do what we thought we were going to do, so they said they would see what they could do, if they could find room for her to join me at this castle. I said, “It’s not a monastery, it’s a castle, so there ought to be a room.” It did work out, we both went there. She actually, these weren’t classified meetings, obviously, she sat in on one of them. It was kind of fun. Her comments afterwards were interesting and useful. In any case, that really gave me an opportunity to see how policy planners throughout Europe, both East and West were approaching this change at the end of the Cold War. I won’t go into all the details of it. Again, I did send a message after that back to Washington. The end of the Cold War was an event that took up a lot of our time.

The second major event was the Gulf War. Here our main concern was, there were two concerns, to insure Belgian cooperation as we moved equipment through Belgium. I had no doubt they would do it, and they did. They did it splendidly, and as I mentioned earlier, this is another example of where military-to-military contact was the right way to go. After having cleared the way on the political side, again not encountering any obstacles, we got it turned over to the military, and they managed it. Things flowed through Belgium as they were supposed to.

I can also say that we were concerned about terrorist activities. Again, I worked with the Belgian Ministry of Interior, and they did a fine job. To underscore that, the day the war actually began, late at night, after we had gone to bed. I had talked to the minister of the interior earlier that day about the need to look after American property, we could be targets, and Americans in general. The way we knew that the war had began was we heard the police outside our windows setting up barriers in the street. That’s how good it was, how quick they were. And they had done that elsewhere. I think that too was an interesting period.
Q: A subject that has been left off in most interviews, but which we should cover with senior officers, and particularly ambassadors, is their role in arms sales. How much was it used as a tool of making the country happy? How much was it a matter of selling American goods and what was the effect of these arms sales in the country?

GLITMAN: Well, in the case of Belgium, a NATO ally, I worked very hard, it was a reason for us to try to make arms sales. Essentially they were two-fold. One, we were in an alliance together and it’s in our interest and in the other countries’ in that alliance interests that all of us be equipped with the best materials, weapons, arms systems available. So I did work hard, with the defense attachés, and often directly with the defense minister and others to try to say that, for example, if the Belgians are trying to replace some electronic gear, I certainly did my best to insure that the American companies would have a fair shot at the market. The same thing, in a different way, and we also worked out arrangements with the Belgians. They almost always wanted some Belgian company to have some part to play in this. That was a relationship that had to be taken into account. I didn’t negotiate these things myself, but the military did, or people would come from Washington. They were technical talks. In terms of what type of equipment would work best. I also worked hard to persuade the Belgians of the importance of keeping their equipment up to date. Giving their pilots enough time to fly their airplanes. In that connection, I did fly on an American F-16. I was able to come back and tell the defense minister first hand, that their pilots were not meeting NATO standards. I think it is 120 hours of flying time a year. And my own personal reaction to being in that aircraft was that complexity of the weapons systems was so great that the flying part had to be automatic. So if you were not up there flying a lot, you really couldn’t do your job. I don’t know if that persuaded him in any way, but it did have, I hope, some positive impact. He seemed to understand what I was saying.

I also accompanied the chief of staff and the defense minister on to the USS Eisenhower. Again, to demonstrate how we have to up to date equipment. We were not selling them any ships, that wasn’t the point. But just to give them a sense of the U.S. there. Some interesting things came out of that too, especially when I sensed some growing concern by some of the Europeans, about what was happening on the Mediterranean side of the European Union. Particularly north Africa. That also came out of that trip like that.

All of this was designed to give us a fair crack at it. We were trying to sell them helicopters, the contract went to the Italians. It later turned out, there were accusations made against the defense minister and some of his political colleagues, that they had perhaps been influenced too much by the Italians, shall we say. I don’t know how the court case ended up but they did go to court. It was a sad ending in a way.

The basic point is, I think it’s perfectly legitimate for American ambassadors and senior officials to try to support American industry in this sort of way. It’s not as if we were forcing these things on them. If we didn’t make the sale, the French or the Germans or the British or the Italians would. Our main point was to make sure that we got a crack at it, at the market.

Q: How about your general relationship with defense attachés? Problems?
GLITMAN: Over the course of the years, I had frequent contacts with them, I had close contacts with them, beginning especially in Paris when Dick Walters was there as Defense Attaché for part of the time. And we exchanged notes on how we were approaching these problems. We did work as a team. There were things he could get into, being military, that I couldn’t, and there were some things that I could get into as a civilian, both with the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry, that would have been more difficult for him to do. But we were all on the same team. I worked again with them in Brussels. Certainly at NATO half of my staff, as DCM, half of my staff was military. I enjoyed working with them. I think as I said before, they have a very positive attitude about getting things done. It doesn’t mean that they overdo it, but they are generally easy to work with. At least I found it so.

Q: You mentioned your DCM. Would you tell us a bit about that?

GLITMAN: I meant myself as DCM at NATO.

Q: At any rate, here at this embassy setting, you had a DCM?

GLITMAN: I had two DCMs, both are good friends, were before and still are. Ron Woods was a DCM when I arrive at embassy Brussels. He and his wife Judy. We had been in Paris together with them, so we knew them from there. They both did a splendid job representing the U.S. and served the embassy well while we were there. Ron went on to become DCM at London, a later assignment. Don McConnell and his wife Francis had been with us at NATO; when I was at NATO Don was on the staff there. They came and worked with us on the INF negotiations. When Ron was leaving, I had to make a choice. Another very able person who was with me in Brussels at the time was also a candidate. I like to pick people who don’t necessarily act, react the way I do. I don’t want someone reinforcing some of my habits, I want someone who looks at things differently, but Don I think is a very calm and thoughtful person. I wanted someone like that around me. I chose him and he came. His wife, Francis also with him. We still stay in touch. It worked out well. He stayed on with my replacement, Ambassador Gelb.

Q: So there were two people, Ron Woods, and Don McConnell? Alright. How about a few words on your representational allowance?

GLITMAN: We certainly used all that was allocated to us. The embassy gets a lump sum, and then it’s up to the ambassador to distribute that. How much does the ambassador take of that, how much for the DCM? Then for the main sections, political, economic and others, eventually it gets down to the junior officers, and as I mentioned, when we were in Paris we were at the bottom of that line. At Brussels, we had enough. I have to say that I hope my colleagues thought they had a sufficient allowance. As far as I can recall, we certainly never had anything left over, but I think we had enough for what we were doing. I wouldn’t complain about it in this case. I don’t want to generalize, because I think in some posts they don’t get enough. Certainly in our earlier days, Nassau, places like that, probably could have used a little more. But I have no complaints about it so far as Brussels is concerned.

Q: How about, as we are winding down on the ambassadorship in Brussels, any other comments about your embassy chancery or embassy residence? Anecdotes, whatever?
GLITMAN: Our residence, as I mentioned, is a superb building and it helped the American image that we were in that building and that we keep it up as well as we have. I also noted that it was possible for me to go from the residence into the chancery without going outside. Well, also the incident there involving our dog Hercules, and his ease of passage. Actually, the passage was not so easy. There were people watching me, Marines, they could see me. You didn’t just walk through. In any case, Chris and I were off somewhere, I don’t recall where, and when we got back we heard that Hercules had somehow managed to walk out of the residence and into the chancery, the office building and wound up in the cafeteria, where he was busily caging food from everybody. After the initial shock he was taken back, but that lead to quite an investigation of how he managed to get through into there. It was a security issue. Anyway, that was another aspect of living together near the office building.

Q: How about the social life at Brussels, diplomatic corps, NATO, and life in Brussels in general?

GLITMAN: Social life, as you might imagine, was constant. It was either a lunch or a dinner, if you were not giving one, you were going to one. I tried to point out before, it’s work in another form and another forum. By and large. You are always trying to figure out how you cam best make use of this event to forward U.S. interests. Either in gathering information or in disseminating position, views. Or combination of that. Because most of the countries, or many had three missions as we did, a mission to Belgium, a mission to NATO and a mission to the European Union, that just multiplied the number of contacts and people involved in the diplomatic life. I had, as you know, worked in NATO and throughout the INF negotiations had been worked very closely in touch with people at NATO or at capitals who would later find themselves at NATO. Earlier on, when I was doing trade work, I had a lot to do with the European Union. So we knew a lot of people who were at those two operations, organizations as well. As a consequence, we spent a fair amount of time being invited over to NATO events, Secretary General Wörner had us over several times for example, at NATO, at his place. He was a wonderful man, he was a great supporter of the alliance. Unfortunately, he was not able to fill his full term at NATO, he died, very sadly.

Life in Brussels, again as I pointed out, we already lived there once. So we pretty well knew our way around. The forest, Forêt de Soignes that I mentioned earlier, wasn’t at our back door any longer. We did have vehicles available. We didn’t bring a car over there. It made no sense to have our own car, because of the terrorism problem. The last thing you want to do is have the same vehicle all the time. So, we would take vehicles from the embassy motor pool. We could then drive to the forest if we wanted to. Basically, you go to the coast, or you go to the Ardennes, or you stay around Brussels, those are your main choices. You could drive to Paris in a day, but it is a pretty full drive, you can get up to Holland, over to Aachen. It was possible to do day trips, and we did a fair amount of those on weekends.

The one thing that I did work out was that I would use a different vehicle every weekend. We had no fixed itinerary on the weekend. We didn’t know where we were going, until we got into the car. The cars were either on the street, next to the residence and the chancery, at the street there, about one block long, or they would put one in the basement for me, of the chancery. The
Marines would open the gate, draw bridges, and then we’d shoot out. But I used a different vehicle, and I got to know lots of them. Including on one occasion, the electrician had a little station wagon. It was okay. We took that one weekend. I could have taken the Cadillac with the body guards, and some of the predecessors had traveled that way, but I thought a) I want some privacy, and b) why have to pay for a driver? I though I had an equal chance by mixing up which vehicle we were taking and turning different directions. The alternative would have been to drive around with what I referred to as “bulls eye,” a big black Cadillac. Because you can’t sit in “bulls eye” all the time, eventually you get to the coast or in the forest, you park it and get out and walk, anyway. The whole scene of chauffeurs with body guards, was more than we wanted to put up with so we took our chances. Fortunately we are still here to talk about it.

We had seen a lot of Belgium. On our last weekend, we got out our Michelin Green Guide. “Where shall we go?” We could not find a place that was mentioned in there that we hadn’t been to. I forget what we eventually chose. There was a lot of music there. As I said before, I like music a lot. We had a lot of opportunities to do that. We had Rostropovich and his wife to lunch, along with one of our Belgian friends who had been ambassador to Moscow, and was at that point a head of one of the largest banks in Belgium. He was a remarkable man. Like many Belgians, he had very excellent language skills, I don’t know how many languages he spoke, but they are very good at that.

I don’t know if I told you about how strong and good they were at commerce. I am sure I did tell you about chocolate and Guam. We also got to see the scientific activities that they were doing, environmental control, environmental clean-up, things which we now know, it must have put them ahead of their time. Different plants would take up certain chemicals and noxious, dangerous toxic chemicals, so you could grow some plants and not others, it was using nature to clean itself up. Very recently things are going on in this direction in the U.S.

Q: Certainly in these times, an ambassador must consider terrorism. Can we have some words in this regard, especially on this issue: How recognizable would an ambassador be in a setting such as Brussels in Belgium?

GLITMAN: Given the size of the community, the answer is, especially if you are the American ambassador, very, very recognizable. We would often be out on the street or on the coast, for example, walking on the beach, and people would say hello. We didn’t necessarily recognize them all the time. You have to sort of live with that. Or people sort of looking at you. They must know who you are, even if they don’t say hello. I had been on television two or three times, discussing the Gulf War for example, and an earlier talk show, and on radio as well. We would do it in French, of course, but with the Dutch language service, they had it translated. But getting known from that as well. Lots of speeches around town. With the Belgian-American society, or U.S. Chamber of Commerce, speaking was a pretty constant activity that would get me out. You had to do your job. You just do it. I grew up in a large city so I had a certain amount of street-smarts. That was with me all the time. I never felt particularly stressed because of it, but I was always very careful.

I should just note that one of the people, who replaced me eventually in the job, the second person who replaced me at the job I had in the embassy Paris had been followed by terrorists.
We knew that. I won’t go into how that was figured out, but to associate with that, other people had been shot at in Paris. This was after we had left there. But this brings home that so many of our colleagues are subject to terrorist attacks. It does bring it home. There were, while we were there, a number of events in Brussels, including bombings of diplomats. Not Americans, these were Arabs, I think, being bombed. Arab Embassy people. Nevertheless, as a consequence, I suggested that we really ought to take a much closer look at Belgium. It wasn’t that we were a target, but it was becoming obvious that terrorists were operating in the city, in Brussels and in Belgium. We did take a hard look at it, and raised the level of security, because if they can have troubles amongst themselves, they can also come after us.

One other thing. After you live that way for a while, it’s very hard to stop looking under the car for bombs. When we came home, there was a transition period during which I would find myself, unthinking, routinely, checking the car out. Chris would say, “You don’t need to do this any longer.” Eventually I got more or less over it. I still sort of keep the doors locked when we leave the car.

Q: Would you know, generally speaking, do our ambassadors go through this in Oslo and Helsinki, Ankara, or does it vary widely?

GLITMAN: I think it certainly varies if you are in certain places, where there is a record of anti-American terrorist activity, you definitely are on your toes. But if you were in Kenya or Dar Els Salaam, you might not have expected anything, and that’s of course where it hit, in its worst form. A lot depends on the individual, I suppose. How you approach this threat. You see, my own approach was to live as normal a life as I could. But, I was on guard all the time. I tried not to be careless. Again, having grown up in a large city at least, you get that feel for what streets you really shouldn’t turn down. You just need to look at it and say, “I am not going down this street, there is something about it. I may be wrong, but my instincts say stop.”

Q: Who replaced you as ambassador in Brussels?

GLITMAN: Gelb, Bruce S. Gelb. And Bruce Gelb had been the head of USIA. He went to Brussels and was replaced by Henry E. Catto, Jr., who was ambassador in London.

Q: Let me check dates here. You were appointed ambassador to Belgium July 15th, 1988, you presented credentials on 28 September, 1988. What year did you leave post?

GLITMAN: In June of 1991. It was a three-year assignment, and that was close enough to three years.

DAVID MICHAEL WILSON
Public Affairs Counselor, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1988-1992)

Mr. Wilson was born and raised in Pittsfield, Massachusetts and educated at
Columbia University and New York University Law. Joining the USIA in 1963, he served variously as Press Officer, Information Officer and Public Affairs Counselor in a variety of posts including Abidjan, Cape Town, Ottawa, Geneva and Brussels. He also served in senior level positions with USIA in Washington, DC. Mr. Wilson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: And of course, when you get to something like Paris, Brussels and all, all of a sudden all the sharks start swimming around. Well then you went to Brussels in?

WILSON: 1988. It was July or August when I arrived there in 1988.

Q: You were there until when?

WILSON: I was there until August of ’92.

Q: What was your job?

WILSON: I was the public affairs counselor to the U.S. mission to the European Community which is now called the European Union.

Q: Who was our ambassador at the time?

WILSON: Well, we had several. I am trying to think of who the, we had a political appointee who was a little guy. His name was Alfred Kingon. When I met him he was back in Washington at first before I went over, he had back problems. One of the ways he got this particular back problem was his unfamiliarity with the European bathroom system. I don't know if you know, but in many of the European bathtubs they have a hand held shower, which you could take out of the wall. He did not realize this and being as small as he was, he figured that he could scrunch down underneath it. And he did, and pulled his back out.

Kington was a nice guy, but he had very fixed ideas in addition to not being familiar with European bathrooms. He wanted to do some things with other European countries. Of course we were really accredited only to Brussels. He didn't understand that really, and whatever he wanted to do, it was my job. He wanted to do this on the public affairs side, and I attempted to deflect him. What I suggested was look, let's put out a newsletter to American business people operating in various communities around, various centers around the European Union, the European Community and in the United States. It will deal with European affairs, businesses. He thought that this was a great idea. So, there was born and I developed the product that now still exists called the Letter from Brussels, based on some of the New Yorker "letters from." It was designed for American business people operating in Europe and for their counterpart offices back in the States. I had to get special permission from USIA to do this because USIA is not supposed to send any information to people in the States, at least they weren't. We went through the general counsel's office, and I had to assure them that any mailings to people in the States would be not done by USIA but be done by the State Department which had no such restrictions. It was a very fine line, and it was more of a semantic difference than a real difference, but that was accepted by USIA. I had to figure out how to get a mailing list. I had never done this before. I went to
some private organizations in the United States. We got mailing lists, mailing lists throughout Europe. We put out about 800 in our first issue. It was six pages. It had a letter, an editorial from the ambassador. It was mightily successful. I mean, we knew that because several businessmen in Brussels and around Europe who either didn't get their copy or threw it out, came complaining to us saying what the hell are you doing going over our heads to our people back in the States. They are calling us asking us about certain things that you put in there. We don't know anything about them. So it was effective. We put while I was there, we put out about six issues. Well, we probably put out about nine issues. Then it expanded. Everybody liked it and wanted to get stuff in. I left, and it is still going. It is still going now as a matter of fact. It is not in the form that it used to be. It is designed to be a handy quick read form that the CEO could take into the john with him, just glance at it. If you had something that he was interested in, he could underline or tell one of his staff to follow up on this. Well by the time I left, or after I left, years after I left, we got an ambassador named Stu Eizenstadt. He was a good guy. And the first letter form Brussels that came out that I saw under Stu Eizenstadt, had his editorial leading off, which was fine. But his editorial itself was six pages. The whole thing was about 14 or 16. It defeated the whole purpose of the publication. I don't know if it is still going. But I felt good about it because I kept Ambassador Kingon happy. It made a difference to some businessmen. It was useful to people.

Q: What was our mission to the European Community doing? I mean what did you see as its tasks and your role in that?

WILSON: It was very clear. We had many trade issues with the Europeans. Some of the issues lent themselves very specifically to public affairs treatment. For example the so-called bST issue which is hormones fed to cattle, a hormone called bovine somatotropin you feed cattle to make them fatter, make them produce more meat. The Europeans were fighting this. They didn't want to have this kind of tainted meat imported into European countries. Our job was to try to get out the word that this is not dangerous. That scientifically at least this is not going to cause any problems. We did this through newspaper articles. We did this through bringing over experts that would talk on radio programs or television programs. We used our international visitors program to send people from the European Community who made some of the decisions, to the States to go to Monsanto and other places to see exactly what was done. This was a made for public affairs kind of issue, and it is still going on.

Q: On genetically modified wheat and everything else. Big article in the paper today in the Washington Post.

WILSON: Yes, exactly. It is still going on. An offshoot of this which hasn't got as much publicity is porcine somatotropin, the same type of stuff you give to cows except this is going to pigs, pork. Several European countries were using this, such as the Netherlands. India was using it, and Israel was using it.

Q: Israel?

WILSON: Israel, yes.
Q: Well one of the big pork producers.

WILSON: Israel is. They export it. A big pork exporter believe it or not. The reason the Netherlands is using it is the pST provides much more meat and much less waste, so that in a small country like the Netherlands pig droppings are a big problem. If you can have less droppings and more meat, you are well ahead of the game. But this still hasn't been totally accepted by the European Community.

Q: You were saying there was another issue.

WILSON: Lots of issues. Certainly there was the issue of American films, particularly in France.

Q: Well France is the major producer of films in Europe. It is a big industry.

WILSON: Italy produces a lot. I will get back to films, the thing I was going to talk about is tobacco. This gave me a personal problem. Not the cigarette side so much, though I always marveled at the American legislation which did not require cigarette manufacturers to put a warning on cigarettes for export. That really bothered me. In any case, a company called the American Tobacco Company produces chewing tobacco. Something you chew. Baseball players, well they don't use it anymore. It is cancer causing. There was a big issue, the European, the British parliament passed a law. The heads of American Tobacco Company got a hold of State Department people, I won't quote their names, and they said you have really got to get to the Europeans and get them to change their position on this. We can't have the European Parliament, the European Commission adopting a ban on distribution of chewing tobacco in Europe. Obviously this was pointing toward doing some public affairs operation. I personally talked to the ambassador and said, "Look, I cannot do this. I will not do this. This is something I can't do." He was not happy about it either. From my Geneva experience, I had gotten to know Dr. Koop, the surgeon general. When I was back in this country I talked to him about it. He said, "Well, you know, if we take this up as an issue, as a government issue. Let me know." I was prepared to. I would never do this under most circumstances, but I was really ticked off. Finally the ambassador was able to convince Secretary Eagleburger to let it drop, and we did not have to push it. I would have been very hard pressed to push the Europeans to letting in chewing tobacco if they wanted to keep it out. I could not have done that. I would not have done it. I mean it was a moral issue as far as, it was not a health issue to me, it was a moral issue. And I did not have to, because the ambassador backed me up on it. We did not have to pursue it. That was a major problem.

On films, Jack Valenti and company established an office in Brussels that had three or so people dealing with it. There is a very interesting series of events that I think, was interesting for the Foreign Service. One incident will suffice. Back in the late 80's, early 90's was a time when you were just getting E-mail. Some were classified; some were not. Sometimes you had faxes but it was often E-mail. Two incidents. The U.S. Mission to the European Community had representatives from the Department of Commerce, Department of State, U.S. Trade Representative's office, Department of Agriculture. They were all there. The one that wasn't there, and the one the ambassador strongly resisted and rightly so was CIA. They were in the embassy down the street, but they were not allowed to penetrate our operation. The ambassador
was very firm. But in any case, the head of the Commerce operation was a nice guy. He wasn't
terribly swift, but he was a nice guy. He was using some of the new technology, the E-mail
technology, and he typed up something that was highly critical of some of his superiors back in
Washington as kind of a joke. It was really critical. He didn't delete it, and he sent it in error. All
kinds of problems.

Q: Oh, God.

WILSON: In any case that was the humorous side. In another case, now this shows you some of
the problems. Because of the six hour time difference, Washington usually wakes up about four
or five o'clock in the afternoon, which was before they sent out cables and things which is about
ten or eleven o'clock in Europe anywhere you are. Our USTR guy particularly had this problem
and would often get calls at home you have got to do this, that, or the other thing. At one point he
got a call at home saying we want you to take into the European Community the following
message concerning XYZ, whatever it was. He was told, when you get in you will find it on your
E-mail in the office. Print it up properly and deliver it to the European Commission. Well Chris
did as he was told, he got it typed up and sent over about 11:00 in the morning. Well, he just
forgot. He was on good relations with the ambassador, he just forgot to mention it to the
ambassador. Between one and two o'clock, the ambassador got a call not from Carla Hills but
from her deputy, it will come to me, saying the message that we asked Chris to send over to the
European Commission, we have changed our minds. We don't want it sent. Of course the
ambassador didn't know anything about it because Chris hadn't shown it to him. The ambassador
got Chris right up and saw the message. He said, "Well I am glad they didn't want to sent it."
Chris told him "I have already sent it." Because of the work habits of the Europeans, Chris got
over there probably about 11:30, 11:45. It was put in the box of whoever was supposed to
receive it. He could go over about two or two thirty and take it out of the box. Nobody had gotten
to it yet. The thing that I want to point out here is the fragility of dealing with new
telecommunications technology in trying to develop foreign policy, because this did not go
through the State Department. It didn't go through anybody except the deputy U.S. trade
representative. Jules Katz is the guy. It went through him. It went through Chris Marsas, the U.S.
Trade Rep in Brussels, and it was taken over to the Commission. This is a major problem. Right
now, obviously, E-mails are going all over the place, classified, unclassified. What is policy,
what is not policy? Is policy only that which comes out in a formal telegram which comes out
from the Department of State? Or are there other ways to interpret policy, particularly if you are
dealing with a multi-faceted agency approach to policy, because the U.S. Trade Representative's
office often has a different view from the Department of Commerce or from the Department of
Agriculture, and does State have a view? In my view, speaking of views, the State Department
way back in the 70's abandoned its interest in economic and commercial affairs and turned it
over to the Department of Commerce. Even in the mid-80's, State was reluctant to get back
involved. To put it bluntly, they didn't want to dirty their hands in these types of things. They are
more into big policy issues.

Q: I know. There has always been this thrust to get the hell out of consular affairs too.

WILSON: Exactly. State never wanted to get their hands sullied in this case, in the case of
Commerce. Now they really have to if they are going to take the lead in foreign policy, as they
should. State really is the one place where all this should come together. Now, with modern communications technology, State has to assert itself. Whether it is at the classified or unclassified level, how do you know whether an instruction from Washington that it is U.S. government policy. This causes enormous problems.

I was not there, but it was related to me by the political counselor who stayed behind or who came after I did actually and worked very closely with Ambassador Stu Eizenstadt. There were some negotiations that were going on. The State Department ruled that when these things are happening between the U.S. and the European Community, the European Union, often business representatives are there for the U.S. side, and for the European side as well. These negotiations are going on with the State Department and the Justice Department. Justice is also involved. In fact, I forgot to mention Justice also has an operation there, ruled that the American business people could not talk to each other because that would be in violation of anti-trust, and they couldn't get together and talk. That was the ruling; I'm deadly serious. It was only because Stu Eizenstadt was so plugged into the administration, when he heard about this that he got on the phone to his friends at Justice and State, and they said stop this nonsense. The Europeans talk to each other. Our guys, we have got to talk to each other or we just break off these negotiations because we can't do it. Both Justice and State backed off. But you don't always have a Stu Eizenstadt. You have got to figure out some way to have common sense policy and coordinated policies. I truly hope that the new department under Colin Powell can make some kind of minor breakthrough in these areas, particularly the coordination of policy involving other government agencies. How you do this is to be strong.

Q: Well, when you were there, how did you find it, especially as public affairs counselor? They have got a mission to NATO, a mission to Belgium, and is there another one there?

WILSON: No that's enough.

Q: That's enough.

WILSON: In Geneva we had six (ambassadors). We only had three here.

Q: Well, you were used to this. Would you get together for lunches just to make sure you all were singing the same hymn?

WILSON: That is exactly what happened. There was no organizational structure to achieve this, and so the public affairs officer at NATO and I and the public affairs officer to the kingdom, we would get together and try to coordinate this on the political level with what was going on. It was particularly true with us and NATO because the issues are very similar. We worked extraordinarily closely, and we helped establish some coordinated policies. We tried to establish regular meetings between the political officers in NATO and the political officers to the U.S. Mission to the European Community. It was critical that we would go back with one voice, that we would have one point of view. You are absolutely right. Indeed the public affairs people took the initiative in this.

Q: Well, what was your impression of the staff in the European Community at that time because,
particularly I am thinking more on the political rather than the professional side, it seems to have gotten into making too many rules and over-managing.

WILSON: You mean the Commission itself?

Q: Yes.

WILSON: They did some of that. The Brits were particularly distraught about some of the rule making. The French were very distraught about the kind of milk that could go into cheeses. They got the rule making at a very low level, which they probably shouldn't do. One thing they were trying to do, and they have been a little more successful now. When they got successful we began to get cold feet, is to coordinate at the political level and to try to coordinate with NATO on the military level. They have a political directorate, composed of people from the various countries, from all the countries. But because you have so many countries involved, once you make a decision at the European Community, you have to go back to these 15 countries and get approval from their foreign offices for any changes. It is very difficult. One time when this didn't happen, all hell broke loose. It is a good example which will be remembered by people concerned the Balkans. It concerned the breakup of Yugoslavia. For whatever reason, the then German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who according to some of my German foreign affairs colleagues used to carry the foreign affairs portfolio around in his hat or his pocket, wouldn't tell anybody. The German delegation at the European Community was pushing for European, EU, EC, recognition of Croatia. We thought that was a major mistake. Our ambassador to the EC at the time, a man named Tom Niles who had been in Yugoslavia...

Q: I had been his supervising officer at his first post in Belgrade.

WILSON: No kidding! He knew this place well. He knew the then existing ambassador, and he knew Eagleburger.

Q: We had all been together in Yugoslavia. Larry was an economic officer in Belgrade when Tom was there.

WILSON: Okay, interesting. I was in his office one time. He pleaded you have got to try and stop this; it is too premature. It is premature, the "too" is not necessary. But the Europeans rushed ahead.

Q: Particularly the Germans did.

WILSON: Yes, powered by the Germans. No, Powered by Hans Dietrich Genscher. The EC recognized Croatia, big mistake at the time.

Q: And followed rather shortly at the time by the Vatican recognizing Croatia, which as anybody who served in Serbia as I did knew, the Germans and the Vatican had been very nasty players there in W.W.II. This set off all sorts of alarms there.

WILSON: And it should have. Were you there, was a guy named Don Tice there when you were
Q: No.

WILSON: Okay, because, anyway I didn't realize you were there the same time Tom Niles was. Interesting situation with Tom Niles. He came with a reputation, he came from Canada, and I had served in Canada. He came with a reputation as ambassador of not really caring about public affairs. As a matter of fact, being anti-public affairs, anti-public diplomacy type stuff. Everyone was terrified. He and I got along extraordinarily well. Not only was he not anti, but he was in favor of expanding things. I mean he saw a "letter from Brussels." People thought he was going to kill it. He loved it; he wanted to keep it going. Secondly he wanted to expand our exchange programs, the International Visitors Program. He was extraordinarily supportive of that because at that point we had maybe five or six people we could send. When the head of the bureau of educational and cultural affairs came through Brussels, Niles went out of his way to give him a lunch and a dinner. Niles is a good politician. He may appear to many people to be cold, but he is not. We lived near each other; we both liked dogs. We got along very well. He was very hospitable to the head of the bureau of education and cultural affairs. He wanted very much to expand the International Visitor's Program. I had come back to Washington to try to accomplish that, and I talked to the head of the European International Visitors Program. I said, "Look, if we could just take two IV's (international visitors) each from Germany, France England, those countries, possibly Italy, they won't miss them because they have 20-25, and we would use them here and it would be very helpful." I got flat turned down. Niles said we will figure out some way of doing it. In the middle of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations that had been going on in Brussels, I got a phone call from the office, because these were held out at the conference center, please get back, please call the head of the bureau of education and cultural affairs. I said, "Look, let me get back to him in a couple of days because of this conference." "No, he wants to talk to you now." So I called him. He said, "We are giving you $100,000 for your IV program." I said, "You are kidding." He said, "No we are giving you $100,000 for the IV program. It's yours." So I went back and I told the ambassador. He was delighted. Two days later when the conference was over, I got all kinds of nasty phone calls from the rest of the bureau of education and cultural affairs. "How could you do this. You are taking our money. You can't do that." I said, "Well, Dr. Glade said it is my money; we can do it. See, if you had given me just the two I wanted from these four countries, it wouldn't have happened. But you brought this on yourselves." They were not happy, but I realized I have got to work with them, so what we did, with Ambassador Niles's approval, was to construct a program where we would take this money and allow the U.S. embassies from these European countries, who were members of the European Community, to select IV's who were particularly involved in European Community affairs. They were; every country had these people. The only thing is we would have to approve them and they would have to come through Brussels for some briefings. So this made everybody happy. We had increased our IV program. The other countries did not lose their IV's. In fact they got to send more. They chafed a little bit at our having to approve, but they got over that very quickly. It worked out extremely well. So we quadrupled the size of our IV program thanks to Tom Niles and thanks to the support that we had from the bureau of educational and cultural affairs.

Q: What sort of things were you doing in the straight public affairs side with dealing with the
European Community at that time? How did you deal with it?

WILSON: First of all, you have correspondents of all major European newspapers based in Brussels. Whether it was Swiss papers or French papers or German papers, they were all there. So you dealt with them. You made certain that when they were writing stories about various issues that came up in the European Union, European community, they had the U.S. perspective. I mean, that was clear. Both wire services, Reuters, AP, very important in dealing with them. So you did the traditional press side of the operation very well, not easily, but you had the contacts that you wanted to have. You talked about our cooperating with NATO, we set up a series of seminars once a year with our NATO colleagues, we helped fund it. I later caught hell from my old organization, the inspector general's office because they said that I was screwing around with the money in different fiscal years. We funded three conferences while I was there in England bringing in people not only from Brussels but from European countries to discuss EU and NATO issues, where they joined. These were often not only academics but journalists. At that point, I remember, one of the people we had as a guest speaker from the United States was Condoleezza Rice. She was then on the National Security Council. We had people come over, and we worked this out very nicely. Where I ran into trouble was the conference would usually take place in the spring in England, April, May. If I had money left over from the preceding fiscal year, I would send that money to the organization that was organizing the conference for us, because they had to get mailing lists out. They had to do some mailings in advance, so it was technically legitimate. No question about that. But the IG didn't like that too much. Well we got it done, and there was nothing they could bitch about because technically we were safe. We did do this kind of thing, and we cooperated very strongly between our mission to NATO and the European Union.

Q: Did you find particularly the European Community at that time, the economic side was, of course, sort of what was driving it, wasn't it? I mean at that point. When you start getting into American products and all it is a continuing battle, particularly with the French. Did you find the problem of globalization, which usually means American firms like McDonald's or the Pizza Huts or the food but also other businesses, raises a red flag in Europe, or at least does today. Was it then or not?

WILSON: No. Globalization was not a term that we used at all. I mean, it was not an issue. American films were an issue; American television was an issue, but globalization of other industries was not an issue. Standards were an issue. Is the European Union, the European Community using standards to block imports or this kind of thing? But globalization as such, as you now described it, was not an issue.

Q: How about on movies and such? Basically, the only real powerful movie industry in Europe, maybe I am wrong, other ones had had it but they sort of withered, would be the French. The British, but was there a constant? I mean, did you get involved in this cultural battle?

WILSON: Well, to a small extent yes, but we were involved in distribution of American films. This was where the French were really, "what about subtitles," "what about voiceovers?" that kind of stuff. But American films were pretty much accepted. The French were the ones who were bitching about American culture dominating and taking over. That was their concern. We
didn't deal that much with the French from Brussels. I did though, because of a quirk in the USIA staffing, become responsible for the public affairs work in Paris at the OECD. So I would go to France maybe once every three weeks. I would go in and out for the day, which is easy enough to do. Looking back on it, I was too honest. I should have stayed over a couple of nights in Paris. I didn't. I could have because the trains went back and forth very quickly. Now they go even more quickly. It was a good, a nice two and a half hour ride.

What happened was the State Department had pulled out the PAO from the OECD. Margaret Tutwiler liked him, a guy named George Kennedy. Do you know George? So there was no public affairs officer at OECD, public affairs person. Well, there was. The head of the public affairs for OECD was the former USIA person, but nothing for the mission. So I would go. And the PAO in Paris at that time, named Bud Korngold, who is a good friend said he didn't want anything to do with the OECD. He had his own problems and he wanted to deal with them. So I got assigned to the OECD because many of the issues they discussed in the OECD were similar to the issues they dealt with in Brussels. So I became the de facto public affairs officer for the mission to the OECD as well. It only became a little bit difficult when the OECD had its annual general meeting, and all the big wigs coming in, and the speaker or somebody from the OECD coming in for press work in a different area, and I would go in. But I did not get involved in French type things. Whenever I went to Paris, I made a point of seeing the PAO or the IO in Paris, so he would not feel I was stepping on his toes.

Q: Well, you were there '88 to '92 when a small little thing happened. That was essentially the fall of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany. From your working point, did that make any changes or not?

WILSON: I think subtly yes. One of the problems we always face, and if you talk to the people involved they would say the same thing, was the concern that the members of the European Community had, and the Germans in particular, that the Germans should not become too dominant in the community because of the experience that Europe had with Germany. They are extraordinarily competent. It was an unspoken kind of concern, you have got to make sure the Germans don't take over. When German unity came, this fear, this concern, was heightened. It was a very difficult thing for the Community itself. They did not want the Germans to take over all the good jobs, and yet they realized the problems that Germany had economically trying to get the eastern European, Eastern Germany to unify with the rest of the country. Yes, it was a concern to us.

Q: Well you left there in '92. Were there any other major problems or issues that you were dealing with?

WILSON: What I was dealing with then is stuff they are dealing with now. When I came, pasta, the kind of wheat that you have. Some of these issues just don't go away. Yes, they were always there. The agricultural subsidies that the European Commission, European Community, gives to its farmers. A big issue. Major issue. That is not going away. The Europeans, of course, complained about some of our subsidies we give. One person's subsidy is another person's need to exist. I mean the Europeans contend the hallmark of Europe is the small farmer, and they have to keep that small farmer going. These issues did not go away. They are there now.
Q: I was just watching French TV yesterday, and in Brussels the whole place was shut down because farmers came again. I am not sure what the issue was. It was an European issue.

WILSON: When we were there, they came in with their tractors. They shut down the whole place at least twice. We also dealt, of course, with the European Parliament in Strasbourg, though there wasn't a hell of a lot you could do with that.

Q: Well, then you left there in 1992?

WILSON: Yes.

THOMAS M. T. NILES
Representative, US Mission to the European Community

Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles was born in Kentucky in 1939. He received his bachelor’s degree from Harvard University and master’s from the University of Kentucky. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1962, he was positioned in Belgrade, Garmisch, Moscow and Brussels, and also served as the Ambassador to Canada and later to Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 5, 1998.


Q: There had been an election.

NILES: Both Canada and the United States had national elections in November 1988. President Bush was elected at the beginning of the month, and then the Canadians reelected Mulroney around November 20, 1988 with a slightly reduced but still strong majority. President Bush’s first foreign trip as President had its first stop in Ottawa around the February 10, 1989. It was on that occasion that Secretary Baker told me that I would be going to USEC, the United States Mission to the European Community, when my time in Ottawa ended. President Bush confirmed that when we were sitting at the table, waiting to have lunch with Prime Minister Mulroney at Rideau Gate, the Canadian official guesthouse. I was very fortunate. I expressed an interest in going to the European Union to Secretary Baker, while he was still Secretary of the Treasury, and to Deputy Secretary to be Lawrence Eagleburger, who was an old colleague from Belgrade days. It was one of those rare occasions when they said, “Yes, that makes sense. You have worked on European Community issue, why not?”

Q: Incidentally, how did you find Mulroney and Bush?

NILES: It was a close and very friendly relationship. During the Reagan administration, on one occasion, when Prime Minister Mulroney was totally frustrated with “the Americans,” because
nothing seemed to be working (the Free Trade Agreement negotiations were bogged down in endless details, acid rain talks didn’t seem to be going anywhere, nor did the talks on the “Northwest Passage”) he let out a cry of anguish to President Reagan. They had a phone conversation. This was in February 1987. President Reagan sent the Vice President up for a one-day visit, along with Secretary of the Treasury Baker. I went with them to the meetings, at which the Vice President basically told the Prime Minister, “Hey, look, these are tough issues. We have to stay the course. We are committed to them. We will work this out, but be patient. We understand you.” Mulroney was under incessant attack from all sides, but particularly, from the Liberal Party and the New Democrats that he was kowtowing to the Americans and getting nothing for it. The Liberal line was that Mulroney was dancing to the Americans’ tune but they did not even give him fifty dollars the way Colonel McCormick used to do when Mulroney sang songs for him back in the 1940s. This close relationship between the Prime Minister, Vice President Bush, and Secretary Baker was forged at that time. It was a very good one. They got along extremely well. Secretary Baker came up to Ottawa in April 1988 for specific issues that needed to be resolved before the G-7 Summit that was coming up in Toronto in June 1988. He also discussed some bilateral issues, including difficult trade problems such as the Airbus problem. So, Secretary Baker knew the Prime Minister quite well, as did then Vice President, and subsequently President Bush. It was a good relationship.

Q: *It was called the U.S. Mission to the European Community?*

NILES: At that time. Now, it is called the U.S. Mission to the European Union. As Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, I decided that the name of the Mission should be changed after the December 1991 Maestricht Summit when the Europeans changed their name from “European Community” to “European Union.”

Q: *You were there from when to when?*

NILES: July 1, 1989 to September 1, 1991. It was to have been a three or four-year assignment, but it was cut short in 1991 when we had a musical chairs routine that started when Henry Catto, who had been Ambassador to the UK, decided he want to leave London to come back to Washington as Director of USIA. He replaced Bruce Gelb, from Bristol-Myers, who came out to Brussels to be Ambassador to Belgium. Ray Seitz, who had been Assistant Secretary for Europe and Canada, replaced Henry Catto in London; I went back to replace Ray as Assistant Secretary; and, finally, Jim Dobbins, who had been Ray’s Principal Deputy, came to USEC to replace me. Ray Seitz had been DCM in London from 1984 to 1989 suddenly went back to London as U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom. He was the first career officer, in history to hold that job and probably will be the last, the way we are going, to serve in that position. Ray’s departure left open this job as Assistant Secretary for Europe and Canada. I resisted the assignment when the Director-General raised it with me, but when the Secretary of State calls and asks you to do something, you do not say “No.” I told the Secretary that I had some important things going on over there, such as the Uruguay Round, and asked whether it would be better for me to stay. Secretary Baker said, “No, I think it would be better if you came back to Washington.” I said, “Well, that probably is the best solution, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for your confidence in me.” That was the way that went.
Q: *When you went out there, could you describe what the USEC was at the time?*

NILES: The relationship?

Q: *No. I am thinking of the mission itself, and then we will talk about...*

NILES: At that time, the Mission was of medium size as our foreign establishments go, and growing. In part, that was because people in the U.S. Government were beginning to understand that USEC was really an important place, and that the European Community, whether you thought it was good for the United States or not, was something that was: (1) here to stay; (2) probably a growth industry; and 3) of growing importance for the United States. Several U.S. government agencies that previously had never thought of having any particular interest in the E.C. or in the Mission to the E.C., suddenly wanted to have their people there. One thing I had to do was to manage the pressures from other agencies, not the State Department, to expand the Mission. The growth phase of USEC began in the early 1980s when Bill Brock very wisely decided that he needed someone from USTR there. I think Tim Bennett was the first USTR representative on the USEC staff.

Q: *Trade representative.*

NILES: He was the representative from USTR on the USEC staff. We had a USIS office, of course, for some time. By the time I got there, a very able officer named Chris Marcich was the USTR officer. He now heads the MPAA office in Brussels. The Departments of Agriculture and Treasury had offices in USEC, and the first issue on my plate was Commerce Secretary Mosbacher’s decision to station USDOC officers there. Given Mr. Mosbacher’s close ties with President Bush and Secretary Baker, I was not in a position to resist. Initially, Secretary Mosbacher tried to get a couple of Texas businessmen to come over and take the job, but I managed to discourage that. The businessmen quickly realized that it really wasn’t the job that they wanted after they came over and looked at it. USDOC finally did the right thing and assigned Jim Blow, one of their top career professionals to USEC as Commerce’s first Minister-Counselor at the Post. It was great for me since Jim had been my Deputy in the Moscow Commercial Office from 1973 to 1976 and my Commercial Counselor in Ottawa. While I was there, other agencies began to look at USEC, including, of course, the intelligence community. Shortly after I left, officers from the FBI and CIA were assigned. So, USEC grew while I was there and it has grown considerably since I left. While I was there, we almost doubled the floor space. I managed to get new space in the same building. When I arrived, we had one floor, and then we move to two floors in the same building. Now, I gather that they have moved to another building in order to obtain more space. USEC, now of course USEU, has become an even more multi-agency mission than it was when I was there, and we had quite a few agencies represented by the time I left. When I arrived, I found that USEC had no classified word processing because we could not establish the necessary “zone of control” required by State Security. This was an impossible situation, and one of the reasons why I pushed for the move to different space was because it involved the top two floors in the building. This satisfied the “zone of control” requirement for the top floor, as long we were able to control access to the roof, which we were.

One of the best things about USEU is that it is a totally “substantive” mission and has no
Consular or Administrative Sections. Embassy Brussels handled consular affairs, and in Brussels we have a combined administrative section for the three embassies: USEU, U.S. NATO and the Mission to the Kingdom of Belgium. In a way that was good because I did not have to worry about those issues, but it had a bad side because the employees in the Joint Administrative Section were really working, in the first instance, for the Ambassador to Belgium. So, on occasion, I had a little trouble getting the kind of administration services my colleagues and I needed.

Q: Your DCM was who?

NILES: When I started off, my DCM was Michael Ely, who had been there with my predecessor Al Kingon. Mike stayed on for one more year with me. Then, Tom Weston came for my second year. Of course, we had planned to spend more years together than that but the personnel changes I mentioned earlier intervened. Tom stayed on with Jim Dobbins, who replaced me in 1991.

Q: I interviewed Mike Ely and he said during the time he was your Deputy, the problem was that you knew how to run an Embassy, and he didn’t have anything to do. That was a compliment to you. He said that you didn’t really need a Deputy.

NILES: I’m sorry to hear that because that means I wasn’t using my resources very well. Mike was a great support and a big help to me in Brussels, and a good friend. Every Ambassador needs a Deputy like Mike, and you want to use that capability well.

Q: I think Mike probably had...

NILES: I think it was obviously different for him, moving from Al Kingon, who was an outside guy.

Q: Yes, someone who had already been an Ambassador to a major country.

NILES: I think what Mike may have been thinking about is that as DCM, the care and feeding of a career Ambassador is considerably less time consuming than if you have a political appointee, as he did during his first two years at USEC with Al Kingon. There are some political appointees who don’t require all that much special attention, but many of them do.

Q: In a way, you were representing the United States at what was essentially one of the key elements of American foreign policy since 1945, and that was to keep the French and the Germans from fighting each other, and dragging us in. That was what the whole thing was about. By this time, however, as you have already indicated, it was maturing. This cornerstone of American foreign policy... When you went out there in 1989, were we beginning to rethink this and wonder whether we were creating an economic monster that is going to bite us. Was there a concern at that time?

NILES: I’m sure some people felt that, but I didn’t. I wouldn’t describe it exactly as you did, although preventing another war between France and Germany was certainly an objective. But
we had a broader view, which included promoting the reconstruction of Europe and creating a partner in a unified Europe. Initially, we felt that reconstruction was most likely to be accomplished if the Europeans worked together. So we used the Marshall Plan assistance and the leverage it gave us to force the Europeans to plan and implement the reconstruction program together. In doing so, we helped to sow the seeds for European integration, and that is something of which we can be very proud. By the time I got there, the European Community was a flourishing organization. It had its problems and still does, but no one questions its existence. You could argue that as a result of our efforts we have built up a potential competitor, or a real competitor in some areas, but we also built up a stronger partner. We can’t have it both ways. We going to have to accept the fact that, in some areas, particularly in some commercial areas, the European Union is going to be competitive with the United States, but that competition, as long as it is fair, is beneficial to both of us. I think, to a degree, the intensification of the process of globalization, which we see going on particularly between the United States and Western Europe, is changing the conditions of much of that competition. Determining the “nationality” of a product or even a company today is not easy. Developments such as the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, for example, and the incredible interconnections that we see in the high-tech industries such as electronics, pharmaceuticals and so forth are creating one North Atlantic economic area with one industry linking Europe, Canada and the United States, with Japan increasingly joining. That is the way we are going. There are some areas, commercial aircraft, for example, where we are still fiercely competitive and we have to continue to compete and insist that the Europeans play by the rules, which we have done. I think it has been a wise policy, and it has been a successful policy. It is a policy that American Presidents since President Truman have followed, encouraging European integration. President Clinton continued that policy and I hope President Bush will have the wisdom to do the same. There were those in the Bush Administration when I was Ambassador there who felt that it had all been a big mistake and wanted to slow this process down. That was very much a minority view, and nobody paid much attention to it, fortunately.

Q: There are a number of issues to follow, but why don’t we start with the fact that you arrived in the year of 1989, which was an earthshaking year.

NILES: Well, it was. We didn’t know when I got there exactly how earthshaking it was going to be. When I got out there, things in Europe seemed to be more or less intact. Interestingly enough, at the Paris economic summit in July 1989, President Bush and the other leaders agreed on a new program to assist Poland and Hungary. That was one of the things we built during my time there, a structure for cooperation between the United States and the European community within which we coordinated our assistance programs, first to Poland and Hungary and then to the other countries that overthrew their Communist systems. As the year progressed, we had the tumultuous events in Germany beginning in August 1989 when the East Germans vacationing in Hungary were allowed to go the FRG. Then the same thing happened in Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, when the Hungarian government declared that its 1968 agreement with East Germany, under which all East German tourists had to return to East Germany, was no longer valid, they cited the 1975 CSCE Agreement. That gave all of us who had worked on that process since 1972 an enormous sense of accomplishment. Then we had the extraordinary events of October and November in Germany, with the breaching of the Berlin Wall on November 8, 1989. In December, we had the fall of the Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe,
culminating in the Christmas overthrow of Ceausescu. It was a truly amazing set of events. Then, we and the Europeans reacted in a sensible way by setting up a mechanism for coordinating our programs to assist these governments as they embarked upon a process of democratization and building free market economies. That is a process that goes on to this day, but we started in 1989. Secretary Baker was very much involved in that.

Of course, we also had a host of other issues. We had the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, which were not going to well, largely due to disagreements between the United States and the EC on agriculture, and were very complicated. They were scheduled to end, but actually did not, in December 1990. We had a number of serious trade disputes with the European Union, particularly on food products and agriculture. In the commercial aircraft sector, a very difficult negotiation underway involving subsidies for Airbus. But at the same time, the European Community was going through its own internal development process, which culminated in the December 1991 Maestricht Agreement on economic/monetary union and the formation of a political union. At that same time, the United States was in the process of rethinking our relationship with NATO and with the European Union in the security area. Secretary Baker, for the first time, in a speech he gave in Berlin in December 1989 to the Berliner Pressekonferenz, expressed the view that we would be prepared to cooperate with the European Union in the security area if the European Community were able to get its house in order on the security side. I got an advance copy of section of the speech on security cooperation from the Department, and went in and showed it to President Delors. He was absolutely ecstatic about it. I rarely saw him so enthusiastic about anything. He said “Secretary Baker has shown us the way.” That marked an important step in the work, which continues to this day, to develop a security relationship between NATO and the European Union. We have made a lot of progress, and it really started then. It was difficult, primarily, because of the French position, as usual. But, we have overcome many of those difficulties, and today we have a fairly good system in place to cooperate with the European Union within the overall NATO context.

Q: In a way, we have had, for almost 50 years, an apparatus, a NATO military thing, in which we have troops well integrated in with other European troops and NATO. What is the big deal about switching it over to the European community from NATO?

NILES: It wasn’t so much a question of switching it over. The question, as we posed it in 1989/1991 period, was whether the European Union would develop its own separate security institutions parallel with, and in a sense, competitive with NATO or whether, in some way, we would find a mechanism whereby the European Union could develop its security capabilities within the framework of NATO, perhaps using the Western European Union, which had been set up in 1948 under the Brussels Treaty. The crux of the discussion was whether the European Union was going to have a security capability parallel to and separate from NATO or whether we were going to do this in a way that preserved the NATO framework and allowed the European Union to act as a European Union when the United States, for whatever reason, decided not to participate in a given military operation, but within the context of NATO and using NATO assets in the command, control, communication and intelligence areas (C3I). Secretary Christopher used the expression “separable but not separate” to describe the relationship of the United States and EU military forces within NATO. What that meant was that, as necessary and as appropriate, NATO capabilities could be used by the Western European Union for specific operations if the
United States, for whatever reason, decided it would not participate. This lead to this concept of
the “Combined Joint Task Force” within NATO, which, in theory, at least, would mean that
NATO capabilities in the command, control, communications, and intelligence areas would be
made available to the Western European Union for some operation. An example of this would be
a humanitarian operation in Africa if the United States decided that it didn’t want to take part in
the Combined Joint Task Force. Defining exactly how this would work is not easy, particularly
because of the French position. If it had not been for the French, we could have solved all this in
six months.

There were some points along the way where we signaled the Europeans that we thought they
were getting a bit out of line. One came in February 1991, when we got some pretty stiff
instructions from Washington which told us to go in and read the riot act to the Europeans. The
reaction was not too positive, and afterwards the question came up of who had written these
instructions. No-one in Washington would take responsibility for them. It was as if the telegram
had, somehow, written itself. Some tried to pin it onto Reggie Bartholomew, who was Under
Secretary for Security Assistance. Others attributed it to Jim Dobbins, who was the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for in the European Bureau. Everybody ran away from this
demarche, which, as I told the Department, reflected an unbalanced view of what the Europeans
were considering. They were reacting to some things that the French had said that didn’t reflect
the overall European position. The debate within the European Community about the defense
role for a unifying Europe had been going on for a long time, and was intensified by the move
toward the Maestricht EC Summit and its consideration of proposals for monetary and political
union. The European Community was in the process of transforming itself into the European
Union, and it announced to the world that the Union was going to have a common foreign and
security policy. That raised the obvious question about the relationship with NATO. That is what
really gave the issue, which had been around for years, much greater prominence during 1991.
And the debate goes on today, but a great deal of progress has been made in developing
pragmatic solutions that enable NATO to continue as the principal vehicle for both European and
Atlantic defense cooperation while the European Union continues the development of its own
unique capabilities, within that general framework. One of the vehicles for cooperation is the so-
called “Combined Joint Task Force,” which was agreed at the NATO Madrid Summit in July
1997. In brief, this arrangement would involve a situation in which the United States decided not
to participate in a given military operation and it was taken on by the European Union, relying on
NATO capabilities in areas such as command, control, communications, intelligence and,
perhaps most important of all, air lift. The fact remains that the only country that can move large
numbers of military personnel and their equipment long distances is the United States, and that is
not going to change anytime soon. We haven’t yet had a Combined Joint Task Force in which
the United States has not participated. When we do, it will be an interesting test.

Q: We are talking about the time you were there, 1989 to 1991. You keep talking about the
French. Was it your impression that the French essentially were using the European Community
to separate the United States from a military role in Europe?

NILES: The French always denied that, and I would agree that for many French officials, that
was not their objective. But what I used to tell the French, in Paris, in Brussels and anywhere I
could find them, was that, as a practical matter, their policies were having the effect of making it
more difficult for us to maintain the U.S. military commitment in Europe. The French
approached the issue from another direction. They said, “Look, World War II ended in 1945, and
it is now 1991. Are you guys going to stay here forever? No, you are not. Sooner or later, the
United States is going to pull the plug on its military commitment to Europe and Europe has to
be ready to deal with that.” My argument to the French was: “You are establishing a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Do you want the United States to do this?” The French response was always,
“No,” to which my answer was: “Okay, fine. Why don’t you take a look at your policies because
what you are doing is having the practical effect of making it more difficult for us to argue in
favor of this continuing American commitment.” It was essentially a circular argument. They
never accepted my logic, and there were, and are, significant forces in France that want us to
leave and would like to see NATO disbanded. But even those French officials who supported a
continued U.S. military presence in Europe believed that a U.S. withdrawal was inevitable and
that Europe had to prepare for it. I told them that the process of preparing for it was going to help
make it happen. It was an impossible argument with the French. The French would deny to their
death that they were interested in this outcome. I argued with them that by what they were doing,
they were promoting it.

Q: Just from a passive view from the United States, in reading the papers, it sounded like the
French wanted to create a European force and make our contribution non-essential.

NILES: To begin with, you have an anomalous situation in which the French are not formal
participants in the integrated military structure of the alliance. For a time, one other country -
Spain - was in that same anomalous situation. When Spain came in the Alliance in the late
1970s, they did not bring their forces into the integrated military structure, but they have now
done that. Part of the problem that we had, and still have, in Europe was a practical consequence
of the fact that the French formally were not in the integrated military structure of NATO. There
had to be some way to take into account the fact that the French were different. We danced
around that dilemma for many years. As a practical matter, from 1966, when DeGaulle pulled
France out of the integrated military structure of NATO, until 1989, when I arrived at USEC, a
great deal had changed in the French relationship with NATO. While the French forces were not
integrated in the same way that the German and other forces were integrated into the military
structure, the links that had been built up between SACEUR, always an American officer, and
the French general staff, were very tight. NATO cooperated with the French bilaterally in all
kinds of things. Basically, France was a part of the Alliance, militarily and politically, but in
strictly legal terms, they were not. Whatever the practical reality might have been, formally they
were not part of the NATO military structure. It was a cause of immense frustration for us and
for others, and probably for the French, too. It underlines the fact that in U.S./European relations,
sometimes you can’t do it without the French, but you can’t do it with them, either.

Q: I would have thought, too, that a sub rosa argument would be, “Okay, France, if you get the
United States out and you have a European Army, whose Army is going to be bigger?” All of a
sudden, the fell growl of Germany comes in.

NILES: There is no question that the change in the French position, which took place during the
1990s, was motivated in part by German unification and the realization that there was no more
equality between France and Germany. France has now 58 or 60 million people, but the Germans
have 82. They are comparable, but the Germans now are the much stronger country, despite the fact that they have this big internal economic development projected called “The Former East Germany” or “the Eastern laender.” The disappearance of Francois Mitterrand had something to do with the change in French policy. The fact is that President Chirac and his government under Prime Minister Juppe in 1995-1996 period favored the formal reintegration of France into the integrated military structure of the NATO Alliance, if certain concessions were made on the NATO side. They tried to use that as a lever to get control over the command at AFSSOUTH in Naples, which we refused to relinquish, and other Allies agreed with us on that. Ultimately, the French decided that they couldn’t go ahead without that concession. But it was clear that Chirac and Juppe, during the time of the Center/ Right Government, favored reintegration. I think, by that time, a majority of the people in France had come to accept that position. With today’s government, a coalition between the Socialists and Greens that depends upon the parliamentary support of the Communists, such a move would be impossible. Still, relations between NATO and France, and between the United States and France in the security area are better today than they have been at any time since 1966, or maybe even before that, because we had a lot of problems before 1966.

By the way, let me just make one other point. The fact that this issue was so important during my tenure as Ambassador to the European Community demonstrates the reality that the US/European security relationship is also an issue between the United States and the European Union and that the Union is inevitably going to assume a role in this area. I’m sure that for all of my successors, going back to 1958, never got into the security issues to the extent I did. I know that my immediate predecessor, Al Kingon, did not. That was an important change that occurred during my tenure there. It was sparked by developments in and around the European Union, including the extraordinary changes in Eastern Europe. An example of this is German unification and the movement of the European Union toward what became the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991.

Q: You did have this American involvement in Europe, which was sparked by the threat of the Soviet Union. Really, from December 1989 on, that threat no longer was a very credible one. Were you dealing with how are we going to keep the United States in here?

NILES: The issue of the future of NATO and the future of the United States’ security commitment began to come up during my time there, but not to the extent it did later. The Soviet Union still existed, even though it was clear that east/west relationship was changing radically as the threat from the East clearly diminished. But did not diminish was the sense of uncertainty about the future. By 1991, we were into the crisis in Yugoslavia. At the time I arrived in July 1989 there were people in Brussels who were concerned about developments in Yugoslavia, including the Yugoslav Mission to the European Community, which was headed by an interesting guy named Crnobrnja, who now lives in Montreal. He had been a close associate of Milosevic but had broken with him over the Kosovo issue.

In any case, the basic rationale for NATO, for a United States’ troop presence in Europe, changed while I was there from dealing with the immediate military threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to dealing with an uncertain security environment around Europe. The Gulf War was part of that, as was the unsettled situation in the Middle East. But the situation in the
Central and Eastern European region, including former Yugoslavia, was becoming a source of anxiety. All of these areas are in close proximity to Europe, and the Europeans were appropriately concerned, as were we. Under these circumstances, the NATO alliance became, in a sense, an insurance policy. It always had been that, but that aspect became more prominent as the Cold War faded. There was a logical question, of course, as to why we still needed NATO and why we still had 317,000 troops in the NATO area, give or take a few thousand. Now, we are down to around 105,000 or so. So, we are down by more than two-thirds.

I characterized the NATO alliance at that time, and I would do it again today, as similar to your homeowner’s insurance policy. You are a homeowner and you have an insurance policy on your house. Your house hasn’t burned down for 50 years, but you keep paying the premium on it. NATO, in a sense, is the premium on a homeowner’s insurance policy. It makes sense to continue to pay that premium. Fortunately, for the United States, the cost of that premium has gone down enormously. If that annual premium in 1989 was $60 billion (this included the direct costs of our NATO commitment 317,000 troops in Europe and all the ancillary structure you needed to maintain that structure), we are now down to a less than one-third of that. It is a wonderful example of how your insurance policy can pay a dividend. NATO paid us an enormous dividend, we still have the insurance policy, and the premium has gone down two-thirds. I can’t imagine a better deal.

Q: There was a U.S. mission to NATO. What was your relation to that?

NILES: That is a good question. One of the things that I tried to do while I was there was to build closer links between USNATO and USEC. There was a tendency on the part of some of the people at USNATO to see USEC as the competition. I wanted to avoid that. Fortunately, I had good relations with Will Taft, who was my counterpart at USNATO. I think we managed to get the idea across that we were not competing and that NATO and the European Union should work together, and that USEC and USNATO should set an example. We started regular meetings. I encouraged our Political Section to get together and talk about all these issues with their USNATO colleagues. Will Taft and I, with our DCM’s would have periodic luncheons and breakfasts. We really managed to work well together and to instill in our Missions a sense of joint purpose.

Q: You mentioned that when you arrived, one of the earliest things was an outreach to Hungary and Poland. This was before they were even able to shake themselves off of what had been known as the Soviet bloc.

NILES: This began with the G-7 Summit in Paris in July 1989. Poland and Hungary were still Warsaw Pact countries and they both had quasi-Communist governments, but it was clear that they were moving away from their former orientations. The Hungarian government took an incredibly important step in August 1989 when it announced that its 1975 CSCE Treaty commitments calling for freer movement of people nullified an agreement they had signed in 1968 with the GDR under which all GDR tourists who went to Hungary could only return to the GDR. Gyula Horn, who was Foreign Minister in the Nemeth government, was largely responsible for that decision, which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall three months later. You may remember Gyula Horn from Belgrade. He was a junior officer in the Hungarian Embassy in
Belgrade from 1963 to 1965. When you met Gyula Horn, he would say, “I am not a diplomat. I am a representative of the Central Committee Secretariat of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. So don’t get me wrong here.” Everybody said, “That’s fine, we don’t care.” So, this guy ultimately became the Secretary for International Affairs for the HSWP and was Foreign Minister by 1989. He was the guy who drove one of the stakes into the heart of the Warsaw Pact and the GDR by opening up the border for the German tourists and taking down the barbed wire. I have a piece of that barbed wire, cut down from the border between Hungary and Austria.

Q: That was the real beginning.

NILES: That was it. In July, at the Paris G-7 Summit, the seven heads of state/government plus Commission President Delors took the important decision to begin the program of assistance to Poland and Hungary. Delors, by the way, played an important role in this. He was a leader of vision.

Q: This was the European Community which was going to help Hungary and Poland.

NILES: Yes, but together with the United States.

Q: How did we fit into this?

NILES: We had our own program, the so-called SEED (Support for Eastern European Democracy) program. They had their program, which was called PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance in Reconstruction by Europe). In money terms, their program was much bigger. This was one of the realities of the post-Communist era in Europe, that the United States has not been able, either in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union, to come forward with the kind of money that was really needed to assist these countries. Fortunately, the Europeans were able to pick up the bulk of the burden. You could say, as we did, that the Europeans were able to provide this assistance in part because the United States had helped them in 1947-55 with the Marshall Plan. If you look at the programs for assistance to Eastern Europe and the former USSR, I would say that the division of labor has been roughly 80% Europe and 20% US. That does not take into account the assistance from the International Financial Institutions, where we have a large quota, but still only about one fifth of the total. The total European share in the quotas of the Bank and the Fund, and the EBRD, is much larger than ours. We coordinated our programs with the EU so that we weren’t stepping on each other’s toes, each trying to do the same thing. We talked in advance about what kind of programs we were going to undertake in each country. It worked out quite well. Ralph Johnson was the first coordinator of that effort, in working with Ray Seitz. He was one of Ray’s deputies and stayed on as a deputy with me when I came back as Assistant Secretary. He is now Ambassador to Slovakia.

I had an interesting insight into the nature of the problem very early on. This was in January 1990, immediately after the revolutions in Eastern Europe. The area was clearly in the stage of a major transformation with extraordinary opportunities for the West. German unification was clearly going to happen. The so-called “2+4” four process began that month, January 1990, at a CSCE meeting in Ottawa. In any event, we had a session in London of the semiannual meeting between members of the European Parliament and the US House of Representatives. The
meeting was in London because the British had the EU Presidency during that six-month period. In the second half of 1990, the European Parliament delegation went to Washington. A major topic on the agenda in January 1990 was what should the US and the EU do to respond to these extraordinary developments in Central Europe. The European Parliament representatives opened the session by talking about the need for a new Marshall Plan. Now, keep in mind, this was a House of Representatives’ delegation consisting of members who were interested in international affairs. They were interested in Europe. They wouldn’t have been there otherwise. These were not members of Congress who were inclined to say “no” to all kinds of foreign involvement. But the reaction on the part of the United States Congressmen was very negative to the idea that we would come forward, once again, with a big assistance program. Their position was that the US had undertaken what they called “the first phase of the reconstruction of Europe” with the Marshall Plan but that Europe was responsible for “the second phase of the reconstruction of Europe, which begins now.” The US members of Congress said that the US would help, but Europe had to take the lead this time. There was some grumbling on the European side that the Americans were shedding a burden, but in the end, the Europeans did it. But, that was the attitude then, and now.

Some experts claim that the Bush administration failed in 1992 because it did not come up with a big assistance program for Russia, Ukraine, and the successor other countries. My answer to that is that we had no chance of a big assistance program through Congress at that time. What we did might not have been the best alternative, but it was the only one we had, which was to involve the international financial institutions in a big way. That is why the IMF and the IBRD are out there. This was Bob Zoellick’s idea and I think it was a very credible response. Bob realized that after we had done some consultations on the Hill that the Administration was not going to get big resources from the Congress to help in the reconstruction of the former Soviet Union. We had to find some other sources, and they were Western Europe, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other oil producers from the Gulf, and even South Korea. We passed the tin cup and coordinated the effort. Secretary Baker hosted a Conference in Washington in January 1992 to coordinate assistance to the former Soviet Union. Our part of it was not very big, which was somewhat embarrassing. But we used to tell other countries that we had no choice in view of Congressional attitudes.

Q: During the time you were at the mission there, how did you feel about the attitude of the European representatives? Were they indicating that they wanted more power, but yet wondering what we were going to do about it? In other words, did you feel you were trying to press a reluctant baton, which they were reluctant to pick up, or not?

NILES: Yes. They were reluctant, for a number of reasons. First, they didn’t want to pay the price of leadership, although ultimately they bit the bullet and accepted it. They also disliked the fact that even though they were paying the largest share, the United States got the credit, or at least what they felt was a disproportionate chair of the credit. They had a good case there, there is no question about it. We probably did take too much of the credit. They also institutional problems in that their structure didn’t enable them to do some of the things that they wanted to do. This was particularly obvious in the case of former Yugoslavia. The Europeans, specifically the Dutch Presidency of the EU, told us in July 1991 that they would take the lead on Yugoslavia. Hans Van den Broek, who was Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, made this
commitment when he met with Secretary Baker in Washington around July 10, 1991. They should have realized that they could not take the lead because, first of all, they didn’t agree among themselves about what should be done and they had no mechanism for settling these disputes within the European Union. It was an idle, empty pledge on the part of the Dutch, but it was not a pledge that was given in bad faith. They really thought they could do it, and we hoped they could. There was at that time a sense that the “hour of Europe” had arrived, as Jacques Poos, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, put it. It turned out that they couldn’t. This more active European role in international affairs as the European Union has been a hard thing to implement, but it is a reality in some ways. It is less than what the Europeans had hoped, but it is certainly more than what it was.

Q: At the time, when you were at your Mission, European economic cooperation was the easy part. Money, economic things can be integrated in a way the major companies are integrating, and all. But, when you get around the politics, the idea of having a Parliament decide whether Europe goes, particularly when you have people like the French and the British, did you see this as a practical thing? Was this a hope? How did you see it at the time?

NILES: Let me say that I think you are absolutely right. The European Union has made tremendous strides in the area of economic policy coordination, particularly in the area of trade policy. They still have their problems, and there are still areas where more needs to be done, such as tax policy for example, but they made a great deal of headway. They made much less headway in the area of political cooperation, and in foreign and security policy they have made least of all. I think this reflects the fact that national governments are loathe to relinquish responsibility for these attributes of sovereign countries. The Europeans agreed, shortly after I left, at the Maestricht EU Summit in December 1991, to move to the next stage of economic integration, which was called economic and monetary union. They also agreed to form a political union, which included greater powers for the European Parliament. That agreement has still not really resulted in what its supporters had hoped. The European Parliament has more responsibility, particularly after a second inter-governmental conference that concluded in 1997. The union has become a bit more cohesive in the political area, but with the move into monetary union on January 1, 1999, you are going to have a very wide gulf between the extent to which these European countries participating in the monetary union have unified their systems and what the 15 have done in the political area. This is what Chancellor Kohl feared prior to Maestricht, namely that you would have a serious imbalance in the Union between the degree of progress in the economic/monetary area and the political area. He warned against this, but in the end he agreed to go along under pressure from Mitterrand and Delors. The European Central Bank in Frankfurt began operations on the January 1, 1999, for 11 countries, and Greece plans to come in on January 1, 2001. Who controls it? Basically, it is pretty much on its own out there.

Q: Like a Federal Reserve?

NILES: The ECB is much more independent than the Federal Reserve. It is on a par in this respect with the Deutsche Bundesbank, which is the most independent of all Central Banks. The Central Bank, in a way, doesn’t answer to anybody because the European Union has a big deficit in the political area, which should parallel the structures that they developed in the economic, monetary trade, financial area. I think this is going to be a problem, particularly if economic
conditions worsen, which they may well. One of the things we and the Europeans need to worry about is that the implementation of this extraordinary change in Europe that began on January 1, 1999, may take place during poor economic conditions. The last couple years, things have been great, better and better. When we look now, it is hard to say that the outlook is quite so good. So, I am a little bit worried about that. I think the Europeans should be too.

Q: At the time, what was your impression of the caliber and the future of the European Parliament?

