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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>Don Carroll Bliss, Jr.</td>
<td>1924-1926</td>
<td>Commercial Attaché, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Cecil B. Lyon</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Third Secretary, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Max Waldo Bishop</td>
<td>1935-1937</td>
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<td>Ulrich A. Straus</td>
<td>1936-1940</td>
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<td>Marshall Green</td>
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<td>Niles W. Bond</td>
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<td>Robert A. Fearey</td>
<td>1941-1942</td>
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<td>Cliff Forster</td>
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<td>Ray Marshall</td>
<td>1945-1946</td>
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<td>Christopher A. Phillips</td>
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<td>Eileen R. Donovan</td>
<td>1945-1948</td>
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<td>Abraham M. Sirkin</td>
<td>1946-1948</td>
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<td>Howard Meyers</td>
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<td>Legal Assistant to General Willoughby, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Henry Gosho</td>
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<td>John R. O'Brien</td>
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<td>Julian M. Niemczyk</td>
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<td>William G. Colman</td>
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<td>Mabel Murphy Smythe</td>
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<td>Robert Lyle Brown</td>
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<td>Edwin Cronk</td>
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<td>Gunther K. Rosinus</td>
<td>1954-1957</td>
<td>Cultural Center Director, USIS, Niigata</td>
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<td>Maurice E. Lee</td>
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<td>Elizabeth J. Harper</td>
<td>1954-1957</td>
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Henry Gosho  
1954-1960 Radio and Program Officer, USIS, Tokyo  
1964-1968 Information Officer, USIS, Tokyo  
1969-1971 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Osaka/Kobe  
1971-1973 Chief, East Asia/Pacific Division Broadcasting Service, USIS, Washington, DC

John M. Steeves  
1955-1956 Consul General and Political Advisor, Naha

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.  
1955-1957 Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Tokyo

Harry Haven Kendall  
1955-1957 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Takamatsu

Harvey Feldman  
1955-1957 Visa Officer, Tokyo  
1957-1960 Consular Officer, Nagoya

Leon Picon  
1955-1957 Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Tokyo  
1957-1960 Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Tokyo  
1961 Program Officer, USIS, Tokyo  
1963-1965 Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Tokyo

Jack Shellenberger  
1955-1956 Public Affairs Trainee, USIS, Tokyo  
1956-1957 Provincial Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Nagoya  
1957-1958 Assistant Motion Picture Officer, USIS, Tokyo

John Sylvester, Jr.  
1955-1958 Consular Officer, Yokohama  
1958-1960 Japanese Language Training, Tokyo  
1960-1963 Economic Officer, Tokyo

Richard W. Boehm  
1956-1958 Consular Officer, Okinawa

Cliff Forster  
1956-1958 Regional Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Kobe

Marshall Green  
1956-1960 Bureau of Far East Affairs, Washington, DC

Kenneth MacCormac  
1956-1960 Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Tokyo

Douglas MacArthur, II  
1956-1961 Ambassador, Japan

Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.  
1956-1961 The Asia Foundation and Sophia University, Tokyo
Lester E. Edmond 1956-1961  Economic Officer, Tokyo
Albert L. Seligmann 1956-1959  Political Officer, Kobe-Osaka
                          1959-1962  Political Officer, Tokyo
Arthur F. Blaser, Jr.  1956-1963  Financial Attaché, Tokyo
Olcott H. Deming 1957-1959  Consul General, Tokyo
Mark S. Pratt 1957-1959  Consular Officer, Tokyo
Carl Edward Dillery 1957-1958  Vice Consul, Tokyo
                          1958-1961  Economic Officer, Kobe-Osaka
James R. Lilley          late 50’s-1958 CIA Officer, Japan
Roy T. Haverkamp 1957-1960  Special Assistant to the Ambassador, Tokyo
                          1960-1961  Japan Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Richard W. Petree 1957-1960  Assistant Labor Attaché, Tokyo
Philip H. Trezise 1957-1961  Counselor for Economic Affairs, Tokyo
Sidney Weintraub 1958-1959  Political Advisor to Commander of U.S.
                          Forces in Japan, Tokyo
Jay P. Moffat 1958-1960  Vice Consul, Kobe-Osaka
Ellen M. Johnson 1958-1961  Economic Section Secretary, Kobe- Osaka
Joseph P. Donelan, Jr.  1958-1961  Principal Officer, Nagoya
William H. Gleysteen, Jr. 1958-1962  Political Officer, Tokyo
Robert S. Steven 1959-1961  Consular Officer, Tokyo
Raymond C. Ewing 1959-1961  Commercial Officer, Tokyo
                          1961  Vice Consul, Yokohama
David I. Hitchcock, Jr.  1959-1960  Japanese Language Training, USIS, Tokyo
                          1961-1962  Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Kobe
                          1962-1965  Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Fukuoka
Ulrich A. Straus 1959-1964  Political Officer, Tokyo
Robert L. Chatten 1960-1961  Assistant Press and Publications Officer,
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<td>G. Clay Nettles</td>
<td>1960-1963</td>
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<td>Donald Novotny</td>
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<td>Agricultural Attaché, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Exchange Officer, USIS, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Hugh Burleson</td>
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<td>C. Arthur Borg</td>
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<td>Security Section, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Director, American Center, Sapporo</td>
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<td>Chief of Protocol, American Pavilion, Expo</td>
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Edward M. Featherstone 1962-1964 Vice Consul, Kobe
Elden B. Erickson 1962-1964 Economic Officer, Kobe-Osaka
Richard N. Viets 1962-1965 Commercial Officer, Tokyo
Walter Nichols 1962-1969 Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Tokyo
William Clark, Jr. 1963-1965 Economic Officer, Kobe-Osaka
Marshall Green 1963-1965 Deputy Assistant Secretary, Washington, DC
Richard J. Smith 1963-1965 Vice Consul, Nagoya
John E. Kelley 1963-1965 Economic Officer, Tokyo
1965-1966 Japanese Language Training, Yokohama
1966-1969 Consular Officer, Fukuoka
John B. Ratliff, III 1963-1967 Assistant Director, FSI Language School, Tokyo
James D. Minyard 1964-1967 Assistant Agricultural Attaché, Tokyo
John C. Leary 1964-1968 Economic/Commercial Officer, Tokyo
Stuart P. Lillico 1964-1969 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Sendai
Andrew F. Antippas 1965-1966 Consular Officer, Kobe
William Clark, Jr. 1965-1967 Principal Officer, Sapporo
Margaret J. Barnhart 1965-1968 Consular Officer, Tokyo
Edward M. Featherstone 1965 Staff Aide to Ambassador, Tokyo
1966-1968 Director, American Cultural Center, USIS, Niigata
1968-1970 USCAR Officer, Okinawa
Robert E. Fritts 1965-1968 Economic Officer, Tokyo
1968-1971 Japan Desk Officer, Washington, DC
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<td>U. Alexis Johnson</td>
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<td>Herbert Levin</td>
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<td>John B. Ratliff, III</td>
<td>1969-1947</td>
<td>Director, FSI Language School, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Charles A. Schmitz</td>
<td>1969-1974</td>
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<td>Lester E. Edmond</td>
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<td>R. Barry Fulton</td>
<td>1971-1973</td>
<td>Special Projects Officer, USIS, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Richard W. Petree</td>
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<td>Isabel Cumming</td>
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<td>Robert B. Peterson</td>
<td>1974-1976</td>
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<td>Russell O. Prickett</td>
<td>1974-1976</td>
<td>Deputy Economic Counselor, Tokyo</td>
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<tr>
<td>James D. Hodgson</td>
<td>1974-1977</td>
<td>Ambassador, Japan</td>
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<td>William D. Miller</td>
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<td>William T. Breer</td>
<td>1974-1975</td>
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<td>Morton I. Abramowitz</td>
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<td>Ulrich A. Strauss</td>
<td>1978-1982</td>
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<td>John E. Kelley</td>
<td>1979-1980</td>
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<td>Robert W. Garrity</td>
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<td>Aloysius M. O’Neill</td>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>Staff Aide to Ambassador, Tokyo</td>
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<td>David I. Hitchcock, Jr.</td>
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<td>Robin Berrington</td>
<td>1981-1986</td>
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<td>Richard T. McCormack</td>
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<td>William Piez</td>
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<td>William Clark, Jr.</td>
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<td>Anthony C. Zinni</td>
<td>1987-1989</td>
<td>Regimental Commander, Marine Expeditionary Unit, Okinawa</td>
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<td>Edward W. Kloth</td>
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<td>Joseph A. B. Winder</td>
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<td>Paul E. White</td>
<td>1991-1998</td>
<td>Development Counselor, USAID, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Paul P. Blackburn</td>
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<td>Walter F. Mondale</td>
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<td>Richard M. Gibson</td>
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<td>Principal Officer, Sapporo</td>
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<td>Aloysius M. O’Neill</td>
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<td>Edward W. Kloth</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>Deputy for Environment, Science, and</td>
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<td>Edward M. Featherstone</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>Robin White</td>
<td>Director, Office of Japanese Affairs</td>
<td>1998-2001</td>
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**DON CARROLL BLISS, JR.**  
**Commercial Attaché**  
**Tokyo (1923-1924)**

*Ambassador Bliss was born in Michigan and educated at Dartmouth College. He entered the Foreign Service in 1923, specializing primarily in the Commercial and Economic fields. During his long and distinguished career, the Ambassador served in Tokyo, Bombay, Batavia, Alexandria, Singapore, Prague, Bangkok, Athens, Cairo, Paris, Calcutta, London, Ottawa and Addis Ababa, where he was U.S. Ambassador from 1957 to 1960.*

**BLISS:** Yokohama had been destroyed, and part of Tokyo. Many people had died and many were homeless. News of the great earthquake of September 1, 1923 had flashed around the world but cold print conveyed no more than that. Japan was far away across the Pacific, a country of kimonos and rickshaws and cherry blossoms. Now the ugly reality lay exposed, the stark scene illuminated by an October afternoon sun as passengers lined the rail while the Dollar Line’s “President Harrison” was tying up to a half-ruined pier. Here and there a roofless fire-blackened concrete skeleton with gaping windows was still standing, as was the squat tower of the deserted railway station where clock stopped at just -past noon recorded the moment when disaster struck. Otherwise a busy port and teeming city had been wiped out of existence, every brick building reduced to rubble, every wooden structure and flimsy house consumed by fire. The earthquake had shuddered many of those houses down when people were preparing their noon meal over hibachis glowing with charcoal and fires had sprung up everywhere, fanned by a stiff breeze which soon became the roaring fury of a firestorm. Thousands of men, women, and children had been pinned under falling masonry and collapsing tile roof’s or trapped by flames as they fled, to make of the city a vast crematorium. The fires had long since burned out but a spiral of smoke still rose from a mound of smoldering cotton bales heaped to the roof of a vanished warehouse.

The city had been reduced to ashes but its life was beginning to stir again. A small crowd waited on the pier for the ship’s gangway to be lowered. Distant ant-like figures were moving through the desolation. Tin-roofed shacks had been erected along roadways cleared for a modest bustle of foot traffic and horse-drawn vehicles, an occasional automobile. The aptly named Tent Hotel, pitched on the rubble and ashes of the Grand Hotel, displayed a streak of white canvas on the Bund. On the semi-circle of bluffs above the city a fringe of buildings spared by the fire still stood on the skyline, some intact, sore in disarray and an American flag floated over the field hospital rushed up from Manila by the U.S. Army as part of its response to disaster.
A few passengers debarked with their baggage to spend the night in the Tent Hotel, and a few came aboard, including, a young man who was looking for me. “I’m Vice Consul Martin,” he said, “with a message for—you. Your orders have been changed and you’re assigned to Tokyo instead of Kobe. You’ll have to get off the ship here before it sails at midnight.” This was splendid news—I would be at the center of things rather than far away to the south, and, attached to the Embassy rather than a satellite Consulate. There was plenty of time to check out with the purser, to have the wardrobe trunk brought up from the hold and put out on the pier, to pack the bags in the stateroom. Young Martin was happy to have dinner on board and answer a flood of questions.

The Consulate had been obliterated and its site occupied by an Army detachment brought in from Manila. Joe Ballantine had arrived from Shanghai to take charge; two Vice Consuls and several Japanese staffers rounded out the complement. They were all camping out in Army tents, eating Army chow, and not too unhappy, although water was a problem and there was no electricity. The rail line had not been restored and I would have to go up to Tokyo in an Army truck. The Embassy had been installed in the Imperial Hotel and Jefferson Caffery was Chargé. Beyond that Martin didn’t know much about what went on in ‘Tokyo.

As we climbed down with the hand luggage the pier was completely deserted except for the wardrobe trunk standing there on the rough planking in the glare of the ship’s lights. In Washington they had told me to provision myself as though headed for a desert in which none of the amenities of civilized life could be found. Consequently the trunk was stuffed with soap, toiletries, and a year’s supply of clothing, along with all the formal attire prescribed for a budding diplomat. To move that trunk was obviously beyond our powers, there wasn’t a soul in sight to help with it, and we would have to come back in the morning.

Away from the ship all was black except for a few specks of light and a brighter glow from the Tent Hotel. On the sagging pier we stumbled toward a lantern hanging on a pole to mark an improvised pontoon bridge that crossed a short stretch of water and brought us finally to land. Martin led the way into the customs shed where a dozing figure in rumpled uniform topped by a red face under a bristle of black hair sat at a desk lit by a kerosene lamp and adorned with a bottle and an empty glass. Our loads spread on the counter, Martin addressed authority: “We’re going ashore now; would you like to see the baggage?” The figure stirred, coughed up phlegm, spat copiously on the floor. “God damn,” it said, and relapsed into immobility. “Please clear this baggage, we want to go ashore.” The figure spat again. Another “:God damn.” “Thank you very much,” Martin said, as we picked up the luggage and departed by the farther door. I was in Japan.

A sentry shone a flashlight at us and opened a gate in the chain fence. The American Consulate was a cluster of tents dimly illuminated by kerosene lanterns. Martin led the way and lit his own lantern to reveal an Army cot on either side of a wall tent floored with packed rubble. We were soon between Army blankets, the lantern had been doused, but I continued to babble into the darkness, wildly excited as I was by what was for me a great adventure. Martin’s replies got shorter and. I thought he was dropping off to sleep when he suddenly slipped across the tent and tried to get into bed with me! Outraged, I gave him a knee in the belly and he retreated to his
own cot, murmbling, “But you shouldn’t talk that way.” To this day I don’t know what I said or had done to make him expect a welcome on my side of the tent.

It was some time before I fell asleep. What an introduction to my first post abroad! The first Japanese I had encountered was a horrible drunken brute; the first Foreign Service Officer I met was a revealed homosexual. What further disillusionments lay in store for an innocent abroad? In the morning I found out.

At breakfast in the mess tent Joe Ballantine welcomed me to a Japan he loved and turned me over to a sulky young Vice Consul with instructions to retrieve my trunk. One of the Japanese staff quickly recruited a couple of baggage coolies equipped with rope and carrying pole and we trooped out on the pier to where he trunk still stood, but no longer in solitary state. A gang of stevedores lay in wait for us, four or five of them in the dingy rough cotton tights and short jackets of Japanese laborers, sweat-rags on their heads. As our men approached to pick up the trunk a great jabber of expostulation arose and the Japanese clerk stepped forward to interpret. More talk, floods of talk, with sweeping gestures, while the two Americans stood mumchance.

At last it was explained. The stevedores had spent the whole night guarding the trunk, they said, even circling the area in a small boat to protect it from a raid by water. They had been faithful to their trust, they pointed out, anyone could see that the trunk was untouched, and now they wanted their pay.

“That’s ridiculous,” I exploded, “we didn’t hire them, we’ve never seen them before, we don’t owe them anything. Tell our men to pick up the trunk and let’s go.” Another flood of talk, and the baggage coolies still hung back. “Can’t we find somebody who is in charge of this dock, or maybe a policeman?” I asked Martin desperately, but he only looked helpless. I felt helpless myself, remembering last night’s customs officer. The stevedores were not impressed by either of us and were determined to hold their hostage until they collected tribute from the foreigner. The baggage coolies clearly had no intention of doing battle for us, there was no authority in sight to be invoked, and we ourselves carried none. The impasse was complete and I had to surrender. What did they want? Twenty yen? Impossible ridiculous, but I would give them, ten even if they didn’t deserve it. Now it was just a matter of haggling and the tension of confrontation eased. We settled for fifteen and while the racketeers were gloating over their money the trunk was -picked up and borne away. Ballantine was more amused than indignant over the incident, but he cast an appraising eye toward his Vice Consul; that young man wouldn’t get very far in the Service.

There was an hour or two to wait, and Johnny Tynan drifted in from the Tent Hotel, knapsack over his arm. He had graduated from Georgetown University, he told us, and set out on a freighter to go around the world. At an early stage the crew tried to rough him up, but Johnny had been an inter-collegiate boxer and after a bout or two on the afterdeck he had no more trouble. In Kobe he heard about the earthquake and decided to draw his pay and come up for a look-see. Now he was sitting beside me on my cot while we pored over a Japanese phrase-book; after my recent experiences I was determined to learn something of the language as soon as possible. So I was going up to Tokyo with my baggage? Could he hook a ride? There was no objection, and in due course we set out in a light Army truck, Johnny sitting behind on the trunk.
The dusty road more or less paralleled the deserted rail line through a countryside of rice paddies and market gardens and a series of small towns. There was some earthquake damage to larger buildings but most of the shops and houses were still standing, untouched by fire. After the ashes and rubble of Yokohama this was the real Japan at last, not the Japan of picture postcards but a land where every sight and sound and smell was strange and exciting. Particularly exotic were the smells: the mingled odors of musty rice straw, pungent soy sauce and sour sake, the scents of cedar and pine, incense from a Buddhist shrine, the reek of open drains in the towns, the whiff of night-soil from lush market gardens. The narrow streets of the villages were crowded and our driver roared through them, klaxon blaring, scattering animals and people and leaving behind a trail of outrage against the heedless foreigner. And so to Tokyo and another scene of devastation.

Between the high stone gateposts of the Embassy a curving driveway led to a heap of rubble over which the American flag flew from the stump of a flagpole, its upper half burned away. On the extensive grounds within a surrounding wall an encampment housed a detachment of Marines and some junior Embassy personnel, with space available for stray Americans. I had a wall tent for myself, floored with the grass of a lawn and equipped with Spartan military simplicity except for the wardrobe trunk. For ablutions a soldier left a pail of cold water outside the tent flap every morning.

Major Latham presided over the mess tent in which the Marine officers and Embassy folk breakfasted, dined off Army rations, and spent their evenings gossiping until bed-time, all for a modest mess bill. During one such session Lee Murray, code clerk in the Embassy, lamented his inability to get home leave after surviving the earthquake – Washington was dilatory about producing, a replacement – and Johnny Tynan spoke up. He had taken Foreign Service courses at Georgetown and thought he could qualify. Consequently Lee was on his way before long and Johnny was sworn in as code clerk. This was possible because most Government cable traffic in those unsophisticated days utilized the simple “Gray code” of five-letter groups listed in a book, no more elaborate and not much more secure than the similar commercial codes of Western Union and private companies.

So much for living. Getting to work was a walk of twenty minutes or so through a burned-out area to the Imperial Hotel, that earthquake-proof monstrosity designed by Frank Lloyd Wright in an attempt to create something vaguely Oriental out of an exotic confusion of jagged forms and elaborate angels, with walls the color of his Arizona sands into which shells, has been ground to take e the skin off an unwary knuckle. The Embassy had taken over a wing of the hotel for its Chancery, most of the furnishing replaced by office equipment except for the carpeting, an occasional couch or armchair, and light standards of elaborate metal lattice-work. Yes, we had electricity, and bathrooms with hot water, plenty of them and much superior, I thought, to the cold shower rigged up by the Marines.

Most of the Embassy officers roomed in the hotel and they had complained so bitterly to Washington about the high cost of their way of life that all salaries, including mine, were doubled by “hardship” allowances. Consequently I was quite well off and could afford to lunch in the hotel and forgerather in the bar on equal terms with colleagues and others in the foreign community, although in the Embassy hierarchy I was the lowest form of animal life. For some weeks, therefore, life moved in a narrow orbit between tent home and hotel office, with on
occasional foray into Tokyo’s main business district. Some multi-story office buildings had collapsed, but most had survived; the vast Marunouchi Building had shed its skin of yellow brick but was being repaired; the Bank of Japan and other buildings with excessively heavy steel frames were intact; the big department stores had been damaged but were back in business; the Ginza was coming to life as a shopping street. The charming little cottages of the prostitutes immured in the Yoshiwara, completely wiped out by fire in a scene of unspeakable horror, had been among the first to be rebuilt as good as new.

The bar of the Imperial Hotel was naturally the main gathering-place for the foreign community, particularly the Americans, a place where news was exchanged and “earthquake stories” circulated. Here we learned of the reluctance of the Japanese, wary of foreign intrusion, to accept help from abroad. A U.S. Navy vessel loaded with relief supplies was permitted to discharge its cargo (provided it departed immediately), but Philippine rice was below Japanese standards and most American foods were alien to the Japanese diet; the winter-weight union suits were mostly too big and many of them, buttoned-up flaps and all, appeared as the outer garments of rickshaw coolies; no Japanese body ever occupied a single bed in the field hospital on the bluff in Yokohama. Those were some of the things we were told as we sat in the bar after work.

Men who had survived the earthquake, tongues loosened by alcohol, also had to relate their experiences, to unburden themselves to anyone who would listen. Some of the tales were tragic and some comic, there had been miraculous escapes, cases of blind panic and arrant cowardice, instances of magnificent heroism and self-sacrifice.

One man whose wife was pinned unconscious under fallen roof beams was driven back from frantic efforts to release her, and he would never forget how her hair puffed into flame as her face was blotted out in a gush of fire and smoke. Poor old Babbitt went once a week to Yokohama to search the ashes of the Grand Hotel for some trace off his wife, last seen struggling to get out of a window. All he ever found was his coin collection melted into a solid mass of metal.

Then there was the tale of tile two Army language officers collecting shells and romping naked on an empty beach, their clothing and picnic basket stowed among the rocks. When the earthquake struck the sea retreated, leaving a vast expanse of shining sand over which they raced to escape the tumbling cliff, only to sense a huge tidal wave roaring toward them and then scramble up the rocks to avoid being swept away. Another shock, and again they fled out on the sand, again climbed the shattered cliff. With all of their possessions buried under tons of rock, they made their painful way inland to a farmhouse where charity fitted them out with kimonos and sandals. It took them five footsore, exhausting, half-starved days to get back to Tokyo.

Most dramatic of all was the story of Tommy Ryan, repeated endlessly by one Bridges, an American salesman who had been in Tokyo on that Saturday afternoon while his wife was staying in the Grand Hotel in Yokohama. It was a hot, muggy day, and she, like several other women, was taking a bath before lunch. When the hotel collapsed a chimney fell across the tub, fracturing her legs and pinning her down, completely helpless. Tommy Ryan, a young Assistant Naval Attaché, had been sitting on the hotel verandah and at the first shock he vaulted the railing into the street, escaping death by two feet, as he put it. After milling about in the panic-stricken
crowd he heard a woman screaming and soon located Mrs. Bridges high above the street on the mountain of splintered wood that had been the hotel. He climbed up to her but found the bricks of the chimney more than he could move alone. Back in the street, he seized upon a fellow American to help him, but was brushed aside – fire wars now blazing up and smoke billowing over then. (Tommy would never say his name, but some people thought they knew.) So Tommy clambered up again, and alone he tore at the bricks with bleeding hands in a frantic race with the fire and got the woman out just as the flames were reaching them. Down in the street he snatched a kimono from the nearest Japanese and carried the helpless woman to the shore where small boats from the “President Wilson” standing off in the harbor were doing valiant rescue work. Now she was convalescing in a Kobe hospital while Bridges sat in the bar proclaiming his conviction that Tommy Ryan was a hero, a saint, the salt of the earth, but he was not satisfied until he had written in the same sense to his Senators and Congressmen, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of State, the Chief Justice, even President Coolidge himself, in fact to everyone in Washington he had ever he had ever heard of. As a result of this one-man campaign Ensign Ryan was recalled to Washington, promoted a grade, and assigned to a soft berth on the President’s yacht “Mayflower.”

The country was in official mourning for the: seventy-five thousand Japanese subjects consumed in the holocaust. Theaters and cinemas were therefore closed, no public entertainments were permitted, and when the Imperial Hotel arranged dances for its foreign guests they were hastily abandoned after the hall was invaded by members of the super-patriotic Black Dragon Society in samurai gear, waving swords and denouncing, sacrilegious foreigners. In these circumstances the diplomatic corps withdrew within itself to form a tightly knit community cut off from all but official contacts with the host country; it was a group of foreigners beleaguered in a sea of unfriendly Japanese. The British were somewhat aloof and the Americans were mere hotel-dwellers, but there were pretty daughters in the Belgian, French, and Siamese Embassies, dinner parties were exchanged and dances organized, even a fancy-dress party; for such festivities protocol was relaxed and all presentable young people were welcome. That was all very well and sometimes fun, but some of us found the Japanese countryside more interesting and far more beautiful than anything in the capital, while the country folk were more hospitable, more attractive and more friendly than city people, as is often the case in rural areas around the world.

Only a few weeks after my arrival in Japan, therefore, three restless young men decided rather brashly to get out of Tokyo for a weekend in Nikko, site of the fabulous ancestral shrines of the Tokugawa shoguns. Armed with a phrase-book and equipped with overnight gear in knapsacks, we set out on a northbound train for a railway junction with the mellifluous name of Utsonomiya whence, we were told, we could get to Nikko on a branch line. The train was a revelation, gliding over a smooth roadbed through an open green countryside of fields and clumps of pine or bamboo among which thatched farmhouses crouched like plump mushrooms. The railway car, of European compartment design, was gleaming spotless, and at a. station along the way we could chaffer through the windows with peddlers offering Kirin beer and bentos – flat lunch-boxes of rice topped by strips of eel cooked in soy sauce. Delicious they were, although we were clumsy with the wooden chopsticks in their paper sheaths.

At Utsonomiya the train glided on its way leaving us on an empty platform at the edge of town, the station deserted except for the baggage porter, a gnome in a red cap. The gnome had little
more English than we had Japanese, but the phrase-book and sign language made it clear that there would be no train to Nikko. Could we get a motorcar to take us there? He was a blank. Could he find a taxi? That seemed to ring a bell, and he darted away up the street, leaving us to wait while a small crowd of schoolboys gathered to stare and giggle. A few travelers arrived at the station in the dark grey kimonos of middle-class Japanese, but one and all turned away when we approached them, phrase-book at the ready. From among the schoolboys a voice called out, “You speak English?” and we turned eagerly, but they only laughed at the joke.

After half an hour of this we decided to strike out for ourselves, splitting up to quarter the town, the station to be our rendezvous. Some distance along the street I followed there was a bicycle shop and in a lean-to alongside stood a Ford sedan.

Eureka! In the shop an old woman motioned me to wait, soon returning with a bright-eyed youngster about ten years old in the short kimono and visored cap of a schoolboy. “Yes,” he said, in carefully enunciated English, “can I help you?” He listened to my tale of frustration and seemed to understand perfectly. “You wish to go to Nikko,” he said. “You wish to go in a motorcar. Please wait here.” He turned to go and I stopped him. “What is that,” pointing to the Ford, “what is the word for it?” “Jidisha,” he said, and grinned broadly. “That is a Japanese word I shall never forget,” I told him, and I haven’t. (It means “fire-wagon and it wasn’t in the phrase-book). “Can we take that one?” “No,” he said, “I will bring. Please wait.” The old woman sat me on a stool with a cup of tea and a biscuit, and before long the little boy was back in a touring car driven by a nondescript character, his assistant beside him on the front seat. (In those days a driver in the Orient always had to have an assistant, presumably to the dirty work, if any.)

Back at the station we picked up the other two travelers, empty-handed and desperate, and soon struck a bargain for the trip. The little boy was pleased and proud, and just then we loved him, that precocious infant with the spirit of a Samaritan; he was not one to pass by on the other side like the travelers in the station. So we made much of him and offered him money, but he wouldn’t accent it. He even refused a Hershey bar. “I am pleased to help you,” he said, and would hear no more.

It was only two hours to Nikko, along a gravel road climbing past fields and forests to the Miyako Hotel. The affable black-coated proprietor that old-fashioned little hostelry was only too glad to see tourists on his doorstep again and there was nothing he wouldn’t do for us, his only guests that weekend and perhaps the first in months. The next day was one of pure delight as we explored the sacred precincts and stood in wonder before buildings of lacquer and gold adorned with carvings painted in bright colors, gleaming like jewels against the dark green of the giant cedars, nor did we overlook the famous three monkeys under the eaves of a shed. With the hotel’s facilities to speed us on the way our return to Tokyo was a breeze.

Another memorable expedition took us southward to a railway station from which we climbed a gravel road slanting up the side of a deep valley to Hakone. Half way up a landslide had carried a quarter mile of road into the depths below and a gang of laborers was gouging out the steep hillside with handcarts and mattocks and shovels of unfamiliar design. We edged gingerly across the gap and reached the Fujiya Hotel at dusk. Again we were the only guests, this time in an ornate tourist facility resembling the lavishly decorated ground floor of a pagoda. There was
electric light, but no hear, it was colder indoors than out, and we shivered mightily in our tweeds as we sat around a table in the vast empty drawing-room. Two sharp hand-claps, a voice instantly answered “Hai!” and a servant came running. Brandy might warm us up, we thought. We ordered a bottle and surprised ourselves by drinking the whole of it, but the alcohol went more into producing heat than inspiring conviviality, and we were still stone cold sober, accent on the cold. In despair we retired to our rooms and our sunken baths – long and deep and copiously fed by pipes leading into the hotel from a nearby hot spring. The body heat engendered by that steam-wreathed session was enough to carry us comfortably through our pre-prandial cocktail and a formidable dinner before we retreated to the shelter of soft beds and mountainous quilts. In the morning we climbed the rounded shoulder of the mountain for the traditional view of Fujiyama mirrored in the waters of Lake Hakone.

In later months, as we gained in sophistication, many more expeditions were organized by different groups in the American community. Some followed the tourist trail to the resorts and beauty spots touted by the guidebooks, to Kamakura, Miyoshishi, Atami, Kyoto and Nara, even to an assault on Fujiyama. Others were off the beaten track, to a fascinating Japanese hotel unknown to foreigners at Chuzenji on the Izu Peninsula, or to a climb of Mount Nantai, looming five thousand feet over Lake Chuzenji on the highlands above Nikko. Since all Japanese mountains are sacred, when we climbed Nantai the women had to hang back out of sight and rejoin us above, while the men followed the prescribed path through a gate guarded by a Shinto shrine where the white-robed priest collected an admission fee and intoned a prayer for our safe journey up the mountain. At the top a large bell was mounted on a stand and we rang it vigorously to announce our safe arrival to the priest below.

In the meantime my way of life was drastically altered when the mess tent was addressed by Major Latham one evening. “I’m sick and tired of all these damned civilians,” he said, glaring at us. “I’ll give you a week to find other quarters. This is a military operation, not a damned hotel. I don’t care where you go, but you can’t stay here.” The Imperial was out of the question despite my temporary affluence, but there was no conceivable alternative until someone in the bar suggested Coty’s house. Before the earthquake Coty had been the manager in Japan for National Cash Register, living with his family in a Japanese house, and the company still had it on a long lease, although at the moment it was full of refugees. When they cleared out I might be able to live there.

That was the answer, and within a week Titus and I moved in to take over the one room already vacated, and soon the whole house. To share expenses we recruited two young married couples from among our colleagues. They were only too glad to get out of the hotel and they settled in happily, one couple in the wing, the other in the larger front room upstairs, while Titus and I remained in the smaller bedroom. We all had to memorize the address: Aoyama Sanchome Minamicho rokui-ichi banchi Coty San no uchi. Quite a mouthful. In translation, working backwards, it came out as “Mr. Coty’s house, 61 South Street, Third Avenue, Greenhill.” The street number, incidentally, was no help; numbers were assigned in chronological order as houses were built. The policemen in their box at the corner would know.

To get to it from midtown there was a street-car line along Sanchome to Aoyama, but it was not in operation. Sanchome was paralleled by Minamicho, one block away to the south, a tree-
shaded dirt road lined on one side by middle-class Japanese houses screened from the street by high bamboo fences; on the other side it bordered the great Aoyama cemetery. Located on solid high ground, this purely residential area had survived the earthquake with no visible damage, its electric power and water supply intact.

Coty’s house was unusual in that district for its second story with glassed-in facade from which one could overlook the vast expanse of the cemetery – acres and acres crowded, almost paved, with gravestones, shrines and monuments, all of rough grey stone with an occasional shrub or tree to break the sad monotony. A one-story wing dripping wisteria extended from the house to the street, and in the angle, inside our bamboo fence, a modest little garden displayed a plum tree in one corner, a clump of bamboo in another, some azaleas and ferns, but no grass on the hard-packed earth. Outside in the street, looking to the right on a clear day, one could see the tiny cone of Fujiyama pricking the sky under arching trees, as it does in so many Japanese prints. A hundred yards away to the left a two-man police box stood at the corner of a dirt road bisecting the cemetery. ‘That road was lined with cherry trees, and in the spring thousands of families would be coming from all over the city for a ritual stroll under the blossoms whenever the newspapers announced that the cherries were blooming in Aoyama.

Some adjustments had been made to adapt a Japanese house for the use of an American family, but they were minimal. Coty had put down a few rugs so that we could wear shoes indoors and not be walking on the tatami, those springy slabs of straw matting, six feet by three and several inches thick, which floor all Japanese houses. He was not going, to live on the floor as the Japanese do and had introduced iron beds and wicker furniture, but to - protect the precious tatami every leg of chair, table or bed had to be planted on a flat glass saucer. He could, and did heat the house in winter with good old American oil stoves in every room, but he could not introduce plumbing nor could he alter the structure of the house and the scantlings that supported the second floor behind plaster walls seemed flimsy.

There were no windows except the untypical glass facade of the second story, and no doors other than one at the side entrance giving on a tiny porch. Instead there were shoji, decorated paper screens in light frames of natural wood fitted into grooves top and bottom; they served as partitions and as sliding doors between rooms and they opened the living-dining room wide to the open air of the garden. (The Japanese, it is thought, came originally from a warmer climate far to the south and were clinging to their ancient ways.) The second story and its two bedrooms separated by shoji were reached by a narrow staircase of unpainted polished wood.

There was no plumbing either, except for a tap somewhere in the back premises. The communal bath was a tall oval wooden tub, full to the brim with water heated by a charcoal fire underneath. Ritual called for scrubbing with soap and water and thorough rinsing (tin dipper provided) before climbing into the tub and sitting on a wooden bench, soaking in hot water up to the neck. One emerged lobster red, warm through and through, and pleasingly relaxed.

In the absence of plumbing there was no water-closet, only a cubicle housing a seat with a tight lid, above a receptacle to catch and store the night-soil. Once, a week this was emptied, when what we called a “honey-wagon” arrived to take away this vital contribution to agriculture, and for the next half-hour we longed for those pads the Japanese wore over their noses in winter to
guard against catching cold. The “honey-wagon” was a narrow vehicle carrying tall wooden drums all in a row, their lids less than air-tight, and it came in various sizes ranging from the two-cylinder miniguard against catching cold. The “honey-wagon” was a narrow vehicle carrying tall wooden drums all in a row, their lids less than air-tight, and it came in various sizes ranging from the two-cylinder miniguard against catching cold. The “honey-wagon” was a narrow vehicle carrying tall wooden drums all in a row, their lids less than air-tight, and it came in various sizes ranging from the two-cylinder miniguard against catching cold. The “honey-wagon” was a narrow vehicle carrying tall wooden drums all in a row, their lids less than air-tight, and it came in various sizes ranging from the two-cylinder miniwagon pushed by a couple of coolies to the eight-cylinder horse-drawn monster often encountered on streets leading to the waterfront, there to be emptied into barges for transport farther afield.

We had no servant problem in Coty’s house; along with it came the Japanese family he had employed for years and to which he turned over stewardship when he left Japan. The reigning queen of the establishment, as far as we were concerned, was Hiday San (Miss Chrysanthemum), a comely young woman who had been more or less brought up with Coty’s daughter and spoke fluent English. She was our linguistic link with the neighborhood, the policemen on the corner, and the rest of the staff, which meant with her family. Chief among these was “Cooky” San, her father, a talented cook who was a friend of the chef at the Imperial Hotel. From a kitchen we never saw he produced amazing and delectable things, ranging from a delicious concoction of baby eels and rice to the roast turkey and baked Alaska of a formal dinner. Our encounters with him were brief, however, and we practically never saw his wife and ten-year old son; they all lived together in back premises which we would not penetrate, but among them they kept the house spotless, did the laundry, pressed the suits, mended the socks, polished the shoes. What more could anybody want?

Some means of transportation other than shank’s mare would have been welcome, but there wasn’t any. Street-cars were not running, no taxicabs were to be found in Aoyama, and it was too far to expect a rickshaw puller to take one to the Imperial Hotel three miles away, and anyway that would have been expensive. So we walked, back and forth, three miles each way, rain or shine, through the cemetery under the cherry trees, and then along a street of small neighborhood shops, finally through Hibiya Park to the hotel. The street of shops was fascinating and one stopped often to study the things offered for sale: clothing, housewares, foodstuffs, medicines, toilet articles, every single item different from anything one had ever seen before, most of them handcrafted and often beautifully decorated. And then there was the archery range and the booth where young men practiced judo under an instructor, the art store lined with fascinating picture scrolls, the curio shop with its ivories, jades and lacquers. To walk that street twice a day for months on end was to acquire a sense of intimacy with Japanese life that no tourist could derive from the department stores or the blaring commercialism of the Ginza.

If the Japanese Government had political problems we juniors paid little heed, but we were quite aware of the shock to national pride delivered by the Asian Exclusion Act of 1924. An Imperial rescript admonished the people not to revenge themselves on Americans living in Japan – they could not be held responsible for what had been done in Washington – and none of us were ever abused or even reproached. Nevertheless a corpse eviscerated in traditional hara-kiri fashion was found in a corner of the American Embassy compound along with a suicide note of eloquent patriotic protest. The police told us privately that it was probably only a cover-up for murder, since no man could commit hara-kiri and also cut his own throat, but this was never made public. The body was therefore buried in Aoyama at a ceremony attended by thousands of people amid inflammatory speeches and scenes of great emotion. The police at the corner were worried lest our house in Minamicho attract demonstrators, but nothing happened and we rejoiced in our obscurity.
One political fact of life no one could escape was the reverence paid to the Emperor, direct descendant of the Sun Goddess who gave birth in a cave to the first of a line unbroken even through the era dominated by the Tokugawa shoguns. No Japanese could look down on the Emperor from above and every eye was cast to earth in his presence. Just then the Emperor was dying in the Imperial Palace and all of his attributes, including the idolatry, had been assumed by Hirohito, the Prince Regent. It was therefore unprecedented in Japanese history, more desecration than political act, when an unhappy student fired a shot at Hirohito’s passing limousine from a gun concealed in a cane.

The police saved the would-be assassin from being torn to pieces by the crowd and he stood trial hopelessly behind a conical straw dunce-cap reaching to the shoulders and concealing his features completely. There was talk of an Imperial pardon, since he had missed his target and only broken a window, but that was just talk.

Perhaps because of that incident roadways were cleared half an hour before the Prince Regent was scheduled to pass, no one was permitted even to cross the street beforehand, and all windows overlooking his route were sealed blind. The police hauled an indignant Australian diplomat down from the lamp standard he had climbed, camera at the ready for a candid shot. I was caught myself one day at a street crossing and required by a vigilant policeman to wait, along with a steadily growing crowd of Japanese men and women in like case. When the red Daimler touring car with its gold chrysanthemum insignia at last come down the street, Hirohito sitting alone on the back seat, the crowd sank to earth as one man, leaving me standing, the only upright figure in a sea of prostrate kimonos. The Prince caught this phenomenon out of the corner of his eye, gave me a knowing grin, almost a laugh at the absurdity of it all, and waved a half salute. Smiling back, I returned the salute and had to restrain an impulse to cheer, it gave me such a warm feeling for Hirohito. God he might be to the Japanese, but for me that day he was a fellow human being, a man with a sense of humor.

An earthquake is not a one-time thing, I soon learned. After a major slippage along the fault it is a matter of months before the stresses deep underground are locked into immobility and pressure builds up for the next shudder of release, perhaps in twenty-five years. In the meantime we were constantly experiencing minor quakes as the earth settled down, most of them known only to the seismographs although every once in a while there would be a perceptible tremor. This would reach the surface as a distinct shock, a bump from below, followed by some seconds of intense vibration and finally by earth waves rippling over the surface. On the cot in my tent I could watch with equanimity when I was jolted awake and the tent pole waved to and fro. Sitting at the dinner-table in someone’s house was something else again: with the shock from below forks stopped halfway, cups paused in midair, and talk broke off abruptly while everyone held his breath; there was an audible sigh of relief when the vibration did no more than rattle the dishes and only a picture fell down when the house began to sway. One day a fairly stiff one tipped over the lamp standards in the office and through the windows we could see the telephone poles and light standards along the street waving back and forth like coconut palms in a hurricane, the earth rippling toward us in clearly visible waves. In the Imperial Hotel this was in no way alarming since we that the hotel was earthquake-proof, built as it was on a single great slab of reinforced concrete that rode the waves like a giant raft.
The house in Minamicho was not earthquake-proof, we well knew. When the big one hit at dawn of a winter morning and a tremendous shock jolted me out on the floor I therefore rolled promptly under the iron bed. It would some protection, one hoped, if the roof were to collapse and heavy tiles crunch down. The night light in the hall dimmed and went out as current was shut off at the power station and the first sharp jolt was followed by a protracted rasping shudder as rock ground against rock, far below. The noise was deafening; every pane of glass and everything movable in the house was rattling violently, house beams were strumming like banjo strings, and the excruciating din extended to everything in the neighborhood. Nell Calder was screaming in the next room and I never heard her. Titus scrambled around on the floor in the space between our beds and I yelled at him: “Get under the bed, you damned fool.” “I can’t find my glasses,” he gasped, and finally obeyed. By then the waves were hitting the house and it tossed and pitched like a small boat in a choppy sea, every joint creaking and groaning. At one point it pitched so steeply that I felt myself sliding on the tatami and dug my nails into the straw matting to keep from going overboard. The whole framework of the house was twisted and wrenched back and forth so far that the shoji came out of their grooves and fell in all directions.

Altogether it lasted more than two minutes, the longest two minutes in any man’s life, until that dreadful swaying finally died away and I climbed into bed; it was over, and I was cold. Calder busied himself putting the shoji back in their grooved between our upstairs rooms, like the solicitous bridegroom he was. Titus was still scrambling around. “I’ve got to get out, I’ve got to get out,” he said, put his foot through a shoji and stumbled out into the hall and down the stairs. The policemen from the corner called to know if we needed help and Hiday San replied that all was well.

When Titus came back to bed in the grey light of morning he explained: “I just had to go outside to see if the earth was still underfoot and the sky overhead. Everything was in place, the trees still standing, and now I feel better.” Eventually the sun rose, he had some breakfast and he felt better yet. But none of us can ever forget that two minutes of blind terror, of utter helplessness as we lay trapped in a storm-tossed house from which there was no time to escape and in which the only possible refuge seemed to be under a bed.

On the Richter scale it was a major earthquake, not one of the greatest. Six months before it would have been catastrophic, but everything not earthquake-proof had already collapsed in September and there was not much additional damage. There were a few fires, quickly extinguished, but the fear of them was so great that a number of guests in the Imperial Hotel, we were told, had rushed outdoors and plunged into the lily pond at the front entrance. Could they have been refugees from Yokohama?

Cecil B. Lyon was born in New York in 1903. He graduated from Harvard
University in 1927. Mr. Lyon joined the Foreign Service in 1930 and served in Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, China, Chile, Egypt, Poland, Germany, France, and Ceylon. He was interviewed in 1988 by John Bovey.

Q: Yes, '33. The war in China was not too far ahead though, was it?

LYON: I was in China when it started.

Q: Was there any feeling then, or any sort of fore-seeing of the terrible things that were to come, the mistakes of the Japanese and so on?

LYON: That's a very difficult question. I don't think we were yet conscious of much. As I mentioned, I was Third Secretary. I felt I was in heaven: wonderful post, marvelous chief, Mr. Grew, and the lovely country -- I loved Japan. My work was doing the weekly political report, and also I was assigned to do despatches on the sale of the Chinese-Eastern Railway, I think it was called. The Japanese were buying from the Russians, the last link of the TransSiberian which came from Harbin to Dairen. That went on for some time and I covered that with Geoffrey Parsons, who was Mr. Grew's private secretary. He had the job that I might have had, and we often wondered whether, if I had got the job, I ever would have dared to have the courage to ask to marry Elsie. I'm afraid I wouldn't have had, because I would not have been earning enough even on my munificent $2500 a year.

In that connection I think it might be interesting to know something about the personal life of old Foreign Service Officers. I hadn't been in Japan more than a month and on July 3rd I went, terrified, into Mr. Grew's study and asked if I might marry his daughter. And he said, "Oh, and what is your situation?" So I drew myself up and I said, "Sir, I'm a Foreign Service Officer, Class 8 unclassified C." He said, "What on earth does that mean? What do you earn? What are your prospects?" I said, "$2500 a year." And he sort of moaned and said, "What other prospects have you?" I said, "When my father dies I'll get half of a very small trust fund." And he said, "Well then, I'll have to talk to my wife." And he went and talked to his wife and thank goodness she was on my side so Elsie and I got married.

But getting back to the more serious side...

Q: Yes. Let me interrupt you there just a minute. My recollection of this period is very dim. Weren't the Japanese already all over Korea -- weren't they occupying Korea still at this time?

LYON: I believe that was later. That was after I left Japan.

Q: I thought that was before the invasion of China.

LYON: You're right about that, but I'm a little bit hazy regarding dates at my advanced age.

Q: I've been very interested recently to read about the sort of mystery that still surrounds the Emperor during the ordeal of his illness that's going on now, and the attitude of the Japanese. It's really a mystical sort of thing.
LYON: Yes, he's the descendant of the Sun God.

Q: Yes. What was the feeling toward the Emperor then?

LYON: Oh, utter reverence and devotion.

Q: Its the same man, isn't it? Its the same guy, isn't it?

LYON: Its the same guy and over here, I will show you what Elsie and I were given as a wedding present by Hirohito -- this lacquer box. It has the imperial chrysanthemum on it, and his mother the Empress Dowager gave us the silver vase in the other room which I'll show you. It has two lions on the side of it and neither of us have ever known whether she did it because we were called Lyon, or it was just an accident. No, there was tremendous reverence for him and for all the members of the royal family and really Japan was almost a fairy tale country when we were there. The women and men all wore kimonos; the women wore beautiful kimonos; now they're all in western clothes. The country, as you know, is absolutely beautiful. You've been there, haven't you?

Q: Never, no.

LYON: Its absolutely beautiful, now its terribly crowded, but then all cities are. We had a very astute Counselor called Eddie Neville -- we didn't have a minister then -- who had lived in Japan many years and he and his wife were very much on top of things. Mr. Grew had very good relations with all the Japanese, and so did Mrs. Grew. They liked Japan. Mrs. Grew, of course, was a collateral descendant of Commodore Perry, so that went down well. And really things ran along very smoothly as far as the Embassy was concerned. I think it was the premier Embassy in Tokyo in those days. The Japanese were easy to get to know, which may surprise you. Elsie had lots of young Japanese friends. When I came upon the scene she'd already been there a year and we used to go off skiing with them, and one would stay in little inns heated only by a hibachi. I remember there was one couple we used to go with frequently and all four of us would sleep on the floor in the little room in the inn with the hibachi at our feet and our bodies stretched out like the arms of a clock -- at 12:00, 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00. A lot of people found the Japanese standoffish. I never did.

Q: Did these people...were they speaking English? Did you have to learn Japanese?

LYON: As you know, John, I'm not a good linguist. Elsie is an excellent linguist but even she had trouble with Japanese. Elsie speaks fluent French, fluent German, fair Italian and fluent Spanish. When we were in Peking she learned Chinese, but she had trouble with Japanese. It was rather funny when we were in Peking, we were assigned to Santiago, and I said, "Well, that's one place where I shall be ahead of you because I speak Spanish." Not good Spanish, needless to say. We got there and we hadn't been there a month when Chileans would say to me, "But how is it you don't speak better Spanish? Your wife speaks such good Spanish." She'd learned it in a month.
Q: Yes, that's surprising. I didn't think the Japanese...that you would hear that much English among the Japanese at that period. Nowadays of course...

LYON: Well, of course, let's face it. In those days we were seeing the government people and the upper crust, if I may use that horrible word; but, even as I remember, Japanese servants seemed to speak some English -- I don't know why, but they did.

Q: And you found them quite easy to get to know?

LYON: I found them easy to know.

Q: I've never had much experience with them. The ones that I've met in different posts I always felt that I got to a certain level, and then there was a whole basement underneath that I just couldn't get into at all.

LYON: Well I think the reason I found it easy -- I think Elsie had broken the ice, and she had all these Japanese girlfriends and then they had husbands and it made it all very easy. And in that connection, John, I think I'll mention something that I have often wondered about. I've often wondered why the administration of the Foreign Service doesn't take advantage of things like this in the appointment of personnel. I've always thought that after the war when things were so difficult with Japan, it would have been very wise to send Elsie and me back to Tokyo where we could have picked up old friendships and perhaps been helpful. The same thing with Turkey where Elsie and her family were for so many years. They did send us back to Chile where we'd been before, but I think Personnel could be more astute in selection of posts for people. I think mostly it is a matter, or was in my days, the old days, of someone in the Department who is looking for an officer to fill a certain spot and happens to know you and your abilities to say, "Oh, Cecil knows how to do this, he knows how this works, we'll send him." I personally never wanted to concentrate, I never wanted to be an expert in one country, or a specialist, because I wanted to see the world and I certainly did.

Q: Well, you did, of course, go to Chile twice.

LYON: Yes, and I wasn't too happy about that.

Q: Don't you find that its difficult to revisit? I've been stationed twice in Holland, and although the second visit was all right I was a little stale on the whole enterprise.

LYON: Yes, I think so, but I was just thinking of Japan where things were so difficult it might have been of some use. I didn't want to ever go back a second time -- although this contradicts what I'm saying about the wisdom of sending people back. As to Chile, of course, when they make you an Ambassador, you certainly don't want to say, "No, I don't want to go because I've already been there." But I did find it difficult because when I got there -- we'd been there earlier as a Third Secretary, and Chile is a small country; you know everybody and all the people that are in government are your friends, so 15 years later they think, "Ah, local boy makes good. He'll get us aid, he'll get us all the aid we want, we'll just turn to him, and things will come flowing." And, of course, it doesn't and you can't do that. So it's got advantages and disadvantages.
You asked about the Emperor. When I went to Japan I had with me a little cocker spaniel puppy and I'd already become engaged to Elsie at this point, and was invited up to Kara, where the Grews were spending the summer. And I said, "I'm bringing Sambo," that was the name of my little puppy. And word came back, "Mrs. Grew says not to bring Sambo. You've got to choose between Elsie and Sambo." So I said, "I choose Sambo." So I went up to Karuizawa and I got out of the car at the Grews' house and Sambo jumped out of the car, ran upstairs, and jumped on my mother-in-law-to-be's bed. And I never got him back, she was so intrigued by him.

Just as we were leaving Japan, Elsie and her father were walking along the moat that surrounds the imperial palace and they had Sambo with them. Sambo fell in the moat, and Mr. Grew was terribly upset. Just then a taxi came along and the taxi driver climbed down inside the moat, rescued Sambo, and then disappeared -- they didn't get his name. So they sent out word trying to find the name of the taxi driver and something came out in the paper about it. And a few days later Mr. Grew went to the New Year's reception at the palace and the Emperor looked at him and said, "How is Sambo?" It was a human touch, I think, from the descendant of the Sun God. His brother and sister-in-law, Prince and Princess Chichibu, came to our wedding and it was rather amusing because Elsie and I were standing in the receiving line and suddenly they appeared and everybody deserted us and ran to see the Chichibus and Elsie and I were left ten minutes alone at our own wedding reception, which was rather fun. And then we had to ask permission to leave because we couldn't leave before the royalty left. So we asked permission, and we were allowed to go and set off on our honeymoon. The honeymoon was amusing also because I hadn't been at the post six months and I wasn't due for leave for six months but Mr. Grew looked up in the regulations and it said, "In the case of emergency you may grant two weeks leave." He said, "This is certainly an emergency."

Okay, that will close Japan, I think.

MAX WALDO BISHOP
Language Training
Tokyo (1935-1937)

Vice Consul
Osaka (1937)

Political Officer
Tokyo (1938-1941)

Ambassador Max Waldo Bishop was born in Arkansas in 1906. In addition to Tokyo and Osaka, his career in the State Department included foreign assignments in Ceylon, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand. He was interviewed by Thomas F. Conlon in February 1993.

Q: What was your first post in the Foreign Service? Did you have some training in the State
Department before you went overseas?

BISHOP: No, I didn't. Ordinarily, we would have had the usual course that every Foreign Service Officer has when he enters the Department -- orientation or whatever. We did not have that. I was asked, and so were those who went with me, if I wanted a language assignment. I said, yes, I did. I asked for a language assignment in the Far East, and I got Japanese.

Q: Had you asked for Japanese?

BISHOP: No, I think I just asked for the Far East. They had a Chinese course, and, in fact, Edward Rice [later Consul General in Hong Kong] went to China at the same time I went to Japan. There were eight of us who went to Japan -- they're in the picture on the wall, the lower picture on the right. Those were the Japanese language students in my group.

Q: Had that program been going on for some years?

BISHOP: Oh, yes, it had been going on for a long time and was very well organized.

Q: Did you have any duties at the Embassy, or was your whole function simply to learn Japanese?

BISHOP: Learn Japanese.

Q: Did you live with a Japanese family?

BISHOP: No. I had three tutors a day -- sometimes only two tutors. They came to the house. We had tokuhons (readers), assignments and so forth. I never was very good at calligraphy. At one time -- I'm probably boasting now -- I knew and could read 3,000 characters. Even learning to recognize and read 1,500 characters is a big memory job. All of these characters were on cards -- on one side were the characters and their various compounds -- and then on the back side was the English meaning. So you'd go through these cards, and those you didn't get right you put to one side and did them again -- day after day. You'd get new cards and more and more until -- well, you had to know 1,000 characters. I was ultimately able to recognize and read about 3,000 characters.

Q: I recall that in Ambassador (Joseph C.) Grew's memoirs he mentions that no Westerner can really learn to speak Japanese. I know some people who can speak Japanese passably well, but, of course, as foreigners, they are not really part of Japanese culture -- that must have been what he was talking about.

BISHOP: That's right. Well, it was (Stanley) Hornbeck, I think, or somebody in the Department who said that because my name was Max Waldo Schmidt, I would be excellent at languages. Of course, I don't know a jot of German. For the most part, my ancestry is English and Irish, I guess. I learned Japanese as best I could...

Q: This Japanese language course was for about two years, 1935-1937?
BISHOP: That's right.

Q: Then, after you finished the language course, what happened next?

BISHOP: Then I went to Osaka as Vice Consul. I did everything there, including the accounts. After just a few months, I was ordered back to the Embassy in Tokyo as Third Secretary.

Q: What Section of the Embassy were you assigned to then?

BISHOP: I was assigned to the Political Section because I was a Language Officer. All of the Japanese interpreters or translators were under me.

Q: Do you have any special recollections from that period -- major questions that came to you? After all, this was a period when Japan was steadily moving along the aggressive course that later led to Pearl Harbor, war in the Pacific and so on. Could you see any clear signs of this in your early days in Japan?

BISHOP: Yes. The biggest translating job I did at the Embassy was the National General Mobilization Law. At that time, I told Gene Dooman (Eugene Dooman), the counselor of the Embassy, and Joe Grew, our Ambassador, that the passage of this law would mean that the Japanese were preparing for a major war. They passed the law. I translated the whole thing.

Q: When did they pass the law? Do you remember what year?

BISHOP: Well, Mrs. Lispenard Crocker (wife of Edward Crocker, Second Secretary in Embassy Tokyo) and I went to the Japanese Imperial Diet to listen to the opening session that year. Of course, she didn't speak any Japanese, so I interpreted for her. There were just the two of us from the Embassy. We wanted to get a feel for the situation. The Japanese were getting ready for a major war. The "China Incident" had just occurred.

Q: That was in July, 1937.

BISHOP: That's right. Anyhow, that was my job as interpreter and translator and head of that unit in the Political Section in the Embassy. I also drafted the monthly Political Report in the Embassy.

Q: How many people were in the Political Section at the time?

BISHOP: Well, let's see. There was myself -- I was low man on the totem pole -- and Cabot Coleville.

Q: Gene Dooman?

BISHOP: Eugene Dooman was the Counselor of the Embassy.
Q: I see. There was just one Counselor of Embassy?

BISHOP: Yes. We also had an Economic Attaché. The Political Section, actually, included myself, Cabot Coleville and Bill Turner. Cabot Coleville left on transfer. And, of course, Gene Dooman was the Counselor of Embassy. Actually, he was perfectly bilingual in Japanese. His family had been missionaries in Japan. He spoke Japanese like the Japanese.

Q: What about Stanley Hornbeck? What was his function?

BISHOP: Oh, Stanley Hornbeck was back in the Department. He didn't serve in the Embassy. I was one of the few people that he really liked and respected, I think. I came back to Washington to serve in the Department on the Japan Desk in July, 1941, though I was not the senior man.

Q: Was Hornbeck the top man on the Japan desk?

BISHOP: Oh, no, Hornbeck was Political Adviser in the Department. He was referred to as PAH ("Political Adviser Hornbeck"). There was a European, a Latin American, a Far Eastern and a Near Eastern Political Adviser -- four of them in the Department, as I recall. They all had Assistant Secretary rank, I think. There was only one Under Secretary of State.

Q: The Under Secretary was the number two in the Department, the deputy to the Secretary of State?

BISHOP: That's right. Then below the Under Secretary were the Assistant Secretaries. Each one had an area -- Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and the Far East.

Q: You mentioned returning to the United States in July, 1941, about five months before Pearl Harbor. I recall your saying that earlier in 1941, you had a particularly important conversation with the Peruvian Minister in Tokyo, which Ambassador Grew then passed on to Washington. Could you give us some of the background to that?

BISHOP: Well, actually, the Peruvian Minister -- and I saw him and his Counselor after World War II was over -- he told me that, according to some of his sources -- he did not name them, and I did not ask him who they were -- the Japanese planned a surprise, all-out attack on Pearl Harbor if and when they decided to go to war with the United States.

Q: And this conversation with him took place in January, 1941?

BISHOP: Yes, it had to be in early 1941.

Q: Well, I'm interested in this because I think that it is now well established that definite Japanese planning began with an order from Admiral Yamamoto, the Commander of the Combined Fleet, to study the feasibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor. And this order was issued in early January, 1941. If I remember correctly, the Peruvian must have talked to you within a week of the issuance of that order. Now this was a highly secret order, and yet it became known to the United States almost immediately.
BISHOP: Well, I got that intelligence not only from the Peruvian, but from other sources.

Q: What other sources? Could you describe them?

BISHOP: Mostly American.

Q: American businessmen?

BISHOP: No, the best source I had was a newspaperman. The journalists in those days were very reliable. They were not sensationalists.

Q: They were not investigative reporters?

BISHOP: I'll tell you an interesting story on this. Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the United Press correspondent in Tokyo -- I think he is dead now -- was one of my best sources. In those days, we didn't have funds to buy information.

Q: There was no intelligence organization?

BISHOP: No, you were on your own, and you collected information as best you could. Of course, the press had money to buy information. I remember the name of the United Press correspondent was Tommy Thompson, Harold O. Thompson. I think that he was the best American correspondent out there. He really had access to good information.

Q: As I recall it, the drift of Japan toward war was unmistakable and had been so for many years. But the specific matter of Pearl Harbor as a target was not so clear.

BISHOP: Well, I sent that telegram. Actually, Ambassador Grew sent the telegram to the effect that his Peruvian colleague had told a member of his staff, etc. That was shortly before I went home on transfer to the Department. Things were getting really hot, and Ambassador Grew wanted me back there. Maxwell Hamilton, on the Japan Desk, also wanted a Japanese expert, if you will, fluent in Japanese and what not. When my ship called in Honolulu on my way back to the U.S., I met with a number of Naval officers who were following the situation closely. The Navy had been training Japanese language officers for a long time in Japan. Some of these Navy people came down to the boat I was traveling on -- I guess the President Coolidge. I spent a whole day with them, discussing "What about this," and "What about that?" I said, well, we don't read their war plans, but the story, which I got from here, there and everywhere -- from good sources -- was that Pearl Harbor was going to be hit. They told me then that they were flying daylight reconnaissance patrols from dawn to dusk. The patrols stopped at dusk because, of course, they couldn't see in the dark.

Q: No radar?

BISHOP: No radar. So they said they had extended these reconnaissance flights out about 500 miles farther from Pearl Harbor. Well, of course, the Japanese got through these patrols. Also,
you can yell for a year, crying "Wolf, wolf, wolf," and here I was, recommending more reconnaiss ance flights. I don't think that the Navy was as alert at the end of 1941 as they were at the beginning of that year.

Q: I think that it was anticipated that war was about to break out. That was unmistakable, but the Navy did not give much credence to Pearl Harbor as a likely...

BISHOP: Well, now here's another matter. We were talking last night about General Marshall. He was out horseback riding on the morning of December 7. The Army sent a final warning. You ought to read everything written about Admiral Kimmel and what they did to him. His son, Tom Kimmel, a brilliant young Navy officer, was railroaded out of the Navy. Not railroaded out exactly, but he never made Admiral. Admiral Kimmel -- the attack and then his transfer from his position as Navy commander -- just broke his heart.

If you think back to the psychology of the American people at that time, the only way that we could be brought into the war was through the Pacific -- the Japanese. The Germans didn't really attack us. Our ships went back and forth across the Atlantic. We sank a couple of German submarines. They didn't sink any of our ships until after we got into the war. Then they littered the whole Atlantic Coast with sunken ships. Anyhow, the only way you were going to get the American people to go to war was through the Pacific -- somehow involving the Japanese, the so-called "wily Orientals."

The Japanese did not tell the Germans in advance that they were going to attack Pearl Harbor. They didn't tell the Germans anything. The Germans were far more frank with the Japanese. The Japanese didn't tell anybody anything. They knew exactly what they wanted to do, and they did it. They wanted to liberate the colonial territories...

Q: And establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere, as they called it?

BISHOP: They called it the Co-Prosperity Sphere and so forth. But the Japanese objective was to get the European, non-Asiatic empires out of there. These empires would have died eventually anyhow -- the Dutch, the French and the British. The Portuguese didn't hurt anybody. They could have stayed there.

Q: The Portuguese decided to leave when they wanted to do so, much later on.

BISHOP: That was it.

Q: Well, then you returned to the Japan Desk, and, as I recall your saying, you were involved in taking notes or otherwise assisting Secretary Hull in the negotiations with Admiral Nomura and, later on, Ambassador Kurusu, in 1941?

BISHOP: Yes, that was my principal job. I kept all of the pre-Pearl Harbor files in my office in a filing cabinet which had a lock on it, the same as almost every filing cabinet in the Department of State and throughout the government.
Q: Was this a combination or a key lock?

BISHOP: A key lock. When you left the Department, you took your keys down to a board near the front door of the State Department and hung them up there.

Q: There was nobody watching the keys?

BISHOP: Oh, yes, there was somebody there all the time, but nothing was well protected. And I don't think that anybody particularly cared. Classified material was protected -- it wasn't left out in the open or anything of that sort. I don't know whether we had Communist agents in the Department at the time. As you know from the "Pumpkin Papers"...

Q: Well, this could have been the time when those documents were taken from the Department.

BISHOP: Alger Hiss was in the Department. Whenever Alger Hiss went on leave, I took his place in Stanley Hornbeck's office, where he was principal aid to Hornbeck. He was a very fine man, a person you would enjoy talking with. But I noticed that, once in a while, he had some dubious, Left Wing characters in his office. But that's another story.

Q: Then you were a part of the discussions with the Japanese, which were unsuccessful. What were your feelings when you learned that Pearl Harbor had been attacked?

BISHOP: I wanted to get out of the Foreign Service and get back my Military Intelligence commission. But the Chief of Personnel said, "Look, you can do that, but I can assure you that you won't get anywhere with it. You can get out of here, but you won't go anyplace else." I had my reserve commission from the time I was waiting for my Foreign Service appointment to come through. I took an examination to get my commission in the Army and so forth. There's my copy of the commission over there on the wall. It was issued in 1935.

Q: Then you continued in Washington after war broke out?

BISHOP: Yes. But I had been married. My first wife became seriously ill. By the way, it was Alger Hiss who arranged for me to take her to Johns Hopkins Hospital. He was from Baltimore. He was the nicest and most helpful person and friend you'd ever want to know. They gave her a complete examination but couldn't find anything for sure. She dragged one foot, and her gold bracelets fell off her arm. The doctor told me that they thought it was "hysteria." Not "hysteria" in a usual sense. He said that hysteria, in medical terms, could cause symptoms of any known human disease or illness, except pregnancy in a male! Anyhow, it turned out to be cancer, from which she eventually died.

Q: What year did she die?

BISHOP: In 1944. She was ill for three or four years.

Q: Did you continue on the Japan Desk during most of the war?
BISHOP: Yes. Actually, it was more than that. I always considered that matters involving U.S. foreign policy were my strong point in the Department. Hornbeck didn't use me so much on that as Hamilton did. We wrote a number of perceptive memoranda on what was likely to happen and what we were planning to do.

Q: What was your next assignment after the Japan Desk?

BISHOP: In 1944, I was assigned as Consul in Colombo, Ceylon. I didn't do much consular work. My principal duties involved advising our military leaders in the Southeast Asia Command on the various problems which came up, which have been well described in published histories. I was also assigned as a secretary of the Mission in New Delhi, India, where I was Political Advisor to General Wedemeyer, then the Commanding General of the U.S.-Burma-India Theater of Operations. I knew General Merrill, who commanded Merrill's Marauders in Burma.

Q: At the end of World War II, were you a part of the discussions about what to do with Japan? In other words, whether to try the Emperor as a war criminal or keep him as a symbol of Japan?

BISHOP: That was absolute stupidity in the Department of State. When the war was over, unless we wanted to act like one of the Balkan countries, there was no reason to try the Emperor. We had fixed Japan. We had burned them out. They knew that they had it coming to them. There was no point to a trial. Thank God that General MacArthur was put in charge in Japan because he was tough. He purged some of the military leaders, but that was about all. They were finished. I was the first Foreign Service Officer back in Japan after the surrender.

Q: When was this? This would have been in 1945?

BISHOP: Yes.

Q: Were you assigned to SCAP (Supreme Commander, Allied Powers -- General MacArthur's office)?

BISHOP: No, I wasn't assigned to his office. I was assigned as a State Department representative. George Atcheson, another Foreign Service Officer, arrived as my supervisor. George hated Japan and the Japanese. He was on the USS PANAY (a gunboat stationed on the Yangtze River in 1937) when the Japanese bombed it. He had reason to dislike the Japanese. He was intelligent and a very fine Foreign Service Officer. He wanted nothing to do with Japan. Fortunately, from my point of view, I was the first Foreign Service Officer to arrive on duty there. Jack Service (John Stewart Service) came out with George Atcheson. Jack and I were the same rank, but I got there first, so I outranked him.

Q: Well, John Service went on to work in China?

BISHOP: Yes. He was a China hand, but they sent him to Japan. George Atcheson was also a China hand. The people in the Department thought that if they sent China hands over to Japan, they would fix the Japanese.
When we were there in Tokyo after the war, General MacArthur, of course, had control of all of the communications. His staff controlled all of the messages sent out. We'd take the messages over to the code room in plain language, and the Army communicators would encode them in the proper code and send them to the Secretary of State. Well, George Atcheson didn't like that. I don't know whether it was Jack Service who put him up to it, but George thought we ought to have our own codes for our messages. MacArthur said no. He said that we could send the messages through the Army message center, which would encode them and send them to the State Department or wherever we wanted. Well, I told George, "Look, either you're going to agree on this and do it their way, or you're going to have an impossible situation. We will lose. The State Department will lose." I mean, MacArthur was the Supreme Allied Commander. This was just tilting with a windmill. Why?

Q: How many State Department officers were assigned when you went back to Tokyo?

BISHOP: I was the only one at first. The others came out with George Atcheson from Washington.

Q: How many came out with Atcheson? I suppose they came over a period of time.

BISHOP: They came over a period of time. Alex Johnson (U. Alexis Johnson) and Beppo Johansen came from China. Beppo had studied Japanese at the same time that I did and was junior to me.

Q: What did they call this group? Was it called the American Embassy in Tokyo?

BISHOP: No, we were in the Office of the Political Adviser to SCAP.

Q: Didn't Ambassador (William) Sebald serve there at some point?

BISHOP: He came there fairly early. He was there when I left Tokyo. After I married my second wife, we stayed there for about a year until 1947. I hadn't met her family, and she hadn't met mine. She was my secretary in the Office of the Political Adviser. It wasn't an easy time in some ways because I was the only one in the office who felt that we had punished the Japanese people enough.

Q: The Peace Treaty with Japan was signed in 1951. When was the Embassy in Tokyo as such reopened?

BISHOP: Not until after MacArthur left.

Q: He left in April, 1951, as I recall. The Peace Treaty came in September, 1951, so shortly after that, the Embassy was reconstituted as such. Who was the first Ambassador? Was it John Allison or William Sebald?

BISHOP: Yes, Bill stayed on for a short time, and then he went to Australia as Ambassador. He wasn't formally Ambassador to Japan, as far as I can recall. U. Alexis Johnson was then
appointed Ambassador to Japan.

Q: Then when did you leave Japan?

BISHOP: Let's see. The war was over in 1945. I went back to Washington in 1947 to attend the National War College. I never went back to Japan after that. I was in the second class at the National War College. I recall that one of the children of an Army officer in our class saw the picture which stated that I had graduated as a member of the second class at the National War College. She said with concern, "I don't see why Daddy had to go to a second class War College."

ULRICH A. STRAUS
Childhood, Japan (1936-1940)

G-2 Intelligence Officer, United States Military
Japan (1946-1950)

Ulrich A. Straus was born in Germany in 1926. His career in the Foreign Service included assignments to Japan, Germany, and the Philippines. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

STRAUS: So I came to Japan at the age of six and entered initially into a German school, and then, in 1936, when it was very apparent what was going on in Germany, I entered the American School in Japan. Again in 1938, as the war clouds gathered in Europe and East Asia, my father had the foresight to apply for an American visa. That came through in 1940. In the summer of 1940, we all marched down to the American Consulate in Yokohama and got immigrant visas to the United States.

Q: Had you learned any Japanese while you lived there?

STRAUS: Yes, but less than you might think. My first language was German, and my second language was Japanese, and my third language was English. In many respects, I think I was already Americanized before entering the United States. In a way, that was home. Certainly Germany wasn't home, and certainly Japan wasn't home, although we felt very comfortable in Japan. But all my friends at that point were also leaving. I have often been asked whether Pearl Harbor was a big surprise. My answer to that is that by the spring of 1941, the American School in Japan had so few kids left that they didn't even bother to open in the fall of 1941. This meant that practically everyone who could leave or felt they could leave had left.

Q: I must say by leaving Germany in 1933 and Japan in 1940, you must have the feeling that the sleigh was going just before the wolves jumped on you.

STRAUS: As an aside, my father left Seoul, Korea about three hours ahead of the Communists in 1950.
I went to high school in New York. During the war, I was a sophomore, I believe, in high school. A gentleman whom we had known in Japan, Paul Rush, who had been a kind of a teacher missionary, and by then was Captain Rush, was going around the country looking up the relatively few Americans who had lived in Japan prior to the war to get them interested in going to the Army Language School when they became the proper age. Of course I was interested, all of my old friends are going to be there.

In 1944, I graduated from high school. At that time, I was still classified technically as an enemy alien. But I set off for the University of Michigan where this Army Language School course was being given. I found out there that I couldn't take any civilian courses in Japanese because they had canceled them for lack of teachers. But they allowed me as a civilian to go to the Japanese Military Intelligence Service Language School, despite my enemy alien classification.

For almost a full year, I did that. When I turned 18...you could draft aliens but aliens could not volunteer...I joined that group and went to basic training. While in basic training, the Emperor decided to throw in the towel in August, 1945. I completed my military training and in January, 1946, came back to Japan as a Second Lieutenant. Shortly thereafter, I was ordered to go to the Tojo trials.

*Q: He was a military general who became Prime Minister in the middle of the war?*

STRAUS: Before the war -- he led Japan into World War II.

The reason I was picked was that I knew German, and there weren't many people in Japan in those days who knew German because all of those who did had been shipped to Germany. I knew both Japanese and German. Along with some British Navy officers, I went through literally tons of German Foreign Office files that had been shipped from Germany to us to go over for possible use by the prosecution against the Japanese who were charged with waging aggressive war in collusion with Germany and Italy.

We wrote many précis, and after a while, our British colleagues left, and I was still there. Then I was working with the lawyers, making full translations of these documents into the two official languages of the court, which were English and Japanese. In fact, I certified as to the accuracy of translation of those documents. It may well have been the most responsible job I ever had -- and at age 19.

*Q: It is interesting that you were a second lieutenant at age 19 without a college degree. Normally, I thought you had to be the equivalent of an adult which, in those days, was not...*

STRAUS: That's right. But I think before World War II it was much more common for even regular officers not to have a degree.

*Q: What was your impression of Japan at this time? Were you able to look up old friends?*

STRAUS: Tokyo was smashed. I think something like 60 percent of Tokyo just didn't exist any
more. Other cities were burned even more to the ground. Seeing old friends, of course, came with a sense of relief that they were still alive but depressing the way they had to live in those days. I, along with everybody else, would take some rations to them and help them out the best I could. The people I knew generally were the lucky ones who had a place to live. But, what was impressive, I guess, was that discipline didn't totally break down. People had to go into the countryside to get food and bargain with the farmers. They would go out with large rucksacks containing what little possessions they had been able to save to bargain for food from the farmers. The farmers, in those days, were the kingpins. They did very well.

Train windows were smashed in because that was the only way people could get in and out of the jam-packed cars. But there was virtually very little crime, even though people were literally starving to death. But there was a lot of sadness, too.

The Japanese at that time were very grateful to us because they had feared the worse. The government had told them all the terrible things we were going to do...rape, pillage and burn. And, of course, none of that happened.

Q: Well, here you were, and you had been accustomed to Japanese society. What was your impression as a young man of the impact between the American forces, who were basically a group of pretty young guys and not very sensitive?

STRAUS: First of all, let me say that I knew very little about Japanese society. My parents' interaction with the Japanese was very limited. The number of times we had Japanese in our house I could probably count on the fingers of one hand in a period of seven years. I had one friend who lived in the neighborhood, but by and large, my playmates were all from the American School, and my whole life was directed at the American School. So I am not sure I can really answer your question. I was beginning to learn something about Japanese society at that time.

Q: What were your impressions from what you were getting and from others who were dealing with the Tojo trial, etc.?

STRAUS: The 28 Class A war criminals...I used to see them on the bench...were beaten men. They were totally disgraced men. I think there was none of the haughtiness that was demonstrated by some of the German war criminals.

One comment on the trial...I was a member of the prosecution, and I dealt with the lawyers. The prosecution was very much aware of the fact that the law they were applying was largely ex post facto law. This is a charge that has been made subsequently. But I think there was a feeling that we had very little choice in the matter. We could not really do what the Russians probably would have preferred to do, and possibly the Chinese, too...stand the designated war criminals against the wall and shoot them. We could not just let them go. We didn't feel we could just turn them over to a weak and untested Japanese government. That might not have been acceptable to the American public at all. So, I think the Western public putting them on trial was perhaps the only reasonable political alternative. And we hoped it would have two results. That it might provide a deterrent for future leaders and that it might provide education for the Japanese public, who, of
course, learned a great deal about their then recent history for the first time.

Q: *Did you get any feel for the dissemination to the Japanese people of what was happening?*

STRAUS: Yes, it was disseminated through the radio and newspapers. We controlled everything, so we could force the Japanese to do almost anything we wished. I don't think, to be very truthful, that the Japanese had a great deal of interest in it because they were interested in survival at that time. They didn't care very much about anything that was going on in the rest of the world.

Q: *When you have lost, you have lost.*

STRAUS: You are just interested in survival and getting back on your feet some how.

Q: *What was the feeling within the American military toward General MacArthur?*

STRAUS: Well, you know, MacArthur never had the adoration of the troops as, let's say, Eisenhower did. He was an aloof figure and a showman. My own feeling was that perhaps he was a better administrator of Japan than he was a General. There was a good deal of dissension below MacArthur. There were two most prominent political wings, one, conservative, under Major General Willoughby, who was in charge of G-2 (Intelligence), and the other, under General Whitney, who handled the Government Section, the more liberally inspired section. Things got so bad between the two sections that we were ordered not to talk to each other.

Q: *You were in which?*

STRAUS: After I left the war crimes trial, I was in G-2. But my best friend and roommate was with the Government Section.

Q: *What were you doing when you left the trials?*

STRAUS: For a bit, I worked for G-2. The trials may have whetted my interest in the Foreign Service, and G-2 did some more because I was working in something called G-2 Operations, and our task was to put together what was known as an intelligence summary of the day's happenings in the Far East Command, which was MacArthur's command. Together with a number of other people, prominent among whom was Tom Shoesmith, who later was DCM in Tokyo and Ambassador to Malaysia, we worked on the Japan part of that. So what we were doing was a kind of journalistic reporting job of what was going on in Japan on the political, economic and social side of things. I contributed some writing to that. We were hampered by the fact that the folks in Government Section, which played a behind-the-scenes role in Japanese politics, would not talk to us, and we could not ever acknowledge the fact that the Japanese government was not a totally free agent.

Q: *Since the war was over, what were the intelligence concerns?*

STRAUS: The concerns in Japan were that we just wanted to know what was going on. Of
course, this was being read not just in Tokyo but by the commands below us. There were still, at that time, about 100,000 troops in Japan. The military concerns were largely outside. They dealt with some of the tense situations in Korea -- between North and South -- and the successful campaign of the Communists in China. There was also a great deal of interest about the communists in Japan.

MARSHALL GREEN
Secretary to Ambassador
Tokyo (1939-1941)

Japanese Language School
Berkeley, California (1942)

Ambassador Marshall Green was born in 1916 in Holyoke, Massachusetts. He received an undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1939. In addition to his service in Japan as secretary to the ambassador, Ambassador Green was posted to in Australia, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and South Korea. He was interviewed on March 2, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Was this October, 1939?

GREEN: Yes.

Q: World War II had just started.

GREEN: Yes. World War II had just started. I was driving west on my way to Japan, spending a good deal of time visiting friends. I went all over the place. I remember that it was in Eureka, California, that I overheard the report of the outbreak of war in Europe.

So I joined Ambassador Grew in San Francisco and went out on the "Tatsuta Maru", a Japanese liner. I put my Ford convertible in the hold of the ship. It was transported to Japan for $50. I had it during the whole time I was in Japan. Finally, I sold it to the younger brother of the Emperor before I left. Then it was painted maroon, because all of the Imperial family cars had to be maroon in color. That is just a sidelight.

So I went out to Japan. It was during our transpacific trip that I got to know Mrs. Grew, who was to be a great bridge companion. Then en route to Japan, I played golf with the Ambassador in Hawaii. I shot about the best score that I ever had. That endeared me to him, and I became his constant golf companion in Japan.

Q: Obviously, you were brand new and really still "wet behind the ears" when you arrived in Japan. How did you view Japan at that time? How did it appear in your eyes in 1939?

GREEN: Yes. I had very little in the way of background, except that I was highly knowledgeable
about geography. I was also interested in demography, being convinced that the expansionism of Germany, Italy, and Japan was rooted in population pressures of those crowded countries. So I went to Japan, knowing all about the geography and demography of the area, but almost nothing of its politics and little of history and culture.

I arrived in mid-October 1939 as a freshly minted, potential Foreign Service Officer, but I wasn't in the Foreign Service. I was being paid out of Ambassador Grew's own pocket the princely sum of $50 a month, for which I wrote out the checks, and he signed them. But on $50 a month I could live pretty well because my Embassy compound apartment was free and many of us converted US dollars on the black market in China into yen at four times the rate you could get in Japan. We could do that through colleagues and friends in China. That was illegal, but everybody did it, except the Ambassador.

On the other hand, since we saw Japan as a potential enemy, it wasn't terribly hard to square my New England conscience with this kind of activity.

Q: How did you view the Japanese system?

GREEN: I never claimed to know much about how the Japanese system operated and I had to depend on the Embassy viewpoint of others whom I encountered. Of course, I was more impressed by the views of Ambassador Grew who showed me his daily diary entries. I was also influenced by the views of senior Embassy officers like Gene Dooman and Ned Crocker or more junior ones like Max Schmidt and Jim Espy. I also had many good friends in the diplomatic and consular corps both in Tokyo and Yokohama. But, as you can see, I had almost no Japanese friends except those with whom I played football and golf or whom I met at Embassy social functions.

Q: "Turbulent Era," for example.

GREEN: That's right.

Q: I read that book, and that decided me to go into the Foreign Service.

GREEN: Oh, yes. Well, anyway, I can tell you this. I wasn't very helpful to Grew, except socially. I didn't know anything about Japan. I wasn't a very serious student of Japan. I never wrote any reports for him about Japan or took on a particular subject, as, indeed, one of my predecessors, Jeff Parsons -- J. Graham Parsons -- had done. He'd been with Grew for three or four years and had become very helpful to Grew. My successor, Bob Fearey, also became most useful to Grew, being deeply involved in events that occurred just before Pearl Harbor. And then, during their incarceration, he helped to put together Grew's report to Secretary Hull.

Q: You were there...

GREEN: I was there for almost two years -- not quite. A year and three-quarters.

Q: You left when?
GREEN: I left Japan in May, 1941. My feelings about Japan at that time, as I say, were very much shaped by Grew and by the people around him. Eugene Dooman was the Counselor of the Embassy, was born in Japan, and spoke Japanese absolutely fluently. Grew didn't speak a word of Japanese, nor did Mrs. Grew. I was shocked at that. He and Mrs. Grew had been in Japan for many years. She had been there as a young girl and later on as the wife of Ambassador Grew. The Ambassador had already been in Japan for about seven years when I arrived there. I remember that on Thanksgiving Day, 1939, when we were down in Kobe to take the train back to Kyoto, where we were staying, they didn't even know how to say, "Where is the train to Osaka or Kyoto." They couldn't speak a word of Japanese.

I don't really believe that Ambassador Grew had very much, first-hand information about the inner workings of the Japanese system. He relied for his information on the Japanese Foreign Ministry, on the Imperial Household, on the ministerial group, on his Foreign Service colleagues, and on his diplomatic colleagues. At the same time, he had an infinite capacity for detail. He worked very hard and conscientiously. He applied himself to the task. He "lived" the problems.

One could criticize Grew, as many did, for being too pro-Japanese, for being too oriented toward Japanese goals, rather than, say, Chinese, American, or other goals. That's unfair. The fact of the matter is that he was a great American statesman. He thought in broad-minded terms. One must admit, nevertheless, that he was always hopeful, always playing for the chance that Japan might straighten itself out, that maybe by one more diplomatic effort we could avoid what seemed to be an almost inevitable Armageddon. He tried every route to see if there wasn't some way to avoid war.

What he was warning Washington about all the time was this: we're talking awfully "tough" back in Washington, but we don't have the stick to back that up. We ought to be damned careful about being as "tough" as we were regarding economic sanctions or holding back on shipments of scrap, ships, planes, or even oil, which was the most critical of all. If we (including the UK, Holland, France, etc.), were going to embargo shipments to Japan of these things (especially oil), Japan is going to be driven to the wall, and we were going to find ourselves at war with Japan, inevitably. But he was always wondering whether there wasn't some way out of that.

Of course, meanwhile, we were already well into World War II. During the first half or three-quarters of my first year there, it was a "phoney" war. Then the situation became very serious when Japan joined the Tripartite Axis.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Grew was "distant" from the fighting which was going on in China. He was "distant" from the Manchukuo puppet empire there [in Manchuria]. I think that a lot of people in Washington -- and, certainly, people in our Embassy in China -- felt that Grew really didn't understand what a horrible machine the Japanese Army was and the cruelties that they visited upon the Chinese. Well, now, Grew did know that. So these comments aren't fair. On the other hand, if you don't experience these things at first hand and don't see or hear or live through them, you're always going to be seen as not knowing the real, inside truth.

Q: Did he make any effort to get out and around, or could he have done so?
GREEN: Well, I don't think that he did enough of that. I also think that he should have gone back to Washington once or twice to pursue his case, because he had a very good case. However, you have to remember that traveling to Washington, in those days, took at least a month or two. Even if you took Pan American Airways, which was just starting its transpacific route, you still had to go by ship all the way down to Manila or Hong Kong to take the flying boat. So it was very difficult to communicate in person with Washington. On the other hand, you could pick up a phone, but the phone was insecure. There was another problem, and that was the problem of coded communications. Grew did not know about "Magic," in other words, that we had broken the Japanese [diplomatic] code, although I don't think that we had broken it much before Pearl Harbor.

Q: *It was pretty close to the time of Pearl Harbor.*

GREEN: There's one thing that one must always remember. That is, if you do have access to "Magic," as they called it, you may feel that you are in the know with superior knowledge in relationship to those without access to broken coded messages. Therefore, there is a tendency that outsiders' views are not given the weight that they would otherwise be given by insiders.

Back in Washington Secretary of State Hull was privy to "Magic," as well as President Roosevelt, presumably. I don't know whether Dr. Stanley Hornbeck was privy to "Magic." He was the head of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Whatever it was, this was an "angle" which, I think, was worth taking into consideration.

Q: *Did Grew have access, as Ambassadors often do, to "movers and shakers" in Japan who came in to meet with him and discuss various issues over cigars, and so forth?*

GREEN: Yes, there were, of course, lots of people who would come in and who had various kinds of experience. Especially journalists. The newsmen tended to get around. Obviously, in Japan they were subject to censorship. The extent to which they knew things and were able to communicate them back to their home offices was not too good. It isn't as if there were well informed newsmen of the type you have today. There were some. But mostly there was lots of information dealing with little issues or scandals involving individuals. But when it came to knowing the real "inside" of what the Emperor, the Japanese military and particularly the Army, or the people who "really mattered" were thinking, there was very little way of knowing.

Q: *How about our military attachés? Did they have any particular entree?*

GREEN: The attachés did have some entree to the military, to the Japanese Navy, but very little to the Japanese Army. After all, the Navy had had more foreign connections than the Japanese Army. The Japanese Army, though, was politically more powerful than the Japanese Navy, and really ran the whole "show."

Q: *At this point Japan was more or less under a military dictatorship, or a military oligarchy, or what have you.*
GREEN: Yes. The Army was "calling the tune," getting ever more deeply involved in Manchuria and then in China. It made heavy demands, both in terms of finances and personnel. What is hard to say is the extent to which the Emperor would prevail if he were to take a strong stand against what the Army wanted. Or would the Army simply find some way of "hushing him up." One never knew. I think that Grew was making his "pitch" very much to the Imperial Household and the Emperor.

Q: How did this take place?

GREEN: Well, really, it took place through intermediaries: people like Marquis Kito, Count Kalbayana, and Baron Maeda. They all had connections with the Imperial Family. He invited the brothers of the Emperor to the Embassy for dinner parties and things like that. Obviously, the Emperor knew a lot about Ambassador Grew. We went through the formal "bows" at the Imperial Palace once a year -- or twice a year, in his case. But, by and large, the Emperor was "out there somewhere." Ambassador Grew had these intermediaries through their insights into how the Emperor felt. On the whole, he felt that the Emperor could exercise a beneficial and stabilizing influence in a country that otherwise seemed to be plunging rather relentlessly toward war, thanks to the powerful position of the military, especially the top generals.

Q: What was the feeling in the Embassy at the time about the Japanese invasion of China? Where was it going, what did it mean, and how would it play out?

GREEN: Well, the Embassy was involved in all kinds of protests that came out of the situation in China, like the sinking of the USS PANAY [a gunboat on Yangtze patrol which was sunk by Japanese bombers].

Q: When did that happen?

GREEN: That was in 1937, I think. These were incidents which occurred in which Japanese force resulted in the killing or injury of Americans or damage to their property or interests. Those were things that had to be taken up in Tokyo by Ambassador Grew.

I am not aware that Ambassador Grew had much first-hand knowledge of what was going on in China. Even if he did, I'm not sure that it would have changed his thinking. The fact that he was continually trying to "get through" and ingratiates and commend, which is the typical way a diplomat functions, was seen by some as being "soft" toward Japan. However, I think that when you read his diary, you realize that there is no "softness" there. He was just trying to use all of the diplomatic arts to keep peace.

During those last six months before the Pearl Harbor attack (I had left Japan in May), Grew was involved in a major effort through Prince Konoye to try to set up a meeting between Konoye and President Roosevelt in Alaska, in which the two leaders would get together and come to some agreements which would at least have staved off war. I think that Grew felt that President Roosevelt would welcome such a development, because Roosevelt was so anxious to keep supplies going to Europe and keep our Navy [in the Atlantic] to protect British merchant ships carrying supplies to beleaguered Britain. If the United States became involved in a war in the
Pacific, it would have been quite a blow to our total capacity to help Britain in its beleaguered hours. So I think that Grew felt that Roosevelt would be sympathetic to some efforts [in this direction], and there was some evidence that Roosevelt was.

This brings up the whole question of Dr. Stanley Hornbeck and his extraordinary powers. I don't recall if I ever met him or not. However, we are talking about a man who was a presence we felt very strongly [in the Embassy] in Tokyo. He was the equivalent of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. His official title was Director of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department.

He was born in China of missionary parents, or perhaps his father was a businessman. Anyway, he was brought up in China. He was pro-Chinese in his viewpoint and very anti-Japanese. Ambassador Grew used to send copies of daily entries in his diaries to Hornbeck in the hope that Hornbeck would be able to see the issues in a more balanced way and realize what Grew was trying to do. But I think that Grew was dealing with a man [Hornbeck] whose views were rigidly set and who was very bitterly anti-Japanese, as anybody whose experience was in China would make him. The difficulty was that Ambassador Grew's communications with Washington were by cable. There were almost no telephone calls. It was all done by telegram. The telegrams went to Hornbeck before they went to Secretary Hull. Or, if they went to the White House, Hull would be asked to comment and would ask Hornbeck [for his views]. So Hornbeck's input became rather governing, with regard to Washington's reactions to [what Grew reported or recommended].

This became a very major issue just before Pearl Harbor. I had left Japan, and my successor, Bob Fearey, was deeply involved. He's written articles about this whole episode that deserve careful reading.

Q: What were your duties when you were private secretary to Ambassador Grew in the Embassy in Tokyo?

GREEN: My duties were largely of a social nature. I made the seating arrangements for luncheons and dinners. "Chief of Protocol" would be a better description of what I did. I had to take the inventory of the wine cellar of the Embassy. I had to handle the checkbooks and keep the Ambassador's local accounts. Not his investments, of course, since we are talking about his expenditures from day to day. I often played bridge with Mrs. Grew and golf with the Ambassador.

I had played football during my years at Yale -- on the 150 pound team. I found myself playing football in Japan and was eventually elected to the "All-East Japan Football Team." I remember playing football on New Year's Day in both 1939 and 1940. In 1940 I had to change my clothes immediately from morning suit (after attending a palace reception) to football clothes in the Ambassador's stand-by limousine, with shades drawn, while I sped from the Imperial Palace to Korakuen Stadium, where we won handily against the All-West Japan Team from the Kansai, the Osaka-Kobe area.

Q: Did you have any particular feeling about the Embassy? Let's start with, say, Eugene
**DOOMAN. WHAT WAS HIS RELATIONSHIP...**

GREEN: Well, I think that Dooman had a profound influence on Ambassador Grew -- probably disproportionately so, because of his knowledge of Japanese and his background in Japan. He shaped Grew's thinking to a large extent. There were others around Grew, like Ned Crocker, a First Secretary who was later to become my father-in-law; Stuart Grummon, the other First Secretary; and "Chip" Bohlen, Second Secretary, who had a lot of expertise regarding the Soviet Union and had come to Tokyo direct from Moscow. These were all able people who had a marked influence on Grew's thinking. However, I would quickly add that the Japanese whom I earlier mentioned had a lot of influence on him, as did some of the American newsmen, either stationed in the Tokyo area -- the ones who spoke English and ran the "Japan Times," the Fleischers -- people like that had influence on the Ambassador's thinking.

Then, of course, there were lots of distinguished visitors who came through Tokyo. The Ambassador would meet with them. So he had a wide exposure to other people's thinking on world problems, quite apart from the fact that he had a long background in diplomacy.

**Q: HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE EMBASSY, EITHER PROFESSIONALLY OR OTHERWISE? THIS WAS THE FIRST GLIMPSE YOU HAD OF AN EMBASSY FAMILY. HOW DID GREW AND DOOMAN RUN THE PLACE?**

GREEN: By today's terms it was not a big Embassy, which meant that personal relationships were closer than is usual today, with Grew and Dooman heading up the Embassy family.

**Q: YOU PLAYED FOOTBALL WITH JAPANESE. WHAT WAS THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA AND KOREA?**

GREEN: I had a feeling that the Westernized Japanese, mostly "Nisei" (second generation Japanese-American) who came back to Japan, stayed out of politics. They talked very little. For the most part people were pretty damned super-cautious about expressing their opinions and views, because there was the "Kempeitai," and other police and thought control organizations. People had to be careful. It wasn't as bad as we've seen in some of the dictatorships in modern times, but it was approaching that.

**Q: DID YOU FEEL THAT WHEN YOU TRaveled AROUND JAPAN?**

GREEN: Yes, I felt it. I can't say that I traveled very much around Japan. I wish that I had traveled more. I did take one long trip which took me through Korea, Manchukuo, and North and Eastern China. I was carrying messages and materials for our Embassy in Peking, as well as to our Consulates in Shanghai and Mukden, which is now Shenyang. I must say that, having taken that trip, I had a rather different view of Japan. You saw Japan from a different standpoint, and it was a critical one. Of course, things were almost chaotic in China, but clearly, the Japanese were invaders and ruthless occupiers of neighboring countries, that's all. There was no other way of looking at it. I might say that, after taking that trip, I was more anti-Japanese than I had been. Frankly, I was rather "spoiling" to go to war with Japan.

**Q: WAS THIS A COMMON ATTITUDE...**
GREEN: No, I felt more strongly about these issues than did almost all my US contemporaries. If I could just read from a letter to my father, it will give you a little bit of what I felt. I didn't come across this letter until I was preparing for this interview.

Q: What was the date of this letter?

GREEN: The date of the letter is August 8, 1940. After deploping widespread isolationism in the United States, including my father to some extent and certainly many of my classmates of Yale, I went on to write: "Isn't it strange that the usually impetuous youth, red-blooded, go-getting youth, the back bone of totalitarian parties abroad, in America are so defeatist, so lacking in the qualities which built our nation. We are over civilized" -- these are my words -- "Over-humored by the good fortune to which we have fallen heir. Where the youth of other lands are aggressive, we are retracting, and our doom, like that of the Greek and Roman civilizations, is sealed when we produce, in our declining years, men not willing to fight for what they have. American support for material aid to the Allies comes from older men, wiser men, like Nicholas Murray Butler [Chancellor of Colombia University at the time] or Henry Stimson [former Secretary of War and of State], and, please note, World War veterans, such as General Pershing. But from the youth, only isolated instances. I have read with delight the opinions of many of our university presidents, leading educators, novelists, and journalists and with equal disgust the opinions of the youth they instruct. I tell you, it is a dangerous condition that we are in, when a nation-wide appeal for enlistments brings in only 9,000 enlistees, of which only a fraction are able to meet the physical requirements. Conscription we must have and will have. It is the only way, maybe, that we can condition our cloistered, theorizing youth to realities." So, these were my thoughts.

Q: Fairly strongly expressed.

GREEN: I felt very strongly about it.

Q: It's hard to recapture how the "America First" and others felt. It's difficult...

GREEN: They divided our class at Yale very sharply. In 1939 we could see the war coming. We had already seen what Neville Chamberlain [British Prime Minister] had said and done and how the German occupation had affected Czechoslovakia. But we had the "America Firsters," as some of them were called, and Father Coughlin, and some of that group...

Q: Father Coughlin of Detroit, a Catholic priest.

GREEN: Yes. These were people that I just loathed. I was quite strongly pro-Roosevelt, because I could see that he was carefully and conscientiously girding and conditioning America to the realities of having to go to war.

Q: You say you saw Grew's diaries. Did he discuss in those diaries where Japan and America were moving during the time you were there? How did he feel about the situation?

GREEN: I believe he was projecting events over the long term, that he saw that there was enough in common between Japan and the United States -- particularly the Japanese he knew. He
could see that their way of thinking of the world was very much the same as his own and that of his friends back in the States. He felt that if we could only get rid of the damnable Japanese "war machine," things would improve. Meanwhile, and this is an important thing to remember, although most people forget it. The Japanese people were getting fed up with their long bloody war with China. They'd lost several million men -- or perhaps hundreds of thousands would be a safer figure to use.

Q: *It was not an easy war for them.*

GREEN: No! Every family in Japan had been affected by war.

Q: *And the Chinese fought a lot harder than they're given credit for.*

GREEN: That's right. Oh, the casualty rates were terrible. The Japanese were really suffering and they were having to "pinch" all the time -- "onion peel" as they say. So the anti-war sentiment in Japan was potentially powerful. Now Ambassador Grew realized this. I don't think that Dr. Stanley Hornbeck fully appreciated that, nor did most Americans. When you do realize that, then there's a certain realism to Grew's thought that for by keeping negotiations going, then the anti-war sentiment in Japan would continue to grow to the point where there would be a possible breakthrough between the leaderships of our two countries. In that way, there could be peace. So I don't think that Ambassador Grew was unrealistic about the possibility of peace. What I am saying is that I don't think that a successful secret meeting between [Japan Prime Minister] Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt was possible. They could have gotten together, but to have such a meeting in secret? No. It was unrealistic to think that the Japanese Army would even allow this to happen. They would certainly have "bolted" and taken over power.

Now [a rapprochement between Japan and the United States] might have been achieved in a certain way. Grew was trying to work toward that end. People like Bob Fearey and others believed that Grew's proposal [for a meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt] was a fairly realistic one and might have worked. I don't entirely agree with that.

Q: *Even if there had been a Konoye-Roosevelt meeting, the Japanese Army had shown that it was quite willing to go in and assassinate him.*

GREEN: That's right. And you have to remember this, too. The senior Japanese Army officers had to think about the younger officers, the "hot heads," under them.

Q: *They had just...*

GREEN: These young officers were a pretty bloodthirsty lot. Once they had tasted blood and become accustomed to "ruling the roost," they would have become very difficult to control. Anything that looked like "appeasement," even if the top military people had condoned it, which is totally unlikely -- but if they had, you still had the problem of the younger officers. And that came up in the February 26 incident, when some of the lower-ranking officers took over control of Tokyo, for a short time, revolting against their superiors.
Q: What year was that?

GREEN: 1936.

Q: Talking about various groups, we had our China specialists, who basically came out of missionary families. You had Eugene Dooman and others, who also came out of missionary families, too. However, they had two very different outlooks. While you were in Japan, was there ever any effort to get American Chinese and Japanese specialists to get together and talk?

GREEN: No, not that I was aware of. That's a good question, because I think that nowadays the first thing that we would do would be to try to get them together. Of course, we were handicapped by travel considerations before World War II, in view of the distances involved.

Q: It was very difficult.

GREEN: However, it is true that we would have benefitted a great deal from the kinds of meetings we later had. We have had regular Chiefs of Mission meetings since World War II. We didn't have that kind of opportunity earlier.

Q: Because of considerations of money and so forth.

GREEN: However, I don't think that the "pro-Japanese crowd" [in the State Department prior to World War II] -- the people with experience in Japan -- could possibly have stood up to Stanley Hornbeck, who was too powerful for them.

Q: Well, this is a question which came up at a later date -- and not too much later -- in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, under Walter Robertson. That bureau, from time to time, has been "dominated" by one person.

GREEN: That's right. It has been, although I don't think that I "dominated" it when I was head of it.

Q: When you get someone who is almost an "ideologue" in there. Now, returning to your experience, because someone else can review how Grew operated during the time when you weren't with him. You left Tokyo in May, 1941. First of all, how did you return to the United States?

GREEN: I came back on one of the "President" liners -- the "President Coolidge."

Q: What were you "after" at that point?

GREEN: I was coming back to take the Foreign Service exam. I went to a "cram school" for a month or so -- didn't get anything out of it -- and took the exam. I just barely "squeaked" through. Then came the war. I was going to be drafted. So I saw an opportunity to enlist in the Navy, in the Japanese language school, and I took it. So that's how I moved from Tokyo into the Navy, within eight months.
Q: Where did you go to the language school?

GREEN: At that time [1942] the school was located in Berkeley, California. This was a "crash" course which had been launched, I'd say, at some point in 1941. I got into the second group that went through the course. The groups at that time were rather small. The course lasted for about a year, during which you were supposed to learn Japanese, I wouldn't say that they turned out people who were proficient in Japanese, although we had some very bright students. Our Navy made a mistake in not accepting Japanese-Americans as language officers since most had some knowledge of the language and some were bilingual. This all reflects the bad prejudices against all Japanese, whatever their status and however long Japanese descendants had lived in the US.

What was worse for us at Boulder was the order by President Roosevelt (and urged by General DeWitt) that all Japanese-Americans had to be relocated 200 miles East from our Pacific coast. This included our Japanese-American teachers, requiring us to move the whole language school to the University of Colorado in Boulder. That's where I completed my year of training.

Q: We know by experience today that one year isn't going to do a great deal...

GREEN: No. No. It doesn't help much. You are immediately thrown into the fray. Of our class of about 30 students 27 went into Combat Intelligence with a short period of training in Hawaii before going out to the Pacific Islands. Three of us were sent to Washington to serve in ONI, the Office of Naval Intelligence. That's where I was located all during the war, except for the last year of the war, when I moved into "Communications Intelligence." This office is still on Nebraska Avenue, NW.

For me it was really a fascinating period. I did make one trip, for several months, to the CBI theater.

Q: That's the "China-Burma-India" theater.

GREEN: That's right. But basically I was always here in Washington. I was not interpreting. I was translating -- lots and lots of documents, some of them fascinating. I was once given documents we took out of the I-1 submarine sunk off Guadalcanal. This was a bunch of oil-soaked documents flown to Washington, to the Naval laboratories in Anacostia, MD. I worked for several days and translated this stuff. It was absolutely fascinating. The Chief Engineer of the I-1 submarine kept careful records of all of the ships that were being built in Japan for the submarine fleet, both the coastal and seagoing types. All the names were listed down one side of the document followed by the specifications of each ship, both those that were afloat and those that were being built -- and where they were being built: Ominato, Jure, Yokosuka, and Sasebo.

So on this great, pull-out sheet, with a minimum amount of effort, I was able to get all of the details of the Japanese submarine fleet. We put out two "Fleet Bulletins" on the basis of that. That's one thing that I was able to accomplish. It was very typical of my whole career. I was lucky, just lucky.
Another accomplishment was in communications intelligence, when I got the idea that the "call signals" new ships were using related to their standardize sizes and uses and to where the Japanese were building them. Therefore, we were able to nail down, merely from call signs, roughly what kinds of ships they were.

Q: You remember the way that the US Navy used to name ships. Battleships were named after states, aircraft carriers after famous battles, and so forth.

GREEN: The call signs were just four letter signals. We would find out, for example, that there were 200 barrels of tung oil loaded at Tientsin aboard "Shiminoseki-7 Maru" with call signal JABC. We had never heard of the "Shiminoseki-7 Maru," but we could immediately deduce from its call sign the size of the ship and whether it was an oiler or freighter. Of course, that was immediately passed on to our air and naval commands.

Q: After looking at these documents, what was your impression of how the Japanese ran their fleet?

GREEN: One reaction was that their security was terrible. Why they ever allowed their soldiers to carry diaries, with gun positions sketched out in them. Now, I wasn't dealing with that kind of intelligence, but our combat intelligence people were. The second thing was that they had no typewriters of the kind we have. Everything had to be done by long-hand and then by mimeograph machine. Well, now, there was a tremendous difference between the way we were doing things and the way the Japanese were doing things. Most insecure of all, the Japanese relied too much on code books which we had already seized.

Q: We are now moving toward the end of World War II. What rank did you have [in the Navy] at the end of the war?

GREEN: I was a full lieutenant.

Q: When did you leave the service?

GREEN: After "V-J Day" in August, 1945, I immediately tried to get into the State Department. The Navy was reluctant to release anybody in intelligence who knew the Japanese language, because they wanted these people for occupation duties and things like that. So it wasn't easy getting out. Meanwhile, I took my Foreign Service oral exam, and the Department accepted me, so I was in the State Department. However, I was still in Navy uniform. My first job in the State Department was to get other naval officers, who were Foreign Service Officers, back into the State Department. I can tell you, to go up to a salt-encrusted Navy captain to try to persuade him to release some of his men back to the State Department wasn't easy. That was my first job.
Niles W. Bond was born in Massachusetts in 1916. He received a BA from the University of North Carolina and graduated from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1938. His postings abroad include Havana, Yokohama, Madrid, Bern, Tokyo, Seoul, Rome, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In 1998 Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Mr. Bond.

BOND: …we were sent to Yokohama.

Q: This was in 19…?

BOND: This was in 1940.

Q: I’ve got you arriving there June 4, 1940.

BOND: Yes.

Q: How did you get there?

BOND: We took a ship, so-called. It was terrible. I forget the name of the line. They ran mainly in the Pacific, possibly exclusively.

Q: This wasn’t the President line.

BOND: Yes. I think it was the President Line. That’s right because it was the President Monroe. It was a terrible old tub. After I got out to Yokohama, I looked it up in Jane’s books and it had a very spotted past. It had been built in 1911 or something like that, and belonged at one time to some Middle Eastern country that had since disappeared. It was terrible. Anyway, we had a pretty good trip out. My boss in Yokohama had asked me to bring all sorts of things along with me, which I didn’t really appreciate, but he turned out to be a nice guy. We were housed in an apartment within the Consulate building. It was a new building, constructed after the earthquake, along the lines of the White House in Washington! It also contained an apartment for the Consul General and for the other vice consul. Just ten weeks after my wife and I arrived, all dependents were repatriated.

Q: When you arrived in Japan in 1940, from your perspective, what was the situation in Japan at that point?

BOND: The situation was that relations between the two governments were just about as bad as they could get. But the attitude of the Japanese people was that they were just as pleasant as they could be. The official policy was not reflected in the way we were treated by them at all. Of course, things got worse later on. Since our honeymoon had been so short, we wanted to get together for our first wedding anniversary. So I persuaded my boss, who turned out to be a very nice man, in spite of all the stuff I had to carry for him. He said I could take local leave, adding that where I went locally, he didn’t even want to know about. He said “even if it means going up the gang plank of a Japanese ship.” So, we arranged to meet in Honolulu for our anniversary,
June 25, 1941.

The main consular business in Yokohama was crew list visas, mostly for Japanese ships. So I had a lot of dealings with the NYK line and, when I told them that I was doing this trip, they were very helpful. There was a ship going there that would get me there just in time. It was the flagship of their fleet, a very nice ship. They sold me a third class ticket but put me in first class. I ate and slept first class the whole trip.

We were about a week out to sea when the ship suddenly started making strange course alterations, around and around, back and around. I finally learned that they had just received news that the Germans had attacked the Soviet Union.

Q: June 22, 1941.

BOND: Yes. Our anniversary was on the 25th of June. So, I think it actually must have been a bit before the 22nd when they received this word. Obviously, it put them in a very dangerous situation. Japan was afraid of the Soviet Union and, with Germany as a Japanese ally attacking the Soviet Union, the Soviets were expected to strike Japan; which they never did. Anyway, the trip went on uneventfully after that. Then I picked up the same ship coming back a week or ten days later, I think. It had gone to Los Angeles and San Francisco. It was the last Japanese passenger ship to go to the West Coast of the U.S., the last one to return, the last to call at Honolulu. My wife returned to California, where she was living, and that was when I realized I was going back out of the frying pan into the fire.

Q: You were the whole time in Yokohama, is that right?

BOND: In that period, yes.

Q: We had our embassy in Tokyo, so you were handling seaman and shipping?

BOND: Mostly that, yes. Mainly visas and passports, including crewlist visas. We only had a Consul General and two vice-consuls, of which I was the junior one. We had two or three Nisei clerks and two male American clerks. So we all did everything. Whatever there was to do, we did it. As time went by, more and more Americans left; after the State Department repatriated its women and children, others followed suit, business people and so forth. So it got to be more and more a stag party.

Q: Did you find that the Japanese government was making it difficult to be an American official there? Were you being followed or challenged or that sort of thing?

BOND: No, I didn’t see any evidence of that. The governor or the mayor would occasionally give a big diplomatic party in the early part of World War II, and I remember the belligerents of either side standing at opposite ends of the big room with the neutrals wandering back and forth. But the Japanese were very polite to us at that point.

Q: By ’41 you were taking this trip to Hawaii and back and so we’re moving up toward the latter
part of ’41. Was it obvious to you that the tensions were getting worse?

BOND: Oh, very obvious. December 7, 1941 (a Sunday in Japan, but a day earlier in the U.S.) dawnd sunny and unseasonably warm. I joined a dozen or so colleagues from the American Embassy in Tokyo at a beach house rented by the Embassy at Shichirigahama, a small fishing village on the coast south of Tokyo. Chip Bohlen came down, and others from the Embassy. Anyway, there were a dozen or so people there, and all we talked about was “when is it going to happen?” and “where will it happen?” Everybody knew it was going to happen: the Japanese had to make a move. They were running out of everything. They had already run out of steel. They were tearing down railings, light posts, all that sort of thing. They were very low on oil. Scrap iron was the thing they missed the most. When the U.S. cut off scrap iron shipments, we knew it was the end. So we knew something was going to happen. The consensus was that it would happen first in Southeast Asia, which it did, by a matter of hours. That was the day before Pearl Harbor.

If I could go back chronologically to the question of the Japanese attitude toward us: there was only one time that I ran into any unpleasantness. We had a new Consul General, Irving Linnell, who had just arrived. Yokohama was his last post. He was in his 60s and about to retire. One Sunday in October or November, before Pearl Harbor, I took him for a ride around the countryside so he could see his district. Yokohama was, at that time, part of a fortified zone because it was so close to the big naval base on the coast. Ordinarily, getting into Yokosuka was very difficult, but if you were already inside the fortified zone, it wasn’t. I took a wrong turn. All the signs were in Japanese, which I could not read. I ended up inside the Yokosuka Naval Base. No American had been inside that base in years, if ever. I had a plate on the car saying “American Consulate, Yokohama,” so they knew who we were. The ship-building crew of the base was just getting out. This was about four or five in the afternoon. The workmen saw our license plate and got very abusive and started beating on the car. We were rescued by a Japanese Naval Patrol. They arrested us both and took us to a little headquarters kiosk that they had there. They asked us what we were doing there, and were not at all impressed by our story that it was a mistake. Finally, they called the Japanese Foreign Office and found out that we were real. Then they guided us out of the base and let us go. They were not very polite.

Q: No.

BOND: I remember also back in early ’41 when I was taking a courier trip from Tokyo to Peking. It was in late January, early February and I was carrying six bags. I had a Marine guard along to help with the unwieldy pouches. We went from Tokyo to Shimonoseki on the south coast of Japan. Then we took a ferry across to Korea to what they called Fusan in those days. Then we got on the South Manchurian railway and went from Fusan the whole length of the Korean Peninsula across the Yalu River, across Manchuria, and then on past the Great Wall of China and into Tsing Tao and then Peking. The train was full of Japanese soldiers and they were very nasty toward us; we seemed to be the only non-Asiatics on the train. They had obviously been drinking a lot. There was no food on the train except cold rice, and the temperature at the station at Mukden when we passed through was 25 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, so that you couldn’t get a drink of water through the water system or wash or anything.
Q: While you were in Japan were you kept abreast of what was known about Japanese troop movements in China? I’m not talking about the real military thing but the fact was that the Japanese weren’t really doing that well. They thought they had taken over but they found themselves in a long hard war which they never really won.

BOND: No. I don’t know to what extent the Embassy was privy to that sort of information. The only reading matter we had was the Tokyo English language newspaper. Since that paper was under government control, one didn’t learn anything pejorative about the Japanese Government. So we were really pretty much in the dark about that.

Q: What happened when the attack came on Pearl Harbor? Let me ask you one question before that. As the gates were shutting, so to speak, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did the visa business fall off and your regular work fall off?

BOND: Yes. By the time the war broke out, we were doing practically nothing but reporting to the Navy Department on ship movements. The Consulate in Yokohama is right on the bank of Tokyo Bay, so we had a wonderful view of the whole Bay. It was very active with shipping. We had a telescope up on the roof and we used it. It used to be, when we first started, that the Japanese ships had the name in Japanese characters and also in Romaji, which we could read. Then, for security reasons, they painted out the Romaji, leaving just the Japanese characters on the ship. Then sometime before the war broke out, they painted those out, too. So we didn’t have very much to go on. We had a set of…

Q: Silhouette books?

BOND: Yes. Silhouette books, and we could tell…

Q: …what class they were and that sort of thing?

BOND: Yes, but that was it. The Japanese, as it turned out, knew about our spying on their ships because one of our American clerks who was a Nisei, with an American father and a Japanese mother, was working for the Kempeitai.

Q: This is the Japanese secret service.

BOND: I would describe them more as the equivalent of the German SS. They were the ones who, when we were interned, took us over. But you were asking about the day of the attack. When I got back from that day at the beach, I had dinner and went to bed fairly early. I was awakened about five o’clock in the morning by a telephone call from this same Nisei clerk who turned out to be working for the Kempeitai. He said, “I think you ought to turn your radio on, because there’s something going on in Southeast Asia. The Japanese have sunk, I think, two British battleships.”

Q: That was a little later. I think there were some previous attacks.

BOND: Yes. They had made a serious attack on the British fleet, including the Britannia; I think
it was, the flagship of their fleet. He said that the fighting was apparently still going on and suggested that I turn on the radio. So I turned on the radio and I kept it tuned to an English language station in Shanghai, which had good music when it wasn’t broadcasting news and had lots of news all the time when it wasn’t playing music.

So I had that on and all of a sudden the news reader interrupted and said he had a special communiqué from the Imperial General Staff. Then he read the communiqué: the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, and Japan was now in a state of war with the United States and Great Britain.

It was about five-thirty by the time I got that and so I woke my colleague, the other vice-consul. We had some things to burn. There was a good place out in the garden which was hidden by shrubbery so we were taking things from the secret files and burning them. After two or three hours of this, the Kempeitai arrived in force and took over everything. One thing we kept, at the Consul General’s insistence (and he was right in a way.) He said, “The last things you want to burn are the code books, because we may get a coded message from the Embassy that we will have to be able to read.” So we kept the code books and they were still there when the Japanese arrived.

The truckload of Kempeitai guards were commanded by a major. He made us go around and open all the files and show him what was inside and so on. He saw the code books. They were in a vault in the consul general’s office, but he didn’t touch them. He didn’t touch anything. He just closed them up and put a Kempeitai seal on them. Then he went on his way, and this was a mistake on his part. This was because my vice consul colleague, Jules Goetzman, and I decided that the thing at the top of our list was getting those code books back, out of the vault, and destroyed, before the Japanese got them and read them or used them. The code was still uncompromised at that time, as we learned later...

So, to make a long story short, there were two doors to the Consul General’s office, one of which opened into a hallway that led to our apartments upstairs. The other led to his secretary’s office which was now being used as a sleeping area for the guards. There were about a dozen guards sleeping in there, and more sleeping around the area.

Q: These were Japanese guards.

BOND: Yes. The vault that held the code books was right up against the wall on the other side of which they were sleeping. So we found one night that they had failed to shut tight the one door that we had access to. So we went upstairs and lit a fire in the fireplace and waited until about midnight. Then we went downstairs very quietly and carefully and opened the vault. Every time we turned the thing we heard this “clunk” inside. It sounded horribly loud to us, but nobody woke up. There was no movement from the next room. We took the books out and closed the safe very carefully. We didn’t lock it because that would have made more noise. We just closed it firmly. We had to break the Kempeitai seal, of course, to get in.

When we went upstairs and spent the rest of the night burning the two code books. We finished between five and six in the morning. Then we had a good, stiff drink and went to bed. About an
hour later, someone knocked on my door: one of the subordinates of the guard detachment. He said, “The Major wants to see you downstairs right away.” He then went over to wake my colleague, and we were taken downstairs to where the Major was waiting.

The Major took us into the Consul General’s office, pointed to the broken seal on the safe, and asked if we knew anything about it. When we nodded, the Major ordered us to open the safe. Once it was open and he saw the empty space where the code books had been, he demanded that the books be returned to him at once. My colleague replied that they had already been destroyed and offered to show the Major the ashes. The Major, in a rage probably fueled as much by fear for his own head as anything, drew his sword and demanded an explanation. Recalling a discussion we had had the night before while burning the code books, Goetzman and I, in an inelegant mixture of English and Japanese, endeavored to explain the destruction of the codes in terms of bushido, the traditional samurai code of loyalty and honor. We pointed out that Americans, too, had such a code of conduct and tradition of loyalty which demanded that we risk our lives to protect our country, in this case by protecting its codes. My colleague then asked the Major what he would have done in the same situation. The Major slowly sheathed his sword, drew himself to attention, and then quietly began to weep as he left the room. From that moment on, nothing more was heard from the Japanese about the incident - or about the Major, whom we never saw again. But the books were burned and I was told when I got back to Washington that they were still uncompromised at the time we destroyed them.

Q: Obviously, everyone at our Embassy in Tokyo was put in together. There are stories about how they played bridge and golf and all that...

BOND: Yes, that’s right. They had it pretty easy, yes, but not that easy...

Q: But essentially, they weren’t giving you territorial immunity.

BOND: No, they weren’t. They also confiscated our cars. The complete guard detachment was changed each week. We were told by someone that they didn’t want the guards to get too friendly with us. Then finally, in about late March or early April, when it began to warm up, one of the guards came to us and said, “Would you like to play some baseball?” We had a softball, they had a softball bat. So we played out in the garden. The rules were that if anybody hit the ball over the wall, it was an automatic out; he couldn’t chase the ball unless he was a guard.

(Laughter)

Q: You played with the guards?

BOND: We played several games with the guards and they were very nice. What they talked about most was “my cousin in California.” They were all interested in going to visit their cousins or uncles in California. Things like that. There was no sign of animosity at all. But, for the first three months we were interned, the Kempei would not even allow the Foreign Office to see us. They wouldn’t allow the Foreign Office to send a representative down. I think it was Sweden that was the…”

Q: Protecting power.
BOND: Yes, the protecting power. They wouldn’t allow anyone from the Swedish Legation to see us. So we couldn’t get anything changed nor anything done. I don’t know how it happened, but finally that situation changed. The Foreign Office sent a delegation down with many apologies. The Swedes came down, too.

One of the things that the Foreign Office persuaded the Kempeitai to do was to allow us to walk an hour each day in a little park that was across the street. It was exactly a mile long and it had been built with American funds after the earthquake.

Q: In 1923?

BOND: Yes, the 1923 earthquake. The park was built on the ruins. That was before the present consular building was built. Anyway, the Kempeitai allowed it. There had been several others sent down from Manchuria and Korea to be interned with us. Foreign Service people. So we were about 10 or 12 altogether.

They would take us walking with guards fore and aft along the park front, one time up, one time back. We were under strict orders not to speak to anyone. The weather was good and there were many Japanese walking, particularly on weekends. We never had the slightest show of animosity from any of the Japanese we passed.

One day, while we were walking, we had an interruption. There were benches every 50 yards or so and, sitting on one of them was a Caucasian-looking young man. It didn’t ring a bell to me. I couldn’t get a very good look at him but, as we got closer and were passing him, he jumped up and ran over to me. He put his arms around me and said, “Hello! Hello! Hello!”

As it turned out, when I was in Cuba, he had been a German vice-consul in Havana. He had subsequently been expelled from Cuba for espionage in 1940, and had been transferred to Panama. He was expelled from Panama almost as soon as he arrived there. The only way he could get back to Germany was through Japan and the Trans-Siberian Railway. But, while he was en route to Japan, Germany invaded the USSR, forcing him to remain in Japan, (laughter), so he didn’t make it home.

Anyway, the guards were very upset over this interruption They ran over and grabbed him. They pulled him away and demanded his identification. He showed them his German diplomatic passport. The guard called for his superior to come over and look at it. He said, “Look, this is impossible! These people are enemies! What are they doing hugging each other!?” He didn’t believe it. But finally they accepted the fact that he was German and that we were pre-War friends. I don’t know what happened to him. He had to spend the whole war there, I guess. I never saw him again.

Q: What about food? Did the Japanese supply it?

BOND: We had a bad time with food. The Japanese were under the impression that we had lots of food stashed away because we always shipped things in from San Francisco. The latest
shipment from San Francisco was sitting on the dock at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. We had been told by the Japanese shipper that it was there, and we could actually see it. The shipper said it would be delivered but it never was.

We had lots of flour, lots of coffee, powdered milk. That sort of thing. Nothing really to eat. We finally convinced the Kempeitai that we really didn’t have anything to eat. So they made an arrangement for the New Grand Hotel to send us meals. It was a very good hotel just down the street, the only good hotel in Yokohama. But it took a very long time to work out the details.

In the meantime, we had a variety of things to chew on from an unexpected source: our former Japanese servants. No longer allowed on the premises and obviously aware of our predicament, they hid tiny packets of edibles in the bushes behind the garage where they could not be seen leaving them, nor we retrieving them. Without their generosity, we might have starved.

At about the end of our first week of New Grand Hotel food, we found that we were eating cat. They were sending over cat. At first, we got chicken or some sort of fowl and seafood. Then, all of a sudden, cat. We drew the line at that. It was about then that the Foreign Office finally got through to us. They made an arrangement with a Swiss hotel and with the Kempeitai for us to have two meals a day at this little Swiss hotel, about two blocks from the Consulate. It was a very nice little hotel. The food was wonderful. The guards who took us over there were also fed.

As far as I know, the hotel never got paid for any of this. We couldn’t pay. We didn’t have any money. The Swiss owners were so pro-American they did everything they could for us. Gave us the best of everything while the guards were over in a corner eating sushi. That arrangement continued the rest of the time we were there.

Q: When did you finally leave? Were you ever united with the Embassy group?

BOND: Yes. What happened was that, I think about the first of June, we had a visit from a Japanese police official in uniform. I happened to be there when he came in and he asked to see the consul general. So I said, “He’s somewhere around. I’ll find him for you.” He had come to invite the consul general to lunch with the local chief of police of the Prefecture. He was inviting the Consul General as well as the two officers assigned to Yokohama. The three of us were to lunch the following day at the New Grand Hotel. He said “Guards will be sent to bring you over.”

The consul general was rather silly. He said, “Never would I accept such an invitation.” The policeman, who spoke very good English, said, “Sir, you don’t understand. This is not an invitation. This is a command. You will be there and your two subordinate officers will be there also. We will pick you up tomorrow at the arranged time.”

So they came around and picked us up. The consul general was still in a huff. He wouldn’t speak to anyone. The luncheon was in a private dining room with beautiful mahogany paneling. There were about 10 other Japanese officials there in addition to the chief of police, who sat at the end of the table. The consul general sat at the other end and we sat beside him. Other police officials, of various ranks, were also at the table.
Ever since I arrived in Yokohama, I’d had frequent dealings with the chief of police. Until Pearl Harbor. We had become good friends. I liked him very much. He was in his 60s and was on the verge of retirement. Anyway, when we went up there, the consul general wouldn’t even look at him. He just stayed in his seat. Well, I went over and shook hands with him and we had a nice little chat. He had always been cooperative.

We sat down to lunch. Then the consul general rudely stood up and said to the chief of police, “I insist on knowing why you have brought us here.” We had just started to eat the first course. The chief of police said, “We have a saying in Japan that ‘One does not eat peanuts while making love.’ We’ll save the peanuts ‘til after lunch.” The consul general was very displeased.

Q: The chief of police was talking?

BOND: Yes. He then talked at some length about such innocuous subjects as Japanese painting and the ancient art of Japanese sword-making before turning to more serious matters. He spoke of his life-long admiration for the United States and his sadness that our two countries had to be at war with each other. Secondly, he stated that he was obliged to warn us that Japan, under the aegis of the Emperor, could never be defeated in war. He started to sit down but rose again and, in a lighter tone, addressed his American guests. He informed us in a by-the-way fashion that we would be leaving Japan the following week aboard the NYK liner Asama Maru, en route to our exchange point in East Africa.

On June 17, 1942, more or less in keeping with the chief of police’s promise, the diplomats, journalists, businessmen, dependents, and other Western Hemisphere nationals selected for repatriation on this first exchange of enemy aliens were transferred by the Japanese to the pier where the Asama Maru was moored. The diplomats were boarded first and I managed to remain at the top of the gangplank from where I could watch for friends whom I had neither seen nor had news of since the war began. Many of these had been in prisons or concentration camps and some were down to skin and bones, some were almost unrecognizable. Others, good friends of mine, gave no sign of recognition when I greeted them, their only reaction a blank stare.

With everyone on board we expected to sail that night. But we didn’t sail that night, nor the next. We were there another week. There were rumors all over the ship about, you know, “the whole thing’s going to be called off; we’re going back; we’re going to be imprisoned somewhere; they’re not going to exchange us after all.” As it turned out, the delay was because the Emperor had a relative in the States who did not have diplomatic status, and he was trying to get him included. The State Department finally agreed and we sailed shortly after midnight on the 25th of June. And God, were we glad to go. Every morning for weeks we’d get up to see which side the sun was rising on.

Being very junior, my fellow vice consuls and I were relegated to the silk holds of the ship. To get to our quarters, we had to go down as far as you could go by stairs, and then by ladder. We were below the waterline in small compartments, oh, I’d say 12 by 14 feet, something like that. They had built six sleeping shelves into each one of those. So there were six of us in each compartment and we couldn’t turn the light out because there was a cage around the only light
Our first stop was Hong Kong where we picked up colleagues from South China. They’d had a very hard time, a much harder time that we’d had. Journalist Joe Alsop was one of those who got on there. Then on to Saigon. We went up the Saigon River and it was sort of like the Titanic trying to go through the Panama Canal. We just barely made it.

Q: Yes. It’s not a very large river.

BOND: That’s right. So we went up there, and spent the Fourth of July of 1942 in Saigon aboard a Japanese ship. We boarded the diplomats and some missionaries there. That was our only other pick-up stop. Then we went on to Singapore to refuel and take on water, and then across the Indian Ocean to Mozambique.

Q: I can’t remember. Had the Doolittle Raid occurred?

BOND: Yes. It occurred while we were there. It was in April. I think we had just started eating at the Swiss restaurant. Anyway, we were walking back from the Swiss restaurant and all of a sudden this plane came flying very low from across the Bay. It was a B-25, a two engine and twin-tailed. None of us had ever seen a B-25 before because they weren’t put into service until about 1942. We thought it was probably a Japanese Air Force exercise. There were American markings on the plane and we thought that might have been to make it seem more realistic.

Then we looked across the Bay. There were great clouds of black smoke coming up from the refineries. So then we thought maybe it was the real thing. We were just about to arrive at our Consulate. There was another plane that flew over at some distance but this one must have been barely 500 feet off the ground. The only thing they hit in Yokohama was the hospital and the reason they hit that was because there was an anti-aircraft gun on the roof.

Once the planes had gone, the head of the guard contingent called us all together and he was furious. He said, “What do you mean!? What do you mean by attacking us that way!? What do you mean?” He said, “If it happens again, there will be some serious repercussions, so don’t let it happen again.”

In the meantime, I remember, one of the American male clerks was tied up in about a half-mile of rope and then hung with signs all over him in Japanese. They paraded him through the streets of Yokohama. They didn’t hurt him, they delivered him back and took off his ropes. That was the Doolittle Raid as we saw it. The clerk's name was Dick Child.

Q.: Could you see Yokohama Harbor when you were under incarceration?

BOND: Yes. It could be seen best from the roof, but that was off-limits to us during our internment. But we could see it even from downstairs. My own apartment looked out over the garden, but my colleague’s second-floor apartment on the front of the building looked right out over the Bay.
Q: Were you keeping notes on what was happening?

BOND: For the last six months or so before Pearl Harbor, our principal official activity was reporting daily to the U.S. Navy Dept. in Washington on the movement of ships into and out of Tokyo Bay. We had managed to destroy or hide copies of our telegrams to the Navy Department before the first arrival of the Kempeitai. Once the Kempeitai arrived, they took away all of our writing materials, all our paper, all our radios, books, everything. The only thing they missed was a little portable phonograph we managed to hide, with one record: a wonderful jazz recording of “I Can’t Get Started”…(hums tune) We did have that but, with no writing materials and constant searches, we couldn’t keep notes. We did have one old copy of LIFE magazine and one of the things in it was a double page spread on different moustache styles. We decided to assign each of us one particular style and, when it grew in, we’d shave it off and start a different style. (Laughter) Oh, God!

Q: Were you aware of the progress of the War while you were there?

BOND: We occasionally had Japanese newspapers discarded by our guards, which some of our Nisei employees could read. So from time to time we could see what the Japanese Government was saying about the war. No matter what the battle scene was, it was always a great victory for the Japanese. Then, sometime in April or May, there was the Battle of the Coral Sea, which we learned about from a newspaper thrown away by the guards. It carried a communique about this great battle. It don’t remember how many American carriers it said had been sunk, but it admitted the loss of Japanese ships, including carriers. We took this unprecedented admission as a sign that they’d really had a bad time. As it turned out, that was a turning point of the naval war. But that’s all we could get.

ROBERT A. FEAREY  
Private Secretary to the U.S. Ambassador  
Tokyo (1941-1942)

Mr. Fearey was born and raised in New York and graduated from Harvard University. He joined the State Department in 1952, after serving as private secretary to the American Ambassador in Tokyo. During his Foreign Service career Mr. Fearey held a number positions dealing with Political-Military Affairs in Washington and abroad. His foreign assignments included London, Tokyo and Paris. Mr. Fearey provided a copy of his Report and Addenda to Georgetown University.

FEARY: This is the story of one year of what has turned out to be a rather interesting life. Another such period was my year as special assistant to John Foster Dulles during his negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty. But with the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor and of the unsuccessful US-Japan negotiations that preceded it approaching in December, there is special reason to set out now my recollections of what I observed and participated in as a private
secretary to our Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, in Tokyo and in Washington from mid-
1942 to mid-1942.

The story of those negotiations, referred to on the US side as “the Washington talks;”
(Washington’s position was that the talks never reached the negotiation stage because of the two
sides’ inability to agree on prior “fundamental and essential questions,” but, for simplicity’s
sake, I will overlook the distinction and use the word negotiations herein.) is available in Mr.
Grew’s Ten Years in Japan (1944), and Turbulent Era Vol. II (1952) and in the official records,
Fully set in those volumes are the arguments supporting Washington’s handling of the
negotiations, on the one hand and on the other--Ambassador Grew’s firmly held views that
Washington’s stance was unimaginative and inflexible, that the Embassy’s carefully considered
reports, analyses and recommendations centering on Prime Minister Konoye’s proposal that he
and President Roosevelt meet face-to-face in Honolulu in a direct effort to achieve a settlement
of all outstanding issues were given short shift, and that if the meeting had been allowed to take
place, the Pacific War might have been avoided.

Ambassador Grew, whom I continued to see from time to time during the war, remarked several
times that only history can judge the issue. We are now fifty years into history, and it is perhaps
not amiss to pull the arguments together for another look. I am no historian, but at least I have
the benefit of having assisted Grew in a small way in the preparation of his never published
"failure of a mission" report during our post-Pearl Harbor internment in Tokyo, of discussing the
issues with him at length during our two months long voyage home, and of accompanying him
when he called on Secretary of State Cordell Hull and attempted to present the report. I thought
then, and I think now, that Grew was right, that the meeting should have been held, and that if it
had been held the Pacific War might in fact have been avoided, without sacrifice of any
significant U.S. or Allied principle or interest. Over most of its length, however, what I will
relate is of little or no historical interest consisting of events and anecdotes during our internment
and the long voyage home via Lourenco Marques (now Maputo) and Rio de Janeiro aboard the
"Asama Maru" and the "Gripsholm".

The story begins in April 1941 during the Easter vacation of my senior year at college. I was
cutting the lawn at home in Long Island, New York, when a call came from James D. Regan,
Senior Master at Groton School in Massachusetts, from which I had graduated in 1937. Did I
recall Ambassador Crew's practice of asking Groton’s headmaster to nominate a Grotonian about
to graduate from college to come out to Tokyo for two years as his private secretary? I said that I
did indeed recall it, and remembered that Marshall Green, of Groton’s class of 1935, currently
held the job. Regan said that Green's time would be up in June, that Rev. John Crocker, Groton's
then headmaster, had received a letter from Ambassador Grew asking him to propose a
successor, and that he wished to propose me.

Regan said that there was, of course, the problem of the draft--would I be prepared and able to
obtain a deferment? I said that I thought my retinal detachment history would prevent me from
serving in any, even home-front, military capacity; that the job with Grew interested me very
much and that I would try to expedite determination of my draft status. He said that he would
mail me a copy of Grew’s letter to Crocker, which, as a demonstration of Grew’s writing talents, devotion to Groton and the Foreign Service and sense of humor, I will attach to this account.

A month later, after being classified 4-F (excluded from any form of military service), I confirmed my acceptance of the position to Crocker. Soon afterward, I received a letter of welcome from Mr. Grew, and in June, Green returned home. We met in New York, where he removed any doubts I might have had that I made the right decision. “The Grews,” he said, “were great, the Embassy group first class, the duties of the job not too arduous and Japan still a wonderful place, not withstanding the gathering of war clouds.” In the course of a couple of days together, I offered Green an airplane ride, having at that time accumulated several hundred flying hours. He still talks of our bombing run a few feet above a tanker moving down Long Island Sound, with the captain running for cover on the bridge.

In those days, hard as it is to believe now, US Foreign Service Officers called personally on the Secretary or Under Secretary before departing for their posts. The number of FSOs was sufficiently small to permit this. I was not an FSO, but Grew had written to his old friend, Under Secretary Sumner Welles, another Grotonian, to ask him to oversee my departure arrangements and briefly receive me. I recall waiting in the anteroom between Secretary Hull’s and Under Secretary Welles’ offices, occupied by two secretaries, before Mr. Welles came out to usher me in. The two claimed to be their bosses entire secretarial support!

Driving my own Dodge car across the country, I read up on Japan, but comforted by Green’s report that I would have almost no need for Japanese, I attempted to learn only a few phrases. At San Francisco, I boarded the Kamakura Maru and recall during the voyage tossing a ball in the ship’s pool with Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan’s Ambassador to the U.K. who became Foreign Minister in 1943 and signed the surrender instruments for Japan on the Missouri. He had lost a leg from a terrorist bomb some years before in Shanghai, and swimming was accordingly his favorite sport. Afterward, we sometimes discussed the deterioration of US-Japan relations and what might still be done about it over tea on the deck.

Arriving in Yokohama, I was met by an Embassy driver, and with his help, I started the paperwork to have my car released by the port authorities. My amah (servant), Kanisan, inherited from Green, met me with a bow and a giggle at the door of my government provided apartment in the Embassy compound in Tokyo. I had barely started to unpack when the phone rang - it was Ambassador Grew inviting me up the hill to his residence to get acquainted.

As I entered Grew’s study, he turned from the old typewriter on which he had hunt and pecked his work at home for decades and greeted me warmly. We talked for about half an hour, during which he said that he had just received a letter about me from my maternal grandfather, Bishop William Lawrence, who had confirmed him at Groton years ago. Mrs. Grew came in to be introduced, lamenting the fact that unlike my predecessor, I did not play bridge. Grew said that he nevertheless had good reports on my golf, which was the important thing. Both could not have been nicer. I left feeling that all would be well.

The next day I met the Embassy staff, particularly Eugene H. Doorman, the Embassy Counselor-born in Japan, fluent in Japanese and Grew’s right-hand man--Edward S. Crocker, First
Secretary; Charles E. Bohlen, Second Secretary--recently arrived from Embassy Moscow and later President Roosevelt’s Russian interpreter/advisor and Ambassador to the USSR, France and the Philippines--Captain Henri H. Smith-Hutton, Naval Attaché; Lt. Colonel Harry J. Creswell, Army Attaché; Frank S. Williams, Commercial Attaché and Marion Arnold, Mr. Grew’s longtime secretary, with whom I shared his outer office.

I had known that one of my principle duties would be golf. Weekday afternoons, when permitted, Grew would quickly assemble a foursome from the Embassy golfers--most often Doorman, Bohlen, Crocker and myself--and away we would go to Koganei, Kasumegaseki or some other nearby course. Relations with Japan had reached a point where Grew’s Japanese friends could no longer afford to be seen with him, including on the golf course. On the other hand, as I will bring out later, there were those, including Prime Minister Konoye, who found carefully arranged golf games and private dinners still feasible for meeting with Grew and Doorman at critically important junctures.

The Grew’s favorite weekend retreat from the summer heat of Tokyo was in Karuizawa, about three hours drive up in the so-called Japanese Alps in central Honshu. There they stayed in the Mampei Hotel, and golf was the order of the day. I was frequently included in these excursions, sometimes going with them in their Embassy car and sometimes driving up on my own.

I was invited on such a trip the first weekend after I arrived and recall teeing up at the first hole for my first game of golf in Japan, with Grew, Chip Bohlen and Ned Crocker looking on. To my partner, Mr. Grew’s and my delight, I hit one of the best drives of my life. Thereafter, my game reverted to form, but at least I never had to be concerned about failing to hold up my end with partner Grew. A tremendous golf enthusiast, he unfortunately seldom broke one hundred. His putting style was unique--between his legs with a croquet-type stroke--but unfortunately no better for the fact. Bohlen and I both prided ourselves on the length of our drives; considerable sums passed between us on the issue, on top of the team bets.

As the weeks passed, I became aware that Grew and Doorman were heavily preoccupied with an undertaking which they believed could critically affect the prospects for averting war. Though the matter was closely held within the Embassy, I learned that it related to a proposal Grew had transmitted to Washington from Prime Minister Konoye that he and President Roosevelt meet fact-to-face in Honolulu in an effort to fundamentally turn US-Japan relations around before it was too late. Grew had told Washington that Konoye was convinced that he would be able to present terms for such a settlement at such a meeting which the US and its allies would be able to accept. Kanoye had said that the terms had the backing of the Emperor and of Japan’s highest military authorities and that senior military officers were prepared to accompany him to the meeting and put the weight of their approval behind the hoped-for agreement with the President on the mission’s return to Japan. Grew and Doorman had strongly recommended that Washington agree to the meeting.

Returning to daily life at the Embassy, of the many incidents that stick in my mind, I will relate only two, both relating to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, a distinguished but slightly stuffy representative of His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service.
One of my duties as private secretary was to operate the movie projector when the Grews showed American movies after dinner parties at their residence. The machine was somewhat antiquated and occasionally broke down in the middle of a reel. This happened one evening when the Craighes were among the guests. Mrs. Craigie, sitting next to Mrs. Grew, remarked, “Isn’t it unfortunate, my dear, that machine of yours is always breaking down.”

To which Mrs. Grew, a formidable adversary in repartee, replied, “Yes, my dear, but isn’t it fortunate that we have no important guests tonight.”

A few weeks later, Sir Robert called on Grew in his office for a review of events. After he has departed, Grew called me in to say that in the course of conversation, Sir Robert had asked him if he was aware that his private secretary had been seen in the company of a half Swedish, half German young lady known to be close to the German community in Tokyo, including members of the German Embassy. Surely with the access which the private secretary undoubtedly had to sensitive materials, Mr. Grew would wish to ensure that the relationship was terminated. Grew said that he had told Sir Robert in no uncertain terms that he had every confidence in his private secretary and that if this were not the case, he would not restrict my contacts but would send me home. Grew doubted we would hear anymore of the matter, and we didn’t.

Reverting to the Konoye proposal, although my knowledge of the cables back and forth was limited at the time, the records show that Washington’s initial reaction to the proposal was not unfavorable. The idea caught the President’s imagination. In a late August session with Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburu Nomura, Roosevelt “spoke of the difficulty of going as far as Hawaii and elaborated his reasons why it would be difficult to get away for twenty-one days. He turned to Juneau, Alaska as a meeting place, which would only require some fourteen or fifteen days, allowing for a three or four days conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister.” At the close of the meeting, he said, “that he would be keenly interested in having three or four days with Prince Konoye, and he again mentioned Juneau.: In his August 28 reply to Roosevelt through Nomura, Konoye said that “he would be assisted by a staff of about twenty persons, of whom five each would be from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy and the Japanese Embassy at Washington.” Nomura “thought that the inclusion of Army and Navy representatives would be especially beneficial in view of the responsibility which they would share for the settlement reached.” Konoye told Grew about this time that a destroyer with steam up awaited in Yokohama to carry him and his associates to the meeting place. An Embassy officer who lived in Yokohama confirmed this.

However, at a meeting with Nomura at the White House on September 3, the President read a message, prepared at State, from him to Konoye, which included the statement that “it would seem highly desirable that we take precautions toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussions of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical applications fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace...” When Nomura asked whether the President was still favorable to a conference, “the President replied that he was but that it was very important to settle a number of these questions beforehand if the success of the conference was to be safeguarded...” He added
that “it would be necessary for us to discuss the matter fully with the British, the Chinese and the Dutch, since there is no other way to effect a suitable peaceful settlement for the Pacific area.”

In succeeding meetings, Roosevelt and Hull reiterated these two themes--that the proposed meeting must be preceded by preliminary US-Japan discussions of (by which they clearly meant agreement on) “the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement,” and by US consultation with our Chinese, British and Dutch allies. In a September fourth meeting with Nomura, Hull said that “this was especially necessary with the Chinese who might otherwise be apprehensive lest we betray them. He (Hull) felt that before we are in a position to go to the Chinese, the American and Japanese Governments should reach a clear understanding in principle on the various points to be discussed affecting China.” Concern for Chiang Kai-shek’s reactions was clearly a key factor in the Administration’s thinking.

Konoye, in his initial broaching of the meeting idea in the spring, had explained to Grew, and he to Washington, why it was necessary for him to meet personally with Roosevelt outside Japan and why he would be able to propose terms at such a meeting which he could never propose through diplomatic channels. If he had said he was to use such channels to provide the specific assurances Washington sought on the China question and other issues, his Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, who had led Japan into the Axis Pact with Germany and Italy and who, with the Germans and Italians, would do anything to prevent a Japanese accommodation with the US, would immediately leak those assurances to fanatical Japanese elements and to the German and Italian Embassies; he (Konoye) would be assassinated, and the whole effort would fail. A further risk of hostile leaks lay in the codes through which the Embassy and the State Department communicated. The Embassy hoped that one of its codes was still secure, but Konoye told Grew that he believed that Japanese cryptographers had broken all the others. The Embassy did not know that we had broken the Japanese codes and that Washington knew everything that passes by cable between Tokyo and the Japanese Embassy in Tokyo.

After Matsuoka was forced to resign as Foreign Minister following the German invasion of Russia in June, Konoye told Grew, and he Washington, that Matsuoka had left supporters behind in the Foreign Office who would equally leak the positive and forthcoming terms which he (Konoye) intended to propose to the President. On the other hand, Konoye maintained that if he, accompanied by senior representatives of the Army and Navy, could meet face-to-face with Roosevelt, propose those terms and have them accepted in principle, subject to Washington and Allied concurrence and the working out of detailed implementing arrangements, the reaction of relief and approval in Japan would be so strong that die-hard elements would be unable to prevail against it.

Grew and Doorman supported this reasoning. From the Emperor down, they told Washington, the Japanese knew that the China venture was not succeeding. Particularly after the July freezing of Japanese assets abroad and the embargo on oil and scrap shipments to Japan, the endless war in China was driving Japan into ruin. Every time a taxi went around the corner, Japan had less oil. There was solid reason to believe that the bulk of the Japanese people, except for the die-hards and fanatics, would sincerely welcome a face-saving settlement that would enable the country to pull back, on an agreed schedule, from China and Southeast Asia, even if not from Manchuria. Japan had now held Manchuria for nine years and successfully integrated its
economy into the homeland economy, and its disposition presented special problems which would have to be worked out in agreement with Nationalist China. (Chiang Kai-shek reportedly declared in 1937 that China was determined to give up no more of its territory—a tacit admission that the return of Manchuria to China could not at that time be expected.) But the time was now—the opportunity had to be seized before Japan’s economic situation and internal discontent reached so serious a level that the military felt obliged and entitled to take complete control and launch Japan on a suicidal war against the West.

Grew told Washington that because of the risks of hostile exposure, Konoye could not provide the clear and specific commitments concerning China, Indochina, the Axis Pact, non-discriminatory trade and other issues which Washington sought before the proposed meeting. On the other hand, he argued, there was strong reason to believe that Konoye would be able to provide those commitments at the proposed meeting and that with the Emperor’s, the top military’s and the people’s support, they would be carried out. No one could guarantee this, but the alternative was almost certainly replacement of the Konoye Government and a rapid descent toward war. A State Department paraphrase of an August eighteenth Grew cable to Hull concluded as follows:

“The Ambassador urges with all the force at his command for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not crystallized completely, owing to the fact that the proposal has the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt is incalculable. The opportunity is here presented, the Ambassador ventures to believe, for an act of the highest statesmanship, such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt with Prime Minister Churchill at sea, with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific.” (For a fuller exposition of Grew’s views in his own words, see the attached copy of his message of August nineteenth to the Secretary and Under Secretary.)

As the weeks passed and Washington still withheld approval of Konoye’s meeting proposal, he and Grew became increasingly discouraged. Konoye warned at their secret meetings that time was running out, that he would soon have no alternative but to resign and be succeeded by a prime minister and cabinet offering far less chance of determinedly seeking and being able to carry out a mutually acceptable US-Japan settlement. Again and again Grew urged Washington to accept the meeting as the last, best chance for a settlement. He urged that not only Konoye, but he and Doorman firmly believed the Emperor and Japan’s top military and civilian leaders wished to reverse Japan’s unsuccessful military course, if this could be accomplished without an appearance of abject surrender. Japan could not pull its forces out of China and Indochina overnight without such an appearance, but it could commit itself to a course of action which would accomplish that result in an acceptable period of time under effective safeguards.
Personalities can make an important difference in such situations. Secretary Hull’s principal Far Eastern advisor was a former professor named Stanley K. Hornbeck. Coming to the post with a China background, he was personally known by Grew and other Embassy Tokyo officers to have shown disdain and dislike for the Japanese. Word reached the Embassy that it was largely as a result of his influence and advice that Roosevelt’s and Hull’s initially favorable reaction to the meeting proposal had cooled. It was largely at his insistence that the policy of requiring Japan to provide clear and specific assurances on outstanding issues, particularly respecting China, before such a meeting could be held had been adopted. Hornbeck was quoted as saying that Grew had been in Japan too long, that he was more Japanese than the Japanese and that all one had to do with the Japanese was to stand up to them, and they would cave. The Embassy heard that State’s “Japan hands,” led by Joseph W. Ballantine, tended to agree with its recommendations, but how strongly was not clear. What did seem clear was that Hornbeck had the upper hand and that his views were prevailing with Hull and Roosevelt.

On October 16, Konoye, having plead and waited in vain for US acceptance of his meeting proposal, resigned and was replaced by General Hideki Tojo. In a private conversation with Grew, Konoye put the best face he could on this development, recalling that Tijo, as War Minister in Konoye’s cabinet, had personally supported the meeting proposal and had been prepared to put his personal weight behind the hoped-for agreement with the President. But Grew and Doorman now held little hope for peace, believing that the chance which Konoye had presented of a reversal, not at once, but by controlling stages, of Japan’s aggressive course had been lost. The Washington talks continued, and Grew employed his talents to the full with his old friends, the new Foreign Minister, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, and others to make them succeed. But he was privately frank to say that in his view, the die had been cast when Konoye gave up on the proposed meeting and resigned.

Reflecting this view, Grew sent a number of cables during October and November, warning that the Japanese, finding themselves in a corner as a result of the freeze and embargo, not only might, but probably would, resort to an all-out, do-or-die attempt to render Japan invulnerable to foreign economic pressures, even if the effort were tantamount to national hara-kiri. In a message on November 3, he expressed the hope that the US would not become involved in war “because of any possible misconception of Japan’s capacity to rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States.” He said that “the sands are running fast,” and that “an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.” Earlier in the year, he had reported that the Peruvian Ambassador in Tokyo had informed diplomatic colleagues that a Japanese Admiral in his cups had been heard to say that if war came, it would start with an attack on Pearl Harbor. The contrast between Grew’s prescient warnings and Hornbeck’s reported view that if one stood up to the Japanese, they would cave, could not be more stark. But “China-hand” Hornbeck’s analysis prevailed over that of our Tokyo Embassy, not only with Hull and the President, but also apparently with our military authorities responsible for our Pacific defenses.

And so war came. It was Sunday in the US but Monday morning, December 8, when the news reached us in Tokyo. At about 8:00, I walked over from my apartment to the Embassy chancery—a distance of about forty feet. There, standing or lying around on the chancery lobby floor, were a collection of golf bags. It was the day for the “Tuffy’s Cup” annual golf tournament, inaugurated some years before by the British Naval Attaché, Captain Tuffnel.
Chip Bohlen came down the stairs. Had I heard the news? The Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor and other points around the Western Pacific, and the Imperial Headquarters had announced that a state of was existed between Japan and the US and its Allies. As I absorbed this intelligence, other Embassy officers arrived, most having heard the news from their drivers, who had heard it over their car radios.

The Ambassador had not yet come in, so I went up to his residence. He was relating to Ned Crocker how he had delivered a personal message from the President to the Emperor through Foreign Minister Togo at midnight and how he had been called over to Togo’s office at 7:30 that morning to receive the Emperor’s reply. Grew said that if Togo had known about the attack, he had given no sign of it on either occasion, though his manner had been even stiffer than usual that morning. That, however, could be accounted for by the fact that the Emperor’s response to the President’s message had broken off the year-long US-Japan negotiations. Grew later heard on good authority that Togo knew nothing of the attack until the news came over the radio early Monday morning.

I returned to the chancery, where people were talking in knots and scurrying about. I joined Bohlen, who was exchanging information with a British Embassy officer named Johnson who had driven over. We agreed that the Japanese appeared to have scored a major initial success. Walking back to my apartment, I comforted Kani-san, who was in tears, as best I could.

I then went down to the compound’s front gate, which was closed tight with Japanese police standing all about. Outside, up the street, I heard a newsboy calling “Gokkai, Gokkai,” meaning “Extra, Extra” and waving copies of the English language “official” Japanese Government newspaper, The Japan Times and Advertiser, on which I could see gigantic headlines. It occurred to me that the paper would probably not only be informative on what happened, but would make a great souvenir. So I walked as inconspicuously as I could back along the eight-foot wall surrounding the compound to a corner where some small pine trees provided a little cover. There I scrambled over the wall, bought two copies of the paper, one to give to Grew and one to keep, and scrambled back. Fortunately, this somewhat foolhardy maneuver was not noticed by the police, who I knew had orders to allow no one in or out of the compound without express official permission.

Mr. Grew was delighted to receive his copy. He asked me to start collecting issues of the Japan Times Advertiser every day for him to take back to Washington as of possible value to US intelligence services and historians. My copy of the December 8 issue, with its massive headline, WAR IS ON, hangs framed on our basement room wall at home. Its probable value as a collector’s item is enhanced by the fact that the Tojo Government, at about the time I went over the wall, ordered that paper’s sale stopped and required everyone who had bought a copy to turn it in to the police for destruction. This was because the paper contained a fuller account of Konoye’s efforts to avoid war that the government wanted known. The paper also contains the English version of the Imperial Rescript to the Japanese people on the outbreak of war. Probably drafted and translated by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis Kido, who was fluent in English, it is a masterpiece of prose, almost Biblical in its majesty and sweep. A copy is attached.
Getting ahead of my story for a moment, I returned to Tokyo in early October, 1945 as Special Assistant to the Political Advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander, General MacArthur. Thinking it would be nice to have a copy of the August 15, 1945 surrender issue of the same paper, which during the war had been renamed the *Nippon Times*, to go with my December 8, 1941 outbreak of war issue, I searched out a copy, and it hangs in our basement alongside the earlier one. The surrender headlines are understandably smaller than the outbreak of war ones, reading, “His Majesty Issues Rescript to Restore Peace.” But as in 1941, the Rescript is a prose masterpiece, probably also written by Marquis Kido, and a copy of it is attached. Beside the two newspapers on our wall are two pages of a 1942 issue of *Life*, with pictures and captions portraying our life during the internment, along with other memorabilia of my time with Grew.

Returning to Pearl Harbor Day in Tokyo, at about 11:00 a.m., a car containing several Japanese officials drove into the compound, and a Mr. Ohno of the Foreign Office asked to see the Ambassador. Someone called the residence, and Mrs. Grew answered. On being informed that a Foreign Office official wished to see the Ambassador, she replied that he was busy, and couldn’t Gene Doorman receive him? But Doorman was not there. Having earlier been denied entrance to the compound by an overly-zealous guard, he had gone off to the Foreign Office to protest. So Ohno asked to see the next ranking Embassy officer, who was First Secretary Crocker. By that time, I had realized what was up and slipped into Crocker’s office with Ohno and his colleagues.

After a brief exchange of greetings, Ohno pulled a paper from his pocket and said, “I am instructed to hand to you, as representing the Embassy, the following document which I shall first read to you.”

“No. 136 - Strictly Confidential/Investigation V.”

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs*  
*Tokyo, December 8, 1941*

“Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that there has arisen a state of war between Your Excellency’s country and Japan beginning today.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.”

Shigenori Togo

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

His Excellency Joseph Clark Grew,  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America at Tokyo.
After a brief silence, Crocker said, “This is a very tragic moment.”

Ohno replied, “It is, and my duty is most disasterful.”

Ohno then proceeded to read the following statement concerning the Embassy and its functions:

1. The functions of the Embassy and the Consulates will be suspended as of today.
2. Members of the Embassy and Consulates will be accorded protection and living facilities in accordance with international usages.
3. In order to secure protection and facilities aforementioned, it is recommended that all the members of the Embassy be congregated in the Embassy compound.
4. Communication with the outside, including telephone and telegraph, will be suspended. In the case anyone desires to go out, permission must be obtained from the Gaimusho through the officer who will be posted in front of the Embassy, liaison officer, Mr. Matsuo. He has come here with me.
5. As soon as a country representing your interests is nominated, contact between your Embassy and representatives of the said country will be allowed as is necessary for the purpose of representing your interests.
6. Due attention is being paid to protecting the citizens of the United States.
7. All wireless transmitting sets will be surrendered at once.
8. All shortwave, wireless receiving sets, private as well as official, the use of which will no more be acquiesced to be handed over.
9. En clair telegrams informing your government of having been notified of a state of war will be allowed through the liaison officer.”

Ohno then asked that someone be assigned to take the police representatives of the Department of Communications around to each office and apartment to be shown every receiving and transmitting radio in the premises. After phoning Grew, who felt that we were not in a position to refuse the request, as it was a case of force majeure, Crocker agreed to this under protest.

Again demonstrating youthful indiscretion, I went back to my apartment and effectively hid a tiny pocket radio which a college housemate and amateur radio expert had made for me and which I had brought along to Japan. The radio was about five inches long, three inches wide and three-quarters of an inch thick and had what my friend had told me might be two of the smallest tubes ever made. I carried it inside the upper pocket of my jacket, with holes cut in the pocket so I could reach in to turn the control knobs. A thin wire ran up under the back of my coat to a small, almost invisible ear plug. With this device, I had been able, unbeknownst to anyone, to listen to the radio during classes at college and even when riding my motorcycle. In Japan, I had tried it out a few times and had no trouble receiving Japanese language stations. In our current predicament, I thought it might be a useful source of information, and in any case, I did not want to lose it. The searchers never found it, and it did prove to be a moderately useful source of information until the tiny batteries wore out. I brought it back to the States on the repatriation ship.
Even before Ohno’s arrival, a group of us under Bohlen’s direction had started to burn the Embassy code books and classified files. The code books were numerous and bulky and the files extensive. Burning them effectively was no easy task, particularly in contrast with modern destruction techniques. The burning was carried on in metal waste baskets indoors and steel drums outdoors in the garage enclosure. From time to time, in spite of our best efforts, whole or partial pages of unburned code or text would float up and away over Tokyo.

Ohno and the agents searching for radios showed no interest in the destruction operation, saying that there orders were solely to find and remove radios, particularly, of course, transmitters, of which the Embassy had none. All our electronic message traffic was by coded text through the Japanese Postal and Telegraph Service. Ohno’s lack of interest may have resulted from the fact, as Konoye had informed Grew a few months before, that Japanese cryptographers had broken all our codes except, Konoye thought, one.

In the days that followed, our group of sixty-five organized itself under Grew’s and Doorman’s direction into a smoothly running, not unpleasant routine. Fortunately, as one of my responsibilities, and with the possibility of was all too apparent, I had in August mailed into San Francisco a large grocery order, after obtaining from each American staff member a list of exactly what he or she wanted, paid in advance. The order arrived only a week or two before Pearl Harbor and proved to be a godsend.

Helen Skouland, a file clerk who later married career Ambassador H. Freeman Mathews, set up a store in a chancery office of all the assembled goodies. She and I decided that in the circumstances, a Communist distribution and accounting system was indicated, based not on who had ordered what but on what the relative needs were, including those of the ten or so American businessmen who had sought refuge in the compound when the war broke out and who had not participated in the order. So we devised a system under which the original orders were nullified, and all items were essentially rationed, with payment recalculated on the basis of a combination of need and ability to pay. The arrangement was readily accepted, and the groceries were successfully strung out to last until our departure. Fresh produce was procured from the Tokyo markets through our Japanese servants, almost all of whom stayed loyally with us to the end.

As the youngest member of the group, except for the eight-year old daughter of the Naval Attaché and his wife, Cynthia Smith-Hutton, I was appointed Sports Director. This was not an insignificant assignment. Although most of the group busied themselves pretty well writing, reading, learning to type or whatever, there was inevitably a good deal of leisure time, and sports had a definite morale and fitness importance. So Bohlen, the Assistant Naval Attaché, Commander Mert Stone and I laid out a nine-hole golf course, totaling over 500 yards among and over the buildings; we set up a badminton court and ping pong table in the garage courtyard; and I organized a succession of hotly contested tournaments in all three sports, with prizes. Some of the prizes, such as engraved silver cups and ashtrays, I ordered from outside, and some were sent in my friends of the Grews, particularly the Finnish Ambassador, Lars Tilltse and his wife.

Golf had always been Mr. Grew’s favorite sport, and every morning he came down from the residence for a game. He still had misplaced confidence in my golfing skills and chose me as his partner for all the team contests. We won our share, and each of us brought back several trophies
engraved “Greater East Asia Black Sulphur Springs Golf Club.” “Black Sulphur Springs” was a reference to the plush resort where our counterparts, the Japanese diplomats in the US, were held. On other occasions, we used the title “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Golf Course.”

To enliven our golf games, I organized a running sweepstakes under which, if you drew the name of the next person to break a window, you won the pot. Needless to say, with some of the holes going over three-story apartments houses into small, invisible to the driver greens, a great many balls ended up in the Tokyo streets. Fortunately, we had a lot of balls and never ran out. And every day, except Sunday, the Grews and four or five other avid poker players gathered for their marathon poker series., which continued on the repatriation ships almost to New York. The stakes were fairly high, and at one point, the indebtedness of an Assistant Army Attaché reached a level uncomfortable to the Grews and the rest of the group as it was to him. But happily in the end, he pulled up almost even. The bridge players, led by Mrs. Grew, were equally committed to their almost daily game.

Everyone at the outset did his or her own laundry in the sink or bathtub, as the sight of drying linens and apparel around the compound attested. One day, while playing hide-and-seek with my best friend and constant companion, Cynthia, We came upon an old washing machine in the Grew’s attic. I managed to get it going, had it brought down to a room in the chancery basement and sent Cynthia to tell all and sundry that we were ready to take over their laundry chores, including delivery back to the apartments if they would bring their things down suitably bundled to us by 9:00 every morning. The next day, the pile waiting beside the machine was impressive, and it remained so for the rest of our stay. Cynthia performed all deliveries, including up the considerable climb to the residence. Our only misadventure was when Mrs. Grew sent down some of her best silk curtains, and I failed to see when I put them in the machine that a pair of Gene Doorman’s black socks were still in it. I accompanied Cynthia on the delivery. Mrs. Grew, after recovering from the shock, was kind enough to say that grey had always been her favorite color.

Another of my duties was control of the Grew’s wine cellar, located in the basement of the residence. Grew had earlier served in Germany—in fact, he had been Charge of our Embassy in Berlin when World War I broke out—and had brought a distinguished collection of German, French and other wines to Tokyo. Needless to say, he and the rest of us saw little point in leaving them for the Japanese to drink up after we had gone. So with the Grew’s permission, I brought the supply down at an accelerated pace by distribution to their and other messes around the compound. But there were still a good many bottles left when we departed.

On another occasion, my eyes started to itch and run. I mentioned it to Grew, who suggested to me that I see his eye man, Dr. Inouye. We were allowed out on police-escorted visits to doctors and dentists. On such occasions, I noticed that the sidewalks were as crowded with pedestrians as ever but that with the shortage of gasoline, the streets were almost barren of cars, even charcoal powered ones. And yet when the traffic light was against them, the crowds, without a car in sight in either direction, would pile up en masse on the sidewalk corners until the light turned green. Habits of conformity and discipline prevailed to an extent which would have been considered ridiculous in the West.
Dr. Inouye examined me carefully and announced that I had trachoma. He said that he would perform the necessary operation at once, consisting of scraping my upper and lower eyelids. Fortunately, I did not relish his description of the operation or the appearance of the scraping machine which he brought out, and I also remembered that trachoma was a serious and highly contagious disease quite common in the Far East but rarely caught by Westerners. I told Inouye that I thought I had better return for the operation the next day.

Back at the Embassy, I told Bohlen. Together we recognized that if I had indeed come down with trachoma, all the carefully negotiated repatriation plans, then nearing completion, could be disrupted. Bohlen went off to discuss the matter confidentially with one or two others. When he came back, he reported that another of our group, Consul General Slavens, had recently complained of the same symptoms. He had seen a doctor (not Inouye) who had diagnosed the problem as pink eye. He had largely recovered. Needless to say, I did not return to Dr. Inouye, but cured myself with some of Slavens medication. Bohlen and I mentioned the matter to no one.

In mid-April, I was playing golf on our private course with Major Stanton Babcock, the Assistant Army Attaché (believe it or not, another Grotonian!), when we heard explosions in the distance. We looked up and saw a rather large military aircraft slowly flying quite low over the Diet (Parliament) building with black anti-aircraft bursts visible behind and above. As we watched it disappear to the south, obviously untouched by the anti-aircraft fire, Babcock said that he was sure that it was an American bomber but that he had no idea how it could have got to Tokyo. The most likely way was from an aircraft carrier, but he had never heard of a plane of that size taking off from a carrier.

We dropped our clubs and ran up for a better view from the residence. There we encountered Grew with the Swiss Minister, Mr. Gorge. Grew said that he had been bidding the Minister farewell when they had seen and heard a number of large airplanes overhead. Shortly after, they had observed fires burning in different directions with lots of smoke. Sirens and gunfire could still be heard as we stood there, but the planes were no longer in view.

The papers that evening reported that nine enemy aircraft had been shot down over various parts of Japan, and several photos were shown to prove it. On examination, however, our military colleagues concluded that the photos were all of one downed plane, taken from different angles. Only later did we learn through Gorge that we had a ringside view of the Doolittle raid.

On arriving in Japan in July, I had got to know the former girlfriend, a diplomat’s daughter, of an Embassy officer which had been reassigned some months before back to the States. The young lady had told me that the officer, on getting settled in his new job back home, would be calling for her and that they would be married. The last time I had seen her, in early November, she had told me that as far as she knew, this plan still held and that she hoped soon to depart.

I had tried to convince the young lady, whom I will call Jane, that these things do not always work out as planned, but without much success. After Pearl Harbor, with communications cut off and having learned that the young man had become engaged to someone else, it bothered me that
Jane might spend the entire war in lingering hope that he would be waiting for her. Being at a romantic age, I felt that I should get word of the young man’s engagement to Jane.

This was made difficult by the fact that she lived in Yokohama. To meet this problem, I managed to get word to a golfing friend in the German Embassy, who had once expressed interest in my clubs and who knew Jane, that I would be glad to sell the clubs to him if he could come in to close the deal. He came in, and while we bent over the clubs, I asked him if he would go to Yokohama and ask Jane to meet me at 8:00 p.m. two evenings later in a second story room in the home of Naval Attaché, Captain Smith-Hutton, just outside the compound wall. The window was only a few feet from the top of the wall in an only moderately exposed part of the compound. The nearest police box, or koban, was about twenty yards away, and it would be dark.

My German friend agreed to do this, and at the appointed time, I wandered out to that part of the compound. As I approached, the policeman emerged from his koban to walk his beat up and down the inside of the wall. I said, “Samui desu nee,” (cold, isn’t it), to which he replied, “Hai, soo desu” (it certainly is) and turned back on his beat toward the shelter of the koban.

Under the cover of the now rather complete dark, I jumped over the wall and through the window, which the Smith-Huttons, who were, of course, parties to the plot, had promised to leave open. There was Jane, to whom I gave the news. She took it stoically, but as we talked, it became clear how much she dreaded the prospect of life in wartime Japan for an indefinite number of years ahead. a bit carried away, I said that as my wife, she would be able to accompany us on the exchange ship to the US, where we would immediately have the marriage annulled. I said that I thought that Mrs. Grew, who knew Jane and her parents, might be prepared to serve as Jane’s guardian for the undertaking, if Jane’s parents would agree. Jane said she would beg for their consent and would find some means of letting me know their answer.

I related the conversation to Mrs. Grew, who, as I expected, readily agreed to help get Jane settled in the US and to be responsible for her. But word came from Jane a few days later that her parents would have none of it. That was the end of the venture. Jane spent a difficult four years in Japan during the war, married a US serviceman during the occupation, and lives happily with him and their family in the US to this day.

Midway through the internment, in late March, Grew, whose fondness for golf was well known to Japanese officialdom, was informed by the Foreign Office that he, Doorman and one or two other Embassy officers would be permitted to play a game of golf, maybe two, at one of the Tokyo courses. The offer was tempting, as the Japanese knew it would be, but after soul-searching deliberation, Grew informed Doorman and the rest of us that he had decided to decline. There would, however, be no objection if we wished to go, not as sport or entertainment, but because we felt the need for reasons of physical or mental health. His undoubtedly well-justified concern regarding his own acceptance of the invitation was that the Japanese would photograph him on the course, and he had no desire to see himself so pictured in the world press at that point. He knew that a number of Allied diplomats had accepted the offer but that the British Ambassador had not. Needless to say, the rest of us followed Grew’s lead and did not go out either.
In late December, as I recall, Grew mentioned that he had started work on a report to Secretary Hull and the President, presenting his frank, carefully considered views on what he believed had been Washington’s mishandling of the pre-Pearl Harbor negotiations. After devoting ten years of his life to the cause of American-Japanese friendship and seeing it end in the holocaust at Pearl Harbor, he did not feel that he could in good conscience fail to present to his superiors in Washington and to history his honest assessment of the 1941 negotiations as viewed from the Embassy. It would be his own, personal report for which he alone would be responsible, but he hoped to benefit from Doorman’s comments and suggestions in its preparation and later from those of a few others in the Embassy, notably, Crocker and Bohlen. The report would, of course, be entirely confidential, for Hull’s and the President’s eyes only, unless they wished to open it to others.

Every morning Grew worked on the report in his study in the residence, progressively bringing Doorman and the Crocker and Bohlen into the task. Marion Arnold did all the typing. One morning in March, he handed me a copy and asked me to take it to my apartment, study it and give him my thoughts and suggestions, all the way from major policy considerations to drafting points. I was to show the draft to no one and was to bring it back myself to him with my comments.

I spent two days at the task and was rewarded by Grew’s apparently sincere thanks for what I produced. As I will soon explain, to the best of my knowledge, no copy of the paper exists today. Accordingly, I can rely only on memory in attempting to relate what it contained.

Essentially, Mr. Grew, a master of the English language, recapitulated in clear, concise, often eloquent terms that case for the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting which he had earlier advanced in his cables. From the moment he had arrived in Tokyo as a Hoover appointee in 1932, he recalled, he had devoted himself unremittingly to the cause of the US-Japan friendship. Instead he had seen the relations steadily worsen as Japan’s aggressive course took it into Manchuria, then China and then Indochina and the Malay Peninsula.

Finally, Grew wrote, in the summer and fall of 1941, an opportunity had presented itself under Prime Minister Konoye to reverse that course. Again and again, in carefully reasoned messages and with the benefit of intimate knowledge of the evolution of Japanese policy, of conditions and attitudes in Japan and of the leading personalities involved, including Prime Minister Konoye, the Embassy had argued that the opportunity was a real one which should be seized. It had clearly explained why Konoye could not present hi far-reaching proposals, representing a fundamental shift in Japanese policy, through diplomatic channels because of the virtual certainty of hostile leaks, of Konoye’s resulting assassination and of the failure of the enterprise. Konoye was prepared, with the Emperor’s and the military’s backing, to pull Japanese forces out of China and Indochina. But this had to be done by controlled stages over a specified, limited period of time and not so as to appear to be an abject surrender.

Washington had initially shown interest in the proposal. But this soon waned and was replaced by sweeping and inflexible demands on Japan, which ignored the real situation in which Japan, as a result of its own misguided policies, had placed itself. The US in effect said to Japan, agree to withdraw completely from China and Indochina, to in effect renounce the Axis Pact and to
subscribe to open and non-discriminatory trade practices, and then we will negotiate with you. The Embassy had explained that Konoye sought many of the same goals that the US did but that he had to reach them by stages, which took account of the hard facts that Japanese forces were by that time stationed widely over China and Indochina, that the nation had undergone heavy sacrifices in pursuit of its misguided policies and that a reasonable period of time was required to turn the ship of state around. The Embassy’s advice that reasonable confidence should be placed in the good faith of Konoye and his supporters to implement the steps which were so clearly in Japan’s interest was apparently disbelieved and rejected.

Grew, in his report, set forth more specifically than he had in his cables or than he later did in his books the terms which Konoye had told him he intended to present to the President. They were, as I recall:

(1) Japan would effectively commit itself not to take hostile action against the US under the Tripartite Pact in case of war between Germany and the US;

(2) Japan would commit itself to withdraw its forces from China lock, stock and barrel within eighteen months from the date of finalization of the US-Japan settlement agreement;

(3) The US and its allies, in return for these commitments and for evidence of the beginning of the withdrawal of Japan’s forces from Indochina and China, would (a) partially lift the freezing of Japanese assets and the embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to Japan, and (b) commence negotiations for new treaties of commerce and navigation with Japan on the clear understanding that signature and ratification would depend on Japan’s full compliance with its obligations under the agreement;

(4) Japan would complete the withdrawal of its forces from Indochina and the Malay Peninsula;

(5) The US and its allies, on the completion of the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, would completely terminate the freezing and embargo and effectuate the new treaties of commerce and navigation;

(6) The disposition of Manchuria would be left to be determined after the war in Europe was over--Konoye intended to point out to the President that if the Allies prevailed in Europe, they would clearly be able to compel Japan’s withdrawal from Manchuria; if, on the other hand, the Axis prevailed, Japan would equally clearly be able to remain in control of Manchuria.

I also recall Grew’s relating in his report an aspect of Konoye’s plan which I have not seen set forth anywhere else. Because of Konoye’s concern about the danger of leaks of what he and the President would hopefully agree at their meeting, Grew said that he (Konoye) had told him that he planned, with the President’s cooperation, to keep the terms of their agreement secret until he had returned to Japan. Immediately on his return, he intended to meet with the Emperor, obtain his approval of the agreement terms and of an Imperial Rescript so stating, and then at once go on the radio to announce the terms, bearing the Emperor’s and the highest military authorities’
support, to the people. As earlier noted, Konoye believed that the people’s response to the agreement would be so positive that extremist elements would not be able to prevail against it.

Although it took fifty years since I studied and made suggestions on Grew’s internment report, and I kept no notes, I believe the above is an accurate rendition of what I read. The reciprocally controlled, step-by-step (pari passu) nature of the arrangement is particularly clear in my mind because of Grew’s emphasis on it in our discussions on the “Gripsholm.” The first steps, he stressed, would be required of Japan; The US and its allies would not be obliged to start to lift the freezing and embargo or take any other action involving cost or risk until they were convinced that Japan was faithfully fulfilling its prior commitments, including those relating to the withdrawal of its forces from Indochina and China. The US and its allies thus stood to gain much--the avoidance of war in the Pacific without sacrifice of any essential Allied principle or objective--while risking nothing.

Why Konoye’s intended terms were not presented in the above detail in Grew’s cables from Tokyo may be explained by Konoye’s reluctance to go into such detail before the meeting or by Konoye’s and the Embassy’s lack of confidence in the security of the US codes. Why he did not present them in this detail later on in his books I do not know. The specifics of the arrangement, clearly enabling the Allies to maintain control of the implementation of the settlement, would seem to add to the strength of Grew’s case that the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting should have been held.

Returning to the story of our internment, the arrangements through the Swiss and Spanish Governments for our exchange with Japanese diplomats, businessmen and others held in the US finally fell into place, with June 18 as our scheduled sailing date. We would travel aboard the Asama Maru via Hong Kong, Saigon and Singapore, through the Sunda Straights and across the Indian Ocean to Lourenco Marques (now Maputo), the capital of Mozambique. There we would meet the Swedish cruise ship, Gripsholm, which would have brought the Japanese repatriates from New York. They would board the Asama Maru for Tokyo while we proceeded to the Gripsholm via Rio to New York.

As June 18 approached, Grew pondered how he could most safely carry out his report. While our persons and effects should, under diplomatic usage, not be searched, we had no assurance that the Japanese would respect that rule, as they had not respected many other rules of diplomatic privilege during the internment.

After discussing the problem with Doorman and others, he decided to make seven copies of the sixty-page, legal size document to be carried, one copy each, on his own, Doorman’s, Crocker’s, Bohlen’s, my and a couple of other Embassy officers’ persons on the theory that the Japanese would be less likely to search us than our baggage. The problem, it became apparent when the seven copies were ready, was that it did not fold very well, producing a noticeable bulge in our pockets. So someone, I forgot who, conceived the idea of making two holes at the top of each of the copies and hanging them down our backs inside our shirts, suspended by concealed strings around our necks. On our arrival aboard the ship, we would all repair to the Grew’s cabin to hand our respective copies over to him, to be kept in a locked box throughout the voyage.
The early morning of June 17 we were taken in a line of police-escorted taxis to the Tokyo Railroad Station. We walked in between lines of police to a large waiting room. There had been collected several score American and other diplomats, missionaries, businessmen, newsmen and others who had been held at various points around Tokyo. The newsmen, who the Japanese assumed were all spies, had been held in closed confinement or prison, often in solitary, constantly interrogated and in many cases, tortured. (Later, on the ship, some of them demonstrated the “water cure” torture to which they had been subjected--some many times.) There was much handshaking as friends met after six months of separation and exchanged experiences.

After an hour or so, we boarded a special train and rode by a roundabout route through Kawasaki directly to the ship. There were no searches or inspections of any kind on the train or as we boarded the Asama Maru, a fairly large liner. Aboard the ship, we were joined by many more American and other repatriates collected from all over Japan.

Soon word spread that a hitch had developed and that our departure would be delayed. The ship moved out to anchor beyond the breakwater, and the next day, it moved again to another anchorage further out in the bay. For a week, we sat there, with launches full of Foreign Office and other officials and police coming and going and with constant rumors of our imminent departure or our return to shore. Our newsman, Max Hill of AP, who had spent almost his entire internment in solitary under torture, said that if we did not depart, he would commit suicide. He clearly meant it and in fact did commit suicide some years later, perhaps due in part to what he had suffered in confinement.

About midnight of June 24, I went on deck. a large group of crewmen were debarking from a launch, a nearby gunboat was frantically signaling with lights and further down the deck, I heard policemen saying goodbye. I woke some Embassy colleagues up in time to see the Foreign Office launch leave for the last time. The anchor came up, and the ship began to move. And then, just as we were being ordered off the decks, presumably to prevent our carrying back military secrets of the harbor, the great white cross, perhaps forty feet wide and tall, high up at the front of the ship, lit up. Our lives would depend on its safe-conduct message being seen and respected by enemy and friendly surface warships and submarines as we made our way through active war zones around Asia and across the Indian Ocean to Africa.

This is perhaps a fit point to repeat a story Chip Bohlen told me years later. He had attended a party in Moscow where the company included several Soviet naval officers. Someone brought up the diplomatic exchanges early in the war, and Bohlen, fluent in Russian, mentioned that he had been on the Asama Maru. One of the former naval officers looked at him and said that he (Bohlen) was lucky to be alive. He told how he had been a submarine skipper in the Indian Ocean, and one very dark and foggy night, he had seen a large ship about to cross his path. Knowing of no Allied vessels of that size in the area, he had assumed it to be an enemy ship. He had ordered torpedoes into the tubes and was just about to give the order to fire when the fog cleared, and he saw a great, lighted cross. He and Bohlen toasted fate and each other with vodka.

On June 27, we passed between the mountainous west coast of Taiwan and two small green islands. Two Japanese submarines surfaced and traveled alongside us for a while. Two days
later, we anchored (back of) Hong Kong in Repulse Bay. US Consul General Southard was one of the first to come on board. He had lost fifty-four pounds in confinement, and his clothes hung on him like sacks. About 100 repatriates were added to our number, including Joe Alsop. That brought us to about 800 souls, with another 150 due to come on in Saigon. Knowing Alsop (still another Grotonian), and being in charge of billeting, I invited him to join the five of us in my cabin. He told us harrowing stories of the fall of Hong Kong, and we endured the clacking of his portable typewriter to all hours all the way to Rio, as he prepared to file them on our arrival there.

On July 2, we sailed all day along the Indochina coast, moving slowly to allow another repatriation ship, the Conte Verdi (which years later burned in a famous accident at sea), to catch up with us at Singapore. The next day we started up the Saigon River, anchoring ten miles short of the city. Annamese swarmed around the ship in their little boats, yelling, diving for coins and selling all kinds of fruit, the first many of our company had seen in a long time. We dropped money down in waste baskets as the end of ropes and pulled up our purchases. Some of us fell for an impressive “cognac” in impressively labeled bottles, which turned out to be a mixture of alcohol, vanilla extract and river water. I kept my bottle in the attic for thirty years and then poured it down the toilet.

On July 4th, we sailed back down the Saigon River and after some complicated maneuvers, set off for Singapore. Approaching shore two days later by a guided zig-zag course to avoid mines, we anchored near the just arrived Conte Verdi. We at first thought we were at Singapore, but it turned out to be an anchorage about fifty miles up the east cost of Malaya. About 150 additional repatriates came on board, with more tales to tell. We were not allowed off, and on July 11th, headed for the Sunda Straights. At one point, we could have slung a stone in one direction onto Java and in the other, onto Sumatra. Looking out a porthole, I saw us pass within twenty feet of the upright masts of a sunken freighter. On entering the Indian Ocean, we soon felt “monsoon swells,” and a fair number were seasick that night.

At about 11:00 the night of July 13th, our rudder failed, and we took a ninety-degree turn toward the Conte Verdi, which was running parallel to us and a little behind. Passing to her rear, we took another ninety-degree turn and almost hit her again. We then came to a complete stop as the Verdi circled us and half an hour later started up again at half speed. The next morning we were still at half speed, with the Verdi just in sight on the horizon.

I will hear quotes from a diary I kept of this part of the trip:

“July 22nd. Up at 7:00, in sight of coast of Africa. Strong wind, very cold (winter down here, of course). About 8:00 Verdi, leading then, picked up pilot while still moving and proceeded across bay toward Lourenco Marques, twenty miles off. a few minutes later we did the same. Nothing has so brought home to me the distance we have traveled as the sight of the four coal black Negroes who rowed the Portuguese pilot alongside. From the same rail, we had seen the same operation performed at Tokyo, Hong Kong, Saigon and Singapore. It seemed no time at all ago that we had been buying papayas from chattering, red-lipped (betel
nut) Annamese down below—and now from African Negroes. We followed Verdi, caught up and passed her, drew near promontory behind which lay L-M, passed around point and right by tanker flying American flag, blowing its whistle to beat the band. British ships on other side doing same. Much cheering and shouting back and fourth. Mrs. Grew and I standing on top deck had been trying to decide whether a large white ship up ahead was the Gripsholm or not. Now we could make out the name in big black letters on the side. Ambassador joined us to say the Port Captain now on board had seen him and been most agreeable, even saying we might go ashore as soon as we landed if he wished. We had been speculating for days whether we would be allowed ashore. Now it appears we will.

“We berthed in front of Gripsholm, with Verdi behind her. L-M dock is a long (half mile) siding—ships berth sideways is single file. Port facilities—cranes, warehouses, etc.—excellent. During afternoon, I handled distribution of first class mail brought aboard by State Department man from Gripsholm. Much pleased to find good sized packet for myself. Informed that exchange of our group of about 800 with the Japanese would begin tomorrow at 9:00 a.m., and we would go ashore afterwards.”

“July 23rd. Next morning people started to line up at 8:00 to exchange. I arranged with Muir (other State Department representative) to get Ambassador and Mrs Grew off without meeting Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. We four marched off the boat first, I carrying Bohlen’s hat box (containing Grew’s report) as I had from Tokyo to Yokohama and onto Gripsholm. a long line of Japanese coming off Gripsholm and going up the pier to get on Asama was beginning to form. Aboard Gripsholm, we waited in smoking room until Grews’ cabin cleaned and ready, then all up to eat fabulous buffet lunch, buy escudos (L-M currency). Spent most of day with press boys Hill, Bellarie, Tolischus and Alsop.”

“July 24th. Arrived back at gangplank with Moran 9:00 a.m. from Polona Hotel to find Ambassador, Williams and Crocker itching to get out on the golf course. Took taxi to American Consulate, picked up Preston (Consul), who took us to Polona Golf Club. Fine club house. Crocker and I played Ambassador and Williams. Fairways terrible, greens fine. None of us expected to even touch the first ball, not having held a driver for eight months. I drove first, and just as my first drive in Japan, hit one right down the middle 250 yards and then soon reverted to type. Had a fifty. We only played nine. Funny sort of hard-shelled oranges all over the eighth hole.”

“Back to ship for lunch. During afternoon, Clara Hamasaki deposited baby with husband Jimmy, and we saw the town. Same in evening, starting with movie “Dive Bomber” and ending at casino. Am working to get them better cabin. Got Wills up to first class from fifth and have helped others. Terrible yakamashii about cabin allotment. People sleeping all over lounges and decks as night before.”
“July 25th. Went shopping with Jane and Cynthia in Preston’s car all morning. Afternoon, played tennis with Benninghoff on private court with girl we met at casino night before. Evening, dance at Yacht Club with same.”

“July 26th. Took Cynthia with me while I bought toothpaste, etc. and then out to zoo. Taxi trip out there of twenty-five minutes gave some idea of African country, natives carrying bundles on head, poverty. Mozambique produces almost nothing, lives by levying head tax on its Swazi natives sent (gladly) to South African mines. Fine zoo, lions, leopards, baby elephants, pythons, etc. spread over about thirty acres, finely landscaped, loud speaker playing jazz all the time. Cynthia wandered away from me for a second, and when I looked up, she was patting what looked like a two-ton lion on the head through the bars.”

“When we got back at 1:00, the Asama had pulled out a hundred yards into the harbor and Verdi was just dropping her ropes. Japanese on shore (diplomatic transferees) and on ship were waving flags, shouting banzai. Asama and Verdi sailed slowly out together. I was probably the only American in the whole town who felt anything like mixed emotions as we watched them go. Cynthia felt no emotion, informing me that she felt the call, so we went back on board Gripsholm, and thence to lunch. Mr. Doorman saw me on deck and asked if I would like to sit with Mr. and Mrs. Stanton (Hong Kong), mother of Fearon (St. Marks), Mrs. Shields, Lois Fearon and him at meals, so there I will be for the voyage. In the afternoon, back on shore and more shopping with Cynthia, and in the evening, a drive and a movie with Preston Jr., son of American Consul. Preston Sr. was Consul in Norway when Germans came in. Preston Jr. works in Jo’burg and is just back from flight training in Scotland.”

“July 27. Sightseeing with Jane and Cynthia until 1:00 p.m. when we all had to be on the ship. Sail tomorrow 7:00 a.m.”

“July 27. Sailed 3:00 p.m.”

One incident which I neglected to include in my diary is of some interest. Grew had worried as we approached Lourenco Marques what he should do if he met Japanese Ambassador to the US, Admiral Kichisaburu Nomura, in the street. They were longtime friends, and he would normally have been glad to greet him, but now Nomura was an Ambassador of a country with which the US was at war. Grew had no desire to have a photograph of Nomura and him chattering together shown all over the Free World. He decided that if they met, he would bow stiffly and pass on without pausing.

And meet they did, in the main street. Nomura was accompanied by Ambassador Saburo Kurusu, who had been sent to Washington a month or so before the outbreak of war to assist Nomura. I happened to be with Grew. Nomura smiled broadly at Grew and started over with his hand outstretched, trailed by Kurusu. Grew never slackened his pace. Bowing coldly, he ignored the
outstretched hand and passed on. The incident long rankled with him, but he never doubted that he had done the right thing.

The voyage across the South Atlantic was uneventful. Life aboard the Gripsholm was in every respect in happy contrast with what it had been on the Asama Maru--outdoor games, swimming pool, movies, excellent food. Most of those who were thirty, forty, or even fifty pounds underweight and/or suffering from nutritional diseases made a good start on their recovery. I will resort again to my diary for the highlights of our stopover in Rio.

“August 11th. Up at six to watch entrance into Rio de Janeiro harbor, supposed to be most beautiful in world. Fine day. Docked 10:00 a.m. Elsie Lyons, Ambassador’s youngest daughter, had flown from Chile, where her husband is the Minister, came on board. We got off about 11:00. As at Lourenco, I carried Bohlen’s hatbox containing “the dynamite.” Dowling from the Rio Embassy and others met us (Ambassador Caffery in US). Pictures right and left as we walked to car, drove to Embassy. There we deposited hatbox in coderoom vault and departed for Copacabana Hotel where Mrs. Grew had gone. Lunch with Grews, then out shopping with Newton. No laundry since Tokyo so bought shirts, etc. Saw a lot of the city. Half hour swim at Copacabana beach. Back to ship 5:30, dressed, headed for Simond’s (Consular of Embassy) house for cocktails for all Foreign Service personnel. Went from there with Cooper and Cabot Colville (Tokyo man now doing checking on suspicious Japanese in S.A.) To party given by Mrs. Caffery where cream of Rio society, quantities of champagne, Brazil nuts, smart talk. Left there about 8:00 for third cocktail party at Jack White’s house, First Secretary, Embassy in suburbs, and from there about ten of us to the Urca for dinner. Urca and the Copacabana are the two best night clubs in Rio. Three wonderful orchestras, floor show 11:00-1:00. Mostly S.A. type of music. Never saw people who enjoyed dancing so much or were so good at it, or orchestras which so genuinely enjoyed playing. Atmosphere entirely different and indefinitely superior to N.Y. night clubs. Left about 3:30 a.m. Half way back to ship when Natalie Boyd and I decided to visit Copacabana. Stayed there an hour.”

“August 12th. Up at 7:30, took taxi with Charlie Cooper out to Sugar Loaf. Five miles. Took us to top in cable car. Marvelous view of city, harbor. Down about 11:00 and decided to go up to the other high point of the city, Corpus Christi, with great big white statue of Christ. About 100 feet below statue we stopped at hotel for lunch and then went up. Even higher and better view than Sugar Loaf; about 2,000 feet straight up. Drove back to ship. Saw Benninghoff and Allison sitting at one of the sidewalk cafes on Avenida Rio Branca, Rio’s Broadway, so stopped for a beer and then walked to ship.”

“Sailed 4 p.m. Stood with Jane and Cynthia on deck as Harry, flying back to US, faded into distance. He may be assigned to a ship and at sea before we get back. Mrs. Grew stayed behind as planned. Ambassador had asked me before we
reached Rio if I would like to move in with him. Moved in that night, Cabin 1A, no less.”

The trip from Rio to New York was another two-week pleasure cruise aboard the Gripsholm. Rooming with Grew provided me further opportunity to discuss his report. He told me that on our arrival in New York, he planned to go at once by train to Washington. He wanted me to go with him, unless some problem arose in New York that necessitated my staying a few hours or overnight. He spoke again of wanting to introduce me to Assistant Secretary of State Howland Shaw to discuss job possibilities, adding that if an appropriate position was not available at State, he wanted to introduce me to the President, “who should be able to open a few doors.” He had been kind enough to read and compliment me on a paper I had written during our internment, in which I set forth my ideas for the post-war world, and said he wished to give copies to Shaw and the President.

We docked in New York on August 25th. The ship was immediately flooded with State Department and other officials and newsman, almost all of whom headed for Grew. After he had met with the press and dealt with the most pressing arrival problems, the two of us were taken by limousine to the station and entrained for Washington.

Then we were met by Grew’s own car and driver and driven to his home at 2840 Woodland Drive. He unpacked, read some mail and made some phone calls. And then, as we were finishing an early dinner, the doorbell began to ring. One after another, a half dozen old friends, including James Forrestall and Harry Hopkins, came in to welcome Grew home and hear his account of events before and after Pearl Harbor. Grew kindly introduced me to all the great men and called on me a few times to enlarge on his replies to their questions.

The next morning, armed with the original copy of his report, he and I climbed into his car and drove to the southwest corner of the State Department, where Secretary Hull’s office was located. Perhaps a dozen reporters and cameramen awaited, peppering Grew with questions and flashes as we worked our way through to Hull’s outer office. Under Secretary Welles was away. After a few moments wait, Grew was ushered into Hull’s office. I sat outside and tried to answer his and Welles secretaries’ questions about our experiences.

About twenty-five minutes later the Secretary’s raised and clearly irate Tennessee accent penetrated the oaken door. I could not make out what he was saying, but it was obvious that the meeting was not going well. Soon the door opened, and Grew emerged looking somewhat shaken, with Hull nowhere in sight. Though it was still only mid-morning, Grew suggested that we walk two blocks up the street to the Metropolitan Club for lunch.

When we were settled there, I asked him what had happened. He replied that he had presented his report to the Secretary, explaining that although it had benefited from the comments and suggestions of the principal members of the Embassy staff, who concurred in it, it was his personal report for which he alone was responsible. As the Secretary knew, he had continued, the Embassy’s assessment of the situation in Japan during the latter part of 1941 and its views and recommendations on the course the US should pursue had not been accepted in Washington.
There may, of course, been factors known to Washington but not in Tokyo which would account for this, but no such factors had been communicated to the Embassy, most of whose messages, in fact, received no reply at all (In his diary, Grew likened his messages to Washington to throwing pebbles into a pool on a dark night.). Nevertheless, during the internment, he had felt it his duty to review the record as it was available in Tokyo and to draw up for the Secretary, the President and Department’s classified files his frank appraisal of the course of the negotiations in the months before Pearl Harbor. It was his honest, confidential report—he had provided copies to no one and would not without the Secretary’s express approval.

Grew said that the Secretary started to leaf through the report. As he did so, he face hardened and flushed. After a time, he half threw the report back across the desk toward Grew and said, “Mr. Ambassador, either you promise to destroy this report and every copy you may possess or we will publish it and leave it to the American people to decide who was right and who was wrong.” Taken aback, Grew said that he had replied that this was his honest, confidential report to his superiors in Washington and that he could not in good conscience agree to destroy it. Neither could he be party to its publication and a public controversy in time of war when national unity was essential. Subject to the Secretary’s approval, he had decided that what he could most usefully do would be to undertake an extensive speaking tour around the country to inform the American people about Japan’s military strength and the need to prepare for a long, though in the end inevitably victorious, Pacific war. The Secretary’s response had been, “Mr. Ambassador, come back at 10:00 tomorrow morning, and give me your answer to the alternatives I have presented.”

I told Grew that I did not see how he could have given any other reply than the one he had. In the course of lunch, he asked if I was a member of the Metropolitan Club. I said, “No, I had only just graduated from college.”

“But you want to be a member, don’t you?”

“Yes, I guess so.”

Looking around, he said, “There’s my old friend, Howland Shaw, who I think is a member of the Board of Governors.”

He beckoned Shaw over, introduced me and told him that I want to join the Club. a few days later, I received a note from Shaw welcoming me into the Club and saying that I was free to use it pending my election. a bill for $20 was enclosed. I was formally elected in January, 1944, paying an initiation fee of $10. These days, one waits four to five years for election, and the initiation fee is $10,000.

The next morning, Grew and I climbed into his car again and headed down Rock Creek Parkway to Hull’s office. This time there were no reporters or cameramen, and Grew was promptly escorted into Hull’s office. No sounds penetrated the oaken door, and after about thirty minutes, the two emerged together smiling and obviously on friendly terms.
Again Grew suggested that we walk up to the Metropolitan Club. During lunch, since he had not volunteered any information, I asked him what had happened concerning his report. He said that the Secretary had not mentioned it but that he expressed strong support for his (and Grew’s) planned nationwide speaking tour. The rest of the time had been spent in a discussion of the war in Europe and other topics.

Shortly afterward, with Grew’s help, I went to work for Leo Pasvolsky, whom the Secretary had put in charge of the State Department’s post-war planning work. I spent the war as a member of a small unit under George Blakeslee and High Borton, preparing research/policy papers which, after approval by the Far East Area Committee and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), were issued in 1945 and 1946 as directives to the Supreme Allied Commander, General MacArthur, in occupied Japan. During that time, I continued to see Mr. Grew occasionally and one or twice to draw him out on what had happened to his report, since an exhaustive search of the Department’s files had failed to reveal it. He never seemed to want to discuss the matter, nor did Gene Doorman, whom I also ran into from time to time and who, toward the end of the war, served as the State member of SWNCC.

Years later, during the ‘70s and ‘80s, after I had been assigned back to Washington, I made a determined effort to find a copy of the report. It seemed a shame for students of the pre-Pearl Harbor negotiations to be denied access to the personal assessment of those negotiations written right after Pearl Harbor during the internment by our Ambassador on the spot. This seemed particularly true considering that he and Washington differed sharply on the proposed Konoye-Roosevelt meeting. The essential reasoning of each side--Washington’s and the Embassy’s--had long been in the public record, but I had never seen the Embassy’s case set forth as eloquently and persuasively as in Grew’s internment report. Having earlier confirmed that the report was not in the collection of Grew papers at Harvard, I sought for clues from Mrs. Marion Johnston, Grew’s long-time secretary, and from members of his family but to no avail. The family told me that at one of his last meetings with them, Mrs. Grew (who died in 1965) had said that everything he wished to say to history was in his books. With this clear statement of Grew’s wishes, and convinced in any case that no copy remains, I abandoned the search.

In Chapter XXXIV, “Pearl Harbor: From the Perspective of Ten Years,” of his 1952 Turbulent Era - Volume II, Grew reaffirms in 131 pages the themes of his internment report. He then cites the contrary views of Herbert Feis, the noted historian, in his 1952 book, The Road to Pearl Harbor.

“If Konoye was ready and able--as Grew had thought--to give Roosevelt trustworthy and satisfactory promises of a new sort, he does not tell of them in his ‘Memoirs.’ Nor has any other record available to me disclosed them. He was a prisoner, willing or unwilling, in the terms precisely prescribed in conferences over which he presided. The latest of these were minimum demands specified by the Imperial Conference of September 6, just reviewed. It is unlikely that he could have got around them or that he would have in some desperate act discarded them. The whole of his political career speaks to the contrary. . .”
Grew, as I have described, believed that face-to-face with Roosevelt, Konoye intended, and would have been able, to “get around” the minimum demands specified by the Imperial Conference of September 6th and earlier conferences.

Grew concludes his Turbulent Era account with the following:

“I may as well close this Postscript with a single sentence from Mr. Feis’s book, taken out of context it is true, but in my ex-parte view, it is the crux of the whole story. ‘It will always be possible,’ he writes, ‘to think that Grew was correct; that the authorities in Washington were too close to their texts and too soaked in their disbelief to perceive what he saw.’”

If, as one can only conclude from reading Chapter XXXIV in Turbulent Era, Grew in 1952 still firmly held to the views he had expressed in his report to Hull and Roosevelt, why did he not insist on the report’s being accepted by Hull in 1942, incorporated in the Department’s classified files and made available to historian twenty-five years later in The Relations of the United States, 1941, Japan? Why did he apparently destroy every copy?

I do not know, but my best guess is that he decided that pressing the report on a resistant Hull would serve no useful purpose and would on the contrary cut him (Grew) off from Hull and the Department and the support he needed from them to do what he felt was much more important at that point—to tour the country to awaken the people to Japan’s military strength and the prospect of a long war. He may also have been looking ahead to the end of the war, wishing to do nothing which would jeopardize the possibility of his being able to influence the terms the Allies offered to Japan, particularly concerning the disposition of the Emperor. As for his obligations to history, he may have concluded that he could tell his story later in articles or books, when doing so would no longer have the above-cited disadvantages.

Supporting this hypothesis is the fact that, with his report removed as an obstacle, Grew was able to carry out his speaking tour in 1942-43, and in 1944-45, he was able to exert important influence on Allied occupation policies, especially concerning the Emperor. He was also able to publish his view of the 1941 negotiations in his books—a limited account in his Ten Years in Japan in 1944 and a fuller account in Turbulent Era in 1952, after he had retired from the Government.

Having reviewed the arguments pro and con Konoye’s proposed meeting with the President from the vantage point of fifty years later, what should one conclude? My own views are as follows:

1) The US should have agreed to the meeting. There was certainly some basis for believing that an acceptable settlement could have been achieved at the meeting and that it could have been implemented over a eighteen to twenty-four month period. Washington’s contention that if the meeting were held and failed, the situation would be worse than if it had not been held at all is
The odds, I believe, are that if the meeting had been held, it would have produced an agreement. But if I had to bet a large sum, I would have to come down on the side that the agreement would not have been effectively accepted and implemented in Japan. Persuasive as Konoye’s and Grew’s arguments were, Japan in 1941 was probably too much under military domination and too committed to the goal of Japanese hegemony in East Asia to reverse course, except as a consequence of defeat by superior military force. One has to suspect also that Konoye and Foreign Minister Toyoda, in their conversations with Grew, overstated General Tojo’s and other Japanese military authorities’ support of the meeting proposal and their commitment to implementation of the settlement terms Konoye hoped to bring back from the meeting. (The Memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, published in 1946, tend to support this suspicion, particularly Konoye’s accounts therein of General Togo’s statements at critical meetings.)

Grew’s analysis, views and recommendations submitted to Washington during the summer and fall of 1941 were wholly sound. He strongly urged that the meeting be held, for all the reasons brought out above, but he always acknowledged that it might not succeed. He rightly did not accept Washington’s contention that if it failed, the situation would be worse than if had not been held. His reporting of the situation in Japan, his analysis of Japanese psychology and his warnings of the imminence of war if the meeting opportunity was let pass could not have been more perceptive and accurate.

Looking back to the critical months in the late summer and early fall of 1941, a further possibility should be noted. One has to wonder whether Roosevelt may not have welcomed Hornbeck’s anti-meeting arguments not for their own merit but because he (FDR) had by that time concluded that the U.S. had to declare war against Germany before Great Britain succumbed. While not wanting war with Japan, Germany’s Axis ally, he may have seen the meeting with Konoye as antiethical to the requirements for full U.S. involvement in World War II if it was to be won.

This end the story of my year with Grew, but the Konoye elements of the story prompt a brief postscript.

One of the papers I prepared toward the end of my post-war planning work at State concerned “The Apprehension, Trial and Punishment of Japanese War Criminals.” When I left for Japan in early October, 1945, to serve as Special Assistant to Ambassador George Atcheson, the Political Advisor to General MacArthur, I took a copy of this not yet finally approved paper with me and gave it, along with other such papers, to Atcheson for his information.

In mid-November, Atcheson called me into his office to say that he had just had a call from General MacArthur complaining that although a number of major, or “Class a,’ German war criminals had been arrested and were in jail, none had been apprehended in Japan. He said that
he wanted a list of such Japanese “Class a’ war criminals on his desk within, as I recall, twenty-
four hours, so that he could immediately order them arrested.

Aitcheson said that since I had drafted the not yet officially received war criminals directives, I
was the logical one to compile the requested list. I said that my work had concerned the arrest,
trial and punishment of Japanese war criminals of all the various “Classes” but that it had not
extended to which Individual Japanese were guilty of war crimes. Nevertheless, I said that I
thought I could obtain the help I needed to compile the requested list.

I thereupon called Herbert Norman, a Canadian, a leading Japan scholar and a friend from pre-
war days, who was attached to General MacArthur’s headquarters in an intelligence capacity.
With his long experience in Japan and language fluency, I knew that Norman would be able to
add much to my knowledge of who the major Japanese war criminals were. Together that
evening at Dai Ichi Hotel, where we were both billeted, we drew up a proposed list, with a brief
statement of our reasons for each name. I handed it to Aitcheson in the morning. He had it
delivered to General MacArthur, and banner headlined a day or two later announced that all had
been arrested.

Some time later, MacArthur called Aitcheson to say that he was sure there were more Japanese
major war criminals and that he wanted a second list. I met again with Norman, who this time
argued strongly that Konoye should be included because of the positions of highest responsibility
which he had occupied over most of the pre-Pearl Harbor decade, including when Japan attacked
China in 1937. In compiling the first list, I had resisted Norman’s view that Konoye should be
included, arguing that he had never been an active protagonist of Japan’s aggressive course but
rather, as an inherently somewhat weak and indecisive man, had allowed himself to be used by
aggressive elements. And he had seen the light in 1941 and done his utmost, at the risk of his
life, to reverse Japan’s military course through his plan for the meeting with President Roosevelt.
Norman said the he appreciated these points but that we could not omit from our list someone
who had held the positions which Konoye had held and who possessed the intimate knowledge
of the Japanese pre-war decision process and if critical top-level prewar meetings which he did.
His status would be less that of a major war crimes suspect that of a material witness.

And so we agreed to include Konoye in the second list. But we also agreed that if he were
arrested, we would get word to him of the special circumstances attending his arrest. With his far
more extensive Japanese contacts than mine, Norman undertook to find someone who would
convey this message.

Konoye was notified of his arrest on December 6th, and ten days later, in the early morning of
the day he was to report to Sugamo Prison, he committed suicide. Norman told me that he had
arranged for a Konoye confidante to pass our message to him, but we never learned whether it
got through. If it did, it probably had little influence. The word that reached us from the Konoye
circle of intimates was that as a two-time Prime Minister and long time advisor to the Emperor,
and with his noble lineage extending back a thousand years, his pride could not endure the
humiliation of standing in court as a suspected war criminal. In his Konoe Fumimaro--a Political
Biography, 1983, Yoshitake Ota relates how a few hours before his death, Konoye asked his son,
Michitake, for a pen and paper and wrote the following:
“I have made many political blunders beginning with the China War, and I feel my responsibility for them deeply. I find it intolerable, however, to stand in an American court as a so-called war criminal. The very fact that I did feel responsible for the China War made the task of effecting a settlement all the more crucial to me. Concluding that the only remaining chance to achieve a settlement of the war in China was to reach an understanding with the United States, I did everything in my power to make the negotiations with the United States a success. It is regrettable that I am now suspected by the same United States of being a war criminal.”

CLIFF FORSTER
Japanese Internment
Philippines (1941-1943)

Cliff Forster was born in Manila, the Philippines in 1924. His father was the field director for the American Red Cross in the Middle East. After serving in the U.S. Navy, Mr. Forster attended George Washington University and Stanford University. Mr. Forster served in the Foreign Service in the Philippines, Burma, and Israel. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on May 29, 1990.

FORSTER: I spent most of my boyhood in the Philippines and elsewhere in the Far East, mostly China and Japan, and when the Japanese occupied the Philippines we were interned by them first at the Santo Tomas camp in Manila, and later at the Los Banos camp in the southern Philippines.

Q: I have several questions about your internment. First of all, were you interned as an entire family? Secondly, I would like to know what kind of treatment you got in the camp. Were you mistreated, other than having short rations, which were partly the fault of the Japanese and partly just general wartime conditions? Or did you have some severe treatment in the camp?

FORSTER: Yes, Lew, to answer your first question, we were all interned as a family. If you recall that occupation, it came very fast. The Japanese actually invaded the Philippines, the 14th Army, under General Masaharu Homma, in late December. But from December 8th on they had complete control of the skies. Our planes, including the newly-arrived B-17s, were caught on the ground at Clark Field. Our P-40s simply could not take on the Zero fighters. We were in a bad way. And yet MacArthur's forces held on valiantly, trying to stem that tide. There were two major invasions, one at the Lingayen Gulf to the west, the other on the Lamon Bay side to the east, and it was a pincers movement on Manila.

So almost until the week Manila was declared an open city, which was just about Christmas Day, those of us in the civilian community had actually been led to believe that we were holding the line. We were told that everyone should stay in Manila, keep calm and stay off the main highways. We then could see the trucks coming through from the south in large numbers with
American troops speeding north. We did not know they were on their way to Bataan, this deployment to escape capture and surrender in Manila.

Homma's objective was to take Manila, and he had been given his orders by general headquarters in Tokyo to capture MacArthur in fifty days' time. Of course, he did not due to MacArthur's strategic move into the Bataan peninsula. That conflict went on until Corregidor fell in early May of 1942.

Back to Manila, to get to your question. On December 30th, we were all instructed to move from our homes, to go into selected hotels, and the one we were all put into, about a thousand of us, was the Bay View Hotel, which still is there, across from the American Embassy. The United States High Commissioner, Francis Sayre, by that time had gone with MacArthur to Corregidor. The President of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon, had also gone to Corregidor. We had no knowledge of all this. We knew that something was happening, because Manila had suddenly been declared an open city by MacArthur, and there was a large banner over the city hall declaring Manila was now an open city. We tried to reason that out. It was obvious to us it was an open city and that meant the Japanese could come in at any time. And they did. They came in the day after New Year's Eve.

Now, on December 31st, New Year's Eve, I accompanied by father down to the military pier, Pier 1, for the evacuation of the last, most severely wounded Americans and Filipinos aboard an old inter-island ship, the Mactan. Very little is known about this first mercy ship of World War II. My father was instructed by MacArthur to get the wounded out of Sternberg Hospital which was a military hospital right in Manila, and he didn't want to have them captured by the Japanese. So about the only boat that was still afloat was this old inter-island vessel which had been in the Battle of Jutland. In no time at all, he was able to get Filipinos together to paint that boat white and red crosses on the side.

On New Year's Eve, Manila was ringed by fires (we were submitting it to scorched earth tactics all the week before) and I went down with Dad to board the Mactan. You had the wounded from Lingayen and the fighting in the south and it was a very sad, very historical time. I remember the captain was a Filipino captain, Julian Tamayo. My father was concerned about his being able to clear the minefield at Corregidor. He asked Tamayo if he felt he could manage that all right, and Tamayo said, no problem, he had the US Navy charts, he'd get them through. His destination for the wounded was Sydney and the ship pulled slowly away from the pier just hours before the occupation of the city. My father had final clearance from the International Red Cross in Geneva. He never did get a response from then Prince Shimadzu, the director of the Japanese Red Cross in Tokyo, although Shimadzu had informed him earlier that they would respect this ship. Then there was silence.

At that point, mind you, the Japanese forces were just on the outskirts of Manila. We could hear the artillery firing. We watched the little ship move out across the bay that night. It was a dramatic sight, with the city on fire, this little white ship with the red crosses on the hull lit up with spotlights.

My dad never knew until he returned to the States -- he was later exchanged aboard the
Gripsholm -- whether that ship had managed to get through. It was always on his mind. They did make it. They had a few close calls in the Celebes, but Captain Tamayo got the Mactan limping into Sydney and the Aussies were up on the bridge singing "Waltzing Matilda," a tremendous welcome to the survivors who managed to get through on that ship.

That's getting away from your question, but I just wanted to share some of that background, because you have to realize the suddenness of the whole thing, how quickly it hit us.

Q: I've never heard most of this story. I think it will be a very interesting addition to the interview.

FORSTER: Well, it's one that I've been trying to write up in this manuscript which I hope to finish fairly soon. There are so many untold stories like this which I do feel should be told. I'm glad to have this opportunity to tell this one, because it was a very moving story, indeed.

On January 1st, we could hear the firing very close to the city. Of course, the ship had cleared Corregidor by that time. On the afternoon of January 2nd, the first troops rolled in. They were all on motorbikes, most of them. All I could think of was Genghis Khan and the Mongol hordes. They had these backflaps like the Foreign Legion, and rifles strapped on their backs. You could see they'd been through a lot, because they were all dusty and mud-covered. They had Japanese flags on the bikes, but you heard this roar in the distance as they came in, just thousands of them on these motor bikes coming up what was then Dewey Boulevard. They were followed by tanks. Tanks rumbled in all night. I witnessed all this from the Bay view Hotel with my father and Carl Mydans, the Life photographer who was also in the hotel, and Shelley, his wife, as the Japanese moved into what was then the High Commissioner's residence, where our Embassy and USIS are now, hauling down the stars and stripes and hauling up the rising sun. So that was the end of our era in the Philippines, and we were just numb from all of this. It happened so fast.

The next thing we knew, we were being rounded up and informed that we were "under the benevolent custody of the Japanese Imperial Army," and had nothing to be concerned about. So they put us in these trucks and took us to this old university, then the oldest under the American flag, the University of Santo Tomas. For the next several days, the Allied internees were pouring in from all around the city. There was complete chaos, in a way, because the Japanese had no supplies there for us. Their primary objective was hot pursuit of the American forces moving into the Bataan peninsula, and they could care less about us, except to throw us into this camp.

My father's doctors and nurses were all Filipinos who did a fabulous job by us. He told them to go to the warehouses around Manila, where there was a lot of cracked wheat, which my father actually was in charge of for transhipment to Chungking via the Burma road. The ships never made it, since they were bombed in the harbor. But they did get the cargo of cracked wheat ashore, so we had sacks and sacks of cracked wheat. It was amazing how the Filipino staff, with all the turmoil and everything going on, were able to get all that cracked wheat into camp, along with some milk supplies, enough to keep us going for a while until the Japanese finally decided they would give us a regular diet of Mongo beans -- pretty healthy stuff then -- and rice, occasionally one Banana. That was about it. Much of it was pretty wormy.
Then they told us we could farm this small garden that was behind the university, and I was on that detachment, I remember. We just all went to work. Some of us became gardeners, other became garbage collectors, and handled the food line and the cooking. All of a sudden you had these Manila senior executives -- it was a great leveling process, because they were all engaged in work of this kind. We even put on skits to entertain the camp. One of them I recall was the tune of "Oh, Take Me Back to My Little Grass Shack," but it went something like this: "Oh, take me back to my little air-conditioned flat in old Manila/Where that rinky-hinky-dinky-stinky town of mine goes by/Oh, I used to be a teller in Manila's leading bank/But now I'm cleaning out a septic tank." And on and on it went. We had a lot of fun with these skits and it was good for camp morale.

I think one thing that got us through the years that followed was a sense of humor and the American ability to organize themselves. We had more doggone committees in that camp to do this and that, which kept us busy. We organized our own school. I was in my last year of high school when the war started, about to graduate, preparing to come to the US to college, so we had our graduation in that camp. The class gift to the principal was a roll of toilet paper since it was hard to come by. Things moved on under very difficult conditions, but we managed to all pull together.

Now, on treatment. I think I've already indicated that the initial treatment, when they came in, was quite good. They were on their good behavior. As time went on and the tide turned in the South Pacific the situation changed. I recall it was about August of '42 after the Battle of the Coral Sea. All their defeats were played up in their propaganda output as tremendous victories. All you heard was their side of the story. They reported they would soon be in Australia and were pushing us back in the Solomons and winning. The aircraft carrier Lexington had been sunk. It looked pretty dismal, because they also gave us very detailed reports on what they had sunk right here in Pearl Harbor. MacArthur's forces would soon be defeated on Bataan and Corregidor. Then you had Singapore and Hong Kong going under and the Battle of the Java Sea. In our Asiatic Fleet, the flagship USS Houston had been sunk in the Sunda Straits. Our old favorite destroyers, World War I-class four stackers, the Edsall, the Bulmer, the John Paul Jones, many of those ships also went down in the Battle of the Java Sea. It looked pretty bad. We thought, "This is a rough time. We're going to be here for a long, long time."

As time went on, we did encounter rough treatment. We had this case of two Australians and a New Zealander -- one of them was in our room -- who attempted to escape early on in February of '42. They were caught just beyond the gate and returned to the camp. We were brought down to witness their torture. They were summarily shot at close range. The effect of this on the camp was devastating. As a matter of fact, we were cautioned by older and wiser people in camp not to do anything to provoke the Japanese at that point. The shipmates of two of these fellows were ready to rush the Japanese, and they were held back. "If you do that, they're going to fire on everyone." This was a tank crew, a very rough crew that was on guard duty down in the front, and we were terribly concerned there would be bloodshed. Emotions were running very high. Well, there were a number of incidents like this. Of course, as time went on, they increased.

I would like to say this, however, and it's something that influenced my thinking about entering USIS years later. Our treatment would fluctuate depending on who was the commandant. If the
commandant had had any kind of contact with us, had either lived in the States or studied under our missionaries, in Japan, in other words, a long association, the treatment was much better. Those commandants who had had no contact -- and many of these chaps were younger -- who had been fed this line of hate, that we were the enemy and to be destroyed and so on, the treatment from these fellows was very severe. In the second camp we were sent to, Los Banos, we experienced this. It was a very nasty time, indeed. We experienced so many things there, some of it sad and tragic, some of it rather funny in a way. It's amazing how you remember the funnier things and not so many of the sad things.

We had one commandant, for example, whom we called "Porky" and he had this long cigarette holder. He was terribly upset one evening, I guess with good cause, because this camp was right on the side of Mt. Makiling and we had decided we were going to put on our first play. I was selected for a very minor part. I don't know if you remember the play "Arsenic and Old Lace."

Q: Yes.

FORSTER: Boris Karloff played the part that I played in this scene, and he doesn't have much to say. The character was slightly off his rocker, as you may recall, the older brother of two old maids who were pretty much into the wine and knocking off their guests with arsenic. He would always come running down the stairs, thinking he was at the Battle of San Juan Hill, shouting, "Charge!" That was about my only big line and I really rehearsed it. We had put up this loudspeaker and we never thought about the ramifications of this thing. But when my turn came, I gave a very lusty "Charge!" and the guards at the gate knew that command, as did our commandant, "Porky". So there was a great deal of consternation, and suddenly the guards were up around the shack where we were broadcasting this for the camp and stopped everything in a hurry. We were brought up to explain what this was all about, and we assured the commandant that there was no attempt to communicate this command to anyone beyond the camp. (Laughter)

We had a wonderful guy as an interpreter, who had served for many years with Singer Sewing Machine in Japan before his capture in Manila. I don't recollect his name now, but I think you might have known him later in Tokyo since he returned there in the post-war years. He did a beautiful job of explaining the content of the play to our humorless commandant. Finally, "Porky" said, "All right, but don't do it again," and proceeded to close down the whole operation. (Laughter) No more plays for this camp.

Q: So your thespian career was cut rather short.

FORSTER: Cut very short, indeed.

The other experience which was some indication of their own problems took place when we were ordered to build additional quarters in X number of days because they wanted to get all the Allied personnel out of Manila. Tojo had come to Manila and we were told that he'd been very upset by the presence of so many Allied internees right in the heart of the city. This was not good. Of course, a number of Filipinos were in contact with us feeding us information on what was going on through clandestine radio and so on. He just did not want to have any kind of contact and Los Banos was in an isolated area far from Manila.
So they gave us inadequate materiel to construct this camp, and my boss-supervisor was a Scot, a very crusty Scot, and he just pointed out, "It ain't gonna work. The first typhoon that's going to come through here will blow it all down." We sent in this report to the commandant, pointing out the nature of the problem. He came back and emphatically told us, "Continue on. Build this camp." Sure enough, the first typhoon came through, and you've never seen such a mess. Only about two or three of these buildings were still standing. We had built just a few at that time. But most of them were flat.

The commandant had lost much face, of course, so he gathered us all on the baseball field. There was a chap beside him, sitting with his head down, and he told us, all of us who were assembled there, that the engineer responsible for the design and materiel for this camp, was not a Japanese. He was a Korean. He then pointed to this fellow sitting there alongside him as the real culprit. Of course, we guffawed since it was obvious that he was trying to pass the buck to this poor Korean in the Japanese Army. I don't know where they found him. I guess they just pulled him in to point the finger. And there were some "boos." (Laughter) This was just a little anecdote to give you some idea of the frame of mind at that time, too.

So that, I hope, answers your question about treatment to illustrate how it was fairly good in the beginning, but became more difficult as time went on.

Q: How long were you interned?

FORSTER: I was interned until the fall of '43, when a number of us were rounded up and told to proceed to Santo Tomas for a prisoner exchange. When I arrived at Santo Tomas I saw my mother and father for the first time. They had been under house arrest ever since he had had a heart attack in the camp in Manila.

We joined the Manila group and were taken up to Lingayen Gulf where we boarded the Teia Maru which had been the Aramis, a French ship captured in Saigon when the war started. It was still war-time gray although it did have some red crosses on the hull. It had not been painted white, however, a requirement for exchange vessels. The ship picked up the first exchangees in Japan at Yokohama. It then proceeded to Shanghai, Hong Kong and Lingayen Gulf since the ship couldn't come into Manila Bay because we still had the minefield problem there. Then it went upriver to Saigon, where we picked up the French, down to Singapore, through the Sunda Straits to Marmagao in what was then Portuguese Goa to be met there by the Gripsholm. The Japanese on the Gripsholm boarded the Teia Maru as we went aboard the Gripsholm for the final voyage home.

We were next sent to Port Elizabeth, and from Port Elizabeth to Rio, where we were checked over from a health standpoint, interrogated for what we knew about the Japanese situation in Manila, our own treatment, the kind of questions you've just been asking. When we arrived in New York we received a very fine welcome with fire boats coming alongside. That was December 1, 1943, I believe.

Q: When we were off tape, incidentally, you mentioned that there were two Gripsholm
repatriations, a first and a second one. I guess most of the ranking people came out from Japan on the first one.

FORSTER: That's right. It was a diplomatic exchange.

Q: Ambassador Alex Johnson?

FORSTER: Correct. Also Ambassador John Allison.

Q: And Allison. You did not go out on the first one; you went out on the second one?

FORSTER: The second one. The second Gripsholm was primarily for diplomats, but of lesser rank from these different places. There were also Red Cross-affiliated officials, which included my father, foreign correspondents, like Carl and Shelley Mydans of Time-Life, Royal Arch Gunnison of Collier's, Emily Hahn from Hong Kong, smoking her famous cigar on the deck, as I recall. Quite a person, indeed. And a number of missionaries. There were other categories, but that was primarily it. I think some of the officers and crew of ships that had been sunk were also on that exchange like the President Harrison, which was seized while trying to escape from China. Most of the exchangees, however, were diplomatic and Red Cross personnel, journalists and missionaries. And they were matched with Japanese in those categories coming in the other direction.

RAY MARSHALL
Naval Occupying Forces
Japan (1945-1946)

Raised an orphan in Mississippi, Mr. Marshall joined the Navy during World War II and was part of the occupation forces of Japan. After the War he earned a B.A. from Millsaps College in Jacksonville, Mississippi, an M.A. at Louisiana State University, and a Ph.D. in Labor Economics from the University of California, Berkeley. Mr. Marshall went on to become the Chairman of the International Working Group for the Commission on Skills of the American Workforce, and the Secretary of Labor. He was interviewed in 1993 by Morris Weisz.

MARSHALL: . . . I was in Japan in the occupation forces. I was off-shore in Japan getting ready to invade when the war ended, so I went in and was there from August 1945 until about May of 1946.

Q: But not with any labor function?

MARSHALL: No. I was a sailor, so I knew what was going on and took a strong interest in it. My sense of it is that we had several different kinds of influence. One, of course, is that in a general sense we strengthened democratic institutions, and I think that probably was our main impact. And, of course, free labor movements are essential in my judgment for a democratic
society. We required that the Japanese establish a free labor movement, and they modeled their early labor movement after the Wagner Act in their law, but then pretty soon, because they were able to wipe the slate clean, and because they had greater unity within the country, our paths diverged; that is, they stayed with the Wagner Act in Japan. We passed the Taft-Hartley Act here and became much more anti-union, whereas in Japan and Germany they didn't take that path. They didn't go through all the things we did. They didn't pass the Taft-Hartley Act and have a strong anti-union movement during the 1970's and 1980's. It is inconceivable to me that in either Japan or Germany any group of employers would form a Council for a Union Free Environment, so I think our influence was to get the Japanese and the Germans started in democratic institutions, but I think they were smarter than we were in holding on to it, and in realizing that in the post-World War II period your people were your most important asset, and that therefore you had to pay attention to a kind of universal education for all workers with a skills training system and a participatory system.

It is interesting what we did in Germany. You see, we realized that the best way to head the fascists off was to have worker participation or co-determination in the German companies, or at least the British realized that probably more than we did, but we realized it too, that a free labor movement is an important buffer against totalitarian forces whether of the left or of the right, and therefore we encouraged the growth of a free labor movement. I think that the Germans have taken that and developed a pretty powerful economic system based on a much higher degree of worker participation than we have.

My sense of it is that Japanese employers were willing to take the latest thinking from people like W. Edwards Deming and others, and say that makes a lot of sense and that we need to develop that system, whereas American employers were not [willing], and I think the interesting question is: Why not? The answer is "Taylorism". Taylorism was always much more deeply embedded in the American system, and the interesting thing about it to me is that here the United States was the champion of democracy and free labor movements, and we probably have the most elitist management system of any major industrial country.

CHRISTOPHER A. PHILLIPS
U.S. Army – Staff of General MacArthur
Tokyo (1945-1946)

PHILLIPS: I spent a year in Japan on the staff of General MacArthur at his headquarters in the Daichi building in Tokyo. There I was assigned to the Price Control and Rationing Division of the Economic and Scientific Staff Section of SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers]. Our job was to establish policies for the distribution of food throughout the country so as to prevent starvation during the difficult first year of the occupation.

Q: I’d like to go back, since this has pertinence to foreign affairs. What was your impression, I mean here you were a young man on the staff of General MacArthur, obviously way down in the bowels, but what was your impression of MacArthur, and two, how did you feel—what was the atmosphere about dealing with the Japanese and about the relationship to Washington and directions from Washington?

PHILLIPS: You’re quite right. I was down in the bowels of SCAP, although by that time I had been promoted to the lofty rank of First Lieutenant! This didn’t exactly give me day to day access to General MacArthur, but I was able to gain some impressions of his impact on that quite remarkable first year of the occupation. Although, ostensibly guided by directions from Washington, MacArthur exercised a great deal of independent authority. In theory, it was the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, which comprised representatives of all the allied countries, that established general policies for the occupation. In fact, the real authority for issuing policies and directives to SCAP resided in Washington. But MacArthur took a rather imperial view of his role and was not unduly influenced by instructions from Washington or guidance from the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

Q: What about the staff around him? Did you get any feel about the staff and its impact on MacArthur?

PHILLIPS: A small group of senior colonels and generals who had been through the war with him exercised the greatest influence - officers such as General Marquette, in charge of the Economic and Scientific Staff Section and General Whitney, who headed up the Government Section. But there were many more junior officers down the line, who from the standpoint of day to day operations, played key roles in implementing SCAP policies. During that first year the staff was almost entirely drawn from our military and naval forces, most of whom had been through the same training programs as had I. We had all participated, to some extent, in the planning operations leading up to the occupation, and were, therefore, well prepared for the tasks that confronted us on our arrival. On the whole it was a smoothly run operation, due in large part to clearly defined policies and MacArthur’s extraordinary influence and leadership. We all marveled at how ordinary Japanese seemed to venerate the General. It made one wonder if perhaps they saw in him as a new Imperial being, temporarily replacing the Emperor himself.

Q: I was wondering, at the time you were there, if one could not have discerned two rather different currents of thinking about occupation policies. On the one hand, New Deal views, though more pragmatic than the earlier days of the Roosevelt presidency, still influenced Washington thinking. At the same time you had a general and his senior officers who generally reflected more conservative views. MacArthur had a lot of autonomy. I would have thought, even in this first year, there would have been some sort of conflict - or did things just sort of click together?
PHILLIPS: Well you raise a good point. Given these circumstances, one might well have concluded that policy conflicts between Washington and SCAP were inevitable. But in fact things did sort of click together. Of course there were occasional differences of opinion between Washington and SCAP, but overall there were remarkably few. We tend to forget that under MacArthur during the first year of the occupation, some truly radical reforms were introduced into Japan which changed, the whole nature of Japanese society. An example of this was the highly successful land reform program. For many years land tenancy had stood at close to 50% of the land. As a result of these reforms, absentee ownership of agricultural land was abolished and former tenants were able to buy their land on very favorable terms. At the same time landlords were reimbursed for the property they lost.

EILEEN R. DONOVAN
Education Officer, Civil Information and Education
Tokyo (1945-1948)

Japan-Korea Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1948-1950)

Ambassador Eileen R. Donovan taught high school history in Boston when World War II began. After the Pearl Harbor incident, Donovan joined the Women's Auxiliary Corps. She was sent to Officer Candidate School in Des Moines, and came out as a 2nd Lieutenant. After teaching Japanese women for a period, she took the Foreign Service exam and was sent back to Tokyo to begin her career that would culminate with an Ambassador appointment. She has served in Manila, Barbados, and Japan. The interview was conducted by Ann Miller Morin in 1985.

DONOVAN: They marked out a bailiwick for us on ship so we wouldn't be bothered by all these men. We landed in Japan in October, '45, which was very close to the beginning, because you remember the signing of the Missouri was the signing of the end of the war, it wasn't the peace treaty, but on the Missouri the surrender was in September. So Tokyo was pretty beat up. I have some pictures in there how it looked in those days.

Q: You arrived in Yokohama?

DONOVAN: We arrived in Yokohama and we stood up in the back of a truck going up the road to Tokyo. There was nothing on the road but little rusty square iron safes which were all that was left of the Japanese little houses that had been there and were burned down, mostly in the Doolittle raid of that year.

Q: You must have seen an awful lot of fire damage. People aren't aware of that in this country.

DONOVAN: We passed a big billboard saying “You are now entering Tokyo by courtesy of the
First Cavalry Division.” They made them change that later on to “home of.” We were taken to a hotel called the Daichi, which was built originally for Olympic games that never took place. There were little small rooms, but they gave each of us a room that had a little tiny bathtub in it, and there I stayed for a good many years.

This is where SCAP comes in. General MacArthur's title was Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. That's SCAP. I went into a division called CIE, Civil Information and Education Section, of the GHQ, General Headquarters, of SCAP.

Q: Civil Information and what was the rest of that?

DONOVAN: Civil Information and Education Section. That was all Japanese Civil Information and Education Section. There I stayed as an education officer. In that division, the education section, they were all pretty much generalists, that is, in secondary education and other things. I was also Women's Education Officer. That's the first and only time that I have ever worked exclusively or primarily on women's matters. But they were very glad to see me.

Q: What specifically were the women's matters at this time?

DONOVAN: Well, for example, I don't like to go on too long...

Q: No, no this is very interesting, very important.

DONOVAN: Early in the game General MacArthur said that women would be allowed to enter the Imperial Universities. There were four or five Imperial Universities that were the very best. But they were not trained to pass the examinations to enter. They had women's colleges, so-called, fine schools, but they were really high school level according to the way we would call it, and the girls weren't prepared to go much higher. So then you had to look and see why that was, because I kept my mouth shut for three months after I first got there and just listened to the Japanese women educators. There was one, Miss Hoshino, who was a Wellesley College graduate who had a college called Tsuda, T-S-U-D-A, which was one of the best. Then there was Nippon Joshi Daigaku, Japan Women's University, and they had some fine teachers, too. I just listened to them and their ideas. I wasn't imposing anything. I was learning. Finally when Miss Hoshino thought she knew me well enough, she pulled out a little book in Japanese from under her futon where she had kept it all during the war, called *Education for Women in the New Japan*, dated 1925. When the militarists took control, they banned her book from the libraries and the newsstands and said that all copies must be destroyed.

Q: Was it a book she'd written?

DONOVAN: Yes. She kept one. She had translated... I think she had an English copy too, because how could I have read it otherwise? She said, "You know, there isn't anything very new. We have known and wanted all these changes for many years but we were forbidden to have them." Then I had to go farther and farther down. I found that the girls' education at the primary and at what we would call the elementary level was quite different from the boys, because they had separate textbooks, like first year arithmetic for boys and first year arithmetic for girls, the
same with history and geography and science. And they were all at a lower level than the boys. And the farther on they got in the school system, the greater the difference became. So even those that were fortunate enough to go to one of the colleges... So then I had to say, “Why is this? This seems strange in a subject which is no different. It's arithmetic, it's the same... “Well, because they were spending so much time on cooking and sewing. The extra hours were taken from these academic subjects. So they said, “We can't use the same text book when we don't have the same hours of instruction.” Then I found, I don't know how I found her, whether she came to me or how I found her, I found a young woman named Matsuo Omoi who had been, I think they called it domestic science or homemaking education, at one of the good universities on the west coast.

Q: U.S. west coast?

DONOVAN: Yes, the U.S. west coast. And she had gone back to Japan. She said, "Eileen, this is the difference. I could draw up a curriculum in which they learn as much as they do now in cooking and so on without spending all those inordinate number of hours on it."

Q: Sounds like a man had set it up in the first place. [Laughter]

DONOVAN: So anyway, then the Minister of Education was called the Mombusho. I used to go over, and heaven help me, talk to them about American education, just in an academic sort of way. I wasn't telling them they should do anything like it. And anyway, with the help of the other people in the education division, the boss, a man named Mark Orr who's now at the University of South Florida, we got the Mombusho to agree to let Matsuo Omoi prepare a new curriculum in homemaking, which would then do away with the necessity of having separate textbooks. Then gradually this thing could be evened out. But it wasn't a one day project.

Q: Of course not.

DONOVAN: I spent a lot of time on that. Then I also spent some time... the only reason I'm in the book over here was because they had an “Imperial Rescriptive 1900,” which was issued by the Emperor, really by his minions, saying that the purpose of education was loyalty and filial piety, which is all right. Those are lovely, lovely things, except that they didn't interpret them as we would. Loyalty meant strictly to the emperor and so did filial piety. So when the militarists got in charge, they used these things and this rescript was the basis for all the education in Japan at the lower levels. We’d studied this thing at the University of Michigan. But we hadn't done anything about it. One of the ministers of education was very fond of this and we hadn't done anything about it. How could you say that education meant helping people to think when there was nothing but these things? And then the end of it, it ended up “loyalty to our emperor, coeval in heaven and earth.” It was really emperor worship Shinto-style. So I said, "Mark, we've got to get rid of this thing. It's silly to go on talking about democratic education when you have this." So I did a lot of studying on it and I went to a wonderful man named Tom Blakemore, who was the only American who had been graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University Law School and we found out the meaning of the words and the connotations. Finally--it was a Ministry of Education decree--but we suggested firmly that it be done, that it was no longer the basis for education.
Q: *That's pretty basic, yes, very basic.*

DONOVAN: Remind me, I'll show you that.

Q: *And very far-reaching.*

DONOVAN: Yes. You asked me what I was doing in Japan. Those are the highlights. Then I had another idea. Who were we? We were all in that place, former schoolteachers and school principals and things, who were we to be making such decisions? History would call us to account. By gosh, we'd better get some really well-known educators over there. So we invited what turned out to be an education mission to Japan, consisting of what started out as the fifty most famous educators.

Q: *Ethel Weed?*

DONOVAN: She didn't do the education, though, she was concerned with the women - there were four or five women in the Japanese Diet.

Q: *Concerned with the politicians?*

DONOVAN: The political part of it.

Q: *That's fascinating, you had a captain's rank?*

DONOVAN: No, not quite yet. I did before I finished there. I was first lieutenant. Then a lot of my women's friends there looked at that uniform, and, not a lot but one or two, said “Were you with Doolittle when they bombed Tokyo?” So I decided to get out of uniform. I became a civilian while I was there. I got my release from active duty at the Zama in Japan. It's a place where you went. I became a civilian.

Q: *What sort of a place is this?*

DONOVAN: We used to call it the repple-depple. It's the Zama replacement depot. It's a place where you went to - it's not important at all. I became a civilian and that's when I started writing my mother frantic letters for clothes. But I didn't know I was going to be in this book which is called...

Q: *Unconditional Democracy.*

DONOVAN: *Education and Politics in Occupied Japan* by Toshio Nishi. I'm not going to ask you to read this now, but he has a whole section about the...

Q: *Oh, yes, "Donovan objected there were not..." Oh very, very good.*

DONOVAN: About the imperial rescript.
Q: Very good. In the course of your work did you have any reason to see the general, MacArthur?

DONOVAN: Yes, but not too often. I did that when I went back in 1949 on the education exchange survey mission. There were two or three people in between me and the general.

Q: Well, I imagine he was sort of an awesome figure, wasn't he?

DONOVAN: Yes.

We had General MacArthur invite over what started out to be the fifty most famous educators to Japan to look at what we were doing and to write a report so that we'd have somebody other than...

Q: Some authority, weight of authority?

DONOVAN: Yes. We did that, and they came in the spring of 1946. It was a slightly different group than we had originally asked for. We picked out people in various fields, but when it got to Washington naturally they had to have a representative of the CIO, and they had to have one black, and I remember a little Irish catholic priest who came to me when the word got out that we were doing such a thing, and he got hold of the list, and he said, "Eileen Donovan, do you realize that there's not a Catholic name on this list?" I said, "No, I never thought of it. What has that got to do with it?" I said, "As a matter of fact, let me look at it again," and I read down. I said, "There's not a Jewish name on there either." Anyhow they came, and they more or less agreed with what we were doing except I thought they never gave the... the women's education was not in the report.

Q: Oh, is that right?

DONOVAN: I thought they slighted them all. I gave them all kinds of lectures and I had my Japanese women leaders talk to them and visited schools and stuff.

Q: So, in effect, they were perpetuating the same old male supremacy, weren't they?

DONOVAN: No. They weren't doing that.

Q: But they were by default, weren't they?

DONOVAN: Yes, isn't that nice?

Q: That's lovely.

DONOVAN: This is the education division when I first got there.

Q: Oh, for heaven's sake, all men except for yourself. How about that? You certainly got used
early to being the token woman, didn't you?

DONOVAN: Yes. That was several years later when they got all the local employees and everybody else in there.

Q: Not too many women then.

DONOVAN: Well, there are plenty. They're all clerks, but... anyway.

Q: To get back to this business, why didn't [they] give more weight to the women's part of it? They didn't think it was important?

DONOVAN: I don't know. They had... those are all pictures of going over. Here's the sign “Entering Tokyo.” There are some pictures that were smuggled out of Hiroshima within an hour of the bombing.

Q: Oh, my. Oh, my.

DONOVAN: That's me visiting one of the schools where the little girls dug up their kimonos from underground.

Q: And put them on?

DONOVAN: Yes, that's me, God help me, giving a lecture to the ministry of education people.

Q: Good for you.

DONOVAN: I have a nerve.

Q: No, why not, you were the authority.

DONOVAN: I mean I knew at the time. I wrote down here, “if the Japanese keep a book of future war criminals, if they go to war with us again, I'll probably head the list.” Imagine me, a woman, doing this. On my left is Terry Nishi. That's about what Tokyo looked like.

Q: Oh, boy, what a mess. What a mess.

DONOVAN: I'm looking for the education mission.

Q: Part of the mission at the Tokyo. Would that be it?

DONOVAN: They had- (end of tape)

-he formed an orchestra called Hiroshi Watanabe and the Stardusters.

Q: (Laughter) I love it. Hiroshi Watanabe and the Stardusters, that's lovely.
DONOVAN: That was up on the roof.

Q: You finally left the service in 1948, is that right?

DONOVAN: Yes. I was a civilian then in the same job. This was when I was still wearing a uniform without any insignia before my mother sent me clothes.

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DONOVAN: So gradually I advanced from collating papers. It was 95, I think, in that office, with no air conditioners. Then however, not more than six months later, I was ordered back to the Department to what they call the Japan-Korea branch public affairs section. It was one of those predecessors of the Department version of USIA. They didn't have any then. So we had another set of farewell parties and that time I went, in November of '48. Went back to the Department as Japan-Korea desk officer. I never did have any basic training.

Q: Never got it at all? No basic training. You were thrown in to sink or swim, weren't you?

DONOVAN: That's right.

Q: You never went through that course at FSI?

DONOVAN: No, I went through other courses later, many of them.

Q: But you didn't go through that beginning one? No.

DONOVAN: So, where do you want to go from here, coach? [Laughter] Did you have that down there that I was trying to start a cultural exchange program in that job?

Q: Yes.

DONOVAN: Then they decided to send me on another mission which was just a small one, called the Education Exchange Survey Mission, in 1949, in the summer. There were only five people on it and I was the Department member of that. So I went off in the middle of this job to that.

Q: The others were from the Department of Education?

DONOVAN: No, no. There was one, John Dale Russell was head of the office of education. The chairman was a man named Tulley, who was Chancellor of Syracuse University. There were two others. Their pictures are in another book here somewhere. So we went back to Japan because none of these men really approved... didn't understand General MacArthur, didn't know what he was trying to do. We had a luncheon with General MacArthur and his wife right near the beginning. It was one of those wonderful luncheons that he's had many times before, I think, in which Mrs. MacArthur would greet us, you know, a charming southern lady, then he'd come in
from the Daichi building where he worked, and then we'd sit down at the lunch table - I don't remember whether they gave us a cocktail or not, probably not. So I, being the only lady again, was on his right and Mrs. MacArthur was at the end of the table. So he turned to me and he said, I don't know if he really remembered me, but if he didn't Larry Buckler or one of his minions had briefed him. He never went anywhere without being briefed--he said, "Well, Miss Donovan do you like the State Department better than the army?" I said, "Well, sir, actually I'm doing very much the same type of work. I loved it when I was in the Army and working with you, but one thing I didn't like was that necktie on a woman in peace time. Now I don't have to wear the necktie anymore." So then he asked me a couple of other simple questions. Then came the - I'm sure it was the routine--Mrs. MacArthur said to him from the end of the table, "Gen' al, Chancellor Tulley has asked me a question which you can answer much better than I. If Chancellor Tulley would repeat his question to you." So then Chancellor Tulley repeated his question, and of course there was silence at the rest of the table. And General MacArthur answered with a nice short answer that took about twenty-five minutes. Then he said, "Are there any other questions?" And somebody asked another question, and somebody asked another question. I think we sat there at that table for two and a half hours. He answered beautifully in his wonderful rhetoric, and splendidly and he knew what he was doing.

Q: Was he frank?

DONOVAN: Yes. Yes he was. I didn't hear anything that I myself would have questioned. When we went out, two of the men said, “Hey, he's ‘whatever the version at that time was of’ he's really something”. They were all tremendously impressed. Then we had an interview with the emperor, too.

Q: Did you?

DONOVAN: I went out in the backyard and patted the emperor's white horse. I have a picture of that, too.

Q: Oh, yes, that famous white horse.

DONOVAN: Then we came back after a month or so. Then I was assigned again. You see I was doing all these things while I was on that job.

Q: Of course.

DONOVAN: John D. Rockefeller III, who had been to Japan and was most impressed, was writing, not a book but a pamphlet, a study on cultural relations with Japan. He didn't know so very much to write it. He knew quite a lot, but not to sit down and write a report. So there was another chap there in the Department of State who was an old Japan hand named Doug Overton. The two of us were assigned to go up to New York and stay at a hotel and go to John D's office every day and help him write his report, which we did.

Q: Did you? It pays to be a Rockefeller.
DONOVAN: I think I have that report somewhere. I've got a bunch, a footlocker here.

Q: Have you? With your papers in it?

DONOVAN: There are some papers that are useful and some are not. I think the report of the education mission is there, and this Rockefeller cultural report, stuff like that. They’re stashed away underneath the water heater out there somewhere.

Then I went to Manila. The Korean war came about that time. Everybody lost interest in Japan.

Q: That’s right, didn’t they?

DONOVAN: 1950.

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Ambassador Donovan was interviewed by Arthur L. Lowrie in 1989

Q: Let me ask you an historical footnote kind of question on Hiroshima. What was the date that you went there?

DONOVAN: It was early November 1946.

Q: 1946, so it was just a little over a year after the bomb. What were the effects of the Atomic Bomb that were still in evidence then?

DONOVAN: Everything was still in evidence. The city was nothing but a bunch of shambles. I went down with a male officer. I was still in the Army then, a Captain. He was concerned with adult education and I was concerned with just education. We were met by the officials of the city in these beat-up charcoal-fueled old cars. These officials introduced themselves, they were all men. They were the Chief of police and the Mayor and head of the Department of Education, all these miscellaneous officials. They apologized very deeply and said, sorry we have no place to meet, which was pretty obvious because there was nothing but debris all around. But, they said there's a little island out here in the Inland Sea where there is a nice little temple and we'll go out there. We had to take a ferry boat to get over. So, we went out, I guess it was about three o'clock when we got out there. We sat down and had the usual refreshment consisting of little "mikan", you know, tangerines, and tea and sake which I didn't drink. They were drinking sake and beer and that's a terrible combination. Then I asked a few questions like, is your family still here? The man would say no, my wife and three children were killed by the bomb, ha ha ha ha. It turned out that almost all of them had lost their families and there they were being so hospitable out on this little island where nobody in the world knew where we were. I said, well when are we going to get to the meeting? When are we going to start? They said, oh, we're not going to do that today. We're going over to the city of Kure tomorrow and have the meeting over there in a building.
They said, you're going to stay here all night. By that time it was five o'clock and it was getting dark, quite dark and night had fallen. It was in November. I said, oh no, we can't stay here. We had neglected, because John had missed an earlier train to stop in Kure where they had a British installation. We were supposed to stop and check in with the British. Otherwise, it was all American around Japan but that was British. So they didn't know where we were and I said, well we really have to go back tonight. And they said oh no, no, no and they all laughed again. They said, we know what you're thinking but we have separate rooms for you and Captain Nelson. That wasn't what I was thinking about that time. Captain Nelson was enjoying himself, by the way. I said, no we'll have to go back right now. They said, no we can't. The ferry stopped running at five o'clock. I said, well there must be another boat. I said, we really have to get to Kure tonight. Otherwise, the British would set out a search party for us. They probably have already called GHQ Tokyo and said, where are these characters, and Tokyo wouldn't know. So, they found a little boat. It was an outboard motor about 12-feet long and they sat John and me on the center of the seat, and they all stood up. The boat was rocking. The darkness was black and we went out about 500 yards or more and I said, John this is going to be a Japanese revenge party. I said, no one knows where we are. These guys are now going to take revenge on us for the loss of their families. I said, is there a lose board down on the floor there? I said, you might as well make an effort to defend us but we're going to be in that water in a very short time. Take it from me, this is our last night on earth. Well, he became serious very quickly. Then the laughing stopped and there was deep silence. And I thought, it's coming John, and then suddenly the motor started up again and off we went across the bay or whatever it is to the railroad station. We bade them all farewell and said we'd see them in Kure in the morning. We got in about ten o'clock at night to a very, very angry British officer (for which I didn't blame him a bit).

So, the next morning the whole group that was in Hiroshima and a whole bunch of others--I don't know who they were--all assembled to hear what the United States Government was going to do rebuilding schools and we had a very nice meeting. We left at the end of the day and they gave me a little cheap wooden tray as a parting gift. You know they always give gifts. You could buy one in any store in Tokyo for about $3 US then but that didn't matter. They had chiseled in the back of it, "To Captain Donovan, The First Western Woman In Hiroshima Since The End Of The War" and I treasure that. There it is over there.

Q: The one on the stand?

DONOVAN: Yes. Now that was an interesting two days, wasn't it?

Q: Was there any signs on the people of the bomb, radiation, burns?

DONOVAN: No. Well we didn't see anyone, you see, except those people that met us.

Q: You didn't see that many people?

DONOVAN: No. We didn't see anybody really. We got in these little cars and went out to the place where we got on the ferry boat. But that was before the Foreign Service.
ABRAHAM M. SIRKIN
Chief of News Division, General MacArthur’s Headquarters
Tokyo (1946-1948)

Mr. Sirkin was born in 1914 in Barre, Vermont, and attended Columbia College, graduating in 1935. He was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1941. After he left the Army he served at number of posts with USIA and USIS, including England, India, and Greece. Mr. Sirkin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

SIRKIN: …I was in the Philippines when the war ended. I was in a foxhole as a matter of fact, preparing for the invasion of Southern Japan when we heard about the atomic bomb and shortly thereafter the end of the war. Soon thereafter the whole unit was picked up and we went to Manila. I was at the airport when the Japanese Army Officers arrived to sign the arrangements for the surrender ceremony on the Missouri. I watched as the Japanese came down from their plane and MacArthur's Intelligence Chief standing on the tarmac to greet them. The big issue was, were they going to shake hands or not? To this day I don't remember whether they did or not.

When we landed in Nagoya, I was by then doing public relations for this small command. I immediately phoned the press office of the Army headquarters of Southern Japan in Kyoto and I said there was nothing much to do in Nagoya, was there something I could do up there in Kyoto? By then people were preparing to leave. "Yes, sure we are losing our this, we are losing our that, going home." So I went immediately to Kyoto where I became a Public Information Officer, number two to the press officer for the Southern Command of General Krueger. After chaperoning bunches of correspondents around Southern Japan, I found that the Tokyo people were leaving and I was asked if I was willing to hang around. My job was still waiting for me in New York, but I was finding this so much more interesting. I didn't go home, I didn't have a family, a wife so I accepted. So I went up to Tokyo and became the Chief of the News Division in MacArthur's Headquarters.

Q: I'd like to stop at this point I think, and we will pick it up next time where you have just become Chief of the News Division in Mac Arthur’s Headquarters. How's that?

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Today is the 18th of June, 1997. When did you become this, what year are we talking about?

SIRKIN: I guess it's 1946.

Q: In the first place, you were going to say before you got to this there was something about a photographer.

SIRKIN: When I was working in the Southern Headquarters of General Krueger, groups of foreign correspondents would come down South in Kyoto to cover things in that area that the
occupation officials tried to interest the correspondents in covering like the blowing up of Japanese armaments and ammunition. One group that came down had about seven or eight correspondents, including a Life editor and photographer Eisenstein.

Q: A major figure in photography?

SIRKIN: He had a big retrospective exhibit not so long ago in New York. Anyway, they were all set to go first to Hiroshima and then to Nagasaki. After they had been to Hiroshima they all wanted to go to Nagasaki because that was the other place they knew about. I started urging, especially the Life editor (I think his name was Dick Lauterbach) who was controlling Eisenstein's assignments. I said I think Nagasaki is just another version, somewhat rather smaller than Hiroshima. But I argued there was something that nobody had covered yet, which would be very photogenic, which was the enforced return and processing of the Japanese conquerors of Manchuria and Northern China with the packs on their back. I couldn't persuade any of the other correspondents; they all insisted on going on to Nagasaki. We were on the Island of Kyushu. I did persuade Lauterbach, who got Eisenstein to go with me and just a few of the other correspondents to Sasabu where there was a processing center for returning Japanese. Eisenstein went and took these pictures and ended up with a cover story for Life. The picture was right on the cover and inside, I don't know how many pages, showing all these former conquerors. Some of them actually with big packs on their back of their belongings, returning from their country's defeat where they had been lording it over Northern China. So, I thought it was an educational thing for the American public to see one of the activities of the occupation. It turned out to be a good thing for Eisenstein even if he had been grumbling about missing Nagasaki.

Q: You moved into the MacArthur Headquarters in '45, to be head of the News Division was it?

SIRKIN: This was in '46. I had been doing the news work for the Southern Command, General Krueger. I offered to go up to Tokyo to fill in when Colonel Reid was leaving and they said sure come on up. This was the News Division of the Public Information, I forget the titles now, but it was the Public Information Office of General MacArthur's Headquarters run by a former National Guard General from one of the Dakotas. He had been with MacArthur all the way up from Australia and knew his entire group of Generals. All the time I was there I myself never exchanged a word with MacArthur. I saw him numerous times because one of my jobs was to be the person representing the press, in a sense, at the meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, where the press was not permitted, usually. I was there to write any press releases. Most of the time MacArthur himself was not in the chair. The other three were a Russian General, a Chinese General and an Australian political science professor, who represented the whole British Commonwealth, a four-power group representing all nine allied powers. Some of the others didn't have a seat on the Council. The Dutch and the French and the others were not in the Council.

I'm trying to remember where, whether I was in Tokyo or still in Kyoto, I guess I was in Tokyo by then, but on the basis of my experience taking people to Hiroshima, people like Roy Howard and Spike Cannon, editor of Christian Science Monitor, groups like that and knowing how it worked in Hiroshima, John Hersey came through for The New Yorker, and he just stopped by my office to tell me what he was going to do. He was going to do something in Hiroshima, trying
to do The New Yorker version of it. I was able to give him the names of a few doctors and others who we had had contact with when I had been bringing groups down to Hiroshima.

Q: Can you describe a bit the atmosphere in the News Division particularly? The MacArthur rule was almost imperial. Wasn't it?

SIRKIN: He was the Emperor of Japan.

Q: What were your observations being down in an element which was still of interest because if nothing else General MacArthur's staff and all had a pretty good eye about public relations and publicity, particularly for the General.

SIRKIN: They were concerned about getting favorable publicity. Officially my job was to write press releases and respond to press inquiries about the activities of the Headquarters. The Headquarters was SCAP, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, in Japan. The press office was in the Radio Tokyo Building. It was the building where Radio Tokyo used to operate and was taken over by the occupation and run by the military for a while, before it was turned back to the Japanese civilians. On the second floor of the Radio Tokyo Building was this fairly big newsroom of desks with typewriters, and correspondents from all over the world. Mainly the news agencies, AP, UP, INS, Agence France Presse, and Tass. All these people had desks there, plus, of course, The New York Times, Chicago Tribune and Chicago Daily News and outfits that had foreign correspondents. I had an office of six or seven reporters who covered the different departments of the occupation, such as agriculture, industry, education, religion, and labor. The official dealing with the Japanese press, I think it was called CI and E, Information and Education. I forget what the C stood for, but it was about the domestic situation because they were determined to change the mentality that led to the war, including getting involved in religion, the Shinto religion, to demilitarize it to a certain extent, and in education, school and women's affairs; presumably women's roles were not as equal as they were in the western countries. My office became a factory of press releases; reporters who worked for me would come and tell me what was going on and anything that they considered newsworthy in their section. Depending on what the story was, I would have to check the press release for both content and style and policy.

Q: Was there an effort to make sure that every story that came out of Japan had a General MacArthur in the first sentence?

SIRKIN: No. I don't think Emperor worship reached that far. There was concern with some of the Officers around MacArthur about anything that might turn out to be derogatory. One of the Bureau Chiefs was Miles Vaughn of UP who had come up with MacArthur from way back in the war. He was an extreme admirer of MacArthur. As a matter of fact, I guess it was '47 or '48, he had written a whole series in UP about the achievements of MacArthur. That was just before the election year in the U.S. when MacArthur was put forth as a candidate. It was something of an amusement to some of the other UP people including the Bureau Chief in Washington, Lyle Wilson. One of Miles’ assistants told me at one point, after MacArthur had been trounced in the Wisconsin primary, about a one-sentence cable, I guess it was from Lyle Wilson in the Washington Bureau of UP to Miles Vaughn, “UNPACK”.
There was a lot of interesting by-play especially political in the international sense. I frequently had a lot of problems with the grumbles from The Chicago Tribune correspondent about the too-liberal behavior of MacArthur's occupation. I know he came in once and pounded the desk complaining, "What is MacArthur doing, letting all these Communist labor leaders out of jail?" Some had been in jail since the Japanese imperial time. (End of tape)

**Q:** You are saying labor leaders had been let go?

SIRKIN: Some of the labor leaders had been released, the Socialist as well as the Communist ones, and some of the more conservative writers, particularly the Chicago Tribune correspondent, was exercised as to why. The Communists were going to take over the labor movement. For a while the Japanese labor movement was I think heavily communist controlled. But MacArthur did a number of other interesting things some of the biographers there who were writing about him didn't expect. He invited Roger Baldwin to come over to Japan to teach.

**Q:** Head of the Civil Liberties Union?

SIRKIN: Founder and then Chief of the American Civil Liberties Union. He came over to teach the Japanese or advise how to teach the Japanese to understand civil liberties as understood in the United States. That surprised again some of these more conservative correspondents. They didn't expect that. Also, MacArthur was breaking up the zaibatsu. Some of his staff had been recruited from academia, Washington bureaucracy, New Dealers whatever and they were trustbusters at home. They were going to trust bust.

**Q:** Would you explain what a zaibatsu was?

SIRKIN: A zaibatsu was a big Japanese trust, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, etc. There were four big ones and there was an effort by the occupation, the Industry Department of MacArthur's occupation, to break them up and the assumption was as in Germany where people were assuming that one of the forces behind Hitler was big steel... and that a similar thing was going on in Japan and one way to do it was to apply trust busting techniques, including introduction of American-Western taxation norms and tax collection procedures. I always remember The New York Times correspondent who specialized particularly in the economics side, Burton Crane, once told me that he was given an explanation from a Japanese person of how the Japanese operate when the occupation comes in and tells them "We know you keep two sets of books, one that you really keep for yourself so you know how the business is doing and the other to show the tax collector. Now your American tax reforms are forcing us to keep three sets of books, one to see our books, a second when they tell us we know you keep two sets of books, and we say okay, we'll show you the other set, and a third set for us so we'll know what’s really going on in our business”.

**Q:** Did you run across any effort by General Willoughby, who was General MacArthur's sort of hatchet man? Did he ever try to interfere, was there discomfort with the news bureau?

SIRKIN: There were several situations that arose. The correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor was among four or five others liked to play on the investigative side and was a little bit
more liberal than the rest, thinking MacArthur wasn't doing enough to destroy the Japanese industrial establishment. They occasionally would write a piece that wasn't 100% supportive of what, let's say, the SCAP the government section wanted to see published. So when the Monitor Editor in Chief, Erwin Canham, came through on one of the group visits organized by the Pentagon, I sat next to him on the plane from Tokyo to the Philippines. (The group was en route to the Philippines, Shanghai and Nanking, where they were to visit Chiang Kai-Shek and I was escort officer for this whole trip.) Mr. Canham asked me if I thought his correspondent was leftist or communist as General Whitney was apparently telling him.

Q: Courtney Whitney?

SIRKIN: Courtney Whitney who was Chief of the Government Section and whose office wrote this very liberal constitution for Japan. I told him I didn't think so. He was just writing what he found and what he saw. Some of it was not to the mind of the correspondent entirely favorable to the occupation authorities, but many of the articles were favorable. They were very touchy. MacArthur was a very tough personality and commander and they didn't like anything that might irritate him; he was very sensitive to what appeared in the press, I gather. So I was at least able to reassure him. He didn't pull him out. Another time, Willoughby or somebody else got very annoyed with two correspondents, Tilton of The London Daily Herald, the labor paper in London, and Bill Costello of CBS. Some of MacArthur's staff wanted to get rid of these two. They weren't going to kick them out, but if they went home on leave they wouldn't be allowed back in. When I heard about this, I wrote a very strong memo to my boss, General Baker, which he apparently passed up to his guru, General Whitney. Apparently Whitney and Willoughby were at cross-purposes on many issues. My boss, luckily for me, was working for General Whitney and the end result was they weren't kicked out. I had tried to explain purely in terms of defense of General MacArthur's reputation that if something like this happened it would arouse the entire press against the General. What these two correspondents now say may be a bit negative on CBS and certainly in The London Daily Herald, not one of the biggest papers in London. This would be much less critical of MacArthur than what would arise if they were expelled. I trust other people said the same thing. To this day I think Mrs. Costello thinks I was one of the people pushing to get Costello excluded, but that was not the case.

Another case involving General Willoughby: Vice President Wallace made an anti-colonial speech somewhat critical of the British and French, but especially the British. All of this was going on right after the war. But the occupation had rules for the Japanese press: they were not to criticize any of the Allied powers. So here is the Vice President of the United States making a speech. General Willoughby's department was the censor of the Japanese press, and they were told at some point that evening after Wallace had made this speech, that they were not to use it. This was a year or two into the occupation and the American correspondents were very close to a lot of the Japanese press and used some of them as their legmen for stories. They had arrangements and would have copies of what they wrote. A couple of the correspondents knew Japanese well and the Associated Press man was Russell Grimes. I think he had actually been in Japan and knew Japanese, and I think he was one of the prisoners who were finally locked up later in the Philippines. So that evening I was in the office alone and the only one in the newsroom was Russ Grimes. He was busily picking out the story that the U.S. government was telling the Japanese press they mustn't print the speech by the American Vice President. And he
had taken it up with the Colonel who worked for Willoughby, who was in charge of the press and he was writing what this man Colonel Stratton, I believe, had said. So he was writing this story, I gathered. I didn't look over his shoulder but he was telling me briefly, “Oh, have I got a good story”. I answered the phone myself and when it rang, General Willoughby was on the other end and he asked if Russ Grimes was working on this story, and wondered if he had gotten a statement from Colonel Stratton. I said I didn’t know, but I thought he was there working, that he’d been writing stuff, sending it out. Russ Grimes, I think, gathered what the conversation was and who it was, so he immediately waved his hands to tell him it was too late to stop. So I told Willoughby I didn’t know what I could do about it, but I would go and find out. I came back to the phone and told Willoughby, “Yes, Russ Grimes says he has written the story and has a statement from the Colonel that it is already on the wires; it's gone off”. To this day, I'm not sure if it was already on the wire or if it was about to go on the wire. But I was in no position to get in the same box with this. I heard Willoughby curse; I don't know if he was cursing me, obviously very unhappy because this put him in the box. This was an ambiguous thing. He had two rules. One was the American Vice President should be able to be quoted by the Japanese press and he shouldn't be censored. On the other hand he had ruled that nothing was to be said against the British or the French. So partly because I was working for a General on Whitney's side, and maybe because of developments like this, I was not in Willoughby's good books. Ultimately it came back a year or two later when at some point Willoughby convinced MacArthur to put the press people under one of his guys and not under General Baker who was a friend of General Whitney. I was immediately packed off because I was the Chief. That was two years after I was doing this and I had had a pretty good run.

Q: What was your impression of the early days of the Japanese press?

SIRKIN: I was not a Japanese speaker or reader and I personally did not have direct contact. I had some contact with the Japanese press in Kyoto because we didn't have that division. So for a few months I got to know well the Kyoto correspondent of Mainichi and a couple of the other correspondents covering South India for the Tokyo press and the economic papers. One of the fellows I dealt with a lot from Mainichi had studied in California and spoke very good English and was a very good journalist as far as I could tell. I have no personal opinion about their enterprise. They were quite professional, they knew the system of Western reportage but, of course, unlike the American press they had very few pages in the Western press. I guess like the British post-war press they were very thin in the amount of space they had. I don't think I can give you any thoughtful response on that one.

Q: When did you leave MacArthur's command?

SIRKIN: In '48. I was a Major. I think when I started this job I was a Captain. I was promoted to Major and then I found that a lot of people took off their uniform and put on a suit. They did exactly the same job at twice the salary. Since I wasn't going to stay on in the regular Army I did the same thing and for the last year or so, I was just a civilian working for the War Department.

Q: This would ’47 - ’48?

SIRKIN: Yes, ’47, because I left in ’48. This was in ’47 though.
Q: Was there any change in sort of the MacArthur hold on things? I mean did you feel it was phasing itself out at all?

SIRKIN: Oh, no. I used to have breakfast in the Dai Ichi Hotel and got to know a lawyer who was one of the main people working for Whitney drafting the new Japanese constitution. He was a Japanese speaker. The phase-out hadn't happened by the time I left; it hadn't yet transpired.

I was there for the beginning of the War Crimes Trials and played a tiny, but interesting role in one little side-light of it. The indictment for the War Crimes Trials was drawn up by another section of MacArthur's staff. It was actually a New York political lawyer type producing the indictment. The indictment was not just Tojo and his people, but it was for generals involved in Chinese atrocities and the Philippines and everywhere. So it was a big tome they had been working on, collecting material. I was getting evidence from military and others, and one of my reporters was a WAC Captain, I think her name was Captain Smith. She would keep me informed about dates and what was going to happen, how it was going to be handled. Close to the first day of the trial the question was, "How do we publicize the indictment?" This related to the crimes of Yamamoto and Tojo, and all the diplomats and military and Navy people, etc. As the date approached, I was still puzzling about how to deal with it. I think it was my boss who told me that Sir William Weir wanted to see me in his quarters. Sir William Weir was the Chief Justice of Australia and he was the Chief Justice of the War Crimes Trial, so I don't know why he didn't talk to my boss. I guess he apparently found out who ran the press show and he wanted to see me. He asked me how I planned to handle the issuance of the indictment, so I said, "Well, the usual procedure is as we go through the indictment, they put a release date on it, hold for release so the press of the world can read it and be aware of what's in it ahead of time. Then the indictment comes to them. They'll be prepared and maybe even write their stories in advance." So he said, "Yes, I know that's the way the press works and that is why I am calling. I'm trying to tell you, paraphrase me - if one word about what's in the indictment appears anywhere in the world in any newspaper or on any radio (there wasn't any TV then), anywhere in the world and I find out about it, I will declare a mistrial."

So I knew it was up to me to decide. I told him, "If I don't put something out in advance, reporters from all over the world will be coming in with photographers and they will be in your courtroom, and they will not have heard a single word about the trial. When the indictment is handed up to your desk, there won't be any copies, there won't be anything."

So he said, "Well, I understand that all I'm telling you is as a result of the way I handle the issuance to the press of the text and what is in the indictment that if anything happens that appears anywhere in the world, I will declare a mistrial." So my solution was not to put out anything in advance. I got hold of the indictment just the day before it was to be presented. I sat up a good part of the night reading it and then sitting up at the typewriter. We didn't have Xerox then, so we mimeographed. I mobilized all the stenographers from my staff and borrowed some others. I had the guards, the soldiers who generally guarded outdoors, come in to be around my office while this operation was going on the night before so that nobody could give out this information to anybody before the indictment was issued. But in order to avoid the mad scramble in the courtroom I just announced that the indictment would be delivered to the press outside my
office in the Radio Tokyo Building, about two miles away from where the trial was. A couple of the press people showed up there; the AP had three or four guys to cover the procedures. All the press was in the pressroom. I had all these things ready with complete copies of the indictment and a press release that I wrote summarizing it. It was three or four pages. I instructed Captain Smith to be in the courtroom and see when the indictment was handed to Chief Justice Sir William Weir, and to get immediately to a phone and tell me that the indictment was on his desk. As soon as I got that call, I distributed the indictment to all the press. In those days right after the war there was a lot of press competition. Editors and publishers used to run ads saying for instance, “UP beat AP by 5 ½ minutes in announcing the end of the war. So a day later I had the satisfaction of Russ Grimes coming to tell me he beat everybody, UP, INS, Reuters and the French press only because he just took my press release and handed it to the copy boy to put it on the wire “as is”. Then he sat down and wrote his own version. So at least my press release was good enough to win him his five or six-minute advantage over UP, INS and Reuters for covering the trial the first day of the indictment.

Q: What was the general feeling about the trial? Later there was considerable unease, you might say, in American circles about the trial of General Yamashita for war crimes in the Philippines.

SIRKIN: I'm afraid I didn't follow it that closely. I know there were some people who were cynical as they were in Germany about the war crimes trials. These were just the victors exacting their revenge or whatever, in some illegal form or appearance of form. But, there were all kinds of stories about mitigating circumstances that somebody wasn't quite as bad as others were, and in some cases it wasn't necessarily the commander who was responsible for what some of the troops did. There were reports of some sort of benevolent or good things some of these people had done, too, during the war. So some were sort of a mixed bag and Yamashita was a very prominent figure who had stories on both sides of the ledger, but I had no personal experience about it. I wasn't able to then, and am not able now either to express any view on that.

HOWARD MEYERS
Legal Advisor to General Willoughby
Tokyo (1946-1949)

Howard Meyers was born and raised in New York City. He attended the University of Michigan and then Harvard Law School, before joining the U.S. Army in 1942. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955, working mainly in the Arms Control area. He served in several posts in England, Japan, and Belgium, as well as in the U.S. Mr. Meyers was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 2000.

MEYERS: When my time came to go back to the States and be discharged from the Army, (incidentally although we were military units in the Counterintelligence Corps we were never allowed to admit that we were in the army and indeed my identification badge simply said “Special Agent of the War Department”). At any rate, I got out of the Army in the spring. I think it was late March of 1946 and I had a very interesting job that I obtained as the legal and administrative assistant to the deputy administrator in the War Assets Administration. On the day
that I reported to work, I got a cable from Tokyo asking me to come back to one of the sections in SCAP headquarters and I did. I was, in effect, the legal advisor to the G2, General Willoughby, then switched over to the Government Section, the Courts and Law Division, as the head of the criminal affairs branch, a small group of lawyers with both domestic and foreign law experience, as foreign legal advisors to the Japanese government in the modernization of the basic Japanese law codes.

The codes had to be in conformity with the Constitution and, on this matter, the Government Section played a major role, as the history books have well recorded. The fact of the matter was that the objectives were set forth in Constitutional type language very generally and the Japanese government found, or rather we helped them find, that in fact they were really engaged in a modernization process, rather than in a substantial law review process of a constitutional nature. The objectives were stated in much more general terms than they would be in the code law of Japan, since Japanese law had drawn on various European codes basically, in order to get out from under the extraterritorial aspects of foreign government interests from the period of the Meiji restoration. The objectives were general. How to get there was much more specific, and open to all sorts of interpretations. Rather than mandating how the changes should or possibly could be made, we in effect were ring holders. It was a very interesting exposure to the complexities of the political and the legal systems of Japan, if one can draw a distinction, and I think one can, both being open to a great deal of change.

We played an important role in helping induce the various Japanese specialists, whether from the Procurator General’s office or the Ministry of Justice, or the bar associations, or the law professors in helping them find ways in resolving very real differences, and only rarely carried out that mandatory role which we were actually authorized to do. The result is that in most of the reforms that occurred, and these ranged from the civil and family codes to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Agricultural Law revision, and on and on, we were helpful rather than mandatory. It was this background, I’m describing this at more length than perhaps is even remotely justified because it was this background that led me to realize that I was more interested in foreign affairs, in more general terms, than in law as a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives. I decided to return and see if I could not find a job in the foreign affairs field in Washington.

HENRY GOSHO
Japan Desk, USIS
Washington, DC (1946-1950)

_Henry Gosho was born in Seattle, Washington in 1921. Much of his career with USIS was spent in Japan. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on January 4, 1989._

GOSHO: I was assigned to the Japan desk of what was called the Foreign Activity Correlation Division, called FC. I was there from 1946 through the beginning of 1950. In those days, the Voice of America was under the State Department. In 1950, it was decided that they would start
a Japanese language program, and they decided that I should be detailed to New York to help set up and oversee the Japanese program. Sax Bradford was then the chief of FC, and Herman Barger was the deputy.

I was in New York, and it soon became evident after several testings of those Japanese living in the U.S. that announcing Japanese was a professional job, and you needed someone who knew professional radio broadcasting. So I was sent to Japan to recruit announcers from NHK. Sax Bradford, when I arrived in Japan, was the PAO. Olcott Deming was the deputy. They asked if I'd be interested in coming to Tokyo as a FSSO. We were then a part of the diplomatic section under GHQ SCAP, and Sax was the head of the information unit. George Atcheson was designated what we would now call the Ambassador. Then he died in a plane crash, and then William Sebald took over.

I was interviewed by William Sebald, Director of the Diplomatic Section, who said, "I understand you fought against the Japanese during the war."

I said, "Well, yes, I did. That's right."

He said, "Well, that may present a problem because we submit all the names to the Foreign Office, and if they find out that you were involved in the war against them, they may turn you down."

I said, "Well, if that happens, that's what happens." But Sax Bradford and John Emmerson went to work on it, as did Olcott Deming, and eventually, the State Department agreed to process my "papers."

So they submitted my name. The Foreign Office approved, and so I was getting ready to be transferred to Tokyo from New York when they discovered that Jeanne, my wife, was born in Japan and was an alien. There was no way that you could get citizenship at that time. This was 1951. It wasn't until 1954 that the Walter McCarran -- I've forgotten the other part -- Act passed, and State immediately processed her papers. But before that, I was assigned to Tokyo on a six-month basis.

I guess it was during that era -- when the Peace Treaty was signed, the diplomatic section was abolished, MacArthur vacated the residence and the chancery, as we knew it -- and we became USIA.

WILLIAM E. HUTCHINSON
Staff of General MacArthur
Tokyo (1946-1951)

Information Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1952-1954)
William E. Hutchinson was born in 1917. His career with USIS included foreign assignments in Japan, Pakistan, Libya, Nigeria, and Hong Kong. He was interviewed by Jack O'Brien on August 10, 1989.

HUTCHINSON: At the end of the war, I came back to Honolulu briefly but was almost immediately recruited by General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. There I became chief editor of the monthly reports that General MacArthur made to the American people and the world about his stewardship of the occupation of Japan and Korea and the Ryukyu Islands.

Q: That was a civil activity?

HUTCHINSON: That was a civil activity. We recorded the civil side of the Occupation. I had a crew of about a hundred people -- statisticians, historians, analysts, draftsmen, all sorts of people. We put together comprehensive monthly reports on the civil aspects of the occupation -- political and governmental affairs, the trial of war criminals and purge of many people implicated in wartime policies, economic activities, the reform of Japanese education, and so on.

Later on, the emphasis shifted to historical studies of the Occupation. We put together a series of 50-odd monographs on all sorts of political, social and economic aspects of the Occupation. Some of these individual monographs were pretty hefty, running several hundred pages apiece. They generally covered the prewar history of the topic, leading up to the situation faced at the outset of the Occupation, and then the actions taken by the Occupation authorities and the Japanese to solve these problems.

This project lasted until the end of the Occupation. At the end of the Occupation, therefore, I found myself really quite familiar with a vast array of information about Japan, and I had been in Japan more than six years.

As the Occupation wound down, I was asked by a joint delegation from the State Department, War Department and CIA to take a small group of my people and put together a draft national intelligence survey of Japan.

Q: This would have been what year?

HUTCHINSON: This was in 1951. So we produced more or less a rewrite -- a shortened rewrite -- of the work that we had done as historians and reporters over the past half dozen years.

I also helped in the allocation and disposition of the libraries and other information assets of the Occupation. These papers were distributed among the State Department, War Department, CIA and the American Embassy.

About the time this was being completed -- and my team and I had offices in the American Embassy while doing this job -- Charlie Arnot, an old friend whom I had known during the war and before in the United Press news agency, was at that time the assistant director of the press and publications service of USIA, and he had come to Tokyo to look over the newly established USIS office. Anyway, when he wandered through the Embassy, he was surprised to find me
there. He came up to me, and he said, "What are you doing here?" I told him. He said, "Why aren't you working for USIS?"

I said, "Well, nobody has invited me."

He said, "I'll see to that." So he went and talked to Sax Bradford, who was the PAO, and to Olcott Deming, who was the Deputy PAO of USIS Tokyo, and in due course, I was brought into USIS Tokyo.

My first experience with USIS was getting evicted from the splendid house I had enjoyed during the Occupation. I had had quite high rank in the Occupation as a civilian, and housing to match. The moment that I joined USIS, I lost all that and had to go out on the Japanese economy and find a house of my own. It was quite a comedown, but we recovered all right.

In due course, I was appointed to a fairly lowly position in the information side of USIS as publications officer. There was not much of a script written for what a publications officer should do, although everybody knew you had to have one, and so I improvised a good many things. I was blessed by absolutely first-rate local employees in my section who provided invaluable assistance in getting to know people in the publishing field and helping me to work on them.

Some of the things I did, such as providing subsidies for anticommunist books and other publications, were not exactly within the USIS mandate and might have been judged improper by standards adopted later, but they were thought useful and effective at the time.

Meanwhile, in this job, I met a great many Japanese editors of newspapers and magazines, especially the intellectual magazines, of which Japan had then, as it does now, a great number of all descriptions -- from far right to quite far left. And I was in a somewhat peculiar position because I was now, oh, fourth or fifth ranking information officer compared with being perhaps the number one or two level in rank in my section of the Embassy previously.

In any case, we were fortunate in having an Ambassador at that time, Robert Murphy, who was undoubtedly a great man. He took an interest in what I was doing, invited me to one of his staff meetings to explain my activities and thus brought my work and the capabilities of my office to the attention of other people in the Embassy. We got a lot of useful propaganda published in the Japanese press, especially in the magazines, which was my specialty. We also sponsored a number of original books by Japanese writers as well as American books in translation. The book operation developed into a separate branch of my operation in Tokyo.

And so things went along for about a year and a half. There was one editor in particular with whom I became friendly. He had a magazine that was slightly left-wing to my way of thinking in those times, but not very far left wing. I can't for the life of me remember what the name of the magazine was now. It wasn't quite at the top of the list like "Chuo Koron" or "Sekai," but it was about third or fourth in line among the leading intellectual magazines. But it was an important magazine. And this editor, whose name was Hara, and his given name was Katsu, became very friendly, although a little standoffish. Mr. Hara spoke a certain amount of English, and we got
along pretty well. I think it's important to realize that by this time, I had been in Japan something like seven years. I knew the ropes. I also knew a great deal of the background and the underlying causes of many of the surface phenomena that we saw in those days.

In any case, I began to notice that no Saturday would pass without Mr. Hara stopping by my house without invitation, without prior notice. He would come in, and he would smoke my cigarettes, and he would drink my beer, and he would talk and talk and talk. It always lasted an hour and a half to two hours, and it happened every Saturday, without fail.

Q: Talking about what?

HUTCHINSON: All sorts of things. Current policy, current politics, current events -- there was no limit to the range of his questions. It was perfectly apparent, however, because he didn't really smoke much, and he didn't really drink much, that he was not there to smoke my cigarettes or to drink American beer. He had some other business in the back of his mind. But I was long enough in Japan to know how to play along with this, so I told the political section of the Embassy what was going on. They encouraged me to keep up these contacts, and report back if anything interesting happened.

These meetings went on for about a year and a half. And then at length one day, Mr. Hara said to me, "Mr. Hutchinson, I have a friend, he's in politics -- well, he's not exactly in politics, but he's an important figure in the background of politics. I'd like you to meet him."

I said, "I'd like very much to meet him, Mr. Hara."

Of course, I notified the political section right away, and so in the course of another week or so, he brought along and introduced Mr. Kishi, Mr. Nobusuke Kishi.

Q: This would have been what year?

HUTCHINSON: That would have been '53 I should think, 1953. What month it was, I don't know. But Mr. Kishi I knew by reputation to have been implicated but not convicted of war crimes. He had been a member of the Manchukuo administration -- a fairly important member of the Manchukuo administration -- and he had been held at Sugamo prison for some time.

He was imprisoned for some time, but he was never indicted. Eventually, he was released and not purged from politics like so many of the pre-war Japanese politicians. We set up another meeting, and to this meeting, I invited some people from the political section.

Q: And when you first met Kishi, did he consider it just purely social, or did he say that he had something in mind?

HUTCHINSON: Oh, it was just social. But he had some political ideas, and obviously, he wanted to talk politics. And I took the opportunity to say I'd like to invite some of my friends from the political section.
Now you must understand that in those days, anybody in Kishi's position would have been watched like a hawk by the Japanese police. And anybody in the position of the American Ambassador or the Counselor for Political Affairs or Economic Counselor, anybody at the upper levels of the Embassy, would have been watched, too. But I provided neutral ground where people like this could meet without being watched.

At that time, I had never had any contact with the then Ambassador, John M. Allison. However, I found out many years later that Allison knew all about all this, had been properly informed, and gave his blessing to the whole venture.

But anyhow, we had this meeting, and to it, I invited a number of people from the political section. I don't remember them all for certain, but certainly one of them was Sam Berger, later an Ambassador, now deceased. Berger was then Political Counselor for the Embassy. Also, there was Bill Leonhart, also a retired Ambassador now, and Dick Lamb, who was Japanese language expert, he's been dead for many years. I believe Dick Finn -- a classmate of yours and mine, Jack, at the War College in 1959 -- was one of those there, I'm pretty sure. There may have been others, I don't remember, but those four I'm pretty sure of.

And we had a number of meetings in my house in Meguro, where we provided the food and drink, and I sat and listened while the dealing was done by the plenipotentiaries -- Kishi and the people from the political section.

The parts that I do remember were extremely interesting. This can all be checked up on if the historical section of State will provide us with a look at some of the messages of those days. But in any case, as I remember it, Kishi outlined his foreign policy, and he outlined his major political game plan, which was as follows: He was going to upset the then ruling Liberal Party of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, and he was then going to wreck the party and rebuild it in a slightly different form. And he outlined the number of senior statesmen -- about five of them as I remember -- who would have to become prime minister for reasons of precedence before he himself could become prime minister.

He also outlined his foreign policy. Fifteen points, as I recall it, something like Wilson's 15 points, and we went down through a checklist where he showed which points corresponded to U.S. policy and which points conflicted with U.S. policy and he explained why he had chosen the policies that he had.

And all this, reporting all this was of course not my responsibility but the responsibility of the political section, which obviously did its job.

Q: Was it clear, Hutch, that he was presenting these views in order to seek the approval or comment of the Americans?

HUTCHINSON: I think it was clear that he wanted at least the tacit backing of the United States government. He didn't want objection from the U.S. government, and he wanted the U.S. government to understand where he stood because he intended -- fully intended -- for these things to happen.
Q: Did any of our people comment as he presented his plans?

HUTCHINSON: Oh, yes. Yes. But I don't think anybody challenged them particularly. I don't remember anybody challenging them, disputing the basis of his judgment of particular policy points.

In any case, in the fullness of time, it all happened exactly as he had laid it out, except I think one of the would-be prime ministers died before he could be appointed. But Kishi came in as prime minister and head of the new Liberal Democratic Party, and so these talks really laid the groundwork for the past 35 years of Japanese-American relations.

Q: And it all had its origins in the Hutchinson house.

HUTCHINSON: In our living room, exactly. One curious thing that I have never quite understood is that shortly before I left Japan in May of 1954, Mr. Kishi invited Kimiyo and me...

Q: Camille? Let's identify.

HUTCHINSON: My wife and me to dinner and an evening at the Kabuki Theater.

Q: This was when he was prime minister?

HUTCHINSON: No, he had not yet become prime minister. But he invited us to this extraordinary dinner and theater party. Mrs. Kishi told me on that occasion that it was the first time in 20 years he had invited her along on one of his evening parties.

Q: But this was his way, obviously, of thanking you for your services.

HUTCHINSON: Of thanking me for my services, yes. But what made it extraordinary in my view, was that I was still an obscure officer in the Embassy. I was not somebody, a prize to be paraded. And yet, during the intermission, he did indeed parade Kimiyo and me around through the foyers of the Kabuki-za and obviously was showing us off to his political friends -- for reasons that I have never yet figured out.

I said earlier that I found out later that Ambassador Allison knew all about this deal. That's because when I was in Hong Kong many years later, in 1971 or '72, there was a PAOs' conference in Honolulu, and one of the events at the conference was a big garden party. Ambassador Allison was there. And so I went up to this little old man standing, leaning on his cane, and I said, "Mr. Ambassador, you won't remember me, but..."

He said, "Yes, I remember you, you're Bill Hutchinson. I remember you very well."

Q: Well, Hutch, before we go on to your next assignment, do you have any final observations on your experiences in Japan?
HUTCHINSON: Yes, I have two or three things to say. First of all, I think it's true, and I think it's of lasting importance that I probably would not have been chosen to be this intermediary between Kishi and the U.S. government if I had not already been in Japan about 7 or 8 years and thus quite attuned to Japanese ways of doing business. I do not think that anybody fresh off the boat or out of the plane can expect to have the sensitivity to the ways of doing business of another country that you gain through living there for a long time.

Second, I think it's important that I was a fairly obscure figure. If I had been a very prominent figure in the Embassy, I probably could not have filled this role. The moral is, of course, that junior officers can do important work if they have the confidence of their bosses.

One must recognize too, that Kishi was faced with an imperative that required him to act. It's gratifying that I was the chosen instrument. But if I hadn't been available, I have no doubt he would have found someone else.

Third, I think it's important to say this was not really a one-man show. I left Japan in May 1954, but the contacts between Kishi and the American Embassy through USIS continued, and the people who carried on those contacts were, first of all, Kenneth Bunce. And after him Bob -- your friend, Bob Beecham, who became quite close to Kishi and indeed served, I understand, as his English teacher for some time. So we had set up something that created a lasting relationship.

JOHN R. O'BRIEN
Press Analyst, Civil Information and Education
Japan (1946-1948)

Public Affairs Information Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1948-1951)

John R. O'Brien was born in Seattle, Washington in 1918. His career with Civil Information and Education and USIS included posts in Japan, Indonesia, Burma, and Thailand. He was interviewed by Hans Tuch on February 15, 1988.

Q: What specifically did you do?

O'BRIEN: The first part of it was to analyze the Japanese press and magazines. That was routine. That developed into a job which was under the policy and programs part of the Civil Information and Education section of the occupation. This section of the occupation, SCAP, as it was called, Supreme Commander Allied Powers...

Q: That was General MacArthur?

O'BRIEN: That was General MacArthur. The purpose of this section was to revise the educational system in Japan and to preserve their arts and monuments, which was well done by Ken Bunce, and to work with the Japanese Government in explaining to the people the
importance of their new constitution, their new civil code, their criminal code, land reform and the range of astonishing developments that took place in the late forties.

Q: This was in 1947-48?

O'BRIEN: Right.

Q: Under the Supreme Commander, under General MacArthur, how was that organized? You said Ken Bunce ran it. Was it an office of Civil Affairs?

O'BRIEN: Well, Ken Bunce was a branch chief. Civil Information and Education was on the same level as other large parts of the occupation. We had the misfortune of having as a chief a lieutenant colonel in the United States Marine Corps. Nothing against him, but he was up against two-star Army generals, his opposite numbers in other sections of SCAP. But he had been in Japan before the war and was a competent enough guy.

We had, then, the responsibility, as I mentioned, of working with the Japanese, both their private and government groups, in explaining these tremendously important reforms and to win acceptance for them. Now, clearly, you simply couldn't go out and say, "General MacArthur says you have to believe in this new constitution." We had to win Japanese support and develop with them information programs involving all the media that were available, and they were all available.

Q: Actually what methods, what media, what programs did you employ in this?

O'BRIEN: Well, as an example, the press, although technically under SCAP control, was fairly free. It could not, obviously, argue against the occupation, but by using our connections with the press, we would encourage interviews with people who were free of a taint of the militarism of Japan.

Q: Did you, for instance, license editors to start papers and have them?

O'BRIEN: No. The old Japanese papers were permitted to resume, including Akahata (Red Flag), the Japanese communist newspaper. Now, as I said, it was quite clear they could not declare war on the occupation. They had to mind their P's and Q's on that. But we had a determined policy that came from MacArthur himself -- freedom of the press short of saying that MacArthur is a bum.

Q: This was, at that time, under the auspices of the U.S. Army.

O'BRIEN: Yes.

Q: Approximately how many Americans were involved in this kind of a major re-education program?

O'BRIEN: Oh, gosh, Tom, I don't know. I worked side by side with people in uniform. Many
then converted to civilian status. You'd be working with the same person again. So it's hard to put a number on it. I just don't know.

**Q:** At that time, if I remember correctly, the whole concept of cultural centers, information centers -- in Germany, they were called Amerka Hauser, in Japan, I don't know what they were called -- also got started at that time and became a very prominent element of this program.

**O'BRIEN:** Our first effort was to strengthen their own libraries and to bring in books that they needed. The actual cultural centers began, as I recall, after the occupation, and as part of what USIS brought in. [Editor's Note: Before the Occupation ended, the CI&E section had established 24 libraries (Bunka Senta), all local costs of which were financed by the Army from GARIOA, local currency accounts controlled by SCAP. American center directors, books and vehicles were supplied by army appropriated funds. These 24 centers were taken over by the Department of State's U.S. Information and Education Office (USIE -- the predecessor of USIA) when the Peace Treaty became effective on April 29, 1952. Abroad USIA installations are called USIS.]

**Q:** How would you evaluate this overall effort? Do you think it largely contributed to the democratization of Japan, or was it, in a way, tangential or inconsequential to the overall development of the new Japan?

**O'BRIEN:** Well, I'm clearly prejudiced. I think that it was a remarkably successful occupation, one that you only need to turn to the Wall Street Journal any day and see how successful Japan is economically. We find that their democratic system works -- there are honest elections; there's a vigorous free press; land reform has certainly taken root. We introduced reforms that have become permanent. Now, the constitution is referred to from time to time as imposed; that's correct. But it hasn't been thrown out. When we take a look at Japan's recovery and its power today, I think we have to say the occupation deserves some credit for innovation, for ideas that won acceptance by the Japanese. They could not be imposed; they had to be sold to the Japanese. They were sold, and I give them much of the credit, clearly. So I look back on a joint enterprise with pride.

**Q:** Would you agree with me in what I said at the beginning, that I thought that these activities that we carried on in Japan -- and, of course, in Germany, too -- were among those that really started this whole idea of public diplomacy blooming, as far as the U.S. Government was concerned?

**O'BRIEN:** I think that's a fair conclusion, Tom. We certainly learned much in Japan that had validity later when the Peace Treaty was signed. But there was a momentum created in that period because in Japan, we were clearly dealing with dynamic people, people of great intelligence, determined to get back into the mainstream of world society. As one of my Japanese friends said, "We want to get back to dealing with respectable people." They had been cut off so long that they were hungry to get back into the mainstream. This is where, in my job, I found myself increasingly becoming a bridge between Japanese groups who were out of touch with people in America. The United Nations was the first example. The Japanese were eager, eager, eager from the beginning of talk about the U.N., to become a part of it. They saw this as a return to decency, and I found myself swamped with requests for information about the U.N. I set up a
relationship with Wilder Foote, who then was Press and Publications Chief at the U.N., and with American groups, private groups that were supporting the U.N., all of which the Japanese would have done in due time, but they were out of touch with much of the rest of the world. So it was in that sense that we were a bridge.

Q: You had experience with Japanese people and Japanese culture. Was it difficult for an American or Americans who had entirely different history and different cultural experience to relate and be able to work with Japanese?

O’BRIEN: Oh, of course. Of course.

Q: How did that resolve itself?

O’BRIEN: Oh, you simply had to rely on good interpreters, in many cases, or on Japanese who had lived abroad. It would be a truly arrogant American, with the exception of those who were perhaps born in Japan, who would say he understood the Japanese and their reaction to all things. So, sure, that cultural barrier, the language barrier, was always there, but that didn't discourage us because both sides were willing to try to make it work. This was the key to it. The Japanese saw it was in their interest to make it work, and that was the big thing.

Q: Why did we never broadcast in Japanese on the Voice of America?

O’BRIEN: We did.

Q: When did this start?

O’BRIEN: It started just after the war. Yes, and went on until, oh, it was the '50s when it was decided that the Japanese had such an astonishingly effective radio system of their own that we weren't reaching much of a market. We had at the time, also, to bring each year from Japan the fastest announcers because the Japanese language was changing. And so we had to constantly improve, but it finally became a budget victim.

Q: When?

O’BRIEN: I would say about the late '50s.

Q: Is there anything else that you find significant that you would like to mention about your Japanese experience?

O’BRIEN: Roger Baldwin, who was founder of the American Civil Liberties Union, was brought out to Japan by Douglas MacArthur. An unlikely combination, isn't it?

Q: Absolutely.

O’BRIEN: MacArthur -- people can find fault with him in many, many ways, but he was a liberal in the sense that he wanted to have the Japanese people become aware of civil rights. Baldwin
came out and worked mainly with the legal section of the occupation. Then there was this job of trying to explain who he was, what he was doing, what his thoughts were, how they might apply to Japan. That fell in my lap, and it was a wonderful experience. It was curious that Roger Baldwin, a very well educated and sophisticated man, had to be convinced that the Japanese did not attach as much importance to the rights of the individual as they did to the rights of the family, but he learned that you had to convert the idea of civil liberties into a different context in Japan and to relate it to the family importance. Roger and I became good friends, and we continued our friendship when I came back here.

Norman Cousins came out. He was editor of Saturday Review then. I forget how I happened to get in touch with him, but he was looking for a woman named Shizue Kato, who, before the war, had been a very active feminist and a peace leader in Japan. Through some Japanese friends, we got Norman in touch with her. There were many other people of such caliber who came through. They were often turned over to us because we had the connections with the press, with other media, so they could pass on their message.

KATHRYN CLARK-BOURNE
Military Intelligence
Tokyo (1947-1950)

Kathryn Clark-Bourne was born in 1924 in Fort Collins, Colorado. She graduated from the University of Washington with a degree in journalism. She gained an interest in international affairs after working in Japan working with the Military Intelligence as a research analyst. Ms. Clark-Bourne later received a master’s degree in mass communications from the University of Minnesota. In addition to serving in Tokyo, she has also served in India, Iran, The Netherlands, Nigeria, and Cameroon. Ms. Clark-Bourne was interviewed on August 2, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

CLARK-BOURNE: After graduation, I got a job as editor of the West Seattle Herald, which was a small weekly newspaper. While I was doing that, I noticed an ad in a newspaper asking for typists to work in Japan, in the Army of Occupation. I wanted to see the world, so I applied and was accepted. They sent us over to Japan on a military ship. I was assigned to G-2 under General Willoughby.

Q: G-2 being the...

CLARK-BOURNE: Intelligence, military intelligence. All the Japanese who had been prisoners-of-war in Manchuria had been brought back to Japan. We had interpreters who were interviewing them for any kind of information they could tell us about Manchuria -- about how many buildings were in the camp they were in, for example.

I was a research analyst. I had to take that data and put it together into understandable reports. If I had questions, I could call back a certain prisoner-of-war and, through the interpreter, ask
questions. When I first got over there, I was just a typist in a typing pool. But, within a week, they discovered that I had a college degree. That's why I was shifted over to research analysis.

Q: When you arrived there, what was your impression of Japan in 1947?

CLARK-BOURNE: When I first got there, some of the city had been bombed out.

Q: You were in Tokyo?

CLARK-BOURNE: I was in Tokyo, in the NYK building, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha building, which was just across the street and down a little bit from the railroad station, which had been bombed.

The Japanese were very nice. For we American civilians, practically everything was off-limits. We were not to go into any of the restaurants. We were not to go into any theaters or movies. On trains we were to go only in a car that had a white line painted on the outside. Well, of course, I wanted to see Japan -- most of us did -- and travel and do things. So, we were off-limits a lot of the time. For instance, we'd go into a movie theater and, in the middle of a movie, the MPs would come in with their flashlights looking for Americans. The Japanese were very nice about hiding us in the projection room. On the trains, they'd hide us in the baggage cars, so I managed to travel all over Japan that way. In this way, I got around a lot.

I hiked a lot. The Japanese like to go out for cherry blossom viewing or autumn leaf viewing, so we'd take a train out to the mountains and spend the whole weekend on all the trails. There would be lovely inns or rest places where we could stay overnight. I took the train down to Hiroshima, which had been completely bombed out. I left there in '49; the next time I was back was in '75. I could recognize nothing, except the Palace and the moat around it. Even Frank Lloyd Wright's original Imperial Hotel was gone. It was sort of sad.

Q: With this intelligence, what was your impression of what we were after at that time?

CLARK-BOURNE: It was obvious that we were after any information we could find about the Soviet Union, and also China, because these were Communist countries at that time.

Q: Did you get any feel for the rule of General MacArthur as it pertained to what you were doing?

CLARK-BOURNE: General MacArthur was not very much liked. He was quite imperial. I had a boyfriend who was in the military. He was a German Jew, had gotten out of Germany, come across Siberia to Japan before the war. Then, when the war came, he and his family were sent to the United States. He went to school at the University of Michigan, but as he had the Japanese language, he was sent back to Japan when he joined the Army. By this time, his father was working for a big company here in the States and he'd come to Japan and visit occasionally. They had a house up at Lake Chuzenji in Japan, so we used to go up there a lot. MacArthur and wife had a place nearby and they would come up, too. There was no fraternization of any kind.
There was a tennis court down in Tokyo, near the Palace, and whenever MacArthur would come to play, his guards would come with their machine guns pointing and get everybody off of all of the courts. Not one person was allowed on any court, except MacArthur and whomever he was playing. The one thing I remember about him is that his guards -- bodyguards, I guess you'd call them -- were all very tall. When I would walk down from where I lived to the NYK building, I would pass by his office building. Usually about that time, his limousines would pull up and the guards would form lines along both sides from his car to the entrance, and he'd march through. That's all I ever had to do with him. I can't tell you anything more than that.

Q: Was there any State Department presence there at all that you were aware of?

CLARK-BOURNE: Not in Tokyo. In Yokohama, I think there was some presence at that time. When I left Japan, I had to get a passport.

Q: I think Alexis Johnson was running the place.

CLARK-BOURNE: Yes, I think so.

Q: You left there in 1949, is that right?

CLARK-BOURNE: I left in 1949.

RICHARD A. ERICSON, JR.
Consular Officer
Yokohama (1947-1950)

Economic Officer
Tokyo (1950-1952)

Japanese Language Training
Tokyo (1953)

Economic Officer
Tokyo (1954-1958)

Ambassador Richard A. Ericson, Jr. was born in 1923. He enrolled in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in 1941, but did not graduate until 1945, due in part to being drafted in the U.S. Army in 1945. In addition to his service in Japan, ambassador Ericson also served in England, Iceland, and Korea. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 27, 1995.

Q: What was your assignment to Yokohama?

ERICSON: Yokohama was a very interesting post at the time. Alex Johnson was the consul
ERICSON: Yes. I thought that I would have bosses like Alex Johnson for the rest of my career and wasn’t that going to be lovely. I should have known better because I had seen the guy who took us through the A-100 course. Alex Johnson was an extraordinary man. He had two more or less deputies, Tex Weathersby and Doug Overton, who were also prewar. Then he had a whole bunch of juniors who were just learning the ropes...anywhere from 6 to 8 vice consuls. The main jobs of the post were (1) to sort out the citizenship claims of some 80-90,000 Nisei who lived in Japan during the war, and (2) to service the occupation.

General MacArthur was very peculiar at that point about State Department operating in Japan. He had what he called his diplomatic section (PSQSCAP) which was staffed by Foreign Service officers and was to help him with his relations with the representatives of foreign countries. It wasn’t to do a hell of a lot of reporting and was to stay out of Japanese politics. It had a consular arm but they were not empowered to do anything. They could take a passport application but could not renew the passport. Their powers were severely circumscribed. This agreed with Alex too. He didn’t exactly trust the characters up in Tokyo to do right. So most of the applications that were made in Tokyo were sent down to us to process. And, of course, they came to us individually in droves. Kobe-Osaka was also open at that time and doing some consular work, but there weren’t many occupationers in that area.

Before the Korean War broke out we had opened the offices in Hokkaido, Kyushu and Nagoya.

We were also doing commercial work, consular invoices primarily and the old type of seaman work, witnessing marriages and the general consular procedures. I was the visa officer in Yokohama and did some visa work, but not to Japanese who were not allowed to travel until about the time of restoration of independence.

Q: I would like to get the dates you were in Yokohama.

ERICSON: From October, 1947 until early 1951. We left Yokohama in 1951...I was in Tokyo when the Korean War broke up.

Q: You were in Tokyo when the Korean War started which was June 25, 1950, so you left Yokohama....?

ERICSON: I misspoke, we left Yokohama and went on home leave in late 1950. We left Yokohama in early 1950 to go to Tokyo when the supervising consul general was moved to Tokyo.

Q: Well, now in this 1947-50 period, let’s talk about dealing with the Nisei. Later on I got involved in doing the same thing with dual Americans in Germany out of Frankfurt. What was the situation in Yokohama?
ERICSON: First let me discuss how Alex ran the post. He got us all together early in the day and said, “Look, there are three people who have rank. Me, Doug and Tex. The rest of you guys, regardless when you arrived, have no rank. If I appoint you as chief of the citizenship section and the guy under you outranks you, that is just too bad, he will be chief some day.” But he rotated us all through each office. We all did everything. He was meticulous seeing that we learned what it was we were supposed to do. My first job was as general consular affairs officer...marrying Sam, doing the deposit of ship papers, notary public, etc.

Dealing with the Nisei. We had two women whose names really ought to be blazoned somewhere in gold, Yuki Ohtsuki and Yuki Weminome, both of them Nisei who had married Japanese and come back to Japan and lived there during the war. Especially Yuki Ohtsuki who was a 70 lb. little wired up bundle of energy. They really ran the program and taught every guy that went through there what he was doing.

Q: I had some Germans that did that to me too.

ERICSON: Well, they knew the Immigration and Nationality Act backward and forward and they WERE Americans. Yuki Ohtsuki was married to a professor at Tokyo University which bestowed upon her considerable social status, but she was an American and nobody ever forgot it.

Yokohama did almost all of that. We had a backlog at one point that was a year and a half of appointments. But the Nisei would inquire and it was much to their advantage, whether they wanted to identify themselves as American or not, to have identification because then they could be hired as foreign nationals by the military and the Japanese gave them extra rations because they were foreigners. It pained the Japanese to do it, but they did. If they could establish citizenship, they could go to the United States.

Anyway, we had a vast backlog of cases and we would schedule... A consular officer would schedule about 8 interviews a day. People would come from all over the country. Before the interview we would send them out the list of documentation that they had to provide...what citizenship based on, prove were born, prove you are who you say you are, get the Japanese records which shows that as well as your American birth certificate. We made it as difficult for them as we possibly could to prove that they were who they were. They had to have identifying witnesses, etc.

So these hordes of people would come up. A lot of them came from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, particularly Hiroshima. When we bombed Hiroshima we did two things. Hiroshima was the center of immigration to the United States. A large portion of the poor farmers who came to the United States came from the Hiroshima area. Many when they returned to Japan left relatives back in the United States. Hiroshima was also the center of Christianity in Japan.

So, applicants would come up from Hiroshima and after three nights on a train...Yuki Ohtsuki had a horror of little bugs that jumped around and she used to spray her office every day after the last applicant had left. They would submit a formal application and then it would be reviewed by an officer. Then we had to write an advisory opinion. The advisory opinion and the application
had to be sent back to Washington in those days to the immigration people.

Q: Ruth Shipley was one of the preeminent dragons in the civil service.

ERICSON: Speaking of the A-100 course, we each drew some distinguished guest to introduce to the class as part of our training. I drew Ruth Shipley. I was scared stiff because she had that dragon reputation. But I went over to her office and it was the most pleasant interview I ever had. She did a very, very good job for us.

Anyway, somebody back in Washington, had to approve the restoration of citizenship and then it was sent back out. This whole process could take as long as two years.

Those who did show up were not from the higher strata of society. People would usually get off the train dirty, tired and smelling not particularly attractively, so all of this stuff was carried out in the basement of the consular building in Yokohama. We all got our chance. I think it was Harry Pfeiffer, a consular office, who devised the Pfeiffer automatic opinion writing document which was a great help. It had various paragraphs which you just filled in dates and information and then sent it up to the typist saying, “Paragraph A, subtitle B, fill in this information.” So you didn’t have to write the whole thing out all the time. It was our first stab at automation, I guess. But it was a big job. Part of it was providing evidence and testimony to support the government in its attempts to prevent the Nisei who we had turned down from suing for restoration of their citizenship.

There was a man by the name of Mike Matsuuta who became a very good friend of mine because we saw a lot of each other, right up to the time he died a few years ago. Mike was a lawyer for the Japan-American Citizens League in the US at that time. He was the one who brought suit on behalf of a family in the United States for some relative in Japan who had been denied citizenship by us. Of course, this was post-war II, very close to the end of the war and the feeling in the States about Japan and the Japanese wasn’t all that tender. But Mike cheerfully sued the government every time he got a good case. I don’t recall that Mike ever lost a case. I can remember cases where young men did everything conceivable to lose their citizenship...joining the army, taking what was considered an oath of allegiance, voting in elections. The outstanding case I think was the kid who had been brought back and hadn’t been registered as a Japanese so he didn’t have dual nationality when his parents brought him back in the 20’s or early 30’s. He went through a process called Kaifutu in Japan which is restoration of citizenship of Japan...Japanese law required registration within six months after birth at that time or you forfeited your nationality. He was put through this nationalization process when he was six or seven years old. He volunteered for the Japanese Navy and was a naval pilot during which he took all kinds of oaths, etc. Anyway, the guy had done everything. And he spoke no English. There was nothing American about this guy and we thought we were going to nail this fellow. Mike thought differently. He said that the renationality was done under duress, his entry into the Japanese Navy, since he wasn’t really a national of Japan at the time because the process was done without his consent, he was serving as a Japanese national. Voting was under compulsion. At that point the government decided they weren’t going to fight it any longer and he went back. A few years later, of course, the Act was changed.
Anyway we had that kind of entertainment. Then we also had the other sole interesting aspect of that job which was ferreting out those who had served in the Japanese Army who claimed that they had not. That was all brought about by this guy Mito Kawakita, who had been a prison guard. He actually hadn’t served in the army but he was a Nisei who had been employed as a prison guard somewhere down in southwestern Japan. He had been very brutal to Allied and American prisoners. He got his citizenship back very quickly. He got a passport, went to the United States and was recognized in a Los Angeles grocery store as one of the two Japanese tried for treason. There was a big hullabaloo over how Kawakita got to the United States. That happened fortunately before I got to Yokohama, but we instituted a system of background checks by the CIC. Every male who could conceivably have served was from that time on investigated by the counterintelligence people to determine whether he had or hadn’t served in the army because what they would bring as a certificate if they hadn’t served was something issued by the local village register. Everything is entered in the local register, if you served in the army it is there. The demobilization bureau of the Japanese army would also issue certificates, but their records were a mess and it was better to rely on the local record, but the local recorders got to sympathizing with these guys. Here this guy has the chance to go to the land of milk and honey and simple justice requires that I give him the certificate. When this process was first started they actually pulled 10 or 12 people off a ship who were actually on board and made them go through the process and found 4 or 5 of them who had actually served in the army.

Q: Serving in the army was considered a disqualifying factor?

ERICSON: Yes, under the Nationality Act of 1940, while a citizen. But these were Nisei, almost every one was a dual national.

That business had begun to decline by the time the call came for my transfer to Tokyo. When we went home on leave we bid farewell to the consular business.

Q: Did you have anything to do with marriages?

ERICSON: Oh yes. Before the war there were not too many Korean-Americans, but in Japan they had whore houses dedicated to the occupation within two weeks of the time troops landed. There was a lot of fraternization. A lot of it might have resulted in marriages if it hadn’t been for the fact that the Nationality Act of 1940 also prohibited the issuance of an immigrant visa to a person who was 50 percent or more of specified races, including Japanese. The army found this very convenient. There was a very small business and missionary communities in Japan. Almost everyone who was an American was affiliated with the occupation and the occupation’s rules. The occupation’s rules on marriage was that you cannot marry anybody who cannot accompany you on transfer. Therefore all these GIs who hooked up with Japanese girls were told they could not marry unless their intended was allowed to go to the States. They would transfer people if things looked like they were getting too hot. You could be transferred from Sapporo down to Kyushu. Nonetheless, the GIs became aware that political pressure could be brought to bear to rectify the situation, so there were several periods when Congress passed special legislation which said in effect...notwithstanding provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act foreign spouse of an American citizen, veteran of World War II, may enter the United States provided the marriage takes place within 60 days from the passage of this act. So it gave guys 60 days to
get the army to approve their marriage. That was done a couple of times, at least one very famous time before I arrived there. The army dodged giving permission and made it as difficult as possible. You had to have Chaplain interviews, parents consent, etc. So the result was that everybody who finally got permission to marry ended up sitting in the consulate yard on two or three days before the 60 day period elapsed. They tell me it was quite a sight.

There is a marvelous story involving Alex Johnson who was consul general in Yokohama where virtually all of these marriages were being done. Incidentally consular officers were forbidden in the words of the time to celebrate marriages. But Japanese law said that a marriage between a foreigner and a Japanese is not legal unless it is dully registered with the Japanese and unless the consul, the representative of the government of the foreigner would certify that he is legally free to marry in accordance with the laws of his country. That poses a problem for us because (a) we can’t do the marriage and (b) a federal officer cannot certify the state law and marriage is governed by state law except for the District of Columbia. Anyway, the way around it was to enter into an agreement with the one ward office in Yokohama or Tokyo, etc., that you will let them appear before you and the American citizen will swear that he is legally free to marry. Then if you are satisfied that he is legally free to marry in accordance with the laws of the state he claims to be a resident of, then you will sign these certificates to witness to marry, take all the papers from both the Americans and the Japanese involved, so that the Japanese can then tell the Japanese is okay and the act of our giving the papers would indicate it was okay by us. Then they would enter the thing in their local ward registry and then send the girl’s papers back up to her so that they can properly be entered in her home ward. Then it is all nice and legal and we can issue the certificate of witness, etc. A lot of these guys came from states where there were still antimiscegenation laws.

Q: Also there were laws prohibiting marriage of different races. This was basically to keep whites from marrying blacks, but it could spill over into Asians.

ERICSON: There were places, Idaho for example, which specifically mentions Japanese. But, you are right, many of the southeastern states had antimiscegenation aimed at blacks, not Japanese, but they applied to Japanese because of the way the law was written.

Anyway, getting back to this Alex Johnson business, Alex was a rather imposing character. He is a little stiff. He can be frightening at first appearance unless you know him really pretty well. He is a very impressive guy. He closed the consulate for everything but these marriages in order to take care of these teeming customers and get those children out from the front yard. It was August, as I recall it, and the consulate general had a big circular desk out in front. You came in the door under the great seal of the United States and the place looked like the White House. It was deliberately built during the Hoover Administration to resemble a little White House. It was a very imposing edifice and it was a little awe inspiring when you came in. You came to this big desk and then to Alex Johnson who is standing behind the thing. One day, Alex was in short temper. It was hot. The guy was carefully instructed to come prepared with all of his papers ready and his would be wife by his side. A Negro soldier, a sergeant, came in with his girl and he approached the desk. Alex rather brusquely took his papers from him and started sifting madly through them. One of the things, as I mentioned, that had to be provided, in addition to all the Army paraphernalia, was an extract from the family census register called a Koseki from the girl
so that it could be given to the War Office and sent to her to complete the cycle. He is looking through the papers and can’t find the Koseki. The sergeant meanwhile was thinking he had gotten this far but he was still not sure of making it. Here is some guy who is obviously irritated looking through his papers. Johnson looked up and gave him his cold, blue, Norwegian stare and said, “Sergeant, have you seen this girl’s Koseki” The sergeant backed off and said, “No sir, I haven’t seen nothing yet. This thing has been on the up and up.”

I didn’t participate in one of those things, but I did do the marriages among members of the occupation who had to have much the same kind of approval. What we did constituted the only legal marriage. Getting it accepted by the War Office and registered in Japan in accordance to Japanese law establishes legality in almost every state which state that Americans married abroad must be married in conformity with the laws of the state in which they are resident. But that kind of thing uncovered the fact that there probably are quite a few people who were nurses, civilian employees, etc. who married other Americans very early in the occupation and whose marriages were not legal because they were probably done by chaplains who gave them a nice certificate saying they were married. However, if any one wanted to contest one of those marriages, they probably could make it stand up.

Q: Then you went to Tokyo for a little while before you went on home leave.

ERICSON: Yes. We established the supervisory office. Johnson had left by this time. Let me tell one thing about Alex Johnson because I think it is one of the great examples in a very small way of what makes a first rate Foreign Service supervisor. I was the visa officer. There was a man in Seattle, a Nisei, who we will call Mr. Imada. Mr. Imada was a prominent Democrat, the leader of the Seattle Nisei political Democratic community. Before the war he had been a large scale importer to the United States of scrap iron. His mother was an Issei, a first generation. She had come to the United States with her husband...

Q: Issei is first generation?

ERICSON: The Issei were immigrants. They were the Japanese who came, never acquired citizenship but settled in the United States. Nisei is second generation, born in the United States, and probably dual citizens because most of the Issei registered their children promptly and had them established as Japanese. We hated the idea of dual nationality and that is what the Nationality Act aimed to eliminate.

Anyway, his mother had lived in the United States for a few years and had given birth to this guy but they had left an elder brother behind in Japan and he turned out to be quite a successful businessman in Japan. So, in the early 30’s the mother had gone back to Japan with a returning residence permit meaning she could get back to the United States as long as she kept that valid. It had a year or two period of validity. She had gone to Japan and never returned to the United States allowing her permit to elapse long before the outbreak of the war. In the three years following the war she had never applied at the consulate for anything and we hadn’t heard word one from Mr. Imada either in Seattle. However, Alex knew of him. He showed up at the consulate one day intending to see Alex and Alex was in Tokyo for a meeting. So Tex Weatherby saw him and what he said was, “I have this ancient mother. She is now in her late
‘’70s and I feel she will be much more comfortable in the United States and I would like to get her a visa to return.” Of course it was totally against regulations and policy at that time to issue a visa to anyone who had shown no inclination to go back. She really had no claim to returning resident status. Tex told him this and he got furious. Tex came in to see me and said, “Dick, take care of this guy. I have ruffled his feathers, he is mad at me.” So I took this guy and talked to him for a couple of hours. I went over and over the regulations and instructions we had. But I told him, “Look, your mother is old and infirm. Why don’t you go back and get some doctor to issue a certificate to the effect that she needs medical attention which is not available in Japan.” I said, “I think I could probably swing a temporary visa for medical treatment and if she goes to the United States for such treatment, who knows what will happen.”

Well, he thought that was a good idea and he left the office and met Johnson on the way out. They chatted and he showed no signs of alarm or anything. Anyway, he went back to Tokyo and found a telegram waiting for him at his hotel to get back to Seattle right away, so he took the next plane. On the plane he probably absorbed a few drinks and started thinking and he got mad. He wrote a letter to his lawyer...I think he was thinking of Tex but the only name he remembered was Ericson...accusing me of everything under the sun. I had two policies with respect to Nisei and Caucasians. I treated one terribly and treated the other with great courtesy. I spent more time at cocktail parties than I did in the office. I had treated him viciously and failed to listen to the justice of his request, etc. Most of it was the allegation of dual standards. His lawyer sent it to Senator Walgren and Walgren sent it to the Department with a covering letter saying that this person was a good strong supporter of Democratic activities in Seattle and important to me and I want to know what you are doing to my constituent and what kind of punishment are you going to give this miscreant out in Yokohama.

The Department, of course, sent it on out to Alex in a dispatch saying, “We want to hear promptly what kind of punishment you are going to mete out to this guy Ericson? What is with him anyway?” There was no question in the Department’s mind that I was guilty. Anyway, Johnson sat down and started his response by saying, “Your charges are misdirected. If there was anything that went on in this office that was wrong, they should have been directed at me because I am the consul general and everything that happens in this office is my responsibility. Then if there is something further to be done I will act against the individual. But first and foremost it happened here if it happened at all and it is my responsibility so you should have been charging me and not Ericson.” Then he went on to say (he went on for four pages, I still have a copy of it), “I know this guy couldn’t have done this kind of thing. Here is probably what actually happened. Etc.” Then he had Tex and me both write our recollections of the incident and enclosed them with his response. He said, “I urge the Department to inform the Senator and Mr. Imasda’s lawyer and Mr. Imasda that until each of them has apologized to Mr. Ericson in writing we will not take Mr. Imasda’s case out of the file.” That was the last we heard of it officially from the Department. I thought that was a rather extraordinary thing for a boss to do. If Alex Johnson had asked me to lie down on a railroad track right then I probably would have done it. The outcome of the case doesn’t show the Department in too good a light because six months later, by this time Johnson had left, I was still visa officer...it happened to be Larry Taylor, the guy who had been my leader in the A-100 course, and he took me aside and said, “Dick, can’t we do something about this? The Department still feels Walgren wants this done and can’t you see your way clear to making an exception of some sort?” I said, “No, I can’t and I
won’t. If I do I am knuckling under this kind of pressure and if I don’t I am being vindictive. I
don’t even want to hear about the case any further.” Actually we had nothing against the old
lady. She was a sweet old lady. She came down for her visa because he went to Jaybird Pilcher
who was the consul general replacing Johnson and he suspended me as visa officer for the day
and made Owen Zurhellen visa officer who cheerfully issued the visa contrary to all regulations.
I was perfectly happy that Owen had done it because she was a nice old lady and what the hell
difference did it really make except it was a matter of principle by that time, of course.

That was one of the things that made Alex Johnson such an extraordinary person. I was looking
forward to having all my bosses be like him, but unfortunately that was not the case. In matters
large and small, he was something else.

Q: Now you went to Tokyo....

ERICSON: I went to Tokyo for the first part of 1950. I was in the consulate in Tokyo when the
Korean War broke out. I was sent to Tokyo with Pilcher because I had had experience of every
aspect of consular work and nobody in Tokyo had and a couple of the other guys were
designated to open the new posts in Nagoya and Sapporo. I wanted Nagoya very badly but didn’t
get it because they wanted me in Tokyo.

Anyway, we were in Tokyo when the Korean War broke out. My parents were in Yokohama.
We had been stationed together for about a year and a half, I guess. Anyway, we were in the
consulate and then went home sometime late 1950 and I came back into the economic section of
the embassy. Quite frankly, I told Jaybird that I was not coming back into the consular section
because I felt I had done it all at that level and I wanted to get some other experience and besides
I had great difficulty with the man who had been running the Tokyo office and who was now his
deputy. A fellow by the name of Glenn Brunner who had been a missionary before the war and
when his missionary society during the impression proved incapable of supporting him any more
had taken a job as clerk in the consulate at Nagasaki and had lateraled into the Foreign Service
and was now consular officer in Tokyo.

Q: One of the real problems, I think, of the consular business was the lateral entry of people who
had limited ability and limited intellectual prowess.

ERICSON: Amen! I won’t go into detail about Glenn but he made it impossible for us. He was a
niggling little nitpicker, scared of any initiative or action and he made life just miserable for us.

So when I did come back I was assigned to the commercial section. By that time the Korean War
was booming along and our attitude and our policies toward Japan were very, very rapidly
changing. The Peace Treaty started to be negotiated about that time and we hired on John Foster
Dulles to represent us. John Allison was his special assistant for that purpose. There was
considerable concern...of course the American army in Korea in 1950 was woefully understaffed.
My wife had taken a job in Yokohama, I was the lowest paid Foreign Service officer going for
the first two years of my existence in the Foreign Service. We had some extraordinary expenses
and we had to get Johnson’s permission for her to go to work. That was spurred on by the fact
that between Owen Zurhellen and me we had the two most disreputable automobiles in
Yokohama and he didn’t like us parking them out in front. So one of my stated desires was to buy a new car. Alex with great reluctance gave Betty permission to take a job and she became secretary to the Chief of Staff of the 8th Army and as such took the notes of General Walker’s staff meetings. She would come home and tell me what was said about the state of readiness, and the lack of equipment and how everything was going to hell in a hand basket with this army of occupation. So, when the Korean War broke out we were woefully unprepared for it. The Chief of Staff, incidentally, was General Dean when she went to work. He was a friend of my father’s as a matter of fact. She worked for him for about 6 months and then he got his division that he took to Korea and lost.

Anyway, we assembled the forces as well as we could, as everybody knows, and threw them into the line in Korea and we denuded Japan. There was nobody really left to run an occupation for 75 million people. And, of course, there was concern, but there was never any indication that the Japanese were going to do anything contrary to what the occupation wanted them to do, despite the fact we had no force to back it up. They remained totally cooperative and as a matter of fact set up their own national police reserve at the time which became the foundation of the current Japanese ground forces. But there was no move of any kind that would have given any American administrator basis for concern.

And then we began to rely very heavily on Japan as a base of operations. Airplanes were taking off to fight over Korea, the hospital system in Japan was devoted to caring for our wounded, and the Japanese economy which really up to that point hadn’t recovered a lot, began to prove capable of doing all kinds of things in support of the action in Korea and the Japanese began to make a lot of money out of it. This was the real beginning of the revival of the Japanese economy, the demands of the Korean War. A lot of interesting things came up on the economic side and I was quite happy to be assigned to that section despite my total lack of knowledge of economics.

Q: I was economic officer and having got a D- in economics in college I was a little worried about this, but it didn’t make a lot of difference. What was our mission setup at that point? You were there from 1950-52.

ERICSON: The occupation stayed until late April, 1952. So during the first two years of the Korean War the Peace Treaty negotiations were going on a pace but it was still formally an occupation. The Department people at that time were still formally part of the SCAP Headquarters. We were called by them the Diplomatic Section. We were called by the Department, the Office of the Political Advisor to the Supreme Command. There was constant war between MacArthur and Washington as to what our status really was and the occupation gave ground very grudgingly, but as it began to fade out our economic section began to take on much of the burden that the economic section of SCAP had. The consular officers were allowed to do quite a bit more. Political officers began to be able to report and we got involved a little bit in politics and it sort of gradually evolved to the point where when the Peace Treaty became effective we were really pretty well prepared and into sufficient things to start functioning immediately as an experienced and capable embassy. But MacArthur never...I don’t know what difference Ridgeway made to all this...as long as he was SCAP accepted any kind of independence or activity without his authority by State Department personnel.
Q: You were there when MacArthur was there?

ERICSON: Oh, yes. I was there at the airport when he left.

Q: Did you feel the heavy hand? Did you feel like a pariah?

ERICSON: Well, remember, first of all I am an army brat and I know something about General MacArthur and his World War I incarnation. He was an extraordinary man although he went very bad towards the end as most great men do. But I have more respect for him than I have loathing and dislike. You could see why he took the attitude that he did. He was the supreme commander. That is what it said. Supreme Commander of Allied Power. None of the powers had any more rights in theory than any of the others. The British established an embassy to him. He almost felt like his own government. But his was the responsibility and he was going to exercise it strongly.

Did I feel personally like a pariah? No. Life in Japan for practically any member of the occupation was a great pleasure in those days. You could go and do anything. There was no physical danger of any kind, no crime, nothing to worry about. If you want to play golf you can go anywhere you want to. I was a member of the Kokane Country Club and well past that. What does it cost to get into Kokane today? A million dollars? You don’t have to pay an entry fee but you have to buy a bond that is worth a million dollars before any individual can be accepted and you damn well better have a Japanese name.

Anyway, we were well housed, we had inexpensive servants and were reasonably well fed. The medical care was perfectly okay from the standpoint of then. The military, as long as you didn’t offend any of their precepts, treated you pretty well. We had an officer who was down in Kobe-Osaka, for example, who insisted on bringing a lady into the bachelor officers quarters where apparently rules were rather rigidly maintained. They didn’t know what to do about this guy so they asked to have him transferred and he was transferred up to Tokyo...and the lady followed him. You really had to step on their toes in order for them to say anything.

Q: During the MacArthur time, what were you doing?

ERICSON: Well, I was in the consulate until just before the Korean War broke out and then after home leave I returned to Tokyo and was in the economic section. The economic section was beginning to phase out and the embassy economic section was beginning to be involved in a lot of things. I was fortunate in that sense to be in the commercial section, rather than doing economic reporting. One of my responsibilities was the Japanese iron and steel industry. I can look back on those days and say, “Gee, I was personally involved and to a certain extent responsible for a lot of developments in the Japanese steel industry.” For example, we were charged with issuing on behalf of the Department of Commerce, what were called priority assistance certificates. You would have a Japanese company that wanted to obtain something from the United States in the way of specialized machinery or specialized technology. Because of the strains the Korean War put on the American economy, it was usually something that was being rationed out in the United States and for an overseas client to get it required some special
effort and certifications. One of the big cases I worked on...there was an outfit called National Boat Carriers, an American company probably owned by Greeks but registered as American, which was involved in tankers and the transportation of petroleum products. Well, the Korean War put an enormous demand...one minute World War II oilers were a dime a dozen and the next minute they were gold and the demands for them jumped by leaps and bounds. Well, they wanted to start building tankers, especially to service the Korean War. The National Boat Carriers saw this opportunity and decided they would like to build them in Japan with cheap labor, marvelous facilities...they built the Yamato...

Q: *The largest battleship ever built.*

ERICSON: Well, it so happened they went down to Kure where the Yamato was built and where the huge Kure naval yard was. In that neighborhood was located a major Japanese shipbuilding company. The naval yards at Kure were part of the industrial complex of Japan that had been designated as reparations to the various claimants against Japan during World War II. Fortunately we didn’t behave like the Russians, who denuded Korea, we didn’t have to. We said to our allied friends, “Look, we designated all this stuff for reparations and if you want it, come and get it.” But how are you going to move a major shipyard? So the naval yard in Kure sat from the time of the end of the war until the Korean War broke out, more or less abandoned. National Boat Carriers saw this and said, “Ah, here is where we will start building our big tankers.”

What it required, of course, was the occupation to release it from reparation designation and among other things, the United States to release steel because the Japanese steel industry was not producing sufficient steel for this kind of thing. I got involved then on behalf of the embassy in investigating this and writing justifications from Japan and making the recommendation to Commerce. The next thing that came up, of course, was that National Boat Carriers decided they didn’t want to build tankers of riveted construction, they wanted to build a welded ship. Well, this put an entirely different light on things because the Japanese steel industry sure as hell was not producing any welding steel ship plate and they would have to get everything they needed from the United States. So this required special exceptions. I then wrote a recommendation back to Commerce which said, ‘No, don’t do it. The purpose for which the shipyard was released from reparation designation was to permit the employment of Japanese in the area and benefit the growth of the Japanese economy and the Japanese steel industry.’ The whole thing looked like a very good deal for the Japanese economy which was still in pretty sad shape. I said, “If you start letting them import welding steel, the next thing they are going to be asking for to get faster and quicker will be something else they can get in Japan, so let’s draw the line here and say No.”

As a result of that National Boat Carriers turned to Yawata, a big Japanese steel company, and helped Yawata invest money to produce steel of the quality they required. That I say to this day is one of the foundations that later became a major, major industry in Japan, namely, shipbuilding. Now it is not as important because they have found cheaper places to do the job, like Korea.

Q: *Yes, and they are moving away from Korea to India or some place.*

ERICSON: Yes. Labor is very intensive in this kind of thing and a very expensive element so if
you can get cheap steel plate...tankers are easy to build, a very uncomplicated ship, although huge. Anyway, I still think today that that recommendation was one of the foundations of the resurgence of the Japanese economy because it forced them to invest in modern technology.

The Japanese were running their steel industry much like they run everything else on a very cooperative and friendly basis. Things were rigged and jobs allocated. We, in the embassy in the declining SCAP were interested in using this Korean War to introduce the element of competition into the Japanese economy. One of the ways we tried to do it was by improving the ability of the smaller companies to compete with the big three in Japan...Nippon Kokan, Fuji and Yawata were the big three, but there were a bunch of others. We had an application from an interesting little company between Yokohama and Tokyo by the name of Kawasaki. Kawasaki Steel Company wanted to build the first really integrated steel plant in Japan. Yawata’s plants and some of Fuji’s could be said to be integrated, but if you were an American and visited any of these things and you saw the way the materials crossed each other and the lack of a logical flow of things. They sort of grew like Topsy and were really pretty bad yards. Kawasaki wanted to build what would be the first post-war steel production facility from the ground up with the latest technology, etc. I had the privilege of writing the justification to get release of the equipment that they needed and to get a loan. The plant was very successful.

Of course, we had told them not to muck around with this kind of thing. Don’t get yourself tied down to single buyers. Find out who makes the best of whatever equipment needed and go and get it. Design the plant not to accommodate some piece of land, but design a piece of land to accommodate the plant. And they did that. They put it in Tokyo harbor and made a landfill into the harbor which was designed to accommodate the plant they had designed so ships bearing ore could come up Tokyo Bay and dump it right at the blast furnace. This was true of any other raw materials. They could be delivered right into the plant and at the other end of the plant could be loaded into ships for shipping. This was one of Japan’s major economic advantages that people don’t think about very much, almost all of Japanese major post-war industries is built along the sea coast and behind it is a marvelous railroad network which makes Japan really tick. So their internal economy is very well served transportation-wise, but externally also. This is one reason why the American steel industry lost out to Japan...In the United States you had to dig the ore from the Mesabi and take it down to Lake Superior, put it on an ore boat, take it over to Cleveland or Gary. Gary was pretty good because the plants were close by, but Cleveland always involved a certain amount of transshipment. Going down to Pittsburgh was another very expensive train ride. Whereas the Japanese could and did buy their much better quality ore (the Mesabi was running out at the time) than we had from anywhere they wanted to in the world and could ship it by sea right to the blast furnace. And they could export it right from the plant without having to put it on a train if they didn’t want to. That was an enormous advantage and probably as much or more than what their labor costs were at that time. Anyway, Kawasaki was successful and the plant was copied then by virtually every other Japanese plant that has been built ever since.

So it was interesting, that work in the commercial section at that time. I met some very important Japanese economic people, especially in those industries which I was covering...the metal working industries, the automobile industry, etc.
Q: **What was the embassy’s impression of Japanese business people at that time?**

ERICSON: Well, in the first place, it is a little difficult to answer that question because...you stood apart and looked at this organization and it was very different from anything you expected in the United States. You didn’t see the dynamic CEO, take care sort of people. What you saw was major economic organizations run on a highly cooperative basis headed by somebody to whom everybody paid great deference, but you never saw that guy do much of anything except ceremonial things that would give you rise to believe that he was somebody due that kind of deference. But, nonetheless, within the Japanese system there was that reason, he had paid his Japanese dues and he got where he was because he was best at doing the things that the Japanese respect. In many respects that is different from what you would expect in an American. They were slow at that time and cautious in many ways. But from the very beginning they were dedicated to making a Japanese and making sure that whatever they got from abroad that they assimilated and made theirs, and then, if possible, they would not continue to rely on the outside source. I saw this time and time and time again.

Remember the Korean War was still going on and they were still crushed. It is hard for Americans to appreciate...those people who worry about a military resurgence in Japan, for example, really should have been there during this period because this country was really more or less paralyzed with uncertainty. Everything that was theirs had more or less been rejected because of the war and they were going to reassert that, but in this period they were still operating in a vacuum.

Q: **How about labor unions at that time? This was the time when labor was a very big item in the American context.**

ERICSON: The Japanese labor movement to the extent that it was effective was almost always company oriented. You had company unions, you had some company-wide unions. They never achieved national organizational status. They never became a major national political influence the way they did in the United States. There was no national automobile organization, for example. There were Nissan unions, Toyota unions, etc. The few that were nationalized represented institutions, which themselves were nationalized. For example, the teachers union. Everybody came under the Ministry of Education so if you were a member of the teachers union why you were a member of a nationwide organization and when you struck or sounded off well then you could make your voice heard. If you were in the railroad workers union, the national railroads covered every part of the country you were a nationwide force and if you threatened to strike well then the whole country would tremble.

But there was much more compartmentalization in unions in Japan at that time than there was in the United States. The Japanese didn’t look favorably on unions and never have and it was a constant struggle for them. Then, of course, politically, the union leadership was always accused, rightfully or wrongfully, of being socialist oriented politically and that was anathema to the conservative leadership of Japanese business which really controls the country and they made it very difficult for them.

Q: **How did the developing military situation in Korea with China’s entrance and the eventual**
firing of MacArthur hit you all?

ERICSON: After the war, the Japanese having had the privilege of being the first recipients of the atomic bomb, the American military was kind of godlike for a while, and this went right to MacArthur, himself. We were kind of godlike to the Koreans too during this period. The Koreans were not fools. Before the Korean War they knew...Koreans and I have argued in the ‘60s and ‘70s when they would say, “We knew who the power of the world was. We knew who did the bomb. We knew who supplied the Russians. We saw the Russians coming down in GM trucks and jeeps. We knew where their industrial basis was. We knew that if you wanted to you could have kept them north of the Yalu, but you didn’t want to. You sat down there and drew this stupid line across the peninsula.” But the same thing applied to a certain extent in Japan until the Korean War broke out and then this terrible weakness in the early days of the war and then the entry of China and our inability or reluctance to go after the Chinese was the first in a series of...it has been a long, slow, gradual process, perhaps we never had the respect that we had in June 1950 militarily from the Japanese. Nonetheless, when the Chinese came in there was no terrible feeling that Japan was in danger, and that was what they were concerned about, they didn’t give a damn about Korea. They didn’t feel that they were militarily threatened really, except perhaps down the road should we fail utterly in Korea. So, they welcomed eventually the renegotiation of the armistice and all that.

Now MacArthur. Well, I think MacArthur up to the Inchon landing was still a man for his time. After that he went down hill pretty badly. The Japanese by that time were pretty conscious of the fact that we were relying rather heavily on them. MacArthur had pretty much done his job in Japan. He did some marvelous things.

Q: Oh, yes.

ERICSON: I don’t mean that he did them, but the occupation did some marvelous things. And you have to say that MacArthur did because he was very reluctant to take instructions.

Q: It was his creature and it worked.

ERICSON: The Japanese didn’t understand what the issue really was. They couldn’t equate Harry Truman with the Emperor and so the fact that MacArthur was defying the President of the United States and saying things that he shouldn’t be saying...in Japan it would equate to some Japanese general who said that he didn’t think the Emperor was right and he was going to go his own bloody way. So they really didn’t understand the issue, but on the other hand, I think they basically sympathized with General MacArthur. But on the other hand, he had run his course. There is no doubt that for a long time there he was pretty much idolized. You could see this. MacArthur never went anywhere. You would joke during the occupation that MacArthur knew Tokyo from A-Z, avenues that is. We renamed all those streets in Tokyo. He went from the American embassy where he lived to the Daichi Building and then back to the American embassy again. He very seldom went anywhere else. But his time of arrival at the Daichi Building was very well known. He always arrived around mid-morning. Every morning during the time he was there, there was a goodly crowd of Japanese, 3 or 4 hundred would stand there and watch him leave his car and walk into the Daichi Building. He never paid much attention to
them.

He was given enormous respect. My father at this time was chief of staff of the Japan Logistical Command headquartered in Yokohama, one of the senior officers in what was left of the occupation when MacArthur left, and we had grandstand seats at the airport for the departure ceremony. We drove from Tokyo into the airport that morning ahead of MacArthur’s motorcade in order to get to our seats in time. That route was lined all the way from downtown Tokyo, two or three deep, all the way down to Haneda Airport, which is a long ways away. Japanese standing there, some of them waving Japanese flags, standing very respectfully. I am talking 6 or 7 miles. Nobody cheered, they just stood there and watched him go. Three or four years later he might just as well not have been there at all. As long as he was there, and as long as he was behaving MacArthurish, they revered him. Did they retain any long time affection for him, I don’t think so. The famous joke when Douglas MacArthur II, his nephew, was appointed to Japan, the Japanese Prime Minister was asked how he looked upon the appointment of MacArthur’s nephew as ambassador, he said, “Well, he is a good man, we won’t hold his name against him.”

There are probably some elements of Japanese society that feel more strongly, if they know the origin of their present well being, who feel better towards him than others do. I have in mind the land reform program, for example. I think it is probably one of the more important factors in transforming Japan from whatever it was to a reasonable facsimile of democracy. MacArthur was sensible enough to bring in one of the world’s great land reform experts to plan with a Japanese, who happened, incidentally, to be a socialist, the land reform program for Japan. I shared an office with Wolf for eight or nine months in the old embassy building. Wolf and this Japanese, whose name I can’t remember, he was a Socialist Diet member for a long time and was then working in the Agricultural Ministry, planned the thing together and they plotted it to have certain effects. One was to destroy the wealth of absentee landowners and the other thing was to provide that land to the people who worked it. They did it by putting through legislation which required the absentee to sell...to transfer the land to those people, to give them ownership rights. They didn’t have any money so this was to be accomplished by the government paying the landlords in government bonds and then making the farmer sign a promissory note to reimburse the government the value of the bond. Well, of course, this was done when the Yen/Dollar exchange rate was 50 to 1 and it ended with the Yen worth 360 to 1. The inflation was probably worse than that so in effect the Japanese government had considerable loss to itself and also there was great loss by the landowners who were paid in what was really rather worthless paper, while the new landowners paid it back at 1/10th the cost. So it was a very effective way of transferring ownership and stood up. These people until today have been the backbone of the relatively conservative element in Japanese politics...these new land owners who suddenly found they had an interest in certain political activities that they never had interest in before.

This was Douglas MacArthur. A conservative, old American military type, who probably couldn’t see beyond the end of his nose in the opinion of most people, but he did a very far reaching and far sighted thing here and it has been enormously valuable to his country’s interests right down to today...I mean the United States.

Q: Was there much of a change in what you were doing in the embassy when MacArthur left?
ERICSON: No, of course Ridgeway came in and the Peace Treaty was being negotiated, so the whole thing was changing gradually anyway. Well, perhaps not so gradually, rather rapidly as a matter of fact. So by the time the Peace Treaty was signed in April, 1952, the embassy was almost functioning...Bob Murphy was the first post-war ambassador and he arrived the day after the Treaty went into effect. Then came the first political explosion on May Day, 1952 when the newly independent, all of its authority in its own hands, was challenged by the left wing in the May Day riots of 1952. At that point we were a functioning embassy. By that time we had a full complement of everybody on board and we were moving back into the chancery, the Residence, etc.

The May Day riots, I think, was a test of the ability of the Japanese government to maintain the course that it had been following which culminated probably in 1960, but we will wait for that for awhile. Anyway, this was a student riot in which left wing student organizations got together and paraded. I have some great pictures. My wife had another job at that time, she was working at 5th Air Force Headquarters which was on the main drag right across from the Imperial Palace and she had a window overlooking the riot scene and she took a bunch of pictures.

That night at an affair of some sort at the embassy when Murphy was commenting on...I didn’t see the riots we were over at the Mitsubishi main building by that time and my section had not moved back into the chancery...we were together that evening and Murphy made a rather astute comment, I remember, he said that he thought what had transpired in the Imperial Plaza was probably the deliberate work of the Japanese police who permitted the students to march from Meiji Park down through the streets of Tokyo, snake dancing as they went...of course you call it a riot but the Japanese don’t riot. They march and are quite well organized. Anyway, they snake danced all the way down to the Plaza. They got in front of the Emperor’s house and then the Japanese police moved in on them. They beat the holy whey out of them. They really were pretty brutal toward a number of the students. But Murphy’s comment was that this was deliberately done so that it could be done at that place and in that fashion to show that the government is in control and is not going to allow anyone to besmirch the name of Japan, etc. Anyway, there was no aftermath. They arrested hundreds and hundreds of students and beat up a hell of a lot more. We lost a couple of cars that were overturned and set on fire. There are lots of stories. This was an internal thing. It was not aimed at Japan’s support for the Korean War or anything else.

We had a guy by the name of Nelson who had an Austin Atlantic convertible, a car I envied very much, who spoke excellent Japanese. He got caught in the middle of this thing. The students started surrounding his car and rock it. He stood up and said, “I’m Nelson with the American embassy.” And they all said, “Oh.” And they left him there. There are lots of other stories about women getting caught up in the riots but never really physically threatened at all. It was the government versus the people who wanted to shame the government and we were extraneous to them.

Q: What was the feeling you were getting from the embassy about the Soviet threat at that time? We are talking about 1950-52.

ERICSON: We all, obviously, saw the Soviets as the instigators of Korea. The Chinese were not
blamed for this at all. After all it wasn’t the Chinese but the Soviets who had put Kim Il Sung up there. But when the Soviets refused to act, or didn’t act, when their clients were being pushed back up to the Yalu...the country that acted was regarded as the potential threat and even then not Japan by a long shot. In many respects the same could be said about the Soviets. After all they didn’t have the atom bomb and we had a superior air force and the Soviets were realizing Korea was a pretty distant place from which to mount a military operation against Japan. So, aside from the Japanese irritation over the northern islands, and that kind of thing, I don’t think the embassy was ever terribly concerned about any immediate Soviet threat to Japan.

Q: *The Kuril islands were not a major issue at that time were they?*

ERICSON: Well, I mean the Japanese irritation over the southern Kurils. The Japanese knew the Soviet presence there was not a threat to them in a military sense. But that was Japanese territory and they didn’t want the Soviets having it, they wanted it back, but they didn’t regard it as a basis for a real threat. They were something that had been stolen from them and the United States, incidentally, might be in a position to get back for them. Why didn’t we? Why weren’t we more aggressive?

Q: *At that time was Okinawa on the horizon or not?*

ERICSON: Only in a minimal sense. The time we are talking about was still a time when Japan was trying to get its basic sovereignty back for the mainland islands. Okinawa, when the Japanese had it, was a third grade society.

Q: *Like Puerto Rico for us.*

ERICSON: Worse, worse, because the Japanese didn’t suffer Okinawans going to the mainland islands. There was no Okinawan problem in Japan as there might be with Puerto Ricans in New York.

Q: *Were you getting that with the Japanese more at this time?*

ERICSON: No, we were getting it from the Okinawans. Back in those days there was a fair occupation presence on Okinawa. We had Kadena and we had a military government unit down there, etc. So from Yokohama, when I was in Yokohama, we used to send Doug Overton down to Okinawa once every three or four months to sweep up all the consular work that was generated in Okinawa...marriages, renewed passports, added children to families, etc. I went down once when he was not available. Tex Weatherby went down once. There is a very famous story about Tex’s trip. They wired ahead that the consul was coming down, consul Weatherby, and they wired back that they didn’t want him, they wanted the vice consul!

Anyway, the Okinawans were always the ones who were a little unhappy about this heavy preponderance of American presence and the fact that they were not going back to Japan and that they were going to be orphans in the Pacific for quite some time. They were agitating more about the Okinawa situation than Japan was. And, of course, when the occupation came along it was understood that Amami O Shima would be returned to Japan whereas Okinawa would not. The
Japanese considered Okinawans third class Japanese and weren’t disturbed as much about them as they were in establishing their basic sovereignty. Later, of course, that changed.

Q: After leaving Japan you went to Japanese language school. What prompted you to do that? Once you took Japanese you kind of knew that was it. I had a colleague, John Sylvestor, when I came into the Foreign Service, who took Japanese and was not seen again anywhere except I think Vietnam.

ERICSON: I know John, yes. Well, I took Japanese for a number of reasons. One of them was medical. We were having a fertility problem. There was a guy at Harvard by the name of John Rock, who developed the pill while doing research primarily for fertility. At the end of our second tour in Japan, the Department came out with this announcement that they were looking for people to take hard languages and were offering certain financial incentives. I was a little tired of being the lowest paid Foreign Service officer in the Service for several years running, so I looked upon that with some favor. We realized Japan was going to be a major player in Asia and whatever came of it I would probably be doing something reasonably important and significant. And, we liked Asia. We liked Japan. From where I sat at the time it looked like this was going to be the only way that I would ever get an assignment in Washington for a long period of time. So based on these factors, we decided to go for it. And, we chose Harvard, not because of its language program, which was frankly pretty bad, but because of the presence of Dr. Rock up there.

Q: Such a Foreign Service officer’s career is made of.

ERICSON: Yes.

Q: Could you talk about the people who came in...we are talking about 1952 and I like to get people’s characterizations of those who took Japanese training. What may have inspired them, pushed them, what kind of people they were, etc.

ERICSON: First of all, I also got interested in Japanese because I had been studying with Eleanor Jordan at the embassy’s language school. Many of us took it on a part time basis. I was under the happy delusion that it was not all that difficult. It wasn’t what it was cracked up to be. I got disabused of that.

People who were studying Japanese at that time...you know, most of our best language officers were naval wartime trainees who had gone through the Boulder, Colorado Navy program. Almost all of our competent Japanese language officers came out of that program. The Army had a program, but the people we got from the Army, with the exception of Dick Lamb, were not all that competent in the language.

Q: Why was this?

ERICSON: I honestly don’t know. I think the Navy was more selective of their people and it was a very, very intensive program. When I first arrived in Yokohama, about a year afterwards three people straggled in who had been off finishing off their Japanese...Owen Zurhellen, Dave
Osborn, and Ed Seidensticker. Those three were certainly among the three best of the post-war language people. They had all been through Boulder, they had been Navy people. Osborn was a linguistic genius. He picked up Chinese along the way. There are all kinds of stories about Dave. Somebody walking in on him in a dark barracks in the middle of the night coming back from a night on the town and a voice comes out of the corner and says, “Is that you Bob?” The guy says, “Yes. Is that you Dave? What are you doing?” Dave says, “Well, I am studying braille.” Osborn was that kind of person. Zurhellen had a marvelous natural flair for the language. It was said that he could hold a conversation with anybody and if a word he didn’t know threatened to interrupt the flow of his words, he would make one up that would sound very plausible and leaving his Japanese interlocutor with a sense of wonder...wondering what he said. And, of course, Seidensticker became the great translator of Japanese literature and got Kawabata the Nobel Prize.

The Department’s own program, from where I sat, and I am not one of its products, was nowhere near as effective, neither prewar or post-war. Alex Johnson who is absolutely admirable in every other respect is not, frankly, very good in the Japanese language. The same for Jerry Warner and many others. The reasons...I wrote a critique of my own program to the Department after I finished my language program and I said what it lacked was intensity. You shouldn’t send people to American universities, especially to graduate school atmospheres for area and language competence because nobody is ever going to get a program that suits him. My experience at Harvard in the area part of the thing was disastrous in terms of what I wanted to study. You look at the curriculum in the book and think you can get all sorts of courses and marvelous instructors and when you get there they are not offering that this year because they are tuned to a three year Ph.D. program and teach courses only every three years. And in my case Fairbanks was in China. The old man who ran the Yenching Institute at Harvard, chose to retire that year. He was the first Caucasian to graduate from (inaudible), and got on a boat a week after graduating and as far as I know never went back. He certainly didn’t go back to revise his teaching material because his subordinate in Yenching was Ed Reischauer, who was teaching from very badly outdated prewar language materials. And they were trying to teach research scholars while the Department of State wanted me to be able to read a newspaper and hold a conversation. So we were totally out of sync and I took a lot of extraneous course which really had nothing to do with Japan but were what was available. Reischauer, I must add, was an absolutely marvelous teacher. He taught Japanese history in the survey of Asia thing and in that he was absolutely superb. His language teaching was pretty badly outdated. He revised it some years after I left. But the old man’s retirement and his own wife’s illness made it very difficult for him to attend very much to us. There were no other State Department people in my class that year. Kingdon Swayne went to Yale where the language instruction was much better. Yale was really the only competent Japanese language program in the States at that time, I think.

Q: Yale had a much stronger missionary influence. Did that have any influence on their program?

ERICSON: The missionaries weren’t a major factor in that. Yale was strong because that is where Eleanor Jordan and Bernard Schwartz had developed the spoken Japanese program for the military services during World War II. He had stayed there and Eleanor had come out to Japan. But they were the first ones to teach Japanese from a modern scientific linguistic point of view
and that is why Yale is better.

*Q: Yale through missionaries to China were also looking more abroad than Harvard was.*

ERICSON: Well, their Japanese language program was better because of this peculiar circumstance. As years have gone by I guess other places have developed better and better programs and language instruction at this stage is much better than it ever was. But nobody who went through language school about the time I did really distinguished himself in the Foreign Service either in Japan or elsewhere.

*Q: While you were taking this I was a private first-class in the Air Force going to the Monterey Language School taking Russian for a year.*

ERICSON: Well, Monterey had a fairly good reputation.

*Q: It was intensive.*

ERICSON: In my opinion, that is the only way to teach a language of this kind. The best language officer the Foreign Service ever had in Japanese, at least during my day there may be better now, was Bill Magistretti. He grew up in Los Angeles with a bunch of Nisei kids and went to Saturday school with them. And then he went to Kyoto and lived with a Japanese family and went to Japanese high school and to Kyoto University before the war and studied in Japanese on an equal basis with Japanese students. He was linguistic gifted and he had that kind of background. And he carried it over into intelligence work during the war and came into the Foreign Service later. Magistretti was the exception. There were very few people who had anything like that kind of experience. But that is the way you have to do it. You have to start when you are very young. You have to have an intense interest in it that’s based on something besides the language itself, I think. And you have to go and study it with your peers in the country before you can really be able to say that you...no white man can speak Japanese like a native.

*Q: How long were you in language training?*

ERICSON: Well, you went one year to a university and then you were assigned back to Tokyo for another year of so-called intensive language study with Eleanor Jordan. The language school still exists in Japan, but I don’t know whether they still send people to universities or not.

Anyway, I went back for what was supposed to be a year and a half of full time intensive language study, nothing but, come to the office in the morning and get eight hours of instruction and go home. But, this is not terribly good either because I had...Eleanor was a marvelous teacher and we had very, very capable Japanese nationals...a wife and by that time a child...Dr. Rock succeeded...and my mother-in-law came back with us that year. Here again there were just too many distractions. If you are really doing this thing you have to do it full time and intensively.

*Q: I must say that one has a certain admiration, although there were other problems, of the old*
British Foreign Service where you didn’t get married until about 40. They would take you and sort of throw you in a foreign country and you kinda just did that, but you can’t do that with a family.

ERICSON: No, you can’t. Of course there was some criticism of that system too in that there were a number of British Foreign Service officer prewar and a few Americans too who would come up with strangely feminine type statements...

Q: And Japanese being one of these places where there is a woman talk and a man talk.

ERICSON: Yes, and some of the times the men talked women talk and you began to wonder why.

Q: This is called pillow talk.

ERICSON: Anyway, I was never better in Japanese than the day I left full time language training with Eleanor in 1954. That was the absolute peak of my Japanese powers. I used it. I could read the economic section of the newspaper, I could read the editorial...the editorial in the “Asahi” looked absolutely fearsome except when you read ten of them all of a sudden you realized you could probably write the damn thing because they used the same sort of language over and over again. I could by and large read the political news on the front page, but put me on the sports page or the social page or anything like that and I was totally lost. There was something in me that resisted, as far as spoken language was concerned, the idea of using a respect language.

Q: Will you explain what a respect language is?

ERICSON: Japan, painting it with a very broad brush, is one large hierarchy. You always have a position relative to somebody else. It is not a land of equality. People sense when somebody older, or of a high caste, is speaking to them and usually acknowledge that in the way they reflect their verbs. If you are speaking to somebody superior to you, you speak in a very polite language upward. If you are speaking to somebody far below you, a servant, you use a very different kind of language. If speaking to your peers, you use a colloquial form but it also depends on whether your peers are close or not close. It can be a very difficult language to handle on social occasions and the Japanese tolerate foreigners using all the wrong forms. Nonetheless, if you don’t like the idea of putting yourself in some kind of a hierarchy it becomes rather difficult.

To illustrate why this is important in Japan, because it is: I say they tolerate it, but they don’t like Americans’ inability to do this very well. A great example why this kind of thing is important to the Japanese. People wonder why Prime Minister Yoshida fell. Yoshida was, like many major figures in history, did some marvelous things in his early and mid career, but in his very late career he obviously had overstayed his time and the things he used to insist on weren’t working any more and there was a lot of political resistance to him. The incident that really brought about his political demise took place in a Diet meeting. He was testifying before a committee...I forget which committee... and was being pressed for some budget figures. He didn’t have them ready at hand and the Socialists were raising hell. He told them something to the effect, “I will give them to you tomorrow,” and the room erupted. People started throwing ink pots and rushed the dais
trying to assault him physically. The police had to be called in to separate the brawling legislatures...which was not all that rare an occurrence in the ‘50s in Japan incidentally. If you were an American and read the translations of the news accounts, unless it was accompanied by an explanation, you didn’t realize what had happened or why the Socialists got outraged when Yoshida made a seemingly reasonable statement.”I will give them to you tomorrow”. Well, the point was, he had used language saying, “I will give them to you tomorrow,” of the sort one would use in telling your servant you are going to give him your dirty underwear tomorrow. To a Japanese this is much more insulting than if he had cast dispersions on the legitimacy of their mothers. For Americans who are raised in a more democratic tradition and who speak on a peer level with people who they meet rather rapidly it is difficult to get into these differences and that was terribly difficult for me.

Q: Did you understand your difficulty and all that at the time?

ERICSON: Oh, yes. I was keenly aware of it.

Q: Did some of our colleagues, I am talking about the diplomatic profession, sort of proceed rather blithely not realizing that they were running their fingernails down a blackboard with the Japanese?

ERICSON: Yes, of course, from time to time there were cases of that sort. But frankly people in the embassy didn’t use their language with the Japanese in a business sense all that much. You would see that kind of thing more on social occasions than business occasions. Your primary dealings were with people in the Finance Ministry or MITI or primarily the Foreign Office and these were among the best educated of all Japanese and were the English speakers in the country and were eager to speak their English. Most Americans sort of backed off and said, Okay.

I don’t think we will ever get to a point where we will have a staff that is comfortable in the Japanese language. We are always going to need an interpreter. Ed Reischauer always used an interpreter for every conversation he ever had.

Q: So you got out there in 1953. Were you part of the embassy at all during the year of language training?

ERICSON: Unfortunately, yes. I say unfortunately because I think again if you are going to study the language you ought to be separated from all other temptations. You shouldn’t be meeting your English speaking friends for lunch. The school at that point was in the Mantetsu Building which was our annex about a block from the chancery. It housed the consular section, USIA, administrative section and virtually everybody except the very core of the political and economic sections. We were surrounded by embassy personnel. There were two or three rooms devoted to the language school on the floor, but you were really in with the embassy. You were living in embassy quarters. Later they took over the old consul general’s residence in Yokohama for the school and that was better. The only time, though, that we were away from the embassy studying language was in the summer time when we rented a place down in Mito on the Izu peninsula and there we lived in a total Japanese setting and probably learned more about Japan and the way people live in Japan and what their problems are and the language to boot than most
of the time we were studying it in Tokyo.

One of the problems in Tokyo was that Eleanor wasn’t really prepared at that time for full time language studies and she also had the idea that the way you learn Japanese was the way a baby learns it. You hear, you listen, you start formulating key phrases, you manage your vocabulary, your situations, etc. and you end up speaking and understanding Japanese. She took pride at that point in herself not knowing any kanji, no characters. And the Department, of course, wanted us to not only speak it but to be able to read newspapers and things of that sort. So she had her people preparing lessons in some cases literally one day ahead of the students. You would get lesson material that had been written out the night before and in somebody’s long hand. So in my day it was not the refined thing that it became later on.

Q: It was 1954 before you actually took a job at the embassy?

ERICSON: Yes. I cut my language training short by six months at the request of Frank Waring who was the economic counselor then, a very distinguished guy in fact who I admired very much who really wanted somebody in the economic section badly to help him and do whatever Japanese language was needed in the section. The political section had seven or eight people with varying degrees of competency, but the economic section didn’t have anybody. So he asked me. Frankly by that time I had staggered up to the sixth of many plateaus and was beating my head against the next brick wall and I said I would be happy to do it.

Q: Who was the ambassador at that time and talk a little bit about your impression of him at that time? And then about the situation in Japan at that time as you saw it.

ERICSON: In 1954 the ambassador was John Allison who suffered the...he was a complex guy as a matter of fact.. handicap of having been a teacher in the Japanese school system before the war. But he knew Japan. He had been Dulles’ assistant in negotiating the Peace Treaty. He had been Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. He had been, as a matter of fact, on my oral boards and when I first came into Yokohama in 1947 shortly after he came out on a trip as assistant secretary. Alex Johnson was an old friend of his so he stayed in the Johnson’s apartment which was adjacent to the office in Yokohama. My desk was just inside the door that led to the Johnson’s apartment so I was the first thing he saw when he came through the door. I was sitting at my desk one day and this bald head character came storming through and stopped in front of my desk and whirled around and looked at me and said, “You are Ericson aren’t you?” I stood up and said, “Yes, sir.” He said, “You don’t know who I am do you?” I said, “No, sir, I do not.” He said, “I am John Allison and I was on your selection board.” This made me feel rather ridiculous at the time, but it gave me a strange hold on him and we got on personally very, very well. I think Allison was very clued in to senior Japanese. He was not good with people and he was known to his staff as the “terrible tempered Mr. Bang,” because he did have a very short fuse.

He was an absolute genius at dictation. I have never known a man more capable of coming back from an important meeting with somebody to send a cable to the Department. I was duty officer one Sunday and he had gone out to talk to somebody about something of terrible importance. He came back and got in touch with me and said, “Send the duty secretary up here I want to dictate a
telegram.” So we went up to the Residence and here he was in the bathroom in his undershirt shaving. The secretary sat on the toilet and I sat on the tub while the ambassador dictated what seemed to me a very cogent, well thought out, well phrased telegram. When it was over, I said, “Thank you Mr. Ambassador, we will get a draft up for your perusal as soon as it can be transcribed.” He said, “No, no, no. Send it exactly the way it is. That’s fine.” And it was. It was a great telegram. A great little exhibition of the art of those days.

But he was terribly short tempered and he, of course, got himself involved with a female of his staff which led to her reassignment at the request, I understand, of other ladies on the staff. It didn’t do him much good either. Of course, he went on to two other embassies after that...he went to Czechoslovakia and then to Indonesia. But he was a difficult man to deal with. For example, when he gave a reception, language officers always worked the doors of the Residence. Everybody had a chauffeur in those days so it meant when a car pulled up to the door, people got out and a language officer would approach them, particularly if they were Japanese, although any other guests too, and ascertain their name, if he didn’t know it, and went to the head of the receiving line where the ambassador would always be standing and said to him, “Mr. Ambassador, may I present His Excellency, the Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Yoshida” and he would turn and say something like, “God damn it, of course I know who this is.” But if you failed to give him the name he would fail to remember it and then couldn’t pass it on to the next guy. So the guys in the line fought this unending...you got glares from him when you were introducing somebody who was perfectly obvious, but slip up one, well you were in real trouble. So we lived through continuing glares.

He had an excellent DCM, Jeff Parsons, for most of this period. I later worked for Jeff when he was Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. So there was always a good buffer. Tokyo was blessed with good buffers, I think, in those days.

Q: At that time what was our view of the situation economically and politically?

ERICSON: Well, it was a funny period. The Japanese under Yoshida’s pretty strong leadership had succeeded in achieving goal one, the Peace Treaty and the restoration of Japanese sovereignty. Having done that the coalition between the Democrats and the Republicans that had achieved this political triumph were beginning to drift apart. Not that there were any very strong ties in Japanese politics along party lines, it was just the group of people were shifting and looking for what would be next. Having achieved their independence, in order to get their independence they had to agree to certain things which eventually became a real sore point. They had to agree to a security treaty which permitted us to station our troops in Japan and they had to agree to permit us to use those troops in pursuance of maintaining the peace in the Far East without their say so. The Peace Treaty was also incomplete in that we remained in full occupation of Okinawa. So from the Japanese point of view there were some loose ends there. From our point of view, of course, we had achieved what we thought...I think most American policy makers were very much surprised at a number of things in connection with Japan at the time. One was their total cooperation during the Korean War. There was never a vestige of any Japanese unhappiness with the way things were done during the Korean War. They sometimes got unhappy for example when an airplane went through the tower of the administration building of the university down in Ryukyu. They were a little unhappy about things of that kind and who
was to be compensated, how and why. That sort of thing. But these were compensation issues
and not “why are you taking that airplane off at all” kind of thing.

We had a focus on the Far East and that was security. We had just been through the Korean War
and we didn’t want a repeat of that. If the truth be told we didn’t fair all that well, it had damn
near torn our own country apart with the MacArthur thing and all the rest of it. And also at that
point Southeast Asia was shaping up as a flash point.

Q: We are talking 1952. Dien Bien Phu and all that.

ERICSON: Yes and John Foster Dulles’ massive retaliation, etc. All that kind of thing was going
on in the background. And the Soviet Union, of course, was the arch enemy and the Chinese, lo
and behold, under the communists were exercising rather effective control over that great huge
mass of potential, so we were very antsy about the security situation in the Far East. We wanted
to preserve our position in Japan very much and we very much wanted to retain the cooperation
of the Japanese. The Japanese economy was beginning, also, to move and we were interested,
frankly, in promoting that. One of the essentials of stability in the Far East we thought
was...Japan had proven itself to be a real arsenal in the Korean War. It saved us an enormous
amount of money by being able to repair...we had huge repair facilities, for example, on the
outskirts of Tokyo for all kinds of military vehicles, ship repairs, R&R...perhaps the less said
about that the better.

Q: All I can say is in 1953 I was in Seoul and took R&R in Japan. I didn’t get outside of
Tachikawa.

ERICSON: You didn’t want to?

Q: I didn’t want to. I was a New England trained boy and had never seen anything like this. It
kept my interest for the week I had.

ERICSON: Sometime around 1951 or 1952, during the Korean War when it was at its height and
the number of Americans passing through at its height, before the Japanese economy had really
begun to move, there was an effort to ban prostitution, to really crack down because this was a
shame and a disgrace. Somebody in MITI did a quite serious report which said that prostitution
was Japan’s leading export item. The R&R industry, the association of men with Japanese
women, the purchasing of Yen by American soldiers to finance this kind of thing, amounted to
what was then Japan’s leading export item. So they decided for economic reasons they wouldn’t
pursue it at this point, and they did not.

Getting back to Japan and what was happening, this was a period when politically Japan was
beginning to drift pretty badly. Having gotten the Peace Treaty during the ‘‘50s but having also
achieved an imperfect...they didn’t know where the hell they were in the world and started
casting about for a better sense of identity, I guess. This meant a lot of agitation within political
parties and led to the demise of Yoshida who had lost his grip on things having achieved his
main purpose in life. He was really a great man in his way. A guy who came in from being a
diplomat to...
Q: _He was kind of like the Adenauer of Japan._

ERICSON: He was a fatherly figure and people trusted him. He was a man of integrity. One of the things everybody says about Japanese politics is that it is among the most money fueled in the world. I would hate to say dirty, but politics in Japan runs very much on money, more so than in the United States, I think. Yoshida was above all that. He lead by means of his own moral principles and he was basically a very good man. He turned a little dictatorial which was his problem.

Anyway, when he finally fell, he was replaced by Hatoyama who was an old line politician who frankly was given the job because he deserved it. He had been instrumental in bringing the party together in the post-war period and he was sitting around in second place to a man who is really not in line. Yoshida came from elsewhere, the diplomatic ranks, while Hatoyama was a homegrown, up from the ranks of politicians who had served his apprenticeship and it was time to put old Ichiro in. Unfortunately, old Ichiro was senile by the time he finally got in. Well, probably not at the time he went in, certainly shortly after he assumed office he began showing rather serious signs of incapacity. There are stories of people having to wipe his drool, mental lapses and wandering attention, etc. It was covered up fairly well for a long time. Anyways, he did very little and with that kind of leadership at the top it wasn’t really possible to develop coherent programs or sit on the Socialists or whatever the conservative political party had to achieve. It was in no condition to do so under Hatoyama. In the meantime, the opposition was gaining, getting stronger and louder in their activities against the government. When a strong hand was needed there was none there. In the United States we weren’t paying all that much attention to things at the upper levels in Japan at the time. Both sides were sort of drifting through the ’50s and we had some very nasty incidents, of course, that strained relations severely. I think of the case of the *Fortunate Dragon*.

Q: _For the record will you explain that case?_

ERICSON: Well, the *Fortunate Dragon* was a fishing boat, a deep sea tuna fishing boat from a small port...I think it was based in Island of Shikoku or else somewhere down in southwest Japan anyway...not a major port. It was fishing in the south seas for tuna when we set off the first nuclear bomb at Bikini. The crew reported seeing this very weird sky and sometime later strange stuff kept falling out of the sky and they kept fishing. When they got sick...of course they were in an area which had been prohibited to them and the American military maintained that notices to mariners had been insistent and loud and clamorous to stay the hell out of the area, but nonetheless there was this Japanese fishing boat.

They went chugging on back to port with a sick crew and a hatch full of fish. When they got to port the fish were unloaded and distributed, put into the Japanese distribution system and then they began reporting to the hospital. Then it came out that this strange thing they had witnessed was the explosion of the thermo nuclear weapon and what had come down out of the sky was probably highly radioactive material and what they were sick from was radiation sickness.

Of course, in Japan, which had been on the receiving of a couple of those things during the war,
why we had this enormous explosion of feeling against the United States for having exploded the bomb and exposing the Japanese nationals to its effects, etc. The Japanese, of course, made terrible blunders of their own. They let that catch be distributed throughout the country and you could smell the fish markets in Japan for miles weeks afterward because nobody...they didn’t know where the fish had gone, they lost track of distribution. Even in Tokyo the enormous fish market sold very few fish for weeks. It was a serious economic disruption in addition to being a psychological body blow to Japan.

And then, of course they made a couple of other silly mistakes, some of which didn’t come to light until long afterwards. They started demanding compensation, of course. Two of the crewman died. One of them was brought up to Tokyo to be hospitalized where he was given blood transfusions which it later became clear gave him the hepatitis that killed him. He probably didn’t die of radiation sickness. We in the embassy were jumping up and down and the United States was jumping up and down because the Japanese refused to allow him to be examined by American physicians. They were demanding enormous compensation from us in various forms but were not allowing us to have any part in the treatment. Perhaps we had that coming, I don’t know, because all through the post-war period our policy on the nuclear weapons was in no way to acknowledge that nuclear weapons were anyway different from any other weapon of war. People would argue, where would you have rather been in Tokyo on March 13 or Hiroshima in August? In Tokyo on March 13th 80 some thousand people died in one night and they died horrible deaths. They saw fire storms coming towards them, they felt the oxygen being sucked out of the air. They went into the rivers trying desperately to escape this thing and very few of them succeeded. And that was deliberate, we did it with incendiary weapons. In Hiroshima, it all went up in a flash and if you died you really died pretty quickly and didn’t know what hit you. Of course there were thousands of people who suffered for years and years afterwards.

One of the manifestations of this policy of ours was the fact that we established the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, a group of medical researches financed by the United States who worked down in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to measure the effects to radiation among the population. People who got sick were brought in and given physical examinations and the progress of their illness was monitored and the effects were noted and scientific papers were written, etc., but they were not treated. We were not offering any treatment and they were more or less volunteers.

It must have been some time in 1956 that we had some PL 480 money available, and I can’t remember if it was a request initiated by us. I was in the economic section and since it was PL 480 money it was basically the economic section’s responsibility. We had an AID mission at the time, but the director of the AID mission was subordinate to the economic counselor in the embassy hierarchy. Anyway, Ambassador Allison asked me to write a justification for using this money to construct a hospital building and equipment at the University of Hiroshima Hospital, specifically to treat nuclear victims. I remember he said, make it lurid. That money was eventually granted and the hospital was built. That to my knowledge was the first thing we ever did, 10 to 11 years after the war, we started to help with the treatment of these people. So, when the Fortunate Dragon incident burst upon us, in addition to the fact that we had dropped the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki there was a lot of pent up feeling that we hadn’t really been properly charitable towards the victims of what the world would recognize of course, as a rather
special use of weapons.

Anyway, there were incidents like that which were making US-Japan relations a little bit difficult. The thing that turned it around, I think, was Hatoyama was finally voted out of office and the arrival on the scene of Kishi, who to my mind is probably Japan’s...he and his brother Sato certainly must combine as the two most effective prime ministers in Japan in the post-war era. Kishi came in and began to whip the Liberal Democratic party into some semblance of shape and to bring Japan out of what was a malaise internally. The Japanese political fabric was going to face rather severe tests of course in 1960 when the Security Treaty was going to come up for what we call renewal.

Q: During this period in Japan you were there from when to when?

ERICSON: I arrived in Japan in October, 1947 and left in the summer of 1958 except for the year at Harvard.

Q: You went to the embassy in 1954?

ERICSON: Yes, the next four years I was in the economic section in the embassy.

Q: Were people nervous about the Security Treaty renewal?

ERICSON: Well we constantly expected that it would be renewed and we expected that the Liberal Democratic party, despite considerable agitation on the left, was going to control things and that the treaty would be renewed. Perhaps it would be modified slightly but not significantly. And it became a growing issue with every passing day and it got complicated, of course, by Okinawa, agitation over the revision of Okinawa.

Q: I want to stick for now just to this 1954-58 period.

ERICSON: I remained working on Japan, incidentally, through 1961. When I went back to the Department in 1958 I was offered the chance to chose between working on political things in INR on the Northeast Asia Division, or taking advanced economic training and certifying myself evermore as an economist. I decided you really had to know something as an economist and you weren’t going to get it in one year, which is what they were offering, one year as a university, so I chose to go back to work on Japan for another two years in INR. Then I got sprung from that and was Jeff Parsons staff assistant when he was Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs in 1960-61. That was the period when the Treaty came up for renewal.

Q: We are going back now to the 1954-58 period. During that time the Security Treaty was not like a black cloud hovering over us. We knew we would have to deal with it...

ERICSON: Well, it was a cloud on the distant horizon. It looked like a white cloud, but still a cloud. The closer it got the larger and darker it got as the opposition to a Security Treaty began to grow.
Q: How did we feel at that time about the left?

ERICSON: Well, there were a lot of very good people among the Socialists. For example, for a year I shared an office with Wolf.

Q: He is a name connected with land reform in Japan.

ERICSON: Yes. Well, he was one of MacArthur’s major appointments. His staff brought (inaudible) out to Tokyo to accomplish the land reform, which was probably the most significant act of the occupation and maybe the most enduring in assuring that Japan would remain a stable Japan style democratic nation. But in doing this he worked with a man who later became a Socialist member of the Diet and was a major critic of American politics. But the two of them combined to devise the land reform program in Japan in the late 1940s which probably saved Japan from an awful lot of political turmoil by getting rid of the absentee ownership system, by turning land over to those who tilled it and providing a very substantial base for the conservative parties that ruled Japan and still more or less do almost 50 years later. They did this very cleverly, incidentally. They limited the size of anyone’s holding and forced those who held more than that and did not occupy it personally to sell to those who did occupy it on a sharecropper basis. They issued government bonds with which the sharecroppers were to pay the landowners and they would be redeemed the next year. In the meantime the inflation wiped them out. The bonds became worth about 5 cents on the dollar, so the new landowners got his land eventually for about 1/20th of its value, and the owners received about 5 percent of its value. The thing was accomplished, a lot of people lost a lot of money, but many of them probably could afford to, and the sharecropper really did benefit.

This man was, of course, not a wild communist...

Q: Was there nervousness on our part about the Socialists

ERICSON: No, not really. There were times, I should say when there was a great deal of nervousness in the government in Washington about the communists. There was a famous confrontation between Dick Nixon when he was Vice President and when he came to Japan as the first really senior American to visit Japan, and this would have probably been in 1954. He came out and gave a famous...among us embassy people...he stood on the balcony on the old chancery and addressed the entire assembled staff down below in which he told us in effect that the greatest danger facing Japan was from communist usurpation of the powers of government. That the government ministries were shot full of communist sympathizers and Communist Party members and the country faced a real danger of revolution. Well, this was pretty contrary to all of our experience. We hadn’t seen all of these fellows and we wondered where he got his information, frankly. Sam Berger was the political counselor and he took him on in a closed meeting apparently in the ambassador’s office and argued the fact that Japan was relatively stable. There were communists but they were not a threat, etc. Nixon got so enraged, the story is, that he had Berger transferred to New Zealand, which put him safely out of harms way, I guess. However, it was there where he met Phil Habib who was just a junior officer struggling along and might never have emerged if he hadn’t been brought together with Berger who took him to Korea.
Q: Sam Berger, I might just say for the record, is famous for the fact that he was the labor attaché in London and when the Labor Party took power shortly after the war he was the only person who knew people. He was a key person.

ERICSON: I was told that he was the only person in the embassy who Attlee would speak too.

Q: Later Sam Berger became ambassador to Korea and also deputy ambassador in Vietnam. He was my boss in Vietnam.

ERICSON: He was a feisty little guy who didn’t hesitate to speak his mind and was a lot of fun to be around. Anyway Sam and Phil ended up in New Zealand and were later together in Korea.

I don’t know how many people in Washington actually shared Nixon’s view, but it was totally wrong. We didn’t see anything of this kind. We knew they were potentially dangerous, yes. And we knew that the Socialists had a certain amount of following. Reischauer at the time, incidentally, was writing that if you extrapolated from the Socialists 2 percent gains in every election every year since 1920, sometime around 1965 they are going to take over the government. We didn’t believe that either. But they were strong enough to be real nuisance value especially if the central government were weak, ill organized and unable to develop effective counter policy. The Socialists seemed to us to be much better organized and, of course, had the labor unions with their enormous organizational ability behind them, so there was some concern about them but fundamentally the country was not socialist, certainly not communist.

Q: I might just point out that Richard Nixon as vice president started off very right wing, but this was early Nixon on the national scene because later he developed a reputation for really doing his homework and listening to people and not taking off on this type of thing. He got very savvy. But this sounds like one of his earliest trips.

ERICSON: A little later I am prepared to comment on Mr. Nixon in his presidential years and his dealing with Japan because I saw a fair amount of that kind of thing. But you are quite right, he didn’t ever go to this kind of extreme again. He was really pretty successful with a lot of things he did with Japan later on when he became President. He had one terrible flaw, however. This comes much later when we get to Kissinger and Nixon, but Kissinger and Nixon believed, I think having watched them operating in Japan, that the way you conducted relations with a foreign government was to find the people, the man, who could really get it done and then you dealt with him. They continued to search in Japan all during the Nixon Administration and they never found the man, of course, because there wasn’t one.

Q: Kissinger in his book, “The White Years,” talks about Italy as being a place...obviously he couldn’t relate to Italy because there wasn’t a man.

ERICSON: Yes, they did this all over the world. It was true in some places, but not in Japan and I will take your word for Italy.

Q: In my interviews of people who worked on Asia during this period, the very firm hand of
Walter Robertson played a major role. I was just doing an interview of somebody who was in Korea during this time. The ambassador realized the embassy could say nothing evil about Syngman Rhee who was a very inept ruler and was building up trouble for himself because he was the darling of the right. Was Japan out of the Walter Robertson orbit?

ERICSON: Well, I think Walter Robertson was, despite the fact that Dulles negotiated the Peace Treaty, he didn’t seem to pay much attention to Japan when he was secretary of state, and Walter Robertson was probably the strongest Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs that we have ever had. He did have a great, great deal to say about American policy in that part of the world and in Japan. He and Allison had a very bad relationship. Robertson announced a visit to Japan at one point during this time and Allison simultaneously announced his intention to be absent from the country. Not only that, but he conceded with great reluctance to having Robertson stay in the Residence in his absence, but he said, “Put the Cadillac away, he will not ride in that car.”

On that visit, for example, Robertson came up...

Q: This would have been about when?

ERICSON: Oh, this would have been 1955 or 1956. Anyway, Robertson came out on the visit and we had a reception for him including many Japanese political leaders. He had his business meetings but I didn’t attend those and don’t know what went on... but at this party a very prominent Japanese politician, a liberal democrat and elder statesman of consideration influence as a faction leader and generally thought of as the next foreign minister, although he never made it...I can’t remember his name but he was from Kyushu, I know that, and that may possibly explain this...somehow Japan had got to make friends with China. It was obvious to him that the Communist government in China was going to last and it would behoove Japan now, in the early 1950s to start making friends with China and as a matter of fact the United States should too. Under Japan’s leadership the three of us should get together and do something. Anyway, he asked for a meeting with Mr. Robertson but he didn’t get it in the normal course of events. But at this party it developed that Mr. Robertson and this man and a Japanese from the Foreign Office who was going to be the interpreter, were wandering off towards the ambassador’s study. Allison got me literally by the ear and threw me in the direction of the study and said, “Now you go in there and you make sure that the interpretation was going to be right.” He wasn’t going to be in the meeting himself. He didn’t want me to interpret but to make sure there were no mistakes in the interpretation because interpretation is an art and a problem, as you know and you had to be particularly careful with this particular Japanese.

Anyway I went into the library and the conversation went along fairly predictable lines. I didn’t know what was coming, frankly, but I heard the man say that he was advocating and Mr. Robertson should give some consideration to means where Japan, the United States and Communist China should get together and reach a modus vivendi for each one’s benefit and mutual prosperity, etc. I broke into the conversation at that point and asked him to repeat his cast of characters. I heard it fairly plainly but I didn’t want there to be any mistake that he was talking about Communist China because I could see that red was beginning to appear in Mr. Robertson’s neck heading for his face, he was getting angry. So he did.
Robertson then turned on me and said something to the effect that I was a fool and that anybody
could see that that was what he meant, that he meant Communist China. I tried to assure him that
I was just making absolutely sure that there was no mistake because of the importance of the
point. Anyway, he ended the conversation very abruptly, quite angry at the turn it had taken. He
felt he had been sandbagged. He hadn’t been warned that this was likely to come apparently. I
was not there to take notes and hadn’t been taking notes but he asked me for a verbatim
transcript of that conversation to be on his desk by 8:00 the next morning. He was going to come
down and sit in the ambassador’s office and he wanted a verbatim transcript of that conversation,
verbatim mind you without notes. I did the best I could. You know I can’t remember to this day
whether his middle initial was Walter H. or Walter S, but I had him down as Walter H. as a
participant. He got very angry at that and didn’t read the memorandum at all but he did pick up
the point that his middle initial was wrong and dismissed me very abruptly.

Not a very pleasant man. But he certainly had more influence than the ambassador did about the
way things were done in the Far East and he was very conservative, very right wing and he
wanted no truck with the socialists or communists.

Q: One sort of had the feeling that the Eisenhower Administration wanted to strengthen NATO in
Europe that being where they saw the great danger. The right wing of the Republican Party had
a fixation on Asia and China. In a way it almost like Asia was tossed to the right wing of the
Republican Party with Robertson running it, while Dulles and Eisenhower could deal with really
a very European centered program regarding particularly NATO and all.

ERICSON: I personally think the end of diplomacy, as it used to be, came with the jet aircraft. In
the days when you had to take a sea trip or a punishing propeller plane, not too many people
were willing to go. Once the jet came in travel just expanded and everybody started showing up
on your doorstep, including the very most senior people. I can’t remember whether Dulles visited
Japan during that period...I’m sure he did...and Eisenhower...

Q: But he wasn’t there during your time.

ERICSON: Eisenhower, no. His famous trip was 1960.

Q: We will treat that later. A little point, you mentioned that Allison said you were to sit in on
this Robertson meeting but you also mentioned that Allison was going to be out of town at the
time. Was this a different time?

ERICSON: This was a different time. I guess Robertson must have been there a couple of times.

Q: Did you get any feel from our political officers, I assume the economic officers wouldn’t be
involved in this, that they felt they had to say the right things because we don’t want to extol the
Socialists or something like this?

ERICSON: Not that I recall specifically. You are right, the economic officers lived a part in that
period. During almost all of the period we had Frank Waring as economic counselor. Waring
was a very competent, totally grey man. He even dressed grey. He was very reserved but very
strong willed and very experienced. He had been appointed economic counselor...he had been the administrator of wartime relief in the Philippines in the Truman Administration and had been given the economic counselorship in Tokyo in lieu of an ambassadorship when it became apparent Truman couldn’t get him approved. We were lucky because Waring was a very fine person. But the ambassador and the DCM focused almost entirely on political activities and left Waring to run the economic and AID business almost all by himself. So we weren’t afraid of offending Walter Robertson because he wasn’t interested in economics either.

However, most of my friends were in the political section and I did not get from them the sense that they feared the great dragon back there in Washington.

Q: Well, in a way Japan was not a problem whereas you had Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan, etc.

ERICSON: Despite the sense of drift and all that, it was a sense of drift and not a sense that we were in any maritime battle. We may not have been going in the right direction but it wasn’t very exciting except for those episodes like the Fortunate Dragon.

Robertson’s departure wasn’t missed. But he was still in office until Eisenhower left in January 1961.

Q: As economic officer during these four years, what were you doing and how did you see the economy there?

ERICSON: There were terrible problems in the economy in those days. Japan had enormous trade imbalances, negative ones believe it or not. But looking back on it is almost laughable because in retrospect we are having exactly the same kind of problems in the trade field with Japan as we have with them today. That is the question of whether Japan would open its market to American goods, give us a level playing field. We didn’t really start running serious deficits with Japan until some years later, but even then there were a number of complaints about Japan.

One was automobiles. One of my functions was to accompany the economic counselor to the Foreign Ministry for a weekly meeting of the American economic counselor and the chief of the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry who had a standing meeting on Thursday. We would go over every Thursday to discuss our mutual problems. Our mutual problems were always the same. Japan wasn’t buying our cars or anything else for that matter, and setting up all kinds of informal trade barriers and the Japanese distribution system was all loused up and calculated to favor Japanese and the exclusion of everybody else, etc.

And then there was the Japanese deliberate penetration with specific goods in order to break down some of the structures of American industry. On the latter point we were talking about textiles. We were having trouble with Japanese dollar blouses. They were flooding the country with blouses that sold for a dollar and this was very bad for American industry. Gingham exports to the United States were ruining the gingham section of the American textile industry. We had cotton velveteen. We used to argue for hours about the Japanese having laid waste to the American cotton velveteen industry by deliberating concentrating on that segment of American industry so they could move on to the next segment and eventually expand their control all over
the American textile industry. Of course textiles remained a major problem right through the Nixon years. Things like thermometers, umbrella frames, bicycles, sewing machines are variations on the problems with Honda, Toyota and whatnot of today.

The Japanese really were not buying American automobiles. They were content to buy and import all the American automobiles they needed by buying the cars of members of the occupation, the armed forces who went back to the United States. That took care of their requirement of cars that could be chauffeur driven, for the barons of Japanese industry. So they were not interested in buying other American cars.

And, of course, the Americans for their part...American importers of Japanese goods, people like Sears and other major American retailers, were assiduous in coming out to Japan and saying, “We know that you can make camera lenses as good as the Leica. Now what we want you to do is give us a camera to such and such specifications which we can sell through our outlets in the United States.” American retailers very quickly saw that Japan was a marvelous place to have a very wide number of products made in Japan and of good quality, because the Japanese had believed our lectures about quality control and were beginning to turn out some quite impressive stuff. Not cars, but some pretty impressive stuff.

If somebody writes a history of American trade problems with Japan they ought to give a lot of credit to the major American importers of Japanese goods who really came to Japan much more than Japanese went to the United States to find sources for the kinds of goods they wanted at the prices they wanted.

In the meantime, American exporters did very, very little to develop markets in Japan. No American car maker put out a right-hand drive car designed to drive on the left hand side of the street. No American auto manufacturer ever prepared a brochure in Japanese. No American manufacturer ever tried to set up a sales force in Japan or looked for a Japanese partner. The same thing applies to refrigerator, stoves and electrical appliances. And the Japanese, of course, were happy with this because it reduced the appeal of American products, but they also borrowed assiduously from American products.

I remember one major incident in 1956. The then president of the EX-IM Bank, an Omaha banker who was one of the first presidents of the EX-IM Bank, came to Japan with the enormous sum of $14 million in his pocket to be dispensed primarily to the Osaka Power Company. He had his vice president with him and I was detailed to accompany him to Osaka to make sure his trip down there and meetings with the businessmen there went satisfactorily. I must say it was the most marvelous visit I ever had anywhere because the Osaka people went all out to impress this gentleman. We visited the site for the machinery which this $14 million was suppose to finance. It was a new generation, high pressure Westinghouse or GE steam turbine, something new and radical in the power generating business. When we looked at the site there were stands for four or five of these things. This one was obviously not the only one that was going to be put there. Eventually very similar things were put there but they didn’t come from Westinghouse or GE, they were all domestically manufactured to specifications developed by Japanese engineers after looking very carefully at what they had been furnished. There were many incidents of that type where they would exploit American industrial prowess to their own ends. You can’t blame them,
but this kind of thing did happen.

Q: Did you make any effort to inspire American manufactures to make more of an effort to sell in Japan?

ERICSON: Not really from the embassy that I can recall. Actually this would have been primarily the business of the Department of Commerce or somebody back in the United States. We wrote a lot about the subject, about what was necessary, but the embassy itself, as I recall, did not organize anything. Groups which come out, textile manufacturers would come out, the Cotton Council people would come out, but certainly the automobile manufacturers and people like that were not and probably would not have. We used to think that these were important problems but when I put it in context, what we are talking about were fairly minor, but they were very irritating to the people involved. But to the automobile manufacturer it didn’t matter a damn whether they sold another 10 or 20,000 cars in Japan. Hell, they had the American market all to themselves and a good part of Europe. So they weren’t terribly interested in it. But it was very clear to those who were working on the problems, if these things had kept on going it would apply in a major way to much bigger things, as it does today.

Q: Did you get involved in trade disputes?

ERICSON: In the very early years when I was in the commercial section I got involved in a couple of those things but not...one of the interesting things I did get involved in for example, which focuses on American attempts to get into the Japanese market, RCA got very interested in Japanese television. There was no Japanese television, The television that had established a foothold in the United States at that time was still black and white, color was just on the horizon, but there was still no television in Japan. They asked for a market survey of the potential for their type of product in Japan. Was there going to be television in Japan, and if so, how successful would it be? I was detailed to do this thing and as part of it I went to interview the man who took over the (inaudible) newspaper after World War II and threw out the communists from the newspaper staff. This caused a tremendous brouhaha in Japan because most of the Japanese press is well represented by Marxist thinkers on the staff. It was a major stink, but he stuck to his guns and developed...it was the number 3 newspaper then, today it is the biggest paper in the world...He was spearheading the idea that television should be brought to Japan and of course it was, both commercially and by NHK. I went to interview him, had a great deal of fun talking to him, but it seemed to me that the country’s economy at that time was so weak and personal incomes so low, and television equipment at the time was so expensive, that if there was to be television it would be a long time coming, probably five to ten years at least for major network activities. I felt that color was very far down the road and that on the whole it would probably be a very struggling industry before it got going. I also put a date to it as the earliest possible date for any commercial broadcasting in Japan. They started about a week after that date.

So, we did have Americans who were interested in the Japanese market. Incidentally, RCA did quite well originally at the beginning with studio cameras and the broadcasting equipment. But they lost it fairly quickly.

Q: Is there anything else you would like to talk about this period before we move back to
ERICSON: Yes, in a sense the change that came along in 1957, which I think is a fairly critical year. I remember I went for some reason with, I think it was Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, to call on Kishi. I can remember Kishi getting up and embracing this man who he had known for many years and saying, “It is great that the two of us should come together at this time.”

Ambassador MacArthur was much reviled in many ways because of his right wing political leanings, I suppose, and because he is identified with what some people refer to as the Security Treaty fiasco. He, however, to me was very much a man of his times...Allison was not a very forceful advocate, he was much better as a reporter and observer and that kind of thing, it seemed to me...MacArthur, on the other hand, was very much an activist and he came at a time when Japan was beginning the post-Hatoyama era. Kishi had just become prime minister and it was quite obvious that something had to be done if we were to face this thing, the Security Treaty, three years down the road. Mr. Kishi was very much his counterpart on the Japanese side, also a man for his time. Between the two of them I think they got things pretty much in order to face the confrontation that was coming over the renewal of the Security Treaty, which was really a tremendous break point not only in Japan’s relations with us, but Japan’s whole orientation towards the world.

Anyway, MacArthur was a hard working guy and was always in the office and expected everyone else to be in the office too. Under MacArthur it got to be Saturday morning, Sunday, it didn’t matter, if you weren’t around and he wanted you, there was something very much wrong with your attention to your business. Fortunately by that time we also had a marvelous DCM, Outerbridge Horsey, who is probably the world’s great buffer. Thank god for Horsey because he saved us down the line an awful lot of grief and absorbed in the process a great deal of the ambassador’s pressure to get things done.

Later, after I had left, Bill Leonhart came as DCM and he was a man cut from MacArthur’s own bolt of cloth and between the two of them they made life about as unpleasant for the staff as any two ambassador/DCM combination ever have.

But policy wise he saw the importance of Japan and saw the drift and he knew something had to be done about it. He worked very closely with Kishi.

Back to the meeting with Kishi, Kishi was bemoaning the fact that they had just been appointed, that the two of them had come together at this moment. Something was going on but I can’t remember. It might have been concerning the Fortunate Dragon incident.

RICHARD B. FINN
Political Officer
Tokyo (1947-1949)

Vice Consul
Yokohama (1949-1950)
Vice Consul
Sapporo (1950-1951)

Political Officer
Tokyo (1951-1954)

Japan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1954-1956)

Richard B. Finn was born in 1917 and raised in New York. In addition to Japan, his career in the Foreign Service included posts in Washington, DC, France, and the Philippines. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 8, 1991.

Q: How did you get into the Far Eastern Commission? Was that the first thing that you did? Did you just go to the State Department?

FINN: No, I had a good friend who was made the number two staff man, Sam Stratton, who was later a Congressman for many years. He asked me if I would be interested. I said I would, and so through his good offices -- they were organizing the staff, which was pretty much of an American show for the first few months anyway -- I got a job. I was the Secretary of the Committees of the Far Eastern Commission that dealt with the Constitution and legal reform, which was something that a legal background was useful for.

Q: Were you involved in working on the Japanese Constitution, or was this pretty much in the hands of MacArthur?

FINN: The Constitution was written by MacArthur's staff without telling the State Department. It came as a considerable surprise to the State Department and to the Allied members of the Commission when the papers announced on March 6, 1946, that Japan had drafted a new Constitution. General MacArthur later told Washington that this was a Japanese initiative and that his staff only helped them. That was, shall we say, an elaboration of what really happened.

We then took part in consideration of some of the Amendments. A number of changes and Amendments were made, and they went through the Commission. They were made over the rather heated opposition of the General, who continued to insist that this was a Japanese initiative, and we would spoil it by our intervention -- by the "threat of Allied bayonets" -- if we kept it up. But I think people in Washington sensed that it wasn't quite that simple a situation.

Q: Did you have any contact while you were doing this? I mean, here you are writing the Constitution, supposedly under the initiative of the Japanese, but obviously MacArthur's headquarters was heavily into it, if not predominantly into it...

FINN: The government section of SCAP Headquarters wrote it.

Q: Was anybody along the way -- either your Commission or MacArthur -- talking to the
FINN: Oh, yes, MacArthur's headquarters did so after they had written it. They took one week to write it in secrecy. It was then handed to the Japanese. The Japanese were working on a draft of their own and had given some preliminary thoughts to MacArthur's headquarters, which found the Japanese ideas very reactionary. The Government Section said that if we don't tell the Japanese what to do, they won't ever do a decent job. And in addition this, new Allied Commission would have Russians, British and everybody else telling us, the United States, what to do. So MacArthur thought that was a pretty good argument for doing it himself. He didn't even tell Washington what he was going to do. This is all a matter of public record. I had no intimate involvement in it.

Q: After working on this for a while, were you then sort of amalgamated into the State Department?

FINN: I took the FSO exams in December, 1945, as part of my idea of getting into the Foreign Service. I was accepted the following summer and left the Far Eastern Commission and took training at the Foreign Service Institute. I thought then that I had had enough of Japan and felt I would like to go to Europe. Of course, I was immediately sent off to Japan. So I became a Japan type.

Q: When you got to Tokyo in 1947, what were you doing then?

FINN: Our office had two titles. One was the Political Adviser's Office (POLAD) -- as such we were a State Department Office -- and the State Department representative in Japan to MacArthur's Headquarters. MacArthur would accept the State Department's office only on condition that it be a SCAP military headquarters' office under his control, and it was called in that capacity the Diplomatic Section. So the office and the man in charge really had two hats -- the State Department hat and the MacArthur Headquarters' hat. MacArthur dealt with it only as part of his headquarters. No telegraphic messages were allowed back and forth to State in Washington. You could send airmail reports back and forth, but it was very much under MacArthur's control. It wasn't oppressive, but almost everything you did was known to headquarters, and every now and then there was some unpleasantness because the State Department view that the State Department thoughts were going directly to its representatives were in fact being read by MacArthur and his staff.

One has to point out that the State Department had a similar office in Germany that was very powerful. It was really the policy-making office for American political and economic policy toward occupied Germany. Our office in Japan had nothing like that kind of autonomy.

Q: It was HICOG, I think.

FINN: It became HICOG after the military command was dissolved. Military people, Eisenhower, and then Clay, didn't want to get into this job. They didn't want the American military wasting its people and talents on military occupation duties. MacArthur loved it, and he felt he was pretty good at it, which he was.
Q: Yes, but what about his staff? What was your impression of his staff? You think of people like Willoughby et al. History has not been very kind to many of the people around him.

FINN: I think that is fair to say. The history is very ambivalent, even about the top man himself. But in my opinion, MacArthur was an excellent supreme commander. He was not an excellent representative of the United States because he thought he was on his own. He liked to act as if he were the Allied Commander responsible not to the United States only, but to the ten other allies as well, and he occasionally made that point very clear to the State Department, which did not like it, but which was not in a position to fire him or even argue with him.

Willoughby? Willoughby was in many ways a brilliant man. He was a remarkable diplomat, a remarkable linguist. A reactionary man politically, but he foresaw the Cold War before many people foresaw it. He probably had foreseen all of his life being a German-born and bred, a military man. I rather admired Willoughby, but he was thoroughly military. He kept close tabs on CIA, for example, which I think is not the way the U.S. government should operate.

And of the other people, they were all terribly loyal to MacArthur. MacArthur came first. We all got along with our own level people quite well. The general officer level tended to be suspicious of the State Department. Several of the Chiefs of Staff looked upon our section almost as if we were the enemy.

Q: Well, what sort of things were you doing?

FINN: We had a Political Section, a Consular Section, and an Administration Section. We were, for want of a better description, the substitute Foreign Office for the government of Japan. Japan had no foreign relations, no foreign representatives. They couldn't communicate with the Japanese nationals in Brazil, for example, or anywhere. We did all that work for them.

My own work was more semi-political, political-diplomatic. The Japanese had all kinds of problems with their relations with foreign countries. The neutral nations of World War II, for instance had not been at war with Japan. At first, Japan wanted to deal with them. That was not permitted. Anything Japan wanted to do through its Foreign Office involving foreign matters had to go through our office. I did a lot of work on the Korean minority in Japan, which was a knotty problem.

Q: It still is.

FINN: Yes. Then there was the Taiwanese minority. There were a lot of Japanese scattered around Southeast Asia and in China. I suppose the main contribution that I made was to try to work out some kind of arrangement that would take care of the Korean problem. One, to minimize friction with the Japanese, and two, to encourage the Koreans to go back and live in Korea. MacArthur decided about half way through the occupation, and I think rather wisely, that the United States ought not to be solving Japan's problem with the Korean minority.

The Japanese would have loved to put them all on a ship and send them to Korea and not let
them back into Japan. We didn't believe in doing that. They had the rights of liberated people in Japan. But the Korean minority was a rather activist, if not obstreperous, group in Japan and to some extent still is. They were hard to handle. MacArthur said that we are going to just get along with this problem and let the Japanese handle it when a peace treaty comes along -- similarly, with the Taiwanese minority.

My own opinion was that it has been very good for Japan to have a minority. One of Japan's great problems in the world is its isolation and lack of easy relationship with the outside world. Japan had, of course, nurtured this isolation for centuries. Many of the Koreans were born in Japan and have lived all their life there. The Japanese are bit by bit doing much better with the Korean problem, but they are a long way from treating the Koreans equally and fairly.

Q: Did you get involved at all in trying to get the repatriation of the Japanese from the Soviet Union?

FINN: Oh, yes. That was another major function of the (Sebald) office. I was sort of the briefcase carrier for Ambassador Sebald on that. There was an organization called the Allied Council of Japan. The Far Eastern Commission was an 11 nation allied body in Washington, supposedly making policy. The Allied Council was a four nation body -- the U.S., France, the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. -- in Japan which was supposed to advise the Supreme Commander on the implementation of policy, and refer back to their governments any issue where they could not agree with MacArthur.

Very few issues were ever sent to Washington for advice or ever seriously debated in Tokyo. MacArthur broke the back of the Allied Council in a matter of half a dozen meetings, so they only considered what he wanted them to consider or what he would let them consider. The Council did not have anybody to report back to and was relatively impotent. MacArthur did not attend the meetings and delegated his power as chairman to the POLAD/Chief of Diplomatic Section. He used the meetings to do what he wanted done, and one of the things he wanted done was to put pressure on the Russians to repatriate Japanese from Manchuria and elsewhere. The Council had its most tense and, to some extent, effective meetings dealing with the issue.

Q: Did you have any relations with your Soviet counterpart in that?

FINN: Not personally. I didn't deal with any Soviet. Only a few Americans dealt with the Soviets. My boss, Ambassador Sebald, did, and a few people in the G-2 section of Headquarters did.

I was in Japan for three months right after the war as a Naval officer, returned to Washington for the year with the Far Eastern Commission and then returned to Japan in September, 1947. By that time, diplomatic relations had solidified into the semi-Cold War relationship between the Russians and the rest of the diplomatic community.

Q: Who was your civilian boss at that time?

FINN: In the State Department office?
Q: Yes.

FINN: A man called Cabot Coville, an FSO-3. Mr. Coville was a diplomat of the old school, but he was extremely knowledgeable about Japan.

Q: So it was a pretty low ranking...an FSO-3 in those days would have been about the equivalent of Colonel.

FINN: Yes, that is right. Ambassador Sebald was the head of our office after 1947. George Atcheson, a China hand and career FSO, was the first POLAD.

Q: So it was deliberately, I assume by MacArthur, kept at a pretty low level.

FINN: MacArthur didn't worry much about personnel or ranks or things like that. His staff always resented any civilian who claimed a high rank because that was a particular strain on housing. Mr. Coville, however, who was divorced, had a room in the Imperial Hotel, which was supposed to be for general officers, so our office did have a little clout in getting nice things like housing.

Q: During that time, you were there from 1947-54, how did things evolve for you? What were you doing while you were there over a period of time?

FINN: I spent two years in Tokyo to start with, doing what I consider pretty interesting and useful work, like the Korean work, and helping on the Allied Council and starting to get ready to at least think about a Peace Treaty. Then I spent a year and a half as a Consular Officer. The State Department felt that every young officer should have a variety of duties.

Q: In Tokyo?

FINN: No. Consular work was headed up by a Consul General in Yokohama. I was in Yokohama for about a year, and then I went up to Sapporo -- northern Japan -- for half a year. I went on home leave and came back to the Embassy in Tokyo. By that time, the Peace Treaty was an important issue, and I was again sort of the bagman for keeping the files and doing the initial drafting on telegrams about the Treaty. The Treaty didn't go very far for some time until Mr. Dulles took over in mid-1950.

In my opinion, Mr. Dulles' greatest contribution to American diplomacy was the Japanese Peace Treaty, which he negotiated not solely by himself, but he was the master hand of the whole thing. He did it before he became Secretary of State.

Q: John Allison was with him?

FINN: He was his number two man.

Q: To go back a bit, when you were acting as Consular Officer in Yokohama and then Sapporo,
what type of problems were you dealing with?

FINN: The biggest problem I recall handling was the expatriation of American *nisei*. We had a very tough nationality law, and a tough lady called Ruth Shipley, who was head of the Consular Division in the Department. If a person had served in the Japanese forces, or voted in an election or taken an oath to Japan in any capacity, we were to make out a certificate of expatriation and send it in, and they were all automatically stamped "approved."

The *nisei*, after a couple of years, got some American lawyers on the job. Pretty soon the tide turned, and later in the occupation, all of these certificates of expatriation were torn up, and certificates of citizenship were being issued. So we had a fine time first expatriating for a couple of years and then repatriating them thereafter. That I won't say is typical of Consular work, but it doesn't give you the most happy impression of the paper mill.

Q: Did you also get involved with GI marriages?

FINN: The State Department would not let American citizens in Japan marry Japanese nationals as long as Japanese were not entitled to become United States citizens. Then when legislation was approved allowing Japanese to enter the United States, the State Department removed the ban on marriages, and many were performed.

We had a fair amount of visa work. For a long time, Japanese were not allowed to go abroad, but in 1949 or '50, the U.S. started letting them go abroad. A lot of students were sent to America; leaders under the USIA-sponsored visitors program went. Visa work was fairly routine. One problem we had was that G-2, Army Intelligence, had taken a lot of Japanese records; anybody who had given the Japanese government trouble prewar had a record with the Japanese police. G-2 made extensive use of that kind of information, and this was something visa officers had to consider.

I know one case of a man, who became a very good friend of mine, named Tsuru. Tsuru had been sent to America as a teenager by his family in the mid-30s because he was a radical in high school in Japan, and they wanted to get him out from under the Japanese police so he wouldn't be put in jail. He ended up with a Ph.D. from Harvard, but he had a police record in Japan. He couldn't get a visa to the United States for many years. He spoke excellent English, but he had this alleged red background in U.S. files. This may be an extreme example, but it is again the type of unpleasantness you got into.

Q: I was at the other end a little later in the Refugee Program, and I think the military did tend to accept the judgments of basically the enemy power of who was for and who was against you. It was ironic, but that happens.

FINN: For that matter, G-2 began to look around at Americans, and there were a lot of Americans who had liberal records. If you had been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, you were suspect in their view. One of the experts in our office in Tokyo was a very bright man of whom I thought highly in many ways. He had been in G-2 before he came to the State Department. He wrote Willoughby's memoranda to MacArthur saying that we had 15-20
communists working in headquarters, mostly in the Economic Section, the Government Section and the Newspaper Section, and we ought to fire them. MacArthur paid very little attention to these memos.

Q: After your Consular work, you said you came back to Tokyo and worked sort of as a bag carrier working on the Treaty. What was your impression of the role the Japanese were playing in this Treaty? Was this really a joint Treaty?

FINN: The Japanese, early in the occupation -- a few months after it started, realized that there was going to be a Peace Treaty some day. They wanted it as soon as they could get it. They set up study groups in late 1945, studying issues like reparations, territory, overseas assets, everything that goes into a peace treaty. For several years, they gave us their memoranda on these matters. We would say thank you very much and send them to Washington. Washington said that while all this was very interesting, there was not going to be a Peace Treaty for a long time, and when the time did get nearer, the U.S. was going to decide the territory or the reparations issue and not the Japanese. So the Japanese views did not count for much.

But the Japanese were realists about it and continued to send us drafted treaty proposals before Dulles came along, and they did two or three quite miserable drafts calling for such things as 25-year Allied Commission, or a council of Ambassadors to oversee implementation.

MacArthur, to his credit, thought that these Washington drafts were poor stuff. MacArthur knew his place in history was going to depend in good part on his work in Japan. I would say he was the first person to believe in a short, non-punitive treaty, not cluttered with all these restrictions. This was very much to his credit. He was not a diplomat. He had some funny ideas about diplomacy, but he wanted an early, liberal peace treaty.

He envisioned soon after the occupation started that he might have a good shot at the White House. He knew that what he did in Japan would be quite important in selling himself to the American people. He had a time table: there was going to be an election in 1948; he would have to get things pretty well wrapped up by 1947, have a peace treaty and then return to the U.S. in time to campaign and cash in on his glory. So he wanted about a 2-year occupation -- get it all done and out of the way.

I think MacArthur secretly -- and maybe not so secretly -- thought highly of the Japanese. He had only been to Japan a couple of times, but in his eyes, the Japanese were disciplined people, and they were good fighters. The Japanese GI did what his officer told him to do, didn't ask questions, and did it to the death. That is an appealing kind of psychology for a military leader.

So he wanted a peace treaty quickly, a non-punitive one. The bureaucrats in the State Department could not really come up with one. By the time it got through everybody in the State Department, the lawyers, the reparations people and the Pentagon, everyone wanted something from the Peace Treaty with Japan. But MacArthur's views were something to conjure with. When he said we should do this and not do that, the chances were this would carry the day. When Dulles came aboard, he and MacArthur saw eye to eye. It was a happy marriage from the point of view of liberal Americans, who wanted a quick and non-punitive treaty with Japan.
Q: As a practical measure, you look at the other side of the equation -- the German one. Didn't we just sign the Peace Treaty this year?

FINN: Yes, in effect, that is right. We never had anything resembling a peace treaty with Germany, but the German solution was reached quite intelligently, in my opinion. First of all, Washington put the economic and political roles in the hands of the State Department, and the State Department extensively relied on German experts. You had a man like Ludwig Erhard making German economic policy by 1948. The U.S. had a Harvard professor by the name of Carl Joachim Friedrich, who advised the Germans on what a democratic constitution should say. He was German-born, and he worked easily with the Germans. He by himself was the equivalent an entire government section as far as our occupation of Germany went. The Germans got a basic statute by 1948, and that, in effect, led to a partial peace settlement with the Germans. That was when McCloy and the American civilians came in and took over from the military. So de facto, we had a Peace Treaty by 1949. We didn't get it in Japan until 1952 because MacArthur decided that he wanted to stay in Japan until the Peace Treaty was signed.

Q: And, of course, MacArthur did not do very well in the 1948 Republican campaign. There was a trial balloon in some primaries in Wisconsin and somewhere else. It just didn't come out very well.

FINN: Exactly. He got nowhere.

Q: When you were working with Dulles...one of the things one gathers about Dulles was that he was a good lawyer, but he really didn't understand other cultures. There is always the phrase, "Why don't you, the Israelis, the Jews, sit down and talk this over like Christian gentlemen?" You get the feeling that he saw things in common "us versus them" -- but not culturally sensitive. But peace treaties are very culturally sensitive documents.

FINN: I think that is two-thirds true. Dulles never quite understood the Japanese. I think they were strange little men to him. But on the other hand, he relied quite heavily on people like John Allison, who knew Japan well. Shortly after Dean Acheson gave him the job, he sat down and wrote a memo on what kind of people the Japanese were. He said in this memo that the Japanese were people who tended to stick together. They were a very group-minded people. They were also susceptible to leadership that would lead them in ways that they, not being a very sensitive or sophisticated people, might not want to go. In this sense, the Japanese were very much like the communists -- subject to dictation and leadership by a few strong people. And there is a fair amount to that kind of observation.

He had a number of things in his essay of that sort. I think most of the people in the State Department felt that Dulles was a smart enough man to learn that he was over-stressing certain aspects of Japanese psychology. And I think that is true. He and Yoshida, who was the leader of the Japanese government during the last half of the occupation, didn't get along at all well, really. But the saving grace was that they had pretty good staffs on both sides, and they were able to do a lot of good business together, with Allison on our side and several senior Japanese on their side. Many of the important, early decisions and drafts were done by the staffs. They were doing
what Dulles and Yoshida wanted done but were not quite able to pull it off themselves. Dulles was, somewhat as you defined, not an easy man to deal with on this sort of thing. But, on the other hand, he was a master diplomatic craftsman.

