### THE NETHERLANDS

#### COUNTRY READER

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MARY SEYMOUR OLMSTED
Commercial Officer
Amsterdam (1946-1949)

Ambassador Mary Seymour Olmsted was born in Duluth, Minnesota and raised in Florida. She received a bachelor’s degree in economics from Mount Holyoke College and received a master’s degree from Columbia University. Ambassador Olmsted’s Foreign Service career included positions in India, Iceland, Austria, The Netherlands, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Papua New Guinea. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on three occasions in 1992.

Q: And then you moved on to Amsterdam, and you were there from '46 to '49.
OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: What were you doing in Amsterdam?
OLMSTED: Initially I was sent to the commercial section, and I was doing reporting on the recovery of the consular district following the war. That was very interesting, I enjoyed it.

Q: What was the economic situation that you were dealing with then?
OLMSTED: Well, it was still very much a wartime situation. I arrived there in November of 1946, and the winter that was just beginning then, that harsh winter after the end of the war.

Q: Really was one of the worst winters Europe has had, and certainly right at the wrong time.

OLMSTED: Absolutely, and there was a great deal of suffering and deprivation. Even when they were able to get coal, they couldn't transport it around because it usually went by canal barge and the canals froze. Therefore the city was cold and the people were hungry, food was still very strictly rationed. And, even though I had extra rations, it still wasn't very luxurious eating.
Q: How did you do your work? I mean things were still falling apart, how does one work as an economic reporting officer in a situation like that?

OLMSTED: Well, one goes out and talks to the Dutch people. I didn't speak very much Dutch, but English was very widely spoken, and I'd talk to them about their problems and what they were doing. There were some government statistics coming out, not a lot but there were some and, of course, I used those to buttress what I was reporting. I managed to travel around a fair amount to see for myself what was going on. I made one trip to Arnhem and Nijmegen close to the German border, the areas that had been terribly, terribly bombed.

Q: This is the place where they had a major battle in an attempt to by-pass the German army and failed.

OLMSTED: Yes, and you could see the rubble for miles and miles piled up along the road as you approached either of those places that slowly were rebuilding. And, of course, I heard a lot of war stories and the terrible times they had there.

Q: Did you get a feel for how the Dutch were responding to the rebuilding, and the reconstruction? One thinks of them as being a commercially motivated nation. Did they seem to be pulling up faster than maybe some of the others because of this?

OLMSTED: It was very hard for me to make comparison with other countries because I simply wasn't doing that much traveling, and when I was I was just a tourist. The Dutch not only had the problem of rebuilding, and reconstruction after the war, they also had the problem of the Netherlands East Indies. And as the situation was falling apart in the East Indies, refugees were coming back in very considerable numbers. And, the Dutch had both the psychological problem of adjusting to the loss of the Indies, and also the physical and financial problem of absorbing these refugees, and this added to their problems.

Q: The Marshall Plan had not yet geared up, or did it?

OLMSTED: It did a little bit later, but the at the time I went there it wasn't even thought of.

Q: We weren't doing much, we were sort of unhappy about what was happening in the Dutch East Indies, and we didn't really want to support the Dutch. What did the Dutch feel about Americans?

OLMSTED: The Dutch felt the Americans were doing far too much in supporting the Indonesians. Initially, when I went there, the Dutch felt terribly grateful to us but I could feel the sentiments changing somewhat as I stayed, and this situation developed.

Q: How were relations with the embassy? Here's Amsterdam that's really is a major city, and The Hague off to one side, and economically, of course, it was even probably more so. Were there any problems with the economic section at the embassy?
OLMSTED: I don't remember any very serious problems. We kept in fairly close contact. You
could get to The Hague from Amsterdam in an hour, and we did a certain amount of running
back and forth to discuss things, and of course we had the telephones, so we were in pretty close
contact. The man who was the Economic Counselor in The Hague had earlier served in
Amsterdam, so he had a certain number of contacts which probably made things a little bit
smoother than they might have been otherwise.

Q: I would think there would be a built in problem there in the system by having the capital off to
one side.

OLMSTED: I think it probably became more of a problem later on, but at the time I was there
there was so much reporting that needed to be done, so many things that we needed to know, that
there wasn't the competition that might have developed later on.

Q: With the reporting, did you have the feeling that these reports were being read and used?
Because obviously these later were going to be cranked into the Marshall Plan, all this
reporting. But at the time what was your sense for the use of these economic reports.

OLMSTED: I did not particularly have the feeling that they were being ignored. Now, I won't
say that I felt that the Department was waiting breathlessly for each one that arrived. I thought
they were found useful.

Q: It was a period when things had changed so much that we had to rebuild our entire
information stockpile, knowledge of what was happening in Europe. Just to get a feel again, did
you find that because things were changing, a sort of an exciting time, or was it fun?

OLMSTED: In some ways it was depressing. There was real suffering there and we got little
tastes of it. Our Consulate General building was taken over from the Germans -- it had been the
German headquarters in Amsterdam -- and it was quite cold, and our local employees would
come to work and you see they were just shivering, and every time the wind changed half of
them would be out with colds or the flu. In a small office like that, you get to know the locals
pretty well, and we felt their suffering and that did have an impact on us.

Q: Did you get any feel, at that time, about the changing attitude toward the Soviet Union?
Obviously in Amsterdam this wasn’t your main fix, but also within the Foreign Service. Were
people beginning to say, the enemy is not dead, but we have a new one?

OLMSTED: I got it a little bit in Amsterdam, but much more in Reykjavik. It was in Reykjavik
where I felt the change.

SLATOR CLAY BLACKISTON, JR.
Political Officer
Amsterdam (1947-1949)
Slator Clay Blackiston, Jr. was born in Richmond, Virginia in 1918. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Virginia. During World War II, he was an aviator in the U.S. Navy. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. Mr. Blackiston’s career included positions in Amsterdam, Stuttgart, Port-au-Prince, Jerusalem, Tunis, Jeddah, Cairo, Amman, and Calcutta. He was a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations in 1971. Mr. Blackiston was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: We can move on. Your first post was Amsterdam; in the aftermath of the war?

BLACKISTON: It was in 1947. You probably know that the winter of 1946-1947 was devastating in Europe; it was bitterly cold. The canals froze, they were using coal and they couldn't move coal on the canals. People suffered. I was not there then, but I got there in the summer of 1947 which was quite a contrast to the winter. It was superb, I don't think it rained from June to September, which is very unusual in The Netherlands. I remember the Dutch people were, in those days, terribly appreciative of Americans. I remember we got off the ship, the Veendam, in Rotterdam, we had one child and we had to change his diaper. My wife knocked on a door someplace in Rotterdam and asked if she could come in and change the diaper. They said fine; they were just as nice as could be. I had a car on the ship, and we drove on to Amsterdam. I was doing the usual vice-consular functions there. Among other people there were Tom McElhinney, Mary Olmsted, and Rufus Smith, who died last year. Tom was Ambassador to Ghana and head of UNRWA, the relief agency for Palestine refugees. Mary was Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, and Rufus was Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, but he was very much involved in Canadian affairs, he was sort of the Canadian expert.

Q: You had a political appointee, Herman Baruch, as Ambassador. What was he like?

BLACKISTON: Well he was really something. We were invited down to the residence on a number of occasions. He had...shall I tell this?

Q: Yes. Please.

BLACKISTON: He had met on the ship coming to the Netherlands a Dutch lady whose name was French, DeChaussee, as I recall, who also had a husband. She was installed as Baruch's hostess, his wife had died. The residence in The Hague was a townhouse, rather attractive. I remember one thing he asked our Consul General to do, and I got the job. Baruch wanted some caviar. There was a Soviet Mission in Amsterdam, and I was assigned to go over there and see whoever was in charge about buying caviar, prices, etc. So this was all set up; I went in, big pictures of Stalin, great big hallway, quite an impressive place. I got the prices of the caviar and conveyed it to the Ambassador.

Later the Consul in Rotterdam, Herb Olds, told me that he was being pressed for a visa for Madam DeChaussee. Baruch wanted to bring her to the United States but he didn't want to marry her at that stage, so he was putting the pressure on the Consul in Rotterdam to issue Madam DeChaussee, who was a gardener, a skilled agricultural visa, a preference category, and Olds was withstanding this pressure. But I am not sure whether he finally succumbed, because she did
come to the United States and they did get married; then, of course, he passed away someplace along the line. Baruch was a very distinguished looking guy with a big beard, a sort of Van Dyke. He was Bernard Baruch's brother, and he was a doctor. How he got that job I don't quite know but there he was.

HERMAN KLEINE
Marshall Plan Mission to the Netherlands
The Hague (1949)

_Herman Kleine was born in New York, New York on March 6, 1920. He received a bachelor’s degree in teaching economics and accounting from the New York State Teacher’s College and a master’s degree in economics in 1942. Mr. Kleine’s career included positions in the Netherlands, Ethiopia, Brazil, and Washington, DC. He retired from AID in 1976. Mr. Kleine was interviewed by W. Haven North on February 14, 1996._

KLEINE: Waiting for a call, yes.

So, I decided that I would take the chance and resign from Worcester Poly. If it didn't work out, I figured I would use the year to finish my dissertation.

I discussed the matter with Dr. Schwieger, the department head, who said, "That's very good for you, but what am I supposed to do with classes about to begin in two weeks?" He agreed to let me go if I found a suitable replacement. That was a bit of a task. I spoke with Dr. Maxwell at Clark. He worked out an arrangement for a graduate student to assist at Worcester Tech. He with an extra load for another faculty member, Ernie Phelps, would cover my classes.

Particularly helpful was the president of the school, Admiral Cluverius, who called me in and said, "Look, we like what you've been doing at Tech, and we're happy you have this opportunity, but you may find that you don't like it as much as you think. Why don't you take a leave of absence rather then resigning?"

I readily accepted. There's a footnote. I later met a Wat Tyler Cluverius IV, who was a Foreign Service Officer and who became an ambassador. He was a grandson of the admiral.

I took the leave of absence and went back to Hempstead. Early in October a letter came from Washington advising me of my appointment and to get in touch with them as quickly as possible.

So, I went to Washington for a series of meetings and orientation. It was an exciting time. In those days we went by ship in first class. I was booked on the New Amsterdam, a real fine transatlantic liner.

Very early in November I arrived in Rotterdam, and proceeded to the Hague, where the mission was headquartered. That was the beginning.
Q: What was the position you were assigned to?

KLEINE: The specific position was Assistant Finance Officer, which has nothing to do with the finances of the controller operations, but dealt with Dutch public finance. It was as an economist working as an assistant to Weir Brown, who had been detailed from the Treasury Department to be the Finance Officer for the mission. He was authorized one assistant. The mission was a small mission, as they all were in those days. I doubt if it exceeded more than twenty five or thirty people, including local staff. We had a mission director, deputy mission director, a program officer, finance officer, industry officer, agricultural officer, productivity officer and a controller and that was about it, plus some secretaries and local staff.

Q: What was the mission? What was its function?

KLEINE: Under the Marshall Plan there was a process of allocating funds to each of the participating countries. The process involved primarily study of the balance of payments and the balance of payments gaps. What kind of changes were necessary to import the level of goods necessary to get the economy rolling? If I recall, the level for the Netherlands during the four years we participated was about $250 million a year.

In addition to that program, which was where the large funds were, there was also a productivity program. It was the forerunner of the Technical Assistance Program. That was primarily a program of organizing groups from industry and agriculture, people to go to the States for short term tours to see what has been going on in the various fields, and come back and try to put what they could into operation. That was a society which had been out of action, so to speak, for five years or so. So, we had a productivity director.

Q: What was your function?

KLEINE: I worked some on the analysis of the balance of payments initially, but mostly on programs for releases of counterpart. Each Marshall Plan dollar that was made available for import had to yield the equivalent in local currency from the sale of the commodities. The goods were not given to the economy, but they were sold into the economy. That yielded proceeds, ninety percent of which were to be programmed for the use of the country, ten percent was to be used by the U.S. for its purposes, including administrative costs of the mission in country, as well as to buy strategic materials for U.S. stockpiles.

Q: That got you involved in negotiating with the government?

KLEINE: Yes, a great deal with the government. As time passed the mission finance office and the program office were merged. Weir Brown became the program and finance officer. I continued as his assistant finance officer. Bart Harvey was the assistant program officer. When Weir left (he was only on detail from Treasury for a fixed period) I was promoted to finance officer and Bart to program officer. At a certain point when Bart left, I became the mission Finance and Program Officer.
By the end of 1952, the program in Holland began to wind down. The Dutch economy was in strong recovery. We were in negotiations for the final year. The process of negotiation began with the presentation and analysis of data from the government. The mission made recommendation to Washington that the U.S. contribution for the final year should be about $15 million dollars. It so happened that I was sent to Paris for a meeting on the Dutch program with the people in Paris that were involved. In Paris was a fellow who was on detail from the Federal Reserve Bank, whom I got to know quite well. We were having a get together and were talking about the balance of payments to the Netherlands. He mentioned that there had been a sharp increase in gold and dollar reserves held at the Federal Reserve Bank in the account of the Netherlands.

This was startling news. There were 90 million dollars that we hadn't heard of or rather, had not been informed about by the Dutch Government.

Q: Which would have reduced the level of assistance.

KLEINE: It would have wiped it out. So I went back to The Hague and told the mission director. He recognized that whatever case there was for the final 15 million was gone. He went to the Ambassador. At that time, the agency was called the Economic Cooperation Administration, headed by Paul Hoffman. It was completely separate from State Department, but it had a loose relationship with the Embassy in country but there was no direct line of authority.

Q: It was not under the Ambassador?

KLEINE: No, it was not under the Ambassador in those days.

Q: It is now.

KLEINE: Exactly. It was always expected that we would keep the Ambassador informed. At that time the Embassies were, however, extraneous to the interests of the host government. They were mainly interested in the Marshall Plan and its resources. So their relationships were very strong and deep with the Marshall Plan people and very marginal with the Embassy people. That created a lot of hostility and there was that hostility between the Ambassador and the Mission Director Hunter.

The Ambassador wanted very much for that final contribution to be made to the Dutch Government. We insisted that there wasn't any basis for it. Finally, he agreed. The negotiations focused on trying to convince the Dutch that it would be to their interest to voluntarily renounce further aid. They did and received a lot of favorable publicity in the papers, including The New York Times, as the first country that voluntarily renounced further assistance under the Marshall Plan.

Q: Were you a part of that decision?

KLEINE: Very much so. The New York Times reported that the termination resulted from financial sleuthing. So, that was the end of the infusion of Marshall Plan funds to Holland.
Q: Did you ever find out where that 90 million dollars came from?

KLEINE: Yes, I did. I should have mentioned that it came from their relationships with Indonesia. Indonesia had been part of the Dutch empire. It was just about at that time that disengagement was well underway, but they were still getting large financial transfers.

Before I left Holland, we had the first case of U.S. responding officially to a foreign natural disaster. In February of '53 there was a big storm in the North Atlantic and the dikes gave way with tremendous inundation of large areas. Half of the Netherlands is below sea level, protected by an enormous complex of dikes. When that occurred, we reported on this to Washington. We started a campaign to get foodstuffs, medicines and clothing to help the victims. Much assistance arrived and was distributed. It was extremely well received by the Dutch population.

Q: That was financed by the Marshall Plan?

KLEINE: Yes. A little later I got a query from Washington inquiring whether I'd be interested in becoming the French Desk officer in Washington. I accepted.

Q: How did you enjoy your time in the Netherlands?

KLEINE: It was a wonderful time. The Netherlands was almost in the heart of Western Europe. On the weekends, you can go to Paris, to Brussels, about an hour flight to London. I used to do a lot of traveling and had the opportunity to deal with the foreign representatives. We were very close. It was a small mission and it was a small country. I got to see practically all there is to see in the Netherlands and a good deal of Western Europe.

Q: How were your relations with Dutch officials and the people?

KLEINE: The people were very friendly and very warm to us. It was a totally positive experience and relationship.

Q: You had to make a lot of trips, I suppose, to Paris to the Overseas Headquarters.

KLEINE: Yes, and I had to go to the annual regional reviews and from time to time for special meetings. During the period, I also went back to the States. One of the advantages of being located in The Hague, was the presence of the International Court of Justice. It was just around the corner from where I lived. I mentioned earlier that I had been working on a draft of my doctoral dissertation when I joined the Marshall Plan. I was able to finish a draft in my spare time. After I sent in the final draft to Clark University, the defense of the dissertation was scheduled. I went back on personal leave in May of '51 and defended the dissertation successfully. I received my degree and returned to the Netherlands.

Q: These annual reviews what were they like? What were they about?

KLEINE: They were meetings at which representatives of the Mission, the Regional Office and
Washington headquarters participated. Mission representatives reviewed the country economic situation and made program proposals. The meetings resulted in recommendations that were ultimately considered in the final reviews by and in Washington headquarters.

Q: These were just within the American group?

KLEINE: Yes. They were personnel of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Q: This was all within the ECA structure.

KLEINE: Yes.

Q: But the European countries didn't get involved in any of these negotiations? It was always one on one?

KLEINE: One on one.

Q: Was there any sort of collaborative effort of the Europeans on the allocations?

KLEINE: Not directly. Among the European countries, were the movements toward working together. The very first was Benelux, which was made up of the Netherlands and Belgium. From the beginning, the policy of the U.S. was to encourage such collaborations. From that came the Coal-Steel Community and ultimately the very complex European systems which exist today. Later came the formation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Development Assistance Committees (DAC) which really became operational after the Marshall Plan period, which gave further impulse to the Europeans to work together on the economic side.

Q: But there was no comparable effort on the European side to deal with this dividing up of the resources, the ECA's assistance?

KLEINE: I don't remember anything other than the bilateral relationships.

Q: So they weren't reviewing each others' situations at all?

KLEINE: Such reviews became an integral part of the OECD and DAC. You had these annual reviews on these country performance, including the U.S. The reviews covered performance in and giving to the developing countries as well.

Q: At these meetings all of the country representatives were there participating together in one big forum or did you each have to go separately?

KLEINE: It was one on one. We'd go to Paris for "our" country review.

Q: You had your time.
KLEINE: We had nothing to do with what was being proposed for the others, such as Italy or France.

Q: What was your impression of Harriman, chairing the processions?

KLEINE: Well, he was very aloof, a big picture man, who wasn't very interested in the details. He wanted to make sure that the money came in and went out. He was very much an advocate for the program, but he left the operations to his lieutenants.

There were some very distinguished people who participated. I was impressed with the caliber of people all through the whole process, at mission and regional levels. People came in for the short term, not for a career. It was not meant to be a career; everything was temporary. As I've said a number of times, the career that I ultimately had was a career that had not previously existed. Growing up to be an international development officer just didn't exist at the time. It was very exciting to be a part in the development of this type of a career. From what is going on now in terms of new appropriations, it may be that the possibility of having a career in international development is being sharply curtailed.

Q: Were there any particular issues that stood out during this time, economic issues or policy issues where it became contentious with the countries?

KLEINE: Holland was in sync with U.S. interests and vice versa all the way through. There weren't any major differences that I can think of. There was considerable harmony.

Q: The allocation of counterpart was mainly attributions to items in the budget, but one issue was the issue of controlling so much local currency. Was it an inflation issue?

KLEINE: We recognized the danger of inflationary pressures. We supported the use of counterpart on a neutral basis. In fact, we sort of worked out a system whereby the funds were attributed to budgetary items such as education and agriculture.

Q: In the agricultural sector, were there are some ideas or input from the U.S.?

KLEINE: We worked very hard in building the export industry in flowers. The export of tulip bulbs became a very important part of their export trade.

In general it was a happy period in the relationship. Everything went well. We were able to say we were the first country to get off the dole. It was very good PR for the Dutch.

Q: So, you went from there back to the States. You were showing me this picture that you bought while you were there.

KLEINE: When I arrived in the Netherlands, and for some time after, housing was very tight. There was a housing authority called "Husvesting," which got involved in finding and allocating space for foreigners as they came into the Netherlands.
At one point, I learned that space would be available in a house which was under the housing authority. It was owned by a man who had controlled the flour industry in the Netherlands during WWI, and, as a result, he became a very, very wealthy man. His home was palatial. He was in his ‘80s and had no immediate family. He was told that he had to have somebody live in his house because of the space that it had. I was it for more than two years.

Q: *The house, it was in Amsterdam?*

KLEINE: It was in The Hague, where the U.S. mission was headquartered, about two miles away. At that stage, he was barely getting out. He spent most of his time in his suite of rooms on the second floor. He had two full time housekeepers. I was the other occupant and had the run of the place. And he wouldn't accept money from me. My meals were served as in a restaurant three times a day. While I was still there, he passed away. His family, wanting to leave things as they were for awhile, asked if I would stay on, which I very willingly did. They were very pleased and I was very pleased. In his will, he left that painting for me because at one time I mentioned what a lovely painting -- it is this one here.

Q: *Oh, I see -- this one*

KLEINE: It’s a painting of a flower market in Brussels. The family was so pleased with my staying on and overseeing the two maids that they asked if there was a painting in the house that I would like to have, other than this one or that one that the other members of the family wanted -- and I said there was. They’d let me have it at the state valuation which was minimal. That’s how I got that landscape painting of Dordrecht.

Q: *The painter’s name was?*

KLEINE: Kosters. It’s been a joy to have, but because of its size, it’s certainly a problem in moving around.

Q: *Oh yes, very difficult. What a wonderful story. Great!*

KLEINE: When I was single I'd never occupied an apartment of my own; it was a fraternity house at school or the faculty house at Clark or in the faculty advisor's room in the dorm at Worcester Tech. I decided that I'd better get some furniture before transferring to Washington. So the last couple weeks in Holland, I picked up a number of items -- all through the house, I still have furniture that I purchased at that time.

Q: *Well, let's continue; you had more to talk about on your experience in Holland?*

KLEINE: You asked what were our objectives during the four years or so that we were in the Netherlands. One was to provide additional resources, financial resources, with which they could purchase more imports than they would be able to do with their own depleted resources. Second was to build up the human capital which had been depleted through the war experience in a couple of ways. There was, of course, the actual loss of manpower, but there was also the loss in technical and professional skills while under the domination of the Nazis. And for that need the
productivity program was devised, which dealt primarily with short-term study teams. They were organized to go two ways. There were teams, for example, in the coal industry, the steel industry, in agriculture, etc. There were also labor productivity teams. The selection of team members was coordinated between the mission and its counterpart organization in the Dutch Government. And they came to the States where complex, intensive programs were organized for them, all around the country, to see what was going on in this country that might give them ideas in their particular fields. And we also organized short-term productivity teams of U.S. leaders of these industries to go to the Netherlands and to make recommendations. This kind of program was carried out in all of the cooperating countries.

Q: And was it successful?

KLEINE: Clearley. Overwhelmingly successful. And, we could talk, perhaps later on, after we do the whole experience, as to why we were so successful.

Q: We'll do that when we get to your other assignments.

KLEINE: Right. What happened later was an experience in an entirely different set of circumstances, i.e., the Third World or the Developing World.

Q: Right.

KLEINE: Related to these programs, we had the objective of encouraging, nudging the Netherlands leaders, as well as the leaders of other countries, to broaden their markets. I mentioned earlier that the Benelux economic union was an early example, then there developed the coal-steel community, followed by the whole European Union. And it took, it wasn't something everybody agreed to, either on the U.S. side or on the European side right away. There were strong protectionist interests. In fact, they still exist, especially in agriculture.

I have some random thoughts about my Dutch experience. One, I was very impressed with the facility that the Dutch had in the use of many languages. It was because Holland, such a small country, recognized that to survive they had to deal with the rest of the world. And so, in the schools, the study of languages other than Dutch was everywhere -- French, German, English. I don't think any one American that I met spoke Dutch, either when they arrived or after being there, but there was no problem in communication because they all spoke English, particularly those that we dealt with in government. When I arrived in '49, which was not long after the war, the anti-German feeling in Holland ran very deep. If one had a knowledge of German, which I did, one learned quickly not to use it, as it would cool the atmosphere. German and Dutch are very similar languages. I remember hearing that one way in which the Dutch were able always to tell who was German was in the pronunciation and use of a test word, the name of the beach resort just outside of the Hague, Schevininger. Germans for some reason, cannot pronounce "Sch..."

The Dutch were very hard working and were very warm, though somewhat formal, in relationship with us in the U.S. establishment. There is considerable use of professional and academic titles. For example, there is a special title for those who have finished their studies for
a doctorate but have not yet completed their dissertation. The title is "Doctorandus," and it was used in correspondence. And if you were a Doctorandus, you would sign after your name DRS. If you had two doctorates, you would use "Doctor, Doctor." If you were a university professor and had a doctorate, you would be called “Professor Doctor.” And that appeared on all correspondence. One can't talk about Hague without mentioning the weather and it wasn't good. The sight of sunlight was a very rare commodity. The few days of the year when the sun came out were so precious, the whole population would turn out on the streets. There were very long and dismal winters, late springs, and short summers. We used to joke that everyone in the Netherlands used to walk tilting to the south, the photosynthesis effect.

I learned that dealing with the press, particularly the U.S. press, took some skill and understanding in order to avoid getting into difficulty. In those days in Holland, there were two or three full-time representatives of the U.S. media. Their news source was primarily the Embassy and the AID people, as well as the USIA. They developed as close relations as they could with them, but I learned that they were always on the job. One had to be extremely careful in social situations to avoid talking about and making official information available. If one were not careful, one would hear information on radio, or read in the press, in TIME Magazine, or in the New York Times that shouldn't have been made public. This was their living and they were always working. Some started out as “stringers” whose total income depended on what they could produce that was actually used.

Q: Sure. Right.

KLEINE: Dan Schorr, now the senior correspondent with PBS, started as a stringer in Holland. He was a stringer for CBS at the time and also a freelance reporter for the New York Times. And he would use whatever information he could gather. And I was a close friend of his at the time, but I always had to make sure that if he asked questions about my work to learn the phrase “No Comment.”

Q: Interesting.

KLEINE: Strangely, I've learned since that it is difficult for people to remember that they can use “No comment” if they don't want to talk to the media.

Also, I thought it might be of interest to mention that, while the Marshall Plan is considered now by most to have been a highly successful program, it was during the time a hotly debated subject in the Congress year after year. It was not wholeheartedly supported by any means. And the uncertainty of our appropriations contributed to making our work more difficult in terms of planning and programming

Q: Can you remember any of the major issues that were on Congress’ mind?

KLEINE: First of all, isolationism has never been very far beneath the surface in this country. That was true before the war, and it came back not long after the war stopped. On the Hill, year after year, there were very, very heated discussions and debates on aid and appropriations, and questions of “when are we getting out?” One specific issue related to sources of procurement for
the use of appropriated dollars. Initially there was no problem. The goods that were to be bought were essentially only available in this country. There was no threat from the buildup of the economies of Western Europe at the time. As reconstruction took hold, alternative, more economic sources of procurement were available in Europe and the Far East. It's also interesting that in the first years of U.S. foreign assistance, assistance was made available on a grant basis rather than through loans as it did when it shifted to areas outside of Europe.

Q: You mentioned that earlier.

KLEINE: But the belief in those early years was that the economies were in such bad repair, one would have to be considered an idiot to think that they would be able to repay. You will recall, just before the Marshall Plan was announced there was a very bad winter in Europe - there was a real threat of starvation and economic collapse.

Q: That's right.

KLEINE: They didn't have enough coal for heating or for power. I arrived just before Thanksgiving, and that was quite a Thanksgiving. I had three Thanksgiving dinners that day. One was by the U.S. Ambassador, Herman Baruch, another by the Mission Director, and the third by people from the New York Times stationed in The Hague. The wife, Flora Lewis, was a columnist who wrote for many years from Europe. Are you familiar with her name?

Q: Yes.

KLEINE: Her husband - his name escapes me - came back to the States and became President of New York Times at one point. And she wasn't a writer at that time, but later did a lot of writing out of Paris.

Q: Interesting.

KLEINE: Shortly after that Thanksgiving, some friends were driving to Bremen for the Christmas weekend. He was with the U.S. Lines, the shipping firm, and Bremen was the main center for the company. He was driving and a friend from the Embassy invited me to go along. It was an opportunity to see part of Germany and was shortly after the war. I had nothing planned, I went along. It was dismal; it was sad to see the scale of destruction. In Bremen there was little lighting, only an occasional light. And every once in awhile, you'd see a scrawny little tree with a couple of little Christmas lights - it was a mess. Yet from that time, the end of 1949, to the time I left, the recovery process was evident not only in Holland, but every place I visited in Western Europe. You could see it happening right before your eyes.

Q: But there was an element of a certain amount of pessimism of whether they would ever really recover from what you were commenting on earlier.

KLEINE: There was indeed a question of how well the program would succeed. There were more questions about some of the countries than others.
Q: I see.

KLEINE: The most problematic were France and Italy. Mostly for political reasons, internal political reasons. There was a bitter struggle between the right and the left. The Communists were very strong in both countries. The U.S. role during that time in Italy was pivotal in keeping the country from going Communist.

WILLIAM C. TRIMBLE
Political Counselor
The Hague (1951-1954)

Ambassador William C. Trimble was born in Baltimore, Maryland. He entered the Foreign Service in 1931. His career included positions in Seville, Buenos Aires, Estonia, Paris, Mexico City, London, the Hague, Rio de Janeiro, and Bonn, and an ambassadorship to Cambodia. Ambassador Trimble was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: I'm looking at The Hague

TRIMBLE: The Hague. That's right. They wanted to send me as political counselor in Germany, and Mr. McCloy said, "No. Because as long as this other man is here, I'm going to back him up as long as I can." The post at The Hague was open. So they moved me to The Hague instead. That was it.

Q: You served there from '51 to '54. You were quite fortunate to have two career ambassadors who knew their way around.

TRIMBLE: Selden Chapin and Doc Matthews.

Q: Yes. So that must have been a real good --

TRIMBLE: Yes, and I had some very good friends. I was Chargé quite often there. And we enjoyed The Hague. It was so different. There was hardship in London. It really was a hardship post then.

Q: That's what I was going to say. Really, it was a very difficult --

TRIMBLE: Oh, it was hard.

Q: It lasted for so long compared to other places, which seems to be because there were internal reasons for it.

TRIMBLE: The British economy was in bad shape, really. Holland had suffered, yes, but nothing like England. And they had a more liberal trade policy than the English, so living
conditions were much better.

Q: What were the main issues you had to deal with in Holland in this '51 to '54?

TRIMBLE: The EDF, European Defense Force. And we got the Dutch to go along with us. It was hard work.

Q: Could you explain for the record what that was?

TRIMBLE: It was a plan for a European army composed of troops of all the western nations -- it would be a European army rather than a French army or British army or -- the Germans were not in it -- or a Belgium army or Dutch army, but one unified command and officers interchangeable and soldiers interchangeable. It was a very good project. The French didn't like it, and it fell through. But the Dutch agreed. Doug MacArthur was working on the Paris end, and I on the Dutch. We got them to go along, and then the French torpedoed the proposal.

Q: Actually, the French had initially proposed it.

TRIMBLE: Yes, I know they did.

Q: As more a ploy and we picked it up.

TRIMBLE: I worked on that. Then there was, of course, work on the successor to the Marshall Plan (now called AID but I don't remember what it was called in those days as it's name was changed so often) which helped their economy. And the Dutch were -- I like the Dutch. They're stubborn.

Q: Decolonization must have -- I mean, this is a very difficult matter for the Dutch to deal with. And, of course, we weren't, in their eyes, playing a very helpful role. This must have occupied a lot of your time, didn't it?

TRIMBLE: It did. They resented the fact that we -- President Roosevelt, felt very much against colonialism, British, French colonies, etc. The British were giving up theirs. For reasons of their own, they had to, particularly India and Pakistan. But the French wanted to hold on. That's when they had the North African affair.

And the Dutch were weak. They couldn't hold Indonesia. After all, it had been taken over by the Japanese. But they wanted it back, so did many of the -- I forgot the name of the group in Indonesia -- who had fought for the Dutch and were very pro-Dutch, and were Christians, as I recall, rather than Moslems. Many of them had fled to Holland, where they were living in pretty bad conditions in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The Dutch had the feeling of nationalism, "This is ours!" So that was difficult.

But they didn't resent us as much, because actually Indonesia had gotten its independence before I got there. Still, many Dutch felt that we should have helped them more. But that wasn't much of a problem. I liked the Dutch. And we tried to get them to take more and more part in NATO.
Q: They have always been really rather begrudging, haven't they? On NATO they have not been wholeheartedly into it often for their own internal politics, have they?

TRIMBLE: That happened afterwards. But when I was there, no, because they still remembered the German occupation, which was pretty hard on them.

Q: Well, now, this is the period when we're getting the Germans cranked up, back in, trying to integrate Western Germany into the Atlantic Alliance. Was this a problem for you dealing with the Dutch? Because the Dutch and the Germans have not been the best of neighbors, let's say.

TRIMBLE: That's true. But when I was there, they did establish with Western Germany, whatever you want to call it, West Germany, diplomatic relations, and there was a German ambassador. There was a very strong feeling against the Germans, but they realized that with safeguards, always safeguards --

Q: We're talking now in 1990 when the problem is still with us. Because West and East Germany appear to be coming together, and everybody is looking for safeguards.

TRIMBLE: They were after safeguards. West Germany coming into NATO and so forth. But they finally were realistic enough. I think leaders were, especially the Prime Minister (Dr. Drees) who was a Labor Party man, as well as the Foreign Minister, Stikker. There were pretty good people, able people, in the government. We did have some difficulties, but not many. There was a feeling, again, that we were taking over their cultural heritage, and we were not nearly as cultured as they, and that we were trying, through our aid program, to take over their educational system. We weren't, but there was always that type of thing.

Q: You went to sort of a real change of scene, back to the Western Hemisphere. You went to Rio de Janeiro. In those days, of course, our Embassy was in Rio. And you were there from '54 to '56. How did that assignment come about?

TRIMBLE: This is a little tricky. A Foreign Service friend of mine who was older than I, had gone to the same school -- I didn't know him at school -- was the child of American parents living in Brazil, and spoke perfect Brazilian. He had been sent to Brazil as Minister-Counselor having served there before. He had a Spanish wife. And he got along extremely well with the Brazilians because he had this background, really. Then President Eisenhower sent down as ambassador a man named Mr. Kemper.

Q: James S. Kemper.

TRIMBLE: James S. Kemper.

Q: What was his background?

TRIMBLE: Mr. Kemper was a big insurance executive, Kemper Insurance of Chicago, a little man, very pompous, very domineering. He had been Treasurer of the Republican National
Committee, so they sent him down to Brazil as ambassador. He resented the fact that his Minister-Counselor knew the Brazilians! He didn't have any foreign language, and he didn't get along himself with them because he was tough, rude and arrogant. So at a staff meeting he said to the Minister-Counselor: "You're fired!", and relieved him of all duties. And then the Department took months to transfer the DCM.

I was then in Holland and Doc Matthews had just arrived as ambassador on Christmas Day --

Q: This would be?

TRIMBLE: '54. Christmas Day afternoon. We were having drinks together and he said, "I just got a message from the Department saying they want to transfer you to Rio, but I need you here so I've drafted a reply that you don't want to go."

I said, "No, you can't say that. I will go anywhere they want me to go." Which we have to do in the Foreign Service.

So he changed it. I can see his point of view. I knew the Dutch, and he didn't. So, anyhow, he insisted that I remain for a couple of months, which I did. Then I had home leave which I hadn't had for three or four years. Mr. Kemper was angry that I hadn't arrived sooner. I finally got there just around early July of 1954.

MORTON A. BACH
Economic Officer
The Hague (1952-1955)

Morton Bach was born in New York City in 1904. He worked with the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps from 1942, and afterwards was posted in Bern, Seoul, The Hague, Vienna, Luxembourg and Brussels. Mr. Bach was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: You were in the Hague from when to when?

BACH: I was there for three and a half years, until 1955.

Q: What was your job there?

BACH: I was an economic officer. In the early days, I received a phone call from the minister, Bill Trimble. Our ambassador was Seldin Chapin. When I went in to pay my courtesy call, with a smile on his face, he said, "I know what you've been through. Now this is a tranquil post. I trust you will keep it that way." Eight months later, the dikes broke. Coming back to Bill Trimble, he called me in and said, "Mort, I would like you to handle military assistance." I said, "What about so and so?" He said, "Oh, he left casually last night." McCarthy period. So, in addition to the financial-economic, I handled the military assistance program. We had a sizeable MAAG
mission there at that time. I will say that during that period we were in the Hague, the genuine appreciation demonstrated by the Dutch people for what we had done with the Marshall Plan was indeed evident and genuine. During the time I was there, I accompanied the minister of commerce, Teppama, on a visit to the United States, which I had arranged. It went down well with the Dutch that one of their cabinet members had been invited. I did have excellent relations with them. Van Lennep, the finance minister, later went on to be the head of the OECD.

It was an interesting period. There were stories that you always heard about the Dutch. Again, we made friends and were invited into homes, as we were back in Switzerland. There was one family. He was one of the major Dutch tulip growers who did business, of course, with the United States. His father in law was, I think, from Belgium. There would always be a humorous interplay. The father in law told a story that right after the inauguration of the $55 one week vacation tours for the U.S. Army in Switzerland, so many of them came over to the Benelux countries as well. He was on a bus one day. Standing in the back of the bus were three GIs in uniform. They were wary of, were these people on the bus on our side or otherwise, as he described it. So he finally said to one of these fellows, "Where do you come from?" This lad said, "Some town in Iowa," whereupon he said, "By the way, is Clark's Flower Shop still on the corner of 19th and Main?" This kid's mouth dropped.

Q: In the Netherlands, the economy must have been very interesting. These were world-class entrepreneurs just getting their feet back on the ground.

BACH: It was. My major emphasis was on the financial-economic side, knowing that they were bank-oriented. There was no rationing. They were very proud of their dairy products and were opening up markets with the rest of the market, predominantly the U.S.

Q: What happened when the dikes went?

BACH: That's an interesting story. They were very fortunate. It didn’t come as far as the Hague or Amsterdam. The ocean came in and destroyed a large segment of agricultural land. The Dutch rolled up their sleeves subsequently and installed new dikes and the like, which made them very comfortable that they would not have to be subjected again. What was interesting to me was that our usual bad luck of being in posts where there wasn’t housing available and we were stuck in a hotel, a couple of American Red Cross officials around. They were also in the hotel. We had cocktails together and so forth. One of these officials said one evening, "I am so proud of our American people, but they have one failing that creates a headache for us. Whenever there is a tragedy such as this, they go up to the attic and they dig out Junior's ripped football jersey and all sorts of things and we have a terrible time segregating what is usable and that bulk of stuff which they insist on. Of course, we can't publicize 'Don't do it,' but we can on general terms say the type of things that are needed."

Q: I was consul general in Naples in 1980 when they had a bad earthquake and we had the same problem. By that time in Italy, 1980, there was really no need for clothes. The Italians themselves were producing so much. We were getting used ball gowns and the whole thing. We were trying to turn it off. It gave people the feeling of doing something, but it costs a lot of money and it was wasted.
You were at the embassy until when?

BACH: 1955.

Q: Did you get involved with Dutch refugees from Indonesia?

BACH: There was a substantial influx. It made for additional merchandise in the antique shops.

Q: You left there in 1955. Where did you go then?

C. GRAY BREAMEconomic OfficerAmsterdam (1954-1956)

Born in Indiana in 1914, C. Gray Bream graduated from Midland College in 1936 and earned an MA and a PhD from the University of Chicago. Bream joined the Foreign Service in 1941 and served overseas in Nova Scotia, Greenland, Sweden, Pakistan, Amsterdam and Germany. He also worked in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research as well as the Arms Control and Development Agency. Bream was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

Q: When were you in Amsterdam?


Q: This is sort of back in your old "playground." What were you doing in Amsterdam?

BREAM: Nothing. I was an economic officer at the consulate general. The embassy was only 40 miles away and they had a big economic section, so what the hell. [laughter]

Q: What does one do when one does nothing?

BREAM: I had a very interesting experience there. There was a GATT conference in Geneva, Switzerland, for three months and I was detailed there to the Scandinavian section of the GATT Conference.

Q: But it wasn't a very fruitful period for you?

BREAM: No it wasn't. Strike that, don't include that.

Q: Well, we'll see how this goes. But I think it's fair to say that it's always been a peculiar thing when you've got the Hague and Amsterdam sitting on top of each other and there is obviously reasons for Amsterdam having a very active consular post.
BREAM: Already then - this is a serious question, you had the Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, in a country not much bigger than Fairfax County. They had excellent transportation, you'd get on a train and in 15 minutes you'd be in Amsterdam and be in the Hague. But Amsterdam was historically one of the first Foreign Service posts, and it came up constantly, after I left there, that we should maintain Amsterdam because otherwise it would injure the pride of the Dutch if we closed it.

DAVID DEAN
Consular Officer
Rotterdam (1954-1956)

David Dean was born in New York City in 1925 and graduated from Harvard. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951. He served in numerous posts including Kuala Lumpur, Rotterdam, Taichung, Hong Kong and Taipei. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: You were in Rotterdam from when to when?

DEAN: I was in Rotterdam from the summer of 1954 to the end of '56. At that time, there was a special act passed by Congress to give additional immigration visas to Holland. I was in the consular section.

Q: The Refugee Relief Act.

DEAN: Yes, the Refugee Relief Act. They wanted to include Holland because some of the dykes had burst earlier, making many farm families homeless.

Q: I think even more so because the ranking Republican member of the judicial committee was from Holland, Michigan.

DEAN: That's right, so they included Holland, particularly farmers whose lands had been inundated by the sea. Most of those farmers had regained their feet and started working again, and yet they felt that there was more opportunity in the U.S. They really didn't seem to be like the refugees who were coming from different parts of eastern Europe and who were genuinely refugees. We always had somewhat of a tussle with the Department over who was eligible. It was a good job because it was very busy. I don't know how many immigrant visas we issued, but it was in the thousands, and it was interesting helping people go to the States. I liked that. They were all good people essentially.

Q: Just about the same time I was a refugee relief officer in Frankfort, Germany, and we would get the same publications from Immigration and the State Department, advisory opinions. We were dealing with people who had escaped from eastern Europe, yet we were reading these things about the Dutch and what the hell did they need, or the Italians. The point was these were
both politically important areas.

DEAN: Well, of course we understood this, and we did ask for advisory opinions and we did realize that the Dutch didn't seem to be in the same category as the refugees from eastern Europe. It caused a lot of back and forth traffic and heartburn. Also neither the law nor the way it was administered were clear. If they had cleared up the whole thing from the very beginning, then it would have been easier for everybody administering it. It does seem to me, (I found this later when I was in Taipei,) that a lot of visa officers, the young consular officers, frequently are given a very short time to decide whether the applicant, especially for visitors visas, is going to return to his/her home or if a student is going to return to his/her home. How can you judge in twenty seconds whether that is false or true. It strikes me that is a very serious flaw in administering our consular work.

Q: We have an almost impossible law.

DEAN: It is foolish.

Q: What were your impressions of the Dutch in this period?

DEAN: Well, my wife and I met and married in Holland. She was the secretary to Consul General Paul Reveley. I met Mary when I arrived, and a year or so later, we got married. She had gone to high school in the States at St. Mary's Female Seminary in Maryland with a couple of Dutch girls whose families had sent them over to the U.S. during the war. In Holland, once you become friendly with a Dutch family, you are friendly forever, and they were extremely nice people, so she had entree into many different households. I, of course, tagged along, so I got to know them too, and they are our good friends to this very day. They are people whom we liked and with whom we have shared sadness and joy. I liked the Dutch very much indeed.

Q: Rotterdam was the major port.

DEAN: Yes, with the exception of a few buildings, it had been almost completely destroyed by the Nazis during the war. The Germans deliberately tried to raze the whole city. At that time there wasn't any place to live in Rotterdam. I lived in the Hague above an antique shop on one of the narrow winding streets in the old part of the city. The only problem was that I had the key to the front door, and I had to go through the antique shop to get up to this little garret. I was always afraid that I would jostle against some priceless vase or something else and create a catastrophe. Also the garret wasn't heated; I had to break the ice in the basin in the morning! Anyway, it was unique. We got to know people who lived in other types of accommodations. We had very good friends, the Van Huey Smiths, who lived in a windmill which they had converted into a really beautiful home with a little moat around it.

Q: Who was the Ambassador then? Do you remember?

DEAN: Matthews I think, Freeman Matthews.

Q: So he was a professional. In those days I take it there weren't any particular problems with
the Dutch were there?

DEAN: No, I think Holland is one of the few countries that have always appreciated the Marshall Plan aid they received at the end of WWII and have always been grateful for it, so we didn't have any serious problems of any type of which I was aware. I don't think there were any. We always seemed to coexist in a very amicable way.

Q: I was wondering if the Dutch were in a way a bit resentful of how the United States by this time were beginning to make themselves more friendly and include the Germans in things because of the Cold War and all that. I was wondering if for the Dutch, at least for that generation, it was not forgive and forget.

DEAN: It was not just that. Of course, they felt antagonistic toward the Germans. But they were firm U.S. allies in the Cold War. However, some of my friends had extensive holdings in Indonesia, and the U.S. was pressing very hard for the Dutch to withdraw from Indonesia. One of my friends was the former Dutch Governor General of the Indies. He died shortly thereafter. His widow was always very interested in what was happening there, and so were many others. Many of Mary's schoolgirl friend’s families had business interests of one type or another in Indonesia, so they were following developments very carefully. I never found in my personal relations with the Dutch that they were antagonistic to me or Mary or to the U.S.

Q: Well, with your experience in Malaysia, what were you picking up about the situation in Indonesia?

DEAN: Just what we knew at the time, that the Indonesians under Sukarno were trying to drive the Dutch out. They had given the Dutch a really hard time when they had taken over the concentration camps that the Japanese had abandoned. The Indonesian nationalists treated the Dutch harshly to get revenge for earlier Dutch control. That phase had passed over, but there were still a lot of problems. We at that time were beginning to furnish arms to the Indonesian insurgents, who were trying to displace Sukarno. It wasn't until sometime later, I think, that we stopped arms supply, after the Bandong Conference. You see, I wasn't in Holland until after that conference; it was a fait accompli. My friends were bemoaning a sense of the past, their lost lifestyle, their lost empire, their lost businesses. But they seemed to be reasonably prosperous. It wasn't as though they had been driven into bankruptcy or anything like that.

Q: You left Holland in ’56.

DEAN: Yes, just at the end of ’56. Our son Ken was born in Rotterdam shortly before we left for home leave at Christmas time of ’56.
Born in Indiana in 1925, Ambassador Nancy Ostrander received her BA from Butler University. She was posted in Santiago de Cuba, Havana, The Hague, Antwerp, Mexico City and Kingston and was the Ambassador to Suriname. On May 14, 1986 she was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin.

OSTRANDER: Right. I didn't ever really like living in The Hague, although I think The Hague is the most beautiful city I have ever lived in. It was an interesting period of time, not all that long after the war. Housing was very scarce and difficult to come by, and so many rules and regulations about where you could live and where you couldn't live, and having to go through something called a *Huisvesting*

*Huisvesting* was housing control. The Dutch had all kinds of rules and regulations. If they were married and their ages totaled sixty, they could have a bathroom, this sort of thing; otherwise they shared. Housing was really that bad, because of the bombing. The Dutch, as usual, were keeping very tight control: "This year we build businesses, and next year we build apartments." If you were moving from one district of the city to another, you had to have their permission to move. If you paid over a certain amount for rent, you could get pretty good housing. You didn't have to go through the *huisvesting*, because the Dutch could not afford it, so therefore it wasn't really necessary. We all had roommates for that reason, because we could pool our allowances and get around the business.

**Q:** How did you choose your roommate, or was it chosen for you?

OSTRANDER: She had arrived just about the same time I had and was looking for a place to live. She was looking at the same time I was, which is what was important.

But the job was a humdinger. There hadn't been anybody in it for six months, and no document had been filed for six months. I didn't know anything about code rooms. They had lost so many people because it was really a chaotic situation. The European Community was trying to get going at that time, and France kept voting everything down. The cables flew like nobody's business, so it was really twenty-four-hours-a-day work with very few people. People would quit from burnout, and then, of course, I walked in and I didn't know a code room from a kitchen stove. I lost two code clerks when I arrived, because they said, "We can't go through this anymore!"

**Q:** Were you responsible for all cables getting out?

OSTRANDER: In and out. But what I tried to do, knowing that what they really didn't need was a code clerk; what they needed was a good manager, was to set about trying to bring order out of the chaos. And I did that. That's what I had done in Havana, too, and I think I set up a reputation at that point of, "If you've really got a mess, Nancy can untangle it."