NILES: Dreadful. In terms of caliber, it was a very mixed bag. You had some distinguished statesman, people who were, in most cases, near retirement, and some very promising younger people who were just beginning their careers and who might dedicate all their political life to the European Parliament, or might, if the Parliament didn’t seem to be going anywhere, go back to their National Parliaments, after they made a name for themselves in Strasbourg. My short hand explanation of the European Parliament was that if you have a body like this which has no real responsibility, it will act irresponsibly. That is basically what happened. The European Parliament has generally behaved in an irresponsible way. They have passed all kinds of resolutions, laws and regulations in areas where they did have some responsibility which caused great problems for the European Union. One of our longest standing trade disputes with the European Union involves their regulations which forbid the import of beef from cattle that had been given growth enhancing hormones. There is absolutely no scientific data that would suggest that these hormones are dangerous, that this beef is dangerous to eat, or that the animals suffered. But, the European Parliament decided back in 1989 that they didn’t like this. They passed a ban under the guise of protecting public health. At that time, the Commission and the Council had the authority to override the Parliament, but they declined to use it. This ban became European law, and now we are in this big trade dispute, which has been going on for 10 years with the European Union. The European Parliament is constantly doing things like this. One of the reasons it happens this way is because the European Parliament 550 prominent political people sitting in Strasbourg in great luxury, drawing big salaries with big expense accounts. But, they don’t have anything to do compared with the national legislatures. And they go off and do half-witted things. If they were given greater responsibility, I think they would behave more responsibly. Given no real responsibility, they tend to behave irresponsibly.

Q: My looking at this, as a non-economist and all, looking at the European Union, Community at that time, as a competitor, it seems to me that we have a certain advantage which won’t dissipate. That is that you have this bureaucracy that is building up, making all sorts of demands, economic rules and regulations.

NILES: European Commission?

Q: European Commission, trying to bring everybody into line and a big bureaucracy that means...

NILES: It is pretty small. People talk about this bureaucracy in Europe, which is growing, and it is large, in absolute terms, but consider that you are talking about a Union with almost 400 million people, the European Commission, the bureaucratic mechanism in Brussels, is pretty
small. Of course, then, you have 15 national governments, which have not downsized, behind them. This is one of the things that is wrong with Europe. As the European Commission has taken over more and more responsibility in the policy making area, I don’t have the impression that the European governments have cut back on their own bureaucratic structure very much, if at all. For all I know, they may be growing. It would be a normal function of bureaucracy. What these European governments should do, is that when policy responsibility for a given area is transferred from the national governments to the competence of the European Union, they ought to cut back on their staffs in national capitals. It hasn’t worked that way. Compared with the European governments, I would say that the Commission staff is fairly lean and mean, although they get a bad rap from various people for living high and having big expense accounts.

Q: Beyond that, did you see that there was a tendency for overgrowth of regulations within this or not?

NILES: Really, no. The principal of the European Union, and they generally follow this, as one with the terrible name of “subsidiarity.” “Subsidiarity” is Euro-speak which means that you regulate an activity at the lowest appropriate level. The only things that you need to regulate at the European Union level are really rather special areas that affect the Union as a whole. Even there, you can delegate responsibility down to the member states, for example. Although the Commission is accused from time to time of being engaged in an enormous power grab, I don’t really see it. At least while I was there and in my subsequent observation of the European Union, albeit from a distance, I really didn’t see that happening.

Q: What were our principal disputes or concerns during this time you were there?

NILES: Well, I have talked about several of them. We talked a lot about the political side, particularly the NATO-EU relationship. We had the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, which began in 1986 and were slated to end, but did not, in December 1990 in Brussels. We had an unsuccessful ministerial conference in Brussels in December 1990. We couldn’t agree on agriculture. We had everything else more or less worked out. Within the Uruguay Round negotiations, the principal dispute between the United States and Europe was over agricultural subsidization. We had a number of major trade disputes with Europe, most of which involved agriculture in one way or another. I mentioned the beef hormone issue. It is a small amount of product, but it was a very sensitive issue. We had big arguments with them about things like corn gluten feed, a product most Americans have never heard of, and never will. It is a by-product of the production of high fructose corn syrup. It is a fairly high protein content. It is a by-product, and in a sense is worth nothing. If you can sell it for a nickel over transport costs, that is a profit to you. We were exporting a lot of that Europe and Europeans thought that was unfair. We had a zero tariff binding from the Kennedy Round GATT Agreement in 1967 on that product and on soy products. The Europeans kept trying to find ways to get out from under those zero tariff findings. We fought them tooth and nail to preserve that access. We had already lost our markets in Europe for wheat and corn. In the 1950s and 1960s, those sales had been fairly substantial. They were killed by the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC/EU.

Q: Why had we? When you think of Europe, it doesn’t really have a lot of land. Wheat and corn take a lot of land.
NILES: Well, they do. This is a classic example of a bad policy decision. In 1967, the European Community, made up of six members, made a terrible decision. They decided to apply, in most cases, German agricultural prices across the board. German agriculture was relatively inefficient and based on small farms, and the prices were high. In France, the prices were relatively low, the farms were larger, and productivity was higher. So, immediately you had this extraordinary upsurge of grain production in France. As you go around France today, particularly in the Isle de France area around Paris, which is flat with big fields and so forth, it is like Kansas. It is extraordinary. Big farmers in France are making tons of money. These big farms have accumulated thousands of hectares of land in that area. They are used to grow wheat and some corn, but mainly wheat. The European Union has become a major wheat producer. They have applied all of the lessons of Kansas, and then some. They have their own enormous tractors and combines. It all goes back to this very unwise decision in 1967, which made the European Union very quickly self-sufficient in most feed and bread grains. We managed to secure the zero bindings on soy products and corn gluten feed. Otherwise, we would have lost that market too. The subsidies of the European common agricultural program when I was there (I’m not sure what the numbers are now) consumed 50% of the budget of the European Union.

Q: What was the farm population?

NILES: The percentage of the population in Europe in agriculture was a little bit higher than in the United States. On the average, we were down, by the time I got to Brussels, to less than 1 ½ % of our active population in agriculture. In Europe, it was about 5 ½ to 6%, depending on how you counted. Within this farm population, you had an awful lot of part-time farmers. We joked that these were people who worked at the Mercedes and Porsche plants, and farmed on the weekend. They would have a couple cows and they raised a little bit of wheat. They would benefit from these extraordinary subsidies. There was some of that. In some European countries, Greece for example, you still probably have close to 20% active in agriculture. Portugal is a little bit less, maybe about 15%, Italy, probably about 8%. So, it is considerably higher than in the United States.

Q: Did you find there were problems for you, representing the United States, arguing against these subsidies, when you would have what amounted to American subsidies, either over it or at least, not labeled as subsidies?

NILES: The fact is we were prepared and had proposed to eliminate our subsidies on a multilateral basis in the Uruguay Round. Our principal subsidies, and we have a number of them, were the so-called “deficiency payments” that we pay to farmers who were raising certain crops, specifically wheat, corn, and cotton. Soybeans were not covered. The “deficiency payment” was the difference between the “target price,” established by the Department of Agriculture, and the market price for a commodity. Tobacco was under another acreage control program. Peanuts and sugar were the subjects of separate programs that resulted in vastly higher prices for those products. The European system was different in that it was based on commodity prices established by the European Commission and maintained by a border tariff called the “variable levy.” The “variable levy” was set at a level high enough to ensure that whatever the world-market price of a commodity, the delivered price of an import would be sufficiently higher than
the internal EC/EU price to make it economically impossible to import. Both systems are bad. They encourage overproduction and major misallocation of resources. The European system is, I believe, worse than ours in that it is totally market distorting, but ours is awful, too. When I was at USEC, I fought, unsuccessfully, for major cuts in these programs. I carried around little laminated cards that compared the levels of agricultural subsidization in the EC and the US. I used to hand them out to people like playing cards, saying “Here is the story, if you want to look at it.” Our subsidies were running somewhere in the range of $15-$17 billion a year. Subsidies to European farmers were much greater. The European Union budget, at that time, was around $100 billion. Of that, about half went in one form or another to the Common Agricultural Program. That included export subsidies. We had our own subsidy export program which we enacted in 1984 to try to force the Europeans to drop theirs. It quickly became an entitlement in the United States, which everybody loved. It was called the “Export Enhancement Program.” I remember a meeting in 1983 when we discussed this proposed program. Jack Block, the Secretary of Agriculture, maintained that we needed this program to fire “a shot across the bow of the European Community.” I will never forget it. Jack Block was a big corn and hog farmer from Iowa, a good guy. He was mad at the Europeans and came up with a proposal to subsidize the sale of 250,000 tons of wheat flour to Egypt. This was meant as a signal, or a warning to the EC: either you cut back on EC export subsidies or we will expand this program. I recall that Mac Baldrige, the Secretary of Commerce, said “Let me tell you something. “If you subsidize this sale to Egypt, we will be launched upon a new entitlement program that will be big bucks and we will never get rid of it.” Jack Block said, “No, nothing like that. This is a one-time effort to fire a shot across the bow of the European Community.” Mac Baldrige replied, “Don’t believe it.” Secretary Shultz, who was there, said, “I agree with Mac. This is a crazy program. Let’s not do it.” But for domestic political reasons we did, and the export enhancement program became a big program with big money attached, and nobody wanted to give it up. Baldrige and Shultz were right, and Jack Block was wrong. So, we had our programs, but we were prepared, even anxious, to get rid of them. The Freedom to Farm provisions in the 1996 Agricultural Act, were aimed at reducing, very substantially our agricultural subsidies, but now people are complaining about them and want to go back to deficiency payments.

Q: In Japan, I know that the consumer ends up paying a hell of a lot for food.

NILES: Because of farm programs such as the rice policy.

Q: What about in Europe?

NILES: It is essentially the same thing.

Q: Were you able to find that this was all very fine, but it costs so much to have a schnitzel and sauerbraten in your neighborhood restaurant?

NILES: Absolutely. I continually pointed out that food prices in Europe, on the average, were 50 to 75% higher on a purchasing power parity based currency exchange, largely as a result of the Common Agricultural Policy. That was an argument which played well with people who were economically oriented and the “Economist,” but they were a minority. Strangely, it was not an argument that carried a lot of weight with European voters. The farm groups argued, dishonestly
in many cases, “We are preserving the European style of life, rural life, don’t desert us.” They developed a concept in Europe at that time, called the “Desertification of Europe,” where vast areas would be depopulated because they could no longer farm them profitably. That is what the Common Agricultural Policy was supposed to prevent. But it didn’t, because the bulk of the subsidies went to large, rich farmers, as they do in the United States. But the CAP, despite the economic consequences, had a lot of supporters. Jacques Delors believed in it very strongly.

Q: Did you find that, particularly in farm policy, the Germans, who were very much behind this, let the French carry the charges of barricades?

NILES: That’s right. The French were the most obdurate in resisting any kind of change. The Germans kept their heads down, but in fact, German farmers were benefiting a great deal from the CAP, and the Germans, when it came to the crunch, talked a good game, but didn’t play it. Their hearts were not in agricultural reform, either. Part of this was CDU/CSU/FDP coalition politics.

Q: How about the Brits?

NILES: The UK was serious about cutting back on CAP subsidies, although there were people in Britain who benefited considerably from it, particularly big grain farmers, and to a degree, big beef producers. Of course, big beef producers were suffering because of mad cow disease. Interestingly enough, the country, on a per capita basis, that made the most out of the Common Agricultural Policy was not France but the Netherlands. The Danes were close behind. One of the reasons for that was because they had developed an extraordinary factory livestock farming enterprise in the Netherlands and in Denmark. They were using Common Agricultural Policy export subsidies to move a lot of that stuff onto the world market. Their arguments were not totally bogus. The Dutch farmers, who had very efficient factory farms for pigs, cattle, and chickens, would come to the Commission, and say, “Hey, let us buy corn from the Americans and we won’t need export subsidies. But, if our principal input is European grain, and that grain is twice the world market price because of the Common Agricultural Policy, we need export subsidies in order to move our products. The Commission was happy to oblige. Now, the fact of the matter is that the Dutch also were the principal importers of corn gluten feed and soy products from the United States. All of this stuff went into Rotterdam. Some of it was sent to other countries, but the Dutch were the major importers. Their arguments were slightly disingenuous because they used every opportunity to use non-EU origin feed grains for their livestock, but they did use a lot of European corn, which is twice as expensive as American corn. So, they said, “Hey, we need subsidies in order to compete.” Now, of course, in the Netherlands and Denmark, and other countries in Europe, and U.S., this very intensive factory livestock operation is becoming very controversial because it produces so much livestock waste. The Dutch are essentially drowning in pig manure.

Q: We are having a terrible time too.

NILES: In North Carolina, for instance. Look at the chicken manure problem in the Eastern shore of Maryland.
Q: Yes, we are having the fish diseased.

NILES: This is one of the consequences of factory livestock operations. As a result of this extraordinarily efficient factory farming for livestock that the Dutch employed, and their ability to get export subsidies for it, they got more from the Common Agricultural Policy, on a per capita basis than any other country. They were big free traders, the Dutch.

Q: You had left by the time Maestricht came, but in leading up to this, was your mission playing a role in the American side of things? I was wondering how we viewed that at the time, and what we were doing?

NILES: We had two inputs. First, to the Commission in Brussels and the Council Secretariat in Brussels, and secondly to the Dutch Presidency in The Hague. Basically, we didn’t have major problems with what they were proposing, namely monetary union. Washington concluded that European monetary union was a good thing for the EU and for the US. If they wanted to do it, more power to them. So, we did not pose objections to monetary union. Now, on the political union side, we did have a very active discussion regarding security issues, which predated Maestricht, beginning in 1989. I talked about that earlier. That involved the relationship between NATO and the European Union, and we did inject our point of view on those issues in the period leading up to the Maestricht European Summit. But, basically, because the principal issue at the Summit was monetary union, we didn’t play a big role in it.

Q: Did we see any problem with the EURO unit being a threat to the fact that the dollar seems to be the place where people, when in doubt, go for the dollar?

NILES: The issue was raised, but we did not raise objections. That included Treasury and the Federal Reserve, where there was some doubt, on our side. If the Euro is a hard, reliable currency, which the Germans and the others hope it will be, it will be a competitor with the dollar for a role as a reserve currency and a currency of trade. For example, today most products that are traded internationally are priced in dollars. Oil, almost all industrial raw materials, agricultural raw materials, and a lot of finished products such as airplanes are priced in dollars. The Euro could change that. One of the consequences of it may be that foreign countries, companies, and individuals would be less willing to hold dollars as a reserve and investments, U.S. bonds for example. That could be a real problem for us in the out years. It would force us to reduce substantially our balance of payment deficits, which would be a good, though painful thing for the United States. We would be more disciplined ourselves about our own economic policy. That was not something that people were terribly concerned about in 1991, although the issue did come up. There was commentary in the press and there were those in the government who said that this could be a problem. It may well be.

Q: During this period, 1989 to 1991, did you see an increase of American owned, or essentially American owned business, trying to get in under the tent? In other words, were we setting up factories, that type of thing, in order to say, “We are going to have this European Union that is coming about. It may start erecting barriers, and already there are barriers, so let’s get inside, rather than outside?”
NILES: That has been a continuing feature of U.S. European relations since the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community went into effect in 1958. Even before that, there was a major presence in Europe of US companies. After 1958, that presence has grown enormously. It involved U.S. companies investing in one or the other of the EC countries in order to gain “European firm” status under article 58 of the Treaty of Rome, and therefore be able to operate freely in any of the EC/EU countries. It is an enormous customs union, with 400 million people if you count the associated countries. People want to be inside that customs union. What has happened is there has been some greenfield investment with new plants going up along with a lot of merger and acquisition deals in which U.S. companies acquired European companies, or merged with European companies. There has also been a lot of portfolio investment, particularly in the 1990s. This started while I was there. There was a growing interest on the part of European companies in listing shares or ADRs (American Depository Receipts) on the New York Stock Exchange. The European companies, in order to issue ADRs, had to satisfy U.S. requirements, including SEC requirements, in the way of auditing standards, publicity, and information. That process accelerated during the 1990s. One of the consequences of that is the U.S. ownership of the equity of some big European companies is pretty high. If you look at the companies which have ADRs right now, British Petroleum, British Telecom, Shell Transport & Trading/Royal Dutch, Daimler-Benz, somewhere in the neighborhood of 30-50% of the equity is held by American persons, either mutual funds, pension funds, or individual investments. One of the consequences of the Daimler-Chrysler merger was that the resulting company’s equity was initially more than 50% owned by American holders. Much of that has now been sold, but that is a sign of globalization.

Q: You had just come from Canada and the Free Trade Agreement, was that beginning to pose a counterbalance to you? Did this play any factor at all?

NILES: Some people suggested that. The U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement, or subsequently, NAFTA could be a counter to the European Union. That is only if you see the U.S./European relationship in an adversarial sense and thus believe that we need to have this counterweight. I never saw it that way, so I thought those arguments were wrong. The arguments made in favor of expanding NAFTA to include Chile, and then maybe other countries such as Brazil and Argentina made sense in an of themselves, and not as an alternative to the European Union. Those are important trading partners for the United States, but as an alternative to European Union, that’s not serious.

Q: Were they carrying a watching brief during the same time? I mean, they were outside this thing, too, weren’t they?

NILES: They had their own relationship. We coordinated with the Canadians in Brussels on issues of mutual concern, particularly agricultural trade issues, as we did also with the Australians, the New Zealanders and others. We had good relations with the Canadians. The relationship with the EU is important for Canada, but I do not think, except in the mid-1970s when Trudeau tried to present the European Community as an alternative to the United States, that the Canadians ever really saw Europe in that light. They recognized Europe as being very important and saw a need to develop their relationship with Europe, but not as a serious alternative to the United States.
Q: Geography is...

NILES: Canada had a strong Mission to the EU and they watched closely over their interests, as well they should, but they did not consider that to be an alternative or even in the same category, for Canada, as the relationship with United States. Keep in mind that by now 80% of Canada’s exports go to the US market.

Q: What about Greece? Later, you were to become Ambassador to Greece. Greece always struck me as the “odd man out” in this whole thing.

NILES: It was, particularly then. When I got to Brussels in 1989, Andreas Papandreou was still the Prime Minister of Greece, in his first incarnation, but he was fading fast, both in terms of health and politically. The Greeks, as a general rule, were the odd people out in Europe. One European Union official once told me once that the European Community had made two fundamental errors over its history, going back to the Treaty of Paris in 1950 that set up the Coal and Steel Community: one was the decision I mentioned in 1966 to adopt German agricultural prices as the basis for the CAP, and the second was to admit the Greeks in 1981. Greece was not ready for prime time. They were brought in to the EC in 1981 as a way of expressing support for the restoration of democracy in Greece and support for Constantine Karamanlis, who was then Prime Minister of Greece. Andreas Papandreou replaced Karamanlis in 1981, pledging that Greece would leave the European Community and NATO and get rid of the American bases. When he left office in 1989, Greece was still in NATO and the European Community, and we had signed a base agreement. He never really paid a political price for his hypocrisy. By the time I arrived in Brussels, Greece had become much more enthusiastic about EC membership because they realized that they could benefit tremendously from it because they are the poorest country in the EC. When it joined the EC in 1986, Portugal was the poorest country in the Community, but they soon passed Greece. Greece is now the 15th on the EU’s per capita GDP rate.

We worked closely with the EC, with the Commission and the member states, in the period right after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to get political support from the Community for what became Desert Shield, and we got it. They also supported us in the UN Security Council on Chapter VII economic sanctions against Iraq. We got good support from the Commission, and most of the European states, not as members of the Community but as allies of the United States, including France, sent substantial military forces to the theater and participated in both Desert Shield and Desert Storm. At that stage, there was virtual unanimity that we had to stand against this, and we couldn’t acquiesce in the Iraqi occupation of a sovereign country, Kuwait. We had very few voices raised against what became Desert Shield, and then Desert Storm, in Europe.

Q: How did you find the, more extreme to the left, politically? Was this much of a factor?

NILES: Really not. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of Communism had plunged the European far left into a state of relative disarray. The only country in which the Communist Party, by the time I got there, was still very strong was Italy. In other countries, Spain, Portugal, and France, where you had had a fairly strong Communist movement, it was gone. It had been reduced to irrelevancy in the political life of the countries. But, in Italy, the
Communist party was still fairly prominent in 1991.

Q: Of course, in Italy, the Communist party, at this point, really was more indigenous.

NILES: It claimed to be a national party, and it had gone through a number of stages, from the time of Gramsci and Togliatti, who were true internationalists. It had established itself, as you suggest, as a much more national party. Today, of course, it has renamed itself and is one of the major factors in Italy. The Secretary General of the Party, Massimo d’Alema, is a respected center-left politician. The Communist Party in Italy has made the transition to the post-Communist world better than any Communist party in the world, as far as I can tell. There is a hard-line, true-believer Communist Party in Italy, as there is in Greece, which occupies the far left.

Q: They were already there, in a way. It had Berlinguer, and all.

NILES: Berlinguer came from an upper-class, aristocratic background. I think it was his cousin who was the Security Advisor to several Italian Prime Ministers.

Q: One last question on this particular field. What about the role of the French that you were getting from the Germans, the Brits, and others? I mean, how did they see France?

NILES: They were frustrated by the French, from time to time. We got a lot of that from the British, and to a degree, from the Germans. I had close ties with the British and German PermReps to the EC/EU. They were frustrated with the French, but their attitude was, “Well, what can you do? You have to find some way to bring the French along?” The French had a tremendous advantage in the sense that the other Europeans recognized that there was no way in the world you were ever going to make progress in the European Union if the French were opposed to whatever you were trying to do, so you had to work with them. You had to find ways to accommodate them. The Germans, in particular, felt this tremendous need to accommodate the French. I would frequently go to the German EU PermRep, and say, “How can you guys do this, change course here on us?” They would say, “Well, we can’t split off from the French.” The Germans were very much under the influence of the idea that the Franco/German relationship was the motor of the European Union. According to this view, nothing happened in the European Union without Franco/German cooperation. The French played the Germans like a piano and twisted the Germans around in all kinds of contortions. The British were less subject to that, but the British recognized, too, that if they wanted to do anything, you had to do it with the French. The British were different in one respect that often they were happy to do nothing, particularly during the Margaret Thatcher period.

Q: What about back in Washington? I mean, for years, we had in the Department the European group, the George Ball group, that argued that whatever happened in Europe to bring unity was really great for us. These were true believers, in a way, but time had moved on. Did you find that we had a more practical group, or was it a split that you were getting?

NILES: I think our attitude was reasonable and pragmatic. We supported European integration. We thought it was good for us, and I think it has been good for us. It is not been good in every
single respect, but, overall, European integration has good for us. By the time I arrived in Brussels, as opposed to the earlier period, one thing had changed, and we made this clear. There were limits to the price we were prepared to pay to make European integration happen. While I was there, some on the Commission would come to us and say, “Well, it is very expensive integrating these new countries. Shouldn’t you make trade concessions, give up your zero binding on soy beans, or something like that, in order to make it easier for us?” Of course, we said, “No way are we going to do that. We favor European integration, but you guys are big enough now to pay the price.” In that sense, we were quite pragmatic about it. By the time I arrived in Brussels, we were no longer prepared to pay part of the price for European integration, although we had been prepared to do so before, as for example when we acquiesced in the establishment of the CAP in 1966/67. The Bush administration, for which I worked as Ambassador of the European Union, had a very clear and pragmatic view of European integration. We saw it as being beneficial to the United States, on balance, but where we thought it wasn’t, we made our views clear. Secretary Baker did, as did President Bush.

Q: All right. Is there anything else we should cover, do you think?

NILES: Well.

Q: You could mention some and we can pick it up the next time.

NILES: That probably does it for Europe. We can pick it up when we move. Some of these issues continued over to my time as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

THOMAS G. WESTON
Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1990-1993)

Ambassador Weston was born and raised in Michigan and educated at Michigan State University and in France. Entering the Foreign Service in 1969, he was posted first in Zaire, after which he began assignments in the Bureau of European Affairs and abroad. His posts include Zaire, Germany, Belgium and Canada. Ambassador Weston was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: By the summer of 1990 you were in Brussels? Is that it?

WESTON: Summer of 1990.

Q: What was your job?

WESTON: DCM at the U.S. Mission to the then European Community, now European Union.

Q: Who was ambassador then?
WESTON: Tom Niles.

Q: Well, Tom is an old hand, am I right? I was his first supervisor overseas, he was a vice counsel in Belgrade. Tom has been one of our preeminent ambassadors. Were the European Community and the group around it looking at what was happening in Eastern Europe? I mean it had a huge impact on the whole European Community idea and all of that. What were you getting in these very early days?

WESTON: Remember these were the days in the early ‘90s when the European Union was changing rapidly, the terms used were “widening and deepening”. It clearly saw early on it was going to absorb the old GDR. The GDR basically became a part of the Federal Republic so that’s one country. You can call that enlargement or whatever you want but it was very clear that enlargement, widening of the European Union, was the direction history was taking. Moreover, it was widely recognized that the prospect of joining western institutions, in particular the European Union but also NATO was a very powerful card in fostering democratization, collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It was widely viewed as the case and still is to this day that a lot of the geneses for the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in the Soviet Union found itself in the activities in another multilateral process which was the CSCE, now OSCE. So, there was a view very much in Brussels, certainly by ’90, that the European Union would and ought to be expanding eastward along with NATO ultimately and that that was a useful instrument in fostering change in Eastern Europe as it was with NATO. Why this is important is because I end up coming back after Brussels to do NATO, the EU and everything else in European Affairs. But then I was doing it from the EU point of view and that was the expanding party.

The other part is the EU which had just enlarged a couple of times in the ‘80s and took on new members. It was moving farther and farther in what’s called the “deepening of European integration” in a whole series of areas. During this period I was in Brussels from ‘90-’93. That was the time leading up to the Maastricht Treaty, which was the establishment of the European Union from the European Community. The formal adoption of a common European foreign and security policy, this was all deep in integration and most importantly was the establishment of a common currency, the EURO, as a logical extension of the European monetary union and currency union. There were all kinds of other things going on, integration in police affairs, the judiciary and, so on. There was a widening and deepening going on very dynamically within the European Community until Maastricht, after which it changed to the European Union. The EU was very much associated with what was going on in what we used to call Eastern Europe and now call Central Europe.

At the same time there were some other things going on which were very troublesome in terms of European affairs and European integration. The big one in the economic fields was we were trying to settle the Uruguay Round while I was there. That formed a great deal of my work as well as working with many of the trade disputes we have with us to this day, subsidies for large aircraft, the banana regimes of the EU. The list goes on and on, foreign sales corporations…

Q: Did you get into farm subsidies?

WESTON: Absolutely, common agricultural policy and American subsidies. That was a key
issue in the Uruguay Round. On the more political side of things, this was the time when Europe was trying to also deal with the break up of Yugoslavia and the rather aggressive nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, not very successfully dealing with it on its own.

Q: I’m wondering at the beginning of when you got there, after all as Foreign Service Officers of part of a bureaucratic process, although we’re used to fast breaking situations, most bureaucrats are, I mean they’re used to how things are, they like them orderly and having all these peculiar countries all of a sudden becoming free and clamoring to get in. I would have thought that the bureaucratic establishment must have been aghast?

WESTON: Absolutely and that was most pronounced in NATO, I would say. It was also present in the European Community but it was most pronounced in NATO and the whole issue of NATO membership was in the forefront. We will get into when I go back because then I took responsibility for this in European Affairs.

Q: But what about during the time you were there about the EU. What was our stance?

WESTON: At that time we were concerned about what NATO would become. The primary instrument for American diplomacy, defense and security policy in the trans-Atlantic system in Europe in the post cold war period had, if not lost its reason for being, then been called into question. I mean, what was NATO for if not to keep the Russians out, keep the Germans down, and keep the Americans in. That was very much at play. There was a tendency on the part of U.S. analysts to see the integration of Eastern Europe and Russia plus states of the former Soviet Union, that the preferable path for joining Europe and the Atlantic system having a very active and robust OSCE in security matters. Using whether it was admission or special relationships with the European Communities as the primary instrument to have the drawing card of the integration work toward democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. Still using NATO to foster relationships but relationships short of membership. I think there was tendency to say that the real responsibility for integration of these countries lies with the Europeans, the European Union. It was a very dynamic period in the variable geometry of Europe, let alone the variable geometry of the European Union.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the French jumped into this with both feet because seeing that here was a real chance of their dominating a situation which they couldn’t do with NATO and all and at that time the Germans were relatively quiet, I mean they weren’t pushing themselves, how did you see this?

WESTON: I would not view it that way. Remember the 2+4 talks which led to the unification of Germany. France and the UK to some extent were not enthusiastic about the outcome of those talks yet they did succeed, so that the integration of the first element of what used to be Central Europe, the old GDR, took place. It was with French and UK acceptance ultimately but dragging and kicking all the way in. Since you asked about France specifically, I think there were some in France who saw potential enlargement relationships with Central and Eastern Europe and with Russia as a means to enhance French interests but more on the economic side, French commercial and business interests basically against Germany dominating those things. Germany having been the traditional economic, by geography and every other way, the traditional trade
power and politically, to some extent, you had an issue within the European Community. The
German, French engine for integration but there was always the French concept that that engine
only worked as long as it was the European Union which was really a greater France. After the
unification of Germany, when it became a much larger country in population and every other
way within the European Union than France, France did what almost any state does. It starts to
think maybe we need some political relationships around the edges to balance off that great
continental land power in Europe. Now this is kind of World War I type of thinking, but there
were elements of that. I think there was a prevailing French belief, remember Jacques Delors was
the president of the Commission, there was a continuing French belief that the European
Community was in many ways ideologically, historically, politically a French creation and that
only as a greater France was European integration really in French interest. I think this was the
prevailing concern among the French political elites, whether enlargement of the European
Union especially into Central and Eastern Europe, where you might expect these countries to be
much closer to German interests. This would be in French interest. Whether deepening as it was
being talked about then of the European Union, greater integration of all kinds of areas would
really lead to a European Union increasing French power in the world, which had been the
traditional motivation for France after containing Germany.

Q: The phrase that is used now by one of our political leaders “old Europe vs. new Europe”.

WESTON: Well, not really, because one of our political leaders would put both Germany and
France in total Europe of course and that’s the German/French relationship here and the
relationships of others to France and to Germany was much more a factor than that kind of a
division.

Q: Were we at this time, maybe it wasn’t expressed openly, was there thought among your
colleagues, what does this expanded European Union mean, are we building a rival to the
United States particularly? We are talking about commercial and economic and I don’t think
anybody is thinking in military terms.

WESTON: Well some were, actually.

Q: Okay, well let’s talk a little about it.

WESTON: We had terrible problems with European security and defense policy because of it.
Yes, those concerns were there and depending on which official you were talking about or
thinker would color how much of a concern these things were. I think though at that particular
time remember we’re talking about the Bush 41 administration. James Baker as Secretary of
State, had a great interest in the result of ending the cold war. You can call it liberation, you can
call it whatever you want but the geopolitical situation had shifted significantly in U.S. favor.
The main interest for the U.S. had was in assuring that remain the case. So, you had the emphasis
on policies, for instance, the rush to open embassies in the countries of the former Soviet Union
to in part a guard against them being reincorporated into some resurgence of the Soviet Union
was very strong. The same thing applied in the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the Baltic
states; that the way to consolidate this wonderfully changed geopolitical situation for the United
States with the end of the cold war was by integrating these countries into the larger whole of
Europe. That was I think for most American policy makers the operative and most important element. Now, were there concerns about Europe as an economic rival? For most people it was quite clear that a very prosperous integrated Europe was very much in U.S. economic and commercial interests. I mean I don’t know what the exact statistic is today, but then a third of European industry was really U.S. investment and vice versa of trade, which was huge and far less important than investment, I would argue. 98 percent was absolutely trouble free, mutually beneficial so Europe as a great economic rival what are we talking about here. That Opal of Germany as a rival to Chevrolet in Detroit or something like that, it just didn’t make sense to people who really understood economics. This is not to say that there were not concerns. They were more in the political realm and on the Hill when an issue would come up. Normally it was a trade policy issue although there were some in the field of anti-trust competition policy, but the trade policy folks felt that it would be a trade dispute and there will be trade disputes, different trading systems, all that sort of thing particularly in the field of agriculture. Those disputes because they were pretty tough and they involved an awful lot of money and a lot of special interest groups, they could get translated very rapidly, at least rhetorically, into concerns about Europe as an economic rival but I don’t think they were realistic and they never, never trumped this greater U.S. strategic interest that I’ve talked about.

Now, there were similar concerns about the development of ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) in defense issues. There was a perception in some quarters, I think the perception was justified for some people in Europe as an analysis of some of the forces that play in Europe, particularly in France, that the motivation for ESDP was not to create a rival military power to the United States but to basically undermine American dominance of security in defense policy in Europe as exercised through the American role in NATO. That led to bitter, bitter discussions. I mean the United States supported the development of the European security defense policy for I believe a whole series of very good reasons but it was always with very strong concerns being expressed that it only take place within NATO and not at the exclusion of the United States. There is a whole history of that diplomacy from this period of time.

Q: It is becoming more and more obvious that the United States had a military that was just light years ahead of European military in transporting...

WESTON: Absolutely.

Q: and in a way the Europeans are, I won’t say a banana republic, but they are just not in the same...

WESTON: The emphasis was not so much on technology but remember you had huge European standing armies in Germany in particular but throughout NATO. Their concern was you had the wrong thing. You had an awful lot of troops sitting there defending against a land attack by the Warsaw Pact into Germany. That wasn’t going to happen. What was going to happen and what was going on at that time was the emergence of conflicts including in Europe in the former Yugoslavia but in other places as well either through ethnic conflict or failed states or disintegrating states and the concern was this was the real issue for the future. It was very much the issue in Yugoslavia, well ex-Yugoslavia at that time. It didn’t take much of a look across the Caucasus and into Central Asia and the Middle East, and everything in Africa, to realize there
was a problem in a lot of places. The U.S. at that time was taking advantage of the end of the cold war, was dismantling a lot of its military and there were not reductions in defense spending but a decline in the rate of acceleration of defense spending for the United States. The same thing happened in Europe, but the United States was trying to adapt itself even then to the post cold war environment. There was a requirement for troops to be more mobile. Europe would have liked to have done the same thing but was still dealing with individual and national forces, defense procurement systems and everything else. It became most apparent in some of the costliest items for defense which the United States already had because of its role in NATO in defending Europe, a tremendous lift capability…

Q: Airplanes.

WESTON: Airplanes, although not only airplanes but mainly its role in NATO which fit perfectly with the need, if you had to deal with conflicts somewhere, you had to get some troops there as well as a very well integrated command and control capability which was not the case in Europe except through NATO. It seems strange saying this today in the wake of the various reports on the American intelligence community, but still, with an intelligence capability in particular for military use which was integrated. The Europeans had nothing remotely comparable to it. So, in these big ticket items and by big ticket I mean a lot of U.S. military intelligence is based on satellites, surveillance and this stuff is expensive. The United States for different reasons already had these things which were applicable to the new threat environment, if you will, which the Europeans didn’t. The whole capabilities issue we had been bogged down in NATO for years on how much you’re spending on defense and trying to foster interoperability and rationalizing their programs going back, you know to the ‘50s on all of these things. What was different in the early ‘90s was the change to the post cold war environment and the thinking that was going on about that which led to very different assessments about the United States and Europe just because of the nature of the military forces in existence then.

Q: Was there at the time you were in the EU, I mean you obviously didn’t deal directly with NATO, NATO was...

WESTON: Did all the time. We had a Mission to NATO, our DCM there was John Kornblum who is an old friend. I had been his deputy in German Affairs, we lived three houses apart in Brussels and we were all the time dealing with these things. We tried. The ambassador was Will Taft, who is legal adviser now, who was deeply involved in this development of European security and defense identity, deeply involved obviously with dealing with ex-Yugoslavia so there was a degree of cooperation. I would argue we worked together between the Mission to the European Community and the Mission to NATO which was unprecedented then because of the changed environment. I can remember John and I putting together lunches which we would co-host and I would bring in some of the kind of political security types from the EU side of things and he would do the same with NATO. You find these people live in the same town Brussels and they didn’t know one another. There was a deep interaction between our two Missions.

Q: Was there any effort on our part, maybe this had been going on for but hadn’t gone anywhere, but getting the major countries in NATO to start developing their own airlift and their own fancy equipment?
WESTON: It was quite clear that we were all going to change the type of militaries we had or had to at some point given the new threats that we thought we would face. We wanted the Europeans to first of all spend more to develop their capabilities but to develop their capabilities for light easily mobile infantry in essence and to integrate in the sense of rationalizing their forces so that they could operate together more. The United States was an early supporter of such things as the so called Euro Core, these joint military organizations which were springing up at that time. They weren’t limited to land forces; there was EURO NAV for naval forces and things like that because we believed there needed to be a rationalization as well as improvement in capabilities. I think for the most part we were not arguing that Europeans should spend a great deal of those defense resources on duplicating U.S. lift capabilities or intelligence. That’s not what they really needed to do. Some help would have been nice but that was not the biggest gap in the common capabilities to deal with the new threats. There was some fear that if we went down that path what you would be devoting scarce European defense resources to something which would duplicate what already existed in NATO because of U.S. forces. That could have the effect of undermining NATO. You can find references to someone citing Europeans have got to build the lift capability. This was particularly true because in the early ‘90s we were trying to stay out of ex-Yugoslav conflicts and they wanted NATO to stay out of it. We were fostering the EU doing things well, the problem is the EU without lift capabilities, intelligence, command and control, did not do well militarily in that part of the world.

Q: Also too, it is one of the problems that one looked at NATO and can’t help resembling the old American confederation and...

WESTON: In the sense that it is all consensus based.

Q: Yeah and in Yugoslavia in those early days NATO or whatever it was didn’t have the will to essentially confront the Serbs.

WESTON: But that means the U.S. didn’t have the will; that’s in fact what the case was.

Q: We stayed out of it, hoping that the Europeans would take care of it.

WESTON: Exactly, which meant that NATO stayed out of it.

Q: And it meant that whoever was doing it was not willing to confront. I mean they were willing to...

WESTON: I mean there were plenty of Europeans who wouldn’t have minded NATO taking it on...

Q: Yeah.

WESTON: But we had not gone through the transition yet of the Germans deciding they could operate “out of area” which Yugoslavia would have been. Now they’re in Yugoslavia, they are in Afghanistan, but that had not happened at that point, that transition in German thinking. That was
the early stages of them, one of the things we worked on. I think the fair way to describe this is because the United States did not want to be involved in these conflicts.

_Q: Did we feel that there could be a NATO spin off without the United States to go into Yugoslavia?_  

WESTON: No, not given our role in NATO. I think this is behind; we support it, the Europeans taking the lead role in dealing with ex-Yugoslavia. The reason is that we didn’t want to and that included, the United States totally dominated NATO. It may have consensus decision-making but it was totally dominated by the United States. That’s why it was such an effective instrument of U.S. policy for so many years.

_Q: Turning to a slightly different subject, were you surprised, and also your colleagues as an old German hand, about the weakness, the horrible economy of East Germany, the GDR. It was named the tenth largest power and all it turned out to be..._  

WESTON: I think the big difference when the GDR still existed; their economy was compared to the other economies of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. That comparison you would put the economy of the GDR as one of the most advanced, technically and every other way. But, if the comparison changes to the GDR economy, a centralized state controlled economy incredibly inefficient, and you compare that with the economies of Europe or North America it is clearly failing. I don’t think it was a surprise that when the comparison was being made to Western economies that it was, that this just wasn’t going to work. It didn’t take very long wandering around the old GDR, or East Berlin to see that they build a building and the façade would fall off two weeks later. This is not good. Or you saw these factories which were completely irrational in terms of microeconomics but you took that and you compare it to what was going in a Bulgaria or even a Poland and it looked pretty good. You compared it to what was going on in Frankfurt or Düsseldorf and it looks pretty bad. I wouldn’t say it was a surprise. Just different standards.

_Q: Our focus is wrong in a way wasn’t it; it was more looking at the Bloc as a Bloc and looking at GDR’s place in the Bloc..._  

WESTON: Oh yes, it’s the Warsaw Pact.

_Q: Rather than thinking in terms of competition straight on with West Germany?_  

WESTON: Yes, in a Bloc but even within that, I will go back to the ‘80s which was when the GDR was still around and it was thinking of the GDR in a little bit different way. You had even within this Bloc one place where you got something which approached German standards of manufacturing in some areas with incredibly cheap labor. I think I told the story of about how IKEA, when it came into being, it’s a Swedish corporation, sourced all of this wood working which was in the area and which it is the lower end of technology obviously but you could argue the GDR, the wood working skills present in the GDR were comparable to those in the Federal Republic and with much cheaper labor. It was within the Bloc but you could still see these differences in the factory production which led to a lot of economic interaction. There was a lot
of economic interaction between the GDR and the Federal Republic.

*Q:* When you were in Brussels this whole thing, the world was changing, were you getting a lot of visitors from Poland, East Germany, Ukraine and all coming in and asking what is this all about, trying in a way to catch up because they had been pretty well isolated. Was there almost a training or a continuous briefing operation going on?

WESTON: Which continued well into the ‘90s and other jobs which we will talk about later that I found myself in. Remember the U.S. was very supportive of the building of relationships between the European Communities and the countries of Central Europe, the Baltics, and countries of the former Soviet Union. In part because we favored immigration there more than we did enlargement of NATO because of some fears about NATO at that time, you know, finding its new role and all that. We found ourselves in the situation where there would be all kinds of visitors from all of these countries. It was Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Baltics and increasingly the Balkans. Initially Slovenia but I can remember the first group of Albanians who came in, it must have been after the revolution in Albania which was ’92, something like that. We found ourselves in the role of the United States of kind of helping to foster relationships and contacts with a lot of these folks with the institutions of the European Community. I can remember, let’s take the Albanians a specific example, right after the revolution the United States was very supportive of this. I remember James Baker went to Albania and adulation from the crowds. Shortly after that we had the first delegation from Albania, the new government coming to Brussels for talks with the European Union. It was led as by a deputy foreign minister. One of the key meetings we arranged was lunch at my house with some folks from the foreign affairs part of the Commission, the development side of the Commission, the European Council, member states and the European parliament. So here you have the United States fostering relationships, and that occurred repeatedly in those days.

*Q:* It’s an interesting thing you are bringing up something that comes through on all these interviews and that is the role of the United States as sort of the one country that takes the mega view, often we are wrong and I’m not putting this on as saying God aren’t we wonderful but the point being, it comes close to being a term which sends a shudder up some peoples spine, but the indispensable country. But, at the same time no matter how you slice it the United States takes the role of and its allowed to, maybe sometimes because of geographic separation of coming in with power but saying “hey, why don’t you all get together and do this, it’s a good idea and have lunch with us” or something like that.

WESTON: That’s of course how European integration started.

*Q:* Yeah, yeah.

WESTON: The Marshall Plan. A fundamental part of the Marshall Plan was that you guys start integrating your economies.

*Q:* I mean all along they were...

WESTON: That’s continued
Q: In so many other things, in Asia and everywhere else, other things have started without our help or even with our opposition but for the main part certainly the post World War II role is very much the fingerprints of the United States is all over it.

WESTON: Absolutely, and I think the fingerprints of the United States are all over and continue to be all over all kinds of developments of the world. Look at Turkey and the European Union now, something which I have been working on in recent years. Would that be where it is now, not sure, no one can be sure when and if it will actually happen. I think it will but would it be as advanced as it is now without U.S. involvement? And that’s, of course, what is the U.S. doing involved in a decision on the part of the European Union about its membership? I wouldn’t use the term indispensable power, because I think you can find when you said the U.S. is the only country with a mega view. I think you can always find in other places the same kind of analytical steps which lead to the pursuit of policies which appear to have a mega view of the world and history.

Q: Of Jean Monnet.

WESTON: John Monnet is a very good example. I think one of the great successes of American policy in the post war period and I’m not sure that I would claim it still exists today but the United States has played a crucial role in advancing enlightened policies. What I mean by enlightened are policies which are likely to build a better world in terms of security and economics and environment and everything else. Now that’s all in U.S. interest, a more secure world and a more prosperous world are all in U.S. interest, so it’s reasonable that the United States would do that but I think it’s been incredibly successful in the post war period doing that.

Q: One looks at things and we are getting quite a feel as we look back but in various things you feel that countries in Europe for example take a rather short range look at things.

WESTON: Or inward looking. Provincial almost.

Q: Very provincial, I mean, ok you sell military equipment to Iran or to China, those are issues right now but other things too of not caring about the consequences as opposed to open market let’s get onto it right away. Maybe I’m cynical but...

WESTON: I may be less cynical and I’ve retained my youthful idealism. I think there are always voices and they exist in the United States as well which we look for short term advantage as opposed to the mega view, to use your term. The interesting thing is that the United States has played a very important role in amplifying the voices as it just did in terms of deferring a decision on lifting the arms embargo to China, amplifying voices which had misgivings about this policy which were most prevalent in the United Kingdom, Germany and probably Scandinavia, far less prevalent in Europe starting with France. It wasn’t so much the U.S. pointing a way to an enlightened policy as the U.S. aiding and amplifying a voice for enlightened policy on the part of elements in Europe in this particular case. I think that’s a role which the U.S. has been very successful at and it’s a role which ultimately serves very broad and important U.S. interests.
Q: Absolutely. Looking at the European role in this period is it the European Union?

WESTON: It was the European Union in '83 with Maastricht. It is the European Community until then, which is European coal and steel community, European Economic Community and EURATOM. It is a technical legal difference.

Q: Were you saying something, looking at it from afar I feel the bureaucrats are taking over so much of particularly economic policy role within the European sphere and people sitting in Brussels or wherever Strasbourg throwing out the laws and having a great time as bureaucrats, developing a tangled web that is going to make things ineffective.

WESTON: Well, I think what is actually happening is those bureaucrats are all doing things following decisions of the European Council. None of them are operating on their own. European Council, of course, being the Council for the member states, that’s the way decisions, work in the European Union. What they are doing for the most part is in pursuance of those Council decisions, decisions by member states. They are called directives for the most part. We will choose the U.S. term regulations, in particular in the economic field but increasingly in fields associated with economics: to improve the basic rates on debt of the European Union which is a completely open market in goods, services, capital and labor, that’s the goal. Now, you know the sorts of criticisms that you hear are of all of a sudden there is this regulation from Brussels that a cucumber to be sold cannot be crooked or whatever it is. There are all kinds of examples like this, you are absolutely accurate. You are trying to eliminate a lot of differing regulations like in France maybe you could have crooked cucumbers but in Germany you couldn’t so that if you are going to have open trade between Germany and France in cucumbers you have to have one uniform standard and literally everything traded, be it goods or services, are subject to standards in one way or another. That is modern economic life. It is easy to almost make a joke of some of these regulations. The one that has always been my favorite was the regulations on the size of condoms. If you are going to have free trade the fact of the matter is you need those regulations and it’s exactly the same thing as happens within the United States and has happened in the United States to permit open trade throughout the United States, trade and investment increasingly. I don’t see it as the bureaucrats having fun; not many of them are having that much fun because what they are usually doing is not inventing new regulations but an area will be identified by the Council where there is a problem. There is something interfering with free trade usually and then they are trying to come up with the best regulation they can out of existing regulations which are different.

Q: When you were there what was the relationship to I think it’s the Council of Europe or whatever it is, Strasbourg is it?

WESTON: Council of Europe is in Strasbourg, right.

Q: I watch French TV when I look at the Council of Europe I see very fancy sort of butler type people with chains around their neck opening doors; it seems like a very lush, plush place.

WESTON: Well you’ll see that in any European parliament almost, the same kind of trappings of
government but the Council of Europe of course is a totally different organization than the European Union. You also have in Strasbourg the plenary sessions of the European Parliament which unfortunately take place in basically the same place as the Council of Europe, a totally different organization. The Council of Europe is a much older organization; it is more devoted to democratization of human rights in Europe and it always has been. It’s the place where the European Charter on Human Rights was developed; it’s the part of the Council of Europe, the European court on human rights to enforce that charter and so on. It is a completely separation organization with a different membership than the European Union. Now, there is a link and that is it is literally inconceivable because of the criteria for becoming a member of the European Union for any state to aspire to membership in the European Union which is not also a member of the Council of Europe but a member of the Council of Europe in good standing; that is, completely adheres to European convention on human rights and so on. European parliament is in Strasbourg, the Council of Europe is in Strasbourg, there is some overlapping membership in these technical, not even technical, they are not technical ties, relationships between the two. In fact it’s very interesting there was just a call by the current secretary general of the Council of Europe for rethinking about whether or not the Council of Europe should still exist given the existence of the European Union; especially because the new constitution of the European Union, which is now going through ratification procedures, may or may not be ratified by all member states and includes a fundamental charter of rights which is very duplicative of the Council of Europe. But, as I say, the membership isn’t identical. But, there is a debate going on right now about whether you need a Council of Europe if you have the European Union.

Q: Did you find you were paying much attention to the Council of Europe?

WESTON: When I was in Brussels in the ‘90s, only with regard to the enlargement of the European Union and the European Community. It is a stepping stone. If you are not a member of the Council of Europe in good standing, that is, you are adhering to the European convention on human rights, you don’t have a chance to join the institutions of the European Union. I have gotten more involved with it in my most recent job which is Cyprus because of some active cases before the European Court of Human Rights related to Cyprus and which has actually gone to plenary sessions in the Council of Europe. But, from ’90-’93 it was very peripheral involvement and in fact, even to this day, say reporting, analysis, of the Council of Europe is not done from our Mission in Brussels to the European Union, it is done out of Embassy Paris and the Consul in Strasbourg.

Q: While you were in Brussels did the war in Iraq, Desert Storm, have much impact?

WESTON: It did in the sense of being a very successful undertaking and a very successful collaboration across the Atlantic to solve a very big problem. Remember it involved most of the major member states in the European Union. It wasn’t in NATO either, although an awful lot of the assets of NATO were used in the process obviously and it only worked as a willing coalition because these folks were also allies of NATO so they could talk to one another on walkie talkies and what not. The Gulf War resulted in relatively positive feelings. Remember this was still the Bush Administration in which our relationship with the European Union in Europe more broadly was of a very different nature then it became in the Clinton Administration and certainly during the current (George W. Bush) Administration.
Q: We withdrew major military forces we used in Iraq and then we took them home. Did that change our role for your embassy?

WESTON: Not for the mission of the EU, but I was still a German type, and watching all of this stuff, that is where the forces came from, in Germany. Remember, I had worked on basing issues with all of these folks for years in the ‘80s. This was also a time when everyone realized that the constellation of forces which existed on the European continent was not the right one for the post cold war period, which was one factor. The other is we used a tremendous number of military assets in Europe to prosecute the Gulf War. I mean, anyone who got injured there didn’t come back to the United States they ended up at the hospital whether it’s Wiesbaden or Mainz or Bitburg or Rhein Main or somewhere in Germany. So that was a very strong view of American assets in Europe which remain in Europe to this day and are very relevant for the current war in Iraq.

Q: I would think that your Mission and your coming would have been very comfortable with the Bush I administration with Baker and George Herbert Walker Bush. Very much a Europeanist and from all accounts you definitely handled the unification process superbly and relations with what was still the Soviet Union, making sure it didn’t feel overly aggrieved.

WESTON: And did a tremendous job at the day-to-day diplomacy across the Atlantic. That started with the President who I came to believe was a superb diplomat back when he was the Vice President and used to come to Bonn all the time. So I would say it was not only the legacy of dealing with the post cold war period and unification of Germany. I attribute a lot of some great successes in U.S. policy, you mentioned the Gulf War, but there were a lot of others during this period. It was also very much due to some really superb diplomacy from the President on down.

Q: Well then you left Brussels in ’93?

WESTON: ’93, right and I left early.

ROBERT M. BEECROFT
Political-Economic Advisor, USNATO

While Ambassador Beecroft served as Political Officer at a number of posts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, his primary focus was on Political/Military Affairs, both in Washington and abroad. Later in his career he served as Special Envoy to the Bosnia Federation and subsequently as Ambassador to the Office of Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) operating in Bosnia & Herzegovina. A native of New Jersey, Ambassador Beecroft served in the US Army and studied at the University of Pennsylvania and the Sorbonne in Paris before joining the Foreign Service in 1967. Ambassador Beecroft was interviewed by Charles Stuart
Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Today is the 29th of October, 2004. Bob, could you talk a little bit about the U.S. Mission to NATO, how it was composed and how it fit into that whole Brussels diplomatic mess.

BEECROFT: Well, it didn’t fit in with any great enthusiasm. NATO, especially at that time, considered itself the first among equals among the three U.S. missions in Brussels, because you have the Ambassador to NATO, the Ambassador to the European Union -- or as it was then, the European Community -- and the bilateral Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Belgians. From the point of view of protocol, the bilateral Ambassador has the lead. He or she is the one who holds the annual 4th of July reception. The reality is that there has been for some time now a tug of war for primacy between the Ambassador to the European Union and the Ambassador to NATO. I gather that over the past 10 years the center of gravity has moved more and more toward the EU.

Q: One would imagine this.

BEECROFT: Yes. But at this time, in 1991, in the aftermath of the fall of the Wall and with the Soviet Union teetering, all eyes were on NATO, not on downtown Brussels. It was a fascinating time to arrive there, especially coming from Ouagadougou and having missed the Wall coming down. It was somewhat frustrating to be in West Africa while those events took place, although I’m glad I did it. I got to Brussels in the late summer of ’91, and first Gulf War was on everybody’s mind. Ironically, the first Gulf War and our quick triumph there had an impact on a lot of things I’ve done since then, because the U.S. felt that we had done a service for the Alliance and for everybody else by defeating Saddam Hussein and restoring Kuwait. We looked to the Europeans to do things they weren’t ready to do in the Balkans. But that’s further down the line.

Anyway, this was the fall of ’91, and there were amazing things happening. We were in the very first stages of developing of opening the Alliance to a dialogue with the Warsaw Pact, which was quickly becoming the former Warsaw Pact. You had these amazing experiences in the halls of NATO headquarters -- seeing a Polish general walk by and doing a double-take and saying to yourself, what is that person doing here? This outreach initiative toward the former adversary was one that the U.S. was pushing very hard, against, I should add, serious French resistance, because the French saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to distance Europe from the United States. That was another thing about that period. There were three U.S. Ambassadors to NATO in three years.

Q: Who were they?

BEECROFT: The first was William Howard Taft, IV, who more recently has been the Legal Advisor in L in the Department, a very nice man, soft-spoken but smart and very subtle. His successor was Reggie Bartholomew, and the third was Robert Hunter. Three very different people. Taft was a high-powered lawyer and a Bush ’41 political appointee. He worked very hard to try to establish a constructive personal relationship with his French counterpart, a man named Gabriel Robin, whose politics were hard right, way beyond Gaullism. Actually I gathered he’d been involved in quasi-fascist organizations like Action Française. Robin was no lover of
the United States. It was interesting. He had written a book in the early ‘80s, criticizing Mitterrand for buckling under to the U.S. on Middle East policy. Mitterrand read the book, and responded by calling Robin and offering him the post of French Ambassador to NATO. Robin took the job, and his performance gave new meaning to the word sabotage. Taft worked hard to sort of build a personal relationship with Robin, who repeatedly rebuffed him. It was not pretty. There were many times in the North Atlantic Council when Robin was openly anti-American to a degree that embarrassed the rest of the Council.

Q: Could you explain on NATO. I mean you have this thing with NATO where France is in NATO, but not in NATO at that time. Could you explain?

BEECROFT: It’s important to remember that France is a founding member of NATO and remains one of the leading financial contributors to the Alliance. There is nothing in the North Atlantic Treaty that says a word about an integrated military structure. France has been a strict instructionist on this point over the years. When de Gaulle pulled France out of the integrated military structure in 1966, he did no damage to its NATO membership in terms of the strict legal reality. You may recall that during the early ‘50s there was an initiative to build a European Defense Community which failed in the French national assembly -- one of the few times the French National Assembly has ever stood up and growled. This was less than 10 years after the end of World War II, and the French weren’t interested in seeing Germany rearmed. But the U.S. was. So we gave Germany the alternative it was looking for by creating or redefining the military side of NATO. SHAPE – Supreme Allied Powers Europe -- SHAPE existed from the war, when it has been SHEAF – Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. SHAPE constituted the beginnings of the integrated military structure, always under an American commander. After the European Defense Community failed in 1954, the U.S. just kept on reinforcing the military wing of NATO. This allowed us to bring a rearmed Germany into an integrated military structure that would prevent any temptation on Germany’s part to go it alone. So now we’re talking about 30 years after that. The Cold War is clearly ending and the French are still looking for a way to loosen the U.S. domination of continental European affairs.

Q: Talking about when you first got there, how did you see any, I mean did you have a French counterpart and your British and German and other counterparts, how did you all work together?

BEECROFT: There was, and still was, a second-level forum under the North Atlantic Council (the NAC) -- the DCMs, who meet as the SPC, the Senior Political Committee. The only exception the U.S. Mission, as usual. Instead of the DCM being on the SPC, it’s the number three, which meant me. My job title was Polad or Political-Economic Advisor. So my counterpart on the French side was their DCM, Richard Duqué, whose family was originally Spanish. He was an interesting guy who had actually trained to be an actor. And he was some actor! He could bluff with the best of them in the SPC. The purpose of the SPC is to clear away the underbrush for the NAC and focus decisions that the NAC would then address. We were good friends. He knew I knew the French culture and the language. And he knew the U.S. – had even married a Cuban-American refugee. We got along fine on a personal basis, but we had some real tussles in the SPC. His successor was Gilles Andréani, the son of a very distinguished senior French diplomat. Gilles was, if anything, harder-line than Richard, but they were both
reasonable enough if you kept in mind where they were coming from.

Q: What were the issues, I mean what sort of issues would come up on this French, American and how did the other members of the alliance play into this?

BEECROFT: The big issue at that time was the future of NATO in the post-Cold-War world. There were lots of think-pieces being written on whether NATO even had a future. If there’s no Soviet threat, no Warsaw Pact, does NATO really have a reason to go on? There were a lot of people at the Quai d’Orsay in Paris who would have said no. In fact the French even tabled a proposal that the French at about this time proposing that the locus for European security be shifted from NATO to the CSCE, later OSCE. Now, I respect the OSCE. but for anybody who knows the OSCE this is funny, because the OSCE consists of 55 countries that operate on consensus, including Russia. Even the French delegation was embarrassed to put that idea forward, but they did. After it was laughed out of the room, we eventually settled back to focus on two things. The first was the U.S. proposal that eventually became the Partnership for Peace. This idea originated with SACEUR, General Shalikashvili. He was looking for a way to bring the military organizations of the former Warsaw Pact in from out of the cold, and make them part of the NATO integrated structure, or at least associate members.

I remember an informal meeting out at Truman Hall, the residence of the U.S. Ambassador or Permanent Representative to NATO, Will Taft, to brainstorm this idea. A few of us, including Taft and Shali, sat down and batted this idea around. How do we make it happen? It still seemed rather visionary, but coming from a four-star general, not a politician, it got our attention and it seemed very appealing. So, there was a lot of strategizing about how you go about it. Now, this was the fall of ’91. A couple of things were happening at that point, although we didn’t realize it at the time, that were going to have a real impact on NATO’s future. The first was the gradual collapse of Yugoslavia. There was still a lot of euphoria in the air in the fall of ’91, a feeling that the millennium had arrived early. Frances Fukuyama had published an article declaring that history was at an end, and there were those who were prepared to believe it. Even in the fall of ’91, before the shooting started in earnest the following year in Yugoslavia, there were debates and discussions on whether NATO should be responding in some way, and if so how. It was at that point that Germany broke with the rest of the European Union and recognized Croatia, and this turned out to be a fatal decision.

Q: What was the analysis. I mean I’ve talked to other people about this. Some say it was Genscher who was the former minister as part of the FDP or something. What was your feeling and why?

BEECROFT: Certainly Genscher did not object, but I think it’s a lot deeper than just Genscher. First of all Germany has always had equities in the Balkans. They keep a watchful eye on what’s going on there. After all it was events in the Balkans in 1914 that sucked them into World War I. Also, a significant element of Germany is Catholic, so the CSU is especially attentive. The Croatians have always made a lot of hay about the fact that they are Catholic and they are more western than the Serbs or Bosniaks – which I do not believe. But it’s a hardy politician indeed in Germany who is going to go against the Croats. So when the Croatians began pressing for recognition by the states of the European Union, and the European Union said no, it’s not time
yet, the Germans just went ahead and did it anyway.

Q: I think also the Pope did, too.

BEECROFT: Yes, the Pope did, too.

Q: This was a one two punch and having been an old sort of hand, I mean to put the Pope who the Catholic Church was not a benevolent force.

BEECROFT: It never is. The Vatican follows its interests as it perceives them, like any other state.

Q: Well, and the Balkans, it was responsible for lots of massacres and all that against Orthodox and then the Germans for what they did. This was a one two punch for the Serbs.

BEECROFT: Absolutely. All of these things came into play. Genscher being an East German originally, he may also have thought recognizing Croatia would be an interesting way to thumb his nose at the Russians, who are pro-Serb. Who knows? Anyway they did it. There was a summit in Rome in November of 1991. Two subjects dominated the agenda. The establishment of the so-called NACC, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which later became the EAPC, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, was approved. The French made a lot of noise, but at the end of the day they acquiesced. The second thing was concern about what was going on in the Balkans. In the background of all this was concern about Russia and how we would deal with the Warsaw Pact or the remnants of the Warsaw Pact. A month later, on December 21, the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the NACC took place as part of the semi-annual Ministerial in Brussels. Every June and every December, the ministerial meetings of both the NATO foreign ministers and defense ministers – except France, which doesn’t send its defense minister. That was a ministerial session I will never forget. It included the first meeting of the 44 NACC countries, including Russia. Almost all the heads of delegation were foreign ministers. It was a big gathering with lots of press coverage, in the large conference room in NATO. Interestingly, the Russian Foreign Minister wasn’t there. Instead the Russians, the Soviets, sent their Ambassador to Brussels and NATO, Ambassador Afanassevsky, a very smart and nervous man -- a chain smoker, he later became the Russian Ambassador to France. So it’s around 6:00 in the evening and two sets of negotiations had going on all day -- there were two communiqués for the first time. There was the customary communiqué of the NAC, for the NATO allies only, and then the first-ever communiqué of the NACC, which was the NATO allies plus all these former Warsaw Pact countries. Nobody knew how the communiqué for the NACC it was going to go, but it went very smoothly. The Warsaw Pact ministers were very happy to be there. The Soviets had only sent their ambassador, so they weren’t getting much pushback from Moscow. So it’s around 6:00 or 6:30 pm, very early, and James Baker was there for the United States and Will Taft, and the usual staff support fluttering around, including me. The NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, was very much in charge. At that point he was still in good health, this was before cancer took him, and he’s in the chair and very much in charge. He looks around and says, “Well, is everyone agreed?” There was a long silence in the room and everyone is quietly praying that we’re not in for an all-nighter. So the Soviet Ambassador raises his hand, and everybody says, oh no. So Wörner says, “Well, Mr.
Ambassador?” And Afanassevsky says, “Mr. Secretary General, I regret this, but I have a request to make.” “What’s that?” “Well, I have to request, on instructions from Moscow that all references to the Soviet Union be removed from the communiqué.” There is, as you can imagine, a long silence. “What do you mean?” “Well, Mr. Secretary General, I have been informed by Moscow that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist.” The room goes totally silent.

Q: Oh, yes.

BEECROFT: If I remember correctly, and I think I do, that Wörner, who was never at a loss for creative ideas, suggested that a footnote to that effect be inserted in the communiqué. Imagine: the Soviet Union reduced to a footnote! They eventually worked it out and people did get their dinners that night, but there we were, hearing from the mouth of the Soviet Ambassador that he was no longer the Soviet Ambassador, just the Russian ambassador. It reminds me of Norman Mailer’s comment after, losing the mayoralty race in New York, that for 15 minutes he felt he had his hand on the rump of victory. Just amazing. It was one of those moments that you don’t forget, but also, in hindsight, it sent a signal that history was not over. We were entering a new era, but weren’t sure what it was going to look like and or even know what to call it. If you call it the post-Cold-War era, that’s a negative – what it isn’t, not what it is. The issues we were dealing with began to change. The Balkans, for example. The relationship between NATO and the United Nations. How you develop the Partnership for Peace program. There were even discussions in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s about whether the bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department should go away -- how economic affairs were going to supplant defense issues. We began to see that that was not going to happen. I can talk, well, I don’t know where you want to go with this, but the whole Balkan issue became central to the future of NATO.

Q: I’d like before we move to the Balkans, but we will go there, I’d like to continue sort of the French side and then we’ll talk about the partnership for peace, partnership for peace isn’t it?

BEECROFT: Right.

Q: Let’s talk about the French though. What were they doing in this thing? I think the French NATO relationship has always been a very interesting one and also what were the Brits and particularly the Brits and the Germans and Benelux saying?

BEECROFT: In the North Atlantic Council, any ally can cast a veto. The NAC works on consensus. The French are marvelous bluffers. They will push something as long as they can, but at the end of the day, you know, some kind of arrangement to be found if you’re creative enough to find it. They’re not going to help you find it. You have to keep poking for it, probing. As a rule, the French stand alone in the North Atlantic Council with one exception, the Belgians. The Belgians virtually always go along with the French. They don’t appear to me to have a foreign policy of their own, at least on defense issues. The Germans played a more nuanced role. The Germans would always quietly seek a compromise behind the scenes with the French, and try to find a way to accommodate. They liked acting as the middleman between Paris and Washington. The British, on the other hand, were seen as the American agents by the French. They tended to a large extent to take positions that were sympathetic to and supportive of the U.S. Then you had other Allies who were less predictable, the Italians, the Spanish, the Scandinavians.
Q: Greeks.

BEECROFT: The Greeks would sometimes lean in the direction of the French. The Turks would stay with the Americans. To the extent that there was a counterweight to Washington inside NATO, it came from Paris, even though as I mentioned before, the French don’t play in the integrated military structure. The French have always been careful to keep enough money and enough equity in the structure so that they have to be taken seriously. Their problem was that their gambit was so transparent. And no other ally saw the French as a serious alternative to the Americans. I don’t think the French could face that simple fact.

Q: Did you feel other than sticking it to the Americans in a way, did you feel that the French wanted NATO to do anything?

BEECROFT: No, not a whole lot, no.

Q: Did you have this Balkan thing looming up?

BEECROFT: Yes. That’s exactly when it arose and it’s a good illustration. In the spring of 1992, when the shelling of Sarajevo began and Serbia and Croatia were fighting a hot war over Eastern Slovenia, there was a lot of pressure from Washington for NATO to intervene. A lot of serious thought was being given to at least doing some planning. And this was, remember, the beginning of an election campaign in the U.S., and there was a need from Washington’s point of view to get this out of the way quickly. Washington was also working the UN angle. There was a lot of debate in the North Atlantic Council about what NATO could do, and the French were deliberately digging in their heels and obstructing the effort. They argued that NATO was a defensive alliance and therefore had no business working outside the NATO area, although the Mediterranean is usually considered to be a NATO area, and that this was a European issue that should be left to the Europeans. When the U.S. proposed that there be active consultations between the UN, which was already diplomatically involved, and NATO, France vetoed that proposal because they argued that NATO had no business talking to the United Nations! They contended that NATO was a mere defense arrangement, whereas the United Nations was well, the United Nations. What the French finally agreed to was that the NATO could use some of its existing resources. They knew full well that only NATO had the ability to act. What that meant specifically was that a prepackaged NATO headquarters was dispatched to Zagreb to act as the core of a UN operation, not a NATO operation in the Balkans. So the two organizations landed between two stools. We had the worst of both worlds. France finally agreed that there could be not a dialogue, but communication between Brussels and New York, but only on specific operational matters, not policy. There could be no question of a policy dialogue as far as Paris was concerned. They argued that NATO was not an organization that had any role in policymaking. This attitude, by the way, surfaced again recently in the French resistance to any major NATO role in Iraq. It reflects France’s constant care to minimize NATO’s overall involvement in any action, because they’re always looking for counterbalances to what they see as the excessive U.S. dominance not only of NATO, but of affairs on the European continent, and of those affairs through NATO. This debate went on for several months. As I say, we finally did manage to get a headquarters down there because the UN couldn’t provide one, whereas
NATO had the personnel and materiel ready on the shelf. Then we had the inglorious spectacle of two parallel chains of command that never touched. You had the political guidance going out of New York, the military guidance going out of Brussels in SHAPE, but they met in Zagreb in the glorious personage of Mr. Akashi -- Yasushi Akashi, who never encountered a problem he wouldn’t try to finesse.

Q: You might explain who he was.

BEECROFT: He was the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in the Balkans, in former Yugoslavia. Oh, and by the way, because the political guidelines were agreed on the basis of guidance from the United Nations, the only way that the Security Council – including the U.S. -- would agree to put troops on the ground was to define the Balkans operation as a Chapter Six operation. In the UN Charter, you have Chapter Six and Chapter Seven peace operations. Chapter Seven operations are relatively robust. You can take military action without waiting to be attacked. Chapter Six, which is a lot easier to get through the Security Council, assumes that you are operating in what is called, I swear to God, a benign environment. So for three years, from 1992 to ’95, the UN told the world that a benign environment existed in the former Yugoslavia. That’s why we ended up with the spectacle of United Nations troops being chained to link fences at weapon storage sites by the Serbs, taken hostage here and there. UNPROFOR’s (United Nations Protection Force) tanks were painted white, and their drivers were given instructions that if an old lady sat down in the road, you were to do a U turn and drive your tank back the way it had come. So guess what? Soon there were lots of old ladies sitting down in the roads of the former Yugoslavia. A lot of us at NATO felt that we were involved in something that was undignified and unworthy of the greatest collective defense alliance in history.

Q: You had a Secretary of State to begin with after the election of ’92, but that brings you up towards the end. You had a Secretary of State James Baker who had made the statement “We don’t have a dog in this fight.”

BEECROFT: That’s right.

Q: So, and you had the Europeans saying the Europeans will do it, which of course for the Americans to have somebody else take on the problem was just joy unforeseen.

BEECROFT: It was music to the ears of Washington. We felt that we had done our duty by winning Operation Desert Storm. When the Europeans, as you say, told us “Okay, this is in our backyard we’re happy to take it on,” Washington was every bit as happy. We replied, in effect, “Let us hold your coats.” Then when Jim Baker said “We have no dog in this fight,” that sealed the deal. It also sealed the deal with Milošević, because he understood that we weren’t going to get involved -- and we didn’t.