Dulles and Yoshida had a lot of trouble with the defense arrangements. The Pentagon had certain requirements. Dulles was able to work with MacArthur on defense issues, but it took a lot of hassling to determine the exact security arrangements we should have. The Japanese were willing to give us bases as long as we didn't make them rearm. The Pentagon wanted both. How to handle that was a tricky problem. Dulles finally sat down, and, in the course of a couple of hours, wrote off a Security Treaty he thought would do the job. He didn't want to clutter it up with all the stuff about legal jurisdiction, bases rights, customs, whether tanks could use highways, etc. He said those things would come later. He drew up a short, simple and neatly-done draft.

It was a model for the Japan Security Treaty, the Philippine Security Treaty, the ANZUS Security Treaty and later the Korean Security Treaty. Dulles was good at this. Likewise, he was very good on the peace treaty. The issues were up his alley. He was an expert on reparations, property and the like. So I must say that two men who did an outstanding job for their country on the Peace Treaty and deserve good marks in the history books were MacArthur and Dulles.

Q: How long were you involved with the Peace Treaty?

FINN: I came back from home leave in early 1951. Dulles by that time was in charge. So I worked on the Peace Treaty from about April, 1950, until April, 1952, when it came into effect, and for many months after on problems related to the Peace and Security Treaties. This story about Dulles is, I think, probably true. In 1950, the Democrats and Republicans in Washington were having problems with a Democratic President and strong Republican representation in both houses of Congress...somebody said that more bipartisanship was needed. So John Sherman Cooper and John Foster Dulles were prevailed upon to take high positions in the State Department. Dulles didn't have to be prevailed upon really. So Dulles came in and did odd jobs in the Department for a few months, and he finally went to Acheson one day and said, "You know, you are getting nowhere with the Japanese Peace Treaty. What you ought to do is give one man responsibility, tell him you will give him one year to get it done, and if he doesn't get it done in one year, you fire him and pick somebody else."

In effect, Acheson said, "Okay, you are it."

Truman wasn't happy. Cooper was more of a gentleman and liberal scholar, while Dulles had a real strong partisan strain in his makeup. But they gave the Japan job to Dulles. There was very little partisanship in what he did. And even when MacArthur got fired a year later, and it looked as if this might spoil the whole treaty arrangement, Dulles was a good soldier. He stuck with Truman and Acheson and finished it off.

Q: What was the effect of what you were doing on the Korean War, which started June 25, 1950, and then leading up to and through the firing of MacArthur about a year later or so?
FINN: The Korean War was a strange experience for us out there. We didn't feel any particular tension or worry about our safety. I think the feeling that America was invincible, as it had shown in World War II, was still very much a part of our own attitude. Much less did we think that the local forces out there could give us the kind of trouble that they ultimately did. Even when the American forces were forced down the peninsula to the perimeter around Pusan in the summer of 1950, we didn't think there was a Dunkirk in the offing, although in retrospect, we were not all that far from it.

Q: It was a closer run thing than I think we realized at the time.

FINN: We all had confidence that our side would win out, and, of course, MacArthur did it again with the Inchon landing, a superb military achievement that seemed to almost end the war. Then, of course, in late 1950, the Chinese came in, and we were in danger of repeating the same performance we had gone through a few months before. That shortly led to the firing of MacArthur.

I don't think any of us felt that the occupation of Japan would fall apart, or fail or would be greatly damaged when MacArthur was ordered out. By that time, the peace treaty was moving along. Dulles had gotten a draft by February, 1951, that the Japanese had happily accepted. The Allies hadn't even seen it. This was a very curious way to run the negotiation of a treaty -- to get it through your enemy first and then go tell your friends what you have agreed to, and please don't upset the apple cart. Some of them didn't appreciate that kind of dealing. But it was America's show; we ran it our way, and they knew we were in charge. I think we were prepared to go and sign a treaty with Japan alone if that should be required. The Allies could have done little to change it, but we never came very near to that.

Q: But also the Allies really weren't playing much of a role. Unlike in Germany, where you had contiguous territory and occupation troops and all that. Japan was all our show.

FINN: The British, in fact, wanted our occupation to end in a hurry because they felt the longer we stayed, the more their commercial interests in Japan would be reduced, which, in fact, was the case. The British had been top dog in East Asia for a century. Here, we came in, and after World War II, we were now on top. They didn't think that was a great deal for them.

Q: When MacArthur went, then everybody wasn't running around wringing their hands?

FINN: No, I wouldn't say that. Bill Sebald, who was my boss and the head of the office, was certainly concerned. Just a word about Sebald: he was an Annapolis graduate, became a language officer in Japan, was in the Navy during the war as an intelligence officer; he left the Navy in the mid-30s to become a lawyer in Japan, where his father-in-law had been a prominent British commercial lawyer and had a Japanese wife. Sebald rejoined the U.S. Navy after the war started and became an intelligence officer. The State Department hired him after the war and sent him out in late 1945 as a lawyer to serve in the diplomatic section. When the man who was the head of it, a China expert, George Atcheson, was killed in a plane crash in 1947, MacArthur said he wanted Sebald for the job. The State Department didn't want Sebald for the job, of course, because he was not a State Department career man. They wanted to put Maxwell Hamilton in,
but MacArthur's view prevailed. So Sebald was somewhat beholden to MacArthur. The State Department didn't make an issue of his appointment. Dulles thought well of Sebald. Sebald made his own reputation and did not have to depend on MacArthur to stay in his job.

Q: The treaty was signed when?

FINN: The treaty was signed in September, 1951, and went into force April 28, 1952.

Q: As an airman first class, I was occupying Japan one day and was defending it the next. What did you do after the treaty came into effect?

FINN: We did almost exactly what we did before. I think we had to give up our house. That was one thing that hit most of us. All the enforced takeover of Japanese housing and buildings in the Tokyo area was reversed. So we all had to look around for some other places to live. But fortunately, the U.S. dollar was very strong, so with our money, we could go out and rent good places to live. Many of the Japanese who had nice houses that had been occupied by the Americans, for which they got very little in the way of rental from their own government, were now able to rent out their places on a commercial basis to Americans after the treaty. We went back to the same house we had when we first came to Japan in 1947. The treaty meant very little difference. We were all a little nervous, but the Japanese seemed to feel the situation was about the same after as before the treaty. They were, of course, relieved the treaty was in effect. Their top leadership got along well with our people. There was no animosity or bitterness, little friction. The Japanese are a pragmatic, purposeful people, in my opinion, and they set themselves about repairing the damage and getting back on their feet.

Q: As I say, I came in due to the Korean War just out of college, and I was just a GI there, and everybody loved it. It was great duty, and we liked the Japanese. We certainly liked the Japanese women. There was not the feeling that they were sort of the under class.

FINN: To cite one mundane example...we no longer had MPs directing traffic downtown, but the traffic moved along fine anyway. Where were you stationed?

Q: I was stationed at Johnson Air Force Base, just outside of Tokyo. Now what sort of work did you do after 1952 to 1954?

FINN: I became, as so many of us seemed to in those days, a political/military officer. After the Peace Treaty came into effect, of course, there was a Security Treaty along with it. We set up a Joint American-Japanese Committee consisting of military people and the Japanese Foreign Office people. We still have something like that sort going in Japan today, 40 years later. I was the State Department officer advising the American General or Admiral -- whichever -- on this Joint Committee.

A lot of the problems were diplomatic. There were many knotty problems. Criminal jurisdiction posed some delicate issues. The Japanese, to their credit, did not want to surrender all jurisdiction over crimes and offenses by American GIs. They wanted some division of jurisdiction that would be very much like the NATO arrangement, figuring that the NATO one
would be an equitable type. The Pentagon didn't want to give it to them. It took a year before the U.S. finally agreed to give the Japanese the NATO formula on criminal jurisdiction.

Part of the formula was that the Americans would request waivers for any criminal cases they considered important and that the Japanese would give sympathetic consideration to that request. That has been going on for 40 years. Any time we want to get a GI back, they will give him back to us. And to our soldiers' credit, they did not go around murdering Japanese, although there were a couple of unpleasant offenses. For example, on a target range once, a GI shot and killed a Japanese farm woman who was picking up the brass shell cases, which were quite valuable. The Japanese didn't go for that kind of thing; we didn't either. I don't think the soldier, his name was Gerard, spent anytime in jail, but he was tried and found guilty of a criminal offense, but his sentence was suspended, and he was sent home.

**Q:** Did you have any problem with our military adjusting to the new status? Often everybody at the top agrees, but there are certain perks which suddenly are no longer there at lower levels.

**FINN:** I don't recall that. I would think for a lot of people their status was pretty much the same. I know of no incidents or grumbling psychology. Even the top general moved to a much nicer house than the American Embassy residence where he had been living. We retained several rest hotels in downtown Tokyo so that the fellows could still get 25 cent martinis and a good steak dinner for very little. No doubt there were plenty of individual cases of unhappiness, but it wasn't a big thing.

**Q:** Again and again the theme has come through that when you are trying to negotiate something, particularly status of forces, the country and the Americans there can usually come up with a pretty good way, but when it gets back to the Pentagon, the lawyers there seem to take a very extreme, unresponsive view. They don't seem to be knowledgeable or very good at dealing with the situation.

**FINN:** That is very true. I mentioned the matter of criminal jurisdiction. Those of us on the spot said, " Why not give the Japanese the NATO formula? Give it to them right away. The Japanese aren't barbarians." The Pentagon seemed to think that they were Hottentots. The military feel an obligation to get all foreign countries to treat our men abroad just as if they were in the United States. Well, they are not. They are in a foreign country, and the Japanese and the Europeans would never cede to us on that kind of issue.

The military wanted another provision in the status of forces agreement: in case of an emergency, the American top military commander would take command of all forces in the Japan area -- Americans and Japanese. Of course, the Japanese only had a kind of token force at that time. But the Japanese didn't want that. Dean Rusk argued right up to the end to try to get it, but the Japanese refused. Finally, the Pentagon agreed not to insist on it and say that if there were an emergency, the two sides would consult on what they were going to do.

**Q:** So after the peace treaty went into effect, you became a sort of political/military officer. Were there any major problems indicating any resentment on the part of the Japanese during your four years?
FINN: There were a couple of provisions in the Security Treaty that they didn't like. One of them was that in case of a large scale internal disturbance in Japan, our troops would be authorized to intervene, if the Japanese government requested it. That was something that we or the Pentagon, I am not sure who, wanted. In effect, we would be interfering in their local affairs if there was some kind of demonstration or communist riots. They didn't like that. We gave up that right in 1960.

There were several things on that order. The most difficult area was the security arrangements we wanted to get, in particular an MSA, or Mutual Security Agreement with Japan. We had them with all the NATO countries. In effect, an MSA agreement means that the U.S. would supply military equipment if the other government would agree to build up its military forces and cooperate with us in meeting the common threat posed by international communism. Well, the Japanese didn't see then -- as they don't really see today -- any great threat from international communism or other sources. To get them to sign the agreement took a lot of arm-twisting. The diplomatic people in the Japanese government thought that this was a nice way to get a lot of weaponry cheap. And further, they would not have to worry unduly that they would be sent off to fight the Chinese, or Koreans or somebody. The Americans would really be agreeing de facto to defend Japan. But a lot of the liberal Japanese, and certainly the left wing, felt that an MSA agreement tied Japan to the American capitalist, imperialist structure. They were not happy about that. That feeling eventually dissipated, but it lasted for about ten years in Japan.

Q: Was it an Embassy in 1952?

FINN: Yes.

Q: How did you see the "Soviet menace" at that time in regard to Japan?

FINN: Japan never had a strong communist movement. The Peace Treaty came into effect on April 28, 1952. Three days later was May Day. The labor movement had a big demonstration in Japan on May Day. We, the Americans, got the Japanese to prohibit the demonstration downtown by the Imperial Palace, so the demonstrators had their first initial demonstration several miles away near Meiji Shrine and then marched downtown anyway. There was a clash with the police. I think I read that one person was killed. The workers threw a couple of GIs in the moat around the palace along with a couple of American cars. There was some fear that the communist revolution was here, and things were going to be tough. Could the police control them; are we in for trouble?

There was one view in the Embassy that wanted to send a telegram back and scare the hell out of the Joint Chiefs by saying that we cannot count on keeping large military forces on the ground in Japan. We should prepare to remove them and keep only token forces. Cooler heads prevailed, and the telegram did not go out.

I did not personally see any great threat. My boss, Sam Berger, thought there was. And I still felt that America was number one, and we weren't going to have to worry about any threats inside Japan. And, frankly, I didn't see any great threats from outside, despite the Korean War.
Q: Well, Berger had just come out of being a very important figure as labor attaché in the UK, where he was sort of our contact with the Labor Government. He was coming from European context on this, probably.

FINN: Sam was a fine officer and learned a lot about Japan. He was the Political Counselor, and I suppose it was his job to see potential threats. Bob Murphy was the Ambassador and a tough-minded man. But when a country with Japan's background has a riot three days after the nation regains independence, and nobody knows really which way the cat is going to jump, you are well advised to look pretty hard at the situation.

Q: This was a real test?

FINN: Yes, it was.

Q: What was your impression on how it was handled in say, five days retrospect?

FINN: My suspicion is that the military -- remember we hadn't sent one GI home because of the Peace Treaty -- felt, one, they were in pretty good control of anything that could happen in Japan, regardless of whether they had authority to intervene or not, and two, they had considerable confidence in the Japanese. The Japanese later developed their own military force, and our military trained and worked with them. I think our officers felt the Japanese could rapidly muster four or five divisions of quite competent soldiers if they had to. Of course, Berger and the Embassy were thinking more of the long term political situation. If you got bloodshed with the communists fighting the Japanese defense force, you were in for trouble. But I think most of us were oblivious to the communist threat or felt that the threat wasn't great.

Q: Robert Murphy had probably the most distinguished career in the Foreign Service, actually coming out of the old Consular Service and then moving on. How did he run an Embassy? In a way, it would seem that he was a fish out of water since he was such a European hand.

FINN: I liked Murphy, and I thought he ran the Embassy quite well. He arrived the evening the Peace Treaty came into force, three days before the riot. He asked me how many men there were in the Tokyo police force. I said that I thought there was about 20,000. He said that that was interesting, since New York had 22,000. That was a natural question for a new Ambassador to ask: What are the local security forces like?

There was one thing about Murphy's style of running things which puzzled me a little. He was awfully nice to the middle and lower officers, but was quite tough on his senior officers. He wouldn't quite chew them out in public, but you could see when he was not pleased with their performance. I suppose top officers in any system have to solve that problem -- how you handle people under you. Sometimes you can't handle them all equally well.

Q: Did you have any feelings about how he dealt with the Japanese?

FINN: Murphy was very good with people. He had all the charm of the Irish, and he used it. A
man like Dulles was rather impersonal and somewhat of a cold fish. John Allison could be that way, too. Murphy was a very personable fellow. He always had cigars, and the Prime Minister, Yoshida, liked cigars, so they always had a fine time together. Yoshida told Murphy the Emperor advised him to give up smoking, and he said he wouldn't do it. Murphy was six feet two, and Yoshida was about five feet tall...Mark Clark, who was the senior general by then, was about six feet four...so it was something to see when you got Mark Clark and Murphy with Yoshida. But Yoshida was a shrewd fellow. His English was good, and he knew the West pretty well. They got along well. Murphy got along from the start much better with Yoshida than Dulles did. Dulles and Yoshida were perhaps forced to get along well because Yoshida was the Prime Minister afterwards, and Dulles became Secretary of State. I know Dulles once said that he couldn't understand Yoshida's English. I think Dulles was the kind of person whose antenna did not work well with foreigners speaking bad English. I may be exaggerating some of these things and showing my own prejudices, but I thought Murphy did quite well. He was a great fellow with people.

Q: Were you getting instructions at all from Washington? I mean, did you find the State Department almost intrusive in your work? This was a very peculiar setup with the military in Japan.

FINN: Actually, we didn't have much trouble. When MacArthur was there, nobody told MacArthur anything, and anything that came from State in the way of an instruction had to go through the military. When George Kennan negotiated a new national security policy for Japan in 1948, Marshall Green and the fellows on the desk thought SCAP was going to really cut back on some of the policies, like the purge, that had gone too far. They wanted to give the Japanese more freedom to run things their own way. So they drafted telegrams to that effect, that we were going to reduce the purge -- we had eliminated thousands of Japanese, mostly military, from holding public office -- and sent them over to the Pentagon. The Pentagon didn't want to clear them because they knew MacArthur wanted to stick with what he had done. He didn't like to be second-guessed by the people in Washington. Those things were not pleasant, and the State Department couldn't do much about it. By the time the treaty came along, we still had a situation where the military was the preeminent arm of American policy in Japan. So the State Department was not unilaterally able to run policy for Japan.

Q: During this period we are talking about, we have a corps of men who were working at our Embassy in Moscow and dealing with Soviet Affairs -- Russian experts -- and they were quite an elite in dealing with the Russians. What about the Japanese hands, the people dealing with this at the time? This is a very important time, and I wonder if you could talk a little about some of the personalities?

FINN: Bill Sebald, who left Japan shortly before the Peace Treaty came into effect, was an old hand on Japan. He had lived there for ten years before the war. His wife was half-Japanese. We had three or four people, older officers, who had been in Japan before the war and knew Japan and the people well. They were not anti-Japanese or tough about Japan, but in my opinion, quite realistic. The same thing was true of the military attachés. A lot of the senior military people had been in Japan before the war. They had a lot of Japanese friends. Yoshida's daughter knew them all when these men came back as part of the occupation. They used to take her out to dances and
things like that. She knew English well and was very Westernized, as was her father. I guess I would say that we never had a large number of Japan hands. We never really had enough people to get spread around the Japanese government politics in a broad, deep way. But we always had enough people to get the minimum job done, and more and more we got trained people who knew the language and were familiar with the country's record and the attitudes of the Japanese.

I would have to say partly that I think the State Department and Dean Acheson were not helpful. They did not like Japan hands. Dean Acheson, in September, 1945, said he did not want to have anybody like Joseph Grew or Eugene Dooman, who were Japan hands, come out to Japan as the State Department representative. Acheson, in effect, said that he didn't have confidence in the old Japan hands. He appointed George Atcheson, a China hand, who went down in a plane crash in 1947, to be the head of the State Department office. And somewhat that same psychology seems to prevail even now. Take Mike Mansfield, by all accounts a very successful Ambassador. He did not know a word of Japanese when he went there, and I doubt if he knows more than one or two words now. Ed Reischauer was an exception in the post-war era, like John Allison and Alex Johnson. But in general, Japan hands are not highly thought of. I think that is a conclusion you can draw from American diplomacy in the last forty years.

Q: Thinking about it, this is true. You have people who are called in who really don't come with a great deal of knowledge of the area. As kids, we hated the Japanese, having just fought a war, but later we fell in love with Japan -- the food was interesting, the beer was great as were the girls. Do you think this worked against Japan because there was a suspicion that the guys had gone too native or something?

FINN: Before World War II, the Far East Division of the State Department was headed by a man called Stanley Hornbeck, who had very little familiarity with Asia, but what he had was China. He had the Chinese attitude toward the Japanese. Look at Joseph Grew, who was the Ambassador for ten years. He probably didn't know more than a couple of words of Japanese himself. He was very hard of hearing and probably couldn't hear what was said to him in any case. The feeling was that we hadn't been well represented there before the war, we were not tough enough, we did not tell the Japanese that they were going to get into trouble if they continued doing what they were doing.

Q: I guess when you think about it, our Russian hands were basically pretty tough. It was a difficult regime, and it was easier to be tough. And that goes over well in the American political complex. You are not letting your side down.

FINN: Certainly under Bush and Baker, the present President and Secretary of State, the expert is not highly thought of. Even though one would have thought that Bush would have seen it a little differently, having been an Ambassador twice. I don't think Reagan and his team either felt sympathetic to the career people. Baker is supposed to have said that all foreign policy is domestic politics. To have your foreign policy succeed, you have to have a successful domestic policy. It is true that if you have Congress against you, you are going to have a lot of problems. But on the other hand, I do think knowing what the foreign government thinks, and what foreign people are like, is worth something in foreign relations.
Q: You came back to the State Department from 1954-56. I wonder if you could tell me what you did then?

FINN: I was the so-called Desk Officer for Japan for those two years. I had three or four officers under me, and we were the Japan political/military side of the operation. There was a separate economic office. We were the primary State Department office for Japanese political affairs. The big things were to assist Japan, which had become independent two years before, in 1952, to rejoin the world and to help the Japanese with some of their problems...getting diplomatic recognition, becoming members of the United Nations. We were also negotiating a number of treaties consistent with Japan's new independent status -- many on the political/military side, like the Mutual Security Agreement.

We also negotiated an Atoms for Peace agreement, which I think was something of a breakthrough. Japan, having been atom bombed during the war and having this allergy about atomic weapons, was still very interested in the science/technology side of the nuclear discovery. They were happy to have a nuclear peaceful use agreement, which they have made very good use of. It has assisted Japan, among other things, in developing so rapidly as an economic power.

That, I think, is in a nutshell what we did. It was a busy office and a busy time. The Japanese are busy people and a business-making people, so we had lots of things to do.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Japanese? At that time, it was the Japanese Embassy. Were you dealing on equal terms, or did you have to do some confidence-building?

FINN: The Japanese, in my experience, are different in some ways from a Western nation in terms of negotiation and handling problems. That doesn't mean that they are obsequious, or deferential or give in, but they don't engage in straight man-to-man on either side of the table, laying it on the line or working out a compromise. The process is much more circuitous in trying to divine on each side what the other one has in mind and what he wants and trying to adjust the two positions accordingly. Agreement comes gradually.

In my view, that is a rather admirable trait of the Japanese, and I think probably other nations have it, maybe other Orientals. The Japanese more than most. The Chinese, in my experience, are much more like us in laying it on the line and cutting down on the differences and then reaching an agreement. The Japanese felt then, as they do today, that America is terribly important to them. We were important to them because they had lost the war, we had occupied them and then had tried to help them get back on their feet. We are important to them today because we are a very rich, powerful country, and we have opened many doors for the Japanese economy, and Japanese activities generally, to enter and be so successful, as we have all seen. The Japanese, in my opinion, are not going to fight or be difficult with Uncle Sam when they see we take a strong position. I am getting away from 1954, but the point I am making is that I think the Japanese are deferential -- no, obliging, certainly not obsequious, but on the other hand, they want to be very careful that no situations in their dealings with the United States become hard obstacles that lead to a threat to the good relationship they think they have, and we, for the most part, think we have. That doesn't mean that we don't have groups -- we didn't have any in Washington in those days, but we have them today -- who are somewhat inclined to say, "By
God, they have no place to go, we will turn the screws on them to get them to agree." We didn't do that. I think our American policy toward Japan has been remarkably good. Many people would say it has been too soft, but I think it has been rewarding for both sides. This was the beginning of that kind of relationship.

Q: Did you have any problems interpreting the Japanese way of dealing with the Americans, like the legal side of the Pentagon or others who were used to doing things their way? Cultural sensitivity certainly was not part of our diplomatic armory in those days.

FINN: One good illustration of the problem has constantly surprised me and disappointed me a little bit. The Americans feel -- they felt it during the occupation and even more so after Japan's independence, and they feel it today -- that the Japanese are still somewhat the samurai. They have this military tradition. They had the Kogun, the Imperial Army, in the 30s. The Pentagon and any number of senior people -- diplomats -- George Ball, Dulles and others, felt that we had to restrain the Japanese. Some in the State Department and the Pentagon felt that all we had to do was to unleash them and let them go, and they would have a big army and would be our policemen in Asia. That has been a very prominent characteristic of American thinking about Japan since about 1950.

Mr. Dulles got the Germans to rearm officially and legally, and he could never understand why he couldn't get the Japanese to do the same. There was a lot of feeling that the Japanese and the Germans were the same kind of people. They were strong, organized, tough, purposeful people who would not only build up their economies but would build up their military forces and would be powers to reckon with in the world. But the Japanese said that they did not want to build up their military force and preferred not to be a military power in the world. They had seen it was not a good policy to have in the 30s.

That was one theory. The second is not directly connected. There was a lot of feeling about the nuclear issue that the Japanese had been so shocked at the damage by the two atomic bombings that they were going to have a nuclear allergy indefinitely. This was somewhat inconsistent with the first theory, but it was particularly true in the case of the Atoms for Peace program. A lot of people could not believe that the Japanese would want to have any kind of dealings with nuclear energy. But that wasn't so.

Q: At this time, when you were dealing with the Japanese in this '54-'56 period, did you have any impact of McCarthyism at that time?

FINN: No. I think people who had any China connection felt it much more. Some of them were on McCarthy's list -- John Service, Robert Barnett. We did have some touch of it though, now that you mention it. The only and prominent example was John K. Emmerson, who was a career FSO and a Japan specialist. Emmerson, I am confident, was never a communist in either a legal or card-carrying sense, or in a philosophical sense. He was also a man who believed that Japan had a very reactionary type of system before the war, and it had to be cleaned out, revised and modernized. He was close to a Canadian diplomat, who was equally a prewar expert on Japan, Herbert Norman. Just one episode: Shortly after the surrender, we had ordered the Japanese to release all political prisoners. The Japanese weren't all that eager to release their communist
political prisoners, but we told them they had to. John Emmerson and Herbert Norman went out to a prison in the suburbs of Tokyo, Fuchu Prison, and interviewed a group of communist political prisoners. They brought several of them back to GHQ to interview and talk about things before they were officially released from jail.

That became a cause celebre in Japan, especially among the rightists in Japan and the right wingers, like the McCarrans and the McCarthys in the United States. They claimed Norman and Emmerson were communist sympathizers who were urging the Japanese to go communist and abandon their good relations with the United States. Emmerson and Norman were not doing any such thing. Herbert Norman committed suicide finally, in 1957, shortly before McCarran was about to start another hearing about communists and communist foreign policy pressures in the United States government. They were going to interrogate Japanese and Americans who had served in Japan. Emmerson's name was mentioned. He never made Ambassador; I think the State Department probably felt a nomination would just not get through the Senate. But that did not affect me or the desk particularly. It did affect John Emmerson. Ambassador Reischauer brought him out as his number two in 1961. By that time, the anti-communist storm had pretty much blown over, but it left a mark.

**MARSHALL GREEN**

**Japan Desk**  
**Washington, DC (1947-1950)**

*Ambassador Marshall Green was born in 1916 in Holyoke, Massachusetts. He received an undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1939. In addition to his service in Japan as secretary to the ambassador, Ambassador Green was posted to in Australia, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and South Korea. He was interviewed on March 2, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

GREEN: The next "tranche" of my Japan career was when, in 1947, after less than two years as Third and then Second Secretary of Legation in Wellington, New Zealand, I was assigned to the Japan desk in the State Department. I served there from 1947 to 1950 as a Japan desk officer, working very closely with Bob Fearey, who was my successor as Ambassador Grew's private secretary. He had not served in the military because of a detached retina. He probably knew more about current US-Japan relations than anybody in the State Department at that point, because he worked [on Japanese affairs] right on through World War II. Bob and I were very close friends in those years and have been ever since.

We worked under John Allison, who was the "chief" of NA (Northeast Asian Affairs). The deputy "chief" changed and was replaced by Max Bishop. The head of the "bureau" -- FE [Far Eastern Affairs] -- was W. Walton Butterworth. Walt Butterworth "took a shine" to me, and I found myself in his office a great deal. This created some problems with John Allison, who was diplomatic enough to know how to handle that one. Anyway, it was largely through Walt Butterworth that I was assigned as George Kennan's only traveling companion to Japan in February, 1948.
This trip turned out to be extremely important. What had happened was that when the occupation of Japan was undertaken in 1945, it was our expectation that it would only go on for two or three years, and then there would be a peace treaty. Meanwhile, to jump ahead a little, John Foster Dulles had been "brought aboard" in 1950 to try to negotiate the peace treaty with Japan. Until there was a peace treaty, Japan would be under Allied occupation. Since it appeared that the occupation period was going to be extended much longer than had earlier been anticipated, it was strongly felt in the Office of Policy Planning in the State Department, especially by George Kennan, but also by John Davies, Walt Butterworth and Secretary of State George Marshall, that occupations can go sour. It was felt that, in the case of Japan, we had to be very careful.

So George Kennan was sent out to Japan in February 1948 by Secretary of State Marshall to discuss with General MacArthur how the emphasis in the occupation of Japan could be shifted from "reform" to "economic recovery." The idea was to normalize things as far and fast as one could to stave off growing, nationalistic resentment against the occupation.

At that time we had various mechanisms for dealing with Japan and with the occupation. In Washington there was the Far Eastern Commission, on which all of the countries that had been enemies of Japan had their representatives. We met in the old Japanese Embassy here in Washington about once every two or three weeks. I used to go to those meetings. Another international mechanism was the Allied Council in Japan, on which representatives of the Great Powers sat. It met periodically and discussed the broader issues. However, neither of those bodies carried any weight with MacArthur. MacArthur "ran the show" the way he wanted to, and to heck with all these other people. He had a little bit of the same attitude toward the White House. He felt that Japan was his exclusive domain. Of course, we came to learn a lot about that in Korea later on.

Now, when George Kennan was sent out to Japan to talk to MacArthur about changing the emphasis of the occupation, he was treated, on his arrival in Japan, just as though he was a visitor from a not too friendly power. He was almost seen as a "spy" from the State Department. MacArthur held him at arm's length. Of course, he couldn't ignore Kennan. George Kennan had his orders, but MacArthur kept him at arm's length and wouldn't meet with him, except socially -- for example at a dinner party.

It was interesting to see how Kennan operated. Kennan got through to MacArthur two ways. The State Department already had a representative in Japan in SCAP [Supreme Commander, Allied Powers] headquarters, William Sebald. Bill Sebald was the head of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP. There were 14 Sections in SCAP -- including Sebald's Diplomatic Section answerable to Major General Fox who, in turn, was deputy to General Almond, a four-star general, who was chief of staff of SCAP. So the State Department's representative, Bill Sebald was "way down the line."

George Kennan eventually got through to MacArthur by casually observing to Major General Willoughby, head of SCAP Intelligence, that MacArthur should not be too concerned about the views of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, whose work was now largely complete. MacArthur was in the best position to judge what now needed to be done in Japan, and Kennan
could be of help to MacArthur in getting MacArthur's views across in Washington.

Through Willoughby and through my intervention with General Babcock (an old friend from our service together in the Embassy before the war) it was arranged that Kennan would discuss the origins and current nature of Soviet conduct in the SCAP HQ briefing room where some 100 top brass were present.

I found Kennan's presentation -- and I suspect most others attending would agree -- absolutely brilliant. It was as though we were at one with eternity like that old advertisement of the Rosicrucian Society, where an eye is seen, piercing into eternity. Of course, all the clouds rolled in afterwards, but there was a transcending moment of truth.

Now, MacArthur recognized brains when he soon heard about the speech. After that, all doors were open to Kennan. In fact, MacArthur provided us with a railroad carriage of our own to go wherever we wanted to go. I'll come back to what we wanted to talk about, but I just want to say that we did go down to Kyoto, where I was left for a week to write our report at the Miyako Hotel. Meanwhile, Kennan went on to Korea and the Philippines and then came back to Japan, where we rejoined and returned to Washington. I did some of the writing of the report.

To return to the fundamentals of what Kennan was saying to MacArthur. He said that we have to move as far and fast as possible toward a more normal type of relationship with Japan and toward putting Japan much more on its feet and taking care of itself. We must be aware that if we move too slowly, nationalism will overtake us, and heaven knows what will happen. This was always presented in terms suggesting that MacArthur knew this better than he did. Kennan never lectured MacArthur. The kinds of things he wanted to end as quickly as possible -- and it was carefully targeted -- included the reparations and decartelization programs. He called for an end to the "purges" immediately or as soon as possible. He said that the Japanese should have some kind of economic representation abroad. (This last point I was to take on as my own responsibility and work very hard on it.) Improvements should be made in communications channels. Kennan placed the greatest emphasis on setting up better internal security in Japan. He was appalled to see how the Police Force was all divided up. The Japanese had inadequate means to maintain law and order in the country on a national scale. He made some recommendations on how to strengthen a democratic Police Force and establish a Japanese Coast Guard that could protect Japan against smuggling, illegal entries, and things like that. There was quite a long list of things that had to be done. All I can say is that our report covered all of these points. So we returned to Washington.

Meanwhile, Kennan suffered from a terrible case of ulcers. Walt Butterworth, with my help, really had to put this report through the National Security Council in Washington, which we did.

Let me go back to give you an illustration of one of the things that happened, while it is still clear in my mind. While I was in Kyoto, writing up the report, I was asked by some Navy friends to come down and see the Osaka docks. They thought I would be shocked by what I saw. And there -- stacked all down the docks -- was dismantled machinery from Japanese industries. The machinery was being greased, crated, and shipped -- at great expense and effort -- to North China, as part of a reparations program to China. Meanwhile, North China was being overrun by
the communists. The whole thing was ridiculous. The American taxpayer was paying for taking machinery out of Japan, which we were meantime supporting, and taking it to China, which was falling into the hands of the communists.

It will not surprise you that Kennan not only spoke extremely effectively but wrote even more effectively. The telegrams which Kennan sent back to Washington were really bristling.

Q: Well, here were MacArthur and Willoughby, who was his "guard dog," you might say. Here were two men with tremendous egos, particularly MacArthur. Here came Kennan -- bright, and all that, but was he criticizing MacArthur's handling of the situation?

GREEN: No. What he was saying was that we want MacArthur to remain in charge, but we wanted to anticipate and head off whatever kinds of forces that might undermine his authority and effectiveness. I think that this appealed to MacArthur, because MacArthur was an intelligent man. Now, where we were running up against problems was with the architects of these policies in SCAP headquarters, for example, the Political Section, which was headed by General Whitney...

Q: Courtney Whitney?

GREEN: Yes, Courtney Whitney. His principal deputy was Colonel Kades. These people had been the architects of the "purge program," for example. They hated to see it dismantled and resisted our efforts to end the purge, even though it was the expressed will of our National Security Council.

Q: Could you explain about the "purge"?

GREEN: The purge involved removing from public office or from top positions of influence, in business or in government, those who were considered to be responsible, in any major way, for the war effort. This meant, basically, anyone in a prominent position was "purged." Kennan was opposed to this way of tarring everybody with the same brush, without any kind of examination of the individual's record. By the way, he had also been opposed to "war crimes trials," but they were all over in Japan by the time he got there.

Anyway, I would like to finish the story of the "purge," because we had difficulty ending it. Meanwhile, Walt Butterworth had been replaced by Dean Rusk in 1949 as Assistant Secretary for Far East Affairs. So after two months of frustrated efforts by Washington to end the purge, Rusk asked me to draft a personal message for Marshall to MacArthur. I thought my draft was "pretty hot stuff," but Rusk said, "Do you think that this will turn the trick, Marshall?" I said, "No, I don't think so, Mr. Secretary, but this is putting it on the record." He said, "The object is not to put it on the record. The object is to stop this damned thing." He added, "I suggest you go back and rewrite this 10-page telegram and make it no longer than a page and a half. Make the point that MacArthur thought originally that the purge should end by this time and that we'd been reluctant as had other governments in the Far Eastern Commission. However, now we've come to see the wisdom of his earlier position, he should go ahead and do it."
So I wrote the telegram accordingly. I gulped pretty hard because I come from New England, where we have strong consciences. I knew that MacArthur had never said this, but we attributed it to him. That did the trick. The purge was ended 48 hours later. I reminded Dean Rusk about this, many years later. He said, "Marshall, I hope you don't go around telling people that story. It casts me in such a cynical light." I said, "Not at all, Mr. Secretary. It casts you in the light of somebody who knows how to get things done through diplomacy."

Q: What was your impression of Kennan? You traveled with him. He was a complex personality. He was my Ambassador in Yugoslavia. I regarded him as a great intellectual, but I was not impressed with him as an Ambassador. How did he strike you?

GREEN: I've always admired his eloquence and his ability to write and speak. His mission to Japan was a great challenge to him. He rose to it, and that's why he succeeded. Now, you know in his "Memoirs," he recalls all this. He says that he thinks that that trip to Japan was probably the most important thing that he did, after the Marshall Plan. Then he went on to say, "Perhaps it was even more important than the Marshall Plan, in the long run." So he attached great importance to this, even in retrospect.

It was marvelous to see how he operated. I mentioned how he "co-opted" people on MacArthur's staff who paved his way to MacArthur. But there was also the way that he drafted reports and telegrams. It was something to behold. He would sit down and start dictating. One of my jobs was to "look intelligent." He would speak to me, while Dorothy Hessman, his secretary, took it all down as a telegram. So he was basically dictating a telegram to Washington while speaking to me. The result was that the telegraph had a kind of conversational flow that made it far more effective. When he was through, he didn't have to change a word of it. Articulation is something I admire in any diplomat.

Q: What were you getting? How was the occupation? Did you think that it was close to "going sour?"

GREEN: No, I don't think so. I don't think that it had gone that far. Some of the reforms had been very successful -- the land reform, particularly. Wolf Ladejinsky had been largely responsible for that along with Bob Fearey. There were other things that they had done that were successful, and MacArthur himself did very well in his handling of the Emperor and the Japanese people, and the respect that he showed them. This was really most commendable. On the other hand, I do think that Kennan's concerns were valid. We simply had to move, "or else." We had to move in a timely way. Then you don't have to act out of weakness, in response to demonstrations or protests.

Q: Did you have anything to do with John Foster Dulles at that time?

GREEN: Not on this trip. Of course, John Foster Dulles "came aboard" on the Japanese problem in 1950. It was in the course of that year and the beginning of the next year that he managed to put together the Japanese peace treaty. He handled this issue with great effectiveness. I was, perhaps, the first person to brief him when he came to the State Department. They gave him an office near the Secretary of State's office on the fifth floor of what was called, at that time, the
"New State Department Building."

First of all, we put together briefing papers for him with the help of Bob Fearey and INR (State's intelligence division). I had done the paper on the political situation in Japan and was briefing him on that particular aspect. He was sitting there, in a deep chair -- kind of a sofa-like chair -- his arms clasped in front of him. His head was nodding. He looked to me as if he was going to sleep. Finally, his breathing got so heavy that I thought that he was asleep. I just tiptoed out of the room. That was my first connection with John Foster Dulles. [Laughter] I didn't have much to do with him because shortly thereafter I went to Sweden. That was the period when most of the work was done on the peace treaty with Japan, with Bob Fearey being Dulles' principal assistant on the critically important and successful project.

Q: What about Japan's role in the Far East? What kind of position did we see for Japan, with the Cold War on?

GREEN: That's a very good question. Actually, I've seen very little written about it. My recollection was that George Kennan favored a "neutral" solution for Japan. Of course, General MacArthur did, too. You'll remember that MacArthur talked about Japan being the Switzerland of the Far East. There was a kind of visionary and unreal "latching on" to this idea of neutrality as the solution to Japan's future, with the United States and other countries serving as guarantors of Japan's neutrality. It was felt that that was the way we should proceed. Of course, that would have fitted in closely with the mood of Japan at the time. Meanwhile, under its constitution, Japan had been denied having armed forces. Of course, much changed with the Korean War. Even so, my own feeling was that this was not a solution for Japan. If you think about the Far East, you have the four great powers of the world there -- the United States, China, and Russia, with Japan potentially as one of them. With such power converging around Korea, the idea that anyone was going to respect Japan's neutrality seemed crazy.

The Korean War just rubbed all of that out. If there hadn't been a war in Korea, I don't know what would have happened. Nobody ever knows about things like that.

Q: Were you still on the Japanese desk on June 25, 1950?

GREEN: Yes, I was.

Q: How did the Korean War hit you? Was it a surprise to you?

GREEN: Oh, yes. It was a surprise. I was struck by how little we knew about Korea. In our Office of Northeast Asian Affairs we had one officer working on Korea who knew little about it. The fact of the matter is that, during World War II, when I was in Navy intelligence, nobody in my intelligence circles was concerned with or about Korea. The same was true before that, when I was in Japan with Ambassador Grew. The ignorance about Korea! Even to this day there is still the supposition that the Chinese Communists first came into the Korean War when MacArthur appeared to be about to cross the Yalu River. The Chinese were across the Yalu River a long time before that. The ignorance about Korea continues to this very day.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, why don’t we cut it off at this point? This makes a good point to break off. I thought that we might then take up the period from 1956 to 1960, when you came back to deal with Japanese affairs.

EDWARD L. ROWNY
Plans Officer, Far Eastern Command
Tokyo (1949-19??)

Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny was born in Baltimore and attended West Point from 1937 to 1941. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II including a special assignment to Liberia. He has also served in Vietnam, Tokyo, and Korea and participated in NATO Military Committee and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Lieutenant General Rowny was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Well, when you got out of Yale, you were sent as plans officer to the Far Eastern Command.

ROWNY: Yes, I was.

Q: The Far Eastern Command was based in Tokyo, wasn’t it?

ROWNY: Yes, it was.

Q: Now, what was your impression and what was the reputation that you’d gotten inside the military of Douglas MacArthur at this point?

ROWNY: Oh, he had a very high reputation. Of course, when I was in the Pentagon, in addition to my other duties, I had been the MacArthur desk officer, so I got to read his cables. Of course, MacArthur was a legend. He had been a division commander in World War I and earned a Medal of Honor and had a distinguished career throughout the years. Except for overzealous lobbying for more forces in the Pacific, he conducted himself quite admirably during the war and with his island hopping ideas avoided a large number of casualties. I was delighted to be assigned out to his command.

Q: Well, how did you find the atmosphere on his staff? One always thinks of this “coterie,” a term that might be used to describe the people and atmosphere that surrounded MacArthur. They were extreme loyalists, and I would think that, as a plans officer, it’d be difficult. I’m talking about just before the Korean War. How did you find this?

ROWNY: It was a difficult situation. Sometimes we envied the civilian side, which was redesigning the entire Japanese government. Their relations were quite smooth. On the military side, we found that there was some tension among officers and, generally, it was caused by the simple fact that you were either an old friend of MacArthur’s and part of his personal entourage or you weren’t. If you were, you could do no wrong. If you weren’t, you’d have to fight for your
positions. We’d find that atmosphere in the staff. There wasn’t an open revolt or anything but it was there nevertheless.

Q: When you arrived as plans officer, this was November 1949.

ROWNY: Yes, it was.

Q: How did you view the potential military situation in your part of the world? What were the threats and what would be our responses?

ROWNY: We were really preoccupied with the Soviet Union and China and, particularly, what would happen if the two combined forces against us. For the first 30 days I was there, I traveled around Japan accompanied by one of the members on the civilian staff, a professor, Edward Morrow, who was both a Japanese historian and an anthropologist. I had a wonderful tour and first hand look at what was going on in Japan. I wrote a trip report that we were wasting our assets by having troops out in so many villages and provinces. That view was not original with me. It was a view that was held principally by the people who were not among MacArthur’s selected few. This idea of withdrawing and pulling back our troops into central training camps was opposed by people like Willoughby, MacArthur’s G-2.

Q: In a way, it was still an occupation, which no longer needed to be an occupation, wasn’t it? Was it the idea of local uprisings, or was it just more for comfort?

ROWNY: The traditional view, or fear, was that there would be uprisings and, perhaps, difficulty in these various places; therefore, we needed American presence in large numbers but that proved not to be not the case. The emperor had good control of the situation but we did need some armed forces because there was no such thing as a Red Cross over there to handle disasters and fires and maybe even riots. The building of a Japanese self-defense force was essential to replace the U.S. Army, which was being pulled back. I wrote the first outline plan for the self-defense forces for the Japanese army.

WENDELL W. WOODBURY
Vice Consul
Tokyo (1949-1950)

Vice Consul
Yokohama (1950-1952)

Wendell W. Woodbury was born in South Dakota in 1920. He attended the University of Iowa and then served in the United States Army. Mr. Woodbury joined the Foreign Service in 1949, serving in the Dominican Republic, Algeria, Japan, and Denmark. He was interviewed in 1993 by Virginia Crawford.

Q: Your first assignment was Tokyo. Were you given any choice in that assignment?
WOODBURY: Yes, some choice. I was very much interested in the Marshall Plan in Europe, and I assumed that because I had so much training in that area, the Foreign Service would consider me for a position where I could use it. Incurably naive! Hence, I put down Europe first, then Latin America because I thought Spanish would be easier to learn, and I am not a great linguist, and last Japan. I had spent three years working to defeat the Japanese Empire, but I had never gotten there (except Okinawa). Perhaps because it was the only specific country requested, I was assigned to Japan, something that I hadn't really thought much about even though my wartime service was directed there.

The occupation was still in force and was the entire time I was there. If I had thought about that, I probably wouldn't have gone. I had already served under General MacArthur as a soldier. They had the Office of the Political Advisor from State, but MacArthur wouldn't allow it to be called that; he called it the Diplomatic Section of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, his Foreign Office so to speak. He wasn't about to take advice from anybody, especially the State Department. There was really no role for us to play except for the Consulates doing Consular work and routine liaison with foreign missions. I helped eight hundred G.I.'s marry Japanese girls, and then I issued two thousand visas to Japanese wives and their children after I went down to Yokohama. SCAP was very upset by the thought that we might be doing any political or economic reporting not under their control. Our role as the nucleus of the future U.S. Embassy was especially troubling as a threat to their pleasant life.

Q: So there was no Embassy there because it was under occupation, and you just had the consular functions?

WOODBURY: It wasn't quite like that. In Europe, you may recall, the State Department ended up running Germany. So far as I know, this worked relatively smoothly as the military was glad to give up the political functions. But not MacArthur, it was his world out there; he was the blue-eyed Shogun. So after a year in Tokyo, I asked to go to Yokohama. There I did Consular work only, a sort of hazing process to teach us humility. It was interesting applying the 1940 Immigration Act to Japan. It didn't go into effect until January 1, 1942, just after Pearl Harbor. There were many questions of comparative law because the Japanese had no nationality law per se; the Japanese are Japanese are Japanese, and everyone knows they are Japanese. There was no requirement, for example, that you had to be a Japanese citizen to be Emperor or Prime Minister. According to United States law, if you had dual citizenship and accepted a job of trust where you had to take an oath of allegiance to a foreign government, you were expatriated. Such a concept was completely unknown to the Japanese, one race, one people, one nation, and one language.

Q: Could we just get your dates straightened out? You went to Tokyo in 1949?

WOODBURY: Late 1949, just in time for Thanksgiving.

Q: You stayed in Tokyo about a year?

WOODBURY: Yes. Then I went to Yokohama at my request because I wanted to get married, and they didn't have housing in Tokyo, but they did in Yokohama.
I took the job of a language officer who was going up to the Consulate in Hokkaido. I took over his job, his house and his staff of five servants who were furnished us by the Army. Incidentally, he was a Harvard law graduate, and his legal training was put to good use. He did some very complex work in comparative law on nationality questions while he was a very junior officer, a third secretary and a Vice-Consul (Richard B. Finn), relating to the initial application of 1940 U.S. Immigration Act. His daughter also graduated from Harvard Law forty years later, and he was wryly amused that her entry salary was higher than his FSO-1 final salary.

Q: What was the situation in Japan at that time? It was still under the occupation.

WOODBURY: Just a week after we left in April, 1952, the occupation ended officially. When I arrived there in 1949, Japan was still devastated. Yokohama was almost destroyed, about twenty-five percent of the people in Japan had active TB. There was general malnutrition. But then in June, 1950, the Korean war started. I was up in Hokkaido when I heard about that, sitting in a hot bath in a country inn. Our Japanese interpreter, a graduate of Northwestern and a Presbyterian minister, stopped talking to us for a while and listened to the Japanese bathers. He told us they were excited because a war had started in Korea. We were far out in the mountains and forests of this largely wild island. He said that the Japanese reported that the North Koreans had attacked and asked if that could be true? I said, "I am sure that is a wild rumor." It took us three days to get back to Sapporo, where we found out that yes, it was true. That changed a lot of things; the Japanese became a valued resource because they had the industrial manpower. They were often used illegally; they not only built the minesweepers, but they manned them in Korean ports, which was contrary to the treaty. That was the beginning of the Japanese prosperity, which was also helped greatly by the war in Vietnam.

Q: If there was no Embassy that you were responsible to, who was your superior?

WOODBURY: The U.S. Political Advisor, (U.S. POLAD) was its formal designation. Bill Sebald was POLAD with the rank of Ambassador. He had been a naval officer before the war -- a Japanese language officer -- and he had made the mistake of marrying a woman who was half Japanese (her father was English). The navy was incredibly racist in those days, so he was forced to resign. He got a law degree and went into partnership with his father-in-law, a well known lawyer, just in time for the war. He went back into the navy then and came into the Foreign Service after the war because of his linguistic abilities. He started as the deputy U.S. POLAD. A very experienced senior Foreign Service officer was U.S. POLAD initially. Apparently, he was one of the few FSO's that MacArthur liked or trusted, so he had considerable influence. He disappeared when his plane was lost flying back to Japan from Hawai. We never learned what happened to him. MacArthur used that opportunity to say that Sebald was perfectly satisfactory -- a nonentity with no diplomatic experience. Whatever influence State Department had on policy pretty much went out the window.

Q: What was the man's name who disappeared?

WOODBURY: Atcheson, I believe -- not quite Acheson. I never knew him. Sebald went on to other Ambassadorships and to be Assistant Secretary for East Asia. He was a competent man but
not somebody who could stand up to MacArthur. Most occupation officials thought it would have to go on for a hundred years to teach the Japanese democracy and how to run trains and build ships. When people told me this, I couldn't believe it. I don't have many kind words for General MacArthur, but in many ways, he was a great statesman. I thought Forrestal summed it up brilliantly in his diary when he first met MacArthur in the Philippines -- "Enormous ability mortgaged to his vanity." That covers it, both the plus and the minus. He insisted that, despite the Korean War, the occupation should end as scheduled because no one ever taught a country self-government under military rule (especially under a man as authoritarian as he was). He was absolutely right; he went ahead and got Truman to appoint John Foster Dulles to get the support of the Republicans -- the Dewey-Rockefeller Republicans -- which would be enough to get the treaty through the Senate. Dulles did great work on that; he had the prestige. MacArthur, always a partisan Republican, let it be known in 1948 that he would gladly take over and clean up the mess in Washington, but even more openly in 1952, an unusual situation to put it mildly -- shades of General McClellan!

Q: The Peace Treaty was being negotiated while you were there then?

WOODBURY: Dulles came out when I was still in Tokyo. George Kennan was there, too. He had a famous comment which I don't think he ever put in any of his books. Any official who came to Tokyo would be briefed by MacArthur's staff about how everything was coming up roses. This went on for two days. Kennan was asked his view of the situation in Japan after his briefing, and he said, "It all began to blur -- one chart after another. All I remember is that all the statistics and charts were going up and up and up, except that of the venereal disease rate of U.S. troops was going down and down and down."

The occupation of Japan was a great success, I think largely due to the Japanese. They were horrible in war, but they were wonderful in the occupation because when they change, they can change absolutely. As far as I know, there was never an attack on an American soldier, even in the earliest days when they went ashore with their weapons loaded and cocked. MacArthur landed at Atsugi airfield and went to the Grand Hotel in Yokohama, which fortunately had not been hit by American bombs -- neither had the nearby American Consulate. He had a food taster there just in case. That suspicion lasted only a few days, and within a week, Americans were wandering alone all over that huge city.

Q: Did your work in Yokohama, being of a different nature -- Consular work -- give you a different insight into Japan? Did you have more contact with the Japanese people?

WOODBURY: Yes, but only for business. It must be remembered that non-fraternization orders were in effect until MacArthur left Japan, long after they had been lifted in Germany. There was a constant stream of people with everyday problems, especially when our soldiers were given permission to marry Japanese nationals. In a way, it was more interesting. As a trained economist, though, I worried I was wasting my time.

I was first assigned in Japan to handle natural resources; the Economic Counselor there, my boss, came from the Commerce Department, and he addressed mainly routine commercial work. He sent the press releases of SCAP to Washington without comment or analysis. He had only one
other officer working for him who did the trade negotiations; Japan could not trade or deal directly with other countries, so SCAP had to do it for them, and they needed a diplomatic officer for that. His staff doubled when I came on board, but he didn't know what to do with me. So I didn't have much of anything to do for about six weeks. He promised to take me over to the Natural Resources Section of SCAP because that had not been covered at all. It had agriculture, fisheries, forestry and mining -- none of which were top boiler issues. My boss was so busy sending in his press releases that he never got around to take me over, so for six weeks, I read everything. It is amazing what comes over your desk. I was learning a lot, but I didn't see much point to it so I kept after him. Finally, he said, "I'm just too busy, why don't you go over and introduce yourself to Colonel Schenk," who was head of the section.

Of MacArthur's section chiefs, Colonel Schenk was the junior man -- the only one who was a colonel -- the rest were all major generals. And not entirely by coincidence he was the only one who had any qualifications for the job. So I went over to see Colonel Schenk, who had been a professor of geography at Stanford. He was pleased that U.S. POLAD, the future U.S. Embassy, was interested enough to assign an officer to his section. He invited me to his staff meetings and briefing, and I won his heart at a meeting in which Colonel Schenk was explaining the basis for the land reform in Japan. A newly-arrived colonel said he thought this was a terrible thing, pure socialism. In Nebraska, if you worked hard, you could homestead and then acquire more land than others as his grandfather had done. It was a matter of hard work, and that is the way it should be in Japan. There was and is no question in my mind that Japan has (or had up to now) a conservative pro-American government because of the land reform; it was the foundation of parliamentary government because people had a vested interest in the system. I told the colonel that my grandfather had been a homesteader in South Dakota as his grandfather had in Nebraska but that the situation in Japan was entirely different and explained why. When they left, Colonel Schenk said he was most grateful, "You explained it perfectly, but I couldn't say that." So because of that incident, I became a friend. Fortunately, civilians do not wear rank on their business suits so the good colonel did not realize I was a lowly third secretary.

Colonel Schenk later asked me if I could help get a SCAP population report released. Professor Ackerman of Harvard had come out to Japan to study Japan's scarce resources in relation to its population problem. His report stated that for the economy to be viable, there would have to be population control, but he made no recommendation as to means. There was a great fuss over that comment because MacArthur had refused to let the public health officer introduce any family planning in Japan -- he was running for president and didn't want that issue raised -- so the whole report was ordered sequestered, fifteen hundred copies of it. I wrote a report to Washington, and there was some pressure from there so they finally let the report out, but they took out the addendum that contained the reference to population. I got a copy of the original report and reproduced that section for the Department. This would be just a mildly amusing story of military heavy-handedness except for one thing; when the Japanese finally did begin to control their population, to catch up with the lost years, they had to resort to abortion, free and unlimited abortion. They had no experience nor training in family planning at the end of the occupation. The Japanese government is always embarrassed by this in international meetings.

It shows, at least, how much influence a third secretary can have or can't have. It took me weeks to get that report out of the office because my boss knew it was a hot potato, so he just kept it in
his in box. Finally, he went on home leave, and his temporary replacement came to me with my report and said, "Let's get it out; he isn't going to be back for two months." So it went up to the DCM, and I got called up to see him, a starchy gentleman out of the old Foreign Service. "I understand you wrote this, and from your conclusion, I understand you to believe that censorship has been improperly used to keep this report from being released."

I thought I was in for it but managed to say, "Yes, sir, that is the conclusion that I draw."

He smiled suddenly, a rare event, and said, "Well you are right, but you have got to write it more clearly so that people will understand it." That was one of my best days. So I polished it up, and it went out, but by this time, it was too late to have had much influence. Once MacArthur made his opinions known, it was like an encyclical from the Pope. At least the Pope admits that he is a man, MacArthur never did.

JULIAN M. NIEMCZYK
Office of Special Investigations
Tokyo (1950)

Ambassador Julian M. Niemczyk was born and raised in Oklahoma. After graduating from Oklahoma University, he entered the National Guard Artillery Division. In addition to serving in Japan, Ambassador Niemczyk served in the Philippines, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 16, 1991.

NIEMCZYK: My assignment was to take a team of five into Canton via White Cloud airfield and to open up the Consulate and accept the surrender of the Japanese element there. An Army Air Force C-47 flew us in and it was the fastest landing and take off that I had ever seen. The crew took some risk in flying in because neither they nor we really knew what to expect there. We unloaded, threw our dufflebags off and the plane took off immediately. I remember vividly this wood panel station wagon filled with half a dozen Japanese coming from what appeared to be an operations building for this airfield called White Cloud which is Canton's main airfield today. There was this station wagon coming towards us and we had no idea whether it would do us in or what. The word was out as to how the battle was going and the first atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima by that time.

Q: This was before the one that was dropped on Nagasaki?

NIEMCZYK: Yes.

This group of six Japanese got out of the station wagon. There were salutes. I had a five-person team, as I said, myself the leader, a communications person with hand driven radio, and a Nisi American to handle the language. This Japanese Colonel came up and we saluted and through our translator/interpreter he said, "We are prepared to surrender the White Cloud airfield and offer any services and transportation." Well that was quite a relief and to this day I have his
saber, which was presented to me.

We went into Canton and found satisfactory, if not pleasant billet. The Swiss had been the caretakers of our Legation there in the Shameen district of Canton. Within a week or ten days the State Department officials came in, took the keys from me and opened up. I went about my business of identifying Chinese collaborators with the Japanese. I remained there three or four months and after the termination of the war, went to Shanghai where I was doing odds and ends just waiting to go back home.

That started me into the intelligence field. When I returned to the States I had a long 90 day rest and recuperation and then went back to the artillery processing center at Ft. Sill again...back home to mother's cooking again and that sort of thing.

Having been with OSS I received an assignment with G-2 (the intelligence branch of the US) the US Army in the Pentagon. At this high level in the Pentagon, at this point I had been promoted and was a captain, my first permanent assignment in Washington and subsequently had a number, 3, 4, or 5 over a 31-year period in the Armed Forces. I spent about eight months doing staff intelligence work.

Then I was assigned to go for one year of duty with the Joint Task Force of Operations Crossroads (the joint atomic bomb tests). I didn't go out to where the tests were being done, however. My job sent me from Washington to Hollywood where I was doing security work with Technicolor, MGM and Hal Roach Studios. What was I doing there? These highly secret, at that time, films were being flown in from Eniwetok, turned over to a group of five of us. There was a major who was in charge, I was a captain, one of four. We worked with these Hollywood studios developing this classified film. It was a pleasant task that lasted almost a year.

Q: I might just as an aside say that much of that film was on TV showing our people blithely taking motor launches around all these ships that were radioactive as all hell and many of them are suffering the consequences today.

NIEMCZYK: Yes, that is dreadful in those instances where after effects set in over a period of years. As a matter of fact one of the four of us, an army major who became colonel, picked up leukemia and died from it while he was on active duty. His wife has often wondered whether handling these boxes of films had anything to do with it. The rest of us had nothing like that.

That job kept me in the security business. After that I was assigned to the Army Counter Intelligence Corps. I worked with Counter Intelligence for a year and a half until the Air Force became a separate department. I had a friend who assisted me in making a departmental transfer from the Army to the Air Force.

Q: About 1948 wasn't it?

NIEMCZYK: Thereabouts, actually 1947. I moved simply from a billet in the Counter Intelligence Corps at Ft. Meade, to a billet in the headquarters of the OSI in...back to the Pentagon, back to Washington, where a person who became a dear friend of mine, Joe Carol,
who was with the FBI and had been handpicked, appointed a Brig. General, to organize, establish and get moving the Office of Special Investigations for the Air Force. General Carol became a three star General over a period of years and died just a year ago.

I spent a year and a half in the Pentagon with OSI and was assigned to Far East Headquarters as the director of OSI's Counter Intelligence Division, in the Meiji Building in Tokyo.

Q: As a historical footnote, was counterespionage at the beginning completely devoted to Soviet efforts or were you looking elsewhere too?

NIEMCZYK: I had orders in my hand in April, 1950 to go, accompanied by my wife, to Tokyo, the Far East OSI Headquarters. In 1950 the Korean War broke out. My wife and I were disappointed that she had to stay in Washington. I went over for a one-year unaccompanied tour and then she joined me. To answer your question, the focus out of OSI Headquarters was primarily North Korea and the movements of the Chinese Communists.

Q: I was really thinking earlier on when you first got into counterintelligence, ’46 or ’47. The Cold War hadn’t fully set in, but what was your attitudinal feeling? Was it the Soviet Union and their efforts in the United States?

NIEMCZYK: I understand what you are saying. I can remember some of the case histories at the Army CIC in 1947, early ’48, that we would use, in Trieste, for example, and that part of the world, clearly bringing in the Soviet potential, the positioning of agents or personnel, etc. So as early as that there was a focus of the counterintelligence, espionage towards the Soviets. However, my relocation to Tokyo again put me back into the focus of the North Koreans, Chinese and their movements, etc.

WILLIAM G. COLMAN
Economic Cooperation Administration, Technical Assistance Division
Tokyo (1950-1951)

William Colman earned his M.A. from the University of Missouri and took a commission in the U.S. Navy in 1942. After the war, Mr. Colman served as Personnel Specialist in the American Mission for Aid to Greece, in Athens, and worked for the Economic Cooperation Administration in Korea and Japan. He was interviewed by Melbourne Spector in 1996.

COLMAN: No. I arrived in Japan/Korea shortly after the second allied retreat from Seoul. What was the name of the river up there at the border?

Q: The Yalu?

COLMAN: The Yalu; the retreat from the Yalu was going on. Chief Meyer and I went over to Seoul, Korea. No, we didn't go on the same plane, but we got there roughly at the same time. We
went over to have a session with John Muccio, the US Ambassador to South Korea. The Chinese and North Koreans were getting pretty close and Chief Meyer went into Muccio's bedroom and saw that all over the Ambassador's bed were valises packed, leading Meyer to think he was ready to get the hell out! Meyer recalled his prisoner period with the Japanese. In the meantime there was a big row going on in the U.N. about the critical military situation in Korea. Meyer said that he was not willing to undertake this assignment and would I be willing to stay in and run the show?

Q: Wow!

COLMAN: I said all right, provided that Edgar Johnson and people back in Washington would okay the arrangement. They did and Chief Meyer left in a few days.

Q: When you say, "run the show," what was the Economic Cooperation Administration Program doing at that point?

COLMAN: On the point of partial liquidation because it looked like South Korea might very well be, if not defeated, occupied. We had all kinds of contracts out for raw materials and various other things. On the logistical side we worked hand-in-glove with the G4 part of the military establishment of MacArthur's. The US Military occupation of Japan (SCAP) was still in existence. MacArthur was still "God Almighty," and Japan hadn't yet formed its own government. That didn't come for a year or so later. We had to reduce our personnel. We had to cancel contracts. We had to divert shipments headed for our Mission in Korea to Manila, Hong Kong, Taipei and other ECA missions.

MARGE: Bill, you are forgetting that meeting in Manila right after you got there. You went down to Manila and met with the Mission Chiefs and everybody wanted cars. They didn't care about two by fours. They all wanted cars.

COLMAN: Yes. That was both an information and deal making conference. We had the Mission Chiefs from the Far East in there. We explained the situation to them, "Here are our orders and here are the personnel and so on, and who wants what?" Then about a month or two or three or four after that we had a similar meeting with the Mission Chiefs in Tokyo, to wrap up some more things. Essentially it was to protect property and to get out of there in an orderly way and get the personnel redeployed. Of course there were some ongoing things in which part delivery had been made and where it could be made by getting into the Pusan Harbor. That was the only way you could get it over there. The Japanese were very cooperative in some respects. They would transfer funds over there via the Japanese and Korean banking systems.

My time was about two thirds in Tokyo, maybe three fourths, and the rest over in Pusan. The dozen or so staff members in Pusan were under the immediate supervision of Allan Loren, who reported to me. There was a get-away plan that if Pusan got overrun, Korean military and civil personnel would go to Chegu.

Q: This was an island off of Korea obviously.
COLMAN: An island off of South Korea. I saw it in the paper, reading about it the other day. The plan was for the officials and the records and so on, both Korean and US in the office over in Pusan, to get on this ship. One of the staff people took me to the ship and I've got a picture of it. In fact I've got a whole album of pictures of these countries that I'm describing. Anytime your curiosity gets overpowering I imagine I have a picture of the get-away ship and many other things and people.

Q: Okay.

COLMAN: We've got a picture of departure day for MacArthur en route to the airport, having got his butt kicked out of SCAP leadership. Well, pictures that you would naturally take at exciting times. Edgar Johnson wrote me a highly complimentary letter about how well the liquidation had been executed. I ran onto the letter, I had forgotten all about it, here yesterday or the day before, when I was going through these papers.

Q: May I interrupt you? Harlan Cleveland wasn't associated with the program anymore at that point. Is that right?

COLMAN: Harlan ran the China program.

Q: China. I see. So he had nothing to do with the Korean?

COLMAN: He had nothing to do, at that time, with the program. Now when I went back with Ty to help set up a new mission in South Korea Harlan was in a position up, I think, in Bissell's earlier post of Assistant Administrator for Program. During my first tour in Tokyo and Korea, Paul Hoffman had been succeeded by William Foster and ECA changed to MSA--Mutual Security Agency.

Q: That's right. I didn't mean to get you off your stride here.

COLMAN: I remember writing a letter to Harlan in that capacity that he was in from over in Seoul about some things that I thought were going badly wrong in the Far Eastern setup, mostly political, stuff about Chiang Kai-shek and so on. Harlan was not in the picture at the time of my first tour. Edgar Johnson was, you might say, the equivalent of a State Department Desk Officer for Korea, and the Far East was in the charge of Allen Griffin.

MARGE: Harlan was with UNRRA.

Q: Before that, yes.

MARGE: ...in Shanghai because that's where I first ran across him and then he went to the, what we called the "Gravy Train," in China--the China Program. He was over there in a civilian capacity.

COLMAN: He was running the China program when I was in the Technical Assistance Division, I think.
Q: I see. So when you finished...

COLMAN: Harlan was in a back and forth situation with UNRRA and running the ECA aid to China.

Q: When you finished in Korea you came back to the States?

COLMAN: I came back to the States.

WILLIAM J. CUNNINGHAM
SCAP Diplomatic Section
Tokyo (1950-1951)

Vice Consul
Sapporo (1951-1952)

William J. Cunningham was born in California in 1926. After serving in the Navy from 1944-1947, he received his Bachelor’s degree from the University of New Mexico in 1948 and his Master’s in 1950. He joined the Foreign Service in 1949 and his career has include positions in Prague, Paris, Tokyo, Taipei, Phnom Penh Saigon. Mr. Cunningham was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 17, 1997.

CUNNINGHAM: I arrived in Tokyo on Christmas Eve, 1950. I had been two evacuations in one year in the Foreign Service. By this time I had been through three posts in my first year and a half in the Foreign Service. I was then assigned to this Field Office of the American Mission in Korea and continued to work with the personnel people there. It was located in the San Shin building in downtown Tokyo not far from the Dai Ichi building where MacArthur had his headquarters. As a matter of fact it was very close to the Provost Marshal’s office where I first checked in the previous November.

I enjoyed working with those people very much, but the office was shut down then at the end of February, as I recall. The question was, what was going to be done with these Field Office people? Some were going to be sent to Korea. I wanted to be sent back to Korea because that is where I had been assigned. No, they couldn’t use me in Korea. They were reducing staff at this point because they didn’t have room for them over there in the Embassy, again located in Korea and reduced from the size it had been in Seoul a few months previously. They didn’t want to maintain this office in Tokyo any longer either. Things had stabilized somewhat. I was then transferred to the office of the Diplomat Section of SCAP, which was run by William J. Sebald, career FSO, Japanese Language Officer and with the rank of Ambassador at that time.

Q: This was the Supreme Allied...
CUNNINGHAM: The Supreme Command for Allied Powers, Japan, Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters. Japan was still an occupied country. MacArthur was still in the Dai Ichi Building down the street. The Diplomatic Section was what passed for the American embassy. Japan did not have foreign relations. In fact all of the other countries had missions that were accredited to the Diplomatic Section of SCAP and it served as kind of a conduit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This time I was assigned there to the general services section of the Diplomatic Section. We were trying to recapture some of our State Department property from the grip of the occupation forces and to acquire additional property for the eventual American embassy in Japan. I worked on some of that with the property manager and did various things that were not particularly interesting to me.

Q: You were in Tokyo from when to when?

CUNNINGHAM: From December of 1950 until April of 1951.

Q: You were saying you were doing general services type work.

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, in the Diplomatic Section of SCAP from the end of February until April. One day during this period I was down in the coffee bar and James Byrd Pilcher, who was at that time the consul general in charge of the consular section, came up to me and he said, “Young man I’ve been watching you.” This was the kind of comment that always made a young fellow apprehensive, but Mr. Pilcher (or Jaybird, as his friends called him) was a cheerful and generous man with a bouncy personality. He said, “How would you like some really good consular experience?” I said, “Well, what do you have in mind Mr. Pilcher?” He said, “We need a vice consul up in Sapporo and I think you would do just fine in that job.” Now I have a habit, and it occurred many times in my life prior to the Foreign Service, where I would hesitate and say, I’d like to think that over, so that’s what I said to Mr. Pilcher. He said, “Why sure, but I’ve got to know soon.” I said, “I’ll come see you tomorrow.”

I went home and I talked with my roommate about this. I have a habit of always asking roommates about this kind of thing. He said, “Why don’t you take it?” I sort of relied upon my old navy experience and the slogans there was that you get more experience on a small ship and more responsibilities than you do on a big one. It is better to serve on a destroyer or on a minesweeper than it is on a battleship or an aircraft carrier.

I went back the next morning and I said, “Okay, Mr. Pilcher, I will do this.” I had no idea what Sapporo was like. I had all of these experiences in Korea, Japan, and so on. I said, “Okay, I will do it.”

Q: You might explain where Sapporo is.

CUNNINGHAM: Sapporo is the principal city of Hokkaido in northern Japan, in the far north. The entire island of Hokkaido is a single prefecture, and by far the largest in area of all of Japan’s prefectures. Sapporo is the Prefectural capital, and the principal city on the island. We
had a two-man consulate there. Off I went to Sapporo.

But before I did something else happened during this period in Tokyo that was very important and influenced the rest of my career. As I said I went to Korea with no background in Asia whatsoever and I didn’t really even know what to expect. Despite the fact that it was a war zone, despite the fact that things were terribly troubled, I was quite fascinated by what I found in Seoul and I liked it. I reacted positively to it.

I was very impressed by what I saw in Japan. I am from California and there was an anti-Japanese bias that was rather strong in California to which I had been subjected, to debunk the capabilities of the Japanese. When I got to Tokyo I saw how by 1950 the Japanese had recovered to that point, restored their city, restored manufacturing capabilities, and were redeveloping their economy. In other words there was a level of development in Japan that impressed me strongly. I compared it to what I had seen in Western Germany where the destruction from wartime bombing was evident everywhere in major cities at that time; it was not evident everywhere in Japan at that time. There were a few places where you could see the damage but you had to look for it in Japan at that time. I was impressed by the industry, by the civility of the Japanese people, and by the sophistication of their whole economic system. I thought this is something important.

At that time Sophia (Jochi) University, which is one of the principal private universities in Japan, a Jesuit institution founded by German Jesuits, was conducting what they called the International Institute. It was night school. The Department of Army civilians who were working in Occupation Headquarters would conduct courses at Sophia University after work, as they do here in Washington, DC at George Washington and American University.

I decided to enroll in a couple of courses out there. I had time on my hands in the evenings. There wasn’t all that much to do and I didn’t have that much money to spend. I enrolled in two courses for the spring term at Sofia. One was a course in economics and the other was a course in the history of the modern Far East taught by a man by the name of Lawrence Battistini. Battistini was a Ph.D. in Chinese history from Brown University. He was also the head of the historical division of SCAP. Battistini was a real Sinophile and a man of great enthusiasm and real dramatic flair so that every lecture was a memorable event. He particularly stressed the achievements of Chinese civilization and the great advances that they had made, and how Asia had suffered from the colonial and imperialist intrusions of the late 19th and early 20th century. That was a very strong theme in his course. He made a very deep impression on me. I was not able to finish the course because Pilcher’s offer came along in mid-semester so I had to leave to go to northern Japan. That was an experience that really crystallized an interest in Asia in me. Battistini’s course started me doing a lot of self-study and reading, and accumulating materials on Asia.

I went to Sapporo and this was a good experience for me because it gave me a chance to finally do what I considered to be really professional Foreign Service work; the kind of thing that I wanted to do. I wasn’t especially interested in doing administrative work because I was more interested in the diplomatic side. In Sapporo we were a very busy consular office. There were just the two of us. The late David Osborn, who later became ambassador to Burma, was the
consul there. He was the second consul. William Magistretti had opened the consulate about a year previously. I got the chance to do consular work and Osborn said to me, “Well you took this course in economics at Sophia University so you might as well be the economics reporting officer also.” I took a course though I hadn’t finished. That was the extent of my qualifications. We had a young army corporal for the first five or six months that I was there who served as the secretary for the consulate. We had four Japanese local employees including Homma-san, the driver; Takeuchi-san, the principal clerk; Aoki-san, one of the Visa clerks; Takahashi-san, the other Visa clerk; and Terashima-san, principal translator and analyst in the Consulate. Aoki was a war veteran – he had been with Japanese infantry in Burma. His father-in-law was a legal U. S. resident – a dentist in Ogden, Utah. Terashima-san was a debonair man with a Continental air. He was fluent in French and an amateur photographer. He was an older man - - in his fifties. Takeuchi was a young fellow, probably too young to have served in the Japanese forces. He was very Western-oriented and was a square dance aficionado, president of the Sapporo square-dancing society.

Just at this time the legislation that permitted the regularization of unions between American soldiers and Japanese women had come into effect so we had a steady stream of them coming in. There was a regular routine that had been set up and it was already in operation by the time I got there. There was a military camp on the outskirts of Sapporo, Camp Crawford, and that was where many of these military personnel were stationed. Others of them were stationed in various offices around Hokkaido and in fact northern Honshu. I’m not sure whether our consular district extended there or not.

The regular routine was they would come in with the necessary documentation to have their marriage regularized under Japanese civil law. They would sign documents in the consular office and we would then execute a certificate of witness to a marriage, which provided an official American documentation of this union. That would be the first day. The second day they would come back and file in many cases a report of birth for one, and frequently two children, to certify the American citizenship to which these children were entitled through their fathers. I executed many reports of birth for the children of these unions. The next step was to prepare the non-quota immigration visa for the Japanese spouse and to take an application for a passport. We did not have authority to issue passports. That was reserved to the Consular Section of the Diplomatic Section in Tokyo. We did over 100 of these cases in the one year that I was in Sapporo in that consulate.

There were all kinds of situations so I really got an exposure to that kind of work. David Osborn did the political reporting. He was a Japanese language officer, and an extremely skilled one; I was not. I took care of the administrative work. After a time the army corporal was transferred elsewhere and we had no one to act as a typist or a secretary so what we really did was our own typing. If there were strikeouts in diplomatic dispatches, there were, that’s all there was to it. We couldn’t do anything about it. That was a good experience.

Q: You were there from April of ’51 until when?

CUNNINGHAM: Until May of 1952. During my first tour in the Foreign Service, which lasted almost three years, I was in five posts and had about six different jobs. I covered a lot of
administrative work and consular work. There was one complication with this appointment to Sapporo. I may have been an FSS-12 by the time this took place. Osborn needed a signing officer, someone with the authority to sign all the consular documents we processed in connection with these marriage cases, so that he could go on field trips and devote himself to political reporting, which was the main reason why he was there. Sapporo was a lookout post - watching for signs of Soviet efforts to infiltrate either from Sakhalin or the “Northern Territories” – the four islands claimed by Japan and occupied by the Soviets off the Northeast tip of Hokkaido

I got up to Sapporo and they started to process an appointment for me as a vice consul and lo and behold I didn’t have sufficient rank to be appointed as vice consul. I had to be at least an FSS-11 or something like that. What they worked out finally after I got there (this was discovered only after I got there) was a temporary promotion to an FSS-10 so that I would have sufficient rank to be made a vice consul and could do the signing work for Osborn. That was very nice because that meant of course some additional pay and I think there were a few allowances that came along with it. I lived in an occupation hotel. The army assigned us billets in those days in downtown Sapporo. I learned to ski while I was there; that was a new experience too. I really enjoyed the whole year in Hokkaido.

Q: You mentioned the marriages and all, and coming from California. During the war, there had been a great anti-Japanese prejudice built up, with sufficient reason, after the attack on Pearl Harbor and all, but I think one of the great phenomenons was that American troops, basically American men, came and fell in love with Japanese women. It wasn’t just sex; it was the culture and all of that. You might say the prejudice and all didn’t last very long at all.

CUNNINGHAM: There were some other very important things that happened as a result of the occupation. People like David Osborn, who was one of the “Boulder Boys,” Owen Zurhellen, Richard Finn, Ed Seidensticker, Robert Scalapino were others...

Q: You’re talking about Boulder, Colorado?

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, Boulder, Colorado. They were guys who were trained in intensive programs in Japanese language by the military services to be interpreters for interrogating Japanese prisoners of war, and also to work on breaking the Japanese codes. These people after the war, and there were others like them... There is a man by the name of Jack Seward, who lives in Houston where I live now...

Q: Let me just stop for a second. You were saying there was something else?

CUNNINGHAM: Yes. The people who were trained in Japanese for intelligence purposes during the war, in many cases afterwards became Foreign Service officers. They also became some of our leading scholars on Japan. They were all people who were in the military services, army, navy and so forth, and they became a very important contribution to our society.

I have had the experience recently of seeing the offspring of some of these unions between Americans and Japanese in the occupation period come back. There is a program now operated
by the Japanese government to recruit English tutors to serve in Japanese high schools. In Texas where I have been one of the interviewers for candidates for this program, there have been several who have come through and said, “My mother is Japanese. I was born there. I want to go and see what my mother’s country is like.” In some instances the mother never spoke about the country at all. In some instances the mother retained a strong attraction to the country or association with the country, and the children knew their cousins and their grandparents there. This is another element in American society that provides a link to Japan that is coming about as a result of this occupation experience.

Something else that is happening too is that the World War II generation of Japan experts, people of my age, are all passing from the scene now. They are really out of the active business of fostering and nourishing the American-Japanese relationship. The program the Japanese government has instituted to bring young Americans to Japan as English language tutors has been going on for about 11 or 12 years, and eventually is going to replace that generation. One of my students went on that program to Japan, and he has now passed the Foreign Service examination and has qualified in Japanese. He will be in the next A-100 class in July of 1998. I see that as part of an on-going continuum that is developing in a very interesting way.

Q: By the way while you were in Hokkaido was there any feeling about a communist movement up there or not?

CUNNINGHAM: Not so much about a communist movement though we were very conscious of the Soviet presence in two respects. The island of Sakhalin is just across from the northern tip of Hokkaido, and Wakkanai was a major intelligence listening post for the interception of electronic transmissions from Sakhalin.

Q: I almost got assigned there. I went to the army language school and took Russian just about the time that you were there. In ’51 I was doing that and I was sent to Japan. I sure as hell didn’t want to go to Wakkanai.

CUNNINGHAM: It was a bleak place. The other thing was that the northern territories, the four islands off of the northeast coast of Hokkaido, were a constant issue. We were always hearing about incidents where fishermen were taken captive by the Russian patrol boats up there. I remember Osborn made a couple of trips up there to report on the situation. There was not so much a feeling of a communist movement, as very strong consciousness of a Soviet presence, and in a way a kind of a Soviet menace. By this time, 1951-52, the war in Korea was fully under way, we were deep into the Cold War, and the divisions of Asia were becoming quite fixed at that point.

I’m trying to recall the governor of Hokkaido at that time, someone whom we knew. I think he may have been a member of the Socialist Party but I’m just not sure of that. I would have to check the record on that because I could be mistaken about that. He was a very personable man and, I suppose, a competent politician. There was a very strong army counterintelligence group there but I think that was directed more towards concern of some kind of Soviet attempt at penetration rather than concern about a subversive movement in northern Japan.
STOKES: Well, in relationship to China when I came back from having been under incommunicado arrest in China the Department said, "Well, what would you like in the world as an assignment that would give you, within reason, anything you want." This was bewildering to me and I remember getting a call from Alex Johnson who was then Director of Northeast Asian Affairs and he said, "Bill, we'd like you to go to Tokyo and do a peripheral report on China, reporting on China in the embassy, and I had two wonderful years in Tokyo in which that was part of the assignment. And the Zaibatsu never forgot their interest in China and their roots there, interestingly enough the head of MITI had been in Manchuria when I was there and he had been President of Manchu heavy industries and we befriended him in the consulate and we helped arrange the evacuation of terribly mistreated Japanese civilians to Japan and his name was Tagisake. And when we came out of China he arranged a reception for us in Japan and so my whole assignment in Japan I had free access to the Zaibatsu through Tagisake. It was also the time of the negotiations for the peace treaty. John Foster Dulles came out and I was assigned to assist him in various ways, there were many others, Bill Sullivan was there, we had neighboring homes. I remember one day hearing from Bill of the replacement by Truman of General MacArthur. MacArthur, of course, was unapproachable, nobody ever got near him and, however, I had a chance to meet him. We were coming out of China having been expelled, and all the world was noticing this and there were headlines in all of the papers. We landed in Yokohama, I mentioned that Tagisake greeted us, we were driven in his limousines up to Tokyo. We were invited by General MacArthur for lunch. We were on our way back to the United States, Mr. Ward and myself. We came, General MacArthur was late and when he came in, we all sat down to lunch and we thought the purpose was that the Consul General had briefed General MacArthur about all the events in Manchuria and what it actually was that General MacArthur gave a long account, it must have been 25 minutes long, of what was happening in China to Mr. Ward. At the end of which he turned to Ward and said, do you agree, Mr. Consul General? And I'll give Ward a lot of credit, "Not really, General, not really." And you could hear a pin drop. I thought the generals were not even breathing then. And after what seemed like an interminable silence MacArthur stood up and said, "Well, back to work." and turned and walked through a door.

Q: Closed mind.

STOKES: So, I contrast that with one day when I had been in Tokyo about 18 months and MacArthur had been removed and General Ridgway was the new Supreme Commander, the phone rang, it was Bill Sebald who was the Chief of Mission.
Q: My Ambassador in Canberra.

STOKES: And he never spoke to me, I mean I'd been to his home and all of that, but the idea that he would call me on the phone, the political section, was very unusual. He said, "Bill, there is an officer from General Ridgway's staff here and General Ridgway wants to see you" and I naturally went with the man, I think he was a colonel of some sort and I went in his staff car over to the Daiyichi building, went through all these corridors and finally came to this door and the colonel said go in. I opened it, it was General Ridgway alone at a desk. "Oh, you Stokes? Come on in. I want to talk to you." I sat down, he said, "Look, you were in Manchuria, right, for four years?" I said "Yes." He said, "Well, you know there's a lot of people who say (the Korean war was in full tilt at this time) that we should bomb the Chinese side of the border, especially the railway to interdict the supply of the Chinese armies." (Every Chinese had nearly at the gates of Seoul at this time) He said, "What do you think about it, what is your experience say, to this question?" I said, "Well, General, during the fighting in Manchuria, as we both recall, the national government armies, American trained and equipped had removed by rail with the US Marines as their guards, and supplies transported by rail supported the National armies. They were beaten by armies that had operated for 15 years without access to any rail lines of any kind at all. And never in my experience did I see any significant tactical resupply of the communist armies by rail. And I've also seen the rail lines lie devastated for nearly 10 years. When we were leaving Mukden they had barely restored the main rail lines up from mainland China. I doubt that communist commanders ever paid much attention to railroads or are deeply reliant on them. I said, if they are they certainly feel perfectly comfortable with alternative means of supply, and I think if the railroads magically could be erased tonight it wouldn't probably affect, from what I can tell as a lay person, that the Army's performance on the ground much at all for any length of time." "Okay, that's what I wanted to hear, thanks Bill." He got up, shook my hand, walked with me to the door. I thought, this is quite a guy, Ridgway. I did as it turned out have something, I'd done a report on the Chinese railroads in Manchuria and that was probably as good information as you could get.

NILES W. BOND
Deputy Political Advisor
Tokyo (1950-1953)

Niles W. Bond was born in Massachusetts in 1916. He received a BA from the University of North Carolina and graduated from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1938. His postings abroad include Havana, Yokohama, Madrid, Bern, Tokyo, Seoul, Rome, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In 1998 Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Mr. Bond.

Q: I’ve got you going to Tokyo in August of 1950.

BOND: Yes, that’s right. In 1950, I had had several other assignments that didn’t work out, that were canceled because of the Korean War. I’d been assigned as DCM to Baghdad just before the Korean War broke out. My successor had already arrived in the Department and I was clearing
things up when the Korean War broke out, and that canceled Baghdad and everything else. So I wrote to Dean Rusk. He was then either secretary or assistant secretary of the Far East. I wrote and said that, in view of my Korean background, I thought I should stay in that area, either physically or at least in terms of work. And that’s how I was assigned as MacArthur’s deputy political advisor.

Q: You went to Tokyo in August of ’50 and you were there until ’53. Is that right?

BOND: That’s right.

Q: What was your job in Tokyo?

BOND: Well, Bill Sebald was the political advisor and was head of what MacArthur called the “diplomatic section.” It was, in effect, the State Department mission to SCAP. Bill Sebald’s deputy had just left and I replaced him. One of the reasons I was given that job was so that I could keep a watching brief on Korea, because they didn’t have anyone in the political advisor’s office who knew anything about Korea. I stayed there until after MacArthur was fired, until after the truce was negotiated. Then I went back to the Department, if I remember correctly.

When I was in the political advisor’s office, I didn’t spend very much time worrying about Korea. I was available if anyone wanted to ask questions about it. The political advisor’s office was a pretty busy place, not giving political advice, because MacArthur didn’t take anyone’s political advice. I said once in an interview that being political advisor to MacArthur was tantamount to being ecclesiastical advisor to the Pope. There might not have been much to do except that he used us for all sorts of other things. In his mind, the principal function of the Diplomatic Section, also called the Political Advisor’s Office, was to keep the diplomatic missions accredited to him off his back. If he had complaints from the French mission, or anyone, he would have nothing to do with them. He would refer them to us. Eventually, the missions got so that they didn’t bother him; they came directly to us.

So we had to handle all sorts of things. We acted as go-between diplomatic missions and the SCAP bureaucracy because the diplomatic missions were dependent for almost everything on the Army. You couldn’t get a house; you couldn’t get food; you couldn’t get anything without going through SCAP. So we spent most of our time doing that. And then, as the peace treaty developed - it was already being drafted and re-drafted by that time - we got involved in that to some degree.

Q: Was Dick Snyder there at the time?

BOND: Yes, Dick was there.

Q: He was working on the Treaty, wasn’t he?

BOND: I believe he was, yes. I remember seeing Dick… Is Dick still alive?

Q: No. No, he died about five years ago or so, rather suddenly.
BOND: Oh, did he? I’m sorry. Yes, I remember him... Foster Dulles was the President’s chief negotiator on the Treaty and the chief State Department guy was John Allison. They both moved out to Tokyo to be closer to the Japanese negotiators. And so we got involved in some of that. I’d worked for John already and I’d worked for Foster Dulles so we all got along well, and finally got a Treaty.

There were other treaties being negotiated with which we got involved, inadvertently. For example, the Italians and the Japanese were trying to negotiate a peace treaty. They were stuck. There was a snag about the fact that Italy started out in the war as an ally of Japan and ended up as an enemy of Japan. The Italian and Japanese negotiators didn’t know how to word that so they asked Bill Sebald if they could borrow me for a week to try to do something. Which I did. And that’s the way that Treaty came about.

The Korean War was still going on for part of the time we’re talking about. The peace treaty negotiations were starting. I was also involved in the negotiation of a “Status of Forces” agreement with the Japanese for non-U.S./UN Forces based in Japan. I was still negotiating that at the time I was transferred to Korea but it was eventually finished up by my successor.

MABEL MURPHY SMYTIE
Professor, Shiga Daigaku
Hikone (1951-1953)

Ambassador Smythe was raised in Georgia, and earned her B.A. in economics and sociology from Mount Holyoke College, he M.A. from Northwestern University, and her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. After having worked around the world on numerous professional exchanges and while her husband was Ambassador to Syria and Malta, she was appointed Ambassador to Cameroon in 1977. She was interviewed by in Anne Miller Morin in 1986.

Q: You stayed two years in Japan?

SMYTIE: Yes. That was our first overseas experience.

Q: What were you--or your--husband doing?

SMYTIE: This was 1951 to ’53. The Japanese educational system had been thoroughly exploited by the war. Students were taken out of classes to work in factories and that sort of thing. So thirty-five American university professors were sent to Japan to serve, one in each of thirty-five national universities--at least the American input into it was going to democratize education. So I went to one university and my husband to another.

Q: So you were two of the thirty-five?
SMYTHE: Yes. We were two of thirty-four, actually, in the beginning. They found the thirty-fifth after we'd already been there a year. And we were the only married couple where both were appointed to work in this program. It was an interesting experience and, in many ways, the foundation of our overseas work and interests. In the first place, we enjoyed it in Japan. We enjoyed the Japanese people, the pace of living, the kind of dignity and perseverance in the people, the hard work that the students put in, and one's sense of humor gets a good working out in Japan.

Q: Where were you located?

SMYTHE: I was in the center of Honshu, on the shores of Lake Biwa, in a little town called Hikone. Have you lived in Japan?

Q: Yes, two years. We were in Kobe, and I went to Lake Biwa for a holiday.

SMYTHE: Oh, that's lovely. Well, I was where the castle stands above the lake. People were so appreciative of children, and Pam was with me. She was three when I went; five when we left. She quickly learned to play with the kids in Japanese. She would watch the way they sat, and when she was speaking Japanese, she sat on her feet with her knees out in front. She went to a Japanese kindergarten. She was way bigger than the children. She was younger than some, but taller than all of them. When they'd have foot races, all of them would put her out, "You run for us." And they'd say, "Kee-aren-chan ichiban!" [Karen is number one!]

Q: What did they call her?

SMYTHE: Ki-ya-re-n-chan. Her first name was Karen. It was Karen Pamela, and when she was little we called her Karen. I don't know why they thought Ke-yah-ren was more "Karen" than "Kahren". I would have assumed it was Kah-ren, but they made it Kee-yaren. Of course, she could outrun everybody, because she was bigger. She was as big as many of the nine-year-olds, and her best friend, in fact, was nine. Chesuko was slightly larger than she was, but this little child and Chesuko hit it off very well. She had been exposed to a lot of things before we got to Japan, and Chesuko enjoyed having a younger girl follow her around and take her word as gospel, and the two of them were just a perfect combination. Years later, Pam and I went back to Japan--ten years after we had left--and went to see our house and looked up the street and saw Chesuko, now a nineteen-year-old, putting her key in the lock. I said, "Chesuko?" and she said, "Ke-yaren-chan!" The two of them liked each other as well as they had as children. It was an interesting experience, because the kids liked to play school, and Chesuko, of course, was about a second-grader.

We had a playroom. It had beds in it--they used the beds for benches--and it had a blackboard, about 4 by 5, a nice big one. Chesuko would get to the front of the room--she was teacher--and she stood by the blackboard and taught the littler ones, who lived in the neighborhood and didn't know as much as she did, how to read and write hiragana, and so Pam learned to read and write those syllables.
One of my Japanese students wanted to study in the United States, and his English was the best I heard on campus. So, at his suggestion, I sent a letter to an old family friend, the president of Morehouse College, and said, "Would you think it's time for Morehouse to have a Japanese student?" This guy went over. He was a stone's throw in front of Martin Luther King. No, after Martin Luther King, right after Martin Luther King. I think King graduated about 1951, and he went to Morehouse in 1952. He graduated with honors from Morehouse. He is now the foremost economic development economist in Japan.

I have seen him very often, because he used to come to the U.N. the way Americans would go to Europe, every year or two. Well, he got so he was coming twice a year. I came home from work one day and found him asleep on the living room sofa, because he had become a part of our family. My parents sponsored him when he went to Morehouse, and they saw him through appendicitis and other trials of being away from home. When they went to Japan, he entertained them. He was really very gracious.

Q: *It is a mind-stretching experience to absorb an eastern culture. Were there many other women on the faculty?*

SMYTHE: No.

Q: *You were the only one, weren't you?*

SMYTHE: There was one woman who was a sort of part-time dean of women, but I never saw her. Nobody ever saw her. She didn't go to faculty meetings. Neither did I. I went to a faculty meeting, and they said, "What are you doing here?"

I said, "I understand there's a faculty meeting today."

They said, "Oh, yes. Well, we'll introduce you to the faculty and then you can leave." [Laughter]

Q: *I think "chauvinist pig" was invented for Japanese men, don't you?*

SMYTHE: It was. We didn't have but three or four girls on the campus as students.

Q: *And the dean didn't have too much work, did she?*

SMYTHE: No. I don't know what her assignment was, but this was only a part-time thing.

Q: *What was the name of the school that you were at?*

SMYTHE: I was at Shiga Daigaku [Shiga University] in the Kansai Gakabu, which is the "economics college", which is why I was there. I think I was the only economist in the group of thirty-five. They wanted me to teach a course in foreign trade and a course in labor relations, and then fill in with English. They needed English teachers, and I didn't really mind because I had had some background in the international phonetic symbols. They asked would I take on an additional assignment to teach the girls who worked in the silk mill, Omikenshi. It was a silk
company. They had started the Omikenshi School for the girls who worked in the silk factory so they could continue their education. So I agreed to do a class once a week and taught there, and I went to Otsu once a week and taught a couple of classes on the other campus that was associated with this one in Hikone.

Q: You were in Hikone?

SMYTHE: Yes.

Q: And your husband was--

SMYTHE: He was in Yamaguchi. His subject was sociology, but he was also teaching English. The president of his university was a very distinguished man who had spent some time in the United States, and he was horrified when the war began, because he knew what might was available in the United States. He took home some movies he had made of the United States and showed them around, and people realized that they might have underestimated U.S power. The government was not too keen on his movies and prevailed on him not to show them too much.

He was a distinguished authority in N_h chanting and taught a group of people how to do it. He invited us to watch them when they came to do this. I met his daughter when I went to Japan in 1984, and he had passed on. He was already a man considered up in age then, but a very distinguished gentleman.

We have many happy memories of Japan. Times have not always been easy; challenges have always been there, but I was never really depressed. I tend to find the possibilities in a situation and look on those, and not fall on the seamy side too much. Otherwise, I suppose I wouldn't survive.

Q: What do you feel you took away from your experiences in Japan?

SMYTHE: I got involved in international education when I was there. I started out, like many Americans, seeing the world as a pyramid, with us at the apex and everybody else at the bottom struggling to get up, but I began to understand that there are people who had pride in their own way of doing things and didn't really want to become Americans. They wanted what Americans had, particularly the power, but they didn't necessarily want to wield it in the same ways. I still have a feeling of comradeship with Japan over some of the things that the Japanese like and do and think. I think their ability to concentrate on what they want to accomplish and just brush hardships aside and go ahead is a marvelous thing.

Q: How did you feel about the way they educated their children, the amount of drill and pressure on them?

SMYTHE: At the time, I didn't know a great deal about education, but I had grown up in a semi-progressive school in the South and the rigidity appalled me. It didn't appall me that children had to get their pails and brushes and wash the floors after they had finished. I thought, "My goodness, we would do better if we had our kids share in some of the real tasks that have to be
done." I think we make a mistake in thinking that children are benefitted when everything is made easy for them. So I liked the discipline and the hard work and the perfectionism. I tend to be a perfectionist myself, so I understand that. But I really did gag at seeing small children allowed to do anything, even slap their mothers in the face and call them "fool," and then a year later having them squashed if they said anything out of line.

*Q:* The boom is dropped on their heads at a certain age and that's it, isn't it? It must make them quite schizophrenic, I should think.

Smythe: I would think so. I came home one day and found Pam scared of the--what do they call them, the bogeyman?

*Q:* Oh, yes. I can't remember.

Smythe: The feeling that you are cruel if you spare the stick and scare kids to death, that horrified me terribly. And, yet, I found that people were understanding and kind, and could be. One Japanese said to me, "We can be terribly cruel people." He was old enough. He was one of the graduate students we got, a public school teacher, actually, who was doing graduate work on the side, that we helped to get a scholarship to come to the United States. He said, "I remember seeing someone who was in the Army with me, and he used the wrong pronoun in speaking of the emperor, and instead of explaining that he made a mistake, they simply knocked him senseless. Of course, he never made that mistake again, but did you really need to be that drastic to drive your point home?"

*Q:* Well, with the emphasis so heavily on coming in ichiban, it makes them do some rather underhanded things.

Smythe: One of my students committed suicide the summer after my first three or four months in Japan. Came back at the end of the year and here he was no more. I had them come over to my house every Thursday night, or whatever day it was, and I would make cookies and have tea, and we'd sit around and drink tea and eat cookies and talk. We spoke in English and they loved having practice, and they had an opportunity to sing songs in English or whatever else. I enjoyed that. But there were so many different kinds of things: this business of having everybody stand when I entered the room and then sit down when dismissed, was very strange to an American, and there were other things.

*Q:* But you must have had great respect because you were a sensei.

Smythe: Yes. And the fact that I was a woman didn't really seem to handicap me with the students.

*Q:* The title was enough.

Smythe: That's right.
Q: How did your household help treat you and your husband? Was he first always? Because you were both teachers.

Smythe: You know, I don't have a real recollection of that, because he was mostly in his own place. We were up to a fifteen-hour train ride apart. But they gave him one of these City University schedules so that he taught three days a week, and if he wanted to spend three days, he traveled two overnights and had three or four days.

Q: I didn't realize that was fifteen hours apart.

Smythe: Well, it isn't now.

Q: No. But the roads were so appalling then. Yamaguchi, is where, exactly?

Smythe: That's down near Hiroshima. It's between Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the train line.

Q: So he was able to come back more often that you could go down?

Smythe: Yes, because I had the baby. I didn't travel except when we had vacation. When we had vacation, I went to his house because he had the more pleasant house. So we spent the long vacations at his house and the weekend ones at mine.

Q: Were they Japanese houses you lived in?

Smythe: Mine was designed by an American missionary. It had a tatami room, but it was really intended to be an American house and it had American furniture. The bathtub was really something to tell about. They had built sort of a concrete bathtub, and it was a great big thing; it was like a trough. I guess they found that it was just too rough on the human body, so they got an old clawfoot bathtub and set it inside the other. [Laughter] You could run water in it, and when you pulled the plug, the water just ran out into the other tub, because there was no pipe connecting them. But it worked all right. It was not easy to clean well.

Now, Hugh's house was a Japanese house, except that they had floors in it and he had regular Western furniture. He had tatami somewhere—I can't remember where—and their concession to heat—we had stoves for heating. He had a very modern kind of stove. We had been afraid of how I would take care of Pam's milk, so I brought a little two cubic foot electric refrigerator from the States and it was duly installed and we made do with that. They bought Hugh a six-foot refrigerator made in Japan. It worked perfectly well. Mine never made ice cubes. The president of the university said shyly one day he would appreciate it if I would send him my surplus ice. I had two ice cube trays, about six inches long, making cubes less than an inch in diameter, but I never got ice cubes because the current was off fifteen minutes of every hour. As soon as you got cold enough so it started freezing, it would melt again. I never knew how to explain tactfully to him that I never had surplus ice because I never had ice. But he learned, because when I left he asked if he could buy my refrigerator.

Q: What did you heat in the stove? You burned wood, did you, or was it gas?
SMYTHE: We had bottled gas to cook.

Q: How did you heat your house?

SMYTHE: A stove. A stove was in the living room, and we had an oil heater, I think kerosene or something like that. I was very careful with such things.

Q: I didn’t know if you had to use hibachis.

SMYTHE: No, we were spared that.

Q: Because the smell of charcoal is so bad, for children especially.

SMYTHE: Quite suffocating, yes. We were all right there. We didn't have any of those pits in the floor for you to put your feet over them. I remember going visiting, putting my feet down there, and at 120 degrees, they were perspiring so and my back was freezing. [Laughter]

OLCOTT H. DEMING
Public Affairs Officer, USIA
Tokyo (1951-1953)

Olcott H. Deming was born in New York in 1909 and was raised in Connecticut. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Thailand, Japan, and Uganda. Mr. Deming was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert on April 20, 1988.

DEMING: Well, we had home leave, and I was then posted directly back to the Far East, to Tokyo. It was interesting that all my effects had come from Bangkok, through Tokyo, to Hawaii, to Baltimore and then back the same way to Tokyo. We went a long time without the things we had been living with in the past years.

I was sent to Tokyo as Deputy to Saxton Bradford, who was Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs. At the time, we had a Political Advisor, Mr. Sebald there, because a peace treaty had not yet been made with Japan. Sebald, was a Foreign Service Officer assigned to General MacArthur's staff as Political Advisor with the rank of Ambassador. Actually, Saxton Bradford, the Counselor for Public Affairs, was Counselor to the Political Advisor. As his assistant, I was there to see the transition of Japan from an occupied country to independence under the Peace Treaty worked out by John Foster Dulles.

On the day the Peace Treaty came into force, the Department sent Ambassador Robert Murphy to Tokyo to replace Gen. Mark Clark as the principal representative of the United States. He was a very strong Ambassador. As assistant to the Counselor for Public Affairs, I accompanied Ambassador Murphy around Tokyo and to nearby cities on speaking tours. He said, "I am going to impress upon the Japanese that they are now an independent sovereign country, and the
occupation is over. There will be no more military processions when I go out." The Japanese had become accustomed to, and no doubt impressed by, MacArthur and the military presence. Ambassador Murphy said that period had passed, and we must do everything to show that Japan is now sovereign, equal. We want to help them, but they're free to help themselves, and they're no longer an occupied land. Not literally quite true because we had then and still have large bases in Yokosuka, Yokohama and on practically all islands as a defense umbrella for Japan and for us. I much admired Robert Murphy and his determination to demonstrate the difference between a sovereign country and a military occupied country.

Q: Do you think there was any downside to this at all? Did it create problems in keeping forward momentum in the improvement of Japan and U.S. relations?

DEMING: I think it came at about the right time. Let's see, 1945 I believe was VJ day, and I was there from '51 to '53. It was a fairly fast rapprochement after the bitterness and the terrible toil on both sides of that war to hand over independence, although under very strict protocols. We retained continued rights to military bases, navy bases, air bases and support assistance. I think it came at a very good time, but it probably frightened and startled the Japanese a bit. "You mean, you're leaving us alone? You're casting us out?" Japan was still a pretty crippled country at that time. Tokyo was still very much of a mess from the bombings, and it had not recovered economically or from the cultural and emotional wounds of war. There was a pundit who observed that if you are a developing country and really want to get ahead fast, you should go to war with America. They will destroy you and then rebuild you. However, I do believe that Japan was ready to take off.

Q: There is some evidence in that direction. What was your particular function then? Was it entirely in the Public Affairs field?

DEMING: My entire assignment was in the Public Affairs field. Actually, the Counselor for Public Affairs, a very able man who is now deceased, had his office over in the Embassy very close to the Ambassador and his advisor. He did not wish to get involved in operations we had inherited from the military - 23 libraries, which were set up all over Japan. The State Department-USIA took over the administration and the running of those 23 libraries. And I, in effect, was administering a very large USIA operation, practically without interference. The most interesting or difficult decision was whether to reduce these libraries or cut them out completely. I traveled around Japan with a bilingual American, and we visited about ten of these libraries. I was handed many petitions in Japanese and in English not to close the libraries because they were the principal places for learning about America and because they were the cultural centers for their impoverished districts. When I came back to Tokyo, I talked to Ambassador Murphy. He said that the Embassy was under a great deal of pressure to close the libraries to save money. I said I thought there were about five that could be eliminated because they're near enough to another library. So we agreed to cut them down to 18. Even so, 18 USIA libraries in one country was an unprecedented intellectual and information presence. I felt that that was the right thing to do. The time would come when the Japanese would indicate that they no longer needed them.

USIA also administered a large Japan-American cultural exchange program. We brought in such literary stars as Hemingway and Faulkner. The Japanese were so anxious to reeducate
themselves on Western culture that they would turn out by the hundreds to listen to Faulkner or any American speaker or musician. It was very stimulating to see the cultural enthusiasm of Japan for the country that had been their bitter enemy.

JOHN M. STEEVES
Political Counselor
Tokyo (1951-1953)

Ambassador John M. Steeves was born in North Dakota in 1905. His career in the State Department included assignments to India, Japan, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy and Thomas Stern on March 27, 1991.

Q: You left Delhi in 1950 and were transferred as Political Counselor to Tokyo?

STEEVES: I was sent back to the National War College from Delhi and then was sent to Tokyo.

Q: That was 1951. You were talking about imperial people -- Douglas MacArthur was still holding forth there?

STEEVES: I ran into Ambassador MacArthur during my second tour there when I was stationed down on the Islands as the Consul General at Naha and Political Adviser to the Ryukyuan Command. That is where I got started in my political-military role, after the War College and after my tour of two years in Tokyo at the Embassy.

Q: When you were in Tokyo, Robert Murphy was the Ambassador most of the time?

STEEVES: That's right. I was there during the last year of the Occupation and then with the first Ambassador under independence, Bob Murphy.

Q: Robert Murphy and Loy Henderson were probably the two major figures in the Foreign Service. How would you describe Robert Murphy's style of operation?

STEEVES: Bob Murphy, you must remember, was well named -- he was an Irishman. We used to have a signal that we gave each other as we were going down the hall toward morning staff meeting. If Bob Murphy was in a good mood, we would smile; if we knew he wasn't, we would put our hands on top of our heads. He could be a Tartar in demanding things that he wanted done. I was the Political Counselor under Bob Murphy, and my window looked out on the road that led down to the administrative office, where the communications center was and from where the morning cables came. I would watch for that courier, and the minute he got into the door I would grab him and look over those cables right away because I knew it would only take about sixteen minutes before Bob Murphy's squawk box would yell, "John, what are you doing about so-and-so?" One was always under that type of pressure.
But along with all that exacting pressure and expectation of near excellence of performance, as far as Bob Murphy was concerned, there was also that great big open armed magnanimity and good nature that you just couldn't escape. I used to play golf with him. We would have a very rough day, and along in the afternoon he would call up and say, "John, what do you think? Let's go have a game of golf." It was his way of kind of saying, "Let's forget everything else that is going on today."

Q: How did he get along with the Japanese? This is a brand new government, and he was the first Ambassador.

STEEVES: Very mixed...some, like Foreign Minister Okazaki, he liked, and they got along very well. We used to joke about everything we told Murphy that he didn't accept. He would always say, "Okazaki didn't tell me that," and that was that. Many of the other typical Japanese he didn't understand too well. The Japanese are never very direct. They speak in metaphors or in "oblique ways" all the time. They never tell you anything directly. Bob Murphy was exactly the opposite.

Q: What sort of things were you reporting on? Political movements were just getting going again after Independence.

STEEVES: Yes, by the time Bob Murphy was there, you see the aftermath of the Occupation, when labor and the Communists were making their first trouble for the Liberals, which, in Japan, are really the Conservatives.

One of the things that took a lot of my time was that I was the Chairman of the Committee made up of Embassy personnel and from the military command to negotiate with Japanese on the Administrative Agreements required to be worked out under our Treaty with the Japanese. These agreements were to govern our cooperative arrangements under our Mutual Security Treaty and Occupation relationships as long as they would apply.

In passing, it is interesting to observe that forty years later, as I speak, the Treaty provisions still govern our conduct in Japan for our forces stationed there.

An anecdote to tell you how difficult some of those provisions of the new Treaty were to initiate: the next morning after the 29th of April, when the Occupation ended, somebody called up and said, "Say, that MP is still down there (naming a main square in Tokyo) directing traffic. Will you send somebody down there and get him out of there." Here the Japanese had been training for months, and they were itching to show off those fancy dances they do in directing traffic, and some dumb military person down the line hadn't gotten the word. These MPs didn't see anything different between yesterday and today, and they were still directing traffic. So it was an awful hard time to get these nuances across to the Americans.

Q: You got this in spades later on when you were in Naha, but I would imagine one of your major jobs was dealing with the American military, which had been living very well. While you were negotiating about these troops, I was a trooper. I was an enlisted man in the Air Force at Johnson Air Force Base then. I know how the enlisted men lived, so I can imagine how the officers lived.
STEEVES: The house that I was given under the Occupation arrangements was a solid block square with the most beautiful stone fence you ever saw around it, a Japanese garden that would make your mouth water and a staff to run it. Fresh flowers were delivered to my door every morning. These were the perks we got under the Occupation.

Q: *It must have been really a cultural shock dealing with this?*

STEEVES: It was a case of them getting tough. General Lawton was the man I dealt with a lot. He became very stern on this business of getting instructions out for people to get into their place and to respect the Japanese rights. It was difficult for the Americans to knuckle under and gradually give up fifty cents a round for the championship golf courses and luxuries of that nature.

Q: *How did we view -- again we are talking about the '51 and '52 period -- the Soviet threat in Japan?*

STEEVES: There was a communist element. There was a communist paper, I think it was called "The Red Flag," which was an annoying nuisance but not a great problem. The American security, and later on the Japanese security, saw to it that it was handled pretty effectively. I am surprised that after Independence and years afterward that they haven't landed on them more severely than they have. You take the demonstrations that they are having out at the airport -- I don't quite understand how they allow that type of thing to happen. It is completely un-Japanese for them to allow it.

The only challenge there was to the Yoshida (prime minister) types were the Social Democrats, led by someone I can't think of right now, who was growing somewhat in popularity. I remember when Nelson Spinks (the officer I replaced as Political Counselor) had the head of the Socialist Democrats over for dinner to his house. He had become a bit of a problem and was getting quite a bit of the vote even before I left Japan.

Q: *Going back to the times when the Social Democrats were a party, we didn't want to see them take over. Did we have a bias toward the Liberal Democrats?*

STEEVES: We had a kind of paternal interest in the Yoshida people. P.M. Yoshida was the one that MacArthur had put in office, and he was such a cooperative fellow to deal with. He understood Americans so well, as did the people that were in his cabinet. He epitomized like none other that I can think of right off the Japanese ability to get along with those who defeat them. As you know, there is no people in the world who know how to do that better and turn that into an asset. You would think that the Japanese were our devoted allies the way they cooperated with the Occupation. So Yoshida epitomized that attitude on the part of many Japanese and became very popular. The people who followed on after him had very much of that same attitude. The people who became the political football in later years, and those who became subject to scandal and corruption, were something we really didn't know in our early days at all.

Q: *How did you find the staff of our Embassy at that time? Was it one that was responsive to*
Japan?

STEEVES: Yes. We had a very high-class staff. Certainly in the leadership that I knew. Dr. Waring was the head of the economic section. He was opposite me. We had Dick Lamb, who knew Japanese like he knew English -- he had a Japanese wife, Dick Finn and Bill Sullivan, a young officer. Bill Sullivan was a young, brilliant officer with a great sense of humor.

*Q: From a different mold?*

STEEVES: From a different mold. One morning, somebody said that somebody had just deliberately disagreed with the Ambassador when he had said some rather harsh things about President Syngman Rhee of Korea criticizing the Japanese. In a comment in a passing telegram, our Ambassador in Korea, Ambassador Muccio, had agreed with Rhee! Sullivan, the brash, young fellow that he was, walked into the big "bull pen" that we used before moving over to the Embassy and said, "Hurrah for Muccio!" Someone thought this was pretty brash because it was just the opposite of what Murphy had been standing for. Murphy heard about it, and, of course, that was heresy for Murphy for anyone on the staff to disagree with him. Pretty soon I got a call from Murphy, who said, "Did I hear something about Bill Sullivan that I ought to know about?"

I said, "Well maybe you should, what did you hear?"

He told me what he had heard and said, "Send him up here."

So I said to Bill, "Bill, I think you are in trouble; you had better figure what you are going to do because the Ambassador wants to see you."

"Well, that's okay," he said, "I never saw one Irishman afraid of another one any day."

I might say that Bill Sullivan went on to quite a distinguished career in the Foreign Service. He was a very bright officer.

**ROBERT LYLE BROWN**  
Chief, Economic Section, Kobe  
Officer-in-Charge, Osaka  
(1951-1954)

Robert Lyle Brown grew up in Ohio. His career in the Foreign Service included posts in New Caledonia, Morocco, Japan, Belgium, and Taiwan. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 5, 1990.

*Q: Your next assignment was in Kobe-Osaka from 1951-54 as chief of the Economic Section in Kobe and Officer-in-Charge in Osaka. Tell us about that.*

BROWN: I said earlier that I intended to leave the Foreign Service after serving in New
Caledonia. When I got the offer of an assignment to Morocco, I couldn't refuse. Casablanca sounded like such a far away place. So I said to my wife, "Just this one more time. Then I'll have had enough and can go to law school." In Morocco, I got orders assigning me to advanced graduate economic training at Northwestern University, which is really what I wanted. I had studied political science. I knew also that as an Foreign Service staff officer, I was still not a full-fledged FSO, and if I were to move up in the Service, I would have to get out of the political area. I had moved up as a staff officer to such a level that I couldn't afford to go back to the bottom of the ladder as a career FSO. I thought that economic training would have been useful to me whether I stayed in the Service or went into law, banking, international trade, etc. I would have more assets. Naturally, I decided that I couldn't quit when the Department was offering me advanced graduate economic training from Northwestern University, so it was on to Kobe, Japan.

I had done some economic work at Syracuse. I really didn't need the sophisticated advanced training in micro and macroeconomics, statistics, projections, analysis, etc. for my assignment to Kobe. When I got to Tokyo, the Embassy wanted me to stay there. But Kobe was a Consulate, and then there was also a sub-Consulate in Osaka. It was a big Consular district -- steel, shipping, textiles and lots of money. So I decided to go to Kobe. The Supreme Allied Commander, MacArthur, was still running Japan, and this in itself created a unique situation. The Japanese government was following our directions and policy guidance. With MacArthur's departure, all of this suddenly stopped. It changed the whole situation, including the beautiful house that we had -- owned by the tenth richest man in Japan. It sat on the mountains. It had a boiler room, which needed engineers with graduate certificates in order to operate it twenty-four hours per day. It was like a ship with a conveyor belt to load the coal into the furnace.

The transition was interesting because then we had to start to use our abilities and wits to influence the communities in which we were assigned. As I stated, the most important industries in the Kobe-Osaka area were textiles, shipping and steel. American business, knowing that Japan needed everything, flooded into Japan. We need to watch to make sure that this business was in the U.S. interests and that it would foster positive and progressive Japanese economic development. The Japanese had limited finances for expansion. The basic challenge was grass roots work at the industrial-business level to bring U.S. and Japanese business together in a manner which would complement each other -- importers and exporters, for example.

Q: Did you see any glimmerings then of the problems that have occurred in the 1980s?

BROWN: I did. In fact, I remember that despite the basic level the Japanese were working, they were gradually tooling up. I could see the quality starting to come out of a primitive post-war setting. One could project that every day was going to be better for Japan. In addition, all they needed was a blackboard and chalk to improve their science and technology. They were dedicated and determined. It was just a matter of organizing. You could see that coming. I found many vignettes of knowledge, as I called them. We all had to write reports, and that I did. But I also picked up a lot of vignettes every week that were slivers of relevant information. I was sure the same thing was happening in other places throughout the world. I initiated a series of monthly economic notes transmitted through the Embassy, as it insisted. The monthly economic notes became a weekly and a world-wide requirement through a new directive. It was a great
way to report substantive bits of relevant information which wasn't being reported in any other way.

EDWIN CRONK
Chief, Japanese Financial Trade Affairs
Washington, DC (1951-1956)

Edwin Cronk was born in 1918. His career in the Foreign Service included assignments in Japan, Korea, West Germany, Australia, Singapore, and Washington, DC. Mr. Cronk was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 7, 1988.

Q: You were a civil servant in the Department of State, dealing with Japanese affairs. We're talking about the early '50s. I have you here from 1951 to 1956 as Chief of Japanese Financial Trade Affairs. What were your concerns in dealing with Japan on an economic basis in the early '50s? The Korean War was in effect. How did you see Japanese-American financial relations -- economic relations -- in those days?

CRONK: At the beginning part of that period, when I came over from the Pentagon, the Japanese were still quite desperate for financial, economic assistance to sustain themselves. We used to kind of despair...how are we ever going to solve the problem of the Japanese economy? The AID program was essentially a relief operation; it wasn't a development program. We wondered, you know, what would it take to put the Japanese back on their feet so they could begin manufacturing and exporting and getting more or less self-supporting.

Well, the Korean War eventually solved that problem because Japan became the source of an enormous amount of material needed by our forces in Korea. Just the ordinary things like cement, and barbed wire and thousands of items. The Japanese began to crank up their small industry to supply these things. They had a shorter lead time in getting it delivered, and they worked like the devil to do it.

There was never anything like the Marshall Plan to provide them the wherewithal, but we supported this gearing up for wartime supply exercise by seeing that the orders were provided to the Japanese and generally encouraged the whole effort. And at the end of the Korean War, they had, in effect, recovered from the devastation of the war. Small industries grew, and they were in pretty good shape at the end of the war. It was the wartime requirements that did it rather than our AID program.

And, in the State Department, we played a role in encouraging this process.

Q: Did anybody, while you were there, see any cloud on the horizon that this might turn into a Frankenstein monster, as far as the United States is concerned? I'm referring, of course, to the Japanese growth and the fact that it has become our principal competitor and rival in the economic world.
CRONK: No, I don't think, Stew, any of us foresaw the kind of development that's taken place. We applauded the fact that they had helped in the war effort, and that they had benefited from it because over time, that reduced the obligation we had, or we felt, to supply them with economic assistance. It wouldn't be until at least fifteen years after that period that they became a worldwide competitor in such a broad range of products.

There was one area where we had some apprehensions, and that was in investment and trade policy, particularly in the investment area. A lot of business men would come to me and say, "We would like to set up a widget factory in Japan. Can you help us?"

And it was quite evident early on that the Japanese -- unless they needed something rather desperately, some technology or a business with a built-in export market attached to it -- there was resistance to foreign investment and any kind of foreign involvement that they didn't think was necessary to their own economic growth.

Of course, we've seen that pattern develop ever since. They have not, essentially, had an open market for foreigners, and foreign investment is still a very difficult proposition for our people. So that was an increasing apprehension. There weren't a great number of American companies interested at that time but a good many suppliers. I would have one or two in every week saying, "Give us some advice on how to go about this." And I did the best I could. Many of them came back rather disappointed, saying, "Well, they've got this requirement, and I've got to do this," or "They just won't talk to me." That was a concern, which I guess was well founded. It turned out to be the real thing.

Q: I'm going to come back to this particular subject several times here. But again, looking at the early '50's, what was your impression of the calibre and the effectiveness of the people dealing with economic affairs in the State Department? This has always been a matter, as you know, of controversy. Often people say, you know, the Foreign Service and the State Department really don't pay enough attention to economic affairs. How did you find it at that time?

CRONK: Well, I guess I would have to say that the calibre of people, or the depth of the talent in economic matters, was pretty limited. For example, in this Office of Japanese Economic Affairs - - or in the whole office under U. Alexis, who was Director of both Japan and Korean affairs -- there wasn't really one trained economist. I was the closest to it because I'd at least had some training and a good bit of experience dealing with these matters. But I was no Ph.D. in economics, and there wasn't anybody anywhere near the level of competence that I think was needed.

And dealing with other people in the Department on problems -- I would have to get cables cleared, and whatnot -- I found a shortage, really, of talent and understanding about economic matters. And you can understand this because before the Wriston Program -- and before World War II -- the Department didn't have a great deal of economic responsibility. And political, consular officers predominated -- administrative people. A crackerjack economist was pretty hard to find. Now, I think, since then, the Wriston Program helped. It was a step forward because it brought in a lot of people who had been working on economic matters here and there in the
Department. But I think since then we've gone ahead quite nicely and have more and more people who understand economics and can deal with it effectively.

But at that time, it was a pretty sorry state of affairs. I remember going to Korea. I don't think there was a person in the Embassy -- and it was a fairly sizable Embassy -- that really knew much about economic affairs. I was new to Korea, new to the Foreign Service essentially, because this was my first Foreign Service assignment. And I could write a telegram about anything almost and get it cleared without any difficulty; the Ambassador or the DCM would look at it, smile and say, "That sounds good." There was no expertise, but I think that has changed somewhat.

G. LEWIS SCHMIDT
Executive Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1951-1956)

G. Lewis Schmidt was born in Washington in 1915. He served in Japan, Brazil, and Thailand. Mr. Schmidt was interviewed by Allen Hansen on February 8, 1988.

Q: When you left the Budget Office, you ended-up in Tokyo. How did that come about?

SCHMIDT: Well, to give you a little background on that, Henry Ford soon left the position of Budget Division Chief, but before leaving, he had made me Deputy Chief of the Budget Division. Then he briefly left to become the Executive Director of the Near East Bureau for the Department of State, and so for a time, I was left as the Acting Director of the Budget Division.

About that time (late 1951) the Peace Treaty with Japan was signed, and it was obvious we were soon going to take over the Army information operation in Tokyo (then called the Civil Information and Education (CI&E) program of GHQ SCAP). USIA was looking for someone who had both Japanese experience and also budgetary and administrative experience. So we struck a bargain. I agreed that I would like to go back to Japan in that capacity if they felt that I was the person to handle the job.

Q: Where had your Japanese experience come from?

SCHMIDT: It started in 1938 or even earlier. I was the American Chairman of a University level student organization called the Japan-America Student Conference. It was an exchange program between U.S. and Japanese university students completely organized, planned and run by students -- no senior support or controlling group. I had attended the fourth annual meeting of this program in 1937 at Stanford University. I was elected chairman of the U.S. delegation for the fifth conference to be held in Japan. So, I organized the American delegation in 1938 and led it to Japan for the summer meeting of 1938. After the conference, we traveled extensively in Japan, then to Manchukuo, which was at that time under Japanese control, and Korea.
When I came back to the States, I had gotten a fairly wide exposure to Japan. Of course, no real knowledge in depth. Because of that experience, when the war came on and when the American Army was preparing after VE Day, or even before VE Day, to invade Japan, they were looking around for military officers who had had exposure to Japan. You can imagine that in 1944, '43, '44, nobody in the Army -- or at least a very few people in the Army -- had ever had any first hand knowledge of Japan at all. Because I had been there, even though briefly, the Army picked me up for the Military Government operation, and I spent nine months studying the Japanese language and Japanese area studies. Eventually, I went to the Philippines, and from there, into Japan after the armistice was signed in September, 1945. I spent nine to ten months of the first year of the Occupation in Japan, during which time I was the Economics Officer for the Military Government Section of the Headquarters of Sixth Army located in Kyoto and in charge of all Southwestern Japan during the early Occupation. Again, in 1951, there weren't all that many people in the Department of State with my background who had been in Japan. And so when we were getting ready to take over the program from the Army (as it was then known), they were very happy to have me go out and assume the position of Executive Officer, USIS/Japan. It was my duty initially to manage all logistics for the takeover from the Army of the CI&E Program, with 24 field offices, 900 Japanese employees, a $7,000,000-$8,000,000 budget plus.

Q: Well, you certainly had the background for it. It must have been a tremendous logistical problem providing the administrative needs for a major cultural and information program in what was enemy territory.

SCHMIDT: Well, it was. The Army had set up very extensive information and education programs in what they called the CI&E, or the Civil Information and Education Program, under the headquarters which was known as GHQ SCAP -- General Headquarters for the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers in Japan. They had twenty-four field offices of the program located all over Japan. Two of them were in Tokyo. They were designated as libraries, though they also were conduits for cultural programming. When the USIS took over, we changed the name to USIS Cultural Centers. The Japanese have been intrigued always by the concept of culture and held suspicions about anything called "information." That word to them (as in Europe) was often synonymous with "Intelligence. So when we took over, we called them cultural centers, or bunka senta in the Japanese language. There were libraries but also an extensive program of cultural activities, including lectures and motion picture showings and all the paraphernalia that USIS frequently employs or did employ then (and to a large extent, still employs today) in its centers abroad.

There were over nine hundred Japanese employed by the CI&E either in Tokyo or in the various cultural centers around the country. Each one of the centers had at least one vehicle as sort of a mobile unit which they could take out into the boondocks and show movies. And they had, of course, substantial libraries of anywhere from three to five thousand volumes each, plus, of course, all the necessities of supporting a staff of that size. Each center was manned by at least one American. Only one or two of them had more than one American. And the rest were all Japanese employees.

The task fell to me alone at first because I, at that time, was the only executive officer there. I was all by myself in what was then the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters SCAP.
Shortly thereafter, however, I was lent a young man by the name of Joseph Womack, who was a junior officer in the Administrative Office of the Embassy. He became my assistant and was with me for the next year and a half. It was a great help to get him. He was very good. We soon began to acquire a very excellent Japanese staff, as the official take over date (April 29, 1952) approached.

We screened every one of the nine hundred Japanese employees. We made a decision to close the second center in Tokyo, so we eliminated the facilities that were there and kept just the one main center in the central part of downtown Tokyo. Initially, we kept all the other centers and eventually took on about eight hundred fifty of the Japanese who had been in the CI&E operation. And believe me, screening eight hundred fifty employees in the three months time was quite a job in itself. I should add that the treaty was supposed to have become effective early in February. And I arrived about the 21st or 22nd of January.

Fortunately, because I don't think we could have achieved the takeover in that short period of time, there were various reasons, which I don't need to elucidate here, for the delay in putting the treaty into effect, and it did not actually go into effect until the 29th of April. This gave me and Joe Brown, who was the Chief Administrative Officer for the CI&E operation, a chance to sort things out. We were able to take advantage of a lot of the so-called GARIOA funds (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas).

Although the Army didn't actually transfer this local currency to us, which had become available under the terms of our giving money to the defeated country and their putting up bank accounts in Japanese yen for the equivalent amount, they did, at my request, give us a great deal of purchasing power against the Army budget while the Army was still in control. As a result of that help, we were able to expand our library collections, get a lot of more modernized equipment, make considerable repairs or improvements at various centers and get them in good shape before we actually took over.

We also had to screen all the Japanese in the CI&E central headquarters in Tokyo. We did that and selected, I would say, more than two-thirds of them to come over and work in the operation that soon became USIS in Tokyo.

Another thing fell to our lot. Not knowing exactly how many people we would need to handle an operation of this size, which, except for Germany, at that time was by far the largest overseas operation USIA had overseas, Washington had set up one hundred thirty-five American positions for Tokyo. We wanted to hire quite a number of the people who had been in similar positions in GHQ SCAP CI&E operation, so we began selecting them. I would say that we probably selected about two-thirds of the Americans who were in positions there to come over to our operation. This included a number of the people who were in cultural centers around the country.

Every one of these people, of course, had cleared the security requirements of the Army back in '45, '46 and '47 when they came aboard with the Army. But by 1952, Senator McCarthy had begun his depredations on the American side. Fortunately, just as an aside, we were never afflicted with Mr. Cohn and Mr. Schine in the Orient. They preferred to dangle around Europe.
Nevertheless, about half the requests that we sent in for the transfer of these people from GHQ SCAP into our operation were turned down by Security. Security had become highly sensitized by the McCarthy raids, and if there was anything even remotely that might set off some accusation of "left-wingism" or immorality by Security (SY) definition or whatever it might be, they turned them down.

Q: So you undoubtedly lost a lot of good people.

SCHMIDT: We lost a lot of good people.

Q: Some that spoke Japanese?

SCHMIDT: Yes. Unfortunately, we didn't have anybody in the motion picture area, and we were about to embark on a rather large motion picture program, including production. We had bought quite a lot of equipment and were ready to start producing some of our own films. Security turned down the first two people requested from the Motion Picture Section of the Army operation that I wanted to get. Finally, they turned down the last one. I was really not only exhausted but utterly turned off by the whole process. I knew this man, and I couldn't see how in the world they could turn him down.

So I persuaded Sax Bradford, who was the head of USIS in Tokyo at that time, to send a telegram which I had drafted and which I felt was rather important. Sax was a bit skeptical at first, but I sent it anyway. (And he was pretty mad himself.) So the cable read, "Your security turn down of George Gierke (the third man in question) completes destruction of the USIS motion picture program in Tokyo. If you can't find some way to send this man over to us, will you please furnish someone of your own choosing?"

The net result of that was that they did renege. They cleared Gierke. He arrived late in 1952 and was our motion picture officer for the next two years until he had to go back to the States for reasons of health.

Well, on the famous day of April 29th, we were at last in business. We had covered or had filled I think somewhere in the neighborhood of eighty or eighty-five of the authorized American positions. We never did reach the full one hundred thirty-five. I'll get into that later.

Q: And when you say the famous day of the 29th, you mean when the treaty was signed?

SCHMIDT: That's when the treaty became effective. It had been signed the preceding autumn in San Francisco. Up to that time, the man who had the personal rank of Ambassador and was the head of what was then called the Diplomatic Section of SCAP was Bill Sebald, who himself was an old Japan hand. But because this was to be a new era, the Department didn't want Sebald to stay on after the Occupation had been terminated. So Washington sent out Robert Daniel (Bob) Murphy. The Department of State withdrew Sebald and sent out Robert Murphy as Ambassador. Murphy had made his reputation in the Foreign Service by being the man sent ashore in advance of the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942 and early '43 and had negotiated the arrangements with the Vichy French Government representatives there, which facilitated the Allied landings.
He was quite a man and an excellent diplomat, although he himself didn't have any prior experience in Japanese affairs. They sent Sebald out the night of April 28th. Murphy arrived early in the morning by plane on the 29th and became our Ambassador. We went into business as businesses opened on the morning of the 29th as USIS Japan.

Murphy later wrote a fascinating, and best selling, book about his experiences and activities on this historic episode. It was titled Diplomat Among Warriors.

At that time, we had filled probably eighty to eighty-five of the one hundred thirty-five American positions that were authorized, and we spread our own people out all over Japan. Several of the people who had been heads of centers in various places around the country during the Army program were still there. A number of them remained in position for the next year to fifteen months, some of them decided they had had it and wanted to go back to the States. Whereupon we sent our own recruits, newly arrived USIA personnel, into the centers, very few of them had had prior Japanese experience.

Building up a program from scratch was facilitated, of course, by the fact that the Army had done a superb job, but we wanted to put our imprint on it. We wanted to start wide scale radio programming, a wide ranging motion picture program and to expand field programming generally.

Most of the Jeeps that the Army had been using for mobile units in the various centers belonged to the GHQ SCAP. The Army took back most of those Jeeps when USIS took over the Information program. We were faced with the necessity of replacing the returned Army vehicles with our own.

Replacement was another story. In Washington, USIE (through The Department of State) controlled large amounts of local currency in European countries. France had just gotten its automotive industry back into operation and were producing something called a Delahaye.

Q: This was a van wasn't it? Or no?

SCHMIDT: It was a van. It was a very large, cumbersome, extremely heavy van. And, of course, there was no power steering in those days. About half of our center directors in Japan were women, some of them quite frail. I had never seen a Delahaye. I didn't know what the darned thing looked like. So I said, fine, if we can get twenty of those sent out here as soon possible, please send them.

Well, it took about five months before they began to arrive. When the first three or four hit the pier in Yokohama, I went down to look at them and was appalled. I didn't know how in the world some of the women who were supposed to operate these things were ever going to be able to control them. One of the funniest pictures I remember is a little woman, who at that time was our Center Director up in the Japanese city of Niigata on the north coast of Japan. She was about five feet tall. I don't think she weighed more than ninety-five or one hundred pounds soaking wet. And to see her behind the wheel of this Delahaye trying to wrestle that non-power steering mastodon around was really something.
Also, their speedometers were all calibrated in kilometers. We were supposed to report our mileage in miles. That posed another small administrative problem. But we did operate for, I would say, nearly two years with these Delahayes.

In addition to that fact, they were the first products off the French assembly line when they began manufacturing. They weren't too well put together, and they began breaking down very rapidly. There were no facilities in Japan to repair Delahayes -- and worse, no parts! In fact, there weren't any facilities to fix much of anything in Japan at that time except those operated by the military. So we had our troubles. Eventually, over a period of my nearly four and a half years out there, we replaced all of them. But for the first year and a half or two years, we had to operate mostly with these monstrosities and then finally junked them. There was no market for them once we were ready to get rid of them.

As I've said before, the motion picture program was the hardest to get underway because it took more than seven months from the time we started operation until George Gierke got out to Japan. Therefore, we started rather slowly. However, George did produce some excellent movies. One of them particularly, called "The Arts of Japan," which was premiered in one of the major theaters in Tokyo in the Fall of 1954, was a masterpiece. It received accolades throughout the USIA program in many parts of the world. It was in its time a remarkably sensitive movie which was a tremendous hit in Japan. USIA in Washington thought it was great and gave all sorts of compliments to George for his success.

He produced a number of other films, but I think that one was the jewel in his crown. He was subsequently diagnosed as having throat cancer and had to come back to Washington. He was replaced in Tokyo by Harry Keith. Harry, who came out on 1953, was really a genius at producing documentary films. I'll talk a little bit more about him later on. But he did an excellent job. Some of the best agency films produced during those years were put out by Harry Keith in Tokyo. Japan had developed a fine mopix capability in pre-War years. Largely under the tutelage of Army personnel, it was, by 1952, recovering well. Thus, USIS could produce films on contract without having to build its own production facilities. We were especially fortunate because, with Army assistance during Occupation years, Japan had developed excellent color processing capabilities in Tokyo. Keith devised and directed, using Japanese talent and production equipment.

We were also blessed by the fact that, just as we were taking over from CI&E, Germany was winding down its immense HICOG operation. As the German operation phased down, a number of fine officers became available to fill our crying needs in Japan. Even though they did not have Japan expertise, they had obtained excellent grassroots informational and educational experience in their various roles in the German occupation and knew what they were doing.

One of the best of these was a remarkably talented woman by the name of Patricia van Delden. Pat often raised hackles among male officers, particularly her superiors, because she was smarter than most of them, and she was an absolute fountain of extremely good ideas, some of which weren't necessarily endorsed by higher ups when they were first suggested. But Pat was so good at logical argument that she usually persuaded her superiors (occasionally against their will) to
put her ideas into effect. This didn't necessarily endear her to her superiors, who felt that she was rather a pushy woman and perhaps was exceeding the bounds of her "proper place" in USIS. One of those who especially came to feel that way was USIS Director Sax Bradford -- but more of that later.

However, we made her the supervisor of the field program, which put her in charge directly of all the remaining twenty-three centers in Japan. I might add also that with so many Centers, we decided there ought to be a regional office in Kobe, where there was also a Consulate General, a regional office for the Tokyo area and a regional office for Kyushu.

Since we only had one center in Sapporo, on the Island of Hokkaido, we felt we didn't need a regional officer there and handled that center out of Tokyo. Of the three regional officers that we had was an old Japan hand, Walter Nichols, who had been born in Japan, grew up there until he was about fourteen or fifteen and spoke Japanese quite fluently. Walt was designated the Kobe Regional Officer. He had the largest number of centers under his general jurisdiction but was also operating under the supervision of Pat van Delden. I must say, I have forgotten the names of officers were who were in charge elsewhere. I suppose if I had tried hard enough and tried to look up their names, I might remember. But at the moment, I do not.

Well, I said earlier that Pat van Delden was a virtual fountain of ideas. Since I am speaking about her here, I will at this point discuss one of her most successful ones, even though it developed in 1953 and thus is a bit out of sequence here in the discussion of what constituted the formative stage of USIS/Tokyo. This was the highly popular and effective summer program that came to be known and recognized throughout a good part of academic Japan as The Nagano Seminar. Although a few others of us assisted in developing the final venue and format, Pat conceived the idea of staging a seminar on American literature in some quiet, smaller city of Japan, away from the distractions of Tokyo. We would select a manageable number (twenty-eight was decided for the first summer, and thirty-two thereafter) of top Japanese professors of English and American literature, support them for a full four weeks of study and discussion under the guidance of American professors of literature and generally exchange ideas with them on a wide range of subjects both during and informally after seminar sessions.

We selected the charming and historic cultural city of Nagano, located about one hundred miles northwest of Tokyo in a softly beautiful setting at the foot of the Japan Alps, which includes, near its (then) northern outskirts, one of Japan's lovelier and more spacious Buddhist temples. From the USIS/Japan budget, we paid the participants' complete board and lodging for a month in Nagano's two top-class Japanese *ryokan* -- in those times, not an overly expensive undertaking. Applicants for the limited slots greatly exceeded the number of openings USIS could offer.

In the first year, we relied on competent American professors who were teaching American literature in Japanese universities to be moderators or discussion leaders since it was too late in the spring to obtain name persons from the U.S. through the Exchange of Persons program. We brought the moderators and the professors to Nagano at the beginning of August. I took two or three of our administrative office Japanese employees up a few days ahead of the opening and went up myself to handle the logistics of getting the program under way. The Japanese stayed
throughout most of the seminar.

In the years after 1953, the Exchange of Persons office in Washington furnished name figures of American literature to perform as discussion leaders at the seminar. The most famous of these was William Faulkner, whose participation in 1955 made headlines all over Japan and whose visit provided one of the most memorable sets of events in my career. But that is a story for later in this interview.

The seminar paid off handsomely in the spreading influence the professors exerted on their students and the publicity the program gave to the American academic reputation. Unfortunately, USIA's 1957 budget disaster, occasioned by the animosity of then Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson for newly-nominated USIA Director Arthur Larson, so curtailed Agency funding that the seminar was dropped and has never been reinstituted.

Q: There was a motion picture made about his visit also, wasn't there?

SCHMIDT: Yes, there was a motion picture. USIS made a film up there which was produced by Harry Keith, named, as I recall, "William Faulkner in Japan." It was a great hit and was extremely successful in our Japan motion picture program later on.

I will talk a little bit more later about Mr. Faulkner's visit, which had a number of interesting and often disturbing sidelights. I want to go back now to an earlier period and talk about the development of the Information and Education program in Japan after it became a USIS operation.

I went ahead of our USIS program story in Japan because I wanted to say a few words about Pat van Delden and about some of the other people who participated in building what I thought was one of the finest programs with which I've ever been associated.

So now let's resume near the beginning. One of the developments that provided our first small crisis in the program was that our Tokyo cultural center, located right in the heart of downtown Tokyo, just off the Ginza, was about to be reclaimed by the Japanese. As soon as the Occupation was over, the Japanese began to pick up a little courage and to express their desires as an independent country, which is not only natural but I think desirable. And they wanted our center building.

So we were faced with the necessity of finding a new location. Tokyo had been to some extent rebuilt. But it was still a partially-ravaged city, even in 1952. Vacant space for the type of operation that we needed was not readily available.

So our Director, Sax Bradford, went to see the Foreign Ministry to determine what kind of help they could give us in finding a location that would be an adequate substitute. They had their troubles. I don't know whether the building that they finally came up with as a suggestion belonged to the Foreign Ministry or whether it belonged to the Mombusho, the Ministry of Education.
Anyway, they said we could have this building, providing that we would rehabilitate it, that it was in bad repair because nothing had been done with it through the whole period of the war and even the Occupation. One favorable thing about it -- it was over in the Kanda district of Tokyo, which is not far from Tokyo University. It's also near the location of many art and book stores frequented extensively by student populations, which we were trying to reach and many of whom were radically inclined. So we thought that would be a good location.

Well, Sax went over to look at it and discovered that the whole thing was occupied by -- I don't know how many, we never did count them -- a substantially large number of students from Manchukuo. The Foreign Office was appalled. They didn't know these students were still in Japan -- especially in Tokyo. The Japanese Government brought them over in the period shortly before and during the early part of the war as exchange students under the Japanese exchange program. I don't know how many people will remember that Manchuria had been taken over by the Japanese Army in 1931-32. The Japanese civilian government shortly thereafter broke it off from China and set it up as a puppet state of Manchukuo.

The Japanese were interested in getting as many as they could of the university students over from Manchukuo to be educated in Japan. Rather large numbers were brought over, and many of them were housed in this building, which the Foreign Ministry had just told us now, after many years of use, that we could have. The situation soon turned into a comedy. There were at least a score of ex-students there. As I say, we never counted them. But there were at least a score of them. Most of them had either married or at least were cohabiting with Japanese women or with Manchurian women students who had come over. And here they were after five years of war and six and a half or seven years of Occupation, still living in this place unbeknownst to the Foreign Ministry and/or the Ministry of Education, both of which were embarrassed to find out that they were still in this building. What was even more unnerving was that this group was at the heart of one of Tokyo's black market operations.

We were disgusted at the appearance of the building, which would have cost so much to rehabilitate that we decided against using it. I never did find out what happened to the long-occupying Manchurian students; presumably, the Ministries found some way to clear them out and perhaps sent them back to Manchuria. But that's the last we heard of them.

Shortly before the center search episode I just spoke about, Tokyo, and all Americans then living there, experienced something that few if any of us had anticipated. It was just three days after the Peace Treaty went into effect -- May Day, 1952. The MacArthur Occupation had, among other things, made a point of writing a new law code governing labor and allowing the unions the sort of freedom they had never enjoyed under the former Imperial Government. The new freedom had allowed a fairly substantial infiltration of Communists into the labor unions, and the majority of the union membership was at least partly leftist in orientation.

Each May 1, since the Occupation began, the unions had been staging May Day parades and celebrations. I am not sure what the Japanese Government expected for this first May Day outside the restricting confines of the Occupation. Probably more militancy than had been in evidence before the Treaty freed up the country but also probably not what erupted. When the parade began, I wasn't up on the roof of our building, the Mitsubishi Shoji Building near the
Imperial Palace moat, and in the heart of Tokyo. The first I knew of the mounting riot was when one of our officers came into my office and told me I had better get up on the roof to see the rioting.

It was frightening. None of my past experiences in Japan had prepared me for seeing the Japanese perform like that. The police were clearly unprepared. If there had been any semblance of a parade to begin with, it was out of hand by that time. Mobs were running about with no apparent destination in mind, carrying (obviously inflammatory) banners, attacking anyone or anything they could see for no apparent reason. The police were outmanned but doing the best they could to beat back attacks either against themselves or hapless bystanders. Fires were being set. Automobiles overturned. The mob grew in violence and numbers as the afternoon wore on. By around 3:30 p.m., there was a sea of humanity rolling all along the moat and onto the outer plaza leading to the entrance to the Imperial Palace.

Our then Cultural Attaché, Margaret Williams, I learned later, had decided when the rioting seemed to be building that she had better get home while flight was still possible. That proved to be a mistake. Her driver thought he could get through the mobs by detouring off the main streets through the narrower passages in the downtown theater district. By the time they reached that street, parts of new mobs were coming down toward them from the opposite direction. The crowd suddenly attacked Margaret's car with stones and long wooden poles, pulverizing, but fortunately not shattering, windshield and car windows and extensively denting the car. By some miracle, perhaps police arrival, they finally managed to get through and tore home. Several other Americans had similar experiences and suffered extensive car damage. There were no severe American casualties, but this sudden explosion of violence toward Americans, who had never experienced much but gratitude from the local citizens, really shook up the resident yankees. It sure shook me. Ultimately, the riots were quieted, but it was a long time before a lot of us could feel the same sense of friendliness and security we had known earlier.

It was not long after my arrival in January of 1952 that I began to sense a cool aloofness in Sax Bradford's attitude toward me. There was no overt hostility, simply an attitude of superiority and almost condescension. I began to feel that he considered anyone in an administrative assignment as somehow less intelligent or intellectual than officers holding other substantive positions.

Later developments and incidents, which I'll mention at the appropriate points in this interview, confirmed my suspicion, but one small episode reinforced my belief early on that I was correct. At a small informal social gathering we both attended one evening, he began a conversation with me and a few minutes later, rather abruptly without any seeming relationship to what we had been discussing, began to tell me about a time a few years earlier when he was heading a delegation to some conference in Mexico City. A State Department administrative officer had been assigned to the delegation to handle logistics and finances. Sax had ordered this officer to pay a rather substantial amount of money for something, the nature of which I have forgotten. Anyway, the officer argued with Sax that the expenditure was a violation of both Departmental regulations and Federal appropriation language, and he couldn't legally pay it. Sax insisted, and according to him, the officer became very emotional about it. As a result, Sax sent a rough telegram to Washington. The officer was recalled and presumably reprimanded. The incident was told clearly to illustrate the single-minded blindness of the administrative type to matters of
higher importance.

Although I never mentioned the fact to Sax, it happened that the man in the story had been a classmate of mine at the Harvard Littauer Graduate School some thirteen years earlier. I recalled that he had suddenly left Government about the time Sax was describing. I had thought it strange then because he already had fifteen years invested in Government service and so far as I knew, hadn't any intention of resigning. He returned to his hometown of Denver. Later, I learned that he had had a nervous breakdown, but recovered. It may not, of course, have had any relation to the incident described by Sax, but again, it might.

Not too long after that, another USIS officer brought me a copy of a memo written by our Cultural Attaché, Margaret Williams, to Sax. I don't know how he got it, but the subject was interesting. She was complaining to Sax that "Our Executive Officer" was assuming excessive responsibilities in the area of program priorities and resource allocations and wondering if it was right for an administrative type to "meddle" so deeply in substantive matters.

There were, of course, grounds for her contention that I was deeply into program. I had been at first surprised and later disturbed that Sax seemed to be little concerned with the details of USIS program operation. He had set up his office over in the Chancery. In the early days of USIS operation, all of USIS, except Sax and his secretary, were in the Mitsubishi Shoji Building, which was more than two miles away on the edge of the financial district near Tokyo Station. Later, USIS, again except for Sax, moved to what was designated the Embassy Annex, the Mantetsu Building, about two blocks from the main Embassy building. If I hadn't been living in the same Embassy residential compound, I would have seen him only infrequently. He almost never came down to USIS offices, and staff meetings were not regularly held.

The date for our assumption of the Army's CI&E program was getting closer. Our budget and program responsibilities were about to take a quantum leap. Sax seemed utterly complacent. In the absence of any direction, I began drawing up organizational and staffing plans, as well as proposed resource allocation by program unit. At our occasional staff meetings, I would present these proposals. Sax seemed to accept them without question. Having been accustomed in Washington to considerable program officer participation in budgetary allocations and other administrative decisions, I found this attitude strange. As spring and summer progressed, I began more and more to consult directly with newly-arriving and already on duty unit heads concerning their program plans and resource needs and making advance budgetary allocations accordingly. At staff meetings, I told Sax what I was doing and received his okay, but no comment. As a result, before long, all the officers, except Margaret Williams, were coming directly to me to discuss their plans and requirements.

An even more peculiar and upsetting development took place during the summer of 1952. Washington sent out a request to draw up a complete detailed program plan of operations together with cost tags attached, descriptions of goals and methods of reaching them. This was far more than the standard budget document of those days. It was what I suppose was the forerunner of the country plan and management by objectives approach that was used in later years and was to apply to our newly-born USIS operation in fiscal year 1953. It seemed to me that it was a document that screamed for PAO participation. Sax treated it as something beneath
him that he should sign when the peons had finished it. By this time, Pat van Delden was aboard. She and I took the initiative, consulted all the program heads, and undertook to write an extensive plan that ultimately ran to over one hundred single-spaced typewritten pages.

When we had it in final draft, I sent it to Sax for his okay. He read and signed it, sending it to Washington without change. A few days later when I met him in the Chancery, he said to me, "Those guys did a pretty good job on the program paper, didn't they?" I had planned and written almost the entire document. There was no recognition on his part that I had had any part in it. It's an understatement to say that I was let down.

Q: You mentioned earlier that you would discuss some other parts of the USIS effort getting under way in the early days of USIS/Japan.

SCHMIDT: Yes, now I want to get back to some of the other program activities that were under way in spring and summer of 1952. Particularly, let me talk a bit about the radio program. One of the few men from CI&E not disqualified by Security was Bill Meredith from their radio shop. He transferred to us immediately after April 29, 1952, as did all the Japanese employees whom, during the late winter months, we had already screened and decided to hire from the CI&E. Meredith was a capable man but not overly energetic. We needed more spark.

A couple years before, Sax had met Henry (Hank) Gosho, who had worked on some projects for VOA in New York. Hank was unique. He was an American Nisei whose father had sent him to Japan at pre-high school age to be educated in Japan. Hank went through middle and higher school there and the first year or so of college. Seeing the probability of oncoming war, his father brought him back to the States on one of the last ships coming to America before Pearl Harbor. Hank's Japanese schooling had made him bilingual in Japanese -- probably the only American in the Information program with that qualification. He also had acquired extensive radio experience. However, because his wife was not yet an American citizen, she couldn't accompany Hank to Japan, and Hank wouldn't take a regular assignment without her. Sax arranged for him to come on a six month TDY, and he provided the spark that got the USIS Radio program going. His wife, Jeanne, finally got U.S. citizenship, and Hank later returned for a regular assignment that lasted several years.

At the time the Peace Treaty became effective, and for some years thereafter, Japan had no national radio network. I don't know exactly how many stations there were then, but I would guess there may well have been two-hundred or more in various cities and towns around Japan. Most of them had a very weak signal -- not more than fifteen or twenty watts. Only a few had even one hundred watts, and I doubt if any were as powerful as five hundred or one thousand, though I'm not sure. Their low power severely limited their range, so stations could proliferate without interfering with one another's frequencies. They wanted to broadcast several hours a day but had little capacity to produce programs and so were frantic for material to fill broadcast time. This gave USIS a tremendous opportunity.

Under Hank's planning, he and a couple Japanese employees traveled frequently around the country, establishing a large and enduring clientele of radio outlets delighted to use USIS-taped material. The response was enthusiastic. USIS began an operation that eventually (when we
acquired enough tape dubbing machines to satisfy the demand) saturated the Japanese airwaves. I don't want to describe this work in detail. Hank himself will be interviewed and give a thorough explanation of what USIS accomplished. It is enough here to say that this sort of saturation went on for several years, until the Japanese finally got back into network coverage. Then the USIS role wound down and terminated.

Toward the end of my first year in Japan, Bill Meredith went home and was replaced by Victor (Vic) Hauge. In late 1953 or early '54, Hank came back for a regular tour, worked closely with Hauge during Vic's years and remained for some years after Vic's return to Washington. The Radio effort at its peak demanded an ever-increasing amount of USIS resources. Besides, we were being cut back from our early affluence. When we first took over from CI&E, our annual budget was something like $7,000,000 or $8,000,000, which was a tremendous budget in the early '50s, though not so much these days. Earlier, we had been pretty well able to fund almost anything that we wanted to do. But we were beginning to get progressively restricted, and even though we were by that time closing many centers (a situation I'll discuss later), we still were running rather tight on money.

I managed however to reprogram things enough as we gradually closed centers so that I could give more money to the radio operation. Vic Hauge performed wonderfully. We had probably an average of two or three hours, and sometimes more, a day on almost every radio station in Japan for a period of several years. A large amount of it was music. I think, for better or for worse, we probably played a fairly large role in indoctrinating the Japanese on American popular music. But in any event, there were other programs that carried more program freight than that. The fact that we had this opportunity was heaven-sent. Vic and Hank did a tremendous job in satisfying their requirements and getting programs on the air for the Japanese at a time when every radio station was receptive.

Q: And you had the staff and facilities to carry it out?

SCHMIDT: Yeah, we had a large radio staff. We had three or four Americans. And Hank was a god-sent at a most critical stage. He had incidentally served in the China-Burma-India theater with the Army and had therefore been rehabilitated as an American citizen. Well, actually I don't think he had to be because he went back from Japan -- went back to the States just before Pearl Harbor -- and therefore was not in Japan like many of the other nisei who temporarily lost their citizenship because they were in Japan during the war and naturally worked for the Japanese war industry, the only way they could survive.

He came with a tremendous amount of experience. He knew Japan intimately. He knew radio perhaps even better than Vic Hauge did. He had this bilingual capability in Japanese and was a superb negotiator with the Japan radio stations. He could always deal with them as if he were a native. We also had superb, highly-intelligent staff, not only among the Japanese who were highly-skilled, but among our two or three top Americans in the radio section. We were also without the sort of competition that would have made such success impossible. At that time, television had not started. It was just beginning to come into Japan when I left in 1956. I don't think there was more than one station in Japan, and it broadcast a very limited amount of time. There probably weren't more than one hundred receivers in the whole country. None of them
were owned by individuals. They were all in the hands of restaurants or businesses or something of that sort. And people, of course, were getting very excited about it.

_Q: And before you left in 1956, weren't you acting Country Public Affairs Director?_

SCHMIDT: No, I had been acting before that, and I'll come to that shortly. But by the time I left in May, 1956, Joe Evans had come to be PAO, and Art Hummel had come out to be deputy PAO.

_Q: Art Hummel, who later became ambassador to Pakistan and China?_

SCHMIDT: That's right -- as well as to Burma and Ethiopia. He was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs for a while. Since you've asked the question, however, I'll go ahead and discuss that part of my Japan experience now, although it involves jumping ahead in sequence nearly three years. Sax Bradford had been named to a new, powerful position in Washington in late 1953. His replacement was Willard Hannah, who, in mid-year 1954, resigned. Ken Bunce had been named Acting Director when I was on home leave in the summer of 1954, and Willard Hannah resigned. Ken remained in that capacity through the balance of '54 into the early spring of 1955 when he came to the end of his tour. By then, he had spent so much of his career in Japan he felt he didn't want to return, and he went back to the States. He later became PAO in India and never did return to Japan in an official capacity.

I became Acting Director at that time and was Acting from either April or May, whichever it was -- I think late April -- until Joe Evans and Art Hummel arrived in October. Several rather significant events occurred during my short stay on the "throne."

I'll come back a little later to the William Faulkner visit to Japan, which in time preceded the exhibit. Commercial atomic energy was just coming into existence. There was only one functional reactor in the world then, the one at Shippingport. The Eisenhower Administration wanted to make the world aware of this great new power source and America's leading role in its development. I believe our exhibit in Japan was the first ever undertaken by USIS. By the time the exhibit opened in November, Joe Evans and Art Hummel had already arrived, but the staging period all took place during my brief reign. Frances Blakemore, who was our USIS artist, a very creative and imaginative woman, was the chief force in planning the entire show, although ably assisted by a skilled Japanese staff and "Tom" Tuch who came out on TDY from the Agency's Exhibits Office. Tom had been in on the ground floor of the Washington planning for these shows and was a great help.

Atomic energy was such a brand new means of power that people could really not comprehend its potential nor all the dangers of atomic generation of electricity.

The Japanese were fascinated, but they were also scared of atomic energy anywhere except -- or maybe even -- in a reactor. However, at that time, they thought it might be a good solution to some of their own power problems. They were hungry for information about it.

A man by the name of Shoriki, who was one of the principal developers of and then editor of the
newspaper Yomiuri, which had under his direction become one of the two most powerful papers in Japan, wanted more than anything else to be the first head of Japan's Atomic Energy Commission.

Realizing this, our information section prevailed upon him and his paper to sponsor the exhibit. He enthusiastically agreed and saved USIS tremendous expense. Yomiuri owned or controlled a large auditorium, which Shoriki placed at USIS disposal to house the show. He also put a lot of money into it, furnishing much labor and material. Of course, Shoriki was present at the exhibit opening and got all sorts of accolades for having sponsored it. He later did become the first director of Japan's Atomic Energy Commission.

My first meeting with "Tom" Tuch took place at that time. Tom was then a young junior officer in USIA. He was working in the exhibit section in USIA in Washington. He came out on TDY and was extremely helpful because he had a lot of information about what Washington wanted to get across by means of the exhibit, and he stayed for about two months until we got the exhibit well mounted. Then he returned to Washington. I don't believe he was there when the exhibit actually opened, though my memory is not clear on this point. But he was there for a good part of the summer while it was being put together and was highly instrumental in its successful conclusion.

So Shoriki realized his ambition to be the first director of the Atomic Energy Commission in Japan. The exhibit was a tremendous success. It stayed open somewhat longer than had originally been planned because it was so popular. I don't know how many thousands of people went through it. When Joe Evans and Art Hummel arrived in late October, I, of course, returned to my official position as Executive Officer and turned the program back over to them. I remained until the spring of 1956, at which time I was transferred to Brazil. Before I leave this discussion of my short period as Acting PAO, Japan, I would like to speak briefly about two other events which occurred which I think were very instrumental in making the Japan programs a success in those early years and which also gained a certain degree of notoriety with a bit of humor and dismay on occasion.

The one was the visit of William Faulkner as the person who was sent out from Washington under the exchange of persons program in 1955 to be the moderator of the Nagano Seminar. We had thirty-two Japanese professors of English at that meeting. The competition for participation in that year's session because of Faulkner was tremendous. He had won the Nobel Prize a few years before and was a legend in Japan among those who knew anything about literature. His coming was highly heralded.

I'll not go into all the details of Mr. Faulkner's visit, but nobody in Washington had told us that he had trouble with alcoholism. When he arrived and got off the plane after a twenty-two hour flight from the States, he obviously was under the weather. I was in Nagano handling the first stages of logistics and setting up the arrangements for registering all the professors and getting the seminar ready to operate, taking care of the hotel facilities and what not. I got a call from Tokyo saying, well, you better come back...Mr. Faulkner is here, and there are some problems.

So I left Nagano and got back to my office the next day. Leon Picon, who was our Book
Translation Officer and Assistant Cultural Attaché, had been designated as the man to meet Faulkner. Leon was going to be the resident American from the Embassy at the seminar in Nagano because of the fact that he was deep into the book program.

Well, Leon was pretty resourceful. He, of course, had come out in an Embassy car. When he got Faulkner off the plane and realized his condition, he managed to get Faulkner back to the International House, which a few years earlier had been established under Rockefeller Foundation auspices. John D. Rockefeller III had made sort of a career of charities and ran the Rockefeller Foundation. He was a Far Eastern specialist himself and had given a large grant of money to the Japanese government and the Japanese cultural operations to set up this International House, which still exists and is an extremely important part of the cultural and exchange program with America today. It is completely independent of the Embassy, but the PAO sits on the board of that center while he's active in Tokyo, and for years it housed the Japan Fulbright Commission offices. The House has hotel-like facilities for visiting cultural personages staging cultural conferences, providing study space for visiting scholars, etc. It's sort of an exclusive hotel arrangement. They even have their own dining room.

Leon got into a conversation with Faulkner, who, despite the fact that he was quite inebriated, handled his liquor fairly well. He was just a charming person, a real Southern gentleman, polite, gracious, absolutely a delightful individual. But, of course, somewhat slurred in his perceptions when he was having this difficulty.

He finally confided in Leon, who had a great capacity to establish rapport with people quite quickly. On the way in to the International House, he virtually broke down and almost tearfully said that he did have a problem with alcohol, and he was going to rely on Leon to keep him at least relatively sober so he wouldn't disgrace himself. So Leon said, okay. By this time, they were on the Leon and Bill basis. He said, "Why don't you, Bill" -- Faulkner is Bill -- "Why don't you let me have any liquor you've got with you?"

He said, "I'll do that."

When they got to the International House, he opened a suitcase which was full of bottles of gin and gave all the visible bottles to Leon, who took them away and sort of tucked him in for the night. Leon said, "Well, we've got a program starting at 9:30, when you have an appointment tomorrow morning with the Ambassador. I'll come by and pick you up about 9:00 or a little before in the morning. See you then." He then took off with his armload of gin bottles.

Leon went back to pick Faulkner up the next morning, and Faulkner had obviously secreted some liquor elsewhere in his luggage because he was once more pretty well under the influence and was stark naked, wandering around the halls of the International House in the altogether. Leon got him back in his room, and they got him dressed. Leon phoned me. By this time, I was over in Ambassador Allison's office waiting for them to arrive. I think the appointment was actually at 10:00. This was about 9:30. He called me in the Ambassador's office and said that he was having a little trouble, but don't worry. They would get there.

Faulkner and he arrived about fifteen minutes later. The International House is not that far from
the Embassy. Faulkner had sobered up a little bit but not all that much, and he plunked down in a
great big overstuffed chair, not very communicative. The Ambassador's number two secretary, a
young girl who was in her first overseas post, came over and said -- very awed at having Mr.
Faulkner, a Nobel Prize winner there -- "Mr. Faulkner, can I get you a drink?"

And he said, "Yes."

And she said, "What would you like? Water?"

He said, mischievously, "No. Gin."

The poor girl was completely nonplussed. She retreated in confusion, but she did bring him a
glass of water.

At about that time, the Ambassador showed up at his outer door and said, "Okay, come in, Mr.
Faulkner. Bill couldn't get out of the chair. So Leon and I hoisted him out, and each one got
under an armpit. We guided him into the Ambassador's office and sat him down. The interview
proved to be a disaster. The Ambassador didn't immediately recognize that he was almost
incommunicado, and he began directing a few questions at him to start the conversation.
Faulkner's responses were at least uncommunicative, usually about two or three words, or yes or
no or something like that. And it soon became obvious that he wasn't going to be able to make a
successful interview at all. I could see the Ambassador getting very fidgety.

So I finally said, after about ten minutes, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, we thank you very much for
your interview. We'll leave now because we don't want to take up more of your time, and we'll
see you this afternoon." (The Ambassador had agreed to give a party for him at the residence to
which we had invited quite a large number of the American press, some of the cultural big wigs
of the Japanese government and some from the universities.) So again, Leon and I hoisted him
out of the room, and we got him over to the Embassy annex where the USIS offices were and
into the office of Don Ranard, the head of the Exchange of Persons Program.

Well, Bill was supposed to speak to the Foreign Press Club at 12:30 that day and didn't look like
he was going to make it. Leon and I stayed with him trying to get him sobered up in the
meantime. However, I wasn't sure he was going to make it at all. He kept passing out. So I got
hold of my wife by phone. She was a nurse. She came over with a lot of antidotes for fainting
and that sort of thing, plus our air mattress, which we blew up and put down on the floor and got
Bill stretched out on the mattress.

Meanwhile, Leon went down to the Press Club and tried to pacify the press. As 12:30
approached, when he was supposed to speak, everybody wanted to know where Faulkner was.
Leon kept phoning back reporting on the situation, and we kept reporting to him that we weren't
sure Faulkner was going to get there. But Faulkner kept saying, yes, I'll do it. So we told Leon
well, maybe we'll get him down there, but we'll be a little late.

Finally, about 12:30, when he was due at the Press Club, he sat up straight on the mattress, but
promptly threw up all over himself and all over the floor. And that immediately, of course, meant
he wasn't going to get to the Press Club. So I got hold of Leon, who had the outline of remarks that he had made for Faulkner to speak from. Faulkner was terrified of speaking anyway. He hated public speaking. And Leon had to give a talk.

The Press Club audience was infuriated. There was an article that appeared in *Time* magazine the next week saying that Faulkner had chickened-out and had come inebriated to Tokyo and hadn't been able to perform. And that while the Press Club was filled with people who'd come in from all over the Far East to listen to him, Faulkner "was bedded down with a nurse somewhere in Tokyo" which was, I guess, literally true, but not the implication that they meant -- my wife being the nurse.

So anyway, we had to take him up to our apartment in the Embassy compound. Leon went up and got a fresh set of clothes for him up at the International House. We got him in the shower, washed him off, put him to bed for an hour or so. Then we got him up around 4:00 p.m. He got dressed in his fresh clothes and really had come out of it pretty well by that time. We had a lovely conversation with him. Wonderful guy when he was sober. My children came in, met him and got his autograph. He was gentle, gracious, kind.

We got him up to the Ambassador's in time for the reception, around 6:30. I told the waiters up there, "Now, don't give him anything alcoholic to drink." I had no sooner gotten him into the receiving line when the waiter handed him a very tall and strong gin and tonic. I glared at him, but I didn't want to make an issue because the guests were already coming in. I made signs not to give him any more. But Faulkner began bowing over the hand of every woman who came in -- and bowing very low in his Southern fashion, and kissing her hand. About that time, another waiter brought in another gin and tonic. I watched Bill carefully. He hadn't completely recovered from the morning, so I knew that this was going to be damaging. But I couldn't take it away from him. Every time he bowed, he bowed lower and lower. I was afraid he might collapse face-forward on the mats. And as soon as all the guests had arrived, or most of them, I got him out of the line, and we put him over at a table nearby. This was in the main reception salon of the Ambassador's residence. Several tables were placed around the hall.

Mrs. Allison came over and sat down and started to converse with him. By that time, they'd given him another gin and tonic, a brand new one. Fortunately, at least he was by this time in conversation with Mrs. Allison and wasn't drinking it. Well, I don't think they'd been talking more than three or four minutes when Mrs. Allison asked him a question. Strangely enough, although he was a little tipsy, he was still quite rational. He was explaining something, and suddenly he swung his arms open in a wide gesture, knocked over this tall gin and tonic and it all drained over into Mrs. Allison's lap. She was wearing a brand new, specially tailored Chinese brocade that the Ambassador had ordered for her from Hong Kong and had been done by her dressmaker. The drink splashed all over her new suit, cocktail suit. Obviously, she was very angry, and so was the Ambassador. All in all, it didn't make for a very successful party.

We had to stay a while. But I finally got Faulkner out fairly early. The party broke up. We took him out to the Army Officer's Club and fed him a good meal. That sobered him up a little bit, and we took him back to the International House.
The next morning, the Ambassador sent me a letter by courier saying, "I want to know what idiot in USIA or the Department of State ever thought of sending this lush, this drunk over here to participate in a nationally-advertised seminar. I want you to give me one good reason why I shouldn't put this character back on the next plane to the United States and cancel his whole visit." That was about 10:00 in the morning.

Of course, all the professors had arrived at Nagano, waiting for the great personage to show up. And I debated what in the world to do to satisfy the Ambassador. Finally, about 3:00, I wrote him a letter back. I said that I was very sorry this had happened. In his letter, the Ambassador had said, "I never expected that he would embarrass me and my wife to such an extent, et cetera, et cetera." I wrote back and I said I was very sorry all this had happened, that I had no idea that anything like this would occur and I had thought I would be able to deliver to him a perfectly sober Nobel Prize winner. But I felt that we couldn't send him back now and terminate the program as far as we were into it -- that I thought we could keep him under control, and he would make a great contribution.

I hadn't heard anything back when the work day ended. It happened to be the day on which the Ambassador was giving a big party for the Embassy staff. He did this two or three times a year so he could get closer and more familiar on a friendly basis with his staff.

The Embassy population was pretty large, and when I got there, the party was already well underway. I could tell by the decibel count that several drinks had already been served. When I got up to the party, which was being held on the roof garden of the apartment in which I was living in the Embassy compound, the Ambassador was there in an aloha shirt and in a fine mood. He had another drink in his hand. I went over to him, wondering what in the world I was going to get as a response. And he said, "Lew, you were right." He said, "I lost my cool. I'm sorry.

Well, Leon managed to keep Bill under control, not always, but for most of the time he was a relatively sober guy. His performance in Nagano was tremendous. The Japanese kind of like drunks anyway, especially if they're artists -- celebrities of one type or another. He was vastly successful in making a tremendous impression on the Japanese who were there. He got excellent press, as we mentioned earlier. Harry Keith stage managed a picture called "William Faulkner in Japan," which was beautifully done. It was narrated by a then JOT, who now is the PAO in Tokyo some thirty years later, Jack Shellenberger, who had been a radio announcer before he came into the USIA program. All in all, it was a tremendous success.

After Faulkner had returned to the States, we were having a staff meeting -- the first Ambassador staff meeting after Faulkner's departure. I reported that the Faulkner visit was over and that it had gone very well, that we had had a great response, that the press reports were all favorable, and the Japanese were enchanted and what not. So Andy Kerr, the rather cynical number two man in the Economic Section said, "Well, was it because he really was all that good? Or was it just because he had a big name having won a Nobel Prize?"

I didn't think very fast. And I said, "Well, it was a little of both. But anyway, his was an effective program." Afterwards, I thought what I really should have said was, "Andy, you're missing the
whole point. It doesn't make any difference what the reason was. The fact that he got that kind of coverage and made that kind of an impression was the important thing. And it was a tremendously successful program." But I wasn't quick enough on the trigger to have said what I ought to have said. At least it was a successful program.

A second thing that I would like to mention just very briefly: Margaret Williams had long since returned to Washington. We had as our cultural attaché at that time a man by the name of Glenn Shaw. He had been an educational missionary in Japan and had lived practically all his adult life, except during the war, in Japan. He spoke Japanese fluently. His accent wasn't all that good, but he was perfect in his syntax, and knew Japanese like a native.

He also was absolutely steeped in Japanese culture. He probably knew more about Japanese cultural arts than the Japanese did themselves.

On one occasion, in the -- I think it was the spring of '55, some sort of a cultural fair was being given by the Japan prefectural office up in Kanazawa. A lot of people gathered up there. At that time, the Japanese Communist party, although not a legal party, was still very active in Japan, and they had all kinds of representatives at the fair. They had infiltrated the organizational committee and managed to get much of their material included in this cultural program.

We hadn't realized the extent to which they were infiltrating. Our branch PAO, Paul Bethel in Nagoya, who at that time was responsible also for managing the north coast part of our USIS operation, had gone up to attend this fair. He soon realized what was happening, so he sent an emergency call down to Tokyo to get Glenn Shaw up there. Glenn went up and extemporaneously gave a series of discussions through the afternoon citing all sorts of Japanese cultural achievements, bringing down the house, and thus very effectively counteracting the communist surge. There was nobody on the communist side that had the kind of background that he had or the knowledge of Japanese history. Since then, I think the Russians have trained many more people in usable Japanese. But at that time, they didn't have them. So Glenn largely rescued us from an otherwise unhappy and overmatched situation. He also received more press coverage than the left wingers did.

Well, I jumped way ahead of the chronological story, but I now will come back to late 1952. The Director if IIA, or I guess it was by this time the General Manager, had changed again. The new man was one of the Compton Brothers. Two of them were a famous scientist and a university professor. The third was a rancher, I believe in eastern Washington. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, that when a new General Manager was to be appointed for IIA, the intent was to appoint either Arthur or Karl, the physicists. By mistake, the third brother was called, accepted, and could not be dismissed after the error was discovered. I can believe it. I do not recall this Compton's given name, but in any event, he arrived with several other officers from IIA for a Tokyo visit just before the November election in 1952. He asked for an appointment with Ambassador Murphy.

I have mentioned Murphy earlier. He was a brilliant man who didn't suffer fools easily. The Ambassador agreed to see Compton not in his office but in an anteroom at the residence at about 8:00 a.m. I don't recall why I was the one who escorted Compton to the Residence. (Sax was still
PAO, but this must have been the time he was on home leave. However, Olcott Deming, his deputy, was in Tokyo.) Compton appeared to be absolutely stupid. He talked discontentedly, made childish remarks, couldn't address a significant subject, and worst of all, seemed to have no idea what he should say to the busy Ambassador, of whom he had requested an audience. I could see Murphy getting edgier and edgier, and finally really angry. Somehow I managed to make an excuse to conclude the interview and get Compton out. Murphy must have thought poorly of the caliber of IIA if he judged it by its then chief.

Compton wasn't through with his absurdities. A couple days later, Eisenhower was elected. Compton called an ad hoc meeting of the top USIS officers and told them that, "Don't worry! The election of Eisenhower won't make any difference. I'm a life-long Republican, and I will be kept in my job." In less than a month, he was dismissed.

From Tokyo, he and his wife, who accompanied him, went to Southeast Asia. A conference of some sort was being held in Rangoon, which Compton was to attend. While he was conferencing, some of the Burmese employees tried to entertain Mrs. Compton with a sightseeing tour that included Burma's famous and historic Golden Pagoda. To make conversation, one of the Burmese ladies asked Mrs. Compton how she liked it. Her reply: "Yes, it's lovely, but don't you think it is rather extravagant for such a poor country?" That story is not apocryphal.

I'll back up now to the point where Sax Bradford went on home leave some months before he became the Assistant Director of USIA for Far East. When he left, we were already under pressure from Washington to start cutting back on the size of the Japanese program. He realized we would have to close several -- at least eight, and probably ten -- of the cultural centers. Before he left, there was a session with him, Pat van Delden as the Field Program Head and Olcott Deming, who was the deputy PAO. Deming was a State Department officer but on loan to USIS, USIA. And with Sax's suggestions, and with their recommendations, they finally determined on eight that they would definitely offer to close and two more that they would close if they had to.

There was great reluctance. Pat van Delden, Olcott Deming and I were at the meeting. I was there because I would have had to handle all the logistics of the center closings. I was upset at the number that were to be closed, but I said very little at that time.

Olcott and Pat argued with Sax about the closings. Sax said, "Well, I don't like it either, but we're going to have to close them, I think, because Washington wants us to cut back on the size of the Japan operation."

So he went on home leave thinking that the closing of eight or ten centers was settled. He assured everybody in Washington that he had selected the ten centers that would be closed but that they wouldn't be eliminated before the end of the year.

While he was gone, Pat began to rethink this whole problem and felt that she just couldn't bring herself to close ten centers. They would close four of them, but they would ask Washington to permit them to retain the remaining nineteen, having closed one of the two in Tokyo already early in the game.
She and Olcott got together one evening, spent about half the night plotting what they were going to do, and finally sent a telegram to Washington saying, "We have decided we cannot close eight or ten centers. We propose to close only four of them. We'll examine the others later on. For the time being, we're going to retain nineteen."

Well, Sax was not only on home leave, but he was at his hometown in Phoenix, Arizona, at the time this cable came in. Of course, it went directly against anything that he had just gotten through telling the people in Washington he was going to do.

When he got back to Washington -- I guess they phoned him and said, "What's going on here?"-- he rushed back to Washington and was apoplectic about this reversal. He just said, "Well, when I left, I thought we had agreed on these closings. I'll have to take care of it when I return."

When he returned, he blamed me for the whole reversal. He said, "Boy, you guys really undercut me on that policy. I'll never forget that as long as I live." He was rather hostile to me the rest of his tour of duty, both as PAO, Japan, and as the Assistant Director for Far East. Actually, it was Pat and Olcott Deming, not I, who had altered the closing plan. But I didn't even try to dissuade him. I felt I had to roll with the punch. To do otherwise would have seriously undercut both Pat and Olcott and look as though I was attempting to save my own skin by blaming them.

If I remember correctly, we finally did get down to fourteen centers--and later closed another two. Twelve remained. Not very long after Sax left Japan to become Assistant Director of USIA for the Far East, Pat van Delden developed a health problem and was returned to Washington. Walt Nichols moved up from Kobe to succeed her as Field Supervisor. We retained the Kobe Regional Office for a year or more after that with newly-arrived Jerry Novick as Regional Officer. After my departure from Japan, Washington ordered more centers closed and the Kobe Regional Office was eliminated. Ultimately, USIS eliminated all regional offices and ran the field program directly from Tokyo.

I don't remember exactly when Sax returned from home leave -- probably late in 1952 or early 1953 -- and he was there for several months before being called back to Washington.

Meanwhile, through much of 1952, we had been continuously trying to fill as many as possible of the one hundred thirty-five positions originally authorized, but it became obvious, as indicated by pressure to close centers, that there would have to be some cutback. I doubt if we ever filled more than eighty-five or ninety of that initial authorization. Then came the Eisenhower inauguration in January, 1953. As is always the case with a new administration, particularly one involving a change from the political party holding the White House, the Republicans believed the government in general, and the Foreign Service in particular, was vastly overstaffed. The resulting cut-back fell pretty heavily on USIS Tokyo. We lost all the unfilled American positions and five or six other Tokyo headquarters jobs besides. One casualty was my young assistant.

The heartbreaking part of the roll back was the need to eliminate a substantial number of Japanese jobs. I remember having to call a meeting of the entire Japanese staff. The rumors of coming dismissals had been circulating for some weeks, and the whole staff was terribly upset.
Japan had not yet gotten out of its economic trough, and finding new employment threatened anyone dismissed with real hardship. Before the meeting, I had determined pretty well how many we were going to have to prune and realized that if we were forced to close as many centers as we apparently had to, we could satisfy a large part of the RIF there. We still had to lose some from the Tokyo contingent. The meeting was long and painful, but I think we managed it as well as could be expected under the circumstances. The few we had to let go were given some help in the transition, and things calmed down after a few weeks.

Of the Americans outside of Tokyo, one was the man who had been running our cultural center in Kanazawa on the north coast of Japan, a fellow named Robert Flershem. Flershem was an interesting gentleman. I would say he was in his late thirties or early forties and was sort of a loner. He enjoyed living alone -- away from other Americans -- and he especially enjoyed being on the north coast of Japan, where he got a minimum of attention from headquarters. The Japanese all liked him, and he was doing a very creditable job there.

I have already discussed the impending center closings, and so we decided that Flershem's job was one of those we might eliminate. His name went on the list of those to be returned home. He took the plane out of Tokyo to Seattle. Those were the days of prop planes. It took about twenty-two hours to reach Seattle. TransPacific travelers were entitled to a one night stopover en route to Washington. Flershem chose Seattle. He was scheduled out the next afternoon on a Northwest Airline flight to DC. He boarded the plane. It taxied down the runway and burst into flames. There was an emergency evacuation. No one was killed, but Flershem was rather badly burned and had to be hospitalized.

It was some time before he got back to Washington, and because of his injury, he was still technically an employee of The Department of State and entitled to State-supported medical care. He was later moved to Washington and hospitalized there. By the time he was released, the administration had decided they'd made a mistake and had eliminated too many slots in the Foreign Service. The Department of State issued authority for us to rehire people in about a half dozen or so positions from our Japan program. We hadn't closed Kanazawa after all, and so suddenly, Flershem was rehabilitated, remained on the rolls, and went back to Kanazawa, owing his longevity in service to his unhappy accident of being burned in a plane disaster in Seattle while on the verge of separation.

Q: Could I ask what happened to the center that had to move out of Tokyo when you didn't get the funding?

SCHMIDT: Well, we finally -- I forgot to mention that -- we finally did get a building which had been a Japanese women's cultural club, sort of a -- it's a Kaikan. They called it the Joshi Kaikan, which in free translation means the women's club. It was a cultural club to which the young women of the country or the city could belong. They could have meetings there or hold conferences, programs, etc. in the center. This was not under our control. This was completely Japanese.

But the organizations had faltered during the war and the occupation period. The Joshi Kaikan was not greatly in use, and while its location was not as desirable as the one that we had had in
downtown Tokyo, they eventually did turn it over to us. I understand now that there is a new one that is a much better center...the Tokyo Cultural Center is the Joshi Kaikan reopened, I think, about the middle of -- or in early 1953 and operated for a number of years at that location.

Somebody else will tell the story of the transition from the State Department USIE to U.S. Information Agency. I believe that someone is going to interview Abbott Washburn, who was named the first Deputy Director of the new U.S. Information Agency. He was, to appropriate the title of a book written by Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. So I won't try to go into any of the details. Anyway, I was not personally present. but it, of course, affected us out in the area. The State Department, still treating all Information Officers as inferiors, immediately decided that we were no longer a State Department entity. Our program, as of August 1, 1953, because an independent agency reporting directly to the President, was called the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). I should note that more than a year before this change over, USIE had been reorganized under The Department of State as a semi-autonomous entity -- a status not unlike that of AID today -- headed by a general manager and titled the International Information Administration (or Agency, I have forgotten which) and known as IIA. We operated in that fashion until Eisenhower issued the August 1, 1953 Executive Order creating us an independent agency.

Up to that time, there had only been two types of passports. One was the regular tourist passport, and the other was the diplomatic passport. State -- largely at the imperious suggestion of Mrs. Shipley, who then controlled all The Department of State passport issuances -- created a so called special passport with a red cover, and those are the kind under which USIA had to operate for the next several years until Mrs. Shipley retired from the Consular and Security Office of the State Department.

Q: Was that called an official passport then?

SCHMIDT: It was called a special passport, I think, and it was given to people like us heathens - - the USIA and what is now AID personnel -- who, when it came into existence, had to operate on the special passport. As I say, that went on for a number of years. I've forgotten just when it was that they finally conceded. Mrs. Shipley left, and a new head of the passport operation came in. And from that point on, we went back to diplomatic passport entitlement.

Q: At one stage, did you replace Sax Bradford, or were you Acting Director of USIS in Tokyo?

SCHMIDT: Well, yes, in a way, but that's a little different story. I didn't replace Sax Bradford. I'll cover that one now since you've asked the question. Eisenhower created the new independent agency as a result of the so-called Jackson Committee Report. C.D. Jackson had been asked to head an ad hoc committee to study the matter of U.S. overseas information programs. His report recommended that the information program be taken out of the Department of State, which didn't want it in those days. Dulles was adamant about that. The committee didn't confine itself just to recommending separation -- it went on to propose a good deal of the internal reorganization of what was to be USIA. Ted Streibert was named USIA's first Director. He accepted the committee report almost in total. Perhaps the most significant element of the reorganization which Streibert adopted was the one that set up four regional offices. These were to be -- and for many years were -- the most prestigious and powerful units in USIA. Streibert looked for men who were
considered to be the officers most capable of heading up these elements. Each one was to be designated Assistant Director of USIA for their region.

He selected Sax Bradford to be the head of the Far East, Bill Clark to direct Latin America and Hunt Damon for the Near East and North Africa. I do not remember who, if anyone, headed Europe at that time, but soon Bill Clark was moved over to direct the European region, and his deputy, Frank Oram, succeeded to the direction of Latin America.

So Sax left quite suddenly. His deputy, Olcott Deming, had already gone, so for two or three months, we had no Director -- or designated Deputy. I was not named Acting PAO at that time.

Shortly thereafter, Willard Hannah came out to be the PAO. He had a fine academic background, and he was also a very competent administrator. He had been PAO in Indonesia for about four and a half years and had proven his worth out there by ingratiating himself with Sukarno. In fact, he was practically on a first name basis with Sukarno and all the top officials of the Indonesian government as it took over from the Dutch and began its period of independence. He was an unusually capable officer -- very intelligent but somewhat short tempered. And this provides an opportunity to give us another example of some of the things that happened.

When the Eisenhower Administration took over, they wanted their own man as Ambassador in Tokyo. And much to the disgruntlement of Bob Murphy, who thought he was going to be Ambassador out there for at least three or four years, the Department told him he was going to be replaced.

Dulles had been instrumental in drafting the Peace Treaty with Japan, and as his assistant in working on the Peace Treaty preparation, he had taken John Allison, who at that time was the head of one of the regional bureaus -- or rather one of the divisions in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Allison so impressed Dulles that he apparently decided if the opportunity ever arose, he would make Allison Ambassador to Tokyo. When the Peace Treaty went into effect in April, 1952, the unit that had been the Diplomatic Section of GHQ SCAP became the Embassy. As indicated earlier, Bob Murphy became Ambassador. However, shortly after Eisenhower's inauguration, Dulles became Secretary of State and appointed Allison Ambassador to Japan.

Allison was a rather touchy man, and he had minimum respect for USIA. Above all, he was extremely wary of the press and didn't want to have anymore to do with it than he could help. Worse, he had the erroneous idea that if he withheld information from the press on any problem facing the Embassy, the press would somehow refrain from reporting anything about it. Two incidents occurring during Hannah's incumbency illustrate the difficulty for USIS of operating with Ambassador Allison.

In the late spring or early summer of 1954, the American Government conducted the second of its atomic bomb tests in the Pacific. They gave prolonged radio notice to mariners that a very large area of the sea around Bikini toll, on which the test was to be conducted, would be forbidden to shipping. But Japanese fishing vessels operating in the area were in those days without any radio contact, so no one got word to them that they would be anywhere near where the atomic explosion was to be detonated. One such boat with perhaps a dozen fishermen aboard
was "The Lucky Dragon." The boat sailed directly through the radiologically contaminated zone. The first thing they knew, the ship began collecting a blanket of grey-white ash. They had no idea as to its source, and so they started picking it up and brushing it off the boat. Finally, there got to be such a mantle on the boat that they got out their brooms and swept it off. Still they kept picking it up and looking at it, trying to figure out what it was and where it was coming from.

At last, they sailed out of the fallout area. They had pretty well gotten their catch anyway, so they started back for Japan. Well, the trawler they were on was a rather slow moving ship, so it took them about a week or ten days to reach Japan. Before they did, they all became violently ill. None of them died, but they were all just deathly sick. Understandably, they couldn't imagine what had happened to them. Of course, what had happened was that the ash from the atomic explosion had gone up into the stratosphere and then precipitated back out, landing on the Lucky Dragon.

When they hit the small fishing port down on the southwestern coast of Honshu, they reported in to the nearest medical center. It happened that there were some medical people nearby who had taken care of some of the survivors of Hiroshima. Immediately, of course, they determined what the difficulty was.

Well, the word got to Tokyo about a day later, and the whole foreign press took off for this small village, including practically every American correspondent, in fact every American correspondent who was there, as well as British, French, German, everybody else. They were all down to this small village.

They weren't permitted to get near the ship when they got down there. The Japanese authorities screened them off because they didn't want them to get in touch with the people who were suffering from the atomic fallout. I don't know whether any of the fishermen actually died. I don't think they did. Undoubtedly, it affected them in later life because they had suffered a severe dosage.

Well, Mr. Allison -- Ambassador Allison -- decided that if we didn't tell the press anything about it and refused to comment on what had happened that they wouldn't have any story. Therefore, the problem would simply go away.

Willard Hannah, having handled the press very extensively, realized that this was the worst thing that one could possibly do -- that it would simply pique the curiosity and raise the anger of all the correspondents who had been denied information. Willard went to see Allison and had a tumultuous session with the Ambassador, trying to persuade him of the necessity of doing something about it. Allison steadfastly refused to talk to the press or allow any information to be released by the Embassy at all.

So Hannah had to go down to the Foreign Press Club and face the whole gamut of press people. He couldn't even tell them that it was Allison who refused; Allison had forbidden him to say that this was an order from the Ambassador. He simply had to go down and tell them, "No comment."
So Hannah faced the press with no logical defense. Of course, the press was irate. They blamed him for covering up information. It was a very rough session. He came back utterly exhausted by the whole thing and terribly depressed.

The next day, he went back to Allison and tried again to persuade him that what was going to happen was that his refusal would erupt into a terrible brouhaha in the press -- that the whole Embassy would be denigrated for being uncooperative. Allison still wouldn't budge. The result was that he and Willard got into a real shouting match. I wasn't present at the match, but Willard came back and said, "I'm afraid that I got rather profane, and the Ambassador was even more profane. We just called each other a whole series of unprintable names."

I was about due to go on home leave. I was supposed to leave for the States about the first of June, and this was mid or late May I think. Willard came back and went into a long session with himself. By the time I left to go back on home leave, he had just about decided that he couldn't live under Allison's regime -- that he was going to resign. I tried to persuade him not to resign, but as it turned out, he did. While I was on home leave, he submitted his resignation not only as PAO in Japan, but from USIA -- went off and joined the American Field Service, where he subsequently had an excellent career as sort of a roving reporter who went all around the world making contacts with high level people everywhere, especially in Indonesia, and never returned to government again. The Agency lost one of its finest officers.

Ken Bunce was in Japan with USIS at the time that Willard left. I was away on home leave, so Willard appointed Ken as acting PAO during the absence as a new PAO being appointed for Tokyo. Willard proved to be extremely prophetic and absolutely correct. A terrible brouhaha had erupted in the press, and the Embassy and Willard personally were vilified as being restrictive, disruptive and non-cooperative. The press raked the whole Embassy, and especially Willard, up and down for failure to cooperate. It was a very unhappy time.

I've forgotten now whether it was somewhat before that or somewhat after that -- I think it was before that -- when our Press Attaché had a similar unhappy experience with the Ambassador. A group of governors, twelve of them, were visiting Tokyo. Of course, the Ambassador had to entertain them and spend a good deal of time with them.

The big party was to be a dinner for the visiting governors at the Ambassador's residence one evening about midway through their week and a half in Japan. Naturally, the American press wanted an interview with the governors to get their impressions of Japan.

John Henderson was our Press Attaché. John actually had been a USIA employee who had been integrated into the State Department Foreign Service under the Wriston Program in 1953 and '54. But he was nevertheless assigned back to USIA or USIS, and he was serving as our Press Attaché.

He went up to the residence early in the evening, before the dinner but while the preliminary cocktails were being served. Because he knew the press was coming up, he had told the Ambassador (or at least he claimed he had done so) that the members of the press wanted to meet with the governors, and he asked if he could bring them up to the residence. According to John,
the Ambassador had rather grudgingly said, ah, bring them up for a few minutes -- words to that effect.

So the press arrived while the cocktail party was in session, and John went in to tell the Ambassador that they were there. By that time, the Ambassador had had a couple of drinks himself along with the governors. I don't really know what caused him to act as he did, but he said, "I'm not going to interview those sons of bitches."

John started to argue with him and said, "You can't do this to the press. You know you'll have a big problem if you do." The Ambassador was utterly adamant.

Finally, both John and the Ambassador walked out of the main salon, where the governors were and where the cocktail party was proceeding, into the anteroom, where the press were waiting. And there John and the Ambassador proceeded to have a profane shouting match at one another. And the Ambassador in effect said, "You're through."

The next morning, John came into the office and said, "I'm sorry, but I'm going to be removed as the Press Attaché. I've got to go elsewhere." Within less than a week, he was out of Tokyo and was assigned as Press Attaché in Indonesia. Fortunately, he didn't get cashiered from the Foreign Service. But he had to leave Tokyo, and we were several months without a Press Attaché because of that episode.

So, you see, it wasn't very easy to operate under Mr. Allison if you were a USIA officer. Because he didn't have much use for the press, he didn't have much respect for us either. He was not terribly cooperative with the press under the best of circumstances, and these two episodes indicate some of the difficulties we had. Before I left on home leave, Willard Hannah called me in and told me he was going to recommend that I be appointed Deputy PAO for Japan. Knowing Sax Bradford's attitude toward me, I thanked Willard but told him I doubted his recommendation would be accepted. We left it at that.

Another incident had occurred earlier which I felt sure would make Willard's recommendation ineffectual. In the spring of 1954, I had received a letter from the Agency's personnel office, noting that my first tour was concluding and what preferences did I have for my next assignment? It had been no secret that I had wanted to be DPAO. A number of officers of some rank had spoken favorably about such an appointment in Washington. When I received the letter, I was pretty sure that the idea had been vetoed. I wrote a long reply, saying, in substance, that I had long hoped for such advancement, that the personnel letter was the veiled answer that my hopes were not to materialize and that, given those circumstances, I would just as soon return for a second tour as Executive Officer in Tokyo. This request was granted.

I learned later that my letter had created quite a stir in the Administrative Area in the Agency and resulted in a renewed push in some quarters to give me the DPAO job. Before long, I received letters from friends in Washington, saying that everyone who knew about the situation, exclusive of Director Streibert, who left all such decisions to Area Directors, and, of course, Bradford, had unanimously supported my appointment. This was especially true of the head of Personnel and
the Administrative Area in general. However, Bradford had vetoed it, and, given the power of Area Directors, that was it.

Just two or three weeks after those letters from Washington friends, Bradford made one of his periodic visits to Tokyo. I knew he had to say something to me during his visit. However, he studiously avoided me, even keeping a discreet distance at a cocktail party at which we were both in attendance. Finally, on his last day, only two or three hours before his plane was scheduled to depart, he appeared in my office. It was after hours, and no one but myself was there. He entered and sat down. I don't remember his precise words, but the following is a pretty good paraphrase of his story. Smiling unctuously, he said, "Lew, I wanted to give you a summary of what happened to your attempt to be named DPAO. You had extensive support throughout the Agency, including from me, but those doggone characters in Personnel and the Administrative Area just nixed it. I guess they are jealous of anyone from Administration getting this type of promotion if they don't."

I sat there for a couple seconds, thinking, "The liar! Do I or don't I have the guts to call his fabrication?" Before I had time to lose my nerve, I looked him right in the eye, and said, "Sax, within the past few days, I have had several letters from friends in Washington telling me that as far as anyone else in the Agency is concerned, I could have the job. This includes everyone in Administration. But you are the one that nixed the deal!"

The Bradford reaction was startling. I had read of such physical changes in fiction, but I had never seen it in the flesh. He was absolutely silent for several seconds, during which time every drop of color drained out of his usually rather ruddy complexion. His face went to a sallow white. His eyes, which were naturally a rather pale blue, almost literally lost all color. I kept my eyes on his, so I don't know if he trembled, but without regaining his color or composure, he said, "Well, that's the way it is," and got up and left. I knew my promotion goose was cooked as long as he remained the Assistant Director of USIA for Far East.

I left on home leave at the end of May and returned during the first week in September.

Q: Had a new PAO been assigned to Tokyo by that time?

SCHMIDT: No, and it was to be a full year before one was assigned. As I said earlier, Ken Bunce had been appointed as Acting PAO while I was away on home leave, and he remained in that capacity until his departure from Japan in late April or early May of 1955. I returned to my assignment as Executive Officer, which, among other duties, involved handling the logistics of some further Cultural Center closings.

In some cases of proposed closings, the Prefectural Governors became terribly exercised. One of them, from Takamatsu on the north coast of the Island of Shikoku, came to Tokyo to plead his case personally. He saw Ken Bunce and wanted to see the Ambassador. I can't remember whether we actually got him an appointment with Allison or not. In any event, his pleas were effective enough to cause us to leave an American Officer (Harry Kendall, who was already there) in that Center. In one or two other cases, we agreed to keep the centers, support them at a lesser level, and leave the running entirely to the Japanese staff. In those instances, the
prefectures agreed to pay some of the operational costs.

As I mentioned earlier, when Ken Bunce left in the spring of 1955, I was designated Acting Country PAO. I have already mentioned the preliminaries of staging for the Atoms for Peace Exhibit, the immensely productive 1955 Nagano Seminar with William Faulkner as the *piece de resistance*, and the saving of the American reputation by Glenn Shaw at the fair in Kanazawa, all of which occurred during my "acting" period. Also during that summer, we presented the Tokyo performances and Japan-wide tour of the Symphony of the Air, mentioned earlier. And I personally take credit for another musical coup. I cannot recall whether the three musicians involved had come to Japan as part of the Symphony or as part of another -- a chamber music -- group. In any event, I knew that many smaller cities in Japan had longed for the visit of an American musical ensemble. Neither the Symphony nor the larger chamber ensemble had considered it sufficiently important to visit any of these smaller cities. In talking to three members of whichever group it was, I learned that they had no immediate commitments in the U.S. and would like to stay on a bit after their group concerts were completed. I arranged for them to constitute themselves as a chamber group: pianist, cellist, and violinist. We christened them "The American Trio" and sent them out on a twenty-four town/city tour. Their audiences were wildly enthusiastic, the press coverage was ecstatic and the men themselves had a wonderful time, enhanced doubly by their enthusiastic audiences.

Q: Do you have any other points you wish to cover regarding the Japan program?

SCHMIDT: Well, I wouldn't want to leave the discussion of Japan without mentioning briefly some of the work done by other highly competent officers who were part of that unusually fine group in the Japan program. The most unique experience and performance was probably the one by a man named A. Fazl Fotouhi.

Fazl was Iranian by birth, a naturalized American citizen, married to a charming American woman. A very friendly sort of individual. We were lucky. I don't know whether he was employed by USIA already -- I think he had been -- but anyway, he spoke both Iranian (Farsi) and English and had a very slight accent in English. He came out to Japan to be one of the Center Directors, and we sent him down to Hiroshima.

By that time, Hiroshima was partially rebuilt, fairly well rebuilt from the atom bomb attack. And it was the center of a medical research program, still run at that time under the auspices of the American Army, for the rehabilitation and treatment of victims of the atom bomb. Already there were the beginnings of the resentment which later became very strong in Japan about the Americans having dropped the first atomic bomb in history on the hapless city of Hiroshima.

So Fazl went down there. We told him he would likely have a rather tough row to hoe because of the growing resentment. Well, I don't think there was anybody except Glenn Shaw in Japan who became so beloved by the Japanese as did Fazl. I don't know what it was, but he just thoroughly immersed himself in Japan and things Japanese. He went to every function that the Japanese officialdom gave. He was always available to them. He sent his daughter, who at that time was only about six or seven years old, to a Japanese public school, where she learned Japanese pretty well -- children's Japanese anyway. Instead of sending her to one of the available American
schools, he sent her to the Japanese school. He was there, I think, in all about five years. When he left, you'd have thought they'd lost their father confessor. He was so feted by the Japanese in leaving that many years later they still talk about him, and they still talk about his departure from Hiroshima. He was a complete hero to the people down there and thoroughly converted that whole segment of the area to a pro-American viewpoint. So I think that was another great success story which probably happened by accident because we were lucky in getting somebody who could establish that kind of rapport with the Japanese. Great praise should go to Fazl for having done such a marvelous job of getting that segment of Japan, in an area where it could have been disastrous because of the resentment of the atomic bomb, pretty well oriented toward things American. And I don't know of anybody anywhere, perhaps there are others, who did as complete and successful a job as Fazl did in that five year period he spent in Hiroshima.

Well, I think I've probably talked enough about Japan. There are other things that could be said about how the program went. I left in late May of 1956. I never went back officially to Japan, although I have been back there probably twenty-five or more times since and spent various periods of time. It's a country of which I will always be extremely fond. I fell in love with it when I first went there, and I am very grateful for having had the experience to spend those four and a half years with the Embassy. Let's cut this off at this point.

Q: Before we leave Japan, I wondered if you would comment a little bit about what the goals or objectives were of USIS when you first arrived there?

SCHMIDT: Well, I must say that we had a general objective in mind which, of course, was to make the Japanese thoroughly familiar with American cultural and economic achievements and also to continue the process which had been so well begun by the Occupation of converting them into a favorable attitude toward the United States. I've got to give the Army and the MacArthur regime tremendous credit for having done a number of things. MacArthur overrode the objections of a lot of highly placed persons in government in deciding to keep the Emperor as a nominal head of government. That proved to be a tremendous decision. I agree with scholars and historians who say it is the glue that held Japan together in those crucial post defeat days. It's been talked about often, and I won't go on further here.

But above all, he decided America was not going to go in as a tough occupying power. These people had been defeated. They were hungry. They were already disenchanted with their own Army and their own secret police, which had treated them abominably. By the time the war was over, they hated their military. They hated the secret police, the Kempeitai. At first, they were scared to death because they had been saturated with propaganda to the effect that the Americans, when they came in, were going to rape all the women and tear down the whole Japanese governmental structure, generally oppress the populace and so forth.

Since I was there almost at the beginning of the Occupation, I can tell you that the Japanese were scared stiff. The first day I was in Kyoto, which was only about eighteen or twenty days at most after the armistice was signed, we were the first people -- except for a small four man landing party -- in Kyoto. We were told we had to go armed with our pistols because we didn't know what was going to happen. And so I was wandering around Kyoto while the headquarters that we were going to occupy was being set up in a partially finished concrete skeleton building in
downtown Kyoto, on which construction had stopped when the war began. Having been there in 1938, I was trying to find a couple of places in Kyoto that I had visited then. My memory was not entirely accurate, and I didn't immediately find them. But in the process, I headed down a residential street not far from the locale I was trying to find, but not the place I was looking for.

When my roommate and I, both of us with a pistol strapped on each hip, started down that street, the street was full of kids, and every shutter was open. The Japanese had wooden shutters on their windows, which they always opened during warm days and slid the windows open. This was early fall -- still pretty warm. They were airing out the houses. I don't think we'd walked twenty steps down that street when every child had disappeared from sight, and practically every shutter had snapped shut. By the time we walked through that street, you would have thought it was a deserted city...absolutely nobody on the street. Once in a while, you could see somebody peeking through a shutter, but they were frightened to death.

Well, after about three days, they discovered that none of this propaganda was true -- that the Americans were really going to help them. And the Americans, being naturally friendly anyway, started giving chocolate bars to the kids -- they hadn't seen chocolate in years -- and giving some of their sake rations to families that they were getting in touch with. Soon all that fear disappeared.

The basic gentleness with which the Occupation handled the entire operation was, I think, tremendous. I don't think any other occupying power had ever before done anything like it. The Japanese were so grateful that an American could do no wrong. It was almost ridiculous. I won't take the time here to discuss a number of interesting situations that occurred in my experience during that first year of the occupation. The good treatment continued. I want to reiterate that the Army had done a tremendous job, and even though they had carried on the tradition of treating the Japanese well, if perhaps a little patronizingly, but nevertheless, with kindness and understanding. And USIS picked up where they left off. We wanted to expand on it. We wanted to increase the knowledge that we inculcated into the Japanese as to the cultural background that the United States had and give them extensive information about our cultural achievements. We wanted them to understand that we were going to continue to treat them as friends and that generally, we wanted to win their allegiance to the United states. That was our major overall goal.

Now, there were a couple of other ones that were related to that. One was the extent to which the Occupation had given the Japanese a freedom they had not previously known and interfered as little as they felt they could afford to with the Japanese return to normality. In short, we hoped to assist in guiding them further toward democracy.

Incidentally, the Occupation had openly allowed labor unions to form again. Japan had never really allowed truly free labor unions to exist. Occupation authorities didn't realize at first the extent of liberal thinking existing among many of the young officers managing the labor union rebirth. There may even have been a few people in the Occupation who might have had a communist background. I won't say there weren't. But even if there was no communist influence, there were a lot of very, very liberal young people who were writing the labor code and who didn't want to interfere with the formation of unions or the activities of unions. The unions
therefore had a very heady beginning and in some areas, were for a long time rather well infiltrated by native communist party representatives. I mean, Japanese Communist Party representatives.

In fact, I think it is possible the Japanese unions may have started the sit-in. I say this because in my role in Japan in the first year, I was in charge of the economic activities in the Military Government Section of first 6th Army, and later I Corps, Headquarters which controlled Japan to the west and south of Nagoya. And through my office had to come every Japanese corporation in the area that wanted to convert from war time operations to civilian manufacturing. Their permit had to be issued from my office. We had to investigate their intentions -- see what they were going to do before granting the permit.

One of the big corporations represented in that area was Mitsubishi, which had had a large aircraft engine manufacturing plant on the outskirts of Kyoto. I became very closely acquainted with the top management of that particular region of the Mitsubishi operation. They were wanting to reopen several plants in the area.

Eventually, we did give them permission by the early spring of 1946 to start resuming operations, and as soon as they did, their new labor unions went on strike. This was the first experience that the Japanese industry had ever had with a really full fledged strike, and they didn't know how to handle it. So at first, they were trying to act as they always did before whenever anybody came up with a labor proposal. They were going to stonewall it.

The next thing they knew, the Japanese unions had moved in. They had about a thousand people sitting down in the Mitsubishi factory and offices, and they wouldn't get out. So the management all descended on my Military Government office in Kyoto, pointing out this terrible phenomenon that had occurred and what could they do with it? I had not been blessed with any organized labor experience previously, and I don't know that I helped very much. But I did give them a few suggestions. I told them they'd have to stop this stonewalling, that they would simply have to negotiate some of their requirements -- some of the demands of their labor. And I thought that if they were reasonable in their handling that, they probably would come out all right. As it turned out, they did.

I think the Japanese labor was so surprised that they got a favorable response and some understanding and concessions that they themselves were amazed, and they withdrew. I still think that was probably one of the first, if not the first, examples of a sit in of the labor movement. For Japan, I am sure it was.

Well, that's a long way of saying that later on, by the time we neared the end of the Occupation, the communist influence had infiltrated quite a bit of the labor movement, particularly the seaman's union and, to a lesser extent, the civil service unions. Although Communists were still an illegal party, they were managing to make themselves rather obstreperous, and they probably had a hand in the May 1, 1952 riot I talked about earlier. They didn't get much support from the general public. Even though the elections were not managed, Communists didn't score highly. They couldn't stand for election. They were not permitted to put up a ticket at that time but tried to make their power effective through the Socialist Party.
We were worried about their growing influence in certain quarters. So one of our objectives was, of course, to try to counteract the influence of the Communist infiltration of various important areas of the Japanese business and industry and also political front.

A third objective stemmed from the fact that the Japanese were not terribly well convinced that America was all that culturally advanced. And so another one of our objectives was to impress them with the cultural achievements of the U.S. and the widespread concern for and capabilities in the performing arts and arts generally in the United States. I think we were reasonably successful in that regard. One of the things we did not too long before I left Japan was to arrange a visit to Japan of what was then called the American Symphony of the Air. It had been the NBC Symphony Orchestra, and I think Stokowski had at one time been conductor. NBC had just a short time earlier decided to discontinue their contract with the orchestra. They were no longer going to broadcast regularly for NBC, so they struck out on their own, renamed themselves the American Symphony of the Air and sought engagements. They had no initial commitments within the United States, so we negotiated a trip for them to Japan, and we scheduled them all over the country. Many people don't realize, or at least didn't in those days, that the Japanese were not only great students of their own music, but were tremendous aficionados of Western classical music. They're nuts about it and had little chance to enjoy it during the war years. No top flight symphony orchestra had performed in Japan at least since some years before the war. I am not sure one had ever visited Japan. So when we brought the Symphony of the Air to Japan, the demand for tickets was enormous. The climax of their visit was a joint concert with the Tokyo Symphony Orchestra in Korakuen Stadium, a huge baseball stadium in Tokyo which normally seats about 60,000 but could only seat about 40,000 people for the orchestral performance.

The demand for tickets was so great that people stood in line for fifteen hours starting the night before at the box office to get tickets. The 50,000 were completely sold out. People stood throughout the concert. Some climbed trees outside to view and listen over the walls. As I noted earlier, Harry Keith shot another notable motion picture around the Symphony Orchestra's visit, which was widely successful in Japan.

We scheduled them not only in Tokyo but in I think about twelve to fifteen Japanese cities. It was probably the single most successful cultural event USIS staged in Japan. It went a long way toward convincing the Japanese that the Americans weren't just a bunch of shallow cultural people -- that they didn't put on or were incapable of staging excellent cultural performances.

So I think those were basically our efforts at that time. We did have subsidiary ones based on trying to convert or at least soften editorial writers and other press representatives who were pretty well left wing oriented and who really were taking off in the Japanese press against anything American. We had mixed results there. I won't say that we were as successful in that regard as we were in some other activities.

But we did have a few minor successes, one of them brought off by the same Paul Bethel that I talked about in connection with the episode when Glenn Shaw went to the Kanazawa Fair. He spent about six months cultivating a major columnist for the newspaper in Nagoya that was
giving us a bad time -- both by extensive personal contact and providing him extensive pertinent information setting forth the American point of view. He had some success. He didn't convert the man, but I think at least he tempered his anti-U.S. editorials a bit. At least for a time, the editorials seemed to be less vitriolic. I think Paul had a reasonable degree of influence on them. There were a couple of other episodes of that nature when we were working out other columnists with individuals assigned to them.

I should mention one further thing, and that is the Japanese had not yet in those early days resuscitated their cultural magazines. Later, they flourished and became very important. But Leon Picon as the Book Translation Officer was greatly successful, not only in getting a large number of books translated into Japanese, but in getting them distributed and sold through Japanese book stores and introducing them into Japanese schools. He also established a magazine called the Beisho Daiori, which was devoted to book reviews (almost entirely) of American books in translation. The publication caught on and was well accepted in Japanese cultural circles. It was still in existence in 1970, even after Japanese cultural publications had long been flourishing once more, but it was finally superseded by the present magazine printed at the USIS Regional Service Center in Manila -- a much fancier, slicker magazine than the old one. Leon's came at a time when Japan was only beginning to recover its cultural publications production and went a long way toward introducing and popularizing American books in translation in Japan. I give full credit to Leon. It was an imaginative approach at which he worked very hard and successfully. In the process, he became reasonably proficient himself in the Japanese language. He was, and still is, a highly alert and intelligent man of wide ranging interests and accomplishments.

Two other programs, ones that are more routine to USIS operations and therefore not so noticeable, were ably run in Tokyo. While Bill Hutchinson was the Director of Press Operations in the first two years of USIS, our placement in an always resistant Japanese press was good, and our publications program moved along productively even though up against a growing Japanese magazine industry that now probably eclipses any other in the world. Bill's successor was not as imaginative or as energetic, and I believe we were less successful in this area after his departure.

The Exchange of Persons Program with Japan was unusually large. It did not compare with the resources devoted to this operation in Germany, but as other USIS operations go, it was large. It was supervised by Don Ranard and was a separate unit within USIS Tokyo. To this operation, among other things, can be credited our getting William Faulkner for the Nagano Seminar in 1955 and the American Symphony of the Air that same year. Those were the two more spectacular achievements. Don's unit also cooperated extensively with the Fulbright office, organizing volunteer help to assist in student counseling, giving the annual Fulbright competitive examinations and negotiating with the Japanese government for expanded exchanges. The Fulbright program today is 50% funded by the Japanese government, and although that development matured after Don's time, he can be credited with having laid the groundwork for later success.

WILLIAM C. SHERMAN
William C. Sherman was born in 1923 and raised in Kentucky. In addition to service in Japan, his career in the Foreign Service included posts in Korea, Italy, and in Washington, DC as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. Mr. Sherman was interviewed by Thomas Stern on October 27, 1993.

SHERMAN: I wanted to go to Japan and that is where I ended up.

But I didn't want to go overseas immediately. Mary Jane and I had been separated for fourteen months when I first went to Korea and that had not been a pleasant experience for either one of us. If I were to go overseas, I wanted the whole family to go together. I had been assigned to the Consulate General in Yokohama, but since SCAP was still running Japan, the State Department had to follow its rules which barred families from accompanying an officer until a specific house had been assigned to him or her. State representatives, until April 28, 1952, were just the diplomatic arm of SCAP. They were not part of a State Department operations. That was true of the Consulates General as well as the Tokyo operations. All were part of SCAP, although on most matters, we operated independently. But when it came to basic rules, we were all under the control of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers.

By chance, I found out that the Army was still running an exchange program with Japan. It was about to bring to the United States five senior members of the Japanese Diet. This delegation was to attend the Peace Treaty signing and then spend three months touring the United States, studying it in depth. The Army needed a bilingual escort officer, who could also serve as interpreter. I volunteered and was in fact assigned to that task. We went to Washington, New York, Boston, Chicago meeting with academics, business people, and politicians. It was a great period during which I learned a lot. Eventually, I had to leave them in Chicago while they went on to the West Coast. The Consulate General in Yokohama, to which I had been assigned, was getting a little impatient. So, in March, 1952, I arrived in Yokohama and Mary Jane and our two kids joined me at the end of the following month -- the day after SCAP no longer controlled State operations in Japan.

Our first home was in the old Consulate General building in what had been the Consul General's apartment. It was quite luxurious for a Vice Consul. It took us a long time before we had accommodations as good as those again.

Q: How large was the Consulate General in 1952?

SHERMAN: I would guess that there were about ten officers and five or six clerks. It was a sizeable post, particularly for that time. Our consular district included three very active prefectures. I was assigned as the politico-military officer, reporting directly to Washington. In those days, the constituent posts sent their airgrams and despatches and the rare telegram directly
to Washington, with copies of the reports sent to the Embassy.

When I first went to Yokohama, I was an economic officer in the Consulate General and one of my jobs was if you can believe it, to expand Japanese exports to the U.S. We had a Consul General, whose job was primarily representation. The deputy, who was supposed to be running the operation, was an old consul (non-career), Charlie Stephan, who didn't do much of anything. He was an old fogey who had all but retired. We had a citizenship officer, a shipping, protection and welfare officer, a visa officer and two administrative people -- an administrative officer and a general services officer.

Soon after I arrived, the Department went through some major downsizing after the advent of the Eisenhower administration. That reduction left Yokohama with no clerks; all we had were Foreign Service officers. We did have a number of resident Americans - Japanese with American citizenship. They were not hired as local employees because they were American citizens, even though they lived in Japan. They fitted into a general world wide category of personnel called "Resident Americans" which had been established for Americans living overseas. They obtained a regular security clearance so that they could handle classified material, although we used them essentially as local employees. They were not subject to transfer to other countries in the world. In the Japanese case, the resident Americans were people who had gone to Japan before the war and had stayed because of family ties.

Since they were all totally bilingual, we used them mostly in consular work. In the 1952 reduction-in-force, they were all fired. Our "Shipping and Seamen" officer position was deleted. By the time the decimation ended, we had a Consul General, his deputy, four or five Vice-Consuls, and an administrative officer. My duties as reporting officer were quickly ended and I was put in the consular section, doing visa, shipping and welfare work. The shipping work was interesting in some aspects. Sometime later, a Foreign Service Staff position was re-established which enabled the Consulate General to return to doing some political and economic reporting. But I stayed with the Consular section.

Shipping would not normally have been a problem in Yokohama, although there was considerable American traffic in the port, much of it due to the Korean War which was still being waged in 1952. Under an agreement with the Seamen's Union of the Pacific (SUP), headed by Harry Lundenberg, a crew would receive a bonus as soon as the ship crossed the date line because it was then deemed to have entered a war zone. As soon as it left a Japanese port, the ship was deemed to be in a combat zone and the crew received another 100% bonus. So it was quite possible for an ordinary seaman, on a ship that shuttled back and forth between Japan and Korea, to make triple his ordinary salary which added up to a considerable amount. We had about twelve cargo ships called "Knot" ships because they were all named after different knots -- the "reef", etc. They shuttled regularly between Yokohama and Inchon or Pusan carrying supplies for our troops. Of course, none of these ships were in any danger because neither the North Koreans or the Chinese had any intention of engaging the U.S. Merchant Marine at sea. In view of the bonuses paid, getting jobs on these ships was very competitive. Theoretically, if a seaman had to be left behind by his ship because of illness or other reason, it used to be the responsibility of the American Consul shipping and seamen officer to find him another berth. The American union set up a hiring hall in Yokohama and declared that it would become
responsible for the placement of American seamen. My predecessor in the Shipping officer position had said that he would not accept that process and vowed to fight it tooth and nail. The union began to publish a little four page weekly newspaper -- "The Harbor Light" -- which was a scurrilous and quasi-pornographic rag. It kept referring to the "Communist" Consul General who was providing jobs to the Harry Bridges' union people. Harry Bridges’ union was a competitor of the SUP. There were vicious attacks in that monthly paper on the Consul General and his staff. The "Shipping and Seamen" Section of the Department was never as active on any issue as it was on the hiring function in Yokohama. It was obvious to me that the Department was trying to find cover because in the early ‘50s, seamen's unions were politically very powerful. By the time I took the job, my instructions we to make peace with the SUP, which I did. We basically let the SUP operate its own hiring hall, even though that practice was legally suspect. We didn't try to block their activities. The shipping laws, which were written for the protection of seamen, govern the employment of any seaman who was seeking employment in an American port or any American seaman seeking employment in any foreign port. These laws placed the responsibility for assuring that the seamen were properly assigned and hired in the hands of a Foreign Service Consul. A ship captain could not hire a seaman unless a Consul was present. The Consul had to put his stamp on the employment contract; all the papers relating to the ship's register and the employment had to be deposited with the Consulate. These laws were passed to prevent the shanghaiing of seamen or forcing them into assignments that were not suitable. A very elaborate structure was established to protect the seamen. Any change in the ship's crew, as stated in special articles, had to be done in the presence of an American Consul. That is the way the law was written and I think might still be. I don't think there have been many changes, although in light of the demise of the American merchant marine, the consuls' workload has been greatly reduced. Foreign seamen also needed transit visas as their ships sailed to the United States, which required lot of documentation.

We were also busy with visas. These days was before the McCarran Act was passed in 1953. The Japanese were viewed as “aliens ineligible for citizenship” and therefore not permitted to immigrate to the United States. They could only go to the U.S. as visitors for short periods of time or as students or members of other special legal categories. Because they were ineligible for immigration, we had to be particularly careful about the issuance of temporary visas to make sure that they were bona fide visitors , students or some other on-immigrant category who would return to Japan upon the expiration of their visas. That meant that every applicant was screened thoroughly and investigated by the Consular Section. There were a number of Japanese who even in the early ‘50s had enough resources to visit the U.S. In addition, we had a lot of requests for transit visas because many Japanese were immigrating to Canada and Latin America. These countries were interested in recruiting particularly farm laborers from Japan. This was the period, for example, when many Japanese immigrated to Argentina. These people had to transit the United States on their way to Latin America. Visas in those days required considerable processing. If one ever watched the Menotti opera, The Consul, you can get an idea of how complex the system was in those days. People would come to the Consular Section and be asked to come back again because they didn't have the right size photograph or were missing some document or didn't have a police certificate or they didn't have a health certificate. It was painful. Some didn't get visas because their children might have had TB which made the parents or siblings ineligible. The processing of a visa application could take months -- many, many months in some cases. There were people who applied over and over again without any hope of
approval. It was a different occupation from that of a visa officer today.

Q: *What was the economic situation in Yokohama in the early ‘50s?*

SHERMAN: It was recovering from the war's devastation, but still bad. Yokohama was particularly hard hit because the city's principal activity were the export of tea and silk. Silk became an increasingly minor factor after the invention of nylon. The tea business was also in a depressed state. The Yokohama port had been almost entirely taken over by the U.S. military; there were very few private facilities left in the port area. The city had been decimated by our air raids during the war. The Occupation Forces had established a large logistic depot in Yokohama after bulldozing large tracts of land. Property lines became non-existent. In most cases, that was not an important factor because much of the property had been requisitioned by the military; very little had been returned at that stage to its owners. Other Japanese cities, where the U.S. Army was not such an overwhelming presence, managed to rebuild at a much faster pace than Yokohama. Yokohama was a special case. To this day, the impact of our war bombing and our post-war presence has turned Yokohama from the flourishing export-oriented city it was before the war to essentially a bed-room community of Tokyo. Its industrial and commercial base has never really returned.

The port has revived, but ships now stop in Tokyo as often as they do in Yokohama. The port of Shimizu, which is just a little south of Yokohama, has expanded greatly, as has Kobe. Yokohama has lagged far behind other ports in its recovery; the government has been and still is active in trying to further develop it, but in fact Yokohama never really recovered from the war and its aftermath. It seems more like an old time museum -- not a live town.

Politically, Japanese cities have never been very powerful. There are only rare instances of regional political powers. National politics are the major interest. The various prefectures have governors' races; the cities and towns have mayorality races. But local officials do not have a great deal of authority and have to depend on the central government for financial support and direction. They can be very obstructive. For example, during the early ‘70s, the Mayor of Yokohama, a socialist, decided that heavy vehicles could not cross the city's bridges because it was not safe in view of the bridges' condition. That happened right during the Vietnam war when we were sending our heavy trucks and jeeps back to Japan for rehabilitation. Once repaired, those vehicles were transported to Yokohama for shipment back to Vietnam. So a complete deadlock developed. The Mayor wouldn't let the repaired vehicles down to the port area and we had no other port immediately available. The Foreign Office finally worked out a complicated by-pass arrangement which involved driving a very circuitous route over roads that were barely passable, but at least did not cross the Yokohama bridges and finally led to the port area. Local officials had therefore a negative power, but in general were greatly dependent on the Tokyo bureaucracy.

Q: *Tell me how you felt living, as an American, in a city that we had damaged so heavily and whose citizens had suffered greatly at our hands. What was your relationship to the local citizens?*

SHERMAN: The relationships were very good. The Japanese response to the occupation was
completely cooperative. They behaved entirely in a friendly fashion. We never met a hostile population in Japan. In Yokohama as well as in the rest of Japan, we had an active information program and an active American-Japanese Society. There is hardly a Japanese locality that doesn't have a sister-city relationship with some American city or town. We never noticed any resentment about the damage that we wrought. The city government would periodically seek return of certain properties or facilities and by the mid '60s, almost all of the free standing facilities had been returned to the city or the original owners. Our presence became increasingly consolidated in base areas.

There were problems of course during this first tour in Japan from 1952 to 1956. They were called "base problems" which involved such matters as camp-followers, some theft and other low level criminal activity that tends to congregate outside a base's perimeter. The citizens were not happy with this. A number of Japanese movies were made, dramatizing and sensationalizing these conditions. The Socialists, the Communists and some of the labor unions used these conditions for their own political purposes. But by and large, the population was not terribly unhappy. We still have problems. We have noise problems created by night landing practices on carriers, we have problems caused by too many people in spaces too small, we have problems created by our large presence in places like Okinawa. But in general, the Japanese towns that are supported economically by our military presence, like Yokosuka, are cooperative and there is certainly no real tension between Japanese and Americans. It was true in the early '50s; it is true today.

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Q: You left Yokohama in June, 1954 and were assigned to Tokyo.

SHERMAN: That is correct. There is again a story behind that assignment. Mary Jane I had gone to Tokyo in July, 1953, at the invitation of Bob Blake, then a member of the Embassy's Political Section, to have dinner with him on July 3. Then, the next day, we were his guests at the customary Fourth of July reception at the Embassy. We also served as unofficial translators between American and Japanese guests. There were a lot of Japanese political leaders there and needed all the translators they could find. At one point, I found myself translating for Mosaburo Suzuki, who was then the leader of the left-wing Socialist Party. Sam Berger, who had just recently arrived to be the Embassy's Political Counselor, had been trying mightily to make contacts with the Socialist Party and the Sohyo, the largest Japanese labor union. So I interpreted for Sam and Suzuki and in the process I managed to convince Suzuki to set up an appointment for Berger with the head of Sohyo, a Mr. Takamo. Everybody was very happy with the event. I went back to Yokohama and shortly thereafter I heard from the Embassy that I was to be transferred to the Tokyo to be a member of the Political Section. So, after home leave in 1954, I reported for work at the Embassy in Tokyo as second secretary in the Political Section.

I was assigned to follow internal political matters. The Liberal Democratic Party was just being formed so that Japanese politics were in a state of turmoil. Later, I became the principal contact with Kishi Nobusuke, who was the main founder of the L.D.P. and a subsequent Prime Minister. That was an interesting experience.
Japan was not yet principally a one-party state, although it was clear that it was headed in that direction. Japanese politics then, as now, was very much a matter of individual leadership with factions springing up here and there. Politics were not essentially a matter of ideology or policies; they revolved more around individual leaders. The battle at the time was between Yoshida, who had been the leader of the Liberal Party, and Hatoyama, who had been his predecessor as leader of the Liberal Party. Hatoyama had had a stroke and had to step aside for a while; when he had recovered, he wanted to reassume his position which had been taken over by Yoshida. Eventually, with an election looming, Hatoyama split from the Liberal Party and formed his own group, which was victorious, making Hatoyama Prime Minister. The Liberal Party lost its majority status and just became one of several conservative parties.

The role of the individual leaders is a matter of historical tradition in Japan. It was so even before the war. It really goes back to feudal days and the rise of clans. This system of factions, formed around individual leaders, is still true today in one guise or another. We were not really concerned with this form of politics. We were very concerned with the power of left wing parties and factions and were very much opposed to them. In those days, the Socialists were much more of a threat than were the Communist Party, which was stable in size and not growing. In terms of policies, it was the Socialists, and particularly the left wing elements, that seemed to us to be closely linked with the Communists. That was a large party, depending primarily on the resources of the Japanese labor unions.

There were efforts made to establish a more democratic socialist movement -- analogous to a European socialist party -- and to inhibit, to the extent possible, the growth of the far left. A split did develop among the socialists -- left and right wings. A man named Nishio, probably with the assistance, both overt and covert, of the United States established a more democratic socialist party. The term 'socialist' in Japan meant the same thing it did in the West -- a system in which the major means of production were state owned and operated. The left wing socialists were essentially Marxists in terms of philosophy. They did not look to the modern versions of Marxism, like the Soviet Union, as models but rather went back to the early days of socialism for their philosophical base. We are of course discussing events that took place at the peak of the Cold War and therefore the United States tended to look at issues, such as Japan's political situation, in rather black and white terms.

At the same time, a more democratic labor council was established to combat the influence of the radical Sohyo I don't believe that the AFL-CIO had a full time representative in Tokyo at the time and were not very active, although periodically a representative would come through. The Embassy had a Labor attaché and the CIA had people who covered the labor movement.

Also the conservative forces in Japan united under the flag of the LDP. They were of course never truly united, but at least marched under the same flag.

Q: How large was our Tokyo Embassy in the mid-50s?

SHERMAN: There were probably about 125 Americans there although I can't be sure because there were so many other agencies’ representatives in Tokyo that it was hard to track the number of employees in the Embassy.
As I said, Sam Berger was the Political Counselor and therefore my boss. His deputy was Bill Leonhart. The DCM was Jeff Parsons, the Ambassador was John Allison. Jules Bassin was our Legal Advisor. It was an active Embassy that worked well. When Allison arrived he decided that there was an over-abundance of reporting and particularly an excess of airgrams. He felt that the reporting should concentrate on the major issues and that not all luncheon conversations needed to be reported. The Embassy had been a prolific papers producer; after Allison took over from Bob Murphy in 1953, the production rate dropped markedly. Much of the Embassy's work fell in the politico-military sphere related to our military presence in Japan. The Japanese military efforts were greatly impeded by their no-war constitution which kept their military capabilities well in restraint. Furthermore, there was not then, in the mid-50s, nor today, any popular support for rearmament or the building of a major defense establishment. In those days, even putting a machine gun on an airplane was viewed as an aggressive military action that the Japanese people strongly opposed. It took years of academic and public discussions to reach agreement that Japan had a right to maintain "self-defense" forces. In the mid-50s we were primarily interested in maintaining absolute freedom to operate as we saw fit from our bases in Japan. Dulles was very anxious to consolidate an eastern arch consisting of countries opposed to the "red" threat. China was a big issue for us at the time. We sought Japanese political support for our Cold War policy positions as well as logistical support for our military activities.

The Japanese were nervous about China. They looked to us to provide the "nuclear umbrella". The question was always whether the "umbrella" leaked. I always thought that the question was whether it was raining or was about to rain. We felt that it was raining at the time. We were seriously concerned about the mainland Chinese. The Korean War had just ended in an armistice that has lasted until today. The Soviets had a presence in Tokyo although their people had not been granted diplomatic recognition. They dealt with the Foreign Ministry as an unrecognized foreign entity. The Soviets had established a mission during the SCAP days and had never left even after the end of the military government. There were no formal relations between the USSR and Japan. The Soviets were in effect represented by an unrecognized mission. They maintained their SCAP car license plates and all the other benefits that they had acquired during the military occupation, but in fact did not legally exist in Tokyo. The Soviets have never signed a peace treaty with Japan. This anomaly did create some interesting events. In the mid '50s, ECAFE held its annual meeting in Tokyo. Ambassador Allison gave a large reception for all the delegates. The Soviets were members of the organization and therefore showed up the party even though uninvited. I was at the door and had never seen any members of their mission. The Soviet that showed up was a Mr. Dominsky, who was the head of their unrecognized Tokyo mission. He introduced himself when I met him at the door; I then took him to introduce him to the Ambassador. Dominsky and his colleagues mingled with the guests for a while and then departed. We didn't have regular contacts with the Soviets, although the Foreign Ministry had a Soviet section which kept in contact with the unrecognized mission on an ad hoc basis.

During this same ECAFE conference, we showed a cinerama film in one of the large Ginza theaters. Cinerama was a big deal at the time; very few people had ever seen it at that time. After the show, I noticed that Dominsky had been in attendance; so I went over and asked him how he had enjoyed the show. He said that it had been very nice, but that the same technique was available in Moscow, except that there were no lines on the film, as there had been on the one we
had shown.

We were in frequent contact with other Western Embassies, particularly the British and also the French, Australians and Canadians. We taught the Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders at our language school in Yokohama. The British had a different tutorial system which they had maintained for many years. At one point, the French asked whether they could send some of their officers to the Yokohama school, but we decided that our training was designed for English speakers and that from a tutorial point of view, it would be very difficult to assimilate speakers of a third language.

Q: In general, would you say that the Embassy in Tokyo in the mid ’50s was an effective operation?

SHERMAN: I was still a very inexperienced officer. This was my first embassy assignment. I thought the Embassy was a good one. We worked well together. We had some brilliant officers assigned there. Sam Berger was essentially removed after a visit by Vice President Nixon in late 1953, before I had actually been assigned to the Embassy, although I had some liaison responsibilities for the visit because of our military presence in the Yokohama district.

Nixon visited Japan and gave a speech urging Japan to amend its constitution to remove the "no war" clause in light of the great threat to civilization posed by the communists. The speech went over like a big lead balloon. The Japanese wouldn't even consider such an idea, although it was American policy to push them in that direction. During that visit, Nixon had Embassy briefings that are normally provided to high ranking American visitors. I am told, not having been present, that during one of these briefings, Berger was alleged to have said that the Communist Party in Japan was not a threat, but rather it was the Socialists that were a danger. Sam was a conservative on foreign policy issues, having been a member of the AFL-CIO. His claim to fame had been that as Labor Attaché in London he was the only person in the Embassy who had any connections with the Labor government when it took power. That situation is supposed to have changed Foreign Service policy about having regular contacts with opposition parties.

Nixon was reported to having taken serious offense at Berger's views, stating that anybody anywhere who thought that a Communist Party or member was not a threat to the United States had no business being in the Foreign Service, much less a Political Counselor at a major Embassy. He also is said to have indicated that in any case there were too many Jews as Labor Attachés and Labor Counselors. I heard this story directly from someone who was present at the meeting. So shortly after I reported for duty at the Embassy, Sam Berger was transferred as DCM in Wellington. He was replaced by George Morgan, who had been the author of a major piece published in Foreign Affairs, which was a follow-on to George Kennan's famous article. George was very scholarly and not very imaginative. He had none of the flamboyance that Sam had. That made the Political Section a somewhat duller place and it ran at a slower pace.

Q: Did the officers stationed in the Far East feel neglected by Washington, which has always been accused of being Euro-centric?

SHERMAN: Not really, because Dulles had a great interest in the Far East and particularly
Japan. That was not always a benign interest from Japan's point of view. The recent State Department Historical Office's release of its series on Asia (1955-57) includes a long memorandum of conversation which I wrote after attending a meeting between Dulles and the Japanese high command. At the time we had considered and had decided to return the Bonin Islands to Japan. This was a small group belonging essentially to the Ogasawara Island chain, which we had occupied with a small contingent of Navy personnel. They were supposed to be of some strategic significance; they were supposed to have had some submarine pens, which eventually was discovered not to have been the case, but the Navy had been determined to hold on to them. The process leading up to the decision to return the islands was a big inter-agency battle, but finally common sense won out. There had been about 500 people on the Bonin Islands who had been evacuated to Japan, and after a number of very cold winters in Tokyo wanted to return to those forsaken but nevertheless warm dots on the map. They wanted to return to their homes, such as they were. We had permitted repatriation only of descendants of so-called original settlers -- Portuguese and some people from Massachusetts. The original settlers had of course inter-married with Japanese, but their descendants had names like Gonzales and Savory -- certainly not Japanese. We had somehow reached the conclusion that people with names like that had been the descendants of the original settlers and were therefore eligible for return, but that was not to be so for people with Japanese family names.

So Dulles came to Tokyo and, as recorded in my long memorandum, met with senior Japanese officials. I was not the official interpreter, but I was asked to attend the meetings under the guise of being the note-taker so that I could overhear and understand what the Japanese were saying among themselves. Dulles started by saying that we had reached the decision to return the Bonin Islands, but that on his trip to Japan he had changed his mind. That caught everyone's attention, although it was not received favorably by the Japanese. Everybody was wondering what was going on because the Japanese had fully expected a "done deal". Then Dulles proceeded to say that the U.S. government had decided to make available to the Japanese a certain amount of fissionable material to be used in research reactors. That was supposed to be a sop to the Japanese, who had been interested in having such material, but it was not certainly an acceptable alternative to the return of the Bonin Islands. Hatoyama was the Prime Minister at the time. A Diet member, Frank Matsumoto -- a native Japanese, raised in the United States -- was being used as a translator. He was of course bilingual. At one moment in the discussion, Frank looked over to me and said: "Bill, what is Japanese for "fissionable material"? I had no idea how that term was expressed in Japanese, but I had been reading the newspapers' headlines which had been discussing enriched uranium. So I suggested that the term "enriched uranium and things like that" be used to explain fissionable material. All the Japanese nodded their agreement. Dulles turned and looked at me, with an approving glance. Walter Robertson, who was then the Assistant Secretary for East Asia, passed me a note saying that it was most important that the discussion be translated accurately. My reputation was made! There was never any question thereafter about my Japanese language competence.

Q: Just one more question about the 1954-57 period. How would you characterize U.S.-Japan relationships during this time?

SHERMAN: I would say that those relationships were positive. The U.S. still considered itself as the mentor and the Japanese, at least in part, accepted that view. They saw the U.S. as its
principal ally -- its only serious ally. They saw their fate totally bound to U.S. policies and were determined to maintain a close relationship at all costs. They did have their own agenda with their own objectives and were beginning to move towards them. They were looking forward to the day when they could exercise their complete independence, when their economy would be self-sustaining, although they never in the 50’s foresaw or even aspired to become a world power, certainly not in military terms or even political.

On the economic front, the Japanese were rebuilding their base. The advent of the Korean war certainly provided an additional boost since Japan was used as a logistic base for the U.N. operations, but I can still remember that during my Yokohama tour, we were providing free advertising space in Department of Commerce publications for Japanese looking for export opportunities to the U.S. I actually went looking for Japanese to use this free service, especially among those firms that were already in the export business, like paper flowers or handicrafts. At times, I even suggested some approaches to increase exports to the United States. Dulles maintained that there wasn't anything made in Japan of interest to the American consumer. It’s amusing to see how well he understood what was beginning to happen.

WALTER NICHOLS  
Public Affairs Officer, USIS  
Kobe (1952-1954)

Public Affairs Officer, USIS  
Tokyo (1954-1958)

Walter Nichols was born in Tokyo in 1919 and was raised in Japan until the age of 15. He attended Harvard University but never completed his degree, accepting a commission in the U.S. Navy just before the outbreak of World War II. Mr. Nichols worked for USIA and the majority of his assignments were in Japan. He was interviewed on October 10th, 1989, by G. Lewis Schmidt.

NICHOLS: That didn't take as long as I thought it would, and about a month after we had returned to Washington, I was signed on at State, given three or four days of general--very general--orientation, and packed off to Tokyo with my family. That was in April, 1952, and all I knew about my first assignment was that I was to be stationed in Kobe at the Consulate General there.

Q: Did they provide you with much orientation as to the nature and mission of USIA?

NICHOLS: Virtually none. It was about 100 percent standard State Department stuff that had very little relation to what I ended up doing.

Q: Well, I hope we were able to brief you sufficiently about USIS, and our plans for the Japan program during your week of orientation with us in Tokyo en route to Kobe.
NICHOLS: Oh, you needn't ever have worried about that! I'd like to say right here for the record that of all the senior officers I served under during all my years, in that Japan program, I owe my greatest thanks to you, Lew, for all your help, particularly in my first year or so in USIS. That was because though I was technically supposed to relate directly to the staff of Pat Van Delden--the Field Operations Supervisor--and of course owed a lot to her, too, for excellent guidance on program development--I quickly discovered when I got to Kobe that we had at first to resolve a mountain of logistic, financial, and purely operational problems before we could hope to develop much in the way of substantive programming. And those were considerations Pat wasn't particularly interested in or capable of handling. So I appreciated her allowing me to go directly to you for help in such matters, which, God knows, would have driven you mad if you didn't happen to be such a knowledgeable, competent and resourceful person.

Q: When the tape ended, you had just arrived in Kobe to take over this new assignment.

NICHOLS: Right. I had learned in Tokyo that the field program outside Tokyo was, as you know, based on the operations of what we call the American Cultural Centers. Formerly the military libraries during the Occupation which in each consular district were handled by a public affairs officer stationed at the consulate general, the consulate. So I was in charge of the Kobe consulate general program for the consular region of the Kobe consulate general, which included all of the prefectures, eleven prefectures, I believe it was, from Wakayama--you want me to give all these?

Q: I think if you say...

NICHOLS: We had seven centers in key cities: Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, Matsuyama and Takamatsu and Okayama.

Q: Didn't you have--you didn't have Kyushu?

NICHOLS: No, from the border of Hiroshima/Yamaguchi south and west was under the jurisdiction of the Fukuoka consulate general. But I had the area with the largest number of centers, and the largest amount of territory. And that was--I spent two interesting years down there, very interesting. I got to like the work very much, I was learning it as I went along. I think probably one of the reasons I got along so well was I had the unbelievably helpful support of a secretary who seemed to know everything about USIS, Charlotte Loris. I'm sure you may remember her.

Q: As a matter of fact, we interviewed Charlotte just a couple of months ago when she was here, when she was in Washington for the annual USIA Alumni Association dinner. And I just turned in her interview to the recipients about a month or so ago.

NICHOLS: That's interesting. Well, believe me, I was sitting down there way down in the southern part of Japan, far away from Tokyo, with only a general orientation that I'd been given, and no previous experience dealing with any of the administrative aspects of the Foreign Service and the State Department or anything. I had the consular staff that could help me out with those things, of course, but any time I was up the creek I'd just turn to Charlotte and say, "Well, how
do you do this kind of thing?". And she'd say, "Let me take care of it," or she'd take care of it. But I learned that way really from someone with her experience sort of how to handle the administrative aspects, which I'd never had to handle before.

And as for the program, it was a fascinating period in U.S.-Japanese history. The Japanese were on their own now. But even after the peace treaty, they relied very heavily on us for lots of things, especially help and advice in things like education and development of libraries and things like that. Of course our program was more politically than culturally oriented, but we didn't have any problems in that connection at that time.

Q: Let me ask you, you must have had a lot of contacts in Japan, both by virtue of your having grown up there at least about to the middle of your teens and also by virtue of having lived in the Kobe-Osaka, I mean Kobe-Kyoto-Osaka area--the Kansai. And then you must have had some contacts based also on your work for the religion section of GHQ SCAP. Did those contacts stand you in good stead during the period of your service there in Kobe? Or did you have a chance to utilize them?

NICHOLS: Well, yes and no, Lew. I'd have to say no, they didn't serve me any good stead in respect to the contacts I'd had as a child, because I'd just gone through ninth grade there and had been in the boarding school. So I didn't know many of the parents of the students who were there, and of course they'd all scattered to the four winds and those people were gone, too.

And as for my family's contacts, I think at the age of 15 and having been in boarding school since the age of 9, that I didn't have any personally strong contacts with any of the people they'd known, or even--I couldn't even say I knew a great many of them at all by name. The contacts I had during the Occupation were very useful, but in a limited sense because they had been primarily with religious people. People in this walk of life swing a lot of weight, and in places like Kyoto, particularly, I knew both the abbots of the Nishi Honganji and Higashi Honganji, the largest Buddhist sects in Japan. And they were about as political as you can get. But it was more in the cultural sense that these contacts were useful, because as you know the famous shrines and temples usually are the seat of cultural and artistic matters; that's where you find the great gardens in Kyoto and things like that. So I had access to an awful lot of openings through those contacts.

Q: Through contacts that you'd made during the Occupation with the religious...

NICHOLS: That's right. And these were not contacts that my parents had made because I don't think they ever had much in the way of contacts with Shinto.

Q: I'd like to ask you another question in this regard. You of course had a very useful capability in the Japanese language. Now at one point you told my wife, Kyoko, that your Japanese did not, perhaps, have the kind of depth that would enable you to enter into extensive discussion of deep political or economic subject matter. It was a useful conversational Japanese but not in that kind of depth.

NICHOLS: That's true.
Q: My question is, despite this fact, did you find that your knowledge of Japanese was of great utility to you in carrying out the duties that you were undertaking in the Kobe area?

NICHOLS: That it was useful? Oh, yes. Well, basically, though, Lew, what I think I told Kyoko was absolutely true. Even to this day, I think, my ability in Japanese isn't sufficient to enter into a very serious discussion of things that are philosophical or very difficult political subjects. But as the language--I forgot to say that of course during the period of the Occupation my Japanese language had increased by leaps and bounds as my vocabulary expanded tremendously. Vocabulary expansion also occurred during my war experience in Naval intelligence. Because when I left Japan at the age of 15 I was just a kid and it was a child's language I was speaking, whereas during the Occupation after all that time and during this period in the USIS in Japan, in the early days, I was exposed to an awful lot more adult conversation and picked up a greatly increased vocabulary that enabled me to get along with people and get into subjects I could not have handled earlier, but still, not complex subjects in much depth. But I could understand much more than I could say. This is the real difficulty. I could absorb and understand pretty well what someone else might be saying. The difficulty is in producing it yourself. Because unless you know the language very, very well you have to just use sort of--you skirt around the subject by trying to explain it in A, B, C terms rather than using the more sophisticated terms that are requisite for a certain level of intelligence. And so it's very difficult.

Q: Of course Japanese is an unusually difficult language because of all the permutations, the nuances, and various levels and of address...

NICHOLS: You know how I solved this problem? It wasn't a solution but I was fortunately in a position to do that. I had a very good assistant, who lived in Kyoto by the way and commuted daily from Kyoto, named Kumagai. He just showed up in my office one day and volunteered. He had been educated in the United States and he was a very wealthy man. He was at loose ends and he was still young and hardy and he was interested in public affairs, interested in politics. He was interested in culture. He was just the perfect assistant for me. But his English was also good enough so that he could understand me and convey it in Japanese, in appropriate Japanese, whatever I wanted to say on a subject. So I found more and more that I was relying on myself for understanding what somebody was saying, but always having him with me or someone like that with me, but preferably him because we worked as a team. Now if someone else were talking about a subject and got into difficult things I could generally follow it pretty well but I'd sometimes say, did I understand this correctly, this, this and this. But then I spoke, I spoke in English and Kumagai would interpret. And even later when I transferred to the embassy to work that is what I did, with Sen Nishiyama as my interpreter most of the time. I could really understand almost everything. There it wasn't quite so difficult. It was mostly talking about administrative things. Sometimes, for example, subjects were a bit too complex, but most of the things I could understand, and most of the things I could explain my position on, but not when it came to something really deep. This is what I'm trying to say. …

Q: Do you have any particular recollections as to any especially effective programs that you've carried out during that period that you were supervising the area of Kobe?
NICHOLS: Well. Let me say, I was only there for two years in the Kobe area, Lew, which is a short time, when you figure that the program was starting from scratch, that nothing was being done till I got there. You may recall, you were already--you had already leased properties for the center in Osaka and things like this, but I mean the program hadn't gotten underway in the sense of coordination of any kind. And we had--every one of our centers was directed by a lady, a woman, you may recall, except for one.

Q: During the Occupation period.

NICHOLS: Because they were the librarians for the CI & E libraries. They were very good librarians and they were very fine people. But for the kind of program that we had in mind, they just obviously weren't going to ultimately be the kind of candidates we were looking for. But it took quite a time to replace them adequately with male officers. And I don't mean that I'm--well...

Q: No, given the Japanese culture, its understandable.

NICHOLS: You have to face it, in Japan--yes. You have to face it, the Japanese are ill at ease, men are ill at ease dealing on an equal level in any sort of administrative or substantive sense with foreign women. Or any women. That's changing a lot now, believe me, but in those days we had a real handicap there. So it was very slow developing in terms of the cultural centers. We were trying to convert them more to information libraries, you may recall. They had thousands and thousands of books that really made them very good libraries, but we were getting to the point of trying to weed them out so they were less impressive in terms of their size and more useful in terms of the content and the selection of material for public information purposes, let's say.

So the development of the libraries was very slow. But I feel that the programs that developed around the centers was the most important thing we did in Japan in those days, except for the key things done in Tokyo, of course, that no field office could ever do.

But in terms of the outreach to the general public, I think those libraries were absolutely effective and extremely useful. But the answer to your question would have to be, I think the most useful thing that I was able to do, I felt that I had accomplished, if you want to put it that way, was the grant program, the exchange grant program. Because my area was rather large, I got a very substantial slice of the grants allocated to the field posts.

There was a big question of how to go about utilizing these grants. This is not really my idea at all, it originated with Mr. Kumagai, so I’m going to give him all the credit. But we discussed and discussed and discussed how to use these relatively small number of grants intelligently in such a large area. I think he came up with a brilliant idea and it worked out very well in the long run. He said, well, of course we should give some grants, say, to maybe a journalist and maybe to some promising young politician or somebody, well, things like that, but basically he felt the most effective way to use a limited number of grants would be to establish a long-term program in the academic field, operating out of Kyoto University.
Now, he, you may recall, lived in Kyoto and had a lot of very important contacts there, including the heads of all the universities in the area. And his point was that all of the academic positions, you might say, of importance in that general region were subject to Kyoto University in the sense that all the deans and professors who held those academic positions had been Kyoto University students and had been nominated by their professors from Kyoto University. In other words, just as Tokyo University has heavy influence on all the other Japanese universities, Kyoto University had the greatest impetus, you might say, or influence through the universities in that whole Kinki area, so whatever happened at Kyoto University was going to affect them in the long run.

And so to give one or two grants maybe outside, maybe to a professor at Hiroshima University, or so forth, but to concentrate over a period of years by allocating, say, at least one grant a year or two grants a year to Kyoto University on a highly selective basis. And the problem was how to select these people. I agreed in principle that--this involved a plan for about four or five years, each year selecting somebody, at least one, from Kyoto University. We said we ought to start at the level of promising professors who were highly recommended by the senior faculty. Well, the serious question that then came up was how we could go to the faculty and ask for nominations when we couldn't guarantee a visa, because of the security clearances. This was the McCarthy era, you may recall.

So we discussed that and he finally said, well, I can get us around that. I said, well, what's that? He said, we'll go to the president of the University, and I want you to come with me and we'll level with him, tell him what our plan is and I'm sure he'll be very pleased and think it's a good idea and be very much for it. And you're going to have to tell him that what you want him to do is to nominate from his own faculty each year someone he really considers a real comer for the future in Kyoto University, but not to tell him he's nominating him until we find out if we can get a visa for him.

I thought, boy, if there's anything verboten, that's it. But I said okay and I went along with him. So we went over and called on the president of the University and, by God, he said, I quite understand, after all, he reads the newspapers. And we explained. He understood what we were trying to do and he said he approved and appreciated it very much. So he said, I will do that, and I don't tell anybody about this discussion, I won't tell anybody that he's been nominated until you come and tell me you can give him a grant. So that's what we did. I put in an advance on his nominations, his names, and got this thing started. It ran right through Cliff Forster's tenure as Branch PAO in Kobe. But, my God, you know, by about the fifth year he nominated young people who weren't deans yet, you know, but every single one of these from Kyoto University ended up as deans, every single one, and none of them ever knew about this program until we could give them a visa.

They learned a hell of a lot from this kind of exchange exposure to America, and we had a very good thing going for us in the academic field down there by approaching it this way, which was really not "according to Hoyle." I was terrified that this would leak out at some point and the next thing you know you'd be reading a newspaper about some big arrangement. But it never leaked. Never did. And Cliff Forster, if you ever talk to him about this, will agree that he was the beneficiary, because when he got there, the dean of economics, the dean of history, all these guys had been on this grant program.
As I say, that wasn't my idea, but my feeling was that the decision I made to go along with Kumagai was right, and I take credit because I don't know that anyone else would have made that decision--it was really risky. The president could have kicked us out, just said no, but Kumagai said, no, I know him very well and I'm sure he won't. But, boy, what a gamble. What do you think would happen today?

Q: In the pre-war period of course there were a great many of the professors who were pretty far to the left...

NICHOLS: Yes.

Q: ...and there was still a large number of them in that category, even in the immediate post-war period who managed to shut up about their views and listen.

NICHOLS: Yes.

Q: And I would guess that that same situation existed even at the time you started this program.

NICHOLS: Oh, very definitely.

Q: So it would be understandable that there might be a number of them who wouldn't pass muster, particularly in the McCarthy and immediate post-McCarthy era. As far as you knew...

NICHOLS: I think we had one case, I think we did. I think we had to go back to him and say, very sorry. And he said--well. I think there was one case.

Q: As far as you know, these people who finally got the grants to the United States, if they weren't necessarily pro-American after their Stateside exposure at least they were understanding and were probably a great plus for us in the...

NICHOLS: Oh, yes. They weren't blatantly pro-American at all. The president picked them on the basis of merit. We had asked him to find people that he thought genuinely could benefit from such an exposure and that was one point, this was essential. If he didn't think they could benefit from it, there's no point in our admitting them. The second point was that there were no strings attached. If the person could get a visa, we were not concerned about his politics, because we'd take it for granted that he'd been a member of the Communist Party or something that the fact would show up somewhere during his security check. We weren't concerned whether he was oriented left, right or what, but we wanted the president's assurance that in his opinion this was a man who had all the capability of rising to the top in the structure of the university. And he said, okay. And they--every single one of them ended up as deans.

Q: I wonder--the assumption must be that since the deans of Kyoto University spread out their appointments of their prize students and their prize underlings to other universities, at least some of this influence then penetrated the other universities to which they were ultimately assigned.
NICHOLS: This was exactly Kumagai's theory, that instead of, say, giving a grant to Okayama University, somebody we picked out of a hat, just because the center director knows him and says he's a great guy, I'd like to have him... If we approached it this way in the academic field--allowing for maybe one wildcard grant somewhere else--if we approached it this way as a plan, we would be influencing ultimately these other universities and the kind of people coming out of that program ultimately to be in senior positions. Because that's the way it goes. They all get their jobs, through their deans. So we've always had, as far as I know, very good relations with Kyoto University since that time. But that struck me, when you started asking me what I might have been able to contribute, was a negative kind of contribution of going along with Kumagai. It was his idea.

Q: No, I don't think...

NICHOLS: When I heard it I thought it was a damn good idea, but I never told anybody in Tokyo anything about this. I just was so afraid that if--and I've seen this happen before--you mention something like this to somebody, the next thing you know somebody comes up and says, hey, you can't do that.

Q: Somebody is bound to say, gee whiz, we've worked out a really excellent program and...

NICHOLS: Next thing you know ... 

Q: ...Nichols down there with Kumagai worked it out, the president of the University did this, that... No, I think you're absolutely right.

NICHOLS: My experience in the security during the war with this communications intelligence experience stood me in good stead. You just don't trust anybody. You know, you weren't allowed to tell anybody where you worked or what you did. Someone would say, "Oh, I checked in over there. What are you in?" Well, I'm in the gunnery or research, or some other obscure area.

Q: Did you establish any other kinds of grants and get any production out of them, say with the media in Kobe?

NICHOLS: Oh, yeah. Sure. We sent press people. We sent governors. We sent people who became governors. The best one we had was--we had very good relations that I helped work out with Governor Kaneko of Kagawa Prefecture, in Takamatsu.

Q: He remained, by the way, a governor for years and years.

NICHOLS: Oh, yes, he's still going strong, but he's been very ill. I think he may be dead now.

Q: No, he's not.


Q: I interviewed Harry Kendall last winter...
NICHOLS: Yeah, well Kendall was down there.

Q: And Kendall says he's no longer governor but...

NICHOLS: Oh, no, he's been out of office, he's been very ill, too.

Q: Harry sees him every once in a while, because Harry made a great name for himself in Takamatsu. And when they opened that bridge across the Inland Sea, a year or so ago, they invited Harry and his wife over there.

NICHOLS: Good, I'm glad.

Q: To participate in the ceremonies.

NICHOLS: That's Kaneko. He was just crazy about Harry. But Cliff Forster was the one who, when he was there as my successor--there was somebody between me and him. There was another guy. Jerry, I can't remember his name.

Q: You mean as the supervisor in that area?

NICHOLS: As the Regional PAO.

Q: Well, Jerry Novick was there.

NICHOLS: Novick, yes.

Q: He's dead now.

NICHOLS: Yes, well, he followed me didn't he?

Q: Yes, he followed you.

NICHOLS: He followed me and then Cliff followed him, I think.

Q: I think so, yes.

NICHOLS: So Cliff was the one who nominated Kaneko for a leader grant.

Q: Yes.

NICHOLS: And he went. So in other words, this was by no means--I didn't mean to give the impression we flooded this program with academics.

Q: No, I didn't mean to imply that you did.
NICHOLS: Oh, sure. We got people in public affairs. I can tell you the funniest story about Hiroshima and an academic in Hiroshima, though, that's--you ever hear this story? You want to turn that off?

Q: Why? Is this something you don't want on tape?

NICHOLS: I don't know.

Q: Why don't you go ahead with it. If you decide later it ought to be cut out of the interview we can cut it.

NICHOLS: You know, we were always being asked for evidence of effectiveness. Well, you know what that's like, it's always a problem. I think this story is one of the best I've ever heard in terms of communications, anyway.

Fazl Fotouhi, when he was down there wanted very much to send a dean of the Hiroshima university--I've forgotten what dean he was, literature or something, I guess--to the States on a grant, so I gave him a grant. Now this fellow didn't speak any English at all, but anyway, he went, and of course his group was escorted with interpreters when they were in the States. So when he came back he came to call on Fazl in the office. So Fazl had his interpreter there and the dean had his interpreter there and everything. When they went in, the dean came in and sat down and started to say something. The interpreter reacted but was hushed. "I talk, I talk," the dean says, in English. So he looks at Fazl and says, "Mr. Fotouhi, I, eh, uh, Mr. Fotouhi. Uh. Umm. Mr. Fotouhi. Oh, shit." That's literally what he said. He learned something over there. It's just a side joke but I've never forgotten it. Fazl, the interpreters and everybody laughed. He just wanted to try to speak a little English, he couldn't get beyond "Mr. Fotouhi."

Q: At least he learned a couple of words.

NICHOLS: Yes, that was the point. Anyway. I don't know. Could I have a break just a second?

Q: While we were off tape, you mentioned another story.

NICHOLS: Yes. You ought to hear this story.

Q: You mentioned that on one occasion you got Ambassador Murphy down there to visit Takamatsu and the governor and he had a meeting. You said there was quite a story connected with that trip. Would you mind going ahead and putting that on tape?

NICHOLS: Well, okay. This was quite a traumatic experience for me because as I said I had had very little experience in the State Department in public affairs, for that matter. When Ambassador Murphy decided to take a trip to Takamatsu and Matsuyama and see Shikoku, I was told by the people in Tokyo to go down there to set up all the arrangements and give them the dates and what not. It was going to be a very grand schedule. I won't go into all those details. But Kumagai and I went down there and talked to the governors, mayors and arranged for the
Ambassador's party to spend a night and a place on the train up to Takamatsu, from Matsuyama to Takamatsu. He was going to fly into Matsuyama...

Q: When the other tape ran out you were just saying that when Ambassador Murphy came down he had flown into Matsuyama and then was taken by train I guess up to Takamatsu, so will you pick it up from there?

NICHOLS: Okay. Well, he flew into Matsuyama, spent the evening, after giving a speech, then he went on to Takamatsu for the next night and gave a speech to the United Nations Association of Kagawa Prefecture that night, and then flew back to Tokyo. So flying into Matsuyama, flying back from Takamatsu with a train ride in between, six hour train ride. Well, this was quite a three days for him, and for me, because we had set everything up and it all ended up going as scheduled. But with many a slip between the cup and the lip.

Kumagai and I went on down with the consul general and stood at the airport and waited and waited. The plane from Tokyo was very much delayed. Finally it flew in. But in the meantime, after he had left Tokyo, but before the party had arrived, the news had broken that Stalin had died. There were a lot of reporters and people, there were radio stations and newspapers. They had picked up on the radio the news that Stalin had died, which was quite an event, of course. So all these reporters were having a fit because here comes the American ambassador who had been up in the air during all of this and they'd be the first people to have a chance to get him.

And so as the Ambassador left the plane they started storming him. We warned him this was what they had in mind. He says, "I don't want to talk to them, I don't want to talk to them." He says, "I have nothing to say, nothing to say, get in the cars and get off." So he got away with no comment. But later when it came to his speech at the dinner, there was no way of avoiding it because there they all were and they had a chance to ask questions so one of them got up and said, Mr. Ambassador--and they had it all translated in English, of course. In effect what he said is, we know of course that surely you must know that Stalin died earlier today and we would like to know if you have anything to say on the subject. And the Ambassador said, "Well, I have not personally been advised of this yet, officially, but you know I've heard lots of rumors about Stalin being dead from time to time and so far I haven't believed them. It could be true this time but I wonder if it is. But in any case, the only thing I have to say is if he is ill, I hope it's nothing trivial."

Well, they all wanted to know, what did it mean, "I hope it's nothing trivial?" The interpreter had a terrible time. So we finally had to just explain that, well, it's just a joke, that he doesn't take it seriously. We flubbed the whole thing, but got over that because they would have had a fit if they thought the American ambassador was saying something like that. Because they came back when they understood, they said they sort of thought that he hadn't said anything. So they said, do you know that Mr. Dulles had wired condolences and the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of England and the Prime Minister of Japan and everybody, everyone has been sending telegrams of condolence, and you have nothing more to say. He said, "I'm sorry, I told you what I had to say. Nobody asked me to send a telegram."

But that was about the way he brushed that off.
Otherwise everything went all right that night, but the next day was the train trip to Takamatsu. Governor Kaneko of Kagawa, where Takamatsu is, the capital of the prefecture, had come down to get on the train and ride the last three hours back with us because he had something very important to say. So we got on the train, and halfway up there the governor got on the train and we had a three-hour session with Ambassador Murphy. It soon became very clear that the governor had a real problem on his hands. And I had to do all the interpreting for this because he didn't want anyone else, he didn't want any other Japanese involved in this at that point, not even Kumagai.

So we sat and discussed this thing and his problem was that they had a little airfield in Takamatsu.

Q: They had what?

NICHOLS: A little airfield, you know, an airport. Of course there were no commercial planes flying in and out of it, in fact no planes flying in and out of it at all, just the strip that had been left by the military. But this strip was built on land that had been confiscated from the farmers of the area during the war to build an airstrip for military planes to land for emergency purposes. And there was great agitation now that the war was over to give the land back to the farmers and let them have it to turn it into farm land again. This had come to a head recently and now that the American ambassador was coming, there was really going to be a problem because he said, "I must confess that we have been holding out and refusing to accept their petitions for return of the land by telling them that we have been told that the American air force will need this for the similar purposes of emergency landings and things like that so that we have no control over the land at all, it's being held at the request of the United States government, which of course is not true." The Ambassador said, "This is the first I've heard of this." The Governor said, "Well, I'm just trying to be very honest with you. I just have to tell you this because they're all going to be demonstrating tomorrow and they are going to be asking you to turn them back the airport and you wouldn't understand what it's all about." So he said, "Can you possibly agree to get me off the hook in other words, by simply listening to their petitions and protests and if you're asked for comment simply saying, 'Well, I really don't know the details of this matter but I will certainly look into it when I get back to Tokyo' and then just go. Because, you see, your plane is going to come and land on that strip tomorrow. So this sounds like a good excuse, you see, for your saying something about this but you don't have to do anything other than say you'll look into it and not promise anything, but at least accept their petition. I wanted to let you know why they're petitioning and I am to blame."

So Murphy laughed and said, "Well, I've never heard anything like this. Okay, all right, all right. We'll see what happens. I'll just say, 'I haven't heard of it before and I'm going to look into it when I get back to Tokyo' and I won't be surprised." So Governor Kaneko said, "Ah, thank goodness."

So sure enough we got off the train and went to the banquet hall after going to the hotel, and he gave a very good speech. This was the United Nations Association of Takamatsu. While he was giving the speech another message came in from Tokyo and believe it or not this one was more
shattering than the one about Stalin. The message was that they just received word that Murphy had been assigned to be Ambassador to the United Nations, so he would be leaving Tokyo very shortly. So at the end of his speech to the UN Association he said, I just got this telegram during this dinner, the coincidence is really fantastic, what a three days.

But anyway, that night he got back to the hotel and there was a mob scene out in front of the hotel, all these farmers and everything with all kinds of signs. What the signs said was, things like this, Dear Mr. Ambassador. Please arrange to give us back our farmland. Please abolish the airport. And things like this. And it turned out that, guess where they'd been? They'd been to our center all afternoon, asking how to write these things in English. So they were all written in very good English, very polite English. Dear Sir.

The center director had told them all what to write. But he said what they wanted the signs to say and very politely. Without knowing anything about this, anything about the airport, but just as a courtesy. So our center was involved.

But anyway, they came and the head man wanted to see the ambassador and somebody came out and said, no, no, he won't see anybody. But, by God, Murphy appeared. He said he had heard something out here, what was this all about? And we told him it was the people about the airport. He said, "Oh, all right, I'll be happy to see them." And so the head man came in with about 10 other people and waited at the front of the hotel. All he wanted to do was hand him this written petition and explain it's about the airport. So Murphy said, "Thank you very much, I'll accept the petition. I haven't read it yet, should I read it now?" And they said, "Oh, no, you can read it later." So he said, "Thank you very much, I will do so." And then he went back into the house and they all left very happy because the important thing was to have left some piece of paper, whether he read it or not, the gesture of having called on him and left this protest. And of course the protest was very mild, whatever it was. Basically they believed that he could be instrumental in getting them back their airport.

So the next morning the plane came in from Tokyo, they were all at the airport, and all the way to the airport were all these former demonstrators lined up with their signs. And at the airport was the chief of the local agricultural group, whatever it was, union or something, all the important guys that were on the protest side standing around there with their signs. The same man in front, you know, who'd given him the pitch the night before. Well, several senior officers and their wives had gotten on the airplane and Murphy was still shaking hands with the governor, when he suddenly said, "Hi, I saw you last night at the hotel." He says to the governor, "Listen, I have an idea. Ask them how they'd like to have an airplane ride." Governor Kaneko was having a fit. He said, "You don't have to do anything like that." But Murphy persisted, "No, no, these people might enjoy seeing Takamatsu from the air and it might give them some idea of how important air connections are." So Governor Kaneko said, "Oh, yes, by all means."

So Murphy ordered everybody off the plane--the staff officers and their wives who had already gotten on--and said to the Japanese dignitaries, "Be my guests. Why don't we take about 10 of you?" So about 10 of the key people in this demonstration group got on the plane and Murphy got on the plane and I got on the plane and he told the pilot to take off. We flew all around, looked at Takamatsu from the air, the castle and the bay and the mountains and everything. And
these people were just bowled over because they'd never been up in a plane. They came down safely and Murphy had made some friends out of these people.

And then, the Ambassador and his party flew off for Tokyo. But this performance really struck me. I had a great deal of admiration for Murphy. He didn't know a thing about Japan but I think he was one of the best ambassadors we have ever had there, simply because of the kind of person he was. This happening was a good illustration of his tolerance and resourcefulness but it's another illustration of the kind of adaptability Murphy displayed. I don't know how anyone could have anticipated this sequence of problem events: like Stalin dying or Murphy being transferred, and then to have this demonstration. I learned pretty fast through things like this all kinds of tricks of the diplomatic trade. But I'll never forget Governor Kaneko for his business of coming down to meet Murphy and having the nerve to ask Murphy to put up with this fraudulent business of saying he would look into it. Which of course he told them he would. The airport now is a very big airport there and it's really brought Takamatsu right into the mainstream.

*Q:* So they never got...

NICHOLS: But it wouldn't have been given back--it's the same land. And the farmers are very glad of it now I guess.

*Q:* They never got their land back.

NICHOLS: They never got their land back, but they did get compensation and there were no more petitions, and Kaneko's neck was saved. But I'll tell you, there was a man who made a lifetime friend out of Kaneko for the United States.

*Q:* I'm sure he did.

NICHOLS: Well, that's been a long story, but it was a baptism of fire for me to have this kind of experience and to sort of learn by leaps and bounds. Suddenly, you know, well, gee, these kinds of things can be involved.

*Q:* I can't imagine somebody like Allison having done that.

NICHOLS: Oh, no. This man, Murphy, was just fantastic.

*Q:* He was really upset by his appointment as U.S. Ambassador to the UN He had gone out to Japan with the understanding that he'd be spending a three to five year period there. That news just really knocked him off his feet.

NICHOLS: Oh, he was upset when he got this telegram. And the sheer coincidence of it coming just as he had addressed the UN Society of Takamatsu.

*Q:* One of the things I meant earlier when I asked you what kind of contact you had with the media was did you have any occasion during the period that you were there, or did the people in the center, operating out of the center, have any occasion to talk to journalists whenever
necessary to try to get any American points of view or policy points of view across to the media? With the hope that U.S. policies could, perhaps, be better explained by the Japanese press, so that the Japanese public would then be informed of exactly what the true situations were?

Nichols: Well, naturally it was part of our standing instructions operationally to do that. And I think that all the center directors did to a certain extent, in all those centers in my area. I did to some extent. But the local media for some reason weren't all that interested in national politics. I mean, the kind of people we related with. You know, the people down there in the Kansai don't feel any great interest in this kind of--the international matters are all the concern of Tokyo. The Kansai people felt very much out of it. So there weren't many people you could pick out as outstanding in terms of ability to influence the country through anything they wrote in the press sense. We worked very closely with media in all kinds of public relations operations, knew a lot of them and knew the presidents of the newspapers and everything of course because they were invited to everything like the opening of the new centers, etc. We had good contacts with them, but I must confess that I never ran into a press man with whom I thought it would be worthwhile sitting down and trying to engage in discussion of some kind of international problem, because they hardly ever wrote about it. Most of that sort of material came directly from Tokyo or Osaka--you know, canned stories on international affairs and similar matters.

Q: I thought there might have been in such papers in Osaka.

Nichols: Asahi and Mainichi?

Q: Uh-huh.

Nichols: Of course their headquarters were both theoretically there, I mean originally. But by that time, everything was happening in Tokyo. You know, to Japan, that's the window of the outside world. I just don't think many stories of that kind were generated locally. They relied always for information from the people at the "source." They were interested in carrying cultural things and things like that and not so much about politics. But frankly, no, I don't think we did very well. I think maybe we did much better when Cliff was there some years later. I don't know about Jerry Novick. When Cliff was there he worked very closely with the press, but to what extent on political things I don't know.

Q: Well, of course later on the regional newspapers became much more sophisticated.

Nichols: Sure, oh, yes.

Q: The times we are discussing were those fairly close to the end of the Occupation and they hadn't fully recovered from being heavily under the guidance, under the oversight of the Tokyo papers.

Nichols: Right. Censorship, too.

Q: And also of the Occupational Forces.
NICHOLS: Yes, that's right. I don't think I ever felt that there was much mileage to be gotten out of trying to cultivate the press down there because if it got published at all it'd be in some little column in some back page somewhere. Magazines, we had a lot to do with magazines. Now they were somewhat different, but then, of course, the major magazines, the influential magazines, are all in Tokyo.

Q: Even some years later, too.

NICHOLS: Yes.

Q: I think they may have had local editions of national papers back in operation at that time but I'm not sure.

NICHOLS: No, that's for press releases. Now, I hesitate to say this because I want to talk about Pat van Delden, who was a very fine person whom I admired a great deal and to whom I owe a lot, because she was the person who finally picked me to go to Tokyo to take her place, which, by the way, dumbfounded me. She was, as you may recall, very much into the business of working on and with the media. She was very strong on getting to and influencing the press. I used to argue with her a lot about the limitations on what we could accomplish by getting too heavily involved in passing out tracts like, for example, "Bloody Footsteps in Korea." We were getting all kinds of stuff like that out of our Publications Branch in Tokyo.

But most importantly, we were operating under the guise of cultural centers, and, as you may recall, I have always felt very strongly that it was very important to maintain, not a neutral but certainly an apolitical facade for the cultural centers, because it was the fact that they were indeed cultural centers that gave us our in with a significant and influential segment of the Kansai people.

Q: The centers were acceptable to...

NICHOLS: Acceptable to the community, so I was always against anything that would jeopardize that tie by being too political.

This had nothing to do with personal contacts center personnel might have had with local people of influence. But for the centers as U.S. institutions to pass out heavy anti-communist tracts would have been disastrous at that time. The one I can remember in particular was something about "Bloody Footsteps in Korea." Anti-communist stuff. We had a real go-round about that with Pat. But...

Q: Pat had just come out of the European background.

NICHOLS: Yes.

Q: Where the U.S. was completely remaking the German society...

NICHOLS: That's right.
Q: I think that was her introduction to media "propaganda" but she was highly influential in inaugurating a lot of those programs in Germany. You could do things in Germany you couldn't do, given the Japanese culture.

NICHOLS: Yeah. Well, I'm a great admirer of Pat van Delden's, really, believe me, but you asked me a question about this business of the press. That was always a big problem for us and I think all the people in the field, because there's no question in my mind that the place to operate with the press was out of the embassy in Tokyo. There you have backup, you have everything. Out in the prefectures all we could do was go with something that we were given as an instruction sheet, or some text or something to work with, and you're sort of flying blind if you get any real questions in depth.

But Pat was rather insistent because she was so imbued with this sort of secretive aspects of media manipulation. One time she actually told me to call her back from a pay phone, not from the consulate pay phone, even, not from the consulate general phone which is supposed to be secure, but to go to a regular pay phone down in the dock area and call her at a certain time like at 10:00 at night and she had a very important message for me. So I said to myself, wow, what's happening.

Anyway, I went down there and the message was in effect that she had arranged for delivery to all of us in the region some, I don't know, thousand copies of some tract like "Footsteps in Korea," a very anti-communist thing. She herself realized from some of the things we had been saying that we wanted to be very discreet about how we got involved in this sort of activity. So she was being very discreet. But she wanted to let me know that she was sending this screed. She was calling all the RPAOs the same way, and these tracts would soon be arriving in an unmarked, big bale of stuff. "Don't let your staff open it if you feel that way about it, but we want you to figure out some way of getting this stuff into distribution."

Sure enough--I thought it was funny to have to go to a pay phone someplace, as if nobody would ever guess someone was making an important call from a public telephone. But anyway, that was all, that was the message. And so sure enough the packages arrived and sat there with ours and all the centers got them. She was mailing them to all the centers and I began getting frantic calls from all the center directors. I had called all of them in advance and said, "There's a package coming down and I really don't know what to tell you to do with it, but there's just no way you could sensibly dispose of, say, 100 or 200 copies of this kind of thing. I just really don't know what to tell you what to do with it, I haven't seen it myself yet, but I know it's coming in any time so be on the alert. Make sure you tell your staff you're expecting a package and you want it brought to you immediately so that nobody opens it, or something like that. Then you look at it and decide what you want to do locally."

Well, everybody handled it a different way. Some of them just looked at it and said, "Geez, I'm not going to have anything to do with this". Others did other things. The center director in Nagasaki felt he didn't want to have anything to do with it, however, he felt he was under obligation to do something with it. So he took the little station wagon we had, in the dead of night, midnight, put the package in the back of it and drove around town dropping 10 or 15
copies off at each street corner so the next morning he had this treatise distributed all over town, all in Japanese, of course. But he said he didn't think--he called me and said he'd done it. I said, "What?" He said, "I've got them all over town." I said, "My God, how did you do that?" He explained it. I laughed. But he did it.

This gives you some idea of some of the difficulties of executing an ordered action of that kind when you're basically a cultural enterprise on the front end and trying to find other ways of doing hard propaganda things without jeopardizing your reputation and status. I don't think we ever succeeded in finding a good way to balance these competing functions in that area, or anywhere through the centers. The centers just were too vulnerable. They were not for propagandistic lectures. You could if you had a visiting speaker who was a well-known authority in his field and he was well known to be violently anti-communist. In that case, it made no difference, because he was an authority. That's what they were coming to hear, no matter what he said. But to have a center director or we bureaucrats, you might say, running around with any such message was, I think, just counterproductive.

Q: Well, if the ambassador had been willing to say it, that could be something else again. They might have...

NICHOLS: Yes.

Q: ...Perhaps given it some degree of acceptance, even if they didn't agree with what was said. But I agree with you, I think the degree of acceptability--the official position of the individual who is saying it for the American side is the key point in Japan.

NICHOLS: And these articles were absolutely unattributed.

Q: When you moved the Nagano Seminar down to Kyoto and had these people from many different disciplines coming over to lecture, I suppose they were also accepted as authorities.

NICHOLS: Yes. And also, as time went by the local press became more and more influential because with experience they wanted to get into international subjects. Nowadays the local papers compete. So times change. …

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NICHOLS: Yes. Well--what was I going to say? Oh, yes. I was getting very comfortable and looking forward to staying on because I thought I was going to be there for a long time.

But when Pat called me up and said she wanted me to come to Tokyo and take her place, my first thought was, who, me? I don't have a clue what she's doing there. You know, I had been to Tokyo to conferences and things, and I was terribly impressed with what she was doing. I didn't see how I could possibly replace her; it was out of the question that I could do what she was doing. At first I was terribly worried about it. I didn't have enough experience I had only been exposed to her during conferences. I really told her I wanted to think it over. She said, "Well, of course, but it's a great opportunity." I said, "I'm sure it is." It just sort of bowled me over.
So I went to Dave Osborn who by that time was a political officer in the embassy.

Q: Dave, who had come down from Hokkaido?

NICHOLS: Yes, he had been consul and Principal Officer in Hokkaido. Yes, that's right. I went to Dave, who was a good friend of mine by that time and I said, "You're an FSO and you've had experience in USIS." (He had, I think in Taiwan. I don't know where for certain.) But, anyway, I said, "This is the proposition I've been given and my inclination is to turn it down because I have some doubts about my ability to handle it." He said, "I don't know what kind of advice you want, but I can give you some advice based on my own observations and experience, if that's what you want." I said, "That is what I want." He said, "Well, I would take it if for no other reason than the fact that if you don't you're going to find yourself sitting there for some time and not being considered again for a long time for some much better more exciting or interesting position. That's just the way it works."

This hadn't occurred to me. I thought about it and I finally said, "Well, I'll go up to Tokyo and talk to Pat and see what the story is." So I went up and talked to her, and she talked me into it. But what really persuaded me was what Dave said. I always felt I went under protest, but I'm very glad I did.

I was getting to feel real comfortable with the kind of contacts we had set up, like Kyoto University, and Kumagai was a fabulous guy to work with. I tried to--I asked if I could bring him up and she said, "Sure". But he wouldn't come. He said, "No, I don't want to get involved with those people in Tokyo. Kyoto's where I belong."…

Q: I don't think you had yet mentioned the name of--you had said it was the first big exhibit that we put on under the Commerce Department's aegis, so would you go on from there?

NICHOLS: All right. What I mean by that was it was not what you'd call an information exhibit. As I recall, it consisted primarily of machinery or equipment loaned for this purpose by various American companies in hope that it would help promote sale of their products in Japan. It was really a product show. And they hadn't had many of that nature before that. This was one of the very first and it was on a big scale. So it was, totally under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department, but they expected our exhibits branch, Mrs. Baker, Frances Baker, to arrange the layout and arrange the exhibition itself. Well, she, being a trained propagandist, you might say, having been in PsyWar all during the war, and working for USIS, she thought totally in terms of thematic exhibits. She in the first place didn't want to work on something, just designing booths with no cohesive thematic continuity. She felt that a program could be designed around this material that could be thematic and to which the Japanese would be more receptive. That was the big catch. She felt they'd be more receptive to a thematic approach than just a display of goods--and it could have a wider impact, in the press and everywhere else. I think I recall that she planned to have it involve the incorporation of some Japanese items, too, that related to some of the non-Japanese things being shown.
To make a long story short, this thing developed into a tremendous battle for decision one way or the other between a gentleman whose name I can't recall [Richard "Dick" Ericson], in the Commerce Section and Fran Blakemore and my staff, and all of us in USIS who got involved eventually and went down on her side. We agreed that to be effective, such an exhibit should to the extent possible have a theme, and be presented in a totality which an audience could appreciate, rather than just looking at certain machines that might be of interest to them and not others.

We went around and around and around, but we finally won the argument, a very bitter argument that went on for weeks. The exhibit was finally launched under the title "Partners in Progress". It was a very good title for that period because we were of course the senior partner at that time. It might be a little different today. The Japanese might put one on in the U.S. called "Partners in Progress" reversing the formula.

That exhibit was the forerunner of another, much larger, more spectacular, and more influential once called "Atoms For Peace". I think you mentioned it a few minutes ago when we were off tape.

Q: Yes, I definitely want to go into that at some length.

NICHOLS: This one was completely organized and run by Fran Blakemore on a thematic basis. It developed from an initially rather modest project into a tremendous thing. A year or so earlier, President Eisenhower had given a landmark speech on the concept of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Following up on the Eisenhower theme, the Agency had staged an enormous exhibit--the first of its kind--on "Atoms For Peace" in Geneva.

Never expecting to be able to replicate the Geneva show, we started out on a far less pretentious scale. Actually, we had absolutely nothing to start with, and I guess as our requests for assistance from Washington grew, the Agency must have decided to support us on a bigger scale with both advisory and materiel help. At what stage they decided to go all out, I don't know. At any rate, our ability to stage the blockbuster event became dependent entirely on whether we were able to get from the U.S. major actual or authentically simulated component parts of a real atomic reactor. To reach its objective, the exhibit had to be sufficient to present a clear, thematic picture of what an atomically operated generating plant was like, and what it would mean, to an audience of Japanese viewers which was conditioned to fear rather than understand the potential of atomic energy from A to Z, at least on a basic level. It became clear that if the exhibit was to be mounted at all, it should make the audience come out of the show feeling that atomic energy was going to be extremely important and could be used for highly productive and peaceful purposes, not just for bombs.

So, from a program priority point of view, it served many purposes. And it became a tremendous undertaking. A startling number of things began turning up not only from Washington, but from various other quarters of the U.S. that we were able to fit into the exhibit plan: valuable full scale models provided by major U.S. corporations, especially Westinghouse, which had built what I think was the first actual working atomic reactor at Shippingport, the pincers that handle radioactive material between shields, and many other important items.
It soon reached large proportions. In fact, it got to the point where we had enough material, and Fran was working on the thematic approach. You could walk in at the beginning and come out at the tail end, having had the whole exposure step by step so you would understand it. But now it was clear that the staging space requirements were going to be horrendous.

So you want me to go on with this, or am I supposed to...?

Q: Yes. Go ahead.

NICHOLS: This is where I got into the picture, because, as I have said, it was all being done by our Exhibits Branch, but when it got to be the problem of how to stage the thing, we had to have a sponsor, preferably a big newspaper to give it adequate publicity. USIS wasn't in a position to purchase either advertising or staging space. The cost would have been prohibitive. So I decided to go to the Yomiuri newspaper, simply because it was an adventurous newspaper, and--it was the third largest newspaper in Japan [In later years it became the largest from the standpoint of circulation.] at the time behind Asahi and Mainichi, maybe 10 million circulation a day in the morning edition. But also I went to them because it was headed by a man named Shoriki who had been the founder of the newspaper and liked to do innovative things. He was a one-man show. He ran that newspaper with an iron fist; he owned it, and everybody said yes, sir when he spoke. He wasn't the typical Japanese president of a newspaper who bows to the wishes of consensus. Or wouldn't think of violating the dictates of a consensus of the staff. He made all the decisions.

So I went down to see him with Ken Bunce in tow to sort of back me up because I thought he could help me to do more than I could do alone. I didn't understand atomic energy myself at all and he, I thought, could help me out. However, it didn't turn out to be necessary.

We were invited and sat through a board meeting that Shoriki had called for the occasion because we were coming to discuss this whole exhibit as a possible thing for his staff to do.

The interesting thing to me was that we were in luck because at that time the whole tone of all Japanese newspaper coverage of atomic energy was very negative in Japan. Discussions of nuclear powered generating plants and things like that were violently opposed by all the newspapers, including the Yomiuri up to that point. Anything to do with atomic energy of course was immediately associated with the atomic bombings and so it was virtually a taboo subject, at least certainly not one in which you'd expect to get any favorable support. But Shoriki had obviously thought about this for a while and, it seems certain he suddenly climbed onto the idea that if he could catch the other two major papers out in left field still promoting this bugaboo view of atomic energy, while he could bring the public around to a dramatic comprehension of both the commercial and peaceful potential for this powerful new genie, he would have scored a real coup and carved out a place in history for himself. Which he did because he ended up riding this thing all the way into being the first Atomic Energy Commissioner in the Japanese Cabinet.

Q: At what point for this support for the "Atoms for Peace" exhibit do you think he realized a potential of riding it into the Cabinet as the first Commissioner of Atomic Energy?
NICHOLS: I don't think he thought of that at first. Well, maybe he did. I don't know, he was a remarkable person. He was also the person who introduced baseball to Japan by bringing the Yankees out here with Lou Gehrig and Babe Ruth. I can remember seeing them when I was a kid in Kobe, play at the stadium. He was the first with television both black and white and color. Imaginative things like that. He had his own television network and radio network, besides the newspaper. He was a real media mogul. But I believe he was thinking in terms of the circulation and the competition with his two big rivals. Besides, it gave him a chance to twist the knife into them or something like that: to upset them.

I believe it was only later on, when the idea really caught on and I think to a large extent due to this exhibit, that there was possibility for safe nuclear power development in Japan, that he began to get the idea that maybe he could ride this even further, and take credit for it. And he got the credit, actually. But of course he had a lot of political clout. I don't know when he really thought of it. I don't think he thought of it at first. Pretty inconceivable to assume there would be an atomic energy commission when you're still battling your own staff to write favorable articles in the paper on atomic energy.

But that was an extraordinary meeting because it was an example of something I had never seen anywhere else in Japan, a one man decision against the whole arrayed opposition of his staff. Then came the question of where it could be held. There were no spaces large enough. And the only thing to do would be to build a building for it somewhere and the question was where could you rent the space. Where could you even find suitable space in Tokyo to construct a building for it. And in the middle of all this, like a bomb, he said, "Well, why don't we build it in Hibiya Park?" That's the park, you know, right across from the Palace grounds and right across from the Imperial Hotel.

Q: Yes, I know.

NICHOLS: As sacrosanct as it can be, and owned by the city. His staff, to a man, didn't laugh. They wouldn't dare laugh in front of him, but I mean, it was pretty clear they thought it was a nutty idea. So they said, "Well, we could never get permission." He said, "Well, I'll see to that." He went right ahead and discussed the location; he kept getting back to "wouldn't that be an ideal place?" Well, sure, there couldn't be a better place, what can they say. So he said, "Well, that settles it, we'll do it in Hibiya Park." Nobody volunteered to undertake to see the city government about this so he said, "I'll do it myself, I'll take care of that." The cost was certainly a factor. His finance man said, "Gee, we can't afford this!" He said, "Give me an estimate." His finance man said, "Oh, I don't know, billions of yen." "We'll do it," Shoriki said. And that was the end of the meeting.

Q: *Yomiuri* paid for the whole building?

NICHOLS: They paid for the building. They paid all the costs. And later they paid for sending that exhibit to 14 other cities. Fifteen other cities.
Q: I had left Japan by that time and I didn't realize it was continuing to be displayed all around the country.

NICHOLS: Oh, we spent years on that thing. It was still in circulation years later, virtually unchanged. A few things were added later as atomic energy techniques advanced, but millions of people lined up for blocks in every city to see it. It really had an impact, and finally it brought everyone else around to it, even other newspapers. You know, they sent their own reporters around to go through it and I think they came out--well, maybe they weren't for it, but they were convinced that, well, you know it probably will work, and they wouldn't want to knock the peaceful use aspect, they began to knock off on that.

Q: I don't know how lasting the effect was over the years, but I imagine that it really turned Japanese public opinion around to a large extent. Because they were so loudly anti-everything atomic whatsoever.

NICHOLS: It certainly did. It was a very timely thing, Lew, because it had happened right after, I think, just about the time the Lucky Dragon incident was prominent in the public mind, when these fishermen got dusted with the fall out from the U.S. Bikini test.

Q: It came right in the middle of the summer of 1954, less than a year before we began preparing that exhibit and was still a hot issue in 1955 as the exhibit was a building in 1955.

NICHOLS: Yeah. So the timing was just about perfect. As I say, Fran Blakemore deserves credit for organizing that show. But it's an example of one of the things I was going to say about my own embarrassment about what I did there during the exhibit preparation. People say, well, what were you doing? Basically I never really did anything. I was involved in negotiating, which is doing something. I was involved definitely in getting Shoriki to do it. That was my idea, and I arranged it. But aside from that, all the doing was by somebody else.

Q: I realize that.

NICHOLS: I left--I always felt that, I could never say, "Well, gee, what have I really done?" In terms of putting my hands on it, saying, "Look, I made this".

Q: I understand that, but I think the idea of approaching Shoriki and getting him to agree to do it was a coup in itself, and although I'm not sure, I don't think that another paper would have done it. In fact, I don't know for certain, but I think there was a real chance that Shoriki would simply sniff at it and turn it down. Instead he bit it with all dentures.

I also remember that Tom Tuch, who at that time was a very young officer (Hans is his real first name) was sent out from Washington that summer to help with the exhibit and spent two or three weeks with us. Tom had just been one of the principal parties planning the initial Geneva exhibit, and had a significant part in its staging. His past experience and knowledge were vital to us in the final stages of preparation. He worked with Fran Blakemore, or was she still Fran Baker? I don't remember whether she had yet married Tom Blakemore at that time.
NICHOLS: Yes. She had already married Tom Blakemore by that time. But anyway, I remember Tom Tuch very well.

Q: Do you have anything else that you think you’d like to speak about with reference to that period of your career?

NICHOLS: No, except to say that--I felt by the time that I left in ’58 and turned it over that we had a fairly good working relationship between the field posts and the headquarters in the embassy which never was disrupted until 1970, after I left.

CHARLES ROBERT BEECHAM
Japan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1952-1955)

Publications Officer
Tokyo (1955-1961)

Charles Robert Beecham was born in South Dakota in 1923. He served in the Department of State’s Government Information program and in USIA. Mr. Beecham served in Japan, Washington, DC, Thailand, and Indonesia. He was interviewed by Jack O’Brien on July 5, 1990.

Q: Bob, how did you happen to get into this profession?

BEECHAM: By accident, partly. But coming out of World War II, I did feel there might be things that could be done to help prevent that sort of event from ever happening again. At the end of 1951, as I was finishing up a year and a half in Corcoran Art School, I began calling various government agencies, including State and CIA, looking for work. I remember calling the Department to talk about a job with the information program and being told more than once that they were not hiring. But as a kid in South Dakota, when I was in the sixth or seventh grade, one of my teachers was a guy named Everin O’Brien, who at that point, in 1951, was working here for South Dakota Senator Karl Mundt. I don't think I went to O'Brien purposely to ask him for help; it came up in a conversation that we had over the phone about what I was doing.

Q: I should explain that he was not related to me.

BEECHAM: When I told O'Brien I was not getting much encouragement, he said, "Well, I know some people down there. Why don't I call them." And, as you may remember, the person he called turned out to be Dick Fitzpatrick. I went to talk to Dick at some point and completed an application. Then, like a lot of others, I waited several months to get word that there was a job opportunity. When it came, it involved a guy by the name Jack O'Brien, who I remember tried to discourage me from accepting what they were prepared to offer me -- a clerk-typist position. Do you remember our discussion?
Q: No.

BEECHAM: Well, as I recall, it was that I would take the job on the understanding that I wouldn't be limited to clerk-typist activities, which you agreed to. I think it was in February of 1952 when I started on the Japan Desk that you had been brought in by Charlie Arnot to set up.

Q: You and who else?

BEECHAM: Dottie Brose and Joe Reilly. I don't think I had any idea what I was getting into at that point. It was a very interesting experience for me. Certainly, I hadn't never been involved in anything like it. My only other exposure to government was working at FBI headquarters for brief periods before and after military service. My attitude toward work, I suppose, was that you took what was available and went on from there.

I remember spending as much time as possible talking to people about the organization, trying to find out what others were doing and where they fitted into the picture. I don't know if that was unique or not, but it was my experience in the Agency as time went on, particularly in domestic parts of it, that too many people rarely had a good idea or much interest in the way their own job and their own office fitted into the larger scheme of things.

Q: I think, Bob, we might explain here that at that time, 1952, the Japanese were still getting acquainted with the rest of the world and demands for information about America were almost unlimited. We had the job of providing much of that, most of it in response to requests from Tokyo. You and I were filing great quantities of copy to the Japanese press at their request.

BEECHAM: Being totally new to what was going on, I don't remember having the same sense of that as you do. Certainly, a lot of what I was involved in initially was very routine and very clerical. I understood better later on, after getting some opportunities to do some feature writing and reporting.

Q: Well, I just came from five years in Japan, and almost everything that we were sending out was picked up in the Japanese press.

BEECHAM: When I went to Tokyo in 1955, I then saw the other end of the operation -- how every day we had scores of Japanese media people coming into that building looking for the kinds of press and publications material that the IPS Japan Desk had been sending out.

Q: Well, you had that first IPS job for how long?

BEECHAM: The place was reorganized shortly after I arrived, and you became Chief of the Far East Branch. Then you went to Indonesia in 1953. Who took your place?

Q: George Sayles?

BEECHAM: Yes. I did various writing, editing and reporting assignments in the Far East Branch after the Japan Desk was eventually phased out. But for a time, I guess, after Dottie Brose and
Joe Reilly had left, I was a one-man Japan Desk. That may have been the point when I became interested in going overseas, particularly to Japan. I used to pester some of the personnel types regularly. Eventually, the chance to go to Japan as Assistant Publications Officer materialized. I think Bill Hutchinson, who had been Publications Officer in Tokyo and was then working in IPS, was probably instrumental in getting personnel to consider my case.

I arrived in Tokyo on May Day of 1955. It was raining, and the Japanese unions were out in force demonstrating. My hotel bed shook slightly the first night from a small earthquake somewhere and added to the excitement. My new boss was the Publications Officer, Carl Bartz. Clem Hurd was the Press Attaché; Charlie Schroth was the Press Officer; Charlie Davis was there going to language school. I knew all three, at least slightly, from their earlier work around IPS.

**Q: Who was the Public Affairs Officer?**

BEECHAM: Ken Bunce was there briefly. When he left, Lew Schmidt served as both PAO and Executive Officer. Later on, Joe Evans came out as PAO, and Art Hummel came as his Deputy. USIS Tokyo was a large organization with numerous Americans and dozens of Japanese employees. At the outset, it seemed very imposing and somewhat disjointed. I kept busy trying to catch on to how the program worked and how people went about their jobs.

I remember feeling that Lew Schmidt, while he was in charge, ran things with a very firm hand, particularly with respect to money. I don't know why it happened so early after my arrival, but I remember Bartz filling me in on some sort of pamphlet project he wanted to undertake. He needed additional money for it, but because he didn't want to talk to Schmidt about it, he sent me up to Lew's office instead. It seemed to me at the time that Lew sort of kept the money locked in his office, and you went up and made a case for whatever it might be you were planning to do. Later on, of course, I learned that was Lew's way of keeping the Branch Chiefs from quickly over-spending their allotted budgets.

Carl was a very inventive and articulate boss. He was convinced that one of the things most needed in those days was a magazine that would put Japanese scholars and intellectuals in touch with the thinking of their American counterparts. It took months of constant, often frantic effort on Carl's part to perfect the concept, win Washington support and financing, line up Japanese specialists to serve on the editorial board, recruit a Japanese editor, find a prestigious publisher and settle on the dozens of American scholarly journals from which materials were to be drawn and reprinted in Japanese in a new monthly called *America*. Bartz and a hand-picked board of Japanese scholars reviewed the contents of the American magazines and picked out those considered particularly appropriate for Japanese readership. It was a huge success and I suspect became the model for similar Agency periodicals later produced in Washington, Delhi and other posts.

I found myself trying to manage much of other publications programming over those months but recollect few specifics other than an ambitious, heavily-illustrated pamphlet on the Hungarian revolution.
Q: You had that job for how long, Bob?

BEECHAM: I don't recall exactly, but Carl left for Okinawa in a year or so, and I succeeded him. One thing that I should mention is that when I went to Tokyo, I really didn't have any deep interest or commitment toward the Foreign Service. I went with the idea that I would do this for a time and then probably go back to Washington and settle down into some job in IPS. I was offered a double promotion the first time around in Tokyo, but since the Agency linked the double aspect of it to my transferring to Foreign Service, I turned it down. I took a lot of ribbing about that but was lucky enough to be promoted again the following year. This time, they left me no options; to get the promotion I had to convert. Of course, Jane and I were married by that time, and I had a much better understanding of what I was getting into than I had earlier.

My first tour lasted three years, as did all my other tours abroad, and when I arrived back on home leave in 1958, you had already set the stage for what came next. George Hellyer, then East Area Director, was getting ready to move to Tokyo as PAO, was searching for a Special Assistant and had gotten my name from you. During my consultation in Washington, George called me in to talk and ended-up offering me the job, which I accepted, of course.

George arrived in Tokyo with the very clear notion that he needed to reshape the Japan program. But to be quite truthful about it, he didn't seem to have a really firm idea of what he wanted to do. I may never have understood what exact problems he had with the existing program, but his determination to generate change and improvement was obvious.

I recall George saying to me, and probably to others too, that he wanted a new country plan. In fact, he stressed he wanted a perfect country plan. I suggested to him that a perfect country plan and a perfect country program would be ones in which USIS worked itself out of a job. My thinking on this was probably influenced by my association with Bartz and the America magazine project. That was a prime example of American private sector influences being brought to bear on the thinking of leading Japanese. I felt it made a great deal of sense for the Agency to be promoting activities in which the natural forces within American society were brought into play to accomplish what the Agency was trying to achieve.

Q: How did George respond?

BEECHAM: Very enthusiastically, at least until he heard from people in Washington that they didn't view it as a very practical idea for building an entire program around. As you remember, it became a very controversial proposition, and we went through endless back and forth with Washington plus at the Tokyo level, an awful lot of internal upheaval and dissension. George became pretty unpopular with much of the staff. I guess I did too. Certainly, the changes we were pushing weren't very popular in many respects. I think it was Harry Keith, the Mopix officer, who came up with the rather derisive term "thinkers and doers" to describe the proposed staffing pattern. I remember John Reinhardt was very skeptical about the whole thing. John was in Kyoto, I believe, as BPAO, and was only one of many who were very critical of the scheme.

Q: This was the John Reinhardt who later became Ambassador?
BEECHAM: And eventually, he was made head of the Agency under President Carter. He then started his own "thinkers and doers" approach to Agency programming.

_Q: George's idea never took root, did it?_

BEECHAM: Well, it took root in the sense that the whole place was remodeled, new offices were established. There were half a dozen or so officers who were given assignments as what we called Program Officers. Their basic function was to develop ways to reach influential Japanese, both individuals and groups, more effectively than we had in the past. The emphasis was to be not only on Agency or USIS products, but also on specialized materials coming from independent U.S. sources -- authoritative research and analysis, scholarly articles, government documents, Congressional hearings and reports, etc.

_Q: Well, let's summarize this Bob. How long did it go on, and what was the outcome?_

BEECHAM: The outcome, I think, was dictated by George's departure more or less under a cloud, not only because of the reorganization, but because of other frictions involving the Ambassador. Months of preparations for the aborted Eisenhower visit put an added strain on relationships all over the Mission during that interval. I don't really know or remember all the story of George's departure, but he was replaced by Bill Copeland who came in quite clearly to reverse the direction in which things had been moving and to keep the Ambassador happier.

_Q: The Ambassador at that time was...?_

BEECHAM: Douglas MacArthur II, who was replaced after Kennedy's election by Ed Reischauer. I left in 1961 and came back to Washington uncertain about my next assignment. What the Agency proposed for me was the USOM Information Officer job in Bangkok. I was not interested in anything that removed me from USIS main-stream activity.

ROBERT O. BLAKE
Political Officer
Tokyo (1952-1954)

_Ambassador Robert O. Blake was born in California in 1921. He served in the U.S. Navy from 1943 to 1946. In addition to Japan, Ambassador Blake served in Russia, Zaire, Tunisia, France, and Mali. He was interviewed James Mason on December 29, 1988._

BLAKE: Maybe we can go back to Japan for just a minute. When I went there my job was to report on Soviet activity in the Far East and on Japanese communist and socialist activity in the domestic area. It was very interesting. A lot of my information was derivative. It came from Intelligence sources, the Army and the CIA. They were wired in very well, but they didn't have much on what was happening on the Soviet side.
My most important task was to help the Japanese Foreign Ministry set up an adequate Soviet Affairs Section. The Foreign Ministry had just begun to expand with the end of the occupation and they were establishing the normal kind of regional setup that they hadn't had before. The man who was in charge was a guy named Niizeki Kinya, who later became Ambassador to the Soviet Union Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was an excellent diplomat. He and I spoke mostly in Russian because he hardly spoke any English and my Japanese, while it got better and better, was never really high quality. We became quite good friends and did a certain amount of traveling around the country together.

I lived in a Japanese house, which was a little bit like camping out in Rock Creek Park in the winter - paper and glass walls. What heat you had in the winter came from little charcoal braziers, the hibachi, and from the steaming baths that you took early in the morning as soon as you got up. Japan was a very interesting assignment. I did a lot of traveling in the Far East and would have been happy to stay. But, of course, I welcomed the Soviet desk assignment. It was a thrill to get back there for that job.

Q: From there you moved on to Tokyo. Did you go directly there? Did you go home first?

BLAKE: Went home first.

Q: Were you by this time married, or was that later?

BLAKE: No, I wasn't married when I left Moscow.

Q: It's interesting to see when you started having a family.

BLAKE: That was a bit later. In Tokyo - I got there just after the famous May Day riots which took place at the end of the occupation. Bob Murphy had come as the first ambassador to Japan and was one of the people whose views - particularly his operational approach - were enormously important to me. In fact, Bob Murphy was quite right wing in many of his views - right wing of the time. But it never seemed to interfere with his judgement, his ability to size up with intuition. He was a very strong Irish Catholic person who was from the roots of his being anti-Communist. And to some extent that was reflected, but I had a lot to do with him first in Japan, and later when he went back and was first Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and then Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and then again while he was still having that job when I went to Tunisia. His finesse, his ability to work with other people, his ability to be tough and get away with it was something which had an enormous impact on me.

Q: I take it that he was the man who took over from the military government? So you had quite an organizational job there to do, whatever he did, right from the beginning.

BLAKE: That's right. Not that big. The proto diplomatic mission had been there in the Political Advisor's office, and while the staff was expanded some of it didn't change too much. The center of gravity of relations with Japan changed, from the military headquarters to the ambassador, and he was very determined that that was the way it should be. He was careful with keeping in touch with the commander. There was no question who was boss, it was Bob. He had a clear
signal from the President - by now it was President Eisenhower whom he'd known very well when he, Bob, had been High Commissioner in Germany - that he was the boss and Ike, not being a great lover of other military guys, that's the way he wanted it. I don't really remember there being any particular spats with the military on the things that we were interested in. In the end, the fact that he was so tough probably was a) the reason why he was sent off to be sort of Political Adviser in Korea, which he was bitter about, though it was a terrific put-down; and then he left that to go back to the States. I think that all that left a very, very bad taste in his mouth. I never heard him speak about this, and I knew him pretty well. He was very careful about such things, but I do know that he felt the State Department hadn't stood up for him enough.

Q: And that was when Allison (phonetic) came in?

BLAKE: Yes. And Allison (phonetic) was the Japanese language officer, the specialist in Japanese affairs, but not a strong man in the sense that Bob Murphy was.

Q: Did you have a lot of BLB (?) personnel that you inherited, that you had to thin down some?

BLAKE: No, we didn't have any by the time I got there.

Q: My experience about that time was in Austria where we took over from the military, and this was one of our problems of very much expanded staff that had to be weeded down and it was a little painful at times.

BLAKE: One of the more interesting aspects that I really didn't know very much about, and in retrospect I wish I'd looked into more, was the beginning of CIA to assert his position in the country, and to try to develop its role as against the role of the military intelligence. One of the really interesting aspects of that was the work that Bob Murphy had me do - when I say Bob Murphy, it wasn't as if I went up and took orders directly from Bob Murphy although I saw a lot of him, it always came through Bill Leonhart, who was very, very active, very smart, and head of the Political Section there.

Q: And he was relatively young for that job at the time too, wasn't he?

BLAKE: I think so, sure. The DCM was a fellow named Bill Turner who is a long time Far Eastern fellow, quite competent, not particularly articulate, but a person on whom Bob Murphy depended to run the Embassy so he could think about the big things. Bob was definitely a politically minded ambassador who wanted to keep full control, but wanted somebody else to run the thing for him.

I started to say about CIA - I think that's worth pursuing just a minute. When I look back at it, I look in wonder at some of the projects they were undertaking. One was, how do we change the Japanese to make the Japanese system even more democratic that General MacArthur had done. The pretentiousness of some of the assumptions about the applicability of US political systems to Japanese experience, the sense that we could really influence a major shift in the way Japanese did business through covert propaganda activities, and through intellectual argument with the Japanese. When you look back as it is just absolutely unbelievable. We collectively took with the
CIA guys the position that this was simply beyond our American capability. But even our guys
were inclined, if you will, to have a sort of a Pax Americana of viewpoint on this thing which, if
I remember these things accurately, and your mind can always play a little trick on you, seems
quite amazing to me.

Q: Well, they were trying to run Japan like we tried to run some parts of Latin America, I guess,
in that sense.

BLAKE: That's right. And I think also CIA wanted to run it instead of the way the military had
run for so many years.

Q: Do you have anything more to say about Japan? We're about the end of this side of the tape.

BLAKE: No. Most of my work was very interesting - political reporting. I learned to speak
relatively good Japanese so that I could understand what was going on. I tried to get to the
bottom of the great conundrum that we all did, of how Japanese opinion was formed; what were
the real dimensions of the consensus process on which Japan works, and I don't think it had
much success. We always overestimated our ability to impact that consensus forming process.
We always underestimated the time it would take to bring about changes, and I don't think
despite all the information we had, that we had a clear sense of what post-war Japan was about as
we thought we did, and as I feel we later did have. It was a dawning on us which was a transition
from the period under the military, where we could demand any kind of information, and
probably got any kind of answer we wanted to get, to the slower process of really understanding
the depths of resistance in the Japanese character to a lot of the basic things that we had tried to
accomplish under the occupation.

Q: Who was the principal Japan honcho on the Department at that time? Walter Robertson, or
did he have somebody else that was primarily the Japanese man?

BLAKE: A guy named Ken Young. We always thought of Walter as essentially interested in
China, and essentially interested in...

Q: Nationalist China.

BLAKE: Yes, and not that interested in Japan. I don't know whether that's correct or not. It
wasn't anything that really came into my ken(?) so much, but I simply don't remember.

CHARLOTTE LORIS
Secretary
Kobe (1952-1954)

After graduation from high school, Charlotte Loris worked in California and
Hawaii. In addition to serving in Japan, Ms. Loris served in Korea, Congo, and
Indonesia. She was interviewed by Max Kraus on June 8, 1989.
LORIS: Then I was assigned to Japan. I went home via Europe, had my home leave, went to Japan, which was also interesting but not the excitement of Saigon. Everyone will always remember their first post. I had a great time in Japan. There I did have the great fortune to have -- I was in the Kobe, the branch post, as secretary, coming up the ladder. And there was a great man in Tokyo who was Executive Officer, by the name of Lew Schmidt, whom I think was one of the first men to recognize that females had ability. And I think it's thanks to Lew Schmidt that I moved on up the ladder to become Executive Officer myself.

Q: Lew was --

LORIS: He was Executive Officer in Tokyo.

Q: Executive Officer of USIS?

LORIS: Yes.

Q: At the branch post.

LORIS: No, in Tokyo. For the total Japan Program. And while I was in Japan USIA became an independent agency, separate from State, in '53. Anyway, I had some interesting field trips, met lots of interesting people, got to know and like the Japanese. Absolutely different type of place than Saigon. I, as in Saigon, taught English and got to know a lot of Japanese there, taught English to the provincial foreign ministry in Kobe Japan. All this is extracurricular activity which one could do in those days to develop their future potential.

LARUE R. LUTKINS
political officer
Tokyo (1952-1954)

LaRue R. Lutkins was born in 1919 and raised in New York. His career with the State Department included assignments in Cuba, China, Malaysia, Japan, Hong Kong, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and South Africa. Mr. Lutkins was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 18, 1990.

Q: Well, you left Penang in '52. I have you in Tokyo for a relatively short tour.

LUTKINS: That's right -- not quite two years. I think I was the first of the Chinese Language Officers assigned to Tokyo. It was considered important that we have somebody to liaise with the Japanese Foreign Ministry regarding their policy toward China and our policy toward China and also to keep aware of what was going on in Japan regarding views about China, both in the business world and in the academic world, press comments and that sort of thing.

Q: Things were pretty Cold Warish, weren't they, at that time? We had been fighting the Chinese
in Korea, and the Japanese were profiting very much -- but very much with us at that time.

LUTKINS: I'm not sure they were really even profiting very much because this was just after the occupation. I got there at the end of '52. The occupation had only been over for about six months. if I remember correctly.

Q: I was there for a very short time in the Air Force as an enlisted man. I occupied the country for about three weeks, and then I was defending the country.

LUTKINS: But even though the occupation was ended, the Japanese were still very much under, I won't say control, but certainly they were strongly inclined to defer to any views that we had in the field of military and foreign policy. And as regards profiting from the Korean War, I'm no economic expert, but the Japanese economy was still very much in the doldrums. They hadn't really started anywhere near the process of takeoff. Now they may have been producing and supplying some material for us in Korea. I just don't know the details on that.

As the job evolved during that year and half or two years that I was there, the focus of it broadened so that I was following Japanese relations with Southeast Asia -- not Korea -- but Southeast Asia. That was it primarily -- what their attitude was toward Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and so forth.

Q: Were the Japanese following things, or were they being rather passive at that point?

LUTKINS: No, they were beginning to emerge. They were certainly primarily passive, but they were beginning to show some initiatives. And they certainly had people on the ground who were following developments and reporting back to Tokyo, so it was interesting to find out what the Japanese view was.

Q: How did you find the Embassy at that point? Did you find it a well-plugged-in Embassy? I think John Allison was the Ambassador.

LUTKINS: Bob Murphy was Ambassador for about six months after I arrived, and then after that, John Allison. What do you mean by plugged-in?

Q: In other words, that you had been in a relatively isolated post, and all of a sudden, here you were with your first really large Embassy. What was your impression of how it operated and the spirit of the Embassy at that time?

LUTKINS: Yes, it was a very chastening experience, going from being in charge of two posts with a lot of latitude. But, no, the adjustment was very easy, and it was a very high-class, high-grade, high-powered bunch of people at most levels.

Certainly in the political section, we had outstanding people. The first section head was John Steeves, succeeded by Sam Burger. And then some of my colleagues were Bill Leonhart and Bob Blake. I'm trying to think of some of the others. Dick Lamb, Bill Sherman, who went on to a fine career in Japanese affairs, Dick Finn, Dick Sneider. So we had a very excellent group in the
political section. And I think the economic section was equally strongly staffed, although I didn't have as much contact with that.

I really wasn't close to Bob Murphy. He was obviously one of our eminent Ambassadors. I don't think he played probably quite as strong a role in Japan as he may have in some of his other posts. John Allison was a Japanese Language Officer and had a fine background.

ROBERT E. BARBOUR
Protocol Officer
Tokyo (1952-1954)

Robert Barbour was born in Ohio in 1927. He graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1948 and attended The George Washington University. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1949, his career has included positions in Iraq, Japan, Vietnam, France, Italy, England, Spain and Surinam. Mr. Barbour was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Then you went back to the Far Eastern Bureau for a while...

BARBOUR: For a while and then I managed to get an attractive job in Tokyo.

Q: Again as a staff officer?

BARBOUR: No, as a staff officer to the administrative officer. This was when my FSS-12, which was only one rank above the clerical bottom, came into play. I went there as sort of a special assistant to the administrative officer because we were changing— the peace treaty was signed and would come into effect on April 29, I think—from the diplomatic section of SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers--General MacArthur most of the time, by that time it was General Ridgway) to an Embassy. Japan was going to cease being an occupied country and become an independent country. We were building up the Embassy in anticipation of that changeover and I went out to be administrative assistant to the administrative officer. Which was fun; it was a very good place because we had a big administrative section and a high powered administrative officer and indeed I was his executive assistant. I don't know what we would call that today, probably it doesn't exist, we are not rich enough for it anymore. The new Ambassador announced was Robert Murphy, who was due to arrive on April 29th, the very day of the changeover. We had in that diplomatic section the protocol office which handled the commanding general's relations with all the Embassies which more or less came under him, at least theoretically.

One evening, I think the day the Ambassador arrived, there was a welcoming reception for him, by us, by the staff, and I remember vividly standing up there minding my own business, quietly, unobtrusively, as was appropriate to my station, when the personnel officer came over to me and said, "I suppose you know that you are going to be the new Ambassador's protocol officer?" Again lightning had struck; I was stunned, I was terrified. I didn't think that was a great thing at
all, I knew nothing about it. This was because the protocol officer who had been in the diplomatic section before was leaving; he was a master, he knew everything, everybody, and I was to take his place! And, of course, Robert Murphy was an intimidating individual; he came there with his record of association with Harold Macmillan and Dwight Eisenhower and Mark Clark during the Second World War; he had been Ambassador to Belgium and he was a kind of diplomat of a type that you see very rarely now. I don't want to sound nostalgic, but his concept of the United States was embodied in him as an Ambassador and he represented the President of the United States and the United States in the broadest and strongest sense. I realize now that the reason he was sent there, given his strong personality--I guess his Irish temper--and his military background, was to make the transition. To see that Japan emerged from occupation and that the military role in the day to day life was changed dramatically.

Q: We are talking about the American military which had been ruling very nicely and happily for quite a while; to suddenly become subservient to an Embassy would be a major problem.

BARBOUR: It was difficult. Mark Clark came out as the new commander and at that time, of course, the Korean War was going on and the United Nations Command was located in Tokyo. The Supreme Command remained in Tokyo, the far east air force remained out at Haneda Airport, the navy was in... So they had a genuine problem of schizophrenia themselves; by and large they tried, but of course under the previous regime Embassy personnel had been military. We were all given ranks. When I arrived I was taken to the Iesu Hotel, a company grade billet, where I shared a hotel room with four other people--two permanent and two temporary beds for people who came over on R&R from Korea. It was a wild existence and it wasn't all surprising to see in our common bathrooms little Japanese girls coming and going and taking their showers too. It was an interesting time. Places were still off limits, there were things that civilian employees of the military could not do. But of course that no longer applied to us and one of the problems was asserting our individual independence vis-a-vis the military--we were no longer under MP's, for example. It was a time of transition, from great things like the role of the Prime Minister to little things about who gives traffic tickets. And Murphy, I am sure, was sent there to effect that transition.

Q: As a protocol officer did you have much contact with Murphy?

BARBOUR: Oh, constant; I moved up into his office. I was today what we would call a staff aide and that meant I had an intimate relationship with him. I was also an ADC, I traveled every place with him. We didn't get all that many visitors to the Embassy and I was sort of the permanent control officer for all Congressional delegations. I did all of his guest lists, his seating charts and things like that. I had all the relations with the Foreign Minister's office, the Prime Minister's office, and the Imperial Household. If he wanted to see the Emperor, for example, which wasn't very often, or if he wanted to take a distinguished visitor like Adlai Stevenson over to see him--which he really didn't want to do all that much but he knew he should--I would call and make the arrangements with my contact, Baron Matsui, I think it was, in the Imperial Household. A lovely man. We would say things like, "The Ambassador is wondering whether His Imperial Majesty might receive Mr. So-and-so." We would get a telegram of instructions requesting that, and I would say, "Of course if it is not convenient we would understand," and it
would never happen. Or we might say, "We hope it might be possible," and he would work it in. Obviously I wasn't making these things up, they were all on Murphy's guidance.

I remember one issue that came up which emphasizes Murphy's role. Some months after the end of the occupation the American Army in effect kidnapped a Japanese national. A very mysterious business, I am not really sure what the ins and outs were; he had a clandestine relationship, was involved in things he shouldn't have been doing; I think he was probably a double agent. Anyhow, they kidnapped him and there was a great stew in the press about what has happened to So-and-so. Nobody knew. Finally it turned out that we had him and had been holding him all this time. Murphy summoned, summoned the chief of staff, a three star general, and explained to him in terms we could hear in the outer office why that was not possible, why it was a stupid thing to do. Of course the general knew it. Murphy's relationship with Clark was a factor but also his own concept of the United States and the way it does things, how you effect a transition from an occupied country to a free country that is going to be extremely important to us. This was an example of the kind of thing that he did.

Q: *Murphy had been the American consul general in Algiers.*

BARBOUR: He was political advisor in that capacity and then he went with Clark through Italy as his political advisor.

Q: *He had also met Clark in Algiers in a clandestine meeting. Clark came by submarine before the landings. So they had a long relationship. As protocol officer did you find yourself trying to hold back, trying to keep the Embassy from leaning too hard on the Japanese so as to get them back in the mainstream, not subservient as before?*

BARBOUR: We treated them with complete normality from our standpoint. Murphy knew how to play the game. The Japanese certainly knew how to play the game of diplomacy. We observed all the forms, all the proprieties and carried on a regular day to day business with them at all levels. Murphy played golf with the Foreign Minister, Okasaki, usually once a week. He spent a lot of time with the Prime Minister, Yoshida. The Embassy was developing its own contacts throughout the government, working relations and things like that, in a very normal way. And looking back on it now I realize that this was the way it was done. One of the problems I mentioned was the legitimate difficulty of the military, psychologically, to readjust. They did. I think they did it, certainly at the top, with total good faith and good will. But it was difficult because they were still a very senior command fighting a war next door. There were some problems from the business community, many of whom had lived in China, many of whom had moved to Japan and prospered under the occupation and found it difficult to adjust suddenly to the Japanese way of doing things. Some did, some didn't; those who didn't used to act in ways that showed they wished things had not changed; there was a carpetbagger mentality on their part.

Q: *I saw a little of this. I was at one point a member of the occupying forces in Japan as an enlisted man in the air force in 1952 or so, then all of a sudden I found myself part of a defense ally as it reverted to a normal relationship. I could see that it was difficult for some of the military not to keep their preeminence.*
BARBOUR: In many, many ways. Landlords, for example, whose houses had been requisitioned suddenly wanted them back and had a right to get them back.

Q: Were you there when the truce came in Korea?

BARBOUR: In July of 1953. Yes, but I was back in Washington taking my oral exams.

Q: So you had applied for the Foreign Service?

BARBOUR: I took my exams in Tokyo in 1952.

Q: It was the old three and a half day exam and then you went back to take your orals?

BARBOUR: I hitched a ride with an Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Robertson, who had been out to see Syngman Rhee.

Q: Did you have any chance at all to talk to him?

BARBOUR: Oh, yes.

Q: He was, I am told, a courteous southern gentleman and at the same time Mr. "don't mess with China" personified.

BARBOUR: My relationship was more or less limited to that flight, at least my initial relationship. He was a very courteous Richmond gentleman, as you say. We had a lot of fun on the way back; he was very relaxed and I was hitching a free ride since at that time there was no other way to take the examination except to go back to Washington and do it. And I was here when the Armistice was announced.

Q: What was your oral examination like? You took it in 1953.

BARBOUR: In July of 1953. It lasted about an hour and a half; there were, I think, five people, one from the Department of Commerce, the others from the Department of State, none of whom I knew. It was initially personal and then we got on to my academic activities, which in high school were terrible and they knew it. They asked me questions about why I had done so poorly in this subject and that subject. I said that except for English literature where I had an acknowledged weakness, I didn't regret it because I had made up for it in college. They smiled and that was very reassuring. Then we talked about the Foreign Service and the implementation of policy. "Did I think the regional high commissioner was a good idea?" That had been discussed in the Ambassador's staff meeting and I had an answer already to go. "What did I think about personnel administration?" That had been discussed in the Ambassador's staff meeting. I had all kinds of information and that helped a lot. Someone had told me in the Embassy, "Make them smile, make them laugh." It turned out very well.

Q: How did your career progress here? You went back to Japan?
BARBOUR: I went back to Japan, back to my job with, by then, Ambassador Allison and stayed another year with him in the same role I had had with Murphy.

Q: Did you find a difference between Murphy and Allison as far as dealing with the Japanese?

BARBOUR: Allison was perforce much closer to them; he had been in Japan before the war, he spoke Japanese and he had been interned by them. So he had a much more personal interest in developing relations with Japan and used to get very upset with people who made his life complicated. I never saw that very much with Murphy.

CLIFF FORSTER
Assistant Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Kobe (1953)

Regional Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Fukuoka (1953-1956)

Cliff Forster was born in 1924. His career with USIS included assignments in Japan, Burma, Israel, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on May 29, 1990.

Q: You must have come in sometime fairly near the middle of ’52.

FORSTER: No, I arrived in Yokohama in July of 1953, and I recall it well since it was the Centennial of Commodore Perry's entrance into the bay with his "black ships" to open up Japan in 1853.

Q: So you got there to help celebrate the Centennial?

FORSTER: Right. And that was something else again, too. John Allison was our Ambassador as you know.

Q: Back to CIE, I do want to say that I have a great admiration for what they did, as a matter of fact. I think that the old-style Army officer would not have done what MacArthur arranged to have done. Of the twenty-four centers which we took over from the Army, two were in Tokyo: one out at Shinjuku and one downtown. We soon closed the Shinjuku center, but we still had twenty-three for another year and a half or two years. But the Army did a really stupendous job, and despite Sax Bradford's antipathy to the military, I have nothing but admiration for what the CIE centers accomplished.

FORSTER: They did a great job.

Q: They got the Japanese involved in those centers and displayed a completely new concept of
how to operate a library and what the U.S. could do for them. So I don't have any adverse feeling about the CIE.

FORSTER: That concept is carried on today, you know. Those centers, of course, many of them are now run by the prefectures and the cities, and they still have the old name. "Cultural," as you know so well, is *bunka* in Japanese. They are still *Bunka* Centers. So the name has even caught on. It's a little-known story, isn't it? I think it's one of the exciting chapters of cultural relations that the institution has survived.

Most of the directors we took over from were women librarians, and they were fantastic. I was in shock at first -- I guess we were a little more chauvinistic then -- that I was taking over from a woman librarian as a Foreign Service Officer. But years later, when I was questioned about the advisability of sending in our first American officer -- a woman officer -- to Kyoto, and there was a lot of opposition to it in the Agency, I said, "No, no. Long ago these centers were run by absolutely outstanding women who were very well-received and who have not been forgotten to this day."

*Q:* I would say that probably two-thirds to three-quarters of those centers were run by women during the occupation.

FORSTER: Oh, yes. Yes.

*Q:* There were a few men under CIE, but very, very few.

FORSTER: Very few.

*Q:* Probably not more than six or eight. The rest were all run by women, who did a very good job.

FORSTER: I think our major problem going into Japan, particularly those of us who had the information officer background and where our previous assignments were in insurgency areas, was the problem of adjusting to this new role in an occupied country. We had specific policy objectives and country plans to work with. So we couldn't quite see the advantages of just the goodwill thing working out of a library in a broader cultural scene. But I'll tell you in retrospect that this was terribly important at the time. I mean, both should go together. There should be some kind of mix of the political and cultural because we have a mission to do. I used to feel in later years that our program should be more balanced. It was much more than going in to pound the table on policy points of view without having that other kind of goodwill approach -- the give and take of these libraries and the students in there using our books. I think that's one of the tragedies. But then I'm very out of date. I do feel that we've lost a lot in our centers in a way, not having them more open to the public than they are today.

*Q:* I think so, too.

FORSTER: There would be a lot of disagreement among some of my very good USIA colleagues on that one.
Q: We'll get back to that period.

FORSTER: That's a later period.

Q: You were preceded by Alan Carter as PAO in Tokyo some years later.

FORSTER: Oh yes. That's a long story.

Q: What did you see as your particular duties during your first assignments in Japan? What were your primary types of programming when you were in Matsuyama, for example?

FORSTER: Matsuyama was the first post. You may not recall, but you called me up one summer afternoon after I had been there a few months to say, "Cliff, pack up your bags with Nancy. You're being assigned to Fukuoka." I was really quite distressed because we loved that little castle town of Matsuyama.

Q: A lovely town.

FORSTER: Marvelous. We had that Center which had been built for us by Governor Hisamatsu, who used to come over in the afternoons to join us for tea. It was a very unusual experience.

So the transfer to Fukuoka came as something of a blow, but I must say that was another great experience in Fukuoka because you had the RPAO or Regional Public Affairs Officer concept then. I was RPAO for all Kyushu, which made it possible for me to work the entire area. We had four USIS centers when I arrived: Fukuoka, Nagasaki, Kumamoto and Kokura. In Matsuyama, I had served under a fine officer, Walter Nichols -- you know him well from way back -- who was RPAO in Kobe. Walt really knew the country, and his Senior Advisor, who I also learned so much from, was Naotada Kumagai. And you had David Osborn as Political Officer in Kobe, who went on to be DCM in Tokyo and later served as our Ambassador in Burma. Dick Ericson was in Osaka then, another top Japan specialist. It was a very professional crew and I had the great privilege, as a complete neophyte, coming in to work with them. And, of course, you were in Tokyo as Executive Officer. You were our main contact then, Lew, more than anyone else at headquarters, because you provided us with all that we needed to get the job done. We had great respect for you and the way you managed those posts.

It was also a time of great stress and strain. I'd only been in Matsuyama about two months when Walter called from Kobe and said, "Lew wants us all to get together to determine which posts are going to have to go in our regions." There was a marvelous field supervisor in Tokyo at the time, Pat van Delden, and I recall that she always wore dark glasses at work. I guess she had a problem with her eyes, but at first, I found myself wondering if I had come into the wrong agency. You also had Bryan Battey still waiting for his center to open in Tokyo and a great guy whom I'd known in the Philippines as a kid before the war. His name was Bill Graves, and he was then running the center in Kanazawa. Bill, I notice, has just taken over as editor of *National Geographic*. Then there was Russ Lynch, whom I'd known with USIS in the Philippines. He was RPAO in Nagoya when I arrived in Japan.
So there were these familiar faces and many new faces as well. It was a very large operation in Tokyo, and I found it rather frightening, having always been out in the field at small posts. But it was an exciting time, indeed, to go out to Japan with the occupation coming to an end following the signing of the Peace Treaty.

I think I strayed from your question.

Q: I asked what the thrust of your program was.

FORSTER: Fukuoka was a far more complex and difficult area to work in than Matsuyama, which was a rather laid-back agricultural town. Fukuoka had the large industrial area of Yawata, with its steel mills and chemical plants. There were the strong leftist labor unions carrying out massive strikes in the depressed coal mining areas. There was also our large Itazuke Air Base, with our jets flying over the university all the time, resulting in more demonstrations. So you had one issue after another and a great deal of anti-American feeling.

We were all working together in the Consulate in those days under the same roof. Owen Zurhellen had been the Consul. He is here now, by the way, teaching at the University of Hawaii. Jim Martin took over from Owen. We had a very close working relationship, and at that time, we were still all State Officers. I had information and the cultural exchange side of it. At first, we spent much of our time continually putting out fires. I was working with our Air Force officers at Itazuke trying to explain their position to the Japanese as an important operation to protect Japan during the Korean conflict. So we did a lot of work on base relations, inviting fighter jet pilots and others at the base to meet with the students often teaching English to them. Our plan was to try and establish these personal relationships between base personnel and the university teachers and students to get more community support for our largest air force facility in southwestern Japan -- just across from Korea.

Overall, our USIS mission then was to try and achieve a better understanding of our policy positions, and Japan's security was one of the major ones. Of course, at that time, the "Rhee Line" was also a major problem in our area and elsewhere in Japan because they felt it affected their fishing rights. We also had the "Bikini ashes" incident, which you remember well, following our nuclear test in the Bikini region when atomic fallout resulted in the death of a fisherman. The anti-U.S. feeling at the time was very strong, and once again we had to defend our position.

Q: The Lucky Dragon was the name of the boat?

FORSTER: Right. The Lucky Dragon. Then you had the case of the U.S. soldier firing on a Japanese entering one of our target ranges in northern Japan. It was known as the "Gerard Case", as I recall, and once again there was a lot of hard feeling since the Japanese felt our military court had let him off too lightly.

Q: I think he (the Japanese) was picking up shell casings.
FORSTER: That was it. There was one public opinion issue after another in those early days, and it was our job to deal with them to keep U.S.-Japan relations on course.

Nagasaki was also in my region of responsibility, where the atom bomb hostility was still running quite high at the time, although it was not as strong there as it was in Hiroshima. I've often thought about Nagasaki bombing as contrasted to Hiroshima, and I think the long association with the West and the strong Christian community there -- mostly Catholic -- made the big difference. Feeling was not as intense there as up in Hiroshima, where my colleague, Fazl Fotouhi, was running into more severe psychological problems.

LAURENT E. MORIN
Economic Officer
Kobe (1954-1956)

Laurent E. Morin was born in Augusta, Maine in 1920. His career with the State Department included assignments in Algeria, France, Japan, and Iraq. Mr. Morin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 24, 1992.

MORIN: In Japan it was different. We had an affordable school and nice houses.

Q: You were there from 1954-1956.

MORIN: Right. I was an Economic Officer. We had offices in two cities. The main office in those days was in Kobe, which is not the case anymore. We had an economic/commercial office in Osaka. I spent a day in each, back and forth. I lived on the railroad line between the two cities, so it was very convenient. It was a place where we really got into the guts of the economy. It was really something. Osaka, among other things, was a textile center. That was the time when the Japanese were starting to penetrate the American market on finished goods, textiles, etc. The American textile manufacturers were really unhappy. It was just beginning, but they could feel the pressure. They were trying to push protectionist measures while the Japanese were expanding their activities all the time, particularly in artificial fibers -- spun rayons, etc. My boss was tremendously competent.

Q: Who was that?

MORIN: Lou Gleeck. He had learned so much about the textile business that some of these textile people would come to him for advice. I traveled with him and by myself around various factories. We had very good rapport with the industrial community.

Another thing that Osaka had...it is the sundries capital of the world. I made a whole series of reports on this. This is enamel ware, artificial funeral wreaths, toy cap guns, strings of beads, Christmas ornaments, fountain pens, cigarette lighters, beaded pocketbooks, toys, buttons and much more.
Q: Sort of the Woolworth-type stuff.

MORIN: Each of these items would have its own quarter. You would go along the narrow streets and see people working away in stalls and ramshackle structures making all these things. They were depending on the American market for most of their sales. They were also great in copying things for the black market in Europe; I remember buying exact duplicates of Parker pens and Ronson lighters for fifty cents. So I made a whole series of reports. It was fascinating.

We also had another interesting experience. In those days, borax was considered a sensitive material that we were keeping away from China. It was used in some form of munitions. A lot of it was being sold to Japan for authentic purposes, but more was going into Japan then should have been. We had the job of tracking it down. I would go around to these enamelware makers. That is where they used a lot of it. I would ask to see their books, and they would show me how much they bought and how much they used. They would get annoyed, and looking back on it, I don't blame them.

The other thing that is very interesting to me is the contrast of the Japan in those days with the Japan of today. It is so different. I am amazed with stories of Japanese efficiency. It was so contrary to my day. For instance, the Bell helicopter plant -- Bell was putting up a plant in Kobe, and I used to know the people there pretty well. The manager said, "You know, we have to put three Japanese on these assembly lines where we usually would have one American."

I had a Hillman Minx -- a little English car I had bought in France. In Japan at that time, they were assembling Minxes in Tokyo, and it was a very popular car. The Hillman agent in Kobe told me, "I have so much trouble with these assembled Minxes because my people have to rebuild them here in Kobe. They leave out things like the sealer behind the windshield and things like that. It is just terrible. People much prefer to buy an English-made Minx." And sure enough, when it became time for me to leave, he was after me to sell it to him. Here is a guy who had a whole warehouse full of new Minxes, and he bought my five-year old Minx, even though the steering wheel was on the wrong side for Japan. He said that he would fix it up and get a good price for it. The whole idea of the Japanese being so efficient now is just mind-boggling to me. I could cite dozens of examples of inefficiency.

I left Japan and went on to Yale and got an M.A. I spent a year at Yale.

GEORGE ALLEN MORGAN
Political Counselor
Tokyo (1954-1958)

Ambassador George Allen Morgan was born in Tennessee in 1905. He received graduate degrees from Emory University and Harvard University, where he received a Ph.D in philosophy in 1930. Ambassador Morgan served in Germany, Japan, and the Ivory Coast. He was interviewed by Arthur L. Lowrie on December 23, 1989.
Q: Then your next post seems rather curious after all of this Russian and European experience, to go to Japan. How did that come about?

MORGAN: I don't know why I was posted to Japan. All I knew was after I had spent a year as Deputy Executive Officer of OCB, I felt I had done my duty there with PSB and OCB and it was time for a change. So I went to Bedell Smith, who was then Under Secretary of State, and asked him for his advice, and he then poked up the personnel people and they assigned me as Political Counselor in Tokyo. I don't know why, but there I was and I was glad to go. It was a fascinating new experience, a different part of the world, different culture.

Q: Who was the Ambassador in Tokyo then?

MORGAN: John Allison and then Douglas MacArthur. Doug MacArthur II -- not the General.

Q: What was the thrust of American policy toward Japan at that time?

MORGAN: Japan was just gradually creeping out from the vast losses of World War II and the main thing we were trying to do was help Japan get back economically, and to secure their alignment politically as an ally against the Soviet Union. So one of the main accomplishments, as I recall, during my day was a security treaty with Japan which secured that. But I must say considering how Japan's economy has flourished, amazingly flourished since then, we had no inkling that they were going to do as much as they have.

Q: What did the Japanese government want from us in those early years? What was the main thing they wanted from the United States, just more economic help to rebuild?

MORGAN: I don't remember.

Q: They were still very much in rebuilding stage?

MORGAN: Yes.

Q: What did you think of Ambassador Allison?

MORGAN: He was reasonably competent, had very good background.

Q: Was he a political appointee?

MORGAN: No, no. He was a Foreign Service Officer. So was Doug MacArthur.

Q: What did you think of MacArthur?

MORGAN: A little too self-assertive, too aggressive. But, of course, in many ways very able, very highly intelligent with an excellent background.
Q: Did you try Japanese?"

MORGAN: Yes, I took some lessons in Japanese and learned elementary spoken Japanese.

Q: All these years, were you continuing your real vocation or your early vocation or your interest in philosophy.

MORGAN: No, no I had no time for that.

Q: You'd set that aside?

MORGAN: No time for it.

Q: Now did you complete your tour at this time in Tokyo and go back to Washington or did somebody grab you again?

MORGAN: I more than completed it. I had planned to take the usual three years, then home leave, then go on to another post. So I had postponed home leave for this purpose when I might have taken it after two years. But when Doug MacArthur came, he insisted on keeping me for a fourth year, to my great regret because I had hoped, in fact I had been promised, a good DCM assignment somewhere. This not only delayed it, it in the end prevented it, it because toward the end of my fourth year I was again yanked back, this time to State Department Policy Planning.

GUNTHER K. ROSINUS
Cultural Center Director, USIS
Niigata (1954-1957)

Cultural Center Director, USIS
Kyushu (1957-1959)

Gunther K. Rosinus was born in Germany in 1928 and emigrated to the United States. He attended Harvard University, where he studied political science; he later studied international affairs in graduate school. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Rosinus served in Germany and the Philippines. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on March 21, 1989.

Q: Why don't you -- now, I think you went to Niigata first.

ROSINUS: I did, correct.

Q: So, why don't you tell me not only what you did in Niigata, but what you felt your particular efforts and objectives were directed towards accomplishing; give me some ideas as to how you went about this or some of your experiences, any anecdotes you may have and whether or not you think you were successful, moderately, quite a bit, or otherwise.
ROSINUS: Okay, perhaps we can put it even in a framework of Japan as a whole, since as you recall, subsequently we went down to Kyushu to take over the regional public affairs job in Fukuoka. In Niigata, I served under your embassy leadership as Cultural Center Director.

Perhaps, I should really say at the beginning of this interview that my actions in USIA have always been based upon a keen interest in what I have defined as the overall mission and purpose of public diplomacy, or public affairs, which I can go into perhaps a little more at length as we proceed with this interview.

Basically, I have always felt that the mission of public affairs was an integral mission, involving all the elements that have now come together. Long ago, I was preaching very hard and working with people like Lionel Mosley and others and then writing periodically on the subject of public affairs as a direct dimension of American diplomacy, of public affairs as requiring the integration of all elements, both cultural and informational, and of the public affairs officer as a substantive officer, not just as a manager or an impresario.

The mission of such an integrated effort was to be, as I saw it, the projection of our open society and of the policies that flow from it. Simple enough. That is it. Therefore, I have always put a strong political aura or context on whatever we were doing and using the cultural side of the house in support of a given defined political objective in whatever country I served. Targeting Labor and Intellectual Circles in Niigata. So, in Japan, for example, and in Niigata, what we were facing in 1954, as you will recall, was the growth of a lot of left-wing agitation, particularly in the labor movement and within intellectual circles.

So, we set up programs directed toward labor and toward intellectual circles, university circles. In Niigata, for example, it took the form, among many other activities, of a regular seminar that I led in international relations with a group of labor leaders from various unions in the Niigata prefectural area.

Q: Had you had any Japanese language training before you went to Japan? If not, were you dealing through interpreters when you were chairing these seminars and how did you operate?

ROSINUS: I had not had language training prior to going to Japan. I took some Japanese within Japan and was able eventually, within half a year or so, to use written texts for speech purposes, which I did, but in seminar settings, I would always use interpretation.

The purpose was to try to clarify through seminar techniques and discussion groups of this nature, U.S. policies and intentions and their origins in American society.

We were, of course, also concerned, as you will recall, with expanding knowledge of the United States as a whole among the Japanese who were emerging from the relatively isolated and poverty period of the post-war years.

That effort, I think, was at least on a national scale pretty successful and I recall a specific incident in Niigata that showed the kind of goodwill that had been built through these efforts. In
1955, I believe, a typhoon fire burned down our Cultural Center and, you will recall, immediately the prefectural government offered us room in its own limited space, because of unlimited offices, which had also been partly destroyed by this fire, and we continued to operate out of there. Of course, we had many expressions of sympathy and all that sort of thing coming out practically every segment of the populace at that time.

I think the widespread use of cultural centers providing access to libraries, lectures, films, exhibits and cultural events, serving as the "window to America," as we called them at that time, was an extremely effective method for projecting our open society at that moment in Japanese history. The Saturday Evening Post praised our efforts, with specific examples from Niigata, Tokyo and Yokohama, in a major article in the September 1955 issue.

Q: You mentioned that you were doing this largely targeting the labor --

ROSINUS: The labor and university audiences.

Q: University. I know, of course, because in Tokyo, we were also having a clear demonstration of a very leftward driven labor movement. I wonder if you felt that you had any substantial impact in diverting them away from this more or less left-leaning attitude or could you measure that at all?

ROSINUS: It is tough to measure. There was one funny incident that might have been -- that, again, shows some of these dichotomies in politics. On May Day, as you recall, the Japanese left was in the habit of snaking down the road in large demonstrations with white headbands and flags denouncing various things including certain U.S. policies.

Well, they were doing the same thing in Niigata on this particular day and they happened to come snaking by our Niigata Cultural Center; and as these labor leaders came running by, a number of them broke ranks, came over to where I was standing watching them and exchanged bows and greetings, turned around and jumped back into the demonstration line and kept on going.

I do not know if that is evidence of anything, but I have sort of a fundamental faith that the injection of rationality into any hot, emotional issue does help somewhat when the crunch comes, yes.

Q: Did you have any evidence in Niigata of the Soviet Union trying to place its cultural emissaries or its agents into any part of the programs that the labor union was involved in or in which anybody else was involved in your area?

ROSINUS: I do not recall any specific incidents. Niigata, of course, faced the Sea of Japan and across the sea was Vladivostok, so they somehow had a keen sense of Soviet presence, but as you know, the Soviets have had a pretty tough row to hoe in Japan also, given the fact of the Kuril Island occupation and the prisoners that they held at that time still and were returning gradually to Japan.
There were, as I recall, a couple of warnings about Soviet ships coming in and leaving books and materials and that sort of thing, but heavens, I do not think that they were of any major concern to us.

Q: The reason I asked that question was because at that time, I believe it was at that time, Paul Bethel was our person in Nagoya and at that point, in late '54 or early '55, there was a cultural festival of some sorts in Kanazawa.

According to Paul, the Soviets had decided to make a point of this and they had people, whether they were agents or whether they were using Japanese for this purpose, up there in force and were presenting cases which were pretty -- not too subtly -- a denigration of the U.S. position.

He called on Glenn Shaw, the Cultural Attaché who, of course, had lived almost a lifetime in Japan, to come up and according to Paul, and I was not present, Glenn got up and gave about a two-hour speech in which he virtually demolished the arguments that had been presented by --

ROSINUS: Whoever they were.

Q: Whoever they were, and he thought that was a great successful enterprise in the use of the cultural officer in political terms. So, I wondered if you had had any such experience, but evidently, you had not.

ROSINUS: No, not directly, but you mentioned one thing, of course, and that was the great advantage during this particular period when there really was an ideological Cold War going on in the Stalinist years, the advantage of the Soviets in having indigenous agents.

Much of this took place within the labor movement through infiltration by the communist party of Japan at that time, so obviously, yes, they did have their spokesmen around and that was what I was trying to combat with my seminars in international relations with the labor leaders and university people up there. But how does one measure it -- except that over the long run, of course, look at Japan today!

I guess you might say we all succeeded maybe too well.

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1957: Transfer to Kyushu, Where the USIS Target Was the Marxist-Influenced Economic and Political Science Faculties at Kyushu University. Which brings me to the point in Kyushu, because in Kyushu there is Kyudai University, one of the great imperial universities of Japan, and my concern there was that Marxism, theoretical Marxism, had such a hold on the economics faculty particularly and in part on the political faculty, in large measure because they were simply out of touch with what was going on around them and Marxist theory was a very appealing construct and concept. It provided the intellectual with what he needs, a "weltanschauung" that hangs together.

So we thought that in Kyushu, it might be a good idea if we could cooperate with another
element of our government, namely the productivity program of AID, which was at that time seeking to develop Japan's economic productivity and which resulted in the creation of regional productivity councils, as you recall, composed primarily of businessmen, some union leaders and local entrepreneurs.

Our aim was to encourage that council, the Kyushu Productivity Council, to pay much closer attention to the integration in its programs of both labor and university elements, so that they in turn would become exposed to the realities of Japan's economic future and economic problems and in that process wean them away a bit more from their theoretical and unrealistic Marxist predispositions.

Q: Now, this productivity program was one of the principle thrusts as I recall of the AID or whatever it was then called.

ROSINUS: Right.

Q: Of the AID program under Chief Meyer --

ROSINUS: That is right, and I think we did have some success in that. I remember still the name of the chairman of the productivity council, Mr. Chikami, and we worked very closely with him and I think the council did try to reach out into university and labor circles, and, therefore, to try to set up a kind of labor-business-university cooperation that was at that time so typical of the United States and which was one of the reasons, of course, for our economic success up to that period.

Beyond that, we ran the usual program in Kyushu, again with a heavy policy thrust in terms of the explication of American policies and with a broad cultural credibility-building base, if you will, including many cultural performances that were particularly popular in Japan at that time, as examples of the American culture in which they had such an intense interest still in those early years. It was the place of our first meeting with Eugene Istoman and with Rise Stevens and with Jan Pierce, for example, the beginning of a long line of contact with such luminaries as Leonard Bernstein, Andre Watts, Zubin Mehta and the like.

Q: Of course we also had going in Tokyo our radio program which was placing a lot of programs in the radio stations around Japan and Leon Picon was in the midst of producing his book translation program. To what extent did you have contact with them, in assistance to them and --

ROSINUS: Very direct, of course. I traveled a lot throughout Kyushu and every time that we took off, we would visit the radio stations, the editors, you know, the usual USIS route, and the universities and labor centers and so forth and leave materials and pay attention to the book translation and presentation program in particular.

Presentation was a large measure of our activity at that time, including presentations within the university and, of course, there was a regular placement of the radio programs as well.
On this Marxist aspect, I do recall one particular contact with a delightful gentlemen who himself was a professor of economics at Kyushu University, a highly recognized and respected one, by the name of Masao Takahashi. Naturally Mr. Takahashi had very close contacts with Sohyo, the Japanese labor federation, as an advisor as well as with the Japanese Socialist Party. I paid particular attention to working with him on a very personal level, having many interesting discussions about the nature of Marxist economics and politics as against our own perceptions and he, I was under the impression also, modified his views over time on some of these issues. We also sent him on a very successful leader grant visit to the U.S.

So, again, my faith in rational discourse was somewhat sustained by this experience.

Q: And by personal contact.

ROSINUS: And by personal contact. This was illustrated very vigorously much later in my career when I went to the Philippines, but we will get to that soon.

Q: So do you have any further comments that you want to make with reference to your tour either in Niigata or in Fukuoka?

ROSINUS: Only that they were wonderful years to be in Japan.

Q: Precisely, what were the years that you were in Fukuoka?

ROSINUS: Fifty-seven to fifty-nine; fifty-four to fifty-seven in Niigata. These were years when Japan was still Japan, as you well remember; when such things as Japanese inns were still available to us all as we traveled throughout the country and they simply invoked an intense interest in Japanese history and culture, which is in itself so extremely colorful and marvelous. It was a great experience.

Q: It was a wonderful period, all right, before Japan became so superficially, at least, western --

ROSINUS: Correct.

Q: But a lot of that has gone by the board.

ROSINUS: Correct. I went back again a couple of times since then, and I was struck, of course, with this in 1980 when I did a series of talks for CINCPAC in seven Japanese cities.

Q: When you were there, were you able to get up to the North Coast of Japan along the Japan Sea?

ROSINUS: Yes, Niigata, of course, was on the Japan Sea. I went off across to Sado Island, also, which is a famous old cultural island with its old dance forms and so forth.

Q: It has the Sado drums.
ROSINUS: And the Sado okesa, that famous dance. Also up to Akita. I did not get to Hokkaido on that tour, but I did then in 1980 when I spoke in Sapporo on U.S. security policies, but that is another chapter.

Q: What prompted my question was that I think if anywhere, the old Japan is probably still partially represented on the North Coast and on up through the northern part of Kyushu where much of Japan today still looks a bit like I remember it fifty years ago when I first went there; and I have one more comment --

ROSINUS: The northern part of Kyushu, you mean, Kyushu or Honshu?

Q: I mean Honshu.

ROSINUS: Because Kyushu is a wonderful island with all of the hot springs and, you know, Nagasaki, fantastic.

Q: Just one comment about your talk regarding the orientation of the faculties of many of the universities toward Marxism. That was interestingly enough a great feature in prewar Japan, when I was there in ’38 just for the summer with the Japan-American Student Conference.

I found that there were many students of Marxist persuasion and they were of Marxist persuasion because there was a very strong element in the faculties of the universities at that time --

ROSINUS: Exactly.

Q: Having been isolated even then from the --

ROSINUS: West, right.

Q: Marxism simply fermented within the universities and I think it took practically a decade or more after the war --

ROSINUS: To wear down.

Q: It gradually wore out.

ROSINUS: Yes, that is right, and, of course, I spoke of the productivity council, but obviously, we did much more broad scale work within the universities as a whole, you know, through the American participant's programs, getting in speakers, economists, and discussion leaders, through book presentation, through the use of the Cultural Center libraries doing whatever we could to expose these faculties, particularly the younger faculties, to non-Marxist economic thought and political thought, but it was again a political focus that I brought with me through my own inclinations and my own deliberations on what the role of public diplomacy should be as an essential element of American diplomacy as a whole.
Maurice E. Lee was born in Erie, Pennsylvania in 1925. His career with USIS included assignments in Germany, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, and Israel. Mr. Lee served as USIS's chief inspector. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1989.

LEE: Well, Yokohama was not unlike Germany in the sense that here I was in a country that was just rallying after a very destructive war. And again, there was great keen interest in Americans and things American.

Q: This was 1954.

LEE: 1954 -- and I stayed there for five years. I had three prefectures I was responsible for. They were Yamanouchi, Shizuoka and Canoga -- three very different prefectures. Yamanouchi was very primitive in many ways. Shizuoka was a beautiful place, noted for its fruit, fish and cottage industries. Yokohama and part of Canoga was very industrial. And right in the middle of the Consular district rose Mount Fuji.

I made a real effort to get out and meet people and talk to them. I had very close connections with the three governors of the three provinces, so it was very easy to get things done.

One of our principal tasks again was bringing in American speakers and American cultural events. And it was amazing how the Japanese responded. I think the USIS programs in Japan at that time had a great deal to do with the spreading interest in Western culture that took place at that time. The Japanese started building concert halls, forming symphony orchestras. And today, as you know, there are many gifted Japanese performers and artists known throughout the world.

One little side thing, for what it's worth. Our center in Yokohama was rather small, and we were unhappy with it. So we were looking around for another building. We heard that the British Club, which had been there for God knows how long and which had allowed no entry to Japanese -- not even as guests, was going to close down. So we gave them an offer and ended-up getting their impressive building. The day we opened it as the American Cultural Center. It was a mob scene. All the Japanese dignitaries that were invited had never been allowed in that building, and so they all came. In a sense, we ended the colonial period for the Brits in Yokohama.

Q: Did the British run out of money for their club? Why did they decide to discontinue it? Do you know?
LEE: I think that a lot of the British had left at the beginning of the war, and many did not return. So there probably weren't enough British around to keep it going.

Q: And the Center stayed in there as long as you were in Japan?

LEE: Right. It closed down many years later when the Agency had major budget cuts. I found my time in Japan an interesting one. I think that we really made some inroads there. It was a great time to be there because the Japanese economy, its cultural institutions, its media, etc. were rebuilding and entering into a new era under a democratic system. We had a lot of influence upon the process.

Perhaps a small example was that there was great, great interest in the study of English. I had hundreds of students come to me about learning English. Or if they had a certain amount of English, how could they get into an American university? It was overwhelming. My small staff and I just couldn't handle it. One day, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet walked into my office. He said, "You know, I've got a bunch of officers' wives down at Yokosuka (where the fleet was based) who don't have anything to do. Could you find something for them to do?"

And I said, "Yes, I've got the ideal thing." He sent one of the ladies to see me. I gave her some office space, and in turn, she organized a center where the wives advised students and gave English lessons.

Q: You mean, you advised the Japanese students what to do if they wanted to get into an American university?

LEE: Well, the ladies ordered college catalogues from all over the United States. They advised students on visa procedures, helped them write letters to the colleges and taught English to the ones who needed it so they could pass the necessary tests to get into an American university. That was the beginning of the great tide of post-war Japanese students who went to the United States to study.

Q: Did you find a big market for your lectures and visiting dignitaries who came?

LEE: Well, again, like Germany, the Japanese were just starving for information about the outside world, and in the process of rebuilding their country, they needed a lot of advice and help. I remember, just to give you an idea, that in my area, Sony, Suzuki and Yamaha, which today are huge Japanese corporations, were just starting out. One day, somebody took me to see Mr. Suzuki. He was building motorcycles by hand in his garage. That was the beginning of the Suzuki Motor Company. I visited Yamaha one day. It was a store that had been converted into a small piano factory. They were making pianos one at a time. Sony was also a very small place. I remember when I left they gave me one of their first small portable radios. The official said, "You wait and see; there will be a lot these in years to come."

Q: One thing that I'm interested in...you had quite a substantial library down there which was, I gather, about ninety or ninety-five percent in English. We often underwent criticism in our own
agency back in the Washington headquarters because it was felt that all these books in English were really not subject to much use by the recipient countries, and what was the use of having a big library under these circumstances. How did you find that?

LEE: Well, that was a running gun battle, as you know, for many years -- until we got a good translation program underway. But as the Japanese got to learn English, a lot of them could read it, and some taught themselves to read it. It wasn't perfect in the beginning, needless to say. But as the translation program grew and the Japanese learned English, our clientele grew and grew.

Q: You, I'm sure, remember very well our old friend Leon Picon who established the translation program in Japan?

LEE: Right. A very, very good officer.

Q: And I think he made quite a substantial contribution, both in his magazine, the Beisho Daiori, and also in the translations that he accomplished. I imagine you took his translations into the library once he got them going.

LEE: Right. And, of course, people in the field were putting pressure on the front office and on Washington to speed up the translation program. But like anything else, it took time.

ELIZABETH J. HARPER
Passport Officer
Tokyo (1954-1957)

Japanese Language Training
Tokyo (1958)

Visa Officer
Naha (1958-1961)

Chief, Consular Section
Kobe-Osaka (1961-1965)

Elizabeth J. Harper was born in Oklahoma in 1920. She entered the Foreign Service in 1951. Her career in the State Department included assignments in Indonesia, Japan, and Canada. Ms. Harper was interviewed by William D. Morgan on June 18, 1992.

Q: 1954, when you got to Tokyo, and then eleven years later?

HARPER: Well, I came home the first of July, 1965. It was ten years, really -- ten years plus -- because I didn't actually get to Tokyo until about January or February of '55.
Q: And then after four years, you went to Okinawa, then back to Tokyo?

HARPER: I went to Kobe-Osaka. It was Kobe-Osaka in those days. It's Osaka-Kobe today. My assignment was as Chief of the Consular Section.

Q: How big of a post was it? It was a Consulate General, I presume.

HARPER: It was a Consulate General. We had, in addition to the Consul General, we had one economic officer, about four consular officers, admin officer -- except the admin officer, God love him, really diverted my activities. First of all, he persuaded the Department to let him buy a house -- an old house at an excessive price -- for a principal residence (that is, for the Consul General), assuring the Department that it needed no initial repairs, thus justifying spending all this money for it. Actually, it needed about $25,000 worth of repairs. Then, two days after all of the papers were signed, he transferred to Tokyo and I became Acting Administrative Officer and responsible for all those repairs in order to make the place habitable! Anyway, that's a different story and unrelated to immigration, but it did take a lot of time away from my Consular duties.

Q: But as Chief of the Consular Section, you had not only visas, but you had the whole schmear.

HARPER: I had the whole schmear. Yes, in addition to visas, you know, we had Americans in jail, we had people who were losing citizenship or who were regaining it, and lots of seamen. You will recall, Bill, in the early '60s, which is when I was in Kobe, during the whole period of the late '50s and early '60s, the Supreme Court was frequently invalidating one loss of nationality provision or another. So people who had been technically expatriated all of a sudden had not been expatriated because the related provision of law was found not to be constitutional.

Q: We were being challenged. This very, very strict, biased -- if I may use the word -- citizenship approach, including on women, was repeatedly challenged, and it kept falling. So today, I think we might say, B. J., it's pretty hard if not impossible to lose your American nationality.

HARPER: I think, actually, it is. And in many ways, I regret it. However, that's beside the point.

Q: In any event, you had the product of these changes when you were there.

HARPER: Yeah. Don't misunderstand me, I don't mind making it more difficult to lose American nationality. I do mind, speaking personally, making it unduly too easy to gain American nationality.

Q: Green card and five years' wait.

HARPER: Well, it isn't so much the green card and five years' wait. I think immigrants should have a reasonable chance to naturalize if they want to; our original ancestors here -- mine came before the Revolution -- were not native-born U.S. citizens. What bothers me is the law regarding, for instance, the transmission of citizenship. John Doe, American citizen, or Mary Doe, American citizen, goes overseas, marries some alien, makes his or her home in that foreign country forever, has a child. We have watered down the length of time the American citizen
parent must have been resident in the United States in order to transmit citizenship. We have watered down the length of time, if any -- I think we may in fact have eliminated the length of time -- the child, who becomes a citizen at birth, has to come and spend in the United States in order to retain citizenship. I think that's unfortunate because we end up with a number of American citizens, in name only, who then become the responsibility of American Consuls to protect.

Q: That's a different question. But the first question is, of course, what makes an American? Attitude, loyalty -- all these words that you and I would say make an American. Some people argue, however, that those issues aren't necessarily what makes an American.

HARPER: Well, I continue to believe no matter what nationality it is, I don't care whether it's American, British, Indian or whatever, it should have an element of allegiance involved. And I really feel that these people do not, in many instances, have anything other than the sense of, "gee, it's handy to be an American citizen because that way, I can go there if I really want to sometime," and no sense of emotional attachment to this country.

Q: But, of course, you and I as Consular Officers, or former ones, never would let that enter into our judgement.

HARPER: Well, it doesn't enter into my judgment if the person meets the requirements of the law. What I'm arguing about, against, actually, are the current requirements of the law. And I really do think that they demean the importance of one's citizenship, whatever the citizenship may be.

Q: Versus whether they appear in front of you and the Consular establishment as an American citizen, burning the American flag and swearing how much they hate America...even that?

HARPER: Even that. I usually made people wait twenty-four hours and come back before I would take an oath of renunciation, incidentally.

Q: Oh, I think that's, as I remember, part of the law, or part of the procedure?

HARPER: Well, no it wasn't part of the law. But we did, I think, finally make it part of the procedure.

Q: Yeah, it was indeed.

HARPER: Before it was a procedure, a standard procedure, I did it. It was one of the things I learned from the more experienced officers in Tokyo.

Q: Well, you're probably the source of some of our subsequent standard procedures or laws!

HARPER: I'm the source of a number of standard procedures because of my duties in connection with the '65 Act.
Q: What about the visa function in your many years in Japan? And obviously, when you were in Kobe-Osaka, it was not what it is today, especially in terms of visa restrictions, inability to travel and the like. But what were the visa issues there at the time?

HARPER: Primarily the bona fides for nonimmigrants because, of course, with the quota on Japan of a hundred...

Q: Which was a hundred for all Asian countries.

HARPER: There was always a question as to whether or not somebody was a bona fide nonimmigrant. And a great many were. The problems, however, were essentially not exclusively with the Japanese who would come in and try to con us into believing that they were just making a short trip and would obviously come back after seeing the Grand Canyon, or whatever.

Q: The famous Niagara Falls or Grand Canyon...or a funeral.

HARPER: Yeah, and surely, or a funeral. Another real problem was with Americans, who were dishonest enough to try to help them fraudulently.

Q: Why would they help them? What was their connection. Friends?

HARPER: I don't know. I mean, I remember a couple of missionaries, one a Roman Catholic and one a Protestant, both of whom submitted fraudulent documents on behalf of and otherwise advised Japanese applicants -- suggestions on what kinds of arguments would persuade the consul to give him, in both cases it was a him, a visa

Q: God's law being more important and overriding than any national law.

HARPER: I guess so. They was also a problem when it came to children, I might add. Missionaries, more than once, would come in with a child who quite clearly was not their child, and try to register the baby as an American citizen, as their own offspring. But, in any event, I don't want to pick on the missionaries because most of them were absolutely wonderful, but there were some, who, as you say, I guess they believed that God's law was more important. Although, none of them ever expressed it that way to me. Whatever their motives, there were occasionally problems.

I also had the interesting experience, one time, of ruling off limits our Consular office, and more accurately, the Consular section, to any member of the Japan Travel Bureau, which is a Government agency. The reason was that one of their personnel was forging documents for people who were using the JTB as a travel agent and applying for visas. Well, as far as I was concerned, that made not only that individual ineligible under 212(a)31, as it was in those days, but it also made the JTB a hazard. So I informed the Embassy, and I informed the Japan Travel Bureau that I was sorry, but no representative of their organization was going to be admitted to the Consulate General in Kobe-Osaka for a minimum of ninety days. At that time, they could perhaps persuade me that they had sufficiently trained their people so that this wouldn't happen again.
Q: I don't think Consular officers could quite do that these days.

HARPER: Well, I don't know if they could either, but I certainly did it, and I expected howls from the Embassy because of the Japanese government connection, but I didn't get any. They said, "More power to you!" And meanwhile, this young man was transferred to something like baggage handler in Shikoku.

Q: Rather than to jail?

HARPER: Rather than to jail.

Q: You have introduced fraud as obviously a key emotional issue for all of us associated with visas. But I never thought of fraud with the Japanese and certainly not in those times. You've opened up the subject of purposeful misrepresentation. Were the applicants largely people who were leaving for economic reasons? What was the basis, if there was one particular one for fraud, or misrepresentation?

HARPER: Oh, they were, for instance, a kid who said he wanted to go to school in the U.S., or a businessman, who really wanted simply to get lost in the U.S. and work. Sometimes it was sad because the applicants would have been found eligible for a visa if they had not engaged in misrepresentation. But they figured they had to do something special to get a visa -- instead of playing it straight. We issued more than 5,000 nonimmigrant visas the year I arrived -- which was so unusual that the Consul General made a ceremony of personally handing the applicant his visaed passport in his office -- so obviously some people were bona fide.

Q: Also, the Japanese were very loyal?

HARPER: Basically, the Japanese are very honest.

Q: But also very close to Japan. They are like the Chinese in not rejecting their culture.

HARPER: No, they don't reject their culture, and they shouldn't. But they do, you know, harbor a desire to go the United States.

Q: Probably it was the quota, the limited quota?

HARPER: And the quota got in the way. They had relatives in the U.S. There was no prayer of ever getting a visa, however, an immigrant visa.

Q: Post World War II problems?

HARPER: It was mostly a matter of there not being visa numbers available, even for people who would be fine immigrants. In the JTB case, our office suddenly found itself getting roughly identical letters, business invitations, purportedly from the United States for, say, Hiroshi Watanabe, or whatever the name would be. They would have misspellings, they would be
written in what was usually known as Japlish, you know, Japanese-English, and the fraud was perfectly apparent.

HENRY GOSHO
Radio and Program Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1954-1960)

Information Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1964-1968)

Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Osaka/Kobe (1969-1971)

Chief, East Asia/Pacific Division Broadcasting Service, USIS
Washington, DC (1971-1973)

Henry Gosho was born in Seattle, Washington in 1921. Much of his career with USIS was spent in Japan. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on January 4, 1989.

Q: Do you remember exactly what date it was that you arrived in Tokyo? I had come out a short time before you arrived, and I can’t remember just when it was you came to be actually assigned to USIS or its predecessor.

GOSHO: I first came to Tokyo to recruit the announcers and then stayed on for six months. That was in the summer of 1950. But I think what you’re talking about is when Jeanne finally got her citizenship. That would be June of 1954.

Q: I’d forgotten it was that late in the game. I remember Sax Bradford talking about you and saying, "As soon as we can get Hank cleared, we’ll get him out here." But I didn’t remember when it was that you actually showed up. I came in January of ’52 and handled the nuts and bolts of the takeover from the Army when the program converted to USIS. We had twenty-four field centers, about 840 Japanese and 135 American positions authorized. We never filled them all, but we did get about 100 on duty before Washington ordered us to start cutting back.

GOSHO: I remember when I was first assigned there on TDY in 1950, USIS was in the Mitsui Bank building. Then we moved to the Mitsubishi Shoji building. Then from there to the Mantetsu building. I guess that was over a span of some fifteen years.

Q: When I came out in January of 1952, we were in the Mitsubishi Shoji building near the Tokyo Station.

GOSHO: There was one more before that. We were in the Mitsui Bank building.
Then we moved to the Mantetsu. I've forgotten now whether it was late fall of 1952 or the early part of 1953, but it was right in that two or three-month period. We moved up either around November of '52 or sometime the first month or two of '53. By the time you came out on assignment, we were already in the Mantetsu building.

GOSHO: That's right. As I mentioned, Victor Hauge was the chief of the radio branch. Vic had already embarked on an ambitious radio program project. The plan was to furnish the commercial stations with USIS radio programs that they could use in the early days because there was nobody that would sponsor any of the time slots, mainly because Japanese businesses were not familiar with the business of sponsorship.

Q: And they didn't have much money.

GOSHO: They didn't have much money. But Vic Hauge saw this as an excellent opportunity to get our message across through the radio programs that we would furnish free. We started out, as I recall, with two or three programs. One I remember was called "Family Album," which was a program that talked about household hints, how things were done in the U.S., how it might work in Japan. It was an excellent way, I thought, to get our American message to the Japanese. A lot of the letters that we received showed that there were listeners.

It was an ideal situation, as you might guess, because there was a lack of sponsors in Japan. We were able to get USIS radio programs on the air in prime time, which was, in those days, between 6:00 and 9:30.

Q: As I recall, at that time, there were no networks in Japan at all. You were dealing with a group of independent stations and therefore had to deliver your taped programs to stations all over the country, each one of which played individually. They were all pretty low-power stations.

GOSHO: Yes, that's right. Radio Tokyo was the first commercial station in Japan, followed by Osaka, then by Nagoya, and then eventually into Fukuoka, and up to Hokkaido. We were fortunate in that in each of those major cities, we had a cultural center. So the cultural center director was able to make contact with the radio station and establish a relationship, which helped in carrying out the cultural center activities in his own area.

 Eventually, the radio stations formed networks. Primarily they were owned by the Asahi newspaper organization, which had one network. The Mainichi newspaper had another network, and the Yomiuri, the third. Those are the three main media newspapers in Japan. These later on branched out into TV.

Our programs were made up of a mix of music and "Family Album," which was more of a home aid type of program, but we would weave USIS country objectives into the program. We also had what we would call talk shows. I think there were two or three of what we called commentary talk shows.

One on which we put a lot of emphasis was a military program for which we were able to utilize a prominent military commentator who would talk about the security pact -- what it intended to
do and what it hoped to do, but mainly to keep the peace. We would receive letters from audiences. Not all were in favor of what was being said, but nonetheless, we thought that it was worthwhile in that at least it got the people thinking about the security pact and what it meant to Japan.

On another commentary program, we invited former Washington correspondents or New York correspondents, who were the Asahi or Mainichi or Yomiuri correspondents, and they would talk about international politics, relating mainly to U.S. and Japan affairs.

Another commentary program was a U.S.-Japan economic talk show. We were able to place these programs initially on prime-time programs.

Q: You talked about the feedback on the military programs. Did you get any feedback on the correspondents' program and the economic program that you were putting on?

GOSHO: We received many comments on the current topic programs, mostly that they appreciated the program and they enjoyed it. But I think that that was mostly because they were able to read in their own local newspapers on current topics or current events. But on the economic programs, we would receive comments that there were some aspects in it that they hadn't realized, and they thanked us for the educational info that was being provided.

Of course, the most popular shows were the music shows. We had country and western, which was very popular at the time. I wasn't much of a country and western fan, but there were quite a few in Japan, strangely enough, because at that time, square dancing was very popular. That went across great, and we got quite a few requests for that type of music. Although we did have classical music, such as the Boston Symphony. Those were very popular, so popular, in fact, that we got a request from Suntory Whiskey Company that they wanted to sponsor one of the shows. We thought, "Gee, that would be terrific." So we sent a message to Washington, but the legal beagle said no, an alcoholic beverage program would not be appropriate, besides which they advised that a U.S. Government-operated program could not be commercially sponsored. So that one went by the wayside.

There was, as I recall, a JTB (Japan Travel Bureau) or similar organization that did sponsor one of our shows without our knowing it. The program had to do with a tour of the United States. They would do a show about the Grand Canyon or about national parks or about various cities and how they were related to Japan, so on and so forth.

Q: I think you mentioned at one point in our conversation before we were recording that you would occasionally put on shows that would review or report on certain articles that appeared in major U.S. periodicals, and some of them in the medical field, which got a great response.

GOSHO: Yes, in the program called "Family Album," we would from time to time insert either new findings or interesting findings by the American medical field, either an article out of the AMA journal or the Harvard medical journal -- I've forgotten which it was. But quite often we would receive inquiries from a medical college in Japan, saying that they heard the program and could we furnish them with more detailed data on it. In many cases, we were able to furnish them
with additional data, and if we couldn't, we would write them and tell them that we were looking further into their request. This was one of those things you call "evidence of effectiveness."

At the height of the radio branch operation, we had between thirty and forty programs, the majority of which were on prime time. But as the years went by, commercial sponsorship caught on. I would guess around seven or eight years later, we began to get pushed out of prime time programming. But interestingly enough, the stations would make another effort to ask us if they could only sponsor "Family Album," for instance, saying they could still carry it on in prime time. But since that was impossible, it would be shoved back to, say, around 1:00 at night, and eventually midnight. Pretty soon, the only time we were on the air was 1:00 in the morning and 4:00 in the morning.

Q: When you were in your heyday and furnishing all these programs to individual stations, did you have "traveling salesmen" who would go out and make contact with the various radio stations first to get them acclimated to taking your product and later perhaps to get a feedback from then as to what they wanted?

GOSHO: We had a system where if I didn't go out, then our top FSL or local employee would go out with, let's say, three or four sample programs. Maybe two tapes would be music tapes. That was a good come-on because good music programs in those early days were hard to come by in Japan. The prime program that you really wanted to sell was either a commentary or "Family Album". In most cases, they knew that if they picked one or both music programs, they were, more or less, obliged to take the talk show or the commentary program.

Q: At the height of utilization of your programs around Japan, approximately how many stations were you servicing? What is your evaluation overall of that earlier period -- say the first five or six years that you were on the air through so many Japanese stations -- as to the influence the programs had?

GOSHO: When we first started out, there were only three or four stations, but at the peak, we serviced in the neighborhood of sixth to seventy stations. In fact, I would have to say that it was probably higher because when you got into the hinterlands of Japan -- as you know, it's a mountainous island -- they had there what they called slave stations. So if Nagoya carried a program, it was generally also carried by the slave station, which would be maybe as many as three or four additional. So we probably serviced, at the peak moments, about 100 stations.

When television came in, I would guess about 1958-59, we started out with three or four programs and ended-up with three or four programs. Of those three, two were English conversation-type programs.

Q: Teaching?

GOSHO: Yes, teaching. One was just pure elementary English, but the other one, we used VOA's Special English material, which enjoyed some success. The other two were documentaries, which were furnished by the Agency's TV and MOPIX Service. But, you know, television caught on very fast in Japan. By that time, commercial sponsorship was making rapid
headway, so there was not much need by the Japanese to depend on us for furnishing material.

Q: Other than the correspondence you received as a result of your programs, did you have any kind of an indication that you were making some headway with messages in the programming that you were preparing?

GOSHO: In a negative sense, and yet the fact that we got some negative responses to it, it was an indication that they were listening. We had a military program, not in the sense of warfare or defense -- well, it had to do with Japanese defense -- but we had a military commentator who, interestingly enough, we were able to get from the Asahi newspaper, whose policy at the time was generally anti-American. By anti-American, I would say they were more pro-Japanese than they were anti-American. But we were able to get a military editor, who would talk about the nuclear protective aspects of visiting submarines or nuclear aircraft carriers. The Japanese were Hiroshima conscious, and so anything that had to do with nukes, they were against. But this military commentator tried to inform them of just what it was that the U.S.-Japan defense was doing. As I say, not all the letters we got in that connection were favorable; a lot of them protested trying to justify nuclear weapons. But at least, as I say, it showed they were listening to the program.

Q: It seems to me that at one time, USIS was arranging to broadcast World Series games. Tell me how that came about and what role you played in that.

GOSHO: That was before I was assigned at Tokyo. It occurred to me that even before the war, baseball was extremely popular in Japan. Probably, next to sumo, it was considered the national pastime. But because of that, I suggested to the Agency -- well, at the time, it was in State -- I put in a proposal, which was approved, that we broadcast the World Series in Japanese to Japan. As it happened, I had gone to Japan earlier to recruit three NHK announcers, two of which happened to be sports announcers, so we were well prepared. I did the color commentary on it. Broadcasting a World Series was a great thrill to me because I played baseball in high school in Japan, and it had always been my dream to see a World Series. Here I got the opportunity to do so.

One of the highlights of the World Series was when I conducted an interview with Casey Stengel, manager of the New York Yankees. I had asked him whether he foresaw a day when they would have a real World Series, with the champion of America playing the champion of Japan. His response was, "You know, I went to Japan in 1934 with Babe Ruth, and now there was a great player." He talked about Babe Ruth, and he said that Babe Ruth had gone to England. "Now, England, that's a different situation. Baseball is not all that popular in Europe, but eventually, there will be a day when baseball will become popular." He switched from one topic to another so rapidly, in the blink of an eyelash, that I had a great deal of trouble interpreting what he said. Nonetheless, it went out over the air.

About two weeks later, we got several letters from Japan saying, "We couldn't understand a word of what that interpreter was saying." Well, what the heck. I couldn't understand a word of what Casey was trying to say either.
The significance, though, of that World Series was that we got reports from USIS Tokyo that there was an estimated audience of between 5 to 7 million who heard all seven games. That was one of the highlights of radio broadcasting, even in Japan, as the first broadcast in Japanese. Of course, today the Japanese are here not only broadcasting the World Series, but the Super Bowl as well.

Another sidebar on the radio branch operation in Tokyo was that we had several local radio producers who were just starting out. In other words, they graduated from university, and they'd apply for a job at USIS, and we would take them on as assistants to the main producer. Later, as Agency budget cuts came, they would move on to Japanese radio stations. Eventually, we had quite a large alumni group of former USIS radio branch employees who were working for various radio stations throughout Japan. We were invited to attend what the Japanese called the NARB, the National Association of Radio Broadcasters, patterned after the NARB here in the States. It was like old home week. I would go and be greeted by these various former workers of USIS.

Eventually, the radio and TV programs sort of faded out, and more emphasis was put on the information side. USIS was divided into the Information Division and the Cultural Division. I was assigned to head up the Information Division, made up of Radio/TV, MOPIX, Publications, and Exhibits Branches. My last assignment in Tokyo was Expo 1970 in Osaka. Although talking about expositions, I was called out of retirement in 1984 and 1985 to be the deputy commissioner of the U.S. Pavilion at Tsukuba.

There are many memories of the long years spent in Tokyo. I guess one of the most memorable was in 1959, toward the end of the year, I'd say around November, Harry Keith, chief of the Mopix operation, and I were assigned full-time to the upcoming visit by President Eisenhower in Japan. It had been announced in October of 1959 that in 1960, President Eisenhower would schedule a visit to Japan, and it would be the first time that a U.S. President would visit Japan. So it was to be a big event. Harry Keith and I were on it seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day practically, as were two from the Foreign Office. We worked as a team in submitting various suggested schedules to Washington.

The main difficulty was that we had to time everything down to the nth inch of what was to happen. For example, on the program, there was a luncheon to be given at the Imperial Hotel. First of all, we had to submit the menu to Washington. The menu was approved. Then Harry Keith and I and the two from the Foreign Office, and two from the White House came, and we sat down in the banquet room at the Imperial Hotel and actually ate what was to be served to the President. Somehow or other, when dessert time came, the waiter brought out vanilla ice cream. We were just about to dig into it when the White House medical officer says, "No, no! We can't have that. There's too much cholesterol in it." So the ice cream had to be scrubbed.

As I say, everything had to be timed to the minute. The visit to the Mejii Shrine, the oldest shrine in Tokyo, was on the schedule. One of the problems there was that there were no telephones readily available. As you know, the President has to have at each station the ability to make direct contact with the Washington switchboard. After a great deal of negotiations and whatnot, they were finally able to install one telephone just outside the shrine admin office, much to the
chagrin of the high priest who objected to it. That was my first experience with picking up a phone and having the White House switchboard come right on.

Q: As you remember, in our early days out there, we were reduced to radio telephone, and very often it was almost impossible to hold a conversation between Tokyo and Washington. On this occasion, what had they done to improve communications so that you had a much better connection?

GOSHO: The telephone at the shrine, for example, went directly to the switchboard at the Embassy, and then the switchboard at the Embassy went to the USAFJ (the U.S. Army Forces in Japan) headquarters in Fuchu, I think it was, and their switchboard was able to patch right into the White House.

Everything wasn't work in preparing for the President's visit. As a "take-off" on the requirement of communicating at all times with Washington, we came up with a little skit where the President is in audience with the Emperor, and there's a familiar red pay phone installed right next to the throne. As the President is bowing, the phone rings. The Emperor picks up the phone and he says, "Hai." Then he hands the phone over to the President and says, "Its for you."

The upshot of the whole thing after all the months of preparation, papers after papers -- plan A, fair-weather schedule, plan B, wet-weather schedules -- and all these things where you had to measure things by the minute, by the second. The upshot was Mr. Haggerty, the President's press secretary, flew into Haneda airport two weeks before the President was scheduled to arrive. We had already had indications there was going to be trouble. There were quite a few demonstrations already going strong. I think it was for that reason that Mr. Haggerty flew into Tokyo to get a final reading. I believe the President was already in Okinawa when Mr. Haggerty came in. You couldn't get into the airport because of the demonstrators. I was there well in advance of Mr. Haggerty's arrival. The Japanese security officer in charge of Haneda airport came to me and said, "A U.S. helicopter is on standby. He's flying in now. We would strongly recommend that Mr. Haggerty avoid the demonstrators and take the chopper, and use that to get to the Embassy."

So when Mr. Haggerty's plane arrived, I went up the ramp and I gave him the message. He just looked at me and said, "No American official is going to go in by the back door. I will use the Embassy car and proceed that way."

Well, he got no more than a few blocks at the far end of the runway there, and the cars couldn't move because of the demonstrators. They were pounding the car with their placards. This was in June of 1960. It was hotter than hell.

Q: That was about the time we were due to renegotiate the Security Treaty, as I recall.

GOSHO: That's right.

Q: Was that the basis for the rioting?

GOSHO: That was the basis. Well, at that stage, it wasn't rioting yet, but there were protest
demonstrations and just general havoc. As a matter of fact, I believe that in one of the
demonstrations at the Diet, a high school girl was crushed to death. That caused further
problems. That was also one of the reasons why Haggerty came in.

It was hot in those cars. The engines overheated, and we had all the windows closed, and they
were pounding the car with these placards. I was in the car directly behind Ambassador
(Douglas) MacArthur II and Mr. Haggerty. There was a knock on the window. I looked out, and
there was the chief of the security forces. I lowered the window, and he said, "I want you to go
tell Ambassador MacArthur that your U.S. Army chopper is going to hover over the cars. When I
give the signal, they're going to lower a rope ladder. When I give the signal, I would like to have
the Ambassador and Mr. Haggerty get out of the car and climb up the rope ladder and take off."

I said, "You're out of your cotton-picking mind! You don't want me to go out in that crowd, do
you?"

He said, "Well, I can't do it. I don't speak English!"

I finally said, "Okay."

As I got out of the car, I got hit in the head with one of the demonstrator's placards, and I turned
around -- more in pain rather than anger -- and this Japanese fellow that hit me on the head with
the placard bowed low and said, "Excuse me. Sorry about that." Out of that emotional bit, there's
that little bit of to-do that remained in my mind.

I went up to the car and told the Ambassador what was going to happen. When the signal was
given, they came out of the car. But as you know, when you're standing directly under a chopper,
it raises a dust storm the likes you've never seen before, especially when it's so low. They got out
and climbed up the rope ladder into the chopper, and it took off. As soon as the chopper took off
and the main object of the demonstrators had gone, why, the crowd just disappeared, and we
were able to proceed back to the Embassy.

In the meantime, the chopper had landed at a place called Hardy Barracks, which is less than a
mile away from the Embassy. Mr. Haggerty and the Ambassador drove directly through the back
roads to the residence. When I arrived, Mr. Haggerty was chewing Ambassador MacArthur out
for not providing the proper intelligence. I don't know what he could have done about it.

Q: Was it at that point that Haggerty decided that he was going to recommend the cancellation?

GOSHO: Yes. The President was in Taiwan, and they had the President go to Seoul. Prime
Minister Kishi appeared tearfully on TV and announced that the President's visit had been
canceled. I believe within the next day or so, Prime Minister Kishi resigned.

Q: We were discussing earlier the value of use of Japanese language by American diplomats
and, to some extent, that it was counterproductive in certain instances.

GOSHO: First of all, I'd like to mention that the majority of my service was in Japan -- I can
only speak for Japan. Over the past several years, I have found the Foreign Service Officers' linguistic abilities to be top grade. Especially I found that those in USIS were of high caliber.

However, I have one observation to make, and I think it still applies. I remember an incident back in the days when USIS would invite the Japanese media for a get together, and almost the entire USIS staff and Japanese correspondents, foreign news editors and so forth were invited. Mr. Watanabe of the Osaka Mainichi, chief of the foreign news desk who was educated in the States and spoke excellent English, appeared at the cocktail party, as he always did. He was a great fan of USIS. As a matter of fact, come to think of it, Mr. Watanabe was one of those who appeared on our commentary programs in the early days. Anyway, he came to me toward the end of the party a little bit upset and said, "You know, one of your officers kept insisting on talking Japanese to me." He pointed him out.

I said, "Well, he's a recent graduate of the Yokohama Language School."

Mr. Watanabe said, "Well, since you and I are old friends, I can be frank with you. Every time I responded in English, he came back at me in his Japanese, which was not bad but not all that good. I think he should realize that when someone answers back in English that they should then drop the second language and respond in English because it tells the person that his English isn't understandable, and it's a breach of etiquette." Also a breach of diplomacy, as far as that goes. So despite the fact that there are excellent linguists, there's always a time and place when they should respond in English if the guest talks to you or answers your questions or carries on a conversation in English.

Q: But on the whole, you feel that the diplomatic students speak a pretty good version of Japanese?

GOSHO: Yes.

Q: However, as we all know, the Japanese language is full of many nuances. To what extent do you think that a student in a couple years of study can pick up those nuances? Or do we miss an awful lot of them? Is that one of the great faults or inabilities in our language learning?

GOSHO: Yes. I can only speak for the Japanese language, but it is a language full of nuances, which is probably some of the reasons for many misunderstandings that arise between the U.S. and Japan -- the nuances of the language.

I recall in the early days, when Washington sent the post a message asking that such and such be transmitted to the Foreign Office, I accompanied the Ambassador to the Foreign Office. The message was transmitted. The Foreign Office official said, in Japanese, "I generally understand." "I got the gist," would be the more accurate translation. Except that the Ambassador took it as an acceptance of the message.

We returned to the Embassy, and a draft telegram was written that they had accepted. As the accompanying officer, I was required to initial the message. I said, "No, I don't think this is correct. What they actually said was they'll study it. It was not an acceptance." From that day
forward, the Ambassador agreed that henceforth anything official would be handled in the English language.

Q: I know that Sen Nishiyama, who, for general purposes, I'll identify as the top local employee in the U.S. Information Service operation. He was born in the United States, got a degree in the U.S. and then went to Japan and lived there ever after. He is probably the best example of a bilingual person that we have. But he and Reischauer used to get into some rather unpleasant arguments over the utilization of certain phrases in Japanese, and the Ambassador would insist that the way he was saying it was the way it ought to be. Sen, in his very polite way, was trying to tell Reischauer that it really wasn't the way it should be said. I suppose that is due to the fact that the language had progressed since Reischauer learned it. Sen, of course, had been there all the time and knew all the current nuances.

GOSHO: I think that may have been true, but initially, it got quite a response from the audience. I recall that at one of the speeches he made, the Ambassador had made a longer-than-normal talk in English before the translation. Normally, he got to a convenient place so Sen could translate. But on that particular occasion, he had talked a little longer -- either that or he forgot that Sen had to translate it. Anyway, it was quite long. Sen translated it as best he could, and when Sen finished, the Ambassador said, "Well, that wasn't exactly what I said. What I said was ..." and the Ambassador started talking in Japanese. It brought much laughter, and a humorous air was interjected. So it became kind of an act, and it was a good one because it showed the humorous side of the Ambassador, and Sen realized it, too. They continued this "act" many more times.

But I agree. Sen, without a doubt, is the best interpreter of English into Japanese and vice versa that I've ever heard. He compares well with Mr. Shimanouchi, who was Prime Minister Kishi's personal secretary and interpreter. Mr. Shimanouchi spent his early years in Los Angeles and was educated at UCLA, so his English was perfect, too. When Prime Minister Kishi came to Washington as the first post-war high Japanese official to address the Congress, Mr. Shimanouchi did the interpreting. When Prime Minister Kishi finished his speech, and Mr. Shimanouchi ended with "Thank you very much" (I forgot to mention that Mr. Shimanouchi was a debater at UCLA, so his English language is flawless), the Congressmen and Senators came over and all shook Mr. Shimanouchi's hand and sort of left the Prime Minister standing out in the cold.

JOHN M. STEEVES
Consul General and Political Advisor
Naha (1955-1956)

Ambassador John M. Steeves served in the China/Burma/India theater during World War II in the Office of War Information. His Foreign Service career included positions in New Delhi, Tokyo, Djakarta, Naha, Kabul, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy and Thomas Stern on March 27, 1991
Q: Then you went from Djakarta to Naha in Okinawa as the consul general and also the political adviser. You were there from 1953 to 1955. Could you explain the situation and what your job entailed?

STEEVES: From the standpoint of personal relationships and comforts that was a delightful assignment because it was with the military command. I got along with all of them extremely well. General Moore and all of his staff. I got the Command people to give up a perfectly delightful site that they had begun to fix up—in fact, put a million dollars into it actually—and use as a club. I told them that it would look very, very bad for them to be occupying a place like that as a military club—high on a cliff overlooking the China Sea and obviously beyond their needs. I said, "You know what you ought to do with that? You ought to turn it in to the consulate general." I got Washington's permission to go along with that and they did.

Q: That's diplomacy.

STEEVES: It was the old Japanese naval inspection site. It had a lighthouse on it. It still had the rings on the wall where they tied up the pirates that they caught at sea. It was a marvelous place. One of the Okinawa contractors built new counters for us out of that lovely travertine that they have naturally in Okinawa and put it all in for nothing. It was one of the most delightful offices I have ever had in my life.

Q: What were the issues?

STEEVES: The issues were occupation problems. Getting the Command to do the types of things for the Okinawa people that would bring about the right relationships between the two, which is not very easy.

Q: Was that the period when you had either a communist or socialist mayor of Naha?

STEEVES: No, neither the Mayor of Naha nor Okinawa Governor were Communist. You must be referring to Senaga, a member of the native Council—or some such office.

Q: How did that work?

STEEVES: Senaga caused us a lot of trouble for he was an out and out communist. He was popular with the people on some issues but he had to be controlled very carefully. Under Military Rule, of course, he could have been dealt with very quickly. But that would not have been a wise course to follow.

Q: This was the fifties. How did you deal with him?

STEEVES: Well, he could be isolated pretty well because he didn't have a lot of influence, but he had potential influence. He was beginning to gain popularity with the teachers union. Then, we had done so many things for the Okinawans that were obvious benefits that they could kind of see where their bread was buttered. I, for instance, sent back to India and got the Coimbatore Experimental Station to send me great crate loads of experimental cuttings to revolutionize their
sugar industry. One of the things that I really prize in the Foreign Service was when they sent me a silver cask with the first sugar that they got from the new cane some years later.

Q: At this period I take it that Okinawa Reversion to Japan was not a major issue.

STEEVES: It became a major issue somewhat later. It was just beginning when I left. It was growing all the time because the Japanese wanted the islands back and the overtures and propaganda was strong and constant.

Q: How about the Okinawans?

STEEVES: Yes, for cultural reasons, language especially, they would be just more at home with their own Japanese people despite the fact that they were always looked on as country second cousins. They suffered a lot by being looked down upon by the Japanese. I am afraid that is happening again--and we told them it would.

**ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, JR.**
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1955-1957)

Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. was born to American parents in China in 1920. His career with USIS included assignments in Hong Kong, Japan, Burma, and Taiwan. He served as the ambassador to Burma, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. Ambassador Hummel was interviewed by Dorothy Robins-Mowry on July 13, 1989.

HUMMEL: As the PAO -- because from Hong Kong...let's see, we arrived in Hong Kong in '52, left in '55 -- from '55 to '57, I was Deputy PAO in Tokyo, managing a much larger program under Joe Evans -- two years, from '55 to '57. That I enjoyed very much and traveled to all of the cultural centers -- twelve to thirteen of them at the time -- and learned quite a bit of the Japanese language.

From there, I went to Burma as PAO, replacing Lionel Landry, from '57 to '60.

Q: So, you were overseas constantly during this period?

HUMMEL: '52 to '60.

Q: What did you make of all those branch posts in Tokyo, or in Japan, obviously during one of the final cut-backs? They've cut back since then, but it was such an agonizing kind of thing. It was so emotional for the Japanese.

HUMMEL: Yes. Well, as the country grows up and reconstitutes or constitutes its own media and cultural activities, the foreign input becomes a smaller percentage of the total pie. So, the
cultural centers that were almost the only thing around that had had intellectual stimulation in the early days of the occupation were increasingly supplemented and superseded by Japan's own lively efforts.

Still, I don't mean to denigrate it because throughout this whole period, there was an intense curiosity on the part of the Japanese about everything Western. They wanted to learn about everything. They are terribly single-minded, as everybody knows.

By the time it became necessary to chop, when that time came, I think that was probably a rational decision because the need was no longer quite so great. In the same sense, the Fulbright Program that had been absolutely essential in bringing people out of environments such as Japan, China, wherever, and vice-versa, later became a small part of the huge tide of exchange of persons that eventually went on through other auspices.

So, I think it had been highly valuable in the immediate post-war years, as USIS' program throughout the world was more valuable everywhere then than it is now because it is quite often submerged under other media efforts.

Q: This was the rationale when I was there for further cutting.

HUMMEL: I'm afraid that's probably a good rationale.

Q: I know the situation in Germany, when they started to cut there, it seemed to be more difficult to cut in Germany than in Japan, but it made the same kind of rationale: You could spend your money on other things.

HARRY HAVEN KENDALL
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Takamatsu (1955-1957)

Harry Haven Kendall was born in 1919 in Louisiana. He entered USIS in 1950, serving in Venezuela, Japan, Spain, Panama, Chile, Vietnam, and Thailand. Mr. Kendall was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on December 27, 1988.

Q: Let's get back to Japan now. What were you doing in Takamatsu, and let's hear a little bit about that program. You were there quite a while, as I recall.

KENDALL: Lew, you had a hand in it, so you would know as well as I. When my time came up for transfer from Caracas, I wrote to Kitty Jones, our personnel officer in Washington, and told her Japan would be my first preference for my next overseas assignment. Then lo and behold, she found a Japan position for me. You remember Kitty Jones. She was a charming lady who took good care of all of the USIS Foreign Service types at that time. She wrote me that there was an opening as director of a binational center in Takamatsu. It was the capital of Kagawa prefecture and the principal city on the island of Shikoku. I had never heard of the place, but I
was ready and willing to go.

We, Margaret and I and our then two-and-a-half year old daughter Betsy, left Caracas in May, 1955, for home leave and transfer to Japan. We traveled surface all the way, by ship from the port of La Guaira to Mobile, Alabama, thence by rail and car to New Orleans, where we bought a Pontiac station wagon to take with us. It turned out to be too long for Shikoku's one lane roads, but we managed anyway. We drove that car to see my mother in Lake Charles, thence to Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to visit Margaret's mother, then to Washington, D.C. for consultation, and eighteen days across country to San Francisco, where we took it with us aboard the President Cleveland bound for Yokohama. From Tokyo, we traveled by train to Kobe and thence to Takamatsu by the old Kansai Kisen ferry. I didn't realize it at the time, but never again during my whole time in the Foreign Service was I to have such a leisurely home leave and transfer.

As I learned in Tokyo, Governor Masanori Kaneko of Kagawa prefecture had gone to Tokyo to request an American director for the center. When the U.S. Army turned over their CEI-SCAP (Civil Information and Education-Supreme Command Allied Powers) libraries to USIS at the end of the occupation, USIS had converted the Takamatsu library into a binational center and given operational responsibility to the Kagawa prefectural government. In effect, they gave the prefecture a good-sized library but no librarian to run it, as the Army had provided. The Governor had found the library very useful in helping his constituents learn about the United States and had been very cooperative in its operation. He wanted another American director and wanted one badly.

I am sure you are familiar with the problem because you were the executive officer for USIS Tokyo at the time. Kaneko had approached you and the PAO on the matter, and as a result, Kitty Jones was asked to send a young American officer. I guess that's the essence of it. My application for a post in Japan hit Kitty's desk in Washington about the time your request came in, so I was tapped for the job. That's how these things come about I suppose.

I regret I wasn't given any special training for Japan. I went there without knowing the first word of Japanese. So the first thing I did was to get myself a tutor and started learning Japanese. I took daily lessons while I was there. I would not say that I became proficient, but when I left, I did an interview in Japanese with the local radio station.

My job was to run a cultural center. There was some connection with what I had been doing in Caracas, but not much. In Caracas, I had been an Information Officer. Here I was to be a Cultural Affairs Officer. It was a general purpose post, and, as I understood it, my job was to help bring American culture to the Japanese hinterland. They were an eager group wanting to learn more.

Takamatsu had been about ninety-five percent destroyed during one massive U.S. Air Force raid on July 4, 1945, and the whole city had burned down. The place was poverty stricken. The inhabitants were in the process of rebuilding the city, and they worked very hard at it.

But they still wanted American culture. They wanted to know what Americans were thinking, what they were doing, and how they could get to know Americans and the United States better. Much has been written about the psychological aspects of post-war Japanese attitudes toward the
United States, but for me there at that time, it meant being confronted by people who saw their future as being aligned with the nation which had resoundingly beaten them in war, and they urgently wanted more information about that nation and its people. My job was to provide it for them as best I could with the resources available. I had a staff of Japanese employees who were on the payroll of the Kagawa Prefectural Government. USIS gave me a vehicle and a driver, but other than that, I worked entirely with the Japanese staff.

Q: I'm interested. When did you get to Japan?

KENDALL: I arrived there in September, 1955.

Q: That's why. Originally when we started, we paid the whole Japanese staff. We simply took them from the Army and put them on our payroll. I think the man who had been in Takamatsu was an Army employee and actually stayed on for a while; I'm not certain now, but I think he stayed a year or two. Initially, we took over twenty-four of those cultural centers. It was about 1953 and '54 that Washington began to retrench in the program in Japan, and they said you've got to convert anywhere from six to ten of those centers to a binational status. I guess that had happened just prior to your arrival, and that's why at that time, we were not paying the staff of the center. It had passed over to prefectural payroll, and they probably got less money than they did under us.

KENDALL: They got considerably less. As a matter of fact, it was a real hand-to-mouth existence for them. But they were loyal, they worked hard, they accepted my direction, and at the same time, they took me in hand and led me through the intricacies of Japanese culture and government. I was a willing student. I'm not sure I was a very good student, but I was willing.

We had a staff of about ten persons to operate our library, cultural and film programs. The prefecture inherited the old CIE/USIS film library and all of the projectors. These materials, equipment, and the library itself became part of the Japan-America Cultural Center. Governor Kaneko looked upon me, a U.S. Government official, as a means for getting more U.S. oriented material into that library -- more books, more USIS programs, more speakers, more visiting artists.

My title was Provincial Public Affairs Officer. I worked under the supervision of the Regional Public Affairs Officer at the American Consulate General in Kobe -- first Jerry Novick, then Clifton B. Forster. The RPAO had supervisory responsibility for the seven Kansai region centers -- Osaka, Kyoto, Matsuyama, Hiroshima, Takamatsu and Nagashima. Cliff had a lovely secretary, Melita Schmidt, whom he called "Snow White," and he used to refer to us as the Seven Dwarfs. It wasn't very flattering, but Melita made up for the difference by taking care of the needs of the more isolated "dwarfs," such as myself, by keeping us supplied with basic necessities from the Kobe Army PX and commissary.

Q: I think Kyoto was still under the Kansai. I don't remember whether the Okayama center had ceased to exist?

KENDALL: The Okayama CIE library was converted to a BNC under the city government, but
it was never very active. They lacked a Governor Kaneko. Jerry Novick and then Cliff Forster
had supervisory responsibility for regional operations, and it was my job to work up my own
programs, with the RPAO channeling what support he could to me and the other provincial
posts. My programs were very scant at first. Later on, we got a system working whereby Cliff
sent us some first-rate Japanese lecturers he was scheduling around the region and occasionally
an American lecturer. That was before our AMPART (American Participant) program got into
full swing. We made good use of those who came our way.

We also had some visiting artists. One of the more interesting ones was an American Indian, or
Native American as we now say, named Tom Two Arrows, who did Indian folk dances. He was
a big hit. Then there was a musician, a harmonica player, named John Sebastian. He was another
big hit for a very special reason. The Japanese in the immediate post-war era were trying to
reestablish music education in the schools, but they had very little to work with. Governor
Kaneko had persuaded the school board to equip the schools with harmonicas, which were very
inexpensive, and so each school had its own children's harmonica orchestra. When John
Sebastian came to town with his harmonica, playing both classical and popular music, he was
met with an outpouring of enthusiasm by teachers and children alike. The schools brought out all
their children to hear him. It was a touching thing, particularly when the children honored the
visiting artist with a return concert. These were some of the few types of performing artists we
were able to get out there in the boonies.

These few programs were not enough to satisfy the demand for information about the U.S., so I
made a point of getting around to the various towns and villages in Shikoku. There were two
Centers on the island, mine and the American Cultural Center in Matsuyama, down in Ehime
Prefecture, one of the fourteen you mentioned. My Takamatsu territory included Kagawa and
Tokushima prefectures; Matsuyama's included Ehime and Kochi prefecture. For an interim
period between directors at the Matsuyama Center, I commuted there once a week to supervise
that program. The trip was four hours by train, pulled by an old coal burning locomotive, and I
would always need a bath to wash off the coal dust when I reached my destination. In
Matsuyama, the American Cultural Center had a studio apartment above the library, but there
was no bath in it, and so I would go to the public bath at Dogo Hot Springs for a good soak in
their mineral waters, always a pleasant experience. Whenever I had to escort an American visitor
for some program or other, I would stay in a Japanese ryokan in the Dogo area. In those days,
when the exchange was 360 yen to the dollar, you could do this without it costing an arm and a
leg. In the evening, the maids would come around and ask you what you would have for
breakfast the next morning. No matter what you ordered, it was always ham and eggs. I recall
going by the kitchen one night with some visitors after an evening on the town and seeing our
breakfast ham and eggs all cooked and ready to be served the next morning. Very efficient, these
Japanese.

My assistant at the Takamatsu Japan-America Center, the Nichi-Bei Bunka Kaikan, as it was
called, was Kaoru Nishimura, a minuscule person about five feet tall. He was a waif of a man
with a good Japanese education, an excellent command of English, and a bountiful supply of
common sense. He enjoyed the confidence of the Governor and had a good rapport with
members of the prefectural government bureaucracy. Even though he had served with the
Japanese army in Manchuria during the war, he was a very unmilitary man. He was head of the
Japanese staff and served as my interpreter and teacher. We became very good friends and remain so to this day.

One day, driving from Tokushima to Takamatsu, Nishimura-san and I stopped at a noodle shop for lunch, and a conversation with the owner gave us an idea for a program we could conduct without the necessity of outside resources, which were not very abundant anyway. The shop owner, who seemed to be an educated man, complained to us that the people of his town -- the mayor, the school teachers, and many others -- were eager for contact with Americans, people they could talk to and learn more about the United States, which was exercising such an important influence on their lives. The kind of questions he asked matched those I had encountered in earlier discussions with my Japanese contacts, and I felt I could handle them just as well as any lecturer who might be riding the USIS circuit. So out of that conversation, we developed the concept for a Japan-America Forum, using myself, and my wife as principals and Mr. Nishimura as interpreter. During the course of the next year and a half, we met with community leaders in cities and towns all over Shikoku.

Nishimura-san organized them and arranged advance promotion. He would sketch out an itinerary for us, and working through the prefectural government, he would get in touch with the mayors or some other local leader in each town and ask them to organize the local intelligentsia - usually high school teachers, principals or professionals -- for a morning or afternoon session of about two hours. On the given day, we would meet with the group in the town hall, sip Japanese tea as we are doing here today, warm our hands over a hibachi, and talk about things American and things Japanese.

They wanted to know a lot about American customs. Margaret was with me, and the women invariably asked her questions about American family life. One even asked how she could get away from her family to go on that trip with me. Answer: a reliable Japanese amah. The questions concerned American education -- mostly primary and secondary, but also about American universities -- about local government, social customs, enormous numbers of questions. None of them were particularly difficult, but they showed a keen interest as well as wide curiosity about the nation that had conquered them. I remember one delicate situation in Tokushima prefecture where racism in the United States had become an issue. We were going through our usual routine, answering questions about education and schooling, and after each exchange, one or more of a group of young men would say, "Well, what about the people in Alabama? What about Selma? What about the discrimination against the Negro?"

This was the period when the struggle for civil rights was going on in the South. Martin Luther King was leading demonstrators and organizing sit-ins against racial discrimination. We could not ignore them and tried to respond as factually as possible. After some time, I said, "Well, you know, we are not alone. Racism is not confined to any one country. You have problems with it right here in this country with the people who work with leather and with dead animals. They do not enjoy the rights of other Japanese citizens."

Later, Nishimura-san said to me, "You know, I didn't translate that bit. It wouldn't have done any good. They've got an Eta village right in this town." Nevertheless, despite this rare, negative reaction, we found our Japan-American forums to be one of our most valuable experiences while
we were in Shikoku.

**Q:** Do I understand that you were conducting these forums in each of several locations throughout the island of Shikoku? Was there any time in which you brought a much larger forum group and had a program centrally in the cultural center there, or was this just a series you did by going around to different parts of the island?

**KENDALL:** Primarily, it was programming myself and my wife because we didn't have other resources. We had similar programs with larger groups in the center with visiting lecturers when we were able to get them. The major thrust of this particular program was taking ourselves south to the towns and villages to meet with local leaders. This wasn't a mass program. It was a selective program for local leaders -- mayors, school principals, school board members, high school teachers and prominent local citizens.

**Q:** Did you have materials about America that you could distribute after you left?

**KENDALL:** We had some, not very much.

**Q:** I suppose most of it was in English, so it was not really useful to them anyway.

**KENDALL:** That is correct. However, we were able to use English materials with the English Teachers' Association on Shikoku. They maintained very close contact with us because we were a source of assistance to them in their own programs. They very often came to our center to get such materials as we had. We brought in Fulbright teachers of English or conducted English-teaching seminars and then spend several days giving teaching demonstrations at our center itself and in their individual schools.

One person who came on various occasions was Glen Shaw, the USIS cultural attaché in Tokyo. He was a real cultural treasure. As a matter of fact, the Japanese named him a cultural treasure of Japan. He had first gone to Japan in the 1930s and had become thoroughly immersed in Japanese literature and culture and spoke fluent Japanese. At one time, he was a columnist for the *Asahi* Newspapers. You must certainly remember him. He was a tall, gangly man. He must have been six feet six. I recall that his first visit while we were there was to help inaugurate a statue of the writer Kikuchikan in the center of Takamatsu. Kikuchikan was a native son of Takamatsu, and Glen Shaw had translated several of his plays and poems into English.

After the ceremony at the statue, Governor Kaneko took Shaw and me on a trip around Kagawa prefecture, stopping at sites of particular interest -- a fish farm, a pearl growing industry, temples and spots of scenic beauty. The Japanese like to have their guests sign visitors' registers, and Shaw would compose a haiku for each occasion. His signature in Japanese was a brush profile of himself. He was a man full of good humor who charmed everyone he met. I also recall that when he boarded the overnight ferry for Kobe, Governor Kaneko asked him how he was going to fit his lanky self into one of the five-foot bunks in the sleeping compartment. Shaw replied, "Well, I'm just going to curl up like a snake and sleep all the way to Kobe." Wonderful guy. He returned later for a series of lectures on American literature and culture.
These were some of the events that highlighted our stay in Takamatsu. There was another of which I feel very proud. It has to do with the "leader grant" program, now called the International Visitors Program, in which local leaders are invited to the United States to see how we live and to get a better understanding of how the U.S. functions. I persuaded Walt Nichols, who was then our field supervisor in Tokyo, to arrange a leader grant for Governor Kaneko. Until that time, it had been against USIS policy to award leader grants to Japanese government officials, but Kaneko was such an unusual person, a decision was made to make an exception and invite him.

Governor Kaneko came to the U.S. for three months and then went to Brazil for another couple of weeks to visit some of the many Kagawa prefecture people who had migrated there in the immediate post-war years. He came back to Takamatsu, brimming over with new ideas for improving the quality of life in his prefecture. He told me then and has repeated it many times since that his vision as a boy was to have a bridge over the Seto Inland Sea, the Seto Naikai. But, he said, he had never imagined that Japan would be able to build such a bridge until he had seen the Golden Gate Bridge and the Oakland Bay Bridge and the one over the Verrazano Narrows. He returned to Japan with the vision of using American technology to build a bridge across the Inland Sea. He said, "As I stood there looking at that Golden Gate Bridge and at the Oakland Bay Bridge, I said to myself, if the Americans can do it, we can, too."

Shortly after returning from his visit to the U.S., Kaneko began a campaign to get his dream bridge built, and it eventually developed into three bridges. The most important one insofar as Kaneko was concerned, of course, was the bridge from Okayama to Sakaide City near Takamatsu. Margaret and I were pleased to attend the inauguration of the Seto Ohashi (Great Seto Bridge) on April 8, 1988. Unfortunately, Kaneko was in the hospital at the time and could not attend the ceremonies, but he still reveled in the glory of the occasion. Unfortunately, the bridge will probably change the rural nature of Shikoku forever. Nevertheless, Kaneko felt his dream had finally been accomplished, and he gave me full credit for helping him to realize it.

Kaneko's visit to the United States also inspired him to other achievements in which I take some pleasure. He visited various museums designed by Frank Lloyd Wright and had one built in Kagawa using Wright's concept of designing the architecture to meld in with the landscape. In New York, he met Isamu Noguchi, the Japanese-American sculptor who died recently. On seeing some of Noguchi's stone sculpture, Kaneko said, "Well, you know, we have some very fine stonecutters in Kagawa, but all they are doing now is making gravestones. Maybe you could teach them some of your kind of art." He invited Noguchi out to Takamatsu, and today there is a very fine studio a few miles from that city producing some of Noguchi's best artistic stone sculpture. So these are some of the intercultural exchanges we developed about which I feel a certain sense of satisfaction.

In 1957, the word came that USIS was undergoing another budget reduction and would have to close one of its centers. My center in Takamatsu got the axe. This incidentally, came about at the hands of Lyndon B. Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader, as a reaction to some rather indiscreet remarks about the Democrats made by the director of USIA.

Q: That was Arthur Larson, who gave a speech before the Young Republicans Club in Honolulu shortly before he was appointed Director of USIA. He made the remark that during the
Democratic years, for twenty years, the United States government had been under an "alien influence." Now that the Eisenhower administration had come into power, that was going to be corrected. Lyndon Johnson was not only Majority Leader but also the Nominal Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, which ran Foreign Service appropriations. So Lyndon Johnson took Larson to great task the first time he appeared before the Appropriations Committee, and USIA got its budget cut something like twenty-five or thirty percent. It took us about six years to get back from that debacle.

KENDALL: One of the results was the closure of my center. That hurt to the quick, but I was compensated by my new assignment. I had done a pretty decent job in Takamatsu, and my reward was Madrid. Joe McEvoy, my former PAO in Caracas, was now PAO in Madrid. He told our personnel office in Washington that he would like to have me join him. So the Agency cut out one good post and gave me another. In effect, they made me an offer I could not refuse.

Q: Harry, earlier we were discussing some of the additional things that came your way as a result of your assignment to Takamatsu. I think they are very significant because this was Japan at a time when it was just recovering from the war. Even ten years after the war it hadn't really recovered its own vision of where it belonged and what it wanted to do. What you have been discussing, I think, was a great contribution to the American help that was given Japan. I would now like to ask you to review a few of the things that we talked about.

KENDALL: I was the only American official on Shikoku. There were two young enlisted men from the Army's Criminal Investigation Division, the CID, who stuck pretty much to their headquarters. But since I was the only public official, Japanese private citizens and public functionaries who needed help from the United States government would come to me as their first point of contact. For example, the prefectural Chief of Agriculture for Kagawa, a man named Irimajiri, was trying to expand local sugar beet production. He said they didn't have any dollar exchange, and they didn't have access to American sugar beet producers or their technology. Would I, he asked, be so good as to help them out. Mind you, there was no U.S. agricultural official there -- no one else for him to turn to -- so he naturally came to me. Basically, what he wanted was various types of seed he could use for his own agricultural experiments. So, with the assistance of the Embassy's agricultural attaché in Tokyo, I obtained a list of American seed houses, wrote directly to them, sent them my personal check and got him his beet seeds. Of course, he reimbursed me in yen. But he used the seed very diligently and was able to improve the prefectural beet production. He took me out to his agricultural experiment station on various occasions to show me what was happening. Naturally, I was pleased and felt rewarded for my efforts. We have heard from Mr. and Mrs. Irimajiri at Christmas every year since then -- more than thirty years.