**Q:** "Send in Ostrander."

OSTRANDER: Exactly. As a matter of fact, I didn't mind that at all. I liked being able to point at progress. I have never known a more grateful ambassador than "Doc" Matthews, who was our
number-one ambassador at the time, H. Freeman "Doc." He was always known as "Doc." He's still alive, I think. He's 100 or something. There was one grateful ambassador, because when he needed documents, he needed them now and he needed them right now, and suddenly he was able to find them and get them. I did set up a good system, and I got a good team together, and we really got it moving. We did a fine job.

Q: How many people did you have under you?

OSTRANDER: [Laughter] Very few when I first started. I had three employees: Earl, Pearl, and Berle. I remember that. And a few others. Let's see. Probably three code clerks and a pouch clerk and maybe three file clerks, but we had a lot more positions than that. I think at full staffing it was double that, if not even larger.

Q: This doubled while you were there?

OSTRANDER: Yes.

Q: That's a very big section.

OSTRANDER: It was. The Hague was a big post, and we had a lot of military. We were the central communications center for that. That is, all of the mail came in to us and went out through us, and we had to get it to the right military groups, which then distributed it. We were pretty central.

Q: But you didn't really enjoy it, you say?

OSTRANDER: Oh, it was twenty-four-hours-a-day work. We had the telexes going to Djakarta through the middle of our section, going out to Indonesia, because that break hadn't been really--the Dutch were no longer in Indonesia, but the old system hadn't really been gotten away from. It was just an impossible job, and the Dutch were not open to us. It was hard to make friends among the Dutch, because we were very low level. They were snobs about the whole thing. Let's face it. I can imagine the ones at the foreign office weren't going to make points because they knew some lowly file clerk. But because of that, we were pretty well isolated and we made such good friends among ourselves that, here it is, thirty-five years later, the group from The Hague are all still very close and write and talk to each other. I probably made more longer term friends in that group than in any other place I've ever been.

Q: Hardship brings people together, doesn't it?

OSTRANDER: I suppose so, and we did get so we enjoyed each other's company a lot, and we traveled a lot when we could get away, together, and got to see Europe.

Q: This experience that you people had was not common to, say, the political officers or the economic officers?

OSTRANDER: Oh, no, I don't think so. I was still only about an FSS-9 by this time.
Q: And your being Dutch-American didn’t help?

OSTRANDER: It might have made it worse. I don't think anybody would have ever even taken
the trouble to find out. Of course, among the locals in the embassy, no trouble at all, but outside
it was awfully difficult.

Q: They’re a very dour people, aren't they?

OSTRANDER: They are what I’d always been taught the British were, as far as being reserved.
And the British, I don't think are, but the Dutch certainly were.

Q: They'd taken a pasting, too, hadn't they, during the war? All of Europe had. The French were
very dour at this time, too.

OSTRANDER: I was there until 1957, so ’54 to ’57.

WILLIAM B. DUNHAM
Political Section Chief
The Hague (1956-1960)

Upon entering the Department of State in 1942, William B. Dunham assumed
postings in Spain, Portugal, Brussels, and Switzerland. Mr. Dunham prepared
memoirs entitled “How Did You Get Here from There?” in 1996.

DUNHAM: The next chapter began with an assignment, in the summer of 1956, as chief of the
political section in The Hague. Doc Matthews was the ambassador, probably why I was lucky
enough to get there after our years together in EUR, and many of the other Embassy officers had
also served with him in the past. It was a very traditional, pre-war-diplomatic-corps-government-
officials oriented enterprise.

We were a bit out of character, very music-oriented, four kids ages 4-11, dog and cat and,
happily, my wife's mother, known to all as Mamie, short, spare, lively, endearing - and fully
capable of dealing with anything that came down the pike. She and Frances Willis' mother would
have made a formidable pair and would surely have had a grand time together. Almost two of a
kind, but not quite - they were each unique, as were their daughters. The Swiss had found that
out and the Dutch would soon find it out, too.

Arrival in La Havre on the S.S. United States and arrival in The Hague by car - a new Ford fresh
off the ship - were both marked by singularly unwelcome unplesantries. We drove up the coast
50 kilometers, stopping at the seaside town of Fecamp for lunch. We then continued on, but only
just beyond the town when the engine threw a rod - all eight of them - with much gnashing and
grinding. So it was back to town and the Ford garage, a one car affair. It would be two or more
days to get the parts from Paris and fix the engine the mechanic assured me. So a very dowdy,
French seaside hotel became our encampment ... top floor, lots of room, but low ceilings, tiny dormers, and lumpy beds. The cat was in disarray and promptly wet one of them. I called Doc, after some travail with the French phone system, and just as he answered the operator said, "Your three minutes are up." If you know anything about that phone system you know to expect such novelties; I thought I had made a firm deal with the operator to let the call run on as necessary. I then tried to make the same deal with the next operator and, for reasons unknown, it worked the second time. I told Doc we were stuck, but would be along in the coming bye and bye, God and a French mechanic willing.

In The Hague a house went with the job and we all looked forward to more inviting surroundings. But never underestimate the bureaucracy even when it's very small. Everyone concerned knew from early spring that our caravan would be arriving in August. But, no matter, the house was not ready and we could enjoy a nice seaside inn at the famous nearby beach, Scheveningen, on the North Sea. And so it was except for the "nice." It was a dreary small space on a beach that was cold and windy where the sand blew in under the doors and around the windows. The incompetence of the man handling the project was revealed, for all the good that did us; we just sat on the beach until the job was completed weeks behind schedule.

The location, the neighborhood, and the house were all very comfortable if a bit tony. The place was a woodsly *cul de sac*, in town, but very close to the beach where we had been buried, holed up, whatever. The Germans had used it as a headquarters during the war and a large bunker jutted out of the ground at the end of our street. Beyond that lay what had been a golf course and then the vast dunes that stretched out to the sea. The Germans had used the golf course as a site for launching some of their V-2 rockets at England. There were a number of elegant houses, ours and the one next door sat well back from the street in amongst the trees. The house was designed by the famous Dutch architect, Rietvelt - two stories, somewhat boxy, lots of glass expanses, and very white. The grounds were surrounded by a wrought iron fence with brick posts that held gates at the end of the driveway. Unlike most Dutch houses, it had lots of light - and people walking through the woods had a largely unobstructed view in winter of the frolicking inside.

Ted, at four when we moved in, was our window and door on the immediate Dutch community. He went off to Dutch kindergarten, soon was speaking Dutch, and (until we finally learned how) did all the talking in those early days with the tradesmen who came to the door daily, delivering bread, milk, butter and eggs, fish, and flowers off their three-wheeled bicycle carts. Meantime, we all stood about watching and listening to this small, stalwart four-year old do his stuff, handling our business with sundry Dutchmen who towered over him. Later on, James, who was six when we arrived, introduced us to the hospital that was quite nearby. One day he sat in one of those folding lawn chairs made of metal tubes. It wasn't entirely set and when he sat down his finger was caught as one of the joints closed and it severed the tip of the finger. So we wrapped up the finger and the dangling tip, dashed over to the hospital, and met up with a young doctor who immediately went to work. After he had attached the tip to the finger, he said it would be awhile before we would know the result, but he felt very encouraged that all would be well. And indeed it was - perfect. A few years later I was glad to have had this introduction to that fine hospital - I had to go there, too, for an emergency appendectomy.

Our several neighbors apparently found us a good risk after they saw our kids coming and going,
playing in the yard and woods. The couple next door, van Bosse, invited us for a champagne brunch one Sunday. They owned sugar and tea plantations in Indonesia and were thus a bit in limbo in view of the worsening Dutch-Indonesian relations that had reverted almost to daggers drawn once again, this time over West New Guinea which the Dutch still held. They were very friendly and helpful neighbors and we became good friends. One summer when we were away on vacation, their goose Josephine also joined in, doing us an invaluable good-turn by driving burglars away when they tried to break into our house. Her racket woke up their son, and others in the neighborhood, and the burglars never had a chance. The Romans certainly knew what they were doing when they used those birds as watch dogs.

Next, just around the corner, were two families who became good friends also, Heerings and Leembreukens. Mr. Heering once explained to me that it was not usual for Dutch people to make friendships so quickly. Holland is small and very crowded; people value their privacy; and consequently they take a long time when deciding how close a relationship they want to commit to. Thus, he said, a year or two or even more may pass before they move from Mijnheer Heering to just Heering. An even longer time is required before they will move to first names. The whole process can take as long as ten years. Happily for us, the process moved much more quickly as one incident illustrates. When the US finally got its first satellite, Echo, up and orbiting the Earth, and it first passed over The Hague in the middle of the night, these families woke us up so we could see it and join them as they celebrated this new phenomenon with cheers and shouting back and forth in the woods in a manner singularly uncharacteristic of this very reserved little community!

Pieter Heering was a wine-lover and something of an expert on the subject. He and others in The Hague were regular purchasers from, and well advised by, a French wine dealer from Bordeaux who came to town several times a year. It was after one such visit that their adviser reported on another wine expert, a Britisher. This man, a prominent British sports writer, had figured out a system for identifying and even predicting the best wine years. Simple: The best cricket years in the UK are the best wine years in France. QED.

As we were gradually settling in, meeting people through the many requisite calls, receptions, and dinner parties - and were eyed in return - Doc Matthews told us there was one subject the Embassy's staff were forbidden to discuss: a recent uproar that had engulfed the royal family and caused a Cabinet crisis. The Queen had brought in a German faith healer, Gret Hoffman, at a certain moment in the hope that she could help the youngest princess, adversely affected before birth when her mother had come down with German measles. As time went on, there were those, including Prince Bernhard the Queen's consort, who thought the relationship between the two women was growing much too close, to the point that Gret Hoffman was having undue influence with the Queen that extended beyond her work with the princess. Eventually, these suspicions became public, the Prince was known to be pressing for Hoffman's removal, officials who agreed with the Prince began to become involved, and finally the crisis exploded, Hoffman was sent packing, but so were some members of the Cabinet, chief among them Wim Beyen, the Foreign Minister.

In our rounds, we had met the Grande Maitresse, the Baroness van Tuyll, and Charlotte and her mother had had opportunities to talk with her, a charming lady and the Queen's close confidante.
Then one day she invited Charlotte and Mamie to tea. That was certainly unexpected and I was eager to get home that evening to hear what had happened. Turns out that the Baroness told them the whole story about Gret Hoffman, the uproar, and the political crisis that ensued! That evening Charlotte typed out a full report and I took it in next morning and gave to Doc. He was utterly astonished, took over the report, and sent it in to the Department, how and to whom I never knew.

I was intrigued by this incident and the way the Dutch had arranged to pass on to Washington this story as the powers that be wished to have it known. We were new to the scene in The Hague, a known quantity at the Foreign Ministry well before we arrived, of course, and evidently also known to other interested parties. The Baroness had undoubtedly checked us out herself, was satisfied by her talks with Charlotte, and had picked her as the person through whom to pass on the story.

In time, Charlotte's chamber music evenings brought a couple of other unexpected connections. Through the Baroness van Tuyl' s assistant we met Wim and Gretel Beyen. He was an amateur cellist and, being "at liberty" as a result of the Hoffman imbroglio, had time and was eager to play. She promptly invited him to come over to play sonatas. These occasions became more frequent, we soon became good friends, and our relationship was further benefitted one evening when we were tardy getting back from some required affair or another. When the Beyens arrived, Nancy and Warren, our two eldest, had taken over, carried on a sprightly conversation and Nancy had plied the Beyens with some of the wonderful confections she was forever making - cookies, cakes, and candies. Afterwards Gretel Beyen said she would hire Nancy any day as her dessert chef!

Wim Beyen, genial and cheerful, was a man of good humor and his own quiet charisma. A veteran diplomat of long experience, a key figure as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Dutch Government, he was also a tough-minded man of principle who had not hesitated to put his career at risk when he believed the Hoffman situation was threatening the best interests of the country. (Nor did so valuable a man remain in limbo for long. By the early '60s he was the Dutch Ambassador in Paris.) We seldom had occasion to talk "business," but obviously a way had been provided so we could do so had it proved necessary. Still I learned a great deal about the Dutch governmental system and its parties, current goings-on, and interesting parts of Holland from our informal chats during those evenings.

Wim also furnished another such avenue of communication when he called one evening to ask if they could bring a friend along. We were pleased he asked, of course, but were absolutely stunned when we found put who the friend was: the other one of the Queen's close friends and confidantes, Miss Tellegan, who was the leader of the Dutch underground during WW II! After the war, she was active in political matters on the Queen's behalf, but exclusively behind the scenes. So much so that she was not seen by outsiders and never appeared on the social circuit. She was lovely company and sat curled up on our sofa enjoying the music. It was impossible to picture this tiny, gentle lady posing as a bedridden invalid in the attic of a farm house out in the center of the country, hidden away from the Germans, yet there directing the efforts of the Dutch underground throughout the war. A redoubtable and justly famous Dutch heroine.
One evening Wim had an amusing encounter at the Kurhaus where they always stayed in summer when they came to The Hague. A famous hotel on the beach at Scheveningen, its fine concert hall one of the sites for the Holland Festival that ran all summer, a place where many of their friends stayed, it was also, fortuitously, just minutes away from our house. On this particular evening, they were leaving to come over for more music-making, Wim was carrying his cello, and whom should they meet on the elevator but Isaac Stern who was going downstairs to play a concert. They had met on other occasions and Stern said, laughing, "Oh, I see you aren't coming to my recital." Wim replied, "Sorry, but no, not this time. I'm off to play chamber music tonight." Stern sighed and remarked, "I wish I were going with you."

As the second Eisenhower administration began, there was the usual round of changes in top officials at home and abroad, including the ambassador in The Hague. Doc Matthews was replaced by Philip Young, one of Eisenhower's old friends, his aide when he was president of Columbia University, and an official in his first administration. Andy Ronhovde, as the Deputy Chief of Mission, had the job of assisting and advising the new ambassador as he assumed his duties. I never did know what went on, but the word crept out that things were not going so well and that at times Andy was anything but as helpful as he should have been. Before long, Andy left and we proceeded without a DCM for some time.

Phil Young, a tall, pipe-smoking, friendly, quick-witted, genial, and highly intelligent man, made it his business to get to know everyone from top to bottom throughout the embassy. He ran things in such a way that we all knew what was going on, and not just in our own sections, and thus the staff ultimately formed a congenial team. It all happened gradually and subtly and was furthered by the social occasions the Youngs arranged that included everyone on the staff from time to time. In the absence of a DCM, the ambassador worked closely with section chiefs and held regular staff meetings where he could learn what was going on in each of the various sections and where he could get information, ideas, and suggestions from us. Before long he had built a happy ship indeed.

The worsening relations between the Dutch and Indonesians over West New Guinea was the one political issue of major concern, not least because the US was being pressured by each side to support its cause. We dealt with this issue at a number of levels. The ambassador, of course, dealt with the Foreign Minister, Josef Luns, and other top officials; my colleague, Bill Sullivan, kept up with the Labor Party on this and other matters as did I with the Catholic Party, those being the two major political groups. At the same time, I worked with the official in the Foreign Ministry responsible for UN affairs, Theo Bot, who was also the point man on the New Guinea question. Eventually, he was made number two in the Interior Ministry with exclusive responsibility for the New Guinea issue, thus emphasizing that the Dutch regarded this as an internal matter.

As a very traditional, pre-war-diplomatic-corps-government-officials oriented enterprise, Embassy The Hague fitted hand-in-glove with the local scene. Here was the standard, unrelieved, tight, diplomatic social scene with all the requisite daily crush of luncheons, formal calls, receptions, dinner parties, week-end tennis and golf. And on the Dutch side there were the usual grand affairs for the Diplomatic Corps, for example the Queen's annual reception for all the diplomats and her dinner for the ambassadors.
The "big do for the dips." took place in the late morning at De Dam, the immense Royal Palace in Amsterdam. It is a highly formal affair requiring the most formal dress - white tie/tails and decorations (for those who have them, namely, all but Americans) and the most formal gowns for the ladies. It was a bizarre sight to see all of us in The Hague leaving our homes at ten in the morning in these ceremonious rigs. At the palace, a cold, dank venue, we were served hot consomme to cope with the chill as we circulated around to keep the circulation going. Thus did we endeavor to cope with the chill. In due course we were rounded up in our own embassy groups, ranked in proper order, and hence suitably organized to meet the Queen, Juliana, a friendly and cordial lady. We could then hie ourselves back to The Hague and "get comfortable" again.

The annual dinner for the ambassadors was an equally formal affair, only they got to sit down part of the time. Our man was seated next to the wife of the new Ambassador from Indonesia. This being a first for her, Phil sought to be helpful by describing the "drill" to her - what would be happening step by step. She was a great talker and he had some doubt whether she was taking in the various bits of information and warnings he was trying to pass on. His doubts were confirmed when the fish course came along. He had emphasized that as soon as the Queen had finished a course all the plates for that course would immediately be removed from the table regardless of whether a person had finished or not. So best to eat first and talk second. And, lo, so it was - and the Indonesian Ambassadors wife ended up going without the fish course. QED!

"Representation" was not something the Youngs (nor we) liked to tackle exclusively in the traditional, formal ways of yore. As "protocol officer," I worked closely with Faith Young and she could put on as fine a formal black tie or white tie dinner as anyone. But these were restricted to occasions when such formality was inescapable. Otherwise she devised dinner parties where multiple small tables were used, thus mixing up the guests in much more interesting and enjoyable ways than formal dinners. And it made seating much more flexible, no one could figure out the rankings other than the way the top dogs were seated. Altogether, when people in this rather formal capital got used to these "different" ways of doing things, they thoroughly enjoyed them.

Evening affairs took different forms, too. Square dancing was a new and soon popular event. The ambassador was an excellent and experienced "caller" who was also an effective teacher for the uninitiated. After clearing out the two large reception rooms at the Residence, there was plenty of space for Virginia reels and waltzing as well. One evening the ranking guest, the Luxembourg Ambassador, was having such a good time he didn't want to leave when the time came. Charlotte was dancing with him and suggested that he go home briefly - he only lived a few doors way - and then come back. He demurred saying that his wife was away and what would she think when the servants told her that he had come home about 11:00 one evening and then shortly left again! As an alternative, he and Charlotte left and went for a walk and then came back, thus allowing the ambassador to enjoy the dancing until much later.

On another occasion, things didn't go so smoothly. The Youngs had a set of English handbells and it seemed that using them at the Christmas receptions would be fun and an attractive switch from the usual standard reception routine. There wasn't much music available for the bells so we decided to make some on big sheets that could be set up on a rack where all could see the notes.
The Air Attache made a saving suggestion: better color-code the notes because most people don't read music. It was a tedious job, but in the end a big collection of Christmas music emerged. We organized volunteers from the staff into a group of bell-ringers, had practice sessions until we were reasonably proficient and could start off the bell ringing at the Christmas receptions.

That was all well enough until the addiction bell-ringing is known to cause surfaced at the first of the receptions and created something of an incident. The Embassy ringers started off as planned. After a few numbers they then handed over their bells to some of the guests. They had their turn and then handed the bells on to others. At a certain moment, however, some formidable Baronesses decided they wanted to continue and they hogged their bells to the point that others were being left out. Finally, there was a spate of muttering until eventually an official from the Foreign Ministry and his wife left in a huff.

As for us, we did an occasional reception as well as dinners at times for officials and diplomats and the like, the local "social" whirl. But mostly we did our "representation" through musical events at home, at the Young's, and occasionally around the country. For a brief period we had a DCM from "the old school" who thought receptions and dinner parties for officialdom were the only acceptable forms and disapproved highly of what we were doing (and what the Youngs were doing, too, I have no doubt - what with square dancing, bell-ringing, informal concerts). His rigid ways spread into the office also, of course, and soon became enough of a disruption that the ambassador noticed that his team was beginning to fray. The DCM was picking on the junior officers, secretaries, Marine Guards, local employees, chauffeurs, and morale was falling. When Phil asked some of us about all this, the answer was, "Oh, it's just a lot of little things." Wrong answer. Phil's response was, "Little things! They're often what make the most trouble." At that point, he went into action and quickly discovered the damage that had been wrought; soon the DCM was gone and we rapidly reverted to the status quo ante. I learned a lot working for Phil Young and he became another extraordinary mentor and good friend.

Phil Young and Foreign Minister Josef Luns, also a large, tall man, got on very well together. Luns tended to be a bit bigger than life, speaking rather louder than necessary, given to comments that were a bit exaggerated as many politicians are inclined to do, but withal very savvy, deft, experienced and intelligent. The two of them carried the load on US-Dutch relations with respect to the New Guinea issue. It was a pretty bumpy ride sometimes because the Dutch wanted our unreserved support and we were non-committal, caught as we were between requirements of our relations with Indonesia as well as with The Netherlands. I remember one time when we were not committing to a vote they wanted at the UN on this controversy, Luns was trumpeting around about the US as "Our Unfair Lady," that new musical then at its zenith.

These tense times were leavened, though, by lighter moments. One such was the visit of a US nuclear submarine. Except for the Dutch, the Europeans weren't ready to welcome such a visit which made a good bit more of the call at Rotterdam than would otherwise have been the case. It was capped by Luns' visit to the submarine at Phil Young's invitation. He asked me to go along; I didn't get to go down into the sub, though, as it turned out. We picked Luns up at his house. It was a typical ugly, wet Dutch winter day and Luns, who had a back problem, came out with a heavy, plaid blanket wrapped around his waist, railing loudly about stinkende weer! His humor was to be much improved, shortly, when Phil told him, as we drove down to Rotterdam, about a
dream he had that anticipated this visit. Phil seemed to have these helpful bits of nonsense at hand when needed. This time it was a tale about the two of them aboard ship where they had taken refuge in a tarp-covered lifeboat so they could talk in confidence. What was so secret was a riddle: why was Eve called the nuclear-powered girl? Give Up? Because she was Adam-powered!” Well, anyway, it caught Luns’ fancy and he laughed his head off. It did the job, though, and the visit went off in fine style.

Before I left Washington there had been talk about building a new Embassy in The Hague. But it was more than talk when we were told the plans were drawn and the building would soon be started. The famous architect, Marcel Breuer, had designed it and it was no surprise to find that it was a splendid place. The building is on a corner with the USIA library facing a main street that runs along beside de Hofvijver, a small, rectangular, artificial lake; on the other side of the lake are the Mauritshuis, with its famous art collection, and the buildings where the First Chamber of the States General (Parliament) meets. The front of the Embassy faces a park-like area which includes, among the buildings bordering it, the Queen's small, in-town palace just a few doors down from the Embassy; The Royale, a famous European restaurant; and a fine, medium-sized concert hall well-suited for chamber music where Charlotte once played with a local chamber orchestra.

The Embassy building is, of course, very contemporary in appearance and well designed inside for its many purposes. On the second floor at the front of the building are located the offices of the Ambassador and the DCM. Across the hall facing the back of the building are the offices of the Political Section. And, handily enough, the private door of the ambassador's office is directly across the hall. (It helped us rescue Clark Gable from a crowd that was pursuing him during our first July Fourth open house; before they saw where he had gone, we got him through that door and into my office.) Our rooms looked out across a broad driveway, leading down into the garage in the basement, and then beyond to a large park.

A pleasant enough location, but it was to be seriously called into question by a security official when he was making his rounds inspecting the building one day. He told me we were not to discuss anything classified in our offices because, with modern technology, what we said could easily be picked up from that big park! I was utterly dumbfounded, the ambassador was outraged, and we were all left speechless that so fine a building could have been planned and built without any consideration having been given to so elementary a security requirement. I suggested lead shields be substituted for glass, but the inspector was not amused. Nothing to do, just watch out what you talk about.

You might think of Holland and The Hague as small quiet, safe places where very little happens. Not so. There are certain to be those whose intelligence services are tying to find out whatever they can about us. Our official facilities are therefore regularly inspected by US security officers: the ambassador's residence, the embassy offices, even our house. (I remember the ambassador teasing the inspector who came to his house about his thorough personal security - he was wearing both a belt and suspenders.)

We did have one episode that was a reminder about personal security. The Hague was a first assignment for a new, young FSO. He settled in well both in the office and on the social scene.
At one point he was talking about some of the interesting people he had met, in particular someone from the Soviet Embassy who apparently knew he was a chess enthusiast and had invited him several times to play with him. On checking him out, he proved to be just doing his job - "making friends" with a young, new FSO.

At one point I became involved in another but very different kind of affair. A Dutch doctor, who had got my name from someone I knew, came to see me one day. His nephew had disappeared and he wanted the Embassy to know about the situation. The boy, 16, was the son of the doctor's sister and her American husband and had come to Holland to stay with the doctor and his family for a year and study in a Dutch school. When he disappeared, the doctor had, of course, notified the police, they had searched without success, and had even called on the Interpol for help. I told him I would report the matter to people in the Embassy and the Consulate General in Amsterdam and he said he said he would keep me informed.

Sometime later he came by to say that all the police efforts were still without result and a psychic, well-known for his success in such matters, was being brought in to help. Well, however that may have been, lo and behold if a month later the doctor didn't call to say that man had led them to the boy holed up with his kidnappers in a dingy building on the docks in Bremen!

Later the doctor and his nephew came in to report what had happened. It seems that the people who took the boy had convinced him that he was the Messiah, they had been searching for him, and they would now see that he received his rightful recognition! What a tale and this young one fell for it. Understandably, his uncle promptly sent him back to his mother and, as thanks, he gave me something he makes as a hobby. He takes a sea shell, cleans out the inside, pours pewter in; when it hardens he breaks off the shell thus leaving a beautiful pewter paper weight in the shape of the inside of the shell. I've had it on my desk ever since.

Theo Bot was hardly settled at the Interior Ministry when the problems surrounding the New Guinea question began to grow ever more threatening. The Indonesians started expropriating Dutch properties again and this time ordered the eviction of everyone who held Dutch citizenship, a population that included a great many Indonesians. They began to flood into Holland and the influx ballooned to such staggering proportions that our Congress passed a special act allowing many of these people to come to the United States, thus relieving to a significant extent the pressure on the Netherlands. In time, the expropriation of Dutch properties, such as tea plantations for example, began to cause serious practical difficulties for the Indonesians involved. The field hands were familiar enough with working the tea plantations, but only up to a critical point: when to start harvesting. That was a determination only the Dutch could make, a decision requiring long experience, including smell and taste, directly associated with the preferences of the markets the Dutch owners served. Thus did seemingly small things exacerbate the tensions between the two countries.

Phil aroused some quite different tensions when he was able to get a film of the Kennedy-Nixon "debate" during the 1960 campaign which dealt particularly with Far Eastern affairs. That subject was of great interest and very controversial in Holland so he invited the members of Parliament to a showing at the USIA auditorium. And what an occasion that became following the film: a
full blown Parliamentary debate that quickly hotted up and ran on until late in the evening. A good time was had by all!

For me, weekends provided opportunities on occasion to explore the country, two parts of which held special interest. Zeeland, in the southwest corner was a province of dikes and waterways on the North Sea and an area that dramatized the way the Dutch managed its land and at the same time protected itself from the sea. Friesland, north of the Zeider Zee, was in many ways a very separate part of Holland. While the Romans, the Spaniards, and the Portuguese had left their marks in the larger part of Holland south of the Zeider Zee - indeed half is Catholic and half Protestant - Friesland was a marshy, wet land, remote, inhospitable, and much less accessible in those early times. Today, with the great dike across the mouth of the Zeider Zee, and polders dotting this interior sea, Friesland is a thriving dairy and agricultural province. It still has, however, its own ways, language, and culture, also including today a fine symphony orchestra in Leeuwarden, the provincial capital, that my wife once played with at the Kurhaus when they visited The Hague one summer.

I particularly sought out fishing villages, small towns, local activities and fairs to talk with fishermen, farmers shop keepers, as well as local officials and newspaper editors. It was not only good education, but also an excellent way to improve your Dutch. In one encounter, I met a man of 90 at a cattle auction in Friesland. He was sitting on the broad sill of the front window of a pub. Men were circling around out front obviously striking deals and this old gentleman explained to me as best he could the convoluted, arcane way the cattle auction worked - both behind the scenes in the pubs and out front where the formal auction was going on. He, having been at it all his life, understood it thoroughly, but I not at all. Nevertheless it was fascinating to talk with one of his years who was still active and involved in making his part of the economy function effectively.

It reminded me of a conversation I had one day with our melkboor, the milk man who came to our house each day. There was some controversy at that moment about wage and price controls in Holland and he explained to me in some detail why such controls were essential, difficult though they were for workers, in order to keep Holland competitive in the world markets. He was one among most Dutch people at all levels who understand their nation's interests, policies, and practices.

My colleague, Bill Sullivan, went me many times better in making his rounds. He took off on his bike. Much closer to the land and to the people that way, he made a grand tour for a week, traveling around as the Dutch do themselves - on their bicycles. That conveyance is called a "fiets" in Dutch and the message we got from Bill was, of course, "I've been on my fiets all day."

Meanwhile, the New Guinea issue was continuing to preoccupy the country. The Dutch and the Indonesians were at daggers drawn, the crisis was heating up not only bilaterally, but multilaterally at the UN, and it eventually became obvious a solution was required that would provide a fig leaf of respectability for each of the parties.

While the discussions of possible solutions spread far and wide, Theo and I sat quietly in our corner talking informally from time to time about scenarios that might hold some promise. The
Dutch had given the territory self-government in 1950 and it was evident to us that any solution would need to include recognition of that authority. And that, in the fullness of time, was the essence of the settlement that was finally reached. Theo went out to West New Guinea as the Dutch representative at the signing of agreements with officials from New Guinea and Indonesia that, in turn, then made it possible for relations between the Dutch and Indonesians to begin to settle down again. But there could be no blinking the fact this time that Indonesian hegemony had replaced Dutch in that still obscure territory, West New Guinea.

Theo returned with a memento peculiarly characteristic of New Guinea: one for the state museum, and one for him and one for me (these latter two perhaps on the sly). The instrument was made from a V shaped tree branch. The longer part, the handle, was smoothed down by use. The other part was wrapped tightly with canning that held a broad flattish green stone at the end which was painstakingly honed down to a sharp edge. It was at once a tool for gardening as well as a weapon of war. To this day it hangs on the wall as a reminder of the principal and potentially explosive issue that was at the center of this five year tour in The Netherlands.

That tour came to a sudden and rather disorganized end when an old friend, Joe Jova in Foreign Service Personnel, called me one day in December to say that I was being assigned to a new State-Defense exchange program. It had been developed late in the Eisenhower administration and the Secretaries of State and Defense wanted to announce it before the change of administrations in January. Two groups of seven officers would be exchanged; I would be the senior officer from the State Department and would be assigned to USAF Headquarters at the Pentagon. The announcement ceremony was being planned for early January and I should be there for that occasion. Meanwhile, I could make farewell calls, attend the ceremonies in Washington, and then go back to The Hague to pack up and return to Washington.

Fine. That all seemed reasonable enough. However, in the end it didn't happen that way at all, of course. But then, we all know about slips between cups and lips, don't we? Evidently the works got gummed up, the ceremony was delayed and was finally called off. I never did hear what occurred, but later events suggested that exchanging a general and me may have been part of it. In any case, our sudden departure from The Hague was delayed until mid-January.

One of the nicest things that happened in connection with leaving involved Mamie. She was greatly appreciated among our Dutch and other friends and much respected for the fact that at her age, 80s, she was the librarian in her home town (Galena in the north- west corner of Illinois). She had also had her 15 minutes of fame on one of her flights to visit us. She was the first in the family to fly on a jet and on one such trip aboard KLM the plane set a new trans-Atlantic record. That morning there was much jubilation at Schipol, the international airport at Amsterdam, lots of officials, press, and cameras. Mamie was one of the first off the plane and when she was asked how she liked the trip and the record that had been set, her reply was, "I didn't even have time to finish my orange juice!" a remark widely reported. The story about our departure in The Hague paper was a surprise, but also a gesture of genuine appreciation of Mamie. It appeared under a front page headline reporting that the "Library Lady" was leaving.

Except for our return from home leave, when we too had the chance to fly on a jet, we were fortunate to make our Atlantic crossings by ship, both the United States and the America. Our
trip back to the States in January, 1961, was aboard the United States. Where those other trips had resembled placid cruises, this trip took us through the enormous storm that had smashed into President Kennedy's inauguration. The seas were gargantuan, many were seasick, but the pitching and rolling of the ship were so severe that many who might have been sick survived without a twinge. Some damage was done to the forward part of the ship and, when we got to New York, the photos in the papers showed that paint had been scoured from that part of the ship and we were festooned with icicles - typical Dutch *stinkende weere* as an appropriate finale to our five years in Holland.

When we got back to Washington, I found that my assignment was delayed (still under negotiation?). I had to knock around for some time, waiting for word. Then one day I heard an unwelcome rumor. A friend, back from a tour as consul in Milan, was up for assignment as the Foreign Service aide to Vice President Johnson. He didn't want that and had suggested I should be given the job. That was the last thing I wanted so I rushed off for help from old boss, mentor, and friend, Livie Merchant, then a top officer of the Department. He immediately telephoned General White, Chief of Staff of the USAF, who said, "Send him over to see me after lunch and we'll get this thing straightened out today." And so it was. Next morning I reported for duty at US Air Force Headquarters in the Pentagon.

**ROBERT L. NICHOLS**
Information Officer, USIS
Amsterdam (1957)

> Robert L. Nichols entered the USIS in 1950 after receiving a master’s degree from Tufts University. His career included positions in The Philippines, Italy, The Netherlands, Taiwan, and Singapore. Mr. Nichols was interviewed by Robert Amerson in 1988.

**Q:** After Milan, two years in Italy, and then on to Amsterdam, wasn't it?

**NICHOLS:** On to Amsterdam, again a one-man post, as branch public affairs officer. It wasn't a one-man post, because there was a consulate there, a consulate general. It was a one-man USIS post. But I closed Amsterdam in 1957. This was during one of the budget cutbacks. Majority Leader Johnson of the Senate was making some cosmetic cuts, and one of these was Amsterdam. It was cosmetic because the Amsterdam operation only cost $15,000 a year, exclusive of my salary. It certainly didn't make any difference in the overall budget. But it abolishing a post.

Things moved slowly in those days. I was trying desperately to get back to Washington because they'd just decided on opening up Chinese language training again after several years' hiatus. I applied for it. But I sat in a closed post in Amsterdam for two months with no job, waiting for a transfer, and then finally I was transferred to The Hague, 50 miles away, as the information officer.

**Q:** And the capital then. It was the only other post in Holland?
NICHOLS: Yes, that's true. It was the only post left in Holland.

PETER J. SKOUFIS
Administrative Officer
The Hague (1958-1961)

Peter J. Skoufis was born and raised in Bangor, Maine. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in France, Italy, South Africa, The Netherlands, and The United Kingdom. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1992.

Q: After SCA, you went to Holland as Administrative Officer in 1958. How did that happen?

SKOUFIS: I was called one day by Personnel and asked whether I was interested in being assigned to The Hague. I had served three years in Washington and I was due for an overseas assignment, but I had never indicated any preference for Holland. I had expressed an interest in going overseas since if I were to be in the Foreign Service, I should be abroad. I really didn't care much for an assignment in Washington, although, as I said, the SCA assignment had been very interesting. McLeod went to Ireland and we had a new Administrator, Robert O'Connor, who had been one of Dulles' assistants. He ran it well, although he was not as skillful as his predecessor on political relationships.

So, one day, the Hague assignment came open and Personnel asked me whether I was interested. I said that would be fine and off we went. I had to find a replacement for myself in SCA because that was the only way the Bureau would release me.

The Ambassador in the Netherlands was Philip Young, a political appointment who had been the Dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration at Columbia University when Eisenhower was President of that institution. Young was brought to Washington as the personnel director for the White House. He supervised the Civil Service Commission and was involved in all the high level appointments and in the development of the government's personnel policies. As a reward, he was later appointed as Ambassador to the Netherlands. The DCM at the time was Herbert Fales. By the time of my appointment I was an FSO-4.

The job had more substance than my job in Pretoria. Almost as soon as I arrived, I became involved in a building project because the U.S. government was in the process of building a new chancery. We had been tenants of the Shell Company in the "Essobau" since the end of World War II. The new premises were being constructed right downtown. It was completed about a year after I got there and we moved into the new building. It was a very lovely Chancery building.

We had an extensive agricultural program as well as a very active USIA program. Both required considerable administrative support. Our agricultural experts were involved primarily in
expanding our markets for US agricultural products -- selling chickens and chicken feed while buying tulips and bulbs from the Dutch. There were a lot of people running around Holland at the time on promotional efforts -- wheat promoters, rice growers. All of these industries had regional promotional offices in The Hague, all under the umbrella of the Department of Agriculture.

We had two consular posts in Holland -- Rotterdam and Amsterdam. We also had a big MAAG (Military Advisory and Assistance Group) staff in Holland, primarily because of the NATO bases build up, including port facilities for our ships and air bases in the western part of Holland. We provided administrative support to the MAAG until they outgrew us. It had a two-star admiral in charge, and finally we just couldn't provide all the services they required. My job then became one of liaison between the MAAG and the Dutch Protocol Office which was responsible for privileges and immunities. Much of the day-to-day matters were handled by the MAAG itself, but we were able to use their APO and Commissary facilities. We were going to make sure that the Embassy staff would not be denied access to those facilities.

While I was there, the Department went through another of those "economy" drives. We came under pressure to cut down the cost of our operations. If you look at a map, you can put a dime on it and cover all three Dutch posts. So we had to cut one post. First of all, the Ambassador recommended that the MAAG be cut out; there was one in Denmark, one in Holland an one in Belgium. At his request, I found out that we had over a thousand military people in these three countries. Those were days when flag-rank officers had military household staff, drivers, etc. The Ambassador wrote a long dispatch; having been in personnel operations, he knew how to present a good case. He recommended that there be only one MAAG to cover all three countries, preferably stationed in Holland because it was the middle country. He didn't get any response for a while; then all of a sudden the whole world came down on us, primarily from the Pentagon which wanted to know what we were doing minding their business. We were accused of not "seeing the big picture" and not understanding why the MAAG were there. The Chief of Naval Operations came to the Hague; he was a good friend of the Ambassador. One day, we had a big staff meeting with the CNO. He said that he couldn't agree more with the Ambassador's logic, but that he was in charge of the U.S. Navy and had to find some place for the Navy people then stationed in Holland. He said he could send them to Kansas or California or Arizona or Maine, but all of his U.S. facilities were full and he had no other place to put them. He wanted to know what to do with fire trucks when there was no fire; you had to keep them because a fire might break out at sometime. And that is the way he asked us to look at the Navy people in the MAAGs; they had to be stationed somewhere, and Holland was a good post. So we lost that battle in a hurry.

But the Department insisted that some savings be made. We had two Army teams in the Embassy: one was buying food in Holland for the troops in Germany and around Europe; they had about ten guys for whom we were providing space. We suggested that they not need to be stationed in The Hague; they could be in Germany and travel to Holland periodically. That suggestion brought the whole Army down on our heads. Then we suggested that a group from the Agriculture Department be eliminated. That was a plant inspection group, primarily for tulip bulbs, Years earlier, the Dutch had exported bulbs to the U.S. where they had be quarantined for a period in New Jersey. Some had been condemned and dumped into the ocean. The Dutch had
already paid for the transportation and therefore incurred a substantial loss. That episode brought forth the idea of a pre-shipment inspection to be done in Holland. The Dutch were willing to pay and reimbursed Agriculture for the cost of maintaining American inspectors in Holland. We didn't know of that arrangement; all we knew was that Agriculture as maintaining an American staff in Holland. So we learned that this arrangement had been agreed upon at a fairly high level and that it was cheaper for the U.S. to keep their inspectors in Holland than having them in the U.S. It also saved the Dutch from potential losses. Furthermore, as a spin-off, all the tulip beds on U.S. government property in Holland got new bulbs every year from the Dutch Tulip Growers Association. Same with the White House. So we didn't get anywhere with the suggestion of eliminating the American Agriculture inspectors in Holland.

Then there were all the sales associations that opposed any cuts. They kept pointing out the importance of agricultural sales to our balance-of-payments. So we couldn't get rid of the Wheat or Rice Growers Associations representatives. We were then left with only one option: closing a post. We hemmed and hawed and did a lot of work and concluded that Rotterdam was the best prospect. We couldn't close Amsterdam, which, although smaller and less significant in terms of consular workload, is really the capital of the Netherlands. The Queen's Palace was there; the Royal family had another palace there. For most people, Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands. The Hague was the seat of government, 25 miles down the road. We couldn't obviously close the Embassy and we had to keep Amsterdam because that was where the Queen lived. So it had to be Rotterdam.

We decided that when Rotterdam was closed we would move the consular operations to The Hague; that is why I was anxious to move some of the military personnel out of the Chancery. The consular operation was a sizable one and a very busy one. There were a lot of Americans in the Netherlands -- shipping and oil companies. The workload was substantial. ARAMCO had its headquarters in Holland at the time.

About a month after our recommendations were submitted -- and the Ambassador was pleased that he had gotten this monkey off his back -- Frank Molloy, then the director for the Office for Western European Affairs, came to The Hague. He called us into a meeting behind closed doors and whispered: "The Department is not paying anything for Rotterdam. The Agency is paying for it all". So Rotterdam had never cost the Department a single nickel. The Agency wanted it open because it could monitor all the incoming and outgoing shipments. For example, the Russians were buying oil there and shipping it home. Rotterdam was an important intelligence post for the CIA, which subsidized much if not all of the costs of maintaining that post. We all got a big laugh out of that revelation. We had struck out again! We of course knew that the Agency had operations in Holland; its headquarters were in the Embassy in The Hague. I knew who was a CIA man in the Embassy, but I didn't know their people in the consulates. I certainly didn't know anything about the funding arrangement for Rotterdam. I suspect that even the Ambassador didn't have full knowledge of all the CIA activities in Holland; he certainly didn't know about the Rotterdam arrangements. Although I was not involved, I understand that the same situation cropped up for Antwerp which was also supposed to close, but didn't because, as I understood it, of Agency financing. It was clear that in both cases, it was necessary to maintain a U.S. presence and that decisions to do so were made at relatively high levels of the U.S. government.
It was interesting how I learned about the Rotterdam situation. We were housed in rented space on land that we owned and we were considering an office building. The Dutch government had been quite generous with us after World War II in terms of allocating space for our offices. The properties we had occupied before the war had been blown up or lost in some fashion. But the Dutch made space available to us in downtown The Hague for the Embassy.

In Rotterdam, either the city or the national government provided some land at concessionary prices or perhaps even as a gift in gratitude for the role the U.S. played in World War II. The lot stood empty for many years and the Dutch were beginning to pressure on us to build on it; it was very valuable land right in the middle of the city which was growing around it. So while I was still in The Hague, an architect came over and developed a building concept. But Washington for some reason or other, backed off and didn't build. We could never understand why nothing would move. The City of Rotterdam had given its approval to the architect's sketches. By the time I left in 1961, I thought for sure that we would build in Rotterdam. I learned later that there had been no intention to build there; we still haven't done so. I don't know what happened to the property.

Ambassador Young's tour was up because the Republicans had lost the election and it was time for another U.S. government. John F. Kennedy was elected and the whole issue of reducing U.S. government expenditures in the Netherlands came to an end. It was all a big joke. We had lived with the suspense for such a long time. That, and moving into the new building, were the two major activities for those years.

All in all, my assignment to The Hague was very interesting. Soon after taking office, President Kennedy appointed John Rice to be the new Ambassador. He had been chairman of the Democratic Committee in Pennsylvania. He turned out to be a very nice guy. He was also very wealthy; he owned a big apple operation outside of Harrisburg -- Biglersville. By the time he arrived, we were already settled in the new building. He was a very good Ambassador. The DCM was Dick Service, with whom I had a very good working relationship. He was John Service's brother (of McCarthy fame).

I was fortunate in The Hague in that I had a very good staff. In general, the staff there was very interesting. It was a very active post. The activities of the port of Rotterdam were growing by leaps and bounds, giving our commercial people a lot of work. Our agriculture exporters used it. Dupont established an operation there.

My principle challenges were the coordination of the administrative activities of the other agencies, making sure that we were providing the necessary support. With the move into a new building, we had to sort out all the support activities and make sure that all got what was necessary. We had of course the usual problem of discrepancy of treatment among personnel of various agencies. I had a good working relationship with the Agriculture Attaché (Bob Reid from Kansas), who had been the former editor of "Country Gentleman". He was also a political appointee and didn't have much of an understanding about U.S. foreign relations and the activities of the Foreign Service or even of the Agricultural Service. In those days, we had to get the other agencies' representatives to agree to a sort of contractual arrangement which spelled out
all the services that the Embassy would render and the costs of each. Most of the other agencies would yell, but I could always go to Bob Reid, tell him about the calculations and an hour later he would call me to tell me that he had signed off on the dotted line. He used to say: "Gee, you guys charge a lot for going to the airport!". Then we would get into a discussion whether it was cheaper for Agriculture to buy its own car and so on. But in the final analysis, he was a good guy and would agree to our estimates. We had a good relationship.

We had a couple of amusing incidents while I was in The Hague. One had to do with the consular office. My office was on the ground floor of the Chancery. One day, a nice lady walked into our building with a handful of U.S. government bonds that she wanted notarized so that they could be cashed. The receptionist was accustomed to sending anyone she could not deal with to the Administrative office which was right down the corridor from her. My secretary was out so I came out of my office and introduced myself to the lady. She said that she wanted the bonds notarized. I told her that she would have to go to Rotterdam because there was no U.S. consular service in the Embassy. We didn't have any authorized notary nor the necessary stamps. She got mad as hell. I told her how to get to Rotterdam which was very easy because you could do it by trolley car at very cheap price. After pronouncing a few unkind words, she finally left. Later I got a call from Washington telling me that some Member of Congress was on the Department's back because some lady couldn't get any consular services from the Embassy, The Hague. Who ever called me wanted to know what all the people in the building were doing and why I couldn't put my name on a document. My answer obviously did not satisfy the caller. The Department was not much help. I finally had to get the Consulate General in Rotterdam to send me a seal; I had the exequatur on my wall which made me a consular officer of the United States. I felt that if I could have a stamp, I could do the rest legally. The C.G. said that I had to have a record of fees, so I asked him for a page from his book, which I would send every time I collected a fee for services rendered. We finally worked it all out, but of course there was never another case when I needed the stamp. I don't know whether there is a consular operation now in The Hague so that they don't encounter the same situation as I did.

The other incident also concerned an administrative problem. We had a hard time getting a cafeteria into the new Chancery building. We couldn't find a concessionaire nor were we at all sure that we could afford one. The Department does not support activities of that kind. So we tried to find someone who would take on the task for whatever revenues there might be. In the old building, the Dutch employees all "brown-bag" their lunches. The Dutch are pretty shrewd businessmen. One guy looked at the situation and decided that there wouldn't be enough revenues to make it a paying proposition; the Dutch employees were likely to continue to "brown bag" their lunches. We searched and searched and finally managed to convince Heineken Breweries to undertake the job. They found a caterer and they, I am sure, subsidized the operation. Our only requirement was to stock Heineken beer; in Holland, of course, beer is like Coca-Cola anywhere else; everybody drank it. It never occurred to me that beer might not be eligible for consumption on government property. The brewery did a fine job; the cafeteria ran well. The Dutch employees continued to "brown bag" their lunches, but at least now they had an alternative and the Americans had a convenient eating place. There was one further problem: in the rented quarters, a milkman used to come around to deposit bottles of milk on the desk of the Dutch employees. This was not uncommon in office buildings; the Dutch also drank milk as we drink Coca Cola. Of course, Heineken promoted its beer and people would go down to the
cafeteria and bring it back to the office or drink there whenever they felt thirsty. One day, a visiting American came to one of our offices and found one of the local employees with a bottle of beer on his desk. That got back to the Department in a hurry; I think the visitor must have written saying that people in the American Embassy in The Hague sat around their desks drinking beer all day. Needless to say, I heard from the Department in no uncertain terms and that brought an end to the beer drinking on government property. It also brought an end to the cafeteria because Heineken was not going to subsidize the operation if their product could not be made available to the clientele. We did manage to keep a snack bar going, although I am not sure of the final outcome because all this happened as I was about to leave The Hague. I wished them luck. This story was just an illustration of how difficult it was to get the Dutch to change their habits.

Q: Was the Embassy well integrated, with all these various U.S. government agencies being represented?

SKOUFIS: Yes. The Ambassador worked hard on this problem, as did Dick Service. We used to have meetings with all agencies being represented. The programs were pretty well coordinated.

We had a major ceremony when the new Chancery was opened. A lot of VIPs showed up. We also used to have an annual Fourth of July party in Rotterdam, with fireworks and other extravagances. ESSO and other American firms used to pay for this; the Embassy organized the activities. For example, we would get an Army band from Germany. The whole American community would work together on such activities and it worked quite well. One year, we also had the Brussels' World Fair. We gave our Embassy there as much support as we could, helping them procure in Holland items they could not find in Belgium.