Q: A couple of things. One was just an attitude because of the situation, in Desert Storm; you got there after Desert Storm. Was there a concern in NATO about the military people talking about things like the French air force couldn’t really go into battle unless they were accompanied by American planes that would tell them where to go. I mean in other words the equipment, the NATO equipment was falling seriously behind the American one, is this a concern?
BEECROFT: It was certainly common knowledge. If you went down to SHAPE and talked to people there, it was of concern, but again, this wasn’t Iraq. This was Europe’s backyard and there was a feeling, rightly or wrongly, that you wouldn’t need the kind of massive maneuver space in the Balkans that you would need in Iraq. So I don’t think the disparity would have been enough to discourage NATO from acting. NATO always acts in the knowledge that the U.S. is the 800-pound gorilla.

Q: I would imagine there must have been on the part of NATO military professionals gnashing of teeth about what was going on in the Balkans where they were having a drunken Serb guerrilla leader would tell them to get off the road and they’d have to, this sort of thing.

BEECROFT: Well, that’s exactly right. It was about this time that the horrible term “ethnic cleansing” came along and that reports of terrible atrocities began to emerge -- concentration camps, emaciated people, mass murder. Lord Paddy Ashdown, who is now the High Representative in Sarajevo and was the head of the Liberal Democratic group in Parliament then, made a couple of trips into Republika Srpska and returned with harrowing descriptions of encountering people in these camps who looked like they’d just emerged from Auschwitz. Gaunt figures who would emerge from barbed-wired pens and say things like “We know we have a half an hour to live, please tell our families.” I have to say that there was still a feeling that it couldn’t possibly get as bad as it did. There were still the remnants of this end-of-the-Cold-War euphoria, so that there was a certain amount of denial. In the first half of the ’90s, the defense budgets in the NATO alliance just tanked. You talked about the disparities that existed in 1991 between U.S. forces and everybody else’s. Those disparities only got worse. The defense budgets in the U.S. didn’t go up either, but we already had such a head start that it hardly mattered. In 1992, there was an election campaign going on in the U.S. It was also about the time that Helmut Kohl began running into political trouble in Germany, politically and economically. And NATO was beginning more and more to define itself through the Partnership for Peace rather than collective defense -- how do we assimilate these new countries that want very much to be members of the alliance? I think PfP really saved the alliance.

Q: What was the French view of bringing these other countries in?

BEECROFT: They knew from the very first that it was a winner. They did everything they could to make it tough. The French are very good at this. What they do is ask questions -- lots of questions: What is the logical reason for this? How would you see it happening? Why is in the alliance’s interest? How is it related to security? So the French made everyone go through a lot of hoops to get there, but at the end of the day they didn’t stand in the way. It just took much longer than it could have. But you have to give them some credit. They did force us to clarify what we had in mind. The idea, for example, that whereas NATO membership could be the end result of joining the Partnership for Peace, it wasn’t necessarily the end result. That was very helpful in getting the Russians to accept PfP, because no one wanted the Russians to be NATO members, but we did want them to be inside the tent. Frankly, Russia didn’t want to be a NATO member anyway, except under circumstances that we would never agree to. We also came to agreement very early on that there would be no laundry lists created by NATO for PfP membership. You wouldn’t, say, hand Warsaw a checklist of 15 specific actions it had to take to
be admitted. Instead, NATO would negotiate an arrangement, an agreement with each candidate on the requirements for being a member of the Partnership. One size did not fit all. Everybody’s approach to the Partnership would be different.

Q: Were you involved in drawing up the list, I mean not the list, but the requirements?

BEECROFT: Sure.

Q: How did you see, let’s take Poland to begin with. What were our concerns about Poland?

BEECROFT: The Partnership for Peace was a military-to-military arrangement. We in the Political-Economic unite would keep a political eye on it. The geography of the NATO headquarters building is interesting. It has a long central corridor, and on one side of it are the delegation offices. On the other side of it are the milreps, military representatives. One of the peculiarities that goes right back to the founding of NATO in the late ’40s was that the defense ministries have their own separate network. In other words, the military representative, who is a two-star in the U.S. system, does not report to the Ambassador. He has his own channel to the Pentagon. The milreps were actively involved in these conversations, I wouldn’t call them negotiations, with the various candidate countries. The focus was on the size of the military, the military budget, the shape of the military, what the mission would be, what the doctrine would look like.

There were three fundamental requirements at the very beginning of Partnership for Peace. The first and most important was civilian control of the military. The second was transparency in military budgeting. None of the Warsaw Pact countries had a civilian defense minister, of if they did it was someone who had formerly worn a uniform. Transparency in military budgeting was important because we had no idea what the Warsaw Pact was spending on defense. We thought that this was key, and it would also involve parliament. So, it reinforced civilian control. The third requirement was the requirement that military doctrine be based on defense, not offense, because what always worried us about the Warsaw Pact was its offensive philosophy. The temptation would always be there to go nuclear in response. Those were the three fundamental requirements.

Q: When all is said and done, from your perspective in our mission in NATO, what was the idea of the partnership for peace? Was this against the Soviet Union to make sure we didn’t have some rogue states floating around, keeping them under control?

BEECROFT: There were a lot of good reasons for it. One was because we didn’t want the various former satellite states to go off in different directions. We wanted to bring them into the tent, and they wanted desperately to be in the tent. Ironically, PfP recalled the offer Truman made to Stalin in 1946 to provide Marshall Plan aid. Stalin vetoed the idea. As in 1946, we said to the Russians right up front, this isn’t just something we would like, all of Europe’s invited, we very much hope you will do this and we will work with you on a program that responds to and respects your specific concerns. Eventually they agreed. I don’t know if they would agree now, but they agreed then. We were very careful never to be triumphalist about it. Not to say we won the Cold War, but to see this as an opportunity to get beyond the polarization and the
confrontational relationship that existed for half a century. And that’s the way we put it to them. We never talked about winners and losers. I think it was a terrific idea at the right time, and now, having just come back from the Balkans, the Balkan states are desperate to get in the Partnership for Peace. This is not a flash in the pan. It continues to be seen as in everybody’s interest to be in the partnership.

Q: Were you looking at this with NATO in a way of putting everybody in the tent, I mean in many ways NATO is one to keep the Soviets out, but to keep the Germans down, but basically to keep the Germans and French from going at each other. Was there, did you see the signs just sort of keeping restive armies quiet? Was somebody looking ahead to seeing this as saying, okay, maybe we should have the Poles provide communications and the Hungarians apply mountain troopers, to some other purpose?

BEECROFT: No, not at that early stage. As I say there was a work plan, but the purpose of the work plan, which was very often left to SHAPE in its details, was to redefine, to reinvent if you will, the militaries of Eastern Europe consistent with those in the Western alliance in terms of their structure, their command and control, the way they were funded and how they related to each other. It was very much focused on the militaries as such. Obviously the question soon began to be asked, okay, PfP to do what? That’s where the more political side of this came in. A number of these countries they are now full NATO members because they chose to used PfP as a stepping stone to full membership. There were others that are partners -- of course there’s Russia, but there’s also the Ukraine for example. There are the Baltic States, who at that point were not seen as serious candidates for NATO membership, but that has now changed. Look what’s happened to Bulgaria and Romania. They were seen as very far from membership, they’re now members. PfP morphed, it evolved into a more political activity as it went along. That was always certainly in the backs of people’s minds, that it wouldn’t stay just as a military-to-military arrangement, but it was a good place to start.

Q: Well, now you’re sitting in Brussels and I would think that you’ve got another development going on with the European Union which was developing teeth and God knows regulations. I mean it seemed to be a real mill for churning out regulations and then you’ve got the OSCE. Were you seeing, was there a conflict? I mean were there problems with these various?

BEECROFT: I can deal with the OSCE matter quickly. At that point it was still the CSCE. It became the OSCE in ’94. The CSCE at that point was widely seen as a second-order organization whose purpose had been largely fulfilled with the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact. Remember the whole Helsinki process. So, the CSCE, like so many organizations at the was searching for a mission. There wasn’t even a dialogue to speak of between NATO and the OSCE. There is now by the way, but there wasn’t then. You say the European Union was getting teeth. I’d say it had gums, but no teeth and frankly, where security is concerned its teeth are still pretty small, baby teeth. The first real test is coming now, with the European Union taking over from NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That’s a 7,000-person presence. It’s quite significant and we’ll see how they do. There have been very careful negotiations between NATO and the European Union on how these various assets, which are largely NATO assets, are going to be used absent NATO command and control. The commander of the European Union force is
a Brit. This is a so-called Berlin-plus arrangement, which defines practical work between EU and NATO in crisis management operations. Under Berlin-plus, an EU force can make use of NATO planning, assets and capabilities when it goes into the field. In other words, although this will a European Union operation, NATO will still have equities involved. There will also be a NATO office in Sarajevo, which will help develop the defense ministry in Bosnia. All of this supplants the old Western European Union, the WEU.

**Q:** Was that the coal and steel community?

BEECROFT: That’s right. It came out of the discussions that took place in 1948 between the French, the Brits, and the Benelux countries.

**Q:** Is that Monnet and all that?

BEECROFT: Yes.

**Q:** Yes.

BEECROFT: The WEU, Western European Union, was described 10 years ago as a sleeping beauty. It had a small office in downtown Brussels, but nobody paid it much attention. The French used the WEU quite successfully as the basis for an eventual EU defense component. The WEU’s role was subsumed into the European Union itself in the late ‘90s, but it was the stalking horse that the French were using at that point. They were potting the WEU forward as a potential alternative to NATO.

**Q:** What were you getting from your German, British, Italian, Belgian colleagues and Dutch colleagues about this French maneuvering?

BEECROFT: A lot of rolling of eyes and shaking of heads, but at the end of the day they were content to stand back and watch the French and Americans fight. It was great entertainment. There was a basic assumption that at the end of the day the French were not willing or perhaps able to wreck the alliance, but that they were going to continue to probe to see whether the European Community could eventually be developed as a counterweight to NATO. Now, this was the Clinton era, at least for the second and third year I was there. Clinton was basically seen benevolently by Europeans. Nowadays, you will find people in places like Belgium or the Netherlands or Germany who, I think, would be more supportive of a strong European Union defense capability than they would have been 10 years ago. The problem is that defense costs money, and high defense budgets are a hard political sell in Europe.

**Q:** By the time you left there in?

BEECROFT: ’94.

**Q:** ’94, by the time you left, how were things playing out in Bosnia?

BEECROFT: Oh, they were awful. It was a subject of great shame and embarrassment that here
was NATO, contributing a pittance -- headquarters and logistical support -- to a UN mission whose rules of engagement were quite robust enough, had they had chosen to use them, but because of political guidance from the UN. in New York they wouldn’t use them. You had the worst of all worlds. The fiction of a benign environment. In Bosnia two million out of four million people either made refugees or killed. Milošević basically having his way. Tudjman having his way too, fighting a shadow war in Eastern Slovenia while dividing up Bosnia, or trying to. It was shameful.

Q: This must again, was in the professional ranks, speaking not only to the military, but the Foreign Service and all, a deep and almost abiding contempt for the UN as an instrument.

BEECROFT: Yes. I think Bosnia the process, which has gone on ever since, of defining the limits of the UN, first by admitting that there were limits. You see, there was a widespread belief in the early ’90s that war-fighting as such was over. History was over, the Warsaw Pact was dead, its former members clamoring to get into the Partnership for Peace. There wouldn’t be any more wars, so what was the mission of, or need for, military forces? But the militaries are organizations made up of human beings, and they preferred looking for a new role to presiding over their own demise. The new role that everybody jumped at was peace operations, which in turn produced a lot of theology. There were peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacemaking, and you had people trying to define each of these in different ways. Peacekeeping meant deploying forces in a conflict-free environment, which you wanted to maintain. Peacemaking meant a Chapter 7 operation, in which the forces would act aggressively and robustly as required. And peace enforcement meant moving in after the shooting had stopped and keeping things quiet.

What began to put some reality back into this? Well, Somalia for one thing. That was in 1993. The spectacle of U.S. Marines landing on a beach outside of Mogadishu in the glare of CNN spotlights -- you can imagine the comments of the military professionals in Brussels: “What is this, showbiz? It’s a good thing there were no bullets flying.” Well, not that long afterwards, we had Blackhawk Down. Without anyone understanding how or why, the mission morphed from peacekeeping to peacemaking. The term “mission creep” entered the lexicon.

Q: And to feed people. I mean there was a huge tragedy going on, the ability to deliver food.

BEECROFT: Yes, no food, no water. Eventually you had these professional soldiers, many of whom were American, who didn’t really know what their mission was. There’s a lot of quoting of Clausewitz around the National War College. One of his aphorisms that I like the most says “No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” Put another way, you have to know what kind of war you’re fighting, and what you want to get out of it. And we didn’t know. We went into Somalia without defining the mission, both political and military and that was an important lesson learned when we went into Bosnia a couple of years later.

Q: But we hadn’t gone into Bosnia when you were there?

BEECROFT: No.
Q: I mean were people in the backroom drawing up plans and looking at logistics and things like that?

BEECROFT: I think there were probably more people doing that in the Pentagon than in Brussels, but there must have been people at SHAPE as well, which is not in Brussels and where the French don’t play.

Q: You mentioned the French weren’t in SHAPE because these were the actual military forces.

BEECROFT: Right. They do have a military liaison mission, but they don’t play actively.

Q: I would think that there would be a certain amount of pressure from NATO to SHAPE in getting things done if you can just to keep the bloody French from screwing things up.

BEECROFT: Here’s another good example. There was a big debate in ’93 and ’94 when it became clear that the Yugoslavia crisis was not going to go away anytime soon. The U.S., with British support and some sympathy from some of the continental allies, began urging NATO to start doing contingency planning -- a key phrase -- for eventual operations into the Balkans. The French objected. They said no, this is not the role of NATO or SHAPE. Of course it was precisely the role of SHAPE to do contingency planning for the Balkans. Then I don’t remember who it was, it might have been Reggie Bartholomew, somebody said, well, if contingency planning is off the table, is there any problem if NATO does some contingency thinking? And the French rep replied No problem, it it’s limited to thinking and not planning. You could see the looks around the room. What’s the difference between contingency thinking and contingency planning? What it revealed to me was how carefully the French had mapped and schemed and thought this all out beforehand. They didn’t object to our having some clear ideas in case the military had to go in, but they didn’t want to formalize the process to an extent where it could supplant what the UN was doing or give NATO too much immediate credibility. Contingency thinking is deniable -- you’re just thinking about it. And if you’re writing it down, don’t tell me about it.

Q: Yes.

BEECROFT: That’s what was agreed. Contingency thinking was okay. Contingency planning was not.

Q: What about Srebrenica? Had that happened?


Q: By the time you left there in ’94, when did you leave in ’94?

BEECROFT: The summer of ’94.

Q: What did you think was going to happen? I mean let’s look at the big picture. You had the
partnership for peace, you had the French burr under the saddle and you had the Balkans falling apart. What did you think was going to come out of that?

BEECROFT: I think most of us were of the belief that it was not a question of whether, but of when NATO would use real force in Bosnia, and that’s why the contingency thinking was so important. It meant that when NATO did finally respond in the summer of ’95, the plans were there.

Q: Was there a feeling while you were still there the military saying, you know, a whiff of grapeshot is going to put these Serbs or the Bosnian Serbs, it’s not going to take a hell of a lot.

BEECROFT: I think people at that point weren’t sure. My conviction has always been that if NATO had reacted quickly in 1991, at the very beginning, when the shells first began falling on Dubrovnik, the Serbs would have backed off. The Serbs had massed artillery on this mountain looking down on Dubrovnik, a world heritage site, one of the most beautiful cities in the world. If NATO had simply dispatched one or two Italian gunboats and taken out that artillery, it would have been over, but by ’94 the Serbs had the momentum and no one was pushing back. I don’t think anyone was too sure that a whiff of grapeshot would do it. The circumstances, the military circumstances had changed by the summer of ’95 so that people were more ready to believe that the Serbs were vulnerable than they seemed in ’94.

Q: This was after the collapse of the.

BEECROFT: It was after Operation Storm.

Q: This was where the Croatians took the.

BEECROFT: That’s it.

Q: What was the name of the area?

BEECROFT: Krajina..

Q: Krajina, yes.

BEECROFT: The Croatian army pushed the Serbs out of Krajina in 1995, Operation Storm. Then they moved into Bosnia and Herzegovina, combined forces with the Bosniaks, the Muslims, and moved on Banja Luka, the de facto capital of the Republika Srpska. Actually the RS government was in Pale, outside Sarajevo, but Banja Luka was the key Serb-controlled city. Both Washington and Brussels were concerned that if the Croats took Banja Luka, if there was a total Bosnian Serb defeat, the consequences could be really serious. The Serbian army would intervene, the war would get worse, and there would be a new and even bloodier phase.

Q: Well, then okay, ’94 whither?

BEECROFT: Amman, Jordan.
E. ASHLEY WILLS
Public Affairs Officer, USIS

Ambassador Wills was born in Tennessee and raised in Tennessee and Georgia. He was educated at the University of Virginia and John Hopkins University. Entering the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1972, Ambassador Wills served abroad in the field of public affairs in Romania, South Africa, Barbados, Yugoslavia and Belgium and in India as Deputy Chief of Mission. He also served in Washington as Deputy Director for Southern Africa Affairs for USIA and as Political Advisor to the US Military Commander in the invasion of Grenada. From 2000 to 2003 he was US Ambassador to Sri Lanka. His final posting was as Assistant US Trade Representative. Ambassador Wills was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: Okay, after that the real world came back to you didn’t it?

WILLS: Yes, I knew when I went to the Senior Seminar I was going to go right after that ten-month assignment to Brussels. Because I had this masters degree in economics’ courtesy of the State Department and USIA, I was assigned as PAO to our Mission to the European Union; I knew that before I went to the Senior Seminar so that was really wonderful to know what I was going to be doing for the year coming but also for the four years thereafter. But about half way through my Senior Seminar year I got a call from personnel in USIA asking me whether I would consider switching assignments with a guy who had been assigned as PAO at the bilateral mission in Brussels. The ambassador there had been director of USIA in the past and knew this particular officer and didn’t like him and wouldn’t accept him.

Q: Who was the ambassador then?

WILLS: Bruce Gelb. So personnel in USIA said, “We’ll put this other officer at the EU and put you at the bilateral embassy.” I thought about it and I didn’t particularly want to do it but I decided to do it and so I was assigned to the embassy. Gelb coincidentally left maybe a month after I got there because Bill Clinton was elected president and Gelb had been appointed by George Bush. We got a new ambassador named Alan Blinken who had been Al Gore’s chief fundraiser and was an investment banker in New York. He was the man I worked with for the next three years.

All of my career at this point had been Communist counties or South Africa or the Caribbean and we had waited to try to get a Western European assignment when our children would be in high school and they could live with us instead of being sent away to boarding school as so often happens in our business. So we were really pleased to be there. We had a beautiful home quite near downtown Brussels. My kids were in school there and my daughter especially was very happy; my son got a little rambunctious and ironically we ended up sending him away to
boarding school but all things summed it was just a delightful way to live. I’ve lived in many
places and the most civilized country I’ve lived in was Brussels, Belgium; the food was
marvelous. They used to say French quality, German portions, because you would get these
enormous plates of fabulous food. When I went there I weighed 170 pounds, I was a pretty keen
runner, I was running twelve miles a week for three years. I ran twelve miles a week in Brussels
and I picked up 15 pounds because the food was so great.

Q: Okay, let’s talk about what was the political situation in Belgium when you got there?

WILLS: Well we don’t have a serious interest in Belgium per se; it’s more that Belgium is part
of Europe. But there is a king and there is a government there that is still struggling with the idea
of unity. Belgium has two major sections, one is French speaking and the other is Dutch
speaking. They’ve never got along very well and they get along even less well now than ever
before and they weren’t getting along well when we were living in Belgium. So, there was a
certain amount of reporting that the embassy did about that but I wasn’t so involved in that. The
bilateral PAO, we had three PAOs there, three missions: the bilateral mission, the EU mission
and NATO. The bilateral PAO nominally oversaw the activities of the other two missions but
only nominally. So I got involved in some EU programs and some NATO things.

I think the most fun thing that I did while I was there, it was the 50th anniversary of the Battle of
the Bulge in Bastogne in southern Belgium and I was put in charge of the big commemoration.
Actually it was the 50th anniversary first of the landing at Normandy and then the Battle of the
Bulge came several months later when our forces advanced toward Germany.

Q: June through December.

WILLS: Yeah, this was in December and the landing was in June, as you say. So I got to meet all
these wonderful old veterans of the events at Bastogne of 1944. We arranged all kinds of
commemorative events and Ambassador Blinken got deeply involved. It was a lot of fun and a
very emotional experience to see these older gentlemen who fought in extremely difficult
conditions and managed to prevail over a superior German force that had them surrounded; so
that was fun. Anyway I was three years into my four-year tour and my wife was working at the
embassy and had a good job, she was the assistant personnel officer. Things were going just fine,
a relaxed assignment after difficult substantive jobs, this was not so difficult; things were going
well. Then I got a call one night from a guy I had worked for in the Africa bureau when I was
head of the South African desk, Frank Wisner. Have you done his?

Q: We’ve done a short one but we really need a longer one but he is up in New York so it’s
harder.

WILLS: Yeah, he is up in New York. Anyway he had just been named ambassador to India and
he called me up in Brussels and said, “How would you like to come out to be PAO in India?”
which was the largest USIA mission in the world. So going from a modest but pleasant Belgium
to big India, which I’d never visited before, seemed a pretty dramatic change. I went home that
night and talked to my wife who couldn’t believe that I would seriously consider taking our
family and moving from luxurious Belgium to less luxurious India. But I told her that it would be
professionally enriching and Frank suggested that if I came out there and everything worked out I might be able to move into another job in the mission, although he couldn’t be sure. In the end, I agreed to it and USIA personnel at first resisted because they didn’t want to let an ambassador choose a PAO but Wisner is Wisner and he got his way and I went. We thus moved from Brussels in the summer of 1995 to India.

Q: Before we leave Brussels, how was Alan Blinken as an ambassador?

WILLS: He was good. I liked him, he’s an amiable fellow, he and I were the only two people in the mission who smoked so even though I was an avid runner I smoked as well. He would come down to my office and in those days you could still smoke in certain offices and he could smoke in my office. We were also bird hunters so we became friends and as I say the diplomatic tasks that we faced in Belgium were not all that demanding. So he had time to develop a lot of friendships with Belgian nobility, Belgian business executives, people he perhaps had known, I don’t know, in his investment-banking career. He ended up being pretty well connected in Belgian society. I remember once he was gone and the DCM was gone so I was the chargé actually, I was the chargé, and lo and behold the king of Belgium died while I was chargé. Suddenly we had to send out a delegation to be present at the king’s funeral, so we had a very powerful delegation. We had Walter Mondale, I’m trying to remember all the senators, and I was their host and took them around Belgium and attended the funeral. So while it was a pretty quiet assignment all things considered there were moments of great activity and that was one of them.

Q: Well as the PAO, Public Affairs officer, did you find yourself having to watch what we were doing as an embassy not to get caught in this buzz saw of French versus Walloon or that type of thing?

WILLS: Yeah, to some extent. The truth was we obviously favored Belgium’s remaining a united country but we were not wild about it. If they wanted to break apart into two countries it wouldn’t have bothered us and it still wouldn’t bother us. Why? Because even then they would still be part of the European Union and so it wasn’t like what happened later in my career when I went to live in Sri Lanka. There we have a very passionate interest in keeping the country united. In the case of Belgium which is surrounded by developed European countries it didn’t really matter to us all that much. But we said the right things; we said we wanted a united Belgium. The serious issues were more things related to missile deployment in Europe, expanding NATO. I got involved in a big, big, big, big program to expand NATO to the newly free countries of Eastern Europe. We had to carry out information programs in those countries that we developed in Belgium to persuade the populations in those countries, ex-Soviet vassal states, that joining NATO would be good for them; we did a lot of that. There were always economic issues that we had to deal with relating to the European Union’s views on trade and other things where we wouldn’t necessarily agree so we would go into the Belgian government and try to persuade them to persuade the EU to take up a position more to our liking. There was a bit of that. But my memory of those three years is not being terribly stressed professionally and having a hell of a good time with my family.

Q: What was your impression of the EU at that time?
WILLS: Way too bureaucratic, they were trying to regulate, they still are, European society down to the most minute detail, determining how a particular type of agricultural product should look and what its size should it be. There were regulations about that, regulations about every aspect of society and modern American society has got a lot of regulations but nothing like what is true in Europe. Also there was a fractiousness to it all; you have all those European nations but they don’t look at the world the same way and getting the EU to take a common position was then and I think still is a very, very hard thing to accomplish.

Q: They say it is like herding cats.

WILLS: Yes, exactly. But one nevertheless has to have respect for what they’ve done. I mean starting with the iron and steel commission and…

Q: Coal and steel.

WILLS: …or coal and steel I guess it was in the early ‘50s. To this? That is a significant amount of…

Q: I mean we’ve been involved in what amounted to in the last century two European civil wars.

WILLS: Yes.

Q: And this seems to have been a pretty good way to avoid that sort of thing.

WILLS: Yeah. I have another vignette unrelated to my profession to tell you about in Brussels.

Q: Yeah.

WILLS: When we got there my predecessor was the bilateral PAO and his predecessor and all PAOs since the early ‘50s, actually since the late ‘40s, had lived in this lovely home in a commune called Boisfort, it had been owned by the mayor of that commune. He had died and his venerable wife who was then in her late ‘60s would lease this…in fact, this was standard, leases were for nine years, a long time. The lease was coming up for renewal just as I was arriving there and she asked for more money, a great deal more money and it was entirely justified because the real estate market in Brussels had gone way up and what we were paying previously was very reasonable. So the embassy housing office informed me that it was too expensive and we couldn’t live there any more, we were going to have to find another house. I said, “Well wait a minute, my wife and children had seen this house, it was gorgeous, beautiful gardens, lovely.” So I said, “Give me a chance to talk to this woman and maybe I can get her to come down on the price.” So we negotiated and my French in those days was pretty good and I brought along a housing officer from the embassy whose French was not good. The landlady didn’t speak anything but French so she and I negotiated over three sessions. In the end I got the lease renewed for much less than we had been paying before. So everyone was pleased and my family moved into the house. Nine years later, in the intervening nine years she had died about a year before the lease ended. When the lease ended I was living in India for five years and we had moved to Sri Lanka. I got a call one day from a lawyer in Brussels who said, “Madame (I can’t
remember her last name now) but Madame Reneau, or something like that, died and in her will she stipulated that when the lease comes up for renewal and to settle her estate the house should be sold but she stipulated that you should have first right of refusal to buy the house and she even determined the price. It’s well below what that house is worth, Monsieur Wills. We would like to know whether you would like to buy the house.” Here I am in Sri Lanka and he has chased me all over the world to find me. He wanted $1.7 million for this house, that was it. I knew the Brussels real estate market well enough to know that house was worth three or four million dollars even then but it was more than my wife and I had. So I had to respectfully decline the chance so I made more of an impression on Madame Reneau than I thought. This little exchange heartened me; maybe I was a better negotiator than I thought.

**LANGE SCHERMERHORN**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Brussels (1993-1997)**

Ambassador Schermerhorn was born and raised in New Jersey and educated at Mt. Holyoke College. Entering the Foreign Service in 1966, she had several assignments in the State Department in Washington dealing with a variety of administrative and political matters. Her overseas posts include Colombo, Saigon, Teheran, London, and Brussels, where she served twice. In 1992 she was named US Ambassador to Djibouti, where she served until 2000. Ambassador Schermerhorn was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

**Q: Going back to Belgium as DCM, who was going to be your ambassador? Did you have any sort of meeting there beforehand?**

SCHERMERHORN: I was, as I said, on the short list so I had to be interviewed by the ambassador; and when I saw his resume before my meeting I understood the milieu from which he came because he was an investment banker in New York. This was a part of the world that I had some connection with and knew something about. So, I felt comfortable with that. He was in Washington and we met. He was very easy to talk to, nice, and he said at one point, “Well, you know, I’m not a detail person,” and I said, “That’s alright Mr. Ambassador; that’s why you have the rest of us,” and he kind of looked at me and he said, “Oh. Okay.” He didn’t say anything right then but his wife was in town also so the next day he asked me to go and meet his wife; so I went and talked to her and she said, “You know, Allen isn’t a detail person,” and I thought well, there’s really something to this. That was fine and I guess he called after that and he said he’d like to have me. When he said that I said, “Well I actually know something about the firm you work with in New York because my brother works there.” He worked in a different part of it because it was very large and he hadn’t made the connection even the name isn’t that… I was not certain whether I should say it and then I realized, no, I shouldn’t say it before he talks to me; and he said, “That was very nice that you didn’t say that beforehand.”

So this was the spring of ’93 and I was going out there in the summer. The previous ambassador had left sometime in July so there was a chargé and the DCM had left, obviously, because I was
going. There was a chargé who was the public affairs officer, the USIS (United States Information Service) chief. I’m driving down from New Hampshire to Boston to the airport getting ready – this was in August – and I hear on the radio that the king of the Belgium has died. I think, uh oh, I’m not there and there’s no ambassador either and a new political counselor also who had just gotten there a week before that. So they had to deal with this immediately and did quite well apparently. It was one of those usual fire drills where you decide who is going to go to the funeral – is it the vice president or what is it. So they had to go through a whole routine for all of that.

I got out there in August and of course it was a very nice introduction in the embassy because I had only left in ’88 so I knew all the staff.

Q: Before we get there, did you take the DCM course?

SCHERMERHORN: Yes. That’s why I couldn’t go earlier.

Q: Could you talk about that, and particularly before you went were there precautions on dealing with ambassadors – any DCM, but particularly if you’re going to deal with a political ambassador? I’m talking a generic problem. It doesn’t always work well. It’s considered one of the traps. I’m just wondering how the course work would be.

SCHERMERHORN: Actually that’s why I couldn’t go. The DCM course that I was enrolled in was in late July or early August. There had been an earlier one but other people who needed to get out sooner were in that. They take you out to one of those places in West Virginia, out in the country, and you have a group grope. I don’t remember anything…There were a series of guest lecturers on different topics and there was a little discussion of that but not, as I recall, as much as you might think. This was quite a large group. It was thirty or something. Sometimes they’re smaller depending on the timing of it. I can’t remember that there was anything terribly specific about that. There was reference to “some of you will be working for political ambassadors and that’s different” but without any great explanation or discussion of how or why.

Q: All of us who have been in the profession, trade, career, work, have watched DCMs operate or heard stories and all. What sort of lessons were you carrying around in your mental portfolio?

SCHERMERHORN: I think, harking back to my discussion with the ambassador when he said, “I’m not a detail person,” and we had talked again after that and he said, “Well, you know, I understand that your role is to run the embassy and do all those things the State Department wants to have done,” and he said, “I have an agenda,” and he told me what it was, which again fit in with my background. He said, “I’m a businessman and I think my role and what the president wants me to do is to go and promote U.S. business in Brussels.” Well it’s a good place to do that. So I knew what he wanted to do and I knew what he thought my role should be, which happened to accord with…

I agree. I think the problems often come in when both the ambassador and the DCM think they have the same role instead of complimentary ones. Some ambassadors aren’t as outgoing and
going out the way this man did, so I was the inside person. But I had a little advantage because I knew everybody in the community and I knew the people in the business community too, both American and Belgian, because I’d been there as the economic counselor. I could kind of explain to him who people were and so forth when he first got there. He didn’t get there until November because he didn’t have his hearing; it was being held up by one of our friends on the Hill.

I guess I approached it with the idea that I could have an idea of what I thought I’d be doing but if it didn’t accord with his I would be the one to make the adjustments and to be a complement. To make him look good is what it amounts to, right? Instead of trying to be a competitor in some respects which I think does happen sometimes.

Q: You haven’t mentioned who the ambassador is, whom, by the way, I’ve interviewed. I had a very nice interview and he was extremely complimentary of you. Could you give the name and his background?

SCHERMERHORN: His name is Allen Blinken – Allen and Melinda – and he was an investment banker in New York with Wertheim Schroder, a big firm which shortly after he left was bought out by Schroders and then it became Schroder-Wertheim and now the Wertheim name is gone completely. It’s only five years later. My brother retired, too.

He was what they used to call a “suit.” He was the person who went out and raised money. He wasn’t a technical person under the bond market or whatever.

Q: Not a detail person.

SCHERMERHORN: Not a detail person. He was one of the youngest of three brothers, all of whom had gone to Harvard. His oldest brother was fifteen years older, Donald Blinken, who was also appointed an ambassador by Clinton…

Q: To?

SCHERMERHORN: Hungary.

So Allen at this point was – he was born in 1937 so he was fifty-six or something like that – was tired of the New York scene, I think. But what actually propelled him into the administration…I used to say he’s not an FOB (friend of Bill [Clinton]), he’s an FOA (friend of Al [Gore]); he’s a friend of Al Gore, not Clinton. This had come about in 1987 when Gore was one of the seven dwarfs and all the Democrats were looking for money and so forth. He had some connections in the New York financial world and he came and made a presentation and he and Allen became good friends and their wives became good friends. They’re very close personal friends. So that was his connection.

I don’t know how his brother arrived at the embassy; not by that route, but anyway. The reason for Hungary is his brother’s wife was born in Hungary and so that was the interest in that. His brother was also some kind of banker, not with Wertheim-Schroder, but was also on the New York State Educational Board of Regents. It was kind a philanthropic…I don’t know exactly
how they made their money but Allen used to say that his father came as a child to the States from the Ukraine or whatever.

**Q:** He did quite a good job, too.

**SCHERMERHORN:** He did an excellent job. I can’t say he’s the only, but he received an honor from the king – a medal – when he left. Not when he was there, he went back sometime later to get it in a ceremony. Whatever it was it was one that had not been awarded readily to people; because he did do a tremendous amount. This partnership, if you will, really worked very well because we did the things that we’re supposed to do. He was a very quick study. He didn’t know a lot about the issues but he could get to the bottom line; but by the same token he got bored easily. He didn’t like people to ramble on. You’d go in and he’d say, “What’s the bottom line?” He’d want to know and you’d have to be able to articulate that.

What was interesting, he always asked me, “Should I do this,” or whatever, so I’d say what I thought – yes, no, not right now, never – whatever the issue might be. He valued that, that you didn’t pussyfoot around and say, “Well, maybe,” or “on one hand, or on the other.” But I always made those judgments. Again, I was fortunate that I had been there before because it allowed me to make that kind of judgment more easily than if everything we knew to me too.

**Q:** You were there from when to when?

**SCHERMERHORN:** From the end of August ’93 until the end of August ’97.

**Q:** What was sort of the political situation? Because Belgium looks like one of these nice tranquil little places, but it ain’t; and we’ve talked about it before but let’s talk about it again during this period when you arrived particularly. The king died. What was happening?

**SCHERMERHORN:** The king had died and he had no heirs so the heir was his younger brother by a couple of years, Albert. He was named after the grandfather who was king in World War I. The Belgians liked Baudouin; they were very fond of him and so forth, but they liked the fact that this man had a family and the monarchy would carry on; because Belgians, as I may have said before, despite their many differences between the Walloons and the Flemish, I think they were canny enough to understand that for that very reason they need a monarchy. They need a unifying institution at the top and that’s what they had.

**Q:** Why hadn’t Baudouin married?

**SCHERMERHORN:** He did marry but they had no children. His wife, Fabiola, was Spanish and from one of the noble families.

**Q:** Yes. Not from the duke of albad?

**SCHERMERHORN:** No. She’s still living in Belgium. Baudouin was young when he died; he was sixty-three or –four or something like that.
Q: Yes. When he came his father had sort of blotted his copy book in World War II and so he was named early.

SCHERMERHORN: Right. The father abdicated or whatever constitutional issue was. After the German occupation, when they reestablished everything in Belgium, he was… He lived somewhere else too. He had married again. The mother was the Swedish princess, Astrid, who was very, very popular with the Belgians and died in an automobile accident; and actually the king was driving the car. That was in 1930 something.

As I said, when I arrived in Belgium in the ‘80s they were on the brink. They had just voted to accept the INF and that was a very pivotal moment in the fall of the Soviet Union and so forth and how we presented ourselves and how they responded to it. In ’93 again we were seeing the fruits of what we talked about before: the European Union’s great leap forward and this process of the white paper that had laid out the roadmap for all of the economic harmonization that was moving very well. NATO was at a crossroads at that point too because there they had been confronted suddenly with the fall of the Soviet Union. Who was out there if we didn’t have the Soviet Union? There was really quite a lot of angst going on. How did we reposition NATO to account for what’s happened and still keep this unity and cohesion of the alliance? And they were beginning to talk about NATO expansion and formulate the first ideas about this.

In Brussels it was an interesting period from the U.S. presence because we had three new ambassadors: our representative to the European Union, our representative to NATO and the bilateral embassy, and three new DCMs. So there was a whole new team and traditionally there, especially in the immediate recent past before ’93 there had been some problems, if you will. Some of the political appointees in the other two missions had not always perhaps been quite as effective as one might’ve hoped in that period at the end of the ‘80s and early ‘90s.

Bruce Gelb had been a political appointee and he’d only been there about eighteen months and he was having a good time. He was out and about and people liked him. So he wasn’t too happy to have to leave so soon. He had left on January 20th, and because of the hearing process Ambassador Blinken didn’t get there until November. Anyway, we had a complete turnover. Bruce Gelb had only been there a year and a half; his predecessor was a career person. Occasionally there’s a career person in Embassy Brussels, mostly not. Mike Glitman, whose great career had been focused on arms control mostly and political and military affairs, he got the embassy the bilateral embassy when really what his whole career focus was was NATO. It’s too bad that he wasn’t the ambassador to NATO. There was somebody who came out from the NSC who was not very well known. So, I understand – this is hearsay of course – there was some tension and people didn’t get along all that well in the three missions.

As I said, this was a mission where the administration for all three is done in a single administrative unit in the embassy; and that harks back to when NATO was kicked out of France and came to Brussels. It was much more effective than anybody having these things. The other two missions, of course the ambassadors, each one of them, felt that he or she was the most important; but of course it was really the bilateral embassy that had the whole picture because they did a classical embassy whereas the other two missions were limited in their scope because they were focusing on one institution.
So this was going to be an interesting moment. We had new ambassadors; my ambassador somebody had already told him this; I guess he had talked to Bruce Gelb. He talked to Jeffrey Swaebe who had been the ambassador under the Republicans when I was there. He went and met everybody. When he came to me he said, “Well I understand they’ve had some issues. I’m not a problem. I’m easy. So we’re not going to be part of the problem if there is one.” So that’s the way we played it. I knew the other two DCMs; they’re both very estimable men who of course were working for quite high profile political ambassadors, Bob Hunter at NATO and Stu Eisenstadt who went to the EU – a really quite remarkable man, Stu. Than of course, they were more focused on upstaging each other in one way; and this came to a head very early on. President Clinton was making his very first visit to NATO for a summit in January of ’94. We had several advance teams come; we had the pre-pre advance, the pre-advance, the advance, and the regular team starting in early November; this was like ten weeks before. They were quite concerned; it was Clinton’s first major trip to Europe and he was making a major speech.

I had had some experience with organizing these kinds of visits in my secretariat days. The ambassador and I had talked and he said, “You know, we don’t need a lot of time but we absolutely have to have ten percent of the time.” There are certain things that with it came and the prime minister of Belgium, and it’s going to be hard because it was like two days. So we sort of seeded everything except we got a little back, but that was better than trying to fight and get a lot. This was simplified in one sense because it was a NATO summit and it was the heads of state of all of the countries; and the king offered them a lunch; but we did carve out just enough time for the Belgian government. The head of the pre-advance team was a Washington lawyer, a woman who had been an advance person and had some experience with this. But what we found, they just had hordes and hordes of these twenty-something people coming to do the advance and it was totally undisciplined. They’d get on the phone and they had all the WHACA, White House communications. I had seen this before, but never to this extent. It was just exponential. They’d get on the phone and they had these conference calls for three or four hours every night with Washington – everybody chiming in.

At that point we hadn’t heard so many tales of the Clinton White House being like the fraternity house; you know, gab sessions and whatever; then I saw that actually working that way. It was really somewhat irritating because you’d say, “Okay, well we’ve got to make these decisions because these decisions predict what happens down the road. We’ve got to set it up. They’d go in one morning and agree on thus and so and then the next day, “Well we changed our minds.” It went on like that for these kinds of things.

One of the things we wanted was to have a session with the chamber of commerce, and explained before that the chamber of commerce was probably the most professional and active in Europe. It has this dual constituency that American companies that our resident investors and whatnot, joint ventures in Belgium plus all the service people who had come to work on EU issues would man their EU committee. So it was really quite a large group. They said no, he doesn’t want to do that. So finally, like December 22nd they decide, “Okay, I guess we can do that,” after swearing up and down it wasn’t going to happen. So I call the chamber and I said, “Well they’d like to do it now.” They could do it; they had set up their fax machine. However, this was over the Christmas holiday weekend. It was supposed to be on January 3rd, but they put
it together. It could’ve been so much easier on everybody if they had just said to me, “Okay, this is when we’re going to do this.” And it went on like that. Much more chaos and time consumption of people than there needed to be to make it happen.

Q: Well one of the things that…I’ve talked to people who’ve been involved in various presidential visits, and what you really want to do is avoid the first one or two when a new administration comes in because all the kids get on board and they’re having a wonderful time. On some administrations what you really have are a bunch of arrogant young people; other ones this doesn’t sound like they were overly arrogant…You’re making faces, so I guess…It goes with the turf but you sure as hell want to avoid the first one because everybody is trying to make their point and they have no idea what they’re doing. It gets more professional as time goes on.

SCHERMERHORN: One hopes.

Q: One hopes.

SCHERMERHORN: Actually it was funny because then of course this was not just one mission – they had this triumvirate here – and at one point this woman who was the advance, she had these meetings and she had me sit next to her and she said to me at the end of one of these, “Now I need to talk to you because you may be sensible. We can’t pay attention…” The other people were being…I said right out, “Look, we need this absolutely…That’s the bottom line and the ambassador will fight for that and win.” The rest of it the other two can duke it out about. All these children were running around and she said, “Oh, I don’t even try to keep it…We have to let them do their thing.” and they’re sons and daughters of contributors or whatever.

One fellow was about twenty-three and apparently his father was a movie producer or something. The centerpiece, apart from the summit meeting itself, was the speech Clinton was going to make. We had much debate as to the locale of the speech and various things. Finally, it was decided that the town hall in Brussels, a beautiful gothic building; wonderful with tapestries and beautiful. I was detailed, when we went to look at the place, to take them to meet the chief of protocol or whatever it was who had to do this – a long-suffering man – and this young movie producer type goes in and he says, “Well, we’ll take the tapestries down and we’ll put the bleachers up here,” and I’m rolling my eyes and saying, “No I don’t think so,” and hoping that they weren’t listening to this. We said to the advance, “Look, knock it off. This is their place and we’re not taking anything down.” So we got through all this. Our hosts, they’re long-suffering in Brussels because they’ve seen a lot of this, but this was above and beyond. They just act graciously and let us get on with it like that.

Well it finally happened, but one of the many things that was funny about it was that the saxophone was invented by a Belgian called Adolph Sax, who was from a little town, from Dinant, I think. So the mayor of Dinant paid a call to the ambassador and he said, “The president is coming and we, the town of Dinant, would like to present the president with a saxophone,” because he’s known to play this and so on. So we said alright and we put it up to the advance team. They said, “Oh no, no, no. We can’t do that.” We said, “Why not?” So finally they very begrudgingly said okay, but it won’t be in public; it’ll be a private presentation. Well one of the other events was, because there are so many Americans resident in Brussels, an American
community event. Again, we had to figure out where to do this. The Conrad hotel which at that point had only been open about a year was built like a baseball stadium with an atrium in the middle. So we covered the atrium and we paid for it out of the American chamber event. They did that because they had their breakfast it was. There had to be a breakfast on top of all that because of the late decision about doing it. We didn’t know where to do the American event and the night before the atrium was covered temporarily so we had the American event there and the president was staying in the Conrad. So they said, “Okay, just before he comes down to the American event the mayor can go up to his room and present this in private.” Well the American event meant there was no press there; it was an American community event. So the ambassador takes him upstairs and Clinton comes out of the sitting room or whatever and he says, “This is President Clinton,” and he says, “Oh, this is terrific!” and he says to the mayor, “Well, this is great. I want to go downstairs and show this to everybody downstairs.” So they take him downstairs, and of course because of the nature of the event there was no Belgian press there or anything. My point is that these people who purported to speak for the president didn’t really know anything about what he wanted to do and they never apparently asked him about this. It could’ve been such a nice little event for the Belgian press and everything, and then to add insult to injury, they leave and the next stop on this visit is Prague. Brussels to Prague is like an hour flight. So we’re watching the television in Brussels to see the plane; they open the plane and show the president getting in a car and then going to the Charles Bridge in Prague and then I don’t know whether it was the mayor in Prague or some functionary presents him in full public, world television, with a saxophone, and it would’ve been nice, Adolph Sax.

But this is the kind of thing you get, and then they went, “Well, the president never jogs here,” and then he said, “Oh, I want to jog…” Everything they spent hours and weeks deciding turned out not to really reflect what he wanted to do anyway.

Q: This is the time when you throw all the kids who are of wealthy supporters and have no idea, probably have nothing to do with the president.

SCHERMERHORN: And they have no understanding of the staff function. That’s alright, you give them a little leeway, but the adults who were part of this declined to supervise them.

Q: This took a while. They had some real problems with the military because some of the staff were denigrating the military in uniform and this immediately got picked up. It’s a bad show and unfortunately it happens relatively frequently with a brand-new administration. They get too eager.

SCHERMERHORN: The other thing that was really bad for a White House that was interested in public relations. You said this was kind of growing pains I think in the beginning. One of the things, because there were all these heads of state, the king was going to go to the airport to greet each one of them when they came. The advance team said, “Oh no, he doesn’t want to be greeted. He doesn’t want to do that,” and we said, “Well it’s not really your choice.” The idea was the king would be at the bottom of the stairs, which is quite a nice thing and so forth, and they said, “Well you can’t.” Okay, but he’ll go over and meet him in the lounge. I guess the idea was that nobody should detract from the president getting off the steps. I don’t know what the idea was but it was very rude, and trying to explain this, we had to smooth it over. We said,
“Alright, the king will be here and then the president will get out and go in the car and then go across the tarmac.” Could you imagine dealing with the chief of protocol and having to explain?

They didn’t want to do it at all and we said, “You have to do it,” and so the compromise was... Of course then we saw Clinton was not the first one to arrive, nor the last, but on television they showed the others coming down and being received by the king. What they got for that was absolutely hysterical because the president came down the steps, got in a limousine and then they showed the car driving across and it showed the president with a bottle of something, water or whatever it was, swigging out of the bottle, and this was a beautiful profile shot of the car. So, that’s what world television saw instead of being greeted by the king, but we got over that.

At one point after that I went over to the chief of protocol and I said, “Thank you for all your good offices,” and blah, blah, and I said, “This was a little different,” and he said, “You know, we’re used to this now.” So I laughed and I said, “Which administration was the easiest to deal with?” and he said, “Oh, there’s no question about it. That’s easy by far,” and I said, “Who?” He said, “The Nixon administration,” which was very interesting. He said, “They came in, they said what they needed, we agreed what it was and nobody changed their mind. We just went ahead and did it and they were very reasonable.”

I mean the Belgians have seen it all.

**Q:** Did you see any difference in the Belgian situation while you were there?

**SCHERMERHORN:** Yes, I saw that there was increasing fragmentation and in the ‘80s you heard a little bit about the far right, especially in Flanders mostly. You heard more about the far right being a bigger force is not the right word because it’s not, it still isn’t – the blands bloc is what it was called; the people’s party of the right. You heard more in the press all the time about what the French thought and about Flemish nationalism basically is what it was; and what they were calling devolution to the regions; in other words, devolution of political power from the central government. Of course, this was about political institutions and functions and responsibilities, but it was also, underneath it all, about money, as I said before.

The issues of the ’80s where Wallonia was on the ropes, that used to be the flesh part of Belgium, the creator of the industrial revolution, the second country to have railroads after the U.K. from 1837 and all of that, and that whole Rust Belt continuing to rust; and more and more the services side of it and the Flemish with their wonderful command of English and doing well and so on; and not wanting to support those lazy sods down in Wallonia is how it came out. Which again you have to take with a grain of salt because of course the great sport in Belgium is tax avoidance. As I said, there are great complaints about the confiscatory tax structure, which would be real complaints if in fact people had actually paid the full rate, but they don’t.

The other issue that was concerning a large part of the press, particularly the Flemish press, was the Africa policy. This was when Mobutu was still in power in that year. There was a lot of digging up of things, circumstances, situations, incidents from the past being uncovered. Then, of course in ’94 we had the problems in Rwanda and this all began to fester and so forth.
Q: Was there a growing need for labor that has...it’s hitting the United States, it’s hit other places – in Europe very much. In other words, was there an African migration there and if so how was this happening?

SCHERMERHORN: There’s always a Zairian/Congolese community there and Mobutu was reputed to own three or four villas in and around Brussels. One I’m certain he didn’t, but others…and then there was quite a Muslim Moroccan, much bigger community in Holland, but still a sizeable community. Tunisian, Moroccan. In fact, at one point I remember asking about the number of mosques and I remember the figure fifty-four mosques in Belgium. But fifty-four mosques in Belgium and Belgium is ten million people. And I think they estimate now – I saw some figures this year – it’s something like one in ten is an immigrant; most of them are Muslim. There’s a Congolese community from the past; there isn’t very much migration now that I’m aware of. And then of course what you began to get just about that time in ’93 were the Eastern Europeans coming in, too.

Prior to the admission of Spain and Portugal in 1985 to the EU, you had a lot of migrants from Spain and Portugal coming to be basically domestic workers. However, that had ceased even by ’85. You had a Filipino community too. An illustration of this: in the ambassador’s residence the cook was Italian, the major domo – the butler – was Belgian, the under butler was Filipino and the sous chef was a Filipino woman and the maids were Filipino because you couldn’t find people. In the DCM house we had a major domo who was Spanish because he’d been there…when I came back to live in the house he remembered me and every time somebody came for a function he knew who they were. He knew everybody for thirty years back. In fact he was over sixty-five and he was supposed to retire but they said he could stay until…he stayed until I left. The maid was Portuguese and she had come in 1981 or something and we had several different cooks. I had a Filipino. So that’s an illustration of where things were going. The butler in the ambassador’s residence retired, the Belgian, and it’s a Filipino now because Belgians don’t do that anymore and neither do other people from the EU. So there’s that change.

Q: Were you seeing – it’s become quite apparent now – a real discomfort showing itself politically about having so many Muslims or people who really aren’t fitting in as well as before?

SCHERMERHORN: It was interesting. The Congolese community you were aware of because they’re visible; and actually in the part of Brussels that I lived in the first time was quite near the area where there were a lot of African stores and so forth. You didn’t see the Moroccan Islamic community so much; down near the railroad station was one area behind…but you didn’t see it as much then. I wasn’t as aware. You could go for a long time and not see a lot of people in that category. Now, I don’t know.

This was also at the time when harmonization was not only for trade policy in the European Union but one of the issues that they were focusing on was how to harmonize immigration policy and open borders. Something called the Schengen Agreement had been passed in 1988; and Schengen is the name of the town in Holland. Some of the EU members, not all of them, had agreed that they would have basically open borders; but one of the ones who did agree was Italy and of course their borders are not only open, they are porous. The U.K. didn’t enter into that.
The idea was that once you got a Schengen visa to enter any one of the countries then you had freedom of movement within it. This was taking effect already. I could see the difference from mid ‘80s when I drove to Luxembourg or you went to France you had to pass through and show your document or they looked at you. By 1994 and ’95 you went to France and you just zipped right down the highway and nothing.

So we had this movement toward integration at the same time that exogenous forces were bringing more people in, whether it was the fall of the Soviet Union or turmoil in Africa or whatever it might be. So you had these two competing forces but they hadn’t yet gotten to the point where the problems seemed to be greater than the desire to open things up and integrate it and so forth. Now in the summer of 2002 we’re seeing some changes in that. People are reconsidering. I don’t think they can possibly go back to closing the borders within the European Union, to national identity. It’s possible to do it, but politically and psychologically and so forth I don’t know if it’s possible. What they are looking at now is asylum policy. I think Belgium, next to the U.K., had the most liberal asylum policy.

Q: But when you were there that wasn’t a particular issue?

SCHERMERHORN: There were a lot of immigrants but people didn’t perceive that it was a problem at that point. The usual crime statistics and things, or interviews with police, they would sort of point in the direction of immigrant communities as potentially greater perpetrators than others, but they have enough home-grown crime in Belgium for that.

Q: How was the solidifying of the European as an entity? Was this in a way helping to relieve Walloon/Flemish things? In other words, they could look towards Europe and sort of forget Belgium?

SCHERMERHORN: Whether you’re talking about…You probably couldn’t have had in the U.K. a vote for a Scottish parliament as you did a while ago if you didn’t have this umbrella that was reaching over. There were people who used to postulate that you pick a time – ten, twenty, thirty years – the national identities as we now describe them and know them may not exist in that form. You have all these irredentist movements, whether it’s Catalonia or Wales and Scotland or various parts of Germany or whatever. You even have it in France; you have, I guess, the Bretons, the Celtic fringe or whatever. So I think, yes, the kind of surety, if you will, of this umbrella, much as some people don’t like specific aspects of it, there are people that keep saying “this could never happen” as they’re marching down that road. They’re saying that this provides some kind of security.

The NATO issues were very interesting too because this is in the period when we had what’s ex-Yugoslavia now disintegrating and what’s happening and talking to the Germans and the Germans for the first time since the war voting to send troops outside. I thought that was quite fascinating actually and the place that they should choose was one where they had such a negative image from the past. Again, that wouldn’t have happened without the fall of the Soviet Union. What that triggered was a whole lot of things that…you push the button somewhere and you’re not sure how the new pattern is going to fall out and you find these things that people didn’t anticipate.
Q: You came there after you’d been away and the Soviet Union had gone and Germany was united, I think. Did you find any disquiet on the part of the Belgians about having a greater Germany?

SCHERMERHORN: I think in Belgium and Holland you always have a residual there, certainly with the older generation. I mean they’ve accepted that this is what grew out of the ashes, what we’ve got now; and people say it’s good and so far it’s good, but there’s always this little…And one of the most interesting parts of my timing of being there from ’93 to ’97 was almost nonstop celebratory, if you will, events for various parts of World War II. And this went on and on and on. I mean ’93 and ’94 and ’95. That’s when you really know if you’re an American, you knew that Belgium was the most American-friendly country in Europe because they had the most vivid memory still of our presence and our physical contribution to throwing off the Nazi yoke, or whatever you want to call it. And they honor that but this is an older generation too.

Q: I was going to say I represent an older generation, too, and I’ve always felt that even looking towards the future one of the big things about NATO, one was keeping the Soviet Union out, but the other one was keeping essentially France and Germany tied into something so that the French weren’t looking at the Germans and the Germans weren’t looking at the French and saying, “Gee, they’ve got more tanks than we do,” and I think for the far future it makes good sense. Was this at all part of the thinking there?

SCHERMERHORN: Belgium is sort of like the deer caught in the headlights. I think that there is probably in some corners but they didn’t articulate this. In some corners there is some unease about this, and you’re right; Germany, up until ’89, West Germany was the bulwark or whatever and then suddenly you had this unification and people thought, okay, they’re going to be busy unifying themselves for a while so we don’t have to worry about that yet. But then this business of making military contribution out of country to NATO came up. That was a function, again, of our NATO – here I’m getting into an area that I’m not very expert at – we were very concerned that we find a way to continue to forge these strong links to the alliance but we were not so interested in maintaining…we were very clear that we didn’t want to maintain the level of troops, particularly with the budgetary problems of the early ’90s and so forth. So we went down from – I think in the 1980s we had 300,000 troops still in Germany. Even when I left Belgium the first time we had had a serious drawdown and then were down to about 100,000; and now I guess it’s even less.

We were beginning to turn back facilities in Germany that we had occupied since the war and so on. It was expediency in a way; we want the Europeans to assume more of the burden, both the financial burden and the actual military personnel burden, of maintaining this alliance which we want to maintain because we think it’s important to have this link and so on; and of course Germany being the economy it is and so forth is going to be one of the areas we were going to look at for this. They were able to contribute, or so people thought. So again, after…as I said, what was so surprising, having been in Europe in the mid ’80s, to find the speed…When I left Belgium in the late 1980s people were saying, “Well, you know, I guess Germany will be united now, but not for thirty years,” and you turn around a year and a half later and it’s done. So once the momentum gains some speed, it’s very hard to slow it down, but, I think people were
concerned that Germany’s somewhat precipitate action in Bosnia was what set things off a bit there.

Q: Yes. This was the fact that Germany recognized Croatia so soon. You’ve got arguments on that but it does look like this was done by Genscher, I guess almost on his own.

SCHERMERHORN: Right. It was one of those things where it was sort of done when people weren’t looking and then it was done and you couldn’t undo it.

Q: Then of course the pope did the same thing, too. The two groups that could set the Serbs off were the Germans and the Papacy.

SCHERMERHORN: Who of course had…

Q: Had horrible records during World War II. It helped; it flamed the situation.

How did you find, when you were in Belgium, relations between its neighbors: the Netherlands, Germany, and France particularly? By having bilateral relations with Belgium we were looking at its neighbors. Did this come up? Any problems there?

SCHERMERHORN: No, not really. I would say that in this period about forty percent of our dialogue with the Belgians on the political side was on Africa, primarily the Congo, and Burundi too. We had trilateral meetings with the French. When George Moose was assistant secretary he came over and we had a meeting in Brussels and then they went to Paris. They had close correspondence on that. They had differences of opinion probably within the EU on issues, but not in ways that really set us off in a different path than any one of them.

Q: Often when we were trying to find out what the EU was doing we often talked to members of the EU into place, but having an EU ambassador right there did you find that you were at all talking to the Belgians saying, “Hey, what’s going on in some of these EU meetings?” or was that kind of left to the…

SCHERMERHORN: We didn’t do it quite that way. The political section would have conversations and we’d report what they said at the working level. They had their own missions to the EU which at least theoretically reported to the foreign ministry but sometimes they didn’t always know what the right hand and the left hand was doing. We had a benefit in the bilateral embassy because we had a joint communications section; so we saw all the EU traffic and they saw all ours.

The Belgian foreign ministry was very professional and very good to deal with. The foreign minister then was Flemish which has been the case since World War II, except for one or two. In the ’50s we had some people but basically…which meant the foreign minister was Flemish and therefore his chef de cabinet was Flemish. Some of the director generals were Walloon. Supposedly they had equivalency, but again they were finding it more difficult to recruit Walloons with the requirement that you have Flemish, French and English. As I said, all the Flemish had the French and the English but the Walloons didn’t always have the Flemish; and if
you didn’t learn it at your mother’s knee it was hard. Anyway, they’re very professional and accessible, very good to deal with.

One of the issues we worked on… I mentioned my colleague who had come to work in CDA, in the personnel thing, with me who had had a lot of military experience and was a general officer in the reserves before he was a general officer equivalent in the Foreign Service, by this time Jacques Klein is his name had gotten himself seconded to the UN mission in Eastern Slovenia, which is a part of ex-Yugoslavia; part of Croatia adjacent to the Hungarian border. He was the TA, the transitional administrator, working with the UN contingent who was a Belgian contingent; they had taken the UN mandate which was peacekeeping and then the transitional administration, the civilians who were going to help reestablish the institutions and make things happen.

Jacques was a unique person and a wonderful choice for this job, terrific; because, the Belgians were the mandated force, when he first got this job, which was shortly after I got there anyway, I heard about it and he came to Brussels and so we started talking and we maintained contact. That was good because the UN mandate came to an end for Belgium in the end of ’94 and by this time they were starting to put together what was going to be a NATO force, S-4 for the rest of the area. We wanted the Belgians to re-up and take on a new two year mandate for Eastern Slovenia. Well they were a little hesitant. The military were not hesitant; they very much wanted to do it. As I said, the military knows they need a mission outside of Belgium to generate all of this national institution business and to keep themselves busy – and they’re good at it. They’ve done a lot of it. But the political masters were a little hesitant because in this period they just had this tragedy in Rwanda where eleven of their peacekeepers were hacked to death. So they felt that the public would not really be too interested in this. They said, “Well, you know, we’ll join the NATO mission but we don’t want to do this too.” So Jacques came down and he went to make the case; and the ambassador and the political counselor and I had a big meeting and we talked about all this. They put out their reservations about it and so forth. At the end of the meeting I asked the chef de cabinet, “Who in the ministry is going to be the point person for this?” and he said Terry De Gruben who was sitting across the table, and he was someone I had known from my previous assignment. He had been their ambassador in Moscow and he was then back sort of without portfolio in the ministry but he was going to do this. So we get in the car when we leave this thing and I say immediately to the political counselor, “As soon as we get back to the embassy call Terry De Gruben and set up an appointment. Let’s keep pushing on this.” That happened – the political counselor was wonderful, Judy Johnson; very bright and conscientious; just kept all those balls in the air all the time. So this started and we…Jacques used to come from Vukovar in Eastern Slovenia periodically because Belgians had a military plane and he’d come and he used to stay actually in the guest house in at my residence.

Q: You were saying that Klein would come.

SCHERMERHORN: So we knew what was going on. We kept the pressure on; we kept the dialogue going about once you roll over your UN mandate in Eastern Slovenia. They agreed finally. At the end the political director said to me, “You know, this was a very good result. We’ve never worked more closely with an embassy on an issue than this.” I felt very gratified that we hadn’t done a lot of high pressure stuff but we just kept in there talking and talking. I’m
not saying they made that decision because of us, but if we hadn’t been good advocates for it and kept the dialogue going, it might’ve been more difficult for them to do and whatnot. Again, that was something that was gratifying.

The political director is a very astute fellow who is actually going to be coming to Washington now as the ambassador this year. I don’t think he would’ve said something like that off the top of his head, and obviously Belgium works closely with a lot of different people.

Q: Did you find that instructions for Washington on the events in Yugoslavia were sort of mixed? How were we dealing with this breakup? I can’t remember exactly when things started to happen there but at first the Europeans said they were going to take care of this and then it fell apart. What was happening from your perspective?

SCHERMERHORN: We didn’t get a lot of instructions, no. In administrative terms we’re coming into the period now where we have a real differential, real spread in technology in embassies from zippo to the highest tech and the Department was beginning to use e-mail. The embassy in Belgium was in a funny situation because in the ‘80s when I was there we were one of the two or three embassies, because, again, we had this joint communications thing so we actually had more traffic than an embassy the size of Belgium you’d normally think of. We had been in the forefront; we had been one of the two or three that had had the then state-of-the-art things. Then we lagged behind because then they spent money to bring everybody else up to date and ahead of us. So we were not as advanced as maybe we could have been. People were increasingly using e-mail. We didn’t have classified e-mail at first; it came while I was there. People were using the telephone a lot, in fact, using the telephone too much. When you think about it, the only thing you could think of was there was so much out there in the ether that if people wanted to listen they’d have a very difficult time figuring out what to listen to, but certainly people used the telephone more than most security say is wise.

Q: But were you also finding a problem with the telephone, because the thing about cables is a cable goes through a clearance process and people say, yes, this is it and you know there’s thought behind it. If you’re sitting around a table saying, “Well, we have to do something. Well I got a telephone call from George.” Well, who is George speaking for?

SCHERMERHORN: I know. Exactly. We had a couple of issues and I remember one of these issues in the economic section saying or I’d get an e-mail saying “do this” and I’d go back in and say, “If that’s a formal request please put it in a cable,” and ten years ago you could do that. Now people say, “Oh. Well, nobody even reads cables.” WE were beginning to get into this area which is a problem for the State Department. How do you maintain lines of communication, maintain archival records, maintain the discipline of the clearance process when people are undercutting that all the time and crosscutting it. We’re beginning to see what now is a full-blown problem, I think. A lot of technology experts don’t consider it a problem. They just say, “Well, we’re here to provide you with the means; how you organize it and work with it is another issue.” But it is an issue which we haven’t addressed, I think.

Q: There is a very definite problem – what is policy – and at some point somebody has to decide and it’s not like the Clinton advance team with everybody thinking, gee, this is a good idea.
Somebody has to sort it out and say, well okay, what’s the line?

SCHERMERHORN: Something like the mandate for Eastern Slovenia, that we knew was something we were supposed to be doing, but I can’t recall exactly how. I’m sure there must’ve been a cable. This was beginning to be a problem.

Another issue that came up was Haiti in 1994; and that was fascinating because, again, we did get a cable saying, “Please go to your governments and ask them to contribute.” This thing came in sort of at the end of the afternoon, just before…the ambassador was going that evening to a concert and he and the foreign minister were the guests of honor. They were sitting in the same box. Oh no. It was some American symphony or something that was coming and he had asked the foreign minister. So he goes off with this thing and he’s got the foreign minister and he said – this was Willy Claes who later fell to the floor, came to grief – he said, “Will, we want you to contribute to this force in Haiti,” and Willy said sure without even…So the ambassador was able to go back in just a few words and say it’s done and he was the first one to go back, the first people to say yes. However, the Belgians always say yes; the Belgians are there for us. So that was something that…but again, the ambassador had a very good personal relationship with these people. They liked to talk to him and he didn’t ask for unreasonable things. He did what he was supposed to do but…He had a very good personality.

Q: Did you ever find that because the Belgians were cooperative with this that you had to restrain Washington from over asking?

SCHERMERHORN: Well yes. There was a tendency to always say, “Well we know they’re with us.” We used to have fun. In the UN of course it was the classic – every year it was the Cuba resolution and we’d have to go and everybody had to beat up on them. This would be a round robin instruction. And they would just laugh at this. We had a lot of good consultation on UN issues, and in fact the deputy assistant secretaries for the International Organizations Bureau used to come out to Belgium every year in the fall, or before the fall, before the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly), and talk about the issues with the Belgians because they were always pretty supportive; and I can remember one time when they did that – I used to have lunches a lot, business, in the DCM dining room and we would do it that way, which the Belgians enjoyed, I think, and I remember one time we had this discussion and one of the visitors said, “Well yes, now you voted with us [x number of times],” and the IO (Bureau of International Organization Affairs) director for Belgium said, “Oh, you mean you voted with us?” That’s an illustration sort of sometimes we are a little too egocentric. But it was all said in good humor.

They did appreciate being consulted; as a small country sometimes they weren’t always. They always play a bigger role, as the Dutch do. They play a more important role in these international fora because they’re responsible, they have very professional people who are pretty evenhanded and pretty rational in their approach and so on.

Q: I keep coming back again to the developments in Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia in this period. Did you find they were sort of eager to get involved to show sort of the European side to taking over? And then of course things went bad and eventually we ended up in there.
SCHERMERHORN: As I said, the military – this was something on their turf and they were good at this and they had this horrible experience in Africa. As it turned out, they did agree finally through all over the Eastern Slovenia UN mandate, but they also insisted on contributing to the NATO operation in Bosnia; and they were the only country to have two mandates. People said, “Well, you don’t have to do the UN because you’re doing the other thing,” and they said, “No, no. We’re part of this.” They had a smaller contribution; it was a communications unit or something; but, because their main concentration…at a political level it was more complicated. Again, I think what you were harking back to before – relations with Germany and how did they look at this – I think now that Germany was playing a bigger part in this in terms of participation, out of area with personnel. I think they wanted to be certainly part of this too.

Q: At one time we were rather blithe; we used to talk about the Benelux – Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. These were small but extremely savvy states. Was there such a thing as a Benelux thing?

SCHERMERHORN: Yes. There was still a Benelux secretariat building in Brussels. I remember when I was there in the ‘80s as the economic counselor calling on them and writing something about it. But a lot of this was pretty well subsumed now under the greater EU. You see the Benelux is really the kernel. The kernel of it is something called the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union of 1923, which they have a common currency. It’s sort of the precursor of the Euro now because it was the same coin, same denominations, but with different pictures. Then that grew into other things. So the Benelux still existed in that; now eight years later I don’t know.

Belgium and Luxembourg pretty well have to operate in agreement. They’re not always exactly in accord with the Dutch; the Dutch have their own agenda, too, and they have a higher profile probably in the humanitarian issues around the world because the Dutch now don’t have the burden, if you will, of a very recent colonial past. They have Indonesia and that’s a pretty well attenuated thing; not too many people even associate the Dutch with Indonesia anymore. The Belgians have this Congolese, this necklace of Africa burdening them down around the neck. As I said, especially the Dutch press was very vigorous about digging into what had gone on in the Congo back before and bringing up all of this kind of thing and some Belgian politicians from the ‘50s and so forth had written about the pre independence part, what went on there – sort of like people writing about the CIA things here. So they had a little baggage that the Dutch didn’t have so much of any longer, I think.

Q: Before we turn to Africa which is another story, were there any economic issues that came up before economic counselor? I mean bilateral things between the United States and Belgium.

SCHERMERHORN: We didn’t really have very much at this point. As I said, in the ‘80s we had these export control issues, but again the gap had folded and the Uruguayan round was over with and now what we were working with was creating the WTO (World Trade Organization), rolling over the GATT into something different. So those were issues. We had nuclear issues in the ‘80s; we didn’t have much of that. What we did have were a lot of environmental issues that we were trying to lobby the EU on, interestingly enough. There was even less interest, if you will, in Belgian industry and that kind of thing. So it was what I would call the global issues in a way –
the environment and that kind of issue.

The one thing we did have was the tripartite commission for the restitution of monetary gold. I think I talked about that when I was there the first time; how it existed and I hadn’t known about it and I was the commissioner ex-officio and so on. When I came back in ’93 I went to the then economic counselor and I asked him what was going on with the commission and he said, “Well nothing. I don’t know,” and I said, “Well find out.” It turned out that the executive secretary had died, this retired British diplomat who was in his high eighties when I was there before, and that they hadn’t had a meeting for a while and whatever. Then I said, “Well you’ve got to resuscitate this because we still have these files and it’s still an issue because the Albanian claim will be settled soon.” That was the one remaining claim, as you may recall from before. “It could become front burner any moment, so get it.” So he did that and he did what I said. “There are a lot of other issues but I consider that the most important thing right now, to get this on the road again.” So he called a meeting and they hired somebody and they got the files caught up and whatever; and sure enough the Albanian claim was settled.