On another occasion, the Governor of Tokushima sent two of his forestry specialists to seek my assistance in expanding that prefecture's lumber production through the introduction of new varieties of pine. Now, I knew nothing about the lumber business, but their problem was lack of access to information on who to contact in the U.S. They needed seed catalogs. They didn't really know who to talk with or to write to in the United States. Would I please help? Again with the help of the Embassy agricultural attaché, I wrote to the seed companies and got them the seed catalogs. They selected the varieties they wanted, and since they didn't have any foreign
exchange either -- imagine Japan not having foreign exchange! -- I again sent off my personal check and got them their seeds. When I was preparing to leave Takamatsu in 1957, the governor of Tokushima sent his representatives over to Takamatsu with a beautiful bamboo carving of the typical Tokushima dance figures -- the Awa Odori -- which I have to this day. It is a beautiful piece that my wife and I treasure very much.

On another occasion, the Embassy informed me that they were sending a commercial trade mission to Shikoku to work with Japanese businessmen and government officials and asked me to organize groups in Ehime and Kagawa prefectures to meet with them. I went to the governor of each prefecture and enlisted their assistance in organizing these officials and businessmen. The purpose was -- and I laugh about it to this day -- to teach the Japanese how to export to the United States. I would say that perhaps we were talking when we should have been listening. But the mission was simply fulfilling the U.S. policy of helping the Japanese get back on their economic feet. They learned their lesson well, perhaps too well.

Those were some of the things that came my way. Another thing I did, and this has nothing to do with being an official American -- just that I was an American there, was to serve as judge for English-speaking contests conducted by the Japanese schools. I am sure you have done that many, many times. These were public performances which we did as part of our official presence there. It was fun; we enjoyed it.

To this day, when my wife and I go back to Takamatsu, we find that our friends -- the people we met and worked with thirty years ago, are still there, and they still remember us. We feel very good about that. During those thirty years, Shikoku has changed from being a collection of poverty-stricken, backwater prefectures to a very prosperous island. It's really beautiful what the people have done with their hard work. They learned their lessons well, and their work has paid off. We have returned for two and three day visits a number of times, and I feel good about going back because I think we were able to contribute something when they needed it most.

Q: I know that Japan has changed tremendously since your and my day there. But in the trips which you have made back, although there is a lot of anti-Americanism in various parts of Japan, do you have the sense that perhaps it's less virulent or less demonstrative in the Shikoku area than it is elsewhere? Or do you find a good deal of it there? Or haven't you really been able to judge?

KENDALL: My trips back have been just for a few days at a time. In 1975, twenty years after we left Takamatsu, we returned to Japan for a second tour of duty, this time in Tokyo, and made several visits to Shikoku to see old friends. We have been back three or four times since I retired from the Foreign Service at the end of 1979. Generally, these visits have been managed by our friends in the way Japanese manage visits -- with every minute scheduled, and my contacts have been invariably friendly. If there is any anti-Americanism present on Shikoku, I have not personally encountered it, though I do recall that on our last visit, we saw a poster in Matsuyama protesting the importation of American beef and citrus fruits, a product of Japan-American trade competition.
HARVEY FELDMAN
Visa Officer
Tokyo (1955-1957)

Consular Officer
Nagoya (1957-1960)

Ambassador Feldman was born and raised in Chicago, Illinois. Educated at the University of Chicago, he joined the Foreign Service in 1954. His early assignments took him to Hong Kong and Japan, which marked the beginning of a career dealing primarily with Chinese Affairs. Mr. Feldman also served in Bulgaria as well as in Washington, where he held senior position dealing with Chinese and United Nations matters. From 1979 to 1981 he served as United States Ambassador to Papua New Guinea. Ambassador Feldman was interviewed by Edward Dillery in 1999.

Q: What things led to your next assignment?

FELDMAN: I knew some Chinese, although I must say that which I learned at the University of Chicago was classical Chinese, which is of little practical use today. I decided that I had enough Chinese for a while and thought that it would be very useful to study Japanese. So I applied for Japanese language training and the Department agreed with the stipulation that I first serve a tour in Japan - to see whether I really wanted to specialize in Japan.

So I was assigned as economic officer and vice consul in Yokohama. We sailed from Hong Kong - I think it was on the “President Wilson” - up to Yokohama on the way to the U.S. for our home leave. When we got to Yokohama, the Consul General - Lionel M. Summers - got on board because he too was returning to the U.S. for home leave. Naturally, I introduced myself as his new economic officer. During the course of the voyage, Summers asked whether my wife and I played “Scrabble.” In fact, Carol and I were sort of “Scrabble” demons. So I said that indeed we did play the game. That began a series of “Scrabble” games between the Summers and the Feldmans.

We made the mistake of beating them very badly several nights in a row. That ended the “Scrabble” games. When I got to Washington, I was informed that my assignment had been changed. I was no longer going to Yokohama, but rather to Tokyo as a visa officer. I protested, but I was told that it was an “appropriate” assignment. There is a marvelous line in American literature from a short story by Ring Lardner called “Alibi Ike.” It goes: “Shut up, he explained.” That is what Personnel said to me.

After home leave in Chicago, we sailed to Japan - I think it was the “President Hoover” - and reported for duty at our embassy in Tokyo as a vice consul and visa officer. I went to work for a Virginia Ellis, who was in charge of the visa section. We became rather friendly; in fact, one afternoon during a cocktail hour, Virginia remarked that if she had full powers, she would never issue a visa to a Chinese, or a Japanese, or a Jew or an Italian - and maybe a Greek as well. I
pointed out that I was Jewish. Her response was: “Present company excepted.” But these comments represented her attitude toward visa work.

One of the matters which took up much of my time in Tokyo was the pre-clearance of Japanese brides of GIs. In those days, if a member of the U.S. military wanted to marry a foreigner, he had to get military permission to marry. Before that permission was granted, the fiancee had to fill out an application which was sent to a visa officer to review whether there were any grounds for ineligibility. There often were because many of these hopeful brides were found in brothels by a GI. There was a prohibition - in law - at the time against issuing visas to women who had been prostitutes. Later on, a waiver of ineligibility was adopted, but in 1957 no such waiver existed and those women were ineligible.

There were an awful lot of women who were ineligible. After the waiver came into effect, we could deem the applicant to have participated in prostitution, but that fact could be waived, allowing the GI to marry the foreigner.

The most interesting visa case I had in my tour did not deal with a Japanese bride, but something that grew out of Chinese history. You may have heard of the “May 4th” movement. In 1919, on that day, there were huge student demonstrations in Peking occasioned by the Minister - Tsao Rulin - responsible for mining. He had been accused of having received bribes from the Japanese who were interested in a “sweetheart” deal on some important coal mines in northern China - the Kailan mines. This set off a series of student demonstrations protesting the deal with the Japanese, the Vesailles Treaty, which confirmed foreign “concessions” in China, China’s weakness, and foreign pressure. The “May Fourth Movement” remains a watershed in Chinese history. One day, a visa application was given to me; it was from a father of an American citizen - Tsao Rulin. Tsao had lived in Japan after he left China in the 1920s. During the war, he lived as a house guest of Shigeru Yoshida who was later to become a Prime Minister. Tsao had several children; one, a daughter, after the war married an American soldier, moved to the U.S. and became an American citizen. She later petitioned for her father to come to the U.S.

When the visa application came to me, I saw no reason to turn it down. He hadn’t committed any crime under American law. He was one of the most notorious figures in contemporary Chinese history, but I didn’t see any part of the law that might lead me to reject the application.

I had had a similar case in Hong Kong - that is, one involving a famous historical figure. One of the visa cases I had there was from a Chinese citizen who was using the name De Vee Sing. I didn’t recognize the name in the Shanghai dialect, but when I saw the Chinese characters, I knew that the applicant was Tu Yueh-sheng, who had been the head of the “Green Gang” in Shanghai in the 1920s. That gang was notorious for prostitution, drugs, protection rackets, etc. In this case, I was delighted to refuse this application.

Q: There were no repercussions?

FELDMAN: No repercussions.

Q: What were the arrangements when you arrived in Tokyo? Had there been any improvement
from what you experienced when you arrived in Hong Kong?

FELDMAN: By this time, I was an “old” hand in the Foreign Service. I had served one tour. I knew consular work. I didn’t need a whole lot of schooling. I moved into the Nonomiya apartments. You arrived sometime after I did and we had adjacent offices. That was the beginning of a friendship that has lasted some 42 years. You and we lived in the same apartment buildings; our children grew up together. I think you were the first to describe those apartments as “shabby genteel.”

Q: Did you see any improvement in the care and feeding of FS personnel from that which experienced in Hong Kong?

FELDMAN: None that I remember. You must remember that when I joined the Foreign Service, I didn’t have the foggiest notion of what it would be like and therefore had no expectations. I was just coming out of graduate school and I would be paid $4,200 - that was an incredible sum of money - especially how far it went in Hong Kong.

I don’t remember what my salary was while in Tokyo - probably $1,000 more. I had been promoted to FSO-6 on the new pay scale. I was one of the FSO-6s who had to go back to FSO-7 and then I was promoted back to FSO-6.

Q: When you first came into the FS, I think there was a budgetary freeze. No one was allowed to travel. So when I got to Tokyo in May 1955, I was very envious of your situation because you had been assigned overseas as a Junior Officer.

FELDMAN: You have to remember that I went overseas as part of the Refugee Relief Program. I don’t know what would have happened if I had been treated as any other junior officer. In any case, I was very lucky.

Q: What did you think of the Embassy?

FELDMAN: It was very, very different from the Hong Kong CG. I had thought that the Consulate General was very formal, but I found it nothing compared to the Tokyo Embassy. This was a real proper embassy. I guess when I got there, John Allison was our Ambassador, but he left shortly thereafter and was replaced by Douglas MacArthur II who was married to Laura Barkley MacArthur, the daughter of Alben Barkley, the former Vice President and Senate Majority Leader. They were a very formal couple.

I remember that very early in my tour, I was assigned to “door” duty at the Residence. I had to stand at the entrance to welcome the guests to the evening festivities. I had to say “Good evening, I am Mr. Feldman of the Embassy. May I escort you in?” You asked their names and then took them to the receiving line and introduced them to the first person there. On my first “door” duty, I was there together with another consular officer, Bill Boswell, who I think was the head of the Passport Section at the time. As I stood there, a very tall red-haired gentleman and his wife walked up to the door; I met them and said, “Good evening; I am Mr. Feldman of the Embassy. May I show in?” The gentleman said, “I know my way” and walked right by me.
Boswell turned to me and asked whether I was a joker. I asked him whether that was not what I was supposed to do. Bill then pointed out to me that that was the DCM - Outerbridge Horsey and his wife. I had never met the DCM.

You asked what arrangements had been made for my arrival. Later I learned that according to Embassy procedures, all new officers were supposed to be shown around and introduced and allowed to call on the Ambassador and the DCM. Nothing like that happened to me. We were met at the airport, taken to the apartment and left then to our own devices.

Q: You were then transferred to Nagoya.

FELDMAN: Nagoya was established as a consulate when the U.S. Fifth Air Force had its headquarters there. That created a major consular workload. By the time I got there in 1958, the Fifth Air Force had departed and the base was Japan Air Force Self-Defense Force base. So the consular work had diminished considerably. Economic work was increasing because Nagoya was the home of Toyota, Brothers Sewing Machines and Noritake, China. But I was a consular officer; so I had a fair amount of spare time on my hands. I used it mostly to study Japanese and to tour around the approximate 13 prefectures in our consular district. I would hit the road with one of my Japanese local employees; we stayed in ryokans. I could go for a week at a time without speaking English. So my Japanese got very, very good even though I had not gone to Japanese language school.

My second son, Peter, was born in Nagoya, shortly after a typhoon. The other notable event was the arrival of an American aircraft carrier to help in providing humanitarian assistance after a very destructive typhoon and storm surge which flooded lower Nagoya. I was asked to go to the carrier to coordinate; I was picked up by plane from Nagoya airport and brought to the carrier where we made an arrested landing - my first and only experience with that kind of landing. I still remember vibrating like a rubber band for quite a while after that landing.

Q: I envy you for that. I would have loved to do that at least once.

FELDMAN: My boss in Nagoya was Joe Donelan. That was his first overseas post. He had served in the Department in various administrative jobs. For promotional reasons, it was decided that he needed a field assignment; so he was sent as Principal Officer to Nagoya. A very delightful guy.

But nothing very much happened in Nagoya. In 1960, I was transferred back to the Department to serve on the Japan desk. I guess the principal thing that happened in Nagoya was the birth of my second son, Peter.

Q: Did you ever have language training? What are your views on the efficacies of such training?

FELDMAN: Other than the hour-a-day course, I never had Japanese language training, but as I said I learned on the job. Later I had Chinese language training. I always thought that the Japanese language course material, which was prepared by Eleanor Jordan, was much superior to any of the Chinese material I used. Although Japanese is intrinsically a much more difficult
language than Chinese because Japanese grammar is so complicated, nevertheless I think I learned Japanese more readily than Chinese despite the fact that I studied Chinese full-time. Maybe that just showed that I had an affinity for Japanese, but I did learn it better. When I was tested upon my return to Washington for my Japanese language fluency, I was given a 3 on the speaking test. Up to that point, I was the only officer who had reached that level of proficiency without having studied the language formally. I was very proud of that.

Q: I recognize how well you did because I had the same experience in Kobe, but I never reached a 3 level.

FELDMAN: I may have had more time to study than you did. What really helped me were the field trips that I would take when I would go off with a local employee to the various prefectures. Then we did not speak much English for a week at a time.

Q: Before we leave your Japan tour, what are your feelings about the differences between Japanese and Chinese people?

FELDMAN: They are completely different. For example, although the Japanese language uses Chinese characters as one of their three writing systems, the fact is that the languages are entirely different. Japanese is a polysyllabic agglutinative of language with a highly complex grammar - e.g. adjectives have tenses. Chinese is monosyllabic, not agglutinative, and had practically no grammar at all. As you might expect, people who grow up with these different languages think completely differently; their social systems are very different. There is no similarity between the two.

Japanese and Chinese may physically resemble each other, but so do Americans and Turks. But in both cases, the people are completely different. What motivates one will not motivate the other and vice versa. There is just no similarity between the Japanese and the Chinese.

Q: Might that lead you to believe that close relationships between the countries is not likely to ever happen?

FELDMAN: I wouldn’t necessarily reach that conclusion because just as I was able to learn enough about Japanese and Chinese culture to be able to act in either culture, establishing rapport with both and able to negotiate with both as I did later in my career, so a Chinese or Japanese can also. That is what diplomats do. I guess one of the things diplomats have to do is to take themselves outside the boundaries of their own culture and learn how to operate across cross-cultural divides. American diplomats do that; Russian diplomats do that and so do Chinese and Japanese diplomats.

I left Japan on the day - June 16 - that Prime Minister Kishi had to resign after the security treaty fiasco. You remember, the Japanese left-wing staged massive demonstrations against Kishi, against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the anticipated visit of President Eisenhower. So Kishi felt he had to resign. But I used to joke and tell people that when Kishi heard that I was leaving, he was heart broken and resigned.
Leon Picon was born in Pennsylvania in 1917. He received a Ph.D. from Dropsie college in 1952. His Foreign Service career included posts in Japan and Turkey. Mr. Picon was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on October 30, 1989.

PICON: I guess I should make the statement here, though it should be fairly obvious, I did not go to USIA -- I was not attracted to USIA by its mission in the first instance. I came into USIA just by default, so to speak. In other words, I was not setting out to be working in the field of public diplomacy. I became interested in that much later. But my first job abroad with the Agency was Book Translations Officer in Tokyo.

Q: When you got to Tokyo, did you have a specific idea of what you were going to do in the Book Translations Program? And did you have particular goals that you were shooting for, or did these develop as you went along in the program?

PICON: The answer to that is definitely that I went to Tokyo with a rather specific instruction from Lew Fanget. It seems that the Book Development Program wanted to compete with the books that were coming out of the Soviet Union and other parts of Eastern Europe, being translated into Japanese and being sold in the Japanese bookstores. There was one book that was quite sensational -- surprisingly a best seller on the Japanese best seller list -- called Keizaigaku Kyokasho, which means Economics Textbook, which came out of the Soviet Union on Communist theories of economics. It was one of the best sellers in Japan. There was a lot of other stuff being distributed in Japan, some having been translated into Japanese in the Soviet Union. There was a good campaign going on.

My job was to get the widest possible distribution for books that would combat this sort of leftist output in some way. And working together with Lew Fanget, I developed a low-cost book program through the business of subsidizing Japanese publishers to put into translation and to distribute books that were of specific interest to the United States government. Our books were quite varied in subject matter -- not all hard-hitting texts -- but there were plenty of hard-hitting texts among them. And Tokyo, at that point, developed the largest scale USIS Book Translations Program in the world.
Q: I wanted to ask you at this point, Leon, when I first came to the Embassy in Tokyo right at the end of the Occupation, although the Japanese were by that time already producing a lot of books, were they still pretty short of Western-originated books by the time you arrived? Particularly American and British? Or were they pretty well along the line of getting an adequate number of books from Europe, the United States and Great Britain? What was the situation then?

PICON: The Japanese were getting foreign language books, which were being sold successfully. But, of course, the selection of those books would have not been the kind of selection that the Agency would have been very happy with. Now, we have to divide the book program into two specific categories here. One relates to the books that were put into translation. Working with a Japanese publisher -- one of the major publishers -- we developed a program whereby the books we wanted to get translated and put into the market would be sold at prices lower than the standard Japanese books: a low-cost book program. And this was becoming a major drive of the Agency when we were working together -- the Agency and we in Tokyo, developing the concepts and methods for low-priced books.

There's another aspect of this which is quite interesting. At one time, one of the major publishing distributors, who was working with the Agency in the Book Development Program, came to visit us in Tokyo. He had some specific things in mind, but among other things, he mentioned in passing that some of the American publishers were not very happy with what was going on in the "Far East" as it was then called. Many American books were being pirated: photocopied and offset printed, bound and sold in East Asia with no profit at all to the American publisher. This pirating was becoming an awful nuisance. And I guess it was just as a joke that I said to Mr. Feffer, "Paul, why don't you tell them to pirate their own books." The idea took. And out of that developed an entire part of the book publishing industry in Japan wherein American books, such as Samuelson's *Economics*...and when I left Japan, there were then about 150 titles -- no, it was before I left. When I left the book operations, there were 150 titles -- American books printed in Japan by the American publishers under bilateral contract arrangements. And pretty soon those book development programs expanded like mad, as these books were being reprinted, legally this time, and at low price, and demand for American books increased greatly.

Q: Were those books that were being reproduced -- this 150 titles about which you were speaking -- books that had been translated into Japanese, or were they still in the original English?

PICON: Original English. These were in the original English. They were mostly college textbooks. But many of them the Agency would not have subsidized, and the Agency did not subsidize any part of this program at all. Many of them were technical books, medical books and things of that sort. But there was a remarkable expansion of American books in Japan at that time because of this program, developed mainly with the Tuttle Company in Tokyo and also with one of the major printers because the job was mainly printing. In effect, what was being done here -- and you can see how the economics of it works out -- instead of an American publisher sending 1,000 copies of Samuelson's *Economics* across the ocean and selling them at the American book price plus transportation costs, converted into Japanese yen, the Japanese could now buy the
book, same book, same contents -- though generally it was in soft paperback rather than hardback -- the same book was now available at generally one quarter of the price that they were paying before. And yet the printers and the publishing company were making good money out of the whole thing.

Q: And were they paying royalty to the American authors?

PICON: Yes, yes.

Q: You also started a rather extensive translation of books -- as you were talking about I think earlier -- of American books through this publisher with whom you had this special arrangement. How did that work out? What was being done there? And what kind of books were you throwing into this translation program?

PICON: It was a very varied program. I believe that by the time I ceased to be the Book Translations Officer, we had about 250 titles going through this method, and they were being sold, regardless of size, at 100 yen. Let's see what that would be the equivalent of in those days...

Q: At that time, since the yen was 360 to the dollar, the equivalent in dollars would probably have been somewhere around twenty-seven cents.

PICON: Yes, that's right.

Q: We spoke before we started this actual recording about the publication "Beisho Daiyori," and I had thought that you were the originator of that magazine. As a matter of fact, in my own interview, when I spoke of some of the programs that we were doing, I attributed the origin of the magazine to you. You told me that, although you did a lot in developing it, the original idea was elsewhere. You might go into that, but I would also like to ask you what does "Beisho Daiyori" mean, and what was it doing? What was the subject matter of it, and how did it help in promoting the kind of books that you were translating?


In format, it was a magazine in which my staff, working with some specialists in American literature and specialists on American society, did reviews of books that were current on the American scene. We would review about twenty-five different books in each of these issues. Now, for this purpose here, I will state that most of the reviews we did were reviews of books that the Agency was pushing. Some of the reviews that we did were based upon other reviews that appeared in American journals, book reviews in other places. The Beisho Daiyori was sent out to anybody who was interested in the journal. They were sent to virtually every large book publisher in Japan, and book publishers did, we know, translate into Japanese some of these titles. The magazine was very well received by the Japanese. They did not consider it any kind of propaganda as such. It was a very highly-respected magazine.
I was not the originator of it. It had been thought of and created -- the concept conceived of by Carl Bartz. But I cannot remember specifically whether any of the issues had yet been published. I believe that they had started to work on it when it was time for Bartz to go on home leave, and then he was going to be transferred to another part of USIS Tokyo. I think that -- I'm not positive of this, but I think -- we put out either the first, second, or third issue and then all of them from then on. I say "we" meaning the people who were working with me rather than with Carl. But this was a tool for us to get American books that we wanted published put into Japanese.

Q: Did you write reviews of the books that you had sponsored in translation -- American books that you had sponsored in translation through this publisher with whom you were working?

PICON: Generally speaking, no. We would have reviewed those in Beisho Daiyori before we worked out the translation of them. It was frequently through Beisho Daiyori that the publisher became convinced that a certain book was one that he would like to do, and many of the books that we reviewed were taken from the Agency's lists.

Q: Do you have any idea of the number of copies of those books reviewed in "Beisho Daiyori" that were sold in the bookstores? Do you have any ballpark estimate?

PICON: Well, it varied with the book. But the Japanese custom at that time was generally to publish 3,000 copies to 5,000 copies of a book, have it get into the market and then do further printing according to how the book sold. In our low price book program, we became convinced that it would be much more economical to print 10 or 20,000 copies of the book and get them out -- sort of flood the market with them, have them around everywhere. At first, the publishers were a little bit reluctant to undertake this, but with a bit of financial help, we worked it out. And in the low-priced book program, our general run of a first edition was 10,000 copies as compared with the normal 3,000 for Japanese books.

Now, let me go back on that.

Q: Just let me ask you one thing before you do. Are you convinced that the majority of those 10,000 were sold in each case?

PICON: Absolutely, absolutely. Absolutely because we saw them everywhere. We saw these books everywhere. As a matter of fact, the publisher designed a specific type of book rack, a cylindrical thing.

Q: I remember that.

PICON: And we could find these -- well, I'm only talking about Tokyo, of course -- but we saw these in many, many bookstores in Tokyo. And when I traveled in other parts of the country, I would see some of these here, there and elsewhere.

I wanted to go back for a moment to explain that 3,000 copies of a book seems pretty, pretty small. But that's about the size of the edition for the kind of books we would be interested in. Of course, the kind of book that would become a best seller -- a novel or whatever -- that sort of
thing was published in greater quantity actually. But thoughtful books were likely to start out with an edition of 3,000 to 5,000. Our objective was to double that at the beginning. The program turned out to be very, very successful. And my successor, Cliff Southard, carried this program to even greater heights.

Q: Did you have any indication as to whether some or a substantial number of these books were being used in university study, or were they mostly books that were bought by, I imagine, students and read on their own but not necessarily in the collegiate curriculum?

PICON: Most of these were not in the collegiate curriculum. In fact, very few were. Our stuff was a bit more hard-hitting than the kind of thing that would get in the ordinary college curriculum. But nevertheless, they were being read. I mean, after all, this was Japan -- Japan with a literacy of something like 99.4%. I think it's actually higher than the preservation of matter in chemical and physical experiments.

But the titles were very varied. Now one thing that we did develop that was definitely used in the universities was a continuum of the works of specific American writers: Faulkner, Hemingway, etc. The reason that these were so popular and were used in the colleges is that they fit into the pattern of Japanese publishing. You can go into a Japanese bookstore and see volume after volume of the complete works of a Japanese author. When a Japanese author established himself, at some point inevitably his complete works would be published. And these fit right into that pattern, and these books became natural ones to be used in the universities when students were studying American literature.

Q: Would you want to say a few words about the so-called summer seminar in Nagano? Because that was at its height at the time you came over. I think it later sort of fizzled out and was transferred to a different kind of program down in Kyoto, which has been covered, by the way, by Walt Nichols in his interview. But would you say a little bit of the purpose and the nature of the summer seminar.

PICON: I had nothing to do, believe me, with the origin of that, though I became very closely connected with it by default. I believe it was Don Ranard who had come up with the idea. I believe that this is so.

Q: It was Pat van Delden, essentially.

PICON: Oh, all right. I didn't know Pat van Delden or very much about her at all, but I did know Ranard, and he was the one who headed the Exchange of Persons Program when I got to Tokyo. Whoever had the idea for the origin of this thing had had a very, very good idea -- the idea being to promote and widen interest in American literature and American writers. I don't know who it was that came up with the idea of getting the individual, but all of that had been decided before I ever got to Tokyo. Someone got the idea of bringing out to the Nagano Seminar -- I'll go into that in just a moment -- an American author by the name of William Faulkner.

The Nagano Seminar, by its name, meant a gathering together of leaders in the field of American literature and American studies to meet at a resort-type place -- at least away from the city, away
from the noise, a quiet place -- and contemplate the navel in good Oriental fashion, along with some specialist in American studies. It was a great idea. It was like going off to Aspen or some of the other places like that which we have here in the U.S.

I had come to Tokyo in March and had been in Tokyo March, April, May, June, July -- five months -- when I inherited the visiting guest by default. Don Ranard had gone on home leave; many others had gone on home leave. The PAO had either gone on home leave or was being replaced, and you yourself, Lew, were the person who was handling everything that USIS was doing in Japan at that time.

Q: Just let me interpose here. Willard Hannah had been the PAO, and he got into a terrible argument with the Ambassador because of the "Lucky Dragon" incident, in which a Japanese fishing vessel was showered with ash from the American atomic energy explosion in the Pacific. When the ship arrived back at its port in Southwestern Japan, all the men were deathly ill, and the Ambassador refused to allow any statement to be made about them. Of course, Willard told him that he couldn't let this kind of thing go because the whole press was after the story. They got into such a shouting match that they actually shouted obscenities at one another, and finally, Willard just came back and resigned both from the job of PAO and from USIA completely, and he had not been replaced.

PICON: Well, in any case, word was out that the great William Faulkner was going to be coming to Tokyo. I wanted a piece of that action. I didn't want the whole thing, I just wanted a piece of it. I wrote a memorandum at that time asking simply for a chance to host a reception in Mr. Faulkner's honor and to invite leading publishers, writers, critics, American studies people, etc., to the reception to meet Mr. Faulkner.

I'm reminded here of a little story about a man who worked with me in London, a British employee, who went to the United States on one of our orientation programs. He came back, and I had lunch with him along with some other people. I was anxious to find out what he thought about the United States. When I asked him what he thought about the United States, he said, "Well, I can summarize that best by telling about getting a newspaper. I arrived on a Saturday night, and Sunday morning I got the Times." It was not the Times he was used to; it was the New York Times.

And I, smilingly, said to him, "Well, how did you like that?"

He said, "Well, frankly, Mr. Picon, I felt as if I had ordered a ham sandwich, and they gave me the whole pig."

Now I had asked simply to be able to host a reception for Mr. Faulkner, and instead I got the whole pig.

You want me to be more specific about this?

Q: Yes, you go ahead and be specific.
Okay. Well, we realized very, very slowly but shockingly -- and then suddenly -- that we had bitten off quite a bit in bringing Mr. Faulkner to Japan. In the first place, when he arrived, he had apparently been doing quite a bit of drinking on the plane, and his eyes were almost moving independently, but nevertheless, he got to Japan and was taken to the International House, where he was to meet with some Japanese critics. I did not participate in that thing at all; I had nothing to do with it at all. It was handled entirely by somebody else, so I can't speak to that. However, a schedule had been worked out for him, and one of the things that he was to do was to address the Foreign Correspondents Press Club in Tokyo at noon the next day. And the Ambassador was going to give a reception for Mr. Faulkner that next evening. This would be the second evening that he would have been in Japan.

I don't remember what day of the week it was, but let's assume for a moment that it was Tuesday that he arrived, and this would have been Wednesday -- Wednesday morning because there was a shortage of people, and I had the assignment of picking up Mr. Faulkner, bringing him over to meet the Ambassador and then taking him to the Press Club, where he would deliver his remarks. Mr. Faulkner was staying at International House in Azabu, Tokyo, and I went there at about 9:00 in the morning. I knocked at his door, and there was no answer. I knocked again and again. I went down to see if perhaps he had gone to have breakfast. No, nobody had seen him. I went back up again, tried the door and it was not locked. There was Mr. Faulkner on the floor, and his room reeked of alcohol.

The first thing I thought of doing was to call you, in fact, because you were going to go at the same time and present him to the Ambassador along with me. I did manage to get him dressed, the car came to pick him up, and we met at the Embassy. You holding one arm and I holding the other arm, we escorted him up the steps into the Ambassador's office. The Ambassador greeted us, invited us in. We went and sat on the couch; the Ambassador sat in a chair near his desk, fortunately some distance away, and tried to make conversation. But Mr. Faulkner's mind was elsewhere, and I remember very clearly, and I admired you for having the sense to say, "Well, we can't take too much of the Ambassador's time, Mr. Faulkner, we'd better go." And you took one arm, and I took the other, and we escorted him toward the door.

I remember the Ambassador saying to you, "He isn't very talkative, is he?"

In any case, our next step was to take Mr. Faulkner over to your office. And in that office, we were helped greatly by Peggy Schmidt, who had been a nurse.

Actually, we went to your office first and then over to Don Ranard's office. And your wife, Peggy Schmidt, was there to help. We tried to bring him to his senses. The clock was moving fast at this time, and it became difficult to see how he was going to make any speech at the Foreign Correspondents Press Club. But we tried to revive him completely. You know, Lew, I don't really know -- it's not clear in my mind at all how much of this was act and how much of this was really intoxication.

Q: I think it was real. He may have been -- he didn't like to talk, and he may have been putting on, but believe me, he was so sick that it wasn't a total...
PICON: No, no. I agree with you. Both of these things were playing together, perhaps if he hadn't been so shy -- so afraid of meeting an audience -- he might have done something psychologically that would help him get into a kind of shape whereby he might have been able to carry on. But actually, at one point, he opened his eyes, and he said, "I'm not going to go there." Just wasn't going to go there.

So, since Mr. Faulkner was not going to go there, and since all these people from the press were waiting, there seemed to be no alternative except to go there and talk about Mr. Faulkner. And there being no one else to do the job, I went and spoke in his stead. I spoke about him, and I read the message that he had written for his Nobel Prize acceptance speech. I apologized and explained that it had been very hot, and he had had a long trip, and he was overcome by the heat. And someone in the audience yelled out, "Was this canned or bottled heat?" No question about it...he press coverage -- whatever there was of it -- on this luncheon address by Mr. Faulkner simply talked about the honored guest who failed to arrive to make his speech.

That evening was the Ambassador's reception, and Mr. Faulkner went. I had given instructions to the help at the residence to keep his drinks light -- in fact, to put practically nothing in them except the soda, or ginger ale, or whatever the drink was to have been. But Mr. Faulkner had his own ideas about that, and he stepped out of the receiving line a couple of times and came back with a drink that he had managed to get somehow himself. I have a photograph of Mr. Faulkner holding a drink, probably a gin and tonic, tilted at a forty-five degree, or worse, a thirty degree angle, and the drink itself coming out of the glass and going all over Mrs. Allison's skirt. The face of Ambassador Allison at that time, as you yourself put it when you saw that picture, "You could see him writing that memo." And I'm sure you won't forget that memo.

Q: Sure won't.

PICON: This was a memo sent to you from the Ambassador instructing you to see to it that Mr. Faulkner was on the next plane back to the United States or to give the Ambassador cause why not. I saw that memorandum when you handed it to me to read along with your reply to the Ambassador, in which you stated quite firmly that Mr. Faulkner would not be on the next plane back; he had come here to do a job; he had come here to do the Nagano seminar, and he was going to do that. And if there were any further recurrence of this, the Ambassador could very well have the resignations of the undersigned. And your name was there, and Don Ranard's name was there, and my name was there? Do you remember that?

Q: I remember it. Except I got that memorandum about 10:30 in the morning. The poor little girl who brought it over was practically shaking, and she didn't want to see me; she wouldn't give it to me, she gave it to my secretary out front. I looked at that paper, and I must have spent two or three hours figuring out how I was going to answer it before I finally put the answer down. But as you say, that was basically the response we made.

And that evening the Ambassador was giving one of his periodic parties for the staff of the Embassy -- to get to know his staff. I had to go to the party, of course, and when I got there -- I waited late, and the party was fairly well underway, you could tell by the noise. I went up, and there was the Ambassador standing over to one side with a drink in his hand and his aloha shirt
on. Finally, I went over to him, and he said, "Lew, I lost my cool. You're right, we've got to let the guy stay, but I'm making you and USIS responsible for his conduct from here on in, and you're going to answer for it if he doesn't work out." Of course, you kept him under control pretty well after that.

PICON: Yeah, you passed those instructions on to me. I hadn't been in Japan very long at this point, and I certainly had never had experience with this sort of thing before. But I must say that you came to the rescue. I traveled by train with Mr. Faulkner up to Nagano. But you sent a car up to Nagano. It went separately, and you had a supply of "medicines" there in case they were needed -- "medicines" meaning things like gin and scotch. And they were very, very, very helpful.

I did not know how to handle a situation like this because I had never encountered anything like it before. But there was a program all arranged. Mr. Faulkner was not very communicative. But gradually, gradually he warmed up. We would go walking together, and talking, and he really was a great man, absolutely a great man. Yet, when 4:00 was approaching and he was to have one of these meetings, he would say to me, "Well, got to go on there pretty soon. You know, Leon, I don't think I feel like going today. I don't think I can face those people without a drink. Couldn't we just have a couple of drinks before we went?" Well, I don't know where I got the idea, but thanks to the stuff that you sent up there I got the idea of keeping glasses soaked in gin ready for such emergencies so that I put in just a little, tiny bit of gin and lots of tonic, and let him have that drink because he would not go without it. Apparently, it gave him enough of a kick -- enough of a high -- to enable him to go to the seminar meeting and to be magnificent.

Of course, there were some other things that entered in to help. One got the idea pretty soon that he had his eye on a very lovely Japanese teacher, an assistant professor or something of the sort. There was nothing wrong with what went on between them. Faulkner simply found her fascinating to look at and to talk to with her demure Japanese nature. Discovering this affinity, I saw to it that she sat up close front, which was breaking the tradition of the Japanese and causing a bit of a problem, but we got that straightened out because he would talk to her, and then he would be magnificent. If she wasn't there, he was far less so.

But I had the task at that time of seeing to it that he remained sober, or nearly so, throughout the course of the seminar. I was with him for twenty-four days, actually. I think it's taken twenty-four years off my life. But we had great times in the evenings when the seminar was over, with dinner. He would drink sake at dinnertime, and then after dinner, the Japanese scholars all wanted to cluster around him, but he always begged off saying he was tired. Then he would say to me, "Let's go up and have a nightcap." So it was not a matter of depriving him entirely by any means of that which he needed so much but rather timing it so that he could do his performances. And that worked out.

Q: The seminar was a tremendous success then, wasn't it?

PICON: Yes, it was absolutely a rip-roaring success.

Q: Did you have much press coverage at the seminar, or did you keep the press away until he got
back down to the major cities?

PICON: There was press coverage of the event. There were Japanese reporters who had been assigned up there to cover this. They never sought an interview with Faulkner himself but covered the activities -- what was going on in the seminar.

The Japanese, because of their own nature, didn't see anything wrong with the amount of drink that he had, and they understood when he went off completely and was not communicable again. This didn't bother them a bit. There was no loss of face or anything of the sort. But I must say that he was fully cooperative. It was blood, sweat and tears, but in the long run, he came through. He was not going "to let USIS down!" Those are the words that he used himself.

Q: I think from all that I remember and from the press coverage that I remember, he made a tremendous impression. Of course, the Japanese were already prepared to accept him as a great man, and he did enough so that he didn't disappoint them.

PICON: There is another thing. You do call to mind another thing which I think is very, very important. All the time that he was there, because of the nature of the Japanese themselves, he was being asked the question, "What are your impressions of Japan?" And he used to say to me when he was asked this question, or after he had been asked, "I don't know what they expect from me, I've just come. I won't have impressions of this place for another three or four weeks. Then if I have any impressions, I'll let them know." But yet when we sat and drank together or when we went and walked together, and he made observations, after he had made them and I could discreetly do it, I would write down into a notebook some of the things that had impressed him. At that time we had a motion picture officer, Harry Keith, who was going to do a film about Faulkner, and I think at the beginning he hadn't have any firm idea of what the nature of the film would be. But he came up there and we talked about this and he got the idea of doing a film which would be called "Impressions of Japan." I gave him those notes and others that I had gotten later and he framed the movie that he made around things that Faulkner had said. Then as he developed this idea, he got Faulkner to the places, to the sites, doing the things that had impressed him, and Harry made a wonderful film, "Impressions of Japan" out of this. But the text of it is all based on Faulkner's "Impressions of Japan."

I gave those notes back to Mr. Faulkner afterward, saying that the Japanese had all wanted him to write something, and one night he penned off a thing which he called "Impressions of Japan" - - A marvelous piece of writing. It is the basic text of that film which Harry made.

There was one other thing in this connection. Faulkner met with reporters at the Tokyo Cultural Center -- a special thing that hadn't been on the program at all. But he wanted to meet with them and to say a few things about the importance of maintaining a democracy in Japan, and he spoke about democracy and freedom. I remember particularly that he told his audience that he was not a profound scholar or a well-versed specialist in the field of political theory, but of this he was certain: "Democracy, as we know it in the West, may very well have its faults and ingrained problems, but it remains unquestionably the best form of government yet conceived by Man." Hardhitting? No. He meant it.
Then, about the last couple of days, he said to me, "Have we met all the requirements, done all the things we're supposed to do?"

I said, "Yes, all except one. You yourself talked, Mr. Faulkner, about the importance that you placed on youth and how you saw this thing as something you were giving to youth. How about writing something for the youth of Japan?" And he did that, too. He wrote a message called, simply, "To the Youth of Japan." And again in this piece he hit hard toward the need of maintaining the democracy that we know. Marvelous piece of writing, "To the Youth of Japan." Both of these things, "Impressions of Japan" and the message "To the Youth of Japan" are things that everybody ought to read.

Q: I think that was the highlight of all the Nagano seminars that we put on. We put on three or four of them. And certainly that was the absolute zenith, or not zenith, absolute acme?

PICON: Apex.

Q: The peak of the effectiveness of that whole seminar. I'm sure it helped tremendously in the Japanese educational system.

PICON: Definitely.

Q: I think now, Leon, we've covered pretty well your work in the Book Translation Program and the Book Program generally in Japan, concluding with an extended discussion of the success of William Faulkner's visit for the purpose of participating in the Nagano seminar and the effect it had in Japan. Shortly after that, I think you -- or after at least a couple of years -- you left the Book Translation Program, and you went on to other things in the USIA program -- some that were not directly in the Translation Program but in one way related to it. So I'd like you to pick up from there now and go on in sequence with what you did with the rest of your years in the country?

PICON: All right. I guess this is the nature of bureaucracy. I guess it's the sort of thing that's certainly par for the course in any bureaucracy, but having been the Books Translations Officer, as time went on, I had to become something else. So I became the Book Programs Officer, which had to do with not only the book translations but the entire book programs field of the Agency, which meant that under my wing came the librarians and the libraries, which was fine. I've never been a librarian; I don't know that much about librarianship, but I did know the program and was very deeply involved in what we were doing with books in any of its phases.

But then, with reorganizations, I found the Exhibits Section under my wing as well, so I was Books and Exhibits Officer. USIS was then housed in the two uppermost stories of what was still called the Mantetsu Biru or Mantetsu Building. And as I developed from Book Translations Officer to Book Programs Officer to Books and Exhibits Officer, our friend Harry, of the "Impressions of Japan" fame, put a sign outside my office which read "TODAY THE MANTETSU, TOMORROW THE WORLD."

Q: We might just say Mantetsu was short for the Japanese of the Manchurian -- the South
Manchurian Railway -- which the Japanese had developed and operated when they controlled the puppet state of Manchukuo. They had, of course, a functioning office up in Manchukuo -- over on the Continent -- but their headquarters for the South Manchurian Railway was in Tokyo, and the Mantetsu building was their building. Of course, when the Occupation came in, our Army took it over, and later we used it as the annex of the Embassy. That's where USIS headquarters were.

PICON: Yes. Anyway, after my experience as Books Officer, Book Programs Officer and Books and Exhibits Officer, we had a reorganization in Tokyo. George Hellyer, who was then the new PAO -- this was some time later -- had a concept which antedates the concepts that -- what I think I'm trying to say here is that George Hellyer had an idea of functioning that predates the Allan Carter thesis on operations, and he used a very untraditional approach to the operation of USIS. He divided us up into what some people teasingly called the Doers and the Thinkers. There was a Program Division, which was supposed to come up with all the ideas for the activities that the organization was going to conduct, and then there was the Production Division, which would do the actual work of producing all of the bits and pieces that went into any of the programs.

And I was in the Programming Office. For a while, I headed the programming office, and Harry Keith -- and then later on Hank Gosho -- headed the Production Office. I don't know really what the reorganization ever accomplished -- whether it made us more productive or less productive or what. But that's what happened to me.

Later on, when I returned from home leave, there had been some further change, and I was no longer the head of the Program Division but was put into a separate corner where I was to deal with "Cultural Programming," as it was called. But my job was mainly one of being in touch with, having contact with and just conducting a dialogue with leading Japanese writers and intellectuals. I think much of this stemmed from an article that was written by later Ambassador Edwin Reischauer, in which he spoke about a broken dialogue between the United States and Japan. He was talking about the breakdown of dialogue between intellectuals in both countries, and this made our PAO and the Ambassador feel that we ought to do something about intellectuals. The problem was that nobody seemed to know any of the intellectuals. So my task became one of developing -- doing nothing but developing relationships with Japanese intellectuals.

Then, as history has its curious ways of behaving, the man who had attacked what the Embassy had been doing in Japan, Reischauer, was appointed by John F. Kennedy as the Ambassador to Japan, and my relationships with the Japanese intellectuals served well at that point.

Q: I know that you had earlier developed considerable proficiency in written Japanese. Had you, at this stage in the game, developed enough proficiency in the conversational Japanese so that you could approach them without utilizing an interpreter -- these intellectuals that you were working toward?

PICON: Well, actually, Lew, no. As you can see from this, it's not only my age that causes me to stammer, stutter and hesitate as I speak. It's always been the nature of my talking. I've always
been very hesitant, and then, in a foreign language, it's almost impossible. I do not have any gift for speaking foreign languages. I do have a gift for reading and writing foreign languages; I just can't speak the languages. I used an interpreter all the time. But most of the time, actually, the important intellectuals were those who could speak English, and our conversations were in English all the time.

I was of use to the new Ambassador because of these connections. By the way, I had known him for a long time. In fact, when I was in the Army studying Japanese, he was one of my teachers. He taught us Japanese, and his Japanese is superb. But he practically never speaks Japanese, at least I haven't heard him speak Japanese ever, except for a few phrases here and there. He always used an interpreter. But, of course, that would be expected -- what an Ambassador has to say is so important that he would want an interpreter's accurate interpretation. But most of the important intellectuals were quite fluent in English.

Q: We spoke a little bit off the record earlier about some of the things that you were doing on behalf of Reischauer in connection with these intellectual contacts, and if you don't mind, I'd like to get some of that on tape.

PICON: All right. Well, Reischauer felt that one of the most important parts of his assignment was repairing the dialogue that he had seen broken. Yet, he was a bit handicapped in his current position as Ambassador, and he was advised, I understand, that he could not run the risk of too much association with the gentlemen on the near and far left as Ambassador. After all, the ruling party was quite conservative and would take exception to his, let me call it "pussyfooting" around with the gentlemen of the near left, certainly with the far left.

Well, Reischauer was not particularly interested in the far left at all, but he was interested in the people on the near left. Let me go off on a little bit of a tangent here, and you don't have to do anything with the tape. There was a funny story in this regard. When I first went to Japan -- I say first went to Japan because I was there for a total of ten years consecutively -- as Book Translations Officer, I was invited to attend a staff meeting of the Ambassador, John Allison at that time, because he was interested in the book translations program, wanted to know how it ran and wanted me to do a presentation on what we were doing in the book translations field. I went to that meeting. It's, by the way, the only Ambassadorial meeting I attended in Japan, ever. But anyway -- when I went to that meeting, I don't think that I became very beloved by the Political Section because of my actions at that meeting.

During the course of that meeting, the Ambassador asked the head of the Political Section whether the Japanese Socialist Party was going to split, as had been rumored. And the reply that the Ambassador got was that there certainly was no evidence that there was going to be a split in the Japanese Socialist Party at that time. And I, sitting there, said, "Uh, but there is. There is very definite evidence." I'm sorry that I said that.

But the Ambassador looked at me and said, "You have some evidence of this, really?"

And I said, "Yes, I do."
Let me give you the background on it. Where we were living during that early period in Tokyo -- in a place called Seta, in Tokyo -- we lived in an apartment house near a shrine and next door to a wonderful Japanese family, a father and mother and three girls who were about the ages of our children. And these children played together. The shrine comes into this story simply because very shortly after we had moved to Seta, the neighborhood was having a festive bon odori (folk dancing) at the shrine, and my family and I went down to see this. At that dance, I was approached by a Japanese gentleman wearing his yukata, and he told me that he was my neighbor and that he would like to come and visit me and pay his respects. He spoke English very hesitatingly. I told him that anytime that he saw that we were at home, he was welcome to come over.

He was a professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University. His field was the history of political ideas. Besides that, he later became the advisor, on theory, to the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan. He was a Democratic Socialist -- what they called in those days the Right Wing of the Socialist Party. But there was only one Socialist Party then. Well, as we became more and more friendly and talked about different things, he wondered if I would help him with something. He had written the constitution for a new party in Japan, which was to be called the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan. He had it in Japanese, and he was translating it into German, and he wanted me to work with him on translating it into English.

When the constitution was translated, and on the date that the Right Wing of the Party was going to announce its separation, they would have the constitution of the new Party published in three languages: Japanese, English and German -- with the help of Fabian Societies and Social Democratic Parties in other countries. Would I help him with the English? I said "Sure." He came over from time to time. This was to be the official document of separation of the new Party.

That's for the background. But at this meeting, I said: "I do have evidence; I have a copy of the proposed constitution for a new Right Wing of the Socialist Party."

Q: You said this at the -- ?

PICON: At the meeting, yes. "I have a copy of the constitution."

Everybody looked at me quizzically: "What do you mean?"

I said, "Well, as a matter of fact, I have it in my desk over at the Mantetsu Building."

Then one of the officers said, "Can I see it?"

I said, "I guess you can, if I can get permission."

But this is the kind of thing that develops when you have this sort of relationship with individuals in Japan. I was trusted not to release this to the press or anybody. It's the kind of thing that you develop person to person. These interpersonal relationships, I believe, are one of the most valuable things that develop in an organization like USIS abroad.
Q: There's no doubt about it. May I ask what was the upshot of that final request? Did you ask the gentleman if you could release it?

PICON: Yes, I did.

Q: And what did he say?

PICON: Yes. But not to the press.

Q: So you gave it to the Political Section in confidence.

PICON: Yes. That's exactly right. But it's an example of the sort of thing that we don't have time for in large doses, of course not. It's too expensive; it's too impractical. But to the degree that this sort of relationship -- and I'm not trying to throw bouquets backwards, but I'm sure you know what I'm talking about -- when this kind of relationship can be developed between an officer of USIS and important intellectuals in a country, it carries our goals farther than a thousand pamphlets, I believe.

Q: I do, too.

JACK SHELLENBERGER
Public Affairs Trainee, USIS
Tokyo (1955-1956)

Provincial Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Nagoya (1956-1957)

Assistant Motion Picture Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1957-1958)

Jack Shellenberger was born in New York in 1927. His career included foreign assignments in Japan, Belgium, Nigeria, Iran and Canada. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

SHELLENBERGER: Our first stop en route to Tokyo was Honolulu. We enjoyed it. The Pan Am Clipper, which permitted us to have the benefits of first class travel, with champagne and the linen on the dining tray, stopping at Wake at dawn. Very exciting.

Q: And a berth?

SHELLENBERGER: And berths if we wanted, but I was too anxious. Tokyo's Haneda Airport was crowded; it still is. I heard my name being called over the public address system, but I was unable to get through Customs to answer the call. So I was a bit agitated. But as we emerged
from Customs, a driver -- a Japanese driver -- was there holding a card with my name. He took us through the congested streets toward the Tokyo Grand Hotel. The traffic was mostly tiny taxis and what they called bata-bata, which were three-wheeled motorcycle trucks, and then, of course, bicycles. It was definitely not the Tokyo of today.

Tokyo Grand Hotel wasn't very grand, but it was only a block or so away from the Mantetsu Building, where USIS was located. Our first American greeter was none other than Lew Schmidt, who came over to the hotel and proposed that we go to lunch at the Union Club. At that time, Lew was carrying responsibility as PAO, as Executive Officer, as Deputy PAO, and we were astonished at his and Peg's graciousness and generosity, given all the responsibilities that they had to carry.

I enjoyed the training period in Tokyo. It was a natural for me to go into the radio side of the operation, producing half-hour programs on developments in America because the media at that time, the Japanese media didn't have the wherewithal to maintain bureaus in the United States to any great extent.

Q: Since you were broadcasting or sending your tapes for broadcast over Japanese stations, you must have been broadcasting in Japanese. Who was doing your voicing for you when you weren't playing music?

SHELLENBERGER: We had two on the team who voiced: Lucy Nakai and Paul Fujimaki. Paul is still a Foreign Service National at USIS Tokyo. I was more or less the editor. And indeed the tapes were sent all over Japan.

What I remember about that year, 1955 -- 35 years ago -- was the visit by the famed Nobel Prize-winning novelist William Faulkner, who came tired but agreeable, ready to do what he could for his country. He was very patriotic about going out as a cultural ambassador -- took it very seriously. But also, he was not a vigorous man, and a couple of drinks could do him in, as it did on the occasion of an ambassadorial reception. The Ambassador sent for Lew Schmidt and a couple of others in USIS and said, "I want that Faulkner out of here in twenty-four hours." Well, Faulkner's visit had been touted as the event of the year, and to have him leave would have been disaster.

So Lew and the others said, "If he has to go, we'll go with him," stating that they would monitor him and make sure that there would be no repeat of this incident. I was one of his monitors, and I absolutely admired Faulkner's gentleness, and his intellect, and his patience and his endurance in receiving intellectual after intellectual and giving them all of his attention and not reverting to cant or repetitions. He took every questioner -- every question -- with the utmost seriousness.

When he went up to Nagano, where the summer seminar which was built about him occurred, he was in all respects a gentleman and an agreeable presence. He wrote an essay called "Impressions of Japan." It was beautifully written, vivid and cried out for a motion picture that would put it into everybody's view. I wrote a script, drawing from Faulkner's essay, and we shot that film in Nagano, in the places that he describes in his essay, and found him to be an utterly cooperative collaborator, even though heretofore he had never let himself be photographed or
filmed. I believe it's the only film other than the Talking Heads video in which he appears as himself. We completed the film after he left, but when he did leave, I remember we took him to the airport early and had him get on the plane and then come off the plane with a number of USIS people and employees to simulate his arrival. That became the opening of the film.

*Q: I hadn't realized he had never been filmed before.*

SHELLENBERGER: He had been filmed in interviews, but he had never appeared in one like this. So it's a first and now a last.

I was transferred to Nagoya to take on my first non-training assignment in the middle of 1956.

*Q: Before you go on with Nagoya, I would like to ask you to make a brief statement about your impression of the success of the Faulkner visit because there were some snide remarks passed by some members of the Embassy as to whether the man was really effective or not. I felt it was one of the great coups that USIA was able to bring off in Japan, and I'd like to get your impression.*

SHELLENBERGER: Well, there are no less than two definitive books in Japanese and English about the Faulkner visit. Faulkner scholars, prior to his visit, were a few -- you could count them on one hand. Today there's a Faulkner scholar on every literature faculty in every university in Japan. And I think it was probably culturally our greatest contribution to U.S.-Japanese understanding at an intellectual level.

My transfer to Nagoya was providential in the sense that it permitted our first child to be born at a U.S. Air Force facility. We would not have had that benefit had we gone to where we were originally assigned, which was Matsuyama. I believe Lew made the decision to put me into Nagoya -- a bigger job, a bigger city than would normally come the way of a junior officer. And so, yes, Katie was born on July 13, 1956, and we enjoyed that central Japan environment and the program totally -- absorbed by it. Our library was one of the most active places in the city because so much had been destroyed, and so little had been rebuilt that we were one of the prime outlets for information. And about 30% of our book collection was translations into Japanese.

I had a call from Harry Keith about a year after I got to Nagoya inviting me to come to Tokyo to be his chief of motion picture and television production. And since I had enjoyed so much the work I had done in television in Philadelphia and doing the Faulkner film, I, without too much thought, said, yes, I would. Art Hummel later told me he thought I had made a terrible career mistake. Art was the deputy PAO at the time. He said, "What you're doing is slipping into the specialist category, and that denies you the opportunity to get into the more responsible and higher positions of a USIS Foreign Service Officer."

All that aside, I did enjoy what I did in Tokyo, making a number of motion pictures. The ones I can recall most vividly were a cartoon we made to try to satisfy or calm Japanese fears about their economic future as a trading partner of the United States because at that time, their deficit with us was enormous -- much higher relatively than our deficit with the Japanese is today. So this cartoon was meant to reassure them that they wouldn't always be in deficit with the United States.
The other two, "Nihon no Takara," or "Treasures of Japan," we produced with the cooperation of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. It depicted the living national treasures in the arts category -- dubbed by the Emperor as Living National Treasures -- doing what they do, whether it's pottery or Kabuki or the Noh theater or painting. And being depicted with American students or apprentices who had come to Japan to be at the master's side, what it did, of course, was to demonstrate not only the cultural tradition of these living national treasures but the reverence and the respect shown them by a diverse group of Americans who were in Japan to learn the Koto, to learn painting, to learn pottery. It was a great success and had a glittering premier.

The other film I'll mention is one that was produced after the unveiling of a major exhibition entitled "Atoms for Peace." Now, atom was a word that was a no-no in some parts of the Embassy because we had not only Nagasaki and Hiroshima, but we'd had a case of a fisherman who had been dusted with radioactive ash from the American Bikini demonstration. And so anything nuclear was sensitive. But the head of the Yomiuri newspaper, a man named Shoriki, urged that Japanese be educated on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. And with the help and guidance of a nuclear physicist from Oak Ridge, a major exhibit was mounted, which showed the use of radioisotopes, various types of nuclear reactors that produce energy, even a model of a nuclear-powered ship. And we made the film, and the film and the exhibit were used for years all over Japan. In fact, that exhibit is still maintained at Tokai Mura, the home of Japanese peaceful atomic research.

Q: I think you told me that at one point, the Ambassador, who, I gather, was still John Allison, had some objection to taking that thing on tour around the country.

SHELENNBERGER: I was out of Japan in late '59 and so was John Allison, but it took place. He objected to something else, now that you remind me of it. "The Family of Man," which again was a very ambitious photo exhibit put together by the great photographer, Edward Steichen, who came to Japan. These were photographs depicting the human face, the human being, from all over the globe and carrying the message that we're all one great family. The Ambassador came over just prior to the press preview. He went through it, and he looked in this one room, and there on the back wall was this huge depiction of the photograph of Hiroshima after the atomic blast. He said, "Well, that won't do, that's got to go. I can't imagine that we could use that photo in this exhibit. It would be enormously insulting." Well, all of us who had been working on the exhibit, and I, who had been making film of the photo and portraits, disagreed. We again had this sort of conference at which we agreed that taking that photo out of the exhibit would become known very quickly and would be considered an insult to Japanese maturity. The Hiroshima photo remained, and the U.S. was praised for its inclusion.
John Sylvester, Jr. was born in Rhode Island in 1930 and raised abroad in a Navy family. He spent much of his career in the State Department dealing with Japan and Vietnam. Mr. Sylvester was interviewed by Jeff Broadwater on April 6, 1993.

Q: How was it that you came to be assigned to Japan?

SYLVESTER: It was a slightly disillusioning process. When I came in the Foreign Service, our class was asked where they would like to go. And I actually wanted to go to Europe; I'd never been to Europe. But the person who spoke to us said that we all had to understand that Europe was the most popular, and your chances of not getting it were fairly strong. So I thought carefully and decided to put down on my so-called wish list my second choice, which was to go back to the Far East. And then everyone who asked for Europe went there. And me, being Sylvester, I was almost at the end of those as they announced the assignment posts.

Q: They were made alphabetically?

SYLVESTER: Yes, they read them out alphabetically to our group of twenty. They got down to me and said I was assigned to Pusan, Korea. I'd just come back from Pusan a year before, which was a real dump then. It's actually a very interesting place, and I was there months ago.

But I was not happy about that, so I went in, rather crestfallen, to Personnel the next day, just to report in that I would be ready to go off to Pusan when the course ended. And they said, "Oops. Sylvester, Sylvester...Your assignment has been changed, and you're going to Hong Kong."

I was happy, and I went over and started basic Chinese language and took that for about a month and a half. I went back one day to Personnel to report in, and they said, "Oops. Sylvester...Your assignment has been changed. You're going to Okinawa." Well, in the end, I went to Yokohama. So I was slightly disillusioned at how government worked by then. But it was probably a good lesson.

Q: Did you ever figure out what was going on with those assignment changes?

SYLVESTER: It was just the normal Mixmaster effect of Personnel's assignment needs.

Q: Now your first post was in Yokohama, at the Consulate there. What were your duties there?

SYLVESTER: It was a typical Consulate. I did the full range of Consular and administrative work. I started as a citizenship and passport officer, which was dealing then with the remaining cases of Nisei who'd been sent back to Japan either during the war or after the war and were trying to regain their American citizenship. It was kind of a sad aftermath of the wartime hysteria. Then I did shipping services, which involved some rather interesting cases of seamen
who’d gotten into trouble. Then later, a little bit of visa work. And then, for a while, the normal administrative chores of the Consulate General.

It was a handsome building -- modeled on the White House -- that was on the Yokohama waterfront, and later, like a lot of our buildings in Japan, was sold off. For a while, it was made into a beer hall. I went back then and had a beer at exactly the place my desk had been as a Vice Consul. Finally, it was destroyed and a Japanese hotel erected on the site.

Q: Now, you said these Japanese-Americans were former citizens, and you were trying to help them return to the United States.

SYLVESTER: During the war, as you know, many Japanese-Americans were put in concentration camps. And some of them, who were pro-Japanese during the war, mainly just out of resentment at how they’d been treated by their own government, asked to be shipped back to Japan. When the war was over, in the post-war misery, with their roots in many cases being actually in the United States more than in Japan, they applied to regain American citizenship. They formally petitioned for this through the Consular procedures, and we would forward their petitions to Washington, with information on their cases, and they would be acted on. It took many years before these all were finished off.

Q: How many of these kinds of cases did you handle?

SYLVESTER: By my time, they’d grown to be a lesser trickle rather than a flood. But even then, in ’55-56, I think I handled at least one or two a week, probably.

Q: You were then assigned to the Economic Section of the American Embassy in Tokyo. How did your duties change when you moved to the U.S. Embassy?

SYLVESTER: I’d taken two years of Japanese language training at the Embassy Language School, which was an excellent course, and then went in as a rather raw officer into the Economic Section and worked on East-West trade issues. We were trying to persuade the Japanese not to sell too much to the Soviets or to the Chinese Communists. There were the COCOM regulations, which limited the types of strategic articles that they could sell.

Occasionally, we’d have a real issue. The one I remember was wide-diameter pipe for the Soviets to build an oil pipeline from the Urals all the way into Western Europe. We were trying to persuade Japan not to sell the pipe.

I also reported on things as the Japanese companies did get involved with China and the Soviet Union. They had a fair amount of trade, and we were just trying to follow it and see what they did.

Q: What kind of influence, or maybe pressure, did you bring to bear on the Japanese to discourage them from engaging in that kind of trade? What kind of leverage did you have in that position?
SYLVESTER: My superiors, occasionally, when it was a significant issue, would go in. The Minister for Economic Affairs when I was there was an excellent man, Philip Trezise, a fine economist, a very savvy man on Japan. And occasionally, when there was an issue that Washington took seriously, he would go into the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, occasionally, with me in tow, and make an issue out of it.

Q: What was the attitude of the Japanese in those kinds of meetings? How did they respond to these overtures?

SYLVESTER: They would cooperate, but they would be skeptical, I think. They thought we were too ideological -- too fixated on these issues. But the ties with the United States were so important to Japan that they weren't going to jeopardize them over relatively minor amounts involving trade with the Communist countries. So they were usually responsive when we wanted to make an issue out of it.

Q: Did it make a difference whether you were talking about trade with the People's Republic of China as opposed to the Soviet Union?

SYLVESTER: Well, at that time, not too much difference. The Japanese did, and still, find the Soviets -- the Russians -- very difficult to deal with. China, they thought, was a difficult market but a market with more prospects in the long run. When I started, it was a period when the Chinese were being very hard-nosed to Japan.

I came, I think, shortly after there was a rather strange incident called the Nagasaki flag incident -- when a young Japanese right-winger ripped down a paper Chinese Communist flag at a postage-stamp exhibit at a department store in Nagasaki. It got in the newspaper, and in Beijing, the Chinese Communist leadership decided to make it an issue with Japan. They blew it up and then put a total embargo on trade with Japan to try to pressure them on some of the political issues at that time.

The Japanese were quite disconcerted, although it didn't achieve the results the Chinese expected. The Japanese trading companies, like Mitsubishi Shoji or Mitsui Bussan, founded what were called dummy companies. For instance, there was one, Meiwa Sangyo, which was a known dummy for, I believe, Mitsui Bussan. And they just let them carry out the trade with Communist China. These companies would act in a friendly fashion; that is, the president of the company would echo the Chinese political line at the time so that the Chinese would approve of them politically. It was all subterfuge -- a Kabuki phenomenon that the Japanese companies found useful in continuing their trade with China.

China wanted the Japanese imports and wanted to sell to Japan, so they themselves kind of went along with this subterfuge. And then, finally, the whole thing evaporated with the passage of time.

Q: By the time you arrived in Japan, the Japanese economy was really starting to take off. Were you surprised by the speed with which Japan recovered from the war? What was your thinking about that as an economics officer there?
SYLVESTER: Looking back on it, my own thoughts, I think, were thin. I think, generally, Americans were surprised at the speed of the recovery. But it was not an easy, very fast process. When I got to Japan as a Foreign Service officer in '55, there were still large sections of Yokohama that were burnt-out fields, just ashes. I remember going down by Yokohama Harbor and hearing an ungodly noise coming out of kind of a warehouse building. It turned out to be a truck fender factory. And the way that they were making truck fenders then was not through a gigantic press, like they would now, but it was an individual workman with a hammer and a flat piece of metal, which he would pound on top of a wooden form until it became the shape of a fender. It wasn't a rich country by any means then.

But my timing, in one sense, was very good because '55 was just about the end of the post-war miseries and the real beginning of Japanese prosperity, I think. And as the years went along, you could see it; people were well clothed, they began to eat well, the stores got fancier and fancier, you began to see more private cars on the road, traffic increased steadily. All the elements of prosperity, year by year, were becoming much more evident during the ten years of my duty there.

Q: Was that something that you tried to explain to your superiors in Washington? How do you explain it...I guess that's what I'm asking.

SYLVESTER: My superiors -- Ambassador MacArthur, Minister Trezise -- would make a real point of it with visitors, that Japan had a very vigorous industrial economy. This had to be pointed out to the American visitors at that time because the image was still of a broken-down Japan, one that was just pulling itself together from the destruction of war.

I remember Ambassador MacArthur had a standard briefing that he gave to one group of visitors after another. And like anybody who gives the same talk, the same briefing, time after time, you begin to can it, and you have the same expressions. He had one which I think was something like "Japan is the Ruhr of Asia." His experience was in Germany and France, and the similes he would bring up -- that this was like the great belt of industry along the Rhine, that Japan had the same sort of massive industrial capacity that north France, West Germany, and the United States had.

It was a lesson that American business had to be told at that time because it was not self-evident.

Q: There was one event that came up in 1960 in Japan that I wanted to ask you about, and that was the debate over the adoption of a new security treaty with the United States. I don't know if you would have been directly involved in that or not, but I was just wondering what you remember about that. Do you remember? There was a lot of opposition to it. I think President Eisenhower was going to visit the country and decided to cancel his visit. Do you remember that?

SYLVESTER: My duties were not officially with the negotiation of the security treaty, but I arrived in the Embassy -- in the Chancery -- at exactly the time that the major demonstrations and riots began over the revision of the security treaty. And it was an awesome sight because I
think there were up to a half-million Japanese, on some days, who made a circuit that went by
the National Police Agency, the Diet, the Prime Minister's official residence, and then came by
the front of the American Embassy. There was this sea of Japanese who were chanting "Ampo
hantai!" (Against the security treaty!) "Ampo hantai! Ampo hantai!" It was an almost hypnotic,
roaring chant. And it was a popular thing; the Asahi and the other newspapers generally
supported the demonstrations. It was a mass phenomenon.

My future wife was a member of a theater group which, like most Japanese cultural groups, had
left-wing inclinations, and a lot of them would participate in this, and then later in the evening
would drop off at my house for a drink. The whole atmosphere was one of enormous tension.

I remember being in the lobby of the Embassy when Mr. Haggerty, Eisenhower's press secretary,
arrived from the airport. He'd been in a car that had gotten caught in a student demonstration
then. The students had rocked the car and stomped on it. He'd finally been rescued and brought
to the Embassy by American helicopter. And they were very shaken, with good reason.

Q: Why was the treaty so controversial?

SYLVESTER: I think there were a variety of reasons. In one sense, the context of it was the very
beginning of the youth revolution that was to hit us in the 1960s. The radical youth leaders of
Tokyo University and so forth were very prominent in the disturbances.

In part, it was the strength of the left generally in Japan at that time. The left, particularly the
Communists, had stood against the Japanese militarists, and they emerged from the war with
prestige; the right wing having been disgraced by having led Japan into that disastrous war. The
left saw communism, socialism as the wave of the future. They saw the Americans as capitalists,
as imperialists. They saw the security treaty as tying Japan to American militarism.

The public was deeply pacifist after the tragedy of the war and was not really sympathetic to
being tied to a military agreement with the United States, even though the leaders thought it
essential in this dangerous post-war world.

There were many reasons, but it all came together in part because the prime minister at that time,
Nobusuke Kishi, was a somewhat Nixon-like figure -- a man who had been a minister in prewar
governments, in Prime Minister Tojo's cabinet, and was once again the leader of Japan, and he
was the one who was pushing the security treaty through the National Diet. In the end, they had
to force it over against a rowdy filibuster by the opposition parties within the Diet. And that
action, plus Kishi's personality, became the final crux of the security treaty riots. When it all
finished -- when Kishi was forced out of office -- the whole thing deflated like a balloon that's
lost its air.

Q: I had read that. Did any of the hostility toward the treaty, or toward American policy
generally, manifest itself in any hostility on the part of the Japanese toward American Foreign
Service people working in Japan? And were you the target of hostility as a representative of the
American government?
SYLVESTER: No, there was very little real anti-Americanism in the whole phenomenon. It was a protest about American policy, about Japanese government policy, about the personality of Kishi, but the Japanese as a whole tended to be rather friendly to Americans. And I found this true, even of many among the political left. I later got to know a number of Socialist Diet members and opposition politicians, and they’d be as friendly as everybody to Americans. The Communists were usually professionally hostile to us and would stay away from us and so forth, but there was very little overt anti-Americanism.

Q: I want to ask you at least one more question about Japan. Edwin Reischauer would have been ambassador at the time you left, or at least you would have served through his tenure as ambassador. Could you tell me a little bit about him, what kind of ambassador he was, how well you knew him?

SYLVESTER: I thought he was a very fine man and an excellent ambassador. He was a man of good sense, of friendliness, of enormous understanding of Japan. His manner of working with the Japanese was what was necessary in the post-security-treaty period. He was an excellent choice, and I think he was an example of how a non-career ambassador, if well chosen, can be among certainly the best choices.

I think the only fault was that he was not experienced in the ways of Washington, like Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II was, and I think he had more trouble getting Washington to do things than a more experienced bureaucrat might have had. But he was very proper for the times. I was a junior officer; I knew him and I called on him several times after he retired and went back to Harvard, and then after he ultimately retired from there. I thought the world of him.

I think his hardest problem when I was there was the negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa. Okinawa had been essentially run as an American military colony after our bloody victory there during the war, and the American military authorities were very reluctant to see it returned to Japan or even to share in its governance with Japanese authorities. But the essential problem was that Okinawa was still desperately poor at a time when the main islands of Japan were increasingly prosperous. The Japanese government regarded Okinawa as part of Japan. They wanted its return, they wanted to bring the living standard of the people of Okinawa up to mainland standards and they wanted to offer money to help this process. And we were in this ridiculous posture of refusing Japanese financial help to the island because the military authorities felt that that was baloney tactics -- that the Japanese would use that as the entrée and then steadily erode the ability of our senior military authorities to govern Okinawa as we thought was necessary. Ambassador Reischauer had to argue that in the long run, this was absolutely necessary for American interests -- that Okinawa was very important to our military but that good relations with Japan and a healthy relationship with the security treaty was far more important to the United States than an ability to run Okinawa just as we wanted. But General Caraway, who was the general in charge in Okinawa when Reischauer first went, was a hard-line person, and he deeply resented Reischauer’s policy recommendations. And there were some sour relations between the Army headquarters in Okinawa and the Embassy. But after General Caraway left, his successors were quite broad-gauged generals, and the mood in the Pentagon in Washington also changed. And by the time Ambassador Reischauer finished his Embassy appointment, very substantial progress had been made on the Okinawan issues.
Q: I was going to ask you about that. While it was eventually returned to Japan, it was after Reischauer had left.

SYLVESTER: Yes, it was 1972 when it finally took place. But the whole process had been put well under way by Reischauer. Another officer who was very instrumental in the process was Richard Sneider, who later became ambassador to Korea. And his officer, Howard McElroy, who later worked for me, was a very able junior officer on that issue.

RICHARD W. BOEHM
Consular Officer
Okinawa (1956-1958)

Richard W. Boehm was born in New York in 1926. He attended both Adelphi College and the George Washington University. He served in the United States Army, and entered the Foreign Service in 1955. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Boehm served in Germany, Luxembourg, and Turkey. He was interviewed in 1994 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

BOEHM: I went to Okinawa, again with misgivings, because it wasn't at all what I had in mind. I seemed to be going in the wrong direction. The Consular Unit, as it was called, in Naha was a four-man post. Organizationally speaking, it was an interesting one. It was headed by a senior officer, at that time John Steeves, who later became Director General of the Foreign Service and Ambassador to Afghanistan. He had the title of Consul General, but his main hat was as Political Adviser to the Commanding General of what was called USARYUS/IX Corps, or United States Army, Ryukyu Islands - IX Corps. The commander was a three-star general. John Steeves was his Political Adviser. That was the main function he had. There wasn't much Consular activity. There was one upper, middle-grade officer who was his deputy -- who more or less ran the Consulate. There were two junior Vice Consuls, of whom I was the more junior. We did everything else -- the administration and the Consular work. The number two guy, Steeves’ deputy, was an economic type. It was great training.

The senior Vice Consul had entered the Foreign Service through the back door. He had been a ship's radio operator earlier in his career. Then he had became sort of a Consular clerk or communicator somewhere -- I think in Australia. Then he made it and was commissioned a Vice Consul. He was a very salty old guy. However, he knew his business. He took it very seriously and taught me not only the Consular business but administrative affairs as well. All of this, plus my experience (in the Department) as a Press Officer stood me in very good stead throughout my career. Even though at the time I was frustrated at being in Okinawa, I came to appreciate it and realized that it was a very useful experience.

Living in Okinawa was nothing much. You lived in a fenced-in area -- a U.S. military compound where a few houses were set aside for the people from the Consular Unit, as it was called. It was called the Consular Unit, because the United States was the administrative power in Okinawa,
and you couldn't have a Consulate as such. Technically, it was treated as a branch of the Consular Section of the Embassy in Tokyo, for Consular purposes. There were several military compounds -- some of them in one area, some in another. Life was kind of like Levittown with a fence around it. So that was a disappointment. We did our best and struggled along.

I got a chance to do something -- I'm not sure what role it played in my career, maybe none, except in my own mind. We had an inspection during my tour there. There were two inspectors. One of them was Ed Gullion, a well-known Foreign Service Officer and later an Ambassador. He eventually became the head of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Ed Gullion sat down with John Steeves, the Consul General, at the end of his inspection. He said, "We have a list here of political subjects on which there has been no reporting. You have this young Vice Consul. We think that it would be a good idea if you and he, between you, would pick one of these subjects, turn him loose for a couple of weeks from his other responsibilities and let him do it."

John Steeves was a very fine guy and a very good developer of his staff, and he said, "Okay." The inspectors went their way, and John called me in and said, "Let's look at this list."

The subject that attracted me was "Reversionist sentiment among the Okinawans." At the time, Okinawa was being run by a military governor -- not the commanding general to whom Steeves was an adviser, but a civil administrator who was an Army officer. All of the civilian Americans living there worked for the military government. They had a notion that the Okinawans loved us so much that what they really wanted was to become the fifty-first State. However, there were a few people who believed that Okinawa should revert to Taiwan because it had historic ties with China at one time or another. It had been an independent kingdom, and there were some who wanted it to be an independent kingdom again. However, those with any sense realized that the Okinawans considered themselves Japanese. If they went anywhere, it would be to become a province of Japan.

I was asked to do a report on this. I did. I took two weeks off. I didn't have very many sources. I must admit also -- and I might want to take this out of the transcript later -- that I had a preconceived notion of what the answer should be, even before I began my research. The preconceived answer was that the Okinawans really wanted reversion to Japan. This probably also served U.S. interests best, and I thought that we probably should start preparing for it. At that time, we kept Japan very much at arms length in Okinawa. There was no official Japanese representation in Okinawa. When a Japanese ship came into the harbor, it couldn't fly the Japanese flag. We kept the Japanese away, which might have been a mistake. We should have begun to involve them and gotten them to pay some of the bills (for the Occupation). I had these ideas before I began my research. So I can't say that it was entirely objective, although I think that the conclusions I reached were correct. I came up with this report, which concluded that reversion to Japan was the way to go.

Q: Method and process are always very interesting things. Here you were -- obviously, you didn't speak Japanese, or certainly not the Okinawan dialect in Japanese. How did you go about this?
BOEHM: I went about it as best I could. I would say now, with the perspective of four decades later, that it was a very inadequate kind of research. But you talk to anybody you can lay your hands on. There was a structure -- a Ryukyuan government structure -- with a governor, a mayor of Naha, various officials and an Okinawan staff. I'm afraid that all too often we drew on our local staff for this kind of report. I tried to find Okinawans who would talk to me, and I talked to Americans who had contacts to see what they thought, looking to those who were as objective as you could find. So I put together what I could. I would say now that what I did was inadequate in terms of research, although I think that the conclusions of the report were correct.

Anyhow, I prepared the report. It was a bombshell. By the time the report was completed, John Steeves had moved on. He'd gone to become Political Adviser to CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific) in Hawaii. But the American military command in Okinawa was outraged at this report. They wouldn't speak to me. I was shunned.

Q: Could you explain what the American military attitude was at that time?

BOEHM: They were convinced that we had to keep Okinawa. It was ours. They thought the Okinawans liked it that way, and the idea of more or less inviting Japan to start coming in and preparing eventually to take over was anathema to them. My report, by implication, rebutted their notion that the Okinawans loved us and wanted us to stay. A few of the military would come to me privately and say that it was a great report. They said that they couldn't say this publicly, but "You are absolutely right about what you said." The official American military reaction was very bad.

It happened that just after the report came out, I went to a Consular conference in Tokyo. At that time, the Ambassador was Douglas MacArthur II.

Q: General Douglas MacArthur's nephew.

BOEHM: Yes. The DCM in Tokyo at that time was Outerbridge Horsey.

Q: Two very much establishment-types.

BOEHM: Very establishment. Horsey gave a luncheon for the visiting Consular Officers, to which Ambassador MacArthur, of course, was invited. Since Horsey had a protocol problem of whom to put next to Ambassador MacArthur, he solved it by choosing the two most junior persons present to sit next to the Ambassador. I was one of them. Ambassador MacArthur turned to me and said, "That was a first rate report on the reversion of Okinawa. Congratulations." I was stunned and thrilled. I doubt if he had actually read it. His staff probably drew it to his attention. It gave me a tremendous lift.

Q: Oh, I'm sure.

BOEHM: And I got a letter from John Steeves, congratulating me on the report, which he said was being read with interest in Hawaii. Even though the local reaction in Okinawa among our military was very negative, the report got some attention and attracted interest elsewhere.
Q: I think that it was the first time we really started to look at this issue.

BOEHM: It did that. I would like to think that I made a decisive contribution to something. As we go along in this interview, I'll come to other points in my career where I felt that I did something that was crucial at the time that I did it. But I'm not at all sure that this was the case (with regard to Okinawan reversion). It was something which was going to happen, either then or a little bit later, in any case.

Q: Anyway, it was a timely report.

BOEHM: It was. It took a little time before we started to negotiate with Japan and to hand Okinawa back to them, although we kept our bases there. It worked out all right. Okinawa is still chafing a little bit. I read in the press the other day that the Japanese governor has been in Washington, asking us to give back a lot of land which we now use on our bases. Okinawa is land-poor, so that kind of issue -- the base presence -- goes on. But that is something that we will negotiate with the government of Japan.

Q: I had a call from Japanese Public TV earlier this year -- not too long ago. They wanted to do something or talk to people about the reversion issue and all of that. I said, "You know, you don't have to talk to the Japanese authorities. If you want to get different views, talk to the Pentagon and the Department of State people at that time because that's really where the conflict was."

BOEHM: They ought to talk to Dick Sneider, who was head of the Political Section (in the Embassy in Tokyo) a little later. It was he who, while in Japan, or perhaps back in Washington in some capacity, gave impetus to the negotiations which ended up in the reversion of Okinawa. Anyway, I'd like to think that I made some kind of a contribution. But the point was that, as a very junior officer, I was given the opportunity to prepare this report. It made a splash. It was a great lift for me.

Q: Oh, absolutely. Was there anything else in Okinawa? Who was Consul General after Steeves?

BOEHM: It was another very fine career Foreign Service Officer named Olcott Deming. He went from there to be Ambassador to Uganda or Malawi and then retired. His son is now, I think, a senior officer in the Foreign Service. I was lucky in my assignment to the Consulate in Okinawa. Both Steeves and Deming were very good guys. I was in Naha for two years (1956-1958).

Q: You left Naha in 1958.

CLIFF FORSTER
Regional Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Kobe (1956-1958)
Cliff Forster was born in 1924. His career with USIS included assignments in Japan, Burma, Israel, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by G. Lew Schmidt on May 29, 1990.

FORSTER: I was assigned in ’56, after three years in Fukuoka, to the Kobe-Osaka district as Regional Public Affairs Officer for that region. Walter Nichols was our field supervisor by that time. I spent two years there. During that time, I should like to highlight two things which come to mind. There were many more, but these two in particular: working on the development of the Kyoto-American Studies Program and the highly successful Faulkner visit to Japan remain memorable and had great impact on the Japanese educators.

Q: I understand that the Kyoto Studies Program was a direct descendant of the Nagano seminar with Faulkner and was more or less a broader, more political program.

FORSTER: Oh, it was definitely spurred by it. Again, you have to recall -- as I'm sure you do -- the situation there in the ’50s, when many of the younger Japanese literature professors were really not given an opportunity at their universities to get into American studies and were told to avoid the young "upstarts," as their mentors would call them -- authors like Hemingway and Faulkner. This was not really English literature! I remember in particular the Dean of Literature at the University of Kyushu, who had studied in England before the war. His whole program was built around Chaucer. It was pretty deadly for many of his younger professors, who were far more interested in contemporary American authors.

So we used to have these meetings at the American Center with the younger Japanese professors, bringing in our own specialists on many of our great authors, and these Japanese became the nucleus of a whole new generation in Kyushu of American literature specialists. This happened throughout Japan at the time -- a real ground-swell -- and, like the labor program, USIS played a very important role in introducing American studies and thereby American culture and our values so that the Japanese would know more about us.

As you say, the visit of Faulkner brought that all together because those professors who were coming to our center to escape this Chaucerian type all went to that Nagano seminar, and many of their students also went to the seminar. I was in Kyushu at the time of the Faulkner seminar. That just reinforced the determination of the younger Japanese scholars to get a strong American studies program under way at Kyushu University, which is kind of an old line traditional university. That happened, as you know only too well, all around Japan at the time. And, once again, I believe, USIS was the catalyst, and we all had a lot to do with it.

The other thing I might mention is during the Kansai period (late 50s), the Japanese really discovered modern American drama and modern dance for the first time. Up until the time of the New York City Ballet -- when we started bringing in our big performing artists -- it was generally the Europeans and the Russians who were receiving top billing in Japan. The only ballet that had any impact in Japan was the Bolshoi. So when the New York City Ballet came out for the first time to the first Osaka Cultural Festival, it really was overwhelming for the Japanese. They were so impressed. Of course, after that, the NYC Ballet and other groups started coming over regularly.
Q: This was the festival in ’58?

FORSTER: In ’58, right. The USSR-sponsored Bolshoi was there along with the US-sponsored New York City Ballet, and it was our ballet which received the rave reviews. The same thing happened later with the first musicals we were able to bring out like "Hello, Dolly" with Mary Martin. This started a whole new wave and a new interest in American drama and music. You may recall that we also started programming the first symphonies -- the L.A. Symphony, the Symphony of the Air and other musical attractions at this time which were widely acclaimed.

Q: The first one to come was the Symphony of the Air.

FORSTER: I believe so.

Q: Their contract with, I think, NBC had just been terminated, and they didn't know what they were going to do. They were still intact, so they were sent out by the State Department as a big cultural presentation and were a tremendous success.

FORSTER: Oh, yes. The USIS centers arranged for that complete tour all around Japan. So again, I would like to cite that as an example of our ability to put the American performing arts on the center stage in Japan. Now, of course, we don't need to do that any longer. The Japanese bring them over continually.

1956 to ’58 was a very interesting time, indeed, and this is when we started working with younger professors of international relations and studies at Kyoto University and Doshisha, who were concerned about the Marxist domination of the curriculum, particularly at Kyoto University. We were able, as with the labor leaders, to arrange for them to go to the States not only to meet their counterparts but also to gather materials to bring back. When they returned, they were able to attract more students because they were not as ideological as the Marxist types. They really wanted to have a more objective presentation of world history for their students, and the American experience provided by USIS was a great help to them.

One of the leaders of that movement was Professor Masamichi Inoki, who you may remember. His disciples, or deshi as they call them in Japan, were also able to visit our universities to develop the same kind of network of contacts, and this resulted in a whole new approach to the study of world politics in Japan. That, I think, was very significant, and it not only happened in the area I was in but also in Tokyo and the other USIS center areas in Japan.

Q: It’s too bad that too often our program has been judged on what has been an immediate reaction to the political situation. We tear ourselves apart -- or did -- in getting a lot of material out -- motion pictures and pamphlets, that sort of thing -- trying to get immediate impact. I don't say that these haven't been successful on occasion because many of them have been, but the long-range impact is so hard to identify as an accomplishment at the time it's going on that you have to wait three, four, six, seven years before you realize it's full impact.

FORSTER: Exactly.
Q: We have often been unable to sell our case in Congress simply because you can't measure this thing in terms of one or two years.

FORSTER: Precisely. And there is continuity to it. I think that was very important -- like working with Professor Inoki and his graduate students and with other professors like that, who wanted to have greater objectivity in their treatment of current affairs in the books they wrote and the classes they taught. Some became commentators, many of them, and they wrote articles for influential magazines. We also concentrated on journalists, sending them over a period of years, and many returned with a positive impression as a result of their trip and came back with broader international perspectives. On my last tour in Japan (1977-81) under Ambassador Mansfield, I found I was working with senior editors and professors, whom we had known in Japan way back when they were at the bottom of the rung -- young profs, associate professors, or, indeed, assistant city editors or assistant political reporters. Now they were in top positions in Japan. All of those people -- so many of them -- had their first contact with the United States through the USIS State Department International Visitor Programs or Fulbright or through the USIS Centers. That, to me, is what USIA was all about, and I hope that these longer-range efforts are continuing.

MARSHALL GREEN
Bureau of Far East Affairs
Washington, DC (1956-1960)

Ambassador Marshall Green was born in 1916 in Holyoke, Massachusetts. He received an undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1939. In addition to his service in the Bureau of Far East Affairs, Ambassador Green served in Australia, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and South Korea. He was interviewed on March 2, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You were talking about your service in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 1956-1960, during which time you worked closely with Assistant Secretary Walter H. Robertson. Did Robertson agree with the way Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin thought about the Far East?

GREEN: No, his views were not as antique as that. However, he was a "dyed in the wool" Republican. He was a man who believed very strongly in the "right wing cause" as far as Asia is concerned, but his views were different from, and opposed to, those of Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin. Moreover, he was a very strong upholder of the Foreign Service. It is interesting to note that all 14 of our Chiefs of Mission in East Asia and the Pacific at that time were Foreign Service Officers -- a record that probably has never been matched anywhere and at any time in history.

Now, I got along very well with Assistant Secretary Robertson. For one thing, one of my first jobs was running the United Fund Campaign for the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, which came out far ahead of its quota. To Assistant Secretary Robertson that was very pleasing and cast me
in a favorable light. I also wrote a lot of his speeches. He liked the way that I wrote, and his speeches got good reactions on Capitol Hill [Congress]. In the speeches, of course, I always gave proper play to his known prejudices regarding...

Q: Was it a problem to write speeches for him? You were a professional Foreign Service Officer, close to your political masters, but at the same time...

GREEN: I knew what his strong views and prejudices were. I had to play them up in his speeches, because they were his speeches, after all. I would present the material as I knew that he would present it. It was more in discussions of particular issues, where I was present, that I would sometimes mildly take exception to what he was saying. It was always mild because, if it went too far, that would be the end of my close association with him.

The one time I can recall when he "blew up" was when I took issue with him over something which Syngman Rhee [President of the Republic of Korea] had done regarding the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels. We had tremendous responsibilities in both Korea and Japan. We were doing everything possible to try to bring them together. With Syngman Rhee around, there was no chance of doing that. I felt that this was a primary issue, to which Robertson was giving insufficient attention.

When Robertson left in 1959, Jeff Parsons succeeded him. He was an old like-minded friend and career colleague.

Q: Robertson was focused on Korea and China. We are talking about Japan at that time [1956-1960]. What were his interests and concerns with Japan?

GREEN: I had no difficulties in writing for him or talking with him about Japan. He recognized the primacy of Japan. Our overall relationships with any country in that part of the world had to be based on a healthy US-Japan relationship. That was something of a concession for a man like Robertson, who put so much emphasis on China.

The Japanese Broadcasting Company recently wanted to interview me about the Security Treaty of 1960 between Japan and the United States. I said that I did not have very clear recollections about that. They replied, "On the contrary. We see you as being a principal architect of that treaty." I said, "What?" They said, "Yes, let us show you the documents." Then they showed me documents which they had arranged to have declassified [under the Freedom of Information Act] from our archives. These showed that while working for Robertson I was the one who originated the proposal for the Security Treaty of 1960 between the United States and Japan. It took the form of a 17 page memorandum dated December 28, 1956 [to which the Japan Broadcasting Company referred] addressed to Douglas MacArthur [nephew of Gen. MacArthur], who at that time was Counselor of State Department, and to Bill Sebald, who was then Robertson's deputy in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. What I wrote was something of a reflection of what I had gone through before with George Kennan [in 1948 when he was Director of Policy Planning and with whom I visited Japan]. I pointed out that the Japanese considered our sizable military presence in Japan as a carryover from the occupation period and as a form of foreign control. Furthermore, this presence had the danger of involving Japan in war because we had extensive military bases
in Japan which were seen by many Japanese as a kind of a magnet which might draw even nuclear war to Japan. Therefore, our political position in Japan was quite perilous, unless we moved very rapidly to put these bases on a mutually beneficial basis. In other words, we couldn't be "dictating" to Japan. We had to be "consulting" with Japan. I urged that we replace the Security Treaty of 1951 between the US and Japan with a truly mutual security treaty, which eventually became the Security Treaty of 1960 between the US and Japan which is still in force today. Judging from what's happened to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], I'd say that it's even more durable than NATO.

This long paper made specific recommendations as to how we should go about negotiating a mutual security treaty with the Japanese and what in general might be the terms of such a treaty. All I can say is that it received the strong endorsement of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Later on, actual machinery was established in Japan to negotiate the treaty between our Ambassador in Japan and CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific, with his headquarters in Honolulu], on the American side, and the Foreign Minister of Japan and the head of their Self-Defense Forces, on the Japanese side. They had all sorts of people down the line, working on this negotiation and finally came up with a very good security treaty.

This was the principal issue regarding Japan during my years from 1956 to 1960 [as Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs].

Q: Let me focus on what is probably the most difficult, adversarial issue. It was not between Japan and the United States but between the Department of State and the Pentagon -- over Okinawa, over bases [in Japan], and all that.

GREEN: Well, I would say, Stu, that ever since the days of General Eisenhower, when he organized the National War College, there have been good working relations between State and Defense. The State Department and the military were prone to sneer at each other -- with references made to "the military mind," and "to cookie pushers" and that kind of thing. After a while, you didn't hear that so much. We had improving personal relationships and mutual interests and we expressed ourselves accordingly.

I think that this was very well reflected when I got back from Sweden where I had been for nearly five years [1950-1955]. It was rather refreshing to find that the military and the State Department were working in more constructive terms, particularly in the case of Japan. The same thing might have been true in terms of Europe as well.

We had an interesting time negotiating the Security Treaty of 1960. Douglas MacArthur had meanwhile ceased to be Counselor of the State Department and had become Ambassador to Japan. He came back to Washington in 1959 to try to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff completely "aboard" on the new Security Treaty. He knew that they were generally supportive but we still had the final steps of the negotiations to complete. Ambassador MacArthur called a meeting in the Secretary of State's conference room, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on one side of the table. On the State Department's side of the table were Jeff Parsons, who had meanwhile taken over as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from Walter Robertson; Ambassador MacArthur; myself; and one or two others. MacArthur chaired the meeting.
I'll never forget the meeting, because a rather amusing situation arose. Doug MacArthur, in his didactic way, was telling the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the essence of diplomacy and how to negotiate a treaty. He said, "Gentlemen, it's absolutely essential, when we sit down with the Japanese, that we know exactly what we want to get out of the Japanese. We want to have our whole position worked out and ready. Then we can do a real "snow job" on them." Admiral Arleigh Burke, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "You mean, Doug, the way you're doing on us right now?" [Laughter] Well, I was the only one on the State Department side of the table who laughed, though I quickly suppressed it. That was one of the things that I found so delightful about Admiral Arleigh Burke.

Anyway, that treaty was negotiated. I don't want to go into all of the details.

Q: Before we leave that, the United States had major bases in Yokosuka and Atsugi, and Okinawa was off to one side. But these bases must have led to a lot of discussion about what we were going to do with them. Or were our military fairly well...

GREEN: Oh, no, I'm not finished talking about the bases, because they raised critical issues. All of the points you have made are valid. We had various problems with our bases in Japan and the Ryukyus -- and we of course had to distinguish between the two, because the Ryukyus didn't revert to Japan until 1972. At this point we are talking about 1960. The bases in Japan and especially the Ryukyus were also very important to carry out our treaty commitments in other parts of East Asia. To some extent it might appear to our other allies in East Asia that the Japanese had some kind of controlling hand over the use of our facilities in support of missions for the defense of those other countries. That could wreak havoc with the fabric of our relationships with those countries.

The skill was how to come up with a treaty which, on the one hand, comported with Japan's feelings that it did not want to become a "lightning rod," and that it did want to be able to control all that went on in their country. At the same time there were the views of the countries which were protected by our bases. I think that diplomacy really triumphed in this situation. The negotiations were handled with great skill by the powers that be. I take no credit for this. They were handled by our ambassador, CINCPAC, the Secretary of State, as well as by Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and his officials.

We came up with a formula under which the treaty left it unclear as to the precise extent to which we would be responsive to Japanese requests not to use our bases for particular missions. In essence the formula involved an exchange of letters in Washington at the end of 1960 which stated that in carrying out our missions each of the parties would take into account the concerns of the other party. Whatever we did would comport with Japanese concerns about not having any nuclear weapons in Japan, not drawing Japan into a position of being a "lightning rod," and so forth.

That was a very sensitive and difficult maneuver and an example of diplomacy at its very best, involving some very good men at the helm in the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister's Office. We had, too, especially Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, a superb diplomat.
Now, you mentioned something else just now, Stu, which is very close and parallel to this. That is, we had bases throughout East Asia, especially in Japan, Korea and the Philippines, but increasingly elsewhere in Southeast Asia, including Thailand and, eventually, Vietnam. With all these bases, we inevitably had numerous problems between our forces and the local communities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Frank Nash, was assigned the task in 1957 of going around the world with specialists in the field of politico-military affairs to see what steps we should take to forestall the dangers of "blowups" as well as to improve, in constructive terms, troop-community relations. I went on a long trip with Frank Nash in May 1957. Also on that trip were Henry L.T. ("Barney") Koren, Jim Wilson, Len Unger, and Tim Hoopes. I was the specialist for East Asia and the Pacific. The others were more or less European or Defense specialists.

The first country we visited was Japan, where we had a real "blowup" over the so-called Girard case. This involved an enlisted man who had shot a Japanese woman who was collecting brass casings [from shells] on an artillery firing range. The matter blew up overnight into a national scandal. So we had that problem right off the bat. We had a similar case that I have already mentioned in my oral history on China. This had to do with a G.I. shooting a "peeping Tom" in Taiwan. I won't go into that. We had some similar cases in the Philippines. Overall, the results of this trip, not just to East Asia but other trips to Europe and the Middle East, did a great deal to improve troop-community relations.

However, my real job was that of Regional Planning Adviser. The task of a Regional Planning Adviser was quite clear in Europe where we had the Marshall Plan, NATO, and all other regional organizations. In East Asia we had no regional organizations at all. Therefore, the region contained four divided countries [Korea, China, Vietnam and Laos] and less important countries -- Communist China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea -- were not represented in the United Nations.

Here let me point out that the only real unifying factor in the East Asian region at that time was the United States which had close ties with most of the countries of the region while those countries had generally poor or non-existent relations with each other. Moreover, the more responsible we were for the problems of our friends in the region, the less inclined they were to resolve issues with neighboring countries.

Meanwhile between 1952 and 1960, the US had established military alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China and the Philippines. These were all bilateral alliances and efforts to establish any multilateral alliance in the region never really succeeded. SEATO collapsed, though it did have a legacy of enduring US military ties with Thailand into the Rush-Thanat Agreement.

Q: Getting back to Japan, how did we view the internal situation in Japan from 1956 to 1960? Were there concerns, or...
GREEN: I don't think that there were any major concerns. My recollection of the internal situation in Japan is that we faced some problems regarding the status of the Koreans in Japan. We also had some problems, which I mentioned before, about our base-community relations. However, as far as the Japanese political figures were concerned, the Liberal-Democratic Party was clearly in the saddle. The democratic process in Japan, if you want to call it that -- was under the thumb of the well-heeled Liberal-Democratic Party, which was oriented toward the United States. So we didn't have much to worry about. However, the left wing in Japan was vociferous and could whip the people up, as indeed it did, on the military base issue. So the situation was nothing to take for granted. We worried about it a good deal. It was an incentive for us to move forward on the recommendations I mentioned earlier about the need to enter into a more truly bilateral mutual security relationship with Japan.

Q: Was this the time when the Zengakuren, a radical student movement, emerged? At that time were we concerned about some of the groups in Japan really going "off?"

GREEN: Undoubtedly, we were, although I can't remember which they were. I know that there were some troublesome groups.

Q: Was part of your job -- and this was clearly its politico-military dimension -- involved in developing the position of Political Advisers?

GREEN: That's a good point. I think that the idea originated with Bill Sebald. Bill Sebald was a close friend of Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, who, in turn, was a close friend of Admiral Felix Stump, who was CINCPAC. Admiral Stump was a touchy salt-crusted sailor, who had the same kind of suspicious attitude toward the State Department that military officers of his vintage -- he was well on in years -- commonly had. The idea of having anybody from the State Department "snooping" on him or keeping an eye on him was disturbing to him.

We got around this problem through the diplomacy of Admiral Arleigh Burke. Arleigh sent a personal message to Admiral Stump, saying, more or less, "Felix, we think that you have one of the most important jobs in the world. In addition to having the best in the way of staff, you ought to have somebody on your staff who knows how to get things done for you in the State Department. We have such a fellow in mind. His name is John Steeves." Sebald and I had recommended that John Steeves [later Ambassador to Afghanistan and Director General of the Foreign Service] be Admiral Stump's first Political Adviser. Well, to make a long story short, Felix Stump got along beautifully with John Steeves, and vice versa. That was the beginning of a string of Political Advisers, all of whom did very well.

Admiral Felix Stump was also very useful in this period in connection with something else. In September, 1957, the Russians put up "Sputnik," [the world's first man-made satellite]. Secretary of State Dulles was extremely concerned over this development and the implication that we were falling behind the Soviet Union in the "race for space," as well as the "race for science and technology." Dulles put out a circular asking each of the bureaus of the Department for suggestions as to how we might counteract this development.

Psychologically, there was need for counteraction, because in the world at large the Russians
appeared to be moving ahead of us. People might begin to knuckle under to the Russians, thinking that they were the "wave of the future." I don't know whether the idea was John Steeves' or Arleigh Burke's or Felix Stump's. However, let's give Admiral Felix Stump credit for it because he was the one who carried it out.

The idea was that, once a year, Admiral Arleigh Burke would conduct an air-sea-ground demonstration in East Asia. The demonstration would be carried on by the Seventh Fleet, with Admiral Stump as the host. He then invited the Defense Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff of all of the countries in East Asia to attend. Most of them came. The demonstration started at Clark Field [in the Philippines], went from there to Subic Bay and Cubi Point [also in the Philippines], and ended up in fleet exercises en route to Okinawa, where there were Marine Corps "vertical envelopment" exercises [helicopter insertion of troops on a given point], for the edification of these leaders. On top of it all the Navy was able to demonstrate how quickly it could bring reinforcements and supplies into the Far East from the West Coast of the United States, as well as from Hawaii. It was very impressive, and I think that it left a very deep mark on all of his guests, that the US was a powerful friend who could deliver.

Q: Looking at some of the things that you were involved with, was there a Japanese connection with the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958?

GREEN: Yes, I think that there was. The Japanese were very nervous about Taiwan, bearing in mind that Taiwan used to be part of the Japanese Empire, and the Japanese are very conscious of being on a long chain of Islands running South from the Kuril Islands right down to Taiwan.

Q: During this time, 1956-1960, did you feel that the Japanese, in some sense, were "coming of age?" They had been through this traumatic war [World War II], we had occupied their country, and...

GREEN: Yes, they were coming of age, but still very slowly. We're talking now about the period 1956-1960. The Japanese were still "reeling" from the effects of the American occupation. The 1960 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was yet to be finalized. They were beginning to make real strides forward economically, but as you know, this process moved rather slowly in the beginning. It wasn't until 1961 or 1962 that the Japanese economy began to boom. It was a bit later that they began to score very rapid increases in their GNP [Gross National Product].

Q: How effective was their Foreign Service, their representation abroad and especially in Washington? I'm trying to keep it to the 1956-1960 period. We'll talk about later periods at another time.

GREEN: They had very good people. Incidentally, during that period, when Prime Minister Kishi came to Washington in 1957, there was no official Japanese-American organization here, as there had been in Japan for many years. So Kishi had no suitable organization in Washington to serve as host for an occasion where he could deliver a major speech on US-Japan relations (as Grew had done in Japan under the auspices of the American-Japan Society in Tokyo).

So, three of us Foreign Service Officers in the Far East Bureau (all specialists on Japanese
issues) undertook to establish the Japan-American Society of Washington, DC which then hosted a dinner party for Kishi. (The Society was to flourish over time, later headed by Alexis Johnson whom I succeeded as President in 1985.)

Q: Did the Japanese Embassy [in Washington] and visiting Japanese cabinet ministers who came over -- did they know how to "play" Congress?

GREEN: Well, I'm not sure that they knew how to "play" Congress. They included able and experienced diplomats who were true professionals, albeit somewhat reticent about promoting their points of view directly with our Congress. They rather looked to the State Department to front for them.

Q: During this period and still concerning Japan, how well do you think our policy was supported by the CIA, as far as intelligence went?

GREEN: The CIA? I think that our policy was pretty well supported. However, there is one weakness about the Agency which was disturbing to me. That is, they tended to get involved in doing things which, if they ever became publicly known, would have been deeply embarrassing to the United States. In other words, they interfered in the Japanese electoral process. They did this in Japan and they did it in the Philippines. When I became Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I saw to it that there would be no more of that. I think that it is a very poor idea for the Agency ever to get involved in the internal politics of foreign countries.

Q: It is counterproductive.

GREEN: Especially in democracies.

Q: Perhaps it is a matter of "don't just stand there -- do something."

GREEN: Yes. The CIA was involved in Japan in this sense. As it turned out, there was an article in the press a few months ago about this involvement. I was surprised and shocked to read about it. I didn't know that there had been such involvement.

Q: Then why don't we move on to the next subject? Is there anything else that you wanted to cover?

GREEN: Yes. The Soviet Union and the relationship of the communists in Japan to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union played its cards vis-a-vis Japan just about as badly as it could. That was a real blessing to us. Consider that when the US-Japan Security Treaty was being negotiated the communists, the socialists, and a lot of the intellectuals were urging a foreign policy of neutrality for Japan. But the Russians came through with threats which really made such a policy impossible, quite apart from the record of Korea itself. You would have thought that once the Russians saw how much success our mutual security treaty had achieved in US-Japanese relations, they would have seen the wisdom of turning back at least some of these islands in the northern territories of Japan. This is something they have never done -- even to this day. They have never understood that by simply turning over these woebegone islands they could have
gained an opportunity for getting loans, investments, and a peace treaty with Japan. They still don't have a peace treaty. The Russians acted in ways that made our job easier in Japan.

Q: Obviously, the Kuril Islands...

GREEN: Well, the southern Kuril Islands.

Q: What was our reading of why the Soviets wouldn't turn these islands over to Japan?

GREEN: That was hard to understand, because we're talking about four islands. Two of them are fairly large, but all are without resources except their proximity to fishing grounds, valuable to the Japanese. The Russians had more territory than they could ever use. By turning back these islands to Japan they would gain all kinds of opportunities...

Q: Was it submarine passage or something like that?

GREEN: There were several available passages for Soviet vessels going through the Japanese chain of islands. Evidently the Russians were (and still are) opposed to any territorial concessions lest this constitutes a bad precedent elsewhere along the borders of Russia -- and it was probably an issue of special sensitivity to the Soviet (now Russian) armed forces.

KENNETH MACCORMAC
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1956-1960)

Kenneth MacCormac was born in Cordova, Alaska in 1911. He graduated from the University of San Francisco in 1933 and served overseas in the US Army during World War II. After entering the State Department, MacCormac served in Seoul, Japan, and Thailand. In 1978 during his retirement Mr. MacCormac directed the Thai Fulbright Foundation. He was interviewed in 1989 by G. Lewis Schmidt.

MACCORMAC Then on to Japan, which was a one-year tour. The purpose of it was to develop a follow-up program for the many hundreds of Japanese who had been to the United States.

Q: What year was it that you went to Japan? What month, do you remember? It must have been June or after, because I had been in Japan for four and a half years, and I left at the end of May of '56.

MACCORMAC: I remember meeting you in Korea one time when you came over on military.

Q: That's right, I remember that.

MACCORMAC: It must have been the summer of 1956.
Q: By that time, Johnny McKnight was PAO in Korea, I think.

MACCORMAC: That's right. He was PAO in Korea. We formed, among other things, a number of American University Alumni Associations in Japan, and I found this was fairly easy to do because the Japanese like to work in groups. For instance, we had a big alumni group from the University of California, from Stanford, with regular meetings, and then we had regular follow-up meetings of returned Fulbright alumni at Fulbright headquarters. I had published at that time a newsletter which went out monthly to 3,000 Japanese returnees, and I think it's still going. As a matter of fact, I have some of the early editions bound and published, and I have them all wrapped up. I'm going to send them back to the Fulbright Foundation in Japan, because they're an interesting history of the Foundation in those days.

Q: When you had our meetings, were they primarily social, or were they study groups? How did they function?

MACCORMAC: The meetings were primarily meetings with visiting American scholars, professors, political leaders, and that sort of thing. We would select and invite Japanese returnees who we thought would be interested in meeting these individuals.

Q: Did you have fairly sizable meetings?

MACCORMAC: Oh yes. There was a good deal of interest in it, yes.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, II
Ambassador
Japan (1956-1961)

Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II was born in Pennsylvania in 1909. He was a Foreign Service Officer in Canada, Italy, France and Belgium from 1937 until the post-war period. His experience led him to be named Counselor of the State Department under Eisenhower. In this capacity, he organized the Berlin Conference of 1954, which brought together all four of the powers occupying Germany. In the late 50's, MacArthur was named Ambassador to Japan. He was interviewed in 1987 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, we have now reached the point where I've been calling you Mr. Ambassador, but for the first time you actually were appointed to an ambassador and to a very major post, Japan. You were as Europeanist as anyone could be. Your entire career overseas was in Western Europe, and although you had worldwide responsibilities as Counselor of the State Department, yet Japan seemed to be out of your field. How did that appointment come about?

MACARTHUR: It came about because during the period that I was Counselor, I spent a great
deal of time traveling with the Secretary of State, usually, but not always, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, in Japan. And indeed, I was named and designated the negotiator for the SEATO Treaty, which was an abortive operation, although the treaty was signed, which tried to bring together the free nations of Southeast Asia into a relationship where they could work together to prevent an expansion of Communist power, which was taking place on the mainland through the Viet Minh operations after the Chinese Communist Party had seized the mainland.

The Viet Minh, the insurgent Communist-supported rebels in then French Indochina were expanding rapidly. Laos and Cambodia were threatened, as indeed was Thailand. So I spent a considerable amount of time in Southeast Asia. And since, in the whole Asian rim of the Pacific Basin, Japan obviously was on its way back to being a very important power and perhaps by far the most important industrial power, because in those days, there were no NICs. The NICs hadn't emerged -- the newly industrialized countries like Taiwan and South Korea and Singapore and the like.

Q: The date when you went to Japan was when?

MACARTHUR: I was sworn in as Ambassador to Japan in December of 1956, around Christmastime, and I went to Japan in 1957. I'd been back in the Department working as Counselor, in the Counselor's seat after President Eisenhower took office in January of '53. I was coordinator of all Mr. Dulles' trips to South Asia, Southeast Asia, Middle East, and the like.

So although my practical experience as a diplomat, until I became Counselor, had been Western Europe, with an initial post in Canada, the next few years as Counselor, almost four years, I had to wrestle and coordinate plans and policies with the Geographic Assistant Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in many parts of the world. Of course, not the least bit was the fact that I was Coordinator of Plans and Policy for all our meetings with the Russians during that period when I was Counselor, including the Geneva Summit in '55 and the various foreign ministers' conferences.

So I did have an exposure to Japan and the Far East. That exposure, before I became Counselor, was enhanced by the two years I spent as General Eisenhower's political advisor at SHAPE, because General Eisenhower realized better than most people that in a period of decolonization, which was creating great problems for our NATO Allies, that what happened in every part of the world was of critical importance to them that could affect the resources they had available or could use in support of NATO and its objectives, while at the same time trying to protect their interests in widespread areas of the world in which they had colonies. In fact, I recall -- and I think I mentioned it in an earlier interview -- that in one of my daily morning briefings alone with General Eisenhower at SHAPE, he asked me when the last time an American Secretary of State had visited the Middle East, and I said no Secretary of State had ever visited the Middle East or South Asia. And he so organized life with Mr. Dulles, his Secretary of State when he became President, and I was present when he gave the instructions that Mr. Dulles was first to visit the NATO countries, and then he was to visit Southeast Asia.

Now, the final part of the decision was that in terms of American strategy -- I'm using the word "strategy" in its broadest terms -- it had become evident by 1956-57 that Japan was not only re-
emerging as an important nation, but that with Communist expansion rife everywhere and with
the developments on mainline China with the Communists taking power there, that American
basic defensive strategy must be based on a tripod concept. The tripod, North America -- that's
Canada and the U.S., NATO, Europe, and Japan, where we had bases, and where we had a
relationship, a special relationship as a result of the period of our occupation and then the 1951
treaty negotiated by Mr. Dulles, that was the so-called peace treaty. I'll come to that a bit later.

So after four years as Counselor, I think -- and I've always felt -- that four years is enough for
any person in a senior advisory position to hold such a position in the Department of State, or for
that matter in other agencies and departments. Why? Because after four years, you become so
much of a part of every past decision of the past four years that you're sort of in your
subconscious wedded to those positions. And we live in a changing world where you have to
look at things slightly differently. I think it's much harder for somebody that has been a part of a
series of successive decisions over a period of years to take a new look at the nature of the
problems that we face, an entirely new look with a different perspective, than it is for somebody
who has participated and been active in making those decisions. It's just more difficult.

So in late '56, I saw the President and the Secretary, and said that I felt it was time for me to get
out of the Department, back into the field in an operational capacity, and have a new person in
the Counselor's job with perhaps a slightly different perspective. The suggestion was then made
about three weeks later by the President and Mr. Dulles that I go to Japan, which obviously was
coming along very rapidly.

Q: Had you expressed any preference at the time?

MACARTHUR: No, I just said I wanted to go out. Japan came as a sort of surprise to me. I
thought they might send me someplace in Europe in view of my NATO background. But the
President and the Secretary felt that Japan was moving very, very rapidly toward an increasingly
important position, and as it became increasingly important as a nation, it would become
increasingly assertive, and with the experience I'd had in various parts of the world and some
understanding of the importance of Japan and our broad strategic thinking, as well as the nature
of the feelings of the other countries on the Asian rim about Japan because of the Japanese
militarist expansionist policies, which were called the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere before
Pearl Harbor, that although I'd never served in Japan, I could fill that role. So I went there. But
that is how it happened.

Q: What were your marching orders when you went there? I'd like to now two things. One, what
were your marching orders? Secondly, what were your internal ideas of what you wanted to do?
First let's go to your official instructions.

MACARTHUR: I knew a little bit about Japan -- very little. I didn't speak the language, although
I took three hours a day for about three months before I went there, which helped only modestly.
And indeed, I took lessons after I got there. But I first visited Japan in 1921 with my father, who
was in the Navy. He was in the Navy, a captain in the Navy, and when the Secretary of the
United States Navy and the Annapolis class of 1881 were invited to Japan as official guests of
the Japanese Imperial Navy, which sounds very strange in light of Pearl Harbor, my father was
selected to command the warship that took the Secretary of the Navy abroad. The Secretary had a son of about my age, and so being a good politician, he didn't want to be accused of taking his boy along all by himself for the ride, so he said, "Captain MacArthur, you have two boys that are friends of my son. Let's take all three boys along together, and nobody will say anything." So we went.

My first contact with Japan was the night that it was so arranged that we would arrive on July Fourth in Yokohama, our national Independence Day, for a very warm welcome from the Japanese. In July, when you're doing the Great Circle Route into Japan, it gets light very early, and I woke up at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning. Dawn was breaking, and I asked permission to go to the bridge, and I went to the bridge after permission was given. The Marine at the foot of the bridge got permission. My father said I could take a seat on the wing, that slot that runs along that the officer of the watch or the skipper sits on, and there I saw, as I looked from one side to the other, on each side there were two small, low, twin-funnelled destroyers ghosting along beside us as an escort, flying the Imperial Japanese Navy flag. That's the one with the stripes coming out from the rising sun.

I looked at these destroyers, and after a few minutes, when my father was not engaged, I said to him, "Isn't it too bad that the Japanese are so behind the times that they have these destroyers with only two funnels, whereas we have those marvelous ones with all four funnels?"

And my father looked at me and said, "Sonny, never underestimate the Japanese." He said, "They're about eight years ahead of us." He said, "We're still trying to get four boilers to go off on two funnels properly and with a low silhouette such as they have, so just never underestimate these people." And I never forgot that, because it was so true, how many people underestimated Japan before and during the war.

Q: And even after the war.

MACARTHUR: And after the war. I'd like to say, if I may, just a word about Japan before we get into the details of what I did while I was there.

Q: Certainly.

MACARTHUR: Japan is a unique country in one sense. There is no other country like it. It is the only nation that has never been subjected to the leavening and melding influence of other societies, civilizations, and points of view, which have come about either through massive waves of migration or by conquest. The Japanese have sat in their islands from the beginning of time, never having been conquered or invaded. Indeed, according to legend, they have been there since the Sun Goddess came down and gave birth to the first Japanese. The word "kamikaze" that was used for suicide airplanes in the last war goes back to the 13th Century, when the Chinese, under Kublai Khan, tried twice to invade China in 1274 and 1281. And each time the Chinese were successful in landing their armies on the beach, but then Japan was saved by the kamikazes, "the divine breeze," which was a typhoon, which came along and broke up the Chinese ships, and the samurai's polished off the men left on the beach with their two swords and that indomitable spirit that the Japanese fighting man has always shown. So their civilization grew up in very much a
unique way. They're an inward-looking people. There is a togetherness and a Japaneseness about them that they feel toward each other and their people, with other people being foreigners. And this is a direct result of the history of the nation, as I say, unlike any other country in the world, any other nation in the world, never exposed to other cultures, civilizations, ways of looking at things, and so forth. They've developed their own unique and in many respects, very, very, very high-grade and beautiful civilization.

I would say, among other things, that in all the countries I've known and visited and served in, I've never known a people with a greater appreciation of duty. This is one of the characteristics that the Japanese have, and you notice it in everything from the way the food is served, the presentation of the food when you're in a Japanese restaurant is as important, the beauty of that presentation, as the cook who prepared it and the preparation of the food.

It's produced, as I say, a remarkable people that have their own very special way of looking at the rest of the world, at themselves. I think this is changing. It is changing, as Japan has become more exposed through the fact that it has come from a defeated, wrecked, destroyed country to become an economic and financial superpower, with its young people going through one of the finest educational systems -- I wish ours was half as good -- that is imaginable, and many, many, many of the young people being sent abroad to learn and study in foreign universities, so that they understand the outside world, and also that they acquire almost a bilingual ability to express themselves in other languages. They are an extraordinary people. I mention all this because it has a background on the years I spent in Japan.

When I went there in February, I arrived on February 3, 1957, I arranged to fly from Washington to Honolulu by American carrier, and then I thought that because of all that had happened during the war and so forth, that it would be a useful thing to arrive in a Japanese carrier, showing confidence in Japan and what it had accomplished. So I took a JAL, Japanese Airline flight from Tokyo to Haneda. In those days, that was long before they had the volume of air travel that is there now and which obliged them to build that huge new airport at Narita, almost an hour outside Tokyo. Haneda was right on the edge of Yokohama in those days. This gesture was very much appreciated, and in my opening statement, as my arrival statement, which was a very short statement, I said that I had come to listen and learn more about Japan, which I'd visited only once as a boy, and not to preach to them or tell them what to do. In effect, that was the thrust of the statement I made.

So I got off to a fairly good start with the Japanese, but I was immediately apprized, after I'd been there a few weeks, that the United States had over 8,000 basic research contracts being conducted by young Japanese, Japanese who had doctorates or master's degrees in the sciences, and that roughly half of these were basic research contracts financed by the Pentagon. This came as quite a blow to me -- a shock. I would say not a blow, but a shock. So I inquired why, and the answer was a very simple one. The majority of bright young Americans seemed to think the quick way to the top and the money, the dough, was by going down the law school route or by going to a business school, like a Harvard Business School, or going into medicine, and we had very, very few coming out with higher degrees in the sciences, mathematics and the sciences. And we had so few that we had to put them basically on development of improvement of existing things, whereas the big and flashing experience is when you make a breakthrough in
basic research. That's where the big glue comes. So I started visiting some of these Japanese plants, and I went to the Sony plant, founded by my friends Mr. Morita and Mr. Ibuka in about 1947 or '48. They then employed something over 700 people. I was amazed to find out that 20% of their human resources and 20% of their financial resources were going into basic research, and the motto of Sony was, "Research makes the difference."

Then I flew down to Nagoya to visit the Toyota passenger car line, and when I went there in '57, Toyota was the only Japanese automobile company turning out passenger cars. In the immediate post-war period when Nissan and Toyota were building motor vehicles, they were building four-wheelers, usually, but they were van-type things which in the period of reconstruction were all-purpose vehicles for families or whoever had them. You could do anything with them. You could use them for any purpose, and that was the purpose they needed, for reconstruction and rebuilding. And Toyota was turning out 20,000 cars a year. I visited the line, and they were, indeed, very kind, and they were most appreciative. They said that Mr. Ford had invited them to come to America before they built the line, that Mr. Ford had not only permitted them to take pictures, but to make diagrams of the Ford assembly line in Dearborn, I guess it is, and that they had come back. But then they said, with some pride, "We have eliminated two full stations on the line, and we're eliminating the third."

And I said, "Well, how did you do that?"

And they said, "Well, we discovered that Mr. Ford, in putting together automobiles, they sometimes have three or four parts, you have to put two together and then the third you screw on and you put the fourth. We found that we could design a part which encompassed all four parts, and you just eliminated the labor of putting these pieces together, and you had a stronger part which functioned better and had less chance of problems later."

Q: Mr. Ambassador, before you get more into the economics of Japan, could we talk a little about when you were sent out? Did you have any instructions?

MACARTHUR: I had no instructions at all, other than that Japan was on the comeback trail, it would again resume a place as an important nation in the world, and particularly in what we referred to as the Far East -- one of my successors or predecessors referred to as the "Near West" -- and that my job was to strengthen the ties of understanding and friendship between our two countries. And that is why I took a Japanese plane in as a practical example of what I might do and to let the Japanese people know from the beginning that I had confidence in them and in what they were doing, and that is why, also, I designed my arrival statement to say that I had come to listen and learn, and not to tell them what to do.

Q: On this economic side that you were mentioning, at the time you came out there . . .

MACARTHUR: The only problem we had at the time I came out there was the beginning of the problem of textiles. This was before the NICs -- Korea, Singapore, and so forth had reached the capacity that Japan did. One of the things that I did while I was there was to negotiate a so-called voluntary quota for Japanese textiles. It was about as voluntary as your doing something if you've got a pistol pointed at your head, economically, because Japan depended even then, not to
the extent that it did now, but it depended on access to the American market.

Japan's balance of payments on trade and commerce were just under a billion dollars in deficit. That billion dollars in deficit was made up for by American military spending on the troops and forces and supplies and things that we procured in Japan for our forces in Japan, our naval base and the air base and so forth. We still had a few thousand troops there. So their balance of payments, overall, was in equilibrium, but the export market was very important to them, and they were obviously targeting it.

Now, I want to make just one point about that. The Japanese honored that agreement, and what happened, Hong Kong immediately stepped up its textile industries and started shipping more than they had been than the total Japanese shipment, and we accepted that from Hong Kong but not from Japan. And why was that? That was simply because we didn't want to offend the British, who said they would be very, very offended if we put voluntary quotas on Hong Kong. So we accommodated the British, we didn't help our textile people with the voluntary protective quotas one damn bit, because it was immediately filled by Hong Kong, and then as Korea came along, by Korea. So the Japanese said, with some reason, "We reduced our shipments and accepted a quota, but you immediately let it be filled by other people. What good does that do you, and why should we be penalized?" It was one of the injustices that Americans sometimes don't understand unless they've been a part of one of these so-called voluntary quota negotiations.

Q: Did this happen while you were in Japan?

MACARTHUR: This happened while I was in Japan.

Q: Did the embassy -- you, as ambassador -- try to protest?

MACARTHUR: Well, you don't protest, but you report their protests and say it obviously is not an equitable thing to do, but that had no effect on Washington, which felt that its special relationships with Britain, born during the war or drawn ever closer by World War II and in NATO and one thing and another, we were not going to offend the British. I mean, back here -- I've been ambassador in many places, and they said, "Well, that's fine. We understand the point you're making, but we've got other considerations that we consider important." And very frequently they're right, because if you're an ambassador stationed abroad, you can't also understand always some of the domestic political implications of things that are not necessarily the best foreign policy in the world, but you have to face up to political realities of who controls the Congress and what they can do, and the extent to which you must cooperate with the Congress if our system of government, the Executive Branch, that is, is to function successfully.

Q: Looking at it from today's point of view, but at the time was the idea of opening up Japan to American goods very high on our agenda, or was it not really considered a very important item?

MACARTHUR: I'm delighted that you asked that question, because it brings out the reason for the tremendous adverse imbalance in our trade. When the war ended, our two great potential industrial competitors, Western Europe and Japan, had had their industries bombed out, burned
out, used up by the war, and exhausted. We had no competition roughly for 15 years. We had no competition. You could sell any American product almost that we turned out if the money was available. We could sell anything if the people had the money to buy it. And when you have no competition, the first thing that suffers is quality of product. When you have no competition, there's no incentive for quality; there's no incentive for better industrial designing which will make your product cheaper and better.

Let me emphasize this by a personal story. After I left Japan in '61 and was appointed to Belgium as ambassador, I decided that I wanted to take a medium-size American car, a personal automobile, to Belgium that I could use weekends or for personal use when the official car should not be used. So I called up a friend, who was the vice president international, one of the two greatest American manufacturers, got him on the telephone, and explained what I wanted, and asked what they had. He said, "I'll call you back in about half an hour."

He called me back in 40 minutes. I'd worked with him before and helped his company a bit here and there. He said, "Doug, we've got just exactly the car that you want. Of course, you'll get the usual 10% Foreign Service discount, and we'll ship it whenever you want." And he said, "Best of all, it's a Wednesday car."

I said, "Joe, what the heck is a Wednesday car?"

"Well," he said, "you know, a lot of our people don't show up on Friday on the production lines. They want a longer weekend, and sometimes a lot don't show up on Mondays because they want to extend their weekend or they've celebrated too much. So we have to put people on the production lines on Friday and Monday that don't do the job every day." So he said, "All our people in the company get Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday cars, but the top executives get Wednesday cars, because that's the time when you will get a car with the maximum chance of it being put together properly in every respect." So much for quality. And it was quality which, as much as anything else, started us down the slippery slope.

In textiles, we had already become or were rapidly becoming not very competitive with quality textiles because of the higher wages in this country as contrasted with Japan and Hong Kong and, subsequently, Korea and Taiwan. But I make the point that the period when we had no competition was to a very, very considerable extent responsible for the falling-off quality in American products and the emergence of foreign products which people bought, not because they were foreign, but because they were of better quality and they lasted better.

Now, I do not want in any sense to excuse the Japanese for their protectionist policies of that period, because they had protectionist policies, too. We could sell stuff for a period of time in Japan, but take automobiles, which they targeted for eventual export. And when I was in Japan, as I say, there were only 20,000 passenger cars a year being turned out. Honda turned out only motorcycles. Nissan turned out a small open sports car with a collapsible top, two-passenger car. Those are the only passenger cars that were being turned out when I arrived in Japan -- 20,000 Toyotas and that was it. But they targeted; they had automobile markets targeted.

I had a very serious argument with Mr. Ikeda when he succeeded Mr. Kishi as prime minister on
the very subject of automotive imports, because I suddenly discovered that members of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, of which I was a member, could not import an American car unless they had owned that car for 30 months before they imported it, and these were businessmen who lived in Japan. How could they have owned abroad a car for 30 months before they imported it? So I went to him and said, "Mr. Ikeda, it's as simple as this. Either you remove that provision of the 30 months and so forth, or I will recommend in the strongest fashion possible that we put quotas and take retaliatory steps on some of your products that are important to your exports to the United States." And that particular provision was removed. This was several months before I left Japan.

Q: But this was, of course, for the personal car of Americans there.

MACARTHUR: It was any Japanese; it was the same thing. A Japanese had to own it; it wasn't just American. It was a rule: foreign cars cannot be imported unless they've been owned for 30 months.

Q: Were we getting any other pressure from American businessmen and from the Treasury and Department of Commerce and elsewhere?

MACARTHUR: Not in the early period that I was there, because the Japanese competition, there were some things. Sony was doing extremely well at that time. I remember the General Electric senior vice president came out there, and when I told him that Sony was devoting 20% of their resources, human and financial, to research and development, and they were coming out with some very, very interesting new things, he was astonished. He said, "My God, of course, we have a much larger budget, but it's less than 1% that we devote to research and the kind that you're talking about with Sony." But the big push had not come. The big push in automobiles and textiles, we'd solved it by the voluntary quotas, which the Japanese observed, but as I recall now -- it was a good many years ago -- but that was the only one where there were strong pressures from America. There was no question about other Japanese products that were coming in -- just textiles.

Q: I'm skipping around a bit, but moving from the economics to internal workings, how did you find our embassy at the time? You had been in the Foreign Service a long time, but this was your first time being charged with an embassy. How did you find it as an operation, an effective or non-effective operation?

MACARTHUR: I found that we had some extremely capable and good people. I found it an excellent embassy. I had been chargé d'affaires for a while in Belgium, in '49, during Admiral Kirk's incumbency as ambassador when he was away, even though I was ill, and I had served in another big embassy in Paris as head of the political section, so I was somewhat familiar with embassy operations. But I found that we had excellent people, first-class people. I found the younger officers who had gone through language training extremely able and contributive to general thinking. Then I had the very good luck, as attrition took place, as it does when an assignment is up and they go, to be able to get very good people to replace the people that had left.
When I came there, Ben Thibodeaux was Minister for Economic Affairs, and when he left for another assignment, I got Phil Trezise, who is still down here with Brookings Institute, an absolutely first-class economic minister and person, with political as well as economic sense and judgment. I got Bill Leonhart from the policy planning staff as my DCM.

Q: For the record, how did this work? Did you say, "I want so and so?" Did you give names of people?

MACARTHUR: I recommended them. Bill had served in Japan, he helped work with me and talked with me when he was on the policy planning staff on my initial statement there, which I mentioned earlier. He is a man of remarkable judgment, and he is still a member of one of the senior government intelligence boards here in Washington. He's a man of admirable intelligence and judgment, which is what you want as much as anything else, in addition to his knowledge and other skills. I would recommend them, and when somebody's time was coming up, you don't wait until the replacement is done. If it's somebody's time coming up and you've got what you think is an important mission, you let the Department know, unofficially, if you will. You let the assistant secretary of the geographic division know the guy that you think is most qualified. That's the way it should work. It shouldn't work with some cabal of people who are 1,000 miles away in personnel doing it; it ought to come from people that know something about the man's qualifications in the post that he goes. I'm all against the idea of having a personnel section that looks at a computer or numbers and picks people out for key positions. Further down the line, as you move along, that's one thing.

The world has become too complex, and international problems are too complicated now to think that one man, an ambassador, can mastermind everything. Every ambassador, like every President, needs the best and most capable advisors that he can get, because an ambassador, some of his time, like a President's time, is taken up in time-consuming protocol things that cannot be avoided. There are many things that he must do, and no single person has the wisdom or ability to know everything about everything. You've got the economic side, you've got the strategic side, you've got the domestic political side, you have the domestic political side on our side of the water as well as theirs. You have all these factors that have to fit in and be fitted in together when you make a recommendation to the Department on a given subject, on a serious subject, and you need the best you can get for that.

Q: Did you find that we were developing a solid and large enough corps of Japanese experts as officers?

MACARTHUR: I can't really answer that question. Certainly you can't take an officer and chain him to Japan for his whole life. I mean, that isn't what the Foreign Service is all about; you won't get the experience. We went through the business of old China hands, and we went through the business of old Middle Eastern hands, who couldn't see anything. We went through the business of old European hands, who didn't understand a thing about the inevitability of decolonization and the like. So we were certainly turning out capable young officers, they were extremely good, and they made a very valuable contribution.

We also had several Japanese nationals who were extraordinary. One of them was Kishiyama,
who was my interpreter. He had grown up in this country, gone to school in this country, although he was of Japanese origin and Japanese nationality. He spoke flawless American. He had a memory like a tape recorder in translating, but also he translated the spirit of what you were saying, even sometimes the facial gestures and things. He was an extraordinary man. After he retired, guess who snapped him up very swiftly? Mr. Morita of Sony.

Q: Looking at the other side, who did you deal with in Japan, and how would you describe the Japanese Government and its structure and personalities at that time?

MACARTHUR: I would like to, if I may, get into the negotiation of the Japanese treaty, which brings out those very points of your question.

Q: Excellent.

MACARTHUR: And I think it brings them out more tellingly than just a descriptive business.

Q: Yes.

MACARTHUR: After I'd been in Japan six or eight months, I was able to develop a rather warm and friendly relationship with the Prime Minister, Mr. Kishi, and also with some of the senior people in the foreign ministry. The foreign ministry was staffed by some very able people. They were entirely Japanese, but they were also understanding to an extent that was not true with the other ministries, particular MITI, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which often tried to block the recommendations of the Japanese foreign ministry to be more liberal and open in the acceptance of foreign products.

I don't exactly remember when, but late in '57, Mr. Kishi asked to see me privately, and I think there were only two other people present on his side, and I went with -- I can't remember. I had a couple of people on my side. I think one was the interpreter. Mr. Kishi said that he thought the time -- it came as quite a surprise to me -- had come to renegotiate the U.S.-Japan treaty of 1951. The U.S.-Japan treaty of 1951 was negotiated by John Foster Dulles, and Mr. Yoshida, Prime Minister Yoshida, an extraordinary gentleman who was five times Prime Minister of Japan, a man who spoke flawless English, he'd been ambassador to Rome and The Count of St.James, a man of courage, a man of great ability. That treaty was negotiated in '50-'51, when Japan was still under occupation. That treaty was the price for the restoration of sovereignty. Until that peace treaty was signed, Japan's sovereignty could not be restored and the occupation ended.

The treaty was, in a sense, one-sided in favor of the United States, because it had to be, for this reason. At the time that treaty was negotiated, Japan did not have one single man under arms, and we took on the heavy obligation of assuring the defense of Japan. When you take on an obligation with a country that doesn't have a single soldier, sailor, or airman, you've got to be able to deploy your troops and forces to meet possible threats if a contingency arises for which the commitment is made. So we were, in a sense, able to do whatever we wanted in terms of moving forces here, there, or anyplace, without consultation. We had a status-of-forces agreement regarding the status of our forces that enabled us to do whatever we wanted, insofar as they were concerned; the Japanese had no voice in it. Generally speaking, the treaty was not in
keeping with our other treaties, because it had been negotiated under entirely different circumstances, our other treaties of alliance.

Mr. Kishi pointed out that since that treaty had been negotiated, with the Korean War, Japan had developed its own self-defense forces -- Army, Navy, Air Force. They were small, but they would be increased and assume greater responsibilities, and that at the same time, we had treaties, we had negotiated the SEATO Treaty, the NATO Treaty, had a treaty with Korea, that were based on equality, whereas Japan, which now had its armed forces, still needed and absolutely had to have the protective umbrella of American military power, but Japan was being treated as a very second-rate citizen. This did not worry Mr. Kishi at that particular time, because our relationships were good and we had a close personal relationship, but he said, "You have only to listen to the broadcasts in Japanese from Peking and Moscow now that there is a great effort being made by the Communist world and by the Japanese Left to upset this treaty." And he said, "If the treaty ever becomes an issue of Japanese sovereignty, and the question of whether Japan is being treated on a basis of equality, it will be much easier for these people to get demonstrations going in the streets, and it will be much easier for them, if a majority of the Japanese so decide, to make your bases useless simply by cutting the communications that you have to get in and out of your bases -- rail, road, all the rest that they can divide. So now, when relationships are extremely good, is the time to renegotiate this treaty and put it on the same basis of equality as your other treaties, so that it is not attackable by the left, that above all wants to see Japan first neutralized and then dominated by the Communist world, our two great Communist neighbors," because they're neighbors of both China and Russia. "And the great potential of Japanese industry used to their advantage."

Q: I just want to make one thing clear. The initiative came completely from the Japanese?

MACARTHUR: It came from the Japanese side.

Q: Had this subject even been raised when you left Washington, about renegotiating the treaty at some point?

MACARTHUR: Never. They'd never raised it with (inaudible).

Q: And in Washington?

MACARTHUR: No, it had not been raised before. Our relationships with Japan were on a stable, even keel, and there it was. Kishi was looking ahead.

So I said I would reflect on this and we would meet again in a week or so. I thought back to a comment that President Eisenhower had once made to me when I was his political advisor at SHAPE and briefing him one morning, and we were discussing a treaty. He said to me, "I don't care how important a treaty is or how important the occasion on which it's signed is, or how important the personality of who signs it is. Once one party to a treaty feels that that treaty is not only not serving its own self-interest, but is against its own self-interest, then that treaty is unenforceable if we're a party to it, unless we're willing to land the Marines."
And I thought about this, and I thought about the future, and I thought about Japan's rapidly emerging status as a very important nation, so I went back and had a further talk with Mr. Kishi, and I said one thing, and I'll tell it to you now. He had said to me, "Of course, any treaty we have with you will have to recognize Article IX of the Japanese Constitution." This is the no-war article in the Japanese Constitution that was put in largely by American insistence in the aftermath of the war, only to be regretted in the Korean War, when Japan was encouraged to raise its own self-defense forces on the basis of the U.N. Charter, which gives every country the inalienable right of individual and collective self-defense.

So I said that I would recommend this to the President, but that in other respects, I would have to see him. I didn't know what his view on this would be, and I would have to consult in Washington. I sent an eyes-only telegram to the President and Secretary, laying out the whole thing and the reasoning, and why I felt that this was the time, when relations were so stable and good, to go ahead with the renegotiation on the basis that we'd have to recognize Article IX, but that it should be consistent, and that with our other engagements, we couldn't make it a special thing with a whole bunch of special things for Japan only, when we had allies in Asia, as well as in Europe.

Then I got word to return to Washington, so I returned and talked to the Secretary and the President.

Q: I assume this was kept very much under wraps between you and Kishi.

MACARTHUR: As I said, eyes-only for the President.

Q: Nothing was coming out of the Japanese side about this thinking either?

MACARTHUR: No, not at that time, because I told them that I couldn't in any way, shape, or form say whether Washington would go along with it. I'd be willing to recommend it; that was as far as I could go.

Q: The Japanese wasn't mounting any campaign.

MACARTHUR: Oh, sure, there was the constant campaign of the left, but it was under control. It was propaganda; it was not an issue. There was nothing that was an issue. The issue only came up after the treaty was negotiated.

Q: I'm sorry to have interrupted. You went back to Washington.

MACARTHUR: We're talking about two years before the demonstrations. So I got back to Washington and got word that the Secretary wanted to see me, and then we'd go over together to the White House to talk about it. I tell this as an amusing episode of the treaty. I knew the Secretary extremely well. I'd traveled many hundreds of thousands of miles with him all over the world, I'd organized trips for him, I'd been Coordinator of Plans and Policies for him, I'd done a lot of things. When I walked into his office that morning, when we were to see the President the day after I got back, he looked at me, and he said to me, his first words were, "Doug, what's
wrong with that treaty I negotiated?"

And I said, "Well, Mr. Secretary, you're a great lawyer from Sullivan & Cromwell, and you got 90% for your client, and it won't stand up over a bit of time, I fear."

Then we went over to see the President, and the President saw the point immediately and virtually repeated this business, "Well, if once ever a country feels that a treaty is working to its disadvantage, it's inoperable unless you are willing to land the Marines. You can't enforce it. It's unenforceable unless you're willing to land the Marines. That we're certainly never going to do."

So he said to me, "Doug, this is all right with me, but first you must go and clear it with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I want you to see these top three people on each side of the aisle, Republicans and Democrats. I want you to see the Majority Leader of the Senate, and I want you to see the Speaker of the House, those people."

Q: *This shows his thinking on how to deal with the Congress.*

MACARTHUR: He said, "If they say no, there's no point in going ahead. We're not going to get into a battle which we can't win with this. If they give the green light for a negotiation, okay. Now it's up to you."

So I spent about four days and saw all these people, and I had brought back with me a draft treaty which differed from the old treaty, because I wanted to get away from the idea that this was just a military treaty. That's why the name we chose, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, would start the economic cooperation, cooperation non-military, in the earlier stages of the articles of the treaty. They didn't want to look at any text, but in effect, all of them said, "Well, the point you make is a very good point, that if it is one-sided, if it's been overtaken by events, we will recognize Article IX, although that will put the Japanese in a more privileged position than any of our other treaty partners, who, engaged in attack, is on us. This engages us to come to their defense only on an attack against Japanese territory or Japanese-controlled territory under the authority of Japan." Our other treaties are more general; an attack anywhere can do it.

So I went back to Japan, saw Mr. Kishi. I got back in the evening and saw him the next morning, thinking he would be very happy. I told him that I'd seen the President, and that the parameters within which I could negotiate with the following, which I thought were emmenintly satisfactory to the Japanese, first we would recognize Article IX of the Japanese Constitution. We would not try to void that by treaty language, that would stand and be left alone, untouched or unmentioned by the treaty, and it would stand.

Secondly, in every other respect, this treaty had to be fully consistent with our other security engagements in other parts of the world, including NATO, SEATO, the U.S.-Philippine Treaty, and the other ones. And he smiled and said that that was fine, but then he said to me, put his head to one side, sort of shook his head and he said, "I have a problem with Mr. Yoshida."

And I said, "What's your problem?"
He said, "He's not enthusiastic." Yoshida, two of his boys controlled two of the largest factions -- I'm coming to the Japanese Government structure later -- that made up the Liberal Democratic Party, Ikeda and Sato, that successively succeeded Kishi.

So I said, "Well, all right."

So I called up Mr. Yoshida and said I was back from America, and I wanted to come down and talk to him about the treaty. He had a little house at Oiso, behind the dunes down on Segami Bay. So I got an Army chopper. He said, "Come on down for lunch." So I choppered down for lunch, and we landed on a little pad there.

Q: I might say for the record that "chopper" means a helicopter.

MACARTHUR: A helicopter. He was waiting to greet me at the little gate and fence around his property, and after greeting me and asking me how I was, his first words -- I give you my word of honor -- were identical to the words of Mr. Dulles, with whom he had negotiated the treaty, "What's wrong with that treaty I negotiated?" [Laughter] I mention it only to show that pride of authorship sometimes . . .

Q: Did you tell him that Mr. Dulles . . .

MACARTHUR: I told him that Mr. Dulles had said exactly the same thing, and he laughed. We had lunched and talked about it, and I explained the reasons why, to make less vulnerable our relationship to the left, which he was concerned about, too, because part of the problem with Japan at that time, and part of his problem with the students that later emerged, was the fact that during the time when the militarists took over in Japan and did Pearl Harbor and did all the expansion, many of the Japanese professors in the universities didn't raise a single voice. They were quiet as mice; they never raised a voice of protest or suggested it might not be a good thing. And after the war, those professors, or some of them, a number of them felt -- and this comes to me from two very distinguished Japanese university presidents, among other people -- they felt that they had to be more liberal and more to the left than anybody else to re-establish their credibility, and so they were, to a considerable extent, behind the students and pushing the students on later, which I will come to.

In any event, the negotiations started, and the negotiators were basically myself, Bill Leonhart, who was my DCM, who made a remarkable contribution, Dick Sneider, in the political section, who was later ambassador to Korea, a wonderful fellow, and he was in the political section. He was the fellow I drafted or tapped to do a lot of the basic work and be responsible in the political section for the treaty part of the negotiation. And on the Japanese side, it was Mr. Kishi, who headed the thing; Foreign Minister Fujiyama, who was a politico and had no international background, he was simply a voice; Kisimara Yamada, the vice minister, who died only six months ago, I only heard about it two days ago; Mr. Togo, who was later ambassador to the United States, who was chief of the American section of the foreign ministry at that time, and who, I think, on the Japanese side bore the brunt of most of the drafting.

Q: He and Sneider were sort of counterparts?
MACARTHUR: Yes, they were sort of counterparts in it, in a sense. And the chief of the Japanese legal division of the foreign ministry. We negotiated along.

This brings me to the structure of the Japanese Government, the political party that's run the country since the war, and how it functions. Why did it take two-years-plus to negotiate a treaty that Japan wanted and we were acceptable to? First, I would have to mention a fundamental and most basic difference in the decision-making process of Japan and most other countries. In our country and many other countries, except dictatorships, the decision-making process is by majority vote in democratic countries, and Japan is a democracy. But in Japan, the decision-making process is a process of consensus. That means that in a cabinet of, say, 24, headed by the prime minister, if one or two people say no, they won't move until those gentlemen withdraw their objection or agree. So we would go along with the easier articles, and then there would be a pause, maybe five or six weeks, where we wouldn't meet. And why was that? That was simply because within the inner workings of the cabinet, one or two or three people would say no. They couldn't move until those people removed their objection. Why couldn't they move?

This leads me to the structure of Japanese Government. The political party that has run Japan since its sovereignty was restored, the Liberal Democratic Party, is not a political party in any sense that we understand it in the West. It is uniquely Japanese, and it has certain feudal aspects. The Liberal Democratic Party is a grouping of coalitions who generally believe in the same philosophy, but each coalition is headed by a very ambitious leader whose ambition is to become prime minister of Japan. The coalition leaders are the ones that shake down big business for the contribution, and then dish out the money they get from the big companies for the campaign expenses, for members of the Diet who support them. So in a sense, it's like feudal Japan, when you had the shogun who had to have the support of a majority of important daimyos, feudal lords. And the feudal lords were, in turn, supported by their samurai swordsmen whose loyalty they kept by giving them so many kokus of rice every year. Today, in the Liberal Democratic Party, you have the factional leader, who is the political daimyo, you have the prime minister, who is the shogun, you have the factional leader, who is the political overlord, you have his samurai Diet swordsmen, who are the members who support him in the Diet, and you have the political overlord giving to his political samurais in the Diet not kokus of rice, but so much money because running a political campaign in Japan is very expensive, of the money that he's collected from big industry.

So the prime minister's position as prime minister depends on keeping the support of a majority of these people, but under the consensus decision-making process which is fundamental to Japan. A majority isn't enough; you've got to have the consensus.

Now, let me give you an example. After we'd been negotiating for about 11 months, ten or 11 months, maybe it was a little longer, and we negotiated to keep it out of the public press, because the press, Asahi Shimbun, I was told by a senior member, had 154 card-carrying members of the Communist Party in its editorial and reportorial staff. We used to meet privately, without any announcement. I went into a meeting one day with Bill Leonhart, I guess, and Dick Sneider, probably. We had been going along and agreed on three or four of the simpler articles. And the prime minister, Fujiyama, looked at me, and he said, ~"We've been thinking a lot about the treaty
lately, and we think we have a better formulation than the one we've been working on, better for you and better for us, better for both sides."

And he handed me a piece of paper, two sheets, to read. I started reading, and as I read it, the adrenalin of anger started making my heart pound so loud, I thought that they would probably hear it. But I remained quite impassive until I had read it through. Why did my heart pound? Because this had nothing to do with what we'd been talking about. It was a treaty that gave every single advantage to Japan with not a single responsibility. It was quite contrary to anything that was dreamable. So I looked very coldly at the foreign minister and said, "I suppose this is your Japanese way of breaking off the negotiations. I accept it as such. I think we've got nothing more to talk about. Good day," and got up to leave.

He grabbed me, and he said, "Why do you say that?"

And I said, "Because you know, your prime minister knows, your government knows, the vice minister who's sitting here next to you knows exactly the limits within which the President and the United States Senate will ratify the treaty, and this has absolutely no bearing. There is not one measure or reciprocity in any sense. It has nothing to do with what we've been talking about. So obviously, there it is."

Then he said to me, "Please give me back that piece of paper." I gave it to him. He tore it up into small pieces, put it in his briefcase, pulled out the treaty we'd been working on, and said, "Let's go back to the other treaty then."

And I said, "No, Mr. Minister. You've raised a very important question in my mind, the question of Japan's sincerity." Sincerity in Japan is a word that translates itself. It is much stronger than in English. It's a combination of "bushido," honor, and sincerity.

Q: *It's a certain amount of face.*

MACARTHUR: Well, it's more than face. It's a question of honor and one thing and another.

I said, "I must think very seriously about whether this proposal that you made originally was a serious proposal or not, and whether we're dealing with sincere people."

And he said, "Next week."

I said, "I'm not prepared to set a date. I may want to communicate with the President and find out what his views are." So I left. I got back. I knew Mr. Yamato, the vice minister, he was a close friend. He called me Mac-san, and I called him Yamato-san. And I sent work to him.

Q: *He was the vice foreign minister?*

MACARTHUR: Yes. I'd done a lot of work with him and Togo-san, the ambassador, later Ambassador Togo, also a remarkable man. And I sent word that I felt that he owed me an explanation about what had taken place. As soon as I got back to the embassy, I got one of my
Japanese-speaking Americans to call up his secretary and say that I felt he owed me an explanation about what had happened that afternoon.

I got word back immediately to come and see him the next morning about 9:30 at his little house, the house that was maintained by the Japanese Foreign Ministry for entertainment and geisha parties and things of that kind. I went there the next morning, and Yamada-san greeted me with a drink in his hand, and said, "Mac-san, come have a drink with me."

I said, "No, Yamada-san, I didn't come to have a drink with you. I came to find out what happened yesterday."

He said, "Please have a drink with me."

I said, "No."

He said, "I'm embarrassed. I can't explain unless you have a drink of friendship with me."

So he poured me a drink, and I touched it to my lips. Then I said, "What the hell happened yesterday?"

He said, "You know, in the cabinet there are 24 people, including the prime minister." He said, "Twenty-one people agree completely with what we are doing, but three gentlemen in the cabinet have different ideas. They don't agree. They say what they think we ought to be asking of America, which was in our paper." He said, "The prime minister explained about your talks with the President and the Foreign Relations Committee. The prime minister explains, I explain that it won't work, that there's no way that such a treaty could ever be ratified." But he said, "Then these three gentlemen look at the prime minister and say, 'Well, why are you afraid at least to try?'" So he said, "We tried." And then he giggled that nervous giggle they give when they're very, very embarrassed.

Now, I mention this because it brings together both the decision-making process and the fact that the three people were important factional leaders or representatives of important different factions, and if the prime minister had overridden those three gentlemen, he would have alienated and had the permanent enmity of the factional leader and the faction they represented. Either they were the factional leader in the cabinet, or they were the factional leaders represented in the cabinet, and there would have been problems further down the road.

So we continued on and eventually completed the treaty. We had a difficult time -- not a difficult time, but for the Japanese, the nuclear problem was a very acute problem.

Q: Could you explain what the nuclear problem was?

MACARTHUR: Well, the nuclear bomb having been used only twice in the world, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and never anywhere else, and several hundred thousand people having perished as a result of either the bomb or the great widespread fires that resulted from it, the Japanese were extremely sensitive to this issue. This was an issue that in the daily broadcasts from Moscow and
Peking, was always hit upon during the period of the negotiation of the treaty, you know, the nuclear business and so forth and so on, and Japan would be a nuclear base, one thing and another. So the problem of devising a treaty that met our requirements and our procedures, with respect to our armed forces was one which was not insoluble for us, but was very emotional for the Japanese.

We settled it by a formula which I would give Bill Leonhart the basic credit for devising, which is that we undertook not to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. Of course, the problem of vessels with nuclear weapons is one which we had always taken a consistent position on. That position is that a vessel and its armaments are inseparable entity, and that we do not, for national security reasons, advertise the particular types of weapons that we carry on any vessel, nor will we ever make them public. But we undertook not to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan.

Q: So you are really talking about a twofold thing. One was that we would not put ground-based nuclear weapons in Japan. On the other, we just left it open.

MACARTHUR: In effect, we said just what the language says: we would not introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. There are two aspects, one of basing land-based weapons there; the other is the question of whether a ship that happens to have a nuclear armament of some kind on a casual visit or passing through Japanese territorial waters, we do not respond to that and never have and will not.

The treaty was signed in the White House with general acclaim, except for the left in Japan, and a number of university professors and the Asahi Shimbun, which, as I mentioned, one of its senior people told me they had 154 card-carrying members of the Communist Party. And then the treaty was signed in the White House in January 1960.

Before it was signed, the President wanted and I wanted a commitment from Mr. Kishi that they would go ahead and get on with the ratification, which they wanted to do. The reason this point came to a head was that Mr. Kishi extended an invitation to the President, when he came over to sign the treaty, to visit Japan. I advised the President that the acceptance should be conditioned on the fact that sufficient time had been guaranteed for the treaty to get over and the demonstrations which we knew the left would mount against it, and that there should be a commitment from the Japanese Government, which had a majority in the Parliament, on a date by which time they would have the treaty ratified. We would then set a date roughly three months after that for things to quiet down.

So the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi gave an assurance that the treaty would be ratified probably in late March, but no later than early or mid-April, and the visit could take place about the middle of June.

When we got back to Japan, the Japanese Government introduced the treaty into the Diet, but the opposition kept, through various delaying procedures and tactics, delaying and delaying and delaying it. In the meantime, the propaganda from Moscow and Peking about the remilitarization of Japan by the Americans and so forth was growing, but no demonstrations started. There was simply propaganda in Asahi Shimbun and speeches by left-wing university professors, and the
Finally, March came and went, and in April, Mr. Kishi felt that he had no choice but to go ahead and vote the treaty through the Parliament with the majority that he had.

Q: We've come to April.

MACARTHUR: By April, Mr. Kishi realized that he had no choice but to go ahead and ratify it, even though it was contrary to Japanese practice, because the opposition socialist party, led by Mr. Asanuma, had threatened to walk out or block a vote on the treaty, and it was contrary to the general sort of consensus decision-making process that was sort of ingrained in Japan, although it does not operate in a modern Diet in domestic or matters of budgetary or other concern.

So finally, Mr. Kishi talked to me twice in April, I guess it was, and I said, "If the treaty isn't ratified, I don't see how it's possible for the President to come out here."

Q: Had the President's visit been announced?

MACARTHUR: Oh, yes. It was announced in January that he would visit, that at the White House he had accepted an invitation to visit Japan sometime in June. It was to be in the middle of June, but I don't think the exact date in June had been fixed. Mr. Kishi realized this, and I didn't even know it was happening. He then decided to go ahead and force a vote in the Japanese Diet, gave the orders to the Liberal Democratic Party, and his cabinet backed him, forced the vote through the Diet.

Well, the minute the socialists heard he had given the order, they grabbed the speaker of the Parliament, the presiding officer, the speaker, because a vote cannot take place unless the speaker is in the chamber. And they locked him up in a broom closet in the bottom of the Diet to prevent a vote from being legally possible. And when the Liberal Democratic Party members heard about this, they went down to the basement, and there was a pitched scuffle, and then they started dragging the poor old speaker up the stairs into the room to vote. Finally, in a tug of war, in which the poor old gentleman's knee was dislocated, if I recall correctly, he was pulled into the chamber, and at that point, the socialists all simply marched out and refused to vote. And the vote was held, and it was a unanimous vote of those present, which was a substantial majority of the Liberal Democratic Party.

But the socialists immediately went out, and with the collaboration of the Asahi Shimbun, published stories and got on the radio that the Japanese Government had brought police and military in, had dispelled the socialist members of the Diet, reverted to militarism, and passed this treaty, which was a total false lie. They had walked out when they saw that they would lose the vote in the chamber. But the story was broadcast by at least one or two of the radios, and Asahi Shimbun headlined it. This immediately was picked up in the universities, and demonstrations started. As one young man explained to me later, which is a different story, which was among the students and later became an executive at NHK, their national television company, broadcasting, the students were all told by their professors and by the newspapers that it wasn't a question of the treaty, that democracy had been violated in the most flagrant way by
the Japanese Government, that had used military and police force to physically eject democratically elected members of the Parliament from the building, and that this was all part of a plot to remilitarize Japan and so forth, and that the treaty was involved in it, and so forth.

Q: Had we had any observers around to see any of this? Were we getting a straight account of what happened?

MACARTHUR: Well, nothing had happened yet. You mean in the Diet building?

Q: Yes.

MACARTHUR: No. We didn't even know they were going to call the vote in the Diet building. We didn't even know they were going to call the vote. But once the word got out the next day, the demonstrations started.

Then James Haggerty, who came over, he was the press secretary, with Tommy Stevens, who was special assistant to the President, they came over in early May, if I recall correctly, when the demonstrations had started, street demonstrations with students dancing and things, in a city which was then a city of 6 million, and with Greater Yokohama, which is all one great accumulation of 11 million, there were probably 15,000 to 25,000 people demonstrating, basically around the Diet. It was business as usual at this period.

When Haggerty, who was coming over to make, as always before a presidential visit, the preliminary arrangements and to survey the schedule and all that, when he sent me word he was coming, I suggested he come in at a military airfield. I said, "There are going to be demonstrations, and the Communist left is capable of mounting a demonstrations of 10,000 or 15,000 people if you come in at the airport. So I think the thing to do, you're coming in a government military plane anyway, is to land at a military airport and then we'll bring you in in a car with no American ambassador flag flying on it. There won't be an occasion or opportunity for them to make something out of your arrival."

Haggerty sent back word saying that he didn't want to do that, that he didn't want to be sneaking in the back door. We had an open relationship with Japan, the treaty had been negotiated and signed in the White House. He felt that he must come in through Haneda. So I got word -- we had observers out there -- that the press here had announced that he was coming in at such and such a time, and I drove out to the airport to meet him, and driving out, I passed a number of groups that were converging on the airport, of perhaps a few hundred here, a few hundred there, a thousand here, a thousand there. And we got to the airport, went in, and nothing happened. The airport was a rather large airport, and there were police to keep people away from any demonstrations, away from the airport itself, but the airport is a very large area. In one place you have to go down underneath a runway or a roadway across the top. We came out on the other side of that, and we ran right into about 5,000 demonstrators, who immediately surrounded the car and started pounding on the thing, jumping on the top, were very careful not to break windows or do things of that kind, but they rocked the car. Tommy Stevens got extremely agitated, Haggerty kept his cool completely and started to pull out his little pocket camera and started snapping pictures of the demonstrators. It was well organized, and they had obviously
been told not to resort to violence, because we had several American newspapermen that were out there also covering the business right there next to the car, and they were snapping pictures and writing their stories.

Q: *Selective violence.*

MACARTHUR: But one of them put his hand on top of the car, and one of the demonstrators who was dancing on top of the car jumped on his hand, and the man said, "Ah!" And the man on top of the car immediately bowed and apologized for stepping on his hand. [Laughter] But finally, when they started rocking the car, the police finally arrived, and they decided that we were never going to get out of there without a helicopter. So the police arrived, and they cleared a little area around the car, then made a thing, and a chopper came down in another area where the police cordoned off. Tommy Stevens wanted to run, and I said, "No, no, don't run. When you run in a mob, I've seen it happen too often, it just excites them. It's like a cat running after a mouse or a dog running after a cat. If the cat stands there. But if it starts running, they go after. So we'll walk at a deliberate pace." We had police on both sides of us.

We walked toward the thing. In the meantime, some of these people had brought along clubs and things, started throwing them into the blades of the helicopter, the chopper. To make a long story short, we got off, took off back to Tokyo, landed at a helo-pad not far from the embassy, and just as we got out and the blades were slowing down, two of the blades fell off that had been hit by these clubs that they had thrown into the blades. So we were very lucky. They could have just as well fallen off up in the air, and we would have been 800 feet up in the air, down to the ground in nothing flat.

So Haggerty went back. Haggerty gave a very excellent press conference, and there was a lot of condemnation that this was not the way that Japan did business, except, again, with *Asahi Shimbun*. They went back.

Q: *What was Haggerty's impression at the time? He was giving the press conference in Tokyo?*

MACARTHUR: He gave a press conference in the embassy residence, where he was staying. He called it afterwards and said that this was, in effect, a childish, barbaric act, that Japan had asked for a treaty, we had negotiated, it was more favorable and so forth to Japan than to other countries, we fully recognized Article IX, and that a free and independent Japan we thought was important to us, and we assumed that the Japanese people thought it was important to them. Then he answered a lot of questions and so forth. He handled himself extremely well.

He went back, and I had a long talk with him and then with Tommy Stevens about it. I said, "If this goes on, we're going to have to perhaps rethink this thing."

Well, the demonstrations went on, and they'd moved up to around the embassy and the Diet building, which is not far away. They were confined to those areas. In the rest of Tokyo, you wouldn't have known there was anything going on, but that's what they focused on. Probably the maximum was around 50,000 people. A girl got killed in one of these demonstrations; she got trampled to death in one of these demonstrations. Then the demonstrations started getting ugly.
This was in May, after the Haggerty visit.

I went to Mr. Kishi and said that I thought that if the demonstrations persisted, the worst thing for Japanese-American relations would be to have the President come there and have a scandal or incidents or have that kind of a reception, and that if they could not find a way of bringing them under control -- and I didn't mean by military means -- then I thought the President's visit should be postponed and that I was willing to recommend a postponement of the visit on the basis that the President hoped to be able to work in -- he was going to go to the Philippines first, and then I think to Korea or Taiwan or someplace -- another one or two more countries on this visit, because he got to the Far East so seldom. Kishi said, "Is this your idea or Washington's idea?"

I said, "It's my idea, but I wanted you to know that I proposed to send a message in."

So he said, "Well, I understand. It's a very serious matter, and I understand." Kishi, of course, was fighting for his life, because if the visit was postponed, he would be held responsible as prime minister and would be finished.

So I sent a personal eyes-only telegram to the President and the Secretary, saying that I felt that the visit should be postponed. It had gotten to the point, particularly after the death of this girl, where it was getting violent and ugly, and there was no assurance -- I reported my talk to Kishi and what he had said -- that I could possibly get from them or give them myself that the demonstrations would not take place when the President arrived, and that would be the last thing in the world to strengthen the ties of Japanese-American friendship, for which the visit was planned. So I sent this telegram off and got word back very swiftly that evening -- it was personal, from the President -- saying that he agreed, and that it would be phrased as a postponement and not a cancellation of the visit and so forth. I went to bed much relieved.

By the time I got up the next morning, I had asked for an appointment with Kishi, a follow-up telegram came. Obviously the President had been talking further with some of his advisors. It said, "While I still believe the visit should be postponed, please tell Mr. Kishi that if in his best judgment the postponement of my visit will lead to the total failure of the treaty to be able to be implemented and create a problem for him, possibly calling for his resignation (I don't remember the exact words), then I will come no matter what the risks involved are. I will come anyway." So I went to Kishi. Instead of going into the thing saying, "The President felt that a postponement was wise under the circumstances," I went with this caveat and put it to Mr. Kishi, and Mr. Kishi thought for a while, said he wanted to think about it. Then he eventually said that he felt that the failure to come on the visit would endanger the treaty. I think that was the word the President used -- endanger the ratification, because it still had to go through the upper house of the Diet. It had gone through the lower house only.

So Kishi, who knew that if the President didn't come -- and this is not a criticism of him -- said that after reflection -- I think he asked me to come back later that day, I just don't remember, for his decision, but he said, in effect, that he felt it would endanger the ratification, because it still had to go through the upper house.
The violence, in the meantime, increased, and the attacks on Kishi from the left increased, and I took the position that we should not cancel the visit unilaterally, that the postponement of the visit should come from the Japanese Government, that if we did it, it would show a lack of confidence in Japan and would be construed in various ways, and that their neck was in it. I felt that it was up to them to do it. This decision, I’ve often wondered about whether it was the right one, or whether I shouldn’t have gone back to the President when I got the second telegram, saying he was bound to do it. But in any event, I accepted the President’s decision and Kishi’s word, except as violence got [worse] later, I sent word to him that it was no longer feasible for me to see him with a crowd, the demonstrations. I felt sure we were coming up against a very serious situation.

Then just before the visit, the President was to leave Washington. The Japanese Government . . .

Q: We had not postponed it up to that time?

MACARTHUR: No, we didn't postpone it at all. The Japanese Government announced that it had requested the President to postpone the visit. When that happened, the reason that Kishi had no wanted to resign earlier was an admirable one. He did not expect, in the face of all this violence, that the upper house would act on the treaty in the 30-day period, but if a bill under the Japanese thing, as I remember the intricacies of it, if it went before the upper house and no unfavorable action was taken, it automatically became law. They had to act opposed.

Kishi's problem was that he had to remain in office for 30 days after the lower house had acted without the opposition being present, because they walked out. I went and saw a number of the factional leaders, who were going to succeed him, because I knew immediately who they were -- Yoshida's boy, Ikeda first, and then Sato. They had an agreement that Ikeda would take it for two or four years, and then Sato would succeed him, and they had the other factions all lined up.

So Kishi stayed in power, deserted by all the factional leaders as somebody that's a has-been. With courage and fortitude, he faced that situation and remained in power until the 30-day period elapsed. The treaty was then ratified. The minute it was ratified and there was no longer any hope, these demonstrations, which I said at the highest, I think, the estimate was 50-some thousand, although from the newspapers, just seeing them concentrated on the crowd, it looked as if the whole city was in an uproar all around the Diet and around the embassy. Kishi stayed in, and then he resigned. Ikeda was immediately elected to replace him.

But the interesting thing was, the minute it was fact that the treaty had been ratified, those 30 days were up and the ratification procedure on the Japanese side was complete, then the demonstrations disappeared.

Q: When Eisenhower was planning to come, when it was still on, you had recommended that it might be a good idea not to come, but Eisenhower had decided . . .

MACARTHUR: No. Let's get it right now. I recommended that the visit be postponed. Eisenhower agreed to that recommendation and sent me a telegram, agreeing. Then he followed it with a second one, saying that if his failure to come would result in endangering the ratification
of the treaty, then he would come, no matter what the risks involved were.

Q: But Kishi's role in this?

MACARTHUR: This is explained to Kishi. But if Kishi announces at that time that the Japanese Government is asking the President not to come, the danger, until the groundwork has been laid for him to remain on with the other factional leaders for 30 days to ratify the treaty, and they wanted it ratified, too, they didn't want chaos, with the left having a great victory. This took time, and the time it took was that period of time when the demonstrations were going on after I had told Kishi of the President's message, and Kishi had said, "Well, I think the President should come." And it was between that time and the time when the arrangements had been agreed within the government that the visit had to be canceled, and it was just about three days before, if I remember.

Q: So the final decision was made by the Japanese.

MACARTHUR: Absolutely.

Q: And at that point, you had not backed away, but you were no longer part of the decision process, because it was their decision. They knew all the factors.

MACARTHUR: It was their decision to make.

Q: This is before the upper house had approved the treaty.

MACARTHUR: Yes. The treaty -- I can't remember, but the lower house acted something around March 20 or something like that, and the upper house had 30 days, which brought it to June 20, and the President was supposed to come over around the 12th or 13th or something of that kind. The decision was always the Japanese. That had been my recommendation from the beginning, because I felt we could ask for a postponement if there were logical grounds, like the President was going to postpone his whole trip to the Far East for a brief period to try to work in a couple of more countries. That sort of a postponement would wash. But for him to just say, "I'm postponing my visit, period," or because of the demonstrations, this would simply strengthen the hand and encourage the left and discourage our friends there. I felt that it would be generally construed as a lack of confidence in Japan and its people. That was the reason I made that recommendation. Some people take it as a mistake. As it turned out, the treaty has become the cornerstone of our relationship with Japan.

If I could cite just a little epilogue, a few years ago I was out in Japan, and I think it was on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the NATO treaty. A treaty is of indefinite duration for anybody to denounce it after ten years. I was asked to be interviewed on television about the treaty, and a very nice team came to the Okura Hotel, where I was staying, and they got a television studio downstairs. I went down. They had several commentators and people, but a very nice young man from NHK was handling all the arrangements and everything, and the interview went well. Everybody, the Japanese that had participated in it, said it had become the foundation and cornerstone of U.S.-Japan relations.
Then at the end, this young man, he was in his late thirties, it seemed to me, something like that, who had arranged everything so thoughtfully and been very nice, came up to me rather shamefacedly and said, "Ambassador, I was one of those students snake-dancing around your embassy." [Laughter]

I said, "Well, what do you think of it now?"

And he said, "Well, we were totally misled. When our professors told us that the Kishi Government had brought in military force, police force, to expel the thing, what we were worried about was democracy in Japan, and this was a return to militarism and the end of democracy. This is what our professors told us and encouraged us and led us in those snake dances." He said, "That's what set us off. It wasn't the treaty by itself. It was this business of the destruction of democracy," which I thought was a very interesting commentary coming from one of the boys who had been there.

Q: One last question before we end this interview, Mr. Ambassador. During the time you were there involved in the treaty negotiations, did Okinawa and the Bonins come up as an issue?

MACARTHUR: Okinawa was always there, and the Bonins. But the Japanese, after getting the treaty revision, were not in a mood to push immediately. But I wrote a telegram to the Secretary saying that the next thing on the board was that. Then when I came back in March of '61, after President Kennedy had been elected, and I'd known President Kennedy since he was a Harvard schoolboy, he spent a lot of time in my apartment when he used to come over in the summer, when he was at Harvard, to visit his father, Ambassador to England, and he used to come over to Paris, I saw a lot of him and knew him well, so before I left, he asked me if I had any thoughts about what we would face next in Japan. I left him a one-page memo which said at the top of the list, "It is Okinawa and the Bonins, and eventually they'll have to go back. But that will be the most important single problem that my successor will face, because inevitably, basically Okinawa, the Bonins are just an extension, if you will, of Japan, but until Okinawa is there, until it goes back to them, it's going to be a continuing problem that will be agitated and be exploited by the left, and it's one that we're going to have to face." It was not my successor, Reischauer, but I think it was Alexis Johnson who finally worked out the Okinawa thing.

But someplace in my files is a copy of that memo, the one-page memo for President Kennedy, because, as I say, I knew him extremely well, and he was interested in knowing what I thought would happen and what the problems would be during his presidency insofar as Japan was concerned. Okinawa was high on the list.

The Japanese, after they got the treaty, the Japanese Government, you know, you can take things sort of one bite at a time. That was quite an exercise. There would be no such demonstrations against the return of the Bonins and Okinawa, of course, but they knew that we'd have to move gradually.

There was one point that I omitted, that I should have mentioned. From the very beginning, our military and the Defense Department were extremely opposed to the idea of a new treaty. Why
were they opposed to it? Because under the original treaty, they could do whatever they wanted. They could move their troops around. Under the status-of-forces agreement, under that old treaty, if an American committed the most hideous crimes against Japanese civilians when he was off-duty or any other time, the Japanese did not have any custody of him.

I arrived at a most inauspicious time when I arrived as Ambassador to Japan in 1957. It was about ten days after the Gerard case broke. The Gerard case was a G.I. who was out guarding a rifle range where these poor, miserable, wretched women, ragpickers, they called them, would come out to pick up casings and pieces of metal and the metal from bullets and things and sell them. And he had strict orders to keep his gun unloaded and never to use it during the rest period. He got up there and squeezed off, targeted an old woman who was about 200 yards away, squeezed off a shot and killed her. He obviously had violated his instructions, was just practicing, and had forgotten to unload his gun during his lunch hour period, which were in his written instructions. The military were totally averse to turning him over to Japan for trial. Although under the terms of the agreement we had, in a case such as that, they had a right to try him. The military immediately whipped up the Congress that they should never let the Japanese try somebody, they wouldn't get fair people, justice, and all the rest of it.

So I came home and went over to the Hill and talked to a lot of senior people in both the House and the Senate about this, who all agreed with me that given the circumstances -- and I brought back the whole history of the case -- that we should turn him over to the Japanese, which we did.

This shows the mentality of the military. But then the idea that they couldn't, without -- under the old treaty, we could have put Japan into thermonuclear war without even consulting her, and the idea that you had to give up the right to do whatever you wanted in Japan and Japanese territory was too much for them. Finally, during the course of the negotiations, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, whose name escapes me now, he went out to Korea and wanted to stop by Japan, and I sent a message to the President and Secretary of State, saying that I felt that it would be a great mistake for this gentleman to come to visit Japan, which was on his itinerary, unless he agreed not to have a press conference, because they were bound to ask him, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" questions about the treaty, which he would not be able to answer satisfactorily, and it would be exploited by the left. This recommendation was approved, so he'd come to Japan and hold no press conference, but he was miffed, and so he just bypassed Japan and didn't come there.

But again, this is a business where I think we've erred a great deal. We have some Secretaries of Defense who go abroad and make statements, and Mr. Weinberger is one of them, that are strictly foreign policy statements. Casper Weinberger talked foreign policy the whole time, perhaps because he always wanted first to be Secretary of State, rather than Secretary of Defense. But you should have one senior cabinet voice speaking for the United States Government on foreign policy. You have either the President or the Secretary of State.

Q: But you had very much the feeling, during the negotiations, that your bosses were the Secretary of State and the President, and they were running the show.

MACARTHUR: Anybody in the Defense Department. General Eisenhower knew the Defense
Department better than the people who were the incumbents. He'd grown up in that department. He knew its weaknesses. He was the one that later, as you remember, talked about the world of the military-industrial complex. He knew it damn well, and he knew so much more about it than any of the others, that if they challenged him, they would be on very poor ground, and they probably wouldn't be around very long. I say that because we have so many Secretaries of State that know nothing about the five-sided building and how it operates and how it works and how the JCS works. I worked with the Joint Staff. I helped work on the first NATO Force Goals and everything else in the bowels of the five-sided building. But there was nobody in the Defense Department that knew as much about the Defense Department as President Eisenhower. We hadn't had a President before him that knew as much about foreign affairs as he did, so we were very, very fortunate.

Q: So you felt the President and Secretary of State were running the ship, as far as you were concerned.

MACARTHUR: There was no question about it. Who else?

Q: We are talking about a different era, where the Secretary of Defense often has his own policy.

MACARTHUR: That's been the fault of the President. That's uniquely the fault of a President, to permit a Secretary of Defense to go out and make all kinds of pronunciamentos when he's on foreign trips, on basic foreign policy. I don't mean that he can't say that we fully support a foreign policy, but to go out and deliberately seek foreign policy, basic statements of foreign policy and things of that kind, that isn't the way to do it. Sure, you support the foreign policy of the United States, but the spokesman should not be because you get conflicting interpretations.

Q: Interview date: March 29, 1988. Mr. Ambassador, there was one question I noticed when I reviewed our last interview concerning Japan. Was the fact that you were the nephew and had the name of Douglas MacArthur a positive factor? Did you find this helped you, or was it almost an inhibitor when you were dealing in Japan?

MACARTHUR: On balance, I found that it helped me. It helped me with the senior people with whom I dealt in Japan at that time. As today, to a lesser extent, it was the older politicians, the older men that were the people that were in power. It's curious, when I called on the prime minister, my opening call, he referred to my uncle as MacArthur Shogun, and I was MacArthur Taishi, Ambassador MacArthur. But General MacArthur was referred to by those senior people as MacArthur Shogun.

On the whole, I think they felt it had been a very benevolent administration during the occupation that had Japan's interest at heart. The Japanese traditionally, going back to feudal days, and let's remember they were only 100 years out of feudalism, the Meiji Restoration had taken place less than 100 years from the time I assumed the ambassadorship there. When the feudal daimyos, the warlords, were fighting each other and the one that lost, he committed suicide so that there wouldn't be any what the French call revanchists, revengeful people, left, the Japanese would slaughter the losing daimyos' people so that there wouldn't be any gathering there that could create problems for them.
I don’t know what, frankly, they expected when they lost a war that they had started with the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the end result was a feeling, except for the left, which accused me constantly of trying to remilitarize Japan when I was negotiating the treaty, this spurred on by broadcasts in Japanese from both Moscow and Peking at that time.

Q: Did they throw your uncle’s name in your face at that time?

MACARTHUR: No, but in some of their broadcasts, they would say I came from a long militarist family, which was quite true, because one grandfather was an admiral, and the other was a general, my father was in the Navy, and General MacArthur was my uncle. My brother had been and died in the Navy. So I was the sign of a military family trying to remilitarize Japan and destroy democracy and reinstate the militarists who had brought Japan to the great disaster that befell it as a result of their action at Pearl Harbor in World War II.

So on balance, I found it a positive mark in my favor. As an example, Mr. Yoshida, who had some very spirited discussions, who was five times prime minister of Japan during the period of my uncle's shogunate there, if I may put it that way . . .

Q: It's still being referred to. In this week's article in the Washington Post, they referred to it.

MACARTHUR: Somebody called my attention to that, yes. But when General MacArthur died, Mr. Yoshida, the grand old man of Japanese politics, who was 86 or 88, flew, and rather infirm -- he died just a year or so later -- he flew all the way to New York for the funeral ceremonies there, then he flew down to Washington, and then he flew down to Norfolk for the burial ceremony where General MacArthur is buried in the old capitol building in Norfolk. So I think there was a great respect for General MacArthur, and, of course, he had learned a lot, because when the Russo-Japanese War took place, my grandfather, General Arthur MacArthur, the Civil War hero who won the Medal of Honor at Missionary Ridge, was named U.S. observer with the Japanese forces during the Russo-Japanese War, and he took as his aide his son, young First Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur, and they were mixed up with the Japanese military. I think my uncle, as a result of that experience as a very young man, and in the close intimacy of life with the Japanese in a military observer's capacity during a war against a great European power, he picked up the fundamental essence of how the Japanese mind worked and how, if you had to deal with them in the position that he was in, the best way to deal with them.

Of course, they were very grateful that he kept the Emperor, because there was a strong move, as you may remember, to depose the Emperor and liquidate it. They were also grateful that when the Soviets proposed dividing Japan into zones of occupation, as they did in Germany, and we agreed to in Germany, he opposed that successfully with every ounce of his vigor, which was very considerable. Had we divided Japan into zones of occupation, Japan today would be divided between a Soviet zone and an American zone, or a Japanese Democratic Republic and the Japan that we know. So in the reconstruction effort, his recommendations; in the handling of the Japanese, he handled them in a way that they were accustomed to. They were accustomed to a senior person, like a shogun or a strong man doing it, he dealt with them, with very few of them -- the Emperor. Mr. Yoshida, and a few others. But he kept an aloofness from the mass and from
mixed social events and things of that kind. This was very much in keeping with Japanese tradition. Of course, with the Emperor, who was surrounded by the silk and veil, and where before the war, when the Emperor passed, you had to bow your head and put your eyes on the ground so that you would not desecrate him by staring at him, I think his mode of operation, call it what you will, and the way he conducted himself was by and large in keeping with something that is similar to what they were used to.

GASTON J. SIGUR, JR.
The Asia Foundation and Sophia University
Tokyo (1956-1961)

Gaston J. Sigur, Jr. was born in 1924 in Louisiana. He attended Louisiana State University from 1941 to 1943. In 1943 he entered the Army and served until 1946. He received his B.A., his M.A. and his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. He worked for the Asia Foundation and dealt with the National Security Council from 1982 to 1986. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

SIGUR: …Later, I was in Japan from 1956 to ’61 with the Asia Foundation and then at Sophia University.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a little about that. You were at the Asia Foundation, and then you were in Sophia University in Tokyo from ’59 to ’61. Could you tell me your impressions of Japan at that time, sort of a formative period.

SIGUR: Japan was moving out from under the occupation (the occupation ended in ’52). And Japan was beginning to feel her way into the post-war world as an independent country-- closely allied with the United States, of course.

I think that's one of the significant factors here, that since that period of time, when the occupation ended, the governments of Japan and the people of Japan, in their election process, have all strongly reinforced the tie with the United States. This has been absolutely key in terms of their foreign policy and the way in which their foreign policy is made and implemented. It is, first and foremost, the United States-Japanese relationship that affects the minds of the policy makers. So I think that's very important.

But also, of course, by 1956 one could begin to see the Japanese economy rising quite rapidly. There had been great devastation caused by the war. Immediately following the war, one saw devastation all over the country. But by ’56 this had clearly begun to disappear. Rebuilding had taken place, new businesses were going up. You got a sense of vitality. This is not surprising, given the fact that the Japanese educational system was one of the best in the world. The literacy rate was almost a hundred percent, even in the pre-war days in Japan. Training was very good. The United States contributed mightily to the Japanese economic development and one got a sense of things moving forward. You could see again the rising of Japan.
Q: What was your impression when you were in Sophia University (this was one of the top universities in Japan) of the student body as far as its attitude towards outside Japan and particularly the United States?

SIGUR: It's hard for me to say too much about that, because I didn't see that many of the students. I was engaged in a research project there with a group of Japanese professors.

LESTER E. EDMOND
Economic Officer
Tokyo (1956-1961)

Lester E. Edmond attended the City College of New York and Harvard University. Edmond was in the US Army during WWII and worked in the State Department before entering the Foreign Service as a Rotation Officer and International Economist. His posts in the Foreign Service include Japan, Finland, Washington, DC, National War College, France, and the Philippines. Edmond was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2001.

Q: So you're out to Tokyo in 1956, I think.

EDMOND: That’s right August 1956. Travel was more leisurely then. Shom, the three children and I flew to San Francisco where we boarded the American President Line’s President Wilson for a thirteen day voyage to Yokohama.

Q: What was your job there, and how did you find things?

EDMOND: Obviously I was assigned to the Economic Section of Embassy Tokyo. Again I have to say that I have been, I think, blessed with the quality of the officers for whom I have worked during most of my career. The Ambassador at that time was Douglas MacArthur II, the nephew of General MacArthur. The Economic Minister was Frank Waring who was followed by Ben Thibodeaux. In addition to serving as Economic Minister, both also served as heads of the US Aid Mission to Japan which was still in existence, although winding down. When we think of Japan today it is difficult to appreciate that when I arrived it was still an aid recipient. In fact one of the assignments given to me during my first years there was to negotiate a PL 480 agreement to furnish rice to Okinawa.

In 1956, Tokyo was immeasurably different than it is today or even when we returned for our second tour in 1970. The city itself had been largely reconstructed after the fire bombings of 1945 which had largely destroyed it. The buildings, however, had been hastily built and were architecturally unimpressive. As an aside it also not widely appreciated that the loss of life in Tokyo, as a result of the bombings, exceeded the loss of life caused by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the pressure to rebuild and rehouse the displaced Tokyo residents the authorities did not alter the narrow winding streets which served Tokyo adequately in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries but which even by 1956 had become clogged with
small three wheel trucks.

The only western style hotel available to foreign visitors was the Imperial Hotel designed by Frank Lloyd Wright and which was one of the few survivors of the massive 1923 earthquake. The high rise office buildings which dominate today’s Tokyo skyline were in the future. In 1957, about a year after my arrival Phil Trezise arrived to serve as Deputy to Ben Thibodeaux and then to replace him as Minister for Economic Affairs. In my opinion which is shared by many of his colleagues, Phil was the finest Economic Officer that the Department has produced, certainly during the thirty or so years of my experience.

The assignments given to me were rather general in nature. One area that I was told to follow and report on concerned Japan’s economic relations with other Asian countries I also did a bit of bilateral negotiating of minor agreements. One that sticks in my mind, because of an embarrassing incident dealt with disposal of the yen proceeds of an aid agreement. I was in the Embassy on a Saturday, when a cable arrived from Washington which reversed the negotiating position that we in Tokyo had developed and which I personally had promoted to the Japanese. In my view it appeared to put the entire agreement in jeopardy. I went charging up to the Ambassador’s office. Under normal circumstances I would have expressed my concerns to my immediate superior so my seeing the Ambassador directly was a bit unusual. But on this occasion, since Phil Trezise was not present, I barged in and remember saying something like, “Mr. Ambassador, we’re in great trouble, we have a real problem.” He said, “What is it?” and I explained it to him. He said, “Well, what do we do about it.” I said, “I really don’t know. The message has just arrived.” Ambassador MacArthur leaned back in his chair and rather briskly said “Les don’t ever come into my office again just to tell me we have a problem. I have problems all day long. All I deal with are problems. When you come into this office with a problem, you tell me what you think the suggested solution should be.” That was another lesson that I learned early in my career.

Shortly after Phil Trezise became Minister, I unofficially took on many of the tasks of a special assistant, primarily in the sense that I was his note taker for most of the meetings which required records to be kept and follow up messages prepared. Phil Trezise had regular weekly sessions with the chief of the Economics Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office (the Gaimusho),and often with the Director General of the Gaimusho’s American Affairs Bureau, as well as intermittent meetings with senior officials of other agencies, such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). It was a somewhat onerous assignment but it provided me with the invaluable experience of observing the interplay between highly professional diplomats as well as providing me with insight into the wide range of politico-economic issues facing our two countries.

Q: This was your first overseas assignment, first Foreign Service assignment abroad. At that time the Economic Commercial Section, Economic Section, was pretty good sized. There were people from other agencies.

EDMOND: It was one of the more sizeable Embassy economic sections. Treasury furnished the Embassy with a Financial and Assistant Financial Attaché. Agriculture also had at least two representatives The Science Attaché’s office had representatives furnished by the Atomic Energy Commission. Commerce had not yet established the Commercial Service. Therefore the
Commercial Section was staffed by Foreign Service officers from State.

The differing relationship between the United States and Japan during the two periods of my assignment there is worth noting. During the 1956 to 1961 period, particularly in the early years, the United States acted as an elder brother attempting to assist a younger sibling. In the trade area, we actually spent time and effort to encourage Japanese firms to export to the United States and to Europe. I recall making speeches to Japanese industrial associations, lecturing them as to the importance of quality control if they were to sell to the wealthier industrialized countries. Little did we realize that in a very few years some of our bitterest trade disputes would be about what we would then regard as excessive Japanese exports to the United States and reputed unfair Japanese trade practices.

Another area of responsibility that was assigned to me was to encourage Japan to expand the level of its foreign assistance, particularly to the countries of Southeast Asia. This was an issue that did not arise too frequently but it had a significant political component as it was often interconnected with the delicate issue of reparations.

Q: The other thing that I [remember], of course - having served with you at least part of the period in Tokyo; I came in 1959 - was the planned Presidential visit by President Eisenhower, which was supposed to take place in June of 1960, and the demonstrations going on connected with the security treaty signature and so on. Do you have much recollection of all of that?

EDMOND: One could never forget that incident which was certainly the most dramatic development in my entire first tour in Japan. As you noted, the President was scheduled to visit Japan in June 1960. The visit was, I understand, strongly recommended by Ambassador MacArthur and was to be a political triumph for Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi who was a great favorite of the Embassy. The immediate occasion for the visit was the revision of the United States-Japan security treaty. One of the conditions of the peace treaty which had been signed, I think, in 1951 had been the acceptance by the Japanese government of a mutual security treaty that provided for extraterritorial status to the American forces stationed in Japan. Some months earlier a Japanese woman collecting spent shells at a US firing range had been shot and killed by an American soldier. The incident quickly became a public relations nightmare and a political issue between our two countries because the United States military insisted on trying the soldier in a US military tribunal as was provided for in the treaty. Eventually the soldier was sent home with a dishonorable discharge but it left a residue of Japanese resentment at the “unequal” treaty that the postwar politicians were obliged to accept.

After this episode the White House was persuaded that the security treaty should be renegotiated to meet the principal objections raised by the Japanese Government. It was believed that the outcome would strengthen the Prime Minister. The treaty was revised in 1960 to satisfy Japan’s principal concerns. Unfortunately the treaty’s revisions occurred at about the same time that Prime Minister Kishi managed to outrage public opinion and alienate many members of the Liberal Democratic Party by proposing a return to a much detested prewar police system.

President Eisenhower had agreed to pay a state visit to Japan to dramatize the new stage in United States-Japan relations. Unfortunately it was not the hoped for success. Kishi, with a huge
majority in the Diet, insisted on pushing the new treaty to a vote without allowing the debate that
the opposition considered its right and Japanese custom expected. At about the same time, May
1, 1960 to be exact, the Russians shot down the U-2 spy plane that was piloted by Gary Powers.
Leftists worldwide, encouraged undoubtedly by the Russians, railed at what they regarded as
untoward US aggressiveness during the Cold War. All these developments set off mass
demonstrations in Tokyo, particularly near the Embassy and the Diet area.

With the demonstrations in full swing, Jim Hagerty, President Eisenhower’s Press Secretary and
the President’s advance man for the Tokyo portion of the visit arrived at Haneda Airport outside
of Tokyo. His arrival had been well publicized and a large mob managed to halt the cavalcade of
cars near the airport and Hagerty’s car was jumped on and treated violently before the police
were able to rescue him. The news and photos made the front pages of the US and Japanese press
and compounded the already negative public relations aspect of the visit. In addition at one of the
demonstrations in front of the Diet a girl student was trampled to death in a confrontation with
the police. As a result of these developments Kishi lost his nerve and asked the Ambassador to
request that the visit be canceled. I suspect it might well have been by mutual consent for I find it
hard to believe that Hagerty would have continued to support a visit after the reception that he
received. The violent aspects of the demonstrations were extensively publicized and US
television made it appear as if all of Tokyo was up in arms.

I saw a somewhat different version of the protests. I was in the embassy working after hours, and
I guess it must have been about seven in the evening or so. I ordinarily walked to work because
we lived in apartment called Perry House, which was within easy walking distance. When I
reached the embassy gates, a sizeable but organized and well disciplined demonstration was
taking place just outside the Embassy, effectively blocking entrance or exit. The demonstration’s
leader was using a bullhorn and leading chants about American perfidy. I didn’t quite know what
to do and I had no idea how long the demonstration was going to last. I don’t think I would do
this today but while standing at the front gate I attracted the attention of the leader of the
demonstrators and then pointed at the gate, letting him know that I wanted to leave. He looked at
me and nodded, and I persuaded the Marine guards to open the gate just enough to permit me to
squeeze through. The leader of the demonstration then turned, raised his hands and stopped the
crowd from chanting and let me pass. I turned and bowed to him in thanks. He turned and bowed
to me in turn and then continued with the vocal demonstration. I don’t know what conclusion
one draws from that, and I don’t mean to imply that the demonstrations, the riots, were not
serious, but my one experience differed considerably from what was viewed as the norm.

Q: I’ve heard of other stories like that, and certainly my own experience was similar. I can’t
quite remember an incident as clearly as that, but I think one point is that they were
demonstrating against a cause for ideology, for ideas, while having, I think, real honest respect
and affection for individual Americans, whether they were official Americans at the embassy or
somebody else.

EDMOND: I agree, and there’s another factor which is perhaps somewhat applicable as an aside.
It’s that the television images emphasize the violence, and the impression is given that the
violence is rampant throughout a city when actually the violence is not as wide spread as it
appears. Now, I worry a bit about saying this, because we now live in different times with far
more violent terrorism and I don’t wish my comments to lead some to think that I am minimizing the dangers that exist in many parts of the world to our Foreign Service personnel. This was just one limited experience in one unique country at one particular time.

Q: I certainly agree with that. On the other hand, I think, again having been there at the same time, I certainly did not - I may have been naive - did not have a fear of violence that it would be directed at me, partly because I knew university students and I kind of knew what they were thinking about, also because the demonstrations were very well organized and disciplined, if you will. We may have been all perhaps not aware of dangers that could be in other settings, but certainly at the time I didn’t have that trepidation at all. Well, when did you actually leave Tokyo, Les? That was in 1960 or ’61?

EDMOND: I left Tokyo in 1961.

ALBERT L. SELIGMANN
Political Officer
Kobe-Osaka (1956-1959)

Political Officer
Tokyo (1959-1962)

Albert Seligmann was born and raised in New York City where he also attended Columbia University’s School of International Affairs. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955 after serving in the US Army during World War II. His career included posts in Japan, Thailand, and Germany. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Well, you were in Kobe-Osaka from 1956 to when?


Q: What was when you went there, you say your job was political officer.

SELIGMANN: Yes. We still had the luxury of such a position. We had offices in both cities; that is why the name of the post was hyphenated. When I arrived, we were on the verge of moving into a newly built building in Kobe and had just moved into a new office building in Osaka, then perhaps the finest, but now one of the oldest - we moved out of it since. I spent more time in my office in Osaka than in Kobe, where I had a small office in the Consul General’s suite. As an amusing aside, CIA decided to open a small suite of offices in the new Kobe building, down the corridor from me and put up a sign, “Political Section.” It caused me no real problems, even though ostensibly it looked like I was the spook and they were the “real” political section - I don’t think anyone was really confused.

Both Osaka and Kobe were fascinating cities whose relative importance to Japan as a whole was
far greater then than, say, ten years later. The headquarters of many of Japan’s largest companies - all the major trading companies, major textile companies, pharmaceutical firms, etc., were in Osaka, and Kobe was still the nation’s major port. It was a tremendous opportunity for a junior officer for two reasons. First, in part as a carryover from the occupation, and in part because the Japan-U.S. relationship was only beginning to change from “big brother, little brother” to a more normal partnership, a process that took some years, I had access to just about everybody, a heady experience. Secondly, I could do things that were more difficult to do in Tokyo, where you were forced to deal more with day-to-day requirements, answering the telegrams, etc., and had to clear one’s work with at least two vertical layers as well as with other sections. The Embassy would levy requirements from time to time, for example when it prepared a report on elections or attitudes on a particular issue where it incorporated the findings of the consulates, but most of the time I could set my own agenda. So what I was able to do as never before or since was to get out and report in microcosm, often at the grassroots level on developments in the Kansai area, that is Western Japan, that reflected on national trends or foreshadowed national trends to come. I knew from my Washington experience how welcome this sort of reporting was. I had no trouble making appointments with governors and mayors, newspaper editors, leading professors, presidents of major companies and banks, some of whom exercised considerable political influence, etc. By and large my contacts were eager to express their views to an American government representative, and many of them became good friends. I was still pretty junior, but found no difficulty, for example, in having prominent people to our house for dinner - more often than not offering them the novel experience of bringing their wives along.

Apart from a sizable consular workload, the major focus of the consulate’s work was economic - I was essentially a one-man political sideshow. Lew Gleeck, the more senior, somewhat crusty head of the economic section, belonged to the old school that placed high value on guidance to junior officers, and even though he had no responsibilities for my work, was of inestimable help in sharing ideas, introducing me to key business leaders, etc.

Q. Well in the first place, just to get a little feel, who was the consul general at this time - or were there consul generals?

SELMANN: George Emory. He was newly appointed to the job and - now we are going to get irreverent - made my job easier in a way. George had been in the private sector before he served under George McGhee in the AID mission to Turkey. As I understood it, McGhee had wangled the Kobe-Osaka position for him, and somewhere along the line, somebody told him this was the second most important position in Japan. Now I don't think that would have sat well with the DCM. I know it didn't sit well with the Supervising Consul General, as he was still called in those days, because he was supposed to supervise the consulates and consulates general But George Emory took it very seriously. He would not move out of his temporary quarters in the new apartment building they built for staff in Kobe until he could find suitable housing. Well, he set his heart on a house owned by Anderson Clayton, one of the big American cotton firms, that were important in the area at that time, a lovely house that ironically much later became the residence of the consul general. It was supposed to become his residence when the incumbent, who expected to be transferred back to Texas, went on leave. He came back, however, so Emory did not get the house. Instead, he combined two of the tiny apartments into one and then complained that he couldn't entertain because he didn't have appropriate quarters. That left Lew
Gleeck and myself to do most of the entertaining. Emory didn't move around much. He would make a grand tour and pay calls on the governors of the 13 prefectures in the consular district, but steered away from substance.

Q: Just to give a person a feel about this, take a day. You start out in the morning; what are you up to? What did you do?

SELMANN: I started off by reading a number of newspapers at home or, if I was headed for Osaka, on the train. One thing I learned early in the game, however, was that while the papers were useful to develop leads, there was generally a story behind the story. For one thing, they tended to treat developments the same way, partly because of the press-club complex, whereby reporters assigned to cover a particular political party, major organization, government office, or the like generally consulted with each other on how they would play a story. Another approach was periodically to check in with contacts who had proved valuable to myself or my predecessors in the past. Often I set out not knowing just what it was I was after, but landed up stumbling on worthwhile information or part of what I could turn into a larger report, e.g., attitudes of the business community toward the coming elections. A major reporting vehicle, well-received in the Embassy and Washington was a monthly composite despatch, in which I devoted a page or two to about a dozen different topics. Occasionally, but not as often as I had supposed, I would be asked to send reports to the Embassy for incorporation into larger reporting pieces - to which the consulate contributions might be attached. In much of this, a good model was my predecessor, once or twice removed, Dave Osborn.

I had the help of a senior local employee, Mr. Oishi, who had been in the job for some years and had especially good contacts with the local Japanese security agencies - so good that I wondered sometimes whether I might be at risk of unwittingly serving two sets of consumers. Partly with that thought in mind, I broke with the custom of some of my predecessors and preferred to conduct interviews on my own in the absence of a situation that called for taking him along, e.g., if my interlocutor had been his long-standing contact. My philosophy was that my language ability was far from perfect, but even if I missed one-quarter of what I was being told - not necessarily the norm - when I talked to a Japanese contact tête-à-tête in Japanese, he was likely to speak far more frankly and tell me twice as much than he would have otherwise. When I went on extended field trips in the consular district, which I tried to do perhaps three times a year, I would go on my own, which probably hurt the feelings of Mr. Oishi and put more strain on myself, but in the end paid off both in terms of information gathering and representation of the U. S. On the other hand, he was extremely helpful in setting up appointments, and based on previous experience, suggesting people to see.

Q: What were you looking at particularly at this point?

SELMANN: Just about all political trends. This was the height of the Cold War and there was great interest in left-wing movements, and, in the light of Japan’s history, the right wing as well. I was amazed at how open a discussion you could have with even the more extreme members of other left-wing groups, including some of the trade unions and the principal political opposition, especially strong in the large cities, the Socialist Party. Much of our coverage of right-wing movements, which were noisy but not all that influential, was through Japanese sources,
especially the PSIA (Public Safety Investigation Agency). Coverage of the Liberal Democratic Party, which has dominated Japanese politics from about that time on, was no problem and helped provide insights on attitudes toward the performance of the administration in Tokyo, factional maneuvering, and the like. It was also a good chance to get to know some of the up-and-coming politicians, a number of whom became prominent in later years. To give one example, Masa Nakayama, a Lower House member from Osaka who became Japan’s first woman cabinet minister, invited us over to meet her son, a pediatrician and Osaka prefectural assemblyman. We became good friends and our families went on weekend excursions together. Subsequently he took over his mother’s seat in the Diet and he rose to be Foreign Minister.

The business community at that time was far more active in politics than it is today, and certain of its leaders were regarded as the pointmen, so to speak, in exerting political leverage; they were delighted to discuss politics and some of my best reporting derived from conversations with persons such as the presidents of some of the trading companies and textile companies, ranking officials of the three major economic organizations, etc. Elections were always a focus of interest. I would generally prepare a district-by-district analysis, to the extent possible based on field trips, replete with predictions, that fed into the Embassy’s composite reporting. This was a luxury that other constituent posts lacking a political officer could not often afford, whereas Embassy officers in turn could not always get away from their desks as much as they would have liked.

I was also able to report in depth on sociopolitical issues such as the status of the burakumin (the current euphemism is dowa but still outcaste) community, especially significant in the Kansai area - hard to imagine today, but tens of thousands of this minority group of Japanese, subject to economic and social discrimination, lived in segregated areas of Kobe, Osaka and Kyoto, without paved streets or sewers, but nonetheless wielded some political clout. Another phenomenon we reported on well before it came to national, let alone international attention, was the rapid growth of Sokagakkai, a Buddhist sect with great appeal to the growing rootless urban migrants from the countryside. Sokagakkai proselytized with methods bordering on illegal coercion, e.g., boycotts of small shopkeepers who did not join, heavy-handed door-to-door visits, ostracizing of non-member schoolchildren and so forth. Out of nowhere it started to hold rallies in Osaka drawing tens of thousands of well-disciplined members with arm-banded marshals, marching youth groups and the like - all reminiscent in the minds of observers of the early Nazi Party. Then in 1956 it ran three candidates in the national Upper House elections, including a popular baseball pitcher, and to everyone’s surprise, all three were elected. This show of well-organized mobilization and discipline worried political observers.

Q: Yes, I was wondering whether we were, I think normally American professionals feel begin to feel disquieted when you have people on sort of religious grounds because it tends towards fanaticism and so forth.

SELMAN: That's right, so we were very much interested. We covered that in considerable detail but I held my fire in judging Sokagakkai’s political intentions: its pronouncements were too amorphous and probing with other political observers did not add much. Some time later, Jerry Schecter, a friend who was a stringer for Time magazine - subsequently, Time Bureau Chief in Moscow - said, "Hey what about Sokagakkai?" I gave him some leads for covering it,
and we traded some of our information. If I remember correctly the article he produced helped bring the group to public attention in the United States. Much has changed over the years, but at the time it was a little scary, because in the next election in 1959 they ran six candidates and elected all six. They had built their strength up to where it is today with about 50 members in the lower house [in 2001 down to 32], and it has become an essential coalition partner of the LDP. For some years, the political party has operated as a separate entity, the *Komeito* or Clean Government Party, albeit with the same religious Sokagakkai base. They no longer have their big rallies; they have dropped their coercion tactics; their policies remain amorphous with no indication of extremism. That was the kind of thing we could report on that was not so easy to do working out of the Embassy.

Q: *This, of course, is the great advantage to consulates which is often lost e in an embassy because people tended to get stuck with visitors, reports, the whole thing, and they don't get out.*

SELGIMANN: I remember that when Winston Lord was assigned as a junior consular officer, I believe to Kuala Lumpur, he had just resigned from the Department on the grounds that his talents would be wasted. I got to know him when we were working in the same office in the Defense Department shortly after that and told him, "You know, you made a mistake: that is the kind of place where if you want to do something, you just do it and you can make a mark for yourself - you will never have that sort of chance again." Of course, he didn't make a mistake. He did very well.

Q: *Did you have problems dealing with this religious group? Often they don't take kindly to foreigners. Was there xenophobic...*

SELGIMANN: I didn't meet with them directly. I relied mostly on government officials, newspaper reporters, and politicians who were observing them. Later on I dealt with them. Jumping ahead, but before we forget, their leader at the time was Daisaku Ikeda, a charismatic figure who is still the head of their international bureau (deposed as leader of the Sokagakkai proper after he became involved in a number of scandals, both monetary and sex. He established a reputation later on moving around the world, sponsoring major conferences, et al. He published a book on his dialogues with Arnold Toynbee. When I was back with the Embassy and we were fighting to get the revised Security Treaty ratified...

Q: *This is 1960?*

SELGIMANN: 1960-61. The question was the LDP being put in the position of having to ram this through the Diet unilaterally, with all of the opposition parties refusing to participate in the proceedings. That wasn't a good picture to present to the world for the U.S. or Japan. It turned out to be a pretty futile mission, but I made an appointment with Ikeda and tried to persuade him to have Sokagakkai at least abstain. In the end they didn't, but we made the effort.

Q: *What about the communists? Could you talk to the communists?*

SELGIMANN: I imagine it would have been easy to do so, that is they would have been willing to talk to me. But for the same reasons prevailing in many other parts of the world, our policy at
the time to have no contacts with the Communist Party or its more blatant front organizations, e.g., the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association, the Soviet-Japanese Friendship Association, Gensuikyo (the anti-Atomic Bomb Association), etc. I thought this was well advised: we did not want to be manipulated by Communist propaganda and wished to avoid giving the wrong impression to others, especially the more moderate left. This was the height of the Cold War with large-scale financing of leftist front groups coming from the USSR and China, and while it runs counter to my basic conviction we should keep an open door for dialogue with just about anyone, it would have been the wrong thing to do. Later on in the embassy, I talked to communists when they came to present petitions. As is so often the case, probably around the world, they mostly turned out to be nice affable people, but we didn't get anywhere convincing each other, and you landed up accepting the petition with a minimum of argument, in a fairly cynical ritual.

Q: Were we looking at the position of Koreans in the society at that point?

SELGANN: Yes. That is a good question. The Korean community was split down the middle, and the vast majority belonged to Chosen Soren, which was the North Korea affiliated organization of the Korean community.

Q: Why would that be?

SELGANN: Well, they were radicalized, which was easy to do because of the discrimination against Koreans within Japanese society and the way the Japanese had treated them during the war, when many Koreans were brought to Japan as forced labor in factories and mines, often in appalling conditions. Many Koreans were repatriated to Korea after the war, but many were not. They had put down roots in Japan, but they remained politically radical. Yes, we reported regularly on Korean organizations and political activity, relying mostly on the Public Safety Investigation Agency. CIA, you know, often goes after the same information, as I discovered down there and in the embassy. CIA may well have traded information with Japanese intelligence agencies or collaborated with them in other respects - I just don't know - but for the sort of information I wanted, they were very open and it was very easy. I often felt over the years that I could get for free something that...

Q: Well, one of the themes that comes through here from time to time with these interviews is that you are getting information for free, but often if CIA is paying for it, it has greater force when it is used with the powers that be, the decision makers back in Washington s because gee, we paid for it you know. So, I mean this must be better, when actually paying for there is a taint.

SELGANN: Yes. I think sometimes the other way: if someone tells one of our officers something and it is clearly sourced and derives from a well-identified conversation, maybe that is more credible. It can cut both ways. Of course the funny feeling I sometimes had was, “Are they giving this to me because they are paying for it?”

Q: Well, how about contacts within I guess it is University of Kobe, University of Osaka, in other words at the university level? Was this pretty much USIA was doing this?

SELGANN: They were doing a lot of it, but there were professors with whom I would meet
periodically, especially at Kyoto University which was the number two university in Japan after Tokyo University and had some prominent professors of international law interested in foreign relations, security issues, and what was going on in the intellectual movement in general. One Kyoto University professor I saw often, Masamichi Inoki, became one of Japan's foremost security experts for many years heading up the government financed Research Institute of Peace and Security in Tokyo. I can’t say, however, that I was deep into the academic community.

Q: Did you find the Japanese I mean at this point very much interested in what was going on in the United States or elsewhere? Was this, I mean were we finding out a lot more about them than they were interested in finding out about us?

SELMAN: Oh they were much interested in everything that was going on in our country. USIA, which then had an extensive network of branches and cultural centers throughout Japan, went about disseminating information in a planned, methodical way, but you could not help but be a source of information about developments in the United States that entered into countless conversations - and we also played our part in the selection of nominees for leader grants, and in making suggestions for the programs of those who were contacts of the Political Section. I had mentioned the business community, and here I have always felt and feel today that even though Japan’s business leaders are in constant touch with American business leaders, both individually and through countless organizations, we are a bit delinquent in not cultivating top business leadership. Lew Gleek, who was a model in this regard, and I probably could not do all of what we were doing then at the same level today. Now you have to be at the top to do it, but I think we should be spending more time with business leadership, talking to them about their attitudes, not just on business and economics but on politics.

Q: One always hears about the Japanese bureaucracy is a unique experience in decision making and all that, but in your type of work, you really didn’t come across it did you?

SELMAN: No. Back in the Embassy later on, yes, but I wasn't negotiating anything down there. After all, representation, reporting, and negotiation are the essence of your job. In Kobe-Osaka I was engaged in representation to a considerable extent, and reporting to a very large extent., but not much negotiation. To the extent we had anything to do with negotiation it would probably have been the responsibility of economic officers supporting our negotiation of the first of many trade issues to come.

Q: Did we have much in the way of military in your particular area?

SELMAN: No. There was a little bit, and it pretty much closed down while I was there. The major installation that remained in our consular district was the Marine Air Base at Iwakuni. I didn't have much to do with them and it presented no major problem of the sort that gradually built up around some of our bases. The commissary near Osaka closed down so we placed periodic orders with the Embassy commissary, principally for liquor, and did most of our shopping locally - in a pinch you could always place an order for commissary goods with the local black market that would be filled promptly.

Q: Well it was sort of a golden time.
SELGIMANN: It was. Professionally, it was fulfilling and I learned a great deal; it was a wonderful place to raise children; travel was easy and affordable; and friends were easy to make.

Q: I thought we might stop at this point and pick it up the next time in 1959 you left Kobe-Osaka, whither?

SELGIMANN: To the embassy in Tokyo.

Q: All right, why don't we pick it up in 1959 when you go up to the embassy.

Today is February 22, 2000. Now you were in Tokyo from 1959 to when?

SELGIMANN: 1962.

Q: So when you went up there, what was your job?

SELGIMANN: I was a political officer. It was a large embassy with a large political section My specific task was to cover the opposition parties, especially the Socialist Party. By the way, there is a tale on why I went there in the beginning of 1959, not the end of 1958. I had a telephone call directly from Tokyo from Outerbridge Horsey sometime in the early fall of 1958 telling me to pack my bags and say my farewells, inasmuch as my orders were on the way and I should be in a position to get up to Tokyo without delay after they arrived. So I did what I was told. I didn't literally pack the bags, but I said all my farewells, had all my farewell parties. And then personnel in Washington dug in. They were getting angry with Ambassador MacArthur for running his own personnel shop without going through Washington channels and decided to show their pique by putting my assignment on hold. So it was a bit embarrassing, having said all my farewells to stay in place for another three or four months.

Q: Well, when you got up there, MacArthur was the Ambassador.

SELGIMANN: Yes.

Q: This is Douglas MacArthur II. Can you describe your impression, I mean you were fairly junior, but how he ran the embassy and the embassy itself, I mean having come from a relatively small dukedom to come up to the kingdom.

SELGIMANN: I suspect you asked that question with malice aforethought because there are so many MacArthur tales. It depended who you were. If you were “in,” you could do no wrong. If you were “out,” you couldn't do any good. The trail was littered with the bones of fine honorable officers who he somehow decided were out, not in. It was very rough on them. I was fortunate; I was in. I think there was a geographical constraint that bothered people. We worked in a wonderful old chancery, one of the first in the world we built as a chancery. It had large beautiful paneled rooms, with bathrooms shared with the office next door, but it could only accommodate a core staff, mostly the political and economic sections, and a few attaches; the rest were packed into an annex a couple of blocks away. MacArthur was very demanding, autocratic in the sense...
that he tended to preempt section heads and dictate the day’s doings at the beginning of the day: I want a telegram on this, I want a telegram on that. He wasn't a model for me, but he could also be very thoughtful and kind.

**Q**: Could you give an example?

**SELGIMANN**: Of kindness?

**Q**: Yes.

**SELGIMANN**: Sure. My wife's father was terminally ill and she got a phone call that it was time to fly home to see him. It happened to be the same day that MacArthur was leaving for Washington to sign the new security treaty. He took time out to telephone me to ask whether we had enough money - of course you didn't have compassionate leave in those days. That was one of many instances. He showered praise if he liked what you did, but if it he didn’t he could excoriate you, too often in front of others.

**Q**: How about Mrs. MacArthur?

**SELGIMANN**: Wahwee, the Veep's daughter, Vice President Barkley's daughter. Very similar. She scared many embassy wives to death, especially at a time when wives were still rated in efficiency reports and the Service expected to get two for the price of one, but she didn't scare my wife or me. We were frequently invited to the residence and treated well - no problems. She too could be thoughtful. For instance, at a receptions if you were working the door, greeting guests and introducing them to the ambassador, you didn't get much time to enjoy the reception. Wahwee always saw to it that there were drinks and hors d'oeuvres placed behind the door for the officers there, small things. Once she got the wife of a newly arrived officer mixed up with someone she recalled being a Georgetown neighbor and invited her over for coffee. The wife in question had no idea why she was being singled out, but when she arrived, and Wahwee soon discovered her mistake, she invited her in and treated her graciously, making her feel at home. Of course, I could tell tales of an opposite nature, but I am sure you have heard many.

**Q**: Well now, what was the position, you were dealing with the left. What constituted the left that you were dealing with during this time starting in 1959?

**SELGIMANN**: The core was the Socialist Party, formed from a merger in 1955 of the Left Socialist Party and the Right Socialist Party, but for all practical purposes still badly divided. It was the major opposition party holding a little over one-third of the Diet seats. The left wing relied for votes principally on Sohyo, the trade-union federation, that embraced public service workers at both the national and local levels; it also found support from left-wing intellectuals in and out of the universities. A small, extreme leftist fringe was virtually indistinguishable from the communists. The right wing drew heavily on private-sector union support with its ideology articulated by a few more moderate intellectuals who saw themselves as part of the Socialist International movement. In addition, you had the Communist Party, which at that time only had one or two seats in each house of the Diet, but which was strongly represented in key positions in a wide variety of front organizations that it skillfully manipulated. The focus of our efforts in the
embassy was renegotiation of the security treaty which was opposed, often violently, by the left, with well-documented outside support from mainland China and the Soviet Union. My task was to report on what they were up to, and in so doing, I found I had pretty easy access to key Socialist Party officials, including both Diet members and functionaries. My contacts with the Communists and representatives of their front organizations were pretty much limited to receiving petitions, a chore that came with the job. I was a great believer in receiving petitions as a way of letting off steam on the part of demonstrators, a process that usually involved preliminary negotiation as to how many petitioners would be permitted to enter the Embassy. They usually turned out to be amiable enough, and once in a while you could sense that one or more members of a delegation were receptive enough to warrant the effort to make a substantive point or two, but for the most part we found little to be gained from extensive dialogue and the petitioners did not press hard for their part. Ambassador MacArthur did not always agree. I'm digressing a bit, but it just reminds me of a time when I had accepted a petition from a group of Communist Party leaders, but MacArthur was so angered at the content, he instructed me to return it. I had never returned a petition before and was unaware of precedent on how one went about it. I decided the best thing was to call in a trustworthy embassy driver, to whom I gave explicit instructions to take the petition to party headquarters, ring the bell, and if nobody was there, slip it through the door. I don't know if they ever realized they got their petition returned or not, and I didn't care.

Going back to the Socialists, however, I got to know many of their Diet members with whom I would have lunch or who accepted dinner invitations to my house. This included a few on the extreme left who advocated nationalization of all major segments of the economy, the banks, the mines what have you, and promoted policies hard to distinguish from communism. Arguing with them never convinced anyone, but it gave us an idea as to their thinking and kept conversational doors open. Many moderate right-wing Socialists, on the other hand, were not much different in their thinking from the far right of the party which was like the Labor Party in Britain or the SPD in Germany.

Q: Were we doing anything to convince them, I think of contacts with the American labor movement, visitors grants to the United States, you know, trying to show these people how one can deal with sort of the left?

SELGIMANN: Very much so. The labor attaché and assistant attaché, a language officer, worked closely with union leaders, mostly from the private sector, sometimes coordinating their efforts with the consulates, and sent a good many officials to the United States at the same time that American labor leaders were sponsored in Japan for programs worked out in conjunction with our cultural centers. Similarly, we made a special effort in our leader-grant program to reach the moderate left at both a national and local level, not only focusing on politicians, but especially on university professors and journalists. Many accepted, including some who later became leaders of the Socialist Party or prominent in their fields. These grants didn't always pay off, but they usually did. I am a great believer in grants. This runs through my post-diplomatic service life as well. When you asked what I was doing, one of the reasons that I talked about efforts to maintain contacts with the left was that I was outraged when Reischauer, even before he was named ambassador, published an article in Foreign Affairs that received a great deal of publicity, entitled "Broken Dialogue," in which he harshly criticized the embassy for not
maintaining contact with the left wing. I took this kind of personally. To his credit, after he was named ambassador by Kennedy, and the Embassy files were opened to him, he acknowledged that this was not the case, and watered down some of his assertions in the Japanese translation of the article. As noted earlier, dialogue is one thing, convincing your interlocutors is another. In the end, Reischauer extended his dialogue no further than we had, even though he had an improved image compared with his predecessor, who was loath to hear out the other side.

Q: Well how did you view the socialists, I mean from your perspective? Did you think that we had become so connected to the LDP that the socialists were almost beyond the pale, and it was hard for us to envisage a socialist government or not. I am talking about the embassy as a whole from your perspective at that time.

SELMANN: There were certainly those who felt that way, and we clashed a bit on it. I felt the left wing of the party was beyond the pale but they were so impractical that they were never going to form a government nor would the majority of the Japanese people ever permit this to happen. On the other hand, there were right-wing socialists who saw themselves as a moderate, constructive opposition. Some were in it for career advancement so to speak. To give one example, Eki Sone was a career diplomat, who after the war was at odds with Yoshida, long-time Prime Minister, whom he personally disliked. Sone, wealthy with an aristocratic bearing, might well have risen to become Foreign Minister, but he threw his lot in with the Right Socialist Party, becoming its Secretary General. I remember one reporting telegram in which I said something about Sone - I don't remember the specifics. Bill Leonhart, who was DCM, called me in to his office and disagreed with what I had written, saying, “Sone is just a communist.” When I replied to the effect that that was ridiculous, he got red in the face, and told me to get out of the office and not to come back. I was shook up but that too passed, and we remained friends. He felt strongly that the socialists were no better than communists. Or to give another example, at the height of the security treaty fracas, which ran pretty much from 1959 through 1961, Asanuma, who was Secretary General, later Chairman of the Socialist Party and had been head of the Right Socialist Party, made a trip to Beijing (Peking), in the course of which he signed a joint communiqué with the Chinese containing the requisite language of the day stating that American imperialism was the common enemy of China and Japan. Not only that, but when he got off the plane back in Tokyo, he wore a Mao cap. Now you have to understand that Asanuma was quite popular with a reputation for being a hearty, bluff, “man of the people,” but not much of an intellectual: he led a simple life, lived in a small apartment, walked his dog in the morning himself, etc. Shortly after he came back from China, he asked to meet the ambassador together with his leading associates both right- and left-wing. First, the ambassador said he wouldn't see them; then he changed his mind and said he would. He quickly reversed himself again, but they were on the way. I was the intermediary for conveying all this through the party’s International Bureau, while sitting in the conference room around the table waiting for the ambassador to enter. When the party arrived at the gate with the press corps waiting, MacArthur did not have much choice.

Asanuma and his delegation of about a six representatives were ushered into the conference room where they were kept waiting for about ten minutes. When the ambassador came in, Asanuma started to greet him, but instead of letting him have his say, before he could get a sentence out MacArthur seated himself at the head of the table and asked, "Mr. Asanuma, when
you were in China, did you say that American imperialism is the common enemy of Japan and China?” Asanuma started to reply two or three times, but each time the Ambassador cut in, “Did you or did you not say that American imperialism is the common enemy?” And each time his voice rose to a greater crescendo. I wanted to crawl under the table, as I believe did the one or two other Embassy officers who were present; it was embarrassing, and the meeting broke up in a total shambles without Asanuma ever getting in his two cents. Needless to say, this was all reported in the press without the gory details, but the gory details soon got around town.

Q: What was the purpose of this meeting? Why did they want to see...

SELGIMANN: Well, pretty much the same reason you deliver petitions: you take a stand and you want to show your supporters you are doing something. I don’t think it was much more than his desire to go back and say, “I told the ambassador what our position was.” To my way of thinking that is sounder than not being able to meet him at all and have him say, “He wouldn’t even talk to me.” To be sure there are some instances where you have to do that - nothing is black and white - but the approach here was counterproductive. (One unpleasant aftermath was that a year and half later Asanuma was stabbed to death on live TV at a political rally by a 17-year old fanatical ultra-rightist.)

Q: Did this cut off lines of communication after that?

SELGIMANN: No. I could never figure out exactly what was going on, but my contacts at a working level with the leading party bureaucrats in the international and policy bureaus, who represented both wings of the party, remained intact and they fed me all sorts of good information, including internal party documents. Perhaps it was a matter of schisms within the party or a desire to keep lines of communication open, hedging against the future.

Q: You were saying if there was an article in the paper...

SELGIMANN: Often the press would provide leads that needed to be pursued - in any event articles often were the source for demands from on high for a reporting message. I would telephone or make an appointment to see one of my party contacts, who more often than not would fill me in on details, give me some of the background, and frequently help me sort out what was real and what was window dressing. If policy pronouncements or other documents were involved, I would often be given copies, sometimes stamped “Confidential.” I recall one internal JSP document that must exist in the archives somewhere that spelled out our prefecture-by-prefecture the organization of the anti-security-treaty movement, the names of the organizations within each prefecture which belonged to the umbrella organization, and the names of the officers of each of them, asterisking those who belonged to the Communist Party.

Q: Did you ever feel that you were being used in the intra-party business to say sort of discredit...

SELGIMANN: Absolutely. I had that feeling all the time: that the more moderate socialists would like to see the left-wing ideologues fall on their face. And yet, the left-wingers would see me too. I didn’t get to close to the few whom I knew to be communist party members, but I don’t
think I was ever turned down if I asked to talk to an official.

Q: Was there a tie into the socialists of Europe? I mean this was, we think of Scandinavia and there was always the Labor movement. The socialist movement in Europe has always been quite strong, very legitimate. Right now it dominates Europe, but at that time what was the tie?

SELGIMANN: As I mentioned earlier, representatives of the JSP right wing attended the meetings of the Socialist International, where they met with the European socialists, which was salutary. It reinforced, gave courage to the moderates. From the perspective of other world socialists, however, Japan was probably a side show to their own battles with the extreme left at home.

Q: Well, during this 1959-1962 period, as you mentioned it was dominated by the security treaty debate and all that. Could you explain what the security treaty was and let’s talk about how it developed from your perspective.

SELGIMANN: The original security treaty was negotiated in the eyes of many historians, I think rightly, as the price for the peace treaty with Japan, which went into effect in 1952. The whole process was hastened by the Korean War and the need to establish Japan as an ally and gain its long-term cooperation, in consideration of U.S. security interests in Asia. The original security treaty called for Japan to provide the U.S. with bases in Japan, and gave us pretty much carte blanche in terms of freedom of action within Japan, what you might call extra-territorial jurisdiction rights over our military personnel,, as well as freedom to use our bases and forces in Japan as we wished in the event of contingencies outside Japan. We had a large presence at that time both geographically, especially relative to the amount of arable or usable land in Japan, and numbers - about 100,000 servicemen. It was seen as a one-sided treaty, notwithstanding that it brought Japan under the U.S. security umbrella; it even provided that the U.S. could intervene to maintain internal order in Japan. Demands for the treaty’s revision to make it more consonant with relations with a sovereign nation began to gather steam among Japan’s conservative leadership by the mid-1950s. So, the United States was foresighted in agreeing at a policy level in Washington that it would be a mistake to wait for pressure to build up to abolish the security treaty, in which case we might end up without any treaty. There was a choice whether to revise the treaty or negotiate a new one - we probably would have settled for either course - but by 1958 we agreed with the Japanese Government’s preference to negotiate a new treaty, a process that got underway toward the end of that year. That said, there was still a deep course of pacifism running in Japanese waters, a carryover from the end of the war, reinforced by what we had preached during the occupation and by the new constitution, which renounced war as an instrument of foreign policy, I was not involved in the day-to-day negotiation of the treaty, although we in the internal political branch were much aware of it. The political-military branch worked on the negotiation with the ambassador, Bob Fearey being a key player. Essentially, we worked out a treaty that gave us what we needed: Japan would still provide bases and facilities for the use of U.S. forces, which we would continue to station in Japan, in return for which the United States undertook the obligation to come to the defense of Japan if attacked. While Japan was obliged to defend against an attack on U.S. forces in Japan, in deference to the Japanese constitution, there was no reciprocal provision for Japan to come to the defense of the United States if the latter were attacked. We also agreed to consult with Japan before using our bases in
Japan for military action outside Japan and before making major changes in our deployments to Japan. The question of nuclear weapons was fudged, especially in regard to their possible presence aboard 7th Fleet vessels, as we fell back on our policy “neither to confirm nor deny.” Okinawa, where we retained administrative rights, was not covered by the treaty, so we retained more freedom of action there. You had the first stirrings of the movement to return Okinawa but it wasn’t a major movement at that time.

Intellectuals, the left wing in general, and an unsympathetic press understood what we were doing all right, but they felt that the new treaty was tying Japan into a long-term military alliance with the United States that ran counter to the “peace constitution,” and risked dragging Japan into war should the Cold War with its Soviet or Chinese neighbors turn hot. Many of them sincerely felt that a neutral Japan could survive as the Switzerland of Asia, and they would rather throw themselves on the mercy of the world if you will. They did not represent the majority of the Japanese people, but it was a strong voice. The Soviet Union and Communist China in turn - we never said PRC in those days, and the language I use here is pretty much the language used at the time -

Q: That’s good. It captures the flavor.

SELGIMANN: ...felt that this was indeed checking their ambitions, and went all out to support a mass movement in Japan, not just a political-party movement, to oppose the revision of the security treaty. We had considerable intelligence on the details of outside financing of the opposition movement, and it was not too hard to calculate the rough cost of mass demonstrations that repeatedly brought 200-300 or more busloads of demonstrators, many from remote parts of Japan, to Tokyo with lunch money; and stipends to enjoy the town a bit after a demonstration. So the lines were drawn. Added to the picture was the public image of the prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke, who had been a member of Tojo’s cabinet and had served time in Sugamo prison as a class A war criminal. Kishi had been a career bureaucrat, a brilliant one, and was doubtless fully committed to democratic principles as being in Japan’s postwar interest, but he left a bad taste with much of the public, including many LDP leaders. (Senior career bureaucrats played an important roles in postwar Japan, but just as I never met a former Nazi in Germany, I never met a former pro-militarist mainstream Japanese leader.) Kishi symbolized to many Japanese the military-zaibatsu-bureaucratic clique that had led Japan down the path to war, which did not make him the ideal figure to negotiate the new treaty. It was difficult to sort out opposition to the treaty per se from opposition to Kishi as a person. What was clear, but not to the American people, as this thing built up to a crescendo, was that there was little anti-American feeling in it. I could have debates, anywhere from taxi drivers on up, the latter being be as good as New York taxi drivers in turning around to argue...

Q: In that traffic and doing it left handed too.

SELGIMANN: ...but the tone was never anti-American. The demonstrations built up. They took a violent turn at times. They were mounted principally in Tokyo but outside Tokyo as well, involving in all hundreds of thousands of people.

Q Were you finding the normal pattern: universities leading the way and all that?
SELIGMANN: There was a structured Anti-Security-Treaty movement with branches throughout the country. The mass of participants came from the left-wing labor unions, the Sohyo unions, including the huge railway workers union, postal workers union, and teachers union with roughly 500,000 members each, as well as from a variety of front organizations. Leadership of the movement was largely political, Communist and Socialist, with the active participation of some left-wing intellectuals, including professors. Left-wing student organizations participated, but the universities themselves were not in the forefront. Through manipulation from the top, large masses of demonstrators were turned out on the streets, but most of them were relatively passive - the rank and file of teachers, for example, marched along dangling briefcases and chatting with one another, methodically echoing the slogans called out by the leaders over bull horns. A friend of mine once described wartime Japan as a nation of watchdogs, who did as they were told, and the mass of demonstrators impressed me as falling into this category - basically nice people who were not that politicized. The student movement was split, but the majority were extremists who could be relied on for wholehearted participation.

Q: Could you talk a little about it because everyone I recall at the time was quite worried about Zengakuren being sort of maybe this is the way Japan will go.

SELIGMANN: I don't think we ever felt this was the way Japan would go. Not all students were members of Zengakuren, and not more than a few thousand were in the forefront, snake-dancing and leading the demonstrators in the chant, “Ampo hantai” (“Down with the security treaty.”)

Q: I remember with the headbands.

SELIGMANN: The headband signified your seriousness of purpose - a samurai put on a headband when girding for battle (or suicide). Indeed, they wore headbands. One of my good colleagues at the foreign ministry who is still active - he is ambassador to Moscow right now - when he was head of the security division of the American Affairs Bureau, responsible for implementing the Security Treaty, used to joke, "You know, I was out there in the forefront demonstrating against the embassy." So, it didn't mean all these people were die-hard leftists any more than the radicals of the 1960s in the United States are all radicals today. A year or two later, it was said that large company recruiters on campus held nothing against student movement leaders, but to the contrary, credited them with showing initiative. The demonstrations at the time were threatening, however, culminating in the so-called Hagerty incident.

Q. Did you have a piece of that action?

SELIGMANN: In that I had the only television set on the floor and Whawee MacArthur, concerned about her husband’s safety, was in my office to keep informed. What had happened was that President Eisenhower, on a trip that was to bring him to Moscow, Tokyo and Seoul, had already been forced to cancel the visit to Moscow when Gary Powers’ U-2 was shot down. He still planned to come to Japan, a visit that had been arranged months earlier after the security treaty had been signed in Washington in January - security passes in Russian, Japanese and Korea had already been issued, with the Russian blacked out, and elaborate preparations had been made. James Hagerty, his press secretary, came on ahead as an advance man on June 10,
but when he got into the Ambassador's Cadillac after arrival at Haneda Airport and started to drive off, about 2,000 Zengakuren demonstrators broke through the police line, surrounded the car, and started stomping up and down on the hood and roof. That was what we were watching on TV, and, of course, there were plenty of dramatic photos later carried by the press around the world. After a while the police restored order and they drove off to a helicopter that took them into town.

To back up and put the incident in context, it was directly related to Japanese ratification of the Security Treaty. The opposition parties had boycotted Diet debate on the treaty, which Kishi was desperate to have in place by the time of the President’s visit. Under the Japanese constitution, if a treaty is approved by the House of Representatives, it automatically becomes law after 30 days, even if the Upper House fails to act. On May 19, exactly 30 days before Eisenhower was due, the Socialists, understanding that the LDP was likely to force a vote on the treaty, physically attempted to block the elderly speaker from reaching the dais to open the session. Toward midnight, a flying wedge of the more martially talented LDP members, however, managed to get him to his chair, whereupon in about a thirty-second action he convened the session and called a recess until the next morning. In the interim, police were called in to restore order, and the Socialists departed.

What just about nobody anticipated was that the Speaker, safe in his chair, immediately opened the next session and in about a minute called a vote on the treaty, which was approved unanimously by a voice vote of the LDP in the absence of the opposition. By happenstance, I had turned the radio on after coming home from a party and listened to all this as it unfolded. I resisted my first impulse immediately to call the Ambassador, and waited for a quick recap to make sure I had heard what I thought I had, and then woke up MacArthur to pass on the news.

Q: Well was there discomfort at the embassy by the fact...

SELMANN: We didn't expect that...

Q: This had been sort of rammed through. I mean it sort of tainted the whole thing.

SELMANN: It did. We were not too happy about it. In retrospect, you know, it is hard to tell. It set the stage for a potential visit that in the end did not occur, but it was not a parliamentary procedure one would ever favor. On the other hand, the unanswerable question is what would have happened otherwise: had Kishi shown less determination: would the treaty have survived? In the days that followed, the demonstrations grew in intensity, directed at Kishi’s use of “tyranny of the majority,” a favorite Socialist phrase, as much as at the treaty, and took on the added purpose of blocking the President’s visit.

The day after the Hagerty incident, the largest demonstration of the whole period took place. While press figures were usually exaggerated, well over 100,000 persons participated. It was a Saturday and I had driven to the embassy early in the morning, but I wasn’t about to try to drive out with a sea of demonstrators massed in front of the closed embassy gate, guarded by maybe a couple of hundred police. About five or six o’clock I decided enough was enough, so I walked out between the cordon of police and the demonstrators. Those in the lead were chanting and
snake dancing; I turned to some of them and said in Japanese, “gokurosama deshita, which loosely translated, means, "Sorry for getting in your way." They all burst out laughing. You don't use humor lightly in Japan, but this worked. They turned to me and one of them replied, “kochira koso, - "Oh, no, it’s our fault" - which only goes to underscore that there was not a great deal of anti-American feeling in all this.

The question before the house, then, was whether or not the President’s visit should proceed. MacArthur came under pressure for not recommending that it be canceled, but took what I believe was the correct position that this was a decision for the Japanese Government to make. Kishi, in turn, procrastinated - I am in a small minority, but I felt he had some reason. In one of the larger demonstrations in late May or early June the daughter of one of the intellectual leaders of the anti-treaty movement had been trampled to death, not in a scuffle, but accidentally by fellow demonstrators, leading to the beginning of what subsequently built up into a torrent of self-reflection on the part of the media as well as more moderate opposition elements. My contacts in the Socialist Party assured me that if the President did come, there would be mass demonstrations, but they would be staged so as not to interfere with the visit! That never had to be put to the test. As the clock wound down, Eisenhower found himself killing time in Manila, when Kishi finally withdrew the invitation and announced his resignation.

Q: Did you find, you know, one always thinks of the Japanese as with the Chinese being concerned about face and how they appear. To have an American president invited to a country and then particularly for the government but it also reflects on the people to say we can’t take care of you. I mean this really sounds pretty awful, and I would think for a sensitive people like the Japanese, this would bother them. Did you find this...

SELMANN: Absolutely. It was the major reason the decision went down to the wire. The Japanese would much rather have had Eisenhower change his plans than to have to be the ones to say we can’t guarantee your security.

Q: Well did this theme play out, continue to play out while you were...

SELMANN: After Kishi resigned, the bubble burst. The establishment of course blamed the extreme left for what had happened, but the left went through a period of introspection. Asahi, the most influential daily and a leader of the anti-treaty movement, ran an unprecedented mea culpa front-page editorial, other elements of the media were self-reflective and many Japanese were thoroughly embarrassed by the outcome. The opposition movement did not dissolve overnight, but it wound down and was never again hyperactive. In this respect, MacArthur deserves his due. The Treaty was in place, whereas a less motivated or less stubborn man might have backed away. As time has passed, the treaty has been accepted not only by the vast majority of Japanese people, but by all the parties that opposed it and all the countries in the region, including China.

Q: Well it keeps Japan under restraint.

SELMANN: Exactly, from their perspective, but they also see it as a stabilizing element in a historically volatile region.
Q: You had a feeling that this cancellation, did this, did you see a change in sort of embassy attitude in dealing with the left wing. You know, these S.O.B.s in the left wing kept the president from coming here. I mean I am talking about our officers and all because something like this can develop an attitude.

SELIGMANN: I didn't see much of that. Those on the scene or following events closely in Washington had a pretty good understanding of the situation with its complexities, although the Ambassador was doubtless bitter. I was scheduled to go on home leave just after the canceled visit, and contrary to my instinct that I would be asked to stay in place for a time, the Ambassador told me to go ahead; as he put it, one time was as bad as another. Going back to your question, while on leave I found that the demonstrations and the cancellation were generally interpreted at home as reflecting widespread anti-American sentiment, and the media, exemplified by an extensive story in *Time* magazine fed the flames. I found myself in Washington and with friends in New York spending a good bit of time trying to convince people this was not so. By the way, just interposing, we have talked about nothing but the treaty. I helped keep my sanity doing other things during that time.

Q: Well, what were some of the other things you were particularly concerned with?

SELIGMANN: The political section was divided into branches so I was not doing external affairs, but I dealt with the American Affairs Bureau in the Foreign Ministry on a variety of matters. Working with USIS, I was responsible for renegotiating a Fulbright agreement with Japan, which put the program on a more solid, long-term foundation with expanded Japanese government support. This was shortly after ratification of the treaty, but a major unsung accomplishment was the conclusion of an agreement whereby Japan repaid a major portion of the emergency relief it had received from the United States during the Occupation under GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) and the earlier EROA (Emergency Relief in Occupied Areas) programs. For a long time the U. S. had asked for repayment of these costs, which is almost unprecedented - as far as I know, Finland had a reputation for being the only country to repay its pre-WWII debts to the United States, and I do not think any other country did so after the war. To many this seemed like pie in the sky. Maybe we could get something of a token nature but could you really expect repayment when Japan was still getting back on its feet? Phil Trezise, the economic minister, headed the negotiation, and asked me to join his team for political input. We did not have a great deal to go on beyond a non-binding statement by Yoshida as prime minister that Japan intended to repay it obligations. The Japanese side having agreed to enter into negotiations, not unreasonably asked for documentation of the expenditures, but to our embarrassment all Washington could provide were some batches of receipts in a warehouse. In the end we came up with a nice round figure in the neighborhood of one billion dollars, and the Japanese side agreed to repay almost half of that, roughly fifty cents on the dollar. I had some input into a provision the Japanese wanted to set aside $25 million for educational and cultural exchanges. It took years and years to get Congress, which took the position that the repayments should simply go into the general account, to agree to implement that part. I never dreamt the Japanese would be so forthcoming - the bad taste of the fight over ratification of the security treaty probably had much to do with the outcome - but Phil Trezise deserves tremendous credit for attempting the impossible and succeeding. Otherwise, life went on: there were elections to
cover, other chores to be done, numerous visitors, many of them interesting...

Q: Well, with the visitors, did you find, I mean sometimes when you get to a place like Paris or London, I mean the interest is minimal in what is going on, and maximal in dealing with shopping, night life what have you, tourism. How did you find the visitors coming to Japan at that time?

SELGIMANN: You had all sorts.. Sometimes if their interests were nocturnal, you’d turn them over to a trusted embassy driver, who knew his way around. When Senator Fulbright came out as he did for an Interparliamentary Union meeting, I was his control officer, having shepherded him on his first visit to Japan while I was in Kobe-Osaka. He was not only serious when it came to substance, but wanted to observe ordinary life. We were doing something or other downtown, when I reminded him that a briefing with the Ambassador was scheduled shortly before noon. He had no love for MacArthur and replied, "I've heard all that before. Is there a good place to eat around here?" When Eleanor Dulles was in town, the political counselor, Coburn Kidd, an old friend of hers, asked me to take her to a typical Japanese restaurant. My wife and I went with her to our favorite yakitori restaurant, a small insider’s kind of place, down an alley near Kyobashi, where they took no reservations, and you had to wait on stools outside. She was a grand sport and loved every minute. Eating yakitori has since become a ritual with Jimmy Carter and more recently George W. Bush (2002) doing the same, but they went to places used to foreigners.

Q: In 1960 you had a very active campaign of Richard Nixon and John Kennedy. The Far Eastern thing seemed to concentrate on the Quemoy and Matsu islands off the Chinese coast. Did this election during the campaign season at all, did Japan come up at all? I mean was there any concern about one side or the other, how sound they were on Japan, or was it just not really a subject?

SELGIMANN: I do not really recall. In general there is always a certain amount of nervousness in Japan when we have a presidential election. The establishment is always afraid that just when they have become used to dealing with one set of players they will have to get to know another, and that there might be unforeseen policy changes. As far as Japan entering into the campaign back home, I felt pretty far removed but remember nothing pertinent.

Q: But I was just wondering, sometimes you have an election campaign and one can get...

SELGIMANN: Oh yes.

Q: I mean I was in Korea in the '76 campaign when Carter was talking about withdrawing our ground forces.

SELGIMANN: I was going to say I was in Japan at that time.

Q: The Koreans were very nervous.

SELGIMANN: As were the Japanese.
Q: But I was wondering whether there was anything comparable to that?

SELMANN: I can’t think of anything.

Q: Which probably speaks to the point that there probably wasn’t.

SELMANN: I don’t think so. It was a breaking-in period for the treaty. It had just gone into effect. We were feeling our way. New institutions had come into being as a result of the security treaty. You had a new high-level Security Consultative Committee, established in large part to provide a vehicle for prior consultation, which required a first meeting, even with an artificial agenda, to get off the ground. You had the biweekly meetings of the Joint Committee, which administered the SOFA, a new Status of Forces Agreement accompanying the treaty, which quite different from the original SOFA. It provided for Japanese...

Q: The SOFA being a, do you want to explain what a SOFA is?

SELMANN: It contains the details for working out our military relations on the ground. The “Security Treaty” itself is shorthand for the full title, “Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and Security.” It is a short document, much of which talks about economic cooperation - there are only a few paragraphs on security. The Status of Forces Agreement, on the other hand, details what Japanese responsibilities are, what ours are, how they pay certain costs, we pay certain costs. It specifies, for example, that the Japanese will provide facilities for our bases and we will pay all operating costs, including labor costs - that was a provision I had occasion to revisit about 15 years later. The SOFA also covers such matters as jurisdiction over U.S. military involved in crimes. While there remained some restrictions on Japanese authority in such cases, the new SOFA was far more equitable than previous arrangements.

Q: Well also I rather imagined this being sort of thrashed out before the election before a new administration came in meant that you know you didn’t have to worry about political posturing of a new administration early on which often happens.

SELMANN: There was no posturing in regard to a change of policy, but a good deal of what you might call benevolent posturing in the aftermath of the conflict over ratification of the security treaty... Kennedy, for example, had never met Reischauer before, but was impressed by his Foreign Affairs article, which he had read, and appointed him as Ambassador to Japan. While MacArthur was well thought of by the Japanese establishment, his public image suffered by reason of personality and association with Kishi. Reischauer, on the other hand, was regarded as knowing Japan; spoke Japanese; was married to a Japanese wife; had no trouble listening to others; and had ties to the academic community. In short, he was a totally different personality. I don’t think he changed any policies while he was there, and I doubt whether he would have been able to have gotten the new security treaty in place, but he was probably the right man for the time in that he presented himself as a sympathetic figure interested in broadening dialogue - while we never lost touch with the opposition, he renewed it at a higher level.

Q: Well the appointment of Reischauer to Japan and John Kenneth Galbraith to India and George Kennan to Yugoslavia was considered, these were sort of major beacons, and this was
going to be a new Kennedy administration. Later on the same old political hacks sort of appeared, but these ones stood out, and they were highly touted at the time.

SELMANN: That's right, and Reischauer made a very fine impression, although he scared the Japanese establishment to death. They were not happy. They thought this guy is just going to listen to everything the left wing intellectuals have to say and get carried away. There was in fact something of an educational process. For a while Reischauer kept a chart in his office which showed the LDP’s voting strength going down and the Socialist Party’s going up, with the lines intersecting some time around 1970, leading him to tell visitors that the socialists would be in power by 1970, which I and my political-section colleagues felt was sheer nonsense.

Q: Well, how did you find, I mean here you were sort of the point man in the embassy for dealing with the left. How did Reischauer, I mean, when he arrived there, how did you work with him, interact with him?

SELMANN: I never worked all that closely with him on a personal level. He preferred to see people by himself, and relied heavily on some of his former students and a former close friend and academic colleague, Burton Fahs, whom he brought in to head USIA with the title “Cultural Minister,” displacing the Economic Minister from his quarters so that he could have the proper ambiance to entertain intellectual leaders. All said and done, while the moderate left now had easy access to the top levels of the Embassy, they were pretty much the same people we had established close relations with at a lower level, and I saw little evidence of broadening our outreach to the more extreme Marxist wing of the opposition, be it intellectuals, politicians, or labor union leaders.

[Q: This is tape four side one with Al Seligmann.]

SELMANN: One of the more dramatic developments prior to the ratification of the security treaty that I skipped entirely was the split in the socialist party, which resulted in the formation of a separate Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). It had long been rumored that such a development was in the offing, inasmuch as the right wing of the party deplored the use of violence and the idea of boycotting Diet proceedings. When the split occurred, however, it had all the appearances of a spontaneous event. One of my less enjoyable chores was to cover Socialist Party conventions. There is nothing more stultifying: Socialist Party functionary friends commented that I was probably one of the few persons inside or outside the party who ever read the policy documents they gave me that were often the focus of convention debate. I had been at this boring annual convention all day long - I believe sometime in 1960 - and went on to a social event in the evening. There had been something in the air, however, which I could not put my finger on, and late evening I decided to return. The only other observers in the balcony besides myself were officers from the German and Israeli embassies, both interested in the socialists. At about two in the morning, Suehiro Nishio, who had the backing of the moderate private-sector trade unions, took to the podium and made his move, announcing that he was resigning from the party. His right-wing colleague Kawakami, who was also a long-time bitter political rival, got up and made an impassioned plea for Nishio to stay in the party for the sake of unity, etc., but the deed was done. Long in the making, the break itself occurred in the height of political passion and was seen by many as premature in the sense that planning was far from complete. It was
happenstance that I was on the spot and in a position to fire off a cable that scooped the media reporting back home. Incidentally, there were rumors that the United States had something to do with this development, but if so, I was not privy to what might have been going on. The new Democratic Socialist Party was initially unable to take more than a handful of Socialist Diet members with it, but it gradually grew in strength over the next few elections, and dramatically placed in perspective the unsavory extra-parliamentary tactics of the extremists.

Q: Well just on a social level, sometimes these conventions, one has the feeling that when the labor party goes down to Blackpool or wherever they go, they can whoop it up at night or something like that. Did you have the equivalent geisha party?

SELIGMANN: Unfortunately, no. These were terribly dreary affairs. Endless meetings that I was not involved with in the background, and they always had their meetings in a shabby old building which was the martial arts hall.

Q: Well by the time you left in 1962, I take it you could see a fairly clear line for the next few years anyway of the rocky road to our relations had been taken care of with the new treaty and all.

SELIGMANN: And by some of the other measures which were taken by Kennedy, with input from Reischauer, which were well timed and had a life span of varying degrees with positive results for U.S.-Japan relations. The first was the establishment of something called the Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, made up of the key economic cabinet ministers on both sides and chaired by the Secretary of State and Foreign Minster. The first meeting was held in Hakone, a resort not terribly far from Tokyo in late 1961. It was quite a show with the secretaries of State, Treasury, Labor, and Commerce; the Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers; and their Japanese counterparts. This particular institution fell by the boards, or at least was downgraded to a deputy-secretary level at the time of President Kennedy’s assassination.

Q: People were in the air on the way.

SELIGMANN: Exactly. So they decided they must never again risk having so much of the Cabinet traveling together at the same time. The other institution that was innovative - and I am sure that the ambassador in view of his proclivities and interests had a lot to do with it - was the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Exchange, CULCON for short, that still meets every other year. Unfortunately, we have never had exactly the same approach to it as the Japanese. We saw it initially as a meeting of eminent leaders in cultural and educational fields of both countries, and our delegation at the first of these meetings which I attended, also at Hakone, included Robert Penn Warren...

Q: “All the King’s Men.”

SELIGMANN: …Arthur Schlesinger, Aaron Copeland, my mentor, Hugh Borton, by now President of Haverford College - about seven or eight in all. The Japanese side then as now, tended to take a much more bureaucratic approach, giving the lead to the Vice Minister of
Education, but it was a fine idea, and has given endorsement to various worthwhile initiatives. Another benchmark development was the visit of Bobby Kennedy, the Attorney General, to Tokyo in 1962. In a sense the Japanese saw it as the proxy fulfillment of the presidential visit that had been canceled, but he also personified the image of vibrant, youthful leadership that his brother was projecting to the world. He was an inspiration to younger Japanese, and inspired some of the younger politicians to adopt PR techniques they had never dreamed of. Up close, Bobby could be cold and demanding, sometimes unrealistic, but this was not what the public saw. Examples I remember were a request to round up some orphans for touch football at the residence, and asking to go ice-skating with workers early in the morning, not exactly a Japanese custom. Dave Osborn managed his extraordinarily successful visit with great aplomb.

Q: By this time, by 1962 when you left there, you had been dealing with the Japanese equation, the American-Japanese equation for some time now. Have you seen a maturity on both sides with knowing how to deal with each other because I mean these are two, the bureaucracy, I mean everything is really there are different reflexes within both of these entities. The professionals who are dealing with them, do they know how to deal with it by this time did you think?

SELGIMANN: Perhaps better than at any time thereafter - or maybe “better” is not the right word, “more comfortably.” The relationship was still an intimate one, and the primacy of the United States in importance for Japan was beyond any challenge. That may still be true today, but Japan for many years has been an important player in the foreign relations of just about all of the most important nations of the world.

Q: Were we trying, maybe it wasn’t your job, I mean you were part of the apparatus trying to get the Japanese to begin to look at the world as a major power. In other words, have their embassies deal with Indonesia, Philippines, what have you? Were we pushing that at all or just letting them figure it out?

SELGIMANN: I don’t think we were pushing the Japanese in those terms at that time, although we have from time to time in later years. Many of us felt it was best to let nature take its course as far as Japan emerging as an international player was concerned and that a close interdependent U.S.-Japan relationship was healthy not only for both countries, but for Japan’s neighbors. A good many Japanese shared this belief. By the same token, we gave some priority to urging better relations with other allies in the Pacific, such as Korea and the Philippines, where reparations issues festered and much ill will was left over from the time of Japanese occupation. Bill Gleysteen, then in the political section, spent a good bit of time and effort on Japan-Korean relations, coordinating with our embassy in Seoul. Before long, we did lean on the Japanese to increase foreign aid, especially in Asia, to supplement our efforts.

ARTHUR F. BLASER, JR.
Financial Attaché
Tokyo (1956-1963)

Arthur F. Blaser, Jr. was born in 1908 and raised in Cleveland, Ohio. He
received an undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1929, an M.B.A. from Harvard University in 1932, and a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University in 1941. In addition to Japan, Mr. Blaser served in England, Germany, and Brazil. He was interviewed by Raymond Ewing on October 16, 1996.

BLASER: In 1956 I was asked to go to Japan as Financial Attaché on the Ambassador's staff. Arrangements between State and Treasury had been changed since I was in London. Treasury people selected for overseas duty were designated as Financial Attaché (or Assistant) and given diplomatic status. The Washington part of the Treasury involved in this program was renamed "Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs (or OASIA for short).

In Japan one of the main jobs was to collect, after negotiations, the money Japan owed the United States for GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas). In this the staff work was interesting, difficult and significant. However in the end the decision rested on what the Ministers felt the Japanese public would tolerate and when, as well as what the Government could afford. Finally after some years the Finance Minister told us they could pay a figure just under $600,000,000, so it was fixed at $595 million.

Another interesting assignment arose when we and the Japanese wanted to get rid of military payment certificates (MPC's), the scrip, equivalent to dollars, which was used in our extensive military installations in Okinawa. A special mission was set up composed of officials of the Defense Department, the Bureau of the Budget and myself from Japan. Our wish was to substitute our regular paper currency and coin but the Japanese were hesitant because of their concern about the impact the change would have on their exchange control. After the mission had concluded its work in the field, I was asked to come to Washington to report on the work. I consulted with various officials and the US Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund. In the end all worked out smoothly, and regular US currency and coin replaced MPC's. I was asked to return to Okinawa during the actual conversion period to report on progress.

As Japan grew in strength, the US hoped that Japan would assist more in maintaining our troops stationed on its territory. Efforts were not as successful as we might have hoped but some progress was made.

A part of the job, as it was in all my foreign assignments, was to report on financial developments, notably balance of payments and the government budget. The US Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were making loans in Japan and I met with their representatives about financial developments. Similarly American private banks were becoming interested in resuming old connections or establishing new ones and I met with many of those representatives, either as they were visiting Japan or with those stationed in the country.

After seven wonderful years I told my wife we had better go home before our eyes took on the oriental slant. We left in 1963 and spent the next two years in Washington. The Treasury's international office had been reorganized in our absence and I was assigned to a unit called Office of Industrial Nations. This of course included Japan so that continued as one of my major responsibilities in the Office.
OLCOTT H. DEMING  
Consul General  
Tokyo (1957-1959)  

Olcott H. Deming was born in New York in 1909 and raised in Connecticut. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Thailand, Japan, and was ambassador to Uganda. He was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert on April 20, 1988.

Q: Let's see. We have just left the UN, or about to leave it. And where did you go after that?

DEMING: Let me just catch up with my history here in my mind.

After a long tour in the United Nations Bureau here and in New York, I was assigned, without much prior notice or expectation, to the post as Counselor of Embassy, Tokyo, and Consul General in Naha, Okinawa, which was still occupied by the American military and administered by the United States Army. At that time things were still very unsettled in China only 400 miles across the South China Sea from Okinawa. The military called Okinawa "the bastion of the Pacific." While the war with Korea was on, Okinawa was a base for jet fighters that could make just two bombing runs over Korea and get back without running out of fuel.

So you can imagine that the priority of Okinawa as a Pacific base for not only the Seventh Fleet but for the Air Force and the Marines. I had never served with the Army or in the military. It probably would have helped me if I had. But I found the "military mind" not inscrutable but difficult to accommodate to.

Q: Channeled along somewhat different lines than you were yourself.

DEMING: Than the diplomatic service, you're absolutely right, Ambassador.

When problems came up I'd have to consult with the High Commissioner, who was a three-star general, and I was the equivalent of a one-star general. When on an Army base civilian officers have an assimilated rank. As a Class 3 Officer I was equivalent to a brigadier general. The brigadier general on the base with whom I served, said, "Olcott on this base, Consul Generals rank with but after Brigadiers." So when meeting VIPs at the airport, I stood at the left of the brigadier general.

Q: Respectfully one pace to the rear.

DEMING: Respectfully.

When ran into a political matter, because I was really a political advisor although they didn't call it POLAD at that time, I would consult with the brigadier or the lieutenant general who were my superiors. The High Commissioner on occasion would point out to me that Okinawa is not a
democracy, it is not a sovereign country, it is an occupied island and we go "by the book." Don't you have a book to go by in the diplomatic field? I would say, no, we don't have a book. We improvise. It's the art of the possible, diplomacy is, within accepted limits.

The Commissioner might shake his head and repeat that the book tells us how to behave when you're on Okinawa. This is an occupied island, we are surrounded by the enemy. We do not fraternize with the enemy. At one meeting I noted that the army had a cultural program here that sends a great many Okinawans to the United States for education. The returned students called themselves "The Golden Gate Club." As a ranking civilian officer here, I give them receptions or parties from time to time. I said I'd like to have the High Commissioner come and talk to them.

That apparently was very difficult for him. He said, "we're still an occupied island and it must be perfectly clear to them that we are the conqueror. We do not fraternize."

I had a leading Okinawan up to my house one evening. He had to come through a check-point, naturally, before coming onto the military base. An incredulous Non Com phoned me up and said "this man says that he's invited to come to your house; is that right?" I said that it was.

As you can see I had some difficulty at first with "the military mind." I had a book by that title which I read assiduously. It was quite impressive and helpful. I thought, wouldn't it be nice in the conduct of diplomacy if we had such a book of rules. I was reminded of an episode during the retreat from Yalu during the Korean War. A correspondent asked a Marine general, "are you retreating, sir?" He replied, "Hell, no, we're not retreating. We're advancing in another direction."

The attitude of the military stemmed from their experience of the "Battle of Okinawa" and explained a lot of their longstanding feeling that this was the land of the enemy. I was told, it's hard to believe, that 153 ships of various sizes were sunk in the Battle of Okinawa. They had to advance from cave to cave, because the island is of volcanic formation. The caves were filled with Japanese with guns and hand grenades. It was a very bloody military operation, the first piece of Japanese territory that the American military had conquered. The Japanese fought to the last man to defend Okinawa. It was on a little island right off the main island that Ernie Pyle, as we may remember, was killed when he stuck his head up to see what was going on and they got him.

So it was a very learning experience for me. I tried to strike a balance. I had separate communications with the Department, which was always a sore point with the military. They got copies of my telegrams of course. The brigadier would often call me over to see him. He'd say, "I don't understand a paragraph here that looks like you're talking on behalf of the Okinawans instead of the High Commissioner." So we had quite a few run-ins of that kind. And it was difficult for them to have a diplomatic/civilian observer to some of their operations on Okinawa, which were often heavy-handed, and not sensitive to the feelings of the Okinawans who, after all, wanted to return to Japanese rule & were destined to do so.

It was significant that the Japanese had a representative on Okinawa who did not come from the foreign ministry or the Japanese foreign service. He came from the office of the Emperor. Had he come from the foreign office it would indicate that Okinawa was a foreign country. This was a
way of saying that Japan held ultimate sovereignty over Okinawa.

I was not there to see the treaty returning Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty.

Q: What year was that?

DEMING: That happened several years later, I think not until about 1970. And it was an occupied area all the time that I was there.

There was much linguistic misunderstanding. I used to follow the translation of the Okinawan daily press. Editorials often expressed the need for having a "confrontation" with the High Commissioner and the military government. This was due to poor translation. What it really meant was a "dialogue." The translators continued to use the term "confrontation" and this irritated the military highly. My Brigadier told me "if they want confrontation, we'll give it to them." I would try to explain that they felt the need for a give and take, a discussion of problems, frankly.

Q: Face to face.

DEMING: Face to face.

One of the interesting episodes of my stay on Okinawa was when John Foster Dulles and his wife flew in on his way back from Japan for an overnight stay. I gave a dinner for him at the officers' club. The Secretary was his usual cantankerous self. He at that time was suffering from rather advanced stages of abdominal cancer which later proved fatal. But he was still in a combative and energetic mood and wanted to know what my problems were as Consul General on Okinawa. I said that one of the problems is that the Okinawans want to know when they're going to return to Japanese rule. They did not understand what the term "residual sovereignty" meant. Trying to put a little humor into the situation, I observed that "residual sovereignty," with the Japanese difficulty with the letters 'r' and 'l', is almost impossible to pronounce. The Secretary said, "It's perfectly clear what I meant by 'residual sovereignty.' It means when we've finished with Okinawa the Japanese get it back. Any other problems?"

So that was that! (I found Dulles a man of extraordinary intelligence with a terrific bark but a rather gentle bite. He liked to drive you into a corner and make you stand up for what you think).

Continuing to make light conversation at the dinner, I mentioned that I had served under Ambassador Robert Murphy in Tokyo and that now he is Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs. Mr. Dulles barked, "my Robert Murphy! My Robert Murphy! He never served in the UN Bureau!" on that cheerful note the dinner ended. About 10 days later, I got a handwritten note from the Secretary: "Dear Mr. Deming. Robert Murphy was Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs for three weeks and one day. Sincerely. John Foster Dulles."

Q: Ambassador Deming, it's now April 21st, I believe. Anyway, it's the next day that we left off from. I guess it's time to go on to your African life, except that I understand you have something you wanted to add on Okinawa. So do you want to go ahead with that?
DEMING: Yes, Mr. Ambassador, thank you. I do have a footnote on Okinawa which illustrates rather dramatically the differing duties and priorities of the military in an occupation situation such as Okinawa, and the historic diplomatic reporting duties of a Foreign Service Officer.

In 1959 for the first time the High Commissioner agreed that there should be an election for the mayor of Naha, Okinawa, the capitol city. The Okinawans had been pressing for this. There were two candidates running for mayor. One, a Mr. Sanaga, who professed to be a Communist, was attracting more support than the other candidate. This presented a rather serious situation. Very shortly, the High Commissioner got in touch with me and said that we cannot tolerate having a Communist as mayor of the "Bastion of the Pacific" and I am changing the regulations under which candidates are qualified for mayor so that he will not be able to run. I said that this is going to be taken very seriously and with some alarm in Washington. He said, "yes, I know. That's why I wish you not to report what I plan to do." I said that this puts me in a very difficult position with my department. He said that yes, he knew that.

Then he took out the Executive Order establishing the authority of the High Commissioner of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. A paragraph made it perfectly clear that the High Commissioner without consulting Washington could take any steps, military or political, which he deemed necessary to the security of the base, and to America's position on the base.

I suggested that we send a limited distribution or an "Eye's Only" telegram to the Department and the pentagon so that they would be apprized ahead of time and be prepared. The High Commissioner said that I knew as well as he that, in effect, there is no "limited distribution" or "Eye's Only." That means it will still go to top policy officers in several agencies. It would become a public matter very rapidly or difficult instructions will be issued to him, tying his hands. I said, "this may be very damaging to my position and career, but I understand your position and authority so I will not report in advance." He said, "I will help you any way I can if you get into difficulties."

The High Commissioner then issued a order abrogating or changing the rules for candidates for mayor of Naha, to this effect: That no one who had been arrested for a civil or criminal offense could run for mayor. It turned out that Sanaga, the Communist candidate, had one or more civil infractions of a rather minor nature, traffic or otherwise, but enough to come under the order. So the order went into effect. There was a great outcry in the Okinawa paper about "the failure of democracy, etc.," The election was held, Sanaga did not run, his opponent of course did win. A day later I got a short but hot telegram from the Department; it said, "Your failure to report has been taken to the highest levels. Please report. Dulles."

Of course I was prepared for this. And I reported, quoting from the Executive Order giving complete authority in such matters to the High Commissioner. And I said, if such episodes were not to happen again, the Executive Order should be amended. Then I went on to explain the origin of the crisis and ended by pointing out, as the High Commissioner had to me, that if I had reported and news had got to Washington first and Washington had directed that Sanaga not been ruled out for election and had been elected, the headlines in American papers would be "State Department Supports Communist Mayor of military base, or stories to that effect." That
apparently got them thinking a little bit.

Fortunately that blew over. But for whatever reason, after that John Foster Dulles was warmer towards me than he had been before. Whether it was because it gave him a chance to amend the Executive Order which had given such authority to the High Commissioner in an outlying province of Japan, with whom we had restored normal relations, and which was going to return to the sovereignty of Japan, or that he understood the position I had been put in under the military and the reasons therefore. I do not know. Changes were made in the Executive Order. I thought I would mention that because it shows the stresses that can develop between the diplomats and the military, each trying to carry out their obligations and responsibilities, as they see appropriate, to support American interests abroad.

Q: I think that's a very pertinent example of some of the problems that you do run into.

MARK S. PRATT
Consular Officer
Tokyo (1957-1959)

Mr. Pratt was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Harvard, Brown, Sorbonne and Georgetown Universities. Entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he studied Chinese and was posted to Hong Kong. Throughout his career Mr. Pratt dealt with Far East and Southeast Asian affairs, serving in Taichung, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Paris, Taipei and Guangzhou (Canto), where he was Consul General. His Washington assignments also concerned Southeast Asian matters. Mr. Pratt was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: So where did you go?

PRATT: Well, I was originally assigned to go to Hong Kong, which is the place that I wished to go because I wished to get as close to China as I could; and instead, I was at the last minute shifted to Tokyo. At that time, of course, the needs of the Service were very much the most important thing, and although we were allowed to express one or two preferences, it was not the way it is being done today. Tokyo, of course, was perfectly acceptable.

Q: You got into the right area, too.

PRATT: Yes, in the right area. Of course, obviously, most of us did not wish to go into visa work. We had not joined the Foreign Service to do that kind of work. After all, majoring in history and political science and so forth are not the things which have inspired one to get into visa work. But of course it was considered the "entry assignment" for almost everyone.

Q: So what was your first assignment?

PRATT: In late December 1956 I went into the Consular Section at the Embassy in Tokyo,
which was visas and passports, citizenship work.

Q: *Let's talk a little about visa work there. This was early on as far as Japan was concerned. What type of people were you talking to, working with?*

PRATT: Well, this, of course, was mostly business visas at that time. The money was just not there for the personal tourism. We had a certain number of student visas, of course, but not too many of those, nothing compared to what happened later.

Q: *I would rather imagine that there was no particular problem, as there was in posts like Naples or Mexico City, where you were concerned about people going to the United States as tourists and staying on.*

PRATT: No, this was not a real problem. There were Japanese who did. Of course, we had the usual "Wristonees" heading the section, who had brought their paranoia with them from the United States, where everybody was just scheming to get into the United States, therefore you couldn't take anything which was said at face value; but of course, those of us who knew a bit more about Japanese society realized that was not at that time and at that place a major problem. It was not like China or Hong Kong or even, at one point, Korea.

Q: *Yes. How about the American community. When you're talking about passports and other American services, was the American community a pretty stable one? Were there any problems with them?*

PRATT: Not really, although passport and citizenship was more interesting even than visa work because we were still living with the fallout of the Second World War, which meant that there had been a couple of Supreme Court cases which had ruled that Japanese who had been impressed into the military had not necessarily lost American citizenship. Though much of this had been cleaned up before I got there, nonetheless, there were residual aspects of that. There were also, of course, a lot of Japanese Americans who had gone over to be in the occupation, and then, of course, the racial laws of marriage had changed, so we were still dealing with open marriages and children, some from some rather complicated backgrounds with very interesting legal ramifications. One of the key things, I think, which we all learned from this is to have a great deal of respect for our Japanese colleagues, in other words, for those working for the embassy, many of whom had started out working for SCAP [Ed: Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers] back in the MacArthur days and then came on the rolls of the embassy. And these persons, of course, were very, very competent and capable and gave us, I think, a very different view of our overall operation there from what one might have gotten in other places. In general, I found that American local employees had been head and shoulders above many of the Americans we sent out.

Q: *Oh, yes. I think we've all learned to rely on them. Who was the ambassador when you were there?*

PRATT: Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II.
Q: Well, now, did you get much involved, were you in the Visa Section the entire time?

PRATT: Well, visa and passport - we had a rotation. I did not get to Special Consular Services because that was a much smaller office, and therefore you couldn’t rotate everyone through it.

Q: You were there during the demonstrations against the 1960 Eisenhower visit, I guess - or were you?

PRATT: No, I had just left, in 1959, I think. Yes, I was in Tokyo from 1957 to 1959.

Q: Did you get any more of a feel for the Orient being in Japan?

PRATT: Oh, very much so, and of course it was the other side of the Orient. In other words, when I was in Qingdao, I had seen that the Japanese had been there, and then of course got to Japan and saw the Japanese on their home ground, and it was obviously a very, very different environment, even at that period when the recovery was just sort of starting. Nonetheless, it was a very different society from the Chinese society I had seen.

Q: How would you contrast them?

PRATT: Well, when I was first starting out on working on Asian matters, one person who had basically spent 30 years, I guess, in China said that most foreigners find that after they go to the Orient they discover whether they are really themselves, in addition to being an agent of their own country, whether they’re Chinese or Japanese. In other words, you either like one or the other. You find it difficult to like them both. And I did not find this to be true because I found the Japanese to be very different in general from the Chinese but really quite impressive.

Q: Were there a lot of GI marriages and all?

PRATT: Quite a few, yes.

Q: Did this cause any problems?

PRATT: Well, obviously, I ran into some cases where the family of the girl was very unhappy because it was a fairly good family and they couldn't understand why their daughter couldn't hold out until they could arrange a marriage for her. But in general that was not the case because so often the girls were ones who came from not very good families or impoverished, parents dead and so forth. And they seemed to work out pretty well.

Q: Was social life pretty well confined to within the American community at that time?

PRATT: Not really for us. I mean there was quite an active American social life, and then also there was quite a diplomatic social life. But also we had a certain amount of contact with the Japanese. One aspect was, for example, the Japanese language school, which for younger officers studying Japanese, there were all their teachers, who were about the same age and we had each had university education and so on, and so you had a certain amount of social life
within that area of the Japanese language group. And then also my local employee, the one I worked most closely with, was very closely tied in with the Ministry of Justice and the police agency and so forth, because her previous work was with the occupation forces, and also it was part of what she did in the Passports and Citizenship Section. And so through her I met many of the other people. Then in addition to that I wanted to keep up with my Chinese, so I cultivated a woman who was working for FBIS in Tokyo, who was married to the man who had been the last minister of the interior in the [end of tape].

The Chinese [inaudible] who was studying at Tokyo University in a postgraduate course in neural anatomy, and he became my Chinese tutor. So through him I met some of his Japanese colleagues and also other Chinese living in Tokyo. A very unusual group there, but these were persons, of course, who were forced out by the fall of the Mainland to the Communists, and so they were living in rather precarious circumstances in Tokyo. So I knew Chinese, I knew the diplomatic community, and we were very much involved in that - the British, the Italians, and so forth, and the French. And one of the French there was the basically air and parachute army attaché in the French Embassy, who was a close friend of these friends of mine in Paris I had mentioned earlier, and obviously when in 1958 de Gaulle took over, the man who had been the head of the military attaché section, and admiral, was somewhat eclipsed by somebody who was much more tied in with de Gaulle and not with Admiral Darlan. So one got a certain amount of French involvement there.

Q: Did you have any connection in the big embassy with Ambassador MacArthur at all or any reverberations of his rule?

PRATT: Not too much. Obviously, we occasionally were called on to do certain things, when we were either duty officers or something of that sort, and so one did get to know him, and in particular we got to know well his secretary, Betty Foster, who was one of those marvelous great old Foreign Service secretaries who realize that one of their principal tasks is training a new generation of young diplomats. So I got to know even better, for example, the DCM, Elizabeth Swarcie.

Q: It was a very professional embassy at that point.

PRATT: It was very professional, and we had some very competent and capable people working on... Dick Snyder was there in the Political Section.

Q: He was my ambassador in Korea.

PRATT: I thought he might have been. And Martin Hertz was... and I had a certain amount of dealing with him because one of the more unusual visa things I had to work on was the contingent from Sumatra that was trying to get to the United States when they had their uprising against Sukarno. And it was Martin Hertz who was handling that on the political side.

Q: Did you ever run across Mrs. MacArthur?

PRATT: Oh, yes, many times because, you see, as young bachelor officers we were often called
upon to fill in for certain things such as one dinner when the secretary of agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, came through with two daughters. And so my colleague Frank MacNeill, who was also a classmate, and I were summoned up to be the ones to sit next to the two young daughters of Ezra Taft Benson. Also, for example, I escorted a person who was put in charge of the newly established and expanded refugee section. I accompanied him up for one... I think Madeleine MacArthur invited him for drinks and so on. So one did see Wawee.

Q: The stories about Wahwee [Ed: Mrs. MacArthurs given name was Laura, but he never referred to her by any other name than Wahwee, her nickname from childhood.] are legend in the Foreign Service.

PRATT: And they should be. She was a legend.

Q: Did you -

PRATT: Oh, I had some wonderful ones, yes.

Q: Could you tell one.

PRATT: Well, one, for example, was as you know she did generally start her first martini a little bit earlier than most, so that when we get up close to the man who was the refugee, she had already had her martini and they had nice big glasses, so we had ours. But she generally apparently continued a bit through the day, not always but sometimes, so we worked up for the Ezra Taft Benson dinner.

Q: Who was a Mormon, by the way.

PRATT: He was a Mormon, yes, and of course she had great instructions to give again and again to the servants, don't you dare offer him any alcohol, no Coca-Cola, no coffee, no tea. But he arrived, and it was a winter evening, and we arrived early, as we were generally called upon to do, and then she came down to give us our instructions, our marching orders, and so she walked into the room rubbing her hands, and Meany, I guess, came a little bit behind her, and said, "It's very chilly tonight." And I said, "Oh, would you like me to lay a fire?" And she said, "Well, if after looking around the room the best thing you can think of laying is a fire, go right ahead." And I said, I think, "In any case, I brought my matches."

But nobody had a really negative view of her. I mean she was a legend, and you had to make sure you didn’t rub her the wrong way, but they were most reactions were really quite generous to her, because we did think that she was an outside figure and had many, many qualities. Another woman, of course, whom we knew was Liz Bonnard Green, and the stories about her were a little sharper.

Q: How about with her? Did she not suffer gladly, or what?

PRATT: Oh, she was not nearly so . . . She just was merely so much stuffier and took the Foreign Service so much more seriously, and she was much more difficult to the women.
women, of course, would be told what color they could wear, what color they couldn't wear, and gloves or no gloves, and so forth.

Q: *Mrs. Green's parents had been in really the old Foreign Service, when it was more a society thing.*

PRATT: That's right. And this was not, of course, anything that Madeleine MacArthur would take very seriously. On occasion, for example, she would say, "Don't get too worried if I use some rather colorful language, but any words I did not learn from my father I learned from the stable boys."

Q: *Of course, her father had been Vice-President*

PRATT: That's right. He won't tell the President.

Q: *Obviously you were tied up with language training, but what was your impression of the political situation on the island in this 1959-60 period?*

PRATT: Well, as I've mentioned earlier, I had been there in 1947 when I was in the Navy, so I had had at least a glimpse of the old Taipei, which was, of course, pretty much untouched by the Second World War. But it was beginning - but only just beginning - to develop economically. I was also trying to maintain my Japanese, and I was trying to complete a thesis for Georgetown, which was on Japanese materials concerning Islam in China, a very abstruse thing, but it was something dear to the heart of one of my professors at Georgetown who became my thesis director. So through the Japanese contact, that is the person whom I had engaged as a Japanese tutor, I got involved with aspects of the Taiwanese society, as opposed to the Mainland society, which I knew, Chou, my contacts in Tokyo, for example, the gentleman in Tokyo who had been minister of the interior in Nanjing recommended me to... He had a son studying there. He had his former colleagues, a general and others, and his wife had a brother who was in the Ministry of Finance. So these were the persons whom I would see up in Taipei, the old Mainlander KMT types, and then down in Taichung with my friend who was teaching me Japanese I would be able to see the Taiwanese, who of course were very much unhappy under the yoke of the Mainland Kuomintang. And so very early on that bifurcated society was something which we got very much into.

Q: *Were there signs at the time that the Kuomintang group was going to be sort of aged out or moved out, or how were we seeing this? Were the Embassy and all pretty well read into the KMT at that time?*

PRATT: The Embassy was not. The Foreign Service people were not. It of course was the political leadership which, of course, found it convenient for the United States to let the so-called China lobby and it's views of the situation be spread around. I think it was also another good indicator of just how difficult it is when you have a democracy and the persons who are your leaders come in knowing very little if anything about foreign affairs and knowing, however, that they do have another election coming up and therefore it's far more important to pay attention to what domestic concerns are than what the foreign realities are. It didn't bother me particularly
because we took that for granted. We realized that we were expected by the Foreign Service to keep track of what was going on in elections, even though, of course, the persons who did so would be called in by the ambassador and the ministers would have fingers wagged at them telling them how we should not be permitted to talk to any of these Taiwanese, we shouldn't go anywhere near polling booths, we shouldn't try to compile biographic information about the Taiwanese and so on. So we knew that we were in an adversarial situation to a certain extent.

Q: Was Walter Robertson's hand apparent?

PRATT: Oh, yes.

Q: He was the head of the Asian Bureau at the time and very much the creature - a strong term to use - but very much part of what you called the China lobby in Congress.

PRATT: Well, I had had for a short time Pat Paul Weinbarger, who, of course, had been earlier tied in with Sun Yat-sen and very early tied in with also Chiang Kai-shek. So I was not unaware of these people. I heard, for example, when I was a student here, a debate between Fulbright and Walter Robertson. So of course the China question was one which was a big problem in the United States and something we were well aware of. But we did see that one of the realities was that the Taiwanese were not that happy to be under the Kuomintang, and I had to remark also that most of my KMT friends in Taipei had nothing but the greatest of contempt for Chiang Kai-shek, and what the military leadership was going. They blamed them for the loss of the Mainland. They said, "I wouldn't be here if they hadn't been such a miserable bunch of corrupt officials back in Nanjing." So I found that the Mainlanders at that time - and that was 1959-60 - were far more willing to criticize the leadership of the Kuomintang than they were when I went back in 1979.

CARL EDWARD DILLERY
Vice Consul
Tokyo (1957-1958)

Economic Officer
Kobe-Osaka (1958-1961)

Ambassador Carl Edward Dillery was born in 1930 and raised in Seattle, Washington. He graduated from Seattle Pacific University with a degree in history and received a master's degree in administration of national security from George Washington University. Ambassador Dillery served in Japan, Vietnam, Belgium, England, Greece, and the Fiji Islands. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 2, 1994.

DILLERY: Afterwards I went to Tokyo as vice consul.

Q: What was our embassy like at that time?
DILLERY: Of course it was big. Remember the occupation had ended in 1951, but even at this time there was still a large vestige of American military presence. I think we still had 300,000 or so American military in Japan. In Tokyo itself there were a lot of military facilities that were being closed up. But there still was a PX and housing area right in the middle of the city. The strangest installation was an old-fashioned American drive-in restaurant right in the middle of the city but all by itself. So the US military presence was still very strong there.

The embassy itself. My first ambassador was Douglas MacArthur and then Edmund Reischauer. David Osborn was Political Counselor during part of that time. Al Seligmann, who I see is one of your interviewees, was there. One of the really best Foreign Service officers we had was on the economic side, Martin Hirabayashi, a Japanese-American who had actually been educated at Tokyo University and knew all the economic leaders in government and the private sector. In those days we had the current chancery and the "Mantetsu Biru", which was the old Manchurian Railroad building. That was where the consulate was and the odds and odds of administration and other agencies, etc. I think in the consulate we had six or seven FSO's in the visa section; probably three people in the passport and citizenship section; and two full time officers in the American Services section.

Q: What were you doing?

DILLERY: For most of the year and a half I was there, I did American Services. The biggest job was marriages. In Japan marriage is legalized by having an entry in the family register -- a complete record of everyone's birth, marriage, divorce, children and death kept at your local ward office. Of course, foreigners don't have family registers. So the way to take care of this is to get an affidavit which you have to take to the ward office. They enter it in a special place and issue a very flimsy piece of paper which is the only legal certificate of marriage. Not very satisfactory for Americans who are used to a certificate of marriage that looks impressive.

As a result, there was a special section in the consular handbook in Japan which allowed us to be witnesses to marriage even though we did not go to watch the transaction at the ward office and also authorized us to issue a "Certificate of Witness to Marriage" that most of our clients must have considered to be their formal certificate. Any religious document or ceremony is not important. During the year I was there we did about 3,000 marriages of which I officiated in about 2,000. Most of them were American serviceman marrying Japanese women. But there were lots of other combinations as well.

Q: Did you find at that time that there was a problem of fraudulent marriages or were these for the most part real?

DILLERY: Not many fraudulent marriages. Most were pretty real, although there were a lot that failed, I think, later on. One of the things we did was to counsel people in that situation. The military were quite strict and you had to have the permission of your commanding officer to marry. So basically they had been counseled by chaplains and commanding officers.

There were odd anecdotal cases. I remember one where in doing all the paper work, and there
was a lot of paperwork to be done, we came to the end of the day without finishing a case. When
he found he wasn't going to finish that night, the American husband-to-be turned to one of our
foreign service nationals, and said, "Oh, if we are not going to be done tonight, would you please
tell my fiancé I'll pick her up in the morning?" He couldn't even communicate with his wife-to-
be. So that is a partial answer to your question.

I am not sure how strong the marriages were, but I think basically they turned out pretty well.
We thought they were good because in Japan, of course, women in those days were very heavily
influenced by their culture to support men. The boy of the family had to be helped and waited on
by the girls, etc. American men treated women in a fashion that Japanese men never did - much
more gallant, and perhaps a bad word now, thoughtful. The combination was a nice one.

Q: What about Americans who were in jail? How did this work?

DILLERY: A lot of Americans were in jail because the American military presence began to
recede and kind of left a little debris on the beach. A lot of black marketeering had gone on and it
was starting to stop by the time I was there. You have to remember that Japan was just emerging
from a very difficult economic situation. It seems impossible now, but American products were
very popular and a lot of smuggling out of PXs, and things like that, went on. What we found
was that there were persons who would take discharges or drift into Japan, pursue illegal
activities and then be caught. We did have a couple of cases of actual criminals. One man stayed
over at the Imperial Hotel and called the hotel jeweler upstairs, hit him over the head and took
his jewels, tried to escape and got caught.

So they ended up in prison. It was not very nice. I think the allowance for prisoners in those days
was 81 yen. You have to realize that the yen was 360 to the dollar so this meant about 23 cents,
not much for even 1957. That was the food allowance and it only exceeded the food allowance
for the Japan Self Defense Force which was 80 yen. But it was basically seaweed and rice and
once a week, fish. Americans were a little weak on that score. So we visited the prisoners and we
tried to intercede for them. We had quite a few death cases. We had several active cases at all
times during that period.

Q: Did you get any feel for Ambassador MacArthur at that time, or was he too far away?

DILLERY: Well, he was a very powerful character and we certainly felt his presence in the
consular section but we had little direct contact. The DCM was Outerbridge Horsey who was just
about as remote. The chief character in our work was an old-line Consul General, LaVerne
Baldwin.

It was the old Foreign Service where you occasionally got invited to the residence, so we would
see MacArthur in that environment. We didn't go to staff meetings or anything. I don't recall him
visiting the consulate. But we knew he was a very strong willed character and very much in
charge of Japan-American relations. He was a presence. Baldwin was a very traditional Consul
General and an old line Foreign Service person. One little anecdote. His wife -- a lovely person
- - was the daughter of an admiral. I can remember on first arriving that she called in the four or
five new young families who had just arrived, and gave us instructions of what our duties would
be at official embassy functions -- arrive early, mix with the guests, take people off the receiving line. One of the little customs at the embassy, on the few occasions that we did go to the residence, was that if it said 6-8, the MacArthurs really meant that. MacArthur’s wife, you remember, was the daughter of Vice President Alben Barkley. At eight o’clock, all of the people from the embassy got on the side of the room opposite the door and starting moving shoulder to shoulder gently pushing people right out of the door.

Q: You were there when Eisenhower was going to pay a visit and it didn’t come off. What was our reaction?

DILLERY: First of all I should say that occurred a little later -- after I transferred to Kobe-Osaka. One other funny thing in relation to the transfer. I arrived in Tokyo in March, 1957 and left in August, 1958, on direct transfer to Kobe as an economic officer. I remember LaVerne Baldwin calling me in and saying, "You have been transferred to Kobe-Osaka as economic officer. With all these good young Foreign Service officers I can't figure out why they picked you, but I hope you do well." So I was textile reporting officer for Japan then from 1958 through 1961.

I worked in Osaka and lived in Kobe. We had our apartments in Kobe in those days, in the compound of the Consulate General.

Q: Where were you during the Eisenhower business?

DILLERY: I was in Kobe at that time. That was very interesting. We read about and saw what happened in Tokyo. The problem was what the Japanese called the tyranny of the majority. The Eisenhower episode happened in 1961. When the occupation ended and Japan resumed sovereignty in 1951, part of the settlement was a ten year Security Treaty. In 1961, it came up for renewal. In Japan at that it appeared that parliamentary procedure was that when there was an controversial issue, with say a 70-30 majority, (which I think the LDP had) the majority negotiated with the minority. The Socialists would get a few concessions in the negotiations and they then would vote against it and all parties would be satisfied.

But in this case, the 1961 Security Treaty renewal was imposed on the Socialists by the LDP. The LDP couldn't negotiate because we insisted on the terms. Many Japanese felt this was a violation of their culture. The Socialists weren't exactly noble either. They barricaded the speaker of the Diet physically in his office and wouldn't let him on the floor to call a vote. After two days of this, maybe it was even three, he finally said, "I give up and am going home." He went out and drove a couple of blocks, the Socialists went home because they were tired, and the Speaker came back, had enough LDP votes for a quorum and passed the renewal in the absence of the Socialists.

That caused an uproar; all the national newspapers were against this saying that it was an unJapanese thing to do. They complained of the "Tyranny of the Majority".

Q: It was Yoshida wasn’t it?
DILLERY: Yes, I think he was Prime Minister. And so there were demonstrations including at our Consulate General in Kobe. The demonstrators came to our office -- and of course, our apartments, with signs "Go Home Yankee" and "Don't Sign the Treaty." But the event was fairly good natured. One of my colleagues, who by this time had learned to speak Japanese quite well, saw a couple of demonstrators afterwards and said, "Throw your signs in the back of my car and let's go have a drink," and he talked to them for a couple of hours. He kept the signs which our children then used to play "Go Home Yankee" in the garden of the Consulate General.

One other anecdote about that. My daughter was in Japanese kindergarten with two other American girls of the same age, three years old. All three were coming home from kindergarten in the custody of a Japanese family servant from one of the families. They were walking down the street and came right through the demonstration. The demonstrators saw the three Caucasian girls and started shouting, "Go Home Yankee". My daughter responded, "But I am home. This is my home."

There was no real threat to the Security Treaty itself but the situation in Tokyo was tense, especially when the Press Spokesman arrived in Tokyo to advance the President's trip to sign the treaty. The automobile was mobbed and violence almost occurred. As a result President Eisenhower did cancel. My evaluation now is that it worked out well because the President served as a lightning rod and diverted some of the heat away from the Japanese Government and the Security Treaty still is in force.

Q: Yes, the Spokesman got rocked in his car.

DILLERY: So, it was a serious moment but didn't last long. The Japanese really recognized that we were providing security for them.

To change the subject, I might report on my job in Kobe-Osaka. I hesitate a little bit about this, but it was our job at that time in the economic section to encourage Japanese exports to the US. Look how well we did. The one commodity that they were not exporting that we thought might be a good idea and suggested to them was automobiles.

Q: Tell me a little bit about your work. This would be from 1959-61. How did you work as an economic officer?

DILLERY: Well, I devoted all of my time to textiles. There were two aspects to this. One was that we were trying to promote the sale of American cotton to Japan. We did a lot of reporting on trends and how we thought new ideas could be used, new ideas for cotton. There was an Association of Textile Manufacturers and we had a wonderful Foreign Service National, Mr. Kondo, who was probably the third most important person in the textile industry in Japan. He knew everybody in the industry, all the people in the trading companies. We were able to get reports and statistics that were not available from anywhere else. So a lot of what we would do was statistical trends on imports.

Textile exports to the US, of course, began to get significant about that time. Just before I arrived there was the "dollar blouse" controversy. The Japanese were actually making a blouse that could
be sold in America for a dollar apiece. This caused great consternation in the American textile industry. So we had to begin to track and try to predict and keep Washington informed about what was going on in their textile manufacturing industry.

My day was composed of working with Mr. Kondo on statistics and looking at trends and then going out and visiting the textile companies and trading companies. The trading companies are very important in Japan because they pull together everything related to supplying raw materials, coordinating manufacturing, financing same and arranging for sales; nobody buys direct from the manufacturers. So we got to know the trading companies and how they worked and tried to inform Americans about that.

Another thing that happened in 1961, we had our first voluntary agreement with the Japanese on limiting exports of certain textiles to the US I did a lot of the preparatory work of research on textiles in the area they were talking about. In this case it was cotton zippers and certain kinds of cotton fabrics and manufactured goods. Then I was part of the delegation that negotiated with them to achieve that first agreement. I believe the delegation was led by Secretary Christopher.

In that connection I did a lot of traveling around the countryside to look at actual manufacturers and try to get some feeling for the potential for exports to the US There was the famous case on woolen suits where a Japanese manufacturer had arranged for a suit cutter from America to come over and cut suits (that is where you make your money in suits) and they were making wool suits which could be retailed in the United States for $45. Even in the late 1950's, that was cheap. A department store owner whose establishment was across the street from the main office of the International Ladies Garment Workers put the suits on sale. You can imagine the uproar.

Q: Probably New York.

DILLERY: It wasn't New York, I think Pittsburgh or some place like that. Maybe it wasn't the Garment Workers but one of the other unions. I can't remember the name of the union now. But the department store was across the street and he had these Japanese suits advertised for $45. He caused a great furor and Congress got interested. So we had to ferret out where the suits were coming from. We had to really snoop around because the location was not well known. A small trading company was handling the deal and the factory was way up on the Northwest coast of Japan. There were three Foreign Service nationals who worked with me and this time not Mr. Kondo but another one and I visited the factory and quickly realized that this was not going to be a major threat to the American suit industry because the factory was too small and there was only one cutter. So we were able to tamp down the controversy on that.

Q: How were you received by Japanese businessmen at that time?

DILLERY: Very courteously. I am sure they were not telling us everything they did, but courtesy is such a strong element of Japanese culture that we were able to winkle out a bit of information. Remember they were very dependent upon us at that time. As I noted, we were trying to help them. All of our formal trade opportunities for the Commerce Department were for exports from Japan to the United States. So anything in the Journal of Commerce that we sent back was for American importers, not American exporters. We were trying to encourage their
recovery from the war because they were really just barely emerging from a deep recession. So they were very friendly.

And then we were so fortunate in that...I remember that our man who worked on the silk industry, which was centered in Kobe, had been in the Consulate General for many years and came from a good family in Japanese society and was very well hooked into the industry. So we had very good access there.

Again, I must note that Mr. Kondo was really wonderful. He later, when he finally retired from the State Department, went to work for the Association of Japanese Trading Companies or Textile Manufacturers and continued to be very significant in that relationship.

I had one very positive relationship with a Japanese textile firm. I went to visit the Japanese subsidiary of one of the Sumitomo companies, a licensee of ACRILAN, which happened to be called EXLAN in Japan. As I was interviewing them and seeing how that agreement was working, they said, "We need an English teacher. Would you help us find one? We want our senior executives to be able to work well with our American colleagues but they don't speak English well."

So I said, "Sure, I will be glad to do that for you. Why don't I do it." I noted that I couldn't take anything for the teaching -- even in those days with less emphasis on ethics and conflict of interest. That was significant because in those days English teachers were paid handsomely. I think people were making $7-8 an hour, or something like that. They said, "Fine. How about Thursday from 5-6?" I went to USIA and got materials for teaching English. When the Thursday session was over they said, "How would you like to have dinner?" And I said, "That sounds very nice." So they took me out to dinner. It was a lovely dinner in real Japanese fashion. We did a little bar hopping and I took the last train home. And that became the pattern for every Thursday night. So I am afraid they spent more entertaining me than they would have if they had paid me. I got to know them so well that I kept in correspondence with them for many years afterwards.

Q: Right now one of the major concerns between Japan and the United States is the fact that the Japanese seem to be such a closed market with many regulations that seem to close things off. Did you find that the Japanese regulation situation was a problem then or not?

DILLERY: It was not a problem, but, of course, part of the reason for that is that there wasn't really much of a market for anything. The yen was very weak so anything imported was very expensive. Japan was heavily devoted to organizing for export. And, of course, in those days the US domestic market was strong and there was not a lot of American interest in exporting, especially in things like textiles. So, since there was not great interest in the US Government or even in industry, we really didn't have any pressure on us to try to encourage US penetration in the market. Remember the American economy was strong and we actually saw what we were doing in Japan as positive. No, that was not a factor then.

The bottom line was that we were starting to see some of the symptoms of the current difficult trade relationship with Japan but real problems were only a cloud on the horizon. Japan's exports to the US were increasing rapidly but textiles still were the major item and much of the rest was
characterized by lower quality items. Automobiles were not in the picture and even the small amount of electronics items were mostly not competitive with US-manufactured products. But the textile situation did give us a clue as to how hard it would be to work out problems when Japanese exports significantly affected major US industries.

Q: How about leftist influence in the labor movement? Were we watching that? The textile industry had rather poorly paid labor. Was this a problem?

DILLERY: Well, we were keeping an eye on the Socialists and sort of Communist influences, but in those days the Liberal Democratic Party was so strong. It had been in power for a long time then and it continued, as we all know, for many years. Japan operated very much on a traditional basis and the Socialists were on the fringes, not even in the center of the academic field. Labor was the only major Socialist stronghold but that was even modest by the standards of labor in other countries. In fact, the Japanese idea of a strike in those days was to wear an arm band that said, "I am on strike, but keep working." There was no real labor unrest. There was a bit of leftist views in the university, but once again, being pragmatic, the Japanese were going to university to get into business or government and it was not the thing to be a Socialist. There were no particular left leaning newspapers. It was a pretty quiet period.

JAMES R. LILLEY
CIA Officer
Japan (late 1950’s-1958)

Ambassador James R. Lilly was born in China in 1928. After serving in the US Army from 1946-1947 he received his bachelor’s degree from Yale University in 1951. From 1951-1958 he worked as an analyst for the US Army. His career includes positions in China, Japan, Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, Laos, and ambassadorships to South Korea and China. Ambassador Lilly was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in May 1998.

LILLY: Then I went to Japan in the late 1950s. At that time, I think, I began to see a process of maturing in the clandestine service. We had gotten rid of the "big fabricators" of intelligence and the big, para-military programs. Programs in Taiwan such as "Western Enterprises" had failed. Ray Peers had headed it. He had been a big hero of the Burma campaign against the Japanese during World War II in "Detachment 101." Almost none of the guerrilla operations which he ran against the China Mainland were successful. We were told that there were a million, anti-communist guerrillas in China. As Peers said: "If I ever find a Chinese guerrilla, I'm going to stuff him and put him in the Smithsonian Institution." People were getting disillusioned.

During this experience I developed considerable skepticism about big programs. I myself had "nailed" one or two fabricators of intelligence. I went out on my own and saw the duplicity of some of the people I was working with. However, it was interesting to me. Communist China was the enemy, and we worked against it. We had a sense of frustration that we couldn't crack it. Our partners were not up to it then.
In Japan we got a sense that we were beginning to get on the right track. We were beginning to focus our energies on getting things done. I had a very brilliant chief that ran the China operation in Japan and I became very interested in the agency at that time. The work was interesting. It was actually much more interesting than what our colleagues in the Foreign Service were doing. They were issuing visas and handling low level, political reporting jobs. We felt that we were doing much more relevant and interesting work.

Q: What was the official view toward China? A couple of things happened. One thing was the "disintegration" of China or whatever you want to call it. There was the "Great Leap Forward" and that sort of thing, which was first played up as, "Well, they may be on to something." Then the split developed between the Soviet Union and Communist China, beginning in about 1959. How did you look at it?

LILLEY: That's when the situation became interesting, and we began to become relevant. My assignment to Japan had involved strictly well-focused foreign intelligence objectives, such as trying to recruit Japanese to go into China. We began to do that. They came back with real information on what was happening in mainland China. It wasn't critical information, but we were beginning to get into the collection process realistically. We were also working on the Chinese Communist community, we were getting people to go to Mainland China, come back, and tell us what was happening.

ROY T. HAVERKAMP
Special Assistant to the Ambassador
Tokyo (1957-1960)

Japan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1960-1961)

Roy T. Haverkamp was born in 1924 in Missouri. He served with the U.S. Air Force in World War II and later earned degrees from Yale University and The University of Cambridge. Mr. Haverkamp joined the Foreign Service in 1952, serving in Korea, Sweden, Japan, Cambodia, Congo, Benin, Vietnam, Guinea, United Kingdom, Jamaica, Grenada, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed on April 11, 1994 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You were in Japan from 1957 to 1960. What were you doing in Tokyo?

HAVERKAMP: For a couple of months I was in the commercial section doing world trade directory reports, trade complaints and things like that. Then I became very lucky and became special assistant to the ambassador which was above being a staff aid. For instance, he did things like send me with George Bush to see the Prime Minister. At that time George Bush was the son of an influential former senator and a businessman. I got involved in a lot of things that I thought were very interesting there.
Q: What was the political and economic situation in Japan then?

HAVERKAMP: Our main interest there at that time was a political strategic interest. Their self-defense forces were just building up, we had to begin to change our military strategic relationship in conformity with Japan's move to independence. We still had AID and the MAAG missions there. We still had large US military presence, the Fifth Air Force, US Forces Japan. On the economic side, the ability, aggressiveness, motivation to succeed of the Japanese was showing itself already. We had serious problems with textiles which were finally settled at that time when President Eisenhower agreed to the idea of voluntary quotas. We had the same problem with plywood, stainless flatware, umbrella frames, but not with automobiles or electronics, although the electronics business was just beginning. The basic problem of the Japanese was that they had a greater propensity to save than to spend, unlike us. They put too much money into increasing capacity. In other words, if plywood sold in the United States, never mind the Americans complaining about the effect on production and employment in the U.S., you put more money into plywood. Success deserves support. The trade problem had already begun.

We had no real answer to Japanese efficiency, their strong predilection to save and invest over spending. The most we could say to them was why don't you diversify and try exporting more to the Europeans and stop making so many problems for us. One of our main problems with Japan was that the Japanese on the one hand wanted to be treated as a budding, first world power in terms of it growing economic strength, but at the same time they wanted all of the concessions that were given to them during the period of occupation and recovery. There was also a highly active left wing in the press, the schools and universities and the labor unions as well as in the Socialist Party that was always ready to put on the headbands and demonstrate against anything American.

Q: There are a lot of countries that pull this. Poor little us, but treat us with respect at the same time.

HAVERKAMP: Or, give us all the concessions that we need to outdo everybody else.

Q: You spent most of your time there as special assistant to the ambassador. Who was the ambassador?

HAVERKAMP: Ambassador MacArthur.

Q: Douglas MacArthur II. I have a series of interviews that I have done with him. Could you describe his method of operation? He has a reputation you might say.

HAVERKAMP: He was a very hard working, very loyal, dedicated Foreign Service officer. He did all of his homework and knew what he wanted and he liked to micro manage everybody. If you wanted to tell him something that you knew he wouldn't like to hear, you had to do it in an indirect kind of way. If you just went in and said it, he would dismiss it. But if you wanted to be effective, you thought carefully how you wanted to present an issue to him. He wanted to be on
top of everything. You would go into his staff meetings with senior officers there with the rank of ministers of economic and political affairs; the MAAG chief was a Major General and we still had the aid program there...and he would tell them, for instance, to report things out of the newspaper. He had some outstanding officers like Phil Trezise, who was the number two in the economic section and some of the younger Japanese language officers. But Ambassador MacArthur's way was getting into the nittiest, grittiest of detail with people. At the same time, if he had confidence in you, he would let you do very interesting things. But he wanted to know everything that was going on. He did not want anything to happen in that mission that he didn't know about. When something unexpected and unfavorable happened he felt it was directed at him personally.

Q: Did you find yourself in the traditional role of a special assistant of going to people and saying, "The ambassador wants to know if you have finished this thing that you are supposed to do," and that sort of thing?

HAVERKAMP: Oh, yes. I would attend all the staff meetings and make note of his assignments and then follow up. But you also had an intermediary role. You had to make judgments at times that the ambassador probably had changed his mind. He had several very ambitious, very able, officers working on economic issues, on security issues...we were then negotiating the Security Treaty. With Ambassador MacArthur it was never "The Ambassador wants to know", but rather "The Ambassador wants, now".

Q: How effective was he and what was his style in dealing with the Japanese?

HAVERKAMP: I never went along on any of the meetings concerning the Security Treaty. He always met alone with the Vice Foreign Minister and they always met at some secret place and at night to keep the press from speculating what was going on and put it into the public domain which would have made progress impossible. To build a good relationship with people he would tell them things that sometimes they might not want to hear, but you can't do this to the Japanese. Like, criticizing the Foreign Minister's staff. He didn't understand that their reaction was one of embarrassment and shame to be put on the spot this way. That is not the way that you dealt with the Japanese. Although he, himself, felt in relation to the military, and others back in Washington that he understood how to deal with the Japanese. I will say, however, that the Japanese had great respect for him and not only because they knew that he had access to the President when he needed it. I think his greatest accomplishment was the successful negotiation of the Security Treaty. He had information from some staff members and advice and at times, direction from Washington but he did all the negotiating alone. As you know the treaty is still the cornerstone of our security posture in Asia. Moreover, Washington's instructions usually reflected his ideas.

Q: He was very close to the President during the war.

HAVERKAMP: During WW II he went with the U.S. Army after the D-day landing in France and was later General Eisenhower's Political Advisor at SHAPE. He also served as counselor of the Department for Secretary Dulles.

Q: So, it was not just a residue of being Douglas MacArthur's nephew?
HAVERKAMP: No, although I think that some people in the Eisenhower administration may have thought that. He would have deeply resented that because he was well aware that he had the talent for the assignment. His father-in-law was Melvin Barkley, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and later Vice President. I was told that Mr. Barkley was always very proud of him because he never asked for special treatment.

Q: He wasn't that close to his uncle anyway. In my interview with him it came out that he earned his own way. During the war he was interned and he was a war time adviser to Eisenhower and all that.

HAVERKAMP: He was a very hard worker. I remember I got into the office one day at 7:45 and there was a note on my desk: A diller, a dollar, a ten o'clock scholar. But he was somebody that I enjoyed working for in a support role because he knew what he wanted, would listen if you made the proper approach and certainly in my case, had me do things far beyond my rank. Many in the Embassy frequently viewed his way of dealing with the Japanese in a different way than he did. But on the major issues, security and trade, he did as much as anybody could have done.

When Professor Reischauer who went out to succeed him had written an article in Foreign Affairs before he went out criticizing the Embassy for not having any contact with the left wing Socialists and the students. Well, they didn't want contact...they wanted contact but to insult you sort of the way you would have contact with the Soviets in those days and exchanged insults. Reischauer didn't establish it either. He also knew, that the students, were going through a process, as students in France did and still do. When they got their degrees and jobs, they were mostly as conservative and supported the Liberal Democratic Party. One of the big things I found frustrating there was that we were not allowed to report the attitude of the Japanese towards China and the Chinese because Ambassador MacArthur was very much Secretary Dulles' man in a personal sense as well as a professional sense and Dulles probably did not want to hear that. The Japanese had to live closer to the Chinese than we do, had a sense of cultural inferiority toward them and saw no reason to antagonize them.

Q: And also you had Walter Robinson or had he left by that time? It was very definitely a topic you didn't raise in that administration and actually the next couple of administrations...any possibility of opening up China.

HAVERKAMP: Our instructions were to tell the Japanese that the Chinese were dangerous trading partners who would key into some critical sector in the economy and after building up a trading relationship would use it as a threat to get political support on issues dangerous to U.S. interests and U.S. Japanese relations. What that will be is hostile to our interests and yours.

In my subsequent assignment in Washington in Japanese affairs, we always were saying long before the rapprochement and Kissinger, that when we recognize China we have to tell the Japanese at least an hour in advance before we do it or we will be in very difficult times there.

Q: What was your impression of the Japanese government and bureaucracy at that time?
HAVERKAMP: I think I had a better chance to see them than many political officers did because I was frequently with the ambassador when he was with them, so I knew many of them.

What was my impression? In the sense of responding to the new post-war generation, I don't think the Kishi government was quite up to snuff in the sense that the post-war generation wanted somebody, I think, not tainted by World War II and willing to assert greater independence in dealing with the U.S. That being said, the main support for the Kishi government came from farmers who had benefitted from the agricultural reforms during the occupation and from business people in the Kansai and Tokyo areas. Not the press barons, but others. There was a transition regime between the WW II generation and the post occupation regimes. They were people who were adequate to the demands of the time. The security relationship with the United States was critical for them. Trade with the United States was critical for them. They wanted to maintain internal discipline within government and society to move forward in an orderly kind of way. But I think the bureaucracy in the Foreign Office, MITI, Finance and the Prime Minister's office, were very effective. The Foreign Minister's position has always been a jumping off place to the Prime Ministership so he could be less reliable and disciplined at times.

Politicians and bureaucrats were accessible for everybody in the US embassy, from the Ambassador on down. Everybody was tacitly aware at least that in the background of our relationship was our security relationship which provided protection for Japan and was a real deterrent for them. That helped us. At the same time they knew trade was becoming a very important part of the relationship. We, at that time, operated on the doctrine that Japan will be allied with and have close relationships with countries with whom it can trade because Japan cannot afford to take any chances on not having sufficient foreign exchange. They had no natural resources other than a little bit of coal that was not of industrial quality and agriculture was mainly rice. So trade and the strategic relationship were the big things.

At the same time it was also clear that the bureaucracy and the politicians were united, that it was not possible to drive a wedge between them and play one against the other to our advantage. We tried often. They were Japan, Inc., as they later began to be called.

Q: One has the feeling that Japan, even more than Italy...you have your political class who go running around but actually outside of making sure en masse they support you, they really don't have an awfully lot of power. The power seems to rest within the bureaucracy. Did you find that true at the time?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, very definitely, except that it is different in Japan in the sense that you have the Liberal Democratic Party which was the dominant party largely because of the land reform and other programs that were put in during the occupation. This gave land to farmers who in the fifties and sixties were becoming middle class people, with a higher standard of living than they had ever dreamt of before. The farmers and rural population were also traditionally conservative, had conservative values. The big business people, were also backers of the Liberal Democratic Party. So the Liberal Democrats did not have to worry about the Socialists or any kind of coalition government as the Italians always have to do. Then the Communist Party in Italy was , I believe, the biggest in terms of membership outside the USSR. In Japan the
communists were nowhere near so important and had little if any influence in government. Their main threat was their support of the Chinese and the Soviets.

Q: One of the major problems while you were there was the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit and the Security Treaty. Could you give your impression of how this went?

HAVERKAMP: The aborted Eisenhower visit was after I was back here working on Japanese Affairs. I believe most Japanese knew that Japan needed a guarantor for its security at the end of the occupations and wanted the U.S. to play that role. They also supported the famous article 9 of the post war constitution which severely limited the right of the government to build an armed force. Some educated Japanese felt that they did not need a security treaty to have U.S. protection because in case of a threat from the Soviets or the Chinese we would come to their defense. A treaty on the other hand might oblige them to help us in a situation in which they would rather not become involved. Then there was the crisis created when the Kishi government pushed the Security Treaty through the Diet in a sub rosa manner which was contrary to the Japanese way of seeking consensus before acting. The government did try to prevent disruption by opponents in the Diet. Mr. Kishi also came to Washington for the Treaty signing. I believe the main impetus for the riots that caused the postponement or cancellation, I can't remember which, of the Eisenhower visit was a desperate reaction to the success in completing the Treaty.

We did the right thing and I think it worked and is still working. I think we may be making a mistake when we tell the Japanese to take on more responsibility for their defense because one of the things that we get from their dependence on us for security is that we have access and influence that we would otherwise not have. It doesn't always show in our trade relationship, but it is there. Demonstrations protesting the Eisenhower visit were organized by the far left and dominated by them although there were other elements in there as well. The fact was Prime Minister Kishi got the Treaty through the Diet and then went to Washington to sign it was a rallying cry for opponents of the Treaty. Signing it in Tokyo would have made no difference.

Q: I am reading the memoirs of George Shultz in which he took issue with the Pentagon...we are talking now in the mid eighties...which was trying to get the Japanese to get more of a military. Shultz was asking the question of whether this would be a good idea and decided no. Does one want to build up an overly strong Japan for really short term American gains and military investment.

HAVERKAMP: I raised this with Bud McFarlane a couple of years ago, he was the National Security Adviser, and asked if this had been thought through. He said yes. As I said earlier there are benefits, strategic and other, as well as costs to our security effort in Japan. But the balance is heavily in favor of the benefits.

Q: Obviously Shultz mentioned that he felt the National Security Council and the Pentagon were wrong. What was your impression of our American military there in Japan? One of the difficulties always is when the American military get in they obviously want all the advantages....to keep their bases, to keep any foreign country from interfering in the way they run things. They are a difficult force to deal with for an American Ambassador. How did this work at the time you were there?
HAVERKAMP: Well, less so under Ambassador MacArthur than under other ambassadors because he never hesitated to assert his primacy. He made sure everybody understood that, and nobody would have touted him on it. The main problems with the military were not the big issues but problems such as when an old woman and a young boy went out collecting shell casings from an artillery range, despite warning signs, and were killed. One day a GI aimed his rifle at a train that was passing, fired and killed somebody on the train. A navy wife down in Yokosuka, who was a pyromaniac, set schools on fire. That kind of thing. The shootings were big incidents in the press and raised the question of jurisdiction. Who should try the accused, the U.S. military or the Japanese? Those were always big problems and obviously spilled over into political relationships because the government had to do something and had to show that they were doing something that was effective in inserting Japan's new sovereignty over us in those cases.

I think most of them were settled to our satisfaction and accused U.S. military got off very lightly. They got off much more lightly than they probably would have had they been tried by American courts. Our SOFA with Japan was the first, I believe, in Asia and was precedent setting.

The land issue is always a problem. The government and I think most people knew what we were doing there and that it was in their interest as well as ours. Unlike many people here who seem to believe because we had troops there or elsewhere abroad we were doing other people favors and we were not getting anything out of it.

The main problem was Okinawa which was still under military control, where the Japanese wanted to take a more active role to assert their "residual sovereignty" and the military were adamant in refusing them. A request to fly the Japanese flag over the schools was rejected and became a big issue. The military even issued laissez-passes to Okinawans who traveled off the island. It was not recognized outside the U.S. Because the military occupied so much of the usable land and since there were so many of them, there were constant frictions with the local people and between the Embassy and the government in Tokyo.

Q: Did the Japanese in general have a pretty good idea of the problem of the Soviet Union and what it represented?

HAVERKAMP: Yes. I think the Japanese in general thought of the Russians as the Koreans did as people that they really had to be afraid of. I think they felt they knew us and what we had done during the occupation, etc. and they knew what the Russians had done in North Korea and above all they knew what they had done in seizing the Northern territories of Kunashiri, Iturup, and Habomai. I first ran into that, as a matter of fact, when I was in Stockholm. The then Prime Minister Hatoyama, after having raised it on a visit to Moscow in 1957, stopped in Stockholm on his return to Tokyo. I forget the terms proposed for a settlement but they were not occupied and the issue still unsolved.

Q: It continues today and has always struck me as an irritant that the Soviets could have taken care of a long time ago, but I guess because of their military priorities they wouldn't.
HAVERKAMP: Militarily that area is useful for them for moving in and out of the Pacific by sea and by air.

A funny case happened when I was there. One day the Soviet Ambassador, who was a very aggressive, very vigorous man named Federenko, was on a train coming back from Kobe-Osaka to Tokyo. He was in the dining car having a meal and a drunk came in and went up to him and said, "I hate Americans" and hit him. He stood up and said in Japanese, "I am the Russian Ambassador." So he hit him harder and said, "I hate the Russians more."

Q: As the special assistant to Douglas MacArthur, I have to ask about Mrs. MacArthur. Mrs. MacArthur, who is now deceased, is renown as being one of the dragons of the Foreign Service along with Mrs. Henderson and a few others, and being an extremely difficult person which had effects on embassies and all. How did you find her influence, was there a problem there?

HAVERKAMP: There certainly was a problem for morale. Let me say first, I know neither Mrs. Armin Meyer nor Mrs. Loy Henderson, but the stories I have heard about them are not like those about Mrs. MacArthur. She didn't slap the servants. She did not criticize the U.S. or Americans, she was insecure and uptight. He spent so much time in the office that there was always tension. I think they were genuinely and deeply in love with each other. They fought like cats and dogs and I think they liked it. Her treatment of the embassy wives was very sad at times. I have seen perfectly delightful and wonderful women reduced to tears. One day a woman came and didn't have the list of people for luncheon and Mrs. MacArthur put her down and the poor woman burst into tears. She was at times crude in her handling of embassy wives and was insensitive to others generally. I saw her slightly before she died and had been converted to Catholicism. She had an angelic expression and didn't have a bad word about anybody. Too late for many who suffered under her.

Q: Did she cause problems for you? Did you find yourself sort of in between trying to smooth feathers?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, because whenever she did something that was really awful I had to try and salvage her reputation. She threw me out of her house once because I was impudent enough to disagree with her on something. I went back to my office and packed my things thinking I was going to be put on the next plane. After about a half hour he called me in and looked at me and handed me back a simple letter I had done for him and said, "You did a really good job on this" giving me a look that said, "Don't be so dumb as to argue with her." Otherwise I got on with her. In those days given the role that the wives played it was not always easy.

Q: Wives got the equivalent to an efficiency report in those days.

HAVERKAMP: In a confidential section that people did not have to show. Non-embassy people may have heard what she was like, but she didn't do the type of things that Mrs. Henderson and Mrs. Meyer were said to have done.

Q: I have heard stories about Mrs. Henderson in India insulting the Indians in public places and
that sort of thing. Is there anything else we should cover on this Japanese tour?

HAVERKAMP: Well, Okinawa was a big problem.

Q: Can we talk about Okinawa? You are talking about the issue of reversion.

HAVERKAMP: Yes, it didn't happen in my time but the pressure and tension was there both when I was in Tokyo and back here in Japanese Affairs. When I was in Washington, I was told General Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff of the Army, who had been Commander of US Forces Japan and UN Forces in Korea, he had a red flag on everything about Okinawa in the Pentagon. The military felt rightly that the Okinawans knew they had been treated like poor relatives by the Japanese and were just sort of pushed out of the way and never really accepted in the way Japanese on other islands were. The military felt they could play on this and the poverty of the island to try and foster an independent country under their control with Okinawan fronts. For instance, they gave them some kind of a laissez passer which couldn't be called a passport because few if any countries would accept it. Then they would travel to Europe or some place on the way to the United States or on their way back and couldn't get in the country because almost nobody accepted the document that they had. They did not really understand the real attitude, the sort of dual attitude the Okinawans had towards Japan. On the one hand they did not like their second class citizenship, but on the other they saw themselves as Japanese nevertheless and wanted no other citizenship even if we could have offered it. The Japanese wanted to fly the flag over the schools in Okinawa. There was a gentleman called Fritz Kramer working on Okinawa in DOD. He wore a monocle, spoke with a German accent and was solid as concrete. He was always telling me about Bosnia-Herzegovina and its relationship to the U.S. in Okinawa. His point was that I didn't understand Bosnia-Herzegovina and consequently couldn't understand Okinawa.

Q: He had been a Colonel in the army.

HAVERKAMP: You could just see him dazzling the Pentagon with his European manner and Germanic condescension. He used to tell me, "Flags over the schools are like camels noses under the tent."

Q: Did you find the embassy and the ambassador were trying to make the military understand that they really had to start working on this problem?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, certainly the Ambassador and the Embassy worked on it all the time. We had a junior officer from State on the Island. It was always a crisis atmosphere to keep Okinawa from becoming a further irritant in our relations with Japan. The attitude was very pragmatic -- do what you have to do to keep things from getting worse. People in State did recognize that someday we were going to have to give up our control, but for the military that was inconceivable.

Q: Then you left there in 1960?

HAVERKAMP: In December, 1959.
Q: You came back to Washington and...?

HAVERKAMP: To the Japanese Desk.

Q: For about a year?

HAVERKAMP: From 1960-61, two years.

Q: Before we move to the Japanese Desk you mentioned one thing about Douglas MacArthur and his talking about the military. That he was always conscious and always saying that many people in the military, particularly back in Washington, did not understand that the occupation was over and that you deal with the Japanese in an entirely different way now than you did before.

When you came back, this was still the Eisenhower administration, who was running East Asian Affairs and what were your major concerns?

HAVERKAMP: The desk officer, Dick Sneider, and under him three officers. Above him you had the Bureau of Northeast Asian Affairs with a director and deputy director which had Korea and Japan.

My main concern at the time was Okinawa and various odds and ends of domestic politics.

Q: Was the desk getting involved in the abortive Eisenhower visit, which was very dramatic?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, we were involved in the planning of the whole trip from the beginning.

Q: Was it seen at the beginning as being a rather tranquil trip?

HAVERKAMP: I think people expected that there would be demonstrations against the visit, but that he would certainly come to no harm. I don't think anybody anticipated what happened to me, Haggerty and that the visit would have to be aborted.

Q: This is James Haggerty, Eisenhower's press spokesperson who along with Ambassador MacArthur were shoved and pushed around in a car at the airport looking over facilities and the demonstrations were such that they decided Eisenhower would not come in. It was quite unprecedented, particularly in a society such as Japan where face is so important, where the President didn't feel he could visit. How did that impact on how things were being called in Washington?

HAVERKAMP: The main impact was on Premier Kishi and the Japanese government and they were pushing us to the end to go through with the visit. They kept saying they could guarantee his security. They felt that it was a definite blow to their prestige and status as the government to say that for this most important foreign visitor they could have they couldn't provide for his security...
Q: It would have been the first American president to visit there.

HAVERKAMP: Right. So, I think in that sense it made the government, Kishi himself, more unpopular. Eventually it led to his demise as Prime Minister. So I think it was very serious.

Why it happened? I don't remember seeing any reports from anybody that such a thing was a possibility, so I think it was a failure to be informed of something that certainly we should have been informed of by the embassy or Intel people. That being said, even if we were informed it would have made little difference to the outcome. Kishi and his government were adamant in having us go through with the visit. An option to make up an excuse would not have been viable.

Q: I am not a Japanese expert, but I gather that one of the things was that the Kishi government tried to railroad the thing through rather than reaching the general consensus that is so traditional within the Japanese political system.

HAVERKAMP: That is true. He came here first to sign the treaty in January, 1960. What happened was the opposition in a very undemocratic way, tried to prevent a vote so the government outfoxed them and approved it. This was atypically Japanese on both sides.

Q: Who was calling the shots as far as to visit or not to visit? Was it the White House that was pretty much calling the shots?

HAVERKAMP: The White House.

Q: This caused a real blip in Japanese-American relationship, a political one rather than economic this time. What were you getting from the Japanese Desk about wither Japan and all that?

HAVERKAMP: As a result of the aborted visit?

Q: Yes.

HAVERKAMP: I don't think anybody anticipated any disastrous consequences other than the possible fall of Kishi as Prime Minister earlier than it would have came about otherwise.

Q: So this was an occurrence rather than an epic shaping event?

HAVERKAMP: Right. It was dramatic but the main issue, the Treaty, survived and still survives.

Q: While you were dealing with the Okinawa issue, were there any developments at that time?

HAVERKAMP: Labor problems, the things that had been going on, there was really no progress anyplace. I think eventually we did allow the schools to fly Japanese flags. There was mainly, I think, the restraining of the military and trying to get them to be more open with the Okinawans
and their relationships with them. To try to understand their allegiance to Japan.

Q: *Did you have any contacts over at the Pentagon while working on this?*

HAVERKAMP: All the time.

*Q: Real diplomacy is not between nations. Nations have interests, and fancy footwork really doesn't help that much. Real diplomacy is within Washington and particularly between two major dukedoms like the State Department and the Department of Defense. How did you find dealing with your counterparts over at the Pentagon?*

HAVERKAMP: Frustrating because they were unimaginative people with one exception, who didn't want to see things as they were, who wanted to see them the way General Lemnitzer wanted them to see them -- the Army is there and will be there forever, will control it and will keep the Japanese hand out of it. The only relieving factor, professionally there were not many relieving factors...there was a wonderful guy over there named Colonel King who liked to eat and about once a month he would take me to the Army Navy Club for lunch and discuss the issues. He was smart enough to know that what the military was trying to do was not very realistic. He had a good understanding of and great sympathy for the Okinawan people.

*Q: You felt they were just saluting and taking their instructions?*

HAVERKAMP: Yes, without any imagination. Kramer and the other guy I dealt with were naive, both had Ph.D.s but no understanding of how politics in Japan really worked or the nature of the relationship between Japan and the United States and how Okinawa affected that.

*Q: That has always been one of the major tasks of the Foreign Service to explain that these countries are not simple and have their own dynamics and you have to understand them if you want to get somewhere. Dick Sneider, who some years later is my ambassador in Korea, what was you impression of his knowledge and feeling towards Japan and how he operated from where you were seeing it at this particular time?*

HAVERKAMP: I admire Dick. He was very tough. He would go into a meeting prepared and if you weren't prepared you probably got slammed. Now that may not have been good, it may have been bad. But, after all, that is how the system works. If your job is Okinawa and you don't know about Okinawa the U.S. is in a bad way. He was very bright, aggressive, very abrupt...sometimes I would be talking on the phone the Pentagon and he would listen in. Half the time with the Pentagon I would put the phone down, walk away and come back again and here we would be on Bosnia Herzegovina. He was very ambitious. He knew exactly how to trim his sails to serve his ambition.

*Q: I found this when we refused visas that he wanted to have issued. Did you note any change when the Kennedy Administration came on?*

HAVERKAMP: There was a big one policy wise in that Dean Rusk understood what we were trying to do on Okinawa and stood up to the military on it. Early on there was one big issue on
which he stood firm and we prevailed. In other words, before that State deferred largely to the military. With Rusk, State played its proper role in that relationship. Rusk arranged that with Secretary MacNamara early on.

We also had a new career officer who came in to be the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Jeff Parsons.

Q: And then Walter McConaughy came in.

HAVERKAMP: For a very brief time.

Q: Dean Rusk had been Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs so that essentially in many ways, it was said later on, particularly with Vietnam, he became the desk officer for the Far East. Here was somebody who was Secretary of State who knew the turf.

HAVERKAMP: Right. I had contact with Dean Rusk subsequently on another part of the world. He took an interest in everything. He didn't say the third world is no concern to me until it becomes a crisis. He made decisions, not on nitty gritty, but if anything was a critical issue he wanted to know about it.

Ambassador McConaughy had served in Japan before the war. He was Ambassador in Korea and came back to be Assistant Secretary. It was a big change and I think there was even a bigger change when he left and Mr. Harriman took over.

Q: What sort of a change was there when McConaughy came?

HAVERKAMP: McConaughy was much less engaged. He didn't seem to have any real agenda that he wanted to fill or get involved in. I remember early on I was the duty officer one Sunday morning and he was going to see the President. This was the critical time of in Laos. I had been in early, seen the telegrams and put them in priority order. Finally, about ten after 10:00 he wandered in, didn't see any telegrams and went over to the White House. About five days later there was a rumor in the paper that he was being replaced, which he was. A very nice guy. He and his wife were loved by the staff wherever they were.

Q: But apparently with the Kennedy Administration they needed somebody...

HAVERKAMP: He was just not an effective operator in that atmosphere.

Q: You were there until 1962?

HAVERKAMP: Well, actually I left the desk around September, 1961 and studied Cambodian for some months.

Q: Were there any other issues during the time you were on the desk that you feel were important?
HAVERKAMP: Trade problems were increasing.

Q: Were there any Congressmen particularly interested in our relations with Japan during this time?

HAVERKAMP: We had no Congressmen or Senators from Japan as we did from Taiwan. When I was in Japan I spent a lot of time with congressional delegations. We had an enormous number of congressional visits. I didn't handle all these visits but I did Senator Hiram Fong's visit. A Chinese-American, because he was getting a lot of press, coming in on the first jet, etc. I remember one of the first questions the Japanese press asked him about was special interest in Asia, including Japan, and his answer was that while he was a Chinese-American, he was a Senator for the State of Hawaii and that included all the people of Hawaii. He was not the Senator for China or any place else.

Many, of course, were very interested. The appropriations people, the foreign affairs people, the members and staff of the Armed Services Committees. There was a great deal of interest, but nobody was aggressively pushing a contrary policy or putting any blame on State. The Japanese were then paying Dewey Balentine, Tom Dewey's firm, something like $300,000 a year to represent them and they were very active. But that was mostly on trade issues. The differences between the governments were not on strategic issues, the differences were on trade issues. There was a congressman from Illinois who took a close interest in Okinawa from the military point of view.

Q: In those days from the President and the Secretary of State on down, Congress was full of veterans of World War II, many of whom fought against Japan. You found that we were trying to take the long view on Okinawa, but the short view was the Pentagon view of we took Okinawa, let's keep it. Did you find that there were Congress people who responded to that type of thing?

HAVERKAMP: Yes. They had one man, Mr. Price, from Alton, Illinois, who was the Pentagon's man. He got a Bill passed that was not helpful in the end because it limited the amount of aid that we could give to Okinawa to, I think $5 million a year. That was a good figure at first but when more was needed, it was impossible to top.

There were other Congressmen with whom they were in contact. As you know they, the military, are the only government Department allowed to have liaison officers on the Hill. People are actually stationed there and work on the Hill for the Department of Defense. However, I don't remember getting a great deal of pressure from Congress on this issue.

Q: Were you every called to testify or work with staffers in Congress on Japanese things?

HAVERKAMP: Other than telephone calls and preparing testimony and questions and answers, etc., no.
Richard W. Petree was born in Jamestown, New York in 1924. His career in the State Department included assignments to Japan and Ethiopia. He served as political counselor to the United Nations from 1976-1981. Mr. Petree was interviewed by Paul McCusker on July 22, 1993.

Q: When did you get your first foreign assignment, and where was it?

PETREE: Well, I went right on working in DRF for another two years, and finally was able to dredge up one possible assignment as Assistant Labor Attaché in the Embassy in Tokyo. I was assisted a great deal by a man whom I came to admire tremendously, named Phil Sullivan, who was the Regional Labor Advisor for the old Far Eastern Affairs Bureau in the Department (FE). Phil later, the following year, went down in a PanAm crash -- the plane disappeared between San Francisco and Honolulu. He and his wife were lost right after I went to Tokyo. In any event, he arranged the assignment, and it involved some interim training in the Department before I went to get into labor affairs. And I reported to Tokyo in June of 1957 and worked at the labor business in the Political Section of the Embassy, 1957 to 1960.

The highlights of that period really had to do with learning the ins and outs of reporting, in general -- on labor cost factors that affected Japan's early trade patterns with the United States, its competition with the United States. But beyond those traditional areas of work for Labor Attaché offices, I became very much caught up in the political reporting on leftist worker organizations and political parties in connection with the whole drive of the left-wing to upset the stability of Japan, which culminated in really large-scale demonstrations against the conservative government in the spring and early summer of 1960. It was during those demonstrations that President Eisenhower's scheduled trip to Japan had to be called off because of all the instability.

Q: Did you run across this fellow -- his obituary, I don't know where I picked it up -- but Shoriki died a couple of years ago -- founder of a Japanese media group which, I guess, was his vehicle to confront the Communist-run labor unions that he helped to destroy, virtually? I don't know whether that's true or not.

PETREE: Well, I don't think that's true. They're still in existence, but on the other hand, he was very much a part of the general right-wing point of view which was dead-set against the liberal development of trade unions' strength in the Japanese economy and in the society. His group was called the Sankei.

Q: Then it became Fuji-Sankei Communications.

PETREE: That was when television came in.

Q: Then you had your own post. That's pretty good so early in your career.
PETREE: In 1960, partly because of all the reporting work I did on the left-wing movements during the upset period, Ambassador MacArthur selected me to be Principal Officer down in Fukuoka, which was the southwestern-most constituent post in Japan. In those days, we had a Consulate of about eleven Americans and twenty or so Japanese, and an American Cultural Center, a USIS post, with at times two Americans and another thirty or forty Japanese employees. So it was a fairly big post in terms of those small Consulates. I also had in that consular district three large U.S. military bases.

Q: Oh, that must have been fascinating...and the problems of the military.

PETREE: And that was, as it turned out, the real substance of what I did for the next three years.

Q: Liaison with the military...well, that will teach you lessons in tact and diplomacy.

PETREE: Well, it is kind of a familiar problem for lots of people in the Foreign Service.

Q: That's right. But there must have been also a lot of consular work there -- straight consular work in terms of registration of Americans.

PETREE: There was. In the district, I had at that time something like 80,000 Americans living there.

Q: With dependents?

PETREE: ...marring and birthing, citizen work, plus, of course, there were the usual seaman cases and one thing and another that came because of the busy ports.

Philip H. Trezise was born in Michigan in 1912. His career in the Foreign Service included assignments in Japan, the State Department's Economic Affairs Bureau, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. He was interviewed by Willis Armstrong on May 17, 1989.

TREZISE: Well, the fact is that MacArthur asked me to come to Japan with him. He went to Japan in the early part of 1957, and before he left, he had arranged for me to join him there as Economic Counselor. Why he chose me, I have never known. He didn't explain. But he had had long talks with Bowie; and Bowie, no doubt, had some part in it.

Q: MacArthur, himself, was not a great Far Eastern expert, was he?

TREZISE: By no means.
Q: I knew him. He was in EUR.

TREZISE: That's right. He was in EUR.

Q: Western Europe...yes.

TREZISE: He had been in France during the Vichy regime, during the war. He came to have a close acquaintance with General Eisenhower -- not during the war, but certainly after the war.

Q: Yes.

TREZISE: So he had, really, a direct line to the White House, which few Ambassadors had. He could pick up the telephone and reach the President without the problems that most Ambassadors would have encountered.

In any event, I went to Japan in the spring of '57 and stayed there through MacArthur's tenure and through the first six months or so of Ed Reischauer. Ed took over after the Kennedy victory in 1960. He came in March, I believe, of 1961, and I stayed with him until October of that year.

Q: So you had four years there?

TREZISE: I had four years there. A bit longer than that, actually, because I should have gone home in April, and I stayed until, I think, October. I sent my family home earlier and stayed on because the Deputy Chief of Mission had left. I was acting as DCM until he returned.

Q: That was an extraordinary period for Japan.

TREZISE: It was indeed. I have often remarked that the first month I was there, the Japanese had a balance-of-payments crisis. It was a true crisis. Their foreign exchange reserve had been drawn down to a few hundred million dollars, and they were really in quite a stew. The reason for the problem was that the country had been growing so fast and had been sucking in imports at a fabulous pace. In those days, believe it or not, Japan had a deficit on trade account. While they were exporting -- their exports were growing fast -- imports were growing even faster.

Q: I suppose the imports were largely capital goods.

TREZISE: Capital goods and raw materials. Yes, in those days, consumer goods were not imported on any sizable scale.

Q: Never were.

TREZISE: To this day, they're not terribly great. Well, the extraordinary things about this episode were, first, that the Finance Minister resigned. That was Mr. Ikeda, who later became Prime Minister. He resigned, and somebody else was put in his place.
The Bank of Japan and the Finance Ministry then imposed a credit squeeze on the economy. Its results were really something to see. I made a trip around Japan at that time to get acquainted with some of the other cities. Everywhere I went there were buildings that had been started, and construction had stopped. There were shells of buildings everywhere in the country. The construction boom, which was part of a total boom in Japan, was just choked off because nobody could get credit, and they simply could not continue. There was great anguish in the business community about the policy, but the government stayed with it.

By the winter, the external account was approaching balance again. Their big deficits were behind them. And by the next summer, the boom had resumed. All that investment activity that had been stopped was under way again.

Q: They've never looked back since.

TREZISE: Haven't looked back since. But that would have been '58. Well, '58 and '59 were big years. In '60, they had the political upheaval which involved us, of course. That was the year President Eisenhower was going to make the first ever visit of an American President to Japan. We turned the Embassy upside down to plan for that visit. I was writing speeches for the President -- not my job at all. The administrative people had everything organized to a T. Everybody knew where he would be, whether he'd turn left or right, where the President would stop and who would get out of the car first. Everything was organized.

But then, for reasons really quite extraneous to the United States, a political upheaval arose against the then Prime Minister, Mr. Kishi. We had renegotiated our security treaty, which had been imposed on Japan as a price for the peace treaty. We had renegotiated it to meet many of the Japanese quite legitimate complaints about its one-sidedness. But the opposition parties, including some of the left-wing trade unions, organized and moved against ratification of the treaty, even though, in fact, all the objectives that the Japanese government had had been achieved.

Nevertheless, they mounted this enormous campaign, primarily street demonstrations. And just before the President was supposed to arrive, they had a small riot near the Diet building, and a young girl was crushed to death in the fighting between the police and the students. There were mainly students in that demonstration. This was a culmination of some weeks of demonstrating. The upshot was that the government lost its nerve and said it could not guarantee the President's safety if he came. So the visit was called off. The President was already in the Philippines. Instead of going to Japan, he went to Taiwan and had a visit there. He was, of course, furious.

Q: He had quite a temper, Mr. Eisenhower.

TREZISE: Yes, well, it was kind of crisis in U.S.-Japan relations.

Q: I remember it. I was in Canada at that point. It was a real black eye for the United States.

TREZISE: It was. It was indeed. And though I'm not an expert on Japanese politics, I have always believed that the problem that Mr. Kishi had was not the treaty. That was chosen by the
opposition parties and the trade unions as an excuse for trying to drive Kishi out of office because he had earlier proposed a new police powers bill. Some of the elements in that bill seemed to hark back to the pre-war system of police control.

Q: Oh, I see.

TREZISE: This caused a great deal of unhappiness not only among the students and the trade unions and the left-wing parties, but in parts of the business community as well. People saw this as something that might turn Japan back toward a period that most Japanese would like to forget.

Mr. Kishi was the author of this. Indeed, when he came into power, one of his positions was to strengthen the powers of the police over internal security matters. So he was removed from office not long after the aborted Presidential visit.

Q: Did the Americans think it was basically a pretext?

TREZISE: Basically, it was an excuse chosen by the opposition as the first opening they had. Actually, the police power bill was never enacted.

Q: Never was.

TREZISE: The Diet -- the Parliament -- simply sat on it because of the widespread opposition. But the thought that somebody would propose it was enough to make Kishi a target. He had been a great friend of the United States. Indeed, there was a point of view that he was the American Prime Minister. We had chosen him for the job, or so it was said.

Q: There's a downside risk in that.

TREZISE: In any event, out he went. Mr. Ikeda came in. There was a wonderful example of a politician doing the right thing. He didn't talk about the security treaty, which by then, had been ratified anyway. He said he had a plan for doubling national income in ten years, and everybody seized on the so-called plan. It wasn't a plan at all.

Q: Release the forces.

TREZISE: It was just a political statement. We will double national income in ten years. In fact, the economy rose at a pace faster than his double national income objective. That would have required a bit more than seven percent growth per year, whereas the economy grew at more than nine percent a year during the decade.

So Mr. Ikeda's regime was a success. He was a Prime Minister for a long time. He died in office, or he got cancer and had to leave office and died shortly afterward. During his tenure, Japan began to come out of its shell.

Q: How long was he in office? From about '60 . . .
TREZISE: He was in office, I think, for eight years, I believe -- or almost eight years.

Q: Eight years.

TREZISE: He was succeeded by his brother, who was named in the Japanese fashion. It was not Ikeda, but Sato. I think they had been orphaned and had been adopted by a family. One took the family name, and the other did not. In any event, his brother, Mr. Sato, became Prime Minister just before President Nixon won the election in the United States. He was the man with whom Nixon and Kissinger dealt.

Q: There was a long period of great continuity in Japanese politics.

TREZISE: Oh, yes. Well, of course, they have had the same ruling party since 1955 -- and even longer than that, really. In 1955, the two conservative parties -- the Liberals and the Democrats -- consolidated into a single party, the Liberal Democratic party. That party has governed Japan since.

Q: It's had a few ups and downs in the more recent years, but it was very solid for a long time.

TREZISE: Yes, and even in recent years, the downside periods were not so serious. Certainly not as serious as the one they're now in, which is the first true crisis that that party has ever encountered. And it's by no means clear how they will get out of it.

SIDNEY WEINTRAUB
Political Advisor to Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan
Tokyo (1958-1959)

Sidney Weintraub was born in New York in 1922, and graduated from the City College of New York with a BBA in 1943. From the University of Missouri and Yale University he received an MA and in 1966 got his PhD from American University. He served overseas in the US Army from 1943 to 1946. His assignments abroad included Madagascar, Mexico City, Tokyo, Bangkok, and Santiago. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Mr. Weintraub in 1996.

WEINTRAUB: I went to Tokyo in the political section.

Q: From when to when?

WEINTRAUB: Just one year. What happened was that my relationship there with the ambassador was not good - maybe my fault, maybe his. The Ambassador was Douglas MacArthur III. He and I never got along. This could have been for any one of a number of reasons. I didn't like him. I don't think he liked me. I thought he was an egomaniac. He thought I was probably incompetent. We never got along. I was transferred out of Tokyo. It was a direct transfer.
Q: While you were there, what developments were there?

WEINTRAUB: I was actually there trying to work on some of the backup, getting ready for the security treaty negotiations. I was also the political advisor to the Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan, who was resident in Tokyo. The political issues were really quite important in the sense of getting through the security treaty and then handling all of the other political sensitivities of one kind or another that came up, and trying to follow the developments in Japanese politics, which were really quite interesting at the time. The beginnings of what is now the Liberal Democratic Party were taking place.

Q: Were you in the Political Section of the Embassy concerned about the opposition that was beginning to build up to the Security Treaty? This became sort of a focal point. This is how the other political parties and other groups, students and all, had something to work on, wasn't it?

WEINTRAUB: That's right. I left before the thing exploded. Remember, it exploded during the proposed visit by President Eisenhower. I was in Thailand by then. I don't think the embassy ever fully understood the depth of the opposition. If I can be frank, the ambassador listened only to himself. In other words, I didn't really think he was that deep an analyst. I'm not sure, if I had stayed, whether I would have seen any more. I don't know. But it was quite clear to me that the embassy was caught by surprise, even though I was away at the time. There were some very bright political officers in that embassy, some very bright Foreign Service Officers. So, I have no doubt that some of these stirrings were being reported. This was a group of quite able people.

Q: What about your time dealing with the American military? Were they, at the top, at the level where you were dealing, do you think they were aware of the sensitivity, of the problems, of the doings, that their troops were causing?

WEINTRAUB: I think so. They were intelligent men. They were impatient with all of this, and I think they welcomed having a civilian who was trained to look for sensitivities and to provide guidance from time to time on some of these things. I think they appreciated it. I never really sensed any tension or animosity. They were aware of the political sensitivities, but that was not their job in life.

Q: Was there concern about a Communist or an extreme Leftist takeover at the time?

WEINTRAUB: Not really, no. It was pretty clear to most of us that the traditional parties were in control. There were several parties. The Liberal Democratic Party was created about that time. There was really not much question that they would dominate the electoral and the governing process.

Q: Did you get any feel of the role of the Soviet Union there?

WEINTRAUB: I didn't have any of that.

Q: You didn't speak Japanese, but-
WEINTRAUB: I studied it a couple of hours a day. No, I didn't really speak Japanese. I could make simple conversation, that's all.

Q: How about your contacts? Were you mainly working with papers?

WEINTRAUB: Papers? That was one of the problems with a lot of us. There were few people who could speak Japanese, not many. Most of us worked from papers, from governmental contacts of one kind or another, a few journalists, and others - people who, in other words, could speak English. Even those who could speak Japanese had very little contact with the general population. The ability to break into Japanese society by American diplomats, even those who were fluent in Japanese, was quite limited. It was not easy to do. I remember asking a lot of my business friends, Americans, Europeans, if they had much success. They said, "Yes in business. Socially, very little." The embassy personnel who could speak Japanese, even some who had Japanese wives, had similar experiences, except with the family into which they were married. It was not easy. It was a hard assignment. Part of the difficulty of understanding what was going on was that limitation, of being able to easily get around in Japanese society.

Q: You didn't get along with the Ambassador and the Ambassador didn't get along with you.

WEINTRAUB: So I was transferred out.

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JAY P. MOFFAT
Vice Consul
Kobe-Osaka (1958-1960)

Jay P. Moffat, a third generation Foreign Service officer, was born in New York in 1932. His career with the State Department included assignments to Japan, France, Switzerland, Trinidad, Morocco, and an ambassadorship to Chad. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 13, 1989.

Q: Your first posting, you went to Kobe-Osaka. Is that right? This is 1958-60? What were you doing there?

MOFFAT: I was a Vice Consul, and I did consular work -- a year of general consular work and then visas the second year.

Q: Weren't you given the impression that this was a period in which Japan was not yet showing the sort of economic muscle that things were beginning to move there? Do you get any feel about how Japan and the United States were fitting together, at least from the Vice Consul viewpoint?

MOFFAT: In terms of economics, I always like to cite hidden indicators that told us that the boom was on. For example, we lived in a Japanese house, and when we arrived, the "honey bucket" man, as we used to call, him would come and pay for the privilege of emptying the stuff,
and by the time we left, we had to pay him to do it.

Q: In my time, the "honey bucket" man was the man who came and removed the human waste to use for fertilizer. All around the Far East, the fields reeked of this, and it was very good fertilizer -- not very healthy sometimes.

MOFFAT: I would say we were out in left field out in Kobe-Osaka. Douglas MacArthur II was the Ambassador at that time. He never penetrated into our consular district, which was a very close second to the Tokyo area in importance -- never in the two year period. It was also the period that riots were beginning -- demonstrations I should say -- only occasionally riots. We had our share down in Kobe and Osaka, but except for the Korean population, of which there was a considerable number in the area, the demonstrators at that point were very amiable and polite.

Q: This was the time when President Eisenhower was scheduled to come and didn't because of the treatment obviously awaiting him. Were you getting much of this in Kobe-Osaka? And was this anti-American, or was this something else?

MOFFAT: I think it was something else. It certainly was not anti-American in personal terms, and there was no feeling of personal danger. You could walk into the middle of the demonstrations. It was a lively period.

Q: Were you working on things? Was there much to do?

MOFFAT: We were an incompetent bunch down there at that time. We had some good people, but the post was mismanaged. As I say, we were out in left field.

Q: This was a time of change in Japan. Looking at both the time you were there and later on, what should the officers have been doing in Kobe-Osaka during this 58-60 period? The Japanese were beginning to stir.

MOFFAT: I think individual officers were doing the right thing. We had very professional officers below the top two levels. What they did was perspicacious and all the rest of it, but the post was not well run. Embassy Tokyo was absorbed in itself and didn't pay much attention to the provinces, so I think a lot of what we did was wasted or misused. We had a number of Japanese-language officers there who were very able. Again, I was very young, very junior, and I had more than I could handle with my own work and only looking back on it reached these conclusions. Embassy Tokyo was slow to take an interest in what was going on with the Japanese people and in the provinces. This wasn't too long after the war and the occupation arrangements. I think everything lagged behind the developments.

ELLEN M. JOHNSON
Economic Section Secretary
Kobe-Osaka (1958-1961)
Ellen M. Johnson was born in New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1934. Her career in the State Department included assignments in Japan, Poland, England, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Germany. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 27, 1994.

JOHNSON: After being sworn in and experiencing three days of "training," which consisted mostly of looking at and being told about various forms of communication -- the dispatch, the telegram and the airgram -- I packed my bags and sailed for Japan and Kobe-Osaka. The thirteen-day cruise was my first trip outside the United States and was very exciting.

Q: It was a consulate general you were headed for, and you were there from 1958-1961.

JOHNSON: Yes. I discovered afterwards that it was unusual to have a three year tour as a first tour, and I don't know why it was set up that way. A two year tour -- or eighteen months home leave and eighteen months tour -- would have been much better.

Q: What was Japan like at that period?

JOHNSON: It was not the easiest place for a single woman. A nice woman didn't work in those days. One year, I commuted to the Osaka office from Kobe, where I lived in the consulate general compound. It was about a twenty-five minute train ride, and often young Japanese would come up to me to practice their English. I was twenty-three at the time, and there were always the questions, "Where are your parents? What are you doing here?" They were always amazed when I told them I worked at the consulate general.

The Japanese did most of their entertaining at public restaurants, although some of the officers occasionally were invited to a Japanese home. There was only one Japanese that I got to know socially, and that was the head local in the economic section who invited the office over to his house for dinner once. His wife waited on us, but didn't join us at the table. It was almost impossible for a single woman to get to know Japanese at that time.

Westernization was just beginning to creep into the Japanese culture, which made living there much more interesting and different. Once I adjusted to the culture, I enjoyed staying at Japanese inns, strolling around shrines and discovering new ways of doing things. I don't think I would like to return to Japan because I fear it has become too Westernized.

Q: You worked where?

JOHNSON: I was in the econ section doing typical secretarial work.

Q: Who was the consul general then?

JOHNSON: A man by the name of Emory, who previously had worked for AID. This was his first Foreign Service post and I believe his last. He and his wife had a drinking problem which was very evident. The foreign community talked about them all the time, which was very embarrassing to a newcomer to the Service who was proud of being an American and in the
diplomatic service.

We had a wonderful senior Japanese national in the econ section who had his Masters in economics from Harvard. He knew a great deal more than his American supervisor did and in effect, ran the section.

It was a small consulate, although all the usual sections were represented, including CIA, USIA and the military.

Q: Did you get any feel for what we were thinking about the Japanese economy at that time?

JOHNSON: We were trying to encourage the economy at that time. We certainly weren't worried about competition from them yet. Shipbuilding was thriving in the Kobe area, which has one of the largest natural harbors in Japan. The textile industry was also doing well. I don't think anybody thought the automobile industry would develop the way it has. The Toyota was being manufactured, but the electrical system was so poor that people bought a Toyota only when they couldn't afford anything else. If you were important, you drove a four-door, black sedan...an American car!

It was becoming evident that the Japanese were good copiers and thought nothing about flooding markets. Whenever a new fad, like the hula hoop, developed somewhere in the world, most notably in the United States, small cottage industries would spring up immediately throughout Japan, and they would flood the market, soon putting themselves out of business. They would then wait for the next fad and then start manufacturing the new item, again flooding the market. Somebody may have begun at this time to worry about these tactics, which might be used with larger items as well as the Japanese industry developed.

Q: I take it you liked it but didn't like it, is that right?

JOHNSON: I liked it but wasn't very happy with the head man and hoped he was not typical of principal officers. I had a wonderful time in Kobe outside the consulate. There was a large foreign community in Kobe, many of whom were single, British men working in the Kobe branches of various banks and insurance companies. I was young and loved to party. So it was fun. But three years without home leave was long enough. I was in need of a rest and recuperation period by the time I left.

JOSEPH P. DONELAN, JR.
Principal Officer
Nagoya (1958-1961)

Joseph P. Donelan was born and raised in New York City. After serving in the U.S. Army during World War II he attended Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He joined the Foreign Service in 1955 and served in France, Japan, India, as well as Assistant Secretary for Budget and Finance and later
Assistant State Secretary for Administration. Mr. Donelan was interviewed in 1989 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: All right. I'd like to come to Nagoya. You were assigned as principal officer to Nagoya in 1958. How did that come about?

DONELAN: I told you about being a new FSO?

Q: You're saying a new FSO because prior to that you........

DONELAN: When I went to Paris I became a Foreign Service Staff Officer with Attaché status; prior to that and when I was hired for the Foreign Service Planning Division I was a departmental employee.

Q: Civil Service then?

DONELAN: Yes, right. Then I was made an FSS to go to Paris, became an FSO-3 in Paris, and then returned to the Department

Q: Under the Wriston Program.

DONELAN: That's right. I took the short route to become an FSO, Foreign Service Officer; the usual investigations, the essay and appearance before a Board of senior officers from the Embassy. I'll always remember the Chairman of the group, was Fred Lyons, who at the time was Supervising Consul General in Paris - that is in addition to the Embassy responsibility he was responsible for the oversight of the operation of all of the Consular Offices in France. Did you ever know him? He was fine gentleman of the Old School. (I'm not sure if he really approved of the Wriston program, but I made it).

Q: No, I never did know him.

DONELAN: After I was back in the Finance job for about a year and a half, although still technically Director, I went to work for Bill Hall, who was THE Budget Officer for the Department My particular assignment was to work with Ambassador Loy Henderson who then was Deputy Under Secretary for Management, who did all the opening statements on the budget, before the respective Congressional Appropriations Committees. Specifically I prepared supporting documents, briefing book, and helped draft statements for his presentations. I say helped draft statements, because he plunged right in himself, nothing hands off about him. One little quirk, he abhorred "split infinitives" and I never more consciously split an infinitive after working with that marvelous man. In time I got to indicate to him my preference for an overseas assignment, and given his long service abroad he was sympathetic to the idea that a new FSO should rack up overseas time instead of being in the Department Findley Burns was in personnel at the time (guess he went from there to be Ambassador to Jordan) but I let him know that if something came along I didn't think Mr. Henderson would object to my leaving. Shortly thereafter Outerbridge Horsey (one of the famous foreign service names) who was Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo came back to the Department on consultation. Seems he was looking to fill
two jobs in Japan: one was the Executive Officer slot at the Consulate General in Kobe, the other was the Principal Officer job in Nagoya. Findley of the agile mind, said he might talk to Joe Donelan. Outerbridge Horsey said, "Is he a Japanese language officer?" And in his best Findleyesque style, the answer was that he didn't know, but he thought my French was pretty good and maybe my Spanish was okay also.

Horsey did call me and I went to see him. He said he'd looked at my background and history and he said: "I don't know. There are two jobs", and then he described what I had heard about Kobe and Nagoya. He then asked me if I had a choice, which position would I select. I told him that if I were he, in looking at my background one might conclude that I could do the job in Kobe but that my personal preference was the Principal Officer job in Nagoya, where I would have full responsibility for the operation.

Q: So you opted for the PO job. Then what happened?

DONELAN: In about eight weeks, incredibly, along came a cable from Ambassador MacArthur saying he would accept me for the Nagoya job. I almost couldn't believe it….

Q: ... What were your principal duties?

DONELAN: As you know a Consulate is pretty much a branch office of the Embassy, with a political, economic-commercial and consular functions, but with in the case of Nagoya considerable emphasis on economic and commercial work, and of course all usual in the consular line - service to Americans,(very few in the area), issuance of visas, handling ships papers, etc. There were fourteen people on the staff, six Americans and eight foreign national employees. We also had a branch USIS office in Nagoya. My personal responsibility in addition to overseeing the work of the office was in political reporting, such as it was, and maintaining contacts with the Japanese business and government community. Nagoya in addition to being the third largest city in Japan at the time, was the headquarters of the Aichi Prefecture with a Governor resident in Nagoya. It's port was the principal port of entry for American raw cotton bought by the Japanese.

The Embassy would task all the Consulates at different times and for different areas of reporting, for example, labor unions encouraged under the occupation were starting to feel their oats.. and the Embassy would call for a country-wide round-up on what was going on, what was happening or who was doing what to whom in local elections.

Q: Was it easy to report in Japan in about the late 50's? Did you have fairly easy access or not?

DONELAN: Generally yes, the atmosphere was right, business was booming, the Toyota Auto had just begun exporting cars to the States, with I might add not too great success at first, Noritake shipping to some 76 countries, but the US was the best customer; the plywood industry was just getting into stride; Japanese were selling things to the US and they were buying things from the US. It was fascinating. Having been in the Pacific during WW II (Okinawa) I went to Japan with this mental image built in, and when I talked to these people and they were so pleasant and so friendly I used to think, "What is he really thinking? What is going through this
man's mind?" Nagoya was 95% fire bombed in the final months of the war (the site of the Japanese aircraft industry). I wonder how many of his relatives were killed? You had to think a lot.

But an incident occurred, a natural disaster, the result of which gave me incredible entry in the community. The worst typhoon in Japanese history swept up the Ise Bay, almost crushed the city of Nagoya, and in passing flooded the port areas, up-rooted trees, power lines, smashed thousands of homes and killed some 6,000 people. As Consul I found myself in charge of the American relief operation.

Q: That was in '58?

DONELAN: This was in '59. We had gotten to Japan in August of 1958, and it was now May 1959. It's a long story. But power was out for days, houses down the street from me were sliced in half; my car was immobilized under some huge trees which fell, and I got to the Consulate the morning of the first day by bicycle. I got in touch with the Embassy through the Japanese Tactical Air Wing Communications operation in nearby Gifu. Relief supplies were in by NorthWest Airline; Admiral Kivette who was the commander of the Sixth Fleet sent in a small aircraft carrier the USS Kearsage which was on its way for duty in Japan; we had forty eight American helicopters, Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force working off of a huge field in front of the City Hall; the Kearsage sent boats and medical parties out over the flooded areas, the choppers dropped food, blankets and fire wood to the little islands of people on the clumps of land which had been the high ground, and they picked up hundreds and hundreds people and lifted them to safety. They did the work and the American Consulate got the credit. And the credit line was almost inexhaustible.

Q: I notice you received a superior service award. Was this because of the ...

DONELAN: That was just one of those things. A piece of paper the Department gave you.

Q: Well, they don't pass them out too often.

DONELAN: That was basically what it was all about, yes.

Q: Well, how were your relations at the post with Tokyo? Did you find that it worked well or not so well?

DONELAN: I think the relationships were really good. I went to Tokyo infrequently, but I preferred Nagoya to Tokyo anyway. The Embassy would call us in for special occasions, like briefings and preparations for special Trade Missions, who then came to our districts. Ambassador MacArthur came for a visit for a few days and it was a whirlwind, but successful. He was very popular being a namesake of the General, but extremely capable in his own right. After MacArthur left, Reischauer became Ambassador, a very distinguished man, who knew more of the Japanese language than many Japanese.
I had one big battle with the Dept of Commerce in Washington who seemed to think that the Japanese were never right, but the Embassy, and our Minister for Economic Affairs really supported my position and you can't ask any better than that.

Q: That was the Economic Counselor in Tokyo?

DONELAN: Actually he had ministerial rank. He's long since retired but I believe he's still with Brookings, here in Washington. But, the fact is, the support was excellent.

Q: I'd like to move on. You worked a relatively short time as Consul General in Tokyo. Was that long enough to talk about really before you moved to New Delhi?

DONELAN: Not really. In fact I've always said it must have been the shortest tenure as Consul General on record. It's probably worth noting that the Foreign Service Inspectors came to Nagoya to inspect the operation. They said three and a half years in Nagoya was enough and I should move on to a larger operation. I really didn't want to go. Nagoya was the greatest experience in my career; I took a Japanese lesson every day; gave speeches all over the place; traveled throughout the Consular District; went to factories; plant openings. The Inspectors meant well, but I thought now they're moving me just when I really know this place.

We went on home leave, and then on to Tokyo. We were there some weeks, and on the day that Mrs. Donelan finally cleared the last of the excelsior and packing material out of the apartment, a Personnel Officer in the Department phoned the Embassy. Now in those days for the Department to make a phone call to Tokyo, you knew there was big trouble. The upshot of it was that I was transferred to New Delhi.

WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN, JR.
Political Officer
Tokyo (1958-1962)

Ambassador Gleysteen was born in China of Missionary parents. Educated at Yale and Harvard Universities, he entered the Foreign Service in 1951. After service in the State Department’s Executive Secretariat, Mr. Gleysteen studied Chinese and was subsequently posted to Taipei, Hong Kong, and to Seoul, Korea, where he served as Ambassador from 1978 to 1981. He also served in Washington with the National Security Council and in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. The Ambassador was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1997.

Q: In 1958, you were transferred to the Political Section in Tokyo. Was that an assignment you had sought?

GLEYSTEEN: Yes, as I recall, I did seek the assignment, although it was one of several possibilities offered by Personnel. I was attracted by the opportunity to work in a political
section, and I had an interest in Japan. The combination seemed ideal for me.

As a junior officer in the Political Section, my job was to report on Japan's relations with China, Taiwan, Korea, and East Asia generally as well as to assist the ambassador in a vigorous US effort to promote normalization of relations between Japan and Korea. Like my assignment to Embassy Taipei, my posting to Tokyo began with a jinx. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur complained about the Department's sending him a Chinese language officer who didn't know Japanese. Probably for lack of alternatives, the Department dug in its heels. I survived pretty well for four years despite a very real handicap.

Ironically, MacArthur, having complained about my language inadequacies, seemed to enjoy interrupting my language study. I used to come to the Chancery one hour early every day and worked hard on the language. MacArthur, an early riser, would call me almost every morning - usually about fifteen minutes after my lesson had started - and often give me an assignment to be done "immediately." These tasks could have been easily left for the regular working day, but he persisted to the point that my language teacher just got tired of waiting outside while I did whatever MacArthur wanted. It got so bad, I was eventually forced to drop my lessons.

My language deficit was a detriment to my work; I had to use translators and interpreters. I leaned heavily on some my colleagues in the political and economic sections, particularly Al Seligmann and Rick Straus, to help me; they were very kind to do so. Fortunately, most of my contacts in the Foreign Ministry spoke English, and I was able to use my Chinese extensively in my work on China. For example, the head of the China Office in the Foreign Ministry, Okada, did not speak English; we communicated in Chinese in which we both were adequately fluent.

Something over half my time was spent under Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II with Edwin O. Reischauer succeeding him in 1961. Bill Leonhart was DCM for most of my time in Tokyo, although John Emerson took over in my final months. Among the political counselors, the one I remember the best was Coburn Kidd-a German specialist. He was a wonderful, fine officer, but he was a rookie to East Asia. He was replaced by Jack Goodyear, another new comer to the Japanese scene, as was MacArthur. Dave Osborn, the senior officer in the section, knew Japan well as did several others. I don't know whether there was a conscious attempt made to bring Europeanists to Japan; probably not. MacArthur was given his assignment because Japan was the largest post in Asia and he was being rewarded for service under Eisenhower at NATO. Having served much of his life in Europe, he was attracted to officers with similar experiences, such as Leonhart who succeeded Outerbridge Horsey, another Europeanist. In part this was the result of an over-supply in the service of European experts; they still dominated the personnel system and got first choices. The Japanese language officers got second pickings. This European bias in embassy Tokyo had a minor negative impact on staff morale. There was some resentment about key jobs going to people unfamiliar with the territory, particularly when there were available well qualified officers who knew Japan and Asia. Of course, these officers had to do all the work anyway. They were the heart and soul of the embassy.

In any event, the embassy seemed to function pretty effectively. With a major exception of messages bearing on policy issues, which I will discuss later, the embassy was proficient in its reporting. There was not much interference from the top with normal political and economic
reporting on domestic or foreign affairs-so long as it was not on a hot topic or policy matter. There were adequate numbers of Japanese language officers throughout the structure.

I shared an office with Martin Herz and later Jim Sutterlin who dealt with revision of the Security Treaty and Okinawa. Although we both reported to the political counselor, we usually worked very directly with the ambassador and DCM, who hovered over our shoulders because they knew Washington was particularly interested in the subjects we covered. Thanks to understanding political counselors, plus our own active effort to maintain solidarity with our colleagues, this peculiar system worked tolerably well. My ready access to the ambassador certainly saved me a lot of time and gave me more authority in dealing with outsiders than was usual for a relatively junior second secretary.

I had an enviable position in the embassy - even under MacArthur and certainly under Reischauer. I had ample status with my colleagues, and contacts in Japan seemed relatively easy to make even as a non-Japanese speaker. At the Foreign Ministry my contacts were normally at the office director level, quite senior in the Japanese tradition. Not infrequently I would go up a level to the director general of Asian Affairs or his deputy. That of course was exceptional in the Japanese bureaucracy; Japanese officers at my level and age were astonished that I had to gall to ask to see these high level officials, even more that I was received by them. Some of the junior officers - all very high officials later - resented me for this and occasionally told me so over drinks. My view was that as a representative of the US government, I should try to contact the highest level official who would see me. My success was probably a hangover from occupation days. The practice is certainly over now.

In general, the living conditions of the American staff were good. We didn't like living in the embassy's huge housing compound, because it inhibited work as a political officer; e.g. Socialist Party members would refuse to come to the compound, and if they were to have tried visiting us, they might well have been turned away by the police guarding the compound. After about nine months, we finally got permission to rent a house - to which Japanese would come.

Of my tasks, the hottest issue was Korea. Thirteen years after Japan's surrender, Japan and Korea still had not established diplomatic relations. The Koreans had a substantial Mission in Tokyo from occupation days; the Japanese had no representation whatever in Korea and were pretty well barred from most activity in Korea. The atmosphere between the former colonial ruler and the resentful victim of its imperialism was tense. The main disputes were: fisheries; treatment of Koreans in Japan; repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea; and reparations or "compensation" for the colonial period. Some of those issues are still alive today.

The repatriation of Koreans to North Korea was in many ways a more contentious issue between Japan and ourselves than between Japan and Korea. Having been brought as almost slave labor to Japan during WWII, Koreans who wished to return to South Korea had been allowed to leave shortly after the end of the war; not so for those from North Korea. When it became possible in 1959 for these people to return to North Korea, the Japanese were prepared to assist the return. We objected because a voluntary return of anybody to a communist police state was virtually unthinkable for us in the midst of our ideological fervor. We dragged our feet and tried to impose our wishes on Japan. The Japanese managed quite skillfully to pacify us, using third party
(International Red Cross) inspections to insure that return was voluntary. Fairly large numbers returned to the North.

The Japanese and Koreans struggled or bickered over everything, often violently in the case of fisheries. President Syngman Rhee frequently whipped up anti-Japan nationalism to deflect domestic criticism of his heavy handed rule; the Japanese in turn often infuriated the Koreans - and sometimes us - by their patronizing attitude and behavior toward their former colonial subjects. Steering around these rocks was a constant challenge, and despite enormous effort on our part, we made little real progress until Rhee was overthrown in 1960 and Park Chung Hee came to power a year later with a clear understanding that his great plans for Korea's economic development wouldn't work without a reconciliation with Japan. Beginning in 1961, the two countries became really serious about normalization. They welcomed our good offices, and quickly established a practical, if still tense, working relationship. Normalization occurred in 1965 while I was in Hong Kong.

I discussed our efforts toward Japan-Korea normalization in an article I wrote for the Japan Foundation’s quarterly publication, Kokusai Koryu. Written from memory, I dubbed it a "fragment of oral history." I understand it will be attached as Annex A.

China and Taiwan were also lively issues for Japan in those days. The Chinmen-Matsu off-shore islands had led to a major dispute in 1958 between the two Chinas. The Japanese were very uneasy about our tough but defensive position; in fact, the issue had caused a semi-crisis in US-Japan relations before I arrived. In 1959 the Japanese were still nervous, though less so once Khrushchev publicly disassociated the Soviet Union from Mao Zedong's militant posture.

In general the Japanese favored a softer line with the PRC. Within Japan, there were several voices. The LDP reluctantly supported us; the Socialists opposed us - the left wing Socialists particularly because they were very close to the Communist Party. But within all parties there were cleavages - moderates and extremists. Sorting out who was on which side was sometimes very complicated, but I found it extremely interesting. I had to know which faction favored what if I were to have a dialogue with them.

Despite much sympathy for Taiwan, Japanese generally felt China was more important to them than Taiwan, and if it had been left to a majority vote, the country would have switched recognition long before 1972. However, the conservative, anti-communists who dominated US China policy also kept Japan in line by firm advice and trade offs, beginning with Prime Minister Yoshida during negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty, and still continuing while I was in Tokyo. I spent a great deal of time talking to varieties of Japanese in contact with China: officials, politicians, and journalists. From these contacts I tried to convey an accurate assessment of Japanese opinion, and, of course, did my duty in explaining our own policy - even though I was out of sympathy with some aspects of it. My years in Tokyo were a wonderful introduction to the kind of detailed analysis that I had to do when moved to Hong Kong in 1962.

As in most of my posts I had relatively close relationships with CIA officers dealing with my subjects. Don Gregg, one of my successors as ambassador to Korea, was one of my counterparts in Tokyo and I got along very well with him. I was generally aware what the Station was
reporting and doing in my areas of responsibility. My considerable contact with CIA people was very helpful to me - and I hope to them.

Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty during 1958-60 was the defining issue during my tour in Tokyo. I think we were caught off guard. In seeking modification, we were genuinely motivated by a desire to ease Japanese concerns and naturally assumed our move would be welcomed in Japan. We were of course aware of strong opposition to the revision - and the whole Treaty for that matter - from the Socialist and Communist parties. Since militant leftists had not been able to prevent the original Treaty from being ratified and were not in control of the Diet or the government, we didn't believe they would succeed in blocking the Treaty's revision. What we underestimated was the existence within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of a substantial dovish faction, which had some sympathy for the left's views.

Back during the Korean war, the US military used Japan as a rear base for operations on the peninsula. Even after the end of our occupation of Japan, the new security treaty gave us the right to use bases in Japan for the defense of Japan and the Far East. The Japanese were concerned that some provisions of the Treaty were inconsistent with Japan's rights as a sovereign nation; in particular that US activities under the Treaty might automatically drag Japan into war in the face of a strongly pacifist mood among its people.

From the beginning, the treaty was severely criticized by leftists and others, and that stimulated the conservatives, who supported the treaty, to push for treaty changes that might dampen public criticism. I was in Washington at the time-a young civil servant. I remember cables from the embassy in the mid-1950s suggesting the Treaty should be revised. MacArthur, who was the counselor of the department at the time, was responsive, and when he later became ambassador in Tokyo he got Washington's agreement to revision. Americans in general thought the Japanese would be receptive, underestimating opposition sentiment. The process of revision opened up a great debate on Japan's role in the world based on its history and future. I am convinced we missed the passion of this in our initial reporting.

When the revision process came to its final stages in 1959-60, the opposition used bodily force and other blocking tactics, provoking the government into foolish responses. After the opposition physically prevented the government's efforts to have the Treaty ratified by its large majority in the Diet, the LDP steam-rollered ratification through by stealth. There were other instances of undemocratic behavior that dismayed the public and middle of the road forces, adding tension to the national debate. My sense was that the debate was most vigorous among young people, particularly intellectuals. There were more disaffected people than we had assumed. In the midst of the storm, James Haggerty, President Eisenhower's press secretary, arrived in Tokyo to prepare the way for the president's long-scheduled visit. The students went on a rampage at Haneda Airport, physically attacking Haggerty's car, threatening his party, and forcing him to continue his journey to Tokyo by helicopter. This outburst of student protest and violence culminated a couple of years later in extraordinary extremism - extensive burning and closing of Tokyo University as well as the formation of the "Red Army" and its terrorist tactics. In the chancery that evening, the atmosphere was extremely tense, since we feared things might rip out of control. With most of my seniors at the airport with Haggerty, I remember summoning up all my unexalted authority to order the Naval Attache, a US Navy captain, to pull back from the
windows where he was running frantically back and forth with a loaded automatic rifle. I was convinced his behavior would prove incendiary if he were seen by the angry clouds outside.

The protests continued after Haggerty's departure. With the public looking on neutrally, huge numbers of students and left-wing union members occupied the center city area near our chancery and the Diet building to stage noisy but largely peaceful demonstrations. Several times a day I had to pass through a sea of them on my way to and from work or going to the embassy annex a few blocks away. With rare exception I found the students cheerful and rather friendly, the labor unionists less so but not hostile. Eventually, however, the tactics of both demonstrators and police became rougher, and violence broke out in the vicinity of the Diet. As I recall at least two students, including a girl, were killed; quite a few others were injured. The protest movement persisted until the government finally capitulated and canceled the Eisenhower visit.

I certainly fault the embassy for its management and reporting of this whole affair. We left the impression that the LDP, which had been formed by the amalgamation of the Liberal and Democratic parties, was strongly in favor of treaty revision. This basic embassy view, effectively dictated by MacArthur and Leonhart, understated the depth of the opposition to the revision, even in conservative circles, and it discounted the degree of popular opposition. So when opposition voices were finally heard loud and clear before the president's scheduled visit, it was an enormous embarrassment to the US in general and the American embassy in Tokyo in particular.

Clearly, MacArthur and Leonhart, who were so confident about everything and so eager to have a successful summit meeting in Tokyo, deserve most of the blame. The political section - and CIA - at least tried to introduce a cautionary note through comments from lower level Foreign Ministry officials, journalists, and politicians who questioned prospects for treaty ratification. Some of this material was reported but usually in a low key manner and framework of ultimate confidence. As the unrest progressed after ratification and fissures appeared within the LDP, many Japanese wondered why we could not see what was coming; it was so obvious to them that the Japanese Government was having second thoughts about the desirability of proceeding with the Eisenhower visit. At this point some key officers of the Section took a stand, urging cancellation or delay. John Stegmaier, a man with a real feel for the Japanese mood, was one of them. For the most part these late signals and embassy second thoughts were not reported or not reported accurately. To put it bluntly, MacArthur's and Leonhart's censorship played a major role in the embassy's mishandling of the visit.

Of course, there was some collective responsibility for the embassy's misjudgements. My colleagues covering Japan's domestic scene should have been more alert to the extent of domestic opposition, particularly within the LDP. Herz and I should also have had a better sense of it. We all should have tried harder to warn Washington. All of us were too influenced by the steadily optimistic line taken by MacArthur and Leonhart. However, these two men were really responsible for the mess. The worse things became, the more compulsive their confidence. Trapped by earlier misjudgments, they squelched pessimistic reports and misleadingly jazzed up embassy assessments. Their role was reprehensible - sometimes stunningly dishonest.

By happenstance I was present as the note taker when Prime Minister Kishi sent one of his
cabinet members, a close confidant, to tell Ambassador MacArthur that the government had reluctantly concluded President Eisenhower should not visit Japan during his East Asian swing. Despite forewarning intelligence, MacArthur appeared surprised and stunned, and for a while he tried to argue with the messenger. More understandably, Washington also was stunned by the turn of events, because even after weeks of turmoil in Japan, the embassy had persisted with its flawed assessment.

It would have been helpful if the US government had a better comprehension of the ambivalence existing in Japan regarding the Treaty. We might have been more active in trying to calm Japanese fears of being dragged into a conflict between Cold War antagonists, explaining more clearly to them the advantages of a US-Japan Security Treaty. We should have worked harder in general and particularly with the LDP to prevent the Diet debacle. In fact, we may have inadvertently fostered LDP parliamentary errors, because we pushed so hard for prompt action on the revision vote. In any event, the US government failed to understand the reality of the Japanese public mood, a mood which sustained the demonstrations and the Diet maneuvers that eventually forced cancellation of Eisenhower's visit.

In the long run, revision of the Security Treaty was good for Japan; in the short run, the process of revision and the need to cancel a US Presidential visit was an enormous strain and humiliation. The Japanese were relieved when the trip was canceled but at the same time ashamed. The humiliation was made worse by the overwhelming reception Eisenhower received in Seoul.

As a result of the confrontation, Prime Minister Kishi resigned and was replaced by Ikeda. I was assigned as escort officer for the congressional delegation that came for Ikeda's inauguration or equivalent ceremony. Ikeda received the delegation at a garden party accompanied by his entire cabinet. He apologized for all the confusion, promised to sustain good relations with us, and announced the powerful economic development drive that later led to the coining of the phrase "Japan, Inc." When the head of the congressional delegation got up to respond, he forgot his entire briefing. He didn't know Ikeda's name, didn't know Ikeda was the prime minister, and couldn't figure out why "this nice Japanese gentleman" was being so hospitable. I was so dumfounded I don't remember what I did.

My complaint about intellectual dishonesty in Embassy Tokyo is not a casual one. During this period MacArthur and Leonhart bullied their staff into conveying a picture of steadiness and progress which was contrary to reality. Finagling with the truth was a problem throughout MacArthur's and Leonhart's tenure. I remember one message which I wrote reporting a conversation with the director general of the Foreign Ministry's Asian Bureau regarding Dutch behavior in Indonesia. Leonhart, who seemed to favor the Dutch over the Indonesians, completely changed the thrust of my telegram by casually revising my verbatim quotes. It was so bad I told him I would not sign the telegram. If he insisted on sending it, he would have to be shown as the drafting officer. Leonhart backed down after a couple of hours of reflection, but we didn't talk for a couple of days.

I had similar confrontations with MacArthur. There were times when he would disguise his authorship of an idea by reporting it as a Japanese one, for example putting his own words in the
mouth of the foreign minister in meetings that I attended as the note-taker. He would also fudge the facts in reporting cables, suggesting in the commentary that the Japanese had originated an idea or approved it when in fact there was no sympathy at all with the US view. Effectively, we were conveying a distorted picture to Washington. When I confronted MacArthur over this practice he laughed me off, but the practice stopped at least in my messages.

I especially remember my refusal to include MacArthur's nasty invective about Marshall Green, our charge in Seoul, in a message to Washington. I won the battle. Even my softened version of the message brought a rebuke from the State Department - asking both Tokyo and Seoul to mind our manners. I don't think I solicited the Department's action, but it was beautifully timed.

Perhaps, I was caught up in this kind of conflict more than others because of my personal standards but I suspect the main reason was my working so often directly with the ambassador and DCM without the political counselor serving as an intermediary. Fortunately for me, my stubbornness eventually led to a more satisfactory relationship with the front office - far better than some my colleagues who failed to draw a line in the sand.

While on this subject, I might mention the effect on the embassy of the ambassadorial change from MacArthur to Reischauer. It was tremendous. MacArthur was viewed by the embassy as a little dictator. He was uniformly disliked. There was considerable criticism about his lack of appreciation and understanding of Japan; he rarely left Tokyo to visit other parts of Japan. Because of these characteristics and the censorship that he and Leonhart exercised over a key sector of embassy reporting, the atmosphere in the embassy was overbearing - in some sense, I suspect it was very much like the atmosphere generated by his uncle General MacArthur a decade earlier. The nephew was equally high handed and equally full of himself.

So when MacArthur left, there was a great sense of relief in the embassy. Bill Leonhart served as charge. He was just a little less unpopular than MacArthur. He also had a huge ego. He was very competent and intellectually superior to MacArthur. But he suffered from the same weakness: a compulsion to control all things in the embassy - reports, personnel assignments, etc. Substantively, he and MacArthur viewed Japan in the same way.

As chargé, Leonhart took some very strange actions, so strange I thought he might be off his rocker. For example, he issued orders about working on Saturdays, about duty officers on Sunday, and finally a statement about wives' "obligations." Today, those orders would be attacked in court; in those days, they just seemed out of line or crazy. By pure coincidence, an inspection had begun just as MacArthur was leaving, and Leonhart got himself into terrible trouble with the inspectors. The orders that I just mentioned were rescinded, and I believe that the unfavorable inspection report effected both men's subsequent careers. MacArthur was offered the ambassadorship to Belgium, rather than one of the large posts that he really sought.

Reischauer was popular. The political section had some initial reservations that he might be naive. He had written an article for Foreign Affairs which mentioned the "broken dialogue" between Japan and the US, suggesting that the Embassy needed to broaden its outreach to include the opposition, especially the Socialists. Obviously he was not well informed about our extensive contacts with the Socialists. Despite some brief resentment over this, Reischauer was
known to us as a highly influential Japan scholar who knew the country well. Moreover, after he arrived any concern about him seemed to evaporate relatively quickly. He was very open to the staff and it responded to his civilized style. Not everything was as I would have liked it, but in contrast to MacArthur, Reischauer was a real blessing. More important, the Japanese responded well to Reischauer, seeing his appointment as the end of an undeclared "post occupation era" under the general's nephew. Reischauer had certain prejudices about Japan, but they were honorable and the embassy staff could live with them without much difficulty. His arrival gave the embassy a new lease on life. Control from the front office was much more benign - far less domineering. I found that Reischauer shared my views on China, and almost immediately, the embassy began to take different line on the PRC's relations with Japan and its neighbors. Whenever we could, we stressed the need for direct US-PRC communication. I was delighted. His views on Korea were similar to MacArthur's but he was more imaginative and considerate. In general the embassy loosened up. Reischauer never tried to censor my reports. In fact, unless the report had something to do directly with him, Reischauer didn't insist on prior approval; he would simply read a copy of what was sent.

So much for the nature of Embassy Tokyo and the problems we faced during my tour. Let me ramble on a bit about the way Japan was looking at the world and itself at that time. When I arrived in Japan in 1958, it was the end of the post-occupation period. The Peace Treaty signed in 1951 formally ended the occupation, but it still took another decade for us to stop trying to guide Japan's domestic affairs. During this period, Japan's economy was beginning to perform very well; GDP was increasing every year by large percentages. There were unmistakable signs of the "new Japan." Actually there were two co-existing Japanese societies, new and old, and both very visible in Tokyo. Sony had a new gleaming white transistor manufacturing plant that was the state of the art. The Japanese military, given their close relationship with US forces, were was pretty much up to date. The Japanese bureaucracy, particularly that part involved in new initiatives such as industrial development and foreign assistance, was modern minded. On the other hand, there was also the "old Japan." One could still see lots of small manufacturing plants that were quite primitive. The taxis were dirty and worn; the drivers from the countryside didn't know the city and drove recklessly. Getting one's car fixed properly was difficult. The criteria that we use today to judge Japan's modernity were just beginning to emerge. Back then Japan might have been categorized as a "developing country in some respects." Today everything is done with white gloves on. That was not so in the 1950s….

…Now let me get into greater detail about the Japan-PRC relationship. They did not have diplomatic relations; Japan recognized Taiwan as the government of China, just as we did. But behind this facade, considerable contact developed. PRC officials came to Tokyo where they visited with foreign ministry officials, politicians, and businessmen. Our rules precluded my seeing them. Generally, our Japanese and foreign hosts took this prohibition into account whenever they invited us to social functions. They accepted it as being a silly rule. There were a number of LDP politicians who visited Beijing in addition to greater numbers of Socialists, often shown making deferential approaches to Mao Zedong. So a substantial relationship was developing. Trade was growing. The LDP was trying hard to prevent the Socialists and Communists from monopolizing relations with the PRC. That approach was not viable with our stubborn policy and got the LDP and government into hot water with us on occasion.
The United States tried vigorously to block Japanese contacts with the PRC, sometimes in feckless ways. We sought to hinder the growth of trade as much as we could; failing that, we tolerated trade in civilian areas, such as agriculture, but correctly we stood firm in our objections to Japanese exports of advanced technology and items that could be used for military purposes.

Our negative posture did not change measurably during the four years I was in Japan, but it was clear to me by 1962 that Japan-China relations would grow closer as time passed - regardless of our policy stance. Furthermore, I felt that the Japanese were right and we were wrong. From the beginning of my Foreign Service career until Nixon's visit, I thought the US was wrong in its China policy. This made my tasks sometimes very difficult.

The Japanese had been forced to recognize Taiwan as part of the peace treaty process. They maintained better than just "proper" relations with the Nationalists in part because Chiang Kai-shek had forsworn a demand for reparations. In addition, the Japanese had a nostalgia for Taiwan, their former colony. Unlike Korea, the people of Taiwan had a view of Japan that was almost positive. The occupation had been much more benevolent than Korea's, and some compared Japanese behavior favorably to the early years of Nationalist rule.

Although economic considerations helped drive Japan toward a closer relationship with Beijing, the Japanese wanted to get along with the government on the mainland for moral and strategic reasons as well. Following the disaster of the war against China, the prevalent view by this time was that it would be smarter for Japan to accommodate itself to the powerful ruling government in mainland China. They hoped a closer relationship would advance Japan's security and trade interests. The Japanese thought that we should be more understanding of their position, and I thought they were absolutely right.

There were also some sentimental factors at work, although these were often exaggerated by Japanese under the influence of alcohol. Japanese felt indebted to China for its influence on their culture, and quite a few of them were genuinely remorseful about the barbarity of their past behavior. In those days the Koreans didn't fare so well; the Japanese were much more deferential towards China than Korea.

When I was in Tokyo, the Japanese were much less concerned about China's military strength than we were; there was some talk about Chinese power having a negative effect on Japan, requiring perhaps some degree of remilitarization, but the concern was buffered by the alliance with us. Japan-China relations are much more complicated today than they were in the 1950s and 1960s.

We also spent a lot of time on the Soviet Union. Washington in its directives to us tended to assume a relatively monolithic communist world. Most of us in Tokyo felt differently and when talking to Japanese, we tried to express our views in more sophisticated ways than the black and white oratory stemming from Washington. To their credit the Japanese had a rather accurate sense of complex relations within the communist camp. They would stress that the Chinese communists were quite different from those in the Soviet Union and that within the Chinese Communist Party there were divisions about domestic and foreign issues. The Japanese would provide me with the analysis of their intelligence community, which I eagerly reported to.
Washington. particularly since I agreed with much of the Japanese analysis. My reporting was well received at least by some factions in Washington. Since strains were becoming so apparent in Soviet-Chinese relations, it is amazing to me that our ideologues managed to hold off a realistic assessment for so long….

…Last, I might just make few remarks about the Japanese decision-making process. When I was in Tokyo - and I think this is still very much the case - bureaucrats, all the way down to lower levels, played a powerful role and were exceptionally aware of the political context in which they operated. For example, in making recommendations to the office director, the third ranking officer in the Korean section of the Foreign Ministry would know our views, probably from being the silent note-taker at a variety of our meetings with Foreign Ministry officials. He would also be familiar with opinions of key Diet members, often by having talked to politicians himself as a result of personal relationships. My sense was that Japanese bureaucrats were more knowledgeable of views in the Diet than we were about the Congress. This exposure helped young officials shape decisions to be approved by their bosses. Incidentally the number three on the Korea or China desk was often a marked man expected to rise to deputy foreign minister or ambassador. Many of the senior officials I worked with later started there.

In addition, every level of the bureaucracy was more conservative than the one below - which is not uncommon in any bureaucracy. Decisions made by consensus moving upwards were hard to overturn; sometimes we did succeed but it was always tough sledding. The process gave the Japanese bureaucracy an image of independent power, but it was not quite as self-contained as people imagined. It is interesting to note that much of the consensus building between the government and the politicians was done at junior levels. That these officials could advise their superiors about political sentiment struck me as quite a contrast to the Department of State.

In conclusion to these long winded comments I must say that my Japan assignment was one of the best I ever had. It was fascinating. I witnessed some tumultuous events which were part of Japan's effort as an independent, sovereign nation trying to wean itself away from the dependent psychology associated with the American occupation. Furthermore, I found the embassy's management under MacArthur and Leonhart a negative learning experience I will never forget. I was lucky that during the early part of my career I was in a political section that gave me heavy exposure to the embassy's front office and the opportunity to work with so many gifted officers. That was invaluable and served me well in my later assignments.

ROBERT S. STEVEN
Consular Officer
Tokyo (1959-1961)

Mr. Steven was born in Massachusetts and raised there and in Rhode Island. He graduated from Brown University and served in the US Army before entering the Foreign Service in 1957. Mr. Steven became a specialist Latin America, where he served in Mexico, Chile and Argentina. He also served in Burma, Vietnam and Japan and had several senior assignments at the State Department in
STEVEN: In ‘59 we went out to Tokyo; I think it was midsummer.

Q: Obviously being in the management business you had a chance to pretty well work your own, so why Tokyo?

STEVEN: Well, I’d been in Okinawa and I was interested in the culture, and I hadn’t gotten to Japan during the time I was there. There was an assignment that looked interesting, a consular assignment. Having been a major in sociology and with my family background, I was more interested in people than I was in policy. In consular work you’re going to meet lots of people and work directly with human beings. So there was an opening there a consular office, a vice consul slot in the consular section in Tokyo, and my wife was thinking Tokyo would be an interesting place to go. So off we went. Those in our generation remember that in those days we traveled first class. By golly, we flew out to San Francisco on United Airlines, but then in San Francisco they put us on one of the old Boeing Stratocruisers of Pan American Airways, the double-decker.

Q: Double-decker, yes, with bunks.

STEVEN: And we were first-class passengers. Before they started the engines, the captain came back and greeted me by name, “Mr. Steven, we’re so glad to have you aboard going to your assignment in Japan.” Wow! That was the one and only time I was ever personally greeted on a flight. But off we flew to Japan with one young child and got settled in there as a vice consul in the consular section.

Q: You were there from ‘59 to when?

STEVEN: ‘61, two years.

Q: How would you describe the situation in Japan at that time?

STEVEN: It was fascinating because the security treaty was coming up for renegotiation, renewal, in Japan and there were many Japanese opposed to the presence of American troops, etcetera, so there were riots going on, the famous riots. There was an organization called the Zen Nakurin, they were students.

Q: There were students - I remember seeing pictures - with headbands and they did snake dances.

STEVEN: And one technique was a fascinating one. They would line up 30 or 40 across and take a pole about this thick and they would wrap their arms around the pole and then march forward and it made a battering ram just like this with that pole, lengthwise so they just held on to the pole, and it made it extremely difficult to stop them because they were being pushed from behind by more students. We watched them go down the width of the street, the pole having been scientifically measured to the width of the street, and then the police in front with their shields
were in a solid line, their shields locked together, and then they would be pushed back. They would retreat back a few yards, and then the whistles would blow and the police would surge forward and push the students back. The discipline was astonishing. There was no bloodshed, there was no fighting as we now see it. Nobody threw anything at the police. It was all chanting and shouting and bullhorns and push and then push. I never saw a missile in the air. I never saw any teargas. It was beautifully disciplined, choreographed shall we say. Nobody ever came near us. I remember once when the building where the consulate was - it was not at the embassy; it was a block away - going out the door there to walk up to the embassy were these enormous crowds of chanting, yelling people out there. And as soon as I stepped out on the steps they opened a path for me, and I walked through, the Japanese, and greeted people and said, “Good morning.” They said, “Good morning,” and they bowed, and I continued on up to the embassy, and they closed behind me and kept yelling. It was a wonderful exposure; for a sociologist. What a different type of a mentality it was.

Q: **Who was our ambassador at that time?**

STEVEN: When I got there it was Douglas MacArthur II. Douglas was the nephew of the general, had taken his name. His wife was the daughter of Alben Barkley, the vice president, Wahwee. We had the interesting experience of working with them for about the first 18 months of our tour over there. I met the ambassador himself probably three time in the entire tour. I was with all the vice consuls in a different building, so logically I didn’t see him. It was an interesting to be there to watch the style, the imperious style, of a man who I think consciously probably tried to pattern himself after his uncle. It was fascinating. And, of course, Wahwee has a reputation, you know as well as I do...

Q: **But did your wife run across Mrs. MacArthur?**

STEVEN: Oh, yes, yes, yes, my wife was then active, as wives were expected to be, in things like the women’s association and so, yes, she’d be at the residence and working on something. She wanted, as I think most of the young wives did, just to step very carefully and try to behave.

Q: **Were you there when the president came out? Eisenhower was supposed to make a visit.**

STEVEN: Oh, yes, yes, he was there.

Q: **How did that go, from your perspective?**

STEVEN: I remember distinctly the honor in the position that I was given. I and another junior vice consul were assigned to be at the airport when the party arrived and the two of us were to take personal charge of the President’s personal bags and his family’s bags, and we were to make sure that those bags were taken straight to the residence - I guess he was staying in the diplomatic residence - and our job was to ensure that those bags reached the residence and were properly installed in their rooms. I thought, wow, this is an honor, the Presidential baggage. Plans were going on, and a good friend of mine, Bob German - do you remember Robert German? He left the Service many years ago, but he was known then. He was the ambassador’s aide, staff assistant. He was the coordinator for the Eisenhower visit. I do remember all of us
assembled in the cafeteria of the consulate building. It was the final briefing. Everybody had their folders, their assignments. Everybody was coordinating everything. Bob was sitting there working on it, and somebody came in and handed him a piece of paper, looked like a telegram, and he looked at it and just sort of sat there in silence looking at this thing, and then he reached down - he had this folder thick with a lot of paper in it - pulled it up and looked at it. Then he took a deep breath and he threw it into the air, throwing paper all over the room, just a tremendous heave. He said, “He ain’t comin’!” - I’ll always remember that scene - ”He ain’t comin’” and threw the papers up in the air, and that was the end of it.

Q: This was a terrible shock to the Japanese.

STEVEN: Well, to probably the government, but there probably were just as many in the Japanese population who had no problem at all with the American President not being able to come.

Q: You mentioned how polite the Japanese were even when they were demonstrating. Did you find that being an American was giving you any problem in your daily...?

STEVEN: No, no, not at all. If anything, probably it was an advantage socially. You had money, which they didn’t have in many cases, and you had access to military facilities, PX’s, things of that nature. The Japanese invariably were polite. I think probably as late as the time we were there, they still had the image, and we, after all, were the conquerors. We had been the occupying power. The respect that the Japanese gave to us carried over to diplomats. I recall no single incident in two years in Japan of any rudeness or anti-American personal reaction. It was always polite and open and receptive. We made a few Japanese friends, which was difficult to do. We were not fluent in Japanese, but we made some personal friends, were invited to a few homes, which again was unusual. The Japanese don’t normally entertain at home; they take you to a restaurant or something. It was a good two years, and I enjoyed it. I rotated through the consular section.

Q: What sort of work were you doing in the consular service?

STEVEN: Well, I did all of them. I started off in the protection and welfare of American citizens, taking care of lost tourists and death case and all these things. Had many good experiences which would make fine anecdotes some day.

Q: Can you tell me, just to give a feel, in dealing with Americans in trouble, do you recall any cases?

STEVEN: Oh, the most famous one - oh dear, should I use his name? Well, I’ll use it and you can edit it if you think I need to; Mr. Wolfson is all I remember; his name was Wolfson - an American, as I recall, a retired US military type who had been living in Japan. There were quite a few of them; they took their discharges there and stayed in Japan, had a wife or a girlfriend or something; they stayed there. Mr. Wolfson died, inconsiderately on a Friday night in his little apartment. I was notified by the Japanese police, and I had to go. He had died apparently accidentally by inhaling gas; the gas burner had been disconnected or something. The Japanese
police investigated, and they were pretty efficient and very good, and they said, “Yes, we’re satisfied it was an accident, not a deliberate attempt.” He was asleep and it sort of overwhelmed him. The man was probably in his 60s. But Mr. Wolfson had to disposed of on a Friday. What do you do? Well, Japan doesn’t have the facilities that we have. They cremate everybody, so they don’t have much in the way of morgues or holding facilities. We had an arrangement with the US military down in Yokohama, who did maintain a morgue, left over from the Korean War, where I could dispose of his body. So there he was, and how do I get him to Yokohama? We had to get his body out of the sliding refrigeration case in the medical examiner’s office. He had to get rid of it - it was Friday night - because there was no other room. He’d done a quick autopsy. So he handed me this body. I got an embassy station wagon and had it loaded with the body to Yokohama. It was an interesting experience. Then it turned out Mr. Wolfson didn’t have a family that could pay to have the body shipped home or anything, so we arranged to have him cremated. Then his ashes were given to me as the custodial officer, and I had the ashes sitting on my desk in an urn at the consulate waiting for instructions. What do I do with these ashes? Finally I thought I’d better put them in the vault at least. It would be embarrassing if the ashes disappeared or got broken. So I put it in the vault on a shelf and sort of waited until I got instructions from the remaining family back home. Finally the young American woman who controlled the vault, the secretary - classified, so it was an American - came and said, “What’s that vase up there, that piece of ceramic on the shelf that you put in there?” Without thinking I said, “Oh, that’s Mr. Wolfson - the ashes, you know. Remember that case we had. We had him cremated, and those are the ashes, and I put them there.” She said, “Not in my vault. I don’t go in there with ashes. Get him out of there.” So I did and stashed him in the bottom drawer of my desk. It was a typical day in protection and welfare work.

Q: How about Americans getting into trouble?

STEVEN: We had a few of those, people who got into trouble. We had at least a couple at any one time in Japanese prisons serving time. That was always interesting because the Japanese were very, very correct. The prisoners were very carefully tended to, regular medical attention. I went, I think, every month at a minimum and sometimes more often, took them magazines and little things. The Japanese were very good at this. They had one prisoner - a Scottish name; it’ll come - who had again been US military there, had left the military, stayed in Japan, and was probably not the most intelligent of men. He went to the famous Imperial Hotel and checked in and then from his room called the jeweler from the hotel to bring a tray of jewelry up that he wanted to look at. He wanted to buy some diamonds, he said, so the fellow went upstairs with this tray. Our American then hit the jeweler and knocked him out, left him on the floor, and dumped all this jewelry into his bag and then walked out of the hotel, having registered under his own name and his own passport and everything. The Japanese police were not amused, and they found him within about two hours. He was a fairly big man; he stood out, shall we say. And they had him in jail by the time I heard about the thing. I remember asking him, “What on earth were you thinking?” He said, “Well, I don’t know. I didn’t think they’d know it was me.” He ended up serving, I think, five years or something there. When I was seeing him in the prison, he had told the Japanese authorities that he would be treated like any Japanese prisoner and he’d eat the same thing they ate. They said, “All right,” and they started to feed him the standard diet of the Japanese prisoners but in much larger amounts. He was a big men; he was at least 250 pounds but all muscle, a big fellow. They gave him all that he could eat, but it was the Japanese diet, and
his health started deteriorating. The Japanese doctors examined him and they told me, they said, “We can’t do this. He’s not getting what he needs out of our diet to keep him in good shape. He’s got to have more” of whatever it was.

Q: Meat probably.

STEVEN: Meat probably, so they insisted on putting him onto at least a mixed diet, and he finally agreed that he’d do that. But I was impressed at the care. It was very correct, very strict, and very careful, always correct but not abused, and he was given a certain time for recreation and he could receive magazines and correspondence and so on. They did a good job.

Q: On the visa side, I imagine that on the immigrant visa side you had an awful lot of Japanese wives. Did you?

STEVEN: A great many, yes.

Q: Did you have the problem that I had and frankly that it usually the girls a GI would meet, a significant number of them, were professional ladies, and according to our laws they weren’t allowed to get visas? This must have been quite a problem for you, wasn’t it?

STEVEN: As I recall, it was not as much of a problem as you might think, because the Japanese have very sensitive ways of dealing with these things. We would get the young lady’s police record, which was required by law. It didn’t identify her as a prostitute or having had any arrests. It just wasn’t in there. Shop girl or something, and then the question was: do we go behind the Japanese police record and challenge it? Do we say, “You’re liars. We know this girl’s a prostitute. Just look at her.” Unless we had somebody who was willing to come in and testify that he had indeed paid this girl for sex, how do we know? So I could sit there and look and know with complete moral certainty that this young lady somebody had picked up in the red-light district, but the police certificate was clean and I had no testimony that she was a prostitute. What else can you do? I acted like all the other regional officers and I was told to sign her off. What are you going to do? The Japanese police didn’t want trouble like that, so they didn’t usually record that sort of thing. Now, if they’d been involved in drugs, that was different, and you’d get a certificate saying there’d been a drug conviction.

Q: My experience was that an awful lot of these young men were ending up with ladies who had been around for a long time. They were almost marrying their mothers.

STEVEN: We had one. I remember a young man came in and he had his wife’s Japanese birth certificate and her other papers, which he couldn’t read, of course, but the clerks that I had, my Japanese Foreign Service locals, we called them then, brought it to me and said, “Mr. Steven, she has erased her age date even in Japanese and tried to rewrite it in, and we can still see what was originally written under, and she’d subtracted almost 20 years.” Her husband thought she was maybe in her mid-20s and she was actually well over 40. So we called her in separately from him, and through the interpreter I said, “Have you altered this?” Yes, and she was afraid if he found out that he wouldn’t want to marry her and she thought maybe that she could do this. I said, “You’ve got to tell him about this. We’ve got to send you back to get another certificate,
and eventually he’s going to find out. You really ought to tell him now," and tried to be nice about it. So I loaned them a little side office that we had, and the two of them went in privately while she was explaining to this young man that she was old enough to be his mother. In a few minutes they both came out with big smiles, and he said, “That’s okay. I love her.” So we got the new papers. Sociologically - it’s interesting - I was interested enough to follow up. There was a study done - and I was able to get the study later to look at - of a large number of these, I think 1000 cases, Japanese brides who’d been taken back over the years to the States and followed up how these marriages worked out, what were the rates and so on. Fascinatingly, the rates of stability in the marriage were roughly the same as the American population of the same people. American soldiers marrying American girls in America had about the same rate of divorce and so on as they did. The conclusion of the sociologist was that the soldiers were marrying the same type of women they would have married back home. In other words, if the boy himself were from a low socioeconomic group with not an awful lot of education, etc., that’s what he was marrying in America and that’s what he was marrying in Japan. Therefore, they tended to be in so many ways the same type of people with the same expectations, and the divorce rates and breakups and so on were no different really than the ones prevalent at the time in America. We found this quite a revelation. It went against the conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom is they must all be breaking up, and they weren’t.

Q: You were doing consular work the whole time you were there. Any problems with passport work, American citizenship problems?

STEVEN: Yes, we had at that time the larger problem of what to do about Japanese Americans. At the beginning of World War II there were many Japanese, both people who had American permanent residence and American-citizen Japanese who were in Japan.

Q: A lot of families had sent their children to get an education in Japan to make sure the cultural ties were closer.

STEVEN: Exactly, they were there, and I’m sure it’s the same thing that you found. When the war broke out, the Japanese government didn’t want to hear anything about “I’m an American citizen and you can’t draft me.” They took one look and said, “You’re Japanese. Get your ass over there to the draft board,” and they were conscripted and fought through the war. They said, well, they were full-fledged Japanese soldiers. After the war, of course, we said, “You’re no longer an American citizen, or you’ve lost your residence, because of service in an enemy army.” The Japanese challenged it, and I forget the exact timing of it but I think it was while I was there that the US Supreme Court finally said, “No, if they were coerced into the Japanese military, they didn’t voluntarily renounce their citizenship or anything,” so they had to be reinstated. I had the marvelous experience of having a Japanese businessman come in shortly after all this took place to apply for a visa and go to the States on business. We looked at his documents and found out that he had been born in the United States, originally had been an American citizen, had lost it at the end of the war because of his Japanese military service, precisely the case that we talked about. So I called the man in and said, “I have good news and bad news. The bad news is I can’t give you a visa to the United States.” His eyes got wide. I said, “The good news is you’re an American citizen. You don’t need a visa.” He was stunned. He had no idea. His English had pretty well disappeared. He was a young man when he left and this was many years later. He
finally said, “What is this? Yes, I was made an American, but they said no.” I explained the situation to him. He was just wide eyed. He said, “How does this affect my Japanese citizenship?” I said, “It doesn’t at all. You’re allowed to keep them both under these circumstances.” He said, “What do I do?” I said, “Here’s a passport application.” He filled it out, we handed him an American passport, and off he went happily to the States. This type of situation was prevalent then.

Q: Did you get any feel, or were you somewhat removed, from, you might say, the embassy Japanese-speaking officer group at the embassy?

STEVEN: There weren’t that many, number one. You’d be surprised how few we had. There was one case, a very interesting one there. The officer’s name was Sakaue, Munoe Sakaue. He’s long retired, I’m sure, but there would be people who would remember him. Munoe and his wife were Japanese Americans but of something like the third generation, and they didn’t speak Japanese. They were studying it, like we were, the basic how to get around the street, but he wasn’t a Japanese native speaker by any means. Both he and his wife had constant difficulty, because the Japanese, of course, looked at them - and they were racially entirely Japanese - and assumed that they had to speak Japanese and would not believe, literally, that they couldn’t speak the language other than the basic few words that I had. It became apparently quite difficult for them in certain circumstances because people thought that they were refusing to speak Japanese just because they were American citizens. Munoe had a great deal of difficulty with that. I remember him talking about it. He sometimes wondered, I think, even if it had been a good idea to assign him there, because the Japanese all expected him to speak Japanese, and when he didn’t speak Japanese, it was very difficult for him to establish a relationship that I could, for example, because they kept looking at the man and saying, “How can you not speak Japanese?” So that was a problem for him. There’s another officer, whose name I long ago forgot, who had been with the US Marines during the war, another Japanese American, as a translator and had been in combat and so on against the Japanese. He spoke so fluently that, of course, unless he told people that he was an American, they would never have known it. He said he used it very selectively. Oftentimes he would just pose himself as a Japanese until the question came up of what he was going, etcetera. But it varied.

RAYMOND C. EWING
Commercial Officer
Tokyo (1959-1961)

Vice Consul
Yokohama (1961)

Raymond C. Ewing was born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1936. His career in the State Department included assignments in Washington, DC, Japan, Austria, Pakistan, Italy, Switzerland, Cyprus, Tanzania, and an ambassadorship to Ghana. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in the fall of 1993.
Q: Your first assignment overseas was to Tokyo. You were there from 1959 to 1962. Is that it?

EWING: Yes, it was from 1959 to 1961. Tokyo, in many ways, seemed like kind of an odd assignment -- the kind of assignment that we would not be giving in the 1980's or 1990's, I hope. I had had German language training, and there I was, sent to Tokyo. I can't explain why I went to Tokyo. I think that the circumstances under which I learned about going to Tokyo were sort of interesting and perhaps indicative of the times. I was playing on a softball team -- actually the FSI (Foreign Service Institute) softball team -- and I got a hit and ran to first base. The first baseman on the other team was from the Bureau of Personnel, or, at any rate, he worked in Personnel. He said to me something like, "Hey, that was a good hit, but I hear you got a good assignment."

I said, "Oh?"

He said, "Yeah, I think it's Tokyo."

And that's the way it turned out. So I didn't have a chance to use my German and went to Tokyo without any Japanese language or any other kind of specific training or preparation for that assignment. I went as a commercial officer, so that, in a sense, followed up on my experience in the Economics Bureau.

I also was able to go a month earlier than was originally planned at the request of Tom Beale, who, at that time, headed the United States delegation to the meeting of the Contracting Parties of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which was having its first meeting on that side of the world. It really was the first international conference of any consequence which Japan had hosted since the end of World War II. It was a major event as far as the Japanese were concerned. My first office in Tokyo was in the old Imperial Hotel building, where our delegation was quartered. This was the first great earthquake-proof hotel -- designed by Frank Lloyd Wright -- which was eventually torn down to give way to a high-rise building. That's how I spent the first period of my assignment in Tokyo.

Q: You were there first under Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, and then Edward Reischauer was the Chief of Mission. This was your first overseas post and experience. What was your impression of the Embassy when you got there?

EWING: My initial impression was very limited because I had very little to do with the Embassy during the first month. I was part of the GATT delegation, which gave me a wonderful opportunity to experience Tokyo and an international conference. The Japanese were wonderful hosts. They took us on several tours. I went on a tour to the "Ajinomoto" food additive factory, which made monosodium glutamate. We were even interviewed on television. We were such a sensation.

Then I went into the Commercial Section of the Embassy. I felt that I was a very small piece of a very, very large puzzle. It seemed like such a large Embassy. I enjoyed the commercial work, but I was only in that job for about three or four months because in 1960, the Embassy became totally preoccupied with a planned visit by President Eisenhower, scheduled for June, 1960. I
was asked in March, 1960, or thereabouts, to come and work in Ambassador MacArthur's office. The staff aide to Ambassador MacArthur, whose name was Bob German, was completely occupied with preparations for the President's visit. The Ambassador felt that he needed somebody else to help with everything else. I was brought into the office to do that. Then, when President Eisenhower's visit was ultimately canceled, Bob German was given an opportunity to take some leave. Ambassador MacArthur had gotten used to the idea of having two staff assistants, and a conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union was coming up in Tokyo. The long and short of it was that I stayed in that job for most of the rest of my time in Japan.

Q: You had a pretty good view of how this Eisenhower trip was canceled. Was there concern about anti-American demonstrations and all that? How did this work out?

EWING: Certainly, it was a time of great tension, and there was a lot of strong anti-American feelings, particularly on the part of the university students. It was really related more to the negotiation and signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which they saw, in effect, as a continuation of the American occupation, which included the risk that Japan would be involved in some future war because of the presence of American forces in Japan. I think that the Eisenhower visit became a symbol of their frustration and anger. It wasn't the visit so much, per se, that was the problem. There would have been demonstrations. There would have been strong feelings expressed even if there had been no Presidential visit coming up. There were university students continually in the streets around the Embassy. I certainly didn't feel any threat, any danger, any anti-American feeling directed at me, and I don't think that any of us in the Embassy did. It was all kind of half policy and half what U. S. Forces represented than opposition to us as individuals.

Q: Was there a feeling of "let down" or unhappiness at the fact that the President didn't come? Was this seen as a blow at the United States?

EWING: There was certainly a feeling of "let down" and disappointment on the part of those of us who had been preparing for the visit. I don't know how many scenarios and schedules we prepared, but we'd been working for months preparing for the visit. So it was certainly a disappointment that it didn't take place. I think that we were not all particularly surprised that the decision was made to cancel the visit. President Eisenhower was actually on a trip to the Far East and was in the Philippines when he decided that he would not come to Japan. But prior to that, there had been an advance visit by Jim Haggerty and Tom Stevens, the Press Spokesman and Appointments Secretary to the President, respectively. Their visit to Tokyo was a very scary experience for them.

Q: Rocks were thrown at their car by a crowd. Were you involved in that?

EWING: I was not at the airport. I remember being at a meeting in the conference room at the Embassy after they came in from the airport. They were quite shaken by the whole experience. I remember picking up a note afterwards that had been written by one of them to the other, referring to a rock that had apparently come through the window. The note said that this rock should be put with their collection, along with a rock thrown at them in Kabul (Afghanistan in a demonstration during a previous visit. There certainly was great relief that they were not hurt and
that the incident wasn't worse. I think that if we had known what was going to happen over the
next thirty years or so, the visit would have been canceled far earlier than it was because there
certainly were great risks. Rocks were thrown at the car, as you said.

Q: Ambassador MacArthur was the nephew of General Douglas MacArthur. He had the
reputation of being a very demanding person. One can't avoid mentioning the fact that his wife
was known as one of the "Dragons of the Foreign Service." How did you find this? We're trying
to get a feel for life in the Foreign Service, as well as the political considerations. I would have
thought that this would have been, for a young officer, a rather difficult and vulnerable position.
How did you find that?

EWING: Mrs. MacArthur was certainly a demanding and difficult person. But I was unmarried. I
think she probably looked at me, in a way, as her son, or nephew or something like that. We
always had a friendly and cordial relationship. She never yelled at me or made life difficult for
me in any way. On the contrary, several times they hosted small functions for the immediate staff
of the Ambassador, which went beyond what they really were expected or needed to do. They
were very nice -- birthdays and times like that. I tend to think that Ambassador MacArthur was
the right kind of ambassador for the United States to have in Japan at that particular time. The
key thing was to stabilize the security relationship with Japan and the role of the U.S. Armed
Forces in Japan. Ambassador Reischauer was exactly the right person to follow him. Reischauer
was much more attuned to Japanese history, culture and personality and less convinced that the
military relationship was the most important aspect. He felt that there was a much broader role
that the United States could play in Japan.

Q: Both these Ambassadors had extra "clout," you might say. Ambassador MacArthur was very
close to President Eisenhower because he had been his Political Adviser at one point during
World War II. Ambassador Reischauer was a professor at Harvard and close to President
Kennedy.

EWING: That's true, although Ambassador MacArthur, in his previous positions, had certainly
had contacts with a wide range of people. I remember that shortly after President Kennedy's
election, there was a very warm exchange of letters between them. They had known each other
over a long period of time. I think that Ambassador MacArthur may have known President
Kennedy as well or better than he knew Vice President Nixon. As you say, his service and his
own background, in many ways, were more in Europe where Eisenhower...

Q: John Kennedy had stayed in MacArthur's house in France when his father was Ambassador
to England.

EWING: I didn't know that, but I knew that they had known each other for a long time. I don't
know how close Ambassador Reischauer's personal relationship with President Kennedy had
been, although obviously, there was a Harvard connection.

Q: How about the way Ambassador MacArthur ran the Embassy? You were, I guess, his "point
man," in that respect.
EWING: He was very strong and even overbearing, in many ways, with people in the Embassy. I think that the further you were from him, the more you may have felt that. He tended to work a lot through Bill Leonhart, the DCM, who was also very strong and, in many ways, also a difficult personality. If Ambassador MacArthur had people that needed to be dealt with or new projects that needed to be undertaken, he probably would use the DCM as much as he would the staff aide, who tended to be more involved with visitors, shuffled papers, did the minutes of meetings and that sort of thing.

Q: Did you perform the same function when Ambassador Reischauer was there, or did you cover much of his period?

EWING: Reischauer came in 1961. I don't recall the month, but I think that it was roughly in June, 1961 -- after the Kennedy administration had entered office. Ambassador MacArthur left, I think, in about April, 1961. One of the things that I remember about the transition was that the request for agrément for Ambassador Reischauer arrived in the Embassy on a Sunday morning. Ambassador MacArthur was leaving by ship that afternoon from Yokohama. The request for agrément was addressed to the "chargé d'affaires." Ambassador MacArthur came into the Embassy that morning -- his last day in Japan -- in his usual, workaholic spirit, to see what telegrams needed attention. He saw the request for agrément for Ambassador Reischauer and was furious, feeling that people in Washington were moving too quickly before he had a chance to leave. He let the State Department know that. In any event, there was a period of six weeks to two months when Bill Leonhart was chargé d'affaires.

I worked for Ambassador Reischauer until about September, 1961, and then moved briefly to the Consulate General in Yokohama before leaving Japan in early December, 1961. Ambassador Reischauer brought a staff assistant with him from Harvard University -- a kind of scholar-graduate student. There was a feeling, as far as I was concerned, that it was time for a change. They also brought in a staff aide from elsewhere in the Embassy. Actually, he came from the Consulate in Osaka to give more continuity with the new political appointee's staff aide. During the couple of months that I spent in Yokohama, I had my only opportunity to do consular work during my career in the Foreign Service.

Q: What was your impression of Japan? What were you getting from people you were working with who were dealing with the Japanese? What was the feeling about how the Japanese system operated?

EWING: I think that by that time, the immediate post-war period was over, and there weren't many signs of rubble or damage left over from World War II. The Japanese Foreign Ministry and Government were beginning to function again and to display more self confidence. The GATT Conference I mentioned was their first international "coming out." A delegation headed by George Ball came to Tokyo to initiate steps toward having Japan join the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). A decision had been made that Japan would host the Olympic Games in 1964. So we were really at the beginning of the next period of Japanese economic expansion, dynamism and growth. As far as the Japanese Government was concerned, I had a lot of dealings with my counterparts -- the private secretaries to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. I certainly found them very effective and easy to work with. These people
were primarily from the Japanese Diplomatic Service, so their English was excellent. In most cases, they had served previously in the United States. I didn't have a particularly wide range of contacts among the Japanese, but those I did get to know -- I taught some students English -- I certainly was impressed with. Several of the problems which have since emerged in the Japanese political system weren't apparent at that time. That came much, much later, with the Liberal Democratic Party.

Q: Then you left Japan in 1962?

EWING: I left in late 1961.