On the whole, The Hague was a very interesting assignment. The new building worked out well. We had some problems which was the result of poor planning. I have never throughout my career been completely satisfied with the Foreign Building Office (FBO) operation. I don't remember who was in charge at the time. The new building was developed by a well known architect, Marsall Breuer. A well known German architect -- he belonged to the Bauhaus school, like Gropius and others. He had designed the IBM building and others in Holland. He had won the contract through competition from FBO. I thought that there were a couple of glaring errors. For example, in Holland, it rains at least 350 days out of the 365 in a year. If you came to the Embassy, you had to get out of a car and walk up six or seven steps in the rain to the entrance level. So everyone who came to the Embassy got wet. When they left, they waited inside the building until a car came and then they had to rush down the wet steps; some slipped on the slick marble.

That was one of the design problems. The other was that there was no freight elevator because the original design assumed that the mail and code rooms would be on the ground floor, along with the administrative offices. The security people became concerned about this configuration; they weren't happy about sensitive operations like the code and mail rooms being on the ground floor. As the Chancery was being built, there was an incident somewhere in which one of our code rooms was sacked and burned. So after construction had started, the security people demanded that the mail and code rooms be on the top floors. Of course, it was too late to install a
freight elevator. So the Dutch postman would just deposit the sacks of mail in the lobby -- we wouldn't let him go above the ground floor for security reasons and I doubt whether he would have in any case -- which required our people to come down from the top floor and drag them upstairs. It was these small annoyances that were a problem; we had to a lot of rebuilding, even after we moved in, to put in secure areas and separate such things as the classified mail room from the unclassified mail room. I remember these incidents very vividly because the Canadians were building their Chancery at the same time. They were more intelligent than our FBO operation; they called our security office in for expert advice and used it to design their building. So here we had two buildings going up practically side by side; the Canadian one, using our security expertise had minimal problems. We, not using the same expertise during the design period, had a lot of scrambling to do after the building was completed. Actually, our security people only got involved late in the game when the regional security officer from Bonn dropped in one day and told us that some of our plans just wouldn't be approved. He was instrumental in persuading the Department to move the code and mail rooms upstairs. I supported him; I just wish the security concerns had been taken into account before the final design had been approved. The Canadians did it the right way; I used to walk through their building while it was under construction. Of course, after it was finished I couldn't go into their secure areas. I had good relationships with my Canadian counterpart.

KATHRYN CLARK-BOURNE
Consular Officer
Rotterdam (1959-1961)

Kathryn Clark-Bourne was born in Fort Collins, Colorado on October 15, 1924. She received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington and a master’s degree from the University of Minnesota. Ms. Clark-Bourne served in Tehran, Rotterdam, Bombay, Lagos, Conakry, Douala, and Washington, DC. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 2, 1995.

CLARK-BOURNE: I was sent to The Netherlands. In those days -- I imagine it's still the same now, I don't know -- all officers had to have consular officer training. Although I was a political cone officer, I was sent to the Consulate General in Rotterdam as special consular affairs officer.

Q: You served from when to when?

CLARK-BOURNE: From '59 to '61. Bob Wilson was CG then. In those days, we had a lot of American shipping and Rotterdam was the biggest port in Europe. The captain of every American ship that came in had to report to the Consulate General and had to leave his papers there. They were given to him only upon departure after he had paid the port fees and fulfilled everything required. There were a lot of ships that came in all the time. Seamen and shipping was one of our basic jobs.

Of course, American citizen welfare was involved. And there were lots of American tourists in Europe, as you know. I'll never forget one day. A little old lady came in and said that she'd lost
her sister. They'd been traveling, I believe, up in Scandinavia, and had come down to Holland. She wanted to come to Rotterdam and her sister wanted to go to someplace else -- Amsterdam, maybe. So, they split up and were supposed to get together in Rotterdam. The sister never arrived. Fortunately, I knew the manager of the biggest hotel there. He was one of my boyfriends. I called him and told him to keep his eye out and called other people and reported it to the police. A day or so later, this hotel manager friend called and said, "She's here. I've got her." She'd arrived, so we got the two little old ladies together. I remember, they came in bearing a cake to show their appreciation. But, mostly, problems were with younger people.

**Q:** Was Rotterdam and Holland...Later, it had the reputation of being sort of the sin capital of Western Europe.

**CLARK-BOURNE:** Oh, really?

**Q:** Well, I mean, Amsterdam more than Rotterdam. Rotterdam was a little more business. Was this a problem? I'm thinking, particularly at this period, it was a pretty straight time for Americans. Were young people getting into trouble?

**CLARK-BOURNE:** Not at all in Rotterdam that I can recall. Outstanding things that happened to me had nothing to do with the young people. One of the ship captains who came in asked me out to dinner one night. We went out with the administrative officer and his girlfriend. After dinner the captain and I decided to leave early. The other two were going to a movie. We got into a taxi and the gentleman collapsed on me. While we were riding the taxi, he said, "Oh, we've got to stop someplace. My left arm has no feeling. I'm having a heart attack." We got out of the taxi, got into a building, where I was trying to find a phone, and he passed out on the ground. By this time, I'd gotten the hospital and said we were coming over and a couple of Dutchmen said, "Here, we'll help you get him into a taxi, and we'll go with you." So, they were in the backseat with him. We got to the hospital and, at the hospital, they said he'd died. We had to stay there until the police came. The police interviewed the two Dutchmen first -- by this time, it was three or four in the morning -- and let them go.

Then, they interviewed me and said, "Who is this gentleman? All his pockets are empty." The Dutchmen, obviously, had fleeced him while they were sitting in the backseat. I let them know this. I said, "The gentleman had a billfold and everything when we were in the restaurant." Then, I told them who I was. They obviously didn't believe me. The Dutch at that time had no women in their Foreign Service. We're talking about 1960. So, I said, "You come with me over to our Consulate General and I will get you his ship's papers and all the information you want." So, they did. They escorted me over there, at five in the morning. We were in a building up above a store that had apartments in it. Our Administrative Officer was living in one of those. I woke him up to let us in and to help me get the safes open and get the information. But, other than that, it was fairly routine.

One problem that comes to mind that I had with younger people was a young gentleman, who was a transvestite, I guess. His passport had a lady's name in it and he was in some trouble with somebody there about that.
It was a good place to be. You got to travel around Europe quite a bit on the weekends. You know, you can drive around Holland in one day. So, I got to see a great deal of Europe when I was there. But I hated the weather -- it rains all the time. And the culture was sort of dull, after Iran. It was too much like US culture. I was supposed to be there for four years. After two years, a telegram came around, asking for Hindi-Urdu language training volunteers. I immediately applied because I knew the sun would shine in India -- right? So, I did that for the next year.

LAMBERT HEYNIGER
Political Officer
The Hague (1960-1962)

Lambert Heyniger was born in New York in 1930. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1953 and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1953-1955. Mr. Heyniger entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Jordan, The Netherlands, Congo, Tanzania, and Algeria. He was interviewed May 19, 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

HEYNIGER: I was in The Hague from 1960 to 1962. It was more or less a direct transfer although we did go home for home leave. The point I want to make here is that I was assigned to a Foreign Service Embassy as a young political officer but got no training and no briefing whatever.

Basically my duties in The Hague were three: number one, to prepare the weekly summary.

Q: Known as the WEEKA.

HEYNIGER: Yes. I did the WEEKA or at least the political side of the WEEKA. Number two, I was responsible for the smaller, more conservative and religious parties in Dutch politics. The senior officer in the political section handled the Catholic party, and the number two officer handled the Labor Party, and I handled the smaller parties. Number three, I was the liaison with the International Court of Justice, the protocol officer and the Ambassador's Aide etc. There were 12 political officers at The Hague, of whom only three were real; the other nine were CIA types.

Q: You raised the question, and I know it was way back, but what the hell were nine CIA operatives doing in this small friendly country? I assume it was sort of a regional thing or it was liaison or something like that.

HEYNIGER: Yes. I really have no idea. There were a lot of people in that Embassy, probably a few more than should have been there. I think that probably in a firm NATO ally country, most of them were declared.

I'll give you one interesting vignette. Through personal family connections in Washington, my wife and I were invited to have tea with Joseph Luns, who was the Foreign Minister. When the Embassy learned that its youngest and most junior officer had been invited by the Foreign
Minister to have tea, they were a little surprised. One of the first things that happened when we got to the Luns's house was the Foreign Minister sat down with me and said, "Well Mr. Heyniger, where do you work, and who do you work for?" I told him and he smiled and said OKAY, now I know what you are (i.e., a real FSO, not a CIA type).

Q: Who was the Ambassador during the '60-'62 period?

HEYNIGER: That is an interesting question, because I had the opportunity while there to serve for two political appointees, one Republican and one Democrat. It was interesting to see the contrast as well as the advantages and disadvantages of political appointees. The Republican was Philip Young, who had gotten to know General Eisenhower when Eisenhower was President of Columbia. Mr. Young, who had been a senior officer with IBM, became Dean of the Business School. When Eisenhower became President, he made Philip Young head of the Civil Service Commission and later on appointed him as Ambassador to The Hague. After the election of 1960 when Kennedy came in, he appointed the Secretary of State of the State of Pennsylvania, to be Ambassador to The Hague. The advantage with both these gentlemen, particularly Ambassador Young, the one with Eisenhower, is they have direct access to the President. When a Dutch official, particularly the Foreign Minister, wanted to go to Washington and see the President, our Ambassador could always arrange that. Whenever our Ambassador called up the White House and said our Foreign Minister is coming to Washington and would like to have an hour with the President, the President said fine. The disadvantage with this is that although these were both very intelligent, well-informed, very hard working people, neither of them had any previous foreign experience or knew anything about The Netherlands.

To a certain extent, that was mitigated by our DCM who was one of the finest officers I've ever had the privilege of serving with. His name was Dick Service. He was the brother of John Stuart Service, born of missionary parents in China, grew up speaking Mongolian as well as Chinese, and a seasoned and thoroughly experienced Foreign Service Officer who later met with disaster in his career through no fault of his own.

Q: What would you say was the political and economic situation in The Netherlands in 1960?

HEYNIGER: From an economic point of view The Netherlands, like most of the Western European countries, was coming out of the wartime and post-war period. The Marshall Plan was pretty much over. The Netherlands was pretty much back on its feet. It was a remarkably unified and remarkably disciplined and, even to an American, remarkably regulated economy. For example, let's say you were living in Rotterdam, and you got a job offer in Amsterdam, you couldn't just move and take the new job. You couldn't get housing in Amsterdam until the government approved it. This is the way things were in The Netherlands then. It is a very highly populated country, and it is very highly controlled. But, it was doing well economically, and we had very good economic and commercial relations with The Netherlands.

On the political side, the number one problem was that The Netherlands had already been more or less pushed out of Indonesia. Indonesia had become independent. The only thing the Dutch had in the East Indies was New Guinea. They were quite willing to leave New Guinea, but they wanted to leave New Guinea under reasonably gracious circumstances and not simply be pushed
out by Sukarno and his government. The United States was attempting to do what it could to help both sides with this difficult sort of rite of passage. The problem was this was a bit difficult to handle either in The Hague or in Jakarta or in Washington. What happened eventually was that the parties agreed to undertake direct face to face negotiations outside Washington, and it was Bill Sullivan, who later became Ambassador Sullivan in Iran, who was the key person arranging those talks. The negotiations were taken out of our hands in The Hague.

Q: Did you find there were repercussions to our participation in these talks? Were the Dutch sort of giving you a rough time, I mean in your normal contacts with people who were aware within the Dutch society?

HEYNIGER: Yes, I think that is fair to say. The Dutch had seen themselves as a world power. Don't forget this is a small Western European country which had immense possessions and influence in a whole different area of the world which they had for hundreds of years. They were going through the difficulty of being pushed out of this and becoming again a small Western European country. While I was there, for example, the Dutch had an aircraft carrier stationed off New Guinea to keep the Indonesians away from New Guinea. I suppose it is a little bit like the Arabs and the Israelis. The Dutch felt that we were not sufficiently sympathetic to their position, and perhaps the Indonesians felt that we were not sympathetic enough to theirs as well, but I think that a lot of people in The Netherlands felt that the United States, particularly under President Kennedy, were somewhat overly favorable toward independence and self determination in the new world and not sufficiently considerate of the contributions which the empire countries had made to the developing world.

Q: I think that is a fair estimate. At the time, the spirit was in the focus mainly on Africa, of course. The Kennedy Administration came in bubbling over with expectations of wonderful things in Africa. Particularly Bobby Kennedy was a torch bearer. While you were there from your perspective, were there any sort of glitches or particular political problems during the '60-'62 period between the United States and The Netherlands?

HEYNIGER: Stu, apropos of the remark you just made, let me give you one vignette. We were all serving as professional Foreign Service Officers in The Hague, and a delegation came through from Washington led by Bobby and Ethel Kennedy. We had a meeting with them in the Embassy. Bobby said, "We're happy to have you join us on the New Frontier." We professional officers looked at ourselves and didn't quite know what to say because we were accustomed to serving whatever administration was in power whether it was Republican or Democrat.

Now, to respond to your other question, what happened with me was that after about a year and a half, I began to see that some of the people that I had come into the service with were doing much more interesting and exciting and rewarding things than I was. Officers who were serving in the Philippines and Africa, Nigeria and places like that were having much more responsible and absorbing and interesting careers than I was. I was having a good time, but being the protocol officer in a large US Embassy in Western Europe has its limitations.

I didn't have any guidance. We had two chiefs of political section, but neither one of them was a Foreign Service Officer. The first one was a civil servant who had been brought with him by
Ambassador Young and returned to Washington and never served abroad again. The second one was a "Wristonee" who was faced with having his civil service career frozen or going into the Foreign Service, so he did. He came to The Hague, but he had no previous foreign experience and no experience really supervising a political section. He went on to have a brilliant career, became an Assistant Secretary of State. My point is that I didn't really get the kind of guidance and supervision that I needed.

I decided after a year and a half that I should get out of The Hague and reorganize my career. I went to my DCM and to the personnel people and they said oh no, you have been assigned here for four years, be happy. Washington told me that the only way I could get reassigned was to volunteer for hard language training, which I did. I was selected for training in Swahili and returned to Washington in 1962 to FSI for hard language training. Let me say one other thing. I was a bit too young and too inexperienced to perceive what I could have done to make my work a little more interesting. What happened was that a month after I left, the Embassy was informed, not asked but informed, that the Department of Labor was assigning a Labor Attaché to The Hague because the Department of Labor had found the Embassy's reporting on Dutch labor to be completely inadequate. Had I had more experience or more direction, I might have been told, Heyniger, get busy with the Dutch trade unions and be our labor man here, but that never happened. So, in 1962 I returned to Washington to study Swahili.

Q: Let's go back to The Hague for a minute. What was your impression of the small political parties. You say you were looking at them from the religious right was it? Can you describe what their attitude was toward Germany, NATO, America, you know within the beginning developing European Economic Union, and also how the religious parties fit in to the Dutch political situation.

HEYNIGER: In the first place, these small parties represented different branches of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Dutch Protestant Christian Reformed Church. Religion is a pretty complicated subject in The Netherlands as it is in many places. I think you could fairly categorize all of them as being rather conservative, not particularly happy with what was happening to The Netherlands in Europe, not particularly interested in European integration, not particularly interested in either economic or social change, a bit sort of clinging to traditional classical Dutch traditions and culture. They were important in the general scheme of things because there were two main parties, the Catholic and Labor Party who usually led governments but frequently were unable on their own to organize a government. Therefore, whichever of the larger parties were in power sort of had to make arrangements and understandings with some of these smaller conservative parties in order to form an effective government.

Q: How were you received by these party officials?

HEYNIGER: I think that they were always pleasant and friendly. I don't think they had a great deal of time for me except that I could sort of give them entree, make sure that their views were being reported to Washington. I attended a couple of political conventions which I found quite interesting.

One of the important things to learn as a young officer is to get out of the Embassy, and even get
out of the Capital and get to where real life is going on. These conventions were often held in the evening and were often held in places like Amsterdam Enschede, Arnhem or places like this. There you did meet both the professional politicians and volunteers who were very concerned about who was going to lead their party and what their party stood for etc.

One more thing that I was proud of and that I would offer as a suggestion for junior officers is, particularly because I am Dutch by ancestry myself, I made a real effort to learn Dutch. We had an excellent teacher in The Hague, a wonderful woman. I did learn, and because I did, after about a year or so, I was offered membership in the Dutch Junior Chamber of Commerce on the condition that I get up on my feet and give a speech in Dutch. I did. At that time I was the only diplomat who had been permitted to join the Chamber of Commerce. It was a whole lot of fun for my wife and me because through that we sort of got out of the diplomatic circuit and we were really with young Dutch post-war businessmen who were not involved in foreign affairs, who were not involved in diplomacy, who were involved in trying to build up the country economically and commercially and who had an entirely different take on life. It was interesting.

SAMUEL DE PALMA
Political Section
The Hague (1961-1964)

Samuel De Palma joined the State Department shortly after World War II and served in New York at the United Nations and in The Hague. He was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Bureau for International Organizations at the United Nations in 1969. Mr. De Palma was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1990.

Q: Then you moved to The Hague as Chief of the Political Section in our Embassy. That was in early 1961. You were there for two and half years. Was there anything special about your tour in the Netherlands?

DE PALMA: First of all, it was my only break away from multilateral diplomacy. I welcomed it. It was my first exposure to Embassy work and to a politically appointed Ambassador -- John Rice, who was a very nice guy. I saw how the Embassy system worked. Dick Service was the DCM when I arrived. I got an insight in how an Embassy worked with a political Ambassador who was being shored up by his staff. It worked quite well. I was also interested in the general work of an Embassy, but I also discovered that I was not as enamored of straight Embassy political work as I thought I might be. I found some of it not that important, and some of it was just plain routine. I was both fortunate and unfortunate, being at the center of a bilateral problem with the Dutch. We were trying to get them to leave Indonesia. It was our policy that this should occur for long-range strategic reasons which were valid. The Dutch resisted strongly. Like the Portuguese; they found it very hard to leave. They had their own time-tables which stretched out indefinitely.

The task of talking to the Dutch was a very unpopular task in the Embassy because who ever had this assignment would be very unpopular with the Dutch. For some reason, the task fell to me.
Dick Service was too smart to get caught with it; he was also very busy running the Embassy. I guess I was next in line as Counselor for Political Affairs and it was left primarily to me. It was heady in some ways, but it was also trying. I had developed a couple of good friendships with members of the Foreign Ministry -- nice guys. The Dutch were easy to get along with; they are such wonderful people. These friendships could be strained by this disagreement. Some of my friends in the Foreign Office agreed with me, but had of course to toe the party line. So I was kind of a marked man. I kept being pushed more and more into this issue, making representations of our views to the Dutch Government. The Ambassador had no real stomach for this. Dick Service did as little as he could. They used me, which wasn't exactly right because it undercut our position by assigning the issue to my level. The bottom line is that we did finally manage to convince them to leave Indonesia.

Q: Did the Dutch think that we were not pushing very hard because the representations came from the Political Counselor and not the Ambassador or the DCM?

DE PALMA: I am sure they couldn't have been overly-impressed. I think too much was done at my level and not enough by my superiors. Washington was very much aware of how the issue was being handled in The Hague. As a matter of fact, I got ticked off once. The Dutch had finally come up with a formula which showed some movement. So I prepared a message to Washington, suggesting that obviously the Dutch's plan was inadequate, but if we added this and that, might that not be acceptable? I got a return message written personally by Bill Sullivan, who was then the Deputy Assistant Secretary for EUR, telling me that the US Government was not interested in compromises. It was short and to the point. I had never been stepped on in that way.

Q: But Washington never insisted that the Ambassador take on a greater share of the representations?

DE PALMA: I can't say that they never insisted. Obviously the Ambassador did make some calls so that you can say that he was on top of it. But it was pretty obvious from my point of view that I was the fall guy. It may have been part of a game that someone in the Department was playing. I am sure that EUR was not that interested in beating on the Dutch. It was the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) that pushed the issue. I am sure, therefore, that there were some little games being played. The Under Secretary, Chester Bowles, who had signed Bill Sullivan's cable to which I referred earlier, of course, sided with FE. And Sullivan had no trouble hammering people when it served his purposes.

Q: You served in ACDA after your tour in the Netherlands. Tell us about that period.

DE PALMA: First of all, I was shocked and terribly disappointed to be assigned to ACDA, another organization involved in multilateral negotiations. Secondly, I was literally shanghaied from my post in The Hague. I had been there two and half years and I get a message telling me to report to ACDA in three weeks. Right out of the blue! No one asked anything. I didn't expect to be consulted, but no forewarning at all. Not a rumor -- nothing. So we returned but I was not terribly interested. I must say, that although I was trying desperately to get out of ACDA during the four long years I served there, I did finally get involved in something interesting -- the non-proliferation treaty(NPT). I was the principal deputy to Butch Fisher and Bill Foster, the Director
of ACDA, for that important issue. That gave me some satisfaction. It was also my cross because I was hoping to get out of the Bureau. But Dean Rusk called me and asked me to stay there to see it through -- it was very important. He knew I wanted to leave, but since he had been kind enough to call, I stayed. It was a significant issue and I was glad to have been a part of it. But I was also very glad to leave the Agency.

FRANCIS M. KINNELLY
Commercial Officer
The Hague (1962-1963)

Consular Officer
Rotterdam (1963-1964)

Francis M. Kinnelly was born in Brooklyn, New York in October of 1935 and raised in Cape Cod, Massachusetts. He received a bachelor’s degree in European history from Bowdoin College in 1957 and a master’s degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He then served in the military in Korea from 1960-1961. In 1962, Mr. Kinnelly joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in The Hague, Manila, Bonn, Madrid, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy June 4, 1997.

Q: You served in The Hague from when to when?

KINNELLY: From November ’62 to November ’64. It actually turned out to be The Hague and Rotterdam. Three of us had been studying German in order to pass our language requirements. But the Department did not have any jobs in Germany for any of us. One went to South Africa, another to Vienna, and I went to The Hague. I remember being told, "Well, Dutch is quite close to German." I soon found out about all sorts of false cognates that could get me in trouble. Blankenship was the ambassador and Fisher Howe the DCM, I remember.

Q: Blankenship, was he a political appointee?

KINNELLY: Yes. From around Carlisle in Pennsylvania, a real gentleman in his demeanor, and I think he was respected by the Dutch. It was a good period for people coming in to the Foreign Service. I had a two year tour as a rotational officer, starting in the Commercial Section. The commercial attaché was away on home leave for a good period of this time. Another young officer, John Heimann, and I had responsibility for the section. It was really an exciting time. The Commerce Department was starting new programs, including trade missions and the first exhibits in international fairs run in Europe. Utrecht was a major center for European trade fairs. We organized the Commerce program there and worked with a number of U.S. companies. We didn't have much in the way of guidelines from Commerce. We just went out and did it. We had a lot of independence and we liked the chance to exercise it. Commerce was, I guess, pleased with us and asked me to come and work there after my tour in The Hague, which I later did. Bernie Crowl was the commercial attaché, a good officer. I think he retired after that tour.
Then I was asked to go down to Rotterdam for experience in consular work. The Hague had no consular section. So, I went to Rotterdam, originally for six months. Rotterdam was only 20-odd miles away. I took a train down there each morning. I started with the U.S. citizen services work. The consulate was short on staffing, so they asked if I would stay on. So for the next 18 months, the remainder of my tour, I worked in Rotterdam. At that time, I decided to take the citizenship correspondence course. I found that the FSNs (Foreign Service nationals) were sort of running the shop and explaining to the junior FSOs who were coming through just what they should do and what they should sign off on. Although the staff was very competent, I thought I'd rather decide myself what I was about. One unique aspect of that work was that Rotterdam was such a major port that a number of young Americans, often college students, had come to Europe and after a summer in Europe, came there to look for work-aways, that is, jobs on a merchant boat to take them back to the States. We tried to find jobs for these people on foreign flag ships. The U.S. flags were out because of union restrictions. We succeeded with a fair number of these young men, but not with all. After they ran out of money, we tried to find and contact their parents to help them. Sometimes the police would take them into custody. American seamen also ended up in jail. I got to know the police quite well and spent quite a bit of time over in the Rotterdam jail checking on these people while they were waiting. We had some money from the American business community to help them. In some cases we were able to keep them in simple lodgings while they waited for a work-away passage. I guess in those days we had enough time to do that.

Q: I guess Rotterdam was spared pretty much the problems of sex and what passed for drugs in those days. That was Amsterdam, wasn't it, pretty much or did you get some of that, too?

KINNELLY: No, I don't think even in Amsterdam - that came later. I was dealing quite a lot with the consulate in Amsterdam. I don't remember having that kind of impression at the time. Rotterdam had really revived. In the recent news, we've seen the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan and the festivities in Rotterdam - it really was helped by U.S. aid after being so badly destroyed by the Nazis. Rotterdam took pride in being the largest port in Europe and in being the Dutch city where so much industrial and commercial effort was being made, as opposed to what they saw as the more laid-back people up in The Hague or in Amsterdam or wherever. The consulate had a good relationship with Rotterdammers. We were treated very well by the Dutch.

Q: Did you get any feel for Dutch politics? I mean, for example, did you get any reverberations from what probably had happened in Indonesia at that time? I mean, it was a little earlier on.

KINNELLY: Well, in The Hague, there was quite a strong Indonesian atmosphere. Many of the old colonial civil servants who had come back from the Indies lived there. There were many Indonesian restaurants and foods in the market. There was a bit of an exotic air in The Hague because of that. But I don't recall any political debates or feeling of lost empire or whatever. It was more a sense of nostalgia. This, of course, was in the early ‘60s and so quite a bit after the Dutch had pulled out of Indonesia.
Mr. Howe was born and raised in Illinois, graduated from Harvard University, and after several years in private business, joined the Office of Strategic Services in London, England. He served with the OSS throughout World War II, after which he joined the State Department serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in The Hague and Oslo. His several assignments in Washington included service as Executive Secretary of the Department of State. Mr. Howe was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: In ’62 you transferred to the Netherlands?

HOWE: In ’62 we went directly. Ambassador John Rice had been in the Netherlands and he came up and visited us in Norway and didn’t tell us, but he later confessed that he did it to look me over as his DCM because he went back to the Netherlands and asked for my transfer - a direct transfer without home leave. So we did go down immediately on a direct transfer to the Hague and settled in there for three years.

Q: So you were there ’62 to ’65.

HOWE: Yes.

Q: How was that? What was the difference in the Netherlands, working there and…?

HOWE: As I look back on it, the international relations and politics were I think remarkably the same in that there was another staunch NATO ally on whom we relied very heavily. The Dutch were even closer and were able to produce more for the alliance and in a way, they were more significant. The same maritime policies, however, were present. The Dutch are a great international maritime country. It was remarkably free of direct U.S.-Netherlands… There were no serious problems. There was differences of views and I don’t know where it came from in the stages of Indonesian independence but that was…

Q: That was way back. By this time Sukarno was even… Well, Sukarno I think was ousted in ’64, but independence had been granted.

HOWE: After U.S. involvement.

Q: Ellsworth Bunker…

HOWE: That’s right. Ellsworth Bunker was a good friend of ours and a wonderful man. Stuart, it’s hard for me to recall any issues that were particularly strong, although I’m sure there were times when we had…
Q: One that comes to mind is landing rights. This was a really big issue with the Dutch who wanted landing rights in Chicago and others. Does that…?

HOWE: If they were it did not come sufficiently strongly into my life that I now recall it. Maybe much of that was done through IATA (International Air Transportation Agency) and in the U.S. rather than in the Netherlands. Kay Lemme was of course a big corporate feature, as was Shell. John Lowden who was head of Shell. We frequently saw him and he came to the house frequently. Chris Herter came over and he was a personal friend and stayed with us. We had a party with Joseph Lutz, the foreign minister, and John Lowden, head of Shell and Chris and Matt Herter, that was a wonderful event as far as we were concerned. They were all such congenial people.

But in terms of foreign policy, I’m hard put to find any particular…

Q: Maybe not. In the trade wars, did the chicken wars intrude at all? I think it was around this time. At least some of Europe was unhappy about chickens that we produced.

HOWE: I remember that but I don’t know that it was when we were there. I remember the chicken wars, but I don’t remember it featuring in there. I somehow associate it with Belgium more.

Q: It may well have been.

HOWE: Doug MacArthur and his DCM, David McKillop.

Q: How about John Rice?

HOWE: He was a political democratic figure from Pennsylvania. He and his wife Elaine were extremely dependent, quite overly dependent upon us. He resigned halfway through our stay there and the president did not appoint a replacement for between a year and a year and a half. So I was chargé there. Not in the interim because it wasn’t that the ambassador was away. It was when there was no ambassador.

I’ve even tried to remember who was the predecessor to John Rice [ed note: Philip Young, 1957-1960]. It’s a choice post and its very apt to be a political appointee. I think they had all been political. William Tyler came over to replace Rice. The State Department felt that because I had been so long acting ambassador it would be inappropriate for me to stay so we went over to England and met him and came in with him on a Holland America ship. Then a week later departed. We just saw him into Holland. He was an old friend from the State Department and a wonderful person. I wonder if Will is still alive?

Q: I think he is.

HOWE: I think he is and I think he lives over in France.

Q: I interviewed him about six or seven years ago.
HOWE: Did you?

Q: How did you find the Netherlands fitting into NATO?

HOWE: Very well and very strong. Sticker had been Lutz’s predecessor. He had then become the secretary general of NATO. That is inevitably a very close tie that was forged between the Netherlands and NATO. Joseph Lutz, the foreign minister, was constantly involved in NATO matters. NATO met once while we were there. Fulbright came over. Rusk was there again. There was much celebration and much turmoil around and festivities. It was a very important time. Whenever the NATO meet in a country it’s a turmoil.

Vice President Johnson came over two weeks before the assassination and was very upsetting to the embassy in all the paraphernalia you have to go through when any vice president comes, but particularly Johnson. He was quite arrogant in the way he dealt with the Dutch officials, including the Dutch Queen. He declared who was going to be at her party for him. Two weeks later he was president.

We went over to Germany to George McGhee, the ambassador, who was a very old and dear friend and we were celebrating his 25th wedding anniversary with Doug MacArthur who came from Belgium, and Archie Roosevelt who came from London. We were having cocktails before a white-tie big diplomatic dinner dance when George got word of the Kennedy assassination. The people all heard it and all knew that the party would be off. We all got into cars. We got into a car, drove back immediately to the Netherlands, to Hague. It was a three hour drive at least from Bonn to the Hague.

Anecdotal, we went immediately to the embassy to make sure that things were in order, that the book had been put out and all the rest of it. It was all well arranged. There was a line for 200 yards in front of the embassy of people - and here it was 1:00 in the morning - lined up to come in and sign the book. Everybody in Hague had heard about it and came and needed to sign the book.

I went out so see the line and there, well down the line, just standing like anybody else was the minister of agriculture who was a friend. A very moving experience.

Q: What was the Dutch reaction that you were getting to de Gaulle and his sort of split with NATO?

HOWE: Lutz and the Dutch foreign ministry were a very sophisticated bunch. They thought the French and, led by de Gaulle, were not doing what they should to help NATO.

Q: After this in ’65, whither? You say that when Phil Tyler came in they felt that you’d been there too long as chargé.
MANUEL ABRAMS  
Economic Counselor  
The Hague (1962-1966)

Manuel Abrams was born in Pennsylvania in 1919, and graduated from the City College of New York in 1939. His career has included postings in Frankfurt, Paris, The Hague, Rome, Brussels and Geneva. Mr. Abrams was interviewed in 1990 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: I have you going to The Hague from 1962 to 66, is that right? Where you were the economic counselor?

ABRAMS: Right.

Q: Could you describe how that was, how the embassy was set up, what an economic counselor did and what sort of staff you had?

ABRAMS: Yes. Well, The Hague was what we considered to be a medium-sized embassy. There was an economic counselor and as I recall it, two other economic officers, then a commercial attaché, and assistant, two Americans, and a staff of what we used to call local employees.

This was my first encounter with export promotion. It was quite an important function.

Q: When you went out there, were you under instructions? What were your major tasks?

ABRAMS: There was a schedule of economic reports which had a name, CERPs, Consolidated Economic Reporting Program. That I left pretty much to the other two officers. I devoted a large part of my time to seeing senior economic officers in the Dutch foreign office, discussing what was going on in Brussels in the European Economic Community.

Because what they did was of great importance to the US both politically and economically, particularly during the Kennedy Round, the GATT trade negotiations of the early 60's. The Dutch were a good source. We were fairly close to the Dutch viewpoints on many matters, for instance, free trade. I use the term relatively because the US spokesmen have a habit of talking as if we have no trade restrictions and it is everybody else who does have trade restrictions. That's nonsense, of course, but we at least did profess a belief in free trade and the Dutch did too. Besides he was easy to talk with, I knew him from Paris.

Q: What was his name?

ABRAMS: Karl Hartogh. He was the Director General for Economic Affairs in the Foreign Office. Then there was a Director General in the Economics Ministry on trade matters. These were the two most important people I saw on a regular basis.

Q: By this time we looked upon Europe as being a full fledged economic machine.
ABRAMS: That's right. By the sixties the lag in thinking had been made up. So there was no longer any question. The European currencies were convertible. But of course, the European community was reducing the trade barriers within the community, in accordance with the schedule set up in the Treaty of Rome. But to reduce trade barriers to the outside world required the Kennedy trade round and that's what we considered so important. We were seeing trade barriers within the community going down and we wanted trade barriers to go down to the outside work as well.

Q: Did you see any particular areas that we were getting frozen out of, I am thinking particularly of the chicken war?

ABRAMS: That is a good example, because I was involved in that.

Q: Could you explain what the chicken wars were all about?

ABRAMS: It was the hottest issue of the time. It involved our Senator Fulbright because Arkansas happened to be producing a lot of chickens. I guess the European community was considering some sort of tariff on the chickens. We started the process of producing factory chickens rather than farm chickens. We were able to export at prices way below European prices. I remember when I was in Paris, the price on the market was about three times the price in the US. In any case this became a key issue. We made so many representations that at one point Mr. Hartogh said, "I am wondering when your ambassador will raise this matter with the Queen."

Q: You worked under two ambassadors, one was John Rice, a non career ambassador.

ABRAMS: That was brief, less than two years.

Q: Then you were with William Tyler. How much attention did he pay to the economic side?

ABRAMS: Working with Tyler? Marvelous. For me it was a change from night to day. Because there was an interim, one year we had no ambassador. We had a chargé. Rice was a very nice man, but he knew little about what was going on. It was too bad that we had him at the time because he was no match for Mr. Luns, who was the foreign secretary. Mr. Rice had delivered Pennsylvania delegates to Mr. Kennedy so he became ambassador to the Netherlands, but with no background at all for the job.

Whereas Bill Tyler was the model of a career ambassador. I had worked for him in Washington when he was the deputy assistant secretary.

Q: I wonder if you could explain how, in a country such as the Netherlands, where traditionally we have sent political appointees, sometimes there's the feeling that embassies run by themselves and all that. Can you think of anything that might have been lost as far as how we operated by not having someone who knew what they were doing?
ABRAMS: Well, the big issue at the time I arrived was a political issue between us and the Netherlands. But particularly Mr. Luns, who made it his own personal issue and this was Indonesia. Mr. Luns had never quite reconciled himself to the loss of Indonesia. There was a big fight between the Netherlands and Indonesia about some of the islands. We were involved in this fight because we were taking a world wide anti-colonialist attitude. And while we understood the Dutch concern about these islands, one was called what was called West New Guinea, now West Irian, I think the Dutch had some basis but they were hanging on and our representations might have been more effective with another ambassador. In the end Mr. Luns had to fold.

Q: When you get instructions that it has to be the ambassador, it has to be the ambassador and no matter how much backing you can give, its the ambassador....

ABRAMS: If you want to talk to the Foreign Minister normally you have to send the ambassador.

Q: And you have to know what you're saying. Otherwise it cuts your effectiveness.

ABRAMS: Again, in the long run, it didn't matter too much but at the time it was a terrible problem between the US and the Netherlands.

Q: The one thing that seems to crop up again and again is the KLM landing rights to Chicago.

ABRAMS: You're absolutely right. That was one of the big fights.

Q: Could you explain what the problem was?

ABRAMS: The problem was when you have a big country like the US, and a small country like the Netherlands, trying to arrange reciprocal landing rights, its just skewed to begin with. What can the Netherlands offer us other than Amsterdam? Nothing. It's the only place you can land. But having just New York is not very great for KLM or for any of the European airlines. I had exactly the same problem when I was in Italy. Ruth had the same problem when she was economic counselor in Brussels. These small countries can't offer us reciprocity. What you have is a big fight. So as long as Washington insists on reciprocity, there's no resolution.

We finally worked out something with KLM. But we did find, in most countries, a way out. The Dutch have a queen, the queen could visit the US and butter up people, and a deal was worked out. But logically, there is no real reciprocity. If we give KLM New York and then also give them Chicago or Atlanta or both, there is nothing that the Netherlands could give us in return.

Q: Two more parking spurs, or something like that.

Then these airlines got better, and more competitive, and our airlines didn't want them to come in because they were cutting in.

ABRAMS: In the theory of landing rights, we were justified in not providing them. But the theory was defective I guess. It didn't take into account the differences in the countries.
Q: I have you going as economic minister to Rome in 1967 until 1969. What was the change for you? Here was Italy and it was quite a different matter.

MARGARET L. PLUNKETT
Labor Attaché
The Hague (1962-1967)

Margaret L. Plunkett was born on April 15, 1906. She received a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, and a doctorate from Kernel University. Ms. Plunkett worked in the New York State Department of Labor; was a researcher at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology; was on the Wage Stabilization Board; War Production Board; BLS in the Labor Department and the Women’s Bureau. She served in Tel Aviv, Israel as the Labor Adviser to the Technical Aid Mission and later in The Hague, Netherlands as the Labor Attaché. She was interviewed by Thomas D. Bowie on July 28, 1995.

PLUNKETT: Anyway in its trade union aspects Holland was also a unique situation. The trade unions were divided up by religion. I don't know of any other country where that exists. There was the Catholic, the Protestant, and what they called the General Union, which was not connected with any religion, but substantially Socialist in its outlook. It was the biggest of the trade unions. But all these people, the general secretaries of each union, were very friendly. They may have had their own differences when they discussed policy, but it rarely came out in the open. They came out with united positions.

Now, there wasn't an overall umbrella union like the Histadrut. But it was a cooperative situation and that was my first experience as a labor attaché. I had to make my own way there. That is one of the great advantages of being a labor attaché. Nobody bothered you. You were not really responsible to anyone else, except the Ambassador, because nobody else knew anything about labor, and they weren't interested in it, but they were very friendly to me. In both places I participated in the economic section. After all, the labor situation had a good deal to do with the economic reports. Anyway, I plunged in and made the acquaintance right off the bat of the general secretaries of the three union groups.

The employers were divided up the same way [by confession]. The nursing service was divided the same way. If you needed a visiting nurse and you were a Catholic, you called the Catholic visiting nurse organization. Here is the funniest example: I lived in a big apartment building, a new, very nice place. I was the only American living in it. A very nice young Dutch woman lived across the hall from me. She spoke very good English and I became acquainted with her very soon. She said to me, "Now, if you want to go to the Protestant grocery store, you turn right when you leave the building, then turn left and go two blocks and there's the Protestant grocery. Now, if you want to go to the Catholic grocery," -- she didn't ask me if I had any religious affiliation -- "you turn left at the entrance to the building and walk three blocks toward the sea." - - I lived way out at the west end of the Hague. -- "and there you will find a Catholic grocery
store."

The whole country was divided like that, and this, of course, astonished me. That has broken down over the years. After I left, the Catholic union and the so-called Socialist union combined. The Protestant union never did. The Protestants were the most devoted to their religious connection. In the trade union, they were perfectly lovely people, but they wouldn’t unite with the others. That was, of course, a very singular situation. I had to deal with three different general secretaries of the unions, and I liked them all.

I still keep in touch with them, and when I was in Holland on a trip with my nephew in 1993, they all came to a party that I had set up for people I knew. I was very pleased. After all, I left Holland in 1967, when I transferred to Israel and this was 1993. And I had asked the woman who had been my assistant, a Dutch woman, to get in touch with as many people as she could that I had known. Do you know, there were 27 people who came to that cocktail party. We had a wonderful time.

Anyway, that religious division colored the whole business of contacts with the trade unions. In Holland I set up a practice that I continued later in Israel. It was to get the trade union people and the industrial people together. That first Ambassador couldn’t understand the point. Nevertheless, every year I had a large reception for both in the library of the Embassy. When I went to Israel, I had it in my backyard, which was an enormous backyard. I invited the heads of the unions and the heads of some of their major subdivisions and various leading industrialists, plus members of the annual delegation of the AFL-CIO.

At one time the head of the Catholic miners' union invited me for a weekend down to the coal mine areas. And this was funny. They took me down into the coal mine and they dressed me up in a white garment and gave me a bath afterward because of all the coal dust. I went way down to the bottom of the coal mine. When I came up they took a picture of me in this outfit. I was all smudged with dust. That picture appeared in one of the issues of our Labor Department publication. Do you remember that?

*Q: Oh, yes, I do remember that!*

PLUNKETT: That was a famous picture. I think I still have my copy.

In any case, the Dutch trade unions were interested in "How do you do this?" and "How do you do that?" in the States. They were interested in getting ideas about what they should do in their own unions. I can't think offhand of anything specific that I feel was a real contribution, except that they all thought I was doing something important. At least they felt a much closer relationship to the United States.

One of the things that was important in my whole service as a labor attaché was setting up programs for visiting Americans. Congressmen and trade union leaders would come and that was very productive because by that time I had gotten to know a great many people that I could contact to help participate in their visits. And it wasn't only labor people or Congressmen. Industry people came. One man came who was a friend of my nephew, as a matter of fact. He
was an industrialist, and he wanted to set up a branch in Holland. I forget what he made. He wrote and asked me if I could introduce him to people in the government and in the manufacturers' association. We often got firms started. So I did and that was a bit of a job, since it was out of my specialty. But he did set up this business, and he lived there himself for a couple of years, and the business became very successful. I kept in touch with him. Later in his life he was on the Cornell faculty. He is now retired.

One experience I had with an American industrialist was very unpleasant. He came and he was the representative of a big engineering company. In those days American companies were trying to come into European countries on business, and this man was trying to do that. The ambassador referred him to me. He came in and wanted to know about the labor situation. And then he said, "Tell me. These Dutch have so many labor regulations, and we don't want to follow them. Tell me how we can get around them." Well that made me mad, and I said, "I don't know how you can, but if I did know, I wouldn't tell you."

Q: Good!

PLUNKETT: He tipped his hat and left. I don't know what ever happened to him.

Q: You saved him from a lot of trouble.

PLUNKETT: Oh, I should say so. You know, the Dutch are so meticulous about everything. They soon would have gotten on to him, and then the Embassy would have been in trouble, because we would have been called on to defend him.

The one major problem we had with the Dutch was an economic problem. It was the "chicken war." Our chicken producers wanted to get changes in the Dutch regulations on the importation of chickens. Of course that is a big industry on the East Coast in Virginia and Delaware. It was eventually resolved. Our economic officer handled that, but we were also involved, because there was the general Embassy instruction, "If anybody contacts you about this, be sure to let us know." It was worked out and the Dutch agreed to raise the quotas. How could they help it? They can't defy the United States, or couldn't in those days. But, as far as I knew, that was really the only major intergovernmental problem while I was there.

Fortunately in both places where I served, relations with the United States were friendly. Of course, the Israelis always wanted more money than we were ready to give them, but we gave them plenty and still do. I have no objection to that. The Dutch situation was different from the Israeli situation, and they each had unique labor union situations. Who had ever heard of a country having a "three-pronged" labor union? Eventually the Socialist union—I think I've already said this—and the Catholic union combined. They were headed by very intelligent, attractive, youngish men.

I had a very funny experience with one Dutch trade union head, the Catholic one. The union headquarters was in Utrecht, and I was going up on my first visit to this fellow. He had given me the street address, and an Embassy car took me there. It was a big building. I said to the elevator operator, "I have an appointment with Mr. Coppes. Will you let me off where I am supposed to
go?" Well, he let me off, and I walked into a kind of a big subdivided room and I said to the girl at the entrance, "I have an appointment with Mr. Coppes." She looked puzzled, but then she took me into an office where I guess the head guy was. He didn't speak much English, and so I explained to him who I was and so on. He looked at me puzzled and said, "Just a minute. I'll call somebody." So he called a young man in who spoke good English. And I told him I had come to see Mr. Coppes. He roared with laughter. He said this was the barbers' union, the "Coppers" union.

Mr. Coppes was the man's name, and the barbers union had an "r" in it. The elevator guy hadn't understood my pronunciation, and so there we were. Well, then he took me up to the office of Mr. Coppes and that was my first encounter with the Catholic trade union. Mr. Coppes took me to lunch. He was an awfully nice fellow, and he said, "Maybe you would like a little sherry before lunch?" And I said, "Thank you, no. I can't stand sherry, but I would enjoy an uer gineva. . ." That was the name of their gin. They had young gin and old gin. I said, "Young gin I don't care for, but old gin I would enjoy." He laughed and said, "I was going to order some of that myself!"

Q: What a great way to get acquainted.

PLUNKETT: We were friends forever. The Protestant union also had its headquarters in Utrecht. I can't complain about any of those people. I just didn't experience the difficulties others have alluded to. I may be obtuse but I don't remember any. As far as being a woman is concerned, I think there were many advantages. In the first place, you weren't in danger of being punched in the nose if you disagreed with them, and a man might well have that happen. You know, didn't that happen to one of our labor attachés in Cairo? He was attacked and very badly injured by some local guy. I forget his name, but he was brought back severely injured.

One rather disagreeable but enlightening experience I had in Holland was with a group in Europe interested in a labor meeting in the Hague. I attended the meeting as Labor Attaché and a young man from Sweden came and sat down at the lunch table with me and a couple of other men. He asked me who I was, and I told him I was the Labor Attaché at the American Embassy. He stared at me. "Oh," he said, "I suppose they thought they could appoint a woman because this country has a queen." [laughter] This was the only anti-female experience I had in all my years as a Labor Attaché.

Q: What did you say, Margaret?

PLUNKETT: I gave him a very big scowl and said, "I really think that isn't the question." He was a brash young snot. I think in the Scandinavian countries, the attitude of men toward women is rather more backward than it is in some other areas.

To repeat, I never really found any animosity toward me as a woman. They might not have liked some things I did, but they never expressed it. Both Ambassadors Bill Tyler and Wally Barbour were very friendly and very appreciative of what I was doing. Generally, I can say that in both experiences I tried to expand the relationship between the embassies and the trade union people, and the ministries of labor.
WILLIAM N. TURPIN  
Economic Officer  
The Hague (1963-1964)

William Turpin was born and raised in Georgia. He attended Dartmouth College, Mercer University, and Oxford University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1949 and received his first post as a Kreis officer in 1950. He went on to serve in Munich, Belgrade, Moscow, and The Hague. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: 1963. Where did you go?

TURPIN: The Hague.

Q: And you were there from when to when?

TURPIN: 63 til 64. I was pulled out to go to Vietnam.

Q: What were you doing in the Hague?

TURPIN: Economic officer.

Q: Who was the ambassador then?

TURPIN: Bloke called Rice, who was the ex-head of Gettysburg College, I think it was. He was a pure politician and never pretended to be anything else. Never interfered with anything. He told the State Department, I was told, that he wanted a thoroughgoing professional as his DCM. They gave him Fisher Howe, who may have had many virtues, but being a real professional weren’t among them.

Q: Well, Fisher Howe ran the executive secretariat at one point.

TURPIN: He wrote a book or pamphlet or something about the use of computers back then. I don’t think he was disfigured with any knowledge of what he was talking about. He was a holy terror. His wife was drunk most of the time. Didn’t add much to the joys of living. Holland was the easiest place to work in that I can imagine. The Dutch would tell you anything that you wanted to know on Saturday morning, if it didn’t involve Phillips or electronics. And they could not have been more cooperative. Could not have been nicer. I thought it was too easy.

Q: I know that part of this time, the only dispute was KLM landing rights.