Anyway, Terry was doing this by e-mail back to Washington and there was one lawyer in L (Office of the Legal Advisor) who had a big portfolio for many years but he was now in his eighties also and this is the one thing he had left to him and he’d been moved out to some building on K Street. But anyway, Eli, this was his baby and I said, “You know, Eli is eighty-something now and we have to get this over with.” I said, “When he goes nobody in the Department is going to know anything about this.” So he got it on track and he was doing it by e-mail. I said, “No, no. Send it by cable. E-mail doesn’t help. It goes on to somebody who moves on to another job and nobody knows anything about it.” So he did and of course one of these cables was seen over in our mission to the European Union where Ambassador Eisenstadt was. He had a lawyer working for him over them and the lawyer called Terry and said, “What is this thing?” and so we explained all that and I said, “Fine. That’s good. He needs to know.”

He was beginning to make some noises, this Holocaust issue and the Swiss banking problems and so forth. Anyway, the whole thing did materialize into this huge thing but we had this all in order so they could wind up the commission and disperse the remaining assets and so forth. This lawyer in the State Department did actually die at his desk at some point. But fortunately the dialogue was going on and enough people then knew what it was. That gave me heart palpitations when I got there and found that after all the hard work we put in to keep it rolling over they just let it lapse. It was funny because the person who was then the economic counselor had been back in the ’80s when I recommended that somebody be assigned in Washington to focus on this. He had been actually working in the RPE, the regional political/economic office of the European bureau, which was the one. So he actually before he got there knew a little bit about it but he hadn’t focused on it until I said we’ve got to do this. So that took a lot of his time but it was worthwhile.

Q: What was the issue? Was it that there were assets to be distributed?

SCHERMERHORN: There were assets. The three allies – Britain, France and the U.S. – in 1946 had created a commission as custodian of the gold bars which had been retrieved from the salt mine outside of Frankfurt that we found with all the Nazi loot and everything in it in 1945,
because the Nazis had looted the central banks of thirteen European countries there were assets from...They weren’t all from this one location; other things came in. Of course, they didn’t ever retrieve all of the assets so it had to be distributed on a prorated basis. But what was interesting about it was that the Germans kept such good records – of course, typically – that they could trace a lot of this. They could say, “Okay, this serial number belonged to the bank in Holland,” or whatever it was. There was this enormous bureaucracy in the late ‘40s and ‘50s in Brussels – a whole building full of lawyers doing this – but they had finally, as I said, settled most of the claims but they had a few remaining ones which were political problems: Czechoslovakia and Albania and whatever. I think I talked earlier about some of that so I won’t go into it more. It’s one of those vestiges of World War II.

Q: Lange, we want to pick this up next time. You’re in Belgium from ’93 to ’97 and we now want to talk about African matters and what else do we want to talk about?

SCHERMERHORN: Well I have a few more things to say about Belgium. I’d like to talk a little bit about those commemorative events of World War II because I think it’s very interesting and useful for us. And maybe a little bit about our missions to the European Union and NATO in relation to us a little more. And then we’ll talk about Africa and Africa policy.

Q: Lange, we’re still in Brussels ’93 to ’97. There are a couple of things you wanted to talk about: Africa, commemorative events, and relations with the European Union mission and all of that. So I’ll let you start from there.

SCHERMERHORN: Well, as I said, in the fall of ’93 November 11\textsuperscript{th} was the seventy-fifth anniversary of the end of World War I and there was a parade in the town of Ghent and the king of the Belgians presided in his military uniform and so on. There were still a lot of veterans, many of them in wheelchairs or with canes and walkers and so forth; they were all basically in their nineties at that point. Obviously it was going to be the last time that there was any significant number of veterans. But it was a very moving thing and Belgian military music is very good and they always have the bands and so forth. Then we began right with the events of World War II and Belgium is really the most American-friendly country in Europe and they remember, although they’re getting older too. But every town and village had their commemoration, and of course as the allied invasion moved along there were different dates and different towns portraying the pace of the invasion and so forth.

We got everybody in the embassy involved in this because our attachés’ office really didn’t have enough people to do all of this by themselves and the ambassador couldn’t be everywhere either, although he did a lot of them. I did a lot of them and I said at a staff meeting we want people to volunteer because it’s something everybody should experience at least once; so a lot of other people in the embassy did volunteer. And every time you went to one the townspeople were so hospitable and so forth.

But the thing that was most striking for me about this; they had never had any commemoration by, with, in the German cemeteries; but there is a German cemetery, a very large one, basically the Battle of the Bulge, and it’s very close to the Dutch border. But anyway first the first time, since it was the fiftieth anniversary, they were going to do this and the German number two was
going to go and my ambassador said he wasn’t going to do that but I went; and the German ambassador didn’t do it either; maybe he realized that we weren’t going to do it, I don’t know. This cemetery is quite different in character from the American cemeteries because ours are open fields, white crosses on green grass; this was with a lot of trees, black iron crosses, very dark, very hard looking; not that nice sort of feeling of elation in a way that you get looking at ours. They put on a ceremony with the little girls and the dirndl singing German folk songs. So I’m sitting there and through the trees we see these German soldiers coming – they had come from the NATO base just over the border in Schusterburg, I think it is – and they were in their grey uniforms with the silver medallion on the...they haven’t changed the uniform that much; I thought I was in the movie The Young Lions, here they’re all coming across. But it was really eerie. I’m glad my ambassador didn’t go, in a way, because I think he would’ve been quite astonished by it all. This was very eerie and you think, oh gosh. But the significance of it was it was the first time they had even acknowledged or had any kind of commemoration; and then the Belgians participated and so on. So that was part of the reconciliation and of course we had the to-do about D-Day and whether NATO representation, and whether the Germans should be there when President Clinton went. That was an interesting sidelight. But it shows some attempts at reconciliation after a long time and the whole point of this was of course to remind people so it doesn’t happen again and so on.

The Belgians put on an exhibition which was probably the best exhibition in a museum I’ve ever seen anywhere. It was supposed to be two months long from November of ’94 to March of ’95 and they kept extending it because the demand was so great. Finally they closed it up in August. You entered and you entered through a doorway that was like the entrance to a World War I trench, and you went through that; and then finally, after some artifacts, you came out into the sunlight of 1920 or something. It was a multimedia exhibition with pictures, photographs, video, audio, room-sized diorama basically. So everything was different and it was interesting. They had about six or seven room-sized things and one of them was showing Hitler youth in the school room and another was the inside of an underground station in London in 19__. So you started in 1918 and you went all the way through. It was trying to depict how did we come out of this horror of World War I and how did we get ourselves into the next horror. And it was extremely well done, as I said, and it had great resonance. It was in the army museum in Brussels which is not all that big. They constructed it with catwalks up and down; they went all around the building in a very interesting way too. It was too bad it couldn’t be shown elsewhere. It was in French and Dutch, no English. They had speeches; you heard Hitler’s voice. And the schoolchildren, it was done basically for them but as I said it was basically one of the best things I’ve ever seen of that sort. It’s too bad it didn’t have a wider distribution. The whole experience, going on, as I said, until the end of ’95, basically two and a half years of... Especially poignant in the Ardennes because of course they remember it very well. Bastogne. And there’s a museum there.

And there’s a wonderful Belgian woman who had been in the resistance and gotten awards from all the governments, Collette Stass, and she ran something called the Belgian-American Association. She’s one of these dynamos that organizes everything and she was really the moving spirit behind a lot of these commemorations involving Americans. And we do have the three cemeteries there: one World War I and two World War II; and we always have a memorial day. The two in the Ardennes are done in the same day and the one in Flanders is done the day
before or the day after. From 1995 they had about 25,000 people attend. Every year there aren’t that many but there are always thousands of people who fly past. The most beautiful American military cemetery I think I’ve seen is the one in Tunisia, but they’re all splendid and I think you should go and look at them.

Q: Did you find the Belgians talking at all while you were there about NATO? I belong to a generation – I was born in 1928, so I was a kid; I wasn’t in World War II, but almost and I got involved later in Korea – I’ve always felt that one of the great importances of NATO was keeping essentially the French and Germans from going at each other, and countries like Belgium get in between these two elephants; and by having everybody tethered together it keeps them from looking over their shoulder and rearming. You can always get some crazy nationalistic leaders and things can build up. Did you find the Belgians looking upon NATO, because NATO was under a lot of debate at the time? What the hell do we need NATO for? The Soviet Union is gone and all. Did you find this a theme by Belgians?

SCHERMERHORN: No. Not so much in the public discourse that I heard. There was nationalism but it wasn’t expressed through the prism of regional nationalism means we abdicate from the rest of it. It was a purely domestic consideration. Thoughtful Belgians, as I said, for the military NATO was really something they wanted. That was the way in which to preserve the Belgian military as a career profession really because if it devolves too far into these regions nobody is going to want to sustain a military. It’s too expensive and what would be the point of a Wallonia and a Flanders with this. And as I said, for Belgium they really don’t have that much glue for their national identity; the monarchy and the military and the church used to be, but the church doesn’t have much sway these days. So the military is an important thing for Belgian national identity and therefore NATO which utilizes this military is a good thing.

I think also from purely economic…Belgians realize that they have their headquarters and it was kind of an accident of history, if you will. But now that they have it it’s an important economic input for Belgium and a thing that makes them a key player whether you think of it that way or not. They are because you’ve got to come to Belgium; it’s in the interests of the international community then to keep Belgium as a viable entity too unless you created a Canberra or a Washington that was sort of an autonomous state. Some people have suggested that. Of course what all the member states were challenging is their contributions to the famous three percent rule, and how were they meeting that or not meeting that as the case may have been.

The window of that debate – what’s the importance of NATO – wasn’t really very wide because we’re talking about the breakup of the Soviet Union and then people began to say, well, who’s the enemy? But then you almost immediately got into the former Yugoslavia and you got Bosnia where then NATO put in military.

Q: Did the Belgians while you were there get involved in the Bosnia thing?

SCHERMERHORN: As I mentioned before, they had the UN mandate for the Eastern Slovenia portion of Croatia, the portion that abuts on Hungary. That was a two-year mandate; I think ’93 to ’95, again, the military anxious to take on these tasks. Then when they put together the UN operation for Bosnia we had this intense dialogue to get them to rollover the UN mandate and
they agreed to do that, but they also contributed a small communications company or something to the UN operation because they said, “We haven’t participated. We’re going to do this even though our major contribution is in the other UN.” And there was some discussion about whether the UN mandate should be incorporated into the NATO [inaudible], but in any event it wasn’t. So they were very proud of the fact that they were actually fulfilling more than their requirements in this regard.

They were also the first country to respond when we asked for troops for the force for Haiti. That was again serendipitous because when the cable came in the ambassador was in a couple of hours seeing the foreign minister and he asked him directly. But they were very useful because of course they had Francophone troops.

**Q:** Let’s talk about Africa.

SCHERMERHORN: Well as I said, a lot of our dialogue in the political section, when it wasn’t talking about NATO expansion and related issues, was discussing Africa with the Belgians. There was actually a trilateral dialogue that went on in different capitols periodically with the French, the Belgians and the U.S. Our assistant secretary for African affairs at that time, George Moose, came a couple of times and discussed that. One of our officers in the political section had the portfolio and was a very hard worker, very prolific, and did a lot of reporting on it; and this was important because this was ’94 when the crisis broke out in Rwanda.

**Q:** Who was the officer?

SCHERMERHORN: Her name was Jeanette Debros. She speaks six or seven languages. Her first tongue was Spanish. You should interview her when she retires, which will be soon. Also, because she had Serbo-Croatian she went and interviewed women in Croatia who were subject to rape.

**Q:** Taking of those camps.

SCHERMERHORN: Jeanette did wonderfully well with this portfolio and had good contacts and they liked her and were very responsive. Of course I think the Belgians at this point were on a mission. For years they had taken so much criticism about…the conventional wisdom was that they had left the Congo in a shambles and they hadn’t done anything to build up the infrastructure or the educational resources and so forth; all of which has some validity. Actually Africa was a subject of pretty sharp controversy within Belgium too. This often split on Walloon and Flemish…actually, the Flemish had more to do, the business with it, in the later period. I think earlier when Leopold first acquired the Congo it was more the Walloons who were involved, but especially the missionaries tended to be more Flemish I think. I shouldn’t really say that because that’s not something I’m absolutely certain about.

At that point, in the early ‘90s, more people were concerned about Burundi because they had another one of these bloodbaths, but actually it erupted again in Rwanda and it’s the classic Hutu-Tutsi conflict. People used to joke, but there’s some amount of truth to it: Look, you’ve got these two countries and there are Hutus and Tutsis in each one; why don’t we just give one to the
Hutus and the other to the Tutsis and let them live happily together, but of course, as we know, things don’t work that way.

When it got to the point where clearly things were falling apart and there was some need to go in and rescue people, our military were talking and the Belgians didn’t have enough transport, which was a problem. Anyway, we talked; but for the U.S. military it’s very hard to get a decision; you go back and forth in the chain of command in the U.S. into the operative command in the United States which would be somewhere inside of Washington and so on. Ultimately, you know, the Belgians did go in and the UN force was under a Canadian general, General Dallaire, and they had a very limited mandate. It was very carefully delineated. Basically it didn’t allow them to do anything offensive and so forth. We at one point had to call on the Belgians because we had some American journalists who got themselves trapped in this…there was this radio station, De Colleen, up in some place and they got themselves up there, so the Belgians went in and got them out. These were people who had been told not to go there, but anyway, at the end of this of course the Belgians lost eleven peacekeepers and they were hacked to death basically with machetes or something; they were not allowed to fire upon and so on. Actually this whole thing became the subject of a Canadian investigation and so on. This was one of the crises for peacekeeping because a lot of the countries said, “Look, we can’t go in and do this with such a limited mandate because we’re too long and bullet free.” Then they came out with this Chapter Seven versus Chapter Eight type of peacekeeping under UN regulations. This, along with the Somalia incident, which had happened in ’93 – not too long before that – of course put a crimp into peacekeeping. The concept isn’t bad, but obviously the UN and the participating countries hadn’t gotten the details down right.

Actually, sitting in ’93, I had just gotten into Belgium and this Somalia thing happened in October but it didn’t make too much of a… I don’t remember that it made too much of a ripple there. Yes, we knew it had happened, but…so then we had in ’94 this problem with the Belgians and that was a great national trauma. I mean they’re coming in and saying why are we doing this and so on, and we can’t protect ourselves.

Q: This is somewhat akin to the United States and the Somali thing the year before. It depends whose troops are getting killed.

SCHERMERHORN: Meanwhile Rwanda was more of a crisis, but then of course the Congo was the permanent, the never-ending crisis and the refugee movements became, when things fell apart in Rwanda, then of course there were a lot of refugees over into Goma, that little part of the Congo adjacent to Rwanda. Then we got involved in the refugee business – an airlift to help that. Of course the Belgians had a lot of contact with different Zairians and, as I said, Mobutu had a lot of assets in Belgium supposedly – real property and so forth.

The Belgians in this dialogue with the French, it was interesting. I think it would be fair to say that the Belgians actually got disenchanted with Mobutu either before we or the French did. However, they didn’t see an exit strategy, basically, and I think we were disenchanted but nobody saw an exit strategy from this. But the Belgians began to push more about doing something about it. But it’s the classical dilemma: you have a Mobutu, a strong man, and then when he goes what takes his place? It can be worse or it can be chaos? Or do you try to hand
pick somebody and support them and then you end up in the place that you had been in before anyway because somebody has a new patron and it may not turn out to be…

Q: Did you get involved in talking to the Belgians about whither the Congo and all of that?

SCHERMERHORN: Well, I didn’t personally but our political section did that, yes. They were very cautious about how they…because they had some economic interests of course that were tied into this too. But as I said, I think they became disenchanted. They realized that it couldn’t go on that way and everybody needed an exit strategy that would leave people with the least damage at the end of it. In the end it was partly achieved in that Mobutu left and died without creating an immediate uproar, but of course what was left behind hasn’t turned out to be very…and the other thing is of course all the states… I mean Mugabe got involved and everybody on the borders of the Congo was playing.

It would be fair to say that Africa was a big part of Belgium’s…and part of it was a feeling of responsibility that I think that they hadn’t…a lot of the current problems maybe they bear some responsibility for in the past and they needed to continue to play a role. I think mixed motives; some of it was clearly their economic interest but I think there was some element of personal responsibility and we need to stand up and be counted.

Q: Was there a strong missionary influence in the Belgian population?

SCHERMERHORN: There had been. That had been a very important part of it. Like the church everywhere, they’re not getting recruits into the monastery; I mean they’re not getting new nuns and new priests at the level they were before. So it’s an aging interest. I’d say it was more humanitarian - some of it attached to the church and some not - that motivated people to take an interest. I think there was also, as I said, a desire maybe a little to vindicate themselves from their past sins in a way by having something come out right. And lots of press, particularly the Flemish press, was very interested in uncovering “the scandals of Zaire,” at least the ones they could attribute to Walloon ministers. The investigative press in Belgium is very active, especially on the Flemish side. There are a couple of Flemish newspapers that have a lot of grist for this mill. And the society operating the way it does, if you start looking there’s a lot to uncover too.

Q: Were you observing sort of a new political class taking over?

SCHERMERHORN: That’s an interesting term because we don’t use the term in America: political class.

Q: We sure as hell have one.

SCHERMERHORN: I know, we have one but we don’t…I’ve only heard it heard very recently in use. The first time I went to Belgium they kept talking about the political class and I knew what they meant but it was funny to hear it because it’s not a terminology that we use. I think more of the population is in the political class. There’s more of a dialogue, more of a discussion, across a broader spectrum of people than we would see in the United States, but maybe that’s just because the population is small.
As I said, there was some interest in investigative reporting but we’ve seen that all over the world since Woodward and Bernstein. I don’t think there’s a lot of change except there’s more visibility, if that’s a change.

Q: I can’t remember if I’ve asked you this question. If you remember that I have then we’ll skip it. Immigrant groups coming from particularly Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo – was this a significant problem then?

SCHERMERHORN: We did talk about that a little and I said there were quarters, quarters, of Belgium, of Brussels, that had different groups. One of the interesting sidelights of the problem in Rwanda, when our embassy was evacuated and their were the killings, we got a message from someplace in Africa where there was a Rwandese woman who had a Belgian passport because she had been married to a Belgian and she had worked in the embassy as the protocol officer. Her family – her father, mother, various siblings; I guess the husband was gone – were killed and she managed to save herself somewhere but she was in Brussels with no money or anything. So there was a question: could she work in the embassy? Typical, this was a period, as I said before, mid ‘90s budget crunch; we couldn’t hire people, we were supposed to be getting rid of them and everything but we had a Fourth of July project that required a lot of work so I said, “Well can’t she work on that?” and we got her a contract. She was excellent. She spoke beautiful French and she spoke beautiful English and she was great help to the protocol officer. So we were able to help her for a little bit.

I guess they still had a payroll for the embassy in Rwanda and so she worked there but they paid her out of her own salary base for a while or something. I’d better not say; it’s probably something we weren’t supposed to do. Anyway, it seemed to be alright. Washington said it was alright. But that’s just a little human sidelight of what goes on in these things. And then I guess she got on a [inaudible], but she probably could’ve gotten a job ultimately in Belgium. She was excellent, a lovely woman. Jean Nevabondi, I think was her name. Africa is a continuing preoccupation.

Q: Then you mentioned relations with, I guess, our mission in the European Union?

SCHERMERHORN: Right. As I mentioned when we talked about the president’s first trip, they’re not full service embassies because they’re missions for a specific operation and they don’t represent the U.S. government to everybody there. But they had two very proactive, high profile representatives, Bob Hunter at NATO and Stu Eisenstadt at the European Union. Bob Hunter’s mission was NATO expansion. He was really one of the architects of how…and that was his agenda. He was pushing it. As you mentioned, the political class did a lot of talking about the pros and cons of this. Initially more of the commentary was con than pro, I think. They plugged away at it and now we’ve got it.

Q: How did it work? Okay, our ambassador to NATO is in Belgium and we had to get the Belgians on the side. You had to carry the water, didn’t you?

SCHERMERHORN: Right. As I said before, some people said, “We don’t need European Union
embassies,” and we had to point out, even to the people who worked at…that that wasn’t really true because they were lobbying and interfacing, if you will, their interlocutors who were the bureaucrats, who were the employees of the member states and the commission. The member states actually voted and had input at a political level but it wasn’t the level they were dealing with. So there are these two avenues and they’re parallel; they’re not duplicative or whatever. So, yes, we’re lobbying government to government and our government is in the mission to the Union lobbying the bureaucrats who are the employees of the commission or of the parliament. That’s a different kind of issue. In NATO of course the structure is different but there were a number of the organization so what our mission there is representing within and to the membership the U.S. views on these issues, but there’s a parallel that Belgium is a member so we’re talking to the foreign ministry about the same kinds of issues and trying to find out…

Obviously these are not identical situations because of the difference in membership versus being an observer basically, which is what we are in the European Union. There is certainly room for the dual approach, and not only room for it, it’s essential because neither one nor the other gets the job done.

**Q:** You were looking sort of on the sidelines but what was your impression of the structure and what was going on at the European Union headquarters? The reason I ask is I’ve talked to people in Strasbourg and I’ve seen pictures of this where guys in tail coats and opening doors for…it looked like a pretty plush organization and just by looking at it I could say we’ll run rings around them because they spend too much time on their protocol and all of that. What was your impression of the bureaucracy?

**SCHERMERHORN:** Well, you know, there’s a problem of centrifugal force here. For efficiency a lot of the members really would’ve preferred to have all the institutions of the Union together in Brussels but because it means jobs for locals, and for other political reasons, member states wanted to have different operations; so the parliament was in Strasbourg and the court was in Luxembourg and as they started putting together some kind of institutions which would monitor the different elements of agricultural standards and stuff like that they talked about going further out into Greece or Spain or whatsoever. There was always this battle between efficiency and ease. Do you really want to get on the train and go to Strasbourg for parliament?

In fact, they had to renovate the Berlemond which is the major office building of the Union in Brussels because they found asbestos in it. And this was one of these buildings built in the end of the ‘70s and it was huge. They had to disperse people around. But then they decided they would build something that basically could have the parliament sit there and they would alternate sessions. So slowly they’re trying to gather this into a…but they still have to placate.

**Q:** Well, they’re up against the French, for one thing; and when you’re up against the French, placation is not much of an operative word.

**SCHERMERHORN:** They do have some redundancies and some problems that are very expensive. They demand that publications be printed in the official languages; well as you expand the EU your languages get more and more and more esoteric. They deal basically in French in English. All of the Nordic countries and Germany do the English. The French are a bit
beleaguered in a way; the days when French was the lingua franca are no longer true, but they’ve got their finger in that dyke. I think you used to take it as a given that all the Scandinavians and the Dutch all spoke French, too, and that’s no longer absolutely true.

Q: While you were in Belgium did any issues come up and say we need the Belgians support on this and that and we would automatically look over to see what the European Union was doing, or did we just go right in to the Belgian government?

SCHERMERHORN: We’d get our instruction and we’d make our demarche to whatever at the same time. You didn’t wait to…the reason I think you don’t wait, if you wait to see, you’re immediately foreclosing an option of convincing them because you’re saying…

Q: Would the European Union’s stance affect how we approached or dealt with it?

SCHERMERHORN: Well it might, depending on the issue I guess. Again, when you’re talking about the political issues here and if you’re talking about the Middle East or you’re talking about something about where to effect change you’re probably going to require some kind of either economic sanctions or military operation, that’s very hard to convince people but there are a few major players. So there are two ways to do that. You can either attack the major players; there’s France, of course Britain and depending on the locale, Italy – if you’re talking about Central Africa, you want to get the Belgian voice if you can; the Dutch are very influential in a lot of ways when you’re talking about third countries because they do very high order of humanitarian and other assistance and they’re very outspoken about what they think and feel, but then of course you find sometimes unexpected things like the Norwegians playing a role in the Middle East. So, again, the good offices of the smaller countries are not to be sneezed at in certain places.

The Norwegians, the Danes, the Swedes, have that traditional role. The Norwegians are very interested in Sudan, for example, which you might not realize, and they’ve played a role in some of the goings-on there. When we’re talking about Sudan policy we talk to the French and so forth because we’re interested in getting a consensus, and we think, again, you’re right, if you can’t get the French on board it’s hard for the rest of the…the rest of the EU isn’t going to break ranks on something unless it’s really whatever. We have this problem on Iraq; the French are very opposed to…So far, the sanctions, we’ve managed to carry that basically by saying if you won’t do anything more, the minimum you have to do is sanctions. We tried to demonstrate that they’ve worked and of course people who are opposed to them say yes, they’ve worked to the detriment of the Iraqi people because the health and welfare of the population is at the lowest ebb ever. That’s both a plus and a minus when you’re making your arguments. It’s very complicated.

The British have always been forthcoming for us but there are voices in the U.K. that are not entirely happy with all of this.

Q: Speaking of which, how did you find the other embassies in Brussels? Did you find you worked with some better than others or did you kind of work together quite often or not?

SCHERMERHORN: Actually, Belgium was the first place where I didn’t have a lot of reason to
work with other embassies and I was a little surprised by that. I had basically been in the developing world where you do work with the other embassies because it’s hard to get information because you feel if you go in together you have a greater impact or whatever it is. But there it was a little sad. The Turks used to call; they were very proper in the Turkish embassy, but everybody was so busy there and we were the 800 pound gorilla in a way because we had so many people in NATO and so many people in the EU and this embassy to the government. Our interlocutors were the Belgian foreign office and other ministries as appropriate and then talking to our compatriots.

The people I felt sorry for in a way were some of the smaller African…they all had to be represented there because it was the EU and NATO, but they didn’t get much of a look. It’s sort of like Washington for some of the small embassies here; it’s hard for them to get a foothold in anything because there’s so much competition. The ambassador used to go to the National Days and I would go to the ones we got invited to but he didn’t want to go to some of these. I can remember going to one which was out in Plancenoit somewhere and they were so happy that somebody from the American embassy came and it meant a lot to them. As far as having much is working activity, no.

Q: One of the questions I often ask about people who are desk officers is how did that embassy work within the Washington context; in other words, were they able to play Congress, the press, and the White House and all? In Belgium where was the seat of power or where were your contacts?

SCHERMERHORN: Our contacts were mostly in the foreign ministry. They were very effective. Journalists – the political section talked to a lot of journalists. We had a very effective USIS there so we had a lot of contacts with the journalists. A lot with the business community because that was another whole element; as I said, our ambassador was very business-minded; and we had a very strong chamber of commerce. What I was trying to get us to do was have more contact with the regional governments in Belgium because clearly things were devolving there. But it’s very hard. We didn’t actually have a lot of people and these dialogues on Africa and NATO expansion took up a lot of time. We had three people in the economic section and they wanted to take it down to two; we had a political counselor.

We had a job that did labor because labor officer was a traditional job there and the Labor Department wanted to keep it, but in fact there wasn’t enough. The labor unions had been a very important part of the dialogue, especially after the war; this was when we got very interested in this. But by 1995 the labor unions were there but it was pretty predictable and what motivated the U.S. government to be interested in the labor movements in the ‘50s with their threat of Communist infiltration and so forth, that was no longer an issue here. So we really didn’t have enough for a labor officer to do so they took on the Africa portfolio. When this woman I mentioned, Jeanette Debro, left, we gave the Africa portfolio to the labor officer and he loved it and he did a great job too. That was something where you could see some results and you could move a dialogue and so forth, whereas the labor thing was pretty sterile at this point.

And then we had a POL/MIL officer who did most of the NATO issues; and we had a junior rotational officer. That’s all. You had three and a half people. For the issues and the technicality
of them and so forth, that really wasn’t a lot. The Belgians were very good and talked and like to move issues themselves. It was a rich dialogue so it was more time consuming; and I wanted us to spend a little more time working in these regional governments and seeing…but you know Washington really wasn’t that interested in the details of devolution in Belgium; just like they weren’t that interested in any details about the economy because these were issues that were important in the ‘50s and ‘60 because you really didn’t know where Europe was and where it was going at that point maybe, quite to the degree. Now these interlocking, European Union, NATO, other issues; I still think that the future of these – it would be too strong to call them an irredentist movement in Belgium because it’s the two basic halves of the country. It’s not like Brittany or the Basque Country or something – but you have this big umbrella and underneath it there’s a lot of movement in these national identities; and whether in due course, if you do have political union of a greater degree of cohesion within this European umbrella then is there room for some movement. We’ve seen the Scottish parliament now and that’s a step in some direction. If you were a football fan, you’d say, “We’re never going to abandon our national identities,” or a follower of the Olympics, because everything is predicated upon this national identity. Maybe it’s not a reality for the twenty-first century; it’s a vestige of something earlier.

Of course what’s important about the devolution is, as we talked earlier, the way they parse out the money – how do you tax people and how much goes to a central government and how much stays there. So these are interesting issues but we didn’t actually have much time to do that to the degree…and this was particularly important in the area of the environment because that was kind of the bellwether issue for the regions. That was the area where they were doing their own thing first so those were areas that were personally of interest to me and I thought they had some resonance; but we’re in this period in the mid ‘90s when the Congress is reducing the money to the State Department. All I want you to do is tell what jobs you can give up. Finally I got so exasperated at one of them. They came in and I said, “Well we’ve already done this, that, and the other thing. If you want another job it’s going to have to be mine,” because we can’t not have a political and an economic section. And you need to have a consular officer; we only had two consular officers and we had some terrific FSNs. Well, Belgium has wonderful FSNs; they’re linguists, they’re efficient, they work very hard.

Q: They know the territory of course.

SCHERMERHORN: And they’re loyal. Given the amount of work that the consular section had, the amount of American Citizens Services and visas and all that, they have some efficiency scale, how many cases per capita, and the embassy and the consular section in Belgium was at the top of the…They did a lot with very little but you couldn’t take it down any more. So this was a period of total unrealism. It was Washington as to what. And here we are, the greatest country in the world – we say and we think and I believe and so do you, I know – and we’re nickeling and diming. It’s just incredible.

Q: During this period did you have a problem with particularly the election of ’94 and Congress being taken over by the pretty extreme right people? At least it seemed to be coming that way. Was that sort of discouraging or did that have any effect on you all? We had a Congress where many of the new members, Republicans, were boasting that they didn’t have a passport because they had never traveled.
SCHERMERHORN: Well, as I said, you didn’t see any immediate direct impact. The dialogue about NATO went on and all the technical – and even at a higher level – but what it did mean is there was a tremendous squeeze on the budget. Then you were saying, well, what do we need people to talk about various things, various issues? However, it didn’t have any direct impact. Maybe that’s not a good thing to say because the Congress would like to feel that they form an impact on policy – and they do over time, but as far as an immediate flip-flop you don’t see it so much.

Q: Well then in ’97, should we leave Belgium do you think?

SCHERMERHORN: I think I talked about the U.S. trade center that Ambassador Blinken…his idea was that Commerce and USIS should work together because one of the things is Belgium had a very fine library and Belgium had one of the earliest incarnations of the Fulbright program as soon as the legislation was passed. In 1997 they had the fiftieth anniversary of the Fulbright program, which had been very effective. Most of the people who had been Fulbright became – we chose well and we had one of the highest records of people who then went on and over time…So we had chosen well and they had benefited, or so we thought, from whatever they had done on the Fulbright program.

And we had a wonderful library which the government and a lot of other people used, but this was a period when they said we don’t need to run libraries in Europe because they have access to…Well, yes and no. So they wanted to close the library and I think we moved forward with that. But then the ambassador put together this idea of having a trade center where people could go and come as a base to work not only in Belgium but throughout the European Union and it would be the assets of USIS, their databases and so forth and Commerce and work together. The two counselors, USIS and Commerce, said, “Well, you know, we’ve never done this before,” and I said, “This ambassador, you notice his body language, we don’t say ‘no’. We figure out how we can do it,” and we did. And he did it and it worked very well and it was very productive and so forth. He got the prime minister to come and open it. The ambassador was very persuasive and the government liked him; so they responded to these initiatives. It all worked very well together.

G. JONATHAN GREENWALD
Chief Political Officer, US Mission to the European Community

Born and raised in Pennsylvania, Mr. Greenwald earned degrees for Princeton University and Harvard Law School. His first government assignment was General Counsel in the Department of the Air Force. He later transferred to the Department of State, where he served as legal advisor as well as Political Officer, both in Washington and in various assignments abroad. His foreign posts include Germany (East and West Berlin), Yugoslavia, Hungary and Belgium. He also had assignments concerning anti-terrorism.
Q: Okay, so in the summer of 1993 you went back overseas to another assignment?

GREENWALD: I did. I went somewhat unenthusiastically and not unwillingly to Brussels. I had wanted very badly to go back to Eastern Europe. I had spent much of my career dealing with East-West matters either in Eastern Europe itself or dealing with Eastern Europe. I'd seen and been on the spot for the very dramatic changes in 1989-1990, and I badly wanted to be part of the next phase, to see how it went, to see whether the new democratic governments in the region sank real roots down and where the next stage of history was going to lead them. I would have loved to be allowed to study Russian for a year and go off to the Soviet Union, which was no longer the Soviet Union by that time but already Russia, or go to anywhere in the former Soviet Union. But at that stage in my career there wasn't much practical possibility of that, because there were already plenty of other people who had credentials for that who had served one or more tours and had been ahead of me in line. But I was hoping to go to Eastern Europe. I bid on a number of positions in Warsaw, for example, and Budapest, and those weren't happening, they weren't coming through, but I was holding out and hoped that eventually they would. It was rather late in the bidding process, the assignment process. Some time in April I got a call from Personnel, and they said, "We have an idea. Wouldn't you like to go to Brussels and be in charge of the Political Section at the U.S. mission to the European Community?" I said, "Well, can I think about it over the weekend and come back to you on Monday?" They said, "Sure," and on Monday I came back to them and said no. They said okay. About ten more days went by, and another call came. Again it was Personnel on the line, and they said, "We have an idea. Wouldn't you like to go to Brussels and be in charge of the Political Section at the U.S. mission to the European Community? But before you answer, remember we can make other suggestions." The penny dropped, and I realized that the other suggestions were likely to have much less to do with Eastern Europe or Europe than Brussels, so I said, "Yes, all right." The reason for my reluctance was ignorance. I had worked on Europe for really all of my career essentially, but I had had essentially nothing to do with the European Community. I touched on it once or twice. I had some part to play in the CSCE business. I had even been to Brussels once at the time I was working on CSCE to meet with some people at the Commission, and I had gone from the Counterterrorism Office to hold what were regular semiannual consultations with the European Community on counterterrorism matters. But it always had seemed to me a place which was 90 percent economic, which wasn't my field, with a little touch of the political but basically an economic place with a lot to do with trade, things I wasn't terribly interested in and didn't think were terribly important. So I went not really expecting it to be a very exciting assignment, and I discovered gradually in stages how wrong I was. I got to Brussels in September of 1993 having done a certain amount of background preparation. I had spent some time at FSI to brush up French and bring it up to a more respectable level, and I had gone into the office in the European Bureau that backstopped the mission in Brussels and I read months of back telegrams and that sort of thing. But I didn't know a great deal about the European Community when I got there or a great deal about frankly what was going on between the United States and the European Community. I arrived one day before my new ambassador, Stewart Eizenstadt, and all I knew basically to tell him was where the men's room was in the mission when he hit the ground running. I quickly learned that he was really a unique public servant. I've met a number of remarkable people in my career, but I don't think I met anybody who combines the degree of intellectual capacity with ability to work endless hours and dedication to getting results and sheer
decency that is combined in the Eizenstadt package. Not long after I got to Brussels, David Aaron, who was then our ambassador to the OECD in Paris, was up visiting, and he told me that he had met Eizenstadt back in the very early days of the Carter campaign in 1976 and had been aboard the campaign airplane when somebody said, "Do you see that young fellow sitting up in the front of the plane? That's Stu Eizenstadt, a nice fellow, knows everything, never sleeps." That's all still true. He made it an exciting place to work, and he insured that, if it wasn't so already, there would be a heavy political dosage in the work. Of course, he came into a situation which had already evolved far beyond that which I had thought I understood to be the case in Brussels. The European Community had already reached a point where its ambitions and to an extent its capacities were to be a political player, not just an economic player, on a world level. This corresponded with a change in the nature of international relations which was rather fundamental, but at the end of the Cold War the major coin of international power had changed from the old-fashioned straight political/military to what you might call political/economic. I went to Brussels thinking that the balance of the U.S. interests was on the other side of town, the side of town where the mission to NATO was. I left convinced that the great balance of U.S. interest was on the side of town where coincidentally I had been working. I recognized that there's always a feeling, a tendency to see things from "where you stand is where you sit," but I think with an effort to be dispassionate in analysis, there is something to that. Most of the types of problems that we face these days in Europe and beyond Europe in the world are problems that require the application of political strength, political cohesion, economic and financial strength, not traditional military strength, and the only potential ally that we have to be an effective partner in dealing with those problems is the European Union, because only it has that combination of shared Western values and capacity or potential capacity to exercise great political, economic and financial strength, which isn't to say there isn't a role for NATO and there isn't a role for military strength. There clearly is, but the fundamental question in Europe, to take the most immediate example, is not their capacity to withstand an advance of the Red Army. The Red Army doesn't exist. There is, for example, not likely to be such a threat in the near or medium term to a Poland or to an Albania, but there is every possibility of a threat to the stability of countries in Eastern Europe if they don't build truly deep root systems for their democratic structures and if they don't develop a truly efficient and effective market economy. No one threatened Albania from the outside. It collapsed last year because it couldn't answer either of those questions: Did it have a working civil society or a working economy? The European Union has the capacity to serve as a magnet, a beacon, for the nature of development that's necessary, and it has the ability to provide a great deal of help for countries in Eastern Europe in making that transition. Once a country is truly qualified to become a member of the European Union, that is, once it has a sufficient civil society and a sufficiently efficient economy to pass the membership test, then it's going to be a secure country basically, or it will become secure. Whether it's a member of NATO or not is, I would argue, irrelevant. I might argue that Ireland is not a member of NATO, it's a member of the Western European Union, but if it was invaded by little green men from Mars, because it would be seen as a member of The Western Club, it would get help, and that's the case for all of the countries in Eastern Europe. The question is can they build those ties that make for the membership in the Western club, not whether they're formally protected by NATO or not. And you can extend that to other parts of the world. One example is the southern mideastern Mediterranean. NATO has a Mediterranean initiative, because everyone recognizes that there's a great zone of instability in North Africa not to mention the traditional Arab-Israel area, and that NATO Mediterranean initiative is to convene
the foreign and defense ministers from the countries of the region periodically in Brussels and chat. It really doesn't go beyond that. The European Union has a Mediterranean initiative that involves an effort to construct over 20 years a giant free-trade zone that would have a political cooperation component roughly based on CSCE; and to prepare the ground for such an undertaking, to help the countries make the changes in their economies that would be necessary to survive in a free-trade zone of that magnitude, they've allocated over the next five years alone something like nine billion dollars of assistance. If you divide nine billion by I think it's 12 countries that are eligible for that assistance and then do it over five years, it doesn't come out to all that much money per country per year. It's only a few drops in the bucket of what's necessary, but still it's an enormous commitment of resources to try to deal with the long-term causes of instability and insecurity in the region. NATO remains the ultimate guarantor of the fire wall if the fire breaks out, but the way to deal with the question of whether a fire breaks out or not seems to me something that the European Union has more tools with which to work than NATO. You can continue on around the world with something like KEDO, the Korean Economic Development Organization, which is the international body set up basically to safeguard the North Korean nuclear program. If North Korea's nuclear program ever went, was ever weaponized, then clearly you'd need the traditional military strength that could keep it in check. But the financial and political support of the European Union was essential to get KETO off the ground, to finance it, to produce the wherewithal to peacefully divert that nuclear program, and on through the kinds of new global issues that we talk about increasingly these days, population, environment, transnational crime and so forth. So I became a convert as I saw the issues and I saw the way in which Stu approached them and began to get some changes in Washington policies, and a convert to the belief that the real name of the game in Europe today is whether or not the European Union makes that quantum jump forward in advancing the integration process and making a true economic and financial union and a true political union not long after that. That will determine the nature of Europe and the nature of U.S. relations with Europe and as well our ability to deal with the kinds of issues that we're going to be facing increasingly around the world. So it became intellectually for me, I think it's fair to say, the most interesting and most stimulating experience that I've had. My own world view was changed recognizing the importance of different elements, economics and trade among other things, finance, as the power factor in the world, different elements than I'd been trained to think of and had thought of for 25 years. I had developed throughout the CSCE experience a substantial respect for what you might call the soft side of security, that security was more than just how much military force have you got and how much does the other fellow have. There was a great deal of importance to for short term, say, the human rights side of security. But those four years in Brussels opened my eyes largely. They never should have been closed certainly, but they did open my eyes to another area of security which with the end of the Cold War had become, I think, the most important. So it was intellectually stimulating and important. We did a lot of good work. In particular, Stu sought to establish some type of new contractual relationship between the United States and the European Union for a couple of reasons. There was a strong feeling in Europe in the first couple of years that we were there that the United States might turn away from Europe. At the time that we arrived in the fall of 1993, the Uruguay round of trade negotiations was coming to a climax, and partly because it was inherited wisdom in the U.S., partly because it was a good negotiating tactic on the part of our government, there was a great deal of talk about the future in Asia and Europe as passé. Then came the 1994 election, and the results seemed to confirm a tendency of the United States to look inward and not be concerned with the outer world, certainly not to be
concerned as much with Europe. There was a large percentage of the incoming Congressional class that had no discernible interest in Europe. So European leader after European leader began to make statements, speeches, proposals for some kind of rejuvenation of the trans-Atlantic relationship. This really was across the board. There was as much interest in some kind of rejuvenation being expressed in France as there was in the U.K. or Germany. Stu sought to use that as a way in which not only something that the U.S. would have to respond to in general but the way in which the response would ratify a new relationship to the European Union and change the balance of the way in which the United States dealt with Europe from the overwhelmingly NATO version to a more balanced role between NATO and the European Union. The explorations that we made went down a couple of dead ends before we finally hit upon the negotiation that became known as the New Trans-Atlantic Agenda: a very large, substantial document that was signed at a Summit with European Union leaders in Madrid in December of 1995. In order to avoid the pitfall of the grand document which makes the headline and then disappears a few months later because it has nothing except rhetoric in it, it had an awful lot of specific items. There were over a hundred specific proposals. They went from purely political traditional foreign policy ones through cooperation in developing new disease control mechanisms through various trade proposals to proposals for establishing, as we call it, the new trans-Atlantic bridges. These were new people-to-people contacts that would go beyond the traditional types of exchanges which governments were increasingly less willing to finance than they were at the time of the Cold War. This was a major effort on the part of the mission and involved a great deal of negotiating, much of it done by us unlike some of the other negotiations I mentioned which were done largely out of Washington. A great deal was done, in this case primarily because of Stu’s drive in and through Brussels. We can only claim partial success. I don't think we made a total breakthrough in the U.S.-European relations or in the consciousness of what you might call the foreign policy elite. There's still an enormous amount of skepticism about the European Union's capacity to be effective, a fair amount of that justified. But I think we did make a substantial movement forward and at least created some of the preconditions necessary for a change in the kinds of U.S. approaches to Europe I've been talking about. At the same time as all of this was happening and the intellectual excitement, the professional excitement of dealing with a major negotiation and making an effort to change policy, I'd also say that it was in some ways the least enjoyable foreign assignment I've ever had. That's because, well, everything that happens at the European Union is terribly important, big issues, but it's all done in a rather dull sort of way, it's done by good diplomats, bureaucrats, Eurocrats, people in nice suits and ties dressing just like you and me in committee rooms, and it's not the flesh-and-blood, pulsing life of a foreign society. That is one of the reasons why many people are attracted to the Foreign Service in the first place. Unlike what you could do in Budapest, you couldn't walk into a pub in Brussels and sit down and say, "What do you think of the way the European Union football team played last night," and get into a discussion. It's not a country. It's not in that sense a real concept. It's an intellectual construct, and you couldn't call up the country's best and most controversial novelist and invite him to lunch and ask him what did that book really mean, what are its implications for politics. There isn't the best European Union novelist; there's not even the worst European Union novelist. And Brussels itself is a very pleasant, easy place to live, but it's such a polyglot international civil servant community that again we felt much less involved in it, much less drawn to it than any other city we've lived in in Europe. So there's a strange contradiction between the policy satisfactions or even the policy dissatisfactions which
were intellectually stimulating and the loss of that romantic side, which at least for me is a strong element of what makes the Foreign Service or makes international life attractive.

Q: I assume that most of your negotiating, your interactions, your dealings were with the staff, the international civil servants of the European Commission and with the diplomats representing member states of the European Union assigned to Brussels just like you were. Is that right?

GREENWALD: Yes, the Commission, it is often said, is the executive branch or the executive arm of the European Union. It's the motor for European policies. It sees itself as the inheritor and the executor of the Monnet-Schuman dream of a Europe which is somehow a political and economic whole. The member states believe in that in greater or lesser degrees. They each have their own concept, the British most famously of the concept of Europe as a free-trade zone but please leave our foreign policy alone and our defense policy, and the Benelux countries which are more inclined toward the Commission type of view because they're small and recognize if they're to play a continuing part in the world, it has to be in and through this larger entity, and the others strung out somewhere in the middle. So any question that comes up in Brussels involving European Union policy is always a fascinatingly complex one where you have to look at the positions being taken and ask why are they taking these positions. Undoubtedly there's an element of institutional competence which always come into play with the Commission trying to advance its power versus the member states who are represented in the council, the European parliament which is growing almost by leaps and bounds in its power and its responsibility so that one had the feeling sometimes that one was watching the 17th century struggle in England between king and parliament with the parliament using the power of the purse to advance its responsibilities into areas that just a few years it had had no say in at all. Every issue that has to be decided, if it's of importance, has domestic political ramifications, which is a truism that, of course, we know from the United States and the famous quotation of Tip O'Neill's that all politics is local. But in the European Union all politics being local means all politics has at least 15 locales. One of the things one learns quickly is that there is almost nothing that matters that can be resolved in one place in the European Union.

Q: Or at one time.

GREENWALD: One place or one time. You've got to go to all of the different power centers, which means in Brussels you've got to touch base with the Commission, the Council and increasingly Parliament, but all of our embassies have to touch base with all of their contacts in their capitals. It's sometimes felt that there's a zero sum game, that as the European Union becomes important or more important in Europe, our embassies in the member state capitals become less important. To an extent that's true but to a much lesser extent than might immediately seem to be the case, because it's only the nature of the issue that our embassy is dealing with that country and its changes becomes less and less what can we do in this special relationship with London or how can we build a special relationship to do something uniquely bilaterally with Bonn than what position is London going to take on the European issue. How is it going to use its influence to make a decision about a European policy or how is Bonn going to use its influence. The work in many ways increases for the bilateral embassy, but it's a matter of in effect becoming a lobbyist for the position that you hope will be represented by Bonn or London or Paris or Rome in the European councils which increasingly are important.
Q: Then there's also a question of effectiveness. You may be able to persuade through the embassy in Rome the Italian government that it should take a certain position, but sometimes it doesn't actually take that or doesn't speak up at the right time. Jon, I'd be interested maybe in delving a little bit into one or the other of two areas. One is the whole question of enlargement of the European Union. I assume in the mid-90s while you were there that was a topic. And the second -- choose one or the other or both -- would be the whole question of the crises that were cropping up in various parts of the world where the United States was involved, the European Union had an interest in some cases, the Balkans, Rwanda, I don't know what else. Where these things that preoccupied you or got you involved, or was this kind of marginal to your responsibilities?

GREENWALD: No, they were the bread and butter of what we were doing, in both sets of issues, enlargement and the sort of ad hoc crises. Enlargement, of course, is the fundamental question. It's whether the European Union can do to and for Eastern Europe what it did for itself, go back to the reason for the Monnet concept, which was to make war impossible between Germany and France, and that was achieved brilliantly. It's inconceivable that there could be a war in Western Europe, because everything is so tied together that you'd be fighting yourself. Whether that kind of coalescence of enlightened self-interest can be developed and extended to Eastern Europe is the big question of enlargement. Everyone agrees with that strategic concept on both sides of the Atlantic. All of the devils are waiting to pounce out of the details. Early on in my time in Brussels, Secretary Christopher made a speech in Budapest in which he strongly criticized the European Union for, as he put it, moving too slowly and for using Eastern Europe as an area from which to draw resources rather than an area in which to put resources. He used as his citation for that fact that in the past year the Eastern Europeans had bought more goods from Western Europe than the EU was selling or sending into Eastern Europe. We were quickly demarched on that at a number of levels in Brussels, because they felt that there were several things wrong with it. First, there was the economic fallacy that they pointed out, and I think persuasively, that if you have economies which were as run-down as those in Eastern Europe which have to retool, which have to get new machinery and new wherewithal to compete, it's only natural that there would be a period in which they make substantial purchases in the West before they can produce the goods that could be sold and bought in the West, they could sell goods which were of quality that would be of interest to Russia or the Third World or, if they didn't make enough, that could be of interest in the Western markets, and they had to retool to do it. The more important point they made was that, while we could argue about the pace of enlargement -- and they had their arguments about why they had to go more slowly than we would like, some of them, I think, quite good arguments -- at the higher policy levels we tended to see the European Union as something like NATO, a club of like-minded. You let somebody in when you decided it was politically opportune to let somebody in, which basically is the NATO case. The European Union is different. It doesn't do anybody any good if you let them in before they're able to stand on their own feet. They'll hurt themselves and they'll hurt the larger entity, so they were arguing, "We're really much more like a government than we are like a like-minded club, and these states aren't ready. To some extent, we're not ready. We have to do certain things. You're right, we've been slow about that. But they're not going to be ready for quite a few years, because they have to make enormous changes in the very root structure of their societies." But regardless of that argument about how fast or how slow one could go, one shouldn't use
megaphone diplomacy in dealing with each other. They should not go into the heart of Eastern Europe and make a statement that will sound good in the ears of your immediate hosts but which takes a dispute into the newspaper headlines. We need a new type of relationship where we talk quietly and in confidence to each other and not the megaphone approach. That's been one of the issues that's continually haunted us on enlargement. It's come up periodically. It's come up very recently also with regard to Turkey, where there are differences that we have about what the approach to Turkey or the relationship to Turkey should be in the European Union. It's a very complicated question, but we tended to deal with that all too often in a public way rather than a private way. That's been one theme, the question of megaphone diplomacy versus quiet diplomacy. The other is this really more fundamental issue of how fast can you go, are they dragging their feet, because it's already been almost a decade. Nobody thinks that there will really be members in Eastern Europe or the European Union before 2002, 2003, maybe 2005. Is that irresponsible, or is it really necessary because it's the complexity of the situation? I think there's a little bit of truth in both, that there's still very fundamental issues that the European Union has to resolve internally before it can take the Eastern Europeans in. Even if the Eastern Europeans were ready today, the European Union isn't ready for them. But to give them the benefit of doubt, I think that all those kinds of decisions would become easier to take if they get through the number-one priority which they have, and that's economic and monetary union. Almost all of their psychic energy, ability to make political compromises, to force through unpopular measures is being directed toward making EMU a success. They think that's the most important thing on their agenda, the step which will most dramatically, most effectively advance the integration process, and which, if it fails, will most dramatically negatively unravel a great deal which has been achieved over the last 40 years. If they get through that successfully, then they'll be ready and able to jump the hurdles that remain before them on enlargement, which they're not yet ready to jump. Since it's going to take a number of years for the Eastern Europeans to complete their own transformation, I think we can afford to give them the benefit of the doubt on that. The ad hoc crises continually raised the question of what leadership is. From our point of view, leadership has generally been us making up our mind as to what needs to be done and then telling the Europeans what that strategy is and asking for support. From the European point of view, that style has increasingly, as they would see it, evolved into a situation where we are saying to them we will lead and have the prestige of leadership, we will contribute our political prestige to that common cause, and you please write the check. The Europeans are feeling annoyed that to some extent it has to be that way, because they aren't yet able to reach those policy decisions which we've reached for themselves, because their differences among themselves are still substantial and their mechanisms, procedures and mindsets for resolving them all too often go toward lower common denominators. There is also a belief that in many instances they are more able than we're prepared to give them credit for to play a political role. Since both sides agree that the Europeans have a substantial number of checks which they can and need to write, there should be a political payoff for that, that there needs to be a different kind of approach toward shared political leadership. That's been very much the case in the Middle East, very much the case in the Balkans. Of course, it's a particularly difficult one because of the painful history of Bosnia. There you have I would say a cartoon view in the United States that it's a little bit like the Second World War or the First World War all over again. The Europeans got into a mess and couldn't handle it, and we had to jump in and save them. The European view, of course, is that, yes, they got into a mess, they couldn't handle it, but we didn't handle it either, and we stood on the sidelines while they tried to deal with it, and we
then got in and provided the absolutely indispensable additional element to resolve the matter, but we couldn't have done it alone either, and now they're providing both a lot of troops and an awful lot of money to try to shore up the situation and rebuild. All of that means that there should be some kind of shared leadership, whereas what they tend to get is the Richard Holbrookian style of leadership, which is accepted at times of crisis but rubs raw quickly when it isn't a time of crisis. That kind of dispute was constant throughout the years that I was there, and I think probably still is. Our role is constantly to mediate; again to explain to Washington attitudes which were sometimes irritated and explain why the irritation; explain ways around it; explain that if we wanted to get that check, we would need to be somewhat more diplomatic in the way we asked for it; and, of course, the traditional role of explaining to the Europeans why it was that Washington was coming at them for this or for that. There was a great deal of suspicion that we had to deal with. You can multiply the examples, but to take just one: the U.S. came up with a rather nice idea which was called the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative, SECI. It was basically developed by Richard Shifter at the NSC. It is a modest proposal for encouraging economic cooperation within the Balkans and in the immediate surrounding area of the Balkans, to try to deal with the animosities that had been exacerbated by Bosnia and to encourage cooperation instead of hostility within the region. We had no financial resource to put into this idea. We had the idea, and we were willing to provide political dynamism. Now when we went to the Europeans and said we have this nice idea and we don't have any money for it but we have political dynamism, of course that sent all of the warning signals up that we were really going to ask them to provide the money and write some more checks, and we had to work hard to keep Washington aware of that sensitivity and to persuade the Europeans that in fact this was an idea that was meant to work without anybody putting any financial resources. It was really meant to encourage cooperation on the ground, but it would have been an easier idea to sell if we had made a little more progress in that more fundamental approach, which is the goal of the New Trans-Atlantic Agenda, which is ultimately to encourage Washington to rethink its concept of what partnership with Europe is all about. So I think we made a start in moving things along in that direction. The next few years will be crucial. That will be determined substantially by what happens with EMU, whether it is made a success. Will it lead, as I think it probably will if it's a success, to a great increase in European self-confidence and ability to make substantial movement toward greater integration and, therefore, a more efficient common foreign policy as well as economic policy. Can the United States make the adjustments that will have to be made on our side to deal with a different kind of Europe, dealing with a Europe which is much more our equal.

Q: Maybe that's a good point to stop, Jon. You've covered over several sessions about 30 years of your involvement with Europe and the United States. This is obviously a story that doesn't quite have a closure and an ending at this point, but the Europe of 1998 is very different than the Europe of 1969 or whenever it was you first went to Berlin. I've enjoyed very much these conversations.

GREENWALD: Well, thank you. It's been a pleasure and an honor to have them with you.

ROBERT E. HUNTER
Ambassador Hunter was born in Massachusetts and raised in Virginia and New Jersey. He earned degrees from Wesleyan University (Connecticut) and the London School of Economics, where he also was Lecturer. He served in the White House on the National Security Council and on Capital Hill in the office of Senator Edward Kennedy. After serving with several private organizations, the Ambassador was Campaign Manager for William Clinton in his 1992 Presidential Campaign. In 1993 he was appointed US Ambassador to the European Union and served there until 1998. Ambassador Hunter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

HUNTER: I was sworn in on July the 8th and arrived in Brussels on the 11th, Sunday morning.

Q: We’ll pick it up at that point, but we will go back to the way you were helping setting your own agenda through Christopher writing this.

HUNTER: My primary objective was, if we were going to be able collectively to do our job, to recoup after the bad misstep a few months earlier.

Q: Which was the fact finding.

HUNTER: Yes, it’s like when the Secretary of State goes anywhere abroad. Fact finding? Uh uh. The Secretary doesn’t go out and “fact find,” because he or she has diplomats to do that. You go out and say: “Here is what we think should be done.” You lead. Boom.

Q: Ok, today is the 16th of January 2007. What did you see as our agenda with NATO in ’93?

HUNTER: Well, let’s give credit where credit is due. The great strength of our relationship with NATO, throughout its entire history is that support for it has almost always been bipartisan in this country. It’s not a matter of squabbling between Democrats and Republicans as to what they wanted to do instead, or saying, “I’m going to do the opposite of what the team that just left has done.” When a new administration does that, it gets us in trouble on a regular basis, not just with some changes in personnel, but the cleaning house that goes on in every American government, where we fire everybody who knows anything, whichever party you are. Second, saying, in effect: “We’re going to go off in a new direction and forget about what the last crew did.” It’s a problem we had with regards both to the Allies and to much of the rest of the world when this team came in in 2001. The George H.W. Bush administration had actually done some very important historical work, not only helping with a “soft landing,” the collapse of the Soviet Union, where the President really earned his marbles as a foreign policy president, but also engineering the unification of Germany, not reunification -- it had never been unified as such a country along the lines it is now -- and as a member of NATO. Not creating neutrality for Germany, whatever that would mean in a post-Cold War era for the eastern part of Germany or for all of it. Also to set in train some steps so that Europe would be less divided, such as the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, created near the end of 1991, which provided membership for every country that was either a regular member of NATO or in Central Europe, nine of them; then when its membership was completed a few months after the Soviet Union collapsed, it included, I think, just about all the countries that had emerged out of the wreckage of the Soviet empire, both the internal and the external empires. That’s the fifteen republics that came out of the Soviet Union, plus all the countries that had regained their technical, practical independence. So the Bush administration had started in this direction. When we were coming into office, we had a number of problems, one of which, of course, was Bosnia, which I may have already mentioned, and on which I had done a good deal of writing, to say that this is something that has to be stopped, the war in Bosnia. The worst fighting in Europe since World War II.

Q: Before we were there did you see Bosnia as being not just because of nasty fighting, but did you see a larger spread that could involve other countries?

HUNTER: One thing that I think became clear early on, which was one of the reasons it was difficult to deal with the Bosnian question -- as you may have noticed, I’ve got a kind of a way of summarizing situations in two lines to try to catch peoples’ attention. The line I had at the time was that, “You could shoot as many Austrian Archdukes as you want in Sarajevo, and you’re not going to have World War III.” There was not going to be a contagion. It was contained. Everybody agreed, everybody, whether it was the Americans, the Europeans, the Russians, etcetera, that this was not going to spread into a wider war. But it still was an issue beyond the human suffering, which was prodigious. 200,000 people died in Bosnia before this war got stopped. How were we going to be able to structure security in Europe, in general? How were you going to build security, and get what you were doing taken seriously, if you didn’t stop it? This was the big thing that finally led to decisions to use NATO air power to stop the war. Not just the enormity of Srebrenica, the worst slaughter of its kind in Europe since World War II, but also the understanding that NATO wouldn’t have a future if it couldn’t stop fighting in its own backyard.

The more immediate issues were: What do you do with this animal, NATO? What do you do about the issue of American engagement in Europe? What do you do about creating a new security structure for Europe and then broaden it to the Eurasian region? That was clear. I may have mentioned that, when I got nominated by the President, one of the first things I did was to call Manfred Wörner, Secretary General of NATO, a friend since I worked for Kennedy and he was in the Bundestag, we were good friends. I said: “Manfred, what do you want?” And he said: “Get me a summit.” One of the things I worked on, even prior to being confirmed by the Senate, was to organize a summit meeting. I think I played a lead role in organizing that, which then took place in January 1994. Why was it important? It was a commitment of U. S. power and permanence. A term I invented sometime before, and was bound and determined to see implemented as a critical aspect, was that "America is a European power." That we are deeply and permanently engaged in the future of Europe and European security, and a European player. That idea has been validated, and even if one said, after the Cold War, "Gee there’re not too many security problems," economically we had already crossed the Rubicon a long time before. We don’t have membership in the European Union, but, by gosh, we’re the extra member when it comes to the management of the global economy. Together with the Europeans, we created economic ties which cannot be ruptured, the US cannot retreat to isolationism regarding Europe,
without the whole structure of our economy and their economies collapsing. Do some Americans still have any illusions about isolation? Sorry, issue dead. Too late. They should have done something about it before, decades before, if that’s what they wanted.

So I had this vision which had evolved over many, many years and with a lot of people, based on what had been done in the previous administration. When we got to it, there were a couple of major changes, where we had to reverse Bush administration policy and move forward, again on a bipartisan basis. Obviously, as I was the nominee for NATO, I made the rounds and saw the people in the Senate who were important, such as Senator [Claiborne] Pell, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but also the minority members that they then were, the Republicans. There were no fault lines. That’s the thing. No fault lines between the parties on NATO

Q: What about Jesse Helms?

HUNTER: I asked to see him, his folks said thank you for doing so, and they said that he didn’t have enough time, so I didn’t see him, and, in fact, for my confirmation hearing he submitted a long list of written questions to be answered afterwards, which is standard practice, and I wrote the answers and cleared them with the State Department, and no problem. It was striking that, when I left NATO, a friend of mine in Congress, named David Skaggs, a very distinguished then-congressman from Colorado, organized a round-robin letter urging President Clinton to keep me in the government, and the first signer of that was Jesse Helms. It didn’t have an effect, but that’s OK. So when you are the nominee, it is very important to call on the Senators. It proved to be a godsend. [Senator] Dick Lugar, for example, was one of the most important people supporting what I was trying to do at NATO.

Q: A senator from Indiana.

HUNTER: And later Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until a few days ago, actually, and the man who coined the phrase "NATO, out of area or out of business" or at least his deputy, Ken Myers, invented it. That phrase was extremely useful to me as we were trying to sell our policies, because the Allies could see that the Congress was behind our policies -- it wasn't just the Ambassador talking -- and a leading Senator from the opposite political party, to boot. I already mentioned that I worked on the idea of the summit. But then Christopher was going to speak at the Athens ministerial-level meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June, to which I could not go because I hadn't been confirmed. In fact, I was only the second ambassador to get confirmed, kind of a hurry up on it. The first one was Pamela Harriman in Paris. A person who surprised just about everybody by doing a terrific job.

Q: She was absolutely first-rate.

HUNTER: She understood politics. She had to do what had to be done, she had to do what she knew, and when she didn’t have the expertise, she called on people who did. I didn't really have a view of her potential when she took the job, but I worked with her closely, and I have the utmost respect for her. She was exactly what we needed in France at that time. Confirmation takes a long time, as you know about this, a long time. I was asked to do the job on March the
8th, I was sworn in on July the 8th, so it was only four months, a record!

When I got involved in preparations for the Athens ministerial meeting, I was given a copy of the draft for Christopher to use. It was "business as usual." A bureaucratic draft, more of the same, just carry on. It could have been given five years earlier, as though nothing had happened in the world. So I sat down, as I mentioned, around the kitchen table, and I typed up a new draft and sent it in, and eventually had to go to the new assistant secretary and argue vehemently that the State draft was useless…

Q: Who was that?

HUNTER: Steve Oxman. Disappeared without a trace. A man who really didn’t know very much about Europe, but he was Christopher’s law partner, disappeared without a trace. Probably a decent human being, but he didn’t know his job. I finally convinced him that he was not doing Christopher a service by relying on the State draft, so I worked on it assiduously. By the end, some munchkins in the Department had dumbed down some of the ideas, no offense meant to the original Munchkins!

Q: Munchkins being little people from The Wizard of Oz. The term is also used pejoratively in the Foreign Service, what people do to the Foreign Service.

HUNTER: It’s like the term the military uses, the "iron majors." People at that level who are looking for a promotion and making sure nothing happens during their service that could possibly be risky. If you want to get the military to do anything you have to convince the iron majors. I had a conversation once with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, he was one of the outstanding military people in our modern history. He’d been Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. I went to ask him why hadn’t certain things been done, even though he had approved them. He shook his head and said, “Iron majors.” Even he couldn’t overrule them in certain things.

Anyway, I had this idea, which is in the speech, to do a comprehensive approach. The one area, let’s be honest about it, that I didn’t stick in that speech was NATO enlargement, taking new members. In fact, that’s something the US government came to only about the middle of September that year [1993]. Instead, the speech draft focused on just about everything else that proved to be of significance, including ideas from the previous administration that had value, notably, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The draft had the essence of the idea that became Partnership with Peace a few months later. A whole series of other things. NATO's relationship with the European Union, what you do with Russia, it was all in the initial draft. The idea was not just to come up with ideas, but that they would make a coherent whole and also show American leadership to the Allies. Again, it’s leaping ahead, in all my years in government and all my thinking about US foreign policy over the years, other than this one occasion, on European security, I don’t think I’ve ever seen an occasion when US grand strategy has been something we started with rather than something we used to describe what had already been done. That’s what you usually do. You look at the package of things and say, "Gee, I guess we’ve got a new grand strategy, here." Let me also say that, as I was working to create the new grand strategy, there were an awful lot of good people involved, including Republicans like Dick
Lugar and his deputy, Ken Meyers, and David Abshire, who was very supportive. Also, from outside the government, there was George Vest, who has been one of the great men of modern American foreign policy, a Foreign Service Officer, who held every job that his skills destined him to have had except ambassador to NATO. Ambassador to the European Communities, Assistant Secretary for Europe, number two at NATO. One of the good things about NATO in the Cold War, and I hope through the early years and even now, if they’ll listen, was that a lot of the high-flyers in the Foreign Service wanted to be involved in NATO. They wanted to be involved in something important, and where it would also be good for their onward careers. There were a number of ambassadors who worked at this recruitment in other areas. For example, Chester Bowles, who was ambassador to India, created a strong team, and many of these people went on to senior positions in foreign policy later on. Kennan in Yugoslavia; in fact, you were one of his quality people! For years, many of the best FSOs were members of what was sort of a German Mafia, they were sometimes called the Bonn Group. These were high-flyers. Many of these people went to Vietnam, and you still see some of them today in some areas, although it’s harder to get the best to go to Iraq, because of the fundamental structural failure of policies, there, which couldn’t be rescued even by the best Foreign Service Officers. I digress.

Q: There’s a book called *Life in the Emerald City*, the people who were sent there because of...

HUNTER: There were inexperienced Republican operatives we sent over, for example to create a stock market in Baghdad, a person who had never been to a stock market before. But I digress. Back when I started out at NATO, there were a lot of good people. I formed a fast friendship with a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, named Joe Kruzel, who was one of the outstanding idea people, and who unfortunately died on Mount Igman, a real loss to the country. He and I and John Shali and I think Jenonne Walker at the NSC were the people who created Partnership for Peace. One of the great things is that everybody now claims credit for it. Which in a way is good. One thing I did, as I may have mentioned to you before, when I got in this job, I followed the Reagan principle: “There is no limit to what you can get done if you don’t care who takes the credit.” One of the striking things, of course, is that everybody took the credit. When it came time for deciding whether I would get another administration job after NATO, as opposed to some of the credit-takers, well, I was willing to pay the price of not getting credit in order to get the job done, and that’s part of service to the country.

Q: Ben Franklin puts forward as his advice to people who want to get things done.

HUNTER: Of course, Ben Franklin was a great self-promoter. He was one of them, and he combined so many American qualities, one of which is being an entrepreneur and a self-promoter, a scalawag, which in the right amount is another wonderful quality, and a great statesman. He was able to combine national and personal ambitions. Unfortunately, we have few people nowadays who can see beyond their personal ambitions.

Q: When you were talking to Christopher when you were working on his speech...

HUNTER: I don’t think I saw him except to have my picture taken, like all new ambassadors.

Q: I first encountered this speech which you rewrote, did he present that basically?
HUNTER: The basic themes, his people severed some language from it, but it really had the essence of what I put in, and I think it went a long way to accomplish the ideas I had. One was to help set an agenda, the second was to help restore Christopher’s reputation in Europe, following that ill-fated trip earlier in the year, which was similar to some things that had been done at the beginning of the Carter administration. Déjà vu all over again. The Allies, they’re very peculiar, even somewhat true today, certainly then. No matter how much they have a problem with a sitting president, as soon as he leaves and somebody else comes in, they remember only the virtues of the predecessor. They look at the newcomer with extremely tough standards because they depended, then, and to a more limited extent now, on the United States for leadership and their security. One of the biggest concerns about the current fiasco in Iraq is the damage being done to the United States and our capacity to do other things. That’s a major reason why most Europeans didn’t want us to go into Iraq. It was “Gee guys, what’s the United States doing to itself? And we need a confident and capable America to be able to do things for us.” So that was a major goal, trying to regain the strength of the position of the secretary of state. He never understood this and never said thank you. I’m a grown up. In fact, I tried twice to get him to swear me in as ambassador. The response I got back from his office was, "If he swears you in for NATO, he’ll have to swear everybody in." As I’ve already mentioned, this was not a job that people were competing for. Indeed, my predecessor, Reggie Bartholomew, had given it up to become the negotiator for Bosnia. So I was lucky to get this job which nobody else seemed to want. I may have mentioned to you, I eventually got a call from Tony Lake, who told me I wouldn’t get a Washington job. I said, “Look, send me abroad, like used to happen with Latin American generals, to get ‘em out of town.” In fact, Clinton ended up sending a lot of good people abroad. Leaving myself aside, that included Stu Eizenstat, David Aaron, Dick Holbrooke, Dick Gardner, and a number of others. Good, solid Democrats with a lot of experience, but the folks who were deciding who got the jobs didn’t want us around. I was there at NATO four and a half years.

Q: The kind of perspective, the people you mention, including yourself, all were really experienced, could be considered to have expertise. One of the people I’ve interviewed said “expertise is the enemy of policy” and you don’t want too much around.