DAVID I. HITCHCOCK, JR.
Japanese Language Training, USIS
Tokyo (1959-1960)

Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Kobe (1961-1962)

Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Fukuoka (1962-1965)

David I. Hitchcock, Jr. was born in 1928 and raised in New Haven, Connecticut. His career with USIS included posts in Vietnam, Japan, Israel, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on November 17, 1992.

HITCHCOCK: We went on to Japan and language school and after that, a short tour in Kobe. There was a proposal made to combine USIS activities in Kobe and Osaka and, to some extent, Kyoto. Kyoto would maintain its independence and have its own PAO. There would be a director and deputy director of USIS Kobe-Osaka. Stu Bohacek was the director, and I was the deputy. It was a crazy idea.

Q: Was it in Kobe or Osaka?

HITCHCOCK: That was the problem. We had offices in both cities.

Q: The Consulate was still in Kobe wasn't it?

HITCHCOCK: Yes. We kept seeing each other going in opposite directions on the train. We would start out in the morning in Osaka and have a lunch in Kobe and a reception in Osaka at night. It was just mad. There was some effort, however, to take advantage of talented Japanese staff and use them beyond the confines of one of those three cities, whether it was the Advisor for Labor or Advisor for Academic Affairs or International Affairs or the Cultural Arts. We tried to use the best of each of those centers' advisers to branch out and get interested in what was going on in the other two cities that would be of interest to USIA.
In any case, after a year in Kobe, I was transferred to Fukuoka and became the director of the center there, which covered all of western Japan -- all of Kyushu Island and Yamaguchi Prefecture, the southern tip of Honshu.

Q: By that time, they had closed the center at Kumamoto.

HITCHCOCK: They closed all the centers in Kyushu except Fukuoka. The last center before Fukuoka was Nagasaki, and it had already closed. But there was a Japan-America library still in several cities -- including Nagasaki -- which we tried to support, but that wasn't working very well.

I think the most important thing that we did in those days in Kyushu was with two groups: one was the labor unions and the second was a left-leaning and very suspicious major newspaper in Fukuoka, *Nishi Nihon*, which simply means "western Japan newspaper." It would be nice sometime to document this, but over the years, starting I think with my predecessor, Charlie Medd, and with those who followed me, we had an enormous effect over time. We were clearly not the only influence on these labor leaders and on that newspaper. The labor leaders were invited to participate in a very large and effective exchange program which brought Japanese Marxists, labor leaders from the coal mines, shipbuilding and others of the left in Kyushu to the States in a group and let them see the dynamism, muscle, wealth, power and influence of the American labor movement and how effective it was.

Q: What evidence did you have that there was any change of opinion on the part of these people after they returned? Did you have a clear indication?

HITCHCOCK: A clear indication of a change in attitude toward the United States in general -- a greater respect, much less harsh treatment of the United States. They were still members of the Socialist Party, most of the unions were, and they had to mouth the usual dogma, but they were just awe struck by how a capitalist society could develop an independent, free, strong and influential labor movement. They were also influenced by our society -- our churches. I made sure they all went to church in a small town. This is an aspect of America that they had never thought about.

Q: In that respect, Kyushu was, of course, one of the first places in Japan that had experienced any kind of Christian influence. Were any of these people influenced by that, or was it just a matter of going to church because they wanted to see what it was like in the U.S.?

HITCHCOCK: It was mostly the latter. Very few of them were Christian. There were some. One of the major patron saints and intellectual gurus of the Socialist Party in Japan was Masao Takahashi, who was then a professor of economics at Kyushu University. There was one other, his life long rival, who was on the left of the Socialist Party, and Takahashi was on the right. I had one ally in the university who helped me to develop contacts with the left in the labor movement. I think that program was very effective.

The other aspect of our work there was to develop confidence -- a really professional relationship...
with the regional newspaper. The International Visitors Program, over the years, played an enormous role in getting that paper out of its shell, letting it see the rest of the world as it really was.

The programs we ran at the center always included reporters from the newspaper. I started an English language class just for journalists. In fact, it wasn't really a class. We would read one of the Japanese daily English papers in English and then talk about it slowly in English. We did the same thing in Osaka. Years later, some of those young men who were really only my age or younger then became senior editors. One of the people who came to our seminars became the head of \textit{Asahi Shimbun} later on. These contacts in those early days in Osaka and Fukuoka helped me to get a lot of things done many, many years later in Tokyo.

We also regionalized things. We tried to make Fukuoka a truly regional center by inventing a Western Japan International Journalists Seminar which was held every year in a different city and co-sponsored by the Fukuoka American Center and the local coordinating committee of all the newspapers in western Japan. We did the same thing with labor and with women. I think we were the first center to hold an annual women's seminar on the role of women in modern society.

\textit{Q: Dorothy Robins Mowry had not yet come to Japan at that time, had she?}

\textbf{HITCHCOCK:} She had. She came in with Reischauer in 1961. Ed Reischauer, of course, was my...well Douglas MacArthur II was Ambassador when I was at language school, but I didn't serve under him. Reischauer brought Dorothy in. She heard about what I was trying to do, and it just suited her plans perfectly, so she was a great help in getting prominent Americans, including Esther Peterson, to come down to Fukuoka and participate in some of these seminars.

\textit{Q: It must have been very encouraging to Dorothy because I understand she had some rather rocky times trying to persuade the main office in Tokyo that there was any need for a women's organization in the country.}

\textbf{HITCHCOCK:} Absolutely. She and I just plotted a lot of this on our own pretty much. I think Walt Nichols and Frank Tenny were helpful in Tokyo, but Ed Nickel and Bill Copeland, both PAOs at that point, were not necessarily against it but were skeptical.

So in journalism, women's affairs, labor...and then we started it with university newspaper editors, again regionalizing things. Then I finally figured out that in all of Kyushu, we probably had about twenty-five, or even less, well-known professors in economics, law, government. But they were all scattered. And to try to bring a well-known American down there and just have a handful -- it seemed like just a waste. So I helped inspire the starting of the International Problems Research Council (\textit{Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu Kai}) for \textit{Nishi Nihon}, with all the universities represented individually. In that way, we would hold a seminar conference two or three times a year in a different campus. We brought Reischauer down for that.

By this time, Vietnam was heating up. Itazuke, the US Air Force Base near Fukuoka, was not directly involved, but on the other hand, it was supporting the war to some extent. The students were radical already, and Vietnam was a perfect cause for them.
So we had Reischauer coming down for this distinguished group of professors and the university which was supposed to sponsor the talk by Reischauer...the university president came to my office one day looking very sheepish and embarrassed and said that he did not think he could sponsor it at his campus, could I find some other campus? We shopped around, but basically, the universities were all scared to hold that meeting with Reischauer, even though it was co-sponsored by their own organization.

In the end, they came to me and said, "Look, you ought to have it right here at the center." One of the things they said I always took as a compliment. They said, "In fact, you are really the most 'neutral' place in town." By "neutral," I think they meant objective. I thought that was remarkable. The Consulate was not in the same neighborhood as the center, and they saw the center as a place where people could come and get information and get the truth. We were never demonstrated against. The Consulate was, but we were not. So that was what happened. We had it at the center, and there wasn't even a demonstration outside.

Q: Who was the Consul General at that time?

HITCHCOCK: It was a Consulate, not a Consulate General at that time. When I got there, it was Dick Petrie. He was succeeded by Tom Shoesmith, who, of course, went to the very top as a Senior DAS in State for East Asia and Ambassador to Malaysia and is now the President of the American-Japan Society of Washington. So the "Fukuoka Kai," or the "Fukuoka Group," meaning those American officers who served there, did well in their careers.

Q: Were you the only American at the center?

HITCHCOCK: Yes. I was the only one.

Q: What years were you there?

HITCHCOCK: In Fukuoka, 1962-65, three years.

ULRICH A. STRAUS
Political Officer
Tokyo (1959-1964)

Ulrich A. Straus was born in Germany in 1926. His career in the Foreign Service included assignments to Japan, Germany, and the Philippines. Mr. Straus was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: You went back to Tokyo from 1959-64.

STRAUS: I was initially slated to go to Nagoya, where we had a Consulate at the time. That was changed at the last moment, and I was sent to the Embassy political section in Tokyo as the most
junior of junior officers.

Q: Did you feel like you were back at home?

STRAUS: In many respects, yes.

Q: Were you given a particular slice of Japanese politics?

STRAUS: Yes. My job initially was to follow the newspapers and do whatever didn't fall into anyone else's bailiwick. I think, to some extent, it included things like the judiciary and court cases. I remember writing a report on a big typhoon -- sort of odds and ends. I did that for a year.

Q: How big was our political section in Tokyo at that time?

STRAUS: I would guess about twelve people. It was getting to be fairly big.

Q: What was your impression of the Embassy? At that time, Douglas MacArthur II, a career Foreign Service Officer and nephew of the General, was Ambassador.

STRAUS: Yes, he was.

I was in Japan in 1955, when he was appointed, and I thought that it was a big mistake to appoint anyone with that name. But the Japanese saw it differently. He had been the Counselor in the Department, a man who obviously had the ear of the Secretary of State, one of the high and mighty, and the Japanese were flattered to get an important person like that.

However, I found the Embassy was not a very happy place. In fact, compared to all the others places I have been subsequently, it was a very unhappy place. I remember one incident, for example. This was a time of turmoil in the spring of 1960 with a lot of demonstrations going on. The Ambassador held forth for all but a minute of this fifty minute interview, where he tried to persuade the president of a prominent university that these demonstrations against the security treaty and against Kishi, the Prime Minister at the time, were all wrong. And that it was his Christian duty, as it were, to oppose this kind of thing. At the end of that fifty minutes, he was rather summarily dismissed and thanked for contributing his views, which the man never had the chance to do. I think that was kind of the way MacArthur ran things.

At a later point, we were asked our thoughts about the Eisenhower Presidential visit, and it was clear to everybody, at least below the DCM level, that it needed to be postponed. But at that point, I think the Ambassador's ego was involved in the visit, and he wanted to continue it until finally the Japanese indicated that they were concerned about the safety of the Emperor as much as anything. Protocol demanded that the Emperor go out to the airport. So at their insistence, it was postponed.

Q: These demonstrations were over a security treaty we were developing with the Japanese. How were we reading this?
STRAUS: Well, let me go back. As part of the peace treaty of 1952, we had negotiated with Japan a security treaty which allowed for the stationing of American forces in Japan. By 1959, with Japan starting to feel more independent, it was clear that the treaty that had been negotiated earlier was not adequate. It had to be revised because it provided for such things as the possibility of American forces interfering militarily in Japan. That wasn't appropriate any more. So it was revised really to provide more powers to the Japanese and to limit American powers. So there was nothing wrong with that except that the left wing force in Japan didn't want any security treaty. They wanted so-called unarmed neutrality and to rest their security on the tender mercies of the United Nations as well as non-aggression pacts with the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

Q: Those of you who were dealing with these groups, how were you reading these?

STRAUS: I think our reading was that these demonstrations in Japan, which were, I think, conveyed in the press to the American public as being anti-American demonstrations, were only partly that. That the majority focus, maybe seventy percent, was really directed against Mr. Kishi, then the Prime Minister. Kishi's background was that he had been a very prominent politician, a member of the wartime Tojo cabinet and got within a whisker of being tried as an A Class war criminal. He was probably the most conservative of the post-war Japanese politicians - - a very wily politician.

It was Kishi's somewhat Japanese idea that the revised security treaty should be a present for Eisenhower. It should all have been wrapped up by the time he came. But given the opposition to this treaty among the trade unions and the left wing in Japanese politics, it became impossible to get it through without ramming it through...what the Japanese call the tyranny of the majority.

Q: -- rather than reaching the sort of consensus which was the normal Japanese way.

STRAUS: Yes. It was then that the anger of a lot of middle-of-the-road people also exploded. It was roughly seventy percent directed towards Kishi, maybe another twenty percent against having the security treaty with the United States and ten percent against the planned Eisenhower visit. I think maybe the Japanese were in a way disappointed that the President of the United States wouldn't come. So I think there was, at least on the part of the press in the United States, a misreading of this. I am not so sure that our reporting at that time carried the full flavor of what these demonstrations were all about.

Q: How did you find the reporting? Obviously, as a junior officer...they tend to focus more on the opposition...this is sort of a traditional role that they always feel that the old guard at the top sits on what they have to say.

STRAUS: The reporting, first of all, was excessive. MacArthur was an early riser, and by the time he came to the office, he had read the English-language Japan Times, which was his bible. He would mark virtually all the articles that dealt with Japanese domestic or international affairs for reporting. We were required to report them, even if the articles turned out to be false. I remember I was told, "Well, then you say that the Times said this, but on further checking, it wasn't true." So it was excessive. I felt that the lower ranks, certainly people like Dave Osborn,
knew the score exceedingly well. But the reporting that was done above the political counselor level was often slanted.

Q: When you say also excessive, were you finding yourself getting down to the county level? Were you learning an awful lot about Japan that you might not have?

STRAUS: Oh, yes. You see, I did this job for one year, and then I became the assistant labor attaché. For a language officer, that was a fabulous job. My boss, the labor attaché, was Lou Silverberg, a very fine individual with a tin ear. Despite having been in Japan eventually for ten years and getting along very well with the Japanese and learning a lot about Japan, he never had the slightest facility for Japanese. Like most people, he didn't particularly like to work through interpreters, so his contacts were generally with the Labor Ministry and with the ILO office and the ICFTU office, and he left the labor leaders to me because there wasn't one who spoke any English. That was great stuff, particularly as the labor unions were the bulk of the people out on the streets demonstrating against the government. That was a very exciting time for me.

Q: We have put a lot of attention into labor movements around the world, and the Japanese was one of the major ones. We made certain calculations early on that this would come out all right, didn’t we? It was one of the big debates with General MacArthur -- whether to have labor unions or not.

STRAUS: No, that was never a matter of debate.

Q: Wasn't there something about that?

STRAUS: Well, I think you are referring to the general strike which was called and which he cracked down on early on in the occupation.

Q: How did you see the labor movement in those days? This was in 1960.

STRAUS: Well, I learned a lot. I learned that the rhetoric was often very extreme and hardly distinguishable from that of the Communists and that sometimes the private views of these labor leaders was much more moderate. Was that important? I got along pretty well with them. There was a difference between the government unions and non-government unions. The non-government unions in the private sector from the beginning were much more moderate because they often identified their interests with their employers. On the other hand, the railway workers, teachers union, etc. were implacable foes of their employer -- the Government.

I do recall talking to a journalist friend of mine about the head of SOHYO, the then Japanese equivalent of the AFL-CIO, on the left side of the spectrum. I said, "Mr. Ota, the President of SOHYO said this and that." I rather took exception to his strong views on American policy, whatever it was at the time. I said, "Why does he keep saying these things?"

"Ah," said my friend. "You don't understand. Mr. Ota really comes from the private section unions, and his personal views are known to be very moderate. Therefore, he has to take special pains to express radical views in public." So that was another lesson about Japan.
Q: This is always one of the hardest things. An officer who gets down and gets more intimate with labor and political leaders can often see what is going on underneath. Yet your masters at the top of the Embassy see a different picture because in a way, they say, "This is all very nice, but this is what their official position is." And this is what gets reported. Did you find yourself having a problem of translating this within the Embassy?

STRAUS: Yes, although I have to agree too that yes, they may be moderate in the inner circles, which usually doesn't get out. It is very hard in a society like Japan to figure out to what extent this alleged moderation translates itself into action or, as the case may be, lack of action. We never really know that. At least we certainly didn't then. We may have a little bit more insights today than we had then about what was going on within the decision making inner circles.

Q: What was our attitude towards the labor movement at that time? Being the assistant labor attaché, did you feel the heavy hand of the AFL-CIO and its attitude, which is violently anti-Communist and anti-left?

STRAUS: There was a great deal of interest in the labor movement. Many of them came to visit on exchange programs. We sent teams of labor leaders to the United States under the so-called productivity councils. It turned out that all these people who went to the United States took very extensive notes and learned a great deal about productivity in the United States which they diligently applied to their own workshops. I am not so sure, frankly, that the American labor leaders who came to Japan were as diligent in learning about Japan, with one possible exception. That was the Reuther brothers, Walter and Victor. They came to Japan repeatedly, especially Victor. They certainly stand out as being very serious people, not just being interested in getting entertained. They were trying to learn about the Japanese system.

Sure, elements of the Japanese labor movement were not with the ICFTU -- International Confederation of Free Trade, headquartered in Brussels.

Q: This was set up as a counter to...?

STRAUS: The WFTU, which was Communist. It was headquartered in Prague, I think.

The SOHYO unions were not affiliated with the WFTU, but they were very close to the WFTU unions, nevertheless. But again, a fair number of these people on a personal basis were very approachable and would tell you a good deal of what was planned. They just shared the views of many Japanese at that time that a close alliance with the United States was not a good thing. It was seen that the United States would possibly lead Japan into a war not of its choosing, particularly against China. You recall we had this very bitter anti-Communist China policy at the time. We had literally forced the Japanese to recognize Taipei; otherwise, they would not have done so. With bases on Japanese soil, this was not totally a wild notion.

Q: At that time, Okinawa was not part of Japan.

STRAUS: It was not. It was administered as an American fiefdom. John Foster Dulles came up
with an interesting notion in international law that the Japanese retained sovereignty, but we exercised sovereignty -- residual sovereignty was what the Japanese had. I should say, of course, it was an interesting period. I wasn't involved with Okinawa at the time. At that point, Ambassador Reischauer had come in with the Kennedy administration, replacing MacArthur. He had some problems with the Commanding General on Okinawa.

Q: What was your impression of Reischauer? Here was a man who was the guru of Japanese and Chinese studies from Harvard.

STRAUS: Well, it was a major change from MacArthur to Reischauer. It was a more relaxed style of leadership. For example, the Embassy had a swimming pool, which nobody other than the Ambassador and DCM could ever use. Immediately, that was opened to everybody, which greatly endeared the Reischauers to us. We got to know them as people, and they were delightful. Politically, his views were very close to what I felt about Japan. He, of course, was a graduate of the American School of Japan, like I was. Haru Reischauer, his wife, was a graduate of that school as well. I had known her younger sisters. So they were very fine people. I think the views, particularly of Dave Osborn -- one of the shining lights of the Foreign Service and certainly in the Japan and China service -- were very much taken to heart by the Ambassador.

Q: Did we have a feeling after the abortive Eisenhower trip, which stands out as a real shock to Japanese-American relations, that we had to get this relationship back together?

STRAUS: Reischauer, of course, had written an article for Foreign Affairs, which, I guess, Kennedy had read and decided to make him Ambassador. He spelled out a number of things that needed to be done. Immediately, relations were established at a high level by the Ambassador himself with people on the left, which included much of the academic establishment, where, of course, his credentials were superb -- and also with the left wing politicians, leaving aside the Communist Party, and the trade union movement. Sure, I and others had relations with them, but it was a different thing for the top level of the Embassy also to see them and invite them to Embassy functions. It was very different. It was very nice.

Q: Under the MacArthur and the Reischauer regimes, were there people that you could not deal with?

STRAUS: Yes, I think it was our view that we shouldn't deal with the Communist Party, and we didn't. That really didn't change, but I don't think there was much to gain at that time. They were still very much kept under either Moscow's or Beijing's sway. We weren't going to get anything that wasn't in the official newspaper, for example.

Q: At that time, what was the feeling you were getting about how the Japanese viewed both Communist China and the Soviet Union?

STRAUS: There was a great distinction that the Japanese have always drawn between the Soviet Union and China. They were never, I think, as persuaded as we were of the unity of those two countries. There was always a feeling that somehow or other they could get along with the Chinese -- that there was a great deal of affinity between them. There was also a feeling of some
shame and remorse of what the Japanese had done in China and the feeling that they hadn't really squared accounts with them. They did not feel any sense of threat like we did. Therefore, there was a divergence in our policy, very clearly. There was a time when I think we feared the Communist Chinese more than the Soviets.

The Soviet Union was a very different matter. The Japanese did not feel any sense of remorse vis-a-vis the Soviets. After all, it was the Soviets who attacked them, not vice versa, and they attacked them at the very end of the war and then took a good deal of booty. Not only the Northern Territories and Karafuto (Sakhalin) but in Manchuria and the Japanese infrastructure there. Then, perhaps worst of all, they kept hundreds of thousands of Japanese in captivity. They were sent to work camps, and many did not survive that. So there is a very strong negative feeling which survives even to this day in Japan about the Soviet Union. But, as you recall, our view at that time was that Communism was universal and undistinguished, whether you were talking about Albania or Czechoslovakia, North Korea, or whatever.

**Q:** Did you ever get involved with our relations with the American military in Japan? Was it a problem for the political section?

**STRAUS:** Not at that time -- there were people who dealt with that. Bob Fearey was one who dealt with that, and Buck Borg was the other. That was their main thing. It was usually things that arose out of the management of the security treaty and agreements that dealt with the utilization of the bases.

There was a problem throughout that period in the sixties, which I dealt with later in Washington, of pressure from the Japanese about wanting to get some bases back. But it wasn't something that we couldn't deal with.

**Q:** Well, back to being the assistant labor attaché, just to get a feel for the period within the Foreign Service, were you concerned that by being there, although you were part of the political section, that this would taint you as not being a regular FSO or not?

**STRAUS:** I wasn't worried about it that much. I didn't really want to be a labor attaché the rest of my life. But on the other hand, I had not gone through any labor course. Whether it existed then, I don't know. But I had no such concerns.

I might say one thing about the demonstrations. We used to have demonstrations in front of the Embassy. We had large demonstrations there. But unlike, I guess certain other countries, I never felt insecure. These were all well choreographed Japanese demonstrations with the police on one side and the demonstrators on the other. Both sides were careful not to step on the grass. Indeed, I can recall leaving the Embassy and walking right through the demonstrators and not having any thought in my head that anything could happen to me. I don't think I would do that in certain other countries.

**Q:** How did we read these demonstrations? Who was organizing them?

**STRAUS:** There were different groups that were involved. The largest groups were always the
trade unions. Indeed, I think it is fair to say that the Japanese government really didn't have much to worry about so long as only the students were demonstrating and even if some Communists were demonstrating along side. When the trade unions joined, then it became a really serious matter, and it became at least a threat that the government could be toppled by that. In a sense, the demonstrations did remove Kishi from office.

Q: Looking at the students at that time, in some countries, students are expected to be as radical as all hell. In Korea, students generally are anti-American, but as soon as they get out, they basically put on another hat and join the establishment. What sort of contact did you have with the teachers?

STRAUS: We had friends at the university level and some of whom said they used to go to demonstrations; it was the thing to do. Anybody who was anybody participated in the demonstrations. It was considered less as something anti-American and more to get rid of this son-of-a-gun Kishi. It was also a sense of adventure. It was fighting the police, and that was a good thing. It was the "democratic" thing to do. For a Japanese at that time, I can understand that. To demonstrate your democratic instinct, you fought against the government at your first chance to do that.

Q: Also there was more of a sense of participation. You put on a headband. You had kind of a uniform to demonstrate.

STRAUS: It was a phase in your life. And as you said, some of the business leaders had the wit to hire some of these people, the leaders even. They felt they showed leadership qualities that they wanted in their business. It was a little more difficult to get into government with that background and record, but not impossible.

Q: What about our analysis that you were seeing of the university system? Often it is sort of at the assistant professor instructor level who are the great instigators of this who haven't quite gotten rid of their undergraduate thoughts. Was that still true there?

STRAUS: Oh, very much so. You know the Japanese are not great individualists, and certainly at that time, the thing to be in the university if you wanted to get ahead was to be a Marxist. That was certainly true in the social sciences. Indeed, some of the students were telling me at the time that if your papers didn't have a Marxist bias, you might as well forget about a good grade. And that was something that worried us.

Q: Did you find that there was much of a spill over into the thinking later on, or was this something that the people who were doing well could shuck very easily?

STRAUS: There was a spill over for a while. You did have -- even then in the large industries -- an element in their twenties who were rather radical, but gradually they turned. Some never did change -- some of the journalists, for example, and opinion leaders. So Marxism in its rather strange and extreme Japanese form did persist in Japan longer than say, in Western Europe.

Q: Then you left Japan?
STRAUS: No, I still had one more year in Japan. I was in charge of the Socialist Party.

Q: What does that mean?

STRAUS: Well, keeping contacts in the Socialist Party and reporting on it -- the main opposition party.

Q: At that time, did you see the Socialist Party presenting much of an alternative to the Liberal Democrats?

STRAUS: I am afraid we did. We thought that the economic basis in Japan by the mid-sixties, with rapid industrial growth and rising living standards, was not all that different from Western Europe and that you would have a moderation of the Socialist Party, such as you had in Germany, France and England. And it didn't happen.

Q: Were we looking at them in a sort of benign way -- this is the group that will eventually take over?

STRAUS: We tried to, but the party split, and you had some fairly conservative elements which eventually formally split off, and you had some people in the middle. Then you had the majority very radical elements in the Socialist Party, which, for a long time, prevailed and set the tone for the Party.

Q: I assume you were following the Party's strategic moves. Did you think they were doing the right thing at the time, or did it seem to be an odd Socialist Party as compared to some of the others?

STRAUS: Well, we probably exaggerated those occasional mild shifts to the center because through the sixties and the seventies, not all that much changed. You did have some changes, but it was so much slower than what took place in Europe.

Q: Looking back on it today, were we missing anything that was happening with the Socialists as far as how we were reporting on it because they are still not in power?

STRAUS: The right wing Socialists, who, in many respects, were the easiest for Americans to talk to, proved singly inept in getting themselves elected and staying in the Diet. So they have lost out. The centrists have done somewhat better. Perhaps they were seen as not really Japanese enough. I think we may have underestimated the LDP -- the conservatives. They, of course, have presided over an unparalleled economic growth and prosperity and peace. That is a very strong prescription for staying in office.

Q: Did you have any feeling about the basic corruption, or was that not much of a problem?

STRAUS: Oh, there was always some corruption, and then, as now, it is less about personal aggrandizement and venality as it is about power. Being in politics requires a lot of money, and
the election laws are very strict -- very idealistic, if you will. Then there is going to be corruption. It is very much part of Japanese society that you have gift giving. That smooths entrees into difficult, personal relationships. You are required as a politician to go to a lot of weddings and funerals, etc. Every time you do, it requires a gift. So it is not surprising, although I think it has been excessive in the last few years. At that time, it was less. By and large, I think the Japanese were less corrupted then than they are today.

Q: How did it work within the Embassy? You were reporting on the Socialists, and there was somebody reporting on the Liberal Democrats?

STRAUS: Yes, that is right.

Q: Would you have a joint meeting of what was going on, and each would present your side?

STRAUS: Well, we jointly would attend the staff meetings of the political section. Obviously, the person who reported on the Socialists was the more junior officer. I don't think we had any great differences of view, but I did get to know some of the Socialists, having been the assistant labor attaché and knowing the labor types -- some of them had previously been in the labor movement. That was one way to get rid of more senior labor leaders, to send them off to the Diet.

Q: You left Japan in late 1964. How did you feel about whither Japan at that time?

STRAUS: By that time, I think it was pretty clear that Japan was on the move. I don't think I or anybody else thought that their success would be as fast. I was concerned already then about Vietnam -- about our growing involvement there. It was clear to me, perhaps because I was working for Reischauer, who was opposed to this adventure from the very beginning because it could cause a rift in our relationship with Japan. So I looked at it perhaps differently than my colleagues did later on in Berlin. Perhaps having lived in Japan, I had absorbed some of the attitudes towards China -- China not being the unalterable enemy of the United States that it later proved to be.

ROBERT L. CHATTEN
Assistant Press and Publications Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1960-1961)

Robert L. Chatten received an undergraduate degree in journalism from the University of New Mexico and went on to receive a masters degree in communications and journalism from Stanford. He was sworn in as a Foreign Service Officer in 1959. He was stationed in Japan, Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador. He was interviewed by Fred A. Coffey, Jr. in 1994.

CHATTEN: From Manila, I knew that there were three assignments coming open in East Asia. On April first in those days and for a number of years thereafter you were asked where you
would like to go. It was known as the April Fool List. There were two openings in Indonesia and there was one in Japan. I asked for that one but I thought, its going to be Indonesia for me, boy. Miraculously, I ended with the Japan assignment as Assistant Press and Publications Officer in Tokyo. “Please be there yesterday,” the cable said.

Q: What year was this, Bob?

CHATTEN: This was about Thanksgiving of 1960. And true to personnel’s continuing way of doing things, they waited and waited to make a decision, and then said we had to be there immediately. One of my earliest, mild-mannered acts of defiance of the Agency was, asking permission to at least let us go via Hong Kong and buy some winter clothes. They reluctantly agreed.

We got to Tokyo in the last days of one of the great characters of the Agency of that day - PAO George Hellyer. He had been a tea planter in Indochina and had been swept up in the Agency’s early net cast to get people who seemed appropriate to the task. He had reorganized the post into thinkers and doers, which was one of the great items of discussion of the whole Agency. It hadn’t worked. There had been a program division, supposed to think about either an audience (labor or politicians) or a subject matter (economics). This was familiar ground later in the Agency but it was tried on a major scale first in Japan. Then there was the doers, the production division, which was supposed to crank out all the stuff aimed at either these audiences or the designated subject matter that the thinkers thought up. I became the Junior Doer. The production division was headed by Hank Gosho as Information Officer, who had been a thinker, and who as a Japanese-American had been one of World War II’s Merrill’s Marauders in Southeast Asia. He was a colorful, wonderful man heading a colorful cast of characters.

Q: Who was your immediate supervisor?

CHATTEN: My immediate supervisor was, again, one of the unique characters that the Agency doesn’t have very many of anymore, Charlie Davis. Charlie Davis spoke fluent whorehouse Japanese, which he had learned while in the military. Charlie was a high roller. Flamboyant and lazy, he very much enjoyed the contact part of his job and very much disliked the part of running a Press and Publications staff of 25 Japanese and trying to get a product out the door every day. When I showed up, he said, “Thank God you’ve come, I’ve got a lot of leave that I’m going to lose. Ciao.” So straight off of this JOT experience, straight off of my week in Hong Kong buying my 3-year-old boy a coat, and my first custom-made suit...

Q: I hope it fit.

CHATTEN: I may still have it. Here I am with a whole crowd of Japanese to supervise and I didn’t even know what the hell they were doing. Open the door and there would be a whole room of six or eight ladies operating Japanese typewriters. Perhaps you remember what Japanese typewriters look like, with several thousand characters on trays, but it looked unlike anything that I’ve seen before. But they were a vital cog. There was a whole copy desk which looked very much like my old copy desk in a newspaper newsroom. It was staffed with translators, who loved Adlai Stevenson when he went to the UN because he spoke in full sentences, and hated
Eisenhower because of the ups and downs and lapses and long pauses in his syntax. Add a bunch of other people who were doing God knows what, dealing with the press, turning out publications. This was the deep-end-of-the-pool school of personnel management. I was lucky to dog-paddle my way through the earliest days of this.

Q: Bob, initially did you get any language training?

CHATTEN: No. Assistant Press and Publications officer was considered an inside job. I came, during the course of our stay in Japan, to that most frustrating of points, the ability to ask several questions and not understand any of the answers. But there were a number of very talented and dedicated staffers who would accompany me on business out-of-doors. The Japanese staff certainly spoke English. This orientation ultimately led to my perspective on the importance of language. To take the case of another famous PAO to Japan, Alan Carter, he never spoke a word of a foreign language and who, for good measure denigrated the importance of speaking another language. He seemed to have arrived at the conclusion that if you know what you want then it’s the other guy’s problem to learn it, or, alternatively you can always get somebody to perform the basically technical function of interpreting. Most people know how much baloney that is, but it was one of those things that, for want of prior experience, I learned in a hurry in Tokyo.

We’re talking about a period in Japanese-American relations in which Douglas MacArthur II was ambassador. He was a smart, colorful man and he interviewed all new staff in the mission. It was very much a period of transition, in which MacArthur looked upon himself as being the one who was finally going to break down the occupation status and the occupation mentality. Whatever the legal status of occupation was at that moment, the occupation mentality was still there on both American and Japanese sides to some extent. So there were some situations analogous to my previous experience with colonial status in the Philippines. Partly as a function of this, MacArthur would not be seen publicly with any American uniformed officers, with the possible exception of some of the generals and admirals. But he wouldn’t be photographed with them. I, as the junior doer, found myself in what seemed to me a curious position of having bird colonels come into my office and tell me the troubles that they had of liaison with the Embassy. But I was about the level who was authorized to talk freely to those guys. I’m sure there were people in the political section who were doing so at some level or other, but it was a strange time indeed.

Our Japan days saw the transition to the New Frontier. Kennedy had been elected but Eisenhower was still in office when we went. MacArthur was replaced by Edmund Oldfather Reischauer, a Japan scholar born in Japan of missionary parents, and fluent Japanese speaker, about whom some of the people in USIS Tokyo thought, “He’d be a good CAO.” It was a yeasty period in Japanese-American relations because the nature of the relationship was changing dramatically, with the change further dramatized by these two very, very different characters of Douglas MacArthur II the nephew of the General and married to Vice President Alben Barkley’s daughter, and Ed Reischauer, married to the granddaughter of a former Prime Minister of Japan. Much of what USIS attempted had to do with trying to interpret the nature of the relationship or the proper nature of the changing relationship, as we envisioned it. There aberrations in the US-Japan relationship, like “the nature of the labor movement” which was our creation but which went off in political directions that we had never anticipated. We were seized with trying to
communicate the new look in the United States, with Camelot coming on line, and the Space Race. I can remember coming back into the office in the middle of the night in order to make sure that releases on Alan Shepherd, first American in Space, were properly pushed out to the media.

Q: *Did you get involved with any program which you thought made a difference in Japanese-US relationships? And our country programs and our country objectives? Did you get excited, did the hair stand sometimes and say, “Boy, this is it?” or “What are we doing here?”*

CHATTEN: Hair-raising may not be totally apt but, sure, there were times when we felt we were doing something that really needed doing. In the Philippines it was the programming that we hung on the visit of the president. Then, as now, a Presidential visit provides wonderful hooks upon which to hang all kinds of messages and I was really an integral part of that.

In Japan I persuaded post management that what they needed was a Press Officer and a Publications Officer and that I ought to be the Publications Officer. That allowed opportunities to do all kinds of things. One of them, the first time that anything I did ever got incorporated into Congressional testimony, was the production of the Kennedy Inaugural Address in a bilingual version pamphlet. It had the specific purpose of marrying Japanese desire to learn English to their curiosity about, and our need to explain, the new leadership in Washington. The English language is one of your great program assets in Japan, and it was then and is today. It was a real rush to be able to come out with something that at the same time was a manifestation of the new winds blowing in Washington and the new winds blowing in Japanese-American relations. It had a huge acceptance among the Japanese. By the time I left we went through nine printings of that thing. I would order up some number that seemed large to me, 20,000 or so, and they’d be gone in a week. So I’d order it again. You could approach an important university’s language people or their English Department and say “Look what I’ve got,” and they’d say, “I’ll take a zillion. That was exciting.

Q: *In some countries I know, the Publications Office had quite a bit of money and so they would reach out and grab titles, grab topics that weren’t particularly pertinent. Did you inherit some of that? Did you have to make some hard decisions in saying, “Some of these things are not useful for our program?”*

CHATTEN: Sooner or later, everybody has had to deal with ten thousand pictures of Lyndon Johnson or something equally difficult, but that’s the cost of doing business. The sparks were really on the side of what was exciting. We started two magazines while I was there. The Labor Information Officer and I put together a new periodical, a quarterly aimed at labor audiences. That was great fun, yeasty stuff for anybody at any level, let alone somebody who’s not out of his ‘20s yet.

Q: *Did you find some interesting reaction to that labor magazine?*

CHATTEN: No question about it. There were elements within the heavily politicized Japanese labor movement that still looked to the United States as a model, as a source of information and wisdom. Organized labor hadn’t been one of my interests, but here we were with an interested
audience in the Japanese labor movement at a time when the relationships between post-war power blocs were still being shaped.

The other excitement in publications began with a cable in the middle of the night telling us to get together with the Brits, the French and the Japanese, quickly. Washington was going to supply camera-ready copy on a worldwide pamphlet about the Berlin Wall, which was still under construction. I have over the years kicked myself, I don’t know how many times, that I did not keep my copy or copies of this thing that we put out on a crash basis. We met at the British Embassy but the US was supplying the copy and photos. The Agency was going to get the text to us in the fastest way possible, which was to be translated into Japanese and fitted into Washington’s layouts. It was a first class piece of work, really good visually. We put a lot of effort into it and we got that sucker out in record time, in tens of thousands.

Q: What was the Japanese reaction to this?

CHATTEN: It’s hard to measure in retrospect. I think probably very good. Here’s an issue around which we, they, the world, might retreat into war and they wanted to know everything that was knowable about it. They certainly wanted to know how we felt about it, and there we were with a quick-hitting product. Remember, those were the days before you could tell a story like that instantaneously via television.

Q: Would you think there was any connection to the symbolic bit of the Berlin Wall and our reaction to it for the Japanese to assess how reliable an ally we are, we were. How quickly were we ready to respond?

CHATTEN: The question of the reliability of the US as an ally came later in my experience in East Asia after Vietnam. If there was a question in policy terms it had more to do with United States’ orientation toward Europe as opposed to Asia.

Q: For one reason or another USIS/Japan has been a particular pilot project, being pushed and pulled.

CHATTEN: While I was there, the post was reorganized into a more traditional model, away from the thinker/doer configuration, which was judged by Washington to have been a failure even though some of the ideas persisted and became Standard Operating Procedures later in the history of the Agency.

The Japanese must have thought us quaint indeed or at least “the inscrutable West” for doing some of the things that we did organizationally and because of some of the products we put out. I don’t think they were very critical at all in those days, concentrating more on just trying to figure us out. That is, except for the people who would march every couple of days in front of the Embassy Annex, our building, on their way to demonstrate at the Diet. Anecdote: We were in the Annex, we were in the Mantetsu Building, which had been the Manchurian Railway headquarters. It was on the route that would be taken by all people who had reason to demonstrate outside the Diet, which was a Japanese thing to do in those days. As long as they were coming by the Embassy Annex, we would get included in the thing. My secretary was at
the window late one afternoon laughing, and saying “Come look.” The orderly, four abreast
demonstrators were carrying signs protesting the high price of butter and eggs and cheese, dairy
products, and the hydrogen bomb.

Q: Well that’s an interesting mixture.

CHATTEN: Not only was it funny at the time but it was instructive about the Japanese as well,
both in their organizational tactics and in how they viewed us. As long as they had gotten
together to harangue Parliament, they might as well take a shot at us as a target of convenience,
the logic must have gone.

Q: So you had two years in Tokyo?

CHATTEN: I had just over a year, with Pat teaching English at Waseda University and a 3-4
year old, living in the old Perry House apartment building. We lost a baby during that time, in a
nightmare experience of driving the streets of an unfamiliar part of Tokyo, with Pat in the midst
of a spontaneous abortion, trying to find the Seventh-Day Adventist Hospital.

G. CLAY NETTLES
Claims Commission Legal Assistant
Tokyo (1960)

Rotational Officer
Yokohama (1960-1963)

G. Clay Nettles attended the University of Alabama and served in the U.S. Army
from 1954-1956. In 1957 he entered the Foreign Service, having taken the exam
during his final year of Law School. Mr. Nettles’s postings included Japan,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Lebanon, Pakistan, Zaire, Italy, Turkey, and Switzerland. He
was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1997.

Q: You were assigned where?

NETTLES: To Tokyo. I was sent there because of my legal background. Article XV of the
Treaty of Peace with Japan provided that any Allied property located in Japan (it had to be
located in Japan, not, for example, in the Philippines) at the beginning of the war would be
returned, and if it couldn't be returned, compensation would be paid. There were over 300
American claims under this clause in the Treaty of Peace. All except 17 were settled, and those
that were not settled were sent to this legal commission, composed of one Japanese member,
Ambassador Nishimura, a former ambassador to France, and a former member of the Court of
International Justice in the Hague; an American member, Lionel Summers, who had entered the
State Department under the Wriston Program from the Legal Division; and a neutral member,
Judge Salim, a Swedish judge who had served on an international commission in Egypt. I was
the legal assistant for the American member, Lionel Summers.
Q: Did Lionel Summers have other responsibilities, or was he there just for this purpose?

NETTLES: He wore two hats. He was the supervising consul general of all of the posts in Japan, including Okinawa.

Q: The consular posts.

NETTLES: Right, and he even had two offices. He had one in the embassy itself, or rather what was known as the Manchesu Biru, the Manchurian building, an annex of the State Department where the consular section was located. Then, for this commission, we had an office in the old Imperial Hotel, which, as you know, was designed by Frank Lloyd Wright. I divided my time between the two offices.

Q: I think, in my oral history interview, I said that my first office, when I went to Japan in 1959 as a member of the United States delegation to the GATT Conference, was in the old Imperial Hotel. But I can see I have no particular distinction, because you have the same location for your first office. You say Allied properties; these were private properties, company properties and so on, primarily?

NETTLES: Both. In a few instances, there were claims for an American citizen whose house was destroyed by bombing. But over half of the claims were made by American companies that owned an interest in a Japanese company. For example, one American company owned a percentage, I believe about 20 percent, of Toshiba, and they brought claims for the damage which Toshiba suffered as a result of the war.

Q: You say there were how many unsettled claims, 17?

NETTLES: There were 17 American claims, but there were other Allied claims, also. But the U.S. had the largest number of unsettled claims. We were the first to have a formal commission and have hearings. The legal issues, particularly as far as the companies, were basically the same for the British or the Dutch or others as they were for Americans. So we worked closely and they were very cooperative, because the legal precedents that would be decided by our commission would be applicable to theirs.

Q: And they would have their own joint commission to take up their claims.

NETTLES: Exactly. But I think, as a result of our claims and the precedents which were established, it wasn't necessary for all of these countries to have a formal commission. I know the French settled all of theirs... I'm not sure about the British and the Dutch. They had the largest number of claims after us.

Q: Now the U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty, I think, was concluded in 1952.

NETTLES: I don't recall when it was signed. [Signed in 1951 in San Francisco.]
Q: But sometime well before you got there in 1960. Had the claims commission been working already for some time, or did it start about the time that you got there?

NETTLES: No, it had been working for some time. As I said, there were initially over 300 American claims, and all but these 17, which were referred to the commission, were settled. Basically, those that were not settled fell into two types: one, that the Japanese simply questioned the validity of the claims, or, two, the financial amount of the claim was so large that none of the Japanese negotiators wanted to take the responsibility of reaching a settlement. They preferred that it go to the commission.

Q: Was the commission able then to complete its work to deal with these, basically, two issues--magnitude and ones where there was a dispute about the validity of the claims?

NETTLES: Right. We concluded the commission within six months. This was almost record time for a legal commission of this type. It usually takes much longer. But the Swedish jurist wanted to conclude and go home, and so he put pressure on us to really expedite the work. It was interesting work, and I think the American companies, for the most part, were very pleased with the outcome. They got pretty much what they wanted, with the exception of one American company, which I won't name. All the companies had brought claims, for example, for their buildings which had been destroyed by the Allied bombing raids, or the percentage which they owned. But the one American company filed claims for the profits which they lost when the war contracts were canceled. For example, the contract to manufacture torpedoes.

Q: For Japan?

NETTLES: For Japan. Of course, at the end of the war, in '45, all these contracts were canceled. But this American company filed claims for the profits which they would have made had the contracts been fulfilled to manufacture these armaments. I know you won't be surprised to hear that it was unanimous that this company's claim for their lost profits was denied.

Q: Now if a company was not satisfied with the judgment reached by the claims commission, did it have recourse elsewhere, or a right of appeal to somebody else?

NETTLES: No, there was no right of appeal.

Q: So this was final.

NETTLES: That was final. But I think, on the whole, the claimants were satisfied.

Q: The claims had to be filed by some specific date?

NETTLES: I think so, Ray, but I don't recall. There must have been a cutoff date, but I'm not sure.

Q: So the commission basically finished six months or so after you started.
NETTLES: Right.

Q: You were there for the windup phase.

NETTLES: That's right. I had been told by Personnel in Washington before going out that this would probably last for about a year, and then I would be reassigned to either the embassy in Tokyo or to one of the consulates and work in the consular section. After the completion of this work, I was sent to Yokohama, where I worked for two years as a consular officer.

Q: You initially had been in Tokyo for six months or so, and then you were reassigned to Yokohama. Did you move, or did you commute?

NETTLES: I moved.

Q: It's not a very great distance between the two cities.

NETTLES: No, but as I'm sure you recall, one could have commuted every day. The train service was quite efficient; it was much more efficient than driving. When I made the move, I just simply drove my car down to Yokohama and moved into furnished quarters. There were, I believe, five consular officers, so every fifth week, you were the duty officer, which meant that you were on call and had to come in whenever there was an emergency or a night-act cable, for example. You couldn't very well have commuted from Tokyo to come in to read a night-act cable, so it was essential that we live in the Yokohama district.

Q: As you remember, I was detailed to Yokohama the last three months I was in Japan. I commuted, because it was very near the end of my assignment. As you were talking about the duty-officer roster, I don't quite remember whether I was on that or not on that. In any event, it would have been hard to respond in the middle of the night or on a weekend from Tokyo, although I guess it would have been possible, because there are trains just about all the time.

NETTLES: Well, no, I believe the last one stopped at midnight.

Q: But you did consular work. You did the usual range of visas and American-citizen protection, and so on.

NETTLES: Yes, on a rotational program, which meant, for example, that I was visa officer for approximately 10 months; administrative officer for about six months; and protection and welfare, which included shipping, for perhaps 10 months (which may not add up exactly, but gives an indication). It was good training. You were the only visa officer, and yet, as you just mentioned, it was close to Tokyo, so if you really got into a difficult thing, you could always pick up the phone and call an expert who had done this for a long time and ask a question. You were on your own, but yet you could get assistance very easily. It was interesting, though, that very quickly, although I was a junior officer, I became the expert in shipping, because Yokohama was by far the busiest port for American ships (and by 'ships' I'm speaking of merchant ships) in all of the Far East. At other ports, Fukuoka, for example, I remember when they had an occasional American ship come there with some problem, they would call me and
ask for my advice, because I had by far the most experience of anyone in Japan at that time.

Q: I think that American consular officers had more responsibilities with regard to American shipping in that period than perhaps they do today. Of course, there isn't as much American merchant shipping on the seas. But what were some of the particular responsibilities that you had for American ships that came in to Yokohama? I guess some actually went up to Tokyo to dock, but Yokohama was the post on Tokyo Bay that, I think, did all the shipping work for American ships.

NETTLES: All the shipping work, that's right. Yokohama was normally the first and the last port of call for American merchant ships going to the Far East. Because of the law and insurance, particularly insurance, it is important to stop by the consular section before going home and file what was known as a note of protest. This was not a U.S. government requirement; it was done strictly for insurance. Executing this note of protest, which contained wording about rough and stormy weather (it always had that phrase), protected the company in the event of an insurance claim. Now I don't know the details, but I know that was the reason for this, and why almost all American ships docked there. Also, they could get from the consulate in Yokohama a crew-list visa if the American ship had foreign nationals on it. Individual visas were not required if it had one crew-list visa. Almost every ship docked for those two things.

Then, in addition, there were other reasons. For example, only an American consul could discharge a seaman. The ship's captain could not. The law (and it was written in the law) simply said (I could almost quote it), "Occasionally, a consul may be called upon to discharge a seaman for cause. This should not be done lightly." Fortunately, I was only called upon once to discharge a seaman for cause.

Q: At the request of the captain.

NETTLES: That's right. It was quite an interesting situation. The ship was located at Shimizu, a port about 100 miles south of Yokohama. I had to go down there and then go aboard the ship and conduct a hearing. The facts of the case were that, the night before, the seaman had been in a bar, and, like Burt Lancaster in those kinds of movies, broke off a beer bottle and cut up the face of the first mate pretty badly with the broken bottle. So the captain wanted to have him discharged. The union representative had sort of ambivalent feelings. They felt like they had to protect the seaman. On the other hand, I said, "Would you really want to serve with this guy on the way back to the U.S.? Aren't you afraid that he might do the same thing again?" This union representative agreed that, yes, he just might. So it all wound up they were happy with my decision to discharge him. Then I had to take the seaman back to Yokohama with me. He didn't speak any Japanese, and I did, so he was on his good behavior all the way back to Yokohama.

Q: Then what did you do when you got him back to Yokohama, put him on a flight home?

NETTLES: The agent for the company was responsible to get him back. So he went into the detention center. The detention center was where seamen who'd missed their ship, for one reason or another, would be held until either they were flown back or placed on another ship. But, again, it was the agent's responsibility to take care of the seaman. But many a week I would get a call
from some seaman saying, "I want to speak to the American consul."

I would say, "Well, I'm the vice consul. What can I do for you?"

He'd say, "All I did was miss my ship, and they've got me here in jail."

Then I would say, "Well, you're not in jail. You're in detention center."

The seaman would say, "Well, it's got bars on the windows. I can't leave."
They had a point, but I would say, "No, if you had seen a Japanese jail, the conditions wouldn't be quite as good as the detention center, and certainly the food wouldn't be nearly as good."

But, in any event, I worked closely with the agents, and we got them out as quickly as we could.

Q: The American consulate in Yokohama is now closed, I believe, and has been for some years. Can you sort of reflect, Clay, about the role that the consulate played, not only in terms of shipping and visas in the port city of Yokohama, but more generally in its consular district? Did you travel quite a bit? You mentioned going to Shimizu. Or was that what the consul general himself would do?

NETTLES: The consul general did, and he was basically just showing the flag. The rest of us did occasionally, but not that much. We traveled a lot, of course, unofficially. Japan, as I'm sure you would agree, has many attractions, and it was always fun to get out. Despite its reputation, basic Japanese is not difficult at all to learn. Japanese is very difficult to speak fluently. But with basic Japanese, which one could acquire easily, you could enjoy traveling where little English was spoken.

Q: You did not have formal language training, but you were able to take some part time?

NETTLES: Early morning language.

Q: In Tokyo?

NETTLES: Yes, and then I continued in Yokohama.

Q: The Foreign Service Institute's Japanese-language school was in Tokyo, not in Yokohama at that time.

NETTLES: At that time. Later, when the consulate was closed, our consular functions shifted to Tokyo.

Q: The replica of the White House, the original consulate building, I think went back before the Second World War.

NETTLES: Yes, it did. Yokohama was 80 percent destroyed by bombing, but there was a block right on the water that survived. That included the American consulate; a British bank; a British
company, Butterfield and Squire; and the Yokohama Grand Hotel, a truly grand hotel. These were all on one long block.

Q: There was a Foreign Service national employee at the consulate in Yokohama named Yamada, if memory serves me correctly, and I believe he was closely associated with U. Alexis Johnson. Do you remember that story?

NETTLES: Yes, I do remember very well. Mr. Yamada was in Mukden, Manchuria, working at the American consulate when war broke out. According to U. Alexis Johnson, he saved his life by preventing a Japanese mob from lynching U. Alexis Johnson. Ambassador Johnson was very, very grateful. Every time he went to the Far East (and when I was there, that was at least twice a year, because he was ambassador to Thailand at the time), he would come to Yokohama to see Mr. Yamada.

Q: There's one other part that I think is kind of interesting. That is, when Johnson came back to Japan with General MacArthur in 1945 to be, I think, his political advisor (and I think he eventually was the consul general in Yokohama, all this well before the peace treaty and before the embassy was reestablished), he broadcast on the Armed Forces radio that he was looking for Yamada-san, and would he please come, that Alexis Johnson was looking for him. He came and was rehired by Johnson after the war, out of gratitude for what he had done in Mukden at the beginning of the war.

NETTLES: That's very interesting. I didn't know that myself. Certainly Mr. Yamada deserves great praise for what he did in saving U. Alexis Johnson's life.

U. Alexis Johnson not only came to Yokohama often, but occasionally Mrs. Johnson would come, too. As you know, Mrs. Johnson had the reputation, as did so many of the top senior wives of that time, of being difficult. As you said, at one time he had served as consul general in Yokohama. So Mrs. Johnson, when she came to Yokohama, would go to the consul general's residence and rearrange the furniture the way it had been when she was there. Of course, when she left, the consul general's wife put it back the way she wanted it.

Q: Okay, is there anything else we should say about your assignment in Japan?

NETTLES: No, except that it was a very good initial post. The legal work was interesting, and because of the unique position, I was included in a lot of high-level functions that I wouldn't have been otherwise as a very junior officer. So that was interesting. Also, one is expected to have experience in every area of the Foreign Service. Yokohama was ideal for that.

Q: It was also ideal that management at the post recognized the importance of location, and scheduled you to do visa work, shipping work, and administrative work.

NETTLES: That's right. I should add, too, that we had the ideal consul general, who was there to support you and to guide you, but he didn't try to micromanage.

Q: I think there was one officer, maybe his deputy, who was very experienced at consular work.
NETTLES: Particularly shipping and seamen, Frances Taylor, that is correct. For years, she had served within the State Department in the Shipping Bureau.

Q: Whatever one would say about shipping work, Yokohama was a very important place where that was done. Probably one of the five most important in the world.

NETTLES: Yes, I believe it was considered the second most important. Only Rotterdam was more important at that time; more important in the sense of American ships that called there.

Q: Partly because of the nature of the Far East at that time, there probably were more problems with seamen related to shipping than perhaps there were in the ships going to Rotterdam.

NETTLES: Well, I would think so, simply because the voyages were longer, and that increased the amount of time in which problems could arise. Then also there were quite a few American ships, and when I say American, of course, we're talking about ships that were under its American flag, merchant ships. But that included tankers, and we had a number of tankers that made periodic trips between the Persian Gulf and Japan. Those seamen would serve normally for six months at a time, and then they'd be flown back to the States. Of course, six months is a fairly long time, so quite a few problems could arise during that period.

Q: Where you wouldn't come anywhere close to the United States and American ports. You'd keep shuttling back and forth.

NETTLES: Correct, correct. These tankers.

DONALD NOVOTNY
Agriculture Attaché
Tokyo (1960-1963)

Mr. Novotny was born and raised in Nebraska and educated at the University of Nebraska. After serving in India with the 4H Foundation, he joined the Foreign Agriculture Service and assigned to its Grain Division. He subsequently served as Agriculture Attaché in Tokyo, Japan and Wellington, New Zealand. In 1964 he returned to Washington, where he served as Director of the Grain division until retirement in 1974. Mr. Novotny was interviewed by Allan Mustard in 2009.

NOVOTNY: I was assigned as assistant ag attaché to the US embassy in Tokyo, Japan in January 1960 and spent four and one-half years there. The ambassador was MacArthur, nephew to the famous general, who was later followed by Reischauer. My immediate boss, the attaché, initially was Chuck Elkinton and later Joe Dodson. Serving with me there was were Russ Strobel and Don Motz and then following me was Jimmy Minyard.

Q: And what did you do in Japan? Well, first of all why Japan, why were you interested in Japan, or was that offered to you? How did that system work where you were a civil servant in
those days and going out on your first tour, what was the dance like?

NOVOTNY: Oh, I hit the ground running. I wanted to get into this and so I studied Spanish for a year and of course I thought I’d mastered it, nothing of the kind, but any way I was getting so I could use it some; every day the morning classes at the Foreign Service Institute. And then I decided I’d branch out into something else so I took Russian for a year, and then, wouldn’t you know, I got sent to Japan. (laughter)

Q: How’d that happen? I mean, how did they offer you Japan, was it just kind of a bolt out of the blue, or what?

NOVOTNY: I think Bob Tetro, Sr., who was then in charge of the attaché assignments, just felt this would be a good assignment, and that it would be a good fit, whatever. In those days nobody was being sent to language school. Certainly Japan was a place where a lot was starting to happen, and so indeed when we got there, we were just in the midst of a big review to decide whether to give up on the US Wheat (Associates) office and close it down and after a couple of months it was decided to go on. And they brought in a guy from Oregon by the name of Jim Hutchinson to head the office. Incidentally I take great pride and credit in that I helped Jim find an assistant, Paul Sone, who had worked for a governor and had excellent English. Paul helped not only the wheat office greatly, but also the whole cooperator group to get more established and vitalized.

Q: Was this the Jim Hutchinson who had been general sales manager?

NOVOTNY: Yes. In Japan he represented western wheat states for I think around 15 years, and then he came back to USA to serve as general sales manager in FAS for a few years and I think he retired after that. When Dick Baum of Western Wheat and Clarence Palmby of US Feed Grains Council made their first visits the attaché asked me to deal with them because I had some background in grain and I had been working with the western wheat office somewhat even before coming to Tokyo. So then I helped the Feed Grains office get their start. And the third main thing that stands out was starting the poultry market program. We had a visit from Joe Parker, who was the first head of the poultry export arm of the US poultry industry at that time and Japan looked like a good first target in the Asian area and again I worked with them to find a good local person who could head the office, Katzi Toyota was his name. Following Parker’s visit, Katzi and I went down to visit some department stores in Osaka and the result of it was we started in-store promotion which was the poultry industry’s first project. And that just grew and grew and grew; everything grew, I mean it was an exciting time for US ag exports and a time when one could really see the accomplishments of the ag attaché office. So soon the office grew rapidly in size.

Q: So you wound up in Tokyo and they transferred you to New Zealand?

NOVOTNY: Yes, yes. I wasn’t all that enamored with the heavy social schedule and indeed in Tokyo it was extremely heavy. There was every night an important social engagement with Japanese counterparts and cooperators and government people.
Q: Every night?

NOVOTNY: Every night of the work week. And it would go from one gathering to another and to another. Those were also times when the social schedule in the diplomatic circuit was extremely heavy and a great emphasis was placed upon active involvement in that by the senior Foreign Service wives in the embassy. So by the time we were three, four years into that life, my wife and I were not sure we could raise a family in such settings and it's just not normal life. So when FAS talked to me about going to New Zealand to head the office where there was only one person in the office, I was somewhat ambivalent, and Dorothy as well. But we went and you know it was like being a representative to the state of Kansas or something.

CLIFF SOUTHARD
Book Programs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1960-1963)

Cliff Southard was born in Illinois in 1925. He joined USIS in 1955. His career included posts in the Philippines, Japan, Burma, and Nigeria. He was interviewed by Pat Nieburg in February of 1988.

Q: Maybe we ought to start with Tokyo, where you were Book Translations Officer from 1961 to 1963. What was it like?

SOUTHARD: Well, as I have often said, I still do believe that the book translations job in Tokyo was the most interesting one that I had in my entire Foreign Service career. I say interesting; it was interesting because I think it was the most cost effective and most personally satisfying job I ever had.

The budget was modest. I think it was something like $30,000. This was in the early 1960's. I subsidized the publication of roughly a hundred books a year -- a hundred titles a year. It was certainly the lowest subsidy program -- the cheapest subsidy program -- of books we had anywhere in the world.

Q: What do you mean by that -- the lowest cost?

SOUTHARD: We would subsidize a book for about $250 to $300 on average for an edition size of two and a half to three thousand copies. Ten cents a book is about as cheap as you can subsidize book translations anywhere. For instance, today in Latin America, we are paying $5 and $6 a book per copy for subsidies.

The other equally interesting part of the job was that we had a monthly magazine. The only USIS magazine ever that was devoted alone -- totally -- to books. It was called, "The Monthly Review of American Books," in Japanese. This magazine probably, I think, was the only USIS magazine that had advertising -- that carried paid advertising.
First, the magazine was an integral part of the whole book translation program because each issue of the magazine would review fifteen new American books that we would like to see translated in Japan. The magazine went to translators. It went to publishers and distributors, and the bulk of them went to university instructors -- professors.

Many of the translators would read our reviews in this magazine and decide that that was a book they would like to translate. As you know, many translations flow from a translator's interest rather than a publisher's interest. Some publishers would see the reviews of these books and choose to get in touch with us, ask us if we would like to support the publication of their translation.

The magazine itself, as I mentioned, was distributed to publishers, translators, and the primary end users were the university level instructors in the country. About half of the magazine edition was distributed by the two largest book distribution firms in the country -- the two that monopolized book distribution in Japan. They went from us to the distributors and from the distributors to the book retailers, who had a special interest in American books or translations of American books.

The magazine had a price on it -- thirty yen -- which was a lot less than it is today. The bookseller who eventually got the magazine at the end of the distribution line was free to either give it to customers of his that were interested in American books, or they could sell it.

I mentioned the advertising. As you know, it is illegal for a USIS post to accept money and use it in its programming. If it accepts money, the money has to go back to the Treasury of the U.S. There is nothing in the regulations that says you may or may not carry advertising in a USIS magazine. My device, which Washington apparently accepted, was to first have a contract with the Japanese printer who was going to print the magazine. Then, if an American or Japanese publisher wished to buy advertising space in the magazine, we developed a rate card. One whole page ad was worth the production and delivery to USIS of a thousand copies of that very issue of the magazine. Harper, for example, Harper's representative in Tokyo would send a purchase order to the printer, Tosho Insatsu, for 1000 copies of the May issue of the USIS magazine, with instructions to deliver those 1000 copies to USIS for distribution. For several months, our advertisers were paying for about half of the production costs of the magazine. Circulation of this magazine, by the way, was 10,000 copies -- not a small magazine.

It was a very interesting part of a circular pattern in the whole book program because once our subsidized translation was printed, then we would have a review of the translation, which would be carried in the magazine. The magazine normally carried fifteen reviews of new American books and reviews of fifteen new translations of American books. So once the book was published in translation, we would give it a little additional sales promotion push by doing a review of the book.

Q: Cliff, you operated in probably one of the highest literacy societies of the world.

SOUTHARD: It is the highest.
Q: If you look at it from your perspective now, Japan is also known as the electronic society. Was there a drawback, or was there competition from other media than books? In other words, did you feel, at that time you were there, that radio or even the infancy of television had an impact that would change the interest in books per se?

SOUTHARD: Certainly, television was going full blast in Japan at the time. The Japanese, however, had always been very, very heavy readers of books. It is the most literate society in the world. They produce more books, I think, per capita than any other society in the world, even today.

As a matter of fact, the number of books produced in Japan today is roughly equal to the production of books in the United States. We think of ourselves as the biggest book producers in the world, but the Japanese, with a smaller population, produce as many titles a year as we do.

Q: What kind of titles did you produce?

SOUTHARD: Well, if you are acquainted with the USIS program, there are all sorts of titles -- American literature, economics, American politics, a great deal on international politics. I remember during that time that I was there, we did translations of two of Kissinger's books, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," for example, before Kissinger was known much elsewhere. Lots of anti-communist books, of course.

Q: Did any of the books wind up as textbooks at universities? I mean, if there were literary works, or did you publish any textbooks, per se?

SOUTHARD: No. We were not in the textbook business as such, and I do not recall that any of these books became texts -- possibly as reference readers in some university courses -- but not as texts. I just cannot think of other titles right now.

Q: Did you have any say on the production in terms of make up, promotion of the books, or was this all written into a contract so that these were quality books, or were they paperbacks?

SOUTHARD: There were all kinds. We had a paperback series, with one publisher, Juji Press, that was a low priced paperback book program. We did about twenty titles a year. These tended to be more popular type books on all facets of American life.

Q: Do you recall one other thing? Do you remember the VOA Foreign Series? Were any of those translated in those days?

SOUTHARD: Yes, several of them were. I think there was one Schram book on communication that I remember got translated there. There were several others.

Q: Tell me, Cliff, what was it like to live in Tokyo at that particular time? There was pollution then, I am sure, as there is now. A lot of people felt it was difficult living in Tokyo. How was it for you and your family?
SOUTHARD: Tokyo was much less crowded than it is today. I have been back in recent years. I would not like to live there very much today.

We enjoyed it quite a bit in the early 1960s. We did live in those Embassy ghetto apartments -- I think we were up in about the sixth floor of a lovely apartment building -- all of which have been torn down to build even larger apartment buildings, which are there now. Those you see today are not those that were there in the 1960s, but those in the 1960s were very attractive buildings.

I had two children, my number two and number three daughters who were both born in Tokyo. This was during the period preparatory to the Olympics -- the 1964 Olympics. Tokyo was adding considerably to its subway system then.

Our children were born in the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital, which was on the far side of town. The streets were so ripped up at night with the underground construction that both of these births had to be induced. My wife reminds me from the far bedroom that we also had three children living in a two bedroom apartment in that ghetto. One baby lived in a closet.

Q: Would you go to work by car, or did you take the subway?

SOUTHARD: The Embassy housing area was not more than five or six blocks from the Embassy and from the Manchurian Railway building, the Mantetsu Biru, which was the building that included USIS and the Consulate. You could easily walk to work or, in those days, and I think even yet today, the Embassy maintains a little shuttle bus that runs back and forth.

Q: Did you make a lot of friends in the Japanese community? You must have had close contact, certainly amongst publishers and intellectuals.

SOUTHARD: I had a lot of good close relationships with publishers and professors. Many of the professors tended to be the translators. As a matter of fact, I was back in Tokyo in 1986 -- twenty-six years after I was working there in this program -- having dinners and social meetings with many of the same publishers that I worked with in the early 1960s.

Q: Let me ask you though, so many times we have experience in overseas posts that entertaining has been very much of a -- dominantly a one way street. We entertained, but depending on the society, hardly ever got to see the homes of our hosts. Was that true in Tokyo, too?

SOUTHARD: In Tokyo, you seldom saw any Japanese home. It is a custom among Japanese to entertain even their own Japanese friends in restaurants or public buildings. My wife, on the other hand, was invited to several Japanese homes by Japanese wives who used her as an English teacher.

I recall only a couple of Japanese homes that I visited in the whole time, but that is not unusual. Japanese homes are very small and are not really built for grand entertaining.

Q: Tell me, how much travel did you do while you were in Japan?
SOUTHARD: I made a few trips. The Japanese publishing industry is essentially centered in Tokyo. In those days, there was little outside of Tokyo. I did make a trip down to the southern part of the country, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Nagoya and then took vacations in other places at my own expense -- most to Hakone. I saw more of Japan as an inspector many years later than I saw when I worked there the first time.

MARGARET V. TAYLOR
Exchange Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1960-1963)

Margaret V. Taylor was born and raised in San Diego, California. She obtained a bachelor’s degree from San Diego State University and a master’s degree in communications from Stanford University. Ms. Taylor served in Israel, Japan, Finland, and Burma. She was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on March 28, 1990.

Q: So you went to Japan from there, and what position did you hold in Japan, and can you tell us a bit about the programming while you were there?

TAYLOR: I went to Japan in January of 1960, where my first experience was to sit practically the day after arrival in Tokyo for the examination, which was one of the first steps in the Agency's career status accreditation. However, having survived that, I then was able to devote myself to my job, which was as exchanges officer, specifically working on the Leader and Specialist Program still under the operation of the State Department, although I was housed in the USIS offices in Japan.

Q: Now, let me ask you at this point, when I was in Japan, some years earlier, USIS had a completely separate section on the Educational and International Exchange Program. Was that still in place when you were in Japan and did you therefore cover a segment of that program? If so, who was the overall Educational Exchange Officer or were you in that position?

TAYLOR: No, I was part of a relatively large office. The head of the Exchange Program was Bob Boylan. There were four American officers and an American secretary just in that one section.

Q: That's the way it was when I was there.

TAYLOR: We were housed in the Mantetsu Biru, which was the only building left standing in that area after the World War II bombing. We were separate from the embassy proper, although close by. USIS had the top two floors of that decrepit building.

My specific responsibility was for the Leader and Specialist Program, both Japanese leaders and specialists going to the United States as well as American specialists coming to Japan to lecture before Japanese audiences in various fields, and in various disciplines.
I was very much aware of and to a limited degree involved in the Fulbright program and the other exchange activities of that office but almost my entire time was spent helping to select Japanese leaders going to the United States for periods of one or two months of observation and study. I also helped to program American specialists who came to Japan to lecture throughout the country on various aspects of American foreign policy, culture, economics, a broad range of American issues that we were trying to present to the Japanese.

It was quite a large program at that time because this was close enough to the war years that we still were trying to educate the Japanese both in terms of basic democracy as well as aiding them in coming out of their long period of isolation in the world and learning more about America.

I felt I had the best job in the embassy because this deeply involved me in Japanese society and I had an opportunity to get to know prominent Japanese whom we were sending to the United States. I had to discuss with them what they wanted to do in the United States, make suggestions and then send those messages forward to Washington so programs could be planned for them. On their return to Japan, I had find out what their impressions were and then to write that up and send it back to Washington.

It was a very interesting and I think extremely worthwhile program and provided an opportunity to cement in a very deep way relations between the United States and Japan.

Q: Now, when you staged these lectures by American specialists, did you do a good deal of that through the cultural centers that USIS maintained throughout the country, or did you mix that with appearances at universities and other economic or political forums?

TAYLOR: All of the above. We did work very closely with the rather large number of cultural centers in the country at that time. For a country the size of Japan, I think we had, maybe up to ten cultural centers.

Q: You still had that many? We started out with 24 when we took over the program from the Army in 1952 and we gradually reduced them. I am interested to know you still had ten left.

TAYLOR: I think it was about that number. I've forgotten exactly but it proved to be very difficult to close them because the Japanese clung to those centers. I think they were an very important part of their learning more about this strange phenomenon, the outside world. They had been so isolated throughout their own history that any information or outreach to foreign countries and to understanding foreign people was something that they both desired and felt that they could benefit from.

We worked through the cultural centers but we also planned lectures and meetings with American specialists' counterparts in Japanese society.

Q: Who was the PAO at that time, was the time when George Hellyer was there? William Copeland was PAO when I arrived in 1960, then George Hellyer. Hellyer was followed by Burton Fahs who came, I think, from the Ford Foundation.
No, I believe he came from the Rockefeller Foundation of which Dean Rusk had earlier been president. I think it was a combination of Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Reischauer that decided that he would be a fine man to go out there and take that position. He was one of the so-called "super-cultural officers" really, and after a while this Agency brought in Ed Nickel to handle direction of the standard operational side. Burton Fahs was then turned loose as a high level cultural man. But I do not know whether that had happened by the time you left or not?

TAYLOR: It was happening, and Ed Nickel did come out while I was there. He was Deputy PAO and for precisely that reason, because Burton was not skilled in the administration of the program. He was more valuable in his high level contacts. He and his wife constituted a real pair. They were a team. She was very important in the work that he was doing.

Because of the special qualifications of Ambassador Reischauer and his Japanese-born wife, this was a period of very great receptivity and support throughout the embassy for the USIS operation. We all worked closely together. The Reischauers were extremely interested in the exchange program and were very helpful to me with these prominent Japanese who were going to the United States. I think they saw it as a very important element in the whole activity of the embassy.

Q: It sounds strange now, but at the time that I left Japan, which was about four years before you got there, one of the largest U.S. programs was conducted by the AID mission and USIS supported their work on the Public Affairs side. Productivity was all the issue at that point because the Japanese were thought to need knowledge of our productivity methodology, which they did at that time. Was that still continuing when you were there or had that phased down?

TAYLOR: The AID program had phased down considerably and there were only a few people left. That function passed along into the economic section and we had a very effective economic officer, Phil Trezise.

Q: Yes, he later became the U.S. Representative in the office of the OEC in Paris.

TAYLOR: Yes. It seems an anomaly now that we were able to tell the Japanese about producing anything but, in fact, it was true then.

Q: They still, I guess, had not exploded into the productive stage they have reached today.

TAYLOR: Well, that economic miracle was gathering all this time. I left in August or September of 1963 when the Japanese were preparing for the 1964 World Olympics. It was the Games and all the activity developed around them, that were the watershed of Japan's emergence into the world economically. They were able to present almost flawless Olympics and the world became aware that Japan was poised and ready to do what they were embarked upon, which was to turn that country around economically and to make it important again.

Q: You left before the Olympics was actually staged?
TAYLOR: Yes, I did, and was sorry, of course. There was a lot of preparation prior to that so I was involved in some small part of that preparation. The Japanese have always had great trouble with English as we do with learning Japanese. It's an equal trade. But I remember traffic signs being put up in Tokyo saying in English such things as: "may parking and stopping" or "proceed to immediate inside left," which were largely incomprehensible. Somebody official thought that that was proper English so they printed them up on metal signs and set them around town.

Q: Do you have any further comments on your Japanese experience before we pass to your next area of responsibility?

TAYLOR: Well, only to say, and this is a personal aside, but I think many of us who served in Japan have carried with us an abiding fascination for that country. It's a country which you never really get to know thoroughly.

There is a point with Japanese beyond which you simply can't get in terms of becoming familiar and really thinking that you thoroughly understand them. Because of Japan's importance now, I find that in my present day life there is a bond with the Japanese and with the Americans whom I knew in Japan which seems to surpass that of any other nation. I'm continually fascinated by Japan. We get so much in the papers and magazines and through all the media about Japan now and it's a matter of intense personal interest to me still.

Q: Yes, I think all of us who have served in Japan as you and I did, (myself over three different periods of time) still have that feeling about the country. It is a fascinating nation and they are a remarkable people.

HUGH BURLESON
Information and Cultural Officer, USIS
Niigata (1960-1963)

Assistant Cultural Affairs/Policy Research Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1963-1969)

Mr. Burleson was born in South Dakota and raised in California. After graduating from the University of California, Berkeley, he served in the US Army before joining the United States Information Agency in 1957. A specialist in Southeast Asia Affairs, Mr. Burleson served variously as Policy Officer and Public Affairs Officer in Niigata, Tokyo, Saigon, Madras, New Delhi and Seoul. He also had several tours at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Burleson was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1996.

Q: How did you finally get out of the administrative field and go into the Foreign Service Officer category?
BURLESON: After my first year as a management intern, the Agency suffered a severe budget cut and was not able to offer me an interesting position in management. I heard that there was a job available in the Agency Research Office as a Japan/Korea Analyst. That seemed quite interesting, so I jumped at it and spent the next three years in that work. Then, in the summer of 1960, the Agency made it a lot easier for people in the domestic service to transfer into the Foreign Service, and I took that opportunity. My wife and I both went through the oral paneling. Within a few months I received my first assignment, which was to Niigata, Japan, a branch post of the Agency.

Q: How did you find the attitude of the Japanese people? Did they demonstrate any antipathy toward the Americans in the period?

BURLESON: It was really... not personal antipathy. It was always, might I say, generic or generalized in the sense that they had complaints about U.S. security policy, but they didn’t take this out on Americans personally. So, it was not really an anti-Americanism in that sense, but against U.S. policy. That was what it came down to. When I had arrived at post in 1960, about three or four months after the big to-do over Security Treaty renewal, which had caused cancellation of President Eisenhower’s visit, things had quieted down considerably. So, we didn’t experience anything but warm hospitality and quickly established friendships among the Japanese and developed good rapport with them.

Q: What were the essential parts of your work? What were you promoting in U.S. relations?

BURLESON: We had a full-scale information and cultural program going to get better understanding of U.S. society. We brought American specialists in to lecture and speak at the university and with various groups in the area on economic and policy issues. We had cultural presentations -- musicians and so on -- coming through. Of course, I did some speaking myself around the area whenever I was asked to. We also taught English at the Cultural Center. We put a lot of emphasis on our library as a solid resource for people who wanted to learn more about the United States. It was really a full-blown program in terms of using all possible means of facilitating communication.

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Q: And how long were you in Niigata?

BURLESON: I was there for three years. I left there in the summer of 1963. I was transferred to Tokyo for an assignment in the Embassy.

Q: What were you doing in the Embassy?

BURLESON: The first year I was Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, helping to carry out the cultural programs, especially lecture and cultural-presentation type programs.

Q: Was Glen Shaw still Cultural Attaché, or had he left by that time?
BURLESON: I think he left while I was in Niigata, or maybe just before I got to Niigata. He was leaving just about the time I arrived.

Q: Who was the Senior CPAO at that time?

BURLESON: Dr. Charles Fahs was CPAO. My immediate boss was CAO, Walter Nichols, for my first year in Tokyo. Then, the job of Policy Research Officer came open, and because of my already fairly lengthy Japanese experience and research job in 1957-60, I was chosen to fill that slot.

Q: Was this in Tokyo, also?

BURLESON: In Tokyo. I held that position for another five years, 1964-69.

Q: Very extensive...

BURLESON: Yes. 1960-69. Three back-to-back, three-year tours. It wasn’t that unusual at that time for people to spend a lot of time in Japan because of the difficulty of language; the cultural differences. You couldn’t just be dropped in there and take off running. When I first arrived in Japan, there were people who had been there also for 8, 9, 10 years. It wasn’t that rare a thing. Leon Picon was one of them.

Q: He was still there?

BURLESON: Yes, he was still there. So, it wasn’t considered unusual or strange to have long stretches in Japan.

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Q: This is working back a little bit but... What did you find out about Vietnam? What was your experience with the officers and their feeling about the Vietnam war and the feelings of the general population of Japan at that time?

BURLESON: Well, the Japanese, of course, from their World War II experience mostly, had become very solidly pacifistic, and they really were repelled by any war situation, so that they were always critical of our involvement, thinking that we were being overly ideological in our approach to the Vietnam situation. The whole trend of opinion was simply to become, through those war years ‘65, ‘66 until I left there in ’69, more and more set in their opposition to the war. They used to demonstrate along the street that went right by the Mantetsu building (Embassy Annex). We called it “demonstration avenue” because student demonstrations were going by there several times a week. So, I had a lot of exposure to all of that ferment, which also began to help kick off the student movement and radicalize the student movement in the late ‘60s.

Q: Did you have any personal contact with the Japanese who were critical in their conversation and who voiced anti-U.S. sentiment?
BURLESON: Yes, constantly. One of the interesting things, and also in terms of my involvement with security issues was that the Agency, certain parts of USIS Tokyo had spent a lot of time cultivating and identifying what we called emerging “defense intellectuals” in the media, academia, and in the Japanese Government, and we worked very closely in trying to make sure that they weren’t simply getting wrapped up in all their anti-war fervor, but would be trying to understand the rationale for, first of all, our security relationship, and secondly, the whole U.S. defense strategy for East Asia. So, we kept feeding them data of all sorts and having them interact with our own defense intellectuals. At the time we considered this a sort of strategic program of USIS Japan -- to develop these people in ways that would assure a rational dialogue was possible rather than the kind of dialogue that you might try to have with students demonstrating on the streets.

The effects of this began to take hold by the very late ‘60s, ‘68, ‘69. Their writings by that time were fairly rational, their articles would often include explanations of what the U.S. policy was and then maybe go on to criticize the policy, but at least they could do part of our job for us.

Also at that same time the left wing in Japan was beginning to focus on what they called the “1970 crisis,” because in the 1960s the Security Treaty had been renewed for ten years, but the leftwingers had failed to center on the fact that, after ten years, unless one side or the other declared they wanted to terminate the Treaty, it will just become open-end. Therefore, that meant that the Japanese Government could sit on its hands and do nothing, and the Treaty would go on indefinitely. But the leftwingers were trying to gear up for repeating the 1960 demonstrations, but more effectively.

So these “defense intellectuals” whom we were working with were also focusing on defusing that, because they wanted to continue basically their rational dialogue with the U.S. on defense issues.

I think, it was in 1968 or ‘69, that Japanese Prime Minister Sato said he wanted to visit Okinawa, the first such official visit in the postwar period. During his visit he said the post war period for Japan will only end when Okinawa was returned to Japan. Control of Okinawa was still under the United States High Commissioner at that time.

So Okinawa was to be one of the big focuses of what the leftwingers wanted to make a major confrontation with the Government in Japan. And the defense intellectuals we had cultivated by that time were organized enough to have their, sort of club, where they consulted with each other.

Q: You are talking about the Japanese?

BURLESON: The Japanese. the ones that we had cultivated. Actually they often got together and would exhort and advise the Japanese Government. So, they organized a big conference with their American counterparts in Kyoto in the summer of 1969 about Okinawa and how it should be dealt with. And some of our own top people, retired generals. really “A” class thinkers on defense issues in general participated.
USIS was not there. We didn’t have anybody present, but we knew we could get the details from our Japanese friends that we had developed. Reischauer had been our Ambassador in Japan in the earlier ‘60s. He came as one of our participants in this Kyoto Conference on Okinawa.

The net result was that each side better understood how far they could push the other side, and it really laid the basis then for when the Japanese Prime Minister visited Washington in 1970, it laid the basis for him to work out an agreement with Nixon on the reversion to Japan of Okinawa.

So, those of us who were involved felt it was one of the great successes of USIS to help defuse, not only on this anticipated 1970 crisis, but also on the issue of Okinawa reversion to Japanese control, because we had helped to cultivate this cadre of Japanese defense intellectuals who could engage our defense intellectuals on a rational basis. Their reports of each side’s positions at this conference would go to their respective governments, who then exchanged and translated these for the respective governments on the opposite side. The whole process was a kind of model for what can be done when you take a long-term view of the possibilities of this kind of dialogue.

Q: Were the meetings with the Japanese intellectual groups a strictly USIA initiative?

BURLESON: They were at first. They would attend seminars that we organized. But after, I guess, about ‘66, ‘67, the Japanese were beginning to organize such seminars themselves. Sometimes, it was sponsored by a major newspaper, sometimes the intellectual group itself and sometimes other groups organized this. By ‘68, ‘69, they were actually inviting some of our own (American) top strategic thinkers to come to Japan.

Thus, we got it launched, and we stayed involved up to about ‘68, ‘69. By then it was pretty much self-generating and it had enough support from the Japanese Government, especially the Foreign Ministry, but also from the Prime Minister’s Office, that we kept sending the materials to them and still had speakers coming over to interact with them. But then the dialogue was much more between equals rather than one-side teaching the other as it was in the earlier stages.

Q: Were you the principal one involved in setting up the contacts with the intellectuals?

BURLESON: No. I was working with our Information Officer and Cultural Affairs Officer on this, and listening in and giving them the feedback. I was more in a supporting role but I was also looking for items all the time, helping them to identify useful materials, because I could read the language and listen also to the debates on television and knew what the issues were and where the areas of continuing misunderstanding were. I could convey this not only to our own officers but also to the Ambassador and the Political Section, so that they could better understand all aspects of this.

Q: Were the members of say, the Political Section of the Embassy and the Ambassadors and others from the State Department side of the program in touch with the cultural group that you were dealing with?
BURLESON: They were all standoff-ish at first. Their mindset was, “We deal with Gaimusho, we deal with the Foreign Ministry on this”. But as they saw that these people were more and more getting nationwide attention, appearing on nationwide TV, being debriefed even by the Foreign Ministry and really beginning to take on the aspect of being advisers to the Japanese Government, then our Embassy officers began taking them more seriously, and began being more active and supportive and involved in this dialogue.

Q: These were people who came, I presume, primarily from the Political Section?

BURLESON: Yes. The Political Section, but the DCM was most interested.

Q: Who was the DCM at that time, Bill Marshall?

BURLESON: No, John Emmerson was one of the first ones that got closely involved with some of this, and later, Dave Osborne (also DCM).

Q: Who was the Ambassador at that time?

BURLESON: Reischauer up till ’66, and then U. Alexis Johnson from ’66 to ’69. Hodgson came a bit later... Somebody else was there... I don’t recall... No. Mr. Hodgson was right there in ‘74-’77. [editor’s note: Armin Meyer 1969-1972 and Robert Ingersoll 1972-1973.]

Q: In any event, it was basically the USIS personnel that instigated the...

BURLESON: Kicked it off and got the dialogue going. Writing...

Q: For which we never got any credit...

BURLESON: That, yes. The State Department doesn’t often like to admit that USIA sparked the opportunity before they were doing anything, but we did take our satisfaction in how it worked out. As I said, that was one of the things that contributed to my opting to go to the War College in ’72-’73.

**WILLIAM CLARK, JR.**
**Japanese Language Training**
**Tokyo (1961-1962)**

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. He graduated from San Jose State College with a B.A. degree in 1955 and served in the U.S. Navy intermittently from 1949 to 1953. In 1957, he joined the State Department. Ambassador Clark’s career included service in Sierra Leone, Japan, South Korea, Egypt, an ambassadorship to India, and a position as Assistant Secretary for the East Asia Bureau in Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.
Q: In June, 1961, you left Sierra Leone and were transferred to Japan. How did that come about?

CLARK: In those days, ever April 1 -- April Fool's Day -- a Foreign Service employee was asked to submit a list of three assignment preferences. When it came time to think about another assignment, I sent in my request, listing a German speaking post as my first choice, Japan as my second and the old standby -- Portugal -- as my third. I told the Department that the Japan assignment was however dependent on getting some language training first. I thought that was rather daring for me not being known as one of the world's great language students.

Japan seemed potentially interesting for a number of reasons. As I mentioned before, I had been brought up in California and had had some Nisei friends. I had served with the Navy in Hawaii. So the Pacific was not an unknown to me. Japan was well on its way to recovery from World War II. It was going to host the Olympic games in 1964. So it was becoming well known around the world and I thought it would be an interesting place in which to serve. A few weeks after having submitted my wish list, I got a nice letter from the Department informing me that I had been selected for language training for six months after which I was to be assigned to Yokohama as a consular officer. I did not know anyone in the East Asia Bureau or in Japan nor did I have any academic background in the country or even the area. I had no help in getting this assignment; it came out of the clear blue sky.

So I went to Tokyo for six months of language training. At the time, the language school had a policy requiring all wives to take 100 hours of Japanese, but no more. Judith first took the 100 hours and then clamored to have the policy changed. It was and she then took more than half as much language training as I did. The wives' training policy was dropped also because some of the wives weren't interested in taking even the 100 hours.

I had been assigned to language school only for six months as sort of a probationary assignment I had never been to Japan and neither I nor the Department had any way of judging how well we might navigate there. The plan was that if I and the Department were satisfied that Japan was the right place for me, I would have gone to Yokohama for a year or so and then returned to the language school to finish that course, That was fair enough.

One of my colleagues at the school was Gordon Beyer, who had been a Marine officer in Japan previously. He later became one of our ambassadors in Africa. But because he had had Japanese experience, his language assignment was for two years. As it happened, Beyer found Japan a different place for a young Foreign Service officer with two small children than it had been for a single Marine officer. He also was not very adapt at learning the language. So I found that I liked the language; he didn't. We both wrote letters to the Department; he asked that his training be shortened to six months and I asked that it be lengthened to two years. The Department honored our requests and Beyer went to Yokohama as a consular officer after six months at the language school.

The language school in Tokyo in 1961 had 22 students -- all Americans. The policy to permit non-Americans to attend wasn't instituted until many years later. Since I was going to be in Japan
for at least two years, the Department had authorized us to ship all our household effects. We had been told that it was most unlikely that, as a language student, the Embassy would find accommodations for us in its compound. Of course, it did and put us in Perry House, where the quarters were fully furnished. When I asked what to do with our household furniture -- fortunately, we didn't have very much -- I was told that the Embassy had no storage space and that therefore finding a home for our goods was my responsibility. Somehow, we managed to jam it all in the small storage area that was assigned to each apartment in the Perry House. When the Department decided to extend my assignment as a language officer to two years, the Embassy sent me a note saying that I was not entitled to be in government owned quarters and that I would have to find my own private accommodations. I am sure that the Embassy needed our apartment for one of its employees. So I was furious twice: first for having to live in government quarters when we first arrived in Tokyo and then subsequently for being booted out once we had settled in. We ended up renting a house behind Shamuya Station, which we could actually afford because the rent was low enough to be covered by our housing allowance. The house was a one Japanese-style bedroom and den, living room, Japanese-style dining room, kitchen and a maid's room. It had a small garden; it was rather nice. It had been built by a man who built another house right besides it and a third one behind that one for his son. He owned all the property between two streets, which today of course is worth a large fortune. I visited the area recently; our house had been torn down. It was a somewhat strange house. It had a western wing. The living room was 21x21 and had a fifteen foot ceiling. The den was 15x15, also with a fifteen foot ceiling. The maid's room was small. You walked from the western-style living room into the Japanese-style dining room which forced you to lower your head. The bedroom was Japanese, as I said. The kitchen was a traditional kitchen. The bath was Japanese-style -- an ofuro. So the house was a real mixture of East and West. It was a very nice house and very convenient to public transportation.

I enjoyed the language school. When we arrived, it was school policy to give the students quarterly exams to monitor progress. If progress had been adequate, then you were given $100 to finance a week's field trip. In those days, you could exist in Japan for a week on $100, including travel expenses. It was a challenge to see how far one could go in Japan on $100. We found that little sum could get you quite far in the country. The school used to bring an outside observer to check the progress of each of the students. I had been at the school just two weeks when I had my first "inspection". I had learned to say "Good morning" and that was about it. But Judith and I were adventuresome and said that we would like to spend a few days in a Japanese inn in Kyoto. That was interesting. We didn't know whether breakfast or a bath was being announced or whether it was a fire drill, but we managed to survive; it was good fun.

The school was based on almost a "complete immersion" principle. That is we were supposed to speak only Japanese. But the school was located in Yohogihashiman near the Maji shrine. It was next to a US military housing compound, called appropriately Majimura -- or Maji Village. The compound had its officers' club, a PX, commissary, etc. We used those facilities for shopping so that the immersion was not total.

There were never more than two people in one class. The instruction day was four to five hours followed by three hours of self-practice. The classes were drills, the old-fashioned way. We used tapes, lots of tapes although not to the degree they are used today. The school had a couple of
reel tape recorders which one could listen to, but it was very primitive compared to today's
language school facilities and equipment. Eventually we graduated to conversations. After a few
months, the students began to work on writing the Japanese characters -- Kanji. The reason the
school waited to do that is because it found out that the students became so fascinated by the
characters they would never get to speaking the language. It was hard to judge progress if the
student only wrote characters.

Even though we lived in the Embassy compound, our social life did not revolve around that
community. We of course knew some of the people at the Embassy, but our social life was
centered on the school and with the other students. Most of the students were Foreign Service
officers, but we had some USIA and CIA personnel there as well. There may have been a couple
of military officers as well. The school tried to bring the students into Japanese life. It would
program field trips which enabled us to meet Japanese groups. We participated in a mini-
exchange program in which we would teach English to some Japanese in return for them
teaching us their language. The school put some emphasis on teaching us to navigate in the
Japanese community we were living in. It taught us how to introduce ourselves to the saki shop
owner and how to make sure that the policeman in the police box knew who you were and where
you lived. Japanese do not use street names or house numbers. So it was very important that
someone like the policeman knew where you lived because he could direct your guests to the
right place.

Q: Had you stayed at the language school for only six months, how helpful would that have
been?

CLARK: It would have been useful. If I had studied Japanese intensively for six months
followed by a tour of eighteen months as a visa officer, I probably would have returned to the
school to finish up the course. I liked Japan. I didn't want to become "Japanese" as some of the
language students have become. They sometimes tend to become more "Japanese" than perhaps
even the Japanese; they will view matters through Japanese eyes only. They come to believe that
the Japanese can do no wrong. I never let that happen to me, but I have been fascinated by that
syndrome. I was never very good at flowering arranging which may explain why I maintained
some balance.

Language school brought our linguistic skill up an "average" conversation level; it was certainly
not adequate for interpreting purposes. When I attended the school, we would be invited to the
Residence for large functions, as I have mentioned. That was essentially because the Embassy
did not have sufficient numbers of officers who could converse in Japanese. That was the only
times we were involved in Embassy functions; by agreement, on the part of the Embassy and the
School, we were not involved in the Embassy community. Our job was to learn Japanese, not to
mingle with Americans.

By the end of the two years at the school, I could get by in Japanese, but I was not bilingual by
any means. It was suggested that when I finished school, I'd be assigned to Sapporo as the Vice-
Consul. Having just served in a two person post, that wasn't particularly appealing. I went to see
Owen Zurhellen, then the special assistant to the DCM at the Embassy. He asked why I was
reluctant to go to Sapporo. I told him that I had just served in a two person post. Furthermore, I
was on a promotion list which would have made me a Consul and there wasn't enough to do in Sapporo for two Consuls. He smiled and asked whether I'd be interested in Osaka. I told him that that sounded good. What I didn't know was that he was about to transfer to Osaka as the Consul General. So I ended up working for him. Zurhellen, by the way, was one of the best Japanese language officers that the Service had. He had studied during the war and then used it in his assignments.

Let me illustrate why I was not bilingual after two years of language school. When I first reported to duty in Osaka, Zurhellen told me that the Japanese Foreign Minister was coming to Kyoto for United Nations Day. He wanted me to go to hear the Foreign Minister and then to write a report on the speech. Fortunately, the authorities gave out copies of the text because the Foreign Minister was Mr. Shina, originally from the Island of Honshu. He spoke a dialect called Zuzuben which I didn't understand at all. I told Zurhellen that I might have wasted two years in language school. He said not to worry about it. A couple of nights later, we were invited by some local officials to a restaurant where we were served by some young ladies from local tea-houses. One of them sat next to me and I was looking forward to practicing my hard learned Japanese. She started speaking in an Osaka dialect which left me completely dumb-founded. I reported that episode to Zurhellen who again said not to worry about it. He invited me to a dinner at his house where he was going to entertain some senior Japanese businessmen. After dinner, one of the guest, the founding father of Matsushka (Panasonic), spoke to some of the guests who were sitting around. They were CEOs of their companies and were all graduates of Tokyo University. They were salaried. Matsushka owned his company although he had never gotten passed the fourth grade in his school in Osaka. Seeing his audience, he also began to speak in the local dialect. I asked him whether he was trying to do me in. After that episode, I decided I'd better learn some of the local dialect which I did. So the school could never have made its students bilingual because the dialects which you encounter in every part of Japan are so distinct that with rare exceptions, almost all Japanese can fall back into their local dialect leaving other Japanese from other districts almost completely in the dark. Most Japanese will claim that they can understand all dialects, but I think they have troubles with some, if not all of them. All Japanese could understand my standard Japanese, but I could not understand all dialects. The one that really mystified most Japanese was the Okinawan dialect, which is now dying out. Okinawa is the only place in Japan where I needed an interpreter. He would interpret my Japanese into the local dialect and vice-versa. The Okinawan I was speaking with could not understand Japanese; I could not understand the Okinawan dialect. Because of TV and other interchanges, dialects are being used less and less today. The "official" Japanese language is basically the Tokyo dialect.

C. ARTHUR BORG
Security Section
Tokyo (1961-1963)

C. Arthur Borg came to the Foreign Service in the mid-1950s after graduating from West Point Academy in 1948 and serving in the Korean War. His Foreign Service career included positions in Japan, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Austria. Mr. Borg was interviewed by Hank Zivetz in 1990.
Q: You served primarily in Europe, although you did have a stint in Tokyo back in 1961-63. Was there anything that happened in Tokyo during your tour there as a political/military officer that might be worth including on this tape?

BORG: Probably in the context of my dealing with the political/military problems while I was there. I was assigned to what was called the security section. Our principal concern was administering the US/Japan Security Treaty and principal headache was trying to whittle down the ungodly number of military bases that we still had in Japan in the early 1960s. Close to 135 as I recall. Some of them were one man weather stations, but nevertheless an over-whelming American military presence. One of my principal jobs was working to try to reduce the number of those bases.

Q: Was the Japanese population at that time as concerned as they are at the present with the nuclear weapons issues--nuclear weapons on our vessels? In the more recent years they have had regular demonstrations as our carriers enter ports there.

BORG: I would say much more so in the sense that when I was serving there, which was in the early 1960s, the Japanese had an aversion toward anything nuclear--nuclear power as well as weaponry. I can remember in 1961, for example, I tried to organize a visit by about a dozen Japanese journalists to Guam to go aboard an American nuclear powered submarine. This did not involve nuclear weapons, just an atomic reactor powering the submarine. It was a good project, but unfortunately it never came to fruition because a typhoon intervened. But it was symptomatic that the Japanese were really very skittish about anything to do with things atomic as compared today where they have a very active Tokamura power program.

Q: Was it our policy at that time to get the Japanese to increase their military? Some years later it became a part of our bilateral relations with Japan.

BORG: In terms of trying to get them to increase military spending? Not so much at that period. The goal that was set forth later of aiming towards at least 1% of GNP was quite a bit later. In the early 60s it was very much defense oriented the notion that the Japanese had to be restricted to the defense of the home islands.

GORDON R. BEYER  
Administrative/Consular Officer  
Yokohama (1961)  

Political Officer  
Yokohama (1962-1964)

Gordon R. Beyer was born in Illinois in 1930. He served as a Foreign Service officer in Thailand, Japan, Somalia, Tanzania, and was ambassador to Uganda. He was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in May of 1989.
BEYER: I had been in Japan during the Korean War, and I was intrigued by Japanese affairs. I had studied under Reischauer at Harvard. Reischauer was the Ambassador to Japan; he had just been named. So I had myself assigned to the Japanese Language Training School.

Q: Let's touch briefly on Yokohama and what you did when you got there. I take it that, having known Reischauer, you probably had some contact with him, even though you were at a separate post somewhat removed.

BEYER: Yes. First of all, the school was in Tokyo. So, when I was up at the school, he would have Language Officers over from time to time, and we would chat with him. I was not the best Language Officer in the world, and I decided that maybe I didn't want to spend a whole career in Japan. So we were just initiating a six-month course. So I switched with another officer, who had been assigned to the six-month course. I went into the six-month course, and he went into the full two years -- Bill Clark by name, who is now Deputy Assistant Secretary in East Asia. Bill was a marvelous linguist and went on to become one of the better Japanese linguists in our Service.

I went on into the six-month course, and then after that, went down to Yokohama, where my first job was as a Visa Officer and an Administrative Officer -- not Visa, Passport and Citizenship, and Administrative Officer. And I did that for six months. It was quite a large Consulate General in those days. It had nine officers and about fifteen folks -- a big place. After six months, it was reduced to three officers -- a Consul General, who lived in Yokohama but worked in Tokyo, a Passport and Citizenship Officer, a Shipping Officer and an Administrative Officer -- he did all those things -- and me, who became the Reporting Officer. So the next year I did reporting, and then the third year it was reduced to one person, and that was me. We just did the shipping and what reporting we could.

Q: So you were gradually being phased out of existence.

BEYER: That's right. In fact, what happened, of course, is -- you probably know -- the school was moved from Tokyo to Yokohama. I was all for this because I thought that the young Language Officers could live in some of the smaller villages around Yokohama, such as Kamakura or so on, which are very lovely places, and they would really get into the Japanese ways and the Japanese society. In fact, of course, what happened is that the Language Officers lived right in Yokohama, went to the Officers Club and didn't get involved as much in Japanese life during those days that they were in the school as they might have.

One other thing that happened in Yokohama, by the way, is we had a child born there who died after two weeks. That was supposed to be our last child because Molly was Rh negative. This results in having to change the blood of the child. So we had been advised by the doctors down in Yokosuka not to have any more because it would be tough for the mother and for the baby. But, having lost this child -- it had a congenital heart disease, lesions in the heart which, in those days, they really couldn't fix, and I'm not sure they could have fixed her even today. But, after three months, we went back to Yokosuka and decided we would try one more time. The folks in Yokosuka said that they would do everything they could to bring the baby out in good shape. So that is when our youngest was born, Tom. He was brought on after seven months. He had a
variety of little things to get fixed up, including a complete transfusion of his blood and so on. But both he and mother survived, and both are doing quite well today.

Q: Isn't that great!

BEYER: Yes.

Q: Actually, our second was an Rh-negative one, too, except it was very early in the procedure, and they didn't do that complete drainage and oil change that they do now.

BEYER: Of course, I really have to put in a plug for the Navy doctors in the hospital in Yokosuka, which was made available to Foreign Service people in those days. They did, really, just a marvelous job. It couldn't have been better.

DAVID L. OSBORN
Political Officer
Tokyo (1961-1964)

David L. Osborn was born in Indiana in 1921. His career with the State Department included assignments to Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, and an ambassadorship to Burma. He was interviewed by Bert Potts on January 16, 1989.

OSBORN: The President's visit, the first ever by a sitting President, had been scheduled to coincide with the ratification of the revised security treaty with Japan. The visit touched off unprecedented student demonstrations in Tokyo; Zengakuren -- the name of the student union in Japan -- became a household word in the United States. Television news reports were full of these mobs of student demonstrators in Tokyo, surrounding the Embassy and so on, besieging the Japanese government. At one point in the demonstrations, a Japanese female student was accidentally killed -- trampled by the demonstrators -- and her death led to an intensification of the rioting and the protests. As a result, the visit of President Eisenhower had to be canceled.

I happened to be at the luncheon table when President Eisenhower's advance man -- Jim Haggerty, his press secretary -- was passing through Taipei on his way to Tokyo. Haggerty asked what was going to happen in Tokyo, whether the President's visit would go off smoothly or not. I told him not to worry; surely the Japanese police, who were expert in these matters, would be able to take care of any problem. This was a case of "famous last words."

The cancellation of the visit was a big trauma. One incidental result was to put me back on the trail toward another assignment in Tokyo. One, it reminded me that I was supposed to be a Japanese expert, and I had just shown in my remarks to Haggerty that I was in need of updating. Also, those riots and the cancellation of the President's visit -- were among the things that led to the assignment of Ambassador Reischauer to Japan.
Ed Reischauer was our foremost academic expert on Japan. The events leading to the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit made the Department realize the need to have a real Japanese expert in Tokyo, and Ed Reischauer was sent there. Ed Reischauer had been my instructor in Harvard, and his appointment may have been another factor.

Q: So you did return to Tokyo, and what was your job?

OSBORN: I was assigned to the Political Section, on the desk which dealt with conservative party affairs, that is to say, government party affairs. I was responsible for reporting on events in the Japanese Diet and on elections and other political affairs in Japan.

Q: What were the highlights of this over three-year tour in Tokyo?

OSBORN: Well, it was an exciting period. We had as one important focus the Japanese protests over our resumption of nuclear testing in 1962. As one of the most fluent Japanese speakers in the Political Section, it fell to me to deal with most of the protestors who were coming not only to demonstrate and protest against our resumption of nuclear testing but also to demand the return of Okinawa. So day after day, I would meet with small groups of protestors, bring them up to my office, talk to them, argue with them and, as necessary, bring them in to see Ambassador Reischauer, who was very good at dealing with them.

For me personally, one of the highlights of my tour was the visit of then Attorney General Bobby Kennedy. The Bobby Kennedy visit was set up and largely financed by Japanese politicians, who saw in this visit a way of trying to inspire the Japanese public with some sense of momentum in the relationship with the United States -- of bringing a little bit of the "Kennedy spirit" to Japan. And they saw this as a way of improving their own political situation. Anything that made the United States look good to the Japanese people tended to make the Liberal Democratic Party look good because the LDP was so strongly identified with the United States. Conversely, anything that made the United States look bad tended to strengthen the Socialists, who were the principal opponents. At any rate, the Japanese put a lot of effort into making the visit of Bobby Kennedy a terrific success. It was the most successful goodwill visit, I think, that Japan had had up to that point.

After that, the opposite pole perhaps was the assassination of President Kennedy, which struck Japan almost as painful a blow as it did the United States. No one who was there at that time can forget the sight of thousands of Japanese in the street, mourning the death of the President. All of us in the Embassy had to take our turns in appearing at different gatherings to join with the Japanese in tribute to the President. It was a very moving time.

WENDELL W. WOODBURY
Economic Officer
Tokyo (1961-1964)

Wendell W. Woodbury was born in South Dakota in 1920. He attended college at
Mr. Woodbury joined the Foreign Service in 1949, serving in the Dominican Republic, Algeria, Japan, and Denmark. He was interviewed in 1993 by Virginia Crawford.

Q: Did you request to go back to Japan then?

WOODBURY: Because of my background on developing countries, I was recruited as Technical Secretary for the Colombo Plan when we hosted it in Seattle. Secretary of State Dulles went out for a whole week to chair it after two weeks of meetings at the lower level. I was one of three technical secretaries under the secretary general. So I developed another specialty -- in multilateral diplomacy and international organizations, and I got to see the Secretary of State close up. It was basically a British Commonwealth organization for South and Southeast Asia. The Japanese were hosting it two years later and they asked for some help because it was the first international meeting they had hosted after the war. They were worried about their command of English and they wanted some people with experience to help out. They asked for four people from State, and particularly asked for me because the Japan delegation knew me from the first meeting in Seattle. It ended up that they only got me from the U.S. There was also a British financial commissioner from New Delhi who spoke Japanese, and an Australian and a New Zealander. We were assigned to the Foreign Office for three weeks as members of the Japanese delegation. The Japanese didn't really need much help because their post-war foreign service officers are great in English. The pre-war English of officers was generally pretty awful, even after a thirty year career because they learned their English from other Japanese. They taught it to each other so just replicated the accents and awkward usage. Now all entering officers are sent to American or British universities for two years and become very fluent but with either American or English accents.

My friends in the Foreign Office told me I was the first American since the Meiji Restoration to serve in the Foreign Office. My British colleague Stanley Charles from New Delhi and I acted as integral parts of the Foreign Office and sat with them on the dais which caused a few raised eyebrows. The Japanese did not need our help on English, but we earned our per diem by advising on Robert's Rules of Order and in an all night session helping draft the Prime Minister's speech.

As a result of this assignment through Ed Doherty, my former boss in INR who was economic counselor in Tokyo, I got to know the economic minister, Phil Trezise. I indicated an interest in coming back because I wanted to see Japan from an Embassy instead of under military occupation and my wife loved Japan. So after a quiet four years in INR, this provided an opportunity to get my foot in again in post-war Japan. As the result of my unusual assignment to the Foreign Office, I had friendly relations with several dozen Japanese diplomatic officers at all levels which stood me in good stead not only in Tokyo and Washington but all over the world at international meetings until my retirement.

Q: So you went to Tokyo in 1961 as an economic officer?

WOODBURY: Yes, as division chief of the internal division. We did the economic analysis of Japan and conducted the diplomatic negotiations on bilateral economic issues. The first thing I
got into was textiles, so that became my temporary specialty; but my primary responsibility became the analysis of Japan's economy. It was an interesting time. They were just beginning the ten year doubling the income program; this was when the tremendous rate of growth started. Trezise, Doherty and I were among the few who believed they could do it. Actually, we were too conservative. The Japanese had to revise the plan after the third year because they were already so far ahead.

Q: Was there a large economic section there at that time?

WOODBURY: Oh yes. It was one of our largest embassies.

Q: And we had large economic interests there at that time?

WOODBURY: Yes. Trade was growing by leaps and bounds and the Japanese had worrisome problems that were politically sensitive. One was cotton textiles; we were enforcing the voluntary quotas -- the Japanese used to call them the "involuntary" voluntary quotas. They were right, of course, but that was the payment of President Kennedy to South Carolina and North Carolina because they elected him after Ohio went for Nixon. The other sensitive point was the balance of payments deficit -- theirs, not ours. In was about $100 million a year. They complained that we wanted them to restrain their exports when there were few things they could make and sell to us. We used to tell them that they should look at the balance of payments in the context of global trade, not bilaterally; also that a country developing as fast as Japan should expect a large deficit on the balance of payments. So they worked hard to overcome that and they sort of over compensated for it -- by a factor of ten.

I used to do a briefing on the textile issues for the political and public relations types who usually are not interested at all in something as mundane as trade, except when it becomes a sensitive item between governments and peoples -- in the headlines in other words. The average American had practically no interest in foreign trade, but every Japanese knew virtually everything about it and was extremely conscious of it. My complaint about our political officers was not so much that they didn't know anything about business or economics but that they said it as if they were proud of it. That attitude sometimes infuriated hard-pressed U.S. businessmen.

I have never met a Japanese foreign service officer who is not able to talk intelligently and vehemently about complicated economic issues. As an introduction to my textile briefing, to show how things turn around, I used material that my wife, who is interested in Japanese history, found and knew would interest me. During our Civil War when the cotton imports were cut off we used to import raw cotton from Japan. While I was in Japan, we were exporting huge quantities of raw cotton to Japan to make into cloth and telling them that they should not send the finished product back to us. On trade, I have always maintained vis-a-vis Japan that we were and are more sinned against than sinning but are too ready to resort to petty protectionism weakening our efforts to open up their markets.

Their economic growth was absolutely incredible; we could hardly believe it; seventeen percent for one year in real terms. I remember there was a steady change in the composition of the trade, both imports and exports, which foreshadowed future problems. We could see even from
quarterly statistics how the exports to the United States were changing from conventional things like tea and raw and manufactured silk, simple machinery, etc. to much more sophisticated products. That was the beginning of what they called their star export system. Japan never had an overall economic plan like most developing countries, but MITI and the Finance Ministry would work together with industry and the banks and decide where the credit and resources should go, concentrating on foreign trade, while largely ignoring Japanese consumer interests, a pattern that largely obtains today although it can no longer be justified on any grounds. Japan's consistent huge surpluses on their balance of payments threaten the stability of the international trade and financial system on which their prospering depends.

Q: Who was the Ambassador when you were there?

WOODBURY: Edwin Reischauer

Q: How was he as Ambassador? Did he do well at running the embassy?

WOODBURY: Personally he was a charming person. At first he had a DCM, Bill Leonhart, who ran the embassy like a Navy ship. Reischauer was really only interested in the U.S.-Japan relationship long range. He was born in Japan of a missionary background -- he had a Japanese wife who is a descendant of the Meiji aristocracy. He had a deep emotional attachment to Japan and I think the war must have been a traumatic experience for him as it was for the Japanese who had a foot in both camps. After the occupation ended we showed our finesse by sending out a Foreign Service officer by the name of Douglas MacArthur II; I think that was about the dumbest thing we have ever done. Many of my friends told me he was a terrible man to work for and his wife was even worse. So after them, Reischauer and Mrs. Reischauer seemed like saints. Everybody liked them, in fact he was almost revered, especially by the language officers.

MacArthur II, while unlovable was such a strong man that he made the American ambassador The President's representative in Japan rather than the commander of U.S. Forces, Far East. We still operated pre-Reischauer pretty much as if there was a senior/junior relationship. I found out recently while working on some files for publication that an American ambassador, John Allison in the 1950's, called over the senior man on American affairs in the Foreign Office to read the riot act to him regarding Japanese export controls to the Soviet Bloc. This amazed me because an ambassador always goes to the Foreign Office; you don't call over a senior Foreign Office man to report to you. Imagine trying that with the Europeans, even a small country! The Japanese let it be known that that was going to end when Reischauer came out there. From then on only the Ambassador would deal with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and he would do the calling, not the Japanese. That is exactly what happened, Reischauer treated the Japanese as equals.

Reischauer's analysis of the political situation in Japan was that as Japan became more prosperous, country people would be moving into the cities to work in industry. Instead of voting conservative as they had before, they would join trade unions and vote for the more left wing anti-American or neutralist parties which might gain control thereby. This could bring into question our base agreements and alliance. I have been thinking a lot about what went wrong. A friend, a former FSO and noted Japanese scholar, questioned it then; he said the Ambassador was
wrong. He thought the extremes, the nationalist right and the communist left would become less and less important and it would be impossible to form a government without a coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party which would act as a brake on any move to the left or isolation. As it happened he was right but he has just told me that Japan still does not have a viable opposition. It is a too complicated an analysis to bring up here.

Q: There must have been a huge difference in Japan in 1961 from the Japan of the occupation, was there not?

WOODBURY: Well, they are always rebuilding Japan but the people and culture change much more slowly. It is hard to make a comparison, but I liked it much better the second time. There had been a lot of racism and condescension in the occupation. The Japanese were segregated on the railroads and other places as late as 1951 until MacArthur was relieved and Ridgway took over. Ridgway saw the long lines of Japanese waiting for the trains and next to them a yellow and black pipe and next to a large empty space. He said, "What the hell are these things? and was told that the empty space was for Americans. "Take them down!" was his reply; you should have heard the wailing. So all that had gone and the atmosphere was much better. You dealt with the Foreign Office as equals, and that is very easy for Americans because they all speak good English there now.

One of our deep, dark secrets is that most of our language officers are not really capable of carrying on technical discussions in Japanese although that may be changing. I have been gone a long time.

We take advantage of that too. One of my biggest responsibilities was the Joint Annual Economic Committee meetings of cabinet ministers of both countries. That came in with the Kennedy administration; Secretary Rusk used to attend with six cabinet members with economic responsibilities. They would meet for three days in alternate capitals and discuss every subject of mutual concern. After the first meeting in 1961, I was responsible for the organization and coordination, both substantive and administrative, at the next five meetings first in Tokyo and later in the U.S. They included wives so programs had to be arranged for the spouses, and all the advisors. It got to be immensely complicated -- transportation, social events, etc. Substantively, there were the briefing books and at the end negotiating the communique, always an all night session. That was a liberal education in the operation of the United States government in diplomacy. I don't think I could have recruited any of our Foreign Service officers from around the world who could have negotiated the communique in Japanese. We always did it in English and it was translated into Japanese later. So much for equal treatment; it is an enormous advantage for us to be able to do that. I had a brush with history in Tokyo in late 1963 when I was coordinating the Joint Committee meeting at that end. I had buttoned down the last loose end and had gone to bed early in preparation for the early morning arrival of Secretary Rusk and party. About 3 a.m. I was awakened by a telephone call from the head of TIME/LIFE for the Far East asking about the effect of President Kennedy's death on the meeting. Of course, Rusk ordered Air Force One to turn back to Washington. Five of the six cabinet members were aboard.
THOMAS P. SHOESMITH
Political Officer
Tokyo (1961-1963)

Principal Officer
Fukuoka (1963-1966)

Thomas P. Shoesmith was born in 1939 and raised in Pennsylvania. His career in the State Department included posts in Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and an ambassadorship to Malaysia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: Well, then, you spent the next, what, two years in Japanese language training again?

SHOESMITH: No, when I was in Hong Kong, I had studied Mandarin on a part-time basis. I enjoyed the language, and I had hoped that I could go to Taichung (Department of State language school in Taiwan) to continue the study of Chinese. I continued part-time study of Chinese in Korea. I tried to learn Korean, but it is a very difficult language. I spent a few months at it, and then gave up. However, Dick Sneider had me reassigned to the Japanese language school in Tokyo. At the time, he was the Japan desk officer in the Department of State. He was one of these officers -- and I believe that we have always had them in the Foreign Service -- who are always looking at personnel matters, trying to put people in the best place, where we could use them, and so on. He had the idea that I would spend a year at the Language School and then fill in behind someone who was in the Political Section in Tokyo. Well, I wasn't terribly disappointed by that. And in point of fact, I think that it was a very sensible thing to do because it meant refurbishing my Japanese, whereas if I had gone to the Language School in Taichung, it would have meant starting from scratch. At that time, I was twenty-eight years old or so, and that's pretty late to start learning, really learning a language. So I went back to Tokyo and spent a year -- a little less than a year -- in the Language School. As I say, it was largely a matter of refurbishing my Japanese, although it was there that I really learned to read Japanese. Previously, I had not really been able to read Japanese, even after the two years' training in the Army.

Q: Well, then you ended up in the, what?

SHOESMITH: The Political Section, and again working on Left Wing political parties.

Q: Were you known as "Mr. Left Wing"?

SHOESMITH: I don't know why it happened, although, of course, that had been my background. I knew something about the Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the Communist Party and so on. And so I was put in that job, again doing the same sort of thing that I had been doing.

Q: How had these Left Wing parties developed since you'd been away from them and come back? Did you see any change in either their focus or their power?

SHOESMITH: No, not really. As far as the Socialist Party was concerned, it was then, as it has
been until relatively recently, very ideologically hidebound. That, combined with the fact that it had no real platform for governance if it were to gain power, meant that the Socialist Party, even with substantial trade union support, was simply not going anywhere. It could not present an effective challenge to the Liberal Democratic Party. The Democratic Socialist Party was not in much better shape. As a matter of fact, it was in worse shape because it had less support within the trade union movement. The Communist Party was still, what, ten percent or so of the electorate.

So there had been no real change in the balance of power among the political parties in Japan between 1950 and 1960, and subsequently, there was some thought in the early 1960s that the Socialist Party would be able to gain a greater measure of popular support. I think that you've interviewed Dave Osborn. He was the Political Counselor for whom I worked at this time. I think the Socialist Party may have been gaining some increased support at the polls, which led some people to think that maybe they were really going to make it to the top. But it never did.

Q: Well, how did you make your contacts in the Japanese political movement?

SHOESMITH: They were easy to make among the socialist parties -- among the Democratic Socialist Party and the Socialist Party, but not with the Communist Party. We had no contact with the Communist Party.

Q: Was the fact that we didn't have contact a result of orders, or was it because they were less receptive?

SHOESMITH: It was the policy of the Embassy. We did not contact the Communist Party. We followed them in the press and in intelligence and other reports, but we did not contact them personally. There were no effective contacts, even if we had tried, because the Communist Party simply would not, I think, have been receptive to it. However, among the two socialist parties and the trade union people, contacts were easy to make. They were relatively open. They would meet and talk with us either in their offices or elsewhere. Oh, it was not difficult.

Q: Well, your Ambassador was Edward Reischauer at that time?

SHOESMITH: Yes. When I first got there, MacArthur (Douglas MacArthur II) was the Ambassador. But that was only for, maybe, three or four months -- perhaps six months. Reischauer came, as I recall, in the early 1960s, but I'm not sure of that. Anyhow, he was there for the whole time I was there.

Q: What was his style of operation?

SHOESMITH: Well, he came with the notion that the greatest need, as far as our government and the Embassy were concerned, was to establish some sort of effective dialogue with Japanese intellectuals and journalists -- opinion leaders. At that time, certainly within the Left, and to a considerable extent in the press and in academia, there was a great deal of very critical comment about the United States. Among Japanese academics, Marxist views were quite prevalent. These views probably were shared by people in journalism and among students. Therefore, the
Ambassador's primary concern was to establish a dialogue with these groups. That's what I remember best about Reischauer's time there, when I was close enough to be able to see.

I don't recall his being terribly concerned about the economic relationship between Japan and the United States. At that time, of course, this was not a matter of great concern. The Japanese were worried about their trade deficit with the United States. As the Vietnam War became more prominent, Japanese movements in opposition to our involvement in Vietnam became stronger. I think that the Ambassador was very much concerned that confidence, trust and support for the U.S.-Japan relationship were at a very low ebb. I recall that it was in 1960 that President Eisenhower was going to make a visit to Japan. That visit was aborted because of student and labor union demonstrations against it. As a result, the atmosphere in Japan, a sort of an overriding concern to Ambassador Reischauer, was this opposition...the strength of the opposition within Japan to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty relationship, the U.S. posture in Vietnam and our presence -- our military presence -- in Japan. In other words, our bases.

Q: Well, I remember that there was a political, almost religious movement in Japan at about this time. Forgive my pronunciation, but wasn't it called Zenkikira? It was supposed to be very powerful, but it seems to have faded from view.

SHOESMITH: Umm, I'm not sure. I don't recall that, but what I recall mostly, of course, were the student movements, and, of course within the student movements, there was a wide variety. There were radical students, militant students and the trade union movement -- the trade union people. And I guess that Ambassador Reischauer felt that part of this was the result of the fact that important segments of Japanese political and opinion leaders -- not so much the politicians, but the academicians, the student people, journalists and commentators of one sort or another -- simply were locked into a very negative view of the United States. What he, I think, hoped to do and felt that he had achieved to some extent when he left Japan -- some time in 1966 -- was the reestablishment of a measure of exchange and dialogue and confidence with this group.

Q: Well, did you either have instructions or were you working on trying to contact Japanese opinion leaders to explain what made the United States run?

SHOESMITH: I did not have instructions. I mean, not in that part of the Political Section where I was assigned until 1963. You see, I was only in the Embassy approximately a year because I was in the Language School for approximately a year. That would have been up to the end of 1961 or some time in 1962. I was not Ambassador Reischauer's Press Counselor, or USIA or others who were involved in this sort of thing. I was not personally involved in that.

Q: Well, when you went to Fukuoka as Consul, what was the response to you as Principal Officer there? What were you doing?

SHOESMITH: Well, in point of fact, as I recall it, we got very little guidance from the Embassy as to just what we were supposed to be doing. You pretty much decided for yourself what you were to do. At the time I went to Fukuoka, there were about four officers and myself assigned. We did the traditional range of Consular functions, including visas and all of that sort of thing. We had a small economic unit. At that time, there were many Japanese businessmen in the area
that were interested in striking out in new ways, finding out more about the American market and so on. We helped in that. We helped in tourism and so on.

A main concern in this climate that I have already described was the U.S. military presence in western Japan -- large Air Force base outside Fukuoka city, a big naval installation in Sasebo and a few smaller installations scattered about. A major focus of what we did politically was to gauge receptivity or lack of receptivity in the area to these military bases.

This was highlighted when the first U.S. nuclear-powered submarine visited Japan. I think this might have been in 1964 -- somewhere around in there. There had been a great deal of agitation in Japan against the arrival of this first nuclear-powered submarine both because it was nuclear-powered and because it was seen, I presume, as another expansion of the U.S. military presence in Japan. This focused the opposition of the students and Left Wing groups of one sort or another. We in the Consulate had the responsibility of providing political advice to the base commander in Sasebo on how to handle this first visit. We were certain that this was going to lead to very large demonstrations in Sasebo, as in fact took place. The business groups and the local government people in Sasebo were quite cooperative in seeing that the visit came off as well as possible. I mean, they helped as much as they could. We were in contact with them. We helped arrange their visits to the submarine and so on. We did that. We talked with the press and tried to explain the purpose of the visit and the safety of the vessel itself. We worked with the naval authorities in providing certain monitoring of the vessel when it came in. There were other incidents involving the bases.

Q: What bases, what were they?

SHOESMITH: The Air Force base at Itazuke, and the Naval base at Sasebo -- these were the two big bases. But occasionally, you would have ship visits at Kagoshima or Beppo, or something like that, which we would facilitate or try to help. These generally did not involve expressions of political opposition, but the submarine did. It went on for a long time. However, the visit came and went, and then there were later visits at Yokosuka and other places.

What I'm saying is that I think that the major focus of our political activities centered around the base problems. The governor of Fukuoka Prefecture was a Socialist. He was personally opposed to our base presence, yet we needed his help from time to time. If we were trying to extend a road, or something like that, or get passage through a certain area, I would meet with him to try to get his cooperation. I was modestly successful on some occasions. And I would imagine, though it's hard for me to recall with any precision, that the bulk of our political reporting was probably on this issue and whatever thoughts we might have had on our policy with regard to basing in Japan and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and popular attitudes toward it and so on.

Fukuoka leaders of all groups, including journalists, students, opposition parties or the conservative parties -- they were all very open. We used to see a lot of them. We used to arrange for meetings with these leaders when people would come down from the Embassy in Tokyo so that they could talk with them. The discussions were very lively. I don't know -- I'm sure that they didn't change anyone's mind, but they were at least a very open exchange of views. There was no problem with the dialogue down there. Of course, it was a situation unlike Tokyo. Most
of our work in Fukuoka had to be done in Japanese.

Q: Okay, you say that you were working in Japanese...

SHOESMITH: Very often.

Q: Now, how did you find public knowledge of the United States? Was it pretty much a Hollywood version of...

SHOESMITH: It was very limited, very limited. But attitudes among most people that I met, even people that were opposed to our base presence, were very positive. Oh, sure, students would demonstrate outside the Consulate with "Yankee, Go Home" and so on, or "America, Get Out" or whatever. However, in conversation, I found that there was not much antagonism.

There was a great deal of interest in what was going on in the United States. We had a cultural center and a USIS (United States Information Service) program there which was very active. Programs were well attended. What more can one say? I mean, I don't think that there was a great deal of understanding of our policies, particularly with respect to Vietnam. We worked a lot on that sort of thing. But there were very strong, visceral feelings involved about the war in Vietnam.

Q: Was it seen as an Occidental race against an Asian race?

SHOESMITH: Well, I don't know that it was all that so much. There was just a feeling that this was the wrong thing for us to be doing. There was a concern that Japan might be drawn in and so on.

Q: Was Okinawa an issue -- the fact that we were basically occupying Okinawa? Well, we were occupying Okinawa, at least large parts of it. Was that a problem?

SHOESMITH: The Okinawa reversion issue began to achieve more prominence. But it was not an issue in the sense that people in Japan were terribly concerned about it. There was a good deal of pressure from the Japanese Government to move in the direction of reversion, as actually took place in 1972. But the Japanese people do not spend a great deal of time thinking about Okinawa. It wasn't something that came to our attention very much.

Q: Before we leave this, what about feeling toward the Soviet Union?

SHOESMITH: Oh, great feeling, always. You know, this is a persistent thread in Japanese thinking when they look outside Japan. There is great suspicion about the Soviet Union. And the Northern Islands issue was one that you would see from time to time. No sympathy at all -- good deal of apprehension and concern about the Soviet Union -- this is still true today.

PAUL K. STAHNKE
Paul K. Stahnke attended the University of Chicago and received a master’s degree in international relations. He served in Hamburg, Kiel, Palermo, Venice, Tokyo, Mogadishu, Copenhagen, and Paris. This interview was conducted by Thomas Dunnigan on June 1, 1994.

Q: So now you are off to Tokyo to function as an economic officer I presume?

STAHNKE: Yes, that is correct.

Q: How large was the economic section there in Tokyo?

STAHNKE: It was fairly large at that point. We had complete division between the economic and the commercial sections. We had between eight or nine people in the economic section, divided into internal and external branches. I was in the internal branch.

Q: Officers?

STAHNKE: Officers, yes.

Q: A good sized economic section.

STAHNKE: Even then we were becoming concerned about the growth of Japanese exports to the United States which, at that time, were generally of low technology with strenuous efforts to upgrade into higher quality products.

Q: That was rather a boom period for the Japanese wasn’t it?

STAHNKE: The Japanese when I arrived were in a "recession" with growth rate slowed to 6.5 percent from double digit figures of the recent past. Of course we are talking about an economy that was much smaller in size than it is now. They were hell bent in getting out of the mild “recession” and improving their trade balance, particularly with the United States. They were then in a deficit relationship with us. We are talking small numbers compared to what they are today. They were about three-quarters of a billion dollars in deficit with us in 1961, quite different from the large deficits we have been running with them now for many years. So, beginning with their prime minister, the establishment (which we now refer to as “Japan Incorporated”) pulled out all stops to encourage all industries to focus on exports, not just to the United States, but to anywhere in the world. In that regard, shortly after my arrival in Tokyo, I visited a small tool and dye maker near Kobe. He told me that he had a large backlog of domestic orders but he was putting in maximum effort to go into exports, an area in which he had no experience, all because his prime minister told him he should do so - not at all like the reaction of
an American manufacturer in similar circumstances.

Only one officer in the economic section was a language officer and he was forced on the section. Both the Economic Minister and Counselor wanted officers competent to handle economic, financial and trade issues and believed, rightly in most cases, that the majority of the Japanese language officers were not competent to handle these matters. Actually, few of our non-Japanese language officers had any real economic training, unfortunate because one had to be a rather sophisticated economist in Japan to deal with the well-trained Japanese economists, both in government and without. Most of those with whom I dealt spoke English almost as well as I did. I, as the others, rapidly learned enough Japanese to get through to our contacts in the various ministries where the telephone operators and secretaries didn’t speak English. Japanese, of course, was also very useful in our travels of which we did a fair amount which, in my case, was very useful in getting a better feel of the state of Japanese industry and to talk with local businessmen and officials. Fortunately we had a sufficient travel budget to do that. We had no real problems in our lack of proficiency in Japanese. We all knew just enough Japanese to convince our Japanese friends that we were interested enough in their culture to learn a bit of their language and much of their culture. This was very helpful to us in our personal relations with them.

I dealt mainly with the big industries, utilities and iron and steel, for example, both of whom had received a fair amount of loans from the Ex-Im Bank as well as from the World Bank. In fact, our own steel industry protested periodically that it was through our help, directly through Ex-Im Bank loans and indirectly through the World Bank, that the Japanese steel industry was able to revive so quickly from the wartime destruction and become so intensively competitive with ours in the US market. That was perhaps my area of most activity because of this concern. US steel officials came frequently to talk to us about their concerns. I had a set “lecture” which I often used saying that they could be more competitive with the Japanese if they would modernize their plants with the American equipment that the Japanese had put into their plants. I found it wryly amusing that US steel firms had to come to Japan to look at a Mesta cold steel rolling mill which a large Japanese steel firm had imported from the US which sharply cut costs of manufacture; something none of them had.

Q: Was that because we bombed them out and destroyed their steel .....?

STAHNKE: To be fair to US steel companies, that was in fact true. We had destroyed most of the Japanese plants with our bombing and they had to start from scratch while our industry continued operating with relatively old equipment. Only one exception was that of the Fuji steel mill near Kobe. When I went to visit that plant, they apologized for the prewar equipment and said it was all our fault because we didn’t bomb that particular plant - all in good humor, of course. That remark was indicative of how little animosity remained from the war years. In fact, I found none at all in my time in Japan. We were much admired and much emulated, both in business and in culture.

In my four years in Japan, I developed a particularly close relationship with a number of officials in the Japanese steel industry which proved very useful when several officials of Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, which owned coal mines in West Virginia, came to me in frustration after a
week of trying to sell coking coal to Japanese steel - totally frustrated because they couldn’t get to first base with those officials with whom they had talked. I told them that one must treat the Japanese differently than an American or European. One doesn’t just go in and make an offer, no matter how good, without carefully establishing a social relationship first. At my instigation, the Economic Counselor (Ed Doherty) organized a luncheon to which we invited the raw materials managers of the principal Japanese steel companies. The Ambassador (Reischauer) made a cameo appearance to emphasize our interest in the matter. I had carefully coached the American steel executives not to raise any business matters at the luncheon but to make appointment to meet them in their offices which they did and. a few days later came to me triumphantly stating they had gotten contracts with a consortium of Japanese steel companies for $1.5 billion in coking coal for delivery over the next ten years. We, in turn, were delighted that we could be of positive service to an American company. In an expression of their gratitude, they got Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia to make a statement in the Congressional Record regarding my and the Embassy’s efforts on their behalf. I told them that if the US government would have permitted me to collect a 10% finders fee, I could retire early. They had offered me an executive position with their firm which would have meant a considerable increase in remuneration but I preferred remaining in the Foreign Service and the continuing interesting life it offered.

Q: I thought Korea was a great exporter of coal in the Far East?

STAHNKE: I think not, at least not at this point. The biggest exporter of coke and coal at that time was Australia, which had the principal share of the Japanese market and, since Australia was much closer to Japan than West Virginia, it took some organizing by the American company to get the coal to Japan at competitive prices, which they managed to do by having large coal carriers, so large that they couldn’t go through the Panama Canal. But, they managed to be competitive.

Another area which was very rapidly changing was the electronics area in which I was also involved. At that point the Japanese had already knocked out of business all American manufacturers of cheap, small transistor radios which were popular at the time. They were able to sell them in the US at a price below the cost of US production. At the same time, Japanese firms such as Sony began making televisions and hi fi equipment of excellent quality and lower prices than our firms could. When visiting a Sony plant in Tokyo where small black and white TV sets were being assembled, I was asked to note the age of the young ladies on the assembly line. All seemed to be somewhere between 18 and 25, keen-eyed and diligent in their work. The Sony official remarked that, in a recent visit to an American competitor’s plant, he saw that all the women were 35 and over, less nimble-fingered than their Japanese counterparts. This, he claimed, was the main reason why their costs were lower. Of course, the young ladies were also paid much less than the Americans. The rapid transition into manufacture of higher-priced and more sophisticated electronic products was the start of the gradual takeover of almost all electronic consumer products by the Japanese and the gradual closing out of these operations by American electronic firms. At the end of my tour in Japan, the only American company that was still making televisions, but increasingly with foreign parts, was Zenith. The rest had all abdicated to the Japanese.

Q: I believe that is still true isn’t it?
STAHNKE: That is probably still true. Certainly on all hi-fi products that is true though to a lesser extent on computers. The Koreans are now also a significant competitor in electronics.

Q: Did you enjoy your tour in Japan?

STAHNKE: It was a most interesting, intellectually rewarding and exciting period. When I first arrived in Japan, having topped off whatever knowledge I had of economics in my year at Berkeley, I had to unlearn a great deal because the Japanese operated differently than western economies. After a year of exposure to this different and vibrant economy, a new economic counselor arrived at post whose experience had been mostly in Europe. Shortly after his arrival, he called me into his office to criticize me for having written such affirmative, optimistic reports on the Japanese economy because he had looked at the economy and said it wouldn’t work; it was going to go bust. I told him that, upon arrival, I had the exactly same impression. I suggested that he trust me and wait and see. Eventually, he reluctantly admitted I was right. This same man never did learn the peculiarities of either the Japanese economy or its culture, despite the advice that several of us “old hands” tried to give him. Fortunately, Tokyo was his last post since his resignation was “requested” upon the completion of his assignment. However, this didn’t happen until after he had given unjustifiably bad efficiency reports to several officers who had attempted to educate him on Japanese ways - myself included. The system doesn’t always work right.

Q: Apparently they didn’t go bust from the news in subsequent years.

STAHNKE: No.

Q: Were we still giving the Japanese loans at that period or had they ended?

STAHNKE: The period of the major body of Ex-Im Bank loans had passed as had AID activities. Although we had periodic visits from Ex-Im Bank officials they came mainly to look at what was happening to the loans that they had made over the years. Of course we remained interested in encouraging US exports and, as I recall, Ex-Im did make several more equipment loans to Japanese firms. As in steel, they had a double effect. On one hand, they provided financing for US equipment exports but, on the other, they made Japanese firms more competitive. This was the case with a new Nissan auto plant near Yokohama which imported a semi-automated plant from the US, making it the most modern, and efficient, auto plant in the world and, thus, a start to the upgrading of Japanese autos which now figure so prominently in world trade and have had a significant effect on the US auto industry.

Q: Now, after four years in Tokyo you were summoned back to the Department. Is that right?

STAHNKE: I was summoned back to the Department at what happened to be a very inconvenient time for me because they wanted me back in February, 1965 to participate in some very important aviation negotiation with the Japanese plus some other things. I had three children in school at that point and it was not a very good time to leave. So I managed to delay my departure until April. I left my family in Japan and went back to Washington and worked on the Japan desk, ultimately becoming the deputy country director.
Q: Who was the country director at that time?

STAHNKE: When we established the country director program, which was about a year after my arrival, Dick Sneider became the first country director. He was brilliant, argumentative and difficult but one of the best persons I ever worked with in the Foreign Service. Each morning, we argued forcefully and loudly about policies and the business of the day. I told him once that I much appreciated those vocal sessions because I’m a slow thinker early in the morning and these discussions got me primed intellectually for the always busy day that followed. Dick eventually was appointed Ambassador to Korea. He is now, unfortunately, deceased.

Q: Well, tell us something about what you did in that assignment.

STAHNKE: After our morning priming “discussions”, Dick often came to my office to find me on the phone. So, he would leave scribbled notes to me on things he wanted done. Most of my time on the phone involved explaining to others in the Department and other branches of government the peculiarities of dealing with the Japanese, usually on specific issues. Dealing with the new Japan was a difficult new phenomenon for most Americans, even those who had been in Japan during the occupation period. It was quite different than dealing with the Western Europeans or Latin Americans.

We had a continuing series of mini-crises on a whole range of trade issues with the Japanese which were important then as they continue to be presently. Many of the problems we had then are very similar to the ones we have now...the names are different, the commodities are different, the size and volume are different but the problems are essentially the same. That period was important because we concentrated on establishing a dialogue with the Japanese that would transcend cultural differences. We worked to make them hear and understand the political importance to us to have what we now call a level playing field in trade. While our chief interlocutors did begin to understand, I suspect that the Japanese, collectively, did not. Perhaps they are now beginning to understand.

In the latter years on the desk, I became heavily involved on the complex negotiations - both within the US government and with the Japanese - on the return of the Ryukyus to Japan. It was an extraordinarily complex matter, more complex than any of us thought at the time.

Q: We couldn’t just hand them back and say you have them?

STAHNKE: No, we had to work out a basic agreement. We also had a very complex series of finance transactions because we had a good deal of property that we were occupying there and we were turning back to the Japanese some of it and retaining some of it. These matters heavily involved both the Treasury and Defense Departments as well as State. The issue was politically very sensitive, more so in Japan than in the United States. We did have some problems in the States with those, within and without government, who felt that, since we had won the war, we had every right to keep the islands and its important military bases.

Q: How did the Defense Department feel about it?
STAHNKE: They were quite reasonable about it at the higher levels. Some of lower ranks had to be pulled in kicking and screaming but we, and key elements in Defense got them to come around. Dick Sneider (country director) was the honcho and it was mainly his forceful direction and obstinate resistance to attempted distractions that we were able to pull this off successfully. The key negotiations were intra-US government - State (headed by Sneider), DOD and Treasury. After a fitful start, we developed a smooth cooperative environment. After the completion of each phase, we would consult with the Japanese to make sure they were on board. When they were not, we had to back to the interagency drawing board. The Japanese, of course, wanted to be as cooperative as they could because return of the islands was great political importance to them. Our most important weapon in encouraging their agreement was our position that the visit to the US much desired by then Prime Minister Sato could not be accommodated until agreement of the transfer was reached. This was an interesting process; one that was new to me. In the course of the year or so of intense negotiations, we (together with the Japanese) drafted the communiqué which was to follow Sato’s visit to President Johnson. Only when all but the final “i” was dotted did we extend the formal invitation for the visit. We left it to the two heads of government to dot the final “i” which was, as I recall, a minor point of procedure. The visit, which included agreement on return of the Ryukyus, was a huge political success for Sato who, presumably in gratitude, gave me, and several others, a set of pearl cuff links which I still use. The communiqué drafting procedure we adopted proved to be an extraordinarily effective lever with the Japanese bureaucracy in order to get them, who moved ponderously at best, to move with relative rapidity to help us resolve the Ryukyu problem, several trade issues and a few minor ones. We found that a most effective way to develop a prime ministerial visit. One that was relatively foolproof. In other words, pre-scenarioed.

Q: Did our Congress show any interest in this?

STAHNKE: Oh yes. There was considerable interest. We had an almost constant interaction with the Congress. I, to some extent, but principally Dick Sneider, kept in close touch with elements of Congress, the Armed Forces Committee, Foreign Affairs Committees, etc., who were obviously interested in this and had their own inputs which we always took seriously.

Q: But they did not indicate that they were going to block such a transfer?

STAHNKE: No. Well, there may have been one or two who were quite negative, but they were not ultimately important. Most felt that the time was right to close out that period in our history. The Ryukyu issue had been a constant sore point between us and the Japanese which we had to be eliminated. A key element of the agreement was the maintenance of US military bases in the Ryukyus; without that we would never have gotten Congressional or DOD agreement. The final agreement gave the military and Congress all they desired and proved satisfactory to the Japanese as well. The Japanese fully understood that it was in their fundamental interest to maintain a strong US military shield as protection against outside forces such as the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China.

Q: And we did get what we wanted in the way of bases, did we not?
STAHNKE: We did get what we wanted in the way of bases and the general authority to run them. This was the most important part of the agreement.

Let me go back to one incident during my time in Japan that shall always remain vividly in my memory. In the early 1960s, we had established the US-Japan Joint Economic Committee in which six US cabinet members and six equivalent cabinet members of the Japanese government participated in approximately annual meetings, alternatively in the United States and in Japan. The next meeting, I think it was the third meeting of the Committee, was to be held in late November, 1963 and I was the secretary of the US delegation. I was responsible basically for organizing the meeting from the Tokyo side. On a Saturday morning, Tokyo time, about 3:00 or 3:30 a.m. I was awaken by our code room which informed me they had received a FLASH telegram saying that the President had been wounded in Dallas. It was followed shortly thereafter with another telegram which said that he had died. A following telegram said that our delegation of six cabinet members, plus their staff assistants and others which had started out from Hawaii on their way to Tokyo, had turned around and were headed back to Washington, and that I was to inform, together, of course, with other members of the embassy, the appropriate Japanese government offices that unfortunately we would have to cancel our participation in the third Joint Economic Committee meeting. That was an extraordinarily dramatic period and of course the Japanese were as much affected by the death of President Kennedy as all the rest of us were and as the rest of the world was. The rest of Saturday and part of Sunday was spent in discussions with the various Japanese ministries that would have been involved in those talks.

Q: Paul, the years you were involved with Japan were those in which the United States was heavily involved in Vietnam, right up to 1968, one of the worse years of the war. What was the Japanese attitude towards our involvement in Vietnam?

STAHNKE: At best, they were very dubious about our objectives and about our tactics. I recall, I believe it was February, 1965, when we began our offensive bombing of North Vietnam, the first Japanese reaction was very, very negative. In fact, to reflect the Japanese view and his own, our ambassador, Edwin Reischauer, sent a flaming telegram back to Washington indicating the deep Japanese concern about our escalation of the conflict, including his own view which were strongly supportive of Japanese concerns. I would note that Japan was not a completely disinterested bystander since some of the aircraft used in the bombings initiated from US bases in Japan. As history shows, these concerns had no effect on the White House or elsewhere in Washington. Subsequently, as I recall, the whole Vietnam issue, this includes years that I was in Washington on the Japan desk, was never really a significant part of our dialogue with the Japanese. When they did express their views they were essentially not enthusiastic, to put it mildly, about our Vietnamese efforts. I suspect that this was at least in part, although much of that they didn't say, because they felt that we were involved in their own back yard which they knew better than we did. They felt the kind of things we were doing, concern about the domino effect, etc., was falsely based. When Prime Minister Sato came to visit the United States in 1967 or 1968, Vietnam was a minor part of his discussion with the President.

WILLIAM T. BREER
Mr. Breer was born and raised in California and educated at Dartmouth College and Columbia University. After service in the US Army, he entered the Foreign Service in 1961. Throughout his career, Mr. Breer dealt primarily with Japanese, Korean and general Southeastern Asia affairs. His overseas posts include Kingston, Tokyo (three times), and Yokohama. His Washington assignments also concerned principally Japan and Korea. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo from 1989 to 1983. Mr. Breer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: You came back in 1961 and was at the Japanese training school from when to when?

BREER: I took the basic A-100 officer’s class and had some area studies. Then I went to Japan and entered the State Department language school in Tokyo for six months.

Q: That was from when to when?

BREER: June or July 1961 through December 1961. Then I was assigned to the consulate general in Yokohama.

Q: How did you find the language school?

BREER: I found it very good. It wasn’t dissimilar from the other language school. It started off with Mr. Naganuba’s books and then people developed their own after that.

Q: How many were in your class?

BREER: There were 20 all together in the language school from the USIA, State and other agencies.

Q: Was the normal course six months?

BREER: The six months was really a test course to see if people were genuinely interested rather than forcing people through two years and having them quit after nine months or something. I, of course, came with a jump start to the six month program. Afterwards the junior officers were
given an assignment in Tokyo and if they wanted to pursue Japanese studies they went back to school for a year and a half more. So, there was no fixed program.

Q: What was the corridor word you were getting when you joined the State Department about taking Japanese and becoming a Japanese specialist?

BREER: I was never in the corridors very much. I was in the A-100 course at FSI (Foreign Service Institute). I didn’t know very much about the Japan speciality. I guess the answer is that I just wanted to go back to Japan.

Q: Did you pick up anything about being a Japanese specialist when you went to language school in Tokyo?

BREER: Bits and pieces, but a lot of us were brand new to Japan. I didn’t pick up anything like that right away. There were several senior officers, but they came later. The DCM (deputy chief of mission) at the time was not a Japan specialist, nor was the political counselor in 1961. Bill Leonhart was the DCM, left over from the MacArthur years, and Jack Goodyear was the political counselor. There were some Japan specialists at more junior levels at the embassy but I didn’t know them. I didn’t mingle with people from the embassy very much while at language school. Then a couple of old hands came back. Tom Shoesmith. Do you know him?

Q: Yes, I have interviewed him.

BREER: But, most of the people at the language school were beginners, I think. At that time we didn’t have the year’s training in Washington as a routine thing.

Q: You went to Yokohama from 1962 to when?

BREER: About a year, I guess, until they closed the post.

Q: What were you doing there?

BREER: I was a consular officer doing shipping.

Q: Who was consul general there?

BREER: Juan de Zengotita.

Q: What was his background?

BREER: I think labor. He later became labor attaché in Canberra in Australia.

Q: What was your impression of the Japanese government, how Japan worked at that time?

BREER: I thought it was kind of chaotic. Tokyo and Japan were in utter chaos when I first arrived, I think. Except for the A, B, C signs the occupation put up there were very few street
names, although there are many more now. In those days I really didn’t know much about the Japanese government. When I first went to Yokohama there were about five officer there - political reporter, economic guy, a couple of consular officers and the consul general. We used to do shipping, dealing with long shipping documents. I had to sign off for some huge guy, a sailor. What do we do for shipping documents now?

Q: It has changed but I’m not sure of the details.

BREER: We had a visa section, of course, which they moved and consolidated with Tokyo over time. They left a skeleton staff there for a while. So, I moved into the consular section in Tokyo about the end of 1962.

Q: Were the visas mostly visitor visas then?

BREER: Well, there were a lot of marriages and a lot of immigration visas. A lot of business people and E-1s. Mostly men in those days. The wives sometimes didn’t go or sometimes went a year later. Not so many tourists. A lot of students.

Q: What was the feeling towards Japanese business at that time?

BREER: I think we all admired it and were interested in its progress. We were more or less supportive of Japanese business and the expansion of Japanese trading companies abroad. We were concerned in the early ’60s about the state of the Japanese economy, watching the trade deficit all the time and concerned that they would spent all of their foreign exchange reserves.

Q: What about Ambassador Reischauer? Did you get any feel for him?

BREER: We were all kind of in awe of him because he spoke such wonderful Japanese, but I didn’t know much about him. I hadn’t been in the East Asian academic establishment before. He was a very pleasant fellow and a great hero. He was very sociable with his staff. He came to our Christmas parties. I saw him quite a bit later but not so much in the early ’60s.

Q: Was there much concern about student radicals or ultra nationalists? Reischauer was attacked at one point by, I guess, an ultra nationalist.

BREER: I don’t know. He was stabbed by [a mentally disturbed Japanese youth].

Q: I somehow think it was the right that attacked him, but I may be wrong.

BREER: We were worried about the communist movement in those days and Soviet influence and later on the Chinese influence. The Japanese Communist party was a force to be reckoned with in those days. We weren’t so sure that a left-wing takeover of the government was out of the question. When I was there as a student in 1960 there were demonstrations against the revision of the security treaty, which ultimately prevented President Eisenhower from visiting. I can remember then just walking by myself around government buildings down town that the periphery of the buildings were virtually undefended. Anyone could get in the front gate. Later
on they built 3 foot fences. I was watching television in a bar down town when it was announced that the visit was canceled.

*Q:* This was quite a blow to Japan actually. Here is a friendly country that is considered unsafe for the president of the United States, particularly in a country where face was important.

**BREER:** The student demonstrations were not aimed so much at the United States as they were Mr. Kishi. The Japanese resented our friendship with Mr. Kishi because they regarded that he was a war criminal. A member of the Tojo cabinet. How could you bring this guy back to political life?

*Q:* The Kennedy administration was red hot on student movements. This was Bobby Kennedy particularly. To get after the youth of a country, youth officers were proclaimed in all our embassies. Did you get involved in this youth business?

**BREER:** A little bit. USIA (United States Information Agency), of course, was responsible for running that in the embassy. We met with young people. After going back to language school for a year, I spent some time as assistant science attaché and then went to the political section looking after the left wing, the communist organization. It was the policy to see anyone who wanted to come and see you at the embassy. You wouldn’t open the gates to a flood of people, but you saw small groups and took protests. We did a lot of that. We also tried to reach out to youth, although I don’t remember spending a lot of time on that. USIA was doing most of that.

*Q:* At the time that you had this unrest there was an organization called Zengakuren. I remember there were articles saying that maybe this was the wave of the future. What was this organization?

**BREER:** Zengakuren technically was the national federation of student government which had been taken over by the left wing in the late ‘50s. There are a whole bunch of other organizations that were loosely affiliated with Zengakuren. Once you get a group you get a faction and some are more militant than others. The Japanese developed a very strong riot police, which they still have, to fence these guys off. They let them demonstrate but kept them from doing really crazy things. And, of course, they protected the embassy. We still have armored vehicles in front of our embassy. So do the Russians. The movement combined with the labor movement where the communists made a lot of headway in the ‘60s, particularly government workers unions, teacher unions. There was a lot of Marxist influence which was anti-American, anti-Security Treaty, anti-alliance with the United States, and the Russians were trying to mess up our alliance with Japan as did the Chinese later on. And then the Vietnam war came along and that was a focus for everybody as it was here, of course. So, there were a lot of demonstrations.

*Q:* You were at the embassy in 1963-64 and then went back for more training?

**BREER:** I was on home leave in 1963 and then I went back for six more months of Japanese language. Then I was assistant science attaché and later worked in the political section.

*Q:* You were there until when?
BREER: I had another home leave in 1965 and went back for two more years in political/military work and a year in Sapporo as principal officer.

Q: So really you were in Japan for seven years from 1961-68.

BREER: I think Mr. Obuchi came to my house for dinner during one of those years. He is now the prime minister.

Q: Looking at patterns, did the universities have the same kind of pattern that they had in so many other countries where students would go through the university and be Marxist and out demonstrating against the embassy and the next year they would be in a neat suit sitting in one of the large firms being good capitalist citizens?

BREER: There was a lot of that. I had foreign ministry friends who demonstrated in the ‘60s and ‘70s until the Vietnam war was over. The guy most likely to be the next prime minister, not this year, but in two or three years, was a demonstrator while at Tokyo University.

Q: As you were moving into this work in the political section, how did the political section work?

BREER: It was headed by a Japan hand, one of the Russian language officers. He came back as aide to the ambassador and then political counselor. He was a work-alcoholic. The section was divided up into international affairs with a first secretary, David Osborne and two of us who did domestic affairs. The head of the section did the LDP (Liberal-Democratic Party), the main party and another guy did the Socialists and I had the rest being the youngest. There was an external affairs division which dealt with Japan’s third country relations and the Okinawa issue, I think. There was another section which did political/military which was all liaison work with the U.S. military there.

Q: You were involved with that at one time?

BREER: Yes, for one year.

Q: Putting these American troops into Japan must have been a difficult relationship.

BREER: Well, American forces were there but declining fairly rapidly and even more so in the ‘70s. I don’t know how many troops we had there when I first got there, but over the years we gave up a lot of real estate, especially for the Olympics. We gave them the huge Washington Heights complex and facilities around the Diet building. Managing that transition through something called the Joint Committee which was set up between the embassy, the American forces of Japan and the Japanese. It was challenging.

Q: You were given the bits and pieces. Were you allowed to make contact with the Japanese Communists?

BREER: They were off limits. They came to protest so we saw them in the office but I don’t
think anybody contacted them. Everybody was scared about John Emerson’s experience.

Q: Could you explain what the John Emerson's experience was?

BREER: He was involved with Jack Sherbert and others in reporting on the Communists in China. After the war he came to Japan and evidently sought out the Communist leaders to track them down and report on what they were thinking and doing. McCarthy didn’t like that. John was a super language officer and ended up as DCM in Tokyo which I think was basically his final posting.

Q: He wrote a book on the Japan threat.

BREER: Yes, an excellent book. If I remember correctly on the last page he sort of wonders why he was ever caught up in this suspicion. I can see why he was, but he shouldn’t have been. He should have been totally exonerated. He never made ambassador because of that. He was a super DCM. I knew him better later after he retired.

Q: Did you find getting into Japanese training that you felt disconnected from the overall foreign service? (End of tape)

BREER: -outside of Japan and East Asia in general.

Q: How did one make contacts with the Japanese at this time?

BREER: You picked up the phone and asked to see them or invited them to lunch or dinner. Japan was then and I think still is one of the most accessible places going. People are busy, but if they have time they will see you. I still go there and see politicians, people I knew when I was there.

Q: In your early years when you were following the political side, were you able to get a feel about how the political system worked? Was it as difficult as it sometimes is portrayed?

BREER: Reischauer knew how things worked pretty well. We had a lot of tutors in those days in the embassy which is true today. During the course of language training we had lectures on the government and what was going on in Japan. I think by the time I got through with the language I had a fairly good sense of how things were.

Q: Japan in the international field. This wasn’t your bailiwick at the time, but it always seemed to be holding back a bit compared with its potential.

BREER: Clearly then, in the ‘60s, it was just getting going and concentration was on catching up by searching the world for technology and buying it, importing it and using it. There was an enormous capital investment in building factories. They were still building steel mills. The auto industry in the ‘60s was just getting started. Their cars were not exportable then. We saw that kind of thing taking place and the ‘64 Olympics gave a huge boost to construction in Tokyo of expressways, boulevards, etc.
Q: What was the view of the major party, the LDP?

BREER: The principal focus of its foreign policy was relationship with the United States. The defense policy was the security system with the United States. It was totally steady in the support of U.S. forces in Japan. Even in the face of a lot of opposition to the use of facilities in Japan in support of Vietnam. We had field hospitals in downtown Tokyo in the early ’60s. We had a lot of troops evacuated from Vietnam that were in horrible shape. Burn cases were the worse thing. I remember taking a congressional delegation down to a hospital for Thanksgiving dinner in Yokohama one time and they were just stunned at the sight of the burn cases. Then the Japanese were too. The Japanese government, despite popular opposition to the war, student opposition to the government, pacifism as a result of the horrible experience of losing in World War II, was totally supportive of our needs in Japan during the Vietnam war.

Q: How was the Vietnam war viewed by your group, the Japan experts, at the time?

BREER: We all spoke in support of it. Although I had serious misgivings from the beginning I was a loyal government employee and defended our actions vigorously. At one time I took on a local newspaper with 600,000 circulation going to see the editor. I thought they were clearly writing biased stories on Vietnam.

Q: What about the Soviet connection, particularly when you are in Sapporo, the holding on of the northern territories?

BREER: The government was not the least bit attracted to the Soviets at that time. They wanted the northern territories (islands) back. It wasn’t such a big issue when I was there. It became a more important issue when they started a movement to get the northern territories returned at a later date. The Russians opened a consulate general in Sapporo just as I arrived and we saw each other occasionally having dinner with each other. They had a huge operation compared with ours. We had consul, vice consul and secretary. They tried to make inroads in Hokkaido by recruiting friends and supporters. But the governor of Hokkaido was a staunch conservative LDP guy who was correct in his dealings with the Russians. He didn’t have a lot of time for them.

Q: Was Hokkaido a different world than Honshu?

BREER: It was really countryside then with a population of 4 or 5 million people, which has declined since then. [There were] at least two American military installations.

The streets behind the consulate were paved in Sapporo. The governor had a nice house. Hokkaido was kind of an economic basket case and still is. Coal mining even in the ‘60s was petering out. I don’t know that there were other minerals. It isn’t a great agricultural area. They tried to grow rice there and it is the biggest rice producing prefecture in Japan but it is the biggest prefecture too. It is pretty far north for rice. They tried the dairy industry and they became very dependent on imported feed. There was some deal where they couldn’t ship milk to Tokyo cheaply to protect the Honshu dairy industry. There was a steel mill and at one time a big word processor industry. I think Hokkaido’s biggest industry now is tourism.
Q: During these times were you running into trade problems faced by American businessmen because of various regulations?

BREER: Well, I don’t think we were so conscious of it in the ‘60s. There were people who were doing good business in Japan. My father’s first cousin was working in California for a company that sold chain saws and they had good business in Hokkaido.

It really wasn’t a big issue then. One of the principal businessmen in Sapporo had an office in Portland, Oregon. I’m not sure what he did but Portland was a sister city of Sapporo and there was a lot of enthusiasm for that. I think the biggest business in Hokkaido was government at that time.

Q: Was Okinawa an issue during this time? It was before the reversion business wasn’t it?

BREER: Yes, but I wasn’t too conscious of it. Pressures were beginning to build in Japan but I hadn’t really worked on it. We had a reversion of another island group in the ‘60s, but I didn’t work on that. The pressure began to build on Okinawa more or less after I was in Sapporo and one didn’t feel it up there.

CLIFF FORSTER
Japan/Korea Desk, USIA
Washington, DC (1961-1964)

Field Program Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1964-1965)

Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1965-1970)

Cliff Forster was born in 1924. His career with USIA included assignments in Japan, Burma, Israel, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by G. Lew Schmidt on May 29, 1990.

FORSTER: I was assigned in June to the Japan/Korea Desk with USIS just about the time Professor Reischauer was going out as our Ambassador to Japan, and Charles Fahs was being assigned as Public Affairs Officer. I was in that assignment from 1961 right up through the assassination (of President John F. Kennedy) in 1963. I recall that we were both in Washington at that tragic time.

Q: Yes, I was in Washington at that time.

FORSTER: I felt I was very fortunate coming in on my first Washington assignment during those years. Those were great years, I thought, for USIA. I know how close you were to the late
Ed Murrow, and I always had had a great admiration for him. Then suddenly, to have him as our director of USIA, I was just thrilled about this. There was an excitement about work at the Agency then, a real sense of purpose, with President Kennedy and Mr. Murrow's strong interest in Japan and the assignment of the Japan specialist, Edwin Reischauer, as Ambassador to Japan and a PAO like Fahs, who knew Japan. There was to be a whole new relationship, which certainly pleased the Japanese following the tense period of the Security Treaty riots. I must say, I take great pride in having been in on the beginning with Ken Bunce, who was our area director, as you know. He certainly knew Japan well, and you were there running the administrative side of the Agency with your long Japan experience. So we just had, I felt, a ready-made situation for improving our relations in spades.

Q: I think we did. I think probably Ed Murrow's incumbency as the Director was the highlight of the USIA Agency.

FORSTER: I certainly think so.

Q: At the moment, I'm about halfway through reading Joe Persico's book. Have you yet read that?

FORSTER: I want to get hold of it. I read some very good reviews.

Q: I also read the first book on Murrow by (A.M.) Sperber, which is not as bad a book as some people say. But Persico's is a much better one.

FORSTER: Was Persico a former USIS officer?

Q: Persico was, yes. Sperber, the woman who wrote the first book, obviously didn't have the insight into Murrow and his personality, and she didn't have access to nearly as many people who knew Ed intimately. She spent ten years researching it, but she didn't deal with many of the people whom Persico got to. The difference is between night and day. The Persico book is so much better than this Sperber book. You really feel that you know Murrow when you get through with that book. I can't say more. It's an excellent book. It didn't get the publicity nor the acceptance of the Sperber book because the Sperber one beat Persico's by two and a half years. But it's a tremendous book, and it ought to be read by anyone who wants to know anything about Murrow.

FORSTER: I certainly want to get hold of it because I've heard such fine things about it.

They were, indeed, great years. Of course, it ended so abruptly there for all of us with the assassination. I might mention one story about USIA during those last days with President Kennedy. We were hosting the U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference in Washington just a few weeks before the assassination. It was in October, I believe, and Mr. Murrow was to have been one of the American delegates to that conference when he had to go in for surgery for the cancer ailment. He was so interested in the conference because Mr. Maeda, President of NHK, was to have been his Japanese counterpart, and they were scheduled to discuss the subject of educational TV exchange.
I was summoned one morning by Don Wilson, the Deputy USIA Director, and informed that Murrow wanted me to go up to see Frank Stanton, President of CBS, to invite him on his behalf to take over as his substitute. Of course, Stanton, because of his admiration for and long association with Murrow, consented right away. That cultural conference turned out to be a very productive one and led to the establishment of a very active TV exchange program between NHK and our public television stations. It was a real breakthrough, and Murrow pulled it off with the help of Frank Stanton. The direct result was the improvement of American TV programs viewed by Japanese audiences and an introduction to American audiences of Japanese educational films.

Q: What year was that?

FORSTER: That was October, 1963 -- just before the assassination in November of '63.

Q: We lost the President from the nation, and we lost Murrow from USIA

FORSTER: It was a double blow, which I shall certainly never forget. One other event at the time involved the White House, and since it was rather historical and so little is known about it, I should like to mention it here. We were told by NASA that they were going to be putting up this relay satellite -- I think it was Relay 2 -- that would be going in the direction of Japan on a westerly course. The plan was to launch it from the Mojave Desert. We suddenly had the idea that it would be great if we could get President Kennedy to address the people of Japan as the satellite moved over Japan for the first time and then to have a special program, arranged by USIS with three national networks, to follow in behind the President's message. The White House bought the idea right away.

I remember the President was in New York giving a speech at the Waldorf Astoria, and Don Wilson told me to call Pierre Salinger to give it the go-ahead. We immediately prepared the message for the President, which we delivered to him the following week at the White House. Actually, he had prepared his own very personal message and really didn't need our draft. It was a beautiful message to the people of Japan written in a warm, informal style.

What happened subsequently was that the relay satellite went up within minutes, as I recall, after the President had been shot. There were then some anxious moments with someone at COMSAT who was involved with the satellite launch that day. Whoever it was, there was this bureaucratic response of, "Well, we're not going to be able to use that footage because the President has just been shot."

I was infuriated about this and went charging in to see Ken Bunce, and I said, "Look, Ken, they can't do this. This is the President's message to the Japanese people when he was still very much alive. He's still alive according to news reports. We can't assume that this is the end until there is confirmation." Ken was in touch right away with Don Wilson, and in very short order, we were able to get it back on the relay to Japan.

Q: Who read the speech?
FORSTER: The President did. The President had prepared the speech prior to the launching of the relay.

Q: Did Johnson read the speech that Kennedy had written?

FORSTER: No, no -- because Kennedy had been on camera at the White House the previous week, and it was ready to go before the assassination. Then whether it was NASA or COMSAT, I don't exactly remember, but the response was, "We're not going to be able to use that. The President has just been shot." We argued very strongly that it should be used, and it was used.

The impact of that speech, followed by the NHK use of live coverage on the relay satellite of the assassination and that terrible weekend in Washington, was very great in Japan and reached viewers just as they were getting up that morning. When the relay satellite first came over, the Japanese were getting the President live and listening to his message to them. By the time the relay was around again, they were getting the reports of his death. The NHK correspondent in Washington called us early in the morning to see if it would be possible to use the satellite just to send all the weekend coverage. To this day, when you talk to our Japanese friends like Sen Nishiyama and others, they describe the tremendous impact of that event, which has never been forgotten by those who viewed it at the time.

Q: I think we might say for the record here that Sen Nishiyama, although he started out his career with USIS and worked there for years, subsequently became the Special Assistant to the President and founder of Sony and became almost a worldwide figure. Also, he was the one who was so prominent in Japan because he had been an American-born nisei, and he had been an electrical engineering graduate from University of Utah. When the walk on the moon took place, NHK got him on the TV, and for that whole week of the moon walk, he handled the transmission -- the announcing and analysis of that whole program. In the process, he became a national figure in Japan. He's not just some person who is an unknown individual.

FORSTER: Yes, I'm glad you entered that background on Sen because he has been so important to the USIS efforts through the years -- not only USIS, but to the whole U.S.-Japan relationship.

It was shortly after the assassination in early 1964 that I was reassigned to Japan. Reischauer was still the Ambassador. Charles Fahs was the PAO. Walter Nichols was the Cultural Affairs Officer. Charles Fahs' Deputy was Ed Nickel, and I was assigned as field supervisor for the USIS centers throughout Japan. Having come up through the centers, I guess they felt maybe I could make some kind of contribution. Again, as a continuation of that whole period -- the Kennedy period -- there was the legacy of that -- the relationship with Japan -- and I returned at a time when the relationship was very good. It was a marvelous time to go back in and to work not only in cultural exchange, but on the information side, as well.

So I did spend the next few years in Japan, first as field supervisor and then subsequently as deputy to Ed Nickel when he became PAO. Ed was transferred to the JUSPAO operation after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, and Ned Roberts came in as PAO. I was with Ned as his deputy for the next several months before being reassigned to Washington to enter the Senior Seminar
Those years in Japan were never dull in terms of U.S.-Japan relations, and we returned to Tokyo just at the time of the Olympics. The Japanese were becoming more international in their approach. You could see how the Olympics changed the Japanese almost overnight. So many of them were so anxious to have the world come to Japan, to Tokyo. They took great pride in this. As you know, they put in new subway systems, the monorail, the fast-speed Shinkansen trains and countless new hotels, which we thought would never fill up. Of course, they're all filled today, one hotel after another. Tokyo was a mess! I'm sure you remember it. It was being torn up and rebuilt for the Olympics, and we thought to ourselves, "How will the Olympics ever start on time? This city is such a mess." But by golly, that opening day, everything was set to go. I've always been impressed by how they got it all together in time.

Q: I didn't see Tokyo at that time because from the time I left in the spring of 1956 until I came back on a visit in 1967, I had never been in Japan again. I was gone for eleven years. I came back after the Olympics, and I think it was the Olympics that really brought Japan into the modern world.

FORSTER: It really did. We left six years later -- we were there for two three-year tours -- from the time of the Olympics to the World Expo in Osaka in 1970. By that time, things had really changed. Talking about Japan into the modern world, the Olympics in 1964 were the Olympics that they were planning to host before the war to follow the Olympics in Germany in 1936, weren't they?

Q: Yes, they were supposed to have had the Olympics in 1940. Incidentally, I landed in Japan with the Japan-America Student Conference on July 14, 1938, the day that Japan announced they were withdrawing as the host of the 1940 Olympic games.

FORSTER: Interesting.

Q: All the press swarmed aboard the ship as we came into Yokohama Harbor. The first question that was asked to me by a correspondent, who happened to be Brad Coolidge, by the way, working for the Japan Advertiser: "What have you got to say about Japan's cancellation of the Olympics?"

We hadn't even heard about it. We'd been on the ship for thirteen days. I remember what excitement that caused when they announced they would not handle the Olympics in '40.

FORSTER: So finally, they were getting them back in 1964. Then, of course, the Expo in 1970 -- and to be there at the time of the Expo in Osaka was just amazing. You were having so many of the folks from the prefectures -- farmers, housewives, students -- all coming in and carrying these little passports to go from one foreign pavilion to another. Now today, of course, they're all over, aren't they? But that was bringing the world to Japan in 1970. Then things really started opening up. I'd say the Olympics in Tokyo and the Expo in Osaka -- the impact of those two events was very great. Japan was now going the international route in a big way for the first time since Meiji, wouldn't you say?
Q: Yes.

FORSTER: So I think whenever you stop to reflect about this, Japan has not been all that international until just these recent years.

Q: And they still have a long way to go. They really haven’t fully, I think, understood what role they have to play in the modern world.

FORSTER: That's very true. And there again is where USIA, I believe, has been trying to assist in shaping that role through international exchanges and communication, but it's been tough going at times.

Q: It's a tough row now because the Japanese are so bitter against the United States. We haven't handled it very well. Mutual recrimination is very ----

FORSTER: -- does not help, no. The bashing that we now have -- and I'll get into that, I guess, when I get back to the period with Ambassador Mansfield, because he was trying to handle that and doing it so well, but the odds were very great against him at that point.

WILLIAM LENDERKING
Japanese Language Training
Tokyo (1961-1963)

Director, American Center
Sapporo (1963-1966)

Chief of Protocol, American Pavilion, Expo ‘70
Osaka (1970)

Desk Officer for Japan, Korea and Micronesia, USIA
Washington, DC (1970-1972)

A native of New York, Mr. Lenderking graduated from Dartmouth College and served a tour with the US Navy in the Far East before joining the Foreign Service of the US Information Agency in 1959. As Public Affairs, Press and Information Officer, he served in posts throughout the world and in Washington, D.C., where held senior level positions in USIA and the Department of State dealing with Policy, Plans and Research. Mr. Lenderking was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

LENDERKING: My initial idea was that I had never seen much of Latin America so I asked for a Latin American tour and fulfilled that desire by going to Havana and Bolivia. But my heart was in Asia, as a result of my Navy experiences. Deep down I also wanted to see Western Europe but
I felt embarrassed to ask for Europe because that’s where many people wanted to go for obvious reasons, but I thought the real Foreign Service was in the more exotic countries where we were facing fresh challenges and greater danger. So I applied for Chinese language training, but there were already more Chinese speakers than could be accommodated because we had no relations with the mainland and Chinese speakers would go to Singapore or Hong Kong or some place like that to deal with the Chinese community. These were not exactly mainstream jobs and there seemed to be more satisfying opportunities than to go to these cities, deal with the Chinese community and wait for relations to be established with Communist China. In those days that seemed a long way off, and in fact it didn’t occur for another 20 years or so. So USIA said okay, we’re going to send you to Japan.

Q: Okay, you took Japanese language training; what was the course, from when to when and where?

LENDERKING: Oh, I should also mention I was first assigned to Kwangju, Korea. I had never heard of Kwangju. By then we had two small children and it just sounded like the back of beyond and I felt that I really didn’t want to be in such an isolated place with two small children, especially since I didn’t know the language. I wanted to be in a big city, the capital. Someone in personnel finally said I shouldn’t be given an assignment in an isolated backwater like Kwangju, but as a young officer I should have a broader experience and the benefit of exposure to senior colleagues. So they came up with Japanese language training, where there were openings, and that fortuitous decision changed my life in a big way.

Q: Where did you start your language training?

LENDERKING: Unlike now, where students have the first year of two years at FSI (Foreign Service Institute) and then go to Yokohama, in those days we had a leased house, a lovely private home with a Japanese garden right in the center of Tokyo. It was an oasis of quiet, but very near the bustling area of Shibuya. There were about 12 students and an equal number of Japanese language teachers and an American director. We spent our days learning Japanese and immersing ourselves in Japanese culture and everyday life. The Japanese language is very difficult, and some experts consider it the most difficult language in the world for a native speaker of English.

Q: How did you find it?

LENDERKING: The experts were right, but it was a fascinating experience. It’s tough to do something badly for two years. Not good for one’s confidence. But at the end, we could speak Japanese pretty well, and my assignment to Sapporo, a vibrant city of over one million where there were few Americans, for the next three years helped enormously. At the end of that five year immersion I was confident of my Japanese in almost any situation or context. I could read a newspaper, at least the political and economic articles, with some ease and confidence, and many days I spoke more Japanese than English.

There is an old story about the early Christian missionaries, who thought Japanese was a language invented by the devil to prevent the Christianization of Japan. Because it is difficult,
being at the language school was not totally satisfying. The quality of instruction and the small class size were excellent. But we were isolated in a close-in Japanese suburb, cut off from meaningful work and daily contact with our embassy colleagues who were dealing with Japan, and it was frustrating too. If you’re struggling every day with the complex grammar, and nuances, and learning all the Chinese characters, and feel you’re doing it badly, you don’t have much job satisfaction, which is contrary to the mindset of most FSOs, who are generally a self-confident bunch. And so to deal with that -- we had six class hours a day and then homework at night -- I took up tennis. I joined the Tokyo Lawn Tennis Club where the Crown Prince (now Emperor) and Princess Michiko played, and a lot of the Japanese elite played there as well. Every day after school we would be on the court at 3:30 and I got a pretty good tennis game out of that. And I eventually learned a lot of Japanese.

Q: Looking back on it, how did you feel the training went?

LENDERKING: I thought it was superb. Of course we all groused about it but it was superb. We also had some special programs. At least twice a year we were given $100 or $200 or something, which was a lot of money in those days, to go off for a week, on our own, unaccompanied by anyone, no translators, family, or anyone like that, and you could go anywhere you wanted and just go out and mingle with the natives, so to speak. And that was very good. The teachers were excellent – they were wise and generally patient, and understood enough English so that they knew why we were having such a hard time putting our thoughts into good Japanese. Some of the teachers ended up marrying the students but that is not why they were good; it was basically one-on-one teaching or maybe one teacher to two or three students or maybe three. A class with three students in it was considered almost unwieldy. You really got face-to-face instruction, intensive teaching and at the end of the day you were tired. But there was a special course where we would have an hour or two hours a week with reading newspapers and so we learned all the newspaper terms with a specialist. There were other special programs that were good. All of the students were keenly interested in learning the language and absorbing Japanese culture and history and there was a strong sense of competition. The FSI texts and special materials were also first rate.

Q: Well, can you think of any of the people who were in the course with you?

LENDERKING: Sure. Bill Clark and I entered about the same time and had about the same learning aptitude, and he later became ambassador to India and had other senior positions. Mark Peattie and Tom Rimer were close USIA colleagues. Both of them had a special interest in Japan and after serving with distinction in Kyoto and Kobe/Osaka, respectively, both resigned from the foreign service and went back to get their PhDs in Japanese studies, Mark in military history and Tom in literature and culture. After that, both had long and distinguished careers as university professors. Most of my fellow students went on to reach senior levels of the Foreign Service, and several became ambassadors.

Q: Bill Clark -- he was political counselor in Seoul when I was consul general.

LENDERKING: Really? Bill and I had a lot of class time together. Later he was consul general in Sapporo when I was the center director there. And, Bill Breer was another- he came after me
but had already learned a lot of Japanese on his own. He and his wife Peggy spent most of their career in Japan, and Bill ended up as DCM. Dave Hitchcock was another. Tom Shoesmith, who just passed away (2007), later became ambassador to Malaysia.

**Q:** Now, this was a two year course. How did the second year go?

LENDERKING: By the second year we had learned a lot and we were also dismayed to see how much we still had to go. By then we had probably learned maybe 1,000 characters and we could read a fair bit of the newspaper and we were in advanced Japanese but we realized how complicated it was. Almost every utterance you can think of is said differently than you would say it in English – word order, grammar, levels of politeness, and so on. So we were functional but I don’t think any of us felt we really had reached the level of educated professional fluency.

**Q:** After the second year – 1963? -- what did they do with you?

LENDERKING: I was assigned to Sapporo, which is on Hokkaido in the north, with a population of over one million. It was and is probably the most congenial large city in all of Japan.

**Q:** Why?

LENDERKING: Because it was settled rather late and with American influence. It was considered Japan’s frontier and was less traditional. People were more open, and more inclined to make friends with foreigners. I was there for three years and I had a near-total immersion because there were very few Americans there. There were some missionaries and there was a small army base about 50 miles outside of the city at the airport, but I was speaking Japanese all day, every day, and in the evenings, too. We ran programs, lectures and discussion groups mostly on foreign policy issues, and that was a great way to learn about what Japanese thought and to improve my Japanese. I got so I could get on my feet and give an impromptu greeting, presentation, or short remarks without nervousness and with very few mistakes. So I gradually regained my confidence.

**Q:** How about your kids? Did they start picking up a lot of Japanese?

LENDERKING: Oh, yes. The kids were marvelous. We sent them to Japanese yochi-ens, nursery schools, and they had some adjustment problems; the kids were not used to the Japanese system. They would get up and walk around and they didn’t see why had to sit in a group on the floor like the Japanese children, or couldn’t go out and play or do whatever they liked, and the teachers were sometimes vexed by their non-conforming and individualistic ways. It was a classic difference – the Japanese children, obedient and group-oriented; my children, independent and curious. But they picked up Japanese very quickly. Unfortunately, when they left Japan they also forgot it quickly. But like most people around the world, the Japanese are great with kids. My second and third sons had flaming red hair and they were real oddities to the Japanese children. We would go to the zoo or some public place and people would stop looking at the animals and flock around them and touch their hair. They were just little fellows and it got too much at times and I would have to shoo the Japanese kids away, but they didn’t mean any
harm; they were just curious.

Q: You were running the American Center?

LENDERKING: Yes. We had centers in six main Japanese cities, established in the post World War II period during the U.S. military occupation. They were accepted as important parts of the community and the Japanese flocked to the libraries and our programs. In Sapporo, we also had a small consulate with three American officers, and we worked very well together and became close friends. What was special about that assignment I think -- I was then all of 29 years old -- is that the Japanese were so welcoming and treated us well above our station. By that I mean the Governor, who was a nationally prominent figure and one of the most impressive men I’ve ever met, would occasionally invite us to play a round of golf with him; we had the President of Hokkaido University and his wife at our house for dinner a number of times, and so on. The Japanese regarded this as a very important assignment, and sometimes asked why it had gone to such a young officer. In their eyes it was unusual, and they interpreted this, incorrectly, as signifying that I had some special talent or abilities. They seemed to think “Why did this young guy get such an important assignment, he’s still a kid.” My predecessor was in his mid-40s.

Well, after a while, we knew many of the top people in town, in government, the media, the universities, the political parties, cultural life, and even to some extent the pro-Marxist labor unions. All of us spoke Japanese well and we all had good personal friends among the Japanese. My wife learned enough Japanese – she wasn’t an official student at the language school, but took advantage of the self-study opportunities – and developed friends and contacts on her own. In a situation like that we all felt we were really representing America in a direct and personal way.

Q: Who was your predecessor?

LENDERKING: John McDonald. He was very popular because he spoke very good Japanese, had a Japanese wife and also was an excellent golfer, the sport of choice for the power elite of any Japanese city. So most of the top people and the ordinary folks of Hokkaido were very friendly and made us feel welcome. Even if we were meeting people who didn’t like us, such as some of the labor union folks who organized anti-U.S. demonstrations over Vietnam and things like that, they would be cordial when we met and sat down, and then they would light into us. Our Japanese was good enough so we could often hold our own, although I don’t think we convinced anyone of the rightness of our policies. Even some of the Marxist university professors who didn’t like the United States at all were personally cordial and we often asked them to participate in our programs, making sure they had a chance to speak. That willingness to listen was an important factor, although I sometimes regretted it because Japanese responses during a discussion tended to become monologues or almost speeches, and so we would sometimes have to impose a time limit.

When I first arrived, I had an informal meeting with a small group of Japanese professors who were experts on American literature. Since I had majored in English and American literature, they asked me on the spot to speak on trends in contemporary American literature. I gulped – they were far more learned than I on the subject, and in recent years I had done more reading on
foreign policy than on modern American literature. Since they all spoke excellent English I at least could stumble better in my own language than Japanese, and had the good sense to make my remarks short.

Q: What was the center’s focus?

LENDERKING: Basically, the center was trying to establish a stronger dialogue with opinion leaders of all kinds. More specifically, we were trying to make intellectual and political inroads into the very strongly entrenched Marxist ideology that reigned virtually unchallenged in the universities and in Japanese intellectual and cultural life. It was kind of an established orthodoxy, especially in the history, economics, and political science faculties. Now, for historical reasons and most recently World War II, the Japanese had no particular reason to feel any affinity at all for the Soviet Union, but because the leftists embraced Marxism and rejected capitalism, they naturally gravitated to the Soviet Union. So we would often hear senior Japanese leftist politicians, scholars, and intellectuals speak about the Soviet Union as the “peace force,” with the United States of course labeled the “war force.” Communism, or radical socialism was the wave of the future; capitalism a remnant of a retrograde past.

The practical impact of all this was that the professors were mostly pro-Soviet and influenced their students in that direction. So we were trying to challenge them enough with facts and scholarship so they would ease away from the rigid ideology that was being transmitted from one generation to the next by the feudalistic university system that still prevailed. The president of the Hokkaido University was sympathetic to this effort but had to be careful because the faculty and labor unions wielded a lot of influence. So that was one thing we worked on.

The President of the Teachers College was personally cordial but a flat-out pro-Soviet Marxist and made no secret of it. The Governor detested him and said if he could have his way, he’d throw him in jail.

We also had a fair number of cultural events. We had a nice library that was used all the time. We had a very active speaker program. We taught English. And there was a lot of scope for me as a young guy bursting with ideas, to try out some of these ideas. And some of the Japanese staff would say hey, you know, you aren’t going to change this society overnight, just take it easy. And they would rein me back in. And they were so good, supportive but wise about our American ways and where they might rub Japanese the wrong way. We were blessed to have people like that who wanted to work for us.

Q: I would have thought there would be a lot of resentment over the Soviets hanging on to, what is it, the Ryukyus?

LENDERKING: The Ryukyus are where Okinawa is, to the south. You’re probably referring to the Kuriles.

Q: Yes, the islands to the north. I mean, because this has always been the great blessing of our policy with Japan over the last 16 years; the Soviets had hung on to those islands to no great benefit...
LENDERKING: That’s true. There was some political resentment of the Soviets on this issue, but it didn’t have much popular resonance for some reason. I think the Japanese were still in their post-World War II mode of semi-shock. They hadn’t quite regained their feet and their full confidence, although the country was prospering and coming on fast. The 1964 Olympics marked Japan’s coming of age as a confident regional power with a world class economy, but until that time they preferred a low profile. Still do, as a matter of fact, so they don’t wield the influence on the world stage commensurate with their importance. Anyway, even though the Japanese had legitimate grievances over the Soviets’ continued possession of the Kuriles, Marxist ideology among the interi, or intellectuals, was a much bigger issue. As pro-Marxists, they condemned Japan’s wartime excesses anyway, so many of them thought Japan had brought its troubles with the Soviets on itself.

Q: The issue has always made it a lot easier for the Japanese to dislike them and like us.

LENDERKING: Well, that’s a good point. The business sector was not at all sympathetic to Marxism and the top businessmen were friendly to us. And the business sector really is what controlled Japanese politics, certainly in Hokkaido. The governor was a conservative in the Liberal Democratic Party and a very powerful man.

Q: Did you spend much time trying to show what we were doing in race relations and all, because this is a time of civil rights?

LENDERKING: We did. We had a very fine movie that USIA produced, you’ve probably seen it, which we showed all over Hokkaido at the universities and elsewhere. It was about Martin Luther King and the March on Washington and it was very moving and quite popular. We must have shown that to hundreds of thousands of people and we did have occasional discussions about that in some of our programs. We had a small program of inviting outstanding students to visit the U.S. for a few weeks and they invariably wanted to visit Harlem or have some insight into race relations. So we did address that problem.

Q: Were we trying to do anything about the gender issue with women? Or was it that this was a Japanese situation and we were not trying to proselytize or anything like that?

LENDERKING: We took that up too. We were very lucky in having an advisor for women’s affairs who was recruited outside of the Foreign Service, Dorothy Robins-Mowry. She had been very active in women’s affairs in the U.S. and although she didn’t speak Japanese she knew her subject and was very empathetic. She sought out non-traditional women with leadership potential who wanted to break out of their traditional roles and restraints, and she established rapport with women community leaders all over Japan. We invited her to Sapporo as a speaker and conference participant several times, and she had some fascinating meetings with Japanese women, activists, who were trying to push against the system. We weren’t trying to overthrow the Japanese system but we were trying to just give them some ideas to think about and suggest things they might do to bring about change within their own system, and in accordance with their own social mores and cultural values. This is a problem the Japanese are still struggling with. Japan is a truly impressive country but still this problem is not solved, and young women today
as a group are massively dissatisfied.

Q: How was the Japanese economic miracle at that point?

LENDERKING: 1964 was the dividing point. The 1964 Olympics took place in Tokyo and there was a frantic effort to modernize parts of Tokyo. They built the facilities, widened the highways, improved their transportation system, and did all kinds of things. And that was a psychological dividing line because the Olympics were a tremendous success. They really marked the end of the dowdy, post-war era when Japan, it seemed, would never, ever get out of the World War II doldrums and frame of mind, reform their society and energize the sluggish economy. But after that Japan took off, and that’s when the Japanese miracle really started. Our ambassador there was Edwin Reischauer, who of course was very familiar with the Japanese situation and was listened to very seriously. He was in some ways a cheerleader for the Japanese, encouraging them to open new ways of thinking and doing, and when he criticized, which he occasionally did, they would really listen to him.

Of course, I’m not suggesting that Japan reformed its society because of a few Americans, even of the stature of Ambassador Reischauer. They did it on their own, but America was a key factor, because the Japanese were watching us all the time, sometimes adapting our innovations and improving of them, sometimes learning from our mistakes, sometimes reinterpreting their own values in the light of the demands of the modern world. The Japanese are constantly innovating, testing, building, and at the same time remain a quite conservative and traditionalist society. The push-pull of these conflicting aspects was always fascinating and we could talk with the Japanese openly about such things. To have lived in Japan without speaking Japanese would have reduced the richness of our experiences by 90 percent.

Q: Was there much travel to the United States at this point?

LENDERKING: More and more. It was growing. There was tremendous prosperity in Japan but generally people were still looking inward but more and more people were traveling to the United States. Young couples would go on their honeymoons to Guam or Honolulu and wealthy businessmen traveled back and forth all the time. Tourism was just starting to take off.

Q: In Sapporo, and the rest of Hokkaido, did you get into the hinterlands much?

LENDERKING: Sure. Yes, Hokkaido has a lot of beautiful scenery, sort of like New England. Not as spectacular as New England but with lovely fall foliage, some accessible mountains to climb and hike in, great skiing places, hot springs all over the place, that sort of thing. Yes, we traveled a fair bit. And Hokkaido is much more rural than the rest of Japan.

Q: Were there any Koreans there?

LENDERKING: Sure. There is a large Korean population, millions of people, not so much in Hokkaido but in the rest of Japan. There were two very large organizations, one was pro-North Korean, one was South Korean, which had a great influence, especially in the labor unions. Oddly enough, the pro-North Korean group was larger and had more influence. The Japanese
were very concerned about North Korean influence and in fact still are because the North Korean group is close to the DPRK politically and there is still a very uneasy, hostile relationship between Japan and North Korea, the DPRK. There is a huge Korean minority in Japan, and many mixed marriages. Prejudice against Koreans is still alive, and is one of the few ugly aspects of modern Japan.

Q: Well, it is about the only minority they had, really.
LENDERKING: Yes.

Q: You were there from when to when?
LENDERKING: From 1961 to 1966; five years in a row.

Q: Five years. So Vietnam really did not raise its head.
LENDERKING: At the end, it did. The demonstrations against our actions in Vietnam started, and the criticisms didn’t come just from the radicals on the left. Most of the intellectuals and ordinary folks were strongly opposed. And we started to be very active on this issue, because we were getting hammered every day. We were stressing that this was not just a homegrown insurgency in Vietnam, but fomented by outside forces in violation of the treaty that established separate Vietnams, north and south. We brought in outside experts as speakers, and by this time my Japanese was quite good and I really enjoyed going up against someone on the other side who was spouting rigid ideological stuff. Of course, I was doing my duty but I enjoyed it because so many of the critics, especially among the intellectuals, were so arrogant and smug.

Q: You were saying the Marxists were quite rigid...
LENDERKING: Yes. There were not, as I recall, a lot of really thoughtful critics; they were basically ideological critics and it was hard to get through to them. I guess as a personal note I enjoyed the back and forth; it was fun but also I thought I was making good points against some of this rigid thinking. And oddly enough, I am skipping ahead, my next assignment was Vietnam. And when I got to Vietnam I didn’t agree with the doctrinaire socialists but I certainly became a very harsh critic of our own policy and actions once I saw it upfront with my own eyes.

Q: Okay. Well, is there anything else -- for example, how did the Japanese fare in language learning? Were they able to pick it up? They all seem to have a problem with learning English, as we have had a problem learning Japanese.
LENDERKING: That’s right. They had trouble and they still do have trouble learning English and other foreign languages. English used to be mandatory in the schools, and may still be, but the emphasis was on reading, especially technical and scientific texts. So English was not taught properly, as a way to understand a complex foreign culture, but as a means to making someone a better engineer, or something like that. That approach reveals a weakness in Japanese attitudes, what some people call their superiority/inferiority complex. As an island nation, they are very self-centered, like the British in a way, but more so. And we, as a continental country aren’t so
hot at learning foreign languages and relating to other cultures ourselves. In Japan, students are taught English to read but not to speak properly. I think the Koreans have much better knowledge of spoken English than the Japanese. They learned it when the missionaries came in the late 19th century, and unlike the Japanese they welcomed the missionaries, mainly because they needed outside help to keep their bigger and stronger neighbors -- Japan, China, and Russia – from swallowing them up.

I would like to mention one program that I did in cooperation with some others that I thought was particularly good. We got a leading professor of modernization from Princeton, Cyril Black, to come out to Japan for about a month and he spent time in Sapporo, Kobe-Osaka and Kyoto, and I worked hard on this for a long time but we arranged for him to give, for the first time ever at Hokkaido University, which was the leading university in Hokkaido and one of the best in Japan, a formal course with senior students and graduate students. I can’t remember whether they allowed a certain amount of credit for it but it was a formal course and we provided the interpreter and Cyril Black was a marvelous professor, a marvelous lecturer, and he taught it just the way he would teach a course at Princeton. And this was a revelation because the methodology was different from anything the Japanese students were used to. After initial reluctance on the part of the students, who were accustomed to listening quietly at a formal lecture and accepting the professor’s words as gospel truth, Black got the students to participate and present diverse opinions -- it was not just a rote lecture. He gave an exam and graded the papers himself, with the help of an interpreter. Afterwards, he told me the exams were weak and well short of U.S. standards. Most of the responses were just regurgitation and showed little evidence of independent thinking. So Black lightened up on the grading standards. But it was a new experience for the students and something of a revelation. I thought it was very exciting. And the professor who was the head of the political science department at Hokkaido University, whose cooperation was essential for this project, was initially very skeptical but he and Black got along very well and cooperated. So this turned out to be a marvelous example of what could happen when you do something right. That experience reverberated years and years afterwards. The professor became a good contact at the center where before he never had anything to do with us. And Cyril Black, Professor Black, who died a few years ago, had the same experience in Kyoto and Kobe-Osaka. It was really worthwhile.

Q: Okay. After Sapporo we’re in 1966, and going to – where?

LENDERKING: I did a year in Vietnamese language training. So I picked up another foreign language.

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LENDERKING: I went back home and did a quick refresher in Japanese and was assigned as the chief of protocol at the American pavilion at Expo ’70 in Osaka, Japan. That EXPO, or World’s Fair, was the biggest ever, and certainly one of the best. It was a huge success, and the Japanese went to extraordinary lengths to make it so. Also, it was the last Worlds Fair the U.S. participated in where we went all out to have a really first class pavilion, and put our best foot forward. And we did, and we had a huge impact, but unfortunately most of the world thought that Worlds Fairs had become redundant in the age of instant communications and they were
probably right. But we had a marvelous pavilion, with huge crowds waiting patiently in the broiling summer sun to get in. Our pavilion was the biggest hit of the EXPO. As for me, I had gone from counterinsurgency in Vietnam to chief of protocol at the biggest Worlds Fair ever in the space of about three months. You can’t beat that for variety.

Q: What was the period you were there?

LENDERKING: The EXPO, by international agreement, lasted five months, mid-April to mid-September. So I finished my Japanese refresher and went out to help with the setup and preparation of the pavilion in February and March of ’70, and the opening was in April. And in the five months, if memory serves, something like 18 million people visited EXPO, and about 7 million came to our pavilion. We were of course hugely gratified, but we had terrible problems with crowd control and related problems.

Q: Describe what EXPO was about and what was shown and particularly what we were doing.

LENDERKING: As I said, this was maybe the last truly great truly World’s Fair, or world exposition, the purpose of which was to present ideas and information to the world’s people and governments that would spur innovation and progress. In earlier years, particularly around the late 19th century, these fairs had a tremendous impact because they would showcase innovations in technology, science, and culture and the arts. For EXPO 70, we had a commissioner general, Howard Chernoff, who was very effective in raising money, especially in fashioning a skillful pitch to Congress to fund the basic appropriation, and then visiting major corporate donors to get them to shell out big time. He did, and they did. We also had a very able and experienced professional staff, plus some gifted Japanese staffers. As Chernoff liked to say, “We’re going in there with our first team,” so we all felt we were part of something special.

Howard Chernoff was a genius at fund raising. At the time, he’d been a special high level advisor to the Director of USIA Leonard Marks, but he came from an extensive media background in the private sector and seemed to know everyone of influence on the face of the earth. So he raised a heap of money from corporate contributors and other people to supplement our congressional appropriation, which as I recall was about $13 million total, and we put on a really first rate pavilion. He’d go to a potential contributor, demand to see the top decision makers in the corporation, promised to take no more than 15 minutes of their time unless they wanted to ask him questions, and tell them what was going to be in the pavilion, how it would be totally first rate and genuine, only genuine artifacts used, and so on, and how their message could be showcased. And he’d also tell them they couldn’t plaster commercial messages all over the place, but spell out exactly what we would do for them, which was considerable, while still preserving the integrity of the operation and avoiding crass commercialism.

That was the era of the moon walk, and somehow Howard wangled actual moon rock samples from NASA and most days it seemed like the whole world wanted to get inside to have a look at them. We also had the actual capsules used to transport the astronauts. No models or reproductions were allowed, and even the marks from reentry were clearly visible. Everything in the pavilion was an original. Sometimes the lines were so long, the people waiting to get in would have to stand outside as long as five hours in the hot sun. Many of the people who came to
EXPO were Japanese from the country and had never seen anything like that, especially something as exotic as the moon rocks. So they would wait patiently, and never complain. Since we were there to present an image of America, making them wait became a big headache for us. So we built awnings to provide shade, and got the great golfer Billy Casper to come and give shotmaking exhibitions several times a day. We built a small platform for him and he would chip golf balls into the crowd, and they would catch them in their hats, and loved it. Japanese love golf more than any other sport and they all knew who Billy Casper was, so it was a big success. This was Howard Cherno'ff's idea, and he made it happen through his connections. It was an eye opener for me and my Foreign Service colleagues on the staff. We operated by the book, and the freewheeling way of doing things in the corporate world – you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours – was rather new to most of us.

Another problem was also caused by our popularity. Of course we had a VIP entrance for special guests, and a range of favors depending on who they were, and I was in charge of all that. A lot of people tried to present themselves as VIPs (very important persons), who really were not. I dealt with arrangements for visitors ranking from emperors to kings, queens, political leaders, congressmen, senators, actors and actresses, corporate leaders, and other celebrities from around the world. They all felt they deserved special treatment and most of them did. I have to say most of them were very gracious and it was fun meeting them.

Q: Okay. Let’s take a king or a queen or something; what would you do?

LENDERKING: We had to set up procedures from scratch, but we worked carefully with other pavilions and with the Japanese overseers of EXPO to handle VIP visitors on a reciprocal basis. Our problem was that we were so popular we were usually overwhelmed, every day. We had to learn to say no gracefully, or make alternative VIP arrangements. Sometimes there was a dispute over what kind of treatment we would give them. But if they were a king or a queen or someone of that rank we would treat them well. Most just wanted immediate access to the pavilion and a personable and knowledgeable guide to take them around, and we had some magnificent American university students who spoke Japanese to do that. Sometimes we’d offer them a drink in our lounge, or even a reception or luncheon or dinner in our small VIP restaurant, which was catered by Pan Am, still one of the world’s top airlines at the time. Our pavilion was visually exciting and stimulating, and it would take maybe 45 minutes or an hour to go through it. Our lounge and restaurant weren’t open to the public, but we had VIPs flowing through there every day. Some were so grateful to just sit down for a few minutes and have a glass of cold water, or a soda, or beer or something. Most weren’t demanding at all. We formed a theory about VIPs – the more eminent they were, the better they behaved. It was the ones who hadn’t made it but who thought they should be in the big time that might be rude or demanding.

As for other corporate donors, Chrysler gave us 13 new cars, including a limousine for the commissioner general, so everything was first-class. We had Chivas Regal scotch and ample supplies of food for our receptions and a nice budget. So we did things right for people who were interested in our pavilion, and for people we wanted to contact. The large Consulate General staffers in Kobe/Osaka used us quite a bit for their purposes, and that was fine. They were also a bit jealous of us because we had a lot of fun, a dynamite pavilion, and excellent resources at our disposal. I think it was the first and only time in my entire Foreign Service career when
everything we had at our disposal for representation was first rate, and we had ample supplies. The general Foreign Service experience throughout my career was to scrounge – make the most of limited resources, scrounge amenities, pare guest lists (and thereby limit outreach capabilities to people who were important to U.S. interests, and so on. We all had that experience.

Q: How did the Japanese run the EXPO?

LENDERKING: As you might expect they were meticulous in planning and details. They were consummate organizers. The fair itself was designed with flair and imagination; sometimes their idea of what should happen and what we thought should happen would differ but they were usually very accommodating; they provided housing for our staff and for the commissioner general that was very comfortable and it was all new. They put in new metro lines and commuter access facilities and all kinds of infrastructure in suburban Osaka, and it was most impressive. I doubt if any U.S. city could do as well on such a large scale in such a short time, even with help from the federal government. In our federal system, authority is too dispersed, and organizing people on a grand scale is really beyond us except in emergencies like World War II.

Q: This is still the Cold War, still in full bloom. Were we competing with the Soviets?

LENDERKING: Yes. I’m really glad you asked that because it was one of the most interesting aspects of my experience. It was also amusing at times but it was also deadly earnest. For any younger people who read this, the Cold War was serious; the threat from the Soviet Union was serious; and the contest between us raged around the globe for 45 years.

In Osaka, the Soviets put up a huge pavilion – they were there to make a statement about the attractiveness of their system, and to engage in competition with us, and they wanted to win. Their pavilion was about twice the size of ours, and dominated the landscape at a different corner of the EXPO than ours. We were clearly in competition. We had two Americans – I and a deputy, Pat Wazer, who was very knowledgeable and correct, although underneath it also an iconoclast -- in charge of our protocol operation and six really excellent Japanese local hires who were just super young people. We worked fast and furiously for long hours and without our bilingual Japanese staff we couldn’t have been successful. The Soviet Pavilion was enormously popular and they had a lot of talent and impressive exhibits, but our pavilion was the one “must see” attraction at EXPO. Among the Soviet professional staff there were quite a few spies, KGB agents, and their thinking was that EXPO was a good place to put their KGB people because they naturally came into contact with all kinds of personages and people and they could pursue their own interests with a perfect cover. My counterpart in the Soviet pavilion, who I met very early on -- we sought each other out -- was a KGB person. He did not identify himself as such but we were able to find that out, with the help of our agency personnel downtown.

A number of the high ranking people in the pavilion were also KGB agents and their cover was their protocol office. The funny part of it was that they assumed that I was, of course, a high ranking CIA person and they paid a lot of attention to me. In other words, they naturally assumed that we would do things the same way they did. You could conclude that maybe this was a reflection of Soviet provincialism, and one of the flaws of their system. Here is another example: they had a large number of guides, and they all spoke perfect unaccented English. It was really
impressive, the more so when I discovered that none of them had ever been outside of the Soviet Union before. In other words, they put these attractive young people through a rigorous and lengthy language training that went far beyond what I had in Japanese, and that was quite rigorous in itself. That is, after two solid years of doing nothing but study Japanese I could get around well, had a good professional vocabulary, could read most sections of a newspaper, and could engage in professional conversation with educated people. But my fluency was not the same as these young guides, who spoke English like American university students, but without the slang. But here’s the flaw: Howard Chernoff, our commissioner general, insisted that all our guides would represent a cross section of multi-ethnic America, and they all had to pass a fluency test in Japanese. Very few of the Soviet guides spoke Japanese, so in a sense their command of English was somewhat wasted, although they were able to provide good explanations of their pavilion in English. But Chernoff wisely never let us forget that we were there to reach out to the Japanese, so all of our guides were able to take a Japanese group through the pavilion and communicate with them, or escort Japanese VIPs through the pavilion and give them a fun tour in Japanese. I must have had hundreds of compliments from Japanese VIPs about our American guides—they were so obviously American, yet they all spoke Japanese, having learned it in university, from their parents if they were Japanese-Americans, or through exchange programs.

If the American people and our congressmen ever understood clearly what a tremendous impact at low cost something like this has, we wouldn’t have to go begging every year for funds, while the Pentagon gets almost a carte blanche to produce weapons. Of course we need weapons; that’s not the point. But we also need to communicate effectively with people and their leaders and we often sadly neglect that aspect of foreign policy.

Anyway, back to the Soviets, who considered me a very important CIA agent. My protestations to the contrary -- that I was just exactly who I said I was -- were regarded as cleverness. They used to say to me, “Bill, you’re very clever, but we really know who you are,” and they paid me an awful lot of attention and treated me as a much more important person than I really was. But another advantage we had was that we had CIA people elsewhere, where the Soviets did not. So we did not need to have agents working in our pavilion. I met with CIA colleagues occasionally, perhaps several times during the course of Expo, on contacts I had and especially who in the Soviet pavilion might be spying, and we were able to identify many who were KGB agents and those who were legitimately working on just protocol. The CIA had pictures of many people they thought were agents and I was able to identify many of them. They had a lot of KGB agents in the pavilion, and in due course they tried to entrap me.

Q: How did that work?

LENDERKING: It was kind of amateurish. I was very friendly with my counterpart, and we got along well, even though I knew he was KGB. The business side of our relationship we both handled quite efficiently, and that was dealing with scores of VIPs high on the other’s daily lists. We sent quite a few of our VIP visitors to the Soviet pavilion – it was large and imposing and second in popularity only to our own, but Sergei often sent us hundreds of their so-called VIPs at a time, creating logistics problems for us. We had a complicated pavilion in that the roof
consisted of a translucent fabric that was held up by air. The effect was magical, because the large building had no posts or beams, and the roof let in lots of sunlight, so the effect was light and airy. But to keep the roof from collapsing two airtight doors were required, and they could only be opened one at a time or the roof would collapse. So it was logistically difficult getting hundreds of VIP visitors into the pavilion at one time. Further, they weren’t really VIPs, but ordinary Soviets off the tourist ships, and Sergei promised anyone who came ashore VIP access to the U.S. pavilion. It got so bad, Chernoff, who had a small bantyish physique but was afraid of nobody, marched down to the Soviet pavilion and into the office of the Soviet commissioner general, and said “you’re leaning on us and you’ve got to stop it.” I wasn’t there but I heard the effect was electric: the astonished Soviet CG, expecting to receive his American counterpart and bestow some affability and hospitality on him, but being instead confronted by an indignant American with some ridiculous complaint on his mind…well, I’m sure it was a shock.

Incidents like those provided some laughs, and weren’t serious because they were quickly forgotten in the crush of business. And, we all knew that we were there to create good will so Chernoff and everyone else in our pavilion were hospitable to the Soviets and we got along well, although we kept them at a distance. For example, we didn’t invite them to our small intramural parties where the guests would usually be favored Japanese from the EXPO staff, and friends from other pavilions. It was too risky that the Soviets would make some contacts or compromise someone who might have had too much to drink. So we were friendly, but careful.

As for my counterpart, Sergei, he was smart and charming, and spoke good English. It was usually easy to identify KGB agents even without the help of the CIA because they generally were more sophisticated, spoke good English, and had much more freedom to move around EXPO – attend parties and official receptions, stay out late, and so forth. We enjoyed arguing politics with each other and would run to see each other at receptions. He was very visible and well known, and it was hard not to like him. He also was working hard to further his country’s interests. And he beseeched me one time; several times actually, to go with him to a massage parlor in downtown Osaka that he said was popular with the people in the Soviet pavilion and it would be a very nice experience. It was such an obvious setup it was ludicrous. I told him very firmly I had no interest in that proposal, but he asked me several more times, before he finally gave up. I was a bit disappointed that a slick outfit like the KGB would try something so obvious and amateurish, but I guess they nailed quite a few people through that kind of thing during the course of the Cold War, so for them it probably was worth a try. If I had gone they would have taken pictures and tried to blackmail me.

Q: Tell me more about our guides.

LENDERKING: We had 60 guides and they were super; I call them kids, because they all had the freshness of youth, but many of them were in their mid to late twenties and were in graduate school or professional jobs. As a group, they were bright, they knew about Japan, and they were a diverse bunch so they really reflected many aspects of our society.

Q: Were they mostly Nisei, or Sansei (second or third generation), or were some of them what we might call Anglo-Saxons?
LENDERKING: There were a few with obvious Asian heritage, but most were not. And the Japanese were surprised and pleased that people who had no ancestral connection with Japan whatsoever had taken the time to study their country’s history and culture and learn their language. To see the impact of that realization was a kind of revelation. Also, I think almost a third of the 60 were Mormons who had been in the Mormon system as overseas missionaries, and we called them the M Squad because they were very aggressive. They did some proselytizing too, in a good natured way, but they were among the most self-disciplined and reliable of the guides. I had a lot of contact with them because they were dealing with the public, and if I wanted a tough job done I almost always would go to one of them and they would get it done. They were superb.

Q: Did you get any movie stars or people that were well known in Japan who visited the pavilion?

LENDERKING: Oh sure. We had a huge number of people from Congress and the Senate. The one I remember best was Hubert Humphrey, who just like his reputation had a marvelous flair for people and was always behind schedule. But he went through the pavilion and just loved every part; he rhapsodized over the various sections and objects, and he was genuinely enjoying the experience. And later on that evening we had a reception for him, a huge reception, in a separate meeting hall, attended by all the VIPs we could round up. And my wife had gone through the receiving line a couple of hours before because I was still working in the pavilion. Altogether about 600 people attended that reception, and I came through the receiving line about an hour after my wife, and when I met him, he said “Oh, Mr. Lenderking, I had the pleasure of meeting your lovely wife a little while ago when she came through.” He had an extraordinary memory for people and an ability to connect instantly with them. No wonder he was a successful politician.

So we had a lot of people. Julie Nixon came out on National Day and represented the United States and she was very gracious. Nixon was of course president at that time. We had a number of movie stars, Dina Merrill and her husband, many others. Dina Merrill was not only beautiful and gracious, but an expert in her own right on art and some of the modern structures we had in our exhibit. Quite a few eminent people came through, celebrities of all kinds, every day.

Q: Who designed the pavilion?

LENDERKING: We’d had a competition to choose the design team and the winner was Ivan Chermayeff, an architect and designer very well known in New York and design circles, and he designed the pavilion. I mentioned the inflatable roof – you could walk on it as long as it was fully pressurized, and it was a very innovative structure. The effect on the inside of the pavilion was almost magical.

The guiding artistic spirit, though, was a USIA career Foreign Service officer named Jack Masey, who in 2007 still worked for the Chermayeff company in New York. He has done a lot of major exhibits, such as the marvelous one on immigration on Ellis Island. He’d also done the U.S. pavilion at Montreal for EXPO 67, which some said was even better than our exhibit at EXPO 70. I think doing these two major exhibits and pavilions were his crowning achievements.
in USIA. In those days, we had a full time design section: USIA had been put in charge of U.S. participation at all foreign expositions, so our exhibits people designed these but also a series of traveling exhibits, large and small, that we sent around the world. Budget cutting and developments in the way people communicated with foreign countries changed all that, but it was beautiful and impressive while it lasted. And maybe it’s true that mounting those huge exhibits was not cost effective when the world moved to instant communication, but they were beautiful, substantive, and said something about America that made an impression on people, and there is nothing we do overseas now outside of the Olympics that has nearly the impact.

Q: What was the Japanese public response? What was your impression?

LENDERKING: Oh, they loved it. And the one thing that everyone wanted to see was the moon rocks. Well, to look at they are just rocks, even if they were mounted in a revolving glass case with special lights shining on them. But the Japanese also responded well to the rest of the exhibit -- we had a sports section, a section of space exploration which had three or four space capsules that had actually been in space; a modern art section; and an antique section with genuine old objets, and they were all great crowd pleasers and the Japanese just loved it. We had relevant music piped through each section, and a great collection of contemporary prints, and we were all pleased that the vitality and diversity of America was displayed so creatively, with no bluster or boasting but with a lot of verve and energy.

I mentioned the appearances of Billy Casper to keep the crowds from wilting in the sweltering heat; he was there for two weeks. And we had a crew of professional folk singers who also performed every day. They were the only ones permitted to have beards or facial hair of any kind. In accordance with the custom of the period, I had let my hair grow so it was quite thick and long, over my ears, although I didn’t have a beard or mustache. But Chernoff made me cut my hair short; he was very positive about what kind of image he wanted the pavilion in its entirety to project, and he was right. Guides and staff were to look fresh and clean cut; folk singers were folk singers and beards were welcome. We also passed out refreshments to the crowd from time to time, but we had to be careful because there were thousands more people than we could accommodate with those gestures.

Q: Well then, so late 1970 you left Japan?

LENDERKING: Yes. EXPO closed on September 15, I think. I stayed on for a few days to write the necessary reports about the protocol section and what we did, and then I left.

Q: And where did you go next?

LENDERKING: I was offered the job of director of the American Center in Kyoto, which was one of the top centers anywhere because of the cultural and historical importance of Kyoto and its being a university and intellectual center. And that job was very attractive but I’d been away from America for so long I really felt out of touch with my own country, especially because so many changes were happening so quickly. The Vietnam war, women’s lib, music, dress, language, and behavior were all changing rapidly. I’d already had five years in a row in Japan before Vietnam, so I was ready to come home. So I became the desk officer for Japan, Korea and
Micronesia in USIA.

Q: And you did that from when to when?

LENDERKING: I did that for the rest of 1970 until mid 1972.

Q: So we are talking about probably ’71 to ’72?

LENDERKING: Yes, that’s right. After my desk officer job, which was busy and interesting, I was the head of Policy, Plans and Research in the large policy planning office of USIA.

Q: Well one of the things that I guess took place, a new Japanese word, “shokku.” (shock). Can you talk about that? Because you must have gotten involved in that. I’m referring to the opening to China, known in Japan as the “Nixon Shokku.” It was in ’71 or ’72. Anyway, it was during your time there. The announcement that Kissinger had gone to China and we had not told the Japanese until the last minute...

LENDERKING: Yes. There is a marvelous story connected to that. What I recall is that it must have been when Alexis Johnson took over as ambassador from Edwin Reischauer, who was a great ambassador. I think the Japanese ambassador to the U.S. was named Asakai, and he told senior people in our government that he had a recurring nightmare that he hoped we would avoid giving him at all costs, and that was that he would wake up one morning and read in the paper that we had gone ahead and recognized Communist China. It was a grave matter for the Japanese because successive governments had stood up to a tremendous amount of domestic pressure by resisting chances to draw closer to Communist China. They did this because they felt that the American connection was their number one alliance, so they took a lot of flak, but it was painful for them. It was such an important matter for the Japanese that the possibility of our normalizing relations with Communist China without telling the Japanese came to be known as “Asakai’s nightmare.” We of course repeatedly assured the Japanese we would do nothing of the sort without full consultations with them beforehand and then we went ahead and did it. To find out we had actually made a major overture to China behind their backs would seem to them something like the ultimate betrayal. But that is exactly what happened, and the Nixon shokku was the fulfillment of “Asakai’s nightmare.”

Q: Well, what were you doing during this period, as Japan desk officer?

LENDERKING: We had a very active USIA program, information and culture, to administer and so I was the backup and the point of contact and expertise in USIA in the East Asian office for everything like that. Our job, simply stated, was to be the post’s backup in Washington for anything they needed, whether it was personnel, policy guidance, support for producing new information materials, cultural presentations, everything. And we also relayed Washington’s concerns and suggestions to the post. We had a very innovative PAO in Japan, Alan Carter, who was trying to put in all kinds of new ways of communicating --super graphics, faster response on policy topics, more serious and focused intellectual content in all our products, you name it. He wanted to introduce a lot more of the exciting ferment that was going on in American culture at the time, the early 70s. Alan was very imaginative and forceful, but there were a lot of old guard
traditionalists in USIA who often regarded new ideas as trendy fads that would quickly run their course. So there were strong disagreements, but it was good for USIA, and Alan’s ideas quickly permeated throughout the agency, particularly among the younger officers. Many of them were put into practice and were effective. I don’t recall specifics, but I suppose that some of them were discarded along the way. But Alan’s watchword for judging these ideas was, “quality, relevance, speed.” Those are still viable criteria and I’m convinced that if the Bush administration’s practitioners of public diplomacy had applied those simple criteria to some of their ideas (instead of being prisoners of the neo-conservative ideology, which had some interesting aspects but also displayed an appalling ignorance of the rest of the world), our response to 9/11 would have been much more effective.

I’m of course oversimplifying a bit, but this was the essence of it. So, returning to the 70s, I was the post’s representative in Washington in selling their ideas to the bureaucracy, to the various support elements in USIA in Washington that were responsible for getting him the resources. And it was a little bit of a struggle and frankly I did a pretty good job but I could have done better. First, I had to resolve my own initial skepticism, but Alan was such an articulate and forceful advocate that he quickly convinced me. The end result, anyway, was that USIA programs improved and the innovations caught the Japanese attention.

As for your original question, I don’t recall how the post dealt with the reverberations of “Asakai’s nightmare,” but Alan’s insistence on quality, relevance and speed meant that we responded directly to our critics with authoritative answers to their criticisms.

Q: Did you find that there was a pretty good connection between what was going on in advertising, education and other areas of the civilian world regarding communicating across cultures, influencing people and getting people to do things?

LENDERKING: Yes, Alan was quite interested in communications theory and introduced a note of realism to USIA’s way of thinking. He borrowed some concepts from the academic world regarding the process of communication, starting with awareness, to understanding, to agreement, and finally to active support for our viewpoint. He stressed that it was illusory to suggest that any information program, except in unusual circumstances, could ever achieve the final step – active support. But it could and should strive for awareness and understanding among our target audiences, and that was difficult enough. Occasionally, we might persuade people that our viewpoint was correct and win over some of our critics, but that was unlikely. It was good for USIA to come to terms with those concepts, because one of its traditional weaknesses was a tendency to exaggerate its achievements in order to justify its existence. That in fact, was one of the chief defects of reporting by CORDS in Vietnam – many CORDS employees in the field confused activities with results. Alan Carter and those who were influenced by him played a big part in educating USIA on realistic assessments of our activities.

USIA then and certainly later on was able to call on really good people, Americans, to travel to posts as speakers and participate in special seminars, conferences and discussion programs and the Japanese were receptive to those. Almost always we were able to get an impressive turnout from leading Japanese intellectuals and other opinion leaders. We had center directors who were for the most part very energetic in getting to know the people in their cities who were important
in their various fields and getting them interested so they would be receptive to these initiatives. So, what the Japan program achieved in those days was to have a very high quality exchange of ideas and information on all sorts of subjects with a great cross-section of Japanese opinion leaders. That may sound easy, but it isn’t, and it’s my opinion that very few posts in the world had that same quality.

**Q:** What about Korea? Here you were, you studied Japanese, served in Japan, a real Japanese expert, and all of a sudden you have Korea on your plate too. The Japanese and the Koreans don’t have the happiest of relationships and the Japanese tend to think themselves quite superior to the Koreans. Did you find yourself infected with some localitis when you first took this on looking at Korea, and were you perhaps looking at northeast Asia from a Japanese point of view or not?

LENDERKING: Yes, to some extent, unfortunately. But I also was dismayed by some of the Japanese attitudes that were really just raw, naked prejudice. I remember one eminent woman telling me I know exactly how you people in America feel about blacks because we feel the same way about Koreans. If I am in a swimming pool and I see a Korean in a swimming pool I get out of the swimming pool; I will not stay in the swimming pool if there is a Korean there. I tried to correct her and she said no, no, I know what you have to say, you are an American diplomat but I know how you really feel. So nothing I could say had an impact on her.

On another occasion, an eminent Japanese, I think it was the Governor of Hokkaido, who as I said earlier was a man I both respected and admired, told me the Koreans were “difficult” people. When I asked why he thought so, he answered, “When we occupied Taiwan, we got along very well with the people there. There were very few incidents and it was a successful occupation. But in Korea, the Koreans gave us nothing but trouble, even though we had the same colonial policy as we did in Taiwan. They are difficult and stubborn people.”

This eminent Japanese was a staunch conservative and anti-communist, and had lived through the periods he was talking about, so he was at least reflecting honestly his views as an old colonialist. But I was flabbergasted by his point of view.

But certainly there was a feeling that Koreans were the sort of people who would come into your house with mud on their shoes and be a bit rough and aggressive. You have to fight those stereotypes. While I was in Japan, my exposure to Korean people and intellectuals was much more limited and I didn’t speak the language, but your obligation as a human being and a professional diplomat is to fight prejudice and stereotypes and keep a balanced view. My experience with Koreans was that they tended to be more open and direct; you did not have to wade through a lot of polite verbiage to have a substantive conversation with them. They would get to the point much quicker, and although I was fierce in my enjoyment of Japan and respect for the Japanese people, I found my limited encounters with Koreans interesting and refreshing.

**Q:** Just to give you the GI point of view, I served as an enlisted man first in Japan and then in Korea. This was the middle of the war, you know, the place was devastated. But I found that the Koreans were kind of like Americans. I mean, if you shove them, they would shove back, you know what I mean? It was very straightforward. Now as far as Japan was concerned, there was
too much bowing and all that for an American GI. I later went back as consul general to Seoul 25 years later and I found the Koreans very refreshing. They were awfully hard working, almost embarrassingly so. But you did pick up a prejudice, their prejudice against the Japanese as their former oppressors who had done everything they could to grind them down and there was just no love lost there at all. But having also served in Yugoslavia where I watched the Croatian/Serbian prejudice and how it affected even the American officers serving at post in Croatia and Serbia, I was just curious whether you noticed that your colleagues in Japan had this infection of looking down at Korea.

LENDERKING: Well, it was there, but it wasn’t much in evidence. I think it was manifested mostly in a sense that we in Japan were working in one of the most complex, interesting, and important countries in the world, and matters Korean simply took a back seat most of the time. I didn’t have the same depth of experience that you had in Korea, but there was a large Korean population in Japan. A lot of those people tried to mask their identity in one way or another because there was prejudice against them, including job prejudice. It was tough for them, no doubt about it. I was very sympathetic to them and I am certainly sympathetic to the Korean community that I see here today in Washington, robust, hard working, all those good qualities that I’m sure you’re very familiar with.

Q: Yes, in Japan the Korean community is divided between the North and the South. I was also surprised that there is a strong community sympathetic to North Korea; I would think that North Korea is so horrible, that once they were in Japan their allegiance would shift away from North Korea.

LENDERKING: In fact, the organization representing the North Koreans, Chosen Soren, I think it was called, was much larger and more powerful than the South Korean organization. Because most Japanese perceived North Korea as hostile, this had a certain traction among Koreans who had experienced prejudice in Japan. In other words, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Q: Do you recall any crises where you had to mobilize any big public affairs campaigns?

LENDERKING: I don’t recall any special mobilizations, but we spent an awful lot of time on the nuclear issue and whether our nuclear ships could call at Japanese ports or whether any of our ships that did call were carrying nuclear weapons. And that is controversial to this day. We spent a lot of time crafting what we could say about that.

How did you feel our operations in both Japan and Korea were funded and run?

LENDERKING: I think the talent pool we had at the American embassy was the best of any embassy I served in. Many of my colleagues spoke good Japanese and found service in Japan challenging and stimulating. They took the time to learn about the country and build contacts. Collectively, we had a lot of country expertise, and an ambassador, Edwin Reischauer, who encouraged us to learn more and get out and talk to people. When we had meetings in Tokyo, he encouraged younger officers from the field to speak up and not just sit quietly while the section chiefs in Tokyo imparted wisdom. Owen Zurhellen, head of the political section for a time, used to take his subordinates to lunch and challenge them to read difficult kanji. Later, when I went to
the Embassy in Rome, I was surprised to find very few fluent Italian speakers and very few American officers who knew much about Italian history and culture. Many of them were just happy to be in Rome and thought they had really arrived if a wealthy Italian conservative invited them for Sunday lunch at his place in the country. Of course, they absorbed partisan views very quickly and many of them had warped judgments, in my view. There was certainly not the same commitment to serious analysis and country expertise that I’d experienced in Japan. This was surprising and disappointing to me, because Italy was not only a delightful country, it was crucially important to us, and was going through difficult times. Further, Italy is an extremely complex modern country, and Italians, although charming, are far from easygoing and laid back.

Q: What about the Pacific islands? What were we doing there?

LENDERKING: Well, we had minimal presence there except in a couple of places like Fiji and Papua New Guinea, where we had small embassies. In the smaller islands, our USIA activities were pretty much limited to occasional visits and finding good people from the universities there to accept Fulbright grants, or studies at the East West Center in Honolulu. We didn’t have much in the way of money or resources, but the challenges were minor compared to the complexity of our relationships with Japan and Korea. I just didn’t have enough time and there were too many places to visit to get into that very deeply. The problem is that if you have a national interest even in some out of the way place like most of the Pacific islands, you ignore it at your peril. George Shultz, who I thought was a superior Secretary of State, once said, “Diplomacy is more like gardening than architecture, and you’d better water your garden and nurture your plants every day if you want to be successful.”

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Q: Did President Fujimori cross your radar at all at this time?

LENDERKING: Yes. I don’t remember when he came in but certainly-

Q: I mean, was he a figure and I was wondering whether you, you know, because of your Japanese experience, got involved with the Japanese community in Peru?

LENDERKING: I got involved with some of the artists who were Japanese, Peruvian-Japanese. Otherwise not. They were not very prominent in leadership circles in Lima. The embassy put on a huge and very impressive show of Peruvian contemporary art every year to raise money for charity, and it was always a showcase event. Susan, my wife, put it together one year -- working with all the artists, arranging for their works to be exhibited, setting up handling the money, and all the rest of it, and we got all the top artists to exhibit and raised a lot of money for charity that way. But I never met Fujimori. Certainly in the beginning he was quite impressive, and he organized the fight against Sendero Luminoso and began to get results. Some Peruvian journalist friends who knew him told me some stories later on that he seemed very level-headed at first but went off the tracks with megalomania.
EDWARD M. FEATHERSTONE
Vice Consul
Kobe (1962-1964)

Mr. Featherstone was born in New York City and raised there and in Japan. After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania and serving in the US Army, in 1961 he entered the Foreign Service. As a Japanese language and area specialist Mr. Featherstone served primarily in Japanese posts, including Kobe-Osaka, Yokohama, Niigata, Okinawa (Consul General) and Tokyo. He also served in Barbados and in Washington. Mr. Featherstone was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1999.

FEATHERSTONE: My first posting was to Japan at the American consulate general in Kobe-Osaka. Then I was posted to the Language School in Yokohama for continuation of language training, which I had started at FSI [Foreign Service Institute]/Washington.

Q: When you were in your initial training back here, had you requested an assignment to Japan, or was this just out of the blue?

FEATHERSTONE: No, I had requested an assignment to Japan. I had been slated for Japanese language training, under Eleanor Jordan, who was the chief linguist, and I believe at that time, she was head of FSI. I spent about eight months with her. Then, I went out to Japan to Kobe. I was a vice consul in Kobe, Japan, from 1962 to 1964.

Q: Who was the consul general there?

FEATHERSTONE: The consul general at the time was a man named Robert (Bob) Chalker. Later on, it was Owen Zurhellen, who is long dead, of course. He was a wonderful man. Anyway, before Owen, there was a person who was not a Japan type. Owen was a longtime Japan man. I knew Owen very well. In fact, I knew Owen when I was a child, in Kamakura where I was raised, a city on the seashore of Japan. Owen was, at that time, a vice-consul, I suppose. We went to Mass at the same Japanese church. So, I knew Owen well.

Q: How large was the consulate when you were in Kobe?

FEATHERSTONE: In Kobe, we had about 12 Japanese employees, and four or five Americans.

Q: Did we have a branch off of Osaka, or was it all...?

FEATHERSTONE: Yes, we did. It was split. We had the American consul general, Kobe-Osaka. We had an office in Osaka and an office in Kobe. The consulate general spent two days a week, I believe, in Osaka and three in Kobe. Later on, of course, Kobe was demolished. It all became American Consulate General, Osaka. At the time, I was very fortunate because Kobe was a very nice city, first of all, and second of all, it was nicer to be farther from the embassy.

Q: What were you doing?
FEATHERSTONE: I was the vice consul. I did the typical consular work. Everyone started in consular work when I was a young officer. I issued visas, and was engaged in protection and welfare of American citizens, people who had been arrested or had difficulties, or were sick or had died. I dealt with that. People always decry consular work, but I thought it was some of the most interesting work I have ever done. The only dead people I had seen, for example, were in McLaughlin’s Funeral Home in my hometown of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. A couple of cases that I had included one case where a man was in an airplane that had had crashed and burned. I had to pick him up. It was one of those things where they pull out the tray and I said, “Yeah, that’s him. You can close it now.” Anyway, I thought consular work was really interesting. The only thing that kept me from not making a career of it was I didn’t care too much for my peers in consular work. I gravitated more toward Owen Zurhellen and the people who ran the political and economic side.

Q: Did you have any opportunity to do any reporting?

FEATHERSTONE: Yes, I wrote some pieces. I don’t know how important they were. I think they were more for my edification than for the department. We had air grams at the time. I wrote probably a dozen air grams, a few cables. Now and then I would write a cable, mostly on consular affairs, usually debts or something that was fairly unimportant and timely, and that sort of thing. I enjoyed myself. I had a good time there. I loved Kobe.

Q: Were there any U.S. military in your area?

FEATHERSTONE: Not too many. When I was at the embassy in Tokyo, we had a few dealings with the U.S. military that were mostly in places like Yokosuka, which was about an hour’s drive. It was a large navy base, and still is. We used to go down there occasionally. I didn’t have all that much to do with it, but sometimes, I would have to go down there on a consular matter. I usually did this by train, which was the easiest way to travel in Japan. I went down there and talked to one officer or another about whatever matter we were faced with.

Q: Were there any Communists demonstrations against the consulate?

FEATHERSTONE: Oh yes. We had those regularly. I don’t know about the term “Communist,” but they were certainly leftists. In some cases, they were anti-American. They were always anti-American. It was usually anti-A bomb, or some policy that we were pursuing at the time. Usually the people were fairly polite. There was one case, I recall, where they had a demonstration, and they had a thing they were carrying, which had some play cards and so forth on it. They knocked against the consulate and they knocked off a lantern like thing we had. The next day they came around with compensation. Even though they were against us in a way, they were decent fellows.

Q: Were you there when Attorney General Robert Kennedy visited the area?

FEATHERSTONE: I was there, but I was not involved with the visit, other than being acutely aware of it and so forth. I think I may have had a minor role in carrying papers around. I was not directly involved in it.
Q: What was the reaction to the assassination to President Kennedy?

FEATHERSTONE: A great shock. The Japanese thought a great deal of Kennedy because of his youth and his energy. He was a rather dramatic figure to them. Japan is a country that has complete gun control. There are no pistols allowed. You can have a firearm for hunting, but there are no pistols allowed. So, it was quite a shock to them. I think we had a ceremony, a Mass, I believe for his death and a lot of people came to it. There were a lot of Japanese people who came. It had quite an effect on them.

Q: Did the ambassador visit from Tokyo very often?

FEATHERSTONE: Not very often, no. He came down once or twice while I was there.

Q: It was Ambassador Reischauer.

FEATHERSTONE: Ambassador Reischauer was there. I think he came only once while I was there. I saw him very briefly. I didn’t have a lot of contact with him at all. Most of my contact was, of course, with my superiors and people like Owen, who I knew very well. He was also my superior.

ELDEN B. ERICKSON
Economic Officer
Kobe-Osaka (1962-1964)

Elden B. Erickson was born in Kansas in 1919. He served in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army in World War II before joining the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included posts in China, Algeria, Paris, Laos, Japan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Ottawa, and Frankfurt. Erickson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Today is July 9, 1992 and this is the second interview with Elden Erickson. You just said that you went to Kobe-Osaka, where you were from 1962-64. How did that come about, and what were you doing?

ERICKSON: I don't know how it came about, I was just assigned there. The vacancy came up in January, and I was available.

Q: I take it you were considered kind of a Far Eastern hand?

ERICKSON: Yes, I had been in China, Laos and all four years in the Department in the Far East Bureau. I was Economic Officer and Deputy Principal Officer there in those days.

Q: Kobe-Osaka, what was the reason it was there, and what was it dealing in during this period?
ERICKSON: It was the second or first industrial center of Japan. Tokyo/Yokohama was important, but Osaka, also for heavy industry, also ship building, trade, tourism, automobiles.

Q: Your main concern then was industrial reporting?

ERICKSON: Yes. And trade promotion.

Q: Let's talk about trade promotion. In the 1990s, it is probably the biggest bone of contention between Japan and the United States.

ERICKSON: In those days, we had a rather heavy surplus in trade with Japan.

Q: So you weren't being pushed overly hard on it?

ERICKSON: But we did have lots of trade fairs and trade promotion activities, though.

Q: Were you seeing any of the closed economic system that has since developed?

ERICKSON: I think it was always there, but it continued to develop as they wanted to move faster and became more protective as time went along. Administrative management, or whatever they called it, they still had a way of promoting certain products and closing the market to the outside.

Q: What was your impression on what we were reporting back about Japanese industry at that time? How did we see it, and what were our interests at that time?

ERICKSON: Our main interest was exchange and balance of trade. Really, at that time, we were heavily on the credit side, so we wanted Japanese exports to the United States. Not that we didn't want to increase ours, but we wanted more to increase theirs. They didn't feel they were getting a fair shake in our market either. We had some fairly restrictive practices at that time, too -- especially textile quotas and auto parts. We restricted quite a number of things to protect United States industry.

I even felt strongly about it. I did my paper at the Air War College about how we had to be less restrictive....I regretted this later, but at that time, it was not so much the Japanese as it was us.

Q: How did we view the political situation in Japan?

ERICKSON: Well, since the war, it was as stable as it could be. We got along very well security-wise. We were friendly economically, even though the trade balance was not so good. Our relations with the LDP were good.

Q: Liberal Democratic Party, which has been in power since 1948. How about our ties? Was it easy to talk with them?
ERICKSON: Oh, very easy. I know that some people think that the Japanese are difficult to understand, but I found dealing with them was very easy. I felt I could understand them, and they understood me. I think part of it was age. They did not trust really young officers who spoke fluent Japanese. They always wanted to talk to someone older who didn't speak fluent Japanese.

Q: Was it that they felt they were talking to the top?

ERICKSON: It is in their own society, too, the older a person...but often they would say, "I prefer not to speak to your young junior officer."

Q: Were you beginning to feel any impact on the Japanese economy of our involvement in Vietnam, which was just beginning to get started?

ERICKSON: Well, we threw a lot of business to Japan during Vietnam to help the Japanese economy improve.

Q: Was this a period when our involvement was under question?

ERICKSON: No. We really had no serious problems with the Japanese at all during that period. Things were really very smooth.

Q: How about relations with the Embassy. Reischauer was the Ambassador.

ERICKSON: He was very well respected throughout by all elements of Japanese society.

Q: Did you feel his hand at Kobe-Osaka?

ERICKSON: He didn't come down too often to Osaka. I don't think we felt any heavy or light-handedness. He just left us more or less alone, and we functioned independently.

Q: Did you get any impression about the Japanese hands...those who trained in Japan? Were they mostly junior officers?

ERICKSON: Mostly, but they were very bright junior officers. They were really top quality, in my opinion. Bill Clark, one of them, is back now to be Assistant Secretary.

Q: Then you left there in 1964 and attended the Air War College from 1964-65.

RICHARD N. VIETS
Commercial Officer
Tokyo (1962-1965)

Ambassador Richard N. Viets was born in 1930 and raised in Vermont. During his career in the Foreign Service, he served in Afghanistan, Tunisia, Japan, India, Romania, Israel, and was ambassador to Tanzania and Jordan. Charles Stuart
Kennedy conducted this interview in 1990.

Q: You then went to Tokyo. What was the commercial, situation and what were you doing at that time?

VIETS: I was thinking about this the other day because I was at dinner with a distinguished American lawyer who had just come back from a couple of years in Tokyo, and we were trading comments and reminiscences.

In those days, Japan was still in its pre-pubescent period. The Japanese were still very busy copying things. They were already well into the radio and television business, but nobody wanted their cars. The Japanese didn't think much of their cars. I remember bringing an American Ford car there, and crowds would gather around it out in the countryside. It was a cheap American Ford, but it was always greeted with great appreciation.

I have always thought that the threshold of Japan's transition to a mature industrial society really was marked by the Olympics in 1964. It seemed to me from that point onward, the Japanese suddenly demonstrated a self assurance in a societal sense that we hadn't earlier seen. They had labored night and day, seven days a week in Tokyo for several years prior to the Olympics in changing the face of the city. Everything suddenly seemed to come together for the Japanese. They became increasingly important players in the international marketplace. They were becoming more assertive in their relationships with us. They grew up. It was for that reason that it was an especially interesting period to be there.

It was made all the more exciting because we had as our Ambassador one of the more remarkable men I have ever worked for, Edwin O. Reischauer, the famous Japanese/Chinese scholar from Harvard. I think the United States was inordinately fortunate to have him as our principal representative to that country at that period because he was very much a father figure for the Japanese. They paid great heed to his advice and counsel. He was a very wise, exceedingly competent man. I think his contributions to the Japanese transition from a sort of occupation mentality into a more normal relationship with us have never fully been appreciated either by policy makers or by historians.

Q: What were your responsibilities, and how did you see him as he related to the commercial side of things?

VIETS: Unlike almost any of the other politically appointed chiefs of mission that I either worked for or saw at close distance over the ensuing years, there was very little in the Embassy that didn't interest Ambassador Reischauer.

We had established as part of our Embassy operations at that point -- indeed it was one of the reasons I was sent there -- a trade center, where every six weeks we mounted a major exhibition. The center was a display case for American products. I remember that the Ambassador took a very keen interest in that operation. He was always there for openings and often came over to see how things were going, etc.
He was also very much personally involved in negotiations in the economic arena. He, of course, was essentially bilingual in Japanese-English, but he used a very clever device. If he were in a press conference, for example, with Japanese journalists, he used the principal Embassy interpreter to do the English to Japanese portions of the affair. And, you could rest assured there would be several points in the course of this exceedingly proficient interpreter's rendition of what Reischauer had said when the Ambassador would interrupt him in Japanese and say, "Now that is not quite the right shade of meaning that you have given to this, rather it is etc. etc." Of course, the Japanese just loved this because it revealed his inner knowledge of the most refined elements of that very sophisticated language. A remarkable man in many respects.

Q: Working for Commerce at that time, what sort of instructions were you getting?

VIETS: The Commerce Department, I think, was essentially a reflection of the general American attitude toward Japan at that point. That is, Japan was an important potential market for American exports. We were beginning to worry about our trade deficit. My recollection is that in those years, we had a shocking global trade deficit of something like $18-20 billion a year -- we would be on our hands and knees if we could get it down to that today.

So Commerce's view of Japan was almost exclusively focused on exports. I must say it was rinky-dink stuff that Commerce was focusing on. I have no particular respect, looking back on that period, for the competence and vision and foresight of the people in the Department of Commerce or State, for that matter, on what was coming down the pike. I can remember those of us on the commercial staff. We had six or seven American officers -- it was a large establishment -- who were principally devoted to kind of hand holding American businessmen who were visiting Japan for the first time. We were involved in explaining distribution systems and patent office problems and MITI (the Ministry of Industry and Trade) and arranging appointments, etc. There was no real understanding that the Japanese industrial juggernaut was gathering steam and would soon be rolling down the road over everything in front of it.

I do recall, however, working on a major study that Commerce never asked for but we decided we should do, on the fledgling Japanese automobile industry and the potential it had for becoming a major player in the global marketplace. I haven't, of course, read that despatch in many years, but I think we demonstrated surprising foresight in our predictions on what was going to happen. I can remember the study reaching Washington and eliciting guffaws...what were those young guys smoking?

So we had it all wrong. We didn't understand very well. And when I say "we," I am really speaking of the policy makers here. Those of us out there in Tokyo realized what was happening, although perhaps not with all the vision that there should have been.

WALTER NICHOLS
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1962-1969)
Walter Nichols was born in Tokyo in 1919 and was raised in Japan until the age of 15. He attended Harvard University but never completed his degree, accepting a commission in the U.S. Navy just before the outbreak of World War II. Mr. Nichols worked for USIA and the majority of his assignments were in Japan. He was interviewed on October 10th, 1989, by G. Lewis Schmidt.

NICHOLS: Actually it was in about May of 1962 that I went out to Japan again. Oddly enough, I had been assigned much earlier to Kabul in Afghanistan. I had protested that I didn't see what qualifications I had for that because, I, among other things, couldn't speak the language. I was assured that there was nobody in the Agency who could speak the language, so that wasn't a factor at all, and they were sure I'd like the ambassador very much, he was a nice guy and all that sort of thing. So I had finally said, fine, I'll go, and finished reading up on it. I think I had about a week to go before we were scheduled to depart when all of a sudden I was called in and told, no, you're going to Japan as the Cultural Attaché. Apparently what had happened, as I understand it, was that shortly before that time, Reischauer had arrived in Japan as ambassador. I understand that he got a commitment out of Kennedy when he accepted the appointment that he would have a right to try to get as many Japanese speaking people from the Foreign Service as he could get. So he had asked for all the data on all the Foreign Service Officers, what their rankings were, their language ability and so forth. He'd been looking all this over and he had picked certain people to come out because he wanted to reach, he thought originally, something like a 75 percent proficiency in the staff, which of course was absurd and impossible. But he had gradually been latching onto people from this list. I don't know why he picked me, particularly. He didn't pick me for any particular assignment, of course, it was just to get people out here. I wasn't on any FSO list at all but he had jurisdiction in this sense I suppose over the USIS operation, too, as part of his promise, as well as on embassy staff....

Let me make a few comments about being Cultural Attaché. It's a fine title and usually I suppose in most posts it would be something rather interesting. In my case I had a rather curious situation to deal with, so that I can't say that as Cultural Attaché I really functioned in any normal sense. That is to say, first we had Reischauer as the ambassador, and Reischauer being a famous scholar, very well-known in Japan and very culturally oriented, naturally in a way was as much cultural ambassador as he was a political ambassador. So you might say we had a cultural...

Q: When the other tape ran out, you said that first of all you had Reischauer as ambassador, who in effect was a high level cultural officer in himself, and then I think we can go on from there.

NICHOLS: Right. So you might say that he as the ambassador skimmed the cream off the top of whatever a cultural attaché normally handles in the way of contacts with the international community, at least insofar as the academic community was concerned, just by virtue of his title. And next to him was a DCM, Emerson...

Q: Oh, John Emerson.

NICHOLS: John Emerson was there as the DCM. And of course he was, he couldn't compete with Reischauer in language ability but he had certainly had a lot of training in Japanese and a
great interest in culture. So he, too, was very anxious to get himself very much involved in cultural affairs. He of course was several levels above my rank so he skimmed off some of the rest. But in addition to that, our PAO at the time, Burton Fahs, was you might say exclusively a man of culture, former Rockefeller Foundation vice president and a person that had been immersed for years in funding and programming for the Japanese intellectual community, especially the academic community. So there were three very senior officers above my rank in the embassy who were front and center in all sorts of cultural pursuits. So when it came to just strictly cultural representation, I was only required, if you want to put it that way, I was only required to handle the normal chores like going to cut ribbons at department store openings or shows or make speeches at farewell parties or something or attend more low-level affairs. So I was kept very busy in this capacity doing things like that, but none of them really amounted to a great deal. My functions were divided, as I said, between running administratively and programmatically the cultural division of the embassy and the field operation and serving on the other side as sort of the person to appear when required to make speeches on behalf of the embassy, I mean minor things, not major speeches but just congratulatory messages and things like that.

So I was very busy and I was very happy to be kept busy in these ways. But I did not have any major functions to pursue regularly that I myself really participated in except for two areas. One in which I was almost exclusively the activist, let's say, one was the State Department's cultural presentations program, which had in the past been handled by the educational exchange section but now was handled by the cultural attaché, myself. And this involved me in many, many projects like visiting orchestras, visiting ballet companies, visiting modern dance companies, stage attractions and things like that. I even had a lot of fun and a lot of headaches being involved with the first appearance in Japan of a bona fide Broadway musical, "Hello Dolly" starring Mary Martin.

Q: What was that?

NICHOLS: "Hello Dolly" starring Mary Martin.

Q: It was not...

NICHOLS: It wasn't Carol Channing from the Broadway cast, but everything else was the Broadway cast after they closed on Broadway, but with Mary Martin taking the Carol Channing role. And that was the kind of thing I had enjoyed doing. I'm more of a project sort, as you may have guessed from what went on before, I like to be involved with projects. But each of these things that came along had a time frame. I mean, you could plunge into it, get it organized, get the thing functioning and then it would be over and that would be that. This is the kind of thing I like to do and I thought I was reasonably good at, and so I spent a lot of my time on cultural exchange programs of that nature.

But on the more substantive side, I was the one in the embassy who worked on more significant projects in the international conference or discussion field, the seminar field, where we're not talking about groups from the United States coming out and touring around and meeting people and giving lectures and things like that, but where you have an event staged as a conference on
some particular topic with experts from various countries. I worked on this most closely with the Asahi newspaper, because I had very good contacts over there from my activities in the cultural affairs area that I have just mentioned. Because Asahi--at the time, there was no cultural ministry in Japan, the Ministry of Education was not involved in international cultural affairs--so the Asahi newspaper had more or less taken over the role of sponsorship to bring things like French treasures from the Louvre, the Mona Lisa and the Venus de Milo, the Egyptian King Tut exhibit, exhibitions from the Museum of Modern Art in New York and American Museums, so that the chief of their cultural section you might say was my opposite number at the Asahi newspaper. He used to joke and call himself really the cultural minister for the Japanese government, because they were putting up all the money and the Japanese government wasn't putting any money into it.

But because of my connections in the performing arts field, with them, they took on a lot of these things from the State Department. I had a very good in with them and got them to sponsor several big symposia for me. Symposia was the word I was looking for earlier, conferences and everything. The one I think I recall most vividly was a tremendous symposium they had on the economics of Asia, which...

Q: Where would you stage these?

NICHOLS: Well, actually the Asahi Shimbun undertook all the financial sponsorship of this whole thing and they staged it in the premises of the, what is it called? The Economic Federation building, which had adequate facilities for this kind of thing.


NICHOLS: Yes. Keidanren. Right, the Keidanren building. The new building up there north of where the old Tokyo station was. You remember?

Q: Tokyo Eki (station) down there.

NICHOLS: North of that, in that area. This new big building, beautiful building.

Well, I went to them to start with about this idea of having a big symposium on a subject that we thought would be of interest to a lot of people in Japan as well as abroad. The idea was to have distinguished international scholars whom they would invite to participate and we would expect them to invite some American scholars. We would be willing to help in any way we could, for example with grants for the scholars from the United States. We weren't going to subsidize the whole thing, but would help.

They bought this idea. The man who was the director of this cultural section in Asahi at that point fortunately had formerly been for seven years a reporter way back earlier in his career in San Francisco so he was absolutely bilingual, a very intelligent, active person with his feet on the ground, if you know what I mean. Because a lot of people in the cultural field often have rather vague views of lofty things, but he'd been a reporter for seven years in San Francisco and he
knew his way around in business and everything else. So, he was a very functional person with a good background, and he picked this idea up and ran with it.

So we were able to get a tremendous thing organized by them underway. We brought out from the United States the people they wanted. We had one case where rather belatedly we ran into a security question. Can you stop this just one second?

Well, for example, we did have a problem with one of their proposed grantees and believe it or not this was John Kenneth Galbraith. They were adamant about having him come out so they had invited him and then turned around and told us they had invited him so please give him the grant. I had the unfortunate job of sending it in for confirmation and getting a message back saying please tell them no, for security reasons. I absolutely leveled with this man, Mr. Kaji at Asahi, as I always...

Q: You always did?

NICHOLS: Yes. His name was Kaji. K-a-j-i. Director of cultural affairs and planning at Asahi newspaper.

Because I had always found it in the past to have been the best thing to do, I did it this time, too. I was very honest. I went to see Kaji and I said, "Mr. Kaji, you know, you and I understand each other very well and I'm sure you've been around a lot and you understand what I'm going to say when I say it, but I regret very much that I have to say we're not going to be able to finance Mr. Galbraith's participation." And he said, "That's okay, we will." So I said, "Well, I'm delighted to hear that he's going to participate and I hope that this doesn't go beyond this room." He said, "It won't," and as far as I know, it never did. He didn't bat an eye.

Q: I'm surprised that Galbraith would have been turned down by a Kennedy Administration, or was this after Kennedy's death?

NICHOLS: Well, it's very strange. I don't know--I'll never forget this as long as I live. Of all people, John Kenneth Galbraith.

Q: I know he was a bit controversial, but I didn't think he was that controversial. He had been ambassador to India, appointed by Kennedy.

NICHOLS: Yes, I know, it was just unbelievable. You know, who would imagine this? And Kaji sort of looked at me and said, "Really?" I said, "Well, that's what I'm telling you." I couldn't believe it either. And I think I told Reischauer and he couldn't believe it either.

Well, anyway, this all worked out very well and Galbraith did come. As a matter of fact, when he was there, during one of the intermissions he collared me and he said, "Well, Mr. Nichols, I hope you don't mind if I make an inquiry about something quite different than what we're discussing here. Tell me honestly, do you think that Ambassador Reischauer would make a good Secretary of State, in the new Kennedy Administration?" Well, I won't go into all of what I said, but I did say, "Well, maybe yes, maybe no. But I'd come down on the no side simply because while he's a
very fine man and a great scholar, I don't think he's really much of an administrator. Not that he'd have to be an administrator in that role necessarily, but I think he's more academic than functional." He said, "Well, you should know, I just was asking because we are thinking of running him, we're thinking of putting him in as Secretary of State and we're just trying to get different opinions. I hope that doesn't get around anywhere."

But in general, Lew, in those years between 1962 when I got there and 1969 when I finally left and then resigned when I got home, it was just one project like this after another. This series of lectures with--this symposium with Asahi was so successful that they undertook to do about three or four others with us, some of them not only in Tokyo but down in Kyoto for example. "Man In the City" was one, which was about city planning. We had the mayor of Boston who was very prominent in that field at the time and several American experts that we'd brought out, and experts from Europe and England and Southeast Asia, people like that. It was a big symposium on where were we going in planning for man in the city, environmental problems and so forth.

Q: I suppose that with Asahi sponsoring it, you got all sorts of publicity on these things.

NICHOLS: Oh yes. There's a plus and a minus in a case like this. When a newspaper like Asahi sponsors something like this, the other papers don't touch it. They try to get interviews with the people on the side, but never mention the symposium. And if they succeed in getting interviews on the side with these people, they publish them because they're famous people. But what you do gain is guaranteed front page and full page coverage. Every one of these things, because of the stature of the people who showed up from other places, like the man from the Philippines was the cultural man at the United Nations and then the cultural--what was his name? He died recently. At the UN. He was at the UN for many years. The education Minister for the Philippines at the time of the symposium. Well, anyway. Romulo, it wasn't Romulo. Well, anyway. Whatever it was. It was people of that level, and from Australia and other places.

So that what you do get is front page coverage of this symposium because of its sponsorship. And then also coverage in depth. And even printing of the speeches in sheet after sheet of the newspapers and the inside sections of the newspaper that has the largest circulation. It's like putting all your eggs in one basket, but it's a pretty big basket, and it was the one basket that carries the most intellectual weight. I don't know if you know, but the newspapers are sort of tagged. Asahi is considered the intellectuals' newspaper, or the academicians' newspaper; the Mainichi is considered sort of more on the business side and the down-to-earth news side; and Yomiuri is more sort of like sports and activities side.

Q: Then you've got the Nihon Keizai.

NICHOLS: Nihon Keizai of course is like the Wall Street Journal, so that's a special paper with a very small circulation, compared to millions. You know, the morning edition of the Asahi alone is something like 12 million. Then they have the evening edition, and then other editions and the specialties, too. So you hit a tremendous audience with just that one sponsorship. But you can't have them all. That's the way it works. We did do some with the other papers, too, but none that were as prestigious. Once you start a series like this with a paper, they like to carry it on. And in
every case it's like pulling teeth to get it going with a new sponsor because they haven't been through the drill.

We even had one on, I've forgotten what it was on, the subject matter, but we initiated this thing that's now very common in Japan, we got a very famous Harvard man--at the time, he was at Yale, then he went to Harvard--sociologist. I'm trying to think. But anyway, he was supposed to come to the symposium sponsored by Asahi in Tokyo and he was the key man, he was the most famous of the participants who were going to attend, and he couldn't attend at the last minute because of some physical ailment. At the very last minute. And they were horrified. But he was living in New York at the time. We arranged for him to go to the Voice of America studios in New York--this was the middle of the night New York time--and during the symposium in Tokyo he appeared three times, first giving his own talk simultaneously translated locally by the interpreter. So he spoke initially with his set presentation; then twice, two other times to answer questions, in the question and answer series where the people there could ask him about his presentation and other things that had been said by other speakers. So he was participating in absentia.

Q: Was this on radio or on television?

NICHOLS: This was in the conference call.

Q: No, but I mean he was in New York.

NICHOLS: He was in New York.

Q: I mean, was this transmission to Tokyo just a radio transmission?

NICHOLS: I think it was by phone, by telephone line.

Q: They hadn't reached the point of projecting a television...

NICHOLS: I'm trying... No, no, it wasn't visual. But it was very clear, and this was the first time that this had ever been tried so of course they wrote that up as a "first". You know what I mean, big news. Anyway, I'll think of that, too, later.

But this kind of thing was famous. Every time we did something like this there were new wrinkles, very intriguing things. Also we in these symposia really were the first people with Asahi to subsidize simultaneous interpretation at these conferences. The International Cultural Conference got its start really working for these symposia. The very first one they ever did was sponsored by Asahi with us. Of course, now they cover all sorts of things, tremendous.

That was the kind of thing I was doing. But again, there's nothing you can put your finger on like this is what I was doing consistently. It was administrative in the sense of division chief, and all the speech writing, reports and budget.

Q: But the idea, you were the one who approached Asahi with this concept.
NICHOLS: Oh, yes. Yes, that's right, yes, that's right. I found that I had--and this is very interesting, because Ed Nickel was PAO at the time there, and Ed I've known quite well for a long time and he knew my track record, you might say, the family man and so forth. So he was going to give me absolutely Carte blanche. If I'd say, Ed, I'd like to go and talk to these people about this, I'm going to take this kind of risk, he'd say, go ahead. You've got my okay for that, no problem. So I never had anybody, sniffing around saying, what the hell are you doing, and trying to pull the rug out from under me. I took some risks sometimes as I did like going back and talking to this Asahi guy about Galbraith. My conviction was that if you got to know these people well enough, you could really level with them and they were pretty good about observing mutual agreements about what should be said and shouldn't be said. Nobody ever pulled a trap on me, anyway.

WILLIAM CLARK, JR.
Economic Officer
Kobe-Osaka (1963-1965)

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. Ambassador Clark's career included posts in Sierra Leone, Japan, South Korea, Egypt, and India. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.

CLARK: As I said, in 1963, we were assigned to Osaka. I was there as an economic officer, principally to follow the textile industry. I became an economic officer because that happened to be the vacancy then available. I think the "cone" concept was developed while I was in Osaka and because of my assignment, I became an "economic" officer in the Foreign Service system. My degree, eight years earlier, was in social sciences and that meant that I had split my courses between economics and political science. So I had some academic acquaintance with the "dismal science". The Consulate General in 1963 was quite large -- much larger than it is now. It had two offices -- one in Kobe and one in Osaka. It covered several prefectures in the southern part of Honshu and all of Shikoku. We also had establishments in Nagoya and Fukuoka. We must have had twenty Americans in the CG. There were also USIA offices in Kobe, Osaka and Kyoto as well as some CIA representation.

Osaka was the center of Japan's textile industry, primarily cotton. The Spinners' Association was headquartered in Osaka and so was the Cotton Traders Association. The latter represented the cotton buyers whose purchases were spun by the members of the Spinners' Association. I learned to become a diplomat. In the morning, I would go to the Spinners and urge them to reduce the amount of textiles they were exporting to the United States; in the afternoon, I would go to Traders and urge them to increase their purchases of cotton in the United States. Being able to do both with equal fervor made for a good diplomat.

Even in 1963, we had concern about trade with Japan, particularly in the textile areas. We still had a trade surplus in Japan, but in the cotton area, we had to push for greater sales because we were still growing more in the US then the world was using. It was just being warehoused and
we were instructed to sell as much as we could possibly do. Before I was assigned to Osaka, the continuing large amounts of textile exports to the US finally required that a treaty be negotiated between the two countries. That first agreement was rather simple compared with the current multi-fiber agreement; it only covered cotton textiles, for example.

I monitored other goods as well. I used to go to Tokyo to talk to the baseball gloves manufacturers. I would ask them also to restrain their exports to the US. I made that pitch until Spaulding stopped manufacturing gloves in the US; then we didn't care about Japanese production and exports. We needed the Japanese to make the goods needed to play our national game! I also followed the steel industry. Sumitomo Metal Company had a continuous metal casting process which I believe they had bought from the Soviet Union. There were three different casting processes in the world at the time. It took me two months to convince the Japanese that I wasn't an engineer who would make detailed reports to their American competitors. Finally, the company agreed to give me a tour of the mill which I found very interesting. For several years thereafter, I used to ask American manufacturers why we didn't use a continuing casting process. They said they had other means which were easier to use. They may have been easier but they were not as efficient and cheap. It has now changed, but it took a long time for the American manufacturers to catch up. So I became interested in a number of commercial enterprises on which I used to report regularly.

By 1963, Japan had recovered to a considerable extent from the War. There were some areas which still bore the scars, like the area in front of the main railroad station in Osaka. In that area where some flimsy building all occupied by squatters. They were booksellers who wouldn't move and the government couldn't figure out how to get them out. If a fire burned a building down, by the next day, it was put back up again. We did a survey of Osaka looking for space for an office building so that we could abandon our offices in Kobe. We found that the land then occupied by the squatters by the railroad station was more valuable than any footage in Manhattan. So even thirty years ago, land in Japan was extraordinarily expensive. However, in the early 80's, I did cut a ribbon opening our new building in Osaka.

There were other reminders of the war. Across the C.G. building in Kobe, lived some Korean refugees who had become squatters. Many of them had been brought to Japan during the war. But in general, the standard of living was on the rise. Covered arcades could be seen. Shopping was inexpensive for us because the exchange rate was 360:1. A bowl of noodles cost 80 yen. A lot of the infrastructure that we take for granted, like sewers, had not yet been constructed, particularly in the rural areas. But you could notice that Japan was about to enter a modern era. There were big buildings, but they were still flimsily constructed. The maintenance left something to be desired. However, we found living conditions quite adequate particularly when compared to what we were used to in Africa.

The Japanese did not show any resentment toward Americans. No one ever castigate us for the war. They were especially pleased if you tried to speak Japanese with them. As Mark Twain noted, it wasn't important if you spoke well; the important thing was that you spoke at all. So I used my Japanese all the time.

During the Osaka tour, we lived in a U.S. government-owned compound behind the Consulate
General building in Kobe. We had a one-bedroom apartment. We all commuted to Osaka. The Consul General had a home between Osaka and Kobe, where we now have housing for our staff. We have closed the office in Kobe. Kobe and Osaka were essentially one city, but two very distinct communities. Kobe was where the foreigners lived. It was the port with the trading houses, the golf course, the country club. Osaka saw itself as Japan's real commercial center, although Tokyo was clearly becoming the center even in the mid-60's. Osakans compared themselves to New Yorkers and Tokyo to Washington, but that was just not the case. Osaka is still an important commercial center, but certainly not the main one.

There were many representatives of other countries in Kobe-Osaka, mostly in Kobe.

My colleagues in the economic-commercial section followed other commodities and products. We fulfilled the requirements of the world trade directories. We all submitted special reports on the trade that we were following. We traveled around reporting on the firms we had visited. At that time, end-user checks were still required. That is, the U.S. government was interested in making sure that items sold under the foreign military sales program were being used for the purposes intended and had not been diverted to other programs or even worst, exports to third countries, especially communist ones. We would go to see what happened to surplus brass that we sold; the buyer of course often could not trace precisely what had happened to his procurement. As long as he didn't export, we didn't worry too much.

Kobe was a nice small city which had been damaged in the war as had most of Japan. Being a major port, Kobe was subject to bombing, although it had not been hit as heavily as Osaka. I have always assumed that Kobe was spared to some degree because it had a high concentration of foreigners living there, although I have no documentation to substantiate that thesis. It had not recovered as fully as some other cities had. It was falling behind in terms of importance and influence. Yet it was a more comfortable city to live in than Osaka. It was more international and had been so historically since it was a port for a lot of foreign vessels. An American ran a restaurant called The Texas on the main street of Kobe. It was a pre-war restaurant which had been operated by non Japanese for a long, long time. There were other foreigners living in Kobe who owned and operated businesses. They all gathered at The Texas at lunch time, rolling dice. I always wondered what they did in the afternoon -- probably slept!

There was a sizeable foreign representation in Kobe-Osaka, mostly in Kobe. Our Consulate General had been built in Kobe and was an award-winning structure. It was a two story building over-looking a fish-pond. It was a beautiful design, all glass -- something you wouldn't dare design in today's security conscious atmosphere. It was also an easy building to work. That did create a small problem because the C.G. had a beautiful office with private bathroom overlooking the port. He didn't like to leave those surroundings for his office in Osaka. The consular operations were principally in Kobe as were the administrative ones. Two political officers and the six of us in the economic-commercial section were in Osaka.

The political reporting, which then consisted primarily of memoranda and despatches, went to Tokyo. The trade directory reports went directly to Washington as did most of the other commodity reports. Embassy officers would come to Kobe-Osaka from time to time to discuss our findings and views. The Economic Minister came. The Embassy people traveled perhaps
even more than they do today. The Reischauers came a couple of times; they liked to travel.

The social life was active. Our friends were either Japanese or Westerns who spoke Japanese. One of our friends was a young Episcopalian minister, Ed Browning, who together with his wife lived in Kobe to study the language. I later met them again in Okinawa where he was the Bishop. After reversion, he was sent to Europe as a roving Bishop and now he is the presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church.

I had an interesting tour in Kobe-Osaka. I learned a lot about the Foreign Service. My first boss, as I mentioned, was Owen Zurhellen. He used to scare people; he growled at them. I just growled back. In those days, we used non-professional couriers to carry the mail back and forth from Tokyo. Our CG would do it for three weeks out of a month and the CG in Nagoya would service all of us one week per month. One time, Zurhellen was having a fight with his administrative officer and I wasn’t aware of it. I was meeting with him alone; a phone call came in and the Japanese operator put me on because she wasn’t going to ask the C.G. to answer it. It was an employee of the Nagoya C.G. saying that he was at the station waiting for someone to pick up the pouch that he had brought with him from Tokyo. He wanted to know what he should do. I reported the conversation and asked Zurhellen what I should tell the courier. He looked up from his desk and said: "Bill, are you in administration? If not, tell the courier to come to the office". The courier arrived and we waited for a half-hour. Finally, I went back to Zurhellen’s office to tell him that the courier was cooling his heels waiting. I asked what I should do with him. Zurhellen said: "Didn’t I ask you before whether you were in the administrative section?". So I walked out. A few minutes later, Zurhellen came out of his office and took the Nagoya courier out for lunch. Later in the afternoon, I told Zurhellen that perhaps I had been out of line, but that I didn’t want our office to look as stupid as it did in those circumstances. No one else would have talked to Zurhellen as I did, but because I did, we got along quite well.

The C.G. who followed Zurhellen was one of the more insecure people I have ever known. He was an old Japan hand, but had had some rough spots in his career that he attributed to the malice of others. He thought that all of his staff were hell-bent on acting like the Consul General. It was nonsense in any case, but especially for a post in Japan where everybody was always concerned with their position in society making sure that one never operated at a level higher than one’s position. It turned out that I became the only officer on the staff that he would talk to. When I was assigned as Consul in Sapporo, this CG asked whether I would stay to manage the Kobe office. I told him I would think about it, although I was sure that I wanted to move to a post of my own. I think the CG wanted me stay because he had come to realize that I was not going to sabotage him. So the experiences in Kobe-Osaka were very useful because I learned a lot about people and management.

There was a definite effort on the part of the Japanese to do things that today would not be acceptable. For example, the Governor of Osaka had a mushroom-hunting party in the Fall; he hosted another event in the Summer. Everyone was being very hospitable. Today, that is just not done; it would be too expensive and questions would be raised why all these resources were being spent on the consular corps. During that period, Japan was seen as needing the help of the foreign community. Much of the Japanese public relations effort were concentrated on the question of how foreigners’ attention could be focused on development of their locality, even
though the plans were not necessarily adequately considered. But all the Japanese were thinking about this issue with each city or prefecture competing for attention. The Japanese would build the necessary infrastructure and then seek foreign investment for plants and other economic development projects. Not many Americans built in Japan, but that was not because the Japanese weren't trying very hard. The Consulate General, although not involved in encouraging investment, did survey its district and reported on what the Japanese were doing and what kinds of investments they were seeking. I am not sure that anyone ever read any of these reports, but we did write them.

Q: In this period -- 1961-68 -- were there any visible indicators which might have presaged the major industrial revolution which subsequently transformed Japan?

CLARK: Quite clearly. The first sign that caught attention were the developments that were taking place in preparation for the 1964 Olympics. While I was at language school for two years, the Japanese were building the ring roads around Tokyo. They also built a high speed highway between Tokyo and Osaka. They built a monorail to the airport. The Japanese were very proud of these infrastructures because it made them feel that they were entering the "modern" world. Of course, by this time, Sony was already the preeminent producer of transistor radios, but that was not a major achievement. I remember talking one evening to Akio Morito at the Ambassador's residence -- language officers were brought to the residence for parties to serve as interpreters, to greet Japanese guests and introduce them to the Ambassador -- a practice that has since ceased. Morito said that his company was developing a tape recorder for television; he thought that it would be an attractive product. I asked what the price might be. He said that he thought it would probably sell for $300, which in those days was a handsome amount. I expressed the view that I thought that at that price, the market might be limited; that episode clearly show why I stayed a bureaucrat and Morito became a famous industrialist. It was clear in the early 1960s that the Japanese were planning to become a major player in the world's economy.

That Morito story is an illustration also that Japan is a society which has an amazing amount of access. It was true in the early 1960s; it is still true today. Even as a young officer, I would talk to the Finance Minister at the residence. He was delighted to talk to someone who spoke Japanese; he did not mind talking to someone considerably his junior both in rank and age. Even then, I could always talk to senior political officials; that is still true today. Junior officers from the Embassy can still visit with Diet members; that would not be possible in Washington. The key was the ability to speak Japanese. We had far better access than, for example, young Japanese unless they were from the member's district. Japanese are much more accommodating for face-to-face meetings than Americans. They make time for these discussions. It is just more important in their culture to have such sessions than it would be for us. This approach was perhaps more prevalent in the 1960s than today, but it is still practiced today. I had a lot of access even as a younger officer; some of those contacts I have maintained through the years. We have matured together.

As I said, the Olympics was the first major Japanese effort to modernize itself. The Japanese have an elaborate tax structure which permits them to collect revenues and redistribute them. It is called kofuze (the redistribution tax). It is based on that old philosophy which taxes those who are able to pay and allocated those resources to those who need them. That spread resources
around the country. That gave the Japanese government an opportunity to target development. The Tokyo Olympics served as a rationale for upgrading traffic flow in the Tokyo area and to other cities, both roads and trains -- the bullet train. The next great event was the 1970 International Exhibition in Osaka. That was used to build more transportation systems and other infrastructure projects. Then came the Winter Olympics in Sapporo, which people there said they would never host again. But it got them a new subway system and new roads and other facilities. This approach to development is one of the reasons for Japanese disappointment when Seoul was designated as the host for the 1988 Olympics; they had hoped that Nagoya would be chosen so that it could join the list of cities that had enjoyed infrastructure development. Japan used these major events as rationales for economic development. It happened when Okinawa was returned to Japan. They build an ocean exhibit and then roads and other transportation projects so that visitors could reach the site. Major events of the kind I have mentioned permits the government to spend resources disproportionally to certain areas, which would not have happened otherwise to the same degree. The event was the excuse for a major economic development effort. Without the event the government would be accused of favoritism.

There were other signs in the early 1960s of Japan's future as an economic giant. It was at about this time that Toyota exported its first car to the U.S. It was a car that worked relatively satisfactorily on Japanese roads of the day which didn't go very far nor could they accommodate much speed. When the same car traveled on US roads, it was different story: it blew up, as the Renaults did. There were enough Japanese that knew something about the rest of the world, but certainly not nearly as many as today. But as a society it reads voraciously. That doesn't mean that all had an accurate picture of the world, but they certainly tried their best. They were always interested in the US. I used to get many questions about the US. As many other Americans, I used to run into people who had studied the US in minute detail and who had some minute fact that they wished to check. It didn't occur to them that I might not know everything about the US! The Japanese were very interested in learning English. It has been true for a long time that wives of American officials could make a very reasonable income from teaching English; some could make more than their husbands if they were willing to work long hours. Some of that is still true today. In the 1960s and 1970s, school children would invariably approach us just to say "Hello". Today, that doesn't happen anymore because everyone expects them to know that word of English and many more. They didn't go as far as some others Asians in touching a Westerner, particularly one with blond hair. But they would point to you and say "Gashinda" (foreigner) partly because in the 1960s the school children didn't see that many foreigners -- even in Tokyo. Today, that is not done very often. I remember one day when Judith and I went by boat to Shikoku. It was a hazy day and we sat on the top deck. She is red-haired and light skinned. By the time we got to Shikoku, she was glowing red. That attracted a crowd of kids who followed us around; she was the original red-haired barbarian. They were amazed!

MARSHALL GREEN
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Washington, DC (1963-1965)

*Ambassador Marshall Green was born in 1916 in Holyoke, Massachusetts. He*
GREEN: I came back to Washington in 1963 to be Deputy Assistant Secretary, basically to take a long, hard look at China policy. However, after President Kennedy was assassinated [in 1963], it was clear that we couldn't get some of our major proposals through our government, although we almost got liberalization of travel to all countries, removing any restrictions on travel. However, ARA [Bureau of American Republic Affairs], claimed that this would upset their understandings with the Organization of American States. So we never got that one through. Meanwhile, Vietnam was increasingly taking up everybody's time.

During this period from 1963 to 1965 when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, my concerns with Japan were really quite secondary. In fact, it's rather hard for me to remember some of the things that we did at that time.

I remember one meeting we had at the Chiefs of Mission Conference in 1971 in Baguio [Philippines], where Armin Meyer, our Ambassador to Tokyo, made a very "upbeat" presentation on Japan. It certainly pictured Japan as our most important partner in the world. Our Ambassador in Korea, Bill Porter, really "savaged" Ambassador Meyer on that. He made a long, fairly sarcastic and sometimes humorous reply to Armin Meyer, asking what the Japanese were doing for us. What burdens were they carrying? What is their attitude toward the world and toward Korea -- which had been the object of Japanese contempt for a long time. Ambassador Porter was speaking like a Korean.

Q: But in a way, isn't there a considerable kernel of truth in this? In the case of those two countries, China and Japan, haven't we had something of a "love-hate" relationship? But the "love" relationship gets more involved. It strikes me that we really weren't asking much of Japan.

GREEN: No, we weren't asking much of Japan. We could see that Japan was going to be terribly important in the future. Its GNP was rising very rapidly with growth rates running around 9% a year. Japan loomed as the major contributor to economic development support programs for East Asia and even for Africa and other parts of the world. We saw Japan in those terms.

During these years we also developed closer contacts with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. When I was Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bill Bundy [the Assistant Secretary] had meetings quite often with the Japanese. That was a system which I carried on later. In fact, during Bill Bundy's tenure as Assistant Secretary, I was more or less the person representing the Bureau of East Asian Affairs on all issues relating to Northeast Asia, because he was so involved with Vietnam and Southeast Asia. I was virtually the Assistant Secretary for Northeast Asia, as he was for Southeast Asia, except when he would go on a trip, I would have to take over his problems, and vice versa. He and I were a very close team. We had gone to school and college together and traveled to Europe together between our graduation from Groton and arrival at Yale. So we knew each other very well.
I would say that there was a lot of forward motion in Northeast Asia during that period. The growth figures, of course, would show that. While we felt that Japan could do more to help developing countries, its "rate of donations" was greatly improved over what it had been earlier on. We were grateful for that. Furthermore, on the diplomatic side Japan was eager to play a more active economic and developmental role in all parts of the world, including in Afro-Asian affairs. As I was to find out in Indonesia, Japan was able to help out in these aid donor groups. Japan was "coming of age" -- that's all, though it had a ways to go.

We had these annual meetings with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. I remember attending one such meeting during this period in Williamsburg, VA. I also went to Japan as the chief of our delegation to a meeting with the Japanese up in Miyanoshita, near Mt. Fuji. We and our Japanese Foreign Office counterparts felt that we had a common stake in the world, with the US coming to depend more and more on Japan, particularly in economic terms. We also saw advantages for all concerned in the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, because it provided a kind of protection for everybody, including, paradoxically, China and Russia. So the Japan-America relationship was highly "stabilizing" in that part of the world.

Q: In some countries you can talk to the Foreign Ministry, but they just don't play any significant role in their government. There is a sort of "disconnect" involved. With Japan did you find that the Foreign Ministry played a strong role, as did the State Department, with some exceptions, in our government regarding foreign policy?

GREEN: The officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry were very important within the Japanese Government because, first of all, the ministry contained many of Japan's elite. They were extremely well educated. They had good foreign connections, with Japan heavily dependent on other countries, both politically and, of course, economically. The problems we had with Japan at that time were not so much directly with Japan. They were largely subjected to third countries problems.

Japan was worried about our relationship with China. They were worried about our relationship with Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam. They were worried that the United States was going to draw Japan into "dicey" situations. When they read about how our Congress and Washington in general behaved, they weren't always sure that we would act sensibly in crises. If we did wrong or guessed wrong, Japan would be drawn into the vortex. So these are the kinds of things that bothered the Japanese.

Q: Could you "allay" these concerns at all?

GREEN: Yes, we allayed them by consultations -- real consultations. Before we did anything, we made a practice of letting them know. We would try to get their agreement. That's how this whole question came up of not having gained their support when President Nixon went to China. This was such a major irritant in our relationship, because we'd been telling the Japanese, year after year, to stay with us on the Chinese representation issue. They did. They "played ball" with us, though they were very anxious to trade with China. We advised them to "go easy" and so forth. So we had a staying hand on their wrist. And all of a sudden, without telling them, we got to Peking first.
Q: This was when you were Assistant Secretary?

GREEN: I was Assistant Secretary. We'll come back to that, of course. I've been jumping ahead. I was simply trying to say that the whole question of consultations developed during the period we're talking about -- 1963 to 1965. This was part of the formative period in the consultations process.

Q: When you were Deputy Assistant Secretary, what was your feeling about President Johnson's interest in Japan?

GREEN: I'm not sure whether I remember much about President Johnson's interest in Japan. I don't remember his being that much concerned with Japan.

Q: Well, that's an answer.

GREEN: I remember talking with President Johnson about Indonesia and about how important Japan was as the principal economic supporter of Indonesia. I also told him that I consulted with my Japanese colleagues, whom I'd known very well. This became kind of a way to "get through" to Sukarno. Sukarno's Japanese wife was a close friend of the Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia, who then introduced me to her. Of course, LBJ was primarily concerned with our growing involvement in the wars in Indochina, and he must have become aware of the fact that any heavy bombing of Asians in Southwest Asia was likely to be deeply disturbing to Asians elsewhere, including Japan. The Japanese government cooperated with us in not raising major obstacles to our military operations in Indochina, but they did this with many reservations and considerable reluctance.

Q: There were those who felt that there was a certain amount of racism in that situation.

GREEN: That's right.

RICHARD J. SMITH
Vice Consul
Nagoya (1963-1965)

Richard J. Smith was born in Connecticut in 1932. He graduated from the University of Connecticut in 1955. He served in the U.S. Coast Guard from 1954 to 1958 and entered the Foreign Service in 1962. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Smith served in Japan, Sweden, Canada, Germany, Poland, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Malta. He was interviewed on July 30, 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Now, were you slated to be a Japanese language officer or was this sort of familiarization.
SMITH: It was more familiarization. It was the short six-month course. It was enough to do a lot of good during the two years we spent in Japan. The Japanese are extremely appreciative even if you're doing a hatchet job on their language, as long as you're trying.

During my two years at the Nagoya consulate, I was in the central complement program. In this program you spent four or five months in each of several areas, including the administrative, consular, economic, and political sections. The United States had the only consulate in Nagoya. All of the other countries covered Nagoya out of Kobe or Osaka. We were in a very nice situation because we had the attention of the Governor and the Mayor. We didn't have any competition and were a fairly small post. There were about five or six officers there.

Q: During this period, you were there from '63 to '65, how were relations with Japan?

SMITH: They were quite good. Ambassador Reischauer had arrived by then. Douglas MacArthur II had a rough ride as ambassador in the early 1960s, and there was a lot of tension in the relationship. But after Reischauer had been there a little while, under the Kennedy Administration, the relationship became something of a love-in. His wife was Japanese, descended from a noble family. He was viewed correctly as a great scholar of Japan and Japanese history, and he was a wonderful man.

The few dealings I had with him were memorable. He came down to Nagoya a couple of times, including once when I was putting together a labor exchange team. I'd brought the team in to talk to him, and he spoke to them in English, using an interpreter even though he was one of the best American speakers of Japanese. He said afterwards that when you get into serious business, you want to be very careful even if you think you know Japanese, because there are a lot of nuances that a non-native speaker may not be sensitive to. I remember an incident that exemplified the spirit of the man. We were walking out of the consulate, and some Japanese were crowded around the entrance. Reischauer walked down the steps and over to them. He reached into the crowd, removed a lens cap from somebody's camera, and said, "You'd better take this off." He was always aware of his surroundings and had an almost Zen-like calmness about him.

Q: What were our economic concerns in the area? Where there any at that time?

SMITH: Yes, certainly in the Nagoya consular district. If it had been a country, it would have been America's sixth largest trading partner. The special steel industries and much of the automobile industry were located there. I remember going to the Toyota plant, when Toyotas weren't so well known in the United States, and thinking that this was a remarkable product and that we were going to hear more about these cars. The textile industries and the fine china companies, such as Noritake, were also located there. So we had a huge economic interest and a very high level of trade between US companies and Aichi Prefecture, of which Nagoya is the capital.

Q: As a former Commerce officer sitting there in the '63 to '65 period, did you have any disquiet or was there any within our establishment about Japanese trade with the United States?

SMITH: No. At that point we were holding our own in our trade with Japan. We were just
looking to open and expand trade in both directions. The kind of issues that we face now had not yet arisen.

Q: How did the assassination of President Kennedy hit Nagoya?

SMITH: Like a ton of bricks. I guess everyone remembers when that happened, where they were and all. I recall working in the consulate and getting that message. We put up a picture of President Kennedy, and the crowds just swarmed in to pay their respects. The Japanese felt about him like they did about Ambassador Reischauer. There was a tremendous response. It was a shattering experience, not just for the Americans but clearly for the Japanese, too.

JOHN E. KELLEY
Economic Officer
Tokyo (1963-1965)

Japanese Language training
Yokohama (1965-1966)

Consular Officer
Fukuoka (1966-1969)

John E. Kelley was born in California in 1936 and raised in Washington, DC. He attended Pasadena City College and the University of Virginia. He then went to Hawaii with the Weather Service and joined the Coast Guard, receiving a degree in government from the University of Hawaii. Mr. Kelley later obtained a master’s degree in international relations of Northeast Asia from American University. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Kelley served in Korea, Portugal, and Australia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 21, 1996.

Q: What was your first assignment?

KELLEY: I was in Tokyo, surprisingly enough, since I had Japanese.

Q: When did you go to Tokyo?

KELLEY: I got there in 1963.

Q: How long were you there?

KELLEY: I spent two years there, from 1963 to 1965.

Q: What was your job when you went to Tokyo?

KELLEY: I was just a trainee, a rotational officer. I started off in the economic section, then I
rotated around among various sections. At the end I was sent back to the economic section because that was the year that they had the first of the U.S./Japan Cabinet meetings. Since I had experience in the economic section the guys thought that I could be of help to them and they sent me back there to help organize the conference.

Q: Let's talk a bit about when you were in Japan. Who was the Ambassador then?

KELLEY: Ed Reischauer was the Ambassador at that time.

Q: Did you have any contact with him, or was he pretty far off?

KELLEY: I had a lot of contact with him, and that's the way I thought it was supposed to be. Maybe at the time I was spoiled by the experience, but he was very approachable. For a Junior Officer I thought that I had quite a bit of contact with him. He came over to my house for a function that I held for some young people. I was invited to things at his residence even though I was the most junior of the Juniors, Christmas things and other functions of that kind. I think he was a very personable, very outgoing, kind of guy, who really made a terrific effort to reach out the young people on the staff. To everybody on the staff as far as I could tell.

Q: What would you say was sort of the political economic situation in Japan during 1963 to 1965?

KELLEY: Actually I stayed in Japan until 1969, I just wasn't in Tokyo for that time. But for that beginning period, the Japanese were as they continue to be, they were highly protectionist. They were still struggling with their reputation for producing shoddy goods and that sort of thing. They were pushing very hard to get their merchandise exported and protecting their markets for all they were worth. It was a very difficult time for us, I felt at that time because the Japanese were capable of retaliating against any American company which would try to get the U.S. Government involved to help it get a better access to the market. With the kind of fear that they instilled into the American companies, we could get no cooperation from American companies and we really couldn't push for opening up the market. Of course the security relationship was totally dominant at the time, so it was a not a very good atmosphere for making any kind of progress in the trade area.

Q: When you say that the Japanese would get back at any firm, how would this happen? Can you sort of explain how this would work?

KELLEY: I'm not the best person to answer that because being a Junior Officer at the time and not an Economic Officer, I didn't get to sit in on any of the meetings with American companies at which they would try to get us to help them without providing us any information. But I talked to my colleagues and the word that was coming through from the American companies was that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry could step in and hold up any applications they might be making for entering into any kind of partnership with a Japanese company, for example. They could make it very difficult for them to do business in Japan -- for example refusing permission they might need to open branches. At that time, opening branches was almost unheard of, and permission just to enter into any kind of agreement or partnership with a
Japanese company could be denied. The problem Kodak is having is illustrative. That problem began in the early '60s, and is still going on. The Japanese government refused to allow Kodak to open a distribution system in Japan, to protect Fuji Film. I don't know what tactics they're using now, but their objective is clearly unchanged.

Q: *For what you were getting, and granted you were kind of off to one side, but the thing was that the U.S. Government was almost going along with this and saying "Let's not make cases of this?"*

KELLEY: No, quite the contrary. We were trying to make cases and we couldn't get any U.S. companies to allow us to use their names as examples of protectionism because the companies involved feared retaliation. Without being able to be specific the Japanese would just stonewall us. As I said, the security relationship was really paramount. The U.S. Government as a whole was not willing to put pressure on the Japanese, absent a good defensible case.

Q: *Did you have much contact with Japanese officials, at your level?*

KELLEY: Most of the contact I had, interesting enough, was through my own private arrangements. I taught English to officials at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. I developed a lot of friends through that, and actually there was a certain sense of obligation, as you know that sets up between the Japanese and their teachers. So they were very open with me and helpful with me about a lot of things about how they worked. We wouldn't get into policy a lot, but I did learn a lot about how they functioned.

Q: *What was your impression about how the system functions, say in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)?*

KELLEY: The main things that I talked about would be careers and how they would advance. What kind of requirements they had for getting ahead and that sort of thing. What the relationships were with their superiors. Also how MITI ranked in the pecking order among the agencies, how much influence the Ministry itself had, how it exercised its influence. The feedback that I got was that they could exercise their influence through the political parties and the Ministers because they were controllers of the information that the Ministers needed to do their jobs. They would work these incredible hours, they were very responsive to the Ministers on one hand, (and they spent endless hours briefing these people) and on the other hand they would craft policies which they would then without great difficulty be able to sell to the Ministers. They were able to maintain great consistency of policy and control over policy by virtue of their control of their information.

Q: *What was your impression of the people that you knew who were learning English?*

KELLEY: Extremely bright, very bright guys. Very inquisitive minds, outgoing, hardworking, and very likeable. I didn't run into a single person that I thought was a difficult case that would hard to deal with. I'm sure they could be if I were negotiating with them, but in the way I dealt with them they were extremely outgoing.
Q: What was the impression at the Embassy of the Japanese economy? We're talking about what seems like a far gone era, I guess, in the early 1960's.

KELLEY: It was already pretty clear at that time that the Japanese were a powerhouse on the make. It was our impression that we needed to give more recognition to their potential and their status as an important economic power despite their inability to do anything of an offensive nature, or an overseas nature in the military field. We wanted to reward both their willingness to keep their military under control and not to be a threat and their willingness to try to be as helpful economically to us as they could within the incredible constraints imposed by the constitution in other parts of the world. When I say an economic sense, I mean in using some of their economic power to advance our mutual security interests.

Q: I take it that the men, was it all men that you were dealing with in those days?

KELLEY: Exclusively, yes.

Q: Were they inquisitive about our Foreign Service and how we thought it worked?

KELLEY: Yes, they were. They would ask all kinds of questions. They were mainly interested in the mundane aspects of how we operated rather than policy - how our assignments worked, our living conditions, those sorts of things. They wanted to learn as much as they could about everyday America, I think. They had a wide range of interests. They were also interested in American policy. I remember giving one fellow a book that I had on the economics of the Kennedy years.

Q: Were you married at the time?

KELLEY: Yes, I got married right after college.

Q: Was there much social life with the Japanese?

KELLEY: Yes there was, there was some. Since these were all guys, usually when I would get together with them outside of the class, it would be on outings in which they were going out as a group. Actually, I had two different groups that I taught, one was the Ministry people and the other one was a group from Waseda University who was sort of scattered into all walks of life in Japan. My experiences with these two groups were complimentary, really. We were invited by one fellow and his wife, for example, down to their family home in Kyoto where we spent a delightful week. On another occasion I had the whole Waseda group down to my home when I moved to Kamakura when I was going to language school, and they all spent the night there. We went out fishing at 4:00 in the morning, pulling in the nets and so forth. We would go off to retreats which belonged to this company or that company. My wife and I were both invited to some of these occasions, and then I was invited alone to others depending on what the guys were doing. If the guys were all going as a group among themselves, then I would be invited by myself, otherwise my wife would be included.

Q: What was the main preoccupation of the Embassy, that you were noticing?
KELLEY: There really was this question of giving Japan some recognition for being an important economic power and ally, despite its inability to project its military power. That was our principal preoccupation, I think. It was to reach out to young Japanese, particularly university students, to take advantage of the tremendous popularity of our Ambassador and of our President, to improve our image in Japan and to try to blunt the radical trend in Japan. At the time, I know our political section was very preoccupied with the possibility that the trend lines between the socialist and the liberal democrats (the conservative party) were such that at some point in the late 1960's the two lines would cross and the socialists would become the majority party and they were anti-security treaty, etc.. Those were the kinds of focus that we had - what would we do with that kind of situation, what could we do to forestall it, or to bring the socialist party around to a more accommodating point of view.

Q: Were you concerned about the student groups, such as Zen Gaku Ren?

KELLEY: Zen Gaku Ren was a big problem at that time because the security treaty was coming up for renewal. In the 1950's of course, we had the problem with student demonstrations preventing President Eisenhower from visiting Japan, I was there after that. We knew in another ten years we would have to face that again, that was another reason why Reischauer was there, because it was generally accepted that he would have a better chance of reaching out to the student population of the left wing of the political spectrum than anybody else might.

Q: I think this is the era when we had Youth Officers?

KELLEY: We did have Youth Officers, Packard was our Youth Officer. Mike Armacost, who later became Ambassador, was in that job. George Packard was the first one.

Q: I was wondering if you, with your contacts and all, were sort of encouraged to meet young people on their way up? Was there much of that?

KELLEY: I don't remember being specifically encouraged but it was almost commonly accepted that's what we were to do. It was our inclination in any event as young guys coming into the Embassy. We knew that Reischauer was emphasizing this himself in his own contacts. He wanted to reach out to young people. That's one of the reasons why that became one of the functions that I held, because I had invited young people. He wanted to encourage this kind of thing. It was just accepted that's what he wanted to do, I don't recall that it was stated specifically by him. It was certainly the evidence he gave by having a Youth Officer who had ready access to the Ambassador I had a lot of contact with Packard, and just gravitated in that direction.

Q: You were there when Kennedy was assassinated weren't you?

KELLEY: I was.

Q: How was that taken? I was in Yugoslavia at the time and flags were at half mast everywhere and huge lines coming in. Really in many ways, Kennedy was more popular abroad than in the United States, I would say at the time.
KELLEY: Certainly there was almost a physical blow to the Japanese. They were involved in it in a number of ways. First of all, half the U.S. Cabinet was in the air on the way to Japan for the first of the conferences between the United States and Japanese cabinets when the assassination occurred - they turned around in mid air and flew back so it impacted the Japanese in an official way. At the same time there was this incredible visceral blow that the Japanese felt, because they just didn't understand how something like this could happen in America. They were disoriented by it.

Q: Was Reischauer attacked while you were there?

KELLEY: He was attacked while I was there. In fact I was upstairs in the chancery, just on the floor above where it happened and rushed down just in time to see him getting some first aid from a friend of mine. I didn't see the actual attack.

Q: Did this attack seem like just an odd ball manifestation, or was this a concern that there might be more to it than that?

KELLEY: I don't think at any time did we think that there was anything more to it than it was just some nut who managed to get over the wall. I wasn't involved in any of the discussions involving the security officers in the Embassy or the police. The Japanese reaction was immediate overkill, because they had lost face. They were going to do everything they could to provide massive protection and Reischauer's real concern was that there not be this kind of overreaction. That was the guidance that we were essentially getting from Reischauer and from John Emmerson who was the DCM, who had to take over. In fact, Reischauer was clearly still running things from his hospital bed. We weren't going to blow this thing up.

Q: You went to Japanese language training in Japan?

KELLEY: I'd taken some Japanese when I was in FSI, here, and then of course I studied early morning Japanese and that sort of thing. And of course I had Japanese in college. Then I went down and got another year of Japanese at Yokohama.

Q: Can you tell me a bit about how the training worked? What was the concentration?

KELLEY: The primary concentration was on conversational and spoken Japanese. It was just that pure written memorization and practice, repetition, sort of child-like absorption of the language. Just constant emersion, the best you could get it. Two-person classes. Endless hours of tapes and drills and things like that. Less focus on reading. I thought it was really excellent.

Q: I've heard about the language school at Oberammergau for people going over to the Soviet Union, where actually they use Soviet defectors to teach just in Russian, and give lectures, everything was in Russian. We'd call it both, language enhancement and area studies. Your studies were in Kamakura?

KELLEY: It was in Yokohama, I lived in Kamakura.
Q: Was there much in the way of what we would call area studies?

KELLEY: No. There was hardly any of that. The closest thing we got to any kind of cultural studies was a tape of a Japanese soap opera that we got to study, because it gave us a chance to learn colloquial Japanese and hear how it was pronounced by actors who knew how to put the right emphasis and emotions into the language. You'd absorb a little bit of everyday life as a consequence of that, but that was about as close to that as we got. There would be field trips, but most of what I got -- and we were encouraged to do things that would help us to absorb the culture and learn more about it -- was from a historical study society I joined in Kamakura. This was ideal for me because Kamakura was such an old city and had this terrific tradition. Kamakura was the old military capital in the 1100's. It had a rich focus on history and it was always considered an intellectual city. A sort of bedroom town for Tokyo, but a very high-class bedroom town. You had a lot of rich access to cultural organizations. That's why I joined this historical study society. I traveled all over Japan in buses with the Japanese who were interested in history and couldn't speak anything but Japanese, so I had some great times and learned a lot, about half of which I understood. [laughter] It was terrific exposure and this was all encouraged. I would get time off from school when they had a trip so that I could go with them, because it was something the school wanted us to do.

Q: When were you in Yokohama?

KELLEY: That would have been from 1965 to 1966.

Q: There was sort of the feeling in the Foreign Service that if somebody took Japanese they'd disappear over the horizon and almost never be seen again by the rest of your classmates because once in Japan, you stayed in Japan. Did you have the feeling that you were joining a monkhood or something of this nature?

KELLEY: I had the feeling that I was joining a very exclusive society. In fact, it was a brotherhood of sorts. I at least tended to absorb a lot of the idea that we were to be loyal to each other, and that we were to be supportive to each other, that we were a band of brothers, in fact. And I would spend perhaps most of my career in Japan. It was a big investment for the Foreign Service, it was a difficult language and not many people wanted to study it.

Q: You got out of the school in what year?

KELLEY: In 1966.

Q: Then where did you go?

KELLEY: I was assigned to the Consulate in Fukuoka.

Q: What job did you have in Fukuoka?

KELLEY: Again it was a variety of jobs, it was a Consulate that was being whittled down and so
I started off being an Administrative Officer. I was a Consular Officer for a short time, I was a Commercial Officer the whole time I was there. I covered labor affairs and in the end I ran the whole place, or at almost the end, because everybody else left.

Q: You were there until 1969, was it?

KELLEY: Yes, I was there until 1969.

Q: You were on the island of Kyushu. Was there a difference between Kyushu and Honshu? I mean as far as a Foreign Service Officer would look at the political economic situation?

KELLEY: Well, the difference was more of the kind of difference that you would find in America, where you get out of the capital, you were closer to the grass roots. People weren't as concerned about the big policy issues and you really felt like your function was more representational -- trying to convey some sense that America cared about that part of Japan and Japan as a whole. And to encourage as much as you could a feeling of good will toward the United States.

Q: We had a rather large base at Tangashia(?) Wasn't it, was that near you?

KELLEY: At that time we had three major bases and a small facility. The closest base to us was Itazuke, an Air Force base which was our main air support base during the Korean War. It would have been the base that we would have operated from if hostility resumed. It was where we flew support missions when the Pueblo was taken, for example, little good that they did, they flew out of there. That's where the big build-up took place when we activated reserve air units and sent them out there. We also had Sasebo, which was one of the two major Naval bases in Japan. It was near Nagasaki which was in our Consulate district. Then we had the big Iwakuni Marine air base that was up near Hiroshima.

Q: What was the impact of the Americans? We're talking now in 1996, where our troops are having a hell of a time on Okinawa. I was wondering how the Americans and service people meld with the Japanese?

KELLEY: At that time, Okinawa was one of the big issues. Again the military bases agreement was a big problem and the question of nuclear weapons was always something that people were concerned about. The Japanese attitudes varied depending on what part of the political spectrum they were from. I was talking to everybody across the whole spectrum. I would talk to labor unions and socialists as well as the conservatives. The conservatives were all trying to be very helpful, but they were very puzzled about the nuclear thing. They, like everybody else in Japan, had this nuclear allergy. They knew that they had a policy against the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. They knew that we carried nuclear weapons on board our planes and aircraft carriers and other ships. They were all very anxious (the conservatives were at least, and that would have been the majority of people in Kyushu) that we somehow be accommodated, without violating their concern about the introduction of nuclear weapons. They thought somehow that we were making accommodations that kept weapons out of Japan. They were just willing to accept and hope that was what was going on. Their attitude was to try and be as helpful and
supportive as possible of the U.S. because they were really worried about Korea, the Chinese, the Soviets. Their attitude was: we're out here all by ourselves and we're a small country. They had been told all of their lives that they were weak and unprotected. They needed us. They needed to be able to count on us and they had to be accommodating to do that.

Q: There was sort of in the background, this idea of an unstable Korea, an unknown China, but not necessarily a friendly one at all, and very definitely not a very friendly Soviet Union there.

KELLEY: They had always been hostile to, and afraid of, Russia. The Soviet Union was just more of the same as far as they were concerned. There was great ambivalence towards China, on the one hand they wanted to be understanding and friendly toward China and knew that they had really screwed it up during World War II, and really didn't have a relationship with China at the time, and were anxious to do something without fouling up the relationship with the United States. Of course the United States at that time was still very hostile to China, hadn't made it's own opening yet to China. The war in Vietnam was just getting underway.

Q: Well, you were in Fukuoka when the real build-up in 1968-69, was going on in Vietnam. Did you see an impact in Japan where you were?

KELLEY: Incredible impact on the young people. It really soured the atmosphere. It would have been difficult with Reischauer there, but at least he was able to reach out to the Japanese and bridge the gap. If he had been there later in the day I think even he would have had a hard time. Although we had a very capable Ambassador and very a capable successor in Alexis Johnson, it was just getting worse and worse. It was very hard to overcome it. There wasn't anybody there who was as capable as Reischauer was at reaching out to the young people, and they were the people who were becoming disaffected. Younger people like myself did what we could to reach out to them, the Youth Officer in the Embassy did, but they were influenced by American youth and by their own idealism. They were having none of it, for the most part.

Q: Did you have any particular problems such as demonstrations and that sort of thing?

KELLEY: Yes, there were demonstrations. The particular problem that we had was after I was there by myself and one of our reserve-officer-piloted airplanes crashed into the University Computer Center. It was still under construction and hadn't been finished, and the students went out and laid siege and they wouldn't let anybody pull the plane out of the building. It was left hanging in the rigging for over a year, while they made it a symbol of anti American feeling. There were other kinds of problems as well. There was an allegation that radiation had leaked out of one of our submarines in Sasebo and there was a big scare about eating fish. Every one of these things was really blown up. The Japanese had this nuclear allergy anyway that was bad enough, and then the press would play on this and there would be this big left-wing drum beat that would go on for a long time. There would be demonstrations in Sasebo, there would be demonstrations at the Embassy, demonstrations at the Consulate, about all of these things.

Q: What was the feeling about Okinawa reversion? Was it your feeling at the time that things are going to happen or was it a matter of time?
KELLEY: The main problem was with the U.S. military, quite frankly. They had a situation there that they would have much preferred not to have to deal with. They felt like the Okinawans were willing enough to continue under their tutelage and if it isn't broke why are we trying to fix this, etc. I think there was much more debate going on within the U.S. Government than there ever was between ourselves and the Japanese once we got the U.S. military on board. There really was Reischauer's selling job - trying to get people to start moving in this direction. I wasn't really directly involved in the Okinawa negotiations, so I didn't have a lot to do with this. From my peripheral point of view, once I left Tokyo and went down to Fukuoka, we had very good cooperation from the Japanese government in dealing with this. They just wanted to make this thing go away, essentially. From the U.S. optic, Japan was an ally, and it was incongruous for the U.S. to occupy Japanese territory. In the event, Okinawa reversion was a Godsend to the U.S. It led to a resurgence of Japanese conservatism, and focused attention on continued Soviet occupation of Japan's Northern Territories.

Q: How about the local officials that you dealt with in the Fukuoka era? How did you find them?

KELLEY: Extremely accommodating, they were basically conservative, they had to trim their sails somewhat to the very different political winds that were blowing as a consequence of our increasing unpopularity because of the war in Vietnam. Personally that never interfered with the relationship at all. The man who ran for governor had to run as an independent, although everybody knew that he was a conservative liberal democrat. I remember running into him the night that he was elected, over at the newspaper office where I had dropped by to talk to a couple of reporter friends of mine. He was there for an interview and the first thing he did was walk up to me, shook my hand and said, "Don't worry about the air force base anymore." That was it, the only thing he said to me. That was the first thing he said, virtually, after being elected. That was the kind of attitude that I think we got from most of the elected officials.

Q: Did we have contact with the communist party or any of the parties on the extreme left?

KELLEY: We were enjoined against contact with the communists, by the Embassy. My knowledge of the communists was limited to what I would get from socialists. It was hard not to make contact with the socialists and the trade unionists. Often the protest delegations that would come in, where we had to meet with them because it was our policy not to turn anybody away. The communists were essentially just beyond the pale.

Q: Are you saying it was hard to make contact with a socialist?

KELLEY: It was really their problem more than ours. They felt that they would be ostracized if they were seen in our presence or were too chummy with us. They thought that we were out to subvert them or that their political careers would be at risk if they were too close to us. They really hadn't had any exposure to Americans, except to left-wing Americans, and anybody who represented the United States Government was a political danger to them. It was very hard to make contact. Some people, to their credit, were open minded about reaching out, or at least were receptive to my approaches. I did have a few contacts, but they were pretty hard to establish.
Q: Did you find that American cultural influence was strong? I'm thinking of movies and T.V.

KELLEY: Extremely strong. It was a love/hate relationship. It was a modernizing effect. Everything American was modern and everything modern was American. We benefited from the symbiosis and so our movies had a tremendous impact, not necessarily for the good. There was a tremendous interest in what we were writing. During the Kennedy years there was a tremendous interest in our politicians and tremendous antipathy for our politicians after Kennedy. Just an incredible amount of interest in the way we lived, our standard of living, what we emphasized real concern about, the level of influence that we exercised. Some concern about American bullying in certain areas, both of defense and of trade. I remember Japanese oranges and tangerines were a particular subject at the time that I was in Fukuoka, being threatened by California oranges, orange juice, etc. We were very large on their horizon and they felt that they were very small on ours and they were very anxious about that.

Q: Other than the airplane crash, were there any other major incidents or events that happened during this time?

KELLEY: There were a lot of demonstrations against the visit of the Enterprise, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, to Sasebo. I didn't go down to Sasebo during that time, we had a principal officer who handled most of that. That was earlier in my stay there. This got attention all over Japan and so Kyushu was in the spotlight. There were massive demonstrations in an effort to stop this visit. It took place, but under very controlled circumstances. The idea was that we were going to break the ice by bringing a nuclear carrier in, and we did. Successfully, although there was tremendous stereotypical resistance. A lot of demonstrations and breast beating and shouting and so forth. There were people running around wearing helmets and scarves wrapped around their faces and so forth, in this quasi-military fashion. The usual Molotov cocktail throwing and this sort of thing, and trying to pick up paving stones and throwing them at the police. Really the Japanese police interposed themselves between the Americans and the demonstrators very effectively. It was really a Japanese problem for the most part, we stayed pretty much out of it.

Q: Did you find that you had any entree to the Universities?

KELLEY: It was very tough. The Universities were the center of the opposition to our ship visits and to our military presence, the security treaty, the war in Vietnam. You always felt a little threatened if you were an American going on a university campus, at least I did. The bigger universities were harder to make contacts, the professors were either left wing or afraid of the left wing guys. Our contacts tended to be with the smaller universities, where they're more conservative or less political. We had good contacts with them, or we had good contacts off the campus. It was very hard to get on the campus.

Q: Was it the usual pattern that is often in many countries, where the students get to be quite radical when they are students at the university and as soon as they get out they become company men or something like that?

KELLEY: Absolutely. It was the most amazing transformation you ever saw. Reporters would
sit there and talk to you and point to these students and say, "That was me two or three years ago and did I ever go through a transformation fast." The system in Japan actually exacerbated the problem because the big problem with the university was getting in. Once you got in you were virtually guaranteed of graduating and getting a job with a good company. So there was nothing that you could do almost, to jeopardize your student status, so you went out and demonstrated for four years, in effect. That's unfair. Obviously they did study, but not all that much.

Q: *This is true also in Korea. Did you find that in dealing on regular matters with the Japanese or their dealing with you that ties from same class at the university, or same class in high school, got to be very important. I mean to know whom was with whom and that sort of thing?*

KELLEY: Very much so. We didn't know enough about that, probably. You can always exaggerate the importance of these things, but the Japanese thought it was important and they would always keep very close track of it. I know from my own personal experience with my friends (the people that I taught English to and the people that I knew) that these people kept in touch with their classmates. School ties were fairly important, but also the year that you came into the company was very important. The company ties would also then take over this.

Q: *You mean that there was sort of a year -- if you were the class of 1963 or something?*

KELLEY: As far as coming into the company, then that was also extremely important. You sort of measured your progress against your peers in the company or in the bureaucracy. It was always understood that when you reached a certain point in the company, a couple of guys would be tapped for the top jobs or the fast track and the rest of the guys would be given a sort of golden parachute -- they wouldn't be let out of the company necessarily, but they would be farmed out to lesser jobs. In the government, that would even take place even earlier. There would be guys on the fast track within the Ministry and then lesser jobs. Once you reached the point where one of your guys was tapped to be the Parliamentary Vice Minister, the highest civil service job in the ministry, all of the people who were his classmates would leave for a job with an associated organization. Which is what they called "Ama Kudare" the sweet downward staircase. So where you were in the flow as your cohort group moved up the ranks was always kept track of and was very important. Then the ceremonial departure as one or two or three might be anointed for top jobs. People would take care of each other in that context, but the cohort group was an important relationship. There were other important relationships, obviously, between seniors and juniors.

Q: *Was there much in the way of demand on consular things such as VISA's or help of something like that?*

KELLEY: The business got political only to the degree, to my knowledge, that you had somebody who had a politically sensitive past who wanted to get to the United States and you'd have to jump through all kinds of hoops to get these guys cleared to get them in. The political section wanted to get them in and there would be all kinds of information out there, and you couldn't tell what the validity of it was and you had to get around this to get people in. That was one of the constant considerations I think, that became important. It was most important to us when I was in the political section certainly. People would come to you from outside or from the
society and tell you about their VISA problems, and would hope that you could do something to smooth the way. What you would do essentially, was say sure give me your card, or give them an introduction to somebody who was a consular officer, that was about the extent of it.

JOHN B. RATLIFF, III
Assistant Director, FSI Language School
Tokyo (1963-1967)

John B. Ratliff III was born in Louisiana in 1935. He graduated from Southeastern Louisiana College and Georgetown University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1954 to 1957 in Japan and Korean Language Training. After postings at language programs in Bangkok and Tokyo, Ratliff became Dean of the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia. Dean Ratliff was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: Well, let’s move to Japan. You were in Japan for 11 years?

RATLIFF: No, I served first a tour of four years ’63 to January ’67. I served that as Assistant Director of the FSI Japanese School in Tokyo. Then the consulate general in Yokohama closed down except for one consular officer, and the school moved out of rented quarters in Tokyo near the Olympic Village to the consulate general building in Yokohama.

Q: Let’s talk about this ’63’67 period. What was your job?

RATLIFF: My title was assistant director of the school. That meant running things in the absence of the director who in fact left for Washington immediately after my arrival on a long delayed home leave. My job was very similar to the director’s in terms of the evaluation of students, the training of teachers, the determining of the curriculum of the program. As it turned out, I was also developing new training materials and coincidentally in another capacity of regional language supervisor, overseeing the part time programs at the consulates, and part time and intensive programs through the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

Q: About how many students at any one time?

RATLIFF: About 30.

Q: How was this split? Were they all State Department?

RATLIFF: No. There was a large State Department contingent in those days and there were some military though they had a tendency to be civilians in the military, and of course, the United States Information Agency [USIA] was very large. At that, there were cultural centers all over Japan. USIA officers represented as much as 40% of the enrollment.

Q: From your perspective, what were the major challenges in teaching Japanese to these
First of all, I experienced the same challenge that I did at Georgetown, that is no really good Japanese materials had been developed since those WWII days, so the materials we were using were not relevant to the needs of foreign service personnel. As a makeshift intermediate text, we were using a Japanese social studies textbook used in grammar school, which was quite lacking in terms of a textbook to train diplomats in the use of Japanese. It was natural; it was there, but it wasn't suitable. There was nothing whatsoever in terms of text materials that addressed political, economic or cultural. Well, cultural, yes by the nature of the social studies and the like, but nothing written for adult Americans and certainly not for adult American diplomats. Dr. Eleanor Jorden had written a couple of texts since the war. Those were in use for the beginning students, but for the advanced students the material situation was pretty sad. There were a lot of raw materials. I don't want to paint it bleaker than it was. We had the advantage of television and a lot of tapes from radio. We were very active with things like radio news and commentaries. We used a lot of what people like to call now, authentic materials to train people. We were certainly taking advantage of the environment in which the students were fortunate enough to study.

Q: I would have thought this was not a time of strict budgets, this was the sort of thing that the FSI could have just gone either to Georgetown or somewhere in Japan, some university and contracted for text materials to be produced.

RATLIFF: If you look back over the period say in the ‘50s, ‘60s, ‘70s, various government agencies did exactly that, went to universities and sometimes private contractors and asked that materials be written for government requirements. Much of that money was wasted because the people outside of the government found it very difficult to understand the true requirements of the Foreign Service and the requirements of the Foreign Service officers particularly in terms of training against what we called at the time the FSI proficiency scale and also the subjects that are needed for diplomacy and diplomatic assignments.

Q: I would have thought that over time the scale that we train people in, the tests, I'm not talking about just Japanese but in general, that a fairly solid template could have been developed for all languages. Here, diplomats need to know this and that.

RATLIFF: I think that's right, but for the most part, FSI took on that task itself, and if you look even today at the list of textbooks used, you will see two kinds: those developed at FSI or those bought off the shelf. You won't see any texts to my knowledge, that were developed on contract or by request by FSI to a university.

Q: Is this something that could have been done or are there really two different mindsets.

RATLIFF: Today it could be done; in those days it was very difficult. Today there is more sophistication out there in universities about this kind of training and these objectives. For example, the commercial language school that I founded after my retirement could develop appropriate training materials easily, and in fact we have produced a fairly large number on contract.
Q: What about as you were working with the students, how well were they coming out at that time?

RATLIFF: Many were coming out very well. I was very impressed with a whole string of Foreign Service officers that came out of the training. There was a problem which crept up from time to time in which personnel officers in making selections considered the ongoing assignment first and linguistic aptitude second, so occasionally somebody ended up in Japanese language training who had no business there through either improper screening but more commonly because someone felt that this was a good officer and those officer qualities were more important on whether he could get a 3 or a 3+.

Q: We are talking about the language rating, which goes from zero to five. Tell me, what was your impression then, and as time has developed, about the language aptitude test that is given. Could you talk a little about the language aptitude test and your impression of its validity?

RATLIFF: As you know, there was a test that was developed by John Caroll at Harvard called the Modern Language Aptitude Test. It is a rather old test at this point; it probably goes back to some time in the ‘50s. I believe it was FSI that developed a new scoring system for that test, with a maximum possible score of 80. FSI was able to make certain rough estimates about aptitude scores necessary to predict success depending on the difficulty of the language. Primarily we are dealing with four different levels of difficulty of languages within the Foreign Service. They have gone down to three now. What we used to call the “world languages,” a term that is now considered chauvinistic, included languages like Spanish, French, German. These are the easiest for the native speakers of English to learn. A typical study program for world languages is six months of intensive study to attain a level three, which is described as professional proficiency. Then there are so-called hard languages like Thai and Russian and Turkish. A course in a hard language is typically 44 weeks to attain that same score, the three level in both speaking and reading. Then the third category – the “super-hard” languages consists of four: Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Arabic. Normally for those languages we figure a minimum of 18 up to 22 months to achieve that same level three competence. That's kind of how it sorts out.

Q: Most of the people being trained, had they taken the language aptitude test?

RATLIFF: Most had and now we get back to the validity of the test. Typically FSI felt that a person needed a minimum score of 60 in order to go into a language like Japanese, ideally at least 65. Sixty to sixty-five was kind of like no man's land. Anecdotally, I saw people who scored 58 and below who had quite a bit of difficulty with the language. There were exceptions - that is important to note. There were exceptions that were based primarily on motivation and hard work. I think that everybody has concluded now that modern language aptitude tests should be one measure or one indication but it should no longer be the basis on which someone is assigned or not assigned to a particular language.

Q: Typically your student who came to the Japanese language school already had language prior to coming there, is that right?
RATLIFF: I think for the most part, but not always. I think there were cases where people were hitting a foreign language for the first time, certainly a hard language like that. My impression was that not everyone had already demonstrated the ability to learn a foreign language.

Q: Had they had any Japanese at the Foreign Service Institute before being sent out?

RATLIFF: Yes and no. At that time there was a full two year program going on in Tokyo and subsequently in Yokohama when the school moved there. Persons were assigned without any particular system that we could perceive, either being assigned six to twelve months in Washington and then on to the advanced school, or assigned for a full two years to the school in Tokyo or Yokohama. Certainly it was based to a degree on the level of the officer and the rank of the officer. First-tour officers didn't get two years of training and consequently always got their training in Washington. There was a very good system which was observed occasionally which worked superbly. That was to give an officer six months of Japanese, in some cases twelve and then ship them off to Japan for a junior office assignment in the Embassy or a consulate. Then on to another tour in a second country, and then bring them back for advanced Japanese language training. I have always advocated you needed to train X number of officers at the beginning level in order to have some field of officers to choose from for advanced Japanese training or any of the other super hard languages. In other words, you have to put more people in the pipeline initially than you expect to need in the future, to account for individual preferences, language aptitude, and resignations.

Q: What was your impression of how it worked out by having the FSI language school in Japan, because I think some of the other countries like the French or the British tended send their officers to a university in Japan, or something like that. What was your impression of putting the people there but in sort of an American teaching environment?

RATLIFF: I think there are two issues here. One is what are the advantages of having the training take place in Japan versus taking place in the U.S., and there were distinct advantages to being in Japan and walking out and being able to speak to the Japanese and to interact. In those days, and to this day, I'm happy to note that students were required to live within the Japanese community. They were barred from embassy housing; consequently, they were coping with day to day life in Japan, learning in some cases reluctantly, how to get things done. That's one aspect.

As far as going into say a Japanese university or in the case of the British, working with a tutor or possibly combining private instruction with some university classes and the like, those of us at FSI in those days felt strongly that system represented what was done in the Foreign Service before the war, and that we learned a lot about language training since then. The structured program with kind of guidance and discipline that FSI provides was a distinct advantage to sending someone off on his own to learn a language. People like Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson before the war learned Japanese from people like Naganuma (who went on to found one of the largest Japanese language schools in Japan) in those kind of relatively unstructured conditions. Some learned it well, and some didn't learn it so well, and sometimes we didn't know whether the student had mastered the language until it was too late to do anything about it.

Some students can learn the language in a very unstructured program. But if you want to be sure
that the majority of the people to the necessary proficiency, then the kind of structured program found in an FSI school is the best procedure.

Q: Did you have problems in fending off the embassy from trying to raid your students from time to time?

RATLIFF: Very rarely. I was very pleased and very impressed with that. I remember we did duty at the embassy when John F. Kennedy was assassinated. The entire time I was in Japan which subsequently turned out to be nine years, that is the only time I remember people in the school, Foreign Service officers, being asked to serve any kind of capacity. There was an early period when I arrived when the school was still in Tokyo when students were required to be duty officers. That rather conveniently went by the boards when the school moved to Yokohama because it became unworkable after that.

The Embassy provided support, and occasional meetings. They would send somebody down to talk to students and invite people up, but it was pretty strictly hands off, and I was pleased with the support from the officers at the embassy, starting with Ambassador Reischauer, who was a noted Japanese scholar and was the ambassador when I arrived there. By the way, at the reception for newcomers at the Ambassador’s Residence, I introduced myself to Ambassador Reischauer. Upon hearing my Louisiana accent, he asked me, “Are you going to teach them Japanese with a southern accent?”

Q: Was there any debate going on about what type of Japanese to teach?

RATLIFF: Well, the debate had come and gone. The type of Japanese to teach was Tokyo dialect, and we were in the Tokyo area. Now it subsequently arose at a time when there was discussion about moving the school, but that was in the ‘70s. The decision was basically taken that we wanted to teach people standard dialect or Tokyo dialect.

JAMES D. MINYARD
Assistant Agricultural Attaché
Tokyo (1964-1967)

James D. Minyard was born in 1930 and raised in Lubbock, Texas. He joined the Foreign Agricultural Service in 1957 and served as assistant agriculture attaché to Japan. He was interviewed by James O. Howard in 1990.

Q: Time you got some foreign experience. What happened?

MINYARD: They decided I should go to Japan to replace Don Nouotny, who was being transferred to New Zealand. I was to be the Assistant Assistant Agricultural Attaché. I thought that would be fine. My wife, Billie, agreed. So all of the preparations took a whole month and a half to complete and get everything done and be on our way.
We got to Japan, and I found out that being the lowest assistant meant that I did all of the commodity work. I had the responsibility for livestock, for fruits and vegetables and for feed grains. I had commodity responsibility for everything except tobacco, soybeans and wheat.

Clyde Keaton was Assistant Agricultural Attaché. He did tobacco, wheat and soybeans. Russ Strobel from the Trade Center more or less did poultry because he came out of the Poultry Division here. The rest of it, I had to do.

The work was quite interesting. My first exposure really to cooperators.

Q: Tell us what cooperators are.

MINYARD: Cooperators are the people who've signed market development agreements with the Foreign Agricultural Service to do export market promotion under PL 480, Public Law 480, Title 2, I believe it was. It provided funds for commodities that were sold overseas to be used to promote the consumption of US agricultural products.

Generally, these agreements were with commodity organizations which represented across the board commodity interests rather than specific individuals or companies. There were several offices there in Japan that these people had set up -- covering wheat, feed grains and soybeans. The cotton people worked with the Japan Cotton Traders' Association, so they more or less had an office there. Poultry had an office, and I think there were some others.

The rest of them were handled on a visit-by-visit basis. I think at one time, we had twenty-two cooperator organizations working there. Some of them were very small, like two or three of the livestock associations which would get a couple of visits a year of three or four days each. Others were fairly substantial projects, spending several hundred thousand dollars. What I was surprised to find was that they were integrated fairly well with the Agricultural Attaché's office. They regularly communicated back and forth on a broad range of issues -- not just narrow cooperator interest, but much broader interests.

Q: In other words, they were intelligence suppliers, was that it?

MINYARD: They provided a lot of information. In some cases, for example, they acted as a go-between between the Attaché's office and government people. Sometimes the government people would feel that they didn't want to approach something officially, so they could talk to one of the cooperator people. That cooperator person would then come and talk to the Attaché, get an answer and go back.

If the answer was positive, then they'd come directly to the Attaché. Otherwise, they would drop it. Then nobody was embarrassed for having been turned down for proposing something.

Q: No loss of face.

MINYARD: No loss of face. I don't know if people realize it, but that is very important in Japan. Quite frankly, it's very important in the United States, too. People don't look at it that way, but
it's there.

Q: You were working with the rest of the Embassy. You really had some exposure, then, to the State Department.

MINYARD: Yes, and it was a very bad experience, as far as I was concerned. Edmund Reischauer was the Ambassador at the time, and he was a real nice fellow, but his interests were in the political and the cultural side of things, not in the economic.

The economic side of things was sort of ignored. It puzzled me because the Japanese were in this process of what they called "income doubling" at the time, which was really going to pull Japan out of the doldrums. It was a very successful program. It probably tripled their income in a ten-year period there.

In 1964, while they were doing that, they became so prosperous that they lost their GATT protection. This had been under the category for trade with developing countries that gave them special dispensation to apply restrictions and so forth. The Japanese at that time still had all kinds of restrictions on imports that were basically illegal under the GATT. So I figured that when they lost that, the Embassy should really go after them and make them start removing these restrictions. There was no higher level interest in doing that in the Embassy. They just more or less ignored it. It was that way all along.

I remember once when the "Maid of Cotton" visited Japan. We had some fairly important Japanese involved in some things that she was doing. I talked to the USIS (United States Information Service) people about getting some publicity out of this. I was told that they weren't interested in that because it was strictly a commercial deal.

And so those are the kinds of things which really kind of turned me off on the State Department in dealing with the world. I don't know if it's changed. I've heard a lot of lip service about changing, but I don't know if it has or not.

I even got in trouble once. The Japanese were talking about liberalizing grapefruit imports, but they weren't planning to do anything about it. So I found out that the U.S. was going to lift the restrictions we had on mandarin oranges coming into four Northwestern states. There was a problem with citrus canker, a plant disease. They concluded that they could ship those mandarin oranges into Washington, Oregon, Montana and Idaho without endangering citrus or the US becoming infested with citrus canker.

So I went over to the Ministry of Agriculture and talked to some people about what a wonderful opportunity this would be to make a trade. They could liberalize grapefruit imports, and we could ship those mandarin oranges in. The Ministry of Agriculture thought that sounded good. They understood this kind of thing.

The next thing you know, we got a phone call from the Embassy. Some of the State Department people were upset and were raising Cain. They said that citrus canker was a technical matter and shouldn't be used to trade for something that was not technical. It was already worked up, and the
Japanese were willing to do it.

It took ten years after that to get grapefruit imports liberalized, when we could have done it so easily and much earlier.

**Q: Were there some trade-oriented people in the State Department -- the Commercial Attachés or some of the Economic Analysts?**

MINYARD: There were some nice people there, but they were a long way down the totem pole as far as importance in the Embassy is concerned.

On one or two occasions, when everybody else was gone, I went to the Ambassador's staff meeting. They'd never mention anything about the economic side. If someone brought up an economic question, nobody would ever ask a question about it. They'd early move on to quote somebody's political position on this, that, or the other thing.

It was just a total mystery to me.

**Q: Were our agricultural exports to Japan increasing during these years, or did the cooperators have any impact?**

MINYARD: I'm not sure what the impact was, but Japan was more or less "discovered" by agricultural exporters during the period I was there. Agricultural exports from the U.S. to Japan went from less than $500 million a year to almost $1.0 billion a year during the year that I left. Of course, it was mostly soybeans, feed grain and wheat. They were the big items, but there was a very broad range of commodities, mostly unprocessed products. I handled skins and those kinds of things.

They did liberalize lemon imports while I was there. That, of course, became quite a booming market. Not people eating lemons but because the feeling in Japan was that if you wipe lemon juice on your skin it turns white. Japanese ladies like to have real pale skin. That's probably by far the biggest market for lemon. But it's okay, let them buy lemons!

I can't remember the numbers, but during the time that I was there, the number of trade people that came through the Attache's office tripled. They would want some help in meeting people or making contacts. Then they reported in on what they discovered or found out.

**Q: Did you work shifts during the years that you were there? You started off with commodity analysis.**

MINYARD: The work wasn't done on a shift basis. I had commodity analysis, trade policy and market development responsibility for all these commodities. I was responsible across the board, though there was a lot more activity going on there.

I guess that one of the major scandals in the market development cooperator program occurred while I was there. I'm still not sure, and I guess nobody else figured out exactly what happened,
but in the Feed Grain Council Program, they had a Japanese-American over there running it named Bill Hattori. Bill Hattori was accused variously of making off with $40,000 to $70,000 in market development money -- but not for his personal use. He didn't put it into his pocket. He just did things that weren't very well accepted by U.S. standards. He was taking people to these *geisha* parties, which sometimes would cost $400 to $500 per person per night -- things like that.

He didn't have enough entertainment money in his program to do it, so he was spending money on entertaining that was supposed to be spent on publications and those kinds of things. There were some other things that he was doing that weren't above board as far as the U.S. side was concerned. He was trying to out-Japanese the Japanese in the way they entertain people. We had people from the OIGP (Office of the Inspector General-Program) come to Japan and spend a lot of time trying to figure out or sort out what was real and what was not real. The number two guy in the OIGP came to Japan and spent about a month. I think they finally agreed that the Feed Grain Council owed the project about $40,000, and they paid that back.

Bill Hattori went to Alaska and was tried there for misusing funds. He was actually found guilty, but they decided that they wouldn't put him in jail. They put him on probation. He had to pay the Feed Grain Council back $100 a month, which would have taken him years to pay off his debt (actually, about thirty-three years at this rate). He worked in Alaska for two or three years and then sort of disappeared.

*Q: I remember that story. I remember how proud Hubert Dike was that he found him in Alaska. That was, as I recall, one of the few scandals that ever took place in that rapidly growing program.*

*Are we ready to bring you back from Japan? Is there anything else there that added to the education of Jimmy Minyard or to the betterment of the FAS?*

MINYARD: I learned a lot of things in Japan, not all of them necessarily for the betterment of the FAS, but it was a very interesting time to be in Japan. First, they had the Olympics in 1964. As a result of that, Japan decided that they didn't win any medals because their nutritional standards were so poor. They decided that they had to improve the nutritional standards for children substantially. And so the school lunch program suddenly became a big deal. These market development cooperators were able to cash in on that.

So something as esoteric as the Olympics can have a very substantial impact on market development. These were the kinds of things that I think most people tend to miss when they try to figure out what’s going on as far as markets and marketing are concerned.

*Q: What was that statistic about the increased height of the Japanese over a certain period?*

MINYARD: I'm not sure about that, but I know that between 1950 and 1963, compared to 1974 or 1975, they had to increase the size of the desks of the first graders three times because the kids were getting much bigger. They attributed this to the nutritional benefits.
JOHN C. LEARY  
Economic/Commercial Officer  
Tokyo (1964-1968)

John Charles Leary was born in Connecticut in 1924. He received a BA in 1947 and an MA in 1959 from Yale University. He served in the U.S. Army overseas as a lieutenant from 1943 to 1945. His postings abroad have included Cherbourg, Dusseldorf, Istanbul, Tokyo, Ottawa, Vienna, Sao Paulo and St. George’s. Mr. Leary was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

LEARY: I was assigned to Tokyo and right before I left for Tokyo, I was assigned to FSI for the mid-career course. I spent three months in that course and it was during that time that President Kennedy was assassinated. At that time I remember precisely what happened when it occurred. It was in one of our sessions, shortly after lunch when our course director came into the back and whispered to someone and he stood up and asked the class to stop for a moment and he reported the events in Dallas and got a very emotional reaction from everybody. We had the rest of the day off and the next three or four days in Washington were the burial ceremonies. But then we arrived in Tokyo, actually the beginning of 1964.

Q: Again you were assigned as an economic/commercial officer?

LEARY: Right. At the time of the Kennedy assassination, there had been scheduled a Cabinet level meeting in Tokyo between our Secretary of State and various other cabinet ministers and their various counterparts of the Japanese side. This is something that had been going on for a couple of years, alternating meetings between Washington and Tokyo. Involving the direct presence of a great number of our cabinet officers. Well our group had been on its way to Tokyo and turned around so the meeting was canceled, but about a week after I arrived in Tokyo, it finally occurred. It was a very interesting introduction to Tokyo. It was something to be observing what was happening and having a chance to meet with the Secretary and other senior officials who were there. Get briefings from them briefings on what was happening in Washington and so on.

Q: As well as to see the Japanese government operating at a high level of interaction with us. When I was assigned to Tokyo in 1959, the first thing I did there was to participate in the U.S. delegation of the annual, the contracting parties meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was taking place in Tokyo. I had a similar experience, although not at the Secretary of State level. Who was the Ambassador when you got to Tokyo?

LEARY: The Ambassador was Edward Reischauer. He was a wonderful man who had been appointed by President Kennedy. He had been a professor at Harvard and there couldn’t have been anyone more qualified for the job. He had been born in Japan of missionary parents and lived there most of his youth and had become one of the countries foremost experts in Asia, Japan in particular. His wife was Japanese, the daughter of a distinguished family in Japan. He was always referred to by the Japanese as Professor Reischauer, not Ambassador Reischauer, as a sign he was well respected.
I recall two incidents. One shortly after I arrived, I was asked by our Information Service people to participate in a series of discussions they had arranged with Japanese students, mostly graduate students who had been in the States and spoke some English, but wanted to improve and maintain their English language faculty. They would set up meetings, usually at Tokyo University in a room with usually six or seven Japanese students and a two or three Americans and they would have a topic of the evening. One of the Japanese would present this topic in English and then we would discuss it. The first night I was there the topic was “The Changing Values of Japanese Youth.” During his presentation, the Japanese speaker kept referring to the well renowned expert so and so. Then when we finished, I asked him to tell me who this expert was that he kept referring to and he said, “Oh, that was Professor Reischauer.”

Another time, which was later in my career, involved the Vietnam War. We had begun the bombing of North Vietnam and the Japanese press were very negative about our actions. In fact, most of their reporters on the scene were in Hanoi rather than Saigon. Ambassador Reischauer was invited to speak at the newspaper publisher’s association. During the course of his talk, he was quite critical of their coverage of the Vietnam War. Their very one-sided coverage and he was urging them to take another look at things. The next day, instead of criticizing him for interfering in Japanese affairs, the local newspapers came out with editorials saying, Professor Reischauer said so and so, so we must self-reflect. So he was a very good representative for the United States.

Q: He had tremendous influence as you were saying, and a great expertise and wisdom for the job.

LEARY: Also he used his staff very efficiently. Aside from his representational activities, he didn’t do his own work, he turned to his staff to prepare the reports.

Q: How involved, how interested was he, in the economic side of things?

LEARY: I would say very much so. Of course more on the political side, but also in the economic side. He was writing a book, at the time, which came out later. I can’t remember the title now, but a part of that involved the economic power positions in Asia. I recall that he asked me one day to develop some tables, population and GNP [Gross National Product], and then he devised two sets of maps in which he drew countries to scale depending on population and GNP. The population of China, for example, covered a large part of the map but when you used the GNP, it was very small. Japan was quite a bit bigger than China. So he was interested in that sort of macro aspect of economics.

Q: Were economic trade issues in our bilateral relationship as they later came to be?

LEARY: I would say, yes they were. We had some of the same issues that you still see today. Japan was not yet as important in our market in terms of Japanese imports, but they were beginning to be. I recall, for example that auto trade became quite an issue. The Japanese had just begun to develop special ships to ship cars into the United States, where the cars could drive on to the ships and when they got to the United States drive off again. Our industry was
concerned that their sales in Japan would, as Japanese auto production increased, that our sales would drop off to practically nothing. Although American cars got to be quite popular in Japan in earlier years. They had delegations come over and debate these things. It proved a number of things. One was that the Japanese were building cars for the American market, while Americans were not building for the Japanese market, where they drive on what we call the wrong side of the road and so on. And that our cars were being shipped in such small quantities. You know, each one was separately boxed where the Japanese had gained some efficiencies from their method of shipment. It cost us probably ten times more to ship a car to Japan than it cost the Japanese to ship to the United States. So those issues were being debated and we had issues about trading oranges and rice.

Q: Textiles?

LEARY: Yes, textiles too. Very much so. I recall we had a delegation headed by Warren Christopher, who later became Secretary of State, but he was the advisor on economic matters that came to talk about trade in textiles and tried to persuade the Japanese to enter into some restraint arrangements. That resulted in a rather difficult situation when one of the Japanese, after some strong presentations from Christopher, was reported to have said, “We are not North Vietnam. You cannot threaten us.” At this point the U.S. delegation decided to leave the room and they came back and talked to Professor Reischauer. He got a hold of the Foreign Ministry who apologized for the man from the Ministry of International Trade who made this comment, pointing out that he was not attuned to political niceties. Eventually things were straightened out. In most cases we worked out at least temporary accommodations.

Also during that time Japan had become a candidate for membership in the OECD and did become a full member in about 1967, during my tour there and we were engaged with the Foreign Ministry in discussions about this.

Q: They were already participating in the work with development assistance of OECD. I don’t know if they were a full member of that.

LEARY: Yes, assistance. I’m not sure about full membership.

Q: But they began to have their own aid programs in southeast Asia.

LEARY: Yes. That was also a project that I became involved in. We had phased out our aid program and most of the staff of the aid program in Japan, so it was a small office that was handling residual matters, the sale of surplus equipment and that kind of thing. So, our section became responsible for dealings with the Japanese on aid matters, both involving the development assistance committee and particularly, at this time, aid in Southeast Asia. The United States had a regional AID mission in Bangkok which worked very closely with other countries in trying to get multi-lateral cooperation on a number of issues including dams on the Mekong River and so on. The Japanese were quite active, although not as active as we would have liked. We were continually urging them to look at another project and consider making another contribution.
Q: Why don’t you talk a little bit about exactly what your job was in the embassy in Tokyo and how that related to other parts of the embassy.

LEARY: When I first went to Japan, I was assigned as Chief of what was called the External Economic Unit, which dealt with Japan’s relations with international organizations and third countries. But rather quickly, as a result of a number of things, including position cut-backs and transfer of individuals and so on, we merged the Internal and External Units, so I became senior officer in that area, reporting to the Economic Counselor and an Economic Minister. We also had a commercial counselor at that time who was from the Department of Commerce, and a separate Commercial Section, and a Trade Center operation. We also had, in the embassy, a number of specialists, such as an Aviation attaché, a Fisheries attaché, and a Treasury representative.

Q: Agriculture?

LEARY: Agriculture. Agriculture had a separate section and they were physically located in another building. In those days the embassy had outgrown its original space, so some of the population were scattered within a few blocks, but separate from the main embassy building. I became something of a liaison, with these people as well. Reporting to the economic counselor. So it was a very busy active job that pretty much cut across the board.

Q: Who was the Economic Minister?

LEARY: The Minister we had...well there were three...when I was first there it was Arthur Gardner. He had considerable background in southeast Asia. He had been, I think, minister in Vietnam at one point. Then came Larry Vass, who was a career Foreign Service officer, that spent important parts of his career dealing with aviation matters. He was head of Aviation Division of BD at one point. And finally at the end of my tour, Herman Barger came in, who also had experience in southeast Asia. He had been Deputy Executive Director of the Asian Development Bank and later became Deputy Assistant Secretary in that department.

Q: So it was a big section. As you say, there was both a minister and two counselors.

LEARY: A minister and two counselors. There was the commercial and economic counselor and then various other specialists.

Q: And you were, in effect, responsible for the State Department Economic section.

LEARY: That’s correct. As well as, not directly, but having a hand in the coordinating with other sections.

Q: And your unit was involved both with Japan’s external economic relations and reporting on the Japan economy.

LEARY: The bulk of our work was on the external side. We did internal economics reporting in a general way. So much was being written about the economy, to a certain degree additional reporting from us was superfluous.
Q: The Treasury did some of that.

LEARY: That’s right. They dealt particularly with the international aspects.

Q: And the commercial counselor was involved in some of the concrete trade issues.

LEARY: Right. The Commercial Section was fairly large, we had several officers there. Some operating trade centers which put on trade shows probably on an average of once a month, maybe more. Which tended to be either sometimes outright trade shows, in the sense of displaying American products, and other times a seminar type thing. One time, I recall, and this involved commercial as well as agricultural assets, but we had a show where we had soy beans. And we had experts describing new uses for soy beans, and so on.

Q: What were some of the other primary issues that you and the embassy were seized with during that period of the mid-1960s?

LEARY: Japan was already becoming a formidable competitor in world markets, not quite to the extent that they did a few years later, but they were beginning to become more active in international areas and we were encouraging them to take a more positive position. One of the areas was assistance to southeast Asia. We had a regional AID office in Bangkok which was largely responsible, together with the AID missions in the various individual countries for a very large economic development program which paralleled our effort to support the South Vietnamese government on the military side. We were encouraging Japan and other countries to participate with us in these areas. Japan was becoming more active. Much of their aid was directed towards areas which complimented their commercial interests in the area, which was not unusual for countries to do, but we were encouraging them to take a bit broader approach on those issues. They made contributions to a number of the infrastructure projects in the Mekong, for example. I recall one relatively minor issue was a foreign exchange operations fund which we established to assist Laos to finance its imports. Japan, as well as several other countries made a contribution to that fund.

During my time in Tokyo I attended two meetings in Bangkok, or what was then called ECAFE, the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. I think the name has been changed in more recent years, but I was a member of the U.S. delegation for those meetings which dealt largely with trade and commercial issues in that region as well as some aid matters. Because of my position in Tokyo, which involved liaison with the Japanese government on some of these regional aid programs, the aid Mission in Bangkok amended my travel orders to enable me to stop in several of the other southeast Asian countries to take a look at aid projects and to consult with our own aid people and the Japanese aid people in the various places, including Laos and the Philippines.

One specific thing that happened where the Japanese did take a substantial initiative, I believe it was in 1965 that the Sukarno government in Indonesia was overthrown. The Western developed countries undertook to provide assistance to the new government, headed as I recall, by President Suharto, who in recent days has fallen on hard times. But the Japanese agreed to host a meeting
of donor countries in Tokyo. The group became known as the Tokyo Club and did put together a package of assistance to Indonesia. We and the western European countries were pleased that the Japanese had taken this initiative and because they had done so they, of course, made a substantial financial contribution to the package.

As a minor note on that, I recall after the first day of the meeting, the Japanese being hosts were responsible for preparing summary records for the next day's proceedings. I had gotten back to the embassy after the conclusion of that day's session and my phone was ringing. It was the Japanese foreign office saying, “Leary-San, we noticed that you were taking notes. Could you please come and help us prepare our summary records?” They had people taking notes who were perhaps somewhat unfamiliar with the issues and also whose English was not entirely fluent and the records had to be prepared in the English language. I went to the Foreign Ministry and spent until some time after midnight helping them put the records together. Interesting effort.

Q: One of the things that strikes me is that all of this was going on approximately 20 years after the end of the second World War, where Japan, of course, had very different objectives and goals in Asia. As it began to take a more responsible leadership role, with our encouragement, it also had to overcome a lot of history and resistance, I would think on the part of some of the Asian countries that still saw them as the aggressor, not too many years earlier.

LEARY: Quite so. In fact, I recall, in particular on one of my southeast Asia trips, spending a couple of days in Manila and there I found the memories of the Japanese occupation still very much alive and a good deal of resistance to the Japanese. Although, in due course, they did welcome the financial assistance that came. But there was still a great deal of animosity in many of these countries about the Japanese, where memories of World War II were quite fresh.

Q: I guess our objective was to encourage them to do what they could, but we also recognized that these realities existed. That they could go as far as they could, but...One of the other things that was happening in that period were the Kennedy round of trade negotiations conducted under the GATT. Were you involved with that much?

LEARY: To a limited degree. Most of the negotiations were conducted in some areas and were closely held in Geneva, but we did meet with the Japanese periodically in Tokyo to exchange ideas. One of our handicaps was because the negotiations were closely held, some of the lists that were exchanged among countries were not made available by our side to our embassies in those countries, so sometimes we were working in the dark. I recall once mentioning to my Japanese counterpart that I was handicapped if I didn’t have the list about which he was talking. He then made a copy which he then gave to me and from then on we were able to communicate on a much better basis. But there was a good deal of exchange on those issues and we were reporting what we heard in Tokyo about the Japanese positions on various aspects of the Kennedy Round negotiations.

Q: On a bilateral level, certainly a lot in the last couple of decades, in terms of the U.S.-Japan relations has been dominated for considerable periods over both Japanese imports... imports from Japan into the United States and the perception that Japan was not giving fair and equal access to the Japanese market for our products. Had that become a significant issue or issues at
the time that you were there or was that later?

LEARY: That was becoming a significant issue. Not nearly so much as later, but the Japanese were already exporting a large number of consumer electronics, television sets and tape recorders and this sort of thing. Their automobile trade was beginning to develop as well.

As a matter of fact, I recall one session with a group of negotiators from Washington on automobile trade. It was basically a fact finding affair. They couldn’t understand how the Japanese were able to compete so successfully in the United States while our car sales in Japan were extremely limited. This brought out a lot of things. Including the fact that the Japanese had developed very modern trans-oceanic transportation for their vehicles. They had the roll-on and roll-off ships which they were able to use because of the volume of their shipments to the United States. Whereas most American cars were being sent individually on the deck of a freighter. That meant that our costs of shipping a U.S. car from North America to Japan was about ten times the cost of shipping a car from Japan to the United States.

Another major factor was that Japan was building cars to the specifications of the U.S. market, whereas our sales to Japan were so small that most of the American and Canadian production was not geared towards Japan. The roads, the fact that they drive on what we call the wrong side of the road. We were continually trusting the Japanese to open their markets more to foreign goods. I did in fact attend a meeting in Geneva during my tour in Tokyo, a bilateral meeting with the Japanese where we were going over a list of quantitative restrictions that the Japanese had maintained on certain products, and listening to their explanations on why they must continue to do this and they listened to our demands that they begin to accelerate the removal of these restrictions. So that was a continuing thing. I think the bitterness which seemed to enter into our relationships more recently was not yet present at that time. Japan was still considered to be coming out of the wartime crisis and still developing. Although, as I said earlier, they eventually became a much more competitive supplier of goods to world markets.

Q: Were you in Tokyo at the time of the 1964 Olympic Games?

LEARY: Yes we were. We arrived in Tokyo in January of 1964 and the games took place in October. At the time we arrived, the Japanese were engaged in numerous building projects to prepare for the Olympics: extending subway routes, building highways, building stadiums. Just a tremendous effort. And when the games were ready to begin everything had been completed. They had two weeks of the most marvelous weather you could ever imagine. The games were held in October, rather than in the summer because Tokyo tends to have summers which are somewhat equivalent to Washington’s very hot and humid. They decided that October would be the best weather for these games. They went off in fine fashion. Everything went like clockwork. They had organized the populace to assist the foreign visitors. People walking around the streets with labels saying, “I speak English.” and “Je parle français.” So that the visitors could, if they were lost, converse with someone. It was an impressive display.

Q: I left Tokyo in December of 1961 and they were just beginning to gear up and had major plans to be finished by 1964. And they were.
LEARY: After the games many of the facilities that had been built for the games became public and the locations were... For example, the large auditorium which had been built for swimming and diving events was open to the public for swimming during the summer and during the winter they put a floor over the swimming pool and turned it into an ice-skating rink which was open to the public. Other facilities were used in a similar fashion.

Q: I don’t think that you had much Japanese language training before you went to Tokyo. Was that a significant handicap for you?

LEARY: I didn’t find it so in my job. It was a bit of a handicap for day-to-day living, although over time we picked up enough to order meals in restaurants and tell the taxi driver which way to turn. But I was not getting any Japanese language training. We had some occasional language training in the embassy but not enough to get anywhere near carrying on a professional conversation. Most of our economic officers were in the same situation. On the other hand, most of our political officers had been to the Japanese language school where they spent up to two years in Washington and in Japan, I believe in Yokohama at a language school, where they became reasonably fluent in the language. I found that in my own job I was dealing mostly with the Ministry of International Trade and with the Foreign Ministry where the Japanese I was dealing with spoke English quite well. We had some Japanese English-language newspapers... English language abridged editions which were helpful.

Q: Well, is there anything else that we ought to be covering in regards to your assignment in Tokyo? I realize that it’s a... you and I are both having a little bit of trouble remembering exactly what we talked about three weeks ago. We may want to add some things later, but is there anything else that really stands out about that assignment? It sounds like it was a very interesting and satisfying assignment.

LEARY: Oh, absolutely. It was very nice. We were there for almost five years and it was a very professionally satisfying assignment. One thing that happened near the end of my assignment, which led to my next assignment indirectly was a meeting in Tokyo at the ministerial level of ECAFE. It was either late ’67 or early ’68 and one of the issues that appeared on the agenda, as it did on the agendas of all of the UN Regional Commissions and other international bodies where developing and developed countries came together, was the issue of developing a system of tariff preferences for the benefit of developing countries. At the same time the meeting was taking place in Tokyo, there was a ministerial meeting of the OAS in Punte del Este, Uruguay. We had learned that President Johnson, who was attending that meeting for a day to deliver the principle U.S. address, had decided that we would reverse our long-standing opposition to preferences and agree to study the possibilities of instituting a system of preferential treatment.

Our delegation leader in Tokyo, Tex Goldsmith, as I recall, he had come from the U.S. Mission in New York, wanted to be able to mention this turn-around in our policy at the meeting in Tokyo and was attempting to get through by telephone to Uruguay to find out precisely what the President said because he didn’t want to overstep his bounds. Communications had improved greatly from what they had been earlier, but they still were not up to today’s standards and we spent many an hour trying to patch through the telephone call. He finally was able to get through and got the language that the President had used which he was able to repeat in our meeting in
Tokyo to great applause from developing country representatives who were present.

Q: I guess the key aspect of that was whether the announcement of our change in policy related to only the western hemisphere countries, such as Latin America, or was it going to be applicable world-wide.

LEARY: No, I think the language was quite clear that it applied world-wide, but it was delivered in a Latin American forum because we were attempting to, I understand, improve our relations with the Latin American countries at that time. But this was something that they were interested in as well as the other African nations and developing countries.

Q: You mentioned that had a connection with your next assignment. What was that and where did you go from Tokyo?

LEARY: Well, I returned from Tokyo to Washington for my second assignment in the Department. I was assigned as Chief of what was then called the General Commercial Policy Division. This was in April of 1968. That division had become responsible for the President’s commitment on generalized preferences. My assignment, as I said, this was a coincidence that I moved into this job relating to what had happened in Tokyo. But I spent the next four years in that position dealing with a number of interesting issues, but that was perhaps the most time consuming and important issue that we had. The issue was several fold.

STUART P. LILLICO
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Sendai (1964-1969)

Stuart P. Lillico was born in Seattle in 1909 and joined USIS in 1953. During his career Mr. Lillico was posted to India, Ethiopia, Zanzibar, Rhodesia, and Japan. He was interviewed by John Hogan in the fall of 1998.

LILLICO: I began getting quite a few inquiries and openings from places that we could work. At that moment, I was offered a transfer to Japan, which I could not resist, and so we left Kitwe -- and Africa -- in late September, 1964.

Q: Well, Stu, it seems to me your whole background had a great deal more to do with Asia than it did with Africa. But, be that as it may, you went from Northern Rhodesia to Japan. To what city did you go in Japan?

LILLICO: We went to Sendai, which is about two hundred miles north of Tokyo and is generally regarded as the center of the Tohoku area of Japan -- a large chunk of the main island of Japan.

By a happy coincidence, this is the area in which my wife had been brought up. Her parents, American missionaries, had been stationed in Sendai at the time of her birth, and they remained there for nearly ten years. Later, they were transferred to another city, also in Tohoku. Her family
was well-known as educators and was still very affectionately remembered by many people in Sendai.

Q: You speak and read Japanese, and I understand that during World War II, you used that knowledge to good advantage?

LILlico: Yes, both my wife and I worked for the old Army Map Service outside Washington, translating Japanese maps and producing new romanized maps for the Armed Services. We were with a fairly large group of nisei Japanese and some issei doing this translation work. I greatly increased my knowledge of Japan's geography at that time, which was a big help when I went back in 1964.

The USIS in Sendai was a heritage, I guess you would say, of the post-war CI&E operation. It had established libraries and done a great deal of work that USIS came to do later. CI&E was in a large mausoleum of a building -- a great big place almost like the state capitol -- and had a program of films, which was very popular, and scholarships and lecturers. I inherited all of this from a series of excellent people -- they are not PAOs, but were called center directors -- that were there before me.

We remained five years in Sendai, the two-year balance of the tour that had been broken off from Africa and then a second three-year tour that ended in 1969. During that time, I traveled extensively around northern Japan. We worked closely particularly with publishers and radio people. We had a series of seminars for newspaper men, correspondents, editors and publishers, bringing in American newsmen to work with them. We moved this seminar series around from one city to another each year. I think it was an excellent operation, and it continued after my departure and after USIS Sendai closed down. Mrs. Lillico's family had been missionaries in Sendai; she had a good entree into Sendai circles. I feel very relaxed about the job in Sendai. For one thing, I felt at home there. Secondly, my wife's family was relatively well-known so that I had an entree.

Also, by that time, I was sufficiently senior, with a bald head, so that I had automatic standing in Japanese society. People were beginning to refer to me as an elder rather than as a youngster coming in. It was a very happy tour.

Q: Wasn't that area the seat of educational institutions?

LILlico: Yes. Sendai has four big important universities. Two are government institutions: the Tohoku University, which used to be an imperial university, and hence very prestigious, and a prefectural university of education, which was slanted more toward teachers. Then there were two prominent Christian schools. One had been run by my wife's father many years before. The second was a girls' school. All four were important, and we worked closely with the faculty and the student groups there.

Among other things, it was always easy to start an English class. It is amazing how many ideas you can sell if you do it in a form of teaching English conversation.
Q: Well, you have been through the mill, I can see that, and your name is probably as well-known now in Sendai as it was then. Do you ever revisit Japan?

LILLICO: Yes, we went back in 1985, which happened to be our fiftieth wedding anniversary year. We visited Sendai again and met many of our friends of former days. We met the USIS staff, which is now scattered through a lot of other offices. We had an opportunity to talk to a number of people with whom I had been working closely in education, and just buttonholing and shaking hands during my time there.

It was an extremely happy visit. Unfortunately, the weather was poor, which is par, I guess, for Sendai. Here in Hawaii, quite a few of our former contacts in Tohoku pass through on their way to mainland U.S. Very often, they stop over, and we have an opportunity to entertain them.

I have not left Tohoku, Japan behind me by any means. It is still very much a part of my life.

ANDREW F. ANTIPPAS
Consular Officer
Kobe (1965-1966)

Andrew F. Antippas was born in Massachusetts in 1931. He received a bachelor's degree from Tufts University and entered the Foreign Service in 1960. His career included positions in Africa, Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Canada, and Washington DC. Mr. Antippas was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 19, 1994.

Q: You were there from 1965 to 1967. What were you doing in Japan?

ANTIPPAS: I was actually sent to be the Administrative Officer. However, the Consul General was John Stegmaier, a senior Foreign Service Officer, who had been in Japan forever. I sometimes thought that he had forgotten whom he represented, the U. S. or the Japanese. Mrs. Stegmaier was even worse. Her family had been missionaries in Japan for generations. She spoke better Japanese than the Japanese. Anyway, it was decided that I would be a Visa Officer and Vice Consul. John Coffey, who had been in charge of the Consular Section, would also be the Administrative Officer. So I basically did consular work for two years. Eventually, when John Stegmaier left, I was made chief of the Consular Section. Kobe was good to me. I received two, back to back promotions in Kobe and found a wife.

The Consulate in Kobe was basically a "visa mill," but those were the days when vice consuls signed every visa, before we had plates with signatures on them. I remember that in one year I signed 13,000 visas by hand. That was a big workload in those days. I don't know what it would be now--maybe half a million. We have a visa waiver with Japan now. During my time the Consulate was "split." The Consular Section was in the Consulate building in the compound that we had in Kobe. The CG and the Commercial section were in Osaka.
This shows you how the old Foreign Service worked. We had had a Consulate in Kobe since the "opening" of Japan [in 1854]. It's a wonderful town--the most Westernized town in Japan, up until the 1960's, I think. We had a Consul General in 1958 who decided that the Consulate would be in Kobe, because he thought that Kobe was a much more pleasant town. In point of fact, most of the work in the office was in Osaka, which is where the commercial center of gravity was. The Department built this compound--the office was an architectural award winning structure--in Kobe, along with an apartment building providing housing for most of the American staff. But, as I say, most of the work was over in Osaka, so another building was provided in Osaka.

Q: How far away was it?

ANTIPPAS: 25 miles away to the North East. Osaka then had a population of four million people. Kobe had one million. Commuting was really something. Talk about "mob scenes" at the trains. Try riding the subway in Osaka in August--or in winter, for that matter. So I spent one year in Osaka and one year in Kobe.

Eventually, another Consul General decided that everyone should move over to Osaka. Now, I think, they've decided to compromise, since the Consul General's residence was in Nishinomiya, which is halfway between the two. We've now built an office building in Nishinomiya. If you have work to do down at the port, you go in one direction. If you have work to do in Osaka, you go the other way. The train service is excellent.

Q: Did you get any feel for how the Japanese felt about us at that time?

ANTIPPAS: Yes. It's interesting that you say that, because it depended on the turn of the generations. I remember that the American impact, the American occupation of Japan, was very strong after World War II. Remember that, first of all, I was a consular officer. I was involved in protecting American citizens. I remember a senior police officer calling me up at 4:00 AM one day to say that they had some guy in jail for some reason or other. I said, "Fine, I'll be down there first thing in the morning." He replied, "Oh, you must come now, because under SCAP [Supreme Command, Allied Powers--the command headed by General MacArthur] rules we must inform you immediately upon the arrest of your citizens. You must come immediately." In the 1940's and 1950's, SCAP meant MacArthur. I remember getting up and going down to the jail, because they took it so seriously. There are countries, including the United States, which would let weeks go by before the police informed a foreign Embassy or Consulate that they were detaining one of their nationals. Who was I to refuse the police officer's request? But at that time the people in authority still remembered the American occupation, which had been over for about 13 years, at that point. The occupation ended in 1952.

Q: I remember. I was there. I stopped occupying Japan and started protecting it.

ANTIPPAS: That's right. But there were relationships established, and we were still very much a powerful influence in that country, although there were lots of pro-Communist, anti-war demonstrations. If you haven't been in a Japanese demonstration, you really haven't seen anything. Until you see 100,000 people show up for a demonstration, snake dancing down the street, linking arms and chanting, with police five ranks deep in front of your office building,
with water cannon and tear gas to turn people back, you really haven't lived. And you know that they're looking for you.

I remember one time in Kobe. I was in the office at lunchtime. pro-Communist demonstrators showed up, walked into the office, and started reading a communist manifesto--in Japanese, of course--at the top of their lungs. I remember how absolutely infuriated and humiliated I felt at these guys. I just went into my office and closed the door. What else could you do? When they tried that the second time, we locked the door on them and wouldn't let them in the building. They would always come at lunchtime. They complained bitterly to our local employees that they worked at the post office. They said, "We do this on our lunch hour." I felt, "Well, screw you. I don't want you in my office." I've got slides of these demonstrations, taken from inside the building. It was really something to see.

Q: Why was it that in the course of these demonstrations--and I did not serve there at that time--no buildings were burned down, and so forth?

ANTIPPA S: No. They were very careful about property damage. I recall that they painted graffiti on the office wall of this prize-winning building, which is very much in the Japanese style. The wall was made of cinder block--lava type rock. It was very porous, and we had a hell of a time getting those red-painted slogans off the wall. But there was no real property damage. They didn't burn vehicles or hurt anybody. Still, 100,000 people! After you get past 10,000, chanting anti-American slogans, what difference does it make? One of the things that we had in that area, just North of Kobe, was a large, aircraft repair plant. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps used to bring their aircraft there from Vietnam for refurbishing. It was an aircraft "rebuild" facility. I can't remember the name of the place. We had a constant stream of Marine Corps and Navy pilots coming through. This was in 1965-66 at the height of the Vietnam War. The pilots would come up to collect the airplanes.

WILLIAM CLARK, JR.
Principal Officer
Sapporo (1965-1967)

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. His career included posts in Sierra Leone, Japan, South Korea, Egypt, and India. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.

Q: Let me now move on to Sapporo. You have mentioned that you had been offered a position in Kobe, which you turned down. How did the transfer to Sapporo come about?

CLARK: It followed the normal procedure. The Embassy people knew me; I was a language officer; I was the right grade to be the Consul -- principal officer -- in Sapporo. Sapporo had two American officers and an American secretary. So my move to Sapporo was not unusual. The only interesting aspect of it was that I had been offered the Vice-Consul job in Sapporo two years earlier, as I mentioned earlier.
Much of the job was "showing the flag". We tried to focus on what was going as Hokkaido was trying to catch up with the rest of Japan, particularly on the economic front. We tried to find investment opportunities. We did a lot of work on establishing "sister cities" relationships between Sapporo and an American city. I had the usual workload of a principal officer in administering an American consulate. Even though we had a Vice-Consul, I had to do some consular work; we provided the full range of consular services. While I served in Sapporo, there was one American in jail, whom we visited periodically. I also spent a lot of time touring the consular district which covered the whole island of Hokkaido and the three northern prefectures of the main island of Honshu: Aomori, Akita and Ita.

As I said, we worked on commercial matters. That was not a subject that engaged many foreign service officers at the time. At the time I was designated as an economic officer. I liked economics. I did political reporting, although Hokkaido was not in the mainstream of Japanese politics. We provided interesting regional footnotes and sometimes we picked up an interesting tidbit, but our political reporting was only a small contribution to the very few who followed Japanese domestic politics in Tokyo. I doubt whether many of our insights ever reached Washington. As an indication of what was important, I should mention a couple of economic reports that I submitted directly to Washington. That did not sit well with some of the people in Tokyo. The Commercial Counselor in particular was upset because they had not been filed through him. The Political Counselor told me to file reports directly to Washington, with copies to him. I think that difference in approach was a sign of what was important to the Embassy and to Washington.

We were involved in mounting a commercial exhibit in Tokyo. The Embassy had tried to have it done, but had failed. The exhibit was intended to be displayed in second-rank department stores. I knew the man -- Mr. Imai -- who headed the merchants' association; he also directed the largest Hokkaido-owned department store. I went to talk to him to see what could be done. He said he thought he could make the appropriate arrangements and he did. So we actually worked out the Embassy's problem from Sapporo. I was thanked for my efforts by the Embassy official, but somewhat grudgingly.

I was in Sapporo when the city fathers decided to apply for being the Olympic hosts. One of the members of the Imperial household came to the site. Then the Japanese delegation went to Rome to plead its case. Upon their return, I was sent an invitation to a "welcome back" reception. There was an entrance fee for the reception -- not very much, but unusual. I sent one of my staff over to buy the ticket and went. It was probably the first time that an American Consul had ever paid for anything in Sapporo. But it gave me a lot of good publicity. It showed people that the Americans were interested in what was going on. I had already volunteered in messages to Tokyo and the Department that Sapporo was worthy of American support. I became a Sapporo fan, as I became a Naha fan, a Tokyo fan, a Osaka fan -- although always remaining an American fan. Of course, the Olympics were a super special event for them. The final site selection occurred only a few weeks before we left Sapporo, so that I didn't witnesses any of the preparations. I knew where the various Olympic sites would be. In fact, the 12 meter ski jump took place right next to the old Consulate building -- which was a combination office-residence. If I had remained in that office, I could have just turned my chair and looked out at the jump competition. My successor certainly
had a good view of that event.

Sapporo had suffered very little damage during the war. That was generally true also of Kobe. Hakodate was more damaged because it was a port. But in general the northern cities escaped major damage. We did have a major military presence in Sapporo after the war some of which was still there when I served there. We had an Army detachment at Shitoysa, where the airport is. We had an Air Force detachment at Wakkanai which is at the north-west tip of the island. It used to be the departure point for the ferries to Sakhalin Island, when half of it belonged to Japan. We had a large airport base at Misawa in the Iwate Prefecture. I spent a lot of time with the military, particularly those stationed at Shitoysa which was only twenty-five miles away. I tried to involve them in some of my activities in Sapporo; they in turn involved me in base activities. We did get to Wakkanai; it was very isolated. That was interesting because there had lived a famous American who had been in Hokkaido soon after the Maji restoration. His name was William S. Clark. He taught at the Agricultural School, which later became Hokkaido University, one of the Imperial Universities. He only stayed six months, but as when he left, his students -- most of them sons of Samurai families -- walked him to the port. The story goes that his last words to them was : "Boys, be ambitious". So there is now a statue to him of the campus. I don't believe that a solid Victorian gentleman as Clark was, would have said anything as crass as that, but that is the Japanese myth. He may have said :"Boys, be ambitious in Christ", but somewhere the last two words dropped out. He is still well known for his comment. As I said, William Clark's statue was on campus; my name was William Clark; the commander of our military base in Shitoysa was a Colonel William Clark; the commander of the Air Force base in Wakkanai was James Clark. We were never able convince the people of Hokkaido that all of this was a coincidence; they were convinced that all Americans named Clark were sent to their island. They were convinced that the American government intentionally sent Clarks to Hokkaido as a tribute to the first one. I have a picture somewhere of the four Clarks standing in front of the statue of the first one.

My days as Consul were very varied. I spent about one fourth of my time traveling around. I liked to drive around Hokkaido. At the time we still used a "one-time" pad -- that is a device by which you manually encode and decode messages. It was great fun, although hard to imagine today, thirty years later. It was particularly aggravating when you had to decode a twenty page message, the essence of which could be read in the following day's newspaper. That work-load wasn't too great and the secretary and I used to take turns. I did a lot of the administrative work -- accounts, personnel, etc. I saw a lot of people who used to drop in to the Consulate. I did some visa work, although that was the main responsibility of the Vice-Consul. I wrote reports. We did a little of everything.

With rare exceptions -- e.g. when talking to my American colleagues -- I spoke only Japanese for my two years in Sapporo. No one expected me to speak English; we conducted all of our business in Japanese. I could not have asked for a better opportunity to become immersed in the language. Hokkaido attracted people from all parts of Japan. So the islanders spoke Japanese very close to "Hojungu" -- that is the Japanese used by NHK broadcasting system -- which is considered the "true" language. So the Japanese that I learned and used was as devoid of dialect as I could have hoped.
The social life was quite active. We had a Japan-America Society; I was a member of the Rotary Club, where I met a lot of people. I used to speak to Lions' Clubs, many of which were in remote towns throughout the island. A lot of the social life was work-related; it was another opportunity to meet people and to make a pitch for whatever US policy was on the top of the agenda at the moment. The Japanese in Hokkaido were perhaps even more friendly than those in Kobe. They had a long connection with the US, starting with the Maji restoration. At that time, they asked a former US Secretary of Agriculture, Forrest Caplan, to bring a team to Hokkaido to assist in the planning for the economic development of the island. That team -- sixty people -- actually assisted in drawing up the city plan for Sapporo; it is based on the "grid" concept which was later also used for Nara and Shinten in China. It was in fact a very ancient concept, but the "wheel was reinvented" for Sapporo. The story goes that the team laid out a North-South "grid", but then someone came along and pointed out that the "North" was the "magnetic North" and not the "true" North, making it three degrees off. The planner thanked the kibitzer profusely, revised the plan so that it is now six degrees off. I can't vouch for the accuracy of the story, but it is an enduring tale. The Caplan team laid out the railroad that goes to the port of Otaru. It conducted a geological surveys. So it was a very active mission; I think Caplan's diaries are still in the Department of Agriculture. So our relationships with Hokkaido go back many, many years, although we didn't open a Consulate in Sapporo until after World War II.

Q: I would like to ask you about the local staffs both in Kobe and Sapporo. Were they competent?

CLARK: It was competent. By the time I arrived in Kobe-Osaka in 1963, most of the staff had probably been working for the US government for about fifteen years -- that is, right after the war. So we had some first class personnel because working for the US Consulate was the best job in town. It paid well and seemed to have an assured future. Even after the local economy took off, these people stayed with us, although, for example, when Tupperware came to Kobe, they hired two of our best employees. One became general manager and the other the plant manager. Most of our employees were bilingual to a degree, although their reports required considerable editing. The Sapporo staff was much smaller. There we had an administrative assistant, two women in the Visa Section, two boiler men and a driver and two political assistants -- one was very good, the other had been with the Consulate for a long time. The latter was essentially a Russian linguist who spent much of his time reading Russian newspapers. He was not terribly productive, but he was the senior local employee. He used to tell me that before the other fellow as hired that he used to perform those functions. One time, after we had sent the new employee to the US for training, we faced out annual Fourth of July party. I told the older man that this was his opportunity to show me what he used to do before the new man was hired -- that is introduce the guests, etc. He promptly got drunk. We finally found some way to ease him out without appearing to be heartless employers. As in the Kobe case, we had no trouble employing local staff when the Consulate was opened; as the Japanese economy developed, it became increasingly harder to attract the top talent. In Sapporo, we had no local staff working on economic-commercial matters; in Kobe, there must have been ten professionals working together with five American officers. Today, Kobe has one reporting officer -- the Consul General.

Q: I would like to discuss Japanese political development, starting with your Kobe experiences and then your Sapporo tour. What are your recollections about those local political situations?
CLARK: I think we now understand that as, Tip O'Neill was so fond of saying, all politics are local. It was relatively easy to see in Japan who did things for a city or a prefecture. There were plaques on buildings which not only provided the name of the sponsor, but what his job was at the time. So everybody knew who was doing the city a favor and that did not go unnoticed. The government was and still is highly centralized, but governors and assemblies for example are elected by their prefectures. The mayors are elected by city residents as are city councils. So there is some local autonomy, but taxation is centrally controlled and mostly collected by the center and then distributed back to the localities.

The Japanese have a custom which requires that if you wanted people to turn out at the polls or at a demonstration or some public gatherings, they had to be paid "Karumidi", which covered their transportation and eating costs for the day. That was not viewed as a payment for services received; it was just a fair and just compensation for out-of-pocket expenses. That meant that people who wanted to be candidates were expected to have enough means to make such payments.

The local assemblies focused essentially on how they wanted their prefecture to develop. During the early 1960s, manufacturing in Japan was much more centralized than it is today. It existed primarily around Tokyo and Osaka. In other prefectures, funds were used to develop industrial estates -- preparing the land, putting in infrastructure (roads, utilities, etc) -- in an effort to attract manufacturing plants. That became an effective strategy. Eventually, plants were build away from Tokyo and Osaka, partially because the central government also accepted the concept of decentralization. But this Japan-wide development was largely the doing of the prefectural assemblies. Before the end of the year, one would invariably see a lot of infrastructure work because they needed resources to buy the traditional year-end gifts. It always took a lot more time to fill in the holes after New Year's than it did to dig them before the end of the year. But people got paid mostly before the end of the year. The arguments in the assemblies were primarily which geographic areas would get that year's projects. This were small projects because the large ones, such as port improvements for example, had to be led and funded by the central government. The taxation system in Japan is known as "kofusei" in which the central government basically taxes prefectures according to their abilities to pay and then distributes the funds according to needs. The poorer prefectures therefore get more tax money back than they paid in; all prefectures have their own taxing authority. For example, sales taxes go to the prefecture, but the percentage to be levied is decided by the central government. Some of the funds that were returned from Tokyo were designated for specific expenditures; some could be allocated by the prefectural government.

Sapporo was supported in part by the Hokkaido Development Agency, as a reflection, I think, of its lag in development behind the rest of the country. It got therefore special assistance and consideration. It was the poor part of Japan.

In Kobe-Osaka, we used to meet with the socialists and the communists, but they were not that anxious to interact with us. They kept pretty much to themselves. We were encouraged by our people in Tokyo to meet all sections of society, regardless of party. In Kobe, I relearned an important lesson. There was never a restriction in Japan in meeting opposition parties as I ran
into later in Korea, for example. We were encouraged to meet a large variety of Japanese; our problem was much more with the lack of interest of certain Japanese groups to meet with Americans. Sapporo was somewhat different; I got to know people much more on a personal basis because it was a much smaller community. I got to know the spokesman for the Communist Party because he was a student of Abraham Lincoln. So we used to spend the middle part of our conversation talking about Lincoln; the first part of the talk was devoted to the petition or complaint that brought him to the office in the first place. We would discuss that, then we would talk about Lincoln. when he decided that he had spent enough time in my office, he would say something outrageous. I would say that he couldn't make comments like that in my office and there upon he would get up to leave. It was a well choreographed discussion. I rather liked him and we along well. We were almost at a point on a couple of occasions in working out a couple of joint programs - debates - but we could never quite put it together although we did get close. The tough crowd was the young socialists; they were militants. They would come to the office and march upstairs and then we would go through a routine that left them well frustrated. This was the period when Vietnam was a hot button in Japan; we would have demonstrations against our policies. Those demonstrated would usually march on the Governor's office; the route passed right in front of the Consulate. So, even if we were not the main target, we would get some side effects. The police came to me on a couple of occasions to request that our gates be closed. I told them that since it was during working hours, that such action would be inappropriate. I would only do so if they would declare that leaving the gates open would endanger the Consulate; they were never willing to go that far. So we left the gates open; sometimes I would even stand by the gate and watch the demonstrators go by. They would chant slogans, then stop and wave and then move on chanting their slogans again. In Kobe especially, the presence of the "Akusa" -- "Yamagucigumi" -- was noticeable. This one of the larger Japanese gangster gangs. That was not true in Sapporo; there you knew they ran some prostitution rings, but the gangs were not that visible.

When tension really began to build up in Osaka -- that was in my second year at the post -- we had a number of demonstrations in the building, part of which we occupied. Our offices were on the ninth floor. The building had two elevators. It was a public building and that prevented the police from stopping people -- according to their interpretation of the law. On the ninth floor, we had a small lobby where one existed from the elevators. Then there was a large desk for the receptionist which blocked the entrance to our offices. Demonstrators would take the elevators, get off and then block further ingress to our offices by just sitting down in the lobby. When I first arrived at the post, the Consul General had decreed that no Americans could be visible to the demonstrators; just members of the Japanese staff. I suggested that we couldn't send the Japanese employees to face any risks that we were not willing to take ourselves. So I went to the lobby, which was very instructive. The demonstrators would chant that they wanted to see the Consul General. They overlooked me; that is not whom they wanted to see. So I sat on the desk and listened. At some point, they would start singing "The Internationale". I found that if I could make eye contact with the demonstrators, they would stop singing. So that is what I tried to do and eventually, they stopped singing. They stood up for the singing; when they stopped, they would all sit down again. Finally, the police would come up and ask them to leave. When the police arrived, the demonstrators would all link arms. Then the lieutenant would point to one of the demonstrators and the police would cart him or her off. It was always rather jovial at the beginning of the demonstration. But after a half hour or so, the police would begin to become fed
up and got a little rough. This process of carting off a demonstrator one at the time went well until the police got to the ring leaders. They would invariably stand up, tell the police not to touch them and then majestically stalk off to the elevator and leave. So it was only the followers who got beaten up. It was a process that was repeated over and over again.

These experiences led me to the conclusion that the socialist-communist support both in Kobe-Osaka and Sapporo was essentially formalistic; beyond the leaders, there was probably not much intellectual commitment. As I mentioned earlier, no one ever instructed me not to interact with socialists or communists. Soon after I arrived in Japan, Douglas MacArthur 2nd was replaced by Edwin Reischauer. The two had entirely different perspectives about Japan and its politics. John Emmerson, who was the DCM, was a target for Japanese conservatives because while he served in SCAP, he was responsible for insuring that political prisoners were released from jail. So he was at the jail's door when the communists and socialists were released and therefore was called the "Red Dean" by the conservatives. Emmerson was also a McCarthy target because he had been one of the "China hands"; he had transferred from there to be part of MacArthur's staff in Japan. Then he came back to Japan as DCM thirteen years later.

The debate in the Embassy in the early 1960s was more about when the Socialists might take power or more likely, when might they win enough seats -- one-third -- in the Diet so that they would be able to block legislation. The Embassy was concerned with socialist-communist influence in the labor movements. The largest supporter of the Socialist Party was Sojio -- the labor union that mainly represented government employees. But this did not prevent us from talking to the socialists. I have never been in the communist headquarters in Tokyo, but I have certainly visited all the others. The unions were not anti-American per se; they did object strongly to our Vietnam policy. Up to a point, they were anti-capitalist; that is as long as it didn't interfere with their own capitalist enterprise. Some communists were theologically committed to their cause, but I think most were like a young student I met who attended Ottaro Commercial College in Sapporo. He was studying economics in a department that had a good reputation. The faculty was essentially Marxist. On one occasion, I pointed out to the student that he was going to college, learning Marxists economics and living in a society which was booming under a capitalist philosophy. I asked why he was studying Marxist economics. He told me that it was easier. Keynesian economics were very difficult. He was going to work for a private concern and make his fortune, but in the meantime, he would learn the "easier" economics.

The US military bases were not subjected to many demonstrations in the 1960s. Certainly the one in Wakkanai was protected because it was the mainstay of the community. The same was true for Misawa because it was also a large employer. This was true even while we were being subjected to anti-Vietnam demonstrations; the military was left relatively unscathed. There were some efforts by the socialists and communists to generate anti-American feelings. I remember once being at an American Coast Guard station in Hokkaido; it had a big antenna and a Loren system which was used to assist to assist ships at sea to know their positions. It was a useful installation for ships of all nations. The communists started to voice complaint about the antenna tower on the grounds that its electronic emanation would sterilize all the women in the area and would lift all the umbrellas within its reach and gobble them up. As far as I know, no umbrella ever got stuck in the tower.
CLARK: Pretty much as it does today. The basic unit of the Party was a faction. Each faction centered on one man and because of that tended to have geographic allegiances. (Inaudible), for example, was strong in Kansai and Kyushu. He used to collect on every lemon that was grown. The factions were built around strong men. At the time, the party machine was very predictable. I did not generally talk to the senior Party members; I talked mostly to the junior members. Most people knew who the next Prime Minister would be and who would succeed him. It was a ritual with strict rules and therefore completely predictable. That system broke down starting with Tanaka, which was in the late 1970s. The Sapporo-Hokkaido faction was not influential; it had adherents, but few financial resources. It was important that the island remain in the LDP fold. So the Party sent a heavy hitter to the island soon after the war, when the island had elected a socialist governor and assembly. So the LDP sent the man who had been the Chief of Police in Tokyo when the Emperor surrendered. Before the war, when governors were appointed, he had been a governor. His family came from Hokkaido, so he was sent by the LDP to contest the next election. He ran and won the governorship, which he held for twelve years. He gave up a promising career in Tokyo where he would probably have become a Cabinet member, but became a major political force in Hokkaido.

Money in the 1960s was not as important as it became in later decades. Elections did not cost as much, so that the need was not fully there. We knew pretty well who was getting paid in Sapporo, but it was no a major concern. It didn't take a genius to figure how the money was collected -- mostly from businesses -- and to whom it was then paid. We are now talking about sixteen years after the war; families had not become rich. The Dodge plan had redistributed the wealth; it took the money class a few years to recover and return to its pre-war prominence. So it was not the issue that it later became. In fact, money had always flowed in the Japanese political system, but in the 1960s, as I said, campaigns were not as costly, life styles were simpler and therefore politicians were did not spend as freely as they did later. Eventually, the political-financial system got out of hand, but that was much later. Like so many matters in Japan, a business and later a family, had a status to maintain; people felt intuitively what was "right" in terms of amounts of donations to political leaders. Businesses were not only donating to the LDP. I spoke to a lot of businessmen who told me that they supported the LDP, but that they also gave some donations to the Socialists, to "cover their bets". As I said before, Hokkaido did not have many financial resources. Okinawa had not yet been returned to Japan; so that the island at the northern and southern tip of the chain did not share the benefits that the larger islands enjoyed.

Sometime later on, the British made a big fuss over the tariff that was being applied to their scotch. Their whisky sold well, but they wanted to sell more by reducing the price. A bottle of Johnny Walker's Black cost about fifty dollars at the time. The British finally convinced the Japanese government to lower the tariff; the prices were reduced significantly. The sales plummeted. Johnny Walker's Black was a known item; everyone knew what it cost. Once the price was reduced, people thought that they were being given cheap merchandise.

Q: Let me ask you about your relationship with the Embassy. Who was your supervisor?
CLARK: It was the DCM, as I recall. The Embassy had a supervising Consul General, but his jurisdiction had been the subject of many vigorous debates. When I was in Sapporo, the DCM supervised the constituent posts. In fact, there was not much supervision at all. The Embassy requested very little of us; most of our work was self-generated. It was also true that we were probably not kept current by the Embassy. But you must remember that this was before modern communication facilities. So our expectations were not as high; we didn't expect to be "fully" informed. That is not true today, of course. Officers today feel that unless they see all of the daily cable traffic, they are somehow deprived. We got the information that we needed. I got to Tokyo finally, after having been in Sapporo for a year, for a principal officers' meeting. The DCM said that he hadn't seen for a year. I told him that we had no need for anything and the Embassy had not asked for anything; so that I had not seen any need to visit. He was surprised that I had not come to Tokyo before, but I was spending all of my travel allotment touring my district. I thought it was a very good situation; I was happy with the Embassy's lack of supervision.

Q: Let me ask you about Japanese attitudes in the 1960s. Did you get many comments about rearmament?

CLARK: Not really. I got more comments about the whether the Japanese should even have a Self-Defense Force. The Self-Defense officers used to go to work in Tokyo in civilian suits; their uniforms were kept in a locker at their offices. If they were seen in uniform, people would point to them and call them "tax worms". People did not hold the Americans responsible for this Self-Defense force. Sometimes, there would be a discussion on why we had written in Article 9 of the Constitution -- barring Japan from a military establishment that could be involved in off-shore actions -- and then support the establishment of a Self-Defense Force. But there was not much of that even. The communists were of course adamantly opposed to any military. I used to tease them by asking to name one communist country that did not have an armed force. To them, that was a different issue and not related to Japanese affairs.

The American military presence was not much of an issue either. For example, there is a little town in the middle of Hokkaido, called Nayoro, which was the home base for a Self-Defense Force unit. In the mid-1960s, our Special Forces were stationed in Okinawa. An arrangement had been made between the military which permitted our Special Forces to come to Nayoro for joint winter exercises in the snow. The Mayor of Nayoro was a socialist. He came to my office and slammed a protest on my desk. I asked him what did he want me to do about it. He said that he didn't expect any action; he had delivered his protest and returned to Nayoro, undoubtedly telling his supporters of his vigorous efforts. So the Socialists had a position, but their defense of it was hardly vigorous or credible. Of course, Hokkaido was in a somewhat different situation from the rest of Japan. It was the closest island to the USSR; some of its fishermen were picked up by the Soviets for fishing in the wrong area or to pass information. My driver had been a prisoner of war in the USSR for five years; he was not very happy with his former captors. There were people in Hokkaido who had been forcibly removed from the Kurils by the Soviets. So many islanders were anxious and bitter about the Soviets; there was a different mood on Hokkaido then there was in the rest of Japan. It was certainly different from that which the Japanese in Kobe-Osaka exhibited.

There was one interesting development during the fifteen year span between my service in
Sapporo and later in Tokyo. When I was in Hokkaido, it was the stronghold of the Japanese drive for the return of the northern islands from the USSR. Later, when I served in Tokyo, the center of that sentiment shifted to Honshu -- the main island and south of Hokkaido. The attachment to the northern islands did not stem from family ties, as some does in the Koreas. All the Japanese had been evacuated from the northern islands. There were family graves there which was one reason for the drive. The other was that the islands had been traditionally part of Japan. Furthermore, those island provided good fishing grounds. I must say that, even while I was in Sapporo, I had the feeling that if the northern islands had been returned to the Japanese, very few, if any Japanese, would have returned there. These islands were not paradise. If they were to be returned today, they would be developed as fishing grounds, but there won't be many settlers. The issue is mostly one of national pride.

MARGARET J. BARNHART
Consular Officer
Tokyo (1965-1968)

Margaret J. Barnhart was born in 1928 in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. She graduated from Goucher College in 1950 with a major in international relations. She joined UESCO and was employed there between 1951 and 1955. Following that she worked for the State Department in the Speakers Bureau. In 1961 she enlisted in the Foreign Service and held positions in Paris, Tokyo, Jerusalem, Bangkok, and Rio de Janerio as well as several positions in the Department of State. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

BARNHART: Before they left, the assignment changed to Kobe-Osaka, Japan. Following home leave, so I was assigned to Japanese area study. I was on home leave when we got word that I was assigned to Tokyo instead. I went to Tokyo. I got there in March of ’65 and stayed till March/April of ’68. It was a three-year assignment then.

Q: What were you doing there?

BARNHART: I started out in the Visa Office for a year. I spent a few months in the Passports- in the Passports/Citizenship. It was pretty routine work. Because there were a lot of military in Japan, stacks of passports would come in since they wanted to travel outside of Japan. Anyway, there was just an awful lot of routine work on that section. So I then got down to the Welfare Whereabouts section and worked as a deputy there. There were just two officers, and then when the head left - Lou Gallo, I think - I replaced him as head of Welfare and Whereabouts, and I loved that. Lots of interesting things there, plane crashes. On a Friday night we had word that a CPAL had crashed at the local airport, and that there were six, seven, or eight Americans aboard. The head of the office was visiting, so I had this disaster. Japan being a place where you do not bury, there is no such thing as embalming. Cremation is the only thing. At Tachikawa we had an Air Force base with a mortuary, and so they agreed to take the six or seven Americans and take care of embalming, and preparation for shipping the remains to the U.S. The very next morning I was called. There was another plane crash. The first was a CPAL, this one was a BOAC that
flew into Mount Fuji. 89 Americans aboard, all from Minnesota's Dairy Queens. Despite rules to the contrary, I suggested we call Washington, since most were constituents of the Vice President, Hubert Humphrey. In those days you sent Western Union messages on death cases. But that was a very bad crash.

Q: Oh, yes.

BARNHART: Two of them, one within 12 hours really. And the instructions from Paris didn't apply really. That's where we had group of transvestites, an entertaining group. There's when we found the clothing and identification of Mary Jones, and we found the passport was John Jones. There were all kinds of interesting things in Tokyo, too.

Q: Did you have to deal with the police at all there?

BARNHART: Yes, we dealt with the police, and it worked very well. I inherited a police group from my predecessor who left, and so I held weekly English conversation classes at my residence. I had policemen come in, and they would say, "Oh, you bad people. Look what you did to Hiroshima and this family," and I said, "Oh, you bad people. Look what you did to Pearl Harbor." "Oh, we didn't do that. Those are bad people we had." What can you say? "This was done by our bad people, but you, the United States, are to blame."

There was a lot of military there. And most of our prisoners would be in military jails. I used to visit them frequently. I used to lace fruitcake at Christmas time with rum, because I could get that past the prison officials. I had all kinds of interesting prisoners there, and a lot of deaths and just a little bit of everything.

Q: Were there any particularly bad cases of people arrested?

BARNHART: There was one man who was on the - Ringwald, I think - he was on the FBI 10 Most Wanted List as a forger, and he was caught forging checks in Japan. Eventually he went to jail. He insisted he didn't want an attorney. He wanted to conduct his own defense. Fascinating. "I didn't hurt anyone," he said. He called in the bank teller, the owner of the bank, all kinds of people. I think the checkbook was also a forgery. He wasn't hurting anyone, and he said the insurance company paid the bank, so no one lost any money. It's not a crime. They didn't buy that. So I used to visit him, and I said, "You know, when you get out of here, you go back to the States with this charge." He said, "Don't you worry about me." He had five passports. But he said, "Not to worry. I can get out." I'm sure he had six or seven more passports.

There was one, however, a murderer who moved back and forth between military and civilian jails. My predecessor taught the Japanese jail how to make hamburgers for our American men, and they did, but by the time I took over, they said, "We can't do this any longer. It's too expensive." They were using ground beef, period. And I said, "Well, you know, bread crumbs, put some things in it." "Oh." Fun things to do.

The one death that I remember - the first one I went to was in a hotel in Tokyo. It was late at night when they called. When I arrived at the hotel, the Japanese police were there. I said, "Well,
I have to take this and this and this." "All right, fine." The Japanese never gave me any trouble for being a female, really. But then they started to do an autopsy on the spot, and I said, "I'll wait outside." He was a visiting businessman.

In Tokyo I took judo lessons, I took Chinese cooking lessons, I gave English language classes. There was so much going on all the time. It was a very active post.

Q: *Who was the Consul General then?*

BARNHART: Tom Murfin.

Q: *How did he run things?*

BARNHART: Just fine. He left you on your own pretty much. He was very, very friendly and very low key. Barbara Watson, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, came through on one of her first visits. I had decided I wanted to stay in Tokyo for another two years. She said she'd support a request for an extension of at least another year. The Department came back and said, "Absolutely not. We already have her assigned, and the NEA Bureau will not release her."

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**EDWARD M. FEATHERSTONE**  
Staff Aide to Ambassador  
Tokyo (1965)

Director, American Cultural Center, USIS  
Niigata (1966-1968)

USCAR Officer  
Okinawa (1968-1970)

*Mr. Featherstone was born in New York City and raised there and in Japan. After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania and serving in the US Army, in 1961 he entered the Foreign Service. As a Japanese language and area specialist Mr. Featherstone served primarily in Japanese posts, including Kobe-Osaka, Yokohama, Niigata, Okinawa (Consul General) and Tokyo. He also served in Barbados and in Washington. Mr. Featherstone was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1999.*

Q: Well, at the end of your language training, you were moved to Niigata, I understand, on the other side of Japan.

FEATHERSTONE: I did go to Niigata, but first I spent a year (1965-1966) at the embassy in Tokyo. It was sort of a fluke that I was assigned to the USIS post at Niigata. The only reason I got the job is, I sat next to a chief of USIS, at the ambassador’s staff meeting. I was the ambassador’s staff aide. The USIS chief told me he had this fellow coming in who was some
kind of a hippie. He was dope smoking, and a no-goodnik, in his opinion. I don’t really know what he was like.

Q: *In 1960s, could have been.*

FEATHERSTONE: That’s right. He didn’t want this guy. Apparently, he investigated it. The only way he could avoid taking him was to get somebody onboard who was already in the country. He turned to me at the meeting and said, “Featherstone, do you want to go to Niigata?” I said, “Well, why not?” He arranged it, and I went to Niigata. He didn’t have to take Mr. pot smoker. My wife and I went up there. Probably, out of all the tours we had, it was the most enjoyable.

Q: *You were Director of the American Cultural Center?*

FEATHERSTONE: Yes.

Q: *That was quite a possibility for a young officer.*

FEATHERSTONE: Well, we had about eight or nine cultural centers at the time. We had one in Sendai, one in Niigata, one in Hiroshima. Later on, of course, when the budget thing got bad, we closed all these. I don’t think we have anything now to speak of, except the consulate, I suppose. In those days, we had cultural centers. Indeed, I had a budget. I had about five employees. I had a little van, and we used to drive around to give talks. I would arrange shows on American art work and so forth. Actually, it was one of the best tours I ever had.

Q: *Were any other countries represented in Niigata?*

FEATHERSTONE: Niigata, no. There were no others. We had visitors occasionally from the embassy. Occasionally, we would get other foreign people, diplomats from other countries. There were none stationed there.

Q: *Did you do the usual thing? Did you have a library?*

FEATHERSTONE: We had a library. We had books. As a matter of fact, I remember one case with Russians. There were a lot of Russians there because Niigata is a port city and a lot of ships came from to the Soviet Union. They used to come into Niigata to go shopping. You couldn’t buy anything in the Soviet Union. They came in all the time. They came into my cultural center one time and wanted to know if they could borrow some books. I gave them Milovan Djilas and all sorts of things. I figured this was probably a really good opportunity to get with these people. I gave these books away. Later on, I got some flack for it. Eventually, my boss took care of them.

Q: *Did you do such things as teach English there?*

FEATHERSTONE: No. My wife taught some English, but we really didn’t do any English teaching. It was set up for English teachers. We could get people in touch with English teachers and what not, but we didn’t do any of it ourselves.
Q: How about reporting. Did you do any reporting, because you were in a unique spot out there?

FEATHERSTONE: Not much. I used to write occasionally, if we had big things, like an earthquake, or some kind of fire or a big scandal of some sort. I would write a monthly letter to the consulate general or to my superior. I used to jot things down and write to him, but it would be a stretch to call it reporting, I think.

Q: You must have had a chance to perfect your language skill out there too?

FEATHERSTONE: I did. There was virtually no one who spoke English. Well, there were a few academic types who spoke English, but almost all the people I dealt with were Japanese. It was a good opportunity to learn the language.

Q: What was the local reaction to our involvement in Vietnam?

FEATHERSTONE: It was overwhelmingly negative. The Japanese, for the most part, thought it was foolish. They thought we were getting into something that we would regret, which turned out to be the case, indeed. They had also been involved in southeast Asia for many years in many different ways. They were of the view that we would come to grief and they failed to understand what our interest in being there. When I say it was negative, we had some demonstrations and some protests. But, it was not ugly.

Q: Nothing violent.

FEATHERSTONE: No, nothing violent. We had people send us letters and occasionally there would be people who would demonstrate holding placards around the cultural center. But, we had no real trouble.

Q: Was Communist influence noticeable in Niigata?

FEATHERSTONE: There certainly was Communist influence. I won’t say it was a hot bed of Communism, or anything like that, but we had unions who were very leftist. Their propensity was to side with the people against us, whoever that happened to be, whether it was the Russians or whomever. We had no trouble with it, but you had to be aware of it at all times.

Q: Any Red Chinese or North Korea presence or influence out in that region?

FEATHERSTONE: I guess there was but we didn’t come in contact with them at all. Occasionally, there would be a Chinese visit, but they usually were going to Tokyo or someplace like that. It didn’t affect us much, where we were.

Q: Did the ambassador visit? I think it was Alex Johnson then, wasn’t it?

FEATHERSTONE: Alex Johnson came down several times while I was the director of the cultural center. Of course, Alex Johnson is an old Japan hand. He knew people and spent time
there. In fact, he had been there, I believe, before the war.

Q: He has. In his biography, he talks about that. Any U.S. military bases in the area there?

FEATHERSTONE: Not in the Niigata area, but there are many in the Tokyo area. The largest naval base in the world is at Yokosuka, Japan. It is the largest U.S. naval base. That is still the case, as a matter of fact. It has the largest dry dock in the world. The Japanese built it for the Imperial Navy. Somebody knew what they were doing back then. We didn’t bomb any of that stuff. We have used them in about five wars since then. I was always amazed. We always think that Americans aren’t very forward looking, in the sense that we aren’t anticipating what is going to come up. But, somebody had done that all right.

Q: Was there much criticism in Niigata about the Japanese security relationship with the U.S.? It was getting stronger at that time.

FEATHERSTONE: Right. Leftist agitators, of course, were very strongly opposed to that. At demonstrations, they would come to protest the cultural center. They would drop their letters or whatever they had to tell us. They were always reasonably polite. There was no unpleasantness about it. There was a heavy communist element in all this, and still is. Some of the labor unions in Japan are very leftist. Communist may be going a bit far, but they are certainly quite leftist.

Q: How about our racial policies? Were you attacked in that regard?

FEATHERSTONE: No, I never was. I don’t think that ever came up. A lot of Asian Americans served, from Hawaii and what not. The Japanese are racists themselves. They look down on anyone who is darker than they. They treated people like Eurasians and others when they occupied them, very badly. The Japanese are not real keen on opposing racism. I don’t think in their heart they do oppose it.

Q: Well, at the end of this tour, which seems to have been a very pleasant one, you went to Okinawa. Did you ask for that or did that just happen?

FEATHERSTONE: They offered it to me. I think maybe it was Owen, I can’t really remember, but they had this job opening. In Okinawa, the big issue then was we were holding it, and Japan wanted it back. We were holding it for good reason. We had strategic interests there. It was weighing very heavily on us, though. This was in the height of the Cold War. We had a situation whereby the Japanese wanted Okinawa returned to Japan and the U.S. wanted to retain all of its bases in Okinawa.

Q: Well, they got reversion.

FEATHERSTONE: The thing about the reversion of Okinawa was the Japanese wanted Okinawa back, in essence. We wanted to keep it. In fact, we wanted to keep it for a number of good reasons. This was a major issue during the entire time I was there, as to what we would do. The United States’ key military people wanted to keep Okinawa and wanted to keep it as long as possible. Of course, The State Department had determined that it would be injurious to our
interest if we got into a situation where the Japanese got angry at us or very dissatisfied with this whole thing or the Okinawan people themselves wanted Okinawa returned to Japan. They would have rather been under Japan than under us. It was a very peculiar situation. The Okinawans hate the Japanese. Here they were, in a situation where they wanted to go back to Japan, but I believe their reasons for wanting to go back were more economic than anything else. The Japanese could provide much more aid, and, of course, they spoke the same language. They were easier to deal with and so forth. I think these were the reasons that motivated them, more than anything else. There was no question, the Japanese wanted to have Okinawa revert to their control.

Q: What would you say Okinawa’s status in international law was at the time?

FEATHERSTONE: There was no question that it was under the authority of the United States of America. We controlled it. I don’t think the Japanese questioned that. They questioned whether we should keep it as long as we were, but I don’t think there was any doubt that they knew we controlled it, legally and any other way. Of course, we used it. We had all kinds of stuff, including nukes in Okinawa at the time. We had a huge armament situation there. We had airfields. I believe Kadena was the largest airfield in the world where B-52 bombers took off during the Vietnam War. All this would have vastly complicated our military situation if we had to revert Okinawa.

Q: What was your job title in those days in Okinawa? You weren’t vice consul anymore.

FEATHERSTONE: I wasn’t vice consul anymore. I was an officer with USCAR [U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus].

Q: Were you a political advisor?

FEATHERSTONE: No, I wasn’t a political advisor. I was with the U.S. Civil Administration in the Ryukyu Islands, what they called USCAR. I was simply a USCAR officer, I guess you could say. We had the civil administrator, who at that time was Stanley Carpenter.

Q: Oh, Stan. I know Stan.

FEATHERSTONE: He was the civil administrator. I worked for Stan, actually. It was exciting, I must say. For all the problems we had, and the tensions with the Japanese, it was an exciting place to be. We were doing things, and we wrote reports that really made an impact.

Q: Were your reports sent to Tokyo or to the department, or to both?

FEATHERSTONE: Well, they were mostly in the form of cables. They did go to Tokyo, of course. We sent them to other places as well. Sometimes, for various reasons, it was cut-off. On the whole, I thought it was a very exciting time. We were trying to work toward convincing the armed forces of the United States that reverting Japan back to Okinawa would be a good thing. In the last part of this, I worked directly for the commanding general of Okinawa. At that time, it was a man named James B. Lampert. He was a three-star U.S. general. I think his last job before coming to Okinawa was as the commandant at West Point. He was, in fact, a West Pointer.
himself. But, General Lampert was quite a perceptive fellow and good to deal with. It was a little dicey for me, because of course I had to take care of his interests, while at the same time, take care of the Department of State’s interest, pushing for reversion. I found him to be very understanding. I had a great deal of respect for him. He is now dead, God rest his soul.

Q: As is Stan Carpenter.

FEATHERSTONE: As is Stan Carpenter.

Q: Well, while you were there, they had their first election, I believe, the first one after the war. They elected a socialist, as chief executive. Were we surprised, first of all?

FEATHERSTONE: No, not terribly. We anticipated that he was probably going to be elected. It didn’t matter all that much. The United States forces continued control over Okinawa. Whoever the chief executive was, he couldn’t do much more than cause some trouble with us, by hosting demonstrations, or fomenting them and so forth.

Q: Of which, there were a number, I guess.

FEATHERSTONE: Of which there were a number. But, they were never violent. Beyond putting up with them, there was no real trouble. The man’s name was Yara. He was an educator, basically. He became the chief executive. He was a decent fellow. I met with him a lot of times. I met with General Lampert regularly. I would be the translator. I should say that they had a man named George Sankey there, who was a Japanese American. He did the translating and I did the writing up of the report. I did the cable that went out. It was an exciting time, and I certainly enjoyed it.

Q: Did you get involved in the labor grievances at the bases there? I gather there were a number of those.

FEATHERSTONE: There were a number of those. Peripherally, I did, yes. We had a labor section. They had about four or five people in it. They did most of the labor work. Of course, it impinged on our area too, because what labor did affected the political situation, with regards our bases. I maintained a fairly close liaison and I had a lot to do with the labor people. Occasionally, I had disagreements with them. I wanted to further with regards to giving the Japanese more leeway. They wanted to be more restrictive, so we sometimes had conflicts there. Well, not conflicts, but disagreements. I will say that most of the time the Civil Administration won.

Q: There was a problem with nerve gas munitions too, I gather.

FEATHERSTONE: Yes, I wasn’t too much involved with that, Tom. But, we had nerve gas as well as nukes on Okinawa. This, of course, was unknown to the Japanese, at least officially, although some had suspicions, I suppose. The actual taking out of the nerve gas from Okinawa happened after I left. So, I wasn’t involved in that other than I sort of anticipated the issue as it was to come up. I myself was not involved.
Robert E. Fritts was born in Illinois in 1934. He received his B.A. from the University of Michigan in 1956 and served in the U.S. Navy overseas from 1956 to 1959 as a lieutenant. His postings abroad have included Luxembourg, Sudan, Rwanda, Indonesia, and Ghana. Ambassador Fritts was interviewed in 1999 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: To take Japanese language training means to almost take the vows to become a Japanese specialist, doesn't it?

Fritts: In theory, yes, but I received a truncated version. Because my assignment was spur-of-the-moment and I was an economic officer, the Department offered only four months at FSI rather than the standard package of six months at FSI followed by a year at the FSI language school in Yokohama. After FSI, I went directly to the embassy in Tokyo.

But going back to your question of "vows." It became quickly apparent that there was a social and professional schism in the embassy between those who spoke Japanese, that is to say Political Officers, and those who didn't. The gulf was elitist and exclusionary. Sort of "Only we (Japanese speakers)" are qualified to speak with the gods and thus handle policy. I recall once when Ambassador Reischauer at a staff meeting directed the Political Counselor, Owen Zurhellen, to have the Political Section do an urgent canvass of its contacts to report on what the Japanese thought of some minor crisis. An hour later, I went to Owen's office on an errand and found him putting the final touches on the cable. I was quite impressed. "How did all of your officers canvass your contacts so fast," I asked. "What canvass," he replied, "I always know what all the Japanese think!"

Serving in Japan confirmed previous thoughts that the Department's practice of de facto limiting language training to political officers was an effort, perhaps even unconscious, to maintain the cult of presumed political officer superiority. Thankfully, language training was progressively opened up to a broad spectrum of functional skills and abilities. I understood at the time that the embassy Tokyo attitude was not unique. Chinese, Russian and Arabic speakers were similarly restrictive.

Fortunately for me, even though an economic officer, I knew just enough Japanese to be considered acceptable by what became to this day some of my very best friends in the Foreign Service. I added to it by wrangling a mid-tour two month stint at the Yokohama school.

Q: How did you find learning Japanese?
FRITTS: The language is not difficult to speak in a rudimentary way. The easy aspects are that Japanese uses the same sounds as American English and is not tonal. The problems come from a lack of cognate vocabulary hints, the agglutinative process of multiple syllables before and after roots, and the hierarchical changes based on to whom you’re speaking. Plus, of course, the difficulty of a goony writing system. One can only go so far in a language if illiterate.

So you went to Japan, I guess about ’65?


Q: What did you do there?

FRITTS: Half the tour was as an assistant attaché on international finance and the second half in the Economic Section following Japan’s economic presence in Southeast Asia. As an assistant financial attaché, I was on loan to the Treasury Department. There was also a Treasury assistant financial attaché - so it was a three-man office, of which I was the State component. I worked with the finance ministry and Japanese banks on some issues and was also involved with the financial aspects of negotiating the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

Q: Let’s talk about the first portion first, working for the Financial Attaché, who was a Treasury official focused on international financial stuff. What were the concerns of the financial attaché and how did you fit in?

FRITTS: The financial attaché was primarily concerned with liberalization of Japanese trade and capital flows and the maintenance of Japanese Government purchases of U.S. Treasury securities for its foreign reserves. To pursue those goals, he and the assistant financial attaché analyzed the Japanese economy and spent most of their time with the Ministry of Finance, which called the shots on virtually all aspects of the Japanese economy. We also were the main embassy contacts with Japanese and American banks and financial institutions. The two Treasury officers were professional financial economists and their analyses were more sophisticated, in both macro and micro terms, than the State side produced. The financial attaché believed the Japanese Government was myopic about its impact on the world economy and short-sighted on domestic economic and financial policies. The embassy view was similar, but broader. It stressed that U.S.-Japanese economic issues should not drive or overshadow our bilateral security interests, impinge on the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty or affect our policy coordination in Asia, the UN and elsewhere. That U.S. dichotomy has remained consistent to this day, encompassing U.S.-Japan frictions, U.S. interagency fights and, even, intra-State office tensions.

Q: Did you find yourself in sort of a different culture working for the Treasury Department?

FRITTS: Of course. Every bureaucratic group has self-perceived elites. In general, Treasury officers considered themselves elite within the USG and, within Treasury, the international guys considered themselves the elite foreign service of the Treasury Department. As a result, I was not fully trusted by the financial attaché and there were a number of meetings between him and the other assistant I did not attend. And whenever Treasury officials came from Washington, I rarely
attended those meetings or would be asked to leave at some point. Treasury had a strong "We-They" attitude.

Q: Well, with that Treasury attitude, did they have their own contacts and operate separately from the embassy?

FRITTS: Very much so. The financial attache was very protective of his contacts, even by usual standards of interagency turfdom. He considered the Finance Ministry to be a Treasury fiefdom. Even the embassy economics minister was chary about calling upon or entertaining senior MOF officials. When it couldn't be avoided, such as a clear instruction from State for someone higher ranked than the financial attaché to do so, the Financial attaché would set up the appointment, but I was pretty sure he briefed MOF officials on the substance and that they could more-or-less just listen politely unless and until the message was confirmed by him from Treasury. MOF officials liked that as it was a mirror image of themselves.

Q: Did you find that you were having a problem serving two masters? I mean, was the economic minister saying, "What's going on there?"

FRITTS: Well, Pelikan and his successor, Victor Mack, could be pretty smooth when they wished. Although they liked being secretive, they stroked their embassy peers, DCM and the ambassador on occasion. No heat came my way, possibly because I attended the economic section staff meetings and did some reporting directly for that section.

Q: There was a period when the Japanese shifted from a poor country to a growing economic competitor. Had this started by your time there?

FRITTS: Yes. It's hard to recall now, but Japan had only a few years before stopped being a formal foreign aid recipient of the United States. Indeed, Secretary Dulles once told Prime Minister Yoshida that Japan should not consider exporting to the U.S. as "...Japan cannot make anything that the U.S. would want to buy." So much for his insight!

Our bilateral economic concerns then, in the mid '60s, were growing U.S. imbalances with Japan abetted by its variety of formal and informal trade and capital flow restrictions. The USG and American firms did not have the sophisticated understanding of Japan then which is common knowledge today. Thus, the embassy and Treasury office were constantly seeking to break down barriers, separate economic mythology from reality, negotiate special access arrangements and, where feasible and without a blink of paradox, force Japanese "voluntary restrictions" on selected exports to the U.S.

Capital flows were a similar story. We favored "free flows of capital" on universalist economic grounds, but specifically so that American banks and firms could invest directly in Japan and Japanese firms and tourists could invest and spend dollars in the U.S. Again, paradoxically, as the Japanese loosened up and began to invest massively in the U.S., we changed our tune and sought to discourage their investments in certain sectors and areas. The usual "Where you stand depends upon where you sit" approach to national interests.
Japanese economic analyses of their own economy, while public, were opaque and data suspect. Our financial attaché office thus maintained its own inferred and interpretive data charts and made independent analyses. As this was before computers, it was labor intensive although quite sophisticated. I wasn’t really competent in that process, but I learned a lot. It helped immensely that I shared an office with an assistant financial attaché, Jon Gaaserud, who had been an assistant professor in economics. Over eighteen months, we often just sat and talked economics. He was a wonderful person and is a lifelong friend.

Balance of payments [b/p] issues were prime concerns and the Treasury office focused on it - b/p trends, the implications, recommendations for Treasury policy responses, etc. While there was some coordination with the embassy, to my eye, the really important stuff was done by letter between the financial attaché and his Treasury superiors. Those letters, to my knowledge, were never shared with anyone in the embassy and, certainly, not with me.

Q: What was your impression of the Japanese bureaucratic system, particularly as it pertained to finance?

FRITTS: In those days, as until most recently, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) called all the shots on the economic-financial side. It ran the economy and thus, to a large degree, the political environment. Usually, MITI, the Ministry of Trade, the Foreign Office and other ministries and the commercial banks, in the end, had to defer to MOF. The MOF folk believed they were the elite of the elite and held the keys to the Japanese kingdom. And they usually did.

All of us studied the Japanese bureaucratic culture and how to work in and around it. We developed and followed a number of guidelines on what to do and not to do, whom to approach and not to approach - all that kind of tradecraft. Actually, we knew a great deal more than most corporate Americans. But what we, as experts, knew then is now common knowledge and can be bought at the bookstand of any international airport.

The embassy had many officers expert in their field and some had deep, even pre-WWII, Japan experience. We respected our ambassadors (Edwin Reischauer and U. Alexis Johnson) and DCMs (John K. Emmerson and David Osborn). We built a Japanese official consensus up through their cultural system, which, in contrast to otherwise common wisdom, also meant building pressures on them. Washington, of course, was always impatient. Indeed, Washington is always impatient. It wants instant results now. But our ambassadors had sufficient clout to make their writs more-or-less run.

Q: Did you deal directly with the Ministry of Finance?

FRITTS: Yes. My niche was primarily the commercial and development banks and their relevant MOF offices. I made demarches at my level, carried out modest representation, and drafted reports and cables which were released by the economic counselor, although cleared by the financial attaché. But then, the financial attaché rarely used embassy communications over back channel letters to Treasury.

I was rather heavily involved on foreign direct investment issues and Japanese capital flows to
Southeast Asia. As the reversion of Okinawa loomed, I became sort of the economic guy on aspects of that and went to Okinawa several times to verify economic assessments made by the office of the U.S. High Commissioner. Frankly, I was still a self-taught economic officer and I wouldn't relish looking at those reports now. However, I don't recall that either the Economic Minister or Counselor had any significant professional training in economics, other than just doing it. The State generalist approach was a major weakness, which was later redressed by recruitment and in-house economic studies at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). Eventually, I would study economics at FSI.

Q: What was the feeling at that time about Okinawa, at least within the embassy, your office? That it was about time and all that?

FRITTS: Our internal view was the Dick Snyder view, who was then the Country Director for Japan. It was simply put. The USG either moved to give Okinawa back and negotiate to our favor the use of the bases or maintain the status quo and see the bases become untenable. The Pentagon originally resisted reversion tooth and nail on military grounds e.g. any negotiated use would be less favorable, and emotionally e.g. the "Rock" had been bought with American blood.

I was not in Washington when Dick Snyder began the process, but we understood it was his idea. He pursued it within the USG against all odds with smarts, wiles, persistence, courage and a high-profile crusty impertinence. One anecdote I often heard repeated was that when Dick first got authority to discuss the issue at the Pentagon, he naturally received a very chilly reception. After outlining the concept, the Army general who chaired the large meeting stated declaratively that the Pentagon would never agree to Okinawa reversion. It was American territory, etc. Dick reportedly replied, "Well, General, the Pentagon has already agreed to return Okinawa." "What? General MacArthur never agreed to return Okinawa to Japan. That never happened!" Dick listened calmly and then said, "Oh, yes, he did. He expected reversion when he made the express decision to retain Japanese as the language of school instruction." …

Q: How about students? Were they at all in your purview?

FRITTS: Students were not my responsibility. We would, of course, have periodic student demonstrations ("demos") outside the chancery, particularly over Vietnam and suspicions that the U.S. had nuclear weapons in Japan. In that pre-terrorist age, we didn't take demos seriously - just noise, bother and inconvenience. I remember being late to a Foreign Office appointment because of a "demo." My counterpart, it turned out, had been prominent in the major demonstrations in the '50s which forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Japan. "Oh, yes," he said, "I remember demos at your chancery well from my student days. It's what we did then; it's what Japanese students always do." He then added wistfully, "And now, I'm a bureaucrat here. In the elections, I vote Liberal Democratic (conservative), although in my heart I'll always be a socialist. But I'm in the government now."

Q: How was living in Tokyo at that time?

FRITTS: It was fine - Americans were very much liked in Japan as being somewhat special. Tokyo was very urban and crowded, of course, with lots of pollution. We lived in an embassy
compound within walking distance of the chancery. Compound living was okay, because most Japanese professionals, including my contacts, lived in compounds and considered it perfectly normal. The yen was 360 to the dollar, so we could easily go to restaurants, Noh and Kabuki performances, and have a maid for childcare. I was working up to my ears, but we could occasionally travel or ski as a family and use Japanese accommodations. Snuggling down with my family in a Japanese ryokan, I thanked FSI for even my modest Japanese capability.

Q: So you left Embassy Tokyo. Where next?

FRITTS: I went to the Japan Desk in State for about three years. I was the economics guy and later became deputy director, but still the main economics guy. I was there about three years - to 1971.

Q: Let' see, in 1968 Richard Nixon was elected with political debts to the textile states of the South with, I recall, an impact up on Japan. But first, let's talk about when you arrived in Washington. How were our economic relations with Japan? What were the concerns?

FRITTS: Basically, our economic concerns with Japan were more-or-less what they had been and still are since Commodore Perry "opened" Japan in the 1850s - how to open Japan up internationally and to ensure that openings benefited American interests particularly. As it evolved, Japan's layers of formal, informal and cultural barriers were difficult to penetrate. Each advance uncovered a new problem. We believed that it was in Japanese, American and global interests e.g. the international financial and trading systems, that Japan be a major constructive player. Our specific policy approach for a decade or so was to induce the Japanese to end their insularities as in their interests and ours. At times we were a mentor, in others a friendly advocate, and in others, such as textiles, a fierce aggressor. To degrees, the same policy exists today.

The United States, of course, was hardly the open economic society we purported to be. We had our own array of protectionist exemptions and procedures. A favorite weapon was to theoretically negotiate, but actually to force, Japanese imposition of "voluntary export controls" on whatever products were impinging upon American producers at the time.

Q: And that brings us to textiles...

FRITTS: Economically, textiles was a receding industry in the U.S. Becoming increasingly outmoded, American producers had sought initially to stave off their decline by moving to the less-unionized South. However, labor-intensive textiles remained under pressure from "unfair and cheap" modernizing producers, such as Japan. The elected representatives in the South became more Republican with great political clout in the Nixon Administration. Thus, we sought to negotiate a series of "voluntary" Japanese export restraints on textiles and ease the pressures on the American market at the cost, of course, of the American consumer. The Japanese resisted strenuously.

The State Department had the great good fortune in those years of having Phil Trezise as the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. A career officer, he had formerly been our
Ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He knew the issues inside and out and had also served in Japan. He's just about the finest FSO role model I ever knew. A man of great knowledge, infinite patience, common sense, courage and impeccable integrity. He resisted interagency and highly charged political pressures. He got us through difficult times with Japan, the White House and volatile Cabinet members by patient, calm, wry wisdom.