TURPIN: Well that wasn’t in my time, thank goodness. We had a big dispute about degouising.
Q: *This is for mines on ships?*

TURPIN: Yes. And what the argument was about, I don’t remember. But we wanted something and they wanted something. And I went over to see my friend in the foreign office and said, “here we are, what are we going to do about this?” He said, “I don’t know. I’ve never seen a situation like this. You are totally wrong and won’t admit it. We are totally wrong on this other issue and we won’t admit it.” I said, “well, Yonn, we’ve got to figure some way out of this that keeps both our sets of admirals happy.” And we did. I don’t know what it was.

The biggest fool thing that I can remember was when I got – this was the most embarrassing experience I think in my entire, if you can call it that, career – just about three or four days before Christmas of 1963 we got a cable. And it said “transmit and close note verbatim.” And in those days you didn’t do verbatim text very often. I don’t think anybody cares now. But they did then and this thing said that under the mutual security act of 1962 or 3 or whatever it was, any government any flagship of which had called out or planned to call at Cuba would be instantly cut off from all U.S. assistance unless said government can give us iron clad assurances that this won’t happen [again].

Well the way the Dutch had been handling this was that day to day the shippers association told people “don’t go to Cuba.” And nobody had except one ship that had broken a propeller shaft and another one that intended to go but turned back. Well the State Department was, I will say for them, properly humble. The deadline, by the way, was New Year’s Day. And they were to accept these terms unconditionally or we cut off all aid. Now our aid in those days consisted of about $450,000 I think, which was devoted to training tank crews to operate tanks which our military attaché was busily engaged in trying to sell the Dutch.

So I went over to the foreign office and presented my thing. And I was allowed to apologize, as I did. Because it had gotten fouled up in Washington and that’s why we got it two days before the deadline or something like that. Well, in due course I was called, I think eight o’clock in the morning, to the foreign office, which I seldom went to. It was a building that looked like something out of Charles Adams, especially on a gray January day in the Hague, which can be about as gray as anything is. And I was called into the presence of this tall, saturnine – he was in charge of American and western hemisphere affairs – and I had been told that he had Americans fried for breakfast. He hated Americans. So I was not anticipating any joyful time. He handed me his reply and I said, “may I read it?” And he said, “sure.” I looked at it and I said, “well, I hope that this works and I know that the State Department was going to bend over backwards trying to straighten it out and I do want to apologize for this asinine demand. Sometime I hope you have something equally silly to ask of us.”

He said, “young man, we know perfectly well who ran the Germans out of this country. We know perfectly well who fed us during the hungry winter. We know perfectly well who is keeping the Russians out of Western Europe. You can have anything out of this country you want. Good morning.” Talk about crawling under the door. It seemed to me at the time, and subsequently, that the Dutch and the Canadians are the only people we can keep around in great regularity.
Q: In 63 then, was there a chicken war going on?

TURPIN: No. There was the usual hassles going on with the ECU, or whatever they called the thing in those days, and I got... I knew a good deal about what was going on because the Dutch would talk to me about it. I didn’t know much about... I mean the Hague, we didn’t have any problems with them. The big problem we had, or the problem had by our political counselor, a good friend of mine called Dan Horowitz who died last year, trying to get them to agree to the “multilateral nuclear farce” as we used to call it. “Force,” of course. Which was a State Department idea, I think. It could only really have come from the State Department. And the idea was if you remember that they were going to put a British, American, Turkish, French and somebody else force on some kind of missile destroyer and that was going to put the European finger on the nuclear trigger. Well the problem with the Dutch is they didn’t want a finger on the nuclear trigger. They wanted ours on there and that was perfectly satisfactory. And they simply weren’t going along with all this. And Dan Horowitz spent hours and hours trying to get them to agree to it. And they wouldn’t. They said they thought it was damned stupid. Which I think it was. Anyway, we didn’t have big problems. And if you wanted information, as I said unless it involved Phillips, you got it.

DONALD R. NORLAND
Political Officer
The Hague (1964-1969)

Ambassador Donald R. Norland was born in Laurens, Iowa in 1924. He joined the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in Morocco, the Ivory Coast, France (as part of the U.S. NATO delegation), the Netherlands, and Guinea. He was ambassador to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and to Chad. Ambassador Norland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Then you came out and you got, at last, to The Netherlands, is that right?

NORLAND: Yes. The great irony, having missed it before -- my predecessor in The Netherlands, who'd gone there in 1961 when I was supposed to go there, was transferred and I was able to replace him. But this is another assignment resulting from a chance meeting in the corridors of FSI. I was at FSI studying Spanish, assigned to Ecuador in a new position as "executive director" of the country team.

Q: Was this also part of this matrix-type...

NORLAND: I think so.

Q: I remember I was offered that job when I was in Yugoslavia. They said this is a big thing. God, I looked at this and I said, "Oh, my God." My gut instinct was to stay away from that.

NORLAND: I know. It looked like another level of bureaucracy. But it was a chance to get into
another area. I felt I'd done Africa. I couldn't get an African assignment. And it was a chance to learn Spanish. So I was in intensive Spanish. And I happened to meet Julius Walker. You know Julius?

Q: Yes.

NORLAND: I met him in the corridor one day. He was in Personnel, and he asked, "What are you doing?"

And I said, "I'm studying Spanish, preparing to go to Ecuador."

"To do what?"

And I told him.

And he said, "You don't want to do that."

I said, "That's interesting. Why not?"

He said, "Well, let me look into it, and I'll give you a call."

Within a week, he called to say, "How about The Netherlands?"

And I said, "Absolutely."

I didn't think I was giving up anything particularly important.

So I went to The Netherlands instead. But it was one of those corridor arrangements.

Q: You were there from '64 to '69. What were you doing there?

NORLAND: The first two years, I was the deputy political counselor, number two in the Political Section. There I had a boss who was a true Wristonee. He sat in his office, with the morning telegrams and the newspapers that he could read (he didn't read Dutch) and the periodicals and the INR studies, and he read. And I studied Dutch an hour every day; I don't think I missed a single day, five days a week. I studied with a wonderful teacher. The Department's arrangement was: You give us a half hour of your time, and we'll give you a half hour of the Department's time. So I was there at eight o'clock for an hour. I later got a rating of 4/4 in Dutch language.) Knowing Dutch was a way of getting out of the office. I made it a point to get out and meet people. The Dutch are very approachable, once you make the effort.

My first year there was torture. They had an inexperienced chargé, who had imperious attitudes. One notable incident: he came into a room where a colleague was seated, and said, "When the chargé comes in, you stand up." Now I happened to be already standing. But that was an attitude that stuck in the craw of a lot of people. A Wristonee.
The political counselor was also a Wristonee, who'd had a previous assignment as a labor attaché in India, but had no particular interest in NATO, or the EC, or the Dutch and their culture. He was a bookworm, in a sense.

Q: For the reader, you might explain what a Wristonee was.

NORLAND: Someone who had been in the Department of State in a Civil Service-type position, and who was told, as a result of the Wriston Report of 1953-4, that you had no option; if you wanted to stay in the Department, you must make yourself available for overseas duty. They were given a certain amount of time. But in the shakedown of what would happen, they ended up, most of them, taking a job rather than being dismissed.

I'd had one of those in NATO, a man who just went around wildly, thinking that this was his opportunity to make a tremendous impression with his rigid, disciplined attitudes. It was a difficult experience.

Anyway, after a year of this in The Netherlands, while I spent my time getting acquainted, learning Dutch, both those men were transferred. Not coincidentally, by the way, because the new ambassador was Bill Tyler. And he brought with him Earl Sohm. And they brought with them Cleo Noel. You know Cleo Noel's name?

Q: I know Cleo. He was killed, of course, in Khartoum.

NORLAND: That's right. Cleo became the boss in one of the best hierarchies that you could possibly imagine.

Q: Bill Tyler was Mr. Europe for some time.

NORLAND: He had been the assistant secretary.

Q: Assistant Secretary for EUR.

NORLAND: Right. I'm told that his oral history is one of the best, and at some point I would like very much to read it. I've maintained contact with him, and I occasionally see him.

Q: He's a fine man. I interviewed him over a period of about three sessions, I think.

NORLAND: He is remarkable.

Q: A very, very nice man.

NORLAND: He brought so much. Tremendous. I mean, he is the most erudite man I've met -- not in a disagreeable way, in a modest way. Excessive modesty perhaps. He is a most Renaissance-like man. He had unbelievable qualifications: an ability to identify key issues, his dealings with Josef Luns, the foreign minister of The Netherlands, his way of managing the embassy. Earl Sohm, too, had such a delicate touch. And Cleo was so good; interested in
everything, and willing to let me have the run of the job. He said, "Go and meet people, get acquainted with the fractieoorzitters," the party leaders. And, of course, receptions are important in The Netherlands. I could say I thought it'd be good if Bill Tyler had lunch privately with one of these floor leaders. Well, I would be told to go ahead, arrange it, and sit in. It was just totally different, like night and day.

Then Cleo got his invitation to return to Khartoum, and Earl and Bill Tyler performed what is sometimes considered a minor miracle; they managed to get a deputy political counselor made a political counselor. It's not easily done. So I had three great years in The Hague as political counselor. And that was really just a wonderful experience, marred only by the awful Vietnam issue.

**Q:** I was going to ask. The Dutch more or less parallel the Swedish experience as far as our time in Vietnam.

**NORLAND:** Well, except their attitude was greatly tempered by their loyalty to NATO. They were torn: they did not want to do anything that would weaken NATO; and they did not want to do anything that would weaken NATO's backbone, which was, in a sense, the United States. So, even within the Dutch Foreign Ministry, you had two quite different attitudes. You had those who said, "Look, don't be tough on the Americans. We need them desperately." And you had others who said, "But the Americans are hurting themselves. They're weakening their own ability to perform this role." So you had a somewhat pacifist anti-American group in the Foreign Ministry that was saying, "Let's tell them honestly how we feel. Let's not just roll over and accept whatever they tell us." It was a painful period. I knew people on both sides, and I tried to be a link between them and to be honest, but it was difficult.

**Q:** Were we having trouble with the students at that time?

**NORLAND:** Yes.

**Q:** It wasn't just the Vietnam issue; they seemed to be a problem for the Dutch, too, weren't they? They seemed to be a force unto themselves.

**NORLAND:** The students were not a major force in The Hague. They were a problem in Amsterdam, particularly. This was the age of drugs, LSD, and the youth culture, an anti-Vietnam spirit took the form of experimentation. It was regrettable. One Dutch political party formed during this time represented a sizable segment of Dutch youth. It was called D-66. Have you heard of it?

**Q:** No.

**NORLAND:** Democrats '66. And a young man named Hans Van Mierlo was the leader. He was a casual dresser, which was not customary in The Netherlands. When you came to see people, you were generally formal. He typified this new generation. They presented themselves in the 1966 elections, and actually won some seats, seven or eight out of 150. The atmosphere, even then, was such that a lot of people didn't think it would be proper for the American ambassador
to receive Hans Van Mierlo. So it was arranged for them to meet in my house. Otherwise it would be interpreted as being soft on our critics over Vietnam. Well, Bill Tyler agreed to come and talk with him. Bill charmed him, and we had good relations from then on.

Peter Dankert, a young Socialist married to a Frenchwoman (who was suspected of being a leftist), was Socialist spokesman on foreign policy and NATO affairs. He was quite ambivalent about how firmly the Dutch Socialist Party should support our NATO policy. But we remained in contact and had long discussions. It was great fun.

So the issue was a terrible impediment to the kind of relations that they wanted and we wanted but that we couldn't have.

*Q: Were there any issues other than Vietnam that were a problem either in the United Nations or dealing with the former Dutch Netherlands East Indies and that sort of thing?*

NORLAND: Yes, there had been.

*Q: But at the time you were there.*

NORLAND: Yes, there was a residue of that epoch. Luns never forgave Robert Kennedy for having pushed the United States, especially in the United Nations, into forcing the Dutch out of what was New Guinea.

*Q: New Guinea, Irian.*

NORLAND: West Irian.

But I have to mention one other thing that preoccupied me during this time, and it illustrates this ambivalence in the Dutch view. NATO and its many manifestations -- bases, logistical areas, PXs -- having been forced out of France, the call went out: "Where else in Europe can we install some of these bases?" The Netherlands is one of the most densely populated areas of the world, and yet the Dutch came through and offered us two major bases: one, called Soesterberg, where they actually put in an Air Force unit; and another base in the south, called Bussum, where there was a Southern NATO Command. So, on the one hand, we had fruitful discussions. I can even remember the names of the Dutch pro-NATO, pro-U.S. people who said, "Well, this is more important than niggling you on Vietnam." We received, in almost record time, Dutch agreement to the bases. We didn't have long, acrimonious discussions about what would be done. The Dutch virtually wrote it and we signed it. We had people moving into the bases in a matter of months.

I thought at one time that was going to be my greatest achievement in the Foreign Service, having succeeded in laying the groundwork for this rather rapid acceptance of NATO bases by the Dutch. I made the initial contact and the initial request. Bill Tyler followed up.

But the Dutch accepted the bases despite the crowded conditions. We had a PX at Soesterberg. One of the rituals of the wives was to get into the car once a week and drive this harrowing
autobahn some fifty miles to Soesterberg Air Base, where the kids would go along because there they could find American comics, American candies and that sort of thing.

There were other important discussions; for example, on the NPT, the Nonproliferation Treaty. The Dutch wanted this very much, and they wanted to go even further than we. They had real experts; one of them was Terwisscha Van Scheltinga, Mr. NPT. And he was also very Dutch; he was not going to accept anything unless it was clear that the "i's" had been dotted and the "t's" crossed. But we talked and by '68, he was ready to go along. His desire to carry this even more deeply had been appeased. And the Dutch were enthusiastic supporters of the NPT.

There were other issues where the Dutch would have taken issue with us but, generally speaking, it was wonderful. If we could only have escaped Vietnam. It was embarrassing. You'd bring in high-powered Americans who had just returned from Vietnam and who were saying, "Give us an audience and we will convince them that we are winning, that we have the situation under control, that it would be wrong to give up now, that our credibility is at stake." And, I had to sit and listen to this. A couple of journalists, one of whom just died, Dries Ekker, a highly responsible journalist, had a weekly column. It was all we could do to hold him from making significant attacks against U.S. policy. We never convinced him, but he did hold off, didn't say the worst. We saw him and his wife often; they were wonderful people.

Q: I take it that within our embassy -- you and others -- there was no feeling of support for the Vietnam War.

NORLAND: Within the embassy?

Q: Yes.

NORLAND: That was a very interesting story. We had an economic counselor, my counterpart, Emmerson Brown. Did you ever run into Em Brown?

Q: Yes, I met him.

NORLAND: He had the guts to stand up in staff meetings and say, "This is folly. This is ridiculous." And we were all finding ways, because we didn't want to be too divided between internal attitudes, where we would agree with him, and then go out and say something different. I regret that I followed the American line pretty regularly and told Em I was sorry I just couldn't agree with him. I should have agreed with him; I should have acknowledged he was right.

Incidentally, there was a breakthrough about 1968. I'd been there four years. We had the visit of Clark Clifford. Clifford and Bill Tyler had known one another (Bill knew everybody), and the day or so after the visit Bill took me aside and said, "You know, I had a talk after dinner last night" (there were thirty people or so at dinner)...

Q: Clifford was, at that point...

NORLAND: Secretary of Defense.
Q: He had been brought in by Johnson.

NORLAND: Right. And Bill said, "Clifford told me afterward that he has the greatest reservations about Vietnam, that he is working to get the United States out." Here we are, officially told that our policy is the same, yet Clifford didn't believe in it. It was just a shame that we couldn't have changed policy earlier. I feel I owe Em Brown apologies for having not stood up for him and said, "You know, you're right, Em." One of his arguments was: We're not paying for this as we go along, which is exactly what it turned out to be a few years later. But there we were. This was the problem of conscience versus duty.

Then Vice President Hubert Humphrey also came to visit. He was not enthusiastic about the war, but at the same time, he wasn't saying anything publicly about it. Too bad.

EMMERSON M. BROWN
Economic Counselor
The Hague (1966-1970)

Emmerson M. Brown graduated from Olivet College in Michigan with a teacher's certificate. He later worked with refugees in Algeria, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Egypt. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. He subsequently served in Germany, India, The Netherlands, Canada, and Washington, DC. Mr. Brown was interviewed by C. Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Then I have you go from one rough place to another. To The Hague. You were there from 1966 to 1970 as economic counselor. What was the situation there?

BROWN: About all you can say about The Hague is that it's a wonderfully pleasant place except for the weather. The rain comes down sideways and it rains about 2 days out of 3. After you've said that you've said all that's bad about the place.

I was the economic guy. We had two problems. KLM wanted landing rights to Chicago. This was back in the days when we had a very restrictive civil air policy and quite simply, from our point of view, their existing landing rights already more than compensated the Dutch for the traffic that they generated. But they kept hammering at it. They also said -- this was not in the economic end of it -- they wanted a nuclear sub -- which was madness. But they would talk about it I guess just as a matter of principle. Typical of the Dutch.

In those days, the latter sixties, we were beginning to have our serious balance of payments problems. The Dutch, without any real prompting, paid off the balance of their Marshall Plan debt settlement years, if not decades, in advance.

Q: How did the KLM landing ...
BROWN: That one was easily solved. Ambassador William Royal Tyler left and was replaced by J. William Middendorf, who had been a prodigious fund-raiser for Richard Milhous Nixon and was given his recompense, which he decided ought to be ambassador to the Netherlands. By the way, Tyler did not pick the Netherlands without thinking.

Q: Yes, I did an interview with him. He said he was due for a rest.

BROWN: About the only bad thing I could say about Tyler was that he may have kept The Hague open longer than he should have, so it would still be available.

I once raised that at a lunch with him and he gave a wonderful story about how it came about. But that's neither here nor there.

Q: You were saying that Middendorf took care of the KLM problem?

BROWN: Middendorf got his assignment, his reward for his great work for the Nixon campaign. And in going down to Washington to get briefed he learned that the only thing that the Dutch really wanted that was practical was landing rights to Chicago.

Q: No nuclear sub.

BROWN: So he said look, I've got to have something when I go over there and -- the word is that Nixon told State or the CAB "hey, give our ambassador something to play with." So Middendorf goes to The Hague and within a matter of months KLM got landing rights to Chicago and Middendorf could do no wrong.

Tyler was just a career man. He told me that he tried, did everything he could but Middendorf, with his political clout, just did something that couldn't be done by a career Ambassador.

Q: This is one of the examples of what can be done with a political ambassador. Then in 1970 you moved to Ottawa as economic counselor. You were there from '70 - '73. How did this assignment come about.

BROWN: How did it come about? It came about because Chuck Wootton, who had been the economic counselor, was posted I believe, to Bonn. So that opened Ottawa. And, as I understand, what I am about to say I have had to piece together and I couldn't swear that this is what happened, but it seems to me that this is what happened.

Len Weiss had been involved in GATT negotiations to get rid of so called non-tariff barriers, the new term for quantitative import restrictions, but more comprehensive. He had been led to believe that he was going to go to Geneva as an ambassador to work on non-tariff barriers -- and he was very sensitive to the possibility of being an ambassador. Oh dear, there's a little more to it than this, because Weiss had been economic minister at Bonn and wanted to be DCM. The ambassador was very happy with Russ Fessenden as his DCM and asked Washington to do something about it; this resulted in Weiss being brought back to Washington and Wootton going to Bonn. Anyway, there was Weiss without an assignment, under the impression that he had a
brief to go to Geneva as an ambassador. But for personnel purposes, they had transferred him to Ottawa to take Wootton's job. That's how he was getting paid. Both the DCM and the ambassador at Ottawa did the usual phoning around, finding it was pretty clear that Ottawa would be attractive to Weiss only if he were DCM or was assured of becoming DCM. That was not on. So then they had to find a place for him and this ambassadorship was held out to him and so Ottawa opened suddenly. (Weiss was later done in, the job in Geneva didn't work out and he ended up doing something else. I guess he went into INR, as I did later). Anyhow, Ottawa came open on short notice. I was at the end of my third year of what was supposed to be a four or five year tour at The Hague. I knew that this couldn't go on forever, even though it was a wonderfully pleasant and interesting assignment. I had learned Dutch and it was great fun. Suddenly I was asked if I would be interested. Our two older children were just getting ready for college so Ottawa seemed too much to hope for. I thought that they would send us to Lower Slobovia or God knows where. The idea of getting to Ottawa was just too good to be true and I jumped at it.

THOMAS J. DUNNIGAN
Political Counselor
The Hague (1969-1972)

Thomas J. Dunnigan was born in Ohio in 1921. He received a bachelor’s degree from John Carroll University in 1943 and a master’s degree from the George Washington University in 1967. Mr. Dunnigan served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946. In 1946, he entered the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Denmark, Israel, and Washington, DC. Mr. Dunnigan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: You went to The Hague from '69 to '72. What were you doing there?

DUNNIGAN: I was political counselor there under Ambassador Middendorf, who had just arrived when I arrived, and we had a new DCM, John Bovey, so the three of us were new there. I'd been given Dutch language training prior to when I went, and so I was able to land and get operating right away. And it was a very interesting post.

Q: What were the main issues that you dealt with?

DUNNIGAN: The main issues were in NATO with the Dutch. They were generally with us on most issues. We were trying to sell them a good deal of equipment. And a lot of our time was spent, and the ambassador, too, he was a good salesman, on having...

Q: He’d been secretary of the Navy, hadn’t he?

DUNNIGAN: Later. Later, he was secretary of the Navy, after this.

But, for instance, they wanted to buy a new antisubmarine plane. And the French were in there
with their model, the Breguet, and we came in with our Orion, as I recall. And we did finally eventually sell it. We also tried to sell the Dutch the F-16s and certain other planes that they were interested in getting.

Now the NATO issues had to do with storage matters. See, I had two tours in Holland and I get a little mixed up. The second tour, we had, in some ways, more important issues.

Q: Well, we'll come back to that in time.

DUNNIGAN: Then, of course, as political counselor, I had the internal political situation there, where we had a change of government from what was basically the Christian Democrats to the Socialists and so forth. So we were working closely with the politicians.

There were a few major issues of difference. We had, of course, tremendous commercial operation there, the Dutch being the world's largest purchasers of American agricultural products in those days.

But that was a relatively serene period, I would say. The Dutch had built-up their military after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. They had put out another armored division, which we were very pleased with.

Q: At that point, the Dutch hadn't developed this almost virulent left-wing group.

DUNNIGAN: Yes, it was just coming. It was coming. It started a couple of years before I got there, and it was becoming ever more noticeable, particularly in Amsterdam. The Provos, as they were first called, were against everything: against NATO, against American involvement in Vietnam, of course. Now this was another big problem for us in those years, Vietnam, because the Dutch were not at all sympathetic to us out there.

Q: How'd you deal with them on this?

DUNNIGAN: How will I say we dealt with them? We dealt with them honestly, but with the understanding that we were not going to agree on certain things. We would tell them what we were doing, we would ask them for help in certain things, for instance sending a hospital ship. They would once in a while do that sort of thing for us, but they would always run into flak in the Parliament about getting involved. They had had their troops in Korea, and they weren't going to have them out in Vietnam, you could be sure of that. At that time, too, the Dutch were still angry with us over what they considered our role in forcing them out of Indonesia. They felt we'd put the screws to them and told them they had to get out of there.

Q: So they weren't at all unhappy to see us involved in that area ourselves.

DUNNIGAN: There was a bit of an I-told-you-so about it, yes.

Q: Well, did you find there was a problem...I mean, after all, it's a matter of size and all. The Dutch have never rested well with their eastern neighbor, Germany, anyway, particularly
because during the war their occupation was a really nasty, brutal one. So the fact that we depended an awful lot on and had very close relations with Germany, did that reflect on our relations with the Dutch, where they felt that maybe we were too close?

DUNNIGAN: To some extent, and yet the Dutch were smart enough to see that it was necessary. The Dutch have some traits similar to Germans, but they're very different in other ways. Attitudes, for instance. Their background in democracy. Their respect for individual rights is much stronger than it is in Germany. Things like that.

Holland is a small country that doesn't want to be regarded as a small country. They want to play with the big boys. So you'll find that they're always among the first to send a force down to the Gulf now, or stand up. Whenever there's anything going on in the world where other countries are involved, Holland will be there. Most small countries wait until the big boys have done the work and then they'll come in later, but not the Dutch. They were once a major power back in the 17th century, and they like to recall that. And they are very welcome, too.

Q: Well, Tom, I know that we're under a time constraint, so I just want to say that we are going to stop here rather than covering your time in The Hague as DCM from '78 to '81.

DUNNIGAN: Which was very interesting, in fact.

J. WILLIAM MIDDENDORF, II
Ambassador
Netherlands (1969-1973)

Ambassador J. William Middendorf, II was appointed ambassador to The Netherlands during the Nixon administration in 1969. He also served as Secretary of the Navy from 1974-1977, ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1981-1985, and as Representative to the European Economic Community from 1985-1987. Ambassador Middendorf was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: Today is the 17th of August 1994, and we're continuing this interview. Mr. Ambassador, how did the appointment as ambassador to the Netherlands come about?

MIDDENDORF: Well, because of my work in the party. I'd been treasurer for Mr. Goldwater, and I was the head of the firm in Wall Street. We're actually one of the largest firms specializing in insurance and bank stocks in the United States, probably the world. And we were very successful but I always wanted to give a little of my time for civic activities, one of which was supporting the Republican Party, and culminating in my being elected treasurer of the Republican National Committee in which capacity I served for five years. And when Mr. Nixon in 1966 decided he wanted to run for president, he had been a great help to us in the Goldwater campaign, in the abortive Goldwater campaign, where we lost very badly. He came to Jerry Millbank and me, and perhaps one other, and said that he wanted to be president, what did he
have to do to get that, could we help him with the delegation that we had worked on for Mr. Goldwater. He had an office close to me, on Wall Street, at a municipal bond firm. So we had lunch with him, and we said we certainly can support you and will help you. So we were able to raise some funds for him, and he had some very great support from Donald Kendall and others. We were able to work with Peter O'Donnell, and a few other state chairmen in the different states. So very soon we were able to form a delegate support network for him sufficient to get the nomination, which he got. And he ran a successful campaign in '68. During the campaign at one point Peter Flanagan, who later became his chief of staff -- since I was treasurer for Mr. Nixon and doing all the work on the cash side so to speak, trying to pay for advertising and television and all that stuff, and someone else was doing the fund raising, but it's a back breaking job -- so they took pity on me and one day Peter Flanagan said, "Bill, is there anything you'd like out of this?" I said I wasn't really in for that, I've always helped a lot of other candidates in the past, but if I did do anything it would be my old love, the navy, Secretary of the Navy. He said, "Well I think that's going to be possible." But then later on Peter had to call me and tell me that John Chaffee, in order to bridge the gap the president wanted to close the gap with those who had opposed him, in the nomination process. So he said, "Would you mind stepping aside for John Chaffee at this moment?" So John was made Secretary of the Navy, and I later became Secretary of the Navy when I came back from the Netherlands -- Under Secretary first, and then Secretary. Then he said, "What else would you like?" I said that I'd always had a great love for the Netherlands, and I am particularly fond of my many friends there, I had been over there many, many times, I had business there, a tulip bulb company, which dated back to Rembrandt's time. So as a result of that he said, "Well, we'll check that out." And he called back and said, "You'll have to go through the usual process, but the President wants you to do that."

Q: Let me ask what specifically was it about the Netherlands that attracted you?

MIDDENDORF: Let's put it this way. There's the Netherlands, and then there's all the rest. We're already well known, world class, connoisseur and collector of great old Dutch art. I was also interested in Dutch art, the old masters, but having this tulip bulb company, which I think at that time the third largest in the world. It was a successful company, and 300 years old, as I mentioned.

Q: One of those that was a involved..., what was it?

MIDDENDORF: Well, you know, on that question I never did research that. I think that took place a little bit before this. Because I think that tulip bulb thing was back in the 1620's and this perhaps didn't date from maybe 1650s-1660s. But so that's a question I should have researched it. I had to sell it, of course, sell my interest in it when I became ambassador otherwise there would be a conflict of interest. In fact, I sold everything.

Q: Did you have any problems with your nomination as far as the Senate went?

MIDDENDORF: No, not at all. As I recall it was a very interesting process. I mean, I was sponsored by Senator Prescott Bush from Greenwich, he was my neighbor in Greenwich, and Senator John Saltonstall, who had been on the same crew with my father at Harvard. So those two took me in, and naturally Senator Fulbright, and Senator Pell, and all, were very supportive,
Senator Pell in particular because he's an old friend of mine, one of my closest friends in the Senate for 50 years now. So it went very quickly. I think it was only five or ten minutes. I think all my confirmation hearings, at least five or six, have all been five or ten minutes. So I think its a total of about 40 for all six. So anyway, it was a blessing. The mistake my friend John Lodge made, and he was going through with me at the time -- when Senator Fulbright asked him if he had any thoughts he would like to express, and he said, "Yes, I do." He had been governor of Connecticut and he and Francisca were great friends of many Spanish folks. And he said, "Yes, I do. Mr. Chairman, (I think he said) I want you to know that Mr. Franco was a fine fellow." So anyway, they held him up for months. By that time, I'm getting out of a month. I said, "Thank you very much Senator for the great privilege and honor of being able to serve," and got the hell out of the room, which I think is the proper way to do it.

Q: This was your first diplomatic assignment.

MIDDENDORF: Yes, and therefore obviously the most exciting.

Q: How did you prepare. I mean, on your way going there?

MIDDENDORF: First off, in the Netherlands you have to understand, it's all business, and they're very practical. The Dutch are very practical, and it helps a great deal to understand their business techniques, and methods, which I was blessed to have an understanding of, and already knowing a number of their bankers and businessmen. That's not just the preparation, of course. The Foreign Service Institute gives a language course in Dutch, and in addition to that you have a series of briefings, and Charlie Tanguy here, who was then the Netherlands desk officer was able to arrange for a number of meetings in New York with major corporations like IBM and others, at Chase, and Citibank who had huge international departments doing business with the Netherlands, and Chemical Bank. We had a number of meetings there, and businessmen were giving us the benefit of where they thought the Netherlands fitted into the European scene, and how important the Netherlands was in the business sense, plus their role in NATO, OECD, and all the other functions where the Netherlands was a key leader in international organizations. It made my job very easy because at one point the Netherlands had the Secretary General of the OECD, the head of the Bank of International Settlements, Joseph Luns at NATO, and the foreign agricultural organization chief. So it was a blessing to have all these marvelous European giants running things in Europe, in a sense, and giving me the benefit of their thoughts on many occasions.

Q: When you went out there was there any problem, or anything you had to deal with? Instructions may be the wrong term, but in other words something that has been festering, and why don't you go out and try to settle that problem. Were there any problems?

MIDDENDORF: You know an ambassador is never a free agent. You have an agricultural attaché, political counselor, and what have you, and even the spy boys are in there. So whatever problems there are, they're all being worked on very intensively, for example, KLM landing rights for Chicago.

Q: Was it Tyler who was ambassador before? He said when you came out, that the Dutch wanted
one of two things. One was a nuclear sub, and the other was landing rights in Chicago. He said he was a Foreign Service officer, he couldn't do a thing about this but you were able to...I mean the nuclear sub was really out of the question. It was just too much, the infrastructure and the whole business but that you were able to take care of the landing rights in Chicago for KLM. Did that happen, and how did you go about it?

MIDDENDORF: Well, the way of going about it was to cash in a few chips with the President.

Q: What did you do? Just ask the President to...

MIDDENDORF: I told Peter that I wanted to talk to the President about it. The President always put his feet up on the desk, and he had these big yellow pads and he'd write down everything you said. It was intimidating in a way, he sat there writing on a pad, page after page, writing down every word you said. But it worked. So I was able to report to Peter Young and Joseph Luns that we were able to deliver on that and immediately John Eisenhower was on my case.

Q: Eisenhower was our ambassador to...

MIDDENDORF: He was over in Brussels. And he said, "You s.o.b. you got them in, and now the Belgians are on my case over here." And he never did get [the Belgians into Chicago], of course he had two big problems. So naturally when I showed up in the Netherlands I got a big warm welcome. I was enthusiastic about the Dutch from the start, and I have been ever since.

Q: In the Dutch government, whom do you see? I mean not just officially, but where are the power centers for the ambassador?

MIDDENDORF: Well, it's important to be very close to the Prime Minister. P.T. Young was a former submarine skipper, and we had a lot in common because of my navy days too. And he had been a great hero in the Dutch naval service with 19 years in the job. And in addition to that, I made a great friendship with Joseph Luns. I think he'd been longer in the job than anybody since Talleyrand or somebody.

Q: He was the Secretary General?

MIDDENDORF: He was Foreign Minister, 19 years as Secretary General. He had 17 great jokes, and he'd program them on one of those tape recorders, and then when he got down to number 17, he start on number one again, and eight of them were all about Charles de Gaulle. And he'd love to tell these stories, none of them were complimentary about Charles de Gaulle. But it was very important to listen to each one, and laugh at the right moment as he (inaudible) himself, which I always did because I had met Mr. de Gaulle when I had taken the U.S. Olympic Field Hockey Team to the world championships in Lyon France in 1963. I was the captain of that particular little effort, and so I stood with the American flag rather nervously, as Charles de Gaulle came down the line meeting each of the 12 teams, and our team was lined up behind me and he's the only other person I've run into in a diplomatic role...he was also 6'4" or 6'5", so I was able to look right eye to eye with him. But at any rate, obviously I didn't have a chance to do anything more than shake his hand. Being what he was, he had a firm handshake and moved
right on. But at least I was able to tell Joseph Luns that I'd met the guy at one point, and that always started a new round of jokes starting probably at serial number six.

Q: *This was just about the time when NATO was moving to Brussels, sort of in your neck of the woods. What was the Dutch feeling at that time about De Gaulle basically kicking NATO, specifically the Americans, out of France. The wounds must have been a bit raw, weren't they?*

MIDDENDORF: Well, Joseph Luns always said, and P.T. Young always said, they were very pro-American, so to speak, and I think they always felt a little uncomfortable with the French...the way I looked at it, they felt that the French with the agriculture policy, which was really a policy designed to subsidize a whole bunch of farmers in France, much more so than their own boys. But I think they felt that the French were getting a little bit too big for their britches in a sense taking France out of NATO, and not being more Atlanticists. The word Atlanticists was a very big thing when I got to Holland in '69. I don't think it's as big today, but wherever I went the Dutch...it was one of those very few places in Europe I've ever been since even, certainly before, where when you go to someone's home or you're a guest of someone and they always got up and toasted the United States for saving them with the Marshall Plan. There was a great deal of real empathy for the United States at that time. I mean, gratitude as being one the most noble of all human emotions, so this was a rather surprising turn of events. It was a very pleasant time to be in the Netherlands, because they loved Americans.

Q: *But also you went there in '69 when something was happening over in another part of the world, namely Vietnam. I've heard stories about our consulate general in Amsterdam being almost under siege.*

MIDDENDORF: The Consul General called me up one day and said, "Bill, I'm about to be murdered. Can you bring the Marines up here? The police can't protect me." Gene Braderman. It was really terrible, they were busting the windows, they were running all around, so we went all charging up there and did the best we could to protect American property, and we had to add support there. Fortunately, everybody saved the day at the end. But he was really up a creek, obviously not hysterical, but he was extraordinarily emotional. It was a very dangerous time.

Q: *Did you feel the Vietnam thing, or was this strictly an Amsterdam thing?*

MIDDENDORF: Oh, no. I remember one time this huge crowd outside, stirred up by the TV, I'm sorry to say, because the TV would always show these people on TV so they'd all show up. And one night there was a hell of a bunch of guys and women out there, all shouting out, "Ambassador come out," and all that. So I was advised by our security people to go out the back door, and Charles, my driver, was supposed to meet me out there, and I said, "Oh, no, at the front door." So I told Charles to thread his way through the traffic because it wouldn't be right for me to go out the back door. There must have been several hundred, 500 people out there yelling and shouting, a lot of them like hippies, but very emotional on this whole question of Vietnam. So I told the guard, "Open that front door." So I went out by myself, and all of a sudden this huge crowd silenced, and they opened the way. The Dutch are polite generally. They opened the way, and I got to the car, opened the door and got in, shut the door, and said, "Charles, let's go," and he started to go forward. The Queen's palace stand about 100 yards, a cobbled stone street there,
so he started to move forward to get out and then they started banging on the car, and shouting
and screaming again but the doors were locked and we proceeded on -- it's a big heavy car
anyway, and we were able to get out of there.

Q: With the members of the government, did you find yourself explaining Vietnam ad nauseam to
the members of the government?

MIDDENDORF: No, certainly not to the central government. Then we had the Nightasweitzer
and the government fell and there was that long nine or eight months period...

Q: What was this, the Nightasweitzer?

MIDDENDORF: Norbert Schmelzer held on. Norbert Schmelzer is a fabulous person. I can't
remember all the details, but everything was in chaos, and the government changed. Whether it
was at that time or later, I remember Joop den Uyl, who then became Prime Minister, and he told
me that one of his greatest idols in this world was Willy Brandt, and he looked to Willy Brandt
for leadership. He'd been over in Willy Brandt's pullman car in one of his campaigns giving
support. He used to tell that story a lot. And he would always come to the house when he was in
the Labor Party or in the parliament, but the day he became Prime Minister he had to turn down
an invitation to my house. He said, "I can't come anymore," because of the Vietnam war. So that
hurt my feelings a lot actually because we'd been good friends up to that point. And we were still
good friends, he would always take my cigars and what have you. He was a very nice man, but I
think he felt that he had to make a statement somehow.

Anyhow, Barend Biesheuvel was an interesting guy when he took over from PTI. And I
remember making a courtesy call, and I decided to do it on my bicycle...in those days you could
ride around on a bicycle without getting shot at, so I rode down these cobblestones to the Prime
Minister's office in The Hague and knocked on the door, and the guard came down and said,
"Can I help you?" I said, "Yes, I'd like to bring my bike in here, and I'd like to meet with the
Prime Minister." "Well, give me your name and I check and see if its fine." Of course, the name
was all right because it said American Ambassador, so they took me in and I met with Prime
Minister Biesheuvel and made my courtesy call in respect to him.

Then when I was leaving The Hague three years later or whenever, the Marine Guard downstairs
said, "There's a tall man down here, and wants to know if he can bring his bicycle into the
embassy." So about two minutes later, up comes the Prime Minister, and he said, "I'm repaying
the compliment," which was very nice, it could only happen in The Hague. Everything in The
Hague is really old world in that sense, everybody is very respectful of everybody. It's a real
diplomacy center. They're still some of my best friends.

Q: What role did the Queen play in this when you were there?

MIDDENDORF: Oh, she was delightful. She played the violin beautifully. In those days when
you showed up to present your credentials to the Queen, up to the royal palace with all those
wonderful Dutch paintings, in the outskirts of The Hague. Along comes this golden carriage to
pick you up, so you get in the golden carriage, you've got your top hat on and your tails, and the
Chief of Cabinet is sitting with you, and he takes you out and introduces you to the Queen in her castle. I don't think they do that anymore. That's a nice old tradition, it didn't happen to me when I was ambassador in Brussels at the European Union. She's delightful, and her husband is a great guy and I got to know them both very well although I got to know him a lot better. We used to make a lot of trips together, even went hunting with him, Prince Bernhard, and he's been over to see us, Charlie [Charles Tanguy, former Netherlands Desk Officer who sat in on this interview] and me, and we've had dinner parties for him. Charlie and I got to know Princess Margaret, as well as the present queen, now Queen Beatrix, but then Princess Beatrix, and her husband Prince Karl. We got to know them very well, much better than the Queen even because the Queen is very quiet. And I remember Princess Margaret when Prince Maurice was born, he was only a baby of three days or a week and they came to the house and she sat on the couch with the baby, and Mr. Peter Van (inaudible) came and played the piano at a dinner party in their honor, and I was surprised she could make it. It was very pleasant in The Hague because I was interested in music anyway, and three or four times I had musical evenings where everybody had to actually have composed something. I was blessed to have in The Hague a composition teacher, who was the son of the Thailand ambassador. He was actually a brilliant young man. So I would invite all the composers from around, and I would write something, and they'd all come and we’d have 20 or so and we'd play their music, whatever they'd composed that evening, which was a very nice thing. We’d have a small little orchestra for them to perform their stuff. The word got around that we were sort of a nice place where if you were a composer you could come and get your stuff played.

Q: Did you find the demonstrations, coming back more to the political side, against our consulate general in Amsterdam and in The Hague...the Nixon White House got quite worried, a mild word, about what was happening say in Sweden and some places and they felt that...did you find that you were trying to keep this from setting off fireworks in the White House, or not?

MIDDENDORF: Oh, yes. I myself, and others, might have felt substantial threats to our persons. There were one or two times when I would have the Marine guard stay overnight at the residence when I would have received some death threats the day before. Sometimes I'd get two death threats a day. It wasn't so much for myself, but I had my family there, a bunch of little kids, a four-year-old boy. But we didn't make a big deal of it back in Washington, we just tried to keep it fairly under control. Charlie worked hard on it all the time.

Q: Were there any problems with NATO?

MIDDENDORF: General Andy Goodpaster came down. He was at that time the Commanding General at NATO, and we had him come over twice. He was wonderful the way he helped us and talked about the need for a strong defense. As a NATO country, the Dutch have to do their share. We cooked up something called Five for Central Freedom; everybody put up 5% of their gross national product for defense, because at that time the Bolsheviks were still running around on the perimeters.

Q: Did the Soviets have any particular...

MIDDENDORF: The Libyan Ambassador, who was the head of the big Libyan campaign, he
was the one who was supposed to have been responsible for topping King Idris, and as his reward he was given the post in The Hague. He had a posting down about half a block from my house, so I got to know him very well. I'm sure he was well respected everywhere, but he also liked to have in the late afternoon a couple of drinks. So anyway, I was making a courtesy call on him for something such as protesting some action they were taking, he was always in a very relaxed mood. But one time I remember a very interesting thing with this ambassador. He was presenting a demarche to me, or I was presenting something about some action -- either we didn't like what they did, or they didn't like what we did. I remember a rather long, prepared speech to me as we sat on the couch under this huge picture, with some Bolshevik in the background in the picture, in a huge frame. Thank God it didn't topple over and kill us both. It seemed like about six or seven minutes into this prepared speech, which was obviously prepared by somebody other than himself, it was almost like a ritual, and then all of a sudden the door opened from the kitchen and out rushed what I thought was the chauffeur, and he came over and whispered in the ambassador's ear, and then left. As if nothing had happened, he turned and flicked something on this picture frame and there was an audible sound like a switch, and then he began this spiel all over again. So I had to listen to this six minute spiel again.

Q: *The recording wasn't working too well.*

MIDDENDORF: Anyway, we were good friends and whether he went on to greater things, I've never found out. At least he was enjoying his post there.

Q: *Were they making any inroads into the left wing, the socialist side, or not?*

MIDDENDORF: I think that (inaudible) did not need much prompting. (noise on tape) And Max had been very active in his party. But as ambassador we got to know everybody on both sides. So when Max (inaudible) moved up to Foreign Minister, we had already made those friendships. Charlie and I had spent a lot of time with him. So when he got the job, naturally he was very (inaudible) of NATO, very silent, and I think that may have saved the (inaudible) regime. I don't think the Soviets down the street had much impact on him.

Q: *I was Consul General in Athens during most of this time, the Dutch were in absolute leadership of the anti-colonial movement. And we were trying to work within it...*

It was a difficult period, and the Dutch, I would say, were the most adamant... Well, it was primarily Max. Something had gone wrong, and for some reason he'd been hurt at some point.

Q: *How did you find the embassy staff?*

MIDDENDORF: John Dudley was my first DCM. Bill Tyler, my predecessor, was a fabulous ambassador. So they had left, or were leaving, and I was always very grateful to Bill Tyler because he said, "Come on downstairs." And I said, "What's this?" "This is my wine cellar, and for a very minimal fee I can let you have the whole thing," which was incredible because Bill Tyler when it comes to wines...and the Dutch...I was a member of an Academy for wine specialists. In the Netherlands you had to be a super wine lover; I was taken in only for an honorary reason, I guess. So we'd go to each other's houses with these wonderful Dutchmen
around the country. Each one would have these special wines, and I had to keep up some standards. They were all leaders in the business community, and they were all top people, so it was very nice to inherit the wine cellar from Bill. And John Bovey, then became our DCM and, of course, there can be no finer diplomat than John Bovey. I don't know if you've ever met him?

Q: I've talked to him on the phone.

MIDDENDORF: A fabulous Francophile in the sense...I mean his French was impeccable, but he knew Europe, and he was well respected, knew everything, and kept me out of trouble. Because you know, when you come in and you're enthusiastic, and you want to do everything like yesterday, he was able to keep me from doing all the wrong things, and that makes all the difference in the world. When he left, he and Marcia decided to move down -- he had written for the Le Monde, he was a great intellectual -- he wanted to live in France, and so did Marcia I believe -- I hope this isn't inaccurate -- but I think he bought himself a wonderful south-of-France house. It was one of those wonderful things, a farmhouse, but it didn't have much plumbing, and it didn't have much heat. He loved it of course, but Marcia was very unhappy, I'm told, cold in the winter, also I think he tired of it too, because he eventually sold it and moved to Cambridge. I think it's different when you go there for summer, and for a visit, than if you try to get in there and live full time down there in one of those remote places. It's very bucolic, and has a lot of traditional history, but I'm not sure in the end John was unhappy with it. It's so hard to fit in. If anybody could fit in, he could fit in because he had his writing for Le Monde.

Q: Were there any major issues that you had to deal with, say with business? Were there business problems?

MIDDENDORF: In an embassy, of course, you come in every day and there's a series of cables. The Germans and the French were pushing this European Consortium, and the European fighter plane, and we were promoting the F-16. And, as Charlie said, we had to switch gears halfway through the debate. They had Pratt and Whitney engines, or General Electric engines, I'm not sure, I can't remember now the details, but United Technology was heavily involved. And also at one point Northrop Aviation was there, and Tom Jones came over personally to brief us on his fighter, which was a much cheaper fighter, and apparently didn't satisfy their needs in capabilities and what have you. Anyway, there was a huge debate. We were always kind of in the action on that. I think in the end the Dutch always did the right thing as far as our planes.

Q: Did you find yourself at all inhibited by the problem that often comes up where the French or the British can settle on one piece of equipment, one manufacturer, and say this is the one we're pushing for. The United States has to be sort of even-handed.

MIDDENDORF: We had two or three.

Q: And if you've got two or three, there might be something that's clearly better, but doesn't this dilute our effectiveness.

MIDDENDORF: You're absolutely right. Whenever you get two American products competing, you go catatonic. They're coming at you with one mind, and you're frozen because you can't take
sides. It's a terrible problem. We have to get our act together whenever we're going to sell anything abroad, in my opinion.

Q: Particularly at that time -- I don't know how it is today -- but you just had to say, well, everything is good.

MIDDENDORF: But your point is not necessarily aircraft when there is a dual product coming at you. Absolutely. In which case you can't do anything, you're really frozen. All you can do is respond, but you can't take sides.

Q: Were there any other products where you got caught up in something like that? Say the French were pushing one product because they seem to be able to line up with one product, or the British, and we just couldn't act because there were too many competing American products of a certain nature.

MIDDENDORF: I can't remember...

TANGUY: I don't think it was a big issue. I heard there was a wine tasting organized by our commercial counselor of American wines.

MIDDENDORF: I did that, I organized that.

TANGUY: We got the Dutch to start to buy American wines which was a real coup, I thought.

MIDDENDORF: We had the first California wine tasting. We were able to talk a bunch of these guys in California into bringing their stuff over there. We put on this big thing at the embassy. The French were so furious, they thought we were really coming at their territory when we brought in American wines in 1970. There was hysterical laughter about the quality of American wines. Everybody said they're such non-starters, they're not going anywhere. And I remember Walter Wriston from Citicorp showed up, they happened to have a trade mission, a bankers’ mission over there at the time. And he was saying to everybody that the California white wines are great, and they've got a future. At any rate we were able to make a fairly good impression. There were some impartial people among the French who thought we might have something going. Actually the problem is that California wines are a little expensive in Europe. At that time they, were a fraction of the price of the French.

Q: Were there any other issues that I might not have touched on during this '69 to '73 period? We were just about to end the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration was quite strong in foreign affairs at that time.

MIDDENDORF: Well, there were two Nixon administrations. The first Nixon administration was very active, and pro-active, and Henry Kissinger was very active. He and Bill Rogers weren't the world's greatest pals, perhaps they were good friends, but they both had a different role to play. I think Bill Rogers had less access to the President, and therefore, on major foreign policy issues Henry had more stroke to reach on. But I always carried on one rule, and that is that every cable and every communication was sent directly back to the desk officer, or to their
related agency in government. I played it straight and communicated everything; even if it was
going to go to the President I communicated through the desk officer, Charlie [Charles Tanguy]
or his successor. And then if I wanted to see the President, or wanted to see someone, they would
set it up for me. I must say, to President Nixon's credit, I always had access to him. Whenever I
wanted to see him, I'd go right in. I mean he always set something up.