HUNTER: I may have told you, having served four years less two hours and twenty minutes in the Carter White House, I am convinced that, you need, at the top level, someone who knows about what’s going on in the world, who knows how to put the pieces together -- what I call having a genuine strategic sense, a rare but vital commodity for the president to have near him. This person, even if he or she doesn't have all the capacity to think things through, he or she at least who knows what questions to ask and where to look for the answers. The answers will almost always be there, somewhere in the US government. Just about everything you need to know, except what Dictator X is going to have for breakfast tomorrow morning, somebody in the government knows it. Somebody. Whether CIA, DIA, State Department, somebody, someplace knows it well and truly. The chore is to find that person and then to listen to him or her. We are extremely bad at that, particularly when most people who make it to the top in our foreign policy establishment, with some wonderful exceptions, are afraid of having somebody down below tell them what they think, out of their own wisdom. Our presidents tend to be very badly served by the government, because of senior people who won’t reach out to the experts. I remember being
stunned, early in the current administration, when I heard that Colin Powell had invited some Army captain or somebody at the deputy assistant secretary level to come to a top-level meeting. He said: “This is the person who understands what is going on.” That doesn’t happen very often. Brzezinski used to bring those of us to see the president who knew what was going on, and Carter was a person who valued that. Like the story of John Kennedy’s calling a bureaucrat down in the bowels of the State Department soon after he became President. The senior people shuddered.

Q: I used to get that, because my name being Kennedy, and I was in INR, and I’d call up and say” Just tell them Mr. Kennedy called.” And I’d get this long pause at the other end, which was about whether the president was calling down. They weren’t sure which Kennedy I was. I’d hasten to tell them that it was the INR Kennedy, not the president.

HUNTER: There is a lot of talent in the US government, and they’re so bad at the senior level in making use of it.

Q: When you went out to there, what was the feeling that you were getting from people in the European Bureau at State or anybody else that you were talking to about NATO? Because NATO was on the brink of “Do we need NATO anymore?”

HUNTER: It was my thought that it was possible to make a good running. The forcing point was getting the one thing that I had to do, which was to get the summit, because summits are a forcing action. The president will be engaged, and you can’t let the president be a bozo.

Q: We’ll pick this up the next time, and we’ll talk about your arriving at NATO and then we’ll talk about setting up the summit and what was on your agenda for getting the president to commit himself there.

Today is the 15th of February 2007, and as you’ve just told me, this is the 109th anniversary of the blowing up of the Battleship Maine. What year are we talking about the summit when you’re going to Brussels?

HUNTER: First, something on the Battleship Maine. Admiral Hyman Rickover wrote a book for the Naval Institute, in which he questioned whether the explosion was due to external causes – like a torpedo; he thought it was a powder magazine that had blown up, because it was right next to a bituminous coal bunker, and they had a bad history of spontaneous combustion. Some other people have questioned the standard view, as well. It was interesting that the court of inquiry at the time the battleship was blown up first came to the same conclusion as Rickover later did, but then, as the publicity mounted, came around to believe that it was external. Walter Millis in 1934 wrote a book about this period, in which he raised the issue of the sinking of the Maine. The reason I say this now, in the Year of our Lord 2007, is that, if you read Millis’ account of how we got into the Spanish-American War, it’s so close to how we got into Iraq in terms of the sociology, the psychology, the players, the misrepresentation of facts, deliberate misrepresentation, the invidious role played by Theodore Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the role of the media, Mr. Hearst and Mr. Pulitzer. In the case of the invasion of Iraq, there were certain newspapers and television networks, that shall remain nameless, that are
playing the same role, now, it is stunning as a repeat of history, absolutely stunning. They did it on Iraq, and they are starting to do it on Iran. And another similar aspect: the *Maine* was in Havana harbor to intimidate the Spanish, just like so many US naval vessels are in the Persian Gulf, now, to intimidate the Iranians. And like in 1898, there is risk of a conflict by accident.

*Q: Well we’re creating our history here now. What year did you arrive in Brussels?*

HUNTER: On Sunday morning, I think it was the 11th of July in 1993. As I mentioned earlier, it was a fairly quick appointment-confirmation process, it was only four months from the day I was asked ‘til the day I arrived at post. The only ambassador who arrived more rapidly was Pamela Harriman, who did a marvelous job in Paris. That Sunday afternoon, almost right off the plane, I held a staff meeting at the US mission, because there was a NATO meeting -- the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, which is the ambassadors -- the following day to talk about the summit the following January. Obviously, I had what are called “instructions,” which I more-or-less wrote, the best instructions are always the ones you write yourself!, for this meeting. My first impression on getting to NATO, and it’s a general comment, is that too many people in our great republic don’t appreciate the quality of the people who work for the government. The Foreign Service, the Civil Service, the military. I had a great team. Part of that was because of my predecessors, whom I learned from, particularly from a man named Larry Legere, who had long since left, but who for years had been head of the defense component at the USNATO mission. He always recruited outstanding people, military and civilian, from the Defense Department, and then made sure that these outstanding people got good onward jobs when they left NATO. So you’d get outstanding people to make this a useful part of their career track. It became quite obvious to me from the very beginning that this was a first-rate team. Of course, that began with my secretary, Mary Ann Silva. Reggie Bartholomew, my predecessor, had told me that, “Whatever else you do, keep Mary Ann.” So I did that on his say-so, and she did a stellar job. My DCM was a career FSO, Bob Pearson, who was one of the best, as was his successor, Doug McElhaney. We had a lot of outstanding people. Three good heads of the DOD part of the mission, as my Defense Advisor: Tom Kuenning, an Air Force Brigadier General, who went on to be head of the On-Site Inspection Agency; Cathy Kelleher, one of our leading NATO academics; and Bob Hall, a USIA person who had worked in Bill Perry's office. There was Bob Beecroft, an "old German hand," who knew NATO backwards and forwards. Norm Ray, a US Vice Admiral, who was Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee, who walked me through the complexities of dealing with the WEU; I later got him selected as one of NATO's Assistant Secretaries General. And lots of others, too numerous to name, including a first-rate group of MilReps -- US Military Representatives, in the office across the hall. I was proud of the whole team, and all share in the credit for an amazing set of achievements. A really dedicated, hard-working group of people, who really cared about what they were doing and getting it right. That was one of my slogans at NATO, “Get it right.” Of course, you know that an ambassador only gets to choose two people, his or her deputy chief of mission and his or her personal secretary. All the rest are chosen by the bureaucracy, in this case the State and Defense Departments, though you can make suggestions. One special thing I should mention. I think alone of all US ambassadors, the one at NATO isn't just connected to the State Department, but also has the right to go directly to the Secretary of Defense. In fact, the two departments concluded a treaty to that effect several decades ago; and I kept a copy of it, DOD Directive such-and-so, on my desk, just in case anyone at State -- and it did happen -- complained about
my dealing directly with Les Aspin, Bill Perry, or Bill Cohen (the last two honored me with the
DOD Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the top civilian honor). Anyway, I got to Brussels
on a Sunday morning, met with the team that afternoon, and we started the ball rolling with the
Allies the following day. I’d have to go back and recollect what the specific issues were, in
regard to the NATO summit that was on the docket, but the basic thing was two or three
propositions. First, it became immediately obvious that the Allies were pleased to have a fully-
qualified US ambassador. We had had a quality chargé, Sandy Vershbow, who went on to be my
successor at NATO, but however good that person was, as far as the Allies were concerned, he or
she -- and until much later, all NATO ambassadors from all allied nations were “he,” from
NATO’s founding until about 2003 or 2004 -- he or she is not an ambassador created by the
President.

Q: However good they may be, it’s still not an ambassador representing the president.

HUNTER: Immediately, the idea that an ambassador was there was very important to the Allies.
The second function that became very clear very early on, and came also out of my experience
over many, many years working on NATO -- including being in charge of NATO issues in the
Carter White House for two years -- whatever the Allies may say about American policies, they
respect American leadership, they look for American leadership. America is the 800-pound
gorilla, it’s the pivot point, it’s the essence of NATO. Without the United States, there is no
NATO. It’s a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. So immediately on the arrival of an
ambassador -- which happened to be me, it could have been somebody else -- the spirits of the
Allies went up, and they desired to be responsive to American leadership. That, of course, was a
primary goal of mine, to make sure that Bill Clinton’s leadership would come across effectively
at NATO and that we would do the right things that were necessary. It was also true, then, and to
a great extent true, now, that if the United States doesn’t take the initiative, nobody does. Of all
the initiatives that led up to the recreation of NATO in the 1990s, the only major one that came
from elsewhere was the NATO-Russia relationship, which came from the Germans and the
French, though the German defense minister, Volker Ruhe, did press for enlargement as much as
anyone in the Alliance. The Americans actually wrote the document, the NATO-Russia
Founding Act, of which the 10th anniversary will be celebrated on the 17th of May this year, but
all the rest of the ideas came from the United States. Strikingly, almost all of the ideas came from
within the government, which is very rare, sometimes, and of these, a high proportion came out
of my mission, from me and my staff, more than from anywhere else in the government. We
were the principal architects, and certainly the integrators, putting together the ideas into a
unified and purposeful grand strategy. That was my job, as I saw it. I should point out, as I think
I have before, that early on I decided to follow the famous Ronald Reagan dictum, “There is no
limit to the good things you can get done as long as you don’t mind who takes the credit.” For
everything we did at NATO, there were at least a thousand fathers and mothers, no matter who
did it, and whenever anyone takes the credit, I never say “No.” Leaping ahead, that was true also
with Allies, as well. It was critical for the process that everybody come around to a view that
they had -- to use that wonderful modern expression -- “ownership” of the product. By the time
we finished getting done the reconstruction of NATO, about 1995 -- virtually everything was in
place by then, except for maybe NATO-Russia, which took a little bit longer -- any one of the 16
NATO ambassadors could go out and brief on what NATO was doing, and they would all say the
same thing, because they all were part of it, they all had ownership of it. It’s a lot of work to get
that done.

The real process for almost all the ideas then took place within the US government, and to a great extent at my mission, between the time I arrived at NATO and the informal defense ministers meeting that took place in Travemünde, Germany, on October 19-21.

Q: I wonder if you could explain before we move any further what you mean by the reconstruction of NATO?

HUNTER: The proximate cause for NATO had gone away. There was no Soviet Union. Here was an alliance of…. to quote Yuri Arbatov, the long-serving head of the U. S. A. and Canada Institute in Moscow, one of the really difficult people, but in the Cold War he had been the Soviets’ “authorized” linkage to the Western, and in particular the US, academic and think-tank world. He said, rather ironically, afterwards, “We have made the ultimate assault on you, we have taken away your enemy.” So here was NATO’s original rationale gone away. In fact, as I’ve often remarked, one of the marvelous things was that NATO didn’t just pack up and go home after the end of the Cold War. I often illustrate that with a story about what happened on the 19th of June in 1815, it was a Monday, the day after the Battle of Waterloo, and Field-Marshal Blücher met the Duke of Wellington at place called La Belle Alliance, just south of the battlefield, and Marshal Blücher said, “Why don’t we call the battle after this place where we are, you know, ‘The Beautiful Alliance.’” The Duke said, “No, no, I think we’ll name it after my headquarters,” which was north of the battlefield, in Waterloo. Well, they had a glass of champagne; they went their separate ways, and that was the end of the Grand Alliance. Well, I used to say that, on the notional day after the Cold War ended, at NATO everybody came to work as usual. The fly wheel. The incredible pattern of people working together in an integrated military structure, in a single language -- American -- with common training, efforts to build common standards, even though lots of equipment was built by lots of different firms in different places. You almost had to turn off the NATO light switch. But there was nobody to turn off the switch. Institutions, you can turn them on, it’s very hard to turn them off. The League of Nations didn’t formally go out of business, I discovered, until the first of January 1946. It carried on all through the Second World War in Geneva. Bureaucrats carried on with it because that’s what you do. So, here we had a circumstance of doubt whether this NATO thing was going to just peter out, or whether there were new tasks to be done. This was my sense, not “How do we preserve this thing?” or “How do we put out a preservation order on this house, and what kind of renovation are we going to do because it’s a nice house?” But “Are there things to be done that this house can be used for?”

I like to argue that, by the time we collectively finished this first transformation of NATO -- and now it’s gone through this fundamental, second transformation in the last four years -- about the only thing that was the same was the building. The innards of the way it works have just been so fundamentally redone. This was, in my judgment, one of the very few occasions I can think of in US history, and I’ve had some appreciation of American history, in which we started with what we wanted to achieve and then built the individual items to make that come true, rather than calling something a grand strategy after the bits and pieces have been done pragmatically. It was less “grand,” obviously, than going back to, say, the meeting in Argentia, Newfoundland in 1941, the Atlantic Charter. Much less grand. But the vision was, “What do we need to do to meet
the conditions of having a viable European security?” It was recognizing that the basics of American interests — let’s talk about American interests — where the Allies would find it compatible, and that hadn’t changed — which was, number one, to prevent the domination of the Continent by a hostile hegemonic power. That would be against our interests. Like Germany was in the two world wars, then the Soviet Union. How do you prevent the emergence of conditions in which this might become a problem, again? How do you advance the interests of democracy and market economies to have this work? How do you give people a common sense of security? Be careful, it’s not necessarily easy to reach a common sense of security. People sometimes forget. The Alliance has worked so long that no one wakes up every morning saying “It’s a miracle that the Alliance works!” Instead, many say that, if somebody gets out of step, like Germany and France on Iraq, “How could they detract from what we’re trying to do?” Come on, give me a break. The Alliance has worked because the interests of allies were additive, not because they were subtractive from some mythical pure state. But I guess that the very fact that one could talk about the behavior of some allies as being subtractive from the ideal shows that this NATO animal does have a life of its own.

So on the matter of going through item-by-item: I’ve already indicated that I drafted a speech for Christopher for the Athens foreign ministers’ meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1993. My draft has all the elements of what we ended up doing, except for NATO enlargement. I was a little slow on that, but I caught up with it. It didn’t take too long. But it was not yet clear that that was either necessary or desirable as a fundamental proposition. You don’t want to do anything that’s going to deprive the Alliance of the capacity to be effective. As a result, one of the great challenges, as we moved into enlargement, was how to make sure that, when you bring in a new country, you don’t weaken the Alliance. I remember when the Latvian foreign minister came to see me at NATO, a year or so down the road, and he said: “I want very much to join NATO, but I wouldn’t want to join NATO if I’d make it weaker.” I replied, “Have you ever heard of Groucho Marx?” — “I wouldn’t want to join a club that would have me for a member.” Well, he hadn’t heard of Groucho Marx, and I didn’t pursue it.

So, we started out looking at what needed to be done. One was to have a summit with the commitment of the United States to the future of European security. I had already had a phrase I invented and had been using in articles: the United States is a European power. A permanent part of the mix in Europe. An unimpeachable proposition. In fact, we’d gotten to the point where we couldn’t withdraw from Europe without doing fundamental damage to ourselves. Economically, as much as anything. On the economic side, during the Cold War, the strategic glue helped us over economic problems. Since the end of the Cold War, economic glue has helped us over strategic problems, because we have a three trillion dollar annual relationship, we can’t damage that.

So, on the list of things, as we worked them up between then and the Travemünde meeting, we put together a whole series of potential initiatives. The one that I’m most proud of my own role in was the initiative that became the Partnership for Peace. It had an horrendous number of fathers and mothers. I think there were three or four, in fact, and I do believe that I was one of them. Another was Joe Kruzels, who died on Mount Igman, tragically, in Bosnia, in that accident, and John Shalikashvili, who was at that time Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and then went off to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. There were some other people who
were involved, notably Jenonne Walker at the NSC. In fact, the key moment in this evolution was a meeting in Brussels on the 11th of September 1993. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) was having its annual convention in Brussels. Les Aspin, the Secretary of Defense, wanted to come, so Joe Kruzel, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for NATO, and I talked. We talked about having a seminar in my residence. In the morning part of the seminar, we had a lot of think-tank people from the US and Europe, plus some US government people, and in the afternoon we just had the government people. Manfred Wörner, the NATO Secretary General, spoke at lunch. We had representatives from various parts of the government. Military, Office of Secretary of Defense, State Department. It was at that meeting, around my dining room table at the NATO Ambassador’s residence, when the various strands came together to produce the Partnership for Peace. It was called “Peacekeeping Partnership” at that point. At some point, we can talk about the details and why PFP – as it was called -- was such a miracle.

So, number one was to keep the Americans involved, and that meant keeping forces there, and using NATO effectively as a strategic instrument. It meant preserving the best of the past, which included keeping Allied Command Europe going and continuing to provide a “home” for Germany.

One of the great miracles of maybe all of modern history was the solution of the German problem, which began about 1866, when it became a single nation, and suddenly it was too big to be contained by any other single European power, thus requiring the balance of power system, working through a very effective coalition of other countries. When that broke down in the early part of the 20th century, it helped produce the cataclysmic First World War, and then it broke down again with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, etcetera. But the transformation of Germany after the Second World War was a breathtaking miracle, so much so that, when Germany was unified after the Cold War, it could fairly be said that the historic problem has been solved! But you still want to have an insurance policy.

Q: When you said the German problem is solved, maybe it’s just me, but I’ve read too much history where you get the wrong people in the leadership and they start pounding the drums, they can put nations on a different course.

HUNTER: All right, let me be clear about what I mean by “solved.” If we were just looking at the remarkable transformation within German society, well, as you say, it is possible that that could prove to be ephemeral. If it hadn’t been for the Great Depression, we wouldn’t have had Hitler, probably. Some people think it was the great inflation period in Germany. But the great inflation period was 1923. The thing that most produced the depression in Germany was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff imposed by the United States, whereby we exported our depression. Because there can be things like a Great Depression and the effects in societies, that’s why institutions are important -- the combination of the European Union and NATO, to embed Germany firmly, and let us hope forever, within these broader institutions. The phrase I used is that it is the objective of this generation of Germans to make it impossible for their children and grandchildren to do what their parents and grandparents did. Thus, when it came to enlargement of the two institutions, Germany was very much in the forefront. Volker Ruhe, the German Defense Minister, was one of the leading proponents of NATO enlargement. It wasn’t just that
he had a bright idea out of the sky kind of thing, it was fundamental to Germany’s future so that, as I used to argue, when Germany becomes the dominant power in Central Europe -- not there, yet, but I think it will come out this way -- it will be not “Here comes Germany, again,” but “Here comes the European Union and here comes NATO.” Hence, when it came to NATO enlargement and to EU enlargement, the German priority, a great vision of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was to surround itself with these institutions. That’s why Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were first. If you had had to choose two, it would have been Poland and the Czech Republic, because those were the two countries on Germany’s Eastern side. That’s why Germany gave up the Deutschmark, the great pillar of democratic, economic respectability for Germany. The engine. The thing that had been held on to more than anything else as a substitute for nationalism.

So, in terms of “preserving the best of the past,” it was to preserve Allied Command Europe, to preserve a “home” for Germany, as well. There was a whole series of other ideas, and I’d have to go back and consult my notes to determine the order in which we developed them. We pulled them all together at Travemünde. Now, within the U. S. government we had worked out the ideas with a lot of very talented people. Jenonne Walker at the NSC, for example, a lot of Defense Department people, notably Joe Kruzel, though a less robust team at the State Department. Some able working-level people, there, but the senior leadership at the State Department was far less engaged, it really wasn’t as talented as some of the other departments or the NSC staff at that time. Later on, there were some highly qualified people at State at that level, quality people like John Kornblum, who eventually became Assistant Secretary for Europe.

We had come together, in the administration, in preparations for the Travemünde meeting, on a series of initiatives, and the State Department made a presentation on behalf of Secretary Christopher, through cable traffic to the allied capitals. But the publicity went to Les Aspin, who was at the meeting in Travemünde, the first-ever informal defense ministers meeting, now generally held once a year, where he laid out the full agenda, notably Partnership for Peace. Enlargement was on the agenda, although it still was not a central point. Aspin indicated that it was still being talked about, but the US was not thinking about doing that right now. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), which John Shalikashvili and his people had invented, which was a way of deploying NATO forces more flexibly than in the past. The US presentation built on a lot of things that the previous administration had done, like the unification of Germany, the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the like. A lot of real continuity. One other element which was important, at Travemünde, was to develop a relationship with the European Union in its security personality, at that time called Western European Union (WEU), which we’ve discussed. Subsequently, it has been called the European Security and Defense Policy, with WEU becoming atrophied as a result. This had been discussed at the end of the previous administration, as the West Europeans -- within the context of what was still the European Communities, then became the European Union -- started to move on their ambition to have a collective foreign policy, to have a defense policy, which ultimately is what you need to do if you’re going to be truly effective. This is even though you have to recognize that a common defense policy is the last thing you’ll do in creating a true European Union, the last cession of sovereignty, ceding national control over your young men and women as they risk their lives in combat. At the end of the Bush administration, various officials fought this tooth and nail. Ambassador Jim Dobbins and Reggie Bartholomew became famous for lecturing the Europeans
that they didn't do any of this. What the Europeans were trying to do had a long pedigree, incidentally. They had been at this for a long time, and I had this vision that the reasons for the US to oppose a strong European component in defense had gone away with the end of the Cold War.

During the Cold War, John Kennedy talked about the twin pillars, two pillars of the Alliance. The US wanted a strong European military defense component, just so long as it did exactly what we told it to do. That was because we had responsibility for central management of the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, and we didn’t want any meddling that could cause real problems. It was the right policy. Then the Cold War disappeared. In fact, the argument then flipped. I recognized early on that having a strong European defense component in the Alliance could be highly useful, even with these quasi-independent elements -- and one person from the previous administration did invent the concept, Sandy Vershbow, I think it was -- to have a European defense personality that was "separable but not separate from NATO." That is, parts of NATO could be used by the WEU, sort of "borrowing the army." Most people don’t understand that NATO has no standing forces, except for headquarters and some specialized aircraft and a pipeline. Nations have standing forces. When NATO wants to do something, it goes around and asks: "Who’s going to come to my tea party?" So if the European Union [WEU/ESDP] is going to do something, militarily, it doesn't have a separate set of forces, though it does have its own headquarters and some support elements. In fact, it’s the same forces! I like to say it’s like, "Whose turn is it to drive the army, today? Can I borrow the army tonight, Daddy?" It’s the same thing. The argument I made was that, if the Europeans are going to try to have coherence and develop a defense policy, and if this leads them to spend more money on defense and work on defense issues than they would otherwise do, and if that’s useful to NATO, why not do it? To this day, there are still some Americans who don’t get that point.

There was a special meeting of NATO defense ministers at Colorado Springs in October 2003, I guess it was, at a time when four of the European countries were thinking of having a WEU planning cell of 50 people in a suburb of Brussels, Tervuren, near where the US ambassador to NATO lives. Some senior American at the Colorado meeting called it the “greatest threat to NATO.” Say again? I shook my head and wondered what the US was thinking. My further response was that, "If NATO is threatened by 50 men and a dog, in a clapped-out old Belgian Army barracks, it’s in real trouble."

Q: Particularly then.

HUNTER: The Ambassador [to NATO], Nick Burns had a wonderful line. In the middle of this park in Tervuren, near where the planning staff was to be, is the African Museum, which was created by King Leopold II, and where the Stanley and Livingstone mementoes are. Outside is this huge stone elephant. Our ambassador to NATO, Nick Burns, said, “One white elephant in Tervuren is quite enough.” A wonderful line, even if it really got it wrong. We still have this kind of US response, so the Europeans will say, “Well, if the Americans aren’t going to accept it unless they invent it, then we will wait to hear what they propose.”

So I had a vision that the United States should, in our interests and those of NATO, support a strong EU role in foreign and defense policy. This is one of the elements, in fact, it was one of
the propositions we made, to have this kind of relationship between NATO and WEU, something I negotiated later on down the pike. One of the wonderful things at Travemünde was that, when Aspin showed up at this meeting -- and it could have been Christopher, if it had been a foreign ministers’ meeting -- the Allies came into the meeting down in the dumps, and they went out with a spring in their step! It was instantly palpable as you watched peoples’ attitudes change. It was “NATO is back and standing tall, and America’s here leading, thank God.” Within 10 minutes of Aspin’s making his presentation with the new US ideas, you could just see people light up. The room was electrified. The Marines had landed. It was so much so that we had one little idea, just a kind of extra throwaway idea, which was “Why don’t we talk about nonproliferation?” The Allies jumped on it and said “Another great idea!” And they asked to put it on the summit agenda. We hadn’t expected it to be part of the summit agenda. It was only an idea we were beginning to develop.

To back up a little bit, this proposal about the relationship with the European Union came out of a lunch I had, soon after I arrived at NATO, at the home of the French ambassador, Jacques Blot. Definitely a French patriot and a very intelligent man, etcetera, and I went to the lunch with two ambitions. One was to try to clean up this relationship between NATO and WEU, so they could be mutually reinforcing; and the other was to reverse something that I had followed ever since it happened in 1966, which was the departure of France from Allied Command Europe and the expulsion of the Command and allied troops from France, whereupon the United States in pique removed the political headquarters from Paris and put it in Brussels -- which France had not asked for. Indeed, France never left the political side of NATO. Incidentally, it also never left NATO’s integrated air defense system, recognizing that that was the military capability that you would need on the spot, the instant a war with the Soviet Union began, and France wouldn’t have time to join up, again. They never left it! People misunderstood what de Gaulle was doing, because this was lese majesté, so to speak, what France had done, and that’s another story for another time as to why it happened. I was bound and determined, since the world had changed, to reverse that. So Blot and I cut a deal over lunch that afternoon, in effect, which I then reported back to the government and had no problem with Washington. I kept Washington totally informed. One of my key principles as ambassador was that I never committed the US to anything where I didn’t have a cable to support it, because you’d get yourself in deep trouble if you did that. Particularly when you’re running a mission as important as NATO. If you don’t have instructions, then if you do something the State Department doesn’t like, they’ll bitch. If you do something the Defense Department doesn’t like, they’ll bitch. That’s why, I think I already mentioned, I never did anything without ensuring that every element of my mission, State Department, civilians, and the Defense Department, military and civilians, plus USIA and FEMA, were all in on the discussion before I took the decisions. As a result, we never lost a bureaucratic battle in Washington, and we never had a leak. I had learned this lesson going all the way back to the Johnson White House.

Q: It’s all very nice to say everybody was on board, but on most things Defense, Treasury, White House, have if nothing else ambitious people who want to exert their own influence. How can one get this situation you describe?

HUNTER: What I’m getting at is first – and this is leaping ahead – we didn’t weigh in on every issue. Second, even when we decided we wanted to come up with a particular position to be
adopted by the US, sometimes we would “lead a witness" in Washington, with a clarity of analysis that would lead them to come to the same conclusion as we had done, so more often than not they would make the proposal we wanted back to us, as an instruction, without our having actually suggested the proposal! Some of my State Department people in the Mission got upset, sometimes, that I didn’t put enough recommendations in my cables. What they didn’t understand, some of them, was that we were putting the recommendations in by creating them through logic, so that other people would come to the same conclusion we had, rather than their saying “Oh it’s those guys in Brussels, what do they know?" The point I’m making is the value of bringing everybody at the Mission into the game. Incidentally, when I’d come back from trips to Washington or one of the military commands, I would tell my senior people everything. I wouldn’t hold back anything, any of the secrets, any of what was going on in Washington: "Who struck John?" or "What’s really going on here." All the parts of the picture. My senior staff appreciated being brought into the picture. So, if we had a full discussion, before I would make a decision about what we were going to suggest to Washington – and I was the president’s representative, that was my job – then even when people lost the argument at the Mission, they knew they’d had their say and they knew that, the next time around, they might win the argument, whatever it was. Thus there was no reason to go off and be a sore loser. They might have lost a particular point, but they’re not going to be sore about it, and if their part of the Washington bureaucracy phoned up and said, “How could you accept this decision by the Ambassador?” they would say, “Maybe I didn’t exactly like it, but I had my say, my full say.” Perhaps an even more important point is that we never had a leak. I’d learned, working in the White House, twice, that the way to keep people from leaking is to involve them in decisions. Then they have some responsibility for them and there’s a moral problem: "I had my say, but I’m still going to go and leak." That’s worse than saying, "I’m going to leak because I didn’t have my say." Human nature.

So with the French ambassador, I had the idea to get them back into Allied Command Europe, because there was no longer any reason for them to stay out of it, based upon an alternative view of the management of East-West relations. The reason that Allied Command Europe was asked to leave France and why the French left the military side of the Alliance, I believed from 1966 on when it happened, was that, for France, French foreign policy is about Germany. That is less so now, but then, certainly the three top French foreign policy concerns were Germany, Germany, Germany, for obvious reasons. By that time, in 1966, they recognized that the Germans needed, politically, to find a way of overcoming the division of their country. In effect, the French invented détente in order to deal with their German problem, given that the Germans hoped the situation of being divided could be changed. De Gaulle had to get his country out of Allied Command Europe in order to gain the flexibility to play to this felt German need. It worked. The US picked up on détente and this started the ball rolling that led, with the Helsinki Final Act and the deepening of détente and other developments – though with a big backwards detour early in the Reagan administration – to the end of the Cold War, three decades later.

Now, here we were at a time after the Cold War. Germany was now united. For France, there was still the thought in the back of the mind about what that could mean in the future. You’re right, to have the “German problem” "solved," you have to keep it "solved." You have to have an insurance policy, you never let up, because you’ve checked your circumstances and decided that the same countries are still there. Geopolitics matters, geography still matters in this globalizing
world, give me a break. That means that having a strong Allied Command Europe, of which France was part, would be part of the effort to ensure the German future. The French could also see the value in a strong WEU, and France would lead the WEU, fine, which was a major part of its ambitions to lead the European Union. I saw that this was not incompatible with what we wanted at NATO, that this could be a package deal. It also occurred to me that, if there were going to be a strong WEU with French leadership, France would have to come back into NATO, because NATO -- especially the US -- is the source of so many of the military goodies. Also, France in the integrated military command system also was necessary to ensure that a unified Germany remained engaged in a broader strategic framework, involving the Americans. So with Blot and I understanding that all this had a strategic purpose, we cut a deal, and in effect we more-or-less delivered on the deal, both of us, and it was approved by our governments, one part of which was the agreement that is called the Berlin-Brussels Agreement of 1996, which included the possibility of a transfer of NATO assets to the WEU and all of that, plus blah blah blah. All this we can talk about later. Plus, France re-entered the Military Committee at NATO Headquarters, sent military staff to NATO at SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe], started sending its defense minister to ministerial meetings -- which I renamed the NATO Ministerial in Ministers of Defense Session, to get the theology right for the French -- and came within an eyelash of their rejoining Allied Command Europe, except for one issue, which had a lot to do with mismanagement more than anything else, which was the U. S. requirement to continue holding the NATO command in Naples, Allied Forces Southern Europe.

Q: CINCSOUTH.

HUNTER: CINCSOUTH, yeah, we can get into that later. In fact, as I said later on, it didn’t really matter that reintegration didn’t go all the way. The French came 95% back into Allied Command Europe, and they have never stood apart from the Alliance, militarily, from that day to this, in anything that NATO has chosen to do. In fact, even though they would resolutely say “We’re not in Allied Command Europe,” in Afghanistan, not only was France involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but at one point it was commanding what was in essence a NATO operation under Allied Command Europe! As long as you don’t tell the French that that’s what they’re doing, poke them in the eye with a sharp stick, they’ll do it. Sometimes, if you keep quiet about what’s happening, things happen there.

Well, this was the deal that Jacques Blot and I cut. (That probably had something to do with the French later giving me the Legion of Honor). Because I recognized that the strategic environment had changed to make these things possible and necessary, so that was part of the package.

The ghost at the NATO banquet, of course, was Bosnia from beginning to end, and that was the poison and the thing that had everybody depressed. Because here was a war going on -- 200,000 people died before it came to an end -- on NATO’s doorstep. The European Union had tried and not gotten very far, though the Vance-Owen Plan had promise. The Clinton administration came in and junked it and started off in its own direction, which was a mistake, so people were in the doldrums about that. There was a tracking of the two processes, dealing with Bosnia and the transformation of NATO to a modern perspective. The basic goals were to keep America in, to make sure West Europe stays stable, to stabilize Central Europe and to take it off the geopolitical
chess board, where it had been the proximate cause of the two world wars and maybe in part of
the Cold War, and to reach out to Russia. To balance all those objectives, so they came into a
coherent whole, fitting them within George H. W. Bush’s vision of a "Europe whole and free and
at peace." This is a fundamental strategic concept. The most radical strategic concept for Europe
ever. I am proud that I played the lead role in putting all of this together, conceptually, and also
to a considerable degree in policy.

Q: We’ll pick this up the next time by talking about putting NATO together to reconstruct NATO,
and one of the things you said right at the beginning, and I’ve heard again and again, is that,
could you discuss next time, why is it that everybody waits for the United States to come up with
initiatives? There are a lot of people a lot brighter than other people, and certainly it’s
distributed fairly among the various diplomatic groups. Would you talk about that? Also, would
you talk about what I would call the Soviet Mafia within the United States, which had been built
up since even before the Cold War, who felt so close in a way to the Soviet thing that they
thought we didn’t want to upset the Soviets as far as this Partnership for Peace, and then we’ll
talk about the whole Serbian-Croatian thing too.

HUNTER: And certain people in the State Department who were the Russian Mafia, if you want
to call it that. Not the anti-Russian Mafia, which has also existed, but the people who saw Russia
as the key to national security, with Strobe Talbott in the lead.

Q: Well, this is a baby. I had been talking to a man who was consul general and chargé in
Zagreb about this time, Ron Neitzke, and Ron was talking about the Belgrade Mafia who
couldn’t see...

HUNTER: That was George Kennan’s doing. When he was ambassador to Yugoslavia, he hired
a lot of extraordinarily talented people, and if you look at the number of people that went on to
senior things: Larry Eagleburger, David Anderson, you were there, too! You’re part of that

Q: It’s a problem, and it’s one that you can look at in an even greater cadre that came out of
service in the Soviet Union.

HUNTER: There’s just one simple thing I recognized early on: that we had to balance the
interests of the folks who wanted NATO and keep it pure, the people who wanted it to play an
effective role, the people who wanted to stabilize Central Europe, and the people who wanted to
reach out to Russia. You had to bring these all together and balance them off against one another
and come up with a package, because you couldn’t sacrifice the relationship with Russia on the
altar of stability in Central Europe, but, even more importantly, you couldn’t sacrifice the future
of Central Europe on the altar of Russia. You had to do both. We understood that at USNATO,
and I believe we played a key role, indeed the most important role, in getting this done right.

Q: And also if you could talk a bit about, you talked about cutting deals with the French, but
what were the French and the German sensitivities as you’re dealing with this. This wasn’t a cut
and dry thing, we’ll talk about that. We have a lot to talk about.
Today is the 19th of March 2007. Bob do you want to talk first about why the Europeans seemed to let us take the initiative and then felt quite inclined to criticize after we took the initiative on things?

HUNTER: I think that’s fairly endemic in human nature, now, isn’t it? Somebody else comes up with the idea and then you bitch about it. What is it they say about the army? You can tell when the army is in good shape when everybody is complaining. One of the wonderful things about our European Allies, this is historically true, and it has continued to be true, is that they may complain about the sitting US president, but then when the new president comes in, they suddenly discover that the old guy had a lot of virtues they like. Then they decide they don’t like the new one very much. A few people have puzzled over this. I think it’s fairly simple. During the Cold War and to a different degree and different way, now, the United States is the lynchpin of common security across the Atlantic. Confrontation, containment of the Soviet Union, major steps to wrap up the Cold War -- all of which required investments of US power and commitment. Central European states, if you gave them a choice between joining NATO and just having a raw US commitment, that is, a choice between joining NATO without America and just having America without NATO, they would choose America without NATO in a heartbeat. Today, we’re helping to ensure, to the extent any external country has a role, the pacific future Russia. Among non-Russians, this depends on the United States more than anybody else. Here in Europe are people who tried the balance of power for 300 years. Sometimes it worked, though it imposed costs. But it failed cataclysmically twice -- the first in 1914, after 99 years of being pretty successful; and the second in 1939, when the Soviets made their deal with the Nazis. So after the Cold War, sensible people in Europe were unwilling to go back to the roles played by individual states, or even by the European Union, itself, because they recognize that, in the big things, the United States still remains the “arsenal of democracy” and has the strategic depth, has the capacity to pull things together, has a single decision-making process, rather than multiple decision-making processes, and, frankly, in dealing with the Russian future, in particular -- the Soviet future, before -- the United States is indispensable. It’s a simple question of power and the mobilization of power.

So a major reason for the Allies’ looking to the United States to take the lead is that only ideas that are blessed in the United States have a chance at being effective in NATO, and many other things, because it involves the investment of power and commitment. It’s one reason they’re so upset about Iraq. Not so much because this is immoral, because there are enough cynical Europeans, it’s because the United States may be doing itself a cardinal injury and therefore may not be able to help protect other people and do the right things. It’s the self-inflicted wound they were most worried about. This is going to be hard to recover from. People in Europe rely on the US. So, you look to the United States to come up with leadership, because it’s only if the United States blesses an idea that NATO works. Now, there are times when the United States opposes what Europeans do. We have a long history of trying to kill off European weapons systems. The British with the Sky Bolt and TSR II. The TSR II was a better weapons system than the one we came up with, the F-111, but we played it off. That’s kind of a sidebar issue.

With regard to Bosnia in my time, there had been a proposal, a set of ideas put together by Cyrus Vance, acting as a private individual, and David Owen, I guess Lord Owen, by then, the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in Britain, and the Clinton
administration killed it off. We suffer, lots of people do, from a very acute case of NIH, "not invented here." If it’s not invented here, we tend to give it a pass. Now, some of those people are clever. The French invented what we now call the G-8. They held the first meeting at Rambouillet in 1975, I think it was, it had legs. At various times, the Europeans would take initiatives in regard to their own security, what we call now the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and we bitch and moan about it. Somehow, it interferes with our capacity to call the shots. Well, in times of difficulties, Europeans have taken a deep breath and said, "Well, if this is going to lead the United States to be less committed, maybe we shouldn’t do that."

The United States, for example, in the administration just prior to the Clinton administration, was staunchly opposed to strengthening the Western European Union. I took the lead in reversing that policy because I recognized, along with some others, I recognized something they didn’t: which is that American strictures on the role of European defense outside of NATO was appropriate during the Cold War, when we had to do central management of the relationship with the Soviet Union. That’s one reason we reacted so intensely to French lese majesté in 1966 when they withdrew from Allied Command Europe. These same people never have come to understand something that I understood at the time, if I may say so, which is that de Gaulle was not doing what he did because he didn’t think the United States would defend Europe with nuclear weapons, but because they knew we would! If you have a lot of diplomatic room to play with, you can do things. And the French were dealing with their central German problem which was deep uneasiness among the West German people over the division of Germany. The French and the Germans then together invented a thing called détente. The United States came along afterwards and picked up on it. Well, so the French invented détente with the Germans, and eventually it proved to be the undoing of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we’ve never forgiven the French for withdrawing from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966. Like some Americans who opposed the invasion of Iraq who still complain that France also opposed it!

Q: Do you think anybody really thinks that any more?

HUNTER: Well, we still react negatively, intensely, anytime the French don't do what we want. This US behavior toward separate European defense efforts was appropriate during the Cold War, when there needed to be central management. But after the end of the Cold War, it was quite the reverse. We had no need for central management of a Cold War, and if the Europeans, by doing things for Western European Union --- or now what is called the European Security and Defense Policy -- spend money on it because it is part of creating a European Union, we should be overjoyed. They might not do the added defense spending because they are worried about challenges in Lower Slobovia, but if they are doing it for purposes of being able to foster European unity, they are still contributing to NATO's military capacity. But we still have not gotten over the European desire to have some military and defense capacity of their own that is not just NATO. The previous administration fought it tooth and nail, and, as I said, I reversed it, but even today there are serious people in the US government who complain, not because of what WEU/ESDP is, but because it’s somehow taking the leadership role away from us, rather than understanding that leadership is what you earn. These people think it should be a birthright.

We have underestimated, for example, the role the British, and particularly Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, played in launching the Marshall Plan and in putting the ideas for a defense
alliance together before the creation of NATO. Western Union, a British invention in 1948, was created to demonstrate to the United States that the Europeans wanted to do something for their security, and to which we could respond. Well, we took all the credit for this, including the Marshall Plan, and that was the way Bevin organized it. He was smart about it. So I think that is a major reason the Europeans wait for US leadership. It’s basically the facts of power.

Of the various issues of NATO that we dealt with during my tenure, the one idea which really came out of the Europeans was the functional aspect of relations with Russia, and that was launched by the Germans and the French. There were people in the State Department and various diplomats in the US government who were pushing the Russian agenda, but they weren’t the ones that came up with this particular idea. Once they did, once the Germans and French took the lead, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was essentially written in the US State Department. Of course, the basic proposal to be made to the Russians was negotiated at the North Atlantic Council. The Secretary-General, Javier Solana, was very clever. He said on a Friday afternoon: “Well I’m going to take all these ideas, and I will work them over on this weekend. I will give you my draft on Monday, OK?” which he then did. The draft was finished in the State Department over the weekend and sent over to me. I printed it out and gave it to Solana, and he then changed the heading on it and put in on his own stationery, and the ambassadors on the North Atlantic Council went with it. We might have got it accepted, anyway, even if it had been clearly marked as our draft, but we were at a time of trying to get people to come along with things and not just our having the ideas. My British colleague came up to me afterwards and he said, “You know, if you are going to do that, have a draft which gets passed off as Javier's, be sure first you change the American spellings to the English spellings we use here at NATO!” Like "defense" spelt with a “c” and "neighbor" spelled "-our." We hadn’t changed the American spellings. It was kind of obvious where the thing was written, right?

Q: Your fingerprints are all over this.

HUNTER: No, it was State Department fingerprints, that’s where all the credit is due, and there were some very talented people working on that down in the State Department, at the junior to mid-levels, where the expertise was. So there you are, you come into a situation like this. My one contribution was during the negotiations among the allies, when the French were objecting to some things we wanted. I suggested to Washington that we offer to hold the NATO-Russia signing ceremony at the Elysée Palace, and that worked like a charm. Suddenly, all the French concerns about our draft disappeared!

Now all this was particularly important, as part of Bush 41’s “Europe whole and free” because, at the beginning of my tenure as ambassador, the United States had been drifting for a while in terms of not doing much followup to what Bush had done in regard to the Soviets, the former Soviets, Russia. As I mentioned, there was a chargé d’affaires at the USNATO mission, there hadn’t been an ambassador for a number of months. The chargé later became my successor, an able Foreign Service Officer.

Q: Who was that?

HUNTER: Alexander, Sandy, Vershbow. An able fellow, but he was still only a chargé and was
a career person, and most USNATO ambassadors had been political people. Recently, they’ve
been mostly career, and I’ll say something that may offend you as a Foreign Service Officer. I
think in part because of some things that had been done during my tenure, where some State
people wanted to get more control over the Mission, they’ve put a Foreign Service Officer in
there rather than a political appointee. I think they had enough of my creating things, and they
wanted to keep control. That’s all right, because an FSO person has a "future" -- right? -- that
needs to be protected, and he or she is a participant within the system and therefore will be
careful not to rock the boat, as I did. But some able FSO people do get selected, and particularly
Nick Burns, Vershbow’s successor, who is now Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and the
current Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, who is also doing a good job, and she's career.

Number two, as I mentioned before, the previous Ambassador, Reginald Bartholomew, was
offered the job of being negotiator for Bosnia, and thought that that was a greener pasture than
NATO, and he resigned to take that job. Well, that said something about the United States; it
obviously didn’t care that much about NATO. It would take an able person and then shift him
and leave the job open because the US agenda was changing. So when I arrived at NATO,
Bosnia was festering, it was 1993 -- how many tens of thousands of people had died at that
point! -- it was not going anywhere, the Clinton administration had undercut the one effort the
US has launched, it abandoned it, the Vance-Owen plan, which hadn't been invented by the new
administration. The secretary of state had gone over to Europe, I guess it was in March or April,
to ask the Allies' advice about Bosnia. Uh uh. Americans who are looked to by the Europeans for
leadership and commitment don’t go and ask advice, they go and offer concrete ideas, that’s
what US diplomats are supposed to do. When the Secretary of State shows up, he’s supposed to
have ideas and say "Here’s what President Clinton’s ideas are going to be." I tried to warn him
and, in fact, I’ve probably mentioned it, that before I became ambassador I tried to seize control
of the secretary of state’s "intervention" -- the NATO name for a speech -- for the Athens
Meeting at the North Atlantic Council in June of that year. I had been nominated but had not
been confirmed. I tore up the draft that the bureaucrats had done, a draft that was just straight-
lining of existing policy as though nothing had happened for years. I wrote him a new draft --
and much of what I said survived -- in part because I wanted to see the secretary of state and
hence the US succeed. I had seen this happen at the beginning of the Carter administration; it
was déjà vu all over again. So he did go to Athens and he showed US leadership on real issues in
relevant terms. The previous administration, I have mentioned, had done a tremendous job on the
unification of Germany, a tremendous job on the Russians, and President Bush had really got it
right. Yet Clinton, coming in as president, brought in basically a group of people selected by the
establishment where a lot of the folks, I’ll leave myself out, who knew something about foreign
affairs were sent to foreign embassies because they had lost the competition for jobs in
Washington. I finally said to Tony Lake: “Well, why don’t you do with me like they do with
generals in Latin America, send me abroad.” That’s how we get so many Latin American
generals as ambassadors in Washington. OK, so they did that, and they sent Dick Holbrooke and
David Aaron and Dick Gardner and Stu Eizenstat, people like that, to Europe. Anyway, that
helped to create a strong US team in Europe.

This leads up to the Travemünde NATO defense minister's informal meeting that fall, when we
came up with an agenda of about a half dozen major initiatives to be prepared for the January
1994 summit, which I had organized to get it done. Other allies made some proposals later on,
and, when we were smart, we would adopt them because, when we got down to negotiations at the NATO Council, the Allies liked the US leadership but they also wanted to have a role in shaping. Then, when we were smart, we would, once we had asserted leadership and come up with the basic ideas, in the fine-tuning we would pick up as many of the other allies' ideas as possible, to make them feel part of the action, to gain what is called in the jargon phrase, "ownership." Remember, the strength of NATO comes from two things above all others: one, the American commitment and two, the consensus principle for all NATO decisions, which means that, once everybody commits to something, nobody has ever fallen off the ladder and that’s the case. Sometimes some of them don’t take part in, say, a NATO military action, but nobody stands up and asks for a decision to be revoked, it doesn’t happen.

Q: Well you know part of the idea of America leading on this the need seems to be reinforced by the crisis of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslavia, where at least according to what one generally heard was Europeans' saying: “Well this is our baby, we can take care of it.” The situation in Bosnia got worse and worse until the United States, very reluctantly, got dragged in. How did you feel about that?

HUNTER: I think it is true that, even though this was before my time so I didn’t see the documents, a number of Europeans thought they could handle it all on their own, they recognized the challenge. They didn’t get very far. The one creation was this thing called the UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR, which I think the consensus is you would never do that again. It was a glorified police outfit, but without its people being able to use deadly force, they were even less than policemen. But with these Bosnian people at risk, they were given a job to do and then told that they couldn’t do it! The mandate was so limited and became part of the problem rather than part of the solution, on top of which we wouldn’t join it. We weren’t about to put American forces at risk, which, had we done so, it might have become something, so this was a kind of mini-League of Nations situation, with a tiny little effort and the inability to apply power.

Ironically, the one country in UNPROFOR which sent tanks and used them was Denmark, it used them once and the Serbs, who were the bad guys in this particular stance, never came near them again. Very interestingly, the commander of the lead tank was a Danish woman officer.

On top of all, the Yugoslav matter was played out with different European Allies choosing sides in the breakup of Yugoslavia, more-or-less where they had been in 1914 or 1941. The German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich-Genscher, a very strong Croatian supporter, had a lot to do with the breakup of Yugoslavia -- whether it should or shouldn’t have broken up, who knows? -- but he played a major role in that. Various countries were pro-Serbian, because they had been pro-Serbian in 1914 and they…

Q: The Russians particularly.

HUNTER: Well, the Russians sure, but I’m talking about within the Alliance, as well, the German relationship with the Croatians going back to the Second World War, for example. The British had another view that interfered with our efforts to get NATO air strikes, which were meant to stop the war. The country that fought that most consistently was Britain, and we never really figured out why. It's not easy to go to them and ask "Why are you doing this," particularly
because they wouldn’t give you a straight answer. They weren’t very good about the air strike business — "punching above their weight" is the phrase that our British colleague on the Council, John Weston, whom I respect, used to use. We would tussle over this, and when we get into a discussion on Bosnia I’ll tell how I organized negotiations at NATO so we finally were able to prevail, but before which we were trying to build bricks without straw.

With the British, there were several things. One, there is an old saying, probably at least half whimsical, that, when you join the British army, you are told three things: "never volunteer, don’t march on Moscow, and don’t get involved in the Balkans." OK. Number two, the British did have some kind of relationship with the Serbs. Manfred Wörner, the NATO Secretary General was once asked by Warren Christopher at a meeting I had set up: “Why are the British doing this?” Manfred said: “It’s because I believe the British want to limit Germany’s influence in the Balkans.” I don’t know if it is true or not, but it had a history. OK?

Q: Well you know they...

HUNTER: The British also had Fitzroy Maclean, who had served with Tito during the War, and he warned them to stay out. Then, of course, the British military didn’t want any part of it. This was at a time when there were all kinds of scandals in Britain, in which the Royal family was being discredited; and some people said that the only institution in Britain that seemed not to be tarnished was the military, and they were against it. I mean we kept reaching for an explanation. All I do know is what the British did, they fought NATO's acting over Bosnia, tooth and nail.

If they couldn’t prevail at NATO, because I followed my instructions on the front lines, so to speak, they would try it back in Washington, they were wonderful at that, fantastic. So that brought us to this situation where NATO was in the doghouse. The United States wasn’t participating in UNPROFOR; the United States had killed off the one peace process [Vance-Owen] that was ongoing, which was a plan to partition various parts of the country. In fact, some people think that’s what should have been done, but that’s history. So everyone was waiting for American leadership, and what we did, since we weren’t prepared to act unilaterally, was something that happened indirectly. By doing all these other things within NATO, about its future, we eventually got to the point where, to make the things we were doing at NATO relevant to ending the European twentieth-century security problem and opening the capacity of NATO to act in the twenty-first century, it became necessary to stop the Bosnian war and clean up Europe's backyard. Otherwise, everything else being done at NATO would be nugatory. That’s what really eventually got everybody to agree to NATO military action over Bosnia. We had gotten this new animal, this new NATO; and people realized that it was going to get destroyed, along with the European Union, unless the Bosnia war was stopped. That’s what NATO really did, eventually. Remember, the United States had no troops on the ground with UNPROFOR. We weren’t prepared to run risks by ourselves or even along with anybody else.

Q: Well I recall somebody who was with the mission that went to Belgrade and said some of the Serb military would jeer them and say; they used the term I think was "eighteen." I think eighteen was the number of Americans who had been killed in the Blackhawk Down at the time in Somalia.
HUNTER: Obviously that was in people’s minds.

Q: Yeah, *I mean the feeling was...*

HUNTER: Where the hell was Bosnia?

Q: *We couldn’t take casualties, therefore any threats we might make were pure bluff. I mean this was the attitude within the Serb military apparently.*

HUNTER: Well, eventually, we did it all with air power and had no casualties, no combat fatalities.

Q: Why don’t we continue with the Balkan thing and then I will come back to the airplane thing.

HUNTER: Sure.

Q: How stood things when you got to Brussels and what was your feeling about what NATO could do?

HUNTER: It’s interesting. The other day, I was putting papers away, and I came upon a memo I wrote to Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser, on the first of May 1993, just a single-spaced memo. I had already been nominated, and I had run into him at dinner at Brzezinski’s. He asked me to send him some ideas. The other day, I read the memo again, and it’s all in there. I had taken a very strong stand the previous year. What had really got me going was an article in the *Washington Post*, saying, in effect, that obviously a lot of other things had happened in history, this is the way of the world, blah, blah, blah. But in my view, this was the worst slaughter since World War II in Europe, and no matter whatever else we wanted to do with the future of Europe, the Bosnia war had to be brought to a halt. It wasn’t only a humanitarian question but also the politics and also the strategy and also the credibility, credibility of power. But there was nothing being done. I arrived at NATO on the eleventh of July, a Sunday; we had already agreed to hold a NATO meeting. So the day after I got to Brussels, there was a NATO meeting about how to organize this summit. It was essentially feeling one’s way at that point, because the instructions I had were pretty tepid, though I had a hand in writing them. It was only later, in October, that we came up with the shot in the arm, including Partnership for Peace.

Now on Bosnia. The lead was taken by Tony Lake in the White House, he was the white knight in Washington and should get more credit than anyone else for stopping the war. An awful lot of people take credit for stopping it, but there are only a handful of people who actually did it. Obviously, the president was number one, and then Tony Lake and a couple of other people in the White House. I like to think I was one of this group. A lot of the people who took credit for stopping the Bosnia war were later in charge over Kosovo and they just blew it. That certainly was an avoidable war. Milosevic test-marketed his approach and repeated what he had gotten away with before, up to a point. The Dayton [Accords] actually let him off the hook, and the same people who were not particularly competent over Bosnia were later running things over Kosovo, and Milosevic almost got away with it a second time, because all the people who had
done the work to stop the Bosnia war had left the government by then. That’s another matter, no names.

Now what happened was that, on about the 28th, 29th or 30th of July '93, I get a secure telephone call from Washington to tell me that the United States had decided to take a constructive step: to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government, because the embargo was working in an unbalanced way against the Bosnia Moslems, who were suffering most of the casualties, by far. The Croats and the Serbs had open borders to the outside world and they were getting heavily supplied with arms, whereas we at NATO were running an arms embargo against Bosnia -- in effect against the Muslims -- and the Western European Union was running a blockade along the coast. So the US proposal was to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, and then use NATO air strikes to protect the UN-designated "safe areas" affecting mostly large numbers of Bosnians, especially Muslims. This gets into the arcana of the UN negotiations and "safe areas," and all that, which we will talk about later. The shorthand for it became "lift and strike." You can get terribly bored about the way power was worked out in the interstices of the debates, about issues which had become symbolic, but were done in terms of the niceties in the words of the documents.

The announcement was that the United States was ready to take these steps, unilaterally, if the Allies would not come along with us. I remember the team that came from Washington for the NATO debate on the US proposal, headed by the assistant secretary, Steve Oxman, who himself didn’t have a lot of experience in Europe. By this point at the US Mission, we had done soundings and determined that the key country that might come along with us was France, but that the country that would not at all come along with us was Britain. The others, of course, were watching what the major powers would do. The Germans played less of a role, because they can’t engage, even today, to the same degree as others in military affairs.

**Q**: *It’s a constitutional thing, and then political.*

**HUNTER**: And a historical thing, historical and political. I am one of those people who say, being old enough, that Germans who tend to be pacifists, let them work it out, don’t push them too hard, because they had a couple of really bad events in their history. Right? I remember the US team coming from Washington. They got in around midnight. During the previous day, we had a meeting at the mission to sort out what we thought would be the likely reaction of various allies. Of course, whenever Washington shows up they come in with a swagger, no matter where it is, it is one of the wonderful things about being a diplomat, as I was briefly, and having watched this so many other times, is that you have a team on the ground, the ambassador and his or her team, and the folks show up from Washington with their little policy papers and their own little debate in Washington. It’s not a magic power and it may or may not be connected to reality on the ground. Smart people in Washington know how to do it when they travel abroad; the dumb people in Washington sort of lay around and preen themselves. So these people came in, and they were absolutely certain that they knew what the hell was going on. The first thing they said was, “The British are for our proposal, the French are against it.” My deputy, Bob Pearson, and I just looked at one another, because we knew, from things said at NATO, that the positions were exactly the reverse. What had happened is that the British government had recognized they could play the game in Washington, sell a bill of goods, because the people there that the British
were talking to didn’t know what was going on, and the British convinced them that their perspective was consistent with our objective. You can’t fault the British for trying. You know, one of the things in diplomacy is that you have to get over saying there are good guys and bad guys. Your job is to figure out how to get what your government wants you to get, right? So you have to do analysis about what is really going on with the other parties. You’ve got to admire the way the British deal with diplomacy. Among the NATO crowd, they probably have the best-disciplined representatives, and they will play good cop, bad cop. They will let down their hair and tell you something, but they aren’t letting down their hair. Their military might say one thing and their diplomats might say another, but they have worked it out in advance. The French are a little different because they are the last NATO ally -- I’m sorry I shouldn’t say this because Portugal had a revolution in ’74 and the Turks had two or three coups d’etat, but otherwise the French are the last ally that almost had a Putsch. Since then, and maybe even before in France, the political side of the house treats the military people like children -- that, they are meant "to be seen and not heard" and they are slapped down if they try to take any kind of an position that is not totally consistent with the line from the Quai [d’Orsay]. Whereas we have civilian control of the military, but we work very carefully and closely with the military, and I think it works. Most of the other allies are at are six and sevens, but the British are extremely well-disciplined.

We saw immediately the Washington team was wrong. So then this assistant secretary gets on the phone back to Washington, I think to Christopher, and in the space of about an hour our resolute position was turned to mush, turned to mush. General Barry McCaffrey, who was the military adviser to the traveling party, looked at us and shook his head and said, “Once again, the United States negotiates with itself.” So by the time we went to the North Atlantic Council meeting in the morning, we didn’t really have very much, and we had backed off the idea that, if the Alliance wouldn't act with us in Bosnia -- "lift and strike" -- we would do it by ourselves. That would have been a potent diplomatic weapon in dealing with the Allies, but we gave it away before we started. The negotiation the next day was my first example of this, watching the team from Washington, we got our heads handed to us. We had an inexperienced team doing negotiations, though we had Reg Bartholomew, who had been our NATO ambassador and who came over with the team. But he got rebuked three times by the Secretary General for being loud and noisy and rude in his behavior. The assistant secretary didn’t seem to know where he was.

Q: Who was the assistant secretary?

HUNTER: Steve Oxman. The Allies were just poking at us, "You Americans don’t have any troops on the ground, you’re trying to put us at risk when you’re not in UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), we have people who are dying." I came to the conclusion, after a while, that the reason the British kept their troops in UNPROFOR was not to help with UNPROFOR, but rather to prevent NATO air strikes. They were deliberately kept there, and the British worked at preventing air strikes very hard, by hook or by crook. Well, that’s a national position, and you can’t say they are morally right or wrong, what you have to do is try to get them to agree to what we wanted. But we were building bricks without straw, because we had no moral leg to stand on, no military commitment in Bosnia, no role in UNPROFOR, particularly when we had earlier said we would if need be act alone. I would have to check on the cable that said we were prepared to do a unilateral strike, which we clearly backed away from, backed down, and so what came out of the NATO meeting was essentially mush that particular day, in
terms of real NATO commitments, blah, blah, blah. It issued commandments about what the local parties in Bosnia were supposed to do, but they didn’t add up to anything.

The idea was that NATO would come back to the issue in a few weeks. Because of the short amount of time between the two meetings, I was asked to stay in Brussels and get ready. I was supposed to go back to Washington and help my wife "pack out," as you folks in the Foreign Service would say, and also to have a public swearing in. I had just had a quickie swearing-in, in order to get to work, and NATO was not a particularly important place, we weren’t taken seriously, and who cares about who’s NATO ambassador, right? What the hell is this Alliance all about? So I stayed behind in Brussels, at Oxman's request, and left my poor wife having to pack out, and without the public swearing-in by the undersecretary, which didn't matter to me, but I did want the European Allies to see that NATO was taken at least reasonably seriously. Then we had a second set of North Atlantic Council negotiations, at the end of August, which went a little bit better, we got a little more teeth in the agreement that was reached, but really it didn’t have anything that was going to take us very far. The Washington team decided to sit this one out. After the first time, maybe they didn't want to risk another embarrassment. At some point, perhaps we can talk about what the various NATO agreements were regarding Bosnia. They get kind of elaborate and complicated.

Q: Well we might as well at least begin to talk about this. In the first place who was...was the American military a major player saying don’t get involved? Or was it Clinton, himself, who didn’t want to...who was more interested in domestic things? Who was on what side in Washington?

HUNTER: Well, I think the people in Washington who wanted to do something in Bosnia were fairly few. Tony Lake and a couple of people who worked for him, like Sandy Vershbow, stood behind the policy of getting NATO actively involved. John Shalikashvili, who was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, had to keep his powder dry, but he was helpful every step of the way when it came to the idea of maybe using military force. Of course, he was then moved from there to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General George Joulwan came in, and he was always, always reluctant to use air power, which made my job more difficult because the allied ambassadors would see the American ambassador pushing one way and they would see the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, this American general, pushing the other way. It was often a difficulty. However, Joulwan's caution about the use of military force flipped immediately, in terms of value, after the Dayton Accords, when we put troops on the ground for the Implementation Force [IFOR] in Bosnia, because his effort to protect the troops, then, was one of the reasons IFOR succeeded, with some of the draconian things that were done for safety reasons, including no drinking. No US service people went out on patrol except in groups of four and wearing full battle kit. But nobody got killed, nobody in ten years, since then. Our troops didn’t like it, they would go into the mess hall, and there would be the French having their bottle of wine, the Germans and the British with their bottles and pints of beer, and the Americans would only have their Coca Cola. But it kept them safe.

Q: I recall I was an observer in ’94 and ’95 I think of the elections there and the Americans were all buttoned up in their flak jackets and helmets and all...
HUNTER: The British soldiers were out there in their skivvies, building schools…

Q: Yeah, yeah.

HUNTER: Yeah, but still for the president the problem was Blackhawk Down, what happened in Somalia, which was the poison pill given to us by the previous administration. I don’t know if I have talked about what was done to us before they got out of town. Sandy Burger called me and asked “What do we do about these deployments in Somalia.” I replied, “We have no choice. Bush is still president.” But it was a poison pill. They left their dirty laundry for us, with a no-win situation. So here is a president left to face this situation in Bosnia. Bosnia is back of the moon, as far as the American people are concerned, it’s in Europe and the Europeans hadn’t cleaned it up, so how could the president ask Americans to go over there and die for a thing like that? We can’t even pronounce the name or find it on a map. But I will say that, over a period of time after this one failed effort, the negotiations at the beginning of August ’93, Clinton did work progressively in the right direction. In fact, at some point if you really want to talk about the details of the various air strikes, there were essentially three separate activities that evolved over time, and I don’t even remember which came at what point. It was an evolution, a gradual evolution, more-and-more theoretically evolved.

There were three set of NATO decisions. One was suppression of the flight of any aircraft over Bosnia, that’s one. That included things like humanitarian flights, so they had to permit those on a case-by-case basis. One of the parties painted a red cross on the plane or the helicopter, and they had to get permission to fly it. One of the problems with that procedure was that sometimes the Serbs would paint a red cross on an aircraft and they would fly, and then you’d see troops get out. Remember, we had an incredible amount of intelligence on this thing, technical intelligence. In that particular NATO effort, Operation Deny Flight, which went on from March 1993 -- in implementing a previous UN decision of October 1992 -- until the Implementation Force (IFOR) kicked in the 20th of December in 1995, Operation Deny Flight flew 100,420 sorties, which was tremendous training on top of everything else. There were some little games that got played here and there by the Serbs. The sorties and all the other uses of NATO airpower in Bosnia were, from the US perspective, designed mostly to protect the safe areas, meaning in particular the Bosnian Moslems. Of course, all the NATO decisions that were taken were to be applied on a neutral basis as regard to the offending party. However, everybody knew that the Bosniacs, the Bosnian Serbs, were taking most of the aggressive military actions in Bosnia. The official Bosnian government in Sarajevo had very little it could do. The Croats were also doing all kinds of nasty things, too, from time to time, so they were also getting pounded by the Serbs. They were both aggressor and aggressee, although the Serbs of course were doing most of the attacking. So when NATO would say, "Thou shalt not kill people," it was formally directed against everybody, on a neutral basis. In fact, the British, with some other allies, were always neutral, and they used to accuse us of always wanting to do things just to stop the Serbs. We said that we did have a neutral approach, but, of course, we were not being particularly truthful and everybody knew it. We were trying to get the people who were attacking to stop, and that meant mostly the Serbs. One of the ironies about the problems we Americans have in some parts of the Muslim world is that we rescued Bosnia; we rescued the Muslims there. We helped them and got the fighting stopped, but we didn’t get any credit because, I think, a lot of folks in the Muslim world don’t really regard Bosnians as Muslims, given that most of them are secular and are only
Muslims because of their ancestors' being impressed into the Ottoman Empire.

One of the ironies is that, if you walk around Sarajevo and you talk to people, and unless somebody is wearing a badge saying "I'm this or that," you wouldn’t know what religion they are. Indeed, Sarajevo was probably the most integrated city -- Orthodox, other Christians, Muslims, Jews -- anywhere in Yugoslavia.

Q: No, these are people who essentially converted in order to get out of taxes.

HUTNER: Well, a lot of them in the Ottoman Empire were taken back to Constantinople as it was then, was, put in the army, many as Janissaries. In fact, there was something like a million Bosnians living in Constantinople/Istanbul. A large number went back to Bosnia. We never got credit for helping these Muslims, bad advertising maybe.

So, where was I?

Q: Well you were talking about three parts and you...

HUNTER: The second part of the NATO effort related to UNPROFOR troops on the ground; the idea is that we would be willing to support them with NATO air power if they got in trouble. In fact in the fullness of time, it got so that we delegated authority for this particular potential use of airpower. Everybody on the NATO Council rigidly held on to authority, especially later on when NATO adopted measures for protection of the UN-designated "safe areas." The one use of airpower that was delegated easily was Operation Deny Flight, preventing any aircraft from flying over Bosnia.

But what would happen if UNPROFOR forces got into trouble and were under attack? How would NATO air power come to their rescue? It was in fact called in on a handful of occasions, and it should have been called in over Srebrenica, but wasn’t. But the authority for this use of NATO airpower was not only delegated to the military and bypassed what we called the "two-key" arrangement with the United Nations, where it had the right of veto; authority was delegated all the way down to the forward air controllers, down to a lowly sergeant. Let’s say you were a Danish soldier down there. You are under attack and you needed NATO air power to come and help you. The guy on the ground could call the airplane, directly, that was circling around overhead, and the airplane would come and attack: authority was delegated all the way down the chain. But as I say, it happened only a handful of times, but it did serve most of the time as a deterrent against attacks on UNPROFOR troops.

The third NATO effort was related to the so-called "safe areas" around various cities. First, the UN Security Council said that nobody could have heavy weapons in these areas, but it was tough enough to enforce that prohibition. Second, there was a prohibition against firing heavy weapons into the safe areas. You couldn’t use mortars, you couldn’t use artillery etc., and that, of course, was even tougher to enforce. Over the next two years, I think, there were something like eight NATO airstrike decisions, and I negotiated all for the United States except the first one. We succeeded in getting each one a little bit tougher, but the definitions were difficult, and there was a two-tier arrangement, whereby both NATO and the UN had to decide upon the actual use of force. Even on the occasions when we at the North Atlantic Council would delegate authority to
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who then would delegate the key to the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, who at the time was a US admiral, and he might even delegate authority, though he tended to hold on it to himself when it was delegated to him -- still, the United Nations had to "turn its key."

Both keys had to be "turned," right? and the UN key -- that is, the formal release authority -- was kept by the UN Secretary General. He didn’t even delegate it to his Special Representative, who was in Zagreb. At one point, the UN Secretary General appointed a Japanese diplomat to be his Special Representative, precisely, the Secretary General said, so that his guy in Zagreb wouldn’t be affected by the emotions of the locals. So he wouldn’t be responsive to any of the European countries, you know, he was some guy out in left field. He didn’t have a national stake in any of the issues that were involved. In fact, when we finally got around to getting the job done in August ’95, the UN Secretary general finally delegated his key to his Special Representative in Zagreb, who then turned his key on permanently and thus allowed us to undertake air strikes.

Prior to that, Milosevic simply out-foxed everyone he needed to out-fox. The British did well at preventing NATO action, and even when we beat them back at NATO, the British totally outfoxed the United States at the UN, that is, the UN mission at the United Nations, the British totally outfoxed them. The US mission to the UN was useless on this issue.

Q: Were the British continuing this policy of trying to keep this...

HUNTER: Absolutely, they would pull back to another trench if they had to. I remember at one point being with Bill Perry, at a NATO Defense Ministers' conference in Seville. All of a sudden, the British came around and they agreed with our position on the use of NATO airpower. Bill Perry, incidentally was very good on this issue.

Q: He was secretary of defense.

HUNTER: Another white knight was Joe Kruzel, but he was killed A couple of Perry’s other people were also very effective. At the Seville meeting, the US had worked around to trying to get a decision that NATO wouldn’t do pin-pricks. If NATO was going to use military power, to protect a safe area by attacking artillery and mortars, it wouldn’t just be pin-pricks, it would be serious strikes. The British supported this proposal. I went around to Bill and I said, “This stinks of fish.” Sure enough, we later found that, even though the British blessed the policy to Bill and supported the NATO decision, but then made it nugatory when it came to practice. It did stink of fish.

Q: I mean was this...

HUNTER: For example, they would agree to do something at NATO, and then they would go and tell the UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, that "We don’t want this to happen," and Boutros Ghali wasn’t a fool. Whether you liked him or not, he had his own perspective of this job of his. He looked at the five permanent members of the Security Council and one of them -- Russia -- didn’t want anything to happen to the Serbs, OK, fine. The Chinese were playing games, "This is not our job and we are not going to stick our neck out." So that leaves you three. The United States had no forces on the ground with UNPROFOR, but was calling for NATO
military action. The two countries with forces on the ground were saying "No," especially the British, and even if we brought the French around, the British would still say "No" at the UN.

Now, the British had approved all this under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, but when Boutros Ghali was going around talking to the permanent members of the Security Council, the British ambassador was saying that they didn't want air attacks to happen. The French were kind of lukewarm, at best, and the American team at the UN was totally flummoxed all the time. Boutros Ghali said to himself, “Well, hell, I’m not going to do this.” Then if the British didn’t find that they could stop the use of airpower that way -- as we discovered on more than one occasion -- they actually gave orders to their military commander on the ground, who was running the NATO military command, not to request the use of airpower at that time. I won’t tell you how we knew this, but we knew it! The use of NATO airpower was off. So that’s how the British would do it.

Q: Well what was happening at NATO headquarters? I mean were you all, were the lines drawn on these where they say, OK, if you, I mean not you but your...