For reasons I don't entirely know, he decided I had some talent and that it suited his purpose to have an occasional confidential action officer on Japan outside his own Economic Affairs Bureau. He thus called the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, Marshall Green, to borrow me on those issues. He also told Marshall that I would not always be able to divulge what I was doing, but that Marshall could check with him on any qualms. Marshall agreed. On a couple of occasions, that constraint bent my immediate boss, the Japan Country Director, considerably out of shape. The arrangement lasted about two years.

Thus, I frequently worked directly with Phil and was part of the formal commodity trade negotiation delegations he led to Japan, which included other agencies, Congressmen and trade reps. His understanding of Japanese officialdom was superb. They trusted him. He had a conceptual long-range vision of how the trade and economic issues fit into U.S.-Japan relations, which he considered vitally important. That trade issues did not crash the U.S.-Japan relationship in those was due in no small part to his skills. While he was respected within the USG and on the Hill, knives were frequently out.

The Secretary of Commerce, Maurice Stans, was a major political supporter of American textile producers and a formidable adversary of State and Phil. He would send Commerce or even private industry emissaries to Japan in secrecy with instructions to avoid the U.S. Embassy, threaten the Japanese Government with dire acts, and instruct the Japanese not to inform us about the discussions. The last stricture would last about twelve hours after arrival when the Japanese would let Phil know, followed by their media. The USG looked divided, weak and foolish. An already bad political-economic situation would become worse.

After being caught several times, Stans switched to sending reps who would check in only with our ambassador, who wasn't supposed to report back. The ambassador, Armin Meyer, was put between a rock and a hard place. He was a Middle East expert newly arrived in Japan and thus without much clout in Japan or within the USG. Secretary Rogers reportedly had trouble confronting Secretary Stans or NSC Advisor Henry Kissinger, so the burden really fell on Trezise as Stans and others, including southern Congressmen, rode roughshod and tried to call the shots directly on trade and financial matters. It was a tough period.

Eventually, Trezise was able in his way to attain Japanese acquiescence on voluntary textile export restraints and openings in commodities, such as beef and citrus. His scenarios on other products and issues became the future models. One prescient Trezise insight was his prediction to the Japanese that within ten years, they would adopt the same approach as the U.S. when sectors in their economy became pressed by imports from Korea and Southeast Asia. And so it was.
Q: You mentioned that you’d be doing things that you couldn't tell your colleagues in the East Asia Bureau. Like what?

FRITTS: Given the adversarial environment within the USG, Trezise would often seek informal understandings with the Japanese before surfacing them within the USG. Trying to work out cooperatively what might fly or not. What was or wasn't negotiable. He was a master at building an eventual consensus within the USG, with American commodity interests, and with the Japanese. However, premature formal consultation meant leaks, sabotage and dangerous failure.

How often Phil spoke with Marshall, I don't know, but I do know that Marshall trusted Phil. The issues were so sensitive and the stakes so large politically that I don't think Marshall passed much on to his Country Director for Japan, Dick Finn. Dick and his successor, Dick Ericsson, were very perturbed when I couldn't tell him what I was up to.

I remember literally racing back to my office from Phil's office one night having been given forty minutes to draft a letter from the President to Prime Minister Sato. Once in my office, I had writer's block. Then Dick Finn came in and wanted a briefing on what the crisis was and what I'm writing. I couldn't tell him. It was tense. I still met the deadline.

Bear in mind I'm not a major actor in all this. I'm neither conceptualizing new policy nor negotiating trade-offs. I'm still mid-level. I was a "go to" guy who drafted quickly, understood the issues, could integrate disparate facts, add a few creative licks, and report well. Most of the really substantive stuff came from Trezise's own people. While they didn't always know his full purposes, they trusted his wisdom and integrity. Trezise used some wiles, but he did so to sustain negotiations against the rogue actors roaming around.

Q: During the Nixon period, there were several shocks or, as the Japanese said, shokkus, in U.S.-Japan relations. What were those all about?

FRITTS: The short answer is non-consultation. Advance and cooperative bilateral consultation had been a prime policy mantra toward Japan for decades. It was a key bedrock to Japanese attitudes toward their U.S. relationship. They gave us considerable policy slack across-the-board assuming we would consult with them on any initiative or situation involving their key national interests. We issued repeated assurances. We even set up annual Economic Cabinet meetings to testify to it.

Unfortunately, the U.S. talks a good advance consultation game, but often doesn't play it. Then or now. Just recently (2000), Clinton overflew Japan to go to China. It was the first time an American President going to China had not stopped in Japan. It was a major shock and demeaned the U.S.-Japan relationship. Each time the U.S. insults Japan in that manner on key issues weakens the special relationship from which the U.S. so benefits.

But back to the "Nixon shokkus". They were three in number and hit the Japanese in key areas of their national interest.

First, the U.S. announced a successful secret opening to China. Japan had consistently held back
on its long-standing desire to improve relations with China in deference to our hostile stance. Every time they wanted to loosen up, we essentially forbade it. Then we moved and left them hanging.

Second, the decision to float the U.S. dollar by negating U.S. adherence to the gold standard at $35 per ounce. We had labeled that policy as a linchpin in our huge financial relationship.

And third, the U.S. embargoed soybean exports because of short supply. We had a virtual international monopoly on soybeans. Soybean products are a major part of the Japanese diet and their consumers went into panic. An unintended result was that the Japanese determined never to be caught short again, made massive investments in soybean production in Brazil, and the U.S. created a major competitor in soybeans.

Q: How did you find Japanese negotiating techniques when working at the Trezise level on these narrow, although sensitive, issues?

FRITTS: Well, all of us working on Japan had to adjust to the fact that not much would ever remain confidential on either side for very long. There were so many actors with axes to grind. On our side, some thought that public Japan-bashing was the way to progress with the not inconsiderable goals of enhancing their own image, careers or political ambitions. And strangely, up to a point, we agreed.

To create their needed consensus, the Japanese often require a measure of being backed into a corner before their various groups can agree upon concessions as "unavoidable." They need a catalyst and sometimes a series of catalysts. That may sound counter to what I said before about rogue negotiators and mismanagement of U.S.-Japan economic relations. However, there were times when forcefulness was necessary to provide a means of agreement. Sometimes the Foreign Office even wanted it and would infer how it should be applied. On the other hand, gratuitous insults, overblown rhetoric and threats stymied or reversed progress. Given American culture and our governance system, it's almost impossible for State to fine tune policy, particularly in trade and finance where the Congress and interest groups participate directly. Trezise came as close as anyone.

Q: The Japanese were/are occasionally accused of not implementing trade agreements. Was that the case?

FRITTS: Frankly, both sides would occasionally renege under some subterfuge or other. We would often cite revised legal interpretations, such as on initiating anti-dumping actions against Japan.

The Japanese reputation derived from the fact that after negotiating the removal or easing of formal barriers, various informal and cultural barriers would then be uncovered. Our exports and investments thus didn't increase as expected or Japanese "voluntary" export restrictions would lag.

There were also serious misunderstandings. President Johnson twisted Prime Minister Sato's
arm, or possibly literally squeezed it, to force his approval to carry out "voluntary" textile export restrictions. The meeting at the White House was private with only Sato's interpreter present, a serous Johnson error. There are about fifteen shades of "yes" in Japanese. The one Sato used was translated as "Yes." Actually, when reconstructed after the fact, we thought it more akin to "I understand what you're saying and will do my best to consider how it might be done". Johnson later reportedly went ballistic about Sato when the Japanese Government denied privately and then publicly there had been any "agreement."

Japanese has many nice-sounding but non-binding phrases that they often sought to insert into communiques and agreements. In English they come out as "full and proper consideration", "best efforts", and that kind of approach. We knew what it meant e.g. "We'll try, but progress will be slow". The uninitiated either didn't understand or, even when we told them, were eager to proclaim public victory for image purposes. As reality set in, their reactions would charge Japanese "run-arounds" and duplicity. After I left Japanese affairs, the USG tried to adopt quantitative benchmarks to measure progress, with occasional success, but also much rancor as the Japanese charged that we were waging "managed trade" rather than "free trade".

Q: I would have thought that there would be a certain almost career or professional danger to bringing in American interest groups working on some of these things. In a way, by explaining how the Japanese operate, it could sound like you've either gone native or you're giving too many concessions. It must be difficult to bring your fellow conferees up to speed about how to deal with the Japanese.

FRITTS: Well, negotiations with Japan are hardball. Their officials are well-educated and experienced. Their professionals understand us as well or better as we profess to understand them. There is gamesmanship involved, but we are prisoners of our culture as they are prisoners of theirs.

Given the period we're talking about, the '60s and '70s - what we then thought as rather arcane but accurate knowledge of the Japanese system is now common knowledge by even the most junior business people going out to Japan, many of whom speak fluent Japanese. Meanwhile, Japan has evolved - has become much more like us.

An anecdote about their system. We had a series of U.S.-Japan Joint Economic Conferences, which were Cabinet-level meetings held annually between the U.S. and Japan. Part of the concept was to expose more insular Japanese ministers and officials, other than just the Foreign Office, to us and our concerns - and to induce them to be more interactive and open in discussing issues and problems. On one occasion, I was part of an advance team with Phil Trezise and others who arrived a few days early. As the working-level coordinator, I had thrashed through the issues within the USG, including the briefing book policy papers, and set up the arrangements. As per usual, I had drafted, negotiated USG clearances, and provided a draft joint communiqué to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

I arrived in Japan overnight, along with Phil and others, and was looking forward to spending half a day or so getting around and talking with people whom I knew in Japan before getting down to the work of the conference. Early in the morning, I had a call from my Foreign Office
fellow counterpart asking me to come over "...for awhile". I demurred, saying I had some other things to do. "No, we really want to see you. You really have to be here." "Okay," I said, "I'll stop by the Ministry." "Oh, no," he said, "Come to the Okura Hotel."

When I got there, I entered a suite they had turned into an interagency cockpit, with a Foreign Ministry guy in charge. I was put at a small table in a corner of a rear room. I couldn't get out without having to walk over about a dozen officials who filled the room. I became captive to negotiating the joint communiqué and I was there for the next twelve hours. We went through the issues and phrases piece by piece. We'd reach an impasse, they'd form a whispering group, a junior officer would leave, and some time later, he and new people would come back and huddle in the other rooms I could see from my corner. What they were doing was running over to MITI or the Ministry of Finance and elsewhere, negotiating with those ministries, and then back to the Okura with revised wording to negotiate. I was there, as I say, for 12 hours or so. I don't remember either food or a john break. We worked out the communiqué which constituted the outcome in advance of the Joint Cabinet meeting to be held. That shows their intensity and the complexity of consultation required to achieve a Japanese consensus. All of them versus me. Quite eye-opening.

Q: Did your negotiated communiqué stand?

FRITTS: Only one word got changed. I was quite proud of that.

Q: So, in retrospect, do you believe our economic negotiations with Japan have been successful?

FRITTS: Oh, yes, very. Japan has opened tremendously. So much so, its culture is changing rapidly. Each advance was too small by our standards, but given the context of where the Japanese were coming from, quite long by theirs. I think the U.S.-Japan relationship can be considered as one of the best and most successfully managed bilateral relationships in history. A true testament to long-term American diplomacy. All of Asia would be in a much different strategic environment today without the firm U.S.-Japan relationship forged over a half-century. And economics are an important part of that success and environment.

Q: Did you feel that way then? Or just, "Oh, God, dealing with the Japanese?"

FRITTS: I always knew, concurred in, and fiddled with our overall long-term policy. But few of us then would have predicted Japan's rise to a top three world economy. However, when I left the Japan Desk, I had been totally immersed in U.S.-Japan issues for about seven years. I was tired of the problems. Some years later in the Carter Administration, a new East Asia Assistant Secretary, Dick Holbrooke, asked me to become reimmersed as Japan Country Director. Much to his surprise, I turned him down to direct another of his offices. I just didn't want to take on what to me were old problems in new guises, political and economic. I wonder how our Middle East colleagues bear it.

Q: Yes, some issues just don't go away. Did the political climate change at all in Japan while you were handling it there? I guess it was the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) throughout..
FRITTS: Yes, the LDP reigned and the political climate was static. But there was a major change in how the Japanese did their diplomatic business. The quality of Japanese representation in Washington and abroad jumped markedly. They always had good people, but a real sea change occurred with their international skills. Always well trained technically, they became much more global, more confident in their ability to interact internationally, and adopted a higher profile in expressing positions. Non-foreign ministry types became fluent in English. Even spouses, who previously could rarely speak English, began to initiate conversations rather than huddle together. Rather than just working the usual places like the State Department, they expanded into the media and onto the Hill. They became Americanized in the conduct of diplomacy. It happened in the space of a few years.

Q: Were they picking this up on their own, or was there a sort of tutorial with us saying, "If you really want to get something done in the United States, you've got to work the media, you've got to work Congress?"

FRITTS: We had always sought to engender greater Japanese openness, less insularity and a more global view of their responsibilities. But the change was also generational, engendered by growing confidence in a world class economy, increased experience, the dimming memory and inhibitions of WWII, the lifting of foreign exchange controls which sent floods of Japanese abroad to clog world tourist sights. Japanese society was changing, and the Foreign Office anticipated and was even ahead of the curve. Would that our Foreign Service could be so farsighted and financially supported.

Q: How did you find the Japanese media? From what I gather, it's a pretty hungry beast - lots of newspapers, lots of TV, and they're all over the place?

FRITTS: The Japanese media are hyper-competitive and very influential. Anything happening in the U.S. and the USG, particularly with any relevance to the U.S. and Japan, is automatically big news. The U.S. is covered extensively and intensively. The media national circulation plus proportion of readership and viewers are much higher than in the U.S. The media were quite insular then. They viewed the first Nixon Administration as "weak" because Nixon's competitors in the primaries were included in his cabinet. Now they have bureaus around the world with very qualified, sophisticated journalists.

Q: Did you get involved when Kissinger went to China? It was the first of the Nixon shokkus.

FRITTS: I had minor roles in damage control - drafting instructions on how to mollify the Japanese. My only role in the opening to China was that John Holdridge, who was on the National Security Council staff, realized he had to have white tie and tails for the Nixon trip to China. He knew I had a set (left-over from being a member of the University of Michigan Men's Glee Club). He asked if I still had them. I did, he wore them, they went.

Q: Did you feel that our involvement in Vietnam tended to downplay the importance of Japan. That all of our effort was focused on Vietnam?

FRITTS: No, not at all. Vietnam actually provoked a good deal of policy attention toward Japan,
albeit often in a Vietnam context. We were up to our ears in trying to assuage Japanese fears that Vietnam was going to disrupt all of Southeast Asia, cut down on their lucrative trade and investments, and create regional instabilities. Their nightmare was that Vietnam could lead to U.S. military conflicts with China and/or Russia or a renewal of war in Korea. Japan wanted an end to the Vietnam War. From Japan, we wanted all the political and, particularly, economic support or "contributions" we could garner. I guess our diplomacy could be termed as focused on assuagement, inducement and reassurance. We tried to get them increasingly involved in Vietnam and SE Asia, not militarily, but economically and financially.

Q: I realize you were dealing with Japan, but was Korea beginning to... It was still early days in Korea, I guess, so Korea wasn't much of an economic power, was it?

FRITTS: No, but Japan was still negotiating reparations and trade agreements with South Korea. Whatever our difficulties in negotiating with Japan, we took relief from the fact that it was much worse between the Japanese and Koreans. Their bilateral "discussions" were marked by Korean vituperation and harassment.

I remember discussing Korea with a Japanese diplomat, who had come back from meetings in Seoul. After we had discussed the substance for my report, he added. "You know, in negotiating with Americans, we're very careful to write down everything precisely and clearly, because we know you'll raise it with us and we'll need to be prepared. But we don't take notes of talks with the Koreans. Whatever is agreed won't last anyhow, so why bother?"

Q: Now this was the Nixon White House and Kissinger is national security advisor. Did relations with Japan reflect their "command and control" styles?

FRITTS: Well, I've spoken of Maurice Stans, the Secretary of Commerce, who cut an independent swath, that U.S. economic policy with Japan was often schizophrenic, and of Trezise' efforts to provide cohesion from his level. Okinawa reversion occurred in 1972 with Secretary Rogers. Whatever the truth, we felt Kissinger was Europe and China focused and didn't care much about what we viewed as the tremendously important relationship with Japan. We thought he took it for granted.

Q: Did the East Asia Bureau feel during this time that Japan was getting enough attention?

FRITTS: Well, we were, of course, incredulous at the non-notification to Japan before the U.S. opening to China, the negation of dollar convertibility, and the soybean embargo. They were insults to a major ally.

Q: Was the feeling that this was lack of attention or deliberate?

FRITTS: I don't know what Kissinger now says, but they were omissions we couldn't understand. Frankly, we thought it would never have happened to a Western European country. Our memos said how bad it was, but, of course, it was water over the dam. Our professional focus had to be on damage control, such as citing exceptional circumstance, no lessening of our strong relationship, sending out VIP's with kind words - that kind of thing.
Q: Well, I think one of the ideas that was floated around, why this happened was that if you told a Japanese anything, even at the highest level, it would be leaked within a very short time.

FRITTS: That probably was a concern and, unfortunately, it was probably true. We generally operated on the premise that most of what we did with Japan would become public, particularly on the economic side. Defense issues had a better record, although they were not immune, as per my Rostow-Emmerson story.

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON
Ambassador
Japan (1966-1968)

U. Alexis Johnson was born in 1908 in Falun Kansas. He Graduated from Occidental College in 1931 and entered the Foreign Service in 1935. He served as Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam from 1964-1965 and Ambassador to Japan from 1966-1968. He also served as Deputy Undersecretary of Political Affairs and Undersecretary of Political Affairs. Ambassador Johnson was initially interviewed by Paige E. Mulhollan in 1969.

Q: How much, as Ambassador in Japan, did you get to stay in the Vietnam considerations? At all? Was your view solicited?

JOHNSON: No. My views were never solicited. However, people going to and from Vietnam at all levels, of course, frequently were passing through Tokyo; and naturally, I saw them. I kept in close contact with the situation through high level people passing through. In fact, in some ways, I felt I was able to keep track of things better in Japan than I was back here. I saw people that normally you wouldn't see.

Q: You saw people going both ways.

JOHNSON: Both ways, yes. And then in Japan, also, junior officers, both foreign service and military people, were coming through, that I'd known, who would stop and see me. So I spent a considerable amount of time simply trying to keep track of what was going on, not that I had any responsibility for it. Naturally, I had a deep interest in it. And of course, it deeply affected my position in Japan.

Q: I was going to say, Mr. Reischauer indicated, in his book at least, that at least one time in Japan there was considerable irritation with American policy in Vietnam. Was that true by the time that you got there?

JOHNSON: I've always thought-'Ed and I have differed on this--I've always thought that this was not as much an issue in Japan as he felt that it was. I've always said . . Let me say, I shouldn't say I was never consulted. On the bombing halt, I was consulted in general on that, and on some
other moves, also, my views were invited. But insofar as Japan was concerned, the position I always took was that we should ignore Japan.

Q: As far as Vietnam was concerned?

JOHNSON: As far as Vietnam was concerned, that we should go ahead and do what we felt was necessary. If it came out all right, fine and good. If, because we listened to or were influenced by the views of Japan, it didn't come out all right, it would quickly be forgotten that we were being influenced by their views. It would simply be recognized that we'd failed. So the thing to do was to go ahead and do what we felt needed to be done without regard for the views of Japan. That was the position I always took on this.

As far as Japanese attitudes are concerned, the best indication of this, that I had, was at the time of the March 31 speech of President Johnson--March 31 a year ago--on the cessation of the bombing of the northern part of North Vietnam. With a liberal assist from the American press, this was universally interpreted by the Japanese press as being a prelude to a complete withdrawal and a reversal of policy on Vietnam. I spent some five hours alone with the Prime Minister two nights following that speech, trying to convince him this wasn't the case. He was terribly concerned that it was in fact the case.

Q: He was opposed to it being the case, I take it, you're saying?

JOHNSON: Oh, yes. Oh, he was very deeply so. And I had nothing to go on except that speech and my own instinct on the situation. And I tried to reassure him that this wasn't the case. And then all kinds of politicians from the--I wouldn't say the extreme left--but from the center and the right came directly or indirectly to me on this subject. They were terribly concerned. Those who had been opposing our policy, and were speaking against our policy, often, in effect said, "You know we've been saying these things because this is necessary, here in Japan, to our political situation. But, God, we never thought that you would listen to us."

Q: "Please don't take it seriously."

JOHNSON: “Please don’t take it seriously.” This was a real shock to them in Japan; the thought that we were really going to withdraw.

HERBERT LEVIN
Political Officer
Tokyo (1967-1970)

"Herbert Levin was born in New York in 1930. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included posts in Hong Kong, Japan, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and India. Mr. Levin was interviewed by Mike Springmann in 1994.

LEVIN: I went to Tokyo, to the Political Section. The Embassy in Tokyo in the Political Section
always had a Chinese Language Officer. Not exclusively to utilize the language skill but because Japan's relations with China, both the mainland and Taiwan, were of importance to the United States. You had to have someone with a strong background in Chinese affairs to have any kind of serious dialogue with the Japanese government and Japanese business people and scholars on China. There was always someone in Tokyo doing this job.

**Q:** What was your title at this point?

**LEVIN:** What was I? I guess I was a First Secretary.

In the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the China Section was headed by a very able, active person who later was the Japanese Ambassador to China, among other places. His name was Hiroshi Hashimoto. There was a great deal of interest in China in both the U.S. and Japan. We both were trying to understand what was going on there.

The Japanese were more forward with China than we were in terms of trade, travel and everything else. At the same time, they had no desire to play a prominent political role with the Chinese. The last thing they wanted was a brawl with the United States over China policy. So I worked on China and Taiwan, North and South Korea. It was really Japan's relations with Asia, including Siberia and Vietnam.

**Q:** What kind of insight did you get into the workings of the Japanese government on their China policy? Did you get that out of them by conversing with these guys, or did they kind of play it close to their chest?

**LEVIN:** I would say that they were quite open. After they accepted that we would be discreet, that they weren't going to hear themselves quoted back either by other Americans in my Embassy or, worse yet, by people in the State Department in Washington, they were quite helpful in trying to get you to understand what was their system of decision making and what the various forces were which affected the outcome.

Since the Liberal Democratic Party was in office and was likely to remain in office for the foreseeable future, they weren't going to have changes in policy due to elections. Factions within the LDP, and also bureaucratic and business groups, had distinct interests. The Japanese were quite helpful in describing these and what goals they were striving for. I found them quite frank in that respect.

Let me describe one incident which might help explain the atmosphere in Tokyo at the time. The United States had decided to recognize Mongolia. This had been an off-again on-again thing for many years, with the Russians repeatedly vetoing the Mongolians desire to have an international relationship with the U.S. The Japanese wished to normalize relations with Mongolia whenever the U.S. did.

The long-standing U.S. arrangement with the Japanese was that when the U.S. had reached the actual point of decision with the Mongolians, we would tell them in advance and permit them to announce their recognition of Mongolia first before the U.S., as a courtesy. This was done. We
informed them in advance when we were going to announce, perhaps it was to be a week later, that it was all decided. The Japanese promptly made their recognition announcement, as agreed with us.

The Americans had also notified Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei that they were going to do this. The Nationalist government in Taiwan claimed that Mongolia was part of China, and they energized their friends in the U.S. Congress -- in the Republican right wing -- to cancel our agreement with Mongolia to enter into diplomatic relations and actually got the President to turn around.

The U.S. then had to go to the Japanese and say, "Forget what we told you; we've changed our minds." The Japanese, not looking for public fights with the Americans, and being a country where forms of courtesy are observed, avoided any public reaction. At the same time, the Japanese were shocked and in a fury that the Americans, after literally years of working on this, could be reversed by Chiang Kai-shek and accept this kind of humiliation from him. The question was also privately raised, "Could Japan really count on anything the Americans could say when something like Mongolian recognition could be changed?" What was more important to Washington: the assurances that the American government had given the Japanese or Chiang Kai-shek's ire? Since I agreed with the Japanese that Washington was guilty of poor judgment, I had little difficulty in meticulously reporting Japanese anger to Washington.

I felt this was significant because it showed that the Japanese wanted to trust the United States. They wanted to be able to rely on us, and we had been unreliable without any really compelling reason.

Another interesting responsibility was in regard to a series of incidents along the northern border of China with Russia -- around Damansky Island in Russia, Chenpao in China -- and the question of who was provoking whom in minor skirmishes and shootings reported. It was obviously part of the world where there were not too many travelers. It was also a situation where satellite photographs couldn't really tell you much because these were small groups of people involved with small arms fire.

I asked the Japanese if they had any views on this. They made available the Japanese Imperial Army archives and retired Imperial Army officers who talked about their skirmishes with the Russians when they had been "defending Manchukuo" in exactly the same place. They explained that this island was really a mudbank, and it moved around depending on the spring floods. Sometimes it was attached to one side of the river; sometimes it was attached to the other side. Recent military academy graduates on first patrols could rush out there in the spring when the water was low and plant a flag and say, "It's ours." If the counterpart new Lieutenant on the other side wanted to show that he too was a hero, defending the soil of the Motherland, he would shoot at them. It was really a kind of a crummy little game over an insignificant wandering mudbank.

This didn't mean that Beijing or Moscow might not be choosing to push the other, and a small number of casualties was reportedly involved. But it really wasn't a situation wherein there was an agreed border, and one side was engaging in calculated belligerency, acts of war, by crossing it.
I think this information from the Japanese may have been helpful to Washington to understand that though one side or the other was letting their patrols be resolute, it was a muddy area in both senses of the term, where there could be people blundering into each other on patrols and other local confusion. The Japanese were cooperative and helpful in trying to figure out what was the real intent of Beijing and Moscow.

This was also the time when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was being negotiated.

Q: This is early '60, '61, '62, '63?

LEVIN: No, this was late '60s. The Soviet Union and the United States were the co-chairmen of the international committee that was negotiating the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Japanese were obviously not about to build nuclear weapons. Indeed, they probably have the greatest anathema toward nuclear weapons of any country in the world because they're the only country that was bombed with nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Japanese were having difficulty in accepting the Non-Proliferation Treaty draft because the Washington and London naval disarmament conferences before World War II had put Japan in an inferior position in terms of numbers of battleships and cruisers to the Americans and the British.

It appeared as if an international treaty was coming into existence which would permanently label Japan as a second class country. While on one hand, they weren't going to develop nuclear weapons, and they were prepared to commit themselves to this, on the other hand, to sign a multilateral treaty which permanently put them in an inferior category was something they were having trouble with. It was necessary to have a long and difficult negotiation with them to put wording in the Non-Proliferation Treaty about the commitment of the nuclear countries to denuclearize and to eventually become equal to Japan, and a lot of other things to make it more palatable. (I think that Germany may have taken a similar stance.)

In the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, there was an individual who had been assigned to Tokyo because, due to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Embassy in Beijing had reduced its staff. The Soviet system had these people coming out of Chinese language training. They didn't have a Consulate in Hong Kong, they didn't have anything in Taipei and they couldn't go to Beijing. So somebody said, "Go to Japan and be a China watcher."

This was a period of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. When this fellow arrived in Tokyo, he found out that there was somebody who spoke Chinese in the American Embassy. He did not speak any Japanese or much English, and he was kind of isolated, even in his own Embassy. He gave me a call and asked if he could come over and see me. I agreed. When we met, he told me the background for his unexpected assignment to Tokyo, and said he wanted to be a China watcher. I told him that was not too easy from Tokyo, but he could be a Taiwan watcher. He said, "Great." I got to know this Soviet officer, and he was a responsible and serious person in terms of trying to understand China. His name was Valentine Kovalenko.

At any rate, at one point in the NPT negotiations, an instruction came out that the Soviet and American Embassies in Tokyo should make a joint demarche on the Japanese in regard to one point in the negotiation. Both the American and Soviet Ambassadors, Alex Johnson and
Troyanovsky, had the same reaction which Kovalenko and I did. This was that if you wanted to increase Japanese resistance, the best way was to have a joint Soviet-American demarche. To have Japan's only ally and its long-standing enemy (there was still no Soviet-Japanese peace treaty to end WW II) going in together would drive the Japanese crazy.

We concluded we were not going to have the two Ambassadors go in and make the joint demarche. However, we could say to the Foreign Ministry that in order to save the Japanese time, the American and the Soviet representatives could drop in together because they had the same instructions. So Kovalenko and I did all the NPT negotiations. We later had American technical negotiating teams coming out. This took a great deal of my time and was very worthwhile.

All of my work on the NPT in Japan with Kovalenko was done in Chinese. In the Foreign Ministry, when we discussed things, it was in Chinese. The Japanese would have one of their Chinese language officers participate. But it was an unusual interlude. It was a period of detente with the Soviet Union, when people in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, who clearly wanted to have normal relations with the United States, were allowed by their system to have them. They came forward, and some of them were personally interesting and professionally useful to work with. They stood out clearly from the more usual Soviet types around them.

Q: Then you went on from the NSC, you said, to the Senate Intelligence Staff?

LEVIN: No. I went from the NSC to the Japan desk in State. I had come from Tokyo to the NSC staff, where I also did Japanese relations, which were very important. Then I went to the Japan desk.

Q: As Desk Officer?

LEVIN: I was the number two.

Q: There are Country Directors and then Desk Officers?

LEVIN: I think they had created the title of Deputy Country Director at that point. It was a large desk by State Department standards, including some seven Economic and Political Officers. Relations with Japan were always extremely active. Basically, there were no bilateral political problems between the U.S. and Japan. There were bilateral trade problems, though less than there are today. You always have American economic interests who are unhappy with the way the Japanese are handling them, so this takes a lot of work.

There are few major problems in the world that can be solved if the Japanese and the Americans are on opposite sides. There are few global problems that cannot be affected favorably if the Japanese and the Americans are working together. It was true then, and it is true now. While we have this endless squabble about Japanese protectionism and the trade imbalance and so forth, which has a life of its own, we also have a tremendous desire in both Tokyo and Washington to have us working together on nuclear nonproliferation or limiting the spread of conventional weapons, on international environmental matters, on what to do about Russia, on what to do
about North Korea, about foreign aid to Turkey, etc., etc., etc. All those things require a great deal of work by the Japan Desk.

These pieces of business are not very secretive or sensitive, but they don't attract the same kind of headlines as another fight over whether or not the Japanese are giving a license fast enough for some American company to sell cellular telephones in Tokyo. We were spending a great deal of time on what was really important to the U.S. national interest, I think with a lot of success. We did not allow the urgent to take precedence over the important.

Q: *This was the early '70s?*

LEVIN: Yes.

Q: *Where did you go after that? Well let me ask you. . .I guess I should ask you about the ins and outs of the Washington bureaucracy. When you were at the Japan desk at State, what kind of interrelations did you have with Capitol committees, or individual Congressmen on Japan, or the Commerce Department, or the CIA or other parts of the bureaucracy?*

LEVIN: On the Hill, there would be a rare Congressman or Senator who would take the time to pursue a sustained interest in a single country. Most Congressmen or Senators don't take any interest in international affairs. The small number who take an interest in international affairs have to spread themselves globally. To find someone who wants to maintain a particular interest in Japan -- there just isn't enough time for members to do this.

There were a handful of members who would designate someone on their staff to keep abreast of Japanese affairs or occasionally ask for a briefing for themselves. Of course, we were delighted to try to work with these people. But the international interests of the Members of Congress tend to be episodic. If something is in the headlines, if there is a public problem, then they will focus on it. It is very hard for the Hill to maintain a continuous interest over a long period of time in something like the totality of a single country relationship.

I think this is best illustrated by the fact that contrary to what many Americans believe, our number one trading relationship is not with Japan, it is with Canada. We have more people moving back and forth between Canada and the United States than with any other country -- and a whole range of other sorts of relations. But the number of American Congressmen or Senators who really take an interest in that relationship, who have some idea of what its dynamics are, are really few. You may have a member from a state that borders on Canada who is worried about too much fresh bread coming across the border because his bakeries don't like it or something like that, but sustained interest in the number one economic relationship the U.S. has -- with Canada -- is unknown.

Basically, Congress is not a place to which you look to set substantial long term international policies for the United States. There are individuals up there who have this kind of an interest. So I'd say the Japan Desk's relations with the Hill were a continuous search to try and find people who did have time to receive this information and to help them understand the problems with Japan.
We always were the targets for wild crazy attacks, "The State Department is selling out the national interest," the usual nonsense. You didn't respond directly, but you could hope to have enough people on the Hill who would say, "Well, what is the full story on this issue?" This kind of defanging effort.

The Hill relationships tend to be sporadic, episodic, very short term, and I think that's just in the nature of the way the Congress operates.

As far as the other departments of government are concerned, you always had Defense Department professionals who had long term commitments to understanding not only Japan's military situation, but the policies in Japan as they affected the military security interests of the United States. These DOD officials, though they were focused on maintaining the military security interest which was their job, generally had a good knowledge in depth of the way Japan operated. Where it was appropriate, they could be brought in to remind the people consumed with the economic problem of the moment that there were other things involved. The quality of the Defense professionals, civilian and military, was quite good.

The Commerce Department is not a policy making or policy oriented organization; it is a service organization. It does quite a good job in providing services, but when people get strange ideas that the Commerce Department is going to determine American economic policy toward Japan, you get in trouble because this is not the way the place is set up -- it is not constituted that way. It really cannot play that kind of a role.

Q: Okay, then you went on from the Japan desk to where?

LEVIN: After the Japan Desk, I was a Fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. I was offered the National War College. It is prestigious; you get to know more officers who are going to become Generals and Admirals. However, I thought if I was going to take a year out of Foreign Service work, it should be out of the government.

ULRICH STRAUS
Japan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1967-1970)

Ulrich Straus was born in Germany in 1926. His career in the Foreign Service included assignments in Japan, Germany, the Philippines, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in late 1992 and early 1993.

STRAUS: So I was back on the Japan Desk.

Q: This was from 1967-70?

STRAUS: That is correct. I had two jobs. One was the political/military job and the other one
was keeping track of internal Japanese political affairs. The last year I was also the Deputy Director.

**Q:** How were you reading the Vietnam situation?

**STRAUS:** Our policy, of course, was to get the Japanese not to go off the reservation -- to maintain our bases in Japan and to retain our freedom to use them, which meant, of course, not launching any combat operations from them, but we didn't need to. We had Okinawa to do that if we needed to, as well as the Philippines.

There was, of course, a growing anti-war movement in Japan, and the Japanese were concerned that our engagement in Vietnam would involve them -- the Japanese -- in conflict with the Chinese. I think many thoughtful Japanese said, in effect, "You know your war in Vietnam is just like our war in China. We had all the military victories, but we lost the war." I thought that was not that far off the mark.

**Q:** Did you find being in the East Asian Bureau that it was difficult? Were there sort of true believers at the top, and you had to be concerned about the reporting that was coming out of Japan?

**STRAUS:** Not particularly. We had many issues and problems dealing with Japan that were strictly bilateral and did not affect the Vietnam thing one way or the other. There was very little interaction there. We had much more interaction with the Korean Desk, the China Desk, although I did have some good friends on the Vietnam Desk, some of whom were true believers and with whom I had some good discussions about Vietnam.

**Q:** What were the major issues that you were seeing that we had with Japan at that time?

**STRAUS:** One of the issues that arose that first fall was the issue of Okinawa. I think it was very clear to both of us that until there was some further progress on the Vietnam situation that it would be difficult for us to give up our unfettered use of Okinawa.

Another major issue was the seizing of the **Pueblo** off the coast of Korea. I happened to be in charge of the Japan Desk at the time because my boss, Dick Sneider, was at a conference. Of course, the Japanese Ambassador came in quite often on consultations on this issue. The Japanese were much concerned that we would launch combat operations from Japanese bases in retaliatory action. That increase of tension on the Korean peninsula, of course, did affect the Japanese government a great deal more than what was going on in Vietnam because Vietnam was further away.

**Q:** What was the feeling on the Pueblo business? This was when the North Koreans seized a radio intelligence ship. Did the Japanese just want to stay out of the problem?

**STRAUS:** Yes. They wanted a peaceful resolution of this issue. They did not, I think, want to be in the position of having to authorize the use of bases in Japan for combat strikes against North Korea.
**Q:** This brings up a question. You know we had our troops in Japanese, not major elements, but bases there with the rationale of protecting Japan. Looking at it, how did you feel? Were we reaching the point of wondering what we were doing there? Did it make sense to be there?

**STRAUS:** Certainly the Japanese public opinion was strongly against any involvement of Japan in the Korean conflict. Nevertheless, the Japanese government did recognize that in Korea, if nowhere else in the world, it was very much in Japan's national interest. While they certainly didn't think of sending combat forces or anything like that over to Korea -- that was the last thing the Koreans would want -- I think they were generally understanding that if there had been an invasion of South Korea by the North that, of course, there may well have arisen opportunities for us to use bases in Japan to protect our interests in South Korea. But I think something like the seizure of a naval vessel didn't qualify for that. We eventually backed off from retaliatory action. The Japanese were understandably nervous. There were a couple of meetings that I recall with the Secretary of State on this issue. The Japanese press was very much interested to know what was going to happen.

Another major interest was the increasing pressure at that time on the part of the Japanese to reduce our military presence in Japan, to withdraw our bases from downtown Tokyo and other cities. To move out into the countryside. The Japanese were prepared to a large extent to offer alternative facilities. To just consolidate our facilities. By that point, the Japanese economy was going great guns, and there was growing pressure in Japan for us to return some base land, which they saw as being under-utilized. We did in a somewhat desultory fashion turn back bases and facilities at that time. As a matter of fact, I recall one case where the military felt that it would be advisable to give up our big naval base at Yokosuka, which we on the Desk thought was the last place in Japan we should give up. We actually talked the military into keeping it.

**Q:** On the military side, was it thought that Subic Bay would take care of it?

**STRAUS:** It was during Lyndon Johnson's presidency and his desire to avoid spending a lot of dollars abroad. It may well be that there was the feeling that Subic would be adequate for our purposes.

**Q:** How did you find the American military? They don't give up facilities easily.

**STRAUS:** I think they will never volunteer to give up anything because they don't pay the price for it. On the other hand, fortunately, I think they are very disciplined, and if they get an order from above to get rid of something, they will salute smartly and get rid of it. There were times in our history when budgetary requirements have mandated such elimination of foreign bases.

A final issue, and one which kept me very involved for a long time, was the issue of nuclear powered warships into Japanese ports. There I dealt with Admiral Rickover and his staff.

**Q:** Admiral Rickover was famous as the father of the nuclear navy and a power unto himself.

**STRAUS:** Yes, and with direct access to the Congress where he had many friends. The Japanese
at that time, again responding, I think, to public pressure, exhibited extreme nervousness about the port entry of nuclear powered warships. The Japanese weren't the only ones at that time that were nervous, but perhaps as much as anybody, they were nervous with this rather new technology. It was part of the Japanese nuclear allergy. We assured them that there was nothing to fear, but they had very strong doubts and insisted on their own monitoring. We had very little confidence in their monitoring. There were discrepancies between their monitoring and our monitoring. There were always demonstrations by left wing forces in Japan whenever nuclear powered warships...

Q: *These were usually submarines weren't they?*

STRAUS: Submarines at first, but later on there were also surface vessels. It took a lot of patient work. Of course, Admiral Rickover really didn't want to make any concessions whatsoever. He was confident that his reactors didn't leak, had never leaked, were never going to leak, and whatever the Japanese saw on their instruments was of no interest to him. Our job was to keep both happy, a typical diplomat's task.

It took a long time, and beyond the time that I was involved with it, the Japanese eventually recognized that these nuclear reactors really were safe.

Q: *Did you get involved with the mega problem of whether our vessels were carrying nuclear weapons or not?*

STRAUS: That involved the highest levels, although I did do some writing about it. There were a couple of incidents when this issue came up. It came up periodically in Japan and was always resolved by a complicated terminology on both sides. We would not do anything without the knowledge of the Japanese government.

Q: *Did you get involved in the recognition of China? We were adamant that nobody recognize China, and a few years later, we surprised everybody by doing it. I think the Japanese wanted to get going with this.*

STRAUS: Very much so.

Q: *Did this come up?*

STRAUS: Well, it was one of the most important points of difference between us. I think the Japanese were good, if reluctant, soldiers on this thing and supported our position at the UN, even while we were losing worldwide support for our China policy. But again, this was a little before the time this China issue became very hot. As long as we were as heavily involved in Vietnam as we were in the late sixties, it didn't seem quite feasible that very much would happen there.

Q: *Those were the major items you were covering at that time?*

STRAUS: Yes, I would say so. Oh, one other issue was the reversion of the Bonin Islands to
Japan. While a minor matter, it was generally seen by both the Japanese and ourselves as the precursor of the reversion of Okinawa, which was a bigger issue. It went rather well.

Q: This was Iwo Jima and...

STRAUS: Yes. And the symbolic significance of Iwo Jima. We were very concerned about our veterans. Actually, our veterans were really ahead of the game, I think, and were supportive as long as the memorial on Iwo Jima was taken care of. They had already established sort of collegial ties with veterans associations in Japan, and, if anything, I think they were rather helpful on this matter. It was taken care of by an administrative agreement with the Japanese rather than a treaty, but we, of course, did take great care that the Congress wouldn't give us any problems. We recognized, of course, the political significance of Iwo Jima.

Q: Speaking of the reversion issue, which is a word we never use anymore and was almost strictly used in our political vocabulary to Japan, and mainly Okinawa, but also the Bonin Islands to begin with -- the northern islands and the Soviets who struck me as an interested but not involved observer that the Soviets lost a major -- they kept Japan permanently hostile practically, even to today, because of these little islands, where some compromise might have been reached. Were we thinking that with the Soviets doing their thing, we could show some flexibility, and they couldn't?

STRAUS: I think so. It certainly made the Japanese government's task somewhat easier in asking for increased appropriations for military expenditures.

I should also mention that in the time 1967-70, when I was on the Desk, we got real movement. With the onset of the Nixon administration in January, 1969, we got real movement on the reversion of Okinawa because we saw that a satisfactory resolution of the Okinawa issue was prerequisite for our ability to maintain the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which underlay the whole relationship.

My boss at that time, Dick Sneider, who moved over in 1969 to the National Security Council, was highly successful in convincing the powers that be that flexibility was essential. Elements of the military held out until the last moment, but agreement was reached in 1970 or so for reversion to take place in 1972. It was one occasion where the U.S. Government moved in the nick of time.

Q: What was your feeling sitting on the Desk about the Okinawa business, because if I recall, the Mayor of Naha kept being thrown in everyone's face because he was supposed to be a Communist?

STRAUS: Yes, he was a Communist.

Q: This was a slippery slope to ruin?

STRAUS: The Mayor of Naha, the capital city of Okinawa, was Mr. Sanaga. Sanaga had been elected Mayor of Naha, and then the military had purged him from office under their powers
there. This didn't necessarily endear him and other people to continued American rule. It was an expression not of their Communism, but Okinawans tend to be somewhat ornery against someone who is trying to run their affairs for them. I thought we had no good reason, frankly, to maintain rule over a million Okinawans. They needed to go back to Japan.

*Q: What was the feeling? Was Okinawa considered part of Japan?*

STRAUS: Yes.

*Q: Was there any separatist movement?*

STRAUS: Well, there was a very, very minor separatist movement, and I suppose the Okinawans, if they had their druthers in a perfect world, would prefer to be independent. But they realized that they can't go it alone. To be a part of a rapidly more wealthy Japan wasn't half bad, and that, of course, is what it proved to be. So it was a very good move.

In the reversion negotiations, I think we retained all the essential rights. One wonders now what all the fuss was about.

*Q: Who were the key people in this whole reversion thing as you saw it, from our side?*

STRAUS: I think Dick Sneider orchestrated the whole thing and later became the negotiator for the reversion in Tokyo. I think Alex Johnson played a major role. There was a fellow, a political appointee over in Defense, ISA. He later was involved with the Pentagon Papers and is head of the ACLU now. I can't remember his name. At the time, he was a rather young man, I think around thirty, although he was a Deputy Assistant Secretary. He helped swing part of the military around, although the military were never very enthusiastic about this. Until the very end, I think, the CINCPAC Commander, Admiral Sharp, opposed it. But the civilian authorities in Defense gradually swung over to the view that it wouldn't be the end of the world. We were also concerned, of course, of what Congress would say. In the end, the Congress was much more sympathetic than we had thought. We were concerned about some of the economic arrangements involved in the reversion, but Congress seemed to be rather disinterested about the American business community and their rights.

Then, in the negotiations, we got some good words from the GOJ on the use of Japanese bases in the future, particularly in the event of a Korean eventuality, and to a lesser extent, in the case of a Taiwan eventuality.

*Q: This was the terminology, an eventuality?*

STRAUS: Well, I think the word was contingency. It has been a long time.
William H. Littlewood was born in Detroit, Michigan in 1924. After serving in the U.S. Army during World War II, he completed his B.A. at the University of Florida and his M.A. at the University of Michigan. He joined the Foreign Service in 1960 and served as a Science Attaché or Counselor in Sweden, Japan, and Indonesia. He also worked in the NASA Foreign Relations Office and as the Associate Director of Science and Technology for USAID. Mr. Littlewood was interviewed in 2001 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You went to Tokyo. You were in Tokyo from…?

LITTLEWOOD: That Science Officer position opened up in 1967. Late ’67. They pulled me out of NASA back into State to be their oceanographic officer as I mentioned before. There was an interagency Committee on Oceanography, so I represented State at that. The White House had a “Marine Council chaired by the Vice President.” So I backstopped that. The State representative had to be the Secretary or the Under Secretary of State. They couldn’t go any lower than that. U. Alexis Johnson was Under Secretary at that time. Later he was Ambassador to Japan. It was a very good experience, so I sat in on some of those Council meetings. And did the background work and other interesting things within the oceanographic field, from an office chair, not a ship...

Q: Concerning oceanography, was this at the time we’re talking about, the late ’60s and all, was oceanography becoming more and more of a shared, open knowledge both with Europeans and also the Soviets and others?

LITTLEWOOD: Absolutely. In the Antarctic we had complete cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The Antarctic Treaty was the only treaty that we had in common with the Soviets. Our Congress was very happy to have that treaty going because it was something that they could point to.

Q: In Tokyo you were there from when to when?

LITTLEWOOD: ’67 to ‘70.

Q: What were you up to?

LITTLEWOOD: There, the same job as Sweden. To meet oceanographers and other scientists there and work with whatever came up with a scientific content. The U.S. had a special cooperative arrangement with Japan, run on our side by the Department of the Interior. It had about twelve different panels. One would be on forestry, another one would be on oceanography, rain sciences, another would be on earthquake resistant building, another on water pollution, etc. In fact, the water pollution meeting occurred first ten to fifteen days after I arrived. So I was helping it to be arranged from the Japanese side and the American side. I was the intermediary. I would help the American side arriving, meet their planes, pass customs, etc. We could tell the late arrivals, “You forgot about the dateline.” [laughter] Other problems were when we wanted to
substitute somebody, and I’d have to report that to the Japanese and see if they had any objections, or if they had any suggestions. Then I would sit in on the meetings and help the American delegation any way that they needed. Maybe we’d have eight people on the American delegation, all water pollution experts, representing both government and non-government, e.g. from a university. So my first real view of Tokyo was with the water pollution field trip going up the canals in Tokyo, and I would just think about, here I’m seeing downtown Tokyo, through their polluted canals. I hadn’t really settled there in Tokyo. I was living pretty close to the Embassy and really hadn’t traveled around the city. And our delegates would say, “Wow, look at the pollution coming out of that thing.” All that hydrogen sulfide. That comes from so and so. It was kind of a different first view of the city.

Q: Japan was just really getting cranked up for the Japanese miracle about the time you arrived.

LITTLEWOOD: I guess one could say that. My focus was on the science side and we had lots of counterparts. The Japanese had a station down in the Antarctic and they were planning certain things like over the ice travel to the South Pole. They needed fuel depots and things like that. They had to depend on the U.S. for many things. When they get to the South Pole they’d be out of fuel but by pre-arrangement they could get enough fuel from us to get back to the coast and their ship. So I was really able to help. I was the perfect person for them, as I knew all of the U.S. senior people in the Antarctic. They were my friends after four years. So I could arrange all of that for them. I did that, and I met all of their oceanographic people, I gave a talk at a breakfast meeting at the Japanese DIET about research on manganese nodules on the deep sea floor, which could be dredged up. This is possibly a new source of manganese but what environmental harm does it do?

Q: Now, did you tell them what you were doing or did…?

LITTLEWOOD: I could give them new information that had not yet gotten into the literature. I could talk because this was a cooperative program; what’s going on, what we were working on in our laboratories and in the field. My focus is to help anything that can promote joint cooperation in the scientific fields in both countries.

Q: We were all terribly impressed by the Japanese manufacturing and Japanese system which was beginning to develop: automobiles, electronics, and all that. And it was beginning to get started while you were there, wasn’t it? Did you find that the Japanese were more into practical science or experimental science, I mean how did you find it?

LITTLEWOOD: Of course much of that technical activity comes over to the commercial side and that’s not in my field, but I was quite aware they were becoming competitive in automobile production. They took away our business by making a better automobile, I presume. And they took away from the Germans their earlier optical leadership; think Zeiss. The Germans made nice lenses, they were the greatest in the world - and suddenly they come up against the Japanese. Cameras and microscopes and other lens-related instruments. And the Japanese did this just by their own ability, and probably Japanese government money, too.

Q: Were we working to find out, you know, sort of the reverse of that side, to find out what fields
the Japanese were working in to get information back to the United States?

LITTLEWOOD: I think that the industrial companies themselves would have their representatives over and could do a better job of that commercial intelligence. I don’t remember anybody in the Embassy focusing on a large scale of that, obviously it’s part of the commercial and economic side of the Embassy, not science. We were promoting cooperation to advance science.

Q: But it was more, we were relying on sort of the powerful American business side to take care of this. How about Japanese going to the United States to study, in the science field?

LITTLEWOOD: There was a certain amount of that but I don’t remember it being a big factor. I think Japan did a lot of just-on-their-own. Of course they started from scratch. When you’ve got a big factory that’s all tooled up for the latest model it’s hard to change, I suppose. When you’ve got a new factory you can tool it up for a new model right away. Perhaps that’s most of Japan’s big advantage, in that they don’t have to change Detroit around. Their government obviously has more input and power. I can’t imagine the U.S. Government dictating the design and price of a car.

Q: It took about twenty years to get Detroit to get back into full competitive swing.

LITTLEWOOD: Even then, the Japanese still have an edge I think with some of the cars, in that they are more efficient, less likely to break down, I’m not into that field, but I have a Toyota Camry. Car and Driver says it’s the best car.

Q: Well, I’ve got one. It’s about eight years old.

LITTLEWOOD: Mine is five years old.

Q: When looking from your vantage point, were we looking at what was going on in China at all, from the Tokyo perspective?

LITTLEWOOD: No, I certainly was not involved at all in anything like that. We had enough science activity between the United States and Japan to keep us busy. The Antarctic cooperation was very profitable scientifically, to them and to us. One of the groups under our science cooperation agreement that came over was the Forestry group. This was great cooperation. And Ed Cliff, the U.S. Chief Forester through three administrations, was the head of the U.S. Forest Service and Chairman of the U.S. forestry team. He was a very nice guy. I went with this Japan-U.S. forestry group on their field trips in Japan and would sit in on their meetings. It was a very good education for me, too, plenty of different viewpoints. Then there was something that influenced me later in my work. I earlier mentioned a group on earthquake resistant construction. The Japanese had a “shake table” where they could build a module of a house or an apartment or something, and give it various earthquake shake forces to see where the cracks began, and how they spread. They then could figure out from an architectural viewpoint how you could strengthen the construction so that particular motion, the lateral motion of the earthquake, will not bring the building down. And they, the Japanese, were doing this because they were about to
build a lot of modular housing. There were to be a hundred apartments, a hundred of the *same* all along the street or elsewhere, all low-cost housing. So they would take various designs and test a model of each from an earthquake viewpoint, before they built a hundred or a thousand of them. That makes a lot of sense. So I gained expertise, I later visited our National Bureau of Standards, now called “NIST,” the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which was a leader in U.S. delegation to Japan on this subject. They were very good. They were also working on this earthquake-resistant construction on our side. I was made very aware of this and later in my story we’ll get to Indonesia. Indonesia has earthquakes and volcanoes and in some earlier work there I actually used that team from NIST. I was then with USAID.

*Qː Were the scientists, Japanese scientists, well supported by their government?*

LITTLEWOOD: Yes, yes they were. And I had no problems, in fact I have not had any problems in my career with cooperation with the other scientists. It’s been a great job.

**WILLIAM J. CUNNINGHAM**  
**Political Officer**  
**Tokyo (1968-1971)**

William J. Cunningham was born in California in 1926. After serving in the Navy from 1944-1947, he received his Bachelor’s degree from the University of New Mexico in 1948 and his Master’s in 1950. He joined the Foreign Service in 1949 and his career has include positions in Prague, Paris, Tokyo, Taipei, Phnom Penh Saigon. Mr. Cunningham was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 17, 1997.

CUNNINGHAM: We finally got to Tokyo, March 1968. Skip Purnell was acting political counselor at the time, I believe. I settled into my job as director of external affairs in the political section of the American embassy in Tokyo.

*Qː You were in Tokyo from 1968 until when?*

CUNNINGHAM: March 1968 until June 1971. This was a significant period in our relations with Japan because the main thing we were doing at that time was to prepare for the retrocession of Okinawa to Japanese administration. As a result of the settlement, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the understanding reached at that time, the U.S. would continue to administer Okinawa which we acknowledged was sovereign Japanese territory, but the governor of Okinawa in effect was an American. I was not involved in the negotiations that ended this arrangement.

*Qː That was Dick Sneider’s jewel wasn’t it?*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes. When I got to Tokyo, David Osborn was the deputy chief of mission and U. Alexis Johnson was the ambassador. This was the third time that I had worked with David
Osborn. He had been my boss in Sapporo when I was vice consul. He had been my boss in Taipei when I was second secretary in the political section and he was political counselor, and now he was the DCM, and I was First Secretary of Embassy. That was a grand opportunity to work with an old friend and somebody who I respected very much.

The other interesting thing was to work for U. Alexis Johnson, who was a veteran ambassador and East Asian hand. There are two things that I remember about U. Alexis Johnson that I think are important to recall.

He had a reception every month at his residence for all the new arrivals to the embassy to welcome them. It was just for us with nobody from the diplomatic community at all. He and Mrs. Johnson would welcome us as friends and colleagues and members of the family. There would be a little socializing and after a while the ambassador would ask everyone to sit down and he would give us a little talk about how to get along in Japan. He said that he realized that most of us didn’t know Japanese and that it was a difficult language to master and that there were many things about the formalisms of Japanese life that were somewhat off putting for foreigners. But, he said that there are a couple of things he had learned that always helped him get along in this country. “The first thing is when you are going out anywhere make sure you always have a notepad and a pencil in your pocket. Japanese know English, they study it from the third grade, but very few of them speak it well. If you speak to them in English they are going to get terribly flustered and embarrassed because they don’t know how to answer and they will think they don’t understand you at all. So, there is a mental block that develops. What I have learned is if you have a question you want to ask a Japanese write it down. They can all read very well. They will understand it and be much more at ease. Then they will either answer you in spoken English or they will write down the answer for you. In any case, they will accommodate you and take care of you because they are very kind to people who are guests in their country.” He then said that a good way to break the ice with the Japanese is to ask them something about their country or their home town or where they come from, who they are, that kind of thing. Ask about something that is in their background. That is one image I have of U. Alexis Johnson, a very wise man, I think, with a lot of experience about how to get along in a foreign culture.

The second thing is a little episode early in 1968. We had already worked out the retrocession of the Bonin Islands to Japan. Those are the islands where Iwo Jima is located. They too had remained under U.S. administration along with Okinawa after the San Francisco Treaty. Somebody, probably Dick Sneider, then still country director in the Department, engineered this retrocession, decided that it would be a good idea to use the Bonin Islands as a test case for the return of sovereign Japanese territory to Japanese administration. The Bonins were unique because the people who lived there are not Japanese, they are kind of the offspring of whoever was on the islands in the first place and co-mingled with people who got shipwrecked or somehow ended up there. We wanted to make sure that their interests were taken care of. That was part of the negotiations that we conducted with the Japanese. The Japanese understood very well that this script was a dry run for the retrocession of Okinawa.

So, it came time to execute the press release for this and that had to be cleared by Washington, DC. One of my colleagues drafted a suggested press release, Rodney Armstrong, a Japan specialist, Japanese language officer. He was in the section of which I was in charge so it fell to
me to take this draft up to Ambassador Johnson to be approved. I read it over and there was something in the text that was a bit obtuse in the sense that you could infer from the press release that this was making a comparison to the eventual return of Okinawa, but it wasn’t explicit. I was puzzled by this. I was newly back to Japan and not fully tuned in to the subtleties of life and diplomacy there. I thought to myself, why don’t we just come out and say explicitly what our purpose is. Why leave people guessing? After all it is an American press release.

I took it into the ambassador’s office, it was mid day and he was sitting behind his desk, which was absolutely clear, nothing on it. He was smoking a cigarette and reading a book. I was struck by that and thought, hmmm, here is Ambassador Johnson heading up this big embassy with 30 government agencies represented and he is just reading a book and taking it easy in the middle of the day while everyone else is slaving away, working hard. I gave him the telegram and he read it over and said, “What do you think of it?” I said, “Well, you know, Mr. Ambassador, I am kind of puzzled as to why we are not more explicit and direct here about the Bonins being a dry run for the Okinawa retrocession.” He looked at it and then at me with those twinkling blue eyes of his and said, “Oh, I think it is better to leave things of this kind to the imagination rather than to come out and be too direct about them,” or something to that effect. He said, “I sort of side with the French style of diplomacy in matters of this kind.” I said, “Okay.”

Later on I mentioned this to somebody. I said, “You know, the ambassador was up there reading a book and as soon as he signed the telegram went back to reading the book.” And somebody said to me, “That’s his style. He doesn’t get involved. He counts on us to know our jobs and to attend to them. His style is, if you need help, he will get involved. When his help is no longer necessary, if you let him know that, he will get uninvolved. He is depending on his staff to be professional enough to carry off its job on its own.” I thought, “Well, that’s a pretty good boss to have. He will backstop you if you need but he is not going to interfere in something if it is unnecessary. He saves his heavy ammunition for the big battles.” So, I admired that very much in Johnson.

My work during those three years in the embassy involved three things. My work was liaison with the ministry of foreign affairs. There was not very much English spoken outside the ministry of foreign affairs in Japan in those days except in the very small international community and I did not know Japanese. I had the hope when I went there that I would be able to develop capability in Japanese since I also knew Chinese very well. That is to say, the written language should not have presented much difficulty for me. If I could learn the spoken language reasonably well then I hoped to be able to develop a capability in the written language also. So, I took the 100 hour intensive course in spoken Japanese that they used to offer in the embassy. After that it was up to me to take an occasional lesson. The short of it is, I never developed a spoken Japanese capability. There was so much work to do that I simply could not find the time or the energy to invest in the homework that I had to do in order to develop a capability in spoken Japanese. That was a disappointment for me that I wasn’t able to do it. People told me that wasn’t unusual because it is a very difficult language and I certainly believe them after that experience. But, as a result I was restricted pretty much to the diplomatic community and the ministry of foreign affairs as far as my work was concerned with Japan at that time.

Our policy at that point was to make the Japanese as fully our partners in diplomacy as the
British were. That was the slogan. In other words, we shared everything with the Japanese. This was just the beginning of that period. So, every day I would look over the incoming traffic and the telegrams to see what issues we had internationally in the world at large that we wanted to tell the Japanese about. We wanted them to know our position. It was not necessarily issues that related directly to Japanese interests or U.S. interests. It would extend to matters that involved our global interests and the whole broad scheme of international affairs.

For example. I cultivated the head of the Middle East desk and would go over and talk to them about what we were doing in the Middle East, what was going on, and what the Japanese assessment of developments in the Middle East might be. The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 had just taken place and how did the Japanese see this situation and how we saw the situation, etc. The same thing with Africa and to some extent with Latin America, and, of course, particularly with regard to China and Southeast Asia. Herbert Levin was also in that section and he was a China specialist and during my time there mainly handled China issues with the Japanese.

Another issue that was going on was the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) at the time. I spent a lot of time talking with the people in the arms control part of the foreign ministry about this treaty and what we were doing and trying to persuade them that Japan should become a signatory of the NPT. There was resistance on the part of Japan at that time to adhere to the NPT. The question being raised, particularly on the political right, in Japan was that by adhering to the treaty the Japanese were giving up a nuclear option. They were sacrificing something that would be important to their national interests. This was the argument that was being made in political circles in Japan against adherence to the non-proliferation treaty. But, I think the real reservation on the part of the Japanese was that they were sympathetic to the argument of the third world countries which was, “well all right, if we are going to forswear the position and development of nuclear weapons there has to be some progress on the part of the nuclear weapons powers towards nuclear disarmament.” The Japanese as a result, became active in the subsequent modification of the draft non-proliferation treaty to impose that obligation in the convention upon the major nuclear powers –the U.S., France, Russia and the UK. So, that was really the point. I can’t remember specifically any conversation where this was made explicit to us, there may have been. Herb and I were both doing this work with liaison with the foreign ministry. But, certainly, and I am sure I did some reporting at the time or Herb and I did together, that made it very clear that this should be inferred from what the Japanese were saying to us and that indeed that did represent their bottom line position in regard to the NPT….

Q: What was your impression of the Japanese Foreign Service and foreign ministry?

CUNNINGHAM: They were super. I never worked harder in my life then I worked in Tokyo. At the end of three years I was very tired. But in all of these comparisons of batting order that we used to make about international affairs every day when I go over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I never told them anything new that they didn’t already know. They knew everything just as quickly as we did. We had different understandings and interpretations and they and we were both interested in knowing what each other thought about any issue at hand. We were kind of confirming each other’s analyses and confirming the details with one another. At the end of one of these conversations, I would go back and report to Washington what the Japanese had told me. In other words, it was another perspective on that particular issue. I never surprised them and
I’m happy to say they never surprised us either in any of these exchanges, but we always learned something from one another. I came to respect the Ministry of Foreign Affairs very, very highly.

The quality of the diplomatic corps in Tokyo was absolutely first class. We had world class people in all the embassies there. It was a real privilege to work with people in the German embassy, the British embassy, the French and all the rest and even the Soviet embassy, with whom we worked from time to time. They were knowledgeable, able people who were first rate diplomats. So, you get to be a good player by playing with the champions, and it was a great opportunity for me to work in that embassy.

WILLIAM SHERMAN
Principal Officer
Kobe/Osaka (1968-1970)

Counselor for Political Affairs
Tokyo (1970-1972)

William Sherman was born in 1923 and raised in Kentucky. His career in the Foreign Service included posts in Japan, Korea, Italy, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on October 27, 1993.

Q: After the War College, you were assigned to Tokyo. Was that your choice?

SHERMAN: I had actually hoped to go to Seoul as the Political Counselor. I had just received a promotion to FSO-2 while at the War College which made me eligible for that assignment. I had been in Korea many years before, as I described earlier. Bill Porter became Ambassador in the Summer of 1967. He had been part of the U.S. delegation headed by Hubert Humphrey that went to the Park Chung Hee inauguration the year before. As I mentioned, I had worked on the preparation for that visit and had accompanied the delegation. So I met Porter on that trip and I took the opportunity to tell him I was interested in that job -- he had already been announced as our next Ambassador by that time -- even though I was not eligible for an assignment until the following year. Sending a newly appointed, but not announced, Ambassador as part of a delegation made matters a little tricky for the Chargé who at that time was George Newman. In any case, Porter eventually chose Dick Peters for the job of Political Counselor and the then the Bureau offered me the job as Principal Officer at Kobe-Osaka. As it turned out, that was probably the better assignment for me in any case.

The Consulate General at Kobe-Osaka in 1968 was approximately 10-12 Americans. The Consular Section was in Kobe and the Administrative Section moved from Kobe to Osaka and back. The Economic Section was in Osaka. I worked in Osaka primarily because that was the location of the World Exposition which as my main focus for the years I was the C.G. All of the other normal activities of the post really took second place.

It is somewhat unique in the Foreign Service to have a Consulate General with two main offices,
separated by roughly thirty miles. I did not travel very much between the two offices. My predecessors and successors tended to use the office in Kobe to a large extent because it was more spacious and far more pleasant and the commute from the CG's house was far better. But since most of my time was taken up by the Exposition, I stayed in Osaka most of the time. Kobe didn't need any "hands-on" supervision, although, as I said, I would occasionally visit our offices in Kobe. I did travel to Tokyo and to prefectural capitals in my district.

The Consul General in Kobe-Osaka is a unique assignment under any circumstances and was even more so while I was there because of the Exposition. Osaka historically and traditionally was the business center of Japan. All of the large industrial combines -- Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, etc. -- had started in Osaka and had kept their roots there. By the end of the war, it became apparent that Tokyo would become the center of Japan. So the CEO's and business leaders, while maintaining their homes in the Osaka area, spent most of their time in Tokyo because that became the center of commercial activity. All of these business leaders maintained a sympathetic and sentimental attachment to the land of their forefathers. Therefore, when the U.S. first established its posts in Japan right after the War -- i.e. the diplomatic branches of the Military Government -- Osaka was a natural place for a presence. Osaka was one of the Japanese cities that have a special designation -- along with Kyoto and Tokyo (as illustrated by the fact that the Tokyo city administrator is a governor, not a mayor). The Osaka is a Fuji, which is a higher rank than a Shi, which is the next level. Kobe, however, also merited attention. There always existed great rivalry between Osaka and Kobe. They are in two different prefectures. Traditionally, the U.S. had had a presence in Kobe because it was a major port. After the War, Osaka also became a major port. It became clear to one of my predecessors that having only a presence in Kobe was insufficient; so the Department rented space for him in Osaka and gradually the post became known as Kobe-Osaka. While I was there, we requested that the post designation be changed to Osaka-Kobe as an indicator of the changed importance of the two cities. Kobe, of course, was greatly distressed by the change, but I felt that the new designation was a far more accurate description of the situation on the ground. Nevertheless, I still had to deal with two sets of Japan-American societies, two sets of city government officials. I suppose that a foreign Consul General in Minneapolis-St. Paul might face the same problems, although those two cities are closer together than Osaka and Kobe were. I had to do a certain amount of representation with the city officials of both municipalities, but there was very little if any official business conducted. That just wasn't necessary and I kept it to the bare minimum. There were consular corps in both cities which had to be periodically called out for some civic function or other -- building dedication, ribbon cutting, Miss Kobe contests, etc.

We built a beautiful new Consulate building in Kobe. It was clear from the beginning, even before people moved in, that this was a summer palace. It never was fully utilized; it always had empty office space. Many of the rooms intended for offices became storage space. It was a great waste of money. During my tour as C.G., I continued the efforts started by Owen Zurhellen to consolidate staffs so that we could all be together in one city, which had to be Osaka. Long after my departure, that consolidation took place; we now are only in Osaka and the office building in Kobe has been sold -- to finance the new building in Osaka. Because of the Japanese tax system, which charges you by the ground square footage, we wound up building a very beautiful tall square edifice in Osaka. So in summary, U.S. representation started in Kobe, slowly over many years shifted to Osaka and is now entirely in Osaka. We still do some consular work in Kobe,
trying to help the shipping and travel industry, but our base is in Osaka.

My principal contacts were the business people in Osaka. I spent a lot of time supporting the American business community, which consisted of 60 or 70 people involved in joint ventures or building nuclear plants, representing 40 to 50 companies. There was a branch of the Japan-American Chamber of Commerce in Kobe-Osaka, I thought the Americans needed more support than they were getting from that source. So I worked hard at keeping them aware of what was going on in the foreign policy arena. The American companies had already penetrated the Japanese market by the late 60's. We had American banks -- e.g. the Bank of America -- American businesses -- e.g. Goodyear-Sumitomo, Dupont -- accounting firms, airlines, services - - e.g. Northwest and Pan American -- construction companies -- e.g. General Electric, which was building a nuclear power plant.

I did a lot of traveling, doing representational work. The consular district was very large, covering fourteen or fifteen prefectures, covering the island of Shikoku and on the main island, almost from Hiroshima to Nagoya and from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of Japan. Hiroshima was of course a place of concern; it was politically sensitive and we tried very hard to keep good relationships with that city and the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, which consisted of 50 or 60 Americans who worked there. There were many missionaries in our consular district, most of whom lived in the rural areas. I started a program in which I and one of my staff would spend a day in one prefecture, trying to explain what the American Consulate General could do for the locals in terms of services. That included not only consular services, but also trade assistance for those Japanese that wanted to trade with the United States. That program was not always successful, but I think it provided the Japanese a better understanding of why an American diplomatic establishment was set-up. I have mixed feelings about the role of constituent posts. It is not always clear to me that they are always necessary; it depends largely on the country whether they are effective and how useful they are. In the case of Osaka-Kobe, it was a very productive operation. We used to issue three or four million visas each year; that was when we still required visas for all visitors to the United States. The staff that handled that work-load consisted of only three Americans and five or six locals. It is true that most of the visas were for visitors, there were only a few immigrant visa cases processed. What helped us, of course, was the assistance of the travel agencies which filled out, or had filled out, all the basic visa application papers. They used to bring these large batches of applications for the groups that they were taking to the United States. Without the travel agencies, I don't think we could have handled the work-load with such a small staff. Many of the Japanese used to go on group tours to Hawaii or Guam; some went to the United States, mainly to the West Coast. These tour packages were relatively cheap and the Japanese are great group tourists. The large number of visitors was an indication of the economic recovery that Japan enjoyed twenty-five years after the War. The tourist agencies would charter a JAL plane, loaded it with its customers and off they went to an inexpensive hotel. It was not very expensive, but there were enough Japanese by this time who could afford that small expenditure so that the visa issuance work-load was very high. The yen in the late ‘60s was still 360 to a dollar -- those were the great days for us.

The Osaka-Kobe consular district was also very busy on commercial matters. The two way trade between that district and the U.S. was almost as large as the U.S. trade with the Common Market. The two-way trade at the end of the ‘60s was very large. The trade deficits were not yet
the problem they were to become, although we could see glimmers of difficulties ahead. Much of the export from Osaka-Kobe were textiles; it also exported metals, minerals, pharmaceuticals and other manufactured goods.

Q: Tell me how it felt to be a United States representative when you visited Hiroshima -- the site of our first atomic bombing?

SHERMAN: It was a remarkable experience. In Hiroshima then and even today, one can clearly see some of the destruction caused by the bomb. You can always see the ruined dome which was the site of a pre-war Exposition. You can see the Noguchi mausoleum, a memorial for the hundreds of thousands who died. That is a site that everyone visits, and the Japanese burn incense or deposit paper cranes in front of it. There is an Atomic Bomb Museum that has horrifying exhibits of the many types of damage that was done; however, the exhibits are crowded and rather poorly presented -- I understand it is better today. Most of the exhibits were in large glass cases so that the horror was not as fully exploited as they might have been. Around these terrible reminders of a terrible catastrophe, the city has developed into a hustling, bustling community with a major automobile plant -- Mazda had its headquarters near Hiroshima. By the late ‘60s the city had been rebuilt and was functioning well. As was true for all cities that had been bombed, Hiroshima was rebuilt in a much more sensible fashion with a grid, much more able to handle modern traffic than it could have managed had it remained as it was pre-war. While I was Consul General, the prefecture had a young, active governor who compared himself to John Kennedy because he had also commanded a PT boat and was about the same age. Hiroshima had one of the most active America-Japan societies in my district.

There was an American Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission which consisted of scientists studying the genetic after-effects of the radiation created by the bomb. That Commission had records on everybody who was anywhere near the epicenter, how far away they had been at the time of the explosion, etc. The Commission gave an annual physical examination to each victim. Even though working in a country like Japan, where autopsies are rare and seen as irreverent, the Commission conducted autopsies as the victims died; the local population willingly supported this deviation from their social mores. All the information was on computers. The Commission increasingly became a joint operation until today it is almost entirely Japanese managed and staffed. In my days, the Americans were in charge of the Commission and as I mentioned before, we had about 50-60 doctors and public health experts living in Hiroshima.

The Hiroshima population was warm and friendly. It was extraordinarily cooperative, even more so than in other Japanese cities. I don't want to underplay in any way the devastation that the atomic bomb caused, but Hiroshima was not taken over by drum-beating, placard-waiving peace activists that might be expected and that could be seen in other Japanese cities and sometimes at international disarmament conferences where they became self-appointed advocates for "Hiroshima victims." Of course, there were many Hiroshima citizens who had strong opinions on disarmament, but they were not the disruptive publicity seeking kinds that one found elsewhere. The United States was not criticized because it had dropped the atomic bomb. We were perceived as Japan's allies. The US presence in Hiroshima, which consisted of a small USIS library in addition to the bomb Commission, was very welcome. I used to go to Hiroshima frequently because I arrived in Osaka-Kobe two years before the 25th anniversary of the
bombing which was 1970. Alexis Johnson, then our Ambassador to Japan, had not paid an official visit to Hiroshima; soon after my arrival, I organized an Ambassadorial visit. So I was in Hiroshima within the first two weeks after my arrival in Osaka-Kobe. Reischauer had, of course, been there earlier; I think he visited almost every prefecture in Japan. But I am not aware on any special attention that the U.S. establishment in Tokyo paid to Hiroshima also Reischauer may have done something special because he was the kind of person who would have thought in terms of Hiroshima's history. But in general, our Ambassadors didn't have the time or resources to devote too much attention to Hiroshima or most cities outside of Tokyo. I found Hiroshima fascinating; I felt some inspiration when I saw how the people had risen from a devastating blow and had turned their tragedy into a positive asset. The bombing was part the city's history, which they respected, but they would not let that dominate their lives. They built a vibrant economy and looked to the future and not the past. They were more interested in re-establishing a major industrial center than in wallowing in their past.

In general, the Japanese were remarkable for overcoming their major military defeat and the scars, both physical and psychological of war. It was not so much a matter of "forgiving and forgetting" as it was a matter of perception of life as a continuing and moving experience. Events both positive and negative happen; they can not be denied, but the present and the future are more important than the sanctification of the past. The Japanese are known for their ancestor worship which is an integral of the Confucian tradition. They do not have a central and dominant religious belief -- certainly not an institutional one. Shintoism revolves around propitiation of natural deities, many representing various natural forces like wind and fire. It is not an ethical system. Confucianism is the ethical system that dominates Japan and Korea. It does not have a Supreme Being at its center like Buddhism, but it is more oriented to giving some structure to daily life. Buddhism centers on the search for perfection and the "after life". The three philosophical strains co-exist in Japan and often reinforce each other as the same person may show allegiance to two or all three strains. You are born Buddhist and you die Buddhist -- there are ceremonies for each. You are married in a Shinto shrine, but you live as a Confucian. Christian penetration of Japan has been minimal; its adherents have remained at about the same number since the 17th Century -- about one million, mostly Catholic. Protestant missionaries have had relatively little success in Japan unlike Korea, where they did have an impact. Japanese do not worship every week; there are holidays that are important, but religion as we know it is not a central theme in Japanese life. Many have a family shrine which is used for offerings to ancestral gods, but Japanese life does not revolve around religion.

Q: You mentioned earlier that the International Exhibition became your predominant occupation soon after your arrival in Osaka-Kobe in July 1968. Were plans already underway for that major event when you arrived?

SHERMAN: The planning for the US participation were well underway in Washington. Howard Chernoff had been named as Commissioner-General and had assembled a staff, under the aegis of USIA which was the lead agency for the Exhibition. He spent some time in raising private American financial contributions which are always necessary if the US is to make any kind of showing. He also supervised the architectural work for the US Pavilion. There was also a small staff already in being when I arrived in Osaka detached from the C.G. devoted to this major enterprise. It was going to be a big deal. Every major company was going to have at least a
booth. The local Chamber of Commerce, the Rotary club and other organizations were entirely focused on the Exhibition, even though it would not open for another two years. There was a large clock in the center of Osaka which counted down the days until the opening.

Ground had not yet been broken for the US Pavilion; so I was there for the first shovel-load. Chernoff moved to Osaka in 1969. I had some experience with Expositions since I had been involved in the closing of the one that had been held in Brussels. I had noticed that Commissioner-Generals and Ambassadors seemed always to be at odds about who was the chief US representative. I was determined that such a situation would not occur in Osaka and that the State Department and Exposition staffs would collaborate fully. There would no competition for being "top dog". I saw the Exposition as a tremendous opportunity for the United States which I was not going to have messed up by "turf" warfare. There was enough work to go around for everyone. The CG was besieged by a steady stream of visitors, most of whom knew little about Japan and we anticipated having to help a lot of visitors with the usual traumas of unpleasant incidents like lost hotel reservations, lost belongings, thievery, etc. The Exhibition was scheduled to last 6-8 months, which meant that there would be an extended period of visitors, whose potential problems would be the responsibility of the Consulate General, while the Commissioner-General could concentrate on the problems of the Pavilion and the exhibitors. I called on Howard before I left Washington and then I hosted receptions for him once he had established his quarters in Osaka. So we developed a very close relationship. He was sensitive to my problems as I was to his. We tried to have our respective staffs mingle so that there was good cooperation at that level as well. In the end, I think our efforts paid off.

My days would start with a drive to our building in Osaka, which always took over an hour since I lived half-way between Osaka and Kobe. It was a long commute, even though most of it took place over a super-highway; even in those days, traffic was bumper to bumper -- "natural clogging" as the Japanese would describe it. Then I might have a luncheon engagement in Kyoto which was 30-40 miles away. That was another hour's drive. After lunch, I might go to Senri Hills where the Exposition was being built. Although there was good public transportation available, my schedule was such that I had to use the car and I spent much of my time just going from one engagement to another. I think I was in my official car on an average of 100-150 miles each day I was in the Osaka-Kobe area.

The Exposition kept me very busy. I had to represent the United States at every ground breaking ceremony, at every national day and at every reception for a Japanese or foreign VIP visitor -- e.g. when Prince Charles of Great Britain or the twin sister of the Shah of Iran appeared. These social occasions invariably took place at the Exposition grounds, not in town, which meant another long round-trip. Sometimes, the foreign visit coincided with a national day celebration. Then we would send special groups to the Exhibition like Ozawa and the San Francisco Symphony; they performed at the Osaka Festival Hall. At one time, there was a film festival in honor of the Exhibition. All of these events required me, as the Consul General and the senior U.S. representative in the area, to attend some social event, unless of course I was sick or out of town. It would not have been acceptable to send a substitute. That made for a huge representational work-load, most of it meaningless and unproductive, generated primarily by the Exposition. All Consul Generals have some representational work-load, but nothing compared to one who has a major international exhibition in this geographical area. These continual social
requirements started sometime before the opening of the Exposition and during the Exposition, which lasted for several months, as I have mentioned earlier. My representational responsibilities were not lightened at all by the presence of a U.S. Commissioner-General. Protocol required that we both attend this endless series of social occasions.

When I first arrived in Osaka-Kobe, I tried to establish a "management by objectives" system for the Consulate General. The consular program of course was already well established and ran smoothly and didn't need much of my supervisory time, despite the fact that we were the second largest visa issuing post in the world -- Tokyo was the largest. Political and economic reporting was not a major concern, but commercial work was important. That usually consumed the work of two American officers and several local employees. The Exposition certainly increased the Commercial Section's work-load just because more American businessmen came into our district and requested information about commercial opportunities. Franchising was becoming an important aspect of business opportunities at the time. It was about this time, for example, that Kentucky Fried Chicken started in Japan with a concession at the Exposition. That was the start; other American firms soon followed with their outlets. The Commercial officers were very much involved in helping the American franchisers establish their networks in Japan. We also worked closely with the American business community to help them expand their investments. The Exposition did not have a major impact on US-Japan trade which was already well developed.

The Exposition and related activities became a major factor in our work-loads. My deputy, Rod Armstrong, put together a loose-leaf notebook, in both English and Japanese, that was intended to assist American visitors. It included such information as doctors, attorneys, hotels, restaurants, etc. A copy was available at the front desk of all the hotels in town for the use of Americans with questions or problems. If the guest needed any services and if he or she couldn't communicate, the hand-book was intended to overcome the language barrier. As it turned out, it was not needed nearly as much as we anticipated. We did a lot of contingency planning, but in the final analysis, we found out that the Japanese were well organized and we didn't encounter any serious problems. The most exciting event during the Exposition came when two of Czechoslovakian guides one night decided that they wanted to defect. They consulted with some of the other Exposition staff, including some American guides. The guides did not come to us and eventually changed their minds and went back to Prague.

The Exposition was a terrific boon to Osaka and to Japan as a whole, just as the Olympics had been for Tokyo and Japan in 1964. I was in Italy at the time, but I benefitted from the Tokyo Olympics because the Japanese rebuilt their city traffic paths; they built a super-highway system, which was the latest in urban planning although they have had to expand it several times since then. The Osaka Exposition did the same thing for the Konsai. A whole new network of highways and roads were constructed in and around Osaka. A whole new infrastructure arose on an amazing dimension, bringing with it thousands of jobs both in construction and other commercial enterprises. So the Exposition had an enormous impact on Osaka's economy as well as that of the region.

Q: I would like to ask about the CG's relationship with the Embassy and with the Department in Washington. Did you get much supervision from either?
SHERMAN: Not very much. In fact, I was surprised by the amount of autonomy I enjoyed. I had never been a principal officer before and it was the first time I was really on my own. I had expected closer supervision particularly by the Embassy. I was pleased that I was given as much flexibility as I did. I took pains to keep the Embassy informed of my activities and events in my district. Dave Osborn was the DCM to Ambassador Alexis Johnson and it was to him that I reported. The Embassy did not have a Supervisory Consul General -- a job that was often seen in the Foreign Service in earlier years. Dave decided that a monthly letter from each of the constituent posts was adequate for supervisory purposes. That enabled him to keep track of the major events around the country. If he had any special requirements, he would phone or write. We were in touch as necessary with all of the Embassy sections when we needed help or guidance. We had a close liaison with the consular and commercial sections especially. We had a branch USIA operation in Osaka, which was autonomous. We were quartered in the same building, but the Osaka USIA office was not part of the Consulate General. This was during a period when USIS was striving for maximum independence and didn't want to have any Department of State interference with its operations. I always included the USIS Director in my staff meetings so that he could keep abreast of political and economic events; we had a close social and personal relationship, but I never tried to give him any directions or guidance. There were USIS branches in both Kyoto and Osaka; the one in Kobe had been closed before I arrived. The one in Hiroshima was closed during my tour as Consul General. We cooperated and worked well together, but I was well aware of the Agency's concern about its independence.

Some of our reports went directly to Washington; others were submitted first to the Embassy. We received all material from the Department that was sent to all posts. We only had a limited telegraphic capacity.

I thought it was important for my staff to know what was going on outside of Osaka. So I instituted a system which permitted one officer to go to Tokyo each week as a courier. He would bring back copies of all the telegrams that the Embassy had received and sent in the previous week. We rotated that assignment throughout the staff so that everybody had an opportunity to go to Tokyo. Once the cables were in the C.G., they were held, under security protection, available for all Americans to read. We didn't have access to the very highly classified material, but the bulk of the telegraphic traffic was available to us. That enabled the staff to keep current on Japanese affairs, certainly, and other worldwide events of note. It kept people from becoming too insular.

That courier run was also used to bring back some of the necessities of life. When I first arrived in Osaka, the Army had a small commissary which was available to State Department employees. It was small, but since the prices for certain basic goods were sky high on the Japanese market, the commissary played a very useful economic role for our staff. For example, meat and liquor, for example, were both very expensive and sometimes scarce on the Japanese market. For those of us with representational responsibilities, it would have been prohibitive to entertain very often if we had to rely entirely on the Japanese market. The commissary closed soon after my arrival, because the US military presence in Osaka or anywhere in our consular district was almost nil by 1968. So we started to order as a group large quantities of the necessities from the commissary in Tokyo. The courier would take that bulk order with him and deliver it to the commissary. We then contracted with a shipping firm to deliver the goods from Tokyo to us.
There was some rivalry between us and the Soviets at the Exposition. We used to issue bulletins about the number of visitors each of our Pavilions hosted during a period. There was no Soviet consular representation in Osaka. Their only presence was their Exposition staff. We had the better attraction because the moon rocks retrieved by our astronauts were on exhibition in our Pavilion. That was an exclusive; no one else had them. In general, our space exhibit was great. We showed the suits worn by the astronauts, the space modules they used as well as the space ships they actually had flown. The Soviets had huge portraits of Yuri Gagarin holding a dove and mock-ups of their space vehicles which seemed to lack credibility.

We had a constant stream of visitors to the Exhibition. They frequently were my responsibility rather than Chernoff's. There were some visitors who came just to see the Commissioner-General, but most were in Osaka under State Department auspices and that meant under my charge. I would take them around the Exposition. Then there were a number of Americans who had connections in Washington who, while being in Japan, thought they just had to see the Exposition. There were a lot of Congressional delegations. Even John Rooney with his usual entourage came. I was expected to shepherd the Congressional delegations. The Commissioner-General's office included two protocol officers who did nothing but take care of visitors.

I enjoyed my tour in Osaka. I think I left the staff more unified than I had found it when I first arrived. We started some recreational activities, like field event days with three legged races, tugs-of-war and other contests. We developed a Consul General softball team that played in local leagues. I worked hard to build morale which I think was successful. Even now when I return to Osaka now, the few local employees who are still there from 25 years ago, I am greeted warmly by them and that is very rewarding. We were fortunate to have a good local staff. Employment at the CG was prestigious even after the War and it was a long term arrangement. Our turnover as very small. That was true for the Embassy in Tokyo as well. When 30 and forty year service awards were handed out, the lines of recipients were long. I don't believe we had anyone on our staff who had worked for us before the War, but many of them stated with us right after the War. We did hire a few while I was there, but the turn-over of the Japanese staff was minimal. All of our staff were very good.

I was there for the whole Exposition run. On the last day of the Exposition, I transferred directly to Tokyo to take up my job as Political Counselor.

Q: That transfer took place in September, 1970, I believe. How did that transfer come about?

SHERMAN: Armin Meyer became Ambassador to Japan in mid-1969. He was not a very successful Ambassador in Tokyo. The Embassy's morale was very low primarily because of the demands that Mrs. Meyer put on the staff. He had not any experience in East Asian affairs. His forte had been the Middle East where he was Ambassador in Lebanon and Iran. He tried to transfer what he had learned in that part of the world to Japan and had very limited success. Although he tried hard and certainly did his best, Meyer didn't empathize with the Japanese; he didn't know them or their language. So Meyer was a "new man on the block". Both he and she had chips on their shoulders particularly with respect to the Japanese experts. So the Embassy was not a particularly happy place. I had an opportunity to meet him several times when he came
to visit Osaka and the Exposition. His visits were always major productions which place heavy demands on our limited staff. He came for opening day of the Exposition; he came when David and Julie Eisenhower were with us. Osaka was also the center of the Japanese textile industry and we were in the center of the US-Japan dispute about textile trade. So for all of these reasons, Meyer came to see us eight or nine times in the first year of his tour.

Meyer traveled a lot, but never visited other posts as often as he came to see us. We got along tolerably well during these visits. During one of the visits, he told me that Dick Ericson, his Political Counselor, was about to be transferred and he wanted me as the replacement. I told him that I would be pleased to take that assignment, but it almost came to nought when we had a major social misunderstanding with Mrs. Meyer. But that was overcome sufficiently that I did transfer to Tokyo. I accepted the job even though I knew the morale situation at the Embassy. I thought that problem was manageable, particularly for the Political Counselor.

My Japanese language skills were good since I had used Japanese often while in Osaka. No one is ever bilingual in Japanese because of the many different levels of speech which can exclude a foreigner from any particular conversation. But I could express myself in Japanese and be understood. I could get along in most conversations; my Japanese came back to me in Osaka even though I had not spoken it regularly for twelve years.

Dick Sneider was the DCM. He had come to Tokyo about the same time as Meyer had. Dick had been in the NSC working on Okinawa reversion. He was assigned to the Embassy to finish off that reversion issue. But the then DCM, Osborn, was due for transfer; so Meyer, who needed a DCM, decided he would take Dick even though I think they did not know each other. It was very unusual situation because in those days most Embassies had DCM’s who were known personally to the Ambassador. But the Ambassadorial position had been left vacant for six months. I don't know for sure, but common wisdom was that the job had been offered to several people who turned the offer down. It was said that John Rockefeller had been offered the job as well as some other notables with Japanese experience or contact. The story was that Armin Meyer became available after his tour in Iran and Alexis Johnson, by now the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, suggested that Meyer be sent to Japan in the absence of any other acceptable candidate who was willing to go. Alex’s view was that any Career Minister in the Foreign Service should be able to take any assignment in the Foreign Service. (Incidentally, I think that is a very defensible opinion.) And that is, according to the grapevine, how Armin Meyer ended up ended up in Japan. One night I got a call from Mr. Hotta, the head of the Sumitomo Bank, asking me whether I knew that a man by the name of Armin Meyer had been appointed to be US Ambassador to Japan. I told him that that sounded very strange in light of Meyer's unfamiliarity with the area. So I was surprised when the nomination was actually made.

Q: You had met Ambassador Meyer during his visits to Osaka. You knew the DCM, Dick Sneider. Who else was in the Embassy at the time?

SHERMAN: Herman Barger was the Economic Minister. He was followed by Les Edmond. Bill Wells was the Station Chief. Alan Carter had come to reorganize the USIA operation in Japan and therefore I knew him from his visits to Osaka. He changed USIA's presence in Japan dramatically, and in the process, of course, ran into some controversy. I knew almost all of the
staff in the Political Section.

The DCM and the Political Section staff were East Asian veterans. The Economic Section had a few East Asian experts, but little Japanese language fluency. In general, the Embassy was well staffed with Japanese experts, many of whom spoke Japanese. The Political Section was all fluent in Japanese.

Q: How were our relationships with the Japanese in the early ‘70s?

SHERMAN: They were good, even though the Vietnam war was still going on. There were a lot of anti-US student demonstrations -- it was almost a daily occurrence. All demonstrations were orderly and many quite large. There was absolutely no violence. There were also still some union demonstrations, but they also were primarily non-violent, especially since the police had become so expert in crowd control. By regulation, all the demonstrations had to follow prescribed routes and procedures. Any diversions were promptly and effectively suppressed without bloodshed. But there were a lot of demonstrations, which consisted primarily of sloganeering and chanting and yelling in front of the Embassy. The "Student League Against the War in Vietnam" -- the so called Beheiren -- was in the forefront of the demonstrations. As I said, labor was also involved as were the Socialist and Communist Parties.

The Embassy's principal task was the completion of the Okinawa reversion process. We were negotiating at all levels on all aspects of the process. We had no guidelines because the event was unprecedented in world history. Territory has rarely been returned by a victorious power, especially after it had been occupied for many years. Eventual reversion had been foreshadowed by Dulles when he expressed the view that Japan had “residual sovereignty” over Okinawa. Once that had been said, the Japanese began to center their attention on reversion. The Nixon Administration had managed to get Congressional approval for reversion, even over some opposition, particularly from the Navy. The Navy believed that its bases in Okinawa were essential for maintaining its strategic role in the Pacific, and in the final analysis, the US retained total control over those facilities. The U.S. military was the only part of the US Government that really opposed reversion. The Japanese continued to press us to give back the islands. Prime Minister Sato's statement made during this period that“the U.S. occupation of Japan will not really be over until Okinawa reversion had been accomplished” pretty well summarized the feelings of the country. Dick Sneider, who had spearheaded the reversion process in Washington just continued his role when he became DCM in Tokyo. He conducted the negotiations essentially as a personal matter; he had a small staff -- mostly legal people and a Vice-Admiral, who was the Navy's watch-dog to make sure that its interests were protected -- reporting to him which worked exclusively on Okinawa reversion. There were others working on Okinawa proper as the High Commissioner sought to work out an amicable procedures and negotiate with Okinawan civil officials. We in the Political Section had little to do with reversion. We were involved when Okinawa was part of larger political issues, but on a day-by-day basis, this issue was handled by Dick and his staff. Whatever economic work had to be done in connection with reversion was done by the Economic Section. We worried about making sure that the professionals in Okinawa retained their rights and privileges when the Japanese took over; we worried about traffic because on Okinawa people drove on the right hand side of the road -- US style -- which was not true in Japan. So a lot of changes had to occur for reversion to work. The
whole reversion process took three years, followed by a short transition period.

All these negotiations took place while Vietnam was still going on; the treaty permitted us to use the bases to rehabilitate ships and equipment damaged during the war, but did not allow planes to take off from Okinawa and fly directly to Vietnam. We had to go through the process of making a refueling stop elsewhere; the Japanese did not wish to be or to give the appearance of being directly involved in our operations in Vietnam. They supported us logistically and in many other ways. But the use of our bases in Japan to do anything other than protect or defend Japan created a Constitutional problem for the Japanese.

Later on, we had a serious problem when the Mayor of Yokohama, who was a Socialist, declared that the streets and bridges of his city were too fragile to carry the heavy tanks and equipment which were being driven to the docks for loading for shipment to Vietnam. We maintained that the US-Japan Security Treaty gave us complete rights to ship material across Japan and between US bases. The Mayor’s position turned into a real confrontation and for a time we were in a complete stand-off. Finally, the Foreign Office drew a very circuitous route over mountains and other natural barriers which was certainly the long way around but didn’t cross any of the Mayor’s bridges. That broke the impasse and we were able to load our ships. This was just one example of the many political difficulties that the Vietnam war created for us in Japan. There were many Japanese opposed to our activities in Vietnam, that we were well aware of it on a daily basis.

The Government, however, did everything it could to solve our problems and to support our position.

Q: We have talked a little about the Navy's role in the Okinawa reversion process. How in general was the US military-Embassy relationship in Japan?

SHERMAN: Alexis Johnson, when he became Ambassador, had established a position for a Political-Military Affairs Counselor, primarily to accommodate some conflicting personalities in the Embassy although I think that Johnson liked the idea anyway. He had done the same thing when he was Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. He had set up a Pol-Mil staff in his own office. The position of Political-Military Counselor was first filled by Scott George. That cut the Political Section out of direct involvement in negotiations and liaison with the military. The military-civilian relationships were conducted primarily through a series of committees that included Embassy, US military and the Japanese government, both civilian and military. Scott was replaced by Howard Meyers. Sneider, who was a Political-Military specialist, kept a close eye on political-military matters. The Ambassador was also involved though his contacts with the US Commanders in Chief of the Air Force and USFJ and with the CINC in Okinawa. When I arrived in 1970, the Embassy still had a Political-Military Counselor. When in 1972, the Okinawa reversion process had been successfully concluded, I recommended that the Embassy return to a more normal organization with the political-military work being integrated within the Political Section. There wasn't a separate section in Germany or in Italy and I didn't understand why, after reversion, there needed to be one in Japan. Howard Meyers had left by this time; Chuck Schmitz, who had been the chief lawyer working for Dick Sneider on reversion, followed Howard as the man in charge of the Pol-Military Affairs office. On paper, that section was part of the Political Section. Sneider had left to be followed by Tom Shoesmith. I insisted that the Political Counselor be responsible for political-military affairs and so it was done. It had worked
that way ever since and very smoothly at that.

Our contact with the US military was on a daily basis, by phone, if not personally. The military rarely met alone with Japanese civilians in the National Defense Agency. There were of course a lot of daily contacts on a military-to-military contacts, but normally, if there were any discussions with the defense Agency, the Embassy participated. As I said, much of the work was done in committees, particularly the Joint Committee, which consisted of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Agency, the Embassy and the military of both countries. There we discussed issues arising under the Administrative Agreement, the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and other important matters. My main contact was usually the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force; the CINC dealt with the Ambassador. Our relationships were generally productive and congenial. The only problem that I can recall was that encountered by Tom Shoesmith when he first arrived; he didn't see eye-to-eye with the general in charge of the military facility at Zama, who was also the same person responsible for the transportation of tanks and heavy equipment to the docks in Yokohama. The General wanted to take a strong stand and demand US “rights” to the freedom of transportation of equipment throughout Japan; Shoesmith was counseling restraint. Tom was sure that a peaceful resolution could be found given enough time; the General was not willing to brook any delay. He just wanted to bull his way through the streets of Yokohama.

So periodically, there were differences between the US military and civilian arms. The military were much more inclined to pound tables and demand, even knowing Japanese reluctance to raise politically sensitive issues. But on the whole, the cooperation was good and there was no competition. Most of the issues that we discussed were related to the status of US forces. There were always problems about some incident or another caused by a GI -- minor incidents of cab drivers bring robbed by a drunken GI, or some incident related to prostitutes. They were relatively infrequent and were handled at lower command levels. The more serious problems involved the question of administrative cost sharing, such as would arise whenever new housing was constructed. Also there would be questions about utility cost-sharing and the wage scales for local employees. Periodically, the citizens living around a base would complain about the noise made by airplanes landing and taking off, particularly during night exercises or about airplane interference with their TV reception or destruction of property during some military exercise. Many of these problems arose in Okinawa because our presence was so much greater there than in other parts of Japan and because Okinawa was used often for military exercises. We had some exercises in Okaido, but most of them occurred in Okinawa.

Q: What were the major political issues that you had to confront during the three years you were in Tokyo as Political Counselor?

SHERMAN: There was a considerable amount of disarray in the Japanese government after Sato's resignation and his replacement by Tanaka. Tanaka was a controversial figure whose ascendancy to power was a stormy affair. That turn of events created considerable amount of reporting and analysis by the Embassy. The one-party system had been entrenched in Japan for many, many years, but it must be understood that the "one-party" label that Americans have applied to the Japanese political system is very misleading. The "one-party" label masked a number of competing factions, which made for vigorous competition in the political process. We
had to follow closely what was happening in each faction.

The Socialists were viewed as a much less of a menace than they had been in the ‘50s and ‘60s. They were not pro-American by any means, particularly when it came to the Vietnam war. Of course, they had a lot of support from non-Socialists on that issue and we had to devote a lot of public relations effort to explain the US position on the war. As I mentioned before, the students especially had a field day with that issue. They not only demonstrated frequently, but sometimes would barricade their campuses, effectively closing them down. One day, an American plane ran into a tower on the campus of Fukuoka University. The plane was held captive by the students as a symbol of American war making. The campus was closed for many weeks. There were some Americans -- e.g. a Buddhist priest named Brian Victoria -- in the anti-war movement; he used to go on hunger strikes in front of the Embassy.

Economic tensions between the United States and Japan were just beginning. We noticed a marked increase in exports to the US, particularly TV sets and automobiles. Textiles had always been a problem. Ambassador Meyer took great interest in this trade issue, in part because textiles were such an important part of Nixon's "Southern strategy". This southern coalition was instrumental in Nixon's election; many represented states with major textile production facilities and workers, who feared the large imports of Japanese textiles. Finally, marathon negotiations were started which ended in a multi-fiber agreement, which cut back on Japanese exports. The US side was headed by Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy. He set up his offices in the Okura Hotel, and he worked from there. The Japanese resented the U.S. pressure and the resulting agreement. That is not unusual; in general, most of the negotiations end up in resentment on both sides. We also worried about citrus -- particularly grapefruit -- imports into Japan, which continued to be a problem for many years, although the issue has disappeared by now. The Japanese were limiting imports of citrus fruits because it competed with its own domestic production; they feared that imports would wipe out their own industry. So the early ‘70s saw the beginning of the trade frictions and the burgeoning of the trade deficits. We were worrying then about a potential imbalance of $10 billion. We have of course long surpassed that!

Q: Who were your main contacts in the Japanese bureaucracy?

SHERMAN: Our main point of contact was the Foreign Ministry, where we had access to any official. We didn't have to go through the North American Bureau to talk to officials in the Foreign Ministry, unless for example the Ambassador wanted an appointment with the Foreign Minister. We made our own appointments in other parts of the Japanese government, like MITI or the Ministry of Finance. Our contacts with the Japanese bureaucracy were daily. Then, as it is today, the Japanese bureaucracy was in control of Japanese policy. It had more power than the politicians, as it still has today. The bureaucracy's continuing strength is anchored in the Confucian social system. In ancient days, there were Mandarins; these were experts with long years of experience in the daily workings of an issue. The Japanese bureaucracy was viewed as the modern incarnation of the Mandarins. Very recently, this view has changed, and the bureaucracy is under a lot more critical attention but it is still very powerful. There was no question that in the ‘70s, the bureaucracy was the dominant policy making element of the government. Sometimes, it could be stymied by determined political opposition which could block necessary legislation or prevent it from being implemented, but that occurred only rarely.
The Liberal Democratic Party didn't always stand united on every issue and therefore couldn't always dictate passage of every bit of legislation. Also the Japanese political system almost requires that legislation have some support from an opposition party. The so-called "tyranny of the majority" was not acceptable in Japanese politics, except on very rare occasions. The LDP would never ram legislation through the Diet without some support from one of the minor opposition party. That was just not the Japanese way -- consensus was and is essential. That society lives by consensus and the imposition of one view, even if held by a majority, is just not acceptable; some representatives of the minority have to accede. That importance of consensus is still vital in Japanese politics as it is in their personal lives. No argument can be won by reference to "I have all the chips"; concessions have to be made to minority views. It is a culture that Americans have a difficult time understanding and dealing with. Unless you have lived with it for sometime, it is very hard to understand it and deal with it. It was our job in the Embassy to try to explain this culture to Washington; it was our job to explain to the newcomers in the Embassy who might not have been familiar with it. It is important to understand the Japanese culture if we are to be successful in achieving our objectives; direct confrontation was and is just not likely to elicit the right response. We had to explain this culture difference to visiting Congressmen or any other American policy makers who were inclined to use the direct American approach. Of course, this role placed us in awkward positions at times; some Americans just viewed us as "apologists". That is true still today. There is the so-called "Chrysanthemum Club", as the old "Japanese hands" are known. We are the ones who are opposing the thunder of the American righteous wrath about Japanese trade policies, for example, when all red-blooded Americans are anxious to mount the ramparts and blast the Japanese for their "sins" in the hopes of bludgeoning the Japanese into taking actions which they are not prepared for. This cultural clash has been true throughout the history of U.S.-Japanese relations. If you look at those relations even before the war when Joseph Grew was our Ambassador in Tokyo you can see some indications of this tension. To some degree, all Embassies have to wrestle with this problem of interpreting their host society to the American policy makers, but I think that our representatives in Tokyo bear a special burden in this area.

The perception that the Embassy had "clientitis" existed in the early '70s. Meyer did not want that perception to be perpetuated and he was tough on the Japanese when it came to economic/trade issues. He was right; some of those transactions should have been brought to the attention of Washington and were. The mercantilism exhibited by the Japanese in those days was just unacceptable. All of the Embassy agreed on that point. There were occasional efforts made to explain to Washington that change in Japanese practices could only be made through other means than direct confrontation. The debate was not about objectives; it was about means.

We also differed with Japan to a certain extent about China. They thought we were much too confrontational with the Mainland. They felt that we would be more influential if we were spoke a little more softly, thereby softening the atmosphere which might permit the Chinese to be somewhat more accommodating. That of course is exactly what took place in the Nixon/Kissinger regime starting with the "China shock". When the Kissinger visit became known in Tokyo, the Japanese were astonished. The professionals were outraged that there had not been any advance consultation, much less warning. They felt betrayed. Here was the United States actively engaged in trying to keep the Chinese Communists from taking a seat in the UN Security Council. We were conferring daily with the Japanese on this issue both in New York
and in Tokyo, stirring up support for Taiwan. We had repeatedly promised that we would take no action with respect to China without prior consultation. In the final analysis, we broke our word. The Embassy knew absolutely nothing about Kissinger's trip to China; I think the Japanese came to believe that fact, but at the time it happened, they probably thought that someone in the Embassy must have known. It would have been impossible in the Japanese system for anything like that to happen. Privately, the Japanese felt that Kissinger had betrayed them, although they really had not had much contact with him. He had never visited Japan and had never shown much interest in the Far East. There was a general curiosity about the articulate National Security Advisor, but he was not a target of Japanese attention in Washington. The China trip changed all that; Kissinger got their attention!

The "China shock" was quickly followed by the "dollar shock" and the "soybean shock". No one in the Embassy was very happy about those and I doubt that anyone in the Bureau for Far Eastern Affairs in State was very happy. Marshall Green was the Assistant Secretary at the time and he was totally surprised. The Japanese found it very hard to accommodate themselves to these major lunges in US policies. They all came as surprises to one degree or another and had no history of consultation behind them. The American decision-making process is so culturally different from that of the Japanese that the effects of policy changes were greatly magnified just by the cultural differences. Everybody in the Embassy was dismayed by the shift in our China policy. Many supported closer relationships with Peking; indeed "ping-pong" diplomacy started in Tokyo. By sheer accident, Bill Cunningham, who worked for me and who happened to be a China expert, was walking out of the Embassy and overheard the Marine Guard at the front desk talking on the phone telling a caller that he couldn't do something or other. He heard enough of the conversation to raise his curiosity; so he asked the Marine Guard what the conversation was all about. It turned out that an American ping-pong team coach was calling because he and his players had been invited to go to China and wanted to know whether it would be all right. Bill immediately cabled Washington about this invitation. We of course did not know that Kissinger had been in contact with the Chinese and that this invitation was part of a diplomatic dance that was on-going and that in fact was a response to Kissinger's "feelers". It was pure chance that the "ping-pong" trip could have been scotched by a Marine Guard; also Armin Meyer was very reluctant to have the Embassy recommend that the players be permitted to go to China. Nevertheless, a reporting cable was sent which became one more step in the "opening to China" process.

Q: Who was the Japanese Country Director when you were in Tokyo and how were Embassy-Washington relationships in the early '70s?

SHERMAN: The Country Director was Dick Ericson, who took that job after I had succeeded him in Tokyo. We had generally good and productive relationships with Washington. The key was the DCM's relationship with the Country Director. There were nightly telephone calls between the two as well as other phone conversations between Tokyo and Washington on specific issues. We were well served by Washington. Our relationships with other agencies were also very good. I certainly had no problems and I don't remember anyone else in the Embassy having any serious issues with other agencies. A number of them of course worked quite independently, such as Treasury. The Embassy, as a whole, was quite effective in these days. After Ambassador Meyer left and after Bob Ingersoll replaced him in the Spring, 1972, the
Embassy worked on much more of an "even keel".

Ingersoll had just retired from Borg-Warner. He had no knowledge of Japan. He had to go through an education process to which he took extremely well. He listened carefully and absorbed all. He was energetic. He saw his role as an American businessman talking to Japanese businessmen. He did that often and extremely well. He permitted us to continue our daily contacts with the Japanese government without micro-managing them. We kept him informed, but he didn't intervene on day-to-day matters. He was a good economist and knew and understood trade both in theory and in practice since he had worked for Borg-Warner. I thought he performed very well.

RICHARD B. FINN
Country Director, Japan Desk

Richard B. Finn was born in 1917 and raised in New York. In addition to Japan, his career in the Foreign Service included posts in Washington, DC, France, and the Philippines. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 8, 1991.

Q: Then they brought you back to your early specialty, Japan from 1969-70. You were what?

FINN: I was Country Director for Japan.

Q: Were there any particular issues during this time?

FINN: The two big things were that we did an NSC policy review paper and the return of Okinawa to Japanese control. The new administration under President Nixon had come in and we did an NSC paper the main purpose of which was to see whether we could agree to the return of Okinawa to Japan. It had to win the support of the Defense Department. We did the paper and Nixon and Kissinger decided to go ahead with the return of Okinawa. Those were the main jobs I had in my year and a half or so as Country Director.

Q: That, of course, was a major step. How did you deal with the Pentagon? Did they feel you were a bunch of stripe pants guys giving away the store, or did they understand that this was an issue beyond just plain military?

FINN: Certainly no opposition and no resentment and no effort to drag their feet or anything of that sort. I think they accepted the decision by the President. And, after all they did not have to pack up and leave. They retained all the rights they had before except that they had to remove the nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

Q: We were still there, more or less.
FINN: Right. That was the same thing in Tokyo, of course, in 1952. We didn't give up an inch of land or send back one GI because of the peace treaty and we did the same thing in Okinawa after the so-called reversion, except for nuclear weapons.

Q: As you dealt with this, did the mayor of Naha play a major role?

FINN: The so-called governor of Okinawa was a man called Yara. He was a socialist and a school teacher and very eager to get the American presence reduced. He was against rearmament, defense and all that. But he was a very engaging person and you couldn't really get mad at him. Although he would make quite strong speeches on the stump, when you talked to him he was quite rational and very understanding. It was not a problem.

But there was a lot of bureaucracy involved in the negotiations before the Japanese could take over the administration of the island. We had to give up certain privileges and activities like the USIA broadcast station there that the Japanese didn't like. They did let us keep it but they wanted to have an agreement on what it could do and could not do. Things like that. But the whole operation really went quite smoothly. It was very well handled, I think. Alex Johnson, who had come back from Tokyo to be the Deputy Under Secretary of State, was really the mastermind. Kissinger and Nixon were quite helpful and cooperative all the way. It was a good operation, I think.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the Nixon and Kissinger foreign policy apparatus knew what it was doing?

FINN: Yes, I think Nixon was very well grounded, very interested and very astute about foreign policy. He used to travel regularly when he was out of office in the 1960s and he would always go around and call on heads of government. He was helpful with the local ambassador whom he would clue in on everything and take along on calls. You couldn't help but feel that Nixon liked to do this and had a real empathy for the problems of American foreign policy.

Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Adviser, didn't do much with Japan, as I recall. I think Kissinger, as he said himself, didn't find the Japanese easy to talk to or easy to discuss problems with. He found Zhou En-lai when he went to China in 1972 a very sympathetic person whom he could spend hours talking with. He never found that kind of counterpart in Japan. The Japanese are different, as we were saying earlier, they are not prone to lengthy discussion and analysis.

Q: Dealing with Japan over a period of time, did you have the impression that there is a problem because the Japanese don't seem to be able to develop a close personal relationship which helps discussion and negotiations—not just language, but cultural problems?

FINN: I think you are right. The Japanese Foreign Office produces some remarkable people who know English extremely well as well as America and our outlook on the world. But they don't make the policy of the Japanese government. Other bureaucracies are more influential in most cases. The businessmen are not that well versed in international affairs. Even if a man has had a couple of years in New York as a representative of a Japanese business, he is not likely to be a powerful man in the hierarchy back home. So the thing is structured in a way that the people who
are familiar with the West and easy for us to do business with are not really the basic policy makers or actors in the Japanese government.

This man who is now (April 1991) Prime Minister, Kaifu, is a remarkable exception. He is really quite personable. But the Prime Ministers tend to be people who don't speak any English, have not spent much time abroad and are rather wooden when it comes to any kind of meetings like a Seven Nation Summit. That is a problem with Japan. Japan is not yet in the international world to the degree that it ought to be. I have on occasion thought that one of our greatest weapons is the English language and the day will come when a lot of Japanese will speak good English. Japanese kids start at age 12 studying English and study it all the way through college, but they are not good at speaking it. A curious phenomenon. We are far worse in speaking Japanese so we cannot blame it culturally on them in any way. But there is a fair distance to go for us and to get the Japanese together.

WILLIAM CLARK, JR.
Chief, Liaison Office
Okinawa (1969-1972)

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. His career included posts in Sierra Leone, Japan, South Korea, Egypt, and India. Ambassador Clark was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.

Q: How did your assignment to Okinawa come about?

CLARK: As I said, I was in the regional Office of the Bureau for Far Eastern Affairs. I was a Japanese language officer. The Country Director for Japan at the time was Richard Sneider, later Ambassador to Korea. One day, he asked me to come to his office. All who now him have recognized what a great manipulator of policies and people he really was. He said that he wanted me to go to Okinawa to head up a liaison office -- the political advisor's office for the Civil Administration. He said that he had send my name to Bob Fearey, who had agreed on my assignment. Sneider said that Fearey knew me "well and favorable". I mentioned him in connection with the SEATO meeting that was held in 1969. He had moved from POLAD in Honolulu to Civil Administrator in Okinawa. I told Sneider that that assignment seemed alright. Once the word had gotten around, I received unsolicited advice from a number of people who thought I was making a mistake, primarily for going to work for Fearey. In fact, Bob and I became great friends and he is one of my son's godfathers. But he had a reputation of being very tough on people, particularly those who had not established the right relationships right away.

I knew something about the Okinawa problems from my tours in Japan. I also knew that, for the record, an assignment to Okinawa would show as "detail to the US Army". That was not the most propitious entry a Foreign Service officer could have on his record; I had no illusions that the Okinawa assignment would be "career-enhancing". But the opportunity to participate in a process which would return occupied territory to its former country seemed to me to be too important to miss. The decision to revert the island back to Japan had already been reached in the
previous year; it was progressing towards an unset date, but I was confident that it would happen during my tour in Okinawa. I was looking forward to assisting the reversion and preventing any obstacles from being erected. What I didn't know was that Sneider was going to go to Tokyo, first as the officer in charge of the reversion process and later as the DCM. Sneider knew that when he asked me to go to Okinawa, but I didn't.

The whole administration of Okinawa was under the US Army. We did have a consulate there which was sub-office of the consular section in the Embassy in Tokyo. That was the ingenious solution to the question of how the US Government could have a Consulate in territory which it already administered. The head of Okinawa consular section was very unhappy with that solution because he was not treated as a Principal Officer which impacted on his eligibility for a number of allowances like Official Residence expenses. All of the Americans in the Consular Section remained part of the State Department establishment; they were not seconded to the US Army. That office was there primarily to service the American military who needed documentation if they were to leave Okinawa for visits to other places. The US military was not entirely happy with the State Department presence for quite a while, but it finally adjusted to it.

I, on the other hand, was detailed to the US Army as were all of the Foreign Service officer who worked for the Civil Administration. I replaced John Manjo who had been the first Foreign Service Officer to head the liaison office. Before that, that position had been filled by a US Army civilian. The office liaised with lots of units, but principally it was there to maintain contact with the government of the Ryukyu Islands, which was run by Okinawans. That was the organization that really governed the Islands.

The US presence in Okinawa was headed by a High Commissioner. He was also the commander of the 8th Army -- a lieutenant general. He was assisted by the 8th Army Chief of Staff, a CINCPAC Chief of Staff because the General also was part of the CINCPAC staff, and a civilian Chief of Staff. Below that level, there was a large Civil Administration staff, which had legal, economic and administrative sections as well as the Liaison Office. The Civil Administrator was a civilian; his deputy was a Colonel. Over time, the Department assigned Foreign Service Officers to the Civil administrator. When it became clear that the Islands would be reverted to Japan, the Army became less and less interested in the function and the State Department increased its representation because, wisely, it thought it was important to have officers in Okinawa who knew the language and the culture as we approached the actual reversion date. So my deputy was a Foreign Service Officer; there were two other FSOs in the Liaison Office as well as four military officers, three secretaries, two Japanese-Americans for translation purposes and two Okinawans.

Our major political objective was to keep stability on the Islands until Japan could take control. We were concerned with anti-base agitations which was on-going; much of it was generated, strangely enough, by the base workers’ union. We used to have demonstrators demanding the abolition of the bases and the same time they insisted on no more reductions in staffing. Logic was not of great importance! So we had to wrestle with some unrest. The US had used Okinawa for a storage area for poison gas -- mustard and CSH nerve gas. The demonstrations forced us to remove that material from the Islands. That was very touchy issue.
Then we had to worry about the future of the facilities we had on Okinawa. Over the years, the US had maintained that many of these facilities were being built for the benefit of the islanders, but which, as part of the final settlement, were in fact sold to Japan for $360 million, which in the late 1960s was a fairly sizeable amount. Ten percent of that went, at the demand of Senator Javits, to a Japan-US Friendship Commission -- an educational program which is devoted to funding research and studies. It is still alive even though it had been expected to go out of business years ago.

We had to deal with the disposition of the Senkaku Islands which are located between Okinawa and Taiwan. They are on the Chinese Continental Shelf. Nevertheless, Japan claimed them -- the only territory claimed by Japan which is on the other side of the Japanese chain. These islands had been part of the Japanese Empire, but had been administered from Taiwan. When we occupied Okinawa, we administered the islands from there. The US government, in one of its usual firm, unswerving positions, said that it was turning the administration of the islands over to Japan, but would not take a position on which country they belonged to. The Taiwanese stimulated some demonstrations against this solution on the Senkakus which we had to deal with.

One other issue that we worked on diligently was the question of which facilities might be retained on the Islands and which would have to be relocated. In fact, this was not a major problem. Unlike the our bases in Japan, the bases in Okinawa were leased from the Okinawans. That made for a large "landlord community". As we approached reversion, the Japanese government picked up the leases and became the tenants. The lease terms were quite generous; in most cases, the leases were more profitable for the Okinawan owners than alternative uses. That factor dampened down the enthusiasm for closing the bases.

The reversion negotiations were a three way discussion: the Japanese government, the Okinawans and us. There wasn't much interest in the issues in other countries. It some way, the most difficult part of the process was to get the various US bureaucracies to agree and to speak with one voice. Let me take you back into history briefly. The first US administrator of the Islands was the US Navy. Then the responsibility was shifted to the US Army. The High Commissioner, as I mentioned, was a US General -- the last one being Jim Lambert. We were all fortunate that he was in charge during the end game; in fact, he extended his tour in Okinawa for another year to finish the job. He had been an engineer and thought that seeing reversion to fruition would be a high note of his career. Issues referred to the Pentagon were handled by a special group in the Office of International Security Affairs which was responsible for Okinawa and Panama issues. This group had been in being for many years; it had a relatively narrow view of Okinawa. It resisted change. The Army finally reluctantly agreed to support reversion, in part pushed by Lambert who was committed to the process and who was instrumental in making progress. The Army, until 1968, viewed Okinawa as a vital defense territory for the defense of our Far East position. The Navy was much more relaxed. They had a much smaller operation on the Islands. The Air Force had a large installation as did the Marines, but the Army was in charge and therefore viewed itself the greater "defender of the faith". The Air Force and the Marines knew that their facilities would remain even after reversion; so they stayed out of involvement in the politics of reversion. Three years before reversion, the Okinawan government changed from a conservative one to a reform in an election. The new Chief Executive was less favorably disposed to us than his predecessors, but he was absolutely committed to getting us out of the
civil administration of the Islands. That helped in getting good cooperation out of him. We were able to do some things with that Executive that we might not have been able to do with a conservative. For example, he was very helpful in the removal of chemical weapons, which was quite an operation.

I think in general we had done a pretty good job in getting the Okinawans prepared to administer their own territory. We certainly did a far better job there than we did in Micronesia. The Okinawans, at reversion time, were in pretty good economic shape by Southeast Asian standards. They were not at the level of their countrymen in Japan, but then they had not been there even before the war. It became the poorest prefecture in Japan as it had been before the war. Our investment was relatively modest to that made by Japan after reversion. We had done a fair amount, but our investment was essentially in the development of the bases, which did become the mainstay of the economy. The Islands were essentially an agricultural area; employment provided by the bases was a major economic boost. Of course, a whole base support industry developed -- bars, restaurants, etc. We had a good many Americans stationed on Okinawa who spent some of their income on the local economy. So our presence certainly was important to the economy, but still not sufficient to bring it up to Japanese standards. We did relatively little on infrastructure investment. We were building a rather large dam to help improve a fair water system. The roads were acceptable and we were building some at the time of reversion. There was a working telephone system. So the economy was finally moving in the right direction; the Japanese accelerated the process.

I arrived in Okinawa after the initial negotiations had been completed. The amounts of compensations had been settled. But there here were still some ambiguities that had to be worked out. One was that, in the reversion agreement, we had promised the Okinawans a complete after system. That seemed to have been forgotten in days after. When we finally got around to looking at it, we found that the main pumping station was in the middle of Kadena Air Base. The Air Force was reluctant to turn the base over to the Okinawans, but eventually it gave in and we did return the base to Okinawa. That was just one example of a lot of loose ends that had to be tied down before the final ceremony. These fine points were not left intentionally vague; the initial agreement was relatively detailed and voluminous, but still too broad to nail down every last aspect. We spent a lot of time with Japanese on how the various projects -- the dam, the roads, etc. -- that we had started would be completed. In retrospect, that was primarily an exercise in negotiations because once the Japanese took control of the Islands, they proceeded as they wished. We undertook those negotiations because we had an engineering division in the Civil Administration which was dedicated to doing a good job and it wanted to be sure that the Japanese would not let all their good work go down the drain. Actually, we just should have told the Japanese what we were working on, given them the plans and then let them do what they pleased.

The initial negotiations were between the Japanese and the US Government. Subsequently, as the details had to be worked out, the Ryukyu Islands administration was brought in making the those discussions tri-partite. The US was represented by a Foreign Service officer assigned especially to Okinawa for these last negotiations; he had a small staff working with him. The Japanese had an Ambassador assigned to Okinawa; he was the head of their delegation. The Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands was the chief Okinawan representative and he also has a small staff.
devoted entirely to the negotiations. At the end of the day, it was primarily a hand-holding operation which was useful in that regard. The Americans doing the negotiations never really appreciated how useful their role really had been. They thought they should be far more operational, but that is not what that staff was intended to be. They were there to act as an information transmission belt and to make sure that all none of the Okinawans were surprised by any developments. This process permitted the local inhabitants to have considerable input before they were officially at the negotiating table.

From the time the US Government had agreed to deal with reversion, the State Department began to infiltrate the US military establishment on the Islands. We, who worked in a US Army organization, got along quite well with the US military. By the time I arrived, the Civil Administrator and his staff had the confidence of the High Commissioner and the US military-civilian interface went quite well. We, of course, had differences of opinions with the US military on substantive issues, but we were fully accepted by them as part of their operations. The Consular office, which as I mentioned was a sub-office of the Embassy in Tokyo, had a more difficult time. The head of the office was never quite pleased with his status because, as I also mentioned earlier, he never had all the perks that went with being a Principal Officer. Until just shortly before reversion actually took place, the US military was very suspicious of the independent State Department personnel on the Islands. They used to monitor the consular operation closely, even though that function was in Okinawa essentially for the benefit of the military. Of course, as time went on, that consular operation was most helpful to the Okinawans who wanted to travel to US or its territories. At one point, Dick Flint, who was the head of that consular office, used to go to Tokyo once each quarter to report what was going on in Okinawa because all of his communications went through military channels, which he felt restricted his reporting. He did write letters and traveled to Tokyo, but I think he felt that he was being censored. The consular section actually worked on one of the military bases; that meant that Okinawans who had consular business to transact had to go through a military check-point.

My assignment to Okinawa was rather serendipitous in the first place having accidentally met Bob Fearey while I was working on SEATO Affairs in Washington. I arrived in Okinawa right after the completion of a major conference on the reversion process. Representatives of State and DOD from Washington attended as well as representatives of the High Commissioner. I was told that it had been a very good conference, except for one occasion when a State Department officer -- trying to be amusing, I think -- commented that General Lambert was using "back channel" communications to Washington. The General didn't appreciate the gratuitous remark and tore the State Department officer into shreds. In fact, Lambert did not use "back channels" and tried his best to be very cooperative with all elements of the US government. The conference finally got over that inauspicious beginning and was successful. My job, right from the beginning, was to liaison with the government of the Ryukyu Islands. At an earlier period, the Civil Administrator and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands had been in the same building. But then a new headquarters was built which separated us from the local government -- three miles away which most often took thirty minutes to navigate. So the Liaison Office was not spending as much time as it should have with the Okinawans. It was my job to see the Chief Executive, although his official counterparts were really the High Commissioner and the Civil Administrator. My main task was the liaison one. I was also responsible for a public affairs function, which included the management of a small fund to build small village places and other facilities of that kind and
were intended primarily to engender good will. We spent some time on "putting out fires". If problems arose, we would try to find solutions. We intervened to a considerable extent in local politics. The last time we tried it -- election of Chief Administrator -- it was an abject failure. We did support the LDP candidate for Chief Administrator. He was followed by a conservative who in turn was succeeded by a socialist, Mr. Yara, who also became the first governor after reversion. About the time I got to Okinawa, the LDP opened an office in Okinawa, headed by a Mr. Nishimi. He later became the Governor of the Islands. Before I arrived, I believe that we provided financial support to LDP candidates; by the time I arrived, the election had taken place and no further US government financial support was disbursed. There was an election of Mayor of Naha. But the reform Mayor was so solidly entrenched that his election was assured. But we had a policy before reversion had been agreed on to support candidates that backed the status quo.

One of the things that I found interesting was the chemical weapons removal because it gave me considerable insight into the workings of several organization. One of those was the US military. The existence of weapons had been published in the Wall Street Journal about six months before my arrival in Okinawa. The military was rehabilitating some of the mustard gas canisters which were deteriorating. A small leak had developed on one of the canisters; no harm had one to anyone, but the story became known to the Wall Street Journal. That began the drive to remove them from Okinawa. The preparation for evacuation was very elaborate. at the last minute, Washington decided that a test run would be necessary -- six months in advance of the total evacuation. Some of us argued against this decision on the grounds that a test run would only exacerbate the local concerns; if we were to get the gas out of Okinawa, we should do it as rapidly as possible. But we didn't prevail. We briefed all of the islanders. We had a Colonel who went all over Okinawa briefing all the local inhabitants, explaining the procedures and what the convoy would look like -- a police car in front, then an MP car, then a contamination truck, an ambulance, then the five gas carrying trucks and then the same configuration in back -- the ambulance, contamination truck, etc. When the demonstration process began, I was on the press bus watching the convoy leave the base. This convoy had only four trucks in it, raising the question of what happened to the other truck. Later, the Colonel explained that his briefings were based on a "normal" convoy; there wasn't enough mustard gas to require five trucks. A story of unintended consequences. The convoy had a long way to go to Tengan Pier, where the gas would be loaded onto to ships -- it was too heavy to fly out. The Okinawans objected to that route. So in the six months between the demonstration and the real thing, we had to build a special road that went straight to the pier, mostly across military occupied territory. The Okinawans had a point; the transport of gas is a dangerous process; their population would have been at greater risk over the original route. But had we not had the practice run, but actually evacuated the gas right away, we would have been successful too. The gas was transported to Johnson Island where, as far as I know, it still rests. We built a disposal facility there, which hopefully has been used.

During the actual evacuation of the gas, Okinawa was going through a severe drought. So we tried to help out by bringing some "cloud seeders" to Okinawa. We tried to make it rain when the convoys were not moving. Trying to make it rain, but not at specific times, was a complicated task in itself. It didn't work very well. There was rain, for which the "cloud seeders" took credit. Unfortunately, most of the time, the rain fell in the seas away from the Islands.
I mentioned that Dick Sneider had gone to Tokyo as Minister for Okinawa Reversion. Dave Osborn was the DCM. When Dave left, the two jobs were combined and Dick became the DCM. By the time I arrived, the direct communications problem had been solved and we had no difficulties. As I mentioned before, earlier in the history of the Okinawa occupation, the US military always wanted to put its spin on the analysis of local events. By the time I arrived that was no longer true and we sent our messages without censorship. The Embassy received copies of almost all the messages we sent, which were sent to the Pentagon with the Department receiving copies. We traveled back and forth often; that was true for Embassy personnel as well as Japanese Foreign Office officials. So we had a close working relationships with Tokyo. Washington was still concerned about reversion. The military of course was interested in maintaining as much of their base structure as possible. The Vietnam war was still on, which made Okinawa a very important logistic base for that effort. Trucks and tanks were repaired on the island, by the hundreds. Reversion was also important as an aspect of US-Japan relations, so that the State Department was interested in what was happening on the Islands. But by the time I arrived, the decision to return and the broad outlines of an agreement had been reached. Our job in 1970 and for the following two years was just to get it done and leaving.

As I mentioned, we did have a mounting number of demonstrations as we got closer to reversion. They culminated one evening in a march on our headquarters in late 1971 or early 1972. I was in a helicopter at the time overseeing the demonstration and radioing back what was happening. That was the last march. It was a union-sponsored march, but it had been infiltrated by some radical students. They managed to pull one policeman from his group; they knocked him down and threw Molotov cocktails on him, killing him. That ended demonstrations for good; the Okinawans had had enough. The students came from the local University. Some of the demonstrated came from Japan. There was a well known incident involving our Marines who had been in Vietnam. The Marine commander, Lew Wilson, later Commandant of the Corps and a Congressional Medal of Honor holder, had decided that despite all their Vietnam experience, his troops still needed more experience, particularly in building "fire bases". He decided that he would hold some maneuvers in the northern training area. The Marines built a gun emplacement and put a 105 into it. In the meantime, local criticism, which spread throughout the world, grew because the Marines were invading the territory of the red throated woodpecker. People were concerned that the gun fire would scare the animals and that might prevent their reproduction. Some Japanese demonstrators showed up and Wilson figured he could handle them by himself. He didn't ask for any assistance from any one who knew something about Japanese or demonstrations. He sent one of his Okinawan employees to monitor the demonstrators. They got half way up the hill where the gun stood. One of them climbed a tree and nailed the Japanese flag on it and refused to come down. I talked to the Civil Administrator about the situation and urged him to call Wilson to cancel the exercise. The Civil Administrator did that and I monitored the conversation on an other phone nearby. Wilson got on and the Civil Administrator said: "Lou, I have Bill Clark on the extension. He would like to talk to you!". So I gave Wilson my arguments; they didn't get very far. The Marines' political advisor told Wilson that the kid on the tree was obviously a leftist and that his fellow demonstrators would congregate around the tree. Of course, anyone who knew anything about Japan would have known that the leftists hated the flag and would never have used it, much less rallied around it. The Marines took a chain saw and threatened to cut the tree down unless the kid climbed down. He of course wouldn't; so the tree was cut down, kid and flag and all. The kid broke a couple of ribs and was treated in the US
military hospital. All this happened while I was in a meeting with General Wilson, three other generals and some of the Okinawans who were protesting the proposed exercise. Wilson got a note during the meeting. He passed the note to other generals and me with many inappropriate expletives. Finally, CINCPAC called from Hawaii and told Wilson to knock off the exercise. Despite this rough beginning, Wilson and I got along very well. As it turned out, the kid was a conservative and the son of a Japanese policeman. He didn't object to our forces being in Okinawa or in Japan; he just didn't want the red throated woodpecker disturbed. That is just an illustration of some of the problems we encountered with the military. It was also an example of a Japanese who wanted the US military to stay in Okinawa but he was definitely in the minority.

The reversion decision had been big news in Japan. The details and some of the troublesome implementations were not headline material. Sato, who served seven years as Prime Minister, was the big Japanese "mover" on reversion. He had said that his principal goal was to end the war in the Far East by the Okinawa reversion. He stayed as Prime Minister until it was completed. He is one of the few politicians who supported a positive policy that he was able to see to fruition.

In closing this chapter of my career, I should describe the actual reversion ceremony which took place on May 15, 1972. It was done on that day because the Japanese fiscal year ended on March 31. The Japanese wanted reversion take place on April 1. Our fiscal year, in those days, ended on June 30 and therefore we were holding out for July 1. The obvious compromise: May 15, which made everybody unhappy. I remember one staff meeting when the generals got into a debate over the need to put up another flag post on all of the bases after reversion in order to fly both the American and the Japanese flags. The debate was about the modalities of pulling down our flag and then putting it up with the Japanese one. I suggested that the ceremony take place at midnight, after sun down when our flag is lowered in any case. And so it was done. We pulled down our flag at sunset and raised both the next day.

MARSHALL GREEN
Assistant Secretary, East Asian/Pacific Affairs

Ambassador Marshall Green was born in 1916 in Holyoke, Massachusetts. He received an undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1939. In addition to his service as Assistant Secretary for East Asian/Pacific Affairs, Ambassador Green served in Australia, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and South Korea. He was interviewed on March 2, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: We're moving to the period of the Japanese connection when you were Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific in Washington. This was 1969-1973. Let's talk about Japan. When you took over this position in 1969, how did you view Japan as a factor in our foreign relations at that time?

GREEN: I had already had several assignments related to Japan. Japan had been a thread
throughout my career. During the period from 1969 to 1973 I saw Japan as increasingly important on the world scene, and especially in East Asia. I saw the primacy of the US-Japan security relationship in the broadest sense of the word. We had a common goal. Many objectives on the world scene were shared objectives. Japan had the technological and economic strength. We had a lot of that but we also had the military strength. Therefore, by working in unison, with each country participating to the maximum extent in accordance with its special strengths, we could make quite a mark on the world in terms of peace and progress. Not for any expansionist reasons but simply for improving conditions of life for the people of the world.

Q: We're talking about 1969, when you became Assistant Secretary. This was...

GREEN: The first experience I had with Japan in 1969 right after I was appointed Assistant Secretary by President Nixon, was in the course of a trip through the whole of East Asia, meeting with the various national leaders, all of which I've covered in the book I co-authored entitled War and Peace with China.

As Assistant Secretary-designate, I visited Japan in April 1969 at the end of a long trip through East Asia. My purpose was principally to convey to Japanese leaders impressions of my trip and to answer questions about President Nixon's views. This segment of my trip was very much like the others. In Japan my pitch was that we would stand by our commitments and that we considered our security treaty with Japan to be the keystone of our whole security position in that part of the world, and so forth.

I also mentioned a number of things about the countries of the area being in a better position to "fend for themselves." I also explained the Vietnamization program, which was already under way, involving turning over more responsibilities to the Vietnamese. So that was my first connection with Japan during the Nixon administration, when I met the leaders.

The second contact with Japan during my time as Assistant Secretary was very closely related to the first one. That concerned "The Nixon Doctrine" itself. You remember that "The Nixon Doctrine" originated on July 25 [1969], when the President was making a trip around the world. He stopped off in Guam and had a background press conference at the Top-of-the-Mar Hotel.

In this press conference President Nixon expressed what became known as "The Nixon Doctrine." Well, along with Bob Barnett, I had written the "scope paper" for his trip through Asia in July [1969]. In this paper I suggested that the President say many of the things that I had mentioned earlier on in March and April [1969] about the countries of the area being in a better position to fend for themselves.

In his backgrounder, the President put his emphasis more on military affairs, on our defense commitments, and on our progress to help strengthen the defense capabilities of our friends and allies. However, it was the primary responsibility of each country to provide for its own defense, to the maximum extent possible. We could only provide assistance in a supplementary sense.

Quite frankly, this had a lot to do with Japan, because in the scope paper that Bob Barnett and I had written for the President's trip around the world we emphasized the fact that these countries
were "more on their feet" these days, with Japan beginning to provide economic assistance, as indeed it had in Indonesia, where they were giving just as much assistance as we were. Later on, they gave more. My idea of "The Nixon Doctrine" tracked back, in many ways, to Japan.

The Japanese reaction to the Nixon Doctrine was generally favorable. They formally expressed their complete support several months later, in November [1969], when Prime Minister Sato gave what he called "The New Pacific Age" speech, which was a distinct reflection of the Nixon Doctrine. The whole concept of this speech concerned the United States working together with Japan and in support of the economic development and progress of all of East Asia.

The United States and Japan were further drawn together, I would say, by the Nixon Doctrine and what it expressed. The reactions of some of the other countries of East Asia were generally good, but they were nervous, fearing that the United States was preparing a rationale for minimizing its assistance to them. So I had a great deal of difficulty in reassuring the countries concerned that we were not "getting out." Once again, I talked about other countries (like Japan) being in a position to do more. As economic development progressed, the countries that were doing the best were in a position to help other friendly nations.

Incidentally, after the President gave his backgrounder to the press in Guam, he said that I would be prepared to answer further questions. Well, I didn't know what he had said not having been invited up to the press conference. It was a little embarrassing for me because I then had to brief the press both at the next stop, which was Manila, and then in Jakarta.

The press kept asking questions about what had gone on at the summit meetings between Nixon and Marcos in the Philippines and Nixon and Suharto in Indonesia. Since nobody in the State Department, including the Secretary of State, was present at those meetings, only President Nixon, Kissinger, and the head of government concerned knew what the President had said. The press people were not interested in general background. They wanted to know precisely what was said. All I had was a slip of paper from someone on one or two points that I could make. Probably, Ron Ziegler [President Nixon's press spokesman] got this slip of paper from Henry Kissinger. That was about it. It was very embarrassing for me. I recall that "Newsweek" magazine came out with an article, saying that my briefing in Manila was very much like a travel lecture. That was about all I could do.

Q: You were the principal person dealing with Asian affairs at that time and you had largely spent your career dealing with Asian matters. How did you feel about Kissinger's views on Asia at the beginning of the Nixon administration?

GREEN: I saw a good deal of Kissinger during 1969. I could sense increasingly that he wanted to have nothing to do with the State Department and that he was going to "run" foreign policy. I realized that I was going to be his principal victim as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, the area which was primarily "on the block" at that time. I could see that I was going to spend a lot of time dealing with an evasive White House. Another thing that bothered me, since we are talking about Japan, is that the only person Kissinger had on his staff who knew anything about Japan was Dick Sneider [a Foreign Service Officer and later Ambassador to Korea]. Shortly after that Dick Sneider found that he couldn't get along with Kissinger and was
assigned to Japan. After that, they had nobody on the White House staff who had real Japanese experience. The Japan factor wasn't adequately considered in a series of situations that were to arise.

Q: As I do these interviews, there is one thing that comes through. That is, first, Henry Kissinger was very "bright." However, and secondly, there were areas that he didn't know very much about and relied on his "brightness." Often, it didn't work out very well. Africa was one such area. Latin America was another...

GREEN: I think that Kissinger had lots of gaps in his knowledge of the world. He was a splendid tactician. In a given situation he knew how to maneuver very well indeed. He also is very good at briefing and is highly articulate. These were his strengths. However, depth of knowledge about East Asia, no. He had none. I think that his failure to draw upon the expertise of people who had spent their lives working on East Asia was a great mistake on his part. That is not the way we should run a government. To pay these people for all of those years of work and then not use them is pointless -- worse than pointless.

Another problem is one that nobody ever speaks about. Let me mention it right now. When you are "cut out" of things, the way other people and I were "cut out" of them, and you know that you are being "cut out," you begin to lose confidence in yourself, because you know that you don't have all the threads in your hand. You don't have the complete picture. Meanwhile, Kissinger knew that you didn't have the complete picture, and therefore he tended to discredit your views accordingly. It ended up by nobody really knowing what the other person knew or didn't know. It's a very bad way of running a government.

Q: Because the information flow must be "up and down."

GREEN: Right. He was playing his proper role of maneuvering and conducting certain kinds of delicate negotiations. However, with the assistance of key people in the State Department, we would not have made some of the mistakes that we made. Furthermore, we would have had a strong, effective foreign policy because it was headed by a man [President Nixon] who came into office, probably knowing more about foreign affairs than any president in history. We had a wonderful opportunity but, of course, a lot of that was not properly used. We could have done much better.

Q: As we keep our focus on Japan from 1969 through 1973, what do you think were some of the major developments?

GREEN: I would say that the two major developments were the opening to China and the "reversion" of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. I would also mention the Nixon Doctrine and the related Vietnamization program as being a fundamental development. So those were the principal developments during the Nixon administration that related to Japan.

Q: Let's talk about China. One of the great moments in the Nixon administration was the opening to China after many years of isolation between the United States and China, although there had been contacts. You've already talked about the US and China. How about the Japan factor?
What were some of the points that you were concerned with?

GREEN: The July 15, 1971 announcement by President Nixon in California of his intended trip to China (following Kissinger's successful earlier trip to China) produced a deep shock in Japan. This was known in Japan as the first of several Nixon "shocks." This reaction is very understandable if you bear in mind that the United States and Japan had a partnership. No third country was more important to the United States and Japan than China. That the President should suddenly announce this surprise visit, reversing policies which we had been pursuing for a long time, was deeply embarrassing to the government of Prime Minister Sato. One of the things we must remember was the fact that, year after year, the United States had been trying to keep communist China out of the United Nations. Sentiment in Japan had been rather favorable toward the People's Republic of China as being a member of the United Nations. We had kept Japan "in line" on this issue. When we suddenly announced that President Nixon was going to go to China, it also looked as though we were "abandoning" Taiwan, which had been a Japanese territory at one time and where the Japanese had enormous interests. Taiwan is very close to Japan. All of this boded ill to Japan.

However, above all, this subject was what was known as "Asakai's nightmare." Asakai was the Japanese Ambassador to Washington [at the time of the Nixon announcement]. His nightmare was that he would wake up one morning and find that the United States was represented in Peking. All of this put Japan in a terribly difficult position. It left the Japanese Government -- and Prime Minister Sato in particular -- with a feeling that they had been worsted, that Sato himself had been overshadowed by Nixon, that we were not reliable partners, and that we didn't consult, when consultations are fundamental to any viable relationship. The Japanese felt that we were committed to consult on all issues and hadn't done so. As a result, the reaction in Japan [to the Nixon announcement] was quite severe, at first. I don't think that the White House had really thought about this.

When Secretary of State Rogers called up on July 15, shortly after the President had made his announcement on television, to ask me and Jack Irwin, the Deputy Secretary of State, how we felt about the news, I said that it was "great but what about Japan?" Rogers said, "Well, what about Japan?" I said, "The Japanese are going to take this terribly hard." Rogers said, "But we gave them advance notice." I said, "You gave them an hour or two advance notice, but that's not much advance notice, and that's not consultations." I said that we were going to have a severe problem with Japan.

At that point I said that Dick Ericson and I would draft a message of explanation from the President to Prime Minister Sato and get it to the President by telex immediately. So Nixon sent that message to Sato. It was an effort to try to placate the Japanese. When we were in Peking, as I said in my book on the subject, as well as, I think, in my oral history of the time, there were indications that Peking was very concerned about the US-Japanese relationship.

Q: Leaving China to face Japan and Russia.

GREEN: They [the Chinese] didn't like that. On the other hand they suspected that all this US-Japan partnership talk might have a contrary design. Maybe the United States was building up
Japan as a military force before it left the area, so that Japan could take over China.

When I was in Peking [with President Nixon], I had a number of talks with a man who was very close to the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En-lai. His name was Hsiung Hsiung-hui, a special assistant to the prime minister. On three occasions during the visit he took me aside -- during automobile rides and once when we were rowing on the lake at Hangzhou -- to talk about Japan. It was clear that he and the prime minister were deeply concerned about Japan. They feared that we were playing our hand in such a way that Japan was going to be a new military power on the world scene. China's memories of Japanese occupation were very deep and rather fresh. I said, and it turned out that Henry Kissinger had said the same thing when he was in Peking in the summer of 1971, that, on the contrary, our whole purpose in our relationship with Japan was to ensure that Japan did not have to be rearmed, except for self defense. We would provide the "Sunday punch," and Japan would not "go nuclear." Japan would not have any expansionist capabilities, because of our treaty alliance. The Chinese had never thought of it that way. I added that the more lasting our security relationship with Japan is, the greater the chances were that Japan would never be, or pose anything like, a military threat to China. Anyway, I think that that went over well.

We must remember here that Japan and China have a long, long stormy relationship, particularly during the years preceding and during World War II. Therefore, there are very deep-seated Chinese fears of Japan. I don't think that the White House ever took them adequately into consideration. This Chinese fear of Japan was more in the calculations of the State Department.

The person on the State Department side who was the most knowledgeable on Japan was U. Alexis Johnson, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Johnson's book, "The Right Hand of Power," devotes a good deal of attention to this particular issue at this particular moment. He graphically described the concerns which our China policy had created in Japan. He reproved the President rather strongly about our failure to consult with the Japanese properly, such as by sending Alex to Japan, maybe a day or so in advance of the announcement. This would have had the effect of giving Prime Minister Sato time to prepare his position publicly and how he was going to express it. Secondly, for us to have taken the unusual step of sending a special emissary to Japan, would be evidence of the primacy we accorded Japan and the importance we attached to Japan's constructive relationship with China. However, for reasons which have never been explained, the administration called off plans to have Johnson make that trip which left a permanent scar on US-Japan relations, according to Alex.

In my meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda following Nixon's China trip, they acted like the old friends that they are. Even though the press, including especially the press in the United States, was talking about what a disaster this had been for US-Japanese relations, that was not my impression at all. I read Selig Harrison's and other people's accounts of the mood in Japan at the time I arrived. By the time I left I had the impression that this view was far too pessimistic. The fact of the matter is that I got along fine with both the prime minister and the foreign minister. The Embassy in Tokyo later reported that what a success our visit had been in terms of allaying Japanese concerns over our China policy. So I think that we got over that hump. That doesn't mean that there are no residual fears.
I might add one other thing here, and I'll come back to this later. I mentioned the Nixon "shocks." We had other problems with the Japanese, largely over trade.

At the time of the agreement with Japan on the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands in November, 1969, there was an understanding that one of the things that Japan would do, in response to our rather generous offer on the return of the Ryukyus, was that they would respect certain "restraints" on textile [exports to the United States]. President Nixon was under very heavy pressure from a number of members of Congress from the South, where our textile industry had moved, to "deliver" on these restraints, so that the Japanese would not export such large quantities of textiles.

Well, to make a long story short, from his end Prime Minister Sato was unable to bring "his" textile industry along. Therefore, that understanding fell apart. President Nixon was furious. This was another area where I don't think that the President ever understood the Japanese leadership, as he did the Chinese leadership. I'm sure that he compared Sato, Fukuda, and others rather unfavorably with men like Zhou En-lai, who had a great, broad political and strategic vision of the world. The Japanese leadership seemed to be narrowly focused on economic issues, and the President and Henry Kissinger were not very strong in that area. That was another reason why they were rather prejudiced against Japan.

There has always been a tendency in our Foreign Service, as, in fact, in the US Government, which goes way back, for at least 100 years, for officials to be either pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese. It seemed that we had fallen again into that syndrome, with the President favoring China over Japan. He would never say so, but that would seem to have been the case. It came largely down to personalities and the fact that, as interpreters, the Chinese used attractive young ladies, who would laugh uproariously when the President made a joke, before they even brought themselves to interpret it, which was a clear signal to the audience that they had damned well better laugh. The Japanese interpreters did their work in a solemn, matter of fact voice. Interpreting Chinese is much easier than interpreting Japanese -- that is simultaneous interpreting. The word order in Chinese sentences is similar to the word order in English, whereas Japanese word order is more like German -- very difficult. These are the kinds of things that have added to problems in US-Japanese relations.

Q: How did you rate our Embassy in Japan during the 1969-1973 period? This was a major period.

GREEN: We had very good people in Japan, although Ambassador Armin Meyer was not a Japanese expert. He had come from being Ambassador to Iran. As a matter of fact, I had been offered the job and given the choice. To make a long story short, I decided to be Assistant Secretary instead. Armin had some very good Japanese specialists on his staff, including Dick Sneider. So I would say that it was a strong Embassy.

Q: So you felt that the reporting...

GREEN: The reporting was excellent.
Q: We were speaking of Henry Kissinger and Japan. This reminds me of his book, *The White House Years.* He talked about going to Rome. When I read the book, I had the feeling that, in Kissinger's view, the Italian Government was really just a coalition -- sort of the same coalition, with people "trading" government portfolios. So you couldn't get anything done. Kissinger -- and, I guess, President Nixon, too -- were people who wanted to sit down with somebody and make a deal. You can't make a deal with a coalition government because there are too many people involved, who tend to "water down" things. It sounds as if there was a similar process going on with the Japanese. It's well known that in Japan you don't talk to somebody in the Japanese Government and really reach an agreement. It takes extended negotiations with both the government and within the bureaucracy to reach a consensus.

GREEN: Absolutely. The bureaucracy in Japan is all-important. Where we have political figures at the top, they have experts and bureaucrats -- and these include bureaucrats who specialize in foreign affairs and are very knowledgeable.

To be a leader, people have to know where you're going. When a US leader suddenly and independently changes his course and direction -- or seems to do so -- it causes a great deal of concern. It was our task to allay that concern. My wife's remark about how wise it was for the President to send two Foreign Service Officers to explain the Nixon visit to China to Far East leaders was entirely valid, since John and I, were known to leaders in Asia. They knew we didn't just come in with one administration and then left. We didn't have any political axes to grind. We were not trying to make a career out of this matter. We were trying to do what was best for the United States and for friendly countries concerned.

Q: When William Rogers was Secretary of State during this period, did he have much "feel" for Japan?

GREEN: I think that Bill Rogers had a good feeling for public opinion. He would have been a first rate Minister of Information, which many countries have. Of course, his activities were so sharply curtailed and circumscribed by Nixon and Kissinger that it's not fair to judge the man. I knew Bill Rogers very well. We were very good friends and played a lot of bridge and golf together, quite apart from our office contacts. I trusted him. I think that he liked the Foreign Service. I felt that he could have done more in the way of taking up with the President the fact that the Foreign Service strongly supported his policies. I remember that I had an impassioned discussion with Rogers about this at the President's poolside in San Clemente, CA. I couldn't get Bill Rogers to say more than that he would take this up at the right time. I don't think that he ever did.

In particular, as I pointed out in *War and Peace with China,* the President made a serious mistake not only in his unwarranted distrust of the Foreign Service but also in his refusal to take Alex Johnson and me into his total confidence. As a result he ran some serious risks which are mentioned in my book and one of those included his unnecessarily sharp affrontal of the Japanese Government. Subsequently Nixon was able to allay Japanese resentment when the President and Mrs. Nixon, at my suggestion, journeyed all the way up to Alaska to greet their Imperial Majesties en route to Europe by polar flight. This was the first trip outside Japan by any reigning monarch of Japan; and the first foreign soil he was to step on was US soil.
Q: One of the rationales given out, and I tend to be very dubious about rationales, which are usually developed on an "ex post facto" basis, is that the White House was concerned that, if it consulted Japan on any subject, the country "leaked" like mad. So the White House felt that it had to be very careful. Half the reason for Nixon's problems was always...

GREEN: Nixon always put it in the sense that it would be a great blow to China if the news of his trip to China should leak out. He acted as though secrecy was something enjoined by China. That's not the case at all. It was his own desire for secrecy that was the controlling consideration here. However, he carried this penchant for secrecy to ridiculous lengths. The arrangements for the President's trip to China by Kissinger had to be secret. I fully agree with that. That they didn't inform the Japanese, say, a week or two weeks in advance, was understandable and justifiable. It is true that the Japanese Government party, the Liberal-Democratic Party, is a coalition of factions whose leaders usually have to be consulted before the Prime Minister takes any action. So the Prime Minister would probably have been under some obligation to "check in" with the LDP factional leaders if there had been, say, more than a day or two advance notice. Had we done that, probably the whole matter of the President's visit to China would have leaked to the press. So, as I say, it's a question of degree. I think that sending Alex Johnson to talk with Prime Minister Sato 24 hours in advance would have been very helpful on that issue.

Q: Shall we talk about the reversion of Okinawa [the Ryukyu Islands]? I always felt that this was one of the most difficult things to handle, internally within the US Government. The US Department of Defense was almost adamant about not giving Okinawa up, at least from some points of view.

GREEN: The Department of Defense was a bit "sticky" on this issue -- more than it was on the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960. Incidentally, the Security Treaty of 1960 came up for renewal in 1970. So the questions that came up in 1969 regarding the reversion of the Ryukyus also had to take into consideration the fact that, if the reversion negotiations fell through, the Security Treaty with Japan might not be renewed by the Japanese. Meanwhile, there was a great deal of Japanese pressure on us to "do something" about the Ryukyus.

Now the issue of the reversion of the Ryukyus was very complex. First of all, their strategic importance has to be underlined strongly. These are a chain of islands, Okinawa being the most important one. It is located off the East China Sea, right in the middle of this whole series of islands looping down from southern Japan. It couldn't be more critically located. More than that, Okinawa is a large island, large enough to accommodate Japanese farmers and city residents, as well as a lot of American installations. We had a problem with the administration there. It wasn't just like a big US military base. There was a large Okinawan population to deal with. Increasingly, there was a great deal of sentiment, mostly among the Okinawans, regarding their future reversion status. Going back to the Peace Treaty with Japan of 1951, the Ryukyus had been placed temporarily under American administration. However, their ultimate sovereignty was vested in Japan. So it was simply a question of when the Ryukyus were going to revert to Japanese control.

In the State Department we thought -- and certainly the Embassy in Tokyo did too -- that it was
critically important to move rapidly on the Ryukyu. Things were beginning to go "sour" in both the Ryukyus and Japan. We needed to move in a timely fashion, bearing in mind that we had a deadline of 1970 [for the renewal of the Security Treaty of 1960]. So we entered into talks about the reversion of the Ryukyu with the Japanese in Tokyo and Washington.

The big question was this. We had major bases in the Ryukyu that were of critical importance in the support of any operation that we might have to conduct in Southeast Asia -- or China or Korea, for that matter in support of our commitment. If the Ryukyu reverted to Japan, we would have to have bases in the Ryukyu on a continuing basis. We would also have to have ready access to those bases and the ability to use them when critically necessary. Our allies and friends in embattled Southeast Asia, Korea and Taiwan were concerned over their dependence on our basis in Japan, for Japan always had a tendency of being rather pacifistic, and might deny us the use of those bases at a critical moment. So we had to meet that concern in any communique with Japan on reversion.

We finally got Japan to agree on language in the Joint Communique (on the reversion of the Ryukyu to Japan) which stated that Korea was vital to the security of Japan and the United States; and that the security of Taiwan was more important. Once we got agreement on that language, then things began to fall pretty much into place. So we and the Japanese were able to declare in November [1969], that the Ryukyu would revert to Japan in 1972. We needed the time between 1969 and 1972 to complete an enormous amount of housekeeping and bookkeeping duties so as to turn the administration over to Japan.

As you know, the drafting of most communiques always precedes agreements and visits. They are not done afterwards. The communique had been agreed to long before Prime Minister Sato came to Washington. When Sato came to Washington, there was a press conference, at which he made a statement which, in essence, said that Japan recognized the critical importance of the Ryukyu to the United States in discharging its security missions. Of course, it is a basic principle of our Navy and of our military never to confirm or deny the presence of any particular weapons systems such as nuclear. So we couldn't confirm or deny this. Instead, there was an acceptable Japanese-US "understanding," that the issue had been worked out in satisfactory fashion for the Japanese.

The Ryukyu issue has been discussed at some length in "The Right Hand of Power," by U. Alexis Johnson. I really don't have much to add to that. You will recall that he pointed out [in the book] that there was a long, sad story of Japanese inattention to the Ryukyu. There were a lot of bitter feelings in the Ryukyu about the Japanese at that time -- bitter feelings that Japan has subsequently been at pains to allay.

Q: Protest about things that happened before World War II.

GREEN: Yes. The people of the Ryukyu felt like "second class citizens" and all of that. So that was another issue which had to be straightened out. In other words, there had to be assurances by the Japanese that they were going to treat the Ryukyu "the right way." Of course, the Japanese had a reason for giving such assurances, because the international spotlight was right on them. I never had any doubt that the Japanese would treat the Ryukyu properly.
We had to have extended talks and discussions in Tokyo and Washington over the actual reversion of the Ryukyus. The financial arrangements were "sticky," because the United States felt that we were giving up an awful lot of property and we already had constructed many buildings, roads, utilities, etc. The Japanese finally did come through fairly handsomely on payments to the United States for materiel, buildings, and so forth which we had left to the people of the Ryukyus.

It was a complex negotiation, involving just about every department of our government. I was the chairman of the task force in our government, dealing with all of these financial and other issues.

Q: Could you discuss your experience in dealing with the US Department of Defense, at your level, on the issue of reversion of the Ryukyus?

GREEN: Yes, I can. I think that I may have mentioned to you, on previous occasions, Stu, that I consider that the Department of Defense has come a long way over the past 10 years or so, in terms of understanding diplomatic and strategic issues. There isn't the kind of "gulf" separating military from State Department thinking which may have existed at one time. When you were dealing with Generals like Curtis Lemay, of course it was difficult. His solutions started with 15 kiloton nuclear bombs and went up from there. State Department solutions involve no kilotons, if we can help it. Furthermore, we have tried to think in long range, political terms. I think that once we got that point through to the military, they understood it very well and were strong supporters of this approach. As I said, I thought that Admiral Arleigh Burke and various CINCPACs were superb as "sailor statesmen." They talked the same language that we did. Setting up all these political advisers throughout the world also helped. Then there are the war colleges, which have helped. The United States, I think, has done more than any other country -- possibly Britain has done as much, I don't know, but certainly the US has done more than the countries that I have dealt with -- to try to instill a common understanding by civil and military leaders of national goals and purposes and how to achieve them.

We have had problems. When it comes down to dollars and cents and particular issues, yes, there have been lots and lots of problems which we have had to iron out. However, regarding major issues, as you "kick them upstairs," you begin to find more and more opportunities to resolve them.

Q: Is there any other area that we should cover on Japan before we move to Australia?

GREEN: Yes, there is one other area that I would like to mention. I think that I began to mention it during the last session that we had, Stu. That is, relations between the ROK and Japan.

Q: The ROK means the Republic of Korea.

GREEN: The Republic of Korea and Japan. Of course, this now looms rather significantly in terms of North Korea developing nuclear weapons and what concerns this can create in Japan. Clearly, one of the advantages that Japan saw in our security relationship was the fact that we
had a military presence in South Korea. In other words, we had American troops standing between Japan and its potential enemies -- North Korea, communist China, the Soviet Union. Throughout my years as Assistant Secretary and as Deputy Assistant Secretary and Regional Planning Adviser before that, I and others in State and Defense had worked very hard for the retention of American forces in Korea. We still have them there today. The reason we have them there today has as much to do with Japan as with South Korea. If we didn't have those forces there, the Japanese would be far more concerned and worried about whether they were putting their necks out too far by being allied with the United States.

There has also been the long-standing problem of feuding in Japan among the 750,000 Koreans residing there, with sharp lines drawn between those supporting North Korea and those supporting South Korea. Obviously the pro-North Korean crowd gave Japan the most concern because of their links with the communists in Asia as well as with disappointed youth in Japan. And of course, all Koreans whether in Japan or Korea harbored long memories of harsh Japanese rule in Korea earlier in the century.

US policy in this situation has been to urge the fair treatment of all Koreans in Japan and the development of much closer relations between Japan and South Korea.

In 1972 we heard the news that the North Koreans had made an overture to the South Koreans, suggesting talks leading to the reunification of Korea. Obviously, this idea was one which we welcomed, although we greatly distrusted North Korea's motives. Sure enough, the North Koreans were making a "grandstand play." They wanted to go for some kind of political union [between the two Korea's], or something like that. They were asking for those things which they knew the South couldn't give. They also knew that the South had a lot of students who, for a long time, have been very anxious to have relations with North Korea. There were a lot of people in South Korea who wanted to visit their friends and relatives in North Korea.

The positions of South Korea, the United States, and Japan had always been, "Let's work toward eventual reunification. Let's have more exchanges. Let's develop a degree of mutual trust that will then enable us to move into the political realm." The very fact that the North Koreans wanted to move immediately into the political realm indicated quite clearly that they were trying to upset South Korea. What we knew -- although we didn't say this -- was that the North Koreans were basically trying to get the South Koreans to agree to reunification under terms which provided that the United States would withdraw its forces from South Korea. We knew that this would be anathema to the Japanese, as well as to ourselves and to the South Koreans. And maybe even to the Chinese, by the way.

So we had to play this game very delicately. In 1972 I made a trip to South Korea. I had talks with President Park Chung Hee, as well as with Kim Chong Pil, the Prime Minister, Kim Yong Shik, the Foreign Minister, and Lee Hu Rak, the head of their CIA who was in contact with North Korea about these matters. We went into some detail about them. I found that the South Koreans' thinking was about the same as ours. When I went to Japan I reassured the Japanese about the talks I had had in South Korea. So I was able to help calm down what could have been a rather dangerous situation -- at least, politically dangerous.
I mention that because, as it turned out, Japan and South Korea did develop good trading relationships. In essence, what happened was that Japan's success in moving away from labor intensive industries into the high tech field meant that Japan's labor intensive industrial field was left for other Asians to occupy. The South Koreans then moved into shipbuilding and textiles. Eventually, they moved out of that, and those activities shifted on to other countries, such as Indonesia, for example. This was the beginning of a train of events where the Japanese were able to help the South Koreans, and the South Koreans, in turn, were able to help other countries. This was all part of the regional interdependence that we were hoping to encourage.

There is one other major development in 1972 relating to Japan. That is, that Japan normalized its relations with China in September, 1972. Preceding that in June we had a meeting with the Japanese in Hawaii. President Nixon, Kissinger, Secretary of State Rogers, Alex Johnson, and I flew out in the President's plane to the Kuilima Hotel, which is on the other side of Oahu from Waikiki Beach. There we had a two-day conference with the Japanese, led by the new Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka.

I remember that on the plane going out to Honolulu, Alex Johnson, Rogers, Kissinger, and I were quite concerned that, since it was known that Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka was going to go to Peking to normalize relations, the Japanese were in a rather weak bargaining position. Tanaka had to deliver on his promise to the Japanese people that he would normalize relations with China during his trip to Peking in September, 1972. This was a situation the Chinese could exploit. We knew little about Tanaka. He hadn't had any advanced education and was a newcomer in the international field. We were rather concerned that China would come up with terms and demands which were going to make it very difficult for Taiwan and the United States. It could be rather shattering for our relationship with Japan if Japan were to accede to such demands.

These matters were discussed on the plane going out to Hawaii. It was really quite interesting, because I remember that President Nixon seemed less concerned about Tanaka's trip to China than did the rest of us. He was right. Those were not problems, as it turned out.

When Prime Minister Tanaka went to Peking a couple of months later to normalize relations, the Chinese were very considerable and reasonable. No demands were made of the Japanese to terminate any of their commercial and cultural ties with Taiwan, for example, with respect to airlines, sea routes, telecommunications of any kind, or cultural contacts. All that China demanded was that there should be a Japanese Embassy in Peking and not in Taipei. So the Japanese actually did get to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China before we did. During the normalization process Peking made it very clear that it welcomed good relations with Japan, good relations with the United States, and good relations between the United States and Japan. Here we had three countries, all of whom had been at war with each other at some point during the previous half century now at peace, representing the world's most powerful country (the US), the world's most populous country (China) and the world's most economically dynamic nation (Japan).

Q: You mentioned that you were the "regional man" in the State Department. You were looking for good relations between the various countries. Now I'm looking at this matter almost from the
Foreign Service point of view. At Chiefs of Mission meetings, did you find the usual parochialism, localitis, or what have you from the various ambassadors or their deputies? Did you have to urge them to play a more cooperative role?

GREEN: No. The only flare up I recall between two of our members where parochialism was involved, occurred at our Chiefs of Mission meeting near Manila in 1971. I have already given you an account of this memorable exchange between our Ambassadors to Korea (Bill Porter) and to Japan (Armin Meyer).

Our Ambassadors are our officials generally, whether in Washington or the field, reflected an awareness of US overall interests and were not given to parochialism, for it was and is basic to US policy that our friends and allies harmonize their relationships as far as possible. Much of our efforts have been directed towards furthering that goal.

Here I should add that our Chiefs of Mission conferences, usually annual affairs in pleasant places like Baguio (the Philippines), Hong Kong or Tokyo, were also attended by representatives of the Defense Department (CINCPAC), AID (Agency for International Development), USIS and a few other agencies.

Q: Before we leave the subject of Japan, I wonder if you could comment on how you felt that Japan operated in the rest of the world. It has become a very important country economically. The Japanese don't seem to have the "clout" or influence that the United States has. In a way, it doesn't seem that Japan will move in that direction outside of the field of economics. Do you have any views on that?

GREEN: As far as military affairs are concerned, Japan is bound by its constitution. More than that, it is bound by its own fears of involvement in a war. The effects of World War II were traumatic, as far as the Japanese were concerned. In my opinion, the chances of their going "militaristic" are very low, indeed. They are all the more reliant on the United States, because their whole position in the world is based upon commerce -- access to raw materials and markets. The United States is the best guarantor of that -- far better than the United Nations itself. And the Japanese know that. It is a fundamental "plus" in our relationship as long as we are a reliable ally, standing firm against threats to Japan and the US, such as are now implicit in the potential development of nuclear war capabilities by North Korea.

Now I will not get into US-Japan trade issues, but it must be emphasized that in the realms of trade, economics, technology and science, the Japanese are fully as powerful as the US Its role in third world development assistance is highly laudable.

Where Japan is weak and, in terms of its size and power, too ineffectual on the world scene relative to its failure to be adequately involved in global strategies, political and social issues.

Finally, let me emphasize the supervening importance of the US-Japanese relationship in the years ahead -- and the consequent need for greater American understanding of the Japanese people and their culture.
In our relations with Japan, we have discovered that it is very hard for the Japanese to make up their minds, very hard for them to reach a consensus. They are consensus builders. We're not. We can have Republicans come to town and, overnight, we have new US programs and policies. It's all too fast. But in Japan such things take a long, long time. So that if we're looking for quick answers and quick results, as we often do as a world leader -- we try to "sign people up" -- we find the Japanese lagging behind. Because of their political processes, they operate that way. Almost all democratic countries do that -- much more than we do. So it takes some time for Japan to make up its mind. And sometimes we get impatient. That's one difficulty.

Another difficulty, of course, is in the whole field of trade and the way their system works. The Japanese are far better organized than we are. They save a great deal more than we do. A lot of the things that we do badly, they do well, and vice versa. I've often thought that the best solution for Japan and the United States is for each to be more like the other. Americans could save more and plan further ahead, the way the Japanese do, to place greater emphasis on education and family unity, more circumspect, more cautious, and certainly to think more in terms of the interests of society, rather than just those of the individual. We would do better if we did that.

For their part the Japanese would do better if they thought more in terms of other races, the need to harmonize with other peoples of different backgrounds, to relax and enjoy life more, spending more on housing, infrastructure and the good things in life. Also if they strove to play a more constructive role across a wider range of the world agenda. These are the things that the Japanese should do.

I believe the Japanese have always rather envied the United States for its wide open spaces and its free spirit. We have to remember that Japan has always lived on a few, rocky islands off the shores of Asia -- far away from the rest of the world with which it has commercial links. Its whole history, its topography, its geography, its outlook are different. So we are "the odd couple" which simply has to get along.

The most important long-term investment we can make toward improving US-Japanese understanding is for Americans to know a lot more about the Japanese, their language and culture than we do today.

I accordingly inaugurated in 1988, with the help of my wife, the Marshall Green Fund, managed by the Japan-American Society of Washington, DC of which I was President at that time. This Fund supports programs encouraging the study of Japanese language and of Japanese area studies deeply at the high school level. Originally the program operated only in the Washington area; now it is nationwide, providing incentive awards to students and teachers as well as video tapes, Japanese encyclopedias and dictionaries. The Fund also finances with the help of Mobil Corp. an annual "Japan Bowl" competition among high schools in terms of language proficiency and general knowledge about Japanese policies, history and culture. Nineteen teams competed in the Japan Bowl" in 1995 held at the George Mason University.

ROBIN BERRINGTON
Mr. Berrington was born and raised in Ohio and educated at Wesleyan University
Harvard Universities. After service with the Peace Corps in Thailand, he joined
the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1969. During his Foreign Service career Mr.
Berrington served at posts abroad in Thailand, Japan, Ireland and England,
variously as Public and Cultural Affairs Officer. He also served several tours at
USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Berrington was interviewed by
Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Today is the first of May, May Day, 2000. Robin, you were assigned to Japan, 1969-1973,
where did you go and what were your initial duties?

BERRINGTON: Well I arrived in Tokyo in January in the winter of 1969. They wanted me to
come what they called the student affairs officer. It was an ACAO position (Assistant Cultural
Affairs Officer).

I was first assigned as the student officer for the embassy. That was fine with me, but shortly
after I arrived one of those curious combination of events which probably are not that infrequent
in the foreign service, one person's wife said something that upset somebody. Everybody got
very emotional about it. The officer decided that he didn't want to stay in Japan. He left; his
position came open, and in a domino effect, other people were transferred to fill his position and
the other position before him, and as a result, the branch PAO slot which was the branch Public
Affairs Officer slot in Fukuoka which is the southernmost and westernmost major city of Japan
came open. That appealed to me much more mainly because it took me outside the capital city. It
put me in charge of my own operation, and as a student of Japanese history and Japanese affairs,
Kyushu which is the island where Fukuoka is located has always been sort of the cradle of
Japanese heritage and politics. It is far and away the center that has produced the most political
leaders and cultural leaders of the country. Kind of not unlike the south is to the United States.
So when the chance came to go there, I grabbed it, and was assigned.

However there was going to be an interim period before that actually came open, so they put me
in language school from January to September even though I already had the language and had
scored a 3/3 or 3+/3+, I can't remember [Editor’s Note: In FSI language competency testing the
first score is reading, the second is speaking. The score of three suggests competency at the
college level]. So I bided my time in language school in Yokohama before I went to Fukuoka.
Which was not a bad development because being in the language school for a few months; it
enabled me to meet some of my colleagues who would eventually be assigned to the embassy in
Tokyo. If I had gone straight to Fukuoka these would have been just names, but now they were
faces and voices and real living bodies. It was helpful to have had that kind of bonding experience even if it was for a very short period.

**Q: Who was our ambassador in Japan at that time?**

BERRINGTON: At that point the Ambassador was U. Alexis Johnson who arrived in 1966 and departed post in January 1969, shortly after I arrived. He was one of the grand old men of the Japan-hands crowd.

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**Q: Well then what was the state of affairs in Kyushu-Fukuoka when you got there?**

BERRINGTON: Well, in fact in a way I was walking into something of a hornet's nest although I didn't know it at the time. Kyushu, being the way it is geographically, is the closest part to Korea. It is also the closest island to the China mainland, so it has always been an important military and strategic base. not just for the Japanese but for the American occupation forces and for those American military based in Japan once the occupation was over. So, we had several bases still in Kyushu when I got there.

There was a U.S. Air Force base called Itazuke. Itazuke had a large air force contingent there. Just a few months before I arrived a jet plane, it was either taking off or landing, I can't quite remember, lost power and crashed into Kyushu University [Editor’s Note: this reference may be to the crash of an RF-4C the night on June 2, 1968] setting off all the radicals on campus into a frenzy of anti Americanism, and you know just provided the further excuse that they wanted to demonstrate and just cause general chaos. That was the kind of stage at which young Mr. Berrington walked onto the scene. So you had a very kind of delicate tense relationship with the base which was located very close to the city, and with the city leaders, the political leaders as well as the economic business leaders. [Editor’s Note: In 1971 it was announced that Itazuke would be returned to Japanese control, and the USAF facilities were closed on 31 March 1972.]

At the same time we had a naval base in Sasebo. That was a constant source of tension as well because nuclear-powered or aircraft carriers often came in to Sasebo. Of course, the American policy being that they would never confirm or deny the existence of nuclear weapons. But anything that came into the port was usually the focus and object of various demonstrators and political malcontents that just wanted to stir up trouble with the Americans. So between this crash of a fighter plane into the computer building at the University in Fukuoka and the constant in and out of American warships in Sasebo, in terms of political relationships there was a lot of tension and a lot of activity to keep you on your toes.

**Q: Who was consul in Fukuoka at that time?**

BERRINGTON: In those days, before job inflation, a lot of the posts in Japan were just consulates. A new consul arrived about the same time I did. His name was Jerry Sutton. The American Center was located in a nice old building right downtown in the very center of the city. In fact it was a building which had been the old bankers club before the war, and during the war
it became a military officers club. After the war when the occupation took it up it became a kind of headquarters for all occupation activities in the Kyushu area. After the occupation ended, the embassy of course, took it over and it then became the American…well at that time it was called the American Cultural Center, but within a few years of that time it became the American Center.

There is one little anecdote which I always found amusing, in light of the extremist students and the crashed plane in the university. The American Center was located, as I mentioned, right downtown in the very core area. On our right side was the top newspaper of Kyushu called *Nishi-Nippon Shimbun*. On our left side was the LDP headquarters building. Across the street was city hall. Down the street just a half a block was the prefectural government headquarters building. We couldn't have had more establishment neighbors. We used to call our neighbor, because of all the student demonstrators and often labor unions demonstrations as well; it was sort of like the “A” court. Because you would catch all of these people together. It was not unusual for me to…our building was a three story building and there was a balcony off on the third floor…stand out there and look down this broad avenue, which had all of these establishment offices on either side. You could look down and you could see literally the whole street just full of people, often waving placards, shouting slogans, raising their fists, all very organized, scripted of course. Then they did the famous snake dancing which you will recall from the Eisenhower period; the Zengakuren.

Q: *That died about...*

BERRINGTON: Oh no. Zengakuren [All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Associations (全日本学生自治会総連合, Zen-Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sōrengō)] was still very much...

Q: *I was thinking of guys with ties around, bandannas around their head.*

BERRINGTON: Bandannas. I had a, I ripped out a page from the newspapers which had a listing of the helmets and the headbands that the kids wore because factionalism in Japan was rampant. Zengakuren had lots of factions in it. If it was a green helmet with a red band around the mouth, then I knew that's faction A, and if it was a black helmet with a white band it would be somebody else. We could always tell who was who. In Japan the uniform is extremely important. You wear a uniform whether you are a businessman, whether you are a student, whether you are a tennis player or whatever. So I would often be up in the top of the building there just watching the snake dancing demonstrations. I can remember one time I was down on the main floor by the entrance of the building, and the groups were chanting and snake dancing past us when at one point one of the kids darted out, ran up the driveway to us. I thought Uh-oh, what's this. He said, Koncho-San, that was my title in Japanese for director. He said, "Koncho-San, here is a book I borrowed from the library. Please take it." And ran back into that demonstration and disappeared into that sea of people. In a way that was a kind of a metaphor for the whole business of the Japanese and the United States. You know, they could demonstrate against us. They could yell things at us. They could carry on like that, but they were always interested in what we were. They were always willing to borrow books. They were always eager to find out more about the United States. In the long run, and there were other examples too where a kid would run out of the line or they would come up to us and say kind of quietly, "Can I use the bathroom?"
felt very comfortable with us. They liked the Americans, and that sort of made the stay of people like Jerry Sutton and myself very pleasant in a place like Kyushu.

The consulate, on the other hand, was located in a new building about two to three miles west of it, west of the downtown where we were in a large park called Ohori Park, a wonderful beautiful building. Jerry and his staff were in the consulate, and I and my staff were in the American Center. We were geographically separated although we would see each other three to four times a week, whether at meetings at the consulate or at the Center or socially and professionally around town.

Q: During this '69-'73 period, what essentially were your tasks?

BERRINGTON: The task of USIS Japan was really not that different from anyplace, of a USIS post anywhere, which is basically to improve…to deepen broaden and generally improve the understanding between the United States and the host country. In order to do that, of course, we employed an array of program tools among which were speakers, who we would bring in to Fukuoka to give talks at the Center itself or at outside institutions around town. We had a large library located in the Center which was pen to the public. Anybody could come in, go out and borrow books or look at magazines or check out the reference materials and other documentary materials that we had. We would work at press placement to get important statements or articles in the local press which was both electronic and print media. We would set up exhibits or arrange for cultural presentations, usually quite modest because we didn't have a large budget for that. We had the exchanges program in which we could nominate local leaders for the IV program which is better known as the international visitor program. Representation, of course, at which both Jerry and I would run around and attend various activities. Goodness I am sure I am forgetting something else. But those are sort of the real basic weapons or tools that we had to work at deepening this dialogue between Japanese Americans on current issues.

Q: Well let's focus on a couple of things. In the first place, could you talk about, maybe they are quite different, but your dealings with both the Navy and the Air Force and the impact they are having on the community and what they were proposing?

BERRINGTON: OK let's take the American military. They had what they called public information officers of their own, who held the rank of lieutenant or kind of junior captain in the air force, or just lieutenant in the navy. Usually these people had no Japanese experience or Japanese language, but they were seen as people who would be fairly good on their feet and capable of dealing with the community and good at PR (public relations). But like most military, their lives tended to be very much focused on the base. They didn't get out that much. They didn't know that many people in the community, and they tended to have a fairly narrow focus on all these issues.

We in the embassy tended to look at a broader perspective at whatever was happening. Some of that - let's say - if a submarine was coming into town, it would be my job to go down there, work with the local PIO, Public Information Officer, and try to arrange for press activity or maybe appearances on local television show in advance or try to get some materials out and about and introduce him to people that he might not have otherwise known. Because, well first of all as I
say, they didn't have the language, and secondly he was so busy on base with the things that he had to do there that he just didn't have the time to get out and meet people. Particularly in a country like Japan you just don't walk in to an editor's office and say bang on the table, “here is a press release. I want you to put this in.” There is a lot of stroking and cultivating of friendships and relationships that are required. I think those of us that were civilians that were not wearing a uniform probably found it easier to do that than the military, partly because of our language ability, partly because we tended to be around longer, and let's face it, for many Japanese, anything in uniform was still suspect. Remember this is only, gosh the occupation was over in '52, so we are talking about only 15 plus years since the end of the occupation. You know, memories of the war and the American occupation were still very fresh.

Q: How did you find the level of cooperation from the military, because sometimes you know, there is almost a built in suspicion, who are these people and what are they doing?

BERRINGTON: The PIOs were wonderful. I had nothing but the greatest respect for them given their limitations linguistically and experience and time. Particularly the one at the airbase in Fukuoka was great because he had a Japanese wife, and he knew...well let’s put it this way, he knew what he didn't know, so he wasn't quite as full of himself. So the PIOs tended to be pretty decent guys who were cooperative and were happy to get our help. The problem, of course, was very often with their superior officers, some of whom had less than what I would call enlightened views about community relations or the position of the Japanese in world affairs or how to deal with the Japanese in terms of achieving other interests besides just the local base concerns. They didn't often see how base issues fit into a larger fabric of U.S. Japan relationship. They tended to see only in terms of what's happening at this base yesterday, today, and tomorrow, and that was about it. There were particularly in the air force. I have to say the navy was generally easier to deal with, even the senior officers. I had quite good personal relations with base commanders. This was I think, quite amazing for me because let's face it, I was a young 29 year old still wet behind the ears, junior officer of the embassy, and the base commander of Sasebo was a Captain, a very experienced Captain who probably would be promoted to flag rank within a few years. So the navy was generally easier to deal with. The air force had I'm afraid a number of what I would call the Curtis LeMay types that saw the Japanese in very racist and prejudicial terms and frankly would have been happy just to go in with guns or bombs and sort of get rid of the opposition whatever their attitudes might have been. It was a bigger challenge with the air force than with the navy.

Q: Well when you were there, did you work on any programs or initiatives to get our military to better know the Japanese and get the Japanese to better know the military?

BERRINGTON: I have to say, now here I am going to reveal my own limitations. At the beginning I thought that would be a great idea. In fact, whenever I hosted an event, let's say there was a cocktail party at the American Center, or I was having a reception at my home, or Jerry Sutton the consul did much the same thing. We would try to include select senior officers or important representatives of the base community in order to give them an opportunity to meet the local Japanese because the largest number of our invitees to events like that were the local Japanese community. I mean first of all we are not over there to invite Americans to these things, and second of all in a town like Fukuoka there weren't many Americans anyway, outside the base
of course. Yes, we tried to include as many of the base people as would have been appropriate. I mean we didn't want an overwhelming number. Say it was a part for maybe 40-50 people; I would usually include three or four uniformed people from one of the bases.

As time went by, I think I began to realize that in many cases this was a lost cause. Many of those who were the most hard-nosed and kind of difficult to deal with probably weren't going to change on the basis of my efforts to get them to change. For many of the GI's, you know, the enlisted, many of them were just as happy to stay on the base, and go to the bowling alley and go to the movie and eat their hamburgers and frequent the bars that tended to spring up around the perimeter of the base. I wasn't sure that was an entirely bad thing because for a lot of these folks to try and put them downtown in a large group of Japanese invited a little friction or problems. There were enough problems already without kind of bringing more by pushing this too hard. I think more importantly rather than the social or political or the understanding side, just by getting a more open attitude among the base officers to meeting with the local press or agreeing to go on local television or getting that press release out there - in Japanese if possible, for example, we tended to mark our achievement in things just like that rather than in getting total understanding between the base people and the local Japanese.

Q: Well at this time what was sort of the political orientation of Kyushu Province and Fukuoka?

BERRINGTON: Interesting area. As I said it was sort of the cradle of Japanese heritage. It has always been one of the more conservative centers of Japan. Again the comparison with the American south is not that bad. Strongly aware of Japanese heritage, very nationalistic, but at the same time, and this is common to many Japanese cities, there was also this broad streak of internationalism which Kyushu tended to have because it was kind of the doorway to Korea, and East Asia, and China from Japan. You have to remember that when Japan was a closed country for hundreds of years, the one opening, the one back door in which the Japanese could peek out at the west and the west could peek in was Nagasaki which was, of course, one of the major cities of Kyushu. So while it was extremely conservative, there was this sort of slightly contradictory element of internationalism in the Kyushu makeup. At that time, Japan was pretty much a two party system. The controlling party was called the Liberal Democratic Party, the LDP, and the opposition was called the Japan Socialist Party, the JSP. The JSP was a permanent opposition. They had never held power until a very brief period a few years after the occupation, and since then they have never done it again. The LDP, although it seemed like an eternal ruling party because in effect their party president became prime minister no matter who it was, so it was just continuous periods of LDP prime ministers who had run Japan, except for that very brief period under the JSP. Many of the LDP leaders came from Kyushu, so the fact that there was that kind of geographical base for many of these people meant that Kyushu got a lot of attention from Tokyo. It also meant that because at that time and still today, the Japanese looked to the U.S. as their most important, their senior, their number one ally in everything, places like an American consulate or an American Center tended to be seen as an extension of the embassy. For those of us who were assigned there, it was a very nice place to be. We tended to get cooperation in almost everything, from the officials. We tended to be included in almost everything. There was a certain prestige and status associated with anything the embassy, and perhaps even more so out there in the provinces. It was in many ways a very comfortable arrangement. We were, Jerry Sutton and I as the two senior Americans in town, the two senior
non military Americans in town, we tended to be the beneficiaries of all of this.

**Q: How did you find your relations were with the press and the media in general?**

BERRINGTON: Electronic media was a different thing. The electronic media tended to be very friendly. If I said I wanted to go on TV to talk about something or make a statement or whatever, usually it could be done. The print media were something else, and that is largely because of...well in Japan, the print media were seen as a more viable opposition to the government than the Japan Socialist Party was. They kind of looked upon themselves as being the one voice that could say things and chide the government or raise objections or criticize in a kind of grand tradition of providing that kind of voice. So on one hand personally they were always extremely friendly, but on the other hand, they were required a lot more massaging and a lot more persuading to get them to say take materials that we might offer them explaining the American side. There was almost a more instinctive or knee jerk, I won't say anti Americanism. The military would have called it that. But I would say an instinctive or knee jerk tendency to criticize America, even over the slightest things. If let's say an American ship sailed in to Sasebo, whether it had nuclear weapons or nuclear power or not, the press always tended to see a boogie man under the bed and tended to exacerbate the problem by insinuating that there might be nuclear weapons or some problem and that one of our main responsibilities was to kind of keep the press from going out too far on some of these sometimes sensationalistic stands to stir things up.

**Q: How would you try to keep them from going too far? Was the press sort of sensationalist in the form that so much of the British press is, sex and scandal and that sort of thing?**

BERRINGTON: No, it was more sensationalist in just accepting hearsay and gossip. The mainline Japanese press are very much like the British press in that there is no naked girls or sex to speak of, a little bit but not that much. That type of material tended to be in the magazine sector of the Japanese print media or in there were a number of tabloid papers as well some of which tended to come out in the evening, good for the commuters when they were riding home on the train. But as far as the mainstream press of which there were two papers in Fukuoka, no you wouldn't have called them any kind of a sleaze and sex, not at all. But they did often pick up a story and just run with it even though they may not have checked it out completely. The idea of verifying two or three sources before running a story is not exactly a popular custom in Japan. You know, if the headline said “nuclear weapons on aircraft carrier in Sasebo harbor,” and if in fact that wasn't true at all, they didn't care that much. The rumor was the story of the day and they would run it; they could always run a denial the next day with further investigation we feel that was not true, but for them moment it was just as easy to run it.

**Q: You had aircraft carriers in there. I am not a navy man but I have to assume that any aircraft carrier would probably be very likely to have nuclear arms on board. How would you if you can't confirm or deny, you have to be very careful if a cargo ship comes in you can't say it is a cargo ship, it can't have it. Then you are pretty much pointing your finger at a warship that probably does have those.**

BERRINGTON: You just of course put your finger on one of the basic dilemmas that all of us
face. We had to fall back upon at that time the Japanese had what they called the three pillars of a non nuclear policy, one of which was never to allow nuclear weapons in their country. They said the American government respected that. What we would say is we follow the three basic pillars of the non nuclear policy and we do not deny or confirm the presence or absence of nuclear weapons and we can't say any more. So it's I am putting our statements in very simple terms.

Q: It sounds like you couldn't go after somebody and refute a claim that we have nuclear weapons on board outside of making a formal statement to the press.

BERRINGTON: Well, in effect, we would have to say the ship is there because of strategic interests in Asia. Japan and the U.S. are co-signees to a security treaty. Ship visits are a part of the Japanese obligation being a co-signee, and again we will not confirm or deny. You had to couch it in other terms, which it was there for reasons that were more important than whether or not there were nuclear weapons on it. Of course what we have since found out is that there were of course, as many had suspected all along. The Japanese government said they didn't even want to know whether or not there were nuclear weapons on any of these, of course did know. We just in fact denied things; they were party to a broad policy to I guess you would call it deceit.

Q: But at the same time it was, I mean anybody who followed military affairs even as an amateur could almost point a finger to which ship would have and which wouldn't have.

BERRINGTON: Of course. It was one of those fictions that we all you know, paid attention to. All of us played this game; everybody knew what was happening, and the media in a way was just as much a party to it as anybody else. They didn't really go out and investigate that much. They never turned up any evidence of there being anything. It was sort of like a, I hate to use the word, but kind of like a Kabuki drama. They knew what the roles and the parts were but nobody ever did anything other than that.

Q: Now your tour was during the height of Vietnam. How was that playing down in your area? What were you doing?

BERRINGTON: Well that of course, was one of the reasons for all of this activity in these bases because particularly Okinawa which was further on down from Kyushu. A large marine contingency was in Okinawa. Most of the visits had some kind of connection to a larger East Asian strategy. The Japanese were very unhappy with what was going on in Vietnam. They saw the war largely in racist terms, you know the white Americans beating up on the yellow Vietnamese. Probably without too much effort they could be reminded of what they had gone through in World War II. The Japanese suffer from something called the victimization attitude. They like to see themselves as kind of victim status a victim situation. WWII was for them a great national tragedy largely because they saw themselves as victimized by the West, not just the Americans but the British, the Dutch and others. The two atom bombs, Nagasaki and Hiroshima, were very much seen as the most egregious final result of their victimization. Now of course, lost in all of this woe-is-me attitude is how the war started and Pearl Harbor and all of that. But never mind, we all have our forgetful moments. So it was easy for them to kind of by extension of this innate victimization they had of their own to look towards the Vietnamese as
being exploited or victimized by the west as well, so there was a sort of big brother/little brother attitude there about gosh that is awful. In a way they wished we could end it, get it over with and get out so they wouldn't have to have this problem weighing on their conscious as much as it was. But of course it wasn't that easy. Needless to say at the same time, and this is something the Japanese didn't exactly play up very much, was the large commercial profit taking by the Japanese corporations with what was going on not only within Japan but southeast Asia as well. So that probably for those that really wanted to dig deeply would cause some feelings of guilt.

Q: All I know is that during part of this period I was consul general in Saigon and the most dangerous part of the war for me was these damn little Honda scooters which I think are still in the streets of Saigon today. This is obviously not without profit to the Japanese.

BERRINGTON: Oh not at all. It wasn't just that. It was all the materials passing through Japan on the way to Southeast Asia. And of course, there was a huge Japanese presence in Thailand of corporate representatives and business activities. Of course, we had all the military bases in Thailand as well, so the Japanese were doing quite well thank you.

Q: Was there a Japanese business community that carried clout that you were dealing with in Fukuoka?

BERRINGTON: Yes. Well the Japanese businessman is a very important part of the establishment in Japan. They have very influential business organizations. In Fukuoka it was called the Kyukeiren which was the Kyushu version of the nationwide Keidanren which is well known as one of the leading Japanese business lobbying organizations. I would regularly get together with businessmen to talk about the issues, to encourage them to maybe fund activities we were interested in. The business community, of course, was more the province of the consul than it was of the American Center, but Fukuoka being a smaller town, it was about a million population, and the establishment of Fukuoka being a kind of rather small well definable group, and because Jerry and I were the only two people there, I mean it was kind of easy for us to move back and forth. He would get involved with a media group with my great support as much as I would get involved with the business community and he didn't mind that. So yes, I would frequently see business leaders. Although my natural constituency tended to be more the media and the educational communities.

Q: What about the educational community because one always thinks about the brighter Japanese university student is on the barricades while a student, and is immediately thereafter moves into corporate or government headquarters where he is sitting on the other side. Was this pattern there too?

BERRINGTON: Oh you summed it up very well, and particularly at Kyushu University which if you will recall, that burned out hulk of that plane is still sitting there on that campus. Because of the political sensitivities, Vietnam, all of the bases at that time, the extremist students would not consent to allowing the authorities to come in and take the plane out. In a way this perpetuated this symbol of American imperialism and American military oppression or name your cliché of the time. So it was very difficult for me to go on to the campus of Kyushu University because of this lingering hostility by these extremist students. Now, probably most of the people at the
university couldn't have cared less about whether I was on campus or not, but the student leaders from these extremist organizations had so cowed and intimidated the university officials that in order to keep there from being more demonstrations and more destruction and damage and riots and tear gas and all that, it was just easier for the academic authorities just to say let's not stir things up. Let's keep it the way it is and eventually time will pass; these kids will leave; things will moderate; and we can get rid of the plane, and go back to rebuilding the structure where it crashed.

There was a second campus of Kyushu University which was about two or three miles away from the main campus where the crash had occurred. I could go over there without any problem. In fact, that was the campus where there was more American studies, literature, political science, the sorts of things we were interested in anyway. The other universities, and there were two other main universities. One was called Fukuoka University and the other was Seinan Gakuin University, were much more moderate in this respect and there were no problems. Again in the same vein that some of the media representatives would be officially very critical of America but personally very cordial. Some of these professors might appear on TV or do an interview in the paper and say some very nasty things about the U.S. and the next day come to my cocktail party or have lunch at my place and be very friendly. So, in spite of all these strains in the official relationship, we maintained a very good relationship with most of the academics there.

Q: In many European and American universities, we use the stereotype that there remains a strong sort of cadre of people who subscribe to, in one extent or another, a Marxist viewpoint which supports easy criticism of the West.

BERRINGTON: No, you literally took the words out of my mouth. The economic faculty at Kyushu University I think was 100% Marxist, and many of the history professors as well had that kind of an orientation. That is part of a kind of a long academic tradition in Japan. Without getting into a long history lesson, right before the war in the 30's, many of the non Marxist academics really kind of did themselves in by, in effect, cooperating with the military officials, with the government that Japan had in WWII. It was only the Marxists and the communists that resisted much of this and were arrested, often imprisoned, and after the war, came out kind of the academic heroes of that period. So, that tradition that the whole kind of Marxist left wing tradition in Japanese academics had some thing of an honorable badge that they could all wear because they had not embarrassed themselves or postured themselves to keep in pace with military governments before the war. So you have that tradition to deal with in the academic community, but again age caught up with a lot of these people, and as time went by, more and more of these professors tended to retire or moderated their positions.

Q: Were you able to sort of turn the spotlight on to the Soviet Union and to Communist China and point out what was happening there?

BERRINGTON: Not really. I mean not because we were unable, but it was because we didn't need to. I mean the Japanese were very much aware of what was happening in China. The Russians, I mean to this day most Japanese don't like the Russians. In any poll of public opinion in Japan, whenever they talk about who are the most beloved foreigners and who are the most hated foreigners, when it comes to the hated foreigners, the Koreans and the Russians always
come out on top. They sort of vie with each other for the top position. So we didn't really have to say or do anything about the Russians to convince the Japanese that they were the bad guys. The Japanese have always had a mixed attitude toward the Chinese. I mean they see the Chinese as the sort of mother civilization of that part of the world, so there is some feeling that they should be closer and more understanding with the Chinese, but then we all know about what happened in WWII in China, so there is some lingering ill will there with the Chinese too. You know the excesses of the Mao’s cultural revolution and all that were frequently reported so we didn't have to play that up. Besides I think that would have been less useful anyway. Our program in Japan was more of a positive program pointing out the benefits to the Japanese of maintaining the security relationship, of close political and economic ties with the U.S. and stressing those positive things rather than working on the negatives of China or Russia or anywhere else.

Q: Was it pretty well accepted there that you could have fun twisting the lion's tail while accepting the security protection the U.S. relationship offered? That basically saved their own kids from going into the military and saved budgetary resources. Was this pretty much an accepted good thing?

BERRINGTON: Oh most Japanese are very happy with that. First of all again a little bit of Kabuki, everything about Japan is. There were what they called the self defense forces. There was a naval self defense force, a land self defense force, the air self defense forces, and they were in effect the Japanese army, navy, and air force. But the self defense forces were quite limited in what they could do This has been one of the ongoing debates internally in Japan, just how far could the self defense forces go in pushing their mandate, in pushing their function. In those earlier years when I was in Japan, the self defense forces were really almost used primarily for disaster relief, that sort of thing. You know, a flood comes along and they were sent down to take care of it. Most of the kids that would go into the self defense forces were not your high fliers. They were the ones that didn't do very well academically or maybe didn't complete school, or farming kids that were very conservative in their outlook, and maybe still thought of the military as being a worthy profession. But for most people it is off to a good school, while for most of the country the self defense forces are really a kind of second rate operation. As a result they were very happy to have the umbrella of protection from the United States rather than having to rely on their own forces which not too many years before had caused the grief and tragedy of WWII. Everything when it comes to Japan still today, you know the two absolutely crucial events were the closing of the country during its Tokugawa period and WWII. Those two events really inform so much of Japanese attitude, behavior and still have formed much of what they say and do.

Q: Speaking of a closed society, how difficult was it to operate in Japan? You might know the language, but was it either hard to make contact or understand how the society operated?

BERRINGTON: I was lucky in that I had studied in Japan, and had more than an FSI language ability. So, it was easier for me to move around. I have to add one other…and probably the sociologists will think I am nuts, but one other factor which I think often accounted for my success in the country, and that is I am only 5 feet 5 inches tall. I could literally look at the Japanese in the eye and I would not intimidate. I mean many of the officers at the embassy would be six foot or more and would be literally overwhelming physically. The Japanese are
very conscious of their shortened stature and their small physique. The idea of getting a foreigner who was the same size, I think, was probably much easier for them. A third element was the fact that I was a bachelor. Incidentally Jerry Sutton was also a bachelor. Japan is a great society for, well I think even today, but even more so back then, it was basically a male society. This meant going out drinking, yukking it up with the guys at night, and since I didn't have a wife or family that felt obligated to spend my evenings or weekends with, it was easy for me to join the gang on any kind of events that were happening. So, obviously my knowledge of Japanese history and my Japanese studies in school, and my previous time there as a student, all of this had sensitized me to a lot of other things as well.

The Japanese society was very dependent on codes, you know gestures, body language, all of that. Much of that I had instinctively picked up over the years, so it was easy for me operate within the society. Now having said that, one of the things for many people to spend a lot of time there, it is very frustrating, is that you are always regarded as a gaijin. Gaijin is the Japanese word for foreigner. It literally means outside person. If you meet a Japanese for the first time, and you were to say something like “Hello, my name is…, how do you do.” It doesn't matter whether you said it with the klutziest accent or whether you said it with an accent that made you sound like a native speaker; they would still think “Oh my God, this man speaks Japanese.” They would be astonished; nothing short of the open mouth and the look of surprise on the face, if you knew how to eat Japanese food with chopsticks. Every time I went out to dinner invariably someone would say "Oh you are very good at chopsticks." There were other little comments like that, that would constantly remind you that you were in fact an outsider. Now very few of us wanted to be Japanese. It is not that, but it is the kind of condescending attitude that many of us felt that we were kind of regarded as not much different from talking dogs. There was a constant curiosity about how we lived, what our homes were like, our attitudes about this and that because we were curiosities.

Q: How much of their understanding was formed by TV and the movies?

BERRINGTON: Unfortunately, and I don't think that has changed much over the years, very much. I mean a lot of it was formed by TV and the movies. You know, all foreigners were blond, beautiful, tall, rich, prone to violence. All those stereotypes were closely held. That was one of the things we had to keep chipping away at, those stereotypes. Well, maybe there was a kernel of truth to some of them, by and large they were not very accurate. It was a constant effort. We are talking about 1969-'73 period. Even 1993 when I left Japan 20 years later much of that was still the same. A story that I used to tell was when I was a student in Japan in 1960-61, I had a Japanese, what they call a guarantor, somebody who signed the papers and make sure if I got in financial trouble or whatever, he would take care of it. He probably knew me as well as anybody. He had studies at Antioch College in Ohio, was fluent in English, was a very intellectual and sophisticated guy. Every time I would see him even if it was, well not every time. Say if I had gone away for a few years and come back to Japan and we would get together for dinner or something, invariably he would start out, “Oh your Japanese is so good,” and “Oh you can use chopsticks.” You know I would often sit there and think even somebody like this? We have to go through kind of these initial steps of proving who you are. It could be very frustrating.

Q: Perhaps not when you were first there, but one of the most revolutionary things that America
has been pushing by example and otherwise is a progressive view of the role of women. Were we doing anything either consciously or unconsciously on that?

BERRINGTON: Yes. When Reischauer was ambassador [April 1961 to August 1966], he brought out a young woman to be a women's affairs officer at the embassy, much in the same way I was supposed to be a student affairs officer. That was a position that was kept in the embassy for a number of years. Of course, if we were bringing out speakers or experts in any field, we always thought we were kind of getting a twofer if we were able to recruit not just an expert but also an expert who maybe happened to be female, or a black or something else that showed in America there was a greater equality of opportunity. So we tried to send messages in more ways than...

Q: I would think that sometimes if we are trying to send a message, we only satisfying ourselves. In other words let's say you put a woman or a black into the Japanese society to lecture on environmental affairs or Melville or something like that. Would the Japanese make the connection that these are really experts and all or would they think they were being...

BERRINGTON: Yes, I think they did, and the reason they did was, it took me awhile to figure this out, but the Japanese had long since come to the conclusion that we, the Americans, were different. By being different, we could do things like appoint blacks or women to important positions or they could rise up in the system to become experts in their various fields, and they could still be listened to and regarded just as authoritatively as if the person were a white man. They didn't necessarily make the next logical conclusion that gee we should do that here too. I think many of my colleagues were hoping that they were making that step. I doubt if they were. Of course, the women's movement or civil rights movement, which for Japan was basically for Chinese or Koreans rather than blacks, those kinds of movements did move along farther as time went by. At this time in late 1960s early 1970s there was not much evidence of any kind of movement in Japan on those fronts.

Q: What about were you getting any reflections from Japanese women about “Gee I wish I had more opportunity” and that sort of thing, or was this not something they had expressed to you?

BERRINGTON: Yes. Many of the Japanese would tell us things that they would not tell each other. Again because we were outsiders, because they probably knew we would not be passing this on, and simply because we were not part of the system. It's like they let their hair down or speak up in front of us without fear of any kind of embarrassment from their colleagues or their family or friends or whatever. So, yes, I would hear a lot of this from others, particularly from women about how they wished they had as many opportunities or as much power as American women. But then of course, there were other Japanese women who would kind of engage in the usual kind of mythology that we-Japanese-women-have-more-power-than-American-women so we don't need to be taking the kinds of steps that American women are. Frankly I regarded that as excuses for those women who didn't want to see the change or had problems dealing with reality.

Q: What about Koreans there?
BERRINGTON: Well Koreans are of course, the ethnic minority group that is most discriminated against and at the bottom of the rung of the ladder. There is a large Korean community especially in places like Kyushu, and in the other major cities. Many of them were basically in professions that were kind of left for the economic low classes. Those Koreans that did achieve and were able to kind of make the leap into the Japanese mainstream usually did so with some risk because they had to either hide the fact they were Korean by taking on a Japanese name or kind of concealing their past, or just by kidding themselves that they had become Japanese when in fact they still were Korean. It was a sad story for many of them. Even more unfortunate of course, was what they called the untouchable class, the “eta” or burakumin of Japan who basically were the sort of like the untouchable caste of India. These were a much smaller minority, but they were still there. They were different from the Koreans in that they were ethnic Japanese which is very astonishing. How they came to be regarded as kind of a non class an untouchable class is one of the great mysteries of Japanese history. It is assumed that many of them were butchers or did those professions that involved unclean activities hundreds of years ago, tanning of hides, burying the dead. Over the generations the families that did those sorts of things just became tagged with that untouchable social stigmatization, and just over the years were unable to escape beyond that.

I had one absolutely astonishing experience in Fukuoka once. As a bachelor and wanting to get out and around, I had a few bars in Fukuoka that I used to frequent. I can remember one night I was at one of these bars and as was often the case, when they see a single foreigner sitting there talking Japanese to the bartender whatever, curiosity is aroused. Another guy sitting at the bar came up to me and started asking me questions, who was I and so forth and so on. He said, "Well let me take you to my bar." We went to his place which turned out to be kind of a night club with lots of hostesses, women sitting around. I could tell that he was a kind of an uneducated lower class type of person, you know, it was fun meeting people of all types. The night club was a bit of a cheesy place but, frankly when you are a foreigner, those kinds of experiences are interesting and amusing. I didn't mind going to things like that. At one point he got up and left to go to the bathroom. The hostess who was sitting closest to me turned to me and said in Japanese, "Did you know that your friend is an untouchable?" I was absolutely astonished. I didn’t know that. I couldn't tell just by looking at them so I said, "No, I had no idea." She said, "Oh, yes, he is a regular here and we all like him very much but I wasn't sure if you knew this." I said, “Okay, that's very interesting. If he is an untouchable, why are you so clearly friendly with him?” The young woman said, "Oh, Japanese women like untouchable men because," and she took her fingers and put them way up, "they have big ones." I was absolutely astonished. I thought Margaret Mead where are you tonight. The idea of a discriminated ethnic minority class having this kind of sexual prowess. I have always remembered that experience. That was so indicative of the whole issue of a kind of lower class or forbidden fruit, that sort of thing.

Q: Well did we get involved at all in saying “gee you should be nicer to the Koreans or the untouchables or whomever?”

BERRINGTON: Let's face it, USIS Japan, USIS any country is in the business of forming, shaping public opinion. We have limited resources and limited ability to do this. How do you do this? You do it through the gatekeepers of the opinion formation process of a country. You try to reach those people who will be in a position to make the decisions or be in a position to influence
those who make the decisions. So what we are talking about are the media of course, the academics, the teachers, the professors, the politicians who make the pronouncements, the intellectuals, the artists who write or do things that are regarded as important voices in the community, those kinds of community leaders. The ethnic minorities or the untouchables certainly didn't fall in that category, and they weren't even a large enough ethnic minority to be a factor in any of the various equations of the U.S.-Japan political, economic, or security relationship. If they had been, then I am sure we might have wanted to do something with them, but no they were just a very small blip on any radar screen if even a blip at all.

Q: This is a time of considerable activity on the part of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger and all. How was this playing down where you were, or did it? I was wondering about the opening of China while you were there. Did you have that Nixon shock too?

BERRINGTON: Well, yes, there were two major body blows to the U.S.-Japan relationship. One was the oil shock which was basically a problem of oil prices and oil supply from the Middle East. The other was the so called Nixon shock which was the opening of China. In both of these cases, the U.S. did not give the Japanese the kind of advance notice or any kinds of consultative briefing that they expected to receive and that they thought they deserved as our so called leading ally in the whole east Asian area. So particularly the China visit was a very humiliating experience for the Japanese leadership because we had not given them the kind of advance word that they expected they would get. We were constantly trying to explain that and deal with that, and that unfortunately for the Japanese was a bad thing. You can hardly make a good thing out of a bad thing.

Q: I heard, and this may be self justification, that there was a certain amount of premeditation in doing this because it was hard to find somebody in the Japanese government that you could talk to who wouldn't immediately share it with everybody else who would share it with everybody. In other words it is this consentative type of government which means that you can't really tip somebody off early. Is that valid or not?

BERRINGTON: I have heard that one before obviously. That was often used as a justification at the time. I mean not an official justification. It was batted about informally. That was very hard for me to deal with too because basically I was in Kyushu. I wasn't dealing with central government officials. I had no idea whether the central government was as much of a fizz of information as people said it was. I mean there was clearly some truth in that notion, but it seems to me that this was a major policy shift, and we certainly paid a price of trust and closeness in the government for a long time after because of that. It is hard for me to second guess.

Q: What about, and I have heard you keep talking about the central government, but also how Japan works, nothing is decided here and now. It is usually in committee, by consensus. Did you run across that when you wanted to put on a program, nobody would look you in the eye and say “OK, we'll do that?”

BERRINGTON: Japan is not a society marked by decisive leaders in any field. University presidents are very much members of a board rather than executives in their own right. Newspaper editors-in-chief again tend to operate within the group rather than in determining
editorial policy as probably an American paper would. Certainly within the political arena, Japanese governors lacked the power that American executives would have in the states. The whole Japanese system of government was very much to use a western model was very much like what I understand France was like with all the power being in Paris and everything flows out, kind of all roads lead to Rome kind of approach. Japan is very much like that. Tokyo was where all the action was taken, and once a course of action was decided on, then there was very much a building of consensus nationwide through the networks that the LDP or other organizations have. Nothing ever changed quickly in Japan. We often used to describe it as being like a large battleship or the Titanic or some giant ocean liner. You know, you can't really turn things on a dime. It slowly moves, but the whole business of consensus building was so important there, you don't get an overnight change. The problem with that, of course, is it takes a long time. It can be very frustrating, and there is difficulty dealing with a crisis or really urgent issues. The good news is, of course, that once consensus had been formed, the whole nation is literally mobilized, or the whole organization. Let's not even say nationwide, just say a corporation or university or whatever, that whole organization is mobilized to do whatever needs to be done. Then you are less likely to have the kind of backbiting or sniping or fractious disagreement, but consensus building does take time.

Q: As the USIA representative, I imagine you would be dealing with artists, the artistic community. What is in it for the United States to deal with the artistic community in Japan?

BERRINGTON: Well the same in any country. Artists are frequently seen as non-political, non-ideological, as sort of neutral observers of events. They are seen as intellectuals. They are seen as people who call it like it is. Because of their artistic achievement, they occupy a special niche within the society. So if, as was often the case on Japanese TV or in a Japanese newspaper, if so and so is being interviewed, or is in a discussion about what ever the topic might be, it might be an artistic issue or a local issue, it was not unusual for something involving U.S.-Japanese affairs to come up and he would be outspoken. Very often they have thoughts about these things. Very few of them would say Oh I am just an artist and I don't think about that. It doesn't work that way. They usually do have an opinion, and it is probably better to have a lot of those guys on your side or if not on your side, at least have them understand better the issues or the relationships that are so important for both countries. So they would certainly be part of what we would call our target audience. This could be anything from musicians to dancers to painters to writers to pop stars. You name it. We did not go in for celebrities cultivating just for the good of saying a celebrity. It was really more to make them better understand what the whole kind of fabric of U.S.-Japan relations was about. You know to be sure, if we had not done it, or if we had not talked to them that much, they would kind of feel like they were left out. Particularly in a town like Fukuoka which was our regional center, and with the consulate and the American Center being major players on the local scene, if we had totally ignored them, they would probably wonder why? Why didn't we include them in things we were doing?

Another element in all this of course is that to talk to these people, very often you had to do things that would interest them. I mean I didn't just walk up to a sculptor and say let's talk about nuclear ship visits and start talking. You had to probably have an American sculptor in town to talk about maybe issues of common interest, and then at the time if it were appropriate or something came up, then you might edge into some of these areas. So it was very important for
us to be seen as the kind of society that had the values that put culture and the arts and intellectualism and all of that high on our list as well. It's an area that I don't think Americans quite understand, but many non-Americans regard a country's culture, it arts, its literature, its intellectual community as something of an indicator of the worth of the civilization of that country. If we as the U.S. government are not doing more to promote our own cultural activities, our writers, our composers, whatever, we would be seen as maybe not quite as worthy an ally or we are not the substantive society or nation that is worth spending so much of their own political or economic capital on. It made up a better, a society of better nations to them, and so, you know, it was very much a two way street.

Q: I would assume there wouldn't be quite the same hang up that we get sometimes in Europe where some Europeans, this is dying but, would take the stand, Americans have no culture. I suppose the Japanese look upon what we do as exotic or something, or did they?

BERRINGTON: That was one of the nicer things about being in Japan. The Japanese were absolutely obsessed with anything that went on in the United States. They were deeply interested in everything we did whether it was in social issues or cultural issues in the United States, largely because they saw us as kind of the laboratory in which things happened, and if these events or trends were successful, invariably they would come to Japan as well.

So if it was like women's rights happening in the U.S. they figured five or eight years down the road it would be happening in Japan as well and the same with any cultural activities or artistic activities. So anything that we would bring to Japan in our exhibit or musical performance or dance or whatever was flocked to by the local community. They really wanted to see what's up in America. If we had not done anything at all, they would have wondered why in the hell we were not doing it, but when we did it, they were always there to take a look and find out for themselves what was happening in America. So, yes, working with the cultural community was extremely important. Let's face it, you can deal with the bureaucrats, the politicians, and the businessmen for a lot of things, but after awhile some of the cultural types were more fun, more interesting, and it was like adding the spice or the salt and pepper to your stew. If you had a party or an event going on, throwing in some of those types, it was more fun for the Japanese to see: “Oh look, there is so and so the well known writer or the famous potter,” “Oh he is here tonight too.” It added to that sort of class or status of your position in the community to have those people there.

Q: What about leader grants, sending people to the United States? Did we have much of a program and did you get any feel?

BERRINGTON: We had an International Visitor program which is what I assume you are talking about. In Fukuoka alone we used to nominate about, oh gosh I think we used to have at least six or eight a year and maybe even more. The Japan program was one of the largest in the world. The embassy in Tokyo was very good at making sure that all of the regional centers got their fair share of nominations. That was very important because the way the Japan system worked, particularly with a lot of these nationwide institutions, whether it was Asahi Shimbun the big newspaper or whether it was a corporation like Mitsubishi or one of the political parties like the LDP or the JSP. Many of these people got their start in one of these regional centers. As
they would rise within the system, first in the regional center and then maybe in Osaka and then finally when they hit the big time in Tokyo, it was much easier to contact and meet these people out in the Fukuoka or Sapporo or Kyoto rather than once they had gotten to Tokyo, where they would be just too damn busy to do a lot of the things we wanted to do with them. So it was very important for us out in places like Fukuoka too, to have these contacts and nominate these people. Many of the people, whether it was members of the diet, politicians or the young journalists that I knew have now risen to extremely senior important positions in their organization.

Q: Were you pleased with the way the program is run and experiences of the people coming back?

BERRINGTON: Oh of course. The IV program was over the years when USIS would go through one of those spasms of budget cutting where you had to rank what are the best things we do and the worst things we do. The IV program would consistently come out on top as one of the best things we ever did. So no that was always very well run, very fruitful, very positive. In leaping forward, one time when I was in Tokyo for example, I sent the deputy governor of the prefecture in which Yokohama is located. Yokohama is now I think the third largest city in the country. The deputy governor was one of those left wing politicians that had kind of grown up within the very Marxist kind of anti American tradition. When we sent him to the United States, he came back he was a changed man. I mean he was one of the most dramatic examples I have seen come through that IV program, and literally had his attitude do an about face about market economies and security relationship and all that, just go 180 degrees as a result of the IV experience. So yes it was an extremely successful program.

Q: Is there anything we should cover here, any events or issues that maybe we haven’t talked about?

BERRINGTON: Well I have been talking mainly about Fukuoka because that was where we were based, it is the largest city, but to a degree the same thing was happening in the other cities of Kyushu. Jerry Sutton and I would try to get to places like Kumamoto or Nagasaki or Kagoshima. I mean big cities but they just didn't have an American Center library or they didn't have a consulate. So we were doing much the same kind of outreach to the political leaders, the media leaders, the academics, just not on as frequent or regular basis.

Often, even though we might be in a place like Nagasaki only say four times a year, the results of those visits could be extremely important because our visit would be like VIP's coming down from the regional center. Another important development during my period in Fukuoka was when we changed the name from the USIS office there from the American Cultural Center to the American Center. That was a major kind of I guess you would say policy decision by the top people at USIS in Tokyo. This was based on the decision that the USIS program in Japan had literally not changed since the occupation period. At the same time, Japan itself was changing by leaps and bounds, and it was time to make our programs far more modern and more welded to contemporary society than it had been. It had gotten pretty cobwebby and dusty and all of that. So we changed it. The one way to show this change was the name change from American Cultural Center to American Center. One of the reasons we did that was to show that there was
more to the American Center than just culture. I mean we were heavily involved in the policy issues of trade and military relations and all of that. But also because we were instituting what were in those days, now this was I think 1971-1972, some pretty radical modern electronic equipment like the old fax machine which is kind of dated nowadays, but in those days we were using fax machines to transmit back and forth between the Embassy and our Center which enabled us to get policy statements from the ambassador or from people literally into the hands of people instantaneously.

We were also, and this was important, we were being much more attentive to the audiences we were dealing with. In the old days, we were sort of happy to have almost anybody come into the Center. We were happy to be giving out our policy paper to almost anybody. You know, you work for the newspaper, fine let's give it to him. Now if he was in the distribution office of the newspaper, so what? He didn't have much to do with policy issues, but because he was with the newspaper, we would give it to him. Well we were much more focused in our efforts, so as to get things into the hands of the real political, economic, cultural, military movers; those kinds of hands rather than just what I called the “Friends of America.” We were more purposefully going out and looking for target audience members, particularly those people who were not true believers necessarily.

In a way, we were making our own lives more difficult because we were trying to do more than we were doing when we were the old American Cultural Center and just sort of dealing with whatever came in off the sidewalk. So it was a much more aggressive, strident, focused, targeted kind of program. For example, (Herman) Melville, you mentioned that earlier. We didn't do anything about Melville. We stopped doing nice comfortable things like Melville. Instead we started doing things like Saul Bellow. The idea was to make the program as contemporary as possible. We figured everybody already knew about the Civil War or knew about Nathaniel Hawthorne and that sort of thing, but how many people knew about the current developments in American dance or how many people knew about those American writers who were getting the book awards and all of that, probably not so much. So we were making it a much more contemporary and focused operation in our program, as well as our audiences. That was a major change because for many USIS people, this meant change.

It meant getting off your can, getting out with new material and doing something; and we were instituting some accountability as well. I mean if you didn't deal with some of these people, you weren't doing what you should be doing. We were actually recording the idea of putting this in quantifiable terms. It went a bit overboard at times, but we were trying to record how much we actually did see the professors of international relations or how many people from the local legislature did we send off on an IV program, as opposed to how many people were friends of ours. It was a major institutional change for USIS Japan. This was a change incidentally which then kind of set the mark for many other USIS programs around the world.

Q: You were sort of in the lead then?

BERRINGTON: Yes, very much. We changed the name of the library from the American Cultural Center Library to what we called Infomat – “info” came from information and "mat" came from automatic. You could automatically get the latest, most relevant kind of information.
So it was a bit of a trendy thing. We put in super graphics in the buildings to kind of liven and make them with more verve and style. In many respects it was very successful.

**Q:** Where was the drive coming from?

**BERRINGTON:** This was coming from the PAO in Tokyo, Alan Carter, who was one of the great thinkers and kind of conceptualizers of USIS. A man who created a lot of enemies because he did upset apple carts.

He was somebody who had never had any Japan experience before he got that job, the senior USIS job in Tokyo. Many of the kind of old Japan hands were immediately against him because they didn't like what he was doing. So in their criticism they tried to use the idea that he was inexperienced in Japan.

Many of us were unsure about what was happening. I think many of the younger officers were quickly won over. Carter did a fantastic job of turning that post around and making us the kind of vanguard of what USIS should be doing worldwide.

**Q:** Did the trade issue come up? I mean were you playing that because we were beginning to be worried about the deficit and also be worried about the fact that the Japanese market was hard to penetrate.

**BERRINGTON:** Oh yes. The trade issue is one of those things that never goes away. When baseball bats two years ago or grapefruits this year or automobile parts two years later or lawyer-age in the next decade, we were always trying to open the Japanese market to whatever the American product was that we felt was being advanced. You know, that sounds like a silly group of things in terms of baseball bats to lawyers but these were the things we were talking about.

**Q:** This is very much the essence of what our diplomatic missions were about. For example, President Nixon came into office at the time you were in Japan and he owed his election to winning in places in the South which in those days were dependent on textiles. Did your work cover trying to explain our textile policy?

**BERRINGTON:** Oh yes, textile policy was a major trade issue throughout the late 1960s early 1970s period. I could have referred to that along with baseball bats and grapefruits, but textiles were constantly coming up. For me in Fukuoka, probably security issues were paramount and then I would say trade. In other places where there weren't so many bases close by, probably security issues were paramount and then maybe trade. Trade issues were an ongoing continuous thread all through my Japan experience.

**JOHN B. RATLIFF, III**
**Director, FSI Language School**
**Tokyo (1969-1974)**
John B. Ratliff III was born in Louisiana in 1935. He graduated from Southeastern Louisiana College and Georgetown University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1954 to 1957 in Japan and Korean Language Training. After postings at language programs in Bangkok and Tokyo, Ratliff became Dean of the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia. Dean Ratliff was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: You left Bangkok in ’69. Whither?

RATLIFF: Back to Japan. I was very much motivated and reassured throughout my Bangkok, Southeast Asia Tour by the promise from FSI that upon the completion of the Southeast Asia tour, I was going back to Japan as the director of that school. I was able to keep my eye on that objective. Even when things got frustrating or I felt a little low, I knew I had that to look forward to.

Q: So you went back there in ’69. You were there from ’69 to when?

RATLIFF: Until ’74.

Q: As director and a different time period, did you find there was a difference?

RATLIFF: Two differences; the two were inter-related. I found that I was no longer the same age as the students. When I arrived in 1964 as Assistant Director, I was one of the guys. First of all, I was not in the position of ultimate authority, and I was the same age, in some cases younger, as many of the students, so I made very good friends. When I came back, I was a few years older; I was the director, and as they say, the buck stops here. I found it a very different existence. It had its own rewards, but it was very different.

Q: Were there any changes in the procedures, problems in this period?

RATLIFF: I thought I'd have a little bit of a honeymoon period once I arrived. I'd had my time in Vietnam and the like. But we had a Foreign Service inspection as soon as I arrived, within I'd say three or four months. The complaints that had been festering over the years about the materials kind of came to a head during the inspector's visit. The complaint was focused on the relative lack of advanced materials. We had tried to write a text when I was there the first time but we had rushed it into production very quickly. It wasn't very suitable and became quickly outdated. It was based on real events at a point in time in Japanese politics and economics and the like. I was pretty much instructed as a result of the inspection to embark on the development of an advanced spoken text that would focus on the needs of the Foreign Service. I spent a good part of the first two years in Japan working on that text while directing the school.

CHARLES A. SCHMITZ
Counselor for Political/Military Affairs
Tokyo (1969-1974)

Charles A. Schmitz was born in Kansas City in 1938. He attended Yale for both undergraduate and law school. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Schmitz served in Morocco, and Japan. He was interviewed by Samuel F. Hart on July 29, 1993.

Q: So when you left Morocco...?

SCHMITZ: I came back to the Office of the Legal Advisor and wanted to be where the action was. Action at that time was in East Asia where we were fighting a war in Vietnam. So I asked for an assignment with the East Asia area in the Legal Advisor's Office.

While there we divided our clients into various categories. I wound up working on elements of the war in Vietnam, primarily what we called the status of the contractors in the country and to what extent they were controlled by military law. I dealt with some of the hostages held by the Cambodians and issues of defoliation of Cambodia, trying to defend the value of the Laotian kip and things of that kind in Indochina.

But as that period developed I found myself being drawn more and more into the work of what I then considered a minor part of my area and that was Japan. I was drawn into it because the preliminary discussions leading to the Okinawa Reversion Treaty were going on. As these discussions proceeded, the issues changed from ones of large policy to ones of technical implementation. How would we square the resulting US presence on Okinawa with their existing treaties in Japan, particularly the Status of Forces Treaty. In the middle of that continuum, between those two extremes, there were policy questions which could take legal form having to do with issues such as how do we take care of the dollars which were being used as legal currency in Okinawa that would be picked up by the Japanese when reversion occurred in such a way that they would not become additional claims on the balance of payments problems of the United States. This was a matter of great concern at the time to the Nixon Administration.

Q: What did you see as the most important foreign policy issues you were dealing with on the Okinawa problem?

SCHMITZ: The principal issue was whether or not we could get the support of the American people to do it at all. We, who were concerned with it, were absolutely certain that it was the best thing to do. I and my colleagues had seemingly endless debates with Americans who thought that giving back Okinawa was a terrible mistake. We had, after all, fought and bled and even died for it. It was important to national security and we couldn't trust the Japanese. In fact, we shouldn't give the Japanese a thing and we ought to just hang on to it and provide for ourselves.

Q: Did this cause you to have certain deja vu feelings later on when you worked on the Panama Treaty?

SCHMITZ: Yes. In fact, I think that experience had a lot to do with why I was working on the Panama Treaty later on.
There were some subsidiary issues in the Okinawa exercise having to do with what do we do with nuclear weapons, what about the American businessmen who were already on the island. What about American activities which were nonconforming under the Japanese Status of Forces such as our VOA station, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, some of the special military operations we were running out of there, religious language broadcasting, etc. I think probably there were about a thousand issues that had to be resolved government to government in that negotiation.

Q: You mentioned special operations being run out of there, could you elaborate on that?

SCHMITZ: It is probably still too early to elaborate on that, but the category of things, of course, was having to do with how we used Okinawa in the Cold War context to advance our purposes. We had there a major CIA installation and a black operations run, I think, by all the services, including the famous black bird itself, the SR-71, which operated out of Okinawa. Most of these things gave great concern to Japanese politicians and therefore to the Japanese bureaucrats with whom we were dealing primarily. And we had to make provisions for each one. And those provisions had to be basically whether they could continue or not, which was a heavy part of the negotiation initially.

And then secondly, if they were allowed to continue how would it be done, how would it be explained? Most of this happened after I had actually gotten to Japan which was a little bit after the time we are talking about.

Q: Was it a good treaty or not?

SCHMITZ: It took us the better part of two years to negotiate the treaty and its related arrangements and to make sure it came into effect in good form. It was for the United States one of the best deals we had made since, I think, the Louisiana Purchase, because we wound up yielding practically nothing. We made some adjustments, but those adjustments did not make it more difficult or more expensive for us to carry out our functions. We continue to this day to use Okinawa as a military staging base, something which in 1969 we weren't sure would last for even five years after Okinawa was returned to Japan. From that standpoint, any usefulness now of Okinawa for us is a big plus.

But in addition to being able to use it for almost everything we wanted to, we were relieved of the burden, financial and other, of occupying and running the island, which most Americans didn't realize was costing us millions and millions of dollars every year for doing something which we weren't good at and didn't need to do. Our continued government there made us look like imperialists, and that was causing us a lot of trouble throughout the rest of Asia. What we did in the negotiations was sell the effort that we had already put in to running Okinawa. Maybe was a contribution that I made, because I argued that once we had committed ourselves to giving Okinawa to the Japanese, we would in effect, in legal terms, be yielding our “future interests” to the facilities which we had constructed there. We would then be criticized by the US people or the Senate as it considered the treaty, for having disposed of American assets without making proper accounting of them.
I did a considerable amount of research on this and discovered that when NATO was thrown out of France there was a similar kind of negotiation when the French took over military facilities. The formula used then was to find the value of the facilities which the French accepted. And that value turned out to be something we came to call the “depreciated replacement value”. That is, what it would cost today to build that same facility with the same amount of years on it as it had had. Obviously it is a purely mathematical construct, but it managed to take into account both the depreciation of the thing and the inflation, which had to be a major consideration. On that basis we calculated a value for these facilities and were able in various ways in the Okinawa Reversion Agreement to have that accounted for by the Japanese and paid back to the United States, not so much in cash, but in very usable forms.

Q: What happened when the treaty went to the Senate?

SCHMITZ: The Senate committee asked for our explanation of what we had done. I prepared the materials for that, including a briefing book for our people with the horrible questions and the best answers that we could make. We were able, by signaling what those questions and answers were going to be, to avoid any difficulty whatsoever in the Senate consideration of the treaty. In fact, when the General Accounting Office, as a part of its responsibility to help the Senate decide what to do about this, asked us to prepare for an audit of the treaty dispositions, I supplied them almost everything we had in the book. They looked at our briefing book and wrote a letter saying that they had been prepared to spend two man years on the audit, but because they saw that we had been completely open with them and had foreseen and taken account of these issues, they gave the treaty a clean bill of health. They suspended the audit and told us we had saved the taxpayers a lot of money by not having forced them to audit the books.

Q: So the treaty had a very smooth passage once negotiated. Other than yourself, who were the major players in negotiating this treaty?

SCHMITZ: The principal player for the US was Richard Sneider, who had been on the Japan Desk when these negotiations first started and then he went to the NSC. When it became time to negotiate the treaty in Tokyo, he was our designated negotiator. It was he who hired me to go with him to Tokyo to do that.

Shortly after we had arrived and assembled the team, he was then elevated to be DCM of the Embassy. So while he could continue to watch over these negotiations, the day-to-day job of finding solutions to the issues in the negotiations fell to me. I wound up be, in effect, the chief of staff for that work. He did the heavy lifting on the interagency concurrences and the initial work on Congressional approval of the treaty. He was a very aggressive man, especially relative to other Foreign Service officers.

Q: Type A?

SCHMITZ: Yes, type A plus. Type A with sharp teeth and sharp elbows. He was a man who was very effective in getting his way and obviously often bruised people in the process. The reason that I was able to exist under that was that early on we had a disagreement and I was lucky
enough that that disagreement was on an issue in which I didn't have any choice. That issue was whether or not this agreement to return Okinawa would be done as an Executive Agreement, as we did in the earlier return of the Bonin Islands, which included Iwo Jima, or whether it had to be done by treaty. His assumption was that we could do it by Executive Agreement and he wanted it to be that way so you did not have to fool with Congress.

As I looked at the issue I easily came to the conclusion that Okinawa was a different kettle of fish qualitatively than Iwo Jima and the little bunch of islands about which nobody cared: that this agreement to return Okinawa was a matter of policy for the country. I argued that we could not win the legal argument that the precedent of Iwo Jima would apply, and therefore we had to go to the Senate with it.

Q: *This was a legal judgment or a political judgment?*

SCHMITZ: Well, it is one of those beautiful ones in which the policy is lying there but the way you decide the policy is that you ask lawyers for views. The Constitution says something about treaties and the implied Executive Powers of the President says something about Executive Agreements, but you then look to see what the precedents are. That is generally a lawyer's job. You look at the precedents, which was my job. I could see that if we were going to assert this was an Executive Agreement, we would have to make an argument about something more important than anything that had ever carried that attribution before; and that then becomes a policy question of whether we want to do it. But, as I told the policy makers, if we try to make that argument, when you turn around to ask your lawyers to help you out, you will see a whole bunch of people diving for cover. The Senate has lawyers too, and so do interest groups, so this is not the kind of issue that you can pass up. This is one of those cases we were talking about before where State Department FSOs, let's say, frequently say, "I could have done it quick and easy if it hadn't been for the lawyers mucking around with me."

Q: *You feel in the end that Sneider accepted your views as being the valid ones?*

SCHMITZ: Oh, more than that. He admitted that he was wrong. The reason he did that was because had he won, we would have lost in the negotiations because we had on our side in the negotiations a very powerful argument for nearly every one of these delicate issues and that was, "You might be able to persuade us, but how the hell are we going to persuade the Senate of the United States." So that in the theory of negotiations is the value of having an irrational partner. The person with an irrational partner almost always wins. In fact, that not only gave us that set of negotiating arguments, it gave the whole negotiation a visibility in the United States that clearly had an impact in the way he (Sneider) was regarded in the State Department through the United States Government.

So the effect was to benefit Sneider, benefit the Embassy, and benefit the State Department because this was a very important negotiation.

Q: *Didn't he later on become Assistant Secretary for EA?*

SCHMITZ: No, he became Ambassador to Korea.
In any case, as we had the discussion about this, he said, "You can not maintain that position. It is time for you lawyers to think politically." I said, "I'm sorry that I can't change this position because as far as I am concerned as a lawyer I can not make the argument that you are telling me I can make, and therefore it is really a question of shall we take this together to our superiors and have it out." Sneider then threatened to throw me off the negotiating team if I didn't change my mind.

Well, if the issue had been tougher for me, I might well have yielded on that and I would have lost his respect, I think. I might have stayed on the team, but I would have been rolled over. But because the issue took the form it did, I didn't yield, and ultimately my view prevailed. The episode developed a sense of reliability that allowed him to turn over to me a lot of this negotiation while he could attend to the rest of the issues of the Embassy.

Q: Okay, we have the Okinawa negotiations completed and ratified and you moved on to...?

SCHMITZ: In the summer of 1972, when everything about Okinawa was pretty much concluded, I was asked to stay on at the Embassy to be Counselor for Political/Military affairs in order to provide some continuity with the negotiations. In part, this was because the Embassy felt that there might be a lot of loose ends to the negotiations and that maybe not everything would work well. Sneider was leaving, there was a turnover of ambassadors, and so I could provide the continuity. Moreover, since I had mastered the Status of Forces Agreement and all the military paraphernalia, it made a certain amount of sense that I do that.

So, for two more years I carried out that function, which had to do in part with making sure that our forces on Okinawa performed well and could do their job, and in part that the whole US-Japan security relationship, which at that time was changing radically because of the reversion, continued to function.

At the same time I could do things like assist in making sense out of adjustments in our military force structure in Japan, and when I had some spare time I could do some legal work such as what was required to clear the title of Embassy grounds so that we could rebuild the Embassy, which we did at the tag end of that period.

Q: Anything else that is particularly memorable from that period?

SCHMITZ: The most fascinating part of that whole thing was an issue which we called the Murasami Bashi problem. That was a problem involving our continuing to fight in Vietnam, very unpopular in Japan, and using Japan to support that fight. We did that in a noteworthy case by repairing tanks and armored personnel carriers at the Sagami depot in Japan. After these things were repaired they were put on big Army convoys and driven down to the piers in Yokohama to be put on ships to go to Vietnam. They moved visibly through the streets. Yokohama was then run by a Socialist mayor. There were lots of young communists. To see these things moving around in Japan they considered were going down to kill Vietnamese was anathema. There were demonstrations about these movements, and ultimately one day a convoy was totally surrounded by demonstrators and stopped. The police told us they couldn't interfere because the load limit of
one of the bridges turned out to be less than the weight of trucks in the convoy and therefore if
they allowed the convoy to proceed, the police would be a party to a violation of the law, which
they would not abide. The short of this was that 104 days went by before we were able to resolve
the issue. I don't want to give the impression that the convoy sat on the street for a 104 days, it
sat there for 25 hours surrounded by a howling mob with highly disciplined soldier drivers in the
cabs of those trucks doing an excellent job. We finally decided to send them back to Sagami so
that we would have some breathing room to solve the problem.

The solution of the problem involved excellent work from some of the finest career public
service officials I have ever seen in my life. These were Japanese and they were what allowed
the solution to materialize. This is a hot issue in the Diet and with the opposition parties
including the Socialist mayor. The Foreign Ministry officials worked out a mechanism with the
rest of the government and the political parties that would allow certain kinds of payments to
flow into Yokohama, certain kinds of political statements to be made, and undoubtedly lots of
other political payoffs.

The essential capability that would allow this to take place was the US Army's capacity every
morning, around 2 am, to throw a Bailey bridge across the top of the existing bridge and rush the
convoy across and down to the docks; unload the tanks and equipment onto the ships; turn
around and get back across that Bailey bridge so that it could be taken down to accommodate the
morning rush hour traffic that began at six-thirty every morning. It was an extraordinarily
disciplined act by the Army engineers of throwing this bridge every morning across the weak
bridge, allowing the convoy to rush in, unload and rush out, and deconstruct that bridge in time
for the Japanese rush hour. They did an astonishing job of it.

The reason that all of this was important was that these vehicles had been promised to the South
Vietnamese military as a part of their Vietnamizing the war and allowing us to get out of the war.
This was an agreement negotiated by Kissinger. It had a special code word. It was critical to the
political processes of a whole lot of countries, including our own.

Q: What year was this?

Schmitz: That was 1972, in the summer and fall.

So the US was under heavy pressure to solve this problem. Of course that translated right to the
Embassy. I had the job. We managed to transmit that pressure effectively to the Japanese. They
felt it and worked literally night and day, by themselves and with us, to get the thing done.

Q: During your period in Japan, both when you were negotiating on the Okinawa treaty and
while you were Pol/Mil Counselor, what Japanese leaders did you have a good close view of and
which ones did you consider were either particularly able or particularly unhelpful?

Schmitz: I think probably the Japanese Prime Minister, Nakasone was one...I am not sure that
I had a closer view of him than you could mostly get in the paper and by talking to people who
worked with him, which was what I did. A very strong personality, hawkish, a great supporter, of
course, of the US and security relationship. He was a powerful and effective man who like most
Japanese politicians of that ilk gave rise to suggestions that he was not entirely honest. It is very hard to be entirely honest and be Prime Minister of Japan, I think, under those circumstances. I certainly feel that he was among the most able of all the prominent Japanese politicians.

But the admiration that I have for the Japanese is not so much for the politicians, they are really less of a leader than our politicians are in the US, but for the Japanese career service and many of those wound up in the Foreign Ministry which is one of the two or three premium ministries in Japan. The best of their people they put on the front line to deal with the United States, because we were their biggest problem. Therefore, I had the wonderful job, both in the Okinawa experience and the political/military experience, of working with what surely was the cream of the crop of an entire generation of Japanese with any kind of public spirit.

Of them I would say that there were several that were among the very best public servants that I have ever seen. Particularly one named Matsuda who himself put together and pushed through, including in the Japanese Diet, the deal that made possible the resolution of this tank shipping problem.

Q: What about on the Okinawa side? Who sold it on the Japanese side?

SCHMITZ: Again the selling inside the Diet was done by these professional diplomats. They worked in a team. A lot of the work fell to their lawyers. They had three principal lawyers working on this while I was there. The two most active with whom I worked were Nakajima, who went on to become Japanese Ambassador to Malaysia and then China and is now on the Japanese Supreme Court, and a fellow who was then a youngish officer called Kuriyama, who now is Japanese Ambassador to the United States.

Q: You mentioned in the context of your time in Japan, the Vietnam war. Would you share with us your views on that whole time? What were your feelings and thoughts then and in retrospect?

SCHMITZ: I had not been in the military, and that was one of the reasons I felt I had a few years to come and give my time to the State Department, so I was looking at it as a civilian and a political analyst. I felt initially that what we were doing there was justified and congruent with US interests. As it became an obviously unwinnable war and we were beginning to use so much of our political integrity in doing it as well as our money, I thought it was imperative that we get out of there as quickly as we could with a shred of dignity. I therefore was supportive of most of what I could see being done when I was in the State Department and was a little more privy to our policies than I am now. I thought that most of our people were working quite hard, first of all to try to win the war and secondly, when we couldn't, to Vietnamize the war part of which we had in Japan and thirdly to terminate our involvement in it just as quickly as we possibly could. Of course, not everybody seemed to be participating in all of that and I thought it was a brutalizing thing for us. It was causing a lot of our people to show their worst sides in public and in private.

HOWARD MEYERS
Counselor for Political/Military Affairs  
Tokyo (1970-1972)

*Howard Meyers was born and raised in New York City. He attended the University of Michigan and then Harvard Law School, before joining the U.S. Army in 1942. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955, working mainly in the Arms Control area. He served in several posts in England, Japan, and Belgium, as well as in the U.S. Mr. Meyers was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 2000.*

Q: ...destined back for Japan many, many years after your previous time there?

MEYERS: Yes, a long time. It was a fascinating job, absolutely fascinating. It was a very difficult job because it was the mid-stage of Okinawa-reversion negotiations. We had, I would say, one of the most competent career officers managing the negotiations, this was Dick Snyder, in Tokyo. He had come directly from his assignment on the National Security Council dealing with the same issues, so there was certainly nobody who knew the issues better and who knew so many of the career Japanese officials. I never encountered an occasion on which we disagreed on substance, but we certainly disagreed on procedures, and how to get there. I put that to one side; I really think he was superbly competent for the job. We had innumerable difficult issues, ranging from the entry and the departure of nuclear powered submarines to naval visits to noise at Yākota, for example, the principal base, to what to do with the complaints raised about the Marines’ use of the artillery base further down in Honshu. There was hardly a day that we didn’t have some sort of minor crisis and it was just fascinating.

It was particularly fascinating to me and for my amazingly linguistically competent spouse, who I swear learned foreign languages by osmosis and who had the charm and graciousness that the Japanese have always found, even in our coming here in our very different tenure there more than 20 years previous, to be so attractive. She was, for example, the only foreign woman on the Board of the International Ladies Benevolent Association, a fascinating organization. The Board was composed, with the single exclusion of Hope, of the ancient Japanese Christian nobility - they were all Christian and mostly Catholic. I think my long Presbyterian background wife was just right to fit in. There was one result of this, we were always turning up at social occasions where nobody else but Ambassadors were invited and I assure you it had nothing to do with me. I was the third ranking career officer in the Embassy, but I had nothing to do with this kind of invitation, it was all due to Hope. It gave a very interesting view, which I got second hand, of the difficulties for the Japanese in establishing close feelings of responsibility or concern about lesser favored people, because though the Buddhists do a reasonable job locally, they do not have the same sense - and I am not saying this in a critical way, but a factual way - of ethical and moral responsibility that we Christians do. I shouldn’t say we Christians, Jews do, others do, who have a different tradition, but this group was exceptional because of this fact. I don’t know that all the ladies were Christians, but most were. I don’t know the percentages anymore, but certainly not more than 2-3% of Japanese are Christians.

I wish that I could relate some of the stories of my interactional role with the U.S. nuclear navy, but I can’t. I’m afraid I would get some of my navy friends in trouble, although Hyman Rickover is no longer there. It was very difficult to cope with this extraordinarily single-minded man who
would not accept in any way, the complexities of foreign relations when it involved his blessed nuclear navy. I got involved in a number of these issues typically because of allegations of nuclear radiation that weren’t true but that caused a lot of trouble. I found my U.S. navy friends to be extraordinarily helpful, to the extent they were able to do it, and if I may be very blunt about it to some extent going around Admiral Rickover. It was a very interesting exposure to what life was like in the nuclear navy. We got through all of these issues successfully except for one dreadful period, when for its own lack of examination naval headquarters in Washington, that is the CNO’s office, decided they wanted to save money on ship repair and decided that they would opt for essentially a commercial operation at Sasebo, instead of being able to use the only Japanese government facility that had always been a government facility in Yokosuka. All of the services: Air Force, Army, Navy, State, kept on saying this is crazy. I won’t go into all the details, but this was the issue because Sasebo was a commercial operation and even with special prerogatives, you had to force your way into line. Finally at the last moment, based in part, I guess, on this absolutely unified representation position, the Navy changed its mind.

At this time they had succeeded in doing something I never encountered in my two tours in Japan. They had united the Liberal Democratic Party, the Socialists, the Communists, the Chamber of Commerce, that is the Japanese version, the labor unions - every single business and political interest was united because they were ready to grapple and grab this gem that had only been an imperial navy base. I suddenly got a notice that a navy team would come out and hopefully reverse the Japanese position. So they came out and we met in my office, on a Sunday as usual, and I told them in the most direct terms - there was a commander who was their leader, an obviously first class technical person, and they have the technical personnel - “I’m going to introduce you and I am going to sit down. You got us into this mess and you’re going to get us out of this mess. I have a promise from the Foreign Office that they will help to the best they can.”

So we went through this procedure on Monday, the next day, and sitting across the table were the very senior representatives of the largest and most important Japanese industrial corporations, the ones that were involved in Sasebo. After I had introduced the navy commander and sat down, saying he would explain what U.S. views were, I listened to him and his view was that these organizations did not have adequate quality control to take care of U.S. navy ships in Sasebo and that it should be done, therefore, in Yokosuka. I managed to keep a straight face, but I want to tell you that one of my two Japanese opposite numbers actually dropped his jaw, but they were manful and they carried out their promise to me, and somehow, God knows what the Japanese government promised, but somehow or other we managed to get out of that particular trap. I have never forgotten that. I was ready to hoot with laughter when I heard what the Navy’s reason was. That was almost the highlight of my experience in Japan except for one.

I was there at the time of the actual formal transfer of administrative responsibility for Okinawa. Our representative was the great man, our then Vice President, and he did quite a good job. But the moment for me which was so transcendent, having landed there as a CIC agent five days after the surrender on the battleship “Missouri,” then to come back and be among the fortunate invited guests when the Prime Minister of Japan announced with tears running down his cheeks, this final recovery of Okinawa.
That was Esaku Sato. But I did not describe an interesting aspect of this ceremony, which was that our information agency had arranged with Washington so that the signing of the changes in the Treaty of Peace would be done simultaneously in Washington by President Nixon and in Tokyo by Prime Minister Sato and shown on a split screen side by side. That was very fascinating, perhaps more so to our friends in USIA than to ourselves. But it was also very interesting to me because of what had happened the preceding night.

A major aspect of political military relations between Japan and the United States is governed by a committee established under our Mutual Defense Treaty. I was a member of that committee. It was necessary to change various technical aspects of that agreement resulting from changes administratively and otherwise in Okinawa and, as I recall, in Japan proper. The Japanese government was very nervous about this, much more so than we. They wanted nothing to go wrong and also they were inclined to be very formal and correct on matters of this high state level. So it was arranged that the two sides of the committee would get together about half an hour or so before midnight, at the Foreign Minister’s guesthouse in Tokyo, and the signing ceremony would take place and we would raise a glass toasting each other and then depart gracefully and go home and go to bed. We Americans (there were only a few of us, and would fit in two cars), we gathered at the Embassy Chancery at about 11 PM. About 11:30 or so, we departed and as our cars departed from the Chancery, as the gates opened into what you could call the square that was immediately in front of it, this was in the heart of administrative downtown Tokyo, the streets leading into this area were suddenly blocked by squadrons of burly riot police, so that nobody could get in. As we turned and went up the major avenue, called Ripongi, as these two cars drove along, ahead of us on either side, platoons of these same riot police would appear blocking all entrance or exit and as we got up the block, they would then disappear, and this happened all the way up Ripongi, until we had to turn left in the direction of the Foreign Office Guest House, which by the way is on the same street, only a short distance from, the Soviet Embassy, but in this case, they blocked entrance from any egress or access to anybody for the entire time we were there for the signing ceremony and the formal toast of greeting to each other. I have never forgotten the efficiency which this was done. And that was a fitting approach to the next day’s ceremony. That was all I have to say.

DAVID G. BROWN
Political Officer
Tokyo (1970-1973)

David G. Brown was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1940. He graduated from Princeton University in 1964 entered the Foreign Service. His assignments include Taipei, Saigon, Yokohama, Tokyo, Vienna, Beijing, Oslo, and Hong Kong. Before retirement in 1996, he served as Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 28, 2003.

BROWN: I spent three more years in Japan from the summer of ’70 to the summer of ’73 in Tokyo. All the time in what was called the external unit of the Political Section and my principal beat was to follow Japanese policy in Asia. The biggest part of that was Japan's relationship with
Q: Yes, of course an interesting time, too. Before we get to that, how would you describe Japanese American relations in 1970?

BROWN: They were reasonably good. We had been through the period of demonstrations against the U.S. Japan security treaty. That was in the past. We were in the process of, I wasn't involved in this, but we were in the process of negotiating what we called the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and of course when that was accomplished in 1972 that was a hugely symbolic event representing America's respect for Japan and the fact that we were, you know, returning the territory to them. Relations were reasonably good. One bad aspect, that again I was not personally involved in, was the controversy over textile exports from Japan to the United States. Later, there were more serious problems caused by the so-called Nixon shocks. The first of those being over Kissinger's secret trip to China and the second one being the U.S. decision to go off the gold standard. Both of these steps were taken without prior consultation with a country that was deeply affected by the decision and a close ally to the United States.

Q: Was it you know, somebody trying to deal with the Japanese government. Was there kind of a I don't want to sound fictitious, a Japanese person you could talk to or if you wanted to deal with the Japanese government you found yourself sharing with a whole bunch of people. In other words you couldn't go up to the prime minister and say, look we're going to be recognizing China, but don't tell anyone?

BROWN: Well, first dealing with the Japanese government was quite favorable. Although I was a junior officer, my counterparts were officials with considerable influence on policy. The Foreign Ministry did control Japanese foreign policy. Within the Foreign Ministry, responsibility was delegated downward on most issues rather remarkably. An office director was tasked to come up with policy ideas and to lead a process of consultation within the Japanese government. His boss, the assistant secretary level person was then responsible for selling these policy ideas to the upper levels of the bureaucracy. The ministry's leadership worked hand in glove with the governing Liberal Democratic Party and would get the LDP's blessing, which was normally pro forma. The LDP controlled the Diet, so there wasn't any problem at that level. If we were able to work things out with the ministry at the level at which I was dealing, things went very smoothly. Now, needless to say when you run into a crisis in the relationship as we did when Kissinger's secret trip was revealed things got escalated way up the line and it was the ambassador who was dealing directly with the minister and political leadership....

Q: Now, you dealt with external relations. Before we move to the China one, what about, to me one of the great puzzlements remains with the Soviets and now the Russians, the hanging on to those little islands up to the north or not making some concession seem and the fact that we were just at the time of the reversion of Okinawa. I mean the contrast couldn't have been greater and where it seemed like the Soviets were in a continual case of shooting themselves in the foot with Japanese relations. It was extremely important for the Soviets.

BROWN: Well, one would have thought so. The Northern Territories were a thorn in the side of the Japanese-Soviet relationship. In recent years, they have tried to deal with it off and on in a
more compromising way, but even now nationalist sentiments block progress. But nothing was really happening on that issue in the '70s when I was there. It had been discussed in the mid-'50s trying to deal with this and trying to work out a compromise that involved two of the islands coming to the Japanese and the status of the other two being unresolved. However, that didn't work out then and issue was frozen the whole time I was there.

Q: It must have given a certain amount of pleasure in a way or at least made things easier for us wasn’t it to watch this? I mean if it meant that flank you didn't have to worry about.

BROWN: Yes.

Q: Well, then, how about again to the south, what about, did you get involved in the relationship over say Indonesia or the Philippines?

BROWN: Quite frankly, I can't remember any big issues there. We didn't really have much in terms of serious problems with the Japanese in terms of policy in Vietnam. We were in the process of trying to wind things down and the Japanese had no problem with that. That was not a big issue.

Q: What about with China? You know, prior to the Kissinger thing because Kissinger visit was when?

BROWN: It was in August of 1971.

Q: Yes. So, what was the state that we were observing of Japanese Chinese relations?

BROWN: Our policies were quite consistent with each other in the sense that neither of us had relations with Beijing and both governments were in the process of thinking about how to change that and modifying their policies in modest ways. Both governments were in sync in terms of supporting the Republic of China in the UN. The big difference was that the Japanese had a substantial economic relationship with China and the U.S. did not. We still had an embargo on trade with China, though U.S. had already been going through a process of small steps with China to signal that we were open to improving relations. Then the big break came when China invited the U.S. ping pong team.

Q: That was the famous ping pong diplomacy.

BROWN: Right. I didn't get involved in it personally because my boss here was also a China hand, Bill Cunningham and he jumped on that as soon as he heard that the news of the invitation. The ping pong team actually transited through Tokyo on the way to China. Bill helped facilitate that and went out to the airport and saw them.

Q: What was the Japanese economic relationship with China?

BROWN: It was not an aid relationship, but a purely commercial one, and it was done under the rubric of a trade agreement between a Japanese trading association rather than the government.
and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, a government front group handling Beijing's trade with the West. It was a pretty substantial relationship. For Japan, which was promoting itself as a trading nation, being able to sell everywhere was important. The U.S. didn't really have a problem with this Japanese trade because we too were moving away from a strict embargo on trade with China.

Q: Was there any disquiet in this period by say the Japanese hands of watching Japan, it was about this time Japan was really turning into an economic powerhouse, wasn't it?

BROWN: Yes. This was their period of fast growth and also a period in which the economists in Japan were making predictions to show when the Japanese per capita income was going to surpass the United States, when the Japanese economy was going to end up being bigger than the American economy. So, yes, the Japanese were on a roll.

Q: Was there any concern on our part, I mean, you know, people looking out from the embassy that you were hearing about?

BROWN: When I was there, no, subsequently we can talk when I got on the Japan desk.

Q: Textiles of course were, Nixon owed a lot of his election to factory states in the South, part of the southern strategy. Textiles in those days were a big deal there in the Carolinas and that sort of thing. I guess that, did that intrude on what you were doing?

BROWN: It didn't intrude on what I was doing, but it was being handled by other people in the embassy and I was knowledgeable about what was going on and about the extent to which it was creating friction in the relationship. Nixon had met Tanaka who was I think at that time the Minister of International Trade Industry and that they had had a discussion on limiting textile exports. Tanaka had said something that for Japanese meant that they would study it, but not do anything. Nixon interpreted he remark to mean that Tanaka had agreed to solve the problem for the United States. That was a misunderstanding that created real strains in the relationship.

Q: Were you in a way being a China hand?

BROWN: Yes, we followed Japanese ties with China closely. I was not an intelligence officer but I read all open source information about China in Japan and reported it. I was supposed to maintain contact with the Japanese China watchers who met Chinese coming through Japan. There were academics whose knowledge and opinions about China we reported. But the main work was maintaining very close coordination with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. We exchanged information on what they were doing on what our policy was, the steps we were taking. There were annual consultations between the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, the China desk at the State Department and the Ministry and between their policy planning staff and our policy planning staff. We were in bed with each other. That's what made the absence of prior consultation about Kissinger's visit to China in 1971 such a shock.

The Japanese government was under a certain amount of pressure to build upon the economic relationship and to begin to improve relations with China. Some European countries were
moving ahead to recognize China in the early 1970s. Out of deference to the U.S., the Japanese government was resisting the domestic pressures on it in order to stay in sync with the U.S. The State Department too was trying to keep our two countries on the same wave length. Then suddenly without a word of forewarning the U.S. takes a huge step to open up its relationship with Beijing. The government and the foreign ministry in particular felt that their confidence and support for the U.S. had been betrayed. There was a lot of bitterness in certain parts of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

Q: How did you personally at this time, how did you hear about the news and what instructions were you giving and how did you deal with the damn thing?

BROWN: Well, you read about it in the news. I can't remember whether we saw Nixon's announcement on TV or not. We saw it replayed. Now, as it turned out this had been very closely held and even Secretary of State Rogers hadn't been told that Kissinger was making this trip to China. We in the embassy were taken by surprise, but when we learned the extent to which other people were equally in the dark, we didn't feel quite so bad ourselves. However, we still had to deal with the Japanese. I can remember going over there and having an extremely prickly conversation with Hiroshi Hashimoto who was then the head of the Office of Chinese Affairs. He was an older man and had spent a good part of his post war life involved in China. As a young man had been a soldier in the Japanese army at the very end of the Second World War if my recollection is right, he was in the air force. His reaction was very nationalistic. Over drinks he said this was the end of Japan's trusting the U.S. The relationship with the United States was going to change and Japan would have to start making its own policy thinking about its national interest. That was not the typical reaction. The typical reaction was not nearly so nationalistic and pained as he was. Yet it had been his job to make sure that his government knew exactly what the United States was doing on the China policy and he felt he had been betrayed.

Q: How did you respond?

BROWN: There is no response. There isn't a good response, but we said that we've got to move on from this. The next order of business between us was the annual fight over Chinese representation in the United Nations. This was something on which the Japanese and American governments had collaborated to an extraordinary degree on a daily basis exchanging intelligence about what was going on every capital in the world, about the demarches that were being made, divvying up responsibility on who could do a better job in persuading various capitals to support our common cause.

Q: I know the Americans had sort of assumed the Japanese had expended tremendous what you might call political capital in these fights over who was going to represent China in the United Nations because this was, every little capital, like you say, Togo or something like that and all of a sudden I can't remember what we did, what did we do, fudge it or something for the next time around?

BROWN: Well, there was a general presumption that this traumatic change in U.S. dealings with China was going to radically undermine the efforts to sustain Taiwan's place in the U.N.
Nevertheless, the instructions that came out were to fight the good fight. The U.S. went to Taiwan and said the only way that there’s going to be a hope of winning would be to go for dual representation, that is an approach which would create the possibility for both Taipei and Beijing to have a seat, even if Beijing. Washington tried to persuade Taipei that if we could sell this it was certain that the Chinese would reject it and that Taipei in the end would remain in the U.N. However, Chiang Kai-shek but was very deeply committed to the idea that the Republic of China was the sole legal government of all China and he was not going to give on that. So, what resulted was that Taipei said it opposed dual recognition but would not object to the U.S., pursuing the idea at the U.N. So on that understanding, the Japanese and American governments again together tried to sell this. However, after Nixon's announcement, many governments were rethinking their China policies because of what the United States had done. In the end we lost the vote in the United Nations and the Republic of China walked out. Our representative to the UN at the time was George Bush and he got up and he said that it is a reasonable thing for China to be in the United Nations, but it's unfair the way this came about because the principal of universality is important. A founding member has now been thrown out which sets a horrible precedent. I'm sure Kissinger probably didn't care at all that that had happened.

Q: Prior to this in talking around with both your colleagues in the embassy, but also, and then it carried over to talking to the Japanese in informal conversations. You know, when I came into the Foreign Service it seemed to me to be perfectly reasonable that eventually we're going to have to recognize China. I mean this was not, to say the least.

BROWN: You've got to live with the reality.

Q: Yes and I think most of my colleagues did and in talking around this was not one of these things that it wasn't staying gee, communism is a good idea or anything like that, it was just you know, we've got other big countries and they're just going to have to come around. Were the Japanese talking this way, too or did you avoid the conversation?

BROWN: No, before Nixon's announcement, I often talked with Japanese colleagues informally about how both our counties should be moving together to open relations with China. After Kissinger trip had been announced and knowing that Nixon himself was going to China in the following year, a process of political change was unleashed in Japan and within a year and a half Tokyo had worked out its deals and recognized China and devised a formula for maintaining an unofficial relationship with Taiwan which has worked for the Japanese pretty well and which in fact the United States more or less copied when we took the step in 1978….

Q: How did you find sort of let's say before because that would have been when things were normal, before the opening to China, dealing with the foreign ministry?

BROWN: It was a very good relationship; personally we got a lot of information. We shared a lot of information. It was a close relationship and it still is.

Q: Did the Japanese have good information on China? I would imagine they would.

BROWN: They had all sorts of sources because of the economic relationship and people
traveling back and forth and conversations that would take place with Chinese leaders when one or another delegation went to Beijing. Did anyone have real access to the countryside and what was going on in China? No, but we were all trying to share the information that we had. They did their intelligence reports and gave copies to us. We got material from INR, not so much from the CIA because the station had its own relationship with the Cabinet Research Office. So, many analytical reports were being sent back and forth.

Q: Did you all have a feel for the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution at that time?

BROWN: I don't know. You certainly were aware of how it had disrupted China, but you didn't really understand then its full impact, as I recall.

Q: Did you know, one of the things I'm struck about people who got involved in that first opening to China. I was just talking yesterday with Winston Lord. I did a very long interview with him and the sort of the thrill of seeing Mao Zedong and all that, but I mean in a way it's almost although, nobody was really making note that this guy at least in my estimation was a real monster. The things he did to his country are just beyond belief. Was this at all coming out at this particular time you were dealing with it?

BROWN: We had the impression of him as a megalomaniac who was very far long in his years and was just losing it a little bit.

Q: A senior moment. How about Zhou? Was he considered the voice of rationality or something?

BROWN: That was certainly the impression we had. I can't recall any particular episodes from the period when I was there, 1970 to 1973, that involved Zhou in a big way. My memory's not as good as I'd like it to be….

Q: After the Nixon visit, well, I mean the Kissinger visit first, as far as dealing I mean your job was it mainly assuaging hurt feelings. I mean were there developments or were the Japanese in a way turned loose as far as China was concerned?

BROWN: Yes. They felt they freed to do what was in their best interests. They would keep us informed. My recollection is that I had to work harder to find things out and double check sources. It wasn't quite as open as it had been in the past. It was more a job of piecing information together to understand what was going on in the political process in Tokyo.

Q: Well, I imagine the Japanese press must have gone wild, not just against us, but the whole idea of okay, now we can really report on China and you know, I mean, in that particular relationship. Things must have been sort of fast and loose.

BROWN: My memory is failing me. I can't remember whether there was a big rush of Japanese reporters to go into China at the time. I can't remember which papers had those kinds of relationships whether that was changing or not. My recollection is that the Chinese were quite skillful at cultivating favorites amongst the Japanese press and freezing out those whose opinions they didn't like.
Q: Did you, for you did you feel that you had finally entered the world of real diplomacy and all?

BROWN: I certainly did. Except for the China issue, not a great deal was happening, but Japan was slowly moving towards what was a very important decision which was to ratify the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Another major issue that I had to follow was attitudes within Japan on nuclear weapons issues. What was the Japanese government doing in terms of eventually ratifying the NPT? What were political and public views on ratification?

Q: I would have felt that it would have been an absolute surety that they were going to say hell, we don’t like nuclear weapons for obvious reasons and whatever you want to do to stop it, we’ll sign it.

BROWN: Well, in the end, that is what they did, but the issue was debated at length. There were elements on the conservative side of the spectrum that complicated the process. Consultation had to take place; everyone had to be brought onboard. Japan had to watch what other countries were doing and who was ratifying. They didn't want to be way out ahead of the pack. They didn't want to be way behind the pack.

Q: But it’s interesting, you know, observing close hand Japanese diplomacy. One doesn't see the Japanese hand in a lot of those things. I mean when you think about you know, as we have today, you think about France for example, its fingerprints were all over everything, but what about Japan? Was there a style of diplomacy that you saw?

BROWN: At that point in time, Japan had not begun to think about having an independent diplomacy. They were still very much in the mode of being with the U.S. I think the shock on China was one of the things that began to prod them in the direction of saying well, you know, the war has been over for almost 30 years now. It's time for Japan to start having its own policies. The amazing thing is that we're now into the 21st Century and this sort of debate about whether Japan is going to have an independent policy from the United States still goes on. It's advanced and things have affected it over time, but it's been a very slow process in coming.

Q: Did you find the LDP had any particular cast as far as foreign affairs as opposed to I guess it would be the left wing?

BROWN: Yes. There was the Japanese Socialist Party, which was still opposed to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. They were in favor of moving rapidly ahead to recognize China, dumping Taiwan. They wanted to normalize relations with North Korea rapidly. That was part of the political scene, but the JSP was always a minority, and the real action was what was going on in the bureaucracy and within the LDP. Where's opinion within the LDP shifted at any given time? That's what you had to take into account.

Q: Well, say in the foreign ministry was the foreign ministry responsive to the mood of the LDP or did the foreign ministry kind of do its thing?

BROWN: The Foreign Ministry had a very strong sense, the ethic of the Japanese bureaucracy,
that they were the guardians of the national interest. The ministry knew what was happening internationally. It understood the sophistication and the complexities of international relations. Therefore, it was their job to make sure that Japan stays on the right course. That meant that the Foreign Ministry had to guide the LDP to do what's right for Japan. As I said, they didn't have to worry about the other parties because the LDP commanded a majority in the Diet. It was just a matter of infiltrating sensible ideas into the LDP. That was done a lot at these evening entertainment parties that went on endlessly and at various levels. The office directors, who were the people I was dealing with, would go off in the evening for dinners and drinking with junior LDP politicians and people in the business community who had interests in China policy. Policy was worked out behind the scene. If a Japanese bureaucrat was doing his job well he was able to come up with the ideas, to percolate them up through his own system. Then the system at the senior levels would do this quiet liaison with people in the LDP and the LDP itself was a very hierarchical and structured organization. It was a bottom up type of decision-making. It wasn't the LDP driving policy; it was the mid levels of the bureaucracy driving it.

Q: But you're saying an interesting thing that much of the Japanese bureaucratic system was giving power below at least, things could ferment up to the top. I mean it wasn't these were at the lower level, these weren't just faceless people putting stamps on things.

BROWN: Absolutely not. From the office director on up, they were trying to structure and manage policy internationally.

Q: What about the, was there a good corps of America hands?

BROWN: Oh, yes, very much so, and there still is.

Q: Do they know it? I mean were they where they coming from?

BROWN: Well, it was a career service. If you happened to be the cream of the crop, you got to go to the country that was most important to Japan, which was the United States. You would go as a junior officer and then you return to American Affairs two or three times during your career, working in Washington and in the Bureau of American Affairs in Tokyo. Very typically people in this track would end up as ambassadors to the U.S. and as vice ministers at home…

Q: Did you with the opening to China; were you conflicted about being a China hand, Japanese hand and all? I mean all of a sudden this is a new ball game.

BROWN: I thought it was a great advantage to know something about Japan. I was able to go back and work in Chinese affairs, but I wasn't a person who was only a China hand as some others were. I would say the quintessential archetype of the China hand was Dick Williams who was my last CG in Hong Kong. He had had five overseas assignments during his 30 plus years in the Foreign Service. Four of them to Hong Kong and one to Guangzhou. Those are the only places that he had served overseas. I mean he worked on other things back in Washington, but that wasn't the career track I was on. I was very happy being able to go from China to something else and then back to China and then do something else and so forth.
David I. Hitchcock, Jr. was born in 1928 in Massachusetts and raised in New Haven, Connecticut. His career with USIS included posts in Vietnam, Japan, and Israel. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on November 17, 1992.

HITCHCOCK: In 1970, I went back to Japan from the IAF office as Deputy PAO under Alan Carter. Alan had all kinds of interesting ideas he wanted to try out. I was the Japan hand. It was a pretty good combination since I had the language and the background on Japan, and he had some revolutionary ideas on how to organize USIS and how to focus its programs on the right audience with a combination of all the tools focused on one issue and one theme.

It doesn't sound very revolutionary now, that is what the Agency still attempts to do, but it was quite unusual to see it done as severely with so much discipline as it was in Japan at that time. He also organized the libraries into what were called "Infomat," with some super graphics done by Ray Komai, a Japanese-American USIS officer who had been involved in inventing the eye logo for CBS in his early days. Certainly in the early seventies, Japan was with it...was very much in the groove of U.S. popular culture. The super graphics, etc., that USIA put on all of its buildings in Japan were popular. It was eye catching, and many Japanese imitated it. The "Infomat" concept was essentially to get ourselves into the electronic age, to get information by electronic means, to focus the library schematically, color coded by area of interest -- to get all the books we had airshipped, to reduce the quantity -- to get the quantity down to about, I think it was to be, about 4,000 hot, fresh books, not in depth any longer. We gave away a lot of books and thus were able to pay for bringing Japan the information as fast as possible.

I know that some people will not agree with me, but I think if I had to name one individual in all of USIA who really made a difference in the way USIA operated, not only in one post but around the world, I would name Alan Carter. There was nobody who had as much influence among the career people in the Agency over the way we operated. He wasn't always an easy guy to work for, and our personalities were not particularly compatible, but that doesn't matter. The fact is that he really made a difference, and I think that his influence later on under Reinhardt continued to be, on the whole, a good influence.

Q: Of course I was looking at it from afar and hadn't much opportunity to observe it. But I know it was highly controversial. You, however, from what you say, felt it was very effective and worthwhile.

HITCHCOCK: It was. It needed moderation a little bit, and I tried to provide that to soften the corners -- to take into account Japanese culture more than Alan would have. On the whole, I think he respected that.

Q: At one point, he expressed the idea that he didn't want anybody with any experience in Japan
in the operation. He tried to weed out those who did.

HITCHCOCK: He certainly backed down on that. I think he respected the ability of those who had the language to communicate with the Japanese. I know he wished he had that ability himself.

After that, I came back to Washington and was assigned to the Senior Seminar first and then to the State Department in the CU job.

Q: You were in Japan for how long?

HITCHCOCK: Three years. So all together by that time I had had nine years in Japan.

I succeeded Frank Tenny in the CU job as area director for East Asia. At that point in CU, just for those who don't recall exactly what that meant, we had charge of all of the educational and cultural exchange programs, which later on, in 1978-79 were transferred to USIA. That included the Fulbright program, the IV program, and the AMPART program, which is now returned to being called U.S. Specialists. We also had the private sector programs, with some of the money for private sector programs with each of the area offices. One of the things that made that particularly fun was that I had some money to play with. I could contract with the Asian Society for a study of how Asia is treated in American high school textbooks, for instance. I had to have it approved and cleared here and there, but basically, I could do that kind of thing.

One of the accomplishments that I look back on in those days under John Richardson -- and Bill Hitchcock, who was the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, was the establishment of what we call the "Asian Studies Scholar in Residence" program. This simply brought Asian professors whose English was up to it to American university campuses to lecture on Asia. That program is still going. I don't think there is anything like it in any of the other areas.

Q: How long do the professors stay?

HITCHCOCK: A full academic year.

Q: This was somewhat akin to the Fulbright program.

HITCHCOCK: It, of course, used Fulbright money, but it was somewhat specialized. They had to be people who realized that they were coming here primarily to lecture. They obviously had some research of their own that they wanted to pursue, but they were here primarily as lecturers, not as researchers.

I think that program ought to be expanded around the world. I think area studies in the United States is still not where it should be. It could use more focus of that nature in Latin America and Eastern Europe in particular, where our campuses just don't have enough.

Q: Was the selection of these people from Japan made through the Fulbright Commission?
HITCHCOCK: Yes, usually they were. They were made with the Fulbright Commission's involvement, but the CAO played a major role.

I should have said that when I went back to Japan as Deputy PAO, I became chairman of the Fulbright Commission as well.

Q: That usually went to the PAO didn't it?

HITCHCOCK: Well, Alan did it for a while, and then shifted it to me. When I came back as PAO in 1981, I chaired it again. So I may be the only PAO who served in the same country as Fulbright chairman twice.

One of the areas that I spent a great deal of time on in CU...now I had started this as Deputy PAO in Tokyo...is in the area of American studies. I would like to talk about this for a minute because in your outline, you also sort of speak of areas where one actually may have accomplished something of a more permanent nature. What I had discovered in Japan, later on, was that the Fulbright program had for years simply been going on its merry way of strengthening the quality of young faculty, usually, to teach better in their own field -- literature, science, etc. But most of these faculty, junior faculty and doctoral candidates who came under the Fulbright program from various countries, including Japan, went back home benefitting themselves from the program immensely. Probably improving their teaching but did not to any degree start any new curriculum to deal with the United States.

So what you had was better trained foreign teachers, but teaching a small handful of undergraduates who were majoring in American literature and a few who were taking on the very few doctoral candidates; the vast sea of undergraduates in these Japanese universities and universities elsewhere never are exposed to the United States in any kind of general introductory fashion. What are our basic principles? What are the tenants of society in the United States? What is the role of religion? What is the role of individualism, where does this concept come from, and how is it carried out in the United States? In other words, not dealing so much with the chronology of American history as with the concepts, ideas, traditions, in a multi-disciplinary, introductory, two-semester course. This is what is still lacking all over the world.

Both as Deputy PAO and Fulbright chairman in the early seventies and as PAO in Israel in the late seventies and in Japan in the early eighties and then as area director in the late eighties and early nineties, I made this my number one priority -- to try to persuade university presidents, deans, faculty members to introduce such courses. And they should be taught in the local language, which meant that you had to have proper level text material. Most of the students would not take courses that already existed on American literature, or whatever, because they were too deep for them. These were kids who were majoring in economics or business management or marketing or whatever. If they were going to take a course outside of their field on the United States, it was going to have to be in their language and at their level. One had to understand that these kids had never had anything to do with the United States academically, except, perhaps, a scattering in world history or social studies in high school and whatever they picked up in other subjects.
We are making progress with this. I made this such a high priority that every PAO has it in his OER goals. Henry Catto endorsed this as a worldwide priority for USIA, giving responsibility to the E Bureau to launch pilot projects with universities in each part of the world. I think that if this works, it will be a legacy that probably overshadows everything else that I have done in these thirty-five years.

**Q:** In the selection of the Japanese professors to come over here, was there any particular major area of study that you looked for? Did their exposure here give them any concept of the American political process?

**HITCHCOCK:** Well, it gave them that. As far as selection was concerned for regular Fulbrighters, there were the usual panels. It was a very objective, a carefully and professionally done thing in which I played no direct role. What I did play a role in was to try to see that more resources were devoted to scholarships in the area of American studies. In most of the universities in Japan and elsewhere, I found some teachers teaching American literature, so what I was trying to do was to get them to focus on the areas that were being left out -- political science in particular, economics also. But I couldn't turn my back on American literature people because they were going to be the hard core. If this was going to work, it was going to be those teachers who made it work. What they ended up doing in a place like Kyushu University and Hokkaido University was to "team-teach" this course. The literature, political science and history teachers would get together and figure out what they ought to be covering in a year in such a course and then figure out who would teach what. Of course, there are many obstacles to this, it is not an easy idea.

**Q:** Universities are pretty rigid.

**HITCHCOCK:** The European system of education predominates still around the world, where the university is a very specialized place and you almost enter into your major field the day you enter the door, hardly ever to see any other field until you leave. So you are battling tradition here. The conception of inter-disciplinary study at the introductory level is not widespread, but there is a growing recognition that this kind of approach to studying other cultures is essential in an interdependent world. That was the argument that I would make. I would make this argument on a worldwide basis. I would say that this was not just American Studies that we were talking about. We were talking about Japanese Studies, Chinese Studies, German Studies. The major cultures that every young, bright kid in Japan, or the Philippines, or Singapore is going to run into, willy nilly, once he gets into his/her career. He/She ought to have some proper exposure to -- some sort of planned introduction to the ideas and societies of those countries that he/she is going to be working with before it is too late. So the argument was being made not that students should be doing it because we are the United States and we are important, but because the world is going in a direction that requires undergraduates to know at least something about some major cultures besides their own. Put that way, deans and presidents began to nod their heads and say, "You know, you are right. There is something to this, and we are looking at the whole question of core curriculum."

So I think this is taking hold. I think it is beginning to catch fire. Where it has been introduced, it has been immensely popular. It has been oversubscribed.
In Israel, I got into it. Believe it or not, Israel wasn't any better than Japan. The Federalist Papers had never been translated into Hebrew. No major solid American historical text, like Morrison and Commager, was in Hebrew. I took my own GOE money -- I was in Israel for four years -- and had Morrison, Commager, and Leutenberg translated in two volumes. It is still the core of several survey courses that have started now at Tel Aviv University, Ben Gurion University of the Negev and Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Also, I had Pritchet's little book on the American political system translated and finally did one on literary criticism of the United States. These became the mainstays of new survey courses taught in Hebrew for Israeli students. They were not taught in English by American Jews who had immigrated to Israel, which was what I found when I got there -- which were only for students whose English was good enough to take that course. So I think this is taking hold, and if I do any consulting for the Agency at all, and I don't know if I really have any desire to do that, it will be in this area.

Q: Just as a matter of curiosity, Doshisha University (in Japan) has quite a reputation for its American Studies program. Was this integrated in any way with what you were doing, or did they go off pretty much on their own?

HITCHCOCK: The famous Kyoto Seminar that was started with Ford Foundation money, and later on, had money from the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and elsewhere, brought professors of American studies to Kyoto in July for two weeks -- and young assistant professors and instructors as well -- from all over East Asia. From Korea, Taiwan and some from the Philippines, but mostly from Japan. It took place at Doshisha University in Kyoto, which is a large, private university started by Christians. Many of the people with whom I worked most closely in getting this thing to go outside of Kyoto were Doshisha professors, and, in fact, I would say Doshisha, along with Sophia and the International Christian University in Tokyo, were the three that have made the most progress in moving in the direction of generalized survey courses for students who are not majoring in anything to do with the United States but in something else and need this kind of course to round out their education.

Q: In my days in Japan, the International Christian University was in its infancy and had very little standing among Japanese universities. I gather from what I see now, particularly through the Japan-America Student Conference people coming here, that it has apparently attained quite a standing within the Japanese academic areas because every year there are three or four students from the International Christian University. Is it your opinion that they have advanced in stature substantially?

HITCHCOCK: I think so. I think what has happened is that the private universities like ICU, Sophia and Doshisha have shown more flexibility in updating their curriculum and modernizing their requirements than the national universities have. So students going into business, knowing that so much of Japan's business is overseas -- students who really have the familiarity, the grasp of language and foreign cultures, are the ones who are going to go places. So you can find ICU placing students in big companies like Sony every year. It has even gotten to the point now where the really good Japanese students are competing for jobs with American banks and firms in Tokyo as well. I think Tokyo University and the other former Imperial universities are still trying to catch up and are plagued by tradition and inflexibility. The Ministry of Education is
finally getting a little looser now.

Q: *But they remain the prestige universities in the country.*

HITCHCOCK: They do. They are certainly for government service -- Ministry of Finance and Foreign Ministry. Indeed, Tokyo University's first two-year campus has one of the strongest American studies program going. In fact, it now has the authority to have four year programs in American Studies, British, French, Chinese and Russian Studies at that campus, which is separate from the fuddy-duddy senior campus of the university. You can go there for four years now and get your BA right on that junior campus. Hiroshima University has gotten permission to do the same thing. So there is a change underway there. And, as I say, as Area Director, I have preached this cause from Australia to Korea. It is going to need vigorous leadership from Area Directors and PAOs to make it stick. But we have goodies for them. We can offer them Fulbright lecturers they might not otherwise get. We can offer them faculty development grants to retool a young instructor so that he can teach not only literature but the history of literature. We can make good presentations to those particular libraries. We can bring them here as International Visitors to see how we organize area studies -- not American studies, but Asian studies or Latin America Studies.

So this isn't such a revolutionary idea, what I have been advocating and Henry Catto has now endorsed. It is not so much providing new resources for America Studies, but marshaling the existing resources more effectively to see that these are all parts of the same thing. If you want to strengthen the teaching of the United States at the undergraduate level, the existing tools are there in USIA. We simply have to marshall them for that purpose. It is going to take, as I say, central direction. Catto assigned that to the Educational and Cultural Bureau, and its acting director, Barry Fulton, who is sold on the idea. We shall see what happens. Now, of course, we have a transfer of power, and I hope this doesn't get lost.

Q: *I hope it doesn't*. Catto has been particularly good at working on these kind of things and has brought the Agency back to the area where it ought to be operating. He has been very knowledgeable, largely because of his background. I am scared to death about a possible time when they get somebody coming in like Gelb again. If that happens, I don't know what will become of it.

HITCHCOCK: We will have to wait and see and keep our fingers crossed. I certainly plan to push this concept with the Agency if I see it is falling on hard times again because of lack of focus.

One other aspect of the work that I did in the State Department in the years of 1974-77, when I was directing the East Asian Office, deserves some focus because it is kind of an historical nugget in itself. I will try not to make it too detailed.

You, with your background in Japan, recall that after the war, the United States spent a great deal of money in Japan for food and all kinds of humanitarian assistance in the first five years. This was called "Government Assistance and Relief in Occupied Areas," with the acronym of GARIOA. The Japanese made it very clear that they would eventually repay this. They paid it all
back, I think it was $900 million over a number of years for this kind of assistance when they were on their backs. Reischauer, as Ambassador, decided that $25 million of this payment should be set aside to increase educational and cultural exchanges. He got permission to do that. There was an exchange of diplomatic notes indicating formal agreement.

_Q: How was that handled?_

HITCHCOCK: Well, this was what happened. It was U.S. money, so it was handled by the U.S. exclusively. But, unfortunately, John Rooney, who was then Chairman of the House subcommittee dealing with USIA and State, insisted that this Yen account, established in Japanese banks, would simply be drawn down to pay the existing Yen expenses of the Fulbright program! So there was no incremental increase whatsoever in the number of exchanges taking place. The Japanese were very bitter about this. They thought this was a betrayal of the agreement, and indeed it was. Ambassador Reischauer and those who followed him resented this, but there wasn't anything they could do about it.

By the time people began to focus on this in the early seventies, $12 million of the $25 million had already been spent in this fashion. There was a little over $12 million left. The State Department had thought long and hard how it could set up some kind of special fund with this $12 million now that Rooney was gone. Burton Fahs, who had come from the Rockefeller Foundation, had been Special Advisor to Reischauer in Tokyo and then PAO, had also come up with this idea. There was a fair amount of correspondence among a number of people concerning what to do with this money. Couldn't a special trust fund be set up?

Independent of this, Senator Jacob Javits of New York got interested in taking a similar kind of repayment by the Japanese to the United States and setting up a special trust fund for U.S.-Japan exchanges. The money he was looking at was the repayment by Japan to the United States for the consolidation of U.S. bases in Okinawa. This was at the time of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, 1972. Javits thought that the reversion of Okinawa was the symbolic end of the war and the beginning of a new era. We had moved barracks, offices and consolidated a lot of expensive business in order to give up land in Okinawa which we occupied. We occupied almost half of the island at some point, and it was now down to about a third. We paid for that initially, and the Japanese were paying us back for those expenses. The idea was to take a certain percentage of that and devote it to exchanges.

The State Department wanted nothing to do with that. They wanted to get the GARIOA funds set aside in some intelligent fashion. Javits didn't want to have anything to do with GARIOA. That was old stuff, war time relief. He wanted this to be a symbol with the Okinawa reversion. We were running into difficulties with the GARIOA project because the Bureau of the Budget, OMB, was opposed to trust funds. Congress, generally speaking, did not like trust funds either because they don't control the money as closely as they would like. So we were running into those problems.

The Administration had no position on the matter. It was the State Department on its own playing with the idea of doing something with the GARIOA funds.
HITCHCOCK: This was during the Nixon and Ford administrations. We were cooking on this from 1974-76. The people who were pushing hardest, of course, were the academic community in the U.S. It desperately wanted to get its hands on some of this money. I found I had allies in John Whitney Hall, professor of Japanese History at Yale, and in Robert Ward, professor of Asian Studies at Stanford. Both of them, Hall and Ward, had been consecutively the Chairman of the U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference, (CULCON) a bilateral meeting held every other year. I was the area director in CU, which was a sort of secretariat for the CULCON sessions. Of course, I came from New Haven and knew the Halls well, which helped.

Since I didn't have any authority, other than John Richardson's general blessing to try to move this forward, I used, and they were happy to be so employed, Bob Ward and Jack Hall, to make the calls on the Hill to try to persuade and come up with some kind of compromise with Javits.

The idea that we had was to combine the two, to take the $12 million GARFOA funds that were left and some of the Okinawa reversion money, which came to about the same amount, it was about $13-14 million, and combine them. Then we would have something that was substantial. We would set up a trust fund and a commission to oversee this.

Senator Javits, in the mean time, had introduced legislation to setup the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, with Okinawa reversion repayments only. It had been in the hopper for several sessions of Congress and had just sat there. There were no hearings. He had never discussed it with anybody in the House, which we thought was strange.

So we went to see Ohio Congressman Wayne Hayes, who, by that time, was the key power on the Hill for the State Department. Hayes made this clear. He said, "Over my dead body will there be any new commission. There are too many commissions now. We ought to get rid of half of them." So we, Jack Hall, Bob Ward and I, cogitated about this and came up with the idea: we didn't need a new commission, we already had one! We have a panel of twelve Americans, including four officials, ex officio, appointed by the Secretary of State to the U.S. panel of the CULCON (Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange) -- the Japanese have twelve, too. We would simply give these twelve Americans, who include two Assistant Secretaries of State (East Asia/Pacific and Educational and Cultural Affairs), the Director of USIA, the Assistant Secretary of Education, a second hat. They would all become "commissioners" for the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission!

Javits wouldn't buy it. It was not prestigious enough. Those people were not well enough known. So as a compromise, we would add two members of the House, one from each party, and two members of the Senate, one from each party, and the heads of the National Endowment of the Arts and Humanities -- all of them ex officio, and the Members of Congress ex officio and non-voting.

Both Javits and Hayes bought off on that. But we still had another problem. It was clear that OMB was going to fight this all the way down the line if it required a new trust fund. We wanted this money to be the principal, earning interest, Government securities if necessary, but definitely

Q: This was during the Reagan administration?
earning interest. The Javits-Hayes bill was passed by both Houses and went to the White House. I was trying to get support for this, to keep this moving, and tried to use the visit of the Emperor of Japan in 1976 as a vehicle, so that this could be announced while he was here. I got memoranda up through Kissinger, from Kissinger to the White House, to the President, thanks to Under Secretary of State Phil Habib, a good friend.

So the question was: "What was the White House going to do with this legislation?" We had made all the deals, all the compromises. We still had no Administration position. We had never been asked officially to give a position, fortunately, because we couldn't have said that we favored it, even though John Richardson had given me all kinds of authority to work with Ward and Hall to get it going.

It went to the White House, and as happened in those days, OMB sent it around to relevant agencies for comment within forty-eight hours. I got wind that Justice was going to recommend a veto. Fortunately, I had contacts at NSC who were trying to help us. What was the problem? Well, the problem was that Congress had adopted the House version and not the Senate version. The House version did not make it clear that the Members of Congress serving ex officio would not be serving in a voting capacity. According to the Constitution, members of Congress should not serve in any other capacity, and Justice was going to veto it! Of course, I was convinced that OMB had put Justice up to this because they wanted to bomb this thing anyway. We had forty-eight hours to get an explanation to the Attorney General from Congress that it was the intent of Congress that the Members of Congress serving on the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission would serve in ex officio, non-voting capacity.

Here is where I made a small contribution to history. I guess I was sort of a Paul Revere that weekend because I had served on the Hill for three years and knew both Senate and House Foreign Affairs staffers. At this point, Pat Holt was Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He had been the number three guy when I was there working for Senator H. Alexander Smith. It was a weekend, and Wayne Hayes had an old timer, whose name escapes me now, but I knew him, who was still working part time for him, and I got ahold of him. I drafted the letter I wanted from Senator Sparkman, who was then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Senate side, and Congressman Clement Zablocki, who was Chairman on the House side. Both the Congressman and Senator were out of town. Holt and the other fellow on the House side had to, in effect, sign the letters for them. I took these drafts around town in my car all weekend long. First I had to go to Pat Holt in Bethesda. He is a tall, lanky Texan. I explained what the problem was, and he said, "I can't believe that." He hauled down the Constitution from a shelf and found that it was right. So he agreed, he would help. So we got the letters in time. Then we just waited to see what was going to happen. Would OMB or Justice have any reason to oppose it?

We began to put some pressure on. We got people like Bob Ingersoll, who had been Deputy Secretary of State and Ambassador to Japan, and others to call the White House and put in a good word for this legislation. In the end, President Ford signed it. But, if we hadn't managed to get the Congressional intent letters that weekend, it would have died, at least for that time in history.
Just to finish this story, it is kind of nice, poetic justice that just before I retired from USIA, Henry Catto appointed me to the CULCON and the U.S.-Japan Friendship Commission, so now I am a member. So that is a nice story, I think.

ROBERT W. DUEMLING
Political Officer
Tokyo (1970-1974)

Ambassador Robert W. Duemling was born in Michigan in 1929 and grew up in Fort Wayne, Indiana. As a Foreign Service officer, Ambassador Duemling served in Italy, Malaysia, Japan, Canada, Nicaragua, the Sinai Peninsula, and was ambassador to Suriname. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on September 11, 1989.

Q: In 1970, you went back to Japan.

DUEMLING: Right. I decided that I could go back to Japan and still maintain my objectivity. By this time, of course, I was too old to become a Japanese Language Officer, but I insisted on learning some Japanese. I was assigned to a position that was not "language-designated" -- that is, it did not require a Japanese speaker. I was supposed to go to Tokyo in the Summer of 1970, but the incumbent of the job decided he wanted to extend for one more year. So the job did not open up in the summer, but it was the period of the Exposition in Osaka. I was given the liaison job between the American Consul General in Osaka and the American Pavilion. That was, again, a staff job. That occupied me from April to November, 1970. That was a lot of fun and very interesting. It got me back to Japan, and I started learning Japanese with a wonderful Japanese who was on the staff of Consulate General in Osaka. Because the job in Tokyo would not open until summer of 1971, I went to Japanese language school when my assignment in Osaka was ended. I had to persuade the system to let me go to the language school in Yokohama. I found myself a tiny little Japanese-style house in Kamakura, where the Daibutsu is. I spent seven months in intensive Japanese language training, which got me at least a certain amount of speaking ability. I didn't learn to read and write, but I did learn conversational Japanese, so I could get around, at least.

Then, in the summer of 1971, I went to Tokyo, where I headed the political-external section. The Political section in Tokyo was divided in two parts: one part focuses on domestic politics and the other on foreign affairs -- Japanese foreign policy all around the world. We have a very close relationship with the Japanese so that my job was essentially one of liaison with their Foreign Ministry. I had an assistant, and we covered all of the foreign policy areas in which Japan and the United States each took a strong interest, which was most of the world. It certainly included Asia, Europe, the Soviet Union and China; less so Latin America and Africa. We were constantly consulting the people in the Foreign Ministry to find out what the Japanese were thinking about in terms of their own foreign policy positions vis-a-vis these countries and then reporting back to Washington. One of most active things I did when I first took the job was to become involved in preparations for the fall session of the U.N. General Assembly, which, in 1971, was addressing
the issue of which government would represent China. There was a huge battle in the U.N. on this issue—Taiwan vs. Peking. The U.S. policy was to retain the Nationalist Government in the Security Council seat. We worked extremely hard to line up our allies and muster support to hold the line in support of the Nationalist Government. In the meanwhile, as we subsequently found out, Henry Kissinger was dealing privately with the government in Peking, and in fact, a couple of days before the final show-down at the U.N., it was revealed that Kissinger was in Peking. He was there on the day the vote took place at the U.N. The vote went against us by at least ten or more votes.

I had been deeply involved, meeting daily with the Japanese Foreign Office, because we coordinated very closely, and they were lobbying around the world, particularly in Asia, in support of the Nationalist Government as were we. Of course, Henry Kissinger just pulled the rug out from under this effort. That was the Nixon "Shokku."

**Q: How did this go over with your contacts in the Japanese Foreign Ministry?**

DUEMLING: The Japanese are very polite. I was embarrassed. I was flabbergasted. I was chagrined. The Japanese, very politely and very directly, said to me that Henry Kissinger had a double game going on. They didn't blame me because they recognized that I had been totally uninformed about the U.S. Government's two track approach. They said that my government had used me and had expected me to be as effective as possible to carry out one track of this policy. They kind of shrugged, but I did lose some credibility. But as Henry Kissinger has been quoted on more than one occasion: "Who cares if some civil servant is embarrassed?" He could care less. It is, of course, some kind of experience -- deeply unpleasant for a career diplomat because one's reliability and credibility is the major stock in trade. The manual on this subject by Harold Nicholson, the great British diplomatist, made it clear that above all else, ambassadors and diplomats at all levels have to be reliable and have to be recognized for their integrity and credibility. When you have an experience like the one I just described, it is detrimental to say the least to one's image of integrity and credibility. Fortunately, the Japanese realized that I was as much the victim of the situation as they were.

**Q: There was some of the same impact on the Foreign Service as a whole. After that event, it did not have quite the same faith in the President and the Secretary of State as before. Would their future directives be real, or once again, intentionally misdirected?**

DUEMLING: You may be right in pin-pointing that event as a changing force in attitudes. There have been some very significant attitudinal changes within the Foreign Service, certainly in the course of the thirty years I served in it. The trust in the leadership is one of them. Can one be sure that the policy being given to you by the leadership is really the one that they will follow? One must ask oneself: "Is this sensible? Should I lend myself to it?" Perhaps in some cases, there should be some holding back. That's unfortunate.

Of course, there are other things that effected that. For one, the politicalization of the Foreign Service. Increasingly, the Foreign Service Officer's view is that if he is to get promoted, he has to play politics -- both within and outside the Foreign Service. He has to find a mentor, a protector, a rabbi in the White House or in the NSC or somewhere who is going to advance his cause.
Increasingly, people see that assignments to highly desirable positions are administered not within the Department, but dictated from outside. That means you have to have your friends outside the Department.

Q: Were there any other periods during your career, besides the China events you have just described, during which there was a conflict between Japanese and American policy directions?

DUEMLING: During my time in Japan, there were some tensions over Japanese policy toward Iran. They were heavily dependent on Iranian oil at that time. They had to be very careful about how they treated the government of Iran. They were much less enamored with the Shah than we were. They were much more cautious about what might happen in Iran. The Japanese may have seen the coming demise of the Shah before we did. They positioned themselves to be a little less involved with the Shah. They may have been able to build some bridges to other Arab states.

That was equally true with respect to Israel. The Japanese have never been strong supporters of Israel. In part, that was because we are talking "real-politik" here. They are interested in the energy resources of the Middle East, and therefore, they have always been very anxious to maintain very good relations with Arab countries. They don't want to compromise those good relations by getting too cozy with the Israelis.

Q: You left Tokyo in 1974.

LESTER E. EDMOND
Minister Counselor for Economic and Commercial Affairs
Tokyo (1970-1974)

Lester E. Edmond attended the City College of New York and Harvard University. Edmond was in the US Army during WWII and worked in the State Department before entering the Foreign Service as a Rotation Officer and International Economist. His posts in the Foreign Service include Japan, Finland, Washington, DC, National War College, France, and the Philippines. Edmond was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2001.

EDMOND: In mid 1970 I returned to Japan for four years, serving as Minister Counselor for Economic and Commercial Affairs.

Q: Which meant that you were in charge of all of the parts of the mission concerned with economic commercial affairs, and you were the number-three ranking official in the embassy.

EDMOND: That’s correct. The Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs had overall responsibility for economic, commercial, agricultural, transportation and even science and technology. He had the support of an Economic Counselor directly supervising the Economic Section, a Commercial Counselor undertaking the same task for the Commercial Section, an Agricultural Attaché and staff from the Department of Agriculture as well as a Financial
Attaché’s Office, the representatives of which came from Treasury and a Science Attaché and deputy supplied by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Agricultural and Financial Attachés reported back directly to their departments as did the Science attaché but all coordinated their activities closely with the Minister who had overall supervisory responsibility.

Q: Let me ask you first, did you have Japanese language capability, and how did that affect you in terms of doing your job?

EDMOND: I did not have language capability, which, of course, would have been very helpful. Although several positions within the Economic Section were classified as language essential, the Minister’s position was not. I assume the view was held that to limit the candidates who would be eligible to fill that position to the relatively few Japanese qualified language officers would have been too restrictive. Becoming a qualified Japanese language officer required several years of full time training and the pool of language officers was quite small. Thus there were very few language officers who also had the necessary substantive background to fill the position of Economic Minister effectively. I took daily language lessons for about an hour a day before the start of the work day in order to achieve sufficient language fluency to permit me to cope with day to day affairs but certainly could not hold a serious conversation in Japanese,

Q: When you had those serious conversations or were negotiating or presenting US views, you would use an interpreter, or did you find that many of the senior officials that you dealt with in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and wherever else in the Japanese government were pretty good in English or combination?

EDMOND: The senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were concerned with American economic or political affairs were almost all virtually bilingual. They frequently had been sent to American or English universities by the Foreign Office to improve their language ability. The language facility of Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was not at all comparable to that of the Foreign Office, but the lack of Japanese speaking officers did not prove to be too great a handicap for effective communication. I hosted and attended many luncheons and dinners with academics and newspapermen and the widespread knowledge of English in those circles continued to impress me. I must hasten to say that this was not true among the general population, even among the well educated, English was widely studied but not so as to promote conversational ability.

There was a need to use interpreters when discussing issues with senior members of the Japanese business community. On those occasions I was fortunate to have as an interpreter, the senior Japanese national employee in the Economic and Commercial Section named Takemori. He had worked for the Embassy for many years and was highly respected in Japanese business circles. Takemori was a trusted advisor and directly supervised the Japanese staff members who were assigned to the economic and commercial sections. I had known him when he worked in a similar capacity for Phil Trezise during the latter’s tenure as Economic Minister, and I was fortunate to have been able to persuade him to postpone his retirement until I had concluded my tour.

Q: Who was the ambassador during this period from ’70 to ’74?
EDMOND: There were two. Armin Meyer who had arrived in 1969 had been appointed by
President Nixon. He was a Middle East expert, and this was his first assignment in East Asia. It
was a surprising appointment. Previous ambassadors to Japan had been experienced in Far
Eastern relations and had been well known personalities. Joseph Grew, a very senior American
diplomat had been appointed to Tokyo in 1931 and had remained until the beginning of World
War II. Ambassador Meyer’s immediate predecessors had been Douglas MacArthur II the
nephew of the General, who had been the Ambassador during my first tour in Japan. He had
been succeeded by Edwin Reischauer, perhaps the leading academic expert on Japan and East
Asia in general, who in turn had been followed by U. Alexis Johnson, perhaps our most senior
diplomat, and highly thought of East Asia hand, who at the time of the Meyer appointment was
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. As an aside, Phil Trezise was also a prominent
candidate for the position of ambassador. I was told that U. Alexis Johnson argued that Phil be
named Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs on the grounds that he was uniquely
qualified for that position, whereas the Tokyo slot could be more easily filled.

Armin Meyer was succeeded as Ambassador in April 1972 by Robert Ingersoll. Bob Ingersoll at
the time of his appointment was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Borg Warner. He was
close to the Nixon Administration and was also being considered as a replacement for David
Packard as Deputy Secretary of Defense.

It is interesting to note that both the Meyer and Ingersoll appointments were greeted with
disappointment in Tokyo and with some doubt as to their wisdom in the United States. The
Japanese apparently felt that the appointments indicated that the United States government was
considering Japan’s relations with the United States to be of secondary importance. Japanese
officials were accustomed to holding policy discussions with Ambassadors who were
knowledgeable about Japanese affairs and who therefore might display an understanding of
Japanese concerns. Criticism in the United State generally took the view that the Japan-US
relationship was too critical to leave to inexperienced hands who would learn on the job. For
example, Carl Rowan wrote in his syndicated column under the headline “New Envoy Leaves
Japan Cool,” that knowledgeable Asian hands “know that Japan is today a critically sensitive
post, and they argue fervently that if there is one post in the world that needs a well-trained
Japanese expert or Asia expert or someone with a special claim to rapport with the people, it is
Japan.” George Ball in an article entitled “We Are Playing a Dangerous Game with Japan” in the
New York Times magazine stated that “In less obvious ways, the Nixon Administration has also
signaled to the Japanese that their friendship is low on our list of priorities. Disregarding their
expressed desire that we send as Ambassador to Tokyo an experienced diplomat with whom they
could carry on a dialogue in depth, the President instead appointed Robert S. Ingersoll, a
businessman with no prior diplomatic experience. Suffice it to say that by the time he left that
post, the Japanese had come to have had a high regard for Bob Ingersoll, and regretted his
departure. Ingersoll’s performance was regarded so highly that he was named Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and within a few months Deputy Secretary.

Q: Well, Japan had probably changed a lot in the 10 years or so that you were away. Why don’t
you say a bit about impact that had on the work of the embassy and what were some of the main
issues, the problems, that you dealt with as Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs.
EDMOND: It might be argued that my second tour in Japan encompassed the most challenging post war period in US/Japan political and economic relations. Japan, itself, of course, had changed radically.

During my first tour, Japan was still recovering physically and economically from the devastation caused by the World War. We were acting as an elder brother assisting a younger sibling get back on its feet and prosper. I recall making speeches to Japanese industrial leaders in which I stressed the need for Japanese firms to promote quality control in their manufacture as they needed to overcome the perception that Japan only exported cheap and poorly made imitative products. Japan’s living standards had only recovered to the level of the 1930s and per capita income approximated $300 per annum. Japan’s Gross National Product approximated $30 billion. Japan was in a payments crisis and foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to a vanishing point. There was a half-billion dollar trade deficit with the world and a $700 million trade deficit with the United States. The U.S. Export-Import Bank was lending Japan $175 million to finance agricultural imports; the International Monetary Fund had approved a drawing of $125 million or 50% of Japan’s quota, and Japan had applied to the IBRD for assistance. The United States continued to maintain a very protective attitude. Japan was generally considered to be resource-poor and to have a vulnerable economy, highly dependent on the United States, and it suffered from widespread discrimination in other export markets.

In contrast by the time of my 1970-74 tour, Japan was regarded as a respected and feared competitor that was in the process of replacing the United States as the leading world model for achieving economic growth. Japan’s GNP had grown to almost $200 billion, the third highest in the world. It’s per capita GNP exceeded $2000, while exports attained a level of more than $13 billion, growing at a rate nearly twice as fast as total world trade. Japan had become a world leader in key industries such as electronics, shipbuilding, steel and automobiles, while the yen was regarded as one of the world’s strongest currencies.

Finally, there was the unprecedented fact that by 1969, the year prior to my arrival, Japan had achieved the largest payments surplus of any country in the world and the second highest trade surplus. Books were being written with titles such as “Japan as Number One” Terms such as “Japan Incorporated” were being bandied about, inferring that some sort of unholy alliance existed between the Japanese government and Japanese industry. Japanese industrial leaders were being credited with having long range policy orientation in contrast to American executives who were only mesmerized by short term profit considerations. Futurologists, such as Herman Kahn were making estimations as to when the Japanese gross domestic product would surpass those of the United States. All of these perceptions were colored by a feeling that somehow the Japanese were not playing fair and that they were taking advantage of an open US society.

The strains in US-Japanese relations were compounded by the existing protectionist measures that Japan continued to enforce and which we had tolerated and perhaps even encouraged when the Japanese economy was still fragile. The Japanese, on their part, regarded our new tough line as being unfair and demonstrated a lack of appreciation of what they still believed to be a weak economy. They seemed to be taken aback by their economic advances and strenuously argued that their economy required protection from outside forces due to Japan’s almost complete
dependence on imported raw materials.

Thus I returned to Japan during a period when both countries were displaying growing resentment toward one another. We were, as I have indicated, psychologically shocked by the rapid development of Japanese industry and our fears that Japan’s growing industrial might would overtake that of America. One could count nearly forty major Japanese corporations which ranked among the largest and most productive in the world. This new apprehension was perhaps most evident in our reaction to Japanese automotive exports to the United States and our growing concern that Japanese automobiles increasingly were being considered as technologically superior to those of the United States. This development was taking place in an industry that most Americans regarded as quintessentially American.

But of even greater popular and political concern was the growing trade imbalance between Japan and the United States. I think the trade deficit with Japan was somewhere in the neighborhood of $3,000,000,000 annually. There was little point in making the argument that a negative bilateral trade imbalance had little or no economic significance. Despite all the efforts of the leading world economists beginning with Adam Smith, mercantilist theory still dominated popular thinking and the almost unanimous view was that a negative trade imbalance was a sign of economic weakness and that drastic action was necessary in order to see it eradicated or at least sharply reduced. Resentment on both sides grew as our manufacturers increasingly complained about the difficulties they were facing in exporting to Japan, which they blamed, primarily if not exclusively, on Japanese policies and practices designed to thwart imports.

Developments in certain industries were particularly politically sensitive. I have already mentioned automobiles. Textiles were another which led to bitter disagreement between Japan and the United States. The textile industry is a politically powerful industry in the United States, particularly in the South. It employs large number of relatively unskilled workers, who would find it difficult to obtain alternative employment. A substantial block of Senators and Congressmen made up the so-called textile lobby and all administrations are appreciative of the political clout of the textile industry.

As we began pressing the Japanese on these issues they grew increasingly resentful over what they thought was an overbearing attitude on the part of the United States; of their belief that we were continuing to press them unwarrantedly to open up their economy, which they felt still was weak. They began to question the dependability of the United States as a steadfast friend and ally. This was the atmosphere that existed during the period of my assignment.

I have little doubt that the position of Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs in Embassy Tokyo probably was the most challenging, the most interesting, and I suspect the most demanding of the economic positions available at that time at any of our embassies. And I was excited to be there. Relations with Japan were soon to undergo even greater strain. This was caused by what has become known in Japan as the Nixon shocks.

The first Nixon shock was a surprise announcement issued by the White House on July 15, 1971. It was brief and simply stated that Henry Kissinger had held talks in Peking and that knowing of the President’s “expressed desire” to visit the People’s Republic, Premier Chou En-lai had
extended an invitation which the President had accepted. The purpose of the Peking meeting would be to “seek the normalization of relations between the two countries” and “to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides.” Although the question of Japan’s relations with China was a continuing burning political issue in Japan, the Japanese Government had largely followed the United States lead and had continued to recognize the Government in Taipei as representing the Government of China. The sensitivity of this issue in Japanese eyes might be appreciated by a comment that Ambassador Koichiro Asakai made during his stay in Washington in the 1960s where he served as Ambassador. It was widely reported that he stated that he had a recurring nightmare that one day he would awaken and read in the Washington Post that the United States had recognized Peking and was negotiating diplomatic relations. The Japanese Government and public felt, in view of the importance of the question to Japan and our close relationship, that the United States had treated Japan disrespectfully and shabbily. They believed we demonstrated little concern at what would be their obvious embarrassment at not receiving advance notification of our reversal of policy. We had broken our repeated pledges to consult and to coordinate our actions.

One month after that, almost to the day, on August 16, President Nixon announced “a new economic policy,” which suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold and called for the imposition of a ten per cent surcharge on all imports into the United States. The statement stated that continuing restrictions would be needed to correct the massive imbalance in trade between the United States and the rest of the world. Since the United States trade imbalance primarily resulted from our trade with Japan and since we had been discussing this issue with Japan almost continuously in an effort to find means to rectify it, the Japanese, not unreasonably, believed that the restrictive measures were largely directed at them. In an effort to minimize the anti US feeling that the new measures aroused, I engaged in a public relations campaign, which involved giving speeches before business and economic organizations throughout Japan, and holding dinners with reporters from Japan’s leading newspapers. I pointed out that the President’s action was not without precedent and that it was a procedure that had been followed by European countries I also noted that the Japanese Government had been told that the trade imbalance was continuing to grow dangerously, and that the Japanese continued to maintain unwarranted import barriers that hampered our efforts to rectify the situation My efforts were designed to secure an appreciation that the President’s action was needed, not merely to assist the United States, but was essential to protect the world’s trading and monetary structure which strongly benefitted Japan and where problems were reaching crisis proportions. I must say that the Japanese press reported these remarks fully and fairly.

The third shock was the completion of negotiations on a textile agreement between the United States and Japan in which the Japanese agreed to restrict the level of their synthetic textile exports to the United States. I can’t think of another issue that was as contentious as the question of Japanese textile exports to the United States. The issue was heavily overlaid with political considerations in both countries. In Japan, the textile industry leaders were strongly influential in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party. In the United States, the textile industry’s political influence in both parties is legendary. In the early 1960s President Kennedy’s administration, consistent with campaign promises, was successful in attaining an International Cotton Long term Agreement (LTA) which limited the importation of cotton textiles into the United States (as well as in other developed countries). By the mid-1960s manufacturing in the United States had
shifted heavily to synthetic textiles and pressure was rising for an LTA type arrangements for man-made fabrics and apparel.

It was commonly believed that the unusual attention that the Nixon Administration paid to the question of textile imports resulted from a campaign promise that the President made when he was a candidate. Although President Nixon was known to be a public advocate of liberal trading policies, during the campaign in an effort to enhance his southern support, he promised to restrain the importation of synthetic textiles. With another Presidential election on the horizon, Southern Republican Senators were raising the fear that in the next campaign the Democrats would charge that only they could be counted on to support the textile industry’s demands. Although the actual negotiations took place in Washington and occasionally through special emissaries sent by the Department of Commerce to Tokyo, I believe, that these negotiations absorbed more of the Embassy’s attention than did any other single issue with the possible exception of the Okinawa reversion negotiations.

The textile negotiation is an example of a negotiation that went badly. There were misunderstandings on both sides. It is difficult to believe now that an issue of such relatively unimportant substantive significance could arouse such resentment. Headline after headline were generated in Japanese papers where it was stated that the United States was exerting overweening economic pressure to demand unwarranted concessions from a small loyal ally. On the US side, the view was held that Japan did not understand the importance of this issue to the United States which already was suffering from discriminatory treatment of its exports to Japan and that Japan in at least one instance had reneged on promises that it had made. I believe that the entire trade in textiles between our two countries probably amounted to no more than $60,000,000 annually. I may be in error on that, but it certainly was a modest amount in context to our entire trading relationship.

We did not wish to impose import quotas, which would have been highly questionable legally and probably would have forced the United States to offer Japan other trade concessions so we asked the Japanese to use “self restraint,” and to develop “voluntary” restraints. The Japanese dug in their heels believing that it was unfair to require them to restrain their exports when, in their view, there was no economic justification for the demand and that the entire question arose only because of an internal political problem that Mr. Nixon himself had created or aggravated.

On one occasion Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans, visited Japan and demanded publicly that Japan deal with the issue promptly. The Japanese, always sensitive, believed that he treated them disrespectfully and not as an equal partner. This did nothing to move the negotiations forward as the Japanese dug in their heels, always sensitive to the view that they might not be being treated with the respect that they deserved. Another untoward development came when Prime Minister Sato visited the United States on a state visit and President Nixon raised the question of voluntary restraints with the Prime Minister. It is not clear what occurred. The Prime Minister may have promised more than he found he could deliver on his return to Tokyo. On the other hand there are those who believe, that the misunderstanding resulted from faulty translation; that the Prime Minister used the phrase “I will do my best,” and President Nixon took this as a commitment. In any event, we took it as a promise and concluded that Prime Minister Sato failed to keep his word.
This incident soured relations between the leaders of the two nations and fostered the belief that Japan could not be trusted.

I too, personally, had a diplomatic misadventure as a result of the textile negotiations. During my first year in this assignment, I had cultivated MITI Minister Miyazawa and had developed a good working relationship with him. During a conversation on other issues, he informed me of what appeared to be a significant offer that he was prepared to make in the textile negotiations. I promptly informed Washington. I was therefore shocked to receive a phone call from Minister Miyazawa within twenty four hours, in which he quite agitatedly informed me that I had misinformed Washington of his views and that I had placed him in a very embarrassing position. Upon investigation, I discovered what I believe had happened. The Commerce Department negotiators, excited about this apparent breakthrough, had informed their negotiating partner in the Japanese Embassy, that Miyazawa had informed Edmond of this new position. The Japanese negotiators, not being aware of this development, cabled Tokyo to determine the accuracy of the report. I believe Miyazawa, was just a little ahead of himself, and had not yet received Cabinet approval for his new offer. As I have already indicated, the textile question was an exceedingly sensitive issue in Japan. My relationship with Minister Miyazawa never fully recovered from that incident. He, however, left that position in a few months as a result of a Cabinet reshuffle.

Much of my time was spent attempting to promote United States exports to Japan which directly would benefit the affected American firms and farmers as well as alleviate the tensions that existed between our two countries as a result of the trade imbalance. These efforts were largely devoted to attempting to persuade the Japanese to remove import restrictions that appeared important to us as much for domestic as well as for economic considerations. At times, for example, Washington ordered us to press for the liberalization of Commodities where the likelihood of success was infinitesimal. Undoubtedly there were political pressures being placed on the Administration. One good example was the time and effort that the agricultural attaché and I spent in trying to persuade the Japanese to permit increased rice imports.

It was an oversimplification to believe that Japan’s restrictive rice import policy solely was due to the Liberal Democratic Party not wishing to antagonize its rural base of supporters, although that certainly was a highly significant consideration. But in addition, a deep rooted belief continued to exist within Japan that it remained a very vulnerable nation that could be blockaded or starved into submission due to its almost complete dependence on imported raw materials. Thus, Japan’s incredibly expensive rice support policy was supported by almost all spectrums of Japanese society, by urban as well as rural dwellers, because of the wide spread view that Japan should not depend on imports for this basic food source. I frequently was informed that Japan’s need to import almost all its raw material requirements was a source of weakness and that Japan therefore could not afford to import finished items that it could itself manufacture. It had to conserve its resources to import essential raw materials. I was told, for example, that Japan’s burgeoning steel industry which was almost entirely dependent on imported coal, iron ore and scrap was therefore inherently weaker than the United States industry. I could argue to no real avail that, in actuality, Japan’s steel industry benefited financially from its ability to import the required raw materials since it cost the American iron and steel firms more to transport coal by rail from Appalachia to the US mills than it cost the Japanese to ship the coal from Hampton
Roads Virginia by bulk carrier to Japan where it would be offloaded at the mill site.

With this background it becomes easier to appreciate the shock that occurred in Japan when the United States announced on June 28, 1973 that it was placing an export embargo on soybeans, which is an essential part of the Japanese diet. To us, soybeans are primarily an animal feed. At that time, the United States was the world’s largest grower of soybeans. In the previous year, the US placed price controls on beef in the expectation that these would reassure the US consumer and yet would not distort the market for the world market price for soybeans was falling and US agricultural experts anticipated that the lower cost of feeding the cattle would increase the available supply and lower the price of beef. Unfortunately, we misjudged the world’s demand for soybeans and soybean prices rose to three times the level of the previous year, and we introduced an export embargo. The US action fed exactly into the fear that I have described. The Japanese were astounded and shocked to see their strongest ally, the one country which we stated they could depend on, suddenly enforcing an embargo on a basic foodstuff. It actually developed that the Japanese did not suffer from the embargo as Japanese trading firms had anticipated and in fact may have partially caused the shortage and had contracted for a sufficient quantity of soybeans to carry Japan until the next harvest.

It was apparent to us at the Embassy that if the trade imbalance was going to be rectified emphasis should be placed on persuading Japan to liberalize the importation of products where the potential demand was substantial and not items such as rice, where even if we were successful, the beneficiaries would be low cost and nearby rice producers, such as Thailand and Burma. This meant focusing on high tech products, such as computers and integrated circuits. I have already mentioned the mystique that computers seemed to exert on the Europeans associated with the OECD. I saw this again when I discussed the issue of computer liberalization with MITI Minister Miyazawa. I had been attempting to persuade Minister Miyazawa to look sympathetically on my request to liberalize a number of commodities, when I mentioned the desirability of loosening import controls on computers. It was as if I had hit a sore tooth. This normally mild speaking man was leaning back in his chair when he suddenly sat upright, and as I recall, said “Mr. Edmond, let me tell you one thing. We will liberalize many things because I believe it is in Japan’s interest as well as that of the United States for us to do so. But don’t expect any liberalization in computers. Computers will be the brains of the world’s future leading economic powers. If Japan is not a leader in computer manufacture we will fall behind and never be more than a second rate power. If there is one item we will not liberalize it is computers.”

Q: Is it fair then to say that much of your activities there were basically trying to put out fires and control conflict and find a way forward?

EDMOND: Ray, it was that in large measure. In reviewing press clippings for this conversation, I was amazed at the number of speeches that I gave throughout Japan before economic groups, business organizations, and opinion makers at universities designed to assure Japan that we were a dependable friend; that our proposals would not harm their economy but actually would be beneficial to them as well as to us. I guess the phrase used today for that aspect of my duties would be the exercise of public diplomacy. I took advantage of the very impressive residence that went with the Economic Minister’s position to give dinners for small groups of opinion
makers such as the editors of Japan’s leading economic newspapers, the Nihon Keizai and the Sankei Shimbun.

A considerable portion of my time was spent attempting to persuade Japanese decision makers both privately and publicly to deal with issues such as capital and trade liberalization. These initiatives were individually not of earthshaking importance, but progress would largely take place only through a series of relatively minor actions that individually would not arouse serious domestic opposition within Japan. This at least would be true until the two governments were prepared to enter into major bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations. For example one of my initiatives was to persuade the Director General of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), the highest ranking civil servant in the Ministry, to agree to permit foreign firms establish wholly owned wholesale companies to enable them to distribute imported products and bypass the powerful Japanese trading companies. Now, this was deemed to be an accomplishment since one of the hurdles for foreign firms was to get their products accepted and distributed by the incredibly complex Japanese distribution system, which deliberately or inadvertently favored Japanese products. In actuality, not very much was accomplished by this development Although it enabled American firms to overcome one obstacle there were many other hurdles that thwarted American exporters.

R. BARRY FULTON
Special Projects Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1971-1973)

R. Barry Fulton was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He earned his B.A. and M.A. from Penn State and after graduating in 1962 served in the U.S. Air Force. In 1968 he entered the Foreign Service and during his career served in Pakistan, Japan, Italy and Belgium. Mr. Fulton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

FULTON: When I returned from my first posting in Pakistan, I returned to the States with an onward assignment as Assistant Information Officer in Rome. The tantalizing proposition from the PAO, Public Affairs Officer in Tokyo to go to Tokyo as the Special Projects officer in what was thought to be a new look for USIA. That I already had the new assignment in Rome was obviously an attractive proposition to hold onto. Who wouldn’t want to go to Rome? But the chance to try something somewhat different was appealing to me and after a few rounds of discussions with people in Personnel and people in the area office, those discussions concluded with the Area Director saying to me, “Well, you know, anyone who has any doubts about going to Rome I think won’t fit in there, you’d better go off to Tokyo.” And so I did.

Q: So you were in Tokyo from ’71 to…

FULTON: ’71 to ’73.

Q: ’73. And what was your job?
FULTON: Well I carried this title that was made up as far as I could tell for the occasion, Special Projects Officer. The special projects that were underway were to revamp a program that still had some of the cobwebs on it from the reading rooms that had been set up all across Japan just after the end of World War II. These were, important at the time, institutions and communities around Japan. But they were feeling by 1971 a little bit threadbare, they weren’t sufficiently supported to keep them modern, and whereas at the time Japan was full of modernity in a lot of ways, consumer electronics and the flash and dash, these were well worn institutions that no longer attracted young people. Our idea, or the PAO’s idea, Allen Carter, his idea was that these should be so attractive that young people would come to them and could find in them the latest literature and the latest films and the latest everything about the United States. I had the good fortune of being able to help articulate and put into practice that vision, along with a very very talented group of people who had largely been recruited by Allen Carter to do just that.

Q: Well now let’s talk a bit. In the first place, how did you see the situation vis-a-vis the United States in Japan in this 1971 to ’73 period?

FULTON: A couple things happened during that period that remind you of what we were winding down and what we continue to deal with vis-a-vis the Japanese. At the time I was there, there was a special negotiator assigned to the Embassy to negotiate the return of Okinawa to Japan. That happened during that period and put a mark of conclusion of U.S. occupation of Japanese territory. A second thing happened during that period, and that was a continuing friction between Japan and the United States on, of all things, trade issues. I recall one day when USIS had a call from one of the major newspapers, and the caller said, “We understand that the President has dispatched a special trade negotiator to Japan and that he is arriving here today. Is there any truth to this?” The person in question was to have been one Ambassador Kennedy, the then predecessor to the Special Trade Representatives office. We checked with our sources in the Embassy because we hadn’t heard of it, and we called and reported back and we said, “No, there’s nothing to that.” And several hours later the reporter called us back and said, “If you check at the New Otani Hotel I think you will find him in room so and so.” And in fact he had been dispatched and in fact the mission did not know about it, and in fact soon thereafter the Ambassador was recalled, the State Department lost confidence in the Ambassador.

Q: Who was he?

FULTON: Ambassador was Armin Meyer. The Department had lost confidence in him to deal with trade issues, because as today it is often that story that jumps out of the press at you for one reason or another.

Q: Well, let’s talk about what you were doing. In the first place, how did we see, what were the target groups that USIA was interested in reaching particularly in this ’71- ’73 period?

FULTON: We knew both from the polling data, and in a way it was obvious even without the data, that there was a generation who had lived through the war, who had lived through American occupation, who had seen, had come to understand that American occupation was both positive and largely benign, and who in one way or another knew Americans. There was a
younger generation coming along as there always is who did not experience that, who did not know America nearly as well, for good or for bad. We understood, we believed that it was in our interests to develop relations with that generation. We had good relations with the other generation, we had good relations with the press, we had good relations with the academic community, and those were people at the time who were beginning to retire and whose successors were less well-known to people at the Embassy. The Embassy being what it was in some ways reflected Japanese society. It was staffed with a lot of senior people, and therefore older people. One of the things USIA tried to do was bring in some younger people who could in fact relate better to this younger generation of Japanese. So that was the primary push that we’d set out to effect, hoping along the way that we would not also stop attending to the people who continued to be influential in the press and academic circles.

Q: In the ’71 to ’73 period, and we’re talking about youth in Japan, the young people in Japan, this was a time when, although one refers to it as the ’60s, the ’60s really moved way into the ’70s in the United States in youth movement and all that. Was there a comparable youth movement in Japan and alienated and all that?

FULTON: Well, far less so. I think the Japanese in style then and still frequently follow the West, the United States in particular. After a few days you begin to see and fear the echo of American culture in all ways, including its discontent. I used to say, a few months after I got to Japan, I thought I had it all figured out. By the time I left two years later I understood that I didn’t know very much. Because Japan on the surface and Japan underneath are very, very different. That country was not at the point where there was anything approaching the real discontent that American youth showed, although it had that appearance.

Q: Okay here you are. You’ve got the sort of dowdy reading centers or cultural centers around Japan which are pretty threadbare by this time. Here you are, the new boy on the block, and they say, “Okay Barry, this is yours.” What did you do? What would you do?

FULTON: I had that role of pulling together a lot of thoughtful people who knew a lot more about Japan than I did. We had a good number of people on the staff who had experience with Japan, and some people who had little Japanese experience but who had some visions for change. What we decided to do, and in this particular case, although I don’t think I’m known for my modesty, I would underscore the we, this was not a Barry Fulton enterprise. I was an organizer of a lot of thinking and a lot of talent. What we decided to do was to try to make our former reading rooms look like a contemporary bookstore. We wanted to have on the shelves, the week after they were reviewed, books that had just been published. We wanted the people in Japan who after all had sufficient resources to conduct their own deep research on anything, we wanted to say we are contemporary, we are your source of helping you interpret what’s going on in America, we have a view of what’s going on and we would like to influence your view by what we present to you in an attractive manner. We understood at the time that that meant we should, as the Japanese were doing, use the latest technology. Everybody would agree with that today. Not everybody agreed with that at the time, technology was not the buzzword as it is today. At that time Sony corporation was just developing home video recorders, Betamax recorders. We had the first consumer recorders in our libraries anywhere in the world, including anywhere in Japan. We talked to Sony and we got the first issued. We got the congressional
record and congressional committee prints on microfiche, and we had a complete collection of these. Now this isn’t something that appeals to young people but it does appeal to young researchers. We were using fax transmission to communicate between our branches at the time. Now it was another ten years before that was commonly used, although I have to say it had been used in Japan by others prior to that. We were, at the time, in Japan out on the leading edge of the use of technology, and we began in Japan to use computer-supported addressing and record keeping so that we could better target the people we were after, and then that was probably the first large-scale use of computers to do what is now routine.

Q: Everything we did really depended on our clientele to speak English. Pretty much.

FULTON: We did all of our programs with simultaneous interpretation. Japanese students universally read English, and they read English at a high level of proficiency. At the time very few of them spoke English, that’s changed somehow. If you go to Japan you find a lot of people who speak English. But at the time there were very few. We made a decision that one of our investments in technology had to be high quality interpreting equipment. That was a change, simply because funds weren’t available, the equipment wasn’t available. Many programs had been done prior to this change in English, because it’s easier and it’s cheaper. It’s very expensive to do good interpretation. We happened to have on our staff one of the better known interpreters in Japan, and he was born Japanese, raised in the Midwest United States, came back to Japan. He was the person who the Japanese, the TV network would have, would hire on contract to do the simultaneous interpretation for the space shots, for example. So he was really a nationally known figure. He was on our staff, and he set up a training school for young translators, so we could expand our translation ability and we got this good equipment, and everything was done simultaneously.

Q: Did you all try to tackle the American military nuclear question, which you know is a very touchy one?

FULTON: Oh, the biggest, probably after trade at the time the biggest issue between Japan and the United States. We’ve since all learned a good bit about that, or at least allegations of the press. Speaking for USIS at the time we had a company line that we used and that was always that we, on any ship’s visit, we fully observed and respected the agreement between Japan and the United States. The direct questions then were often, “Well, are there any nuclear weapons aboard this ship?” And the answer was, “We fully respect the accord between Japan and the United States.” We never discussed the presence of nuclear weapons. Now, the accord between Japan and the United States was such that one would therefore conclude that there were no nuclear weapons aboard that ship. Now, subsequent to that we understood there were side agreements, and I don’t know to this day any more than I knew at the time.

Q: Yes, it always was touchy, and I think sometimes the question rested on, were they in Japan if the ship was docked, I mean, you know, in a way it was fully understood by the people and authority on both sides what was going on. It just was not one thing, and probably rightly so. I mean otherwise it could spin out of control and you had peculiar manifestations that you had to offload on a ship outside the three-mile limit or something like that. Was USIA, your organization, tackling trade with Japan?
FULTON: Yes.

Q: How would you do that?

FULTON: Mainly with the press. Like any good USIS operation the time, resources were roughly divided between information and education/cultural work. The Japanese press is terribly important not only in Japan but outside of Japan. It’s frequently quoted. The Japanese are vociferous readers, there are six or eight major dailies in Japan and regional dailies from all the prefectures many times over. We had branch posts in six places outside of Tokyo. The branch PAOs were all tasked with keeping in regular contact with the regional papers and Tokyo itself, where all the national dailies, practically all the national dailies were headquartered, we had very active relations with them. Trade was right at the top of the agenda, but when we could bring through a specialist on trade issues, if we had anything to say about it that person did not get out of town without dealing with the press. As I said earlier that was almost always done with interpretation, when we had the chance then to explain our views. We had easy access to the press, I should say. It was not, this wasn’t shooting our way into the front door, the press were eager to hear from us. So it was a matter of a phone call and an easy meeting and was something that was easy to do if we had a position to represent it frequently got good attention. We initiated a magazine at the Embassy called Trends. Long since it was first started, Trends in fact has been privatized and sold to a private entrepreneur. I don’t know if it’s current, but when it started, trade was one of the major issues covered in this magazine, It was a glossy heavyweight magazine and targeted to influential people in Japan, and there was not an issue of it published, came out every other month, that did not have some trade-related story.

Q: For the embassy, dealing with political and economic affairs, how important was it to make good contacts away from Tokyo?

FULTON: I think you’d find a dispute on this question. Japanese political life and cultural life is highly centralized. Tokyo is to Japan as Paris is to France, it’s not decentralized. On the other hand, the population is dispersed widely across the islands, and we believed a lot of future leadership would come from outside of Tokyo and we believed it was important to have a reach outside of Tokyo. Hence we operated centers that had long been in existence in Osaka and Kyoto. We opened a center in Nagoya because it was a regional population center of some significant, and we continued centers in Fukuoka and Sapporo. At the same time we closed some smaller reading rooms were population size didn’t warrant the continuing expense.

Q: How about our troop presence there, was it becoming a problem more than it had been, say the generational change?

FULTON: No it wasn’t, with the exception of Okinawa, where the question of sovereignty was a major question and was resolved through the negotiations, there was not any major discontent about U.S. troops on Japanese soil. All things considered it was seen as positive. There was the occasional incident, but they were very infrequent.

Q: Did you use these posts, these reading rooms as sort of listening posts? Were things coming
from them, different regions back to the Embassy?

FULTON: Well, yes and no. Yes in theory, one of the things that we frequently argued is that the better contact we had with people and the regional centers the better we could be advising on policy. In practice that didn’t happen often. Busy people who run programs don’t frequently do reporting. I don’t know if that’s your experience in branch posts, but that’s usually the case. In practice State Department colleagues of ours who do reporting infrequently come to programs. Happened occasionally, not routinely. Should have.

Q: Armin Meyer left shortly after you arrived?

FULTON: Yes, it had been six months, he left, that was because of discontent within the White House or the Department with his role as concerns trade negotiations.

Q: He was replaced by Robert Stephen Ingersoll.

FULTON: Replaced by Robert Ingersoll who in particular had Kissinger’s confidence, and Ingersoll stayed in Japan for the best part of two years and then returned to Washington where he became Kissinger’s deputy in the State Department.

Q: How did you find relations between USIS and the State Department?

FULTON: In the time I was in Japan they were exceptionally good. It seems to me that that element which always contributes to good relations between the two has been whether there was this professional respect across the two. State Department had, as I think it frequently does in Japan a very, very strong contingent of officers and it happened the time that I was in Japan that USIS did as well. That appreciation that crossed that line was very, very strong. It couldn’t have been any better. Ingersoll came to town, he had not served in a mission before, although in his business life he had a bit of foreign experience. He had a very, very broad strategic view of what U.S.-Japan relations should become. He used all the resources of the mission and orchestrated that mission in a way that could be a model anytime.

Q: Well I assume the feeling on the part of you and your colleagues was that Japan was a major player in the situation, in our policy in that part of the world.

FULTON: Well, it was so perceived certainly at the mission, and I think it was perceived that way in the Department as well.

Q: Were you all trying to paint the Soviet Union, I mean make sure the Soviet Union was getting the bad press or not?

FULTON: No. The Japanese had their own view of the Soviet Union and it was in most regards complementary to ours. We didn’t spend any time on that.

Q: How about Vietnam?
FULTON: Ah. The irritation with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam escalated during that period in some ways reflecting what was going on domestically in the United States. I don’t think it ever reached the fever pitch that it did actually in the United States, but we saw the same discontent reflected, the question of whether we were there as an imperial power, the question of how long we would say, the question of whether commitments would be honored in terms of withdrawals. All of the issues that the United States confronted at home and around the world were present in Japan. We dealt with those as best we could. During that period we had a policy that was very much in transition and that was a difficult policy to explain, and we did our best.

Q: Was there a problem in Japan that you often have in a country that is dependant on the United States, we were their military power? You had China to the west and the Soviet Union to the east, it was not a friendly neighborhood. And yet as we see in other situations that you can get this sort of Ying and Yang, this mighty United States and we don’t have any control over their military or some of their policies and all, at the same time for God’s sakes don’t leave us alone here, I mean was this a problem? Were you seeing this deflate out in the Japanese body politic?

FULTON: Well, you have well-described the dilemma that the Japanese faced, and dilemmas don’t have solutions. On the one hand we were disruptive in the neighborhood by our presence in Vietnam, on the other hand we were essential to keeping peace in the neighborhood. The Japanese appreciated that, they appreciated the role we were in. One can imagine a Japan split between those two views, groups in the street opposed to U.S. policy. In fact there were some. It wasn’t as though half the population felt we should be there with our military presence and our economic might and half thought we should not be. Probably half of every Japanese felt on the one hand and on the other hand, this is, we were both destabilizing and stabilizing in certain ways. All things considered, our relation with the Japanese was highly positive.

Q: What about the Korean-Japanese relationship? I was wondering whether we were trying to say, “Why can’t you all learn to love each other again?”

FULTON: It wasn’t an issue for us and it’s clear that since that time the Korean-Japanese relationship has matured somewhat. But that came about through the efforts of the two sides, we were not party to that.

Q: Was Okinawa within your province?

FULTON: Well, we had a center on Okinawa when I arrived there, we had a USIS officer, and as I mentioned earlier we negotiated the return of Okinawa during that time. Had that not successfully happened that would have become a major irritant. It hadn’t reached that stage but it could have. As I said it was a question of sovereignty. There were very complex issues on Okinawa that the Japanese themselves then and still face: economic disparities, and the U.S. troop presence that continues. We negotiated at the time a settlement that all parties thought was just for the return of Okinawa to Japan.

Q: Did you find on mainland Japan, referring to the three major islands, much interest in the Okinawa thing, you know, with your reading rooms and all that?
FULTON: There was enormous interest in the national press. I didn’t sense that there was much interest outside of Tokyo in that question, apart from that generated by the National Press. But there was great interest in the press because it was a question of Japanese sovereignty.

Q: What about the national press? What you were getting? Although this was not your major area of responsibility, I mean you were still in the apparatus that was dealing with this, among other opinion makers. What was your impression of the Japanese press? Because it’s so big and seems to be a little hard to put a handle on.

FULTON: Well, the Japanese press was not then, I can’t speak for it today as I’ve not followed it closely, but I would suspect we have some of the same situation today; it was not a totally free press in the sense that we understand it here. One has to be careful with these definitions across cultures, because a Japanese journalist would take offense at what I’ve just said. But certainly there was a very close relation between reporters who covered various aspects of the Japanese government and those government ministries. If you were covering a certain ministry, you had privileged access to that ministry. I don’t want to suggest that doesn’t happen here on occasions, too. But we are talking about an access that is unusually close in Japan, and if you are a reporter covering that ministry and you do not cover it in a way that is thought to be fair, at the time you could be cut out of the news in a way that could not happen here. So one sees across the spectrum of the Japanese press a similar line and a line that certainly at that time was well orchestrated by the ministries.

Q: Who was running Japan at this time? Where did we feel Japan was being run?

FULTON: Help me out with that question, let’s go a little further.

Q: Well, I mean, in the sort of Foreign Affairs apparatus we always look for power centers. If you’re looking at the United States, you’d say who runs it, I mean it’s obviously the White House and the Foreign Affairs National Security Council with the President. The Department of State, Congress, Defense Department, conflicting things, so where did you feel, as far as, particularly American relations were concerned, who was calling the shots?

FULTON: You know, I’m tempted to give you some answers but I’m going to resist because I was not, when I arrived there and when I departed two years later, I was not a Japanese specialist. I was not a Japanese language officer. I had a particular role in trying to help restructure and recreate a new USIS operation. Probably two-thirds of the people I served with there were experts on the politics of power within Japan and could answer that question with much more validity than I can, so I’m not going to try that.

Q: I’ll accept that. By ’73 how did you feel, by the time you left how’d you feel the program of updating, modernizing, reattracting clientele was going?

FULTON: I was satisfied that we had accomplished what we set out to do. What we set out to do was to make the centers, and that is not only the books and periodicals that were there, but also the programs that took place in those centers with visiting American experts, to make those
attractive places that young Japanese would feel attracted to. Our attendance shot up, our book usage increased even though we had fewer volumes on the shelves. We weeded out a lot of things that never circulated and brought in newer things. Then attention of the national press increased to the centers. One of our designers who helped design the centers, an American who served in Japan for a couple of years, of American and Japanese ancestry, he was awarded by a Japanese design professional association their highest award for one of the years he was there for design of the centers. A Japanese encyclopedia, that is the equivalent in Japan of the Encyclopedia Britannica, used our centers to illustrate modern design. We got attention, which is what we were trying to do. We called, instead of calling them libraries we called them “infomats.” That would work in 1990 easily, in 1971, 1972, 1973, some of our critics said, “Well, that’s sort of a gimmicky title.” Well, it was kind of a gimmicky title. But we were looking for that gimmick to say this isn’t your traditional library, this is something new and you can come in here and look at videos and you can come in and listen to audios and you get the latest books and get the latest magazines. We’re not your father’s library. We’re your library. And that part of it worked.

Q: How about the school system? I’m thinking more about the grammar and high school gymnasium system. How was that, was that a prime target of you all?

FULTON: No it was not. Our target was at the college level, and I think you could make a good case that you should target people much younger. I think you could make that case intellectually. One finally is constrained by the budget, and so we did our targeting at the university.

Q: And also, it’s a different clientele. It’s noisier and the more high school kids, the less college kids you get.

FULTON: You’d have to do it very differently. Target worthy, we were targeting college kids and their professors.

Q: Did you get involved in exchange programs?

FULTON: Yes. Japan and the United States have one of the largest exchange programs. That program is a genuine bi-national program, in fact the Japanese contribute more to that program than the Americans do, and the Japanese have traditionally had a large number of exchange students come here. I don’t recall the number at the time, there are around 50,000 here now. The exact numbers would have been on the same scale at that time. Far fewer Americans going to Japan, and one of our interests over the years was getting more Americans to Japan. But the exchange program was a core part of the whole thing. It probably underwent less change than any part of the program, because it was working very well and still does.

ROBERT B. PETERSEN
Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Sapporo (1971-1973)
Mr. Petersen was born and raised in Ohio and educated at Oberlin College. He entered the USIA Foreign Service in 1965 and served as Public and Cultural Affairs Office in Embassies or Consulates in Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, Mauritius, Israel, Morocco and Cote d’Ivoire. He also served in several senior USIA positions in Washington, DC. Mr. Peterson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

PETERSEN: I loved Sapporo.

Q: You were there from when to when?

PETERSEN: From early ’71 until mid-’73. I left in July of ’73. I was there during the Winter Olympics of ’72.

Q: Sapporo was the major city of Hokkaido.

PETERSEN: Yes. It was over a million population. It was a huge city. It was that part of Japan that had been an area of competition between imperial Russia and imperial Japan for centuries. It was not until the 19th century that Hokkaido became an integral part of Japan. It was absorbed into Japan under the Meiji era when they had all the samurai who had to be resettled during a great transformation in Japan. A number of people were induced to go up to the snowy, cold north in Hokkaido and settle that area. Before I was assigned to Sapporo, I had spent part of a week as a tourist in Kyoto and found it fascinating, but once I had lived in Sapporo for a brief time, I went down to Kyoto and I remember thinking, “Gosh, I am so lucky to be in Sapporo” because I found it fresh and open and exciting. Everything was in the future in Sapporo and in Kyoto, there was this tremendous cultural, historical legacy among the people of Kyoto and elsewhere in Japan as well. I just found Sapporo to be open and forward leaning, looking to the future. I liked it immensely. I had never in my life seen a ski slope before I went there, but once I found out I was going to Sapporo, I told myself, “I’m going to love being a skier.” I went out and bought ski boots before I went to Japan. As soon as I got there, I bought a set of skis and started learning to ski the week I was there. Skiing was an important part of my time there, one of my enjoyable recreational activities.

Q: You were in Japan during an interesting time. You had the Nixon shokus and all that. How different was the work you were doing and the reception to the work you were doing in Hokkaido?

PETERSEN: Night and day. In a certain sense, going into the branch post in Sapporo was going into the traditional work of the U.S. Information Agency, if you would consider USIA’s efforts in Vietnam as somewhat of an aberration for the Agency. The emphasis on PSYOP, working with the police and the military and with the department of prisons and so forth that I did in Malaysia and the kind of work I had been doing in Vietnam, yes, it used the concepts and the tools, the resources, of USIA, but in Sapporo, the structure was different. When I arrived in Sapporo, I was already nearly six years into my USIA career. I have to acknowledge that I had a very poor understanding of USIA at that time, how it functioned, the bureaucracy, the roles of different positions and so forth. JUSPAO in Vietnam was a one-off structure. My work in East
Malaysia, I kind of designed the organization and had a great deal of latitude to do so. In Sapporo, I was running a branch post that mirrored the other five branch posts in Japan. The same personnel structure, except the one in Tokyo was first among equals. It was bigger and more important. But the other five were all basically the same branch PAO, same number of staff, identical collections. The themes we programmed were identical. The PAO, Allen Carter, made a major point of saying, “There is only one foreign policy and the days of the branch PAOs programming according to what they felt were the appropriate themes for their area are gone. We’re all speaking from the same textbook, all singing from the same sheet of music.” I had some bureaucratic structure added to my life that had been lacking up until then.

But once again, I was further from the USIS headquarters than any of the other branch posts. I enjoyed that immensely. I worked with two different consuls in Sapporo. The first one, Martin Heflin, was there just a brief time. He left and Sunao Sakamato took over, became the consul.

Q: Sunao has a fascinating history. He was a Marine. He was my deputy in Seoul.

PETERSEN: He went from Sapporo to London.

Q: He came to Seoul later.

PETERSEN: He was delightful to work with. While I was there, the major concern was Japan. You asked about the Nixon shocks and trying to add useful background to those issues was quite a challenge. Melvin Laird became the new Secretary of Defense. I remember using a lot of things he said to try to urge Japan to assume a greater role, share more of the burden for defense in East Asia. One of the challenges was trying to help the Japanese understand more clearly how it was that some of their exports could indeed harm the United States. The Japanese would talk about being the younger brother and the American being the older brother and America being very powerful and Japan being very weak. There was that popular image, but things such as textile exports were indeed creating havoc in part of our economy. I remember efforts through USIS in meeting with journalists, educators, others, to publicize the fact that, well, you’ve got to understand where textiles are located in the U.S., where that industry is located, and the fact that through a seniority system in our parliament in the U.S., the people from that area exert a lot of control on our government. You’ve got to be more sensitive to your export policies and more aware. One of the popular examples was just talking to a member of the executive branch of the United States isn’t sufficient for the Japanese government. It should be also communicating with our Congress to understand us. So, through our IV (International Visitors’) programs and our speakers programs and so forth, we were trying to increase this understanding of how we worked and how our two economies and two political systems could interact.

We also had the issue in Sapporo of the effort where we were trying to open up a little bit toward the Soviet Union in the period of detente. Our place there involved very carefully orchestrated meetings between the Soviet consulate and ours. We would go to their place. They would come to ours. I remember the first meeting in our consulate. I think there were three of us Americans there, the three Americans in the consulate. The soviets were sitting there rather stiffly. And we went to their place and sat rather stiffly. It seemed like we did this once a month; maybe it was less often. We exchanged views. Our two governments were trying to understand each other
better. So, we would talk about Japan, about our interests and so forth. One of the things that impressed me immensely in dealing with the Soviets was the wealth of resources they poured into training for their diplomats. They would tell us about the preparation they had for their assignments to Japan and it made us envious of how much they got. We talked. A big high point was, they expressed interest in the cultural center that we operated. I discussed this ahead of time with our consul. We were ready for this, but they were absolutely shocked and delighted when I invited them over and said, “Come on in and we’ll show you around.” I specifically invited the one man who said he had cultural interests, but the whole team came over. In any event, I was very pleased to show them our center and let them see what we did and all the holdings we had. That was one aspect of the work, dealing with them.

But I was there to work in support of our country plan on Japan. We had a very active program in Sapporo. When I was assigned to Japan, we had nine branch posts, nine cultural centers. Allen Carter, the new PAO, reduced the nine to six and make the six of them identical, gave them all up-to-date resources, revamped them so that much of my first year was involved in the reconstruction of our center and retraining the staff. The center itself was active. Lots of speakers. A lot of outreach. I worked a great deal with Hokkaido University. One of my big projects – and it was supported by Dave Hitchcock, the deputy PAO in Tokyo – Dave took a particular interest in that and really pushed hard – was to have an interdisciplinary American studies program take root at Hokkaido University. The mantra for us was, we don’t care if someone’s studying law or medicine or history or literature or chemistry, but in the course of that student’s stay at the university, that student should have the opportunity for at least one course about the United States --American history, literature, foreign policy. We worked very hard at that, bringing in people who could substitute and teach for Japanese professors who would take a sabbatical to go to the U.S. We provided other support to the university as well in terms of resources. But that was taking root when I left. That was something I took a real interest in. I felt that was a major long-term accomplishment for the program.

Q: Did you have to go into high gear in Sapporo when the first Nixon shock, the opening to China, came? How did that hit your area? How did you all respond?

PETERSEN: Definitely. I don’t remember the details of where I was when I learned about it. But yes, there was a flurry of activity. We were out meeting with people, getting our talking points, and then rushing off to meet with journalists primarily. That was the immediate concern, the media portrayal of this. There wasn’t a crushing need to speak to government officials in Hokkaido, since that was being done at the ministerial level in Tokyo. But the media, the Hokkaido Times, the Hokkaido Shimbun and so forth. I went rushing over there as quickly as my legs could carry me to give them the latest material explaining the background of this. There was a sense on the part of the Japanese that we had peremptorily done something when we should have to properly reflect our relationship with them, we should have been consulting them about the impact this would have on Japan. There was great concern. Alleviating that, we were in high gear.

Q: Going back to the Soviet thing, the fact that the Soviets were hanging on to those northern islands was probably the greatest boon to our policy with Japan for 50 years.
PETERSEN: It was interesting. In Sapporo, when I’d be in a movie theater, before every film would begin, there would be on the screen an outline of the northern territories. There would be a banner statement “The northern territories must be returned.” Some – enough that it made quite an impression on me – Japanese I would meet in Hokkaido, if I turned over their business card, on the back would be the statement “The northern territories must be returned” and an outline of the islands. Go down to Tokyo, and people would shrug. It wasn’t an issue that moved them. I even had a Japanese tell me down in Tokyo, “You know, it’s kind of embarrassing the way the people in Hokkaido carry on about the northern territories because it interferes with some of our foreign policy initiatives.” One of the messages I would carry down to Tokyo to the country team was, it may be artificial in the way it’s engineered, before a film is shown in the cinema, having that appear on the screen, or putting it on a business card, but artificial or not, it was a first-line issue up in Hokkaido.

Q: Was this something that you could kind of drop, a card you could always play, say, “We support you fully on that?”

PETERSEN: We also held Okinawa. While I was in Sapporo, Okinawa reverted to Japan. I don’t want to say we were crass. We were subtle. We didn’t have to be out shouting about it. People could draw their conclusion. We were astute enough to let the issue speak for itself. That doesn’t mean we didn’t put out a lot of information about the reversion, because we did.

Q: This had been in the cards for a long time. It was taking a long time and we weren’t negotiating with the Japanese on this. We were negotiating with the United States Marines.

PETERSEN: And still are.

Q: And still are.

How did the Olympics go?

PETERSEN: The Winter Olympics of ’72 went off like clockwork, beautifully planned. I had an interesting involvement there. I arrived and began working in Sapporo a little less than a year before the Olympics. In that year, 1971, I remember participating in some public panel discussions. I think one time it was in the big meeting hall of either the Hokkaido Shimbun or the Hokkaido Times. It was a panel discussion about how could Sapporo best prepare for the influx of all the foreigners. There I was, talking along with a few other people about what the city should do, reminding them that taxi drivers are vital, that that often is the only contact somebody has. The Japanese preparation was very well done, very sophisticated. I wouldn’t begin to suggest that I actually contributed anything to that. They left no stone unturned and that was indicative of the efforts.

Q: Did we have any problem with star American athletes acting a little bit prima donna-ish or anything like that?

PETERSEN: I don’t remember that.
Q: I'm not thinking of any incidents, but it's always a problem. This is true of any country.

PETERSEN: I don’t remember that. I remember Avery Brundage, an American, head of the International Olympic Committee. There was the opening ceremony in an outdoor stadium. But then there was some other kind of opening at an indoor venue a couple days prior to that at which Avery Brundage spoke. It was relatively small, maybe 1,000 people or so. Maybe it was the opening of the meeting of the International Olympic Committee. I remember Brundage getting up and I could only describe him as irascible. He talked about how the person who founded the modern Olympics at the turn of the century would be turning over in his grave at what had become of the Olympic movement and especially the Winter Olympic movement, which has all these pseudo sports and all this advertising effort put into it. Brundage was a purist and was very critical of the idea of having a Winter Olympics and certainly of the effort to advertise in connection with it. As far as American participation, I remember the American hockey team because I met the guys on the team, but I don’t remember how they did. I don’t recall any great exploits by American athletes. There may have been some. But I do remember a Frenchman, Jean-Claude Killy, who was the hero, the great downhill skier. He cut a swath. Then for Japan, a fellow named Kasaya, who won a gold medal in the ski jump, the 70 meter. I was there and watched that. I later had the honor of presenting him the Helms trophy that is given to the outstanding amateur athlete of the year. I remember we arranged a presentation at USIS. It was covered on TV. I remember a cousin of mine in the U.S. told me he saw me on TV making that presentation later. I guess it had widespread coverage. But a lot of Japanese were just delighted with that. It was thrilling. The Emperor saw it. It was exciting.

Q: What was your impression of the Japanese media, their provincial media?

PETERSEN: Energetic. I was illiterate. I could piece out what an article in the newspaper might be about and get it right occasionally, but I couldn’t actually read the article. I could recognize perhaps enough of the characters in an article to kind of figure out what it was about, not much beyond that. So, in terms of what was in the newspaper, I relied on secondary sources. My impression is mainly of the journalists that I got to know. They were very energetic, very… I want to say opinionated, but that’s unfair. It’s just that they did have decided views on things. Very critical of the government. I don’t want to use the word “cynical,” even though it’s the word that comes to mind. In a sense, they remind me a lot of journalists I’ve met in a lot of countries, particularly wire service people and others, American journalists abroad. Very skeptical about what they heard and learned. Always looking for the real story behind the story. They would keep me on my toes.

One of the things we did, because we were still immersed deeply in Vietnam, was set up a monthly off-the-record meeting at the center and invite journalists in to talk only Vietnam. I’d bring people up from the embassy in Tokyo to talk. I would speak, drawing on my own experience and following events there closely. I remember, I would always say at the beginning of these sessions, “This is off the record and our purpose is to share information so that you will draw your own conclusions. Your conclusions are your conclusions. We’re not trying to tell you what to conclude, but we want you to form your opinions on as accurate information as possible.” We would answer questions that we could answer and present information that they might not otherwise be aware of. Most other sessions were on the record. The Japanese wanted
to know about our opinion of their going in to try to exploit Siberian resources. Would we be supportive? Would we interfere? That was an issue. What would the U.S. view be of Japan really making an effort to develop mineral resources in eastern Russia?

Q: I can think of nothing that would cause a more difficult response than getting something from the government. This is usually going to be an ad hoc thing when it happens anyway. To come up with a considered, quick response from USIS would be very difficult.

PETERSEN: I remember being very impressed by the econ officer who was head of the economic section from the embassy. His answer was, “We’ve got this very close and special relationship between us, but Japan has to make certain decisions that are in Japan’s interest and we understand what Japan has to do.” That was a summary of maybe a 15-minute long answer he gave. I was very impressed by that. The man did a very good job.

THOMAS P. SHOESMITH
Deputy Chief of Mission
Tokyo (1971-1976)

Thomas P. Shoesmith was born in 1922 and raised in Pennsylvania. His career in the State Department included service in Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and an ambassadorship to Malaysia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: And then you went as Deputy Chief of Mission to Tokyo, where you served for almost five years. That's a long time. How did you get the job?

SHOESMITH: Marshall Green asked me to take it. There was a new Ambassador, Robert Ingersoll. Although he had had a certain amount of experience in Japan through his business connections, senior Department officers obviously felt that they needed somebody in the DCM slot, a professional who knew the Department and knew how an Embassy ought to run and had some experience in Japan. I don't know why Marshall Green asked me to do the job, except that we had worked together in Korea when he was DCM in Korea and I was in the Political Section. We were friends. I was succeeding Dick Sneider. Dick was a very effective operator in the bureaucratic structure and very knowledgeable about the Northeast Asian area. He was very effective in his dealings with the Japanese Government, particularly on the question of Okinawan reversion and the prospective home porting of an aircraft carrier, which was one of the issues that was up at that time.

So I accepted. I mean, you don't turn down positions like that. I accepted the assignment with some trepidation because I'd never had a management job as large as that. I remember Ambassador Brown, who was the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary at that time, said to me, "This is being the Chief Executive Officer of a large corporation, and that's what your job is going to be out there." And most Foreign Service Officers -- I suspect even today -- when they get into positions like that, have very little management experience.
Q: Could you provide some idea of what this management job involved? I mean, the Embassy in Tokyo is obviously a major Embassy. What were some of the management areas and problems you had to deal with?

SHOESMITH: Well, I think that the largest problem is simply one of defining the priorities of the Embassy, what we ought to be trying to do within the broad framework of the policies that are outlined in Washington -- our relations with the host government. When you have as large an Embassy as that, with so many different parts, and including the attached agencies, you need to make sure, as best you can, that they are all at least aware of what each other is doing and that they're all more or less working on the same track. Then there's the problem with all of these people that you've got -- I think that the American contingent, including the attached agencies, was something over 250, maybe 300 people. You need to try to create within the Embassy the best climate for them to do their job, to give them a sense that you regard what they're doing as important and that you are concerned to see that they get what they need to do their job, insofar as possible. More generally, you need to keep up a congenial, collegiate atmosphere within the Embassy through one device or another, whether through staff meetings, meeting individually with these people, and so on. I think that those are the general parameters within which I worked as...

Q: Did you have any problems with any of the other governmental agencies, in the sense of "free wheeling" or striking out on their own?

SHOESMITH: Not particularly. There would occasionally be times when you had that, but no particular incident comes to mind right now. Of course, there must have been such times. However, I found that most people, and particularly most of the heads of the attached agencies, were anxious for me to know what they were doing. They wanted to be part of the Country Team. I took the concept of the Country Team very seriously. I think that most people -- if they were persuaded that you took them seriously -- were quite ready to work as part of a team, rather than as independent operators. It worked that way, as far as I could see. There was also the problem in Tokyo that when you have Consulates, as we have in Hokkaido, Osaka and Fukuoka, you need to keep them truly a part of the operation. However, that took less time.

Q: Well, your first Ambassador was Robert Ingersoll. What was his background, and how did he work?

SHOESMITH: He's a businessman from Chicago. He had a family business which, among other things, used to manufacture automobile transmissions. They had good business contacts in Japan to buy transmissions for automobiles and maybe for a lot of other things. He had a businessman's background and relationship with Japan. He was a first class person and very quickly was able to attract the admiration and respect of everybody in the Embassy. He made very, very good use of his staff, across the board. His contacts, where it was most natural and easiest for him, were in the Japanese business community. He did a lot of work in that community. He was always available if we felt that he ought to meet with a political leader, or journalist, or whatever. He was always very effective in such meetings.
Q: How were relations with the Japanese Government? They were just going through the aftermath of the trauma of the opening to China and all that. The Japanese had not been informed and felt very unhappy about this.

SHOESMITH: Well, they certainly did feel unhappy about it. While you would encounter constant reminders of the "Nixon shock," I don't think that really posed a serious problem in the relationship, although it probably underscored the view of many Japanese then, and perhaps even now, that we did not give them full, what would you call it, partnership status. They believed that we were prepared to do things affecting their interests without consulting them properly, and particularly not consulting them in advance. That was true then, and it's true now. The economic relationship in the early 1970s was beginning to become quite troublesome, particularly with the surge in Japanese exports, including television sets, textiles and other items. And we were beginning to run a deficit in our trade at that time. It was negligible, compared to now. Maybe $4 or $5 billion annually. However, we were very much concerned about that. There was the continuing problem of the base presence and Vietnam, even though we were standing down in Vietnam in the early 1970's. There was still considerable, public opposition to our continued presence in Vietnam and to our base structure in Japan. One of the principal efforts of the Embassy was to try to accommodate to some of those pressures by consolidating bases. For that purpose, we needed support from the Japanese Government. We spent a lot of time on those subjects.

Q: How did you find the American military? I mean, did they try to dig in their heels as much as possible?

SHOESMITH: Well, yes. I suppose that is to be expected. However, there was very good leadership from the top. General Persley, a very sophisticated man, was the commander of U.S. Forces-Japan for most of the time I was there. General Snowden, a marvelous Marine Corps officer, was his deputy. They were people of very, very broad scope. While we did encounter problems with individual base commanders, we had lots of support in trying, for example, in the context of developing a consolidation plan -- to close down some of the bases and consolidate them in various places, thereby reducing our exposure, to some extent. I had very good support from them. As we moved in the mid 1970s to try to -- what would be the word -- to try to put more of the base structure under the Japan-U.S. security arrangement that would give the Japanese a better sense of cooperation with the Headquarters of U.S. Forces-Japan. Together with us, the two commanders were able to work very closely and very effectively with civilians, particularly Japanese civilians in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had the lead much of the time.

Q: How did you find the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

SHOESMITH: Well, increasingly sophisticated. We were able to work very effectively with them. They were well informed, they were very effective, working within their own ministry. As you know, perhaps to a greater degree than is true within the Department of State, much of the actual policy formulation comes from below in Japan. It moves up the chain to the Minister and the Vice Minister. So these were important people to deal with. And we worked very well with them on all the base problems. I can't speak so much for the economic side of things because I
was not as directly involved in those matters as I was with base issues.

Q: Well, what about the issue that kept -- and keeps -- coming up: nuclear weapons on board American ships?

SHOESMITH: Oh, that was a very sensitive issue.

Q: Never to confirm or deny.

SHOESMITH: Never to confirm or deny.

Q: But anybody knows that if you have a large aircraft carrier coming in...

SHOESMITH: Again, the Japanese Government relied on a statement that was worked out, I think, in the 1960s some time, I think it was when U. Alexis Johnson was Ambassador. The statement said, in effect, that under the terms of the security treaty arrangement, if the United States wished to undertake -- I've forgotten the exact wording -- any major change in the disposition of its forces, this would have to be in consultation with and in agreement with the Japanese Government. And the Japanese Government explained that that would cover such things as the positioning of nuclear weapons in Japan or even the transit of nuclear weapons in Japan. And since they had never had any such approach from the U.S. Government, they assumed that this was not taking place. And that was it.

Q: In other words, that didn't quiet the critics. Obviously, we're not talking about anything classified. To anybody knowledgeable, it was pretty obvious that we couldn't denuke an aircraft carrier...

SHOESMITH: Couldn't off-load the nuclear weapons, no.

Q: But if you didn't say things specifically, then there was an agreed upon ambiguity.

SHOESMITH: I think that puts it very well. There was an agreed upon ambiguity, which proved to be sustainable. That is to say, the Japanese Government never felt so pressed by critics of its policy that it felt it had to clarify the ambiguity, as, for example, was the case in the Philippines. Under their new Philippine constitution, I think that this matter is explicitly dealt with. There shall not be positioning of nuclear weapons in the Philippines. Or as, for example, happened in New Zealand, where, under -- I've forgotten his name -- the Prime Minister (David Lange) insisted that we either confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on our ships before they came in. The Japanese Government never felt under pressure to that extent. So this agreed upon ambiguity, as you put it -- I think quite rightly -- proved sustainable. It did not answer all the criticism, but it was there.

Now, there have been times when some people have felt, on the American side, that this is a dodge that allows the Japanese Government -- if, for example, something should ever come to the surface that was irrefutable -- to place all of the responsibility on us for having violated the so-called agreements. At one point, Ambassador Reischauer got quite upset about this. He
wanted to make it clear what had happened. He wasn't very keen about leaving it ambiguous. However, it has worked. So far as I know, it is not now an issue.

\textbf{Q:} Well, James Hodgson came up with a labor background.

\textbf{SHOESMITH:} I think he had been Secretary of Labor. I've forgotten under which administration. At the time he was nominated as Ambassador to Japan, he was, I believe, a Vice President, a senior executive in Lockheed for labor relations. This must have been some time, like, 1973 or early 1974 -- somewhere in there. His confirmation was held up for nine months by Senator Symington, I believe it was. There was competition in Japan for aircraft sales -- military aircraft sales -- between Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas. I think McDonnell-Douglas is in Missouri. And Senator Symington felt that having an ex-Lockheed man there -- I guess this is what he felt, this is what I heard -- would give Lockheed an advantage. So he sat on this as a matter of personal privilege for nine months. But finally, Ambassador Hodgson was cleared.

\textbf{Q:} Well, what were his strengths and weaknesses?

\textbf{SHOESMITH:} Again, his most natural area of contact was in the business world. He was a good administrator. He probably took a more active role in the management of the Embassy than Ambassador Ingersoll had done. However, like Ingersoll, he relied very much on the staff.

\textbf{Q:} What about the evolving relationship with the People's Republic of China? Did you spend much time trying to explain where we were going?

\textbf{SHOESMITH:} No, I did not. If it came up, it must have been a peripheral issue, but I can't remember talking about it at any time at all. You know, in Japan, the focus on the relationship with the U.S. is overwhelming. And almost nothing else comes up. I can't recall the correct chronology. I believe, yes, the Japanese did move ahead of us in reestablishing relations with China. I believe that's the case. Prime Minister Tanaka visited China. This must have been in the mid-1970s, whereas we didn't normalize relations until 1979. The Japanese kept us very well informed on what they were doing.

We have a series of annual policy planning discussions with the Japanese, with the participation of people from the Bureau (of East Asian Affairs) and from the Policy Planning Staff in the Department. Also participating are people from the Department of Defense and maybe some of the other agencies and their counterparts at the assistant secretary level or below. In that context, questions of where we were going on China policy and where Japan was going on China policy were discussed. For example, draft papers on the recognition issue were prepared for these meetings during the late 1960s and early 1970s. At a typical meeting of this kind -- which covered two and a half days -- there was a general review of matters concerning the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, and so on. At that level, a good exchange took place, even though only once a year. However, they had established contacts that could be drawn upon subsequently in the intervals between the meetings by people coming to Washington and meeting with the people that they had met on the Policy Planning Staff. Also, under the Security Treaty, there were two levels: an assistant secretary level for security consultations and then the annual meetings at the top, participated in by ambassadors, CINCPAC, and so on. And there you would have similar
discussions going on. These meetings were not limited solely to the security treaty relationship but would deal with the context of the relationship, the strategic context of the relationship. As a result, you would again have discussions about our policy in such areas as China and the Soviet Union. As a result, on an ongoing basis, there was a good deal of exchange on policy matters between Japan and the United States. What did happen, of course, was that sometimes when we would reach a decision, we did not always inform the Japanese.

Q: Was that a real problem, since it was almost impossible to inform the top level of the Japanese Government without all of this getting out?

SHOESMITH: Yes, there was. There certainly was. That was true. That was a concern frequently expressed on the American side. However, I always felt that it was somewhat a case of the pot calling the kettle black because Washington is a great place for leaks. I don't think that Tokyo was any worse than Washington, if as bad.

Q: How did you feel that Henry Kissinger, who was the dominant person during almost all of the time that you were there, related to the Japanese? You always think of him as focusing on China and on the Soviet Union and lots of things involving the Middle East. But I never get a feel for him on Japan.

SHOESMITH: Well, he himself, after he left office as Secretary of State, has acknowledged on a number of occasions that he really never quite understood Japan and never felt very comfortable in dealing with it. At least, not in the early stages.

I mean, in the latter part of his time as Secretary of State, he may have understood them better, but he did not. He simply did not understand Japan, and he, I think, had a suspicion that Japan was holding something back because how could you be, by the 1970s, a burgeoning economic power and not be willing to assume responsibilities as he would like to have them do? As, for example, in the Mid East crisis of -- I've forgotten which 7-day war this was, maybe...

Q: 1973 was the October War, the Yom Kippur War.

SHOESMITH: As I recall it, Mr. Kissinger went to the Middle East and got some sort of agreement between the Arabs and Israelis at least to enter into some sort of discussions. He didn't want to prejudice these discussions, he didn't want countries lining up on one side or the other. The Arabs, of course, had instituted a boycott...

Q: Of oil.

SHOESMITH: And the Japanese were terribly concerned about their position, their access to Middle East oil. After he had been in the Middle East, he went to China, and then he came to Japan. And he met with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. In those meetings, he was very anxious that Japan not take any step which would seem to place them on the side of the Arabs in the conflict. The Japanese concern was that they couldn't go out too far because, look, they are dependent on Middle Eastern oil, and if they are denied that access, the consequences at home will be quite serious. I remember one remark that Kissinger made, I think to the Foreign
Minister, that, well, it wouldn't be the first time in history when a country made a decision on the basis of short-term advantage at the sacrifice of longer term interest. I think that he was just very impatient with the Japanese. Of course, they were not nearly as successful as, I presume, Zhou En-lai was in explaining their views. Also, I think that Kissinger's own words speak eloquently of the problem he had. He says, "I did not understand them." I think that that was very apparent. And he used to get terribly upset when the Japanese press would criticize him, as they did very frequently. All sorts of bells would ring in the Department whenever that happened. Then bells would ring in Tokyo. Of course, we couldn't do anything about it. We didn't take it all that seriously.

Q: Well, what about the problem of Vietnam? You were there at that time. Was this a difficult period for us because so much of our policy was based on the idea that in time of trouble, the United States will be there. And here we were, pulling out of it.

SHOESMITH: Well, the one thing I do recall very clearly was that in academic and intellectual circles in Japan, there was a good deal of speculation as to what our defeat, as they saw it, our withdrawal from Vietnam meant for U.S. policy in East Asia. Was the U.S. going to continue to maintain an active, an important presence, in East Asia? Or were we going to be sort of withdrawing from the Western Pacific? There was a lot of speculation like that. What would the strategic implications of this be if the United States actually did that? I mean that, apparently, there must have been a sufficient measure of ambiguity in our own public statements to keep this sort of speculation alive. And by the period 1976-77, there was a good deal of this, and we used to be concerned about that in the Embassy and tried to do what we could to provide assurance that we were not withdrawing from the Western Pacific. So that, I think, was certainly one consequence of our withdrawal from Vietnam that I do recall which we had to deal with.

The other side must have been a certain amount of relief on the part of the Japanese that we were no longer engaged in a war in which they had absolutely no confidence. They felt that it was the wrong place for us to be in, that it was draining away resources that we could better devote to other purposes and that it was damaging our position, not only in Japan, but throughout the region. So there must have been some sense of relief about that. However, I don't remember that. What I remember is this concern that this might mark a major shift in U.S. policy with respect to East Asia. In point of fact, those concerns continued into the 1980s.

Q: Yes, while I was in Korea -- I went there in 1976, and, obviously, this was a major concern in Korea. The more so because they were really on the front line.

SHOESMITH: That's right.

Q: Well, now, just one last question on this period, and then we might wrap this up, and I can come another time. I have a picture in my mind of President Ford coming on a visit, wearing pants that were too short. In other words, the wrong outfit. It almost personifies something really going wrong. How did the Ford visit...

SHOESMITH: It went off very well. His pants were too short. I understand why they were too short. This was evidently morning clothes that he had had for many years. And his waist,
probably, increased in girth. When that happens, your trousers go up. That was a story that was kicking around, and I heard it because I was at the detached palace where he was staying. I spent a lot of time there.

I suppose that I might just interject here to say one thing about presidential, secretarial, and congressional visits. It was my experience that the best embassy in the world, doing superbly on all functions of an embassy, if you had a major screw up on a presidential or a congressional or a secretary's visit, you had a blot against your embassy that was very difficult to overcome. So I spent a great deal of time on those visits in organizing them, making sure that we had everything nailed down as best we could. We did that with the Ford visit. The visit, I thought, went off quite well, as that sort of thing goes. It was the first presidential visit to Japan.

Q: Really? I hadn't realized. Nixon never made it?

SHOESMITH: No. And Eisenhower never made it.

Q: Eisenhower didn't. Why didn't Nixon? He was traveling all over. Was there any particular reason?

SHOESMITH: I don't know. I don't have any idea. President Grant made it, but only after he left office...

Q: On his world tour.

SHOESMITH: So there never had been a presidential visit until Ford's. I don't recall anything about the visit except there was a tremendous amount of work that was involved. I don't recall anything that went...

Q: No, it's just that one picture that sticks out in one's mind.

SHOESMITH: I think that it went off reasonably well. It was a good one. I know that they went to Kyoto as well and did the usual sort of things down there. But substantively, I don't recall that it did anything at all. I think that the Japanese were very anxious to have a presidential visit, obviously.

Q: Particularly, after the abortive Eisenhower visit.

SHOESMITH: Yes, that's right. But I don't think that there were any substantive issues that were resolved or surfaced to any great extent. We must have had trade problems at that time, but I don't remember them. I mean, I don't remember any in particular.

Q: Well, before we leave this and close off this interview, are there any other issues that we missed?

SHOESMITH: No, there was a MiG-25, I think it was, that defected to Japan during this period.
Q: Flew into Hokkaido.

SHOESMITH: Flew into Hokkaido. It was the first time that that aircraft ever came within our grasp. And so there was a great deal of anxiety in Washington to get hold of it as quickly as possible. The (U.S.) Air Force had the notion of flying something over to Japan and wrapping this thing up and taking it back to Wright-Patterson (Field) so that they could really examine it. No point in going into all of the details, but the Japanese had to handle this in their way. It was very time consuming. They had to have some concern for the Soviet reaction. Yet, they wanted to cooperate fully with the United States, but it was bureaucratically confused. We couldn't get to it as quickly as we wished. Comments and complaints surfaced about just how good is this security treaty, really -- the arrangement that we had with Japan. It surfaced in some rather high places in Washington, much to my distress. We were absolutely confident, and not only our Embassy but U.S. Forces/Japan were absolutely confident that at some point, we would get full access to that aircraft in Japan, as much as we wanted. That actually did happen, but it took weeks.

I mention the incident only because, despite the growing effectiveness of this security treaty relationship or of this relationship as a whole, over time, doubts about Japan's commitment and sincerity and so on and so forth kept surfacing very quickly, depending on an incident like this, as it did. Actually, the present Prime Minister was Foreign Minister at the time and was very helpful in working out this problem. But it was bureaucratically complicated. In Japan, the initial Japanese reaction was that this had been a customs violation. It was in the hands of the police and customs. So it sounds ridiculous. It was perfectly understandable if you have some understanding of how things work in Japan. The worrisome part was, as I mentioned, how quickly criticism of Japan surfaced under those circumstances.

WILLIAM CLARK, JR.
Economic/Commercial Officer
Tokyo (1972-1974)

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. He graduated from San Jose State College with a B.A. degree in 1955 and served in the U.S. Navy intermittently from 1949 to 1953. In 1957, he joined the State Department. Ambassador Clark's career included posts in Sierra Leone, Japan, South Korea, Egypt, and an ambassadorship to India. Ambassador Clark was Assistant Secretary for the East Asia Bureau from 1992 to 1993. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.

Q: In 1972, you were transferred to the Embassy in Tokyo as a member of the Economic Section. What were your responsibilities?

CLARK: I was the officer in charge of US-Japanese trade problems. It was a new title for the position. I was assigned to the Economic Section even though according to the Department's personnel guidelines, I was a political officer. At this time, there was some concern in the
Department that the commercial officers were seen as "second class" citizens. They were never involved in policy matters, but were kept busy writing reports. Nevertheless, I was interested in the job, I wanted to be assigned to it and Dick Sneider helped me get it. I had several years before been designated as an economic officer because I was in an economic job when "cones" came into fashion. Then, in going to Sapporo, I became a political officer, but as you can see, these designations didn't have much meaning to me -- or the Department either. In any case, one of the first things we did was to integrate the commercial and economic sections -- they had been in separate buildings -- thereby giving officers doing commercial work also an opportunity to develop some policies in their areas of specialization. The commercial section had been headed by a Commercial Counselor who reported to the Economic Minister; that arrangement only created friction in the economic complex and did contribute to meaningful policy making. We integrated the two sections; 18 months later it was torn asunder again when the US Commercial Service was established, which was later transferred to the Department of Commerce approximately four years later.

As became my practice in subsequent assignments, I also tried to bring the political and economic sections together. Since I was technically a "political officer" and since I was the first Japanese language officer ever assigned to the economic section -- which is an indicator of the Department's attitude in those days toward economic and commercial matters -- I began to go to the Political Section's staff meetings. From time to time, I even managed to get a Political Officer to come to the Economic Section's staff meetings, but not too often. During my 1972-74 tour, the Economic Section began to look at which Japanese politicians might have an interest in economic issues. It was a marginal beginning, which has greatly improved over time. In 1972, the perception was that political and economic work were two distinct and unrelated fields of activity, which did not need to be integrated. There were some suspicions as well in the Embassy, some of which still linger. For example, the head of our translation unit had before joining the Embassy worked for the Ministry of Trade and Industry. He worked closely with the Political Section and was therefore well attuned to its needs and desires. But I could never entice him to come to the Economic Section staff meetings and therefore we were never served as well by that translation unit. So even those Japanese employees viewed themselves as part of the Political Section and were not necessarily responsive to our needs. The Economic Section was the one that really needed the translation service because I was the only officer who spoke Japanese. It could have used material available from open Japanese sources.

The Ambassador, when I reported to the Embassy was Bob Ingersoll, one of the world's real "nice guys". He had replaced Armin Meyer, who was a Middle East expert. The DCM was Dick Sneider. The Economic Minister was Les Edmonds, who was one of the more thoughtful people I have worked with. Mike Callengar was the Economic Counselor and I was a First Secretary. Even today, we still have both an Economic Minister and an Economic Counselor. That is an indication of how serious trade issues were even back in 1972.

The day after I arrived, I went to Hakoni -- to the Fuji-one of the nicest old hotels there -- for the first ever trade talks between Bill Eberly, the US Special Trade Representative and his Japanese counterpart, the Vice Minister for Trade of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Tsuzumi. We spent three days there talking about trade. It was a time when the Japanese trade surplus with the US was $3.8 billion. That was the same amount as our world-wide trade deficit. It was something we
"would not put up with"! The balance of trade shifted in 1970. The main Japanese exports at the time were textiles and electronics (transistor radios, etc). Our position was that the Japanese market was closed to US goods and that it needed to be opened up. What those talks resulted in was some forward buying of aircraft and wheat which brought trade into better balance. These talks were, as far as I know, the first full trade talks between the two countries. We didn't emphasize then the nature of the Japanese market as much as we were urging the Japanese to buy American goods, like cotton and wheat. It was Les Edmonds' idea for the two delegations to negotiate a side letter that would have allowed American retailers to open up stores in Japan to sell US goods as well as other foreign goods to fill out the line. No one ever took advantage of that agreement. The American merchandisers thought that land was too expensive, that Japanese were not super-market oriented and that there was a law which discouraged large stores. We could have taken care of the last problem if an American retailer was interested in overcoming the first two. Sears, JC Penney and others took a look and rejected the opportunity. If they just would have bought the land then, they could have made immense profits years later without ever building on it. It is true that land was expensive throughout Japan. When I was in Osaka in 1963, I did the first land survey at the behest of the Consul General, Owen Zurhellen. We were looking for a building site in Osaka; we had one in Kobe, but wanted to build in Osaka. The front of the main railroad station in Osaka was occupied by a lot of squatters who had occupied the land after some two story bookshops burned down. After the fire, the squatters hurried to occupy the land, thereby making it their own. That land in 1963 was worth more than any space in Manhattan of comparable size. Land prices were always high in Japan, but they also grew tremendously over the decades and of course became astronomical in dollar terms because of the dollar decline.

The important point that I wanted to make is that, had the Americans retailers been able to see over the cost consideration barrier, they could have opened chain stores in Japan. Starting in 1962, the Japanese themselves started enlarging their department stores, getting away from the standard "mom and pop" store. A large part of the LDP came from small shop owners; that tend was not acceptable to them and they revolted. That resulted in the "large store" law which required that any investor who wished to build a large store had to obtain the agreement of all the small store owners in the neighborhood. That was daunting for Japanese firms; the Americans figured that it would be an impossible barrier for them. But since we had reached agreement with the Japanese government that large American stores were acceptable, I think we could have worked out the modalities with the Japanese government. My assumption has never been tested, so that I can't be sure of the results had an American retailer decided to try to enter the Japanese market. It is true that American retailers faced the issues of costs, the "large store" law and the cultural Japanese aversion to large stores, but I hoped that a retailer or two would really test the market. In fact, during the time we are discussing, the Japanese had some large department stores, but not the large discount stores that were becoming popular in the US. That came later in Japan.

Eberly and his staff put a lot of emphasis on Japanese purchase of US aircraft. That was the year when Lockheed and Boeing were competing for Japanese orders. This was a very important question which eventually resulted in the resignation of Tanaka as Prime Minister because of alleged bribery. There was considerable discussion in Japan on whether our governments had agreed on one American supplier; I have never researched the issue, but I suspect that the rumor was probably true. At the time, there was no Japanese competitor; the aircraft field remained
open to foreign competition for roughly another fifteen years.

Our trade discussions with the Japanese during this period was mostly about commodities. No pressure had yet been brought to bear by the American auto industry to open the market to their products. That market at the time was still insufficiently developed to attract American interest. The Japanese were beginning their penetration of the American market, but it was not yet a significant factor. During my time as the officer-in-charge of US-Japanese trade matters, we had some discussions about "closed markets", but that usually referred to specific sectors.

The Department's interest in our commercial work varied from individual to individual. There was very little interest in commercial issues in EA, unless a commercial issue appeared likely to become a political dispute. But the Bureau of Economic Affairs, particularly in the commodity sections, were interested in our work. But those officers were also not as integrated into the policy development process as they should have been. Congressional interest had not yet developed to any great extent.

The Ambassador showed more interest in my work than the DCM. He had come from the business sector and was interested in trade. Dick Sneider was interested as well, but to a degree. He was occupied with the management of the Embassy and had other tasks to work on. Les Edmonds was responsible for the economic work of the Embassy. In any case, although trade imbalance was an issue in 1972, I don't think we ever foresaw the present situation. We viewed it as a cyclical matter which would rise during some years and decline in others. But then we didn't foresee the huge trade that now prevails between the two countries. In 1972, we were trying hard to raise agricultural trade to $3 billion. We reached that in 1874, shortly before I left. That we believed was a major achievement. Today, of course, that looks like peanuts, if you pardon the expression!

I did work very hard on trying to help the Brown Shoe Co. to penetrate the Japanese market. The Japanese had a "cultural" reason for trying to block that. In their view, shoe manufacturing was done by the "untouchables", who had been brought to Japan for specifically that purpose. Imports might create unemployment for those people and then what would they do? That argument had some validity. In fact, a young lady whose family might own a shoe store would have had difficulty in finding a suitable husband. She would be suspect of having some "untouchable" blood in her veins. In reality, I conducted a survey and found that only 10% of the shoes made in Japan were made by "untouchables". But that didn't have an effect on the Japanese. They imposed quotas on leather and hide imports. So we decided that if we couldn't get shoes through, we would try for the higher quality end of the leather and hide lines. Even that was very difficult. The "cultural" rationale for blocking shoe imports was pure bunk. The argument could be made that, based on Buddhist philosophy, shoes should be brought in from foreign lands because then Japanese could not be charged with killing of animals and using their hides. The main reason for import restrictions was that the Japanese government sold quotas for imports of leather and hides. It was a lucrative income for the government and for the traders which they were most reluctant to give up. One Director General in the Foreign Ministry told me that importers were not beyond calling on him at his office and dropping a short sword on his desk. He was worried for safety. So the few importers that controlled the trade were not anxious to give up their monopoly and would have gone to great length, I think, to enforce their
privileged status.

Rice was never in question; there was an absolute prohibition against imports. But rice has had a curious history. When I fist came to Japan and still in the mid-1960s, Japan was buying rice from us. It was not self-sufficient and was happy to buy the rice. I remember being in one of the better sake breweries in Osaka; I asked the owner whether his customers knew that he was using American rice. He said that they didn't and hoped they would not find out. The sake tasted the same regardless of the origins of the rice. In fact, the brewery was known for making sake from special rice grown in one particular region of Japan with special water. The rice came from us and the water probably out of the tap. So when the Japanese were not self-sufficient, they did not have any problems with import of foreign rice. In fact, the reason the Japanese have such great problems with rice imports now stems from their imports of twenty years ago. Then the Japanese government bought domestic rice at an inflated cost, but by mixing it with cheap imported rice, it could sell it to its people at a reasonable price. That ploy worked until the early 1970's when Japan became self-sufficient in rice. The government was then stuck with paying inflated prices to the farmers, but had to sell it to its consumers at a much lower level. That created a major budgetary drain which was not foreseen and Japan slipped into this difficult situation gradually without attracting much notice until it was too late.

A lot of food came through purchases of a food agency which had a monopoly on the imports of such commodities as wheat. There were quotas on citrus -- grapefruit, oranges, lemons. We finally got the lemon quota lifted after years of battles. The Japanese kept arguing that the imports of lemons might diminish their sales of Mekong oranges. There was no correlation between the two citrus fruits at least in our eyes. Now that oranges can be imported, Mekong sellers are still doing quite well. One could make the argument that the Japanese were using us for their own purposes because Mekong oranges were being overproduced by about 20%. The Japanese finally gave us a higher quota on oranges and then told the Mekong farmers that they had to cut down twenty percent of the trees because the "Americans had forced us to import more of their oranges." There was no causal connection, but it the government's ploy was used to its advantage both with its farmers and us. Our import quota was raised, but at the same time, the Japanese made us the scapegoats.

In 1972-73, some one in the Department of Agriculture, decided that the United States was running out of soybeans. One day, we received instructions to inform the Japanese that until further notice we were cutting off all exports of soybeans. We raised the question with Washington whether that ban included soybeans for tofu -- bean curd -- which was a staple of the Japanese diet. These were special soybeans for which the Japanese had issued contracts. The answer was that the export prohibition covered all soybeans. So I went to the appropriate Japanese Ministry and delivered the message. The next day, the press published the story; the price of tofu immediately doubled. Agriculture in Washington continued to study the problem and then soon found that in fact we did not have a soybean shortage. Our embargo in the final analysis did not reduce any Japanese soybean imports, but the price of tofu remained twice what it had been before we made our pronouncement. Every housewife in Japan hated us, for a while, since they saw the rise in the tofu price as an American-driven plot. It was not one of our finest hours!
Q: Did the Embassy have an Agricultural Attaché at that time?

CLARK: Indeed it did. It was a rather sizeable office which was part of the Embassy's economic cluster, reporting to Les Edmonds. The Attaché was primarily assigned to push American agricultural products. That is true even today. The Embassy in Tokyo has always had a relatively large Agricultural Section. Japan has always been both actually and potentially a large market for Americans products.

Our access to Japanese manufacturers at that time was pretty good. My Embassy job did not require me to do some of the things I had done in Osaka. For example, I did not make "end-user" checks; that is, investigating what foreign buyers were doing with military hardware they had bought from the military. I did have contacts with Japanese businessmen, partially because I was the only Japanese speaking officer in the Economic Section. But plant visits remained pretty much the responsibility of the constituent posts, although I did some just because I liked to do it. Even then, we were interested in finding areas in the prefectures that might lend themselves to American investment. Not much investment ever developed, but we did gather some interesting insights into Japanese development. There were some American investments, like Texas Instruments. It had a long fight to establish an operation in Japan with 100% American ownership to make semi-conductors. That was when we still had a monopoly on that market. The Japanese finally agreed and Texas Instruments build a plant in Kyushu. Now, that operation is well integrated into the Japanese market. IBM had already established a presence in Japan with 100% ownership. That was an interesting situation. Even in the early 1970s, although the operation was entirely owned by IBM (incorporated in Japan), its actual operations was run by a completely Japanese work-force, up to and including the president of IBM-Japan. The production of the IBM facilities was counted by the Japanese as foreign manufactured, until the 1980s; that bolstered their argument that they needed to subsidize their own computer development because "foreign" firms had such a large share of the market. So the Japanese, when analyzing the foreign penetration of their markets, included all IBM production, even though taking place in their country, as being "foreign".

The American business community in Tokyo in the early 1970s was fairly good size. It was not as large as it was at its height and it is now smaller, but even then there must have been about 1000 American business men in Tokyo. There was an American Chamber of Commerce, whom we worked well. This was the period during which the Japanese opened their market to foreign banks; that created mini explosion of American banks opening offices in Japan. Most of them started on the wrong foot; they insisted on having an office on a street corner for "walk-in" traffic, although that was not a good business opportunity. They paid awesome amounts for rental of real estate which was not very useful in the final analysis. The American banks had not done their home work; they knew little about the Japanese market. Banks in Japan were not allowed to advertise for "walk in" business; furthermore, the ordinary Japanese was very reluctant to deposit his yen in an American bank. They used Japanese banks or postal savings accounts which were exempt from tax declarations.

The Ambassador would meet with the Chamber's executive board monthly. At each of these session, one embassy officer would brief the group on matters that he or she were working on. In exchange, the Chamber would brief us on what they were working on. That relationship has
grown even closer as years passed. The Chamber had complaints, of course, but in those days, the business community appealed to the Embassy only as a last resort. That meant that the problems were usually quite large before they were brought to our attention. Even when they had a problem, most of the Chamber's members did not wish to be identified as the source of the complaint. They would ask us to help in the resolution of an issue, but didn't want to be publicly connected with the process. They were concerned about potential Japanese retribution.

I might add a couple of additional matters of interest. Because of an earlier assignment, I retained my interest in textiles. There was an official in USTR who dealt in textiles. His name was Tony Jurick; he had been involved in much of the Okinawa negotiations. He was sort of protégé of Strom Thurmond's. When I got to Tokyo, I noticed that Jurick was coming for a visit. I asked who had been assigned as escort officer. I was told that no one could handle Jurick; he just ran around Tokyo on his own. So I volunteered to shepherd him; I followed him around and learned a lot. This happened in a period when the Japanese were just about ready to support us in global textile negotiations. They were becoming increasingly concerned about imports and less about exports. Tony had a meeting with his counterpart in MITI, but never at MITI. They met in hotel rooms. I watched them hammer out the negotiations. After a week, they finally reached agreement. Then Tony wanted to know where the formal meeting would be held which would ratify what the two of them had already agreed upon. The Japanese official said that it couldn't be in Tokyo because there would be too much pressure; he said it couldn't be in Washington because then he would be accused of having sold out to the Americans. He therefore suggested Hawaii. Tony had problems with that suggestion, but he finally gave in. Then came the question of how long this ratifying meeting would take. The Japanese official said "Five days". Tony thought that this was excessive and suggested three. He thought that that was all that would be necessary. The Japanese said it had to be no less than five because for the first two days, he would balk at any American suggestion and fight for the Japanese position. At the end of two days, he would have to fly back to Tokyo; he would then return and sign an agreement, the terms of which had already been decided on during Tony's stay in Tokyo. And that is exactly how the drama unfolded. The American and Japanese delegations met in Hawaii, fought for the first two days, broke so that the Japanese could return to Tokyo and assembled again to finish the deal.

That was an illustration of how American-Japanese deals are put together which we have seemed to have forgotten. Now we negotiate in the press, thereby preventing the Japanese officials to go through their elaborate Kabuki dance in order to show his constituency that he had been fighting very strongly for them. I found Jurick's modus operandi very instructive and effective. I also learned that the Japanese official had considerable limitations on his freedom of action, which today's press seems to ignore or minimize. He had to manipulate his own constituency, just as Tony had to manipulate the American textile industry. I am now talking about the early USTR days when it was a rather meek organization. The staff was still small. They essentially coordinated and directed the rest of the bureaucracy to contribute to the government's trade policies. USTR were the lead negotiators, but they were not an entity unto themselves as they later have been accused of being. If there were any difficulties then they usually stemmed from the lack of economic expertise in State Department. Commerce had more people than they knew what to do with. That meant that State was always outmanned on trade issues, but the government worked well in those days on trade issues.

All of the Japanese bureaucracy is beholden to its clients; that is probably true in most countries,
but it is certainly so in Japan. There is a close relationship between a Japanese official and his constituency. Then and still today, bureaucrats retire at age 55 or 60, if they are very successful, and need to have a second career. There is the Amakudari -- the descent from heaven -- which brings the official into one of the organizations that he represented during his government career -- after a two year "cooling off" period during which the bureaucrat is given a job in a think tank or some other "purifying" activity. I have a good friend who used to be the Japanese Ambassador in London. He then became a consultant to Mitsubishi. I asked him what his duties there were. He said he had given that matter considerable thought at the beginning. He finally had reached a conclusion. He said he would remember a photograph of the chairman of a large Japanese corporation. There would be a lot of people in the background. In the background, somewhat indistinct, would be a Chinese vase, which you can not see clearly, but you know that because it is in the chairman's office, it must be valuable. He viewed himself as a Chinese vase -- a sort of decoration.

In those days, the Ministers themselves became involved in negotiations after the deal had been struck, if at all. On textiles, Ministers tried their best not to get involved so that their political future would not be endangered. One of the famous episodes in the US-Japan textile story took place in Hawaii when Nixon met Tanaka. Nixon insisted that he needed a concession; Tanaka, after a lot of arm twisting, gave him the Japanese political equivalent of the "check is in the mail" -- Zensho shimas, which literally means "I will make my best effort". Japanese experts understand that the term means "No way" or "I will give it a good shot, but I know that I will fail". Nixon took the literal translation and played it up as having achieved more than would have been expected. Neither Japanese or Americans liked to get involved in textile negotiations.

Agriculture was a little easier. There was no flat barrier in Japan against import of such commodities as wheat. The negotiations on those commodities was on how much would be imported. Beef and oranges were a different matter; there the argument was on whether any imports would be allowed. Those discussions took place until fairly recently. The present Foreign Minister, Hata, was a Minister of Agriculture at a later period and then was very helpful to us on oranges. He did get involved in the early 1980s when I was the DCM. I went to see him to talk about oranges just after we had gotten a small break on beef imports. At that time, he told me that he had done all he could for US agriculture for the time being. He needed some pause in the pressure. I think that if US can find an influential Minister who has the confidence of his constituency, then a deal can be struck. Hata was the right minister and he was able to influence his constituency. That doesn't always happen. Because the Japanese tend to rotate their Ministers every two years, there will be sometimes a Minister who will not be able to take any helpful steps. Then you have to go to the politicians who do have influence in the particular commodity area in which you are interested. This close relationship between the government and the politicians supports the thesis that in a country like Japan it is essential that the Embassy's political and economic sections have to work very closely together.

NATALE H. BELLOCCHI
Commercial Counselor
Tokyo (1972-1974)
Ambassador Natale H. Bellocchi was born in Little Falls, New York in 1926. He received a degree in industrial management from Georgia Tech in 1944 and was soon drafted into the U.S. Army to serve in a rifle platoon during the Korean War. His Foreign Service career included positions in Hong Kong, Laos, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, India, and an ambassadorship to Botswana. Ambassador Bellocchi was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 21, 1995.

Q: I always like to get the time element. You were in Tokyo from when to when?

BELLOCCHI: '72 to '74. It was in '74 that I was assigned to the Senior Seminar.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you were in Tokyo?

BELLOCCHI: Ingersoll.

Q: He had a labor...

BELLOCCHI: No. Chairman of Borg Warner.

Q: I would imagine that he would be interested in the commercial side.

BELLOCCHI: He did have a lot of functions for visiting businessmen at that time. Oh yes, he was very, very helpful, and really very nice, he and his wife. So they used their facilities, their huge reception room in the residence for business oriented receptions. So, yes, he was very interested and very easy to work with.

Q: What was the principal work that you did? Both in commercial attaché and commercial counselor.

BELLOCCHI: Well, one was to try to come up with these analyses of why are these Japanese trading companies successful, and what do we have to learn from them. So I tried to do a lot of reporting and generate a lot of reporting on how they operated. And secondly, of course, was export promotion. And in Japan that was very important to try to break down. The economic people were trying to work back here with negotiations to break down the barriers. We even had a trade center, and we had shows going on all the time, trying to increase our exports. Our biggest problem was the same old traditional one, the big companies don't need that kind of service. They know how to operate abroad. It's the middle and smaller companies that need it, and they wouldn't make the commitments to exporting in those days. I think the times have changed now, but in those days such companies looked on exporting as something they did when the domestic market wasn't doing well. If they wanted to maintain their production line, they would go into export. Then the minute the economy picked up in the States they would forget about exporting. And you can't really keep agents abroad doing your work for you very well if you're up and down that way.
I had an experience that was fascinating when Mitsukoshi, a big department store, came to us. Wine and cheese was a fad at that time in Japan. They said they understood that one of the big winery companies in California shipped wine in bulk in tankers around to the east coast, and bottled their wine in the east coast for distribution. And they would like to buy a tanker full of wine, and have it bottled under a Mitsukoshi label. In return, a certain percentage of their wine area in the stores would be for California wines. I mean we're talking about a tanker full of wine. So we tried to find, and get people interested, but could not find anybody interested in selling a whole oil tanker-type ship full of wine to Japan. Couldn't do it.

The next year, when I was in the Senior Seminar, we happened to stop out there on one of our trips to a California Wine Growers Association barbecue.

Q: I remember that.

BELLOCCHI: Yes, you were there, and they complained about not getting much help in exporting their wines. That was more than I could take. I got up and told them about my experience in trying to get a whole tanker full of wine. Their rationale was: "Well, but that was in a good year here in the States and we had the domestic market, we didn't have the wine available for export." That's precisely the point about why they couldn't develop their export market. So that was our main problem in that job, trying to get the American companies to understand there's a huge market there. But it wasn't free, they had to work for it.

Q: I had the same experience when I was in the Persian Gulf back in the ‘50s where Americans would once a year send somebody from Geneva through there, a small market, but it was obviously one that was going to develop. I was the economic/commercial officer in Dhahran, and they would come through once a year and they'd usually come through, they'd fly in on Thursday and leave on Saturday, and Friday was the day everybody was out. It was that type of thing.

BELLOCCHI: We did that. They were very unrealistic when they'd come to Tokyo and say they had ten appointments for two days in Tokyo. You know, that really didn't make any sense at all. Just the traffic in Tokyo alone assures you you're not going be able to have five appointments in one day. That was a major problem in our job.

Q: We're speaking today, where I think the President has signed an order putting prohibitive tariffs on certain Japanese cars, or threatened to. I mean, this goes on, but one looks at this where we feel, one, the Japanese market is closed, and two, we don't seem to be able to commit ourselves to you might say, hard selling within the area.

BELLOCCHI: Times have changed. I'm not suggesting the same is true today as it was then. But I have little sympathy, for example, for the automobile people who complain about the lack of an open market in Japan. A lot of it was due to two reasons in my time. One is, first of all they didn't make a car that was very sellable in Japan. I mean, the steering wheel is on the wrong side to start with. Secondly, they liked to use local dealers who would treat the American car as sort of a special fad car which did not mean a large market, it meant a high price. That's what it meant. So they didn't have the distribution system developed there that they should have. So part of it was their fault themselves. They really weren't developing the kind of market that they
should be developing. We used to complain a great deal about the distribution system in Japan. They're all mom and pop stores, and therefore they favored the Japanese, and our companies couldn't sell on the Japanese market because of that distribution system. Well here we are in the States trying to redevelop the local communities stores. They are now, of course, chain stores instead of mom and pop stores. Here we were looking the Japanese in the eye and saying, you've got to change your distribution system so that our companies can sell over here. And they're looking back at you, and saying, "Hey wait a minute, these people vote and I don't particularly want to change." So in the commercial section we were looking at the Japanese side of it a lot, and trying to develop understanding back here. Whereas in the economic area, of course, they focused on the real obstacles to trade. There were plenty of obstacles to trade. There were non-tariff barriers that existed that had to be lowered. But time and again we'd finally get them to lower the beef quota, or shoes, or something and other countries would come in and sell. The Spanish would come in and sell the shoes, the Australians would come in and sell the beef, so all of our work would be for naught.

PAUL P. BLACKBURN
Japanese Language Training
Yokohama (1971-1972)

Director - Tokyo American Center/Embassy Cultural Attaché
Tokyo (1972-1975)

Paul P. Blackburn was born in Hawaii in 1937. He received his BA from Haverford College in 1960 and an MA from the School for Advanced International Studies in 1962. His postings abroad include Bangkok, Khon Kaen, Udorn, Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur. Mr. Blackburn was interviewed by Charles R. Beecham on November 18, 2002.

Q: Were you also preparing to go to Japan at that time?

BLACKBURN: Yes, I was. Fortunately, I had finished the first draft of the dissertation before I started Japanese training at FSI, so did not have that hanging over my head.

Having been interested in Japan for a long time and with some earlier self study under my belt, I was able to get a fast jump on the Japanese language training. I really didn’t want to put aside two full years for language study, but hoped to earn the required 3/3 in one year and start working right away. The FSI teachers (especially Tanaka-sensei, a gifted educator known to many of her students as “Tiger Tanaka” for her boot camp type drilling of beginning students) really encouraged and pushed me. I got the S-3/R-3 after that one year, the first student ever to have done so, I was told. Still, there was no appropriate job for me in Japan, and my Japanese was not all that deeply implanted anyway.

When I got to FSI Yokohama in the summer of 1971, the teachers were very kind, but essentially said, “Burakuban-san, you may have gotten a 3/3 back in Washington, but you don’t yet have a
3/3 by our reckoning.” The terrific team of Japanese teachers in Yokohama worked me over pretty well that year, while keeping my spirits up through ping-pong games, go lessons, and occasional drinking bouts. In the end I scored a 3+/3+, which was pretty good, but not the 4/4 to which I had earlier aspired and which some had predicted I might be able to attain.

One of the highlights of the Japanese language program was my participation in the annual Japanese speech contest for foreigners that is broadcast live on NHK. With enormous help from an extraordinary Japanese instructor, Konno-sensei, I wrote a speech on the stages of my supposed “love affair” with the Sony Trinitron TV set that aided my language learning efforts. Looking back on the experience today, I wonder why I came up with such a sappy subject. Still, it was a good speech, reasonably well delivered despite my on-air stage fright, the Japanese loved it, and I beat out most of the competition to win third prize – the best anyone from FSI Yokohama had ever performed in that contest, and a record that may still stand.

After two years of the exquisite agony that only Japanese language students know – and I can attest that spoken Chinese is a breeze in comparison – I was eager and ready for my assignment at the heart of Alan Carter’s would-be USIS utopia, the Tokyo American Center.

Q: When did you know you would be going to the Tokyo center, and who did you replace?

BLACKBURN: I knew about it roughly a year in advance. I replaced Warren Obluck, a superb officer who had made tremendous contacts within the Tokyo arts community.

Actually, Frank Shakespeare took an interest in my assignment to Tokyo, and told me he had personally and enthusiastically signed off on it.

Q: So while you were studying Japanese, Carter showed up as PAO, right?

BLACKBURN: Alan arrived there in 1970, replacing Ned Roberts, just as I was getting started in the language training. On his arrival he announced a determination to fundamentally revamp a program he viewed as almost totally inappropriate for advancing our interests in the Japan of that time. He said the operation had become flaccid. The bulk of the post’s key contacts dated back to the Occupation period, we were spending much of our time, energy, and money on “cultural centers” that had outlived their democracy-tutelage original purposes, and a scathingly-critical younger generation of Japanese viewed the U.S. as a nation in decline. Alan, I think correctly, concluded that USIS Japan, in both style and content, should reflect a vibrant, up-to-date America poised to exercise leadership in the decades ahead.

Although capable Japan specialist Dave Hitchcock served as Alan’s deputy, most of the post’s Japan experts and Japanophiles were moved to the sidelines or out the door. In their place came an extraordinarily talented and brilliant group of officers. Among them – besides Dave Hitchcock – were Barry Fulton, Don Hausrath, Ray Komai, and Dennis Askey. Harlan Rosacker, another outstanding officer and later the head of USIA personnel, ably handled press relations, but was not centrally involved in the “Carter revolution.”

First among the revolutionaries was Barry Fulton. Barry had Alan’s complete confidence and
was in overall charge of planning and implementing the new organizational concept. His first act was to “seize the mailroom” – to get a feel for what sorts of communications were passing between offices and in what formats. Soon we all had standardized letterheads for USIS products, with stationary and name cards that were all part of a modernistic design concept masterminded by Ray Komai.

Among Barry’s early tasks was to set up an integrated speaker system along the lines of the “packaged programming” concept first articulated, I believe, by Sam Courtney – and put into practice when Alan was Area Director for the Near East and South Asia just before being assigned to Japan. It was a great and, at the time, highly innovative idea. When a speaker came to us at the Tokyo American Center (TAC), it was not just a one-off event, but part of a broad-gauged effort that often included materials for distribution, other Japanese and American speakers, simultaneous translation, and lively A/V elements such as “triptych” slide introductions.

At the time we had branches in Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, Fukuoka and Sapporo. All USIS activities operated out of American Centers (ACs) in those cities. The TAC was part of a tightly integrated AC network, and my official Agency title was “Branch PAO Tokyo.” To emphasize our intention to address tough policy issues, the former “American Cultural Centers” had been shut down for refurbishment and then reopened as “American Centers.” All of the ACs used essentially the same speakers, had the same library collections, and featured the same modular furniture, for example. And we all operated according to detailed instructions, written or approved by Barry, that we kept in loose leaf folders by our desks.

Barry invented the first full-fledged “Audience Record System (ARS),” which later became the Agency’s standardized Distribution and Record System, or DRS. We worked hard to identify the key organizations and audience members we would try to reach with our activities, limited our invitation lists essentially to people we had identified, and kept track of how well we did in contacting them over time. In addition, each officer at the post was charged with maintaining his or her own “inner circle” of about 20 individuals who were supposed to receive our personal attention on a regular basis. We would report attendance at programs and other interactions to a central ARS office of the post. Every few months we would get a computer printout that showed how we and the other ACs were doing in terms of reaching our audiences with various types of program activities. Although Barry had thought through many of the fundamental issues, implementing his concepts brought out the Jesuit in each of us – as we struggled to define precisely who should be in or out of the system, how much of our effort should be devoted to bringing people to our centers – as opposed to taking speakers to other venues – what to do about keeping track of students in the ARS, and so on. And on and on.

Don Hausrath was in charge of the libraries. They were no longer called “libraries,” but became “Infomats” – to emphasize their new status as outlets for current “information materials.” The Infomats were technologically well ahead of most Japanese institutions of that era. We had video as well as audio cassette collections, including excellent materials on U.S. scientific achievements as well as VCRs of the best of our AC speaker programs. And, beginning in 1972, we used an early form of a FAX machine, with which we could communicate with the USIS Infomat support office and between ACs. It took about ten minutes per page for the transmission,
but it was very handy for answering reference questions and doing other business.

Besides the modular furniture, another important design feature was our beanbag chairs on the floor all around the Infomat. The Japanese loved to sit in them and read. And of course sometimes they would be so comfortable they would fall asleep. When Alan would come to the TAC and find a patron dozing, it seemed to make him mad, because he would go over and give the “chair” a little kick. If you have ever tried to sleep in a beanbag chair and had someone kick it, you know it wakes you right up. By the time the startled Japanese patron had his wits about him, Alan would be well away from the area, with an innocent but satisfied look on his face.

The most innovative, radical and controversial aspect of the Infomat was its approach to the collection itself. For starters, each of the six ACs had exactly the same 3,000 titles, 2,000 of them for circulation and 1,000 to meet the reference needs of our audiences. The TAC had an additional 1,000 reference titles, for a total in all of 4,000 volumes. The standard 2,000 circulating titles were divided equally among the five major themes – or post objectives – that also guided our speaker programming. These themes were: security and U.S.-Japan relations, economics, American society, arts, and what we called “toward the year 2000” – the latter reflecting our desire to address the great Japanese interest in futurology. With 400 titles devoted to each theme, it was further decreed that no more than 100 of them could be more than five years old, and the other 300 should be roughly divided among works published in the previous five years. The concept was that we would collectively work together – with help from the Japanese staff who scanned Japanese newspapers and magazines as well as library support personnel back in Washington – to identify and procure the 60 most important and pertinent books published annually in each of the five subject areas. Further, to maintain the rigidly disciplined nature of the collection, we weeded out the same number of books we added to our shelves each year. A lot of people found this approach reprehensible, or at least astounding – especially the idea that after we had already disposed of tens of thousands of volumes from the old Cultural Centers we were now prepared to discard even perfectly serviceable newer ones to meet some kind of mechanistic formula. It was definitely a rigid approach, but I didn’t oppose it. I generally agreed with the thesis that such discipline was a necessary underpinning for our great exertions to obtain the most up-to-date materials – even to the extent of having books airshipped to us for use in programs or to feature on our shelves. And our key audiences appreciated what we were trying to do, and began to look to us as a major source for any research they were doing that related to the United States.

Ray Komai was the design specialist, who worked closely with Dennis Askey on the art work for the post’s upscale Japanese-language magazine. Trends was a beautiful monthly product that not only featured modern American art and architecture, but also carried in-depth articles on our other major themes.

In designing the centers, Ray worked with the incomparable Lynn Nyce of the central USIA space design office to came up with a contemporary look. The look featured supergraphics that showed visitors the way to rest rooms, “REFERENCE,” or whatever, tubular legs on tables and desks, white walls, large modern prints, and a strict policy of no personal items – including photos, calendars and flowers – on desks. The latter dictum was the hardest for many to swallow. All the public and working spaces of the ACs were intended to give a modern, professional feel.
Those of us who worked there were viewed essentially as temporary occupants of the space.

**Q: How did you fit into this operation, and how did you get along with Alan Carter?**

BLACKBURN: When I took over the Tokyo American Center, which was at Akasaka Mitsuke about a mile from our embassy, it had just been renovated and launched in the new format. We were the experimental ground zero for the new approach. People came to check us out all the time. The Japanese were fascinated by the experiment, stopping by in droves to sample our services or just see what we were up to. In Tokyo, as in other cities with American Centers, the revamped operations received extensive and positive newspaper, magazine, and TV coverage. Alan, justifiably eager to show off the TAC, regularly brought visitors, frequently including Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, when we were having a particularly interesting speaker program or cultural event.

Unfortunately, Alan and I did not get off to a great start. Being the officer charged with running the flagship operation of the whole program, I saw my responsibilities as divided between those of salesman/cheer-leader on the one hand and internal reporter of system glitches on the other. In the latter role, I was following one of Barry’s management principles to the effect that a certain error rate in any new endeavor is to be expected, and no one should be surprised that things don’t work 100% as planned. Alan, however, clearly wanted me to be a whole-hearted enthusiast, even in our internal discussions. Early on concluding that I was entirely too negative – and perhaps suspecting, completely wrongly, that I was bitching back-channel to his arch-rival, Dan Oleksiw – Alan started an office folder to document my transgressions, his secretary told me.

The low point was a BPAO conference in Kyoto, where Alan and I had several acrimonious exchanges during what were supposed to be relaxing social occasions – over, as I remember, some rather minor problems I had identified. The arguments didn’t bother me so much, as I knew Barry felt my criticisms raised issues that needed to be addressed. What I literally lost sleep over – from fear that, if found out, I would be fired or at least severely reprimanded – was a serious mistake I had made before leaving for the conference. Foolishly I had agreed to let a Japanese avant garde theater troupe use the TAC programming space for a performance the same weekend we were all to be in Kyoto. I should have checked more closely to find out what was in their performance, because the same night Alan and I had our worst argument, back at the TAC a show was presented with a scene in which sympathetically-portrayed PLO soldiers paraded around the stage, their rifles at the ready to confront the Israeli enemy. I never should have permitted such a deviation from policy and good sense. I prayed that none of my bosses would ever get wind of my mistake – and fortunately they never did.

Later that first fall I organized some impressive seminars at the TAC, and put on a week-long video art festival that was the largest of its kind that had been held anywhere in the world up to that point. Having seen that I really was a positive force and an asset to his program, Alan’s attitude toward me mellowed. A month or so later his secretary told me Alan had instructed her to remove and destroy the special file he had been keeping on me.

**Q: What sorts of activities did you have at the center?**
BLACKBURN: We put on lots of speaker programs, seminars, co-sponsored off-site conferences, exhibitions, films shows, and even a few concerts. I was aided by a terrific staff, with 22 Japanese Foreign Service Nationals and a Deputy Center Director, first Mike Haller and then Carol Ludwig. Among the many outstanding FSNs, I was closest to the wise veteran who served as the TAC’s senior FSN, Kinji Ando, to arts specialist Kyoko Michishita, and to Matsuko Kyoto, who was the number two in the Infomat. Other notable staffers were programmers Mr. Soga, Mr. Kubo, and Ms. Tatara, chief librarian Mr. Fukuda, and the administrative genius Mr. Kitazawa, who regularly assured me that he would “leave nothing to chance.” All the FSNs were thoroughly professional, dedicated to making the new arrangement work, and so cohesive that I could hand them a knotty planning problem in the confidence that after mulling it over they would present me with a workable solution to consider.

The TAC generally had two or three programs a week. In all, I think I presided over more than 200 separate speaker events during my three years in the job. The first program I handled featured Mike Armacost, who was Ambassador to Japan during my second tour there, talking about regional security issues. We had many prominent experts in all fields. For example, Paul Samuelson, the great economist who “wrote the book” – the one we all used when we studied basic economics. On the arts side, we had Isamu Noguchi and Louise Nevelson speak at the center, did a big event honoring the work of Sam Francis, who was living near the TAC at the time, and even cosponsored an event that brought Andy Warhol to Tokyo.