Q: Were there any issues you saw him about?

MIDDENDORF: Usually the type of issues we're just discussing. I'd give him a progress report.
He was always very interested. There was one occasion where the President had me in on some
issue, and for some reason some of the staffers wanted to keep Ryan Van Linden, their
ambassador, out of the room -- the Dutch ambassador. I can't remember the circumstances, we
went over to the White House together and I just walked in, and all of a sudden the door shut,
and I was in there with the President. And some Dutch delegation, I can't remember exactly what
it was, and the ambassador was outside and he got madder than hell. For some reason he had
done something, or I don't know who had gotten mad at him, but at that point there was some
reason they kept him out. But he stormed right in. He insisted on being in the meeting, and in he
came, to his credit.

Q: Did you see any of the Kissinger-Rogers differences through different channels. Was
Kissinger coming at you from a particular angle?

MIDDENDORF: We weren't that big a player. Obviously we weren't on the China team, or
Russian, where Henry's interests were much more dramatic. Helmut Sonnenfeldt worked for
Henry, and Helmut was always much more accessible to me, or to the team if there was a major
issue. He would be able to organize a meeting. There was one occasion early on when Henry
suggested that I should keep the channels open directly to him if there was any major issue. That
was when I was fairly naive and didn't know that there was a routine way of doing things in the
State Department. But in checking it over with Charlie, and with John Bovey, I decided to do it
all straight, right through the State Department. I think it turned out to be the proper way. I got a
lot more done that way. I had a very good team back in Washington who was always very
responsive, I got a reply instantly, and they'd fan out throughout the agencies on any request.
And I always got extremely good support. You might say we got almost favored treatment.

TANGUY: Of course you laid the foundation by having all those briefings and meetings in
Washington before you went out to the Netherlands. You'd already made all these friends, so
when a cable came in that was going to some other part of the State Department, it wasn't falling
on a stranger's desk, you already knew them. And the other thing you should recall, Stuart, is that
you came back, I think, the first year out there 14 or 15 times, all but one of which was at your
own expense. So when the ambassador shows up -- its one thing to send a cable in, and the way
the Department works, they can kind of ignore it if they chose to, but when the ambassador
shows up it's a little hard to ignore the ambassador...very exciting times.

Q: You mentioned that business was a very important element.

MIDDENDORF: I'd say 60% of the gross national product with the Dutch is exports.
Q: Did you find that here your business experience was an advantage and you did not have to rely on the Department of State? I’m not saying this in a derogatory sense, but the problem is that the Department of State is not very business-oriented.

MIDDENDORF: Oh, yes, it is. The economic counselors were very professional. It is true that, in trying to put a little emphasis on this idea of export promotion, we were able to attract Jimmy Carter with his Georgia delegation and businessmen, and later on when I was ambassador in Brussels I was able to get Chuck Robb over with his delegation, and we would have a number of delegations and businessmen that we would invite. I even sent out, naively I'm afraid, a letter to every CEO in America of the Fortune 500 inviting them to come over there and start getting into the export business. And we would lay out all the facilities for them. We got some response, but not the level of response I had hoped for, because America is not that export-orientated. One of the disappointments I had was when I went...I hate to say this...but when I went to the Commerce Department for a list of the Fortune 500 with their addresses -- I mean it was a simple request, and it was seven or eight months before I got an answer. In meantime, I just got ahold of Forbes, or one of these magazines and had somebody copy it all out. It was as if I were asking them to turn over some major state secrets. I would have thought that was their job, to get us all geared up. Perhaps they thought there was some hidden political gimmick on my part to do this.

Q: They just didn't have it. Did President Nixon visit there? Or Vice President Agnew?

MIDDENDORF: No, we tried to get him, we couldn't get him. We tried to get Nixon a number of times; Luns said we had to get him. So I kept sending back cables saying this would be the first time a president had been here since God knows when -- since ever. In fact Bush was the first one that ever showed up over there. Everybody looks at Europe as bouncing over to NATO, and then over to Italy or Germany, or over to France, or over to Geneva, or over to London, or over to Israel, but nobody ever wants to show up in the Netherlands because the Netherlands are not the squeaky wheel. The Dutch just get everything done quietly, and they're very, very efficient, and people forget about them.


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Q: We're talking about '85, before the collapse of the Soviet Union. I would think in the back of everybody's mind would be you really want the Germans inside the tent, and part of the process, and not somehow left to themselves, because even before they were united we'd had enough problems before. I don't know, but was this part of the background thinking and one you could never express.

MIDDENDORF: Well, it was certainly the view of the Dutch...the Dutch have been run over by them, and possibly the British, and the Luxembourgers, and Scandinavians too. Europe is made up of two compartments. There is that latent feeling about the Germans, but Europe is split more into what I consider the south have-nots, versus the north haves. For whatever accident of history, or accident of make-up, the northern folks make a little more money and seem to have
more cash around. The southern bloc is led by the French, Italy, Greece -- you were there and you know far better than I do -- and Spain, Portugal, and France, that's the southern bloc and they're always looking for something from the north, some subsidy or a little bit more access to something. Whereas the north knows darn well that they're being taken, but for unity they're willing to pay that price -- the Dutch especially, who as I say are very external, 60% of their gross national product is exports, so the Dutch are an external nation. They live beyond their borders, so to speak, they don't look inward at all. Ever since the 17th century, the age of Rembrandt, the Dutch have been the great merchants of the world. They're really very great Atlanticists, they're wonderful. So it comes down to the Dutch, and the Belgians, and the Luxembourgers, and the Germans, and the Danes, and the British -- the British are late in the Union, but the British are trying to hold on what they got, not give up too much in the way of subsidies. And the British, curiously enough -- even though they led the charge against the Belgium ex-Prime Minister and have blocked the common currency -- the British are good leaders in the Common Market. They've been very aggressive and active, and so have the Dutch. The Germans have always sort of been understated. For some reason they don't throw their weight around.

Q: This has been true in foreign policy.

ELDEN B. ERICKSON
Consul General
Rotterdam (1970-1974)

Eldon B. Erickson was born in Kansas in 1919. He served in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army in World War II before joining the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included positions in China, Algeria, France, Laos, Japan, Lebanon, The Netherlands, Canada, and Germany. Mr. Erickson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: You then went to Rotterdam as Consul General from 1970-74. How did you view that assignment?

ERICKSON: I thought it was the greatest assignment anybody could ever have. Better then being ambassador.

Q: This was one of the advantages of being in Personnel. If you serve your time you know what jobs are available.

ERICKSON: Well, Frank Wile, who was head of Personnel for EUR at the time...he and I had been together on Southeast Asian Affairs and then in Personnel...he said, "I have three jobs coming up. Consul General in Rotterdam, Consul General in Casablanca, and Consul General in Cape Town. Which one do you want?" I said, "Whichever one comes up first." That was how that happened.
Q: You were there from 1970-74. I would have thought it would have been a difficult time because the Dutch activists were taking a very strong anti-Vietnam stance. This was a period of anti involvement in Vietnam also in the United States. There was a lot of encouragement for young people to get out and do nasty things. The Dutch have always been on the leading edge of this kind of thing, their young people.

ERICKSON: Well, that was the only dark spot really in the whole assignment. We did have Molotov cocktails and evacuations at the Consulate, and parades, etc. Except for the throwing of Molotov cocktails at the residence and the office, we didn't have any serious trouble. The people we dealt with really weren't all that anti.

Q: Well, Dutch society always seems to me to have a peculiar duality. You have extremely activists, almost anarchistic young people and a very staid, conservative business, political community. Did you find this to be true?

ERICKSON: Yes and fortunately for Holland the radical group is centered totally in Amsterdam. The Hague is a nice and quiet bedroom community. Rotterdam is a hardworking community. Leiden is intellectual with the university. The southern Maastricht area is conservative. So you could just shrug it off. The Dutch did too. It all happened in Amsterdam while the rest of Holland just went about its business.

Q: What was your main work?

ERICKSON: Again, in Holland we had first Bill Middendorf as Ambassador and then Kingdon Gould the next two years I was there. Both of them were totally trade oriented. I must say that in many ways they were both very good ambassadors. They were totally supportive of me. In Rotterdam, again, it was trade and economics. They would help in anyway they could. They would come down and see people, etc. at my request.

Q: How was Holland as a market for American goods?

ERICKSON: It was a good market for American products and also the biggest grain port for transhipment of grains and the biggest oil port in the world. US investment in Holland is tremendous. You know 40-50 percent of German trade goes up and down the Rhine through Holland.

Q: What were the main tasks of the Consulate?

ERICKSON: It was a small post, but a terribly active one. We had Congressmen and Senators all the time who had to see the "biggest port in the world." We still had Consular invoices at that time. I think that has stopped now.

Q: Very little American shipping, I guess.

ERICKSON: There was quite a little. We still did a lot of seamen services. We had one fellow in the consular section that did entirely seamen related services. We also got all the kids who ran
out of money who were sent to Rotterdam from all over Europe for us to get work-a-ways on ships going to the United States. All immigrant visas were issued from Rotterdam.

Q: Did you find that there were areas in the United States, particular Congressmen, who were on your neck about things?

ERICKSON: No. It was more Congressmen from port cities who were always interested in Rotterdam, but they were never on my neck. Both the Ambassadors handled all of these visitors very well and we could always get the harbor master to get us a boat for touring, etc., so we could show them what was going on.

Q: Middendorf, what was his background?

ERICKSON: Investment banking.

Q: Was he Secretary of Navy before or after?

ERICKSON: Before.

Q: He was very well connected to Nixon.

ERICKSON: Kingdon Gould was the grandson of Jay Gould...and has interests in the Mayflower Hotel and all the parking lots I think in Washington. He was a real gentleman and a nice person, besides being a good ambassador.

Q: Were there any major elections or anything like that at that time?

ERICKSON: No, again, it was one of the few places I served which was relatively placid, calm and quiet. Except for the Vietnam side, it really was quiet.

Q: Who was throwing the Molotov cocktails?

ERICKSON: Young Vietnam protesters generally.

Q: Were these kids from Amsterdam coming over?

ERICKSON: Yes. We would have parades in Rotterdam, but they were always well controlled.

Q: We were having trouble, certainly later on, in Amsterdam because the local authorities didn't want to do anything. We were getting very close to closing our consulate there because there were some life threatening situations and the local authorities were not responding.

ERICKSON: The security forces in Rotterdam were just like the people there. They were hard-line security forces and it was a different atmosphere.
BRADERMAN: So, I was offered either Milan or Amsterdam, and I picked Amsterdam.

It was still thought, at that time, that it would be useful for the Consul General, the chief of the post, in addition to at least one other officer, to know Dutch.

So I enrolled in a Dutch course with my wife. We were the class, as a matter of fact. It was very good. We had two different instructors. There wasn't enough time to do the full 24 weeks, which is regarded as the minimum for the achievement of a 3.3 level. We took 11 or 12 weeks, and I think we both got a 2 level out of that. Dutch is a difficult language. I knew some Spanish and ...  

Q: Dutch is closer to German.

BRADERMAN: In getting my doctorate, I had passed the written examination in German, but that was a case of memorizing words and then promptly forgetting them -- unfortunately, but that was the case.

While I thought Dutch was very difficult, we did learn a good deal. And I must say here, in reference to the Foreign Service's language requirements, that I think knowing the language is a very important ingredient, even in a country like Holland where most all the people you meet at senior level speak English. They speak four languages, of which English is usually their number two.

We traveled the country; we saw more of Holland than most Dutch do. When you get to the small towns and you speak the language, they invite you into things that you'd never get into otherwise. That was one thing. Also, they appreciate the fact that an American has learned their language, because so few of us do.

Q: Especially one that's limited to a one-country language.

BRADERMAN: Only 14 million people around the world speak the language.

But, also, I had promised myself I was not going to be a prisoner of staff in reading the newspapers. And I was able to read the Dutch newspapers, because there there's no substitute. While there is the European edition of the Herald Tribune and so on, it does not cover Dutch events. The only way to keep up with the news in the Netherlands is either through listening to Dutch radio or reading the Dutch newspapers. I had some difficulty listening to the news, I could
get some of it, but I had no difficulty reading the Dutch newspapers.

I continued my Dutch studies in the Netherlands. I had lessons three times a week with a Dutch teacher and became more proficient. Wherever I went it was useful, and it makes more friends for the United States, which is part of our purpose. So that was a very useful, as well as a wholesome, thing.

The post, itself, for me at this stage of the game, was small potatoes in terms of administration. We had a staff of fewer than 40. I had been running staffs for 30 years that were larger than that.

It was a new experience in that it was not part of a headquarters staff. It was a new experience in that it was semi-independent, in the sense that the Ambassador always rules the roost overseas. But, even though distances are small, the 35 miles between The Hague and Amsterdam was enough of a distance so that there was no interference.

I served under two political Ambassadors, Middendorf and Gould. Both relationships were excellent -- we got along very well.

Q: Were you in charge of all the commercial activities in the country?

BRADERMAN: No, no I was not, and I understood very well why it had to be so. As a matter of fact, I had had close relationships over the years with both the Economic Counselor and the Commercial Attaché. I won't mention their names, but I was partly responsible for keeping the Economic Counselor in the service when he had some difficulties early in his career, and the Commercial Attaché had worked for me on two occasions in the Commerce Department.

But they both said, you know, this is our job and it's countrywide, and while we know that you know this and that, do you mind if we run economic and commercial activities here. And there was no question in my mind that they were right.

I had a Commercial officer on my staff, and he's the one who kept those contacts. I regarded my job to be running the Consulate-general and running it well, hopefully.

There are 11 provinces in the Netherlands and my Consular District included seven. So I was responsible for our relationships with seven Commissaries, who were the equivalent of state governors, as well as with city and other local officials.

That was another essential difference in my experience, not working in a headquarters as I had all my life, but working with local authorities. The people I knew best were Commissars, the Mayor and the Chief of Police and people of that sort, not the Minister of Economic Affairs or his staff.

Now, there were a couple of highlights (or lowlights) in this experience.

My wife was a great help. This was a period of change in the status of wives in the Foreign Service, when they were asserting their independence and so on. My wife was not under the heel
of an Ambassador's wife. In any event, though independently minded, she stepped in and did the things that a traditional Foreign Service wife should do, in terms of local and community activities and all of those things, and she enjoyed them.

She had done a lot of volunteer work in things like the League of Women Voters and so on, earlier. It appealed to her and she did them well, and also the usual amount of entertaining that one has to do.

As a matter of fact, we were able to do more than usual. This is an aside that might be useful to somebody who listens to this.

Like every chief at a post, you have a very limited amount of representation expenses. Not being independently wealthy and having been careerists, we were limited in what we could do with our own resources. So, we devised a variety of techniques for entertaining more modestly.

Her Dutch helped her. We learned of somebody who was just starting out in the catering business. He had a restaurant and was very much interested in the diplomatic end. He was Dutch and knew only Dutch, and he didn't know where to go or who to go to. There was a local resident, that I happened to meet, who introduced him to us.

My wife was able to establish a relationship with him, initially, purely on the basis of the fact that she could converse with him in Dutch.

She made an arrangement, which continued throughout our stay, in which he charged us something like 50 percent of what he would charge any other customer for running these affairs. What he got out of it, of course, were the contacts he made by doing a good job for us.

To mention one or two other things: when I had been in Washington as Deputy Assistant Secretary, one of my contacts was with the Motion Picture Association.

The Vice President for International Affairs was a former Assistant Secretary of State, named Griffith Johnson. I had known Griff before, in other ways, but we had official relationships because of problems for the U.S. motion picture industry abroad, particularly in repatriating earnings in U.S. dollars.

As a result of our relationship, I used to receive invitations to come to the Motion Picture Association's preview showings of new films.

I always found that people who were invited to those, came. Even very prominent people, who would not go to the best of cocktail parties, would come to his private showings.

During a party that was given just before I departed for Amsterdam, and at which he was present, my wife went to him and said, "Griff, you know it would be a great idea if we could do some of this in Amsterdam. Is there any way we could do it?"

He said, "Well, there are a number of representatives of American picture companies. I'll tell you
what I'll do, I'll write to our regional representative in Paris and ask him to get in touch with you. You tell him what you want and see if something can be worked out."

Soon after I got to Amsterdam, I got a call from Paris. The chap introduced himself and said that one of the company representatives in Amsterdam who handled the Netherlands for the association had asked him to call me, which he did.

We had a meeting, and I told him what I was interested in doing, which was to have some movie house offer to give me their private screening room, and then let me show current movies.

Well, out of this initial conversation, I developed relationships with three of the people who had private screening rooms, and about once every month or two, I would put on a private screening.

What worked in Washington, worked there. Whether they were important local officials, or American businessmen, or whoever -- I mean, to be able to walk into a private screening room and sit down ...

Q: And see a new film.

BRADERMAN: Correct. This movie-entertainment socializing was a great success. The Dutch drink a lot of sherry. I learned that at my first party when I was trying to figure out what drinks to serve. So, my wife and I would bring sherry and cookies and a few other things. We'd have a little party beforehand, then have the movie, and then sip something afterwards.

It turned into a very nice social evening for some 15 to 25 couples, depending on which theater we used. And that supplemented other official-social events. The movie people donated their screening rooms, and all I'd have to do was pay for the screen operators. So, for something like $50 an evening, I'd entertain an average of 20 couples. It was really a great thing.

I also found that companies, on some occasions when they were having regional meetings abroad, or things of that sort, would want to arrange parties with local officials. I was often able to add a guest list to another guest list to get them in on it. You know, I did the usual things one has to do with those you regard as important, but there were peripheral contacts that I could toss into those parties. It worked out very well.

So, I did an awful lot of party-giving that I wouldn't have been able to do otherwise.

Q: Great, you learned the ropes awfully fast. Since you started in the Foreign Service in 1947, you had some experience for it.

BRADERMAN: As I said, we decided to tour the country. We used our weekends thus, since the Dutch, like so many Europeans pretty much keep official engagements to weekday evenings. We found ourselves very busy Monday through Friday, but weekends not so much.

Later in our tour, as we developed a number of Dutch friends, we'd be invited to everything from picnics to hunting parties, which might include a weekend. But in the earlier period, our
weekends were free.

We had decided to pick a different area each weekend, and either drive or take a train, go out and wander around and see the country. This was very useful in many ways.

One related to the attitude of a couple of the major newspapers toward the United States.

I've got to go back and remind you that this period was 1971-1974, when we were at the tail end of the height of some of the feeling on Vietnam.

Anyone over 35, who knew our participation in World War II, the Marshall Plan, and so on, loved the United States. Our relationships with the older generation were great.

But anybody under 35, roughly speaking, hated the United States with a passion. Since the Dutch have a propensity for involving themselves in other people's affairs, particularly the youngsters, they decided we were "the enemy" at that time. (Later it was the Greek Colonels, and so on.)

They always have somebody they want especially to love or hate and in that period it was the United States, and the antagonism to our role in Vietnam. They really took off on us.

Now The Hague was fairly quiet, because it is a quiet city, so the Ambassador was not unduly harassed. He got some attention, but not much.

But Amsterdam, that was the place. I was not only Mr. Nixon, I was the personification of everything these young people hated about the United States. There would be demonstrations almost daily.

In the beginning, many of them were small. I would go out and discuss Vietnam with these youngsters (it would usually turn into argument), and I would do it in their language. I had been in Vietnam, they had not, so it gave me an advantage. And I would argue the case.

But when the groups got to be very large, you just couldn't do that. Once or twice I invited them into the consulate general for discussions, but that didn't work very well.

The demonstrations escalated. We had two, more or less serious, events. One was an occupation of the Consulate General.

This was a period when these kinds of things were just beginning to happen around the world. The Department of State was definitely not geared up to handle, not even to understand, this kind of thing.

I think the only international event of consequence in this regard had been the Pan Am plane incident in Jordan, where they'd been blown up. But nobody expected anything in a nice country like the Netherlands.

I would report from time to time, either as part of an embassy report or my own, on some of
these demonstrations. But when they got to be a daily event, they appeared routine and our reports were ignored. The people back home were not interested in reading that kind of stuff, anyhow.

But on one occasion one morning, we were occupied. Shall I go into it?

Q: Sure, by all means.

BRADERMAN: I don't know whether we were the first establishment that was occupied, but we were one of the early ones at any rate.

What essentially happened is that when we opened our doors about 8:30, the demonstrators planned it so that they could rush in behind the officer who opened the door.

I should point out that the previous evening the administrative officer at the Embassy called to say that someone at a tavern was overheard to say an American establishment was going to be taken over at some unspecified time.

Curiously enough, I had gotten word that something might be happening to an American installation, somewhere in the Netherlands, sometime in the next two weeks. I had heard that the night before.

It could have been a military base. We had two consulates general and the embassy -- it could have been one of them. It could have been a business establishment, one didn't' know. Nevertheless, I took it seriously.

I called the Chief of Police and alerted them to it, and he said he would put some cars on watch around the Consulate General.

I learned later that he did (they assigned a Volkswagen, which they were using to roam around the city in those days), but that officer had gone off duty at eight o'clock.

So, at 8:30, our door was rushed. I was just getting ready to leave the house, which was a half-mile from the consulate general, to come to the office.

We generally opened at 8:30; though we didn't open for business to the general public until 9:00. And opening for business was important because we were one of the largest visa-issuing posts in the world. I think in my last full year, 1973, we issued 42,000 visas -- it was a lot of visas.

I got a call from my Commercial officer saying that he had barricaded himself in his room. We had been occupied. There were two local employees in the building that he knew of, and that was about it.

He had taken one peek in the hall before he pushed a desk or something up against the wall. They hadn't disturbed him, but he didn't know when he could get to the phone again.
I called The Hague, spoke to the Ambassador, and I asked for instructions.

He asked, "What are you going to do?"

I said, "As soon as I get off the phone with you I'm going to call the Chief of Police, and get up to the Consulate-general, and we'll get these people out."

He said, "Well, that's fine with me. Go to it."

Q: Patted you firmly on the back and...

BRADERMAN: Those were Middendorf's instructions to me.

I called the Chief of Police, and we met at a corner near the consulate general.

These people had taken over the building. They had banners up from the top floor saying: "We won't get out until the U.S. gets out of Vietnam," or something to that effect. They had horns and they were blaring forth and what not.

We discussed ways of getting into the building. There were some little foul-ups -- they didn't bring any ladders that would get to the second floor and so on, but within a half-hour they had the necessary equipment, and they started to do that.

And then I remembered that one of our back doors had a broken latch (it was a metal sliding door). The building was very easy to get out of; it was very hard to get into once you bolted everything up. In addition to bolting all the doors and windows they had put file cabinets up against all the doors. But the back door was a weak spot, so we were able to get that open.

And then they told me, under Dutch law you had to give the people who were occupying the building a chance to get out. So, I asked for the leader.

They said, "We're all leaders."

So I shouted that they'd accomplished their purpose, they'd taken over the building, now wouldn't it be a nice thing if they got out peacefully, or something to that effect.

They refused.

I was discursive that day and I made three separate appeals, asking them to get out.

Later, when the matter went to court, I learned that if I hadn't done it three times, it wouldn't have been legal.

After the third time they still wouldn't get out, so we had the police break through this already partial opening. They took them all into custody and arrested them. We went back in the building and it was ...
Q: They hadn't destroyed files or anything?

BRADERMAN: No, in that we were fortunate. They used files only as barricades, used desks only as barricades. They didn't try to get into any classified material, which we only had in limited amount, and almost all in one secure place in the consulate general. So, there was no security problem from that standpoint.

They were interested in making a point. They had planned to stay 24 hours, I learned later. Instead of that, they were in there an hour and a half.

I was on the board of the American Schools. I had offered to have a Board luncheon that day in the consulate general, which is not set up to serve lunch, but we were going to do it.

By God, at 12:30, we had lunch. Everybody on the staff pitched in, got every desk back, files straightened up, everything all ready. And we were back in business by noon. That show of team spirit and loyalty was really great.

But, at any rate, that was a very unpleasant experience.

Another, that was also unpleasant and more fraught with potential danger, was this incident. We contracted with a firm to have our establishment cleaned regularly. What they would do was generally clean waste baskets, tidy up bathrooms, and so on, every day, but do the heavier cleaning once a week.

The consulate, on the ground floor, had a big, waiting room area where people interested in visas, passports, and services of various kinds would come in and then be serviced by our employees. That waiting room still had some of the old overstuffed furniture that was a relic of by-gone years.

Incidentally, the consulate general had been used by the German commander of Amsterdam as his headquarters during the war, and the residence was used as his residence. There were some things, including security stuff, in the basement that were still a remnant of the German occupation.

But the point was that this was a big, open room in which people sought services. We generally closed at five o'clock for outside visitors, and then our staff used the next half hour or so to get things organized and files away. The American staff, most of them, would stay as long as whatever they were doing required.

About 4:30 one afternoon, I got a call from one of my local employees, who handled visas, saying that he thought we had a bomb, could I come downstairs. I was on the second floor U.S. (first floor European.) I came down to the ground floor, and I said, "Hans, what is it?"

He said, "There was a big package (something that would resemble a Safeway or Giant grocery package here in the United States), which I found behind that sofa." And he said, "I picked it up
and I took it out and threw it in the bushes."

And I said, "You thought it was a bomb, you say?"

"Yes."

"Well, you should never have picked it up."

He said, "Well, I didn't think about anything. At any rate, it's sitting there in the bushes."

I gingerly went over and listened, and I thought I heard something ticking away. So I called the police. They said they would send somebody right over. Well, it took them almost ten minutes to get anyone. A squad car came by, an officer looked at it, and he said, "There's a bomb in that."

I said, "Well, what are you going to do about it?"

He said, "Look, we don't know if it's a big one, a little one, or what it can do, or anything of the sort. We need an expert."

I asked, "Do you have an expert?"

He said, "We have one man on the force who specializes in this."

(This takes on, somewhat, the characteristics of a not-so-funny comedy, but anyhow ...)

So I said, "Well, get him, quickly!"

They didn't have any walkie talkies, so they said they'd send one of the squad cars out to find him. Well, it took 20 minutes for them to find this fellow, who came riding up on a bicycle.

He took one look at the bag in the bushes and said, "That's a bomb." He said, "I wonder if it's a percussion bomb because if it is I don't want to touch it."

I said, "It's not a percussion bomb. It was inside, it was carried out here."

He said, "Oh, okay." And he turned to me and asked, "Does anyone around here have a pair of pliers?" (This is in the year 1973, a big-city's expert on bombs.)

So we went to one of our cars and got a pair of pliers. And he defused the bomb. Then he took it apart, and I have shots of all the parts and everything else.

He said, "In five minutes that would have gone off."

I asked, "And what would have happened in five minutes?"

He said, "If it was in the building where it was placed, it would have blown the building to pieces
and everyone would have been killed."

Q: Boy! That's something for your memory book.

BRADERMAN: What do you do at that stage? By this time there were crowds around, newspaper people, including a couple of stringers for the U.S. media. I made a quick decision. (And remember we didn't have much experience in that sort of thing at that time.) I decided that one of the things that whoever had put it there wanted to do, aside from killing some of us, was to get publicity. So, I offered no interviews. As matter of fact, we closed the consulate general and I quickly left. And I was unavailable that evening.

The next day, I got several calls. I said things had worked out all right and so on and so forth. As a result there was very little publicity about it.

The mayor, of course, called me, and he was very hopeful that I wouldn't try to make a big thing out of it.

The mayor and I had become good personal friends, although politically we were at odds. He was a Socialist, and I am not. He was 100 percent against our participation in Vietnam. We used to have tremendous arguments on this score. And by 1973, a lot of Americans were very much against our ...

Q: Even before that. I mean when you have two boys in college in the '60s...

BRADERMAN: Yes. Well, he thought I might, or somebody might make me, use this against the city in some way. And I told him that I was going to keep it quiet, and he was very much relieved. And we did.

But, you sit there and you wonder: Is this person going to try tomorrow? The next day? Where? How?

Q: Did you ever have any indication of who did it? They wouldn't have claimed credit until it blew.

BRADERMAN: Nobody indicated anything, and nothing on that score ever occurred again. Our house was broken into, but I don't think it was related to that. At any rate, it gave me pause.

One of the things we began to do was to change the physical nature of the consulate general. We got funds to put up barriers and bullet-proof windows. We employed a security guard.

As we began to move into the latter part of 1973 and early 1974, with much of the activity continuing, I found that instead of spending my time making friends for the United States, as well as handling the routine tasks that one has to, I was spending an awful lot of time on security.

Q: I'm afraid that's the history of a lot of the Foreign Service in the last ten years or 15 years.
BRADERMAN: And it went against the grain. I always felt that when a foreigner came to the U.S. Embassy or the Consulate-general, his first vision of the United States should be that we are a free and open society. That's what he should see. But when he had to come and find barriers and so on ...

RAY E. JONES
Secretary
The Hague (1971-1972)

Ray E. Jones joined the State Department after serving in Germany and Korea shortly after World War II. His career included assignments in Switzerland, Sudan, Austria, Vietnam, The Netherlands, and China. Mr. Jones was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1994.

Q: So, after your experience there, you went back to Europe. Tell us about that.

JONES: Well, from Monrovia, I got a direct transfer to The Hague. This was in the fall of 1971.

Q: Yes I remember it well having been at The Hague at that time. I might add that I know why you were brought there, because the Ambassador, Bill Middendorf, had not had the best rapport with the first two secretaries he'd been given and I think the service was looking for its best. But, anyhow ...Then you arrived in The Hague, and with his reputation which I presume you'd heard of. Did you have any doubt about going there?

JONES: No doubt, whatsoever. Bill Middendorf was an extremely generous person to work for.

Q: Well I think this is partly due to your way of handling ambassadors.

JONES: I enjoyed his flair and his collection of art and taste. Exquisite.

Q: Well, I know that he reciprocated that because he was very impressed with your art collection. Did you have any problems in your life in The Hague or was it ...?

JONES: None whatsoever. I enjoyed the Dutch very much. They were very good friends.

Q: And certainly a tremendous change of climate from Liberia.

JONES: Definitely.

WAYNE LEININGER
Consular / Administrative Officer
Rotterdam (1974-1976)
Born in New York State, Mr. Leininger was raised in New York and Florida. After graduating from Florida State University he joined the Foreign Service. His foreign assignments, primarily in the Consular field, include Moscow, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong and New Delhi, where he was Regional Supervisory Consul General. After attending the State Department’s Senior Seminar, Mr. Leininger had several assignments in Washington concerning Personnel Management. Mr. Leininger was interviewed by Michael Mahoney in 2004.

Q: As your tour was coming to an end, did you think about a next assignment?

LEININGER: I didn’t really have a chance. The Department said that I was going to Rotterdam. That sounded good to us. First though, I had to attend Dutch language training, although as we know the Dutch speak several languages - French, English, Spanish, German, and Dutch. But in any case, I had to acquire a passable knowledge of some foreign language and Dutch served that purpose well. So I spent five months learning Dutch and got off language probation status.

So by the summer of 1974, we were in Rotterdam. That was a wonderful small post. There were only five Americans officers there. I was nominally the “American citizen services” officer. I was also the full time administrative officer. Towards the end of my tour, I also served as the commercial officer for 6-8 months; I also did some political reporting in my spare time. So I had opportunities to be involved in a wide variety of Foreign Service tasks. That was a wonderful developmental assignment - an opportunity that would have been hard to replicate in most other posts.

I should mention that I was also the “by the way” officer. My office was right down the hall from the consul general’s. He was an economic officer on his first assignment as a principal officer. He had been in Rotterdam earlier in his career as a junior officer, and had married a Dutch woman. So he was very excited by being the principal officer in a post he knew; but this was his first assignment as a consul general. He had never run anything larger that a three-man economic section. He had a very hard time making decisions. He had to be pushed, led, nagged, begged, and threatened, before we could get any decision out of him. The subject matter was not an issue; he just could not reach a decision on any issue presented to him.

Unfortunately, I was the first American within his line of sight whenever he entered or left his office. So I was “by the way, could you look into this matter for me?” Or “could you follow up for me on this?” That got me involved in a lot of projects that had nothing to do with my nominal job description. He had of course a deputy who also served as the chief of the consular section - John Coffey. John liked to go to visit the American ships that were coming in. He had been a consular officer in almost every major seaport in the world - back when “shipping and seamen” issues were major issues for American consular offices. By the mid-1970s, though, the industry was deeply into container ships. The ship’s captains no longer had to come to the consulate to present and deposit ship’s papers, because the vessels were in port for less than six hours - the derricks just put the containers off and on the ship, and it was on its way to the next port. The unions also had become a major factor, which meant that we did have to worry so much about seamen’s welfare and repatriation and other personnel issues as had been the case in earlier days.
The unions took care of those matters. In any case, John liked to visit the ships; he used to spend weekends on board talking to the captains. So he had no time for issues dealing with post management. Since the CG could not reach any decisions and the deputy was busy elsewhere, often the chore was left to me. That included such matters as having the CG’s driver disciplined for drinking Heineken on the job, for instance!

Q: It is interesting that the principal officer had no management training or experience. That has been a theme that has run throughout the history of the Foreign Service.

LENINGER: Rotterdam was a commercial-interest post. It was the largest seaport in the world at the time. It was the banking center of the Netherlands. So an economic/commercial officer was assigned as the Consul General. It was a very busy post.

We enjoyed living in Rotterdam, except for the weather. There was a period between February and May, 1975, when we saw the sun on only two days.

Q: Aid you notice any anti-American feeling because of Vietnam?

LENINGER: By the time we arrived that issue had pretty much faded from the public’s mind. The Dutch were very judgmental about what they considered to be the deplorable state of race relations in the U.S. Within five years, they themselves had to face the problems of integrating different races and cultures; they had a major influx of Surinamers who had gained their independence from the Netherlands. They came by the hundreds and thousands, until the Dutch decided to shut down the immigration. I think it was four or five years after our departure that the Dutch had to face race riots in their own cities - both by the whites protesting the influx of the black Surinamers, and by the blacks protesting their treatment by the Dutch. That, I think, brought pretty to an end the Dutch tendency preach about the status of African-Americans.

Q: Did you have a heavy consular workload?

LENINGER: Visas for the Dutch was pretty much a pro-forma operation. But we had a lot of third-country applicants - Iranians and Middle Eastern people. They were on the move and landed in the Netherlands as “guest workers” - legal or otherwise.

Q: In either Toronto or Rotterdam, did you notice much congressional interest in consular matters?

LENINGER: There was a lot of interest in certain visa cases, particularly in Toronto. There, fortunately, I had one of the best local employees in the world - a woman by the name of Betty Garnett. She took me under her wing when I first arrived. She drafted the overwhelming majority of our congressional correspondence; I think we received about 2,000 letters per year from the Hill.

Q: Were there cases that were more than just pro-forma inquiries? Did you get phone calls from staff or Congressmen?
LEININGER: Indeed we did - more often than not, as a matter of fact, there were phone calls -
Toronto being almost a “local call.” I ended up on a first name basis with a lot of congressional
staffers. I would categorize them as insistent, but certainly not unpleasant. I don’t think, during
my whole career, I ever have run into a staffer or congressman who went beyond reasonable
limits - with perhaps one exception that we can discuss later. I found that my contacts with the
Hill were always professional. As long as our case was supported by facts, rather than prejudices
or knee-jerk reactions, I never had a problem. The staffers understand that what they receive
from the constituent is a one-sided story; they are perfectly willing to hear a balanced and fair
presentation of the whole case.

I must say that attorneys are a different matter. The immigrants - both legal and otherwise –
living and working in the U.S. were to some extent or another desperate people. Many did not
have the required documentation; some had shady pasts. They were ripe for picking by attorneys,
some of whom we referred to appropriate authorities for investigation, resulting in some
disbarments. These were people who were manufacturing job letters for labor certification cases.
They were manufacturing marriages. There was considerable fraud involved in many cases
prepared by unscrupulous attorneys. Their clients could not afford legitimate or competent
representation.

Q: What was the background of the program that required people living in the U.S. to go to a
near-by foreign country in order to be issued a visa?

LEININGER: The only people who could qualify as for an immigrant visa from a near-by
consular office were immediate relatives of American citizens or green-card holders. Without
that connection, we would not have processed the application; they were required to go back
home. People in other visa categories, such as the then-third preference work visa applicants, had
to go back to their country of origin for processing. So the services we provided in Toronto were
primarily for the convenience of a family of an American citizen or green-card holder.

Q: You were in Rotterdam from 1974 to 1976. It was, I gather, a good assignment.

LEININGER: That is was. It was also a wonderful place for traveling because it had good
transportation facilities. It was the rail junction for northern Europe. The European trains were
fast and clean, so that we could get to anywhere in Europe from Rotterdam. My sister, after her
high school graduation, visited us and we took her around the continent - on the “Tran-European
Express.”

MARTIN VAN HEUVEN
Childhood
Utrecht (1932-1947)

Political Counselor
The Hague (1975-1978)
VAN HEUVEN: I was born in Europe in the Netherlands in a city called Utrecht, best known for the Peace of Utrecht of 1713. I was the first child of parents who both came from Utrecht. My father was an eye surgeon. My mother studied law but never practiced.

Q: In what year were you born?

VAN HEUVEN: In 1932 Utrecht was a university city. Since both my father and mother had degrees from the University, my family was part of the Utrecht nomenklatura. On my father’s side my ancestors for several centuries were teachers. On my mother’s side, my grandfather was also a doctor. His parents were farmers. So mine was a very Dutch family. We were comfortable at the time I was born, the crash of ’29 had not affected my parents. But at that time - and I wasn’t aware of it then - the Nazi threat in Germany was already evident. In due course, my father thought he saw the war coming. He was British oriented because he used to go to ophthalmological congresses in Oxford and had many English friends. He considered leaving the Netherlands, but in the end the settledness of our situation simply trumped the desire to go. So we stayed, something my father regretted ever after. We went through World War II in Utrecht. I never saw any fighting. Both in 1940 and 1945, fighting stopped just short of Utrecht. In May of 1940, we avoided being hit by German bombardments. After the Germans destroyed Rotterdam, Utrecht was next on the target list. We had been evacuated to the center of the city, to a building used by Louis Napoleon. Two hours before sunset the Dutch armed forces capitulated and so Utrecht was spared. Otherwise, I probably wouldn’t be here to tell you this story.

By 1947, my father had been back to England, and also to the United States. There, he received several offers to teach and practice ophthalmology. He took up the offer to go to the Yale medical school. On my 15th birthday, November 25, 1947, my mother, my brother, and I set sail for New York on the New Amsterdam. My father had preceded us to the United States. A week later, we settled in our new home in New Haven, Connecticut.

Q: I’d like to stop you and go back. What was life like in Utrecht during the German occupation?

VAN HEUVEN: At first it was not all that noticeable. I was 8 at the time, so my memory is that of a boy. What I remember most was the last year. The Allies attempted to liberate all of Holland in September 1944 with an airborne attack involving the 101st, the 82nd, and the 1st British airborne. The attempt to take the bridge at Arnhem failed. The other landings succeeded. The result was that the south of the Netherlands was liberated and we were not. At that point, things really turned bad. They had already become bad for the Jewish population in the Netherlands, who had experienced roundups starting in 1942. And they had become bad for others, such as the young men who had been in the army, who had been shipped off to work camps. But these events did not affect me directly, nor did they affect my father’s practice directly. But in September of 1944, the Germans requisitioned all able-bodied men. Schools closed because there
were no more teachers. Then, from all 1944 to May 1945, we went through a cold winter. There were no more cars on the road. Bicycles were also requisitioned by the Germans. The trains had stopped running. People stayed in place. Some of them had a very bad time, both with the cold and lack of food. Because my father was a doctor and had patients from the countryside, there was a supply of food that kept us going. Not everybody was that fortunate. I remember times when we would get a couple of sacks of potatoes from a farmer patient and then redistributed them to people whom we knew and who needed them. There was also a pervasive element of fear, because at that point not only the German military occupation but basically the exercise of civilian authority by the Germans had come to rest on informants. The whole atmosphere was extremely hostile. The risk of doing a whole lot of things was enormous - listening to the BBC, picking up the leaflets that the allied bombers would drop overnight. The exercise of German authority was arbitrary. We lived from hand to mouth. You really couldn’t trust anybody.

Q: I would think particularly for a boy around 12 it would be a trial for the parents to keep somebody like that from not doing something that could really cause problems. Kids are very adventurous and all that.

VAN HEUVEN: That’s a very American way of looking at the situation. But let me assure you there was no adventurism whatsoever. Since 1940 we had experienced all sorts of restraints and we knew from family experience just how bad things could get. An uncle of mine was picked up by the Germans when hiding in my grandfather’s country house. The Dutch word was “onderduiker.” He was an “onderduiker.” He had basically disappeared from view. But they tracked him down and he spent the rest of the war in a camp. His wife, a schoolteacher, later on used an unflattering word about the Germans. One of the kids in her school told the parents, and she ended up for a year in jail in the city of Groningen. So, right in the family, we knew that risks were all around you. Authority was capricious, arbitrary, and potentially lethal. It was lethal right until the end of the war, when my mother’s nephew, who was active in the resistance at the time when the Germans were capitulating, incautiously decided he would reveal himself, put on the orange armband, and start trying to carry a message across town to allied lines. He was captured and summarily executed. Had he waited 24 hours, he would be alive. Those things made you very cautious. You knew even as a 12-year-old boy that this was not a game, that what you did could cost your parents’ life. It could basically disrupt everything. So, caution absolutely impregnated everything I did.

Q: One knows of the retribution given to Nazi sympathizers in France. Right after the German surrender, what happened in the Netherlands with the Nazi sympathizers?

VAN HEUVEN: It was a very local issue. In Utrecht, there was an interregnum of about two days between the German capitulation and the arrival of the Canadian 1st Army. The underground came out into the open. The Germans were still there. The Dutch uniformed NSB, the Dutch Nazi party, were still out there in their black shirts. Everybody was armed. There were firefight in some of the squares, with casualties. After the war, there were trials and the Dutch quisling, Mussert, was convicted and executed at the end of his trial. There was not a lot of kangaroo justice. I think people were just simply too worn out by their ordeal. It was not in the Dutch nature to practice kangaroo justice, although the Dutch can harbor deep grudges. That was not the way you do things. But I cannot sit here and tell you that kangaroo justice didn’t happen.
Q: No, but it gives a feel for things.

It must have been quite an adventure for you to arrive in the United States, wasn’t it, in ’47?

VAN HEUVEN: The idea of leaving war-torn Europe and going to America was an amazing prospect. It was not just the British, but also the Canadians and the Americans who had come into Europe to chase the Nazi Germans out. The army side of the liberation was Canadian, General Foulkes’ 1st Army. But it was the British Royal Air Force that flew the sorties. During the last year of the war we witnessed every 24 hours huge overflights of bombers heading for Germany. They dropped leaflets. So you were very aware of the war because it was being waged in the air. You associated with those men who were flying those aircraft. I remember watching from the back of the garden when one of them got hit, burst into flames, and then crashed. Near our country place there were graves of some British fliers who had been shot down and were buried pretty much where they fell. You associated heavily with the Allies. So the notion of going to America was a liberating prospect and a profoundly liberating experience. By coincidence, I came upon an article in a newspaper published in Yakima, Washington, in 1946. My father was taking a tour of medical schools in the United States at that time. He had been invited on a lecture tour in his field, ophthalmology. He was in Yakima visiting a distant cousin of my mother’s. The interviewer for the “Yakima News” asked him how he felt about being an American. What struck me was my father’s emphasis on the word “freedom.” He said, “Even after the war, we don’t really have it. People are still too afraid to talk to each other because of what they have just been through. But here things are free.” When a year and a half after arriving in the U.S. I graduated from Hopkins Grammar School in New Haven, there was an article in the New Haven Register about me because I was the valedictorian. In that article, my English teacher, Victor Reid, is quoted as saying: “When Marten came here, he mistook our freedom for license and didn’t understand that.” But what I realized again, as I went through these two articles just a few weeks ago, is that the basic theme of freedom must have run very deep in my father’s mind and my mother’s. It certainly was part of my own makeup.

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VAN HEUVEN: In the summer of 1975, I set off for The Hague.

Q: You were there until when?

VAN HEUVEN: For three years, ’75-’78.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you went out there?

VAN HEUVEN: Kingdon Gould, a political appointee and a very successful businessman from Maryland. In manners and pedigree, Ambassador Gould was a man of the old school. He was a Yale graduate. Mrs. Gould was a spirited ambassador’s wife. She had wonderful taste. Her manner of speaking reminded me of Katharine Hepburn. But I didn’t know Kingdon and he didn’t know me. There was no ambassadorial input in my selection as political counselor. The Hague was not a large embassy. The political section consisted of two officers and a local
assistant. The economic section consisted of three American officers. Two were Americans in the public affairs section. The DAO had its usual complement. So did agriculture. So all together we were maybe 30 Americans, with the usual complement of local employees. There were consulates in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The U.S. Air Force had a wing in Soesterberg. The Netherlands is a western country, a member of NATO and of the UN, and a large investor

In the United States. So there were many contact points between the United States and the Netherlands. Earlier, Gould had been ambassador in Luxembourg. The Hague was his second ambassadorial post. There was some Dutch feeling that he had gotten the job only because he was a contributor to the Republican Party. In essence, that was probably true. In any event, Gould was a great representative of the United States. Being a businessman, he sought out businessmen. He had a winning way about him. He was also a keen sportsman. When the time came to celebrate our 200\textsuperscript{th} anniversary as a country, Kingdon had the idea of organizing a huge bash, renting the entire Hague conference center, and putting on a five-day show of speeches, lectures, visits, exhibits, and what have you. All of us in the embassy were dubious about doing this. We thought this could never be pulled off. Kingdon said we were going ahead. He set up an independent legal entity, cleared it through the Office of the Legal Adviser. Then he scheduled golf games with his unsuspecting Dutch business friends. So as he played golf with friends from Unilever, Shell, and Phillips, he got them to contribute to our national birthday party. He got the funds together and under his leadership, we put together one hell of a fine program. Even as it was happening, some of us had doubts that this would succeed, but Kingdon had no doubts, and he was right and we were not. This was a case where the ambassador was way ahead of his troops. He pulled off something that we did not have the imagination nor the clout to do ourselves. So, that is a sample of where Kingdon made a difference.

He played hockey and became a member of a senior hockey team. He was also a good rider. He had been doing a lot of riding in Maryland. In fact, he had actually ridden in the Maryland Hunt Cup, which is a very difficult race. He was a fox hunter and he responded to repeated invitations to join fox hunts in the south of Holland, and took me along. He was a marvelous host. He was extraordinarily gracious. He had good relations with Foreign Minister Van Der Stoel and with pretty much the entire top level of the Dutch government. Many came to appreciate him. He did spend a fair amount of time in the office. Sometimes he felt that he had to answer his own mail, until we advised him that he had a staff to help him do that. His consistent instinct was to help out people who were in trouble. So, even right up until this year, my wife and I have been getting unexpected telephone calls from Kingdon to help out, say, some Nigerian whose widow’s son needed help getting him into school here. These often were far-out good causes, but Kingdon always engaged for good causes. He put his own money behind a lot of them. The Goulds became, and have remained, dear friends of Ruth and myself.

\textit{Q: During the time you were there, what was the state of Dutch-American relations?}

\textbf{VAN HEUVEN:} The state of Dutch-American relations is almost always good. My period in The Hague was no exception. The Dutch were the third largest investor in the United States. Americans were the third largest investors in the Netherlands. A lot of enterprises were Dutch-American. So, in that large realm, things took care of themselves without intervention by the United States government or the American Embassy in The Hague.
The issues that we did face had to do with how to deal with the threat of Soviet communism and in particular the nuclear threat of the Soviet SS20s. I witnessed the beginning of the discussion on what eventually became the issue of stationing UN middle-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Q: The Pershing.