HUNTER: Oh no, what happened was this. NATO took up the issue, or had to take up the issue. Essentially, when the United States pressed for the use of airpower, but without a leg to stand on, morally, because we had no troops on the ground with UNPROFOR, that was always the card that others could play, particularly the British. Don’t get me wrong: there were a lot of courageous people in UNPROFOR, and there were casualties, a lot of people killed. The French alone, I think lost 73 people killed. The French are tremendous allies. Once they agree and get to the fight, they get in with both feet and slug it out with the best of them. Caveats disappear almost all the time. Generally, they were fantastic once they got in, and with the use of air power, the French Air Force never posed a problem.

When something happened in Bosnia, especially some especially outrageous act by the Serbs, then people at NATO had to focus on the issue, and we Americans would seize on the opportunity to get the issue back on the front burner, again, and to try again to get more resolute NATO action. However, in between these particular incidents, people at NATO had reports all the time, but there was a lot of blah, blah, blah. Thus most of the time was spent on the reformation of NATO. It was only when those two threads came together that we were able to stop the Bosnia War.

Now, the next big event after Travemünde, if I recall correctly, was the NATO summit in January 1994. Christopher came over to see what was going on, in preparation for the summit, and I took him around to see Manfred Wörner. Wörner was a white knight who always pushed for robust NATO action on Bosnia. On this occasion, he said to Christopher that, either we should be serious about the use of NATO air strikes, or we should abandon the commitment, since we were looking like hypocrites. So when Clinton came to the summit and got that message again from Wörner, he reworked what he was going to say to the Council. Tony Lake sat there madly writing new text, new talking points for the president. Remember I told you Tony Lake was stalwart in Washington. The president in effect said, you know, NATO needs either to be serious about the air strike commitment or abandon it. Given that this was the summit that was remaking NATO, and that America was back and doing all these other things, the allied
leaders fell in line with Clinton. It was a very effective performance. I don’t know whether Clinton's actual statement is available somewhere, since it was an off-the-record, classified meeting. Wörner and Lake and I and a few other people got the reinforcement we needed out of the Council at the level of heads of state and government.

I’ll also tell you what happened after that first NATO meeting at the beginning of August 1993, which had been such a disaster. We had sent people over who did not prepare adequately, either weren’t good enough or took a slapdash approach, and they certainly didn’t handle the Council right, I just couldn’t believe it. I woke up angry the next morning. I said to myself that this was just a terrible thing for the United States, a terrible thing for the Alliance and for the people of Bosnia, and it made me very angry. Having watched how Washington had fallen apart on the US negotiating position even before the negotiating even started, I said to myself, "Now, how are we going to do something about this?" It occurred to me that there was just one person out there who could do something about it, and that was Manfred Wörner. Manfred was a very sick man, and he had come back to NATO for the Council meeting from his rest cure up in the Bavarian mountains. Of course, he died about a year later, he had cancer and folks knew it, but he was a man of great physical courage, moral courage, and a great flamboyant character. He came across as a giant when he was most needed.

Q: Let’s wait a second.

HUNTER: So he was up in the Bavarian mountains, and I phoned and asked him if I could come see him. He agreed instantly, he was also deeply frustrated. I quickly arranged to get permission to go to Germany. You always have to get permission to travel, when you're ambassador, you have to get permission both from the State Department to leave your post and from the receiving country, otherwise you don’t do it. So I flew down to Munich and got picked up by the German Army and driven up in the mountains to this lakeside rest area where Manfred was recovering from his cancer treatments. He was in his jogging suit. His wife, Elfie, was there. Manfred and I hatched a plot to try and get something done. Essentially, elements of the plot were that we would get Wörner together with Christopher and Shalikashvili at Aviano, the airbase in Italy, because Christopher was coming through at the end of a Middle East trip. Wörner would say “I am proposing this meeting.” So I reported back that Wörner wanted to meet Christopher. The meeting took place the following, I think, Saturday, so a few of us flew down from Belgium. That was when the incident occurred when Christopher asked Wörner why the British were resisting the use of NATO airpower. So we went down to Aviano, and Shali laid on his plane, SACEUR’s plane, and the Chairman of the Military Committee learned about this quite by happenstance and demanded to go. That was Field Marshal Vincent, who was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. Of course, his first job, as he obviously saw it, was to support British policy. The British do that, even when they are in international billets.

One of the great problems for the American general who is SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is that he is also a US serving officer in command of US forces in Europe. Every Pentagon has always gotten PO’d at SACEUR for taking European views from time to time. It’s a lot of effort for SACEUR to balance his two sets of duties. But that means our guys at least have that kind of experience. But the British don’t have two perspectives, except very rarely. They have fine officers who have been exceptions regarding this point, but that was not
true of this particular guy, Vincent heard about the trip and he just had to come along, presumably to make sure the British position got a full hearing. We at the US mission had worked up some talking points. I had written up some stuff, a position, and I sat on the plane with Shali, and Shali went along with it, and he added some things to it, it was pretty robust in terms of what NATO would do. The next NATO meeting was coming up, and Field Marshal Vincent was doing his damnest to try to draw NATO's position back. He was nervous as a puppy as we flew down. I mean he was just about to wet his pants because he could see that we could actually do something that we were talking about. We got in this meeting in Aviano, and Christopher took a robust position. He understood what had to be done, and full marks to Christopher, and full marks to Shali, and full marks, obviously, to Wörner, who was making the running. I was there taking notes and codifying what was agreed. Based on that meeting, I thought we had something real. I wrote up a cable based upon what was decided, which was the ideas I had been pushing and that had been blessed by Wörner in our meeting the previous week. I would like to find that cable, a seven-point program for getting the job done. I sent it back as a cable, and that’s the last anybody ever heard about it. It disappeared in the Washington maw. So when the next NATO meeting came on Bosnia, the agreement was again fairly tepid, the safe area thing advanced a little bit further, but in effect we came out of that NATO meeting with not much help and the issue went away for a while. The moment had been lost. NATO chose to ignore Bosnia, and the Serbs stuck their heads down and didn’t do a lot.

Q: Were the Serbs coming back then?

HUNTER: How do you mean?

Q: Well I mean were they increasing their shelling?

HUNTER: Well, no, they backed off a bit for a time on major shelling. There was a lot of local shooting here and there, and some people getting shot at in Sniper Alley, but there wasn’t a major shelling, and there wasn’t anything truly egregious until I think it was February the seventh the next year, ’94 right smack in the middle of the conference in Munich that’s held every year. It was then called the Wehrkunde Conference; it’s now the Munich Conference on Security Policy. This was the event every year during the Cold War, where the US Secretary of Defense would come over and meet with his counterparts in this great conclave, along with representatives of NGOs, and all the great and the good from the outside world. In effect, SECDEF gave the Europeans their marching orders each year. It was much less like that after the end of the Cold War, but the conference was still a big deal. Right during the middle of that conference, a shell landed in the middle of the market in Sarajevo and killed a lot of people, and that provided a galvanizing event. I saw the opportunity to grab hold of this beast, again, after the summit, and try to push it forward, and you can pick up there if you want: What we tried to do and why it failed.

Q: OK, shall we stop at the...

HUNTER: Yeah.

Q: We will pick this up...what happened after the market place shelling and what NATO did. I do
want to come back to dealing with the Russian/Soviets and how we were dealing with them and NATO and the sensitivities and the battles that raged on that.

HUNTER: Battles within the US government.

Q: Oh yeah.

HUNTER: Where you had some people who wanted to run NATO into the ground if they couldn’t kill it. We had some people who wanted to preserve NATO just as it was; we had some who wanted to make it able to stabilize Central Europe. We had some who didn’t want to do anything that was going to alienate the Russians. I was the guy who eventually had to pull that rabbit out of the hat by playing one side off against another. Actually, the pro-Russia people, led by Strobe Talbott, were particularly hard-over in trying to limit what NATO would do.

Q: It is very obvious from reading newspapers.

HUNTER: Sort of.

Q: OK. Today is May 2, 2007, let’s talk about post-marketplace Sarajevo and how did this galvanize NATO, I mean this one mortar or artillery round killed what about 80 people and all the killing had been going on for a long time in Sarajevo. This really seemed to be sort of enough is enough. From your perspective how was this...what were the results of this?

HUNTER: Well, unfortunately, it wasn’t "enough is enough." Within the US government, there was the support of the President who, of course, had limitations on what was possible because of Bosnia's being a long way from nowhere. The one person in Washington who I think was consistent on pressing for the use of military power to try to do something about this was Tony Lake, the National Security Advisor and, of course, those of us at USNATO, our mission. I recall flying back from the Munich meeting, this is February 1994. I think I may have mentioned, earlier, that one of the perks of the USNATO ambassador, at least it was until up to recently, was, when necessary, to be able to use military aviation out of Ramstein to go to places where it was either hard to get to by commercial flights, or with special needs. Like when I went on missions to the Caucasus and Central Asia. So flying back from the Munich meeting to Brussels, I had four or five of the other NATO ambassadors on the USAF plane, I will have to check my notes to see which ones. The group did include the British Ambassador, Sir John Weston, who is a very smart individual, one of the smartest at NATO during the time that I was there, but was under instructions -- at least, let’s say I inferred that he was under instructions, judging by his behavior, "Ye shall know them by their fruits," right? -- to oppose the use of NATO airpower. So, we came up with some ideas, collectively, on the way back to Brussels on the plane, which then got the full approval of the US government in terms of trying to get NATO to step up to the mark -- I guess you would call it drawing a line in the sand, if you wanted to use that kind of idiom, though we never did. I’d have to check the notes, because there was a sequence of these NATO decisions, there were about eight-nine of them, but this one was to be quite precise about the definition of the so-called safe areas. These were areas from which heavy weapons had to be excluded and could not be in the area -- a 25-kilometer radius from the various towns/cities, which included Sarajevo -- and if any heavy weapon was identified or used, which would be
defined as artillery, mortars and the like, anything with a range where it could be used from outside into the safe area, that would call for the use of NATO airpower. This was, of course, under the two-key system, which meant that an air strike had to get the approval not only of the North Atlantic Council, which, on this and on subsequent occasions, was delegated to the NATO commander: “You don’t have to come back to us, here are the criteria. We expect you to follow through on this.” But the UN also had to turn its key, it’s a symbolic key, legal key, which meant the UN Secretary General would have to “turn the UN key” or he could delegate authority to his representative on the ground, who was the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). That was Mr. Akashi for a considerable period of time, who was Japanese and who was put there precisely, as Boutros Boutros Ghali said, so that he wouldn’t have somebody there with any emotional or political attachments. Akashi would do what he was told to do from New York, and, unfortunately, it was very difficult to get the UN Secretary General to agree to air strikes.

I may have mentioned to you, I think it was the subsequent April, when there was a NATO Council meeting a second time after the restrictions regarding safe areas were violated in a major way, but where NATO had done nothing more than what we called pin-pricks, all that NATO had been allowed to do by the UN Secretary General. At that time, Manfred, with whom I was very close, told me of a conversation he had just had with Boutros Ghali, who had said to Wörner: “Some of your allies speak with forked tongues.” It was wonderful, an Egyptian reaching for an American Western idiom, that we attribute to Native Americans. He meant the British and maybe the French, as well, were saying one thing at the NATO Council and doing another thing in New York. In fact, it became obvious to us that the British were misbehaving in terms of being straightforward. They might agree to something at the NATO Council, but then they would go to the UN and try to block the decision, there, by keeping the UN from turning its key. We even determined at one point, through keeping our ear to the ground, that their commander defied NATO orders to use air power. So the British were very effective in blocking us, and our UN mission in New York was constantly and thoroughly hornswoggled, to use another great Western expression, by the British and sometimes by the French. The French were kind of hiding behind the Brits on this in New York. The US Mission to the UN was asleep at the switch, and it was no help at all to try to get this done. A lot of folks talked about who was doing what, but when it came to actually getting things done on Bosnia, the USUN mission failed. So it was really Tony Lake back in Washington, with a few others, doing practical things, and those of us at the US Mission, plus Manfred Wörner, doing what we could. As you know, Manfred died that spring, which was a terrible thing for NATO. I’d have to check on the actual date of his death, but a couple weeks beforehand, he came from the hospital in Aachen to a NATO meeting on air strikes, and he was sitting there with his oxygen tank, and the morning he died he was working on these issues right up to the moment he died. I’ve seen a few of those people who... Hubert Humphrey was another....who literally were working on the things they believed in until the moment they died, hours before they died. I had the honor to work for Humphrey and with Wörner and to see this kind of incredible courage and devotion to ideals right to the last moment.

So a decision was adopted at that February ’94 NATO Council meeting. Incidentally, the NATO commander was very much concerned about protecting his forces, General George Joulwan, and I have a very high regard for him. He is what they call in the jargon, a "soldier's soldier;" he cared about the people under his command, and you can see it. Another senior officer I worked
with who was like that was Admiral Mike Boorda, who was AFSOUTH and later CNO -- who committed suicide over what seemed to us civilians to be a peccadillo. You can't fake caring for the men and women under your command. A couple of fine officers. Of course, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR, is always an American, as a visible commitment of American engagement at NATO. We used to say, beginning when Eisenhower was the first SACEUR, that he is worth two American divisions, because the relationship with the United States and Europe is always a matter of mutual trust and the firm commitment of the US to European security.

Q: You were talking about a US officer always in command.

HUNTER: Well, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe is a four-star US general and commands all US forces in Europe. He is also the commander of allied forces, and so has two hats, as a minimum, and generally there is no a tension there, but sometimes there is a tension between what the US government wants and what the Allies want. George was very sensitive to that, and though in fact I didn’t happen to like it at the time, I can understand the value in it, and I’ll describe it. He would be given a directive by the Council to do things, and then he would say to them, in effect, “Are you sure, are you really sure this is what you want to do?” In effect, he would always come back even when he didn’t need to, he’d come back and say, “Are you really sure?” He didn’t say it in so many words, but they got the message. This was not what the US government wanted him to do, but his saying it led the Allies to believe that maybe the US government wasn’t so keen on using NATO force, as well. Also, the Allies looked to this military leader to keep their folks safe – an important, positive thing. But his sowing doubts about what the US really wanted was a real pain in the butt for those of us who were trying to get the war stopped, because it added to the limitations on the use of NATO air power.

It worked the other way, however, after we deployed the Implementation Force, following the Dayton Accords, when there was an incredible requirement not to take casualties. So the same general, George Joulwan, imposed some really draconian requirements on the forces, the American forces, who were deployed with IFOR in Bosnia: no drinking, they had to travel in flak jackets and body armor everywhere, and they had to go in groups of four in reinforced armored personnel carriers. The Brits would be out there in their skivvies building a school, and the Americans would go by fully-loaded down with armor. But we didn’t have any casualties -- nor did the British or anyone else, for that matter -- and that was critically important for the President to be able to keep US forces deployed. We haven’t taken any casualties since then. So what worked for the post-peace environment was a pain in the butt prior to that, because it put severe limitations on the use of NATO power and the willingness of Allies to do so. They could read the signals and could see there was a kind of a tussle between me and George, because I was the representative of the President and of the US government, and he did his military duty as he saw it. But, eventually, we got the bombing done, anyway, and stopped the war.

Q: But coming back to the post marketplace mortaring did anything particular happen? I mean were wheels put into motion or anything happen or how?

HUNTER: NATO created what are called "Op Plans," operational plans, which set out a whole panoply of things that you would do. One of the good things about the military, particularly
when they have time to work it through, is that they look at all the angles, they figure out everything that has to be done, and when you are doing it in an allied environment, you want everyone to know what is expected of them and what’s going to happen and what the rules of engagement are, because the Allies have to have confidence in the Op Plan. For example, when it came time to have the actual Op Plan, which led to the air attacks by NATO which brought the war to an end, it was a big, huge document. The Allies insisted on seeing it, the ambassadors. I supported that happening, but none of them read it, there was too much to read, but they had their technical specialists look at it and sent it back to their capitals. Of course, they already got it through their military people. Yet the fact that they had a chance to look at the Op Plan helped deal with the political problems they had. So it wasn’t that something was being done secretively or behind the barn. A lot of the process was about building confidence. You see, this proved to be the first-ever use of NATO air power except for a bomb here and there. You had to build the confidence to do it so it would work. It happened over time.

Q: How long sort of a period between the…I keep coming back to the marketplace as only a benchmark…

HUNTER: Yes, I saw it and people like Tony Lake saw it. This was the moment when we could try to shame the naysayers, and by that time, obviously, it was mostly the Brits. The French would come around in the end, but the Brits were kind of leading the other people who had some trouble with NATO air strikes. The Canadians were often the last to make a decision, in part because they had a lot of troops on the ground, and about the only thing they did at NATO was, first, at UNPROFOR, and then later the Implementation Force. A lot of Canadian troops. There was also a six-hour time difference for them, between Brussels and Ottawa, but the Canadians never held out when the other allies were ready to act. I found in the negotiations that, as I would line up a number of the Allies who were deeply concerned about the American commitment to Europe and to their security, and if the United States were prepared to take action in Bosnia, that was sufficient. Then if I could get the French split off from the Brits and get the French being willing to do something, and then tee up the Canadians to come along, at that point the Brits got isolated and would have to fall off on opposing an actual NATO decision. Then they would have to find some other way to mess it up, by going to the UN, for example, hence Boutros Ghali’s comment about "some of your allies speak with forked tongues."

I may have mentioned before, Boutros Ghali wasn’t being stupid, he was saying, in effect, "I have five permanent members of my Security Council, I’ve got two who don’t want this at all, the Russians and the Chinese are out there watching the play and taking advantage. You’ve got the United States, who’s in favor of this, at least so it seems, and then you’ve got one who is ambivalent, the French, and then you have one dead set against it. Why should I get out in front of my guys here?" In fact, it was only when both Britain and France finally came on board in the summer of 1995, after Srebrenica, that Boutros Ghali was prepared to release his key to his local guy, with orders to do what he had to do.

Q: Did…

HUNTER: You can understand what I’m saying was very frustrating. Here was the market bombing. Here was NATO taking this firm decision about safe areas, here were the violations
that continued. The NATO commander was ambivalent about it and telegraphed his ambivalence about putting people at risk. Then you had the British who were actively opposed to it. It meant that NATO didn’t use its air power and looked stupid.

Q: Did you get any...were you able to have meaningful, frank discussions with your British colleague? Why were they taking this position? Usually they are not in that...

HUNTER: I never got a straight answer and, in fact, we never did figure this out, and someday we’ll get told. On a couple of occasions, I found that on other issues that the British ambassador... who had been a friend for twenty years, right? A very able person, he had been one of Margaret Thatcher’s bright young men and that tended to warp, if I may look at this from an American perspective, the perspective of a number of them, to believe they had more power and authority than they did and to be a bit hard-edged, as she was and as she did in her own country. One time on another issue, I think it had to do with Western European Union, I discovered that he had exceeded his instructions, because I knew quite well a senior official in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I was in London, and I had a talk with the official, and it turned out that Sir John hadn’t been following his instructions -- and he was then brought up short. The whole thing was very unusual, because the Brits are very good at keeping on the agreed message. One of the things that I may have already mentioned is that, if you are dealing diplomatically with the Brits, somebody will come from some part of their government, military or political, and they will tell you, “Gosh, my guys over there are not being very helpful, but I’m going to be helpful to you.” Rubbish, the Brits are always on message, sometimes they play "good cop" and "bad cop," but they are always on message, as one of their strengths to play this game. They would sometimes say things here in Washington to try to undercut what we were doing at NATO, leading some of the less-sophisticated people in Washington to believe that, because of the "Special Relationship," they were on our side. I mentioned that, when we had the first negotiation at NATO on Bosnia, in August of ’93, where the team that flew in from Washington believed the Brits were for what we wanted to do and the French were against it. They had it exactly backwards, because the Brits had convinced the naive people in Washington: "We are with you, but why don’t we tweak this just a little bit," thereby eviscerating our position, and the Washington people fell for the wine and dine set. My job, you see, was not to be sucked in by the wine and dine set. I was being paid to figure out exactly what people were doing and to try to figure out why they were doing it, with all sentimentality put aside. This is when I was struck with the realization -- being basically an Anglophile, having lived there -- that it was the British who were sabotaging us on Bosnia.

Q: Were you ever concerned about the will of the Clinton administration? Because I’ve talked to other people who talk about the reluctance and sometimes they even use the term “the cowardice of the Clinton administration” on getting involved in things, having been hit early on with Somalia, which really wasn’t their fault. But also this was not a sort of pro-active administration. Did you ever sort of look over your shoulder and wonder what’s happening back in Washington?

HUNTER: Obviously, part of my analysis as an ambassador was to try to figure out all foreign countries, including your own, when it comes to it. It is like my old line that the country most foreign to the State Department, begging your pardon, is the United States Congress. But I was
saying that the one person at the senior level who was always steadfast on this was Tony Lake.

Q: At the National Security Council.

HUNTER: National Security Council. He was steadfast, and he had a couple of people working for him who were also working to get NATO airpower employed to stop the war. But other people were essentially phlegmatic, some of them. I will say that Bill Perry, I think, was one of the best Secretaries of Defense we ever had, as far as I could tell from knowing some of them and studying most of the rest. Wherever his heart was on these things, he was always very supportive of what we were trying to do regarding the use of NATO air power. You would want to ask him, but I suspect it came in part out of an understanding that, if the United States didn’t keep its word or was made to look like a chucklehead in face of someone else’s use of power, that would have a broader impact on us. So he was always there. John Shalikashvili, from the time he was SACEUR and then, when he became, soon after I arrived, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, never had a whiff of variance in his support. The State Department was involved enough for Christopher to understand what was going on, but there were some people at State playing games and, you know, really weren’t all that steadfast. In fact, later on, there was an effort by the chief negotiator to keep things solely on a negotiating track and not to have the use of NATO air power. I can speculate on the motive, but I just know what happened, that we did not have the support of the negotiator for the use of NATO air power on a consistent basis.

Q: That was Richard Holbrooke?

HUNTER: That was Holbrooke, yes, so that was a bad message, there. Now, to go back to your point. To repeat, it was on July 28th, give or take, ’93, when I got a secure phone call at the residence to tell me that we were going to "lift and strike," but to try to do it with allies. But by the time we got to the end of the NATO meeting that took place, it was obvious that we weren’t going to get the Allies’ support. The United States then backed away from the idea of acting unilaterally. Now, I can understand that Bosnia was in the European backyard, but the European Allies weren’t prepared to get engaged in the use of air power, and that that would have made this a unilateral US action in the European backyard. But there was never any reluctance that I saw in Washington, with a few exceptions, to use air power if it could be done in an allied context, if there would be allied agreement to do it, never reluctance on that part.

I will say one thing, because it will go in my memoirs, but they aren’t going to come out for years, anyway. We had had the meeting at Travemünde in October of ‘93, which brought together all the ideas we’d had, the Partnership for Peace, which was invented around my dining room table in Brussels, and all this other stuff which was the package of things the United States put forward at NATO. Christopher, who sent messages with the US ideas through cables to his colleagues in Europe, didn’t get any public attention, but Les Aspin spoke directly to his colleagues at this special meeting of defense ministers at Travemünde, Germany, which got the Alliance turned around in the space of two hours. The United States was back and leading, this is what it’s all about.

Well, we were flying in the helicopter from the airport in Berlin, Tempelhof, the grand old airport that has what used to be the world's largest air terminal, shaped like an imperial eagle, if
you’ve ever seen it. It's now going to be torn down. It's in what was the American Sector of Berlin. We flew by helicopter with Les Aspin out to Travemünde, and I got hold of his briefing book. It included a vacating of the American commitment to use air power in Bosnia. I said to him through the squawk box headphones, “You do this and you might as well not do any of the other proposals.” I said, “This will vitiate American leadership, and that will be the end of it, forget about the rest of it.” He didn’t say anything, except at the end he said, “Yeah,” and he dropped this point about ending the air power commitment.

Q: Where was this coming from?

HUNTER: I have no idea. Well, obviously, it came from some people back in Washington. I’ve never gone back and researched to find out how high up it went. It was obvious to me that it couldn’t have been something that involved presidential engagement, or Aspin wouldn’t have been able to drop it. It may have come out of his Pentagon bureaucracy, maybe it’s worth researching. But it was clear, as I said to him through this squawk thing in the helicopter, “You make that statement and forget about the rest of it, that would be the end of American leadership here.” He was not stupid and he figured it out, he probably hadn’t read the briefing book up to that point, anyway. They don’t go through them if they are told that there is nothing controversial in them. Perry never did that. Perry grabbed the briefing book as soon as he got on the plane, and if, by the time he got off the plane in Brussels or wherever the ministerial meeting was being held, the briefing book looked the same, it was a miracle. Les was a man of great intelligence, and to his credit he dropped that point from his statement, fortunately. Otherwise, I didn’t detect any opposition in Washington. Yes, there were failures by the US mission at the UN, yes, there was the opposition, covert at first and later overt, by the US Bosnia negotiator, Dick Holbrooke, to the actual use of NATO air power, reluctance to see it used. As I’ve already mentioned, once we got the bombing started, 24 hours later he demanded that it stop so he could go and negotiate with Milosevic, which then failed. Any child could have told you it was going to fail, but, you know, somebody had to get the credit for stopping the war, and it wasn’t going to be NATO stopping it.

Q: I’m trying to get a little time-line here.

HUNTER: Sure.

Q: Marketplace Srebrenica bombing.

HUNTER: Well, this took a long time. NATO military action, and this is the tragedy, and tens of thousands of people died, or thousands, anyway. The first NATO decisions were taken in August of ’93, and then the marketplace bombing in February of ’94, followed by the first big NATO decision. The next big decision was about three months later, I guess it was April. I can’t remember what the incident was. Then there were various incidents and various ratcheting up of the decisions, until Srebrenica, which took place in July of ’95. There was a whole series of incidents in between, and we had the NATO Council meetings. At every one, with one exception I will talk about, we were able to negotiate harder lines in terms of exclusion of weapons, triggering devices, whittling away the limits on what the UN was prepared to do. Getting more commitments by the Allies.
Now, remember, there were three sets of decisions, three sets of NATO activities, and I would have to go back and look at the record to see at which point which ones were agreed to. Operation Deny Flight, which was that no non-NATO aircraft could fly over Bosnia, and we shot down a few Serb planes. If I remember correctly, by the time that Operation Deny Flight came to an end after Dayton, there had been 100,420 sorties or something like that. That is a huge amount of flying over this period.

The second one was the Safe Areas, UN-mandated, and the third was ground-support air strikes, which were such that, I can’t remember the exact name, if it ever got to the point where an individual UNPROFOR unit, say a platoon, was under fire, it could call for a NATO plane flying overhead to come and strike the people firing against them, without having to go through anybody for permission. Authority was delegated all the way down there, a procedure which remains one of the open issues, open sores, for the Dutch and others at Srebrenica, about why they didn’t call in the NATO air power.

Q: They had the authority to...

HUNTER: They had the authority to, as NATO planes were patrolling all the time, to say on the radio, “Hey, Charlie, I want you to attack that position over there.” That would have been related to the Dutch soldiers, themselves, being under attack, regrettably not related to the Serb attacks on the Bosnia Moslems. The Dutch could have done that. There were various occasions on which NATO would finally get a chance to use a little bit of air power. At one point, for example, after the Serbs had broken the embargo on flying airplanes over Bosnia, I got an agreement through the Council, just to add to what we were doing, that there could be a retaliatory strike on this particular Serbian airbase. The decision was taken on a Friday, and the actual attack was done on a Monday. But when it came, the NATO attack was not against the aircraft; it was only against the runways. The Supreme Allied Commander hadn’t told us, including the Secretary General, as Claes told me, what the attacks were going to be against, so they were just against the runways, and an hour later Serb aircraft took off on the grass to prove that the NATO attack had been useless. You can see what I am getting at is that this kind of feckless use of air power, pin pricks, was worse than no use, because it telegraphed to Milosevic that we weren’t prepared to do serious things, and he could read what was going on. He had at least one allied country letting him know, he was able to read the tea leaves; he could also read them in New York, etc., as to what was going on.

There was, for example in 1998 or ’99, after I’d left office, an incident involving Kosovo, in which the entire NATO air armada was sent off in the direction of Serbia during the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. It got to the Serbia frontier and turned back. This was a demonstration, right? I pounded the wall: it was a demonstration of weakness, not strength.

Q: Sure, if you don’t use it, it shows you’re bluffing.

HUNTER: Absolutely, it was...Milosevic read it as a bluff. I like to think that wouldn’t have happened when I was at NATO.
Q: Part of the problem about air strikes was that there were so many allied troops in there, that they were considered to be hostages. I mean, how was that problem addressed?

HUNTER: Some soldiers were actually taken hostage; I think it was May of ’95. This time...before I forget it, one thing about the French: when they took a decision, they followed through, no BS. Their military was always happy to take part. In fact, they were as good allies as we had. I remember, at one point, the Council went down to Aviano, to the air base, and we were talking to a French Air Force colonel and an American Air Force brigadier general, both sitting in front of a screen, vectoring NATO aircraft, and I asked them, “Do you have any problem with working these things together?” They said, “Why would you even ask a question like that?” The French, once they make a political decision, no problems, whereas with the Brits, that was only step one. You were saying what...

Q: My question is how did we deal with the potential and actual hostage situation?

HUNTER: Oh, the hostage situation, OK. As I mentioned, there were ten NATO Allies with troops in UNPROFOR. There was a large number of troops, over all, and many of whom were from non-NATO countries and some of them -- this is one of the sad commentaries about UN peacekeeping -- did it for the money, not soldiers as mercenaries but countries, poor countries getting money to do our work. When people dump on the United Nations here in this country, they forget that there are an awful lot of people from an awful lot of countries who send their soldiers off to risk getting killed, doing things that benefit us, and that criticism of the UN just gets you. Well, anyway, there were ten NATO countries with troops on the ground with UNPROFOR and, I think as I’ve said before, I became convinced that the British kept their troops on the ground precisely so they could make the argument against the use of NATO air power.

What happened at some point in ’95, there was an issue about what would happen if life really got tough for these people. The United States was refusing to put forces on the ground, because of the Somalia precedent. Frankly, those of us at NATO had nothing but...contempt is the wrong word, let’s say I have to think of a word for UNPROFOR. Not the people serving there, they were as courageous as they come. But they should never have been put in with this kind of mandate. They were put into a hostile situation where they had to a great extent less than police power. At least a policeman is able to draw his weapon and shoot somebody, if he has to. You know, if there were two people, say a Serb and a Moslem, trying to kill one another, the UNPROFOR people just had to sit there and watch it, under the rules of engagement. They were sitting targets, but a lot of people undertook that duty because it was the United Nations and they believed in it. I wouldn’t have agreed to my nation being involved under those circumstances, because what leader can really put his people under rules of engagement where they are just targets and nothing else? That was before the United States was willing to do anything unilaterally, as a given. Other Allies weren’t prepared to act, this was a brand new kind of thing, it was different from the Cold War, and they hadn’t yet understood what was going to have to happen. It was a transitory process. People would ask: “Why didn’t NATO act in Bosnia sooner than it did? I’d say, “It’s a miracle that NATO eventually acted at all!!” This was a psychological transformation from the Cold War era to the new era. Unfortunately, tragically, in that process of transformation, a lot of Bosnians died, but at least we came out the other end, in a way that might
not have happened, historically, but that’s no comfort to people who died. It’s like I’ve often said that, if anybody in the 20th century did not die in vain in a war, it was the people in Hiroshima, because that raised to human consciousness the enormity of a nuclear war. We might have had another nuclear war if it hadn’t been for the use of the bomb at Hiroshima, although that may seem a terrible thing to say. I once said that to John Hersey, that everybody should be required to read his book once a year, *Hiroshima*. It’s a fantastic, shocking book. I also believe that, during the Cold War and maybe even now, when people talk of the use of nuclear weapons, you should every once in a while blow up a nuclear weapon in the South Pacific, with all the world leaders watching it, just so people are conscious of what the hell these things are. People talk about nuclear war in theoretical, antiseptic terms.

OK, so we Americans didn’t have troops on the ground, but we were pushing for use of air power. That always meant that our hands weren’t clean, so to speak. What happened in early in ’95 was that there started to be a movement on the part of some of the NATO countries with troops in UNPROFOR. They were saying "We’re going to have to get out of here, the risks to our people have gone up." The United States had earlier said, “We are prepared to send in our troops to help UNPROFOR leave under benign circumstances. We will send in planes and whatever else is required and all the big stuff that we've got, to help people pack up and get out under benign circumstances, but we won't do it under hostile circumstances.” There was one thing that we managed to engineer in early ’95, I was pushing for it at NATO, and Tony Lake was in Washington, and this was a critical moment. In fact, to show you how rapid the turn around was, on one particular morning, the Canadian ambassador came to see me, John Anderson, former Chief of Defense in Canada, one of those quiet, thoughtful, no-nonsense kind of military people, who is going to do the right thing, a sober person. He told me that his government had decided that they were going to leave UNPROFOR, OK? Two hours later -- I couldn’t tell him at that point, I would only have my instructions two hours later, when I actually got the cable -- I went to the Council and said "The United States has decided that, if UNPROFOR has to leave under hostile circumstances, we will send in forces to get them out as safely as possible." This was a US force commitment, running risks, shared risks, a fundamental principle at NATO. The Canadian ambassador came to see me two hours later and said, “We are going to stay.” The attitude at NATO turned around just like that, because there was the commitment of the United States to be willing to share risks, which actually reduced the likelihood that it might have to happen, a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. It was the fact that we made the commitment, if need be, to do this. It showed engagement of the United States. People at NATO were looking for that, the subtleties of it.

Well, in May, I think it was, some UNPROFOR troops were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs.

*Q: Was it in ’94?*

HUNTER: ’95.

*Q: ’95.*

HUNTER: Taken hostage. Later on, after Srebrenica, and tell me if we’ve covered this territory, I think we did. At that point, the reason that NATO was ready to act, finally, all the objections
got swept aside, was several events. The most important, in my judgment, was that we had completed the work of the reform of NATO, Partnership for Peace, enlargement on track, looking towards a relationship with Russia -- it had joined Partnership of Peace by that point -- a new relationship with Western European Union, Combined Joint Task Forces, looking toward a special relationship with Ukraine, all of the things that made NATO relevant for the future, to wrap up the 20th century and then move forward. Oh, I should mention another program, that George Joulwan put together. It “partnered” Central European militaries with the National Guard in different US states, like Illinois partnered with Poland -- that one was kind of obvious. Ohio and Hungary, Michigan and Latvia, etcetera. For training and the like. This was a terrific tool; the National Guard in the different states took it very seriously.

All this demonstrated American commitment. This whole package got done and then, as I indicated, some people, including my current colleague here at RAND, Steve Larrabee, said at one of the annual NATO-related conferences, “You guys are fat, dumb and happy, you think you’ve got all this done, but you’ve got this war going on. If you can’t stop this war right in your backyard, you’re worthless, you and the European Union.” Or words to that effect! This kind of comment had a major effect, people understood that all this work would be for nothing if we can’t stop the war, and that includes America’s commitment to Europe's security future, and the rest of it, to stabilize Central Europe, take it off the chess board, lots of incredible developments, which included ending the European civil war that had started in 1914, to work toward George H.W. Bush’s goal of a Europe whole and free. I mean this is big stuff, OK? I mean you get that stuff ready, NATO and the European Union, but a war is going on near to NATO and EU territory. People tolerate lots of killings in lots of places, but don’t tell us about it, because then, by God, we can’t ignore it, because it becomes a moral problem. I don’t mean just "moral" on its own, but also in terms of there being a kind of moral basis for political credibility.

Srebrenica was the triggering event, the worst atrocity of its kind in Europe since World War II; and reminiscent of it. I may have mentioned how, afterwards, the Dutch ambassador to NATO came to me and said, “I’m getting some reports about things that happened, and I urge you to take a look.” So I reported this back. The CIA folks and the National Reconnaissance Office got out photographs of the area, before and afterwards, and discovered all these newly-plowed fields. Madeleine Albright showed the photos at the UN, which showed where there were mass graves. That galvanized people. For NATO, the EU, this was the galvanizing event.

Tell me, have I talked about Srebrenica?

Q: I'm not sure but I don’t mind going over this again.

HUNTER: Well, the instruction I got from Washington was to secure the use of NATO air power. Incidentally, there was another thing with our Bosnia negotiator. I may as well correct the record about how, when we agreed to have American forces be part of the Implementation Force. He made a meal of it and went to the president at a White House social event, including the secretary of state, and Holbrooke said, “You understand, Mr. President, that this is going to mean that you are no longer going to control American forces." The president said, “I thought I was in control of the American forces.” The secretary of state said, “Let’s talk about it later.” Well, this individual, Dick Holbrooke, must not have read the NATO documents, even though they had
passed over his desk at least five times for approval. The US president never gives up control of US forces; he can pull them out any time he wants, so that was flat misrepresentation. I will put it down to ignorance rather than any other reason. The president was right, you know, he doesn't give up control of US forces, and, of course, the same is true with any other leader. One of the things for credibility, as all the leaders know, is that "I can pull my guys out. Troops are under allied command for an operation, but I can pull out at any moment, that’s important."

So, I get my instructions after Srebrenica to get the bombing done. Finally, we got it cleared carte blanche. Incidentally, Boutros Ghali at the UN got the signal from France, certainly, and also from Britain, that they were prepared to go forward with this. So he delegated his key. I watched this happen, I reported it and said, “Here is what he is doing and why is he doing it.” I figured it out because, finally, he had the big three Western permanent members of his Security Council at one, and so he could say, “It’s not my problem, I can wash my hands of it, let the other folks do it.” So he delegated his key to his Special Representative in Zagreb, with the idea of turning it on. Thus at that point, we had that key turned on. On the NATO side, I also got the instruction, “Make sure that when NATO bombing starts, it won't stop if UNPROFOR hostages are taken.” We were certain that there would be some immediate provocation by the Serbs. It was another market bombing actually that triggered it, eventually, in Sarajevo. I have to check on it, but I’m pretty sure that’s what it was.

But, my instructions continued, "make it a provision that, even if there were a hostage-taking, the use of NATO air power would continue." An impossible instruction to implement, given that we had no troops at risk. It was one of those Washington magic-wand things. There was one of those all-night meetings of the NATO Council -- and the all-night NATO meetings are the best rather than the worst. Some commentators said, “Oh, God, the Alliance is in disarray.” Oh, no, a long meeting shows allies honestly grappling with tough issues, and they come out at the end with a firm understanding and decision, because they’ve had a chance to grapple. So it was 2:00 in the morning, and I was trying all kinds of different things to get our provision on "no halt to bombing even if there is a hostage-taking." I made a proposal which was, "Why don’t we set it up so that the fighting will continue -- that is, the use of NATO air power, with our key turned on -- even if there are hostages, unless we decide as a Council to turn it off?" Of course, the instant I said that, I realized the trap that I had walked into. All the other ambassadors understood that my proposal would give us a unit veto to prevent the stopping of the bombing, although we didn’t have troops on the ground with UNPROFOR. Well, everybody recognized that instantly, and I said to myself, “Oh God, I’ve just”…whereupon a flurry of ambassadors' hands went up, and they started denouncing me and the United States. Everybody spoke, including the Acting Secretary General, with unkind words for what the United States was doing. I wanted to crawl under the table, I really just wanted to. The worst 45 minutes or an hour I had had at NATO. I was taking every insult, just being pummeled. "What cynicism, how can you do that? Your troops aren’t at risk. You’re willing to let our people die," and all of this stuff went on and on. The Acting Secretary General chimed in, saying, "This seems to me a very inappropriate thing for the United States to have suggested." I got through the end of all of that, and everything quieted down, and then they agreed to my proposal!! I said to myself, “I guess I wasn’t so stupid after all, that was a masterstroke!” They had to get it out of their systems that the United States was asking them to be put at risk, without our troops being at risk, and they wanted finally to express their dudgeon at the United States, and I had given them a chance to do it.
So, once they had gotten it out of their systems, and had also made some points for people back in their capitals, they agreed to the decision sheet, as its called, and hence the bombing started. After all the bickering, the bombing was done extremely effectively by the NATO military; Joulwan put his heart into it.

Q: Well, had you by this time, having gone through the pin-prick stage, had everybody realized that, if we are going to do this, we really got to do it?

HUNTER: Oh, yeah, sure, that was clear. In fact, at one point we had a meeting in Seville of the NATO defense ministers, I will have to look up the date on it. This came in the fall of ’94, and Bill Perry, of course, was there. He and I cooked up a deal, because Perry was always very useful, and, as I said, he was one of the best secretaries of defense we’ve ever had. He and I worked out a deal to get introduced that, if NATO were to use its air power, it would not be a pin-prick; it had to be a serious use of air power. We put it out there, and I was surprised that the British agreed to it, it went through. I went to Perry and I said, “I smell fish.” He said, “Well, see if you can find out what it is that is stinking.” Sure enough, we discovered, in the not too-distant future, that the British were turning things off at the UN, and also were cooking a deal with their own NATO commander on the ground, who had to start things going. So they had given in at Seville, not because they had a change of heart, but they were just going to change the venue and the manner in which they were going to fight us. To my credit, I will say, I smelled fish as soon as they put it out there.

Q: How was that dealt with?

HUNTER: You do what you can to push and shove and pull and that sort of thing. I told you that we tried to find out what was going on with the Brits. Their ambassador used to call it “punching above our weight,” and I’m pretty sure he was following instructions. I really haven’t figured it out. I told you what Manfred Wörner said to Christopher, that it was because of the Brits wanting to limit German influence in the Balkans and with the Serbs. OK?

Q: I may have mentioned before but I’ve been told that every British soldier has...

HUNTER: Three rules…

Q: Three rules and I think I..

HUNTER: Don’t volunteer, don’t march on Moscow, and don’t go into the Balkans, right?

Q: Yeah.

HUNTER: Those are the three rules. Well, in fact, the way the British acted at one point, there, was real misbehavior. I think it was over the Safe Area at Gorazde, and we were going to hold a meeting in the morning at the NATO Council to jack up the NATO role and the requirements imposed on the Serbs. I got a call at 2:00 in the morning from the British ambassador, who said, “I’ve just gotten word that a deal has been worked out by our commander on the ground with
their commander. The Serbs said Gorazde is going to be relieved, and everything is going to come right, so we don’t need to hold a NATO meeting in the morning, right?” A big miscalculation on his part. I put the phone down, and I picked up the STU line (secure telephone unit) and I called SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, got a hold of people, and I said, "Here’s what I've been told, let me know what the facts are." They called back ten minutes later and said there was nothing to it. There hadn’t been a deal reached. So I got on the phone, and I called Washington, with the six-hour difference, and I reached somebody senior, told them what was going on, and said we’ve got to get this turned around. At 4:00 in the morning, our time, the President of the United States called the British prime minister. So when we came in in the morning, the British Ambassador had different instructions. I said to myself that he was so proud that he was about to confound us, you see, that he telegraphed his punch, whereas, if he had come in in the middle of the meeting and announced this supposed "deal," we probably would have had a failed meeting. But, instead, I had the time to get something done.

Q: OK, well looking at time it’s probably a good place to stop. So we will pick it up at this point where you have confounded the British...

HUNTER: On this one limited engagement. But it didn’t lead to anything because…

Q: We are still talking about the leading up to the all out commitment of NATO to bombing. We are talking about the British machinations is the only word I can think of, of trying to stop it. But we will move on then from that point on.

HUNTER: Sure.

Q: Good.

HUNTER: Thank you.

Q: This is Tape 9, Side 1, with Robert Hunter. We are sort of filling in. Bob, we have been talking at some length about the British reluctance to go along with our effort to stop the fighting in the Balkans. One of the questions that occurred to me afterwards was did you have much contact with our embassy in the United Kingdom, and did you get much reading from them about what was...why the British were taking this covert stand, you might say?

HUNTER: I don’t think we had a lot of contact directly with our people in London, but some. I don’t have a memory of getting a satisfactory sense from them of what was going on. I don’t know how much of that might be clientitis, which tends to happen to embassies, in general, but essentially I think we weren’t getting a sense from anybody who really gave us a serious view on that. I do recall once being in London at the US ambassador’s residence and...

Q: Who was the ambassador then?

HUNTER: Bill Crowe, a man of great distinction.

Q: Yeah.
HUNTER: Who I think was an excellent choice for that job. Now that I reflect on it, I don't think our embassy in London had any more of a take on the motives for British behavior over Bosnia than we did, beyond just simple explanations of what the British positions were, and the like. You have to remember that Anglophilia, which I have been infected with myself for forty-five years, having lived in London for seven years, is a chronic American disease, and one sometimes has to get beyond that to see what is actually going on. The British are very crafty and they are very adept. I may have mentioned to you, before, that one of the things we get paid to do at NATO, as much as any diplomat, is to read your audience, because you are negotiating all the time and you’ve got to understand whom you are negotiating with. You can’t just engage in bombast, you have to learn all you can and use all the techniques that you can to elicit information. One thing about the British is that they are all always on the same page. They will seem to “let their hair down,” but they aren’t in fact doing so. The British military will tell you something like "Our political people don’t know what they are talking about," or vice versa, but at the end of the day, they’re really all saying the same thing, they are just playing "good cop, bad cop." They are exceedingly well-disciplined. The Germans aren’t terribly well disciplined, and with the French it is absolute command by the political over the military. The French diplomats make it very clear at NATO, by sometimes insulting their military people in public, making sure everybody knows that they are in charge. If you think about it, of all the major allies of ours -- except maybe Spain or Portugal, though what happened there was quite different -- they were the last ones who almost had a Putsch, over the Algerian question. So the French political side keeps their military under control. With most allies, you can learn different things by talking to diplomats, the military, etc., but with the British it’s always…

Q: On the other side, I know, when I was consul general in Naples, and Admiral Crowe was CINCSOUTH (Commander in Chief, Southern Forces)...

HUNTER: Exactly.

Q: There he was, saying that his cooperation with the French military was outstanding. Although, technically, they weren’t in the integrated command structure, they participated in most things, and, I understand from other people, who said that the intelligence cooperation is really first-rate.

HUNTER: The cooperation from the British side is number one in terms of day-to-day, but number two is the French. I may have mentioned before that the British will agree to something and then get you on the details. But if the French agree to something, they do it. It’s kind of like our methodology, as somebody once said about negotiating with the Japanese. One of the difficulties we have is that we will come to an agreement, and then we will work out the details. The Japanese work out the details in advance and, when they agree, boom, it happens instantly, because everything is already worked out. They are just two entirely different negotiating styles.

Q: Let me ask a question about the Japanese. Was it ever considered that in some way or another that we wanted to nail the Japanese into NATO? It’s almost an oxymoron, but at the same time they are a power, and NATO is a military power.
HUNTER: The simple word is "No," except during Bosnia and, I gather, later in the Kosovo operations. We were looking for support everywhere in terms of who would send troops, this was for the Implementation Force, but the Japanese still had problems with doing that. A striking thing was that, every time we had a ministerial meeting, the Japanese ambassador to Brussels would come around to see me and would ask all the toughest, most penetrating questions. They were extremely well-prepared.

There used to be a NATO-Japan dialogue, and, every couple of years, some NATO folks went to Tokyo or some people from Tokyo came to NATO. The only other country with which that happened, in what you might call a somewhat bizarre situation, was Argentina, which always wanted to have a dialogue with NATO, and some of us found it a little bit amusing.

Q: While we are sort of on this tour of the horizon, you might say... You know, every time one gets up and talks about great powers and potential and all, Brazil always comes up. Yet, I have to say that, in all my oral histories, unless I’m talking about something south of the Caribbean, Brazil never raises its head. Brazil seems to be not a very aggressive or influential power.

HUNTER: I remember twenty years ago, people used to joke that "The optimists are learning Russian, the pessimists are learning Chinese, and the realists are learning Brazilian Portuguese." It’s one of those phenomena, if I were a Brazilian, I would feel fat, dumb, and happy, not having to worry so much about international security issues. The Monroe Doctrine works still. It is the American backyard, and, if I were most Latin Americans, I’d think it was wonderful not to have the kind of ambition that the great powers have, which classically is not about security, except from time to time, but is about other aspects of national society. So far, they have largely been proof against that. The whole world would be happier if we could all become proof against that. An untapped area of inquiry is why nations do things out of pride, status, self-respect. The struggle for Africa in the 19th century was mostly about that. The Belgians got in because everybody else was there. The Germans wanted to get in because everybody else was there. I haven’t looked at the research, but I suspect none of the European powers ever made a net profit on the colonies.

Q: I think from what I gather that that is quite true.

HUNTER: We certainly haven’t with our "colonies."

Q: No. Going back to where I started, I was asking if the Brits at their NATO mission, and the ambassador, there, gave you any answers. Looking at the broader picture, as the ambassador to NATO, I would think that you would be either tasking our embassies in Europe for information or our embassies in Europe would be tasking you. I mean, was there much dialogue or were you kind of doing your thing and they were doing their thing?

HUNTER: One thing at NATO is that you’re on the cable traffic routing for all of the European countries, so you are reading a large part of the cable traffic, not the really nuts and bolts stuff about every domestic issue, but anything to do with security, so you are really always getting an overall picture. I recall visiting one embassy within our purview in Central Europe, and the ambassador's cable take was about a quarter of an inch thick a day, while mine was about six
inches thick. But, sure, when something was being done by another NATO ambassador around the Council table that you didn’t understand, you either got on the phone or you sent a cable, or, as you sent out your reporting cable, you would copy everybody who was relevant, and then you would, say, include the phrase: "Embassy Bonn may want to comment" on this and tell us what the Germans are up to. Then they would do their research, and they would send a cable back. That would be emails, now. In those days, not so long ago, we didn’t really have email. In fact, I like the use of cables, because you have to think a little bit before you write a message, you have a better track record, and everybody gets the cable, and so everybody is getting the picture you’re getting.

Q: Well there is a discipline to cables. An email is in a way a sort of indulgence, which is dangerous because, when you do that, you may say, “Well I think this and that” rather than "We’ve looked at this long and hard, and we feel this is the way things are."

HUNTER: That’s why I maintained an absolute discipline. There was obviously communication by phone back and forth, but we were not looking at five positions being communicated to Washington, because the basic thing is to get people there and elsewhere to know what is really going on and what the decision framework is, rather than just people blowing smoke here and there. I may have mentioned to you, before, that an awful lot of the Washington interagency process on NATO was actually done at my mission, because I involved everybody, never cut anybody out of anything, and I never had a leak. I’d come back from Washington and I would say, "Here is everything that went on," so my team would know and could do their jobs, and they respected that, being professionals. We never lost an inter-agency battle in Washington, because somebody there would pick up the phone and call somebody in one of the elements of the mission, the Foreign Service or the civilians in the defense element or the military in the defense element and ask "What is going on, why didn't you object to this thing in the cable?" The people in the mission would say, "Look, we were involved in the decision, and this is the best deal, go with it."

But, yes, your basic question is that the idea was to make sure, as things were happening, that all the relevant US embassies with a security perspective in Europe were informed of what we were doing. That’s why we did a lot of heavy reporting and did honest reporting, not cooking it one way or the other. You want to make sure that everybody knows what is going on, and then you polled the other embassies for their perspective. Or somebody in another US embassy would read our cable and reply, "I think I can give you an explanation as to why the country I am in is doing thus and so." Or Washington would intervene and go out with a demarche, or simply a request to the other embassies to go out and talk to foreign ministers and that sort of thing, to find out what was going on.

Q: How about your experience with the American apparatus? How well disciplined were we? I'm not just fishing, but I'm talking about the overall thing.

HUNTER: Well, one of the wonderful things about the United States is the way in which we arrive at decisions. We are a heavily consensus-based society, not in the sense that we all start with the same understanding, but that we tend to work until the consensus becomes rock-solid. It's one reason that enemies don't roll us once we have a consensus. World War II, we had a
consensus, and it held up throughout the war. But there is this famous line of Kissinger’s, which I’m sick of hearing, which is “I know who to call in London and Paris but whom do I call in Europe?” But the real problem is "Whom do Europeans call in Washington?" There are so many different centers of power, here, and some of the Europeans are good at playing one side off against another, here in Washington. The British are wonderful at that, playing one side off against the other, with the different positions on issues in different parts of the US government. For European diplomats coming here, and their capitals, trying to figure out how we do things, they find that we are easily the most arcane or the most hidden or the most complex of just about any country. We managed, historically, to have a society that worked, where we could reach decisions, when it was 3,000 miles from here to the farthest state in the Union in California, and when we had one telegraph line. We made it work. So we’ve got this complicated process, this ethos, that tends to bring things together. That means that, if you can dominate the topic, you can often dominate the result. So a European coming to the States can’t understand us. Today, for example, you go to NATO Headquarters, and you walk in there and the issue is Afghanistan. You come here and the issue is Iraq, right now. Neither sees the others', what’s the word? preoccupation, because of the obsession with whatever the issue is we are focused on.

So, I would say the question is "What phone number do you call in Washington?" One thing that I tried to do at NATO, and I think more or less successfully, was "one-stop shopping," so that by engaging everybody in the US Mission, from the different sectors, critical sectors, of the American government that worked on NATO issues -- State, Defense, USIA, FEMA, uniformed, civilian -- it became easier for others at NATO to know they could come to us and ask anyone of my people, "What is going on?" and they would hear a message that we could deliver on. If they went to Washington and got the bottom line, they would hear more or less the same message that they got from us, except from some folks who were out of line, and they would thus learn over time to rely on the central messages coming out of our mission, rather than just the speculation in different parts of Washington. It was a real strength for US policy.

Let me just take this one step further. One thing I really liked when I was at NATO, from early on. I found in talking to military people, there, beginning with the Americans but also others, I’d sit and listen to these military people talk to one another -- let’s say SACEUR or the US Milrep (military representative) or some of the other military officers from different countries. The amount of information they shared with one another was incredible; and yet I know that, in the Foreign Service culture and in the political culture, information is power, and people clutch it to themselves and don’t share it: "I’m going to get ahead with the boss because I know something that you don’t know" -- this kind of competition, which I find detrimental to the government, but it’s human nature. I didn’t practice it. But when it came to understanding the reason that the military people share information, I came to understand that it is because, if you don’t, somebody dies. The stakes are red hot, precision and communication are required, whereas some people play games a lot with information. I didn’t play games with my staff. As I said, I shared everything, because they couldn’t do their jobs if I’ve got something in the back of my mind that they don’t know about. There might have been a few items that I held back which were not relevant, which were so sensitive, but nothing relevant to the jobs that they were doing.

Q: Well one of the things that I’ve noticed since I’ve been doing these interviews and sort of watching what is happening in Iraq, is the hotter the issue the more the experts tend to be pushed
aside and the Washington operators who know how to manipulate the Washington system, the staff assistants, the people who are out to make a name for themselves, get involved in it, and the people who, say, have served on the ground and know what the real issues are and what the problems are are dismissed practically.

HUNTER: I appreciate that. That is one of my central insights after forty years in this business.... and I have been fortunate to have had, now, more than thirteen years at the highest levels of the government, in one form or another, with no more than one person between me and the President, on the executive side, and then working for Senator Ted Kennedy for three and a half years at a time when people thought he was going to be president. I’ve had a chance to see these things. I was talking with a diplomat yesterday at the American Academy of Diplomacy about how Robert Murphy said his greatest moment was when he was in Algeria, and we broke diplomatic relations, and he had five people on his staff. I remember Don Burgess, who was US ambassador in Egypt when relations were broken at the start of the Six-Day War forty years ago, and, when I visited him in Cairo, he was sitting in the US embassy with a Spanish flag on top of it, with only eight people, and he was having a wonderful time. The same thing happened with an ambassador we had in Prague. In a way, we were lucky at NATO that we were a pariah because of Bosnia – I used to tell people that we were Typhoid Mary.

So a small group of us went through the entire reform process of NATO, up through the end of ’95. A small group of people, mostly on my team. Back at home, there was Tony Lake, as I said, the hero on Bosnia, and he had a couple of people working for him there who shared his perspective. There were a few people in the State Department at the DAS level (deputy assistant secretary), not the assistant secretary, he was a zero, he didn’t even understand Europe. There was a first-class team at Defense, particularly after Bill Perry came in, Joe Kruzel whom we lost on Mt. Igman, Gen. John Shalikashvili, SACEUR, who became the Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and some desk officers at State and Defense. I suspect if I lined then up, it might be, outside of people on my team -- some outstanding people, really outstanding people -- of the Americans who remade NATO, there might have been a dozen or so people, plus some junior desk officers.

Then we got Bosnia right, fighting the people who were the credit-takers on Bosnia, but who were often not there when we could have used their help. The war in Bosnia didn’t stop at Dayton; it stopped earlier with the bombing campaign by NATO. The Dayton conference was a clean-up act, to get Bosnia off the US plate. Milosevic got enough out of it that he decided to have another go and did Kosovo. I mentioned that, by that time, the team that had in fact stopped the Bosnia War were all gone, and the credit-takers were in charge, and so we fought a war we didn’t have to fight over Kosovo because of failures of American diplomacy and American use of power.

Then, after the end of the Bosnia War, all of a sudden we at NATO became the flavor of the month, and everybody piled in. NATO had suddenly become the big game, so everybody came piling in. But the good news was that we had already done the work, while nobody was looking, so that the newcomers couldn’t pull it apart. Even though there were some credit-takers and people with well-known names, which I’m not going to name. In fact, there was one person who came back to Washington from a foreign posting and thought he was going to redo everything at
NATO, but it had already been done. For example, the argument has often been made that NATO enlargement really wasn’t decided until 1996, and then only because of the Herculean efforts of a couple of people. That was nonsense. NATO enlargement was decided on the 11th of January 1994. I’ve got sitting here on the wall a part of the summit communiqué, which my team and I helped draft. It says "We expect," this is from the communiqué of that summit, "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe." That was the commitment to enlarge, and everybody knew it. Now, that sentence has other elements in it. One is that it applies to democratic states. Another is that it is evolutionary, it wasn't going to happen all at once. And taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe." That means you have to pay at least some attention to Russian security -- though we always made clear that this was without ever giving Moscow either a look-in or a veto on NATO actions. So this was the commitment to enlarge, and all the stuff about how the commitment wasn’t made until two years later is nonsense. Everybody knew that the United States, President Bill Clinton, had made the commitment. In fact, he then went off to Warsaw after the Brussels summit and made an even stronger statement, that enlargement "is not a question of whether, it’s when and how." Well, bingo. But the credit-takers hadn’t been around, and so they had to pretend that it hadn’t happened, in order to show that they had done it.

Now, when I get to what you are saying about crowding out sensible advice and real knowledge, this is one thing that I feel very strongly about. Remember, you and I lived through Viet Nam. I shared with some folks who were meeting here, yesterday, a quotation from Bernard Fall. Bernard Fall told us, the French journalist, what we were getting into in Viet Nam, but people didn’t listen to him. He later stepped on a landmine and died. I will say that one of the unfortunate things in our country is that the experts who were right and were ignored never get rehabilitated. We rehabilitate the McNamara’s and the Wolfowitz’s and others. Wolfowitz would still be at the World Bank, if he hadn’t made himself vulnerable, but when he was, a lot of people wanted to get even with him for what he had done in leading the country into the mess in Iraq. But we don’t rehabilitate the people who were right. You are out of step. It is part of the American consensus-building process, especially people who don’t want to admit we got it wrong when our young men and women were sent off to war, and many of them had to die. So we were turning against Viet Nam and all, but we didn’t take the people who warned us, but we didn’t listen to, and rehabilitate them. The Washington establishment won’t do that, just won’t do that.

So what happened in Viet Nam is that all the real experts got crowded out, and the same thing is happening with Iraq, the debate in Iraq before the US invasion was not among the real experts, it was among wannabees. That's also true of Iran.

Q: I have to say that I watch this and I watch one PhD. talking to another Ph.D., and you know they don’t know diddlysquat about the realities there. Well, anyway.

HUNTER: I got asked by one of the top three people in the foreign policy apparatus this year if I would join a group of advisors on Iraq from the Democratic Party. I said, “I would be delighted to, but I’ll have to tell you, none of us in Washington can contribute anything on the tactical situation in Iraq. We can talk about the politics and the grand strategy and all that stuff.” I said,
“The only people who can make those decisions are the people who actually interact, and you people in the government who are interacting on a daily basis.” That’s a fact.

My other pet thing, Hunter’s Law Number 27, which I invented, in fact, when I was in the White House the second time. I probably told you this before: "Anything you want to know about the world, except what Dictator X is going to want for breakfast tomorrow morning, somebody in the US government knows it, the culture, the whole bit, the whole smear." The job of the top policy makers is to find that person or persons and then listen to them. The former is sometimes easier than the latter. For top people, it is extremely difficult for them to hear things that produce cognitive dissonance, extremely difficult, especially when you get into meetings, even when the president is not there. Colin Powell, a couple of times, I understand, actually brought desk officers to the Principals' meeting in the White House Situation Room. When I was at the White House, serving the president, that was my job, and there would be a meeting, the president would have a foreign leader come, and we were doing the final strategy papers. I would write them in my area and send them to Brzezinski, and he would make changes, if he had any, and send them to the president; increasingly, he didn’t because we have the kind of resonance, you learn. But I would get the State briefing papers and look at them, and then I would then call the desk officers, not the higher level people, I would call the desk officers and ask, "What about this, what about that?” They would tell me what was really going on. Then I would change all the stuff and get it right, rather than the product of the interagency process or the State process, which would water things down. I remember one wonderful occasion on which I got a paper that came out of State for a presidential meeting with the British prime minister, and there was a particular issue that wasn’t addressed, and I’d been reading the cable traffic. So I called the guy who had written the paper, the desk officer, and I said, “How come this issue so and so isn’t in there?” He said, “Well, that’s all in NODIS traffic, I couldn’t include it.” I don’t know if I explained this, before -- you understand it, of course -- but that means “No Distribution,” which means that only the main people get to see the cable. I said to him, “You know, the last time I looked, the President of the United States had a security clearance.”

But he was in no position, because of the NODIS traffic, to put it in. So this is endemic in this government. I would say that most of the mistakes we make in the world are because of failing to use the talent and to understand who is best. It isn’t even judgment calls, two guys differing on an issue; it’s first finding somebody who knows what’s going on. We made this mistake in Iraq, we did that in Viet Nam, we did it all over the place. We are doing it on Iran, today.

Q: OK, back to what about did you find, I may have asked this before but it's worth going back to again just so I make sure that I don't miss it. Did you overlap or were there problems with the European Union? Was there a European Union when you were there? Was it in...

HUNTER: There’s been a "European Union," with one name or another, since 1956, or 1950, if you include the Coal and Steel Community.

Q: Well, I mean it was called by various names.

HUNTER: When I got there, I think it was still called the European Communities, plural. It then became the European Union in '93.
Q: But was there in a way you had almost a tremendous overlap. How did this work?

HUNTER: Well, first we always have an ambassador who does the European Union and who has a different relationship with the host. At NATO, the US ambassador and other ambassadors sit on the NATO Council by right, there is no agrément, each government appoints somebody, and you just bring your letter of credence from the President -- "I hereby appoint..." -- you are there by right. If you are the US ambassador to the European Union, you have to get agrément from every single EU member country, it takes a while.

Q: He’s also not a...

HUNTER: And he is an outsider.

Q: He’s outside.

HUNTER: OK, he’s an outsider. Now, there were three US ambassadors in Brussels while I was at NATO. Jim Dobbins, who works with me here at RAND, was on his way out, going off to another job. He was replaced by one of my oldest friends, Stu Eizenstat. We'd been in the Humphrey campaign, together. He came to the EU for three years, and he then went off and became Undersecretary of State for Economics and eventually Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. When Stu left the EU job, there was a third individual who came in as ambassador, Vernon Weaver, who had been head of SBA, the Small Business Administration. Now, obviously, there were some areas of overlap, but the most important area had to do with the military side of the EU's activity, which technically at that time was the Western European Union. It's later been incorporated within European Union, itself -- to bore you, they call it the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). NATO calls it the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), with an "I," the NATO argument being that it is "separable but not separate" from what NATO does, because a lot of the assets WEU would be using were NATO assets, the same troops, blah, blah, all of this. Now, the question is, "Who is in charge of relations with the WEU for the United States?" It had traditionally been the NATO ambassador. I made very clear at the beginning that that was going to continue, and Washington backed me up. There was the USEU [US Mission to the European Union] staff making a run at it, but we won that bureaucratic struggle. In fact, today, it’s still true, even though now someone from the current USNATO mission sits in the USEU mission, and somebody in the US Mission to the EU sits in the NATO mission, and they try to do this quietly. A sensible arrangement. The USNATO mission's being in charge of relations with the WEU made sense because, in fact, in the European system, there were still fights over turf. Indeed, in my entire time at NATO, there was only one European ambassador to NATO who had ever served at the European Union. There were separate career structures. Now, of course, as the military piece has come in as Pillar Two, the security piece, within the European Union, they are now getting a unified civil service, and so people can cross from one issue to another and go back again. So, we at USNATO had control of that issue, and I was therefore the United States representative to the Western European Union, and there were meetings back and forth. In fact, the joke was that, when we had meetings every six months, NATO ambassadors would go to them and the WEU ambassadors would come to us, on a rotating basis. Out at the WEU, there were about ten of the European ambassadors who were
"double-hatted," the same individual would sit at the NATO table and sit at the WEU table. When we went down to WEU -- it was in a former bank building, just off the Grand Sablon -- all of these folks from countries that belonged to the WEU would have this little plastic name card, denoting that their countries were Members or Associate Members or Observers. We and the Canadians didn’t have any name cards at all, so they made them up in paper, they would handwrite this little paper thing. I used to joke that one of my accomplishments, after four and a half years, was that, when we went to these meetings, we’d now have a little plastic sign. I said, “You can’t call us members or associates or observers, why don’t you call us and the Canadians 'Friends of the WEU?’” Because there are institutional problems there, which today still exist, stupidly in my judgment, stupidly. Right now, there is paralysis between NATO and the European Union, which is costing everybody, particularly in Afghanistan. So we would have these meetings with the WEU.

Q: Well now we haven’t talked about when the bombing...you say the Brits were opposed to doing something. Anyway, the bombing took place, the Dayton Accords came...

HUNTER: Let me just review. I don’t remember if we said it, before. In my judgment, the reason we finally did the bombing, the triggering event was Srebrenica, the worst human crime in Europe since World War II. It came against the background of all this work we had done at NATO to reform it, that we had gone through. So, suddenly, we had an institution with a future to it that needed to be protected, like the European Union, but for it this mattered in a lesser way. The argument was that NATO is a zero if it can’t stop a war in its own back yard. Thus, when Srebrenica came, we had a reason to act, and suddenly everybody was prepared to come along. When the UN Secretary General found that the French and particularly the British were no longer opposing at the UN what the British, particularly, had agreed to at NATO, he then got out of the way and we ordered the bombing and in 18 days the Bosnia War came to an end.

Q: Was Srebrenica as apparent? As you know, the Dutch were overwhelmed and all, but the enormity of what happened afterward, was this a slow process of understanding what the Bosnian Serbs did to the...

HUNTER: It took several days. Obviously, those of us who wanted to use military force had been unable to be effective at getting it done What happened, a few days afterward, the Dutch ambassador to NATO came to me and told me the stories about what the Dutch soldiers had been seeing, which I instantly reported. The CIA, the National Reconnaissance Office, or some place or other, got out photographs of the region and discovered there was a lot of plowed ground that hadn’t been plowed a few days earlier. These were graves, mass graves, and these were the photographs that Madeleine Albright, our UN ambassador, showed at the UN. Then, of course, everything let loose, inspectors went out there and found the mass graves, that’s how it happened.

Q: How did the insertion of NATO forces into Bosnia go from your perspective?

HUNTER: Swimmingly, to use a phrase. You’ve got to remember that the war was stopped by the NATO bombing, plus some local military action by the British and the French, plus the fact that on the ground, the arming of the Croats and the Bosnians did actually enable them to seize
enough territory to get to the magic 51/49 percent split on their own. We had provided a lot of, as I said, "material help," so Milosevic already knew that he wasn’t going to get all that he wanted. Then the bombing took place, which showed unanimity at NATO. That was the big thing: he couldn’t pick us apart. It was critical, he couldn’t pick us apart, he couldn’t use the Greeks, he couldn’t use the British, he couldn’t use anybody, and everybody was prepared to do the bombing. I told you that, 24 hours after we started the bombing, the US negotiator, Dick Holbrooke, demanded that we stop the bombing, so that he could go and negotiate something. Well, I opposed that, the Secretary General opposed it, he was really angry, but it had to be done because Holbrooke was the negotiator, so we did it. The negotiations failed, as all of his Bosnia diplomacy had failed in the absence of the connection to the military instrument. I then renegotiated the bombing to restart. Afterwards, we realized that the bombing halt had had kind of a backhanded salutary impact -- though it was a "close run thing," like Wellington said about Waterloo -- because, having stopped and then restarted the bombing, it showed Milosevic that NATO was prepared to go for it. But it sure took me some fancy footwork in the NATO Council to get the bombing restarted! I began by getting the Secretary General to declare that we didn't need a new bombing decision, but just had to end the pause; even so, it was 3 in the morning before we got it all done. So then the bombing was over and the war was over. Then came Dayton, which tidied things up, did a lot of things, but also to a great extent let Milosevic off the hook, gave him more than he had any right to expect. The military side of NATO had prepared the plan for the Implementation Force that would be going into Bosnia, which was one of the reasons that Dayton worked, because the negotiators could point out what was actually going to happen: "This is who is going to do what."

One reason the [1999] Rambouillet talks on Kosovo failed is that we, among others, had not done the preparatory work so that the Supreme Allied Commander, who was then Wes Clark, was not able to go into the Rambouillet talks and say, "This is what is going to happen if there is an agreement. Here’s how NATO can broker things on the ground." But that was only one reason that diplomacy over Kosovo was a failure; the US simply funk ed it. The people in the US government who had done the work before, to stop the fighting in Bosnia, had been let go. I hated to see a war [over Kosovo] happen almost by accident, at least in major part because of internal Washington politics that kept us from doing the things that might have stopped Milosevic without war.