In addition to the challenges of running the Tokyo American Center, I was also designated the Embassy’s Cultural Attaché. Alan felt that position and the access it afforded should go to the TAC Director rather than the Cultural Affairs Officer working out of the Embassy. Having those two hats, I was invited to a great many cultural events – performances, exhibits, avant guard film showings, and the like. Thanks to the great contacts that Warren Obluck had developed, particularly among composers and print artists, I was relatively quickly able to establish myself as a reasonably plausible member of Tokyo’s cultural community.

Q: What was the biggest programming challenge you faced?

BLACKBURN: There were many difficult ones – relating to the Vietnam War, to our sudden opening to China, to increasing trade frictions, and so on – but the Watergate crisis certainly put us in a strange public affairs situation. The Japanese generally were quite high on Nixon, despite the “Nixon shocks” relating to China and our unpegging the dollar-yen exchange rate. They thought Nixon was a tough, effective Cold War leader. In Tokyo, as elsewhere in Japan and around the world, USIS officers suddenly found themselves in the odd position of explaining why our president’s transgressions were so serious many Americans had determined that he should be thrown out of office. My Japanese contacts, no matter how versed they were in “American studies,” simply could not grasp what was going on. They kept asking me if there wasn’t really some sexual or financial scandal behind it all. I tried to explain the seriousness of Nixon’s alleged participation in the Watergate cover-up, and to use the crisis as a way of informing Japanese about the arcane workings of our political system. Despite our efforts, the Japanese continued to view the cover-up as a very small matter that had been blown way out of proportion by Nixon’s mean-spirited and opportunistic enemies.
Q: Sounds like you had a great time.

BLACKBURN: Well, it certainly was an enormously stimulating period in my life. I became well informed about all sorts of things and met many fascinating Japanese as well as American who participated in our events. In other ways, it was a humbling experience. Perhaps influenced by the Japanese penchant for self-criticism, I became vividly aware of my inadequacies. I soon realized that I would never really know that much about the subjects my speakers were addressing. I could never keep up with all the must-read books and magazines flowing into our Infomat. When we would have a high-profile speaker with us for a couple of days, like the novelist John Gardner, I made time to read two or three of his novels, but that meant I couldn’t fully prepare for other speakers in the same time frame – perhaps experts on alternative energy sources, international trade theory, or Sino-Soviet relations. I also realized that my Japanese was not as fluent as I wanted it to be, and that I was not seeing as much of my contacts as I wanted to. To keep from being too hard on myself, I had to keep telling myself that I was just there to do the best job I could under the circumstances – and not to expect any more than that.

Tragically, this tendency toward excessive self-criticism when working as an AC Director became pathological in the case of my friend and counterpart in Nagoya, John Lepperd – who took his own life while en route to a direct-transfer assignment as CAO in Jakarta. John sent pathetic suicide notes to his bosses, including PAO Bill Miller, who had by then replaced Alan Carter, apologizing for having done such a poor job in Nagoya. We all realized after the fact that John had for some time been crying out for help in different ways, but that we hadn’t heard him. I felt terrible about it, and was quite angry at those in the USIS chain of command who should have been more responsive to his pleas. These were the days before we had psychiatrists available to our overseas posts. Currently, there is one assigned to Tokyo.

Q: Are you saying that you think he was suffering from the kind of pressures you were describing as feelings of inadequacy on your own part?

BLACKBURN: Yes. I think we all had the same feelings to some extent, but he quite clearly went over the edge. He said in his letters that he felt he had done a terrible job as Nagoya AC Director, but we all – including his supervisors – thought he had done a fine job. He described his Japanese as mediocre, but he was easily the best of the six of us at the ACs. It was just an awful situation, and we all felt so helpless. I am still in regular touch with John’s widow, Hemlata, who lives in Washington.

Q: The Japan program was pretty controversial back in Washington, wasn’t it?

BLACKBURN: Indeed it was. In addition to those in USIA whose feathers Alan had ruffled over the years and were happy to take potshots at him, many in the Agency were genuinely concerned – in some cases even alarmed, at what they understood to be going on there. Jim Moceri was sent out by Agency management to have a look at the USIS Japan program and see if it should be, A, strangled in its bed; B, kept alive but applied only to the peculiar conditions of Japan; or C, used as a template for changes elsewhere in USIA’s world. After conducting his mini-inspection of the post, Moceri concluded that while the program may have had some validity in Japan, it contained deeply serious flaws. It was, he said, much too mechanistic, it didn’t take adequate
account of local sensitivities, and it didn’t place proper emphasis on warm personal friendships, especially with intellectuals. I am not doing justice to his critique, but I believe that was the gist of it. Alan was summoned back to Washington for what some called a “star chamber hearing” to respond to Moceri’s criticisms. According to those who attended, it was among the most dramatic confrontations in the Agency’s history. People stood along the walls of the packed conference room for the four or five hours that Alan and Jim went head to head over nearly every aspect of the program. The upshot was that Alan prevailed, at least as far as Japan was concerned – which was all that he had been arguing for in the first place. The Agency’s leaders congratulated him on putting together such a fine and carefully considered program, but reserved judgment about its applicability elsewhere.

As it happened, many of Alan’s innovations did spread to other countries in the following years – for example, using modern design to draw trendy young audiences to the USIS centers, placing emphasis on getting the most up-to-date reference materials into the hands of key contacts, and instituting more rigorous distribution systems. In addition, USIS Japan’s targeted speaker program, and the heavy demands it put on disparate Washington elements, prompted a full revamping of USIA’s field program support apparatus, carried out under the leadership of Chas Freeman and Ed Schulick.

PAOs who came to Japan later, even those like Cliff Forster who had been early critics of the Carter approach, actually changed very few of the basic programming elements, as I saw for myself when I returned to Tokyo as PAO after an absence of 17 years. Yes, the beanbag chairs were gone. The Infomat had become an Information Resource Center. We had gone back to having an Information Officer, instead of a Media Relations Officer, and the Cultural Attache portfolio belonged to the Cultural Affairs Officer. The Audience Record System, now the DRS, was more sophisticated. And we had started having each AC book collection concentrate on a specific theme, and no longer insisted that a book be thrown out for every one that was added. More important was what was kept – the attention to carefully selected audiences, the dedication to constant upgrading of communications and A/V support technology, and a willingness to pass up activities that were “nice to do” in favor of a disciplined focus on our primary objectives. This approach continues to this day, under the leadership of another “true believer” from the old days, PAO Hugh Hara.
Petree served in Ethiopia. He was interviewed by Paul McCusker on July 22, 1993.

Q: So you kept up your contacts, and I presume also with the language. You finally did get back to the Far East though.

PETREE: That was because of Okinawan reversion in 1972 and I was picked up and sent on direct transfer.

Q: From Addis direct to Naha?

PETREE: Back to Naha. And I arrived there in early May just days before reversion on May 15th, 1972. I participated in the reversion ceremony down in Naha. I delivered greetings to the Okinawan people, in Japanese, which hadn't been done before. It made a stir in the press and it was fun to watch.

Q: Did you run into a guy named Jay Van Swekringen, or had he left already?

PETREE: Sure. Oh, he had left there but I had known him while I was on the desk, mostly because he was out there at that time.

Q: That's right, because I replaced him in Jakarta, originally as commercial attaché, but we didn't have any commercial business in Indonesia during the Sukarno period. Anyway, we eliminated the commercial attaché position, but I replaced him. He'd been in Indonesia for several years, and then he went off to Naha. That must have been a delicate business representing the American community. The Japanese, of course, I guess, were happy to have Okinawa back as part of their country. How did you find the dealings with the Japanese went?

PETREE: That was smooth. That was the smaller part of the problem. There was tension between Okinawans and Japanese authorities in Tokyo, principally because Okinawans have always traditionally been treated as second-class citizens on ethnic grounds, if nothing else. They were terribly sensitive about how they would be treated in the new era after reversion. And there was a great deal of nervousness between the two of them in that early period when reversion occurred. And there still is, but it has settled down now, particularly, I think, smoothed out by the amount of money Japan has spent on trying to bring them up to speed. They've thrown a huge amount of central government funds into helping Okinawa get on its feet again.

But the big job that I'll never forget was dealing with Americans. Understand it was then the Vietnam war, and the focus of the military commanders, who were all very, very senior people, Marine, Air Force, Army and Navy, and they were all present on the island, and they'd been there for many, many years and had their own environment that they had built and hated to see it go. And for the most part were emotionally pitched against the State Department's foolishness of trying to give Okinawa back to the Japanese. So, the big tensions that I had to deal with were in every day's dealings with the feelings and the other preoccupations that the military commanders tried to protect. The general thing that never had occurred to me before, is that we Americans are no different than anybody else in the world. We form attachments for a territory, or a turf, and a
place, just like the Panama Canal, and the Philippines more recently. But it was true in Okinawa too. We are colonialist just as much as anybody else, and that had never occurred...I always felt like that was one thing you could forget about. We Americans never did those bad things, never had those instincts that drove other nations. But it was true.

Q: So then you went from Okinawa...did you get another direct transfer? Or did you go back to the Department?

PETREE: Direct transfer up to Tokyo, and that was part of the package, the agreement, to go back to Naha, take one year to set the consulate general up, and then I would be permitted to go back to my area of specialization in Tokyo which I did for three years.

Q: You were counselor for political affairs at that time. That must have been equally exciting, at least you got back into your area of primary interest.

PETREE: Yes, that was important to me because I'd been away for a long time.

Q: What happened of particular note? Let's put it this way, what was your greatest crisis, personally, as a counselor for political affairs? I don't mean on a personal life side; I mean in your job. Did you have a great DCM, to start with?

PETREE: Oh, yes. Tom Shoesmith was DCM for that period, and he and I are good friends, and were good friends. We went to Harvard together. He came out of DRF, just like I did. While you speak of crisis, I think that the one thing I remember was in 1974, or 75, just before President Ford was going to visit Tokyo, the first Presidential post-war visit, and, of course, he brought back to mind all of the troubles that Eisenhower ran into when his visit was canceled in 1960. So there was a lot of tension about whether the American President ought to be permitted to come in and out of Japan with no overlay of trouble and tension, and instability. The left-wing people jumped up again, and it was also during a period when we were building a new chancery. So we were living in, not a Quonset hut, but a temporary building near where the chancery was being built.

Q: Were you living, or working in it?

PETREE: Working, as a chancery. So some Japanese radicals, activists, stood up on the roof of the Okura Hotel, or near the roof, the 12th floor, and threw fire bombs onto the roof of the American embassy one afternoon. I was, I guess, the only senior officer in the building, and immediately after that they attempted to ram the gates of the embassy with a truckload of people who were armed and out for no good. They did break into the compound and we were wrestling all over the parking lot.

Q: Were the Marines on hand?

PETREE: They were on hand helping, but, of course, the number on duty are not that many, and they're not armed. But nothing serious happened, it was just terribly...
Q: Did they tear down the flag and burn it?

PETREE: No, they didn't have time. We got them out of there before anything like that happened.

Q: The local police showed up?

PETREE: Yes, they came very quickly.

Q: That's very different from what it was in Indonesia in the mid-60s. The local protection didn't exist in Jakarta in those years. The crowds of paid protesters were storming the gates, and tearing down the flag and burning it.

PETREE: The serious part of the work for the political section during that period really was the movement in the U.S.-Japan relationship to try to renegotiate in great detail the terms of our base presence in Japan. This involved the effort to get Japan to pay more for keeping us there. They now, of course, over the years have continually moved the ratio of their subsidy of the base presence upward. I don't know what the current figures are, but it's something over half the total cost, and it's paid for by Japan, which most American people don't really know about.

Those negotiations, along with the different military rules of engagement, command and control understandings, etc., which came along with new weapons systems -- there were missiles to be accounted for. There was a different kind of submarine war with the Soviets going on off Japan. And the ways of patrolling and protecting Japan in the light of all of these threats involved different uses of the bases than had ever been true before. And negotiating all of that was really what kept us up at night. And thirdly, I'd say, very closely related to this business of the pattern of the relations around our military presence, had to do with the rather rapid switch of our forces from conventional weapon systems to nuclear weapon systems. So that it no longer was possible to bring in Army units to do something without considering nuclear weapons problems. This changed the debate, the political exposure, the tensions between the two governments a great deal when we came to try to negotiate around these issues of nuclear powered warships, and nuclear weapons.

Q: Nuclear-powered submarines, were they allowed? And there was a base for nuclear powered...

PETREE: We eventually got the right for them to enter port, but it has only been in very recent years that one of them has been based in Japan, down in Sasebo, and I think it's still there. They've reactivated a support group down there.

Q: Well, of course, nuclear weapons is a very sensitive subject and I can't imagine very many other places quite as sensitive as it is in Japan.

PETREE: That's right.

Q: You had obviously a successful tour from your point of view, I think, in Tokyo that time.
Mr. Piez was born and raised in Rhode Island and educated at the University of Rhode Island and the Fletcher School. After service in the US Armed Forces, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Frankfurt, Kabul and Manila as Economic Officer. During his career Mr. Piez dealt primarily with economic matters of East Asian countries, particularly Japan, where he served first as Economic Counselor and, from 1983 to 1985, as Economic Minister. In the Department in Washington, Mr. Piez was Deputy Assistant Secretary of East African Economic Affairs, and from 1989-1991, Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative. Mr. Piez was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

Q: Well then again here we come to 1971. Whither?

PIEZ: Ok, in May of that year, I was transferred. I stayed that long because the academic year for the kids in school ended about that time. I was transferred to Washington and assigned to the Economic Bureau.

Q: In the economic bureau was Frances Wilson the czar there?

PIEZ: She was administrative director, yeah.

Q: She was a civil servant but a major and a very positive person for the Economic Bureau.

PIEZ: Well she did manage the career situation of economic officers, whether they were in the bureau or not, by setting certain rules and working hard to get compliance. She must have had a prodigious memory for names and the qualities of economic officers. Every economic officer was supposed to be assigned to the bureau early in their careers. Once you started there, you were expected to stay for four years. You might switch to a different office or a different DAS (Deputy Assistant Secretary) within the bureau at the two year point. That was the way she got to know the people and she got to have some say in the kind of assignment they should have in accordance with what their talents were. She was very effective.

Q: My understanding I have talked about her influence. One thing was she basically raised the standards of the Economic Bureau. The other was she helped in her own way just looking to develop a very professional core who had not really been there before.

PIEZ: And she firmly supported economic training programs.

Q: I am sure she did.
PIEZ: I didn’t participate in the six months economic course that she successfully fostered. I was a little too early for that. But that training course really made a huge difference. I noticed it when abroad and I would be in charge of an economic section, and I would get a new officer out of that course. That officer really knew his or her stuff. If you asked about a marginal propensity to consume, he would know what you meant.

Q: Well you know it is one of the grand stories of development within the foreign service the political officers always dominated. You might say it was a much softer philosophy. You can write what you think about something. Whereas with economists you are trapped within...

PIEZ: You are supposed to analyze a situation and stay with the facts.

Q: And the recruitment of foreign service officers for political work tends more toward the BS [bullshit] side.

PIEZ: Well, yeah. A political officer could say well Marcos is going to win the next election. Now a wise political officer once told me never to forecast an election. Report what the experts and the political community are saying, but don’t yourself predict what is going to happen. Whereas, as an economic officer, you can’t get anywhere near that sort of speculation. Anyway I always felt I had plenty of scope. Reporting and analysis of economic facts and interests was always well received.

Q: Well where did you go in the economic bureau?

PIEZ: I was assigned to the office of trade in the section concerned with developing countries. “Developing countries,” of course, was how we described countries that had not developed. Whenever, in the assignment process, I was asked what do you want to do I always put down my interest in working with developing countries. That was tied in with my suggestion that I would like to go to Africa. Anyway in my new job we were working at the time on generalized preferences. The UN and the UNCTAD were very much committed to it. The proposal was simply that developed countries should charge zero duties on their imports from developing countries. The U.S. was still considering terms and conditions. Finally President Nixon decided that it should be done. Fred Bergsten was then working in the White House and I think he marshaled the arguments and wrote the necessary papers, and the President made a decision to find a way to do it. One of my jobs was to work on those details and to deal particularly with the Commerce and Labor Departments because they had interests in this matter. Zero duties on imports from so many countries could, after all, have impacts on American workers and business.

Q: Were you on the trade side the whole time, all four years?

PIEZ: Well no, and what happened, and maybe we are coming to a breaking point, is that I was telephoned quite by surprise one day by the Japan Country Director who said, “Come and see me.” He offered me a job, and knowing Frances Wilson’s rule, I said, “Maybe I am interested but I don’t think so.” Well I turned out to get the job anyway, and that was after I think 17 months in the Economic Bureau. Well I had come to a breaking point on GSP (generalized
preferences) because we had a complete legislative package to go to Congress with all of the agency support in place and it wasn’t a bad time for me to move on. But it was breaking one Economic Bureau rule.

**Q: Why you and why Japan?**

PIEZ: Well they had a need for an economic officer, not someone who spoke Japanese but someone who spoke economics. Because we had cabinet level talks with the Japanese coming up.

**Q: Well this is the Nixon administration, and Japan economics were a major thing because it had political implications in the Republican party in the south and...**

PIEZ: There were specific issues like that. Textiles was one, and there were general issues like the balance of payments and the trade deficit.

**Q: Also had the Nixon Shocks happened at that point yet?**

PIEZ: Yes, they had.

**Q: These were the two, one was going off the gold standard and the other was the recognition of China, which had hit Japan particularly hard.**

PIEZ: We could have easily avoided that by just tipping them off at the last minute that Kissinger was on his way to China. But at the last moment it was decided not to do that, to catch the Japanese surprise, but also to assure that the Japanese would not be able to leak the story.

**Q: Do you want to stop here?**

PIEZ: I think it is a good breaking point.

**Q: Today is 25 September 2009 with William Piez. Bill, where are we now?**

PIEZ: Well we are just at the point where I was re-assigned from the Economic Bureau to the East Asia Bureau, Japan desk as the senior of two economic officers.

**Q: What year was your assignment?**

PIEZ: Ok, it was early in’73.

**Q: And you were doing that until ’75 or so.**

PIEZ: Yes, until the summer of ’75.

**Q: Well this was right around the time when we were going through, I mean Japan loomed very high on our economic agenda. The Nixon shocks on gold but also textiles and China recognition.**
PIEZ: Well we had running problems and negotiations with the Japanese on textiles. We also had running discussions on Japan’s growing trade surplus with the United States and the world.

Q: Well what piece of the action did you have while you were there?

PIEZ: Well I was specifically wanted because for some years we had had an agreement with the Japanese establishing a U.S.-Japan Economic Council, called ECONCOM for short. It had been invented after the failure of the planned Eisenhower visit way back in 1960.

Q: Oh yea, I have ambassador MacArthur talking about White House Press Secretary Haggerty and him getting mobbed on the road in from the airport and the whole canceling of the visit.

PIEZ: Secretary Haggerty arrived at the airport, and his limo never got downtown I guess. There was a huge student demonstration particularly focused on the new security treaty.

Q: Was it Zengakuren or something that the student movement called itself. It had a name.

PIEZ: It was one of those Japanese acronyms. It was called Zengakuren (National Federation of Students’ Self-Government Associations). But anyway because the President couldn’t go to Japan, it was felt we needed another high level forum. It was decided to have the economic oriented members of the two cabinets meet roughly once a year in alternating capitals. I think that the first conference would have been held sometime in the 50’s. They had proceeded, not absolutely every year. When I arrived at the Japan desk, we had one maybe a year and a half before with the Japanese coming to Williamsburg, and then to Washington where, using the State Department auditorium, there was a meeting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce and others, plus their Japanese counterparts. The two countries really discussed the whole range of economic issues. There was a little story of some interest at that time. The meetings at Williamsburg were primarily social and tourism oriented. The main event was a big dinner for all the Japanese representatives in the very elaborate dining room of the Williamsburg Inn with all of its colonial fixtures. Everyone was in a reception room, and when the dining room was ready, the doors were opened and everybody entered into this beautifully arranged and outfitted candle lit dining room. One of the American foreign service officers overheard a Japanese saying in Japanese to another Japanese, “They must have had a power failure.” I think that is a good illustration of cultural difference. The Japanese had no familiarity with the idea of a candle lit dinner. That was a first for them.

Q: What were our concerns?

PIEZ: My job was to make arrangements for the next ECONCOM, which was scheduled for June of ’73. They brought me in without quite saying we are dropping this hot potato into your lap. It was like a presidential visit in that you needed a complete briefing book for all the U.S. cabinet members with a paper on every issue that was going to come up or might come up, and there were a lot of them. Every U.S. agency with an interest in Japan, and there were many, contributed to the preparations and all briefing was cross-cleared with them. We bureaucrats were up to our necks, and this was before the time of word processors.
Q: There must have been a lot of coordination between the Treasury and the White House and all this.

PIEZ: Oh yes. The first step was an inter-agency meeting. I think it was nominally at the deputy assistant secretary (DAS) level, but many agencies sent lower level people. That was Ok because the lower level people are often better informed about the particulars. At that meeting there was agreement on all the topics we thought should be covered and every agency contributed to that list.

Q: Well the list at a certain point must have gotten way too long didn’t it?

PIEZ: Well actually I think we had it pretty well under control, and there was always the possibility of combining topics. It had to be judiciously organized so that every agency knew they were full participants. One way you did that was to parcel out the initial drafting, which we did. Treasury got to write on all of their own issues, for example, as did Commerce and Labor and other agencies.

Q: Were you drawing on what had gone on in the year before?

PIEZ: Very little. I looked at the book and the record of the previous Williamsburg ECONCON and realized most of that was history. We had moved on. Now we had exchange rate issues. The yen was still fixed at 360 and Treasury was beginning to show an interest in that and the implications of Japan’s fixed rate.

Q: Had we already gone off the gold standard by that time.

PIEZ: That was one of the shockus when Nixon had announced that the U.S. would no longer buy or sell gold at $42.00 an ounce.

Q: That must have caused a real dislocation in financial relations.

PIEZ: Well I think in the event the changes really weren’t that great. The Japanese still had a fixed dollar price for the yen and they didn’t change it until much later. They were able to defend it. Foreign exchange markets weren’t telling us the yen was improperly priced, but there were still questions about it. The Japanese kept the Yen stable by using surplus dollars to buy U.S. Treasury securities. It worked, but later on those issues certainly had to be dealt with.

Q: I particularly think of textiles because Nixon’s political base had moved into the south which was textile country, so he was particularly sensitive to the textile things. The Japanese at that time were a textile country before they had moved beyond that. How did that play out?

PIEZ: Well we had annual negotiations with the Japanese over textile quotas. Year by year those negotiations became ever more complex because the quota was split up into categories, blouses, dresses, underwear, men’s trousers, even textile findings, a category which comprised things like waist linings and pockets and parts of, say, men’s trousers. The Japanese had a quota for a
certain number of those “findings” which they could ship to the U.S. U.S. companies would then sew those into the trousers they were making. You had various interests involved. Some people in the United States wanted those quotas to be quite high, retailers for example. There were others who thought no that was really a bad idea. I remember at one point Nixon had appointed a former Chicago bank president named Kennedy as chief textile negotiator. He was given the rank of ambassador, and he was given access to the White House pool of aircraft, so he would arrive on an official aircraft to conduct those negotiations. He came to the Philippines when I was there.

Other issues, especially market access problems faced by U.S. exporters became important. We had annual talks on those problems also.

Q: What sort of role did the Japanese embassy play at this point?

PIEZ: I don’t think they had a major role in most of the negotiations. The negotiations for the most part tended to take place in Tokyo. Perhaps one reason was that the Japanese liked it that way because then all of their agencies could be represented, and their presence in the room was always double or triple the number we had. They liked to bring in junior officers for training and experience and note taking.

Q: Well did you find, you almost were negotiating with two powers. One with the Japanese national interest at the time, but also the Japanese bureaucracy. Did you almost feel that the bureaucracy which can in many countries become dominant just because they can say no. Did you find them a power to be reckoned with, or did you get decisions at the top and they would be translated down the line?

PIEZ: Well, the Japanese bureaucrats certainly were a power to be reckoned with. The Japanese had this concept of administrative guidance. It was called “gyoseishido” In Japanese it came up so often that even Americans untrained in the language would call it “gyoseishido.” Anyway the bureaucrats could take advantage of some pressure from us because it allowed them to go to their industry people and say, “This is what you need to do.” They liked being in that position since we would be strengthening the authority they already had. The interest of the industry was not necessarily to eliminate the quota. They wanted to resist on principle, but they did a good business under quotas because then they could plan their production in detail, and each company would, for example, have a quota share of so many men’s shirts, allowing it to ship say 50,000 men’s shirts. They would say Ok, we are going to do 5,000 a month, and we are going to have two months off for refitting the production line for next year’s fashions. We will auction our production to the big American retailers. They could make a lot of money. And the market in the U.S. was not flooded with competition, so they got pretty good prices.

Q: As we were dealing with the Japanese at that time were countries such as Thailand important? Obviously China was not in the business.

PIEZ: Not at that time.

Q: At that time were you but also others people looking at how the world was going to change,
Japan was going to move more into electronics. Were you watching a moving stream where the stream is moving to a different area.

PIEZ: It was definitely a moving stream. They were big in electronics and big in autos. At one point a bit later in my career we negotiated TV quotas with Japan. They got a quota to ship us about 1.8 million TV sets a year. Later we negotiated automobile quotas with Japan. Those were in effect for about three years.

Q: I have to say that when you think about this, we make a big deal about sort of free trade and all. But here you worker bees in the State Department and elsewhere were sitting around and saying Ok, you can make so much and you can send so much. This isn’t free trade. This is regulated trade.

PIEZ: Definitely. Free trade in theory, quotas as a matter of practice. But I will say this about textile quotas. I found that, although so many countries were highly competitive in textile and clothing production, when I wanted to buy clothing for myself or my family, we bought in the United States. We ordered from Woodies. Why? Because, although the quotas were protecting the U.S. industry, the best quality, the best selection, and the best prices were obtained in the United States, even though the products might have been imported. We could go to Hong Kong or Korea. We did not find textiles or clothing there that was better than clothing from home. If you want a not so great suit, have it custom made in Hong Kong. It is an anomaly but what I think it tells us is that, although a number of economists have figured out that our textile quotas were quite costly to the American consumer, if you were a smart buyer, the quotas weren’t really hurting.

Q: Were you dealing with anything else or was this pretty much it?

PIEZ: We started off dealing with ECONCOM. That ECONCOM was held in ’73 in June. It was so successful that we never had to have another (ironic tone). No, in fact what happened was that the Jerry Ford administration broke the ice and President Ford went to Japan. There were no demonstrations, and everything went beautifully. It was worked out in a very interesting way. The Emperor wanted to come to the United States and because of the fact no American president could go to Japan at that time there were reservations about this. But eventually it was worked out. The Emperor came to the United States, which he very much wanted to do, and the visit was a public relations success. That was all you could ask because the Emperor had no political role whatsoever. With that event as background, Japanese good manners could not fail to invite the U.S. President to visit Japan and receive him warmly.

Q: Well, he got along. He was very much a part of the war with the United States.

PIEZ: Oh yes, but he came to the United States, and then President Ford was able to visit Japan without any untoward events. And after that we could exchange presidential visits, and Japan also eventually hosted the group of eight (G-8), which would involve a presidential visit as an add on. That high level back and forth became part of the structure of the relationship, and we didn’t need ECONCOM any more.
Q: Well it is interesting to go back to that time because we haven’t been since the Eisenhower visit, if your chief of state can’t go to a country, it does complicate things. That puts a reservation on things. It is not that things are awful but it doesn’t speak to a full relationship.

PIEZ: You can compensate any way you want to and you may be able to deal with every political issue, but there still is a gap at the top.

Q: Yeah. Did you get involved in anything else?

PIEZ: Immediately after ECONCON we began to become much more involved in the exchange of regular negotiations with the Japanese on issues like textiles. Michael Smith was a foreign service officer who eventually became our top textile negotiator. I started dealing with him when he was in the economic bureau office of textiles as a working level officer. He and I became pretty good friends. Whenever he was negotiating with the Japanese and later on even with other countries, I tended to be involved, one of the people at the table.

But one example that might have escaped notice was the subject of cigarettes and tobacco. We had repeated negotiations with the Japanese on the subject of their informal controls over imported cigarettes. Interesting history there because during the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese were literally running out of money, and they went to the New York bankers who said, “We need some security if we are to lend to you. What you might do is set up a tobacco monopoly because that will be very profitable and it will give you the means to service the loans you are asking for.” The Japanese said, “Oh, that is a smashing idea.” And they did it. That tobacco monopoly still existed in 1973 and still exists today, although it is not as strong a monopoly.

Q: Tell me in the country of Japan what a tobacco monopoly means.

PIEZ: Well it meant that the production and marketing of all tobacco and cigarettes was controlled by a government agency.

Q: For sort of snob appeal and all, American brand cigarettes for better or worse, maybe for worse, are desired by people, Lucky Strikes, Camels and all of that. I mean would the Japanese buy them and sell them?

PIEZ: They would, but under Japan tobacco monopoly control. The monopoly would buy them all packaged and ready to go and they would arrange for their marketing in certain tobacco outlets. The monopoly would offer foreign brands only in a limited number of tobacco outlets, thus holdings down sales. Advertising was limited, and advertising of foreign brands was subject to additional limits. These could be quite subtle, such as never advertising a foreign brand on tobacco delivery trucks. Imported brands paid import duty at rather high rates. Local and provincial taxes were also imposed at equal rates for all brands.

Q: With stamps. Revenue stamps.

PIEZ: Yes, of course they would have the Japanese revenue stamps. But the package looked very
like the American package because that is what the Japanese consumer wanted.

_Q: Was there any feeling that you are dealing with a deadly poison. I mean we know today that smoking kills thousands of people._

PIEZ: American negotiators were well aware of that. We would go into negotiations with the Japanese and their negotiators would all be smoking. None of the Americans would. I remember we had negotiations where we had ten or a dozen American representatives at the table and not a single one of them smoked.

_Q: That is interesting because it was 1964 that the surgeon General’s report came out. I knew the year because that is when I quit smoking._

PIEZ: Well by the late 70’s many Americans weren’t smoking.

_Q: Americans of sort of the educated level had pretty well stopped._

PIEZ: Yeah, I mean…

_Q: Did you feel any twinges of guilt?_

PIEZ: Oh yeah, and there were some Americans on our side who were saying we really shouldn’t be promoting these cancer sticks. But the response was we were not promoting them. We are only asking the Japanese to treat the imports the same way they treat the domestic product.

_Q: How did the negotiations come out?_

PIEZ: Well in negotiations we said to the Japanese, “If you want to solve the problem, you will only be allowing the market to work. In other words you will let Japanese cigarette buyers buy foreign brands as they want, and not limit the supply, and not limit the number of outlets that can carry them, and you will either abolish the tariff or abolish the monopoly.” Well they weren’t about to abolish the monopoly. But they did finally abolish the tariff.

_Q: In your experience particularly in the 70’s you found that Americans and Japanese could reach agreements._

PIEZ: Oh yes.

_Q: I mean this wasn’t a matter of both sides stonewalling._

PIEZ: Right. And interestingly enough as I look back on it, I cannot really recall a situation where the Japanese really gave up anything important to them. They would ease up on the beef quota. They would throw in 10,000 additional tons of beef this year, “But don’t ask us for the same next year,” they would say. “It is not a precedent.” On all of these issues we would make some progress. Our negotiators would go home and say, “Well here is half a pound of bacon. It
is not a whole pound but it is something.” We were able to manage the relationship that way. As I look back on it, the Japanese, the tobacco monopoly still survives. It is still an important source of revenue for the Japanese government. I suspect that demand for cigarettes overall in Japan has tapered off a bit, and the American market share sort of settled in at around eight or ten percent. But we resolved issues.

Q: Were there any other issues you were particularly involved in?

PIEZ: Well we had long running negotiations over the Japanese managing of the exchange rate, and by degrees they backed off on their market interventions. Treasury was the lead negotiator. The yen is now maybe 93 to the dollar instead of 360. However, the details of the negotiations were quite fully controlled by the Treasury Department. That was a proper role for them. My experience with Treasury was when you met them in an inter-agency meeting preparatory to dealing with the Japanese or anybody else, they were smart and tough and very demanding. But when they sat down with the Japanese they were skilled diplomats in their approach. They were very cool and correct in dealing with the Japanese. They might tell me we have really got to pound the table, but when they talked to the Japanese they weren’t pounding the table, but they were persuasive.

I recall one Treasury negotiator who was prepared to be quite tough on the Japanese representatives. The day before the talks opened he went shopping and lost his wallet with money and his passport. He went back to a store he had visited and they sent him to the local police station. It was nearby. In Japanese cities small police posts can be found in every neighborhood. At the police post he found his wallet had been turned in with money and papers untouched. His impatient attitude with Japan changed remarkably after that. I would not say he backed off on any negotiating essentials, just that he became more patient.

Once I lost my wallet in a hotel restroom. I did not miss it until I got home and found that the hotel had already phoned to tell my wife that they had it.

Q: You know sort of knowing the Japanese pounding the table really didn’t work very well did it?

PIEZ: No.

Q: It just wasn’t negotiating.

PIEZ: In Japan if you lost your temper, the Japanese concluded that it was a moment of insanity that will pass. And it would.

STANLEY ZUCKERMAN
Japan and Korea Program Monitor, USIA
Washington, DC (1973-1974)
Mr. Zuckerman was born and raised in Brooklyn, New York and educated at the University of Wisconsin. After service in the US Army, followed by newspaper reporting and a position with the Governor of Wisconsin, he joined the USIA Foreign Service in 1965. He subsequently served as Information, Press and Public Affairs Counselor in Congo, Belgium, Mexico, Canada and Brazil. He also had several senior level assignments in Washington at USIA and the State Department. Mr. Zuckerman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

ZUCKERMAN: Well, they put me in the East Asian bureau coming out of Korea, and gave me the Japan and Korean programs to monitor. I was, of course, very familiar with the Korean program. We had a very interesting program underway in Japan which gave rise to a good deal of controversy within the agency. Alan Carter was the PAO, and he was developing a very experimental program that was upsetting some of the old timers in the Agency, in part because Alan was getting the attention of younger officers in other posts who wanted to put some of his innovations into their own programs. Alan had been the director of our public affairs program in Vietnam as the war drew down, and had held other senior position. He had run the motion picture and television division for awhile. Later on, he was the deputy director of a division that went under various names but was essentially the central programming division of USIA.

Alan was trying to institute a program in Japan that took account of its very advanced appreciation of design, its outstanding educational system, and its deep interest in and concern over the impact of US policy on its own security and its economy. His approach corresponded more directly with the kind of analysis that a private public relations firm might make in dealing with the affairs of a client. The audience was more thoroughly analyzed than in most programs to identify the key people who the post wanted to reach. Every program that was developed was carefully thought out, and had a beginning, a middle and an end. It ended with an evaluation by officers who did nothing but evaluate the work that was done and made an effort to candidly assess its strengths and weaknesses. He had certain theories, one of which was that we did our best work when the programming, whether they were conferences or video or film showings or lectures, took place in our own facilities. Japan, certainly Tokyo was a difficult place to get out to the institutions we dealt with – media, educational, governmental, arts – because of the size of the city, the traffic and the dispersion of those institutions. And he felt that once we brought them into one of our centers, (and we had centers in six cities, Sapporo in the north, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, Fukuoka, and Okinawa) we could create an American experience.

He also seemed to some observers to have rules that were extremely rigid and unrealistic. I remember one instance in which they were having a major conference on US Japanese relations and needed a high ranking official participant from Congress or the Executive Branch. I went to the director of the agency, James Keogh, who was able to get the then minority leader of the U.S. Senate, Hugh Scott, to agree to do an interview with the Japanese audience from a studio in the Voice of America. The problem was that Scott, given his schedule, could agree to participate in principle but had to withhold firm confirmation until we got closer to the date in question, because he had no notion of what the Senate’s calendar would be on that date. Because all of our programs involving important people always ran the risk of falling through and disappointing our audiences, Alan had set a deadline for all speakers to absolutely confirm their participation no later than three weeks ahead of the event so that the post could do all the preparatory work, print
the biographies and all of the displays that were necessary to create this total experience that he had in mind. He called me up at dinner time in Washington, to say, “We are going to have to pull the plug on Senator Scott, because the three weeks are up.” I said, “Alan, you can’t do that. He is not only a leader of the U.S. Senate; he was personally recruited to do this program by the director of the Agency. We just have to wait and keep our fingers crossed and try to have a backup set up in case it falls through.” Well we went to the mat on it and Alan understood that it wasn’t going to help his program any if I had to tell the director of the Agency that we’re pulling the plug on the Minority Leader of the Senate. Ultimately Senator Scott did appear and made an outstanding presentation.

Sometime after that an inspection of the post was carried out, led by a notorious opponent of the Japan program, that returned scurrilous findings. One of the inspectors noticed that a picture of President Ford was pasted on a square block, a design feature, and he took it to mean that the post was conveying the message that the president was a blockhead. The inspection report was full of silly observations like that which made it plain that the inspection had been set up to do Alan Carter in, to do the program in. I had mixed feelings about some aspects of the program, but it certainly did not deserve that kind of treatment. It was achieving a lot in an environment that was far more culturally complicated than was true of most of our posts. Alan came to Washington and participated in the kind of face to face showdown that was reminiscent of what Erasmus must have faced in challenging 16th century Catholicism, because the dispute was both theological and political. Alan survived, but the real effort of his opponents was not to destroy the program in Japan but to make sure that nobody else tried to copy it. Well, this was a new experience for me. I had never truly worked in Washington before except for a brief period a few months before I went to language training and then to Africa. The other year I was in Washington was spent at Johns Hopkins. It gave me a totally different picture of the kind of problem that you are not aware of in the field, particularly of the bureaucratic infighting. It was a useful exposure for me once I had major overseas assignments of my own, and prepared me for handling relations with Washington from abroad.

Q: Well did you mean it really sounds like you are up against a religious experience on one side or the other. People were Carterized or weren’t Carterized. Did you get any feel for this? Why were people so adamant?

ZUCKERMAN: Some of it I guess was politically tinged, but I think more of it came from the old way of doing business in the Agency, in which a public affairs officer turned over his card file to his successor with the names of his contacts. Well, we had gone through several iterations of trying to keep really coherent records of people we had contacted, when they had been contacted, what programs they had participated in, what we knew of them, followed their careers. But Alan developed this to what some felt was extremes, almost a secular catechism. I couldn’t second guess that. I had visited Japan when I was in Korea, but when I was assigned to back up the program in Washington I spent a month visiting all of the posts and getting a feel for their program. I started in Sapporo on the northern island of Hokkaido and ended up in Okinawa. When I got back to Tokyo Alan was waiting for me with fire in his eyes because he had been getting reports back from each of the branch posts of questions that I was asking which gave him the impression that I was being critical. We had a real set-to, but I observed to him that his branch posts were manned by very young and inexperienced officers, some on their very first
assignments after their training assignments, who had nothing to compare the Japan program with. They were obedient practitioners and followers of his system, but had little sense of the need to sometimes color outside of the lines. I showed him the schedule that awaited me at my hotel in Sapporo, where I arrived on a Thursday. Nothing was scheduled that day, Friday was a local holiday, and my schedule showed several appointments on Monday and Tuesday. I called the young man, who was single, at home and invited him to dinner that night. We had a nice talk. I said, “Maybe there are some people who I would like to meet despite the holiday or on the weekend. The schedule was so loose I was wasting a tremendous amount of time. I finally gently conveyed to him the understanding that I wasn’t there as a tourist. So we did get some things going, and I did meet some people and learned something about the program. By the time we got finished talking he was able to concede that perhaps there was not enough awareness at the post of how beneficial it would be to the whole program if I understood and could represent the posts’ program in Washington.

Q: Did you get the feeling that had been conveyed to you, here is a guy from Washington and he is trying to screw us or upset or do it in, so let’s not open up too much. Were they were suspicious of you?

ZUCKERMAN: No question there was suspicion. I don’t think on Alan’s part, but I think these people had been visited by many people interested in what they were doing, and the program had been the object of concern by some of them. Alan knew what was going on in Washington; that the old guard felt that he was trying to be scientific about something that was ultimately intuitive. Well, I didn’t come to be a convert to the church of Alan Carter because I didn’t think it was applicable to all situations. But I believed that it was extremely important that he try to see if that system would work in a place where we hadn’t done a very good job before. Japan had media circumstances that were unbelievably more complicated than most of what any PAO confronted anywhere in the world, and were remarkably advanced. I mean when you had giant publications like Asahi and Yomiuri or TV networks like NHK, these were gigantic media empires. They covered the country by helicopter. He deserved a chance to see if his system worked in such an advanced environment. I think he ultimately did get that chance. I think when they did replace him, they sent out someone with strict orders to resort to more traditional methods of reaching people. I am not sure that worked better. I doubt it. On the other hand, I think Alan was not well served by having people at the posts who were so inexperienced that they were in no position to question whether all things in the program were effective or not. But nonetheless I admired him. He was one of the few people in the Agency who really had the guts to experiment with new techniques. I think they did wonderful things with their Cultural Centers. They redesigned them so that they were up to speed with Japanese design, which was extremely experimental, extremely full of wonderful new ideas which has affected our own sense of design in the US. So I thought it was a narrowness on the part of the Agency to be so skeptical and demeaning of something it should have been proud of. Well I only stayed in that job for a year, but it was a very good experience for me. I got a chance to visit Seoul as well and was able to keep in touch with the program and with the friends I had made there, Korean and American.

HANS BINNENDIJK
Mr. Binnendijk was born in the Netherlands and raised in Pennsylvania. He was educated at the University of Pennsylvania and Fletcher. During his career he held responsible positions with the State Department, the National Security Council and with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His other career activities include: Director, Center for Studies in Foreign Affairs; Director, Institute for Study of Diplomacy; Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies; and Fellow, Japan Foundation. He was also a member of President Clinton’s Transition Team. Mr. Binnendijk was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1996 and 1997.

BINNENDIJK: In the summer of 1973, I was given the opportunity of a lifetime. I was granted a Japan Foundation fellowship to live in Tokyo for a year—all expenses paid—with my new bride. I had applied for the fellowship; my work on Okinawa reversion was known in Tokyo. The Japan Foundation, a completely Japanese enterprise, had just been established. It was looking for a couple of people for their first fellowships. I had developed contacts with the Japanese Embassy staff in Washington—Yukio Sato in particular—now the Japanese Ambassador to Australia. He came to me one day and told me about the new fellowships; he asked whether I would be interested. I certainly was; I was eager to fill in the many gaps in my knowledge of Japan. I didn't for example know the language, I hadn't lived in Japan for any extended period. I was aware of the gap. I had done my Ph.D. work on Japan issues but knew too little about the country and culture. I saw the opportunity provided by the Japan Foundation as a way to enhance my knowledge of Japan.

There is no question that my work on Okinawa raised my interest in Japan. I was attracted by the opportunity to further study Japanese culture—and the comparison of Japanese and American societies with the former so highly structured and formal. The year in Japan gave me an opportunity to round out my education on that country, which, as I mentioned, started out as a job and ended up as a real interest.

The fellowship was very flexible. Under its terms, I could do almost anything I wanted. What I ended up doing was to associate myself with Sophia University. I taught a graduate course during the second semester on US-Japan relations; that was a lot of fun. One interesting aspect of my University experience was that I was teaching in the graduate school while studying in the undergraduate program—Japanese language. I wrote an article for a Japanese quarterly and several newspaper articles. We traveled throughout Japan and to Korea. As I said, my goal was to fill in my gaps of knowledge on Japan and I think I essentially succeeded.

As I said, we traveled widely in Japan. We visited Kyushu, Hokkaido—skied on the Olympic slopes. One recollection: Mary and I were looking for the perfect onsen. We found one in the Izu Peninsula. We went there and were sitting comfortably in one of the many tubs that were available, when we heard some giggling behind us. Along came Ed Schumaker, at the time a stringer for The New York Times, who was a friend. He was carrying a camera around his neck. He snapped a few pictures and I didn't give the matter much thought. A few weeks later, I began
to get letters from friends all over the US. In fact, there were pictures of Mary and me all over the front page of *The New York Times*'s travel section sitting--discreetly--in the hot tub.

By mid-way through the year, it became clear to me that learning Japanese was a major commitment. We attended classes a couple of hours each day and studied the language a few more hours besides that. My progress after a few months made it eminently clear that to learn Japanese would take me two or three years if not more. I would have to become a Japanese scholar. That was not the road I wanted to chose. I was sincerely interested in learning about Japan, but my first love was Europe. So I gave up on the idea of being a fluent Japanese speaker. Of course I gave my lecture at Sophia in English--which was fine since the graduate school gave most of its courses in English. Most of the students were Americans; there were some Japanese. I learned enough of the language to use it in social environments; I could not have used in any professional setting, but I knew enough to be comfortable getting around. Mary learned about as much as I did, but ironically enough probably found it more beneficial because later in her life, she was a Senate staffer specializing in Asian affairs.

We lived in Shinanomachi in Tokyo in a little apartment--since torn down. The apartment consisted of a 7 ½ tatami mat room--the size of a one car garage. It had windows overlooking Kao Hospital. Every night, we would get the futon out and spread it on the floor. That room was a living room, a bedroom, a dining room. We had to go across the hall for the toilet. The bath was down the street. We did not have a cultural shock despite the un-American living accommodations. In fact, I enjoyed the living style.

I came away from Japan with a sense of a very formal society--very conscious of hierarchy and the relationship of one individual to another. After drinking a couple of cups of saki, they do loosen up. Then they are a different people. They are so different from other Asian, like the Koreans. The Japanese world view was almost sheltered. They could not think in geo-strategic terms. I think the Japanese have learned how to behave internationally, but others obviously had concerns. One day I plotted out the changes in Japanese foreign policies between Perry and WW II. The line had peaks and troughs, causing some very rocky times for US-Japan relations. The Japanese are capable of radically changing their world views, but I think that the advent and blossoming of democracy in the post-WW II period will be a major restraint on Japanese military involvement off-shore. I trust the Japanese.

I did develop friendships with several Japanese. I broke through the formal barrier. I found it easier to establish a personal rapport with students than with the older generation. They had not yet entered the professional life. I was not too much older than they were; so we were able to communicate rather freely. I also made friends with some of the professors--e.g. Prof. Mushakoje who was fairly western in his outlook. And there were others as well.

Even in 1973, I think it was very clear that economically Japan would rise. It was during the period when Zbig Brzezinski wrote *The Fragile Blossom*. I always felt that he had understated Japan's strength. It had a lot of staying power. Its economy, already important, was bound to be of increasing importance in the world. It was obvious to me that Japan was moving very rapidly; evidence of that economic surge was clearly all around us. I was really impressed by the energy and dynamism of the people. They were willing to work incredibly long hours; they were willing
to live in ways that westerns would never find acceptable; they saved and saved and saved and spent very little on consumption. They placed an extremely high priority on their children's education--perhaps too much. They had all of the characteristics of a strong society.

Despite that economic strength, I felt Japan would remain constrained it terms of its security and military role. In part because of that view, I gained an increased appreciation of the importance of the US-Japan security treaty as a fundamental aspect of their orientation. The security treaty was the cardinal factor in preventing Japan from returning to its historical swings, which I mentioned earlier.

I had the opportunity to meet some of the Embassy's staff. I ran into Bill Clark once again--he now having been assigned to Tokyo. I used the Embassy staff frequently in my course. Mike Armacost, then the special assistant to the Ambassador, gave a lecture. It was clear to me then that he was a super-star in the making. I thought that the Embassy in general was doing a great job. As an academic, I looked at their performance more theoretically and I found that the staff performed well day and day out on a myriad of details, but when lecturing to my class could theorize and put the US-Japan relations as well as their day-to-day routine in a context which made it meaningful for my students--and me….

During our year's sojourn in Japan, we also traveled to other Far East countries, like Vietnam, Thailand, India and Nepal. We went to Vietnam as tourists because this was the country that had had so much impact on my life and I just had to see it. We went to Saigon and surrounding areas. By summer of 1973, the war was still on, although our troops had been withdrawn. There was still some optimism in Saigon that the South could survive, but it was clear that it was a very dicey situation.

In general, through my travels, I got a fairly broad exposure to South Asia. I had been in India previously while doing the Okinawa study. The abject poverty of that country is an image that one does not forget. It was also a country of contrasts with the wealthy, well trained elite at one end of the spectrum and the "untouchables" at the other. I remember well, the dirt, the heat, the visible misery. We went to New Delhi, Agra, Jaipur. We went from Delhi to Jaipur in third class-unreserved seats--wooden benches. We went with some people who had been in the Peace Corps. It was one of those experiences that are part of youth--third class on an Indian train! I remember sleeping on the floor of the car--I was worn out--with Indian bare feet dangling in my face. It was a fun trip.

Nepal was a beautiful version of India. I remember the airport in Kathmandu well--a runway on the edge of a cliff. I have a vague memory of one aircraft which did not stop in time and was lying at the bottom of the cliff. We spent about a week in Kathmandu seeing sights and soaking up the local culture.

The year in the Far East gave me a much better appreciation for foreign cultures. I think I acquired the willingness to listen and to try to understand other perceptions--more than I might have done so otherwise. I think it is too often our approach to top issues: "What is in our interests and that is what we need to protect regardless." The year in the Far East I think sharpened my ability to understand where another might be coming from and his or her cultural context. I
should mention that I stopped in other countries as well--Israel, Greece, France etc--for a week each. I came away with a clearer sense of how large this world was, how varied it was, how many different cultures it hosts, how complex it is. Spending a week in ten different countries gave me a lot of snapshot impressions.

We did not really encounter many anti-American attitudes during this year. The US had withdrawn from Vietnam; so that period was pretty much over. We were pretty warmly received where ever we went. We were young graduate students and were able to deal on a person-to-person level. We were able to see the countries as an ordinary citizen would; we lived very frugally as I have mentioned before. We wrote a number of papers based on our experiences. The most prominent was on US-Japan relations. In those days, the buzz phrase was "fine tuning." I argued that basically the relationship, by and large, was strong, but that it needed a little more firming up than the Embassy thought, although in general the paper was very supportive of US policy. That paper was published in the Japan Quarterly--a publication which I think does not exist anymore.

I think that the year in Japan serves me as a reference point because that was my last major involvement in Far East issues. As I think I always knew, my heart was really in Europe. After that one year, when working in the Executive and Legislative Branches, I concentrated on Europe and Middle East affairs--with the exception of Korea--but the year in Japan was a touchstone to which I could always return. My wife Mary of course stayed with Far East issues during her career. We both left Japan with a warm feeling towards Asia, but for me that was not enough to overcome my heritage. Mary had spent a year in Grenoble, France, but she did not have the same feeling of heritage that I had.

ROBIN BERRINGTON
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1973-1975)

Mr. Berrington was born and raised in Ohio and educated at Wesleyan University Harvard Universities. After service with the Peace Corps in Thailand, he joined the Foreign Service (USIA) in1969. During his Foreign Service career Mr. Berrington served at posts abroad in Thailand, Japan, Ireland and England, variously as Public and Cultural Affairs Officer. He also served several tours at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Berrington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Today is May 8, 2000. Robin you are off to Tokyo 1973. That tour was from 1973 to when?

BERRINGTON: 1975. In fact I wasn't even supposed to go to Tokyo. I was assigned to Lagos, Nigeria. Quite frankly I was not interested at all in going to Lagos, Nigeria then or now.

Q: Was that as a result of Secretary Kissinger’s GLOP [Global Outlook Program where officers were assigned to areas for which they had no background, as a way of stemming parochialism]?
BERRINGTON: Yes, exactly. I had already spent four years in Japan, two years in Thailand, so that meant six years in the area. For the personnel gurus, that was enough, so they decided to GLOP me to someplace else. We in USIS didn't use that term. That was really a State term, but the concept, the principle was the same. The PAO, a man whose name I have mentioned before, Alan Carter, as I said, he had really been there about a year I think, a year or two. He was trying to really reinvigorate, redo, modernize, update the USIS program in Japan. One of the ways he saw to do that was to retain a knowledgeable Japanese speaking, young staff rather than accept the typical personnel assignment of older or more experienced officers who were now in personnel eyes it was time for them to have a time in Japan. I don't know how Alan did it, and frankly I never asked him to do it. He told me that he would check into this and would I be interested. I said, "Yes I would be," and that was for me to stay another two years in Japan. So he must have talked to somebody back in Washington, and they got the Lagos assignment turned around, and suddenly there I was going from Fukuoka to Tokyo for an additional two years, which would have made a total of it six years in Japan. The assignment was to be what was called the program officer or the program development officer; the title kind of depended on which business card I had printed up at the time.

In effect the job was the ACAO, Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer for USIS’s program development. What that meant was organizing the speaker programs, the seminars, developing what Alan liked to call a packaged program which was…you identified say four or five program themes for the year. Say one was opening the Japanese market to American investments. Let's say another was maintaining the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Let's say another was demonstrating American achievement in science and other domestic activities. Let's say another was showing to the Japanese the innovation and imagination of contemporary American art. Let's say another might be proving to the Japanese the value of a democratic society, what is happening in American society in terms of civil rights, human rights, all of that. Now I picked those out of the air, but those were concrete examples of some of the things we were trying to make a central part of our program in USIS Japan in the early to mid 1970s. The concept was the program development office, of which I was in charge, would identify the ways in which we could support those program themes i.e. getting speakers, getting presentation books to give to people who might or might not have participated in the speaker program on the same themes. Perhaps even books written by the speaker. Not just taking any old speaker that USIA would send down the pike but actually identifying the best people in those fields, requesting them by name to USIA in Washington, having them come to Japan, not just for one or two days, but often for two or three weeks to go around to all of the six USIS centers, producing letterhead on which invitations would go out on which bibliography would be printed, identify the bibliography from the USIS library, send out if there any U.S. government publications send them out in advance of the program. In other words it was sort of a multi pronged approach in which we would try to support or promote that program theme through a variety of program tools.

I would work with the press office to make sure that they would be trying to place items in the papers or provide opportunities for interviews on television on the same theme. I used to call it the sort of the Mount Everest approach. A month or two before the arrival of the speaker and the big seminar, maybe a whole day long seminar, we would have small events, kind of preliminary events. These events were the foothills of the Himalayas. Maybe a month or a couple of weeks
before the event, we would be doing something a little bit bigger or more splashy. In other words, leading up to the big thing, the Mount Everest, the big seminar which might have been in Tokyo. It might have been in Osaka. It could have been in any one of our center cities. We would usually invite two or three people, specialists from the selected field. All two or three would participate in the seminar or big event whatever it might be, but then after that, they would go around. The team would break up so to speak and they would go around to the other center cities speaking on the same topic but maybe being a solo performer instead of the whole team.

For those people that we felt were really important out in the other center cities like Fukuoka or Sapporo or Nagoya or whatever, we would sometimes invite them in, pay their way, and have these Japanese lights actually participate in the big seminar that might be in Osaka or Tokyo. In that way we would kind of get a national impact, because very often these would be Japanese people in the papers or television or scholars who had some caché.

These would be people from our target audiences from each of these center cities. So a national conference like that would insure that the theme message would get out. Then we had an angle to all of this as well. Very often that person, if he or she had been invited in to a big seminar in Tokyo or Osaka, by the time the team of speakers split up and went out to the various center cities to do their solo performances on this issue, that person might then be the moderator for the program in the city when that person came through. So it was very much an organizational, planning kind of operation. When I had been in Fukuoka, I was very much on the front line. I was dealing with Japanese audiences, using my Japanese, being the spokesperson for the consulate, going out to various events. But this job in Tokyo, this planning job was basically an inside job. Most of my dealings were with the bureaucracy back in Washington or within the embassy itself trying to line up all these various materials and programming tools we had in support of the chosen theme, this particular seminar, this particular approach we had to the issue at hand. I must say I think we set the standard for a lot of USIS posts in presenting a full program like that, a well rounded approach to what USIS posts for many years had been doing but not in quite so planned and organized a fashion. We used to really anger USIA in Washington because we kept insisting on really high level important speakers. We wouldn't settle for just the familiar name and face. We often used to joke that there were a lot of kind of old time speakers who had been at the trough of USIA for years and years. Whenever Joe Blow wanted to take his trip to Europe or Asia, he would just call up USIA and they would send out cables and arrange for speaking programs and what, you name the issue. Whether it was relevant to their country plan or not is something else. We would not settle for that. We had to break a few eggs to make the omelet that we were trying to make.

**Q: Do you have any idea of some of the people who came?**

BERRINGTON: We had senators, we had congressmen. We had for example Herb Stein from the council of economic advisors in one of our economic programs. We had, arms control was an area that we did a lot in. Most of the big names, the names just, I'll have to go back and check on those.

**Q: How did you find that this interface worked, given the cultural differences? Americans aren't too aware of how the Japanese approach issues, how did you find this worked?**
BERRINGTON: It worked very well. The Japanese are...well first of all there are potential problems on both sides. Fortunately, the Japanese are very much into what you call a study type of activity. They are used to coming to a lecture or a speech by somebody with their little notebooks and pencils ready to take notes. It is almost as if they never left college or the university. They are always in a note taking mood. Whenever we would put on one of these presentations, it was never a problem getting an audience.

The more they became familiar with the idea that we were bringing in not just well known, name people but people who were extremely knowledgeable and accomplished in their fields. The more the word got around that you had to be at the American Center to find out what was going on, the less problem we had getting the kinds of quality audience we wanted. Before this program started, before Carter really instituted some of these reforms, too many American Centers in Japan has sort of relied on what I used to call the camp followers, the people who would just come to the American Center because it was heated in the winter or air conditioned in the summer. You got a free drink after the program was over. You know, the sort of people that would just hang around embassy or consulate operations like that. We tended to dismiss that and really went after getting, as I said before, significant, influential people in the media, political, business, academic, and other important communities. Because the Japanese were used to this kind of format of a speaker and an audience, they would come. Now the problem however, of course, is that most of our invited American speakers, not all, but most of the people we had come in couldn't speak any Japanese. Of course, the audience was largely a Japanese speaking audience. Some of the people in the audience could speak some English, but not well enough to really engage in a high level discussion on say arms control or trade negotiations or whatever. So everything had to be done through interpreters.

There was always that question of whether you do simultaneous interpretation or what we would call consecutive interpreting. Of course simultaneous is when one is going on the same time the speaker is speaking and the audience is wearing earphones. Consecutive speaking was where the interpreter would sit at the table with the speaker; the speaker would speak for two or three minutes; the interpreter would be taking notes furiously, and then he would speak for two or three minutes. The speaker would speak for two or three minutes and then the interpreter would speak for two or three minutes. It was always a debate as to which was the better way to do it. The simultaneous certainly provided a better flow and more spontaneity, except there was always that issue of how much accuracy because of just the need to keep up with the speaker and occasionally making an error, and how much would sometimes get left out. Sometimes the real flavor of it might not be there because the speaker was a fast talker and it was difficult for the interpreter to keep up. Consecutive was probably much better for accuracy and reliability, but it did break up the flow of conversation and for those people who might speak some English, they might tune out for two or three minutes. It was a little bit more awkward. So from the Japanese side there was always that problem of interpreting.

Another problem for the Japanese side is that we were interested in dialogue. Now Japanese from high school, university days on, the whole idea is for the lecturer, the professor, the teacher, the sensei in Japanese, he or she. I shouldn't say she, it is usually he. He would come in, give the lecture; the students would take the notes, lecture is over; students leave the hall, end. Questions?
No way! Exchange of ideas? Forget it! It is just not part of the Japanese system. What we were trying to do with the American Center programs is to encourage that kind of dialogue. In fact, we made a point of not calling these things lectures. We had another Japanese word that we used which was more an exchange of ideas rather than lecture. For many Japanese it took them awhile to get used to this. The idea of the speaker speaking for maybe 15-20-30 minutes and then the next hour and a half – for a two hour program, for example, the next hour and a half would be Q&A (questions and answers) or commentary from the audience with the speaker responding. For many Japanese that was never done. Once they got used to it, it was OK.

But the kinds of audiences we would bring together, well occasionally it might be a media only audience or an academic audience or a "politician only" audience. I mean one time I brought Mayor Koch out from New York. We just got him together with a bunch of young politicians. So that we might do a very specialized audience for something like that. But most of the time it was a mixed audience of all of these categories. The Japanese are very conscious about who in the audience is, well getting back to hierarchy, who is the sort of a senior group, who is the junior group, who is the in between group, who is higher than me, who is lower than me. It would be seen as very unsettling or rude if maybe one of the junior persons was the first one to speak up, to raise his hand and say “Mr. Professor, I would like to ask you about.” So whenever the presentation part of it was finished, there was always this, you could see a kind of rustling in the audience. People would kind of be nervously looking around in their seats. Everybody is trying to figure out who is the most senior, most respected person to kind of break the ice and get the discussion going. Once that got settled, then things would usually...

Q: Did you ever load the thing by going up to the top dog in the audience...

BERRINGTON: Does a bear do what he does in the woods? Of course, but it still was no guarantee that it would always work out that way. No there is a Japanese word called sakura which is the word for cherry blossom. In terms of audiences, I guess you would say the claue or the claue in question or whatever, that is called sakura in Japanese. So we would sprinkle our audience with all sorts of sakuras to make sure that. You know I would pull somebody aside and say, “Make sure you ask about this or don't hesitate to sort of get things going.” So those were the kinds of challenges in organizing presentations for a Japanese audience. First of all, to engage in dialogue, secondly, to break through - with our assistance of course the interpreters - the language barrier as well.

On the American side, there were always the problems that, well first of all just in dealing with Japanese behavior at events like this. Now this may sound rather silly, but the Japanese have a habit of when they are at a program like this, even though they have got their little notebook and pencil or pen ready, very often they will sit there with their head down and their eyes closed, and it looks like they are falling asleep. In fact, they are not. I guess it is just a way for them particularly they are listening to interpreters. I guess it is a way for them to kind of really concentrate and get the message. Frequently after the presentation American speakers would talk to me and say "Oh boy did I bomb. I mean look they are all asleep in the program." As a result, one of the things I would always do in advance of the program, and this was a very important part of the planning kind of preparation process is I would brief the speakers on just how the Japanese behave in these kinds of programs. Another problem for me and the speakers was the
Japanese seldom asked a direct question. That is almost considered rude. So what they would do is they would make usually a long winded statement about something, and maybe there would be a slight question at the end of this. If you were lucky there was something with a question mark at the end of this. But more typical would be this kind of long winded statement, and the implication would be what do you think of what I have just said. Americans even with the interpreter because the Japanese would be doing this in Japanese and the interpreter would then be rehearsing the process back to the speaker. Even with the interpreters in tow like that, a lot of the Americans would find this difficult to kind of figure out what the speaker was really after. The Japanese as a people are not given to much public displays of emotion or feeling or anything like that. So that it would be hard to get any kind of feedback from the audience if you were really doing well.

There wouldn't be, for example I would tell the speakers don't even bother with the jokes. I know that things go over well in America, but I assure you here most jokes just won't make it. Some of them would take my advice and wouldn't bother, and others would brush me off.

My point was maybe the audience wouldn't understand the joke because of the interpreting, but more importantly, this was supposed to be an educational serious occasion. Professors, learned people in this culture don't make jokes. So anybody who tried to do it would just be, you know, it just wouldn't go over. People weren't expecting it and didn't know how to react to it. This would often discombobulate the American speakers. If they weren't getting any feedback from the audience that things were going well and that there were some kind of response. So there were those rough edges. Then also I think as much as Americans would study up on the issues, and these were all very specialized, accomplished people in their fields,...as much as they would study up, and we would often before they came to Japan, would send them a list of things they might want to read and familiarize themselves with. Even if they did that before they came to Japan, once they got there, they would find the real Japanese attitudes and feelings about things so different from what they had expected. from the papers that often they would have to totally tailor their remarks or change their presentations.

Q: How would they find this out, the difference? I mean would you sort of be somebody with you explaining how, I mean did you sort of have to bring yourself up to speed on the issues?

BERRINGTON: Well first of all, I said the briefing was a very important part of this whole preparation process. I don't mean just the briefing a half hour before the program begins, which we did of course. Also we would arrange briefings with embassy officers in the various fields literally within a day after these people would arrive and got over the jet lag, we would schedule a full day of embassy briefings or briefings from other American and Japanese specialists in the country who would kind of bring them up to a kind of working level of how the Japanese understood or regarded these issues or how the American government wanted the issues presented. Of course the speaker was then free to use or disregard any of that information as he or she saw fit.

But probably as much as that, even more important was the eventual feedback they would get from their first presentation or two. They would figure out gosh they really do think that or they really don't understand that. It wasn't just at formal presentations because we would always as
part of this package program process; we would usually arrange media interviews before or after a major seminar. There were always representation gatherings, maybe a lunch or a dinner or a reception where the drinks and the food would certainly be abundant. The Japanese are, things always worked much more smoothly with a few drinks. They relax; they kind of let their hair down. It just is a much more sociable and candid occasion id there is a bit of liquor around. So, we would make sure that those kinds of opportunities were there for the speakers as well. In fact, let's face it, these programs even though it was allegedly bringing in the Americans to deal with the Japanese, to give them our views about positions, to present them with the latest information about X or Y. A lot of this was allow the Japanese giving it back to the Americans for the Americans to take back to the United States to their various constituencies there. So we saw ourselves very much as conduits for a two-way exchange of information, and given the high level and influential nature of the people who were participating on both sides, this was a significant learning experience.

Q: Did the Japanese have anything comparable to this in the United States?

BERRINGTON: They do, but it is not nearly as…the quantity is not as great. One of the big things we used to astonish our Japanese audiences with was that, let's say we did a program on arms control and we brought out three speakers. One of the speakers might be opposed to U.S. government policy. We would purposely go for a range of views. We weren't just trying to get the toadies or the kind of knee jerk U.S. policy supporters. We wanted the specialists in the field. I should add, we did this in cooperation with a very important institution so that they would be our co-sponsors, our co-hosts. It would give it more credibility to do it that way. But then the Japanese audience would then be very surprised that people, organizations as important as the embassy and our co-hosts would literally sponsor a program featuring people that were opposed, that were critical.

I must say it was not infrequent that our embassy colleagues would have snit fits about this as well. And people back in Washington would say, "Are you really sure you that?" We'd say, "Yes, we were really sure." We had done our homework. We had decided these were the people we wanted, and we were looking for a presentation that reflected the range of views in the United States. You can't understand the dialogue in the U.S.; you can't understand the political debate in the U.S. unless you know what is happening on both sides of the issues. This seems common sense. This is basic to the whole process of learning. I don't know why people would get upset about this, but some did.

Q: I am looking at the dates you were there, 1973-1975. We were going through probably the greatest constitutional crisis since the Civil War i.e. Watergate. How about that?

BERRINGTON: Well, we did not program specifically on Watergate. I mean there was really no need to do something on that issue per-se because it was being treated daily in the papers. You know kind of like Monica Lewinski, there was a certain amount of Watergate fatigue setting in. But what we would do is we would program on the more fundamental idea of say impeachment. How the impeachment process works or on some of the issues in constitutional law that would affect the whole Watergate process. And people knew what we were doing. It wasn't that unclear to them. There were certain issues that quite frankly there wasn't much point in programming.
For example, violence in America, the drug scene, why all of that is the way it is. There wasn't much we could do with that because there is not much way you can come out looking good or providing any answers that the Japanese don't already have. And besides it was only those issues that were really issues that directly affected the U.S.-Japan relationship that we were most interested in.

Q: How do you handle preachy topics which some might feel is none of our damn business, women's rights, treating minorities - which Japan had had and has a problem with. This buzzing around in their backyard. Were you feeling these were topics that in a way affected our relationship?

BERRINGTON: In a way they did, because they would affect the whole and I guess even crime would fall into this category as well, but nevertheless we felt there was nothing we could say about crime that would make people feel better about it. I mean it is there and there is not much you can do about it. Something like women's rights or civil rights, blacks all of that, yes we could say something about it. We could demonstrate not only governmental outrage and support for progress in these fields but we could also demonstrate a kind of local level support and reasons for this. The whole point of it was we found there was a potential problem of losing confidence in America as a nation, to hold together as a nation. If you realize this was a time when there was a lot of conflicting constituencies, you know, the women, the African Americans, the pro-war, the anti-war, the abortion, the anti-abortion and all of that. America in the 1970s looked like a very fractious, divided place. Our concern was that the Japanese would lose confidence in our ability as a nation to govern ourselves and to remain a leader throughout the world. So there was a need to show that some of these issues like say the women's issue or the black or whatever was part of an ongoing process of achieving greater rights for all of our citizens and providing more democratic opportunity. If the Japanese thought gee, we could use some of the same thing here that was their conclusion. We did not make that leap. We did not say we are doing this and you ought to be doing it here, too. Of course not, that would have been interfering in domestic affairs.

Q: And these were billed as basically explaining American society.

BERRINGTON: Of course, yes. And again, you know we brought out, I mean now that we start thinking of specific areas a couple of names. In women's rights, we brought out both Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem separately. They were fantastic, you can just imagine. On African-American issues we had Mrs. Martin Luther King. We had others as well, but she came out and did a program for us. We were looking for the people, and again these are not necessarily the people who supported the government line. This period coincided with the Vietnam War, and we would often have problems. One of them, some of my speakers who really, I would say look, you are here to talk about women's rights or African-American civil rights or whatever. I said, "If somebody raises their hand and asks you a question about American relations with China or Vietnam, that is your business whether you want to answer it or not. We recommend you don't because it just opens a can of worms and you are not a specialist in this field, and that is not what the point of this program is about, but you are free to do whatever you want to do." Some of them would take that advice and would say look, I don't know a thing about Vietnam. I am not going to get into that. Others would suddenly say, well now that you mention it, yes, I think the
Americans are mad dog, imperialists, suppressing the Vietnamese, or whatever it was. We would think Oooh. But invariably most of the Japanese realized that they have their people in Japan that are specialists in economics or maybe foreign policy but know nothing about issue X or Y and say silly thing there, so it didn't do much damage.

Q: I would think a subject particularly at that time, you mentioned Vietnam, would have been of major importance to us. This is a period of when they were pulling out of Vietnam. Both in Korea and Japan particularly, they were looking long and hard, and wondering if the Americans were dependable or not?

BERRINGTON: You just put your finger on the nub of it and that was Korea because by this time Vietnam was really winding down. There was still a residue of ill will, and there were still things to talk about. But the issue was if we had done this in Vietnam, are we going to do this in Korea too. We did a lot of, not aggressive programming, but we did a lot of smaller programming just to reinforce the point that look, we are in Korea. We are going to stay. We have been there since the Korean War. We have massed all those American forces. We have got too much at stake there. In spite of if you recall Jimmy Carter made a statement when he first was inaugurated or maybe during the campaign that he would withdraw the Second Division from Korea. Now that caused quite a stir.

Q: But that was a year later. I mean did the Japanese sort of as a nation or as a group see Korea not only their feelings about Koreans themselves, but see Korea as a very dangerous place if the communists were able to take over?

BERRINGTON: Well there is the old adage that Korea is a dagger aimed at the heart of Japan. Yes, I think most Japanese thought about these issues, were very concerned that there is always something ready to boil over there. Tensions were even higher back then than now. Yes, I am sure a lot of Japanese were very worried about that. But at the same time, they saw our constancy there as we assured, and we kept wanting to reassure, that we are not going to leave. We did.

Q: Were we able with this program to reach some of the audiences I think we would be interested in. You mentioned women, I am talking about influential women and people who were there, and also the young students?

BERRINGTON: Well the student audience was a big question mark for us. Obviously we wanted to get younger audiences. We were not looking for the presidents and the editors in chief or people like that when we attracted. We were really looking for what we call the next generation. Our target audiences, the key people were not the top people. I mean we had pretty much written them off, one because they were older, and two because they were just too damn busy. They couldn't afford the time to come to a lot of things we were doing or inviting them to. So we would go for the kind of mid level or slightly younger audiences. They would really be our prime audience for this sort of thing. This would include the assistant editors or as I mentioned before, the young reporters. In Fukuoka I would assemble a group of young reporters and meet with them about once every two weeks. We would have drinks, usually some snacks, and we would sit down and just talk about whatever was in the news. It was off the record, informal. They knew they couldn't quote me. I knew that there was no danger, no danger of
finding something in the papers the next day. They saw it as much as a familiarization process of how the embassy thought about these things and learning for them. It would be people like that, that we would be trying to encourage to come to these programs knowing full well that they would then when they got promoted and would move on to Tokyo, they would be in a position to do something with that.

Students were always a bit of a conundrum for us because first of all, the student audience is huge. You have got to realize that Japan is a country that values education very highly. Almost everybody goes off to university. The university system in Japan is just like everything else in Japan, it is highly structured and very hierarchical. You know, there are the top universities like Tokyo University and Kyoto University and Waseda and a few others. Then there are the mid-level universities, and then quite frankly there are the universities that are barely good enough to be called universities but they are. So given this huge student audience, how would we start attracting people? We couldn't just say, we couldn't send out you know, blanket invitations.

The way it works in Japan is that most students, there aren't things like student unions or anything where you could get the word up to people. The best way would be to attract them through student clubs. The clubs were not very well organized. They were a very difficult audience to reach, literally to reach in physical terms. One of the principles of this whole new program that Carter wanted to put into place was not only that you put out a high quality relevant program, but that also it go to the right members of the audience and not just once but repeatedly. So, we weren't inviting Mr. Tanaka once a year. We were trying to contact Mr. Tanaka once a month. If your student audience is that large, which it is. I mean even at a school like Tokyo University which is by most people's definition one of the top universities, there are thousands of students there. So how do you get back to an audience that large repeatedly? Well, you really can't is the point.

Q: In a way you were trying to pick them up I guess, once it had gotten within their career path which is a pretty good...

BERRINGTON: OK, so having come to this conclusion that as much as we would like to get to them it is pretty difficult to get to them on a timely and repeated basis, so we decided that we, you know, through the sort of ink stain or oil stain whatever your analogy, you get to the professors. The professors will get to the students; that's one way. Or you get to the students once they graduate. If they had stayed within the academic system to go to graduate school, that filters down the numbers considerably. By that time every important professor will have several graduate assistants. Now those were people we could get to, and their numbers were not so great, and they were knowledgeable about the issues, and they would come. So we would get to them that way, or we get to them you know, if they joined Mitsubishi or if they joined the Ministry of Finance you know, as the new young members of the organization, we could reach them there. We would very enthusiastically make the effort there. So we kind of discounted the student audience per-se, but we were really trying to get them as they moved into the next phase.

Q: Were there any segments of the society that you felt were either unapproachable or off limits or something?
BERRINGTON: Well, there were, as I think I mentioned last time, Japan is a government with you know, the ruling party has been the liberal democrats, the LDP. The permanent opposition was the socialists. The socialist party was split between the really left wing socialists and the right wing socialists. The right wing socialists were no problem. We could deal with them pretty quick. The left wing socialists for ideological reasons often refused to deal with us. They just didn't want to be seen with the Americans. The left wing socialists could sometimes be more rabid than some of the extremist splinter parties. The one party that by embassy dictate we avoided was the communist party, because we did not want to honor them with an invitation or give them the opportunity, the platform to say anything or do anything at an American Center or university event. Of course the Zengakuren type, you know, even though Zengakuren is a student organization, and even though it is very well known and would make a lot of noise and get attention in the papers, it was hardly a student group. I mean many Zengakuren leaders were in fact in their lower 30's. These were just kids who stayed in the system and never really graduated. They found their niche in extremist politics and that kind of student radicalism and they just hung around. We just never bothered with the Zengakuren because those people were not interested in dialogue. They were just interested in making noise and getting attention. So those were probably the only two groups that we consciously chose not to reach or just didn't think it was worth the effort.

Q: I was wondering about in Japan the court around the Emperor. Was this sort of an unapproachable area?

BERRINGTON: It is funny you asked that. I was the person in the embassy who kind of by chance just fell into becoming one of the main liaisons with the imperial family. The Emperor and his immediate family is, and I will have much more to say about this later on when my connections with them become even closer which they did in the 1980s and 1990s. The emperor and his immediate family is really non political. They don't say or do anything of a political nature. Of course that has a basis in the problems of WWII and Emperor Hirohito and the criticism about his involvement in war decision and various councils that either kept war going or ended the war so the culpability and the war guilt of that Emperor sort of made it difficult for any Emperor today to express any political views. If the Emperor did say anything of a political nature it would cause such an uproar. So the Emperor's position was basically a very symbolic one. He goes around and opens factories and you know, presides over poetry readings and very much ceremonial and harmless protocol. They are very much like the Queen of England. When is the last time you heard the Queen of England say anything political or substantive. So the imperial family we didn't really try to make any effort with. Of course for protocol reasons when the President would visit or other social reasons, yes there was a need to maintain a connection with the family, but as far as our programs were concerned, no.

Q: The greatest challenge in American diplomacy or any diplomatic establishment is between the various departments within our own government. How did you relate with the political section or other parts of the Embassy?

BERRINGTON: Pretty well. In fact I think largely because of my experience as the program officer for USIS and because of the high substantive nature of things were doing, I mean policy nature of things we were doing. As I have said before we weren't doing literary studies of
Hawthorne or you now, happy events on July 4 in America. That sort of programming was long gone. We were really seen as a very integral part of the embassy process of getting the message out. I was a participant. I sat in on all of the political and economic section staff meetings, more to pick up than to give. I mean I was more interested in what the issues were for me to then go back and start thinking gee should we maybe be doing a program on that. Of course, whenever we would do something, let's say we did a program on arms control at the Center, we would make sure to include a couple of embassy staff people from the political section or the military or whatever to be there just to sit in the audience. And invariably we would have a reception afterwards, and it would give them an opportunity to meet with our audiences. Because of the kinds of high level Japanese audiences we had, the embassy people were thrilled to be there because it gave them opportunities to broaden their contacts and meet some of the new young faces in the field. I think the USIS embassy relationship must have been one of the strongest, when I say embassy I mean political and economic or Pol-Mil (political-military) that sort of thing. It was one of the strongest kind of most synergistic of any embassies I have been in. The ambassador always supported us.

In that time the Ambassador was Bob Ingersoll, who was a political appointee, had been the president of Ingersoll Rand from Chicago and was terrific. [Editor’s Note: Ambassador Ingersoll presented his credentials on April 12, 1972 and departed post on November 8, 1973.] He ranks as one of the best ambassadors I have ever had, a very decent, human person, very knowledgeable about economic and trade issues, and great with the staff. He knew how to motivate and utilize his staff. He was ideal. As I say most of us regarded him extremely favorably. The ambassador was in support of this kind of a program. There might have been a few people around the Embassy who would joke, “Oh what's old useless doing.” [“useless” in this context is a negative homonym in English for USIS.] But by and large I think the kind of program we were developing and putting together there came to be highly accepted by the other members of the mission.

Q: What is there anything else we should talk about at that? It sounds like a very fruitful period.

BERRINGTON: You know it's funny, I have got notes and I have forgotten to bring them. I made notes last night and I forgot to bring them. We had a lot of high level visits. For example, Gerald Ford came out just after he became President [November 18-22, 1974]. Certainly our involvement in that was very strong. I remember I was Ron Ziegler's control officer. He was the spokesperson for the White House.

I remember there was one very funny incident where because of my experience in Japan before as a student, my language, and I was one of these people who did get out. Even though the program developing job was an inside job, I would still get out and meet people and try to learn as much about what was going on in Japan. I guess this is when my Tokyo contacts really started to expand. I got to know a lot of the people in various fields, not just the policy business politics foreign policy field but also the arts and other social fields. As a result whenever there was a high level event like that, the protocol office would invariably come to me and ask for me to help draw up the guest list for big receptions or big events that needed not just your parliamentarians and your foreign ministry and you know, not those usual suspects, but some other people to add a little bit of color and flavor and interest to this. So one of the persons that I suggested we
include, because I had met him a couple of times and he was very sociable, was the actor, Mikone. He came. This was to the Ford reception. The Japanese papers the next day just went bananas. The reason was that Mikone was going through a very messy divorce with his wife at that time, and he brought his girl friend to the embassy reception to meet the President of the United States. We thought this was terrific. We didn't mind any of this at all. It got us more publicity and it was kind of amusing publicity. But the Japanese just went berserk over that one. It was an amusing incident.

Another thing which I used to do which again is more in the fun category than in the serious side, but you know these are the things that make foreign service life interesting. Because of my interest in music and the things we would do with music and arts and all of that. Tokyo saw the first visit of the Metropolitan Opera. The embassy organize it, it was done through local sponsorship. Nevertheless, we arranged to do a big party at the embassy for all the singers of the Met, everybody. There were hundreds of people there. The orchestra, the tech types, the stage hands plus the stars and the kind of sub level stars and all that. I can remember for their performances they came to me and said, "Look we need some extras on-stage because all the performers are going to be Caucasian or black with enough makeup so they look western or look Caucasian. We can't have Japanese extras on-stage. They will stand out; it will look funny." Extras of course, are the people that wear the costumes, the spear carriers, the picadors, the toreadors, that sort of thing. They said can you help round up some extras which I did. For Carmen and for La Boheme we arranged for a number of men, women and children from embassy or the local American Chamber of Commerce. For most of those people that was one of the great plays of their life to as some people said, they made their debut with the Metropolitan Opera in Tokyo.

Q: Did you get to carry a spear?

BERRINGTON: Actually I got to dance. Since I was the one who put this all together for them, they gave me the plum role. I was a picador or matador in Carmen, but then in La Boheme in the act II scene, I don't know if you are familiar with it. It is the big café scene on Christmas Eve. Musetta is trying to make her sugar daddy very jealous, so she kind of plays around with people in the audience. At one point she goes and picks a young sailor and dances from one side of the stage to the next and laughs and gives him a drink and then moves on to somebody else. I was the young sailor. So there were some things like that in that time as well. These tended to develop because of the opportunities the job gave me to get out and meet people and make arrangements.

Q: You mentioned the high level visits. Over the years a Japan visit seems obligatory for ranking American officials. As a Japanese hand, what was the impression about this? Did friendships develop or was this just an obligation to get through

BERRINGTON: Oh, yes. I mean, it got to the point where some of them, I'd have to tailor my comments really. We are talking about those Japanese who were more sophisticated, more westernized and usually, I would say nine times out of ten, had enough English language ability where they could really make a connection. Yes, between economic policy makers, Japanese people in the economic policy business whether it was government or the private sector, yes,
there were some strong relationships developed. Which for us was terrific. We liked that; that's what we were in the business of doing. We would often, I think I mentioned earlier the international visitor program, send younger members of the Japanese government, private sector, business, academic, media or whatever to the U.S. and they would meet people there. Then when this person over the years as they both kind of grow up in the system, maybe now this person came to Japan as an assistant secretary or you know the vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce or something, they would get together with those people, dinner or maybe even a weekend. If say the person brought his wife with him, they would get together over a weekend and go out to their summer place. Yes, it was very encouraging to see the number of good relationships develop. Now I don't want to overstress this. It is not like there were thousands of these, but there were enough to be encouraged by this.

MYRON B. KRATZER
Science Counselor
Tokyo (1973-1975)

Myron B. Kratzer was born in New York City. He graduated from the University of Oklahoma and Ohio State University. He has worked for the Atomic Energy Commission and has served as Science Counselor in Japan and Argentina. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

KRATZER: I was in Japan from 1973 to 1975. That was to be a somewhat longer assignment but in 1975 I was asked to return to the Department to be deputy to Dixie Lee Ray, who after having been chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission became the first assistant secretary of the new bureau of Oceans and Environmental Science when the AEC was dissolved. I don't know whether I was required to take the job of deputy assistant secretary, but I thought it was a sensible decision to make.

Q: In 1973 to 1975 who was the ambassador to Japan?

KRATZER: The ambassador, when I arrived, was Bob Ingersoll, who later became deputy secretary. He was from the private sector, an industrialist, and a very fine gentleman. He left about mid-way through my two years there and was replaced by Jim Hodgson but pronounced "Hodson." He was a nice gentleman but I think somewhat less active as ambassador than Ingersoll had been. He had been Secretary of Labor.

Q: Obviously, Japan in those days was full of development in electronics? What were your concerns there?

KRATZER: Let me give you an anecdote, one which helps answer that question and which helps illustrate change that Herman brought about in the whole program of embassy science counselors. I was preceded by a gentleman named Bob Hyatt who had been president of the University of Hawaii. I forgot what his field of science was but he was a recognized scientist. Shortly before I got out there, there was about a two-month hiatus. Hyatt had already left to
become president of the University of Alaska. That's kind of a switch in climates! I knew Bob quite well, and he was a fine person but I don't think he saw the job in the same way that Herman did. When I got there, I discovered that an agreement was being negotiated which was of some importance in the U.S. view. It was an agreement with the Japanese government on energy research and development. The responsible officer in the embassy was the commercial counselor or commercial attaché, and I was, to put it mildly, upset by this. I thought that this was my responsibility, and I began making phone calls back to SCI and Herman and others. To make a long story short, the responsibility was changed and assigned to me. We did negotiate a useful cooperative program in energy research and development. I should have added that I did not carry with me out there the responsibility of AEC scientific representative, because there was already an AEC scientific representative there that I had worked closely with while I was at the Atomic Energy Commission and in fact had assigned there. While he was, to some extent, autonomous, there was, in effect, a little science office which, as science counselor, I headed. It included this gentleman, the AEC scientific representative, and two National Science Foundation people. Before I came there was also a representative of National Institutes of Health. That position was discontinued but later, largely at the initiative of the Office of Naval Research [ONR], but with my support, we set up an ONR office that included two or three scientists. It did not focus on military matters but on general science matters of interest to the office of naval research that perhaps had a naval aspect but were basically scientific. The science counselor’s office was a multiperson office and I, for the first time, had a junior FSO assistant. It all adds up to the proposition that it was a pretty active place. While I was there, one example of what one does was this negotiation of an agreement on energy research and development.

Another area toward the end of my stay that became very important and for which I took responsibility in the embassy was the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission. This organization existed from 1945 or 1946 onward. This was a joint U.S.-Japan scientific program to study the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, following them medically to see what was happening, to see what the incidence of various diseases was, and so on. It was very important scientifically but also very sensitive politically. At the beginning, we paid 100 percent of this. As time went on and Japan became more affluent, we became a little less willing to pay the full cost. We began to feel that they ought to fund a good part of it, maybe all of it. To make a long story short, while I was there, the Atomic Energy Commission re-negotiated the terms of reference of that body. Its name was changed to the Radiation Effects Research Foundation and the funding formula was renegotiated. I was the local embassy representative and an active participant in the negotiations by which we were able to reduce very substantially our cost of running the thing. It was an expensive operation in those days. I believe that the successful outcome of this negotiation was a major factor in my being requested by Dr. Ray to return to Washington to serve as her deputy.

The environment became an active issue while we were in Japan. The whole proposition of Japanese progress, which we saw very readily, was well along when I got there but it really built up steam. It didn't take a rocket scientist to see that they were outstripping us, particularly in consumer electronics, and I reported on this. I don't know who read my reports, but I reported extensively on this.

There was a very interesting event that took place while I was there. Boeing had been involved in the development of a supersonic transport. That was in effect terminated by U.S. government
action because of environmental concerns about it. It wouldn't have much effect now, but that termination put a considerable dent in Boeing's prospects. As a result, Boeing was looking for partners to develop the next plane, which they then called the 7x7. I'm not sure, but it may have become the 737. In any event, Boeing was in the process of developing a partnership with the Japanese aircraft industry, which was not a very active or advanced industry by world standards because Boeing needed help in the funding. It struck the Japanese as very curious that a private firm, Boeing, would be able to risk U.S. leadership in civil aviation, without any real consideration and approval by the U.S. government.

I was generally concerned that the Japanese were getting a lot of U.S. technology for very little; that they were getting U.S. technology largely through effective negotiation and playing off one potential supplier against the other, at very little cost. They were scouring the world, and that meant primarily us, for technology. They weren't self-sufficient at that time in the development of technology. They were exceedingly good then and, of course, now at adaptation and improvement but they generally derived their basic technology from other places, primarily the U.S. This was true in space when they started their space program with U.S. help. It was true in many areas.

I thought then and still do that you can't keep other countries out of these advanced things, and it makes sense to cooperate with them, but on a carefully thought-out basis of mutual benefit. I do have reservations about how well the government can run things like this, but I think there has to be a degree of governmental involvement in terms of which technology is made available and on what terms. That didn't exist. We were not really, in my view, getting what we were entitled to for transferring this large volume of technology. In any event, I felt that things were going on that people didn't understand at home. I guess that everybody in the field tends to have the feeling that headquarters isn't listening and I had that feeling in that position. The point I am trying to make is that there is a lot of science and technology policy regardless of what side you might take and how you report it. There was a lot of that happening between the U.S. and Japan then, and I'm sure it still is.

Q: You are saying this is pretty much one-sided as far as technology is concerned. Was it that the Japanese had management techniques which, at least in those days, was working well? That's what gave them the edge?

KRATZER: Well, I think, frankly, there was a certain amount of naivety on the part of the U.S. suppliers of technology. I don't think that they fully took into account the extent to which the Japanese could attain scientific predominance - technological, I think, is a better word - by exploiting and often improving on the technology they got. In other words, I don't think we fully understood that we were putting a competitor into business. I don't think we, as a country, or our industry, were being properly compensated for that risk.

Q: Was there much contact between you and, say, the commercial office to alert American business of what was happening?

KRATZER: I think the answer is there probably could have been and should have been more. I didn't have any problems with the commercial people other than the initial one of finding them
running the energy research and development negotiation and we were good friends, but I don't think that was the way they saw their job. The answer is there was very little. I would write my messages and airgrams, and I don't recall, in general, that I felt the need for any clearances from them.

I'll give you another example of this, IBM. The details were very complicated even then, and I certainly don't pretend to remember them all now. IBM was obviously, in those days, more than dominant in the U.S. computer industry. It was pretty much the whole game. It was quite unusual, but IBM had a wholly-owned Japanese subsidiary, which was in existence when I got there. Japan was a lot more closed to foreign investment then than it is now. It was just not done. They preferred technology licenses for their firms to foreign-owned subsidiaries and in the computer business had Japanese licenses, but IBM had a wholly-owned subsidiary. In exchange for that, IBM had agreed to license all of their technology and all of their patents to Japan for a period of time. There was also an arrangement, whereby, for every computer which IBM imported into Japan, there had to be, say, two built in Japan by IBM Japan. It was a clear effort, on the part of the Japanese to use the IBM arrangement to create a Japanese computer industry, which is natural. IBM knew that this was happening but felt it was worth it to have a share of the Japanese market. They also agreed that there would be a certain amount of export activity by IBM Japan, maybe to the U.S. I know that there were IBM people posted out there from the States that thought that the arrangement was not a good deal for IBM. My point is that I don't think anyone in the U.S. government had a clue that this type of thing was taking place. I did report on it. I have my doubts about the audience, but it seemed to me then and it seems to me now that these are things of enough importance that somebody in the U.S. government ought be aware of them.

Q: What about Japanese commercial people and officials that you would call on? How did you find them?

KRATZER: First of all, I had a wide acquaintance with the nuclear community before I went to Japan. I tried to keep that up even though there was an AEC scientific representative. The other people I met in all of the Japanese government departments and in the companies couldn't have been nicer. I had a local employee who was a competent interpreter. I couldn't have done it without him. Not so much to communicate with the responsible officials, because a lot of them spoke acceptable English, but just to set things up and to go through secretaries who didn't speak English would have been totally out of the question without local interpretation. I had good relations. I still admire the Japanese and have continuing contacts with many of their nuclear people.

Q: Were there any particular points of conflict that you got involved in between the Japanese government and ourselves?

KRATZER: The most significant thing that took place while I was there was the final Japanese decision to ratify the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They had signed it earlier but, for a variety of reasons, held off their ratification. I had a friend in the Japanese nuclear community that I kept in close touch with. I don't think that I had much to do with their eventual ratification, but I certainly had a useful contact. It was useful for them to know from people, including me,
that their ratification of the NPT continued to be important to the U.S. I don't think we had any major outright disagreements other than my feeling that what was happening was not being paid a great deal of attention to in Washington. It was just a feeling that they were rapidly gaining on us in a lot of fields, which is fair game, but largely as a result of the base of U.S. technology that they were very consciously using. There was nothing unconscious about this process.

Q: Did you make this known? Obviously, you were writing your reports in but how about other contacts within the embassy? Was this picked up as a theme?

KRATZER: I don't think so. Perhaps that was a feasible avenue to express my concerns, but I guess I didn't see it that way at the time.

Q: I am not sure. I probably would have gone but I am just wondering?

KRATZER: I don't think it would have gone very far, but I really didn't try. Another nuclear area that I had gotten involved in, which was a presidential initiative on our side, was uranium enrichment. At that time, the balance of payments thing was heating up, and there were a number of efforts being made to help reduce the trade deficit. One of these involved the proposition that we might get the Japanese to invest in a private uranium enrichment activity in the United States. That may have been a couple of billion dollar investment. It was big enough for the president and prime minister to talk about. I became actively involved in the discussions on that, which were between the private U.S. company involved, Bechtel, and the Japanese. There were a lot of interesting projects but I would characterize them in two ways, at least in terms of whether I found them interesting and found them worthy of reporting and spending significant amounts of time on: first, if they were really not science but technology; second, if they had policy implications. Anything in the nuclear field has policy implications, sometimes of a non-proliferation nature. The business of the rate of progress, that is our competitive standing with each other, also has policy implications. I don't for a moment think that I was the one who discovered it, but the whole issue of competitiveness with the rest of the world and Japan, in particular, became a really major issue in the U.S. several years later. I think it happened to some extent because we didn't keep our eye on it.

Q: Did you feel that Japan was at that time a really closed market?

KRATZER: Oh yes. Sure. I never knew how they accomplished it. Anyone who spent time there believed this was true. You didn’t see U.S. goods except in rare circumstances, especially in those days. You could buy their goods cheaper in the U.S. or in the PX than the Japanese could buy them in their own outlets.

One of the small but very significant outcomes of my assignment in Japan took place on a trip home from Japan. There was a conference of U.S. science counselors and attachés from around the world. I told Herman Pollack during the conference that I thought he ought to rename what were then called generally the science counselors to science and technology counselors. He did not delay. He thought that was a legitimate point and he did that. To the best of my knowledge, they are now called science and technology counselors or maybe minister counselors, I'm not sure.
Q: During your time from 1973-1975, was it a matter of some frustration you think?

KRATZER: Oh, no. I wouldn't put it in those terms. I was just trying to address the question of what I thought was important and interesting. There was so much to do that I didn't have time to be frustrated. I'm sure I must have been having feelings about who is reading my reports. I guess I still wonder, but I think I know now a little bit better than I knew then what some of the obstacles are to action in fields like this. It is very complicated. I still think - and I don't know the answer to it - that reporting by science counselors or science and technology counselors requires that a considerably higher level of attention has to be achieved for anything to be done. The whole issue of competitiveness, that became so prominent, is still unsolved, though now we think we have solved all the problems. I don't believe we have. I think there is still a major gap in many areas. Everything looks good because our economy is healthy and theirs seems not to be, but I can't believe that we can continue to have something like a $200 billion trade deficit, of which $30 or $40 billion is with Japan, indefinitely. I don't think that's sustainable.

THOMAS PARKER, JR.
Economic Officer
Tokyo (1973-1976)

Mr. Parker was born and raised in South Carolina and was educated at Davidson College, the University of Michigan and Duke University Law School. After service in the US Army, he joined the State Department in 1967 and was posted to South Vietnam, where he worked in the CORDS program. Mr. Parker subsequently served in Japan and Uruguay as well as in the State Department in Washington. His assignments were primarily in the economic development and management fields. Mr. Parker was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2009.

Q: And where- So that- the old building was demolished while you were there, and where was the temporary?

PARKER: Sort of up the hill behind it and just a plain rectangular three story building, very simple, very bare bone, small offices.

Q: But on that compound or the ambassador’s residence, the old chancery?

PARKER: Probably the far side of the ambassador’s residence. As I recall we were across the street if not from the Okura Hotel itself at least from that hotel’s compound. It had more property than the hotel itself occupied. So we were in the immediate vicinity; I think we were on the far side uphill of the ambassador’s residence and were there for a couple of years while the embassy was built.

Q: And were you still there when the new embassy was occupied or used? Or had you gone?
PARKER: No, I think we must have left before then.

Q: And in terms of your work in that period you were doing sort of reporting, same kind of thing, or-?

PARKER: Yes, reporting, a little bit of negotiating. We had an agreement with Japan stemming from the Second World War; what was this one called? An agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the trust territories of the Pacific islands, a lot of those islands that were fought over in the Second World War, some, maybe all of which, I don’t remember, had been given to Japan as trusteeships after the First World War. Anyway, we took them in the Second World War and we negotiated somehow with the Japanese an agreement under which they were paying claims of civilians arising out of the occupation and the fighting, something. So I was in charge of that little agreement which had a very small amount of money, I think a few million dollars, and the way it worked was this amount of money could be used for not to pay individual claims but for procurement by the trust territory government of mutually agreed items. So I did, I supervised that. I don’t know if I really did any negotiating or not; I did a little representation to the foreign office regarding aid to Egypt following the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, but basically it was mostly reporting. I’m just drawing a blank right this minute but my area of responsibility was Japan’s economic relations with developing countries. So that’s pretty broad but- so we were interested in Egypt, for instance, or the relations with the Middle East, economic relations, I’m sorry.

Q: And in those days, the early 1970s, Japan was taking on an increasing burden, responsibility in terms of an aid program for developing countries-

PARKER: Yes.

Q: -in Africa and elsewhere.

PARKER: So I paid attention to that. I mean, of course Africa, Southeast Asia, of course, so I paid attention to that. Occasionally there would be issues and I used to talk to them occasionally about aid to Cambodia. I mean, along with us they were providing aid to the Cambodian government so I would discuss that with them, information to be exchanged, questions posed and answered.

Q: Were your main interlocutors, the main people you had contact with about these various issues the foreign ministry?

PARKER: Yes. Not exclusively but primarily. I mean, I knew a few people in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI, or their environmental- do they call theirs the environmental protection agency? In any event there was some issue involving maybe emissions standards and how to measure emissions, pollutants, I discussed once or twice or half a dozen times. Again, you know, not negotiations really, just discussions and exchanges of information.

Q: Let me back up for a second; you at some point declared your interest in being an economic cone Foreign Service officer. You, college your major was English literature, minor in history.
You'd worked for a bank; what sort of economic training - you've had wonderful language training in your, what, five year Foreign Service career at this point, roughly; Vietnamese and Japanese. To what extent did you have economic training?

PARKER: I had nothing in college, absolutely nothing in college but my first job out of college was with the telephone company in Charlotte, North Carolina, and I used to walk around during my lunch hour, and as it happened there was a branch of the Federal Reserve right down the street, and in those days they actually had sitting out on the street, well the sidewalk, a tract rack full of all these nice publications by the Fed about the economy and monetary affairs and financial affairs, just free for the asking, so I started picking those things up and reading those so that's how I began to learn something and began to develop an interest and so that's why I expressed the interest in the economic cone when I signed up. So other than on the job in Tokyo and of course I could read, I could write, I could add, so those skills all served me in good stead but at that point it was just paying attention to what I read and what I heard and trying to be careful and accurate. So after Japan, which was the summer of 1976, my next assignment was the FSI economics course so I did that and then several years later I was assigned to, dare I say it, advanced economic training. I don’t know if that phrase is used or not.

Q: Yes, it is.

PARKER: I went out to-

Q: Or university economic training.

PARKER: University economic training; went up to the University of Michigan for a year so that’s my formal training; FSI, University of Michigan.

Q: Okay. Well you must have done well in the economic commercial section in Tokyo but that’s certainly, you know, in that period or probably today as well that was one of the most important embassies in that field in the world.

PARKER: Yes, yes. I’m sure that was the case. Well trade and in particular Japanese exports and our trade deficit and sensitive items in international trade such as textiles from the southern United States, those were all big issues and so a lot of attention was paid to quotas or threats of quotas or voluntary restraints on Japanese exports to the United States. It would have been done by the minister and/or the counselor and not somebody at my level. Also, the exchange rates were of great interest. I mean, in the beginning we had the post-war 360 to one exchange rate.

Q: I well remember that.

PARKER: Yes, yes, the good old days which finally gave way and the yen began to float, I forget, 1973, 1974, 1975, something like that. So that was an intense interest but Treasury had its attaché and an assistant attaché and occasionally even higher level visitors would come through. Paul Volker came through; what was he at the time? He was a senior Treasury guy at one point, wasn’t he?
Q: Oh yes. He was undersecretary for international policy or something in the early ‘70s.

PARKER: Probably in that capacity he came through. So not only did I not work on that issue but State Department people didn’t work on that issue either. They might have kibitzed a little bit around the edges but I’m sure Treasury guarded its prerogatives very carefully.

Q: In the period 1970, ’71, maybe ’72, I was in the embassy in Rome working as a financial economist, reporting to the Treasury attaché, part of the economic section. Was there a State Department counterpart in Tokyo in those days in the Treasury attaché’s office, do you remember?

PARKER: I don’t think so. I mean, maybe there was and I don’t remember but I don’t think so. I mean, there was the attaché and his assistant, who was another Treasury guy.

Q: Well in Rome we had- Treasury Department had a Treasury attaché and assistant attaché also from the Treasury Department and I was the third wheel, third officer in that office and did a lot of the financial- the macroeconomic reporting under their direction, supervision.

Who was the economic minister during this period? Was Bill Colbert still there or most of the time?

PARKER: Yes, I think he was there until I came home. I think just Les Edmond to begin with and Bill Colbert afterwards.

Q: Then who did you say replaced Peter Lande?

PARKER: Mike Calingaert.

Q: Mike Calingaert, yes. Well, all very strong, as I said before, economic officers.

PARKER: Well one would hope that Tokyo would get that kind of person.

Q: Right. Although, you know, it sounded like, from my understanding and recollection that you had by far the strongest language skills in that section probably, Japanese language.

PARKER: Well none of the four people I’ve mentioned had language skills. I mean, some of the other working level people had them. I mean, my contemporaries included, for instance, Don Westmore, who was an excellent language officer; Bill Breer, was a little ahead of me in Japan though we did overlap. We had some time in Japan together and he was superb at Japanese. One of my contemporaries was Ira Wolfe; I forget if he got he advanced training or not, to be perfectly honest.

Q: Okay. Well, we’re coming, I think Tom, to the end of our discussion of your time in the embassy in Tokyo. Is there anything else you want to say about your- that period of your career?

PARKER: Well I guess nothing immediately occur to me. I mean, obviously it was a wonderful
experience, both Vietnam, believe it or not, the war going on, and Japan, wonderful experiences. Japan was different from the first perspective and also because I was now married and since, as I said, we were married three weeks before going out there, we always considered Japan to be our five year long honeymoon.

Q: So you were there for about five years?

PARKER: Yes, about five and a half, yes, but I did work hard, I stayed busy. I don’t know that I’ve described any traumatic happenings to you; survived an earthquake or two, which always gets your attention. I think it was early in our stay in Japan that we had the first oil crisis; that was late 1973, as I recall. It wasn’t that I was brand new in Japan when that happened, but the irony that I recall was that just months before the first oil crisis the Japanese had closed maybe their last coal mine, which is on an island way up north somewhere. It was actually featured in a TV program within the last three or four months; I happened to see it, which made it refresh my memory enough to remember it this morning. Yet, how ironic is it to have shut down their last coal mine just literally months before the price of oil quadrupled or did whatever it did.

Oh, one very pleasant thing I will say about Japan at about that time, after the first oil crisis, was that the Japanese in very short order introduced car-free Sundays so we could just walk around Tokyo to our heart’s content and not breathe the fumes or fear getting run over or be deafened by the noise. Those were delightful; we kept waiting for the United States to introduce car-free Sundays but we never did.

Q: You lived in the period after language training in Yokohama; you lived in what, an apartment in the embassy housing?

PARKER: Yes, after language training we came back to the embassy compound and I think at the time there were three buildings, Perry House, Harris House and Grew House and in their turn we lived in all three. Our first daughter was born in Japan; that was exciting but not especially professionally relevant, perhaps.

Q: It is certainly important to you and your wife and to your daughter.

PARKER: Yes, indeed.

Q: Okay. Did you travel around Japan a lot or not really all that much?

PARKER: Not as much as we should have and I regret that. We had what seemed like a good excuse at the time. You also probably know the name John Emerson, a distinguished American diplomat who finished his career as DCM in Tokyo. It was felt that his career was stunted or retarded because he had been, I don’t know, peripherally connected with the China hands during the Second World War and although I think he himself escaped any serious blame or accusations, nevertheless a little something sort of rubbed off and it was thought that kept him from being ambassador or going further than he did. Nevertheless, the point is he had a very nice rental house in Nikko. Did you ever visit this place, Akamon in Nikko? Anyway, in our day there’d be a group of embassy people who were in charge of the place, we paid the expenses nine
months out of the year and he and his wife would always come for late summer and fall.

*Q:* *He was retired at that point?*

PARKER: He was retired by that time. So since we had the use of this wonderful house a couple of hours by train from Tokyo we spent many weekends up there and loved every one of them, but that kept us from traveling elsewhere as much as we otherwise might have so that was too bad.

*Q:* *Well I remember Nikko very well but I don’t remember that house or that property.*

PARKER: It’s very close to the big temple complex and to the red Sacred Bridge that crosses the river there, the Shinkyo, if you remember that, the Shinkyo.

*Q:* *Well I think with the consulates, I guess in those days, in Sapporo and Kobe Osaka and Fukuoka.*

PARKER: Yes.

*Q:* *I don’t remember a lot of encouragement to embassy people to travel, at least in my period officially. I mean, when we would- I was single at the time and would go skiing and you know, do other travel but not so much for professional reasons.*

PARKER: Yes. Well I guess I’ll have to say I never felt pushed to travel because if I had felt pushed I probably would have done it. Took a couple of trips under the auspices of the language school; they wanted us to do that as part of our training. It was required to go off somewhere and speak the language for a week. So I did that.

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**NICHOLAS PLATT**  
Liaison Officer  
Tokyo (1973-1977)

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**Japan Desk Officer**  

*Ambassador Nicholas Platt was born in New York in 1936. He attended Harvard University and Johns Hopkins University, entering the Foreign Service in 1959. In addition to serving in Japan, Ambassador Platt served in Hong Kong, China, and Washington, DC, and was ambassador to Zambia, the Philippines, and Pakistan. Ambassador Platt was interviewed by Paul McCusker in 1994.*

*Q:* *How long were you in Tokyo?*

PLATT: I was in Tokyo almost four years and I became thoroughly embedded in the US-
Japanese relations and the life in Japan. I really enjoyed it and the family really enjoyed it. It was a lot easier place to live than Beijing. The Japanese were a lot easier to deal with than the Chinese. And the contrasts were so marked. It was to me so interesting to have a full hands on experience in both countries. I had wanted that long before the Liaison Office position came up. I really thoroughly enjoyed it. I found the language training a great therapy from all the difficulties we had been through in China. It was just like going out and sawing wood.

Q: Then you went back to Washington, I gather, around 1978?

PLATT: I went back to Washington in 1977 to the Japan Desk. I was lucky. They were looking for a Japan country director and there were people more senior than me who had more Japan experience. The new Assistant Secretary was Dick Holbrooke who was a younger guy who was not attracted to the older Japan hands who were served up to him as possible Japan country directors. He asked me, who he knew, I had known him for years, whether I would like the job, and I said, "Yes." I was an FSO-3 and it was an FSO-1 job, so I grabbed it. I spent a year and a half doing that. It was during Mansfield's first year. Then I spent two years working for Brzezinski on Japan and Korea on the NSC. I really spent my time persuading President Carter to leave the troops in Korea. I did that in a variety of elliptical bureaucratic ways. Then I went over to the Defense Department to work for a year for Harold Brown.

The Carter years for me were very instructive because I had a chance to deal with the same set of issues but from three different bureaucratic points of view -- the State Department, the White House and Defense Department. We had a kind of round robin going in which people at the deputy assistant secretary level, all of whom knew each other, were taking these jobs one after the other. So we had a very tight coordination mechanism in which each of us were able to represent our institutions and their points of view, but not with the suspicions that came from not knowing each other and what you were dealing with. So, when Vance, Brzezinski or Brown were talking to each other about an issue that couldn't be decided at a lower level, they not only knew what they were supposed to say from their own institution's point of view, they knew what the other institutions were thinking. So it worked very well.

ELDEN B. ERICKSON  
Economic/Commercial Counselor  
Tokyo (1974-1975)

Elden B. Erickson was born in Kansas in 1919. He served in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army in World War II before joining the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included posts in China, Algeria, France, Laos, Japan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Canada, and Germany. Erickson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Then you left there and went off to Tokyo.

ERICKSON: Right. Back to Japan.
Q: How did you feel about that?

ERICKSON: Actually, I was happy to go back to the Far East. I loved working with the Japanese, contrary to many people. I felt that they were totally honorable. My opinion in dealing with them, though, was just to be frank, and if they didn't want to have reciprocal responsibilities, then you did something about it. But don't just go on and on saying how bad they are. You have to take measures against their protectionism. And they understand that.

Q: What were you doing?

ERICKSON: I was Economic/Commercial Counselor. But I was really just doing commercial work rather than economic.

Q: Had the commercial situation changed by this time?

ERICKSON: Tremendously. They were really going great guns since 1964. In ten years, it had turned around totally and was becoming a big force in world trade. And things were so expensive. When I was there as a junior officer, we could travel everywhere in Japan, stay in the most expensive places and enjoy them. But this time, three bites of celery cost a dollar, and we couldn't afford to stay anywhere. We couldn't really afford to travel either. Official travel, yes, but not personal travel.

Q: How about James Hodgson as Ambassador? He was former Labor Secretary wasn't he?

ERICKSON: Yes.

Q: How did he operate?

ERICKSON: He was very low keyed. A very sincere type of person, but very much different, obviously, from Ambassador Reischauer, who had the language and the respect because of his background. I don't think Hodgson was either a great plus or great minus. But he certainly was a good person and didn't do anything to reflect unfavorably on the U.S.

Q: Were you given a lot of pressure to "change" the Japanese system as far as protectionism, etc.?

ERICKSON: No. Again, there were quotas, quotas, quotas. Negotiations all the time.

Q: We have been playing this game now for twenty years or so. At that time, how did we approach it?

ERICKSON: It was all "temporary." The Washington position was that our restrictions were just temporary restrictions to give our people a chance to catch up.

Q: Was it one of these things...I found in other circumstances as Consular Officer, we would
scream and yell about what happened to American citizens, yet we were drafting foreigners if they were on non-immigrant visas in the United States. If something like that were to happen in another country, we would protest like mad. It was very difficult for our people to see that what we did had a counterpart in another country. Were you spending a lot of time explaining to both sides?

ERICKSON: Yes.

Q: Did anybody listen?

ERICKSON: No.

Q: Did you find either Treasury or Commerce difficult to deal with?

ERICKSON: Treasury I found more difficult to deal with. Commerce was not so bad. Again, it was textiles and cars.

Q: What was the Treasury people's main concern?

ERICKSON: I can't think of anything specific, but I remember they seemed to be inflexible on every point where we tried to do anything. They would be against it.

Q: Did you find yourself able to get to the various concerns that were importing and exporting to the United States? Did you have easy access to the higher echelons of Japanese business?

ERICKSON: Well, I was very lucky, having been in Osaka first. I knew really as friends heads of the top trading companies. I was a Rotary member in Osaka, and many of them were members. I saw these same people when they came to Tokyo. So I had an advantage there. But I really didn’t have top echelon contacts with them.

Q: What was your impression of MITI?

ERICKSON: Ministry of International Trade and Industry. That was where they really regulate everything by administrative rules. They don't have laws enabling one to challenge their protectionists laws. They just do it administratively, and very often it doesn't become known, but the effect is obvious that they are doing that.

Q: Were you able to make any contact with them?

ERICKSON: Oh yes. We had meetings with MITI all the time on various problems such as protectionism.

Q: How responsive did you find them?

ERICKSON: Very often it was really tacit denial that they were doing it. But they were always polite. Our problem is that we never said that if they didn't stop this, we would do something.
ERICKSON: Yes. They would have understood if we had. They still would.

Q: Did you find that these rules...there are bureaucracies and bureaucracies, and some are very much run from the top and everybody jumps, but other ones, and I found this in some Oriental societies, middle and lower level people...

ERICKSON: The top would be caught because they really felt something probably should be done, but the middle bureaucracy was really solid against moving in that direction.

Q: This is what I found in Vietnam and Korea, where I served. The middle bureaucracy...the top people really couldn't control them. There wasn't much of a way of ordering down.

ERICKSON: Yes, that was true of Japan.

Q: You were in Japan only a couple of years.

ERICKSON: I was only there a little over a year. My wife became ill from the pollution in Tokyo and was medically evacuated. I just stayed on until they found a replacement.

Q: The pollution was that bad?

ERICKSON: Yes. We were right there at the Embassy Compound, just below the big overpass, and all the pollution just dropped right down on us. That was unfortunate for everybody, but it happened

ISABEL CUMMING
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1974-1976)

Isabel Cumming was raised in Boston, Massachusetts. She served with USIS in Korea, Sweden, Poland, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, and Germany. Ms. Cumming was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on January 15, 1990.

CUMMING: I went to Tokyo after -- I went to Tokyo, and I worked for Alan Carter in Tokyo.

Q: I want to ask you a question, and I don’t know whether you want to answer it. What Alan did, of course, was largely to dismember the old list of our contacts and the library programs and install this -- what was it he called it -- it was a forerunner of the computer operations.

CUMMING: Oh, yes. Computer. What was it called? What was it called?
Q: Anyway, anyone wishing to obtain information had to bring it up on the monitors...

CUMMING: On the monitor -- right. I give Alan his due. On the first staff meeting I ever attended, he had a group of young men in that establishment in Tokyo, and I'll tell you they were a scruffy looking bunch of people. I had just come out of Rome, where people wore ties and shirts and coats.

Q: I am surprised to hear that because everybody in Japan in my day wore suits and coats and ties...

CUMMING: Well, they were there in -- I tell you -- I never saw -- I can't believe some of the outfits that some of these young men were wearing. Alan himself was sitting in shirt sleeves.

But they were a solid group of young men. They were really sharp. Paul Blackburn was one of them. At that time, Blackburn was the Tokyo Center Director.

Q: He was a JOT in Thailand at the time I was there.

CUMMING: I give Alan -- he really had some young men -- and he let them talk. He gave them an opportunity to really discuss. He didn't always say we can do it, or I agree, but he did give his staff the opportunity to throw out ideas, and if he felt they were good, we would work on them.

Q: What did you think was the attitude of the Japanese staff to Alan's renovation or changes in the USIA program -- USIS program -- and did you have any feedback as to what the Japanese public thought about it?

CUMMING: Well, the staff was mixed. They either liked him, or they hated him -- loved him or hated him, let me put it that way, because Alan was the kind of person that did not like a cluttered desk. He didn't like papers on his desk. You know, you put it here, and it went out there, and as soon as it was "there," it was supposed to be gone.

He would walk through the office and he would just -- if there was too much, he would just go like that (indicating with an arm swipe) and wipe all your papers and all your books on the floor. He just couldn't stand it. So they either liked him or they disliked him.

Alan was liked in the community. I saw both him and his wife socially quite a bit, and they had a wide variety of Japanese friends; he seemed to be very popular and very well-liked.

Alan is a different type of person, as people know, and he is not a bashful man. I had worked for him before, so I had known what to expect. I mean, he goes right in there. They did not object.

Of course, the Japanese -- we all sort of towered over them because they are a smaller race of people, although that's not true anymore because they're getting taller and taller. I think they are eating our type of food. So we always felt that we towered over them. But I think they admired Alan. He traveled a lot so that he went out into the boonies and he saw what was going on in the
post, and he seemed to care. He called on his people a lot in the post, he also went visiting so that he knew what was going on. He had his finger on the whole program. He had a wonderful information staff.

Harlan Rosacker -- I don't know whether you know him from...

Q: I know him slightly. He is now a personnel officer for the Agency.

CUMMING: He is now a personnel officer in the Agency. He was our Information Officer, and he had a wonderful rapport with the Embassy, with the Ambassador, as did Alan. They relied on Harlan and our office greatly for the information.

Q: Who was the Ambassador at that time?

CUMMING: There were two political men.

Q: Mansfield, did Mansfield come during your term?

CUMMING: No. No. Mansfield was not there. The last one was a TWA -- the man who had been with TWA, and he was being criticized when they were having that thing about TWA -- I think he was from Hawaii originally. I can't remember their names.

But he never -- I remember meeting some TWA people, and I said, “Oh, our Ambassador.”

And they said, "We would never know it because he never comes to the TWA office." He divorced himself entirely from his job because there was -- his previous job -- and just was the Ambassador to the country.

Q: This was again in what years?

CUMMING: It was `75 to `77, somewhere like that, in the late `70s.

Q: Because Alan was in.

CUMMING: Alan left and went to Saigon because there was another man who came who has since retired -- Bill Miller -- Bill Miller. He was my PAO also.

Q: I interviewed Bill last year, too.

CUMMING: But, yes, because Alan went to Saigon. Right. Right. He got the word from Washington that he was going to Saigon.

Q: The reason I asked if he was there that late in the program is because he was in Tokyo the last time I made a trip out there officially, which was in December, 1971. So I guess he was still there later because there was a Japanese local who had been on my staff when I was in Tokyo in
the early '50s and who had been transferred to Nagoya; her office mate in Tokyo was the woman who is now my wife -- a Japanese woman.

So when she was brought to this country as a local employee trainee, we invited her to stay with us. The staff in the Nagoya office had very little use for Alan Carter, and she said whenever the word was out that Alan was coming down, everybody spent the afternoon before picking up all the papers off their desks and locking them in the safe, leaving the desks clean; then, when Alan left, they brought them all out again to work.

CUMMING: Well, I can believe that because this is the way he operated. He did not like -- he would come, and if he saw papers on the desk, he wanted to know what they were doing.

Q: Yeah.

CUMMING: He didn't care whether you were a Japanese national or whether you were an American. I mean he just would not -- that, to him, was just -- of course, the building was rather weird -- I thought it was kind of fun except for the downstairs. But you got sort of used to it, the way he painted it. But we also had an Exhibits Officer who was very modernistic and, of course, he would do all this, too. It was all changed when Bill Miller came because Bill came and revamped the whole thing.

But I think it was -- because I was in Rome I think until '74 -- and then I went to Tokyo, and I was there just two years, and then I went to Belgrade after that.

Q: Was John Clyne in Tokyo when you were there? He would have been the Executive Officer.

CUMMING: No, but John Clyne was in Washington. John Clyne was the Deputy Personnel Officer. Wasn't he deputy to...

Q: I think he was head of Personnel's East Asia section.

CUMMING: Yes, okay. I met him in Washington at that time. He had been in Bonn, and when I was going to Bonn, he then gave me some information on Bonn.

Then John went back to -- but John Clyne had been -- no. I'll tell you -- Fred Hawkins was my...

Q: Oh, Fred Hawkins.

CUMMING: Yes. You know him from the USIA.

Q: Yeah, very well. John had been to Germany as Deputy PAO before he went to Tokyo. Then he went to Tokyo for a second tour where he was Executive Officer again. Then he came back to Washington and was put in the personnel assignment, which he thoroughly disliked.

CUMMING: Yes. He hated it.
Q: Finally, they said, well, you can go back to Germany if you want to, but you will have to go back as Executive Officer.

CUMMING: Yes.

Q: He said, well, I would rather do that than stay here, so he went back to Germany. That is where he was when they diagnosed him with his cancer.

CUMMING: Yes, exactly. But I met him in Washington when he was working with Angie.

Q: While we were talking about Tokyo before we temporarily went off the tape, do you have anything further that you want to refer to as taking place in the Tokyo program while you were there? I know we had a big Fulbright program.

CUMMING: You know my mind is blank. I can't even think who our Cultural Affairs Officer was. I can't even think in my mind where they sat. I've got the whole information section, but I can't even -- and the exhibit section. Isn't that strange.

I'm sure we had Fulbright. I'm sure we had a student program. But my mind is -- sorry. I can't tell you, but I am sure Alan Carter would be working with students, and we would have had a program because he was very youth-oriented. I'll tell you.

Q: Yes. He got that from the Bobby Kennedy/Ted Sorenson connection.

CUMMING: Yes, because he was very much for young people and for youth. So, I am sure we did. My mind is -- I am sorry it is a total blank now.

Q: Do you have anything further that you want to say about Tokyo?

CUMMING: No, I don't think so.

ROBERT B. PETERSEN
Executive Officer, USIA
US Pavilion, Okinawa’s World’s Fair
Okinawa (1974-1976)

Mr. Petersen was born and raised in Ohio and educated at Oberlin College. He entered the USIA Foreign Service in 1965 and served as Public and Cultural Affairs Office in Embassies or Consulates in Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, Mauritius, Israel, Morocco and Cote d’Ivoire. He also served in several senior USIA positions in Washington, D.C. Mr. Peterson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.
Q: You were in Japan from '74 to when?

PETERSEN: I left again in '76. I went to Okinawa and set up shop in a Hilton hotel. If I wanted to sum it up in a couple of sentences, I could describe the whole expo. It’s like the circus coming to town. You go in, put the tent up, you do the show, take the tent down, and away you go. That describes to some extent what I did. I was the executive officer. The person in charge of the pavilion was hired from outside the Agency, Allen Beech from Seattle, who had had experience working at international fairs in different capacities. He was hired to be the pavilion manager. As a deputy, the Agency provided him a fellow named Nikita Gregorovich Barski from USIA, a career employee. I was the executive officer, handled the administration, which included personnel, security, maintenance, and so forth. Quite a change for a public diplomacy specialist.

When I got to Naha, I think I was the third one to arrive. Al Beech was there. Nik Barski was there. When I left in ’76, I was the last one to leave, turned out the lights. It included tearing down the site and returning the land to the same contours that it had before the pavilion was there. It was an impressive building. It was modular in design. We had an administrative module and about seven exhibit modules, one that had to do with weather forecasting using satellites over the ocean, another that was all about deep sea drilling. In one module, we had a huge saltwater aquarium. In addition to the fish, we would have people go in with television cameras and they’d be filming the artificial reef and filming the fish. We’d have monitors outside showing what the people were filming inside. It was very interesting. From late ’74 until sometime in late spring of ’76, I was attached to the pavilion. We had 75-80 employees, maybe more, who were direct employees. I had security and maintenance teams who were just contractors who were hired. It went smoothly to the visiting public and was very impressive. Of course, behind the scenes, it was just an incredibly mixed up, challenging thing to provide support, see that the pavilion was constructed according to plans, that the exhibits got there, were installed properly. I continued recruiting personnel once I got to Okinawa. My first couple of months there, a lot of time was spent on that, interviewing and hiring appropriate personnel. I did not hire some of the technical people, the people doing filming. I certainly didn’t have anything to do with hiring anybody involved in construction per se. That was all done under a blanket contract. It was mainly to hire guides and administrative staff, support personnel. I hired a librarian to set up and run our library at the pavilion.

Q: How did you find the interaction? Okinawa is out in the boondocks for most Japanese.

PETERSEN: One of the reasons for having the exposition there was to help with Okinawan development. Reversion had occurred in ’72. The Okinawan prefectural government and the Japanese national government, was looking for ways to develop Okinawa. It was felt that tourism could, would, and should play a major role in Okinawa’s economic future. It was felt the International Expo. would be a good way to kick off an effort to increase tourism to Okinawa, both Japanese and international tourism. But also it fit in with road building, developing roads to the center of Okinawa and into Nago and out to the Motobu Peninsula, where the exposition was placed. All sorts of infrastructure upgrades, not only such things as roads, communication upgrades and so forth, but beautifying Okinawa, planting the palm trees along the highway and doing other things to really make it attractive to tourism, building additional hotels, increasing hotel space, restaurants, and so forth. It was all designed to not just ease the way into increased tourism, but to really jumpstart tourism to Okinawa. Behind the scenes, for us, it was a real
challenge to not only get it constructed but to put appropriate exhibits into the pavilion. Congress provided what could be described as seed money. But to have exhibits and so forth was dependent on going out and going to organizations and getting them to donate exhibits or material that could be used as part of exhibits. Lockheed provided something that occupied all by itself one of the modules, a model of a future floating city that showed how you could have a self-contained thing that a few thousand people would live on. It used the thermal difference in the temperature between the surface water and deep water to set up a circulation that powered this floating city. It was a grandiose, greatly expanded floating oil derrick. It was a model made out of plywood or something. It showed how such a thing could operate. The Jansen company was approached and provided some of the costuming for our guides. Bayliner provided a boat to us. We had a nice inboard-outboard 28-foot Bayliner. I’ll tell you a funny story. From the company’s point of view, it was an opportunity to show off one of its products to people who would see it in the midst of this exposition. I was an executive officer, so I guess you could call me a bean counter. My fellow bean counters back in Washington took a jaundiced view of this and were disturbed that we had this boat on our inventory there. There was discussion about how it would not only be used for representational purposes by the commissioner general of the U.S. pavilion but that it would be available for emergency commuting from near Kadena Air Base up to Nago when the roads were not passable because of construction and so forth. It may have been used that way a couple of times, but it was a several hour trip by boat, much longer than going by highway when the highways were open.

In any event, at one point during the exposition, word came down from Washington that we had to get rid of that boat immediately. We got rid of it just prior to the end of the expo. Somebody in Washington was disgruntled that we had that boat there. I had to find a buyer and sell the boat.

Q: Did you find that you were bringing in Japanese tourists?

PETERSEN: The expo was a bust financially. People who invested money, the collateral people, not the official exhibitors, of course, the big company, Mitsubishi, had a nice exhibit there, and other major companies did. It must have been part of their marketing budget and they accounted for it as marketing. People like us, it was an expenditure for our government, the seed money. For some of our exhibitors, I don’t know which ones, there was a marketing benefit. But the people who invested money in restaurants, hotels, and particularly souvenirs didn’t make out very well. I know some of them were extremely disappointed. They said that the estimates about the projected number of visitors had been highly inflated by whoever was originally in charge of conceiving the idea of the expo. There was a lot of disgruntlement by businesspeople.

Q: Looking at it from a distance and not knowing the territory, I would think you’ve got Okinawa, a relatively poor area with not a huge population. You’d have to rely on a lot of Japanese particularly flying down there. I wouldn’t think Okinawa would be the place the Japanese would fly to.

PETERSEN: The number of visitors did not reach the projections. There are lots of reasons and explanations, everything from the general state of the economy, to the remote location, but it’s true that it was not an expo that provided a lot of monetary benefit to people who invested in the collateral parts of it.
Q: I realize you were really tied up with the Expo. Okinawa had reverted to Japanese control just a few years before. How was this working?

PETERSEN: Aside from just a brief airport visit once on my way to Malaysia in ’68, I had not been in Okinawa until I arrived again in ’74. The return of Okinawa to Japanese control had been in place for a couple of years. There was still a rather healthy expatriate American community there. People were involved in business, many of whom supported the American military presence, a few who had branched out and were just a regular part of the Japanese economy. I got to know quite a number of them very quickly because we turned to them for some services, some work that we needed at the pavilion as well as just general guidance as to what was going on in economic and business sense in Okinawa. But a few things stand out. One time, an American schoolteacher who taught in the military school system there for many years, said to me at a social event, “This was terrible, this reversion. This was a number one territory that the U.S. needed. We’d developed it. We should keep it.” I remember looking askance at her and thinking, “I never thought I’d hear...” She was a schoolteacher but employed by the military system, so technically she was a U.S. government employee. I was surprised to hear a fellow U.S. government career employee talking in that fashion. I heard echoes of that from a few other Americans who were irate and felt that we had done so much and that our contribution to developing Okinawa was not appreciated. These people said to me, “Every Okinawan wanted to remain part of the United States.” I was thinking, “Oh, are you out to lunch. What nonsense!” I forget the technical word for someone who wants to hang on to a territory that way. I heard a few stories told half humorously about the bumpy transition to Japanese control. One of them might be an urban legend about a Japanese businessman who was visiting Okinawa and was caught speeding in his car. He told the policeman, “You have no right to arrest me. Okinawa belongs to Japan. I’m a Japanese. You can’t do this.” He was talking to an Okinawan Japanese policeman supposedly. I’d hear stories like that. I heard a lot of nonsense, frankly. I did not observe any significant difficulties, wasn’t really aware of any.

Q: Recruiting from former missionaries, did you have any problems with them reverting back to missionary reflexes?

PETERSEN: Wanting to proselytize, they’d go out and spend their free time going door to door? No. That was not an issue. I don’t know the number of former Mormon missionaries we got in, probably six, certainly fewer than 10 out of the total number of guides that we had. We had quite a diverse group. We ended up recruiting quite a number of people who had grown up in Okinawa, sons and daughters of longtime residents, people who had U.S. citizenship but who had grown up and lived in Okinawa, gone to American schools there and were fluent in Japanese. Our guides were divided into different groups. Some were the outside greeters. All the guides were costumed. Some of them on the exterior were welcoming visitors and would be dressed in American colonial costumes, the men in the colonial seaport look. We had some models and displays of American sailing ships showing the development of seafaring technology in the U.S. from the first years of the Republic. The women guides were dressed in colonial period, something like hoop skirts and bonnets. Inside, depending on the location, we had some people dressed as oil-rig people with hardhats and so forth as they’d look if they were working in oil exploration. Others in the modules having to do with future technology were dressed in
futuristic costumes. It was quite a diverse group of men and women as our guides.

Q: In '76, you moved on. Did the fact that the fair was sort of a bust carry over?

PETERSEN: It did. Having been associated with it didn’t work to my advantage in terms of a corridor reputation. At the same time, it would be greatly exaggerated if I suggested that was some significant impediment to me in any way. You know how it works in Washington. You come back and meet somebody on the elevator and between three or four floors you exchange your recent vita. If you’ve come from a hotspot and done something, you get off the elevator and that person’s mind says, “Wow! So-and-So is up to great things and just continuing with his stellar career.” If I said to somebody, “Well, I just got back from this expo, it wasn’t the greatest thing in the world.” They’d think, “Petersen’s on a downward slope.” But it was a frustrating, difficult experience.

I was the last person to leave the expo staff. We finished it in January of ’76. All the others had departed over a period of many weeks. Come late spring, I was still there returning the last of our equipment and vehicles that we’d gotten on long-term loan from the U.S. military.

There is a little interesting sidelight. Congress provided seed money but we had to go around and get donations in order to make this thing work. In one sense, we were living hand to mouth. We needed a fleet of vehicles. When I got to Okinawa, it was arranged that we would borrow them from the U.S. military. I went over and in a series of meetings with some of the DOD people worked out an arrangement where we were going to be provided with six passenger vans.

This technicality was that the rules of participating in the exposition were that you had to import the things you were going to use. Other countries that were participating had to purchase an imported vehicle or actually physically import vehicles that they were going to use for their pavilions. No one else had a military presence on the island. I patted myself on the back for being able to figure out a bureaucratic way of dealing with that. We took those U.S. military vehicles and technically exported them out of Japan and then reimported them a few seconds later with the appropriate paperwork. We weren’t doing anything dishonest and we weren’t doing anything that the Japanese didn’t agree to and know fully well what we were doing. We imported the vehicles for the use of the U.S. pavilion on paper. But then we took the vehicles and had them repainted from the olive drab and painted over any identifying marks of the military, painted them all white, and then had the USA pavilion logo stenciled on the sides of the vehicles. It made a very handsome fleet of vehicles. When I left, I had to go through the whole thing again, export those vehicles and have them reimported by the U.S. military. I dropped them off at some military lot. Presumably, they repainted them back to olive drab again and put them back into use. We did that with a number of things.

There were all sorts of things that I went through in dealing with personnel, security, and shipping. I’m often asked about what it was like to work in Japan and I sometimes use as an example my experience negotiating a shipping contract, which I did shortly after arriving in Okinawa while we were still housed in the Hilton Hotel and using the Hilton as our office base. All the pavilions, all the national exhibitors, had to have shipping contracts to have things shipped in, as did we. I went into this and the negotiations took a couple of weeks. It was an
elaborate and not unsatisfying act that we went through sitting down with the team, never fewer than five or six people across the table from me from the Japanese representing the expo organizers. They offered us an array of potential shipping companies that had been approved by the expo organizers. I was free to select among them. I knew going in prior to the first meeting that they knew which one they wanted me to pick and I wasn’t sure they knew that I knew they knew. But we went through these long negotiations. At the end of it, although we talked in great detail about what would and wouldn’t be covered, what the fees would be, could we get a discount here or there. I’ll never forget standing up, reaching across the table and shaking hands and knowing in my heart of hearts that, yes, eventually we’re going to put pen to paper and sign the contract but this thing was going to work because I was dealing with a Japanese company whose reputation was on the line and once the handshake took place, that was it. There would be no deviousness on their part, nothing unfulfilled. They were going to make sure that we were happy. I also knew or suspected that everybody on the Japanese side knew the outcome before we began, certainly which of the companies I was going to be steered to. I felt we got a very good deal on the shipping contract. The same thing happened on contracting with the security company to provide a staff of guards. I enjoyed it. I since have had some experience negotiating with American companies and sometimes there can be a big difference. But there was this certain sense of honor and confidence that I could really trust. I knew the outcome would be good and indeed it was. We never had any problems with any of the Japanese companies that we dealt with. We had problems with some American companies, but not the other way. But I don’t want to come across sounding like some naive Japanophile here. It’s not that. But it was an interesting process, the negotiations.

RUSSELL O. PRICKETT
Deputy Economic Counselor
Tokyo (1974-1976)

Mr. Prickett was born and raised in Minnesota and attended Hamline University and Harvard Law School. He entered the Foreign Service in 1959. During his career he held posts in Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Japan, also working in the State Department’s Office of Economic and Business Affairs and Trade and Finance Division. Mr. Prickett was interviewed in 1999 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

PRICKETT: Then I went to Tokyo, and as I said, I didn’t have a chance to learn Japanese before going, and Japanese language study was a long, long course. I had to make do with an hour a day while I was on the job, and most of us couldn’t always make time for that hour a day, either. So I learned to say biromo itan kurasai, which means ‘another beer, please.’ And some other things that sound very, very Japanese but basically mean ‘driver, please turn right at the next signal.’ But I did learn enough Japanese so that I was able to take my kids and a bunch of other teenagers to a ski resort up in the mountains, and I was the only one there with any Japanese at all. But in the land of the blind, the guy with one eye is king.

Q: Well, that was how many years, Tokyo?
PRICKETT: I was in Tokyo ‘74 to ‘76. It was to have been a three-year tour, but my second wife left and came home after, I think, a year and a half or so, and so I curtailed my tour and came back to the States after two years in Japan. But it was the Far East. I got to travel a bit. I got to Taiwan and Hong Kong and to the Philippines.

Q: You were in the Economic Section, or were you running it?

PRICKETT: Yes, let’s see, I was deputy economic counselor.

Q: Oh, well, you were moving right along.

PRICKETT: Yes, and I had just been promoted to O-3, just before leaving the Department. And my predecessor was a Class 3 officer, and I think he had made 3 in that job. So it was not a bad job. On the other hand, I was writing the Economic Trends Reports on Japan, and I had been writing the Economic Trends Reports back in Belgrade from ‘64 on, so here I was ten years later doing essentially the same thing.

Q: For a bigger economy.

PRICKETT: Bigger economy, certainly a more significant economy in the world, of more impact on the United States, and I had supervised four or five officers in Washington, and I had three or four officers to supervise in Tokyo. I had a very high batting average getting promotions for my people. One year in Washington I got three out of five, and one that I didn’t get had just been promoted the previous year, and it was essentially the same thing in Tokyo. I was always really happy when I could get people some recognition for what they had been doing.

Q: And who was ambassador and DCM?

PRICKETT: The DCM was Tom Shoesmith. Tom Shoesmith never got an ambassadorial appointment. I think he was cross-wise with some folks up on the Hill.

Q: Yes.

PRICKETT: I believe they eventually gave him the consul general job in Hong Kong.

Q: Oh, that’s not bad.

PRICKETT: Not bad at all. It’s better than a lot of ambassadorial jobs, no question about it.

Q: Of course it is. He was a Far East expert.

PRICKETT: Yes. And let’s see. The ambassador was a guy from Minnesota, as a matter of fact, who’d been at the University along with Eric Sevareid and Bud Schulman and a bunch of people. He was a former Secretary of Labor and a very genial fellow. We got along great. We talked about the Minnesota Mafia. He did some very nice things at the embassy, and he ran basically a
happy shop, and it was fun serving under him. And he would come back from consultations in Washington saying, “They see things as very quiet out here, and they just want us to keep it that way.” We had an era of good feeling with the Japanese at the time.

Q: *Trade was in balance, was it?*

PRICKETT: No, but the deficit wasn’t intolerable, either.

Q: *Was this the time of the Japanese economic boom?*

PRICKETT: Yes, it was. Now let me think. I think they were. . . . No, I think they were in recession, which meant they had annual growth of about three percent, we were all wishing we could have a Japanese recession. The dollar was sometimes over 300 yen, which is a lot of yen for the dollar, and still, the Japanese restaurants were so expensive that you had to read the menu outside the door before you set foot because you could go broke in a Japanese restaurant.

Q: *So that didn’t make life very comfortable.*

PRICKETT: Well, there were plenty. You could go to the Yakitori places and you could go to the noodle shops, and there were nice restaurants, and we had very good Japanese staff who could give us good advice on these things. And we could travel. We had to drive on the left side of the road, or we could take the bullet train — that was fun.

Q: *And housing?*

PRICKETT: We lived in embassy housing that had been built right after the war. Our embassy had very, very valuable property right in the heart of Tokyo, and I had a four-bedroom apartment in New House. I was there with my second wife and her two little boys and my oldest daughter, and we had four bedrooms, which was the biggest of the apartment buildings. All of that now has been replaced with other buildings.

If you entertained, why the Japanese were amazed at how much space we had because they lived in such small digs themselves. And after my second wife went back to the States, I did some bachelor entertaining, and we had a balcony where I could put my charcoal grill. Beef was terribly, terribly expensive, and we had access to commissary beef, so I would always do a London broil if I was entertaining, and that went over great with the Japanese counterparts.

There was, again, an English language theater group over there, TIP, Tokyo International Players. I did some Shakespeare and some other stuff with them. And while I was there I formed a little chorus that went around and serenaded various ambassadors. The Embassy Recreation Club owned a bus, and so when we got our group of carolers together, we were able to take that bus, and we didn’t have to fight parking problems or anything, and we went on two different evenings, I think, around and sang Christmas carols at the various embassies around town, and we wound up at our own ambassador’s place. He was in the residence where MacArthur had lived, and had a big, big, almost like a medieval hall, where MacArthur had had his desk at one end of it, and people who approached him had to come the whole intimidating distance of that
long hall, which had, you know, nice beams and rafters atop it all.

Q: *What about MacArthur?* How is he revered by the Japanese at that stage? *Was he still the great hero?*

PRICKETT: Oh, yes. Very much, very much. And we were considerate, and we had been very considerate of the Japanese. The predecessor — doggone! Why can’t I remember our ambassador’s name? But his predecessor was Edwin Reischauer, who was the great Harvard Japan scholar married to a Japanese woman. And so the Japanese knew that we had been very thoughtful. Again, it was Jack Kennedy who appointed Reischauer to that one. He was able to get some very fine people working for him in important positions.

Oh, I found out some of the backstage stories about how my friends in the International Organizations Bureau had let me down up in New York from a Japanese counterpart who had been there at the time. He told me that the guy, an old AID hand, sponsored by IO, had been actually absent from the chair of the Committee of the Whole in the Economic Committee up in New York — had been absent from the chair when a bunch of stuff went through that later was so embarrassing to us down in Mexico and elsewhere. But he just couldn’t be bothered with it. That was a little late to find those things out.

Q: *Well, but that’s good to know.*

PRICKETT: Yes. I guess because of my previous experience, I had the job of liaising with the Japanese on international multilateral economic matters. And I was able because with this one guy that we had shared some experiences with before, I was able to find out what the Japanese were planning to do and so on. There was in it a bit of embarrassment. We had a very able Agency station over there, and it seems that they had some folks in the Japanese Government that were telling them things, and they were getting some second-hand information about what the Japanese delegation was going to advocate when they went into some of these multilateral meetings. Sometimes their stuff was wrong. Sometimes they were getting it second- and third-hand from inside the ministry. I complained about it, and nobody thought we ought to fuss with the Agency about it, so we didn’t, but my analogy was — and somebody said — “Well, you know, isn’t so-and-so responsible for this?” No, I’m responsible for it. And so-and-so, of course, was a reserve officer, had a reserve commission, *et cetera*. I said, “It’s damned embarrassing when you go right up to the front door and you ring the bell and you present your credentials and you go in and you ask, in all honesty, what are your plans here, to find that somebody else has been skulking around to the back door trying to sneak information from the servants.”

Q: *Yes.*

PRICKETT: And that kind of thing I’d heard echoed from colleagues, you know, with experience elsewhere. I remember a friend who had served in Panama said that he couldn’t get people to talk to him because other people were paying him to talk to them — and this was when we were into the Canal negotiations. And that can poison the wells of information.
Ambassador James D. Hodgson was born in 1915. He spent 25 years as an executive for the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. He was Secretary of Labor during the first Nixon administration and was appointed ambassador to Japan. Ambassador Hodgson was interviewed by Hank Zivetz in November, 1988

Q: Mr. Ambassador, you were appointed and confirmed as Ambassador to Japan in June of 1974. Why were you selected and why Japan?

HODGSON: This was a subject that puzzled me because I had very little experience with respect to Japan. I knew nothing of the Japanese language. I admired the Japanese people, and as a West Coaster, I took more interest in the Asiatic side of the world than perhaps most people would. But other than that, I really felt I had no credentials.

I learned, however, that I became Ambassador because of an unusual combination of circumstances I will outline for you. When Mr. Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State after Bill Rogers, he wanted an experienced executive to run the Department while he handled the geo-political policy aspects. He sought Bob Ingersoll, who was then Ambassador to Japan, to come back to become Assistant Deputy Secretary of State. Bob resisted at first. The Japanese didn't want Bob to leave because they liked him. However, Henry insisted he needed Bob, so Bob eventually accepted.

Henry, being sensitive to Japanese displeasure with what he had done, asked the Japanese to outline for him the kind of a person that they would to see appointed Ambassador. They had four requirements. Number one, they wanted somebody who knew all the top people in government so they wouldn't be prisoners of the bureaucratic chain of command, someone who could go directly to and get responses from higher sources. Second, they felt that their nation was essentially economic in character, so they wanted somebody who was strong in the economic aspect of life, particularly somebody who had been in business, if possible. Third, they wanted someone other than a Foreign Service Officer. They had had bad luck with one or two Foreign Service Officers, and finally, they said, "We're an unusual culture, select somebody who is people-sensitive."

Later, Kissinger was having a conversation with the President and Secretary Shultz one day and said, "Where shall I find somebody like that?"

Shultz says, "That sounds like a tailor-made job for Hodgson."

Of course, I had worked with Shultz while he was Secretary of Labor and Secretary of the Treasury, so he knew my background. He knew I knew everybody in Japan because of the Cabinet-level meeting I attended between the U.S. and Japan. He knew that I had come out of the "personnel business," so I would be people sensitive. I just seemed to fit the requirement.
Henry said, "But, of course."

And that's how I became Ambassador.

_Q: Interesting. Could you tell us a little bit about your background?_

_HODGSON:_ Well, I spent, after college, the first twenty-five years of my life as an executive for the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Largely in personnel, labor relations and administrative activities.

It was because of that background that, when Secretary Shultz was made Secretary of Labor, he asked me to come back and be Under Secretary. When they promoted Shultz to become head of the Office of Management and Budget, they tapped me to become Secretary of Labor. So I was Secretary of Labor during the first Nixon Administration. Following that, the events I've just described occurred.

_Q: Thank you. In October of 1974, a former U.S. Admiral, Jean LaRoque, contended that nuclear weapons were stored aboard U.S. naval vessels porting in Japanese harbors, in possible contravention of the U.S.-Japan mutual-security treaty. What was the American Embassy strategy to counter the public furor that arose in Japan after the LaRoque statement?_

_HODGSON:_ Actually, there had been a claim of that same nature made either by a Japanese source or an American source approximately once every six months since the middle of the 1960s. The claim was nothing new. So it was simple to restate the American policy on the subject, that is, to never confirm or deny the existence of nuclear weapons at any place, at any time.

_Q: It was charged that there existed a secret agreement. Did the Embassy respond to that at all?_

_HODGSON:_ Well, that same charge had been made several times. There was nothing new about LaRoque's charge. So the subject did not become a major issue in Japan. It was a one or two day story and then dropped. So there was no need to devise any special strategy for that occasion.

_Q: Shortly afterward, there was an announcement that President Ford would be visiting Japan. Using the nuclear issue as an excuse, more than two million Japanese were said to have demonstrated throughout Japan against the Ford visit. Did you find that there was similar hostility or second thoughts on the part of some people in government in Japan at that time?_

_HODGSON:_ No, none whatsoever. Let's go back a bit. Demonstrations against the United States had been long-standing, a standard behavior pattern of activists and leftists in Japan. From the time Mrs. Hodgson and I arrived in July of that year, they continued right up until the visit of President Ford. President Ford's visit was so uniformly successful and so widely acclaimed that immediately after that visit, all these demonstrations stopped, and there were no further problems with the leftist Japanese press.
Q: So the Embassy's position, if I understand you correctly, was to generally ignore?

HODGSON: No, it was just to continue policy positions that had been laid down earlier and to resist further pressure to elaborate on them.

Q: I see. From what I read, they made a lot of a demonstration in Kyoto at the time of the Ford visit. Was this overstated, or was there any real concern at the time?

HODGSON: During the Ford visit, there were practically no demonstrations. I spent a day and a half with him in Kyoto. No demonstrations were then discernible to the President or to his entourage. If there was a demonstration, it was held privately in some part of Kyoto where the presidential party did not visit.

Q: Very soon after President Ford's visit, Tanaka resigned. What was the American Embassy reaction to this resignation and the charges that accompanied it?

HODGSON: My first reaction was to be puzzled. So I sought out the then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Togo, and told him I needed to get an explanation.

He said, "Okay, let's have lunch."

At lunch, I put the question to him, "Why did the Prime Minister resign?"

He said, "We have an old Japanese proverb."

"And what is the proverb?"

He replied, "The proverb is 'a nail that sticks out gets hammered down.'"

What he meant was that the Prime Minister had become too assertive and too dictatorial by Japanese standards. So they forced him out of office.

Q: Togo was obviously not a member of Tanaka's faction?

HODGSON: He was a member of the bureaucracy, the superb Japanese bureaucracy that runs all their ministries.

Q: But Tanaka had a very effective faction?

HODGSON: That's right. He continued to have one even after he was no longer Prime Minister.

Q: Yes. Just shifting a little bit. We'll come back to Tanaka. In September of 1975, a group of Japanese Democratic Socialists visited Washington. How was this trip arranged? Was it on their initiative or the Embassy's initiative?

HODGSON: Previous to that time, the Democratic Socialist Party had not particularly
cooperated with the LDP running the government. They had been members of the opposition. When President Ford visited Japan, he made a point of seeing not only the party that was in power, but the head of the Democratic Socialist Party. Later, the head of the party asked whether it would be considered appropriate for him to visit Washington, and the Embassy arranged that visit.

Q: Did you accompany this group?

HODGSON: No. I only accompanied officials of the government when they came to Washington.

Q: I see. Now, how much contact in this period did the American Embassy have with political parties other than the ruling LDP?

HODGSON: Very considerable, with all parties, with the exception of the Communist Party. I became close to Daisaku Ikeda, who was the head of the Komeito Party, the so-called "clean government" party. I admired the idealism with which he pursued international peace and the intellectualism he displayed in that pursuit.

Second, I became on speaking terms with the top people in the Socialist Party and with the top people in the Democratic Socialist Party. You see, I had been Secretary of Labor, so the labor movement in Japan was something in which I had a great interest. Thus, I spent a good deal of time with top labor people, most of whom were in the Socialist Party.

Q: In your view -- this is going off and projecting perhaps -- did you see the possibility of the socialists ever achieving power or any party breaking the hold of the LDP in Japan?

HODGSON: Not until they adopt positions that are realistic with respect to running the government would this be a possibility. At the present time, and in the last twenty-five years, all they have been able to do is to muster a series of negative positions, rather than developing a program for governing. They do not feel they are in a position to develop such a program or have enough support to do so. I don't think there is any possibility of them taking over until they change.

Q: During your tenure in Japan, were there any special Soviet overtures toward the Japanese? Was the issue of Soviet influence in the area a major one during your tenure?

HODGSON: It was a significant one but not a major one. You will remember this was a time of detente in our relationship with the Soviet Union. In Tokyo, I had developed a good relationship with the Soviet Ambassador, who, at that time, was the dean of the Tokyo diplomatic corps, Oleg Troyanovsky. He later became Ambassador to the U.N. We exchanged visits. I was able to arrange appointments for American journalists to meet with him.

But with respect to the relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan, Ambassador Troyanovsky's principal objective was to build the economic relationship, and he was successful. He doubled the level of trade between the two countries during the time he was there.
There was, at that time, as there is today, deep resentment on the part of the Japanese for the Soviet occupation of four islands north of Hokkaido. As long as the Soviets continue to occupy those islands, it will be difficult to have anything approaching a really amicable relationship between the two countries.

Q: Would you say that American interest in Japan was, at that time that you served there, more in the economic sphere than in the political sphere?

HODGSON: I thought it was mostly geo-political. The economic sphere was very smooth during my time. This was, if you will remember, the mid-70s. It was a period when in no single year was a trade deficit as high as $2 billion. Today the deficit is in the $50 to $60 billion range and has become a real problem. So there were then really no major economic arguments between us.

There was a major effort on the part of the Japanese during this period to cut back on protection they had provided their infant industries. The American trade relationship with Japan, because they were taking such positive measures, was an unusually good one.

Q: Was it so good that there was little indication of what lay ahead? Was there any indication that you can recall?

HODGSON: Yes, during my last year, there was such an indication. Mr. Nakasone, who at that time was Cabinet Secretary, took me aside one day and said that the projections that had been made for the trade deficit for 1976 probably were going to be wildly wrong. Instead of the deficit being at about the billion and a half level, it would be up around the $5 billion dollar level. I knew from previous experience that such a deficit could become a very serious problem, so I made a great effort during my last few months there to convince officials like Prime Minister Miki and Prime Minister Fukuda that they were flirting with danger by letting the trade deficit get out of hand.

Q: Did your reports to Washington evidence this concern?

HODGSON: Yes, not only my reports to Washington, but if you'll remember, this was a period when Arthur Burns was the head of the Federal Reserve. He came through Japan. Arthur is a long-time friend, and I spent a good deal of time discussing it with him because he would be in a great position to spread the gospel back in Washington.

Q: Well, obviously, that wasn't done, or at least it wasn't heeded. Can you say that?

HODGSON: Well, as to what happened after I left there and why it happened, I'm not certain, but the United States, in pursuing its basic policy of free trade, evidently was willing to allow the deficit to reach levels I had not expected it to allow.

Q: The argument today is made that what we want is a level playing field. Did you feel at that time even that we were operating on a level playing field vis à vis the Japanese trade restrictions?
HODGSON: Well, both sides want a level playing field. The problem is each side wants the playing field to be their's. What we have is a situation where the Japanese would like to see everybody play by their rules. We would like to see everybody play by our rules. The level playing field argument really doesn't mean a damn thing as far as solving the problem is concerned.

We've got to find out in the years ahead what the new international economic world we now live in needs in the way of rules that everybody can live by. They probably won't be the rules of any one country. Some adaptation will be made of all countries. I think that this is one of the most unresolved, long-term issues.

Q: Thank you. Now we come to something that has intrigued me -- the Lockheed scandal. You had been an executive at Lockheed and now the American Ambassador in Japan at the time the scandal broke. How did this affect your performance?

HODGSON: Well, it obviously had a potential for being very embarrassing. But two things were very fortunate in these circumstances.

Number one, I had been in Japan more than a year. I had established what kind of person I was, the kind of trust that could be placed in me and my objectivity in dealing with issues affecting our two nation relationship.

Second, at the time of the hearings in Washington where the Lockheed scandal broke into public view, a question was asked of the man from Arthur Young, who was the principal testifier, the man who had audited the Lockheed circumstances and disclosed the payment to the Japanese that was the essence of the scandal. He was asked, "Do you have any knowledge of, or in your investigation, did you find any evidence that our Ambassador to Japan, who at one time was a member of the executive corps at Lockheed, knew of or had anything to do with this matter?"

His answer was, "None whatsoever."

Further hearings were held in executive session. I appeared before the Church Committee, and they properly concluded I knew nothing about this matter -- that it occurred at a time when I was not at Lockheed but was serving the government.

Q: Did the media press this with you?

HODGSON: No, that was a wonderful thing from my standpoint. The media treated this in a very straightforward way and did not editorialize on it. In fact, I got great support from the media.

Q: I wasn't aware of this until I did the research. It undoubtedly made you uncomfortable.

HODGSON: It made me uncomfortable for about the first month after the story broke because I didn't know, first, how the Japanese media and people would react. Second, how it might change
my relationship with the Japanese Government. It didn't change that relationship in the slightest, and after one month, my role in the story became a non-story in Japan.

**Q:** Did it affect the relationship between American businesses in Japan and Japanese business and Japanese government? Was there a spill-over?

HODGSON: I believe not. In fact, during the year in question, 1976, there was a significant increase in the business relationship and level of trade between the two countries.

**Q:** During your entire tenure as American Ambassador to Japan, which issue was considered the most important from the American perspective? Was it the Japanese defense posture, for example? I know that we've always been after the Japanese to increase their expenditures for the military. We talked slightly about the growing trade competition. In your view, what was the major focus of your tenure?

HODGSON: I arrived in Japan in 1974, when the Japanese were very upset with the Americans. They had experienced what they called "three Nixon shokku," three shocks that Mr. Nixon as President had inflicted on them. They felt Japan was a friend of the United States and hadn't been treated like a friend.

The three shocks were these: first, they had been told that if we were going to open a relationship with China, they would be involved in consultations before that occurred. They were not involved in consultations before it occurred, however. The first they knew about it was when Kissinger was already in China. So they were upset by what they considered a breach of an agreement.

Second, the August 1941 economic measures adopted by the Nixon administration included a 10% surtax on all imports from all countries, including friendly countries like Japan. Japan could not understand that.

And third, shortly thereafter, we clumsily installed a soybean export embargo. Japan depended on the United States for about 80% of its soybeans.

As a result, they were upset by all these things. In effect, they felt the United States no longer loved them.

So my first job over there was to re-establish trust and assure Japan that these shocks had nothing to do with a desire to change the relationship between the United States and Japan. In other words, my objective was to restore the relationship to an amicable, business-like, friendly bond.

I faced a unique situation. For years, the *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper had run a biannual survey of Japanese attitudes. One of the questions asked was, “To which country should we, Japan, be the most friendly?” Every year, until two years previous to my arrival, the United States had been the country so designated. After these Nixon shocks, however, the United States fell into secondplace ranking after the PRC. After President Ford's visit, a new survey was made. This time the United States was again back as number one.
President Ford was the first President in history to visit Japan while in office. Japan was the first country outside of the continental United States he visited. The visit showed Japan that he and America valued their goodwill. The U.S.-Japan relationship thus got back on track.

So my biggest challenge was to get our relationship re-established on an amicable basis. That was accomplished with two events -- President Ford's visit to Japan and the Emperor and Empress' visit to the United States the following year.

Q: *You accompanied the Emperor to the United States, and you would say that that was a major factor?*

HODGSON: I have never been so proud of my countrymen. You can't control American behavior. No one can predict how they are going to react. This era was, if you will recall, during the tag end of a period of activist unrest in our country. I had no way of predicting whether the Emperor would be met with placards and demonstrations or how he would be treated.

Actually, the Americans, in every city we went to (there were eight of them) and at every stop we made, greeted him in a dignified, gracious way. The trip was a conspicuous success. It probably did more to cement our long-term relationship between the two countries than anything that's happened before or since.

Q: *It's rather sad today to be seeing the newspaper accounts of how they are keeping the man alive. I feel distressed myself. I have a feeling that maybe they should let him pass away.*

HODGSON: Well, it certainly is a testimony to the efficacy of the state of Japanese medicine at this point in history.

Q: *Whenever people talk about the Japanese economy, anybody who has any knowledge of how it operates brings up MITI, the Ministry for International Trade and Industry. In your view, how much influence has MITI had on the course of the Japanese economy?*

HODGSON: Tremendous influence, for reasons Americans consistently refuse to understand. The whole Japanese institutional scene -- by that I mean business, government, labor, science, educational institutions, etc. -- does not operate on an adversary basis, as in this country. They operate on a more congenial basis. They have established collegial relationships through which they influence each other.

Under these circumstances, as a planning and resource allocating unit, MITI has gained tremendous influence. Japan owes a great deal to MITI in achieving the Japanese economic miracle. But MITI is only one piece of a total. It is not in sole control. It is merely one part of a cooperating whole.

Q: *Some people say that the Diet, the legislature, the Japanese government, are less important in the course of Japanese events than say, the bureaucracy, MITI, particularly, or the Keidanren. Some people say that the government is a creature of the Keidanren. First, for the benefit of the
HODGSON: The Keidanren is the top business organization in Japan. It consists of a kind of organization that would occur in this country if we were to put together the Business Roundtable, the Business Council, the American Chamber of Commerce, the National Manufacturers Association, the Iron and Steel Institute and other major institutions that represent American business. We have never, in this country, put those organizations together to serve as a single spokesman for the American industrial scene. In Japan, that's what the Keidanren does.

Q: How would you evaluate the influence or the importance of the Keidanren vis à vis the operation of the Japanese government?

HODGSON: It is the spokesman for the Japanese business community, the way MITI is the spokesman for the Japanese economic bureaucracy. It plays the role of partner.

HODGSON: I thought it might be interesting to review my concept of the role of an American Ambassador in contemporary times.

The interesting thing to me is the way that role has changed, dramatically changed. This change upsets so many people who went into Foreign Service work at a time when an American Foreign Service Officer serving abroad was required to make at least minor policy decisions for his country. Because of the limited nature of communications and the lengthy time it then took to get answers from Washington, he did this.

Two things came along in the 1950s to radically alter the diplomatic world. One was the communications satellite and the other was the jet engine. With these two devices, travelers now could go to or talk to any part of the world in practically no time at all. No part of the world was now more than twenty hours travel time away from Washington. No part of the world was more than twenty seconds away by telephone communication.

As a result, in an inter-related world, Washington held together its policy apparatus, keeping decisions all there. This meant that officers out on the forefront of diplomatic life in various countries no longer had to make, nor were, in fact, allowed to make, decisions on their own. They had to plug in headquarters to make sure decisions were consistent with policy and would avoid negative fallout elsewhere.

As a result, there is among many of our older Foreign Service people, a sense of having a job near the end of their career not nearly as satisfying as they anticipated at the start of their career. This sentiment has frequently surfaced in news stories citing bad morale in the American Foreign Service. Actually, we have a tremendous amount of talent in the American Foreign Service. Those who have adjusted from their original concept of ambassadorial life to the contemporary realities have performed admirably.

This leads to what I consider to be the main job of an ambassador. His job is a relations job. It is not a policy job. It is not a decision-making job. He can influence policies, and he can effect decisions through the information he supplies and advice he gives, but he cannot control them.
As a result, his job is to make sure that the relationship with the country where he is posted reflects the kind of relationship that overall American foreign policy dictates. It is not a job that requires a great deal of individual decision-making, nor the setting of policy. This has been a hard thing for some ambassadors in the Service to understand, but I believe increasingly it is being accepted as the norm. The process can’t really work any other way.

Q: Thank you. That’s quite interesting and in my experience, quite true, both in terms of the new definition of the job and also in terms of the frustration that that sometimes entails. We tend to think that because we are out on the firing line, that we have a greater impact on the policy than we really do. It’s reflected very often when a major issue arises in a country, there is always a delegation coming from Washington to handle it. And the political officer, in particular, is put out because he knows the players, and he knows the issues, and who are these guys? But that’s the reality of the new situation. Could you, as we discussed before, tell us a little bit about your experiences that might not have a weighty impact on event, but would be of interest and would give us some background on Japan at the time?

HODGSON: Well, I divided my approach to the ambassadorial job into three parts.

Statecraft was number one, meaning enhancing the relationship between the two countries, both from a bilateral standpoint and from the standpoint of long-range geo-political strategy.

Second came economics, promoting a healthy economic relationship between the two countries, especially an understanding of how our respective economies work. They work so differently that grasping the differences continues to elude peoples of both countries.

The third part, of course, is cultural. Here was a sphere that many ambassadors probably don’t have to concern themselves with heavily. They may be posted to countries with a Judeo-Christian tradition, with a background in Greco-Roman philosophy, and conditioned by the great minds of the Europeans over the years.

You have an entirely different flavor to life living and thinking in Japan. I found that in order to understand the differences between these two countries, I had to go back almost to the cradle of civilization and examine how these differences got started. It seemed to me that somewhere back in the mists of history, the Judeo-Christian tradition went off in one direction into the Greco-Roman era and eventually into the European reformation and enlightenment eras. That was one stream of human thought. The other stream went off in the direction of the Orient, developing Confucian and Buddhist and Hindu thinking and eventually flowering into Taoist and other kinds of philosophy that has conditioned current thought there.

What I find is that one society, the American society I came from, believes strongly in the individual. It believes in supporting the individual by guaranteeing him rights.

In Japan, the individual is not the focus; the group is the focus. And rights are not something by which they reinforce group identity. Relations are. So we contrast the individual on one side of the Pacific with the group on the other. Rights on one side with relations on the other. A consensus way of achieving decisions and making policy on the Oriental side contrasts with an
adversary, up and down, majority vote in our particular society. For these two societies to understand each other is very, very difficult.

To simplify the differences between the two and track down these differences right down to the bottom line, you find that in Japan, the individual attempts "to fit in." In Western society, the individual attempts "to stand out." The difference between these two will explain a great deal about the approach each society brings to the table when they sit down together in the diplomatic world. Unless one understands these differences, reaching an agreement can be exacerbated enormously.

Q: I understand that this creates problems for the businessman, for the diplomat, for anyone who has to have relationships. Would you say that we have been more successful diplomatically or in the business field when we accede to the fitting in, to the relating, rather than to the standing out, to confronting?

HODGSON: Well, I don't think either side necessarily needs to fit in or to stand out, in other words, to adopt the other's approach. I spent my life in what might be called conflict resolution -- labor management relations, minority group relations, relations between business and government and relations between countries. One doesn't merely adopt another's point of view or values in order to reach agreement.

A good bridging device is to integrate what each side has in common and find a way to achieve commonality that satisfies both interests. That is not as elusive as it might sound. Sometimes it must end up in compromise. But compromise is necessary when you cannot find a satisfactory resolution by integrating what each party has in common.

First, you try to integrate what both sides have in common and then compromise the differences that remain.

Q: You felt that this approach was successful for you in Japan?

HODGSON: Yes, it's been successful for me in every phase of my life's endeavor. Labor management relations particularly is where I generated this approach.

Q: And are there any specific examples while you were Ambassador that could illustrate this? I can say I have had occasions where I have had to convince my Japanese counterpart of something, and it's been, for me, a very frustrating experience when I've got no answer, which some people accept as an affirmative response. But I was wise enough to know that I wasn't getting any response because they didn't want to agree. Where does that leave you? Do you do anything specific?

HODGSON: Well, let's start with a generality. I developed what I called Hodgson's law for dealing with the Japanese. It's quite simple. If you will bend toward the Japanese in matters of form and in matters of pace, they will try to come your way in matters of substance. In other words, to get what you want, you better accept their approach as to the form of the deal and the speed for reaching an agreement on it. But if you accommodate the Japanese on those two things,
they will try to give you the substance of what you want.

I have found this a very useful concept. I'll give you one example. In late '76, September of '76, a Soviet pilot flew out of Siberia and surprised the world by setting his MiG down on Hokkaido and defecting, thereby placing in Allied hands a late model MiG, a real intelligence coup for the free world. The American Defense Department immediately asked me to get them access to this aircraft.

I made such a request to the Japanese, and they said they would be glad to consider it. I then got a lot of pressure from Washington, raising a great hue and cry that the Japanese were not going to cooperate, that they were being difficult to deal with. None of those things were the case.

The Japanese had to go through a certain procedure for matters of this kind. Standard procedures control the Japanese way of doing things. I knew once they had completed the procedure, doing it at their own pace and following their own form for releasing the information, we would get what we wanted. That is exactly what happened. But if I had listened to the impatient Americans, we could have stumbled into a difficult argument over what became a very amicable resolution.

Q: Did you find that your staff in general at the Embassy was as sensitive to their Japanese counterparts as you suggested is important, and as knowledgeable of Japanese history and culture and so forth, and as competent in their particular specializations as you would like?

HODGSON: First of all, the staff in the Embassy taught me a lot about what I have just described, especially men like Mr. Tom Shoesmith, who was my DCM. He is an old Japanese hand, speaks Japanese beautifully; his whole career had a strong Japanese focus, and he understood the country. I tended to put a little different stamp on things and maybe put it on a different philosophical level than he and others did, but they were very, very helpful.

There were some Embassy people who, because the Japanese system seemed to frustrate their particular personal objectives, were unwilling to accept Japan's cultural parameters. I accepted them as the best way to get something done in service of my country. To do my job most effectively required accepting them. I am a fairly impatient man. I speak definitely, and try to give straightforward answers. That these approaches were not part of the scene in Japan did not strike me favorably. It seemed to me, however, that my role was not to convert the Japanese, but to deal with them.

Q: When you were in Japan, were we in the old Embassy? Had the new building been constructed? What was the housing situation?

HODGSON: Well, I had been in Japan in 1969 with the American Cabinet committee, had visited the old Chancery then and had lunch at the old Embassy residence. I thought it was a beautiful arrangement. When I was asked to be Ambassador, I was looking forward to participating in the kind of life that involved a lovely residence and a classical Chancery.

After I had accepted the job, Secretary Kissinger told me, "The Chancery is no longer there. It has been torn down. We've got a little private office that you're stuck in for the next two years
while we're building a new Chancery."

The residence, however, was fine. It was one of the finest residences American Ambassadors have anywhere, in my opinion. A marvelous place. The Ambassador and his wife occupy a couple of rooms off in one corner of the second floor, but the rest is a public house, and it's a very nice public house.

The new Chancery, however, was a great disappointment to me. I had to dedicate it while I was there. I thought it was one of the most ugly buildings I'd ever seen. It resembled a New England loft building of the last century, built at minimum dollars per square foot with very little in the way of aesthetic taste. It really didn't fit the site in Tokyo at all. I had a terrible time trying to think of words that wouldn't express my true view about it, so I came up describing it as an imposing, commodious building. Both terms could be characterized either negative or positive.

Q: But you never really occupied the new Chancery?

HODGSON: Yes, I was in it from September '76 until March '77. It's a fine working building, but it adds nothing to the Tokyo scene. That's the least unkind thing I can say about it.

Q: Well, Tokyo architecture is eclectic, isn't it? Whatever they see, they put up, regardless of where they've seen it. I would agree with you, it was a shock to me. I served in West African Ghana, where they have a fantastic-looking Embassy, but it's a terrible place to work in.

HODGSON: Well, it's like the one they have in India that Pat Moynihan says is the worst place to work in that he'd ever been in.

Q: Well, I've seen it, but I did not have to work there. You touched upon a question of morale, staff morale, before, in another context. I know it's difficult for an ambassador to gauge staff morale because, to a great extent, much of that is taken out of your hands by the DCM.

HODGSON: Not if you've spent your life dealing with morale, as I have done in my career.

Q: But how would you gauge it? It's a big Embassy, lots of people, rather impersonal as embassies go. How would you gauge the morale of the people while you were there?

HODGSON: Well, there are really two different groups there. Three-fourths of the Embassy personnel are Japanese, and one-fourth are Americans.

The Japanese, when I arrived there, had been very well treated, especially from the standpoint of wages, salaries and perks. They worked for an employer who viewed things in a different context than a Japanese employer would have. Japanese industrial employees, during the period from the end of World War II until about 1970, were held under very tight rein. Though Japan was then a low labor-cost part of the world, the Embassy employees were well taken care of. So their morale was very good.

However, during the time I was there, private-sector wages started escalating faster than the
public sector. I could see that perhaps later on, there might be morale problems among the 
Japanese employees. I understand there has been some of that.

With respect to the U.S. employees, morale, I think, depended upon the extent to which they felt 
a fascination with Japan as an assignment. You can either be fascinated with or repelled by 
Japan. I happened to be extraordinarily fascinated by it. Men like Mr. Shoesmith, who were 
Japanese specialists, were also. There were some that could never understand the Japanese, 
feeling that the Japanese were beyond understanding. Their morale was not the best. So, I would 
say that those who liked Japan liked the assignment. Their morale was good. Those that did not 
found the assignment negative. The proportions were probably two-thirds who liked it and one-
third who didn't.

*Q: Are there any highlights that you haven't touched on yet? Something that sticks to your mind?*

HODGSON: Well, I always find it awkward to answer such questions as, "What was the biggest 
event you had in Japan?" or "What was the major crisis you faced while you were in Japan?" I 
characterized my tenure there as the "no-problem era" in our relationship. The Embassy managed 
to keep under control anything that appeared as though it might become an incipient problem. 
My relationship with officials like Mr. Miyazawa, who was Foreign Secretary, and Prime 
Minister Miki, who was Prime Minister, during two-plus years of my three-year stay was just 
outstanding.

I believe it's axiomatic that the greatest thing in life is timing. I timed my stay in Japan 
impeccably. It worked out to be an outstanding period in my life, a very satisfying one, as well as 
a period in America's relationship with Japan that hasn't been bettered before or since.

**WILLIAM D. MILLER**

*Public Affairs Officer, USIS*

*Tokyo (1974-1977)*

*William D. Miller was born in 1921 in Altoona, Pennsylvania. He served with the CIA and the USIS. Mr. Miller's career with USIS included assignments in India and Japan. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on March 4, 1989.*

MILLER: All right. Now, Japan is almost the opposite of India as far as its general 
communications, as well as for the type of programs one should have there. First of all, Japan has 
practically the same amount of media exposure as the United States does. In some areas, perhaps 
more. And it has roughly the same level of sophistication. You've got a highly educated 
audience.

*Q: Ninety-eight percent literate.*

MILLER: Ninety-eight percent literate, if you can believe that given the difficulties of the 
Japanese language. It’s a great accomplishment.
Q: It is.

MILLER: And so the idea of issuing press releases, of putting out your own materials and having them used is ridiculous. The Japanese media are so capable of gathering information on their own that they have no need for this at all. And they recognize a handout for what it is, a handout. So the question is how do you crack a market like Japan? And the answer to that is you find out what it is that we want to say to them, what they are interested in hearing about from us, and you say it to them in a way that they'll accept it. And the best way, the easiest way to do that, is through various exchange programs. We -- now, this was not my doing, this was done well before I got there -- but I think at that time, Japan had the most sophisticated program in the world, exchange program, in that we invited people from the United States to come to Japan, usually two or three at a time, to meet with Japanese counterparts in the same field and discuss their respective subject specialties. And we had to get people of sufficient importance so that they would be important for the Japanese media to cover. If you could get the Japanese media to cover them, then you'd have all of Japan at your feet reading your information.

That basically is what the Japanese program was all about when I was there. You had to use a variety of weapons. Some of them were sending Japanese to the United States to cover things. But normally, the Japanese would do that. But maybe your Information Officer, talking to somebody at NHK, might suggest why don't you send somebody over to cover this or that? And quite often the Japanese were very willing to do that.

Personal contact in Japan was very important. We had to work very hard to keep our contacts with the various media and the academic and cultural sections of Japan. And through that personal contact, we were able to get on to the Japanese media frequently. And frequently we got across a good solid message. It could be a hard hitting message. If it comes from an important American official visiting Japan, he can say what he wants to, and they will print and broadcast it, televise it. And we had very good access to NHK, the Japanese national television service and the other television companies and practically all of the major press. Not for hand outs, but for things which we could develop. And we also did have a sufficient number of important Americans visiting there, mostly on their own. Our program merely rounded out the elements that we could scrounge up from people who were coming through on their own. If they listened to only one particular segment of America, for example, businessmen, then they'd get an imbalance.

But one thing that comes to mind was the Law of the Seas Conference that took place while I was in Japan. The Japanese were very interested in this, especially the idea of putting a 300 mile limit or fifty mile limit or whatever out there, as they saw it, to obstruct their fishing, which was a lifeblood question in Japan. Fish constitutes a very large part of the Japanese diet. Their fishing industry is quite large, and they were very concerned about limiting catches of whales for example. We in this country were very disturbed about those Japanese killing all the whales. The Japanese were concerned about us keeping them from eating whale meat, which they like.

We saw that that was going to be a problem very early in the game. And we began to invite Americans who were interested, who were involved, in the Law of the Sea and particularly the
fisheries thing, to Japan and have them state their case outright and state it in as hard hitting terms as they wanted. I think by and large, we blunted the Japanese opposition to the Law of the Sea by doing this. They began to understand what a real problem it was and why large parts of the rest of the world were so concerned about it. So they understood that while they might be eating a little less whale meat, this had to be done, or they wouldn't be eating any at all sometime in the not too distant future.

Q: I wanted to ask you another question. Did you immediately succeed Al Carter?

MILLER: Yes.

Q: What was your evaluation of the very substantial change that he made in the Japanese program?

MILLER: I thought his basic changes were good. But I thought it had gone too far. We were too exclusive. Naturally, the cost of doing business in Japan was so great that we had to be very limited in our targeting, very, very limited. But I felt that we had to be limited in our targeting without appearing to be. So we didn't have to go around telling everybody that we don't want you in our cultural centers. And there was a general sort of attitude of that kind in the American staff there. My mandate at that time was to make changes in the program because it had offended a number of people who had gone out there to look it over.

Q: It offended quite a number of prominent Japanese, too, I think.

MILLER: Oh, but I think that was the biggest problem. We practically told people at the doors of our library -- this is an exaggeration -- but they couldn't come in unless they were on this particular list. And so we had to put a stop to that, and we did. And I think I was resented by a good bit of the American staff there for insisting on that.

Q: Were they still using those -- oh, it was I guess a form of the computerization. They had these TV-like monitors in each of the centers, and they were virtually eliminating the books at one point. You had to get your information from the center by going through this monitor system in which you had a monitor screen.

MILLER: There was an awful lot of that. And it was more than that. It was a slavery to technology to the extent that you almost eliminated the human element.

Q: Yeah.

MILLER: And we had to humanize the program more. That was the biggest problem. There were also, I felt, we seemed to go overboard on things like paint, you know, being extremely modern in designing our libraries and so forth. I thought we should be up to date. But I didn't think in a contest with the Japanese we were going to win any prizes for leading the world, not USIA at any rate, with the limited budget we had.

Q: The Japanese have great pride in their own particular decorative capabilities.
MILLER: Exactly, exactly. And so I thought our facilities ought to be modern, neat, clean, but warm. We found things like an insistence on the part of some of our people that even the glasses we used to serve cocktails had to be the finest quality glasses that you could find. And my administrative guy found at one point that they were spending something like four or five dollars per glass, which tend to get broken fairly frequently, too. And we put a stop to that kind of thing over considerable opposition.

But no, the program needed to be humanized. That was the biggest thing. I think basically Carter had the right idea, that you had to cut out the hand outs sort of thing and stick to what you were trying to do. But they have a tendency to carry things a little bit to extremes. I hope within my stay there we managed to do that -- humanize.

WILLIAM C. SHERMAN
Bureau of East Asian Affairs

Ambassador William C. Sherman was born in 1923 and raised in Kentucky. Ambassador Sherman served in Japan, Korea, and Italy, and he was Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia Affairs from 1984-1986. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on October 27, 1993.

Q: What was the Bureau for East Asian Affairs like in 1974?

SHERMAN: I reported for duty just around the time when Bob Ingersoll returned from Tokyo to become the Assistant Secretary. Ingersoll had been appointed when Mac Godley could not win confirmation because of his alleged involvement in the Laos fiasco. Kissinger had just moved from the White House to his offices on the Seventh Floor. Ingersoll only stayed for about six months before being promoted to Deputy Secretary and was then followed by Phil Habib. Bob was the nicest person, but he was really a neophyte in the Washington bureaucracy. He worked hard at being Assistant secretary and had good policy sense. He was determined to serve the Secretary as best be could, but I think he eventually found the role of Deputy Secretary hard to accept because he found himself working on all the issues that Kissinger didn't want to touch. That made him the Department's front man on many sticky matters. Habib was replaced by Art Hummel in mid-76 when Phil became Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I spanned three Assistant Secretaries. Habib was the most interesting one to work for. He was the most exciting boss that I ever had.

As Japan Country Director, I first reported to Dick Sneider, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for a brief time before going to Korea in the summer of 1974. Then Owen Zurhellen succeeded Sneider. He lasted for less than a year because he offended Kissinger in 1975 and was shipped out as Ambassador to Suriname. Zurhellen ran into trouble when the Japanese Prime Minister was due for a Washington visit. The event had not been publicly announced. The President, Kissinger and a number of VIPs were scheduled to take a trip to Europe, but it was not
publicly known that the President was going to extend the trip to Romania and perhaps to another country. In any case, no one knew for sure when he would return to the United States. I brought the Japanese Ambassador to see Kissinger before his departure on this European trip. The Ambassador wished him well and said that he hoped that all was set for the Prime Minister's visit. Kissinger asked in his usual elliptical fashion: "Mr. Ambassador, would a postponement of a couple of days make a great deal of difference to the Prime Minister?" The Ambassador thought that was manageable as long as the visit dates had not been publicly announced. Once the visit was public and so announced to the Diet, it could not be changed; that would create a disastrous P.R. problem. The President and his entourage went off to Europe and the plans for the Prime Minister's visit proceeded. When it became apparent that the President would not return on his previously announced schedule, Zurhellen, then acting Assistant Secretary in Habib's absence -- he was out of the country -- told us to keep sending telegrams to the Secretary asking about when the Japanese Prime Minister might be welcomed. We told the Secretary that the announcement would be made soon; each cable had a stronger note of urgency because we knew that the Japanese might announce the visit at any time. We kept asking for guidance because if the dates were not satisfactory, we would have to tell the Japanese immediately, if not sooner. We spelled out the consequences; i.e. once the dates are announced, there could be no changes. Cable after cable went unanswered; we got nothing but silence back from Kissinger. No guidance at all. The Japanese schedule was announced in the Diet. The President and Kissinger returned one night; the next morning the Japanese Prime Minister arrived at ten o'clock.. By this time, Habib had returned and he and I and Zurhellen were summoned see Kissinger for a briefing. Habib was asked to step into the office alone. I was later told that the Secretary gave him holy hell; then he called Zurhellen and me into the office and yelled and screamed at us. He asked how we could have let such a thing happen. The President and his staff had just returned from a long trip; they were exhausted. They couldn't possibly receive the Prime Minister and his delegation. He really raved and ranted; Zurhellen tried to explain that we had sent cable after cable asking for guidance. Henry would not be placated; he just thought that we had failed miserably and completely. The Prime Minister's visit came and went, as did Zurhellen soon thereafter. We never found out what happened to our cables. It would be tempting to think that the staff screwed up since the volume of traffic to the Secretary was always very high when he traveled, but I think it is more likely that Kissinger just wanted to wait; he was well aware of the matter and decided for whatever reason not to pay any attention. I am sure that he could have found a few minutes to give us some guidance; he was tireless and always on the go. But he didn't choose to do so and until today I don't know how and why the whole mess developed.

Then Oscar Armstrong became the DAS for a while; he was followed by Bill Gleysteen who stayed there until he became Ambassador to Korea in 1978.

I mentioned earlier that the concept of Country Director was born during Crockett's regime. By the time I became Japan Country Director, the theory had become well entrenched in practice. I had wide ranging authority to monitor and direct most of the activities that took place in and with Japan. The China Country Director operated in a similar fashion. Both of the occupants of that position had a lot of credibility within the Department and within the U.S. government. In fact, I think the whole Bureau operated as envisioned by Crockett and others. Both within the Department and the U.S. government, East Asian country directors were viewed as linchpins of policy making and implementation. Scott George was then the German Affairs Country Director.
We would often say that we had the best jobs in the Department; the problems and issues for both of us were major and of course we handled matters that pertained to two of the most important countries in the world. I would not say the same thing for all other parts of the Department.

Phil Habib gave me a lot of leeway. Once he came to know me, he relied on my advice and provided a lot of support. Phil would be quick to run with the ball if he thought he could do it better than anyone else; he thought that most of the time. But once he was convinced that you could do a satisfactory job for him, he tended to keep supervision at a minimum. I had a very good relationship with him.

Phil's trademark was to appear to be enraged by anything that was going on at the moment. He would always find fault with what was done; he never seemed satisfied. He would bluster and shout, particularly with Dan O'Donohue, at every staff meeting. Dan was the Korea Country Director. Dick Sneider used to refer to himself as the "Charge for Korean Affairs" because Phil always tried to micro-manage Korean programs. Actually, Phil and Dan were very close, and Phil helped Dan in his career on many occasions. But you had to understand Phil's *modus operandi*; otherwise you would be overwhelmed and respond in exactly the wrong way and be left in utter oblivion. I did not know Habib before he came to the Bureau, but I quickly adapted to this boisterous exterior. He would ask a few questions out of the corner of his mouth and then he would grumble some instructions. He always had some gracious comment at the end to the effect that he could have done the job better and quicker himself. If you understood him, you didn't take pay any attention to these rumblings. Indeed, I think I developed very close relationship with Phil Habib. He started out being suspicious of Japan and of Japan experts, but that didn't last very long. Soon, as I said, he came to trust my work and judgement and I found him to be a most inventive and persuasive leader. He was always ready to take up your cudgel if that were necessary. At one point, during the Miki visit, the Prime Minister wanted to modify slightly the security relationship between the United States and Japan. He was seeking some minor change in the Far East security clause of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty. Miki just wanted to move Japan slightly away from the responsibility it had under the security treaty for considering a threat to the security of the Korean peninsula as a threat to the security of Japan.. He didn't quite know how to go about doing it. Kiki Kuriyama, then the Political Counselor at the Japanese Embassy and I spent days finding an acceptable formulation for this relatively minor change. We finally agreed on a statement that said that the security of Korea was essential to the security of the Far East, which seemed to satisfy Miki as being sufficiently different. None of the rest of us saw it as a change of existing policy or formulations, but it appeared to satisfy Miki’s domestic political requirements to present himself as somewhat more independent of the United States than had been the case with his predecessors. After we finally had come up with satisfactory language, we had to get Kissinger's approval. It was one of those days when no one could get to the Secretary through established channels. That evening, at a small White House working dinner, hosted by Ford, to which, much to my surprise I was invited, I carried with me the text and sat on it during the meal). This had been worked out in advance. As we left the table -- there were about thirty guests -- Habib took the paper and grabbed Kissinger and briefed him on the change. The Secretary looked at it and grumbled and said "OKAY", but only if the Japanese would publicly state that US-Japan relations had never been better. That was an easy task and so we wrapped it up. But it was an interesting illustration how diplomacy sometimes is conducted.
Furthermore, Habib was loyal to his troops almost to a fault. He could yell at us, but he would not permit anyone else to do so. No one, but no one, could criticize his "boys and girls". He was probably more adapted at handling Kissinger than any other Assistant Secretary in the Department.

The relationship with Habib in addition to the policy challenges, made the Japan job an exciting one. It kept me on my toes all the time partly because I worked for a capricious and unpredictable Secretary of State who would become involved in problems and then just as quickly become disengaged. Fortunately, he did not involve himself in Japanese affairs very often -- he had more urgent matters to attend to. But every once in a while, Japan would come up on his screen and then we would have to find ways of satisfying him. Usually, the matters that he became involved in were very petty. He was always trying to recover his status in Japan which had plummeted after the "China shock". He tended to dismiss Japanese sensitivity to having been ignored on the China initiative. He used to defend himself by saying that information leaked out of Japan faster than any other place in the world and therefore it would have been too risky to share his plans with the Japanese. Any time his name appeared in the Japanese media, Kissinger seemed to find out about it. If the story was even remotely viewed as critical, he would call Habib and ask for an explanation. He always felt aggrieved by these stories and always wanted them stopped. That is an illustration of the matters in which Kissinger became involved. He stopped in Japan on several occasions and he saw Japanese Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers in Washington on a number of occasions. The first visit, which came shortly after the new Administration was inaugurated, was scheduled after Prime Minister Miki through his son who was a student in Washington inquired whether he could make contact with the new team. The son went to see Jim Wickel who was the Department's official Japanese translator and worked for me in The Office of Japanese Affairs. Miki said that his father wanted to have this contact, but found it difficult to initiate it. He would however send Miyazawa then the Foreign Minister, to meet with Kissinger secretly. When we informed Kissinger of Miki's plans, he was delighted because he loved to operate in this fashion -- that is hidden from public view. But Miyazawa dawdled around and didn't schedule any meeting. He instead wrote a letter asking whether he and Kissinger couldn't get together at some international meeting that might take place in the near future. That of course didn't please Kissinger at all; he thought he was being led around by some upstart who didn't understand how to conduct international diplomacy. So when the Foreign Minister finally did arrive, he was scheduled to meet Kissinger at 10:00 a.m. He arrived punctually at the scheduled time only to find that Kissinger was at the White House (where he was writing his annual "State of the World" report). So Bob Ingersoll received the Foreign Minister and hosted a lunch for him. The Japanese reporters were very upset by what they perceived to be a major insult and breach of protocol. Finally, Habib and Eagleburger prevailed on Kissinger to return to the Department. So toward the end of the meal, in sweeps Kissinger, full of apologies and contrition. Miyazawa, who spoke excellent English, was able to make few well chosen points, but at the end, all was smoothed over. Kissinger said that he had "to return to the White House to translate his report from German.", but that he would host another lunch for the Foreign Minister the next day. Luckily this could be told to the Japanese reporters before their deadline and nobody reported that their Foreign Minister had been snubbed. It ended well, but for a while, the atmosphere was very tense and we were on edge of a precipice. If Kissinger had not arrived when he did, the reports back to Japan would have been very harsh indeed.
We spent some time worrying about trade, although those issues had not risen to the decibel level of the last ten years. The trade imbalance was probably on the order of $7-8 billion at the time, which seemed huge in those days, but was not close to the today's level. There were people in our government -- Commerce and Treasury -- who were concerned with the imbalance. There was some interest shown by Congress, but little on the part of private industry. The list of commodities under scrutiny were the standard ones: textiles, citrus, automobiles, television sets. The pressure to do something about the deficit was just beginning to build, but it was not yet the major preoccupation.

We focused primarily on security issues. We worried about Japanese contributions to the support of our forces in Japan and the self-imposed Japanese budget limitation of 1% of GNP for defense expenditures. DoD was pressing us to take a stronger position on this defense expenditures issue; they wanted the Japanese to spend more. We did in fact pressure the Japanese on this questions through the Ford and Carter administrations, but it was essentially an unproductive initiative. The Japanese did not take kindly to us telling them they had to spend X percentage of GNP on defense. The Reagan administration, in addressing the problem, talked in different terms. I think this primarily due to the influence of Rich Armitage. The US in the '80s did not talk about levels or amounts of expenditures, but rather discussed the issues in terms of roles and missions that Japan had agreed to undertake after joint consultations. We then said that sufficient amounts had to be spent to conduct those roles and missions without ever specifying exact levels of expenditures. That put the issue in a much more acceptable framework for the Japanese.

Q: Does that comment suggest that the other parts of the US bureaucracy had little understanding of Japanese culture and modus vivendi?

SHERMAN: I think that was true. It is the standard complaint of the expert. Japan is different from a Western country and even from other Asian countries. That fact requires that a lot of education be provided for those in the US government who are not familiar with Japanese customs and mores. We spent some time explaining Japanese perspectives and motivations for their behavior. That doesn't mean that we should not try once in a while to change their behavior or their policies, nor should any one in the US government take on the role of apologist for the Japanese. But if you want behavior modification, you have to understand how that can be done in the Japanese framework. US goals can be achieved with a minimum of bruised feelings if approached in manner acceptable to Japanese society. It has been done and continues to be done in certain instances. The most effective way to change Japanese behavior is to identify common points of interest rather than the points of disagreement. Japanese do no respond well to a confrontational style of negotiations. They do respond to consensus and compromise which is carefully worked out. It is important for negotiators to insure that "face" is not lost on the part of either side. Too often these important, and sometimes vital, aspects of negotiating with the Japanese are ignored by Americans, who view using these tactics as "coddling of the Japanese" who, they feel, are smart enough to do things the American way. There are easier, better and probably more successful ways of negotiating with the Japanese than the tactics we use today and did in the '70s as well. There is always someone in the US bureaucracy who wants to bull his or her way through the "Japan shop". That perhaps is an appropriate tactic if all else has failed; sometimes the "shock" approach is the only one that will work, but we must recognize
that every time we use the direct and forceful approach, we pay a price. I was very fortunate that Habib particularly understood that question; if he didn't, he trusted that I did. Both Habib and Hummel relied on the advice of their country directors and that made for a smooth working operation.

My relationships with the Pentagon were good, in general. I worked primarily with ISA. For part of my tour, I worked with a War College classmate who was in ISA handling Japanese matters. In the Department, we worked with the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and that worked well. Of course, it helped that by the time I had finished my tour as Country Director, I had lasted in that position longer than any of my predecessors and I should add, longer than any of my successors, even though it was only three and a half years. But that gave me a familiarity with issues that many others did not have. I set a record which I don't think has been broken to date. I don't think that length of service in a particular position gives a State Department official an advantage in the Washington bureaucratic in-fighting. I do think that State is at a disadvantage in that arena because its officers serve overseas more than they do in Washington. Washington is a unique environment that requires some familiarity with its processes. Bureaucratic in-fighting is a skill that Foreign Service officers either do not have or do not cultivate and therefore that puts them at some disadvantage in the Washington environment. The State Department officials who navigate well in Washington are often the civil servants who do not serve overseas, but are in Washington all the time. It is the constant rotation between Washington and overseas that puts a Foreign Service Officer at some disadvantage when he works in Washington. We don't know where the power lies either within the Department or in other agencies. And we don't have the opportunity to build up the personal relationships which the civil servants develop over decades.

Q: What other agencies were you in close contact during this period?

SHERMAN: In those days, the NSC was in tight control of inter-agency contacts. They supervised inter-agency work closely to insure proper coordination and control. This was the period when Kissinger was both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. That "dual hatted" role did not affect us in our daily work. The Seventh Floor and the NSC had their own channel of communications so that both staffs were fully apprized on current matters. So we didn't have to worry about keeping both staffs apprized; their coordination was very good. The Seventh Floor was, as far as we were concerned, Kissinger and his close collaborators. Despite the fact that Ingersoll was the Deputy Secretary, he had little, if any involvement in Japanese affairs. the same thing happened when Habib became Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Even he didn't get involved in Japanese matters. We had semi-annual planning talks with the Japanese, which were led on our side by the Policy Planning staff. The Japanese delegation was headed by their Foreign Ministry's Office of Research and Intelligence. Win Lord -- the Director of the Policy Planning Staff -- Sam Lewis -- his deputy -- and I would go to Japan for the meetings, most of which were held in remote locations to minimize outside distractions. We would talk about world problems and try to coordinate where we could our policies. Then six months later, the Japanese would come to the US and we would continue our discussions. The focus of these talks were global issues, to US-Japan relations. I thought that these exchanges were useful; Win Lord seemed to enjoy them as had his predecessors. They helped maintain close relations with the Japanese.
We also had separate discussions on China and the Middle East, although Japan's involvement in that part of the world was very limited and didn't grow until later. The Japanese participated fully in these discussions; the issues were of interest to them. They did not however try to stake out independent policy positions; they were primarily interested in being brought up to date on our views. They tried to support us as productively as possible on our positions. In those days, the key goal of Japanese foreign policy was to maintain close relationships with the United States and to support us to the best of their abilities in our global goals. We agreed that the Japanese basic policy was correct; we did not try to push them to be more active. We were very mindful of the limitations imposed on the Japanese by their Constitution and did not try to urge them beyond the limits of foreign policy activity that they had decided on. Their Constitution prohibited military alliances outside of the United Nations and limited Japanese participation in military strategic planning. At the time, we did not see Japan as a possible surrogate for our policy in any parts of the world. We did believe that Japan could play a constructive role in the area surrounding that country. We thought Japan could be a stabilizing force, particularly in the economic field and especially in Southeast Asia. We didn't expect much, if any, political leadership from Japan because neither we or the Japanese could foretell what the reaction of other Asian countries might be if the Japanese were to try to bring any massive political influence to bear. The scars of World War II were still too fresh in Asia to expect any of those countries to follow the Japanese on political issues. The Japanese would have been willing to play a constructive role, but were not about rush in where they might not be wanted and we were certainly not going to push them faster than they wanted to go, in the mid-70s, at least.

We thought that the Japanese could still play a constructive role on China in this period. It was still early in our relationships with mainland China, we had just be re-initiated only a few years earlier. The Japanese, by now, had more or less gotten over the "China shock" and they were anxious to support as much as they could our opening to China. They followed our lead; they would not stake out an independent path, but they did give us full support as an independent nation dealing with China. We thought that the Japanese could be very helpful in assisting China's economic development. There were several large projects, like the Chumen oil fields, which the Japanese supported.

Once the Shanghai communique had been issued, we did not believe that the Mainland-Taiwan issue was any longer a major impediment to Far East stability. We essentially viewed those tensions as resolved by the communique. Essentially, we did not see the United States having a policy in the Far East independent of the over-all Cold War strategy that governed all of our foreign policy strategies. In the Far East, was well as in all other parts of the world, all major issues were viewed through the Cold War prism. For example, we viewed Japan as a logistic and intelligence base for our confrontation with the Soviet Union -- the "unsinkable" aircraft carrier - - 300 miles away from the Pacific end of the USSR. Japan provided a base for air coverage of the eastern portion of the Soviet Union, if that became necessary. Our bases in Japan were well located to provide a very potent strategic arm which would, while forward bases for our defense, could at the same time be a vital component of Japan's defense. Our problem was to manage this defense concept in a political manner acceptable to them so that it would not infringe on their strict constitutional limitations on military actions. The government undoubtedly understood that it was part of our "containment policy", but it had to be careful in its explanation to its citizens of its defense expenditures and policies. The political opposition stood firm in its strict
interpretation of the Constitution which prohibited Japan to be involved in any military operations except self-defense.

The NSC official for Japanese affairs was Dick Smyser, a Foreign Service Officer. He had responsibility for all Far East issues. He was an expert on Vietnam having worked with Kissinger in this issue for sometime. He and I talked almost every day. Whenever the NSC wanted to reach a policy decision or adjudicate a inter-agency dispute, it would issue a NSSM. The bureaucracy would crank one up and then a Presidential decision would be made.

We kept in close touch with the intelligence community and Defense Department. The intelligence community served us well and was quite responsive to our needs.

There wasn't enough Congressional interest in this period on Japanese affairs to require me or any of my staff to spend much time with Members of Congress or staffers. If there were any hearings, they were handled by the Assistant Secretary or sometime by the Deputy Assistant Secretary. I remember that I briefed one Congressman one time; he was the chairman of the Far East subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Soon after that, he was moved to another subcommittee.

Q: I would like to just briefly return to the question of the Japanese bureaucracy. Did you have any difficulty dealing with that bureaucracy in the 1974-77 period?

SHERMAN: No. The Japanese bureaucracy was, by and large, essential to the operations of the Japanese government. It was more important to work with the bureaucracy than it was to work with the politicians. Regardless of what might have been said about it, I think the Japanese bureaucracy is still the largest single collection of well-trained and idealistic -- in their own terms -- people in Japan. They feel that they have a mandate to get a job done and they get it done, most of time well and in a timely fashion -- according to their clocks. I dealt again primarily with the Foreign Ministry, although I also had contacts with MITI and the Finance Ministry. Later on, when assigned to Tokyo, I also became acquainted with other Ministries, such as Postal and Telecommunications - which has been causing so much trouble on the current Motorola issue -- and the Health and Welfare Ministry -- on import of medical equipment, and the Justice Ministry -- on American lawyers practicing in Japan. Those Ministries are much more narrowly focused and domestically-oriented. They have little knowledge, and perhaps even interest, in international affairs and therefore are much more difficult to deal with, unlike their sophisticated counterparts in the Foreign Ministry and MITI. In the '74-77 period, these American investment and export issues were just beginning to emerge; they of course became serious bones of contention in later years.

This period between 1974 and 1977 was very active. The Japanese Emperor paid his first visit to the United States. It was of course purely ceremonial and strictly governed by protocol. The Emperor had done a little travel outside his country, but not much. So the Japanese required strict conformance to their practices, not for security reasons, but just because that was protocol. They were greatly concerned that the royal institution not be minimized in any way. Practically, the whole Imperial Household Agency was in the US at one time or another checking on this or that detail. For example, the Emperor was scheduled to visit Shea Stadium to see a football game --
baseball season had unfortunately passed by the time he visited. The Japanese called Angier Biddle Duke's office in New York -- he was then the city's Chief of Protocol -- wanting to find out how many times a visitor had been booed at the Stadium. They were assured that it would not happen to the Emperor and it didn't. The visit went very well; in fact, as the Emperor was leaving, just before the game concluded, some fan raised his beer cup and said: "Thanks for coming, Emp!" The Japanese also insisted vigorously that the Emperor would not have his picture taken except with another chief of state or that he would not sign any guest books. Of course, in the final analysis, the Emperor had his picture taken with everybody from the President to Mickey Mouse. He signed every guest book that was put in front of him, signing "Hirohito" in laborious Japanese script. He was very human and warm and the trip and the pictures that came form it did wonders for his image in Japan. The Japanese had never seen that side of their Emperor's personality, and they liked it. It was a typical case of staff over-protection. He had a marvelous visit. We were deeply involved in the trip's plans down to the last detail. It took months. I was supposed to accompany the Emperor during his U.S. stay, but unfortunately my mother died at the time and I had to send a substitute. She died slowly over a six-weeks period and I wrote a note to Phil Habib saying that I couldn't devote full time to the Emperor's trip. I suggested that he bring someone else to the desk to take over my responsibilities. Habib called me immediately after he had read my note, saying that I should not worry about the visit and that arrangements would proceed as planned. They did and the visit was a great success. The Emperor very kindly gave me a gift: a box which I still have and an autographed picture of him and his Empress.

EDWARD W. KLOTH
Japanese Language Training
Yokohama (1983-1984)

Economic-Commercial Officer
Fukuoka, Japan (1984-1986)

Mr. Kloth was born in North Carolina and raised in New York. After service in the Peace Corps and private business, he worked with the Department of Defense, later joining the State Department. In his career with State, Mr. Kloth served several tours in Japan and Korea, In Washington assignments he dealt with East Asian, Political/military, Economic and Environment matters. He also spent two years on Capitol Hill as Department of State Pearson Fellow. After retirement, Mr. Kloth continued as advisor to the Department on variety of matters and served a tour in Iraq as Economic Officer. Mr. Kloth was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: What did you do after your year and a half back in the consular section?

KLOTH: Then I went to Japan, to Fukuoka via a six month refresher Japanese in Yokohama to bridge the December 1983 to July 1984 gap before the incumbent in Fukuoka transferred. Japan was very popular as an assignment. There was a boom of interest at U.S. universities too. Japan’s economy was booming, and the trade friction with the United States made the trade issue number
one. Now I understand that China is all the rage and understandably so. That’s where my interest in the Far East started.

When I was in Tokyo in the late ‘70s as a graduate student, the Japanese press was full of trade issues and the back and forth about U.S. complaints about Japanese protectionist policies which were accurate. The Japanese, of course, said U.S. companies didn’t try hard enough and that had some truth as well. For my second tour then, I thought I’d like to see the situation from outside Tokyo, and got a job at the consulate in Fukuoka as economic-commercial officer. A friend of mine recommended a consulate as fun, and it was. I did a lot of public speaking everywhere from Rotary clubs to Chambers of Commerce. I had two very good Japanese employees; we worked with American businessmen who were in the area and helped them sell everything from women’s leotards and Texas beer to nuclear power plant equipment. I was there from summer of ’84 to summer of ’86. We had a consul, economic/commercial officer plus a consular/admin officer because at that time Japanese citizens needed visas to come to the United States. We also had a USIS cultural center.

**Q: Was the Japanese Red Army an issue at the time?**

KLOTH: No, it was pretty well gone. We did computerized name checks for visas. Occasionally we’d have demonstrations in front of the consulate, but they were rather small and not a danger. Japanese police would always bring a police bus around, but I never saw a confrontation.

The Chinese consulate general was down the street from us. A big black right-wing bus would come by sometimes with its loud speakers blaring. Just after they passed my window you’d hear the guy changing from the anti-US to the anti-Chinese tape.

**Q: Okay. How would you describe particularly from your perspective relations with the United States at that time?**

KLOTH: Because of the heated negotiations over trade issues at the time, a key mission of the consulate was to get out and tell the U.S. side of the story. We also helped U.S. firms enter or expand in the market. We knew the people in the companies in the region as well as the local economic situation.

Japanese in our area felt the overall U.S. relationship was important to their country but that Japan was being picked on unfairly on trade. In their view, Japan needed to export to buy raw materials such as oil and minerals it did not have. Japanese companies’ success was a result of finding out what foreign markets wanted and making it at a good price. Most Japanese I met felt that the basic problem was U.S. companies weren’t any longer internationally competitive vis a vis Japanese companies. Trade complaints, and automobiles were the big centerpiece, were unfair. In their view, U.S. companies had gotten lazy and were not producing high quality goods from TVs to cars.

While U.S. buyers of Japanese products were clearly saying the same thing, in its post-WW-II drive to grow its economy, the Japanese government had, in large part by design but also because of the way its bureaucratic system worked, closed its market to protect its companies. One major
issue in negotiations was the difference between U.S. and Japanese standards. We can go further into this and other trade problems later. In a consulate you do not negotiate but you certainly investigate and provide useful information and perspective to Washington.

Take the case of autos. I went to the Cadillac dealer in Fukuoka. And I said to him, “You know, I’m reading in the press about all these safety requirements that are being levied on all foreign autos to conform to the Japanese ‘safety standards.’ Could you show me on the Cadillac what has to be done to pass Japanese inspections?”

He clicked off the list which meant that Cadillacs, like other foreign cars, had to have a number of modifications done in a GM shop in Japan. That added to costs. For example, cars were required to have turning signal lights visible from the right and left sides as well as from the front and rear, so GM had to put on additional little lights on. That’s probably not a bad idea for safety, but the “standard” that really got to him was that the requirement to have a metal plate under the engine. He had been told that was so if you parked on grass the hot engine wouldn’t set the grass on fire. Where, he wondered, do people park cars on grass in Japan?

I used to do a lot of factory tours and saw the strength of the relationships between Japanese firms and their suppliers that was very difficult for a foreign firm to break into. I visited a shipyard in Nagasaki in ’85. They said, “Well you know the competitive pressure is coming on from Korean shipyards, so we have to cut our costs which means our suppliers are going to have to cut their costs. But we send engineers around to them; we send bookkeepers around too and see if we can help them to cut back, to rationalize and improve the efficiency of their operations.”

The yard was reluctant to look for new suppliers even in Japan, let alone abroad in the US. Yard management knew their suppliers and felt they could count on them. From their viewpoint, the start-up costs of a new supplier were high. Nevertheless, shipyards are businesses. When in 1985, the Plaza Agreement greatly strengthened the yen against the dollar, we got a call from them asking for to help finding U.S. suppliers!

Rice was a very sensitive issue, you may recall. I went to Saga City to talk to rice farmers. They were pretty excited that the U.S. was demanding that they open their rice market. But it was not personal. They were gracious hosts. In that area, the farmers blamed Japanese government farm policies for making it difficult for them to be competitive internationally. Cheap farm credit and taxes, especially for small farm machines, let “weekend farmers,” people with office jobs, buy equipment and supplies at favorable rates and encouraged them to hold on to small plots and made it very expensive for full-time farmers to increase their farms size, and so, my farmer friends pointed out, become more competitive.

Q: Well, that rice thing was very tricky wasn’t it? I mean, as agriculturalists in the United States know European agriculture is protected.

KLOTH: The U.S. also has quotas for agricultural products such as sugar. It is my bottom line is and still is my bottom line: trade friction is an economic problem; it’s a political problem. At any rate, our job was also to give hands-on assistance to U.S. firms. We had a number of success
stories for companies large, medium and small, on both sides of the Pacific. I worked with Westinghouse in Tokyo and a Japanese power company in Kyushu to restore their frayed relationship on purchase of nuclear-power-plant equipment. I spent about a year and a half and the result of a $10 million deal. As econ-commercial officer, I was not a Westinghouse salesman per se, but lived in Fukuoka and could act as a go-between. Living in Fukuoka I could make drop by and talk to the Japanese firm about how things were going. I could anticipate issues, call Westinghouse and tell them to come down and head off problems. We did the same thing for small U.S. businesses or new-to-market companies too. For example, our work resulted in a U.S. firm finding a Japanese franchisee after years of trying.

I also enjoyed living in Kyushu, having lived in Tokyo as a grad student.

*Q: This was a period where the Japanese system seemed to be the world model.*

KLOTH: Do you remember Ezra Vogel’s popular book on Japan as number one? But there was another side; the Japanese companies did not escape the economic challenges businesses anywhere have. The Nippon Steel in Kitakyushu and Oita had had to institute a RIF (reduction in force) in the ’70s and ’80s. They didn’t like to fire people, but tough business conditions forced them to stop hiring, offer buy outs; and “early retirement” workers, often by placing them in suppliers’ companies.

I asked one supplier of industrial-size steel containers how that worked: did he need more help? I had heard some argue that because of “unique Japanese culture,” Japanese large firms and their suppliers “cooperated harmoniously on such issues.

The small company manager I talked to had perhaps a different perspective. “Yeah, they did the RIF. I had a hundred or so employees. The economic situation was hitting my sales too. The steel company approached me to take three of their people. You’ve got to understand I buy the steel for my cans from the steel mill. The mill is also my major customer. Now, if they ask me to help them out, what am I going to say?"

I loved going to the plans and talking to the managers someone else not from the PR section. I worked at a Sikorsky helicopter plant one summer in college, worked on the production line. The best plant tours are always from a manager, engineer or foreman. You want someone who knows the business and the plant floor. A PR person knows a script. The foreman can really know what’s going on, what it takes to keep production and quality up, and also some time perspective on changes at the facility. The most impressive thing for me in Japanese plants for all the excellence of the Japanese work force was that every plant I went to would start out the briefing with how they were automating further to cut down on labor costs.

*Q: Was it apparent at that time that the Japanese had a real problem in demographics?*

KLOTH: Yes, but the automation was being driven by a desire to be more efficient overall. Remember in the 1980s, the Japanese were very confident. Japan seemed to be number one; the economy was booming. Pollution and other such issues popped up in the ‘60s and ‘70s, and the
government had started to address them.

_Q: Were you seeing the change of the social dynamics of women, particularly businesswomen?_

KLOTH: Yes, but it was still a very conservative society.

_Q: They weren’t, I mean I remember in Korea when I was there it was somewhat the same thing, people loved working for the American embassy, particularly women did. They were top rate people because if they worked for a Korean business, if they were married they’d have to quit. With us we didn’t care._

KLOTH: That was true when I was in Korea too. And Japan. Big and medium companies let women go when they got married. Of course, women in both countries did and still do run many small businesses.

Life was no picnic for men in even big companies. For example, the companies in Tokyo and Osaka would rotate their people to the “provinces.” The big companies had one-room company apartments in Fukuoka for these tours. Families did not want to move the kids around and disrupt their education, when Dad did a two-year tour in Fukuoka.

_Q: How did your wife find it being Korean?_

KLOTH: Overall she enjoyed Japan and Japanese friends, and still found time to write her PhD dissertation, and have a baby, our son. A lot of the potters in Kyushu came over in the 16th century from Korea, so, while there was some prejudice, in that area, there is also a special relationship.

_Q: Did the American military presence there cause any problems?_

KLOTH: There are two major bases: the Iwakuni naval air base and the Sasebo navy base, both modest in size. As the economic guy, I wasn’t involved directly if there were issues, the consul handled them. People in the area appreciated the security relationship, but criminal incidents or accidents grab headlines. There was one bad incident where a serviceman got into an altercation at a Mr. Doughnut’s shop in the middle of the night. The Mr. Doughnut clerk wound up dead, so the consul worked with the base commander to ensure that the citizens of Iwakuni understood U.S. dismay at the incident. Expressions of regret are very important in Japan among Japanese, so it is critical that U.S. representatives be proactive. That is very important.

In Sasebo, if ships came in some demonstrators would go out in their boats and the Japanese police would be out there; but it was not like the situation in Okinawa. The footprint was pretty small in Kyushu. At least in the Japanese business circles I traveled in throughout the region, I didn’t hear concerns about base-related issues.

_Q: How were your relations with the embassy?_

KLOTH: Actually my closest work relationships were with the commercial section of the
consulate general in Osaka-Kobe. Our work was not negotiations and policy, but focused on helping U.S. firms come into the market or Japanese firms buy U.S. products, that is, establish relations with U.S. companies. We had a very good and experienced consul in Fukuoka.

For my commercial work I would go up every six months to Tokyo, and see the American Chamber of Commerce. That’s how I learned of Westinghouse wanting to come back to Kyushu. Day in, day out. The Commerce Department’s Foreign Commercial Service officer in Osaka was my closest colleague. We talked regularly to exchange ideas and leads.

We collaborated with Osaka to get more American business people to come down to Fukuoka. The likely candidates were those who already had made the mental leap out of Tokyo and were willing to go to Osaka, that is to the provinces. I had good relations with the Tokyo econ section and FCS. I did a lot of speeches, talked to people and local media, so I needed to know what was going on in the trade negotiations. But in terms of the real work on the commercial side Osaka was the big help.

WILLIAM T. BREER
Interpreter Training School
Yokohama (1974-1975)

Political Officer
Tokyo (1975-1978)

Mr. Breer was born and raised in California and educated at Dartmouth College and Columbia University. After service in the US Army, he entered the Foreign Service in 1961. Throughout his career, Mr. Breer dealt primarily with Japanese, Korean and general Southeastern Asia affairs. His overseas posts include Kingston, Tokyo (three times), and Yokohama. His Washington assignments also concerned principally Japan and Korea. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo from 1989 to 1983. Mr. Breer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: In 1974 where did you go?

BREER: To Japan. They were looking for developing an interpreting capability within the foreign service and they picked me. So, I was sent to the language school which by that time had moved to Yokohama. We had closed our consulate and the school was housed in the old consul general’s residence, a western style house. I was supposed to learn how to be a professional interpreter.

Q: How long were you there?

BREER: From 1974-75.
Q: *I would think this would be something that you would dig your heels in against because this puts you not in the right line unless this leads to other things.*

BREER: Eventually it did and I was looking at it as an opportunity to go back to Japan and it was in the political section so it wasn’t a clear transition at that point.

Q: *Being an interpreter I would have thought demanded such a language skill that one would have to think on a dual track, one is just plain remember what is being said before it comes outs and I wouldn’t think everybody would have it. I sure wouldn’t.*

BREER: I don’t have it to the extent that a lot of simultaneous translators do but I got fairly good at it. Actually one of my first interpreting jobs was for Kissinger and President Ford’s visit in the fall of 1974. I was still in school at the time and was called out. I remember one time when Phil Habib and the chief of staff visited I was called upon to interpret. There are various techniques and I went to an actual interpreting class at the International Christian University (ICU) as well. Of course you take notes. Even simultaneous interpreters take notes. There were all kinds of drills that we went through, vocabulary, learning the latest slang in both languages, or trying to.

Q: *I would think you would have to have a certain number of Japanese proverbs that would relate to American proverbs. You can’t say, “I only go to third base on that,” in Japanese and expect it to be understood. There are sports or cultural terms that don’t correspond to a particular culture and you would always have to have a mental list of ones to pick from.*

BREER: You do that to some extent but again that is unending. There are books now that have saying equivalents, but there weren’t any then.

Q: *Ever get to a point of saying, “So-and-so made a joke, please laugh?”*

BREER: No, I never had to do that. The other problem with Japanese and English is the predicate comes at the end of Japanese sentences.

Q: *So you have to wait?*

BREER: Yes. Oftentimes subjects are not expressed in Japanese.

Q: *Could we talk a bit about your working on the Ford visit because the press played this up making fun of him quite a bit early on, I think. If I recall there were pictures of him in too short trousers and things like that. What was your impression of Ford and Kissinger?*

BREER: I thought it was a pretty successful visit. It came at a time when the prime minister was clearly on his way out. I think he resigned the next week. Tanaka had been exposed for corruption just a few weeks before in connection with the Lockheed incident and in connection with the sale of a hotel to Japan and I think also in connection with the Lockheed 104 program we had with them. I can’t remember the details but there was a big scandal and Tanaka, who was probably the most dynamic and powerful politician that Japan has had since the war - a real boss type operator with a lot of ideas of his own - was kind of humiliated because he was on his way
out and everybody knew it. Of course, Nixon had just left and Ford went ahead with the planned visit. So, there was some chaos but I thought Ford handled himself very well. His trousers were too short.

*Q:* I think he got caught off guard. His staff probably didn’t warn him that he needed morning clothes.

BREER: Yes, and Japanese morning clothes and ours are slightly different. Americans don’t generally have such clothes hanging in the closet, but all Japanese do because that is the standard wear for weddings, funerals and formal occasions any time day or night. Otherwise I think he conducted himself quite well. Kissinger wanted to be very much part of the scene so table arrangements were made. In those days you had a return banquet. The imperial house had the banquet one night and the president the next night. I was the control officer for the imperial guest house and one of the events was the president’s banquet. Nobody had come up with a guest list with the dinner two weeks away, so I made one up and submitted it and they had no ideas of their own. The protocol people at the White House and State Department made a seating plan that didn’t include [the foreign ministers] at the head table. The emperor and empress, and the crown prince and princess and the royal family were all there and Kissinger and the only other ministers sat at other tables. That created a bit of a stir in Japan. It was the first visit by our president ever and I think it was pretty successful. He spent four or five days in Japan.

*Q:* From the people at the embassy, one had the impression that Kissinger didn’t spend much time thinking about Japan. Obviously there were other things on his plate, particularly the Soviet Union. Was that manifest at all?

BREER: He was there. He engineered the China opening on Nixon’s instruction and the Japanese were having trade problems with China which started in the early Nixon years. The Japanese didn’t just roll over. They complained about trade policy. They were very protective in those days of their blossoming industries. I don’t think Kissinger regarded Japan as a great power whereas I think he did regard China as one. Japan just never played very large in his strategy. I haven’t read his new book. I don’t think Kissinger’s Japanese interlocutors enthralled him as the Chinese did.

*Q:* I would have thought there would be a problem dealing with Japan the same way there is dealing with Italy. There was really, after Tanaka, hardly anybody to talk to. It is a collegial government with the prime ministers changing fairly often. Certainly this was the way in Italy with a revolving set of ministers.

BREER: That is somewhat true, yes. But it depends on the prime minister. Some are more in a debating mode than others. I think the current prime minister, for example, is pretty good, Keizo Obuchi.

I forgot to mention something. When I was in the marine corps my wife and I flew to Anchorage to join the president and she was the interpreter for Mrs. Nixon when the president greeted the emperor and empress.
Q: This was when Hirohito came?

BREER: Yes, he was on his way to Europe but he made a refueling stop in Anchorage. I think I wrote the memorandum recommending that the president go meet him, so he did.

Q: After you left the language school was your interpreting just a skill that you had but you were doing other things?

BREER: I was a political officer in the embassy.

Q: So, this was just honing up your skills so you could be called on.

BREER: Yes.

Q: Well, you were in the embassy in Tokyo from 1975 to when?

BREER: From 1975-78.

Q: What slices of the political pie were you given?

BREER: The first couple of years I was in charge of the opposition and part of the LDP for political reporting. So, I tried to develop as many contacts as possible and I still have many of them today. I think that is the first time I met Obuchi. I just wandered around talking to people seeing what they thought about the direction of Japan, about relations with the United States, etc. The last year I was pol/mil officer at the embassy.

Q: How did we view the opposition at that point? Did it seem to have a chance of becoming powerful or was it almost destined to be second fiddle to the LDP?

BREER: I guess we felt there was a possibility that the opposition, the Socialist party, could disrupt the LDP majority. I don’t think there was the same kind of concern about the communists as there was in the ‘60s. There was a new party by then, begun in the ‘60s, called Komeito, which was the Buddhist based party. It hasn’t grown very much since then. The Socialists were not all anti-American but they were anti-security treaty, anti-bases in Japan, and for unarmed neutrality. It is really kind of an ironic position for them to take because if there had been no security, Japan probably would have rearmed to a much greater extent calling it self-defense. Then there were big struggles about nuclear submarines in the ‘70s, because our submarine fleet was becoming nuclear. We had to walk a careful line between Admiral Rickover’s feelings about his boats and the Japanese desire to know whether they were emitting radiation or not. The question of nuclear weapons on naval ships was around

Q: Were the Socialists interested in talking with you?

BREER: We communicated. The door was open. We had protest delegation people who wanted to come to see us and talk to us about their issues, about nuclear issues, about American policy all over the world. We had an open door policy and would see anybody including the
communists.

*Q: By that time we were able to talk to the communists?*

BREER: Well, when I was first in the political section in the ‘60s we received communist protestors. We limited the numbers.

*Q: Were we able to go out and make contact with them?*

BREER: No, we didn’t seek them out and talk with them, although we did with the Socialists.

*Q: Was there any concern at this time about the LDP and indications of corruption?*

BREER: Well, it was always lurking in the background, but Japan’s economy was growing so fast and people’s livelihood was growing so fast that nobody wanted to rock the boat very much. I think Japanese, and most Asians, view gift giving as an essential part of life. They realize that it screws up their system a lot in extremes, but I think there is more tolerance for fairly substantial gift giving to officials or somebody who can affect their future. Not that we don’t have it.

*Q: We call it political contributions.*

BREER: I think political contributions of a $1000 an individual is fine.

*Q: But, you don’t give $50,000 and not expect something.*

BREER: Right. But that doesn’t apply to political appointments in Japan because it is a professional government.

*Q: As you say much of Japan is ruled by professional bureaucrats. Were these a group to be cultivated?*

BREER: Sure.

*Q: Was somebody assigned to that or did you all do this?*

BREER: There were various functional assignments in the embassy in both the political and economic sections and traditionally the internal affairs officer was the one who dealt with the foreign ministry on coordination and bilateral relations. But we all participated in that as well.

*Q: Who was the ambassador in 1975-78?*

BREER: Jim Hodgson, who had been secretary of labor, was ambassador from 1975 until 1977.

*Q: How did Hodgson do?*

BREER: He was quite conscientious and did quite a good job. But, he was plagued by having
been Lockheed vice president for labor relations at one time. He was a very nice fellow, very smart and low key. He worked at cultivating Japanese.

Q: And Michael Mansfield?

BREER: I was there for his first year, 1977-78. I also served with him from 1984-87 as his political counselor. I was junior in the ‘70s and didn’t see that much of him, but I did do some things for him. We had a terrible incident. Two jet aircraft took off from Misawa and crashed into a house in Yokohama killing two people and severely injuring some others. The Navy was kind of slow about paying [respects] we thought in the embassy. So, Mansfield sent me out to the hospital to see this woman whose child had been killed and she terribly burned. I tried to be a go between, between the embassy and U.S. forces who didn’t want the Japanese monkeying around the investigation of the accident. The pilots had bailed out and were sent home before the Japanese could talk to them. This raised all sorts of jurisdiction questions, the status of foreign forces in Japan, etc. It was in the line of duty so arguably it was American jurisdiction, but the fact that the planes crashed into civilian territory raised issues. We finally found out that there had been a misalignment of some part of the aircraft during a major maintenance time in California some place.

Q: Did you have any work on Okinawa during this time?

BREER: Yes, sort of managing daily issues. I can’t remember them all now. The Okinawa reversion had taken place and things had settled down some. I don’t recall any huge issue.

Q: How about the governor of Okinawa?

BREER: I don’t remember who he was. I think he was a conservative.

Q: There was a point where you had a leftist who first, I think, was mayor and then governor, I’m not sure.

BREER: The recent past governor, Governor Otah, was a university professor at Cal, I think.

Q: When the Carter administration came in did you sense any difference in how they were approaching Japan?

BREER: There were trade issues at one time but I can’t really remember the pyrotechnics about them. The one big issue that came up while I was pol/mil officer was the Carter administrations’ policy of withdrawing ground forces from Korea..

Q: Yes, taking the 2nd division out.

BREER: Right. And a number of visitors came to Tokyo including Habib and I accompanied them on some of their discussions. The Japanese were very hesitant to tell us how to run our military and still are to some extent because of war time experience, a rather more passive diplomacy and the fact that we were a senior partner in their security relationship in relation to
Korea. But, they were very, very nervous about our removing ground forces. The South Koreans knew that as well as did our ambassador in Seoul, Bill Gleysteen. That was kind of a major issue which was eventually resolved.

Q: From 1976-79 I was consul general in Seoul and a member of the country team. We thought that the Carter administration had made a campaign promise that made no sense because it just heightened the chance of war rather than lessen it. But, Carter was more insistent in carrying out campaign promises than most presidential candidates. He was a little too honest for his own good. In the end it was all fuzzied up and the 2nd division remained in Korea. I think it was resolved by removing some obsolete missile batteries and probably eventually putting some better equipment in. I would think Japan during this period would be looking very closely at Korea because they had a very powerful North Korean army and if it attacked, and nobody really knew what was going on in the mind of Kim Il Sung, this would make the Japanese nervous.

BREER: Oh, I think very uncomfortable, because they knew that we would have to massively use facilities in Japan to support our operations in Korea. I don’t think they felt a direct threat to Japan but just the politics of trying to support the United States. They had gone through that in the Vietnam war when the government was a loyal supporter despite all the protests. I am not sure they had the stomach to do it again. But, there is no question that they wanted us to stay in Korea.

Q: What about the Korean community in Japan? For some odd reason, at least to me, it all seemed to be so North Korean oriented. Did you all get involved in looking at this phenomenon?

BREER: We never did much in the embassy. Occasionally someone would write a cable about it. In actual fact, in those days I think it was evenly divided with Korean loyalty to North and South. But, the North supporters were more vocal and engaged in activities on behalf of the North. I think the North supporters stuck out more because they were tracked by the Japanese security people. Also, they were a good source of money. We didn’t know how strong the North Korean army was in those days. Our intelligence wasn’t very good then and isn’t very good now.

Q: In those days, when I was sitting there, the common wisdom was they could be in Seoul in three days but eventually would be badly beaten.

BREER: I think that is still the common wisdom.

Q: What about the northern territories held by the Russians?

BREER: The Japanese and Russians talked about these islands from time to time over the years and at one point were on the verge of making some progress on it when something happened domestically in Russia and the Russians pulled back. I think the Russians at one time offered to return two of the islands, but the Japanese insisted upon all of them. I think the Russians are not prepared to make territorial adjustments around the periphery. They weren’t then and I don’t think they are much more interested in doing so now. There has been some opening up involving fishing and tourism.
Q: But, not during this period?

BREER: Not much. I’m sure there were some Japanese fishermen who bribed the Russian coastal people and were able to take seaweed and I suppose shell fish.

Q: Was this a period of increased Japanese interest in ties with Mainland China?

BREER: Yes, because they recognized China shortly after the Kissinger visit. The Japanese saw a big market there and were intent on expanding relations, more in the ‘80s than the ‘70s, but still they were very interested in China.

Q: Were we concerned at the embassy level about the Japanese looking to China? Were we concerned that this might make the Japanese a less cooperative partner with us?

BREER: There was some concern in that regard.

Q: I assume human rights never came up, this is the Carter administration, but were there any problems in Japan?

BREER: The human rights report started about that time.

Q: I think it started under Ford.

BREER: The Japanese were offended by the remarks that we had to make about the way the minorities, including the Korean minority, were treated in Japan.

Q: On the political/military side what was your main concentration?

BREER: The first set of guidelines set out the rules and ways we would interact in the event of an attack on Japan. There was no codification of what Japanese entities would do to support the American forces in the event of an attack on Japan or other emergency crisis. In 1977 we set about to write up guidelines of what kind of support the Japanese would provide us and this was restricted to the defense of Japan.

Q: What was the scenario? Was North Korea a problem?

BREER: Not then, no. The guidelines didn’t cover North Korea.

Q: Was it the Soviet Union at that time?

BREER: It was the defense of Japan, so I guess it could have been North Korea, too. But, it wasn’t us responding to a North Korean attack on South Korea.

Q: Basically the main possibilities were the mainland Chinese and the Soviets.
BREER: Yes.

Q: Were we able to get much coordination with the Japanese or were we doing this on our own?

BREER: The guidelines were done with the Japanese. It was a jointly agreed set of guidelines on how we would cooperate with each other. What kind of support the Japanese would give American forces in operations for the defense of Japan. This includes use of highways, ports, hospitals, etc. all of which are under the direct jurisdiction of the central government. Now we have a new set of guidelines which cover not only Japan but also operations in areas around Japan.

Q: Did Taiwan enter into anything we were doing those days? Carter recognized China and we set up the American representative in Taiwan, the American liaison. Did this cause much of a problem?

BREER: Well, the Japanese were doing the same thing. Actually, they did it before we did. Their liaison office was set up in 1979, I guess. I don’t think there was much controversy between the United States and Japan on the issue. There was a lot of coordination to make sure we weren’t doing anything really stupid in regards to our bilateral relations.

Q: On the political side, was the growing imbalance between trade a major factor in everything we did during this period?

BREER: Yes. It’s acuteness depended on the unemployment rate in the United States or what town was being put out of business by foreign competition. And, that is true. There were all kinds of towns throughout New York state, Ohio, etc. that closed up. Not entirely from foreign competition because a lot of stuff moved to other parts of the country, but the political reality was that people believed it was due to foreign competition and the most prominent foreign competitor in the ‘70s and ‘80s was Japan.

CRAIG DUNKERLEY
Japan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1974-1975)

Political Officer
Tokyo (1976-1978)

Ambassador Dunkerley was born in Wisconsin and raised in several states in the Midwest. He was educated at Amherst College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In 1970 he entered the Foreign Service, serving abroad in Da Nang, Tokyo, Yokohama, Fukuoka, Brussels and Vienna. During his career Mr. Dunkerley became a specialist in NATO and International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control matters, and served as Special Envoy for Conventional Forces in Europe from 1997 to 2001 with the personal rank of Ambassador. He also had
several tours of duty at the State Department in Washington, DC. Ambassador Dunkerley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: You moved to the Japan desk?

DUNCKERLEY: William Sherman was the Japan Country Director at the time. My own duties involved at first a variety of odds and sods. Over time, I picked up increasing responsibility for several bilateral science issues, including work on initial U.S.-Japan cooperation in the development of Japan’s own space program. As various other issues came to fore, I ended up following bilateral fisheries negotiations and the like.

Bill Sherman became a very good friend and mentor. My work with him back then steered me towards what was turning out to be a major interest for me: US-Japan relations. So my initial year on the Japan Desk was necessary for deciding to undertake a long-term investment in language training.

Q: Had you applied for Japanese language training earlier?

DUNCKERLEY: No, this was something that came about from my time with Bill Sherman – and colleagues like Tom Hubbard and Rust Deming – on the Japan Desk. It grew as a personal interest and then as a professional opportunity.

Q: How did you find language training?

DUNCKERLEY: I think long-term hard language training can always be difficult in the Foreign Service. You take individuals who by their very temperament and selection are very articulate and you require them essentially to return to a very basic “me Tarzan” level of discourse for eight hours a day over nine months or a year, a long time before you begin to gain some fluency. That can be grating.

Q: Believe me, I know.

DUNCKERLEY: Japanese can be particularly ferocious in that regard. I did a year of basic Japanese training in Washington before going out to the Political Section in Tokyo for two years. I then did more advanced language training at FSI’s branch school in Yokohama, a second year of language instruction, before going down to be Principal Officer at our Consulate in Fukuoka in Kyushu.

Q: So you had one year of Japanese and went to the embassy, worked for two years and had another year of Japanese in country. Japanese foreign relations in 1976 to 1978, I assume that the LDP was in control?

DUNCKERLEY: The LDP was very much in control. Indeed, the back and forth of domestic politics at that time related, in the first instance, to the internal factional competition within the party. This was the post-Tanaka period of Prime Ministers Ohira, Fukuda and Miki and before Nakasone’s prime ministership.
That was the domestic political context. Among the foreign policy issues that I followed in the Embassy Political Section’s External Division was tracking the course of a long stalled Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and the People’s Republic of China: essentially a political complement – or rubric – for what was then the beginning of a burgeoning economic-commercial relationship with China.

At the same time, we followed Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union – and the never-ending frictions between Tokyo and Moscow regarding the disputed Northern Territories, various disputed islands in the Kuriles between Japan and the Soviet Union.

And those of us in External also spent a good deal of time in following Japan’s dealings with Korea which, as you know, is bound, on the one hand, by considerable political and economic and even strategic common interests. But on the other, it is also a relationship carrying particularly strong and continuing animosity, friction and suspicion given past colonial history.

One of the issues that came up while I was there with the advent of the Carter Presidency was the decision by the new Administration to rescale the American military presence on the Korean peninsula, revolving around possible withdrawal of the U.S. Second Division. That generated a whole set of anxieties on the part of the Japanese; that in turn generated an extended period of high-level consultations with the new U.S. team. The embassy political section played a particular role in that regard by providing running commentary, analysis and interpretation of the Japanese concerns.

Q: Let’s talk about the Korean relationship. What was the feeling? They didn’t want the Second Division out?

DUNKERLEY: At the time, the Japanese seemed concerned as much about what this particular move by the new American Administration, and its apparent manner of decision and announcement, might have conveyed about overall American intentions in the region over the longer term. Much of their commentary was cast in more specific terms of reliance upon the American military presence on the peninsula to provide continued stability. I had impression their anxiety was less motivated by a careful calculation of specific military factors—weighing various elements in terms of a dynamic strategic balance – than out of a more fundamental and inchoate concern about our longer-term level of interest, engagement and staying power.

Q: To put it in its time context, this wasn’t too long after we pulled out of Vietnam. We had been forced out of Vietnam so there was considerable doubt about us. Carter had made pronouncements about withdrawing forces from Vietnam during the political campaign. I think he said, ‘we’ll get our troops out of Korea.’

DUNKERLEY: He made certain statements to that effect during the 2006 campaign; after the inauguration these were reiterated during an early visit to Tokyo by Vice President Mondale, the first visit by an Administration senior figure out to the region. You are correct that one of the basic themes of that particular period was the effort by the United States, in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, to redefine, readjust, reaffirm the nature of its role in East Asia. The challenge
was to do so in such a way as to provide reassurance to our partners in the area. That could be said to be underlying much of this. It took time – and some trial and error – to do so credibly.

Q: What were you doing on this particular issue?

DUNKERLEY: I was spending a lot of time with the Japanese Foreign Office and their Korean Desk in particular. But I was also seeing a number of Japanese journalists, politicians and the like, especially those engaged on international issues. Again, at this particular time the role of the embassy’s Political Section was not just that of a passive watching brief on Japanese concerns and attitudes but that of a more active effort to help the Japanese interpret a new Administration in Washington. The ebb and flow of Japanese concerns, being political in nature, tended at times to be slightly irrational.

Q: During the same period, I was Consul General in Seoul. We were very concerned. It seemed like a stupid move at the time presenting the North Koreans with an opportunity to do something. As time played out, essentially they really didn’t do it. They moved some batteries out. How were your Japanese contacts reading this? Did they understand the political life in the United States and why this came about?

DUNKERLEY: That covers a broad sweep of the Japanese. On the one hand, the Foreign Office’s America desk, the First North American division, usually had – I thought back then – a sophisticated and realistic understanding of both American policy and American politics. On the other hand, that sort of sophisticated reading was not necessarily shared in the wider range of political thinking in Tokyo, especially as amplified in popularized generalizations.

Q: Were the newspapers playing this up? Were they across the political spectrum saying things like ‘you can’t trust the Americans, they’re not committed to the Far East,’ that sort of thing?

DUNKERLEY: I would hesitate to say that it was as blatant as that. But with allowance for the sense of understatement that is so often the case in the Japanese language and especially the language of politics, there were clear signs of uncertainty and in some cases anxiety.

Q: By 1978 how was it?

DUNKERLEY: Much of the open controversy had died down by then. As you probably noted from your post in Seoul, once an extended process of consultations between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and with Japan and other interested parties got well and truly underway, at a certain point, the issue began to be defanged.

Q: Was there much consultation with Ambassador Richard Snyder? He was a real Japanese hand.

DUNKERLEY: Obviously having him in Seoul, given his extensive knowledge and experience in that region, was a great benefit. He was very much involved. I had known him from my earlier job in the East Asia Bureau Front Office.
Q: As you were working on this, what sort of attitude were you picking up from the Japanese about the Koreans?

DUNKERLEY: Certainly the official Japanese were entirely correct in the views they expressed in their conversations with us. As you know from your own experience in that part of the world, however, if you’re talking about broader society, there continued to be prejudices voiced towards the Koreans and vice versa.

During this time a new ambassador arrived, former Senator Mike Mansfield. He came to be very important in steering the Embassy’s approach on this and other issues. He was an excellent man to work for; like others, I learned a number of lessons just in being able to watch how he operated. About the same time, Bill Sherman, for whom I’d worked earlier on the Japan Desk, became DCM for Ambassador Mansfield.

Q: What were some of the lessons that you picked up?

DUNKERLEY: In terms of management and leadership, Mansfield conveyed – among many other things – an excellent sense of how to prioritize, choosing among those issues on which to expend personal time and energy as ambassador and the President’s personal representative in Tokyo, and those better to leave to a large and capable staff at the embassy. Not surprisingly, given his history as a veteran within the Senate, you could note how he’d go about carefully building political capital on this or that issue, and then deciding the right moment and manner to weigh in with either the Japanese or policy-makers back in Washington. Throughout he would display an exquisite sense of personal diplomacy in all his relations with the Japanese at all levels. It was useful reminder of the importance of conveying a sense of personal integrity in all your dealings – that very much characterized all that he did.

Q: Were trade pressures from the United States running counter to trying to have good relations with the Japanese?

DUNKERLEY: That’s always been a recurring theme – of varying intensity and urgency. Indeed one can say that has been true of U.S.-Japan relations for as long as most of us can remember, certainly going back to the 1960s. There were all sorts of trade-related strains in the relationship when I was there, but sometimes taking new or unfamiliar forms. For instance: in the early 1970s there was a brief but abrupt cut off of soybean exports from the United States to Japan. That was driven by reasons extraneous to Japan as I recall, but for the Japanese body politic, it was very off-putting in its effect – a “shock” in the terms of that time for the larger relationship.

Q: Were the Japanese doing much with North Korea at that time?

DUNKERLEY: No…and I suppose yes. As you know from your own experience in the region at that time, the Japanese did not have a formal governmental relationship with North Korea – even as they enjoyed diplomatic relations and a web of close, but at times difficult, political and business ties with the Republic of Korea in the South.

Nonetheless there was geographic proximity and a long history at work as well. As a
consequence, there was a certain amount of commercial trade and interaction between the DPRK and Japan, though it was much more important for the former than latter. And of course you had within Japan itself a large resident ethnic Korean population. Within this were significant organizations – some were supportive of the ROK and some that were very strongly and vocally pro-DPRK. Indeed, some of the latter were very much creatures of Pyongyang, Chosen Soren being foremost. These generated a modest degree of political leverage and a continuing stream of economic support, not least in the form of remittances, for the DPRK.

As a consequence, North Korea was a particular neighbor of special interest for us at the Tokyo Embassy. We would seek to follow North Korean developments to the limited extent we could. We did so, in part through regular discussion with Japanese counterparts working Korean issues and exchanges with those third-country diplomats with either a reporting presence, or first-hand experience, in Pyongyang. But in hindsight I continue to be struck by just little information, let alone insight, was out there.

Q: With China during this 1976-78 period, we had already gone through the opening of China and actually we recognized, we opened formal diplomatic relations during this period. Where were the Japanese standing on this? Were they trying to almost move ahead of us? Or, were they still annoyed about Nixon?

DUNKERLEY: I think it had been said by someone at the time that the ideal of Japan’s foreign policy towards China would be to stay one step ahead of us – but only by about six hours. That is to say, while differences as to degree or detail might be periodically expressed among individual politicians or journalists, most political and business leaders of Japan seemed clearly interested in moving towards some form of greater normalization of relations with China. But, in the daily effect of its policies, the government seemed not so precipitate as to get very far out ahead of the U.S., presumably wanting to avoid any bilateral problems too great a divergence on this issue might entail. At the same time, government policy-makers were exquisitely sensitive, still raw, that they not be surprised once again by the U.S. on something so important for Japanese interests as China – as they had been so visibly embarrassed in the Nixon-Kissinger period a few years before. And so, at this time in the mid to late-70’s – one had the sense of Japanese diplomacy on China as being in a state of constant testing, modulation and adjustment.

Another aspect affecting Japanese calculations in their evolving relationship with China was, of course, what this might mean for their relations with the Soviet Union. At that time a regular feature of Chinese public diplomacy was the expression of concern about Soviet ambitions in the Far East, casting this in terms of resisting aspirations towards hegemony. As a consequence, one of the recurring questions wrapped up in the on-again off-again efforts to conclude a long-stalled Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty came to be whether or in what form Tokyo might accede to language, however oblique or elliptical, characterized as being “anti-hegemony” in intent.

I recall that, as an embassy reporting officer, I had any number of conversations with Gaimusho – that is to say, Foreign Office – colleagues on this or that turn in the unfolding of this negotiation. Interestingly enough, most of the Japanese concern then seemed related the degree that all of this might be perceived as being overtly anti-Soviet. At that time at least, the Chinese
were not assertively pushing the public notion of “anti-hegemony” as applying to U.S. bases in Japan.

**Q:** Were you or the political section primed to encourage or discourage anything about the Japanese-Chinese relationship at the time?

DUNKERLEY: Not really. Given the delicacy of U.S.-China relations (recall we were also moving slowly and quietly towards a normalization of diplomatic relations with Beijing as well); given the number of domestic factors that were in play in Japanese-Chinese relations, both pro and con; and given the degree to which the Japanese government seemed to be fairly cautious – advancing a step, testing the water and moving back slightly as necessary, there was no overt lobbying on our part either way – certainly from the perspective of my level. At much higher levels of our bilateral discussions ….I wouldn’t directly know but at that time saw little sign of any major campaign on our part.

**Q:** What about our relationship with Taiwan? How were the Japanese dealing with Taiwan during this period?

DUNKERLEY: This was a bilateral relationship of many different levels and different forms. There was, just as there continues to be now, important economic ties between Japan and Taiwan. Such commercial interests were matched by standing relationships among individual conservative politicians and various political support groups. Their relative weight within Japanese politics had evolved over the post-war years. So by this time, one had the sense, at least as an outside observer, that the interests underlying the Taiwan relationship – and its advocates – certainly were a factor that needed to be taken into account, could not be neglected, but which by themselves would not prove to be the most decisive factor as Japanese policy came to develop.

**Q:** One last relationship is the one with the Soviet Union. It has always struck me that the Soviets could have made great strides on some of those islands. It was almost as if we were paying the Soviets to maintain this high line stance in the Kuriles.

These are, of course, the famous “Northern Territories” – four disputed islands in the southern Kuriles chain – all of whose names I much regret have slipped my memory today. Again this was a long-standing problem that the External Office of the Embassy Political Section had to follow in our reporting – not as a breaking issue (it certainly wasn’t) but more as a recurring environmental factor for the conduct of Japanese foreign policy vis a vis the Soviets.

You are correct: There was a particular Moscow-Tokyo dynamic at play in those years which suggested at times almost a quality of strategic irrationality, not least on the former’s part. Territorial disputes are often tough because of the popular political emotions they can excite – and for a variety of reasons, both parties appeared to have boxed themselves into a cul-de-sac. But this seemed counter-productive in terms of the Soviet tactics – especially given what we assumed could be significant strategic objectives to be gained by them through a more normalized, more upbeat relationship with Japan as an emerging economic super-power whose investments and technologies could greatly assist in further development of the Soviet Far East.
From the Embassy’s perspective watching this play out, day-to-day diplomacy on Moscow’s part with the Japanese seemed clumsy, at times pugnacious. I remember that, at the time, Japanese colleagues in the Gaimusho and in the press would speculate about how particular personalities involved on the Soviet side, in either the MFA or Central Committee, with personal experiences in the past dealing with Japanese POWs in Siberia, tended to reinforce a particular tone to all of this. You see that Japan-Russia relations, even now, continue to face problems arising out of this long-term legacy of the Northern Territories.

MARILYN A. MEYERS
Language Learning, FSI
Washington, DC (1974-1975)

Economic Officer
Tokyo (1975-1978)

Ms. Meyers was born in Virginia and obtained degrees from Southwestern University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. A Japanese and Burmese language officer, she served tours in Tokyo, Yokohama and Fukuoka in Japan and as Principal Officer (Chargé d’Affaires) in Rangoon. Other assignments include Johannesburg, Canberra and Washington, where she dealt primarily with economic matters. Ms. Meyers was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2005.

Q: Well, following your interesting assignment in South Africa, you were selected to take a course in Japanese. Which you’d asked for?

MEYERS: I had. During a vacation break, while in South Africa, I took a trip to the Far East over Christmas and New Year’s vacation. One of the officers in Johannesburg and his wife had previously served in Hong Kong and Jim told me how quickly the Far East, at least in appearance, was changing, becoming modernized, more westernized. So I decided to go have a look and one of the places I went was Japan. And I was absolutely struck, captured by Japan in two ways. First of all, I had never been in a culture that seemed so different. I’m talking about the arts -- kabuki, and music and flower arranging-- and dress -- the kimonos. And at the same time, here was the city of Tokyo very much a part of the modern world. And all these businessmen racing back and forth, in their black suits and white shirts, no pastels yet. And I thought, “These guys are going to give us a run for our money when it comes to trade and commerce.” And I also thought, “I want to be part of that.” I came back to Johannesburg and on my desk was a circular asking for volunteers for hard language training, beginning in the summer of ‘74. One of the languages offered was Japanese. Others were Urdu, Chinese, and Farsi. I thought Farsi might be interesting, although I’d never been to Iran. I talked to our new CG, John Foley. And I said, “I want to volunteer for hard language training; I have the aptitude for it. And I’m vacillating between Farsi and Japanese.” I gave him my reasoning, my thoughts on Japan. And he felt Japan was the smarter choice. So I volunteered for Japanese. In light of subsequent events in Iran, I’m certainly glad I did!
Q: What was that course intended to do? To help you speak the language, or to read it, or even to write it. Or to get you over the 2,2 hurdle?

MEYERS: To get you over the 2,2 hurdle. Basically what that meant was speaking at the 2 level, which is a basic speaking capability, and a rather elementary reading ability. I got the 2,2 after the year. Originally, my onward assignment was Fukuoka in Kyushu. But that got changed because somebody was leaving early. So I went to Tokyo, instead, after the one year. I was glad, because I hadn’t had the chance to work in an embassy, only consulates. The downside of going to Tokyo language-wise is you’re going to be dealing primarily with Japanese bureaucrats -- in the Foreign Ministry and the then Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and, in my case, Transportation. And most of the guys I dealt with had studied English for years. So, I’d go make my calls and of course we would converse in English because they knew what they were talking about and I would have been sitting there with my Japanese dictionary. So I went to Tokyo for three years, actually, from the summer of ’75.

Q: Where you specialized in transportation problems. That includes, I presume, the automobile problem.

MEYERS: Yes, I had the transportation portfolio. At first I thought, “Ah, the Embassy’s motor pool; I’ll have control of the motor pool. That’s going to be real power!” Of course, really, I dealt with trade issues in the transportation field. Yes, it had to do with the beginning of the automobile trade problems between the U.S. and Japan. Too many of their cars coming here; none of our cars going there, for which there were very good reasons. For one thing, U.S. vehicles were huge. And we made only left hand drive, whereas in Japan, you drive on the left. But, also, very importantly, the major part of my time was devoted to airline negotiations and which carriers got to fly where. The only international carrier for Japan then was Japan Air Lines (JAL). In those days, we had three carriers flying to Japan -- Northwest and Pan American and Flying Tigers which was only cargo. All went to Japan and beyond. The Japanese wanted to update our aviation agreement, which dated back to the mid-Fifties. They felt it was very unequal in that Japan wasn’t being given enough landing points for JAL here. So there was a lot of friction on that. And I found the airline portfolio absolutely fascinating. And then also there were maritime issues on occasion.

Q: Were we still encouraging Japanese auto exports to the States or had we stopped that?

MEYERS: Aside from our free trade principles, I don’t think you could say that we ever “encouraged” Japanese exports to the States. I mean, the Japanese were very, very adept at studying markets and making products consumers want. The U.S. had been through its first “oil shock” in the early Seventies. I got to Japan in ’75. The American consumer by then was interested in buying cars that were fuel efficient and smaller. And the Japanese were making those cars, and they found a tremendous reception here. So the cars were promoting themselves.

Q: Were you there for the Lockheed scandal?

MEYERS: No, I arrived after that. The scandal was ’73-’74. Our ambassador to Japan when I
arrived in 1975 was James Hodgson, a former Lockheed official. He was the last Nixon-appointed ambassador. No scandal ever touched him and he remained as ambassador through the Ford Administration.

Q: What about the Japanese growing trade surplus with the U.S. Was that much of a problem to us at the time?

MEYERS: The number itself was not a problem. What caused the problem was the perception that Japanese saw trade as a one-way street. In other words, trade meant they could export but, so far as importing, they were not interested in importing manufactured goods but only raw materials since Japan is a natural resource poor country. When it comes to iron ore or natural gas or oil, they’re all ready to bring it in and it was the finished goods they would send out. Pressure against Japan began to build, particularly as the Congress here began to see the impact of Japanese exports on various sectors -- automobiles, color televisions, steel -- and on American jobs. And the perception that the U.S. manufacturer was not able to penetrate the Japanese market, that trade was not a two-way street, caused the problem, rather than the numbers.

Q: Were you there when Vice President Mondale came over on his visit? Was he concerned with these problems?

MEYERS: I think he was. I did not accompany him on his calls. I was only a First Secretary. But I was there in the control room, saw his comings and goings from the hotel. He was very gracious and also obviously a politician. He arrived late one night, having flown directly from Brussels. President Carter had dispatched him shortly after the inauguration to reassure major allies there would be no significant shift in U.S. policies. And he came to the hotel. And we were all standing in the doorways of our rooms to greet the vice President as he came down the hall. He must have been tired as all get out. But he stopped and greeted everyone. I said “hello” and that my family was from Minnesota. And the next morning, as he left, I was back on duty. So I went to the doorway to meet him again and he looked at me and said “I met you last night.” And I was impressed that he remembered my face.

Q: Did you have any other problems we should talk about there?

MEYERS: I don’t think so. It was an interesting tour. I was actually supposed to be there two years and I extended to three.

MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Inter-American Affairs
Department of Defense
Washington, DC (1974-1978)

Ambassador Abramowitz was born in New Jersey and educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 after service in the US Army. A specialist in East Asian and Political/Military Affairs, the
Ambassador held a number of senior positions in the Department of State and Department of Defense. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and as US Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981) and Turkey (1989-1991). He also served in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vienna. Ambassador Abramowitz was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2007.

ABRAMOWITZ: Japan also loomed large on our “client” list. We visited Japan frequently, often in connection with a trip to Korea. Our main objective in Japan was to try to convince the Japanese to increase their military capabilities and to minimize, if not entirely eliminate, the ever recurring politically sensitive issues arising from our bases. I was among the first U.S officials to push for Japanese assumption of our base costs. This was a multi-year push which finally came to a successful culmination during my tour in ISA after CINCPAC.

We held an annual meeting between American and Japanese leaders. CINCPAC was one of the designated participants. I didn’t go to the meetings but I would go to Japan with the CINC which gave me the opportunity to sort of rub elbows with principal staffers.

In my year at CINCPAC, the two major issues I got deeply involved in were the base issues in Japan and the defense of South Korea. In general, we pushed hard, as I said, for increases in Japanese military capability and for a continuation and strengthening of U.S.-Japan military relationships. In the mid 1970’s, unlike today, the U.S.-Japan alliance was not taken for granted. There was still a huge animosity against our policies. Americans disliked Japanese pacifism. Today, few question the need or the desirability of a U.S.-Japan alliance. But in 1970's, there were many issues, large and small, which were aggravating and often raised by the Japanese left just to “keep the pot boiling.” These issues like noise pollution managed to keep the tension levels at times between the two countries at a high level. We spent considerable time massaging our relations with Japan, dampening down the tensions rising from these incidents and at the same time encouraging the Japanese to increase their defense capabilities.

I was assigned to develop a response to Nunn’s efforts. I took the position that in the interest of preserving our position in Asia (and most of our facilities), we had to make some offer to reduce our presence somewhere in the area. In 1975-76, we undertook a major base structure study that was requested by Nunn. At the end, we made only minor changes, which satisfied the “withdrawal crowd” without damaging our military posture. My view was that we should continue to maintain robust forces in Thailand, Japan, Korea, Okinawa and the Philippines. As I said, we made some minor adjustments in our total presence as well as closing or reducing some bases. This gesture satisfied our immediate political requirements, both domestic and foreign, and permitted us to preserve our essential base structure.

Early in my tenure in ISA, I became involved in the issue of financial compensation by the Japanese for our military bases in their country. I am pleased that we managed to get the Japanese to begin to bear some of the costs of our presence. The Japanese had recovered quite well from the war, at least in economic terms. I felt it was time for them to assist in maintaining our military facilities in Japan, which to a considerable degree where required for Japan’s defense as well as Korea’s. We negotiated the first labor costs sharing agreement in which the Japanese became responsible for the payment of a significant portion of the local labor costs.
involved in the management of the bases. The negotiations were actually conducted by our embassy and military establishment in Japan, but we provided the initiative, guidance and back-stopping. Eventually, this small step led to a major Japanese investment in our bases; today the Japanese pay the lion share of the costs. This was a concrete and measurable achievement. Our focus on reaching this agreement was in part stimulated by our interest in showing Congress that we had vibrant allies in East Asia who were willing to share the defense burden.

Q: You mentioned earlier the efforts to have the Japanese pay in part for our presence in their country. What else did you work on with the Japanese?

ABRAMOWITZ: In my last year in ISA (1977-78), the Japanese appointed a new defense minister, whose name was Sakata. We became close and he was also deeply interested in working with SecDef and other senior DoD officials to strengthen our defense relations. He and I began to work on a paper which would establish guidelines for the development of our defense relations. This became ultimately a key document which was worked on for years after I left the Pentagon. It was the basis for the enhancement and improvement of our defense relationships and the beginning of an expanded Japanese role in the defense of their country. This expanded role was in my mind one of the key ingredients in our post-Vietnam military posture in the Far East. As I said before, my goals were to try to prevent any weakening of that posture; to try to strengthen our relations with Japan and Korea; and thirdly, to help accelerate the enhancement of our relations with China, in great part, as a counter-balance to the Soviets. In the case of the third goal, I must admit that the improvement of military-to-military relations moved very slightly because we really had no platform from which to operate. It is true that Brzezinski wanted DoD representation on the team he took to Beijing both for cosmetic reasons – so that the world would know the deepening of our relations – and to actually begin a relationship between the two militaries and defense cooperation. I became the personification of the “cosmetic reason”; specifically, I was charged with briefing Chinese officials on Soviet involvement in Asia. I did make a presentation which took about an hour and showed them pictures of Soviet deployments, but I must admit that I don’t think it was a very satisfactory meeting because the Chinese refused to engage in any exchange of views; they listened to us carefully, but were not prepared for a dialogue. They did have some questions about some specific issues raised in my presentation, but there was no real exchange of views. The Chinese were not ready to become seriously involved in major issues such as Soviet activity in Asia. The briefing served the purpose of breaking the ice, a necessary first step. The Chinese had an opportunity to have new facts and intelligence brought to their attention; that in itself was useful. I had hoped that my presentation would have been the start of a serious discussion; in fact, that would take more time. The Brzezinski visit was a crucial step in the development of Sino-American relations, and a fascinating first experience for me in mainland China.

As for Japan, I mentioned that we had some successful negotiations concerning Japanese financing of our military presence in that country. By “we”, I mean the whole American team, our military in Japan, our embassy, and ISA of State. We had first of all to collect a lot of detailed information – financial and otherwise – about our operations, which our military supplied. Our senior Air Force officer in Japan, who had been the secretary’s military aide and whom I knew well, was deeply involved and did the lion’s share of the negotiations. The Washington team which I headed discussed the general principals and the U.S. objectives with
the Japanese foreign office and defense officials, but the nitty-gritty was left to the Air Force general and his staff. Our discussions lasted a year and produced concrete results, ultimately leading to billions of dollars of savings each year.

The Philippine and Japan base negotiations illustrate two common problems that have held true for almost, if not all, base issues, at least two decades ago. First of all were problems associated with the American presence – drunken behavior, inadvertent accidents, noise generated by our planes, etc. Such problems are not solely connected with bases; naval port calls often generate the same kind of negative behavioral actions. We in ISA, usually in connection with the Joint Staff of the Chiefs of Staffs, spent a lot of time negotiating such issues. The second problem was the status of forces agreements and all the negotiations which had to be undertaken in order to preserve the judicial position of U.S. military on foreign soil. This was always a major issue, and was always on our desks.

The “status-of-forces” agreements were generally a challenge. We had to protect our men and women from arbitrary actions by the host country while it had a responsibility to its citizens to protect them from a wayward American soldier or sailor. The signing of an agreement was only the beginning; the daily workload was frequently generated by activity on the ground which required an interpretation of the agreement. Some of the incidents had the potential of developing into serious political friction and we obviously did our best to try to avoid such escalations. But the process to handle these incidents was time consuming as were the inter-and intra-agency deliberations leading up to and including these instances and the broader international negotiations. An office in ISA/DoD was charged with conducting status-of-forces agreements. Phil Barringer headed that office where he had worked on these issues for at least 25 years. U.S. policy on both sets of issues was set by an inter-agency group with this ISA office being the chief implementer.

Personally, my involvement with base negotiations was limited to the Philippines and Japan and later Turkey, where we also held a number of discussions about our base structure in that country.

I should not end the discussion of base negotiations and status-of-forces agreements without tipping my hat to our embassies in the countries with which we were negotiating. They were of vast help.

HUGH BURLESON
Policy Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1975-1978)

Mr. Burleson was born in South Dakota and raised in California. After graduating from the University of California, Berkeley, he served in the US Army before joining the United States Information Agency in 1957. A specialist in Southeast Asia Affairs, Mr. Burleson served variously as Policy Officer and Public Affairs Officer in Nitgata, Tokyo, Saigon, Madras, New Delhi and Seoul.
He also had several tours at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Burleson was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1996.

Q: So when you got back and after your home leave, where did you go then?

BURLESON: I was assigned to Tokyo and again in Policy. It had been almost purely in the research position that I had held in ‘64-’69. As a matter of fact, in policy/research. I was more involved in the strategic planning, drawing up country plans, running the DRS. We originally called it Audience and Records System. The aim was to computerize the records of all USIS activities and have audience records in your computer too. I was also running and evaluating programs, surveying reactions to our programs and to our publications, and so on. So, it was a broader job that I went back to and did for the next three years, ‘75 to ‘78.

Q: Who was the head of your operation at that time?

BURLESON: First it was Bill Miller. Then, Cliff Forster. He had been Deputy PAO when I was in Tokyo in the ‘60s, and now in the ‘70s, he was back as PAO.

Q: They have now moved back to California.

BURLESON: Yeah, they just went up there, Tiburon, near Sausalito. We are still in touch.

The job was more complex and I was very much involved especially in the country plan process and then in evaluating programs. We did surveys among opinion elites to see how well our activities were reaching them -- level of awareness. A few times we did before-and-after surveys of program participants; and we did surveys to measure relative exposure to USIS publications versus commercial or organizational publications treating foreign policy. We continuously analyzed reports of Japanese opinion surveys, and did some of our own surveys as piggy-back polls. A large number of Japanese opinion surveys were being done, and it kept me busy analyzing and reporting on them. It eliminated much of the guesswork over how U.S. policy was perceived.

DAVID LAMBERTSON
Japan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1975-1977)
Political Officer
Tokyo (1977-1980)

David Lambertson was born in Kansas in 1940. He received his BA from the University of Redlands in 1962. He entered the Foreign Service in 1963, and his assignments abroad included Saigon, Medan, Paris, Canberra and Seoul with an ambassadorship to Thailand. Mr. Lambertson was interviewed by David Reuther in 2004.
Q: So, now having spent all your time overseas, you can’t get out of Washington. Your next assignment is to the Japan desk?

LAMBERTSON: It actually worked pretty well for me. I’d gotten married when we were in Paris and I acquired three stepchildren, so it was rather good for us to establish ourselves as a family and have a semi-normal life in the Washington, D.C. area, in Alexandria, Virginia, from the summer of ’73 until the summer of ’77. In ’75 after two years in EA/RA I joined the Japan desk. That was a very good move for me. I’m extremely glad I did it.

In that case it was Bill Sherman, the Country Director, it was Bill Sherman’s initiative. He came to me and asked me if I would be interested in becoming deputy director of the Japan desk. I certainly was. I wanted to broaden my horizons. Japan loomed larger in our thinking then than it seems to in 2004. Bill Sherman was a man that I had gotten to know a little bit and I admired him, so I was very happy to move around the corner in the bureau to the Japan desk.

Q: Now, you’re deputy director?

LAMBERTSON: Right.

Q: A deputy directorship is a major assignment in the State Department, so he obviously had a very high opinion of you.

LAMBERTSON: Yes, I think he did and I appreciated that at the time, and I’ve always appreciated Bill’s tutelage and mentoring - all of that that he provided over the years to me. He was the best Foreign Service boss I ever had. Quiet, soft spoken, very wise in the ways of bureaucracy, wonderfully knowledgeable about Japan and policy toward Japan and policy toward lots of other things, and just a very good teacher. It was a great opportunity for me.

Q: How big was the Japan desk at this time?

LAMBERTSON: It was quite small. Six officers and three secretaries; might have been seven officers, but certainly no more than that.

Q: It would be split into economic and political sections and maybe a consular officer?

LAMBERTSON: Right. Yes, I think we had a POL/MIL specialist.

Q: POL/MIL specialist, right.

LAMBERTSON: For the security relationship.

Q: Okinawa had gone through some...

LAMBERTSON: By then, Okinawa was once again fully part of Japan. I joined the desk just a few weeks in advance of the visit to the United States by Emperor Hirohito which was a very big
deal in U.S.-Japan relations, and significant in U.S.-Japan history I think. A tremendous amount of preparation had gone into that visit as you can imagine. The Japanese being as careful as they are about anything like that and doubly so when the emperor was involved. It was a highly choreographed operation, but there was very good symbolism to it. I think it in a sense put a final “period” to one important phase in U.S.-Japan history.

Q: Were there particular highlights that one side or the other wanted in the schedule as particularly symbolic or were both sides pretty much on the same track, oh yes, he should see this, he should do that?

LAMBERTSON: I don't remember any particular controversies over the schedule. He was elderly at that time of course. We had a wonderful welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn and that was followed by a reception in the East Room of the White House. Sacie and I just made the cut for that event. We went through a receiving line and shook hands with the Emperor of Japan, which no Japanese could have ever imagined doing. Then that evening we didn't qualify for the State dinner, but we did qualify for the “after dinner entertainment” which meant white tie and tails and fancy dresses for the ladies. We were ushered in through the south portico and went upstairs, as I remember, to the main north entrance to the White House where once again there was a receiving line, where we once again shook hands with the emperor. Then there was a little orchestra and there was dancing right there on the marble foyer in the White House. Gerald Ford took the floor first with Ginger Rogers, who was a little long in the tooth but still very graceful on the dance floor, as was Gerald Ford, so it was a great evening, a great day.

The substantive issue that I remember most from that job, 1975 to 1977, was the so-called Lockheed scandal. Lockheed or its agents had allegedly attempted to bribe some Japanese politicians to improve prospects for the sale of, probably, the P-3 (anti-submarine warfare aircraft) and it became a huge scandal in Japan. There were reverberations back across the Pacific. Frank Church, who was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seized the issue and held hearings on it. I think there was an investigation of some kind that preceded the hearings, and I got very much involved in the Department’s response to that whole process. It included among other things passing information back and forth between the Japanese government and the congress. We were sort of the conduit for information requests from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which were conveyed to us by Chuck Meissner, the late Chuck Meissner. Moose and Meissner, remember?

Q: Oh, I thought it was Moose and Lowenstein?

LAMBERTSON: Well, it was Moose and Meissner at first. He was an assistant secretary of commerce in the Clinton Administration and was on Ron Brown’s airplane in Yugoslavia, unfortunately. Anyway, Meissner was the staffer involved and I was the middle man, and the Japanese Embassy officer involved was a good fellow by the name of Kazuo Ogura, who became a very senior Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) official. As a result of all that, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was born.

We had visits by Japanese prime ministers as always happens. There were two of them during my two years, two different prime ministers. I was involved in those visits. Prime Ministers Miki
and Fukuda.

Q: That’s LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) prime ministers, still?

LAMBERTSON: Oh, yes.

Q: Prime ministers. Was there any particular significance to that political change?

LAMBERTSON: I don’t recall. I think it was essentially internal LDP politics.

I remember flying on Fukuda’s airplane from Washington to San Francisco on his return to Japan. Evan Dobelle was also on that airplane and I sat next to him. He was the chief of protocol under Jimmy Carter. I guess this was very early Carter Administration. This would have been early ‘77. We landed in San Francisco and were met by the city’s chief of protocol, Cyril Magnin of the I. Magnin department store family. He was a very nice, elderly gentleman and had been doing this for years. He organized the San Francisco portion of Fukuda’s visit. I rode in from the airport with George Moscone, the mayor of San Francisco, who was an attractive guy. He was killed not long after in the Harvey Milk shooting incident. We had dinner at a fancy hotel and Cyril Magnin I think was a little embarrassed because the evening was so dominated by San Francisco’s Italians, not only Moscone, but a lot of other people whom he considered a little bit nouveau riche and not very sophisticated. His reaction was amusing. It was a nice event.

Q: Is that fairly typical for the deputy director to escort a prime minister?

LAMBERTSON: Oh, I don’t know how typical it is. It was just something that Bill Sherman let me do. I wasn’t “escorting” the Prime Minister, but I was a member of his party.

Q: You were traveling commercially?

LAMBERTSON: We were traveling on a chartered Japan Air Lines (JAL) aircraft. It was Fukuda’s personal plane.

Q: So, there were certainly enough Japanese embassy people there, too?

LAMBERTSON: Yes.

Q: Sitting in Washington you must, and having done it in the field, the presidential visit, you must have looked out the window and thought “I know what the embassy, the Japanese embassy guys are going through.”

LAMBERTSON: That’s right, although I guess up to then I had not done a presidential visit. I did my only presidential visit in fact in Japan in 1979.

Q: Now, when you’re on the desk you had the opportunity, which is fairly typical at that time of making an orientation trip to your post. Had you not been stationed in Japan, you probably passed through Japan to get to Saigon because that’s a great circle route and all that. What did
your introduction to Japan, how did that strike you in October of ’76? You went to Honolulu first, you probably saw the CINCPAC people?

LAMBERTSON: Yes. I first visited Japan in 1965 on an R&R from Saigon. You could do that sort of thing. I flew into Tachikawa air base, which by 1976 had been closed down. Japan in 1965 was still a far cry from an economic super power. It was interesting to go back and see it again in 1976. I was impressed by the sense of power that you felt around you in Tokyo, sort of a pulsing energy and the same kind of feeling you get in some other Asian cities now - the same sort of feeling you get now in Beijing, and in Tokyo, still. Things are happening, really moving.

I spent a good deal of time with Nick Platt, because by then I knew I would be replacing him the following summer. I met many of the people at the Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) who I would later get to know very well. I went with Nick to a couple of Gaimusho-hosted dinners in cozy little Japanese restaurants, with serving girls, the modern equivalent of geishas – unbelievably expensive evenings I’m sure, but Gaimusho funds at that time seemed to be unlimited. I talked with lots of people in the embassy, in all sections. I’m sure I met people from USFJ, although I don’t recall specifics. I visited Sapporo – it turned out to be my only trip to Hokkaido, unfortunately. A fascinating place, I thought, a distinct variant of Japanese culture. I was hosted there by Larry Farrar, the consul general, as I was a few days later by the ConGen in Naha. One of the things I remember from the Naha visit was looking out over the plain and the sea from the consul general’s residence and watching an SR-71 circling to land – it no doubt having just returned from a run along the DMZ in Korea. I stopped in Honolulu on the way out for a briefing and I’m sure I paid a courtesy call on the Admiral. I stopped in San Francisco on the way back where I met my parents. We had a nice few days together, touring wine country among other places. During my absence, Carter had beaten Ford.

Q: At this point you’re on a desk in Washington at the time of a change in administrations. My experience is this is the time of drafting transition papers where recent history and policies are summed up. How did that process sweep through the Japan desk?

LAMBERTSON: I don’t remember specific papers quite frankly, Dave, but I know that was the process. Everybody did it. “Where are we going” kinds of papers for the new guy coming in. I think we learned fairly early on that our new guy was going to be Dick Holbrooke.

Q: Old Saigon friends getting together?

LAMBERTSON: I suppose. Actually I was happy to leave the bureau when Dick came in. Partly, perhaps, because I still considered him a peer and felt uncomfortable about the idea of his being my big boss. Partly also because his style bothered me – a little too aggressive for my taste. I was pretty well convinced that I’d be better off watching his performance from a distance. Japan seemed about right.

Q: You’re doing these papers. I guess what I wanted to ask was there any particular policy that you thought needed to be highlighted as you passed things on to your replacement or was Japan fairly stable at that time. I know the reversion of Okinawa had earlier been a very major event.
LAMBERTSON: Yes, that was done and I think in 1977 the relationship was in pretty stable condition. Indeed during the entire time I was in Japan it seemed to me that it fundamentally was. I had an interesting job there because I was dealing with foreign policy issues, but the bilateral relationship was steady, and in good shape. We had just appointed Mike Mansfield; that happened before I left the desk in the spring of 1977. That met with everyone’s great acclaim. I thought he was a wonderful choice.

Mansfield had first visited Japan in the ‘20s, as a young Marine returning from China. He had a lifelong interest in Asia and in addition was a distinguished political leader – Senate Majority Leader longer than anyone else before or since. He was a man of great age – 75 or so at the time – which alone was enough to earn him the respect of the Japanese. And as I got to know him, which I was lucky enough to do, I admired his modesty, his unassuming nature, his warmth. All of those qualities made him a wonderful ambassador. One of his favorite phrases was that the U.S.-Japan relationship was “the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” That might have been an arguable proposition, but Mansfield believed it, and so did I.

I have a photo of him over there on the wall, with a very generous inscription. One of my favorite souvenirs.

Q: I was going to say one of the things that happens in Washington at that presidential transition time, you do the transition papers as a handoff and then you often get a new ambassador, particularly Japan had a long line of outstanding political leaders, that’s a political appointee job. The desk has a major responsibility to Mansfield in his hearings; to brief him up. Do you go to him or is there an office at the Japan desk? How is he introduced to the Foreign Service?

LAMBERTSON: I don’t know that we had an office for him, but he came into the Japan desk a number of times during that period. I had the good fortune of going around town with him to call on various people. The Undersecretary of the Treasury. Bob Strauss, who was the Special Trade Representative at the time. Commerce Secretary, I don’t remember who that was. I went with Mansfield on all those Washington calls and he was a wonderful man to be around. I also went with him up to the Hill, where his Senate colleagues gave him a going away reception in a room in the Capitol. It was very nice, to see him lionized by his peers as he was. I felt very privileged to witness that. I really liked Mansfield and I got to know him pretty well in my three years in Japan, and kept up with him at least occasionally in the years that followed. I called on him in his downtown office not too long before he died. I admired him very much, and I appreciated having an opportunity to work for him and get acquainted with him.

Q: Those are major responsibilities of the desk, the transition stuff, the new ambassador. Mansfield obviously had done a lot of traveling, he knows the Foreign Service, so he probably felt very comfortable coming onboard. As you said, your next move is from the desk as deputy chief of the political section of the embassy in Tokyo. Tokyo’s expensive. Why did you want to go there?

LAMBERTSON: Well, really it was a great job, because Japan was and is an important country and we have such very important relations with them. There was a need for, for want of a better term, “coordination,” so that we could speak with the same voice toward third-country issues,
international issues. So the external affairs portfolio, which was what I had in addition to my title as deputy, was a really good one. It meant that I worked with the Gaimusho on a daily basis, and I developed great respect for the Gaimusho and its ability to represent Japan to the world, and respect for the individual talent of so many of its officers, especially the ones in the American affairs track, who were the best. There were many young Foreign Service Officers in middle grades and some at sort of the early senior level with whom I worked directly and who later rose to the top of the Japanese Foreign Service. Ambassadors to Washington and vice ministers and things like that.

The other reason it was a good job was because of the quality of the people in the embassy. Mansfield was the ambassador, Bill Sherman was the wonderful DCM, Al Seligmann was my prickly, but brilliant boss and I had a lot of respect for him. Then there were all the other good people in the political section. Tom Hubbard was the internal affairs guy. Bob Immerman was the labor attaché and his deputy was Chris LaFleur. Bill Breer was the political-military man. His deputy was Don Keyser, who typed letter-perfect telegrams at 75 words per minute on his IBM Selectric. I had working directly for me, as my external unit, Craig Drunkenly, Mark Minton and Mark Mohr. A great bunch of people.

Q: It was and that’s a great list of names, but something you said earlier. There was a Japan crowd. You often say there’s a Japan crowd, there’s a China crowd, how did you crowd into these?

LAMBERTSON: The only senior job in the political section that allowed for that was the one that I had, the external affairs portfolio. Nick Platt had had it before.

Q: So, it was non-language designated?

LAMBERTSON: It was non-language designated. We were working with these superb English speakers in the Gaimusho. I managed to get to Japan that way. Yes, most of the members of the political section were new or in some cases old members of the “Japan club.” They had done two years of language and some were on their second tour. They intended to spend much of their careers working on Japan and on U.S.-Japan relations. It was a high quality group. It was a specialty that attracted real talent and I am sure still does.

Q: You mentioned that your portfolio was the external issues, so, Japan’s relationship with the outside world. The Carter administration comes in and says it wants to reduce troops in Korea. Korea is in Japan’s backyard.

LAMBERTSON: Yes, that troubled the Japanese needless to say. We always tried to put the best possible interpretation on what Washington was saying and doing on that issue. They were bothered by it.

Q: Obviously it was raised in the diet, Gaimusho would be saying it was out there. They’re getting reports from their own embassy.

LAMBERTSON: Yes. The Carter approach to Korea was a matter of concern to the Japanese. A
lot of things happened in Korea during the time I was in Japan. There was the assassination of Park Chung Hee and all that followed, eventually the Kwangju massacre, which happened while I was still in Japan in the spring of ‘80. Bill Gleysteen, the ambassador in Korea, came to Tokyo a couple of times at least while I was there, once shortly after the assassination of Park and the assumption of control by Chun Doo Hwan, basically to brief the Japanese. They had their own embassy in Korea obviously, but they very much welcomed Bill’s insights into what was going on. I went with Bill to all of his meetings and it was fascinating. I was extremely impressed with Bill Gleysteen, always had been. I had not had much contact with him before, but he was so articulate and so thoughtful and so clear in his explanations that I couldn’t help but be greatly impressed. So, I’m sure, were the Japanese.

Q: How high did he brief?

LAMBERTSON: I suppose at least up to the vice minister of the Gaimusho. Then he had a couple of dinners with senior people who were very anxious to hear what he had to say. Bill asked me to be his political counselor before I left Japan. I was pretty tempted. I relied in part on Bill Sherman’s advice as to what I ought to do next. He thought it would be good for me to go off to the RCDS, so I did that.

Q: We’re illustrating how issues in third countries impact on our bilateral relationship and how the bilateral relationship responds to that. Isn’t this the same period as Afghanistan?

LAMBERTSON: Yes. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and our response to that, which meant keeping as much political pressure as we possibly could on the Soviets and that included of course generating a boycott of the 1980 Olympics, which was one of the issues that we dealt with in Japan. They reluctantly agreed to go along with us and they did not attend the 1980 Olympics.

The Iran hostage crisis was happening as well and the Japanese were helpful to us, as I recall. They had an embassy in Tehran which was a good listening post and they had a very well connected Iranian ambassador in Tokyo who had been a confidant of the Ayatollah Khomeini. There was something of a channel of information there.

Just about anything significant that happened internationally during that period was somehow on our agenda. If you’re in any embassy you’re going to get instructions relating to things that happen half a world away, but that occurred more often in Japan than in most other places, and there were probably more often action requests connected to such messages, because we wanted Japanese support, expected it in a lot of these situations. The Japanese were not always totally anxious to give it, but they usually came through.

In a larger sense, we were always talking with the Japanese about their role in the world. We encouraged Japanese activism in foreign policy, because we knew that if they exerted their influence, it would bolster ours. We were of course aware of the political constraints under which the GOJ – and Gaimusho professionals – labored. The Gaimusho was almost always “out in front” of the rest of the government, the Diet and the public at large when it came to the idea of Japan being more activist internationally. Even today, the Japanese are mulling over what
their role should be, and activism is still considered controversial. When I was working there, almost 30 years ago now, the constraints – political and even constitutional – were much stronger.

Q: That’s of course exactly to the point and exactly why you need the Foreign Service. The other country is not at your beck and call. You make your case and he filters it through his interests, but I suspect it’s a very close relationship in which you probably talked of Africa and Asia. You were talking about Russians seeking political asylum during the time that you were there?

LAMBERTSON: We had several incidents of people seeking political asylum from Russia, from the Soviet Union. I can’t remember how many members of the Leningrad Symphony ended up under our care during my time there.

Q: You mean in the embassy?

LAMBERTSON: They sought political asylum and we provided it. But we had one bona fide defector case - a Soviet KGB colonel. It was an important defection. My involvement in that, apart from being up much of the night, was to inform the GOJ, which I did in a very early-morning meeting in the Gaimusho, and to ask for their cooperation in getting the fellow out of the country.

Q: President Carter visits Tokyo for the economic summit or was it something other than that?

LAMBERTSON: It was for the 1979 Economic Summit. The first of those things to be held in Japan. I guess it was the G-7 in those days. It was I’m sure a typical presidential visit. All the other presidents and prime ministers and their entourages were comfortably housed in the New Otani, a huge high rise hotel near the Akasaka Detached Palace where the meetings were to be held. We of course needed something much more than that and so we decided on the Okura Hotel, which was at the time the best hotel in the city and right across from our embassy. We made do with 600 rooms there – two-thirds of the hotel’s capacity. So, we had a few members of the cabinet as well as the president and all that that entails. Bill Sherman, the DCM, was the control officer and I was his assistant. I spent a lot of time with the pre-advance team of a dozen or so individuals. Lots more with the advance team, 60 or so. Then all my waking hours as the visit drew near. Have you been in a presidential visit?

Q: Yes, I have. That’s a point I think to emphasize here. Tokyo is a large embassy. You’ve got a lot of people. We’ve got one in Bangkok, but these visits are actually major, require major allocations of officer time and effort. I mean you have, but you’re allocating assigning officers to individual cars to see that the darn things work and they’ve got gas and nothing can go wrong, so everything has to be done in great detail which means the embassy stops, right?

LAMBERTSON: Yes, certainly anything of low priority quickly gets wiped off the agenda and the visit takes absolute top priority over everything else. Individual officers have to be assigned to each venue, there are officers assigned to motorcades for example, all of those things have to be done. This was a state visit for the president in addition to his participation in the Economic Summit, so there was some travel involved, some events that took place outside of Tokyo.
Immense logistical preparation was of course required for all of that. Tremendous demands were made of the Japanese government, and more than once we came up against the inherent rigidities of the Japanese decision-making system. The Japanese would want everything thoroughly orchestrated well in advance and it was always very difficult to change plans at the last moment. Anything not conforming to the graven-in-stone plan was very hard to get approval for from the Japanese. We ran into that during the Carter visit.

Occasionally we simply ran roughshod over the Japanese, as we do routinely with presidential visits wherever they may be. We do things that are embarrassing to the embassy, that require the embassy to go around and mend fences afterwards. I think this is always part of a presidential visit. The role of the embassy is to make it work for the president, and to the extent possible limit the bruises among local officials. It always is an important political event for the host country and in that sense, generally speaking, a major “success,” but there always also are abraded feelings among people on their side, in this case the Japanese side, whose sensibilities have been trampled upon by advance teams or some other part of the visit machinery.

Q: Let’s look at that point for a minute because I’ve found that advance teams representing the president really don’t care what country they’re in or what society they’re in.

LAMBERTSON: It could be Pittsburgh.

Q: There’s an incredible lack of sensitivity and in one sense any lack of what the economy can provide for them. Advance people are the first ones the embassy wants to strangle before they get to the real delegation. How did you find advance people? I mean the security guys are tough enough.

LAMBERTSON: I thought that Carter’s advance people were quite good. The team had a very young chief. I think he was in his late ‘20s. He was running a very big operation. He was a professional advance man. I respected his abilities. We got along pretty well. I got a very nice letter out of it at the end of the trip - one of the nicest of those things I ever received. Yes, you’re quite right, they are fixated on doing exactly what they believe the president wants or what they believe is best for the president. It makes absolutely no difference whether that fits or does not fit with realities in the host country. So, you’re bound to have conflicts and you just have to kind of try to massage the hurt feelings of your host country counterparts after wheels-up.

Q: You mentioned off line that when Carter came he wanted to do some jogging or something there.

LAMBERTSON: That’s right, he was a jogger and he was staying in the ambassador's residence right across from the Okura Hotel. He had tried jogging in the small backyard of the residence once and he didn’t like it. By then he had been to the Akasaka Palace for the first meeting of the Economic Summit and its grounds were very spacious, beautiful, 50 or 60 acres, and he thought, why can’t I jog there? So, we informed the Japanese that the following morning the president would like to go jogging at the Akasaka Palace and the Japanese immediately said, that’s not possible. We had a meeting that night in the Okura Hotel between the Japanese police, who were the ones who had vetoed the idea, and ourselves, ourselves being myself and Chuck Kartman.
who was my number one assistant as well as my motorcade man, and we tried to get the Japanese to let the president go jogging in the Akasaka Palace grounds the following morning. The Japanese police were absolutely adamant. There were two Gaimusho fellows there trying to be intermediaries between us and the Japanese police. That was the only time I ever saw a Japanese official cry.

The Japanese police were everywhere during that visit and the city was completely shut down. It was a very bizarre scene. Jimmy Carter could have jogged down the middle of the Ginza quite safely I’m sure, but the Japanese police would not let him use the palace grounds.

Q: You were saying that, as we all often experience, there is a point past which you have to make apologies for how a couple of things came down. I think in this visit you were saying...

LAMBERTSON: Yes, in this visit the president of course called on the emperor in the palace, and the audience with the emperor was obviously limited in numbers. The president and a few of his top people. One of the people who made the cut for that event was Dick Holbrooke. Incidentally I remember when the advance team came to Tokyo and we were talking about some event and went down a list of people and the advance man said, “Who’s Dick Holbrooke?” Another member of the advance team said, “Oh, he’s one of Vance’s guys.” It put a different perspective on who was a big shot and who was not within our system. In any event, for the call on the emperor, Dick Holbrooke was one of the participants, and the dozen or so people who were allowed into the reception room proceeded toward it. Apparently Dick Holbrooke had with him Nick Platt who was the country director, the fellow who I had replaced and who had in turn replaced Bill Sherman as Country Director, and Dick said, “Come on Nick, you can join in.” So, Nick did and they marched in numbering 13 instead of 12, past the outstretched white-gloved hands of the imperial household staff. The Imperial Household Agency was outraged, and within two hours of the departure of Carter, Bill Sherman was called over to the palace. I went with him and we were reprimanded by the Imperial Household Agency’s chief of protocol for this incredible breach of custom. We thought our people should have known better. Dick Holbrooke should have known better and Nick Platt, the country director, should certainly have known better. Anyway, the world didn’t come to an end.

Q: The point is having a presidential visit in Japan, which is a major ally, and when you’re dealing with the emperor whose status is so incredible. I mean Japanese language alone, you can’t even talk to the gentleman, the vocabulary requirements are so extensive, so I mean this isn’t just a visit down the street or to Ottawa. It has layers upon layers of protocol and meaning and you survived.

LAMBERTSON: That’s right.

WILLIAM PIEZ
Economic Counselor
Tokyo (1975-1980)
Mr. Piez was born and raised in Rhode Island and educated at the University of Rhode Island and the Fletcher School. After service in the US Armed Forces, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Frankfurt, Kabul and Manila as Economic Officer. During his career Mr. Piez dealt primarily with economic matters of East Asian countries, particularly Japan, where he served first as Economic Counselor and, from 1983 to 1985, as Economic Minister. In the Department in Washington, Mr. Piez was Deputy Assistant Secretary of East African Economic Affairs, and from 1989-1991, Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative. Mr. Piez was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

Q: Well then where did you go after…

PIEZ: Well I stayed on the Japan desk until ’75 and then was assigned as economic counselor in Tokyo and I went to Tokyo in ’75.

Q: Tokyo from ’75 until when?

PIEZ: 1980. It was almost exactly five years.

Q: Good God.

PIEZ: I was assigned for four. I asked for an extra year for personal reasons. The tour extension made it possible for my son to remain in the same American high school in Tokyo until graduation.

Q: Ok, you are out in Japan in economics. Who was the ambassador?

PIEZ: Well when I arrived there it was James Hodgson. He had been Secretary of Labor and he was the ambassador then. Our embassy at that time was in a temporary building. Our old embassy, going back to maybe 1930, was being torn down and rebuilt. Part of the contract called for a temporary building nearby which the contractor put up. It was all made out of prefabricated panels, so it would be easy to take apart and trash. When I arrived in Tokyo there was no economic minister, no economic counselor until I got there, and no commercial counselor, so I had all three jobs.

Q: You say you were an economic counselor. You say there was an economic minister.

PIEZ: There was an economic minister, one of five in the world at that time.

Q: An economic minister would be a rank above you.

PIEZ: Yes, and he was presumably in charge of the State People, the Commerce People, the Treasury attaché and others as a sort of inter-agency economic complex…

Q: Because we had so many important economic ties to Japan and we had all these different people there he was made sort of the super director in order that he or she could direct all these
units. That was, and you would be in charge of sort of the Department of State and that type of stuff?

PIEZ: Yes. The economic portion.

Q: First let’s take an overall look. In ’75 how stood relations with Japan?

PIEZ: Well relations were I think on a very positive basis. It was in ’72, after approval by President Nixon, that the reversion of Okinawa to Japan was concluded. That really removed a major impediment to a friendly relationship, and the Japanese immensely appreciated it.

Q: Well you know we have talked about this before. In State Department language there was a quick battle for Okinawa which was between essentially State Department people and U.S. marines who didn’t want to give up any sovereignty or control over Okinawa. This was a battle that raged for some time in the corridors of the State Department.

PIEZ: But actually the Pentagon found a very capable army general to take command in Okinawa, and he worked very effectively to make reversion work while protecting the interests of both the Marines and the army contingent there.

Q: Richard Snyder...

PIEZ: Dick Snyder, yes, he was the major negotiator in the State Department.

Q: Yes, it is quite a diplomatic history there.

PIEZ: Yeah.

Q: So this thorn in the side had been cleared away by the time you got there.

PIEZ: Yeah. One interesting consequence of reversion was that the Japanese came into possession of the dollar funds in circulation in Okinawa. Under U.S. administration all of Okinawa used U.S. dollars, not yen. At reversion the Japanese Government replaced dollar cash and bank accounts with Yen. The question was what to do with the dollar funds. It was agreed to set up a U.S.-Japan Friendship Commission as an independent federal agency endowed with the dollars released at the time of reversion. The Commission promotes education and information programs conducted in both countries.

Q: And also the opening of China and going off the gold standard, those shockus had run their course, so were things on a pretty stable course?

PIEZ: They were on a pretty stable course. There were glitches, sometimes quite unexpectedly. While I was on the Japan desk it was decided in Washington we would suspend exports of soybeans in order to reduce run-away prices in the U.S., so we had the soybean shock. That occurred in ’74.
Q: Yeah, what was behind this?

PIEZ: Well what was happening, particularly on the commodities market in Chicago, was that the price of soybeans was just going crazy. It was decided, and this was cleared by the Secretary of Agriculture with Secretary Henry Kissinger, that we would just suspend exports. Well Japan was a huge market for soybeans.

Q: You are talking about soybeans.

PIEZ: And the Japanese had committed contracts with U.S. suppliers of soybeans and poof, the contracts were suspended.

Q: This is like cutting out hamburgers to the United States. This was huge. I mean when you were doing economics at the time...

PIEZ: I was on the Japan Desk when this suddenly occurred. I called my counterparts at Commerce who agreed with me immediately, and then I called Agriculture and said, “What have you done?” Their Japan experts immediately reacted. Within a day they had changed the order to say half of the contracts could be fulfilled.

Q: What happened. I mean had this thing worked itself out by the time...

PIEZ: It did work itself out very quickly in a practical way in that half of the contracts were approved for fulfillment the day after the announcement. I think they announced it on Sunday and the half-way pullback appeared on Monday. The price in Chicago immediately moderated. Then within about 45 days the whole thing was lifted. So for 45 days the shippers were working on half the contracts. Using that allowance they were able to make normal shipments.

Q: Of course the problem is if you do something like this, if you are in Japan soybeans are as important as oil practically. If your major source shows up as untrustworthy.

PIEZ: In 45 days the practical problem had disappeared, but the emotional problem was still there after I arrived in Tokyo. It reminds me of President Roosevelt’s statement that he and Eleanor didn’t mind political criticism, but Fala did. The shipment of soybeans to Japan continued, but still the Japanese minded.

Q: The dog.

PIEZ: Well the Japanese had to concede that they were getting all the soybeans they could use. But they still resented it. When the Secretary of Agriculture made a trip to Japan some time thereafter to smooth the waters, if you will, the Japanese invited him to a dinner where the menu consisted entirely of soybeans.

Q: Well you can do that with tofu and all.

PIEZ: They have so many things you can do with soybeans, so they put together a complete
Q: Well in the first place how did you find the embassy apparatus there. I mean you were pretty high up in the hierarchy of the embassy. How did you find the officers, the morale, the efficiency?

PIEZ: Well Ambassador Hodgson was I think a very effective representative. The basic work of the embassy was left to the DCM. That was Tom Shoesmith who was a very competent language officer. The political section was heavily staffed with Japanese speakers. We had an excellent translation section. I got complete translations of the daily press in Tokyo. The local press was very active and the morning papers had huge circulations. I would have those translations by 9:30 or 10:00 in the morning. So we had a very good system for keeping track of public events and personalities. Now on the economic side I will say that Shoesmith rarely interfered. He wasn’t sending me memos of instructions. He would sometimes ask me a question, usually a relatively difficult question, but he used a kind of Socratic method of managing. It worked as long as you did your job. Many assignments came by telegram from Washington. Because of the time difference we would get most traffic during the night.

Q: When you say assignments, what do you mean?

PIEZ: They would say we want you to convey the following to the Japanese government, and to obtain their cooperation or assistance or information, whatever is needed. The request might relate to strategic export controls. Japanese exporters did not always conform to the rules, even though the Japanese Government had imposed agreed restrictions. Another example would be a message about someone in Washington who wanted to go to Tokyo to open discussions about an issue. Or we would have a Congressional visit to arrange. My practice was if possible to answer those instructions the same day, which was good because with the time change the State Department people would be receiving my late afternoon response in the morning of the next day.

Q: How did we view, was it MITI?


Q: But that at that time was your principal...

PIEZ: Mostly we went to the foreign ministry and the foreign ministry was quite jealous of its prerogatives. At times they would say don’t go to MITI; come to us first. But it just couldn’t always work that way. We would need to go to MITI without the advance permission of the foreign ministry. But we worked it out. We kept the foreign ministry informed.

Q: I assume that the LDP, Liberal Democratic party was very much, did they have any policy towards the United States. Was it get along or were they confrontational? Did you have any fears that might be translated into...
PIEZ: I would say the top policy maker was really the prime minister because the U.S. was too important to leave to the generals, as it were. Our ambassador had access to the prime minister, and our DCM, Tom Shoesmith, had access to the office of the prime minister for any critical issues. The questions often related to security. Day to day the security relationship was quite smooth, but then really bad bumps in the road that would occur, such as when a marine had raped somebody. Rarely one of those really dreadful incidents would occur.

Q: Down in Okinawa you had really young troops there, and every once in awhile one or two would go wild. Well tell me, you got there in ’75 and the whole situation in Vietnam collapsed at that point.

PIEZ: Yes.

Q: Did that have any effect in say well the United States said it would stand by South Vietnam and it didn’t. You know sort of a requisitioning of our commitment to Japan.

PIEZ: I don’t think the Japanese felt that was their problem at all. I think they were just relieved.

Q: They just got that off.

PIEZ: Their real concern was Korea and Japan itself.

Q: And Korea at that point was pretty much under Park Chung Hee. I mean it was a pretty good period. I know because I was there from ’76 to ’79 as consul general. There wasn’t any great love lost between the Koreans and the Japanese.

PIEZ: Well, no, the Koreans actively hated the Japanese down to the very bottom of their guts. I think maybe it has ameliorated since, but much of it is still there. You don’t have 40 years of Japanese colonialism of the type the Japanese imposed without creating enormous resentment.

Q: Well the Japanese made the Koreans change their names, adopt the Japanese language.

PIEZ: The language of instruction in schools during the occupation was Japanese. The names issue, I recall learning from Koreans, was intensely sensitive. Within a day, after the Japanese occupation ended, all of the Korean names reappeared because the Koreans all knew what those names were supposed to be according to Korean tradition. Anyway the enmity was certainly there, but the Japanese greatly valued the American military presence in Korea. Most of what the U.S. military did in Japan was keep a logistics base.

Q: Did you go over to Seoul from time to time. We were always having somebody from the embassy including Ambassador Mike Mansfield and Secretary Hodgson came over.

PIEZ: Well some Americans came to shop, although I must say I did not find Itewan a good place to buy anything. My kids, when they found I was going to Seoul would say, “Don’t bring me any clothes from Itewan.”
Q: Our ambassador in Korea at the time was Dick Snyder who was the great Japanese expert having basically done the Okinawa treaty. This was sort of his reward. Was there any stirring that came to you about I guess it was the northern territories, the Kuriles. I always thought this was the greatest gift we could have had was the Soviet intransigency on restoring these stupid little islands. It kept the Soviets from having any influence in Japan.

PIEZ: Yeah, that was the effect. The splinter Japanese rightist organizations would sound blast the Soviet embassy from their trucks about twice a month. The Japanese security police would be all over them protecting the Soviet embassy, but not obliging them to lower the noise level.

Q: What about we had just opened our relations, we didn’t have a full embassy, we had an interest section in China at the time. But the Japanese just have been looking at China as big as it is as being a potential if nothing else in the trade business. Were you getting this from the Japanese?

PIEZ: Well it was very much under wraps. The interests of the Japanese included trade; the potential for trade with China was enormous. But they were very cool. They had so many issues with China over apologies for World War II and over the prime minister’s visit to the graves of Japanese war dead.

Q: Japanese war cemetery.

PIEZ: Yeah. This inevitably irritated the Chinese, and the Chinese had a number of issues about the content of Japanese school textbooks.

Q: Well the Japanese never really attacked the problem of war guilt. You go to Germany the Germans have done a remarkable job.

PIEZ: They were side stepping. The Japanese policy was one of what I would call bob and weave. They just kind of hoped it would go away.

Q: What was your impression of the Japanese bureaucrats that you dealt with?

PIEZ: The Japanese had a very effective education system going all the way back to the Meiji era based on European standards up to University level where they based their system on American standards. It was an effective education system and their bureaucratic recruitment for all of the key agencies was quite similar to the State Department’s system for recruiting foreign service officers - tough exams and real screening. Now in the foreign ministry employees are at four levels. The top track, we call it top track or first track, was drawn from college graduates in international studies or law as they called it. Their law faculties were much broader than law. Students graduating already had a fair command of English. That was absolutely required for a top track job. Beyond that there was a second track of officers who became country experts. They were also expected to have a good command of English. They might be experts on the United States, Canada, Great Britain, India or any other country where English is important. Second track officers might also specialize in Arabic or Spanish or French. They would spend their entire careers in their language areas. The third track was like our foreign service staff level,
and in the bottom track were code clerks and typists and that sort of thing. If you were recruited into the top track you were virtually guaranteed an ambassadorship unless you really blotted your copybook badly along the way. So they were well educated, well trained, smart, and very effective.

Q: *Did you find you had to know more about some of the people you were dealing with than let’s say if you were talking about an American. I was wondering if you had to know which high school and which university they went to and some of the ties. These ties are very important aren’t they.*

PIEZ: They were certainly important to the individuals. We knew what they were because they were quite free about telling you about that. They would say, “I have been to Tokyo University.” The acronym in Japanese is *Todai*, and a very large number of their officers in MITI or the foreign ministry or the finance ministry came from there.

Q: *With the economic slump were we also looking at the labor movement in Japan?*

PIEZ: Well to some extent. We had a labor attaché and an assistant labor attaché and the Department of Labor would fill the attaché position. His job was really to keep track of the labor unions. They could really be of political importance. So he was counted as part of the political section. But the embassy was always quite well covered in that respect.

Q: *Were we at all concerned as Americans we get more concerned about social matters than other countries. Were we concerned and looking at the role of women in Japan?*

PIEZ: Not too much. There were always questions from time to time about the prospects for the women we knew who were working their way up in the Japanese bureaucracy. MITI, I remember, had one woman who became the trade minister in the Japanese embassy in Washington. For political reasons recently she was foreign minister for a while. So we were beginning to see the appearance of women in the Japanese bureaucracy in the top tracks.

Q: *As I say I was in Korea almost the same time you were in Japan, and we found ourselves in Korea just as a hiring practice, the American embassy was considered to be a top job even in a secretarial level because if you were a woman and you were married, you were sort of dismissed. We didn’t care if they were married or not. And also our hours were shorter, and they were also treated better. What sort of things were you looking at in Japan?*

PIEZ: First of all the economic prospects for Japan and their economic plans. The Japanese are great planners. Particularly we were concerned about the impact their economic plans would have on trade with the U.S.

Q: *Were we seeing sort of the proclivity of the Japanese, the normal Japanese saying they were not as good a consumer of our stuff as we would like them to be.*

PIEZ: Yeah, and we had particular sticking points with the Japanese. We had very important
markets in Japan for grain and soybeans. But when it came to processed foods, no. Those industries in Japan were quite well protected with tariffs and they observed informal practices of simply not buying imported stuff. Orange juice, for example. It was notorious if you ordered orange juice for breakfast in a big hotel this was an extra. It would cost you ten dollars because there was a quota on citrus fruit. A very strict quota.

Q: Well also on rice, I was told that American rice wouldn’t fit the Japanese stomach or something like that.

PIEZ: Well, we had in the United States a pretty active lobby for the U.S. rice producers in California. They would work very hard to somehow make a breakthrough into the Japanese market. At one point there was a severe rice shortage because of a crop failure in Korea. The Japanese stepped up and said we will sell you rice. Japan had a surplus of rice left over from prior years. There was a lot of heartburn in the U.S. because U.S. rice producers wanted the Koreans to buy from them. So we had lengthy negotiations over Japanese rice exports. The internal price for rice in Japan was extremely high, maybe eight or ten times what American consumers of rice were paying. The Japanese were used to the high prices. To export they had to sell for much less, hurting the market for every other potential supplier.

Q: Also this was designed to protect the rice growers, and these were people sitting on prime real estate.

PIEZ: Sometimes. More important, they tended to vote in a block for LDP candidates.

Q: Well it in a way was like what was happening in Europe.

PIEZ: And in many districts it was critical to the election of LDP members to the diet. Very sensitive politically.

Q: Well did you turn rice negotiations, orange juice negotiations, these were taken pretty much on the trade negotiators.

PIEZ: Yeah with the Department of Agriculture big players, and USDA kind of torn because they valued the market for grain and soybeans, but they also wanted the market for these specialty products.

Q: And also we didn’t want too many TVs going in so there was an awful lot of trading back and forth I guess. Were there concerns, you were on the country team weren’t you?

PIEZ: Yes.

Q: Was this a period of say pretty stable relations?

PIEZ: On the whole, yes. We might have specific problems on trade issues or on quotas, our quotas and their quotas, but as I say they were reasonably well managed without a whole lot of damage to effective and profitable trade relations in many sectors between the two countries.
Q: Well this is a period I remember reading reports coming out, people trying to sell in Japan, that there were all sorts of obstacles put in their way and their being able to sell this and that. But the basic thing was that it was pretty much quid pro quo wasn’t it?

PIEZ: Well yes, we would work out those issues, or some of them anyway. The American business community in Japan was extremely active. It was growing during the years I was there. Through the American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo, they took an extremely active interest in all the topics under negotiation. If the U.S. Trade Representative came to Japan, his appearance at an event given by the American Chamber of Commerce was a matter of routine. So we had those people as well as traveling company representatives as a continuing presence in the background whenever anything came up. Whether it was a Treasury negotiation over financial issues or anything else.

Q: Were relations with Japan and North Korea and all a subject of concern to us?

PIEZ: I don’t think so, no. The issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese hadn’t developed at the time I was there. There was a faction of Koreans in Japan’s Korean community that was oriented towards North Korea.

Q: It has always been there. It has always seemed to me to be sort of remarkable.

PIEZ: Yeah, and somewhat similar to the fact Japan has a communist party. The communists would elect maybe ten percent of the Diet, but they were really of very minor significance. There was practically nothing they could do except what members of our Congress would call client services. It was important to them to get re-elected. That was about it.

Q: There was a period, I guess in the 80’s, maybe I am wrong, maybe it started before, where the Japanese were riding pretty high as regarding income and all that and they were investing and buying Rockefeller Center and Movie companies.

PIEZ: Oh yeah and some people feared that they are going to own all of American farm land. They bought one farm. It caused a press panic.

Q: Was this going on in your time?

PIEZ: Oh yes. I think half facetiously an officer in MITI that I knew once said, “Well we have this huge accumulation of treasury bills and bonds and this huge trade surplus, so why don’t you sell us California?” Our response, even more facetiously, was, “Do you really want it?” But there was a time when at least nominally all the land in Japan was worth more than all the land in the United States. And all the land in Tokyo was worth more than all the land in California. But there was a huge bubble of land prices in Japan and in ’91, when their recession began, the major part of it was the popping of that bubble. Land in Japan was way over valued.

Q: Was it more or less apparent to everyone that it was more or less over valued?
PIEZ: I think so. We would report this to Washington along the line that of course you guys already know this. And they did. It was published data often reported in the press.

Q: There was not much you could do about it.

PIEZ: What we might have done was to report formally someday this is going to burst and it is going to cause a recession. But it was one of those things that was considered common knowledge. The Japanese certainly knew it, but the banks continued to accept the land at these high assessed values as collateral for lending.

Q: How did you find the banking system?

PIEZ: Well it was a powerful private banking system and very closely tied to the large Japanese corporations, the trading companies and the manufacturers. There were some variations. Toyota was so profitable that they had practically no borrowed capital and was itself practically a bank. But that was exceptional. The trading companies operated quite steadily on credit from their related banks.

Q: How was life for you and your family? You had a son.

PIEZ: I had a son and two daughters. It was a very comfortable place to live. During the time we were there, the housing was convenient and of good quality. We had short commutes that was a big benefit and very much in the government’s interest too because it meant practically all of the professional embassy staff was really on call. In Bangkok, for example, our officers often have a long and difficult commute, and that is a hardship. But we had no pressure of that sort in Japan. There were no problems of supply. You could get anything you wanted. It was not a country where you could employ household staff. It was just completely priced out of reach. So people had to be quite self sufficient on that end. But Americans are used to that. That is how we live here after all.

Q: Absolutely. What about social life? Were you finding a change, were the Japanese at the professional level more open to contact or not?

PIEZ: It is difficult for the Japanese to entertain at home, so typically they would entertain in restaurants or hotels. Often times they would have an allowance to facilitate that so you got invited to events on someone’s expense account. They would often relate their entertaining to visitors from out of town or some seasonal event. New Years was a big holiday time and after New Years they would catch up on their social obligations. We could entertain at home. The Japanese were glad to come to those things. And always quite curious to see how Americans lived.

ALBERT L. SELIGMANN
Political Counselor
Tokyo (1976-1980)
Albert Seligmann was born and raised in New York City where he also attended Columbia University’s School of International Affairs. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955 after serving in the US Army during World War II. His career included posts in Japan, Thailand, and Germany. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Today is April 11, 2000. Al, we are back 1976 to 1980, is that right?

SELMANN: That's correct.

Q: You are off to Tokyo as political counselor. Who was the ambassador when you were there?

SELMANN: When I arrived it was Jim Hodgson, former Secretary of Labor, for about a year and then Mike Mansfield.

Q: How was Hodgson as ambassador?

SELMANN: He was very easy to get along with. He didn't engage deeply in the operations of the embassy, but more or less let it run itself. It was a fairly relaxed time. Hodgson used to refer to the period as “windless days.” I got to know him better later on when he was a member of the U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission, and I was executive director. When we met again, I remarked,, "Jim, the wind is blowing strongly now." He, of course, agreed. He enjoyed a relatively calm period in our relationship shortly before trade issues whipped up a storm.

Q: You were political counselor. Could you describe the political section and what you were concerned with at that particular time? Let's start in 1976 and if any changes came, we can...

SELMANN: The section was divided into three branches: external affairs, headed by my deputy, with particular emphasis on China, Korea and the Asian region; an internal affairs section which covered internal politics and internal developments within Japan; and a political military section dealing with an endless stream of issues related to our military presence as well as a number of new developments that soon took center stage on the political side of the house. The section also had responsibility for the Translations Services Staff that turned out daily press summaries and monthly magazine summaries, as well as ad hoc translations. I had talented people working with me.

Q: Who were they?

SELMANN: Most have gone on to be ambassadors. Nick Platt for a year was my deputy followed by Dave Lamberton, both of whom got their own posts. Tom Hubbard in external affairs. Bill Breer, Howard McElroy and Don Keyser in political-military affairs, Mark Minton, Craig Dunkerly, Chuck Kartman...

Q. Chuck Kartman?
SELIGMANN: Yes. Now handling the talks with North Korea. Bill Breer was later DCM in Tokyo and is now the Japan chair at CSIS.

Q: Yes, I have interviewed him.

SELIGMANN: I have probably left a few out. Talented people, which made my life easy. Within a week of arrival, we all faced the chore of moving from temporary offices into a brand new chancery. Fortunately, all the details had been worked out in advance by Nick Platt, so I was spared any space planning. Many of us who had worked in the old chancery regarded the new building as an architectural monstrosity - clearly we needed a much larger building, but we could have done better. Before I began to settle in, I was informed the day after I arrived that labor-cost-sharing negotiations were to start the following week, and I would be heading up the US negotiating team. That was interesting, inasmuch as I hadn't heard a word about it in Washington.

Q: What did that involve? What was that?

SELIGMANN: For years we had been having a great deal of friction with the local Japanese employees of our armed forces in Japan. It was customary in Japan for government as well as non-government employers to negotiate annual year-end bonuses, as well as pay increases in this period of prosperity. It was a period when wages were high, there was full employment, and the exchange rate was not working in our favor. Our budget being what it always is for such matters, this had become a nasty business, where we held the line, making concessions only after USFJ (United States Forces Japan) employees went out on strike, with resultant bad feeling all around. We argued with the Japanese government that our forces were there to help defend Japan and they should assume some of these labor costs. The Japanese pointed to our status of forces agreement (SOFA), which stated all too clearly that the Japanese would provide facilities, bases for our forces, and we would pay all the operating costs, specifically including labor costs. Nonetheless, partly reflecting a different attitude toward contractual arrangements than ours, i.e., if conditions change, renegotiation may be in order, the Japanese had agreed to talk about this. When the Japanese agree to talk about something, it usually means they are prepared to do something, although we didn’t know what that something was when we started out. I am no lawyer, but it was pretty clear we had no solid legal base to go on, even though I thought we had a fairly good political case. The best thing going was the trade deficit, which was beginning to cause a great deal of economic friction between Japan and the United States. I am sure we would never have gotten to first base otherwise.

Q: In a way was it, I mean we could plead poor mouth.

SELIGMANN: We could plead poor mouth, which didn't sound so good, but that isn't exactly the way we went about it. I think the Japanese saw it, whether we did or not - I did at least - that being forthcoming in matters like this, which contributed to the U.S. presence in the Pacific, could help with Congress and the public by demonstrating that this was a true alliance, a true partnership - the word ”alliance” was still taboo at that time. I had a little leeway to put our act together, inasmuch as the first meeting was a pro forma organizational session chaired by the DCM and the Director General of the North America Affairs Bureau; my counterpart was
Hiroshi Kitamura, the latter’s deputy, later ambassador to Canada and London I immediately got together at the embassy the USFJ J-5 and labor officer and the three labor officers of each of the services from Yokota (air), Zama (army) and Yokosuka (navy). To preempt a fight over priorities and provide an opportunity to get all demands on the table, I asked for wish lists of what they would like to see covered. I consolidated these in a single initial negotiating brief to which no one on the U.S. side could possibly object, including a host of items: special allowances, health insurance, overtime, administrative costs - just about everything except basic pay. The underlying argument I used was my own invention: even though the status of forces agreement obligated the United States to pay all these costs, there was nothing in the SOFA that said Japan could not pay them if it wished. This got laughed out of court initially, but with the passage of time came to prevail. In effect that is the way it came out over the course of time. There were other issues coming up. but I might as well pursue this one.

Q: Do this one.

SELGIMANN: We started off, as usual in that kind of negotiation, getting nowhere for a long time, listening to each other’s respective positions. In the interim, the Foreign Ministry had work to do to coordinate its position with the Defense Agency and, more importantly, with the Finance Ministry. Gradually, the Japanese began to find that certain costs could be described as other than “labor costs,” e.g., “health and welfare costs,” or “administrative costs.” In the end they came up with a package that amounted to some 30-odd million dollars a year, not a huge amount of money, but a start. In return, however, they wanted the United States to make a commitment that there would be no further demands in this area. Also they wanted the U. S. to agree to a period of labor peace for two or three years, during which there would be no prolonged haggling over bonuses and the like. We were prepared to go along with the second request from the start; indeed, it was an objective for us as well. We always came through to some extent in the end anyway, as in most labor-union negotiations, but we always made it difficult. We could not, however, agree that this was the limit. We appeared to have reached a stalemate, and also had to overcome strong feeling in the Pentagon that the amount offered was insufficient. We were approaching the point where we were going to have another round of bitter labor negotiations if we didn't get something done. In regard to the amount, Yukio Sato, head of the Security Division of the North American Affairs Bureau, now Ambassador to the United Nations, took me aside and said something that I understood, although it was hard to sell back home, "Listen to the background music." I took this to mean, “Accept what we are offering now and there will be more in the future,” i.e., this was an opening wedge. Maybe you have to live and work in Japan to read it that way, but the Pentagon was another matter. I pulled out every stop I could think of to try to bring the Pentagon around through high-level messages from the ambassador and the like, and I made the pilgrimage myself a couple of times to Yokota to try to persuade the Commander USFJ and his chief of staff, who fortunately were understanding and sympathetic.

We remained at loggerheads, however, in regard to Japanese insistence on writing into the agreement a clause that stated this was the limit possible under the SOFA. Thereupon I drew a leaf from my Berlin experience, drawing on a gambit we had used once or twice with the Russians, even though I was not personally involved. In a tête-à-tête, I suggested to Kitamura that when the agreement was initialed in the Joint Committee, the body that met every other week to administer the nitty-gritty of the SOFA and other matters related to our military
presence, he stated for the record that this was the maximum Japan could provide under the terms of the SOFA, and that we in turn stated for the record that we did not agree. He took the proposal under advisement, and the next day agreed. With that in hand, Washington gave us the go-ahead and we had an agreement. The short-term postscript was that whereas we understood matters would slide for at least a couple of years, the next year, without any prompting on our part, the Japanese volunteered to take on further costs, approximately doubling the amount to over $60 million a year. Over the years additional cost-sharing agreements have been concluded whereby the Japanese have assumed virtually all our support costs, including utilities, and all local pay; the figure varies depending on budgets and the exchange rate, but the last I heard it came to $85,000 per U.S. serviceman or about $4 billion a year. I think it is an interesting lesson on how one deals with Japan. They are not a litigious society. Much is based on faith, handshakes, personal relations and confidence in and respect for each other. If you show that respect and you show that you have the confidence and leave it up to them, they will often come through in unbelievably generous ways. This has happened again and again although they rarely get any credit for it.

Q: You were mentioning that the Pentagon was very difficult to deal with. What about the Japanese military establishment? Are these decisions made at the political level so you are not up against a Japanese defense apparatus?

SELMANN: It is a good question. It comes up in regard to another issue we will talk about. At this stage, the Foreign Ministry felt strongly that they ran the show on all political-military matters. They would listen to the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), which while headed by a Director General who was a Cabinet member, had less than ministry status, but the Foreign Ministry felt it should make all final decisions with political ramifications. This was born out of the post-war scheme of things, civilian control over the military being an important concept, which of course had not been accepted before World War II. The foreign ministry was and is run by people of a liberal bent in the best sense of the term, meaning they were wary of giving too much influence to their own military. This was resented by the self defense forces, who sometimes were made to feel they were second-class citizens in the bureaucracy. I made it a matter of high priority in my own dealings to maintain direct relations with the JDA without going through the foreign ministry where that was appropriate. I certainly wouldn't go around the back of the foreign ministry on something they should be aware of, but wanted both the JDA civilian leadership, which tended to come out of other agencies such as the Finance Ministry and Police Agency, as well as the military leadership to feel that we understood their problems. Generally, of course, I dealt with the civilian side of the house. In regard to issues themselves, what few differences we had were usually limited to matters where the JDA and USFJ were in accord. My contacts with the JDA paid off. On one occasion, the day the Director General (Minister), an old political contact, was to depart for a visit to Washington and some European capitals, I received a last-minute call from his office suggesting I might wish to pay a farewell call. This was rather unusual and when I scurried over, I noticed a waiting room full of Japanese officials and one or two foreign ambassadors. I was immediately ushered in a side door to his office, however, to find him quite relaxed, reading a newspaper; he wanted to clue me in on some significant commitment he intended to make, the details of which I have forgotten.

Q: Now, did those self defense forces have sort of professional ties within the military, in other
words going beyond dealing in Japan? You know, so often particularly you think of the Israelis and all, but others who have good military contacts and they come back to the United States and they hit the Pentagon before they go anywhere else. Was this at all going on with the Japanese?

SELMANN: We were and are Japan’s only ally. Apart from the heritage of the occupation and the initial post-occupation period when we helped build up the Self Defense Forces, we have traditionally maintained close military-to-military ties. Nonetheless, a number of developments had gradually taken place to alter the picture. Whereas for years almost all of Japan’s military leaders spoke pretty good English, this was no longer the case. For our part, we had drastically reduced our military presence, and partly in response to Japanese pressure for base consolidation and the return to Japan of facilities sitting on much desired land, had concentrated them at a few major installations. The SDF, in turn, tended for tactical and other reasons to be stationed in areas such as Hokkaido or Kyushu, where there was little opportunity for frequent contact with our military. We still were collocated or were next-door neighbors at a few facilities, especially true of the navy and some of the air force, but the top military leaders on both sides, with some exceptions, were no longer on the first-name basis they had been for many postwar years. The navy and air force routinely conducted joint exercises, but because of budget constraints and geographic separation, this was less and less true of the Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF or army), which accounted for perhaps two-thirds of the Japanese forces. We were not growing apart in the sense of thinking separately or acting separately, but we were not seeing that much of each other and the opportunities to go to service schools and the like were more limited than they had ever been, partly because of the extraordinarily high costs we charged - eventually, State, working with the Pentagon managed to get Japan so-called “NATO treatment” or discounted tuition. I could see a burgeoning or nascent problem, because, I felt that if there is any one place in Japan where the seeds of nationalism might take root, historically, traditionally it might be with the military. If you read this morning’s New York Times, you know what I am talking about.

Q: No, I didn't.

SELMANN: The governor of Tokyo, while not an extreme rightist, has a reputation as an outspoken nationalist; he is the man who wrote "The Japan That Can Say No [to the United States]" that caused such a fuss a few years ago. Speaking to the Self Defense Forces, he apparently mouthed some blatantly nationalist sentiments that could cause political problems. I don't for one moment suggest that his audience lapped all this up - that was not my experience with the SDF people I dealt with - but he was playing to what he assumed was a receptive audience for his ideas.

Q: Apart from the labor-cost negotiations, what other things were you involved with?

SELMANN: Another major item on the political-military side was negotiation of what became known as Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. Our military staff and the Japanese military staff had been working together on contingency planning, which from the U.S. point of view was an altogether natural thing to do with an ally. We do it with all our allies, and anyone in this town is aware that the basement of the Pentagon is full of plans. We have plans for every contingency under the sun. In the case of Japan you would plan for a Korean contingency or a
Taiwan straits contingency or whatever. It doesn't mean that you expect that to happen, but you plan for it. When something does happen, it never happens the way you planned anyway, but the planning process has facilitated how you react. However, in Japan, you had all the baggage of the pre-war and wartime military, which made this an extraordinarily sensitive area. Some time before my arrival, one of the magazines or newspapers had come up with the "revelation" that there was an exercise known as “Three Arrows,” in which United States and Japanese military were planning for a contingency, I think on the Korean peninsula. The idea that such planning had been going on in secret became a political scandal, so it ground to a halt. After that, the Japanese were unwilling to engage in further joint planning. The question was how do you work with your military friends in this situation. The solution agreed to either in the Security Consultative Committee or the Security Subcommittee was to have a public set of guidelines for defense cooperation that would permit planning to go on and would spell out the planning parameters. Sometime in 1977 or 1978 we began negotiation of these first guidelines. I was the embassy representative on the U.S. negotiating team, but the negotiations themselves were left pretty much to the U.S. and Japanese military staffs. The Japanese approach was to obtain as explicit a commitment from the United States as possible to just what forces would be committed in just what contingency. Our military were not unwilling to go along with this kind of thing. On the other hand, I felt that even though the guidelines required nothing more than departmental approval in Washington, they were to be approved at the cabinet level in Japan. We were not negotiating a treaty and could not sign an agreement that went beyond the scope of the security treaty itself; to do so would probably be unconstitutional. That issue was never raised by anybody but myself as far as I know; I did flag it at one point in a message to Washington which met with no disagreement. We were all agreed on fundamentals, still stated in the guidelines, that if Japan was subject to attack, the Japanese would in the first instance respond with their own resources, and if that did not work, then the U.S. will come to their assistance. And of course without specifying it, the nuclear umbrella was still in place. The two military staffs, however, wanted specific commitments, e.g., in X circumstances, the 24th division will be flown in from Hawaii, etc. I held that this sort of thing belonged in a plan, not an intergovernmental agreement that lacked the status of a treaty. In the end we worked out more general language along lines I drafted. The guidelines, made public and approved by the Japanese cabinet, permitted planning to resume and have remained in effect. By direction they were confined to measures to defend against an attack on Japan, but they were expanded two years ago by a new set of far more extensive guidelines on ways in which our armed forces would cooperate in meeting contingencies outside of Japan.

Q: Meaning Korea.

SEILGMANN: Not just Korea. It could mean the Taiwan Straits, although the security treaty deliberately fudges the definition of what is the Far East. But the new guidelines now provide a framework for cooperation short of participation in direct combat for contingencies other than an attack on Japan proper,

Q: Were you feeling in the 1976 to 1980 period, just after we got out of Vietnam that the Japanese felt that the Americans seemed to have become undependable now. We can't be assured what they might do and they wanted to nail this down more than had been the case before.
SELMAN: I think there was a period of great uneasiness after Nixon announced the Guam doctrine and right after the end of the Vietnam war, but by the time I got to Tokyo, I think we had weathered most of the storm. No doubt, however, some of that feeling was behind the desire to get the guidelines pinned down.

Q: But 1976 was an election year and Carter was making noises saying he was going to withdraw troops of the 2nd division from Korea.

SELMAN: All remaining combat troops.

Q: One division had already gone. So the 2nd. division was the only one left there. I know because I was in it. I arrived right in July in Korea at the time. This was supposed to have sent shock waves, the fact when he was elected was very disturbing to the Asian powers. How did you find this?

SELMAN: The Japanese government all but panicked Prime Minister Fukuda either came to Washington himself or sent a special envoy to plead with Carter not to do so. Carter seemed to feel almost simplistically that he had to keep a campaign promise, even though there did not seem to be that much pressure for him to do so. Eventually he backed down, limiting withdrawals to 3,000-4,000 men, but it was a very bad period. It was perhaps more worrisome to Korea but the Japanese were just about equally upset.

Q: Well, Carter did not come through as a very sound person, did he, on foreign affairs in the Far East early on?

SELMAN: No. I think the Japanese liked him as a person. It was almost the opposite of the Nixon situation, where they approved of much of his foreign policy, e.g., China, and could not understand why we had problems with him. They felt American presidents had responsibilities for the rest of the world, read “us,” and domestic US politics should take second place.

Q: Well, these plans that we made public, well, not the plans but the framework, did they look pretty good? I mean were they sort of innocuous?

SELMAN: From a U.S. point of view they were both innocuous and unnecessary. They met a Japanese need, however, and worked out fine, permitting the kind of planning the Japanese and ourselves wanted to do tp go ahead without roiling any waters.

Q: Were there any other we have sort of had the labor costs, the plans, anything else you got involved in during this time you were there major things?

SELMAN: I served as the deputy US representative of the Joint Committee, chaired on the US side by the Chief of Staff USFJ and on the Japanese side by the Director General of the Foreign Ministry’s North American Affairs Bureau. Apart from the management of incidents and the usual flow of minor problems, the major agenda item was base consolidation, contingent in many instances on the Japanese constructing alternative facilities, e.g., housing, hospitals. Most
of this was worked out by the military and our PolMil officers - I would only get involved if they thought I should. During this time we created still another consultative mechanism, the SCG (Security Consultative Group), chaired by the DCM and the Director General of the North American Affairs Bureau. This was designed to permit mid-level decisions without bringing in participants from Washington, where a binational imprimatur was needed. It served for example as a body to set up the modalities for negotiating the Guidelines and formally to approve them.

The domestic political situation was in a state of turmoil in the wake of the Lockheed scandal that had toppled the government of Prime Minister Tanaka, an otherwise popular leader, now under investigation. Just before the December 1976 general election, a number of younger LDP Diet members defected to form a new party, the New Liberal Club, that did exceptionally well, to the point that the LDP lost its majority for the first time since 1955 and was forced to govern in coalition with the defectors. This resulted in a heavy load of domestic political reporting in the light of foreign media speculation that the end of conservative rule was in sight.

We had the usual never-ending stream of third-country and UN related issues, including toward the end of my tour, the hostage situation.

Q. You are talking about hostages in Iran.

SELMANN: Yes. On most international issue, including the USSR and China, we saw eye to eye with the Japanese, but in the Middle East, we were not always in synch. The Japanese were more dependent on Middle East oil than we were, although oil is fungible - if someone doesn't get oil, everybody hurts. For example when you had the oil crisis in 1976...

Q: 1976-1977: Carter was in by that time.

SELMANN: Yes. Prime Minister Miki immediately went over to Iran and other countries and was just delighted to be designated a “friendly country” by Iran, a designation they did not hand out lightly. That influenced getting their oil to flow again, and Miki is said to have exulted on the plane on the way back to Tokyo. This was not in the best of taste and did not sit well in the United States.

Q: Were we leaning on them to be unfriendly?

SELMANN: No, because we understood their problem, but we felt he was a bit obsequious, playing up to the Iranians. It wasn't a serious difference in the overall scheme of things. As I might have mentioned earlier, on my watch we took a more explicit position than we had hitherto on the question of the northern territories, which prevented Japan and continues today to prevent Japan from having a peace treaty with the Russia. I think that helped us in our general relationship with Japan.

Q: Well, I would think there would be always a subliminal delight in the fact that the Soviets were hanging on to these things. In other words diplomatically it protected our flank up there. I mean we didn't have to do anything about it.
SELIGMANN: That's true. Moreover, there is a long-standing historical distaste or distrust for Russians in Japan. One incident while I was there which I think we all kind of relished was the landing of a MIG fighter, which was flown into Hokkaido under the Japanese radar by a defecting Soviet pilot.

Q: *It was state of the art at that time.*

SELIGMANN: Yes. I was having a relaxed Sunday afternoon when I got a frantic call from our defense attaché. He was so cryptic and careful on the telephone that I really did not catch on to what he was trying to tell me. He said something like, "One of those aircraft landed up at Hakodate in Hokkaido." I thought he was referring to a U-2, which flew on missions from Kadena, that occasionally had to make emergency landings as a result of weather conditions or for other reasons. This was something that had to be informed to the Japanese but did not strike me as anything to get excited about - it was no big deal. Once the message got through, of course, all kinds of things started to happen. First of all, the intelligence powers in Washington were sure that the Japanese were going to let the Soviets take the aircraft back home, and we would never have a crack at it. It never occurred to us in the Embassy that there would be any problem.

Q: *Were you all trying to get to them and say, “Don't worry; leave it alone?”*

SELIGMANN: Yes. But, you know, they were nervous as could be and weren't listening. This went on for a couple of days, and then a colonel, I think stationed at Misawa, sent a direct message back to the Pentagon without clearance with the embassy, saying that the Japanese were going to turn the MIG back and we had better turn the heat on them. We were furious from the ambassador on down, and in the end the colonel got reamed. It was enough, however, for the embassy to receive an instruction to make a high-level representation to get assurances that we would have a chance to look at the plane. I accompanied Tom Shoesmith, the DCM to the Foreign Ministry’s guest house, where the Vice Minister was hosting an evening reception. He came out and after Tom made a brief pitch about how important this was, etc., simply replied, “Don’t worry.” For our purposes, that was all the assurance we needed, although, needless to say, our military continued to worry. What happened after that was all fun and games. The Soviets naturally were screaming that the plane and the pilot should be returned without delay. As an immediate pretext for not complying, the Japanese charged the pilot with entering Japan without clearing immigration and further complained that the plane had been brought in without going through customs. They permitted us to take the plane completely apart, and when we were finished, packed it up in crates and sent it back.

Q: *This is tape 7 side 1 with Al Seligmann.*

SELIGMANN: The Soviets sent them a bill for damages, which the Japanese countered with a bill for shipping charges. That was the end of the incident. Also in the category of cold-war incidents, we had a very high level KGB operative defect.

Q: *How did that work out?*
SELMANN: This was in the middle of the night, and was handled properly. The duty officer came over and knocked on my door, not using the telephone, which was the way to do this, and told me what was going on. I went into the embassy in the wee hours, and had to face the station chief and his colleagues, all of them wanted to get this guy on a plane from a U.S. base to the States within an hour. I said that this could not be done under any circumstance without notifying the GOJ and deferring to their wishes; they would have to wake up the ambassador if they wanted to go ahead. There was a lot of fuming and storming, but in the end again, it worked out fine. With elaborate security precautions in place, he went out legally in effect, not surreptitiously. To have acted otherwise would have been a slap at Japanese sovereignty. All of these incidents illustrate the need to have a little faith in your allies and friends, respect their desires, and prevent others who are over-eager from trampling all over them.

Q: Well, also, there is a track record isn't there? I mean the Japanese produced well. I mean I had some experience earlier on in Greece. If that sort of thing had happened in Greece, My feeling would be get them the hell out. Get somebody out; don't give a damn because the Greeks weren't going to be cooperative at all, mainly trying to get out of the line of fire.

SELMANN: I would agree. What you do in one country does not necessarily apply anywhere else. I would be only speaking about Japan although you would probably say the same thing about West Germany.

Q: And then there is Greece. Mike Mansfield came in, and he was a grand old man of the Senate and all, and he stayed there, you were there for the beginning. He was there for about what, 12 years.

SELMANN: Twelve years. I went away and came back six years later and he was still there.

Q: Yes. How did he take on, this was his first time as ambassador. Early on, how did he grab hold?

SELMANN: The Japanese have sometimes had trouble with our appointments as ambassador, even though they almost always work out in the end From the start, they were very flattered to have a man of Mansfield’s stature and reputation named as ambassador to Japan. There may have been a bit of concern because of the Mansfield amendment...

Q: Would you mind explaining what the Mansfield amendment was?

SELMANN: The Mansfield amendment, directed not so much at Asia as at Europe, called for a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. That happened without real adverse consequences, but some Japanese thought he might advocate a similar drawdown in East Asia, especially in the light of Carter’s pronouncements on Korea. Apart from that possibility, which never materialized, they were extraordinarily pleased at what they saw as an indication of the importance of Japan to the U.S. that his appointment represented. He had a knack of saying, doing just the right thing. I remember his very first press conference, maybe the first week after he arrived. The embassy auditorium was packed, with mostly Japanese reporters but also all the foreign press in Tokyo. They expected a long introductory statement, but he got up and said,
"I'm the new boy on the block, shoot!" That threw the Japanese into a panic, few of them having any notion how to translate these colloquial phrases. They learned early on that he was not a man to waste words. From the start, he announced unequivocally, “The United States-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world.” Before long, this was slightly embellished with the additional phrase, “bar none.” This sentence was repeated in just about every public statement he made while in Japan and became established as a trademark to the point that his audiences waited for it. As a politician he understood how effective that could be. We in the embassy in time came to refer to ourselves as the “bar none ranch.”

Q: How did you deal as political counselor?

SELGANN: He pretty much let the embassy run itself, and dealt through the DCM. I rarely took an issue to him directly, except when I was acting DCM, and can recall no instance when any substantive or non-substantive difference arose. He ran the weekly large staff meetings, which provided a good opportunity to get endorsement or take a sounding on a matter. On the other hand, he didn't take kindly to small talk, and I always felt sorry for section heads who felt compelled to come in with an agenda whether anyone wanted to listen to it or not. So we worked principally through the DCM, who would sign off on most matters.

Q: Tom Shoesmith.

SELGANN: It was Tom Shoesmith and then Bill Sherman.

Q: How did you find the people you were dealing with on the Japanese side? You know, you have been in and out of there a number of times. In this 1976-1980 period, had there been any evolution, were they seeing things differently, or was it pretty much operating the same way it had before?

SELGANN: Our relationship had emerged from what has sometimes been called the “big brother, little brother” period that followed the Occupation for some years. The revision of the security treaty marked the beginning of the end of that stage, and Okinawa reversion could be seen as marking the end. We had moved into a partnership relationship, with mutual recognition that our two economies combined accounted for 30%-40% of world productivity. That brought with it an increasing amount of trade friction and on all fronts a natural tendency for Japan to speak for itself. Sometimes this was interpreted by commentators and businessmen as “arrogance,” but I saw no significant sign of that during this tour. Japan remained highly dependent on the U.S. military presence in the Pacific and while a major donor of foreign economic assistance, was still hesitant to assert political leadership; most of its initiatives were confined to Asia. On the political front we saw eye to eye on most issues, which made for easy-going relations with the Foreign Ministry. At the same time, the Japanese began to react less kindly to preaching on our part. I recall sitting in on a meeting with Foreign Minister Sonoda and a prominent visitor (Secretary of Defense Brown?). Without waiting for anything specific on the agenda to come up - I think this was while we were negotiating cost-sharing - Sonoda departed from script and surprised his own side by saying, in effect, “Don’t tell us what to do; tell us what you need.” Sonoda was known for being blunt, but to make sure I understood (his Japanese was not that clear and the interpreter had bungled a bit), the head of the Security Division phoned me
later to make sure we had it straight. We had, but the incident was indicative of nascent shifts in the Japanese approach which we needed to take into account.

Some changes had taken place on an operating level, in that rank was more significant in determining access to government officials, political leaders, business leaders, etc. The United States was still \textit{primus inter pares}, however, and our language officers enjoyed a considerable advantage in being able to see almost any politician short of the very top levels. I also profited from friendships and connections established earlier in my career, and was often able to deal at a higher level than I would have been able to coming in cold. This was also true on the political scene, where junior politicians I had known were rising in the ranks. The embassy, incidentally, tried to get me the title of minister - we had an economic minister - in consideration of these factors and the tendency of other large embassies to have a multiplicity of ministers, but was turned down by the Department, a position that was sensibly reversed after I left.

\textit{Q: Did you feel that the foreign ministry was getting a good reading of what was happening in Washington? One of the things that sometimes happens in the Foreign Service, you can almost get a better reading from what is going on in Washington, particularly Congress and all by listening to your host foreign affairs establishment because they are working the field which we don't work. In other words they are looking at the White House and they are hitting the Congress and all, and you know we sort of hear it kind of the way it should be rather than the way it actually is. Were you getting any of that?}

\textit{SELGIMANN: That is a good point. Going back to the time I was in S/PC, it had been customary during our policy planning talks with the Japanese to have one informal evening over drinks, during which we discussed out respective domestic political situations. These became unproductive and boring, however, particularly because the Japanese were far more circumspect than we were in talking about their own politics. In preparing for one session, I suggested that as an experiment, we make the initial presentation on Japanese politics and that they start off on U.S. politics. This turned out to be more insightful and lively, so we kept it that way. When I was back in Washington, after this Tokyo assignment, I thought the Japanese embassy was doing a pretty good job covering the field. While it has varied some, depending in part on facility in English, they have generally assigned their most able diplomats, not only as ambassador, but down the line, and have been able to establish good personal contacts with top officials and members of Congress, as well as working-level officials in all key agencies and Congressional staffers. Togo, who had been the point man for renegotiating the security treaty, was ambassador in the late 1970s, and the first to occupy a magnificent new residence that was an asset in representation. So, to answer your question, they were well clued in on the Washington scene. Above all else, Japanese who talked to him had a great asset in Mike Mansfield who was about as well informed on the Washington scene as anyone.}

\textit{Q: Did Okinawa play much of a role at this time?}

\textit{SELGIMANN: The major issue of reversion was behind us. We had to contend with occasional off-base incidents involving our military personnel, more often than not young Marines, and we were still under considerable pressure to reduce our presence. Artillery practice that called for the periodic closing of a major highway on the island, demands for the return of land in and near}
downtown Naha, and the call for reduction of our extensive maneuver areas were all thorny issues, and twenty years later we are still trying to work out base reductions without jeopardizing military requirements. Considering the disproportionate weight of our presence in relation to population and usable land, it is important that we stay ahead of the game. The Okinawans themselves have always been torn between the boost our presence gives a poor economy and the feeling that they are being called on to make sacrifices beyond those of the rest of Japan.

Q: Was there concern during this time about the Soviet Union because you had the Soviet attack in Afghanistan that would be sort of unprovoked, and then the Soviets, this is December 1979. But also I think around this time or earlier on the Soviets were making noises about using Camranh Bay as a major base.

SELGIMANN: There was also a sizable buildup of Soviet Forces in the Soviet Far East, including the northern territories. They had not had much in a military presence there before, but now they put a division, I believe, into the southern Kuriles.

Q: What was the thinking then, I mean from our own thinking and what you were getting from the Japanese about this?

SELGIMANN: There was not much feeling that the threat to Japan had increased substantially, but it reinforced the feeling that the Soviets were the enemy. Japan’s fringe extreme rightists made the most of the Soviet stance with their noisy sound trucks, and the police maintained tight security around the Soviet embassy, but overall the major effect was to reinforce our partnership, our alliance.

Q: How about China?

SELGIMANN: With Nixon’s visit to China, we had come to see things about the same way. The Japanese had felt for a long time that we should be more forthcoming in establishing relations with mainland China. When we did so, of course, we administered one of what came to be called the “Nixon shocks,” by failing to consult or inform Japan in advance. The Japanese still had visions of quick profits through massive trade and investment - dreams some entrepreneurs harbored for Siberia as well - but realism was setting in on both fronts.

Q: Korea?

SELGIMANN: Japan has always seen and probably always will see Korea as a dagger aimed at the heart of Japan. Whatever happens there can have severe effects in Japan. A Korean contingency had become perhaps the major rationale for maintaining our bases in Japan, more so than the defense of Japan proper, and a Japanese nightmare, which persists, is the thought of tens or hundreds of thousands of Korean refugees flooding into Japan if stability is not maintained on the peninsula.

Q: Were we doing any pushing on the Japanese to, say, be nicer to the Koreans or were they pretty nice? It has never been an easy relationship.
SELGANN: It has never been easy, and I don’t think they have been terribly nice. This was not one of the periods where we were in the middle, however, as we were at times in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Discrimination against Koreans, failure to grant Japanese citizenship to second- and third-generation Koreans born in Japan, textbook euphemisms about Japan’s colonial record in Korea, etc., remain questions that have to be resolved by the Japanese by themselves or bilaterally.

Q: Well, on nuclear matters, how did that play during this period? Any problems or just sort of status quo?

SELGANN: You always have had the problem of what we agreed or didn't agree about port entry of naval vessels and whether they did they or did not have nuclear weapons aboard. I can't remember the timing, but at some point the mayor of Kobe decided to take a New Zealand type approach, demanding assurances there were none on our vessels calling there, so we just stopped calling at Kobe. I am not sure where we stand with that today. Japan had its own internal problems in developing nuclear power. Everybody wanted cheap electric power or electric power from sources other than fossil fuels, hydropower being almost fully developed, but nobody wanted a reactor near them. There was a question of what to do with their one nuclear powered merchant vessel that never really worked out commercially - the GOJ was ready to give it up, but no port would take it in, so it was an orphan for awhile. I am not sure whether it was then or later on when reprocessing became a major issue, especially the security in-transit of used fuel sent for processing to Europe. These were not, however, what I would put in the category of major issues.

Q: Well, is there anything else we should discuss do you think?

SELGANN: Endless visits, presidential on down. One that I won’t forget was a transit stop by former President Nixon. He came through Narita airport en route to a triumphant return visit to China, but Ambassador Mansfield could not go to the airport because of a long-standing commitment to address the faction of former Prime Minster Miki at their annual meeting several hours from Tokyo. In the absence of the DCM, I went to Narita to greet Nixon bearing a letter from the Ambassador regretting that he was not there. All this had been discussed with the Secret Service in advance, so that there would be no surprises. When Nixon arrived, I was shoved out of the way by his ex-Marine aide, while they commandeered my car to take him but not me to the nearby (c. 50 yards away) Air France lounge, which had been reserved for his use during his layover. After about thirty minutes, I said I would like to deliver the Ambassador’s letter, and was told to proceed at my own risk. I knocked on the door, Nixon told me to come in, looked up from the pad where he was apparently working on a text, took the letter, threw it unopened into his despatch case and quizzed me on why the Ambassador was not there, how far away his meeting was, etc. Then he went back to work without a word, thereby dismissing me. Nice man. The Secret Service agent-in-charge apologized for what had transpired. When I told all this to Mansfield, he was upset and asked his old friend, Leonard Woodcock, ambassador in Beijing to keep him posted. As I recall, he reported back that Nixon had made no remarks about his reception at Narita, and Mansfield did see Nixon off when he came through Narita on his way back.
Q: Yes. I mean, a lot of things were happening. Were you getting any reaction from the Japanese about President Carter, kind of wondering who is this guy and what is he doing? Were they uncomfortable with him?

SELIGMANN: Initially they were, but that wore off when it became clear we were not going to pull out the bulk of our remaining ground forces in Korea. He paid a visit to Japan, which went smoothly enough, but I recall one episode that was disappointing. The embassy staff had assembled in the chancery forecourt on the assumption that he was going to talk to them as scheduled but he decided not to do so. Finally Roslyn came down from the residence and filled in nobly. This was more important for our Japanese local employees than for the Americans, but it was kind of funny that he would do that. I don’t think the Japanese felt very strongly about him one way or another. In the end he was hostage to the hostage issue, immobilized by it.

HARRY HAVEN KENDALL
Program Officer, USIS
Japan (1977-1978)

Harry Haven Kendall grew up on a Louisiana farm and entered USIS in 1950. His career included assignments in Venezuela, Japan, Spain, Panama, Chile, Vietnam, and Thailand. Mr. Kendall was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on December 27, 1988.

KENDALL: Then after two years at it, I took over as Japan Program Officer and Field Supervisor for the six American Centers in Japan and became a "Shinkansen cowboy," riding the bullet train up and down the Japanese archipelago, looking after the needs of our centers in Sapporo, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Fukuoka. It was a rewarding and important job.

Special experiences grew out of my role as Regional Programs Officer and Field Supervisor for Japan. I met a lot of very interesting people, particularly the scholars visiting Japan. Ezra Vogel of Harvard, who was then researching for his book Japan As Number One, was one of them. Bob Scalapino came on various occasions, as did Larry Krause, one of America’s leading economists who is now on the faculty at U.C. San Diego. There were many others.

One of the more interesting individuals, practically my first recruit, was an expert on waste disposal. Waste disposal is not usually considered a prime concern of USIA, but he was an American expert in a field of increasing concern to many cities in Asia, and our posts were hungry for good speakers. I offered him, expecting to get one or two responses, but practically every post asked for him. He did very well, hiking around the garbage dumps of Southeast Asia, telling the local authorities how to better manage their waste disposal problems.

Another individual, more interesting in terms of our programs, was a specialist in American literature named Charles Anderson, professor emeritus from Johns Hopkins University and a superb lecturer.
Q: Did you schedule them primarily in the universities?

KENDALL: The posts did the scheduling in the universities and in our own cultural centers, such as the Tokyo American Center. Anderson came with high recommendations, and he seemed to get better with each post report, so everybody wanted him, from Australia to Korea and then on into India and Europe. He was perhaps the single most popular lecturer on the USIS circuit that I’ve ever known. I feel rather proud for having found him. We are still in contact, he's still writing, lecturing vigorously, even at age eighty-five. Marvelous guy, delightful sense of humor, and a real joy to know.

Those were some of my activities in Japan. I got out into the hinterland there, too, but spent most of my time in the cities where we had our branch posts.

ROBERT GOLDBERG
Spouse of Foreign Service Officer
Tokyo (1977-1980)

Mr. Goldberg was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland and educated at Gettysburg College and the University of Chicago. He accompanied his Foreign Service wife on her assignment to Tokyo before entering the Foreign Service in 1983 as Foreign Service Officer. A Chinese language specialist, Mr. Goldberg served both in the State Department of State in Washington, D.C. and abroad dealing primarily with Economic and Chinese affairs. His overseas posts include Tokyo (as spouse), New Delhi, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Beijing, where he served twice, once as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Goldberg was interviewed by David Reuther in 2011.

Q: So let’s see, the Carter administration comes in 1977 and you are off to Tokyo.

GOLDBERG: We were off to Tokyo. It was a great three years. I studied Japanese. I worked at Simul International, which was at that time run by the guy who used to refer to himself as Japan’s foremost simultaneous interpreter, Masumi Morimatsu. They were very nice to me. I was their English language re-writer. They had a group of Aussies and New Zealanders and one or two Brits who did the translations of a lot of Japanese language material. Then I came in and polished it up re-writing it. Most of my battles were with my fellow foreign nationals who thought my rewrites did not adequately capture the sense of the Japanese.

Q: So that is what you were doing.

GOLDBERG: I was also teaching at the University of Maryland extension school in Yokouska and that reenergized my interest in teaching.

Q: Where were you living at the time?
GOLDBERG: We had a house off of the compound, in Asaksa off of Aoyama Dori near the Emperor’s palace. It was very close to the TBS tower and around the corner was the Embassy of North Korea. So this was 1977-1980. We used to watch the North Koreans meander through the streets. My older son always used to say there was a Black Guy coming down the street. What he meant was a guy in a black suit, who was North Korean. I was always tempted to walk over to the Embassy but never quite got up the nerve to do so. Probably not a career-enhancing move.

Q: What was it like living in Tokyo in those days?

GOLDBERG: It was a great experience. We had a full time housekeeper. I could study Japanese. I could go off to work. My wife really enjoyed her job. She was in the political section. At that time Tom Hubbard, future Ambassador to Korea and the Philippines, was a relatively junior Foreign Service officer. We knew the Hubbards quite well. I don’t know if you knew Tom Bleha. He was there. Bill Sherman was the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] at the time. A couple of future ambassadors like Chris LaFleur, future DCMS like Dick Christenson. Obviously Mike Mansfield [served from June 1977 to December 1988] was at the beginning of his incredibly long run. I didn’t have that much to do with the mission per se. A fellow who just recently passed away, Bob Immerman became a very good friend. We had known Bob in New York when he was there at U.S. UN. We renewed our acquaintance with him in Tokyo.

Q: Now 1979 was a big year on the Sino-American front, Washington extended diplomatic recognition to Beijing. How did that go over in Japan?

GOLDBERG: Frankly I think the Japanese were expecting it; it was eventually going to happen. Of course, just springing it on them is what was unexpected. The Japanese in the office in which I was working just commented that “It is about time.” There seemed to be a lot of navel gazing going on the part of official Japan, like what do we do now, what about Taiwan, but I don’t think it was all that much of a “shocku” to use the Japanese term. I had already gone to China for the first time in 1978 with Bob Immerman and my wife Sally. We started off in Hong Kong and went in through Shenzhen, which if you recall at that time was really just a checkpoint. When I became consul general in Guangzhou many years later I used to tell the story of my first trip to China and note that Shenzhen was just a little fishing village of less than ten thousand people – and now was a city of over seven, eight million.

From Shenzhen, we went to Guangzhou, Guilin, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing and then on up to Beijing. We knew Charlie Sylvester who was the political counselor at that time and we stayed with him and his wife Evie in Beijing. It was a wonderful trip of a little more than two weeks. I guess as with most people who traveled in those early years you were basically seduced by what you are seeing. This country had been closed for so long and you were finally there. It was clear that something was happening, change was around the corner, that sort of thing, but little had happened yet.

Q: The facilities in Beijing were pretty basic still at that time.

GOLDBERG: They were. The Sylvesters were in the Jianguo menwai diplomatic compound where Americans had some apartments. There were a lot of people who were still spending six-
to-nine months in a hotel before apartments became available. As the political counselor, Charlie
was at the front of the cue for housing. We did the tourist routine, riding away on flying pigeon
bikes. My recollection of getting from the Sylvester’s to Tiananmen Square is of the barrenness
in between – there was, in fact, nothing in between. And people didn’t talk to you. In
Guangzhou, you were drawn to the English language corners in the park and were immediately
surrounded by people. When was the first time you were in China?

Q: I finally got there in 1987.

GOLDBERG: 1987, was more open and I suspect you didn’t have the sense that people were
very wary of talking to you. When I got back and was working at Simul, there was lots of talk, as
I say, about the normalization but it was mostly it was a good move and what now.

MARK E. MOHR
Political Officer
Tokyo (1977-1980)

Mr. Mohr was born in New York and raised in New York and New Jersey. He was
educated at the University of Rochester and Harvard University, where he studied
the Chinese language. After service in Korea with the Peace Corps, he joined the
Foreign Service in 1969, and served abroad in Taipei, Taichung, Hong Kong,
Tokyo, Beijing and Brisbane. In his service at the State Department in
Washington, Mr. Mohr dealt primarily with Far East Affairs. After his retirement
he worked at the Department of Energy on Nuclear energy matters. In 1997 he
was recalled to the State Department, where he worked as Korean desk officer.
Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

Q: Well you went to Tokyo when?

MOHR: I was there from the summer of 1977 to the summer of 1980. So I spent three years in
Taiwan, two years as a vice consul and one as a language student, three years in Hong Kong as a
junior political officer, and three years in Tokyo as a somewhat less junior political officer. I
missed the 1970s in the U.S. I was overseas.

Q: OK, so we are now in 1977.

MOHR: Yes, in Tokyo.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MOHR: Former Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield. This was the first three years in what
turned out to be a 12-year tour for Ambassador Mansfield. He was first appointed by President
Carter, and then reappointed by President Reagan. So I was there in the early Mansfield years. I
was lucky, because Mansfield was greatly interested in China, and I was the only China
specialist at the Embassy.

Q: Yes, he had been a marine in China.

MOHR: Correct, guarding the Beijing-Tianjin railroad in the early 1920s. I think Mansfield was a bit disappointed initially that he didn’t get the Beijing job, but after a while you could tell that he realized how important Japan was to the United States, and he grew to really love his job in Tokyo.

Q: Yeah well it was a far more important job at that particular time.

MOHR: Oh yes, and he understood that. He coined a memorable phrase, “The most important U.S. bilateral relationship—bar none.”

Q: Well you were the China watcher.

MOHR: Correct. I was the China watcher. There were approximately 12 people in the political section. 11 were fluent in Japanese, and then there was me.

Q: OK, so what did you feel like? You were in the Chrysanthemum club, the club for Japanese specialists, but you were a China hand. Did you feel like a fish out of water?

MOHR: Well, I wasn’t in the Chrysanthemum club, composed of Japanese language officers. I was more like an observer. But I soon grew to be interested in Japan and Japanese society. So I asked my colleagues a lot of questions, and as is normal with human nature, when they realized I was interested in what they were doing, they grew to accept me as a sort of honorary member of the Chrysanthemum club. About halfway through the tour, the deputy chief of mission called me into his office and offered me the opportunity of Japanese language training. It was a great honor, but after thinking it over for several days, I declined. I thought that if I learned Japanese, when I was in China, I would feel guilty and anxious because I wasn’t doing enough to keep up my Japanese, and when I was in Japan, I would be worrying about losing my Chinese language skills. So, I declined. Some foreign service officers have been able to do both, but I knew I was not one of them.

Q: What was your job at the Embassy?

MOHR: Well, my job was in the external section, to report on Japanese foreign policy in various areas, especially of course China. My other areas of responsibility included the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations. I would go to the Gaimusho (the Japanese foreign ministry) several times a week, and usually call on the deputy director of the relevant office, because the deputy director was my equal in rank at the time. The members of the Japanese foreign ministry all spoke good English, even those for whom English was their second foreign language.

Q: What was the Japanese attitude or approach to China during this time?
MOHR: A very good question. Their basic overall attitude was a bit critical. They felt we were too carried away with China, that we were too emotional. Of course one major concern was that our preoccupation with China would translate into ignoring Japanese interests.

Q: China does this. People are falling in love with China over and over again.

MOHR: Yes, the Chinese are very good at manipulation. One example was long-time conservative columnist Joe Alsop. He was a friend of Taiwan, and a critic of China, for many decades. Then, sometime in the 1970s I believe, China invited him for a visit and he went. His column afterwards was incredible. He basically said something like, after going to China, he understood that they were communist, but underneath it all, they were still Chinese! Since they were still Chinese, they were basically good. An incredible flip-flop. The Chinese are good at this, and the Japanese are not. The Japanese spend great sums of money on public relations, invite Congressmen and their staffs to Japan, and still most Americans have a warmer feeling towards China. The Chinese have this amazing ability to beguile foreigners that very few other foreign countries have. The Japanese are particularly bad at this, and so are the Koreans.

Q: The Koreans are in your face.

MOHR: Yes.

Q: Which I find a pleasant habit in a way. It depends on...

MOHR: Your mood and on the circumstances. Whereas the Chinese know how to make you feel welcome, and important. They are very good listeners, and rarely spend time trying to impress you. But if you are observant, you notice they rarely talk about themselves, and never gossip.

Q: The Chinese come across as being almost obsequious.

MOHR: Not quite. Underneath it all, the Chinese are not obsessed with wanting to be liked. They are very comfortable in their own skins. If they want something from you, they focus on their objective. They do not waste any time on trying to impress you, but on trying to influence you. But they do this in such a pleasant way, that you don’t feel manipulated. I think most Americans want to be liked, and the Chinese can sense this and use it to their advantage.

Q: Did you find the ambassador and the staff called upon you to find out what is going on in China very much?

MOHR: Yes, Mansfield would, on occasion. But most of the time, he would simply read my reporting. As was well known, the Ambassador was a man of few words.

Q: He was known as probably the most laconic man who has ever been in the Senate.

MOHR: Yes, this reminds me of a good story. The first time I was invited to the residence for a social event, I noticed the Ambassador remained in the receiving area. All evening, Mansfield remained in the foyer. I was puzzled as to why he wasn’t mixing, so I went up to him and asked
if anything was wrong. I think this got him a bit irritated. He just replied that he was fine, and
that I should go back and mix. I shouldn’t have bothered him, and afterwards, I learned my
lesson. The Ambassador didn’t like small talk, and he didn’t like to socialize. At receptions, he
would stay in the foyer, and never mix. Another time, Ambassador Woodcock was in town from
Beijing, and I was informed that Ambassador Mansfield wanted me to accompany him in taking
Woodcock back to the airport. Now Narita airport is a good two and a half hour ride from Tokyo.
Woodcock also didn’t talk much. I sat in the back between them, and I counted how many words
they said to each other during that time: nine. The atmosphere however was pleasant. They were
good friends. But neither talked much. I like to talk, so I went a little crazy, since I couldn’t talk
unless spoken to. And they did not feel the need to speak to me.

After saying goodbye at the airport to Woodcock, I did not look forward to the ride home.
Finally, I asked the Ambassador if it would be all right to put on the radio and listen to the U.S.
armed forces network. He agreed. It was the hour for the news. All of a sudden, there was a
commentary tearing into Senators from the oil patch, claiming they were basically bought and
did not represent the interests of the country, but only the interests of the oil industry. After the
program was over, I asked the Ambassador if he would care to comment. He puffed once on his
pipe, then said: “Yup. He’s right.” I was so stunned, I was at a loss for words.

Another advantage of having Mansfield as your ambassador was that you had nothing to fear
from visiting Congressional delegations. Usually, you don’t know how critical they might be,
including to the Ambassador. But with Mansfield there, all Congressmen, and especially
Senators, were downright reverential. Usually, the Senators continued to address him as Mr.
Leader.

Q: When did you leave?

MOHR: I left Tokyo in 1980. Having been overseas since 1971, it was time to go back to the
United States. My family had doubled. I now had a daughter and a son. My daughter Jennifer
was born on Taiwan in 1972, my son Adam was born in Hong Kong in 1975.

CLIFF FORSTER
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1977-1981)

Cliff Forster was born in 1924. His career with USIS included assignments in
Japan, Burma, Israel, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by G. Lew
Schmidt on May 29, 1990.

FORSTER: In 1977, Mike Mansfield became our Ambassador to Japan, and I received my
assignment to be his Public Affairs Officer in Tokyo.

Q: Did you replace Al Carter?
FORSTER: No, I replaced Bill Miller, who came in after Carter. In mid-77, I was asked to come up to USIA Director Jim Keogh's office with Gene Kopp and Bill Payeff to meet our new Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield.

I've always been a great admirer of Senator Mansfield, and it was a real pleasure to meet him for the first time. I must say the next four years with the Ambassador, like the earlier Kennedy period with Ed Murrow, were very special years. He was a marvelous man to work for, and he was always so interested in USIS and our role there. He knew how important we could be to what he was trying to achieve, and we worked with him on his whole effort to try and de-escalate some of the economic issues and tensions that were just beginning to build up over the trade imbalance.

Most of that period, I would say, we were involved primarily with our trade relations with Japan, and since there was so much rhetoric on both sides, we had an important job to do. The Ambassador went to every prefecture, relying on USIS officers who accompanied him around on all these trips. He recognized the value of what we were doing there, and when Simul International, a prominent Japanese firm, wanted to publish a collection of his speeches in Japan, we worked with them on that project with the Ambassador's approval. That book is a real seller now, a very popular book.

Q: Was it translated into Japanese?

FORSTER: Yes, into Japanese.

Q: Was it our program that did it?

FORSTER: No, it was Simul, and we talked it over with Mr. Muramatsu and Mr. Tamura, the publisher. They had expressed interest in doing something really big on the Ambassador, and we decided that the speeches would be the main content -- all using the wireless file copy. For each speech, Simul had a commentary that went along with it by a well-known Japanese. It was extremely well done, and the Ambassador was very pleased about that, and so were we. Of course, Simul was overjoyed. They were able to get that book all around the country.

Ambassador Mansfield, in my view, played a very important role during that critical time. He used to have an expression, Lew, when he would meet with the press, and his press conferences were always on the record. At the end of each session, he would say, "Well, boys, tap 'er light." Of course, he smokes this pipe, you know. So the first one to come and ask me about this was the New York Times correspondent. "When the Ambassador says 'tap 'er light,' I assume it's his pipe," he commented.

"Yes, I guess it is," I replied. I just assumed that myself. But the Times bureau chief said he'd like to know. Shortly after that, at a Japanese press conference, the Ambassador said the same thing. "Tap 'er light." Several Japanese journalists came up.

"What is tap 'er right?" they asked.
So I went up to the Ambassador and had one of the longest conversations I experienced with him. He said, "Well, Cliff, when I was a young fellow, I used to work in the copper mines in eastern Montana. As you pound that stick of dynamite into the shaft walls, you'd holler down the line, 'Tap 'er light. Tap 'er light' and that's what we've got to do here in Japan. We've got to keep these economic issues from becoming political issues by tapping 'er light. We don't want to tap her too strong. Let's see if we can't do it without raising the decibel count."

And he really worked at that. We all did, I think, but particularly the Ambassador. Bill Sherman was his DCM, whom you know, and we coordinated our public affairs effort on this issue with him.

It was a combined effort to try to keep the dialogue going, working with congressional people coming through to try and avoid emotional diatribes. And with the Japanese, to try and make them aware of what they were up against with American public opinions and up on the Hill, if they didn't just open up on the trade side. The problem was really on both sides. You could see it coming.

When I left Japan in 1981, it was beginning to escalate fast. It was a very challenging time for both Americans and Japanese in avoiding emotional clashes. I'll just end on this. There are many things to talk about during that period and just about the time we left, we had that big budget crunch. I guess you and I, over the years, went through these cutbacks and RIFs, as we called them, which involved the closure of several USIS centers. But that 1980-81 budget cut was a very difficult business for all of us, and we had to cut back, although I did my best to hold on to the remaining centers. You know how strongly I feel about the center program, which are on the front line of our program.

Q: How many centers did you have at that time?

FORSTER: At that time, we had six. From twenty-three in our earlier period, we were down in 1981 to only six -- Sapporo, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kyoto and Fukuoka. I just couldn't see another center going, and these were the core centers, in my view. So we had the usual wrestling match with Washington, which kept asserting that we had to cut some centers to meet the requirements.

WILLIAM C. SHERMAN
Deputy Chief of Mission
Tokyo (1977-1981)

Ambassador William C. Sherman was born in 1923 and raised in Kentucky. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Sherman served in Korea, Italy, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on October 27, 1993.

Q: In June, 1977 you transferred to Tokyo as the Deputy Chief of Mission. How did that come
SHERMAN: Mike Mansfield had been selected to become our new Ambassador to Japan. I don't know exactly how the selection was made. I had known Mansfield, although not well. During my first Foreign Service Officer assignment, I worked with Congressman Mansfield when he was part of the US Delegation to the UN General Assembly. Later, while I was assigned to Rome, he came for the coronation of Paul VI and as I explained earlier, I was the control officer for that delegation. I escorted him and Maureen Mansfield around at the time for three or four days, along with Earl Warren, Rabbi Lewis Finkelstein, Charles Englehardt and others.

Of course in 1976, there was an election in the US won by Jimmy Carter. Within ten days of his inauguration, Carter sent Mondale to Tokyo for discussions with the Japanese.

In the meantime, Dick Holbrooke had been named as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. So Japan was high on the foreign policy agenda of the new administration and that kept us hopping during the first half of 1977. In the Spring of that year, the new Ambassador had been selected and the DCM selection process begun. I was due for an overseas assignment in any case and Holbrooke was in the process of restructuring the whole Bureau to meet his own needs and desires. I was of course hoping that I would be selected by Mansfield to be his DCM and I was very glad that he did so. Before he made his selection, I escorted him around in all of his meetings around Washington. I arranged all the meetings and went with him. So I got to know Mansfield relatively well during his indoctrination period.

Mansfield had traveled widely and therefore was familiar with the role of a U.S. Ambassador. Hodgson had left Tokyo in February, 1977 so that the post had been run by a Chargé Tom Shoesmith for several months. When Mansfield's appointment became public, Hodgson flew to Washington to brief the Mansfields on his experiences. As far as Mansfield was concerned, he did what he had always done: consider the question carefully, reach a decision on what was right and then do it. He never had a problem engaging the Japanese; he was just a very skilled leader who knew how to approach issues and get them resolved if he could. Mansfield did not see himself as a manager of a US establishment; he viewed himself as a symbol of the American presence in Japan. He was the President's personal representative and felt responsible for the image of America in Japan. He was at first very reluctant to be a highly visible Ambassador; he wanted to limit his public appearances to no more than two or three per annum. His initial inclination was to view his assignment as a semi-retirement. That of course, changed rapidly once he became ensconced in Tokyo. He communicated frequently with the media, both American and Japanese. He did like to meet with individuals, often early in the morning. He was always polite and attended even routine ceremonial functions because he was the Ambassador, even when he personally would have preferred to do something else. He became famous for his ability to walk in the front door of a National Day reception, shake a few hands, often have his picture taken and be gone in a few minutes. He moved into an active role very slowly and somewhat reluctantly. He acted very much like David Bruce did in London. Bruce met with the Queen and the Prime Minister and perhaps a few key Cabinet officers, but never with lower officials. Of course, the way Mansfield decided to be an ambassador was very much a function of his own personality. I don't think the role he defined was done consciously, but he molded the Ambassadorial role to fit his own style and behavior.
Mansfield very rapidly established close ties to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The Japanese held him in awe; he was by far the most important American politician who had ever been appointed as Ambassador. They were overjoyed by the appointment because it signified to them that the new US administration held Japan in highest regards. While in Tokyo, Mansfield tried very hard to maintain his contacts with the US Congress. He always said that he had no ambition to return to Congress after his stint as Ambassador except perhaps to escort a foreign Prime Minister. He used to say that he had enjoyed his years in Congress, but that he would not return to serve. He did so when he came back to Washington go to Congress just to discuss the "good old days", but, as I said, he would escort the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister whenever they visited Washington. He was always right there whenever these key Japanese would meet the Foreign Relations Committee or Senators or Congressmen. That was always very helpful to the Japanese because Mansfield would be the "gate opener" and would lend his prestige to their discussions with members of Congress.

He would always host any Congressional members who might be in Tokyo. He would personally brief them and would exchange views with them. He was always well informed on trade statistics, for example. He could tell each Congressman exactly what the trade between his or her State, in some cases even district, with Japan was at the time. He never forgot a statistic. He always knew what was important to these members of Congress; he had never forgotten the lessons he had learned as Majority Leader. He was very skilled in handling Members of Congress. He never used these occasions to ask for any Congressional action or favor. He would present the case as he saw it and would then leave to his audience to take whatever action it considered appropriate. I think that on a couple of occasions, Dick Holbrooke asked Mansfield to take on a couple of political assignments -- lobbying. The issues had nothing to do with US-Japan relations. Mansfield refused; he didn't even do any political work for the Administration in his home state of Montana. After having left Congress, he never used his ties or connections to do any political work of any kind.

He never demanded that he be kept abreast of anything, except perhaps occasionally on economic statistics. He may have asked the IRS representative to help him with his income taxes, but he never demanded anything. He expected the staff to let him know what it considered important. I made certain that he saw every important substantive cable from the Embassy. He was always the first in the office. The Marine Guard would give him the key to his office suite. He would start the day by reading the newspapers. Because of his careful readings, he was extraordinarily well informed on both American and Japanese current events. I would get to the office around 7:30 a.m. and start my day by having a cup of coffee with the Ambassador. Some days that session would last a few minutes; some days it lasted two hours. Sometimes, he would reminisce about his political life; sometimes he would want to discuss a Japanese political issue or about mutual security affairs or about events of the day or the week or about internal Embassy matters. I was never quite sure what the subject of the day's conversation might be, although I always had an agenda that I wanted to cover with him. Sometimes he would suggest some form of communication to be sent to the Department -- and he would usually say: "Make it strong, Bill". Sometimes he would ask for a personal message to the President or the Secretary to be drafted for his signature. That insured that his views were always well known in Washington on the major issues. As far as I remember, he never called the President; he didn't feel he had to and
in any case, he hated telephones. He would see the President whenever he was in Washington, almost every time. Same with Secretary of State; he rarely called Vance from Tokyo. Holbrooke would call him from Washington and Mansfield would talk to him, although very reluctantly. Sometimes, he would refuse to take the call; I would then get on the phone and tell Holbrooke that the Ambassador didn't want to talk to him. Holbrooke could barely believe his ears. I remember one day, while I was back in Washington for consultation, Holbrooke called Mansfield because some private group -- it may have been the Council for Foreign Relations or something like that -- were visiting Tokyo and had not been invited for any kind of social occasion by anyone in the Embassy. The members of this private group had expressed some dismay to Holbrooke. Dick thought that Mansfield should make some kind of effort. He was about to call the Ambassador when I intervened and suggested that he would be wasting his time. Fortunately, Holbrooke thought better of it and didn't call. He would not have received a very cordial reply from Tokyo! In addition to his personal reluctance to host large receptions, you must remember that both Ambassador and Mrs. Mansfield were children of the depression. They barely scraped through their youths. Spending money came hard to them, particularly for what appeared to be frivolous matters. We had a very hard time convincing Maureen to spend money for representational purposes, even if were not her own. She was a little more relaxed about spending the government's money, but there was always a struggle about the size of a guest list for any function at the residence. I tried to stay as far away from issues of that kind as I possibly could. Some of Mansfield's predecessors -- particularly Jim Hodgson, who was a business man -- had made the Residence available for what were social functions sponsored either by Department of Commerce or Agriculture trade teams or even American private business groups. These groups would either pay the costs directly or reimburse the Embassy. Soon after the Mansfields' arrival, someone called Mrs. Mansfield and told her that there would be a social occasion at the Residence that evening and wanted to make sure that there would be sufficient sustenance for the guests. Maureen was outraged by the call; after that, I issued instructions that the Residence would not be available for that kind of activity. I added that only the Ambassador could determine what events would take place there, that he would be the sole host and that all costs would be paid by the State Department's representational funds. If a commercially oriented reception took place, it was because the Embassy deemed it to be important, not because a company or trade group wanted to use the Embassy property...

I did a lot of drafting; sometimes I would assign the task to others. The messages would be shown to the concerned principals in the Embassy so that we would all be saying the same thing to the public. Mansfield almost never wrote anything himself; he would approve our drafts or ask for certain changes to be made. He of course saw all "first person" messages; sometimes I would show him other messages that were being proposed by Embassy officers when I thought they were important enough to have the Ambassador's approval. I was determined that he would never be caught unaware on any major substantive issue. I was equally determined that I would not play any games with him, as some other DCMs may have done with their Ambassadors. I was not going to pursue any personal agenda and present Mansfield with a fait accompli. The Embassy was his Mission and not mine. I was there to help him and to marshall the resources of the Embassy to support him. I think we made a good team. I think he was satisfied with my performance and I was certainly delighted to work for him.

My main task as DCM was to run the Embassy -- in my fashion -- and be its principal point of
contact with the Department in Washington. I was also responsible for the operations of our other establishments in Japan whose Principal Officers reported to me. We didn't have a Supervisory Consul General as was the case in other countries. We had a Consul General in Tokyo, but he was only responsible for the consular operations at the Embassy. Each Principal Officer submitted a monthly report to me on their activities. I used to contact them by phone when some one special would visit their district or when we needed something done. I did a modest amount of traveling throughout Japan. I took a couple of trips to Southeast Asia to compare notes with my counterparts there. Whenever there were major changes in the Cabinet -- a new Prime Minister or a new Foreign Minister -- you could always expect the newcomer to visit Washington sooner, rather than later. The Ambassador always accompanied the Prime Ministers and I usually accompanied a new Foreign Minister. I would represent the Embassy during the course of his meetings with various Washington officials.

We had our usual battles with Washington on the staffing of the Embassy. We had more than 300 Americans representing all agencies. Of that number, only 100 or so were from the State Department. There were 33 or 34 different agencies represented in Tokyo, including such as the Bonneville Power Administration which was buying generators in Japan. The Ambassador always felt that there were too many official Americans in Tokyo; our presence was just too large. During one of the many efforts to reduce overseas employment (called MODE this time), which begun just as I arrived in Tokyo, the Embassy was certain it could do something about reducing the American presence. That view was held despite the failure of many similar previous efforts. This time, the Ambassador was determined to do something.

He was particularly upset by the Office of Naval Research which had a small staff in Tokyo. No one was quite sure what they were doing; it something to do with cooperative efforts with Japanese scientists. One member of the staff had taken an official trip to China without any Embassy clearance or even notification. In the late ‘70s our relationships with China were still sufficiently delicate that we did not allow many US government officials to travel there for fear that it might be misunderstood by the Chinese or that they might take some P.R. advantage from such a trip. So Mansfield targeted the ONR office and was convinced that it should be disbanded. That was the office that he would eliminate. That got us into a battle royal with Washington. It took us two years of constant cable traffic, arguing back and forth about these three or four people. We enlisted the assistance of the Department, which, in matters of this kind, was and is just useless. We had high ranking Navy officials coming to Tokyo to review the situation. We took the issue up whenever we were in Washington. In part, the bitterness of this issue was the consequence of a major bureaucratic battle we had had with Foreign Office made several years earlier during the Okinawa reversion period and the security treaty days when the ONR office was opened. The Japanese viewed the office as an intelligence collection operation and were very reluctant to allow it to open. ONR was an open liaison operation and in the final analysis, the Japanese government gave us permission to open it. But the scars were still showing in the late ‘70s. After two years, ONR closed shop in the Embassy. It just moved to a military command doing the same thing under a different sponsor. It was ridiculous! The Embassy wasted a lot of time and effort and accomplished nothing.

I might at this time mention my fight with the Inspection Corps. Within a month of my arrival, a team of Inspectors came to take a look at our operations. The chief inspector was Terry Arnold,
an old Philippine hand. Sheldon Krys was his deputy for this inspection. The confrontation between the Inspectors and the Embassy started almost immediately. The team had gone to some constituent posts first. In Sapporo, the Consulate had hired a local, but before he could report for duty, the Inspection team recommended that his position be abolished. It was much too late; all the paperwork had been done and the person was ready to report for duty. The team had behaved in a very high-handed fashion and had left a lot of bruised feelings in Sapporo. On their first day in Tokyo, Lea Anderson, our Administrative Counselor, took the team on a tour of the Embassy. After that, the team came to me and said that the Embassy was too big. I suggested that they might wish to hold that comment until they were finished with the inspection instead of starting with a conclusion. Their comment was not addressed to me because I had just arrived and had nothing to do with the size of the Embassy. Nevertheless, the team kept coming back to this issue every time we met; we were not entirely unsympathetic with the general view because the Ambassador himself had reached the same conclusion. But we were irritated by the team's knee-jerk reaction. Mansfield met with the team a couple of times in very formal settings, like their first courtesy call and their final call during which he listened to their oral report without comment. He didn't entertain them or have a discussion with them.

In any case, every time the team and I met, we had a disagreement about one thing or another. For example, the team took exception to the long standing practice of the Commissary selling to other foreign diplomats. It was a practice that had been approved by the Japanese Foreign Office many, many years earlier. It was a useful practice not only to develop good will in the diplomatic corps, but also to generate funds for the Commissary and other non-governmental expenses. Part of our profits from the commissary went into a world-wide pool used to assist commissaries at smaller posts that needed financial support. Arnold and his group took exception to the practice. That gave rise to a major dispute and debate. I still remember discussing the subject with Arnold at the Marine Ball toward the end of the inspection trying to shout over the blare of the band. I found the whole inspection a total waste of time and money. The major recommendation was about the size of the Embassy and the desirability of it being reduced by 10%. The team wanted us to volunteer a reduction of our personnel ceiling by that percentage. Of course, the team did not suggest where the reduction should take place; that was to be left to us. Then their report recommended that we cease commissary services to other foreign diplomats in Tokyo. I really took umbrage at the whole inspection effort in our written response to the report. Our response was so harsh that the Inspector General was upset and felt offended. I thought it was a lousy inspection which wasted everybody's time and lots of money. The Inspector General's office referred the issue of sales to the Legal Advisor who ruled that it was illegal for US commissaries to sell to non-US diplomats. So, much to our embarrassment, we ceased that practice. But we refused to accept the general recommendation on personnel reductions on the grounds that no specific suggestions were put forward by the inspectors; we couldn't do anything with a recommendation that just said that the Embassy was too big. Months of back and forth with Washington left a lot of ill feeling on both sides. Mansfield supported my positions, but didn't get involved in the bickering. I am generally pro-inspection, if the team takes the attitude that it is at a post to try to help to improve efficiency. But when the team sees itself as an adversary, then an inspection is worthless and maybe even worst. The end of this story was that the whole inspection report was buried and considered null and void.

Q: What about the quality of your staff?
SHERMAN: Tokyo had and has always had a first class staff. Being such an important post, all agencies try to send their best people. The senior staff were all very good. The language capability was adequate, certainly as far as the Foreign Service Officers were concerned. The Economic Section could have used more Japanese language officers, but to find people conversant both in economics and in Japanese is very difficult. The Department has always had difficulties recruiting first class economists and then couldn't really spare the ones it did hire for language training, particularly hard languages. I got along very well with the Station Chiefs, first Bill Wells, then Horace Feldman and Bill Grimsley. That has always not been true for some of my successors. A lot of Foreign Service Officers are just psychologically opposed to CIA and therefore have difficulties relating to intelligence personnel. I had the full cooperation of the Station which was helpful many times.

The Embassy, traditionally, had been close to the American military contingents. The Military Attachés, as is often true in countries where the Defense Department has troops or ships, did not play a significant role. We had an American Military Defense Assistance Organization which was basically an sales force for American weapon systems. It did not conduct any training functions. The MDAO was part of the Embassy and the Chief reported to the Ambassador, but his reporting channels were through CINCPAC in Hawaii. He had very limited contacts with the other American military commands in Japan. Years earlier, when we had a MAAG in Japan, there was some confusion about command relationships because that group saw itself as a staff section of the US military command, while the Embassy thought it to be an integral part of its operations.

The Embassy had a Politico-Military section with close ties to the Japanese Defense Forces. By the time I arrived in Tokyo, that section had been abolished and the work was being done in the Political Section by a politico-military officer. The Political Counselor and his staff worked with the American military stationed in Fuchu and provided the Embassy a day-to-day liaison. Of course, the military could have contacted me at any time and the CINC could have called the Ambassador at any time. But that rarely happened because the Ambassador only became involved in large public issues and seldom, if ever, became involved in operational matters. One that Mansfield was very active in was when an American submarine rammed into a Japanese merchant ship and then submerged and didn't stick around to see whether any assistance was required. Most of the issues that required Embassy-Command contacts dealt with host nation support and sometimes status of forces. The issue of Japanese financial support for American forces was in part dealt by the Politico-Military section of the American desk office of the Foreign Ministry and in part by the Self-Defense Agency. For the American side, much of the work was done by the Embassy's Political Counselor supported by US military representatives. The US military related primarily to the Japanese on a service-to-service basis and with the Self-Defense Agency. If they had a reason to contact the Foreign Ministry, they would go with the Political Counselor or a member of the Political Section. Sometimes, the Counselor or a member of his staff went to the Self-Defense Agency accompanying a US military officer. The routine was well established and there were no bureaucratic frictions between the US military and the Embassy. The Air Force Chief of Staff at Fuchu was the primary American military representative who dealt with the Japanese. He used to be in the Embassy almost on a daily basis and was certainly in touch telephonically with us every day -- either with me or the Political
Counselor. Whether I would be involved depended on the nature of the issue and its importance and whatever level of the Embassy had to carry on the discussion with the Japanese. For example, if a meeting of a Security Subcommittee was required, then I would get involved. If an agreement had to be signed, that would involve me. If senior Defense Department officials were visiting Tokyo, that would also require my involvement. Those visits were not unusual; the Secretary of Defense would come out at least once a year.

Q: Let me ask you about trade issues in the '77-'81 period. Where the tensions already running high?

SHERMAN: Trade issues were beginning to become sticky. Bob Strauss, then the Special Trade Representative, had been given the mandate to do something about the automobile trade imbalance as well as color TVs and some agricultural issues. He was in Tokyo frequently, often with a very high P.R. profile. He and Mr. Ushiba, former Japanese Ambassador to Washington and one of Japan's foremost "American handlers" were the authors of one of the early trade agreements. That was done in a two-three days "three ring circus" atmosphere. I participated in the day and night long marathon meetings which took place mostly in the Ambassador's Residence. Periodically, Strauss would pause and say that he would have to call the President; he used to say that he had promised the President by a certain time and that would always leave only a few minutes to wrap up one issue or another. That would focus the Japanese mind once again and the bargaining would resume. Those were wild meetings! There were simultaneous meetings of a number of groups focusing on one matter or another. Dick Rivers, the USTR's General Counsel and Allan Wolfe, one of the Deputy Trade Representatives would be in different rooms meeting with their Japanese counterparts. During these separate negotiations, Strauss would hide out somewhere, meeting in secret with somebody theoretically unbeknown to anyone else. At one stage, Strauss came to the Embassy where he was confronted with a draft agreement that Rivers and Bill Piez of the Embassy had negotiated out with the Japanese. Strauss didn't want to look at it; he kept saying that he was too tired to look at anything. Dick Holbrooke kept after him -- during critical meetings, Holbrooke and Erland Heginbotham, his economic expert and other EA staff members, would be present in Tokyo. Finally Strauss looked at it and exploded. He wanted to know whether Rivers had really worked on it. When he was assured that he had, he said that he would fire him immediately, if not sooner. He had a number of less-printable expressions that he used periodically and he would let them loose in a red hot string at moments like this. Perennially, we had large meetings of this kind, with what seemed as if half of Washington were in Tokyo.

Then there was a Congressional trio who took a keen interest in US-Japan trade matters. Jim Jones, the Congressman from Oklahoma, a Lyndon Johnson White House staffer and now our Ambassador to Mexico, Sam Gibbons, a Congressman from Florida and Bill Frenzel, from Minnesota would visit Tokyo from time to time to pressure the Japanese on one trade issue or another. Mansfield always saw them and worked with them. Jack Button, then the Embassy's Economic Minister, worked with this Congressional delegation, which played a very helpful role in focusing Japanese attention on the seriousness of trade issues.

Then there was a period during which Frank Weil, the Commerce Department's Assistant Secretary responsible for trade issues, used to visit Tokyo frequently. He was interested in
increasing Japanese imports of American consumer products. The Japanese offered the use of their trade ship; that is the ship which they used to promote their own goods by sailing it around the world as sort of a mobile trade fair. The Japanese offered the use of the ship to us so that we could take our wares to various Japanese sea ports. In the final analysis, that ship ended up being a combination of military surplus wares and a novelty shop. No serious American exporters were going to use a gimmick like that. The ship did carry some American clothing, some furniture, some novelty items, but it was not really a serious trade promotion effort. But the preparations for the ship’s sailing took up a lot of the Embassy’s time and effort.

We made other efforts. The US-Japanese trade advisory council was very active during the late ‘70s. There were lots of committees formed, some by the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and some formed by other groups. There was a constant series of meetings and other public and semi-public events. The trade issues did not lack attention, but the tensions kept rising. The American Chamber had Mansfield’s full attention; he was very active in that forum. The Chamber met monthly with the Ambassador. We would brief the officers of the Chamber, with Mansfield presiding over the meeting. He would listen to the Chamber's views. He of course knew all the leadership of the Chamber as well as many of its members because he devoted a lot of attention to that group. He thought that an American Ambassador had an obligation to listen to and represent whenever appropriate the views of American business in a foreign country. He also thought that his relationship to the Chamber was useful in the management of the trade issues. The Chamber did conduct a number of studies that were useful to understanding the issues more clearly. You have to understand that at this time there were probably 25,000 Americans in Tokyo, most of whom were involved in trade issues of one kind or another. The Chamber was very active under good leadership, which was assisted by a good professional staff. So the Chamber had adequate financial and human resources to really represent the American business community. The leadership would return to Washington for annual meetings; during this period, it would visit important people in the Legislative and Executive branches. They developed this routine in concert with us. So the Chamber was an influential group on trade matters.

Q: Let’s finish our discussion of your tour as DCM in Tokyo with an account of the President Carter’s visit in 1979. What do you recollect from that?

SHERMAN: President Carter did come to Tokyo in 1979 and again in 1980 for the funeral of former Prime Minister Ohira. The 1979 visit served two purposes: a) Carter attended a G-7 summit -- the Energy Summit -- and b) a State visit. There was the usual Presidential hoopla: large teams from Washington some of them arriving three months before the event. More would come as the visit time neared and the planning became more concrete. There were at least three hundred staffers and press visitors during the President's visit. Secret Service had a 24 hour watch, with twenty men on each shift. The Presidential communication requirements are massive. There were two plane loads of press. There were all the experts needed for the summit.

Having been through a number of such Presidential visits, I think I had the Embassy pretty well prepared and organized. David Lambertson, now our Ambassador to Thailand and then the deputy Political Counselor, was in charge of the day-to-day Embassy support activities. He was assisted by a young officer who is now the DCM in Seoul, Chuck Kartman. The Embassy
worked well with the Secret Service, the White House Communications staff as well as the White House trip planners. The White House political staff was primarily interested in show-casing the President. Since Carter had a reputation for having started "town meetings", I suggested that we have one in Japan in the little town of Shimoda. That was the port town that was visited by Commander Perry and his black ships and where the first Consul General Townsend Harris had established his residence and office. The Japanese were not at all happy with that suggestion because they felt that the country "bumpkins" of Shimoda would ask all the wrong questions and embarrass the whole country. The Japanese preferred that Carter chat with a group of intellectuals -- University professors, writers, etc. -- in Tokyo. In the end, atmospherics prevailed and the town meeting was held in Shimoda. It was a warm and human session and the President and the citizens of Shimoda communicated easily and smoothly. They asked human questions, not very sophisticated, but much more meaningful to ordinary people both in Japan and in the United States.

When an Embassy is first told that a Presidential visit is being contemplated, its first reaction is panic. The first question is whether the Embassy has enough resources to plan and support a Presidential visit. The second question concerns the routine work-load: can the Embassy both support a Presidential visit and do its regular work? In fact, an Embassy stops doing its normal work and concentrates entirely on the visit. After that, a list of issues is developed; most of them concern logistics which are the responsibility of the administrative section. Slowly, an outline of a schedule is developed; the routes that the President is to travel are mapped out; stops and photo opportunities are planned. Plans are developed for a communications system which will get material to the President wherever he may be. That raises the major issue of where the President stays. Carter stayed at the Ambassador's Residence; that required the Mansfields to move all their personal belonging out of their bedroom suite into another bedroom in the house, which, for ten days, was almost the only room they were permitted to use. When Kennedy came to Rome, Ambassador Reinhardt was ill and in fact was in the military hospital in Wiesbaden, Germany. Mrs. Reinhardt was in the Residence by herself, but the White House staff told her she would have to vacate the premises and suggested she fly back to Virginia for a week while the Kennedys occupied the Residence. When Johnson went to Bonn, it was the Hillenbrands -- he was then the DCM -- who had to vacate their home. The Sherms were lucky; the White House advance team looked at our house to see whether it wouldn't be easier to move us out, but fortunately our residence was a little far away from the center of activities and more difficult to secure. Of course, the Secret Service had to secure the house which meant thorough sweeps and surveillance. Then come questions about the feeding and taking care of the media; that is usually a USIS function. Then of course an Embassy becomes somewhat of a translator between the White House and the Foreign Office trying to explain the position of one to the other. The White House believes that the President's schedule is their business; the host government feels that it is in charge. Accommodations always have to be reached, but they can sometimes take days and days. Tempers flare, feelings get hurt. There are always major turf battles over who can attend what meetings or social functions. I had a huge fight with Dick Holbrooke the night of the Imperial banquet. The Palace rules are that the Ambassador and the Ministers of an Embassy are invited to Imperial functions. Invitations were restricted to those few from the Embassy plus certain people from the delegation of the visiting dignitary. Of course, the number of people who would like to attend an Imperial function are always many more than the Palace will invite. In our Embassy, there were two Ministers: myself and Jack Button, our Minister for Economic
Affairs. We received our invitations. Holbrooke was incensed; he wanted to know why Jack Button had been invited. He had a member of the EA Bureau with him -- Alan Romberg -- who he thought should have received priority over Button. He stormed in his usual fashion and I tried to explain the Japanese protocol to him. I told him that the Japanese had their protocol and we were not in a position to tell them how they wanted to run their business. He finally accepted that fact, but he surely was upset.

Once the visit is contemplated, then it is the sole issue of the day, day after day, week after week and sometimes month after month. Japanese were and are almost paranoid about security, partly as the result of the embarrassment they felt when the Eisenhower visit had to be canceled because of demonstrations over the Security Treaty. They have always tried to recoup from that failure. So when an American President visits Japan, security is almost overwhelming and certainly suffocating. For blocks around where a President stays, the police form a cordon keeping all possible attackers far, far away. They had police snipers on the roofs around the Chancery; I could see them every day from my office as far as my eye could see. In the four or five weeks preceding the President's arrival, the police and the military conducted massive operations. Carter wanted to have a feel for Japan and the Japanese people. He wanted to jog around the Imperial Palace, which is the preferred route for all Tokyo joggers. Then we suggested using the Akasaka Palace -- the formal reception building where State dinners and other formal functions were held. No way! The Japanese authorities just wouldn't even consider it. Finally, Carter settled for jogging around the Ambassador's Residence where he was staying. Even that, barely passed Japanese muster because someone could have taken a shot at the President from one of the near-by roof tops. We did challenge the tight security that the Japanese imposed; we constantly argued with the Japanese authorities about that. But the Japanese insisted that security was their responsibility and that they would be held accountable of anything had happened. That was of course true. The Secret Service never complained about the tight security; they were happy with it. But the White House political team and the Embassy did because the security was limiting us in how we could present the President.

On a couple of occasions, the President did manage to escape the security net. He had visited Tokyo before as a member of the Trilateral Commission and therefore had a favorite yakitori restaurant. One evening, the Carter family slipped out and went to the restaurant, escorted by their own Secret Service, but not by the overwhelming Japanese security forces. They stayed there for an hour or so; you can still see a picture of the Carters eating there.

The only serious glitch that occurred during the State Dinner that the Japanese hosted. They didn't say anything while Carter was in town, but expressed their great displeasure to us after everybody had left town. To this day, I am not sure how the unfortunate incident took place nor at whose direction. The dinner was at the Imperial Palace. Somehow or other, Cornelius Iida, the US official translator, appeared on the scene and took a chair right behind Carter. That is never done!. Emperor Hirohito had one translator, Ambassador Masaki, who always handled all translation chores for the Emperor. He was the only one permitted to translate for the Emperor and that was the way protocol had always been conducted. All of a sudden the Americans produced their own translator; I don't know how he got into the Palace or the dining hall. In any case, the Japanese considered this a serious breach of protocol. I was as surprised as anyone else, although there must have been people in the American delegation or staff who arranged Iida's
presence. In any case, after the President left the country, I was summoned by the Chief of Protocol and told in no uncertain terms that Iida's presence had been a major breach of protocol and that it would never happen again. It had never happened before and the Japanese would never permit another such serious breach of protocol. I forwarded the Japanese protest to our Chief of Protocol, Kit Dobelle. I assume that she had some knowledge of the affair, but I never heard another word about it.

In general, I would say that the visit went smoothly. As I said, we had a large staff in the Embassy; most of them had been involved in the visit one way or another. Many had worked long hours for weeks before the visit. One would assume that sometime during the ten days that Carter was in Japan, he could have found time to talk to the staff. But we were informed that he would not have time, but that Mrs Carter would address the staff. So on the day set for this appearance, I went to pick up Mrs. Carter. She said that she didn't understand why the President had not found the time to meet the staff; she said that she wished he could because she understood that everybody had worked so hard to make their visit a success. She was very polite; she met the staff and apologized for the President's inability to attend. That was alright. I was told by someone in the entourage that Carter just didn't make appearances of that kind. But at the end of the visit, as he was about to leave the Residence for his flight to Seoul, he mentioned to Mansfield that the Tokyo visit was about the best organized one that he had ever been involved in. He wanted to express his personal pleasure to the staff. Mansfield immediately called me to assemble the troops so that Carter could meet as many as he could. I went to work immediately, of course, but we couldn't even find the lights in the main auditorium. I didn't know where they were nor did anyone else right at hand; they were hidden in some control room. Our Administrative Counselor got into an elevator and stopped at each floor, yelling out of the door for all who could hear to come to the auditorium to meet the President. It was quite a flurry. Carter had to wait for a few minutes until we could get the lights turned on. When we finally assembled as many as we could, Carter spoke for about ten minutes very graciously thanking everybody for their fine performance. People were grateful that he had done that.

In all Presidential visits that I had ever been involved in, the White House staff brings with them sackfuls of tie clips, cufflinks, pens and other mementoes with the Presidential seal on them. Sometimes, it would be an autographed picture of the President. These were given to those who had worked especially hard on a visit. For that Tokyo visit, there was nothing. Absolutely nothing. It meant that people like Lambertson, who really spent untold hours on the visit, had no souvenir at all. When it came time to exchange gifts with the Emperor, we presented a bunch of Norman Rockwell plates left over from the bicentennial celebration. Who ever ran the Presidential gifts operations -- I think it was one of Carter's cousins -- did it on the cheap, making the White House appear like a country store. It did not make the U.S. look very good! When Lea Anderson and I raised a question about the gift to the Emperor with some of the White House staff, we were told to mind our own business in no uncertain terms and never to mention the subject again. The White House did not handle the gifts and souvenirs very well.

The visit in 1980 was essentially unnecessary. Washington felt that there had been a close personal relationship between Carter and Ohira. In fact, it was more a public relations friendship than a real one. In any case, Washington felt that it would be appropriate if Carter attended the funeral. Unfortunately, the Japanese have a different attitude toward funerals. They don't usually
have State funerals for a deceased Prime Minister. Those funerals are much more modest and no head of state is invited. Prime Ministers come and go with some frequency; the Japanese plan relatively modest funerals for their political leaders. For Emperors, it is a different story.

So for Ohira's funeral, the Japanese were not soliciting high level foreign attendance. I told Washington what the Japanese were planning and why. It didn't pay any attention to our advice; Washington had made up its mind to do it its way. The moment the Japanese were told that Carter was considering coming, their plans changed; they invited a lot of other senior foreign dignitaries. In the end, however, it was Carter and a few minor European royalty that showed up. Other countries sent their resident Ambassadors or Cabinet officers. Carter's attendance forced the Japanese to have a much larger funeral than they had expected; it did show a close relationship between the Carter administration and the Japanese, but overall, it made the U.S. look a little over eager. We didn't have much time to plan since the funeral took place about ten days after Ohira's death. As a matter of fact, I was in Hawaii when he died. I was attending a SSC meeting. I had leave that abruptly and return to Tokyo to supervise the arrangements for Carter's funeral visit. Given the brief period between the death and the funeral, the Embassy wasn't out-of-business for nearly as long as the previous year. Furthermore, funerals have an entirely different meaning than State visits; they are therefore much less complicated to arrange and to support a Presidential visit.

DAVID L. HOBBS
Consular Section Chief

David L. Hobbs was born in Iowa in 1940. After serving in the US Army from 1960-1963 he received his bachelor's degree from University of California at Berkeley. His career included positions in Germany, Brazil, England, Japan, Colombia, and an ambassadorship to Guyana. Ambassador Hobbs was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in March 1997.

Q: What was your job in Japan?

HOBBS: I was the chief of the consular section in Osaka-Kobe. It was a very small section but had the third highest volume of visas in the world, after Tokyo and London.

There is so much travel by the Japanese to the United States and we still had this requirement that they all have visas. We were just grinding out these visas by the hundreds of thousands.

Q: I assume they arrived with shopping baskets full of passports.

HOBBS: Right. We hardly saw any of the individual Japanese. The travel agents brought the passports over in bags and boxes.

I had one little interesting skirmish with the Japanese staff there. They were actually very good
and worked very hard, but had their own little points of view. One of them was that Koreans were not worthy of having long term visas. They would decide pretty much whether or not the visa should be issued and for how long. We would only spot check and ask them to bring all the problem cases to us. During spot checks I began to notice that Koreans were getting three month one and three visas even though they were people born in Japan and lived there all their lives and had jobs in Japan. I called them together and thought it was not a good idea to do that. We kept giving these people visas over and over again. The staff resisted but I insisted and in the end they crumbled and did what I told them, although I’m sure on the day I left they went back doing what they always used to do.

But, I always remember this one woman to whom I said, “Look, somebody who was born here, lives here, wears the same clothes, speaks the same language, you can’t really tell the difference, so why are you making a big fuss about this?” She said, “We can too.” “How can you tell the difference?” She said, “Because Koreans are always standing in front of pachinko parlors wearing white shoes and swinging a little chain.” I said that I would not accept that and therefore do it our way.

Some months later I was walking towards a place where there was a little art show and I went in front of a pachinko [pinball] parlor. I suddenly noticed a man standing in front of the pachinko parlor with white shoes and swinging a little chain. I said to my wife, “Look, there is a Korean.” She looked at me and said, “What do you mean?” I explained what this woman had told me. She said that was crazy. But it was amazing that the stereotype was so strong in Japan about the Koreans. As a matter of fact, he probably was a Korean, the owner perhaps.

There was another thing we had going on there that was very difficult. The Japanese had a great number of investments in the United States and there was a lot of effort by the Americans to attract more Japanese investments. We had dinner with the then Governor Clinton of Arkansas when he came over once to try to interest the Japanese in making investments in Arkansas. And they did make some. There were a lot of companies who would send a lot of Japanese to the United States to run their investments on treaty visas. But, we caught on that there was a enormous number going over and it looked like they were staffing these companies almost entirely with their own nationals, which was going quite a bit beyond what the treaty visas were intended to do, take care of the visas for the managers and technical experts. We did a lot of inquiring and asking around and found out that they were indeed staffing entire offices with their own nationals, down to the most menial tasks. So, we decided we would govern this a bit and put more attention to the issue and ask a lot more questions. Inadvertently we created quite an uproar in Japan. It was front page news. Why were we inquiring more thoroughly into these visa requests? We had a meeting once where several thousand Japanese business people showed up for a meeting on treaty visas where we tried to explain the qualifications. Got a lot of press.

I was on the train with my children, who were going to school, going to the consulate one morning and I said something to my daughter about leaving Japan. This man who was standing next to me hanging on to a strap got off the train with me and said, “When are you leaving?” I looked at him surprised, not knowing who he was. He said, “You are the American consul?” I said, “Yes, I am.” He said, “When are you leaving?” I said that I didn’t know when. Later I heard through the community that there was a buzz going on about the consul leaving and maybe there
wouldn’t be any trouble anymore about getting treaty visas.

When I got back to the States there was a conference on treaty visas which one of the immigration associations had arranged. Again it was held in a large room and it was filled with almost entirely Japanese business people who were very much concerned about the treaty visa and wanting it very badly. I remember asking one of them why it was so important to have a treaty visa when they could just go over on a regular visa and do a little business if they wanted to. His answer was that in case of another war they wanted to be covered by a treaty. I found this quite interesting that they would worry about the possibility of another war with the United States. In some ways it is a very difficult culture to figure out and quite, quite challenging. There was quite a bit of trickery going on among the companies trying to get the visas.

Q: Were they also staffing their offices abroad with Japanese because they were easier to work with?

HOBBS: Yes, top to bottom, because it is easier to work with someone in your own culture and the communication is better with native speakers. But, they were comfortable not only with having Japanese native speaking managers but felt more comfortable, I guess, with having the entire staff of their own nationals and just manufacture as much as possible and sell it to the Americans. It was working quite well until we started to look into it a little more carefully.

Q: Did you have any problems with the embassy, because this was causing a stir within Japan?

HOBBS: Yes, it got front page news. It even made it into the New York Times, the fact that there was a bit of controversy in Japan over treaty visas and the embassy was uncomfortable with it. The DCM told me once that as long as you didn’t get in the papers you were okay but once you did you were in trouble. He was quite uncomfortable with the situation.

Q: Who was the DCM?

HOBBS: Bill Clark. And, it was true of course, it is nice not to get into the newspaper. It was the one problem we really had and we still haven’t sorted it out. The Japanese were working very hard to promote their own exports, which was fine, but their markets were quite closed then. From my personal experience I could see how difficult it was. For example, one man there who was a commercial officer who spent most of his career in Japan, made it his personal crusade to get Louisville slugger baseball bats approved for use in Japan. They didn’t meet Japanese standards so couldn’t be imported to Japan, yet they were shipping bats by the tons to the United States. This man spent five years of his career beating on this one issue until in fact we wore them down and Louisville bats were approved for sale in Japan, but no one bought them. The distributor would not order them. So, it is an example of it not always being the obvious trade barriers that make it difficult for us to sell in that market, but the sort of non-tariff barriers, the cultural proclivity to support one’s own. I know Japanese businessmen who would tell me how embarrassed they were that there was an American computer in their office and not a Japanese one.

Our victory in the baseball bats was not much of a victory. There was a kind of little struggle we
went through constantly.

There is a great reputation that the Japanese have for being above board and very honest in their dealings with people, and that is basically true. But, I remember once Mitsubishi Ship Yards was trying to send an engineer of some sort over to Norfolk, Virginia to work on a broken down ship that they had built for an American company. The American consul looked it up and told them if the person has special expertise that is not available in the United States then he comes in on a B1 visa instead of a temporary worker visa in this emergency situation. Mitsubishi was told to get a statement from the Norfolk ship yards that this is an emergency situation and there is no American technician to deal with this ship problem. The next morning we had a telegram that was supposedly from Norfolk but was obviously written by a Japanese. We were pretty sure it had come from the Mitsubishi Ship Yards in Kobe. I called over there and asked them point blank from which office the telegram had come. They finally connected me to the office realizing they had been caught red handed.

The Sony Corporation wanted to open a factory in Mexico on the border under that program we had for Free zone. Mkiadori business they call it. A tariff free zone. Things that are brought into Mexico to have value added to them can be shipped back to the United States without any tariff. So, Sony decided to open a factory in Mexico to make televisions for sale in the United States. They asked for treaty visas to live in the United States. I said, “Well, since your factory is in Mexico, you should be getting a visa from Mexico to live in Mexico to run your company. You don’t have a business in the United States.” They didn’t want to accept that, so I told them I would send an advisory opinion to Washington to see if it was okay to run an office in Mexico but live in the United States. The answer came back after a month or two that if they ran an office in the United States they could have a treaty visa for the United States, but otherwise they had to get a visa from Mexico. So, I called the Sony people to come talk about it and they came with their attorney. I told them Washington’s response and they conferred among themselves a bit and finally turned to me and said they wanted to see the cable that I had sent requesting an opinion. I showed it to them. They read it carefully. Then one said to another, “It looks like he is telling us the truth, so we will have to go along with the decision.” They were very adversarial.

Another example of the cultural differences that made it so incredibly challenging. I got a call one day from Washington wanting to know what in the devil I was doing to make trouble for a tooth company that was trying to get some people in to open a factory in Arkansas. Senator Bumpers was very upset. I had never heard of this and said I would check into it. I called the company, which supposedly we were giving trouble to, to ask them if they had applied for visas and if so, when, who applied and what happened. They knew nothing about it but called me back a little later and said they actually hadn’t applied yet. I asked them to explain why there was a problem in Washington. They said they would get back to me. They called me back in a day or so and said they had figured it out. What happened was they had a lobbyist in Washington, a Japanese citizen who had been living in the United States for many years, who had met Senator Bumpers and had talked about this great thing the company was planning to do and had made some comment about hoping there wouldn’t be any problems with the visa. The Senator must have misunderstood and assumed that they said there was a problem and that was how it all got started. I told them to send over their applications and they would be taken care of. They came over, visas were issued and everyone went away happy.
When the company opened its operations in Arkansas a delegation came out from Arkansas to thank them for the big investment and I was invited to the big party, which was held in a very nice estate outside of Kobe. It was amazing fun. As I walked in everybody I saw from that company was bowing as far as they could bow and apologizing to me for all the trouble they had caused the honorable consul. I caught on that somebody at the top had ordered that everybody should grovel to this consul because he had been hassled for no reason. At one point I was talking to the president and the vice president of the company and I told them it was okay, they didn’t have to be so upset, I wasn’t really upset about it. Mistakes happen. Then the vice president turned to me and said, “But, you know, you have to understand how this happened. The lobbyist in Washington has been in the United States too long and acts like an American.” I said, “I think that was an apology, thank you very much.” Japan was quite an interesting place to work.

Q: During this 1978-81 period, did you get any feel for the politics of Japan, particularly in Japan-American relations?

HOBBS: The Japanese were beginning to feel that they had been a little too long under the tutelage of the Americans, I think, and were trying to be a little more on their own. They didn’t like to have a very high profile on any political issues in the world, but they also seemed to resent more and more assumptions Americans would make about where they would stand on issues and what approaches they would take. I had one man who had been living there for about 40 years who was part Japanese and part American. He had a ship chandler’s service in Kobe harbor for many years. He had been watching how Japan had been progressing for years. He spoke good Japanese. He said he saw definite generational change. Those who were born after the occupation and had become adults and had no recollection or remembrance of anything the Americans had done at that time to be of assistance to Japan in a very difficult time, had a very different attitude towards Americans. He called it an arrogance. Perhaps there was a little of that for a while, but it probably dissipated a lot after the late eighties when the economic bubble burst taking some wind out of their sails. I haven’t been back to Japan since then, so I don’t know.

One incident happened while I was there which was very unfortunate. The Americans were having some military exercises off Japan where submarines were trying to evade aircraft which were trying to spot submarines. In this little game they were playing, one of them surfaced and came right up underneath a Japanese fishing ship. The ship was badly damaged. The submarine waited a little bit above the water, appeared to be checking out what was going on with the ship as it was sinking, and then submerged and went away. Two people, the captain and one other person, died and many others were plucked out of the sea having been pretty well exposed to the cold water and pretty upset. I had to conduct the hearings in Japan to try to determine the reason for this action. There was a terrible uproar about this incident. A lot of anti-American sentiment being expressed for a few days, and then it all went away again. But, they were very upset that this American warship had killed somebody.

Q: Well, it really does sound like bad judgment on the part of a naval commander.

HOBBS: That was exactly what was determined in the end. I had to take the statements of the
Japanese members for the navy. Then the navy took the statements and included them in a broader hearing that took place, I think, in Tokyo. In the end the captain was found not to have acted properly. Once it was obvious the ship was sinking, he should have abandoned the game and rescued them. That decision helped, but there was still the question of paying damages to the families of the dead captain and crew member. The head of the US navy in Japan personally went to the home of the captain’s wife and apologized, as did Ambassador Mansfield. Those kind of things help a little bit.

Q: Did you get any feel for Ambassador Mansfield and how he worked in Japan?

HOBBS: I was there his first couple of years. He was very well received. He didn’t speak Japanese, although had some history background in Asian affairs and knew something about Asia. He had been in the Senate all those years and obviously was a very prominent American, and that helps in Japan a lot. They like to have somebody who has a high profile in the United States assigned to Japan. It doesn’t matter to them whether he is truly a diplomat or not. So, Mansfield had great entree, was highly revered and his words meant a great deal to the Japanese. They paid a lot of attention to him. So, I thought he was doing a very, very good job.

MARILYN A. MEYERS
Japan Desk Officer (Economic)

Japanese Language Training

Principal Officer
Fukuoka (1981-1983)

Ms. Meyers was born in Virginia and obtained degrees from Southwestern University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. A Japanese and Burmese language officer, she served tours in Tokyo, Yokohama and Fukuoka in Japan and as Principal Officer (Chargé d’Affaires) in Rangoon. Other assignments include Johannesburg, Canberra and Washington, where she dealt primarily with economic matters. Ms. Meyers was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2005.

Q: You were brought back to the Japanese desk.

MEYERS: Oh, yes. Which I asked for.

Q: And there you were again doing economic work. How many of you were handling economics?

MEYERS: There were two of us. Two out of six officers.
Q: What problems were you faced with there?

MEYERS: One of the major things that I was working on was energy, a continuing problem. We’d been through a second oil crisis by the late Seventies. We were trying to work with the Japanese to develop and fund research on alternative sources of energy. And there was a sense that the Japanese owed this to us because they were running such huge surpluses in trade. So let’s take a bit of that money and plow it back into development of alternative fuels. I coordinated those efforts with our own Energy Department and the Japanese Embassy, of course, working back to Tokyo. I can’t think of any specific problems in this area. I guess the major surprise of my tenure was Secretary Vance’s resignation over the botched hostage rescue attempt in Iran. I heard it first when a Japanese reporter I knew called, seeking my reaction. And I said “What?” And he said “Yes, I’m over here at the White House and they’re handing us Xerox copies of the Secretary’s resignation letter. And I said “Well, Imai-san, I know nothing about it and furthermore I have nothing to say about it.” And then hung up the phone and shouted, “Does anybody know that Secretary Vance has resigned?”

Q: Were we trying to get the Japanese to assume more international responsibility? Remember, we said “You’re now big boys and you ought to do more?” Or did that come within your portfolio?

MEYERS: We were beginning to push the Japanese to do more in international aid and assistance. By the time I got back to Tokyo years later we were holding formal discussions to better coordinate our aid programs.

Q: Did you have to deal much with criticism of the Japanese from American sources, from the Congress or anything?

MEYERS: No, answering occasional letters. Maybe later on, but not for the two years in Washington.

Q: Well, after two interesting years on the Japan desk you went to Yokohama. That was for language training, I gather.

MEYERS: That was for language training. Actually, I had made up my mind as I left Tokyo in 1978 to come back to the Japan desk. The only way I could drag myself onto the plane at Narita was to say “Okay, you’re going to go back. You’re on the Japan desk; that’s great. And you’re going to start working on getting back to Yokohama so you can finish the language training. Because, yes, you want to be a Japan hand.” So, fortunately the assignment to Yokohama came through. I didn’t want the full course back in ’75. I wanted the one year so I could come to the Embassy, work, and see if I really wanted to be in Japan as much as I thought I did. And I found I did want to make it my specialty. So, yes, I got back to Yokohama and had a very good study year there. Because, first of all, the teachers just knocked themselves out, the Japanese language instructors. And the classes were small. I mean, two of you and the instructor sitting there; there was no escape. There was nowhere to run and there was nowhere to hide. So it was pretty intensive but therefore very good. And that’s where we really got into the reading, as well as the speaking. Reading selected newspaper articles and listening to radio news and television until
you understood what they were talking about. Embassy Tokyo also offered supplemental language courses. But Yokohama was fulltime and I achieved a 3+,3 rating. I could always talk better than I could read.

Q: Well, at the end of that you were sent to Fukuoka, where you expected to go for your first tour.