VAN HEUVEN: Cruise and Pershing. The Dutch popular attitude on that issue was strongly anti-nuclear. There is a long history in the Netherlands, visible right up to today, of neutrality and antiwar feelings. The basic distaste for anything that wears a uniform was a constant element in Dutch political life. So the Dutch armed forces also were not held in high regard. The Dutch armed services had been unable to perform effectively in 1940 against the Germans, nor, after the war, in Indonesia. The Dutch tradition was anti-militaristic. The job of defense minister was generally viewed as a liability to the political career of the officeholder like the way it is in Germany today. So, the question of putting nuclear weapons in the Netherlands was a lightning rod. In my time there were one million signatures out of a population of about 14 million on a petition opposing the steps that the U.S. and NATO were proposing to take. The Dutch government was led by a social democrat, Joop den Uijl. The defense minister, Vredeling, was also a social democrat. From their party point of view and their whole upbringing they were instinctively not in favor of deployment. They were supporters of NATO, but their notion of NATO was of a comfortable organization under whose umbrella the Dutch could live safely. Who took care of the repair of the umbrella, and its use, wasn’t really up to the Dutch. That was up to the Americans, and the Dutch trusted the Americans well enough to be comfortable with that situation. The notion of stepping up to the nuclear plate themselves was a politically unsellable proposition. In the end, it was the efforts of initially Gould, and later, Bob McCloskey, and eventually, Jerry Bremer that helped bring the Dutch government - and by that time it was a different Dutch government - around to agree to join the NATO decision and participate in this program, thereby making it possible for Germany not to be the only country with Italy to station the allied nuclear response to the SS20 threat, to go ahead with the program. The rest, as they say, is history.

Q: The issue essentially was, the Soviets had threatened Europe with the SS20 and our idea was to have a counterpart which would then allow both to-

VAN HEUVEN: To create a balance. That was the idea. But it did involve the introduction of new weapons, and that was not regarded as…

Q: Was there any aftermath to what turned into a running sore with our demonstrations of quite rowdy young people against our consulate general in Amsterdam during the Vietnam War? This was not particularly benign. This was kind of a nasty confrontation. Was that over with completely? Or were they picking up something else?

VAN HEUVEN: Anti-U.S. feelings on the score of Vietnam had been strong in the Netherlands. In typical Dutch fashion, those who felt that way were allowed to vent their views and the rest of the population stood on the sidelines, many of them silently agreeing, but basically letting them go ahead. Police attitude toward protection was always mild, far milder than I later saw it in
Germany. Just incidentally, just two weeks ago, when I happened to be in the Netherlands, there was a demonstration about Iraq. The demonstrators took down the fence that is now around the embassy, and daubed it with paint. The police, according to the account that I read, gently removed the demonstrators. I’m sure that nobody spent any time in detention for what they did, although the Dutch government, of course, will pay for the damage that was done, which means removing the paint. That is a typical Dutch way of doing these things.

Q: When you arrived there, this wasn’t that long after these things. Was that sort of a burr under the saddle of at least our embassy and consulate people in the Netherlands? You don’t like to be demonstrated against when the police don’t give you adequate protection.

VAN HEUVEN: I think there were two phases and maybe the one you’re referring to happened later. The first phase was the Vietnam phase. In Amsterdam, typically, the crowd would go to the Vondel Park and the Museum Pein, and try to get at our consulate. The nasty demonstrations came later, when Jerry Bremer was ambassador. Jerry later told me that he put the choice to the Dutch foreign ministry. He told him, “Either you give us good protection or we close the place.” That was more than the Dutch government was willing to stomach, so they provided better protection. Now, the place is surrounded by a huge fence which is an eyesore and is not viewed kindly because it doesn’t really fit the surroundings. However, when the point was made to me the other week by a Dutch acquaintance, I said, “It’s too bad. If you don’t control your crowds, we can’t sit there and let some of our Dutch employees be the target of mob fury.” So, the Dutch don’t like to be too tough on demonstrators. They never have been. They have never been tough on drug users. They just don’t like to be tough on anyone or anything. Some Dutch are now beginning to rebel against this set of attitudes. The politician Pim Fortuijn, who ran for office just this last summer and was murdered just before his party got 23 percent of the vote, had been taking the line that it’s time to call a spade a spade.

Q: Were there splits in the Dutch body politic that concerned us during the time you were there?

VAN HEUVEN: Let me mention two issues. One had to do with reprocessing nuclear fuel, an esoteric subject. The government had the greatest difficulty with the notion that Dutch plants in the eastern part of the country would engage in reprocessing material which, when returned to its sources - mainly the countries and the plants that were providing this spent fuel for reprocessing - might be used for nuclear weapons. Reprocessing of spent Brazilian fuel caused an immense raucous in parliament. Particularly on the left side of the political spectrum, the feeling was that the Dutch shouldn’t be involved in this sort of thing. Elsewhere in the political spectrum, it was pointed out that this was a major industry that brought considerable revenue and could be handled well by the Dutch under appropriate safeguards and should therefore be something the Dutch ought to do. I was obliged to get an education, the second time in my life, into the nuclear reprocessing cycle. It also forced the foreign minister, van der Klauw, a former diplomat, also to learn this lesson. Unfortunately for him, he never seemed to do the amount of homework on these esoteric things that was required if he were to look good in parliament. So van der Klauw ran into difficulties in parliament because he was not on top of his brief. Eventually, he had a short tenure in that position. The experiment of a foreign service officer as foreign minister was the last time the Dutch did it, until recently. The issue also involved us, also because the United States has nuclear weapons. We had our own reprocessing facilities. This was the time the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was in force. We had our ideas about nuclear non-proliferation. The Dutch struggle to find their way through this issue was of considerable interest to us. But it was something that we could watch only from the sidelines.

Q: How were we viewing the European Union and whither it and the role of the Netherlands in the European Union?

VAN HEUVEN: The U.S. view of the European Community (EC, as it was called at the time) was positive. It was regarded as a good thing, as structure to which we contributed building blocks in the form of the Marshall Plan. In 1975, it functioned as a common market. There was an incipient attempt to coordinate positions on foreign policy issues. There was no talk of a common EU foreign policy, but the EU chairmanship country did have the job of putting together the agenda for monthly meetings of the EU representatives - the level lower than the foreign ministers - where positions on issues such as Cyprus or apartheid or whatever else on the fringe of Europe might be discussed. Thus, EU countries could arrive at a common view which, in turn, might be reflected at the General Assembly in New York, where an EC country would speak for them all. It was a process in which we had a role, and a significant one. The agreed operating procedure required that the chairmanship country would furnish to Washington the agenda of the next meeting and allow input. I remember an event when Bob McCloskey was our ambassador. The Dutch were in the EU chair. We got the agenda; we sent it into Washington. But we didn’t get any guidance. The meeting was going to be over the weekend. Friday afternoon, there was no guidance. Saturday morning, there was no guidance. The meeting had started and we had provided no input. The Dutch called us and said, “Do you have any input?” We responded “No.” Bob was livid. He sent in a rocket to the Department. The punch line of the message was that it was undignified for an American ambassador to be left in a position where he had no guidance. By Sunday, the meeting came to an end. Sunday passed in silence. On Monday, there were two cables. One said, “When I gave you liberty, I did not promise you dignity,” signed “Kissinger.” Of course, Bob had been Kissinger’s press spokesman. The second one was from Assistant Secretary Art Hartman. It said, “Bob, you must be kidding.” It caused a good laugh on the part of McCloskey and all of us. He never complained again. But it illustrates that at that time in the mid-’70s, the EC attempt to begin coordinating foreign policy was open to us and that we were invited and our views were considered. It was, in a way, a golden age of consultation, with few rules, but when our importance was recognized and our voice mattered.

Q: How was the Carter administration viewed there? We were taking moralistic stances on human rights and things of this nature.

VAN HEUVEN: Holland was probably the country in Europe that understood moralism better than anyone else. The Dutch themselves are prone to take moralistic positions. The political discourse is a constant mix of those factors. So that sounded quite familiar. The Carter approach may at times have led to some raised eyebrows in the ministry of foreign affairs, but Carter was not viewed critically as he was in Germany, for instance.

Q: With Helmut Schmidt and Carter…

VAN HEUVEN: Schmidt had no use for Carter because he didn’t trust Carter to stick to his
views.

Q: Which is proof…

VAN HEUVEN: But that never particularly hurt the Dutch.

Going back to the nuclear issue, I want to mention two events. One that caused a lot of problems was our request for a port visit for the USS California to the port of Rotterdam. California is a nuclear-powered cruiser. It may or may not carry any nuclear weapons. In any event, getting permission for the cruiser to come all the way into Rotterdam took forever, and we exercised polite pressure of all sorts. I must have been in the foreign ministry a dozen times to argue for it. Eventually, we got permission, despite a mix of environmental concerns and anti-nuclear feelings. It was a dicey thing to do for the government to say, "Okay, Rotterdam is not on the coast. You get this big, visible ship all the way up the Maas river, about 15 miles inland. Rotterdam harbor is the aorta of Dutch commerce. The Dutch message to us was “We don’t want anything to go wrong.” So, finally, the California came into Rotterdam harbor, but on the way in, its engines encountered trouble. I remember that phone call and it was not good news. But what was the problem? The ship was using river water for its cooling system - and quality of the water of the port of Rotterdam was so bad that it was fouling up the cooling system of the California. So we had the reverse of what the Dutch had feared - the river polluted the ship and not the other way around. In any event, the ship came in. It got a certain amount of publicity. I took a couple of colleagues from the foreign ministry for lunch aboard. Afterwards, the DCM’s car swayed so badly on the Belgian cobblestones on the pier that all of a sudden the engine caught behind one of these cobblestones and we were brought to a prompt halt, sending me through the front windshield and my guests from the back to the front seat. So, having just left the California, where we had had lunch, I found myself back in the sick bay of the California, having many pieces of glass pulled out of my forehead. I also had the unfortunate distinction of having totaled the DCM’s car. Luckily, I wasn’t the driver, but that was the end of Elizabeth Brown’s official car.

Q: How old were you when you originally left Holland

VAN HEUVEN: I was 15 on the day I left.

Q: Did you find that, as often happens, you still had almost a kid’s vocabulary? Did you have to bring your vocabulary up to speed?

VAN HEUVEN: That question gives me the chance not only to answer that but to get into another major theme of my three years at the American Embassy at The Hague. Sure, language had changed. In fact, the official spelling by law had changed somewhat so that a lot of “sch’s” became just “s’s.” But the way in which you said things was different, just as you find that to be the case here in the United States. A typical salutation here is, “Take care.” Twenty years ago, nobody would have known what that meant. And so, in 1975, the Dutch spoke a language full of those expressions that I had to reacquaint myself with. But that process went pretty fast because I still read and spoke it at the 5/5 level. When you’re political counselor, you have every reason to look at the press and look at television and talk with people all the time, so that was a matter of
very rapid acclimatization. I had been back in Holland a few times, mostly a couple of days, sometimes as much as 3-5 days. But basically all my other time in Europe had been elsewhere, in school in Paris, and in Germany. But I can’t say that those very quick visits made much difference in my ability to handle the language. But I adjusted fairly well.

What was a challenge was to try and explain to myself, and then to Washington, the ways the country was different from the country that I had left. This was the first major test of my ability to deal with the question of societal change. In The Hague I was in a position where I saw a country that was obviously very different from what I had left. I had to explain what had happened, why it had happened, and what were the implications. Of course, you see change all around you. You see it in your family, in where you live, and so forth. Much of the time, you don’t pay attention to it. But when you deal with estimative analysis, as I did later on, you have to ask yourself what are the patterns of change, what are the trends, and what do they mean? The Hague provided my first frontal encounter with major societal change.

What was the change? The Netherlands that I had left - and probably what I say is true generally of Europe, but I certainly saw it through the Dutch prism - was a country with a fairly long history in which the regents governed and the people accepted their governance passively on the assumption that the regents knew what they were doing. They deserved and got respect. The regents, moreover, were few. The university population in the Netherlands before the war and right after it was only a small percentage of the population. Big business was also a very small percentage of the population. Therefore, the clan that ran Holland was identifiable, small, and interconnected. You knew not only the people, you knew who they were married to, you knew the family relationships. That was the accepted order of things. All sorts of societal patterns that went with it, including in the Netherlands the social phenomenon of so-called “zuilen” or pillars, and the system of student clubs at the main universities. Since the war against Spain in the 16th century, there had been a protestant pillar and a catholic pillar. The two never interfaced. In 1975, when I returned, there was also a social democratic pillar and a liberal pillar. So, Dutch society was a bunch of stovepipes. You would find a situation in a particular town in which, if you were Dutch reformed, so would be your baker, your clothier, your milkman, the club you belonged to. You didn’t go outside of that stovepipe for anything. You watched the other stovepipes and at a certain point in politics in The Hague these stovepipes came together in some carefully balanced way, and constituted the government that governed the country.

When I returned to the Netherlands the population was larger. The university population had expanded exponentially. The regents had lost authority. Everybody wanted what they called “inspraak,” which means they wanted an opportunity to have their say. And the people who wanted to have the most say were the ones who were on government salaries, particularly at universities. They had few fixed hours, so they could go to meetings all night and outstay the people who had to leave and go to bed. That left them alone to vote through their particular hobby horses. This led to situations, such as in Rotterdam, when governance of the University of Rotterdam was in the hands of equal groups of teachers, students, and non-academic employees. The janitors had a vote on how the university was running, including university appointments. This was an unheard of situation. The social rebellion had started in Amsterdam in the sixties. At first, it consisted of innocent manifestation, such as by the so-called “kabouters,” the dwarfs, who did funny things, wore funny costumes, had exotic ideas like “Let’s solve our transportation
problem by having 10,000 white bicycles all over town and when you need a bike you pick one up and you go to where you want and you leave it again.” It didn’t work. They were stolen. Societal change happened gradually after the war. It started in ’53 with the big floods, when several thousand people drowned, many of them through perceived incompetence of the authorities who were looking after the dykes. It turned out they had their jobs because they belonged to certain pillars in society, not because of their competence. That started the erosion of respect for authority. Not to make too long a story of this, I did seek advice from political scientists at Leiden, some of whom are now in California, Arend Lijphard in particular. There was also an academic by the name of Daalder, whose son, Ivo, is now on the news because he’s at Brookings and he was in the NSC in the Clinton administration. I also went with the ambassador to see the cardinal in Utrecht. He helped me understand best how to think about the process. He said, “You have to think of this process as a molecule, consisting of atoms and electrons. They all are in relation to each other. They’re subject to outside forces, but they hang together. But the outside forces increase. Still, the molecules hang together. Eventually, however, those outside forces are so huge that the molecule breaks. Then everything flies off in different directions. The electrons spin off. The atom splits. And they all take on a new form, and that is the new pattern that you have.” That was an image that I kept. I committed all of these impressions and analysis to a very long airgram, as my effort to explain to myself and everybody at home what the nature of Dutch society was. Back in Washington, most people were living with the myth of the Dutchman with the finger in the dyke and the wooden shoes. That was nice but not reflecting reality. Kingdon Gould read the airgram with visible reservation. But he signed it, with the comment that this might be the first case in recorded history of an ambassador going in through the dissent channel. But I had the backing of Elizabeth Ann Brown, the DCM, and many others on the staff of the embassy. It took six months to put that airgram together. It was like a small term paper. Ever since, I have applied the lessons learned in that exercise.

Q: Dutch society being a changing but ordered society, did you notice that the young people were getting the hell out and going off to the University of California or elsewhere to do their thing because they didn’t have the right family or they felt stultified?

VAN HEUVEN: That was true right after the war, from ’46 to maybe ’55. Those were years when conditions were still not good and the temptation to leave was strong. After that, things improved. The Netherlands is an extremely prosperous country with a high degree of well-being. In the seventies, the emigration pattern was much weaker than it had been earlier. Most of the Dutch who had emigrated were farmers who felt they were running out of farmland and they could go to Canada or Australia and resume their careers there as farmers. The outflow of Dutch to other places was not significant. There were no long lines in front of the consulates for the visas. We didn’t issue visas in The Hague, so there were no lines. But I know that was not the case in Rotterdam or Amsterdam. No, not a push to leave in those days and not afterwards either.

Q: What about the role of the royals? Was there any role really?

VAN HEUVEN: Yes. The House of Orange played and still plays an important part in Dutch life. In my time in The Hague, it was Queen Juliana and her husband, Prince Bernhard. She was universally loved. He was appreciated. Some of his capers, some of them extramarital, were known, but they didn’t much affect people’s views of him. He was implicated in those years in
something called the Lockheed scandal. It was a question whether he had been more active than he ought to have been in getting the Dutch government to procure aircraft from Lockheed. He probably did more than he should have but in the event it only led to a government decision that he would no longer be allowed to wear his air force uniform. The queen had a constitutional role and still does today. She selects the person who, after an election, puts together the next cabinet, and then appoints the prime minister. While there are certain rules that would be hard to violate and get away with, that is her decision. She is the key figure who consults with all the parties after an election. In between elections, she has the opportunity to keep informed on all issues of state. Other than that, the queen or the king is a figurehead, whose many social and representational duties are, generally, deeply appreciated at all levels of Dutch society. While the Dutch instinct about the nature of their country is republican, they feel good about the House of Orange. I speculated at the time with one of the journalists who was an expert on the royals about how this would go in the future. Our conclusion was that then princess Beatrix would have to earn that same respect that her mother and her grandmother had had, that this would not come automatically. I left that as a question. Now we know that Beatrix, in her own systematic, rigorous way, earned deep respect, being a hard worker and by immersing herself in her briefings. At times, she has exercised prerogatives that have raised eyebrows, like questioning whether an ambassador who had just divorced and was living with somebody was a suitable ambassador in a country to which he was about to pay a state visit, and by raising the question with the prime minister whether the ambassador shouldn’t be replaced. That caused a howl because that was not seen to be her function or role. There are probably a number of other stories that can be told along this line; Beatrix has tended to push the envelope in that respect. Now the question is, of course, what will her son, who has just last year married a young Argentine woman, manage to earn his respect. But there are no indications that the House of Orange is in danger. There are a lot of princes now, and a lot of members of the family, and when you have a large family some of them are bound to get into trouble. The boulevard press will pick that up very happily. And in my time I heard stories about some of the younger members of the royal family who tended to assume prerogatives that weren’t really there. The royal household handled those issues with delicacy and skill. I came away with respect for Juliana. Beatrix was not on the political scene yet.

Q: What about relations with Germany?

VAN HEUVEN: Let me back up for one anecdote on Juliana. Once a year the diplomatic corps troops to the palace in Amsterdam for the New Year’s reception. The rule was that the ambassadors could bring five members of the staff. We would all enter the main gate of the palace and be assigned to pens in order of precedence. And in order of precedence each national group were ushered in. The ambassador would be greeted by the queen, and shake hands. He would then introduce the staff. The queen would say a few things. And then we would proceed out and the next ambassador and his group would come in. When we went out, ambassadors went one way and the staff were sent the other way. Ambassadors were given champagne. We got pea soup. This was a typical Dutch dish. Particularly in January, it could be a warm antidote to the cold outside. But pea soup was not champagne. It triggered amused comment about the proverbial frugality of the House of Orange. The queen was not going to spend any more on these events than she absolutely had to.
Q: How did you find relations with Germany during this time?

VAN HEUVEN: They were still uneasy. A considerable residue of sentiment remained anti-German. That exhibited itself in childish stuff, such as putting graffiti on German cars at the sea resorts. A few people on principle didn’t want to go to Germany. But the Dutch business world knew that they were part of the German DM area, that most of their business was with Germany, and that the port of Rotterdam was the port through which German goods came out and goods headed for Germany came in. The Dutch made money on that. In that respect, relations were pretty normal. The reconciliation between the Netherlands and Germany did not come until many years later, when Chancellor Kohl was persuaded by Prime Minister Kok in the early ‘90s to visit Rotterdam, following a poll - which upset both the Germans and the Dutch governments - which showed that there was still a lot of resentment in the Netherlands. Kok persuaded Kohl, who was not easy to persuade on these matters, that he ought to come. But Kohl came, laid a wreath, and said the appropriate things. That was sort of the formal end of the World War II. Meanwhile, the Germans had done a magnificent job in sending outstanding ambassadors to The Hague. I knew two of them personally. They learned Dutch fluently and they worked very hard to improve relations. I think that helped a great deal in smoothing the relationship and eventually making the Kohl visit the success that it was.

Q: Did the Battle of Arnhem… Was that an annual celebration?

VAN HEUVEN: The annual celebration in those days was still the 8th of May, which was the date of the liberation in 1945. It was marked by processions to the spots where Dutchmen had been executed; it was a sober type of commemoration. This practice is now losing force, although I’m sure that the commemoration continues. The Battle of Arnhem, I don’t think, is commemorated in any particular way, unless by the locality.

Q: Not even by the British?

VAN HEUVEN: It might be, but it would be very small. One of the particular things that I remember was that as a child I had seen those planes and gliders come over in September 1944. They landed 35 miles from where I was living in Utrecht. I couldn’t see them come down but I saw them come over. There was no antiaircraft and no German Luftwaffe to keep them from doing so. It was a huge fleet. It was spectacular and we didn’t know where they were going, but they were low enough so we knew something was happening close by. In ’77, when the ambassador and the DCM were prevented by their schedules from doing so, it fell to me to represent the United States at the opening of the Arnhem Battle Museum in the castle named Hartestein. This was where General Urquhart and the 1st British Airborne made their last stand. I found myself with a Polish general, and many Dutch authorities. There were also many British. General Urquhart himself turned up for the event. He was in his 80s. The British flew a Dakota over.

Q: A DC-3.

VAN HEUVEN: Out jumped two parachutists in uniform. They landed on the front lawn. We were deployed on the steps in front. The lead parachutists undid his parachute, walked up to
General Urquhart, saluted, and handed him the key to the building. General Urquhart then opened the building and we all went in and signed the book. What General Urquhart said in his speech about the surrender was, “In the end, it wasn’t the gerries. It was the lack of water.” So the British forces ran out of water and they surrendered. For all of us who hoped for success, it was a huge disappointment.

Q: Oh, yes. It was known by a book and a movie called “A Bridge Too Far” by Cornelius Ryan. Is there anything else we should cover during this period?

VAN HEUVEN: No.

ELIZABETH ANN BROWN
Deputy Chief of Mission
The Hague (1975-1979)

Elizabeth Ann Brown was born in Oregon on August 15, 1918. She received a bachelor’s degree from Reed College and a master’s degree from Columbia University. She worked for the State Department in International Organization Affairs; development of the New United Nations system, UN events. Ms. Brown then joined the Foreign Service and served in Bonn as a political officer; Athens as a political counselor; and the Hague as Deputy Chief of Mission. She was interviewed by Thomas J. Dunnigan on May 13, 1995.

Q: In 1975, then, you were transferred to The Hague [the Netherlands], which was a change of pace.

BROWN: A real change of pace. Since you served in The Hague yourself, you know that the situation is relatively tranquil there. Dutch diplomats not only are very approachable but, like the Greeks, they tell you what they think. It was a very tranquil period, I would say, without any major issues to deal with.

Q: Talking about issues, what about the stories about payoffs to Prince Bernhard by Lockheed and Northrop? Did these stories cause a great to-do while you were there?

BROWN: There was a certain amount of interest in the subject, but there was no great to-do. I think that a more exciting event for us were the South Moluccan takeover of the French Embassy.

Q: Tell us a little bit about the South Moluccans -- who they are, what they were doing, and how...

BROWN: When Indonesia became independent [in 1949], the South Moluccas was something I dealt with in the UN context, when the hawks in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs thought the South Moluccas should have been independent. That was years before, and I never expected to
hear of the South Moluccas again. Anyway, they had been loyal Dutch subjects. I don't think that they ever gave up the thought that they would eventually become independent. I arrived in The Hague after the time when they had taken over the French Embassy, but I was there when they took over a department store in Amsterdam and for the train incident.

This was interesting. I discovered that the Agency had all sort of fascinating techniques like putting listening devices in trays of food and what not. That was about the most exciting thing that happened [to me in The Hague].

Q: Speaking of the Agency, it was during your period there that Phillip Agee lost his residence permit in Amsterdam and was kicked out of the country. He'd been a thorn in the side of the Agency for some time, I know.

BROWN: Yes, I think so. For me service in The Hague was kind of a nice change. I don't know what your experience was, but the people in the Agency in The Hague [during my time there] were much more open and cooperative than had been the case in Athens.

Q: Yes. That tour in Holland was interesting because it also gave you a chance to "test your wings" as a DCM, which is always an interesting position. Tell me a little about that -- how the Embassy functioned.

BROWN: It was an interesting Embassy because the Ambassador during most of my tour was Kingdon Gould, Jr., whose interest in the political scene in the Netherlands was somewhat limited. He really left it to the Political Counselor, Martin Van Heuven, and me to do most of the substantive work. In fact, he was absent from the Embassy a good deal of the time. A good example of this is that when Secretary of State Kissinger came to the Netherlands, the Ambassador hadn't been in the Embassy for a month or so. He came back for one day and then left with Kissinger, whose visit was extremely interesting. I don't know whether you experienced anything like this, but Kissinger absolutely sought to cut the Embassy out of everything except one luncheon. He told the Dutch, who ignored what he had said, that they shouldn't share the discussions that they had had [with him] with the Embassy.

Q: I had the same experience in Israel when I was there. That's a difficult situation in which to work, when your own Secretary of State is doing things that you don't know about.

BROWN: Exactly. I'm sure that it was much worse in Israel. Actually, the issues we had with the Dutch were not the kind of matters which were that difficult. There really weren't any great political issues that came up during my tour in the Netherlands. We had a rather difficult battle over whether to close down the Consulate General in Rotterdam. We had a crisis when the Maytag people, who ran an outlet store, came into Amsterdam and sold their merchandise cut rate. We had a lot of stranded tourists there.

During my tour we had a change of Ambassador, when Bob McCloskey was assigned. This gave me an opportunity to see the difference between presenting credentials in Greece, with much military fanfare, as had been the case when we had a new Ambassador in Greece, and that quiet visit down in the country [in the Netherlands] which Bob McCloskey and I made to see the
Queen [of the Netherlands]. Ambassador McCloskey had a limousine [and a driver]. Period.

Q: It was a more relaxed atmosphere.

BROWN: A very relaxed atmosphere.

Q: I'm sure that you and Bob worked very well together.

BROWN: Yes. I enjoyed serving with him. Then, at the very end of my tour [in the Netherlands] another new Ambassador came, but he was really there just to "meet and greet." That was it. You had him.

STIER: But we marched on, and in 1975 we were off to The Hague for our Last Hurrah.

Q: Without having another Washington tour.

STIER: No, I successfully -- once was enough. We were in Holland from 1975 through the end of 1979 when I became 60 and was mandatorily retired, not felicitously so. I wanted to work a couple more years, but again, we were lucky in our assignments. We enjoyed all the places we lived. We liked the people. We were even happy about the extremes of weather. We've had a lot of hot weather, and we didn't mind the cold.

Q: How did you find the Dutch about the Americans?

STIER: Oh, boy. The Dutch are pretty pro-American, friendly, go there all the time, culturally very susceptible to American ways and fads and modes, very well informed. A lot of them have been to school here. A lot of the media people had worked here for their newspapers, magazines, radio television. That was good. They knew the United States very well indeed. The Dutch go back to our fight for independence. They've loaned us money. It's very strong. On Thanksgiving we all would troop traditionally down to the Old Pilgrim Church in Rotterdam for the annual commemoration of the Pilgrims' stay in Holland and the ambassador would give a speech. So many Dutch immigrants are in the United States, and that increased the bonds between us. That, and the Dutch mastery of English made for very close relationships. On the other hand, it also made it easier for them to lambaste us in their marvelous, candid, outspoken Dutch way. The Dutchman is an outspoken, honest critic.
Q: Okay, at the end of the last tape you were commenting on the ubiquitous use of English among the Dutch. I gather from what you say that there’s a pretty good feeling about America and Americans among the Dutch, although I’ve had friends who have said they’ve had some unpleasant experiences with them. But am I correct in saying that generally the Dutch are quite friendly?

STIER: Yes, I’d say so. I think what you’ve referred to as American friends having bad experiences in Holland come from the far out elements in Dutch society which are replicas of similar groups in our own country, the drug culture, the very radical, chic radical groups. But in art, for example, the Municipal Museum in Amsterdam is full of modern American abstract art. American films are popular. Television fare is sickeningly American.

Q: You mean, American programs?

STIER: Yes. The Dutch have a good feeling about us. They are grateful to the United States for our World War II participation. One of the most moving things in the annual American-Dutch calendar is, I guess it’s on Memorial Day, when the Netherlands American Society sponsors a moving ceremony in the beautiful U.S. cemetery at Margraten.

The Dutch character is frank and bluntly forthright so that you have to -- you can't have a thin skin around Dutch parliamentarians and leaders, academics and the press. They'll tell you what they think. On the other hand, they permit you to tell them your view and you can make a rebuttal. I found them a very decent people to work with.

Q: Well, in view of the fact that they are so disposed towards America, other than the cultural program, what were your objectives then in Holland? It seems that you really didn't have a great problem of trying to sell the United States there.

STIER: No, I don't think so. We had a program typically concentrating on negotiations with the Soviet Union based on our NATO relationships, in which of course the Dutch played a leading role.

The Dutch felt strongly that U.S. consultation with the Dutch was inadequate and our constant apprehension was that we and our Dutch audiences would be caught by surprise by some U.S. Government action taken in concert, say, with the British, the French and West Germans. When that occurred it was a bad day.

Q: It happened two or three times that I know of.

STIER: More than that. But the Dutch were interested in NATO, but didn't really like even the small NATO presence we had there. We had a fighter squadron. But our main (USIS) interest was foreign economic policy, the Dutch being some of the world's greatest traders with an enormous trade relationship with the United States. I learned more economics during my four years there than I did the whole rest of my life, I think.
Q: Did you ever run across Pat van Delden out there?

STIER: It's a funny thing. Pat, of course, was a predecessor PAO of mine.

Q: That's right.

STIER: And she had taken herself from the public view. She'd literally disappeared.

Q: I've never been able to find track of her in the last 20 years and I knew her very well.

STIER: It was a common understanding, I think my predecessor told me that when she'd get mail he wasn't even to try to pass it on. He had -- the PAOs always had an address for Pat, a mailing address, in Holland down country someplace. And only once in the four years I was there did we get a piece of mail for her that looked as if it ought not to be thrown away. It was heavy, with a lot of stamps on it, insured, the lot, and I went to someone, I won't use names on this because I was sworn to secrecy. I had met a Dutch friend of hers and her husband. Pat married a Dutchman, and she herself was of Dutch descent, I think.

Q: I'm not sure, but she married an Indonesian Dutchman. The family had been big in Indonesia.

STIER: Anyway, this Dutchman knew where Pat lived, although he didn't see her anymore. He himself didn't understand why. But at any rate, I took in this letter and showed it to him and said I think she should have a chance to destroy this herself. He agreed with me, but in a week or so I was told to destroy the letter. Now, you can figure that one out. So, I never met her.

Q: I have wondered because about 1971 or 1972, she just seemed to cut off communication with everyone. Anyone I've ever encountered who knew her and knew her well, says, "whatever happened to Pat van Delden?"

STIER: The only speculation I heard quite frequently was that she had been connected or seen to be connected with the CIA and either got frightened, furious or in an embarrassing position and took herself out of common society. I don't know. Very interesting.

Q: It is.

STIER: We loved the Netherlands. Its geographic position in Europe was so strategic for travel, too. You had the whole economic life of the world right there, and in Brussels you had NATO and the European Community. But like all things in life, the end comes. In September 1979 we piled our belongings in the car, took our poodle and toured Europe for a couple of months before we came home here to Berkeley.
Ambassador Robert McCloskey joined the Foreign Service after graduating from Temple University and working for a number of newspapers in the early 1950’s. He was the State Department Spokesman from 1964-1973, and served as ambassador to The Netherlands and Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: I wonder, do you think we might move to The Netherlands now? Because there are many other things I would like to explore, and I hope there will be other interviews which will be more job specific. The Netherlands sounds like a much more pleasant assignment. If there is such a thing as a reward, this sounds like it. How did this come about?

MCCLOSKEY: Well, like so many of these things, there is a certain element of roulette. You start out with one. First, I was going to go to Israel. Then, Kenneth Keating got into it, and that was that. But that had gone to a point where Golda Meir was here for something, and I sat next to her at a luncheon, and she said, "When are you coming to Israel?"

So then, I forget, Sweden, no, well someplace, finally I was asked would I want to go to The Hague, because I had complained loudly enough that it was time again, and I had other personal reasons. So I was asked then, would I want to go to The Hague. I said, "Yes, I'll go, and I'll be very happy." I did go off quite happy. It was my first European assignment. The Dutch, whatever else you say about them, they are into everything. So it was exposure to NATO, to issues in Central Europe. Lousy climate.

So it was educational. It was important. There were a fair number, both then and in the early part of the Carter Administration, of career people in Western Europe, unusual.

Q: I was going to ask how you were able to stay with the change of administrations in Holland?

MCCLOSKEY: Well, I just never had any question about that. I knew everybody who was going to be involved. I had known Vance very well in the past. In fact, he asked me, "Would you rather come back here or stay where you are?" I said, "I would rather stay here." Anyhow, in Western Europe there were Janet and Dean in Copenhagen. I was in The Hague. Hartman, ultimately, got to Paris.

Q: Arthur Hartman.

MCCLOSKEY: There was some career person in Madrid.

Q: Wells Stabler was it, back then?

MCCLOSKEY: He had been there. Let's see, this was now '77, and I guess he was still there. Yes, he was still there, because my family went into Spain for vacation and stayed there. Anyhow, I can remember saying that it's unusual that there would be this number of career people in Western Europe at this time.
Q: What were the main problems that you saw that you had to deal with in The Hague?

MCCLOSKEY: The one that was the most difficult was non-proliferation. It was a son-of-a-gun. Where there were two, non-proliferation, and the neutron bomb. Because we all spent a lot of time in Western Europe, you know we were under instruction to get yes for an answer on the deployment of these things. The Dutch, I had one hell of a time on that issue.

Then after things were just about set, Carter made this off-the-wall decision that he wasn't going to do it. It's never been adequately explained. In fact, I wrote a paper, not on this subject, but used it to help make a case on a longer paper I was writing about press leaks, for Johns Hopkins two years ago. I looked up everything I possibly could find and talked to any number of people. Anyhow, that was one of the important issues.

Q: The Dutch seemed to have always taken something very close to a neutralist stance on many of the defense issues. They're part of NATO, but in some ways you almost feel they are NATO's neutrals.

MCCLOSKEY: It's true, and the Socialists were in power when I got there. But there are many idiosyncrasies about Dutch politics. For example, The Dutch Prime Minister, at the time, was the Socialist party leader. He pretty much saved Bernhard's skin.

Q: This is Prince Bernhard?

MCCLOSKEY: Prince Bernhard after the Lockheed scandal. It would have been easy enough for this socialist prime minister to let the Parliament dump on Bernhard, but he made a very balanced and somewhat sympathetic presentation to the Parliament, which took the edge and the curse off what Bernhard had gotten himself into. It was a coalition. They were the governing party. The coalition leader was socialist. They were dovish on defense issues. They had to pay attention to -- the terms are just the opposite there, the liberal party is, in fact, the conservative party, the one that calls itself liberal. It was a significant number of influential politicians, although they just didn't have the numbers to lead the coalition.

Then you had figures like Joe Luns, who had for many years been the Foreign Minister, and was in this period the secretary general of NATO. They maintained an army, a fairly sizable one, and that liberalism which beats in the Dutch breast was venting itself as much on domestic issues, than as, I think, it was on foreign policy issues, with the exception of neutron weapons. Yet the Dutch were quite prepared to take the neutron bomb.

Q: Could you explain what the neutron bomb is, for somebody who might not be familiar, if you can explain it?

MCCLOSKEY: It is the phrase attributed to the weapon, otherwise called the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW). We were speaking of euphemisms, earlier. It's principal feature is that the explosion from the warhead will cause less damage to buildings than other nuclear warheads. But it may cause greater civilian casualties. If you can turn that into any kind of public virtue, I
defy you. In any case, the odd thing about this entire story is that the ERW had been around for quite a long time, had been the subject of some news coverage and somewhat more extensive treatment in scientific or military journals that weren't making that much news, until a Washington Post reporter found some testimony where funds were being requested that year, being 1979, for the weapon. He wrote a story, repeated much of what had been written in the past and it caused an uproar, because it was the weapon that wouldn't damage buildings, but would kill people.

**Q: The ideal capitalist weapon.**

**MCCLOSKEY:** Anyhow, that is what it was. It shocked the Europeans who had not heard of it before, and certainly not seen it described as such, as it did many Americans at the same time. It was a tough one to defend, because once it was described as I've mentioned, whatever other virtue or rationale the weapon had would never catch up with that awful sloganeering.

**Q: So you were, at one point, trying to defend it and then the President changed his mind?**

**MCCLOSKEY:** It was an astonishing development for all of Western Europe, and one of the angriest people of all was Helmut Schmidt, who was chancellor of the Federal Republic at the time, went to great lengths against public opinion to assure that the weapon could be deployed there. I think he contends that he lost serious political capital as a result of Carter's decision, which I have not found any convincing or satisfactory explanation for.

**Q: How about other issues, were American civilians with drugs there a problem?**

**MCCLOSKEY:** Yes, when the French Connection was busted, the center of gravity on drug trade, not so much its use, moved to Amsterdam, and by the time I got to The Hague the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) had established a small office in the American embassy, for which the consent of the Dutch government had been obtained, and had been spending time trying to convince the Dutch that there was a serious problem and that we would hope the Dutch would get behind some law enforcement measures. This is just about the time I arrived. I got involved in some of this.

The man who later became Prime Minister in a subsequent conservative government was, at that time, a minister of justice, and had accepted a DEA invitation to visit the United States. I know, specifically New York, where the case was made -- it didn't have to be made, it was self-evident -- that there was a serious problem there, but that much of the narcotics were coming into the U.S. from abroad, and that some from Southeast Asia were making their way through Western Europe, specifically, Amsterdam.

With that the Dutch then got behind it. It was a little bit passive, because the Dutch rather took the attitude that the Dutch neither were involved in the trafficking nor were Dutch among the addicts. Well, within a fairly short time that changed, and Dutch were becoming much more involved and were experiencing much more serious addiction problems. By the time I left Holland, they had very much accepted responsibility for it. While it's still there, my sense that is it not of the magnitude it was in those years.
Q: How did you find the staff of the embassy? I always think of The Netherlands as not being in the mainstream of the major European posts, and I was wondering whether there was a tendency for the cream of the Foreign Service not to go there. How did you feel about that?

MCCLOSKEY: I'd say that the strongest office was the political office. It happened that the counselor was, in fact, Dutch-born, and was bilingual, of course, but had a strong sense and understanding of a very complex society. When I went there, for example, I had that kind of narrow mind set that recalled having a Dutch uncle or a Dutch cleanser, or going Dutch, all of which suggested a pretty straight-laced, hard working, work ethic minded people. It is not that at all. It is a hell of a lot more complex. And this man quite understood all of that.

I think, probably, the economic section could have been stronger given the magnitude, well, of matters like Dutch investment in the United States, and American investment there. In that period the Dutch, as a nation, represented the heaviest outside investment in the United States. So that there was a lot to that part of the bilateral relationship, and I'm not sure that we had the strongest economic section that we should have had. The public affairs section was pretty good. The consular section hardly amounted to anything in The Hague, but there were two big consulates, one in Rotterdam, and one in Amsterdam. There we had very good representation. On the whole, I think the mission could had been stronger than it was.

Q: What about in the consulates, maybe this is after your time, but for a period, anyway, our consulate general in Amsterdam was almost in a state of siege with young leftists, particularly during the Vietnam War, but even afterwards, causing a great deal of trouble with very little protection from the city fathers of Amsterdam. Why did we keep it going?

MCCLOSKEY: Yes, one of the problems that I found there -- and I'll get to your specific matter in a moment -- was, as I said earlier, there was a Dutch tendency to want to get involved in everything. And the liberal heartbeat of the country, which is a sizable number of its population, adopts causes that have nothing to do with that country. For example, we often had demonstrations in front of the American embassy on their perception of the treatment of the American Indians in the United States, and the attitude in this country toward homosexuals, and I remember, particularly, the woman who was a spokesperson for orange juice, who identified with the anti-homosexuals.

Q: Yes, Anita Bryant.

MCCLOSKEY: The Dutch would demonstrate on the conditions in American prisons outside the American embassy. To go to your question on the consulates, the Vietnam matter was pretty much over when I arrived. I didn't get there until 1976. We left Vietnam, altogether, in 1975.

But what affected the consulate, and not directly, but it was on the scene at the time, were Dutch demonstrations that were going to Dutch issues for the first time. These were called the squatters, who were occupying both abandoned buildings, and incomplete new buildings. And, indeed, the day that Beatrix was invested on the throne in 1978, the most serious demonstrations and violent ones ever to occur in Amsterdam, occurred. These were not anti-American, but the consulate was
right there on one of the main thoroughfares.

In Rotterdam, the biggest threat to the consulate general there, in my time, was that Washington was going to close it. I fought to keep it open. I was satisfied, having gone there often enough, that it did a real day's work, and had a fair amount of business. Although, one had to acknowledge that Washington asked a fair question, why couldn't people go to The Hague if it was a matter of visas. Eventually, it was closed, and perhaps for good reason, looked at globally.

JACOB GILLESPIE
Information Officer & Press Attaché, USIS

Mr. Gillespie was born in Illinois and raised in Illinois and Maryland. Joining the Foreign Service of the United States Information Agency (USIA), he served several assignments at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC in which he dealt with various aspects of USIA's operations in the U.S. and abroad. His foreign assignments include Accra, Bujumbura, Leopoldville, Montevideo, the Hague, San Salvador and Madrid. Mr. Gillespie was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2010.

GILLESPIE: In the summer of '75 I was assigned to the Netherlands as Information Officer. I studied Dutch for 16 weeks with tutors since there was no available FSI class at that time. So I had 16 weeks of one-on-one instruction in Dutch, which really was quite good, and I, in January 1976, I flew to the Netherlands and I spoke the language getting off the plane. Now, not as well as I did five and a half years later when I completed the assignment, which was very long.

As families are, and especially children at that time as they’re in their, I guess, pre-teens, they certainly did not want to go. It was a very tough. We laugh about it because they hated the idea, and they were mad at me. It’s the famous time that my son uses the words that my wife had thought so often, “I didn’t join the Foreign Service, you did.” However, if you were to ask the family they would all agree, everyone thought was the most wonderful five and a half years that they spent.

Q: How old were your kids?

GILLESPIE: My son was 13, my daughter was 10. In any case, we went to the Netherlands. Before I arrived everyone had asked why I wanted to go to The Hague, a sleepy little place that doesn’t really matter? Well it turned out for a variety of reasons that it was a new center of Europe and especially of media interest, which made it interesting for me as the Information Officer and Press Attaché. I very quickly received an introduction to Dutch press and society. It was about two weeks after my boss had a very nice farewell and welcome reception for my predecessor and for me. “Vrij Nederland,” was the top political-social-cultural weekly in the country and was extremely good and over the years I came to appreciate it very much. I didn’t at the very beginning when they ran an enormous front page piece naming CIA names in the
Netherlands. Philip Agee, scoundrel that he was, was living in The Netherlands at that time, down in Zeeland. Now, in fact, I was never able to confirm that Agee had provided names and I’m not sure that he did. If you will recall, at about the same time the East Germans published a book of-

Q: “Who’s Who in the CIA.”

GILLESPIE: Precisely.

Q: I was in it.

GILLESPIE: As was I. Well, I think I was in an appendix that someone published later.

Q: I was in the regular thing. You know, I picked it, say, I wonder whose name is- and there I am and it was because- I think they picked me up because I had been in INR, you know, a regular assignment.

GILLESPIE: Of course. Well mine was. I spoke six lines of Russian and in Burundi that’s what I spoke once to the Soviet ambassador.

But, in any case, I did not show up in this list in the paper but of course it gave me an incredible opportunity to learn and meet a number of other journalists who I was quickly able to impress with the fact that I wasn’t going to say anything except that off the record. This was scurrilous and did raise some serious problems for some very decent people, such as our General Services Officer who is still one of my best friends, who they just named. He was married to a German woman.

However, within the next two months my second cause for major introduction happened and that was that the Lockheed scandal broke. You may recall this was a case of bribery that Lockheed had done in a number of places around the world.

Q: Including Japan where it-

GILLESPIE: In Japan where it-

Q: -cost Tanaka-

GILLESPIE: That’s right, it caused the fall of Tanaka. Well, in The Netherlands the principle contact for Lockheed for The Netherlands was Prince Bernhard. Prince Bernhard was the consort of Queen Juliana. Juliana was older at this time. In fact, just as I was leaving The Netherlands preparations were being made when Juliana had already announced her abdication in 1981. But Bernhard, in the late 1960s and mid ‘60s and late ‘60s, all the way into the early ‘70s, had been asked by the Dutch government to help them bring business to The Netherlands and he worked on it, in the course of which it appears he received a great deal of payment. There were some fascinating things that came out. For the first time the Dutch looked openly at their royalty and it caused a great deal of complications. You know, The Netherlands, as it was explained to me by a
number of good Dutch friends, was really a republic that happened to have a queen and a royal family. Over the period following this, maybe in the next six months or so, I got to know a number of younger members of parliament, one of whom was quite outspoken. He was a Republican and he had no use for them at all. In fact, especially Labor members of the Labor Party did happen to be pure Republicans; it wasn’t that strong a thing. We were having coffee in the parliament building with friend of mine, Tom Martin from the political section, and we were talking about this. Tom’s a realist and I asked who he would vote for president here if you’re going to have a republic? He said it’s easy; I’d vote for Juliana.

Q: Yes.

GILLESPIE: And this was- But Bernhard had the additional burden of being a German by birth. He had been something of a war hero; he had already married Juliana. He was in the Dutch air force and flew with the Brits and then actually came back and worked with some of the Dutch resistance groups and was a legitimate war hero and had earned, in spite of the problems from World War II, which were still very serious, he had earned acceptance.

However this other story started to break and very good journalists were looking at it seriously and they said where did the money go? He gets a lot of money, we pay him well. Well it turns out as it had been suspected, a great deal of it went to two women in Paris, one of whom had been Bernhard’s mistress and the other was his daughter. And this set off a stream of other problems. Bernhard pulled back; he basically gave up everything. He even left his position as the honorary chairman of the World Wildlife Fund, which he had helped start. As someone said, my taxes go to that family and it’s all very well and good but I pay Bernhard to sleep with my queen. Bernhard then basically moved out of the public eye for an extended period.

For me, this was a major thing. Lockheed was producing the F-16; the Dutch were going to be major partners in the European production of the F-16. They were going to buy a number of them. I was required to learn a great deal about the Justice Department, about the SEC (Security and Exchange Commission) and about the Senator Frank Church’s Committee, which you may recall.

Q: This was when the Church was investigating this-

GILLESPIE: That’s right. And it wasn’t just Lockheed; it was a number of companies and it led to some new American law that basically has gotten stronger over the years prohibiting bribery in foreign countries.

Q: For a while it was a real inhibitor.

GILLESPIE: Absolutely.

Q: I mean, other countries were playing the same rules.

GILLESPIE: And still-
Q: It’s changing somewhat but-

GILLESPIE: Yes, but my own experience is that a number of them don’t. The Europeans have become much better. The Japanese have become much better. There are other Asian countries that are not quite as good and certainly some of— in the post-Cold War period I’m not sure that the Russians are. However, however, that was the first big thing.

The next thing that-

Q: Before that-

GILLESPIE: Yes.

Q: -a little sort of nuts and bolts. You were there from ’76 to ’81?

GILLESPIE: Yes.

Q: When you arrived who was the ambassador?

GILLESPIE: I was going to get into that.

Q: Okay, alright.

GILLESPIE: This is a good time. During that period I worked for three ambassadors, three very interesting people, different ways, two of whom became very close friends, personal friends of the Gillespies. The first—When I arrived Kingdon Gould was the ambassador. Kingdon Gould is a fascinating man who was a Washington developer and businessman whose family development firm still is a major firm in the Washington area and Kingdon had been a supporter of Richard Nixon and he was in his second tour as an ambassador. And he said, quite openly, I paid $25,000 to help elect Nixon the first time and I went to Luxembourg. So I called up as we were approaching this second election and I said how much do I have to pay for a better place? And I paid $100,000 and got The Netherlands. However, Gould was more than just someone who bought a seat. Kingdon Gould worked very hard at what he did. He came from the Gould family, although he was—

Q: Jay Gould.

GILLESPIE: Jay Gould. And he had spent a great deal of time in Europe. He spoke flawless French and had taught himself some Dutch, enough to make small talk, do an opening three lines in every speech and then say quickly I will not bore you anymore, and he had enough sense to do that and get out of it and speak English. He was an athlete. He played everything. He was still going back and he was a goalie on a veterans’ field hockey team that played. He was a golfer. He rode his bicycle everywhere he could. He occasionally drove us crazy with doing things but in fact, as I look back on it I have great admiration for him. When he left that he came back to Washington and started the annual JFK field hockey tournament here in Washington that brought clubs, not college teams but clubs from all over the country and the world in some cases, and
they used to play on the mall and he underwrote the whole thing.