OK, so then after the Dayton Accords were concluded, NATO went into Bosnia, it had an incredibly elaborate plan to do it, the kind of plan we should have had for Iraq. That is was one reason our people tear their hair over Iraq. General Joulwan, who was Supreme Allied Commander, had in my judgment made things more complicated when we were trying to get NATO to use air power to stop what the Serbs were doing against the Safe areas, by his desire not to have anybody at NATO get hurt. But then, with the deployment of the Implementation Force, that same attitude proved to be a fantastic asset, because that fulfilled the European and allied requirement not to have casualties in a place nobody heard of. On top of which, NATO put in a stunning amount of force "right from the git-go," which, as a devotee of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, I strongly supported. If you put in a lot of forces, you are likely to take fewer casualties. It’s not that the more forces you put in, the more people get killed, it tends to be the opposite, the fewer who get killed. So what happened was that SACEUR, General Joulwan, took the US First Armored Division, probably the most potent military unit on the face of the earth,
and drove it down through Hungary and through the Brčko Corridor, which was this amazingly conflicted area, to take up positions. To see an Abrams tank, an M1A1, on top of a tank transporter moving along, the earth shakes, boom, boom, boom, this is Hannibal and the elephants. If we are prepared to use it, all of a sudden people say, "Oh, oh, don’t touch." If we had done that in Iraq after the initial phase of fighting in 2003, it might have come out a lot differently.

Obviously, there were local problems and difficulties and all of the smear that takes place, but there was that backbone of a heavy force. We had been practicing, the Allies all working together, forty-plus years of NATO working together, etc., in the integrated command system, bringing in the others. There was the Bill Perry effort, on which George Joulwan did the nuts and bolts, to get the Russians involved in IFOR, where the politicians in Moscow had hated what we were doing with the bombing but, by God, Marshal Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defense Minister -- I’ve got his picture sitting right there -- got Russian troops involved. The Russian military wanted a piece of IFOR, they wanted a chance to show off, and they sent their very best people. One of the wonderful things about it was, “How do you fit them in the command relationships?” They weren’t going to take commands from NATO. So the clever thing that worked, which Joulwan personally worked out, with large charts and arrows showing the arrangements, was that the Russians would report to an American general: they could do that, because Americans were the big game. There is nothing second-rate about reporting to an American general, and that is not NATO. He just happened to be the same person who was also the NATO commander! So the Russians were there working for the Americans, not NATO. It was a conceit, everybody knew about it, sure, but it worked. In fact, there was more than one occasion on which Russian soldiers came to rescue Americans who were in trouble, and Americans came to rescue Russians who were in trouble. This was the first time the American and Russian military were together since the meeting on the Elbe in April ’45.

There was one occasion in which the Americans came up to a Serb position and the US officer in command said: "I want to go into that particular barn, I think its got some weapons in there.” And the Serbs came out armed to the teeth. So the guy whistles and, all of a sudden, this huge force appears over the horizon, half Americans and half Russians, helicopters and tanks and everything, and the US officer said, “Now, pretty please, can I look at your barn?” So that was it, and they found it full of weapons.

Q: *I remember as an election observer, we had people coming to lecture us about what to do, and all I could remember was a Russian lieutenant colonel getting up and telling us about certain police activities and what could be done and all. It was an impressive time.*

HUTNER: The combination of the NATO military action and IFOR were what really brought peace to Bosnia.

Q: *What did this do for you all at NATO headquarters? Were you walking all a little taller because this really was the first time that NATO had been used for anything?*

HUTNER: When I arrived at NATO on the 11th of July in ’93, morale was at rock bottom. There hadn’t been an American ambassador for a little while, and everybody was at six and sevens, but
then we got the work going toward the January 1994 summit, and there was the defense ministers' meeting at Travemünde, which I mentioned, where the US came in with all these proposals, and America was back and standing tall. What happened at the summit in '94, we got all this stuff done, and then, finally, in August '95, we got the ability to drop bombs in Bosnia. The day after the bombing started, everybody walked around the NATO Council room, around the building, everybody was ten feet tall, grinning from ear to ear. NATO had finally stepped up to the mark, the first time it had ever used military force in a serious way. It wasn't that we were a bunch of blood-thirsty people and, "By God, we finally got to use the instrument," but rather, "By God, we finally took on something and showed this Alliance could do something to help people and stop a war," which it did. Then, obviously, morale was way up, and, in the day-to-day things, it made decisions much easier as we worked things through. Communication from the military to the political was excellent, we had quality people in charge, we had gotten rid of the bystanders and the naysayers. The term as Chairman of the Military Committee had just ended for the British field marshal who had been working hand-in-glove with the British government, making sure nothing happened, and he was gone. We had a man replace him named General Klaus Naumann, he'd been the former head of the German military, as fine a military officer as I have ever worked with in a political-military environment. He was now Chairman of the Military Committee, and Joulwan was there huffing and puffing in all the right ways. As I said to Joulwan the other day, “When you came to the Council, you inspired trust that you would keep people as safe as possible. Here are committed troops under foreign command, to go into a potential war situation, and these people trusted you to do the best that can be done to prevent casualties while getting the job done.” A lot of the military led on making IFOR work, because some of the civilians in NATO weren’t ready and, in fact, took a long time to "ramp up," to use a military phrase. The political side had, I thought, an outstanding high representative, Carl Bildt, former Swedish prime minister and currently foreign minister, and actually on the Board here at RAND for a time, which I arranged.

The civilian side of getting things done took a long time to get going, but we bought the time. Even though political success in Bosnia still has a long way to go, nobody’s dying, nobody’s dying. The same in Kosovo, nobody is dying, and, in the fullness of time, these places will come right, but it is not easy because of very deep, antediluvian attitudes.

Q: Now young kids are growing up in their different worlds there from their parents.

HUNTER: Well, some of their textbooks still need changing. I remember three years ago, being at Naples, the NATO command there, and there was a NATO general, a large general, who had just come back from traveling around Bosnia, and he said he had gone into a little school there, with Croatian kids in the Croatian part of Bosnia, and the kids were singing a song for him in Croatian. He said he then asked the teacher to translate that for him, and the words were, “The Serbs are the enemy, Croatia has been persecuted for a thousand years. We must grow up and learn to kill Serbs,” or something like that. He said to the teacher, “Now you stop that right now or you are out of here,” because NATO still had the command. He said that is what they are teaching the kids.

Q: Oh yeah. Were there problems in...we’ll stick to Bosnia at the time. Were there problems with NATO and other forces, Ukrainian, you had Moroccan, you know. Were there problems from
your perspective? Did you get involved in unity problems or anything of that nature?

HUNTER: No, we organized at NATO for what we called TCNs, Troop Contributing Nations. They had an opportunity to send their diplomatic people into NATO and to take part in some of the bodies that talked about this, so it wasn’t just, "You have to do what you are told."

Essentially, we delegated this to the Military Committee and to SACEUR and kept out of their way. Then, of course, individual nations would report back, but we gave them a framework, we gave them an Op [Operational] Plan. There was some resistance in the NATO military, at first, to showing the Council the entire draft Op Plan. There was a summary of the operations plan, right?

Well, we Americans didn’t care, I mean we saw the people writing the Op Plan, and we saw the whole thing, that is the US government. So I convinced the military people, I said, “Look, nobody on the Council or in the allied governments is going to read the Op Plan, but they want to see it.” OK, so reluctantly the military dumped the 1,200 pages on everybody’s desk. Two days later it was approved.

The Allies, the political people, the ambassadors, wanted the right to have a chance to see it. Of course, they sent the draft Op Plan back to their capitals and they’d been working on the military side, but the political side wanted the right to see the full Op Plan, so they could say to their capitals "We saw it." Who’s going to read the 1,200 pages? It was an important political part of creating confidence, and I convinced our military people that they had to do this. So that is what it is. The fundamental thing about NATO is building the trust and confidence among the nations and between the civilians and the military, that’s what makes it work.

Q: I’m looking at the time, it’s probably a good place to stop, but I’m not sure if our times are right, as far as when you were there. Were you there for Kosovo?

HUNTER: No.

Q: All right, so we won’t talk about Kosovo, but we really haven’t talked about the integration of some of the nations coming into NATO, the new thing. We will talk about it in here. We’ve sort of finished with Bosnia.

HUNTER: Well I was there 'till New Year’s Day 1998. The decision to admit the first three countries had been made. The prospect of the Baltic States having a chance to get in was there, the idea that others would come in and the processes, which were highly elaborate, to get countries ready to come in were all there, but the actual admission didn’t take place until the 17th of March 1999. In fact, I remember the Czech Embassy here had a dinner the night before the signing, out in the Truman Library in Independence, Mo., to which the US team who had done the work was not invited, incidentally, that’s all right. The games people play in Washington!

But we had the dinner at the Czech residence, and the Czech foreign minister was there, people were making all these little encomiums and all this stuff. I said my bit about what they had done and how they had earned their way into NATO, and then I said, “But I have to tell you, minister, there’s good news and there’s bad news.” I said, “Tomorrow morning you join NATO.” I said, “But in about two weeks, you have to go to war.” That is Kosovo, “Welcome to NATO.” They were put to the test right away, which was true, and they passed the test.
There was another important moment a few weeks earlier, when President Clinton signed the US instrument of ratification of the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in a ceremony in the Rose Garden, the wind blowing the documents every which way. Since NATO membership is about the US strategic commitment, and this is what the new Allies really wanted, this was the decisive moment. I was sitting at the back of the audience in the cheap seats, next to a guy named Jan Nowak, who had been a hero at the time of the Warsaw Uprising in '43, as a courier to London -- and Churchill, God help him, wouldn't see him. Jan was sitting there in tears. I said, "Jan, for Poland, today is the day that World War II has finally come to an end." Just short of 60 years after Britain and France went to war precisely in defense of Poland. He then paid me the ultimate compliment of saying I had played a major role in making it happen.

Q: OK so we’ll pick up that whole process of bringing the countries in and the preparations they had to go through...

HUNTER: Absolutely.

Q: and all that. So we will talk about that.

HUNTER: Just to give you one line: that between the day we decided to bring countries in, January 11, 1994, and the first admission on March 17 in 1999, was five years and two months. In between were all the efforts that went on to make sure that new countries would increase security rather than decrease it, would strengthen NATO and not weaken it.

Q: Yeah. Good.

OK today is the 20th of June 2007. Bob, we are talking about bringing the NATO people in. Can you tell me about your approach to the various countries and how we viewed it at the time? I’m told that they received a three-and-a-half foot set of requirements or a checklist or something they had to do. I mean it was quite a feat, wasn’t it, to bring...?

HUNTER: That’s more European Union than NATO. With the EU, new members have 20,000 pages, literally, that they have to accept, they call it the acquis. Well, NATO enlargement is one of those things where you look back and say, "This was obvious," or "It’s been done, so it must have been a piece of cake," but it wasn’t. We started out in the United States, at least, taking over from the Bush administration into the Clinton administration, without enlargement being on the agenda, at least for the near future. It's sometimes called enlargement, sometimes called expansion. We use the terms interchangeably. Expansion tended to look as though we might be a little more threatening toward Russia than otherwise. But I’ve used the word interchangeably. That was not on the agenda. In fact, if I recall correctly in the speech at the Athens meeting of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Session in June of 1993, Warren Christopher had a line in it, "At an appropriate time, we may choose to enlarge NATO membership. But that is not now on the agenda." I essentially wrote the speech, though that particular line, I don’t know where that came from. I was not yet in the government.

Q: Were you thinking that this was inevitable or what was your thinking when you wrote the
speech?

HUNTER: Well, to be honest, I wasn’t one of the earliest supporters of enlargement in terms of formal membership. I was concerned about retaining NATO’s strength for the future, particularly the Article 5 commitment that engaged the United States, along with the effectiveness of the integrated military command structure, and that it would be a serious security instrument. And I was one of the three or four authors of the Partnership for Peace. One of the debates that took place was within the administration, about whether NATO should become a “Y’all come” party to bring everybody in, to make it another Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a kind of chowder and marching society…

Q: It was a delusion and…

HUNTER: A potential delusion, or was NATO going to be really a hard-core effort, serious about security and serious about American engagement? My initial concern was to solidify the gains and to take Central Europe off the map of strategic competition, countries that are being fought over. This was a proximate cause of the First and Second World Wars, but in terms of actually bringing these counties into formal NATO membership, that was not on the agenda right at the beginning.

It moved from there into a formal commitment to do so at the summit in January 1994, in part because other elements were moving along, and in part because it became obvious very quickly that this would need to be done, if your objective was how to "create a Europe whole and free" -- the first George Bush’s history-making statement, the idea that there could be a single security for everybody in Europe, in which everybody gained and nobody loses. This was the first time, as I always used to joke, since Charlemagne, that you have had a chance to try to get a unified Europe, at least in a positive sense. There were, after all, Napoleon and Hitler.

A major element of that had to be what you did with the Central Europeans, and that’s where the invention of Partnership for Peace came in. But enlargement, formally, didn’t come on to the agenda until a clear understanding was reached in the Alliance of the perspective of the countries and peoples that were affected. For them, with their history of militaries rolling across them from the East and rolling across them from the West, having been occupied and having had to live under the Nazis or under Communism -- or both -- the need to gain a sense that they were not going to be again subjected to invasion was Item Number One; and that, until they had some kind of confidence about that, psychological confidence about protection against the vagaries of history, the rest wasn’t going to be possible, in terms of political and economic development. So that awareness moved us from the idea of "Let's do serious, constructive things with the Central Europeans" to "You know, we are going to have to bite the bullet and take countries in." That decision, as I indicated before, was taken at the NATO summit on January 11, 1994, even though there were some people who argued that it wasn’t taken until later and, after all -- to be ironic about it -- not everybody was there at the NATO summit to take the credit for the decision. But the key statement, the commitment to enlarge NATO, was negotiated for that summit and negotiated with every word's being balanced and with everybody around the table, at the ambassadors' level, the ministers' level and the head of state and government level -- with everybody knowing what it meant.
As we progress to the critical year of 1993, leading up to the Summit of ’94, I mentioned earlier that, when I first got asked to do the job, I called Manfred Wörner, who was the Secretary General and was an old friend, and I said, “Manfred what would you like?” He said, “Get me a summit.” So that became my ambition, and I had a lot to do with getting that on the docket, even before I joined the government. That focused the mind. Summit meetings, I learned when I was at the White House, are a great way to get work done. I lived at a residence hall in London in the 1960s, called London House, and the patron was Her Majesty the Queen, and she was going to come for a visit. They were building an extra addition, and it was going to be inaugurated by her, and, by God, they worked 24-hours a day, and if you know anything about the Brits in those days, getting anything done in less than ten years was impossible. I called it the “Visit from the Queen Theory of Economic Progress.”

Well, we had a summit scheduled, and during the period leading up to the Travemünde meeting of defense ministers, October 20-21, we were pulling together a whole series of elements. In my entire experience of government, I can’t think of another occasion, which I’ve either had a chance to witness or analyze or been involved in, when the US started with a grand strategy, what we are trying to achieve, overall, and then worked on the bits and pieces, rather than doing things pragmatically or by happenstance or in reaction to events and then giving it the coloration of a grand strategy. Whether President George H.W. Bush knew the import of his statement, to “create a Europe full and free and at peace,” I do not know, but it was the inauguration of a genuine grand strategy and created the framework. I’m pleased, as I’ve said elsewhere, that in the Clinton administration we picked that up that initiative and made some changes to it, but in effect built on it. This helped to create the great success at NATO. Over the years in US politics, NATO has always been bipartisan, and that’s had a tremendous value, even today, at a time when you can’t say very much is bipartisan. It’s a tremendous virtue. The elements of that bipartisanship were, first, to keep the United States engaged in Europe, whether for reasons of tidying up after conflict or for longer-term reasons. I had coined a phrase two or three years earlier in an article, "America is a European Power." The implication was of permanence, not coming to Europe in 1917 and then leaving in 1919 and then coming again in ’43. When you think about it, after the Second War, in the late ‘40s, we didn’t leave completely but would stay forever.

Second, the idea was to preserve this thing called NATO, beyond doing so just because of inertia, but because it would do useful things. Not only was NATO the mechanism through which the United States expresses its strategic commitment to Europe. That worked, in part because NATO was military, and thus it was somewhat simple and straightforward. We got to run NATO to a great extent, sort of the 800-pound gorilla, and we kept NATO within the framework of what we would like it to do. It was also an opportunity for American leadership, in which we pride ourselves, whether it’s a good thing or bad thing. I think it is a good thing. Nothing has happened at NATO without American leadership, just like a lot of other things going way back and carried over.

The third thing was the inertia factor. You can’t kill institutions. NATO kept on going in part because of this magnificent thing called the integrated military command structure, in which everybody, with the partial exception of France, we will talk about the details of that later,
maybe, said, “If we are going to do defense in Europe, we are going to think about NATO first.” Even Iceland, with no forces and therefore not in the integrated command structure, still thought in that way. Such an alliance had never happened before. Yes, there were always problems of interoperability and who can do this or that, but no set of militaries had ever before been able to work as closely together – there were problems with the alliances in World War I, World War II, etc. But we had this thing that worked. So preserving it was kind of important.

Number four was now that everything had come loose again -- history had been “unfrozen,” to use a phrase I can’t remember who said it first, but I plagiarized it. That raised the question of the future of Germany, where there was François Mauriac’s famous line, a Frenchman, who said, “I love Germany, I love it so much I want two of them.” If there was anything that we and the Soviets agreed on during the Cold War, it was the division of Germany. In fact, when I was in the government under Carter, in charge of European affairs at the NSC, we used always to talk about pressing for the unity of Germany, but we were always being hypocritical and we always knew it.

Q: This reminds me. I was in Korea, when anybody who has dealt with Korea, as I did at a certain point, we were sort of glad that Korea was divided, because the Koreans are a very powerful force, and I mean a very disciplined force, and one used to say: “It’s not really that bad a trait to have Germany split and to have Korea split.”

HUNTER: One of the longer-range concerns is whether you get a unified Korea with nuclear weapons. Anyway, in fact the division of Germany was something we and the Soviets agreed on, and the process of transforming that mutual agreement was one of the remarkable parts of the Cold War that was not understood very well. Like there was De Gaulle’s leaving the military structure of NATO. That was essentially his effort to try to deal with West German concerns about unity, something I started writing about in these terms the day de Gaulle made his declaration in 1966. This fact of the German interest in unity was underscored when the first Bush’s administration, under the President’s leadership, did what I considered to be a brilliant bit of statecraft, both in the soft-landing collapse of the Soviet Union and in the unification of Germany, not reunification but unification of Germany. There was the Soviet Union and then Russia, as its successor, facing the choice whether they wanted this unified country of Germany rattling around loose -- or at least the eastern part of it -- or to have it fully encapsulated within NATO. The Russians chose the latter, I think wisely. There was a transition period of several years in which certain things couldn’t be done by NATO in the eastern part of Germany, blah, blah, blah, and other questions about what NATO could do in Central Europe, of which we still see vestiges, now, in the question of missile defenses to be installed in the Czech Republic and Poland. Whether it would be better to have a unified Germany under the control of the Americans rather than its rattling around loose was also why, when the enlargement of both NATO and the European Union came along, Chancellor Kohl wisely sought to “surround” Germany with these institutions, so that when Germany becomes a major if not dominant player again in Central Europe, etc., it won’t be “Here comes Germany, again,” but rather "Here come NATO and the EU." It was also the reason Kohl gave up the Deutschmark for the Euro. The German economy still drives the Euro. Here we are in 2007, and a few weeks ago I had a discussion, at his request, with the Polish ambassador to the US. He said, “We’re worried about the Germans.” I said to myself, “Bravo.” Here we go again, right? That’s why the transformation
of NATO was done that way. That was one of the elements: NATO had provided a home for Germany and would continue to do so in the new circumstances.

Then one of the other elements was, what do you do with these new countries that have come loose from the Warsaw Pact, regaining their freedom with the “unfreezing of history?” One of the concerns was how do you take them off the geopolitical chess board? That led to the invention of Partnership of Peace, and the State Partnership Program with the National Guard, which we will talk about if we haven’t already, and then eventually you’ve got to give them a sense of confidence about the future, through NATO enlargement. Then, to take a couple of other elements, there was Ukraine, a special case; and Russia, which at first we really hadn’t quite figured out how formally to deal with, but there was an understanding, which began with George H.W. Bush, which we in the Clinton administration carried over, and I used to cite this all the time. This is a bit-truncated history, but I think it’s real. Germany after World War I was kicked when it was down -- the French took the lead, the British came afterward, and we got skunked at Versailles -- and this helped produce Hitler, at least he used it as an argument. Well, George H.W. Bush had the vision, as I inferred it, that you don’t treat Russia the way you treated Germany after 1918, you treat Russia the way we treated Germany after 1945, at least the Western part, and we carried on that policy consciously in the Clinton administration.

Then there were a couple of other things. We worked to get NATO to pay attention to countries to the South, in the Med. That became the Mediterranean Dialogue, which was mostly for the Allies closest to them; it never went very far, because France, in particular, didn't want NATO -- meaning the US -- interfering in its bilateral business. As part of it, I arranged for Israel to have a relationship with NATO, working through their ambassador to Belgium. I also travelled a lot to PFP countries; one time I recall in particular was going to Central Asia and being in Tashkent: I joked to people later that if anybody had missed the Brezhnev times, come to Uzbekistan, where they are alive and well. I had a three-hour meeting with Islam Karimov, the dictator who was a holdover from the Soviet Union, who started off with a 50-minute harangue. I said to myself that I was there as the US representative, so I answered with a 40-minute “sober-but-pointed response”!

One important issue was how do you deal with the European Union, as it is now called, which, with its own aspirations of developing its integration, wanted to have a foreign policy, wanted to have a defense policy? This goes all the way back to the early ‘50s, with the European Defense Community, EDC, which failed in the French parliament, not because France was really against rearming Germany, which was a major element of the whole thing -- we were pressing to get Western Germany rearmed, we needed the troops. Because 42 days after EDC failed in the French parliament, Western European Union was created, following a British suggestion, with even fewer controls on German forces than there would have been under the EDC. It was really that France was not willing to give up too much sovereignty, too soon. Raymond Aron, who was one of my heroes, wrote about that at the time. So you had this thing -- we can go into it at some point if you want to, it’s an arcane issue, though it’s still important -- the development of a foreign policy and a defense policy by the European Union, as we now call it.

The previous administration had still had the perception that we had in the Cold War, which was “Let us have” -- to use John F. Kennedy’s phrase -- “a strong European pillar of defense.” There
was a codicil, which we never said out loud, but everybody knew it: “...provided it does exactly what we tell it to do.” That was for a good reason, which was that we had to take the lead in managing the central strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, you didn’t want someone else meddling with it. With the end of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, that reason goes away. But the Bush administration didn’t change its view, and as late as just before they left office, they were continuing to throw dirt balls at anything the EU did in this area, quite harshly, too. I was bound and determined, when I came in, to reverse that.

Q: Did you feel that there was a group or a person who was opposed to what you might say was “the course of history,” the reintegration of Europe, or the fact that Europe was going to develop more self-determination in world events?

HUNTER: If you’re talking about, not the unification of Germany or the overall picture, let’s say just the role of the European Communities and the European Union, I suspect there were, and even continue, today, to be some people who do a “harrumph harrumph” at the Europeans’ challenging our supremacy, our dominance and influence. I think people fundamentally misconceive that, strategically Europe, is in sync with us. I think I mentioned before that I have had a $20 bet now for thirteen years -- nobody has ever picked it up, they’ve just increased it because of inflation: “Name for me a scenario according to which the European countries, through what is now called the European Security and Defense Policy, would want to do something in the world militarily that we would object to.” Nobody has ever been able to define any such circumstance. The EU nations don’t have any strategic ambitions that are against our strategic ambitions. It’s a positive thing. Also, there are some people who say that the Europeans are getting too big for their britches, economically; they are going to be too strong or we can’t compete with them. But the smart money in the private sector has always understood exactly the opposite. It is a positive-sum game. I think, to go back to the burden of your question, the real opposition to a European foreign policy was that people had trouble adapting to novelty. People are like the machinery, the bureaucratic inertia, and the US response was quite harsh.

Q: I keep coming back to here you’ve got this huge apparatus, as I sit here and look out your window at the Pentagon. I can see helicopters flying out to Langley, CIA; I can see the State Department. I’m sitting here in RAND and...

HUNTER: Where I have “oversight of the Pentagon.”

Q: Huh?

HUNTER: Where I have oversight of the Pentagon -- it's right there, less than half a mile away. A joke.

Q: Yeah, you have “oversight of the Pentagon,” and you know, considering the billions of dollars that have been spent on intelligence and it was all focused on the Soviet Union, but nobody got it. When it broke up, there were a few individual people who can point to some sentences in what they wrote or something, but basically it was bureaucratic inertia and not only bureaucratic but also think-tank inertia. Everybody was in the same boat.
HUNTER: Well, I certainly don’t cite this as one of the great lessons of good things that happen! I made some real mistakes in my life on foreign affairs. I supported the Viet Nam War longer than I should have. I had started working in the White House at the time of the Tonkin Gulf. And I missed the end of the Cold War in its profundity. Ironically, I predicted its end in a book I wrote in 1969, second edition in ’72, and more-or-less got right how it would happen, then abandoned my own analysis after I was in the government some years later: a lesson there, I guess! I’ve always joked that I don’t know anybody who knew anything who predicted the end of the Cold War. I’ve met a couple, as you were saying. I know some people who didn’t know anything but who got it right, because they weren’t wrapped up in it. It was so compelling, this structural framework -- and this is not a conspiracy theory. This is when you are dealing with something of the enormity of this struggle between us and the Soviet Union, dealing politically between capitalism and communism, if you want to oversimplify it like that. The fact that you had these two nuclear armed states, each and together with the capacity to end human life on the planet. In fact, one of the great achievements of human society is that we escaped the Cold War without a nuclear conflagration. Today, you can’t even tell people this, it doesn’t mean anything to them, it doesn’t resonate. I think one of the healthy things, psychologically, is that we now worry about half dozen people getting killed, somewhere. Back then, we talked about deaths in the hundreds of millions of people. It had a morally calcifying and corrupting effect on the whole system, everywhere, that people were engaged in. As a result, the very idea of thinking about the end of the Cold War became unacceptable. It just wasn’t done. It was supposed to go on forever, and the idea of the enormity of moving this supertanker, or redoing a whole set of assumptions, was just…well, people just didn’t think about it. My favorite -- as you know I have an anecdote for everything. I remember a meeting in 1989, out at one of the rival think tanks, it wasn’t at RAND or CSIS, where I worked then. It was about twenty of us, the Grand Pooh-Bahs on European security. We were talking about what was going on in Central Europe, Eastern Europe. We were there the whole morning, and one thing nobody even suggested, as a possibility, was the opening of the Berlin Wall, and we were right…. for four whole hours! It just didn’t occur to us. This has been very chastening. It’s one thing to say, wait a second, we must not fault the analysts. This can have consequences, falling into this kind of trap. In fact, today, there is an effort by some people to have terrorism or maybe "political Islamism" replace the Cold War as the “central paradigm."

Q: A very strong element within, I’d say, the administration but also think tanks.

HUNTER: Oh yeah, sure. One thing in our society, America, that can be a great strength, but sometimes it is a temporary weakness, is that we work by consensus on things like this. People work to get the consensus, and when we get that consensus, we are going to take on the Nazis, we are going to take on the Japanese, we are going to contain the Soviet Union. By God, it’s strong. You don’t break it apart. But then, if we make a mistake like on Viet Nam -- I think it was a strategic mistake, but how big a mistake historians still can’t say -- it takes a long time to correct it, because the idea that our leaders might have done something wrong or we’ve been wrong, and I don’t mean wrong in a moral sense, let’s say “miscalculated our own interests” -- the correcting is extremely difficult to do to, the breaking apart of that consensus.

Q: But were you, was there almost a B team that was looking at some of the consequences that
you...were you aware that you didn’t want to fall in the group thing and figure out what does this mean, and let’s look at all the alternatives and not feel that...one of the major concerns was would this so enrage the Russians that they might re-instigate a Cold War-ish type atmosphere or something like that? Were we looking at this?

HUNTER: Yes, as a short answer. I think a number of things were happening. One, a lot of steps were being taken all at once, as soon as the Cold War began to fracture. The old group-endorsed framework had been shattered in a world that had suddenly changed, number one. Number two; a lot of thinking was going on in Europe, the intellectual and political leadership came out of Europe, in a sense that events would take place out there. Folks would come over here, and you would hear about something that just happened, yesterday, in a febrile period that we hadn’t had since the beginning of the Cold War. So everything was in play, and it gave you a chance to work with possibilities.

Third, as I indicated, as we started to paw our way through all that was happening, we started with the basic thinking of the previous administration, with George Bush and his crowd, and we recognized that here was a chance to shape events in a really grand strategic way, for the first time in 45 years, and we picked it up in the Clinton administration. There was a relatively small number of people involved in this, and so there were a lot of debates that went on. Are we going to infuriate the Russians, does this mean taking on too many responsibilities, is it going to dilute NATO, is it going to get us off track of having a strong NATO, shall we just have a y’all come party, does this enable us to get out of Europe? All of these things were in play. I guess the good news was that not that many people were paying attention at the beginning of the Clinton administration. We had the ability to work on these issues with a relatively small group of people, because the basic work for German unification had taken place, the Soviet Union had collapsed and, interestingly, there was one other thing that affected this greatly. It was the Bosnia War, which kept going, it was festering. As a result, people in Washington had no interest in horning in on what we were doing. It was only later, after we had rebuilt NATO for the future, that everybody said, “Gosh, look at what is happening, how do we get in on the act?” But during this period of about two years, we had, until the Bosnia war got stopped -- or, rather, we stopped it -- it was possible to get so much done because nobody wanted to poach. NATO was a career-ending place, this is where you get into the tar baby of Bosnia, and there were a couple of people who did and they didn’t do such a great job, though they did take credit for what NATO did, but that’s another matter. So there were these debates clearly going on, and there were different elements within the US government that had different perspectives on it.

One of the other major elements in this mix that enabled things to go forward was a reassertion of US leadership, and by a relatively small group of people within the administration who decided to do this and supported it. What we discovered was that our European friends were aching for that leadership, with the recognition that here was all this stuff that had come loose, there was an indeterminate future, there was a risk of reliving the period between the First and Second World Wars, and that the United States was critical to getting the future right. But the US had been flailing around for a while, with only having a chargé d'affaires at NATO for a while, and then the change of administration. A new administration always takes forever to take up the reins; we’ve talked about this before, we are the only government in the world that, except where they have a fundamental revolution and they shoot all the old guys, changes so many people.
We’ve got 6,000 people who are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, and we change just about all of them. So for the first X months of the new administration, you’re just dumb to foreign policy, sometimes with terrible consequences in the world. So what happened was we started when we said, “All right, we’re going to have a NATO summit and we appointed an ambassador to NATO in a relative hurry” -- it happened to be me, it could have been somebody else who incidentally knew something about NATO -- but it showed the president was interested. Then, at the Trámembünde meeting in October, we came out with a whole raft of ideas, and suddenly "America was back," by God. I may have mentioned earlier that we came up with a whole bunch of ideas for the summit, and then there was one other idea we threw out on non-proliferation, which we just wanted to talk about a bit, and the Europeans grabbed it. We said, “Oh, well, I guess that can be another summit initiative.”

But all of these things were in play and, I guess if I had to order them in terms of importance, first was the demonstration of keeping America engaged; second was preserving what you got in NATO that’s still useful, through good old bureaucratic inertia; third, what do you do about the German future, blah, blah, blah? -- all that’s to preserve the best of the past. Then how do you stabilize Central Europe? Those were the big ones. How do you get all that, plus the thing in the background, that you don’t want to push Russia away? So as we moved forward, all of these elements were there. The one that probably took the longest to come to fruition was how to figure out a relationship with Russia that was going to make sense. Now, there were some people who believed that what was happening in Russia was only a transitory phase, and that they were going to be back and be a threat. I recall when I first arrived, I went down to SHAPE to meet with the team there under John Shalikashvili, the Supreme Allied Commander, who then went back to Washington to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and who was one of the major positive forces in all of this. I have tremendous respect for him. He had been given a briefing by his staff to give to this new American ambassador; one of his briefer got up and gave it. I don’t think Gen. Shali had ever seen it. It was about how by the year 2000 we could expect the Russians to have 98 divisions poised against the West. Instead of just sitting there, I said, in effect, in nice words, that this was absolutely absurd. I said this was ludicrous. John Shali turned bright red, and, afterwards, I wrote him a nice note, and I think that helped create a relationship. I think he realized that the briefing was ludicrous. To go from this Russian society which was, as somebody said, "Costa Rica with nuclear weapons," to the idea of having 98 fully armored divisions in 7 years -- come on, give me a break. But there were some people who thought that way. There were some other people in the government who thought the most important thing was not riling the Russians at all and treating them as though Russia was just like any other country.

What we recognized in my team is that we had to deal with all of this stuff at once, and it had to add up to a strategic whole. That’s why I say that this is only time I know of in which a small group of people figured out what was in the American grand strategic interest, building on what Bush had done, and then trying to put the individual elements to it so that it could work.

Q: When we were looking at this, were we looking at Sweden and Finland as being part of the thing, or were we sort of allowing a sort of Nordic neutral bloc to be there and not even make any sort of "include them out?"
HUNTER: Well, they weren’t members of NATO.

Q: Yes, that’s what I mean but...

HUNTER: When we formulated Partnership for Peace, they were offered membership, because we recognized their potential contribution -- I created this phrase that I constantly used, we wanted allies "to be producers and not just consumers of security." When we invited Sweden and Finland to join PFP, along with the other former so-called "neutral and non-aligned" countries, and I say "former" because the term is still used, but how can you be "neutral and not aligned" if there is nobody to be neutral and non-aligned in reference to? I said to the Swedes and the Finns, “If you are going to be in Partnership for Peace, you are going to be on the teaching staff,” because these were countries that took security very seriously. Sweden was one of the most serious security countries in Europe and still is. In fact, I may have told you, back in the ‘80s, I gave a lecture once out in Washington State, and Scoop Jackson’s widow was there, and there was a guy who was a senior official in the Swedish government named Sverker Åström, and I said, “You know, Sweden is the 17th member of NATO and a serious asset.” He got furious, he got me denounced in the Swedish parliament. But I got my revenge in 1994, when he was sent by the Swedish government to NATO to find out what role they would be playing in Partnership for Peace. I said, “Welcome to NATO, Sverker.” In fact, when NATO went from the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the essential reason for the change was to enable countries that had been neutral and non-aligned to join this particular institution, along with Partnership for Peace. They weren’t applying for NATO membership, but, in fact, today, anytime Sweden and Finland want to be NATO Allies, they would be welcomed as full allies the next day, because they are serious about security.

I’m a bit rambunctious, and I figure if I’m going to be involved with something, I might as well make it interesting. So I went to NATO determined that we were going to make a go of it, but no point being shy about it. I had some ambitions for the Alliance. One was on the summit, and I used that as a transformative vehicle, having seen before now how you do that in administration. When I was at the Carter NSC, dealing with Europe and then the Middle East, every time a foreign leader would come to Washington, that’s the time you get everything out of the in box, the hold box, and get it done. You’re an old Yugoslav hand, and I remember when Tito came, and Larry Eagleburger was the ambassador there, and he kept sending in his "Eaglegrams: "Can we do this, can we do that?" I kept saying, "yes, yes, yes,” so we just did all kinds of things because Tito wanted to have a productive relationship, so we got the bureaucrats out of the way of getting things done.

OK, but another ambition I had was to reverse the US attitudes on the European Union, its foreign policy and military ideas, on which I had worked, literally since 1963. I recognized that the strategic argument against having a strong European pillar had reversed. There was no longer a need to keep them down, because there was no longer a central strategic relationship with the Soviet Union that the US had to be in charge of managing. The Cold War was over. In fact, the situation was quite the opposite. If, indeed, the Europeans would take defense more seriously than just for the reason of being in NATO, with the limited challenges it faced, because they wanted to build an effective defense instrument within the EU, and if therefore they would spend more money on defense and take it more seriously, that’s great, why get in the way of that? That
insight enabled me to take the lead in reversing the US policy on this issue, so that we were able to work effectively with WEU [Western European Union] as the EU's "defense identity" was then. For some US opponents of this change, there was the illusion that there were somehow two sets of European forces which would be inherently in competition with one another, in getting resources, for example, as between NATO and the WEU. But in fact, WEU didn't field a separate set of military forces, there was only one set. European countries don't buy two military forces, one for NATO and one for WEU. The question was "Who got to use the army?" and the NATO phrase, which was invented right at the end of the Bush Administration, was to see WEU as involving forces that were "separable but not separate from NATO." That is, WEU could "borrow the army," but we argued that it should be understood that these forces were not in fact separate from NATO, but rather "separable" from it. Furthermore, it is important to understand that NATO, as such, has no permanent forces. What gets used is what you, the NATO commander, ask for on the day from national military components, which are already trained and ready. But, in regard to WEU and the European Union, you can take forces that might otherwise be used by NATO and have them used by WEU. They are separable from NATO, but they are not separate from it. It is a subtle but still very important distinction. Then there was a big debate over which institution would have first call on forces if both wanted to use them at the same time; we can talk about that later if you want, since it is a continuing debate. Does NATO get primacy or the EU primacy? It was a false debate, since it is hard to conceive that this would ever happen, but it was part of the game of competing for allegiances, etc., between two institutions.

The other ambition I had was to get France back into Allied Command Europe, again to be part of the integrated military command structure. Something, as I said, I watched and commented on since 1966. I went back and I got out what De Gaulle said in his press conference in February 1966 about how France would stay out of the allied command until such time as NATO reformed itself. That is exactly what we were doing, reforming the Alliance. It also occurred to me that we had some leverage on the French: since, if there was going to be a serious Western Europe Union -- a "European Security and Defense Identity" it was called, generically, France saw this as its opportunity for leadership in the defense and military area. The Brits weren’t really playing very much in WEU, preferring to stay offshore from the Continent, and the Germans were still the Germans, right, with special restrictions against having nuclear weapons, and special restrictions imposed by the Bundestag on other things it could do in the military area. Now, if France wanted to take the lead with the ESDI -- (they made the last letter a "P" for Program, since they didn't recognize that it was just a hiving-off from NATO), as part of its overall ambition to lead within Europe, they would be far more effective if they were back in Allied Command Europe, because that would open the goodie bag to them, give them access to all kinds of modern equipment and military capacity they wouldn’t otherwise have in order to play this leadership role. In fact, during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the French got involved, but the military suddenly realized that they were out of the game because they hadn’t been involved in Allied Command Europe and had missed out on more than a generation of transformation. As a result, the French put themselves during the ’91 war under US command, which was tough for them.

Q: Also, I’m told that they didn’t have the same guidance equipment, they couldn’t fly missions, and they couldn’t communicate. I mean the whole...
HUNTER: The whole nine yards. They had a lot of modern equipment, but it couldn’t integrate, and so the military desperately wanted back into NATO's integrated command structure and still do. We don’t have any problems with the French military on this point; they want to be our favorite ally. The politicians, that’s another problem. So I saw this. OK. Here was the deal, that there would be value for us to be able to have the French military contribution, and to be able to do a lot of things that would be possible with their involvement, on and on. So I cut a deal with the French ambassador. I did this on my own to begin with, and then got Washington’s blessing. They had no problem with it. In effect, we would recognize the importance of Western European Union, and they would move back towards reintegrating into NATO's command structure. Also, because the original reason for France’s getting out of the NATO command structure was to manage the German problem in terms of détente, that reason had gone away. Second, if they were going to have a residual question regarding a unified Germany, they would want it deeply engaged in NATO, and that meant cozying up to us. They couldn’t rely any longer upon Russia to keep Germany divided, along with us; they had to look to us to deal with their German problem. Third, they wanted all the goodies. Thus this was a marriage made in heaven: we cut this deal. In fact, we almost got everything done. Later on, the issue came up about who was going to get the command of Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples -- the US or France -- and the deal came apart over that, but we still got 95 percent of the way there. So, frankly, the difference between where we actually got to in the French relationship within the integrated military structure and what the original idea was isn’t a dime’s worth of difference.

Q: While you were dealing with this how would you rank the various Eastern European countries that were planning to come in?

HUNTER: Hoping to come in.

Q: Hoping to come in. I mean during the time you were there, were there ones that just seemed they just weren’t that good or did you see them...was there a rank order of how... not politically, but I’m thinking militarily?

HUNTER: I’m glad you posed the question that way, because that was a meaningless question in terms of geopolitics. In terms of geopolitics, it was in terms of how do you create a framework in which you take Central Europe off the map for competition, without creating more problems, either by driving the Russians away or by weakening NATO -- hence, one reason for Partnership for Peace. Some people wanted Partnership for Peace as a way station for countries that will never get into NATO, but we’re helping them anyway, giving them some kind of confidence. Others saw PFP as a way of getting them up to speed so that, when you take them into NATO, they would do well. With my team, I was able to work those two angles into a common package, so we could beg that question, but still we could get countries into Partnership for Peace and make it a useful instrument.

The position of our US military was, "No, no we can’t take these countries in as allies, it would weaken NATO." The basic rationale for enlargement was for geopolitical reasons, security in Europe, peace, confidence in the future, and to whom should we be prepared to give the Article 5 guarantee? -- that is, we will fight for you if you are attacked. Which meant, in reality, the US strategic guarantee, that’s what Article 5 is about. To whom was the United States willing to give
a strategic guarantee? One of the elements of the answer for us, in addition to the grand strategy idea, was “How do we take in new members without destroying NATO?” The argument in answer was that countries needed to reform their militaries, and they also needed to make their economies work; they needed to have democratic societies. All the arguments we made early on were based on the fact that NATO membership is forever. Nobody has ever been thrown out; there was no mechanism for throwing anybody out. So you don’t want to take in country X, which is democratic, but tomorrow morning it becomes a dictatorship. Hence, this is why Slovakia didn’t make it the first time around.

Q: Well Greece went into the…it has a dictatorship. I was there.

HUNTER: What happened with Greece in 1967 was that NATO suspended it from Allied Command Europe; of course, that didn’t matter very much then; and it also stopped supplying the Greeks with documents. They were sent to Coventry, they weren’t sent out of the Alliance, though. Oh, yeah, they paid a penalty, but they didn’t get thrown out. Of course, NATO at the beginning took in a Fascist Portugal, etc.

When we started on actual membership as part of the process of taking Central European countries off the geopolitical chessboard and helping them gain confidence about the future, we knew that membership was ours to confer. We’re in the catbird seat, they are the demandeurs, we can make them leap through any hoop we want. When you talk about different countries to be asked to join, it was not, "Who is ready to be a decent ally?" it was, "What territory do we first want to pick off the map of contention, whom do we want to solidify?" Everybody agreed on Poland, for obvious historic and geographic reasons, it’s perfect "tank country" is what I’m saying. The other one that was obvious was the Czech Republic, on the Eastern frontier of Germany, with the desire to surround Germany with NATO, to bring in the areas where, if there were ever a new conflict, would be in play, blah, blah, blah, all the rest. So everybody always agreed on those two. Then the question was “Who else do you add?” Hungary became the next one and Slovakia would have been, too, the so-called Visegrad countries, but it messed up under Vladimir Meciar. Remember, however, that we denied that there was any geopolitics involved, membership was open to everybody, it’s based on values, it’s based upon X, Y, and Z factors. But in the order of membership, obviously what really mattered was geography: surround Germany; stabilize Central Europe; Russia won’t be able to play with it anymore, etc., etc.

The first time NATO decided to bring in new countries was at the Madrid summit in July ’97. It was three countries, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic. That got more-or-less set in concrete at a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Sintra, one of the grand old cities of Portugal, in May that year. The French were pushing to include Romania, we thought just so they could be different from us. Maybe because Romanian is a Romance language! The irony was that, even though France championed Romania’s NATO membership, it did almost nothing to help it become ready to join; that job fell to us in the US. The British wanted to include just one more country besides the three, and that was Slovenia. Their goal was to make that the end of enlargement – I thought as part of the unspoken British goal to keep NATO small, so it will work; and to make the EU large, so it won’t! But at Sintra, after all the other ministers had spoken, it was going alphabetically around the table, which put the US last, Madeleine Albright said that we preferred a “small number” in the first round of enlargement, and that number was
three. So that was it. The US reasoning was that it could be difficult to get the Senate to ratify a NATO “Article 5” commitment to new countries, so let’s start with some that are sure to pass. The French made another run at including Romania at Madrid, more to make a point than anything else, but it got nowhere, once Chancellor Kohl backed up the US – where the Germans had up ‘til then not taken a position on whether it should be just three or some more. That followed a contact by President Clinton to Kohl, which I suggested to the President that he make, so we wouldn’t have a squabble at the summit and mess up the sense of unity over NATO enlargement.

The only other difficulty at the Madrid summit came when some of the Northern European Allies wanted to create a “prospect” for the three Baltic states to join at some point. Strobe Talbott, who was then Deputy Secretary of State, fought any reference, because of concern about the Russian reaction. He had earlier tried to reverse a NATO decision to hold a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Madrid, because the Russians, by their absence, could be embarrassed. He even told me when I saw him at the State Department in June that I should have ignored my instructions to agree to such a meeting! I replied that Madeleine had made the proposal to a meeting of the NAC earlier in the year, and suggested that he should take it up with her. To my surprise, he did so, earning a withering glare from her and a terse “Since I proposed the meeting, I guess we should go forward with it.” Then at the Madrid summit, in a meeting just of ministers and ambassadors to iron out problems in the communiqué, the Danish foreign minister made clear that, if there was no reference to the Baltics, there would be no communiqué, so that took care of that.

The Partnership for Peace was thus designed in part so that when countries came into NATO, they wouldn't be liabilities, militarily or in any other way. That’s one reason why it took five years and two months from the promise of enlargement to the admission of the first three members. At the same time, we did not want them to do so much militarily, to "buy their way in," if that’s what it was, that they wouldn’t be able to survive as societies, hence the two-percent of GDP idea as a limit for their military spending, the idea that we don’t want you to buy a bunch of high tech equipment that would take away from your economic development. It's why we didn’t push them to buy tanks and airplanes; we pushed them to transform their militaries, to get democratic leadership, to make as positive a contribution as possible to what was happening in their societies. I used to say to the American military folks who went out to work on Partnership for Peace in the Central European states, “You are ambassadors,” I said, “They will not just be watching how you make a platoon work. They will be watching the relationship between officers and enlisted people. They will be looking to see how democratic societies do these things. They will be looking to see how you hold your knife and fork.” That's what PFP was, and that was one of its great successes.

At one point, we had 50 percent of all the officers and enlisted personnel with the United States Air Forces in Europe involved in PFP activities in Central Europe -- it’s a thing called PERS Tempo, it’s the tempo of personnel activity, what did people do. More than 50 percent of the time, on average, everybody in the US Air Forces in Europe was involved operationally in Central Europe with Partnership for Peace. It was fantastic, it was one of the great successes of political-military engagement with people who were hungry to be involved in this. It was pushing an open door.
Another important point that is sometimes misunderstood. There were never any formal requirements for an aspirant to join NATO, because if an ally is going to give a strategic commitment to another country to defend it -- "I commit my defense to your defense" -- you make that commitment in your heart of hearts. You don’t say, "Somebody passed the test and so let's just take them in;" you just ask yourself: "In my country, am I willing to defend this guy if he gets in trouble?" However you decide that. But we still had a bunch of things we got the aspirants to do, necessarily. Thus there was a major NATO Enlargement Study in 1995, and it laid out expectations. But even if you checked all the blocks, it didn’t make it sure you would be admitted; and you could come in, if you were Poland, even if you didn’t behave.

Let me tell you one little anecdote about not focusing on high technology, high performance weaponry. The first peacekeeping exercise we were having under PFP was in Poznan, in Poland. It went very successfully; the Poles took it very seriously. Beforehand, there was a bilateral meeting with the US Secretary of Defense at NATO, and with John Shali, who was I think still SACEUR then. He might have already become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs by then. Anyway, we were sitting in a room with the Polish defense minister and the Polish chief of defense and, of course, the minister of defense was a military guy in civilian clothes. The Poles started laying out what they wanted this PFP exercise to be, so they said, “The first thing, we will have the F-16s come from the US Air Force, and then the tanks will come in this way, and then…” Shali finally said, “Stop!” He said, “This is a peacekeeping exercise, this isn’t preparing for the second Battle of Kursk!” That was the largest tank battle in history. The Poles didn’t get it, because, for the Poles, this was "How do we join up so we can take on the Russians?" We were saying, “No, no that is not what it’s about.” It took a long time to get them to understand that. So it wasn’t about having a lot of tanks and a lot of airplanes, even though some of them still hung on to all of that stuff. It was having these transformations, relatively low-cost, high-impact transformations.

Then, of course, there were a lot of other things involved in what, as you know, was the unfreezing of history. You had a lot of these countries who were operating on the basis of 19th century nationalism. We were trying to build on what was going on in the European Union, a 21st century concept of "beyond nationalism." Well, one reason it happened that way is that memories had been frozen, some since 1948, some back in 1933 in Eastern Germany with the Nazis, some in 1944-5, with the Communists coming with the Soviet troops. One of the things that sustained these peoples and one of the things that we worked on in the West was the promotion of nationalism. In Poland, you have the Catholic Church. Polish nationalism in the Catholic Church was fortunately great, this was very strong. After the end of Communism, people don’t go to church in Poland as much as they used to. I guess it is along the lines of their expression of what a relief it is to be free and independent. I was the guy who got the crown of St. Stephen returned to Hungary, which the US military had "liberated" in 1945, the central symbol of Hungarian nationalism. We worked very hard at that promotion of nationalism in Central Europe. Well all of a sudden…

Q: It wasn’t St. Stephen was it?

HUNTER: Crown of St. Stephen, yeah. So here it was, suddenly you have the apparatus of Communism and Soviet power collapse, these countries are independent, again, and we’ve
helped to stir up all this nationalism. Well, they had stirred it up, themselves, as a way of holding on to something, and suddenly we are saying, “You’ve got to get beyond that if you are going to become members of the European Union and NATO; you’ve got to learn to get beyond it.” But some of it had a darker side, as well, because you can’t slice and dice it. Nationalism also means claims against your neighbors, and one of the things we said, very honestly, was, “Hey, we can’t have you being revanchists.” We told them that, if you want to join NATO, you’ve got to get over that particular part of history. They were so hungry for NATO membership and the American strategic commitment that they’ve done a pretty good job of it.

Hungary, for example. The Treaty of Trianon, one of the four Versailles treaties, in 1920 took Transylvania away from Hungary as punishment for being one of the Central Powers, and gave it to Romania. Well, what do you do about that? One of the issues was, of course, that a lot of Hungarians had been thrown out of Romania. One of our arguments was, “OK, but you can’t revisit that, you Hungarians get over it or you are not going to get into NATO.” The reconciliation between Hungary and Romania, which is still holding, is one of the great achievements of the last ten years. Taking all this garbage, which came out of the First World War and the Second World War and is still there, it had been frozen, and trying to get over it. One of the things about going into the Balkans, today, where, ten years after the Bosnia War, where nobody had been killed, it’s still about trying to get people over their history.

Q: You have to go back only to 800 A.D. when they do the line first and then you start from there. Oh God.

HUNTER: One of the things is…it is wonderful to have a chance to work on trying to help people get over the bad elements of their historical memories, to gain a genuine sense of security, to have a chance to build lives in free and democratic societies, and we have a lot of very fine people in the US government who have worked on this, like Joe Kruzel, who died. I’ve got a sign sitting here in the office, which he gave me, which I may have shown you before. He was killed on Mt. Igman. He played a critical role in getting the summit going in the summer of ’93, when he was charge of preparations at Defense, as the Deputy Assistant Secretary, and we took the line in the Clinton campaign from.....

Q: James Carville?

HUNTER: He said, “It’s the economy, stupid.” So Joe had this sign made up, “It's the summit, stupid.” He put it in French, as well, saying “C’est le sommet, imbècile.” Afterwards, he gave the sign to me for the work we’d done together. That is my memory of a great man.

Q: Probably this is a good place to stop at this point. But the next time we really haven’t come to the end-game in NATO. How did things stand at the end? I mean we’ve talked a lot about...

HUNTER: I hope there is no end. The end of when, what are you talking about?

Q: Well I mean of your time there. How did things wrap up by the time...you left there when?

Q: How sort of...

HUNTER: The work of completing NATO’s role through the 20th century, all of the building blocks were in place at that point, with a lot of very able people working together on it.

Q: So maybe next time we can deal with that part of your time there, and I would also like to ask, was there much talk about definitions, what would be considered by NATO as an attack, because very recently there was an attack on Estonia, by electronic means of playing around computers and all of this, which was very definitely orchestrated out of Russia, and the cutting off of oil.

HUNTER: People don’t understand. Estonia may be the most electronically-wired country in the world, because they started fresh. You go to park your car at the parking meter, and you take out your cell phone and you pay for your parking with your cell phone. People don’t have checks. Everything is done with their cell phones.

Q: Sticking to the end of your time at NATO, how did we define, maybe not an attack, but aggression? Or did we? Does NATO pursue this and another one, the problem with the Russians having difficulties with Chechnya and other places? This wasn’t within your purview but...

HUNTER: NATO didn’t touch it.

Q: OK, well we will visit it.

HUNTER: Didn’t touch it.

Q: Well we will just take that off the thing, wouldn’t touch that.

HUNTER: Or even talk about it.

Q: When you left the job did you see a change in attitude back in Washington? Because there are an awful lot of people really who don’t know what they are doing but they have very strong opinions. That’s coming from me.

HUNTER: You don’t hear me disagreeing!

Q: But we will...sort of the climate when you left there and then we will pick up where you went afterwards. OK?

Q: OK, today is the 26th of July 2007. Bob when you heard what we said...

HUNTER: The anniversary of Castro’s arriving in Cuba on board the ship The Granma in 19, what 53?

Q: ’53 yes, yes this is July 26th, this is Cuban National Day, isn’t it? Bob, well as you were leaving, you were saying in ’98 that everything was kind of put together. Did you feel that NATO
had received its new definition of what it was going to be and all at that point?

HUNTER: I won’t say that NATO had come to a terminus, at a point in my life where I had done a great job and everything was wonderful from then on!! But at least during my time there, a lot of things did come to fruition, some of which, of course, had been begun by the Bush administration.

Q: Not the first Bush administration?

HUNTER: The first Bush administration, 41, as it’s called. The unification of Germany and the reaching out to Russia were two facts of great historic importance organized by President Bush, the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the idea that the United States would still stay involved in NATO, these were all very important developments. But in the next five years, from the beginning of the Clinton administration, we picked up what Bush had done. Except in a few areas, we didn’t try to reject everything our predecessors had done. The one area where we did act differently from what had been done was on Bosnia, where US inaction had helped feed the tragedy in part because, I think, people weren’t paying a lot of attention to it. Usually, when new administrations come in, everybody tries to reinvent the wheel, and sometimes you get into trouble. When you do that, it takes you a while to understand that the previous administration often knew what it was doing! But as I’ve already indicated to you, this is the only time I’ve had a personal experience of in my career in foreign affairs in which creating the grand strategy -- the idea what we were trying to do and why we were trying to do it -- did in significant ways precede the devising of the elements that added up to a grand strategy. Very often, what we call "grand strategy" is a series of responses to requirements in the outside world. Then you lump all the things you are doing together and you say "That’s our grand strategy." But if you pursue a grand strategy effectively, like we did in the Second World War and the post-Second World War and at the beginning of the Cold War, then it can be quite something. With NATO in the 1990s, this was the only time I can remember when we started with the idea of what are we trying to achieve, what are the elements required, and only then how do we put the building blocks together.

So, by the time I departed from NATO, I think that NATO had done major work on all the necessary building blocks. I probably mentioned it before, but one was the permanent commitment of the United States to European security. Another was the continuation of Allied Command Europe and the idea that countries would look, if not first and foremost, certainly very high on the list, to the integrated structures as they did their defense, with a common language, various common standards, the 1,200 NATO Standardization Agreements or STANAGS. The idea that the North Atlantic Council and its processes were important for dealing with critical issues in the trans-Atlantic area, where it was understood that, if the United States was going to be involved, it had to be through NATO. That was preserving the past, institutionally. Then there was the idea of preserving the best of the past, substantively, of which one of the most important was to provide a home for Germany. This was "surrounding Germany" with both NATO and the EU, which was a principal German desire when NATO and EU expansion started. Germany wanted to surround itself in order that, when it became more powerful, especially in Central Europe, it wouldn’t be "Here come the Germans, again," but rather "Here is Germany as part of NATO and the EU." We are seeing some of that now and so it’s working; also, Germany's giving
up the Deutschmark was another of the most important steps.

So, all this was about how you keep history from repeating itself in grand strategic ways. Let me say that it was about how do you wrap up the Cold War, really wrap it up? One was, of course, keeping American power engaged and NATO continuing. Then, there became a central issue, which is, how do you take Central Europe off the chessboard? It wasn't easy; it was a dynamic effort. "The end of history" was a stupid statement when it was made, and it looks even more stupid now.

Q: That was what’s his name?

HUNTER: It was Frank Fukuyama. A Russian who was present when Frank gave his first paper on "The End of History" was asked afterwards: “What do you think of the presentation?” He said, “Lousy presentation, but what a great title!” Well, our objective, to get back on the main line, here, was to take the Central European states off the chessboard, to "end history" if you must, but in the sense of their no longer being the object of other peoples actions, to make them subject to their own actions and, in effect, to remove something which had been a proximate cause of a lot of conflicts. The First and Second World Wars and the Cold War all had in significant part the proximate cause of uncertainly in Central Europe. Our idea was to freeze them in place as part of the West, so to speak, to make them permanently a part of the West, in order to give everybody a clear sense that they were no longer "fair game." It started with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council under Bush and continued with the Partnership for Peace. We came then to understand that NATO enlargement was important, not to do it to turn NATO into just another chowder and marching society, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but to give these people confidence that they would no longer be invaded by anybody, so they would know their place was securely in the West, and so everybody else would know it, too. Then they would have the confidence to get on with the business of economic and political change. I mentioned that, when the three Baltic presidents were asked at one point if they had to choose whether to join NATO or the EU, they were unanimous that they would join NATO. "Give us our security and then the rest will follow." Comfort, understanding, everybody knows it, OK. The power of the United States to be engaged and to say, “I’m sorry, OK?, all these places are off limits.”

It was critical, however, not just to say "Y’all come," but to ensure that new countries joining NATO would strengthen it or at least not weaken it, and so the aspirants understood their responsibilities, and also so everybody would know that, if the Allies were going to make the key security commitment, the Article 5 commitment -- "If you are attacked I will defend you" -- it was a very, very important moral and political commitment, even more important than the legal commitment. So everybody would know that all the Allies really meant this commitment, because otherwise the NATO treaty is meaningless, it becomes just a scrap of paper. People didn’t want 1930s' scraps of paper. So that is why it took, as I mentioned before, five years and two months between the time that NATO proclaimed on January 11, 1994, that it was going to enlarge and the date when the first three countries entered. It was necessary to get all this other work done, including a demonstration by the aspirants that they would be, in the phrase I invented: "producers and not just consumers of security." It also included the reaching out to Ukraine, and it required, critically, the reaching out to Russia. There was a balance of objectives.
How do you give a sense of security to Central Europe without giving a sense of insecurity to Russia or a sense of stigmatization or giving the Russians cause to believe that they had a right to revanchism later on? This happened with Germany in 1919 and afterwards. There were major debates in the US government. There were some who wanted to favor the Russians and some who wanted to favor Central Europe, and some of us who wanted to favor the whole ball of wax. Fortunately, "we" ended up winning!

The relationship with the European Union, we had to get that sorted out so that it was a positive rather than a negative factor. The redoing of the NATO command structures, reorienting the focus of NATO from the big war to small wars and toward efforts that would bring the military and the civilian aspects together, to reorient the direction of NATO clockwise a hundred and twenty degrees from the Fulda Gap in Germany to southeast Europe. That also involved the movement of a lot of American forces. Thus the US Air Force, in large part, moved from Germany across the Alps to Italy, to be nearer to where the problems were.

These were the essential building blocks that came together. Together, they said two things. One, we’ve wrapped up the 20th century in Europe. The notion of security involvement with NATO was that we will try to design something, even though we won the Cold War, in which everybody has a chance to gain in security terms, and nobody will lose anything in security terms, as long as they are prepared to play by certain simple rules, not rules that require anybody to be stigmatized. Now, that meant certain governments were beyond the pale, at least to begin with. The Slovak government didn’t make the first cut on NATO enlargement because of the lack of reforms. Belarus has still got an undemocratic government; Moldova is still, unfortunately, in an ambiguous situation because of what the Russians are doing. Milosevic down in the Balkans had to stop doing some things that he was doing in the Former Yugoslavia. Also, in order to validate all that was being done for NATO’s future, NATO had to stop the war that was going…you couldn’t have a war going on in Europe and say you’ve succeeded. "Who the hell do you think you are?"

Well, these weren’t just "Let’s wrap up the 20th century so it cannot happen ever again." There were power, institutions, attitudes, engagement, giving everybody an incentive that they will gain more in terms of their security and their sense of self respect, etc., if they play the game rather than if they break the game. Well NATO is a… it just occurred to me to mention this..... a collective defense organization, not collective security, which includes everybody, with a unit veto and which gets you nowhere. But in some ways, the attitude we were developing was about a larger collective security idea: here’s a chance, not to gang up against members that don’t play the game, like the League of Nations and the Italians when they committed aggression over Abyssinia -- it’s not to say there isn’t some merit in that -- but it is something more, which is incentives for all the European countries to work at "a Europe whole and free and at peace."

What we were trying to do wasn’t just about closing the door on the past, it was also how do we do things for the future to make sure it doesn’t happen, again, and also to reach out and expand the idea of what security is all about, beginning with the Balkans?

That was the black hole of European security, certainly since the Balkan Wars of 1910 and ’12, and then the match that lit the First World War. Nobody ever wanted to deal with it, and they were perfectly happy to have Tito keep Yugoslavia all by itself, followed by that incredible
patchwork government they had, with the rotating twelve presidencies, and then Yugoslavia broke up. But if you are going to do a secure future in Europe, you had to start dealing with that. What NATO was doing for the future also meant taking on some of the newer issues; non-proliferation was on the agenda very early. Then creating processes not only to stop the war in Bosnia, but also to stop what Milosevic was doing in Kosovo, which was technically outside the NATO area. Then to have a methodology and growing attitudes, so that NATO would be able in the 21st century to begin to do things beyond Europe that would be in the common interest.

Now, when I left, nobody at NATO was talking about Kosovo, nobody wanted to talk about it. It wasn't a squeaky wheel, and yet, ironically, on Christmas Eve, I guess it was in 1992, the first Bush administration had made an absolute commitment to the security of Kosovo. So that was something that was not dealt with at NATO. In my personal view -- and I was not then in office and didn't see the cable traffic -- I think what happened in Kosovo had a lot to do with serious American diplomatic blunders and a failure to mobilize power in the right way and to send signals to Milosevic that he could not get away with it. He took advantage, and then he came close to getting away with it. A lot of people suffered because, among other things, the US had dismantled the team that had done Bosnia, the ones who had been successful at dealing with a critical Balkan crisis, before. We put other people, a bunch of wannabees, in power, who, when the time came, weren't up to it.

Q: Well when you were putting...

HUNTER: Let me say one other thing. One good thing was that, at USNATO, we managed to build a bridge between State and Defense, we managed that the senior leadership in the United States government accepted the ethos that is NATO -- not that there are angels singing, like in the Terry Thomas film, Carlton Brown of the FO, whenever the UN was mentioned -- and that it was reaffirmed for the future. NATO has always been bipartisan, a great strength, and thus has always had the support of the Congress, the support of the president. We ratified and reinvigorated that for the future, and that factor just sits there quietly in the background. But it is a major strength in terms of American security and Western democracy, prosperity, and everything else.

Q: But OK on that subject did you ever sort of have dark thoughts, night thoughts, looking at the United States and saying, “You know the wrong leaders, the wrong atmosphere and the United States might say screw it,” and basically opt out. I mean did you feel that were we so imbedded in NATO that it was pretty much out of the question, or could there be a change in the political environment? This was how you thought at the time looking over your shoulder?

HUNTER: I guess I looked at it instrumentally. Rather than looking at what might go wrong, but rather saying, "Here are the things that need to be done, now, so let’s get on with the job." But, sure, there was a move on the part of some people at the end of the Cold War and in the early years, afterwards, that NATO could be dispensable, that history had come to an end. Keeping the institution strong didn't matter to them; you could turn it into another OSCE, a "chowder and marching society." But I was operating on the basis that there was an evident American self-interest and values here that were involved, that reinforced one another. It's a matter of winning through to get these things done. So while you are doing these things, you don’t entertain black
thoughts about things going wrong, because you are making them go right.

Now, one of the times I had a real problem of confidence was at the first negotiation of air strikes for Bosnia, when we had a second-rate team that came from Washington, didn’t know what they were doing, didn’t know much about it.

Q: Whom would you call the team?

HUNTER: Well, let’s just say they were a second-rate team, they didn’t really understand what was going on.

Q: But I’m trying to pin this down a little more. Where was the team located? I mean you’re talking about...

HUTNER: The Assistant Secretary of State, who didn’t know much about Europe, along with a former NATO ambassador, who tried to browbeat the Allies and got rebuked three times by the NATO Secretary General. I’m not trying to personalize it, but what I’m saying is that I woke up the next morning angry, I probably told you this, but, anyway, the United States had come in a few days earlier and said "We will 'lift and strike.’” Lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, strike with aircraft if people were being killed, make things happen, and do it unilaterally, if need be. By the time we got through this NATO Council meeting, we had been crowded back by the Allies, and the United States had abandoned its idea of doing lift and strike on its own, right? That’s when I woke up the next morning, really angry, because I saw that there was a possibility of absolute collapse on Bosnia, and that would be a collapse for everything we were doing. That’s when I flew down to Bavaria and met with Secretary General Wörner, and we started cooking up plots to make things work, and they eventually they did, but only after he died, unfortunately.

Another time I despaired is when the Bosnia negotiator, Dick Holbrooke, demanded a pause in the bombing 24 hours after we got it started -- though I was able to get it restarted -- in August of 1995. There were two or three events like that, including one I mentioned to you, a black moment of about twenty minutes, riding in a helicopter with the Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, from Berlin out to Travemünde in September of '93, and reading his briefing book, in which he was going to retreat from the "lift and strike" commitment. I told him, “We’ve got all this smörgåsbord laid out for the future of NATO. If you say that about lift and strike, it is all over.” He was smart enough to understand that, and he left it out of his speech, but that would have been the end of American leadership and much of the future of NATO.

There were some dark moments when we struggled to get certain air strike decisions negotiated on Bosnia and had to fight the British on it, under the John Major government, which still I don’t understand why they worked so hard to sabotage -- if that is the right word -- what we were trying to do to help the Bosnians get peace. The way I eventually solved it was, by accident, first to get the French onboard and then the British guys, who at that point had to come on board. And there was the only time that we failed to get a NATO Council decision that pushed the envelope on what it was prepared to do. It was over some Serb attacks on the safe area at Bihac. The NATO meeting was on our Thanksgiving Day, in '94. Washington was absent. Holbrooke, by
then both the assistant secretary and the Bosnia negotiator, had taken his fiancée to London for the weekend, so he was "out of pocket." Albright, at the UN, went to Haiti to have Thanksgiving dinner with the troops. But this was a critical day at NATO, for Bosnia. So, when I needed support from Washington, I worked on the phone directly with Christopher, who was "home alone." The French were posing a problem, obstructing movement. So, at my suggestion, Christopher got on to President Clinton, who phoned the French president, François Mitterrand, and Chris phoned me back and said that Mitterrand had agreed with us. I walked around the Council room to where Jacques Blot, the French ambassador, was sitting, reading poetry -- the Council was in recess as ambassadors were consulting with governments. I said, "Our two presidents have just talked. I don't want to tell you how to do your business, but I might suggest that you phone Paris to see if your position has changed?" Blot looked up from his poetry and said: "My government took a principled decision this morning, and nothing my president and your president could have said to one another could possibly have changed that." I was nonplussed! It thus proved not possible to get a robust decision out of the Council over Bihac. It was only some time later, when I was sent the memcon of the Clinton-Mitterrand conversation, that I saw the problem. Mitterrand had kept using phrases like "je comprend," and "Oui," and the like, to indicate that he understood what Clinton was saying, but obviously the notetaker on the US end of the phone call mistook words of "comprehension" for words of agreement! Blot had been right.

Oh, incidentally, one thing I'm not sure I mentioned was that I worked very hard not just on the relationship of NATO with the EU and Western European Union, but also to get France back into Allied Command Europe. This was a plot, a bargain, cooked up by the French ambassador and me for national reasons. We got 95 percent of the way there. In fact, the difference now between France's being in the integrated command structure and being out is a matter for the theologians, it doesn’t matter on the ground, and that was a real achievement.

Q: Well that’s, of course, a major...well I think also the French...

HUNTER: You see, the French also learned in the Gulf War in '91 that they had to be with America. They had to put their forces under US command, because they had missed out on all those years of modernization. I also realized that, if they were going to be effective with Western Europe Union, now called the European Security and Defense Policy, within Europe, they had to have access to the NATO goodies and the NATO planning and all this other stuff, so they had to come back into NATO in order to be part of something that would enable them actually do a job in competition with NATO, and they understood that.

Q: One of the great arms of American military might or diplomatic might is our airlift capacity. Were we working during this time to get somebody else and to have enough C-130s or C-5s or whatever it is? Significant aircraft to move troops hither and yon and all that, or did we sort of feel, yeah this is pretty good for us to have it under our control, which means people have to pretty-well depend on us?

HUNTER: I never detected that idea, ever. The United States was quite generous with providing airlift when necessary. When I was in the White House under Carter, there were operations in southwest Africa and that sort of thing.
Q: Yeah.

HUNTER: The Congo, we were there. Under the deal that my team and I brokered between NATO and the Western European Union, there was the so-called potential transfer of assets. In major respect, that meant American transport aircraft with American pilots would go and work for Western European Union. Everybody was comfortable with it, our military was comfortable with it. There was also an effort to get the Europeans to buy more airlift of their own, to buy some C-130s, buy some C-17s, and a lot did. They’ve, of course, come along with their A-400M, "a day late and a dollar short," which a lot of our people thought would eventually die on the vine. I warned them that it wouldn’t, because it’s about European job shares, and the plane eventually will come into service. But also at this time we are talking about, "lift" was mostly sealift. NATO wasn't getting involved in distant places where you might need highly-expensive airlift, and even today in Iraq, 90 percent, 95 percent of the lift is sealift.