MEYERS: Yes, I was very happy to go. Because I’d worked hard on my Japanese in Yokohama and I knew if I went to Fukuoka, it would stay the same or maybe even improve – since I would use it more -- and I wouldn’t slip backwards, which is what I feared would happen in Tokyo.

Q: And you were in charge of the Consulate? How large was the post?

MEYERS: Well, if you counted everyone – Americans and Japanese -- maybe twenty five, thirty. Not many Americans – only four. The Admin was run by a Japanese, the admin section. We had one American heading up the consular, one American heading up econ/commercial and a branch public affairs officer (BPAO) and myself. The Japanese staff totaled about twenty, twenty three or so. And a wonderful, tight knit, cooperative bunch. I mean they were just super.

Q: What were your problems you faced?

MEYERS: I guess the major issue that came up had to do with our political/military relationship. I had two U.S. military bases within my consular district. One was the Iwakuni Marine air base on the main island of Honshu and the other was the Sasebo naval base over in Nagasaki prefecture. The U.S. carrier Enterprise and its battle group were planning a port call to Sasebo. And it was the first in years because the last time the Enterprise came, we were still in Vietnam and huge anti-Vietnam demonstrations occurred in Sasebo. The sailors came ashore but they were never allowed off the base because it wasn’t safe. There were actually a couple of Japanese killed in the demonstrations. So there was a lot of tension. Everyone thought all would probably be fine; Vietnam’s long past. We had also developed a much more cooperative military relationship over the years. I went from the Consulate to report on the visit as did the pol/mil officer from Embassy Tokyo. All went quite well. That visit, was one highlight of my tour.

Q: And Nagasaki was in your district, as you mentioned, apparently. Any residual feeling there about Americans?

MEYERS: Little. August 9th is still remembered each year. And there were a few hardcore demonstrators, Communists and so on. One other event I recall about Kyushu as being really memorable was a visit by a Congressional delegation (CODEL) from the House Subcommittee on Ways and Means. It was led by Sam Gibbons from Florida, who was a prince of a man. Anyway, his CODEL of Republicans and Democrats, and wives and staffers, outnumbered the Consulate staff almost two to one. And at first I thought “How are we ever going to handle this?” But we did. Almost every member of the subcommittee would go to Tokyo each year for trade discussions to emphasize the importance of trade being a two way street. And each year the CODEL would also make a study tour outside Tokyo. So they came to Kyushu when I was there. We arranged a very busy schedule. They toured a Nissan plant in eastern Kyushu and a
semiconductor facility operated by Texas Instruments. We traveled a fair amount through the countryside. I remember one day being on a bus driving from somewhere to somewhere. Two members were talking and looking at the rugged Kyushu hills and remarked, “Good thing we didn’t have to come ashore here back in ’45. This would have been rough going.” All in all their visit went extremely well. They worked hard but they also had a good time.

ULRICH A. STRAUS
Consul General
Okinawa (1978-1982)

Ulrich A. Straus was born in Germany in 1926 and, after some time in Japan, his parents settled in the United States. He served in the U.S. Army and attended the University of Michigan. Mr. Straus joined the Foreign Service in 1957 and served in Japan, Germany, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

STRAUS: A job in Okinawa opened up.

Q: This was 1978-82.

STRAUS: Right.

Q: I assumed you jumped at this chance?

STRAUS: I did.

Q: The position was...

STRAUS: As Consul General. This was six years after reversion and Okinawa by that time was a regular part of Japan. The thing that makes Okinawa unusual and why we have a consulate there in the first place is the fact that we have somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters of our total military forces in Japan on Okinawa. The time that I was there that meant about 50,000 Americans, including dependents, which translates to five percent of the population.

Q: It is not a heavily populated island then.

STRAUS: Well, a million people. Part of the area is jungle. Of course, the potential of problems are manifold. On my way to Japan I stopped off in Tokyo and had a memorable first encounter with Ambassador Mansfield. He was so gracious. He asked me if I wanted a cup of coffee, and I said, “yes.” He goes out into the little vestibule next to his office and makes the coffee. I also, of course, talked to Bill Sherman, an old friend, who was DCM at the time. Bill in effect told me to do my thing down there. He didn't want to hear from me. We don't want any of the problems in Okinawa to escalate into US-Japan issues. And I think I was successful to the extent that during my time there I think I succeeded in doing that.
I think that having good luck is an essential part of effective diplomacy. And I was very fortunate. I was fortunate in the type of military officers I dealt with for the most part on Okinawa. I was also most fortunate in the Okinawan authorities that I dealt with. Within a couple of weeks of my arrival in Okinawa, the Governor of Okinawa, who was a member of the left, was stricken by a stroke, which forced him out of office within two or three months, and led to his untimely death. He was succeeded by the candidate of the Liberal Democratic Party, the center right in Japan, and he took a much more cooperative view of the American military presence in Japan then his predecessor had. It was a period of conservative resurgence. It was believed by the Okinawans that it was the left wing that had set the stage and effected the reversion of Okinawa. But now that they were part of Japan, it was more beneficial to have a member of the same party that was running the rest of Japan as governor. But it wasn't just the governor, it was a lot of other local jobs that went to the conservative party.

As I said, I found the military, particularly some of the Marines...in Okinawa it should be noted that there was a rather unusual situation. It is the only place abroad where it is the Marines that are the dominant military force. So the senior military commander was a Marine. You have about seven or eight general Marine officers. The next largest force is the Air Force, because of the huge Kadena Airfield there. Then the Army and Naval are minuscule, which is rather strange.

I guess my job was really to keep the peace. I had generally pretty good cooperation from the military. I never had to go up to Tokyo to ask them for anything. I had very good relations with the Japanese government authorities, as well as with the Okinawa authorities. We got constant harping in the Okinawan press, which plays a major role in Okinawa. We had frequent protest groups that came to the Consulate. We encouraged them to come to us rather than to the military because we felt we could probably deal with them better than the military could. We were fortunate that there were no really major incidents. I'm glad to say that during my time there was no murder on the part of our troops. All the really nasty stuff the military do in Japan really goes on in Okinawa. The nasty stuff involves live fire exercises which the Marines have to do to practice. Your typical Marine is a 19-year-old. The Air Force is very different. It is generally a 35 year old married mechanic who is the typical Air Force guy. If anybody is going to get in trouble off base it is generally a Marine. But most of the problems were not that type. There were ricocheting bullets, which hit a rock and would fly out of the maneuver area. Then there were accidents involving the Air Force like fuel spills and that sort of thing. Then the Air Force also, of course, were very noisy. They had these U2 type aircraft.

Q: These were high flying photograph type planes.

STRAUS: Yes, remarkable things. They had the most modern fighter jets at Kadena Airfield, one of the largest military bases in the world. Active 24 hours around the clock.

I used to tell the Marines and Air Force when they would complain about lack of Japanese cooperation, "What do you think an American mayor or governor would do in similar circumstances?" They were generally understanding. Particularly the Marines. Perhaps they lived close to the ground and had a particular understanding for the political problems. I also had that feeling with the Army, a much smaller group.
So it was a very interesting experience for me. There was nothing like running your own post. I did a lot of reporting on incidents and I think the way I reported them had an effect on perhaps decreasing the number of these incidents, making sure the military took all reasonable precautions.

Q: *Did you work with the military to get them to adjust their operations to avoid problems?*

STRAUS: Yes, exactly.

Q: *It wasn't, "Well, get the damn civilians out of the way that is their problem"?*

STRAUS: No, no. As I said, I found them generally quite accommodating and it was always a matter of individuals. You can't expect all of them to be that way. I think if they felt that you understood their problem ... When I got there in 1978, their problem in part was that the average Marine was a guy who was perhaps out of reform school who decided it would be better to go into the Marines than anywhere else at this point in his life. Many of them didn't have a high school diploma. By the time I left in 1982, that had changed. The quality of the people they were getting was much better. But we were still in the post-Vietnam period when I arrived. I had sympathy for them and I expressed that. I thought they were doing a remarkable job really of educating these young men and women.

I counted this as some of the happiest time I spent. I wasn't overworked, but on the other hand I had plenty to do and I thought I was very usefully employed.

Q: *How did you find the Okinawans? They had now adjusted to being part of Japan, but did you find they were a breed apart and would sort of use you to find out what was happening on the mainland?*

STRAUS: No not that, but I had the feeling that there were three actors, three players in Okinawa, whereas in Japan you only had two. You had the Okinawans who were sort of the landlords, the Japanese who were the treasurers, and then there was us. And any two were sort of playing off against the third and often badmouthing the third. But I think it was a well-understood game. And, as I said, largely thanks to the kindness and understanding of the Governor, who I thought was a very shrewd and effective politician and was there almost the entire time I was there, things suddenly worked a lot better in Okinawa and I was able to take the credit for it.

Q: *What was your feeling about the Japanese officials or others who were down there?*

STRAUS: Well, I think the Japanese were usually more sensitive to the situation in Okinawa than they are usually given credit for. The Okinawans, while they were under the Americans had a great deal of independence, and now they were just another prefecture. Not only that, they were a prefecture that was historically the poorest of the lot. In a sense they didn't like that. They liked to be more important. So they screamed and did a lot of yelling which resulted in the Japanese pouring a lot of money down there.
There were a lot of guilt feelings involved on the part of the Japanese because, of course, the only land battles fought on Japanese soil was in Okinawa. They were told that was necessary in order to defend the homeland. Well, it turned out the homeland then decided to throw in the sponge. The whole thing is, of course, an irony. Everybody, of course, knows about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the prefecture that took the heaviest hits in World War II, was none of those two, it was Okinawa. A quarter of the population of the prefecture died. No place in the world had that kind of catastrophe. It was staggering. Historically they had been very pacifist. Then the irony is that they now host the largest concentration of American forces in Japan. So the Okinawan feeling is that you Japanese are getting the benefits of the American presence, but we have the Americans, thank you very much! So the Japanese say, "Yeah, but look what we are doing. We are subsidizing this and that." And they are doing that. And they were careful, at least during the period I was there, to restrain their business and not rush pell-mell down there and drive out less efficient Okinawan businesses. So there were no Japanese banks down there or department stores or construction companies. Okinawa really has no industry as such. Whether this has changed in the meantime, I don't know. But at that time I thought they showed commendable restraint and sensitivity. At the same time that they still tended to look down on the Okinawans as being under-educated, under-disciplined. Okinawans tend to be sort of southern people...a little slow, more relaxed...and that is not the Japanese. There is a difference.

But we appreciated the Okinawan culture. It is a different culture and it is remarkable what that little group of islands accomplished in history.

KENNETH YATES
Policy Officer
Tokyo (1978-1982)

Kenneth Yates was born in Connecticut in 1940. He served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1969-1962 and received a BA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1967. After entering USIA in 1967, he was posted abroad in Seoul, Kabul, Tokyo, Reykjavik and Beijing. Mr. Yates was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: Let's move to Japan where you were from 1978-82. What was your job there?

YATES: In Japan I was Policy Officer.

Q: What does that mean?

YATES: I was charged with overseeing the theory and operation of the Japan program. At the time, Japan had five branches–Sapporo, Nagoya, Osaka, Fukuoka–and Tokyo. My job was the Country Plan; I made the initial draft of it each year. I handled all the public opinion and other research done by the post and also handled the growing use of computers. In Japan at the time, we were just getting into the computer age. While I was there, I installed a WANG VS-100
computer; it was state-of-the-art at that time. Because space in the Tokyo embassy was at a high premium, we had to locate the major works of the computer, the central processor and the large disk drives, in a converted closet along one hallway. At the time, the hard disks each occupied a device of its own and had interchangeable disk packs with a stack of “platters,” each about a foot and a half in diameter and stacked about eight high like pancakes. It was not as powerful as a main frame of the time, but it was not too much different. It was a serious computer and permitted a large number of terminals.

In Tokyo, USIA was going to be the “lead agency,” as it was termed, for all computers for the different sections in the embassy. The chief reason for that arrangement was that USIS had the initial interest and me, who had some experience in computers. So we got the original assignment to provide services for all. The Wang VS-100 we installed was to provide such service for the entire mission. The embassy was a ten story building in downtown Tokyo with about 20 different U.S. government agencies, such as the FBI, IRS, State, Defense, USIA, etc. All of us were going to work on the same computer. That was at least the theory in the beginning. So I wired the whole building, including communications.

After we got this thing running, I thought it would be a good idea if we could hook up with communications directly and thus be able to send cables from my desk as it were. I was told that could not be done. “Why?” was my question. “Because we have a classified system.” The classified system was housed on the top floor of the embassy and was inside a vault like installation to provide maximum security. All that was needed was to connect my VS-100 through the wall of the vault and I could then fully wire communications for the embassy. Such an arrangement ran into difficulty, however, for I was told, “no, you can’t connect a black line to a red box.” The red box is classified and the black line, unclassified. I argued that it should work fine and that, technically, there was no problem at all. We would only use an unclassified circuit, we would have unclassified control, and there shouldn’t be any problem. “No, it is technically not possible,” came the response. I thought that was funny, because we used to have a thing called USINFO, an unclassified channel that used old teletype equipment in USIA. That system was stand-alone, but we were able to receive messages in the normal telegraphic traffic. It was mixed in with all the classified traffic.

USINFO was the original USIA network which was devoted to press materials, post advisories, and other unclassified items. It was slow but serviceable, a sort of bridge between the real “wireless” file that used to be broadcast from VOA relay stations around the world and the later computer-to-computer transmission that is now used. USIA posts around the world still used USINFO to receive longer messages such as press stories, long articles for placement or translation, and the usual internal messages such as transfers, admin messages, and the like. USINFO was handy to keep bulkier traffic away from the usual telegraphic channels.

We used to get USINFO messages regularly, and a dependable flow was important. Many posts without alternate technical means would receive USINFO traffic via the usual telegraphic channel. Knowing that was possible, I stood my ground and maintained that the “red” and “black” channels could coexist. I said, “You CAN connect a classified network with an unclassified one, and I can demonstrate that to you.” The communications technicians were adamant, “No, you can’t. That is completely out of the question.” Asking them to just wait a bit,
I said I would send a message to myself now and come back to the 10th floor to pick it up. They thought I was crazy.

I then went downstairs to the basement where we had a USINFO terminal and punched in a message to myself. Since our traffic contained a large number of USINFO messages in the telegraphic flow, it was easy to pick up an example with the appropriate addresses. After I had completed my keyboard work at the aging terminal, I returned to the 10th floor and asked for my message. Humoring me, they checked the received traffic, and sure enough, there was an unclassified message amid the classified incoming. I now had demonstrated proof of the mixing of the “red” and the “black.” Once more, I asked that the connection between my computer and the communications panel be made, so that I might enable telegraphic transmission and receipt directly from each desk.

While surprised, the communications people refused to budge but were curious about how such an unbelievable mixing was possible. The story was a bit convoluted but simple. The USINFO terminal is in the basement of the embassy. The connecting line was an old U.S. Army 75 baud circuit which ran to the old Sanno Hotel down the street. The Sanno Hotel was a U.S. military R&R facility and it, in turn, was connected to Camp Zama. Of course, from Camp Zama via Hawaii, communications were connected to the Pentagon which maintained a bridge to the State Department’s communication system, and - voila - all the U.S. embassies around the world including Tokyo. That is how the simple typed message I sent from the basement arrived instantly on the 10th floor.

Q: Camp Zama was the American army headquarters in Japan.

YATES: Right. We later found that if we could get an address in the large worldwide cable system, we would be able to use that simple USINFO terminal as the basis for connections world-wide. That would permit me to connect my computer on the second floor of the embassy with the worldwide cable system. I discovered that the Department of Agriculture had an extra address it was not using and I could get it. Yet I ran afoul of a technicality, because the speed of the USINFO line was too slow at 75 baud to be able to match up with the rest of the network. The minimum speed to be acceptable on the network was 300 baud, and the U.S. Army would have to upgrade its circuit to the embassy from 75 baud to 300 baud. This involved the purchase of a $200 modem. They were not willing to do this for our benefit since such older lines were being phased out wherever possible. I was never able to get the connection.

In reality, the Department of State really did not want to see such direct communication enabled, because someone would be able to sit at his desk and send messages directly by computer, transmitting them to any embassy in the world over the State Department network. While the whole e-mail system was technically feasible at that time, the problem was internal controls. Who would see what I said? Who would clear what I had to say? This promising project floundered. The technical people rejected it in the beginning, saying it wasn’t possible. When I showed them that it could be done, they got very bureaucratic about it, and the promise of convenient and instantaneous communications, the stuff of e-mail today, never had a chance. I thought this was too bad, because I thought at that time we could really do something interesting in an unclassified environment which would allow us communication with our other posts all
around the world. This was in 1978.

**Q:** I was just across the pond in Korea about this time, and we were just experimenting with a WANG computer there. It was pretty primitive.

**YATES:** That time was very interesting. One of the other things I had to do, because of my computer connection, was oversight responsibility for our mail system, addressing, which in USIA is called “DRS,” the Distribution Record System. I had control of that in Tokyo. One of the problems with our DRS was addressing. In Tokyo, we had to use Chinese characters (Kanji) that are commonly used in Japanese addresses, particularly for names. People would use the phonetic syllabary, “kana” in combination with Kanji for everyday Japanese text, but because of the large number of homonyms in the Japanese language, the kana system is used primarily for inflections on verbs and simple connectives. For such things as names and addresses, you need Kanji, which are based on ideograms, and therefore carries a much more complex meaning than the kana. At that time, Kanji-based language was beyond the relatively simple machinery of the Wang VS-100, at least in addressing programs, and therefore made it necessary to contract our address system out. We had no Kanji printing capability in the embassy itself. I discovered, though, that computers were starting to come into their own, and there were some programs available back in the U.S. that might be able to handle our printing needs from there.

In particular, I found a connection to a GE node in Beltsville, Maryland that was being operated by the Japanese advertising firm, Densu, and they had a multiplexed connection to Tokyo working 24 hours a day. What we would have been able to do was to dial up a local number in Tokyo and get access to the GE computer in Maryland. This would have been much like the Internet operates today. In turn, they would connect us with our USIA headquarters here in Washington, and we would be able to exchange data plus use the large variety of programs that were online in Beltsville. They had a Kanji printing program that Dentsu was already using.

The basis of my concept was to do the processing in Beltsville and then, download a print file to us in Tokyo where our address labels would be produced. The advantage of this was economic, since the Japanese contractor was rather expensive and through this process we would have full control in the embassy in Tokyo. International computer connections were a relatively new phenomena, and the Dentsu network was not being used that much. The whole process promised to be a lot cheaper than the contracted services then in use, and we would have the added benefit of all of the software that was otherwise not available to us in Tokyo. As it turned out, we ran into all kinds of problems.

This seems silly now, in light of the vast amount of personal data that is available on the Internet, but at the time, we were worried about transborder flow of information on individuals. We had a name list that, at the time, included what we were sending them, when those materials were sent, plus a record of when a given person attended a program with us. This enabled us to maintain contact with our audience and have a better grasp about our effectiveness. The target audience in Japan, at the time, was broken down into different pieces. At the center, was a small group of about 300 whom we spent a lot of time working with. These were key people in the media, economic institutions, and the government that we wanted to talk with about U.S. policy or simply to mail background material to them.
Beyond that, we had a much larger group of individuals that we would invite to programs and send materials to but would not devote much personalized time to. These included junior professors, younger reporters, people who were coming up but had not yet arrived. They were not members of our “core audience” but were important to us, nonetheless, and certainly were a part of the audience we had to maintain contact with. So we included them on name and address lists. Altogether, we had about 15,000 in the database for those sorts of individuals throughout Japan.

The operation of the DRS systems always was a controversial topic. Our local staff members helped but were sometimes suspicious, believing that we probably were feeding data collected about individuals back to Washington where it would be used in intelligence or other conspiratorial needs. Of course, nothing of the sort was done, but the more efficient the system and the more productive it was for guidance, the higher the level of local suspicion and anxiety. Some felt uncomfortable with the possibility that personal data on Japanese was possibly being passed outside the country. For most, it was generally all right to keep such information in Tokyo where our local employees had their hands on most of the processes. Efficiencies, such as those offered by the Dentsu arrangement, were understood, but the discomfort was palpable. Technically, it was feasible, and essentially, we had it all set up. All we had to do was sign the contracts to implement a system which, in a limited fashion, would have looked like the Internet does today. Of course, few show much concern about trans-national flows of information today, but at that time, it was a serious problem.

Q: This time in Japan, 1978-82, from your polling what were your particular concerns? Whither the Japanese public vis-a-vis the United States?

YATES: That was an interesting question. There were a number of Japanese polls, the largest being the Jiji poll which had been done for many years. There is what’s called trend data available through the Jiji poll, because they have had the same kinds of questions asked over very many years.

Q: This is a Japanese firm?

YATES: Yes, it is. We would do contracts with the office of research, because I had been in the office of research before and my policy job in Tokyo included research responsibilities. On occasion, I would contract for questions in Japanese polls. For example, “What do you think of the American policy?” “What do you think about the US-Japan-Security Treaty?” The interesting thing was that we could take the results of these published polls and with the new Wang computer, do some reprocessing for results that were important to us. Most important was trend data, looking at similar questions over a longer period of time. The Jiji poll was particularly useful. Mainichi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun ran similar polls, as did most major Japanese news organizations.

In the aggregate, the poll data on US-Japan relations over the years revealed the basic trends in Japanese thinking on the relations between the two countries. By analyzing data using a technique called regression analysis, you can condense a variety of information into a single
graphic representation and reduce uncontrollable variation to reveal the fundamental change in the data over time.

A good example of this was Japanese impressions of America and its relations with the power that had defeated it in the Second World War. For some data, if you looked at it in the short period, you found dramatic rises and falls. This related directly to the events of the day and the nature of the newspaper headlines at the time of the poll. However, if the same data were combined with that from other polls and the data were examined over a longer period of time through the technique of regression, then in a period of about 10 or 15 years, you found a gradual increase in the favorable attitude of the general population. There was a lot of press commentary saying Japanese-American relations were going down the tube or was at one extreme or another. The revealed truth in longer period analysis was that the Japanese view of America was fairly stable and positive.

Yet every time there was an incident, such as when a U.S. submarine hit a Japanese trawler, our poll numbers went down sharply. That was in reaction to individual events. When you plotted significant international events in Japanese-American relations, you found they very closely correlated with the mood swings of the Japanese public. But if you did a regression analysis over a longer period of time, it turns out there wasn’t much change at all. That was an interesting lesson for those who watch polls here in this country, the famous one being the Dewey/Truman election. They looked at the spikes and didn’t look at the trends.

Q: Did you find yourself almost odd man out? Here you were playing with computers in an era when they were just beginning.

YATES: In USIA, computers for some were bad words, as it was throughout the government. I think USIA probably was more receptive to most of this new stuff. Yet for an ambitions Foreign Service Officer, a connection with computers probably had a negative effect on his career. While I believe that the effect of using computers to assist in communication programs had an enormous impact over the years, I don’t think I got much credit for it. It was considered out of the mainstream of what a traditional Foreign Service Officer was concerned with. So I tended to get odd jobs. I built the first audience record system in Korea that was based on computer principles. That was in 1968, when I first entered the Foreign Service. I had previously had a lot of computer experience while working my way through university, so the development was a natural one.

Q: At the bank?

YATES: Yes. So I had a base of operational knowledge to work from. When I arrived in Korea, they were struggling with organizing data about the audience and programs. Every officer would have a Rolodex on his desk or at least a business card file, and it was on that basis that contacts were developed and managed. The Deputy PAO at the time was Mort Smith, and he had within his responsibilities managing this audience. I suggested we do something with punched cards. We didn’t have a computer and could not afford one - but punched cards were available. I told them we could do a “key sort” system, which is based on very primitive physical computer principles.
I drew up plans for a key sort device on a piece of paper and got a local vendor - literally on the street - to build it out of wood. It involved a box into which we put cards which rested on a trap door on the bottom. Also on the street, we located an umbrella repair man and bought umbrella staves from him. We used these as the needles for the key sort system and designed a card that had holes around all the sides. We got a company to drill the cards. You put the person’s name and something about them, what kind of audience, academic, government, media, etc.. We coded the area, their interests, etc. We would then use a mechanical punch to cut through from the drilled hole to the edge of the card. Each card could then be coded with notches which opened the hole to the edge. If you put the pin-like staves through the holes pertaining to what you wanted to find out, those which had a punched out notch in the appropriate location would fall from the rest of the cards when the trap door was opened. This was a primitive card sorter. We then would put the selected cards in a mimeograph-based printing machine and printed the name and address onto a piece of paper which you could use to wrap materials to be sent to the audience. Then you put the cards back in the box. Next time you would pick a different group of holes.

Q: My recollection is of an outfit called Royal Mcbee...

YATES: That’s right.

Q: It was a knitting needle system and I think it started in 1870. We used it in personnel in the mid-to-late sixties.

YATES: It was old at the time, but it was good enough to get us off the ground with a machine based system without any real cost. The interesting thing was, in order to make this work, we had to get the information and the names and addresses. That was quite a problem in USIS at the time, because people on the staff were not organized for information with that in mind. We had a Cultural Affairs Officer who was very distinguished and who had very warm and close contacts with some important members of the Korean audience. When the call went out from the Deputy PAO, Mort Smith’s office, to give their names and addresses to me for my “machine,” this particular Cultural Affairs Officer resisted the concept. He considered his contacts his own and was very reluctant to have them shared with anyone else.

There was a real row in the post about that. He was ordered to give his list to me, and it turned out after all the fuss, he had only about seven names. Whether it was out of indignation over the order to turn over his private set of contacts to the general staff or masking his embarrassment that he had so few genuine contacts, I never was sure, although I did suspect the latter.

The key sort system was a precursor which had become outdated, as you pointed out, and it did not last very long. There were physical problems. First off, there was the problem of transferring the addresses from the cards to paper. Sometimes, not all the cards would drop out; you really had to shake the box hard. The mimeo-based system was clumsy and new cards had to be re-done after only a few uses, because the chemical deposit on the surface of the card wore down to the point that it no longer gave an image adequate for the postal authorities to read.
I heard that the U.S. Army declared some card sorters surplus at Camp Zama in Japan. Under the U.S. procurement system, if any element of the federal system has equipment that is declared surplus, any government agency can lay claim to it before it is put up for sale. So we got the army to agree to give us a card sorter. We had to modify it, because Japan ran on an electric current of 100 volts and 50 Hz. That conversion accomplished, we brought it to the office. We then had to punch cards with a key punch which we got locally. We could then prepare standard IBM punch cards, and it then became a real system. We could process a much larger number of audience members and could sort cards quickly to meet desired criteria. One disadvantage to a key sort system is, you can select but you can’t sort; you have to do it mechanically unless you do it through a series of selections and then it is all screwed up and you can’t put it back in order again. The old IBM card system was much faster. We got it installed, and although it still used a mimeographic address transfer system to prepare selected address lists, it ran for many years after I left.

Q: Back to Japan. In policy planning, besides the more technical side which we have already discussed, were there any other aspects to your work?

YATES: I ran the research part, which was important, because we used the information we developed to govern the use of our resources. Even then in the late seventies, resources available to USIS were declining. There was a question of how many cuts we could take and where to focus our resources. We stepped back and took a look at the physical facilities we had in Japan. How could we best use these facilities to reach a maximum number of people with the greatest amount of information that was going to have the direct utility to them? Questions raised concerned personal contact versus direct mail, versus invitations, versus radio (such as the Voice of America), versus libraries.

The problem of libraries was one of the biggest questions. A book was quite a large investment, and you are never certain anyone is going to read it. However, you are fairly certain people will read direct mail and can often make an assessment based on direct feedback. So we had to make such relative decisions.

A controversial one was how many people could be effectively addressed with this multimillion dollar program in Japan? We did the math backwards. We went back to individual officers, asking how many hours a day an officer could spend with people, given the usual office mix of administration, meetings, and the other mechanics of operating in a large organization. Put in a different way, how many people within their assigned duties would they be able to know well? The level of personal intimacy was important. Could you possibly know something about a contact’s kids or his wife, and be almost on a first name basis (which you don’t do in Japan)? Could you be on a level of friendship with a person, so they would trust you when you went to them with something that was important, an issue they were concerned about? How many could you accommodate on that level? We looked at this really hard, did a lot of talking. We came up with a number, about 30 people that, on average, could be handled at the defined level of closeness. This would be 30 people they could really get to know, to be functional with.

If you multiply that 30 by the number of American officers we had in Tokyo, you came up to something like 300 people. That became a very problematic figure. The 30 individuals for each
program person thereby defined the “core group” in the DRS. For our bean counting critics, the charge might be, “You mean you are spending $5 million a year (or whatever we were spending at the time) on 300 people?” This would be leveled by congressional staffers who looked at our program in Japan. “You can’t do that. You have this big operation and you are only talking to 300 people? That is outrageous.” On the other hand, if those were the right 300 people in Japan, it would be worth putting all of our resources onto them. But that, of course, is not the way people look at things in Washington. The earlier PPBS (Program Planning and Budgeting System) was tried in earnest, but was not in place so very long. Neither was “Zero-Based Budgeting.”

Real or imagined questions soon got out of hand for each of these systems. Some asked to assess the value of the operation, based on how many people saw your movie, or attended programs, or visited the library. Under PPBS, I remember during my time in Korea we would show movies to assembled audiences containing all sorts of people. For example, we might show three movies to 50 people in one sitting. What was our contact? The total reported under PPBS was 150, but I only had 50 people attending. The formula we were requested to apply asked for a count for each screening. One film shown to 50 people counted 50, but three films shown to 50 at one time counted 150. How this could quickly get out of hand seemed obvious, and there was no assessment of the quality of either the audience or of the impact those films had on their viewers.

Q: When the Carter administration came in, there was a great deal of emphasis on the zero-based budget, too. This was the buzz word of the time.

YATES: That’s right. This was not the first time and downsizing (although we didn’t have that word then) was very much alive in Japan in the late ‘70s. We were talking about cutting branches and reducing the budget by 15-20 percent. One of the things I had to do was to look at the program and make suggestions for where we might cut at various funding levels. If we got a 5 percent cut, where would the axe fall? If we got a 10 percent cut, what would be eliminated? Twenty percent cuts were unimaginable, but we were forced to consider the possibility. From one year to the next, we never knew what we were going to have in the next budget. It was a silly way to run a railroad, and much of the time spent in such sterile exercises would have been much better spent in developing contacts or better programs.

One of the most strongly attacked parts of the system was the libraries, because collections of books absorb an enormous amount of resources in staff, plant, and investment - you had to keep your libraries current. Technology was changing libraries a lot even then. Microfiche was a buzz word. It is probably gone now, replaced by computers, but at that time microfiche was a big fad in library science. So the question was, do we buy a lot of microfiche materials for our libraries? If so, how do we reduce our book collection in order to offset the cost of the new materials and the associated readers? We had a library in every one of our centers, absorbing about a third of our budget. The question was, were they paying off with a third of the return?

The simple answer was “no”. The complicated answer was “maybe”. The presence of the library in a community gave an institutional face to the whole operation. It would be difficult to justify in local terms having a government operative in their midst going to universities, if he is a propagandist passing out U.S. government brochures. But if he is the director of the library, that
is good, because that is passive and something people want to have, a resource for the community. Few wish to strike up close relations with someone whose only justification is to sell a point of view.

However, if you are the head of a library, a source for learning and students, you are accepted, even welcomed. So as cachet, a way of defining ourselves in the interest of the communities, the library is very valuable. But that is hard to convince somebody who runs a budget. The libraries cost x number of dollars. How many people use them? We had to keep statistics on how many people walked through the doors, but that didn’t indicate what they read. Even those who came to our programs held in the library were counted. It was a real game. Unfortunately, at that time we were examining our navel on this one without looking at the larger questions and understanding them and being able to articulate them to those making the decisions in Washington. We just did the numbers and aggregated the numbers worldwide. Later, Charlie Wick’s “billions of people watching TV in Europe on Worldnet,” was the illogical result of what was supposed to be a scientific approach to the problem. The logic and its science were flawed and led to a flawed conclusion. Instead of looking at the context, they were looking at the volume and that wasn’t very useful.

While I was in Japan, we did another thing with our new computer. One of my duties there was to help people apply new technology to make our traditional programs stronger. We knew the library system needed a shot in the arm. First, on our new WANG VS-100 we created an interlibrary loan system, so that all of our library holdings could be accounted for centrally. If someone in Fukuoka wanted something on a particular topic, foreign relations in the U.S. or the Korean war, he could ask the librarian in Fukuoka what was available here in Tokyo, as well as all the other branches in Japan. That meant we could reduce our holdings countrywide. Maybe Osaka would be a center for trade, Sapporo, the center for American history, etc. We could specialize our libraries, and we would then have to buy only one copy of a “must have” title. This would save us some money. I did that in COBOL at the time.

Q: COBOL being?

YATES: Common Business Oriented Language. That is the old fashioned stuff that has for the most part disappeared or has been transformed into the “C” or “C++” programming language and now has returned to being so much in vogue because we are trying to get the year 2000 (Y2K) problem straightened out. I programed the new inter-library loan system with something like 5000 strings of code to provide reports and other data for the different branches. We would periodically update them.

At the same time, we had another problem with our libraries: to get people to use them. If you are going to survive in a period of cuts, you must keep attendance numbers up. We devised a direct mail “outreach” system, a way of making the target audience aware of what we had available. In the traditional approach, you make up a list of materials and send it out to your library patrons. That wasn’t good enough, because we didn’t have enough library patrons who were members of the all important “core group.” That group was generally too occupied with business or government to have time to visit our libraries, so were not members.
Therefore, we created an outreach system where, instead of sending out a list on American history, for example, to all on the library patron list, we chose instead to approach only those we thought most interested in the subject. Our full country audience was about 15,000, but obviously, not all would be interested in American history. Maybe 50 or 100 at best. American History is a narrow field, particularly in Japan. On the other hand, we may have had 4000 in our target audience who would have a special interest in the discipline of economics.

Since our DRS was categorized by topical areas, we were able to ask the libraries to make up a list of recently received materials (no more than 15 or 20) in a certain subject area. They would decide what good materials they had in that area—new books, new magazines, etc. We then used our WANG VS-100 to find out how many people in our audience had an interest in the selected topic. Once we had a workable number of individuals to “target” for the selected materials, we would send the instructions to a contractor who, with the specially prepared form, would list the selected materials and mail the announcement to those names topically selected.

The recipient would then look over the listed materials, select up to an allowed four, and return a tear-off portion of the form to the nearest USIS branch for them to respond with the indicated items. The return reply form was postage paid and, once torn off from the listing, would fold up into a format that was acceptable to the Japanese mails. On the reverse side of the completed return form was the original mailing address, so the only part the recipient would have to complete would be the check-off blocks indicating which of the items he or she desired. Completing the form by the recipient was designed to be fairly quick and easy, so as to minimize the effort needed to complete the process. Within four or five days, they would get an envelope back with the ordered materials.

For example, suppose we wanted to do something on our trade imbalance with Japan. Once a topic was decided, within 14 days we would have completed an entire cycle, including the target group selection, addressing, mailing the outreach announcement, the response by the recipient, and the return of the ordered materials. Of course, once the topic and materials were selected and the contractor put to work to mail out the announcement, we would reproduce the listed materials in sufficient numbers to cover the anticipated response and send those copies out to the branches, depending on their proportion of the target audience. We were able to use drivers and other people who were not working on immediate tasks to receive the responses and assemble the orders.

Thus, the materials would get to the target audience in the shortest time possible. The assumption was that if we could respond in a rapid fashion, the person ordering the materials would still remember his or her request and therefore have a better chance of actually reading the materials than one to whom the materials were sent blindly.

We got an average response about 15 percent for each of our mailings and sometimes it was as high as 20-30 percent on economics. But that was very high. It meant that we were getting primary material that we had selected into the hands of people that we had selected. This is a fairly high average rate for unsolicited materials, but because we had carefully selected the target group as one which we knew to be particularly interested in the materials, our high success rate could be explained.
We did not bother people with materials they did not want. Ideally, each time the recipients found the outreach flyer in their mail, they would be conditioned to recognize it as something they would be interested in. If they were not interested in American history, they would not get anything on American history. If they were not interested in the environment, they would not have to read that. But if they were interested in economics, they got the economics material.

The whole outreach process revealed a couple of other things. It quickly showed that our libraries were not always up to speed in those areas with the highest priority in our country plan. The country plan now applied to the libraries. We were beginning to get the pieces of the program to fit together under this single outreach, or “alert,” as we called it in Japan. I don’t know if it is still running, but it did run for a good number of years. It was very easy to do. It didn’t involve very many people. It involved one librarian, at least, who would develop a list of materials. It involved writing up those materials in a summarized form, typing them into the computer, and sending them over to the contractor with the characteristics of the audience wanted; the contractor did everything else. They even mailed the alert.

A blank form, which was the frame for all “alerts,” was pre-printed and on hand with the contractor. Only the printing of the selected names and addresses and the special list of materials was necessary before it could go in the mail. Then, all we did was to reproduce all the materials and make sure the branches had enough, so that they could then distribute them directly to the audience when they mailed in their requests. The mail cycle of addressing and mailing gave us enough time to reproduce and distribute on the first cut. The stuffing of envelopes was done in each branch and mailed directly to the audience in its area. After the order was received, the clerk who stuffed the envelopes would separate the order form into two parts, that with the actual order and the part with the return address of the person who did the ordering. The original target’s address did double duty. It was used with spray-on adhesive to address the package of materials, so we could avoid the additional work needed to address the envelope to the target member. The remaining piece of the original order form had printed on it the membership number of the target recipient and the actual order form on which the ordered materials were selected, so we had a full record of the transaction to keep a running tally of our effort.

Q: What were the principal problems USIA found in dealing with the Japanese where we wanted to try to get them to understand our position?

YATES: Among a variety of trade problems were the major items of beef and oranges. We had a citrus problem in Japan. The Japanese grew their own citrus, called “mikan” - a small, very sweet tangerine, and prohibited or prevented, through tariff and non-tariff barriers, the importation of American citrus products. American beef was not imported into Japan. While beef was an important U.S. agricultural product, the Japanese would not buy American beef, because they had their own beef industry. Japanese “Kobe” beef was very expensive, and they didn’t want to have competition from the grass-fed American beef, because it tasted better and was a heck of a lot cheaper. The Australians were selling flank steak to the Japanese, which also was much cheaper than Kobe beef that was raised on imported grain and sometimes hand massaged to increase the fat content. So we had those two major trade problems.
We also had the automotive imbalance, of course. At that time, Japanese cars were getting hot in the US, and they were making enormous strides in sales of automobiles, while we were doing nothing in Japan, mainly because of what were non-tariff barriers. For example, a shipment of General Motors cars came to Yokohama but were all impounded at the dock and could not be released for sale. The reason was the amount of light in the rear lights that leaked between the area of light that was the brake light and the area of the light that was not the brake light. Under Japanese law as interpreted by the customs officials, that was not allowed. The problem had nothing to do with the safety of the car, its reliability or its value. It was purely a non-tariff barrier which the Japanese customs people could use at the port of entry.

The folks at GM had no idea such a law existed but had to retro-fit all the imported cars with a special gasket in the taillight to prevent light from leaking from one chamber to the other. This example is indicative of the kinds of things that we were up against. A similar kind of tempest in a teapot also occurred regarding “medfly” on U.S. apples going to Japan.

In addition, we had a military problem. About 32,000 American GI’s were resident in Japan, principally in Okinawa. There was a constant battle over the presence of those GI’s and their tendency to get into trouble in the social life that tends to swirl around military bases. We had a training site on the side of Mt. Fuji which was always a sensitive issue, because Mr. Fuji was considered to be a Japanese national symbol and we were shooting artillery shells into the mountain. That, of course, raised sensitive feelings, particularly on the part of the Japanese who were uncomfortable with our presence.

And then there was the problem of noise generated by military aircraft. This was a special problem at those bases where carrier aircraft were moved when a carrier was in port at Yokosuka. Since those large ships could not conduct operations while in port, pilots would have to maintain flight status and keep up training schedules from alternate sites. Of special concern was night flying. Military emergencies may occur at any time, day or night, and the pilots needed night flying experience. However, the people who were aroused at 2:00 am by the roar of the jets taking off and landing at Yokoka Air Base or other military bases could not be expected to be sympathetic to the military need. American military aircraft don’t have the noise abatement fittings that commercial aircraft do. As housing developments pressed closer and closer to U.S. military installations, the problems increased.

If that was not enough, there were nuclear problems as well. Over the past several decades, nuclear power became increasingly prevalent in major American ships. The Japanese had a nuclear phobia and were unhappy with American nuclear powered vessels showing up in their ports. The Japanese’ three no’s - no production, no holding, and no use of nuclear weapons - were a symptom of this particular nuclear phobia. They would give us a lot of trouble on that, and there was always a question of whether American warships that visited Yokosuka were carrying nuclear weapons. The Japanese had the right to ask, but chose not to, thus most times successfully avoiding the problem. But those were serious questions.

Perhaps you remember the soybean incident during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, when he cut off the supply of soybeans to Japan? The soybean and its various products represent an important staple in the Japanese diet. Tofu, for example, is made from soy, and everybody uses soy sauce
in Japanese cooking. Some Buddhists and other vegetarians eat practically nothing but tofu. When Japan is not self-sufficient in soybean products, and when, during the Carter years, it was decided to stop supplying Japan because of official pique over trade difficulties, the Japanese went into shock. They realized how dependent they were on outside sources for something that was very, very important to their diet and did not like the feeling of insecurity.

A related issue is rice. American rice is very good - as a matter of fact, in the opinion of some, better than Japanese rice in terms of taste and quality. However, in Japan with arable land at a premium and rapidly diminishing because of the pressures for housing or other more profitable uses for open land, rice production sharply declined. Perhaps in part because of the shock of the soybean crisis, the Japanese attitude toward self-sufficiency in rice became much more rigid. They clearly felt that something so vital for national survival should be fully supplied from domestic production. That led to very high price supports for rice farmers and an astronomical cost of rice in the market. U.S. rice was much cheaper, but the Japanese felt deeply enough about the problem to continue to pay a very high premium for their rice simply to avoid a situation where they would be beholden to foreigners for the supply of such an important staple. The import of rice was completely banned.

The extremes to which this particular paranoia could be taken can be found in the prohibition of the import of wild rice. While a grain, wild rice is not rice but a completely different product that the Japanese do not grow. Still, since it contained the term “rice” in its description, it was fully banned as an import into Japan. For a long time, the prohibition against the importation of rice has cost the Japanese taxpayer dearly. Politically, however, the Japanese voter accepted the burden as the cost of retaining “food independence” and to avoid the national embarrassment that the soybean shock had created.

Those were the principal issues that faced the bilateral relationship during my tenure in Tokyo. From time to time, other minor things would come and go as immediate issues. Nonetheless, we had definite public affairs problems, all of which were to be addressed through the methods I have described—the outreach, the alert system mailings, the DRS to design the audience around these issues, so we could target the Japanese press and media.

Not all of the problems in Tokyo were of a bilateral nature. One special kind of experience occurred when a CODEL (congressional delegation) came into town. CODELs came and went through Tokyo all the time, and they were always playing to their home audiences while they were in Tokyo. A congressman from the mid-west would come and have no interest in what the Japanese were thinking, but only in what impression his constituents might receive while he was in the news from overseas. Ostensibly addressing the international press on international questions, he would actually be speaking, not to the press in Japan, but to his constituents back home. That always led the Japanese to great seizures of angst about “what are the Americans saying now? Is this a trial balloon? What are they trying to tell us?” We would explain to Japanese journalists that we were trying to tell them nothing. This was simply a Congressman on a junket in Japan but talking to his or her folks back home. So don’t worry about what he says, and particularly do not take what he said as indicative of the attitude of the American government. The Japanese didn’t understand this and always felt they were missing something.
One time, Steve Solarz from New York came into town. We got a call from the embassy political section one afternoon, saying that Congressman Solarz was in town staying at the Okura Hotel and wanted to see me, because he understood that I had poll data on Japanese opinions. I asked what information he was interested in, and he said he wanted to see the data. I responded that I could pull together all the information on a specific subject and save time for him, but he insisted he wanted to see all the data in its raw form. I had about six large, bound books of data, so I picked them up and took them to the Congressman’s room at the Okura Hotel. I sat for a couple of hours in Solarz’s hotel room while he went through the books page by page. I was dumbfounded. Once in a while he would ask a question. He was an intelligent, careful observer of this information and was actually reading the data with an analyst’s eye. For me, this was a revelation, because I had never expected a member of the American Congress to be interested or capable of absorbing information at that level. Whether or not this was the best use of his time was a bit beside the point. He evidently wanted to see the raw data unedited and undigested by others.

Q: I am interviewing Steve Solarz now, mainly on Africa. His way of operating was to go to a place, have people lined up for him, and then he would also talk to other people. He would vacuum up everything. During the period I am interviewing him for now, he was chairman of the subcommittee on Africa; then he went to the subcommittee on the Far East. But he could talk with tremendous knowledge, because he talked to everybody and did the things you are saying. So he was able to draw on real data and real contact. Sometimes he could be a pain in the ass, because he wanted to be everywhere, but I think he was also respected, because he did what you are saying.

YATES: Although I spent a lot of time in the Foreign Service, I had only the slightest contact with American Congressmen. Solarz, with his evident hunger for straight data, was an exception. Of course, the reason was that I had the data he was interested in. I did have respect for Solarz, although there were a number of CODELs that I had no respect for.

One such instance occurred while I was in Afghanistan. Lester Wolf from New York came to Kabul. An interesting man. My recollection is that he was only there about six hours. He was interested in drugs, illicit narcotics. The embassy had made several discoveries in the area of interdicting narcotics and had come to an arrangement with the Afghan government on the means to handle such investigations. They held announcement of the new arrangements off, to wait for his arrival so that he could attend a show and tell about the progress that was being made. At the news conference, he said, “I came to Afghanistan, and despite all these bureaucrats, I broke the log-jam in the narcotics problems here in Afghanistan.” Such a grab for the glory that was based on the hard work of others did not endear him to the hearts of the people who had done so much to make it possible for him to be a part of the final success while he was in town.

That kind of offhand treatment of Foreign Service and other officials working abroad is something that happened very, very often. I saw congressmen and even their staffers coming through, using embassy resources and then spitting on the people who had done so much to help them and made sure their visit was successful. Following an overseas visit where every effort was made to make their visit productive and comfortable, members of the Congress would turn around and criticize imagined standards of living abroad or such things as the “booze budget,”
the funding needed to provide receptions and food to visitors on such occasions as the Fourth of July. They simply were feeding stereotypes at home to make it appear that they were champions of stringent budgetary guidelines, but the cost of one CODEL far exceeded representational events where real governmental business was transacted to the benefit of American business or the taxpayer.

Of course, there were people in the government who were not like that. In the Carter administration, there was Jodie Powell, whom I had some association with while he was at the G-7 in Tokyo. Normally, when a presidential visit would occur, we would have to supply materials, and everybody in the embassy would take a different part of responsibility. In USIS, one of our responsibilities was to prepare Wireless File materials, a news service we provided to the mission. Included in the Wireless File were summaries of public opinion in the host country and of world events in other areas. The basic service was to keep the presidential party abreast of what was going on and what the local press was saying about the visit. Naturally, USIS would also handle incoming foreign press and briefings and interviews.

Powell was particularly good, because he was accessible. Each day, I would put together the local media reaction plus wireless file materials and get it over to his office. He worked in the basement of the Okura Hotel, which was a hotel next to the U.S. Embassy, so it was easy for us to access. He had a windowless office in the basement, about 7 feet by 8 feet. A very small office, it had just enough room for a desk and a chair. He was always in this office reading. The rest of his people often were pushy and insufferable. But he was smart, capable, knew what he was talking about, didn't waste time, and was always respectful of people who were trying to help him. That was very important for those of us who were grinding out the information.

On the other hand, some of the advance people, in particular, were not very smart. Political advance teams that come out, even for presidential visits, are not always the best and brightest. They were often campaign workers who were given an overseas trip as a reward for their campaign work. I recall one member of the advance team for the Carter visit to Japan that was supposed to be at the airport at a certain time; embassy officials couldn't find him. They were supposed to go to the airport, bring him in, brief him, and get him set up for his work. He had disappeared in Tokyo. After an exasperated search, they finally discovered him in Tokyo.

The story was he had gotten to Narita, gotten off the airplane with his backpack, and went into the terminal to find transportation into the city. Not knowing that he would be met, and evidently not appearing to be of presidential advance team caliber to those who were tasked with meeting him, he checked the cost of a taxi to Tokyo, which was astronomical, and the fare for the airport bus, which was evidently too much as well. So he hitchhiked along the expressway back into Tokyo. He put out his thumb out and got a ride. The great amount of effort spent to track him down because of his ignorance of how things are done created much frustration, a quick spreading story, and did little to encourage respect for the incoming presidential advance team.

There was another incident with the Carter advance team at the time of that visit. As usual with such trips, the President had one schedule and Rosalyn Carter had another. One of the things she was going to do was visit Kyoto and one of the gardens there; I believe it was Ryoanji. The young lady responsible for that part of the trip traveled to Kyoto to set up the visit. She took one
look at the stone garden and said this would not do. She wanted carpeting put on the rocks, so that when Rosalyn came and walked out into the garden, she wouldn’t slip on the rocks. It took a lot of tall talking to get the advance team to understand that this would not be something that would be possible, because of Japanese sensitivity to the aesthetics of the location. The advance team fought long and hard on that principal, but finally relented when it became evident that the Japanese and the embassy, would not budge.

During the visit, Carter was to make a major speech on economics. Somebody in the bowels of the White House wrote the speech. I don’t know who it was, but he or she knew nothing about Japan, its culture or its sensitivities. Luckily, we got an advance copy, took one look, and knew it wouldn’t fly. In the last hours before the speech was given, we had to literally rip the whole thing apart and rewrite from sentence one, because it was so crudely written. One wonders how the government manages to keep things connected at home. On the road, it is evident that things fall apart quickly.

When we have had important officials abroad, more than a few times the saving grace has been some poor guy sitting out in the brush who knew the situation and could say, “No, no, don’t do this. You are going to screw it up.” As we downsize and shut facilities, as we remove people, there are fewer and fewer experienced people to do this, and the logic would be that we are going to make more and more mistakes, as, I guess we did, on the recent trip to China.

Q: Carter got hit by the press at least twice. Once was in Poland and another time was making a remark about Montezuma’s revenge in Mexico City. Neither went down very well.

YATES: You have to have somebody with local ears, local eyes, and local feelings to be able to say “Don’t say that,” or “I think, Mr. President, that isn’t quite what you mean,” and correct it on the spot. If you wait for three days, you are lost. You do a lot of damage and negate a lot of the effort that has gone on and millions of dollars that were spent to try to get people to understand American policy and attitudes. And, more importantly, to understand that the American people have respect for people in that country. A presidential slip, a gaffe by one who is speaking for the American people, can undercut a lot of good will that has been established. Maintaining goodwill sells American products, which means American jobs back home, and builds our own reputation abroad as an important place in the world. So as we are shutting down, we are losing this currency.

Q: How did you find living in Japan as, say, compared to Korea?

YATES: The physical aspects of living in Japan?

Q: Just operating within Japan.

YATES: Japan is different, light years away from Korea. During my time in Japan, I went over to Seoul on consultation only once. Since I had been in Japan for some time and other places before that, I had lost my sense of the Korean environment. When I stepped off the plane, it was immediately apparent. You could just feel the difference, a sense that the air is different. The reason, I believe, is in the attitude of the people. The Japanese don’t feel comfortable with
physical contact. They aren’t comfortable with a relationship that gets you too close to their personal lives. It is all right to have an official relationship, and they are very happy with that and are wonderful friends, but if you get too close on the personal side, they are uncomfortable, because you don’t fit into the Japanese scheme of things. For example, there have been many, many books written on the difference between the Japanese and other culture’s business practices, and these are best sellers in Japan so that their readers may feel more comfortable when traveling abroad.

Koreans, on the other hand, are physical. They are in your face. They are much more open and you can joke and carry on - to a point - with a more relaxed feeling than you could in Japan. On a Seoul street, you get bumped into and no one will say, “I am sorry.” In Tokyo, it is a great crisis. If they bump you on the street, they bow and are very apologetic. A Japanese friend and I had formed an international club, the International House. We brought in speakers from different embassies and had a cultural exchange. He was a very quiet and personable man and has since died of a heart attack.

Before I left Japan, he invited me to lunch to say goodbye. It was a nice, pleasant restaurant at one of the smaller hotels in Tokyo on a side street. We were sitting eating, when all of a sudden I crunched down on a piece of glass in my rice. I put it on the side of my plate and ate the other things. My friend asked, “What is the matter with the rice?” I replied, “I think there is glass in it.” “We probably should say something or someone else may be hurt eating the same rice.” So he called the waiter over, and he asked what was the matter. “My friend here found glass in his rice,” he said. The poor waiter almost fainted on the spot. He picked up my plate and rushed off to the kitchen and bedlam ensued. The chef, the restaurant manager, the hotel manager, waitresses - everybody on the staff - suddenly appeared, bowing and almost knocking their heads on the floor saying, “This is unacceptable. We run a good restaurant and are deeply sorry.”

In fact, my friend got away with a complete free meal, because when we left, there was no charge. The whole staff turned out to say goodbye in the parking lot and once again apologize. There was a great intensity in everyone’s apologies. In a good American restaurant, the waiter might say, “I’m sorry, I will bring you a fresh dish and you will not be charged,” and you might even receive an apology from the manager. I would not expect the entire staff to turn out in a display of contrition. But in Japan, there was an extreme sense of embarrassment. My friend said if we had not been cordially treated, we could have simply picked up the phone and called the health officials in Tokyo, and they would have come and closed the restaurant, because an infraction of that type could cause a serious health problem if left unaddressed. A much less dramatic but similar situation can be seen if you buy something in a Japanese store. The clerks spend minutes wrapping up a relatively cheap purchase. The Japanese do things with a different sense of aesthetics and responsibility, which I think is sometimes surprising to westerners who are accustomed to a more casual approach to service. But the Japanese consider it important and necessary.

Q: How did you wife feel about being Korean in Japan? Was this a problem?

YATES: Yes. One of the dark sides of Japan is that they are not as racially tolerant as most of rest of the world. This is true for much of Asia. We had a problem when I was in Kwangju with
the black GI’s. In the late ‘60s, American blacks felt they were deeply wronged in the US, and if they could only get outside of this country, things would be okay. We had black GI’s at the air base in Kwangju who would go off base, thinking they had finally gotten away from this racist society and run right smack into a racial antagonism which was far deeper than anything they had encountered in the US. It caused severe psychological problems for the black GI’s in Kwangju and the military brought in a psychiatrist to handle them. The military were very uncomfortable, since at one time, they had a policy of not sending any black GI’s to Korea because of the racial tension, but that was no longer an acceptable course of action. Korea had not changed, however, and the problem persisted.

A similar effect could be seen in Japan. The Japanese are more sophisticated, perhaps, because there is a basic cultural attitude not to confront people or things directly. This leads to the image that all is fine. But under the surface, there are powerful feelings that have deep cultural roots. The Japanese do not like Koreans, and the feeling is passionately reciprocated. Up until very recently, they fingerprinted all ethnic Koreans resident in Japan, even though they have never been in Korea and don’t speak Korean and may be a second- or third-generation Japanese citizen. They were still considered “gaijin” (foreigners) and had to have an alien registration card. So how did this basic animosity affect us?

The first reaction of Japanese who are not internationally experienced when seeing an Asian woman with an American man is to assume that they are an American GI and a Japanese bar girl. That is a hard image to get over. Once they discovered I am not a GI and she is not a bar girl, it was all right, but she is still Korean. From a distance, my wife would appear Japanese to most people in Japan. It is only when she comes closer that they will recognize that she is Korean. Americans probably wouldn’t notice the differences. There are differences in cheek bone, in the color of the hair, and in the length of the thigh bone, due to the respective national diets. In Korea, there is much more calcium in the usual diet, as well as a larger quantity of vegetables and less salt.

When my wife went into a shop, if they weren’t paying attention, the sales people were very warm and treated her like just another Japanese customer, but if they recognized her as a Korean, they became very cool. That caused some problems, although I think my wife was usually comfortable there because, generally speaking, the Japanese don’t make a point of differences unless they are forced to confront you directly. If you are in an environment with them, they are oblivious to you, even as they are oblivious to other Japanese. Their houses are enclosed by walls, and they keep a very intensely private area. Japanese architecture and the shape of a Japanese garden focus internally. You don’t buy a Japanese house for the view, you buy it for the garden and focus internally.

They do this in their personal relations, which made her tense. Westerners, the round-eye, long-nose type of person, are treated more like children: cute in their own way and distant from intimate Japanese concerns. A Westerner who speaks a little Japanese is adored. It is a wonderful feeling, you are coddled, they fawn over you...to a point. The point comes when the foreigner’s Japanese gets good enough that it is no longer a barrier to communication. No longer cute, a foreigner who speaks Japanese well must be made to fit into the social fabric, even to allow discourse to proceed. Of course, that is virtually impossible without a long residence and
acquaintance with the Japanese person encountered.

A good friend of mine who has been a professor of Japanese language and literature for a number of years and whom I served with in Hokkaido when I was in the army, married a Japanese girl, whom I also knew. A very fine woman. They went back to the United States, and he studied Japanese and became very proficient. They returned to Japan where he studied in Kyoto as a researcher in the Japanese language. He told me that he found the Japan he returned to very, very different from the Japan he had left as a GI. The reason was that his Japanese had improved to the point where it was no longer something that separated him from Japanese society. The problem in Kyoto was that the Japanese now were cold and distant. At the point that he no longer had a barrier in communication with them, he had to be categorized within their system. He could never become Japanese. Sort of like those Hawaiians who become sumo wrestlers. They are wrestlers, but they are always gaijin. Some become Japanese citizens, but they are always gaijin.

The problem for my Japanese speaking friend was that he found his experience in Japan not so much distasteful but much, much harder, because the Japanese he met did not know where to classify him. The Japanese carry business cards which give a lot more information than we probably would have on our business cards. But this is because you must be placed in the system, so people will know how to talk to you, how to relate to you, and what kind of a relationship they should maintain with you. When you are a cute, stumbling gaijin, it is easy. If you are a Japanese person, you don’t let your daughter talk to those male foreigners, but it is all right to socialize in a remote sort of way. You invite them out, entertain them, give them gifts. Everything is fine. It is much as it would be with foreign visitors here. But when you become closer, the relationship changes. Maybe it is true for immigrants here who, after living in an American town for a while, become one of the people but are still seen as different. It then becomes harder for them, since they feel at home but not really comfortable.

Q: What was your impression of the embassy?

YATES: The ambassador during my whole tour in Japan was Mike Mansfield. He was there for more than ten years. Mansfield was a phenomenon. He had more energy than almost anyone else in the office. As I mentioned before, USIS was on the second floor and had big windows that stretched across the entrance. I could walk down the hall and see Mike coming and going. He had a spry step, getting into and out of the car. I guess he must have been about 80 at the time. An amazing man.

When I installed the Wang VS-100 computer at the post, we were very proud of the accomplishment and wanted the ambassador to come and officially begin its operation. We arranged for a photographer, and I had a special terminal set up in my office for him to use. He was going to go to it and touch a key and it would say “Welcome Mr. Ambassador.” So we brought him to the second floor. I still have a picture of him sitting at the terminal, holding up his hand and saying, “What now?” That was because he had pressed the key and the screen went blank. We had tested this repeatedly before, and it always had been fine. My guess is, when he sat down at the terminal, he leaned on the table or something like that, and the cable at the back had come loose. But Mike was a great guy and never lost his cool. He always called me “Ted,”
although I can’t think why.

He also had great influence among the Japanese. First of all, they knew he was very well connected in the Democratic Party and Washington. He was very credible in interpreting the mood of Congress to the Japanese. But he would also do things differently. In his office, for instance, he was famous. When he would invite a guest in, he would say, “Would you like some coffee?” Of course, the Japanese always had coffee and would say, “Sure.” He would say, “If you will just wait a moment, please.” He would walk into a little small Pullman kitchen on the side of his office there, and he would make the coffee and serve it. To a Japanese bureaucrat or an official who is waited on by flocks of young office girls, coffee or tea comes automatically; you don’t ask. The fact that the Ambassador got up and made and served the coffee became sort of a social bit of cachet in Tokyo—those who had coffee made for them by the American ambassador. He used little things like that to great effect. He obviously knew what he was doing. It was a nice touch.

We had a particularly difficult incident in which Mansfield was especially effective. It was on the occasion when a Japanese trawler went down. We had a roaring time with the press; they were taking us apart.

Q: Just for the record a submarine surfaced...

YATES: The submarine was coming up, and the conning tower hit the bottom of a trawler and it sank. The submarine crew did not realize they had hit the small trawler. Three Japanese crewmen lost their lives in that incident.

We were getting roasted by the Japanese press on it. Ambassador Mansfield singlehandedly turned the entire incident off. The way he did that was to get his picture taken by the press with one of the surviving families. In the picture, he was standing before the family bowing and apologizing for the incident. The whole episode instantly vanished as an issue. It was no longer relevant. He had the sensitivity to understand that one single act was what was needed. By making the apology, the matter was concluded. Sort of like my friend’s ear in Afghanistan. It was over, and the Japanese got back to business again. An interesting bit of sensitivity exhibited by the grizzled old coal miner.

Mansfield was an interesting ambassador to work for. I didn’t work for him directly, although I had opportunities to go sit in on the country team meetings. In the morning, he would come into the meeting briskly, once everyone was in place. Everyone soon learned not to be late for one of his meetings, for they never lasted very long. He would brook no shuffling of feet or mumbling or carrying on. He would come in and say, “What’s up?” If everyone said everything was okay, he would say, “It sounds good,” and get up and leave. When there was discussion and you indicated you had something to say, hesitation would cost you the chance and he would go on to the next person. As a result, Mansfield’s country team meetings rarely went longer than 15 - 20 minutes. His philosophy was, if you have something to say, say it; if not, shut up and let us get on with other business. He also had an enormous capacity for statistics and numbers. At a briefing, he could spill out trade numbers and problems at a level of detail that would knock the socks off the press people. An amazing person and a very, very good ambassador, I think.
When the administration changed, the mainly Republican business community in Tokyo was fully of the opinion that they wanted Mansfield to stay. Which important Republican politician wanted to come to Tokyo was immaterial, because Mansfield was so good in maintaining contacts with the Japanese and keeping everything on an even keel, that they didn’t want to lose that capability. He remained there for many years.

EDWARD M. FEATHERSTONE
Political/Military Officer
Tokyo (1978-1982)
Consul General
Okinawa (1982-1986)

Mr. Featherstone was born in New York City and raised there and in Japan. After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania and serving in the US Army, in 1961 he entered the Foreign Service. As a Japanese language and area specialist Mr. Featherstone served primarily in Japanese posts, including Kobe-Osaka, Yokohama, Niigata, Okinawa (Consul General) and Tokyo. He also served in Barbados and in Washington. Mr. Featherstone was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1999.

Q: Well, in 1978, they found an assignment for you, I gather, in Tokyo?

FEATHERSTONE: Yes. We were in Tokyo in 1978. I was a political-military officer again. We had bought our house in Arlington, Virginia not too long before that, in 1976, which is the house we are in now. My daughters were, at that time, in high school. Anyway, we had a good situation with my kids.

Q: They were able to accompany you to Japan?

FEATHERSTONE: They accompanied us to Japan, that is right, until they graduated from college, of course. I mean, until they entered college.

Q: Who was the ambassador at the time? Was it Mike Mansfield?

FEATHERSTONE: Yes, it was Mike Mansfield.

Q: Since you weren’t doing a full new job, how large was the political-military unit in the embassy?

FEATHERSTONE: It wasn’t very large. As a matter of fact, it was three people, counting myself.
Q: To whom did you report?

FEATHERSTONE: I reported to the political counselor.

Q: Depending on the problem.

FEATHERSTONE: Depending on the problem, yes.

Q: Did you have American military officers assigned to your office?

FEATHERSTONE: No. We dealt regularly with the military, but there was no officer assigned to our office.

Q: What were the major problems you had to deal with in those years?

FEATHERSTONE: These were the Carter years. It was mostly getting used to the style and to the stipulations of the Carter administration. There were some ups and downs, of course. I didn’t have all that many serious problems facing me, in terms of political-military or economics, at that time. It took a long time to get used to the Carter’s people way of doing things. I think I said before, they changed USIS a lot, which made USIS people quite unhappy. It was a situation of getting our feet on the ground, after the Carter people came in.

Q: You had been away from Japan for about 10 years when you went back. How did the country change, or did you notice many significant changes?

FEATHERSTONE: It had changed a lot. There was a lot more growth. When I first saw Japan in the late 1940s, it was in ruins. Later on, things became better. Then, they became better than ever before. Now, Japan was rich. It’s like a John Updike thing: rabbit was rich. We finally got to the stage where Japan was rich, and they were outstripping us, in terms of finery. You saw it in the buildings. They had these fancy buildings going up, and all sorts of things. We didn’t have the money anymore to compete on that scale, which was putting big projects up that would impress people, that sort of thing. Not that we didn’t do it for that reason. Japan began to feel its power, I guess. The fact that they had so much money, they had a great deal of influence. It was somewhat more difficult to deal with them because they thought we ought to confide in them more or do things their way more often. This is quite natural. That is the state of the world.

Q: Political-military... Did you get involved in the sales of our airplanes to Japan?

FEATHERSTONE: No, I didn’t really. Mostly, the military people did that. We had a military affairs’ office. There was, I think, a Army colonel and all the military aircraft sales were in his purview. They kept me advised and used to come to me with various ideas on who would be a good fellow to approach or something like that. I would help them out. In that sense, I was involved, but I wasn’t the one who made decisions on that course.

Q: Well, while you were in Tokyo, there were several visits from the Defense Secretary, Brown. Were you involved in those?
FEATHERSTONE: I was, indeed. I was the control officer for Brown. In fact, he sent me a nice note one time. There was a friend of mine who was a colonel in the United States Air Force. He was actually the control officer of Brown, I think. I was there as a State Department political-military officer. If I recall this correctly, the Japanese interpreter was supposed to be there, but he wasn’t there. So, here they were with Brown. So, they dragged me in, and I did the interpreting for Brown for about a two-hour session. Somebody wrote a nice letter to me from him; I think it was Dave Lohman. He was an Air Force colonel who was a good friend of mine.

Q: I think President Carter also visited Japan during the time you were there.

FEATHERSTONE: He did. I went to one of the cocktail parties. I was not involved in the visits, myself. I did go to the reception, though. I remember being there. The Carter people were unusual. They had a laid back, southern style, quite different from what I was used to.

Q: Could you see Japan emerging as a military power or partner for us in the Far East?

FEATHERSTONE: I think it is unlikely. Although memories are now fading, the defeat was very traumatic. Everything was leveled. I remember being in Japan when I was a kid in 1947. There was nothing standing. It was a complete devastation. I remember that pretty vividly. I can’t see getting in the military. There is sort of a psyche resistance to military stuff with the Japanese. They have a terrible time recruiting people. People won’t join. It is very difficult. I just don’t see Japan getting into the major military business.

Q: What about the scandal, I guess you would call it, of the bribery of Japanese officials by American companies such as Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and others?

FEATHERSTONE: Well, you know, this happens. It has happened with probably every nation. I recall, I guess it was the Germans who had something with Siemens in the early 1900s. It happens all the time. I am not condoning it. This is not something that is out of the blue. Of course, one ought to take measures to prevent this sort of thing, and of course, punish those who are obviously overstepping their bounds. Corruption in Japan, like in the United States, is nothing new. They have a lot of stuff, a lot of payoffs on things. Lockheed was one of the big ones. I think former Prime Minister Tanaka was involved in that. I met Tanaka several times. He was from Niigata. Of course, I had been assigned there. I met him several times in Niigata. He knew that I was a Foreign Service officer. I always used to chat with him when I saw him. He was a tough guy. He was nobody to fool with. He came to an unfortunate end, I think. He could have done good things for Japan, and in some ways, he did. He could have been much more effective if he hadn’t rubbed so many people the wrong way, and gotten involved with others who were corrupt. I don’t think he was a bad person himself, but I think he was always in bad company.

Q: This can happen. Were you involved in forcing Japan to increase its military spending?

FEATHERSTONE: That was always something that was on the table for us. It was an objective that we always had in mind. We were always congratulating Japan or encouraging Japan in
things that they did that would increase our readiness and theirs, of course. There is a limit as to how much you can push. Of course, when you are dealing with a nation that was controlled by military authorities for about 1,000 years, you don’t want to push too heavily. We didn’t press them. We certainly complimented them and tried to show our appreciation, which we thought was the right thing.

Q: Can you tell us a little bit about the problems we had with our nuclear arms ships trying to come in, the Midway and others?

FEATHERSTONE: Yes. Japan has a terrible, what they call a “nuclear allergy,” being the only nation that suffered two A-bombs. They were really traumatized by this. My own feeling is that the A-bombs saved Japan, because if we ever had to invade Japan, it would have been house-to-house fighting. Everything would have been destroyed, just like all the places in Europe. It would have been rubble. I don’t know whether you are aware of this, but we never bombed most of Japan. We bombed some of the military area.

Q: In Tokyo.

FEATHERSTONE: We heavily fire bombed Tokyo. In fact, the fire bombs in Tokyo killed more people than the A-bomb did, far more. We never bombed a lot of stuff, including the largest dry dock in the world, which we are still using.

Q: You made the point. They may have had something in mind.

FEATHERSTONE: There is a lot of stuff in Japan like that. We reserved and saved, and Japan was able to recover all that much faster. They had all their power plants. That would not have been the case if we had bombed them to smithereens.

Q: It wasn’t the case in Germany.

FEATHERSTONE: They had all the railroads too. Japan has a massive railroad network. That was all there, and still is. All you had to do was start it up. Everything was going again. That is one of the reasons Japan was able to recover so quickly. The Japanese people, of course, are hardworking and all that. Without that, it would have been 20, 30 more years.

Q: Were you involved in many demonstrations?

FEATHERSTONE: Yes. We had quite a few. As the Vietnam War heated up, there were more and more of them. As I say, they were never violent. I don’t think we ever had any kind of violence. But, there was chanting, and they would wave banners and flags. People would approach you and say, “Get out of Vietnam,” even if that was the only English they could manage.

Q: Were you there for Secretary Weinberger’s visit?

FEATHERSTONE: Yes, several of Weinberger’s visits. He made more than one. Of all the
people that I dealt with, he was by far the most pleasant and easiest. I also think he was one of the smartest. I received a nice letter from him too. Weinberger was a very fine fellow.

Q: Well, after these four years in Tokyo, you went to Okinawa.

FEATHERSTONE: Yes, I went as consul general this time.

Q: The island had been reverted to Japan.

FEATHERSTONE: The island was reverted to Japan in 1972. I was the consul general. Of course we had, and always had, a large military establishment there. I think we had the biggest air base in the world, in terms of runways.

Q: That is what consuls general pride themselves on, I think.

FEATHERSTONE: I am a big scuba diver. Some of the best scuba diving in the world is off Okinawa. I spent almost every spare minute that I could, scuba diving. I was diving all the time, except when the weather wouldn’t permit it, of course. A bunch of the Air Force fellows and the Marines were with me on this. We used to hire a boat and put about 40 people on. You could probably get 60 people on board, but we didn’t have that many. We would go out every weekend, weather permitting, on this boat. We would go to other offshore islands, and anchor the boat, and go diving. It was one of the best times in my life, honest to God.

Q: How large was your staff?

FEATHERSTONE: I had about six or seven people. Some of them are still around, up in Tokyo now.

Q: Oh, it doesn’t matter.

FEATHERSTONE: I had a number of associates and friends at the time. It was one of the best times of my life. I wrote regular reports on local events, conditions, people, etc. and sent these to the DCM, who was my boss at that time. I don’t know whether that information was of much use to anyone, but my Okinawa sojourn was certainly one of the happiest times of my life.

Q: Did the ambassador visit you very often?

FEATHERSTONE: The Ambassador came down once or twice.

Q: Who was it at the time?

FEATHERSTONE: Ambassador Mike Mansfield (Big Mike).

Q: What was the attitude of the Okinawans?

FEATHERSTONE: The Okinawans have always liked Americans. We came there after the war.
Everything was obliterated, because of the war. We came there and helped people. We saved the lives of many people with sulphuric drugs, medicines and so forth. They have always liked Americans. They hate the Japanese.

Q: *That is interesting. I never heard this before.*

FEATHERSTONE: The Okinawans came under Japanese control in 1609 when the Japanese took Okinawa. It was a terrible, harsh rule and the Okinawans had a miserable time of it. Everything was the death penalty. The Japanese were really tough guys. There is no question. They were massively brutal.

Q: *Cruel?*

FEATHERSTONE: Very cruel. Anyway, the Okinawans always liked us. We were their saviors when we came in after World War II, because we helped them. Even with all the demonstrations and everything we had, they were always tempered... They never called us names. They were never spiteful toward us.

Q: *What were your relations as consul general with the American military?*

FEATHERSTONE: Very good. I spent some time in the military myself, so I was simpatico with a lot of them. They were all conservatives, which I am.

Q: *You also didn’t have the big problem of reversion, which you had your first tour out there.*

FEATHERSTONE: That’s right. It was all over with. It was a great thing. For years, the U.S. military thought reversion would be terrible, because they would lose all their influence, because they wouldn’t be able to fly all these missions. But, they were able to do all that and more. In fact, the Japanese paid for a lot of this stuff, actually. It was cheaper having been reverted. It turned out to be much better for the U.S. and much better for Japan.

Q: *Did you have any visitors from this country, out to Okinawa?*

FEATHERSTONE: Yes. We always had whoever the ambassador was, or the chief guy involved in Military Affairs, would come out. They would make regular visits.

Q: *I have only been at the airport. When we landed there, they had us pull down the curtains on our plane, so we couldn’t see anything. This was back in the 1950s.*

FEATHERSTONE: It’s just beautiful. The people are very nice, too.

Q: *Did you at the consulate have to deal with this problem of crimes by the U.S. military out there?*

FEATHERSTONE: Yes. You probably have read about, more recently, the rape of two 12-year-olds by a Marine and a sailor. When I was there, a taxi driver was killed for four bucks, or
something like that. How can somebody do something like that? Killing somebody for four bucks. Killing somebody anyway is awful, but I mean, for four bucks. I remember having to go to the funeral for this guy and a woman broke down and said bad things to me about the United States. That was unpleasant.

Q: I imagine that was an unpleasant duty. Did we still have a problem with atomic weapons out there?

FEATHERSTONE: Not too much. We took most of the nukes out of there by that time. We took the poison gas out. There wasn’t too much there except 21,000 Marines and all their tanks, and all that stuff. The Navy didn’t have very much there. The Navy used to send ships in every now and then, but I don’t think there was a presence there. There was one naval officer, a senior officer, on the staff.

Q: As you were leaving there, what was your view of Okinawa’s future? Do you think it will continue as a happy base for us?

FEATHERSTONE: Well, yes, I think it will continue. Okinawa is a very poor area. It hasn’t anything to recommend it except tourism. It has wonderful beaches, but they don’t make anything there and there are no resources, such as oil. There are no natural resources. The only thing they have is tourism, a beautiful island, and some wonderful places to snorkel dive, swim. The economic prospects aren’t very good. I think most likely the Japanese will continue to support them in various ways, financially.

Q: Subsidized. Yes.

FEATHERSTONE: Subsidize things by providing money for power plants and that sort of thing. I don’t think anything is going to happen that will disturb that because the Okinawans certainly don’t want that to happen, and I don’t think we do either. I think if it is going to continue, then okay. They will never love having American bases there, but they put up with it. Of course, they reap a lot of economic benefits from the bases, by way of selling things. So, it is not altogether bad. I don’t anticipate that there will be any great problems in Okinawa.

JOHN E. KELLEY
Labor Officer
Tokyo 1979-1980

Deputy Chief, Political Section
Tokyo (1980-1982)

John E. Kelley was born in California in 1936 and raised in Washington, DC. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Kelley served in Korea, Portugal, and Australia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 21, 1996.
Q: You left Congressional Relations in 1979, where did you go then?

KELLEY: Back to Japan.

Q: When were you in Japan?


Q: What was your job in Japan?

KELLEY: Again, I had two jobs in Japan. I went back with the understanding that I would have succession of jobs, I went back to the Labor Counselor for a year and then switched over to become the Deputy Chief of the Political Section for the last two years that I was there.

Q: Who was the Ambassador when you were in the 1979 - 1981 period.

KELLEY: Mike Mansfield.

Q: What was your impression of how he operated?

KELLEY: Mansfield focused on creating the impression among the Japanese that the United States had an extremely high regard for Japan. That Japan was, as he used to say, "our most important bilateral relationship, bar none." He had the stature to accomplish that. He did not get himself involved in the minutiae of relations with Japan or in the running of the Embassy, but he was very much in charge of the direction of the policy. He was an excellent representative of the United States because of his personal humility and yet his extremely high stature and with the high regard that he was obviously held in by both the government of the United States and by the Japanese. He also emphasized to a greater degree than any other Ambassador before or since, the role of the Congress in U.S. policy and spent a lot of time personally cultivating all of the people he had known in the Senate and in the House of Representatives, during his long term in the Senate, to build the impression that he already held that the U.S./Japan relationship was the most important bilateral relationship that the United States had. He would spend a lot of time with any Congressional Delegation that came through, personally briefing them on this relationship and what was going on with it, then corresponding with these people to make sure that they understood and appreciated the importance of the relationship.

Q: You had the labor job for a year. What was the labor situation as you saw it in Japan and what did the Labor Counselor do?

KELLEY: The Labor Counselor had both a traditional role and then had a role that I thought was more important. The traditional role was to keep the Department of Labor and to a lesser extent the Department of State advised of what was going on in Japan. The role that I thought was more important was to use the labor connection to advance United States interests in the economic relationship between the United States and Japan.

Q: Let's talk first about the traditional role. As long as you have two "masters" (almost three
masters really) the Department of Labor, the Department of State, and the AFL CIO, did you feel at this particular stage of things that you had too many "masters"? What roles were they playing?

KELLEY: My feeling was that they didn't have enough "masters". Or at least not enough people who were involved in and concerned about what I was doing. At one point I even thought that it might have been a good idea to switch the Labor attaché functionally, from the political section to the economic section. I never actually pursued that officially, but I pursued it in other ways. I worked much more closely with the economic section than I think anybody had in that job since it was first instituted back in the 1960's. Having different people interested in what I was doing and trying to influence what I was doing was never a problem because ultimately even though different entities have different approaches, if they were interested in the U.S./Japan relationship at all, they were regarded as a plus. It was an opportunity for us, not a burden, to cultivate a perspective of the relationship which was congenial to our own. That was the Ambassador's impression that it was the most important bilateral relationship that we had. So we did that. The more people that were involved and interested, the better. So when I would receive delegations out from the AFL CIO, for example, it was a great opportunity to go out and expose them to the nature of what the Japanese were doing and let them know what the competition was like, and what we had to do to deal with it -- give them a dose of reality.

Q: How did you view the Japanese labor situation? Where do they fit into the Japanese scene, at the time that you were there?

KELLEY: The Japanese labor movement was split in two, the larger portion was aligned through the labor confederation with the Socialist party, with strong communist influence. The other was aligned with the democratic socialist party and was less political really, and more congenial to the American approach to labor relations, industrial relations, although they were historically much more company unions, enterprise unions, if you will, than our own unions were. Politically, we wanted to moderate the attitudes of those in the socialist labor movement to get them to be more accepting of what we were trying to accomplish in Japan: what the United States and Japan were trying to accomplish together in the region. What we were doing and what our security treaty was all about and what it was trying to accomplish. Because Domei had a relationship with the AFL CIO, and Sohyo's relationship was more with the communist trade unions, we had a strong interest in strengthening that relationship that Domei had with AFL CIO, and strengthening Domei's influence in helping to encourage to the degree that we could without actually interfering, was the consolidation of a labor movement, unification of the Japanese labor movement, but along democratic principals so that Domei would be the dominating influence.

Q: How did the Japanese labor leaders and people you dealt with respond to what we were trying to do?

KELLEY: Sohyo almost predictably thought we were trying to dominate the labor movement and undermine their efforts and advance our own political agenda. Domei wanted to keep us at arms length because too close of an embrace would taint them. But they appreciated the assistance we gave them and they knew that we would invite them over to the United States, provide them with grants of various kinds, to see how the U.S. labor movement operated for
example. We helped them promote contacts with the free labor movement and helped them to get wider recognition around the world through these contacts. So they encouraged a quiet, cooperative relationship. They tried not to be too openly engulfed in our embrace. They were congenial to our views about the security treaty for example, and other political issues and were quietly supportive.

Q: Did you find the delegations of the AFL CIO that came over to understand the need not to be too exuberant in the dealings with Domei?

KELLEY: Well, it wasn't a problem for them so much, because they were union to union. If the government got involved with the union then that was suspect. That tainted the union if it became to blatant. Another union, the AFL CIO union, having contact with a Japanese union or a union movement didn't carry the same weight. The communists within Sohyo tried to paint the AFL CIO as a CIA plant and in fact tried to discredit Domei. But they had to be very careful about that, because they wanted the relationship with the AFL CIO themselves. So it wasn't an approach that was taken by Sohyo, it was only taken by the more extreme elements of Sohoto influenced by the communists. They tried to cultivate a relationship with the AFL CIO and the AFL CIO recognized that they couldn't exclusively relate to the Domei and they also had to have a relationship with Sohyo and they tried to develop it.

Q: At one time we had the Department of Labor and within the AFL CIO had essentially ex communists who were more holly than the Pope as far as being anti communists, and sometimes this outlook did not allow them to see things except in extreme black and white. Was this a problem then?

KELLEY: You had individuals who had this problem, but we didn't see much of that in Japan. More often you would get people from the AFL CIO coming out who recognized that they had to have some kind of contact with Sohoto, to keep it within balance so that Domei wouldn't get bent out of shape, but would try to make overtures to Sohyo. Because in many cases they would be dealing with unions and there would be union to union problems that had to be resolved. We had some international issues for example, we had to work to resolve to the benefit of the American labor movement and we needed the cooperation of a sector which was dominated by Sohyo and we had to work with the Soviet Union. There were even representatives, or people who would be at international conferences who wouldn't have to deal with Sohyo and they would do so. You find the Sohyos logs more often in the area of working with underdeveloped countries then you would working in the industrialized countries.

Q: You said that there was also an economic side to your labor job, what was that?

KELLEY: I thought that the most important part of the economic support of my job was the automobile industry, which was sort of emblematic of the economic side of the job. It's the constant problem of not exporting our jobs to Japan or any other country. We had a problem with the U.S. automobile industry which had not recognized that it had to export and had satisfied itself with the United States market and had allowed the Japanese to export into our market without really competing. It became clear to me early on, as it became clear to the Japanese auto workers union at the same time, that if the Japanese automobile industry continued to export
autos to the United States at the rate it was at the time in the late 1970's and early 1980's that there would be a tremendous reaction in the United States and there would be an effort to shut down trade relationships in automobile exports in Japan and the United States. This would benefit nobody. It could reverberate throughout the U.S. trade area and could wind up with all kinds of restrictions in all kinds of countries on imports. So there had to be some moderation in Japanese exports of automobiles to the United States, or some gesture of some sort that could be accepted by the AFL CIO, and by the U.S. auto workers.

The idea that the Japanese auto workers had was that they should encourage the Japanese automobile producers to do what Honda had already started to do. Honda was a renegade in Japan. Nobody followed Honda's lead. Everybody in Japan thought Honda was nuts. The big automobile producers, Toyota and Nissan, showed no inclination to build automobile production in the United States, and as long as they did not there was a tremendous possibility of explosion.

The Japanese auto workers decided that they would try to convince the Japanese auto manufacturers to open production in the United States, thinking that they could blunt the inevitable American reaction that way and maintain jobs in Japan at the same time that they provided some jobs in the United States. This would benefit the Japanese automobile industry over the long term. When I learned that this movement was afoot, I went to the Ambassador and asked him to take a personal interest in this thing. His immediate reaction was "How"? I suggested to him that he write to Doug Frazier, the President of the UAW, and ask him to accept an invitation that had been extended by the head of the Japanese Auto Workers and to come to Japan and try to negotiate arrangements with the Japan auto industry to produce Japanese cars in the U.S. The Ambassador liked the idea and he asked me to draft a letter. I did and he sent it off. This became the catalyst because Frazier was not about to respond to the head of the Japanese Auto Workers because he thought he would be sandbagged. He thought he would be exposed to the criticism of the United States if he came over and negotiated some kind of deal that turned out to be a bogus deal. He didn't know what to think. He didn't know enough about Japan. When he got the assurance from the Ambassador that this was a good idea, and since Mansfield had such great credibility with the labor movement because of his former position as Majority Leader, this broke through all of the barriers. Frazier came over and negotiated deals with all of the major auto manufacturers, over several visits. That provided the impetus for the creation of all of this industrial automobile production in the United States which is so accepted today. I think that probably avoided a collision which could have damaged not only our relationship but changed the course of our trade policy and converted us to isolationism.

Q: That's fascinating. That shows you that officers in the field can take a look and see opportunities and gain the support of somebody such as the Ambassador and of course you had an Ambassador who could do it. It was almost fortuitous, if you had the normal Ambassador, well thought of and all, but wouldn't be able to reach out to somebody such as the head of the UAW.

KELLEY: I felt that it was perhaps the most significant thing that I had ever gotten involved in and had any influence over in the Foreign Service. I had to take a little flak from the Political Counselor because I had sort of gone out of channels, directly to the Ambassador with this thing because it was really so much economic that I was afraid that it would get too politically colored
by bringing it through the Political Counselor.

Q: *Who was the Political Counselor?*

KELLEY: Al Seligmann. I didn't deliberately try to offend him. I tried to be conciliatory after the fact. My role was to be the Ambassador's advisor on labor affairs and nothing in my charter said that it was supposed to go through the Political Counselor, for that particular thing. If it was political that was something else. In the end the Ambassador became so enamored of this project that it developed a life of its own with him. He would make speeches on it -- when I switched over to the political section as Deputy of the political section, I continued in the role of a speech writer for the Ambassador and helped him to craft some ideas in his speeches that dealt with this particular issue. We continued to work very closely on this thing throughout. It was a tremendously important episode in the U.S.-Japan relationship -- I think it was the seminal event in the economic relationship between Japan and the United States during Mansfield's tenure.

Q: *It really lanced the boil, didn't it?*

KELLEY: I think it did. The unfortunate thing is the UAW ultimately didn't recognize the significance of what its own President had done. When Frazier was replaced as President, and then the succession of UAW Presidents tended to focus on what was wrong with the relationship, what was wrong with the agreement, the way it was implemented and so forth. They didn't recognize that this was an agreement that had to be applied with some flexibility. They focused on the way the Japanese continued to subcontract parts production with Japan, they continued to bring in partially constructed vehicles, frames, etc., and assembled them in the United States. They thought all of this work should have been done in America. Well it should have been. But there was a tremendous breakthrough there none the less. The rest of the problems could be worked on and were worked on and resolved over time. Not to recognize the seminal importance of the breakthrough, I think, was churlish on the part of Frazier's successors and some of the lesser elements of the UAW.

Q: *When you moved to this other job in 1980 or 1981, what were the main things that you were dealing with then in the political section?*

KELLEY: For the first year the job was external relations, during the second year I moved into the internal. It was also sort of executive officer in many ways, for the Embassy and I would do things like coordinate Presidential visits under the direction of the DCM. I would really be his exec in effect, he would be the overall coordinator.

Q: *Did you have a Presidential visit or visits?*

KELLEY: We did, Carter came out for Ohira's funeral. I dealt with that, coordinated that.

Q: *How did it go?*

KELLEY: It went extremely well, given that it was such short notice. In fact that may have made it a little better, there wasn't enough time for anybody to come in and screw it up. We had to put
together a number of side consultations with the Japanese and a number of other countries. We
had to give the Japanese plenty of political mileage out of the visit, give the President some
exposure to the new Japanese leadership and at the same time give him a chance to reassure the
Japanese about a lot of the things that we were doing out in Asia. All together I thought it was a
great success. They certainly thought so, they had come to us early in the piece as soon as they
discovered that U.S. citizens were here and they thought that it was very important to recognize
that this was to take place at the highest level. It took me a while to convince -- I didn't have the
wit unfortunately to make sure that they understood that what I understood to be the highest level
was the President. I just assumed that they knew that the President was the highest level and I
think that they assumed that I knew that as well. Unfortunately the Political Counselor didn't
accept that. He wouldn't let me go back and clarify it with them, so I had to persuade him and in
turn that is what they meant. Meanwhile we spun our wheels for awhile while I tried to get him
to agree to that was what they meant. Once we got past that it went pretty well.

Q: During this 1980-1981 period basically the Carter Administration, Japan's external relations
I take it that the Northern problem with the Soviet Union remained a delightful obstacle for any
opening up to the Soviet's, didn't it?

KELLEY: The Soviet's were our best friends during that period. They were all over themselves,
stepping on their own crank constantly during that period. Doing things that just alarmed the
Japanese. Of course the Japanese were deliberately taking advantage of every gap, of every flight
by a Russian Bear aircraft, or anything else that these fools might do, to exacerbate the problems
in the relationship and build up the Northern defenses. So for us it was wonderful [laughter] we
would just sit back and watch this and watch the Russians stumble over themselves refusing to
give up the Northern territories, or even talk about it. We'd watch the Japanese get madder and
madder and madder.

Q: Was there anything happening with China in that particular period? This was during the
Carter Administration where we formalized relations with China. Did you see much movement?

KELLEY: The Japanese were always concerned that they would be out ahead of us, but not too
far ahead. Trying to fine tune that posture was their particular concern. They were particularly
concerned with not being hit with anymore surprises about China, the way they were with the
Nixon visit and Kissinger's visits and we obliged it. We didn't hit them with any surprises
regarding China and they were always a little bit ahead of us in developing their relationship
with China.

Q: How about the new nations in the Pacific Islands, any Japanese more interested in those than
we were?

KELLEY: Our problems in that area were largely that the Japanese had a much better image out
there than in the areas they formally had control of during World War II and before, than we did.
The island areas were very anxious for Japanese economic assistance and our primary concern
was that the Japanese economic assistance not be so overwhelming that ours was dwarfed by
comparison and we were made to look foolish. This was a constant problem because there was
no money available, or very little money. As always has been the case since after the Korean
War with our assistance for that part of the world. I don't recall any particular difficulties in that area.

Q: Are there any other areas, problem areas, during this period?

KELLEY: There was one other problem area and that was that former Ambassador Reischauer used the occasion of a visit that he made to Japan to make a pronouncement about how nuclear weapons had been handled in the U.S./Japan relationship. He referred to the "introduction" of weapons into Japan. Given the Japanese allergy to nuclear weapons, anything that was said on the subject at all which introduced an element of uncertainty about whether we had or had not introduced nuclear weapons into Japan was a matter on intense alarm. Politically this was probably the most explosive issue during the time that I was there.

Q: Reischauer had been Ambassador, among other things, was this a gratuitous remark or was there a purpose behind it?

KELLEY: I didn't have a chance to talk to Reischauer and he never really explained himself, that I recall, I'm sure he did at some point. My assumption is that he was just having pangs of conscience, that he thought that perhaps he had not been as forthright and honest and his reputation was somehow stained -- not as forthright as he might have been. He was a little bit uneasy about the requirements of diplomatic life with regard to how you dealt with very delicate issues and having a policy which were not totally clear, frank, etc., about what you were doing in areas as important and as explosive as the nuclear weapon policy. It was sometimes that he may have had a lot of trouble dealing with. I think that he felt that he needed to ease his conscience somehow with his new academic colleagues -- after he went back he became more vocal about our policy in Vietnam, and I think he felt uneasy about anything he might have done that dealt with this very sensitive Japanese issue.

Q: It was very obvious to anybody who was even not privy to secrets -- obviously we were carrying nuclear weapons in somewhat major ships that we put in there. If we sort of said "We're not saying" it was sort of a fig leaf, but once you say it all of a sudden then it becomes a reality. How did you all deal with this?

KELLEY: With great trepidation. [laughter] We knew what the reality was and we knew that the Japanese at the highest levels of government knew what the reality was. We had to craft language that would make the reality palatable, without rubbing the Japanese public's nose in the reality. That's what we went about doing, and ultimately we wound up with a formulation that the Japanese government thought was acceptable to the Japanese public. Fortunately, Reischauer did not feel obliged to push the issue much beyond what he had already done. He could push it to some degree, but he didn't pound on it. It continued to be a festering problem in the relationship up until the time the Navy decided that it would remove its nuclear weapons from its tactical forces.

Q: You left there in 1981, is that right?

KELLEY: It was 1982.
Q: Did the coming of the Reagan administration have any effect on policy with Japan?

KELLEY: The difference was night and day. The Japanese were much more at ease with Reagan, in the political sense, security sense. The Japanese are traditionalists when it comes to diplomacy, they like the tried and true methods. They know how that works. They were brought up on the power politics of the turn of the century, that's when they were introduced to diplomacy, generally. When Reagan came in this was great power, diplomacy again. They knew how that worked -- or at least they thought they did. They got it wrong when they were first introduced to it at the turn of the century, but at least they thought they knew what was going on. This was the America that they had dealt with before. The one that knew what its role was, it was confident that they could do it against the communists, that valued its alliances and put them first, and didn't go around beating up on people about human rights. To the point that it seemed to not be taking into account cultural differences, which was always the great preoccupation in Asia. They could understand a certain emphasis on human rights but what they got bent out of shape about was when we seemed to be telling people how to behave culturally. So they were relaxed about Reagan. The left didn't like him very much, but the left didn't run Japan.

CRAIG DUNKERLEY
Principal Officer
Fukuoka (1979-1981)

Ambassador Dunkerley was born in Wisconsin and raised in several states in the Midwest. He was educated at Amherst College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In 1970 he entered the Foreign Service, serving abroad in Da Nang, Tokyo, Yokohama, Fukuoka, Brussels and Vienna. During his career Mr. Dunkerley became a specialist in NATO and International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control matters, and served as Special Envoy for Conventional Forces in Europe from 1997 to 2001 with the personal rank of Ambassador. He also had several tours of duty at the State Department in Washington, DC. Ambassador Dunkerley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: You then went down to Fukuoka?

DUNKERLEY: It was my great good fortune to be assigned as Consul – the Principal Officer – at our Consulate in Fukuoka from mid 1979 to mid 1981. It was a delightful experience – one that I still remember with fondness. It was an assignment to a very pleasant part of Japan, the consular district essentially covering the island Kyushu, which in turn was exceptionally rich in Japanese history and tradition, in the arts and traditional culture. For the most part, there was not at that time a pervasive Western presence, let alone numbers of Americans, in Fukuoka or Kyushu – at least as compared to Tokyo or the Osaka-Kobe area. This was both an advantage and an attraction to being posted there: if you wished, it was an opportunity to access and immerse one’s self in things Japanese in a way not readily available in Tokyo.
Much of the Consulate’s activity was related, in addition to the usual sorts of consular work, to very active trade promotion and to extensive public affairs outreach. It was also a useful perch from which to gain a sense of domestic politics at the local level in that part of Japan – Western Japan – and so we provided considerable analysis and reporting during several national elections during that period. Given its location and past history, this was also a part of Japan with special and long-standing ties with both Korea and China. While the basic direction of Japanese relations with those countries was set at the national level, there were interesting regional aspects to those relationships. For example, Japanese investment and industrial projects with China were picking up then – this was the late 70’s – and so the Consulate also followed several ground-breaking Kyushu-Shanghai projects of the period.

So in all of this, as Principal Officer I ended up doing a great deal of time traveling throughout Kyushu and its different prefectures, with the opportunity to meet not just local officials, business leaders, and journalists – but also various artists, craftsmen, actors and the like. From a personal perspective, it was a great time.

There were, of course, also occasional but quite serious problems to deal with. Early on there was a tragic fire in one of the consulate residences in which an American officer perished along with his visiting mother.

And there was a major political incident of an American submarine – the George Washington – sinking a Japanese freighter in, as I recall, early 1981 (Perhaps a recurring theme in U.S.-Japanese relations has been that of accidental submarine collisions). The accident was serious enough by itself, resulting in several deaths. The immediate aftermath was a casebook example of the problems and tensions arising out differences in culture: in this case, the divergence between an understandable but unfortunate reluctance on the part of some U.S. authorities to say too much prematurely, following our own legal standards and practices, and the need, seemingly hardwired into Japanese perceptions of what constitutes proper behavior in such situations, for prompt, sincere, and even emotionally evocative apologies. As much of this played out in Kyushu waters, and the Japanese casualties came from Kyushu. I ended up playing a certain role in the management of that problem.

My two years there went fast. At the end of that period, I was awarded a Fellowship – as an International Affairs Fellow – at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. After a year at the Council, I returned to the Department in Washington, working from mid 1982 to 1986 I was in the Bureau of European affairs – first in the Office of Soviet Affairs dealing with strategic arms control and then in the Office of NATO Affairs continuing this focus on negotiations with the Russians.

Q: I’d like to go back to Fukuoka. Was the political atmosphere different there than in Tokyo? Newspapers, political control and all that?

DUNKERLEY: Yes and no. There was, of course, a noticeable difference between being out in the provinces and being in the central metropolis. One could say that it was a slightly slower pace out in Western Japan, though I wouldn’t carry that too far. It was certainly not more insular. But as you know from your own experience out in that part of the world, Tokyo was and remains
very much the center of Japan’s political affairs, and its national media out of Tokyo similarly shaped much of the broad coverage of politics by regional and local outlets.

Q: How was the influence of U.S. military?

DUNKERLEY: Within Western Japan, you had a US Navy presence at Sasebo naval base not too far from Nagasaki. There was also a Marine Corps air station at Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture, on the Honshu mainland but also part of the Kyushu consular district. Inevitably there were periodic civil-military problems with aircraft noise and the like.

But it was my good fortune when I was there not to have the sort of problems that had been seen there more recently, for instance in connection with our presence in Okinawa. There was a qualitative difference. Just looking at the numbers involved, the ratio of American military presence in Okinawa was much, much higher in a relatively small area than what we are talking about in Kyushu at the time I was there.

Q: Without overstating it, there is a difference almost in quality and outlook between an infantry and people maintaining airplanes. What happened during the incident between the George Washington and the freighter?

DUNKERLEY: The SSBN George Washington was running exercises. There was bad, foggy weather and low visibility. It surfaced and abruptly collided with a small Japanese freighter. It submerged and the freighter sank. Several of the crew drowned. Again, there was a question of responsibility for the initial act and then an apparent failing to respond.

Unfortunately, in the George Washington incident, it took 24 or 36 hours before we were able to say authoritatively through the U.S. Navy that in fact it had been an American submarine involved. During that time there was a certain amount of confusion on the Japanese side. That length of delay was unfortunate. Part of the problem that followed relates to the inevitable disconnect between a culture such as ours – where we are acutely aware of legal procedures, determining guilt and responsibility through a formal process – as opposed to a Japanese cultural situation where there is much more weight assigned to an immediate and profound expression of regret. It took a certain amount of time to work out – just as in the more recent incident off Hawaii of a few years ago.

Q: Off Hawaii where we sank a Japanese research and school vessel.

DUNKERLEY: Yes.

Q: What did you do? Did you have to wait?

DUNKERLEY: No, I had to get involved since it was in my consular district and all of the crew who were lost came from a small town in the southern part of my district – in Kagoshima prefecture. I had to get to the scene rather quickly and represent the U.S. in expressing at least our initial apologies to the grieving families. I had to make a variety of public statements to try to tamp things down even as the U.S. Navy was grinding through its own procedures to determine
responsibility. I had to convey that sense of regret.

Q: Did you have the Navy trying to keep you from over apologizing?

DUNKERLEY: No, but I was the one who had to be out front on the local scene in those first few days.

Anyhow, enough of those days.

ROBERT W. GARRITY
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1979-1983)

Robert W. Garrity was born and raised in Boston, Massachusetts. He graduated from Boston College in 1957. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Garrity served in Germany and Iceland. He was interviewed by Hans N. Tuch on June 5, 1990.

GARRITY: I think the interest was probably common to my wife and me. Comparing notes, it started back in childhood, reading and so forth. It really hit us en route to our first assignment in Southeast Asia, because our first stop outside the United States was a 24-hour layover in 1965, with our three small children, in Tokyo. I remember my wife saying at that time, "Some day you've got to get assigned here." We just never forgot Japan. Of course, in those days it was still under construction. They had had their 1964 Olympics and did very well. Tokyo, in 1965, compared with when we went back in 1979 they were two totally different cities.

Q: I was there for two weeks in 1955.

GARRITY: When there wasn't much city at all!

Q: That was the only time I've been there.

GARRITY: So I guess you get a feeling about, and an attraction to, a place, and the contrast. I think we returned to Japan on the way back from Vietnam, and my wife was posted in Bangkok with the children. Of course, the contrast between Japan and Southeast Asia is quite extraordinary.

Q: Yes. The reason I am so interested in this is that in all our dealings with Japan, both governmentally and non-governmentally, it appears to me that we have often thought in terms of dealing with Japan as our Secretaries of State -- Kissinger comes to mind, specifically -- deal with the Europeans. However, it appears to me that you are really dealing with an entirely different culture, with a different world, and that one has to take that into consideration if you are ever going to do any good -- let's put it that way -- in Japan for your own country.

What do you think is the essence of how we should approach our relationship with Japan?
GARRITY: I think there's a danger in being overly mystified by Japan. The Japanese themselves, over many, many years, contributed to the feeling that they're very difficult to understand -- really, for foreigners, impossible to understand.

Q: They convinced me. (Laughter)

GARRITY: Their language is "impossible for anyone to master." It's a very difficult language. It's difficult for the Japanese. I'm not saying that as one who mastered it. I was shortchanged on the language training and only got the half of it, and that was the lesser half in Washington.

But I think that compared to Americans and American society, Japanese culture and society is more easily available and more easily understood than our own. We are much more complex as a society. On the other hand, I think there is a tendency to think of Japan as just one big homogenized mass of people. That's not true, either. My experience in Japan, because of having supervision of our Cultural Centers -- which we don't call Cultural Centers anymore; we call them American Centers, whatever that means -- I think the contrast in the different parts of Japan can be very marked, to me. The rich historical tradition in Kyushu, the outward-looking and very different kind of attitude among the people in Hokkaido, which is more recently settled, sort of the California or the last frontier of Japan.

It's an exciting country to experience. Obviously, understanding the culture is essential to dealing with Japan. There are a lot of Americans who do understand that. There's a tremendous amount of expertise, not as much as we would like to have, but more than we realize we have. Nevertheless, coming to Japan later in a career rather than at the beginning, as most Japan hands usually do, I made it my point to see Japan and try to accept it as it is today, rather than being burdened by what it was like way back then. And this incredible economic miracle, it's all done. I think we have to deal with Japan as it is now, not agog over what they've accomplished compared to what they were forty years ago.

Q: In our relationship with Japan, do the Japanese have an easier time understanding us, dealing with us, than we with them?

GARRITY: I don't think so. I think that they learn to deal with certain patterns and traits of Americans, but I think there are very few Japanese who really understand the United States.

Q: But superficially -- just superficially -- we have a relatively small number of Japanese-language officers both in the State Department and USIA, who can deal with the Japanese and Japan in their native language. I don't think that there is a Japanese salesman, whether they sell computer chips or Toyotas, who would think in terms of dealing with Americans in this country without speaking fluent English.

GARRITY: That's right.

Q: I mean, isn't this one shortcoming that we have as a society, in that we are reluctant? Maybe we realize it now more than we did in the past, but that we shortchange ourselves in not dealing
with, say, the buyer of our products on his own terms and in his own language. We expect them to speak English and deal with them in our terms rather than their terms. Do you have any comment on that?

GARRITY: I think that's been a tradition. We were not traditionally an export country. We sold what was left over from the American market. Quite a contrast between that and other nations' approach, where they actually research the foreign market and manufacture to suit that market. We are learning how to do that, but it certainly has not been a tradition in the United States.

Q: From your point of view and from your experience, how, in the area of public diplomacy, that we were involved in, what do you think we have done wrong? What do you think we have done right? And how do you think we ought to approach the future?

GARRITY: Our public diplomacy, as practiced with Japan, has really been driven by policy. We are supporters of policy. Our job is to explain policy, as well as explaining what makes Americans tick, as we do everywhere. Policy isn't necessarily made by people who know anything about Japan. As a result, the pattern over many years in our dealings with Japan is an intense kind of focus on very small issues. So we've really dealt microcosmically with Japan, where the Reischauers and the Ezra Vogels of the world see a macrocosmic view of Japan and know all the issues as well. The official policy has never really come to grips with the macro view of Japan. So as a result, we have concentrated so heavily on whether there is access in the Japanese market to particular American manufactured goods --

I think I found it very useful to come to Japan when I did. I suppose it was kind of a quirk. The assignment, I believe, was made purposely by John Reinhardt, the director at the time, to actually bring in someone who hadn't been there before on assignment and, in a sense, bring a stranger into the club.

Q: You were there before David Hitchcock?

GARRITY: David was there for the last two years of my stay, and the first two years, Cliff Forster was PAO.

Q: Both Japan hands, so to speak.

GARRITY: Yes, long assignments in Japan and fluent in the language.

Q: Is David fluent?

GARRITY: Oh, yes, and very, very good on the culture, very strong understanding of Japan.

Q: David has written quite a bit about Japan. As a matter of fact, I am going to try to interview him, also, although he is not yet a retired person, but anticipating his retirement.

GARRITY: I would say that the people assigned by the Agency in Japan, particularly the American Center directors -- maybe I'm just judging from my own experience there -- having
division of labor with the PAO during my time; I had charge of the Information Division and in the Information Centers, plus just the overall concern for the post -- the Center directors, in my experience, were some of the most outstanding Foreign Service officers I've come across, without exception, very, very able in the language.

Q: That seems to parallel my experience in Germany, when the Amerika Haus directors, in my view, were sort of the engines that drove the program in Germany.

What was the major thrust during your period in Japan, which was the four years between 1979 and 1983? Mike Mansfield was the ambassador during the entire period.

GARRITY: Yes.

Q: What was the main thrust of the USIS program in Japan at that time?

GARRITY: Let me preface that by saying, working as an Amerika Haus director in Munich gives you a very special connection to anyone else who has ever been an Amerika Haus director or an Information Center director. It's probably -- going back over everything -- the best job they've ever had. It's the most fun.

Q: Exactly! The most fun. (Laughter)

GARRITY: The most fun. It's twenty-five hours a day and you never regret a minute of it.

Q: But you do think that's what you would normally do for recreation. (Laughter)

GARRITY: Right. (Laughter) The contrast, of course -- and I think it's probably a contrast with the program in Germany today -- we had a program in Munich which was markedly cultural. We covered all the issues, but we had a very rich cultural program, as well. That was less true, I think, in Japan, although we did have cultural presentations, visiting artists. Certainly the heavy concentration was on the issues that were driving the bilateral relationship.

Q: In other words, you were involved in really supporting the economic, the political, the security issues which were in the forefront through programs that you did in your centers or through exchanges.

GARRITY: That's right. I particularly did a lot of work with the Japanese media around lunches that I would have at my home. We had a steady stream of government officials who I would try to get together with the appropriate Japanese media.

Q: Was it easy or difficult to deal with the Japanese media? Were they receptive to your approaches?

GARRITY: Oh, yes. Very much so.

Q: I noticed in Germany, no self-respecting German editor would ever use a piece of wireless file material in his or her newspaper, whereas in Brazil, even in the most respected newspapers,
even under the absence of censorship, would take a wireless file and slap their own correspondent's name on it and publish it as though it were their New York or Washington correspondent. Did the Japanese, for instance, use the wireless file?

GARRITY: They certainly understood what we were doing with the wireless file, and it was not an object of suspicion in that sense. They found it most valuable as a record of policy statements.

Q: Source material.

GARRITY: Source material, texts for speeches, presidential speeches, and so forth.

Q: In other words, they used it, say, to write editorials, because the wireless file was the one resource that provided full text, which the AP or other wire services, if a president gave a speech or a secretary gave a press conference, would provide a story, not the authoritative text.

GARRITY: They have several of their own international wire services and their own correspondents, plus, of course, access to AP, Reuters, UPI, Tass, you name it. I mention Tass, which has become a little more respectable now than it used to be. Nevertheless, the value that the wireless file offered -- and it was invaluable -- it's a full text that you just wouldn't get from any other source that quickly. That's what we really tried to stress with Washington, to keep those texts coming, keep the policy statements coming.

Q: Talking about the wireless file and the importance of the centers and your program in the centers, what were some of the other things that were particularly effective? Exchanges or the Fulbright program?

GARRITY: The whole exchange apparatus is gold, as far as I'm concerned. When I first went to Japan, I approached our cultural attaché, who was a fine man by the name of Sidney Hamolsky, who is now retired in southern California.

Q: We served together in Brazil, where he was the cultural attaché.

GARRITY: Very, very devoted. In my naivete, I said, "Sid, could I have a list of all of the exchange programs between Japan and the United States?" Not just ours. (Laughter) He laughed and said, "Anyone would give their life, practically, to get such a list, because there are so many exchanges on so many levels, that nobody has ever compiled one."

Q: Did the government program of exchanges, whether it's the Fulbright program or youth exchanges, did it make an impact? Was it important, what with all the other exchanges going on?

GARRITY: I would say so. It certainly had a lot of visibility. The prestige that's attached to being a Fulbright exchange scholar, for instance, is just enormous. During my time in Japan, a national organization, an Association of Fulbright Alumni, was formed.

Q: In Japan?
GARRITY: In Japan. The alumni had met together in various regions around Japan, but it became a full-fledged national organization and a fund-raiser. There was a very sizable grant that started all this off, by a man named Yoshida, who was the head of YKK, the foremost fastener company in Japan, maybe in the world. We always called him the Zipper King. He was the first man to set up a plant in a place called Georgia, when a man named Jimmy Carter was governor. They established a friendship, and really, in honor of President Carter, he donated $500,000 to the Fulbright Commission. You may not know, but in Japan, such donations are not tax deductible. Not only that, they are taxed. So he probably had to pay an additional $50,000 on his donation. But it really got things going.

There was a thirtieth anniversary of the Fulbright program. Senator Fulbright came to Japan for the occasion, and I would say that the attention paid to the Fulbright program and the organization of the alumni and the fund-raising that went into it got a lot of publicity.

Q: That should have been an interesting occasion, because Mansfield and Fulbright saw eye to eye on most issues, didn't they, when they were in the Senate? Were they friends?

GARRITY: I would say that Ambassador Mansfield considered himself, and was considered, a first-class colleague by all of the incumbents and former members of the Congress. Just a remarkable rapport. We had so many visitors actually serving in Congress or having had congressional service, who came through Tokyo. Without exception, in my memory, anyway, they had apparently a warm feeling with Mansfield.

Q: You and I both had the good fortune of serving with non-career ambassadors, politically appointed ambassadors in our respective last posts, you with Senator Mansfield, I with Arthur Burns. They really, as far as I was concerned, were inspiring and really made, in my case, the last few years in the Foreign Service a particularly interesting and satisfying experience to be with people like that.

GARRITY: That's true. I think in the case of Ambassador Mansfield, he prided himself on coming into the Congress first as a representative, then as a senator, from the academic world. This was a very important distinction for him. He was a professor at the University of Montana.

Q: So was Fulbright.

GARRITY: Right. So this gave him a natural feeling about the Fulbright program or the exchange programs. Certainly he was a very strong supporter of the YFU exchange programs, and particularly got involved with the Senate-Diet exchange program.

By way of explanation, that was a program where the Japanese Government invited each senator to nominate one youngster from his or her state to spend three months in the summer in Japan under the auspices of Youth For Understanding, and in turn, then, the US Government decided to reciprocate by inviting a number of Japanese youngsters between fifteen and eighteen from each prefecture in Japan. That was called the US Senate-Japanese Prefecture program, which, unfortunately, at the present time is coming on hard times.
Q: So I hear.

GARRITY: Yes, because both governments are reluctant in their funding of this program, and I think it's so valuable. Ambassador Mansfield made it a practice to say "sayonara" to the Japanese as they went off to the US, and to greet the American exchange students as they arrived in Japan. There was no question that he considered this a very, very important program. The caliber of the students was just overwhelming, and the impact that they made in their communities was quite profound.

Q: What programs didn't work?

GARRITY: What didn't work? You know, we have a funny situation in Japan. The American companies who do business in Japan successfully don't really like to talk too much about why they're successful, because they don't want any of their competitors to get their secrets. But the companies who fail sort of steal away in the night and they don't want to talk about it at all. (Laughter) So programs that don't do well, they tend to disappear and be forgotten.

Q: One of the reasons I'm asking the question is because during my time at the Voice of America, there were those, including the then director, who really wanted us to broadcast the Voice of America in Japanese, because he felt that the Voice of America was a global radio network and we had to broadcast in all the major world languages. He felt that way also about German and Italian and French.

I always opposed that, because I felt that spending resources -- and they would have had to be considerable resources -- on starting again to broadcast in Japan, it's a media-saturated society, I felt, especially by radio. Secondly, it is a free society where people have access to all kinds of views and news and information not supplied to them only by the government. Thirdly, I felt that it would take us so much time and effort and money to build an audience in this media-saturated society, that I thought it would be a waste of resources to broadcast in Japanese, and instead, we should spend our resources on programs which would be much more effective in the cultural communications process.

As long as I was there, and I think even now, I mean, my view prevailed, but it was a sore point with some people that we were not broadcasting in Japan.

GARRITY: I think clearly a Japanese-language broadcast would have been, in any case, unnecessary and certainly not worth the cost. There were maybe half a million Japanese listening regularly to Worldwide English on VOA. There are aficionados of shortwave radio all over the world, and Japan has their percentage.

Q: But these were not the target audiences.

GARRITY: Not necessarily. No, I think these are people who are just interested in tuning in around the world and getting BBC or whatever. There's no question that Japan has access to worldwide information, either directly from their own representatives around the world or
subscribing to other news services. Building an audience for a Japanese-language broadcast by VOA would have been unnecessary -- unnecessary completely.

Q: How about television?

GARRITY: I think television, as we gained expertise in the two-way satellite operation, for specific events, was useful. For instance, the first program that we put together, working with Washington on a satellite broadcast, was with the Secretary of Defense [Caspar] Weinberger. I remember this vividly. I'm not sure it's something I should talk about. (Laughter) The cable came from Washington saying, "How would you like to have the Secretary of Defense?"

"Sure!"

They were willing to put money into up-leg and down-leg. It was kind of one of the first programs and they wanted it to work. Well, I got together with our press attaché at the time, who was Bill Moyers, who is in personnel right now. You might go to Bill Moyers and check whether I remember everything correctly. But we got ourselves over to NHK, which is the big non-commercial network, somewhat the equivalent of BBC and much, much bigger than our own PBS. I didn't bring money up at all. I mean, I would have killed the deal if I had raised the subject of money. NHK has so much money, they don't know what to do with it. When they heard "Secretary of Defense," they said, "Great!" They had a program already on the schedule, where they could just tie him right in. In fact, the first thing they wanted to do was just carry it live. We subsequently did record it and then put time into a really good translation. Simultaneous translation can be a risky business, a high-wire act. So eventually that's the way it did work.

NHK picked up the entire tab for their end, and I must say there was kind of a begrudging attitude on the Washington end, in that they didn't get to spend all the money that they had in mind. (Laughter) Rather than thanking us for saving them money!

Q: Worldnet, which it finally developed into, was its purpose as Charlie Wick envisaged it initially, as a news maker? Was its value as a news maker or was its value more in the way that it provided an opportunity for people who could not come in person and go around and talk to a lot of people or to communicate as sort of a specialist in a subject and thereby provide the information and the contact that they could not provide in person? Which one?

GARRITY: In my view, the latter, certainly. News makers, that's covered by commercial, already existing communication lines and networks. The real value, to me, of the technology was not this daily program, which is just sort of a poor imitation of the "Today Show." The real value was in getting the counterpart to the Japanese expert on the other end of the tube and giving them a chance to really talk. I think that it gave an immediacy that you just couldn't get otherwise. We've done the same thing on telephone lines, which may seem primitive, but in its own way could be very, very effective.

Q: It works.

GARRITY: It works. I mean, there are very successful talk shows in town today that don't have
television and yet work beautifully. So I think whatever means electronically you have to bring our people together with Japan and wherever, fine. Television adds to it, but I think the real value is not the regular scheduled program, but the event-by-event --

Q: In dealing with the Japanese, in your programming with the Japanese, was the factor of language a major element? In other words, did you really have to do things in Japanese?

GARRITY: I would say most of the time we did things in Japanese. That doesn't mean all our American speakers were able to come over and speak in Japanese. But we put a lot of effort into translation and interpreting.

Q: How about publications? Did you publish anything?

GARRITY: First of all, we had an outstanding magazine which somehow managed to continue to exist during an era when the Agency was considering one-world materials, which seemed to me to be the ultimate in nonsense, to consider that one piece of material is suited to every audience in the world. [See interview of Stanton Barnett in this series on this subject. The idea was sometimes called "the Global Village" concept, that all intellectuals worldwide have similar interests and reactions to the same idea.] (Laughter) How an agency with so much knowledge could ever come to such a conclusion was beyond my understanding.

The magazine *Trends* was geared to a Japanese audience, primarily reprints of appropriate American articles, but also there were articles commissioned for the magazine with American writers.

Q: In Japanese?

GARRITY: They would be written in English.

Q: I mean the magazine, *Trends*, was a Japanese-language magazine.

GARRITY: Yes. In fact, it won several awards for design, which were richly deserved. We were very fortunate to have a succession of American officers, publication officers, who were immensely talented and devoted to keeping the magazine up to high standards, and a very devoted Japanese staff working on getting the magazine out, and some awfully good translators who were able to get these articles and re-rewrite them. I don't really like the word "translate," because you can't translate -- maybe in some languages it works, but in Japanese you can't just translate from English to Japanese. You have to take English and put it into Japanese to make any sense. I think that *Trends* was an outstanding example of a successful magazine that really communicated and went to a very, very important opinion-making audience.

Q: Before we go on to the other subject of concentration this morning, is there anything else you would like to mention?

GARRITY: Yes, I'd like to make one more comment on my experience in Japan. You asked were there any programs that didn't work. I would say that although there's a need, as we all
know, to keep track of your audience and be sure you're communicating with the people you are supposed to be communicating with, the intensity with which we were expected to work with our audience records, the DRS, distribution record system, vastly outweighed the return.

WILLIAM PIEZ
Director, East Asia Bureau

Mr. Piez was born and raised in Rhode Island and educated at the University of Rhode Island and the Fletcher School. After service in the US Armed Forces, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Frankfurt, Kabul and Manila as Economic Officer. During his career Mr. Piez dealt primarily with economic matters of East Asian countries, particularly Japan, where he served first as Economic Counselor and, from 1983 to 1985, as Economic Minister. In the Department in Washington, Mr. Piez was Deputy Assistant Secretary of East African Economic Affairs, and from 1989-1991, Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative. Mr. Piez was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

Q: Well you left there when?

PIEZ: Well I left there in 1980 to come back to the East Asia Bureau to the Economic Policy Office. I was the office director.

Q: You were there from when to when?

PIEZ: I was there for about two years. In 1983 I left that job. Transferred again.

Q: Well what was this ’80 to ’83 period. We have been talking about economic difficulties. How stood Asia at this point?

PIEZ: Well at that time it was the region of the economic miracles. You have got Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia not too far behind. Vietnam was settling down. We were dealing with some of the political issues like the POW/MIAs. We had an extensive structure of regional organizations in Asia. We had ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). We had the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC). It included Australia and New Zealand. The American Chambers of Commerce in the different countries had their organizations in the region and they met every year dealing with various questions of their business interests in the Asian countries.

Q: From your perspective when you got there in 1980 what were sort of our economic concerns?

PIEZ: Well there were still trade issues, and we still had a number of questions relating to encouraging our exports, and the increasing importance of China as an economic power was certainly of interest. A lot was going on there.
Q: Well how did we feel about China? Did we see China as a potential market? All this oil for the lamps of China idea that this is a great market, at the same time if this thing starts going it will flood us.

PIEZ: Occasionally you would have someone say if every Chinese lengthened his gown by one inch there would be a market for 80 million square yards of cotton. Well Ok. I was not too impressed with that sort of thinking. We didn’t see China developing as a threat in particular, but certainly Chinese economic development was very much to be desired. China as a poor country was not something that would be to our interests at all.

Q: Was India included in your bailiwick or not?

PIEZ: When I was in the bureau, No. That was part of South Asia and still the NEA bureau. We went as far as Burma and after Burma that was it.

Q: During the time you were there, two years or so, did the investments in Thailand and Indonesia were they beginning to go sour? Were their economies in pretty good shape?

PIEZ: On the whole they were. Indonesia had some pretty forward thinking industrial and economic leaders. I think it was pretty well known the system was highly corrupt. To get into the category of economic or industrial operations in Indonesia you had to have connections. But on the whole the country seemed politically stable, and economically developing at a reasonable rate. There were continuing problems in the Philippines. Thailand was doing well. The East Asian financial crisis occurred only after I had retired.

Q: The Marcos regime was beginning to come apart right while you were doing that.

PIEZ: It was during the Carter Administration that the Marcos regime collapsed. Richard Holbrooke was our Assistant Secretary and he was concerned that Marcos be replaced, but in an orderly fashion and without violence. That was how it worked out, essentially, although economic advancement in the Philippines was still slow and sporadic.

Q: This was the Reagan administration, at least after you were there Reagan came in. You know, Reagan being a Californian and all, also his people were from California, so they must have been a little more oriented...

PIEZ: More oriented toward East Asia. The Reagan Administration came in while I was in Washington. I recall that, during the Air Traffic Controllers strike, I was on night duty for a time. Because of the time difference a lot of the traffic on related issues came in at night. Our concern was to keep flights from and to East Asia operating safely as much as we could.

Q: Did you feel that you were getting your due share of attention in the State Department.

PIEZ: Oh yes. Ambassador Mansfield, one of his repeated expressions was the U.S.- Japan relationship was the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none. He could make that case. One might choose to argue, but he had a pretty strong case. President Reagan kept him
on as ambassador, a wise decision.

*Q:* But also to the point where you take a look at the situation you have differences. If you look at say Europe. You have a whole bunch of countries, but they are all rather cohesive. But when you look at Asia you have only really got Japan.

PIEZ: Well Japan was clearly by far the second largest economy in the world.

*Q:* China, you didn’t know where it was going. Korea was in the middle of a dictatorship. Park Chung Hee had been killed...

PIEZ: The harsh realities of dictatorship.

*Q:* You mentioned the Philippines dragging behind. What was the problem? How did we perceive it?

PIEZ: Well Marcos and his cronies stole everything they could get their hands on. If they saw a sector of the economy that was doing Ok on exports they might seek a way to milk it. The prime example was cocoanut production and exports of copra. Marcos and his cronies literally took over the business. And the actual growers of cocoanuts and copra were really reduced to subsistence levels. The cronies tried to control and time the exports in order to maximize the prices. That doesn’t really work too well when you have a lot of competition from other countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. But they thought they could do it. They did certainly make a lot of money out of it. The bad thing was the Filipinos who were getting all these profits tended to stash them abroad in the United States or in Hong Kong, or put them into showcase mansions that did not add much value to the economy. As I mentioned before a country could tolerate some corruption if the people who make the gains from corruption invest it wisely in their own country. In the Philippines they weren’t doing that. They would send the money out.

ALOYSIUS M. O’NEILL
Staff Aide to Ambassador

Japanese Language Training
Yokohama (1981-1982)

Political Officer
Tokyo (1982-1984)

Mr. O’Neil was born in South Carolina and raised there and in other states in the U.S. He was educated at the University of Delaware and Heidelberg University. After serving in the US Army in Vietnam, Mr. O’Neill joined the Foreign Service in 1976 and was posted to Korea. He subsequently served three tours in Japan as student of Japanese and Consular and Political Officer. He also served in Burma,
Korea and the Philippines as well as in Washington, where he dealt primarily with East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Mr. O’Neill was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: You were there from 1980 until when?

O’NEILL: To 1984. The first year was in Tokyo as ambassador’s aide, the second year — from 1981 to ’82 — was the second year of Japanese language training at FSI Yokohama. From 1982 to ’84, I was back in the embassy in the external branch of the political section dealing with Japanese Asia policy.

Q: Before we get to working for Ambassador Mansfield, what was your impression? First, a little compare and contrast Japan and Korea in your eye, Seoul and Tokyo and all. Was this quite a change or not?

O’NEILL: It was in certain respects. Both were huge metropolises, of course. The biggest obvious difference between Korea and Japan was the absence of a North Korean-style military threat to Japan. The military threat the Japanese were concerned with was the Soviet Union, not North Korea. Even though there were large U.S. military forces in Japan their principal mission was first the Soviet Union and secondly North Korea. The Japanese were in those days certainly happy to hide behind the American force presence including the nuclear umbrella.

The level of development between the two countries was still very widely different. Korea was on the very upward path to where it is now. Japan had already been there, and it was a gigantic economy and one that was years away from the economic doldrums that it’s mostly been in since the mid-1990s. It was a real powerhouse. You’d start seeing these American books about Japan as number one, and Japan was being touted as the model for American businesses, etc.

In the U.S., nobody was thinking of Korea in those terms. Tokyo was a more glitzy city, a more developed city. Obviously, there was a great deal of construction going on in Seoul at the time, replacing these buildings that were post-war construction with better and more modern apartments, office buildings, etc. So there were a lot of physical differences. It was also a lot easier to get around Japan. We could walk out of our apartment in the embassy housing compound and get on a subway line to one of the major railroad stations in Tokyo and go by rail to anyplace in Japan except Okinawa or Hokkaido. The rail network in Japan was extraordinary particularly compared to Korea at that time. It was also a much bigger country with a much larger population.

Just one example of the difference was in the way that the respective embassies dealt with the military relationship. As I mentioned earlier, in Korea it was normal once a week for the ambassador and the top American four-star to have breakfast once a week when they were in the country. In Japan, the number of U.S. military total was larger than in Korea perhaps by 10,000, counting people on ships based in Japan. The main periodic connection between the embassy and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) Headquarters at Yokota Air Base outside the city was usually a lunch between the DCM and the Marine major general who was the deputy commander and chief of staff, USFJ. It was a lower level relationship. The ambassador and the commander could
certainly talk when they needed to, but the routine connection was somewhat lower and less close than it was in Korea. No surprise, really.

Q: Let’s talk about Mike Mansfield, your impression of Mike Mansfield as a person, and then what you were doing with the embassy and with Japan.

O’NEILL: It was a fascinating year. I never expected to be working for somebody who was a real historic figure in American political terms. Mansfield had been born to Irish immigrant parents in New York on the day before St. Patrick’s Day in 1903, March 16, 1903. The family moved to Montana when Mansfield was very young. As you may know, Mansfield had a military background. In 1917, during WWI, he had dropped out of school and enlisted in the Navy. He was kicked out when they found out he was only 14. He was living proof that a fraudulent enlistment was not always a bar to future success.

Mansfield then went into the Army for a year or two and then right after World War I he joined the Marine Corps. As a Marine private, he was sent both to the Philippines and China. He was very proud of having been in the Marines. In Tokyo, if he wasn’t wearing a U.S. Marine Corps tie, he wore a Marine Corps tie bar, with the Marine eagle, globe and anchor on it. The only inscription on his tombstone at Arlington is his name, his dates (1903-2001) and “Private, U.S. Marine Corps. There’s nothing about being the longest-serving Senate majority leader or the longest-serving U.S. ambassador to Japan.

Mansfield used to tell Japanese visitors that he first saw Japan in 1922, often long before some of those visitors were born. When the ship was taking him back from China to be discharged, it stopped in Nagasaki for coal. He said — of course, the Marines weren’t allowed off the ship — he could look out and see lines and lines of Japanese women with baskets full of coal on their heads. They’d dump the coal into the chutes of the coal bunkers on the ship. That was his first view of Japan.

After he had got out of the military service he began teaching at the University of Montana. He was elected to the House of Representatives I think in 1942, anyway during World War II. Then he was elected to the Senate in 1952. I heard him tell Lady Bird Johnson, who was visiting Tokyo, that that was the year Lyndon Johnson, John F. Kennedy, and Prescott Bush all entered the Senate. At the time that he was appointed ambassador in 1977 he had been the Senate majority leader longer than anybody else.

Mansfield was quite an extraordinary character. When I got there in summer 1980, of course, we were heading towards the election in which Carter was running against Reagan. Lots of people were telling me that I’d have an exciting time as the ambassador’s aide because there’d be a new ambassador after the election. They were saying it would be fascinating dealing with the Imperial Household Agency over ceremonies involving the emperor and helping the new ambassador get adjusted to Japan.

Mansfield was very much like a Liberal Democratic Party politician of Japan in some ways. One is that he had spent his entire political career in the legislature which most Japanese politicians do in their parliamentary system. The other is that he was somewhat older than the average
American ambassador even at that time. He also was pretty soberly dressed all the time.

In contrast to lots of ambassadors he didn’t necessarily want his staff aide to be in his office as early as he got in. He tended to get in around 7:30 and he wanted the time to read all the newspapers in English and press translations that had been provided. Then I would come in and go through all the cable traffic to select the small amount that he really needed to see. Mansfield had a tremendous ability in his 70s to absorb what he was reading and put it to use in meetings or in instructions to people in the embassy. He was a courtly gentleman who also had an enormous appetite for information.

One of the many fascinating things about him was the range of his correspondence and the range of contacts he had. He had spent a lot of his career in Congress focusing on Asian affairs and had many contacts among very senior Asians including Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia. In his correspondence file, you’d find letters from him to and from everybody ranging from Kirk Douglas to Sihanouk and just about everybody in between. People were constantly coming to see him and pay their respects and ask his advice, etc. There was one time that Melvin Laird was then meeting with the ambassador.

Q: The secretary of defense.

O’NEILL: The former secretary of defense. The meeting with Laird was going long. The next person he was supposed to meet was Harold Stassen, the former “boy governor” of Minnesota who had run for president certainly four or five times. Stassen was out in the waiting room, and I kept going out and saying to him, “Sorry, Governor, but things are running a little late. The ambassador will be with you soon.” After one of those trips to look in on Stassen, my phone rings, and it’s John Kenneth Galbraith, wanting to “say hi to Mike.” He was just passing through Tokyo. I said he had this line of visitors; Galbraith said, “Just let Mike know I called,” which I did. This was just one moment in a Mansfield day. It wasn’t always that way, but it illustrates the kind of person that he was and the kind of people who sought his advice. They all wanted to say they’d been talking to Mike Mansfield about Japan.

That was a tough time in U.S.-Japan relations because of huge discord over trade, particularly automobiles, exports from Japan in the United States, and the fact that when it came to automobile imports from the U.S. to Japan, there were two big factors, two barriers. One was Japanese non-tariff barriers to trade including a lot of their hyper-attentive inspection routines. The other thing was that the American automakers resolutely refused to make cars for the Japanese market, and nonetheless demanded that Japanese consumers buy them anyway. So you had the American Big Three, furious that the Japanese were not buying huge American cars with the steering wheel on the left hand (wrong) side and cars that were, because of their size, real gas guzzlers in a time when gasoline in Japan was many times higher than it was in the United States. Had they been to Japan, the Big Three’s executives might have noticed that the streets were narrower than LA’s too. Managing that issue was a big problem during that year.

As it happened, these thoughts about my getting to deal with the arrival of a new ambassador were put on hold by President Reagan. Mansfield’s reappointment was as far as I know Reagan’s first ambassadorial nomination. In the springtime the often rocky U.S.-Japan relationship got
rocky, indeed, because of a series of incidents. One happened in April 1981 when *George Washington* which was originally built as a Polaris missile submarine was running submerged near Japan in international waters. It struck and sank a small Japanese freighter, the *Nissho Maru* with the loss of the captain and the first mate. This accident caused a huge uproar in Japan. To help cope with the outcry, the ambassador made a formal call on Foreign Minister Abe, the father of the recent Prime Minister Abe, and was photographed bowing deeply before Abe. This didn’t sit too well with some in the U.S., but it certainly did in Japan to have this distinguished and broadly admired figure doing what Japanese would have done in the same circumstances. His bowing publicly to the foreign minister did help contain the uproar over the accident.

Not long thereafter Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki made an official visit to the U.S. to meet with Reagan. Either in the course of that meeting or right after it, Suzuki, who was as bland a politician as has ever been prime minister, stated that Japan would defend its sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles. Also, PM Suzuki used the word “alliance” to describe the Japanese relationship with the U.S., which as far as I can recall was the first time that a Japanese prime minister had done so. This was 21 years after the revised Mutual Security Treaty had gone into effect but Suzuki’s statement also caused quite a stir in Japan. (The American public of course, thought that was the relationship with Japan all along.) Responding to Suzuki’s statement about defense of the sea lanes, Foreign Minister Ito promptly resigned on the grounds that this whole question and public announcement had not been vetted with the foreign ministry. The White House quickly issued a statement saying that this had been the most successful U.S.-Japan summit meeting in history, which probably did little to repair the damage.

Then a third thing happened in that eventful spring of 1981. I went to the office one morning, and Bill Sherman, the superb DCM, a Japan hand of the deepest hue, and just a consummate FSO, was looking at one of the newspapers. The big story was former Ambassador Reischauer who had been Kennedy’s ambassador at Japan, upon his retirement from Harvard took it upon himself to announce to a Japanese reporter that of course we had brought nuclear weapons into Japan over and over again, and the Japanese knew it. Bill Sherman was never rattled by anything. He always knew what to do; he always had the right answer. I had never seen him so unhappy. His face was just white, and he was furious. In the aftermath of the *George Washington-Nissho Maru* accident and the flap over the Suzuki visit, now this, Bill Sherman said, “What else can go wrong?” Bill said some uncomplimentary things about Reischauer that morning. There was a good bit of fancy stepping to put that particular genie back in the bottle, and eventually the Japanese wandered on to other subjects.

*Q: It was one of these unspoken things, that Reischauer had spoken, wasn’t it?*

O’NEILL: He did it for no good reason at all. Whether he felt on his retirement he had to get one more headline, I don’t know. I never met Reischauer. I knew of him as a great scholar of Japan and, presumably, a successful ambassador. But, yes, what he raised in public was one of those things was never spoken of. The U.S. press guidance was always very fixed and very bland. Both sides always wanted the issue to go away.

*Q: How important was the emperor, the court, the court protocol, and all that, from your perspective?*
O’NEILL: In the Japanese constitution the emperor’s not even described as the chief of state. He’s called “the symbol of the state and the unity of the people.” So his constitutional role was to be very ceremonial, indeed. When there was a presidential visit, there would be ritualized meetings with the emperor, and the emperor would welcome the president. Ambassadors presented their credentials to the emperor in great ceremony.

There was an annual cycle of events for the diplomatic corps hosted by the emperor, including the emperor’s garden party. There was even an annual trek for the luminaries of the ambassadorial corps out to the imperial pig farm, and there were other events like concerts of an extremely traditional form of music called gagaku at the music hall of the imperial palace to which the diplomatic corps was always invited. But the emperor played no role in politics. He would have a nominal role in opening parliament and giving a rather stilted speech on those occasions, and the emperor’s birthday on April 29 was a holiday, the anchor holiday of the so-called “Golden Week” but he was not a political figure. Had he tried to be so, it would have been quite disturbing in Japan.

Q: As the ambassador’s aide, did you get any feel for the relationship between Mansfield and Reagan and Alexander Haig when you were doing that?

O’NEILL: I’m trying to think. Haig was Reagan’s first Secretary of State. I don’t know how much contact that Reagan had ever had with Mansfield before Mansfield was nominated as ambassador. The communication that I remember most between senior Washington figures and Ambassador Mansfield was with trade officials — commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, etc. — over autos, steel, and all the other major issues in trade relations. Haig didn’t visit during that year. In that year, I don’t recall that we had any cabinet visits except, perhaps, on the trade side. I don’t think the treasury secretary did.

Q: It’s interesting. Here’s a major ally.

O’NEILL: Just let me add some atmospherics about Ambassador Mansfield who was a very fine gentleman of the old school. If he would be coming to an elevator at the same time as one of the female Foreign Service Nationals, one of the Japanese employees, Mansfield would always step back and try to usher her onto the elevator. Of course, this would paralyze the FSN because there was this towering figure to whom she was supposed to be bowing deeply, trying to let her on the elevator ahead of him.

One of the well-known things that he did to help put visitors at ease was his ritual, particularly with Japanese visitors, of making instant coffee for them. This was in total contrast to the Japanese way of doing things which was to have OLs or office ladies serve tea to everybody. Of course, in Japan the great person himself who was hosting the meeting would never think of doing such a thing. But Mansfield did this, trying in his way to put people at ease.

Another thing, in his office on the bookshelf next to where he would meet visitors, he had photographs of the Republican and Democratic congressional leaders. He would almost invariably point these out, particularly to the Japanese politicians and also business leaders. His advice was, “When you’re looking at Washington, don’t think only of the executive branch
which is obviously very important, but these people are very important to you, too.”

Q: When you were his aide, did he go down to Okinawa, which was “Marine territory?”

O’NEILL: “Marineland of the Pacific.” He didn’t go to Okinawa that year at all. He had been I’m sure. I went with him and Mrs. Mansfield on a long trip to three of the prefectures on the Japan Sea coast of Honshu. He made quite a number of trips to the U.S. during that period, and I always went out to Narita Airport with him and Mrs. Mansfield to see them off and to welcome them back.

Q: How about Mrs. Mansfield? Ambassadors’ wives run the gamut. How would you describe her?

O’NEILL: She was a lovely person. She was really wonderful. Ambassador Mansfield was absolutely devoted to her all his life. She was in frailer health than he was overall but she was fascinated by Japan, really enjoyed learning about Japan. Aside from visiting places and meeting people, she did a lot of reading on Japan. She was a lovely lady, a fine hostess, and absolutely essential to him because he was so devoted to her.

Q: How did he run the embassy?

O’NEILL: The DCM ran the embassy. The ambassador knew the embassy officers whom he dealt with, but he didn’t go around the embassy shaking hands and that kind of thing. In that respect he was different from an FSO ambassador who would have been more likely to spend more time just on a periodic basis going around the various sections. Those in the embassy who didn’t normally come in contact with him in their work weren’t necessarily happy with that fact.

But he always had very strong, capable DCMs who were real Japan hands. The one I first dealt with was Bill Sherman who as I recall had gotten a start in language training at the end of WWII. He was one of the people the Navy trained in Japanese. I’m not sure if he was overseas during the war, but he was thoroughly involved in Japan thereafter. That was the way Mansfield wanted it. He wanted to be able to deal with senior Japanese and have the DCM run the embassy and give him good advice.

Q: We’ll move into a different sphere in a minute, but from your staff aide’s viewpoint. I would think Japan would be hard to deal with because you have a Diet that doesn’t seem to be a functional legislature. One party that’s been in forever and…

O’NEILL: Of course, in that era, the Liberal Democratic Party or LDP always had the majority in both houses in the Diet, the upper house and more crucial lower house, and always picked the prime minister. An interesting factor in Japan, though, was that even when the LDP had an absolute majority, and therefore could pass any law, there was a compulsion because of cultural strictures to get, for example, votes from the Japan Socialist Party the main opposition party and, perhaps, some of the smaller parties, too, to at least give the…not even the illusion of consensus but a certain amount of consensus. That was the practice. The LDP would make concessions that would be unheard of in the U.S. Congress. If the Republicans or the Democrats had the absolute
majority, they would pass whatever they want and devil take the hindmost. Japanese tended to be more conciliatory, but the factional infighting among the LDP tended to produce prime ministers prized for their timidity and for their lack of willingness to take bold initiatives. This has been an interesting phenomenon all along with few exceptions like Prime Minister Koizumi early this century.

The other thing that marked Japanese politics was the jockeying for the prime ministership among faction leaders in the LDP. They were usually vying for cabinet positions that would position them later for a run for the top job. This produced a certain amount of turmoil and turnover in the cabinets, more than you might want, and also some cases where cabinet members who had decided a career path to move from one ministry to another were not all well versed in their portfolios. The bureaucrats, the permanent bureaucracy which started at the vice ministerial level in all these ministries, were determined to control their ministers and make sure the ministers did what they wanted. Bills that went to the Diet were normally drafted by the bureaucracy and presented to be passed with as little discussion as the bureaucracy and the PM’s office could manage.

There was and still is the opportunity to vent opinions in the Diet, however. Every year in the springtime, March and early April, the diet budget committee sessions were televised. Despite the name, these budget committee hearings were a concentrated form of the “question time” that you would see at the House of Commons in London. It was an opportunity for all members of the Diet to — and certainly all opposition parties at least — to throw rhetorical rocks at the prime minister and various other ministers about anything that came to their minds.

The bureaucrats, during the budget committee hearings, usually camped out in their ministries because they were up all hours of the night writing Qs & As, questions and answers, for their ministers or the prime minister, and otherwise sat in their offices all night playing mah jongg, waiting for some new question to come in. They were prisoners of their ministries during the budget committee hearings. It was an opportunity for the general public to see the ministers and prime minister be baited with leading questions and having to respond, and measuring their quality as government officials based on this.

**Q: You moved after a year to the political section?**

O’NEILL: In Tokyo, the staff aide’s job was a one year assignment. During that year, the DCM decided I should get the second year of language training in FSI Yokohama and after that go to the political section’s external branch, which dealt with Japanese foreign policy. I was slated to be cover Asian affairs, which was to my mind the best job in the political section for a mid-level officer.

**Q: How did you find the second year of Japanese?**

O’NEILL: In some ways it was easier than the first. But it necessitated moving down to Yokohama which was only about 30 miles away, and living in a house “on the economy” as the military says, rented for that period of time from a Japanese realtor. It was a wrench in that we had already moved twice in Tokyo because of the reconstruction of the embassy housing.
compound. We moved to Yokohama knowing that 11 months later we were going to move back up to Tokyo into the newly rebuilt embassy housing compound.

I found that during the year I was staff aide, my formal Japanese had fallen off alarmingly, because mostly I was dealing with senior Japanese officials who all spoke exceptionally good English. During that year most of my Japanese language practice came in running around to little towns sightseeing or going around in Tokyo. So I had a certain re-learning curve at the beginning, but it was excellent instruction.

The teachers were all experienced, and both male and female in contrast to the situation at FSI Washington. That was very helpful in and of itself. The program was more elaborate. We had field trips at different times during the year of two different types. Sometimes the entire group of students would go with teachers off to some place, usually of historic importance, to spend several days in a Japanese environment. There were two or three times at least where you’d go out for a couple of days at a time on a program that you designed yourself to see a particular part of Japan, etc., and then you’d report on it. There was a lot more active use of the language during the course of the year than there could have been at FSI Washington. It was quite good instruction and I wound up with three-plus in both speaking and reading at the end of that year, which is above average.

We moved back after that to Tokyo, after home leave in the U.S. to the new embassy compound which was built on the site of the old one. This was in September of ’82, and I worked in the political section for two years.

Q: Before we move to that, how was your wife adjusting to this? She’s Korean, and the Japanese… I mean, both sides aren’t very nice to each other in normal.

O’NEILL: She was quite good about it. She adapted extremely well to the whole business of being in the Foreign Service, and she adapted very well to Japan. In the first year when we were in Tokyo, Jin spoke no Japanese, and I had had a year. When we’d go into a shop, I would speak in Japanese and the person would invariably answer my wife who had not said a word, and because she looked like she ought to be saying something in Japanese. But I can’t think of any instance of overt prejudice against her.

When we were at FSI Yokohama, spouses could take Japanese on a space available basis. There were sufficient teachers that this was possible, so Jin took Japanese full time, the whole 11 months. Of course, she knew essentially the same Chinese characters that the Japanese use. Koreans and Japanese don’t exactly use these characters in precisely the same way, but she knew them from her schooling. Korean and Japanese are grammatically very similar; so Jin had a built-in leg-up. By the end of the course, she actually had a four-four which was full proficiency in both speaking and reading Japanese. The official score she got was a three-plus, three-plus because the person who was then the head of FSI Yokohama — a Korean whom she’d known when she was teaching Korean for Peace Corps — explained to her that it would be damaging to the morale of the diplomats who were studying Japanese for a second year if she got as high as a four-four after one year. So he gave her a “very strong three-plus, three-plus.”
As an aside, in contrast to FSI Washington, FSI Yokohama also trained Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand diplomats. Those governments paid. We had some Australian military officers in FSI Yokohama, who were great fun to be with but not necessarily deep scholars of the Japanese language. All of them usually did two full years back to back at FSI Yokohama, which would have really sent me around the bend. As it was, by the end of that second year of Japanese, I had spent three of my first six years in the Foreign Service in hard language training, which was not something I’d recommend to anyone else. It was fine with me though.

Q: I’m looking at the time and maybe this would be a good place to stop. We can pick this up in ’82 when you’re coming out of the language thing. We’ve got quite a bit to talk about in your time dealing with external affairs.

O’NEILL: Yes, a time including among other things the KAL007 shoot-down and the Rangoon bombing of the Korean cabinet and other…

Q: And also the Soviet attitude toward Japan’s Northern Territories.

O’NEILL: One of the things we’ll want to talk about in that time period is Prime Minister Nakasone’s rather surprising trip to Korea to meet with Chun Doo Hwan. It was early in ’83, I think, but I’ll double check on that. Nakasone who eventually developed a great relationship with Reagan broke tradition, which was that the first overseas trip for a new Japanese prime minister was always to Washington.

Q: Today is the 12th of September 2008. Continuing with Al O’Neill. Al, we left it when you were just getting out of Japanese language school in ’82 was it?

O’NEILL: Yes, summer of ’82.

Q: Summer of ’82. We’ve got a lot of things to talk about Japan including Nakasone going to Korea, the shootdown of KAL 007, the Soviet-Japanese relationship, the Rangoon bombing and all this. You were in, external affairs?

O’NEILL: Yes. The political section in Tokyo was divided into three branches. One was external which dealt with Japanese foreign policy. The second was internal which dealt with the Japanese political parties, the Diet and domestic politics in general. The third was the political-military branch which focused on the U.S.-Japan security relationship, Japan being a treaty ally of the U.S. In fact, we were their only treaty ally. There was a branch chief and at least a couple of officers in each of these branches.

As far as I was concerned, I had the best job which was Asian affairs. Normally that dealt Japan’s relationship with the countries which were under the State Department’s East Asian bureau although depending on staff shortages, I sometimes covered everything from Pakistan to the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. It was a very interesting time.

Q: I would think that whoever or those who had the portfolio for internal political affairs must have been very bored, something like reporting on politics in Switzerland. The ministers changed
and the prime ministers changed, but nothing happened.

O’NEILL: That was why I was glad I was in external. In the internal branch, unfortunately the main thing that they had to watch was which LDP faction leader was going to become prime minister next.

In the political military branch, there was a lot of work because there was usually a good bit going on in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship. Sometimes it got pretty difficult. A big theme during that period 1982-84 in the political military realm was what was known as the Kanto Plain Consolidation. The Kanto Plain is the area that includes Tokyo, Kawasaki, Yokohama, Yokosuka, and into Chiba Prefecture on the coast to Narita Airport, one of the most densely populated areas in the world and one of few relatively flat areas in Japan. The U.S. military was consolidating a lot of bases that had been held since the occupation and, indeed, had occupation era buildings in most cases, largely vacating Yokohama and then consolidating into Yokosuka Naval Base and into a much smaller area of Yokohama. Other consolidation was going on among U.S. Army and Navy facilities elsewhere in the Kanto Plain. There wasn’t to my recollection much change in the Air Force structure in the area.

In the external branch, that period 1982 to ’84 was pretty busy, particularly 1983, in which there was one major event after another in Asia. By late 1982, Yasuhiro Nakasone had become the prime minister. He was very conservative which was not unusual for LDP prime ministers, but he was a more energetic person than, for example, his immediate predecessor, Zenko Suzuki. Nakasone put his stamp on things from the very beginning. Let me mention that at the end of World War II he had been a junior officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which was a little unusual for the LDP politicians at the time.

The tradition was that the first overseas trip for every prime minister was to Washington, to meet the president and senior U.S. officials and show the people back home that he was getting the approval of the U.S. government. Nakasone decided to make his first trip to Seoul to meet Chun Doo-Hwan, the former general who had taken over the Korean government in a more-or-less bloodless coup that then led to the very bloody Kwangju uprising of May 1980.

Not only was Nakasone doing this very precedent-breaking thing but he’s obviously been preparing for it a good while because he had learned a few Korean pop songs to be able to sing at drinking parties with Chun. He had also given strict instructions not only to the staff of the Kantei, the prime minister’s residence and office, but also to the Foreign Ministry that they were not to tell the U.S. about the visit in advance and after the announcement only to say what he was going to let them say. When this little bombshell dropped on us, the political counselor at the time was just beside himself.

Q: Who was that?

O’NEILL: Bob Immerman. He and Rust Deming, the external branch chief, and I were frantically calling our contacts in the Foreign Ministry to get more information. They were telling us that they were under instructions not to say anything, which was not the happiest situation for us. Ambassador Mansfield himself, that very revered figure, called the vice minister
of foreign affairs who was the senior professional Japanese diplomat. The vice minister told Ambassador Mansfield that he was under instructions from the prime minister’s office not to say anything more than that the visit had been announced.

Q: I would think that particularly you being a Korean hand would say, “This visit is a good idea.”

O’NEILL: Yes, in my “personal capacity” as they say in Japan, but in my official capacity in the political section, I wanted to at least find out the basics. If the prime minister wanted to break precedent, that was a remarkable point to begin with, but we wanted to find out what was going to happen, what they were going to discuss, what kind of aid or loan packages the Japanese had in mind, etc. From the workaday professional standpoint, this was not a happy moment. As I recall, before the visit we did get more information. It was just a two or three day embargo.

I think that the visit went very well. Nakasone did, indeed, party with Chun Doo-Hwan who was a pretty nasty character, but it was important for Japan to have a good relations with Korea and, indeed, it was important for us for the two to have good relations, too, since they were both our treaty allies. The fact that Nakasone made a good impression on the Koreans was good for the three countries.

Let me think of other things that happened during that year. Well, the next big event of 1983 took place on September 1. I happened to be on leave in my apartment, when the first word came out that a Korean Airlines 747 was missing on a flight that was to take it from Anchorage to Seoul across the Pacific. This happened to be the 60th anniversary of the Kanto earthquake which had devastated Tokyo and Yokohama on September 1, 1923.

Q: That was when Frank Lloyd Wright’s Imperial Hotel was about the only building to remain standing.

O’NEILL: Exactly. A devastating earthquake that not only flattened and burned Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama with a huge death toll but also as an offshoot produced a number of anti-Korean riots and the killing of Koreans based on rumors that in the aftermath they were poisoning wells and that kind of thing, another unhappy moment in Japanese-Korean relations.

First, the flight was supposedly just overdue. Then there was a report that it had been forced down in the Soviet Union, and then as more and more details came out it was clear the Soviets had shot the plane down. Ronald Reagan was president, George Shultz was secretary of state; Casper Weinberger was secretary of defense. It was a time, anyway, of rather significant tension in U.S.-Soviet relations, and this was just an outrage. I said before that it was in April 1979 that the Soviets shot down the first Korean Airlines airliner, Flight 902. It was actually April of ’78; I was off by a year. In that case the pilot managed to land a very badly damaged airplane on a frozen lake in the Kola Peninsula near Murmansk. In this case the aircraft was destroyed, and it crashed with loss of, I think the total number of people on board was 269.

Q: Including an American congressman.
O’NEILL: Congressman Larry McDonald who was if not the head of the ultra right John Birch Society was one of its high level officials. There were other American victims, just ordinary Americans. The high school age daughter of one of the senior people in the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan was on that flight and she was killed. There were just people of lots of different nationalities, mostly Korean.

The Soviets first denied any knowledge of the whole thing. Then one of our embassy officers who was a Soviet expert and Russian language officer was given the audio tapes from the Japanese Air Self Defense Force listening station at Wakkanaiai on the northern edge of Hokkaido. That was the transcript of the radio transmissions between the Soviet air defense ground control with the Sukhoi-15 interceptors that were tracking the plane.

The plane was way off course from Anchorage, starting with a tiny angle of deviation from the intended course. The farther along you go, of course the wider the deviation actually gets. The tiny little navigational error that was somehow built-in in Anchorage got bigger and bigger. Instead of going south of Kamchatka and Sakhalin over Hokkaido and down to Seoul, it was actually going over these very sensitive parts of the Soviet Far East where they had missile installations, submarine pens, and large fighter interceptor bases to protect against American bomber attacks just as we had similar bases in Alaska and radar stations. It developed that the plane was shot down. It was clear that the plane was being tracked by the Soviets. They lost it two or three times, and there was no evidence at all that the KAL pilot or crew knew anything was going wrong.

I knew a Pan Am 747 pilot at the time, who had been a Navy pilot. In the aftermath of this terrible business, he said several things. One is that every 747 has three inertial navigation systems on it — INSs — which are supposed to guide you even if you’re flying over the polar area where there is a lot of magnetic distortion. He told me that according to the instructions each of these INSs is supposed to be set by the crew individually before the flight, zeroed to the precise location to where you are on the runway, say in Anchorage. But he said nobody does that; everyone “gangs” them and programs all three INSs at once. Thus any error that’s put into one of them is going to be in all three of them. Once you start these little mini-computers putting in the positions, if the ground crew happens to move the aircraft even a small amount, that’s all you need for an eventually major navigational error.

He also talked about the Soviet claim that they had fired warning shots from one of the interceptors behind the 747, which would normally include tracer rounds that should be visible at night. Most SU-15s didn’t normally have guns. They were armed with air-to-air missiles although some of them did have external gun packs, so maybe the Soviet pilot did actually fire warning shots. My friend said it wouldn’t matter. You’re at night in a brightly lighted cockpit. You couldn’t see tracer rounds no matter what. He was speaking not only as a Pan Am pilot but as a Navy fighter pilot as well.

This turned into a huge row in U.S.-Soviet relations. We were obviously supporting the Koreans and their attempts to recover whatever remains, etc., could be found. The Japanese were weighing in on our and the Korean side and were providing support, as I said, from the SDF radar installation. It was a huge incident.
My boss, the external branch chief Rust Deming, and the Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Soviet division, Minoru Tamba, had the lead role in Tokyo on dealing with the incident, along with a senior Korean diplomat whose name I can’t remember. Tamba was quite a character, who eventually rose very high in the Japanese foreign ministry. I think he became a deputy foreign minister eventually. He had been born on Sakhalin, when it was still Japanese held. Tamba, Rust Deming and the Korean diplomat eventually got permission to go to Sakhalin to deal with the Soviets, mostly military people, on this shoot down and the attempts to recover remains, etc.

The Soviets they were dealing with were obviously under very tight control as to what they could say, and I was told that in one of the rooms they were working in was a little glass booth with a man in it watching and listening to all the meetings. You can bet he wasn’t from the Soviet Red Cross. Even after the Soviets admitted that they shot the plane down they were saying it was an intruder, and began hinting it was on an intelligence mission. The “usual suspects” in the West and even some in Japan took up that conspiracy line and ran with it. It was all nonsense; the real story was simply that for the second time in five years a KAL flight crew had made a terrible navigational error and this time it cost the lives of all on board. Sadly, I’m sure the botched Soviet attempt to destroy KAL 902 in April 1978, which was a huge embarrassment to the Soviet air defense, caused them to be even more ruthless and unforgiving in 1983.

The Soviets in Sakhalin were under extreme pressure to not give out any information. And also meanwhile U.S. and Japanese vessels were searching the straits north of Hokkaido to try to find remains and the so-called black boxes from the aircraft. While they were doing this they were dodging Soviet destroyers which were out not only to find the black boxes first but also to harass our vessels as well. That was a big event that had fairly long lasting negative effects on U.S.-Soviet relations.

One of the other things that happened in that same period was the assassination of Benigno Aquino as he was coming back to Manila from U.S. exile in August 1983. He was murdered on the steps of his airplane by two men from the Philippine Aviation Security Command. That murder lit the fuse of resistance to the Marcos dictatorship that eventually caused Marcos’s ouster by his widow Corazon Aquino’s People Power movement in 1986.

While the uproar over the KAL shoot-down was still in full spate, Chun Doo-Hwan was making a state visit to Rangoon, Burma in October. While he was there three North Korean army officers set a bomb in the open roof of the mausoleum where Aung San was buried. He was the Burmese national hero whose daughter Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest in Burma since about 1990.

That mausoleum was analogous to the National Cemetery in Seoul or Arlington Cemetery here. A state guest would go there and pay his respects to the national founding hero; so the North Koreans knew Chun Doo-Hwan was going to do that. Chun apparently got held up in traffic en route to the mausoleum. It appears that the North Koreans mistook the Korean ambassador, who I’m told resembled Chun to a degree, for Chun. Because Chun’s retinue was largely there, the bomb was detonated killing the ambassador, the much respected Foreign Minister, Lee Bum-Suk, and most of the senior Blue House staff including Hahm Pyong Choon, a presidential aide.
who had been ambassador to Washington, and a number of the senior ROK military people. A number of other people, Koreans and Burmese were gravely wounded.

We were watching this from afar in Tokyo, but we were also interested in getting the Japanese to do whatever they could to support the ROK. It was pretty obvious that the North Koreans were the only ones who would have done something as atrocious as this particularly in a country whose people are as superstitious as the Burmese. No Burmese whether he was a Kachin, Karen, Burman, Chin or from any other ethnic group would ever blow up a grave because they’re so concerned about spirits. As an aside, when I was in one of my language stints at FSI, the senior Burmese language teacher had originally come to the U.S. as a diplomat when Burma became independent in the late ‘40s. He said one of the Burmese diplomats died while at the embassy in Washington. Because of the fear among some of the embassy staff of this man’s ghost continuing to linger at the embassy, they asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cut orders transferring him back to Rangoon posthumously, which was their way of getting rid of the ghost.

From that and stories that my father told from his World War II service in Burma, I knew that no Burmese group, even anti-government groups, were going to get involved in blowing up a tomb. Particularly Aung San’s because he was one of the rare Burmans who actually had gained the trust of most if not all of the minority groups who were usually being oppressed by the Burman majority.

One fear that we had and I think the South Koreans also had was with Burma’s long history of neutrality they would say we’re just getting rid of both, breaking relations with both North and South Korea. We didn’t want that kind of outcome which would have muddied the situation and let the North Koreans off the hook to a degree. That was a big fear. We were trying to encourage the Japanese to do what they could to get Ne Win, the dictator of Burma, to come down against the North Koreans. (Ne Win had been trained by the Japanese in WWII – Aung San, too, for that matter.)

In fact, the Ne Win government actually managed to capture two of the North Korean officers. One was badly injured by a grenade that he set off, another was killed by his own grenade, and the third man, a major, was captured unharmed. The two living North Koreans were put on trial by the Burmese army and convicted of the murders and of the assassination attempt on Chun.

In the end, we needn’t have worried about a muddled outcome. Ne Win not only broke relations with the DPRK and expelled their diplomatic mission but also withdrew recognition of the existence of the North Korean state, a serendipitous twist that I don’t think anybody had done in diplomacy before. But it was clear. By the way, this assassination attempt enraged the Chinese as well. They published, I’m told, the Burmese account and the North Korean denial in The Peoples’ Daily using exactly the same number of Chinese characters. That symbolized Chinese anger at this crime. When you think about it, not every state, even a pretty nasty one, would go to the length of blowing up the tomb of a friendly state’s national hero in order to get at one of their enemies who was on a state visit. Fortunately the Burmese were as outraged as they should have been.

Our last big project of 1983 was on Veterans’ Day weekend when President Reagan made a state
visit. This was my second presidential visit having done the Carter visit to Seoul in ’79 as we discussed earlier. Once we knew that this was going to take place, I immediately volunteered for all of the events having to do with the emperor. I wanted to have the experience of dealing with the Imperial Household Agency which is known as the Kunaicho in Japanese. It’s the group of extremely traditional gentlemen who basically control everything that has to do with the emperor or the imperial family and the outside world’s dealings with the imperial family.

_Q: They had quite a reputation along with the Hapsburg emperor’s court._

O’NEILL: Right. But in terms of longevity, the Hapsburgs were Johnny-come-latelies in comparison with the imperial family which they say goes back to descent from the Sun Goddess about 2300 years ago. Reagan was visiting for quite a number of reasons. It was natural for the president to visit one of our top Asian allies, one of our top trading partners with which we had difficulties, particularly over auto exports from Japan to the U.S. and the balance of trade in general.

On the positive side, obviously, we wanted to affirm the relationship with Japan in the military sense and to remind the Japanese, obviously, that we were with them in the face of the Soviet Union which in those days the Japanese saw as their main threat and on which they collaborated with us a great deal in defense planning.

All U.S. presidential visits are an enormous strain on the host government and the embassy. Reagan’s visits were no less so than any others. In part it was because every president realizes that these things have to look good on TV back home, and their staffs realize that too. So there is a great deal of searching out the best local color venues and for imbibing the local culture and history, etc., and portraying the president’s interest. Again, it’s a legitimate purpose both to the U.S. population and also for the host government’s population to show that the president is interested in this or that aspect of host country’s history and culture. But it’s very time consuming because the people from the White House included people like Mike Deaver, who was probably Reagan’s longest standing and most important advisor other than Nancy Reagan herself.

_Q: And Deaver was extremely close to Nancy Reagan. That was a very powerful combination._

O’NEILL: It was a very powerful combination. What you usually have with the presidential visit to country X, Y, or Z is a series of at least two advance teams. In this case, we had a survey team, a pre-advance team, and then two advance teams before the actual visit. There were two levels of events. One series of events was the ceremonial ones involving the emperor which included welcoming Reagan to the Akasaka state guest house, a courtesy call on the emperor by Reagan and his entourage at the imperial palace, then the state dinner, and then just before the departure there was to be the farewell call by the emperor.

I was assigned to the events at the Akasaka palace, where the Reagans were going to stay during the entire visit. One of the other embassy officers became the event officer for the courtesy call on the emperor and the state dinner. We were both fully occupied. Working with the Imperial Household Agency was very interesting because their idea of precedent was that something had
been done exactly the same way for the last 1200 years.

A particular twist in this visit was the security requirements in the aftermath of the Rangoon bombing, the KAL 007 shoot down and the Aquino assassination. Nancy Reagan was really security conscious and so of course was the Secret Service. Reagan was supposed to have gone to Manila. That leg of the overseas trip was cancelled because of Aquino’s assassination, both to show our strong belief that the Marcos government was behind it and also Nancy Reagan’s concern for the president’s safety made it impossible.

In the event, the very distinguished and able diplomat Mike Armacost who was then our ambassador in the Philippines came to Tokyo to brief Reagan on the Philippine situation.

We had weeks and weeks of more and more White House people. They included people like Mike Deaver and the Secret Service in great profusion because they had to be able to cover all of these various visit sites before and during and were also responsible for flying in the President’s limos and helicopters on USAF transports. There was White House Communications Agency or WHCA, a military organization part of the executive office of the President who do all the communication set-ups in every place he’s going to be. The White House public relations people also. There were mobs of U.S. officials to start off with, plus there was going to be the news media, too.

When we got the word of the visit dates, the embassy initially reserved 1200 rooms at the Okura Hotel right across the street from the chancery and the ambassador’s residence. It was one of the great hotels of the world and one which was very accustomed to American presidential visits over the decades. Eventually I think we only needed about 700 rooms.

One of the principal duties of an embassy is to make sure there’s only one visit being planned, not a host country version and a White House version, because if you let the two of them get away from each other, you’ll have a real disaster. The host country players, the people from the Imperial Household Agency, the foreign ministry’s protocol office, the prime minister’s office, the Japanese police, all were working on planning. The White House whether Republican or Democrat has its own ideas as to what the visit is supposed to do for their own domestic and foreign benefit. The host government whether it’s Japan or whoever else, has their own imperatives, too, things they want the president to do, things they want him to see, people they want him to see, all that sort of thing.

**Q: Did you get any feel for Nancy Reagan and her astrologer?**

O’NEILL: This was 1983, so I don’t know how long the astrologer had been around. The astrologer was not part of the presidential party. That would have been a minor thing. The biggest thing was security, and it got to a very serious impasse. One of the major sites to be visited by President and Mrs. Reagan was the Meiji Shrine, a huge Shinto shrine in downtown Tokyo, devoted, to the Meiji Emperor, the first emperor of modern Japan and the grandfather of the then emperor, Hirohito, the Showa emperor.

There were two events at the Meiji Shrine: One was to pay respects at the shrine proper, and then
there was also going to be an exhibition of what is called yabusame or horseback archery in which men in 12th Century samurai costumes ride down a dirt track and shoot sideways at targets with those great long bows that the samurai used before they got into swords as much. That was to be one of the big televised cultural things on the itinerary.

The Secret Service wanted to bring dogs — and I’m not making this up as Dave Barry says — into the inner sanctum of the central building of the Meiji shrine and go behind the altar to check for bombs. The Japanese were just about overcome. They were really reaching for their smelling salts.

Q: Dogs in Oriental culture are not...

O’NEILL: Yeah. Not a great idea. Not a great public relations gambit to begin with, particularly not in something like this. It would be somewhat similar, to, say, the British prime minister’s security staff saying that they wanted to have their dogs up in the private residence of the White House to check things out because the PM is coming for a visit. It would be like that although without the religious character that you’ve got with a Shinto shrine. At one point, Ambassador Mansfield had to meet with PM Nakasone over security issues – pretty unprecedented in itself – and I’m sure the dog search was on their agenda. Eventually the secret Service had to back down. They couldn’t do this. Among other things, they were told by the Japanese that the regular Japanese national police can’t even go into that inner sanctum. There’s a separate shrine police force who are the only security people allowed into those precincts. Even thereafter, all through the visit there was a lot of tension between our Secret Service and the SPs or Security Police, which is the Japanese equivalent. Of course, they are proud of their ability to protect foreign dignitaries, and their view was when a foreign dignitary, even the president of the U.S., is in Japan, they protect them.

Q: Everything was overlaid with the whole Rangoon business.

O’NEILL: Yes. You had all these major incidents, great tension with the Soviets after KAL 007, the Rangoon bombing, Aquino’s assassination, all back to back, all in early fall of 1983.

But in the end, Reagan arrived, over Veterans’ Day weekend. It all looked great on television which, I’m afraid, is often the main thing. Behind the scenes it was often more frantic, especially at times at the Akasaka state guest house where the Reagans were staying. It’s sort of a miniature samurai Versailles in downtown Tokyo.

The first event was the emperor’s welcoming ceremony. Air Force One and the press plane were landing not out at Narita Airport but at Haneda, the downtown airport which was no longer used for international flights. They were to be picked up by Marine helicopters, both Marine One which had been transported from Andrews in a giant C-5 as well as other, larger Marine helicopters from units in Japan. The party would be helicoptered from Haneda to the palace.

The uniform for the Emperor’s welcoming ceremony was morning coat, formal striped trousers, etc. We had to outfit Ed Meese, James Baker, the deputy treasury secretary, and all the White House party who were to greet the Emperor. We had gotten their sizes with the help of the White
House advance team, which was extremely professional. They really knew what they were doing. In different rooms in the guest house, we had the formal outfits laid out with nametags. Our job was to run out to the chopper pad next to the palace, find all “our” White House senior staff, who were getting off the helicopters in a swirl of dust, all wearing blazers and polo shirts and chinos because they had just flown across the Pacific, run them up the steps of the palace, into the right rooms, get them dressed, run them back down the steps, and line them up before the emperor got there. The time for this was really short, but we did it!

All along since the summer, a couple of us had been working with the Imperial Household Agency on every detail of the Emperor’s events. Fortunately they had people from the Foreign Ministry on detail, and the senior official we usually dealt with was an ambassador named Yamashita. He was indispensable to making the events with the Emperor go as planned. Aside from the security and press issues, the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) needed to have several vans at the Imperial Palace during the state dinner, which was not the usual Japanese practice for other state visits.

Q: Was somebody keeping an eye out for World War II issues? After all, by many accounts Hirohito could have been considered a war criminal. Were there things that arose on the visit that would have raised the ghost of World War II?

O’NEILL: Certainly not that I can think of on that visit other than we were meeting with the emperor. First of all, a relatively small handful of people in the United States knew or cared that Reagan was going anywhere outside the U.S. Nothing in the visit itself in terms of where they were going, the specific places like the Meiji shrine, etc., would immediately raise in the minds of any Americans, any association with World War II. They weren’t going to Hiroshima or to Iwo Jima or Okinawa.

In terms of what the American people saw on television it was a great visit, smoothly run, great visuals and all that. There were good discussions. Reagan and Nakasone cemented what was known as the “Ron-Yasu relationship,” which was the closest personal relationship to date between an American president and a Japanese prime minister that I can think of. I don’t know that they completely solved any of the top issues between the United States and Japan, but these visits are always the chance to move things forward and make some progress on most of the issues. The Japanese were delighted that the American president was making a state visit.

Earlier, I think I mentioned that I developed a measure of success for presidential visits which is if bilateral relations are no worse after the visit than they were before it was a great success. This one exceeded that cynical standard. I think most of the remainder of my time there, another eight or nine months in Japan, was pretty much the routine stuff of diplomacy between the U.S. and Japan. Fortunately, 1984 in Asia did not match 1983, with the Aquino assassination, KAL 007 and the Rangoon bombing.

Q: Let’s talk a bit before we leave about Japanese attitudes. Let’s start with the Philippines. This was during the Marcos regime. Of course, the Aquino assassination led eventually to Mrs. Corazon Aquino overthrowing Marcos and becoming president.
O’NEILL: Two and a half years later.

Q: Prior to that, how did we view the Japanese relationship with the Philippines?

O’NEILL: To my mind at the time, it was overwhelmingly commercial and aid-related. The Japanese saw big business opportunities in the Philippines and they always had. This was something they have been interested in since before World War II. There were lots of Japanese business concerns in the Philippines when it was still a U.S. Commonwealth before independence in ’46. Nothing sticks in my mind of any instance where the Japanese criticized the Marcos regime, as far as his destruction of the Philippine economy, or human rights depredations throughout the country. The Japanese usually kept a very low profile almost everywhere, often to our annoyance because 25 years ago Japan did not attempt to match its economic importance in the world with anything approaching diplomatic and political importance.

Let me mention too the important Soviet relationship with Japan. Even under normal circumstance, even without KAL 007, Japanese relations with the Soviet Union were very bad. Evans Revere, who is now the president of the Korea Society and who served both in Korea and Japan, once commented to me, “Only people who served in Japan during the Soviet era would realize how bad Soviet-Japan relations normally were.”

The focus was the Northern Territories, the group of islands just north of Hokkaido that the Soviets took in the immediate aftermath of World War II. After Japan surrendered they moved forces into those northern islands and have never given them back. It was the only issue that united every Japanese political party from the far right fringe to the Communist Party, the Japan Socialist Party and the LDP. Everybody was united on that: Give back the Northern Territories. It was a really neuralgic point.

The animosity toward the Soviets was evident at the Foreign Ministry as well as a matter of policy. When we’d go over to the ministry, we’d just call ahead to the particular office, Southeast Asia I, China, or whatever, talk to the person we wanted to see, and then we’d just go up to his office. It was different for Soviet diplomats. The only office in the Foreign Ministry that they were normally allowed to visit was the Soviet Affairs Division. There was a little doorbell at the front of the door of the Soviet division, and it said “Please ring the bell.”

The Soviet diplomats would then be taken to a separate room down the hall. Their Japanese interlocutors would be seated in front of a gigantic map of the Northern Territories. It was as big as the wall behind you. The Soviets would be facing the map of course. This is known as “oriental subtlety.” [laughter] Regardless of what issue the Soviet diplomat came to talk about, that would be the setting.

The Soviets almost never missed a chance to irritate the Japanese whether wittingly or unwittingly. They just had a tremendous knack for doing so. In fact, when something bad would happen in the U.S.-Japan relations, miraculously you could almost count on the Soviets doing something really stupid that would help draw attention from the problem in U.S.-Japan relations and get the Japanese upset about the Soviets. They were wonderful!
They also had a track record of sending as ambassador to Japan whoever happened to be the most recently failed minister of agriculture. He would be dismissed and disgraced because of two or three years of failed harvests, and sure enough he would be appointed as ambassador to Japan. There was one case during that time in which the new Soviet luminary was dismissed from the Party Central Committee of the party after arriving as ambassador to Tokyo. It was hard to know if the Party did that to insult the Japanese or for their own obtuse internal reasons but it was easy for the Japanese to feel insulted.

Q: How about China? Let’s talk Taiwan first. How sat things during the time you were there?

O’NEILL: Between Japan and Taiwan? It was very interesting. In those days in the Japanese Diet and elsewhere in the Japanese political world, there was a Taiwan Lobby, not quite as virulent as our so-called China lobby in the ‘40s and ‘50s, but nonetheless people who were still powerful and protective of the Taiwan relationship. To backtrack: The Japanese opened full diplomatic relations with the PRC, People’s Republic of China, shortly after Nixon’s visit. That visit is still known as “the Nixon shock” in Japan.

Q: The Nixon shokku?

O’NEILL: “Nix-on shokku.” Nixon and Kissinger unfortunately did not tell our Japanese allies about their secret visits to China, so they were absolutely blindsided by Nixon’s extraordinary visit. It was a vitally important visit for Japan, but we could hardly have handled it worse. In fairness to Nixon and Kissinger, they probably figured that as leaky as Japan’s political world was, advance word would have gotten out. The Japanese press was all over the ministries and all over the prime minister’s office and the Diet all the time. There was a certain amount of reason for not telling the Japanese in advance.

The Japanese under Kakuei Tanaka, the famous and eventually disgraced prime minister, a much more activist prime minister than the normal run of the mill, was very quick to open full diplomatic relations with the PRC which meant breaking relations with Taiwan. But, there still was a large body of people in Japan who were linked to Taiwan and wanted to do whatever Japan could do to help Taiwan.

Part of this went back into history because one of the immediate results of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 was that Japan got control of Taiwan (or Formosa) which had largely been neglected for centuries by the central government in Beijing. It was mainly inhabited by two groups of people. One group was aboriginal tribesmen somewhat similar to people of the northern Philippines, who had been there for eons. The other group was ethnic Chinese who were largely from Fujian province across the straits. Those people had been in Taiwan for a long time too. They were sort of left to their own devices more or less to be traders and pirates by the central government of Beijing. Anyway, Japanese had control of Taiwan for half a century. In contrast to the Japanese colonial period in Korea, the rule over Taiwan was relatively benign and beneficial to the people. The Japanese did a good bit of infrastructure development. The people certainly didn’t resist the Japanese, at least not like the Koreans did because the circumstances were so different. The Japanese came in and treated them pretty well.
Q: It was also a resort area for the Japanese.

O’NEILL: It became so, yes, in a way that Korea could probably never been for a lot of reasons, including Korean outrage at having been taken over by the Japanese. That control over Taiwan was lost in 1945. But there was still a lot of trade between them, political, educational and personal ties as well.

The Japan-Taiwan relationship was rather protective with many of the Japanese conservative politicians trying to look out for Taiwan. They couldn’t do much because again, Japanese foreign policy was just not very assertive. Whatever support they could provide quietly, they would. The catch phrase for Japanese diplomacy in those years and before and afterwards was “omni-directional peaceful diplomacy,” zenpou-i heiwa gaikou in Japanese. That rather mushy phrase exemplified Japanese diplomacy for some decades. Don’t get anybody angry at you, don’t ruffle anybody’s feathers and just muddle along and hope you get another big commercial contract for Mitsubishi or the like.

Q: From your perspective were we ever going after the Japanese to support something in the UN or in the Japanese moves toward Taiwan during this time?

O’NEILL: Nothing that I could remember. Obviously we were always after the Japanese and many other countries to support us in this or that committee in the UN and this or that General Assembly vote. I don’t remember that Japan was on the Security Council as one of the temporary members during the time I was there, but had they been we would certainly have been after them for their vote. The Japanese would normally be with us. They would tend to get uneasy if we were after them, for example, to join us in a vote condemning a dictator in whatever country we happened to be focusing on at the moment. They would not want to do that, and they would tend to want to abstain. Positive things they would get on board with, things they would consider negative or in any way sticking their necks out a way they’d be reluctant.

Q: Al, we’re touring the horizon right now. How stood things in the People’s Republic of China during this two year period from our perspective from Tokyo?

O’NEILL: I’m trying to think of anything that blew up! [laughter] There was one visit which was good and significant. Hua Guofeng, the Chinese party leader at the time… I recall that this was in the spring of 1984. I’d have to check the dates, but my recollection was it was the spring of ’84.

Hua made an official visit to Japan. It had been some while since a Chinese of his rank had visited Japan. He turned out to be a very affable guest. Hua wasn’t a cold, aloof type of party apparatchik that you might expect but was quite an outgoing, bubbly sort. He was a big hit in the Japanese news media. I think Hua went to Osaka to see that big commercial hub and I think he made a good impression on the Japanese in general – no gaffes. He helped with the reasonably good relationship that existed then between the Japanese and the Chinese at that moment. The Japanese were trying to encourage the Chinese toward economic reforms which eventually did take off. The reforms were actually on their way because Mao had died in 1976. The Japanese were encouraging the Chinese to continue moving in the same direction.
Q: Was the problem of the Japanese textbooks about World War II alive at the time either vis-a-vis China or Korea? Certainly in Germany this subject is treated in depth in the school books, but in Japan it’s almost completely glossed over.

O’NEILL: Yes, I should have mentioned it. There was a blowup about textbooks right before I arrived back in Tokyo to begin my job in the political section. In August of 1982, the Japanese had come with new guidelines for history textbooks. The Ministry of Education does not write the text books, but it puts out guidance for those who do and also this guidance is often used by the prefectural school systems in picking textbooks.

That blowup involved the Republic of Korea and the PRC but that to the best of my recollection, had been smoothed over long before Hua was visiting. If the issue had still been alive, Hua probably would not have come. It’s one of those things that’s episodic. The larger underlying issue is that the Japanese had not – and have not – come to grips as well with the World War II situation as the Germans. Shame is a serious problem in Japan. If somebody does something that they consider shameful, it really is a disgrace, so many cannot bring themselves to believe that they did anything shameful in World War II. Some do and some don’t, but certainly in those days many followed the line in that the Japanese were liberating the Chinese, the Koreans, the Burmese, Filipinos, and those in the Dutch West Indies from western colonial rule. They never quite figured out, “Yeah, we killed several million of them doing that, but they should be grateful anyway.”

In those days, when you spoke with Japanese who had served in World War II or were old enough to experience it as teenagers, they tended to speak as if it were a typhoon or an earthquake. It didn’t seem to have any human agency at least as you were talking with them about it, it was just like a natural disaster. They certainly were not willing to recognize how they were seen in almost every part of Asia with the possible exceptions of the Burmans, the majority people of Burma.

The Burman majority pretty much welcomed the Japanese invaders, who expelled the British in 1942. Ne Win and Aung San and others who were Burmese independence heroes, the so-called Thirty Comrades, went to be trained during the war on Hainan Island by the Japanese. They got infiltrated back into Burma because they saw the Japanese as the Japanese saw themselves: as the liberators from western colonialism. Elsewhere whether in Hong Kong or Singapore, the Malay Peninsula and certainly the Philippines, the attitude toward the Japanese in World War II was quite a bit different.

Q: How about some of the last ones, unless there is another, unless you want to talk about Southeast Asia? What about the North Koreans? There were two things. One, the relationship with North Korea as a state and also North Koreans in Japan. How was this in your time?

O’NEILL: Any time you see a statistic about the Korean population of Japan, in whatever year from the 1950s through today, it always seems to be 600,000, no matter who’s writing about it. It’s hard to believe that such a population could be so static, but that’s the figure that’s always given for, say, for 40-something years.
Most of the ethnic Koreans in Japan originally came from southern Korea or from Cheju-Do, not from the northern half of the peninsula. Some went voluntarily because there was a better economic opportunity even while Japan was the colonial master, and more were either forced into laboring jobs there or perhaps drafted into the armed forces. Anyway, you had this population of ethnic Koreans who were settled in Japan, sometimes for many generations. They were divided politically once the peninsula was divided and two states were set up in 1948. Their allegiances went in different directions.

There was a large group that was called in Japanese Chosen Soren, short for the “General Association for Korean Residents in Japan.” That was the pro-North Korean group. The South Korean group went by the abbreviated name “Mindan.” They were roughly similar in size, I think. If you were part of Mindan or pro-South Korea, you would normally have a Republic of Korea passport, a South Korean passport, and you could travel out of Japan. You’d have to have a visa to come back to Japan or a resident certificate. If you were an adherent of North Korea, a member of Chosen Soren, you didn’t have a passport, or at least the Japanese didn’t recognize the North Korean passport. You were more or less stateless residents of Japan because of Japanese antipathy toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the communist North.

Of course, the Japanese had full diplomatic relations from 1965 with the South and an embassy in Seoul. There was an ROK embassy in Tokyo. There was a good bit of antagonism of course between the two Korean groups although not that I can recall any violence. Also, there was a weird feature of the Japanese political system in that, rather than the Japanese Communist Party, it was the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) that was closest to North Korea and friendliest to their policies.

While I was in Japan the Japanese communist party newspaper which was called Akahata or Red Flag, published an article bitterly attacking North Korea, saying that the worship of the Kim Il Sung personality cult was just like the emperor worship in the Meiji era. Further, the North Koreans really did start the Korean War which was totally contrary to what the North Koreans were saying and certainly an issue on which the Soviets and Chinese at least remained silent. I don’t know what prompted this outburst. The Socialists got a lot of support from the North Korean population of Japan, and a source of revenue for this population was these Pachinko parlors. Pachinko was a Japanese pinball game. The prizes were things like packets of Kleenex or a comb. It wasn’t like you were winning at Las Vegas. Nonetheless, pachinko was a major source of revenue for North Korea and for the Japan Socialist Party.

In fact, in later years when the Japanese government began to cut down on revenue sharing from the North Korean residents’ group to North Korea, it was also cutting into the revenues of the Japan Socialist Party, which may have helped contribute to what I consider its well-deserved demise as a major player in Japan’s politics. But something that became a major issue in Japan relations with North Korea years and still is the top issue now is the abductions of Japanese to North Korea.

I was aware that the Japanese National Police Agency strongly believed that a number of the disappearances of Japanese from coastal areas in the ’70s into the ‘80s were caused by North
Korea. They were quite certain that this was the case, but they were not in a position to make any public declaration about it.

Q: At the time you were dealing with this, was there any rationale for these abductions?

O’NEILL: That’s always been one of the major questions. The purpose of bringing them there was to train North Korean intelligence operatives to be seen as Japanese, to be able to speak Japanese without a Korean accent, to be able to understand Japanese customs and culture and all of that well enough that they could pass, at least, in a third country as Japanese with fake passports.

The question always arises, why didn’t the North Koreans use this large community of several hundred thousand ethnic Koreans? Most spoke at least a good bit of Japanese, and some of them spoke Japanese as their first language and Korean as their second language which they were learning in Chosen Soren schools. Part of my answer is the North Koreans are so suspicious of everybody that they would even be suspicious of these pro-North Korean people as being not quite loyal. There’s a reason for my thinking this, and I’ll get into that in a second. Also, being outsiders in Japan in the final analysis, they might not be able to pass for “real Japanese.” But if you grabbed real Japanese who spoke nothing but Japanese, who know no other customs than Japan’s customs; you were really getting the genuine article.

Bizarre as this whole thing is, kidnapping people from another country to bring them to your country to train your intelligence operatives, it’s what they did, including to train the two people who blew up KAL 858 near Burma in November of 1987. That’s pretty weird, and yet that’s what was done. The North Koreans may also have been wary because of the unhappy history of a lot of Koreans from Japan who went to North Korea starting in the late ‘50s and early ‘60s. There’s a great book about this called Exodus to North Korea by Tessa Morris-Suzuki.

A lot of those true believers, originally as I say almost all from hometowns in South Korea went to the North expecting to be in a nationalistic Korean paradise in which everyone was going to be equal and they were going construct socialism, following great leader Kim Il-Sung. Everybody was going to live happily ever after. Many of them got very disenchanted very fast with the realities of North Korea which was then as now a brutal totalitarian state. When those émigrés began making suggestions to North Korean officials about improving economic processes or industrial production, that was not what the central committee was planning. If they kept pushing they got into trouble. In a lot of cases, they and their entire families wound up in the North Korean gulag.

Another book that came out about 2000 or 2001 was called The Aquariums of Pyongyang. It was written by a man who’s now in the south who was of such a Japanese-Korean family. His grandfather and grandmother took his family from Japan to North Korea. The entire family wound up for, in his case, 14 years in an incredibly primitive and horrible existence in a prison camp. The writer eventually learned the reason that they went was because the grandfather was criticizing the North Korean system. Off they went, the whole family, even ones who had done nothing like the writer, who was a teenager. After the grandfather died, the problem was removed and they got out of the prison camp and were back, though under great suspicion, in
North Korean society in the provinces. This suspicion about their loyalty of the émigrés, I’m sure, was a key reason why the North Koreans resorted to the bizarre tactic of kidnapping Japanese.

Q: Did you generally find that North Koreans in Japan as being a spy problem or something of that nature?

O’NEILL: They were certainly watched. Sometimes North Korean infiltration vessels would use Japanese waters. In other words, instead of trying to go down the coast to infiltrate South Korea, they’d come over to Japan. Sometimes they’d both land and pick up agents and information, etc., in Japan, but also as a sort of ruse went to infiltrate South Korea. Instead of the South Korean coast guard or navy seeing a vessel coming down the coast from North Korea, they’d see what might be a large fishing boat coming from Japan, so it would help fuzz things up especially at night. The Japanese knew this, and they just couldn’t bring themselves to make an issue about it because I guess in some cases there was a limit to what they could do about it.

Q: Did you pick out from your Japanese contacts any concern that all of a sudden North Korea might invade South Korea? I mean, Japan would then have to be heavily involved.

O’NEILL: No. Not really. Had there been a major clash that, let’s say, prompted a North Korean invasion, the Japanese would have been very upset on a number of levels, one of which was just the fear of how far it could spread. The involvement of all the U.S. forces in Japan in the Korean contingency would have been not only immediate but also sustained during the entire conflict. All the forces in Japan would have headed for the Korean peninsula right away, plus there would have been huge air, naval and ground forces coming through these same Japanese bases, particularly air and navy, flowing through to sustain the defense of the south and the defeat of North Korea. That would have been pretty alarming to the Japanese.

Q: Did you and your wife have any contacts with South Korean diplomats?

O’NEILL: Oh, yes.

Q: What was your impression of their attitude toward serving there?

O’NEILL: I think most of them were Japanese speakers; largely they had good Japanese language skills. I think they liked Tokyo; they liked Japan, and we knew quite a few of them. We had good close relations with the Korean embassy people, the political section mainly because that was who I normally got in touch with. I think they were under the same kinds of strains dealing with the Japanese government as Japanese diplomats were in their embassy in Seoul. It’s generally a relatively good though touchy relationship, but there were times things were pretty strained. The Japanese relationship was second only to the U.S. for Korean diplomats certainly at that time and they wouldn’t have been assigned to Tokyo had they not wanted to be.

Q: Okay. Today is the 17th of September 2008. This is an interview with Al O’Neill. Al, I think we were talking about 1985 or ‘84?
O’NEILL: Yes. I left Tokyo in summer 1984 and went back to my first State Department assignment that summer. I was assigned to the political-military bureau in what was then called the Office of Strategic Technology Affairs. It was the office that dealt with COCOM, which was the Coordinating Committee for Strategic Technology Controls, based in Paris. That was a multi-national organization aimed at preventing the Soviet Union and its allies and the PRC and others from getting what was called “dual use technology,” cutting edge technology that had both military and civilian applications, the purpose being to restrict their ability to increase their military technological level.

The office was quite small. It had only five officers: an office director and four other officers, one of whom was an Air Force captain. The rest of us were Foreign Service officers. At the time the political-military bureau was, as I put it, under the command of Lieutenant General John T. Chain, Jr., USAF, who later got a fourth star and became commanding general of Strategic Air Command. We had quite a large number of responsibilities for such a small office in addition to having a leading role in COCOM for the State Department, a mission that we shared with the Office of East-West Trade in the economic and business affairs bureau or EB.

We also had the U.S. government lead on what later became the Missile Technology Control Regime to try to restrict both the payload and ranges of ballistic missiles worldwide. When SDI — the Strategic Defense Initiative — of the Reagan administration became internationalized, we helped negotiate agreements on SDI cooperation. That was when the U.S. government decided that they wanted to have international partners like Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Israel. We played a role in those negotiations with those countries trying to reach agreements with them on their cooperation with the SDI operation itself. Largely this was going to be in the realm of technological research in those countries that might ultimately benefit the entire SDI project which was, of course, an anti-ballistic missile project, popularly known as Star Wars.

WILLIAM CLARK, JR.
Director, Japanese Affairs

Deputy Chief of Mission
Tokyo (1981-1985)

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. He graduated from San Jose State College with a B.A. degree in 1955. He served in the U.S. Navy intermittently from 1949 to 1953. In 1957, he joined the State Department, serving in Sierra Leone, Japan, South Korea, Egypt, India, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.

Q: Bill, tell us how your next assignment was arranged?

CLARK: My work in Seoul became known to Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary for the Far East. For one of the few times in my career, I didn't have a clear idea what my next
assignment would be. Holbrooke had suggested that I return to Washington, but did not mention a specific assignment. Two possibilities appeared: either Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs or Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. As it turned out, Holbrooke was not able to find an onward assignment for Bob Rich, then the Korean Office Director, and extended his tour on that job for a year. Therefore, I became Director for Japanese Affairs, which turned out to be a very useful assignment for my career. I would have gladly taken either assignment. I should note that during my tour in Seoul, I received an inquiry on whether I might be interested in a direct transfer to Tokyo as Political Counselor. The question came from a friend who thought that such an assignment could be approved if I were interested. I gave that idea considerable consideration, but finally decided against it because it would have been essentially a lateral transfer. In fact, there was more action in Seoul at the time then there was in Tokyo. In retrospect, it was one of the best decisions I have ever made.

So I returned to Washington to immerse myself in Japanese affairs after a six year absence since 1974. However, I had been close enough to Japan not to have missed the major themes and trends. Copies of messages between Washington and Tokyo on major issues were often sent to Seoul which permitted me to stay current. I may have been somewhat surprised by the degree of concern exhibited in Washington over the automotive trade issue. As you will recall, my last assignment in the Department before Korea was in the special trade office. So I knew something about the issue and the debate over Japanese protectionists policies. In the mid-70s, the issue was specialty steels. But I was startled in 1980 by the level of the tensions over US-Japan trade. The first debate that I became involved in was whether the Prime Minister of Japan should be invited to the United States and if he did come, whether the President would receive him. The problem was that of a meeting would be held, the President would have to take a very hard line on the automotive trade issue. That view in Washington appeared to me to have come from a sharply increased level of concern for trade issues from even four years earlier. There was no question that in that period, the trade tension between the US and Japan had increased measurably. The automotive issue was the principal one, but there were other commodity problems as well. We were upset, to put it mildly, by the ever increasing Japanese penetration of the American car market.

I spent a lot of time on this issue with the USTR, Treasury and Commerce Departments. I saw some people on the Hill, although the Department's Congressional Relations staff did its best to keep Departmental officers as far away from Congress as possible. Most of the Congressional liaison work is done at the assistant secretary level; country directors could join in seminars or talk to people on the Hill with whom they were acquainted. I saw some industry representatives, but that was minimal.

As I said, Holbrooke was the Assistant Secretary. Tom Shoesmith was the first Deputy Assistant Secretary for Northeast Asia I worked for and he was followed by Mike Armacost, after Reagan succeeded Carter. Both of these officers gave me considerable latitude in the management of Japanese affairs, except on trade issues. There, because the issue was of interest to the President and the Secretary, many others more senior to me became involved. This was particularly true in 1980 as Presidential elections loomed, even though trade did not become a focus of attention. After that political event, top level interest waned a little. In early 1981, the first Japanese "voluntary restraint" regime went into effect. That of course is a euphemism, but it has been used
since then and has become part of the lexicon. The Japanese never filled their quota, but it their "restraint" stood them in good political stead. I became involved to a small degree in the negotiations of these "restraints", but since the levels agreed upon were based on history of imports, there wasn't much of a debate within the US government or with the Japanese. This is not to suggest that the Department was marginalized in trade negotiations in the early 1980s. In fact, it was much more involved then than it is today. State officials spent a lot more time with the USTR then, in part because USTR was then a much smaller organization which relied on State and other agencies for analysis and support. Today, that organization works much more independently, much, I believe, to the detriment of the US effort on trade issues. In the early 1980s, the USTR was a coordinating agency, which led US efforts, but worked cooperatively with other departments and agencies. It made other agencies compete within the US government, which produced considerable creativity. Then the departments and agencies were deeply involved in the implementation of USTR and Presidential decisions. So I and my State colleagues felt part of the US team.

In the brief ten months period that I was the Office Director, there were a couple of other major issues that engaged my attention. One concerned a Navy nuclear submarine that sank a Japanese freighter after having rammed it right off the coast of Japan. The submarine did not believe that it had caused any major damage and therefore left the scene. Unfortunately, that was a bad call. It took us a long time to convince the Navy that apologies were in order. Being a litigious society, the Navy was concerned that admission of error might prove to be a costly policy. But we were clearly at fault. The Japanese Prime Minister at the time was an unlikely choice, Suzuki Zenko. The headline in one Japanese newspaper when he became Prime Minister was "Zenko Who?" -- a take off on an earlier American headline. That situation in Tokyo made matters somewhat easier. In any case, eventually we squeezed an interim report out of the Navy which Ambassador Mansfield gave to the Japanese Foreign Minister in New York; I was present for that occasion.

Suzuki came to the United States. He rode around Manhattan Island an a boat owned by Malcolm Forbes, the Highlander. At the end of that cruise, Forbes, as was his standard pattern, made a few remarks. He wanted to give a present to Mrs. Suzuki. It was a lamp that she had allegedly admired, which to my tastes, was the ugliest thing I had ever seen. It was made of blow fish skin -- a fish that the Japanese liked to eat. Forbes presented it to Mrs. Suzuki, because, according to him, she had said that the lamp had reminded her of her husband's career when he was the Fishery Minister. When she took the lamp from Forbes, she said that she had been misunderstood. She in fact had said that the lamp had reminded her of her husband -- not his career! During the Suzuki visit, we hammered out a unique communiqué; for the first time, we got the Japanese to admit in a communiqué that we were allies. That was a concept that had always been troublesome for the Japanese. But this time, they agreed to have it in an international document, referring to "an alliance between the United States and Japan". Suzuki was criticized by the Japanese press at home for the way the communiqué was handled. He had come to the US for a two day meeting with a formal dinner at the end of the first day. The second day was reserved for a presentation by Suzuki; the first day had been ours. At the White House dinner, some members of the Japanese delegation came to me asking whether they could release advance copies of the communiqué to the press before the end of the bilateral talks. I said that that was not acceptable. The Japanese said that that was their normal procedure. I continued to demur. So they left and found someone who worked on the NSC, who told them to go ahead.
Before releasing the draft, these Japanese came back to me and told me that they had NSC approval. I told them that they should not have told me because I would not change my mind and if they were looking to me for the official US government approval, they would not get it. So they gave out advance copies to their press. Naturally, for the first time in my memory, the press violated the embargo which it had always religiously observed and wrote stories about the communique which appeared in the next day's Japanese papers. Of course, the draft included the phrase about "the alliance", even before Suzuki had an opportunity to make his points to the President. That didn't play too well in Japan. The stories really appeared as Suzuki was on his way home. When he landed, he held a press conference in which he said that he didn't know that the text would be released prematurely and in draft and that it was all the fault of the Foreign Ministry officials. That led to the resignation of the Foreign Ministry, who in any case was looking for an excuse to leave the government. The Foreign Minister knew all about the process. As a matter of fact, while we were in New York, we were a little late to a meeting because the presentation of the Navy interim report had taken a little longer than anticipated. In going to this meeting in a car were the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Mansfield, the Japanese Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN and myself. The Foreign Minister didn't speak English; Mansfield didn't speak Japanese. So the Deputy Perm Rep and I did the interpreting -- he for the Foreign Minister and I for the Ambassador. During the ride, the Foreign Minister mentioned to Mansfield that I liked the communique; he thought that -- jokingly, I believe -- we all were therefore in difficulties. After translating for Mansfield I told the Foreign Minister that I thought the communique was good for him. Little did I know that three days later he would be forced to resign over that piece of paper. That was an interesting by-play in the communique process. The communique stood untouched with the "alliance" phrase in it.

The other result of the Suzuki meeting was a speech that the Prime Minister made at the press club. In that he declared that the Japanese were responsible for the protection of the sea lanes as far as 1,000 miles from Japanese shores. That had never been said before. So the visit became significant in a number of ways by advancing positions that we had long held.

I should note that between the end of 1980 and early 1981, I experienced my first transition, but not the last one by any means. The last time, just to jump ahead, I was an Assistant Secretary not of their choice and probably not of their point of view either. I have to say that the Carter administration did not quit after November 1980; we continued to receive guidance from the political leadership until it actually left office. Holbrooke continued to be active. I have heard that when he took over four years earlier he told all of the deputy assistant secretaries that he wanted them out of their offices by January 20, 1977. He moved his choices in on that date. He actually began to manage the Bureau even before having been confirmed and sworn in. That I think could not be done today. In those days, that approach was expected; today it would be subject to severe criticism. I think that Holbrooke’s approach was the right one; you shouldn't leave a vacuum for as long as it takes now for confirmation. Holbrooke stayed until the last day; his successor did not give the deputies orders to vacate their offices; they all stayed on for a while. That is the way it worked eight years later when Bush succeeded Reagan when I was the principal deputy. Of course, that was an intra-party transfer which is quite different from a change in parties. But in early 1981, we still received guidance from the Department's leadership; Armacost stayed as acting Assistant Secretary. The new leadership had some difficulties in selecting a new Assistant Secretary. Once Holdridge was selected, he was
confirmed rather expeditiously. He had just retired from the Foreign Service, after having served as national intelligence officer. Armacost is a strong personality; he made sure that no vacuum would be created after Holbrooke’s departure. Al Haig, the new Secretary, knew Mike and respected him. That helped considerably and we didn’t lose any momentum in the transition. For us, at least, it went rather smoothly with no shift in US policy.

During the transition, I spent a lot of time with the transition team. I worked with Ken Adelman, who had been assigned to study Far East issues by Robert Neumann, the head of the transition team. Ken and I spent a lot of time together talking about Japan and our policy towards that country. He told me that he had joined the transition team as a labor of love and that he was not interested in a position in the government. So I was not surprised when he took a job at the UN! I did write a briefing paper for Al Haig, but I never knew what happened to it.

Soon after Haig moved into his office, I met with him to brief him on Japan. The Japanese Foreign Minister was about to visit Washington. I remember that I pulled an old bureaucratic trick, which was not well received by many of my colleagues in the Department. This was a time when the Japanese were pushing for one of their officials -- Mr. Iami -- to become Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. This man was a leading expert on nuclear energy and a physicist. He at the time the Japanese Ambassador to one of the Gulf states to give him the appropriate credentials. I didn't think that he had much support beyond his own country; there were nuclear experts in the US government who didn't like him -- he was very outspoken. Since he was not going to win approval in any case, I thought we could well afford to support him, since it certainly would have had a positive effect on US-Japan relations -- at least it would have kept one more issue off the agenda. So when Haig asked me whether there was any positive steps that the US might take in the relationship, I suggested the support of Iami for the IAEA position. I told him that he Foreign Minister would probably raise the issue and that I thought that a positive response from Haig would be very helpful, without incurring any costs because very few others would follow our lead. So when the Foreign Minister raised the question, Haig promised US support for Iami. The bureaucracy reacted very negatively because they were opposed to Iami, but it never had an opportunity to make its views known to Haig. My advice was the only one that the Secretary received on the subject. In the final analysis, Iami did not get the directorship, but the Japanese were grateful for our support. I got a few negative comments from the US nuclear community, but I survived.

Haig had a particular interest in Japanese matters. He was married in Japan while serving with the occupation forces to the daughter of an American general. He considered himself to be an expert, even if minor, on Japan. So I had good access to him and our discussions quite open. He was willing to listen to both sides of an argument. But I didn't stay on the desk for too long after inauguration. My next assignment developed during one of Mansfield's trips to the US to accompany Suzuki on another visit. While Suzuki was in New York, Reagan held a meeting of his senior advisors in preparation for his meeting with the Prime Minister. Mansfield came to Washington for that. That meeting took a solid three hours discussing all the Japanese issues of importance at the time. I don't think I have ever seen another President take that much time on a single country, but Reagan used to do that. He may have used his 3x5 cards, but his staff made sure that the President was completely prepared for these high level meetings and that all the relevant issues had been thoroughly discussed and that the conclusions were generally acceptable.
to all senior members of the administration.

It was during this time that Mansfield was looking for a new DCM. When he returned to the US, I spent all of my time escorting him around. At the end of his visit, as I took him out to National to board a Northwest Airline plane, we were walking to the plane. I was one of two candidates for the DCM job, although technically I was too junior to fill that position. Personnel had sent Mansfield a list of candidates and told me that they made an exception in my case by putting my name on it even though I was not at the right rank. I told him at the airport that, although I had not raised the subject, that he should not interpret that as an indication of lack of interest on my part in the DCM job. He said: Yup!". End of discussion! The day after he returned to Tokyo, he called me and said that he would like me to join him as his DCM. That was all he ever said about it. It was up to me then to inform Personnel and other interested parties of the Ambassador's wishes. There was never any argument; what Mansfield wanted, Mansfield got. I should also note as a footnote that Mansfield always flew Northwest because, I think, it was the only major airline that served Montana; it also always took good care of the Ambassador. I was delighted at the turn of events. Although I enjoyed the Washington job, I had had my eyes on the Tokyo DCM job for a long time.

Mansfield was a unique man; I enjoyed working for him immensely. He was older than most ambassadors and by this time had formed certain views that he held firmly and from which he could not be shaken. He knew what his goals were; he had been in Japan for four years already and was firm in the policy course that he had set. His first DCM had been Tom Shoesmith, very briefly, who was followed by Bill Sherman for almost four years. I stayed four years. I was followed by Anderson for another four years. I refer to myself as Mansfield "middle Minister". Mansfield did not like staff meetings, particularly long ones. He held them; if they lasted for five minutes, that was long. He used just go around the table in the conference room to see if anyone had any comments; it was wise to have something important to report. I saw Mansfield leave the room if the presentation became long winded; he would first fidget and then when he couldn't take any longer, he would just decide that he had more important things to do in his office. So the staff kept its comments very brief as did the Ambassador. He expected the DCM to deal with most of the people in the Embassy. He dealt directly with a few -- the Political Counselor, the Economic Minister -- but for example, he would not hold meetings with the Station Chief, which was very upsetting to that individual, as I am sure it would have any Station Chief at other posts. We had three Station Chiefs during my tour and they all finally came to terms that they could not see the Ambassador, but had to talk to me. I saw everything that he did which was related to his Embassy role. He had a voluminous correspondence network with which he corresponded personally, but that was never seen by anyone. His secretary did make copies of these letters and put them in he file for record purposes, but these letters dealt with matters mostly unrelated to his Ambassadorial job. Mansfield got a lot of mileage out of his hand written notes because people appreciated the time he had taken in writing to them. He also used that personal touch by personally giving his visitors a cup of coffee in his office.

The management of the mission was left entirely up to the DCM. Mansfield seldom got involved. I remember one time that he did get involved. It was a time when we had gap between Administrative Counselors. Sherman suggested that the person who had worked for him return to Tokyo to take up the slack. I thought that was a good idea and agreed. What I didn't realize was
that that person and Mrs. Mansfield had not gotten along very well. Since this I had always been responsible for the administrative support operations of the Embassy and the assignment of the person was to be of short duration, I did not check with Mansfield. That was a big mistake. He let me know that I had made a mistake and that he was still the Ambassador. That was one of the few times that he got involved in the management of the mission, although he did pass on the assignment of every senior officer in the Embassy; that is the people that he would most likely be in contact with.

The Embassy was too big. Even the State Foreign Service contingent could have been smaller had we been better organized. For example, the Department's decision to provide administrative support for all components of the US government stationed in Japan -- which by the way was not fully implemented -- required us to have too many people in the Embassy assigned to the running of the Embassy and the constituent posts. I thought we did not devote enough State resources to finding out what was going on in Japan, in the political, economic and security fields. This is an observation that is not exclusive related to the staffing of the Embassy in Tokyo; there were and are many other posts which suffer from the same imbalance of effort. The Embassy in total consisted of about 280 Americans; approximately one fourth of that staff was State. I not only wanted an overall reduction because we just didn't need all those people to achieve our goals, but perhaps even more importantly I was interested in a realignment of resources to increase the Embassy's ability to handle economic issues. My goal would have required shift of resources among agencies, but that is an impossible task in light of the way the US government was and is organized. Mansfield agreed that there were just too many Americans in the Embassy. He had a firm rule, which I fully supported, that there would be no increase in that level. So if an agency wanted to assign a new position, it had to offer up an off-set. That policy put an end to the increase of staff. We did manage to even shrink the size of the Embassy, although it was rather modest. We kept trying, but could only reach about 10% reduction. It must be remembered that even in the early 1980s, Tokyo was not an inexpensive post. We had 143 families in the Embassy compound and the rest in the village, where the rents were expensive. Mansfield was also very good in supporting the size of the State contingent. We ran into the usual and pervasive problem: the State contingent had always been thin, but when it came time to tackle the size of other agencies' staffs, the answer was always "We would be glad to do so if State is willing to offer up cuts in its own contingent". That was practically impossible because the largest part of the State contingent was devoted to administration which supported all agencies. The Consular staff had a legal mandate to process applications; that meant that any cuts to be made in the State staffing would have to come out of the Political or Economic Sections, which were too small already. A flat cut across the board for all agencies was not a very effective management technique since the basic staffing had never been determined on the basis of policy priorities, but had grown up over years depending primarily on the whim of the various Washington agencies. But it was very hard, if not impossible, to reduce the American presence except through a flat percentage cut across the board.

Our representation outside of Tokyo had been cut before my arrival. I think that in some instances the cut may have been too deep. Sapporo was down to a Consul, a Vice Consul and a branch PAO. Fukuoka was about the same. Osaka was larger primarily because the consular workload was heavier than in the other posts. I think it was the largest visa issuance post in the world before we eliminated the need for non-immigrant visas for Japanese. But Osaka was the
second largest economic hub of Japan and we had only one reporting officer and that was the
Consul General, who had many other duties as well. That staff, I thought, was just too small. I
think an economic officer should have been assigned to Osaka. In general, all remnants of our
occupation-days staffing was long gone. The only exception was Okinawa and that staff could
have been reduced, but there was always the argument that the size of that CG was justified by
the workload that the American military presence generated, which was certainly true to a major
degree.

The US-Japan relations in 1981 were pretty good. Trade tensions were at their usual high level;
that was and is a constant in those relationships. The first trade talks between the two countries
took place in 1972. Since then, those issues have been a major factor and perhaps even a factor
of increasing importance as years passed. In the 22 years since the trade problem was first
addressed, there were some years when the issue did not dominate our dialogue, but those were
few and far between. Mansfield took a very balanced approach; he thought, not too surprisingly,
that Washington might not always be correct either in its analysis or its tactics. The tensions
were not always the fault of the Japanese. He used to say periodically that "the mote was in our
own eyes". That view was not well received in Washington, both in the Executive and
Legislative Branches. But Mansfield was a very principled man; he had spent fifteen years as the
Democratic Majority Leader, but when he became an ambassador, he became the President
personal representative, regardless of the President's political views. He used to say that he was
somewhat surprised by the role reversals that the political parties had exhibited: the party of
protectionism had become the party of free trade and vice-versa. He used that comment
frequently. He was also a firm believer in the thesis that "one catches more flies with honey than
with vinegar". That maxim is as applicable today as it was over twenty years ago; the debate
within the US government, and particularly between the Embassy and Washington, was over
tactics, not strategy or goals, although the debate is much more vehement today than it was then.
This continuum of tensions is not too surprising given that the issues are only grudgingly settled
for a while and that some of the players remain the same. For example, one of the vocal "Japan
bashers" is Clyde Prestowitz, now out of government, but working closely with the Clinton
administration, but then the Special Advisor for Japanese Affairs to the Secretary of Commerce.
He has been advising Republican and Democratic administrations for over twenty-years.

By 1982, I had not lived in Tokyo for seven years. Tokyo has always been a large metropolitan
area, but in the intervening years, I noticed a lot of new construction, which has continued to this
day. The ten period between 1972 and 1982 was the beginning of the modernization of the city.
More subways were build, roads had been widened; it was just an easier city to live in. It was
also somewhat more expensive and much more prosperous. That was true for the whole country.
The economic boom was clearly visible. The smaller towns were not as rural as they used to be;
all cities and towns were becoming more and more alike. Ten years earlier, one would notice
thatched roofs on country dwellings; one could see quaint rural scenes. By 1982, such vistas
were becoming rare; the country was becoming homogenized.

On the political side, the Liberal Democratic Party was still in power, the Socialists were not a
threat, Komaito was a factor at times and not at others, the Democratic Socialist Party was small
and not growing. The only question was which LDP faction would next rule the country. There
was a difference from the 1970s when one could make a pretty good guess on who the next
Prime Minister would be. By the 1980s there was no certainty because the factional alignments had become less predictable. That started in the Tanaka regime. I think in part this new development stemmed from certain LDP reforms such as the membership voting for the Prime Ministerial candidate rather than the back-room process that had been in effect. There were events such as Fakuda while running against Hohira saying that if he were not elected he would not run again. Hohira bought enough LDP votes to deny Fakuda a clear mandate forcing him to resign him from the Prime Ministership to be succeeded by Hohira. Kissinger liked that because Hohira listened to him.

We were aware that money was flowing between business and politicians, but was not up to the level that it became later when it became a scandal. We were never certain about the magnitude of that flow and in the 1980s it was still possible to plausibly defend a system of cash support for politicians because it did cost money to run elections. As far as we knew, the factional leaders did not collect money for themselves; all the contributions were devoted to election process and the operations of the faction. This all fell apart with the discovery of $50 million in walls with Shinkanimura. Tanaka lived quite well, but it was plausible to believe that his life style was primarily supported by the construction work in which he was involved before entering the government. When he was forced to resign, the family did not seem to have much money, which suggested that he did not profit from his political activities. In fact, most of the factional leaders lived somewhat modestly. They had to entertain frequently, which obviously cost money. But there were no indication of venality or politicians becoming personally rich from the financial support they received from their backers. In the early 1980s, such personal enrichment was not supposed to happen.

The relationship between the politicians and the bureaucracy was pretty much the same as it had been seven years earlier. Different politicians were identified with different ministries. Some had worked in a ceratin ministry and then had entered politics, but still had close ties to their former colleagues. That was particularly true for the Ministry of Finance and MITI. Those politicians who were known to be allied with one ministry or another were assumed to be following the guidance of the Minister with whom they were allied. Conversely, they also exercised some influence over that Minister. All of the senior bureaucrats had supporters in the Diet or in the LDP. Some bureaucrats had contacts with the Socialists, but that was more for form than for substance. So the politicians and the senior bureaucrats scratched each other's backs. Sometimes the politician played the role of protector; I would assume that the bureaucrat would be expected to be helpful in return, although I personally had no knowledge of such interplay.

This intricate relationship always was a challenge for the Embassy. In the political-military field -- that is security issues -- the Diet played a role, but that was a straightforward public debate and we knew who was interested in such issues. Economic issues were harder to track. This was one of the reasons that I tried to get closer coordination between the Embassy's Political and Economic Sections. I thought it was important to know which Diet members had walnut growers in their districts so that we could make a better judgement on the political impact of our pressures for tariff concessions. In the walnuts case, when the tariff was lifted we quickly found out who in the Diet was interested. Had we known those interests beforehand, we could have done some ground work which might have eased the shock. And that was true for all economic issues. I thought it was important that the Political Section, which had the best relations with the
Diet, be knowledgeable of the economic interests of various politicians. I think we made some progress on this front, but I would have liked even more coordination. On all major economic issues, the Embassy tried to explain its position to both bureaucrats and politicians. That was not as prevalent on international affair issues; most of those were discussed with the bureaucracy only. The Japanese Diet tended to more focused on domestic matters; very few members had a real interest in international affairs. I think there were wide agreement that as far as Japan was concerned, the United States was still the leading power in the world and certainly Japan's closest ally.

We viewed Japan through the prism of a bipolar world, but talked about it in other words. We used to discuss "equality" at great length, but we believed that when necessary, Japan would follow us without question. We viewed Japan as a "stationary aircraft carrier". That phrase came from a Nakasone visit to the US. While in Washington, he portrayed Japan as a "stationary aircraft carrier". His interpreter translated as "unsinkable aircraft carrier". "Unsinkable aircraft carrier" was a phrase that Japanese naval commanders had used during World War II. So the misinterpretation was seen by the Japanese as a Nakasone reversion to right-wing revisionism. If the interpreter had used the word "stationary", it would not have caused the uproar that it did. It was Don Oberdorfer of The Washington Post who finally looked at the original text of Nakasone's remarks and noted the error. I later asked Nakasone about the episode and asked him whether he intended to correct the record. He said that he wouldn't because if he raised again, the issue would be debated once again; as it was, the incident had past and had been forgotten. It was that Japanese atmosphere that allowed the interpreter to go unpunished for his grave error. In fact, he was a good interpreter; he had just heard the phrase "unsinkable" so often that the English words almost came out automatically. The phrase has considerable meaning in terms of the Japanese Constitution, which is very much oriented against military matters. I mentioned Suzuki accepting responsibility for the protection of the sea lanes for 1,000 miles from Japanese shores. In fact, if one draws an arc 1,000 miles from Tokyo to the east and 1,000 miles from Osaka to the south, one will find that there are Japanese territories at those distances -- little islands. We were working on other defense concepts. For example, the US Navy were patrolling from Okinawa in the Persian Gulf; that raised a question in the Diet. The Foreign Ministry responded that the US-Japan Security Treaty permitted the US to provide for the defense of Asia and patrolling of the Persian Gulf was consistent with the Treaty because that was the source of oil for Asian countries, including Japan, which was an essential commodity for the defense of Japan and other Asian countries. What was happening, which continues to today, was that the Japanese were broadening their interpretation of their Constitution and their military responsibilities. There were never any large leaps, but gradual creep which I thought showed great skill and imagination. We of course kept up the pressure on Japanese defense posture and particularly the issue of devoting only 1% of their GNP to defense expenditures. This was a constant theme, but there were a number of us that were uncomfortable with our position on this issue. The logical conclusion of our pressure would have forced the Japanese to rearm and would have forced the Japanese defense budget to our levels. But our pressures were not driven by security concerns; in fact, our interest in increasing Japanese defense expenditures was primarily trade-driven on the grounds that the more Japan spent on defense, the less it could devote to increased trade and civilian production, thereby improving the balance of trade between us and Japan. There was some interest in increasing Japanese support for our military presence in Japan, but that was not a continuing issue and could have been accommodated, I believed, within
available resources in the Japanese defense budget. We were asking that Japan pay for 50% of
our military expenditures in Japan; the Japanese maintained that was just too high. Now they are
at about 70%. The US position was more based on the view that the Japanese were just not
spending as much as others on defense which gave them an advantage on trade issues and
economic development. The casual relationship between defense expenditures and economic
growth is somewhat suspect. South Korea, which had percentage-wise a higher level of defense
expenditures than we had, also had a much greater growth in its GDP than we had. But no one
ever brought this fact to the discussion. So every once in a while, I would argue against
pressuring the Japanese on defense expenditures, but there was solid support for US policy both
within the Embassy and the American military establishment in Japan. I did note on those
occasions that I had grown up in a world that had a fully armed Japan and that I was not
particularly enthusiastic about the consequences of that situation: I didn't think it was wise to
return to those days. The question of Japanese expenditures was not a major issue in the early
1980s, but we kept it on our agenda and would periodically raise it. The Japanese would
promptly reply that they were doing their best and promptly ignore us. The Japanese contribution
to our military expenditures began to climb after the Okinawa reversion which required us to
rehabilitate some of the sites that we maintained. Up to that time, the Japanese paid for some
relocation costs -- if they wanted a building that we were occupying, they would pay for a new
one somewhere else. But they never paid for upgrading our accommodations. After reversion,
those guidelines changed and the Japanese paid for infrastructure improvements. That started an
ever escalating rise in Japanese support for the US military. The Japanese bureaucracy of course
would scream, particularly, as I have mentioned, that the support of US forces came out of the
defense budget. That meant less money for Japanese forces. The Self-Defense Force appreciated
our presence and was very supportive of our presence, but have preferred that Japanese resources
be spent on Japanese forces. There was also a view that once the 50% level was reached and
breached, then who could tell where the support would end up. And of course that was correct.
The resistance to increasing financial support to the US military was not a public problem; it was
primarily a bureaucratic opposition that had to be overcome.

I should note that the American military presence in Japan by the early 1980s was quite slim; it
was considerably smaller than that I had encountered six-seven years earlier. The main forces
were the Marines on Okinawa and the Air Force at Kaduna and Missau. In general, the
relationship between the Embassy and the US military was very good in this period. Mansfield
was always very mindful of their presence and was interested in any case in strategic issues.
When I arrived, the Commanding General, who is always an Air Force General, attended
Embassy staff meetings sporadically; most of the time, he sent his deputy. I wanted to foster
closer coordination. One day, after the arrival of a new Commander, Chuck Donnelly, I
suggested to Mansfield that he be invited to make a presentation to the senior Embassy staff.
Mansfield gave his classic answer: Okay if it wasn't too long. So we proceeded and it was very
interesting because Donnelly had just been transferred from Saudi Arabia where he had been the
Chief of the MAAG. He gave his version of the Middle East situation, cast somewhat from the
Arab point of view. Within minutes after the staff meeting, the PAO, Dave Hitchcock, was in my
office demanding that he be given equal time at the next staff meeting to set the record straight.
He had just come from Tel Aviv and saw the Middle East somewhat differently than Donnelly. I
told him that I thought that it would not be appropriate for us to get involved in that issue; we
had enough problems of our own. We had asked Donnelly to make the presentation to build
bridges to the military, not to fight the Middle East battles in Tokyo.

We often discussed the nature and extent of US pressure on Japan. There were those of us in the Embassy who considered ourselves knowledgeable on Japan who viewed our efforts as essential because the bureaucrats who would be on the receiving end of the pressure -- except the Foreign Ministry -- all had alliances and allegiances to domestic pressure groups. Our demands would have some negative consequences and no bureaucrat would welcome that, much less initiate such actions. So our pressure enabled the bureaucrat to blame us for new policies because he certainly would not wish to take the onus himself. We understood that outside pressure was needed if the bureaucracy were to move in areas and directions of interest to us. We of course were not the only pressure point; politicians were another as well as Japanese consumers, in some cases. But a pressure had to be applied to the bureaucracy; for many years we were the main pressure group and still today we are one of the major ones. But we also we quite aware that the application of pressure had to be handled with skill and at the right time and within acceptable limits. Our problem was probably that we did not have sufficient focus. My main plea to Washington in this period was not to send us long list of demands. The Japanese would pick those which were of least importance to us and take credit for being responsive. But that plea fell somewhat on deaf ears because the US bureaucracy was also responding to its constituencies and was not willing to favor one over another. So our "wish list" just became too long and did not allow us to focus on the key and major issues; our pressure was diluted because of the range of issues that someone in Washington was concerned about.

I considered perfectly legitimate the general approach of putting pressure on the Japanese bureaucracy although I should note that we did reach agreement on some issues without applying that pressure. For example, the Japanese expanded their defense role and mission without very much urging from us. They did it because they felt it proper and did have a beneficial impact in some respect on the intra-Japan debate on defense issues. The general thesis developed that Japan had primary role in defending Japan and we had the principal role in maintaining stability in Asia. Once that thesis was generally accepted, the Self-Defense Forces had a much easier time acquiring the necessary resources. I think we were right in changing our policy of setting an arbitrary percent of Japanese GDP to be devoted to defense efforts to the concept of establishing agreed upon roles and missions. It was a much more effective way for the Self-Defense Forces to present their requirements and therefore being allocated increasing resources. They could argue that if someone were to invade Hokkaido, for example, the Self-Defense Forces would be able to slow down that effort long enough to enable the US to bring its power to bear on the situation.

Before ending the discussion on my tour as DCM, I should mention the Koreans in Japan. They had always been an issue and remain so to today. Their treatment by the Japanese was always a human rights issue, even before Carter and Clinton made it a center piece of our foreign policy. In the early 1980s, there was a big debate in Japan about fingerprinting "aliens" which in Japanese eyes included the Koreans, although many had been there for decades. We were opposed to that policy as a violation of human rights. On the other hand, some of those Koreans also had strong connections to North Korea. At that time, we were not greatly concerned by that linkage. We were interested in the traffic between Japan and North Korea because we hoped that it would provide us some intelligence on what was going on in that very close society. But I don't think we ever got much out of that traffic. I used to talk to Koreans when they returned to Japan
from North Korea, but I can't say that I gained much insight and I don't think anyone else in the Embassy did either. I don't know whether it was true, but the travelers maintained that they had been sequestered when visiting North Korean and could not observe much. Of course, the Koreans also had constraints because members of their family still lived in North Korea, whom they did not wish to endanger. Furthermore, we were Westerns and therefore not entirely trustworthy. That was particularly true for the supporters of Kim Il Sung.

Q: I would like to finish our conversation about your Tokyo tour with some questions about Ambassador Mansfield, whose name is mentioned in other oral histories. First of all, what was your relationship to him?

CLARK: It was probably not as close as those enjoyed my either my predecessors or my successors. In keeping with Bill Sherman's practices -- he was my immediate predecessor -- at the beginning, Mansfield and I would have coffee in the morning at about 7:30 a.m. But that ritual faded over a period of time and so I would see him in the morning when I needed to and not when I didn't have anything on my agenda. Our relationship was very good. I tend to manage without requiring much supervision and Mansfield left the running of the Embassy entirely up to me. The one time I did get into difficulties I mentioned earlier and that was over the assignment of a temporary administrative officer. That was the only time we differed on anything.

There were times when I would press him on some matters that I knew he was reluctant to address. For example, at one time, the Japanese Foreign Minister was going to visit the US and Mansfield didn't want to accompany him. So I suggested that he might wish to send me instead. That didn't resonate with him but he agreed. But by large, I found the working relationship a very rewarding one. He taught me a lot about how to handle people. When I first arrived in Tokyo, I was struck by Mansfield's complete confidence in his own policy views, even when he would champion an unpopular policy. For example, I had been with him in New York when the interim US Navy report was presented, as I have discussed earlier. A few weeks later, he received the final report and was to take it to the Foreign Minister. I asked him who he wished to have escort him. He said he wanted the Naval Attaché, who was less than thrilled to be involved. But Mansfield knew that the presence of the Naval Attaché was important for symbolic reasons. He also said that when he presented the report, he would bow to the Foreign Minister. I pointed out that if reported that gesture would not be welcomed in Washington. He said he knew that, but that the Japanese, for all of their vaunted literacy, did not necessarily read, but they would be greatly impressed if my picture bowing to the Foreign Minister appears on the front pages. They will understand without having to read the articles that I apologized for the sinking of the freighter and that he said, was the appropriate gesture under the circumstances, Washington notwithstanding. As predicted, everyone in Japan knew that the American Ambassador had apologized for the sinking, which was greatly appreciated, and there was some carping in Washington about Mansfield kowtowing.

This use of symbols came to Mansfield almost naturally. He did consider everything thoroughly. One time, he was scheduled to give a press conference at the Press Center. It was during another debate in the US of troop withdrawal, which had at an earlier period given Mansfield great visibility as the author of the "Mansfield amendment" which called for a reduction of troops in Europe. The debate at this time revolved around our military presence in Korea. I predicted that
he would be asked about that issue. He said he had prepared for it; he had asked the librarian to do some research, which he did not use in his remarks. He was asked about troop withdrawal from Korea; he gave, as customary, a very brief answer to the effect that he had been in error in his previous position. The audience gave an audible gasp. The reporter didn't believe that he had heard correctly and repeated the question. He got the same precise answer again. On the way out of the room, one of Japanese reporters mentioned to Mansfield that he had been surprised by his answer. Mansfield looked at him and said: "Remember that a "foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds". He knew where the quote had come from, but for the following days the buzz word in Tokyo was their version of "hobgoblin". But Mansfield knew exactly what he would say and had a great feel for how it would play. His speeches usually tended to be the same, except for one or two paragraphs which covered his views on the issue of that day. The Japanese soon knew how to read Mansfield's speeches and would target these special paragraphs. The rest of the speech they practically knew by heart, but Mansfield would always slip in a comment or two which was topical on the day he delivered the speech. He was a master of public relations. He may have been a very private man, but his public appearances were always so well prepared and considered that I came to believe that he in fact enjoyed them.

I also learned from him that the worst advice is that which is not sought. People in Washington would ask him to intercede with one of his former Congressional colleagues on one issue or another. They would ask Mansfield to let the Congressman or Senator know where he stood on the issue in light of US-Japan relations. Mansfield answer was invariably the same: if he were asked, he would be happy to give his opinion. He would never volunteer it. He was very careful with his Hill relations which paid great dividends. Washington never seemed to learn that Mansfield would not take the initiative. Dick Holbrooke, then the Assistant Secretary for FE, particularly never learned. I remember one episode particularly which occurred while I was still the Country Director for Japan. When Mansfield left his post, he firmly believed that the Chargé was then responsible. Mansfield did not like being called on Japanese matters once he was not physically in Japan. He felt that if he did not have confidence in his deputy, he never would have left him in charge. So his position was that if an issue had to be decided, the Chargé was the person to do it. I understood his point of view, but others didn't. In any case, on one occasion while he was vacationing in Florida -- in Jane Englehardt's guest house -- Holbrooke wanted to talk to Mansfield. That was a double mistake: a) the Ambassador didn't like to be called when on vacation and b) he didn't like to talk on the phone. But Holbrooke was insistent and asked me to find the telephone number. So I called the Englehardt residence in New Jersey and was given the Florida phone number by the butler. So Richard got in contact with Mansfield; the conversation did not turn out to be very satisfactory. Mansfield suggested that Holbrooke call the Chargé in Tokyo -- Bill Sherman. Holbrooke ended the conversation and told me that the discussion didn't get very far. I reminded him that I had told him that calling Mansfield was not a very good idea.

In addition to establishing the premise that once he was not in Japan issues should be decided by the Chargé, as I said, Mansfield detested telephones. When I was to Tokyo, there was no way to get in touch with the Ambassador if he were caught in traffic, which happens often in Japan. So I suggested that we install car telephones in the Ambassador's and the DCM's cars. Mansfield resisted, even though I promised that I would not let anyone else call him. Mansfield's Japanese guard had a walkie-talkie and Mansfield thought that was enough. I pointed out that that enabled the guard to be in touch with the police or the diplomatic security service, but it was absolutely
useless if I needed to get in touch with him. I thought that Washington would not be please of it called for the Ambassador only to be told by the DCM that he didn't know where he was. This argument went on for six months before finally Mansfield agreed to have a phone installed in his car and we only managed to get that approved by installing the phone in the front seat so that anyone riding in the back could not reach it. We never used it, but I felt better because at least in an emergency, I could be in touch with my Ambassador. Mansfield just didn't like telephones.

The other comment I would make refers to the Mansfield team. Mike was the "front man", but Maureen was a formidable member of the team. It was one of the best political teams that I have even observed. He would seek her counsel on many issues; sometimes he would come back to the Embassy and change his views, obviously after having been counseled by Maureen to do so. If he didn't remember a name, she would. Watching the two working together was both enjoyable and instructive. I was certainly aware of that team operation and I am sure that many of the senior Embassy officers were also aware of it. That doesn't mean that we tried to influence Mrs. Mansfield; that would not have worked and would have been inappropriate. In connection with this discussion, I should note that often Maureen was ill. She was allergic to MSG, as many are; unfortunately MSG is used widely in Japanese foods. When Mansfield accepted an invitation to dine at some fancy Tokyo restaurant, it was not unusual for Maureen to send her regrets at the last moment because she didn't want the risk of eating MSG. The funny part was that restaurants to which they might be invited would not have used MSG under any circumstances, but Maureen was always concerned about the possibility because in fact the use of it was very prevalent in Japan. But these last minute regrets would generate great concern in the community because "poor Maureen was ill again". She also used that excuse to get out of going places when she didn't want to. It didn't take long for all the Japanese hostesses to understand that Maureen didn't tolerate MSG and would make sure that she was never served any food with that additive in it. Sometimes, the Ambassador would do things that Maureen liked such as going to fashion shows. She knew the designers and had good tastes. So often, one would see the Mansfields at the leading Tokyo fashion shows, which was obviously a major boon for the designer and something that she enjoyed doing.

Mansfield was a master in handling Congressional delegations. He is the only ambassador I have ever seen receiving standing ovations after his briefings. It was almost unbelievable. I remember one Congressional delegation that visited Korea. It was not going to stop in Tokyo. So Mansfield flew to Seoul and briefed them there on Japan. Ambassador Bill Gleysteen, who was an excellent briefer himself, didn't stand a chance; there was no one who could make a presentation like Mansfield's. No one ever talked back to Mike Mansfield. He never used notes and could brief for as long as he thought it was necessary -- anything between 10 minutes to an hour. He had absolute command of facts and figures; sometimes he would repeat himself, but that was a rare exception. We would always provide him with updated figures. I then would watch this master at work and learned how to use statistics in a meaningful way; I could never do it as well as Mansfield could. When he was finished with his polished presentation, he would ask :"Any questions?". After the applause, some one in the audience would first thank him for the excellent briefing. Then the questions came, most of them relevant, but none in the same category that other ambassadors received. They were always politely worded!

Mansfield guarded his connections. He used them, but in his own way. He would take advantage
of visitors. He had an extensive correspondence and used that. He used to send hand-written notes to people; that was a big deal for the recipients. He could have dictated them, but he understood how much more appreciated these notes were when they were in his own handwriting. I found people really appreciated that extra efforts that a hand written note takes. He did a lot of that and he worked his contacts very well. But he did not take the initiative; he would respond when asked. He worked very hard on his relations with the American business community in Tokyo. All of at the Embassy did that, but he was by far the best contact that we had. Although he didn't like long staff meetings, that didn't apply to his sessions with the American Chamber. He would sit through those regardless of the time involved. He would listen carefully to their presentations and they knew that they could count on a receptive ear. Mansfield held the view that the US needed more and better work by the American business community if we ever hoped to achieve some better trade balance. He was anxious to have more American business in Japan and that made important for him to understand the Chamber's perspectives, which he would factor in his analysis of economic policy. Mansfield was convinced that if the American business community were willing to invest time and money, more US imports could be brought into Japan. He used to say, as I think I already mentioned, that often "The mote was in our own eyes". He was critical of some of our domestic policies, particularly those that tended to increase our budgetary deficits. He also criticized some of the positions of both political parties; after all he had been the Senate Majority Leader for fifteen years. He noted, as I have said, the parties' role reversals on free trade, which often aligned him with the Republicans. In some ways, he had more clout in the Reagan White House than he did in Jimmy Carter's. Some of his critical comments on US domestic policies were not always welcomed; he was criticized for bashing his own country and not the Japanese. He did not buy the thesis, which was being discussed then and his alive and well today, that the way to move the Japanese on trade issues was to publicly berate them. I have never thought that that approach had much success. We in the Embassy fully supported Mansfield in his trade views. I certainly believed that greater American effort would increase US imports into Japan. We made some things easy for the Japanese. For example, on automobile trade, the American companies, until very recently never tried to sell cars with a right hand drive. That is what the Japanese drove and would be hard to expect the Japanese consumer to change just for the sake of driving an American car. In fairness, I should note that I talked to the Yanase people about Mercedes sales; that was a very successful import program. They were the original Japanese distributors and it was true that over one half of their sales were left-hand drive Mercedes. I was told that the reasons for that were two fold: a) people drove left hand drives just to show that their car was foreign made and b) the most important consumers of Mercedes were companies' presidents; for them, it was more convenient for the driver to open the left hand back door, which was the curb side, if he drove on the left hand. I was also interested why large European cars sold better in Japan than large American cars. In Washington, I had used a little Audi Fox station Wagon -- really a Volkswagen. We took it to Tokyo, but soon after we arrived I looked around for a Cimeron, which was a Cadillac car. I asked the local representative whether he had one that I could see. He didn't, but he encouraged me to order one. I then asked about spare parts. He thought that would not be a problem because I could always order them through the APO. In the final analysis, if the local representative didn't have one in stock, if there had not been any demand to bring some into Japan and if spare parts were not available in Tokyo, I concluded that it didn't sound like a very attractive deal. As an alternative, the dealer suggested that I buy a Mercedes which he said he could guarantee would not use its full value two years later if I were to trade it in then for the next higher model.
He said that a lot of Embassies were doing that, but he noted that the American Embassy was not taking advantage of that opportunity. I told him that I wasn't about to do that either. This is just an illustration of attitude a dealer of imported cars took on their wares; he was pushing Mercedes in preference to an American car. American business was not doing all it could to push American wares.

Mansfield was a very good customer for statistics. He was also a voracious reader. He read all the time. If some one had access to the list of books that USIS was requested to select for him, one would find undoubtedly a long list tailor made for a person who was an ambassador to Japan. He read as many books on Japan, economics and other important disciplines as he could get a hold of.

Mansfield expected the Embassy to perform up to his expectations. When he thought an officer had failed to meet his standards, he or she rapidly lost access to him. He just wouldn't call on that officer, but seek his information from someone else. As I mentioned earlier, he had an aversion to staff meetings. He held them because I guess some one convinced him that it was good for staff morale. But they were over in a hurry; a five minute staff meeting was a long one. I think I also mentioned that I had seen him walk out on presentations that he considered too verbose which certainly did not delight the officers making them. He would ask me to take the chair and walk out.

Mansfield relationships with other ambassadors was very good. When he arrived in Tokyo, he received and accepted some very good advice from Bill Sherman. He was told that he was the most visible ambassador in Japan not only because he represented the United states, but because he was an important figure in his own right. Sherman told Mansfield that protocol required a new ambassador to call on all of his colleagues. And that is what he did -- every ambassador in Tokyo who was available, in the alphabetical order of country. It is a lesson that I took to heart; I did exactly the same thing when I became Ambassador to India. It took me six months and I was delighted when I got to Yugoslavia! After that initial spade of calls, Mansfield maintained contact with the diplomatic community. He of course saw all the representatives of the major powers, but he also went to a lot of receptions and therefore didn't slight anyone. He attended one reception almost every evening and sometimes two or more. Ambassadors of other countries would come up and talk to him during these events. He did not pretend to remember their names; it was always "Your Excellency". He included members of the diplomatic corps in his dinners which further cemented his relationships. He had certain favorites; he invited the Moroccan Ambassador more than once, for example. Morocco was the first foreign country to recognize the independence of the United States and he liked the Ambassador. He often invited the Mexican and the Philippine Ambassadors in part because he liked both countries. So he reached out beyond the major powers. In fact, I saw more of the Asian ambassadors than the British Ambassador, for example, at the Residence. Mansfield made a point of inviting representatives from smaller countries. He thought that that was appropriate and good politics and also it gave him an opportunity to have different points of views and information. It was a wise policy.

Mansfield was a master in the usage of the media. I mentioned his press conferences, which were not frequent, but perfectly timed -- once a month or every other month. The media loved these press conferences. He always spoke on the record, an approach which I then used later in New
Delhi. He never made any pretense of speaking Japanese, but he would fill a room anytime he wanted. He held the conferences when he thought they were necessary. Sometimes, he would limit attendance to American press only. As far as I know, Mansfield never gave a "backgrounder". He rarely appeared on TV; that had been Reischauer favorite media. Mansfield didn't really like TV, but he would appear from time to time. He made frequent public appearances. He visited every prefecture; by the time I arrived, he had almost completed the circuit of Japan. He traveled less after his initial forays. there were parts of Japan that he liked very much. He loved Kyushu and Sasebo, for example. Sasebo had a Navy guest house on the US base which fronted right on the water; he liked to stay there. When he was there, there was usually another purpose to his visit. One time he visited Nagasaki, which was close by. In his speech there, he said that his first visit to Japan was in the early 1920s aboard a troop ship which was coming from the Philippines on its way to China. The ship stopped in Nagasaki for three days to take on coal, which was brought on board a basket at a time carried up the gangplank. He mentioned the dates he was in town. Later, some of the citizens came back to him telling him that his dates were not quite correct and their records, which had survived an atomic bombing, indicated slightly different dates. He was impressed that the Japanese could reconstruct that little piece of history.

While mentioning Nagasaki, I should comment on Japanese attitude toward their suffering. Over time, they did not show much bitterness. To today, they feel that they are unique because they are the only humans who were subjected to atomic bombings. So when one talks about nuclear war, the Japanese are in a very special position. But there isn't special bitterness. In fact, one old general when asked whether Japan would have used an atomic weapon if it had one, replied without hesitation :"Of course!". That caused a major uproar in Japan because it is really contrary to the national mood, but I think he was probably right; in the mid 1950s, the Japanese Imperial Army would have used the bombs if it had it. This is not say that the Japanese have forgotten their history; if you go to Nagasaki today, you can go to the museum and see some horrific sights resulting from American actions. I think I mentioned previously the Hiroshima Study group, now run by the Japanese, but which originally was a joint effort. It is a continuing study of the victims of atomic bombing. But by the early 1980s, the subject was not really discussed, except for example when the Chinese test one of their weapons, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the first to condemn these efforts to "disrupt world peace". They have assumed a self-manufactured mantle of responsibility for all nuclear issues around the world.

While I was in Tokyo, we had a Presidential visit, as a return for the Suzuki visit, which I described earlier. Reagan came; it was great fun! This was somehow different from others we had suffered through. It started with an advance team headed by Mike Deaver, which came about three to four months before the visit. We visited the sites that the Japanese wanted to use. They were particularly interested in having Reagan to go to Kyoto, which was one of their ancient capitals. In addition, I think the Japanese were anxious to get Reagan out of Tokyo. Deaver and I discussed the Japanese interest; I pointed out that a Presidential visit should not look like a tourist trip. I thought that we had to do some things in Tokyo. Deaver saw the situation the same way and so we got along very well, especially since we were both graduates of San Jose University. But we flew down to Kyoto and looked over the possible sites. We finally told the Japanese that we didn't think Kyoto was such a hot idea; then relations became a little tense.
Finally, we all agree that the visit would take place entirely in Tokyo. I made two contributions to the planning of the visit: 1) when it was suggested that the President do something with the Crown Prince -- the Emperor was getting along in years -- I recommended that we have the two watch a horseback riding and archery exhibit in which the riders would be dressed in old court costumes. Both Reagan and the Crown Prince had an interest in horseback riding. I wanted to have that done in Tokyo, but the Foreign Minister, when consulted, mentioned Kyoto again. I said that that was not possible, so the Foreign Ministry suggested Kamakura, where the Great Buddha statue is located. I said "No" to that as well; I told the Foreign Ministry that shows of the kind we were discussing had been put on in Tokyo. I mentioned that there was a horse park in Tokyo that the father-in-law of the Emperor's second son had participated in developing. So that was a natural location. Then I suggested that a better place yet would be the Maji Shrine. That didn't immediately draw a favorable reaction. I said that the Japanese government had for many years tried to get an American President to the Maji Shrine without success because the missionary community had always objected since that was a Shinto shrine. I suggested that here was an opportunity for the Japanese to have an American President visit a major shrine without giving it a religious connotation which we always found unacceptable. That argument seemed to sway the Foreign Ministry; they were willing to go with us to look at the site. In fact, when we went there, the head man gave us a brochure, which included a section on horseback riding and archery. There was a special field for it which seemed to be news to the Foreign Office types. So President Reagan went to the Shrine with the Crown Prince, didn't enter it, but walked around it to the archery field. The day was somewhat overcast. One of the reporters said: "I hate you, Clark. I don't really want to take these pictures but they are the best shots of the trip".

The second contribution concerned the white tie and tails affair to be hosted by the Emperor. The President had his own which made him look very elegant. For the rest of the delegation and us who resided in Tokyo who had been invited, the challenge was daunting. Trying to rent white tie and tails in Japan is almost impossible; one could find them at Matsuaki, an old store. But they looked as if they had been cut thirty years earlier. So we ended up getting them at the Prince Hotel, which had a section devoted to weddings. They all looked fine, except they all had velvet lapels. I refused to take on with velvet and got a regular one -- I didn't want velvet lapels.

Security for the Reagan visit was unbelievable. If anything, it was even more suffocating than that which the Japanese had developed for the Carter visit. The Secret Service had its own advance team which negotiated with their Japanese counterparts. As often happens, the two services argued about whose responsibility the protection of the President it was. One of the points of contention was whether the Secret Service car could be as close to the Presidential limousine as it wanted. The Japanese wanted their protection car immediately following the limousine. The Ambassador was instructed by Washington to call on the Prime Minister to discuss this very "high level" issue and presumably to make sure that the Secret Service car followed immediately after the Presidential limousine. As you can well imagine, Nakasone was not at all pleased with having to deal with matter of this kind; Mansfield was also not very happy with the instructions. So the two of them plus us and the Japanese staff spend half-an-hour or more talking about the order of cars in the motorcade. At one point, Nakasone suggested that the Chief Cabinet Secretary, an old LDP man named Nokota who had been a police officer, and the Embassy's DCM get together with their experts to settle the problem. Mansfield readily accepted. So we continued the meeting in the Chief Cabinet Secretary's house which was right in the Prime
Minister's residence's compound. That meeting took another three hours with my side threatening to walk out on a couple of occasions. In the final analysis, the Secret Service did not get its way, but by that time, they believed that we had been as forceful as we could have been and they awarded me a commendation. Recently, I attended the Emperor's arrival ceremony at the White House and wondered what would have happened if the Japanese had been as obstinate as we had been. The Reagans were staying at the Akasaka -- the Japanese version of Versailles with indoor plumbing -- which used to be the Crown Prince's Palace and is now the official guest house. Visitors always reviewed troops in front of that Palace; the Emperor drives over from his Palace for that ceremony which is the official arrival ceremony. The chief of the Secret Service detail insisted that he had to stay with the President at all times. The Japanese would not permit that; no one could be that close to the Emperor. The newsreel of the Reagan arrival ceremony will show an unknown figure in morning coat walking a few paces behind the President. That was the head of the detail who decided to completely ignore the Japanese; fortunately, the Emperor did not accompany Reagan in his review because by this time he was getting along in years and could not walk that far. The head of the Secret Service would not allow anything to come in between him and his President! Fortunately, the Japanese did not react; it could have been a serious problem. Our Presidential visits, wherever they may be, are always subject to controversy and frictions because we insist on so many of our ways of doing things. So security was even more heavy handed for Reagan than it had been for Carter, which as all will remember completely isolated the President from the Japanese people. It is true that the Japanese did not marshall as many troops for the Reagan visit, partly because Reagan was just not that interested in mingling with crowds or holding town meetings. So the visit centered on functions at the Akasaka; he went to the Diet to give a speech and to the Imperial Palace for the formal call on the Emperor and the banquet. The motorcades were quick; he did not spend much time in the road eliminating the need for the massive security that the Japanese mounted for Carter.

The visit was more than just ceremonial. Reagan was accompanied by Shultz and Sigur, some of the White House staff and other high ranking US officials. As with all Presidential visits, much work is done on the side especially by those responsible for drafting the communique. In that paper, a lot of substantive issues are resolved. Usually, the initial drafts are prepared before the visit, but the thorny issues, if resolved at all, are hammered out during the visit by senior officials from both delegations. The DCMs, in Presidential visits, are responsible for the smooth progress of the visit, but usually are not involved in policy debates.

As always, the President is accompanied by a large media contingent which travels on its own plane. It occupied two wings of the Okura Hotel. That is always a major workload for an Embassy, particularly the USIS component. Before leaving Tokyo, Reagan met the Embassy staff. In fact, he did something quite unusual at the suggestion of one of the White House staff. His stay in Tokyo happen to take place on November 10, which is the birthday of the Marine Corps. Because our Marine contingent had to be on duty for the Presidential visit, the Marine Corps ball could not be held. So Reagan invited the Marines to the Akasaka to share their birthday cake with him; he had a little party for them and only them. The senior American military men in Japan could not believe it; here were some lowly soldiers invited to a party with the President of the United States and they were not invited! That resentment got back to the White House, which then invited the generals and some of us civilians. It was a very amusing show to watch!
The White House staff was quite easy to work with. I think it helped that I knew them all, having worked with them in Washington in preparation for the Suzuki visit. That staff also had a nice touch. Although Suzuki was the one of the first official visits and the staff was just learning the ropes, it handled the protocol as if they had been at it for years. For the State dinner, there was a guest list, which didn't include low level types like myself. For us, they hosted a smaller dinner in the Garden Room which included most of the people who had spent time on the preparations for the visit. The White House included some people in the Japanese Embassy. After dinner, we were invited to join the formal dinner guests for the entertainment. I thought that this gesture was a great touch and greatly appreciated by all the working stiffs, who usually work endless hours for State visits and receive no recognition at all. So I knew the White House staff that came to Tokyo. Deaver was in charge of the "photo opportunities" settings. As I mentioned earlier, the President addressed the Diet, which meets in a dark wooded chamber -- quite a handsome room. There is a sky-light made of stained glass, which somehow escaped untouched through the war. Unfortunately, teleprompters can not be read with the light coming through the ceiling and shining right on them. Reagan is very good with just a script and that is what he used; in fact, that technique is much more personal and each member of the audience felt that he was talking directly to him or her. It was a superb performance. The Japanese were very pleased with the visit which paid appropriate attention to Japanese sensitivities.

Later Reagan returned to Tokyo for a G-7 meeting. That was easier to handle because he was there as a member of a large group, all hosted by the Japanese.

Before closing this chapter of my career, I should mention that this assignment was my first encounter with the problems of down-sizing US representation overseas. It was by no means the last, but I learned a lot about the process even though we were not very successful in Tokyo, even with the full support of the Ambassador. His unswerving view that US government agencies were assigning too many people to overseas posts; the net result was that there was an unbalance in representation with the State Department contingent under-represented and other agencies over-staffed. Although he didn't manage to reduce the Embassy staffing, in his eight years Mansfield did manage to hold the line; it could have increased substantially had he not taken such a firm stand against it. One just needs to see what happened in Bangkok! Every agency wanted to assign its people to Tokyo; some of the assignments had to be settled at the Secretarial levels in Washington. I recall the FAA case. It wanted to assign fifteen people to Tokyo to work on airline safety to be quartered in the Embassy or downtown Tokyo, although they would be working out at Narita and Nahata. I thought that was insane since the commute between Tokyo and those airports was even then at least two hours each way. I suggested that they be located out at Narita and fly to Nahata when they had to work there. FAA thought that was entirely unacceptable and in the final analysis, never did assign a staff to Japan. FAA of course used the argument that their work was vital to airline safety, but most US government can make a case that their work is of the highest priority.

ROBIN WHITE
Japanese Language Training, FSI
Ms. White was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Georgetown University. After graduation she worked briefly on Capitol Hill before joining the Foreign Service in 1973. A Trained Economist, Ms. White served at a number of foreign posts as Economic and Commercial Officer. In the State Department in Washington, she occupied several senior positions in the trade and economic fields. Ms. White was also a Japan specialist. Ms. White was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Let’s talk a bit about language training. How did you find it?

WHITE: I lack the language gene, so it was difficult. I worked very hard at it and I got my 3/3 in Japanese, but it was constant work. I was at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) at Rosslyn for a year, which was not an attractive place physically. We were in a high rise and in small airless rooms doing fairly stressful work, though I enjoyed the teachers and my fellow classmates. The FSI campus at Arlington Hall is a great improvement and much more pleasant surroundings for students.

Then I went to Yokohama, a pleasant environment. Yokohama is a great city as an introduction to Japan. It is a large city, but seems much more relaxed and green compared to nearby Tokyo. My classmates were interesting because the Foreign Service Institute at that time also had Canadian, Australian and New Zealand officials, which made for a nice mix. It was a good combination of backgrounds there, and gave us a wider circle of friends and contacts when we moved on to Tokyo. We also did field trips and travel, so it was a good year.

Q: As you learned the language was the cultural and social structure part of what you learned?

WHITE: It was. I don’t remember specifically what I learned in area studies, which is ironic because I’m now teaching the Japan Area Studies class at FSI, but students imbibed a sense of culture and social structure as they learned the language. Japanese is a very hierarchical language and words and structure reflect the way people interact. Women have a certain way of talking that is very distinct from men’s tones and vocabulary. You talk one way to your seniors and one way to your subordinates. That is really the most difficult part of Japanese. You’re not learning one language; you have to at least be able to understand quite a range of different manners of speech. We were taught basic, standard speech, such as radio announcers would use, but it was always difficult to understand when listening to TV or movies when people weren’t speaking standard Japanese or were talking in what might be considered slang.

Q: It seems that a lot of Japanese women seem to speak in a higher tone than necessary.
WHITE: Yes, it is considered a polite feminine form of speech.

Q: How did they teach foreign women?

WHITE: The FSI teachers are careful to teach the students, male or female, to speak a standard neutral Japanese. All the teachers in Washington were women, so they were very careful not to give the male students certain mannerisms or speech patterns that would be considered feminine. Neutral speech from a foreigner is pretty much what the Japanese would expect. They don’t expect most foreigners to make the speech distinctions Japanese do.

Q: How about the writing system? It is like the Chinese, isn’t it?

WHITE: There are two different alphabets based on syllables, hiragana and katakana, the latter used for foreign worlds. There are also thousands of kanji which are the Chinese characters. We were taught to read kanji. It was pure memorization so students focused on their substantive areas and learned the kanji for technical words. I was trained to read economic and trade articles and was able to get a 3/3 reading economic articles, but had I been given an article about missile defense, I wouldn’t have been able to read it at all.

Q: When in Yokohama, were you able to use your Japanese?

WHITE: That was the great benefit of living and studying in Japan. From the beginning we were living in Japanese neighborhoods, talking to the families, and shopping in little stores. There were also “conversation ladies,” who came as volunteers to chat with the students and get together for tea and casual conversation. The Japanese really appreciate people trying to speak the language and praise any effort. It is a positive atmosphere for learning.

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Q: You went to Embassy Tokyo in 1982?

WHITE: Yes, in June 1982, and I stayed four more years in Japan. Former Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield was the ambassador, one of our longest serving ambassadors who served under both Republicans and Democrats. He was greatly respected by everyone, a gentleman and a man of great integrity. Don Oberdorfer wrote a good biography of him a few years ago.

I was a mid-level officer in the economic section and I had a double portfolio. The more demanding part was transportation. At that time, Japan’s export of automobiles was the major trade problem with the U.S., a very political issue. Aviation negotiations occupied a great deal of my time and we saw a lot of changes in the aviation relationship during that period. I also followed shipping.

The other half of the portfolio was reporting on Japan’s relationship with the communist countries. I reported on their trade with China, with the Soviet Union and handled the COCOM issue, which related to controls on the export of strategic materials.
Q. Was Japanese essential for your work?

WHITE: Probably not essential. Most of the people I worked with in the Foreign Ministry and in MITI, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, spoke English. The Ministry of Transportation people who were my other main contacts were mixed in terms of language. The people in the International Division spoke English but with some of the more technical bureaus we did things in Japanese. My Japanese was adequate, but I must admit that it never reached a level of real fluency where I could feel comfortable doing a negotiation without a Foreign Service National (FSN) to back me up.

Q: I know the feeling. In the early 1980’s, how did you find being a woman dealing with the Japanese? Was it a problem or were you just the 800 lb. gorilla representing the United States and it didn’t make any difference?

WHITE: I think it didn’t make much difference. It was very different from how I would have been treated had I been a Japanese woman. I was an American and therefore dealt with as an American, and also had the advantage of being an American diplomat. I think an American businesswoman or reporter would not have had as easy access as I did, but they had to deal with me on government to government issues. I also think that for some Japanese it was a novelty to be sitting across the table from a woman. Speaking some Japanese helped, too.

Q: On that subject, I don’t know how it worked for embassy people, but business people often had to go out drinking in the evenings when the business was really done. Was this the case?

WHITE: Certainly drinking after work hours is a major part of the Japanese business lifestyle and also to a certain extent the government official’s lifestyle. It is considered important to cement business ties at a social level. I occasionally went out to dinner with people and went to a lot of receptions but didn’t go often to smoky bars. Not too many embassy people did. Those who spoke Japanese very well, particularly those who had lived in Japan earlier as students, went out more with the Japanese. People in the political section, especially those following the political parties, worked to make that sort of social connection. Most people, especially those with families, worked long enough hours and had to go to enough official functions that we limited the bar scene to what was really necessary.

Q: Let’s take the issues one at a time. On the transportation side, what was the car situation at that point?

WHITE: That was the time when Japanese exports were really overwhelming GM, Ford and Chrysler. To a certain degree it was a problem of American quality and fuel efficiency. People had noticed that relatively inexpensive Toyotas or Hondas tended to last and, being smaller, get better mileage. To the American automakers’ credit, they did restructure and started turning out much better products, but initially the reaction was political. Given the trade deficit, it was easy to generate protectionist Buy America campaigns and Congressional pressure on the Japanese. Congress got involved with threats of legislation and quotas; also the Super 301 amendment to the Trade Act was passed. That was aimed at “unfair” trade practices of any country, but mainly
was aimed at Japan. Because the auto industry is such a major part of the U.S. economy, autos were the prime target.

It was also a problem because very few American autos were exported to Japan. There were a number of reasons for that. One was that U.S. autos tended to be quite big and gas guzzling and weren’t practical in a Japanese city. Therefore most of the U.S. automakers hadn’t made much of an effort to meet Japan’s standards. For example, American steering wheels were on the wrong side for Japanese roads, but American companies didn’t make a right hand drive model.

Foreign companies had a very hard time getting into distribution networks. There were also some strange and complicated technical issues on the Japanese side. You had to have fold down mirrors and special headlights. You had to have special shields for catalytic converters. Due to the strict standards, it was very expensive, about $1000, for every American car that came to Japan to be reconstituted, ostensibly for safety reasons. I worked to get more American cars into Japan. On my home leave I spent a good deal of time in Detroit visiting the testing facilities of the major American companies. I wanted to see the emphasis they put on safety in order to argue authoritatively that the U.S. safety tests should be accepted. The Japanese were saying they needed to be done all over again in Japan. What eventually developed was a program that allowed small quantities, e.g. 1,000 cars, to come in without having to go through all the tests and changes. It was a special exception made for political purposes.

As to exports to the U.S., a “voluntary” restraint agreement (VRA) was put in place in 1981 whereby a set number of cars was to be exported. I believe it was 186,000 cars a year. That left the Japanese government to decide who got the quotas, which meant they looked at past export records. This favored Toyota and Nissan. Honda, which was late in entering the U.S. markets, got a much smaller quota so there was a lot of political concern within Japan about how to allocate the 186,000 among their big three and smaller companies.

The irony is that the VRA gave U.S. companies breathing room to restructure, but it also really strengthened Japanese companies. Protectionist pressure often has such negative results. Extra profit went to the Japanese companies as Toyotas, for example, were in short supply in the U.S. Toyota dealers could ask for premium payments above the list price, so the Japanese ended up shipping their more expensive models because they could only ship a certain number. Profits in the American market gave them large capital reserves.

Q: Were Americans and Japanese looking at building Japanese cars in the United States? My wife has a 2001 Toyota with a sticker saying 60% was built in the United States. Was this a factor?

WHITE: Major Japanese investment in the U.S. developed during that time period. From the mid-1980s there was a migration of auto plants to the U.S. Obviously, since they couldn’t ship all the finished cars they could sell, they realized that they could assemble cars in the U.S. and they would be U.S. cars not subject to the VRA. That caused political controversy too and at least initially the critics were right that this was not real U.S. production. Companies were sending over the most expensive, high tech parts like the engines and just having them put into car frames by Americans, which wasn’t doing a lot for American employment. Because of the
pressure for more American content, they gradually increased parts production in the U.S. In many cases, however, the parts suppliers were Japanese transplants as well, part of the keiretsu or inter-connected company network. That caused many complaints as well. Still, Americans got more jobs and many states benefited. Local content is now quite high.

**Q: Were they talking to you or the embassy on this subject?**

WHITE: The U.S. government encouraged foreign investment in the U.S., particularly the Commerce Department and the Commercial Section at the Embassy. The purpose was to increase employment opportunities for Americans. The Embassy was helpful to a lot of state governments that opened trade offices in Tokyo. Those trade offices, which had been to encourage Japanese to purchase their exports, became more active as investment promotion offices. Many states offered good tax benefits to encourage companies to locate there. That worked well for places like Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama, though not much investment went to the traditional auto-producing -- and unionized -- states like Michigan and Ohio.

As more Japanese investment went in, and there began to be “buying of America” concerns, the Japanese were clever enough to seek good labor relations, join in community activities, contribute heavily to local charities. Now they are a real presence in the U.S. and that has a political impact. Their employees are voters, and congressmen see the benefits of foreign investment. If someone proposed protectionist action against Toyota, for example, you’d see tens of thousands of Toyota employees in the U.S. objecting. Toyota is a good case of community involvement, as they now have plants in a number of states. One of their good programs is to send high school teachers to Japan for a month each year, at first from the states where they had plants but now from all over, I think. Many of these teachers have never been out of the country before and their students have little international exposure. They come back and talk about Japan to their students and to their communities and it makes a difference.

**Q: Was there a cultural movement spurred by industry?**

WHITE: It was fairly calculating, e.g. we’re going to be facing political pressures for a long time, so let’s find a way to be in the U.S. market and develop a countervailing force against protectionism in the Congress. Many excellent exchange programs have been developed, in part due to a political motivation to gain greater American understanding of and sympathy for Japan. Jobs were key, but education and cultural exchanges were and are very valuable whatever the initial motivation.

**Q: Did automobile manufacturers and others in Japan understand the American market and the political system or was it a learning process?**

WHITE: They got a lot more sophisticated in the 1980s. Japanese corporations put a lot more money into hiring Americans. That led to domestic criticism of K Street lobbyists hired for their political connections. They also hired people to do analysis and publish studies, including economic work, and it was not usually biased in favor of the Japanese. But nonetheless it was an ugly period due to the trade tensions. At one point several congressmen took sledgehammers and destroyed a Japanese automobile on Capitol Hill in full view of the cameras. That was replayed
many times on Japanese TV and Japanese still talk of it today. There was an even uglier incident when some drunken unemployed autoworkers beat to death a Chinese American because they thought he was Japanese.

Q: I remember that. That was just terrible.

WHITE: That of course brought a lot of memories of the discrimination in World War II when the Japanese Americans were put in interment camps.

Q: And the Japanese exclusion at the turn of the century.

WHITE: That’s right. So a lot of Japanese at first felt defensive, then resentful, about why they were hated when they saw themselves as just working hard and making good products. In the U.S. there were articles and books with the theme that we won the war, but the Japanese really won in the long run with their economic dominance.

On a more thoughtful note, writers in the revisionist school of political economy, led by people like James Fallows and Clyde Prestowitz, were writing books saying that Japan could not be treated as a normal nation in terms of trade policy. The theory was that countries like the U.S. and the EU worked within the GATT rules, but Japan, due to the structure of its business-government relationships, simply operated outside the rules. The answer therefore had to be managed trade in which there would be quotas and arranged markets on both sides. So it was good policy to limit the Japanese to 186,000 cars a year in the U.S. market and require the Japanese to import 10% of semiconductors from foreign markets. That was a very strong trend throughout the ‘80s. The pressure diminished in the ‘90s when it turned out that the Japanese system was not as infallible and ready to take over the world as had been feared; also the Japanese vigorously resisted pressure for more specific numbers.

Another revisionist concern was that that because Japanese companies’ source of capital and capital flows were different from ours, the Japanese companies did not have to worry about profits. They could just concentrate on market share. That was true, and it helped them grow for many years, but it wasn’t sustainable. In the ‘90s it turned out that because they hadn’t had to worry about profits they made a lot of unprofitable investments that then came home to roost and led to a decade of stagnation.

Q: There was no basic accountability.

WHITE: Yes. Because banks rather than the stock market were the source of capital, and because of close keiretsu ties between banks and corporations, you didn’t have a real cost of capital. Therefore there was no outside demand that required it to be used in an efficient way.

Q: During the ‘80s there were books about how the U.S. should copy the Japanese system. In many ways, we did with better quality control, as in automobiles, which have changed considerably.
WHITE: There was a positive interest in quality control. Also some firms gave workers more responsibility for pointing out areas of concern or for improvement, and the ability to stop the assembly line if something was going wrong. That was a lesson from Japanese factories.

Q: What about your relationship with your Japanese counterparts? This was a very difficult time because of the anti-Japanese feeling fostered by exactly what you were dealing with, particularly the automobile issue. Did you find this reflected in dealing with your Japanese counterparts?

WHITE: On an individual basis there was no hostility. There was a professionalism, a sense that regardless of what our governments or politicians were saying, and certainly regardless of what the press was saying, we had to work together to solve the problems. It helped that Ambassador Mansfield was well respected by the Japanese and was considered very even-handed. That got him into trouble back in the U.S., of course, because any ambassador who seems sympathetic to the host country is considered to have gone over to the enemy. But in fact while trying to explain to Americans where the Japanese were coming from and why they took certain positions, he still pressured them hard for market opening actions.

The economic section handled a lot of delegations, usually led by USTR, sometimes by the Commerce Department and there were long difficult negotiations. But there was no animosity among the people involved. Americans from these other agencies often were fairly new to work with the Japanese, but over the years developed into very savvy negotiators who really understood the system.

Q: I understand from a person from the Commerce Department I interviewed that the Foreign Service National (FSN) Japanese staff was invaluable during negotiations in being able to point out flaws and inaccuracies on the Japanese side.

WHITE: I think most embassies have extraordinary FSNs and benefit greatly from their knowledge. At that time in Embassy Tokyo, there was a transitional period because the first generation that had been hired after the war was retiring. They had started working in the ‘50s or early ‘60s and were a great source of advice. As you noted, they played a big role from the back row as they could remember what had happened in previous talks. Short tour Americans were at a disadvantage. The Japanese brought huge delegations into the room. They would have 10 or 12 people at the table and 25 young people behind. The young people were all taking notes as part of their training. This meant that they had very good records and could go back and say something like, “In 1978 the deputy assistant secretary said X, which contradicts what you are saying now.” We didn’t always know the background because we changed so much. The more senior Japanese staff at the embassy were a big help there; I’m not sure they were always invited to participate, but they should have been in the room. Also, as other agency personnel don’t change as much, a strong cadre of American government experts has developed over the last 20 or 30 years.

Q: What about bureaucratic practices designed to stifle imports into Japan?

WHITE: Japanese bureaucrats used the excuse of safety regulations to make things very difficult. That was certainly true in the automobile case. Regulations on things like the size or brightness
of headlights had unnecessarily narrow limits, things were obscure, and the bureaucrats were totally rigid about things. But there were also misunderstandings. There was one possible non-tariff barrier that people thought was an outrage until they found out the whole story. Parking lots were refusing to allow foreign cars into their lots. The assumption was that the Japanese had such deep anti-foreign car feeling that they wouldn’t let American cars be parked. It turned out that the yakuza, the Japanese gangsters, were among the biggest consumers of black Cadillacs. That was a sign of gangster prosperity. Not many other people would buy them for that reason. The parking lot attendants said “no foreign cars” because they were terrified that a Cadillac would get scratched and they’d have their kneecaps broken. You do have to look below the surface sometimes.

Q: Did we look at retaliation?

WHITE: We threatened more than we acted. A number of trade cases under Section 301 of the Trade Act were brought. The interagency group considered them, tried to negotiate and drew up a list of items for retaliation, but very few of them got to the retaliation stage. It was actually a failure if we reached the retaliatory stage, for it meant that the U.S. hadn’t been able to gain the trade liberalization we sought. It was better to make a deal.

Regarding import procedures, another issue I worked on related to customs procedures. Japan has a terribly inefficient airport, Narita Airport, which serves Tokyo. It was politically controversial from the time it was built because the government highhandedly seized land of farmers to build the airport. It was intimated that some of the land had been bought up by politicians’ friends so they ended up making a lot of money. A certain number of farmers refused to move and it became a focus of violent radicalism.

Q: I remember seeing farmers out on the runway and that sort of thing.

WHITE: Yes. Several guards were killed in the early days of fighting. Even today the airport is ringed with heavy security. The bilateral complaints related to the fact that once the airport was built, the continuing conflict meant they couldn’t expand it for many years to add a needed second runway, which seriously limited foreign carriers who wanted to expand into a growing market.

Narita also had a very inefficient customs process for goods clearance. Goods had to be trucked to another facility 20 or 30 miles away which wasn’t too bad if you weren’t dealing with something that was perishable or needed fast clearance. However the U.S. wanted get efficient processing on our exports of agricultural products, especially fruit. Apples, cherries, etc. faced all kinds of phytosanitary requirements but slow customs procedures were equally obstructionist.

It became even more difficult when organizations like FedEx started what was new at the time, an overnight small package delivery service. The shipments would get quickly to Japan, but once on the ground the customs clearance was really a hindrance. The customs officials worked basically 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM so for overnight shipments the timing was all wrong. American flights arrived in the late afternoon in Tokyo. We had constant battles to get the Japanese to hire more people, extend their hours, have more facilities on site at the airport, and get the stuff
through the clearance process. That’s the sort of bureaucratic problem that applied on the surface to domestic and foreign interests but had a more negative effect on American operations.

*Q: Moving to the other part of the transportation portfolio, what about railroads? Were we doing much with railroad products?*

WHITE: It wasn’t a question of import/export with railways. We were interested in the technology and occasionally the Embassy would handle visitors coming to look at the Shinkansen, the bullet train, which was at that time the highest speed rail in the world. They were also starting to experiment with a magnetic levitation train in southern Kyushu. So this was an area of cooperation, not conflict.

A different problem in the transportation area related to road transport. One non-tariff barrier that I worked on a good deal was a limit on high cube cargo containers. The major American shipping lines, American President Lines (APL) and Sealand, used a certain container that was the routine size of containers all over the world. However it was about a foot and a half too high according to Japanese regulations, so these companies went to great expense in taking cargo out of the containers that came off the ships and putting it into smaller containers so that they could be shipped on the Japanese roads.

*Q: Were they worried about high cube containers hitting low bridges?*

WHITE: That’s what they said, but as I kept pointing out, the shipping companies would obviously plan and take safe routes. It wasn’t in their interest to run into low bridges, after all. The bureaucrats were simply defending the status quo—which, in this case, was negatively affecting Japanese companies as well.

On this issue, I worked a lot with the National Police Agency, which was one of the more insular agencies, at least on the road transport side (as opposed to cooperation on criminal issues) as they didn’t generally deal with international issues. One of the most undiplomatic things I ever did was when a police officer said to me, “We can’t have these high cube containers because Japan is a small country.” I laughed out loud. Then I tried to recover by pointing out that Hong Kong, which was considerably smaller, had managed to arrange their regulations to accommodate these containers. We finally succeeded in getting them to allow the taller containers. Not surprisingly, that was in part because Japanese companies were switching to these larger size containers and put pressure on as well, probably through political channels. Of course then the containers got even larger and they asked for double container loads and things, but as that was after my time I don’t know how it stands now.

*Q: Some of these were American problems, but they weren’t uniquely American problems. You had Europeans exporting, too. Was there a unified approach or it was everybody for themselves?*

WHITE: We didn’t usually coordinate on specific actions but we did have contact and share information. I called on my European counterparts and we were close to the British and Canadians in particular. Other countries saw the U.S. as the country with the most leverage. They were helpful and told us what they were doing, but the attitude was more to let us go ahead
while they went in later and supported us. They knew that the Japanese were more likely to listen to us because of the size of the U.S. market.

**Q:** Were you undercut by countries caving in to the Japanese regulations in order to gain advantage over American exports?

**WHITE:** I don’t remember any specific incidents of that. The Europeans were doing better than we were in exporting automobiles, particularly the Germans. It was because Mercedes had a good reputation and Volkswagens were popular because they were cute and small. Right hand drive and good gas mileage, along with a reputation for quality, were key. But the numbers for imports were nothing like the Japanese exports to Europe. That in turn was far less than exports to the U.S. I believe that the Japanese exports to Europe were limited by EU import restraints, both standards and quotas. They weren’t getting the overwhelming market penetration the U.S. was. In fact back in Washington there was a three pronged effort where we tried to get the Europeans to get rid of their protectionist legislation so that some of the flow would be diverted to Europe, taking some of the pressure off the U.S. as the only big open market. The other two prongs were working to get more U.S. cars exported and the Voluntary Restraint Agreement.

**Q:** On the aviation side you mentioned the airport customs clearance problem. Were there any other aviation issues?

**WHITE:** This was a major issue and along with autos took most of my time. There had been a treaty in the early ‘50s that was very rigid, as most bilateral aviation treaties were at that time. Certain airlines were allowed in a market with a set number of flights and prices were controlled. The domestic aviation market had also been heavily regulated, but in the ‘80s deregulation in the U.S. was well underway and companies wanted more flexibility in international markets.

The American carriers in the market were Pan Am, Northwest, and Flying Tigers. Continental had a small route that went between Japan and Saipan that carried mostly tourists and honeymooners. On the Japanese side the carrier was Japan Air Lines (JAL.) The Japanese felt that they were disadvantaged because they had only one airline in the market. That happened because at the time of the treaty they had only one international airline, which was heavily government financed. There was a lot of pressure on both sides from other airlines that wanted to get into the lucrative trans-Pacific market.

A new round of talks began when the Japanese asked for landing rights for Nippon Cargo Air (NCA), which was a new cargo airline that was a subsidiary of All Nippon Airways (ANA.) ANA is a large domestic airline in Japan while JAL had always been the international carrier. ANA had aspirations to become a bigger player in the international field, but some years before they had been slowed down by the Lockheed scandal which involved Prime Minister Tanaka. It involved kickbacks for buying Lockheed planes for ANA. So for a while they were quiet and made no effort to expand into American markets.

But in the mid-‘80s ANA wanted to get involved and asked for landing rights for NCA. They were looking at flying high-tech components as well as finished exports to the American market, with rights to Chicago a major part of their plan. The USG refused, though strictly speaking the
treaty allowed the new rights. But U.S. airlines had been seeking more rights both for existing carriers to increase their flights and for new carriers. They saw no other leverage than to refuse what was in fact a legitimate Japanese request. In the meantime NCA had two huge Boeing jumbo cargo jets sitting on the runway losing a lot of money, so the Japanese were furious and we began a long round of negotiations.

The talks were led by State Department and Department of Transportation (DOT), as was the pattern, but unlike most aviation talks, USTR and Commerce also got involved. American companies opposed to NCA framed the question as example of Japan, Inc. because NCA was associated with ANA and also because we’d had all the other problems with customs clearance, high cube containers, etc. that related to cargo operations. The talks became highly political on both sides.

Q: Using the term Japan, Inc. was a shorthand term of saying both the government and business were very closely entwined.

WHITE: Yes, The argument was that ANA/NCA was a conglomerate that was going to overwhelm the smaller American players like Flying Tigers, the cargo airline. Needless to say Flying Tigers was very eager to keep out another cargo carrier. Pan Am and Northwest were combination carriers, with passengers but also large cargo operations, so they liked the status quo. They had a nice market because it was a protected market share, a pie of a certain size and with all the same players year after year.

This series of talks was interesting because a lot of the negotiation went on among the American side. There was Continental wanting to expand its operations, and United, Delta and American Airlines wanting in the market and the new player Federal Express (now FedEx) all pushing DOT and the State Department and the Congress to negotiate a big package. Northwest, Pan Am and the Flying Tigers were trying to keep the status quo and warning that constituents would lose jobs if all the new players were allowed to come into the market and lower prices. Negotiating with the Japanese was only half the problem for the American team as it was impossible to keep all the American companies happy because there were so many different desires and a lot of political people weighing in on behalf of their local airlines.

It was a long hard negotiation but the two sides ended up with a very big package in about 1985 where the old system was completely broken apart and new players came into the market. ANA soon realized that a big package could finally break JAL’s monopoly on the U.S. market and eventually all international passenger flights. So there were countervailing forces on the Japanese side for liberalization. NCA finally got its landing rights. ANA got international flights (which has made a lot of American negotiators happy because you can fly nonstop from Washington to Tokyo on ANA, which now has a code-share with United so you can actually fly it on government travel.) Northwest and Flying Tigers were unhappy, though a few years later Flying Tigers was taken over by FedEx. United went in in a very big way and eventually took over the Pan Am operations.

The new arrangement was not completely open skies, not a completely deregulated system. Conflict continued with the Japanese about the number of slots and the timing of the arrivals at
airports because, as noted earlier, Narita Airport was unable to expand as much as it should. Nonetheless the deal brought a lot more capacity in the market and really helped the consumer. Prices went down and the volume of passenger traffic went up.

**Q: Was Ambassador Mansfield called in from time to time to weigh in?**

**WHITE:** Yes, having been a senator he was sensitive to the politics and careful to ensure that all the American companies got a fair hearing. During the many months of the aviation talks he received a lot of the American companies who had very divergent views. Some were very eager to get the market open so that newcomers could come in, while the incumbent carriers were arguing against a deal. It’s hard not to take sides in something like that because either you support the ones in the market or you don’t. The general inclination of economists is to support a freer market but that can be difficult to say for political reasons.

The Japanese companies also made calls and gave their point of view. Sometimes he pushed them to consider alternative scenarios. I remember one interesting meeting with the NCA officials who were just wringing their hands and practically in tears at that point because they were losing so much money with their planes grounded without landing rights. You’ve probably already heard about how Mike Mansfield would make coffee for his guests himself. It was instant coffee and he made it in a little alcove and refused help from his staff. That stunned Japanese visitors because they always had a young office lady to do that, but here was Ambassador Mansfield bringing them coffee himself. At this meeting the NCA officials gave a 10 minute explanation about why NCA should be allowed in the market, cited the treaty and said it really wasn’t fair. When they finished the ambassador took his pipe out of his mouth and said, “I agree.” That’s all he said. They didn’t know what to say, so they basically repeated their points again. I thought that was classic Mike Mansfield.

**Q: Moving to the controls, the Cold War was still going on with China and the Soviet Union. What were some of the issues that you got involved in?**

**WHITE:** There was a lot of concern about dual use items, high tech equipment that could be going to the Soviet Union or other countries for ostensibly legitimate purposes but that could be diverted to military use. The allied nations’ Coordinating Committee - COCOM - in Paris kept a specific list of sensitive items. There were constant arguments among the developed Western nations about which items should be on the list and which were legitimate for shipment. Many of the decisions were made on a case by case basis.

Japan got a lot of attention because Japan made computers, high tech ceramics, electronics and other sophisticated components, more so than most countries. Partly because of the general anti-Japan feeling in Washington, many people believed that Japanese companies were unscrupulous and selling items under the table, through third countries, with questionable invoices, etc. There probably was a certain amount of that going on, as other countries’ companies did as well. The question was how you found out about it. There were certainly a lot of things being shipped to third countries and then on to the Soviet Union, maybe with the knowledge of originating companies while some may have shipped goods in good faith. We quietly shared information on questionable cases with Japanese government officials.
Q: A case that got a lot of attention involved Toshiba.

WHITE: Yes, there were apparently deliberate shipments of goods that allowed the Soviets to create very quiet submarines. It happened a year or two after I left in 1987 or ’88, so didn’t deal with that one, but that was a classic case and Americans were justifiably very angry that a Japanese company would put profit over security, especially given that we had our troops defending Japan. I don’t remember what the sanctions were, but the Japanese government cracked down harder because of that case. It is still remembered here and still resented.

Q: In many ways it sounds like the economic side was a driving engine in the Japanese American relations during this period.

WHITE: I think it was. It certainly was what got the most attention. Of course at this time there was a strong security relationship and good political ties. This was during the Reagan years and Reagan developed a good rapport with Prime Minister Nakasone. Nakasone was unusual in several ways. First he lasted more than a year or two. A lot of American presidents have mediocre relations with the Japanese prime minister because it’s a different one every time they meet. The Ron-Yasu relationship developed into a strong personal bond during the period, so the political ties were quite good. And Nakasone was a strong personality who made an impression on the American public. This is unusual as many Japanese politicians aren’t well known here.

Q: Were there the economic summits at the time you were there? They’re called the G-8 now.

WHITE: It was the G-7 at that time. One year it was in Tokyo and it very interesting to observe.

Q: From your perspective how effective were the summits? Were they trying to settle some problems or was it just people talking and getting together?

WHITE: For the embassy it was a time for everybody to be involved in one way or another, being a control officer for this site or that site, taking care of the visitors of all levels. In terms of the bilateral economic problems handled by the Embassy, I don’t think much was accomplished. There were bilaterals and each side had a laundry list of issues and talking points. A lot more emphasis was put on the Treasury Department’s concerns and the multilateral issues.

Q: How did it work with the Department of Commerce which had its own Foreign Service? Were they a player in major negotiations or were they really looking for commercial opportunities? How did you work with them?

WHITE: The Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) people worked on both negotiations and commercial opportunities. The commercial section and economic section were both large sections in the embassy and also each had a number of Foreign Service Nationals. Their main focus was to help specific companies get into the market, but they were also involved, though to a lesser extent than the economic section, in policy questions. Things could have gotten complicated if the personalities in the two sections had clashed, but luckily the two sections saw their roles as complementary so we didn’t have problems. In negotiations like automobiles the
commercial officer was part of the delegation. While the economic section focused on policy, the commercial section focused on practical aspects and could bring evidence of specific problems that business people had encountered when they tried to get in the market.

Q: During this time Japan was pretty expensive to live in wasn’t it?

WHITE: Yes, when I arrived there in ’81 to go to language school I think the yen was about 240 to the dollar, but after the Plaza Accords the rate went up and down so there was a lot of variation. Almost everyone in the embassy lived on a compound, which was newly constructed at that time. It was very convenient because one could walk to work in 10 or 15 minutes. You didn’t have housing or utility costs to worry about. There was a small store there that got goods from the commissaries on the military bases, fresh milk once a week, that sort of thing. Basic canned goods, cereal, were available. People with large families or who did a lot of entertaining drove out to Yokota Air Base or Yokosuka Naval Base to do their shopping although I only did that a few times.

Travel was expensive, unfortunately, because people with bigger families couldn’t afford to get on the train and go to Kyoto or Hokkaido or other parts of Japan. Train fares were high as was lodging unless you went really low scale. Nonetheless we tried to visit various areas and get out of Tokyo as much as possible. Tokyo is a very concrete city and every three months or so you needed to get out and see some greenery. My daughter’s school went on ski trips to the Japan Alps and she and I traveled a good deal by air, train, bus, ferry, etc. We especially enjoyed our trips to Kyushu.

Q: You left there in ’86?

WHITE: Yes.

HITCHCOCK: I would like to turn for a minute to Tokyo as PAO and a few of the things that happened in those years. You mentioned Reagan. One of the things that happened was Ronald Reagan’s first, I think, overseas visit to Japan in 1982. This may have been during his trip to Korea as well. One of the first things that happened in the preparations for that -- I think the visit was in November -- was that in the summer -- in July I think it was -- White House Aide Deaver came and sat with the country team. A lot of the talk seemed to be about physical security. He seemed bored. I finally spoke up and said that I felt we needed to spend time talking about what...
kind of image we were trying to cast of the President in Japan. What sort of impression did we want to leave, and how would we build that impression? Here is a President who is seen in the Japanese cartoons as a cowboy or a B movie actor with very reactionary views and not much awareness of the rest of the world. How do we overcome this in his speeches and in his public appearances? Deaver perked up, and when the meeting was over, he pulled me aside and said, "I want to work with you and your staff. I can see that you are after what I am after." We developed a very good relationship.

I went with him out to one of the scenes that we were thinking of...the Japanese were thinking of having President Reagan go out to Nakasone's summer cottage, which is close to two hours from Tokyo by car. So we went and looked at it with some other people. It is just a little Japanese cottage on a hill. Deaver got up there, looked at it and said, "Don't change a thing. Don't let them pave the gravel road."

A couple of weeks later I got a call, a faint voice from Washington saying, "This is Misty Church. I am a speech writer in the White House, and I understand that you are in charge of the public affairs side of the Reagan visit, and I want to work with you." Well, that was just great. I couldn't have had a better offer. She was a young researcher, but in charge of doing much of the preparation of the key Presidential speeches, including the Diet speech. We had, by that time, composed a TV interview for Reagan and some remarks at two receptions -- one for Japanese and American businessmen and one for the media. So we started working together.

She didn't have the foggiest idea about...I don't think she knew where Japan was. She started out by saying, "We want to get some kind of quote like 'Ich bin ein Berliner' in the Diet speech. There must be something where the U.S. and Japan have...When he went to Canada, for example, and the President gave a speech to the Parliament, there wasn't a dry eye in the house because he talked about our comrades in arms. Don't we have something like that in Japan?"

I said, "No, I am sorry, Misty, but we were on opposite sides of that one."

She said, "Well, but what about Korea, we cooperated there didn't we?"

I said, "No, no, that is even worse, we can't use Korea either."

So I had to lead her along the way. But she knew what she wanted. She wanted some references to early Japanese Meiji leaders who had tried to bring a democratic process into Japan, the first Constitution, etc. We looked up Hirobumi Ito, Fukuzawa and gave her some select quotes.

We came up with a slogan finally. It wasn't "Ich bin ein Berliner." And it won't go down in history like that. It was: "Japanese American friendship is forever." She said, "Yeah, go ahead and put it into phonetics, and we will see if he will read it." Nichi-Bei yuko wa eien desu. We put it in phonetics and checked it out with everybody, the language school and so on.

She said also that they wanted to salute Japanese culture. I think I put that in there that the President should find a way to express his appreciation, respect and awareness of the sophistication of this ancient culture. This would rub off some of the cowboy image that
remained. She said, "Good. Find something literary." I decided I would try to find a haiku that had some social, ever so slight, perhaps, reading that could be made of it -- some haiku that could be interpreted as having some social consequence. My wife, Lee, and I got out all the haiku books we had and borrowed a few and looked through them. I wanted Basho because he was the best known poet in Japan. He is the Shakespeare of Japan. I finally found one. It basically goes something like this: Many blossoms in the field, but each has its own special fragrance, or something like that...quality. It was really "many flowers bloom;" almost Mao's slogan. But we got it into the question of cultural values, shared values and diversity in our societies.

Then, of course, I had been working with...I knew who the interpreters were going to be for the Diet speech. It was this outfit that you are probably familiar with now because it is so well known -- Simul International. The head of that outfit was a friend of mine, and still is. We wrote in Tokyo a good deal of that speech. Not the political side of it necessarily, but all of the themes. We wrote the opening statement for a TV interview -- and they never changed a word of it. We wrote some of the toasts. The historical references, quotes and so on in the Diet speech stayed in.

Then I had a call from Simul, and they wanted, my friend, who was going to be in the glass room up above the Diet, the text of the Diet speech. Well, I wasn't at liberty to give it out at all. And yet, I knew what he was saying: if he didn't have the text in advance, there might be references that he would not be familiar with. So, I just quietly gave it to him.

As it turned out, thank the Lord that I did because President Reagan got up there and the speech went fine, and the Japanese had earphones on so there was no oral translation. He got to "US-Japanese friendship is forever" and mispronounced it. Of course, the interpreter was there ready. He immediately corrected the President's mispronounced "yuko wa eien desu," and there was a murmur of approval across the whole Diet hall.

The Basho haiku that Reagan quoted made a bigger hit then anything else in the speech. The Japanese understood that the President was reaching out, that he was tipping his hat, even though somebody on his staff had done this for him. The fact that he took the time to do that was just terrifically important to the Japanese.

I only told that story as an example of something that American political leadership and the State Department forget all too often, and that is: when you are dealing with Asia, it is how you do things, the style of how you do things, the symbolism that you project, that is much more important than the substance, and indeed becomes the substance in large measure. Without it, it is a cold fish, a cold visit no matter how much everybody tries to hide it. It has to be there. If we don't take this into account during the President's visits overseas, we are missing a chance, and that is where USIA has a special role to play, I think.

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Director, Tokyo America Center, USIS
Tokyo (1981-1986)
Mr. Berrington was born and raised in Ohio and educated at Wesleyan University Harvard Universities. After service with the Peace Corps in Thailand, he joined the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1969. During his Foreign Service career Mr. Berrington served at posts abroad in Thailand, Japan, Ireland and England, variously as Public and Cultural Affairs Officer. He also served several tours at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Berrington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Today is June 27, 2000. Robin, you are off to Japan. You were assigned to the Embassy in Tokyo from when to when?

BERRINGTON: Well, I arrived in June of '81 and left the summer of '86.

Q: Did you write anymore Christmas letters?

BERRINGTON: Well, it was interesting. When I came back as we discussed earlier…I was summoned back. I was told just don't write these things anymore. Of course I did. I didn't change how I wrote these things, and I have kept writing them year after year. In fact I am still doing it even after this year. While I was in Washington, I went through a couple of months of language refresher, because I hadn't used my Japanese for some time. I just kind of laid low and waited for all the dust to settle and trundled off to Tokyo in June of '81.

Q: Was Mansfield the ambassador the whole time you were there?

BERRINGTON: Yes, he was there the whole time I was there. He had been appointed by Jimmy Carter in 1976. Then when Ronald Reagan won the election in 1980, much to some people's surprise, Reagan said, "Mansfield is such a good ambassador, even though he is a Democrat and an appointee of my predecessor, a Democrat, this Republican administration will keep him on." So they asked him to stay on for well as long as he and they wanted. So he was in place for, well he had already been there four years or five years I guess when I arrived. [Editor's Note: Ambassador Mansfield presented his credential on June 19, 1977.]

Q: Well now, your job was Public Affairs Officer?

BERRINGTON: Oh, no. I am afraid I never rose to those heights except in Dublin. I guess they would never let me do it again. No, I was assigned as director of the American center. The American Center was the USIS cultural center, I guess, in other countries. The America House for Germany, the Thomas Jefferson Center for Manila. You know they had various names, but they are all essentially the same kind of thing. In Japan, we had six of these. Five of them were in the leading regional cities starting from the north, Sapporo, then leaping pretty far south, Nagoya, then Osaka, Kyoto, and Fukuoka. The sixth center was in the capital city, Tokyo. Of course, I had been the director of the Fukuoka American Center a number of years previously. This time I was back as the head of the Tokyo American Center. That was considered the flagship of all of them. It had the largest library, the largest staff, the busiest program, the most important audience. It stands to reason that it would be a little bit more equal than other centers.
Q: Okay, well, let's talk about when you arrived there, how would you describe the state of Japanese-American relations? Tell us about what you were doing and the issues.

BERRINGTON: Well, you know, Japanese-American relations are always been on a fairly even keel. The issues over the years have not changed that much. The official, well not just official but the formal as well as informal relationship has usually been an excellent one. There are a lot of reasons for that.

First and foremost I suppose, is that with the exception of a few years after the occupation in the 1950s, the Japanese government has always been under the control of the Liberal Democratic Party, which is a conservative party, despite its name, and is composed of a series of factions centered on the influential leaders of the party. All of these factions and basically the party's control comes from any one of these factions which may be large or small depending on elections and a leader's death or a leader's illness or something like that. Certainly not on any ideological or policy issue grounds. But all of these factions have as a fundamental pillar of their policies, a pro-American policy. So, there was never any real shifting of governmental attitudes about the United States. They were very much behind America and we were almost kind of like, you know some people suggested it wasn't that much different that MacArthur and the occupation. The American embassy, the American ambassador was almost like some kind of pro-consul and the Japanese government was very eager to listen and not very eager to disagree. Now maybe that is not doing complete justice to some of the disagreements we would have, but by and large it was a very friendly, very close relationship between governments. This extended to the people too. Throughout relations at the times I was there, other people had been extremely cordial and friendly. It is very hard for me to remember in all the years I have been in Japan, any overtly hostile or unfriendly acts by anybody. You might bump into a slightly aggressive drunk, but he might be unfriendly to anybody not just Americans. Of course, there was the Japanese Communist party and a few other kind of professional anti-foreign types, but they really were more anti-foreign than strictly anti American.

Another reason why relations were usually pretty good and pretty close was that within East Asia, and of course our policy in Japan was based on a number of regional issues as opposed to only bilateral issues; within East Asia, there was a fairly common concern about China, of course, and North Korea, and although there may have been times when they saw China in slightly different ways than we did, and we'll go into that further later on. Nevertheless, China was regarded as a rather unfriendly power in the area. There was absolutely no question about North Korea. We tended to be in total agreement about that one. By this time, the major strain on the relationship, Vietnam, was long since over. So the regional issues were pretty much not major irritants.

The bilateral issues, well you know, with Japan, it's funny they have been kind of like the bad penny that keeps coming up again and again. It is just a different year on the penny. These bilateral issues that seemed to disturb the relationship, it was always trade. The Japanese were eager to restrict imports of whatever was the issue at hand, and the Americans, of course, were always trying to open up the market so that more whatever it was could be brought in. Over the years this could be anything. I am not making this up as silly as this might sound today, baseball
bats, grapefruits, textiles, and probably the most particularly American part of all, lawyers. These are all things the Japanese wanted to, to the extent they could, keep out of the market for various reasons, most of which had to do with competition with the local product. So whatever we were talking about in the trade issue, the trade area, it was like we could pull out the scripts and the arguments and the factors impinging on all of this and lift out the word baseball and put in the word computers or chips or oranges or whatever. So it was almost like a ritualistic routine that both governments would go through. It was as if they knew what we were going to say and we knew what they were going to say. We both went through the motions, and strangely enough after a number of bargaining sessions, we would reach some kind of compromise which would satisfy both parties. Things would be fine for another year or two until another issue came up, which would be start exactly the same process, what we would call kabuki, where we would read the same lines and go through the same dance and it would get resolved.

Q: What was the role as we saw it and you saw it at that time during the 1980s, early Reagan, of the American centers in your perspective?

BERRINGTON: Well, I had told you earlier about how the American Centers when I was in Fukuoka went through a major not just cosmetic change, changing the name from Cultural Center to American Center, but also went through a much more kind of modernization, I guess you would say where everything from fax machines were introduced. This was back in the 1970s when fax machines were introduced, Our audiences were more carefully identified, and the speakers and the programs we did were clearly fine tuned to the mission's policy concerns. Of course this was not how it was before. You could have had somebody come in and talk about Moby Dick or Nathaniel Hawthorne and nobody would complain. When things changed in the 1970s that kind of programming, unless somebody just kind of did it secretly, just never happened again. Which in my opinion was a very good move. You know it brought them up to date. So by the time the 1980s had gotten around, there had actually been a kind of almost Sisyphean, is that the right adjective, a number of reverses. Alan Carter, the man who was responsible for the modernization, had long since left. A couple of PAO's had come in that were either anti-Alan Carter, didn't like what he was doing. In fact, these were usually people who had been in Japan before Carter and if anything wanted to take the program back to status quo ante. I mean there wasn't as much demand if you could just fly by the seat of your pants and do whatever you wanted to do. If the PAO happened to like the issue of science, okay, then we did a lot of science. If the next PAO happened to like literature, then everything was on literature. That's no way to run a railroad. That's the sort of mismanaged or disorganized program that Carter was trying to eliminate. So his successors inherited the Carter program, but some of them tried to actually turn the clock back. Of course, they couldn't do it completely. There were too many people who were strongly in favor of the program as it then existed. Even a program as radical and different as Carter's was at the time, after a few years does take on a bureaucratic life of its own. We all know that very well. So despite the efforts of some of these successors to push things back, although they might have caused a little bit of mischief here and there, it really was maybe one step back and two steps forward, and maybe another one step back and then two steps forward as the people changed. Of course, the new program was something that the State Department and other people liked very much too. They were no more eager to see it turned back than the rest of us. Anyway, by the time I got to Tokyo, this was kind of the situation in which
the program was in. All of the communications modernization was still very much in place. We still had very clearly refined audience systems, which by then was computerized. Back then everything had become computerized. We could pull up the audiences; let's say if we were going to do a program on the U.S.-Japan security relationship. We could pull up an audience of interest there. An audience in which we could identify who of those were strongly interested and those who were only mildly. That was still in place and probably in better shape than before. The libraries had been well funded so that they were stocked with the best, kind of up to date books on most of these policy issues. The staff was, the Japanese staff as well as the American staff, was pretty much committed to this kind of program, and although a few might have had nostalgic longings for the old days, because most of the staff remembered those days, they were not pressing to go back. The program was in pretty good shape. In short I would say the USIS program was probably about as healthy as you could find. In those days Japan was still a country where the quality of officer was pretty good. First of all you had to study the language. That would eliminate some of the people that were not good at that sort of thing. The issues, because of the Japanese angle and the unique aspects of the history of U.S.-Japan relations, required a bit of serious study, rather than a quick 24 hour introduction. Because of all of this, I think it tended to get people, like myself, who were repeats and who were familiar with things and knew how to work there. So morale was pretty good. Most of us people were happy with what was going on. I would say as a result USIS was considered a fairly integral, valuable part of the mission valued by the ambassador and the various political, economic, commercial, DAO sections for what we could do with the press and other audiences. Also valued by the ambassador and other elements of the mission for what we could do to put them in contact with various kinds of people we knew around town.

Q: Did you find the dichotomy between a fascination with Japan on one hand but at the same time almost a missionary or reformist desire to shape Japan to our image on the other. You know, women aren't being treated in the way they should be or there should be more competition in stores or what have you. I mean was there a problem with us struggling to sit in the impulse to change the society?

BERRINGTON: Oh, yes, some of that went on, but as I think I mentioned last time, rather than just get out there and say you know wagging our finger at them now, now, now, you should do more with women or now, now, you should provide more rights to your Korean minority groups or whatever. Let's face it, those were basically internal issues, and rather than us telling them how they would you know, cure their own illnesses, we did more by kind of illustrating by example how we handled these things in the U.S. Japan has been a country that really looked outside to see which way the wind was blowing. From the Meiji era on, they have always taken from the West what was considered the most relevant developments, brought them home, and then crafted or shaped them into something that was very definitely Japanese which you could see how it had gotten its start from someplace else. You can see this in whether it was the development of the constitution back in the Meiji era, whether it was the development of the army, whether it was the development of the medical system. Incidentally, of all of those three things, the constitution came largely from Germany. The medical system came largely from France. They were interested in seeing what other countries were doing and would take all of this. So after the war and after the occupation, the United States was considered the place where things were important. We were now the leading power, not Germany or England or France or
anything. So they were always looking to see how we handled issues knowing full well that whatever was happening in the U.S. may very well start popping up in Japan four or five years later.

**Q:** I usually gave ten years. Any time we have a problem or a fad, this is serving abroad, you just knew this was going to spread.

**BERRINGTON:** The only reason I use five years, it probably was ten years at an earlier period, is because things are moving much faster. Of course, the 1980s is still the time before E-mail and the revolution in communications. But still things were happening quickly. There used to be an expression in Japan: when the United States sneezes, Japan catches a cold. They were very sensitive to anything happening in the United States, sometimes for fear of, and depending on which quarter you were dealing with sometimes in eager anticipation of what would eventually spring up in Tokyo or elsewhere.

**Q:** There was a time, now maybe this is later on when the Japanese economy was really booming. It looked like the Japanese were going to buy up the United States. This was not that period?

**BERRINGTON:** Well, this was the beginning of that period what they called bubble. It really reached its peak when I went back to Japan at the end of the 1980s. I was there from 1989 to 1993 as well. That was sort of the heyday of the bubble. We could really see it starting at this point. Of course, what was behind it, I am not an economist or a finance person, and when I get in these waters I have to struggle a bit, but basically what it was, was inflation in land values. The banks owned all of this land. People made loans, or took out loans, the banks made them. The collateral used on all of this was this land, and the land just kept expanding and expanding in value until it was absolutely absurd. I mean it got to the point in the late 1980s where they would say a piece of land the size of a postage stamp in downtown Ginza would be worth something like a million dollars. It was just unrealistic, madness. Then, of course, one day all of this burst as any commonsensical person would have expected. That then led to the problems that Japan is having today. But in the early 1980s this was just getting started. Japan was always an expensive place for tourists in the 1980s because of the rate of exchange. Japan was not necessarily an expensive place for the Japanese. This is something that is always hard to keep in mind. Yes, housing was expensive, no question about that. Land became expensive, so housing and land, yes that was a major expense for the Japanese. Certain luxury items became very expensive. A bottle of foreign scotch whiskey as opposed to Japanese scotch whiskey would be ridiculously expensive. Or if you had a meal in a certain western style high class restaurant, it was very expensive. But your ordinary day to day purchases, your train ride, your commute, the taxicabs, just the value of ordinary clothes, things in the supermarket, no Japan wasn't that expensive for the Japanese.

My reading is that it was the 1970s oil shock and all of that really led to the financial problems that started some of this inflation and provoked also the unsettling of the currency markets in East Asia. At that point of course, ever since the occupation up until the end of the 1970s, the dollar in Japan was 360 yen. It was sometime in the late 1970s early 1980s when the exchange rate started to drop against the dollar. So that from 360 to the dollar, it went down to the 200
area, and in the late 1980s early 1990s, it was hovering around 100 yen to the dollar. You aren't
going to be a major economist or mathematician to figure out that if there is not that much
inflation in Japan, yet 20 years ago you were getting 360 yen for a dollar and now you are
suddenly only getting 100 yen for a dollar, for the foreigner goods are really becoming very
expensive. Not so much so for the Japanese, but for the foreigner, it could be a really tough
place. So this is all sort of the background of what was happening to the economics of the
situation in Japan. This, of course was a problem in our relationship. I was not as privy to
discussions in that field, but certainly USIS would do a number of programs on how to stabilize
the exchange rate; how to make sure that the strains of this sort of these floating rates that were
just plain chaos for the trading systems, how we could bring some order to all of that. Nothing
was finally resolved. I think we all just managed to muddle on through.

Q: Let's look at the role of the American Center. Was there much of a relationship with the
universities in the Tokyo area? I mean aren't the top rated universities there?

BERRINGTON: Well, the American Center had as its audience; I think we had eight or nine
audience categories. The top two for us were the academic and the media audiences. By
academic I mean university. This included both faculty and student. The media of course,
consisted of the electronic and the print, magazines, TV stations, editorial writers, and
everything. For the universities, once we had refined it down; it was not junior colleges; it was
not high schools; it was not vocational colleges, nothing like that at all. Partly because you have
to realize the audience universe in a place like Tokyo. Well, one of the universities the Nippon
University, which we translated as Japan University, had 100,000 students. I mean let's face it, it
was something of a diploma mill. How do you deal with 100,000 students? You can't! So once
we refined it down to a university category, then we would refine it to what we considered the
best university. What were we doing? We were trying to identify those people who when they
graduated or when they moved into the employment field were those who would have some
effect on U.S.-Japan relations. We were trying to influence the opinion leaders either of today or
of tomorrow. So, we just didn't reach out to any university, a small select group of universities
and within the set of small select universities there was a set of small select faculties within those
universities. Tokyo University was of course one of them because Tokyo University for years
was is and probably will continue to be the main feeder into the bureaucracy. If you graduate
from Todai, that is the Japanese word for Tokyo University, you could almost write your own
entree into the foreign ministry or the finance ministry or the ministry of trade and industry, just
to name a few of the biggest ministries we were interested in. Of course Todai was a school we
were very interested in. Within Todai it would be the faculties of economics and the faculties of
politics and international relations because they were the places from which the kids that went
into the finance or foreign ministries usually...or law. We didn't deal with faculties of medicine.
We didn't deal with faculties of engineering. We didn't deal with faculties of veterinary science.
Yes, they might very well turn out somebody who 20 years later might in fact have strongly held
opinions about U.S.-Japan relations, but the likelihood of somebody coming from those faculties
and having an influential role in relations was very slight.

Q: Sounds like you were making a calculation in Japan, which we had not been making in
developing countries. In developing countries, at one point, we were trying to contact anyone
with education. We wanted to have good veterinarians; we wanted to have good civil engineers
and good technicians, we were interested in bringing people up to what we considered a good standard.

BERRINGTON: Other than my time in Thailand, which was unusual because as you know, it was during the counterinsurgency period and our mission there was very specialized, I have never been in a third world country. Perhaps what you are describing is a U.S. mission in a third world country. So it is hard for me to comment on that. You would have to talk to somebody who had been in, as you know yourself and your own experiences.

We were aimed at informing an audience that was already quite well educated. You have got to remember that the Japanese educational system was a very advanced, very sophisticated educational system. I mean yes, it has its problems, some of them quite serious, some we have back here in the United States, but it was an educational system with many areas of excellence, high standards which turned out well qualified people in various fields. Who was it for us to come in and tell them that their civil engineer programs were no good? So no, that is why we were not engaged in anything like that in a country like Japan. Now, perhaps back in the occupation period there may have been more of that kind of thing going on. I wasn't there; I don't know.

Q: Well, in some of the interviews we have conducted under this program one gets an impression, the war had come and gone and we were trying to bring people back to a certain developmental state and all of that. We were the leading repositories of...

BERRINGTON: Yes, well, that is kind of the big brother little brother, white man, Rudyard Kipling is still alive.

Even when I first came to Japan in the 1960s that was never the case, even under the old programs. So basically what we were doing was trying to inform, not so much to educate as to inform a very defined audience, granted a small, I hesitate to use the word elite because to me elite signifies a kind of almost financial oligarchic sense. They are all sort of in Latin American terms these are the landed aristocrat types. That was not the case in Japan. Japan is a very mobile society. Even the poorest kid in Japan, if he can pass the entrance exams to the university can go on to become foreign minister. In fact this is the story in the case of Prime Minister Tanaka. His background was extremely poor. He went on just on sheer ambition and hard work to become the prime minister. He had no aristocratic or even any wealthy background. So given all of that, the word elite seems kind of inappropriate. An intellectual elite or maybe an educated elite may be more like it.

So in that respect I suppose we were. But as I say it was really informing them about things, so we would go for certain faculties and go for certain...

Q: Well, this is the Reagan period, and first term Reagan. Reagan had been known around the world as a movie actor and all that. What was the USIS approach to portraying this American President?
BERRINGTON: Well, USIS in those days had a fairly routine song and dance that we would do when there were any administration changes. This was largely because of materials that were made available through Washington. We would in whatever the jazzy format was at the time, would put together a folder of members of the cabinet, of leading people in the new administration including the President and Vice President of course, and give these packets out to the media. If we were doing a program on as we did a number of times, the foreign policy of the new administration and the expected Japanese policies of the new administration, of course we would make these materials then available to the people that were invited to this program. So, yes, we were trying to inform them about Reagan, and of course we would try to play down the movie star side. That was not something we made a big deal out of. He had been a governor; he had been a leading political figure in the States for many years. The Japanese also knew him as a governor. That is the important thing. You have got to remember he was governor of California. When I was the director of the center in Tokyo, I did a lot of traveling in the Tokyo area to some of the cities. My district was while it was predominantly the city of Tokyo, it did take in the same consular district of Tokyo which extended several hundred miles north and to the Japan Sea to the west, as well. So I would travel out to these places maybe once or twice a year. Every now and then I would go to a place, and the governor, or the mayor, or the university president or somebody would haul out this dusty old visitors book and ask me to sign. In flipping through the pages I was not at all surprised to discover that Governor Ronald Reagan and Mrs. Reagan might have visited this place on a California trade promotional tour or something like that. So he had been and California being a Pacific state facing East Asia, his travels in that area were not few and far between. So they were familiar with him as more than just a movie star. That is some respects I think probably made it easier for us than say maybe our counterparts in Europe might have had.

Q: Were you working at that time to combat the images of the United States as seen through movies, TV, records and all?

BERRINGTON: Well, that has always been a problem for us in every place. I mean I can remember when I was in Dublin. Probably the most popular television program of the day was something called Dallas. I am sure you remember that.

Q: Yes. Serious people would come up to me and talk about Dallas. I thought it was about a dynasty of oil people, basically a soap opera. This is serious stuff.

BERRINGTON: I don't quite recall if Dallas was still a big deal in Japan. Oh yes of course, the movies, television. The other point, of course, and this is no news to anybody like you who has served overseas, American movies are extraordinarily popular overseas. They are one of our most successful exports. I think if you have to talk about the most significant products of American civilization in the 20th century, American film, and I say this with some regret, is right up there at the top. In terms of impact, in terms of financial return, in terms of forming opinion, I mean it is just incredible. So that was a major problem. And of course, television quickly became equally influential. In the case of the movies in Japan, except for, and this is what I always thought was a very curious combination, except for Walt Disney and Woody Allen, don't ask why because I don't know, but except for those two, all Hollywood movies were subtitled. So even, the Japanese are a very literate people so you know subtitles were maybe not such a big
problem for them. But if it was Mickey Mouse or Woody Allen it was dubbed. You know they actually had Japanese voices rather than subtitles. But nevertheless, movies, all the big Tokyo theaters and even out in the smaller towns, there would always be some kind of a Hollywood movie playing someplace.

Now when it came to TV though, that was a different story. Television became extremely popular, American television programs. They were all dubbed. I always found it amusing because clearly they would look for a Japanese who had the same type of voice, so that if the American actor had a raspy voice, they would look for a Japanese with a raspy voice. They were very good at it actually. So we were constantly dealing with the misperception, the misunderstanding, the kind of you know whether it was violence or glamour or whatever comes out of Hollywood movies and Hollywood television.

Q: When Ronald Reagan too office, he brought with him his new USIA director, Charles Wick, who was a Hollywood product and full of ideas. People interviewed in this program have provided a mixed review. Wick could get money for USIS and he had ideas, but he really wasn’t focused on USIS’ core mission.

BERRINGTON: Charles Wick probably wouldn't have known a public affairs issue if it bit him in the face. Of course, when he first came in, he was very much the object of derision among the professional corps. Who is this guy this Hollywood wheeler-dealer type whose personal style frankly could be rather coarse at best? Yes, there was a definite culture clash between the foreign service and somebody like Charles Wick. But as time went by, and this is when you will recall, this is when government budget cuttings started really coming on in earnest, and departments and programs and various activities started to find their funds cut, Charles Wick was an absolute genius at just calling up the White House and telling Ron; or his wife Mary Jane would call up Nancy, and we would always somehow manage to survive.

Charlie Wick was always interesting. As you know, the Washington Post always publishes a list of who was at the White House for X or Y dinner. The Wicks were always there, unless they were out of town. Even more important, if it wasn't an official party like a dinner for the king of Norway or whatever; let's say it was just the Reagans having Thanksgiving dinner. Who was there? Charlie and Mary Jane Wick were always there! So after awhile, yes, maybe we thought this kind of used car salesman type guy…we might not have liked his style or manners such as they were, but we sure were appreciative of his political connections and how he could save our budget. He would come out overseas. We would all cringe when he would meet local personages. He was very much a bull in a china shop particularly in dealing with foreigners. But, certain categories of people, you could see how across the cultural divide and the linguistic differences, Charlie Wick worked out. For example, there was one Japanese theater producer who had very close political ties to the Liberal Democratic Party. He was one of their major fund raisers. Whenever they needed a movie star, he could always get somebody to be there in the Japanese sense. We introduced him one time to Charlie Wick, and the two of them hit it off perfectly. They were just two peas out of the same pod. So he had his ways of relating to certain people, but it was always a bit of a trial for us to put up with Charlie's rather eccentric ways.
Q: Early in the Reagan Administration were we drumming away on the obstinacy of the Soviet Union on the northern islands or had that sort of faded from view?

BERRINGTON: Well, that was one of those issues that never went away. It was always a source of some consolation to certain Americans. Every year various Japanese newspapers would conduct opinion polls, which is the best nation in the world? Which is the nicest nation? Which is the nation we respect the most? That sort of silliness. Invariably number one in all of these popularity contests was Switzerland.

Q: You know the Swiss-Japanese relationship was so key!

BERRINGTON: Yes. And why? Because you know, pretty mountains and little Heidi like figures and Swiss watches and chocolates and the Matterhorn. Switzerland of course is really a threatening country. Maybe there was something in common through the bankers, I don't know. But Switzerland was always number one. Then number two could have been usually us, or maybe England. But if we weren't two, we were number three. Now going way down the scale, coming up after us would be France, or Italy, or Canada. At the other end of the scale it was always a struggle who was going to come out on top so to speak, on the bottom really. Would it be North Korea or Russia? They were always in a race, and depending on what might have happened in a given year, one would beat out the other. As a result, because of this ongoing strong enmity between the Japanese and the Russians which is if you look back historically there was the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the century.

Probably the real key element was right before the end of WWII ended, when Japan clearly was going to be defeated and was on its last legs. I think we had dropped the bomb on Hiroshima but not yet on Nagasaki. At that point the Russians declare war on Japan. The Russians capture and detain huge numbers of Japanese troops in Siberia. There were still many people who remember being POWs in Russian camps for several years who eventually survived and came back to Japan. Well, all of that has meant a lot of enmity, a lot of hostility between the two, much of which is reciprocated by the Japanese for their own insecurities. Another legacy of how the war ended, of course, was the Russian occupation of the northern islands. There is still no peace treaty between those two, Russia and Japan. It is not like there is an active war going on, of course not. But there is no peace treaty and for reasons that just bedevil both sides they have not yet been able to sign a peace treaty to resolve the northern territories issue. By comparison of course, even though our occupation of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands could be considered almost a mirror image of the Russian occupation of the northern territories, after rather protracted, long, and difficult negotiations, we finally did give back Okinawa. A lot of Japanese used to say, "See the Americans are our friends. They gave back Okinawa, but those dirty old Russians never gave anything back."

Q: So we didn't have to hammer away at that. It just was there.

BERRINGTON: No. Seldom did we have to say or do anything about the Russians. Now, do you remember the shoot down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by Soviet interceptors on 1 September 1983 over the Sea of Japan just west of Sakhalin Island? The shoot down initiated a major PR offensive by us. Much of it handled personally by Rick and Jean Kirkpatrick. With all kinds of
materials being put out. As in the case of anything we got in Japan we would translate into Japanese before giving them out to the Japanese, video tapes. It was a worldwide offensive on our part to expose the Russian duplicity on that. That was something that was certainly an incident that marked a period of time. Again we didn't really have to do that much. In fact, there were times I felt like we were going at carpet tacks with a sledge hammer. The Russians were just hanging themselves. There wasn't that much we had to do, but still it was a major offensive by us at the time.

The issue which probably, when I think back in terms of long term difficulty, the issue that probably has caused us the most, I mean apart from the trade issues which were a constant thorn on the side. But the issue of China, how to handle China; the Japanese have always looked on China as a kind of mother country. I mean in the same way that England looks on the continent as where so much of their civilization comes from, the Anglo-Saxon background. Japan looks on China in the same way. A mixture of respect and slight condescension because China is the source of the language; that is where Buddhism came from, much of the art and culture, Confucianism, all of that is from China. Nevertheless, by the 20th century, look where Japan is, a major industrial world power. Look where China is, still backwards, still split by competing forces with a population in some part starving. Clearly Japan could look at China and say maybe we got everything from you, but look where we are today compared to you. So it was with very mixed feelings how they regard China. But as China developed some nuclear weapons, and after the death of Mao and some of the struggles that went on there, and as China started to figure out its own world view vis-a-vis the U.S. or Taiwan or Korea or whatever, we could not always count on Japan to be right behind us on everything as much as we might have wanted it. There was no question that part of the Japanese differences with us had a racial element to it. You know, very much like Vietnam, they saw China as another Asian brother, and in fact if anything it was more like an Asian mother or father than brother. So for the western powers to deal with China in the way they did sometimes caused problems within the Japanese, particularly the media. There was the occasional thorny issue for us, and still is today.

Q: How about with the media? Did you see a change in how the Japanese media was dealing with the United States or using the Center or anything like that?

BERRINGTON: No, not that much change from what I had mentioned before with the media in Fukuoka. The Japanese media probably have the largest press corps in Washington from any country, including Europe or anywhere. If you go down to the National Press building, I mean every floor has some representative of the Japanese television station or newspaper or news agency or something. All of these offices have several members in them. So what this means is most of these people would be assigned to the U.S. for a year or two. They don't tend to keep them very long overseas. Journalists would come over here for a couple of years and then come back. There was a huge number of people who had experience in the U.S. and knew a lot about American politics or how American society worked. As a result, we weren't really dealing with the kind of ill informed third world type of journalist. We were dealing with pretty well educated, pretty opinionated, knowledgeable people in their own right who were not always quite so ready to take the embassy press release or the embassy word at face value. Whereas in some countries you could just give something out and you could count on it being kind of on the front page of the paper the next day, that was hardly ever the case. We had to struggle to get our
point of view across. Now, yes they wanted interviews with the ambassador, yes they wanted access to the visiting assistant secretary of state, yes they wanted to meet with the senator or the congressman when he or she came through. We would have some leverage over them in that respect. We didn't automatically give out these exclusive interviews. We were very careful as to how we gave them out, and if somebody had really made us angry recently, they might not get that interview this time. There is a certain amount of realpolitik in press attaché work, of course. By and large, we could count on their interest and we could count on their enthusiasm. As a result, America was reported on, not always correctly, often consciously, I think, incorrectly. But America was reported on on a regular basis, daily in the case of newspapers.

In fact, one of the points we used to keep making to the Japanese was almost information overkill. The Japanese would report on American issues or what was happening in America or anything that could happen in America that had a Japanese angle to it would get reported in the Japanese papers in a huge way. So that let's say Congressman Irving Schwartz from Fargo, North Dakota, who wouldn't know a Japanese from a Korean from a Chinese suddenly gets up in Congress and says, "Those Japanese, they are the most racist people in the world, and we should cut off relations from them." You know, first of all if there is anybody in the house listening that would be one thing. Nobody would pay any attention to it here anyway because Congressman Irving Schwartz on Japan, who cares. But back in Japan, headlines the next day, “Congressman Irving Schwartz demanding that diplomatic ties be cut.” Now of course I am making this up, but the point is the Japanese would report anything about Japan in their papers. Whereas if you look at an American paper, and this is back in the 1980s, and sadly enough even more so today, you really have to look hard to find something on Japan. It was often with a sense of sadness that the Japanese would wonder why we didn't report more on Japan. Now they never seemed too concerned that there was over-attentiveness or what we would call a substance gap or kind of a credibility gap. Why report on Congressman Irving Schwartz if he isn't important back here, if he isn't crucial to the dialogue or to the power structure or to the issue at hand. But they didn't see it that way. And I have to say probably some of them never saw it that way because they never were quite sure who was important back here. So that was a constant problem for us, trying to put their reportage of American things in proper perspective, in a proper balance that would bring credibility to what was really happening. It was a major challenge for the press officer and for the embassy and for the ambassador and any of us who were out talking to the Japanese.

Q: These programs that you had at the American Center, which ones do you think were really right fit, of being on target and did very well to a certain audience or subject or what have you?

BERRINGTON: Well, Stuart, in my opinion there was never any substitute for face to face contact, what in USIS you have probably heard us call the “last three feet.” The idea that like we are right here talking to each other across the table rather than reading something in the newspaper, rather than reading a book, rather than seeing something on television. I am not belittling that. I am just saying in terms of importance, the idea of the face to face dialogue and face to face contact was really very important, and made much more of a difference in convincing somebody or persuading somebody about an issue than the more passive form of a book or a newspaper. So those programs that fulfilled that function, that provided somebody for that “last three feet” were the ones that most of us thought were the most important, and by which I would say and I am not really in part order now. This is just what springs to mind. The
IV program, the international visitor program, in which we would send people to the United States and go down and meet their counterparts and come back. The speaker or seminar program in which we would bring out specialists or experts of one kind or another to talk about issues. Whether it was talking with 20 people or in some cases maybe just with two or three people, those were the programs that really made I think the biggest dent.

For example, when I was at the Tokyo American Center, well, Yokohama which is the biggest city south of Tokyo, it is about a half hour south of Tokyo, a major city in its own right. It is a separate administrative district, not part of the Tokyo administrative district. The governor for that area was a well known socialist party figure, meaning he was somewhat critical of the United States. His deputy governor was a much younger socialist party politician who had been to North Korea, had been to China, had been to Russia, had been invited to all these places several times, but had never been to the United States. He was somebody that I got along with, but we would constantly have this ongoing kind of debate about the United States. He really didn't know that much about the U.S. Well, I figured this was a guy who was going to go further, and so I nominated him for an international visitor grant. He went to America. It was his very first time. He went all over, met with Democrats and Republicans, mayors, senators, congressmen. He even stayed on an Indian reservation in New Mexico. He made a home visit with a black family in Alabama. We really gave him the whole nine yards. He came back and I debriefed him. He spoke no English, like most Japanese politicians. So everything was done through interpreters on his trip to the U.S. But he said he had never had an experience like that in his life. That by comparison his visits to Russia, Korea, China of course, were much more like taking you to a Potemkin village. He didn't realize that at the time as he did now in comparing it with his American visits. He said it just made a total difference in his outlook on the United States. The way he put it, he said, "I have come back a changed man." I think it was people like him, and he is not the only one, but it was a combination of people like him in the socialist party which have really contributed to the eventual kind of implosion of the socialist party into, well there is no socialist party now. They have been so doctrinaire, so irrelevant that enough people like him said eventually to hell with this. They have gone out and joined other parties or you know, totally left the Japan socialist party. So it was that kind of experience that taken together really contributed to a lot of change in Japan.

I can also remember when I had Ed Koch, the mayor of New York, in for a seminar. We had a bunch of young city council people from Tokyo, young politicians. They just came away from that meeting absolutely, you could see they were all just so whipped up with enthusiasm in how they are going to go back to their jobs and really make a lot of changes and do this and do that. Not that New York was the model but just simply Koch's style and what he was trying to do in New York was seen as something that the Japanese should try to emulate. Without those face to face experiences, I don't think that anything like that would have ever developed.

There was another example, of Zushi was a small town south of Yokohama where there was an American, well it was very close to Yokosuka, where we had a naval base Zushi was where a lot of the personnel from the Yokosuka naval base were housed. The mayor of Zushi was an astronomer who had somehow gotten into politics. He was a good friend of a friend of mine who was a labor leader. This whole issue of housing the American naval forces in Zushi became a fairly bitter issue. The local folks didn't want this housing development. Zushi, the local
administration didn't want it. The mayor of course was sort of leading the charge on all of this. He even refused to see anyone from the embassy. He just wouldn't have anything to do with the ambassador or the political section. He didn't want to be seen as you know, sashaying with the enemy. So, the embassy, because this was in my territory because I was down there a lot, and because he was a friend of a friend, this was turned into the friend invited the mayor and me out to lunch. We talked about a few things, and one thing led to another, and I literally became kind of like an emissary. I would meet with him. I would talk about certain things. I would ask him questions. Then I would go back to the political section and report on what had happened, and the political section would say oh this is good or this is not so good, now what about this. Then I would go back and talk to the mayor. I felt like the Henry Kissinger of Middle Eastern shuttle diplomacy. This would not have been possible if we had not had an American Center because the American Center was physically removed from the embassy. Everybody knew it was part of the embassy. I had an embassy title, but simply because it was physically removed, and because it was in the Japanese eyes seen as a cultural program rather than a political or economic program, I could get away with this. Eventually over time, I was able to back off, and the embassy people and the mayor would get together and everything was fine. But again I think it was those “last three feet” that made a difference. If it hadn't been for first of all the American Center's removed or distance, and also if it hadn't been for the fact that I had the friend who was the labor leader, we probably couldn't have gotten very far.

RICHARD T. MCCORMACK
Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs
Washington, DC (1982-1985)

After attending Georgetown University, Mr. Richard T. McCormack assumed a multitude of administrative roles for the Nixon Administration in addition to serving under Governor William Scranton of Pennsylvania and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina. Mr. McCormack’s career also included positions as the US Ambassador to the Organization of American States as well as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Ambassador McCormack was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

McCORMACK: I was Acting Assistant Secretary from whenever George Shultz came into office, which I guess was in the summer of 1982 until 1985.

Q: Now when you came in, you mentioned earlier on the Japanese relationship that we had, so many of our people were nurturing this country because we wanted to make sure we weren’t ever going to have to fight it again. Were there any countries or areas where we were saying let’s not be too rough on these people because we have other fish to fry. We want to encourage their development so it is not just Americans selling stuff, but let them have a piece of the action.

McCORMACK: It is my impression that U.S. trade policy became increasingly concerned about a level playing field as our trade deficit began to mount. Early on foreign trade was such a small factor in our vast economy that we didn’t really care that much. The only thing that slowed
further opening of the U.S. market was U.S. protectionist interests. From the economic point of view and certainly from the State Department point of view, we ourselves gain by having cheap products here to be sold on the American market. The consumer gains by these cheap products. Trade not aid was the thesis. There was also what was called the positive adjustment program, organized by the OECD. This was basically a strategy of actively encouraging the advanced countries to move out of certain areas to make room for third world countries to have jobs and to grow their economies. That was something that was never formally presented. The very existence of this “positive adjustment program” is something I myself learned about quite by accident. But that was in fact the banner under which some people operated. However, as the trade deficit mounted, senior people became increasingly concerned. Thus, increasing pressure was put on the Japanese to restrict their exports, particularly cars, to the U.S.

Many people, though, concluded that we couldn’t get the Japanese to open up their market to U.S. exports, and therefore, we needed to slow up their penetration of U.S. markets. Eventually this led to efforts by Treasury Secretary Baker to encourage the Japanese to develop more domestic demand rather than rely so intensely on exports to grow their economy. The Japanese in fact attempted this, but unfortunately they carried it too far as they over expanded their money supply. They developed a huge asset inflation, and they eventually seriously damaged their financial system. To this day, the Japanese blame Jim Baker for that, unfairly, but they in fact do blame him.

After the Plaza Agreements, the Japanese currency strengthened somewhat, the dollar weakened, and our balance of trade stabilized until the 1997 Asian crash. Due largely to Baker’s earlier efforts to correct the currency situation during the time when I served as Under Secretary of State, we had the smallest balance of payments deficit in many years.

Some elements of the basic strategy that the Japanese used to penetrate the United States are now being used by China against Japan and the U.S. This involves a variety of state capitalism, deployment of their savings via banks to support targeted sections of the economy, and taking advantage of low wages, cheap capital, others’ intellectual property, and an undervalued currency to penetrate markets; while using nontariff barriers to protect vulnerable sectors of the economy.

We have now a 200 billion dollar a year balance of payments problem with China, which is growing every year. The Japanese are simply not able to compete in many areas with the Chinese at this particular point. Some of their industries are slowly hollowing out. This problem has them troubled. They don’t know quite what to do about it. They understand the dangers. They are trying to persuade the Chinese to appreciate their currency, just as the Japanese were forced to appreciate their currency earlier. However, the Chinese are resisting. This is going to be an increasingly lively issue and very important for the U.S. and the global trading system that we succeed in this area. It won’t be easy or automatic. It will require a conscious forceful U.S. strategy, now missing.

Q: We are still going back to the ‘80s. I notice you said when you went to China to set forth your three no’s as far as export, that you consulted with the Japanese. Was there a feeling that after the Nixon shokus and all this, that we really need to keep the Japanese informed. Was that part
McCORMACK: It was not part of the ten commandments; it was my own initiative. Nixon earlier stopped consulting on some sensitive matters with the Japanese after the Okinawa reversion because he felt betrayed by the Japanese Prime Minister on a trade-related quid pro quo that failed to materialize. But I felt that we had a shared interest in consulting with each other on some issues. Also out of courtesy, I felt that we should consult the Japanese since they were the main strategically exposed country in the region and our principal regional ally. Had they expressed major objections to our technology transfer policy to China, and if their objectives were credible to me, I would have certainly passed them on to Washington. This might have influenced what Bill Clark eventually recommended to the President. The fact of the matter is, when you have allies or you want to keep allies, you consult with them in advance rather than present them with fait accompli’s, if you want to maintain trust and friendships. So this was, as I say, my own initiative. But I also learned, after the fact, that the Secretary of State had not been consulted on this policy change. This had been a White House initiative, and there had been no meetings held either at the Assistant Secretary level or at the Secretary level on this issue. I did mention to the Secretary at a morning staff meeting that this was a live issue. The White House, however, did not want to have the policy preemptively destroyed. There was concern that if they had an interagency consultation, the Pentagon or conservatives on the Hill would have made it difficult to execute the policy. The White House wanted to do it for strategic reasons. So this issue was handled by an extremely small group of people, very quietly. This was not a unique situation in the first Reagan administration. When I reported to the Secretary after I returned, he approved of it and said that he had always felt this was a good idea.

WILLIAM PIEZ  
Economic Minister  
Tokyo (1983-1985)

Mr. Piez was born and raised in Rhode Island and educated at the University of Rhode Island and the Fletcher School. After service in the US Armed Forces, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Frankfurt, Kabul and Manila as Economic Officer. During his career Mr. Piez dealt primarily with economic matters of East Asian countries, particularly Japan, where he served first as Economic Counselor and, from 1983 to 1985, as Economic Minister. In the Department in Washington, Mr. Piez was Deputy Assistant Secretary of East African Economic Affairs, and from 1989-1991, Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative. Mr. Piez was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

PIEZ: I left Washington in ’82 and was assigned again to Tokyo this time to the economic minister’s job.

Q: They couldn’t get you out of there.

PIEZ: Well one thing that can happen to a foreign service officer is that you get categorized not
only in a career track like political or economic or consular but you get categorized into a region. I had never in my career asked for East Asia, but I got it. You get to know the people, and you get to know the decision makers. They tell you I want you here. It is very hard to say no I won’t do that.

Q: Well also if you are looking at an overall sort of point of view of foreign policy. I mean have a man who speaks the language and knows people and I imagine in a country like Japan where essentially there is a lot of stability with the governing apparatus.

PIEZ: The political system was incredibly stable.

Q: Ok, you went out to Japan from when to when?

PIEZ: Well I was there from late in ’83 until 1985.

Q: This is a continuation of the October 20 interview with Bill Piez. Ok, you were over there ’83.

PIEZ: Yeah. I am trying to recall just what month it was. It was in the spring of ’83 that I returned to Tokyo.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

PIEZ: Mike Mansfield. He had already been ambassador there for some time. He had arrived in ’77, was first appointed by Jimmy Carter, and then Ronald Reagan kept him on.

Q: With Mansfield, how did he view the economic side of things? Did he say you know the business and let you go?

PIEZ: Oh yeah, he rated it as a very high priority. The political section was dealing with reporting on the stability in the political system we had mentioned earlier. But on the economic front there was always something going on. They were following closely the opposition to the LDP. The opposition was quite disorganized but sooner or later our political officers knew it would gain in power. We had many visitors, and our visitors really liked to call on Mike Mansfield. It was a feather in their cap just to be able to go home and say when I saw Mike, etc. And he knew that.

Q: Well did you sit in on a lot of these interviews?

PIEZ: Practically all of them. So many that it is difficult to remember many of the details. Mansfield’s practice was normally to arrive at his office about 7:00 in the morning, and he would read all of the incoming documents and the newspapers. During that time he did not want to be disturbed. Beginning about 8:00 or 9:00 he would read the translations from the Japanese press for that day’s newspapers. Then he would receive visitors about 9:00. He always wanted his appointments early in the morning. He would personally bring coffee to visitors from his serving counter between his office and his conference room. Japanese could hardly believe it. They always expected a tea girl to do such ordinary tasks.
Q: Yeah, but to put it mildly Mr. Mansfield was not a loquacious man.

PIEZ: No he was not.

Q: How did you find these meetings went? Did he sort of nod and listen to the people and let you carry the economic load?

PIEZ: He certainly would nod and listen, but whenever he could he would express agreement and support. It was rare for him to say outright that he did not agree. But his basic approach was to tell them, “Tell it like it is.” If you are having difficulty bringing in your product or clarifying an import regulation when you talk to the Japanese tell it like it is. He would not tell them to pull their punches. He would not tell them to go easy on the Japanese because we have a hot political issue involving maybe some security question and we don’t want to upset them. He did not link political and economic issues. He kept them separate. He very much ran his meetings his way. I was not there to talk very much, but to take notes and follow up. He was well informed about the Japanese economy because he checked the press, the translations, and USIS feed every morning. But he was slow to show off his knowledge, letting people learn for themselves that he had a good response to any question. He was in his eighties and a sharp as ever.

On one occasion he was visited by a former U.S. cabinet member who had just come from China. Mansfield knew China well, and asked, “Where in China did you go.” The visitor said he had been in Kunming, perhaps expecting Mansfield to ask where that was. Instead Mansfield said, “Oh yes, Kunming, the land of eternal springtime. President Roosevelt sent me there on a mission during World War II.” The visitor then changed the subject.

Q: This is an admirable trait because I know as a consular officer, if we had a consular problem in some embassies, sometimes it would be, “Gee I hope you don’t raise that too much because we have got something else on the other side, base agreements or this or that.” This is a very bad practice to get into.

PIEZ: I frankly cannot think of a single case where he told a visitor, whether it was an official from say the Treasury Department in Washington or a businessman or an old friend of his, maybe a lobbyist going back to his early days. I cannot remember an instance when he told them to hold back because it might hurt us with respect to another issue.

Q: Was there a change in the stance of the Japanese, particularly the bureaucrats but also the politicians, regarding trade and economics than before or was it pretty much the same business?

PIEZ: Was there a change in Japanese attitudes? Well I would say there was a gradual evolution in Japanese attitudes in the 1980’s as the Japanese economy continued to grow at high rates and become stronger as time went by. Many Japanese were strongly aware of the fact that during the occupation the U.S. presence was benign and actually very helpful. There were times when we exported rice to Japan because the people were hungry. You probably know that when General Macarthur got there he realized that food was short and was going to remain short for quite a while. He gave orders that no members of the occupation forces were to eat food from the
Japanese economy. And if they ever had leave they were issued rations, C-rations usually, to take with them so they wouldn’t be frequenting Japanese hotels and restaurants and buying food. There were things like that which many Japanese remembered. But as time went by I would say they nevertheless became more assertive and less willing to go along. For example, in textile negotiations they steadily demanded and got increased quotas. It got to the point where they couldn’t fill the quotas. The negotiation would be on the subject of what to do with the overhang which was the code word describing the portion of the quota that was unfilled. They just got tougher and tougher all the time.

Q: Well were we looking sort of at Japan in the long run. The demographics in Japan today and back then they aren’t good. They don’t...

PIEZ: They aren’t maintaining the population.

Q: And they don’t, they are almost pathologically averse to bringing in foreigners.

PIEZ: Immigration is not popular in Japan.

Q: You know when you put those two together you are talking about a nation that is going to peak and just start going down because of too many old people. Is this something we would talk to them?

PIEZ: We noticed of course that the Japanese population was barely staying level. There were forecasts that they were facing population decline. But I would say at the time an awful lot of Japanese people felt there were too many Japanese anyway, and they were not worried about it. Today they are, but at the time I was there I would say they were not.

Q: How about the labor movement in Japan. Was this of concern or not?

PIEZ: Well there were well organized labor unions in practically all of the large companies. I can’t think of one that was not organized. This during the occupation was something that we tacitly supported because it was a way to counterbalance the power of elites, including the elites that have military or aggressive inclinations. Sometimes Japanese labor unions were quite benign. Sometimes a union would strike for an entire lunch break, but no longer. The purpose was to demonstrate power and solidarity, but not hurt the bottom line of the employing company.

Q: Daibutsu or something like that.

PIEZ: Of course the old word for a Japanese monopoly was Zaibatsu. They have been renamed the Keiretsu. But they were essentially the same thing. It was Mitsubishi, and Mitsui and other groups of that kind. They were fully identified in the press. Everybody knew who they were and what they were. Every Keiretsu had a top bank, and a top manufacturing company. It would be a big auto industry or a big steel industry, and then there would be a big trading company and then a panoply of others of lesser importance, but all part of the group. It is a very important factor in the Japanese economy because within the Keiretsu there was an attitude of trust and confidence. It made productive risk taking easier and it had a lot to do with the growth of Japan at high rates.
Even during the time when Mansfield was there their economy would grow seven percent a year or more pretty regularly.

Q: Was this the period where we were looking at the Japanese model and saying we should emulate it?

PIEZ: There were some who said that, yeah. Then in 1991 the whole thing folded, but that was just about the time I retired.

Q: Well were you looking at the Japanese industrial model and were you seeing sort of both the strengths and the weaknesses?

PIEZ: Well I think so. I have of late wondered, seeing our own recession here, did we in Japan, observing the economy in say ’85 take note of the fact that there were credit structures that were expanding beyond safe levels. And the particular area of overpricing was land and real estate. Well, as I think back on it, everyone knew that Japanese land and real estate was overpriced. The Japanese certainly knew it. It was a bubble that did burst in 1991. Now I cannot say that we reported Japan’s got this bubble and it is going to burst sometime soon, because we didn’t know that for a fact. But I think it was generally known and covered in reporting that land prices in Japan were unreasonably high. It was a risk. A credit risk.

Q: Were the Japanese at this point looking at China as a market or a rival?

PIEZ: They were looking at it as a market and a place to invest. I don’t think they were looking at it as a rival. I don’t think they foresaw that in the 1980s.

Q: What were the major sore points with our trade relations. Was it still automobiles or selling things in Japan, rice or things of this nature.

PIEZ: Well I think it breaks down really into three categories. There was first of all, Japan’s huge trade surplus with the United States and the world. As part of that there were a series of negotiations led by treasury on exchange rate management by the Japanese. In time they did appreciate the yen. They had to. The second issue was the whole category of access to Japanese markets. They shipped to us. We felt that our shipments to them of goods and services were constrained in many ways, and a lot of our negotiations with them concerned improved market access. That was true both under Democratic and Republican presidents. The final field was the shipments of Japanese goods in large quantities to the United States, resulting in demands from U.S. producers for U.S. restraints such as quotas or anti-dumping measures. Those issues were more or less continuous.

Q: Could you explain what a dumping issue would be during your time?

PIEZ: Well, under the international trade rules, dumping is defined as exporting a product and selling it for less than you charge in your own country, or for less than the cost of production.

Q: How would that develop? Is it just they produce too many?
PIEZ: A businessman in the United States would say that his marketing of stainless steel flatware is being damaged because the Japanese are shipping this product and are charging prices which don’t even cover their cost of production, or the Japanese are selling it in my market for less than the charge at home.

Q: Why would the Japanese or any businessman do that?

PIEZ: Why would he ship at a loss?

Q: Yeah.

PIEZ: Well of course under the rules we didn’t care if they made a profit or not, only that they were doing it. The reason they would do it is they have the production capacity and want to keep it working. They are making enough profit in other markets so they can afford it. They want to increase market share and eventually increase the price.

Q: Well how did you work, I understand from stories I was reading at the time, that many of the Japanese technically wouldn’t allow traders to sell goods easily in Japan but they would say you don’t meet Japanese standards. I have heard stories there was one entry point where only one man would check the papers and just delay shipments, that sort of thing

PIEZ: Well there was any number of instances of that kind. One example that I think hasn’t gotten a lot of public attention in the U.S. was glass. Construction is a big business in Japan. There is a huge consumption of glass in new construction. U.S. companies producing glass were competitive in terms of their own costs of production, but they had virtually no market. Sometimes the Japanese would say well it doesn’t meet our standards. At one time Japanese standards required glass entry doors to be reinforced with wire mesh cast into the glass. Modern tempered glass is so strong such reinforcement is unnecessary, but the Japanese were slow in updating their standards. Other times they would say oh the market is really open; its just that you don’t know how to sell to Japanese.

Q: What would you find though? Would you have your…

PIEZ: We would find that the four or five important glass manufacturers in Japan, each of them were members of a Keiretsu, and would sell to the construction company member of that Keiretsu, or they would buy from the trading company which would buy from the glass company. There were these established channels based partly on very strong personal relationships. These guys all knew each other. They had dinner together once a month. That was how business was done. If the glass company was asking an excessively high price, they would negotiate it out internally.

Q: Well how would we combat that to find a market for our glass?

PIEZ: Well we would say to MITI, “You need to issue some administrative guidance encouraging these people to look to other suppliers of glass including American companies.” As
I have said, administrative guidance is called gyoseishido in Japanese and that was a phrase we would understand even without their interpreting.

_Q: How did it work? I mean was this...._

PIEZ: I can tell you with respect to glass it didn’t work very well. But these impenetrable barriers were an enormous challenge, very hard to deal with.

_Q: Well with your economic section could you send out people to deal with or sort of delve into complaints to sort of find out what was happening?_

PIEZ: Yes. This was a big part of the work of the commercial service, the foreign commercial service and the economic section foreign service officers.

_Q: What would you do? Would they sort of go out and..._

PIEZ: Well just to take another example, it was very difficult for any American to sell any kind of boat in Japan. A motorboat a rowboat, a fishing boat, any sort of boat. Standards. The Japanese would say, “Well your Coast Guard has standards and so does Japan. We have a terrible time meeting those standards just to dock at Honolulu.” So they had their counter arguments. The approach would be first of all get them to tell us what the standards are. It might not be easy to find out. Then you might be busyly translating them. We found one standard that any small boat had to be dropped from a height of four or five meters onto its bow. Imagine a rowboat shaped like this (gesturing a prow). You lift it up and drop it four meters and see if it smashes. Well mostly they will. It might be a little; it might be a lot. But they had this standard. If you brought a boat to customs in Japan that was one of the ways they tested it.

_Q: Were Japanese boats built, were they, you just didn’t know._

PIEZ: Well if you asked them they would say oh yes. Of course we weren’t in a position to go out and test Japanese boats. Another area was automobile standards, and they had a long list of little things like the parking lights could not be clear. They had to be yellow. The speedometer had to register in kilometers only. A speedometer that registered both miles and kilometers was not acceptable. The companies that shipped cars to Japan called the process of meeting Japanese standards “homologation,” a new word for me. The U.S. auto shippers had a market and they had dealers. You could buy an American car. It was very expensive, and homologation might cost three, four or five thousand dollars. U.S. car dealers also upgraded cars. Japanese buyers demanded perfect paint finishes, so an imported car would be sanded and lacquered to a flawless mirror sheen.

_Q: How were economic relations with South Korea at the time._

PIEZ: Between Japan and South Korea? Well I think their economic relations were pretty good. The Koreans have no particular affection for the Japanese. I don’t think they expected or desired very much to export to Japan. They certainly didn’t desire to import from Japan, and I think they did as little of that as possible. They, of course, found that as a smaller country they could export
to the United States and mostly stay under the radar, with the Japanese up front as the primary problem in our minds.

Q: Were there economic relations with Taiwan? Were these significant?

PIEZ: I would say not terribly significant, although the feelings between Taiwan and Japan were nothing like as difficult as they were between Korea and Japan. I was told the real reason for that is from 1905 the Japanese occupation of Korea was managed by the army which was very severe. But the Japanese occupation of what was then called Formosa was the Japanese navy, and they were smart and much lighter in their policies. The Taiwanese had some happy memories of the Japanese occupation.

Q: I was told it was considered sort of a recreational spot, whereas Korea was used for labor. For most of those places you kind of went on vacations for the well-to-do Japanese. Well then let’s see, when did you leave there?

PIEZ: I left there in 1980. No, that was after my time as economic counselor. I left the economic minister job in Tokyo in 1985.

EDWARD W. KLOTH
Japanese Language Study
Fukuoka (1983-1984)

General Officer
Fukuoka (1984-1986)

Mr. Kloth was born in North Carolina and raised in New York. After service in the Peace Corps and private business, he worked with the Department of Defense, later joining the State Department. In his career with State, Mr. Kloth served several tours in Japan and Korea, in Washington assignments he dealt with East Asian, Political/military, Economic and Environment matters. He also spent two years on Capitol Hill as Department of State Pearson Fellow. After retirement, Mr. Kloth continued as advisor to the Department on variety of matters and served a tour in Iraq as Economic Officer. Mr. Kloth was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: What did you do after your year and a half back in the consular section?

KLOTH: Then I went to Japan, to Fukuoka via a six month refresher Japanese in Yokohama to bridge the December 1983 to July 1984 gap before the incumbent in Fukuoka transferred. Japan was very popular as an assignment. There was a boom of interest at U.S. universities too. Japan’s economy was booming, and the trade friction with the United States made the trade issue number one. Now I understand that China is all the rage and understandably so. That’s where my interest in the Far East started.
When I was in Tokyo in the late ‘70s as a graduate student, the Japanese press was full of trade issues and the back and forth about U.S. complaints about Japanese protectionist policies which were accurate. The Japanese, of course, said U.S. companies didn’t try hard enough and that had some truth as well. For my second tour then, I thought I’d like to see the situation from outside Tokyo, and got a job at the consulate in Fukuoka as economic-commercial officer. A friend of mine recommended a consulate as fun, and it was. I did a lot of public speaking everywhere from Rotary clubs to Chambers of Commerce. I had two very good Japanese employees; we worked with American businessmen who were in the area and helped them sell everything from women’s leotards and Texas beer to nuclear power plant equipment. I was there from summer of ’84 to summer of ’86. We had a consul, economic/commercial officer plus a consular/admin officer because at that time Japanese needed visas to come to the United States. We also had a USIS cultural center.

Q: Was the Japanese Red Army an issue at the time?

KLOTH: No, it was pretty well gone. We did computerized name checks for visas. Occasionally we’d have demonstrations in front of the consulate, but they were rather small and not a danger. Japanese police would always bring a police bus around, but I never saw a confrontation.

The Chinese consulate general was down the street from us. A big black right-wing bus would come by sometimes with its loud speakers blaring. Just after they passed my window you’d hear the guy changing from the anti-US to the anti-Chinese tape.

Q: Okay. How would you describe particularly from your perspective relations with the United States at that time?

KLOTH: Because of the heated negotiations over trade issues at the time, a key mission of the consulate was to get out and tell the U.S. side of the story. We also helped U.S. firms enter or expand in the market. We knew the people in the companies in the region as well as the local economic situation.

Japanese in our area felt the overall U.S. relationship was important to their country but that Japan was being picked on unfairly on trade. In their view, Japan needed to export to buy raw materials such as oil and minerals it did not have. Japanese companies’ success was a result of finding out what foreign markets wanted and making it at a good price. Most Japanese I met felt that the basic problem was U.S. companies weren’t any longer internationally competitive vis a vis Japanese companies. Trade complaints, and automobiles were the big centerpiece, were unfair. In their view, U.S. companies had gotten lazy and were not producing high quality goods from TVs to cars.

While U.S. buyers of Japanese products were clearly saying the same thing, in its post-WW-II drive to grow its economy, the Japanese government had, in large part by design but also because of the way its bureaucratic system worked, closed its market to protect its companies. One major issue in negotiations was the difference between U.S. and Japanese standards. We can go further into this and other trade problems later. In a consulate you do not negotiate but you certainly
investigate and provide useful information and perspective to Washington.

Take the case of autos. I went to the Cadillac dealer in Fukuoka. And I said to him, “You know, I’m reading in the press about all these safety requirements that are being levied on all foreign autos to conform to the Japanese ‘safety standards.’ Could you show me on the Cadillac what has to be done to pass Japanese inspections?”

He clicked off the list which meant that Cadillacs, like other foreign cars, had to have a number of modifications done in a GM shop in Japan. That added to costs. For example, cars were required to have turning signal lights visible from the right and left sides as well as from the front and rear, so GM had to put on additional little lights on. That’s probably not a bad idea for safety, but the “standard” that really got to him was that the requirement to have a metal plate under the engine. He had been told that was so if you parked on grass the hot engine wouldn’t set the grass on fire. Where, he wondered, do people park cars on grass in Japan?

I used to do a lot of factory tours and saw the strength of the relationships between Japanese firms and their suppliers that was very difficult for a foreign firm to break into. I visited a shipyard in Nagasaki in ‘85. They said, “Well you know the competitive pressure is coming on from Korean shipyards, so we have to cut our costs which means our suppliers are going to have to cut their costs. But we send engineers around to them; we send bookkeepers around too and see if we can help them to cut back, to rationalize and improve the efficiency of their operations.”

The yard was reluctant to look for new suppliers even in Japan, let alone abroad in the US. Yard management knew their suppliers and felt they could count on them. From their viewpoint, the start-up costs of a new supplier were high. Nevertheless, shipyards are businesses. When in 1985, the Plaza Agreement greatly strengthened the yen against the dollar, we got a call from them asking for to help finding U.S. suppliers!

Rice was a very sensitive issue, you may recall. I went to Saga City to talk to rice farmers. They were pretty excited that the U.S. was demanding that they open their rice market. But it was not personal. They were gracious hosts. In that area, the farmers blamed Japanese government farm policies for making it difficult for them to be competitive internationally. Cheap farm credit and taxes, especially for small farm machines, let “weekend farmers,” people with office jobs, buy equipment and supplies at favorable rates and encouraged them to hold on to small plots and made it very expensive for full-time farmers to increase their farms size, and so, my farmer friends pointed out, become more competitive.

Q: Well, that rice thing was very tricky wasn’t it? I mean, as agriculturalists in the United States know European agriculture is protected.

KLOTH: The U.S. also has quotas for agricultural products such as sugar. It is my bottom line is and still is my bottom line: trade friction is an economic problem; it’s a political problem. At any rate, our job was also to give hands-on assistance to U.S. firms. We had a number of success stories for companies large, medium and small, on both sides of the Pacific. I worked with Westinghouse in Tokyo and a Japanese power company in Kyushu to restore their frayed
relationship on purchase of nuclear-power-plant equipment. I spent about a year and a half and the result of a $10 million deal. As econ-commercial officer, I was not a Westinghouse salesman per se, but lived in Fukuoka and could act as a go-between. Living in Fukuoka I could make drop by and talk to the Japanese firm about how things were going. I could anticipate issues, call Westinghouse and tell them to come down and head off problems. We did the same thing for small U.S. businesses or new-to-market companies too. For example, our work resulted in a U.S. firm finding a Japanese franchisee after years of trying.

I also enjoyed living in Kyushu, having lived in Tokyo as a grad student.

Q: This was a period where the Japanese system seemed to be the world model.

KLOTH: Do you remember Ezra Vogel’s popular book on Japan as number one? But there was another side; the Japanese companies did not escape the economic challenges businesses anywhere have. The Nippon Steel in Kitakyushu and Oita had had to institute a RIF (reduction in force) in the ‘70s and ‘80s. They didn’t like to fire people, but tough business conditions forced them to stop hiring, offer buy outs; and “early retirement” workers, often by placing them in suppliers’ companies.

I asked one supplier of industrial-size steel containers how that worked: did he need more help? I had heard some argue that because of “unique Japanese culture,” Japanese large firms and their suppliers “cooperated harmoniously on such issues.

The small company manager I talked to had perhaps a different perspective. “Yeah, they did the RIF. I had a hundred or so employees. The economic situation was hitting my sales too. The steel company approached me to take three of their people. You’ve got to understand I buy the steel for my cans from the steel mill. The mill is also my major customer. Now, if they ask me to help them out, what am I going to say?”

I loved going to the plants and talking to the managers someone else not from the PR section. I worked at a Sikorsky helicopter plant one summer in college, worked on the production line. The best plant tours are always from a manager, engineer or foreman. You want someone who knows the business and the plant floor. A PR person knows a script. The foreman can really knows what’s going on, what it takes to keep production and quality up, and also some time perspective on changes at the facility. The most impressive thing for me in Japanese plants for all the excellence of the Japanese work force was that every plant I went to would start out the briefing with how they were automating further to cut down on labor costs.

Q: Was it apparent at that time that the Japanese had a real problem in demographics?

KLOTH: Yes, but the automation was being driven by a desire to be more efficient overall. Remember in the 1980s, the Japanese were very confident. Japan seemed to be number one; the economy was booming. Pollution and other such issues popped up in the ‘60s and ‘70s, and the government had started to address them.

Q: Were you seeing the change of the social dynamics of women, particularly businesswomen?
KLOTH: Yes, but it was still a very conservative society.

Q: They weren’t, I mean I remember in Korea when I was there it was somewhat the same thing, people loved working for the American embassy, particularly women did. They were top rate people because if they worked for a Korean business, if they were married they’d have to quit. With us we didn’t care.

KLOTH: That was true when I was in Korea too. And Japan. Big and medium companies let women go when they got married. Of course, women in, both countries did and still do run many small businesses.

Life was no picnic for men in even big companies. For example, the companies in Tokyo and Osaka would rotate their people to the “provinces.” The big companies had one-room company apartments in Fukuoka for these tours. Families did not want to move the kids around and disrupt their education, when Dad did a two-year tour in Fukuoka.

Q: How did your wife find it being Korean?

KLOTH: Overall she enjoyed Japan and Japanese friends, and still found time to write her PhD dissertation, and have a baby, our son. A lot of the potters in Kyushu came over in the 16th century from Korea, so, while there was some prejudice, in that area, there is also a special relationship.

Q: Did the American military presence there cause any problems?

KLOTH: There are two major bases: the Iwakuni naval air base and the Sasebo navy base, both modest in size. As the economic guy, I wasn’t involved directly if there were issues, the consul handled them. People in the area appreciated the security relationship, but criminal incidents or accidents grab headlines. There was one bad incident where a serviceman got into an altercation at a Mr. Doughnut’s shop in the middle of the night. The Mr. Doughnut clerk wound up dead, so the consul worked with the base commander to ensure that the citizens of Iwakuni understood U.S. dismay at the incident. Expressions of regret are very important in Japan among Japanese, so it is critical that U.S. representatives be proactive. That is very important.

In Sasebo, if ships came in some demonstrators would go out in their boats and the Japanese police would be out there; but it was not like the situation in Okinawa. The footprint was pretty small in Kyushu. At least in the Japanese business circles I traveled in throughout the region, I didn’t hear concerns about base-related issues.

Q: How were your relations with the embassy?

KLOTH: Actually my closest work relationships were with the commercial section of the consulate general in Osaka-Kobe. Our work was not negotiations and policy, but focused on helping U.S. firms come into the market or Japanese firms buy U.S. products, that is, establish relations with U.S. companies. We had a very good and experienced consul in Fukuoka.
For my commercial work I would go up every six months to Tokyo, and see the American Chamber of Commerce. That’s how I learned of Westinghouse wanting to come back to Kyushu. Day in, day out. The Commerce Department’s Foreign Commercial Service officer in Osaka was my closest colleague. We talked regularly to exchange ideas and leads.

We collaborated with Osaka to get more American business people to come down to Fukuoka. The likely candidates were those who already had made the mental leap out of Tokyo and were willing to go to Osaka, that is to the provinces. I had good relations with the Tokyo econ section and FCS. I did a lot of speeches, talked to people and local media, so I needed to know what was going on in the trade negotiations. But in terms of the real work on the commercial side Osaka was the big help.

JACK SHELLENBERGER
Language Training, USIS
Yokohama (1983)

Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Tokyo (1984-1988)

Jack Shellenberger was born in 1927. In addition to Japan, his career included assignments in Belgium, Nigeria, Iran, and Canada. Mr. Shellenberger was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

SHELLENBERGER: I had bid on PAO Paris, but I withdrew it after coming back from the Versailles summit. It struck me that the job in Paris seemed largely a case of wining and dining and being an escort for VIPs, at least that’s the way Jack Hedges characterized the job. And suddenly, Tokyo came up, which was not expected at that particular time, and I did bid on the Tokyo job with the proviso that I get a year of full-time language training. So that was agreed to, and in 1983 I went to Yokohama, found a dark but comfortable apartment about a twenty-five minute walk from the Yokohama language school on the bluff overlooking Yokohama Harbor.

My memories of Yokohama are mostly the unrelenting grind of study, a very, very simple regime of study, munching a sandwich during the noon break, preparing a very simple meal at my apartment, and studying some more. I enjoyed the companionship and friendship of my sensei, the teachers, they were more or less my contemporaries rather than my seniors in age. And they opened many doors culturally to me so that I was able to get a sense of the Japanese culture of the ’80s, which was then, as they often asked me, contrasted with the Japanese culture of the ’50s. I think what I found most different in the ’80s was the Japanese ability to speak out and laugh heartily during the day. In the ’50s, it would happen only at night and when people had been drinking. But now it was much more up-front and much more natural, reflecting a kind of self-confidence that was not as apparent in the late 1950s.

At the end of the year, I moved to the PAO residence in Tokyo, which was a far cry from the
rather, I wouldn't say mean, but ordinary, establishment I had in Yokohama. Here was a two-story penthouse apartment with two balconies overlooking Akasaka and Roppongi, Azabu, a car and driver at my disposal, a housekeeper, cook -- so it was a different lifestyle entirely. My new wife and daughter joined me a month after I got to Tokyo. So again it was not only a new physical environment but a very different living regime.

The Tokyo years were, as they have always been, eventful. Having an Ambassador of the quality of Mike Mansfield as your mentor was a privilege. His standing within the Japanese official community, and unofficial community, was so high as to permit the resolution of many of our nitty-gritty problems. Ambassador Mansfield always said: we spend too much time in the minutiae of the Japan-U.S. relationship, and we should be crafting the framework for a U.S.-Japan free trade area. Some economists feel that that would not be to our benefit. It would lead possibly to a diminution of our technological edge. But, of course, it would also give our traders greater access to the Japanese market.

*Q: Of course, our superiority in technology has diminished pretty substantially without the aid of an open-end trade agreement, and I don't think we've done nearly as much as we should to remedy that fact.*

SHELLENBERGER: The '80s -- this is before '88 -- was also a time of continuing competition and rivalry with the Soviet Union in security matters, and Japan's steadfast performance on the security front and its readiness to share more and more of the burden -- the cost of maintaining our forces there -- I think muted some of the more eager members of the Administration who would mix the political security relationship with that of the trade relationship. Since '88, that's changed, and I think under the Bush Administration, there is disposition to take aim at trading practices that might have not been aimed at with the same force as during the last part of the Reagan Administration.

Among the events of the late '80s in Japan was the Tsukuba Expo, which was, for the U.S. Pavilion, explaining artificial intelligence. Complex subject, to say the least. But our involvement was marginal, it was actually managed by an exhibits team of professionals.

*Q: Was that the one that Hank Gosho was masterminding?*

SHELLENBERGER: Hank Gosho was the man in the trenches, handling the public relations part of it, but being a very constructive presence.

During our Tokyo years, we had the opportunity to see in action most of the major personalities in the United States lexicon: actors, poets, politicians, groups, orchestras, operas, ballet. It was simply a torrent of personalities coming to a country which was, as ever, fascinated by what was going on in the American scene, whether it be the arts or the politics, the technological. And the great difference between this time and 1955-59 was that most of these people were coming on the Japanese ticket. And that ticket could be very pricey, as we know when Reagan came out after his presidency as the guest of Fuji Sankei Communications for a fee of $2 million.

In my role as the Counselor of Public Affairs, I saw more of these events and personalities than
would normally be the case. One is that I had very solid contacts with many of the media leaders, and the media often were the funders for these events.

**Q: Was Yomiuri (newspaper) still riding high in that regard?**

**SHELLENBERGER:** Yomiuri was -- they all were riding high, and they tried to outdo each other as to who could bring in the biggest, classiest, most prestigious act or event.

**Q: At this time, had Japan progressed far enough so that they had cultural events, particularly in the musical field, which were favorably comparable with those coming out from the United States, or did you feel there was still a considerable difference between them?**

**SHELLENBERGER:** Well, the market for things Japanese in the United States, while growing, and certainly sushi was one of the new fads, appreciation for Japanese cultural aggregations would be limited pretty much to your afficionado, whereas in Japan, there was no limit to the people who wanted to see Michael Jackson or the Metropolitan Opera. No, there was a difference of considerable degree.

The other thing that gave us access was the fact that the Mansfields were very selective about what they did after hours. And the fewer events the better, as far as they were concerned. So we would very often represent them, which offered a great opportunity to meet on repeated occasions members of the Imperial Family and leading people, personalities in the government and arts worlds.

I took up golf for the first time since playing in Mawlamyine, Burma, as a way of getting some exercise, but also as a way to, oh, have a point of reference with certain of these Japanese contacts for whom golf was a very important activity. And again, Fuji Sankei asked whether I would play in a celebrity tournament, which would precede a major professional tournament involving a lot of Americans, among others. So, like a fool, I did agree. The only thing I can be grateful for is that I didn't knock somebody in the head with one of my missed shots. Isao Aoki was in our group, and he would have been considered in those days one of the top golfers in the world. He was -- what's the word -- tolerant of my poor play.

**Q: You ought to have been able to get a designated hitter.**

**SHELLENBERGER:** Well, I was being watched by innumerable cameras, and that also inhibited me from getting a designated hitter.

When I compare Japan in my latter time there with the earlier time, and also with time in other parts of the world, I think what struck me most about my situation professionally was the fact that my title meant more than my name, as compared with the '50s, when my name meant more than my title. And truly, it was clear that in Canada, my name was more than the title. But in Tokyo, Japan, as the Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs, that was the addressee, and Shellenberger had very little meaning. I remember in Yokohama, I had no meishi or name card. And it was always a matter of being somewhat rude and putting off some Japanese who didn't know where you were coming from, making them a little uncomfortable because they didn't
readily identify your status and so forth. Once I had the *meishi* with that title, I was, you know, given deference and being added to invitation lists to the extent that I was doing four or five or six evening events a week. Fortunately, weekend entertainment was purely social.

During my Yokohama days, I was able to meet what they call volunteer Japanese conversationalists. These were ladies who would come over once a week and just talk with a student about anything. And the one who was assigned to me had a brother in Tokyo that she wanted me to meet, said I would find him interesting. And indeed, when I got to Tokyo, we invited him and his wife over and subsequently learned that he was a minor powerhouse, plutocrat, not in the establishment sense but in having made it on his own. He was not an educated man, but he had gotten into the printing business at about the same time as the occupation and was awarded a contract. And he turned all of his profits into property acquisition.

*Q: When it was dirt cheap.*

SHELLENBERGER: When it was very inexpensive, and now here he was, a fifty-five year-old man who was semi-retired who had, among other things, an airplane with pilots and attendants; he had a yacht and hotels and restaurants. He didn't know me on the basis of my name card, I don't think he cared about that. And we established a relationship that was without reference to my day-to-day agenda. But it was again very rewarding. He didn't have English, and so it was an opportunity for me to use Japanese much more than would be the case with many of our more cosmopolitan contacts. But to be in his, what's the word...

*Q: Financial league?*

SHELLENBERGER: In his company and seeing how he moves and what he makes of political issues was quite at odds with a lot that I might be reading in the newspapers because he was a man of the streets, and he knew everybody's number. I don't believe he was a particular partisan of any cause, but I do know that his support, as it were, was sought after by all political figures.

Anyway, that was an interesting relationship that developed right from the beginning of my Tokyo days and continued. In fact, my last weekend in Japan four years later was spent at his bungalow (really a misnomer), but his place in Hayama overlooking a lovely harbor. So he is a memory.

Another memory is the chance to reunite with two old friends from the 50s, a professor of American Literature at Chiba University and a documentary film producer. We had been very close in the late '50s, and now we resumed our relationship, which again didn't have much to do with my work at the Embassy but which I think gave me other eyes, other spectacles, with which to see what was happening in our relationship.

I know you wrote a very memorable letter, end of the year kind of letter, about your impressions of Japan that was emerging in the late '80s as being resentful or -- not resentful but being...

*Q: Somewhat arrogant.*
SHELLENBERGER: Arrogant, condescending toward the American and the American presence, and certainly there's been literature on this.

Some have opined that the Japanese could turn into a very (vis-a-vis the U.S.) alienated power that would strike whatever deal it needed to for expediency. After all, in the world of economics, it is a mercantilist power, and ideologically, it could develop the same way. What will deter this, in my view, and I see a lot of it happening, and I think a lot of it was strengthened or at least emphasized during my tenure, was the growth of private relationships between Japanese and Americans. Exchanges -- just a whole panoply of interrelationships, whether it be through alumni organizations, through Fulbright scholarships, International Visitors Program, Youth for Understanding. These I think are nurturing among the Japanese who take part a sense that we and the Americans need each other, not simply as markets, but as forces for societal and global change.

Q: The thing that disturbed me particularly in the middle of last year, which was the time that I was getting all this feedback out there, was not only Ishihara's book, but there were two or three other books written. One of them was written by a reporter who had interviewed not very many Americans, but he had interviewed a number of the Japanese who had participated in the first three or four Japan-America student conferences back in the pre-war days and who had been very pro-U.S. as a result of that participation and even during World War II, had kept their distance to the extent they could from the Japanese government. They were almost as bitter about the U.S. in their conversation, as were others, less informed, even having had that pre-War relationship, which was very unusual in Japan in those days. They had come around to a rather hardened viewpoint on the American attitude toward Japan. They considered the Americans arrogant, non-comprehending, blustering and overbearing in their demands on the Japanese and unfortunately, were not ready to look sufficiently, I think, at their own failures in opening up their economy. But nevertheless, it isn't what the facts are, it's what they believe. The fact was that these were the kind of people who were expressing this sort of antipathy toward the United States, and there was an awful lot of it in the Japanese press. The press was quite bitter about it. And of course, that coincided with the time that the U.S. had just declared Japan a potential point of attack for Law 301, threatening to put them on the more or less embargoed list as being an unfair trader. I think it eased up a little this year, but I just wondered how much of that you encountered during the latter part of your term over there.

SHELLENBERGER: No, I felt that we were politically, economically -- our relationship was as Mansfield said, the best he'd known it in ten years when I left in '88. And he said as much. So the cracking and the seepage of this attitude that you speak of began after -- not that I had anything to do with it, but it began to leak out after the Mansfield years, not, again, because he departed, but events conspired to make '89 a year of rethinking on the part of very serious Japanese.

I have heard about a book that's just out by Tadashi Yamamoto and, I've forgotten the other, on U.S.-Japan societal perceptions of each other that I'm looking forward to reading. It's a brand new book. They examine it, using, as I understand, the Japan-America Societies themselves and their memberships in both the United States and Japan. Interesting, in my time in '88, I believe it was that Kyoto established its first Japan-America Society ever. And the ones that, the sister city, the sister state activities were increasing; university affiliations were on the rise and are still on
the rise. These are the things that I like to think count in bilateral relations. More and more Americans studying Japanese and more and more universities having Japanese connections, and vice versa, will, I think, engender attitudes among the younger generation that will not lead to the formulation that what we face is a great beast.

Q: About a month ago I read an article, I can't remember where, whether it was in -- it had to be in some paper other than a Washington paper because I read it while I was still abroad, whether it was a New York Times or the Herald Tribune or an English language Japanese paper -- but there apparently is a group of about half a dozen books coming out starting in August and September on the American side that are all very serious Japan-bashers. It's apparently the answer on the American side to the Ishihara book of last year, which, by the way, is going to be published in English shortly, I'm told, in the U.S.

SHELLENBERGER: It's not much of a book. Have you read it?

Q: I haven't had a chance to read it yet.

SHELLENBERGER: The version that was making the rounds in Washington was a pirated thing, and it is relatively incoherent, it needs a lot of work.

Q: Of course, part of the incoherence may be due to the fact they didn't have a good translator, but I'd be interested when the book comes out, I'd like to read it then. I hope that these books that are coming out aren't as seriously taken in Japan as I'm afraid they may be. It would just add more fuel to the fire of bitterness.

The next question I want to ask, and this has to do with something we were discussing before on the growing toughness of Japanese attitude -- of the antipathy, did you have any occasion to be in close relationship with any of the student populations, whom I gather are now, as they were in earlier years, attempting to be more radical? Students often seem to be among the first to develop anti-American attitudes or anti-foreign attitudes.

SHELLENBERGER: In contrast to the '50s, it was a totally changed picture. Whereas in the '50s we could rarely get on a campus, much less do any program work, now campuses were readily accessible. The thing about the student population in most, in all of the universities that I went to, and I went to all of them that I could as I went around Japan, I encountered not the slightest hostility that was ideologically based. There might be some resentment, especially in the Ryukyus about our military presence occupying so much of the real estate of Naha and it's environs, but it was never what I would call radicalized. In fact, what struck me most about the '80s is the relative apathy of the students, that the students were, as they are here, more engaged in preparing for a career or some kind of slot with an organization that would give them economic security. That was the number one goal of students. There obviously would be splinter groups that would come into the fore on issues, such as the banning on whale hunting and environmental disputes, but it never approached the numbers that could be turned out for a political cause as was the case in the late '50s. The demonstration against the battleship New Jersey visit in '85 was a great hype but a conspicuous failure in terms of numbers.
Q: Quite a contrast to Korea today, where the students are in the forefront in every anti-American activity that goes on and very bitterly so.

SHELLENBERGER: Couldn't be a greater contrast.

Q: I want to go back briefly to your comment about your title meaning and what it did. I think there's another difference between now and then. In the '50s, the old line ambassadorial group and the old line Foreign Service had not yet been willing to give USIA officers the kind of titles that would grant prestige among the people with whom we have to be in contact. The whole attitude toward the USIA program is today vastly different than it was in those days, which, of course, makes it in one respect much easier.

On another subject, how did you read the Japanese media on American-Japanese relations, particularly in the trade difficulties, which was, of course, one of the major, if not the major, source of friction?

SHELLENBERGER: Well, nowadays the Japanese media representation in Washington, D.C. is variegated and huge. And they cover microscopically every Congressional hearing, every Congressional statement and feed it back to the homeland. And what would be considered an obscure reference to the U.S.-Japan trade picture suddenly becomes a headline on the front page. And of course, it made our jobs very interesting. We would have to explain to the editor that, yes, this was said, but this individual's role in the Congress is of small moment. If you remember the time some Congressional people took hammers and beat a Toshiba radio, audio cassette to pieces, and the spectacle was repeated and repeated and repeated on Japanese TV. It became part of not only that day's news show but of subsequent news shows. In fact, a year later, to open a discussion of U.S.-Japan trade relations, they would rerun this shot of the Congressional people banging on the Toshiba set. So there was a proclivity to sensationalize what was said and done by Americans, especially in the Congress, on trade issues.

But then, at the same time, coverage accorded governors who were coming to Japan seeking investment was full and fair, and the negotiations that took place constantly by ourselves and the Japanese were covered to a fault -- to a fault, I mean, because the Japanese media is used to being briefed about everything. And there's no such thing as a privileged negotiation from their point of view. So it would make our negotiating side angry. As Clyde Prestowitz would recount it, before a negotiation was even into its early innings, there would already be outcomes as projected by Japanese spokespersons to the media.

I think in the last year, a lot of this has been overcome. It's been partly the degree of discipline, maybe, that's been imposed by the Kaifu Administration in its attempt to not let the cat out of the bag. One particularly insidious example of media treatment was contained in a pseudo-documentary produced by Nogyou, an agricultural cooperative with immense resources, which suggested to the viewer that eating American agricultural products, or imported, I should say, agricultural products could lead to deformities, could lead to monstrous genetic effects, all done as if this was scientifically based. I learned about it through a friend who was in the film industry, and we obtained a copy. It was for sale in any video store. We fanned out as a country team. The Agricultural Counselor went to the Ministry of Agriculture; I went to the public affairs
person for the Foreign Ministry and told him about it. They got hold of the product and -- oh, the Labor Counselor went to the Labor Ministry -- and Japanese officialdom saw immediately that this was a gross insult. And it was withdrawn, the video.

Now a year, two years later, I saw another prime time TV program which is a cartoon something like the Simpsons -- a family, not flagrant at all, but very subtly suggesting that Japanese rice in no way should be augmented by imported rice because it had very special health giving, safe tastes and all the things. But it...

Q: Even medicinal qualities, no doubt.

MR. SHELLENBERGER: Exactly. And very cleverly done. It's not something you could say, wait a minute, this is an attempt to define other people's products as unsafe or unsanitary. No, it was -- but it was very subtle, with the message being Japan must not open its rice market. But done in a cartoon.

Q: With regard to the press play on things American, Bob Garrity, the gentleman who just before he retired was head of the Foreign Press Center here for USIA, said that the Japanese correspondents were having a very difficult time with their home newspapers because they were being leaned upon to find examples of American decadence and loss of skills, decline in their scientific and other similar activities, and also the decline in their finances and their will to operate, to compete in the world. The Japanese editors wouldn't take stories which these correspondents were sending back to their home papers that contradicted this viewpoint on the part of their editors. I don't know really how that's played out in the Japanese press, but according to this gentleman, there were a lot of disappointed and really frustrated Japanese correspondents here from the major papers in Tokyo who were getting these kind of requests and finding that stories to the contrary were not acceptable back home. Were you able to detect any of that?

SHELLENBERGER: No, I would argue that that would be maybe on the basis of a personality who's feeling the threat of competition, thinking that we can maybe get an edge over our competition by running the more bizarre, the more sensational items about the U.S. demise. But I think that would be the exception rather than any kind of rule. I was struck by the number of major media who gave their reporters free rein to do Americana pieces, what's going on in the small towns and the rural sections, not keyed to drugs or keyed to racial problems, but keyed to Americana and its overview. Again, I was struck by the variety of this sort of reportage that was available. Sure, you could turn on the TV and get mayhem at night in Detroit almost as a regular thing, but balancing that would be something quite thoughtful and expressive. So, again, I don't see it as a tide, I see it as rivulets that go into the media of any free country that doesn't have, you know, that isn't setting the media's agenda. And I don't think anybody is.

WILLIAM LENDERKING
Public Affairs Officer, East Asia & Pacific, USIA

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A native of New York, Mr. Lenderking graduated from Dartmouth College and served a tour with the US Navy in the Far East before joining the Foreign Service of the US Information Agency in 1959. As Public Affairs, Press and Information Officer, he served in posts throughout the world and in Washington, D.C., where held senior level positions in USIA and the Department of State dealing with Policy, Plans and Research. Mr. Lenderking was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

LENDERKING: I heard that there was a job in East Asia as the head of the office of public affairs in East Asia and Pacific, and I would also be the spokesman for the bureau, and they wanted someone who was familiar with Japan, and who could speak Japanese to deal with the Japanese press because there was a very large and influential press corps covering Washington and American politics. So that’s how I got the job. Paul Wolfowitz, who went on to even greater fame, was the Assistant Secretary and he had a group of very able guys as deputies and the office directors were all very good, but the original purpose for which I was hired actually did not come to pass, as is so often the case. The most aggressive people that I had to deal with were Australians and New Zealanders, our closest friends, and I almost never had a really tough issue with the Japanese press corps.

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LENDERKING: There was one perennial, and that was the adamant refusal of New Zealand to have anything to do with, or permit any contact with, nuclear vessels or weaponry or anything like that. That means that U.S. nuclear ships couldn’t call at New Zealand ports. We couldn’t conduct naval exercises with New Zealand ships if any of our ships were nuclear powered, and so on. It meant, in effect, that New Zealand had opted out of the very close mutual security relationship we’d had with them. It was a serious problem, for them and for us, not just a disagreement among friends.

Well, they stuck to their guns, and we still have a problem with them, but they sky didn’t fall. New Zealanders are marvelous people and they have a lovely country, but they also tend to be a little self-righteous and they saw themselves as leading a crusade to keep nuclear weapons away from the South Pacific, and beyond. One might say, “well, good on them,” but our immediate concern was our security relationships and we had good reason to feel the New Zealand position jeopardized our security. The Australians agreed with us. Our policy, to this day, is that we neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons anywhere. We also feared that the New Zealand attitude would undermine our fragile working arrangement with Japan, which still had a strong nuclear allergy. Now, we and the Japanese eventually figured out a way to finesse this issue, and with New Zealand, we felt we had no choice but to exclude them from military cooperation operations and there was considerable cost to New Zealand.

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Q: Turning to Japan, you say they have a large press corps here. Can you talk about your view of the operations of the press corps, because this is a subject about which we aren’t very
familiar. How did they operate and was there much investigative reporting, that kind of thing?

LENDERKING: The Japanese press is large and very sophisticated, and in some ways outstrips our own. Their journalists are generally well educated, serious, and professional. Of course there are scandal sheets, just as there are in any country where there is a free press. They break down along conservative to progressive lines just the way our papers do but the numbers are vast, the readership and circulation figures. The Japanese have a big three, they are all national newspapers; the “Asahi,” -- I don’t know how it is now but probably basically the same, is considered the paper more for intellectuals and it was the most left of center, but it was a mainstream paper. And then the “Mainichi,” centrist and mainstream, and then the “Yomiuri,” which has the largest circulation and is slightly conservative, or at least it was then. I think in those days the daily circulation was around 12, 13, 14 million a day. They all put out English language editions, which were excellent, well written and full of information, necessary for the large expat colony, most of whom couldn’t read or speak Japanese. And there were a lot of other newspapers too; one was the equivalent of the “The Wall Street Journal,” another perhaps similar in editorial content to “The Washington Times.” Now these are huge and very powerful organizations. Japan is probably the most literate country in the world, so you can imagine how important the media are in a democratic country like that. In addition, they have weekly intellectual, political, and cultural magazines, similar in content to our own except that there are probably more of them.

The correspondents for the established newspapers stationed in our big cities are all well educated; most of them really enjoy their assignments here because this is a place where events of world consequence are either happening or being hatched, and having good, reliable information about the U.S. flowing to Japan is essential to Japan and to us as well. I am ashamed to say it, even though there are many excellent American correspondents covering Japan, there are more Japanese covering the U.S. and the quality of their coverage in an overall sense is more thorough and more informative. Most of the Japanese correspondents here speak good English and they are often ‘A team players,’ so to speak. They developed good contacts and they were approachable; they weren’t just off on their own, writing stories in a vacuum.

Q: Were there Japanese newsmen or newswomen burrowing down in the various parts of society and then all of a sudden stories would pop up that you had no idea were coming at all, and you had to deal with them?

LENDERKING: I can’t recall a specific instance, but I think there must have been. I was constantly worried that the Japanese didn’t call me much about stories they were working on. Yes, they had good sources, but with American correspondents and some of the others I got to know well, they called on me often as an official source and occasionally depended on me to warn them away from misleading paths or sources, and to the best of my ability and the limits of classification, I tried to do that – it was an essential part of my job. Sometimes I couldn’t talk about a sensitive subject directly, say, for example, most aspects of the nuclear issue, but I often could say, “there’s nothing to that idea,” or “you’re on the right track,” and so forth. Determining how far I could go was what made the job so interesting – it was far more than just sticking to the press guidances. I’d say that any press officer who insisted on doing only that would be useless to his superiors and to the media as well.
Anyway, the Japanese didn’t often call me, even though they knew I spoke Japanese and would help them if I could. Maybe it was their ingrained distrust of government officials. If they were working on a story and no one denied it, then they might feel a bit freer about what they wrote, just quoting sources. But of course not every seemingly credible source is reliable. With the Japanese, I knew most of them, and a few of them were friends and I saw them socially. But I found that a lot of times when they were working on a story, they would go out and develop their own contacts. We knew what they were writing. Our embassy in Tokyo did a press digest every day, so they knew we knew what they were writing.

I might explain that my phone usually started ringing non-stop around 1 pm, after the daily press briefing and when reporters were starting to work on their stories and meet deadlines, and it didn’t let up until around 5 pm. Of course, I had other things to do besides brief reporters, so it always seemed I was doing a lot of things at once. But the callers were almost all Americans, Australians, New Zealanders, plus visiting non-resident journalists in town to do a story or two and set up some interviews.

**WILLIAM T. BREER**

Political Counselor  
Tokyo (1984-1987)

> Mr. Breer was born and raised in California and educated at Dartmouth College and Columbia University. After service in the US Army, he entered the Foreign Service in 1961. Throughout his career, Mr. Breer dealt primarily with Japanese, Korean and general Southeastern Asia affairs. His overseas posts include Kingston, Tokyo (three times), and Yokohama, His Washington assignments also concerned principally Japan and Korea. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo from 1989 to 1983. Mr. Breer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

**Q:** Well, then you went as political counselor to Tokyo from 1984-87?

**BREER:** Yes.

**Q:** Who was the ambassador?

**BREER:** Mike Mansfield.

**Q:** Had the political situation in Japan changed much when you got there from the way it was when you were there before?

**BREER:** If anything, I guess by that time, the LDP had strengthened recovering its grip on power. The prime minister was Yasuhiro Nakasone for a good part of the time and I think the LDP was gaining more confidence. Nakasone was a confident leader widely regarded as a sort of
nationalist leader in the slightly pejorative sense of “nationalist.” It turned out that he moved Japan to even closer cooperation with the United States. He had this wonderful Ron-Yasu relationship with the president and was admired by Reagan. Those were pretty good days in U.S.-Japan relations. We didn’t make a lot of progress on trade issues, which were probably the same old issues we were dealing with before and still are dealing with today. The fundamental issue is essentially that Japanese businessmen prefer to do business with other Japanese if they can get away with it. Americans like that too, but less so.

So, those were pretty good days in Japanese-American relationships. The Japanese loved Mansfield and Mansfield spoke up on behalf of a strong American-Japan relationship as the most important bilateral relationship in the world. He also preached to the Japanese on their need to open up and give more access to foreigners in their market. It was a good time.

Q: How did Mansfield operate? How did he use the political section, for example?

BREER: I never had the feeling that he really did use it. He knew that we were all out talking to politicians and meeting with opinion leaders in Japan as was USIS. We had a pretty broad network of important politicians that we were in touch with in those days. For example, we were at dinners and lunches with the current prime minister, Miyazawa. A lot of the guys who are leaders now we were in touch with in those days. We reported on what was going on in Japan and the ambassador accepted and absorbed all of that. He didn’t order us to do anything. We did our job, I thought in a competent way. He kind of led by example.

Q: Were there anything that we were concerned about, perhaps having a watching brief on? The fact that the LDP had been in power for so long possibly causing concern for corruption, too many old people and lack of new ideas, etc.

BREER: I think that was a subliminal concern. We didn’t attempt to promote the LDP in order to keep them in power. Some of the opposition complained that we favored the LDP too much, but after all it was the only government with which we had to do business, not the Socialists. There really weren’t any viable alternatives. The Socialists had never been a terribly serious challenger. It is very hard for political parties in Japan, even today, to have a distinctive platform and market it. The parties have never had that kind of expertise within themselves in Japan. So, it has been since the war that the LDP and the senior bureaucracy working together devised policy, and they were successful for a long, long time. But, as you say, it did get a little bit corrupted and a little bit too cooperative and a little bit creaky which has led to the situation we are in today. I think we all thought about that, but I don’t think anybody figured there was anything to be done about it. And, it was different from the Reischauer days. People were talking about a trend of growing opposition power in Japan and then all of a sudden that sort of stopped and it became apparent the opposition wasn’t going to take over the government for a long time. Eventually they did in the coalition of 1990, but during the ‘80s that wasn’t really feasible.

Q: Were there any areas of concern over what the Japanese were doing in regard to their foreign relations with China or the Soviet Union?

BREER: I don’t think with the Soviet Union so much or even with China. I think we probably
viewed Japan as an economic competitor to some extent, which is true today. There were moves and talk about economic development in Siberia and the Far East, but not much was done about it. There was some joint oil exploration in Sakhalin and I think that is still going on today. But, no major mineral or timber exploration in Siberia partly because of the northern territories issue, partly because by the time they started getting really serious there was a glut of those things and Siberia didn’t need to be opened up. That certainly wasn’t a very big issue.

Managing our security relations with Japan always requires a lot of work as the U.S. wants to fly their airplanes any time of day or night and Japan is a small country with a dense population and there was a lot of irritation between the bases and the local populations. That persists today. There are economic advantages in having a base but the nuisance factor is always present and that is true globally.

One thing I didn’t mention was the host nation support thing. This is another fallout from the troop withdrawal in South Korea. The Japanese were fearful that the United States was going to withdraw even more from East Asia and we were running out of money in the late ‘70s. So, we entered into talks for host nation support. That is the Japanese would subsidize our presence there through a variety of ways. I think they started out paying the labor force and we started a construction program under which they spent billions of dollars and basically rebuilt all of our facilities. I don’t think we have a collection of more modern facilities than our bases in Japan. That is still going on in Japan to the tune of about $5 billion a year. But, that is something that the Japanese put into place in the late ‘70s and modified through the ‘80s.

Q: This was to keep us there?

BREER: Originally to keep us there. And then it was in response to arguments in congress about the free ride Japan was getting despite earning a great deal of foreign exchange. It is going to be controversial again I think because now they have been spending eight or nine hundred million dollars a year on facility improvements and I think they have just about finished the job. Yet, we want them to continue spending the money. That is going to be an issue in the next year or two.

Q: Were we seeing any effort on the part of the Japanese to exert influence around the world in foreign policy or trade?

BREER: During the ‘80s the Japanese economy was still growing and their foreign aid ventures were increasing quite dramatically until they finally surpassed ours in the early ‘90s. Japan is a greater aid donor than we are now and much more diverse than we are because ours is basically two or three countries. Yes, Japan was expanding its investments tremendously throughout Southeast Asia and all over the world, really. And, then in response to complaints here about imports here, Japan began to establish factories here. And then the yen appreciated and it made it even cheaper to do business here, more attractive. So, yes, during the ‘80s there was tremendous global expansion by Japanese financial and commercial interests. At one point Japan was a leading banker in New York. That is gone now.

Q: Was there concern in the embassy about Japanese investments in the United States during the ‘80s?
BREER: The Waikiki hotels I think were bought in the late ‘70s or early ‘80s. Then in the mid ‘80s came all of the trophies here, movie studios, big buildings in New York, golf courses, etc. I don’t think we were all that sensitive about this in the embassy, but it was obviously beginning to bug people here. There was a kind of hysteria when I came home in 1987 about Japan owning the United States. A lot of people were on that bandwagon for a while until the Japanese bubble burst.

Q: Were we looking at the Japanese people and wondering how long they would put up with all this money that didn’t seem to be changing their way of life from our perspective?

BREER: Still in the ‘80s there was a huge building boon of houses in suburban residential areas and they were very expensive. Buyers of these new houses are really suffering now because although their house values are down they are still paying a big mortgage. Our assessment of foreign living standards is very ethnocentric, thinking about upper middle class point of view and doesn’t take into account that 20 percent of Americans live in very shabby housing. You drive through London and see all of these high rise apartment buildings and they are about the same size as Japan.

Q: I just came back from London and a significant portion of the housing is substandard, old and not particularly clean and falling apart.

BREER: Yes, and there is a lot of that in Japan, too.

Q: How did you find living there?

BREER: It was terrific. You had to learn how to avoid large traffic jams by returning to Tokyo Sunday afternoon, and things like that. Otherwise it was great. The air was good. Tokyo is a wonderful city with restaurants of all kinds.

Q: Did the cost of living hit our people?

BREER: Sure because the yen appreciated dramatically in the mid ‘80s and it became very expensive. But, we had fairly substantial COLAs (cost of living allowance) and we also had access to embassy shopping facilities. We had a store in the embassy.

MARILYN A. MEYERS
Economic Counselor
Tokyo (1984-1987)

Ms. Meyers was born in Virginia and obtained degrees from Southwestern University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. A Japanese and Burmese language officer, she served tours in Tokyo, Yokohama and Fukuoka in Japan and as Principal Officer (Chargé d’Affaires) in Rangoon.
Other assignments include Johannesburg, Canberra and Washington, where she dealt primarily with economic matters. Ms. Meyers was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2005.

Q: Then, after that, you were back to Tokyo and this time as economic counselor.

MEYERS: Everything fell into place. I got the timely promotion I needed to get the job in Tokyo. I got across the Senior Threshold and so I went back as economic counselor.

Q: How large was your section there?

MEYERS: Pretty good size. Now of course, by this time-- mid ‘80s -- the commercial and economic work had been divided. So I was economic counselor. There was also a commercial counselor who represented the Commerce Department. But my section itself had about five or six officers and several Japanese staff. The economic minister headed the two sections.

Q: Did the Ambassador pay much attention to what was going on in the economic section?

MEYERS: Lots. The ambassador was Michael Mansfield. Very interested in our work because trade issues continued to define our relationship with Japan. By this time semiconductor production was a problem. And also supercomputers. The U.S. made excellent supercomputers. How come the Japanese weren’t buying any for their agencies? There were services access issues -- for example, U.S. law firms who wanted to practice in Japan. So, the economic, trade issues were still driving the relationship.

Q: Did you have a role in Vice President Bush’s visit there in ’84?

MEYERS: Well, I guess I didn’t, because I don’t remember it. I got there in July, just in time for Fourth of July.

Q: Well, he may have been there earlier in that year.

MEYERS: Perhaps, because I think I would have remembered. I certainly remember President Reagan coming for the Economic Summit in ’86, the G-7 as it was then. So I was there for that and participated in that, writing some of the papers and so on.

Q: And we were having trade disagreements with Japan by this time, weren’t we?

MEYERS: Yes, automobile exports were still a serious issue. The Japanese had come up with what they called VRAs, voluntary restraint agreements, whereby they would set a limit on how many cars they would export to the U.S. each year, trying to pacify our Congress. And they also, wisely, began to manufacture over here. I think Honda was the first, into Ohio, and then Nissan went into Tennessee, then Toyota into Kentucky. So that was going on. But automobile trade friction continued. The Japanese MITI Minister came to call on Ambassador Mansfield at one point to try to extract a “satisfactory” VRA number, but the Ambassador refused to be pinned down. The Minister and his entourage tried for about thirty minutes to get him to name a figure
but he simply wouldn’t do it. A little aside: I often escorted Japanese business visitors to the Ambassador’s office. Ambassador Mansfield was such a down to earth person that he would invariably offer them coffee. “Would you gentlemen like to have coffee?” Oh, yes, yes, they’d like to have coffee. Well, then, he would get up and he would walk into his executive washroom and prepare his finest instant. And I would say “May I help you, Mr. Ambassador?” “No, no, Marilyn, I think I can manage, I can handle it.” And his Japanese guests were dumbfounded. Here is this woman, sitting here, and here is the American Ambassador, in his shirtsleeves, serving them, and me, as well. It kind of blew their minds, and was very good for them.

Q: Were you there when Toshiba got into problems for selling illegal equipment to the Soviet Union which was going to improve the Soviet submarines, make them much more quiet? We were very upset about that here.

MEYERS: I don’t think I was there for that. I left in ’87 and came home the long way via the Trans-Siberian Express!

MICHAEL E.C. ELY
Economic Officer
Tokyo (1985-1987)

Michael E.C. Ely was born in 1929 in Washington, DC and entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career with the State Department included assignments to Malaysia, France, Algeria, Somalia, Italy, Japan, and Belgium. Mr. Ely was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

ELY: I found out in the corridors that Tokyo was open: they were looking for somebody to run the Economic Section there. I threw my hat in the ring and, to my surprise, was accepted. I had been in Japan but really knew nothing in depth about U.S.-Japan trade problems. It took several months to find a replacement for me in EUR/RPE. Roz Ridgway, the Assistant Secretary, wouldn't let me go until she had a replacement. She was certainly within her rights.

I never had a chance to do much in the way of preparation for Tokyo; I was parachuted in there. I had a hard time coming in at a very senior level with no preparation. There was a tendency among the people in Tokyo to say, "Okay, you're very senior, you've got a good record, do it, buddy. If you've got any questions, we'll be glad to answer them. But since you're such a hotshot, you figure out what the questions are." And I found out, "Well, there's no money to do anything for you in Japanese language training. You can join a class with the Marines." But I traveled so much and had such work pressures I was unable regularly to attend language class. I made very little progress on the language, which I found discouraging.

We lived in a newly-constructed compound, which still houses almost everybody. I had the top two floors of a middle-rise apartment building. The accommodations were, by Tokyo standards, fabulous. It was a big, modern, comfortable apartment, very suitable for entertaining. But I found I was living in an American compound, with sullen teenagers, aerobic dancing, and Marines
playing basketball, bicycles on the lawn, people walking dogs, and Fourth of July festivals. I'm not against this sort of thing, but it's not why I went to Japan. There were people in the compound that never left it. And living there, you were really out of contact with Japanese life. You had all the disadvantages of both societies. After six months, I got over some of my culture shock and didn't like being there.

Then I found that the work in the Embassy was difficult. American policy toward Japan was then and still is subject to great tension. You basically had two poles. One was represented by the Political Section, the Japan Office in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and the National Security Council, that looked (and I think, in many respects, correctly) not at the commercial and economic problems, but beyond that to the security relationship and the political relationship and would not allow economics and commerce to dominate the other aspects of the relationship. At the other end, you had the people who were self-serving Japan-bashers. They were saying, "Look, they've got a $70 billion deficit with us, they've got to buy my products." Or "Look, we're getting no satisfaction on product X, Y, or Z. Go in there and tell them that unless they do something about it, we're going to do A, B, and C to them."

The State Department and the Congress had gotten to the point where they no longer communicated. People like Senator Danforth felt the State Department was playing its own game at the expense of American business in Japan. There was some truth to that.

The revisionist school of analysis of the Japanese economy and Japanese international behavior had not yet emerged. I got to know those people in Tokyo. Laura Tyson is one of them. Chalmers Johnson was the pioneer. Karel von Wolfran, a friend of mine who I knew before he wrote his book, taking off from Johnson, has come up with this idea that Japan doesn't really behave like other countries: the structure of the Japanese economy and the structure of Japanese society together are basically exclusionary. Dealing with Japan on the basis of Ricardian comparative advantage, exchange rates equilibrating trade flows over the long term, reciprocal foreign investment in each other, exchanges of science and technology, doesn't work.

I think this is right, it doesn't work. This doesn't mean that the alternatives of managed trade are better. But we had then, and still have, a very severe problem of trying to manage our economic and political relationships with the Japanese. We tend to sentimentalize. Basically, I agree with the major thrust of our policy: Japan is important to us, we're important to the Japanese, and that link is essential. But when I got to Tokyo in '85, we were getting beaten across the board. In any area where you can keep score, the Japanese were beating us, not just trade, but investment, technology, and technology transfer. The gains in all of these exchanges went to the Japanese, not to us.

We couldn't get our lawyers in.

We had this longstanding, nightmarish argument over containers for goods. The Japanese have containers that are slightly smaller than the international containers. International containers cannot be carried in Japan. This I believe, but I certainly can't prove, was designed this way to keep out the foreigners.
Similarly, their electrical standard is 100 volt. No other country in the world has 100 volt, 50-60 cycle. So they can produce for anybody with 50-60 cycle, including the American market, which has both. They can also do 110-220, 50-60. But Europeans with 50 cycle can't use step-down transformers into Japan, Americans with 60 cycle can't use step-up transformers into Japan.

Similarly, their FM band barely overlaps with ours. So foreign FM sets cannot be sold in Japan, but Japan makes large numbers of FM sets to international standards that sell around the world.

These are anecdotes. The Japanese economy is extraordinarily regulated; everything is regulated. The results of these regulations, sometimes unintended, sometimes a result that was understood and not unwelcome at the time the regulations were installed, impede trade.

Similarly, speaking very broadly, it is a country without the rule of law. There are only 15,000 lawyers in Japan. There are all kinds of impediments to having more. There aren't many courts. It costs a lot to try a case. It takes forever, and you're likely to die before it happens. They have no punitive damages. They don't have a jury system. So on the commercial side, there's very little recourse to law.

This means that people deal with the people they trust. It takes a long time to build relationships of trust. And, indeed, enterprises tend to congregate into the Keiretsu. Interest groups would coalesce with banks, and insurance companies attached to them. The Keiretsu tend to deal with each other because disputes can be worked out within the family, so to speak. This is a system that basically puts outsiders at a disadvantage -- Japanese outsiders first, and foreign outsiders at a greater disadvantage. The Japanese basically believe that if some foreigners have a hard time in the Japanese market, the foreigners should become more Japanese; they should join Keiretsu or form their own. They insist that the main reason that foreigners don't do well in the Japanese market is because they don't try hard enough; they should work harder.

This is foolishness. Of course, they should work harder. We all should. But the failure rate in the Japanese market is extremely high. American companies that have done well have had very deep pockets and gone at it for a long time. It was adversarial exporting, and only into niches where there was no Japanese competition.

Companies like Honeywell have done well in Japan. But they brought in new technology and new products; they did not compete with Japanese competition.

The only company that ever (well, not the only one, but anecdotally) -- Weyerhaeuser managed to get into the Japanese paper market, a chunk of it, after years of effort, by building a special factory and warehouse and designing special paper-handling equipment and meeting the price. They knocked on the door for years and years and did everything right. Finally, the door was reluctantly opened a fraction, and they were let in.

The area where it all came to a head was on supercomputers. I got to know the trade people who were trying hard to sell supercomputers in Japan.

This is a complicated story. Laura Tyson, in her recent book *Who's Bashing Whom?*, has a rather
complete and good account of it. I wish I'd had as much information to work on in Tokyo when I was there. I had to work on anecdotal stuff.

Seymour Cray invented the supercomputer; had a natural monopoly on it. He was a science wonk from Milwaukee who spun out of IBM and set up Cray Research, which invented the supercomputer and still produces most of them, although the technology has since changed.

The Japanese government had never bought any Cray supercomputers. And, indeed, when I got there, there had been only two of them sold to the private sector, one to Toyota and one to Recruit, which later got involved in the scandal as a result of intense political pressure by Mike Mansfield directly.

The Japanese had many reasons why Cray couldn't sell: the price wasn't good enough; Fujitsu and Hitachi were, by that time, producing supercomputers and selling them. In other words, no supercomputers were ever purchased by the Japanese until there were Japanese producers, then the Japanese producers got the whole market. Budgets were kept small by the research institutions that purchased them. Fujitsu and Hitachi sold at enormous discounts -- seventy percent...

Cray can't do that. It's not part of a combine. It's a free-standing, medium-sized company that finances its research and development out of current receipts. Cray had been pounding on the door for years and essentially getting the runaround. They also were not well represented from a sales standpoint. They eventually got themselves a Japanese manager as their sales rep.

We had a very intense meeting with the senior Japanese on the supercomputer problem, along about the middle of my second year. Clayton Yeutter was then STR. He came out and we had a formal negotiation.

Q: Special trade representative.

ELY: Yes. Then he became Secretary of Agriculture and then chairman of the Republican National Committee. Yeutter is an extremely able, fit, strong negotiator. Mike Smith, who was the chief negotiator for STR, was with him. I was there with a couple of others. After we'd had formal negotiations, the Japanese took us to dinner at a traditional Japanese restaurant, in a lovely tatami room, and we started over again. And this time, Makoto Kuroda, MITI Director General for International Trade, who was famous for being tough and blunt, quite un-Japanese, said, "Look, you know, we've been doing this for a long time. Let's be frank. You people, and Cray in particular, are never going to sell supercomputers in Japan. You're not going to do it under the present system. You've got to change. Either you nationalize Cray, so you've got the U.S. government behind it, so it can go in and be aggressive and compete with our companies, or you merge it with General Motors or IBM, someone with very deep pockets. Otherwise, you know, you're basically wasting your time."

I was amazed and shocked by this and immediately went off and dictated a telegram laying all this out, with a comment on it: "This argument gives credence to those who believe that Japanese companies and the Japanese government seek eventual Japanese dominance in the
supercomputer industry." I passed it around. Mike Smith made a few changes, Yeutter said fine, and I sent it off.

It was leaked in Washington, out of the House of Representatives. George Shultz sent a cold letter to the congressman who leaked it, and there was some heated discussion about whether perhaps the law should be brought down upon him. Shultz said, "Don't be silly. We can't do that to members of Congress."

Anyhow, the telegram leaked. It is quoted in Tyson's book, and it was clear that I was the author; I was the only one that could have been the author. The Japanese knew that I was not a friend, that I was a critic -- and a suspicious and hostile one. I knew that, at that time, my utility in Tokyo had probably ended.

At the same time, I got in a fight with Desaix Anderson, the Deputy Chief of Mission. Honeywell was going to market Fujitsu computers to the U.S. Air Force for specialized training simulation exercises. I said, "Well, this is a terrible idea. If, while the Japanese are screwing us on supercomputers, we blithely go ahead and buy Fujitsus by government procurement, why, they're going to think we're not serious." We should say to the Japanese, "Look, fine, we like your computers, but we'd like to see a little progress on some matters in which we're interested before we make this concession for you on government procurement," which is not governed by GATT rules anyhow. Government procurement is generally handled on the basis of reciprocity or unilateral action.

Well, Desaix Anderson said that my telegram laying this out was contrary to policy. We'd made a link between government procurement on one hand, and Cray's trade problems with Japan on the other. And that George Shultz's policy decision sometime earlier had explicitly rejected making such linkages.

I felt baffled. I was not party to that earlier decision and felt that if we went forward, we would be undermining our case. I thought about sending a telegram on the dissent channel. I finally decided not to use the dissent route, which I knew to be mainly employed by sore heads, not serious policy advocates.

Q: Back-channel being a...

ELY: A dissent channel. But I knew it would have ended up in the Policy Planning Staff, and the people wouldn't have known what to do with it. It was hard to staff out. So I said, "Okay," to Desaix, "You know, you and I disagree on this. As a policy matter, I consider myself overruled, but I think I'm right."

About that time, I got a call from George Vest, asking if I was interested in going to Brussels to be deputy to Al Kingon, the Ambassador to the European Community. I said, in a formal way, "I'd like to think about it." A few days later I agreed. So two years after I arrived in Tokyo, I was direct-transferred to Brussels.

Q: Basically, it was not a happy assignment there at that time.
ELY: Well, it was wonderful, in a sense. I learned a lot. It was extremely active. I opened a window, a new world. I worked very hard and enjoyed my personal contacts there. Learned a lot about Japan, in a superficial way. Without the language, you never go terribly far. It was unique, vigorous, exhausting, exhilarating, but fun it was not.

Q: The Ambassador for many years was Mike Mansfield.

ELY: He was my Ambassador when I was there. Ambassador Mansfield was an admirable man. He didn't like to talk very much. He had very sure political instincts. He was no longer young at all, nor was his wife. The Japanese venerated him. He stayed above all the trade issues. But, typically, you'd come to the point on a trade issue where you were very close, and the Japanese would go to him and say, "You know, you've got to intervene."

And he would always say, "Well, just a minute now. If I do anything, you've got to do something, too. And we can perhaps together close the gap. But remember, you know, you've got to do more."

The Japanese would say, "Yeah, yeah, that's okay." They expected him to say it, which struck them as fair. But it helped them to go back and say to their people, "See, we talked to Mansfield-san, and Mansfield-san says we've got to do more. Then they'd say, "All right, we'll do a little more!"

Then Mansfield would write a telegram, or I'd write it for him, and he'd fix it, saying, "You know, I understand there has been a very tough negotiation. The Japanese are going to do a little more, and if we can do a little more, we can fix this." The telegram would go out, and eventually, the agreement would be reached, and everybody would be happy, except that the Ambassador got the reputation of being kind of the middle-man for the Japanese. In other words, he was running the same technique in the mid-'80s that we had used in the late '70s, and the problems were a lot worse. The Japanese wanted to maintain the pattern of agreements when the Japanese basically didn't have to do very much.

Another problem when we were there...about the time I arrived, Jim Baker put together the Plaza agreement, and the dollar tumbled against the yen.

Q: Jim Baker was the secretary of the treasury at the time.

ELY: The dollar tumbled against the yen, losing very rapidly a substantial amount of its value. I, trained in classical financial comparative analysis, expected that trade flows would eventually reflect this change.

I also noticed, to my consternation, Japanese imports had been growing less rapidly than the Japanese GNP. That meant that Japan was becoming less interdependent. It was not becoming integrated to the world economy, it was separating itself from the world economy. Unheard of! No other modern industrial country has ever gone through a period like that. And when the dollar exchange rate did not produce any perceptible effect, I began to believe that we were really in
some sort of a strange world and that Japan and the United States were not playing according to the same set of economic rules.

This is a theme that was later picked up by a number of people and since '87, has been studied a lot. It is now a general consensus that, yes, it is true, Japan doesn't march to the same drummer. However, the argument that we therefore need managed trade doesn't follow either. We've got to get the Japanese to do more, we've got to do more ourselves, et cetera, et cetera. I think I buy that. I've been thinking, since I left Japan, about what to do about a country that systematically puts its best talent, technology, money, capital, management into exports, with a system that operates across the board to exclude imports except where strategically necessary, where they complement the strengths and penetration power of the Japanese economy.

Now this analysis itself is being somewhat overtaken by events as Japan and Americans go into more joint ventures, where Japanese failure in the fifth-generation computer becomes clearer, where you find that Hitachi and Fujitsu have been chasing their white whale, IBM, down a blind alley (IBM is in trouble, and they're probably in trouble, too), when Japanese trade surpluses really don't seem to make a hell of a lot of difference, and the Japanese economy is in deep trouble. Not as deep as some people say, but still, they've been having big financial problems. And the natural advantages of much lower cost to capital is disappearing.

We're coming into a new world, where Japan is no longer about ready to elbow the Americans aside to the number-two position in the world economy by the year 2000. Still, handling Japan remains a very serious and difficult job.

Jim Baker really never paid any attention to that problem, mainly because I don't think he had anybody who could do it for him. And the problem is going to come back again.

Q: Today is April 22, 1993, and we continue. Mike, you went to Brussels from '87 to '90. What were you doing?

ELY: I was deputy chief of the U.S. Mission to the European Community. As I mentioned during our last conversation, because of the supercomputer episode I thought that my utility in Tokyo was going to be restricted. When the Director General of the Foreign Service asked if I was interested in becoming Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission to the European Community, I decided, yes, this was probably a good thing to do. Also, I found working in Japan strenuous. I enjoyed it and found it stimulating, but it was a struggle. Each day, every day was fight, fight, fight, either within the Embassy or with the Japanese.

Q: One question about with the Japanese. Did you find that you had to go out a lot at night to sort of business dinners and things like that? I speak from my experience in Korea, and these were a little bit difficult because it meant a lot of heavy drinking.

ELY: With the Japanese, it was not the same. American businessmen had to do the drinking business, both the local resident and the visitors. We foreign officials were considered in a different category. We had to participate in all kinds of official entertaining, but not in going out, eating and drinking and taking our hair down with our Japanese counterparts. So that part of the
work was not particularly onerous. However, I became friends with Karel von Wolfran, who was one of the founders of the revisionist school of analysis of Japan. I found that I was then, and am now, in full agreement with von Wolfran in his characterization of Japan as a country where everybody collectively and nobody individually is in charge. Dealing with the country is very difficult. An individual can hardly engineer a common appreciation of what he's trying to do among people whose agreement will be necessary for decision. Accordingly, you end up chipping away with individuals and making very little progress.

I found it, and I'm not the first, quite a frustrating experience -- Bill Clinton, being the latest member of this club, with the Japanese saying yes, but they really mean no. The Japanese are very embarrassed by that but know there's some sort of American truth in it.

SAMUEL VICK SMITH
Economic Officer
Tokyo (1985-1988)

Samuel Vick Smith was born in California in 1940 and graduated from New Mexico State University. He served in numerous posts including Nairobi, Vietnam, Madagascar, Tokyo and New Zealand. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Well, then, let's put it, you went to Tokyo in 1985?

SMITH: Right.

Q: You were there until when?

SMITH: ‘88. For three years.

Q: Okay. First, what was, how would you say, particularly economically, what was the state of relations between the United States and Japan when you got out there in 1985?

SMITH: I’d like to say a little more about the way I felt. By this time I was a true believer in the magic of the marketplace and also I had seen that Japan was very successful at exporting manufactured goods to the United States. Especially in those days they were very good and often inexpensive. Also, I was well disposed towards Japan for many reasons. One, having lived there as a little kid, and two, I had been in Geneva for a total of five weeks at the conference. The Japanese delegation, had been very supportive. When push came to shove the people that I depended on to support me when I was almost isolated would be the Japanese and the Danes. So, I was well disposed towards Japan for many reasons. What I found when I got there was that the frustration was very high on both sides, as the new economic minister counselor perceived when he got there about the same time I did.
Q: Who was that?