When Ambassador Gould was replaced, the Dutch and the journalists, the people that I dealt with most often, thought it would be so nice if we could finally get a good career ambassador. They felt all they got were political appointees and they were tired of them because they didn’t really know anything. In spite of the fact I think Gould did a pretty good job.

They were thrilled when in the late summer of 1976, Bob McCloskey was named to replace him. McCloskey of course had been for many years the State Department spokesman under Rusk, Rogers and he was very highly thought of. He had also been the principle negotiator of the Spanish- or re-negotiator of the Spanish bases treaty. We were all thrilled. I was somewhat nervous, although I recognized he was a wonderful person, all I could think of was I’ve got the man considered the best spokesman ever coming here looking over my shoulder now. In fact, he was terrific. He never directly said anything to me that was not either a compliment or- about my work- or in an exchange with questions about what was happening that he was interested in.. Any criticism that he had, and he did, he gave to my boss, a wonderful man named Victor Stier, who had also been an information officer in several posts, an old newspaper man, and Vic would come in and chat to me. Vic also was one of the kindest men going. And so I never really got chewed out, which was nice, although I was often corrected.

Bob started off wonderfully but he came at perhaps the wrong time. The Dutch government fell; they went to elections and then they went into what was quite common for them, an extended period of formation. They tried to form a new government and they had, of course the government holding but it couldn’t do much. And he was sort of stuck.

At the same time there were elections in the U.S. which led to, for us, a change. The Carter Administration came in. It didn’t affect Bob directly but I think in all honesty what happened, Stu, he was bored. This wasn’t what he had hoped for. And so after less than two years he took an assignment to Greece. And this led to another crisis of moaning and groaning by all the Dutch, of my contacts, the politicians, the foreign ministry types, we lost the best ambassador we’ve ever had. He would say he hardly was. He said there was nothing for me to do. And he was replaced after a period of time by Geri Joseph.

Geri Joseph was a woman-

*Q: That’s J-E-*

GILLESPIE: G-E-R-I Joseph.

*Q: G-E-R-I.*

GILLESPIE: G-E-R-I. She was from Minnesota, from Minneapolis. Her husband was a major grain dealer, which caused some perturbation because he also had done a great deal of business in the world’s largest port, which was Rotterdam. She was the Vice-Chairman of the Democratic National Committee and she was a very close friend of all the Minnesota Farmer Liberal Democrat Party, that’s DFL, Democratic Farmer Liberal; Hubert Humphrey and Vice President
Mondale. And we had no idea what to expect. What we got was a vivacious, intelligent, extremely hard working diplomat who came right in and said I don’t know anything and you all are going to be sick of teaching it to me but I’m going to learn it.

In any case, those were the three ambassadors. She ended up doing a fantastic job anyway. She is the principle reason that I spent five and a half years there.

In my first year there the U.S. elections came up.

Q: This is-

GILLESPIE: Nineteen seventy-six.

Q: This is Carter-

GILLESPIE: As it turned out, Carter against Ford. And the United States elections are very big in the Netherlands to this day but at that time, I mean, I was flabbergasted; they knew a great deal; they sent a large amount of media coverage to the U.S.; they had correspondents there; they put television crews, several of them working in the States. My secretary reminded me that every four years we have a big election seminar for all the editors. We go somewhere for two or three days. Well, what happened was the only place we could get, which turned out to be satisfactory, was the Holiday Inn in Leiden. The disadvantage of Leiden was it was too close to Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague and it was too easy for editors and-

Q: To go back to work.

GILLESPIE: -to go back and forth. You’ve got to get them away. Well of course it’s a small country and it’s hard to get them completely way.

But, in any case, we did. John Gilligan, the former governor of Ohio and the future Administrator USID and the father of the current secretary of HHS Kathleen Sebelius (Department of Health and Human Services) was our featured speaker. We had several others; we had two or three very good local academics and I was amazed. The top editors and foreign editors in the Netherlands came and they sat down and they took it very seriously; they knew things; they wanted to talk about things; they knew Watergate backwards and forwards; they wanted to know things like what do you think the impact will be of Ford’s pardon of Nixon; what do you think this will be; how is this going to affect but who is this guy Carter? Because by that time Carter running and was serious. It was an extremely successful event and just the beginning for me of what went on for the rest of the year on the American election. Universities from all over the country would call, we went and spoke, and I had a lot of fun doing that.

The other event in 1976 was the bicentennial. And this combined with the Holland Festival, which was held every year. In the course of our bicentennial year we had the Boston Symphony, the North Sea Jazz Festival which went on every year but it was even bigger. The North Sea Jazz Festival is a four-day event usually the week before the Fourth of July and it brings all sorts of people in. Martha Graham Company came. I remember sitting watching Martha Graham when,
after the lights had gone down, there was a pause. We had very nice seats, and two women came in from the side and sat in the box in front of us. When the program finished, they kept the lights off and the two women left and went backstage. My boss said we’ll go back and say hello to the company and thank them, which we always did. We went backstage and there was the Queen, which was a wonderful thing.

The other event from that I will always remember was the New York Philharmonic came and played, under Leonard Bernstein, played in The Hague. 1976 set records for heat in Western Europe but at this time of the year it still was beautiful. It was spring-like and they took over what was a great ice hockey rink, and put the Philharmonic in the middle. It was a great. Bernstein was Bernstein, doing what Bernstein did and doing it very well. When they started playing encores, he came back and he stood and he said perhaps a few light pieces by the conductor. They played some musical comedy pieces, “Candide,” and “West Side Story” and of course they kept calling him back, calling him back, calling him back. And so he walked back out, raised his hand and just lowered it and they played “Stars and Stripes Forever.” I love listening to the big military bands play. I think they’re wonderful. But I have never heard “Stars and Stripes” played like this. Julius Baker, the first flutist, took up his piccolo and stood and played that glorious piccolo solo. The place went wild.

The last thing, for the Fourth of July bicentennial, Kingdon Gould said we must have a party. And we took over the Congresgebouw, the big conference center in The Hague, where the North Sea Jazz Festival had been held the week before. And we took it over. We had things here and there and the big dance downstairs. This was underwritten by the American Chamber of Commerce and others. Basically, it was all the American community and there were some others but there in the middle, greeting everyone who came in, was Ambassador Kingdon Gould as Uncle Sam on stilts, and he stayed on stilts the entire evening. This was a man in his mid-60s; it was a remarkable performance.

We went through the Dutch elections, which went on and on. McCloskey left, as I said. Carter came in; Carter brought one of the more fascinating cabinets in with him, certainly from the national security side as both Harold Brown and Cyrus Vance were remarkable men. At this point two things really shaped the rest of my tour in the Netherlands. One is the neutron bomb. Department of Defense let it be known that we were looking at the construction of a neutron bomb, which was best described as being capable of killing people and saving the buildings. Of course this brought the European far left to the streets. And to think back, 1976, this was still—this was post ’68 in Europe; there still was a lot of dissatisfaction and anger and they came out and demonstrated. Well of course, the administration had never said we’re going to build the neutron bomb. They said they were talking about it and they were talking about it seriously and it was being talked about at NATO as perhaps something that would make sense in Europe.

By that time my friends in the Dutch Labor Party and in the Centrist Christian Democrats, which were just forming from the three parties, would come in and would say how can you do this? How can you do this? Well, in any case it was in about six months to a year completely surpassed by the NATO decision to deploy intermediate nuclear forces. Over the next several years they made the decisions about what this would be; there would be several bases of Cruise missiles in the Netherlands; there would be some in Belgium, and Pershing II rockets in
Germany.

Q: By the way, this was in response-

GILLESPIE: To the SS-20-

Q: Of the Soviet Union.

GILLESPIE: -of the Soviets, which we were quite concerned about and it wasn’t-

Q: These were intermediate range-

GILLESPIE: That’s right.

Q: The idea being that by putting these intermediate ranges the Soviets were saying okay, you Europeans, we can hit you and we won’t threaten the United States and you no longer have the-

GILLESPIE: You no longer have-

Q: -cover.

GILLESPIE: And this would give the cover. A majority of serious European strategic thinkers agreed with this. And we pushed it.

Well, the problem was it basically became the only major issue for us in the Netherlands for the next two or three years. The Dutch government was a center left government. The Prime Minister was Joop den Uyl, an economist and a fine man. The Foreign Minister was Max van der Stoel, perhaps a great man, certainly considered so in Greece where he had been a leader in human rights questions and led the battle to get rid of the colonels. The Dutch Government supported INF, but they weren’t happy about it. The problem for the Dutch was that they recognized that their only real power, other than their economic power, was through European organizations. They wanted to play a major role in NATO. It was very important to them. And if NATO said this is what we ought to do, they would probably go along with it but politically in the Netherlands it was very tough. They knew that they would have a hard time agreeing to the whole package as it came in. They couldn’t get it through their parliament and they probably couldn’t win an election based on it. Both the Labor Party and the Christian Democrats had the same problem. The Christian Democrats were the second partner of this coalition, but they were just forming. There had been three traditional parties, two Protestant and one Catholic; it had been a major event for them to pull together. I found the Netherlands in the 1970s continued with many of the old social divisions that had existed in the Netherlands for 200 or 300 years.

Q: But still.

GILLESPIE: Still. It was at this time I took a group of journalists to NATO. We went by train from The Hague. There were about 10 of us and we took off toward Rotterdam. Well one of
them was a man named Frans Bletz. He ended up as the deputy director of the Netherlands’ largest think tank and left his journalist role but he was really a very, very smart guy, and as we pulled out of Rotterdam and started to go down across Brabant, the southern part of the Netherlands, and I think it was when we crossed the Meuse River, he jokingly said Jake, you know, I need a visa to come this way; this is the historical division of Catholic and Protestant Netherlands. These were fascinating things to me. I was so intrigued by this.

These three parties were joining together and they had each played a role. The Catholic Party had been in every government in the 20th century at that point. They were always in the government. There are more Catholics in the Netherlands than any other group. That’s because the Protestants are so divided. There are a lot of Catholics and we often forget this.

Q: There’s no established church?

GILLESPIE: I don’t think so, although the Queen and the Royal family have been Protestants – Reformed Church – forever.

However, the influence that this had on the INF debate was great. One leader of the three parties said he was a pacifist. He refused to support any of this, and, although he held his parliamentary seat and no little political influence, he was moved out of power in the new Christian Democratic Appeal – the CDA.

What it all meant for me was an enormous group of journalists coming in. American journalists wanted to know what are the Dutch going to do because this was a big story. The Dutch had never had so much foreign press interest. The other thing it meant was that this became “the” issue for USIS. We did seminars; we did round tables. We would get an American official who would come in; if he would give us two hours, the end of an afternoon, we would bring in 10 journalists and sit around the conference room and talk about this kind of issue. USIA sent us a number of academic experts, some very good ones. They would come in and we’d do the same thing. And it got so we could call journalists in on a moment’s notice. I mean, virtually 24 hours. We’d say, we’re going to do this tomorrow, are you available? And they would make time. They would come in for it. We prepared materials that were sent from USIA, press materials that we’d put out. And I think the proudest day that I had there was when they had the first big parliamentary debate. Ambassador Joseph, as did several others from the Embassy, sat in the diplomatic boxes. We saw on virtually every desk, stacks of the bulletins that we had sent out with the distinctive “Stars and Stripes” banner across the top. I looked and thought, I don’t know if they will agree with it but at least they’re reading it. I can’t ask for any more than that. And these were the members of the parliament.

The debate went on. It was not resolved during the time I was there, Stu. It went on and on but I think we made some inroads. We sent IVs (International Visitors), one of whom became minister of defense; later another one, actually two of them minister of defense. And others took major positions. On this issue it was always a question what would the left wing of the government do. If the government didn’t feel it had the support, the government wasn’t going to bring it up to parliament.
Now at the same time there were other- I don’t want to say that there wasn’t anything else going on.

Q: Well before we turn away from that, I was wondering if you’d talk a bit about sort of with the spotlight on the Netherlands but this was happening elsewhere, these tremendous demonstrations against this. I mean, we were perfectly- I mean, they weren’t against the Soviets for putting stuff that was going to go into the Netherlands. I mean, was this a chance for kind of the left that at last they had kind of an issue where they could show that they were anti-American or they weren’t under the thumb of the Americans?

GILLESPIE: Yes.

Q: I mean, what was going on?

GILLESPIE: I think there was a bit of that. As this blew up, as it started off, I started in my own mind with the conception that this was a level of anti-Americanism. We polled, Stu, we polled a lot. We used the Dutch polls, the Dutch Gallup which was extremely good. I was never able to get anything and our people back in research who did- looked at all these we were never able to get anything that showed this.

Q: Showed the anti-Americanism.

GILLESPIE: It wasn’t there. We did other things in the midst of all this and would see no indication of it. On Memorial Day we would go to Margraten, the American military cemetery outside Maastricht. Limburg’s a little more conservative; you’ve got a couple of NATO operations down there, maybe it’s a difference. But you would have thought that we had liberated the Netherlands. In fact, the Americans didn’t liberate the Netherlands. The Canadians did. After the Americans and the British under Montgomery went so far and the attempt at Arnhem failed, we pulled back through that winter. I have Dutch friends to this day who talk about the horrible winter of 1944-45, when they had nothing to eat. The Germans came back in and took horrible revenge on the people. It was the Canadians who went to liberate the Netherlands as the spring came in 1945. We had been tied up all that winter in the Battle of the Bulge.

However, the Dutch were always appreciative of our war efforts and the Marshall Plan. At the bicentennial they recognized their wonderful historic ties to us. They were very proud of the fact that a little Dutch island in the Caribbean had been the first place to recognize the American flag.

Q: Yes, yes.

GILLESPIE: And, you know, I mean, we see it still today.

Q: Do they talk about New Amsterdam and all?

GILLESPIE: New Amsterdam. And we see this today. And New York, they just celebrated the Henry Hudson 400th anniversary. The ties are close. I mean, you can’t walk around New York
without seeing them from Wall Street to Brooklyn. I mean, those are all Dutch names. And the Bronx; they’re all Dutch names. But at that time, the left was frustrated. What had happened is that the Socialist International parties in Northern Europe had moved pretty much to the center, with the exception maybe of Sweden. Sweden as a neutral didn’t really count that much because the ones that mattered were the Germans, Belgians and the Netherlands. The Germans started with Willy Brandt, who, you know, by the time he was in power was hardly a raving leftist. Joop den Uyl, the Dutch Prime Minister and the leader of the Socialist- of the Labor Party, was a moderate left economics professor and the same thing in Belgium. So the left wings of those parties were frustrated, no question. Also, in the Netherlands, and I think in Germany too, there was a strong pacifist streak that ran through the left and the anti-nuclear was terribly strong.

Maybe it was 1980 the Tellers came to visit and I was assigned to take-

Q: This is Edward Teller.

GILLESPIE: -to take care of Edward Teller.

Q: Who’s the father of the-

GILLESPIE: Well, the H (hydrogen) bomb. But you certainly didn’t want to say that in front of him and he made a point of it; he said don’t have anybody say that, please. He was a charming man, a fine pianist. He said he wished that he’d just been able to keep playing the piano.

We went to see one of his old friends, a Dutch physicist, who set up a chance for Teller to speak at his institute. And we went to see him and the two of us sat there, talking to him. The two of them were talking and I was listening and, you know, an awful lot of my high school physics was pfft. But they were talking and then he said, he said you know, this may not be a terribly warm reaction. Teller said they cannot be any worse than what I get in the United States and I’ve pretty much learned to take it. In fact, he dealt with every difficult question. He agreed with many of them. He said you know- he said I do have some things that I believe in. I believe in nuclear power; I think it’s vital. I think there are ways to handle waste disposal. He went on. But it was very interesting. I had some pickets outside the embassy the next day. I mean, we had done no publicity on him. We had taken him to this and we’d taken him to two or three other places and we thought this would be it, but I had pickets because the word got out he was there. It was a strange sort of a thing the way that it spun off and built up. It also became a way for opposition political parties to try to get a jump on the parties in power. And it was basically a political thing, I think, by the end.

Ab Slichting, who was a politician who had become the chief advisor to the minister of defense and the spokesman for the ministry, as I was leaving he said “Jake, I’m sorry, I just don’t- I’m not sure we can do it.” It happens that I went back on a visit about 18 months later after I had left the country and he came over to me at a reception and said we’re going to accept it. We’re going to accept it. And of course they did. The small bases were built, protection went in. The Cruise missiles went in. Fortunately the Pershings never were actually based and their principle purpose, as it turned out, was to get an INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty that limited and, you know, basically eliminated the SS-20s and got rid of all of them. And so they
went in and they came out. It was a great expense and I think very, very much worth it.

Q: Yes.

GILLESPIE: Was that Carter’s idea? I don’t know but Reagan certainly adapted it and turned it into that.

It was a crazy sort of a time. The big issue in the Netherlands around INF for many of these people was would it include the possibility of reductions and how much. When we said we will reduce bases; would we include the possibility of reducing these to zero, having no missiles at all. Carter said yes, but no one would buy it. Reagan came in and that’s what he did. Everybody said, oh you’ll never do that. You’ll put them in; you’ll never take all of them out. You might take a few out. That’s what it was.

There were other serious political issues going on. Of course there were trade issues. We had trade issues all the time; this was a major trading partner but the other ones, the things that went on that I found struck us, especially as my career went on was terrorism. In Europe the two main terrorist groups that were working were the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and the RAF (Red Army Faction) in Germany. They both came into the Netherlands. The IRA killed the British ambassador in a frightening, a really frightening assassination for all of us.

Q: What happened?

GILLESPIE: He was walking out of his home and they just blasted him. Came by with a car and blasted him and drove away. The RAF did two or three other things. They would come across the border. The RAF worked a lot in the Dusseldorf-Cologne area and they would come across the Dutch border and rob banks to get some money in the Netherlands and run back. They may have had some ties in Amsterdam but I don’t think anyone ever found any real Dutch terrorist violence. The one terrorist group that was Dutch, although the Dutch didn’t like to admit it, was the South Moluccans. South Molucca is a small island in the Indonesian chain.

Q: Yes, I’m just looking at it.

GILLESPIE: The Moluccans joined the Dutch Colonial army and, in effect, they became the Dutch Gurkhas. They were good fighters and as Indonesian independence took over the Moluccas, they didn’t have much future short-term there. They, with their families, were taken to the Netherlands and put into camps. The Dutch later realized that this was a horrible thing to do, and re-settled them. However, among the South Moluccan leadership in the Netherlands there was always a belief that they had been promised an effort to return to their island with independence for South Molucca and that the Dutch would help do it.

The Dutch weren’t about to do that, obviously, and in the fall of 1975, South Moluccans hijacked a train running between Amsterdam and Utrecht and held it for a number of days. The last thing in the world the Dutch wanted to do was to go in and get into a shootout. This is not the way the Dutch police work. That train sat there for almost a week. This happened the year before I arrived. People had generally forgotten when in 1978 they did it again. It was a different train; it
was outside The Hague and the Minister of Interior said we’re not going to put up with this. And it was not nice. The Dutch cut off all supplies to the train. But the situation still lasted about a week.

I had gotten to know a young member of parliament because my contacts in parliament in the Labor Party had come to me and suggested Henk Molleman for the International Visitor Program. He was a sociologist and taught at Leiden University. His interest was the Moluccans and other immigrant minorities in the Netherlands. He recognized that this was going to be a major problem. We arranged the IV and he did some interesting things. He said the Cubans in Miami are a lot like the Moluccans. They’re going to do anything they can to go back. They’ll never stop talking about it even though most of their community is moving off and assimilating in the rest of the Netherlands. He became the Labor Party point man on immigrants for many years. He dealt with the Surinamers, the African immigrants, and I still see his name now and again dealing with Arab- or Muslim issues.

Central America became a major issue. There were a number of people who were very interested in Central America. There had been Dutch assistance programs in a number of those places; they were very taken with Nicaragua and had great hopes for the Sandinistas. Then, in 1980 two Dutch journalists were killed in El Salvador. This is somewhat ironic as I look at the rest of my career; I spent a lot of time the last year and a half there dealing with Central America. As we moved toward the end of my tour there in 1980 we came up to the second American election while I was there.

There is one thing I should mention that we were very involved in and this was Iran. In 1980, after the Iranian revolutionary guard took over the American embassy in Tehran we filed suit in the International Court of Justice, which is in The Hague. There was a lot of press interest. American journalists were coming in all the time and it was- this was fascinating and time consuming and probably in the greater scheme of things did not mean a whole lot, although it kept attention and pressure on Iran.

But as I was about to say,, our elections were coming up again in 1980 and so very early on this time I said we’re going to have another seminar. Geri Joseph was there and she agreed to participate.

I asked Washington for good speakers and they said we have a great one for you, Fred Harris, former Senator from Oklahoma. He teaches at the University of New Mexico and would love to do it. So Harris came and I had Geri Joseph. I had a visiting American professor at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies who had been on the Wisconsin Democratic Committee and I had a young American who taught political science at Leiden. Well, it turns out all of them were Democrats. I went to my friend, Bruce Gregory, who was working on this in Washington and said get me a good Republican to come here. I’ve got to have someone. And about two weeks later he called back and said I’ve got someone for you. His name is Tom Korologos. Now, I didn’t know him but he was Nixon’s Senate liaison and had worked in the Senate.

Q: I’m interviewing Tom.
GILLESPIE: Bruce said he didn’t know him but he came very highly recommended.

We had a wonderful group of participants and we were out in the Dutch countryside, a wonderful place that these days they could never do because even though the journalists paid their own way; I would love to see what the inspectors would say today about it. But it helped to draw the editors and senior columnists.

We opened with a reception and dinner and Harris opened the presentations. We already had a small American gathering in The Hague before we all went out where we met each other. And I could see that Korologos was fun and would be enjoyable. But I still had no idea how anyone would be before this tough audience. Fred Harris is a hilarious man and a dynamic speaker. We were finishing up and the journalists, all headed to the bar. I was setting up for the next morning. And Korologos stops me in the hall. He said you SOB, Gillespie. You set me up with Harris. In good spirits, but he was obviously concerned.

Fred Harris is a great speaker. I don’t know if it was in the opening or later on that he used what I thought was one of the great stories. One of the Dutch journalists asked why must all of this campaigning go on forever and ever. You wipe out your candidates before they can ever be president. Harris said maybe you’re right. But you know something? I come from a very poor family; my father and mother didn’t have anything. Father was a sharecropper and a lot of time in my early years I would have to work all the time and I chopped cotton and I would have to pick beans and I’d do it all day. And he said you know something? I’ve chopped cotton and I’ve run for president and running for president’s a lot easier.

But anyway, the next morning Korologos didn’t come down to breakfast, and I was afraid he might be ill. I called his room, he picked up, he said I’m fine. I’ll see you there. Don’t worry. He said I had some breakfast up here. And what he had done was he had been on the telephone. He went back after the evening session and called his office and said get me the latest data. Tom Korologos is a delightful person and he had not spent most of his life in politics without knowing how to speak to a slightly hostile audience. He opened up his first remarks by saying my name’s Tom Korologos and I’m probably something you have never seen here. He said I’ll tell you what I am. I am a conservative hawk from the state of Utah; I am a Greek American. I am a lobbyist. But I have been a journalist. Then I think he ended up by saying I’m conservative and I am very hawkish and you don’t have many of those, which of course was absolutely true. The Dutch right falls- at that time would have fallen into our middle politically. But he proceeded to just absolutely wrap everyone. And so here we had two great speakers. The others were very good, each made a presentation. We went on with questions and the two of- Korologos and Harris, would just take off. One of them would tell a joke, the other would tell a better joke. And there may have been some learning, I don’t know. I think the young professor from Leiden drew the job of always talking about how the system works. Well these guys had an idea but this was to refresh them so they didn’t forget what happened and this sort of thing. And we came down to the last morning. The panel had done what had to be done. I said all right, last round of questions. I’ve got the question for everyone. What’s going to happen? Make your predictions. And they went around- And I should explain. Tom Korologos, after this trip, actually came back to the Netherlands at least once but he later became a member of the USIA Advisory
Commission and then later the head of it. This is a man who was, in many ways, a great friend of anyone who ever worked in public diplomacy in USIA.

Q: Yes, he cost the- he might have been conservative but he-

GILLESPIE: There was no politics; there was no politics. Later on Tom learned that my wife worked for Paul Sarbanes. Well that was pretty good, even though he was a great liberal, because he was Greek.

Q: Greek, yes.

GILLESPIE: He’s been married to-

Q: -the McLaughlin.

GILLESPIE: Anne McLaughlin.

Q: He was ambassador to Belgium too, of course.

GILLESPIE: Yes. And then later he was Ambassador to Belgium. And I think from all I’ve heard really a pretty good one.

Q: As a matter of fact I heard from Beth Jones, who’s our assistant secretary for European Affairs during-

GILLESPIE: That period.

Q: -the Colin Powell period, that she focused on him and said he was really the best of the political ambassadors because he would go to the government where he was and carry tough messages.

GILLESPIE: Yes.

Q: A lot of political appointees don’t.

GILLESPIE: Don’t like to go; they send their DCM.

Q: By the way, I was- I had another session, I’m working with him, Monday, this Monday, so Tom and I are well-

GILLESPIE: Oh, good. Well give Tom my best.

Q: I sure will.

GILLESPIE: In any case, as we went around the room saying what’s going to happen, and remember this is 1980, we got to Tom. He said something like, “I’ve done my best to show you
that the situation is right for a Republican to be elected. I have a hard time imagining that
President Carter can be re-elected and the public probably wants to elect someone else. And so I
feel confident that it would be a Republican. Except it’s the Republican Party and we’ll probably
do something stupid like nominate Ronald Reagan.” Of course, again, the place all laughed but
they didn’t think about it until later on. I’ve never forgotten it.

We went through the election; it was the same thing for my section and I think others in the
embassy. I lectured everywhere from Leiden University to a union training program in the port
of Rotterdam on the American elections. People were interested; people followed it. And of
course it was extremely important because the Dutch at that time were very nervous about what
was going to happen with their own political situation and the INF question. Reagan was elected.
This came as a real shock in the Netherlands. It wasn’t just that he was elected; of course, it was
a landslide.

The morning after, starting at about 5:30 or 6:00, we had a coffee and donuts at the embassy,
open to everyone. The American embassy in The Hague then, happily, but, no longer
unfortunately, was down the street from one of the main palaces, a block from the foreign
ministry and a block and a half from the Houses of Parliament. A better situation; you could not
ask. It was designed by Marcel Breuer and was of that stark style. The stone and the color made
it blend in perfectly with the 18th and 19th century buildings all around, including the palace.
We held the event down in the auditorium in the embassy and we had teletypes, boards with
detailed results of House and Senate races, some written analysis and as much else as we could
get. We had the Dutch television, which was still covering it. They covered it all night and kept
going. And people started coming in early in the morning. They knew what had happened and
we had all of the results hanging, states, Senate, House, everything. And the Prime Minister
came in, Joop den Uyl, and he said I’ll need no help, I’ll be okay. He got a cup of coffee and
started looking at the results. And I saw him and I said- I walked over and he said you know, this
is terrible. He said I’m looking at all my friends who were defeated; Church, McGovern, all of
the senators who were defeated. I stood with him and helped him find certain races. Within a
year the same thing would happen to him. And although he stayed in the Parliament and led the
opposition after his election, he moved on and then actually did not live terribly long, which was
very sad. He was a fine man.

But the Dutch elections were fascinating. The moment ours ended it seemed like I started on
another. Because the Dutch- they had this crisis and because this was important to American
interests.

I can think of no other election from the Netherlands, occasionally Belgium would get some
interest because it would be Flemish-Walloon battles but no other election from the Netherlands
where you had front page stories two and three weeks before the election on the Dutch elections
Journal” The TV networks covered them very seriously. Since most of the American
correspondents in Europe and others knew me from talking about INF. They would come and
they would ask, you know, can I get a briefing with someone here, what do you know about this,
who should I talk to on the Dutch side when they came. When the elections were coming they
came to me and they started to say what, you know, what’s going to happen? And I always said
well you better understand what’s going to happen because the Dutch have a very complex
election system. It is a proportional with carryovers; there is a first past the post in some cases
but always and it builds up. They had, I think, 12 or 13 parties in the parliament. The idea is to
give the representation to everyone. So I would describe it; I had a little diagram I could draw for
them on how it happened. It is very complicated.

Well I must have done this briefing ten or twelve times before the elections. One day I got a call
from the spokesman at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It’s three or four weeks before the
election, maybe less. And he said could we have lunch? He said he was going to bring two or
three people from his office. Now by this time, I should explain, my Dutch was such I worked in
Dutch almost all the time. The great question everybody asked when I did so, well why on earth
are you studying Dutch? He said let’s have lunch in English. And I said well you all speak very
good English; perfectly all right with me

He said you’ve been talking to all the American journalists who come through about the Dutch
elections. And I said well, and I thought oh my God he’s going to- they’re going to complain
about this. And I said well yes, I have. You know, they come in and we talk about things they
want to know. He said well it’s a very complicated - what do you do? I said well I explain what’s
happening and I said I explain your system. You know, I’ve been through one election and I’ve
watched and I’ve talked to a lot of people and I try the best I can to explain what’s going to
happen. And he said would you tell us what you say and talk to me about it. And I said I’d be
glad- And we walked through and got through and he said our problem is this: we’re going to
have British, Irish, American journalists coming in. We’re going to be briefing and we have
never talked about this stuff in English. It’s all technical jargon and we don’t know how you say
this but you managed to do it. And so this confirmed one of the things that I had discovered over
my five years there; the reasons for learning Dutch may be somewhat limited, but you should
learn it because there are certain things that the Dutch just don’t speak about in English. They
didn’t talk about their political system in Dutch, the political system and Dutch literature. I
discovered this kind of by chance. I could get the Dutch to talk about their political system in
English but I had to force them, which probably wasn’t good. It was better to kind of stand there
and take part and that’s what happened. And by this time this probably made those 16 weeks
studying Dutch in the heat of the summer and fall in 1975 worthwhile.

In any case, the Labor/Christian Democrat government fell. A new government was elected. It
was chosen after, again, a long period. The prime minister was Dries van Agt who had been the
Minister of Justice in the previous two Labor/Christian Democratic governments. But this was a
Christian Democratic/Liberal coalition that formed the new government. Even they were not
certain when the government was formed that they had the votes to support INF and it wasn’t for
another difficult year that they managed to pull it together.

We too elected a new government. In May of 1981, on his first official trip abroad, it was
Susan’s and my pleasure to host at dinner for Director Charles Wick and his wife. Wick was
supposed to make about three stops on a trip but his confirmation was held up. He wanted to go
to the PAO conference that was being held in Berlin. He was sworn in and had nothing on his
schedule for three days because the trip had been messed up. They came to the Netherlands two
days early. Wick had scared everyone by this time. And I don’t know why, actually. Well, I do
know why. He could scare people. So he came out to our little duplex with his wife and the Director of European affairs for USIA. It is on the edge of a canal in this small but very pleasant suburb of The Hague. Their introduction to USIA overseas was having two kids pass him a few hors d’oeuvres that Susan had thrown together and we had, we actually had a delightful time. I can see all of the faults of Charles Wick and I’ll talk about this if you want, but we’re going to want to go on forever.

Q: We will on this.

GILLESPIE: Well next time. I see all the faults but in fact, like I also see an awful lot of good things that he did and I think like most USIA career people I have now come to the conclusion that he was really very good for us.

Q: I think that’s the- that’s what I get from-

GILLESPIE: Yes.

Q: But we’ll pick it up.

GILLESPIE: Because I leave at this point and return to the States.

Q: Okay. Today is the 20th of May, 2010, with Jake Gillespie.

And so Jake, we want to sort of set out a bit of the framework of what we want to talk about.

GILLESPIE: Okay. I believe I have already talked about the Washington tour but to make sure let’s just mention, there were some highlights. There were some things that were interesting that I focused on. Having spent a great deal of time in the Netherlands working on issues surrounding the installation of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe…

Q: This is the SS-20-

GILLESPIE: Versus Cruise missiles and the Pershings. When I returned to Washington I worked first in a section where I dealt with NATO issues, security issues, all of the things that nobody in USIA ever thinks they deal with. But what happened, because this was such a key issue, Director Charles Wick was very interested in it. First of all, I went with the Deputy Director to attend all the meetings of the McFarlane Committee in the-

Q: This was Bud McFarlane.

GILLESPIE: Bud McFarlane, at the National Security Council, and this was a big interagency group dealing with a number of issues but not directly the INF decision issue. But while I was there I not only met McFarlane and a number of other fascinating and interesting people from there and other places but also got my first introduction to Ollie North. And that name will pop back in briefly later. I also was the USIA representative sitting in on the State-Defense Committee chaired by Richard Burt or Richard Pearl, you may have your choice, depending on
which one you talked to, I’m sure, on the direct issue of the installation of NATO INF. This was much more interesting to me because it really showed the complexity of the problems that our own government had dealing with this decision and dealing with our allies in working out the decision.

Charlie Wick took a considerable interest in this. I imagine that USIA got more attention paid to it than normal was because people knew that probably twice a month Charlie Wick spent his weekends at Camp David with the president.

Q: Mrs. Wick and Mrs. Reagan, who was a, you know, I mean-

GILLESPIE: They were best friends.

Q: They were best friends and so, I mean, you know, when you think about Byzantine politics, when you think about the wife of the director of the information agency and the wife of a president have- can bring significant clout of another agency, of the information agency.

GILLESPIE: Yes. It goes way back; it goes way back. It went to when their children started school together in California.

However, I have always imagined, I do not know it’s so but I do know- did know Charlie Wick well enough to know that somewhere in Camp David there was a piano and on Friday night he sat down at the piano and started to play and had a drink and the president was there and I’m sure President Reagan, who was a warm man, went over and said Charlie, how are things going? And I will guarantee you that everyone else in the foreign affairs community in Washington worried that Charlie was going to say I’m doing fine except, you know, there’s this guy over at- and he’s a little bit of a problem. And Stu, that was a source of great power.

Q: Yes, oh of course.

GILLESPIE: Which I only saw used once. The president had made a speech early on in his first term and I think it was his first major foreign affairs speech. And it was on the issues of intermediate nuclear weapons and what we proposed to do, in which he talked a bit about what was known as the “zero option.” And the zero option was well, we can reduce both sides to zero and have none of these.

Now my own history in the Netherlands taught me that they didn’t believe this very much. They really did not believe that the United States would ever go down to zero but President Reagan mentioned this. The speech actually had a good bit of resonance for maybe three or four months. In Europe it got good response. About a year later I was working on this and out of the blue Director Wick called a meeting; maybe a half dozen people who were involved in this, senior level or others, and he said I believe the President should make a second speech. It’s time to follow up on this. We need more push to get this through. Now that’s a perfectly reasonable thought and appropriate. Whereupon he and my immediate boss in the section, a man named Scott Thompson, were called later to a meeting with Director Wick where he talked for maybe half an hour on his vision of this speech and what should be in it. And so he said Scott, you and
Jake draft this speech. No, draft me a briefing for Bill Clark and the Security Council with charts. Okay. And we went back and went to work.

Well the problem was that he had his remarks to us transcribed for a tape he made. We received a transcript. And so I went to work and sort of used that as an outline, that’s what he wanted, and I gave it to Scott. I said that some of these things are wrong because his numbers are way off; factors of tanks in the Warsaw Pact by, you know, are maybe off by a factor of two or three. I said, you know, he really doesn’t want to go in and do that. And Thompson agreed with me, he said we can’t do that. He said there are a couple of others- Let me work on this. And we had a second meeting.

Thompson, who had been the son-in-law of Paul Nitze when he started this job, was in the process of getting a divorce. He was very smart; he is very smart, a good writer. He had been at Tufts, at Fletcher, and Scott was smart. The problem was he made a point of letting the Director know how smart he was and Charlie didn’t like this. And Charlie, I think also had talked to Nitze who could not abide Scott Thompson at this point. Scott sent Director Wick a draft. So we had another meeting and Charlie laid him out and said Jake, you go back and redraft this. And I just gave it- Thompson turned it in as his draft which I thought was- he shouldn’t have. I mean- Well no. It was a mistake. If it had been my draft I could have taken the hit; I don’t think Charlie would have done it to me; I was too far down the pecking order. And so I did this and he said this is fine, take it around and get it cleared. Get it cleared in Burt’s office, get it cleared. So I did, I took it to Bert.

Q: Bert’s office was European Affairs?

GILLESPIE: European Affairs at this point. I had the whole presentation sent over to Burt’ office. That didn’t get a reply and then someone said you come over here. And they just let me have it. Burt and his staff looked at me and said this is the silliest thing. The only person who was decent to me the whole time I was there was Charlie Thomas, who was a wonderful man and had been the Peace Corps director in Uruguay when I was there. Charlie, as we walked out, he said “Look, you got to do what you got to do.” And they wouldn’t clear it.

I went back to USIA and Wick hit the ceiling. Wick had Jock Shirley, who was Counselor – the number three position in USIA -- call a meeting of all the interagency committee in Director Wick’s name. There were representatives from all interested offices. Jock started the meeting and said we want to talk about this, we know there are problems and so on. Then Charlie walked in. Jock acted surprised and said something like “Oh, Director Wick, come on in, have a seat. Would you like to say something? Charlie said I think I would. And he looked around; Bob Blackwill was there from Burt’s office. Steiner, the secretary of the NSC, who was the son of the Columbia professor, a very bright young guy was there and a number of others. And Charlie said I would like to read you all something and he proceeded to read from the executive order creating USIA that is re-signed every four years by every new president. It says that the Director shall do this and this and this and shall advise the president. Charlie said I will not be fulfilling my charge if I do not advise the President and I hope you will go back and let your principals know that I am going to advise the President, whether they like it or not.
The next day Charlie’s draft was cleared with the worst errors corrected. About three weeks later, the President gave the speech; it went through the NSC with Clark and all the others. Overall, it did not get as high praise as the first INF speech, but it got good marks, in Europe and the US. It was one of the most wonderful examples of uses of political and bureaucratic power in Washington I think I’ve ever seen.

Q: Yes.

GILLESPIE: Now, and the speech had an effect and it worked to some extent. Eventually, of course, the Europeans came around.

Q: It also was a forerunner of the what became the Reykjavik-

GILLESPIE: Yes, yes. That was when they moved from talk about INF to talk about strategic weapons and a forerunner of all of our negotiations with the Soviets after Reagan. But once again, it’s having a bleacher seat in the seventh game of the World Series. It was a great thing to be involved.

Q: This is the sort of thing that I find that our oral histories bring up. I mean, the inner dynamics of things, which you don’t get if you look at the official correspondence because it just doesn’t appear there.

GILLESPIE: No.

Q: And often-

GILLESPIE: And Charlie Wick is gone. I’m sure he would never have admitted to this; I’m certain that Burt and Clark would not refer to it in this way but I think it had, you know, some impact. In any case, that’s one item. After several years, about four, doing this I shifted jobs, not a minor, yes, something of a shift. I moved about three offices down at USIA but we were a small agency so you could make great shifts with only three offices. Actually, it was more like three cubicles down.

I became the Chief of what was known as the Fast Guidance Unit, which was a terrible name.

Q: The what?

GILLESPIE: Fast Guidance Unit. We were responsible for providing the daily policy direction for the USIA media. Now, this was always a battle within the media because the Voice of America took no direction in principle. They did listen to us, as a matter of fact. But the main way that we did this was either I or my assistant were the USIA participant in the preparation for the State Department spokesman’s daily briefings. And doing this I learned that the best possible way to learn what U.S. policy is, public policy, on any issue that you want is to read the spokesman’s daily briefing book.

Q: Some of those things, of course, may never be issues may never be raised but it’s-
GILLESPIE: Were it to be-

Q: It’s there.

GILLESPIE: That’s right.

Q: And you’ve got a copy of that.

GILLESPIE: I wouldn’t go to the early meeting that they had. I would get a call from the Deputy after they did that. Originally it was Alan Romberg who would call me and he’d talk about what they were going to do. It was a very fixed structure. They met with the Secretary and other principles in the morning and having met themselves they said here are is the news, starting early. Here are the issues we’ve got to answer. And they farmed out the questions across the State Department and the federal government. These were assignments to prepare guidance and get it cleared and get it into the press office by 11:00. It was and, I believe, still is, a remarkable machinery that they’ve got going. Of course, they now use computers and email and do it faster.

I would go to that 11:00 meeting and sit with, let’s see, who was it? John Hughes was the first spokesman there when I went, a wonderful man, a former “Christian Science Monitor” editor and current “Christian Science Monitor” columnist, although John may be retired now. He had come with USIA first and then became director of Voice of America and Secretary Shultz asked him to come over to be Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and spokesman. John and Romberg were a terrific team. They worked well together. John did not know State, Alan did. I never met anybody who knew policy as well as Alan Romberg, I’ll be perfectly-

Q: He’s here in Washington still.

GILLESPIE: Yes. I haven’t seen him for two or three years. I’ve run into him occasionally.

Q: I want to get a hold of him.

GILLESPIE: He’s- It’s one of the think tanks.

Q: Yes. It’s the Center of something.

GILLESPIE: You’re right, you’re right. It may be the Center in Asian. …

Q: Something.

GILLESPIE: Okay. In any case, they would go through this in great detail, argue back and forth. John would make handwritten changes; he said I’m not going to say that. John was a writer and John knew what word to use and he said you can’t say this or this and he would make changes. That book would be put together with his handwritten notes in it and would be copied. John would take it into the briefing and use it in the briefing. Everything- every guidance that was used he wrote on. I sat in the briefing and additionally made notes and it was fun. I became kind
of a part of this. I mean, I knew John from his time at USIA a bit, not well but a bit, and he opened up- And then I got to know Alan and worked with him well.

The briefing done, we went back to the press office director’s office. We had a post-mortem; what went right, what went wrong, what’s going to come up again, who’s going to come after something. All of these and some assignments were made. The staff, meanwhile, copied the book. I got a copy- I got two copies of the book and I headed back to USIA with these under my arm. I sat down, when I got back, I grabbed a sandwich, ate the sandwich and prepared for an early afternoon meeting. Representatives from offices all over USIA—usually ten to twelve -- came in and we discussed what had gone on and why. Many of them had listened to the briefing and so it was a short 15, 20 minute meeting after that and then that was it. It was a fascinating job. It went on for-

Q: I assume you- within the bowels of the institution the word was passed on to posts overseas.

GILLESPIE: Yes, because it went to the regional offices and they sent the things out, but the main way was through the wireless file.

Q: I’ve got a question. It’s sort of institutional. When you were there, particularly doing this work, did you find that USIA was sort of bipolar or something? I mean one was- the people, they wanted to get out the American word, the American way, culture, but the whole thing and the other one was let’s push what the policy is today. And I can see that there would be a certain conflict between the, you know, the American way type things and the thing of by God, we want to get this accomplished today. Did you see-?

GILLESPIE: You know, I think when I sensed it in Uruguay. There was a real sort of a push and pull between the culture guys and the information guys and I was a cultural guy at that time. Then when I was in the Netherlands I spent an extended period as Information Officer and the Press Attaché and I spent an extended period as the acting PAO. I saw it start to move together and I had a very wise PAO there, Vic Stier. He said if you really are interested in the policy things, and he said they’re important, you’ve got to remember that what you’re doing is fertilizing the field, making it possible to understand. Otherwise how is that guy in Chad ever going to know what a whale is?

Q: Yes.

GILLESPIE: And so at the top level in USIA there was an understanding of the conflict, but awareness that there really wasn’t a conflict. It fit together. At the working level there always was. Who gets more money? Oh, the Fulbright people get all this money and we don’t get anything over here for film. VOA never lacked for money. And so there was some difference, but not really a conflict.

Q: Well did you find yourself, maybe, I mean maybe you’re too far removed from it but I would think there would be political types; I’m talking about Congress or newspaper people saying you know, what are these guys doing with this artsy-fartsy cultural stuff? I mean, particularly a new group coming in who seized political power through elections. You know, we’ve got a policy,
want to do this, and don’t worry about that.

GILLESPIE: Well, of course, that was a problem. I went through two major changes in Washington. I never had that sense of the problem with the Carter people. No, I went through three really, but I had no sense of the change at all between Johnson and Nixon and people coming in. I was in Uruguay.

Q: That was still the era where the foreign affairs, you know, politics stopped at the border practically.

GILLESPIE: Yes. There was some conflict as the Reagan people came in. But not in USIA because we had Charles Wick who was well aware of the policy problems and on the other hand, he was a man with a background in the cultural stuff.

Q: Yes, sure.

GILLESPIE: He was a musician, he was a film producer, and he knew these people.

In Congress you frequently had a problem and I think it comes up a good bit at my last post, Madrid. Some congressional people, it could be a problem. They would tell us to give some money for this. But no one ever objected to the Fulbright program.

Q: Which, you know, when you look at this, I mean God, of all the things that are productive, this is, I mean, it’s stood us in great stead because it introduces people to the American way.

GILLESPIE: My favorite Fulbright story comes from my last post. There was one event or other, one celebration or other; we had a very big Fulbright program. And the Minister of Education came to speak.

Q: Of what country?

GILLESPIE: Spain. And the Minister of Education came to speak and he talked about a young political radical in the ‘50s and ‘60s, at the University in the Franco era and how hard it was. And he said but, I got a passport because I got a Fulbright. And I got on the boat at Cadiz and we went to the United States. We sailed from Cadiz. He said we watched and the moment we were out of Spanish territorial waters we opened a bottle of champagne. That minister became the Foreign Minister; his name is Javier Solana, he spent four years in the States. He marched against NATO with the Socialist party in Spain. He, of course, later became the Secretary General of NATO.

Q: NATO, yes.

GILLESPIE: And, is now the head of Foreign Affairs for the European Union and is a wonderful guy. But that’s- I mean that’s what Fulbright does.

Q: Yes.
GILLESPIE: Well, okay. The split, you always sense the split when you’re talking- when you are among the worker bees down there. They feel it. They feel it when the other side- the other side gets listened to and they don’t; when the other side gets more money than they do; when they need resources and they see the other- they sense this and they sense it a good bit. But I think by the time you’re up into lower levels of senior management and maybe even upper middle management you start to move past it and people understand that this really fits together. And frankly, I think that the problem in State is that we’ve completely separated these things again and we’ve gone back, in effect, to the ‘50s where we had CU and then whatever information things we do on the other.

Q: Yes, yes. I, you know, I think we really should recreate the information age just to see where we are.

GILLESPIE: Well that’s- I may think- I may agree with you but Humpty fell off.

Q: Well it’s not-

GILLESPIE: It’s not going to happen.

Q: It’s not going to happen.

GILLESPIE: In any case, I spent about three years working with- two years, two and a half to three working with the State Department press office. It was a great bunch of people; it was an interesting time. John briefly- John and Alan followed by Bernie Kalb maybe a year and Chuck Redman and then Chuck, as I left Chuck took over. I was assigned to El Salvador as PAO. It wasn’t really, you know, at first it would not have been my choice, obviously. We had a real conflict; my wife had a very good job. She worked for Senator Paul Sarbanes. She said I’m not sure. We had one daughter in college and a son who was about to graduate when I took the assignment. And she said I’m not sure I want to, that I should go. So-

Q: He was graduating from high school?

GILLESPIE: He was graduating from college.

Q: College, oh.

GILLESPIE: Our daughter was in college. Susan said you know, maybe let’s see. I said look; it’s a two year assignment. I can commute. I can come back and forth frequently. You can come down when you get leave. And you know, I said I’m sure Senator Sarbanes will let you go when they’re in recess.
Mr. Newlin was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He obtained degrees from Harvard University and the Fletcher School and, after serving a tour with the US Army, joined the Foreign Service in 1960. A generalist, Mr. Newlin’s service took him to France, Guatemala and Belgium, where he dealt primarily with European Organizations and NATO. In Washington his assignments concerned Trade, Law of the Sea and other economic matters. Mr. Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

NEWLIN: I went to the Benelux Desk.

Q: That was Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. You were there from ’77-’79. I just want to take each country separately. What were the issues with the Netherlands?

NEWLIN: We had energy issues with the Netherlands. We had gas issues with the Netherlands. I don’t remember the details of them.

SAMUEL VICK SMITH
Economic / Commercial Officer
Amsterdam (1978-1981)

Samuel Vick Smith was born in California in 1940 and graduated from New Mexico State University. He served in numerous posts including Nairobi, Vietnam, Madagascar, Tokyo and New Zealand. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

SMITH: We went, to everybody’s surprise including me, to Amsterdam to be the Economic/Commercial officer at the American Consulate General. For those way on the outside, their map of the Netherlands will probably have the star for the capital city on Amsterdam. That’s because that’s where the palace on the dam is, next to the “new church” where the monarchs of the Netherlands become monarchs. They don’t have a coronation; they call it something else. That palace on the dam is their old city hall and when Napoleon took over and sent his nephew there to become the king of the Netherlands, they had to provide him a palace and that’s what they did. The government offices are not in the capital, they’re down in The Hague and that’s where the embassy is. We used to get some mail that didn’t belong to us which we’d send to the embassy. So, Amsterdam had a consulate general.