DONALD B. KURSCH
Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to the European Union
Brussels (1996-1999)

Deputy, Stability Pact for Southeast Europe

Donald B. Kursch was born in New York in 1942. He graduated from Harvard University in 1964 and served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1964 to 1965. His assignments abroad after entering the Foreign Service in 1966 included Zurich, Budapest, Moscow, Frankfurt, Bonn and Brussels. Mr. Kursch was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

KURSCH: In '96, I went to Brussels as the DCM at USEU, which was a really very good assignment. Again, you bid on a number of jobs, and this one was the top job on my bid list. The way we were coming out of it, my wife…

KURSCH: So I was in a rather curious situation. We didn’t know who the ambassador would be USEU…

Q: USEU, it’s...


Q: When did it become a European Union?

KURSCH: Oh, probably shortly before I got there. It used to be USEC. Took a while to get used to USEU. I think we were still calling it USEC. Stu Eisenstadt had been our representative there and was a very vigorous proponent of the US relationship with the European community. Indeed,
his team had come down in 1994, on the eve of the German presidency, to Bonn. We had had contact, I was his control officer and I got to know a little bit. And he came back to be the undersecretary of commerce. I worked with him a bit on trade issues and also on Holocaust compensation questions, which was something that he was very engaged in. On this issue I recall somehow inviting ourselves to an executive board meeting of the American Jewish Committee in order to make an approach to the German foreign minister who was also in attendance.

Eventually, they asked me if I wanted the DCM job. I became the bureau’s candidate and I think the undersecretary, Joan Spiro and Dan Tarullo of EB and John Kornblum seemed to have agreed on me, and I ended up going to Brussels, but I didn’t know who the ambassador was going to be. The name that was then put forward was an Arkansas businessman, Vernon Weaver, who had been the head of the Small Business Administration in the Carter administration, and had gone to Annapolis with Jimmy Carter. He was an older gentleman, but very nice, old-fashioned Southerner. We met, and he seemed to be comfortable with me so we went off to Brussels together. I’d had some relationship with EU issues because of my tour in Bonn, but working with the commission bureaucracy and trying to get a handle on who did what took a little bit of time.

Q: You were doing this in ’96 to when?

KURSCH: ’96 to ’99; I was there for three years.

Q: Let’s talk about some of the issues. I watch some of the results of the EU decisions, and I sort of have a feeling that the bureaucracy there is always going to keep the EU sort of a step behind maybe the United States, Japan and all that don’t have the same constraints, just because of the complexity. How did you find this?

KURSCH: Well, the EU is a very complicated place, as I’ve said before. It’s very different working with EU institutions than working with a government. In a government, it seems that usually you can get clear cut decisions one way or the other. In Germany, you could call the Chancellor’s office or you dealt with the foreign minister’s cabinet or had good ties with the economics ministry and you could get response to your demarches. With the commission, I found it much more difficult to get clear-cut answers, even when you worked with powerful officials. Access was not a problem as I had good contacts with senior people in key offices.

The most important office for us was that of the trade and external affairs commissioner. That position was then combined. Sir Leon Brittan was the commissioner and I dealt with his chief of staff very well. And on the whole, Sir Leon was a person who generally shared our approach to trade and economics. But, he had to also operate in the EU context. He had to deal with the French who were very suspicious of him. He had a grating personality and did not get along well with his opposite number, the US trade representative, Charlene Barshefsky and was not well received in Washington when he came here. The president of the commission, Jacques Santer, of Luxembourg, was a compromise choice, and chosen, among other things, because the Germans and the French did not want a strong personality in that job after Jacques Delors. Jacques Delors had been a very strong leader at the commission. Jean-Luc Dehaene, the then prime minister of Belgium had been considered for the job, but he had been blackballed and they wound up with
Santer who was, I must say, a weak leader. That also made it much more difficult for us, because when the commission teams would come to Washington, for the semi-annual US-EU summits, our people saw the commission as being Jacques Santer, who wasn’t very effective, and Leon Brittan, who was brilliant but was very abrasive. This complicated our life and made it more difficult, I think, to get positive results.

Stu Eisenstadt had put something together called the New TransAtlantic Agenda, to try and find ways that we could work in tandem on issues of common concern, whether they be trade issues or political issues or foreign aid, and helping the countries of Eastern Europe. We were of course big supporters of EU enlargement. But, I must say, filling that agenda up with content was a challenge. I mean even getting things like a science and technology agreement concluded was really quite difficult. There was a French commissioner at the time, Edith Cresson, a former French Prime Minister, who actually helped bring down the commission, because of scandals she had been implicated in. But she was a very difficult presence, if I can be kind.

We did things that didn’t help either. One of the first things that happened, when I got to Brussels, was that the US passed the Helms-Burton legislation on dealings with Cuba, where we adopted a policy of secondary boycotts. We would go after European companies that traded with Cuba saying, “Look, if you want to trade with Cuba, don’t trade with the United States.” And this brought about a 15-0 vote in the European Council made up of all the member states to stand up to us. We had that problem hanging over our heads. Of course, we never went to war over this, even a trade war and eventually were able to manage our differences. But certainly could be clumsy at times.

In addition, there was a still considerable reluctance to recognize the power of the commission by American companies, and to some extent by the US government, both the Executive Branch and the Congress. One example I can think of is the Boeing McDonnell-Douglas merger, and the companies essentially not wanting to deal with the Commission, ignoring its warnings, and basically saying to the Commission, “Well, what are you going to do to us?” …Rather than recognize the European Commission’s authority over mergers affecting European trade the US firms approached our own Congress to have it pressure the European commissioner for competition to back off. What they did was create a beautiful opportunity for this commissioner, a Belgium politician named Van Miert, to wrap himself in the European flag, and stand up for Europe against these American interests. Boeing eventually had to give in. They could have saved a lot of money if they had listened to us. But they had to do it their way. Now that Boeing has Ambassador Tom Pickering working for them, this won’t happen again. But I think there was that reluctance to recognize that whether we like it or not the Europeans had their own rules whether it was on the environment, health rules, genetically modified organisms, or the use of hormones in beef cattle. These differences between ourselves and the Europeans created many hours of work for us.

Q: Frankenfood.

KURSCH: Yes and, really, it’s gotten much worse.

Q: Yeah.
KURSCH: We were sort of the victims there of the Europeans’ own ability to manage effectively their health problems, particularly with respect to mad cow disease. I think that this whole furor over so-called Frankenfood was greatly stoked by that, which we correctly felt that we were the innocent victims. We would always point out, “Hey, we don’t have mad cow disease in the United States.” But there is this European mentality that somehow “Our regulations are superior. You’re not that careful with health. And our regulations are better.” We seem to have lost that battle. I’d heard on the radio this morning that Monsanto is pulling out of Europe, and had given up. It’s not been an easy time, but it was certainly stimulating. As we’d always pointed out that the relationship between the United States and the European Union is the biggest economic relationship in the world, the biggest trade relationship, the biggest investment relationship. And certainly, most of our companies on both sides of the Atlantic are doing well in each other’s markets.

Q: Well, it’s a culmination of a foreign policy which has been the foreign policy of the United States since 1945, and that is somehow to keep Europe together so they don’t fight each other.

KURSCH: Well, that was the original idea, to bring Germany and France together, and it’s been spectacularly successful.

Q: Yeah. Well on the Helms Burton thing, how did you get around this? The idea was, I take it, that if a company had relations, had property, or somehow a tie to property that had originally been American-owned in Cuba, and when Castro confiscated it and had a tie then, we couldn’t do business with them and couldn’t give visas to the people... It was a ridiculous law.

KURSCH: It was certainly a stretch, and it was the kind of law that if somebody else had done it to us, we would have had a fit. What we did is, the Treasury Department it seems investigated these cases with all deliberate speed. I think we had a couple cases where visas in fact were denied. The Europeans were careful about how they handled these properties. They didn’t flaunt things in our face. But, over time, we seemed to manage. It was like so many things that we do in the Foreign Service. You manage issues in away, you never really totally resolve them. And I have to tell you I don’t know what the status of this is right now. But we’ve managed it in a way that we never went over the brink. A couple of people were denied visas and there were some headlines at the time. But no major economic damage was done.

Q: Well, what about the whole modified food, the Frankenfood type situation? Did you see behind this...? Was this sort of a people’s manifestation or was this a manipulation of anti-Americanism of the intellectual left, or what?

KURSCH: As with all things, there are a lot of factors. I do think that the concern, in general, about health and the kind of foods people eat and the lack of trust in their own respective authorities in Europe is pretty great. In the mad cow thing, this lack of European public confidence in their authorities was certainly justified. I recall this British Minister saying, “Oh, I’d go out and get a hamburger for my little daughter.” And then we’d see how many animals were infected, how widespread and how dangerous the problem was. In fact at the time there were very projections that large numbers of people might get this terrible disease because
nobody really knew. In France, you also had the scandal of tainted blood be sold to hospitals. There was a fair amount of cynicism in France about how well people are protected by their authorities. So there were a number of things that were coming together, and I think there was a general assumption in Europe that somehow, however weak their laws are, US laws are even weaker. There was some genuine concerns about the rapaciousness of American companies and the fact that these people were putting their traditional ways of life into jeopardy and endangering the traditional good quality of foods they had enjoyed. There was fear that these developments it would create products without taste, without any character--sort of a Brave New World type of product. You also had some of the anti-American element, but there was also this commercial element. At one point, the French were the biggest supporters of biotechnology in the EU. But at one critical moment, and I can’t tell you when that was, but I’d say in 1997, they flip-flopped. They just went from one side to the other on the issue, within the EU councils. This became a way to keep certain American products out of Europe. And we lost the EU export market for US corn. We lost it all. We had I think about a billion dollars worth of export of corn to Europe and because of genetic modification, we essentially lost it. So, to some extent, it was pure old-fashioned protectionism.

Q: Did you find, were there problems with, using the example of McDonald’s, but other American food or companies in Europe... although they were using European foodstuffs, still they were the symbol of Americanism. Did this attract the lightning of the EU?

KURSCH: Yeah. I think it’s been part of that. I think that it’s made it certainly difficult for the EU to pursue more rational policies. It’s forced them to go very slowly. They adopted something called the Precautionary Principle, which meant that they did nothing on a lot of these applications to approve genetically modified products. It’s also slowed down greatly the level of research in Europe. And if there was a lobby, it was the industry itself in Europe that was afraid that it would get left behind. So, to the extent that there had been modifications of European policies, and I think there have been some, it’s been this concern that “Gee, all the hot research is going on in the United States, and if we impose these restrictions on ourselves, we’ll get left behind.” But certainly the situation has deteriorated since I was there. It’s not one I can claim success on, unfortunately.

Q: Where did Canada fit in in all this?

KURSCH: Well, we had a group in Brussels, a luncheon group, it was ourselves, the Canadians, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Japanese, and somehow the Koreans… it was the major countries that were not EU members that were capitalist countries, exporting countries. We tried to at least exchange experiences and views on EU agricultural policies because of the common threats we faced, although, we and the Australians also had our differences.

Q: Oh, yes.

KURSCH: I guess the Canadians and we were probably, we were fairly close to Canada, and my Canadian counterpart and I were pretty good friends. The Canadians were always kind of frustrated in a way because they wanted to have the kind of high level bilateral dialogue with the EU that we had, but they could never get the EU to give them the time.
Q: Were we able... this was the time of the development of North American trade... NAFTA... North American trade agreement, wasn’t it?

KURSCH: I think NAFTA was earlier than that.

Q: It had happened, but was this seen as the counterpart to the EU, was this something that could be used, “If you do this, we’ll do that.” Or was it...?

KURSCH: Not really. We pretty much dealt with the EU bilaterally. The Canadians are, frankly, don’t have the economic or political weight. They don’t produce that much value added on most issues to carry the day with the EU if we come in. The Japanese, I must say, were also part of the group of trading companies I talked about. I guess if we, the Japanese, and the Canadians came in together, that’s maybe a greater voice. I’m trying to think of when that happened. I don’t recall specific incidents. The other thing is the EU has this great political component to it as we discussed before, and it just has a very different kind of character. We supported that political evolution. And I believe we still do, although we didn’t want the EU to define itself as being an entity that was opposed to the United States or was a rival to the United States. We wanted a partner. My sense is that we’ve been somewhat successful in achieving this, but certainly not fully successful.

Q: Were we looking upon the EU in foreign policy as being a fairly weak instrument, for them, an ability to come up with a common policy?

KURSCH: Well, I think the problem we had, that EU policies, even to this day, tend to be the least common denominator of all the member states. And even small member states can dilute it further. So, we had frequent frustrations. There was also the old inclination to deal through NATO and with the major powers, to deal with the British, the Germans, the French, the Dutch and, to some extent, the Italians and Spanish. I don’t think Brussels or the EU was then seen by US policy makers as a place that would be normally helpful. And the mission, to some extent, may have been tarnished by people’s frustrations with the EU systems. I feel that way. There was not, I would say, in the European bureau, much affection for Brussels. I can remember the deputy secretary coming through at one point, and I had to escort him from NATO over to the commission to make a call on Commissioner Van den Brueg, and him saying to me, “I’m doing my patriotic duty by coming into this place.” He found them very frustrating. Even in delivering material assistance, they were very slow. I remember trying to get money for something called the Open Broadcast Network for Bosnia. Secretary Albright had been promised money for this and they were just so slow to deliver it. And I’d had to call over and call over and call over, and I guess they finally got it. But it was such a painful process.

Q: Yeah. Well, did you look at this, did you see developing in the EU, sort of a bureaucracy where the veins were hardening, and it was hard to get things... It became a bureaucracy that existed to be a bureaucracy.

KURSCH: I don’t know if that’s fair. I think that the commission officials are generally very bright people. The examinations to get in are very demanding and positions at the Commission
are among the best bureaucratic jobs in the world in terms of pay and, benefits. In this respect it beats any of our respective civil services. But there is a sort of papa or mama knows best attitude among the civil servants in Brussels. I’ve seen that with many EU officials I deal with. There, it’s kind of a Mandarin operation that ‘we are trying to build Europe and we know what will work for Europe. We’re here on this mission.’ These are not people who used to testifying before a tough Congress, as our senior people have to do all the time. They aren’t humbled in a way by having to respond to constituents the way our bureaucrats have to. And I think that’s a major shortcoming in the whole European process. It’s starting to change. I mean the European Parliament does have more clout than it used to have. Most impressively, it dismissed the whole commission while I was still in Brussels.

Q: This is because of Edith Cresson

KURSCH: Well, because of the scandals, yes, and basically because of indescrections by Mrs. Cresson. But because the Parliament can’t get rid of individual commissioners, they basically had to dismiss the whole commission and it resigned collectively. And I think that that had created a new atmosphere. Plus the fact that now you have Javier Solana as the special representative for foreign and security policy. They are now talking with a new, with the new constitution of having in effect a European foreign minister. You also have even brought in Chris Patton as the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. This has brought about some positive changes in the relationship and also I think made Europe more dynamic. But this is a process in the making, and we don’t know how it’s going to come out at the end of the day. We see now, one of the things that’s interesting to me, is that the likelihood of the UK adopting the euro, which if you’d asked me three years ago I’d say, “Yeah, I’m sure they’ll do it within the decade, maybe by 2005.” That ain’t going to happen. The Swedes now voted it down despite the fact that all the political classes and the businessmen were for it. Now we have the major development of the ten new members, and they’re going to make the EU a very different place, just as a reunified Germany has made Germany a different place. So, what is this going to be? I don’t think any of us know exactly, but the experiment certainly has been much more positive than negative, and we’d miss it if it weren’t there.

Q: This might be a good place to stop now and pick up later on.

KURSCH: OK.

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Q: Where did you go in ’99?

KURSCH: I stayed in Brussels.

Q: But I mean what happened?

KURSCH: Well, we set up the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. I worked on the Balkans for three years, promoting Balkan reconstruction.
Q: Ok, why don’t we do Balkan reconstruction.

KURSCH: Yeah, we might be able to finish the whole thing up.

Q: Yeah. Great.

KURSCH: OK, good.

Q: Today is the 31st of October, Halloween, 2003. Don, when we talk about the Balkans, what was the status of the Balkans, in ’99 when you got involved?

KURSCH: Well, the Kosovo war had just come to an end. We were wondering what to do next. I think it had finished quicker with fewer casualties than we had expected. But I really hadn’t been involved with it too much, except as an observer, because I was working the US-EU relationship.

I was charge d’affairs, had been that for about five or six months. The ambassador had left early in the year, I think in January, to go back to his company. All of a sudden, I did see these cables on postwar planning and realized that the Germans had come up with this proposal to create a postwar initiative for the Balkans that would involve a large number of donors. I was somewhat surprised to see that we were enthusiastic about somebody else’s proposal. But, indeed, this took root as a US-German initiative under EU leadership, because Germany was had presidency of the EU for this period, it was the first half of ’99. I hadn’t really done much work in the Balkans at all. But I had served in Hungary, which was next door.

Just as I was getting ready to go back to Washington for my next assignment which would have been to work with the Air Force’s Chief of Staff as his political advisor, I got this call from Washington, saying, “Look, we have made a decision to create this new initiative for Balkan reconciliation and reconstruction. We’re calling it the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, and it’s going to be German led. But the Secretary wants an American deputy. Do you want to take this job?” I guess one of the major considerations was that the German nominee was a domestic politician who didn’t speak English very well. He was running the Chancellor’s office at the time. He was head of the Bundeskanzleramt.. So, I called up John Kornblum who was the ambassador in Bonn at the time, and asked him a little about this Mr. Hombach, who had been nominated to lead this initiative.

I got in the car, I still had a driver then as chargé, and went over to Bonn, where I met with Mr. Hombach, who was still sitting next to the seat of power in the Chancellor’s office. We had a two-hour conversation, he offered me a cigar, and we sat around in his office and we kind of hit it off. He was a person who had started as a party activist in the Social Democratic Party in Germany, and had worked his way up. He’d been the party boss of North Rhein Westphalia, which is the biggest state in Germany, and then also had been involved with business. He’d been the economics minister of Rhineland-Westfalia at one point. But he was a classic party politician, and he had run Schroeder’s campaign for Chancellor. He was not particularly close to Schroeder, but he was a very creative presence and a lot of political savvy. So, here I was, a career bureaucrat and I signed up with him.
Of course, then we really didn’t know what we were supposed to do with this initiative. There was this enormous fanfare at the time about the Stability Pact, and I think the countries of the Balkans somehow expected that we’d be sending large aircraft over the region and dropping out stacks of $100 bills. This was not helped by the fact that it was decided, I think under US urging, that we have a big summit meeting in Sarajevo to kick this off. So at the end of July 1999, President Clinton, and Jacques Chirac, Schroeder, Blair, and about 30 other heads of government or heads of state descended on Sarajevo for this summit meeting. So, if the locals weren’t expecting the $100 bills before, they certainly were expecting them afterwards. And of course flowery speeches were made about the great commitments of all of us to win the peace and reconcile these archenemies. The Serbs weren’t invited to this one because they were still under Milosevic’s control, so they were the big hole in this donut. But Tudjman of Croatia came, with some reluctance, and there was some superficial reconciliation between him and the Bosnians at the meeting.

After this great extravaganza had taken place in the old Olympic ice skating rink, which the Bosnians fixed up for the occasion,--God knows how much money we must have given them to fix that up after all the war damage--all the leaders went home and we went back to Brussels. We didn’t even have an office or any equipment. Well, we had phones, but we had to find a basic office. I was able to get ourselves a basic office through friends I had at the Brussels Office of the high representative for Bosnia, which had some extra space it wished to sublet. So we had six extra physical offices with desks and some telephones, and we were able to get the telephones, sublet them from OHR, and start operations.

This was a shock for me at my relatively advanced age, because in my previous jobs, and particularly in Brussels where I’d had a very solicitous and efficient secretary who took care of all my needs. When we started up the Stability Pact I had no support at all. Our initiative had been given all this fanfare, so people were expecting lots of things. We were getting calls and letters, and but at the office I was writing my own faxes since this was the only way I could communicate with them. We had a fax machine and communicating by fax. So we were really creating something out of nothing. We didn’t have any money either. That was the other thing. We were not a bank, we tried various schemes, Bodo Hombach, he was very nice to me. He insisted that we operate on an informal or “du” basis right from the beginning, and we did a lot of our conversation in German. German sort of became the language of the office. We had a wonderful chief of staff, a fellow named Marcus Ederer, a career German diplomat. And we did get a number of countries to chip in people into this operation. In fact, I was successful in getting some additional US support. For a while we had an extra state department officer and we got a Commerce Department officer, through undersecretary David Aaron.

Q: When did this thing was kicked off, what were they saying they were going to do, and what were these 30 chiefs of state saying they were going to do, other than pat each other on the back?

KURSCH: I’m not sure that anybody had ever really thought that through. I know Dan Hamilton who’s over at SAIS now had a lot of ideas on it. You really ought to get a hold of Dan and maybe figure out what he was thinking. But, my sense was, one of the things I heard, was that
politically, the Germans very much wanted to have a peace initiative as one of the features of their presidency of the EU, and that this served an internal purpose within Germany. There had been a major split in the Green Party between Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister, and some of the other Greens over the use of German military forces, and this was part of the effort to show that they were going to win the peace. From the American perspective, I think all of us, I certainly was, were delighted to see Germany taking a major role, because the Germans were always reticent about taking leadership roles, and that this time in 1999 it seemed like an excellent idea. The Germans did have political support and came up with some extra money. The problem was, first of all, that the EU bureaucracy, the commission bureaucracy, was never very enthusiastic about this because they saw the Stability Pact as a rival even though they were supposed to be our principal sponsor. God knows what Hombach was promised when he took the job. I think there was some sense that he would be sort of a czar for the Balkans, but you can’t be a czar unless you have a lot of money. One of the first things the Commission tried to do was ship us off to Thessalniki, Greece, to get us out of town. I caught them trying to do that on my farewell calls as USEU DCM so I quickly called up Hombach friend in Germany, and told him, “Bodo, you better get to work because they’re going to ship us down to Greece, and if they do, we’ll never be heard from again.” We’ll be out of town and out of luck. So, he was able to turn that one off. That was kind of symptomatic of the battles that we had with the European Commission. Interestingly enough at the time, there was no European Commission because, as I noted earlier, the Commission had been dismissed by the European Parliament.

Q: This is because of the scandal.

KURSCH: Yes the one involving Madame Cresson, which brought down the entire commission. So they were in the process of reassembling a new commission and the commission bureaucrats were really in control. So we had this short period where nobody was running things. And then they brought in Chris Patton, they set up a new foreign affairs high representative, Javier Salana, but when we started out, none of this was there. Anyway, we had this mandate, and we set up along the lines of the OSCE.. We had been established under the auspices of the OSCE, but nobody could really figure out what that meant. But what we did, we set up our operations based on an OSCE model, we created three working tables to promote our initiatives: one for democracy, one for economic development, and one for security. And we found people to head up each one of these initiatives. Then it turned out, that we ended up with three deputy special coordinators. This came later.

I had a colleague from the commission who had worked with the previous Dutch European Commissioner, Ed Kronenberg, and he automatically grabbed the economic table because the EU wanted to take the lead here. A Finn was brought in to handle the security table. I took the democracy portfolio because it seemed to me that that was something that was appropriate for an American to do, and I didn’t have a security background anyway, and it intrigued me. So we created that, and it really was creating something out of nothing, because they had found a very eminent former Dutch foreign minister, Max van der Stuhl to head up our initiative. But what was surprising for me, although he was a very famous human rights advocate, the first time I met with him he was asking me “What kind of ideas do you have to promote democracy in the region? I was hoping to get ideas from him. [laughter]
Q: [laughter]

KURSCH: So, we really did have to start this from the ground up and it was quite hectic at the time because at the beginning, there was a lack of staff support, a lack of precedent, and no clear definition as to what this was going to be. And of course, when you have an initiative with people, staff from 15 different countries, there’s kind a lack of common experience. Plus, we also had the added challenge that our boss was linguistically challenged, really didn’t speak any foreign languages other than German very well, and tried to avoid situations where he had to speak English, if at all possible. So we got off to a bit of a bumpy start. Of course, we had these enormous expectations to deal with, that we were going to shower the region with money.

So, we did do a number of things. One of the things...we set up separate meetings of these so-called working tables, security, economic development, and democracy. By doing that, we defined to a greater extent what we were going to do. Then we concentrated on putting together a big donor’s conference for the region. We had one of those in March of 2000, where we would basically, like a big charity event, get countries to come forward and say how much they were going to pledge for the region. We also, and this was something that I thought up together with the Hungarian government, was we put together a special program for aid to the Yugoslav opposition to Milosevic. We had a program to help the cities and town in Yugoslavia that had elected opposition mayors in this election... In the late ‘90s there’d been an election where Milosevic had actually allowed a semi-free election to let off some steam, and a number of opposition people were brought in, including the present prime minister of Serbia, Mr. Zivkovic, who was the mayor of Nis. So we were developing city-to-city relationships that would and give money, assistance and moral support to these municipalities. We were trying to find practical things to do, and trying to get pledges from perspective donors. We went around getting advice from people. We came to the United States. I had breakfast with financier George Soros, and together with Bodo in his apartment in New York.. Soros wanted to start a fund for democracy, and was prepared to match us for any special money that we could raise.. But there was no willingness on either the part of the United States or the EU to put money into a special fund for this so that approach was not going to work.

So, what we ended up doing, and, in retrospect, I think that this worked reasonably well, was to develop a menu of projects in cooperation with donors, and then we would ask the donors to put up money for these particular projects. Secretary of State Albright, was very interested in the time in dealing with the question of history and how history was presented to the populations in the region. So, the US pushed this very hard, and we put up money for that. We put up seed money. We got other countries to be partners in developing these individual initiatives.

The Austrian deputy foreign minister, wanted education to be a priority. At the opening organizing meeting, that was adopted as a priority, but then I said, “Well, now, how much money is Austria prepared to put up?” And they really hadn’t thought about that too much, but they realized that if they were going to push it, they were going to have to come up with money. The Swiss were pretty good. We got thirty million extra Swiss Francs out of the Swiss Parliament for the Stability Pact provided I could get the Switzerland to be accepted as a full member, which was more difficult than one would think, but we worked that out. The Swiss loved the Stability Pact because it was a way for them to take part in an international initiative without having other
tell them exactly what to do. They could do good things, get credit for it, but could also decide how they wanted to spend the money. And then when we finally did have this donor’s conference in Brussels in the Spring of 2000, we were able to get pledges over a couple of billion dollars, as I remember. On the democracy side, we got pledges between four and five hundred million, which was pretty good. I think the lion’s share of that was for refugee returns, but we also received significant pledges to promote freedom of the media, ethnic reconciliation, education and other activities.

Most importantly, though, is that we got a process going. I think that was the real contribution. First of all, we put the EU on the spot. The EU realized that they had to produce, as they were the designated leader. And as much as the European Commissioner didn’t like the idea of the Stability Pact very much, at this first conference, where they were the host, they had to come up with a serious program for the region. And so the EU accelerated its efforts and they came up with a plan for including association agreements with the countries of the region that accepted basic EU principles. Very importantly this also involved economic assistance to these countries. And, most importantly, these countries were also give the perspective of eventual EU membership. Up until then, SE Europe had been a “black hole” for the EU. They really didn’t want to think about “What do we do with Albania? The process, as it unraveled, did create that kind of a dynamic. Today, I do think that all of those countries do have a perspective, even a country like Albania. It may take the Albanians thirty years, but that is still a perspective.

Another thing that the EU did, and I give them a lot of credit, was take over the leadership role. Here was a clear example for the US, and it was represented there by my presence there a deputy, that this was an EU need. The Americans were there to give a certain amount of assistance, but to remind the EU that this was their show. And as hard a time as they had getting their act together, I think our reminding them was probably a critical factor.

Q: Yeah, you were saying...

KURSCH: The third thing that we did that I think was extremely important, was we created a regional dynamic where we were getting these countries together and urging them to try to define what their priorities were. Part of the problem with the whole Balkan region, was that nobody wanted to be in the Balkans. They all said, “No, no, we’re not a Balkan country.” Or, “We’re an EU candidate.” Everybody was trying to escape the region. But what we would say is, “Well, whether you like it or not, this is geography.” And the EU would reinforce that message by saying, “Look, if you want to be part of our organization and you can’t get along with your neighbors, how can you expect to become an EU member someday, because by definition we all have to get along” So, we did accelerate a regional process, which I thought was very valuable. As a matter of fact, if I had had my way what I would have done with the Stability Pact after maybe three or four years would have been to enact a sunset provision and turned the process over to the countries of the region. These countries had their own fledgling regional process called the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP). There wasn’t a good deal of meat in this process, but we could have taken a lot the projects that we were doing and turned these over to the SEECP, and then provided technical assistance, political support, and maybe a certain amount of diplomatic cover, while at the same time making these countries feel that was their process. That has not been done, although I think there is some movement in that direction.
But, anyway, what is clear four years later is that the whole process of discussing various issues, whether they be crime, trafficking in human beings, dealing with natural disasters, trade, has been set in motion, through a regular series of meetings and negotiations. The dialog is very, very lively. The only black hole still in the region is Kosovo, and that is an area where we were really not successful. I thought because of the way we operated we might be able to do something with Kosovo too, because we started out working, as I mentioned earlier, with the Yugoslav opposition. When the government in Yugoslavia changed, we immediately reached out to the new democratic government and asked them to come into the Stability Pact. They used us as a way as a bridge to reach out to the region. I thought that was done quite adeptly by Bodo Hombach. I thought, it’s too bad, we ought to be able to do this with Kosovo. I remember, we had Montenegro as a member from the beginning, but not Serbia. And I thought, “Well, since we have a precedent to show that working with the Stability Pact doesn’t imply diplomatic recognition, there ought to be practical steps that we could take together.” But, really, not a great deal was done in that regard.

But, as I look today, at what the Balkans looks like, and I look what we inherited in 1999, I believe that this has been a real success story. Although I wouldn’t say that things are irreversible, they’re moving in that direction. If we look where Europe was four years after WWII, it wasn’t so clear that the things that have happened were going to happen. I’m pretty optimistic about the place. I also think that we and the Europeans did it right. I wish there were more attention given to how we the United States, and the EU, and the key member states, particularly Germany, worked together on this, because it has been an effective example. The way we brought in neutral countries, like the Swiss, and other non-EU members like the Norwegians, was very, very helpful.

Another thing that we did, which was a maybe a small but significant difference, was to get the countries of the region, the so-called new democracies, to think of themselves as donors for the first time. I know Hungary pretty well, and I mention this initiative for helping the Yugoslav opposition. The way this one started was that, the Hungarians wanted something that would reach out to the Hungarian minorities in the former Yugoslavia. So, they proposed to do, start something called the Szeged Process, that would meet in the Hungarian border town of Szeged. I said, “it’s is a great idea to help the opposition, but we can’t just be helping Hungarians. This has to be generic throughout the region, particularly in Yugoslavia. And, by the way, how much money are you prepared to put commit to this?” This was something that they really hadn’t thought of because they hadn’t been a donor country before. But, they pledged over a million dollars to establish a foundation in Szeged, and they’ve committed additional amount since then. The Czechs also put up money for projects of interest to them such as freedom of the press. The Poles became involved. Slovenia, was another country that was helpful as a donor country. I think the mentality, “Hey you guys live in the region, and yes, you’re still relatively poor, but you’re better off than your neighbors, and it really is in your interest to help them” I think it was an important development. …

Another thing, too, that these countries didn’t want to be thought of as the objects of this exercise. You know, they wanted be participants, but you’re either going to be an object, or you’re going to be a donor. So, we did make major steps in that direction. I think that there are a
lot of little individual initiatives. We opened up a center in Belgrade for the destruction of small arms and light weapons. I think that this was the first initiative to be headquartered in Belgrade. We had a meeting of Yugoslav cities and towns in Belgrade that I co-chaired, in the fall of 2000, three years ago. This was the first international meeting that had taken place in Belgrade in almost a decade and received a great deal of local attention. So there were those kinds of things. And with a staff of twenty people and no real budget, this was not insignificant. And in terms of what is the basic axiom of medicine, “Do no harm.” That certainly we didn’t do. The only thing I think I would have done is differently was to transition the initiative into another format by now. The United States is gradually easing out its participation in the Stability Pact, or downplaying it. Of course, we have other priorities now, but I certainly hope that we don’t abandon the Balkans altogether because the job isn’t quite yet finished.

Q: You know, in all your talk, I never heard the word France mentioned.

KURSCH: No, no. Well, the French are difficult partners as we know, I think I mentioned this earlier to you. They were present. One of my colleagues was French, and he was quite capable. He had been in the High Representative’s Mission in Bosnia. In the Balkans, in Bosnia and Kosovo, it seems to me we have worked moderately well with the French. But I think that the French had very mixed feelings about an initiative that was American and German led. I also have the sense that the Germans on this initiative may have reached an understanding with us before they told the rest of their EU partners. So the French did not take a particularly high profile. There were a couple of initiatives that they were engaged in; I also think they also did not want to spend the money. They did hold a big meeting, it seems to me, during their presidency, where they pushed these association agreements, but it was done very much in an EU context. There wasn’t great eagerness to give the Stability Pact or the United States much credit for what was going on. They did have some able officials. Their coordinator for the Stability Pact, a man named Alain Le Roi was quite capable and he later became EU representative for Macedonia. The Italian side was interesting. Because at the very beginning, they were quite interested. They had a Prime Minister, I think his name was D’Amato. He came from southern Italy, and they had the problem with the Albanian immigrants,

The Italians showed a great deal of interest. But during the evolution of this exercise, the leadership in Italy changed, and one could sense the decline of interest from the Italian side. So, the Italians had promised a fair amount of resources, but then they started pushing some other initiatives of their own. The Greeks were moderately helpful, because it was directly in their neighborhood. Foreign Minister Papandreou, took a direct interest in the democracy working table. There was a Greek coordinator after this fellow, Van der Stuhl left, a former Greek minister was brought in, named Rumeliotis, with whom I worked closely. In fact, I guess I was one of the few people who could get along with him. But I have to say I worked well with the Greeks on this.

We did have sort of a rival initiative, which also complicated things. Dick Schifter had started the southeast European cooperation initiative on his own. He’d asked for EU support. They hadn’t offered it. So, there was some rivalry there, and that also I think deflected from US support for what I was doing, and complicated my life somewhat. But, at the end, it’s come together reasonably well. Among other things, the guy who was the European coordinator for
Schifter’s initiative, a former Austrian politician named Busek, succeeded Hombach as the Special Coordinator for the Stability Pact. So, it’s like so many of these things, you have these very strong rivalries while you’re working bureaucratically, but when you look back, you think, “Gee, I’m not sure who did what, but when I add up everybody’s efforts, collectively, we’ve done a pretty good job.” I mean, Schifter’s initiative on combating crime in SE Europe was very useful … They set up this crime fighting center in Bucharest, which seems to be a pretty good idea that brings the police officials from the region together where they talking to each other, where they’re developing confidence in each other, where they can make each other look good. So, we’ve come a long way. The region just has, as you know, so many economic and political challenges. You have the real deficit in civic culture, and so much time has been lost. So it’s going to take many, many years. The expectations are still very high. In this time of globalization when people see on television how well their neighbors in the west are doing and can actually travel out there, people are going to be impatient. But I think that part of Europe is on the right track.

Q: Well, one of the things, several years ago, there’s considerable press attention to the corruption in Bosnia, particularly. Of course Albania was almost sort of ungovernable. How were the funds distributed and accounted for?

KURSCH: Well, the funds that we had were distributed through the various donors. So, if it was a USAID project, then USAID would distribute the money, or the Swiss development organization. Or, in some cases we worked with NGOs, but you’d set up a project, for example, the teaching of history, or maybe aid to fight corruption, or to combat trafficking in human beings. So these individual projects were administered by project administrators. In a way, when I think back, yes, we would love to have had a democracy fund or a fund for another special purpose. But if we had to administer such a special fund, it would have been necessary to bring in special people to do that. So, that was not a particular problem for us. This wasn’t clear in the beginning. And then I guess people say, “Well, what is your value added?” But your value added is the political value added produced by going out to get countries to make these commitments, to develop projects they are comfortable with and to make them feel that they’re part of a larger process. Another thing that I think is important from the US perspective was that we were not the sole donor here. We’ve gotten the Europeans to put up money, and indeed, they’re putting up most of it. Politically, this is a very good message to send. So, that was not a particular problem. I think the bigger problem is how do you really change these cultures when corruption is so deeply imbedded. I’m hoping in a place like Serbia, for example, where you do have a younger generation of people coming in this will be possible. I know the minister of finance there is a young former investment banker who has made a lot of money in the West. I think he was working in France. You hope that people come in with different ethical standards that they can then pass on in a broader sense. I know there are people who have those values in Serbia, but how well they can prevail over time remains to be seen.

Q: And as you mentioned, history may seem like a minor matter, but history is what has driven all the problems of Yugoslavia. But trying to get a handle on history not being a matter of learning what happened in order to get revenge but to bring about reconciliation, is terribly important.
KURSCH: One of the great tragedies of Yugoslavia, in my judgment, I have often compared Mandela and Milosevic, and thinking what a nightmare we would have had in South Africa had a Milosevic type personality risen to power and pitted the various racial and ethnic groups against one another. And I can remember at times, it seemed, that they might have been close to that. On the other hand, what might have happened if you’d had a person of vision in Yugoslavia, a Serb, a real leader who could have somehow risen above these hatreds of the past, and who had made a serious bid to the EU to bring Yugoslavia into the EU as a single entity. When I see how the EU enables countries like Spain and Belgium, in particular, to deal with their own internal ethnic differences, and if the EU also had had the vision to say, “This is a real opportunity for us” we might have avoided ten years of tragedy. It would have been a lot more easy too, for the EU, with just one additional member state than all the others. But what’s happening now, I think, is largely positive. We talk about transforming the culture. Here, I think the EU is a very positive presence because to get into the EU, to become part even of the Council of Europe, you have to sign off on all sorts of commitments. These are quite detailed. I think some Americans would see them as highly bureaucratic. But you do need to make commitments to democracy and human rights, and freedom of the press and you have to do an awful lot of things that we take for granted. Also, you should have effective laws to fight corruption and an honest administration. The ability to promote this kind of process is what makes me optimistic. Even in a country like Albania, which has had very, very different experiences, and was kind of the North Korea of Europe for many years, I see a real willingness, almost a childlike eagerness, to transform itself. I like the Albanians. They were very hospitable. But they also seemed to be people who really tried to do the right thing in most cases, but it was very, very hard for them. It’s going to take a lot of support and many years. But there aren’t that many Albanians. So, we’ll see.

Q: Just for the person who is looking at this later, I understand what you mean, but would you explain, when we talk about human trafficking, it sounds like there’s the slave trade going on at the turn of the century. Could you explain what we’re talking about?

KURSCH: Well, this is the smuggling of people across international boundaries for sexual exploitation, basically. There’s a lot of this that goes on throughout the world, but it does seems to have been particularly flagrant in the Balkans, in Bosnia. There was internal trafficking, but there’s also external, out of countries like Moldova is a major source. Because the economic perspectives in these countries, the former Soviet Union, are so bad, I think young women are easily talked into leaving these countries, going somewhere, to the west where they are offered jobs as waitresses, hostesses, whatever. Maybe they even think they know what they’re getting into, but they don’t really know what they’re getting into, because when they get to these countries their passports are taken away, and they are kept as virtual slaves. This has become a major issue for the current administration here. For Congressman Chris Smith, for whom I worked on Capitol Hill during my last year in the foreign service, this was one of his big issues. I think it’s another area where we and our other friends can work together. I’ve become a big advocate. I just should mention briefly my last year at the Helsinki Commission where I worked as the senior advisor to the commission.
Commercial Minister, U.S. Mission to the European Union  

Ambassador Charles Ford was born in Dayton, Ohio in 1950. He has a BA from William and Mary College and a MA from George Washington University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1982. His overseas posts include Buenos Aires, Barcelona, Guatemala, London, Caracas, Brussels, and as ambassador to Honduras. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

FORD: A few months after arriving in Caracas, Secretary Daly, who was the Commerce Secretary at the time, reached out to me and asked me to help him out on a innovative FCS project. The Department had decided to establish an expanded new office for the Commerce Department, not just the FCS but the entire Commerce Department, at the U.S. Mission to the European Union. Having served in London for the five years I had really wanted to do this while still in London but was required to take the hardship assignment in Caracas, so I got the call and we talked to everybody and found a replacement for me in Caracas, so I left that Christmas season, holiday season, arriving in Brussels in January of 2000, and spent the next 3 ½ years there.

Q: This is 2000.

FORD: This is January, 2000. I was there until July of 2003. I was tremendously excited to have the opportunity to serve in Brussels and focus on the European Union given my previous work in Europe, first in Barcelona in the middle 80’s right after Spain joined the EU. I developed in that Barcelona assignment a real practical appreciation for what the European Union meant to transatlantic business issues. And then coming over from London where I led our entire commercial program in Europe, it was a great step to go to Brussels and look at the evolving continental marketplace through the lens of a federal city. The European member states had ceded their sovereignty over much of their market to Brussels. Again, given my responsibilities in the trade and investment and commercial relationship area, the new single market meant that much of the action and debate was in Brussels and not in the capitals of the member states.

Q: Yeah, in many ways the European Union, the guts of it was commercial activity, sort of like the tax union or something.

FORD: Exactly. You might recall that it started out as a six country oil and coal and steel community formed in the 50’s. Then it evolved into the European Union with a commitment to create and perfect a single market, and then finally in the late 1990’s many of the member states joined the Euro. The EU then became a monetary union as well as a trade union. During this evolution, the EU kept expanding from its original six member countries to 15 member states during the time of my service. At that time, there was a commitment to expand and include 12 countries from Eastern Europe. This expansion had very interesting consequences for our trade and investment posture in larger Europe. As Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary were negotiating their entry into the EU we wanted to make sure that the terms of entry didn’t disadvantage American interests. As I mentioned when Spain joined, several of our interests in the agricultural area were hurt because Spain switched their sourcing from U.S. to European...
agriculture for some of the basic grains. So engaging in a conversation about the EU expansion to the East was a key part of the job. But it was a fascinating time to have been in Brussels as the institutions of the European Union were expanding and building capacity to take on the responsibilities of operating and directing this new monetary union with the Euro and began a discussion about the nature of the political union that they required moving forward. The European project continues to evolve and confronts massive challenges as it moves forward. Many years later the EU institutions approved a constitution that they started to talk about when I was working at our EU mission. So obviously that impacts business too. Politics and economics are inseparable. But the Commerce Department was challenged with defending American commercial interests in the European Union when you have the markets in the member states but the rules written and enforced out of Brussels. This evolving and not fully created federal union was a complicated institution to explain to American companies! But I found it fascinating to try to understand how the rules were written. At the US Mission to the European Union (USEU) we had an economic section obviously that was very involved in this, and we had USTR, the U.S. Trade Representative, who had one of its two overseas offices here in Brussels. Three actually, one in Japan, and they had one in Geneva. So the USTR, FCS, Econ, Agriculture, we had a large group dedicated to working with, understanding, and negotiating with the EU institutions in Brussels. At the beginning the entire U.S. mission to the EU was an economic mission. By the time I arrived, USEU had a political section and a DOD representative and a senior USAID leader who coordinated our assistance programs; so USEU was becoming more representative of a normal country team found in most of our embassies. Our FCS focus was on technical rules and regulations and business standards, because that was so much of what impacted American business that was dealing with Europe.

Q: Well you know, sometimes these rules, they are always described in terms of the greater good or something, but often there can be a real malicious movement behind it. In other words how to screw the Americans our keep the Americans out.

FORD: Or anyone who is not in your club.

Q: Or anybody else. Did you find that and how did you deal with it?

FORD: There were two elements that needed to be addressed or confrontations happened. One I think there is an interesting philosophical difference between the Europeans and ourselves as to what is the role of the marketplace. I mentioned this is one of my other assignments. I think our general view is that the marketplace works and the government intervenes when the marketplace is not working, or where there are imperfections in the marketplace. But the idea is to let individuals work and then government would address any issues that turned into problems. The European view, in my sense, is first they make the rules and then they let the market work. So it is much more of a very predominant role that the state is given in much of continental Europe. I think it is interesting to look at the British and Irish experience because I think you will find that they traditionally addressed the issue as we do but have changed to accommodate to the EU approach. You have a sense on the continent that the state starts by establishing the rules and then those rules guide the market as opposed to the market existing and allowing this kind of creative destruction and dynamism. For example, there are new financial services reforms being proposed in Congress because it looks as if the market didn’t work too well these last few years.
So these philosophical differences have created considerable tension in our trade negotiations in recent years and we are working through dialogue and negotiation to resolve them or at least address how the two approaches do not discriminate against companies from either the U.S. or EU. The U.S. and the EU are still at the heart of the world trading system although now recognizing that developing countries need to have a bigger role, countries such as Brazil, China, and India. The second element, though, to your point, is that these rules often have the impact of discriminating against US exporters. I am not one of those who believe that there is always intent to have a rule that keeps a competitor out of the market. Sometimes the information just isn’t clear to the other company from outside as to how to get into the market. Quite often I would find an American firm would inform us that its importer had been called up and informed that the EU had just passed or made effective a new rule and the US exporter would have to do X, Y, and Z or they couldn’t keep shipping their product. Then we get this urgent call that they are trying to keep us out of the market, and sure enough, there are competitors in the marketplace but was it the competitors that managed to restrict the product or was it the fact that because of the nature of the system, the US exporter wasn’t hearing from their importer in London about the change in the rules. So there is a considerable confusion sometimes as to where this new rule came from and why didn’t I know about it. I found that a lot of American companies would come in with that complaint, and we would help them navigate the process and be able to continue to export. That was one of our most satisfying jobs. We could make it more transparent and simpler for them in that they only had to do these four things and then they could keep on exporting and take away the idea that they were being attacked.

Q: Well in the first place in a way you are almost looking at a psychological element of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy exists to make rules. And you have got these gnomes of Brussels sitting around saying, “Gee we have got time on our hands, let’s figure out the configuration of pickles.”

FORD: There is the famous story of trying to get rid of the English pint of beer. You shouldn’t be able to get a pint now because since 1973 the UK had entered the EU which had the metric system. There is your point: that once you create a bureaucracy and you have the mentality that that bureaucracy is to set the rules for everything, you get a machine that starts to work very actively. On this one though the EU bureaucrats met their match and you can still buy a British pint of beer at a pub today!

Q: Let’s stop for a second.

FORD: It is the numerous layers of bureaucracy that is important to appreciate. You have the bureaucracy in Brussels, the European Commission, staffed with very knowledgeable technical people in practically everything. Now it is not just that group that sets the rules. Each of the 15 member states sends their technical people to work with them on it. Then if this process obtains approval from the Commission it goes to the European Parliament, the European level parliament. Then it has to go to the European Council of Governments. Then let’s say many years after all of these institutions pass these rules, it must go to the 15 member states to be implemented by national legislation. So often from a business point of view, the trader only sees if they are importing this or exporting this to France, they only see the French government. And there are often differences as to how the French might implement the same rule as opposed to the
Germans. So there is an enormous challenge. It is not like you have a federal government. They have still independent sovereignty in these 15 countries that are members of the European Union. That creates a real challenge for the concept of a single market.

Q: Did you or did we create the equivalence of an information center? You have got these gnomes of Brussels working on rules and things like that, and we are trying to get American things in. I mean was there any organization including yours, taking these things and translating say what this really means is?

FORD: That is a great point and I think the short answer is we did not do this directly because the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels had an excellent group called the EU Committee which has now become a separate American Chamber. So that committee composed of U.S. subsidiaries in the EU was connected to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington. Their main mission was to follow the rule-making process of the EU institutions. Unfortunately, U.S. based companies/exporters did not have an office following either current rule-making or maintaining a database of existing rules and regulations. Our challenge, which was why I was asked to create this new office, was that each of our embassies in the 15 member states had a FCS office. And that is where the U.S. based company would go. They were coming to London and Rome and Paris and Bonn and Düsseldorf and Berlin and all the commercial parts of Europe. We needed to connect our office in Brussels to those offices so that when we had an issue in those offices about an EU rule, we could become a resource for the embassy to answer the question or be the advocate to help solve the problem. So our goal was to serve as an enabler of the embassy offices. At another level we were very actively involved with American trade associations, and larger American companies that had a presence in Brussels. Our goal here was to influence how the rules were written, so we would work as an intermediary or convener to engage informally the European Commission and other European Union institutions. There were many formal relationships to insure that American exporters could make their views known so that the rule-making was informed and did not prejudice trade. But for me, what I found really exciting was how to unlock Brussels and make it less mysterious, more transparent to our U.S. companies and our embassies. Not by getting in the way, but by understanding what our office needed to know and to get that information to the US companies and to be available to assist them.

Q: You say the embassy. You mean the embassy to the European Union.

FORD: No, our U.S. embassies in the individual member states of the European Union. That is where the American companies would go, not Brussels. But invariably if they had an issue that issue was going to have something to do with Brussels. They would see this big brochure in a foreign language on new regulations and they would often just decide that this market was too complicated for them. We can help make them understand that it really was very simple. Or we would explain how we could take their case to one of the Commission offices and complain about it, because it was unfair and had unintended consequences. We could serve as an advocate to work out solutions. Again all of these services would be on an informal basis. We had an entire series of formal relationships. Here the most interesting issue in my tenure was steel. Steel was an interesting issue because it became a major trade dispute between our two economies. So when we restricted steel exports from Europe to the U.S., I believe that was in 2002, which was a
Commerce Department lead activity and created quite a bit of anger in the European Union. So I
was a member of many US trade negotiating teams that visited Brussels to work on the steel
issue.

Q: Was this involved in retaliation for something?

FORD: Well they were retaliating against us. The Department of Commerce and the
International Trade Commission reached a decision that determined that steel imports in general
were hurting U.S. industry. Thus, steel imports were restricted for a period of 18 months. The
decision included European imports which the Europeans felt were not injuring American firms.
They argued that we might be injured by Chinese imports or imports from somewhere else, but
not Europe. So they took action against an equivalent amount of our exports, and we had a very
nasty trade dispute that went on for about two years until they actually won their case in the
World Trade Organization (WTO). That was one big issue. There is another great issue that I
found very interesting, and is still obviously very interesting and that is data privacy. The
Europeans in general in electronic commerce have a system that if the consumer wants to receive
certain electronic information from a company, that the consumers have to opt in and ask to
receive the information. Otherwise, the company was not allowed to send you information that
you had not requested. We have the opposite system which is opt out. We receive all electronic
mail until we figure out a way to indicate that we don’t want to receive it. The European
approach is you don’t get it until you ask to get it. So it became interesting again, dealing in a
global economy, creating systems that protect data privacy given our philosophical differences,
and our own divergent views toward privacy. There were numerous issues but I would focus on
three as dominant: the data privacy issue, the steel issue, and then there was a huge issue about a
proposed chemical regulation that was developed to protect the environment but had massive
unintended trade consequences. This was another example of the Europeans regulating chemicals
and products like batteries to deal with environmental protection but very easily writing a
regulation that had the intended or unintended consequences of stopping American exports. For
the proposed chemical regulation we developed a strategy to engage American companies and
others in the EU rule-making process. I can go on but those were the three predominant issues
that I remember.

Q: Did you get involved in things like computers and the systems within the computers?

FORD: Well not so much directly myself. Other sections of the mission did. Microsoft
confronted a major antitrust case raised by the European Union when it attempted to purchase a
competitor. Boeing, when it purchased McDonnell Douglass, faced a similar situation. Again the
ever more global reach of American firms increasingly found that they could no longer count on
a automatic approval by the European institutions, particularly the antitrust authorities. Those
cases did not just involve my office but the Economic section of the State Department, the
Justice Department, and a range of Cabinet offices.

Q: The subjects are really big.

FORD: They are huge and I think many American companies were caught off guard at that time
as they had not fully factored into their decision-making the authority wielded by the European
Union. This all of a sudden very aggressive European Commission had not played this role before.

Q: Did you get any feel for the European Commission and the bureaucracy around it? You were in Brussels.

FORD: Well, there were three institutions. The Commission, the main institution historically, which served as the Executive power. It was the Commission that had the authority to conduct trade policy, oversee the single market, the environment, the enlargement on behalf of the member states. Much of our work was with the Commission. But over my tour of duty, the European Parliament was beginning to play a much more important role. So there are parliamentarians elected from all the member states to serve at European level.

Q: They are in Strasbourg aren’t they?

FORD: They are in Strasbourg and Brussels. They have a large new building now in Brussels and they probably spend more time in Brussels as opposed to their Strasbourg home base. You are right, that is where they were initially located. I think one week a month they are in Strasbourg. Until this century, they basically had some rubber stamp authorities, but they were beginning to exert themselves more over this last decade. My friends in the Political Section told me that the officials elected to the European parliament were no longer the kind of second level officials from the member states. Many times now these were important people that were going to run and play out their role in Brussels and go back to their home country as national leaders. Then, the third institution, one that was most unknown to me was the European Council. The Council is where the member states themselves sit and involve themselves in the legislative process. So you have a Commission which is like the executive branch, and the Commission has two checks and balances on its power, the Parliament which is like our House of Representatives and the member state Council which might be compared to our Senate. This was all very important to understand, so we worked quite hard to understand the role of each institution on commercial issues and how they worked together or might check each other. Part of my leadership responsibility was to travel to our embassies in the member states to educate them on how the EU worked and also to educate myself as to the kinds of issues they were facing and how our office in Brussels could serve as an advocate for them. With the Embassies, I worked not only with the FCS but also the Economic Section and at times the Political Section and the Office of Defense Cooperation. We organized seminars for the economic agencies at post to understand how the EU economic policy and business regulation process worked, so that they could recognize why in their countries they should expand their contact list to not just include the relevant officials that dealt with the North American market, but also those officials who handled relations with Brussels. These officials could have a very significant impact on American business in their country. We actually reached a point where we were organizing conferences in Brussels where the American ambassadors to the various EU member states would come and attend two day seminars with us and meet key European Union officials. Again it was a very dynamic time in what was a long term process in Europe of evolving power to a federal like entity. The period I was in Brussels was intriguing because the Euro came into effect for most of EU member states. Not the British. The Danes were I think still out. But most of the members had joined the Euro in the late 1990’s. Having a monetary union basically around what is the old
Deutschmark zone of influence strengthened this push for a more federal Europe. They just this last year elected or named a President of Europe that serve for more than six months and a new Foreign Minister for Europe. One could observe another period of major consolidation and strengthening of the European project. Since the European Coal and Steel Community of the 50’s and then the 60’s and 70’s and 80’s when the focus was on a single market. Now in the early years of the new century, there was a sudden move to monetary union. There is this very interesting experiment going on for the last half century of creating an economic union so as to create the conditions to move to an eventual political union or federal arrangement among European States. If my history serves me right, I am not aware of this process every working as other cases start off by creating a political union that then fosters a national marketplace. So it was very interesting to observe this group of leaders struggling with the issue of what was the right mix of sovereignty to transfer to Brussels.

Q: Was this looking at it sort of objectively, was this basically a French-German creature?

FORD: Initially yes. When there were only six countries in this project, I it was very much dominated by France, Italy and Germany. When the EU expanded to 15 member states, the French and German influence remained strong but the entry of the United Kingdom began a process in my view of lessening the commitment to a federal Europe and deepening the effort to focus on enlargement and the creation of a single market. It has been very interesting to follow the evolution of Spain, particularly under the administration of Prime Minister Aznar. Spain started to break out of its deferential role with the French and began to develop its own set of interests in Europe. I am sure now with the enlargement to the East with 27 members this influence of France and Germany is further lessened although still important. Poland for example, I believe has almost as many “votes” technically as the French and Germans. But I believe frankly that this Franco - German center is not as dominant as before.

Q: Well you know here you are working on this. In a way this is the culmination of what we started in 1950. We were tired of what amounted to these damn civil wars in Europe particularly between the French and the Germans and get them together. Began with the coal steel community and the whole thing. Our hands were all over every step of the way pushing and prodding and getting it to happen. But now that it had happened, were you picking up any people saying, “Oh my God, what hath we wrought?”

FORD: Well, I would hear a lot more of that kind of rhetoric let’s say when I was in London and the UK. The Brits were in general very skeptical of the European project and particularly the growing strength of the financial services industry in Frankfurt. I also believe that for those who want to create a more federal Europe, it has been a mistake not to have a more public, political dialogue about why this is needed and how it would have a positive outcome. Many citizens of Europe give credit for what they believe is good to the national government and blame Brussels for what is bad or undesirable. That political attitude does not help if one wants to promote Brussels and the Union. In the end, the French people turned down the effort to pass a stronger EU constitution which is remarkable when you realize how much France has invested in the EU.

Q: I thought it was the Irish.
FORD: And so did the Irish. Two thoughts to offer: when you test the proposition of Europe through some vehicle like a referendum you really find a lot of people that aren’t really ready to give up their national sovereignty to Brussels. Yet on individual proposals, there is quite a bit of support. We haven’t talked about the money yet. Another part of my job in Brussels that was new for FCS was to reach out to the European Investment Bank in Luxemburg and to get a sense of their financing priorities and whether and how subsidiaries of US firms could be eligible to apply for some loans or supply goods and services to some projects. The Bank focused its financing on infrastructure type projects throughout Europe. But how could American companies participate in this very big financial market? We felt through the WTO there shouldn’t be any restrictions on American firms going after much of this project finance. The Bank helped transfer large amount of resources for infrastructure and other public goods investments into the newer, lesser developed states that joined the EU. So when Ireland and Spain joined the EU there was a lot of money coming from Brussels. I think we could actually learn a lot from that as we look at our free trade agreements in this hemisphere as to how not only to have this focus on trade but also on investments in infrastructure and education and health so that the poorer country coming into the Union can have a chance to participate more actively in the economic growth of the region. But to your question it was very clear that the public in Europe has not been asked to comment much or talk much about this idea of having a United States of Europe. I think the phrase is “do you want a United States of Europe or do you want a United Europe of States?” That last phrase always captured to me the current state of affairs; the European public really wanted to have 27 member states, with Brussels doing some things, but with the desire to maintain considerable sovereignty in each nation state or even regions of nation states such as Catalonia in Spain or Scotland in the UK. I guess we went through a similar debate in our formative years as a republic and it was resolved in our Civil War in a more definitive way.

Q: Well what about you came there after the Bush administration was in power.

FORD: No, I came there actually in the last year of the Clinton Administration, in 2000.

Q: All right well that brings even more so you have we get involved because of the Iraq War...

FORD: I was there when it started.

Q: and you had a series of events talking about well that was old Europe and this is new Europe. I mean were you seeing was there a feeling that the Bush administration was more skeptical about the European Union?

FORD: That is a very good question. I think some senior officials in the Bush Administration had that feeling but I know it was not shared by the officials I worked with in the economic policy part of the Cabinet. The immediate impact that I saw after the transition to the Bush Administration was with regard to climate change and the Kyoto agreement. I think it was in the spring of 2001, we announced we were not going to continue that discussion. That decision and the manner in which it was announced in a White House press briefing receive considerable negative attention in Europe, maybe throughout the world. Brussels was disconcerted totally, perhaps by the way it was communicated, but then by the policy content itself. I would be remiss though not to mention the tremendous warmth and unity that we all felt after the 9/11 attacks. All
of our policy differences were brushed aside in a display of unity in the face of the terrorist attacks. I remember being at the Commission in the office of Trade Commissioner Lamy with a trade delegation from the U.S. in town to co-host a major Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue Conference and dinner. I must say the European outpouring of support and solidarity that day and for the next weeks in Brussels was so moving and exciting that I can never ever forget how meaningful it was to me personally and as an American. This happened all over Europe and was particularly strong in the countries of “Old Europe”; it was a huge sign of unity and a feeling of warmth between our two countries. But in the months after the Iraq war started and given how the war went in those early months, there was quite a bit of hostility and almost daily street demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Mission which was right next door. As we left Brussels that summer of 2003 to return to Washington D.C., Brussels was a different city in terms of attitude towards Americans. It reminded me a great deal of the attitude I found towards Americans when I traveled to Europe years before as a student during the Vietnam war.

Q: Why don’t we talk a bit about your impression of you might say the Turkish problem.

FORD: Well that is a good place to conclude this segment because by the time I left in 2003 the discussion in Brussels was increasingly an uneasy one about Turkey which was the next country in line to join. The process and political decisions to enlarge the Union to 27 member states in 2005 and 2007 was already in place. The details needed to be negotiated with Central Europe; the last two remaining states being Romania and Bulgaria. But again you earlier mentioned in your questioning the U.S. support for the creation of the European Union which has been successful. We haven’t had any other wars on the continent since this process began. I think now everyone is so tied together that I can’t imagine any backtracking in that area. But the question became after going to 25 or 27 member states, should Turkey be next? I know that President Clinton and President Bush and President Obama very much support Turkey’s application for membership into the European Union. The discussion in Brussels over the question of Turkish membership was fascinating to observe in those last months of my assignment. Major American trade and investment relationships were anxious to expand the single market and include Turkey. My particular focus was to understand where we had a major presence in Turkey and in Europe and how Turkish membership could actually advance our commercial interests. But more broadly speaking, the issue of Turkish membership really captured the debate in Europe over two very different visions for the European Union project. From my personal perspective, the views of the British and Nordic member states supported a growing European single market with a focus on trade and investment but not on a deeper commitment to a federal Europe. The opposing point of view, held by a core group, France and Germany, Belgium and some of the original members preferred a smaller, more federal union, more of a United States of Europe union. A Europe that is much more than just a single market.

Q: Yeah there is that phrase saying prior to the civil war Americans would say “The United States are,” afterwards, “The United States is.” Well what about..

FORD: But Turkey really pushed that envelope as to an almost existential question for many: Is Turkey really a European country?
Q: Well tell me were you being, this may go beyond obviously the commercial side, but it doesn’t mean an observer or participant in our diplomacy and all, the impact of particularly African and middle eastern immigration and oh hell, Indonesian. I mean any wave of immigration which is really quite a different flow from what we have experienced.

FORD: Now that is a great point. A reason that I truly loved the job in Brussels so much is that I was able to observe, analyze and act on the big issues of the day, through the lens of course of US commercial interests. My challenge was to interpret these trends into meaningful work products that could be used to advise US exporters and investors on transactions they were considering right now but with a view towards the future. The demographics of Europe were becoming a concern to large American companies, frankly to European companies as well. For example, if German demographic patterns remained the same, I believe by 2050 Germany’s population would be reduced to half the size it was in 2000. So clearly given the aging population and the declining fertility rate, it became mandatory for Europe to grapple with the issue of immigration and how to have much more of it. This was an enormous struggle and will continue to be one given cultural and historical norms and traditions.

Q: Sort of almost the ingrained inability to absorb immigrants. We have perfected this very well as a nation of immigrants.

FORD: We are a nation of immigrants, as imperfect as we still are; I believe we have gone through all the trials and tribulations to create or attempt to create a melting pot where over two or three generations immigrants are successfully integrated into the mainstream. In my time in Europe it was the Spanish who left for Germany and France, later to return when the Spanish economy started to take off. The UK economy was booming in the mid to late 90’s and they received a lot of immigrants, and you frankly had a lot of other European Union citizens going to the UK, which was a more dynamic entrepreneurial economy and Ireland; so you had this movement of people within Europe, not just from outside of Europe. It was fascinating living in London in those years where I would see so many examples of this intra-European immigration, whether the waiter in the restaurant or the investment banker that was coming over form continental Europe because they wanted the excitement of this entrepreneurial and innovative economy. I know that some also came to the United States for the same reason. But the challenges looking forward were enormous. A dramatically declining birthrate and an aging population will place enormous stress on the welfare states that are common across Europe. There would be no way that intra-European immigration would solve this structural problem. The only answer would be to increase the fertility rate or promote large scale immigration or some combination of the two. So where I would be exposed to thinking about this more is in meetings with investment bankers or other bankers looking at sectors and opportunities and trends where they would want to develop scenarios for the next 20-25 years. There was this kind of step back and a little bit of a gasp when we looked at the demographics and then the question was could immigration fill that gap? I remember engaging with business conference boards and some business global think tanks. It was fascinating to have them look at U.S. demographic trends and compare them to trends in Europe. Our numbers looked very good in comparison. Our own domestic fertility rates and our immigration trends were showing promise that we could have a dynamic situation for much longer than Europe. Now nothing in life remains static. I mean indicators today point to German population growth going down by half, but that is just a
projection based on a non dynamic situation. That said, you do begin to wonder about the capacity in Europe to absorb significant numbers of immigrants to participate in their economic life if for nothing else to sustain their current economy and have some level of growth.

Q: And also whatever the immigrants are coming and they are non absorbable. I mean it is not that they are not absorbable but they are not being absorbed.

FORD: Well the U.S. situation is fundamentally different in that our immigrants have come in waves from Europe and Latin America, speaking Spanish and coming from a Judeo-Christian tradition. Look how hard that has been for them yet we have managed to create a culture and society that works to integrate and move on. It has made it easier for immigrants from Asia that do not meet that profile. Europe meanwhile sees as its source of immigrants coming from Turkey, the East and Northern Africa, often from a very different ethnic and religious tradition. That said, many European countries have very pro-active skill-based immigration programs where they seek out immigrants from all over the world identified by market-based needs.

Q: Well just like the Turks came in like guest workers back in the late 40’s and many of them haven’t really been absorbed into Germany yet.

FORD: Exactly. There are these rigidities.

Q: Did this come up as a question or a policy? Ok I am setting up a bookbinding business. Should I go out and hire Moroccan immigrants or should I try to stick to native?

FORD: Well the first tier question was often just thinking out loud about the current size and skill base of the labor force needed and would that labor force be there in 25 years. In other words who is going to be here to buy the cars, or XYZ? This was more of a question for the larger American companies already in Europe rather than for the U.S. exporter. The trader doesn’t get as impacted by this. I never had in Brussels the discussion about what kind of worker you would hire. I know in Spain, in Barcelona, it was interesting to understand the lack of mobility that you find in much of Europe as compared to the United States. That is another point that relates to immigration, many companies that would be looking to expand or to modernize or to inject a new product into the economy would find it very troubling when they put a plant maybe an hour from where the old plant was and they couldn’t get workers to travel there. They would hear phrases like: “I am not going to travel that far. I am not moving from my village.” Now this might be a generational issue that the younger generation doesn’t have, but there is a reluctance to leave home. That together with a lack of immigration was troubling many companies as they couldn’t answer the question of how they would find sufficient workers for their proposed investments as they go forward into the next 20-25 years.

LAWRENCE DUNHAM
Assistant Chief of Protocol, Office of Protocol
Washington, DC (2001-2005)
Mr. Dunham was born and raised on Nantucket Island, Massachusetts and was educated at Catholic University and George Mason University School of Law. After working briefly in the United States Customs Service in Washington, DC, he joined the Department of State’s Office of Protocol in 1983. He worked in the Office of Foreign Missions as Diplomatic and Consular Liaison until 2001, at which time he was appointed Assistant Chief of Protocol, serving in that capacity until 2005. Mr. Dunham was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: FAM is the Foreign Affairs Manual.

DUNHAM: Correct.

Q: It is basically a list of our regulations and procedures on how to deal with issues.

DUNHAM: Correct. But because of this there were certain procedures that we had to follow. Subsequently there were a couple of big cases that came up which were handled in accordance with the FAM guidelines. We had one case where a fellow who was staff level member at a European embassy, entitled to criminal immunity, took a gun from the embassy. He went down to Florida by bus. He got down there, and he went to gay bars,

Q: Let’s say homosexual because terminology may change.

DUNHAM: These were bars where homosexuals hung out. On two successive evenings he went to a bar and he picked up somebody, and he went to the beach with them and shot them.

Q: Good God!

DUNHAM: Yeah. It was quite frightening. The Florida police (I think this was in Fort Lauderdale) were very concerned because they thought they had a serial killer on their hands.

Q: Where was he from?

DUNHAM: Which country? It was Belgium. (This was publicized at the time.) He went to these bars and he picked up men on two successive nights. He murdered them on the beach. So the authorities were very concerned. Of course the police were on the lookout for this person. Within the gay community in the area there were warnings. Then out of the blue, early one morning this fellow approached two police officers in a patrol car. It was about 1:00 in the morning. He approached the officers who were just sitting in a parked police car and he said, “You know I am the guy you are looking for. I want to turn myself in.” The officers took him to the station, and started to book him. As identification, he showed them an ID card issued by the State Department that said he had diplomatic immunity. At that point, they called our duty officer (protocol has a 24-hour duty officer who is available to handle inquiries from the police in cases like this). The duty officer called me at home and got me out of bed, saying, “Larry, the police in Florida have a man who has just confessed to committing two murders. He has diplomatic immunity. What do we do?”
The Vienna Convention is quite clear that even though people may have immunity, if they appear to be a threat to themselves or others, or there is a chance that they might commit the crime again, they can be held pending a determination as to how to handle the matter. In this case the man actually had told police he was prepared to go out and kill others; I had no problem telling them they could hold him until we could determine what to do with him. I went to work early the next day and called the embassy as soon as it opened.

Q: The Belgian embassy.

DUNHAM: Yes. I spoke with my counterpart, explained what happened, and said, “You know we really need a waiver of his immunity so that the police can continue to hold him.” Within a very short period of time (we did have to prepare a written request), the Belgian government waived his immunity. It was done before COB that day.

Q: COB is close of business.

DUNHAM: Correct, that day. The police were able to hold him temporarily. Over the next day or so we were able to negotiate a complete waiver of his immunity so that he could be prosecuted in Florida. The sticking point for the Belgians was the fact that Florida still applied the death penalty in some cases. They had recently executed people. The Belgians didn’t enforce the death penalty any longer. Their concern was if immunity were waived, that he would be put to death. So the lawyers at the State Department got in touch with the prosecutors in Florida. After the prosecutor determined that he wouldn’t ask for the death penalty, the Belgians waived immunity. The fellow was prosecuted and convicted and he is in jail now.

Q: You know it sounds like a case that this man was mentally unstable. I mean what you said, it doesn’t sound like a rational person.

DUNHAM: You may be right, and quite honestly, once the decision to waive was made, I no longer was involved with the case.

Q: You washed your hands of it.

DUNHAM: It no longer was a matter for the Protocol Office. I went on to other things. But that was one of the more notable cases that occurred during my tenure.

Q: This must have been quite a shock to the Belgian embassy wasn’t it?

DUNHAM: It was, but they were very responsive and very cooperative as well.

End of Reader