SMITH: Mike Ely. He said that we just keep talking to each other and we just keep saying, “open your markets, open your markets, open your markets.” The Japanese keep saying, “try harder, try harder, try harder.” Now, I may be unfair in my paraphrase of what he said, but that was about it because there was a lot of talk and not a whole lot of movement. What movement that occurred was very difficult. The Japanese market in many different ways was closed to our exports. Some of its was government action, some of it was actual laws. Some of it was just their distribution system. Some of it was cultural. It was very difficult for American products to get sold in Japan, while our market was essentially open. Most of the economic section, which was a large section, of about ten people spent most of its time working on this. Delegations would come from Washington: ad hoc ones, and regularly scheduled ones. There would be meetings and things were accomplished in some narrow areas. From my point of view, not enough. It wasn’t long before I was not nearly as well disposed towards Japan as I had been before I got there, because I felt that they were treating our traders unfairly. My job was I’d say three-fold. I was the deputy section chief. When the economic counselor would be away I would be in charge of the section, but there would still be an economic minister-counselor above me. I also supervised two junior officers. One who handled the macro-economic reporting and the other hand who handled mainly Japanese, economic relations with developing countries reporting on their aid programs. Then my other job was my job title, which was ‘regional resources officer,’ which meant natural resources. That was primarily energy, which meant trying to get the Japanese to buy our coal and our natural gas, explaining to them why they couldn’t have our Alaska north slope oil because that was against the law, and talking to them about who they were buying their oil from, that sort of thing.

Q: Well, now just on the side, but why was the Alaskan oil forbidden to Japan?

SMITH: As you know today there's much controversy about whether additional places on the north slope (the Arctic Ocean coast of Alaska) should be drilled because it might harm this caribou preserve. In those days when this was opened I guess in the 1970s, a deal was worked out in Congress to permit this oil to be developed and the pipeline to be built all the way across the wilderness from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. The deal was worked out that this oil was needed for our energy security. Therefore the only people that could use that oil would be us even though oil is fairly fungible. Why couldn’t we sell it to somebody else and get somebody else’s oil? Frankly, much of the reason was that if that oil were going to the United States it then would come under the Jones Act which we talked about in the context of maritime affairs. That meant that all of it would travel from the south coast of Alaska to probably the west coast of the United States or somewhere else in the United States on U.S. ships, U.S. built, U.S. flagged, and U.S. manned ships. United States ships that trade internationally don’t have to be built in the U.S., but if they trade between two U.S. ports then they have to be built in the U.S. So, this was a deal worked out with the environmentalists and the shipbuilders and the ship operators and the labor unions. That's why the Japanese couldn’t have north slope oil.

Q: I thought Japan had a lot of coal?
SMITH: They did, but it was not easy to get to. It was more expensive than buying it from us or Australia and more dangerous because it was in very inaccessible places. They of course mined a lot of it for years, but they’d mined so much that what was left was hard to get to. Some of the biggest coal mines were under the ocean, off of little islands near Kyushu and the miners would go down this shaft and then go out under the ocean to get the coal. So, it was expensive in addition to dangerous.

Q: Well, let’s look at the embassy. Who was the ambassador and DCM and the top economic person?

SMITH: The ambassador was Mike Mansfield. He’d been there for a long time because he was a Carter appointee and this was the Reagan administration by this time. The DCM was Desaix Anderson and the top Econ officer for two years was Mike Ely, Michael E.C. Ely. He was replaced later as minister counselor by a lady, Aurelia (Rea) Brazeal and then under them was the economic counselor, who when I got there was Marilyn Meyers. She was replaced by David Brown.

Q: Did you have much to do with the Japanese economic establishment?

SMITH: My main interaction was with the ministry of foreign affairs and MITI, the ministry of international trade and industry. In MITI, it was almost entirely with the energy office.

Q: How did you find dealing with them?

SMITH: At that time it was very easy, cordial. I heard that later it got more difficult, but at that time it was a pleasure. Probably easier than any other place I had served. I had access to the people I needed to talk to. I could almost always get an appointment, just call them up and say I need to talk to you about this and so we’d set a time and I’d come over.

Q: Well, I mean, there are two things, there is access and then there is dealing. Were you doing the equivalent of negotiating and trying to open up things or was that done by a different team?

SMITH: Well, I wasn’t negotiating the trade agreements. I would sometimes make a pitch for this, that or the other. Often what we went to see the foreign ministry about was on some multilateral issue where we wanted their thoughts on a particular conference and gave our views on how we wished they would vote. So, there was a lot of that.

Q: You say you became disenchanted with, what disenchanted you, here you had good access and?

SMITH: For my personal work I don’t think I ever became disenchanted, but the major work of the economic section, trying to open the Japanese market to American products: I saw what was going on there and that’s when I became disenchanted.

Q: Did you feel that you know, that others that you had been talking to were dealing with this, was this a vast Japan incorporated conspiracy or was it just how the system was put together?
SMITH: It was not so much the way it was put together, but the way it worked. I wouldn’t call it a conspiracy at all. I don’t think anybody on their side really felt that they really needed to do anything more to open their markets. Some of them probably thought their markets were opened adequately, but they weren’t. To get them to do anything was very difficult. I’m glad in many ways I wasn’t involved in that. That was where the action was, but I think I’m glad that I wasn’t getting my nose bloody trying to do it.

Q: What sort of things were you trying to get? Was it mainly information that you were getting?

SMITH: What I was doing?

Q: Yes.

SMITH: Some of it was gathering information, some of it was setting up meetings, a lot of it was instructions from Washington on what do the Japanese think we should do at the next conference of this, that or the other. They were usually pretty good, they were very good, they were very well organized.

A couple of vignettes might be interesting. In the foreign ministry most of the officers spoke good English. At the Ministry of International Trade and Industry this was not as true and so in every office, the office director and his deputy director would be able to speak English, but the others might not be able to. My main counterpart was a deputy office director in an office in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which dealt with international energy matters. I frankly can’t remember the exact name of the office. I remember his name, but I won’t give it. He was a bright, young man who had studied in America. His English wasn’t terrific, but it was good. I would probably call it S-3+ or an S-4-, something like that. This meant that he frequently had to be fairly blunt in what he said because he didn’t have the nuances he would have had if his English were better. One time in order, just to get some information, I had talked to somebody else in another office who he had introduced me to earlier and that guy had been brought in as the expert on coal. When I got through with speaking with the coal expert a second time, a little bit later I got a phone call from the deputy director of the energy office. He said, “Mr. Smith, you shouldn’t be calling the coal expert. You should always come through me and if you don’t come through me you won’t be able to talk to any of these people.” That was pretty direct.

That reminds me of another thing that occurred in that office. I can’t remember the exact period, but it was fairly early on. I think it was late ’85 or early ‘86. You may not remember, but the price of oil plummeted to about $10 a barrel and this was amazing because the Iran-Iraq War was still going on and the price of oil was down around $10 a barrel. The director of that office was constantly bemoaning the low price of oil. Well, here is the industrial power of the world that has to import the highest percentage of its oil and he’s worried that the price is too low. Finally, one day I think he was just sort of overwhelmed, and I said, “Why are you worried about the price being so low when you should be benefitting from this?” He said, “We have all these government programs that we’re responsible for on renewable energy and other things which are funded by an extra import duty on the oil. It’s a percentage duty so when the price of oil falls in
half we get half as much money for our budget.” Their budgets are probably more of a problem even than our budget. This was what was bothering him, but it took a long time for that to come out. Another vignette, which I think was interesting: twice a year we had a set of meetings on energy. They were called the “energy working group and the energy experts group.” I don’t know which one it was, whether the energy experts or energy working group, but people from State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Commerce would come from Washington and we’d have these meetings with their counterparts in Tokyo. One day we were sitting in this meeting in MITI and the American side asked the Japanese side about a particular issue. This is all being done through interpreters. The director from MITI gave his answer. When he was done the director from the ministry of foreign affairs stuck up his hand and said, “I think what Mr. so and so meant to say was such and such.” The first MITI official, dropping interpretation, said, “I don’t need the ministry of foreign affairs to interpret what I meant to say. What I meant to say was what I said.” That opened a lot of eyes.

I want to mention that because I was nominally the regional resources officer, I was sent to China to talk to the Chinese, mostly about coal and oil. I didn’t really want to go, but after I went and came back I was pleased that I had gone. So I went to Beijing, helped out by the embassy and then took a forty-hour train ride north to Daqing which is in the middle of what used to be Manchuria. It’s very far inland. It’s their biggest oil field, but it’s an old oil field. Even in ‘86 it was an old oil field. It’s about halfway from Harbin to Qiqihar. It was a new, manufactured city because that’s where the oil was. I think the most interesting thing I saw was that a lot of the oil pumps weren’t working. Then we visited a museum of petroleum and you couldn’t see anything there because there were no lights. Here in the center of their oil production area they didn’t have enough electricity. Behind the sort of motel hotel where they billeted me was an oil rig, which ran on electricity, too. They were drilling for oil. In the middle of the night the electricity came back on and the rig came back on and it ran all night. This was, I think, a commentary on a lot of things—how communism had run an oil field. The biggest single oil field and there wasn’t enough electricity to run it.

Q: While we’re still in Tokyo, how did your family find it? Did it work out pretty well?

SMITH: Oh, very well. The school worked out well for our daughter. This was ASIJ, the American School in Japan, founded in 1902. The most famous graduate was Reischauer, JFK’s future ambassador. It was a good school; it profited my daughter a lot. The Japanese she learned there permitted her to go to Hawaii and enter Japanese studies and skip the first year of Japanese. My wife loved it. She still is pining to go back.

Q: How did sort of the Vietnamese/Japanese thing work out?

SMITH: Well, most of the time, fine. The cultures aren’t the same by any means, but then they’re more similar to each other than the European culture or American culture is to Vietnam. I think one of the things my wife liked the most is that you can get around Tokyo so easily by public transport and it was so safe. She had more freedom there than she probably had ever had anywhere, perhaps even more than here. It was about a ten-minute walk from our housing compound to either of two subway stations. She could go anywhere in Tokyo and its vast suburbs by subway, bus, and train. She had a good time. She took art lessons. She took Koto
lessons, which is a musical instrument. She really loved it. As I said, she still to this day wishes we could go back.

Q: How did you find expenses there?

SMITH: In those days it wasn’t anything like it is now. It wasn't that bad, primarily because we had good access to U.S. commissaries. So, for necessities you didn’t have to worry about the exchange rate. And a good cost of living allowance had been worked out by the embassy and Washington. It didn’t hurt us. I always said it was the best of both worlds. We had this large apartment centrally located and we could live there like Americans and then go out and enjoy the Japanese ambience and then come back to our large apartment.

Q: In ‘88 you left there?

SMITH: Right.

Q: Is there anything else you should cover do you think?

SMITH: Well, maybe a few things. This was a period when the Japanese seemed to be able economically to do nothing wrong and we seemed to be having our troubles. The Japanese didn’t mind tweaking us about that. A lot of Americans who should have known better were thinking maybe the Japanese had the right idea of how to run an economy. It was thought that one of the impediments to our entering the Japanese market was the weak yen. While we were there the yen started strengthening and the dollar started weakening.

One of the things I did in my job was keep a monthly record of the trade deficit and the exchange rate. It turned out that no matter how strong the yen became in those days, the deficit stayed at $5 billion a month or $60 billion every year. Well, they said this was the “j” effect. We’ll finally get over it, eventually this will take effect, it didn’t. It was shown by some studies done, I think by economic journalists here in this country, that when the yen got stronger against the dollar, it didn’t make any difference in the price of Toyotas here or American products there, where in Europe it did. The price of BMWs would go up and down with the Deutschmark exchange rate, but not the price of Japanese cars. This was of course the time that the Japanese started taking care of this anyway by building car plants here. The other thing is that I don’t believe anyone realized that this period, the late ’80s, was the last period in which the Japanese would have a growing economy. For the last eleven years it has been stagnating. As you can see, the series of Japanese prime ministers and Japanese governments since 1990 have been unable to solve the problem. So, the second largest economy in the world is stagnating and it always seems to be left to us to pull the world along behind us and now our economy finally is beginning to stagnate.

Q: You know, one of the things that is interesting is as one examines this thing, American foreign relations and all, how often accepted trues or at least in two major, major examples. One being the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is you know, ten feet tall and it couldn’t break up and it would keep going and all and yet, by ‘89 it began to collapse. The other one was and you know we weren’t, at least no significant part of our intelligence or analytical side of the government was really willing to accept or was predicting this. Here we have something far more open, but the
Japanese problems I guess you might explain them I mean why were they looking so good and weren’t so good? I mean were there indicators there? Had we become sort of prisoners to the same thinking of conventional wisdom or something you think or what?

SMITH: Obviously not. I think the one thing that people might have noticed more was that the inflated value of real estate property in Tokyo had gotten just out of this world. That turned out later to be one basis for the beginning of this eleven-year slump; it’s when the bubble burst in land values in Tokyo. A lot of wealth was tied up in that and a lot of banks had loaned money on the basis of property being worth “x” when it was only worth half “x.” That’s been part of the problem, and as you know, even today they are still working on how they are going to have their banks write off their bad debts.

Q: Were we looking at the Japanese on the economic side of the inability... Did you see rigidness of inability to look at a situation and respond to it? There are certain rules like the bank should start taking care of matters or something or not being able to lay off people.

SMITH: At that time, since their economy was doing well, nobody would think to criticize them for anything except that they weren’t importing more. A few of us pointed out that their rice policy meant that a lot of land that was devoted to growing high priced rice could have been used for something else, maybe building houses so that the people could live better. In fact, one high U.S. government official did make that point. It obviously fell on deaf ears. This was a time when the world market price for rice was about $400 a ton and the internal price in Japan was $1,400 a ton. I was able, at a small meeting to reveal something to James Fallows, the journalist and author. He was living there in Tokyo or about to. It’s what I always call the “cow story.” The Japanese had beef import quotas to protect their highly inefficient beef industry where one farmer might have one, or at most two cows which he lovingly cared for and then produced wonderful beef at a terrific price.

Q: Kneaded them and all that?

SMITH: Yes. Massaged them.

Q: Massaged them.

SMITH: So, what had happened was the price had gotten so high that other Japanese, who obviously weren’t in the agricultural side of the economy but were in the distribution side of the economy were going to the United States and buying up herds of cows in the middle West, fattening them to Japanese tastes, and putting them on airplanes and flying them to Japan where they then were quarantined for five days and then slaughtered. Even after you slaughtered them and throw away the bones, the resulting beef was still cheaper than the price in Japan, even including the airfare. This could be done because there was no quota on live cattle. Somebody saw this loophole and the local price was so high that it paid to fly the animals in live. Fly them in, not on cattle boats. They made the trip from Kansas to Tokyo in less than twenty-four hours. This is symptomatic of the sort of things they did. They were growing rice for three times the world price because the farmers and their political friends had been able to convince themselves and the populace that after the starvation of World War II they needed to be self-sufficient. Well,
they were self-sufficient in rice, but only because they were importing the fertilizers and other chemicals to grow rice with. But they weren’t self-sufficient in anything else. You can’t eat just rice. It was all the politics of the rural vote, which is much stronger in relation to the urban vote than the population numbers would seem to indicate. This is the problem that now, just now, finally they are facing and this is one reason that the LDP has been in trouble recently.

Q: The Liberal Democratic Party.

SMITH: Right. They’ve been in trouble because the city dwellers are finally getting tired of being taken advantage of.

Q: You look at Japan and it’s sort of a unique society. Was it of interest, I mean, was somebody in the economic section, maybe this would be CIA or INR, but looking at the population, the work force, I mean it’s becoming apparent now some 12 years after you left. The Japanese have another big problem in that they do not accept foreigners in there willingly to work. Their work force is aging, or is this a problem?

SMITH: Well, they were facing that eleven years ago. Even eleven years ago they were very concerned about their aging society and how they were going to support them. So, they were facing that. At that time the way they got around the work force problem was they were importing workers from other Asian countries—Bangladeshis and Filipinos.

RICHARD M. GIBSON
Japanese Language Training
Yokohama (1986-1987)

Political/Military Officer

Richard M. Gibson was born in Florida in 1942. He received a bachelor’s degree from San Jose State College in 1965 and his master’s in 1966. He served in the US Navy from 1966-1971 as a lieutenant overseas and entered the Foreign Service in 1971. Mr. Gibson was assigned to Rangoon, Bangkok, Songhla, Yokohama, Okinawa, and Chiang Mai. In 1998, he was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

GIBSON: I just wanted to be in Japan and after my experience in Burma which was the only country that I served in where I did not speak the language, I said to myself I am never going to serve in another country where I don’t speak the language. I wanted to go to Japan but I didn’t want one of the jobs in the embassy where you didn’t need the language. It is no fun to live in a foreign country if you don’t speak the language.

Q: How did you find Japanese?
GIBSON: Extremely difficult. A poke in the eye with a sharp stick starts to look pretty good after a few months of Japanese. It’s the hardest language that I’ve ever attempted and linguists say Japanese and Korean are supposedly the two most difficult languages for a native English speaker to learn. I believe it. They have incredibly complex grammar. Pronunciation is a piece of cake. That is not a problem. It is not like Thai, where the real issue gets to be pronunciation. With Japanese, the grammar is incredible and, of course, there is the vocabulary. The American unabridged dictionary is about six inches thick. I don’t know this for a fact, but I am told by linguists that a Japanese unabridged dictionary would take up a whole book shelf. They have just a tremendous number of words and an awful lot of those words sound an awful lot alike. Then, of course, you’ve got all the little characters. It’s quite a mess. I was never very good.

Q: My other question was, is it a situational language? I’m not sure if it is the right term but in Korea the language you used depended who you were and whom you were talking to: above you, below you, male, female, and all that.

GIBSON: Japanese is that way but what the Foreign Service Institute does, it teaches you the middle level, your basically polite conversation amongst equals on the theory that you are a diplomat and you don’t have to worry about it. It is sort of an all purpose polite level and if you use that level you can talk to anybody. As an American diplomat, you are fine. I will make a couple of comments, observations, on the Japanese language program which I thought was really good. They were able to make guys like me speak it passably well, well enough to do my job. They deserve a real attaboy for that. Compared to the Thai section when I studied Thai, the Japanese were much more business like, much more organized, pushed harder, a lot less fun but they did the job a lot better. I thought my three-three in Japanese was better on a relative basis, than my three-three in Thai. I thought the Thai wasn’t really a three-three though they gave you a three-three. I could do more with my Japanese than I could with my Thai as a three-three, that’s what I am trying to say.

I think there are some problems with the program though and I think I was a prime example. In 1985 I was 43 years old already. Do not take people at 43 years of age and invest that kind of time and money into them, as much as I was enjoying it. I wanted it so I was quite pleased but it makes no sense in a bureaucratic situation. I think you’ve got to get younger people and do it. I think the other thing you’ve got to do is somehow demand a high language aptitude. The personnel system has subverted the old system where you had to have a decent language aptitude. Now, and I was in personnel, we just assign people. If they don’t have the language, too bad. That person is going to Ankara. You are going to teach him Turkish. I would see where FSI didn’t really like that but they acquiesced. I think in the Japanese program in particular, there really should be a level of screening for the aptitude level. I don’t say MLAT is the answer because I’m not sure that test is all that good.

Q: There is a test that has been used for a long time...

GIBSON: It’s MLAT isn’t it, Modern Language Aptitude Test?

Q: Yes.
GIBSON: It’s indicative.

Q: Whether they use Farsi or something like that.

GIBSON: Kurdish I’m told. My MLAT score when I came into the service was 66 which is sort of okay but it is not particularly good. They used to say the cutoff for hard languages was 65 but it didn’t matter because it all became moot because of the changes in the personnel system. It goes all the way up to 80. Most of the people I was studying with in Japanese were up in the 70s. The difference between their aptitude and my aptitude in the middle 60s was night and day. I really think the system is wasting their time on guys like me. I loved the heck out of it.

Q: Did your wife pick up Japanese?

GIBSON: No. She’s not going to study that stuff, she was raising kids, having fun.

Q: In ‘87 you went to Japan?

GIBSON: Actually in ‘86 I went to Yokohama for the second year. The first year is here and the second year is in Yokohama. In Yokohama I went with my son, and my wife and daughter stayed in Falls Church. Yokohama was for about nine months and the idea of ripping the whole family up to move there didn’t appeal to us. My son needed adult guidance. He needed somebody bigger and stronger than him so he came to Japan with me. We were in Yokohama for about nine months or then we came back and picked up the family, packed out and went to Okinawa.

Q: You were in Okinawa?

GIBSON: Yes. From ‘87 to ‘89. I was the political military officer there.

Q: What was the situation on Okinawa from the American perspective and all when you arrived in ‘87?

GIBSON: The seeds of what happened three years ago or so were well planted. The friction between the local Okinawan populous and the American military was very real. The political strain on the island was leftist and not necessarily anti-American but anti-military. They didn’t like the Japanese military either so it was sort of an anti-military attitude. It sort of got twisted around to be anti-American in some ways, although I think that is overplayed. I think it is just anti-military. They said, quite correctly, that we have all these American bases on Okinawa that are taking up a lot of the good land, and there is not a whole lot of land. I recall the population of Okinawa is maybe 1.2 million or something like that, most of whom are on the main island. On the main island nearly 20 percent of the land area is taken up by U.S. bases. I think it was something like 15 percent for the Okinawan prefect on the whole but on the main island I think it was close to 20 percent or maybe it was 15. I forget. Anyway it was a sizable part and a lot of it was right down in the heavily populated areas.

You always had incidents in addition to the economic issue, the idea that if we can get you out of
these bases we can develop shopping centers, convention centers, houses, whatever, there were
the irritants. Nineteen year old Marines are not necessarily the best diplomats that we can send
abroad and most of them are single. They are rowdy and obnoxious and they did a lot of bad
things.

Then there are always the training accidents. When I was there, in the village of Kim there was a
big hoopla because the Marines that were training there with live fire were not always shooting
in the right direction with their live fire and the bullets would land in this village. Usually no one
was killed or hurt, but there would be spent bullets around, through a window, or something like
that. There was another case where a taxi cab was driving down the west coast road and from the
east coast where we were doing some training (there is a mountain range down the middle of the
island) a 50 caliber bullet went over the mountain range and shot the guy’s taxi cab. It didn’t hurt
him, but it put a big hole in his taxi cab. Sometimes pieces of airplanes would fall off, like a
sonar-buoy. A sonar-buoy is just a little thing, it’s not really going to hurt anything unless it hits
you. Sometimes an extra fuel tank would drop off, empty usually.

At times helicopters would have to have emergency set downs. They would be flying around and
all of a sudden the red lights come on and the pilots would look for a school yard, or a flat area to
put their helicopter down. Whether it was going to crash, that’s an overstatement. That was the
view of the Okinawans; the plane almost crashed, they just barely got it down. What it was were
the warning lights telling the pilot that procedures had to be followed and had it been in a combat
war situation, he probably wouldn’t have landed there. Still they have to set down.

Then there is the constant noise from the jets taking off and landing and going right over
populated areas. You add to all of this, at least when I was there, a total insensitivity on the part
of the American military commander to the irritations they are foisting upon the Okinawans. One
of the greatest expressions, the first time I ever hear it, when the Okinawans would complain
about the roar of jets right next to their house or right over their houses, “that’s the sound of
freedom”. Right. Anyway this was the attitude.

I still remember this one thing. PACAF, Pacific Air Force at Kadena Air Force Base, had an F-
15 pilot who was their sort of regional demonstration pilot. He was a tremendously good pilot. A
26 year old kid out there with a 40 million dollar airplane having a ball. What they would do was
every Wednesday afternoon, or maybe Thursday, this guy to keep his flying skills honed, would
get up over Kadena Air Base and start doing his show routine which included full power climbs,
screaming dives, spins and all this neat stuff which of course is making a racket like crazy.
Apparently he couldn’t do it over the ocean because with the horizon and the ocean, you’re
asking for trouble. If you do it over land the pilot can see what he is doing a lot better and he
lives longer that way. The Okinawans would complain. Why do you have to do it over Kadena
Air Force Base, can’t you go and do it anywhere else? Why does it have to be right here in town?
Kadena Air Force Base was surrounded by town except on one side where the ocean is. But the
embassy said to him we finally, you know the embassy nagged them enough and they finally quit
I guess.

I’ll give you an example of the insensitivity of the U.S. military. The Okinawans attitude toward
nuclear bombers and everything too, the B52, is not positive. There is this famous picture at the
officers club at Kadena Air Base taken during the Vietnam War. It’s a composite photo pieced together from a really wide angle, showing something like 105 B-52s lined up at Kadena. Until reversion in ‘72, that was a major bunch of bombers going over to Vietnam all the time. The Okinawans just absolutely didn’t like that. They are all anti-war, anti-military because of the destruction that was wrought upon them. We had this one general who presented a proposal from Pacific Air Forces, I don’t know where it came from, that as a public relations measure, the air force would send a B-52 to Kadena Air Base and put it on static display and they would have with it a mock-up of a nuclear bomb. How nice!! It is scary enough that some idiot thought of this in the first place but then it was scary that the initial reaction from the U.S. military in Okinawa was “Yeah, we could probably do that. It might be a good idea.” Naturally we, the embassy, everybody, jumped all over them of course and they backed off but it showed the attitude.

Q: I think this is an important thing. I take it that as the political military officer there you were dealing with a hostile power, the American military.

GIBSON: Not hostile. We just had different viewpoints. Socially, personally, it wasn’t an issue. It was kept on a professional level by and large.

Q: This has been a constant refrain of people, not in other places but for some reason our military on Okinawa seem to lack the sensitivity that has been drilled in military officers throughout Europe, they really understand this. But marine officers that rise to the top are considered by people who have been to the war college, as being really better than the air force as far as understanding sensitivity, being more politically aware.

GIBSON: The top marine officer when I was there until right towards the end, was a guy named Norman Smith. He had a two year tour and came and went almost at the same time as me. He was totally insensitive. I think he did fairly well after that. I think he got his third star. He was a nice man, gracious socially and everything, with a good sense of humor. Just a good guy, but he was totally insensitive to the Okinawan concerns. Either insensitive or he just rejected them as that’s the price of freedom. We are here protecting Japan and if you don’t like it, well, you have to break a few eggs to make an omelet, that sort of attitude. And it ran down. His successor I understand was different and his predecessor was a little different too. There were two air force generals when I was there who were both one star. They both struck me as rather insensitive about the noise issues and things like that. They didn’t seem to care. It was just this overall attitude of we’re here to protect you and we have to do this.

I think there were seven marine generals on the island when I was there and they ranged the full gambit from jerks. They had one, who shall remain unnamed, who was an aviator and a complete jerk. Then you had guys like (can’t remember name). He was one of the slickest guys I had ever seen and could be an ambassador anywhere. He was very sensitive, very intelligent, Scottish by birth, immigrated to the States as a teenager. Bob, I’ll figure out his name. He was tremendous and really sharp. There was another guy who was a colonel at the time, Colonel Zinni. Now I think he is a three star general and is really big in the Marine Corps. These guys were really good and very sensitive. They would fit the mold you are talking about, but there were a bunch of other guys who were just sort of jerks. A mixed bag.
Q: What did we have, a consul general there?

GIBSON: Yes.

Q: Who was the consul general?

GIBSON: A man named Spence Richardson.

Q: How did our consulate general work?

GIBSON: His view, rightly or wrongly, was that the most important thing to him was a good relationship with our military people there. He kept good relations with our military people there.

Q: I would imagine the embassy would be breathing heavily because obviously they had other fish to fry and I would assume that sort of the mainland Japanese people would use the Okinawa situation to play up, it’s dead (or big) news.

GIBSON: It would get the press whenever anything happened of course. Unlike in Thailand where the ambassador is the boss, in the relationship between the embassy and the military in Japan, the ambassador is not the boss of the military over there. The setup is different. The commander of the U.S. forces Japan is a three star and I think almost always an air force officer. Basically when the ambassador is dealing with him, he is not quite like an equal. The ambassador in the end will win but he can’t just order these guys to do something. You’ve got to work with them and you’ve got to persuade them. Whenever you are talking about constraining their ability to train, you are getting very close to the bone with those guys because they have seen in Okinawa as well as the rest of Japan, a steady erosion of their ability to train and to be prepared to fight wars. They resent that so I think that is probably why they will fight anything that they see as a curtailment on their operational abilities and on their abilities to train. The embassy has to pick its battles very carefully. That is my view from someone in the trenches.

Q: I would have thought that there would have been more shuttle flights of airplanes and all over to Korea to do this stuff with the Koreans. They kind of like to have American military around.

GIBSON: A lot of the Kadena Air Force Base wing that was there, the first air division or whatever it was called at the time, (I think it went back to wings but it was a division at the time) always had F-15s forward deployed to Osan. They always had forward deployed units over there, and they had RF-4 phosphates as reconnaissance birds. They were always over there fooling around. I think it was a function of cost to take those F-15s, fly them all the way to Korea and play all the games. With the per diem, the fuel and all of this, I think it was a cost factor.

I was thinking that I had come from an environment where the ambassador was god and if he were a smart man like John Gunter Dean, he could have his way. John Gunter Dean used to sometimes get generals in his office and chew them out like buck privates. He was just incredible. The military knew from the minute they walked in the door, they were not John Gunter Dean’s favorite guys. John Gunter Dean was boss and he let everyone know it, whereas
in Japan it’s that different relationship. It is a much more cooperative, give and take relationship.

Q: Was Mike Mansfield the ambassador still?

GIBSON: Yes, I guess he was the ambassador while I was there. Just as I was getting ready to leave, Mike Armacost came and replaced him but basically it was Mansfield. Mansfield was a nice old man and he wasn’t going to go to war with the military. I don’t know what Armacost did, I had left.

Q: Besides working with our military, what else were you doing?

GIBSON: That’s about it.

Q: It sounds like a full time job.

GIBSON: Oh yes. I’ll tell you how things worked. You had asked what the consul general did and what was his thing. This was a fascinating system. Whenever a local community had a complaint with the military, the military had a policy that the military does not see civilian protesters. In other words if Kadena Air Force Base is making too much noise for the mayor of Kadena, the mayor of Kadena can not take a protest note over to the air force general next door. That’s nice. The consul general said that these are all leftists doing the protesting and they largely were because most people on the island are sort of leftist. He didn’t want to get involved in it because he had more important things to do, which he did frankly. As pol-mil officer, I was the duty receiver of protests.

It was sort of seasonal but it was frequent that there would be protests. It was so Japanese it was just incredible. They would come to the consulate and they would sit in our conference room. There would always be a lot of them and we would have no cameras, no recorders and this sort of thing. They would come in all dressed up in coat and tie and very polite including sometimes a communist, sometimes a socialist, and whoever. They would present me a protest letter. I would welcome them with a few words and this sort of thing. The best Japanese I had was welcoming people and telling them I was glad to see them, good relations and all this stuff. Then the leader of the delegation would read the document word by word and I would follow along. I had my FSN over here to keep me straight and narrow. They would read it all and then they would sit back. I had this spiel about how we understand exactly, this is a very sensitive issue and very important to our relations and we want to be good citizens here on the island. Usually the delegation would be from a local town or village so there would be more than one party represented. The lead guy of each party would insist on saying a few things and I would nod understanding about half of what he said but with my FSN telling me the rest. At the end I would thank them all for coming, shake their hands and lead them out the door. It was all very ritualized. I would then take the protest note and pouch it up to the embassy and fax a copy over to the marine base commander, or to whoever the appropriate guy was. That is how we dealt with protests. We’d just take them all upstairs to the embassy.

Q: During this time the Soviet Union was going through Gorbachev’s period and things were beginning to change. Were any of you thinking about maybe time is running out for Okinawa as
far as a military base?

GIBSON: Yes. The military were aware and they didn’t want to hear about it. They said we are here not because of the Soviet Union. This is Okinawa. This is not the guys up on the mainland. We are here because of the Korean Peninsula. Just because the Russians are starting to lighten up is not an indication that all is well on the Korean Peninsula. They are right of course. Their point was we’re here to fight on the Korean Peninsula and to project power into Southeast Asia and so on. That was their position and so they didn’t see that as meaning they had to pack up and go home.

While I was there, there was the continuation of long protracted negotiations on reducing the size of our bases and turning over unnecessary bases back to the Okinawan land owners. I was the consul’s representative on the meetings up in Tokyo with the working level military guys on this. Occasionally some Japanese military guys would come in, the Defense Administration Agency. They were civilians but they ran the bases. We were doing that and I think as I understand after I left, we did turn over a couple of places and a few years later we turned over some more and this sort of thing. It is an ongoing process. We had a lot of bases there on Okinawa and a lot of areas which we were not using but the military still didn’t want to give them up because they might need them. They are right, they might need them. The land issues were tough.

When I was there we put in motion to give back a couple of places but they weren’t very big, it was an ongoing process. There were areas that had been turned back before I got there, in a couple of cases years before I got there, that still weren’t fully developed by the Okinawans because then the problem became, you turn these land areas back, April 1945 took care of most of the land records on the island. Once you get an area cleared of the Americans, you go in and tear down all of those structures and everything and sort of prep it for doing something with it, then you have to sort out all of the land ownership records and that was an incredibly complex task. It would tie things up for years and years. There were two pieces of land in particular that had been turned over five or six years before I got there, and they hadn’t done anything with them because they couldn’t sort out the land records. It’s very complex, the whole land thing in Okinawa.

Occasionally on a military installation you would put a little fence around an area about the size of this room. That land belonged to somebody who refused to sign the lease to let U.S. forces use it. They were anti-war landlords so they would just fence off their area and that was their little piece of land and we couldn’t use it. There were many landowners who were getting much for the land that we had for our bases that wasn’t really worth much, and on the open market it wouldn’t have been worth much to the landowners. But because of the money that the Japanese government was paying to the landowner as rent for us to use those bases (we weren’t paying for those bases), that made the landowners want to keep the Americans there. So you have this split there. Meanwhile you have a lot of the American military people convinced that they are the backbone of the economy.

Most American military commanders, their subordinates, and even privates and their dependents, believed that without the American military presence there, the Okinawan economy would shrivel up and go away. You’d ask them for a guess of how much the U.S. presence contributed,
and they would say three quarters of the total GDP, or something like that, of the island that we contribute to. They all really believed this. I pointed out to them that it was really down to around 12 percent and that was an eye opener for a lot of them. There was still this mentality among the American military there that this was sort of our area.

Q: *We conquered it, it’s ours, I think that was the attitude particularly when the reversion came.*

GIBSON: There was a lot of that attitude there. The fact that a lot more Okinawan and Japanese got killed than Americans got killed there, didn’t seem to interest them much. In fact the biggest casualty figures came from the Okinawan civilian population. There was that attitude.

WILLIAM CLARK, JR.
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. He graduated from San Jose State College with a B.A. degree in 1955. He served in the U.S. Navy intermittently from 1949 to 1953. In 1957, he joined the State Department, serving in Sierra Leone, Japan, South Korea, Egypt, India, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Clark was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.

Q: *As you mentioned, in mid-1986 you were assigned back to Washington as the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for EA. What were your functions and responsibilities?*

CLARK: All the regional bureaus operated differently. Most of the senior deputies were alter egos for the assistant secretaries. They didn’t have jurisdiction over specific regions or countries. In EA, we have four deputies: one for economic affairs and the other three had responsibility for specific countries. I had watched EA for a long time and had seen it try various organizational arrangements. It was clear to me, and Gaston Sigur agreed, that one deputy could not be responsible for both China and Japan. The work-load would have been too great. So Stapleton Roy returned from Singapore to handle China, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands matters. I was responsible for Japan and Korea, administrative affairs of the Bureau and its public affairs. Dave Lambertson handled ASEAN, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. It was a good division of labor and I think worked quite well. When Sigur resigned in February, 1989, I became acting Assistant Secretary, which lasted for about five months.

The Department at the time viewed a Bureau’s Executive Director as a deputy assistant secretary equivalent. He or she was given a document stipulating that rank. But I was always interested in management and took an active interest in administration and personnel matters. I tried to run the Bureau on a day-to-day basis so that the assistant secretary could focus on the major issues as he chose. Of course, I also supervised the Country Directors for Japan and Korea, countries with which I had personal involvement and continued interest.

In the 1986-89 period, which was the tail end of the Cold War, we had an opportunity to move
away from our central concern of the previous decades, namely security. This is not to say that we have gave a thought to sacrificing our defense establishment in and around Japan, but the world situation was such that we could begin to focus on other US-Japan issues besides the common defense. We had for a number of years concerned ourselves with the major trade imbalance between the two countries and that remained major bone of contention. But in this end of 1980s period, we were able to begin to engage the Japanese in other issues such as UN, Cambodia, North Korea, etc. Today, I regret to note, we have returned to the "single issue" era -- i.e. trade -- that all other matters are pushed so far in the background that they are almost unmentioned in the dialogue between the two countries.

On the trade front, I don't remember the situation being much different in 1986 than it had been a year earlier when I was also working on it. There was no question that it was a major issue, which it continued to be for as long as I have been involved in Japanese affairs. At the beginning of the Bush administration, we did obtain final approval of the FSX program. This was not something that a new administration was necessarily comfortable with, but it was essential that it be done. That was the program that permitted Japan to build its own fighter aircraft with US assistance. It should be noted that now, five years later, no aircraft has yet been produced. But in the late 1980s, to get Congressional approval was a major fight, primarily because those that worried about Japanese "unfair" trade practices, led by Dick Gephardt, were just set against helping that country to develop a competitive fighter aircraft by transferring our technology to it. So the FSX program became a trade issue when it should have been viewed as a common defense matter. I took several "beatings" during Congressional hearings on this issue with the antis insisting that the trade imbalance should be rectified before we worried about security. I was the Department's principal witness on the FSX issue with one exception when Cheney, Mosbacher and Eagleburger -- the three secretaries -- testified as the final administration witnesses.

On trade issues in general, USTR was the principal administration spear-carrier on the Hill. The regional bureaus were of course involved in setting of the US trade policies -- much more than they are today, according to people who are still in the Service. The Bureau for Economic Affairs was also involved, but I am told that the Department as a whole is not nearly as involved in trade issues in the mid-90s than it was at the end of the '80s, with the exception of perhaps Joan Spiro, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. I testified on trade issues as well as security issues, often with representatives of other State bureaus. It was not unusual for deputy assistant secretaries to be the Department's lead witnesses; it was not a role that assistant secretaries sought or enjoyed. Generally, I was part of a three person panel with other representatives from the Department and other agencies. All the witnesses knew each other and had almost daily work contacts, so that the administration witnesses were a congenial group. That was true for trade, security and the FSX issues.

This was my first real exposure to Congressional testimony, although I had been a witness on a couple of occasions when I was the Japan Country Director, when I represented the administration on the issue of whaling. That was not an easy issue to deal with. I was a witness along with someone from USTR and someone from Commerce. There were some members of Congress who wanted to cut off all trade with Japan because of their whale fishing practices. A famous expert had just finished studying the humpback whales who lived off the shores of
Argentina. His daughter had made recordings of whale sounds. She appeared at the committee meeting just before we did. It was a tough act to follow. She gave every member of the subcommittee a copy of the book she had just written on whales. All I could bring to the table was information on the extent of our trade with Japan and what the consequences would be for American business and labor if that trade were severed. That sobered the subcommittee a little!

I was fortunate in one respect when it came to testifying in the late 1980s. Much of my testimony was in front of the Asian subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The chairman of that subcommittee was Steve Solarz, whom I had known for sometime going back to his visits to Korea. I also saw a lot of him when he visited Japan. So I had a known quantity in the chairman. I also knew some of the other members of the subcommittee -- e.g. Congressman Solomon (NY) who was a Japanese linguist. I learned early in the game to keep the opening statement short; I would submit a longer and fuller statement for the record. Congressmen tend to become testy and impatient if they have to sit and listen for too long. The more appearances I made, the easier it became, although it was never an experience that I enjoyed or looked forward to. After a while, I became accustomed to sitting in the well with my interlocutors sitting at higher levels so that you always had to look up. At the beginning, it was a little intimidating; you felt sometimes that you were facing a panel of judges. One time, I was lucky. I had been asked to brief the whole Foreign Affairs Committee on China; it was right after Tiananmen. I had told the staff that I could not testify in open session, but that I would be glad to brief the Committee in a closed session. On that occasion, I sat in the Chairman's chair and the Committee sat in the well. During this briefing, Solarz made a comment and I was about to "rule him out of order", but refrained. I told him later that I had come very close to doing that!

You could never be sure what question might be raised nor could you be sure that your answer was heard with the same meaning that it had when I delivered it. You know what you said, but you don't know what the Congressmen heard. In general, we knew what the questions might be because we had discussed the hearings with the staff. So we usually were prepared for at least the Chairman's questions. Some of the Committee members would wander in and out of the meeting and they were much less predictable; it was not rare that we had to answer a question that had been asked before when the member was not in the hearing room. But with the Chairmen, regardless what subcommittee was involved, we knew pretty well ahead of time what issues would be addressed and what the objectives of the hearings were. The staff was quite good on giving us advanced notice. It was usually a very good collaboration; we knew what information they wanted and they knew what we needed to know.

In addition, Congressional testimonies are difficult because you are addressing several audiences. Not only did the committees hear your testimony, but the Japanese press certainly covered much of it; even a small number of American press might be present. The Japanese bureaucracy was of course informed of every word you uttered through the ears of a Japanese Embassy official who covered the hearings. Then there was the Washington bureaucracy. Quite often, I would appear at hearings having covered the issue with the Chairman of the subcommittee in private. But the Chairman held the hearings because he wanted to make a specific point. I remember once, when I was testifying together with another administration official, he gave an answer that we had agreed would not be given. The Chairman immediately went after him and the two went off into discussions that were useless and possibly counter-
productive. I finally interceded and managed to bring the dialogue to an end. After the hearing, the Chairman told me that he never wanted to see the other witness again. I told him that I had no control over that because he was not a State Department official. Furthermore, I suggested that having that hearing was not necessary and that it ran the risks that in fact developed. He said that after having gotten that wrong answer, he could not let it stand unchallenged, thereby taking the discussion into areas which were not at all profitable and being diverted entirely from the objectives he had in mind for the hearing.

Being part of a panel always runs some risks. I am sure that some of my colleagues from other departments did not always agree with my comments. But in general I think, as I suggested earlier, the administration witnesses were on the same wave length and usually quite well prepared. I did find myself on occasions in tight spots. For example, as the senior deputy assistant secretary, I was responsible for testifying on appropriations for the Asia Foundation, which got much of its financial support from the US government. That was in part because the Asia Foundation was at times a useful adjunct to the US government overseas representation because it could do some things that we could not. One year the Department's Comptroller was former USIA official -- Roger Feldman -- and he felt that the Asia Foundation was not worthy of US support because he thought that USIA could do all that the Foundation did. The Foundation had good Congressional support. Every year, the Department was required to write an assessment of the Asia Foundation, which we did as objectively as possible. It was usually quite favorable. The Comptroller would use this assessment as the preface to the budget request, but then would not seek any budgetary authority. We were precluded by Department regulations to discuss budgetary issues during any of our Congressional appearances, which is an interesting experience when you are testifying before a Committee that is responsible for appropriations. Once, I was before the appropriations subcommittee with the Comptroller sitting in a spectators' row behind the witness table. Congressman Obey commended me for my report in the Asia Foundation activities, but wanted to know why the Department was seeking reduced funds to support it. I told him that I could not answer the question, but I suggested that since the Comptroller was in the room, the Congressman might wish to ask him. It was a silly game; the Department would send its budget request to Congress which would show a reduced requirement for the Asia Foundation. I knew that this tactic would not fly and that Congress would add to the amount requested. I told Feldman that he was just giving the Congress control over the Department's budget because it would restore the amount cut by reducing another Departmental account which was probably damaging to the Department. But I could never convince Feldman that he was acting against his own interests by reducing or eliminating the Asia Foundation support.

I should mention that most of administration testimony is public and on-the-record and often covered by the press. There are occasions when the testimony must be classified and then you closet yourself with the committee in one of the secure rooms. That is a little more intimidating because in a closed hearing the Congressmen can raise any questions they wish. You don't have the protection of an open hearing when you can always say that the matter is classified and that you would be happy to brief the Congressman privately or in an executive session. But in a closed session, you don't have that protection. An administration witness always has to be aware of the Germaness of a Congressional inquiry. Just because it is a closed session, that does not open the discussion to anything that might be on the Congressman's mind. The question should
be germane to the subject of the hearing. You just couldn't afford to allow "fishing expeditions". I always made sure under those circumstances just to say that the issue was not in my purview or the subject of the hearing; I would never try to mislead or talk around the question. Fortunately, this problem didn't arise very often, but you always had to be aware of the possibility. On the other hand, closed hearings had the advantage of not being open to the press and you didn't have to worry about tomorrow's headlines. A closed hearing is likely to require the submission of more documentation, which raises a new set of problems because classified documents are supposed to go through the Intelligence Committees where they are available to members. But Congressmen often chafe at this restriction and would much prefer to have the administration witness hand over the documents right during the meeting. On one occasion, I faced the issue of recursion. The issue was Vietnamese funds frozen in US accounts and whether some might be released. Lambertson was in charge of Vietnam issues, under Sigur. But on this occasion, it turned out that I was the only senior official in EA who didn't have a share of IBM stock. IBM was a plaintiff; so every one else recused themselves and I ended up being the witness on a subject that I did not know very well. I accused both Sigur and Lambertson of buying a share of IBM just so they would have an excuse to recuse themselves. The stock dropped in price soon thereafter, so I am glad I didn't own any.

I testified several times on Korea and especially on security issues. The atmosphere was different than that existing when Japanese issues were discussed; the trade tensions were not present. Furthermore, there was a palpable and obvious military threat. So the questions were most often directed to the future and the likelihood of a North Korea invasion. So the questions concerned troop capabilities and locations. The Korea question was not particularly acute during the 1986-89 period, but the tensions on the Peninsula was of continuing interest in Congress. In State, we felt, and we were supported by some people in Washington, that some movement towards North Korea might be appropriate. We devised what was known as a "modest initiative". In 1988, Sigur went to New York and gave a speech which had not been cleared through the bureaucracy, including the Secretary of State's office, as widely as it probably should have been. He said that we would remove regulations against the use of credit cards for Americans who wished to travel to North Korea, which involved a change in Treasury regulations and a notice in the Federal Register. Sigur also said that we would allow "humanitarian" trade which also involved some changes in regulations. We also said that we would make it easier for North Korean academics, clericals and press to travel to the US. Finally, Sigur said that he would authorize American diplomats to have substantive discussions with their North Korean diplomats at third party functions. In the same speech, we told the North Koreans, that in return for the easing of regulations that Sigur had announced, we would like some reciprocal actions and we gave them a list of actions from they could choose. We used this technique because we had found out that the North Koreans were very reluctant -- in fact, did not -- to talk about quids pro quos. So we used a public speech to communicate with the North Koreans.

When I became the senior deputy in the Bureau in 1986, there had not been any great attention paid to the question of taking some positive steps toward North Korea. However, sometime during the next two years, we slowly developed the idea of taking some initiatives. There had always been a lot of discussions about the North in the Department and in other parts of the bureaucracy. The complete absence of any movement was just unnatural; furthermore, as long as the situation was as frozen as it was and as long the North was as isolated as it was, the
possibility of miscalculations was very real. We thought that is we could get some dialogue going, we might be able to raise some warning flags before it was too late. We just wanted to find some ways of alleviating the tensions that had existed on the peninsula for many, many years.

There were of course the continuing military-to-military meetings in Panmunjom which were part of the armistice agreement. They were very formal meetings which were not really a good forum to raise political issues. We had tried some approaches through the Chinese. There had been some indications that perhaps the North was becoming more interested in a dialogue. We decided to test the waters by using a technique that would not involve us in endless discussions about either the process or the eventual outcome. We used the 1988 speech to give the North Koreans an opportunity to respond; they could have said "Thanks very much. Let's talk about it" or "We are interested in talking about one of the matters you have raised" or "Forget the whole thing. It is just another imperialist plot". The North could have responded in many different ways.

George Shultz' first response to the speech was that it was outrageous. When the speech received approbations, the Secretary then complained that we never sent him speeches that were that good. Of course, he never would have delivered anything like the speech that Sigur gave because it was so far in front of existing policy.

The speech had some effect. First, the North Koreans contacted one of our Embassy staff in Beijing at the International Club and requested that a meeting be set up. This was not in one of the actions listed in our "modest" initiative; the North Koreans had requested a bilateral session whereas we had stipulated substantive conversations only in a multilateral forum, such as a social occasion. I was asked what our response should be. I mulled it over for a couple of days. I then instructed our Embassy in Beijing to tell the North Koreans that meetings at the International Club would be acceptable at the Consular level on the grounds that the Club was owned by the Chinese government which then would become the third party to the dialogue making it a multilateral one. That in fact became a channel that has operated since soon after the Sigur speech. Nothing much came of the opening, but at least it opened a channel outside the military-to-military one. It gave both parties an opportunity to discuss political issues. I should add that I of course, in the course of drafting the Sigur speech, considered adding a provision for a direct North-Korea-US dialogue, but I didn't believe that the bureaucracy -- in State, in DoD, some in NSC -- in Washington would have found that acceptable. A question would have been raised about why we would wish to accede to what we knew the North Koreans had wanted for a long time; they had not shown any great willingness to be forthcoming. The other parts of the "modest" initiative could be defended on their own merits -- e.g. humanitarian aid, credit cards, visas to certain North Koreans (which was merely an expansion of a policy already in effect). Of course, the North Koreans never took advantage of the openings we provided; they never sent journalists, clerics or other categories; they have restricted their visits to the US to their own diplomats and some "academics" -- i.e. people who worked for the government.

The speech received considerable approval in the American academic community which for a number of years wanted to open a dialogue with their North Korean counterparts, preferably in Pyongyang. Many people used the speech as a jumping off point for their conversations with
North Korean representatives; other country diplomats used it to illustrate how the US was trying to be reasonable. There were some academics who opposed our initiative basically on the grounds that we were granting privileges which were not needed or desired. But the speech did not generate the kind of sustained debate in the US that I had hoped for, but it was heard in Pyongyang, which was certainly one of our objectives. Our dialogue at the UN did not increase until much later nor did North-South talks really begin at this time. On the other hand, the reaction to the speech in the United States I think made it eminently clear to my bureaucratic colleagues that mentioning the possibility of a dialogue with North Korea was not a kiss of death.

Although the thaw in US-North Korea relations was barely noticeable by 1989, later it did become easier for Americans to obtain visas to visit Pyongyang. Some went at North Korea's invitation which may have served the North's propaganda machine, but was useful to us as well because it gave us some first hand insights that were not available to us otherwise. We eased slightly the restrictions imposed on the North Korea mission to the UN by permitting some of that staff to travel in the US to participate in conferences. I think our pace of improvement of our relations with North Korea was glacial at times and incremental at best. I think the Sigur speech opened the way, but it was almost another fifteen years before any major discussions between the two countries really took place. For example, when I was the Assistant Secretary for EA in late 1992, I received a call from Dave Locks who was in charge of the annual Prayer Breakfast. He was planning Clinton's first Prayer Breakfast and wanted to know whether some North Koreans could be invited. I referred him to the "modest" initiative and told him that clerics, academics or journalists would certainly be acceptable. The North Koreans submitted the names of seven participants, six of whom were government officials and the other was their Permanent Representative at the UN. I said that that list was not acceptable, but I finally told Locks that the UN representative would be acceptable. Unbeknownst to me, that North Korean was given a seat at the head table along with General and Mrs. Colin Powell, Senator and Mrs. Ted Kennedy, Senator and Mrs. Sam Nunn and I think the Mongolian Ambassador and his wife. I asked Powell later how it went; he told me that the North Korean didn't seem to have a clue about what the breakfast was all about and didn't have anything to say. I think the North Koreans missed a major opportunity.

The history of US-North Korea relations is a tortured one. Carter tried to open a dialogue using a three party proposal -- North Korea, South Korea and the US -- when he visited Seoul in 1979, which was summarily rejected by the North. Then came Sigur's speech in 1988, which at least opened another channel for dialogue in Beijing. The North, I think, in 1988 might have been interested in trilateral talks, but then we were not interested. We suggested in lieu that they hold bilateral talks with South Korea. I think that was the appropriate response in 1988 because the North was obviously at the time trying to get us to talk directly to us holding the view that the South was just a US "puppet". The North was using pejorative language when referring to the South and did not seem interested really in relaxing tensions on the peninsula. So the atmosphere was all wrong in 1988 for any progress. After that, it was inch by inch when there was any progress at all until 1993.

Our relationships with South Korea had its ups and downs. On the issue of democracy, I was in Seoul in 1980 when its fledgling beginnings were forcefully suppressed. By 1986, Chun Doo
Wha, the President, was on his last gasps. Roh Toe Woo made a "grand" gesture to the opposition by agreeing to terminate certain undemocratic practices, thereby assuring his election. In any case, the political process was much more open in 1986 than it had been eight years earlier. In early 1988, I went with Secretary Baker to the Roh swearing in -- Sigur didn't go because Ed Dwerinski, who was then the Counselor of the Department, went and Gaston didn't want to be the third ranking State Department official. On the way to Seoul, I kept telling Baker that the name of the new Korean President was pronounced "Noe", even though it was spelled Roh. Baker was well received even though, since he was not a head of State, he did not rank among the most senior of the guests. Soon after that, President Roh paid a visit to the United States. I told Baker then that his name was to be pronounced as "Roh". The Secretary said that this was contrary to the advice I had given him earlier. I pointed out that the situation was different; that when in Korea, the name was pronounced as "Noe", but when in the US, it was "Roh". In the United States, for public relations purposes, the Koreans felt it was far better to referred to their President as Roh Toe Woo and not Noe Toe Woo -- it was too much like Doctor No.

We were encouraged by Roe's election. In addition, we were very active on the "democratization" front. In the last days of the Chun Doo Wan regime, some University students had occupied our USIS offices in Seoul. Harry Dunlop, who was the Political Counselor during this incident, held long discussions with them, permitting them to air their grievances and trying to talk them into leaving the building. He wasn't successful and the police finally had to force the students out. But Dunlop and the students had a long conversation about Kwangju, during which he felt that he had done a masterful job of explaining the course of events as we knew them. After that, Dunlop suggested that we publish a "White Paper" repeating essentially what he had said to the students. The Embassy supported Dunlop, but we did not see any good reason why the issue should be publicly debated again. I saw Dunlop's report on what he had said while visiting Seoul and did not quite conform to my recollections as a resident American diplomat during the uprising. Secondly, we had some reservations about issuing a paper when a friendly government was in power, particularly since the new President had been involved in the Kwangju matter. It was after my return from that trip that I turned the matter over to the Historian's Office, as I described earlier. That report was issued in part to put our views on Kwangju on a written record, but our action was also designed to encourage Roh to continue on the democratic path he was following and hopefully, even accelerate his pace. In the final analysis, I think Roh made tremendous progress in bringing his country into the democratic fold. During his regime, that was not really a major issue between our two countries.

As further evidence of the great progress that the Koreans had made on democracy, we noted the freedom that both Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam had in Korea. When I had been in Korea in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these two men were either in prison or under house arrest. They were seldom free. But by the late 1980s, they had fairly free reins. One could visit them if you were in Seoul. Kim Young Sam was politically very active and Kim Dae Jung was free to tell his side of history. The Embassy did have contacts with the two in the late 1970s, when they were not imprisoned. After the "Seoul Spring", in 1980, the Embassy had considerable contacts with Kim Dae Jung. We urged him not to address college audiences so that passions would be unnecessarily stirred up; he ignored our advice.
There were some trade frictions between the two countries in the 1986-89 period. Beef was one commodity that was always in debate both with Korea and Japan. I used to tell the Koreans that I was depressed by their position on beef imports because only a few years earlier I used to cite them as a shining example of free beef traders because we used to sell as much beef to "little Korea" as we did to "huge Japan". The Koreans closed the market for our beef exporters. It was a shameless comment, but then shamelessness has been a hallmark of diplomacy for centuries. We also had some problems with American companies that were leaving their investments in Korea, like Dow which sold its assets to "Dynamite" Kim. But in general, trade issues were not a major bone of contention.

When I first returned to Seoul in 1986, after an absence of six years, I was struck by the tremendous changes. There was no curfew for example nor were there any troops on the streets. The atmosphere was very different, although I must say that even when the curfew was in effect and the troops were on the streets, we did not feel the heavy boot of oppression. The Korean government did not interfere with our daily lives; I thought it was not any worse than Paris during the Algerian crisis when you could see machine guns on the street corners and troops heavily armed everywhere. That was suffocating. By 1986, the society was much more open and the economic boom was evident. Buildings were going up everywhere, particularly on the south side of the river almost all the way to Suwon. Development had engulfed the farm areas which in 1980 still surrounded Seoul. More bridges had been built as had been Yoido, an island in the middle of the Han River which had been densely developed.

The Han River project was almost finished. This was a water-management project that had been under discussion when I was in Seoul in 1980 and for which the Corps of Engineers had done some planning work. That project made Seoul a different city introducing boats and parks to the entertainment landscape for the citizens. Seoul did not look anymore like a capital under siege; so the change in the physical appearance also made it seem like a freer society.

I might make some comments about anti-Americanism in Korea. It seems to follow closely political unrest in the country. It was quite virulent in 1980 after Kwangju. In 1987, when the Koreans were becoming unhappy with Chun Doo Wha, anti-Americanism rose. When Roh Toe Woo had stabilized the political situation, anti-Americanism abated. But I think it is fair to say that it always existed to some extent in Korea. There was a recent newspaper story recently about a young Korean, who after having completed academic studies in the US, returned to his country and killed his parents for the inheritance. We have been accused of being the cause for this young man's actions because we somehow educated out of him the family tradition and filial devotion that he would have been taught to strictly honor had he remained in Korea. So there seems to be always a feeling below the surface that somehow the United States, even though praiseworthy for defending South Korea, nevertheless is less than perfect and that some of its cultural patterns were really not welcomed in Korea. My personal contacts from 1980, which I re-established when I visited Korea in 1986 and thereafter, were certainly less anti-American than they had been. This was particularly true of the American missionary community which was much more at ease with their government in the late 1980s than it had been at the end of the 1970s. That can be explained in part by the fact that the missionaries were not as harassed as they had been during the Park regime; their new-found freedoms made them more benevolent toward the US. My Korean friends reacted pretty much the same way. Their views of the US had
The Embassy, I thought, was working well in 1986. I was not happy with its physical location which remains a problem even today. We don't own the building or the lot; we had signed an agreement that stipulated that we would vacate the premises when our assistance program had ended and I think after 1979 we could not make a very convincing case that we were still extending assistance, either economic or military. But fifteen years later, we are still squatters. We do own land in Seoul which we have never developed, but never seem to be able to find the resources to build a Chancery. Our position on this issue is unseemly, at best, for a major power. We now occupy an old building, built soon after we began an aid program to Korea, not at all consonant with the modernity of much of the city; the Embassy's switchboard and the heating system is in a building next door.

We had a good working relationship with the Embassy. We were on the phone frequently with both Seoul and Tokyo, although unlike some other deputy assistant secretaries or country directors, I did not believe that a daily telephone conversation with every embassy was necessary or desirable. When daily calls are required, I believe it seems too much like micro-management and that is not the role of the Washington bureaucracy. Information nevertheless flowed freely and I think both we in Washington and the people in Seoul were pleased with the relationship.

It was during my tour as deputy assistant secretary that the Koreans began to make some headway in their relationships with the Soviet Union. They had for a long time tried to establish contacts with the other superpower, but until the late 1980s, had had limited success. We did not urge them to be more vigorous in their pursuits nor did we interpose any objections. The opening to Moscow was Roh's legacy as were his efforts to establish a dialogue with North Korea. I think the Koreans did a marvelous job on this issue and are rightly proud of their accomplishment. Their timing was good and the establishment of official contacts with the Soviet Union was followed soon by similar successes with the People's Republic of China. We did not play much of a role in these initiatives, which may have been one of the reasons the Koreans were successful!

Now let me move to our relationships with Japan in the 1986-89 period. The Japanese have never been as interested in involving themselves in world affairs to the extent that we would like. Of course, there are some that they say that the average American is also not sufficiently engaged in world affairs. The Japanese, by and large, including the ruling circles, we do not want to be perceived as a world power. Influence yes; their views taken into account, yes. But not the responsibility that goes with being a world power. The Japanese public is certainly not prepared to take on that responsibility. I wonder however what their views were in the early 1940s when the war was going very much in their favor. Since there weren't any public opinion polls at the time, we will never know. The Japanese did what they did in the 1930s and 1940s because their Emperor wished them to do so; that was enough for the average Japanese, although there were some who warned of likelihood of failure. The Japanese theory then was basically that of jujitsu -- a small man properly trained could beat a big man. When applied to countries, the Japanese felt even more comfortable taking on a democracy. I think most of the Japanese felt that way, although history proved them wrong. The Japanese view since the end of WW II is not too different from the isolationism that Japan practiced for most of its life. It was essentially closed
to the outside world for 300 years, although it did invade other countries -- particularly Korea and later China -- in that period. I think the Japanese are happy with their society as it is and are reluctant to have it "contaminated" by outside influences. The Japanese are essentially very conservative and are not seeking much change; they like their present situation, although the strains are beginning to show since labor shortages are forcing them to import people from other countries. That is likely to cause changes in Japan which it will resist; the Japanese believe that their aggressive policies of 1941 was a big mistake; i.e. attacking China was one matter, but attacking the US was just plain dumb. They don't want to repeat the same mistake. Today, the Japanese see themselves as a small country which might be stepped on if it wonder too far off its own shores. This concerned is reinforced by the emergence of a powerful neighbor - China -- which has had more political influence than Japan in the world since the end of WW II and which has a larger military force, although that force has no projection capability. China has not been an economic rival of Japan, but that is also changing. Those who had great insights might have been able to detect the emergence of China in the late 1970s if they had believed Deng Xiaoping's vision for his country. Not many then believed that China would emulate the "Four Tigers", although we were particularly amazed that Deng included Hong Kong and Taiwan in his list of countries to be emulated. I don't think we paid enough attention to Deng's pronouncements in the late 1970s; the Japanese did not either. In fact, the Japanese corporations were late in trying to make inroads in China despite their providing government-to-government assistance to that country. They are present now, but still not in the magnitude that has been the hallmark of some other investment efforts. Since we couldn't provide assistance, our private economy stepped in with its investments.

One of the continuing problems between the US and Japan is a asymmetry. That still exists today. In the late 1980s, we assumed that the Soviet threat was a major one. The Japanese didn't dispute our view, but since they were not in a position to take any effecting measures, they tended to be more relaxed than we were. They did not have the same sense of urgency about the Soviets being a regional threat. There was a continual shift in the definition of roles and missions in the national security sphere. I think both sides came to agree that the United States was not in Japan primarily to defend Japan, but rather to insure stability in Asia; that was an important revision in Japanese views which resulted in a force restructuring.

In 1986, we viewed the US-Japan and the US-Korea relationship through the prism of the Cold War. That emphasis continued throughout my tour as Deputy Assistant Secretary. Even in 1989, we in EA at least had not detected that the Soviet empire was collapsing.

Finally, I think I might just briefly discuss my role as the day-to-day manager of the Bureau. I was faced with the perennial problem of insufficient resources. We were always looking at the possibility of reducing the State Department component of an embassy or of closing posts. We had to do some of that. The issue of US representation overseas was always facing us; the contentiousness of it increased during my tour because other Cabinet Secretaries were deciding to take even the minutest issue up with the Secretary of State. That I thought was a ridiculous waste of everyone's time and the issues which dealt with one or two or even three more positions certainly did not warrant the attention of Cabinet level officials. So overseas staffing was always major issue. Shultz used to periodically make some noises about the size of US overseas representation, but it was very difficult for an any Ambassador to make his decision to reduce
staffing stick with other agencies in Washington. Just to go back to my Cairo tour, I should note that there I developed a plan which would have required a 10% reduction in the total Embassy staffing. I did that at the urging of the Department of State. When we submitted that plan, we were left holding the bag; the Department gave us absolutely no support at all. My impact was a little greater later when I was in New Delhi, but in general the US leadership in the field is essentially impotent when it comes to the question of the size of US representation. In 1986-89 period, the Washington attitude was that the bureaucracy in the Capital should be reduced first before any cuts were made overseas. But the only Cabinet department that seemed to follow through in reductions is the Department of State. That was compounded both in Washington and overseas because the Department is a very minute component of the total bureaucracy; therefore any reductions have percentage-wise a much greater impact on the Department than they do on other agencies. Other agencies are so large that a reduction in Washington is barely noticed. The Department's financial squeeze was real in the 1986-89 period. Resources in real terms were reduced with every succeeding year. Costs rose, but the budgets did not rise at the same rate. For example, the costs of our operations in Japan went out of sight during this period without any significant addition to available resources. That left us with the dilemma of whether to reduce our presence in Japan or to take the resources out of another embassy's budget and staffing. The EA budget from 1985 to 1992 grew perhaps 15%. The yen-dollar ratio rose probably 75%; that is a losing formula.

On the personnel front, diversity was a major management objective. In this period, women, who by this time were represented in the Foreign Service in large numbers, won a law suit which stipulated that a certain number of the higher level positions, such as DCM, be reserved for them. That caused some minor difficulties for us. It wasn't that there weren't qualified women available, but Personnel, in its management of the over-all assignment process, would at times come down to the last few assignments for the year and realize that it had not met its established quota for women. That forced all bureaus to begin to shake things up, canceling assignments already made, moving people before the end of their tours, etc. Had Personnel planned better, these last minute adjustments would not have been necessary and the assignment process would have been much smoother. We also had to manage a couple of problems relating to African-Americans. We had an excellent black officer who was very good in the function that he knew. The powers-that-be decided that he should be assigned to another function because that would have increased diversity. He and I had agreed on a career development program, but he was under great pressure from some of his colleagues to move into another area. As we predicted, he found himself floundering and received some very damaging efficiency ratings. The whole assignment was unfair to this individual; it put him a position where he had to have language and reporting skills that he did not have. It was a poor assignment for an excellent officer; he survived, but that assignment set back his career unnecessarily. In general, the Bureau was under pressure to place more African Americans in the Far East; there had been and still was a great imbalance among bureaus with AF having the greatest proportion of African-American staff than any other bureau. Of course, there were more Asian-American staff in Far East posts than there were in other parts of the world. The Department had decided that these concentrations based on ethnicity were not good and made an effort to spread its ethnic personnel resources more widely. It worked alright, but everyone interested in the issue must realize that it is a long term process and that immediate results could not be expected.
The Bureau's relationships with the central Personnel Office were good in 1986. They went downhill from there. George Vest was the Director General until the Spring of 1989. Bill Swing was the senior deputy. In my first year, Personnel was very cooperative in making appropriate assignments. We did a lot of things that according to the rules were not allowed, such as "stretched" tours. Sigur was interested in personnel assignments as were all the deputies. Personnel had the formal responsibility for making assignments, but there was an assignment board which actually made the assignment recommendations. Of course, most of the process was based on the "bids" that every officer made for vacancies when his or her tour was coming to an end. All bureaus were represented on this board. I had been in the Service for many years and by this time knew a lot of people. I sometimes counseled people not to bid on certain specific jobs because I thought that the assignment would not have been good for his or her career. I said that I would try to help the officer, but that he or she was making a mistake bidding for the particular job they had in mind. Personnel might well have made the assignment because the officer was the right age or had the right credentials, but I knew that it would probably not work because of the nature of the job or because of the personality conflicts that might arise at the post. So in my first year, I was very pleased by our personnel management accomplishments. The next two years were an entirely different story. Personnel became very uncooperative and blocked many of our assignment desires, despite the fact that I had been friends with both Deputy Directors General: Bill Swing and Larry Wilson. But I found that increasingly, the Personnel's front office promised to take certain actions which the staff below did not carry out; if the staff felt that an assignment was not within the rules, it tended to ignore the stated guidance from the Director General or his deputy. So the personnel operation became very rigid and calcified, which it continues to be today.

I believe that even as we speak, Personnel is about to assign someone to the Political Counselor position in Seoul who has never been in Asia, much less knowing anything about Korea. It makes absolutely no sense at all, even if you give the individual language training which is not likely to be very effective given the age of the officer. This is the kind of assignments that were beginning to happen in 1987; the justification seemed always to be that the central office was trying to break "the old boy network" -- that was Ron Spiers' expressed intention. He had held that view for many years. I always considered the "old boy network" as a management tool. I think that part of the Department's problems stem from the tendency to turn management over to the people in "M" (the Under Secretary for Management). The officials who should really be responsible for management are the senior people in the operating bureaus, but they don't pay enough attention to problems. When they do pay attention to management, it is usually through the "old boy network," which is then criticized as being the enemy of good management. It is a vicious circle; I feel rather strongly about the whole management process of the Department, as you may have noticed!

We also faced the perennial debate of functional vs geographical specialists. For much of this period, Ron Spiers was the Under Secretary for Management. Ron has always upheld the importance of functional specialists; I have always leaned towards geographical specialists. This is a time honored debate. Ron always referred to us as the "regional Barons". We were in the 1986-89 period able to keep regional specialization as the most important ingredient in the assignment process. I insist that the Department of State deals with cultures; that requires deep knowledge of country or regional history which is more important than global environment, etc. In fact, there cannot be one approach to our foreign relationships; each issue has to be addressed on its own merits bringing in most cases the best regional and functional experts together. Some
issues might be resolved by functional experts alone; some by regional experts alone, but most, I believe require the closest cooperation between experts on different matters. The artificial distinction that many make between function and geographic doesn't make any sense in most instances.

In general, I must say that the Department of State is not very proficient in the management field. It is a very difficult job, even if you know what you are doing. To do it well in the Department is very tough; to do it the way the Department wants it done is damn near impossible! We had one major challenge during my tour: a staff reduction which required a meeting of all of the assistant secretaries with the Under Secretary for Management. That meeting with Spiers on the first issue was interesting because no bureau wanted to point a finger at a sister bureau, even if it felt that more of the reduction should come out of somebody else's hide. I attended because Sigur decided that that I should represent EA. The meeting must have lasted two hours trying to make the case that an across-the-board reduction applicable evenly to all bureaus was not the appropriate approach -- it certainly wasn't "management". We all thought that the senior levels of the Department should establish some priorities and then let the bureaus decide how the reductions might be applied to their own operations. Spiers listened to all of the arguments, nodded his head periodically and at the end of the meeting told all the bureaus to tell him how they would apply a 7 1/2% reduction to their own operations. As far as I know, "management" in the Department has not progressed beyond that simplistic and unthinking approach to resource reductions. The relationship between policy objectives and resource utilization has never really been developed in the Department of State. The Department seems to be unable to prioritize its objectives and functions. Everything seems important to everybody every day! That of course is not the real world, but that is the way the Department exercises its "management" responsibilities. The debate between functional and regional bureaus has been active for many years. I would say that today the functional bureaus seem to have priority, although I don't know how long that is going to last. Clearly the Clinton administration came in with a bias toward looking at the world on a function by function basis.

Lateral entry at mid-career levels was not a problem in the 198-89 period. It had been a problem when I was Country Director in the early 1980s when, as one administration was coming to an end, political appointees of that administration were trying to enter the career service before their party left power. It was very poor timing for the individuals involved. But during my tenure as a DAS, I do not recall any great pressure to take into the mid-level positions of the Service any people from the outside. We did face the issue of politically appointed deputy assistant secretaries, although EA was not directly involved. We did not face that because Sigur was a non-career appointee and he wanted to have career people as his deputies. After Sigur, the pressure increased and the Clinton administration is even more eager to fill some deputy positions with non-career people than the Bush administration was. I have heard that even positions below DAS have been filled by non-career people. That was done in a couple of instances during the Carter administration; those people are now part of the career service.

ANTHONY C. ZINNI
Regimental Commander, Marine Expeditionary Unit
General Zinni was born and raised in Pennsylvania. After graduating from Vallanova College he joined the Marines, which became his lifelong career. His distinguish career took him to Vietnam, Okinawa, Philippines and Germany, where he served in senior level positions. Attaining the rank of General, Zinni served as Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, where he was deeply involved in worldwide missions including Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. General Zinnia was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

ZINNI: Well, I think besides the military sort of evolution of your experience, the war colleges and schools and command at different levels all the way up, I think the most significant thing was the exposure to the different cultures. Living overseas, operating in a number of different environments, working with forces from different nations, so being involved in their environment and in their culture so I think this whole exposure. I mean, we had a mission during the Cold War to go to Norway so we had cold-weather training. We continued our jungle training, mountain training, desert training and exposure to those environments out there so it was sort of this global environment, being exposed to that. And then not only commanding a unit in Okinawa, but I commanded a camp, so then I was required to interact with the local community.

Q: This was on Okinawa?

ZINNI: This was on Okinawa. I had to work with the mayor of Kin, a town that my base was located in and the assembly and so that gave me more exposure to, you know, interaction of working with them and, you know, the social aspect and all that, going to their funerals and to their weddings and everything else and getting to know them on a personal basis, too. And the same thing in Europe and elsewhere and so I think the most significant thing beside the military experiences during that time was the exposure to such a variety of cultures.

EDWARD W. KLOTH
Japan Desk Officer

Mr. Kloth was born in North Carolina and raised in New York. After service in the Peace Corps and private business, he worked with the Department of Defense, later joining the State Department. In his career with State, Mr. Kloth served several tours in Japan and Korea. In Washington assignments he dealt with East Asian, Political/military, Economic and Environment matters. He also spent two years on Capitol Hill as Department of State Pearson Fellow. After retirement, Mr. Kloth continued as advisor to the Department on variety of matters and served a tour in Iraq as Economic Officer. Mr. Kloth was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.
KLOTH: In the summer of ’88, I moved to Japan desk to work on trade. At that time, U.S.-Japan trade issues were highly contentious and had been for over a decade. When I first came to Washington in ’80, at seminar at the University of Maryland one weekend, I heard a UAW rep, Ford lobbyist, and Toyota lobbyist discuss the problems of the U.S. auto industry and its demands for the U.S. government to stop Japanese imports into the US. People asked the Ford and the UAW reps if limiting competition would just enable the U.S. auto industry to continue to develop unpopular products and so take the pressure off it to become competitive in the U.S. and world markets. I remember one or the other of them said very frankly, “That’s a legitimate, but the political pressure from inside the industry and the union is such that we will demand the U.S. government to do it.”

Predictably, of course, the “voluntary” limits on Japanese cars led the Japanese auto industry to bring in higher value vehicles which were head to head with even more of the U.S., industries’ models. If you’re limited in number of units, you want higher profits per unit, so that Japanese reaction was easy to anticipate and led to the price of Japanese cars going higher without lowering demand because Americans were willing to pay the premium for a better product. The U.S. industry did bring some better products like the Taurus, but two decades later only Ford management seems competitive.

The upside for U.S. workers is that major Japanese, Korean and German makers build cars here. The irony is that in the late ’70s, though, a Japanese banker told me that U.S. trade pressure gave Japanese auto firms the excuse to override “keep-jobs-in-Japan” politicians and bureaucrats and build plants here – a move that made economic sense – arguing that Japanese firms did so only “to escape U.S. protectionism.”

At any rate, the political antagonism to the Japanese, who were running protectionist policies, make no mistake, was high. When I moved from Korea desk to Japan desk, a Congressional staffer I knew well warned me, “Ted, our relationship is going to change. Don’t take it personally, and you’ve been really helpful to me and my Senator. But the feeling up here on the Hill, the antagonism over these trade issues means that when you move to Japan desk, and we talk, it’s not going to be in the consultative kind of way that we’ve talked up to now. The nickname on the Hill for State’s Japan desk is ‘the second Japanese embassy.’”

I could understand. The U.S. was running a large trade deficit with the Japanese, and the Japanese had continued protectionist their policies developed after World War II to rebuild their economy. By the ’70s and ’80s, Japanese industries were internationally competitive. The auto industry comes to mind but others such as ship building and electronics were doing very, very well, so the protections that had been erected became an obvious economic issue in terms of U.S. products being able to have access to the Japanese market in the same way their products had access to our market.

It was a complex picture because there were some restrictions that were pure politics. The government party depended on rural voters, so there were zero rice imports, not a big U.S. export, but beef was, and beef imports were tightly controlled.

There were also other issues such as standards which were kind of a second level of obstacles to
foreign importers. The issue was whether or not, for instance, safety standards for construction materials were drawn up in such a way that manufacturers in Japan had an unfair advantage. Japanese standards were set in centimeters. A board needed to be X by X centimeters to meet code. The issue was whether an X by X inch board from the U.S. could bear the same load. If you specified in terms of load-bearing rather than linear measurement, it was better for U.S. saw mills, and Japanese consumers. Japan demanded clinical trials in Japan for medicines.

Standards got the U.S. government’s attention as an issue from around 1980, when a U.S. baseball bat manufacturer complained to our economic/commercial officer in Osaka that his metal bats were “not up to code in Japan” because the code had been deliberately set to ensure only Japanese bats would qualify. He had done all the right things in Japan in terms of coming to Japan and building relationships with potential purchasers and having a good product at a good price. The American bats did not meet Japanese specifications because they were not milled on the inside, which made no difference to safety or performance but was a requirement of the Japanese standard, and there was strong suspicion, given the collaboration between Japanese government and industry, that this had been set to keep U.S. bats out.

Further investigation revealed that the standards issue was a big one for many U.S. products, even when the Japanese bureaucrats were not trying to be deliberately protectionist. They too often set specifications in terms of form rather than function. Other issues such as the relationships between the banks and the large Japanese companies emerged. Negotiations started with the Japanese on a full range of these complex problems, including the value of the Yen.

Q: What piece of the action did you have?

KLOTH: Well, I had automobiles, construction, and others, including the so-called large scale retail store law. This law was developed to protect mom and pop stores in Japan, which were the largest number of stores and so the largest number of voters, from competition with Japanese department stores, but also hurt U.S. firms like Toy ‘R U.S. trying to enter the market. There were similar, it turns out, laws in places like Germany. We never had American companies complain about them, just as we never had American companies complain about the German auto industry. After World War II, the Europeans had let U.S. firms back in, and Japan had kept them out.

Q: Sure, the Ford was producing the Taurus and all sorts of ...

KLOTH: Later I discovered Australia is highly restrictive on imports of automobiles, but Ford and GM long ago opened plants in the country. Restrictions on autos not made in Australia served their interests too.

Q: From your perspective were you able to make, you being obviously part of the team, make any progress and how did you deal with this?

KLOTH: U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is the one who leads the American team, although that office sometimes agrees to a delegation of work. Department of Commerce, for instance, led a team trying to open the Japanese government construction market to internationally
In the midst of my time on Japan desk, we had a transition from Reagan to Bush I. In terms of watching Secretary Baker and his team move into the Department, one would have thought that would have been seamless, given one Republican was replacing another. In fact, I recall it as being a time of some stress for those at levels closer to the secretary than I was as a desk officer, but that stress was passed on down.

Secretary Baker moved into the Department rather quickly, as I recall. He had an office on the first floor, the transition office, and people were very favorably impressed both by the team members they met and by the new Secretary-to-be’s own demeanor. I remember our OMS (Office Management Specialist) came back one day very excited. She had been in the lunch line, and the Secretary designate had been right behind her.

When the transition actually took place, although Secretary Baker had a very sharp team he brought from Treasury where he had been under Reagan, the seventh floor (where the Secretary has his office) seemed uninterested in much of the Department’s work. Only a few issues like Russia interested them, so no guidance on many issues was coming out. Morale went down.

In EAP, however, we had a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for economic affairs, Robert Fauvre from Treasury, so we in EAP/J felt we were in the loop on the new U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). Treasury developed the SII as a comprehensive approach to move beyond the individual item by item negotiations that seemed endless. In addition to talking to the Japanese about individual issues brought up by individual companies, we would look at six areas where the structure of the Japanese system impeded foreign companies coming in. They included a broad range of issues from the relationships between companies and banks to the distribution system (defined as everything customs to the large-scale department store law) to price differentials.

Price differentials, led by Commerce, turned out to be a great one from the public relations point of view. You could often buy Japanese products cheaper in the United States than in Japan, but U.S. products would be more expensive in Japan than in the US. Up until the early ‘70s, Japanese aware of this thought is a necessary measure to keep consumption low and investment high. Further, as a resource poor nation Japan had to import things like oil and pay for them in dollars gained through exports. This was the development model they had and was widely accepted.

By the late ‘80s, Japan had been doing very well for decades, and Japanese were starting to do things like travel with families. They wanted a reward for their hard work and thought they had earned it. When a Commerce Department and Japanese counterpart survey was done, and the results got into the Japanese media, the Japanese public and media response was, “Yeah, why are we paying so much more for this or that?”

It was not all the result of policy to make imports more expensive. When we looked, for example, at the distribution system, all these small mom and pop stores need more frequent deliveries. So, of course, there is a cost for that. Our argument was that the restrictions of the
large-scale department store law made it very difficult for a new large store like Toys ‘R Us to set up in Japan and bring goods at lower prices to Japanese consumers. There were other issues too, the question of how long it took to come through the ports to get through all the customs and other clearances.

**Q:** Looking at it did you find that the customs clearances were just trying to stall rather than to do what one should do, necessary operations or a lot of other things like that?

KLOTH: Well, we found Japanese Customs was an unexpected ally. The Japanese Customs did not have the latest information technology and was way behind U.S. Customs not only in the technology but in the use of technology. For example, they had not developed as sophisticated set of risk-evaluating algorithms, including input of intelligence information, as U.S. Customs had. Japanese Customs realized that their government’s agreement to our “demand” for faster processing could force the Finance Ministry to fund modernization of their data-processing system.

**Q:** If you examine these two different systems, this is sort of the American perspective in reading about this in the various newspaper accounts. You have the feeling that the American system is basically practical; the Japanese was designed to keep things out. I mean did you come away with this impression?

KLOTH: True. But other factors were also at work. In Fukuoka the head of the local office of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (at the time called MITI) said, “Japanese have much more of a sense that the government is responsible for the quality of products that they buy as well as for the organization of a host of other things in society. It’s a big problem for the government, if something comes in that turns out to be problematic.”

Listening to Japanese officials in countless meetings, I realized that in many areas they were already much more worried about Chinese than U.S. imports. China in the 1980s was just gaining steam, but the Japanese were quite prescient in seeing quality issues coming. Look at U.S. reaction to lead in the paint of kids toys from China! For example, if Japan accepted U.S. test results for pharmaceuticals or even construction materials, they would open themselves up to great pressure in the future when China wanted to send exports to Japan. Lately Americans have been criticizing a lack of import testing here.

Fundamentally, the Japanese were frustrated by our attitude. “When we sell you our products, we find out what the U.S. requirement is, and we manufacture to the requirement. Now why don’t your firms manufacture to our requirement?”

Our manufacturers responded, “Because you restrict our ability to sell in quantity in many different ways, so it’s too expensive.”

Starts too sound like the chicken and the egg in some aspects, but in the end the U.S. is a bigger market, so foreign companies are go meet our standards.

**Q:** Were the Japanese and the European Community demanding kind of the same things or had
our trade gotten so sophisticated with the European Community that it wasn’t an issue?

KLOTH: We had some issues with Europe, but nothing of the scale of friction with Japan. There were issues, for example, European government support for Aerobus. In the case of Japan, there were so many issues. It was so broad and so deep that it was a major negative element in the relationship and very serious.

So many members of Congress had industries in their districts that felt they were unfairly disadvantaged trying to export to Japan, which was by the ‘80s a large potential market. Certainly the beef, a highly symbolic issue, and the autos were infuriating for many Americans. Japanese would talk about the “cultural” importance of rice to Japan. In fact, the United States was not going to export very much rice. The Japanese were much more concerned about rice coming in from Southeast Asia. Americans could make both a “cultural” as well as economic argument about autos or beef for America. The political chemistry was bad.

Q: Okay, you’ve got our special trade representative who’s the lead person. What from your perspective was the role of the State Department in the Japanese trade negotiations relations?

KLOTH: We worked closely with USTR and our embassy because there was no USTR representative in Tokyo. At a larger policy level our DAS in ’88 Bill Pease, who was replaced by Bob Fauvre, said well. Our job at State was to be sure that one, issues identified as targets for negotiations with the Japanese were of real importance to the United States, given that the U.S.-Japan relations were critical to U.S. security as well as economic interests. Two, as the prime U.S. experts on Japan and the dynamics of Japanese government and business, the Japan desk and our embassy had to work actively to develop strategies that led to real results for U.S. business, and to minimize the kind of nasty political posturing, and huffing and puffing that some in DC agencies were tempted into simply to score points in the U.S. domestic process. Trade fights hurt our relations with Japan, a close ally. We had to make sure the benefits were worth the price we paid. I found the biggest challenge to your diplomatic skills was working in the Washington interagency process, not foreign capitals.

I guess my own quick and dirty on trade issues is that I’m hard pressed to think of a trade or an economic issue that is really an economic issue. They’re political issues. In general, tariffs or quotas whether in Japan or the U.S. are the result of political decisions. The United States does not restrict sugar imports into our country from abroad because it makes economic sense, unless you are a sugar crop producer.

Q: Let me ask an indiscreet question. You were involved with negotiations on high visibility subjects. Leaks are often an issue when stakes are high. Did you ever leak? If not, why not?

KLOTH: No. At State in ’82, when I joined, there were two big things on the minds of the people running our A-100 incoming officers’ basic course. They were mid-level and upper mid-level officers, an 0-3 and an 0-1. One was the question of leaking. These officers, if they had not been in Vietnam, had certainly been in the Vietnam era Foreign Service. They and more than a few senior officials, who addressed us, emphasized that you have an obligation within the walls of the Department to put forward vigorously the position that you think the U.S. should follow.
But once a decision has been made on what that U.S. position would be, your job is to advance that position. That includes defending it on the Hill and defending it to the media.

If you disagree with it, then you have a number of options. One is to just proceed forward. If you feel that your disagreement is at a level where you cannot in good personal conscience continue to defend it, then you should either seek another job in the Department or you should resign. Those seemed reasonable terms of employment to me.

Further, while there are different motives for and results of leaks, my experience was that in most cases with the issues I worked over my career, leakers were trying to subvert agreed policy or gain advantage outside the process when their arguments were unpersuasive in the process. That struck me as sleazy. If you don’t like the policy for whatever reason, move to a different job or quit, then go public if you’re so moved. Maybe I was just lucky; perhaps deliberations on the issues that I worked on didn’t produce a result so disagreeable that I felt tempted to leak.

The other thing that was much on their minds was the Iran hostage taking, because this was March 1982, so there were people in the training world who knew people who had been hostages. Bruce Langdon came and spoke to our group about the Middle East and about being a hostage. It was also made very clear to us that the U.S. government was not going to negotiate for our release, and that meant that might increase the chances of your being killed or held a long time. The Department wanted everybody in the class to think this through and be sure you really wanted to be part of the service.

RICHARD T. McCORMACK
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs

After attending Georgetown University, Mr. Richard T. McCormack assumed a multitude of administrative roles for the Nixon Administration in addition to serving under Governor William Scranton of Pennsylvania and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina. Mr. McCormack’s career also included positions as the US Ambassador to the Organization of American States as well as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Ambassador McCormack was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: What happened on the Japan-related issue?

McCORMACK: We had a much more open market in the U.S. for imports than was the case of Japan. I was in favor of pressing the Japanese harder to open up than some of the other people in our Department. My view was widely shared on the Hill. A very strong piece of trade legislation called Super 301 was passed. The second Japan-related problem was of a structural nature. A very strong dollar during the early part of the Reagan period was partly a consequence of very high U.S. interest rates. High rates attracted a lot of foreign money. You had many other countries that wanted to build up their manufacturing bases and were perfectly delighted to see
the U.S. dollar remain very strong. That was what the Plaza agreement was meant to address. A strong dollar meant, all other things being equal, that the U.S. manufacturers were going to have difficulty competing. This situation plus import barriers abroad helped cause the Midwest industrial implosion, what was eventually called the rust belt. Unemployment soared in parts of the country during the first Reagan administration.

A basic structural flaw in the overall trading system evolved. As tariffs became less important, competitive currency policies increasingly determined the terms of trade. The floating exchange rate system was not allowed by mercantilist countries to operate freely. This certainly worsened after the 1997 Asian banking crisis.

But in 1989, I felt that we needed to lean harder on the Japanese to reduce non-tariff barriers and some of the other structural obstacles that were making it very difficult for foreigners to export to Japan. As an example, at one point we pressed the Japanese because we were concerned about Colombia needing something to export besides drugs. So we asked the government of Japan to let the Columbians export their flowers to Japan. After tremendous pressure by the trade office, the Japanese formally opened the market for flowers and removed all tariffs for such flowers. However they also immediately instituted a new customs procedure that required inspection of each individual flower at the airport before it could be marketed. Of course that made the business impractical. The Germans told me that in the case of automobiles, 30% of the value of every single German car sold in Japan was related to costs of complying with non-tariff barriers and special standards that the Japanese had established to discourage exporting cars to Japan. And on and on and on. The State Department was naturally interested in preserving a good relationship with the Japanese, and I was also. But I felt we needed to create a more even playing field. This was not always a popular view at the Department’s Japan desk.

Q: This raises a very important issue. The one between trying to right an injustice, and trade barriers, and good relations. You know, you can have great relations with a country if you do everything they want you to do. This is a classic battle. But I would think by this point, the late ’80s early ’90s, that even the Far Eastern Bureau would see Japan for what it was, taking unfair advantage of our open market and their relatively closed market.

McCORMACK: It wasn’t just the State Department that was not totally supportive of being tough on Japanese trade and currency problems. The Japanese admitted to Treasury in 1988 that they were spending nearly a billion dollars a year wiring Washington: providing money to think tanks, former senior U.S. officials, people who had political connections and access to the White House, etc. They created a huge and effective lobbying operation. Thus, you not only had to deal with the political sensitivities that would emerge from the State Department process, but you also had to deal with Japanese lobbying connections to the White House and the press. An enormous effort was made by Japanese officials to shape foreign press coverage of sensitive Japanese economic, trade, and financial issues.

It was widely believed, correctly or not, that if you cooperated with the Japanese during the time that you served in government, and was viewed as their friend, after you left government, you might be retained as one of their lobbyists or industry advisors. One high-ranking White House official was dismissed in part because of improper handling of a Japanese-related matter. Soon
afterwards he was given a million-dollar contract by the Japanese to study a possible second canal through Central America. In any case, it was very difficult to keep any secrets from the Japanese because they had so many different opportunities to find out what was going on inside the U.S. policy process.

**Q:** Was there any effort made by the FBI, the State Department, or somebody else, to identify people who were essentially on the payroll?

McCORMACK: As a matter of fact, after I left government, there was a major review by the FBI of people getting paychecks from the Japanese and other foreign interests but not registering as lobbyists. There was a whole series of proposed indictments that were drawn up by the FBI and sent to the Justice Department, according to media reports in 1992. Many people were taking money but not registering as foreign agents. When the Clinton people came into office, they noted the many prominent people who were involved in this potential problem, including some of their friends, and decided to quash the whole investigation. According to the media, two senior FBI officials resigned as a consequence of this. I have not verified this beyond what was leaked to the press.

**Q:** What I am talking about, if nothing else, is that you were dealing in an atmosphere in which you felt that you couldn’t really trust a lot of people.

McCORMACK: No. I felt I could trust many people. I also felt, however, that there were no secrets as it related to U.S. policy toward Japan on trade issues as I mentioned earlier. When I left government in 1991, I went to the Woodrow Wilson Center for scholars. While I was there I was earning my $40,000 a year stipend and recovering from 10 years in the State Department, ill and bone tired. I soon received a visitor from a prominent Japanese company who said how much they valued my analytical skills, and offered me a large retainer. I told him that I didn’t really feel I should do this because I had been dealing with Japanese issues for the U.S. government.

Some few political appointees, who plan to be in government for a brief period of time, use government service as a career launching pad for subsequent service of an entirely different kind. These people sometimes leaked. Subsequently, an executive order was passed slowing down the revolving door, prohibiting this kind of thing, and requiring a period of cooling off before you could become involved in lobbying. The issue continues. In one of his final acts when he left office, President Clinton canceled that executive order. This gave his people the opportunity to do things that he had been quite proud to prohibit when he was President.

These are the kinds of little problems that exist in this town. We all know they exist. The point I want to make is that when you are dealing with the Japanese and others on matters of trade policy, there are no secrets. You basically had to operate on the assumption that they knew everything that you were going to do and say. Therefore, when you moved to deal with them from a substantive point of view, you could not use classical diplomatic techniques. You basically had to prepare a power position that you knew was supported by the President and Congress. If you had that power position, you were able to go forward with your negotiation and possibly get some results. If you were operating without this explicit support, issue by issue, you
would be politely heard and ignored. That was the complicated reality.

Japan was not the only country where this was a problem, but it was a conspicuous example because in those days they dispensed hundreds of millions of dollars annually wiring Washington, a tiny fraction of their vast trade surplus. Such lobbying was viewed merely as a cost of doing profitable business here.

There used to be a Japanese joke. Where is the most expensive intellectual capital in the world? Answer: Washington, DC.

Q: From your perspective at the time you were in the State Department, you were looking at this and did not see this as a particular weakness or problem.

McCORMACK: We knew that it was a long-term problem. One also assumed that sooner or later when you have a vast program that is not actuarially sound, this will become obvious to enough people. Politics will then do its thing; democracy will do its thing; speeches will be made; commissions will be established; changes will be made. Bear in mind a political appointee, who is in an office for a brief period of time, manages this policy debate for a short time. You start by building public awareness. You conceive strategies. To make these strategies work, you have to build a consensus. For major issues, this process can take years.

In the case of Japan, I decided after I left government to continue to provide my analytical services free to my successors and give them the benefit of everything that I had learned in dealing with Japan. Every year I do a major review of global economic trends, including the Japanese financial system. These reports were read by top people in successive administrations, beginning with Lloyd Bentsen when he was Secretary of the Treasury.

In 1997, the White House asked me if I wanted to be considered for Ambassador to Japan. So I know this work had some value. Each of us has some area of expertise. People who have done the Arab-Israeli issue very often offer their advice and thoughts to successive administrations as they move on. The period where you actually have power is brief. Power in our system consists mainly of sitting around a table, making your points known to your colleagues, and trying to persuade them. The second bit of power that you have is the ability to hire people and therefore magnify the point of view that you would like to see expressed within the system. But it is a very diluted thing because so many people have overlapping portfolios. There are always at least three different agencies that are watching the same issue that you are watching not to mention your other colleagues in your own agency. You have to be able to justify what you are doing and sell what you are proposing.

ROBIN BERRINGTON
Cultural Attaché, USIS
Tokyo (1989-1993)

Mr. Berrington was born and raised in Ohio and educated at Wesleyan University
Harvard Universities. After service with the Peace Corps in Thailand, he joined the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1969. During his Foreign Service career Mr. Berrington served at posts abroad in Thailand, Japan, Ireland and England, variously as Public and Cultural Affairs Officer. He also served several tours at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Berrington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

BERRINGTON: Back to Japan. Sayonara was not part of my vocabulary. I was there from the summer of 1989 to the summer of 1993.

Q: So a good four year tour. What were you doing there?

BERRINGTON: Well, I was the Cultural Attaché, what they called the senior CAO. USIA had a number of so-called senior CAO positions around the world. One was Japan, one was Germany, one was India. I think maybe Mexico might have had one as well. I think they were the four posts where the cultural program was large, well funded, had branch posts, almost all the basic USIS activities in play, so the American staff was large enough that they would make CAO a senior CAO and I had both a deputy CAO as well as assistant CAO. Not many places had that array of titles and officers. Frankly speaking it was just title inflation as far as I was concerned. But nevertheless, that is what I was. I should add that I was fully surprised to be back in Japan. I never expected to be there again because when I looked at the staffing profiles, the way things were, the incumbent CAO in Japan, the job that I would have been most likely a candidate for and the one I was most interested in, was supposed to be in place for a number of years yet. The job would not be open when I was available. Anyway, what eventually happened is that he decided he didn't like Japan. He decided it was time to retire, and after two years in Tokyo, he surprised everybody by upping and retiring right then and there which then opened the CAO position unexpectedly. That's how I got there.

Q: Who was the ambassador? I guess you had two didn't you?

BERRINGTON: Well, in the last months while I was on the Desk, we were kind of in between ambassadors. Mile Mansfield had left Tokyo in December 1988 and Mike Armacost arrived in May 1989. In effect by the time I got there and by the time I got into play, Armacost was the Ambassador. He was in effect the chief of mission for the whole time I was there.

Q: You arrived in 1989. This, of course was the year of destiny. The whole Soviet Union fell apart. Were you seeing a change in what we were after in Japan during this period beginning to move out of the cold war?

BERRINGTON: Well, not really. As I may have said before, cold war determinations did not affect our activities in Japan quite as much as I think they must have in other countries. The one item that had a clear cold war impact was, of course, the security treaty, the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Because that, in a way, kept the Japanese from rearming. You would have thought that the Chinese would have been opposed to any kind of security treaty between the U.S. and Japan, and of course they were years before. At this point the Chinese actually came to see it as kind of a good thing, in a way sort of keeping the cap on the bottle of Japanese militarism, or cork in the
bottle I should say. Of course the Koreans were very happy with it. When I say the Koreans I mean the South Koreans, because we had our own treaty with the South Koreans, but also because it just added to the security of East Asia as a whole. You know, for much of that time the most potential flashpoint has always been the border between North Korea and South Korea. Even the Chinese, who maybe felt comfortable talking about Taiwan or whatever, didn't really present that much of a real danger. So it was really more the Korean problem we had to worry about. The cold war really took on more of a regional coloration, and the real enemy there was more likely to be North Korea than anybody else. The Russian element in cold war politics in other parts of the world didn't play as big a role, I think, in what we were doing in Japan. So the whole collapse of the Soviet Union, all of that didn't really change our basic mission that much. Again the trade issue was predominant and always has been, probably always will be. The trade issue was so strong. The security treaty, and then other areas of cooperation between the Japanese and us in say environment or technology. Energy sources were of course always an ongoing concern. That wasn't a real issue that divided us; it was one where we tended to agree.

Q: Of the issues at the time I can think of, were you engaged, as cultural affairs officer, in activities relating to the Gulf War and the rallying around. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had an effect on Japan of course because of its dependence on the Persian Gulf oil.

BERRINGTON: Yes we were engaged; we were involved, but it was more in the - I guess you would say - in the opinion forming process than anything else. You know, we would bring out, the cultural section would organize and bring out speakers to talk about this. We would provide materials from our libraries, which incidentally at that point were starting to be called information and resource centers rather than libraries. The word library over the years kind of became a dirty word. It reeked of old fashioned and a lot of people back in Congress couldn't understand why we needed public libraries in countries around the world like Japan., They would argue we don't have enough libraries in our own country. I mean that is confusing the issue, as though libraries in South Carolina are dipping into the same pile of funds as libraries in Japan that the embassy supports. But anyway we would provide materials from our information resource centers.

You have to recall at that time the Japan program had access to electronic data. Our computerized programs were very much state of the art for its day. If a newspaper man who was covering something about the Gulf War, he could get into one of our information resource centers, talk to one of the staff. She could put him to a computer or get the material herself. In any case we were in a position to provide these kinds of materials almost instantaneously and very completely, and in much greater detail than we could have before the onset of the computer and all of that was provided there. So yes I guess that is kind of a roundabout way to answer that but yes we were in the whole business of shaping opinion and informing key audiences, members of the audience, yes we were engaged in things like the Gulf War.

Q: This is your third tour in Japan. Had you noticed an evolution in I won't say Japan itself, but I how opinion and how opinions were working. You are trying to inform and influence and all. I was wondering whether you were seeing a change through the eyes of a new generation, more people willing to get away from the lockstep of Japanese society?
BERRINGTON: Let's see my first tour was 1969-1975. The second was 1981-1986, and third, yes this is the third time in Japan. Over these tours I would say there were some very definite changes. I mean this was the time when I think all this change was becoming much more evident. First and foremost was the role of women. The opportunities for women had been gradually increasing over the years, but really at a snail's pace. In the 1990s it started to really open up. A number of reasons for this. One was the violence of the so-called bubble economy, when there was just lots of money around, lots of job opportunities around. The Japanese population, if you ever go to Japan, it is an extraordinarily crowded and jammed group of islands, but in fact it is a fast aging society so the number of people available for jobs particularly in that time when jobs were increasing by leaps and bounds was not that great. There weren't that many young people around, so that sector of the population that normally would just go to school, graduate, get married and stay at home and tend the kids and clean the house suddenly were right out there in the job market. The whole business of birth control changed as well. Women were now not having babies as quickly. I mean, if it all sounds similar to the changes here in the States, it was. It may be 10 or 20 years later in Japan, but the whole business of what women could do was moving down the same track, at a slower pace but...

Q: But you know, you've seen these changes in a society, and were we trying to reach women's groups? Were things changing for you target audience?

BERRINGTON: Oh yes, well more and more organizations like the sort of Japanese equivalent to the National Organization of Women or whatever. There were groups like that out there. And if they were of a national level of impact, and if they were concerned with issues that we were concerned with, then we would try to work with them, or we would invite them to activities or include them in events that were going on. They would become a part of our target audience. We found out it is a very curious question. We found that many of the kinds of public action groups or community organizations like say consumer groups in the United States. Consumer groups in the U.S. of course, worked for lower prices and for greater availability of goods and higher standards and you know environmental protection and whatnot. In Japan, organizations like consumer groups weren't necessarily working toward the same goals. It is a strange thing about Japanese society, but many of those kinds of pressure groups or lobbying groups had such strong ties to the government already that they were almost part of the government apparatus, so that in a trade issue where our argument was bring in the U.S. good. We argued it will create more competition and lower the prices, which seemed to be an automatic argument for any self respecting consumer organization. No, it didn't fly that way in Japan. The consumer groups there would argue, why do we want American foodstuffs. American foodstuffs would come in and put the Japanese farmers out of business. In other words they were just mouthing the Japanese government line. It was very frustrating for us because we couldn't understand how consumer groups with any self respect could in effect simply parrot what had become a version of the government line. But in Japan, most pressure organizations had to have that kind of political connection to be effective. The idea of being a gadfly or a Ralph Nader type troublemaker would just not a role model for the Japanese. The just didn't see that kind of function doing any good for society. So we did not work as much with some of these organizations that on the surface you would have thought oh the embassy must be working with X and Y, because they were just not that useful a group to go with.
Q: You talked before about bringing in speakers on program themes that had become sort of automatic. How did you find it when you came back this time?

BERRINGTON: Well, as I had said before, a lot of those changes had become fairly well institutionalized, and they had their ups and downs. By the time I got there in 1989, it struck me as being another one of those down periods. But 1989 was an interesting time for the embassy. I am sure nobody really gets any credit for doing this on purpose, but it was as if all the old gang came back. And by that I mean people like Mike Armacost, the ambassador, who had been in Japan as a special assistant with Ambassador Ingersoll years ago when many of us were there during the Carter period that I mentioned earlier. The DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) was a guy named William Breer who was also very familiar with the USIS program and what we were doing. He had been a political counselor in previous years and now he was back as the DCM. Rust Deming was now Political Counselor. Then there were people within USIS who it was now time for them to come back. It just was a very kind of unified and compatible group that was there at that time. The PAO was Rob Nevitt who had been with me in Thailand actually years ago in the late 60's. Although this was his first time in Japan, he understood the value of having a well organized and well thought through and very carefully targeted program. So he had no problems with any of that. Many of the center directors and many of my colleagues in the press office or even within the cultural office they were in agreement as well. So, in effect even though it was a little bit rocky when we all started coming back in the summer of 1989, I would say by the end of the year we had formed a fairly well knit and good program. We all sort of knew how each other could work and it was quite comfortable, the situation.

Q: How did you find by this time ties between American academic institutions and Japanese institutions? Were there strong ties?

BERRINGTON: Not really. There were some sister school type relationships. It didn't work very easily for several reasons. First of all was language. If an American student or American teacher goes to Japan, to be really effective at the university there, he or she has to have Japanese. The classes in Japan are not run in English, they are run in Japanese. How many professors or students in the U.S. are comfortable with the language to be able to do that? The same thing applies in reverse. If a Japanese student or professor is going to go for a year to the sister school or whatever, they have to have good English. Obviously the English level of most Japanese is far better than the Japanese level of most Americans. Even still the English level of too many Japanese, and I am sad to say this is particularly true of the academic community, is insufficient to the task I think academics tend to be less outgoing and have that kind of extroverted personality that you really need to develop a language well, to learn a language well. In any case few academics in Japan had the English ability to survive as a student or a teacher in the U.S. Even though many schools in America and in Japan wanted that kind of relationship, the Americans wanted it because again this is the bubble economy and Japan is rich, money, money. You will remember also at the same time when Japanese businesses were seen as absolute successes. They had the most brilliant management ideas. Things like theory X and all of that where all these books being written. Japan was the hot number of the early 1990s. Everybody wanted to find out what the secret of Japanese success was. So sure there was a lot of interest, but the language was a pretty big barrier for a lot of people.
Secondly, Japanese universities were run by the ministry of education. The ministry of education in Japan has to be one of the most feudalistic, backward, hardened, hard-edged, I mean just a very stubborn bureaucracy which does not like new ideas or change. They found the arrangement running the big state schools, universities of Tokyo or Kyoto, all the best schools, they found it all very comfortable, why should they change? It was working for them. So any type of school agreement, any kind of exchange program that might be set up would have to have the minister of education's stamp of approval. Getting that was sometimes a big problem.

A third problem, again going back to the bubble economy, Japan in those days as you may know from your own experience because you had passed through Japan at that time was extraordinarily expensive place. This was the era of the ten dollar cup of coffee and all the horror stories you hear. Now it was expensive because you were converting from dollars to yen, not necessarily expensive if you had yen to begin with. Nevertheless, that meant a lot of Americans simply wrote Japan off their list. They might have been interested. They would love to go pick up on this or that management program, but they just didn't have the money to spend at that time. So for all those reasons there was not much exchange going on between Japan and the U.S..

Q: Within your circle of Americans and Japanese, were there Cassandras saying look at this economy. It’s a bubble economy based on real estate values and there are real problems or was the atmosphere in the embassy and also in your Japanese's social group this is the way it is going to be.

BERRINGTON: There may have been a few. Unfortunately those that said those things had kind of blotted their notebook with rather anti-or statements critical of Japan that kind of reeked of slightly racist or that evoked memories back to WWII or whatever. Many of the criticisms of Japan that might have been Cassandra like would be somewhat compromised by the known political standing or attitudes of the person that was saying this. It made his or her comments far less credible. I am afraid most of us were pretty guilty of just being sucked up by the enthusiasm of the times.

Yes, a lot of us had lived and worked in Japan knew there were problems, knew that these kinds of inflated prices, property could not go on forever. I mean it was called a bubble economy during that time. We all know what happens to a bubble economy, it bursts. That is the nature of the beast, so we knew it was going to happen sometime. Just when of course, nobody knew. But until that happened, there were a lot of people willing to go out there and join in the party and rake in the money and take advantage of all the opportunity that was there. It is hard to criticize people for not being a little bit more realistic about the weaknesses of the system at that point.

Q: Well, during this time what were your projects that may have been different from other times?

BERRINGTON: One of the big issues for us in the cultural office and in fact it connected with what you were asking earlier. This is what we called the branch campus problem in Japan. What this was because of the reasons I have just explained why there were no sister school relationships or very few, and because of the expense and whatnot. Many American schools wanted, they wanted those Japanese students to come to their campus in Kansas or Texas or New
Hampshire or whatever. But that wasn't going to happen. So if they couldn't get the kids to come to the U.S., what they did was to take the mountain to Mohammed so to speak and they would set up a branch campus, Smith University or Johnson College, you know I am just making names up now. They would set up a branch campus in Japan. The idea was the Japanese students could enroll at this American branch campus, study English, study other kinds of programs, get a degree from this school, and then while staying in Japan, and then move on into employment or whatever. This kind of arrangement was set up usually with the cooperation of local authorities in a city or prefecture or local politicians or local businesses. It was usually seen as a money making machine. Its academic credibility, its academic credentials quickly became suspect. The ministry of education was always very suspicious of this because they didn't like the idea of all these foreigners coming in and setting up branch campuses all over the country. The quality of teachers that were hired to teach at these places sometimes were brought over from the U.S. but often were hired locally. They didn't get great teachers. Some of these schools promised more in the way of programs and degrees than they were prepared to follow through and provide. Well, after about a year or two of all of these schools coming in to set up these campuses, things started to get rather nasty with the ministry of education, parents of students, local authorities and others getting more and more upset with this kind of an arrangement. Lawsuits, threats, started causing political problems. It became quite unpleasant. As a result the embassy was drawn into this because many of the Japanese parents or people from the ministry of education wanted the embassy's input trying to control or bring some stability to what was a very bad situation. So we were very much involved with that problem. That was probably one of the main things that marked the four years I was there. In fact my deputy cultural affairs officer, that was one of the main things he handled, that and nothing but that.

Q: Were we trying to dampen this thing, because it was giving us a bad name.

BERRINGTON: Oh yes. It gave American education a bad name. It gave the schools that came over a bad name. It was just a losing proposition for everybody. The only ones that gained from this were usually the local Japanese businessmen or others who had, because the ministry of education insisted on local control, wanted these Japanese businessmen or politicians to sign on as presidents or members of the board. These guys usually gained financially from this. No problem for them, they were getting money, so if the school didn't do a good job, they didn't care. They were just kind of guys behind the scenes. Often they were, members of the board were not even known to the public at large. Yes, we wanted to put a stop to this kind of academic and financial hanky-panky simply because it was giving a bad reputation to American education and the United States in general.

Q: What issues seemed to come to the fore? How about movies and all just doing their things. It was a business that had been going on for years.

BERRINGTON: Yes, very much so. There was no change there. In fact the 1989-'93 period was largely, because of all the money that was in play, was not a terribly crisis ridden period, except for the continuing trade issues. Even they I don't think seemed quite as bad at times. I mean I can recall you had people like member of congress Helen Bentley [Republican Party], I believe, from Baltimore. She took a sledge hammer to a Japanese car in front of the capitol building one day. It was all a photo opportunity. She didn't just see a car. They had brought in a Japanese car and
then the Congressmen all bashed on it with sledge hammers. [Editor’s Note: In 1987, Bentley organized a public relations stunt in which she and several GOP colleagues used sledgehammers to destroy a Japanese-made radio on the Capitol steps.] That caused a bit of a ruckus in Japan.

No the relationships between the two governments were quite good, quite compatible. The exchange of information, there were even the start of some programs where you were exchanging members of the bureaucracy, members of a Japanese agency might go to the U.S. for six months and work alongside their American counterparts. Then vice versa, members of the U.S. bureaucracy would go to Japan and do the same thing. It was evidence I think of the closeness of the two governments, bureaucracies and how smoothly that it worked.

**Q:** Were we concerned at the time in Japan’s growing prosperity Japan and Japanese entities buying Rockefeller Center and all that and the American reaction of Japanese bashing in the United States?

**BERRINGTON:** Yes, that was always a constant undercurrent. It was frankly because of one basic thing and that is, I am sorry to say, but there is a racist element in America, and Japanese are a different race. Memories of the war were still - most of the veterans were old men - but there were some memories of WWII. You certainly didn't look at the amount of investment in the United States from Holland, Canada, Germany and the UK all of which were still higher than Japan at that point. Yet there was not Dutch bashing or Deutsch bashing or anything like that, but they were behaving this way toward the Japanese. It was hard to not regard it as a form of racism.

**Q:** Is there anything we could do about this?

**BERRINGTON:** Well, no, because this was a problem back in the U.S. of course. The embassy was in no position to have any kind of effect on things back home. I mean newspapers would write editorials or local politicians - a Congressman or a mayor or somebody - would make some inflammatory statements. There were even a few well known academics who would kind of like to wave the flag and engage in this kind of practice. No there wasn't anything we could do about it. If those people came through Tokyo as they occasionally did and wanted to meet with the embassy, of course we would meet with them, and we would try to reason with them and present what we thought was a more accurate realistic picture of what was going on. But a USIS program is not organized to deal back in the U.S. The embassy really had such small resources that we really can not affect the discussion like that back in the U.S.

But Japan was very concerned. The foreign ministry and the Japanese government was definitely upset at this. Constantly when you would go out and meet with, and it wasn't just the government officials. The Japanese people, as I mentioned before in the papers, there was what we called this significance gap where the papers would report on every single thing that happened in the United States that concerned Japan. Even if it were so irrelevant or insignificant, you know if something happened in some small corner of North Dakota or a Congressman that nobody has heard of before or since says something. Who cares? But the Japanese would care. It would get reported in the papers, big headlines, pictures, stories. So the Japanese were definitely concerned because they wondered if things were just going kind of haywire vis-a-vis the U.S.-Japan relationship.
You have to realize the Japanese look at the rest of the world as a source of so much that they need to survive. The energy they need to keep the country going, the cultural stimulation they need to keep society going, all of this comes from abroad. Their main partner, the Japanese are very concerned about the hierarchy of the world situation. In the Japanese eyes, their main partner, their main benefactor, their main ally was the U.S. So if they think something is happening in the U.S. that somehow we are slipping into an anti-Japanese way of thinking, they found this a concern. They were not happy with this. But the Japanese were sometimes their own worst enemy. For example, on American TV, let's say some American politician says something outrageous in the emotion at the moment, you would think that a member of the Japanese embassy or a well known Japanese of some international reputation could then get on American TV or in the U.S. newspapers and do an interview, do something that would show how the Japanese really think or their side of the argument or something that would be persuasive or credible. They had a very hard time doing that. They are just not comfortable speaking in public. They are not good on TV. Their English language ability was always a serious barrier for allowing them to communicate internationally. Several of us in the embassy used to just batter over and over again on the point why don't you train a group of whether it was government officials or scholars or journalists or anybody who can get out there and talk about these issues so that your side of the story is getting across to the public in the U.S.? It is not. You are literally leaving the whole discussion up to the Japan basher side. Why not engage these people; why not present your side of the issue? Over the years a few did emerge, a few Japanese that could do this. But they are not good at public affairs. The whole concept of what we had been doing in our work for years, public diplomacy, is just not a function it is not a value that they have. As a result they suffer from it. I mean the other problem, too, is, I mean if I were ask you to name the Japanese prime ministers since WWII, you would probably have a hard time to give more than about two or three names. Whereas if you were Japanese and I were to ask you to name the American presidents, you could rattle them off, bingo, bango. Or name famous Americans, they they could do that. But could you name some famous Japanese personalities?

Q: This is tape seven side one with Robin Berrington. For famous personalities, how about Mr. Toyota, Mr. Honda, Mr. Sony. But aren’t these made up brand names?

BERRINGTON: No, there really is a Mr. Toyota. There really is a Mr. Honda. If he was to walk into this room you wouldn't even know it. These are not well known. They are not recognized; they are not public personalities like American business leaders or political leaders. Even famous scholars in America like Henry Kissinger will develop into a public personality. That doesn't happen in Japan. {Editor’s Note: sounds like} “Lord Ika,,” who is one of the most impressive people in the 20th. century in Japan, was very much castigated by his peers for being so well known, for having this kind of personality. Why? Because he spoke English, because he was very dynamic and kind of liked to get out there and be in the spotlight. There is an old Japanese saying, if the nail sticks up, it gets pounded down. That is the problem with Japanese society. Any business, government or whatever, anyone who sticks up, who gets attention, society pounds them down. You don't have the kind of individual in Japan that can stand up and say, “That’s wrong,” or be a public speaker. In the States almost all of us have public speaking courses in high school or somewhere along the line. That never happens in Japan. It is just inconceivable in Japanese education. So it is just a totally different attitude about how you deal with each other, how you deal with the public, how you cultivate and nurture personality. As a
result the Japanese are their own worst enemy.

*Q:* You've watched Japan over a period of years since 1969. Do you see a change? Because what you are describing is a national characteristic, but it is a national characteristic that is not a winner's characteristic in a competitive world.

BERRINGTON: Well, and you see what is happening now. After the bubble burst, Japan has really struggled to deal with it. The Japanese used to get very depressed when they would think about how many Nobel Prize winners they had compared with the other countries with similar GNP's or research institutions or level economy or whatever. The reason they don’t is because the idea of promoting innovation, inventiveness and all of this is just not part. It is difficult for me to say why, but it is just not part of again Japanese character. So when the bubble burst and the economy went into such a drastic slide, you know, it has been years and they still are not really sure if they are out of the woods. I remember just a couple of months ago there was something in the papers about how the last quartet it looked like things were finally turning around. But in the quarter after that, it was back into negative figures again. So they haven't come up with any good ideas on how to turn the economy around. There still are not that many well known Japanese personalities or figures that can stand up and excite public emotion. Having said all of that, yes it is changing. It is definitely changing. There are more and more women in business, in government. In the last election there were more women elected than ever before. You know, just a couple of weeks ago in the latest election. More and more companies are being started up, you know the Japans dot-com's have come along. So, yes, the change there is just a much more glacial change. The thing is it is getting better, and it is too bad the bubble economy had to burst when it did and it has taken so long for things to stabilize. I think most of us that have been involved with that country know that it is just a matter of time. They will probably be stronger for the experience. But they do have some definite negatives that they just have to deal with, one of which is the bureaucracy which is so overwhelming and so inflexible and rigid and just tends to dominate every aspect of society.

*Q:* Is there anything else we should talk about or should we move on? Were you there when President Bush visited?

BERRINGTON: Oh, yes. Well, as the cultural attaché, I was always in charge of the wife. On that particular visit, I was in charge of Mrs. Bush. She was terrific. We had a good time. I remember she was interested in problems with old folks so we took her to an old people’s home. She wanted to do some sightseeing and other things. It was a very nice schedule. He was there or 48 hours, two days. On the second day, President Bush was playing tennis with the emperor and the crown prince. Ambassador Mike Armacost was his partner. So it was Bush and Armacost versus the emperor and the crown prince. Mrs. Bush and I got back to the place where they were playing tennis just as the game was winding up. We all sat around and talked. The President looked tired. He had been suffering from a bad cold or something. The Japan stop (January 7-10) was the last in a series of visits that started in Australia on December 31, 1991 and went to Singapore (January 3-5, 1992), and Korea (January 5-7). They went back to the hotel, and at that point the only event for the rest of the day was the state dinner being hosted by the prime minister at his residence. As control officer for the President's wife, I accompany her the whole time she is on her separate schedule. But when she goes back to the President's party, in other
words when she is traveling with the President to a state dinner or whatever, I, as her control officer, back off, because the President's control officer automatically takes her under their umbrella. So I was in effect finished for the rest of the day. It was very tiring as you know. I went home. I was watching the event on TV. This is like 7:30, 8:00 at night. I was watching it on TV when suddenly I saw something was not right. He slumped over. The cameras were way in the back of the room. You couldn't really see up close what was happening, but when everybody realized that the President had slumped over and fallen under the table, then everybody suddenly got very tense. The camera tried to zoom in. But within minutes the phone rang. It was controller of the president's visit. They said, "Robin, be prepared to get down here right away." I said, "Why?" They said, "Well, as you may know, the President has taken ill, and we need somebody to deal with the imperial family."

One of my other functions in the embassy was as the sort of main contact with the Japanese imperial family. This was partly a function of my job but also partly was based on something I had developed over the years by being in Japan so long. I had gotten to know a couple of members of the imperial family through their interest in the arts. One thing led to another. For example, the empress used to call me up if she had questions or she wanted a copy of a book or materials about the United States. She would just call up and say, "Mr. Berrington, can you get this to me?" I would. The emperor and the empress were very interested in music. We would provide music opportunities to them, for example, Orpheus, the chamber music group. When Orpheus came to Japan, I arranged for Orpheus to provide a private concert for the emperor and the empress and their family, because all the members of the imperial family play musical instruments. The idea was they would be able to play with Orpheus.

I was often invited to accompany the crown prince when he would go to maybe an opera or a ballet because they liked to have a foreigner or two with the official party, and because I could speak Japanese and I knew him, I was an easy pick. I would often be invited to their houses or palaces for dinner parties or cocktail parties. I wasn't a foreigner that was going to embarrass them or cause trouble, and being cultural attaché doesn't hurt either. So anyway when the President got sick, there was just immediate concern that the imperial family would get very concerned because the President and the ambassador had been playing tennis with the emperor and the crown prince and would the emperor feel upset that maybe the President had overdone himself or they had not been good tennis players. Concerns like that. So they wanted me down there in case someone from the imperial palace showed up with flowers or just in case. So I said, "Sure, of course. I'll come down." As it turned out they quickly realized that all he had was stomach flu. As you know of course, he up chucked his dinner in the prime minister's lap. When they took him back to the hotel and had the doctor look at him, they knew exactly what the problem was. It turned out the emperor didn't show up or the crown prince didn't come and there was nothing like that, and I didn't have to do anything. But, it was quite a tumultuous evening.

Q: While we are on the subject, do you see an evolving role of the emperor, the crown prince, and the royal family or were they hemmed in by the court bureaucracy that sounds like something out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

BERRINGTON: Yes, yes, yes. They were hemmed in, and the bureaucracy was an extraordinary one. Everything I have said about Japanese bureaucracy, just multiply it by three or four times.
and you will have the imperial household agency. Probably the most hidebound, conservative, tradition oriented, inflexible, rigid bureaucracies in all of Japan. Because it is the emperor's bureaucracy, they feel that what they say goes. They don't have to worry about what others think. You know, we speak for the emperor. I can remember one time when Reagan...

_Q: The emperor at this time was Akihito._

BERRINGTON: The emperor was Akihito. His father Hirohito did it the same way. But, Akihito, you have to remember, was tutored by an American Quaker. One (Elizabeth Gray) Mrs. Vining.

_Q: She wrote _Windows For the Crow_ n Prince: Akihito of Japan._

BERRINGTON: Yes. So there has been…this was of course during the occupation after the war, and American influence there helped to raise Akihito, who was the Crown prince at that time, with an westernized outlook and slightly better exposure to the outside world. I mean he went to Gakushuin University which in the old days was a peer school, peer meaning nobility. The peer schools then after the war opened up to a lot more people. The current crown prince also went to Gakushuin but went to Oxford as well. This is the first time a member of the royal family or I should say an, crown prince level of the imperial family had been to university outside of Japan. Akihito, of course, married a commoner. The empress is not a member of one of the collateral imperial families of the old nobility. Her father was a flower maker. I don't mean flowers like in the garden but flour that makes bread. I mean he was a very wealthy, very well placed businessman. That marriage was something that just didn't happen. It was definitely arranged, and all the things that led to it were carefully orchestrated. So the family is changing, but the bureaucracy still calls the shots. But it is opening up, it is loosening quite a bit. I mean the fact that of some of my closest friends who were nephews of the emperor, the fact that they could do some of the things that they did. I mean they weren’t in the immediate line. You know it would take three or four deaths before they would ever get up there, but some of them went to school in Canada or Australia. Some of them married commoners. On down the line, so things are shaking up. But the imperial family is very much a reflection of Japan. They are a very reticent family. Everything is kept very close to the vest. None of them are very outspoken or individualistic in any way. They are all very careful in what they say. They are basically cake cutters and ship launchers. They preside over fundamentally ceremonial and other kinds of state functions like that. They don't have what you would call glamorous or exciting lives.

_Q: Compared to what has been happening in the royal family in England, they are probably well off._

BERRINGTON: Well, the Japanese family is probably in much better shape. Most people tend to respect the Japanese family. They do not particularly want to be like them, but they tend to respect them, and they are not held in the kind of ridicule or disregard that the English are. It is a totally different family system.
Mr. Breer was born and raised in California and educated at Dartmouth College and Columbia University. After service in the US Army, he entered the Foreign Service in 1961. Throughout his career, Mr. Breer dealt primarily with Japanese, Korean and general Southeastern Asia affairs. His overseas posts include Kingston, Tokyo (three times), and Yokohama. His Washington assignments also concerned principally Japan and Korea. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo from 1989 to 1993. Mr. Breer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is October 12, 1999. Bill you are DCM in Japan from 1989-93. I can’t think of a job that is more foreordained for you. How did that come about?

BREER: I was office director of Japan affairs in the State Department in the spring of 1989 and Mike Armacost was nominated and shortly thereafter he asked me if I wanted to be his DCM.

Q: What was Armacost’s experience in Japan?

BREER: He had been there as a teacher at ICU (International Christian University) in 1969. I guess he had been teaching at Columbia University before that. Then he had served as the special advisor to Ambassador Ingersoll from 1972-74. Then he had worked on Japanese affairs and after that, I think, went to policy planning. He was the deputy assistant secretary for East Asia in the Defense Department, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, and may have served at the NSC.

Q: The ambassador sets the ground rules as to how he is going to use his DCM. How did Armacost use you?

BREER: Mike was a kind of hands on person. I think he used me to make sure the embassy functioned properly, that any visitors were accommodated properly and as an advisor. We talked about policy a lot. He didn’t really set out specific ground rules. He just sort of expected that I knew what I was supposed to do and what he wanted to have done. We were together a lot. I was in the meetings with him and all the important visitors, which is kind of traditional.

Q: Obviously you had been dealing with it in Washington, but when you arrived back in Japan did you find the political climate was changing in Japan?

BREER: Not when we arrived so much. We were through with the FSX issue although its after effects were still being felt in Japan, but we had a deal for co-production and were moving ahead with that. Japan was still booming and the Japanese were full of vigor and dollars. I don’t think the political climate had changed all that much.

Q: Would you say that around 1989 the United States was suffering a decline?
BREER: Well, yes. Many Japanese thought that we were on a permanent decline and would never recover economically and they were on a permanent upward path which would never taper off or decline. So, the crash the following year was a shock to the Japanese.

Q: Did you find that this had any repercussions in how the embassy and the United States was dealing with Japan? Was there a feeling that maybe these guys have the answer?

BREER: I think that was a more general feeling in American business because I think during the ‘80s despite the trade problem and complaints about unfair practices, etc. they were trying to figure out what made Japan tick. We certainly came back with more competitive vehicles in the ‘90s. So, I think we learned from the Japanese experience of the ‘80s in terms of quality and on-time delivery.

Q: Was there any feeling of wait until next year because the United States was beginning to retool and rethink business practices?

BREER: I didn’t feel that at that point. I don’t think it was a wide spread feeling in the United States that we were on the way back. I think we were still kind of gloom and doom at that point.

Q: How did you find all these disparate groups that huddled around the embassy or were attached to the embassy like trade, FBI, etc? It is a huge embassy and practically every department had a representative there. How did they fit together?

BREER: Loosely. The trade people, though, I think gained considerable amount of presence in Japan. The foreign commercial service was gaining some momentum at the end of the ‘80s and had some very bright people in Japan who were aggressively seeking out issues and solutions for them. A major one was the Narita International Airport which was in the early stages of planning in 1988-89. It was a big part of our construction industry negotiations with the Japanese in the ‘80s and ‘90s. I discovered huge turf problems among law enforcement agencies which I don’t think I ever did resolve because those can be resolved only in Washington when these guys figure out the line of demarcation on drugs and currency laundering, etc.

Q: Was there concern about possible Japanese mafia and our own connections?

BREER: I don’t think it was that strong in those days, but there was concern about drugs and the Japanese were in a period of denial about drug use by Japanese. Japan was the most affluent market in the world, although I don’t think the problem ever approached the level that we had here at that time. There was some coordination but it was an uphill effort.

Q: Did the turf wars between DEA and the FBI and all cause any embarrassment for the embassy?

BREER: It was pretty much an internal turf war although I’m sure the Japanese knew what was going on.
Q: Was there any problem working with the trade representative organization to keep them from being overly aggressive?

BREER: I can’t think of any incident when we tempered our trade policy because of security interest.

Q: This a time when there is considerable sort of Japan bashing in the movies, editorials, etc. The United States was feeling hurt that it was not considered number one. Did that cause you problems?

BREER: I think most of us were interested in and hoped for a more constructive engagement because we had major security interests and the cold war wasn’t over yet and we needed at least cooperation to continue our foreign policy aimed at having peace and stability in the region. And, also aimed at deterring North Korea and providing a platform from which to operate in Korea in case of an emergency. In retrospect the FSX issue was not so much a crisis or setback in U.S. relations as much as it was an issue that had to be dealt with and we had to find some way to reconcile the ambitions of Japan to built its own aircraft which was kind of understandable with our trade problems and the interests here of playing a role in whatever advanced aircraft the Japanese make and protecting American commercial interests. In other words, there was a strong feeling here of why shouldn’t the Japanese buy aircraft right off the shelf from us when we had a trade deficit with them. Wouldn’t that help balance the trade deficit.

Q: Also, President Bush was from Texas where General Dynamics is located. Was that at all an issue?

BREER: Not directly, but obviously it may have been more directly connected with other parts of Washington.

Q: During the time you were there how did this play out?

BREER: It played out that everybody sat down and went to work to build the FSX. I have forgotten the exact division of labor but we were to provide computers and the Japanese were going to manufacturer a super high tech kind of plane. We did haggle over the division of contracts and I have forgotten exactly how it was worked out but it was something like they got 60 percent and we got 40 percent. The American contractors moved a whole bunch of engineers and I think everybody sat down and worked the night away and tried to build this airplane. And they built it. There have been some test flights and I think they found some problems with the wings. I’m not sure if it is flying yet.

Q: When you were there did Okinawa cause any problems?

BREER: I don’t think there was any major incidents in Okinawa, but Okinawa is always a place that is somewhat contentious. American bases occupy a great deal of land in the southern part of Okinawa. We had consolidated, moving out of bases near downtown Naha by the end of the ‘80s and many of them are still vacant. But, still it was taking up a high percentage of a restricted land mass and injecting a large number of U.S. forces and families into a densely populated alien land.
space is not easy. But, I don’t think there were any huge problems at the time.

Q: *You were there during the tremendous changes in our relations with the Soviet Union. At the very end I guess it ceased to be the Soviet Union.*

BREER: Yes. On my way to the embassy one day on passing the Soviet embassy the gates were open and they were having a flag raising ceremony of the Russian flag.

Q: *Did that cause any changes, particularly concerning the northern islands issue?*

BREER: I think some Japanese thought it was the time to take advantage of Russia and really push hard on the northern islands issue. It was a mistaken impression. I think, because the last thing Russia wanted to deal with was more territorial breakup. I think we tried to engage Japan in providing financial assistance to Russia and that was more or less successful. They were kind of reluctant, I think, given the territorial question.

Q: *What about the Gulf War?*

BREER: That was probably the biggest trauma during my entire stay there.

Q: *The embassy must have been pushing against Japan to give assistance.*

BREER: We were trying to figure out all kinds of things. Many Japanese colleagues were trying to work with us to find ways in which Japan might be seen as supporting the western effort. We talked about using [Japanese] aircraft. We talked about Japanese aircraft for transport, ships for transporting goods and moving refugees. We tried all kinds of things and nothing visible ever worked given Japan’s constitution and politics at the time. Finally, they first put up $4 billion and then $9 billion for support of the cost of the war. Neither one of those ever got much publicity. So, Japan didn’t get much credit for their help but got a lot of criticism for not being on the scene. It was a period of really serious strain in Japan, strain between us too but, there were Japanese who were embarrassed that Japan couldn’t find a more positive way to support the United Nations. Itchino was one of them and is still around in politics and pushing for Japan to be able to send troops abroad. He called it “normalization.” That led, I think, pretty directly to the split in the LDP and the current political situation we have now with a coalition situation.

Q: *How did we feel about Japan being a “normal” nation. Germany has gone through the same trauma and after all the war has been over for more than fifty years. In a way we have all grown comfortable with a Japan that is sort of out of it and wasn’t intruding its own interests and more or less following what we wanted or at least staying out of the way. Were there internal debates about what we wanted Japan to do?*

BREER: There were debates in Washington. Most of the Japan experts understood that Japan was not going to be able to participate militarily or even in a support role. They did dispatch minesweepers to the Gulf after the war was over. They played a crucial role in cleaning up the Gulf and they were exposed to some danger. At the same time we all believed that Japan could and should play a more responsible role. We had been urging Japan for a decade to play a more
responsible role in the [Middle East]. But our definition, of course, was as we see it. But, this was one time that despite the fact they have the constitutional restraints, political restraints, and legal restraints, I think a lot of people were acutely embarrassed by Japan’s inability to move quickly to play a big role. They didn’t come through with their second contribution of money until the war was almost over. But, they did pay it in full. Between the time the Diet appropriated money and the time it came to pay it, the yen had appreciated to the tune of $6,700,000,000. We said they had promised us $9 billion and they went back and coughed up the foreign currency difference.

Q: Did you find the embassy in the unenviable position of trying to explain Japan to Secretary of State James Baker and President Bush? These were men who were familiar with the situation but had a crisis on their hands and they wanted more.

BREER: I think we were reasonably successful in explaining the situation. Armacost met with the Japanese leadership a lot, privately and otherwise, and wrote a lot of his own cables about what was going on. I think Washington had a pretty good feel but that didn’t make that much difference.

Q: Did Secretary Baker come out?

BREER: Treasury did come out.

Q: On this issue?

BREER: Yes. The first time was in September. Secretary Brady came out and met with Hashimoto and walked away with, I think, $4 billion. The second meeting, I think, was January of the next year, just about the time the war ended, took place between Hashimoto and others in New York. Hashimoto and Ozawa played a key role in Japan’s coming up with the money. They were deeply embarrassed by the fact that Japan was paralyzed over the issue.

Q: What was their background? Do they represent a newer generation? I’m not familiar with these gentlemen.

BREER: They were both younger men then the leadership. Hashimoto was in his early 50s and Ozawa about 50 and were regarded as the young leadership in the party. Hashimoto was the more traditional politician. Ozawa wanted Japan to play a role and be seen to be playing that role. Hashimoto was a little more reluctant, I think, but Ozawa had the upper hand at that time. They had a very weak prime minister in Mr. Kaifu. The foreign office was under heavy pressure to try to figure out something to do.

Q: Did it come rather quickly to the general public’s attention that their oil supplies were being challenged by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait?

BREER: Yes, but, there was also a feeling in Japan that oil could be obtained at a price. If Iraq took over Kuwait they would still have to sell their oil.
Q: Was there still the same sense of outrage that I think hit the United States?

BREER: I don’t think quite as strong.

Q: How about the takeover?

BREER: There was a feeling that Kuwaiti leadership was no better than any other leadership in the Middle East, no more democratic.

Q: The Kuwaiti leadership is one of the problems.

BREER: They are back in there now aren’t they?

Q: Yes, they are back in. I have talked with people who have dealt with it in the area and the Kuwaitis seemed to have gone out of their way before to stick it to the United States. In other words, it was not considered a really friendly regime.

BREER: I never thought we should reinstall them.

Q: Well, I guess we had a real problem there. How about the financial shock, the stock market crash? Were warning bells going off by our economic counselors, etc?

BREER: Yes, I think everybody was skeptical of the stock market at whatever it was, 37,000 yen with P/E ratios off the chart, much worse than our market is today.

Q: Profit sharing ratio?

BREER: Yes, price ratios. Market share was more important [than profits]. They have learned now that they have to have profits to stay in business, I think to some extent. Other than that, and, of course, real estate was sky high, too. There was a vacation colony that we used to visit once in a while where land about the size of a suite or maybe twice the size of a suite was $3 million with a house on it. They were asking that, I’m not sure they ever got it. I don’t recall anyone sounding the alarm. A lot of people had gotten used to the Japanese economic and financial management with heavy leveraged debt for the private sector.

Q: How did we respond when this happened? Were we basically observers? Did it make much difference to the United States?

BREER: I don’t really remember but it must have scared the hell out of the people here when a foreign market like that collapsed. It was the most heavily capitalized stock market in the world. People must have been scared that the whole house of cards was coming down. I don’t think really that Japanese prosperity ended with that. After all, only three or four years later the market doubled. I don’t think anybody realized the magnitude of the problems it caused until much later. But, during the bubble period people were putting up $1 million property as collateral for loans that two or three years later were worth only $250,000. I’m sure that hit some people, but I don’t think it hit the general public as heavily, except that there were a lot of people who bought
houses at a peak rate only to find the value of their houses were cut in half but they still had to pay the same mortgage. There is a lot of that still going on. Gradually, over a period of three or four years it became apparent that things were not going to revive immediately. The Japanese economy wasn’t miraculous, capable of pulling off miracles, so there would be a decade of retrenchment.

Q: Were there any other issues that we had to deal with?

BREER: We had trade, of course, although it came upon the scene towards the end of the Bush administration. They had been on the scene but we had voluntary restraints that nobody acknowledged but nevertheless enforced. It gave some breathing space to the American embassy and then Toyota and Nissan were able to increase their exports.

There were disputes over parts procurement in the United States, because we found that the Japanese would build a factory and also bring along a lot of their suppliers and set them up in the factory rather than buying from American suppliers. Then gradually they increased the share of suppliers. But then those companies became American so that became an issue for traditional American auto parts. Now it is all mixed up. Some suppliers supplied the Japanese as well as GM and what have you.

There was a lot of concern also about Japanese purchases of property in the United States including Rockefeller Center, a piece of Time-Warner, all of Waikiki, hotels, movie studios, etc. Half of the office buildings in downtown LA were owned by Japanese. Many feared that if the buying rate continued at the same pace, soon the Japanese would own the whole country. There was a lot of jingoism about that. I didn’t notice it so much after I went to Japan, but it was certainly clear the last year I was in Japan. But, of course, the collapse of the bubble slowed all of that way down and then the collapse of real estate in the United States in 1990 killed their investments here as well. They took big losses on that. They took bigger losses later on in the ‘90s when the dollar went to 180 yen or something like that.

Q: When you left there in 1993, were you seeing a more normal relationship? The trade issues were sort of working themselves out.

BREER: By 1993 the trade deficit was going down. The decline of real estate value stopped the exuberant purchaser. They weren’t buying real estate at bargain rates. The market crashed here in Washington. My daughter and son-in-law bought a house in 1989 and they are staying in it.
foreign posts as Economic and Commercial Officer. In the State Department in Washington, she occupied several senior positions in the trade and economic fields. Ms. White was also a Japan specialist. Ms. White was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

WHITE: I was only there for a year and then I went to the Japan desk (EAP/J) and became head of the economic section there. I began the summer of 1990 and soon after I arrived Iraq invaded Kuwait, so that was the dominant problem for many people.

Q: Was it the same issues on the economic side or were things changing?

WHITE: On the trade side we continued the Structural Impediments talks and I did a lot of work on the distribution system. The Kuwait/Iraq war ended up consuming a lot of our time. Japan was in a unique and uncomfortable position because of Article 9 of their Constitution. Written by the American Occupation authorities, it says that Japan is not allowed to have a military and not allowed to take aggressive military action in international affairs. The Japanese embraced the concept whole-heartedly after the miseries of World War II and became intensely pacifistic as a nation (despite the fact that their Self-Defense Forces are well trained and well equipped.)

When the coalition formed against Iraq, Japan couldn’t put boots on the ground both for legal reasons and because of public opinion. Many Americans didn’t understand these constraints. We got a lot of calls from congressional offices asking how much of Japan’s oil was coming from the Middle East. It was a very high percentage, at least 80%, and that figure obviously showed up in Congressional speeches, e.g. “Japan gets all its oil from the Middle East and they’re not sending any soldiers. They’re letting us spill blood for their economic growth.” The anti-Japanese feelings generated by trade problems were greatly exacerbated by Japan’s passive posture.

On the economic side of the war, we got involved in heavy USG pressure on the Japanese to contribute money and eventually they gave about $14 billion to the war effort. They were the only country that actually raised taxes to pay for the Iraq war and for the coalition. It was a difficult process and left bad feelings. A high level official Treasury went in to negotiate this amount but the agreement failed to specify whether it was going to be in dollars or yen. The Japanese said they agreed to a certain amount in yen, but the Americans expected the $14 billion. When the exchange rate went the other way, it got quite unpleasant. There was no good record of the meeting for our side because Treasury didn’t allow any Foreign Service Officers in the room to take notes.

The end result of all these problems was that when the coalition had its victory parade down Constitution Avenue, the Japanese weren’t invited to sit on the viewing stand with all the other members of the coalition despite the fact that they basically paid all the American costs of the war. When Kuwait took out full page ads in the New York Times and Washington Post thanking all the countries that had helped them, the Japanese weren’t mentioned. The Japanese were angry and humiliated and they still remember the slights. The people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were working on these issues were very burned by that experience and determined never to see it repeated. We saw the results in a much more positive way after 9/11 when they were quick
to respond and offer help to the U.S. It shows now in their involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq today, which is far more than I would have expected 15 years ago.

**Q: During this time you were dealing with a country whose nose is out of joint and probably quite rightfully so.**

**WHITE:** The Japanese ended up doing things that were enormously difficult for them, even though it was hard for outsiders to see that. Their political system moved very slowly. While there were sophisticated people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office who knew they had to take action — send medics, send mine sweepers, make some physical not just financial contribution — they were stymied by a rigid system. Because the U.S. had provided a security guarantee, they had rested on their peace constitution and hadn’t had to define their military role in the world. They eventually ended up sending some mine sweepers, and they did their best to send trucks and autos, vehicles that the troops welcomed for their good air conditioning. U.S. forces modified them for military use but even with the vehicles they made bizarre distinctions. The public and politicians were so wedded to Article 9 that the use of their vehicles in combat situations was unacceptable to them. The vehicles could carry bandages, but not ammunition, that sort of thing. Of course they were used in many ways and some Ministry people were well aware of this but wanted it to be kept quiet. A number of Japanese worked very hard to be supportive and it was hard for them to see the lack of public gratitude.

**Q: Were there any warning signs about the Japanese economy and the overinflated bank loans at the time?**

**WHITE:** What we started seeing at that time was the real estate price boom, the bubble that got to ridiculous proportions. That started in the early ’90s because a lot of companies held real estate as collateral. They were able to borrow on it and then it became like a pyramid scheme to the degree that at one point the theory was that the Imperial Palace land was worth more than the state of California. The high prices allowed companies to borrow against the land that they had in Tokyo or other cities and then use that money for all sorts of speculation.

It became a bilateral problem when the Japanese began investing in a major way in the U.S. On the one hand, states were trying very hard to get Japanese direct investment in their states. Some states had offices in Tokyo and people working to get companies to come with job-producing factories. They offered subsidies and other incentives. The actual physical plant investment wasn’t a problem, but when the Japanese started buying Rockefeller Center and Pebble Beach Golf Course people noticed. These purchases were so visible that there was a strong negative reaction, e.g. “the Japanese are going to buy up this country.” At one point a Time Magazine cover had the Statue of Liberty wearing a kimono.

The other one that caused a lot of attention was Sony’s purchase of MGM. I was in the Under Secretary’s office at the time, so it was probably 1989. He was one of the people who sat on the investment review committee called CFIUS, Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. They were asked to review anything that might involve national security, which usually meant a European company buying up a high tech manufacturing concern, but in this case somebody asked CFIUS to go over the motion picture purchase, perhaps for fear the Japanese would use
films for propaganda purposes. McCormack’s view was that the case should go through the long process rather than an expedited review so that Congress and other critics could be satisfied that a very careful look had been taken. In the end the purchase was not blocked.

Q: Of course nobody knew what would happen. It didn’t seem that Sony Pictures was going to produce Japanese language pictures.

WHITE: No, the fear was somehow Sony would become a propaganda arm of Japanese business/government. One critic pointed to the film Exodus and how much an effect it had in generating American sympathy toward Israel. What if the Japanese started doing that? But that was a rather far-fetched idea, as people are so sophisticated these days and were quite anti-Japanese and suspicious at the time.

Q: Then there was a joke going around about a new ad campaign, now we bring you the new Toyota by those wonderful folks who brought you Pearl Harbor.

WHITE: People used the phrase “economic Pearl Harbor” and that indicates the strong negative feelings toward the Japanese. But their economic onslaught turned out to run its course, and they were actually buying land at highly inflated prices that left them holding bad investments. And not just land. We also saw the Japanese buying Van Gogh paintings for huge sums of money and many purchases went downhill. They ended up holding on to vastly overpriced land and buildings, particularly in Hawaii. They’re still recovering from the prices that they paid for buildings and hotels there.

JOSEPH A. B. WINDER
Economic Minister
Tokyo (1990-1993)

Joseph A. Winder was born in New York in 1939. He received a BA from the University of Michigan in 1964 and his MBA in 1965. Mr. Winder served in the US Army from 1959 to 1962. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1966, he was posted in Santiago, Bonn, Jakarta, Bangkok and Tokyo. In 1999 Mr. Winder was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

WINDER: …Ambassador Armacost in Japan asked me if I would come to be economic minister and I jumped at the opportunity because I had done economic work most of my career, Japan was the center of the Asian economy and U.S.-Japan economic relations were really one of the most important in our entire foreign relations. I thought it would be a wonderful way to cap my career and so took the job.

Q: And, you did that from when to when?

WINDER: I did that from 1990 to 1993. I that three years in Tokyo and enjoyed it very, very much. It was a good period in our relationship, although we had some frictions. We made the
transition between the Bush and Clinton administrations which wasn’t easy because the Clinton administration team came in saying that the Reagan and Bush teams were all wrong and they were going to do it their way. Changes were more style than substance. We had a lot of activity going on with Japan. A lot of interaction in a whole range of various trade issues primarily. I was sort of the ambassador’s deputy on the economic side and viewed my position that way as did he and the DCM, Bill Breer. So, I was able to get out and about in the business community. I put a lot of time and effort in cultivating the Japanese business community because I thought it was important that they knew Washington’s perspective and conversely that Washington knew their perspective. I think I was reasonably effective in broadening our ties with that group.

There had been some friction between the economic and commercial section when I arrived and the commercial minister and I quickly sorted that out. We represented USTR’s (U.S. Trade Representative) interest in Thailand, and I think very effectively. There had been some moves in USTR before I arrived and there was some notion that perhaps they ought to send a USTR official from their own office out there. I think they were satisfied with the way we handled their affairs. We worked with the Commerce Department. It was good. There was a lot of interagency coordination. A lot of working with the different Japanese ministries - MITI, telecommunications, fair trade, etc. It was very rewarding.

Q: Japan has the reputation of being an absolutely closed market, but it had been changing. How did you find the market when you went there and what were we doing?

WINDER: Japan is always difficult to assess in that regard. Looking at it closely, it looks like there are huge obstacles to market access. And looking at it through a longer time frame, there is change, but it is very slow and frustrating to people. By the time I had left, the conclusion I had come to was that the market for American products that were sold directly to consumers was relatively open. Clothing, toys, consumer goods of one kind or another, things that people bought that were recognizably foreign could get in the country. The big problem was with American products that companies bought as components for other operations. In the case of automobile parts, machine tools, things that companies bought as part of their investment program or for working capital, the traditional links between the purchasing agent on the one hand and the sellers on the other were extremely difficult to penetrate. That was true in a number of different sectors including automobiles, glass, paper, telecommunications, government procurement, etc. It was a source of great frustration to us to be unable to make more progress, quite frankly in breaking down those barriers. The business-to-business ties were long standing and very, very difficult to penetrate.

Q: What was the instrument that one dealt with on these ties?

WINDER: We had a number of mechanisms in dealing with the Japanese. In the ‘80s we tended to focus on sectors in particular and engaged in a lot of sectoral negotiations, whether it was construction or automobiles or pharmaceutical equipment. We took problems a sector at a time. In the late ‘80s the administration decided that the talks ought to be much broader. To look at structural impediments, there was something set up called the SII (structural impediments initiative). A process was established whereby on the Japanese side, the finance ministry, foreign ministry, and MITI all participated and on the U.S. side there was a broad range of people from
State, Commerce, Treasury, USTR, etc. The hope was that it would bring some of the economic ministries in Japan into the process and perhaps put some pressure on them to make some of the necessary changes.

When I arrived the SII was in full swing and we actually made quite a bit of headway, I think, in getting them to make some changes in some of their procedures. Unfortunately, dealing with the Japanese is to change one procedure but not another. So, it is sort of like peeling an onion where you never quite seem to get at the core, although you make a little headway. At the same time we were doing SII, we were still continuing an emphasis on sectors. A double whammy approach.

The Clinton administration didn’t like the SII stuff and came up with a different process called the “framework.” The “framework” was a process that looked at economic issues and structural issues at the same time. Of course, that is what the Republicans had done, too, but had just called it by a different name. The main difference was the Democrats thought they ought to focus more on results than on process, so if the Japanese agree to a specific result you would have more success. The Japanese said they were not going to do quotas and not going to agree to that. So, they were able to somehow fudge it over in such a way that the United States could call it results and the Japanese would say it isn’t. The end result was the continued series of negotiations in sectors as well as more broad negotiations in the framework process.

Q: As economic minister, were you involved entirely in trade? There must have been a major portion that wasn’t.

WINDER: That was my main area of interest. We had long standing financial ties between the Japanese finance ministry and the U.S. treasury department and those contacts stayed pretty much in their own framework. I chaired regularly a meeting with the financial attaché and the commercial minister and the agricultural attaché in an attempt to make sure that we all knew what each other was doing. I represented that group in the daily senior staff meetings that the ambassador held and I kept them informed about what was going on in the senior staff meetings. But, basically the Treasury and Finance Ministry talks had their own momentum. Even though I was economic minister, I was head of the State Department part of the embassy, so my job on the other areas, both agriculture and finance, and to some extent commerce, pretty much handled the trade promotion aspects of U.S. business interests. We, in the economic section, took care of the policy side whether it had to do with civil aviation, or trade. Civil aviation was a big deal. We had a lot civil aviation negotiations with the Japanese. Market access basically, trying to get more slots at the airport for our planes. We had a variety of different areas that we worked with. But, I think, the frictions were mainly in the trade area.

Q: Was there any disquiet when we were looking at the Japanese situation about investment, borrowing type of organizations which not too long thereafter caused real problems?

WINDER: I am not sure what you mean.

Q: Weren’t there too many loans or too much money on real estate?

WINDER: We were concerned about the Japanese economy, that is true. The real estate bubble
burst while I was there. The time I arrived in Japan was interesting. At the time in early 1990s, Japan was king of the hill. Books were out saying that the United States was never able to keep up with Japan and had sort of turned everything over to them. They are eating our lunch everywhere all across the board and it is all our fault. And, we shouldn’t let it continue. By the time I left, the Japanese economy was in the doldrums and no body was talking anymore about poor American manufacturing and good Japanese manufacturing. The American manufacturing sector had reinvented itself. It had re-structured, downsized, focused on core competence and focused on the kinds of things it needed to do and was again very competitive. The Japanese industry was just entering that period and they still haven’t worked their way through it. So, when I arrived, if anyone had said the Japanese were going to have negative growth, you would have been laughed out of the room. And, now, if you think you are going to have positive growth of one percent you are laughed out of the room. It is an amazing turn around.

PAUL E. WHITE
Development Counselor, USAID

Mr. White was born and raised in Indiana. He received his education at Sacramento State College, Valparaiso University and the East-West Center in Hawaii. He joined USAID in 1970. During his career with that Agency, Mr. White served in Vientiane, Seoul, Phnom Penh, Panama City, Lima, Guatemala City, Tokyo and Mexico City. He also had tours of duty at USAID Headquarters in Washington. Mr. White was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.

Q: You say you were doing this for a couple of years, we get up to 1991, 1992. Then what?

WHITE: Well, a couple of things happened. First of all, the person in AID who ran Asia, Near East, South Asia, Pacific Bureau [Assistant Administrator Carol Adelman] decided that was far too much for one person and so they split it up into an Asia bureau and a Middle East bureau and an Eastern Europe office. And the person I had been working for maintained, while the Asia bureau moved she made the argument within AID that the political programs should stay with her and that meant keeping the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Cambodia with her, even though some of those programs should have moved to Asia. She maintained the Middle East and Eastern Europe. So there was a date set for when all of the programs in Asia would move to her and we talked about that and I decided that at that point, when those programs moved to the Asia bureau, I would move on. But before that happened AID decided that they wanted to put a person in Japan to help coordinate U.S. foreign assistance with the Japanese foreign aid program, that was now the world’s largest program. And my name came out of the computer as having had some Japanese. So I was approached and asked if I would be interested in accepting that job. I said, “Yes” and so in 1991, as those Asia programs were leaving the bureau, I left and went to Japan from 1991 to 1998.

Q: Wow! What were you doing?
WHITE: That's a good question. When I got there the head of their aid program made it clear that I was there at Japan’s request and they had had so much trouble trying to coordinate with AID because we’re decentralized that he wanted someone close at hand in the Embassy who could help him, advise them on how they approach AID, who they worked with and all of that. So from Japan’s perspective, that was why I was there.

From our perspective, I was there for several reasons. The Japanese aid program was largely infrastructure transfer to countries. They did almost nothing on policy. They did almost nothing, how should I say it, trying to use their aid as a lever for trying to achieve different kinds of policy in countries. They did nothing on the soft side, that is in democracy, women in development, environment, HIV/AIDS, population. That just was not a part of what they did in their aid program. They built buildings and supplied equipment. So my job was to try to move them towards a program that would look more like our program.

So those were the two big reasons why I was there. What I did is, I spent most of my day, I learned very quickly that JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) was not AID’s counterpart, that JICA was more like a consultant. JICA was not part of the government of Japan, for instance. Their aid program was run by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So that became my key counterpart and I spent every day over at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, either trying to figure out what they were doing and why, or how I could influence them to do different things.

Q: What was your impression of the Japanese aid structure?

WHITE: Before I went there, my impression was that JICA, their grant aid group, was our counterpart. I quickly learned that their aid structure was very different than that, that what they had was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs that made all of the policy decisions and then a series of implementing bodies, JICA being one, but also their Ministry of Trade and Industry, their Ministry of Fisheries, they put their money out to various implementation organizations. So that was very different from anything I had confronted before and almost immediately I started thinking in terms of, if USAID ever were to become part of the State Department our program would probably start to look more like the Japanese program. While my job was to change them to look like us, what I saw down the pike was possibly us changing to look more like them.

Q: How about your counterparts? Would they have a different attitude than you did, did you find

WHITE: Yeah, certainly they had a different attitude. I think the Japanese aid program started as war reparations in the Greater East Asia area where the Japanese had ravaged so many cultures and countries. So in a sense they were paying back the Koreans and the Thai and all of the East Asian countries. They saw aid as a concentric circle, where you put almost all of your money in your neighbors in East Asia and you trickled just a little bit off to Africa and South America and other places, largely because of international community pressure to cover the world, but that East Asia was the primary target. So they could never understand why the U.S. didn’t have that same philosophy and why we didn’t basically concentrate our aid program on South America and then a little bit elsewhere.
Another big difference that we had was over the issue of equipment and buildings. They built things, they equipped things. They had a lot of white elephants. They built things that countries couldn’t run. They couldn’t understand how we could go in with soft assistance, curriculum reform and teacher training. To them those all seemed like interferences in the affairs that should have been of those countries, whereas they were just coming in and doing something that was apolitical and providing a wherewithal for someone to have a better building and perhaps have better research because they had better equipment but they weren’t interfering in the structure of the country. So we had some pretty major differences.

Q: Did you make any difference, you feel, or did they make any difference with you?

WHITE: I think we made a huge difference on them. Their program now looks very similar to ours. When I first went there, it was the (George H.W.) Bush Administration and they had a program for working with the Japanese called the Global Partnership and under the Global Partnership what we tried to do was institute a few really large cooperation projects around the world. So we started…one way to get them to work in environment, for instance, we negotiated with them to do a joint environmental project in Indonesia, where we put in ten million dollars, the Japanese put in ten million dollars and the Indonesians put in ten million dollars, so a thirty million dollar project to do biodiversity in Indonesia. So we tried to use our money as leverage to get them to do things that they hadn’t done before. That Global Partnership started several projects like that, large projects around the world and then all of a sudden the Bush Administration ended and the Clinton Administration came in and we were in the midst of this shift, so the question was what do we do? And we decided to continue with the program but change the name. So we changed the name to the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda and continued to work with the Japanese. We got them to commit a huge amount of money, nine billion dollars, to work on HIV/AIDS and population, in an up front kind of commitment that they would work with us around the world on those areas, because they were receiving a lot of pressure, not only from us, but from the international community to do more in areas like population and HIV/AIDS. They would say, “HIV/AIDS, we don’t have that problem in Japan. We don’t understand it. So we can’t do it.” But they were willing to fund it if they worked with us and we kind of developed the activities and they provided funding. So over time we were able to develop a lot of different projects around the world where we worked together and their aid program gradually started to shift to work on biodiversity and population and HIV/AIDS, a lot of the things that they hadn’t done before, democracy, even. So at the end of that period of time I think, yes, they had changed their program substantially.

Q: Was the Japanese society, the universities, producing sort of committed do-gooders? I’m using the term in the best sense of the word. I mean people who really wanted to help, because it’s such an enclosed society I think it would be hard to bring these people to the fore.

WHITE: Yeah, I think they had real trouble understanding the way that the U.S. has a sense of responsibility for the world. They’re a much more inward-looking society. But a couple things happened. They had a really active Japanese Peace Corps and I think the universities started to change when many of these young Japanese Peace Corps people came back from Africa or Bangladesh or wherever they had been, the South Pacific and enrolled in the university and
started looking for ways to continue what they had started overseas. The Japanese government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also had a very enlightened look at how they could involve the Japanese people, local governments, local NGOs and the universities in their aid program. So from the top down they also started to involve these people, in really interesting ways that we don’t involve groups. For instance, they would form a group of local community people, NGOs, universities, as an evaluation group. Get twenty or thirty people together from a cross section of their society, send them to Indonesia to look at the Indonesia biodiversity program and evaluate it. They would have maybe a movie star and a famous baseball player in this group as well. So these people would come back and talk about what they had seen and why. So the Japanese public, something like 80 or 85 per cent, is in support of their aid program, whereas our public was maybe 15 or 20 per cent, if that, because they did this. As a result of involving people like this, universities started developing programs, development programs that help people understand the importance of economic development in the Third World and it would start producing people that would become advisors to the foreign ministry. So they had a different relationship with society than we have. I think a much more positive relationship.

Q: As an observer, did the Japanese become involved with the South Koreans particularly and the Chinese? These are two rather dynamic societies but coming from obviously different backgrounds. How did this work out?

WHITE: Interesting. When the Japanese would ask me, “What do you think the biggest AID success story is in the world?” I would always say “Korea.” They would say, “How can that be? Why isn’t it somewhere in South America?” I would say, “Well, when we started working in Korea” and even I could say when I went to Korea in the late Sixties. “Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. It was poorer than many of the African countries. It had been devastated by the Korean War. Now they’re like the 12th or 14th leading economy in the world.” And what AID was doing in those days was the old style programs of building cement factories, building the North-South Highway. Infrastructure, what Japan used to do. And so I would say, “With the investment that we made in Korea it’s really turned around.” They see Korea as their success story. I always used that because that got into a really rich argument about infrastructure and soft assistant and all of that.

They had a difficult time in Korea because they had changed Korean culture. They went in and required the Koreans to paint the Korean names off the grave markers of their ancestors and put Japanese names on the grave markers. So there’s a lot of hatred of the Koreans towards Japan and there’s the “comfort women” issue and all of that. So a discussion of Korea always brought out really interesting things in Japan. I guess they felt that they had poured a lot of money and they had poured a lot of money into Korea. They had not done that as much in China, where you also had tremendous hatred of the Japanese, but their main point in foreign aid to Korea and to China was to start to change the opinion of how people looked at Japan, to get them to forget comfort women and all of that. And they felt that they were making headway. In part they were making headway because as older generations died out and they dealt with younger people that hatred was much less. But they certainly put a lot of money into those countries.

Q: What about North Korea?
WHITE: We had some conversations about North Korea, Iran, Iraq and other places like that because I often had talking points from State to go in and find out what the Japanese were doing and to try to convince them not to provide assistance to Iran or Iraq, specific kinds of assistance. North Korea was one of those as well where occasionally I had to go in and just see what they were doing. They weren’t doing much in North Korea.

Mongolia…as the communist world started to disintegrate, there were opportunities to get the Japanese to take a leadership role. It’s Asia, it’s where they feel like they have a natural leadership role. Why don’t we work with them to get them to be, hold the donor coordination group? Instead of holding it in Paris, France, where they’ve always been held, why don’t we get them to hold the coordination group for Mongolia, which they did. Again, if you look now, Japan is taking a lead on a lot of that stuff. In those days, the first reaction was, “Of course we can’t do that. It’s Asia, we’d be interested in it but Paris is where that’s done and we’ve never done that before.” But they’ve really grown into that role well.

Q: You’d had that Japanese experience early on, which had turned you off. Did you feel that you were looking at a new Japanese person, in a way, or were you seeing one develop, or not?

WHITE: Yeah, I think I appreciated the chance to go back full circle and go back to my original love and to do it not as a poor university student eating noodles with no position in society but doing it as the number two or three person or four person in the embassy, where I commanded a lot of respect. So in part I saw not a new Japanese person but I was in a different position. Therefore I was treated very differently. But I also saw developing confidence in Japan, in terms of their ability to work with other donors. Before you’d talk to people, if I asked the aid people around the world, “What do you think of Japanese counterparts?” when I first went to Japan, they would say, “Oh, Hashimoto-san goes to the meetings but he sits over in a corner of the room and smokes a cigarette and keeps notes but never says anything.” By the time I left Japan, not because of me but just because of the way things were changing, Hashimoto-san was an active participant in those meetings because he had something to say. They were doing the kinds of programs that other donors were doing. The Hashimotos that went out earlier and didn’t speak English very well and all of that had been replaced by young Japanese who had good command of English. I must say their Foreign Service program is superb, in terms of producing high level people who speak languages.

They do something that I think we don’t do and that is early on they identify the people who are going to be China hands or French hands or whatever. They send them to university for several years in the country that they’re going to specialize in, the language they’re going to specialize in. Then they give them several language assignments that enable them to use their language skills. And so you find Japanese Foreign Service people now who, I think, are exceptional at the top layers.

Q: During the time you were there was a difficult time in terms of the Japanese bubble and Thai bubble, they all popped, burst. How did you find that?

WHITE: I found that it affected the Japanese tremendously, in the sense that they felt that they had a development model that worked, the West had a development model that was a failure. So
they felt that their investment in infrastructure in East Asia and South Asia and Southeast Asia had led to the “tigers.” They commissioned the World Bank and the IMF to do a study of the East Asian miracle, expecting it to say that Japan’s development model led to this and this was right at the time the bubble was bursting and all this. The study eventually said that these countries made right decisions and it gave little or no credit to the Japanese aid program. So that was a crushing blow for them, because they had funded this study with the hopes that it would show something else.

In Japan it had two effects. One, it made people, the fact that they were experiencing financial difficulties, it made people question why Japan needed to be the leading donor in the world. They were at ten or twelve billion dollars a year, we were at eight. So they were way above us and then everybody else was way down below us. In Japan there’s a saying that the tallest nail is the nail that gets hammered down. So everybody came to them to ask for money, instead of coming to us. So there was a lot of domestic pressure on them to reduce their aid program, which they eventually did. So it had that impact.

In terms of living in Japan, I guess one of the things that I continued to be amazed at was that every restaurant you went to you had to stand in line to get in. You literally did not see the impact in the way that people lived in Japan but certainly you read about it in the newspapers and there were big changes like reducing their aid program and other things, but daily living, you didn’t notice it.

Q: How’d you find living in Japan and Japanese society?

WHITE: Well the second time around I loved it. The Japanese were very gracious. I traveled all over the country doing speeches, some for USIA and some just on my own. I taught at a Japanese university and I also went out to other universities as a visiting professor. The second time around I really loved it. I continued to find that the Japanese, they find it hard to accept a foreigner who understands their country and speaks their language a bit. They like to be kind of secretive and think that they have a special society unlike any other in the world. I remember during the rice negotiations, when we were trying to get more U.S. rice into Japan, they were making the argument that the Japanese intestine is not like foreign intestines and can’t digest foreign rice. They really do have a view of the world that is unique.

When you went into a Baskin-Robbins, the American ice cream franchise, and said, “I’ll have one scoop of vanilla and one scoop of chocolate” you see the clerk’s hand starting to sweat, because that’s not what you do. So they would go back and ask the manager, “Is it okay that we put a scoop of chocolate and a scoop of vanilla together?” It’s a society that lives by so many rules and that everything is a routine. If you go outside of that routine it’s difficult for them. So once you understand that, it’s wonderful, trying to figure out what little kind of things are going on in every situation you’re in.

Q: Who was the ambassador during your tour?

WHITE: When I first went there it was Ambassador Armacost [Ed: served from May 1989 to July 1993], who was absolutely wonderful, received AID into the embassy with open arms and
was very supportive and then Mondale came [Ed: served from September 1993 to December 1996] and he was even better. We got along really well together. Anytime I asked him to go out and give a speech or go visit, he always did it and very gracious. Then just as I was leaving Ambassador Foley [Ed: served from November 1997 to April 2001] came and I overlapped with him for a short period, several months. He was on a steep learning curve. Mondale, as far as I could tell, didn’t have a learning curve. He was the kind of guy who was...he would just absorb everything and then go back in the right way. Foley struggled a little bit at the beginning, in just learning what it was to be an ambassador and how to do it. But all three ambassadors were wonderful.

Q: How’d you find the rest of the embassy? Japan is not a country where AID, since MacArthur’s time, has had much of a presence. All of a sudden you’re there?

WHITE: Yeah, but I was really well accepted. When I went there the big issue was should I have an independent office or should I be folded into one of the traditional embassy sections? So they decided to put me in the econ section, because the econ section had monitored Japan’s aid program before I got there. Also an issue was would they continue to do that or would I take over those monitoring functions that the econ section had done? The other issue was should I go in with the rank of a minister/counselor, co-equal with the minister/counselor for econ, or not? They decided not to make me a minister/counselor for development but just a counselor for development and that was fine with me. I’m not interested in that. So I sat in the econ section and that was good.

I worked in partnership with the U.S. economists and also the local economists that had worked on Japan affairs. We became our own team of Japan ODA (Office of Development Assistance) or development experts. Had not problem within the econ section. Had no problem with the other, what I did, in a sense stepped on the toes of many different groups, the political section, the Foreign Commercial Service. The kind of things that I was working on were the kind of things that they had worked on traditionally with Japan. They quickly saw me as an aid expert, knowing what I was talking about, a lot of that stuff and all of those things came to me with no conflict within the embassy. So that went really, really well.

At some point, when the econ, that econ minister/counselor left, we did separate AID off and moved to another floor and became our own office [Ed: The State Department publication “Key officers of the Foreign Service lists Mr. White as a separate AID office in its Fall 1994 and July 1995 booklets]. That was good and bad. That was not something that I instigated. It happened partially because of space and a lot of other things. For me the bad news was I no longer sat in the classified section of the embassy. So it was much more difficult to have access to all of the classified cables and I had no place to store them and all of that and I missed that part of it but that was the only part that I missed, having a separate AID office. But the embassy was wonderful. Never had any issues with the embassy, other than GSO issues that you have everywhere you go.

Q: General services office, those are housekeeping matters. You mentioned the Foreign Commercial Service. Did we get into any problems between Japanese aid and American aid, the difference between John Deere and Kubota or something, different types of tractors or anything
like that?

WHITE: One of the other big things that I went to work on, my original mandate, was to work on Japanese tied aid, the fact that they not only built buildings and supplied equipment but that the equipment they supplied was all Japanese and the world community, through the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, had tried to get all donors to untie their aid, saying that the fair thing for any country was to be able to pick the John Deere or Kubota or whatever tractor was most suited to their needs and the best price and if the Japanese were continuing to tie their aid that was something that we needed to work on. So I worked on that really hard with the Department of Commerce and over time we got the Japanese to gradually untie their loan aid. They do something that we don’t do. They provide loans to countries. So the argument was if you’re loaning India the money, that money in a sense is Indian money that they should be able to do with as they want, including procuring from whatever source they want to. Eventually we won that argument through a lot of hammering at all of the international meetings of the OECD and through my efforts. Every time there was a big Japanese loan program, say loan program for telecommunications in India, the telecom people would be out talking to us about how do we get the Japanese to open this for our market. Another one that the Japanese worked on a lot were railroads. They built a lot of railroads and bought a lot of engines and things like that, so General Electric and General Motors, they would be out immediately to Tokyo, to meet with me, to meet with Foreign Commercial Service, to make the rounds of all the procurement agents in Japan, to talk about opening the bid. So I spent a lot of time on that. That was maybe the most contentious area that I worked in but we were very successful in that area.

Q: Another thing that was happening during the time you were there was essentially the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly in Asia. Were the Japanese involved there?

WHITE: What I saw was more on the margins of the issue. Japan had its own problems with Russia, the Northern Islands and so the relationship between Japan and Russia was a difficult relationship. While I was there a couple of interesting things happened. We talk about the U.S. diplomacy with China through ping-pong diplomacy. What I call wild bird diplomacy happened in Japan. A Japanese NGO, the Wild Bird Society, found that certain birds migrate from the Northern Islands in Russia down to Japan and then back and they were able to start a dialogue between Japan and Russia about wild birds that eventually bloomed out into a more political discussion. But that was one difficult area. Another area that I worked on related to that was something I call trilateral projects. I found that if the U.S. and Japan were working together to support a project it neutralized a lot of the negative feelings, either towards the U.S. in certain places or towards Japan. So we were able to do some joint projects, the U.S., Japan, Russia, where it just cancelled out the Northern Islands issue and other things. So I was on the margins of that. What I did not see was the more political issues between Japan and Russia. A lot of things were playing out at that time on the political side, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating and everybody was trying to position themselves for what might come next, including Japan. Of course there were also the issues of the United Nations and what Japan’s role would be in the United Nations, on the Security Council. There were a lot of those kinds of issues, as well as the trade issues that we all are familiar with.

Q: When the Soviet Union broke up and all the “sans” emerged, the Central Asian countries.
Were the Japanese interested in this or not?

WHITE: Yeah, this was at a time after the Mongolia Consultative Group meeting was a big success, Japan had run it, that Japan decided to try to play a role in all of the stans. They tried to become the consultative group host instead of France for the stans and they did that successfully. As I said, every Japanese trading company interested in trade had specialists and they had specialists for each of the stans and they had lots of interests, oil pipelines and selling their Kubota tractors and all of that. So, yeah, Japan took a big interest in being actively involved in what went on there, politically and economically, after those countries became independent and took the lead in the consultative group meetings and took the lead in being the number one donor in dollar terms for many of those countries.

Q: Were the Japanese doing anything in Latin America; there was a large Japanese immigrant community in Brazil, and the president of Peru was Fujimori. Was there much going on there?

WHITE: Certainly, traditionally, in the Japanese aid program they had a category for overseas Japanese. So they provided a significant amount of assistance to Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, where there had been a lot of large migrations of Japanese in the past. They provided assistance to those communities, to be able to come back to Japan and get an education and that kind of stuff, more USIA kind of fellowships and grants and all of that. But they also provided bilateral assistance to Latin America, in fairly small terms. The old formula was seventy per cent of Japanese aid should go to East Asia and ten per cent should go to Africa, ten per cent to South America and ten per cent to South Asia. That was kind of their tradition, how they saw aid. But a lot of pressure was on them to do more in Africa and at certain points to do more in Latin America.

We had a State Department, the head of ARA, Latin America affairs bureau, came to Japan a number of times and developed a good working relationship with the Japanese and it was all around something called the Partnership for Development and Democracy in Latin America, which was a State Department initiative and they wanted Japan’s aid program to join in that, as a partner with AID, to support activities, mainly in democracy. So that became a major thing that I worked on and we got the Japanese to actually take a role as a leader in one of the working groups under this PDD and to up their assistance somewhat to Latin America and to try project areas that they hadn’t tried before like environment and democracy. So the answer is, while they didn’t up their program that much they responded to pressure and they inched their program up for Latin America and for Africa.

Q: You’d been with AID a long time, was there a growing international aid group, I mean were the individual donors coalescing, rather than everybody doing their thing and did you find yourself in a way part of this jointness as a representative in Japan?

WHITE: Yeah, I think there was at least some sense, there was more of a sense, that if donors cooperate together you can get more done than if everybody goes their own separate way and while philosophically people would agree to that, when it got down to the rubber meeting the road everyone still did their own thing, because the requirements for developing projects and the way that we fund them and the reporting we do is so different from one donor to another that it’s
very hard to cooperate. That of course is an argument, if it’s difficult for us it’s even more
difficult for the host country, who has to keep different kinds of books and different reporting for
every donor they deal with. So there’s been a lot of attempts at the Development Assistance
Committee level at the OECD to develop standard reporting formats and standard budget formats
and all of that but it never goes anywhere because most donor programs are based on the politics
of a situation and things other than the development itself. So those efforts haven’t ever gone
anywhere. So while theoretically I think people are much more willing to say, “When we work
together things happen better than if we don’t” practically they don’t do it, even now. Certainly
over time there’s at least an awareness that is an issue.

WILLIAM CLARK, JR.
Assistant Secretary, East Asia Bureau

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. He graduated
from San Jose State College with a B.A. degree in 1955. He served in the U.S.
Navy intermittently from 1949 to 1953. In 1957, he joined the State Department,
serving in Sierra Leone, Japan, South Korea, Egypt, India, and Washington, DC.
Ambassador Clark was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.

Q: In 1992, you were nominated and confirmed as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
affairs. How did that come about?

CLARK: It came in a couple of ways. Baker became unhappy with Pickering, then our
Ambassador at the UN and wanted him reassigned. Tom had always wanted to go to India and
the Department granted him his wish. That started a chain of changes with Assistant Secretary
Solomon moving to the Philippines and I returning to Washington as the Assistant Secretary. I
don't remember whether any one called me or whether I read in the newspapers that Tom was
being sent to India. I did get a call from Eagleburger offering me the EAP job -- an offer I
couldn't refuse! Tom and I worked out the timing because he was in no hurry to arrive in Delhi
and I was in no hurry to leave. I stayed until mid-summer, although the change had been
announced several months earlier. I did return in May for my son Jerrod's graduation from
Columbia. Since I was back in the States in any case, I suggested to Alan Cranston, my Senator
from California, that I have my hearings while I was in the U.S. He told me that he didn't have
certain reports from EAP that he had requested and that although I was not responsible for the
delay, he was not going to proceed with my confirmation hearings until he had received those
reports -- which, by the way, had nothing to do with me but were on some subjects of interest to
the Senator. So I went back to the Bureau and got the reports sent to Cranston. Then he didn't
have time for the hearings at that moment, so I went back to Delhi and returned in June for the
hearings. I was in Washington then just for the day -- forty-five minutes for the hearing and back
to Delhi. As was true for my previous confirmation hearings, I appeared before two Senators,
one Democrat and one Republican. In the 1992 hearing, Cranston was in the chair and Frank
Murkowski was the minority representative, as he had been three years earlier when I was being
confirmed for India. Frank was an old friend; he would come into the hearing room, throw me
some "soft balls" and leave; for the Assistant Secretary hearing, he stayed a little longer. Then it was back to Delhi for the goodbyes and return to Washington in mid-summer.

The Secretary of State was Jim Baker. Larry Eagleburger was the Deputy Secretary and Arnie Kantor was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. These were all people whom I had worked when I was the Acting Assistant Secretary and who knew me well. As far as I was concerned, the Baker team was very good. There was a lot of criticism that the "Baker gang" was a closed circle which you couldn't penetrate. But since I knew the people well, I did not have any problems. Also just as I began my tour as Assistant Secretary, Baker began to phase out in preparation to his transfer to the White House. I always had easy access to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. Baker held a staff meeting every morning which permitted all the Assistant Secretaries to keep him informed and to receive guidance unless it was a complicated problem which required a separate session. So it wasn't necessary to see Baker frequently. I used to see Larry more frequently on personnel and other issues. I saw Kantor once a week at a regularly scheduled meeting; the same was true for Frank Wisner who was the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. These were meetings strictly on EAP matters.

My days as assistant secretary would start early so I could read the night time telegraphic traffic before diving into the day's work. Then I would go to the 8:45 staff meeting which took about a half hour. That was a meeting of the Seventh Floor principals and the regional assistant secretaries; one or more functional bureaus would be represented on a revolving basis. I remember those meetings well because there never seemed to be enough chairs; on a couple of occasions, people had to stand against the wall. After that, I probably had a meeting with Kantor or Wisner or another Seventh Floor principal. In the afternoon most of the time I would chair one study group or another; I had formed several on one topic or another. Then there was always the constant stream of visitors and the staff. The day would end about 7 or 7:30 p.m. EAP had jurisdiction over a disparate group of countries. I don't think we were nearly as disparate as my colleagues in NEA were; there is more commonality in EAP than in NEA. We basically had ASEAN, North East Asia and Oceania; those groupings in effect covered all of the countries in EAP and I think could be supervised adequately by one person, as long as he had four deputies. Now one deputy handles Japan, Korea, ASEAN and Burma which is much too much. I disagree with the way the Bureau had been organized by Dick Solomon because one deputy carried too great a workload and I certainly disagree with the current organization. We will try to develop a regional security policy as are the countries in the area; I don't think it will be entirely effective because I am not sure you can separate out one part of the world without much relationship with other parts. On economic issues, ASEAN is developing its own as is AIPAIC; then there are the burgeoning economies of Japan and China which far outweigh all the others. You can't develop a meaningful general economic policy for the whole Far East; there are too many issues that require special and distinct attention. That is not to suggest that there aren't enough commonalities among the nations of the Far East that would require separate regional bureaus; I believe one can handle all the issues, but I don't believe that one regional policy will ever replace the webs of bilateral relationships. Country experts are still absolutely essential. It is a fact nevertheless that our position vis-a-vis one country is becoming increasingly important to our bilateral positions with other countries; we do set precedents when we act in a certain way on a bilateral issue; other countries in the area expect the same treatment. If we are developing a policy towards China, for example, we must take into consideration its effect on other Asian
countries. We have not done that sufficiently because the whole phenomenon of Asian assertiveness is new; those countries are collaborating much more and are not always supportive of our actions. They want to be consulted -- real consultation and not just notice ten minutes before the public announcement. For example, for the Japanese being on good terms with the U.S. was sufficient reason to go along with us. The rest of Asia, if the Japanese agreed, would also go along. Now some Asia countries will advise the Japanese not to go along with us on certain matters. The Japanese are also becoming more concerned about the impact on Asia of any agreements they might reach with us. It is a different game and we are very slow in catching up with the new reality. The ascent of China, along with the increasing economic importance of many Asian countries, has made for a new ball game in the Far East. Other Asian countries are impressed by the obvious expansion of the Chinese economy; this has been happening for the last fifteen years, but has become impressive only recently. The growth of China's economy has of course security implications for all Asian countries and that is becoming a very important factor in their policy considerations. Furthermore, ASEAN has graduated from the poverty; Japan has to be more careful about its US policy in light of the growth of China and ASEAN. All these new developments require new US approaches and perceptions. Despite all of this, I still think that one person can give oversight to US policy in the region, particularly if, as I did, he or she has very good deputies. I used to see my deputies all the time; we exchange information often and directly; my door was open to them all the time. I held a small staff meeting three times a week and a large one once a week. Then we had a meeting with deputy assistant secretary levels officials from DOD, CIA and other agencies. It was very informal intended to let all of us know what was of concern that week to a particular agency. That meeting was unique in the Department; I don't think other bureaus had such an exchange with other agencies. It was a system that Paul Wolfowitz started and I think worked very well, as long as it was not used as a platform for a lecture by an assistant secretary.

The evening social season was not that burdensome. I think we may have attended functions two or three times each week; it was not a great burden. There were also two or three lunches each week.

By summer, 1992 the Presidential campaign was in full swing. That had some impact on one issue that I dealt with, such as the sale of 160 F-16s to Taiwan. The General Dynamics plant where these F-16s were built was located in Texas. the political campaign meant that the decision on the sale was made much quicker than otherwise might have been the case. Our memorandum requesting a decision was devoid of any reference to the domestic political issues. Once the decision was made, I recommended that a high level emissary be sent to Beijing, so that the Chinese could berate someone for our actions. I thought that would be good therapy for the Chinese. I also suggested that we provide the emissary with some good news to offset the Chinese unhappiness. That recommendation came back approved with a note of congratulations because I had been chosen as the "high level" emissary. If nothing else, our approval of the sale made G.D. a much better buy for Lockheed which occurred a couple of years later.

The "two China" policy had always been a very delicate balancing act for the U.S. By the time I became Assistant Secretary, the Chinese had been berated, as they are almost every year, by the Congress; the President had vetoed the anti-Chinese legislation and had been upheld. So I found a stable situation with the U.S. maintaining close relations with both Beijing and Taipei. My
deputy, a China expert, Lynn Pascoe, who is now the head of the American office in Taiwan, was very good; I had brought him on board as I had all of my deputies. He is still young and has a very bright future in the Foreign Service, which is one of the reasons why I had him assigned as one of my deputies. When he first reported for duty, he was still carrying the traditional banner "We can't do anything for Taiwan." Our Ambassador in China, Stapleton Roy, opposed the sale; he was a real student of Sino/US relations having been involved in that process for many years. He believed that the sale was a violation of the letter and spirit of the 1982 communique, which had become the central tenet of our China policy. I thought somewhat differently; I saw no reason why we couldn't be more forthcoming with Taiwan and I was pushing our policy in that direction. I asked for a review of our China policy which has just now been completed. With Lynn's assistance, we wrote a very balanced decision memorandum for the President. I was able to take some of the heat of out the dire predictions that the China experts were making; he on the other hand was able to convince me that some of the predictions were probably right. So I felt comfortable with our memorandum because while it did predict strong Chinese reactions, it did not assume that all ties with China would be broken by our sale to Taiwan. I was told by a number of people around town that the White House had already reached its decision; that didn't seem to me to erase the desirability of forwarding a balanced, well considered memorandum with options. It was Lynn who suggested that among some other actions we might take a high level emissary be sent to Beijing. We knew that it would be a terrible visit during which the Chinese would vent all of their frustrations on the U.S. delegation. We also put together a package of four "goodies" so that the Chinese could rightly say that while we were selling the planes to Taiwan, they had not been forgotten. For one, we settled four FMS cases that had been held up since Tiananmen. We closed the cases -- the Chinese lost a lot of money in the transaction and got their junk back. That action permitted the Clinton administration to start its relationship with the Chinese on a level field. Secondly, we agreed to re-establish military-to-military talks and for that I invited Teddy Allen, the head of DSAA at the time, to join my delegation. He came in full uniform and a military presence which I believe made our offer to restart the talks more credible. Thirdly, we agreed to have a joint committee hearing on commerce and trade that the Chinese were anxious to hold. This was an established mechanism which we had also put in abeyance after Tiananmen. For that purpose, Barbara Franklin went to China in December 1992 on a trip which was greatly criticized, but which was absolutely critical to the calming of the roiled US/Sino waters. She was criticized for a "boondoggle" trip which was unjustified because she managed to get $2 billion worth of contracts signed. Lastly, we also agreed to restart the Science and Technology joint committee; that took place in Washington and was important also to calm the Chinese apprehensions.

We worked out this package and then I took it to Eagleburger. I told him that I could only be effective on this trip if I had a U.S. Air Force plane for the trip. He said that I just didn't qualify for that. I pointed out that I was a high level emissary. We finally compromised on a small airplane that took me from Tokyo to Beijing. That plane was so small that we had to refuel somewhere both on the way to and from Beijing. The meetings with the Chinese were even tenser than I had imagined. I knew that I was going into rough waters when I was met only by Roy at the airport -- no Chinese. Got to Beijing and Roy and I talked about the game plan and did some fine tuning. Then we went to the Foreign Ministry where I was received by the Director General for American Affairs, who is now the DCM in Washington. I spent about two hours with him explaining why we had made the sale, why we thought it was good for the Chinese
and then what we had in mind to do for China. He told me that I spoke with no honor and that I 
had a forked tongue; this was all done with great formality. Then I was asked to wait because my 
next meeting was to be with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lee Hung Qwa. We waited 
for about half an hour and then the Vice Minister came. He read from a script, which I did note 
had been somewhat modified to take into account what I had said to the Director General. That 
meeting lasted for about a half an hour and that was the end of my meetings with the Chinese. 
The package I brought with me was not that great, but since the Chinese only expected me to 
explain our rationale behind the F-16 sale, it was helpful. We did not make a big deal of the four 
"goodies" because that would have been counter-productive, but we just explained the sale and 
said we had also decided to proceed on the four items that I mentioned. We never linked the two, 
but the package was presented as matters on which we wanted to proceed because it would be 
good for both us and the Chinese. Although these were not my more pleasant meetings, I think 
the whole trip was worthwhile for it did reduce the level of hostility that Beijing was 
manifesting. The Chinese press was rather low key about my visit. In the first place, they didn't 
want to treat me as a Presidential envoy, which I was, but rather as an Assistant Secretary. That 
was alright with me. I have seen my two Chinese interlocutors since that time and they both have 
always assured me that their coolness was not a personal matter and that I should come back to 
Beijing when they could host me appropriately. That was an interesting trip!

On the F-16 deal, we worked very closely with Frank Wisner, the Pentagon and the NSC; to a 
much lesser extent, with PM in the Department. EAP was the action bureau and we wrote the 
report, obtained the clearances and sent it up the chain. That is a process that was different than 
that which might have been used some years earlier or is used today. I always prefer that the 
action bureau be a regional one.

I mentioned before that I hired a new deputy for China matters -- Pascoe. I hired one other one 
and kept two who had worked for Solomon. When I arrived, the principal deputy was a Japan 
expert; it didn't make any sense to have both the Assistant Secretary and his principal deputy 
being expert in the same area. I wanted some one who knew China and that was Pascoe. Then I 
wanted a real go-getter and recruited Don Westmore who was the DCM in Sri Lanka -- a job for 
which I had recommended him. He dealt with ASEAN affairs. He has unfortunately left the 
Foreign Service and is now the regional rep-resentative for AT&T. So one deputy handled China 
and Korea, one was responsible for Japan and ASEAN, one had Vietnam and the Pacific Islands 
and one handled region-wide economic issues. That was a different arrangement than had been 
customary for EAP, but I wanted to shake things up and therefore changed the deputies' areas of 
responsibility. Long before I became the Assistant Secretary, Sandy Kristoff, the economic 
deputy, had been at USTR and had asked me whether she should take the EAP deputy job. I 
knew her from India where she had served before her USTR assignment. Now she is at the NSC. 
So I knew all my deputies well and had worked with most of them at one time or another.

In general, I was satisfied with the level of competence that I found in the Bureau. I did think 
that it was not as lively as it might have been. It was not as pro-active as I wanted it to be. Some 
people had been there too long and were obviously in need of new challenges. So my first goal 
was to shake the place up and I am glad to say that the core of my new staff is still in place 
today. I knew of course that economic/trade issues would be central to our relationships with 
Japan and therefore selected an economic officer to be that Country Director -- Steve Eckton,
who had been at the OECD and was a Japanese language officer. That was the first time that had been done. I also recruited a few more Country Directors -- people that I would be comfortable with.

Vietnam became a central issue for me. When I arrived, Ken Quinn, for whom I had great respect, was the DAS responsible for that part of the world; he was taking a lot of flack on our MIA and POW policies toward Vietnam. He had been targeted by all the critics -- "The League of Families", etc. I also found that in DoD there was very hard line official in ISA who had a direct connection with the Secretary. He used to by-pass his Assistant Secretary, Jim Lilley. I found that the head of the "League of Families" used to come to meetings of government officials on the subject of Vietnam. That didn't seem to me to be appropriate, so I just didn't hold anymore meetings. But I did want to proceed with normalization; I thought that it was time to bring the Vietnam war chapter to a close. I think we -- i.e. those of us who saw the situation in the same light -- got very close to striking a deal and almost convinced the White House over the tenacious objections of a lot of people in Washington. We had the White House almost convinced that the time was ripe for serious discussions with the Vietnamese on normalization because I felt that they had been sufficiently forthcoming on the MIA/POW issues. Had my recommendation been followed, the Clinton administration would have had a much easier time when it started down the normalization path. Even though I started my efforts before the election, I pursued it even after Bush lost because I thought it was the correct policy and I wanted to start something that the Clinton administration could bring to a conclusion. There was no chance of doing anything before the election, but after it, I was pushing very hard for a change in our position. We did manage to do a lot of the necessary staff work. General (ret) Jack Vessey, who had been in Korea as the CINC when I was there, was very helpful since he was our principal negotiator with Vietnam on the MIA issue. But to get the Washington bureaucracy to look at the Vietnam issue again and to change course, was a very difficult challenge. Some parts of the bureaucracy in DOD and at the NSC never did agree. I was always convinced that once we had decided to proceed with normalization, the threat of a major political back-lash by the veterans' groups would not occur and in fact when the Clinton administration pursued it, there was not much of an uproar. I think Clinton deserves considerable credit for pursuing what we started; my only criticism might be that the process is moving too slowly.

We worked closely with some Congressional members on the Vietnam issue. That was Quinn's task. He urged Senator Kerrey, a Medal of Honor winner in Vietnam, to hold hearings on the subject and we got a lot of help from various Members of Congress. Without their help, we could not have changed course. It was the Congress in fact that approached us. A couple of people, like Senator McCain, went to Hanoi. Both Kerrey and McCain carried considerable credibility on the issue because they both had suffered greatly during the war. Both wanted to move toward normalization and had started the ball rolling even before I returned to Washington.

As I mentioned, I took over as Assistant Secretary in late summer, 1992. The election which the sitting President lost, took place three months later. That really created a vacuum, although I found it somewhat easier to work with because Eagleburger was first acting and later Secretary. As I have said, he was an old friend and we work well together. So I had complete access to the top decision maker in the Department. I think the hiatus also enabled me to get the Vietnam issue to the White House and almost approved, although I was never able to get formal NSC approval.
I found that in fact the change in administration did not interfere with progress, such as the North Korean issue. There was a decrease in White House drive to accomplish things, but within the Department, momentum was maintained.

I mentioned North Korea. I had been away from the subject for three years, but I did not in 1922 find that there had been much change in Pyongyang's attitude. The big issue during my tour as Assistant Secretary was one that in fact I had dealt with three years earlier; i.e. the nuclear question. Back in 1986-87, we suspected that the North was taking actions that were consistent with a process of nuclear weapon development. By 1992, we had further confirmation of this development. It is true that the North Koreans had signed the NPT in 1987; by 1992 they had finally concluded an agreement with the IAEA for full scope safeguards. That enabled IAEA inspectors to look at manufacturing facilities and laboratories where development efforts might be taking place. We also had information that we thought should be made available to the IAEA particularly when the inspectors began to have some concern about the accuracy of the North Koreans' information. This was the first time that we released "overhead" intelligence collection material to a non-ally. The membership of IAEA included several country representatives to whom we would normally never had divulged our intelligence findings, much less evidence of our capabilities. But in the case of North Korea, we felt that we had to break with past practices and turned over relevant intelligence collections. Of course, the IAEA had also found religion; it had been embarrassed by the Iraq surprises and had become much more thorough about its inspections. There was a wide spread divergence in the intelligence/nuclear armament community of what the North Koreans had done or were about to do. There were some who felt that weapons had already been built and that the US had to destroy them as soon as possible. I disagreed with that view profoundly. We also started a dialogue in the UN on the issue where a very good working group and process went to work. I spent considerable amount of time going to New York to talk to some of the Permanent Representatives and I thought that real progress was being made in bringing some rationality to bear on the North Koreans. Although I recognized the potential danger of the situation, I was also intent on not raising it to a hysterical level, which I think it became in 1993-94. I did not think that raising the status of North Korea to "super power" level even if it had built four nuclear devices made any sense. Such status would only encourage them to build more, some for themselves and some for sale.

We laid all we knew about the North Korea situation to the Clinton transition team. The fellow responsible for East Asia was a young Hill staffer who knew remarkably little about the area. We also gave Winston Lord a full briefing. I stressed to both that I hoped that we would not permit the situation to escalate unnecessarily. We did write papers which we eventually sent to the NSC. We used the change in administrations to request a review of our China policy, as I mentioned earlier. We wrote a lot of papers on East Asia issues for the new team, fully expecting that Lake would ask for them sooner or later. In fact, the new NSC never asked for them, but we sent them anyway. Winston showed up soon after inauguration, but was really shackled and not able to function at all. Over the years, the government's guidelines on what nominees could or could not do had been tightened considerably; now, until one is confirmed, one can essentially fill a chair and a desk and that is about all. When Carter was elected, Holbrooke sent Ken Quinn, who was to be his executive assistant, to the Bureau to let everyone know that starting January 20, he wanted all the DAS gone because his new appointees would start working on that day. He moved into the Assistant Secretary's office on January 20 and began to act as if he had been already
empowered. That process had changed by 1993; Lord moved into a small office and I stayed on as Assistant Secretary until April. A couple of weeks before his confirmation, I did move into the office that Lord was occupying and Lord moved into one of the DAS offices. He would not move into the Assistant Secretary's office until he was confirmed. In fact, I weaned myself away and the Bureau's Executive Director became acting assistant secretary. One evening, someone called him and told him that there were a lot of papers to be reviewed. He said that he was leaving and that someone else could look at them. Over the January-April period, I just slowly faded away into the background; at the end I was available if needed, but the Bureau operated without me essentially as April rolled around. I think the transition went very smoothly. I was a little surprised by the change on the Seventh Floor. The advance word had been that the new team would be much more open that the Baker group. Towards mid-February, I finally saw the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff. I suggested that he needed to see the assistant secretaries more often; it had been the pattern for many years that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs saw each regional assistant secretary individually at least once a week. Tarnoff resisted that; he was willing to see us if we had a problem but was very reluctant to schedule a regular meeting. I pointed out that that just wouldn't be adequate because he would not necessarily know if there was a problem. In the three months in 1993, there was one meeting with all the regional assistant secretaries which was very short because after Tarnoff had said his piece, he was called out of the meeting. The Secretary also made a couple of speeches emphasizing his interest in openness, but I can't say that we saw much of him. He held staff meetings with his senior people all the time, but assistant secretaries and others only saw him at staff meetings that he held every Wednesday. Those meetings usually were taken up by a lengthy presentation by one person and then quickly at the end, we went around the table to see whether anyone had anything to say. That was not a recipe for openness. When Baker chaired those meetings, some decisions were made or at least there was an intelligent debate about an issue. Christopher's staff meetings were much too large for that kind of dialogue. This all may have changed by now, but in early 1993, I thought that Christopher was more remote than Baker ever had been. Fortunately, there were not many issues in the three months that we are discussing that required Seventh Floor involvement; we handled most of them at the Bureau level. As soon as Lord was brought up to date, it was he who went to see Tarnoff and went to the NSC meetings. In EAP's case, the transition worked well; I understand that in other bureaus, there was considerable friction with some of the newcomers being shut out as long as possible. I thought that type of behavior was silly and it didn't happen in EAP. It also helped that Winston and I were friends of long standing.

I'd like to talk now a little about Cambodia. Dick Solomon had worked long and hard putting the Paris Accords together. There was a good working group at the UN on Cambodia. The sessions at the UN would normally start with a meeting of a small group -- France, Great Britain, the U.S. and someone from the Secretariat -- which would be followed by a larger group meeting, which also included the Germans, the Russians and the Chinese. All countries had accepted this process and it worked quite well. That was a very useful avenue and Dick should get a lot of credit for getting it started. When I became Assistant Secretary, it was becoming obvious that the Paris accords were not being followed. We reviewed the situation and decided that it was highly unlikely that the Paris Accords would ever be followed strictly. But there was enough movement in Cambodia to make it worthwhile pursuing the peace arrangements. Most of the debate both in Washington and in the UN was the extent to which we would permit modification of the Paris
Accords and still maintain momentum. We agreed to just keep moving the process along as long as it was going in a positive direction and would not insist on strict compliance with the letter of the Accords. In the final analysis, an election was held in Cambodia and we had a surprised King. So I think we took the right tack, even if the process was not as smooth as it might have been.

I certainly found that EAP was relying on the UN more in 1992 than it had in 1989. Cambodia was certainly a large part of that shift since the UN had been used first to organize the Paris talks and then to monitor progress in Cambodia. We also used the UN on North Korean issues because the IAEA is a creature of the Security Council and therefore we thought that the Security Council was an appropriate forum to express our concerns. The Chinese did not reject this approach. There had been enough dialogue on the North Korean nuclear issue in the UN so that when the IAEA governing board had to take up the matter, there was no debate; all the bases had been touched and we were able to marshall virtual unanimity in the IAEA; there may have been a couple of objections from countries like Libya. It is true that the Chinese said that had the issue been subjected to a vote in the IAEA they would have abstained, but since the IAEA works on consensus, it usually does not take a vote and we viewed the Chinese statement as more a warning to North Korea that it couldn't count on China's unswerving support.

So there are some issues that are best discussed and dealt with in a multilateral context. I do not think that this new process made my life as Assistant Secretary more difficult. In fact, issues that lend themselves to international scrutiny are easier for an assistant secretary to handle if they are dealt with in an international forum. I did not find that other parts of the Washington bureaucracy were anxious to be the lead unit even when the matter was being addressed in the UN. It may be that I was just lucky because our representative at the UN in the early 1993 was a temporary delegate since Albright had not yet been confirmed. The Assistant Secretary for IO was also very cooperative, so that I found using the UN a very good and bureaucratically effective method in dealing with Cambodia and North Korea, at least. My philosophy is somewhat different than the present State Department team which concentrates much more on functional issues to the detriment, I believe, to bilateral relations. That new approach puts a lot more of the policy development and implementation burdens on functional bureaus. For example, it is Gallucci, as the head of PM, that spearheaded the US policy towards North Korea. I would have preferred to have EAP be the lead bureau.

Japan was always an issue for the EAP Assistant Secretary. It was always the trade problem. We were aware that the White House was considering using Japan for campaign purposes, but fortunately that didn't happen. By 1992, I had watched Japan trade issues for thirty years. In retrospect, the best I could say is that it could have been worse. If we hadn't engaged in trade negotiations and other dialogues, the Japanese would have had even a greater current account surplus. Their markets would have been more closed, although they might have some weaker economic sectors. Our pressure for "market opening" has forced Japan to modernize some of its sectors and become more efficient. I guess I would have to say that on balance our efforts have had some positive results although it would be hard to prove by just looking at the statistics. You have to remember that State has had one policy; you can argue that the White House and Treasury have followed two policies. State had always supported free trade and market opening in the hopes that would increase our exports to Japan and decrease their imports to us. The White
House and Treasury agree with that thrust, but they also have pushed the strengthening of the yen which hopefully would have had the same results as the market opening efforts. That yen strengthening policy is the one that is always discussed and I think it has been very effective in restraining the trade imbalance. I have already commented about the lack of understanding in Washington about Japanese culture and its decision-making process. By 1992, I think Washington had come a long way in understanding those factors. That did not ease the burden on the Embassy of not appearing to be Japan's spokesperson. It is always the burden of an Embassy of trying to explain the cultural differences between its host country and the US without appearing to be a defender of its hosts. I think when I was in Tokyo we managed to maintain a balance in our reporting, which has not always been the case. But even today, even with an increased understanding of the Japanese culture and process there is a lively debate in Washington on how you deal with it. That debate has not changed in the last ten years, although the environment in Japan has changed markedly. We still have the Team A and B concept: at one time we negotiate, at other we beat on the Japanese. Arguably, ten years ago, Team B might have had the right approach, but now, with Asia growing in confidence, it won't work in Japan and in fact creates a back-lash from other Asian countries. Those other countries will agree with our goal of market opening, but do not agree that strong arm tactics -- such as numerical targets and the "301" approach -- are appropriate. In 1992, EAP was involved in trade issues; I have the sense that today USTR has taken over entirely. Of course, once again, the fact that I had a friend in USTR, Jules Katz, helped; we had worked together many years. Jules and I didn't agree on many issues but we respected each other's views. It is a fact, I think, that the Japanese "experts" have an entirely different view on how to deal with the Japanese than other Washington bureaucracies. The Japanese "experts" have to be careful lest they are perceived in the same way as our Embassy in Tokyo was seen from time to time. It is very much a matter of presentation; if you emphasize tactical routes to achieve commonly agreed objectives, then you will have a much better hearing than if you say that the Japanese just won't do some things. Unfortunately, most "experts" tend to take the second line and that is not the road to success.

By the time I became Assistant Secretary, the famous Bush trip to Tokyo was history. That was one of the best prepared trips that had ever been developed for a President; it was then cancelled and then reinstated and became one of the worst trips. The President's illness didn't help, but it was not a well planned trip to start with, even though we did reach some agreements with the Japanese during his stay in Tokyo. In any case, during my tour as Assistant Secretary, the Japanese trade issue was not a major preoccupation of the administration.

As I mentioned, cooler heads prevailed at the White House and Japan did not become an issue that Bush discussed at any great length. I think the Clinton team had a much harder time when they came into office because they had discussed the issue during the campaign -- although the Democrats didn't make it a major issue either -- and had hinted at a much tougher policy. That made cooperation with the Japanese somewhat more difficult. China was the big campaign issue with Bush being accused of coddling the Chinese dictators. That also caused Clinton more trouble when he became President -- as evidenced by the whole human rights fiasco. I should note that the transition team did want to be briefed on what we had been doing on human rights; I think we had a fairly good record on that score. But it was not a subject of much exchange. On China, Lord knew it well and we didn't spend much time talking about it. We did raise the Philippines with the transition team because at the time the SOFA agreements had expired and
we had no legal protection for our armed forces in the Philippines who still used the islands for exercises. So we needed to have new agreements negotiated.

I should mention finally that I wished I had been able to make a couple of changes in the process. I would have liked to stay on to bring those changes about. But the new administration had already selected its team; it did offer me the ambassadorship to the Philippines. It took them a while before they finally decided and that gave me an opportunity to look at other possibilities. Just as they were about to send the paperwork forward, I decided to look for greener pastures. My case is an illustration of the mess we have made of the nominating process; it is now so complex and the confirmation is becoming increasingly longer that it is a wonder that any new appointments are made. I think increasingly people will not be willing to wait that long.

PAUL P. BLACKBURN
Public Affairs Officer

Paul P. Blackburn was born in Hawaii in 1937. He received his BA from Haverford College in 1960 and an MA from the School for Advanced International Studies in 1962. His postings abroad include Bangkok, Khon Kaen, Udorn, Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur. Mr. Blackburn was interviewed by Charles R. Beecham on November 18, 2002.

Q: So you were refreshed and prepared to go back to Japan.

BLACKBURN: Yes, I was. And again I had the rare good fortune to return to a post where I had earlier served. To do so once was unusual enough, but to do it twice was extremely rare. I never have heard of another case of it happening.

Much to my amazement, the basics of the USIS Japan program to which I returned were essentially unchanged from what they had been during the days of Alan Carter and Barry Fulton. It still had a well-functioning DRS, a program development office for speakers, a first-class press operation, and even Carter-era FSOS back on hand to serve in key positions. My outstanding deputy, Hugh Hara, was formerly BPAO Nagoya and fully steeped in the Carter/Fulton systems approach. Veterans Bill Morgan and later under Emi Yamauchi made sure that the Information Section hummed along at peak efficiency. And I was so fortunate to have Japan guru Robin Berrington and later Art Zegelbone running the Cultural Section. Another stand-out performer was Alex Almasov, who was a most worthy successor to Warren Obluck, Robin Berrington, and me as Director of the Tokyo American Center.

Robin was ideally suited to working with Mike and Bonny Armacost. They were deeply into the Tokyo cultural scene and liked to have frequent artsy receptions at the Residence. That was something Robin loved and was so good at. Later, when the Mondales arrived, Art was equally terrific in assisting Joan Mondale with various cultural projects that were important to her and conveyed good cultural messages.
Though we had had a top-class operation in Japan, it was extremely costly, taking up about half of the East Asia budget. Our FSNs earned an average of $100,000 a year. At one point, because the exchange rate dropped below 90 yen to the dollar, the senior USIS FSN, Mr. Konya, had a salary of some $230,000, which made him the highest paid USG employee in our history! He was getting even more than the President of the United States, who at the time got $200,000. We lost a few positions along the way, had to close down one post, and terminated Trends magazine, but basically did not suffer heavy cuts. The reason was that everyone in Washington recognized that we had an extremely important mission to carry out – in both the economic and security fields.

Q: Was Mike Mansfield still involved?

BLACKBURN: No. He was out of the picture once Armacost took over in 1989, well before my return to Japan in 1992. I had about a year with Mike Armacost, and then worked for the latter three years under Walter Mondale.

But I will tell one Mansfield story. Before departing for Tokyo I saw Mansfield at a reception and asked if I might stop by his office and get his views regarding our public diplomacy effort in Japan. In his usual laconic and to-the-point way he said, “No need for that. When you get to the post, just ask Robin Berrington for his advice. He knows everything about what needs doing.” Although I did indeed get plenty of counsel from Robin, I would have liked to hear from the great man himself.

Q: So what were the major specific issues you were dealing with there?

BLACKBURN: This was still a time when many Americans feared that the Japanese were going to overtake us economically and buy up our most treasured assets. The revisionist “Japan as threat” thesis was in full flower. Its proponents held that the “Japan Incorporated” web of private-government strategic interconnection was not only directly harmful to the U.S., it was also spreading threatening tentacles throughout the world, particularly in Asia.

Q: Setting up a new East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere…

BLACKBURN: That’s right. And many in our country felt we Americans were not up to this challenge, because we didn’t have the access to the Japanese market we needed. And the trade deficit kept getting bigger and bigger. So trade was a top priority for my whole tour.

Many of the economic issues were very technical and thus hard for USIS to deal with, but we were effective in making the broad case for free trade and open markets through our speakers, the IV program, and our publications. In addition, the press office was in constant motion supporting the constant stream of U.S. negotiators, Cabinet officials, CODELs, and other VIPs.

Q: Did you still have the branch posts?

BLACKBURN: Yes. We had super teams of officers and FSNs at the American Centers in
Sapporo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka.

Q: *What about Kyoto?*

BLACKBURN: Kyoto, too, for part of the time. Unfortunately, I had to close it for budgetary reasons. Having looked on Kyoto as the dream USIS post – along with Florence – from my earliest Foreign Service days, I particularly hated being the one to preside over its demise.

Q: *I would have thought that would have been one of the last of the branch posts to close.*

BLACKBURN: Its cultural position was certainly important. Though we never had a Consulate in Kyoto, the Embassy was always happy we kept a BPAO there. They could send over the visiting firemen and know there was an FSO on the spot to look after them – to show them around, introduce them to important local personages, and the like.

Q: *But perhaps the hard issues were not ones of concern in Kyoto.*

BLACKBURN: Right. Few of our DRS audiences were interested in our priority issues, and they could be reached from Osaka, which is less than an hour away. When closing Kyoto, we changed the name of our operation in Osaka to the Kansai American Center – to emphasize that we would continue to give a high degree of program attention to key contacts in Kyoto. Though our friends in Kyoto were very unhappy to see us pull out and I wish we could have kept the post open, I understand the new arrangement is working pretty well. Shortly before I left Japan, we also came close to shutting down Sapporo, and after I left, they actually did so.

A bigger issue was whether or not to have a branch operation in Naha, Okinawa. Though it was out of the question to set up a full-fledged American Center there, over the years the Consuls and senior Embassy officers like DCMs Bill Breer and Rusty Deming had encouraged USIS to assign an FSO and some FSNs to Naha. I strongly, and successfully, resisted the proposition, but Louise Crane, my successor, had a different take and transferred one of the Cultural Section FSO positions down there. My argument, based in part on whatever authority I could derive from having spent two summers in Naha in my college days, was that there was little for a BPAO to do except work as a kind of glorified assistant to the Consul. The audiences for discussion of bilateral issues were extremely small – except when it came to the “100-pound gorilla,” that is, our bases on the island. For the latter issue, there were already the officers in the Consulate and the vast military public affairs apparatus.

I said we would send Press Office personnel down on TDY whenever needed. AIO John Lundin was especially effective handling such TDYs. I also pointed out that despite all the IV grants lavished over the years on the two Okinawan dailies, those newspapers never cut us any slack at all on bases issues. If anyone could have any influence on their editorial and news treatment policies, it would only be the Consul or the military brass. Besides, I argued, the Consul’s job is more than 50% public affairs anyway, so we should be concentrating on giving public diplomacy training to the Consul and his or her FSN staff – or perhaps assign a USIS officer as Consul. Even after the consolidation of USIA and the State Department, the Department still hasn’t taken up either suggestion. Anyway, those were my arguments, and they prevailed for a time.
Q: How was the Fulbright program in those days?

BLACKBURN: The Fulbright program occupied a lot of my time, just as it did Rob Nevitt and most of my predecessors. A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official and I (as the Ambassador’s representative) annually rotated the positions of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the bi-national commission, formally known as the Japan-United States Commission for Educational Exchange (or JUSEC).

JUSEC is one of the very best, most active Fulbright operations in the world. The extraordinary Caroline Yang, who became its Executive Director early in the 1970s, was still there. After leaving the job she became a member of the J. William Fulbright Board of Foreign Scholarships, and now is its Chair. She was replaced by Sam Shepherd, a top-notch exchanges professional in the field who we selected after an exhaustive open competition – and after successfully fending off Japanese arguments that the job should be reserved for Foreign Ministry retirees.

The Fulbright program in Japan is generously supported by its Japanese alumni. Many of them came to the U.S. after the war, got advanced degrees, and then returned to Japan to make a lot of money. These alums made a substantial contribution, as much as a million dollars each year, and I enjoyed getting to know them – and to thank them for all they had done and were doing to support the program.

The alumni put on an annual golf tournament, which was a big money-making and social occasion. However, unlike for avid golfers like Mike Armacost, Rob Nevitt, and Caroline Yang, for me it was something of an annual embarrassment, because I don’t play golf – at least don’t play it with skill and enthusiasm. The event was held at the Totsuka Country Club, and each participant paid a $700 fee. The money covered not only the golf game, but also the chance to win one or more of the terrific donated items – which sometimes included a car and always several international plane tickets. They would raise well over $100,000 from the 150 or so people who attended. I didn’t actually have to pay the $700 fee, as one of the more affluent alums would cover expenses for the Japanese and American chairmen, as well as the Executive Director.

So I would go and play, and be a good sport – and actually have a lot of fun, too. One year I won the “booby prize,” a very large stuffed animal I gave my young daughter. The Japanese are very smart about these things, and award this prize not to the person who registers the lowest score, but instead – knowing some people might purposely play badly in order to be the worst golfer – give it to the player with the second to worst score. That was me.

Q: Didn’t your tenure there overlap the 50th anniversary of the end of the war?

BLACKBURN: It sure did. We spent a lot of time thinking about how best to posture ourselves for 50-year anniversaries of such 1945 events as the fire bombing of Tokyo, the Battle of Iwo Jima, the Battle of Okinawa, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the formal end of the war.
I was particularly concerned that we help the “main island Japanese” better understand what really happened during the Battle of Okinawa and how the horrific fighting there figured so centrally in the American decision to drop the atomic bombs. The Governor of Okinawa at that time, Governor Ota, was considered by many in the Embassy to be very anti-American. He had received a Ph.D. in the United States, had written a history of the Battle of Okinawa, and was very opposed to our bases. Having been on Okinawa in the 1950s, when memories of the devastating battle were still raw for the Okinawans, I recommended that we pay respectful attention to Governor Ota during whatever commemoration the Okinawans thought appropriate for marking the awful tragedy. Following the advice of many of the old Japan hands, Ambassador Mondale and the top U.S. military brass did just that, I am happy to say. The Okinawans put on a very moving ceremony, and inaugurated a unique peace park that lists the names of all those killed in the battle: Japanese, Okinawans, Americans, Koreans, and Chinese.

To help us past the August 1995 Hiroshima anniversary, I encouraged Ambassador Mondale to visit that city in 1993 or 1994 and give a speech to the chamber of commerce, as previous Ambassadors had done. Though the speech would primarily deal with commercial matters, we could expect that in the Q&A period he would get a question on the A-bombing. I hoped he would have a chance to say something to the effect that though most Americans had supported that action as a way to bring the war to a decisive conclusion, we who are alive a half century later must look to the future and do everything possible to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used again in the coming fifty years. Words to that effect, anyway. The idea was to get an on-the-record statement that we could refer back to when asked for comments during the actual anniversary period. In the event, the Ambassador never did get to Hiroshima during those years.

At one point, I also favored recommending to the White House that President Clinton include a brief stop in Hiroshima during his 1993 visit to Japan. Despite my argument that such a visit would be a statesmanlike gesture and perhaps help defuse anti-American sentiment when the actual anniversary came along, others in the Embassy adamantly insisted it would be much too risky, so the idea never went forward. Despite my failed efforts to forestall public affairs problems, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki anniversaries came and went without a great deal of the agonizing I had anticipated.

I also got into the middle of the Air and Space Museum’s ambitious plan for an exhibition around the plane that dropped the bomb on Hiroshima, the Enola Gay, which ultimately produced a big controversy and much embarrassment for the Smithsonian. The museum proposed to display part of the aircraft and supplement it with a four-part exhibit highlighting the evolution of the war up to mid-1945; the testing and preparations for using the bomb; the actual delivery details of getting it from Tinian Island to its target; and the on-the-ground devastation. This multi-sided concept represented a major departure from the usual celebratory exhibitions at the museum. When the curator, Tom Crouch, and others came to the Embassy, I was the point person to talk with them. I told them that as far as the Embassy was concerned, the Air and Space Museum could make its own decisions, but that I personally applauded the idea of educating the American people about this important part of our history. I also suggested culturally-sensitive ways for them to approach the Japanese and elicit cooperation while maintaining control of the content in the most problematical fourth segment of the exhibit. The Japanese involvement was essentially worked out to everyone’s satisfaction, but the curators
faced insurmountable “cultural” problems in dealing with the U.S. Air Force veterans! They unleashed a storm of criticism against the entire concept. The veterans didn’t want anything in the exhibition about devastation and suffering on the ground – or about the evolution of the war, either. Essentially, they wanted the exhibition confined to technical aspects of its second and third themes: the development and delivery of the bomb by the Enola Gay. The whole scheme fell apart and became a first-class fiasco, one that cost the director his job. The museum finally mounted a very modest display, but without most of the contextual material originally planned.

Q: It sounds like the military relationship was very high on the Embassy’s agenda in those days.

BLACKBURN: Our concerns never seemed to have a moment’s rest. In the fall of 1995, just after the U.S. had, with the help of the Japanese, avoided most of the pitfalls surrounding the various 50th anniversaries, we were jolted by the news of a horrible gang rape of a young Okinawan girl. Many of us feared that that dramatic, horrifying event might well become the catalyst for our being forced out of some or even all of our bases in Japan.

USIS closely monitored the Japanese mood, in the media and elsewhere, which suddenly became quite critical of the U.S., especially our continuing to have bases in Japan. Over the months of the crisis, I reported on Japanese opinion at a number of meetings with senior U.S. commanders in Japan (including General Richard Myers and General Pete Pace, currently the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) as well as with senior visiting Defense Department officials such as Secretary William Perry (who had seen devastated Okinawa at the end of the war) and Joseph Nye. The DOD leadership, and senior military officers on the scene, deeply concerned about protecting the Okinawa bases, made sensitive expressions of remorse and apology, and worked with State Department counterparts to fashion policies to reduce our “footprint” on that island.

Meeting over lunch with a group of contacts who were senior editors at the major dailies, I learned that early in the crisis they had met among themselves to discuss what could be done about the growing mood of anti-Americanism – not only on Okinawa but throughout the country. They recognized that Americans were observing this trend and beginning to conclude that the Japanese public wanted the U.S. to remove the bases right away. Believing that such a withdrawal would be very harmful to Japan’s interests, particularly at a time when the Chinese were conducting intimidating missile tests in the Taiwan Straits, they decided – in Japanese consensus fashion – to calm down the reporting by their correspondents and use their editorials to support continuance of the bilateral security relationship. Once those policies were implemented by the Japanese mass media leaders, public opinion rather quickly returned to where it had been. In the four main islands, that is, though not on Okinawa itself. I think that gives a good example of how “Japan Incorporated” sometimes operated in the U.S. interest.

Q: Did the Japanese ever get to try the rapists? Or were they tried in an American court?

BLACKBURN: The Japanese eventually tried them, though I don’t know exactly what happened. As a result of this awful case, we agreed to changes in the SOFA, or Status of Forces Agreement, that made it easier for the Japanese to indict our soldiers in such instances. One of the reasons the Japanese had been so upset with us over this incident was that our military had let
the alleged perpetrator of a previous rape slip out of Okinawa and get back to the U.S. before anyone could nab him. Understandably, they were highly suspicious that such a thing might again happen in this case.

**Q: Did you have speaker programs on security issues as well?**

BLACKBURN: Yes, we had many, both by non-governmental and USG specialists. One innovation I made was to introduce a new regional forum for addressing issues related to the U.S. security presence in Asia. I dubbed it SNEAS, or the Symposium on Northeast Asian Security. It was designed to bring American experts together with Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian security specialist alums of USIA and CINCPAC’s long-standing Symposium on East Asian Security, or SEAS. With participation by Ambassador Mondale, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord, and – via digital videoconferencing – CINCPAC Joseph Prueher, later my Ambassador in Beijing – we held the kick-off SNEAS conference in Tokyo in 1996. It was cosponsored by the Japan Institute for International Affairs. The next year SNEAS was mounted in Seoul, I brought it to Beijing in 2000, and later it went to Ulan Bator and back to Tokyo. I don’t know if it is still going on, but during those years I felt it made a valuable contribution to our broader security effort.

**Q: What was it like working for a former Vice President?**

BLACKBURN: Working for Walter Mondale was always interesting. Mondale of course is one of the great American politicians of our era...

**Q: By what measure?**

BLACKBURN: In my view he represents the highest standards of integrity and public service. Besides that, I found him to be good-hearted and on the right side of issues that I care about. The Japanese were delighted to have him there as our Ambassador. They love to have us send them an “oo-mono” – meaning a person of great prestige as well as substance, someone with the ear of the President, like a Mansfield, Tom Foley, or Howard Baker. Mondale made an excellent public impression. He particularly enjoyed talking to bright and powerful younger people, the second echelon power structure, if you will. He wanted to get things done, while minimizing long discussions and formal exchanges of platitudes that are so much a part of meetings with older Japanese.

Joan Mondale was enthusiastic about being in Japan. She always seemed to be having a great time, was ever on the go, and made friends easily. Known during her Washington years as “Joan of Art,” she had an activist agenda for promoting closer cultural ties between the U.S. and Japan. Her pet project was promoting U.S.-style “public art” in Japan, and in collaboration with CAO Art Zegelbone developed an interesting talk on the subject that she presented at numerous venues.

**Q: Did Mondale go out and talk to students, on the campuses and elsewhere?**
BLACKBURN: Only to some extent. But when he did, he was terrific. He also had a wonderful touch with the media, and was readily available to correspondents, especially American ones, with whom he held background sessions from time to time.

While many of Mondale’s press activities were suggested by us in USIS, he would sometimes initiate them on his own. For example, when a Japanese student was murdered in New Orleans, he was so disturbed by it he told us to set up an impromptu event that morning where he could express his apologies and sorrow. He also wanted to explain that America – despite the horror stories one hears – really is essentially a safe and welcoming country. That personal gesture was something only a big-league American representative could have carried off. It got excellent media play and helped defuse the sense of outrage surrounding the crime.

Mondale had no complaints about Bill Morgan as his Press Attaché, but he felt frustrated not having a personal press assistant on his immediate staff.

Q: How come you didn’t give him one?

BLACKBURN: He really wanted something we couldn’t provide. In Bill and then Emi Yamauchi, the Embassy was served by top-of-the-line Information Officers/Embassy spokespersons. In fact, Bill Morgan had ratcheted up the Press Office operation to meet Mondale’s need for early information on the Japanese press by instituting a daily four- or five-page “Quick Read.” That document took a lot of Japanese FSN and American time in the early hours, but was available at the opening of business. It was a terrific product and much appreciated by the Ambassador - and everyone else in the Embassy.

Q: But that wasn’t enough? Is that what you are saying?

BLACKBURN: Yes. He wanted someone, he told me, who would function like one of the staffers he had had when he was Senator and Vice President. Some enthusiastic young person who loved to go out in the evening and socialize with reporters, who would pick up the gossip, and who could at times drop a hint or give out a little something that might produce a favorable item in the press. He was mostly thinking of American correspondents, not Japanese ones, of course. He said he had no criticism of USIS, but wanted to supplement its outreach to the media by means of someone more directly focused on his day-to-day interests. Realizing that we did not have anyone to assign to him on that basis, Mondale went to USIA Director Joe Duffey and asked for the allocation of a Schedule C political slot. In the end Duffey found the position, and Andy Meyers, who was resident in Tokyo and had previously done some advance work for the White House, was hired to do the job – though several non-USIS people in the Embassy tried in vain to talk Mondale out of the idea.

Anyway, Andy was brought in and we all made the best of what was an awkward situation. The fact that Andy didn’t know the local or international media or have any resources to contribute to his interactions with them – other than their knowledge that he was on the Ambassador’s personal staff – meant that he depended heavily on the USIS Information Office, which continued as before to carry out the mainstream media relations program of the Embassy. Though Bill Morgan handled the situation with outward aplomb, I felt I had let his operation
down by not successfully heading off Andy’s assignment. After a month or two of breaking in, the arrangement sorted itself out. Andy proved pretty easy to work with, and used his advance-man skills to arrange some good public affairs events, such as an Ambassadorial visit to a Japanese super market selling American products. It wasn’t a great situation, as I think the Ambassador probably soon realized, but Andy and USIS cooperated to make it work as well as possible.

**Q:** Were there any Presidential visits during that era?

BLACKBURN: Yes, there were two visits by President Clinton, beginning with the 1993 G-8 meeting in Tokyo. It was Clinton’s first overseas trip as President and included a strong speech on regional security issues at Waseda University, an event we helped shape and carry off. The White House press advance people, led by the meticulously-professional Anne Edwards, were in a state of high anxiety, which made us even more anxious than usual to get everything right. I asked for and got a “dream team” of carefully-selected USIA officers assigned on TDY from all over the world. We laid on a great support operation, for which we received many kudos - despite the fact that on the way into town from the airport the press bus I was traveling on with Anne Edwards got into an accident right on the Shuto Expressway (with a police escort, yet). Working in the trenches with Anne on two POTUS visits laid a good basis for our collaboration on the much more complicated and even more high-profile Clinton visit to China in 1998.

**Q:** What else did you focus on while you were there?

BLACKBURN: Working with ACAO Anne Callaghan, an immensely talented Japanese speaking officer, I spent a great deal of time trying to support – or rescue – American branch campuses that had been set up by U.S. universities in collaboration with Japanese institutions during the heady “bubble” period around 1990. Both the Americans and their Japanese business/academic partners had unwisely thought these operations would make a lot of money. At the peak there were about 30 such ventures all over the country, but the flawed dreams of the educational entrepreneurs who set them up quickly went up in smoke. Besides the effects of the economic downturn, the collaborations suffered from destructive cultural clashes between the Japanese and American partners. Ultimately, none of them were profitable, some folded even before they got started, and only the already-functioning Temple University branch survives to this day.

**Q:** Were these for American students or Japanese students?

BLACKBURN: Mostly they were intended for Japanese students, though Americans resident in Japan or on overseas study programs could also attend. The hope was that many Japanese would take courses for one or two years at the branch campus, and then go on to the U.S. for further study. The prospect of large numbers of fully funded Japanese students was of course enormously attractive to the American colleges and universities.

When things began to get difficult, the organizers of these programs looked to us in the Embassy for help. For instance, they wanted us to lean on the Japanese Ministry of Education to afford the branch campuses some kind of formal recognition. Such status would help them with everything
from recruitment to student rail passes. The Ministry, a particularly conservative institution, was not inclined to bend over backwards for these not-yet established branches, especially since they showed at best a minimal willingness to follow the regulations applied to Japanese colleges and universities.

I also tried to help American academics teaching at Japanese universities who claimed (often with justification) that they were victims of Japanese prejudice against foreigners. On several occasions they had a chance to voice their concerns directly to Ambassador Mondale, and with my help he spoke to Japanese officials on their behalf.

We gave good advice to the struggling campuses and helped the professors as much as we could, but were less effective in moving the Japanese bureaucracy than I – or they – would have liked. One activity that did bring me satisfaction was my involvement in what we called “the Oiso group.” It consisted of ten top American and Japanese professionals in cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries. Some participants were from foundation world, while others - like a Japanese Foreign Ministry official and I – were governmental. We produced a report that took direct aim at some of the fundamental Japanese practices and regulations that impeded the growth of international interchange. Our practical suggestions, and the clear way they were presented, helped form the basis for ground-breaking legislation promoting the growth of NGOs. However, caught completely by surprise by the report, my up-tight Foreign Ministry counterpart on the Fulbright commission was angry that I had been involved in a project that implicitly criticized the Japanese government, especially having done so in league with one – or perhaps more – of his bureaucratic enemies. He called in DCM Rusty Deming to formally complain about my “inappropriate and undiplomatic” actions. Rusty was unfazed by the criticism, agreeing with me that the influential report never could have been done if it had been subject to an internal Japanese clearance process.

WALTER F. MONDALE
Ambassador
Japan (1993-1996)

Vice President Mondale was born and raised in Minnesota. A graduate of the University of Minnesota and its Law School, Mr. Mondale served as State Attorney General before his appointment and subsequent election as United States Senator from the State of Minnesota. Elected Vice President of the United States in 1976, Mr. Mondale served for the duration of the Carter Administration as active participant and advisor. President Clinton nominated him United States Ambassador to Japan, where he served from 1993 through 1996. Throughout his career Mr. Mondale has contributed substantially to the welfare of the nation in both the public and private sectors.

Q: Let’s jump forward to your ambassadorship to Japan. You took up your post as ambassador in August ’93. This is a post at which there’s been a long tradition of non-Foreign Service people being the ambassador. How did this opportunity to be ambassador arise for you? Obviously you
MONDALE: Well, Clinton had asked me to be ambassador to Russia and I accepted and then called him back the next day and said I didn’t think so. I figured that was the last I’d ever hear from him. But in about 3 months or so, Christopher called and asked me whether I might be interested in being looked at as ambassador to Japan. I said, “Yes, I’d like that.” I was selected.

Q: How did you hear? Who called you?

MONDALE: I think the first guy to call was Brian Attwood, who was in the State Department. He’s now the dean of our Humphrey Institute. I said, “Well, Brian, you can put my name in there, but I don’t want it speculated on publicly. I don’t need that at my age.” So, of course, he said, “Nobody will know about it” and it was in the paper that afternoon. What’s new?

Q: Is America a great country or what?

MONDALE: Yes, it’s wonderful. There were some others that were interested. I don’t know how the process went, but I’m told that Christopher came down on my side, he said he thought he could work best with me. I had had a good relationship with Clinton. I don’t think he had problems with it. So, off I went.

Q: Most of our interviews are with career people. We don’t often get into “How did you prepare yourself for this once it was official” because there is a number of very unique steps in this process. Just the announcement that you’re going to be the nominee is...

MONDALE: Yes. This is me talking about myself, but I have had a lifetime style of really soaking in things. In other words, if I’m going to do something like this, I want to read it all, I want to hear from the best, I want to sort through and weigh the issues and how they might work out, the politics of the thing and so on. So, from June or so to August while I was going through the vetting process and the confirmation process and the rest, I had any number of meetings with State Department officials, with think tanks in Washington. I went up to Harvard, Columbia universities. I was out at the University of Washington and maybe Stanford. I spent a lot of time digging into this stuff. A lot of people came to see me like Haru Reischauer, the widow of Edward L. Reischauer, who is a relative of ours. She came… She’s the first one to tell me I was going to be ambassador. There was a leak somewhere and she came out here and we spent a couple days together and she gave me the books I was supposed to read. You’ve Got to Have Wa. So, we spent an awful lot of time on that. Then I started to connect with the career people that were going to help me: Bill Breer, Russ Deming, Desaix Anderson, Japanologists that could help me better understand what I was going to handle. So that’s what I did.

Q: So then the confirmation with the Senate was pretty perfunctory?

MONDALE: It was wonderful.

Q: Some people you’d met before.
MONDALE: Oh, yes, and everybody… Bob Dole came in. The old Jesse Helms was for me. It all worked out very well.

Q: The first time you arrived in Japan was the trip as Vice President?

MONDALE: I think I was there once or twice as a senator.

Q: Probably going through on your way to Vietnam.

MONDALE: Yes, I did, and Reischauer was the ambassador once in ’65, something like that. Of course, Joan was related to him, so I stayed at the embassy and I talked to Reischauer. So I had been there, I think, twice, as a senator.

Q: Now you’re walking in the door… You were in charge of the place.

MONDALE: Yes. It’s different.

Q: Who’s there? Who’s in this house of the American federal government?

MONDALE: Let me begin by summarizing. It was about as impressive a group of people as I’ve ever seen, as committed, as knowledgeable, as helpful, with a good spirit. It really makes you feel good to be an American. They were so good. Many of them are still my friends. Still got somebody coming into town next week. We’re all getting together to talk about old stories. If the American people could have seen what I saw, they’d feel a lot better about how they’re being represented.

I started out with Bill Breer, my DCM, and I asked him to stay on a couple of months to get me started. I asked Russ Deming to come over to be my DCM following that period. I forget just what the timing was. So, Bill helped me get started. He’d been there under Armacost and is an old Japan hand. Peggy Breer was very good to Joan, helping her get started, as was Russ Deming. Then I got to know all the station chiefs and department heads in my embassy. I would have the morning meetings. We’d have the issue conferences. We’d meet in the auditorium and talk about questions. It’s a big embassy. Because there’s a lot of American military over there, you’ve got a whole additional section that deals with that. A big commercial relationship, a big section dealing with that. A big immigration flow. All this stuff. And several significant consulates around the nation and several significant military bases. So, there was a lot to learn. Incidentally, the commander of the US Forces Japan was a guy named Dick Meyers and his assistant was a guy named Pete Pace, who are still in the business. [Editor’s Note: General Richard B. Myers, USAF, became the fifteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Oct. 1, 2001. From November 1993 to June 1996 General Myers was Commander of U.S. Forces Japan and 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Japan. General Peter Pace, USMC was advanced to Major General on June 21, 1994, and was assigned as the Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces, Japan. He is currently the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ]

Q: They are. General Pace was just in the papers the other day. But isn’t that just the point? The public really doesn’t understand that… If you ask the general public, “Oh, it’s the State
Department overseas,” but in fact, it’s the house for the federal government and it’s one way of defining what issues are important with that country because you have the Commerce Department there or the Treasury Department or the FBI…

MONDALE: Or the Ag(ricultural) Department or the Department of Energy or the National Science Foundation, all of that, that broad range of government agencies.

Q: The embassy in Tokyo has a science section?

MONDALE: It did and I think it still does. One of the first things an outsider like me had to learn was that what appeared to be kind of a single agency running the embassy, the State Department, was in fact that plus all these separate agencies represented by their people. Although you have the famous President’s letter to all of them, that “You’re it and you can throw people out of the country and so on,” it doesn’t work that way and you have to develop cooperative attitudes and respect to make it work.

Q: Just as an illustration of that, at the time that you were there, there were some major commercial and economic issues: auto parts and Kodak.

MONDALE: Insurance. We had a lot of tough economic issues.

Q: How did these issues come before you? Was there a pressure group back in Washington and...

MONDALE: Most of the issues arose either from the STR (U.S. Special Trade Representative) or from Commerce, maybe from the State Department. We were having yawning current account and trade deficits, a strong belief existed that there was widespread mercantilism at work. Under Mickey Kantor and some others, they were trying to do something about it. So, these issues, the main ones were cars, car parts, insurance, construction, some intellectual property issues, foreign direct investment issues, a long list.

Q: And if it isn’t issues in Japan, it’s their investment in the United States. In fact, doesn’t that sort of illustrate that countries don’t interact on a single issue or two; they interact over such a broad range of circumstances that that’s why you call it “managing the relationship.”

MONDALE: And that’s why one issue is rarely isolatable from other issues. If it’s significant at all, they relate to each other and they push the agenda of what’s possible. So, if you really pressure trade issues, you might have security issues or other kinds of questions that come up that will be presented in a way that’s not as favorable as if you didn’t have those issues. So, whenever you press another nation to do something that’s significant, you have to ask not only what is it that you want and how you’d be glad to get it, but what is it that you might have to pay, perhaps elsewhere or in the relationship itself, and is that worth what you’re asking for.

Q: When you first arrived in ’93, how would you characterize the temperature of the relationship?
MONDALE: I thought it was good but a little anxious – good because the underlying elements of the relationship were and remained very solid. Both democracies, a strong economic trade relationship, a treaty alliance that worked and was very strong, common interests. Japan and the United States worried about Russia or other security threats in the region meeting each other, all those things. I thought it was very good. The edginess was arising over basically trade. By the time I got there, there had been already a couple of dustups over trade. I forget what we called those… We wanted some kind of guidelines to measure our progress. The Japanese government under the previous Bush Administration had agreed to a certain number of cars that were going to be sold over there and they wanted to get off that idea right away. We weren’t asking for numerical guidelines, but we wanted some kind of measurement of progress. So, by the time I got there, that was getting a little bit edgy. But the rest of the relationship I thought was excellent.

Q: Of course, the guidelines are helpful not only for you to calibrate how you’re going, but it allows you to go back to the US and say to interested parties there, “Yes, we have accomplished this. We’re sharing with you our guidelines.”

MONDALE: But I also think that trade is a very touchy and potentially explosive issue. It’s not a one, two-step between demanding something of another country, getting public support back home, and everything being positive. People are worried about it. Pressing these policies too hard will lead to a damaged commercial and economic relationship. It could lead to irresponsible protectionism. That the market will take care of these things better than government can take care of them. I would say that after a couple years of fairly intense US-Japan trade tension is something that should be studied by scholars to see what we learned from it. Progress was made in the specific issues but what did we learn? I wish somebody would study that.

Q: Because there is always Newton’s third rule of physics in that for every action you make, you are getting a reaction out of the other side. He has his domestic concerns.

MONDALE: Right. And the essence of diplomacy is trying to understand their needs as well as your own in seeing how you can align them and make it easier for both sides.

Q: Which I suspect is not all that different from the legislative skills of a senator.

MONDALE: No.

Q: If you’ve got to get your bill through...

MONDALE: If these politically-appointed ambassadors that we sent over there, like Mansfield and myself and Baker and Foley, bring anything, it’s that we spent a lifetime trying to see how the process works and you’re no good at that game unless you first understand what the other side must have and try to find common ground.

Q: One of the contentious issues, or one of the issues that had to be managed with some sophistication, of course was the U.S. military presence on Okinawa.
MONDALE: Right, a terrible question.

Q: How did you and your staff work with that?

MONDALE: What brought the issue to a head on my watch was the rape of a 12-year old girl by three members of the U.S. military. The public outrage against it was very understandable and shared by me. But within a few days, it had morphed into that issue to be sure but beyond that into the question of whether Americans should withdraw from Okinawa or at least sharply reduce its presence there, change the Saco guidelines to permit easy access and prosecution of American soldiers. For a while, it was really very tense around there. There is so much historic resentment in Okinawa toward the huge presence of American forces there that it was an issue that readily metastasized, not only just Okinawa but in a large part of the country.

We spent the better part of a year walking that thing backwards or sideways so that we could make the changes that we could make but keep our security presence there. And we made a lot of changes, including agreeing on conditions to close Futenma. So that was a big issue. The Japanese government wanted to come out where we did. There was never any question. In the privacy of my discussions with their leaders, they didn’t want this to fracture. They didn’t want to kick us out of Okinawa. They wanted to get this thing back to some kind of stability, but they were politicians and they had to deal with it, too.

Q: And I would suspect that they were coming to you in part saying, “Can you help us out in the case for our own people?”

MONDALE: Right. And we had many meetings with the specialists, with political leaders… Kono, now the speaker, was the foreign minister. Hashimoro and some of the others were around. We would have many meetings trying to figure out how to reduce tensions. The agreement on the Futenma base was the biggest thing, but we also agreed to reduce our footprint in Okinawa, to reduce a number of marchings on streets and ammunition practices and artillery practices and parachute landing practices, and in many ways try to be less obtrusive there. While we didn’t change the Saco rules, we did agree that where there was commissions of crimes of high morale something (I forget the exact word) that we would allow easier access to the charged party.

Q: On the part of the Japanese police.

MONDALE: Right. Baker got this. We insisted that it be an American lawyer around. They didn’t want that. That’s now been agreed to.

Q: What you’re talking about is the Saco...

MONDALE: Strategic Action Committee on Okinawa. SOFA is the Status of Forces Agreement. That’s the one where they prescribe how criminal matters should be handled.

Q: Yes, what each government’s authority is.
MONDALE: Right. And those things are difficult because it’s not just how they’re handled in Japan, but if you change it in Japan, every other country where there are American troops will say, “Hey, here we are.”

Q: “How come he got that and we didn’t?”

MONDALE: Right.

Q: And so there is always the pressure for a common level of approach.

MONDALE: Right.

Q: Also at that time there were the defense guidelines worked up between ourselves and the Japanese, which was to try to get to a different issue in the security relationship of interoperability... What were some of the issues?

MONDALE: There had been some guidelines that were in being that had been issued in ’87 or something like that, but they were toothless, they didn’t really give much instruction. I think what had happened, the way I remember it, was that we got into some really tense relationships with North Korea. In ’94, there was a time there where we were actually preparing for the worst and making plans for moving refugees into Japan and building up American forces in Japan and in South Korea and maybe going to war. That opened up a whole range of private discussions with the Japanese about how we cooperate, about whether these things are prohibited, acts of collective defense, and whether we could buy supplies from them, and whether we could use some other bases or ports, and whether they could help us, say, with mine sweepers and things like that, and if we were attacked defending Japan, could they come to our defense, and that sort of thing. The answers were not there. Neither country thought the answers were there. And so we spent the better part of a year and a half grinding away on those questions. Then in April of 1996, we had one of the most successful U.S.-Japan summits ever. Clinton came over and we signed the guidelines, the defense agreement, and several other agreements, that I think brought a lot of these issues to a very strong resolution.

Q: But isn’t that interesting. Here you’re ambassador. The average person would think that you’re responsible for bilateral US-Japanese relations only, yet a stimulus comes from afar, from the Korean Peninsula, into this bilateral focus and you then have to work together with the Japanese government to adjust to this outside situation.

MONDALE: Right. Not a bad point because it really underscores the fact that while you may think your job is the U.S. ambassador to Japan, in fact, because of that you get involved in all kinds of regional issues that bear on how Japan fits with those other countries. You don’t run Japan, but together you’re talking and working to resolve these issues in a way that together makes a solution more practicable. So, North Korea is a very good example. It still dogs that part of the world. I think one of the many reasons why Japan and the United States are very close is they share a common fear of what an irresponsible North Korea might do.

Q: Might do and the end result might be. You were talking about evacuations into Japan.
MONDALE: Right. With the missiles that we now know they have. If they have nuclear weapons as is speculated, it’s not just “over there.” They could hit us over here. So there’s a lot of reasons why we’re concerned about this with the Japanese.

Q: Let’s look at the Korean situation a little bit. As you were saying, in ’94, things seemed to be spiraling down. The North Koreans withdrew some of their nuclear promises and whatnot. Former President Carter goes to Korea. Did you know he was going?

MONDALE: His first visit to Kim Il Sung was June of ’94. I was over there. I think he came by Tokyo on the way out and he told me about what he had talked about. He was very hopeful that this would help resolve the North Korean issue, that they were willing to open up peninsula talks, they were willing to put strength behind the idea that there should be no nuclear weapons on the peninsula, that Kim Il Sung was ready to talk to his counterpart in South Korea, that they would return American bodies still there from the Korean War, and Carter thought he had made good connections there and there was going to be…

Q: His trip in the first place was a little unsettling to some people.

MONDALE: It was, not to everybody.

Q: Only those who were responsible for the policy at the moment. But before he went, did he pass through Tokyo? Were you aware what he was doing, outside of what the newspapers were saying?

MONDALE: I’m not sure. I remember talking to him about it. I remember him telling me how it had gone with Kim Il Sung. He talked to me on the way out. I’m trying to remember whether he did also on the way in and I can’t remember.

Q: That was a very interesting intervention on his part.

MONDALE: And this is a good thing for the State Department to ponder. The fact of it is that Carter’s talk with Kim Il Sung came at the last moment that that was possible. He was soon dead. Carter came back through Tokyo on his way for the second trip. On the way out to the airport, he was informed that Kim Il Sung had just died. But that first trip opened up commitments and possibilities, but even people who didn’t want Carter to go later used to try to influence the son when he took over. So, I think that what you have there is the special prominence and stature in this case of a former President who can gain access with a guy like Kim Il Sung and have serious, multi-day discussions about things that none of us could have talked to him about. But in the doing of it, how does our government control the brief that the President uses? How do you tell a former President, “Here’s your talking points. Here’s what you can say?” To get the best out of people like that, we have to find ways of doing both. I think there’s strength there that sometimes the traditional diplomatic system can’t fully reach.

Q: And in part, that’s why we have politically appointed ambassadors because you’re trying to send a special message or create a special bond.
MONDALE: I think one of the things that helped me a lot was the feeling by the Japanese government that I had access back home, that if there was something that was important to the relationship, that I could get into the highest levels, I could talk to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and do what had to be done to make certain that my concerns about our relationship or about various things would be heard expeditiously at the highest level. That in turn gave me an improved ability to work with the Japanese leaders. Everybody I’ve talked to like Baker and Foley and Mansfield felt that that was a big edge and advantage.

Q: That’s a big edge, and did you use it?

MONDALE: Yes, I did. Not every day, but if I thought there was something compelling, I would go to the President, I would go to Christopher. I remember talking with (Secretary of Defense) Perry many times about this defense guidelines and Futenma decision, we worked almost every day… That’s an exaggeration, but whenever I wanted him, I’d call him.

Q: And Sak Sakoda and people from Perry’s office would be out there.

MONDALE: And I remember one day the vice minister wanted to know something about a policy that we had in the UN that wasn’t apparent from the stories, so I called (Ambassador to the United Nations) Madeline (Albright) and in a half hour call back and said, “Madeline Albright tells me that this is what they want.” He said, “That’s very helpful.” That’s one thing you can do.

Q: We’re talking about third country issues that impact on US-Japanese relations. Another one that came up at that time was the Senkaku Islands imbroglio. How did that unfold?

MONDALE: Either it was some Japanese that went out and occupied one of those little dots on the ocean-

Q: And put a lighthouse on it.

MONDALE: Well, there was two different island disputes. One was the Senkakus and the other was the islands down around the Philippines. The Senkaku islands, I think it was either Japanese or Chinese that went out there, in effect staking sovereignty claims through their private actions over these islands. The question was, well, what is the American policy toward the Senkakus? Is it a part of the administered areas referred to under the treaty with Japan? Or is it separate from that and thus more eligible for Chinese claims of sovereignty? That issue came up. I made inquiry back home about what I could reliably tell the Japanese government. I was told reliably from our own government that the Senkakus were a part of the administered area and I called the vice minister at the foreign ministry and told him so.

Q: That’s actually our standard response, isn’t it, that we don’t draw other people’s borders?

MONDALE: No, but we have this unique relationship with Japan and we have a treaty in which we pledge to defend Japan that refers to “administered areas,” areas that we administered after
World War II as part of our occupation, and this issue comes up every 2-3 years over there. I saw it came up again the other day. The same answer.

*Q:* But isn’t that an interesting aspect of international relations, that issues will repeat, that you have tradeoffs?

MONDALE: Yes.

*Q:* Which leads me to ask, one of an ambassador’s jobs is creating an image of the United States in the country that you’re resident in. How did you rate the embassy resources for the job of public diplomacy on Japan and what did you do to assist that?

MONDALE: I thought the people working there were wonderful. I really enjoyed it. My wife was active in the arts and there was a group of people in that side of the embassy that worked very closely and she was able to do what she wanted. They loved it. Everything you do every day is part of this public. You go out and give speeches. You travel around the country. You meet with their leaders. You meet with various groups from Japan. You write articles for the newspaper. You hold news conferences. You go over and see the prime minister or the cabinet secretary or this person or that person. The idea is to create a public presence and the development of public issues in a way that strengthens the relationship.

*Q:* How about the resources for the embassy to do that?

MONDALE: I was somewhat disappointed in that. We were going through a time of budgetary restraint. We weren’t quite there yet, but we were about to go through this issue of whether USIA (United State Information Agency) was separate or to be folded within the State Department, which created some anxiety in the USIA. We had closed the cultural consulate in Kyoto, which I thought was a terrible idea. It had been there for 40 years. They had tried to close the one in Sapporo. I think they got it back, but I was fighting rear guard action all over trying to protect the little presence we had. They closed a lot of the libraries down before I got there and while I was there. The people we had were very talented, but we didn’t have much of a budget to work on with a country that size. I thought, not with many of them, but with a few of them, that some… I’m saying this because I know these things are important to the State Department. Most everybody in the embassy worked with us very closely but there was an attitude on the part of a couple of USIA officers – not most of them – that they were truly independent and separate and to get involved with us, to promote policies, was a corruption of their independent role as the tribunes of truth. So, I had a couple of get together meetings with them about that.

*Q:* We’re talking about the consulates… So what’s one consulate?

MONDALE: Oh, I think they’re very important. In many ways, per capita, they have more clout than maybe the embassy. That consulate down in Naha, Okinawa, is tremendous. The one up in Sapporo is very important. These consulates have on the ground in touch relationships. I remember when the State Department was going to close Sapporo because of budget reasons, the governor of Hokkaido came down to see me. He said, “We’ve made a decision. We’ll pay for it. Don’t close it. We’ll pay for it. We want you here.”
Q: And I think that’s something a lot of people don’t understand. Oh, well, gosh, you have an embassy, you can read the national newspaper and therefore you’re fully informed.

MONDALE: A lot of people think it’s kind of striped pants cultural feet arrogance. In fact, it’s the most fundamental kind of connectivity that really helps sew our relationships together.

Q: Particularly among democracies.

MONDALE: And it’s people with language skills, with cultural background, with a sense of history, many of them over the years have developed a connection of contacts and friends and sources of information and advice that is invaluable to our country.

Q: You were talking about President Clinton stopping by one time. There were a couple of times when he skipped Tokyo on trips to Asia.

MONDALE: Clinton for the record was in Japan more often and for more hours by far than any other president in the history of the United States. But this was after I left… He took a trip to China with Hillary and their daughter and he turned it into an official trip but also sort of a tourist trip, which is fine, but he should have come back to Japan and he didn’t. That was duly noted in Japan and was not good.

Q: Those are the kinds of things that can set the groundwork or set up some tremors.

MONDALE: Right. When he came there in ’96, he was stunning. I’ve never seen a public leader capture the affection of people like he did. You could just feel it. It was throbbing. I’m sorry that a later venture diminished some of that.

Q: We’ve been talking about the use of consulates and whatnot.

To start a summation, what do you see as the role of an embassy overseas and the kinds of things that it can do? They’re always under budget pressures.

MONDALE: I think that’s a good place to begin. We need to see the value of these things. Fulbright liked to say how 40 years of Fulbright scholarships, with all that meant, cost less than half a Polaris submarine. We’re talking about money, but in terms of the size of our nation, the wealth of our nation, the issues that we have at stake, the cost of our diplomacy, the very modest expenditure and the most productive yield of almost anything we do, I think we have a question of not only what’s spent but what we get for it. I’m told that Powell has been very good about this and that people love him for that. I do, too, if that’s what he’s done because he was in a position where he could leverage.

We were slipping. I think when I left, the real support for diplomacy in our budget had dropped in real terms by almost 50% over the last 15 years. The nominal amounts were there, but inflation had eroded it there. A terrible thing. And we were cutting things. At one time when the yen got really expensive, our whole embassy and their families couldn’t even go out at night to
go see a movie. They had no money. A great nation like ours, hamstrung. So I think that it’s one of the best things we do. We need to be better at it. We need to work to improve the morale of these officers so they know we know they’re important. We need to support their education so they get the languages and the background that really helps them become good officers. I believe that the overly prompt rotation – that’s the way I saw it – of skilled young career officers was a mistake. I know there are other reasons, but you’d get a young officer there for 2 years, they’d get some skills in the language, start making contacts, and then be shipped off to Russia or something like that. I don’t know the bigger picture, but I believe that there ought to be maybe another year in those first assignments, that we ought to make certain that there’s a liberal opportunity to really get good at the language more than we do.

I was irritated sometimes about how what I used to call the “GLOB,” the State Department Personnel Office, would make decisions about who came and went from my embassy. For example, when we came up to the time of the auto negotiations, in the month or two previous to those negotiations, every one of our top officers who was a specialist in that field got ordered somewhere else. Every one of them. There were 3 or 4 major principals that knew all about it. Out they went. I called the GLOB and said, “You can’t do this to me.” They did it to me. And as a matter of fact, they sent word back they didn’t appreciate my calling. It’s kind of a headless operation. I think there needs to be some way… You can’t have politicians running-

Q: And in fact, representation budgets, for example, are crucially important. In this law firm where we are conducting this interview, I’m sure you’d take your colleagues and your business partners out to lunch, but according to Congressman Rooney, he wasn’t about to let those striped pants Foreign Service officers spend good taxpayer money on a function which we know is enormously invaluable in making human contact.

MONDALE: That’s right.

Q: Which speaks to the issue of public support for diplomacy.

MONDALE: And public understanding of what diplomats do.

Q: Yes. And that comes at you in a number of ways. When I would come back from a tour, I’d call the public affairs guys and say, “Okay, I’m back in Seattle. I’ll do some public speaking for you.” “Well, now there’s no budget for that.” So, the American public is denied in one sense the knowledge that their sons and daughters from Washington state and Minnesota and Arizona are Foreign Service officers. There still are lots of people who don’t understand the broad base of the Service itself.

MONDALE: Also, 9/11 and what did we learn about those risks? What could we have learned about those risks if we had better language officers around the world? How are we going to deal with this growing threat of terrorism from around the world that’s more and more apparent if we don’t have people who can participate in trying to find out and protect us? I’m not just talking about the CIA, although that’s part of it. This is also a part of every State Department and other official overseas. How good are we and how fully do we support decent efforts to get in there
where you can hear and learn about these things and to protect America?

Q: Or make the friends that are going to give you the platforms to fulfill American foreign policy goals?

MONDALE: Yes. This is a national security issue.

Q: By the time Secretary Powell take up his assignment, various gold ribbon studies suggested that the State Department foreign service personnel was up to 1,000 officers short. That was the peace dividend which Congress collected during the previous decade. A thousand people for 3M, nobody would even notice. But the Foreign Service is only approximately 5,200 people, so if you’re missing 1,000 and you have to rotate people and nobody gets language. Secretary Powell, in fact, has spent the time to encourage Congress to restore most of that funding.

MONDALE: Yes, and that’s great.

Q: But that’s all part of the key: public understanding of that diplomacy function.

MONDALE: Right. And I think that’s got to be worked on. I would have to say, I don’t think the public understanding of what we’re talking about is very deep.

Q: One could question the level of public discussion of foreign affairs, but I wonder about how issues are framed once they become part of domestic politics. Would you really get a domestic politician saying, “Well, we have to listen to the other guy, find out his interests?” Probably not because the politician from the opposite party would take a contrary position and say, “Ah, no, whack him on the other side of the head. The U.S. must be shown to be winning.”

MONDALE: There is a current fever that may be abating that supports the idea that it’s only simplistic macho slogan-type certainty that can tap American strength and influence abroad. It’s the only thing that guarantees that we’ve got a he-man at work, that subtlety and nuance, the sorts of things that the best officers in the State Department help us achieve, are things that diminish national strength. I think that is horribly distorted to the point of risking national security, that understanding others – their languages, their histories, their compulsions, how their systems work, what’s driving their sentiment, all of those things – must be understood in order to be strong.

Q: You would assume that would be an easy lesson for a commercial market society as ours to understand.

MONDALE: Because every businessman knows that.

Q: Exactly. And every businessman listens to his salesman who is his feedback mechanism to the market. And if the salesman comes back and say, “Hey, boss, I can sell more of these things, but you’re got to paint them purple instead of blue,” does the boss say, “Hey, that’s fine because understanding our customers is going to make us rich?” Well, what if you get the response, “Well, my grandfather set up this company three generations ago and we’ve been making blue
widgets and we’ll never...” You’d go out of business if you don’t listen to the customers.

MONDALE: That’s right.

Q: In our own world of commercialism and advertising we see people spending enormous amounts of money influencing other people after studying what the consumer wants.

MONDALE: To me, it’s a question of respect. What I tried to do when I was ambassador was take every opportunity I had to build the sense that my interlocutors are people I respected and a country that I respected with a history that I respected with a potential that I respected. And you could feel it. I used to tell American VIPs when they came through – and they always had these talking points that you guys had prepared for them – and he’d say, “Well, I’ve got these 7 points...” I’d say, “Okay, that’s good, but here’s what I suggest. When this meeting starts, introduce yourself, tell them how happy you are to be there, and listen to him, let him talk. He may not want to talk, but the fact that you wanted to hear from him first will be noted by him and it’ll make it easier for you to give your points than if you start right out, “This is our agenda.” It’s a respect thing. I believe that that’s the great strength of America. There is an inexhaustible supply of dignity around. You can give it to people and there is more around to give to other people. You can show respect without reducing your supply of respect. And the idea that America wants to like others and to work with others wherever we can because we like them or we respect them is a subtle but powerful tool for us and for our future.

Q: When you were Ambassador, did you have the opportunity to have small groups into the residence and have these kinds of informal contacts?

MONDALE: I did. I would meet with them. We’d go out for dinner, which I liked. We would have them in the embassy. I’d meet them in their offices. We had sort of routine things like, I’d always have breakfast every week or every month with the vice minister of foreign affairs. We really tried to make these things go.

Q: So there was a regular pattern of interaction that you had set up so that was available to you if something were to-

MONDALE: Right. And I would go around and meet all the ministers. I’d go to the party headquarters and meet the leaders. You know what the ambassador does.

Q: But does the public know what the ambassador does, sitting there regally in his office? As you’re saying, most of the gentlemen I worked with saw their job as getting out and creating a presence for the United States and a reputation. We would have small dinner parties at the ambassador’s residence for key people. Again, that’s what one does in a commercial society to maintain a human relationship with the client. It’s just good business.

MONDALE: I think that commercial analogy is a very good one because people can understand what they’re doing. But it leaves me a little cold because I think there’s things about human connections that isn’t commercial - I realize you’re not saying that – that go more to respect and human vibes or something. But I placed a lot of emphasis on that. I think there’s something
about living the life of a politician, if you’re any good at it, that you find that side of human nature is… If you go at it right, you’ll see the power of trust and respect to do things that you need to get done and may be difficult.

Q: The kinds of issues that you dealt with sort of had a natural life in and of themselves sometimes. But were there things that sprang from the American political process that some lobby group got in or something like that and this was a new issue then for you?

MONDALE: I felt like I was America’s desk officer. You had a lot of people with a lot of agendas that would try to come in through different agencies or come to us directly to push their agenda. It might be a commercial agenda. It might be a weapon they wanted to sell. It might be any number of things. I always felt that it was my duty to look at the total relationship and respond to them based on what I thought best served our country. If I didn’t like the idea, I didn’t think it helped, I’d sometimes tell them. Sometimes I wouldn’t tell them, I’d just handle it that way. I’d get orders, “Take this immediately to the prime minister” on something I knew was not appropriate at that level and something I knew the prime minister would think I was crazy, so I’d say, “We’re going to get right to it” and I’d send some lower level assistant over there and tell them to leave a message or something. You had to do that. I think that’s how an ambassador has to operate. If the government doesn’t think he’s doing it well, get somebody else, but I don’t think you can just let this stuff come unfiltered into the country.

Q: Isn’t that just the key thing that an ambassador offers, prioritizing your messages and making sure that they have the proper effect that you want?

MONDALE: Right. And sometimes you can’t get decisions out of the government that have to be made quickly. When that girl was raped, I immediately apologized. I didn’t wait for instructions from the federal government. I just went out and did it. When they had the 1995 annual memorial service for those killed in the firebombings of Tokyo that terrible night, I went to it. I wasn’t taking sides in the war, but I let them know that Americans were sorry about what happened to innocent people, and I know it made a difference. I got a lot of bad mail from over here, but it was something that made us human, it showed that we cared, and I just did it.

Q: And of course handling the 50th anniversary of the end of the war was… There were ceremonies all over the place.

MONDALE: All over, but this was different. This one involved America’s bombing Tokyo. I wasn’t going to review that issue, but I wanted them to know that we were sorry that innocent people were killed. I think I got away with it.

RICHARD M. GIBSON
Japanese Language Training
Yokohama (1994-1995)

Principal Officer

Richard M. Gibson was born in Florida in 1942. He received a bachelor’s degree from San Jose State College in 1965 and his master’s in 1966. He served in the US Navy from 1966-1971 as a lieutenant overseas and entered the Foreign Service in 1971. Mr. Gibson was assigned to Rangoon, Bangkok, Songhla, Yokohama, Okinawa, and Chiang Mai. In 1998, he was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

GIBSON: I came over here to this wonderful campus and studied the six week economic course because I always wanted to take it. Then I did some refresher Japanese language training here and in January of ‘95 I went out to Yokohama for more refresher Japanese language training. In the summer of ‘95 I left Yokohama and went to Sapporo Japan as principal officer up there and stayed there until December of ‘96 when I decided that it was time for me to do something else with my life and quit. I am one of the few white male political officers who quit rather than had their clock run out.

Q: Tell me about Sapporo. To identify it, it’s the principal city of Hokkaido isn’t it?

GIBSON: Yes, it’s the principal city of Hokkaido. It is where the Hokkaido administrative apparatus is. It is like the capital. The consular district included the northern part of Honshu as well. I think the consular district was something like 27 percent of the land area of Japan or something like that. It is quite extensive, quite large. Hokkaido was an interesting place. I think it has 22 percent of the land area of Japan and it’s got something like five percent of the population. It is thinly populated with beautiful forests. It is actually a beautiful country. Dairy farming and fishing are big up there. Coal mining is gone now. It is mainly agriculture. Some of it is rice because they grow rice everywhere in Japan but there are a lot of potatoes and onions and sort of western crops are grown there plus it is a big dairy area, the dairy capital of Japan. It’s like our Wisconsin.

Q: What were the issues? What was the situation there when you were there?

GIBSON: It was all pretty calm and easy, kind of boring. It was actually the most boring job that I had in the Foreign Service. We had a beautiful facility occupied one half by the USIS branch office and we had the other half. Actually USIS had most of the building because they had an auditorium, library and that sort of thing. It was a very nice facility. Then there was us. The USIS thing got closed down after I left actually.

The main job that we had on the State side was trade promotion and that was basically our job. Our military would go up there and we’d do exercises with the Japanese self defense forces and that sort of thing. Every now and then there would be an incident up on the disputed area between Japan and Russia which we’d report on. We would also report a little bit on far eastern Russian developments, trade relations with Japan. Basically it was trade promotion. We were helping U.S. companies selling to Japanese companies. Our biggest market was building materials. In Hokkaido, because they had more space, there tended to be more western style homes built and two-by-four construction as opposed to post and beam construction which the
Japanese had traditionally used.

Q: *This is tape five, side one with Dick Gibson.*

GIBSON: Oregon, Washington and the Canadians too were selling a lot in there and so were the Swedes and various Scandinavians. The Australians were making a good effort too. Throughout northern Japan, northern Honshu and on Hokkaido, as I said two-by-four style construction was flourishing and our companies would sell better quality building materials shipped from the west coast to Japan and we could beat local Japanese prices.

Q: *Did you have problems with Japanese regulations, custom, I mean a concerted effort to make sure that nothing got through?*

GIBSON: That’s right we did but you just keep plugging away at it. Tokyo was handling most of that. Tokyo was fighting that battle. All we were doing was we were cheering Tokyo on and if we got a particularly egregious case we would report it to the embassy and then they would use it in their negotiations with the Japanese. Certain things we were doing okay in and certain things we weren’t. Wiring and plumbing, forget it. They had that one sewed up. The Japanese had all these little regulations on wiring and plumbing and stuff.

Q: *You can draw up things so that you only have to use certain types of piping and wiring.*

GIBSON: We were chipping away at it. We were doing real well on stuff like timber and on things like drywall, fiberboard, basic construction materials. Yes, it all had to be passed and this and that and everything. You know, you beat on the Japanese long enough, they give grudgingly with two steps forward, one step back but then you just keep pounding on them. We were working at it.

I think what we were trying to do was get a U.S. share of major construction projects. The biggest one that was going on there was the city of Sapporo was building a new stadium for the World Cup in 2000 or whatever it was going to be. We knew it was an uphill fight but we did a lot of lobbying with Sapporo officials and everything to get American companies to get a good shot at it. We knew we wouldn’t get an American contractor in there, that would never happen. But we were working very hard to get an American engineering firm to have a role in there. As I understand after I left it came down that way. It started out as an American engineering firm and I think the Brits bought it out but it is still largely American in many ways I guess.

We were also doing pretty well in selling electricity producing things like generators and that sort of thing to the local electric companies because the utilities in Japan are under increasing pressure to become more cost effective and so they were looking for better ways to do it. We were having some success in that area and we were having some success with computer and high tech stuff. Other things surprisingly enough were helicopters. The various prefectures in Japan and major cities were on the kick of buying emergency helicopters, rescue helicopters for medics and that sort of thing. We had some pretty good luck selling Bell helicopters to the city of Sapporo and the province, state, whatever you want to call it, of Hokkaido and some of the other cities down in the northern Honshu area. But that is basically what we did. I spent a lot of my
time doing trade shows. We would do trade shows both in Sapporo and in Sendi which is the commercial center of northeastern Japan, the Tohoku area they call it. We were doing okay. We did pretty well. I was quite please with the performance of the guys doing that but basically that was all we did. No one cared about anything else up there.

Q: *What about with trade and all, I would have thought that Wisconsin or Minnesota, you mentioned dairy, might be pretty good sending trade delegations there and all of that or maybe Idaho potatoes or something like that?*

GIBSON: We got strawberries but not potatoes because Hokkaido grew plenty of potatoes and quite good ones. Wisconsin didn’t participate. You take dairy farming at their own place, there is no way you can beat them.

Q: *I was thinking of equipment or something like that.*

GIBSON: Oh yeah, the dairy farming equipment, milking equipment and a lot of that stuff was American, very heavily American made stuff was there. But you know it is funny because I guess what was going on is the dairy industry in Hokkaido was consolidating while I was there and a lot of people were selling their farms and there were fewer and fewer farms and this sort of thing. Mom and dad would retire and Sally and Joey didn’t want to be on the farm, they wanted to be in the city and they had left. When I would visit dairy farms you would see American milking equipment and various other things which I’ve sort of forgotten because I don’t know anything about farming anyway. There would be Ford tractors and all this stuff. You would see a lot of American made equipment but we weren’t at the time really engaged in selling them which told me that it was sort of a maintenance job. There was a local Ford rep. It had sort of gone on its own and it didn’t really need any consulate intervention, trade boost and this sort of thing. I think that it was probably because it was a very stable market, or a shrinking market if anything. You are right. Our stuff was being used over there.

Q: *When was the last time that you were in Japan?*

GIBSON: Last month.

Q: *No, I’m talking about a tour before this?*

GIBSON: It had been ‘86 (if you count language school) to ‘89 in Okinawa.

Q: *Did you notice any change in the Japanese? Up in that area were they more internationally oriented? Was there a change?*

GIBSON: First of all I can’t really say if there was a change and I’ll tell you why. Okinawans are Okinawans, they are not mainland Japanese. Hokkaido people are not your average Japanese because Hokkaido is settled. It was a frontier area as late as the turn of the century so the people who went up to Hokkaido came from all parts of Japan so they are much more open and less closed than the people from the main islands of Japan. They are not really representative of the Japanese either. I found the Hokkaido folks in general to be much more open, easier to talk to.
Not easy but easier than most Japanese. Yes there is a very high interest in international things like music festivals, and Sapporo is building a world trade center. They would have exchanges with the Northern (tier) Group, countries that basically are at the top of the world.

Q: Kind of cold.

GIBSON: Yeah, kind of cold, the Scandinavian countries, Russia, Canada, U.S. through Alaska. They are constantly having meetings and conferences. Hokkaido and Sapporo are really good on dragging in international things. At the universities there they have a lot of sister school relationships with U.S., Australian, Russian, Chinese universities. Sister city programs are very popular. All of this, as there is toing and froing and this sort of thing, and does it make a real impact on the psyche of the average Japanese citizen in Hokkaido? No. They go through all the motions and everything, they are doing all this. My friends and I, the cynics that we are, we would always say the Japanese wouldn’t know kokusaika if it bit them in the ankle. Kokusaika is the Japanese term for internationalization. They don’t get it but they are trying real hard.

They had a program in Japan called JET program, I think it means Japan English Teaching or something like that. It is a government sponsored thing. Young Americans or other nationalities too go to Japan and some of them teach English in the schools and some of them they put in the city or the provincial administrative offices and they handle these international programs. In every province, (I use the term province. It’s multidimensional, they are not even all the same in Japan but they are province like things for cities and all the major cities) they all have international programs and in the city there will be an international department. You know how exploded the bureaucracy in Japan is, so they’ve got all this tax money and they sponsor these. A great many of them have these foreign kids there. You meet some real nice young Americans, I met mainly Americans of course. Anyway they are very interested and the people of Hokkaido more so than most I think.

Hokkaido is basically a colony of mainland Japan. The Japanese sort of see them as the provider of milk, cheese, potatoes, onions and a market for their manufactured goods and this sort of thing. Very few Japanese companies will go up there and locate. The Hokkaido crowd are always trying to get foreign companies to come and invest in Hokkaido but they won’t because transportation costs between the mainland and Hokkaido are prohibitive. The government regulates everything and won’t give a break on airline fares, telephone calls. They won’t give them a break on anything so they pay outlandish fees.

I’ll give you an example of internal transportation and why factories won’t locate in Hokkaido. You can ship a standard sea-land container of goods from say Seattle to Yokohama Japan for x number of dollars. At Yokohama you put it on a ship to bring it up to a port in Hokkaido on the Pacific coast, we’re not talking about the Sea of Japan side, we’re talking about the Pacific coast. It will be 2x dollars. It will cost you twice as much to ship it internally and if you try to do it by road, it is going to be the same thing.

I used to love the internal phone thing. My wife was over here in the States while I was there, that was one of the reasons that I didn’t do the full tour. I would call her, as I did most nights. The embassy has this tie line back to this area so once I got to the embassy operator my
telephone call to Virginia was free but the thing that limited our phone conversations was I had to pay the phone bill between Sapporo and Tokyo. It wasn’t quite as bad as her calling me direct from here but it wasn’t much cheaper. It was cheaper but not much. Anyway, nobody wants to locate up in Hokkaido and the Hokkaidan people are always pressuring the government to give them a break on this or that. Everything is regulated so if the government bureaucrats want to, they could make the long distance rates cheaper. It gets in the way of telegraph, e-mail, it affects everything up there.

Q: Did the dispute over the northern territory with what used to be the Soviet Union and is now Russia, intrude at all?

GIBSON: No, occasionally. The Japanese poached a lot in those islands. Their fishermen would go up there and start poaching and the Russians don’t mess around. A patrol boat would go in and warn them a couple of times and if they didn’t smartly get out of the waters or heave to for arrest, they’d shoot them. They would just open fire. There were a couple incidents where machine gun holes in the cabin and this sort of thing and boats would be arrested. In every case the Japanese were in the wrong. The Russians were in the right in the sense that they were protecting their territorial limits. You may not agree with their territorial limits because you may say that that’s an island that really belongs to Japan, but not so. The islands we’re talking about are right here where they’ve got a sort of hatch there. They would be around usually right around in this area just off Hokkaido. But sometimes they would be up here off Sakhalin and Sakhalin is not disputed. The Japanese were poaching. There would be occasional incidents but it would always be played down.

If you went up to that area of Hokkaido, the We Want Our Northern Territories Back movement or whatever, was really strong. They have museums there and they have road signs along the road which the Japanese right wing would have up showing basically Russian soldiers bayoneting nice Japanese babies on the islands, that sort of thing. It was really just funny propaganda. I used to take snapshots of the big signboards. You get away from there and nobody much cares, it’s a dead issue. They are god forsaken islands and who wants them? At the museum they have a lot of historical photographs of Japanese families and workers. There is nothing up there. They are barren, cold, isolated and nobody in their right mind lives there. In fact the population has drained because once the Soviet Union broke down, the Russians don’t have to stay there any more and they are heading back. There have been some earthquakes that have destroyed a lot. Nobody wants to live there, even the Russians don’t want to live there, and there are no Japanese left there. They all were sent back down to the mainland and so nobody really cares except for these old codgers up there, the right wing.

A few years ago the Russians and the Japanese agreed to a system whereby several times a year without bothering with visas and everything, the Japanese can go up there and visit the ancestral graves. That took a lot of the wind out of it too. I think it is sort of the thing, oh yeah well great grandfather Hashimoto he is buried up there. That is great, you stay there Hashimoto-San and I’ll stay down on Hokkaido where it’s a lot nicer. It was a big Cold War issue at one point.

Q: It was a very handy thing for the old Cold War. It kept the Japanese from playing footsie with the Soviets. It was stupidity on the part of the Soviets but anyway it was their stupidity and not
GIBSON: What is interesting now is if you took a poll in Hokkaido, 90 percent of the people in Hokkaido would say let Japanese businesses invest in those islands because there are plenty of Japanese businesses that would like to invest in construction on those islands or in a fish canning processing plants and this sort of a thing. They see it as an opportunity for some profit but the Foreign Ministry won’t let them because if the Japanese invest there, they have to get Russian permission which implies that it is Russian territory, and so on, and so on. The Hokkaidans are always pounding on Tokyo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying hey, forget that let’s just do a deal, but Tokyo won’t do it. The people of Hokkaido they don’t care.

ALOYSIUS M. O’NEILL
Consul General
Okinawa (1994-1997)

Mr. O’Neil was born in South Carolina and raised there and in other states in the U.S. He was educated at the University of Delaware and Heidelberg University. After serving in the US Army in Vietnam, Mr. O’Neill joined the Foreign Service in 1976 and was posted to Korea. He subsequently served three tours in Japan as student of Japanese and Consular and Political Officer. He also served in Burma, Korea and the Philippines as well as in Washington, where he dealt primarily with East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Mr. O’Neill was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: Al, I think this is a good place to stop. We’ll pick this up the next time. You’re off to Okinawa as consul general. When did that happen?


Q: Okay. Today is the 7th of November 2008. This is with Al O’Neill. Al, I’ve had quite a few interviews relating to the battle of Okinawa. I’m not talking about the invasion of Okinawa in ’45. I’m talking about the battle of Okinawa over a reversion treaty. Reversion was the term?

O’NEILL: Yes, that was.

Q: There was a very bitter battle between the Department of State and the Pentagon over a reversion agreement. You were there from when to when?

O’NEILL: I got there in August ’94 and stayed till July ’97.

Q: First place, how did you get the job?

O’NEILL: Charm, I suppose. I had had Japan experience. I was still considered a Japanese language officer although it had been 10 years since I’d used the language very much. I wanted
the job, and I knew people who were in a position to recommend me for the job, particularly Tom Hubbard who was our deputy assistant secretary.

I made clear that I wanted it, and the fact that I had Japanese language and previous experience in Tokyo was helpful. That was where I first worked with Tom Hubbard, who was the chief of the internal branch in political when I was Ambassador Mansfield’s aide. Plus I’d been working for Tom for two years in the East Asia bureau. I was at the right grade. I wanted it for a lot of reasons, one of which was I wanted to be a principal officer and run my own post for a change. I thought that my military background would be helpful and I figured it would be a very interesting place. It turned out to be even more interesting than I thought.

Q: What was the situation in Okinawa? In the first place, when did the reversion come, and how stood things at this time, and where did Okinawa fit at this period in the Japanese political context?

O’NEILL: Well, reversion had taken place in May of 1972, 22 years before. Okinawa again became a prefecture of Japan as a result of reversion. Japanese was the official language. Many Okinawans, particularly the older ones, still spoke various Okinawan dialects which are quite different from Japanese. Okinawa was also the most visible symbol of the U.S.-Japan security relationship under the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960.

As a prefecture, Okinawa had an elected governor and elected prefectural assembly and elected mayors in the cities and towns and their own city councils, etc., from among the Okinawan populace. There were Okinawan representatives in the Diet in Tokyo. There were also numerous Japanese officials in Okinawa, including from what was then called the Japan Defense Agency or JDA, now the ministry of defense. Bank of Japan had an office there. Many of the organizations of the Tokyo bureaucracy were represented in Okinawa as they would be in other Japanese prefectures.

The U.S. military presence was huge. Okinawa prefecture consists of the main island of Okinawa and a line of much smaller islands stringing out north and south from Kyushu, the southernmost main island all the way to the island of Yonaguni. It is said that on a clear day you can see Taiwan from Yonaguni.

The bulk of the population and the bulk of the U.S. military presence were all on the main island of Okinawa which was only 67 miles long at its longest, the north-south axis, and then at the widest it’s just 14 miles wide. Most other places it’s a lot narrower than that. About 1.2 million Okinawans live on that island. In my time, there were also 29,000 U.S. military people packed into that island and a similar number of family members and Defense Department civilians including 900 people from the Defense Department school system. There were 13 DoD dependent schools on Okinawa including two four-year high schools; so it was an enormous U.S. presence on a pretty small island.

About 17,000 of the 29,000 military people were Marines from the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force or MEF. The MEF commander was then a major general, a two star who was the senior U.S. military officer on Okinawa. He did not command the heads of the Army, the Navy, and the
Air Force components on Okinawa, but he was the senior officer and the Okinawa Area Coordinator. Each of them answered to component commanders at Yokota Air Base, Yokosuka for the Navy, and Camp Zama in the case of U.S. Army Japan. Most of the military forces on Okinawa were combat units of various kinds, so they trained constantly and tended to make a lot of noise. There were three F-15 fighter squadrons on Kadena Air Base, for example, and they were flying all the time. The units were always training for contingencies particularly in Korea and elsewhere in Asia as well. So, packed on a very tiny island, you had a U.S. military presence that affected everything because it was so large and noisy. The U.S. military also occupied also a lot of very prime land in central Okinawa.

Let me mention a couple of things about Okinawa’s past. Until 1879, Okinawa was a separate kingdom, the Ryukyu Kingdom, a tributary state of China. In conducted its own trading relations with Java and Siam, Korea, etc., as well as China. They had a long history of being an essentially unarmed trading nation. They came under increasing Japanese control in the 1600s from a samurai clan in southern Kyushu, but they still were a tributary state of China. After the Meiji emperor was restored to being head of government in 1867, Japan moved to annex Okinawa as a prefecture. As a result of this there was always tension between the mainland Japanese and the Okinawans. The Okinawans were very much looked down upon by the mainland Japanese as being not really Japanese, as being mixtures of Chinese and Korean and Okinawan, etc., and were very much second class citizens through the war period.

The Battle of Okinawa was horrendous. It was one of the biggest battles of the entire Pacific war, 82 days of pretty much non-stop combat. The invasion took place on April Fool’s Day, April 1, 1945. The naval force was larger than the one for the D-Day invasion of Normandy. The fleet was almost unimaginable. One thousand four hundred fifty seven warships took part including 40 aircraft carriers, 18 battleships and 430 troop ships and who knows how many cruisers and destroyers, and 50 submarines. There were 1,500 airplanes including B-29s. So this was a gigantic invasion of a very small place.

The purpose was to establish a base from which the U.S. could conduct the invasion of mainland Japan, starting in November 1945 with Kyushu and then the bigger invasion of the Tokyo plain which was planned for the spring of 1946. The Japanese probably didn’t believe, based on the Pacific war to date, that they would be able to defeat the Americans and keep them from controlling Okinawa. Their intention was to cause as much damage to the American forces as possible to delay them and to make them think twice about the cost of invading the mainland which is, indeed, exactly what happened.

We had 14,000 people killed in that battle. The U.S. Navy lost more people in the Battle of Okinawa than in any other battle in its history, a total of 4,500. Kamikaze strikes took a huge toll on the Navy during the battle and sank and damaged a great number of ships. Most of the people who died were Japanese, of course. About 240,000 people were killed all together, more than half of them were Okinawans civilians. The rest were Japanese soldiers and Okinawans who were part of the Japanese forces. Most of the fighting took place in an area about 15 miles by 20 miles at the southern end of Okinawa. The Okinawans refer to this battle as the “typhoon of steel,” very aptly.
Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 with the San Francisco Treaty but we held on to Okinawa for another 20 years. We euphemistically referred to “U.S. administration” but, in fact, the senior U.S. official in Okinawa during that period was an Army lieutenant general, called the high commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands. A State Department officer was his political advisor or POLAD, but there was no doubt that the Army was in charge.

Over the intervening years the U.S. tended to consolidate or close a lot of their military bases on the main islands of Japan as they were no longer needed or as they became too difficult to train on, etc., because of domestic political pressures. There was consolidation in some of the military bases in Okinawa as well but just not on the same scale. In fact, during the ‘80s when I was in Tokyo there was a great consolidation along the Kanto Plain military bases in the Tokyo area: Yokohama, Yokosuka, etc., but less so on Okinawa. The idea was that by doing more consolidation on the mainland and less on Okinawa, the U.S. and the Japanese governments would be buying time for a continued base presence in Japan and, indeed, they did up until the 1990s when I got to Okinawa.

The situation that I had to deal with was fascinating in a lot of ways. For one thing, when you go to a Foreign Service post you normally figure you’re going to be dealing with one foreign culture or one different culture, anyway. In Okinawa, the consul general was dealing with three different cultures because there was the Okinawan culture which was pervasive and very interesting in its own right, but also there were the Japanese culture and the U.S. military culture.

In dealing with base issues, the consul general was a member of what was called the Okinawa Area Coordinating Committee or OACC which had the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine component commanders, and the Marine general who was the real estate commander, who oversaw the 13 Marine bases on Okinawa. The consul general ranked as a brigadier general. The OACC operated relatively informally. It was very valuable for coordinating among ourselves both in good and bad cases and to present a united front to the Okinawan prefectural government. The base issue was always at the top of the agenda on the U.S. side both in terms of dealing with the Japanese government and the Okinawan prefectural government and also the cities and towns that hosted the bases.

To get back to the battle for a second, the battle was always in the minds of Okinawans particularly the great number of Okinawans who had survived the battle. There were interestingly mixed feelings among Okinawans about the relative U.S. and mainland Japanese roles in the battle. We came there as the invaders and the conquerors and blew up the island and killed lots and lots of people. But relatively speaking, the Okinawans that we dealt with in the political world, the academic world, businesses, etc., had a better attitude toward the American role in that battle than they did to the mainland Japanese role because they knew the Japanese strategy.

The governor at the time was named Masahide Ota, an academic turned politician. He was a deep-dyed pacifist. He had fought in the battle as a student soldier, was very badly wounded and hadn’t surrendered until November 1945, two months after the Japanese formal surrender. He was illustrative of an Okinawan attitude of greater antipathy toward the central government in Tokyo than toward the Americans, although Ota was quite anti-base and would have been quite
happy to have all the U.S. bases out of Okinawa. But he operated as did many Okinawans from this bifurcated look at the relative roles of the Japanese and the U.S. in the battle and then also later on, too. I think — and this is a sort of very broad brush — Okinawans felt that the Americans on the island and in Washington were at least more willing to listen to them and their complaints and maybe try to do something about it than the central government in Tokyo. There were some interesting examples of that that cropped up on my watch.

Q: Where did Okinawa fit in the Japanese political spectrum and society?

O’NEILL: It fluctuated because there were periods in which the prefectural governor, prefectural assembly, and many of the larger city mayors were conservative and were aligned with the LDP, the national ruling party. Ota’s predecessor was a two or three term governor named Junji Nishime who was conservative. There were other times when the pendulum swung the other way. Ota himself was very much identified with the Japan Socialist Party. There was the Communist Party and a home-grown leftist party called the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party. So you had divisions among Okinawans as well.

But when I was there, most of the mayors with a couple of exceptions, and most of the city assemblies, the prefectural assembly and the governorship were from the left, anti-base activists. But also, as I kept reminding my military colleagues, mainstream opinion in Okinawa wanted to press the Americans and the Japanese for a reduction in the both the number of military people there and the total land area occupied by these bases. So even very much pro-American, pro-base Okinawans always were in one way or another pressing for what could be done to reduce the base presence.

For reasons having to do with topography and also in some cases where the Japanese themselves had built bases during the war, a lot of the U.S. bases were concentrated in the central part of the island which was quite populated. The farther north you went, the more the population thins out and it’s more mountainous. There were mostly fishing villages or excellent resort areas along the periphery, but in the areas where the bases were it was relatively flat and better land in general than you would have farther north.

Among Okinawans, not only were there real party differences but the political pendulum periodically swung. Later on after I left, Ota ran for a third term and was defeated by a businessman whom I knew quite well who had never been in electoral politics before. His wife had taught my wife Chinese character calligraphy. He defeated Ota and heralded a switch back to a more conservative line in the prefectural government and many of the cities. The political pendulum swung back and forth depending on a lot of things, in no small part depending on what various Okinawan administrations were able to get out of the central government in terms of largesse because Tokyo spent a huge amount of money on Okinawa in big infrastructure projects and on noise abatement measures. For example, in the houses around the bases the central government put in double pane windows and air conditioners to help keep down the noise of the KC-135 tankers and the F-15s that were taking off all the time.

Tokyo also paid large amounts for rent for base lands because another peculiarity of Okinawa is that most of the base land was privately owned. By contrast, the bases on the mainland were
almost all former Japanese imperial forces bases like Yokota, Yokosuka and Sasebo that had been built before and during World War II. The Americans just took them over. In Okinawa there were a handful of such former Japanese bases like Kadena Air Base but even that base had absorbed much private land as it was greatly expanded during and after the Korean War.

That was also another subplot because a lot of the landowners didn’t necessarily want their land to be given up by the U.S. That’s one of the reasons why over the years it often became difficult to return or consolidate bases even when we wanted to because the landowners objected. They knew they wouldn’t get as much money or believed they would not get as much money from a sale or return of the land for some commercial use.

**Q:** For years the thorn in our side was the mayor of Naha who was quite left wing, either socialist or communist. Was he completely out of the picture at this time?

O’NEILL: Mayors are elected every four years, and you could have multi-term mayors. During my time, the mayor of Naha was named Oyadomari; he was in the socialist camp. I think you’re talking about a famous case, which will give you an idea of American democracy in action in Okinawa during the period of “U.S. administration.” In the 1950’s a man named Senaga was elected by the people of Naha as their mayor, and the lieutenant general who was the high commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands, essentially the occupation commander, removed him on the grounds that he was a communist even though he had been duly elected. He was, indeed, in the communist party which was a legal party in Japan but didn’t seem terribly legal to an U.S. Army lieutenant general.

Okinawans remember that kind of thing. They’ve got an intense sense of history. They think of things that happened in the 1950s much as they do of things that happened last week.

**Q:** Did the Japanese on the main islands go to Okinawa? Was this being in exile? Was there much commerce or intercourse between Okinawa and the rest of Japan?

O’NEILL: In tourism there was. By the time I got there Okinawa was a great tourist destination for mainland Japanese. In fact, tourism had long supplanted the bases as the principal direct money earner. One of the peculiarities of Okinawan tourism was it was almost exclusively aimed at mainland Japanese. There was not much in the way of an influx of Americans or Australians, etc., who would be tourists in Hong Kong, Singapore or Thailand, for example.

One of the reasons for this, that I kept reminding Okinawans about when they would talk of trying to compete with Hawaii, for example, was that they had to improve English language education among younger Okinawans. One of the things that surprised me was that even though the U.S. occupation had ended only 22 years before, relatively few Okinawans spoke much English at all.

So when you’d go to beautiful first class hotels on lovely stretches of the beach with sparkling blue water, you would rarely encounter any hotel staff who could speak much English in contrast to the top hotels in Korea. They had boxed themselves into tourism aimed at the Japanese mainland: honeymooners, scuba divers. There was world class scuba diving. That was one thing
that did attract people from Australia, U.S. etc., to the coral reefs. In fact, I once met Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh in Okinawa. He was there as the president of the World Wildlife Federation, and he was particularly looking at the state of some coral reefs. He was not somebody you would expect to see there.

Q: Were the Okinawans at all ahead or behind the rest of Japan and in getting foreigners to come in to replenish the stock? Japan is renowned for getting older and older and not really reproducing itself.

O’NEILL: Well, I think the Okinawan birthrate was probably higher than the mainland birthrate. So were the divorce rate, the unemployment rate, and the basic income levels. That was always a constant source of complaint among the Okinawans towards the mainland, and they blamed this on the bases, too, which was not quite accurate at all.

In fact, I thought it was quite the opposite. My view was that it was the existence of these bases that put Okinawa on the map in terms of the central government in Tokyo. Had the bases not been there, I think Okinawa would have got a lot less attention because of the lingering prejudice toward Okinawans. I think some Okinawans understood this, that there was this weird paradox that the bases they were complaining about were the big ticket items as far as their influence in Tokyo was concerned.

Indeed, Okinawan politicians played this angle for everything they could because not only did you have the governor going to Tokyo to lobby for more goodies, like Ota’s big idea for a monorail project and lots of other things. Everybody in Okinawa had big ideas that they wanted Tokyo to fund, and the individual mayors would lobby various offices in Tokyo for their projects in addition to whatever they wanted to do in terms of base realignment. There was no single voice in Okinawa. There was a fair amount of overlap in the kinds of things they wanted, but there was not an identity of desires, if you will, in dealing with Tokyo.

When I arrived, there were three main issues, Sanjian in Japanese, which Governor Ota was pushing with the central government and the headquarters of U.S. Forces, Japan. One of these was to relocate Naha Military Port which was run by the U.S. Army, to relocate it slightly up the coast alongside an existing Marine logistics base called Camp Kinser in Urasoe City, the next city north of Naha.

The second thing was to return a little air field called Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield which was no longer used for aircraft, but it was a site of parachute training for the Special Forces and the Marine airborne people. This was right behind the original invasion beaches in 1945. The third thing that Governor Ota wanted was to relocate the remaining artillery training from Okinawa to the mainland. About half of the artillery training that the Marines had done on Okinawa had been moved elsewhere, but there was still a minimal amount, literally firing guns from fixed positions at a mountain inside a gunnery range on Okinawa just to be able to know that the guns and shells actually worked. There was no realistic training in moving the guns into position, doing all the calculations for setting up firing positions and actually firing the way you would want to do at Fort Sill, Oklahoma or another large training area.
The Okinawans made a big deal about the artillery training. It was a very safe thing, in fact, but they made a big deal, and the governor wanted that moved, too. The Marines were quite willing to move the training to Mt. Fuji artillery range on Honshu which is where they did much of their training anyway. The Japanese government up until 1995 was unwilling to expend the political capital that was necessary to do the ground work in the communities around Fuji to allow for this additional influx of Marines and somewhat more noise and a few more firing days per year than the local inhabitants were normally dealing with. Tokyo simply did not want to do it. They eventually did as a result of that horrendous child rape incident in September 1995, which I’ll go into in more detail later.

Let me mention one other factor during my first year there. The prime minister of Japan was Tomiichi Murayama, who in many ways was very peculiar in comparison to his predecessors. First, he was from the Japan Socialist Party and had become prime minister in a rather shabby deal that allowed the LDP to keep a measure of power in a coalition. Murayama was in his 70s which was not unusual for Japanese prime ministers, but he had spent his entire political life of 50 years as a pacifist fighting against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and against the existence of the Self Defense Forces which he considered unconstitutional. When he became prime minister, he had visited exactly one foreign country: North Korea. The Japan Socialist Party had links of various kinds, including financial, with North Korea over the decades. His CV boded badly for a lot of things in the coming year.

Nineteen ninety-five was, of course, heading into the 50th anniversary of the last year of World War II. For Japan this meant the appalling battle on the little island of Iwo Jima in February and March of 1945 and then the April through June bloodbath on Okinawa, the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the 50th anniversary on August 15 of the surrender. The intent of all parties — the Okinawans, the central government in Japan and the American military, of course, was to commemorate the 50th anniversary of this huge battle, the last U.S. ground battle against Japan.

The issue of how it would be done caused a lot of nervousness among a lot of Okinawans because they were afraid we would be celebrating our victory which was far from the intent in either of the U.S. forces or, indeed, the American veterans of the battle. So we had a lot of preparatory work both to plan the events and also to reassure the Okinawans about U.S. intentions about the commemorations which were going to be centered in June. The landing was on April 1, but the idea was to do the commemorations over several days marking the very end of the battle in late June 1945.

As one example of the groundwork, I did an interview with NHK, the national TV network, a couple of months before the commemoration. My main point was that we were not going to celebrate a victory. First of all the American veterans’ purpose was just to return to Okinawa where they had been through a horrendous experience and to remember their comrades who had been killed. They were not trying to celebrate anything. The overall U.S. idea was to remember the dead from all sides and also to emphasize the 50 years of a very productive relationship between the U.S. and Japan.

I think my NHK TV interview was helpful. I pointed out that NHK itself had done a program on
the Battle of Okinawa a few months earlier. They reported that the American invasion force had brought with them food and clothing for about 100,000 Okinawans plus many thousands of civil affairs specialists. The U.S. knew that the Okinawan population had not bombed Pearl Harbor, but had been basically caught up as innocents in the militarist plans of the Japanese government. So I played that back to the NHK interviewer. He found that earlier program and blended it in with my interview when it was broadcast. The intended tenor of the commemorations was the point I was making to NHK and continued to make to the Okinawan news media including the newspapers.

Fortunately by the time Okinawan concerns were rising we had had the commemorations on Iwo Jima in March. Even though Iwo Jima is in Tokyo’s consular district rather than Okinawa’s, the Marines on Okinawa planned and supported the commemorations on Iwo Jima. With the NHK interviewer, I was able to point to the commemorative nature of the 50th anniversary ceremonies on Iwo Jima as a practical example of our intentions concerning Okinawa. I had seen that first hand. My wife and I had flown to Iwo Jima on General Meyers’ airplane. He was at the time a lieutenant general commanding U.S. Forces Japan, later became chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his deputy in Japan, Pete Pace, became his successor as Chairman.

At that time, Generals Pace and Meyers and Ambassador Walter Mondale, the former vice president, and his wife Joan came down to Okinawa the day before the flight to Iwo Jima. The Mondales stayed with us that night. There was a big formal dinner at the main Marine Officers’ Club and we all flew to Iwo Jima on Meyers’s airplane. Iwo Jima is a tiny place. It’s about two miles by four miles, and at least 26,000 people were killed in six weeks, over 20,000 Japanese and 6,000 Americans. It’s still an active volcanic island, a very unpleasant place but a real shrine for the Marines.

The Okinawa commemorations in June 1995 were quite an extraordinary series of events. The prime minister came, as well as the speaker of the Diet’s lower house and the chief justice of the Supreme Court. There was quite a large turnout from the Japanese government, a lot of ceremonies marking the huge toll of Okinawans who died. There was the dedication of what was called the “Cornerstone of Peace,” an elaborate monument or set of monuments at the very southern tip of Okinawa, where the battle ended when there was no more room to fight. These were a series of low granite walls, like Oriental screens, in which were carved the names of all 240,000 people, Okinawan, mainland Japanese, American, Taiwanese, Korean, and British, who had died in battle. It was quite an effort by the Okinawans to collect all these names. It is probably the most complete list of the battle dead that anybody could come up with. That was dedicated by the prime minister in the course of these commemorative events.

Of course, there were lots of things to be done on U.S. military bases for the veterans themselves. As I say, the Mondales were there. They were a big hit. General Mundy who was then commandant of the Marine Corps was there and also the commander in chief, Pacific Command plus lots of other high U.S. military officials. I was glad to be there during that time. As a baby boomer I had grown up in the shadow of WWII. Also, one of my uncles had commanded the Marines’ 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion during the entire battle of Okinawa, so there was that additional interest for me.
Q: I was wondering, how did you relate with the American military at this time? Was there any animosity between State and Defense?

O’NEILL: We normally worked quite closely together. I’ve mentioned the Okinawa Area Coordinating Committee (OACC) which was one of the most frequent means of interaction among the main players on the U.S. side, including me. As the OACC, we interacted quite a lot and, of course, we also talked a good bit on the phone and met each other individually both officially in our offices and at many social functions. So there was a good bit of interaction. There was also a lot of contact between the military people and the towns and cities whose land they were occupying.

Kadena Air Base, for example, was big. The base covers 5,000 acres and adjacent to it is a 6,000 acre ammunition storage area. It’s now, I think, the largest air base certainly in the western Pacific and perhaps anywhere outside of the United States. There were two 12,000 foot parallel runways. As I said, they had three F-15 fighter squadrons. They also had the only tanker squadron in the entire western Pacific, 15 KC-135 tankers. Also the Navy operated P-3 Orion anti-submarine patrol planes out of Kadena, and that was a very active thing because they were watching the Chinese all the time.

The bases themselves had pretty well established channels with the towns. For example, Kadena base overlapped two towns and a city: Okinawa City, Kadena Town, and Chatan Town. Their mayors met regularly with senior Air Force officers who were tasked to deal with their complaints about noise, accidents, problems of various kinds, disciplinary problems, etc. Generally these things worked pretty well because, for one thing, the military I think generally understood that they were a very large presence, a noisy presence. They usually recognized that it was some imposition on the Okinawans even if the military people also were quite wrapped up in their missions which were largely directed toward a contingency in Korea. They did a lot of training in Korea; very realistic training. I think at the same time they did an overall good job at trying to manage the base issues as best they could. The mayors understood this, and I think generally the relationships were quite good. There were certainly difficulties and misunderstandings but they were usually manageable.

The commanders were thinking all the time that they may be called to go to war tomorrow, and they had to make sure their people are trained up as much as possible so first, they could do their mission and second, fewer on them would be killed than would be the case if they were poorly trained. So there was this kind of mission tension, if you will, between needing to keep the Okinawans as happy as they possible with a very large and active base presence and also their obligation as commanders to be able to “sound the charge” when they needed to.

To go back to these Sanjian, these three main cases that Governor Ota was pushing; as I said one was relocation of Naha Military Port. It was an old facility, and relatively small. A lot of ships couldn’t use it because the ships had outgrown the port. It was also subject to silting that had to be dredged all the time. The U.S. military would have been delighted to give it up if they could have a replacement facility, and where they wanted it was, as I mentioned, Camp Kinser which was just a few miles up the road from Naha City. You had several things at play. Camp Kinser, the ideal site of the relocated military port was in Urasoe City. The Urasoe Chamber of
Commerce really wanted the port because they saw all sorts of benefits for what would become a
dual use port for civilian use as well as military use. The mayor of Urasoe at the time was a nice
man who was not terribly strong, and he was in favor of it, too. He wanted to get a brand new
state-of-the-art military/civilian port, but his city council was majority leftist, and they would
attack the mayor every time he supported the move to their city.

The Okinawan private citizens who owned the land that comprised the existing military port saw
the same disadvantages to the old port that the U.S. military did. They thought, “Well, I’ll lose
my base rent if this port is actually turned over to Naha City, so where’s my future income?” So
they lobbied as hard as they could with Tokyo against turning back the port. This was one
eexample of the tangle in Okinawa.

Here’s another thing about this Naha Military Port issue that illustrates a lot about relationships
on Okinawa. Once, Chairman Uechi of the Urasoe Chamber of Commerce asked me as the U.S.
consul general to arrange a meeting for him and his colleagues with the director of the Japanese
government’s Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (DFAB) so they could him lobby for
moving the port.

The irony of this was that the DFAB director was a representative of Chairman Uechi’s own
central government, his own defense ministry. And in terms of physical proximity, Chairman
Uechi’s office was much closer to the DFAB office than it was to mine. Nonetheless, he asked
me to arrange for him and his fellow Okinawans to meet with this Japanese official to promote
an idea that presumably the Japanese government wanted as much as we, Chairman Uechi and
the other businessmen did. So this is kind of illustrative of the weirdness which could occur in
Okinawa. I was more than happy to arrange that meeting which took place in my office. The
director of Naha DFAB and Chairman Uechi had a nice discussion in front of me. This was a
little disorienting but an illustration of the distance that a lot of Okinawans still felt from the
central government.

Q: Was the closing of our bases in the Philippines on the minds of Okinawans?

O’NEILL: It was on Governor Ota’s mind. I used to talk to him a lot and Ota used to talk about
Subic Bay in particular. As I mentioned, when I was the deputy director for Philippine affairs a
couple of years earlier I had visited Subic and talked with Dick Gordon, the chairman of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. He was working to transform that huge former naval base
into a free trade zone and a high tech hub.

Ota talked longingly about reproducing that in Okinawa. I kept reminding him of the huge
difference between the Subic situation and Okinawa. President Ramos and that Philippine central
government saw Subic in the same way the Dick Gordon did, which was that it was going to be a
huge economic boon to the entire Philippines. I told the governor, “Nobody in Tokyo sees that as
a big boost for the entire Japanese economy; it’s a totally different situation.” Nonetheless, Ota
was in many ways a romantic thinker in his economic theories and he was persistent in all of
this.

Q: Did the Okinawans operate like Japanese in not reaching a decision until you got consensus?
O’NEILL: That was more or less true in Okinawa as well. That much the Okinawans had in common with their Japanese brethren on the mainland as a concept anyway. The difficulty a lot of times, though, in Okinawa was there were so many players that there was often no unity of view among Okinawan political entities about what should be done in any given case. Each of the cities, for example, had elaborate drawings and plans for the post-base development of their city. Nobody in Okinawa coordinated all these, so basically each city in Okinawa that had a U.S. military base had a plan for a theme park and a shopping mall, and some other things. A couple of kilometers up the road the next town would have its plan for another theme park and shopping mall. It just wasn’t very coordinated at all. The governor for all of his desire to get the bases out of Okinawa didn’t really feel the need to do much coordinating of these plans.

**Q:** Okinawa, when you were there, was basically a dagger pointed at North Korea and China and maybe even Russia. Russia was falling apart at this point. Did events in North Korea or in China play any particular role, or was this too far away?

O’NEILL: China literally was not very far over the horizon. There’s a dispute between China and Japan over a group of islands called the Senkakus or Diaoyutai to the Chinese, which are part of Okinawa prefecture, a sprinkling of islands out to the west in the direction of China. Taiwan also claims the Senkakus as the legitimate government of China. There were times when Taiwan patrol boats would come into the waters around the Senkakus and also around Yonaguni, the southwestern-most island in the prefecture. The Japanese government would protest against this invasion of their territorial waters.

Also, you may remember in 1996 there was going to be an election for the president of Taiwan. The Chinese declared they were going to be testing intermediate range missiles and fired missiles in the direction of Taiwan. Nobody missed the message. Some of these missiles actually came down quite close to Yonaguni and other Okinawan islands. They didn’t hit land, fortunately. At that point the Clinton administration sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to that area to bolster the people on Taiwan, which was an unusual concentration of aircraft carrier battle groups.

The central government in Tokyo was quite upset about this Chinese missile firing. The major of Yonaguni was quite upset too. But when I talked to Governor Ota about it, he claimed that it wasn’t important. It was just something out there in the distance. Okinawans didn’t have to worry because the Chinese were friends. Ota, in one of his romantic schemes, was trying to revive an economic link between Fujian Province on the coast of China and Okinawa. When there was a Ryukyu Kingdom, its principal link with China was through Fujian Province. There are a lot of cultural influences in Okinawa that are from Fujian. He thought that it would be a great thing to revive this, and he had arranged to build an Okinawan trade office in Fujian, on which the Fujian authorities overcharged tremendously.

There were a couple of flaws in Governor Ota’s ideas. For one thing, he saw this as a way of reviving Okinawa’s economy by bringing back these artifacts of the past. But no one in the Okinawan business community thought that it was worth pursuing at all. They thought it was just sort of a pipe dream of an academic who had never done any business, and they were probably right. The biggest thing that nobody could explain was why the people in Fujian would do what
Ota wanted. He wanted them to export to Okinawa semi-finished products that Okinawans would finish and then sell for export. Nobody could quite explain why the people of Fujian Province wouldn’t take the semi-finished products, finish them, and sell them, which is what they were doing.

Otherwise, on Okinawa the U.S. and Japanese militaries were very interested in China. In addition to the U.S. Navy P-3 Orions from Kadena, at Naha International Airport there were two Maritime Self-Defense Force Orion squadrons which worked very closely with our military, and they were doing the same thing, hunting for Chinese subs. I don’t think anybody paid much attention to the Russians.

*Q: I remember pictures about that time showing the Pacific Fleet, Soviet Pacific or now Soviet Pacific rusting up in Vladivostok.*

O’NEILL: The Navy rear admiral who was the commander of the 7th Fleet’s Amphibious Force, Task Force 76, was based with in Okinawa with his battle staff. There were three in succession during my time in Okinawa. Their ships which were located on Sasebo in southern Kyushu were the helicopter carrier and the amphibious landing ships, etc., which would carry the Marines into a Korean contingency, for example. The ships came to White Beach on Okinawa quite a lot to pick up Marines for exercises in Thailand and Korea.

Among the things that started then with the Russians was ship visits to Vladivostok and humanitarian rescue training with the Russian Navy and what the Russians called the Naval Landing Forces, their equivalent of our Marine Corps. The first of the amphibious group commanders I knew, John Sigler, came back from an operation in Vladivostok where they went with the amphibious ships and trained with the naval landing forces, and came back to Okinawa. John said he had had “an out of body experience. I was looking down into the well deck of one of my amphibious ships and here are these Russian amphibious vehicles.” He added, “I had spent my entire naval career getting ready to fight these people, and now we’re cooperating in these humanitarian rescue operations.” One of his successors who eventually went on to become commander of the Pacific Fleet, Walt Doran, had an even more interesting experience with the Russians. He took some ships to Vladivostok, too, for a similar exercise. Walt said they were tied up alongside the Pacific Fleet flagship, *Admiral Pantaleyev*. Some of his career sailors were scheduled to be reenlisted in the U.S. Navy. They came to Walt and said, “Admiral, can we get reenlisted on board the Russian flagship?” He said he would ask the Russian admiral.

Lo and behold! He and his sailors got permission to go aboard the Russian flagship for the reenlistment. The captain paraded his entire ship’s company to watch this American ceremony. Through an interpreter Walt learned that his remarks included, “You see what the U.S. Navy does for its sailors? I want the Russian Navy to be this professional. This is what we need to move towards.” That was pretty remarkable.

*Q: I’m sure you had incidents. My brother was a naval captain graduate of the Class of ’40 and was commanding officer of Navy pilots in the 1960’s. He talked how he from time to time had to go, if a Navy plane crashed, had to go offer condolences to family. I assume that you who must have had drunks, rapes, murders, whatever. Did you get involved in any?*
O’NEILL: Yes, I did, yes indeed. The main accident that I got involved in was only in the sense of attending a memorial service, but it’s just a reminder of the cost to our people of operating with the very intense training tempo that they did. One of the squadrons at Kadena was HH-60s, search and rescue Blackhawk helicopters that would go out looking for downed pilots in combat and that sort of thing. They usually operated around Okinawa. However after dawn one morning in October 1994, I learned from the Air Force at Kadena that one of their rescue helicopters had been practicing night flying with night vision goggles near Osan, Korea. They hit a power line, the chopper crashed, and all five men were killed. That produced five widows and three orphans in an instant.

There was a big memorial service at Kadena. They brought the widows and everybody at Kadena went and obviously, naturally, I went. I remember the Wing deputy commander telling me afterwards “At three o’clock in the morning we got the word that they had been killed,” and he said, “I was going around from door to door with the chaplain immediately to tell the wives. They don’t pay me enough for that.” It was pretty bad. On another occasion, a Marine helicopter crash killed a captain and another Marine. Naturally, I went to their memorial service up at Camp Schwab too.

But yes, there were crimes of varying magnitude on Okinawa. Any time you have 27,000 American military people in such a small area, unfortunately you have some who are pretty bad eggs and others who just get in trouble because they got drunk or something like that.

The general Okinawan reaction to various incidents was usually pretty measured. Okinawans were able to discern the difference between an accident — even a fatal traffic accident, for example — and a real crime. They understood the difference, and they usually reacted accordingly even though there were people who were always trying to take advantage of any incident. Particularly this was true in the Okinawa news media. But in general Okinawans knew the difference between a traffic accident and a rape.

I wound up dealing with the worst such crime probably since reversion. On Labor Day evening 1995 a Navy hospital corpsman and two Marines went out and searched for a schoolgirl to abduct and rape. They were caught within 48 hours by the U.S. Navy Criminal Investigative Service, NCIS. There was absolutely no doubt that these were the guys that did it in part because they had all been out in a rented car on Labor Day which was a day off. There were originally four of them altogether, three Marines and the hospital corpsman who was the ringleader. They began talking about kidnapping a schoolgirl and raping her. When the fourth guy began to realize that the other three were serious, he asked to be taken back to Camp Hansen where they were all stationed.

That night, the other three went out and found a 12 year old girl, and they had duct tape and rope and stuff that they had bought at the PX in preparation for this crime and they beat and raped her. When the NCIS began going around the barracks at Camp Hansen, the “fourth man” told his sergeant or NCIS that the other three had been talking about this, and he realized they had actually carried out the crime. So within 48 hours they were in the brig at Camp Hansen, each in solitary confinement. Monday was Labor Day; Wednesday is when these creatures were arrested.
The first I learned about it was that day in a serious incident report cable from the Marines back to their headquarters and to everybody throughout the military chain of command, copied to me.

That Wednesday afternoon I immediately called Embassy Tokyo, to the head of the political military branch in the political section. He said he already knew about it because the mayor of Kin Town, next to Camp Hansen, happened to be meeting with them that day. Mayor Yoshida of Kin told him that this had happened, so the embassy knew about it already. I was talking to my Okinawan chief political employee who was absolutely wonderful to work with on this whole terrible business. He said the Okinawan police were trying to keep the knowledge of this out of the press.

It turned out that the MEF commander Major General Wayne Rollings, the senior Marine and the ranking U.S military officer on Okinawa had left that Labor Day weekend, to go to Hawaii for a commanders’ conference and see some of his own units in Hawaii. The III MEF was scattered all from Hawaii to Iwakuni in mainland Japan to Okinawa.

On that Friday, since General Rollings was gone, I called Brigadier General Mike Hayes the relatively newly arrived Marine Corps base commander, to talk about what to do because obviously it was going to become public at some point. While I was on the phone with General Hayes, my FSN came in with the Friday afternoon newspapers that had this appalling story all over the front pages. I told General Hayes that we needed to figure out what we were going to do to respond.

I was also in touch with the chief of staff to Governor Ota in the prefectural headquarters in Naha, as I did several times over the weekend. We agreed in the course of our discussion that I would go and meet with Governor Ota on Monday to apologize for this awful crime and apologize to the Okinawan people. It would also be an opportunity for me to explain what the judicial processes would be. I was also in contact with the embassy in Tokyo several times over that weekend.

When, later on Friday or over the weekend, I spoke again to General Mike Hayes about meeting the governor on Monday, he said General Rollings was not scheduled to be back in Okinawa until that following Monday night which would be a week after the rape. He said that if Rollings was not back that he, General Hayes, or the deputy commander of the Marine Expeditionary Force, another newly arrived brigadier general, would go with me to Governor Ota and apologize. My political FSN and I spent a lot of time on the phone mainly with the governor’s staff that weekend arranging the mechanics of the Monday meeting. So on Monday morning I was really stunned when I heard from the General Hayes that General Rollings had come back Sunday instead of Monday night and had decided that neither he nor any of his generals would go with me to meet Governor Ota.

As background, I had been in Okinawa for 13 months by this time. General Rollings and I knew each other well. We worked together on many things. He had been the Marine Corps base commander when the MEF commander, Major General Carl Fulford, was reassigned to the Pentagon. Wayne he was promoted to major general to command the MEF and become the senior Marine general on Okinawa.
Wayne Rollings was, by way of background, a tremendously brave man. He had been awarded the Navy Cross in Vietnam which is our second highest medal for valor. He had the Silver Star twice, the third highest medal for valor. The Marines don’t give away medals for valor. He had two Purple Hearts, and he was missing the two last fingers on his right hand. So Wayne was a real lion on the battlefield. But like many generals, he was really camera shy despite his demonstrated bravery in combat.

As further background, in the previous four or five months there had been a couple of cases where Marines had murdered people in Okinawa. In one case a Marine had beaten a woman to death with a hammer. Because this was not an on-duty crime, obviously, he was subject to the Japanese judicial system and was then on trial in Naha as far as I can remember. But there were no Okinawan protests, interestingly, about that murder and previous one. In neither case had I recommended that Wayne Rollings or his predecessor and I go see the governor. But I knew instinctively this gang rape of a child was going to be bad just from the very disgusting nature of the crime and that we needed to deal with it in an extraordinary fashion. At that moment though, I had no idea how bad it would be, the extent of the reverberations nationwide.

I called Wayne right away about going to see Ota and said, “We really need to do this. This is really very important.” He said no; he had two reactions. One, that if he went with me to see Governor Ota then the press would “make the military look bad” and two, he said he was going to do something preemptive. He said he would send a letter of apology to Ota before there was a protest, and he thought that this would be a valuable gesture. I told him that would not work in this case, that this is really something very bad indeed. As soon as I could I called David Shear who was the political military branch chief in the embassy in Tokyo and told him that to my amazement that General Rollings would not go with me. I added that I was going to talk to him right away and rode immediately to Wayne’s office at Camp Butler which was about 20 minutes away.

When I got to Wayne’s office, he had about four or five colonels and his Japanese-American civilian public relations specialist with him. I went by myself and began lobbying General Rollings as hard as I could. I told him that by this time I’d been in Asia for 15 years and there’s no place in Asia where apologies count for more than in Japan and it is really important for us to do this. He was very resistant. I even used the example from 1981 of that fatal accident where the U.S. submarine George Washington sank the Nissho Maru. As I told you, ultimately Mike Mansfield himself went to the Japanese foreign minister and apologized for that accident. There was a famous photograph of Mansfield bowing deeply in front of Foreign Minister Abe. I said that helped. It didn’t solve the problem by any means, but it did help. While I was there he called General Myers who was the commander U.S. Forces Japan and said, “Al wants me to go with him to Governor Ota. It’s going to be a public thing, sort of a press conference.” It was not exactly a press conference, but I guess it was close enough for military purposes.

Now, anytime you met with Governor Ota in his office there were TV cameras all over the place. There were microphones stuck in your face and all that, and you were meeting in his big conference room in his office suite.
Myers gave him permission not to go, so I had to call back to the prefectural people and tell them that I was coming by myself and I had to make up excuses as to what exactly General Rollings had in mind. So in the end Wayne didn’t go and I did. Meeting Ota on camera gave me the opportunity to convey directly to the Okinawan public the shock that we Americans all felt at this horrible crime, and I said that the suspects were in U.S. custody but they would indeed be turned over to Japanese jurisdiction when they were indicted, in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA.

Later I realized I’d made a critical mistake. Having worked closely with Wayne Rollings for over a year, and not having recommended going to the governor for every incident, even a murder; I mistakenly believed that Wayne would trust my political judgment on this one. I underestimated how much he hated cameras. During the previous few days that he was in Hawaii if it had occurred to me for a second that he would refuse, I would have called him in Hawaii. His subordinate generals would have gone with me and I am sure that his predecessor Major General Carl Fulford would have gone with me too.

As I was going to Ota’s office from the elevator and afterward going back to the elevator, I was swarmed by the TV cameras and reporters demanding “Why don’t you turn them over now?” I kept repeating that we would follow the procedure under the SOFA. They would be investigated by the Japanese police while they were in U.S. custody – which they were at that very moment – and as soon as they were indicted would be in a Japanese court. They would be turned over to the Japanese police for imprisonment prior to trial which in fact did happen. Beforehand, the Japanese police did investigate them very thoroughly.

The feelings among the Americans against that trio were almost indescribable. The annual Futenma Air Station flight line fair was about a week or so after this rape. All of the American military bases had a big open house every year with rides and food, etc., to display all their military equipment and allow the Okinawan public on the bases. My political military officer was at Futenma that day. He just casually asked some of the Marines who were with a helicopter display what they thought about the rapists. One said, “We’d like to kill them.”

Q: This was in a way...

O’NEILL: Pretty intense to say that, but that was the kind of feeling that Americans had.

Q: What was in these guys’ minds? The idea of going after some teenage...

O’NEILL: A 12 year old sixth grader. I don’t know that we ever found out exactly what motivated them other than just really twisted minds. It was really — and still is — sickening to talk about. Of course, we had an unbelievable wave of protest groups coming into the consulate general. Everybody from one end of Okinawa to the other all sorts of groups, political, non-political, business, you name it, to the point where most days for weeks after this crime became public we had to line up the protest groups in our consular waiting room on the first floor and bring them up one group after the other to meet with me on the second floor. People were really angry as they had every right to be. There was nothing feigned about this. It was the worst thing that happened since reversion, and it sparked the largest series of demonstrations.
There was another aspect to it, too, which was because of the very fragile state of Japan itself, this child rape incident really caught on nation-wide. You had this whole series of bad occurrences in Japan during 1995 which added strength to the Okinawan protests. They reverberated in Tokyo and throughout Japan. When the Okinawans finally saw some of their pain and tribulations were gaining traction in mainland Japan, which spurred them on to more protests that kept feeding back and forth.

These were the factors in Japan in 1995: You had an extremely weak prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama, who as I mentioned before was a pacifist who had fought against the security treaty for 50 years. Also, Japan was in the fifth or sixth year of a recession which seemed to have no end to it. In February, you had had a gigantic earthquake in the Osaka-Kobe area which was extremely destructive. It was not only destructive in terms of about 5,000 people being killed and great damage being done to Japan’s number one port area but also a psychological blow. The Japanese had looked at the earthquakes that we had in Los Angeles and San Francisco and said, “Americans don’t really know how to deal with earthquakes. Well, we Japanese know.”

March brought not only the 50th anniversary of Iwo Jima but also the truly bizarre sarin nerve gas attacks in the Tokyo subway system engineered by the weird cult named Aum Shinrikyo. They killed 15 or so people and sickened quite a number. It would be like a nerve gas attack at Metro Center in DC.

Then there was the trauma over the 50th anniversary of the Okinawa battle and the two atomic bombings followed by the surrender. So that was the Japan that in September of 1995 was faced with this horrendous rape case.

I was in touch with the prosecutor in Okinawa, a Japanese central government official. He told me he was quite pleased with the cooperation of the U.S. military authorities and the course of the police investigation. He had no problem at all; the police had access to the suspects for as long and as frequently as they wanted. The police were taking the three suspects to the scene of the crime and to the nearest police station and were investigating them. There were always U.S. Marine escorts with them to the best of my knowledge every time they went for police interrogation. The Japanese police operate very differently than ours do. They don’t allow lawyers to be present during interrogations anywhere in Japan. It has nothing to do whether it was military or civilian. So we had to provide more protection to these creatures than would normally have been the case, but the Marines felt obligated to do it. Otherwise, they were in solitary confinement in the Camp Hansen brig.

But meanwhile the Okinawan press was spreading lurid stories about how these three were free to roam around Camp Hansen which was an absolute lie. Frankly, if they had been out free they might have been killed, as I said, by their fellow Marines. The news media were spinning all sorts of lies; so ultimately I got the Marines to bring the press onto Camp Hansen to show them the brig and show where the three were being kept. After the news media had done so much damage by spreading lies, they did finally report the facts.

This crime also was reverberating in the central government in Tokyo, and also in DoD. The
defense secretary at the time was William Perry who by coincidence had been an Army engineer in Okinawa right after World War II; so he had some feeling for the place and Okinawan people that the average secretary of defense would not have had. Perry was incensed at the child rape. He directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps to order the Marines on Okinawa to have a two day stand-down. They’d stop all training. The idea was they would have a couple of days of reflection about this vile crime and what might have caused it, etc. Ota himself went to see Ambassador Mondale after I saw Ota. General Myers from U.S. Forces Japan was with Ambassador Mondale when the session with Ota took place. Beforehand, the ambassador was good enough to talk on the phone with me quite a bit to ask what was Ota like, what to do, and how to handle the meeting. He was quite willing to take some of my advice on how to deal with Ota.

General Wayne Rollings took one step on his own that was very helpful, and I told Ambassador Mondale so. There was artillery training coming up, and he cancelled that before anybody mentioned it so it would not be a focus of more demonstrations.

Also, I knew that a pacifist organization called the Okinawa Peace Movement Center headed by a man named Arakaki Zenshun was going to hold a demonstration which was supposed to end up at the gates of Camp Butler, the Marine Corps headquarters, in the central part of the island right near Kadena Air Base. I kept in touch with General Rollings about this, telling Wayne what we knew. I told him I would invite Arakaki to talk with me about the demonstration and his plans. So I got my political Foreign Service National, FSN, to invite Arakaki to talk, which he was quite happy to do. Arakaki was a gentleman, a long-time pacifist, very much anti-base but a decent man. We had a long chat. The thing I was most concerned about was the march to the base gate. I wanted to know how the march was going to be controlled and how it was going to be controlled afterward so there was no opportunity for any mischief or misunderstanding. I also wanted to know what the objective was. What did Arakaki want to get out of this demo?

He explained they would march from assembly areas and have marshals for each subgroup. He was expecting 6,000 in all. When I said, “We really want this to be a peaceful march.” He smiled and said, “We have a lot of experience with demonstrations.” He didn’t want anything untoward to happen either. There were a couple of tiny extreme leftist radical groups on Okinawa, offshoots of ones from mainland Japan, and he said he was going to make sure that those people were not part of the march because he didn’t want anything to put a blot on it. He said when they got to the gate at Camp Butler he just wanted a Marine to take their protest petition. He said he didn’t care who it was, just somebody at the gate to take the petition. Then the march would break up, and he had plans for moving everybody back in an orderly way.

The American news media on the other hand had gotten wind of this planned demonstration and were hoping for firebombs and blood. CNN was gathering and so were others. They were really hoping for something really messy. Our collective idea was to disappoint them. Right after this very productive meeting with Arakaki, I called Wayne Rollings and described the discussion. When I told him what Arakaki wanted, Wayne said, “I’ll send Colonel Stu Wagner,” his public affairs chief, “Stu Wagner will be at the gate to take the petition.” That was great because Stu was very savvy when it came to handling these kinds of things.
In fact, that demonstration of about 6,000 people in a very congested area, in the midst of several military bases, went off without a hitch. CNN and all the rest were absolutely disappointed, which was a great achievement. That was the beginning of what turned out to be quite a large number of demonstrations of various kinds, over a long span of many weeks, all of which were non-violent.

The biggest one took place on my birthday, October 21, six weeks after the rape. It was held in a large sports field not far from my office. It turned out to be the largest demonstration in Okinawa since reversion in 1972. People from the embassy came down to observe, as did several of my people. I didn’t go; I was watching on television from my house and was on the phone with Ambassador Mondale and the deputy chief of mission Rust Deming and getting reports from the scene. By that time I was recognizable enough that it would not have been helpful for me to be there.

We figured, given the size of the field and also the number of buses that you could observe, there were probably 25,000 people which was a significant portion of the population of Okinawa. The police eventually estimated 58,000 counting the crowd at the field and people as far as they could see in the general vicinity. The Okinawan press printed the figure of 85,000 which then passed into legend, and became the accepted figure among Okinawans. Wildly inflated, but there it was.

Nonetheless, as I pointed out to Embassy Tokyo, CINCPAC and Washington in a cable that day, even if our low estimate was correct it was still the biggest demonstration since 1972. That was the important thing. Just about every Okinawan group was represented there. The main speaker was the speaker of the prefectural assembly. The business community was even represented which was quite interesting. The business representative was Keiichi Inamine who eventually replaced Masahide Ota as governor. The only group that stayed away was the conservative base land owners.

The whole thing was absolutely peaceful except for one woman, an anti-base activist from Osaka on the mainland. She wanted to burn the American flag on the dais where the dignitaries all were lined up. The speaker of the prefectural assembly prevented her from doing that because he didn’t want that kind of thing to mar their demonstration. So she went off to a far corner of the field and set fire to the flag. The next issue of Time International had a close-up of the burning flag as the cover photo. I still have that issue of the magazine. That cover photo was a good example of what the news media wanted.

The demonstrations continued. The main upshot of all this was the formation by the U.S. and Japanese governments of something called the Special Action Committee on Okinawa or SACO which included the State Department, Defense Department, Foreign Ministry, and Japanese Defense Agency policy level a major effort to decide what could be done to ameliorate the base situation in Okinawa. The idea was to reduce the so-called footprint of bases in terms of land area and also to reduce training and noise and disruptive training to the minimum allowable; in a word, to still keep the troops ready for the missions in Southeast Asia and Korea. We had floods of Japanese and American officials coming out of Washington and Tokyo to Okinawa to look at what could be done. Most of them had never seen the bases or at least hadn’t looked at them.
through any kind of a fresh eye, so this was quite a new thing for them.

One of the amazing things was that few Japanese officials from Tokyo whether they were in the foreign ministry or even the Japan Defense Agency understood the way the U.S. military operated, or understand the command relationships. They thought, for example, that Wayne Rollings as the major general commanding the Marines also commanded Brigadier General Tom Hobbins the Air Force wing commander and the rest which was not true. In reality, each of the senior service commanders on Okinawa answered to their service component commanders on the mainland. The top Marine general was simply the coordinator. So an awful lot of education was needed on just in terms of dissuading some Japanese officials from some bright ideas they had that were predicated on the idea that the senior Marine commanded everybody else.

In the midst of all the protests, the mayor of Kin Town where the little girl lived used to come see me fairly frequently. I knew Mayor Yoshida well. He’d come to see me dressed in a polo shirt, jeans and running shoes but not as the leader of a protest delegation. We’d just sit and talk. He unfortunately knew the little girl and her parents very well and that made it worse. He wanted to talk it out. It was a nauseating crime.

Q: Had anybody made an official apology to the parents?

O’NEILL: There were public apologies from me, Ambassador Mondale and Lieutenant General Myers, the U.S. Forces Japan commander. These weren’t made directly to the parents. For one thing, Mayor Yoshida and the family did not want the girl’s name to come out at all. He kept telling me that the Tokyo weekly news magazines were desperately trying to find her name because they wanted to have that big scoop. He was doing everything he could, and I think the people of Kin were doing everything they could, to prevent that. To the best of my knowledge, the little girl’s name never came out.

Of course, U.S. Forces Japan provided what is called a “solatium payment” as an initial token gesture. The military families, the various military families’ organizations throughout Okinawa and the rest of Japan were putting together voluntary donations for scholarship funds for the girl. I can’t remember the total amount collected or the exact mechanics of how this was done, but it was substantial. There was an arrangement whereby these funds were given in a way that did not reveal the family’s name. It was really hard to describe how the Americans felt about this. The ordinary rank and file Marines were as disgusted by the rapists as anybody else would be. We knew that those creatures were lucky they were in solitary confinement in the Camp Hansen brig.

Q: Maybe it was after you left, but what happened to the Marines, the perpetrators?

O’NEILL: Well, usually the Japanese judicial system is extremely slow. It goes on and on. Between being charged and actually being indicted and then tried in the Japanese system can take months or years. Those three were indicted in record time for several crimes. The actual names of the crimes in Japanese law sound kind of peculiar to us. One was something like apprehension which was roughly equivalent to kidnapping, and then there was one that equated to sexual assault. But those were just about the only charges.
Once the police investigation was finished, the three were certain to be indicted. They would then go straight into Naha District Prison. They were indicted, tried and convicted all in record time. I think it was not later than mid-November that they were convicted of these several crimes. The Japanese prosecutors were asking for what they thought was a tough sentence. They wanted 10 years each, if you can imagine that in such a case. In the end, two of them got seven years in Yokosuka civil prison, and one of them got six and a half years. They got amazingly light sentences by American standards although these were considered relatively heavy sentences for child rape in Japan. In fact, a few months earlier in June 1995 two Japanese men had abducted and raped a 15 year old Okinawan girl. Just by coincidence, they were convicted shortly after the September rape. Those two Japanese got two and a half and three years for abducting and raping a 15 year old.

If the Marine Corps had been able to try those people they would have been jailed for the rest of their lives, in part because there would have been so many more charges that a Marine general court martial could have brought against them. There really are no conspiracy statutes in the Japanese legal system, for example. So even though they conspired to kidnap, conspired to assault and conspired to rape, that wasn’t part of the legal equation in the Japanese system. The Marines could have gotten them on all those charges plus any number of other ancillary charges that really would have added to their sentences. I couldn’t imagine them getting less than 50 years each and they probably would have all would have gotten life at least as an initial sentence of a Marine general court martial. Two of them were married, so the Marines could even have, if they thought about it, charged two of them with adultery on top of everything else. But they would have put them away forever.

Some Okinawans understood this, but with the intense emotion of the time, there was no conceivable way the Marines could have tried those people. The demand throughout Japan was to follow the SOFA and have them tried in a Japanese court which was exactly what we intended from the start. There was absolutely no question in our mind that that was going to happen – a Japanese criminal trial.

Q: I'm looking at the time now, Al, and it's probably a good place to stop. We'll pick it up... Is there anything more you want to talk about after that just to mention a little about what we'll be doing?

O’NEILL: Not now, but later on we can talk about the process, the results such as they were, of the SACO process and the changes that took place in Okinawa, the involvement of President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto in signing the agreement in the spring of 1996.

Q: Today is the 26th of November 2008 with Al O’Neill. Al, we were talking about the aftermath of his horrible rape. You’ve gone through the legal things, but just one last question on that. Do you know what the final fate? Did these guys get out or what?

O’NEILL: I’m sure they’re out because they had very light sentences of seven years in the case of two of them and six and a half years in the case of the third one. They served this in a civil prison in Yokosuka in the same town where the big naval base is. I’m sure, although I’ve lost track, that all of them were released at the end of their sentences. I would be surprised if they had
gotten out early. After release they would have gotten dishonorable discharges from the Navy and Marine Corps. The ringleader was a Navy hospital corpsman of all things, and the other two were Marines. I think it would have been legally possible for the U.S. forces to prosecute them further without double jeopardy because there several crimes that they had committed that aren’t even in the Japanese legal system: conspiracy to kidnap, conspiracy to assault and conspiracy to rape. I think the Marines reluctantly just decided they had better just let things go with the Japanese punishment, mild as it was by our standards for such a loathsome crime.

The three rapists certainly triggered almost an earthquake you might say, in U.S.-Japan security relations. As I explained earlier, Japan was very vulnerable in September of 1995 when this rape took place and when the Okinawans began protesting as they naturally would at such a disgusting crime, it resonated unusually strongly in Tokyo and elsewhere in Japan. The Okinawans found themselves getting an unusual amount of support for their protest against the American military presence, more so than they did when they were protesting against accidents or other crimes in times past. That further encouraged particularly the anti-base Okinawans led by Governor Ota to further protests and to further attempts to parlay this horrible crime into decisions by the national government to curtail training, to demand the return of training areas, etc., and other base areas to Okinawa. This reverberation back and forth continued for some while.

Prime Minister Murayama quit in the first week of January 1996. He just couldn’t handle the conflicts between his 50 year long pacifist ideological stance and the demands of being prime minister of Japan and, therefore, a defender of the security relationship. His replacement was from the LDP, Ryutaro Hashimoto who was a conservative politician in the LDP mold but who realized that there had to be visible adjustments in the security relationship in order to preserve it.

Even before Murayama quit, the two governments had formed what they called the Special Action Committee on Okinawa known as SACO or “Sacko.” This was headed on the U.S. side by deputy assistant secretary of defense Kurt Campbell and on the Japanese side by North American Affairs deputy director general Hitoshi Tanaka. It involved State and DOD and U.S. Forces Japan on our side and the Japan Defense Agency with the Foreign Ministry in the lead on the Japanese side.

The deliberations of SACO continued for several months. The initial stage of negotiation between the Japanese and the U.S. sides, took place mostly in Tokyo there were lots of visits to Okinawa by everybody. The foreign minister was coming down; lots and lots of members of the Diet, particularly those Diet members who fancied themselves as experts on the security relationship were coming down in quite good numbers. I learned from dealing with them that some of these experts knew a lot less about the mechanics of the security arrangements than they thought they did.

But anyway, it was an opportunity to try to instruct, and so I wound up going with more than a few Japanese visitors to meet with my military counterparts. There was value in this anyway in terms of a learning experience for the Japanese and also to bring home — though I don’t think it needed to be — to the U.S. military people just how serious this whole thing was. The SACO
process produced a statement that was ultimately endorsed in April of 1996 by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto to curtail a number of training activities, remove certain training activities to other locations, and make commitments to reduce the size of bases and training areas.

This interim SACO report that was issued when President Clinton came to Japan in the spring of 1996 was followed up by a final report in December of 1996. I'll just run down some of the main items. There were 30 major recommendations on training and on facilities. One of the biggest, the centerpiece of these SACO decisions, a decision in December of 1996 that has still not been carried out as of November 2008 was to return Marine Corps Air Station Futenma after a suitable replacement was completed in northeastern Okinawa. Futenma is still in operation. It’s a very important facility for the Marines and also gets some use by the Air Force under certain circumstances, but it is right in the middle of the City of Ginowan.

Just as an aside, every consul general since reversion in 1972 had a very clear view of Futenma and its operations because the consul general’s residence is on a ridge which is one kilometer from the south end of the Futenma runway. The house is on a straight line to the end of the runway, so every airplane that either lands or takes off from Futenma goes over the consul general’s residence.

SACO was the big issue and it still hasn’t been completed. About half of the northern training area which is in a very remote rugged area in northeastern Okinawa, the Pacific coast side, was to be returned, and I think some of that at least has been. The northern training area can’t be developed commercially because it’s so rugged and forested. It’s also the watershed area for Okinawa, which suffers from water shortages from time to time. They did move parachute training from Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield which is at the 1945 invasion site. The parachute training, which was the minimum possible to allow people to remain qualified, was moved over to Ie Shima, an island which can be seen just off the coast from Yomitan.

Q: That was where Ernie Pyle was killed?

O’NEILL: Exactly. That is where the famous war correspondent Ernie Pyle was killed in 1945. There’s a little monument there. I’ve been to that, too. Also at Yomitan there was — probably still is — a large antennae array called the “elephant cage.” This is run by the U.S. National Security Agency for its purposes. Under SACO it was to be returned once a much smaller more modern facility was built within Camp Hansen, a Marine base.

The Marines had been asking for years to move their very minimal artillery training to one of the mainland artillery ranges for more realistic training and the Japanese finally agreed. The reason for the delay was that until the rape case and the uproar over it, Tokyo was simply not willing to spend the political capital to persuade the Japanese towns near the mainland ranges to accept a few more days of gunfire noise. In the aftermath of that horrible event they finally mustered the courage to do this.

The last big ticket item, if you will, was to relocate Naha Military Port just up the west coast from Naha to the next city which was Urasoe. To the best of my knowledge that still hasn’t been
done even though, as I explained before, the Urasoe Chamber of Commerce welcomed the idea for a new port that would be dual use; that is, both for military purposes and for their purposes.

It might be worthwhile to talk a little bit about why some of these base returns take so long; not just Futenma. But some of the points are also germane to relocating Futenma out of the center of Ginowan City and moving the air operation up the east coast to Camp Schwab which is where the Marine infantry division’s units are based now.

One factor is that in some cases the Japanese government is unwilling to pay the costs whether they’re financial or political, or both. Another factor is Japanese requirements for environmental studies which can take a minimum of three years. These regulations often involve not only Tokyo’s equivalent of the Environmental Protection Agency but also the prefectural government and in some cases cities have their own environmental rules.

There were also numerous NGO’s — Non Governmental Organizations — on Okinawa, and others from the mainland that has been active in trying to block the move of Futenma’s operations to the new location near Camp Schwab. They profess concern about coral reefs in the area, for manatees and other marine life. Then sometimes there are cases where the U.S. military force involved is reluctant to make the change on the grounds that it could be disadvantageous for training and readiness.

There were also political and economic cross currents within Okinawa itself. One good example concerns Futenma. The anti-base activists wanted Futenma to be closed immediately whether or not there was a replacement facility which would allow the helicopters to work. It’s important to note that when you have Marine infantry you’ve got to have Marine helicopters because the helicopters move the infantry in Marine Corps doctrine. You couldn’t, for example, keep the infantry in Okinawa and move the helicopters to Hawaii or to the mainland of Japan. That would be one of the virtues of moving the helicopters to Camp Schwab where they would be co-located. Instead of flying from central Okinawa to northern Okinawa simply to pick up the Marines and move them to the northern training area, they would be right near the troops and the training area. So this move would be an improvement, if it ever happens.

Another example of the cross currents in Okinawa was also related to Futenma relocation. Governor Ota and his anti-base activist following wanted to get Futenma returned by moving the Marine aviation operations to Kadena Air Base which is just a couple miles away. Ota was busily lobbying Prime Minister Hashimoto, the Japan Defense Agency, and the Foreign Ministry to co-locate the Marine air units to Kadena and then to close Futenma right away and return it. He was forcefully ignoring the mayors and the people of the three towns whose land comprises Kadena Air Base: Kadena Town, Chatan Town, and Okinawa City. Those mayors were adamantly opposed to taking on Ginowan’s aviation burden when they already had three F-15 squadrons, an air refueling squadron, P-3s and other air units operating out of Kadena.

Since I was talking with the mayors, I knew this directly. They kept trying to go see Governor Ota to present their opposition to him. He adamantly refused to see the three mayors. He didn’t want to hear from them because he wanted to get the credit for closing Futenma faster than anybody thought possible. A big part of my job was to explain these complexities through
reporting cables to Embassy Tokyo, U.S. Forces Japan and Washington agencies because Ota was the one who had the bully pulpit as the governor. He was the most famous Okinawan figure outside the prefecture. We had to make sure U.S. officials knew that not everything that Governor Ota said was shared throughout Okinawa, especially about Futenma.

The three mayors were all very nice people and fundamentally accepting of the need for the bases despite their constant lobbying for restrictions on training and other measures that would have reduced the burden of the bases on their people. Ota’s idea was a non-starter for them; Mayor Miyagi of Kadena for example, told me that if Tokyo and Washington decided to move the Futenma air operations to Kadena, the people of Kadena Town led by him would block the entrances to the base to prevent it from happening. He said it in the very nicest way, and he would have done it in the very nicest possible way, and there would be no animosity toward the Americans on the bases. After they were repeatedly stonewalled by Governor Ota the three mayors saw their chance when Prime Minister Hashimoto went to a conference in Okinawa. The three mayors cornered him at the meeting site and made clear that none of them or their people supported Ota’s plan. I might add, too, that the total population of these three municipalities that hosted Kadena was about 12% of the population of the island, so it’s not insignificant in voting terms.

But Ota was prey to other influences. Ota himself was a very complex character. In the beginning of 1996 I wrote a long biographical cable about Ota which I sent to everybody in Washington and all the military addressees from Japan to Hawaii giving his background including his combat service during the war. Even though he was wounded, Ota the student soldier didn’t surrender till November 1945, two months after the surrender of the rest of the Japanese forces. He was one of the holdouts. Also, after the war he went to Syracuse University on an U.S. scholarship.

Ota was a pacifist, and he came I think by his pacifism reasonably honestly even though he was sort of a charlatan in certain respects. Kurt Campbell, the DOD deputy assistant secretary for Asia, told me one time that Anthony Lake, the national security advisor, had said that President Clinton had read my cable on Ota. So our reporting which was voluminous was getting a pretty good audience. People were really beginning to look at reporting from this little tiny post in the middle of nowhere. Winston Lord was the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and during the remainder of my tenure there, we got more than a few personal cables from him congratulating us on the quality of our reporting. That made very pleasant reading.

Added to the complex currents regarding Futenma was that Nago City, the northernmost large city in Okinawa, was to get the replacement aviation facility and they were basically lobbying for it. There was some opposition from some groups within Nago but Nago’s mayor and the generally conservative people of northern Okinawa saw this as a big opportunity for jobs, for business. They expected that the air facility would be dual-use both for civil and military, and they resented Ota for hogging too much of Japanese government largesse in central and southern Okinawa where there were more people and, therefore, more voters. So there were lots of reasons why the good folk in Nago were interested in getting this new facility and they were doing what they could for it.
One of the things that Tokyo did to assuage Okinawan feelings in the aftermath of the rape was to have the Foreign Minister set up a Foreign Ministry office in Okinawa. Since Okinawa was a Japanese prefecture that was somewhat like a U.S. embassy in Hawaii. But anyway, that’s what they did with an ambassador in charge. He had two or three diplomats with him.

When this was announced, the U.S. generals and admirals were alarmed because they saw themselves as getting dragged into an arena that they didn’t want to be in at all. They worried about what this new office would do and how it would interact with them. So I asked the DCM in Tokyo, Rust Deming, to make sure the foreign ministry understood that as the U.S. consul general I was to be the counterpart of the head of this MOFA office, not the generals. The first chief of the office was an ambassador named Harashima who was a fine person to work with. He was also a real aficionado of American western movies to a degree that no American could possibly fathom!

So I relieved the generals of their worries on this score. In addition to the new Foreign Ministry office, there were other three institutions of much longer standing that dealt in one fashion or another with Okinawa base issues. The first one was called the Joint Committee which was set up under the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA, for dealing with issues related to military bases, military training, and military operations. That organization of course dealt with U.S. Forces Japan countrywide, not just in Okinawa and I would say that the Okinawans didn’t understand it very well. Nonetheless, when the SACO final report was issued in September of 1996 the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee was designated by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (the foreign minister, the defense agency director, the secretary of state, and the defense secretary) to be the implementing agency for the SACO process.

There was also a U.S.-only grouping called the OACC or the Okinawa Area Coordinating Committee. It was made up of the senior Marine officer, the Marine Expeditionary Force commander, then a two star general; the Marine Corps base commander who was usually a brigadier general; the consul general; the commander of the Army’s Tenth Area Support Group and the Navy captain who commanded Fleet Activities Okinawa. In addition, the commander of the amphibious forces Seventh Fleet was normally invited to these meetings. He was located on Okinawa for ease of planning with the Marines, although his ships were at Sasebo on the mainland.

That committee met both formally and informally usually quarterly but other times as needed. It was kind of the central means for doing two things: One was working out some fairly large issues with the prefectural government and also sometimes coordinating within the services certain things that needed to be worked out because of what might be called cultural differences between, for example, the Air Force and the Marines. The OACC also handled things that overlapped the various services, and there was a lot of this. When you look at the names of the bases on Okinawa, you see one is a Marine base, another one is an Army post and another’s an Air Force base, but in fact almost all these bases had people of the other services on them. For example, at Kadena you had the Navy P-3 Orion squadron and the headquarters of the Navy’s Fleet Activities Okinawa. When the 7th Fleet’s carrier would go into port at Yokosuka, the carrier air group would often do bombing practice off the west coast of Okinawa. The Marine air wing from Iwakuni sometimes would have its F/A-18s go down for the same purpose.
One example of OACC action involved Chatan Town, which comprised the west side or East China Sea side of Kadena Air Base. There was a good bit of graffiti writing and trash, etc., along Chatan’s sea wall. There were also some incidents of drunken U.S. service members urinating in people’s yards, which was totally unacceptable anywhere. So when the mayor of Chatan brought this to the Kadena Air Base commander’s attention we knew this would involve all the services. We had an OACC meeting very quickly.

Two things happened: One, the OACC imposed a curfew on military people in Chatan Town and perhaps some of the other areas, too, to limit the amount of time they were allowed to be out at night. Two, there was a very visible cleanup campaign where service members volunteered their time to clean up the graffiti off the seawall, clean up trash, which went over very well with the local population. I remember some of the generals saying in the media that they’re homeowners, too. They wouldn’t put up for any of this bad behavior in our own neighborhoods. Why should the people of Chatan have to, especially with foreign military people? So there was no question about the need for action, and that was one of the things that the OACC handled.

There was another more specialized group; I suppose you could say, the Tripartite Liaison Committee or TLC which combined the OACC, the prefectural government represented by the governor and his senior staff and the Japanese government which was represented by the Defense Facilities Administration Bureau in Naha, an organization under the Japan Defense Agency. Those were the officials who worked on base issues for the Japanese government with the towns and the prefectoral government.

This TLC had been set up originally at the behest of the long-serving conservative governor Junji Nishime in the 1980s, and its purpose was to bolster Governor Nishime’s credentials as somebody who could deal with base issues. In other words, it gave U.S. support to a conservative governor of Okinawa who was indeed still trying to limit training and to get land returned where possible but was going at it from a perspective that was in favor of the security treaty and recognized the need for the continued existence of certain essential bases.

During the time that I was there, you had largely leftist, or reformist as they’re called, mayors in most of the major cities in Okinawa and a very reformist, pacifist governor who was very active in anti-base issues. This was sort of a different situation for the TLC. The TLC met only one time during the three years that I was in Okinawa, on St. Patrick’s Day in 1995. Basically the military people were quite reluctant to give Governor Ota a big forum for his anti-base activism. I supported them because I’d been dragged in with Governor Ota to some examples of his on-camera anti-base activism, so to my mind the TLC was not a useful organization during his tenure. I think it was revived under his successor, Governor Inamine, who was a more moderate person on base issues.

These were all institutions that were peculiar to Okinawa to address base issues. In addition it’s important as I’ve touched on a couple of times, to note that frequently during the course of a week and sometimes almost daily, there was contact between the mayors of the various towns that hosted the bases and senior base personnel in things large and small. The issue could be a complaint about some particularly loud noise or an accident that took place or a request to curtail
certain training because school examinations were taking place. Almost invariably, unless there was some crucial training reason why they could not agree, the bases acceded to whatever adjustment that was needed.

As one example of this continuing cooperation between the bases and townships, one of the high schools in Ginowan City was having its gym rebuilt, and the school officials asked the Futenma commander if the kids could use one of the gyms on Futenma for their gym classes while construction was underway, and it was done. This was typical.

I left in July 1997 after a very good tour. I want to mention several items that happened there, one of which was a very sad situation and the other three were kind of unexpected for Okinawa. A few months before we left in 1997, my wife and I went to a concert by the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra in one of Okinawa’s very fine concert halls. On another occasion, I met the Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Philip who was there in his capacity as the president of the World Wildlife Federation looking at endangered coral reefs. Separately from his visit, the royal yacht HMS Britannia came to Naha civilian port, and the Commodore Royal Yacht Squadron invited all the generals and their wives and me and my wife to a reception aboard Britannia which was a 450-some foot long yacht, now out of service. They had a small Royal Marine band contingent on board, and after the reception they did a formal “beating of retreat” twilight ceremony on the dockside, too. It was quite an unusual thing, totally unexpected for Okinawa.

The sad story is an example of the kind of thing that can crop up in any Foreign Service post, I suppose. It was a miniature tragedy in August of 1996. One Friday night about midnight I got a call from my newly arrived vice consul. The Kadena command center had just told him that a C-141 transport had arrived from Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. In the nose wheel well of the airplane the crew found two Mongolian kids one of whom was dead and the other of whom the Air Force security police managed to revive on the tarmac. The two were transported immediately to Lester Naval Hospital next to Kadena.

I told him to call the Department’s Op Center, of course, to be put through to our embassy in Ulaanbaatar immediately to say that this had happened. Also, to tell them that I was going to call the Mongolian ambassador in Tokyo in the morning, Saturday, and ask him to send an embassy officer down to Okinawa that day so we could deal with this. I also called our embassy’s duty officer right away, and I called our deputy chief of mission (DCM) on Saturday morning and told him what happened. I did get in touch with the Mongolian ambassador and explained who I was and what had happened, and asked for an officer to come down. I said I would meet the officer at the airport. He sent a Mrs. Nasanbuyan, their commercial attaché to Naha that Saturday night. She spoke very good English and she stayed overnight at my house.

The first thing Sunday morning I took her to Lester Naval Hospital where Captain Don Anderson the hospital commander escorted us to see the kids, the body of the one that was in the mortuary and the other boy who was in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). One boy had on shorts, a short sleeve shirt and shower shoes, and the other one had sneakers, a long sleeve shirt, and long pants. They looked like they were about 12 years old. They had no identification, so we had no idea who the boys were.
The hospital people took photographs of both of them which we had faxed to our embassy in Ulaanbaatar so that they could put the photographs on Mongolian national TV in hopes that somebody could identify them. The hospital people were doing just everything they could. The pediatric doctors in the intensive care unit were briefing Mrs. Nasanbuyan and answering all her questions about the surviving boy who was in a coma.

I then drove her up to Kadena where we met Brigadier General John Baker, the 18th Wing commander, and a colonel from Military Airlift Command because the C-141 transport was a Military Airlift Command plane. Before the four of us went out to see the airplane, John Baker gave a briefing of the flight from Ulaanbaatar. Basically, for more or less five hours those kids had been at the elevation of Mt. Everest because the plane was mostly at about 29,000 feet and sometimes higher. Of course, they had no oxygen. They had no proper clothing. General Baker and the colonel took us to the tarmac to see the airplane, and Mrs. Nasanbuyan looked into the nose wheel well, and could see where the boys stowed away. She met the air crew and also the Air Force security policeman who had revived the one boy.

Then, in relatively short order two things happened: One, the boy who was on life support died, which sadly was a blessing because he would have stayed in that condition, if he had been moved back to Mongolia somehow. Also the Mongolian authorities identified the boys fairly quickly. It turned out they were not brothers as they seemed, and they were teenagers, a bit older than they looked.

It turned out that they lived on the outskirts of the Ulaanbaatar airport, and the older boy had seen a movie called Passenger 57 with Wesley Snipes. In the movie he’s a counter terrorist operative. A 747 is hijacked and the hero gets into the nose wheel well of the 747, gets inside the airplane, and eventually overcomes the hijackers and wins the day. Over the following days, I got more information through our embassy in Ulaanbaatar and also from Mrs. Nasanbuyan during the night or two that she was at my house and calling back to the Foreign Ministry. The older boy came up with the idea that they would fly to Germany. So while the crew was offloading the humanitarian aid from the rear of the airplane, the two kids managed to get through the security fences, and into the nose wheel well. The crew chief, when he did his preflight check, just couldn’t see them.

The crew was devastated. They were staying at Kadena because there was going to be an investigating officer flown out from Dover Air Force Base. I met with them and made clear that the Mongolian government did not blame them at all. In fact, it fired the airport security chief at Ulaanbaatar Airport and punished several other officials involved but did not blame the air crew. Then we had to work with the mortuary people at Kadena to get the bodies back to Ulaanbaatar. In Okinawa, you just never knew what was going to be in store when you picked up the telephone late at night.

By the way, there was a chapel service for the Mongolian boys at one of the Kadena chapels. The Officers’ Wives Club organized a service for them. I sent the leaflet from the service to the Mongolian embassy in Tokyo. It was a sad little story, and that is where it came from — a movie. Mrs. Nasanbuyan, when she was first looking at the boys in the hospital said sadly “We teach our boys to be brave.”
Q: Al, was there any... You may have covered this right from the beginning, but what was the rationale for our troops on Okinawa? Was this ever questioned, moving to Guam or something like that, while you were there?

O’NEILL: Oh, well, it is now. The bases are a combination of both history and geography. The U.S. forces occupied Okinawa after perhaps the bloodiest battle of the entire Pacific war. In 82 days of constant combat, 240,000 were killed; most of them were Okinawan civilians. A huge base complex was built up particularly during and after the Korean War. The U.S. kept Okinawa under occupation for another 20 years. Reversion didn’t take place until 1972.

While I was in the embassy in Tokyo from 1980 to ’84, there was a considerable consolidation of U.S. bases in the Tokyo area and Yokohama, from north to south, Tokyo to Yokohama to Yokosuka. Even during that same approximate period there were some consolidations of U.S. military bases and closings of U.S. military bases on Okinawa but it was not nearly as sweeping.

To hop back in time a bit, during the Vietnam War those Okinawan bases were very valuable because we had B-52s stationed there which were taking off from Kadena and doing bombing missions in Vietnam. That could not have happened had reversion taken place. So again, there was this enormous feeling of the importance of these bases. If you look at a map you can see Okinawa is closer to Pusan than it is to Tokyo, and so it’s also straddles the space between Kyushu, the southernmost main island of Japan and Taiwan. It’s a keystone between northeast Asia and Southeast Asia in a physical sense. From a strategic standpoint, it’s a thousand miles closer to the mainland than Guam. All these strategic, historical, and political factors militated towards continuing a large and robust base presence on Okinawa even while there were returns and cutbacks, etc.

You asked about Guam. In the meantime, and I don’t know exactly the time frame but certainly after the Vietnam War and all the Indochina involvement was over, we largely closed down a lot of the facilities in Guam. This was in part because of Guamanian opposition to the bases. Even while I was in the Philippines from 1997 to 2000, to the best of my recollection there were no U.S. Air Force flight units assigned to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam, and few if any U.S. warships at the naval base. There were pre-positioned ships which are large supply ships that can be sent anywhere. They’ve got vehicles and repair parts and all kinds of supplies, but overall there was a much reduced military presence on Guam while that significant presence continued in Okinawa.

I don’t think I mentioned this before but there is in Japan something called the UN Command Rear which is directly linked to Korean contingency planning and the UN Command in Korea. These UN Command Rear bases include Yokota Air Base in Honshu and Sasebo in Kyushu, where the amphibious force ships were based. On Okinawa, Kadena, White Beach Naval Station, and Futenma Marine Corps Air Station were the UN Command Rear installations. They flew the U.S., Japanese and UN flags to symbolize that status. There was a separate SOFA or Status of Forces Agreement with the Japanese that governed the use of these UN Command Rear bases. So you had this factor as well, the concern about the availability of the bases in Okinawa for a Korean contingency. In fact, there’s a 6,000 acre ammunition storage area adjacent to the 5,000
acre Kadena Air Base, where a huge amount of ammunition for a Korean contingency was stored.

Following through from the SACO process, the two governments have reached some agreements on relocating some of the Marine units from Okinawa to Guam. I think there’s a target date of 2013. In any case, in the natural course of things in the SACO process I think it’s fair to expect that any such plans are going to be slipped by many years. The Japanese government is supposed to spend several billion dollars, and it may be six billion, but don’t quote me. Several billion dollars to build facilities on Guam for the forces that will be relocated out of Okinawa. This would result in a significant reduction in the manpower in Okinawa and, therefore, the noise levels and the kinds of disruption that the noise levels produce. A very visible gesture, assuming it takes place.

Q: Was having this force there in some manner a warning to China about Taiwan?

O’NEILL: There were various operations out of Okinawa aimed at learning about what the Chinese were up to, including the operations of the P-3 Orion anti-submarine squadrons there. Not only was there the U.S. P-3 squadron at Kadena but the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force had two squadrons of P-3s at Naha International airport. There was also what I’ll euphemistically refer to as the acquisition of information through some of the U.S. facilities on Okinawa which I’m sure involved the Chinese.

Q: Actually, one of those planes landed on Hainan Island.

O’NEILL: That was, of course, much later, and that was an EP-3. The ones that normally operated out of Okinawa were plain P-3 anti-submarine planes. The EP-3 that was involved in this collision with the Chinese fighter in what, spring of 2001, was strictly surveillance. It had no weapons as the regular P-3s can carry. It was also marked very differently, too. The U.S. news media very annoyingly called the EP-3 a spy plane. Well, the P-3s on anti-submarine patrol are painted a pale flat grey with slightly darker grey U.S. markings on them, very low visibility. The EP-3 that was knocked down by the Chinese fighter was painted a bright glossy white on top, with shiny dark grey undersides and big red, white, and blue U.S. markings on the sides and the wings. They were not trying to hide anything.

Anyhow, China figured more in national thinking at the Tokyo level than it did in the thinking of Okinawans. The 7th Fleet amphibious group did at least one visit to Shanghai, and the group commander at the time, Rear Admiral Walt Doran, told me that as they were heading into the roads at Shanghai, he didn’t know if the port visit was on or not. There was always something going on in U.S.-China relations that made these things uncertain but that particular port visit to Shanghai did take place. So there was a combination of positive interaction and also watchfulness, I guess, with respect to the Taiwan Strait situation and China on the part of the U.S. forces in Okinawa. It was an enormously interesting place. I couldn’t have asked for a better assignment.

Q: With your Japanese experience, did you sense any changes in the way the mainland Japanese regarded Okinawa? I’m thinking that Okinawa was treated the same way that the Germans in
the northern part of Italy were viewed from Rome, as being a bunch of peasants who didn’t really speak the language, etc. Did you see any change in this?

O’NEILL: There was a certain amount of change. To my mind the prejudice that you’re speaking of toward Okinawa was quite strong, and I think that something of a change occurred in the aftermath of the horrible child rape case in September 1995. There was more sympathy on the part of mainlanders for the Okinawan situation in the aftermath, which was a good thing because largely the mainland view of Okinawa was just similar to what you mentioned: They’re not exactly Japanese; they speak funny, and they have weird customs and all that. In their dialect, the Okinawans call the mainland Japanese Yamatunchu or Yamato people and themselves Uchinanchu.

A lot of prejudices continued to linger particularly among the older generation of mainlanders. That awful crime did generate a certain amount of sympathy and a recognition that there did have to be adjustments in the base situation. Part of the equation was the NIMBY syndrome, the “not in my backyard” syndrome: “We’re so glad those bases are down in Okinawa because that’s what Okinawans are for. We don’t want Marines and airmen wandering around our neighborhoods and making noise nearby.”

During that time, and it may have been coincidental, maybe not, Okinawan musical groups playing Okinawan music got a much wider hearing and much larger audiences in Tokyo and Osaka for concerts and for CD sales and all that. So there was a beginning of greater appreciation of the richness of Okinawan culture. In lots of ways despite the small population and tiny size, it’s very rich in sculpture and pottery, weaving, textile dying, and distinctive lacquer work that’s often very pretty.

There’s also a generational element into it, too to mainland Japanese thinking about Okinawans. Younger Okinawans tend to be non-political to a degree that was surprising to anybody who served in Seoul and knows how spectacularly political younger Koreans have traditionally been. Also, I think, younger mainland Japanese, are more accepting and open to Okinawans particularly because of tourism. The largest component of the Okinawan economy in recent decades — the last 15 or so years — has been tourism, which is almost all from other islands of Japan, rather than from the outside. So younger Japanese have been there for tourism, for honeymoons, etc., and they have encountered Okinawans as being Japanese like themselves, people who do not think that they should be separate from Japan. So that’s been a leavening influence as well, a good effect.

Q: Speaking of cultural changes and all, I’ve seen reports from time to time that Japanese teenagers, particularly girls, seem to get on to fads, which has become quite an element in Japanese society. How did the teenage girls from Okinawa and our troops there get along?

O’NEILL: Well, they often were very friendly, and there were more than a few marriages of service members and Okinawan young women. There was the usual bar culture, too, that you have around any military installation of any nationality anywhere in the world and any time, going back to Caesar’s legions. This was less prevalent in Okinawa than it had been, say, during the Vietnam War era. The reduction in such activities from an economic standpoint, whatever the
concern from a moral standpoint may be, had a very depressing effect on a number of the towns of Okinawa that didn’t necessarily have a lot of other things to substitute for the townspeople’s livelihoods.

The number of marriages between Okinawan women and American servicemen was perhaps less than in the past because a lot of the American military people were on accompanied tours. The Department of Defense school system ran 13 schools on Okinawa including two four-year high schools. The consulate general used to issue 100 “reports of birth abroad” per month, month after month, year after year, because of births at Lester Naval Hospital. Lester Hospital also had extremely good neo-natal intensive unit. Despite the fact that the hospital itself was rather shop-worn, its people and equipment were really first rate.

In the Okinawan language the word for a stir-fry dish is *champuru*, and they call their culture “*champuru culture*” because they have mixed in so many elements from different places in the world including Southeast Asia. They’re allowed to import Thai rice to distill *awamori* which is their rice whiskey. Nobody else in Japan could import foreign rice, but the Okinawans for historical reasons are allowed to do it for that purpose. Some of their musical instruments look similar to ones from Southeast Asia. Some of the original court dress and the formal dress have Southeast Asia elements particularly the caps that resembled the ones that used to be worn by Vietnamese mandarins. Their tombs that they call “turtleback tombs” are unique to Okinawa. You don’t see them anywhere else in Japan. They’re from Fujian Province in China across the East China Sea.

Okinawans who were descended from Korean potters or Japanese or Chinese traders would tell you this with some pride. If you had that situation among mainland Japanese, they’d hide it from you. One of the stir-fry dishes in Okinawa has vegetables and corned beef hash in it which is obviously not a traditional Japanese delicacy, but that’s a literal example of their “stir-fried culture.” They’re a very easygoing people. There were Americans who married Okinawan women before reversion and after, and these mixed families and their children are not seen as odd by Okinawans. It’s a very refreshing situation in comparison to the generally more rigid views of mainlanders on such things.

**Q:** One last question on this. How did you find the relations with the embassy? Was the embassy happy that you were there? But sometimes the greatest joy of a consul general is not to have to have the embassy pay much attention to him or her.

**O’NEILL:** Well, it was basically inevitable that the embassy would pay a lot of attention to Okinawa during that period. I was very fortunate. Ambassador Walter Mondale was wonderful. He was a great believer in the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

He and Mrs. Mondale, Joan Mondale, were great people to be with, too, and they made several visits mostly for ceremonial occasions having to do with the Iwo Jima 50th anniversary and the Okinawa 50th anniversary. During the June 1995 50th anniversary events, they stayed at our house for three nights. Mrs. Mondale, who is an artist and a potter in her own right, was very interested in all the arts of Okinawa. She came down one time on a visit of her own — she was with us for two or three days, visiting potters and weavers, etc., and it was a tremendous thing,
got huge publicity in Okinawa. That the wife of the American ambassador and ex-vice president was clearly interested in the arts in Okinawa was tremendous. We couldn’t have designed something better than that.

Rust Deming, the DCM, was one of the foremost Japan hands in our Foreign Service his entire career. His father, Ambassador Olcott Deming, had been on Okinawa; his title probably was political adviser to the U.S. military commander. He — Olcott Deming — was very fondly remembered even by people like Governor Ota, the scholar and pacifist, for what he had done to try to ease the base burden on Okinawa in the 1950s.

Another thing, in consular operations we had one potential problem that I was able to defeat with the support of the embassy consular and administrative sections and ultimately, the ambassador and DCM. The Department was moving toward electronic visas that would be printed out on a serial-numbered visa sheet and then pasted into the passport as opposed to being stamped as the old non-immigrant visas were. These things would have a photo of the visa applicant electronically imprinted in the visa itself.

As the State Department was moving to this system worldwide, its initial view was that non-immigrant visa processing at Consulate General Naha would end. Okinawans would have to go to Fukuoka on Kyushu to get their visas, not the most convenient place. I argued that we should continue the non-immigrant visa operation. My argument was that much of what the U.S. represents to most Okinawans is the bases. There are a few narrow areas in which we could do something other than operate bases. An obvious one was convenience of visa processing for Okinawan visitors. I forget the exact number, but it was a reasonable number. It would have sent a bad signal in that era to take it away from them and say they had to make a special trip to Kyushu and then maybe fly to Tokyo and then to the U.S., because direct flights from Okinawa to the U.S. were closing out. There were just a lot of reasons, and fortunately the embassy agreed with me, lobbied the State Department, and we retained the non-immigrant visa processing. So that worked out well.

EDWARD W. KLOTH
Deputy for Environment, Science, and Technology
Tokyo (1997-2000)

Mr. Kloth was born in North Carolina and raised in New York. After service in the Peace Corps and private business, he worked with the Department of Defense, later joining the State Department. In his career with State, Mr. Kloth served several tours in Japan and Korea, In Washington assignments he dealt with East Asian, Political/military, Economic and Environment matters. He also spent two years on Capitol Hill as Department of State Pearson Fellow. After retirement, Mr. Kloth continued as advisor to the Department on variety of matters and served a tour in Iraq as Economic Officer. Mr. Kloth was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.
Q: In ’97 you are off to…?

KLOTH: To Tokyo. I took a job as deputy in the environment, science and technology (EST) section from 1997-2000. I like to say it was going from bad science to good science, meaning from the use of science to create very nasty weapons to the use of science to advance the human condition in happier ways. I was also coordinator for the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda, an effort to increase and highlight for our two publics cooperation on a wide variety of issues from development to the environment to international crime. We had six officers and a very good Office Management Specialist; a minister counselor was the head of section. We also had what we called the “science cluster,” which included a National Science Foundation office, an Department of Energy officer and the USAID representative. USAID was in our cluster is because our section and I, in particular, was the coordinator in the embassy for the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda. When an unexpected year long gap in the USAID position, I filled in. The EST section also had three top-notch FSNs. NSF and USAID also had excellent Japanese staff in addition to the American officers.

The Common Agenda started in 1993 was an initiative by the Japanese, and the thought was that there are three pillars to the relationship: security, trade and cooperation on many global issues. Security and trade issues usually got the headlines, meaning negative headlines, so the Japanese government wanted to highlight positive cooperation through the “Common Agenda” name plate. They also wanted to see both governments get more bang for the buck or yen through increased coordination. We agreed.

Q: This is what the press is all about.

KLOTH: Right and, in particular, the Common Agenda covered a wide range of important but little appreciated areas from cooperation on development to scientific and technological research and the Kyoto process. You remember the Kyoto Conference on Climate Change was in the late fall of ’97.

Q: So that was your kind of arrival?

KLOTH: I arrived in August, so we were in the final run up to the Kyoto Conference.

Q: Why don’t we talk about the Kyoto Conference? What was that all about?

KLOTH: I arrived in August of 1997, and we were in the final run up to the Kyoto Conference on climate change. We had a very sharp officer who had been there a year already working on Kyoto and knew it very, very well.

Q: Who was that?

KLOTH: A guy by the name of Allen Yu. Unfortunately, Allen had to take emergency leave, I took over for the last major pre-Kyoto Conference meeting. Undersecretary Wirth, former Senator Tim Wirth, led a U.S. delegation out. There was a lot of contention between us and the Europeans as to the level at which the goals, the targets, should be set. Another huge issue was
that the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, and others in the developing world didn’t want to have
targets levied on them at all, lest such obligations slow their development. Of course, the
underdeveloped countries argued that the greenhouse gas problem was literally manufactured in
the developed world and that, as developing countries they couldn’t afford all the expensive
technology to, for instance, clean up emissions from coal plants. Indeed they needed to get as
many coal fired plants up and running to provide the electricity they needed for development at
the lowest possible immediate cost.

Between the United States and the Europeans, there was disagreement about the levels of
emissions targets that should be accepted by the developed countries. It was my first experience
at a UN conference. The U.S. delegation was in constant communication before they came out
with both American businesses and American environmental NGOs; listening to both sides very
carefully and trying to craft a position that would enable us to cut down our emissions without
adversely affecting our economy.

In Europe the political mix meant their governments seemed more concerned with cutting
emissions. As I looked at this getting ready for the preparatory meeting and the Kyoto
Conference, in both the press and the reporting from our posts in Europe, we didn’t seem to hear
much from the European business side or the economists who were concerned about the impact
on business. It was also my first experience seeing the dance between representatives of both
individual European states and the EU. There were times, I think, when the American delegation
and other national delegations found this a little frustrating because both the EU and individual
states wanted to talk and courted. Fortunately, Allen was back for Kyoto, where we certainly
needed his expertise. The huge U.S. delegation included executive branch officials from many
agencies as well as members of Congress. Representatives from U.S. business and environmental
NGOs attend too. The Vice President zoomed in for the finale. Kyoto was an enormous
undertaking logistically for an embassy. We mobilized administrative, political and economic
section officers, and even our defense attaché mobilized before we were done.

My boss and I did a tag team, because the conference was, as I recall, 7-9 days. My boss went
down at the beginning and the end, and I was there in the middle to give whatever additional
help was needed. When I first arrived on maybe the third or fourth day, all the delegations were
very, very busy, but were in pretty good humor. By the end, however, people were tired; jet lag
hit like a club - they had flown in from all over the world. Most importantly, the issues were
narrowing down along predictable lines, and it was not clear how a compromise was going to be
reached. The tension level among the Japanese delegation, who as hosts wanted a success most
of all, had gone well above the roof. This was a tremendous big deal for them, and the idea that
the conference could somehow end without a Kyoto agreement was for them taken very
personally.

Q: Well, you know as this thing reached its end, how did you personally and your colleagues and
also to the American delegation view this thing? The Kyoto thing is still, well, it hasn’t been
ratified, meaning that it still is a bone of contention, but how did you view it as it was coming to
an agreement?

KLOTH: Everyone on the U.S. delegation was working hard, but many were frustrated because
of an underlying sense that no matter what agreement came out, it was not going to be ratified on the Hill. The U.S. would sign on but would not get the legislative support that it needed. As we went running up to it, Under Secretary Wirth, who had come to the preparatory meeting in Tokyo resigned as the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, and took a job with Ted Turner’s new UN organization. While U/S Wirth insisted he was driven by the opportunity, many and certainly many Japanese officials felt it was an ominous omen for the Kyoto process. The Japanese first question to us was: does this mean he thinks this agreement is not going to happen, that this conference will be unsuccessful, and he doesn’t want to be associated with it?

Q: It strikes me that this wasn’t very gracious on the part of Wirth.

KLOTH: From where I sat in Tokyo and then Kyoto, the timing wasn’t helpful. But, as you well know, we diplomats spend a lot of time holding other people’s hands.

The U.S. delegation, including the senators and representatives who came out, worked hard. The acting under secretary, who was the assistant secretary, not only had to work with the foreign delegations, but met every day with the environmental groups and the U.S. business groups, separately, of course. She would brief them on what was happening and then take their comments and suggestions. Often what one liked, the other hated, although not always. The new world of multi-constituent diplomacy is a challenge.

Q: Did you find an awful lot of you might call “ideology” or very firm ideas on this? I mean the business delegation said, “What are you trying to do ruin us?” The scientific people were saying, “You are going to ruin the world if you don’t do something.”

KLOTH: I think the question for the business people was what are the costs involved and what’s the impact those costs are going to have on American businesses competitiveness, particularly vis a vis firms in countries such as China or India that do not take on environmental obligations. The representatives from NGOs were vociferous in demands for tough targets.

Let me add to that we also had on the U.S. delegation a delegate from the Pentagon, I believe a Navy officer. Our armed forces operate globally ships, airplanes and other vehicles. The services were very concerned about the impact of an agreement on their operations and costs. I would not say they were negative. They understood the need for a green environment, after all the sailors and the airmen are in the air and on the seas. The issue was costs and a key part of that was whether there would be a global standard or individual national standards; the latter could be a nightmare for our military operations.

Q: How about the Japanese? I mean the Japanese are a big business power obviously.

KLOTH: The Japanese government had clearly committed itself to an agreement. Japanese had, after a number of awful incidents, cleaned up a lot of their own industry. There was concern among Japanese business about the potential cost and the impact on competitiveness. Japanese are very sensitive about how the world sees them. Japan was hosting the conference, so most Japanese wanted success. Nevertheless, Japanese business was calculating the costs for different options carefully.
Q: Mercury.

KLOTH: Mercury pollution too, that was one of the big ones.

Q: Or that horrible situation in some village.

KLOTH: Minamata? I went to a U.S.-Japan-China-Korea waste disposal conference there hosted by the University of Montana’s Mansfield Center. Minamata is an out of the way place. It had a museum with the history of the problem with mercury poisoning. I saw horrific photos of what had happened to those poor people. So the Japanese were very conscious those problems. I think by the fall of ’97, many Japanese businessmen were as concerned as the broader public that this Kyoto process be successful. I suppose that, given the politics in Japan as host, opponents of an agreement were not likely to be as publicly vocal as say some of the American business people.

Q: Also, were the Japanese looking towards the new world as regards anti-pollution manufacturing devices and things of this nature?

KLOTH: Japanese industry is very sharp at seeing which way the wind is blowing and sailing with it, not against it. Think back to the first oil shock in ’73. I was out in Seattle, a graduate student. One joke that went around was that when Congress proposed gas mileage consumption limits, U.S. auto maker hired lobbyists. The Japanese hired engineers. I’m not sure that’s really changed three decades later.

To finish off Kyoto, the Conference was at deadlock when it was time for me to get on the bullet train back to Tokyo. My boss and I sat down in the coffee shop at the Kyoto railroad station. I briefed him on what was going on. Vice President Gore then made a dramatic arrival and broke the deadlock, putting forward U.S. agreement on a standard, so consensus was reached except, although China and the developing countries remained outside. Congress never ratified.

The discouraging part after such high theater were the reports afterwards that the Administration knew Congress wouldn’t support what was put on the table and, therefore, was not going to push it forward on the Hill. While the Japanese were delighted the Vice President had made “their” Kyoto conference a success, for the next two and a half years, we were frequently asked by Japanese in and out of government, why the U.S. hadn’t ratified yet.

Q: Did you explain this to the Japanese, your counterpart?

KLOTH: The Japanese watch U.S. politics a lot more closely than we watch Japanese politics. Japanese officials understood, although they were very frustrated.

Q: Well then, after the Kyoto Conference what were you up to?

KLOTH: Okay, well then my focus was on the Common Agenda, as embassy coordinator, and on oceans-related science issues. We would have Common Agenda meetings once a year at the Under Secretary level home and away. We had them twice in Tokyo and once in Washington
when I was there.

At high level meetings, the top officials always want new initiatives every year, but there is not necessarily money for new initiatives. Worse yet for us State Department worker bees, State had no money of its own for projects. Other agencies funded. USAID was perhaps the biggest gorilla in the room on the work with our Japanese counterparts. Nevertheless, AID didn’t have new funds for new projects every year, so there was always a scramble before the meetings to come up with “significant new initiatives” that could be taken that wouldn’t involve new monies. Of course, our Japanese foreign ministry colleagues did not have new monies every year either, so we were partners in pain. Working with Japanese and American NGOs on projects that were funded was fun, however.

Another factor was that Japanese assistance budgets were coming under increasing pressure from the Diet. The Japanese economy was doing poorly. Diet members were asking why taxpayers’ money should be spent on foreigners, not their constituents.

Q: Did you find just in all this type of thing you’ve got a bunch of people particularly at the top trying to do things when a lot of things that they were doing really required at a certain point you saying, okay we’ve done that, now let the people who actually manage it do it, and it is going to take a couple years and let’s keep our hands off?

KLOTH: The issue was not that the top wanted to monkey with on-going projects, but that they wanted new initiatives and didn’t have the money to pay for new stuff.

Q: What did you do on the oceans side.

KLOTH: I worked closely with some great people at the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) in my role as oceans attaché. This slot was for many years a separate position in the economic section, filled by a non-State expert from the Fisheries service. The oceans attaché was very important to the U.S. and the Japanese when the United States let foreign fleets come in to the American Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to catch a set quota of fish. The attaché was the go-between between Washington and the Japanese government on fisheries and, in particular, quota issues. He was also the go-between on highly contentious whaling issues. By the mid-'90s, foreign vessels could not fish our waters, and maritime environmental issues were at the top of the pile, so the position was moved to the EST section and environment and scientific issues were an important part of my portfolio.

NOAA in the late ‘90s had a project called the Argos Project which put floats out all over the world’s oceans to collect data. While 70 percent of the world’s surface is covered by water, we know very little about it in terms of the science of it. This also relates to not only to climate change but daily weather, storm predictions, health of the oceans, fisheries, there is a wide range. Fisheries issues were still in my portfolio. They were chiefly focused on the challenge of trying to protect the resource with large. We did have some fisheries protection treaty negotiations that I was involved in.

The whale issue was highly contentious. It’s a terrific example of a diplomat’s worst nightmare.
The diplomat’s job is to make deals. I’m being a little facetious here. How do you make a deal when one side sees whales as, if not your brothers and sisters, then your cousins, while the others - the Japanese, Norwegians and Icelanders - sees whales as cows and pigs, a food source. Of course, you don’t want to kill them all, because then there won’t be any left to eat tomorrow. You can agree to manage them wisely, but eating them is no worse than eating a cow or a pig. If whales are your cousins, just eating a few is unacceptable. Where’s the space everyone to give a little and get a little?

**Q:** How important were whales in say the Japanese diet?

**KLOTH:** By the late ‘90s, whale meat was a pricey delicacy. The Japanese only did some “scientific” hunting, so supply was limited.

**Q:** Well, it is just like back in the turn of the last century, chicken was the main meal on Sunday, a book even called *Chicken Every Sunday*. Chicken was a pretty fancy item; we didn’t have the great chicken farms.

**KLOTH:** Right, right. After World War II the American occupation government had encouraged the Japanese to whale to supply protein to the diet. But by the late ‘70s, early and late ‘80s, the whaling moratorium became for many in Japan a symbol of cultural imperialism on the part of Americans. Americans are chomp away on their burgers and their fried chicken, and badmouth Japanese for wanting to eat whale.

We also had a NASA representative in our office. Every time NASA does a space launch with foreign crew members, the crew visits the foreign country afterwards, so we had two visits to Japan. The second one was the one in which John Glenn also flew and the Japanese crewmember was a woman, so that got a lot of attention in Tokyo. Everyone in the section usually worked in some way on the visits which were fun and highlighted U.S.-Japan cooperation.

The NASA representative was a full member of our section. He was a GS-13, I think. NASA management was sharp. Some agencies think having stand-alone offices staffed by their own mid-level or even senior people increases their local clout, perhaps at the specialized ministry but not across the Japanese government. NASA released that our arrangement gave them a solid expert on the ground, plus the services and clout of the EST minister-counselor, a high ranking diplomat, which impressed our Japanese counterparts in the scientific as well as other ministries. Because inter-ministerial communication is often difficult in Japan, the title “career diplomat” can enable you to move horizontally in ways not so simple for what the Japanese bureaucracy see as “detailees” from U.S. functional agencies. The diplomat needs, however, to demonstrate that he or she has the support of the U.S. agency to be effective.

**Q:** Yeah, this is something we often forget about. We think in terms of our own bureaucracy and not...

**KLOTH:** Not how it looks to the host country officials. Further, the NASA representative working on our section’s issues, like high-level visits, gave him experience outside his usual box and a useful perspective on how, say, NASA’s work supports and is supported by broader U.S.
interests in Japan.

Q: Well, looking at the time you were, there how would you describe the flow of scientific knowledge between the United States and Japan? Was anybody ahead or behind? How was it working?

KLOTH: First of all, the amount of contact that goes on is far beyond what I had imagined. When our minister counselor and I visited Tsukuba, Japan’s science city, and its nuclear research facility, we were startled to be shown around by two American professors from Princeton and Cornell who come over every year with their students to use the facility, one of only a few available in the world. The global demand exceeds the supply, and they were happy to get time on the Japanese machines. So there’s a lot that goes on. We don’t hear about it in the embassy because they don’t have problems.

Language is a big barrier in terms of foreigners having access to Japanese research data. The Japanese are also very concerned about this being a barrier to their access to foreign research. The science faculties want to make sure that their students can read, write and speak English, so that they can participate actively in the global scientific community. So, for example, at Tokyo University, which is Japan’s primo university, the MA students present their MA thesis in English.

While, as I noted, some Americans went to Japan to do research, I’m sure many more Japanese came and come to work in our facilities. They come over; they do research in U.S. facilities and certainly make contributions. While there was Japanese government money for research, Japanese scientists complained of bureaucratic entanglements. They still looked to the United States as the most hospitable place for researchers.

For example, Japanese scientists told me that the Japanese government would identify an outstanding scientist or what was felt to be the cutting edge technology or cutting edge research topics, and provide government funds to set up a research institute, often getting very good results from it. But, let’s say five years down the road, that would no longer be the cutting edge and the reward, the cost benefit analysis, would’ve shifted to another area. But the bureaucratic and political system militated against open competition for grants, so that individual or institute would continue to get funding regardless, and at the expense of innovative research by lesser-knowns. Our National Science Foundation folks argued that the U.S. system was much more nimble.

Before we leave Japan, let me make another point about the Common Agenda. One of the frustrating things with the Common Agenda and one of its goals was to highlight all the good things, good cooperation going on in other areas other than defense and trade. Overall our security alliance had kept the peace in Northeast Asia since 1953. Americans and Japanese were benefiting mightily from trade. Nevertheless, issues such as base locations or incidents of crime by U.S. military members or trade disputes grabbed headlines. It was very difficult to do highlight cooperation because it wasn’t bad news.

I and my Japanese Foreign Ministry colleagues thought a lot about the problem. We could
usually get a small paragraph in the press when the meetings took place but it was hard to imagine many people even noticed. In the final meeting of my tour in 2000, we had a breakthrough and got front page coverage in the Tokyo papers of the NOAA Argos oceanographic research float project which Japan joined. The breakthrough came when the powerful Ministry of Transportation (MOT) heard about the project and invited me to come over and brief them. They became very enthusiastic, because Japan is, after all, an island nation dependent on maritime transport. MOT wanted in. There was some hesitancy on the NOAA and Japanese scientists’ side, because the transportation ministry is clearly not a science research organization. There was concern that the scientific research part might get deflected or diminished.

Because I understood NOAA’s interests and was in Tokyo and could meet with the Japanese S&T Agency as well as the MOT officials, I was able to get everyone to focus on the advantages to all of working together. A key point was that MOT had a great deal of clout in the Japanese government’s budget process. Well, NOAA brought out a model of the float to the 2000 Common Agenda meeting. MOT held a press conference highlighting the project with the float there as a visual aid. Their press corps was very much plugged in to not only the editorial boards of their papers but also the Diet, so we had a front-page newspaper story with an artist’s rendition of the float, fully deployed! It was a very good feeling and also very frustrating. When things go well, few much care.

EDWARD M. FEATHERSTONE
Director, Japanese Area and Language Training
Yokohama (1998)

Mr. Featherstone was born in New York City and raised there and in Japan. After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania and serving in the US Army, in 1961 he entered the Foreign Service. As a Japanese language and area specialist Mr. Featherstone served primarily in Japanese posts, including Kobe-Osaka, Yokohama, Niigata, Okinawa (Consul General) and Tokyo. He also served in Barbados and in Washington. Mr. Featherstone was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1999.

Q: You went to Yokohama as Director of Japanese Area and Language Training, which is an important outfit, which you were a graduate of, I gather.

FEATHERSTONE: That’s right. I graduated from the school in 1965.

Q: How large was the center when you took it over?

FEATHERSTONE: We had about 18 to 20 students at the time, something like that. These are not only Americans, but we had New Zealanders and Australians. We had a few people from other agencies, a couple students. But we trained them in Japanese for one year.
Q: I was going to say, is it a two-year course or one year?

FEATHERSTONE: It is a two-year course, but we gave them the second year. The first year they went elsewhere. The first year they were in New Zealand, Australia, or FSI/Washington. We would get them the second year.

Q: Were you funded adequately to do your job?

FEATHERSTONE: I want to say that you can always use more funding. We had enough money to do our job. There were certain things we didn’t have enough of. We could have used some more text books. We could have used some more tape recorders, that sort of thing, but we had a sufficient number to do the job. We certainly were not hurting.

Q: What were your relations with the embassy?

FEATHERSTONE: Well, we were 25 miles away from the embassy, so they were pretty good. The farther the better.

Q: Did you get any visits from the ambassador or any other senior officers there?

FEATHERSTONE: Senior officers, yes. I’m not sure that the ambassador ever came down, frankly. I think we invited him two or three times, but... I think it was Mike then.

Q: It was Foley, I think, then.

FEATHERSTONE: Maybe it was Foley.

Q: He must have come during your period there.

FEATHERSTONE: He probably came at the end of my period, but I don’t think he was around very much when I was there. It was right toward the end, I think, when Foley came. I think that was one of the areas where we could have used more visits from higher level people just to get some visibility, and give the students a chance to talk with them. I don’t think we had enough high-level visits. I must say that I had a good time there. It was a well-run operation.

Q: So, I gather that you think this Japanese language school is a very good investment for the U.S.

FEATHERSTONE: The only way that you will be able to train language officers... Well, not the only way, you could send someone to college in Japan and so forth, but that requires even greater knowledge of Japanese, before you can do that. There are people now coming into the Foreign Service who have been to Japanese universities. They come in with far greater language skills than the people we train.

Q: Oh, you mean they have actually studied in Japan?
FEATHERSTONE: Exactly. Some of them have Japanese mothers, or something like that, but many of them are coming in with substantial language skills. This is a very good thing. But, of course, many of them won’t come into the Foreign Service, necessarily when they get these language skills. They may rather go to a big company, or whatever.

Q: *Are we getting enough candidates in these Japanese language schools, or not?*

FEATHERSTONE: Well, being away from it, I can’t say, Tom. It’s hard for me to give you a real good answer on that. I have been away too long. I don’t know. I suspect not because those who go to Japanese universities and acquire really good Japanese language skills probably aren’t going to come to the Foreign Service. It is a real problem. I think you always need a cadre of Japanese language officers. The question is what is the best way to get that. You can seek out these people who have studied abroad or you can try to train them yourself. You will probably always need a training facility for Japanese for a long time to come, I think.

Q: *What was the quality of the American students you had in the training center?*

FEATHERSTONE: Pretty good. Some of the top students we had were New Zealanders or Australians, but we had some good Americans also. They were pretty careful about the people they selected. On the whole, I can’t say they would get duds, not in that program.

Q: *Did you have any big problems in those years, or not?*

FEATHERSTONE: No, it was supported pretty well. Like a lot of places, we could have always used more money for this, that and the other thing, but I wouldn’t say there were problems that hampered our operation. We were funded pretty well.

Q: *Well, at the end of that period, in 1998, retirement came to you again.*

FEATHERSTONE: That’s right. I forget whether that was the second or third time I retired, but this time I made it stick.
WHITE: Then I became Director of the Japan desk and I was there from ’98 to 2001. This was in the East Asia bureau (EAP.) It was an excellent job at this time of my career with a lot of management responsibilities. Also, for the first time, I worked a great deal on security and political issues, much more so than economic issues, so it was an interesting challenge to get up to speed quickly.

Q: What were the major security issues?

WHITE: In September 1998, about a month after I began the position, the North Koreans shot a type of long-range missile, the Taepodong, which they claimed was a test or a launch of a satellite that failed. It flew over Japan and the Japanese reacted very strongly to that. It made them feel very vulnerable. Before that, the public hadn’t really felt that Japan as a country could be a target. During the Cold War the feeling was that if Japan were to be a target, it would be because the Soviet Union was targeting American bases in Japan. With the missile shot and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, they suddenly realized that Japan itself could be a target. They needed a lot of reassurance that they were still under our nuclear umbrella and that we would come to their aid. One Japanese official told me that the Taepodong missile had the same effect on Japan as the takeover of the embassy in Tehran had on the U.S. It made a country realize its vulnerability.

The North Korean issue was very important throughout my three years on the desk. At that time former Secretary of Defense William Perry had started a process called the Trilateral Coordinating Group (TCOG) which brought the South Koreans and the Japanese together before and after each U.S. negotiation with the North Koreans. He was followed by State Department Counselor Wendy Sherman, who was well respected. There was a great deal of coordinating work; it worked well to keep the Japanese and South Koreans assured that they were informed of everything going on in bilateral talks. The personalities involved worked well together and I think it was an excellent exercise in diplomacy.

Q: How did you find the Japanese and South Korean relationship?

WHITE: It has always been a difficult relationship because Japan colonized Korea in 1905 and there are still many negative feelings. The Koreans remember that the Japanese punished Koreans for speaking Korean during that period. Many Koreans were sent to Japan almost as slave laborers during World War II and the comfort women issue remains very painful. However the animosity wasn’t as strong then as it is today. The TCOG process was significant because the Japanese and Koreans met together with the Americans and put aside the history problems to work toward a common goal, dealing with North Korea. It is sad that those good working relationships never spread to a wider number of officials or to the general public in both countries.

Q: What was our position at that time and what were the North Koreans up to?

WHITE: The Agreed Framework was in place at that time so the plutonium that the North Koreans had been reprocessing was under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision. There were IAEA inspectors at the nuclear plant in North Korea and the plutonium
was in fuel rods under constant surveillance. The question was who was going to pay for the quid pro quo. KEDO, the Korean Economic Development Organization, had been set up after the 1994 crisis to provide energy to North Korea through construction of two light water reactors. I’ll leave the details of that to the Korea experts, but it was important to Japan because Japan and South Korea were going to pay the bulk of the money to construct the power plants to replace the nuclear program the North Koreans gave up. There were a lot of delays in that for one reason or other. The U.S. Congress never like it and delayed sending heavy fuel oil, there was suspicion about the North Koreans having an underground testing facility that had to be investigated, and the North Koreans were not particularly receptive to the South Korean technicians coming in. It went very slowly. However at least the North Koreans were not making nuclear bombs, which is not the case today unfortunately.

Q: Yes. Did the Russian occupation of the northern islands come up while you were there?

WHITE: Yes, the Northern Territories issue has been a constant problem and Japan doesn’t have a peace treaty with the Russians from World War II because of this territorial complaint. The Soviet Union took over four islands north of Hokkaido just at the end of the war.

When I was following Japan’s relationship with the Soviet Union back in the ‘80s there was a sense that if only the two countries could have better relations it would benefit both; Japan had the money and the technology and the Soviet Union had the resources. It was always thought that the big turnaround was just around the corner. When they could finally get things resolved politically and the Russians became a little more reliable in their bureaucratic and legal policies, people could do business. Well, that’s never happened, largely because the Northern Territories issue remains unresolved. Putin has gotten even more hard line than people in the ‘80s. I don’t see a political solution coming anytime soon.

Q: Were we playing any role in trying to help them resolve the problem?

WHITE: I don’t know what U.S. officials were saying to the Russians. We hoped for resolution and we supported the Japanese, but there was not really a useful role that we could play.

Q: The Northern Territories seem to be sparse and bare.

WHITE: Not many people live there. But like so many of these little rocks or islands, they have fish and other resources around them so whoever can claim them gains fishing rights and possibly access to oil. There are also questions of maritime passage and it becomes very symbolic of one’s sovereignty.

Q: How about our troops on Okinawa and other bases in Japan?

WHITE: The U.S. military presence on Okinawa has been controversial for some time. The U.S. held the islands after World War II and it wasn’t until 1972 that Okinawa reverted to Japan. The reversion talks were interesting, a successful diplomatic effort at a time when the military hadn’t wanted to return Okinawa. It was in the middle of the Vietnam War. There were many troops
based in Okinawa who were flying to Vietnam, maybe not directly on bombing runs, but certainly it was a key area for the military.

The Okinawa issue continued to be difficult, however, because even after reversion the Okinawans were left with such an enormous proportion of military forces on their very small islands. There are about three main roads which tend to be choked with military vehicles. It’s very noisy there with helicopters and planes constantly taking off and landing. The American bases are prime real estate. The Okinawans see the country clubs and the nice housing and compare it to their often cramped towns.

On the other hand the bases are very important geographically because troops there can reach all parts of Asia much more quickly than they could from Guam or other places. They are an important part of the contribution that the Japanese government makes to the U.S.-Japan military relationship. The Japanese either provide the land free of charge to the U.S. government or they pay the rent to the landowners. In Okinawa there are a number of landowners who have tiny plots of land that they rent to the Japanese government for U.S. bases and some of them are making a pretty good living out of that. The question of returning bases has long been difficult in Okinawa.

The American career military knows how important the bases are. Many genuinely believed that the negative attitudes toward U.S. forces really came from a small group of press and local politicians, while the bulk of the people really liked having them there. To a certain extent people did benefit, the shopkeepers and the people getting rents, but I think the military tended to close their minds to the fact that the average citizen resented the noise and the confusion and the occasional very upsetting incident.

Nonetheless I think everybody recognizes that something needs to be done and at the time I was on the desk the return of Futenma Marine Air Station major issue was the major issue. Unfortunately, even today it remains unresolved. Futenma Marine Air Station is basically a helicopter base located in the middle of a very populated area. It is down in a bowl with houses all around it. People have said for years that it’s an accident waiting to happen which would be horrific because of the density of population. Under the SACO agreement, Special Advisory Committee on Okinawa, it was agreed that the Japanese government would facilitate the relocation of this base to another place in Okinawa.

At the time I came in one proposal was for an offshore facility to be used as this helicopter base. A number of Japanese construction companies and steel companies were pleased with this idea because it would have been an enormous construction project, but even here in the U.S. some doubts were raised about the feasibility of it, the cost of it and particularly the environmental impact. That idea was on the way out when I came in.

The new proposal was to create a new base in the Nago area, which was a bit outside the more populated cities. During my time talks continued with the Japanese government on that. The complicated fact was that the Okinawan people didn’t feel that the Japanese government was taking their wishes into account. While we never negotiated directly with Okinawan local leaders and groups, we often met with them and heard their concerns. Local press and politicians were
very vocal and their basic position was that they had the burden of too many bases. Given the concentration there, their position was that if the base was vital for the relationship, move the base somewhere else in Japan. That of course ran into the “not in my backyard” syndrome which was very strong in Japan. The governor said they would accept Nago as a site, but only with a 15 year limit after which U.S. forces would have to leave that base. That’s something the U.S. could not accept and never did agree to.

State (EAP) worked very closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in talks with the Japanese government and efforts to accommodate the Okinawan people as much as possible. Two key players were EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Rust Deming and OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell. Both knew Japan well and worked hard and well to maintain the relationship. One way the Japanese government tried to gain local agreement was to pour a lot of money into Okinawa. The people in the Nago area were being promised a lot of central government funding. When the 2000 G-8 Summit was in Japan, the Japanese government decided to hold it in Okinawa. That was to recognize the role of Okinawa, but also, in a sense to bring publicity and money and try to smooth the way for a base. The hotel where the Clinton administration stayed in was in Nago in a beautiful area with nice lagoons.

Q: Did you sense a distance between the Japanese establishment in Tokyo and people in Okinawa?

WHITE: The Okinawans feel that the Japanese government discriminates by burdening them with bases and that mainland Japanese look down on them. And the wartime memories are very painful. There was terrible suffering during the Battle of Okinawa. Just about every family lost family members and they blamed much of that on the Japanese military, not on the Americans, for putting them through it. The Okinawans considered that they were looked down upon as being a bit racially different; the dialect is different. They felt like poor cousins and thought that that’s why they ended up with all the bases because they could be sort of out of sight, out of mind. Also, economically the Japanese government has poured a lot of money in and there was domestic tourism, but they haven’t done some basic things that would really help the economy like deregulating airlines enough that there could be some start up carriers offering competitive flights outside of tour packages. It’s very expensive to get to Okinawa, so businesses aren’t locating there.

Q: Any other major military-related issues?

WHITE: An important and tragic incident took place in February, 2001, when the American submarine the USS Greenville hit and sunk the Ehime Maru in Hawaiian waters. The Ehime Maru was a Japanese fishing vessel, but it was also a training vessel where teenagers were being trained to be fishermen or maritime officers. They had been training near Hawaii and had enjoyed some tourism before resuming their work.

There in Hawaiian waters the American submarine surfaced suddenly in an exercise of rising quickly to the surface. It rammed right into the Ehime Maru and the boat sank almost immediately. Nine people were killed, including four 17-year-olds. It was a terrible incident from many angles. First, there were all these deaths, and they were so young. Second, the submariners
were at fault for failing to make sure that there were clear waters all around before suddenly surfacing. Also, it was actually a demonstration for VIPs so had the aspect of a joy ride.

I was on vacation when it happened and it was shocking to see it on the television news. I got back a day later to find the State Department had to closely monitor what the military was doing. DOD and the Navy were doing all they could to find survivors and remains, but while well intentioned, they didn’t have a particularly diplomatic touch with their public relations.

First they wouldn’t let the captain of the submarine vessel apologize, though an early and sincere apology would have meant a great deal to the Japanese families and public. Military lawyers were concerned that their legal position would be compromised and that if the captain said he was sorry that would be taken as an admission of guilt -- though there was no question about who was at fault. Right away the American and the Japanese cultures clashed. If he had come out and bowed deeply to the families right at the beginning, a lot of the resentment and bad feelings could have been avoided in my view. Later, after he left the Navy, he said that he had wanted to do this. During a later court of inquiry, he apologized to the Ehime Maru crew and some families. Some months later he went to Japan and met families to offer his apology, but by then it was too late to head off a firestorm of anger and grief.

It was a major story for weeks -- there were front page pictures in newspapers for many days showing pictures of the young students in their aloha shirts in Hawaii. It was terribly painful. The military did well to continue the search for survivors/bodies for a long time. At one point, a week or two after the incident, they sent word through to the Japanese government that they planned to end the search as there was no hope of finding anyone. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official called me in the middle of the night to tell me they were sending a deputy minister to the U.S. to stress how important it was for the search to continue. He was about to get on a plane but we managed to convince them that it would not be useful. In the end the military continued the search at great expense throughout wider and wider areas in order to make the Japanese feel that we were doing all we could.

Another incident showed the different cultures between State and the military. DOD drafted a presidential letter of condolence. When it came for clearance I was a little upset by it because the first paragraph was a well worded sentiment of condolence and grief. But then the letter went on for four paragraphs listing all the Navy was doing in the search. It set totally the wrong tone, so we managed to get it cut back to a very simple condolence, not a self-justification. That showed the importance of working together because the military was looking at the problem from their own point of view and doing their best, but they didn’t have a good sense of what the wider impact would be on the Japanese public when this was made public.

Q: Yes. The fact that the captain didn’t apologize early on became quite a point of conflict. It does point out that as a rule, the Pentagon lawyers tend to be very protective. They have their reasons, but the point is that often it is the wrong thing.

WHITE: Yes, as I said, the absence of an immediate and personal apology really hurt. The Pentagon quickly realized they had to compensate the victims and they did pay compensation to
the parents. There wasn’t a lot of arguing about the amounts, but still that was a little later in the game and the public reaction to U.S. Navy maneuvers and methods remained very negative.

Q: Can you talk about your impressions of this G-8 summits?

WHITE: For the Okinawa Summit, I worked mainly on the bilateral side of the visit. There was a different group in the White House and the European and Economic Bureaus who worked on the multilateral side. While I was there for the whole summit, I was concentrating on the events that President Clinton did with the Okinawan people. The main event was a visit to the Peace Park. This is a park at the edge of the ocean where some of the most fierce fighting took place toward the end of the Battle of Okinawa. Many Japanese either died or committed suicide in the caves near there. It’s very moving because there are a number of marble plaques with the names of all the dead, not just the Japanese soldiers but the Okinawan civilians and the Americans, Australians, New Zealanders and others who died in the fight. Clinton gave a very good speech at that park in broiling hot weather to a large crowd.

Q: How did the Clinton administration and Clinton himself get along with the Japanese? How was the relationship during the time you were there?

WHITE: Like most presidents, Clinton wanted to develop a personal relationship with his counterparts, but in his two terms he met seven Japanese prime ministers. Just about every time he went to Japan or to a G-8 Summit it was a different person, so he never really developed a personal relationship. There is such a difference in the Koizumi- Bush relationship because Bush sees him a lot so of course they have developed a friendship. Clinton never had a personal interest. He wasn’t negative toward the Japanese, though not particularly warm either. Early in the administration there had been a lot of more trade friction, but I wasn’t involved at that time. On the desk we worked well and closely with the Asia group at the NSC but among the top people of the Clinton administration there weren’t many with strong Japan ties.

Q: What was happening with the Japanese political system? Did we see changes in it? The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had been around for a long time and I was wondering whether Japan might be becoming more independent from the United States.

WHITE: At that time there was a lot of intellectual debate about Japan becoming a “normal nation,” meaning Japan should take on more responsibility for its own security. I think most of the Japan hands in the U.S. government thought that it would be a good idea for them to become more self-reliant. We had encouraged the Self Defense Forces to take more forward leaning roles as peacekeepers in various regions. There was concern among pundits that if Japan became a more normal, more independent nation, it could mean that they wouldn’t always follow our lead on a lot of issues. Most Japan specialists saw that possibility but felt it would be a healthy development. The alliance was strong enough to manage some disagreement and we had the same core values.

One incident that illustrates this is that after the North Korean Taepodong missile crisis, the Japanese decided they needed their own intelligence satellites. They thought they hadn’t been given enough intelligence by the Americans -- although they probably had and certain agencies
just didn’t share it widely. When the idea was proposed, it seemed that a lot of the Japanese press expected the U.S. to step in and object, saying that Japan didn’t need its own intelligence satellites. They seemed geared up to complain that the U.S. wouldn’t give them the technology needed to build them. That didn’t happen.

At State and DOD, we argued that the USG should support Japan. They needed the satellites for their own self-image and sense of pride, and to make them feel they were full partners in the relationship. It would have been harmful to insist on what was in fact the case, that the intelligence we were giving them was better than what they could get by building their own satellites; also it would have been a lot cheaper. So they went forward with a plan to build four satellites at enormous expense.

We had to negotiate an export control agreement to allow them to get some sophisticated technology. I worked with very good people in the Political Military Bureau who took the lead. It required a lot of interagency coordination because there were other satellite related negotiations going on with European countries and people were concerned that the Japan talks would set a precedent about the type of technology we’d share. They finally built the satellites at great expense. Ironically, I’ve have been told that commercial satellite companies now produce photos as good or better than what they’re getting from their own satellites, but nonetheless it was important that they be able to do it as a “normal nation.”

Q: How did the Clinton administration view the whole relationship with Japan at that time?

WHITE: They had come into office very hard-line on the trade issues which at the beginning of the ‘90s were considerably more in the American public eye than they were toward the end of the ‘90s. They had tried for a few agreements that had numerical targets but the Japanese resisted mightily and it caused a lot of bad feeling between officials of both countries. By the late ‘90s the concern was much more that Japan’s economy was floundering. The economic giant that was going to take over the U.S. was now an enormous drag on Asia. Their growth rates were so low they were not providing any stimulus to growth in other countries and that became much more a focus. The attention shifted in a sense from what USTR could do on specific trade issues to more concern about what Treasury and U.S. businesses could do to urge Japan to get its economic house in order. The banking system had huge amounts of non-performing loans, but it was very difficult to get them to change because there’s nothing more domestic than monetary and economic policy. The U.S. government’s policy at that time was to promote deregulation of various sectors in hopes that a more free market economy, while painful at first, would give Japan a chance to restructure and use its assets more effectively and efficiently.

Q: Were we pushing for something that today is very much in the forefront, deregulating the postal bank, which is the main banking engine in Japan?

WHITE: Postal reform has been Prime Minister Koizumi’s main issue. At the time I was on the desk we were not pushing hard to deregulate it completely because that seemed politically unrealistic. What we were looking at then was the insurance sector, which was related to the postal system. Because they were such a big government organization they were able to offer various kinds of insurance and banking services very cheaply, while we were trying to create
opportunities for American companies to compete. There were wider macroeconomic implications, as postal savings money deposited by households in low interest accounts was used to support favored industries and channeled to quasi-governmental organizations. Koizumi later worked to break the system, which is having considerable political impact within the LDP and the way they have operated.

Q: Also on the economic side, they’ve got two things which seem to be rather inhibiting. One is the role of women in society. The other one is the low fertility rate and the lack of interest in immigration to augment the work force. Do you see any changes in these things?

WHITE: Well, they’re connected. It’s interesting that the most traditional societies where women do tend to stay at home like Italy and Japan have the lowest fertility rates of developed countries. Places where women are welcomed in the work force and well supported like the Scandinavian countries and to some degree the U.S. have much higher fertility rates. So, Japan’s situation indicates that stay-at-home wives are not having many children; it may be because it is expensive to educate children, there is little childcare, and husbands are still expected to work long hours. People have been talking for years about the underutilization of educated Japanese women. You would think that would change because they are having a shortage of labor. Instead of bringing in immigrants, which they aren’t comfortable with, why don’t they just give support to women?

The role of women is changing certainly in areas where they can be more independent as doctors, as small business people, as academics. Those women are doing much better than they are in the corporate world, not surprisingly. The fertility rate would probably improve if women find that there is child care support and support for aging parents and better social services. Exhorting people to have children as a civic duty doesn’t help.

It will be interesting to see how that develops because more and more young Japanese women just aren’t interested in getting married. We see many bright women marrying foreigners or going to work for foreign companies. The embassy has certainly benefited from that, as some of the best FSNs are women who prefer the embassy to Japanese institutions.

Q: When you were on the Japanese desk at this time did you find that in a way you were in competition with the China desk? In other words, with China being a newly emerging power, a huge power, and Japan suffering from economic troubles, did you have fight for attention from higher levels?

WHITE: Certainly the Japanese felt that way. They used the phrase “Japan passing” throughout the Clinton administration, claiming that Washington wasn’t paying much attention to them compared to China. I often responded that it was because China was a problem. If you have a problem, you’re naturally going to spend more time working the problem as opposed spending time with the good, steady, strong ally.

It sometimes was difficult to set up meeting with high level Japanese and senior USG officials. For example there is a regular meeting called the Two plus Two which we try to have annually. The four are the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense plus the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Japanese Defense Agency. We usually tried to do it in New York at
the time of the UN General Assembly. You could always be sure of having the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State there, but coordinating schedules for all four people was always very difficult. Some of the Secretaries of Defense felt it was just a formality and really not that interesting.

Q: During the 2000 election campaign, when Gore and Bush were running against each other, did China come up as an issue?

WHITE: I don’t think Asian issues were very important, though it seemed to be a fashion for one side to accuse the other of being soft on China, then when a new group comes to office they realize that reality is tougher to deal with than rhetoric. There was only one mention of Japan in the debates as far as we could tell, so Japan was clearly not a campaign issue.

Q. Did you get involved in the transition with the Clinton and Bush administrations?

WHITE: Yes, but in a fairly routine way. We prepared paper and briefed people. There was a fairly smooth transition at the NSC because they had a strong Japan person, Michael Green, who headed the Asia office. He’d been an academic as well as in and out of government and he knew all the players. The new Deputy Secretary was Richard Armitage who had a strong Japan background and many personal contacts. He had spent a lot of time in Japan both in his navy days, as a consultant and at DOD. He understood Japan and he understood the importance of meeting and greeting visiting delegations. Access to the 7th floor by visiting delegations of Japanese politicians, for example, really improved because Rich was always ready to sit down and talk to them -- he knew most of them anyway. The Japanese were very pleased. They saw quite a shift from what they saw as benign neglect under the Clinton administration to having strong connections in the administration. Jim Kelly who became Assistant Secretary of State had been at the East West Center in Hawaii and also was very familiar with Japan and Japan issues. In that sense you had real experts coming in and we certainly didn’t need to do a lot of briefing up on the major issues, particularly in the security area.

One of the final things I did was to work with Howard Baker to prepare for his ambassadorial hearings. He was part of a long time of really superb ambassadors that Japan has had.

Q: We’ve made a real point of putting our top people there.

WHITE: Yes. They include Mike Mansfield, Mike Armacost, Walter Mondale and Tom Foley. Ambassador Foley, who had been Speaker of the House, served in the last years of the Clinton Administration. The Japanese were pleased that he was followed by Howard Baker from the Senate side, who was well respected by Democrats and Republicans. He was an excellent nominee. As his wife was Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, most people thought either one of them would have been a superb ambassador. His confirmation hearing was like a coronation. The room was filled and all the senators on the committee were there. Nobody had any questions. They basically just wanted to make their speech saying what a great choice Howard Baker was. It was fun to watch and a nice change from so many difficult ambassadorial hearings.

Q: Had he had much experience dealing with Japan from the Senate side?
WHITE: He had a reasonably good background in Japan without being an Asia expert. He traveled there and had a lot of contact with Japanese politicians and business people. He had been serving as a lawyer in Washington since leaving the Senate so he was well aware of the key issues and the concerns of Washington.

Q: When did you leave the desk?


End of reader