Q: Who was the consul general?

SMITH: It started out with Henry A. Lagase and ended up with S. Morey Bell. There were four FSOs: the CG, and me and then two vice consuls and about nineteen FSNs. It was primarily a visa mill. This was in the days before the visa waiver program, so that little consulate was issuing 90,000 visas a year. I thought that was a lot until I got to Tokyo where they were issuing
a million a year. We went there in the summer of ’78 for a three-year post. We got our poor little daughter into a real school, the International School of Amsterdam that had about three-hundred kids in it, instead of eight, where she did the third, fourth and fifth grade.

The consulate was a big, old mansion built in 1913 on the Museum Plein, the main square for the museums. It was quite a location. At one end of Museum Plein was the Concertgebouw and at the other end was the National museum; across from us the state museum and to the right of it, the Van Gogh. Then right across from us, which will figure later in this discussion was a temporary building which was the downtown terminal for KLM. The Consulate General Building had a basement, three full floors, plus an attic floor, which still had a lot of room in it. The first floor was all for consular work and the third floor also did some of the consular work. The second floor was my commercial section and the consul general’s office. I had a good staff. I had four FSNs and we did trade promotion, but I think the bureaucratics are always interesting. My supervisor was the consul general, but my director for commercial work was the commercial counselor in The Hague. He didn’t find that a very good system since the work I was doing was primarily for him, but the guy who wrote my efficiency report wasn’t him. One other thing about that job, which I don’t know, may sound like nothing to a reader who hasn’t been in this, is the duty officer. To put it mildly, we in Amsterdam were getting cheated and this was how it worked. The embassy, which of course had all the staff, said, “We’ll have two duty lists. We’ll have the embassy duty list for political things, directives from Washington in the middle of the night, NIACT immediates, etc., and then we’ll have a consular duty list for consular work.” Well, anybody who has ever been a duty officer in an American embassy in a developed country knows that ninety percent of what the duty officer does is consular business. That may be a slight exaggeration.

Q: Well, pretty close though.

SMITH: The duty list then for consular work was at most seven people long because neither consul general would be thought to have to do this. There were four officers other than the consul general in Rotterdam and there were three other than the consul general in Amsterdam. Unfortunately, the duty list was run by Rotterdam who found a way to cheat us every way they could. So, at the very least I was duty officer every seventh week and sometimes more often. It got to be about as bad as being master on duty at Masaba Senior Secondary School in Uganda. You’d get all these crazy calls. They fell into mainly two categories: Americans who’d gotten in trouble, usually through every fault of their own, and Dutch who at 5:30 on Friday evening decided they needed to go to America that weekend and they needed a visa. For the latter, you would ascertain whether it really was an emergency and it had to be a real emergency. If it really was an emergency, we’d issue them a visa. Otherwise, we would just tell them to show up at the American consulate the first thing on Monday morning and we’ll take care of you. For the first case it could be anything, people losing their passports in the red light district, or people who never should have been let out of the mental institution. There was one young woman who was stranded there in Amsterdam. She was on her way to be a disc jockey in Qatar. She was an American citizen of Arabic descent and some Arabs in L.A. had hired her to go to this hotel in Qatar to be a disc jockey at the disco. She showed up there and since she wasn’t escorted by a male, she was turned around and sent back. She wouldn’t call the consulate during working hours, she’d wait until about two-o-clock in the morning and I would get a call from the Marine
in The Hague who would tell me about this problem. That went on for almost a whole week. We had a poor American army deserter who was killed in a car wreck on Christmas Eve. After I spent the whole four-day Christmas holiday weekend taking care of that, about three months later we were chastised by some Army command in Germany for not having let them do it. I sure would have liked to. This was a poor guy who had deserted during the Vietnam War, which was long over by this time and stayed in the Netherlands and was killed in a car wreck.

Q: Well, I would have thought that, I don’t know, I mean things have changed, but particularly on the duty side. Amsterdam had both this very open red light district. I don’t know if the drug culture was thriving at that time, but I would have thought this was sort of a Mecca for young Americans who wanted to sin.

SMITH: Oh, it was.

Q: They had there, which means, you know, consular wise, it means trouble.

SMITH: Yes, we had a lot. We had very good Foreign Service Nationals and they could handle it very well during the week, but if it was on the weekend I would have to somehow glue it together until Monday morning. I would go every Friday night, when I was duty officer, to the senior FSN and say well, what to expect this weekend? One weekend, one Friday he said, “Probably nothing will happen on this case, but I need to tell you about it. There’s been an American couple here looking for their granddaughter. Their American teenage granddaughter has disappeared from the school, the same school where my daughter was a fourth or fifth grader. The Dutch relatives she’d been living with don’t know where she is. They’ve been to the police. The police have done everything they can. They (grandparents) have to go home. Their money, or their one-week excursion ticket or whatever has expired and the have to go back to the States. So, as a desperate last minute move, they’ve put an ad in the newspaper with her picture. So, maybe somebody will see her over the weekend and you’ll get a call.” Apparently as soon as that newspaper picture hit the streets, a large number of Amsterdammers recognized her and called the police and said, we know her, she’s a stripper at this club. She was young, no more than sixteen. The next morning a Dutch policeman showed up at the consulate. He was going to escort her back to America and he wanted to make sure his visa was good. It was. He had a multiple entry visa so he could take her back. I didn’t even have to issue a visa. It was really something. The newspaper probably hadn’t been on the streets two hours before she was found and taken into custody and then deported back to the U.S.

Q: A lot of people knew her intimately as far as her description was concerned.

SMITH: I guess so.

Q: You were mentioning.

SMITH: I have to make sure we talk about the commercial work, which was the main thing I did.

Q: Well, on this theme, let’s go through this for a bit before, then we’ll move to the commercial side. You were mentioning this before we started this section of the interview about a mob that
SMITH: Yes. At that time in the Netherlands, because of the policies of the Dutch government and the Amsterdam government, you had a vast shortage of accommodation in Amsterdam. Most apartments were rent-controlled. The rent was low, but there was a waiting list which could amount to eight or ten years before you could get into one. At the same time, there were many, many buildings which were empty. These were empty because no investor wanted to be forced to rent them out at rent-controlled prices. So, they were being held by speculators. There were large groups of people living in these buildings anyway, without the permission of the owners of the building. These were called squatters. The same thing happened in a lot of cities. It was particularly prevalent in Amsterdam. Occasionally things would get out of hand.

One weekend, the police were evicting squatters from a particular building and the squatters and their supporters rioted, put up barricades, and whole large areas of Amsterdam were not under the control of the police. Streetcars couldn’t run. This was on a Friday evening. Monday morning I saw the Dutch army tanks going down in front of the Concertgebouw to tear up the barriers. These were engineer tanks with big bulldozer blades on the front. They had to use them because if someone had gone there with an ordinary front end loader the squatters on the roof would have killed him with bricks they threw down from the roof. The government of the Netherlands took back control of their capital after a weekend, just like the Malagasy had done with theirs a couple of years earlier. Later, and I forget the reason, we’d had trouble at our consulate and the police put up a permanent police post outside our consulate which made us feel a lot safer. The embassy in The Hague had a new building designed to be more secure and had marine guards. We had this old 1913 mansion with a low steel fence around it and one middle-aged Dutchman who was our security guard. He didn’t have a weapon as far as I know. Around the corner from us, on the same block, another building was occupied by the Soviet travel agency, Intourist. They were on the bottom floor of this building and the top floor was vacant and squatters had gotten in and squatted the top floor of the Soviet government travel agency. The Soviets went to the police and the police didn’t do anything. One of the things that happened was that under Dutch law it was hard for the police to evict the squatters if they didn’t have their names. So, the Soviets had to have their embassy in The Hague go to the foreign ministry and say, “Look, under the conventions under which we have diplomatic and consular representation in your country, you’re required to let us use this building the way we want and we don’t want these squatters upstairs, so get them out.” Very reluctantly, the Amsterdam police came to that building to evict those squatters and the squatters’ supporters came with them. There was a big hullabaloo. In the end the squatters were evicted.

Then this mob of people started going around the city looking for other targets of opportunity. A mob came in front of our consulate. The police left and this mob started throwing bricks at the building. I can still hear them going thunk, thunk, thunk. I was on the second floor. The windows had something like Mylar put on them, so they weren’t too bad. I got under my big old government desk and I called my boss in The Hague to tell him what was going on. By this time I was working for him instead of the Consul General which was after the inauguration of the Foreign Commercial Service. Also, I called the police. I was sure other people must have called the police, but I called the police and I said, “There are people throwing bricks at our building.
The bricks are coming through the windows. We need help. Send the police.” The young lady on the other end of the phone at the police station said, “You can’t be the American Consulate, you don’t speak Dutch.” In retrospect, she probably thought we were hoaxers trying to give them a hard time because there were more rioters than the police could handle. There really were only 1,500 policemen in all of Amsterdam and they were being run ragged by this. This went on for about half an hour and it was very frightening. I think because it was so sustained it was more frightening than anything else I’d ever been through in the Foreign Service including getting blown up and getting mortared in Vietnam. There was nothing to protect us. I think if the rioters had known how little there was to protect us, we would have been in real trouble. Who knows. But anyway, they threw all this stuff at us. A young lady worked for me back in another part of the commercial office. The next day when she turned on her IBM typewriter, it just spit broken window glass out at her.

Q: I can remember during the Vietnam War those of us in the Foreign Service did not have pleasant thoughts about the Dutch because there was almost a continuous demonstration in front of our consulate. I mean rather nasty demonstrations and the Dutch didn’t do a damn thing, or very little. I mean, you know, maybe, it seemed like the Dutch in their sort of laissez-faire idea of shown in the red light district and in drug business and everything else, kind of let the kids run the, I mean the lunatics run the asylum. Did you get that feeling at the time or is that unfair?

SMITH: No, not exactly. I think it is unfair a little bit. The government wasn’t particularly right wing. The government of Amsterdam was socialist, so there was sympathy amongst the government of Amsterdam and some people in the government of The Hague for the causes of the demonstrators. If it’s true that they didn’t provide adequate protection for our consulate, I think that is inexcusable and I have two things to add to that, three things. First, my boss in The Hague had been in my job in Amsterdam earlier and he told stories about literally having to push the door back against the bodies pushing against it during those Vietnam demonstrations. After I left, it had to have been the next year in ‘82, demonstrators were after us over El Salvador because some Dutch journalists had been killed by the Salvadorian forces or at least that was the allegation. The KLM building had been torn down. There was still rubble there and they planted crosses in the rubble. I didn’t see all this, I read about it in cables, and the mobs got so bad that the consul general informed the embassy that he could no longer vouch for the safety of his staff and was closing the consulate. He did. Later when I was in Tokyo I was at a Japanese imperial function with a bunch of other diplomats. The ambassador of the EC was a former prime minister of the Netherlands, Van Agt. I went over to say hello to him and said I’d been in Amsterdam in those days. He immediately asked me to sit down and told me how sorry he was at how badly things had worked then. I think his view was that while he wanted to help us out he had the trouble of the Amsterdam government in-between.

Q: I was surprised that during the Vietnam thing we didn’t close.

Let’s turn to what you were really doing there.

SMITH: Right. I was 90% doing Commerce Department commercial work, and Amsterdam being an important commercial city in an important commercial nation, I had a lot of work. This is the sort of stuff that is now done primarily by the Foreign Commercial Service. In fact, at this
time I was on loan to the Commerce Department and I was on loan with the Foreign Commercial Service which I believe was inaugurated in 1980. There’s a lot of routine things you do and if you have a good Foreign Service National staff as I did, they carry most of the load. The other thing you try to do is take part in or run trade shows. We had been doing something called catalog shows, which I’d done as a commercial officer in Nairobi and in Madagascar. In fact we ought to go back to Madagascar with one story.

Q: Oh sure.

SMITH: Let me describe a catalog show and then we’ll talk about the Madagascar one. I don’t know when the Commerce Department invented catalog shows, but they were doing them when I got to Nairobi in 1970. It was a way to get information from many American companies in front of foreign prospects without having to send the U.S. companies or their goods. So, you’d have catalogs from all these companies and you usually had a theme that might be business equipment or pharmaceuticals or computer equipment, anything like this. In Madagascar, somebody thought we would have a catalog show based on logging and timber and forestry because Madagascar had a lot of forests, a lot of them planted by the World Bank. So, fortunately I was familiar with these from Nairobi and USIS agreed to let us use their main exhibition hall for the catalogs. By this time, Commerce had realized that catalog shows were a lot more alive if they sent along an “industry expert” who could knowledgeably explain the catalogs. If the customer comes in and opens a catalog and has a question, he has an industry expert to ask. The industry expert that they sent to us in Madagascar was a man who was an editor of a forest industry trade journal. He knew his business. He was good, but he didn’t speak French. Of course he didn’t speak Malagasy. My economic local, who I said was so good, found a guy who was a forestry expert who happened to speak English. He was Malagasy and happened to speak English and he was going to be the interpreter for our industry expert. He worked for the Madagascar government’s forestry department. The idea would be for him to take leave from them and come and work for us for the two days of the show. The day before he was to go to work for us he called us up in agitation and told us that he had not been told he couldn’t help us out but he’d been sent to another city so that he couldn’t help us out. He regretted it. It was obvious that the Madagascar government was doing this just to prevent him from helping us out with the show. Very petty. We scurried around and we found at the paper mill there was a Belgian who spoke good English and perfect French who could do it because most of the Malagasy that he would be talking to spoke French anyway. He would do just as well as the Malagasy guy would have done. His boss, who ran the paper mill didn’t tell him he couldn’t do it. In fact, he was happy to cooperate. The evening before the show, I hosted a small dinner at our house for the participants plus people from the Madagascar government who we wanted to see our show. Everybody was arriving and since this is in the tropics, it’s dark very early. About seven-o-clock a knock on the door and here is the Malagasy guy who was supposed to be our interpreter and had been sent away. He wasn’t leaving until the next morning. He had drawn up his courage and damned if he was going to miss a chance to go to a foreign diplomat’s for dinner and he showed up. Very brave on his part.

In the Netherlands, there’s lots of trade shows. They have something that I don’t think we used to have so much here, but we do now. They have these big buildings which were used for nothing but trade shows.
Q: They’re called trade centers.

SMITH: Yes, but they’re huge. The one in Amsterdam had seven buildings. It was called the RAI, which was a Dutch abbreviation of their bicycle industry association dating from the time they made bicycles. It had been there a long time. There was another one in Utrecht called Jaarbeurs which just meant “annual shows.” If there was a business equipment show at the RAI we would show up with a little booth of catalogs of American business equipment. The same for electronic equipment and so forth. The trouble was that when a real trade show was organized by Commerce, with a trade mission, say with lots of samples, they rarely came to Amsterdam because we were a small country. They’d go to Frankfurt or Munich. My leader in The Hague was always unhappy that Commerce wouldn’t send him a real trade show. I had two senior local employees and one worked on consumer goods and he and I put together a proposal for a clothing show. There was a trade mission already traveling around Europe with clothing and textiles and we tagged onto it. That was fairly successful. The big success was in computer software. Now, we’re talking about 1981 which probably to the young people would sound like the dark ages of computers and it is true that at that time computer software was just beginning to become really, really important. Commerce was going to send us a seminar mission, five computer software experts would come to three or four or five cities in Europe, under Commerce Department auspices. At each stop they’d have a seminar on software and then afterwards they’d have individual appointments, which we were supposed to arrange for these five experts to sell their goods to individual Dutch people. Either sell them or get agency agreements. They were going to go to at least Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam and maybe another place. My other senior FSN was working real hard to get people to come to our seminar and she’d gotten a lot of cooperation from Dutch trade journals, a lot of publicity. We were going to have a real success. We reserved a hotel, the rooms for the people to stay in, rooms for the seminar, rooms for the individual meetings. We were all ready to go and about a week before these guys were supposed to get on the plane, Commerce canceled the mission and supposedly the reason was they hadn’t been able to find five American software companies who wanted to do this. Fortunately, we were the last on the road so we could cancel hotel reservations without losing the government’s shirt. I don’t know what Paris and Brussels did.

Well, this was probably in 1980 and the young woman who was working for me was very distraught because she had put so much work into it. It did mean, however, that she had a ready-made list made of Dutch prospects who were interested in American software. She said, “Look, something new is happening. The Jaarbeurs, the people in Utrecht, were going to have the first ever computer software trade exposition in the Netherlands. Why don’t we see if we can put our own exhibit there?” We asked Commerce and Commerce said yes we could do it, but we won’t give you any help. We can’t help you fund it. So, we asked them to send us the names of some American companies who we could contact to see if they want to join this mission. They sent us thirty names. We found the guy at our trade mission in Turin. He sent us a slightly out-of-date book with a list of all the American companies doing software. I should tell people reading this, this was long before the Internet had ever been heard of. It all had to be done with paper. We sent a letter to 1,000 of these companies saying we will sell you a booth at this first ever Dutch software trade show, for I forget how much, maybe $1,000, and told them all the things we would do for them. This was fairly risky because there was no government money behind it. We
had to make it all pay out of its own budget. I don’t think you could do it today, but we got an agreement from Commerce to let us do it. The embassy agreed that they would establish a separate fund and all the checks would be sent to me, but they’d be made out to the U.S. Embassy, The Hague and we deposited the money there. We got a good response. We got about a four percent response. People will tell you that if you’re doing a sort of a blind mailing even if it is directed to people that should be interested, four percent is a wonderful response rate. Four percent of 1,000 is forty booths. Well, that’s a sizable chunk of this trade show. We had just a marvelous success. Everybody came out of this smelling wonderful. My boss in The Hague was finally calmed down because I was working for him and I was doing great things. It probably had a lot to do with my being promoted to FS-1 the next fall, the fall of ‘81.

Q: When the commercial service took over the commercial function were you approached, tempted, how did you feel about joining the commercial service as opposed to State, the Department of State?

SMITH: A very good question. As a matter of fact, I was never approached officially on whether I wanted to join the Foreign Commercial Service, but just before I left some guy came by from Commerce and said, “How come you haven’t joined the FCS?” I said, “Well, amongst other reasons, I haven't been asked.” He said, “Well, okay, we’ll ask you.” But I didn’t and the reason I didn’t was several fold. I thought that the State Department has one real purpose and that’s to keep embassies running all over the world so that the Foreign Service is the single most important chunk of the State Department. It’s the reason for the State Department’s existence. Commerce, I knew, was a huge organization. They were only going to have a couple of hundred Foreign Commercial Service officers and I thought we’d get lost in the bureaucracy. Furthermore, I, whether fairly or not, had not been very well impressed with the long-time political appointee big shots I’d run into in Commerce. Things like what I described, where we had a good idea for a trade event and they could only find thirty names for us. At that time anyway, it was a cumbersome organization. I liked doing foreign commercial work. To be honest, there’s probably an element in there that I didn’t want to leave the State Department. I liked the idea of the State Department and I didn’t want to do just commercial work for the rest of my career.

Q: Commerce, you mentioned, too that Commerce had and really still has the reputation of being sort of at the end of the political patronage food chain?

SMITH: Oh, I wouldn’t say that.

Q: Well, I would, I mean the people I’ve talked to, the political appointees who go there often these are the ones that don't stay very long and probably it’s sort of the end of the line, you know.

SMITH: Well, the ones I saw were the ones that had been there for a long time and had their little fiefdoms and didn’t impress me. That may be unfair, but they were cumbersome and remember the case of having us all get ready for a trade mission and canceling it one week before it was to start.
Q: Yes, and not having your people in order at all.

SMITH: One of the things they were cumbersome about was the long lead-time to run one of these things. It was more than a year in advance that you would propose all of the trade events. This mission had been on the books for a year, at least, and it had been canceled in the last week.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover in this Amsterdam period before we move on?

SMITH: Yes, I think so. Housing. Having served in two African posts, Nairobi and Madagascar, I was used to embassy-provided housing. In most of Europe you got a housing allowance instead and you had to rent a house. I rented a house in Amsterdam where my predecessor had been. This was at a time when the dollar was plummeting. Also, it was at a time when I was still just an FSO-4, not making much money and the housing allowance that the administrative section in The Hague had calculated was below what the rent was. Now, it was a housing allowance, which was either stated in guilders or was indexed so I didn’t lose anymore guilders as the dollar went down but that difference between the rent and the allowance became bigger. That difference in guilders became more dollars as the dollar plummeted. There were only three officers there. The consul general had his own house. The two vice consuls and I had to, as the military say, “live on the economy.” We later learned that there was a fourth person in their calculations. There was some military officer assigned to the F-16 program at Schipol Airport. He lived in the outskirts out near the factory at Schipol Airport and had a lower rent. Based on these other rents, I wasn’t getting enough. This was never fixed all the time we were there. I know other posts in Europe, where the embassy went out and leased houses or they helped the officers find leases they could afford, but the embassy in The Hague treated Amsterdam the way constituent posts are often treated. There was nothing I could do about it.

Q: Did you get any feel as an economic commercial officer for the big guns, the Netherlands may be a small country, but you know, they’ve got some major, major international firms, Philips and on and on and on. Did you get any, did you have much to do with them or?

SMITH: No, The Hague made sure that if anything was to be done with the big companies that they took care of it. We had very little to do with that. However, when I did that trade show for the computer software I ended up very much on the good side of EDS, which was still run by Ross Perot then. Suddenly I was basking in the reflected glory of big American business.

THOMAS J. DUNNIGAN
Deputy Chief of Mission

Thomas J. Dunnigan was born in Ohio in 1921. He received a bachelor’s degree from John Carroll University in 1943 and a master’s degree from the George Washington University in 1967. Mr. Dunnigan served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946. In 1946, he entered the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, The United Kingdom, The Philippines, Hong Kong, The
Netherlands, Denmark, Israel, and Washington, DC. Mr. Dunnigan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Then, in 1978, after that year, you went to The Hague, is that right?

DUNNIGAN: For the second time, yes.

Q: And how did you get that job, and what were you doing there?

DUNNIGAN: Well, one day at Center College, I got a call from my personnel guru in the department who said that President Carter had named a new ambassador to The Hague. And this was Gerri Joseph, who had been a Democratic Committeewoman from Minnesota, a newspaperwoman who had been vice chairman of the Humphrey campaign in '68. She wanted to interview some candidates because the DCM was scheduled to leave -- would I be interested? And I said, "Yes."

So I went to Washington and was interviewed by Mrs. Joseph. I think there were five or six candidates.

Q: Just to give a little feel for this, how would you characterize it? What type of questions were asked? What did she seem to be interested in?

DUNNIGAN: I was very impressed. I don't know if you've met Ambassador Joseph, but she's an attractive woman, poised, who knows exactly what she wants to get from you but has a very pleasant and nice manner of doing it. For instance, she had a series of questions she asked, and a pad on which she made notes, and she asked me about my background in the Foreign Service; about what I thought of the Netherlands, having served there before; would I have difficulty working for a woman; what did I think the role of an ambassador was in a country like the Netherlands; how would she relate to the other American entities in-country; and so forth. Those were the sorts of questions that I remember now, and I was surprised -- they were good questions, and ones that someone coming in from the outside who's never been in the field should ask. We didn't go deeply into Dutch politics or anything, because I knew she'd be briefed by the desk on all of that. And she had a good deal of reading to do, and she did it all. But I was very impressed. I left there not knowing, of course, what the result would be. She said that she would consider it and I would learn later.

Well, I guess it was within a month, I was called and told that I'd been selected. And I was very pleased with that, and I thought at the time that she'd be interesting to work for. And intelligent woman, with few, if any, hang-ups.

Q: Just to give an idea to somebody reading this, what would someone, like Ambassador Joseph, without an international-experience background do to get ready? Do you know how she got ready to go to her post?

DUNNIGAN: Well, I know she read as much as she could about the country. And then she went around and interviewed the previous ambassadors and talked to them about some of the
problems.

Q: That's very interesting. I mean, so seldom is that done.

DUNNIGAN: Yes, and talked to them and was advised by them. And I think they were flattered by it, you know, that she wanted their advise. But she's that sort of person: intelligent enough to understand what she doesn't know and how to get it. You could only admire that in her.

So she came well prepared, was well received by the Dutch, and her predecessor, Ambassador Bob McCloskey, had been well liked, of course. But she brought something different there, and they weren't quite sure what to make out of her at first because the Dutch are not great on women ambassadors. But she quickly won them over, won a good relationship with the prime minister, with the leader of the opposition, with the trade union leader and businessmen throughout the country. So, as a result, she turned out, in my book, to have been a resounding success.

Q: When you arrived, did you both sit down and say, well, these are the outstanding problems and how do we go about this? Or was it more at that point a maintaining of good relations period? Or did you have some problems?

DUNNIGAN: I had no problems. My predecessor, Elizabeth Brown, was an old friend and she briefed me. And I had about a three-week overlap with her, which was about a month before Ambassador Joseph arrived, so I had several weeks in charge there before she did. I was familiar with the embassy, having been there before, so we had little difficulty getting started.

I did the normal thing: I told her that she should call on certain people, start with the chief of protocol who'll arrange a call on this and that, that she would be presenting her credentials to the queen at a later date, and so forth. Meanwhile, we arranged calls, and then she would have to go through the rigmarole of calling on all the other ambassadors. She took that with good humor and made friends out of almost all of them. And she assiduously made her calls.

Meanwhile, she was reading the traffic. I screened some of the things and sent her what I thought were the important items to be looked at, and she would go over them. And she took an interest in everything going on in the embassy. Some ambassadors, you know, have only an interest in political or economic or military affairs. Not Ambassador Joseph, she was on top of it all and was helpful to others.

Q: Had she brought management skills with her, did you find?

DUNNIGAN: Oh, yes, she was very good at that. She ran the embassy beautifully, with a light but firm hand. She needed little coaching in that. She had been in public life for many years. She'd served on a commission, something to do with education, I believe, appointed by Lyndon Johnson, you know. So she had been in and out of Washington and she knew how large organizations functioned.

Her staff meetings were well run. The consuls general from Rotterdam and Amsterdam would come, and the head of the Coast Guard contingent in Rotterdam, and others. And she invited the
commander of our air base at Soesterberg, which is a fighter base, and had them come once a month to her staff meetings -- country-team meetings being held in between times -- but they were delighted to come. And so she had a good feeling.

She also got out a lot and spoke, which we urged on her.

Q: Did we have any issues with the Dutch at that time?

DUNNIGAN: We certainly did. The big issue was the GLCMs, the ground-launched cruise missiles, part of the short-range nucleus of what we wanted to put into Holland. There were strong feelings on that. We wanted to put them in both Holland and Belgium. Well, these countries were very skittish. They both had strong anti-war movements, and there were lingering suspicions of the U.S. in Holland as the result of Vietnam, of course, and other things, and also the feeling of Mr. Big pushing Mr. Small around, and the whole thing. So we had to behave carefully on it. But she walked it skillfully through; dealt with the prime minister, Van Agt, closely on it; won his sympathy and his support. And we were very pleased that in December of '79 the Dutch Parliament accepted the missiles. It was a close vote, but they accepted them. That was one of the biggest things we had going at that time.

Q: Tom, you were saying it was interesting about how Ambassador Joseph got her job. I wonder if you could go into that a little more.

DUNNIGAN: Well, as I understand, as I recall she told me this, after the Carter administration came in, they began to make appointments domestically and to our embassies abroad. And the new vice president, Mr. Mondale, apparently complained gently to the White House (or perhaps not so gently), saying, "Look, it's all very fine, but none of my people are being appointed."

Q: These were obviously mostly from Minnesota.

DUNNIGAN: Yes, and mostly friends of Carter's were being appointed. So he said, "I'd like to appoint some of my friends." And he was told subsequently that he could have two appointments: one to Norway, where his ancestors came from; and one to the Netherlands, because we needed an ambassador there. He picked one for Norway, and then he decided that, well, Gerri Joseph would be a good candidate to go to Holland. Well, she had always worked domestically, and so she was quite surprised when he told her, but the more she heard about it, the more it intrigued her. And that's how she got it; she was one of his two candidates.

And a footnote to that is that when the vice president was coming to Europe on a visit to Norway, and to all of the Scandinavian countries, as I recall, she wrote him and said, "Dear Fritz, you've got to come to the Netherlands. You've sent me here; they're doing a great job; and it'll help us push through the GLCM program, among other things." I didn't see the letter, but I understand it was a letter along those lines.

Well, you know how difficult it is to change presidential or vice presidential travel schedules.

Q: Yes, oh yes.
DUNNIGAN: But her clout with him was such that he told his staff he wanted to go to the Netherlands. And so he spent two days there. It was a triumph for her, because he could relate to the people of the Netherlands. His liberal outlook was such that they admired him from the beginning. He said all the right things, met the right people, and his visit was quite a success.

Q: He came to Naples when I was there. This was after he left office. But a very fast study and very interested in the history. I mean, a very inquiring mind.

DUNNIGAN: As a result, we got a lot of good out of it.

Q: How did she use you as a DCM?

DUNNIGAN: This is a very interesting question. She let me, in a sense, run most branches of the embassy, coordinate them, make sure the reports were out, that we were hitting the high spots, bringing to her the problems that required her attention.

So much of what a DCM does now, it seems to me, is super-administrative work: getting-in required reports each year, how many bodies there are, what the budget is going to be, working with the administrative officer on these things. But also he has to be fully in tune with the political and economic counselors, with what the military is doing. We always had important military problems with the Dutch. She wanted me to stay on top of all those.

And I would sign-out routine telegrams, in fact most telegrams, sending in to her only those that I thought she would certainly want to see. And we almost never had a breakdown in that arrangement. Perhaps I erred in the sense of sending her too much at times, but she was a workaholic and she would take it.

I did not sit-in on all her meetings with staff members. Sometimes I thought it was better if they'd talk to her one-on-one on things. They'd talk to me; they should talk to her. And this happened.

We had occasional personal problems, personnel problems. And she handled those quite well, removing people who had to be removed. Which was hard for her to do because she's very empathetic, but she would understand the necessity of it.

Q: What did you feel at that time about our having a consulate general in Amsterdam and Rotterdam? With all this closing and shutting down, all of a sudden you had these places which seemed to be just a hoot and a holler away. And we had three -- The Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam -- right in a very small country.

DUNNIGAN: I know.

Q: What was the rationale, and how did you objectively feel about it at that time?

DUNNIGAN: Of course, you can't be in Holland without noticing the things you mentioned. But
I would add, also, that all those posts were opened in the 18th century, and there's tradition behind them.

Now Rotterdam, which seemed the most vulnerable because it was less than thirty miles from The Hague, was the largest port in the world. We shipped more grain there and we sold more grain to Holland than any other country in the world. More agricultural produce than into any country except Canada. So it was a tremendous market of ours, and we had great business interests in Holland.

Q: Well, this would also be a tie between Ambassador Joseph, coming from the grain area, there, too.

DUNNIGAN: Not only that, but her husband was a grain trader, you see, with a business in Rotterdam. And she had to be very careful about conflict of interest. She told me that this required some weeks back in Washington to get that straightened out.

But that was one of the reasons we had a post at Rotterdam.

Secondly, we had a large Coast Guard set-up there. The Coast Guard office for northern Europe is in Rotterdam. And there were the usual protection and welfare, visa cases and so forth -- the normal consular work.

Amsterdam is different. Amsterdam is the capital city of the Netherlands, although the government sits in The Hague. The queen's palace is in Amsterdam, although she doesn't reside there very often. Amsterdam is a larger city, it's farther from The Hague, it's the scene of the international airport, Schipol Airport, there.

So, when the time came to close posts (and that, fortunately, was after I left), Rotterdam was closed and Amsterdam was kept open, and all of the consular work in the country was transferred to Amsterdam. I believe The Hague now is a minor consular section, which we did not have before. I'm not sure how it's working; I haven't had enough feedback on that yet. The Rotterdam consular local staff were transferred, I understand, to Amsterdam, while continuing to live in Rotterdam, and this is not really their idea of a...

Q: Probably a transitional phase.

DUNNIGAN: Yes, I think there's a transitional phase till they retire and so forth.

Q: What about Amsterdam? I remember, in the early eighties, the continual series of demonstrations against the United States. I mean, Amsterdam seems to have almost a floating group of antis -- our consulate general was almost under siege by many of these people -- and a very tolerant attitude towards demonstrations on the part of the Dutch. Was this a problem when you were there?

DUNNIGAN: Always. In my two tours, from '69 to '72, and from '78 to '81, it was a problem. In the early tour, it was a group called the Provos, who were restless young people with painted
faces and wild hairdos -- perhaps an anarchist outlook on life would be the way to describe it. And, of course, we were in Vietnam at the time and we were the enemy. We were also siding with the wrong people in the Nigerian conflict with Biafra, in their view. We had nothing to offer them, nothing to teach them. In fact, in their view, it would have been better if we had got out. And they showed that and said it and so forth.

Later, the Provos had disappeared, largely, but they had been succeeded by larger groups -- less structured but just as unpleasant and dangerous, in some ways, to our interests.

And I think you put your finger on it, Stu, when you mentioned the word "tolerant." The Dutch are overly tolerant. Anything goes, as we used to say there, and this would infuriate us at times. It was true that our consulate general in Amsterdam was under siege, I believe at least twice, in my time there. So it was difficult. And there were mobs frequently marching by it, denouncing us and threatening us -- for imagined slights. If it wasn't a racial slight, it was our behavior in Central America, which was looming larger when I was there the second time, or our association with dictators in other parts of the world, which ostensibly offended the Dutch sensibilities.

Q: When you say the "Dutch sensibilities," was this basically a small segment, or was this a significant segment with an activist tip? Were they reflecting a Dutch spirit towards the United States at that time?

DUNNIGAN: Unfortunately, I think it was a growing spirit. All you'll have to do is watch the several Dutch television channels to notice this, because they're controlled largely by people who think along these lines. And several of the Dutch newspapers are, too. A newspaper that would be considered quite conservative on the Dutch scene would be considered very liberal in this country. It seeped into the body politic, into the social groupings, into the Catholic Church -- it's very evident there, they've had real problems. But it's an atmosphere that's grown up in the last thirty years, I would say.

Q: Well, not just the power structure in the Netherlands, but beyond that, in general society, were there reflections of anti-Americanism that you saw there?

DUNNIGAN: During my first tour there, one of our junior political officers went out to meet with a group of students at Leiden University, which is one of the most famous universities there. He said he sat down, they sat around a table, and they said, "What do you want here? We have nothing to do with America and we don't want anything to do with you. We've got nothing to say to you." And that was the attitude of students back in 1970.

I can't say it had improved greatly ten years later. We were listened to, occasionally, politely, and occasionally not so politely.

Of course, you had a generation difference, too, there. Those who remembered World War II, the Marshall Plan, what we'd done for them after the great floods in '53 were very inclined to be pro-American and helpful. But it was the younger generation that was coming on, that is taking over the country, that was raised under different circumstances and has different attitudes.
Q: At the time you were there, was there a feeling that this meant worsening relations with the United States as this generation came up? Or was the feeling, well, at a certain point these kids are going to grow up and become more conservative? How did you feel about it at that time?

DUNNIGAN: We hoped for the latter, but I don't think any of us were very certain it was going to happen. Not at all certain, in fact. Worrisome times.

It doesn't mean that the Dutch are not going to be allies in certain circumstances. They are. They've always proved to be staunch allies and good fighters. But there will be certain other things about us, socially, that they don't like.

Q: You were talking about the tolerance. I had an interview not too long ago with Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, who at one time was brought back and was dealing with problems in Personnel. This was in sort of the earlier part of trying to deal with what is now called the gay problem of the homosexuals. This was, I guess, in the early seventies, and we had been refusing to have homosexuals in the Foreign Service. But it looked like there were court decisions that this no longer could be done. So, with the Foreign Service, where do you assign them? And they were talking about having what were known as sort of homosexual posts. I mean, this was in the thinking side, and obviously Amsterdam, Stockholm, Copenhagen were ones of them. But, I mean, this was part of the atmosphere. Did you have problems, not just homosexuals, but bisexuals, whatever you want to talk about it, problems with the staff in this very tolerant atmosphere? I mean, was this people run wild?

DUNNIGAN: No, that was not a problem during my time there. I can't think of any particular cases. We had some alcoholic problems, but those are endemic to posts.

One of the big things that was going on, particularly in my second tour, was the drug problem. And we had a very large DEA contingent there, Amsterdam being one of the centers for it. In my first tour, in '69 to '72, the Dutch told us that was an American problem: any drugs had been introduced by American soldiers from Germany, and the Dutch had no problem. They were a little more honest ten years later, they realized they had a major -- and a growing -- problem in Amsterdam. And not only in Amsterdam; Rotterdam, The Hague, it was all over, widespread. And, again, the tolerant attitude had led them to allow drugs, just as they allow prostitution, pornography, everything else. Anything will go, because you can't forbid it, is the Dutch attitude. And I'm sure homosexuality is included there, too. That would be tolerated.

Q: Well, what about Americans getting into trouble because of drugs? Was this a major problem for you?

DUNNIGAN: Occasionally it was. Too often soldiers coming over on leave from units in Germany would end up getting in trouble, but the military would take care of them pretty well. I think, yes, there were the usual consular problems. Of course, a lot of people come: "Whoopee! I'm in Amsterdam, I can do anything I want," you know. Well, they can and they can't -- the police aren't always as tolerant as some of society is about things. So, yes, there were cases, but I wouldn't say anything out of the ordinary.
Q: Just one final question on this. Obviously, Germany was our major NATO ally, and the Dutch and the Germans, particularly since World War II, had certainly had their difficulties. Did you have a problem balancing our closeness to the Germans in this growing estrangement, as you were talking about, with the younger generation and others in the Netherlands?

DUNNIGAN: No, we didn't have to, for this reason: economics did it for us. The Dutch saw that their markets are so tied to Germany, which is their largest market, that, while they personally are not fond of Germany for historic reasons, they would have to get along. And they were, after all, getting along very well in the Common Market as they did in NATO. I mentioned earlier that Holland took more grain from us than any country in the world, but most of that, you see, was for transshipment up the Rhine to Germany and Switzerland, mainly to Germany, so it was very important to them to maintain good relations with the Germans. The Dutch guilder is tied to the German mark, which makes it a very hard currency. All of those relationships drive them together, when the chemistry is not always very good between the two and the Dutch would just as soon do without the Germans. But, still, thousands and thousands of Germans pour into Holland each year on vacation to use the beaches, and this tempts the Dutch in another direction. So it's, I would almost say, a necessity-hate relationship.

Q: Well, is there anything else, any other problems or issues that you dealt with?

DUNNIGAN: Let me think...the big ones were always trade issues. We were trying to get more American products there. Mrs. Joseph was very good at that, attending a trade fair; she was familiar with business from knowing her husband's business. We were successful in some ways. The Dutch have tremendous investments in the U.S., as you know. When we were in Holland, they were the second-largest investors, after the British, in the United States. I think now they've been surpassed by the Japanese and perhaps by the Canadians, but they are still fourth or fifth in the world in the amount of money they have in this country, so they have a great interest in what's going on here. And we were continually urging them to buy more of our products. They do buy a lot now, but they could always buy more.

Agriculture seemed to take care of itself. They were a tremendous market for soybeans and grain for us, mainly for transshipment, but the things were processed there in Rotterdam and considered as imports into Holland. Rotterdam is the busiest port in the world, so that meant there were always American and other ships there, including Cuban, and that kept us on the qui vive at times.

We had naval visits frequently, because Holland is a seafaring nation and the big seaports are there.

The Dutch permission to put the GLCMs was very important to us.

Mrs. Joseph arrived just shortly after the fiasco of what was called the neutron bomb.

Q: Yes, could you explain what that was.

DUNNIGAN: Well, the neutron bomb was a form of expended uranium put inside our artillery
shell that, when it was exploded in a confined area, was lethal to everything involved. Without damaging much of the surroundings, in a tank or in a house or a building it could kill everything within.

It was considered a very advanced, a very desirable, weapon by our military in the mid-seventies, and our desire was to introduce it into the NATO arsenal. Most of the NATO military people thought it was a good idea.

But, unfortunately, we think it was handled ineptly. Rather than introducing it through the military, President Carter decided that, because it contained a nuclear element, we would have to get the political approval of the governments involved.

Well, I needn't tell you what happened...the opposition party seized on this as the American desire to have them burned alive, cremated, and so forth. And, besides, the Americans were more interested in killing people and saving property. They always thought we were capitalists at heart, and so forth and so on. And, as a result, the Dutch, among other governments, said they wouldn't accept the neutron weapon on their territory.

And this was a lingering problem when Mrs. Joseph went in to begin the talks about ground-launched cruise missiles -- only a few months after the decision, by the way. That had taken place before she arrived, but still it was lingering on, it was a problem.

**Q:** Well, then the election came along, I guess, of 1980.

**DUNNIGAN:** The election came along in 1980, yes. Mrs. Joseph and I parted company then, in the sense that of course she was a very strong supporter of the Carter-Mondale ticket, and I kept quiet and she knew that I was not for that slate. She was disappointed in the outcome. I had a frank talk with her and told her that she would be expected to submit her resignation. And she wrote out a very gracious resignation letter, sent it in, and came back to Washington in January. The new secretary of state, Secretary Haig, said he'd like to see her. She'd known him when he was in Europe. Well, she went in and had a very nice talk with him, and she told me later that she left there feeling that she might be retained. But 'twas not to be, you know, and she eventually left in early March and was replaced the first of September.

So there was a hiatus there. She, however, comes back frequently to Holland and was there, I know, a few months ago.

**Q:** When did you leave?

**DUNNIGAN:** I left at the end of August.

**Q:** Did you brief the new ambassador? Was there a new ambassador before you left?

**DUNNIGAN:** Bill Dyess came, I believe it was the 27th of August, and I left the 29th. We had a few hours together, and I gave him the highlights of what I could. We left, of course, some written material for him. The new DCM had just arrived.
Q: They were both professionals.

DUNNIGAN: Both professionals, and I thought it was time to go. I don't think a DCM should stay around very long under those conditions. So Ambassador Dyess and I had one long lunch together, with the new DCM, and I just had a short talk with them. We didn't get into details about anything greatly.

JACK A. SULSER  
Consul General  
Rotterdam (1978-1982)

Jack A. Sulser served in the U.S. Army during World War II and was a prisoner of war in Germany. He entered the Foreign Service in 1950, where his career included positions in London, Bologna, Dusseldorf, Vienna, Rotterdam, and Washington, DC. Mr. Sulser was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: Turning now to Rotterdam. You served in Rotterdam from '78 to '82. What was the situation? The Vietnam War was all over, which had been a major irritant with the Dutch. What was the situation for American-Dutch relations during this period?

SULSER: They were fine. This was not only a great relief after my year in London, but I had the almost 100% sheer pleasure that goes with a post of your own. There are always things that cause some groups of people, at least, to protest. At that time it was El Salvador. We had a few demonstrations, people climbing up on the roof of the Consulate and hanging banners over the side about various things they objected to. Somebody in some country was killing somebody on our behalf and, they thought, at our direction, that kind of business. Occasional parades, we had the Tehran hostage business while I was there, plus there were Iranian student groups in Holland that Dutch intelligence forces thought were occasionally interested in doing something about me or the Consulate. So from time to time I had some police protection there.

Rotterdam was nice and quiet. Rotterdam really is an exceptional town. I was so pleased these past two days watching the Davis Cup match out of Rotterdam, because they showed many scenes of the place. It was a thoroughly pleasant post and unlike Amsterdam in almost every respect. It's just as Dutch, just as international, but is much more sober, a real business-oriented town. It's the largest port in the world, by far, much larger than Kobe-Osaka, which is second, and many times larger than New York. Hamburg, Marseille, San Francisco, all are very small compared to Rotterdam. It's a post-oriented city. Although it's only 20 minutes or so by car from The Hague, it is very different from The Hague. It's enough of a distance from the Embassy so that I really was very much on my own there. I went to weekly staff meetings at the Embassy, and the Ambassador and DCMs were always very cordial.

Q: Who was the ambassador at the time?
SULSER: The Ambassador during most of my time there was Geri Joseph, a woman from Minneapolis, former newspaper columnist, former co-chairman of the National Democratic Committee, friend of Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale. A very, very pleasant and capable woman. And Tom Dunnigan was DCM, whom I had known in my first London days -- my wife was his secretary, as a matter of fact -- so he was my wife's boss at the beginning of our Foreign Service and he was my boss at the end of my Foreign Service. Then with the change of administration Bill Dyess became Ambassador, but that was only about the last year I was there, so there was less connection. We had had a Consulate in Rotterdam for nearly 200 years. In fact, we celebrated the 200th year of Netherlands-U.S. diplomatic relations during my last year in Rotterdam. The longest period of uninterrupted relations the United States has had with any country in the world. There were year-long festivities which were very pleasant to participate in. One of the events was a yacht race from Rotterdam to New York, done in two phases, the larger ones that could go straight across and the smaller ones that needed to stop at the Azores. They had two different starting dates. One of my good contacts, who was head of one of the three elements of the Christian Democratic Party in Holland, also was the CEO of a large insurance company that sponsored one of the yachts in the direct race to New York. I had never had anything to do with yachting before but learned that, when you sponsor a yacht in a race such as this, the sponsor has the right to re-name the yacht for the period of the race, which he did. He put it in the name of his insurance company, Stad Rotterdam, which means City of Rotterdam. He invited me to do the christening of this "new" yacht. Ambassador Joseph was invited to christen one of the competitors. The yacht I christened won the race, which was a special pleasure. One of the local companies, De Kuyper distillery, sponsored a reception to start the race, hired a big cruise ship, a river boat paddlewheel kind of thing with a couple of hundred guests to go down the river from Rotterdam to the mouth and witness the official start of the race. There was also a destroyer of the Royal Netherlands Navy. It was a very gala affair, a lot of fun.

The city government in Rotterdam was Labor Party; the Lord Mayor was one of the vice-chairmen of the Labor Party who joined the Cabinet when the government was reorganized, shortly after. I had very easy relations with City Hall and with several Christian Democratic and FVP businessmen, lawyers in town. I was a member of the Rotterdam Golf Club, which was good fun.

Q: How did the Dutch view the Germans at that time?

SULSER: I'm glad you mentioned that because I would have hated to record my impressions of Holland without getting on to that subject. Rotterdam is the largest port in the world because it is the major port for Germany, not because of Holland. It's at the mouth of the Rhine, and most of the stuff that goes in or comes out of Rotterdam is destined for or originates in Germany. The Dutch are so sensitive to being second cousins to the Germans -- the Dutch language is really a dialect of German, although they would argue with me if they heard me say that; it's very close to Plattdeutsch but is officially recognized as a language. If you speak German you can be understood in Holland and you can learn Dutch after learning a few words that are different in the two languages. But the Dutch are so concerned about being overwhelmed by the Germans that some of my Dutch friends, while they preferred German wine, would drink it only in the
privacy of their own homes. They didn't want to be seen drinking German wine in restaurants or public places. Although Rotterdam really is at the mouth of the Rhine, the Dutch call it the Maas because shortly after the river crosses the border from Germany into Holland it's joined by two smaller rivers coming out of Belgium, including the Meuse or Maas, and the Dutch choose to name the river Maas from that point, although the Rhine is contributing three-quarters of the water into this combined stream. One minor little tributary that empties into the North Sea at Leiden, they call the Rhine. The chairman of the port promotion council during the time I was in Rotterdam was a German citizen, head of a German-owned shipping company there in town. But you never see in any public references to him or the sort of official bio that's available from the port promotion council that he is in fact a German citizen.

The German Consul General during my time was a very unusual person. He was bilingual in Dutch, which is not so unusual, but really was at home in the language because he went to school in Holland. His parents were anti-Nazi and didn't want him educated in schools in Germany during the Nazi times. When Germany invaded Holland in 1940, most of the kids at the school, which was a Friend's boarding school, were evacuated to England, but the headmaster of the school told him, "Look, if you go to England, you're going to be an enemy alien there and be treated as an enemy-alien. I think you'd better go back home to Germany." So he went back home and not long after was drafted into the German Army. At some point during his military service, in a routine inspection I think, anti-Nazi literature was found in his duffel bag and he was imprisoned by the Nazis. You'd think with that kind of background he'd be welcome in Holland as a representative of the new Germany, and feel comfortable there. But in fact he told me he was very uncomfortable there, and his wife refused to live there. She stayed in Germany because when she first came to Holland she felt she was being treated badly by the Dutch.

Our Dutch friends used to make jokes about the Germans all the time, and I witnessed several very amusing incidents. We would have Dutch friends over or go to Dutch friends' houses for a party and there were other Dutch friends there who would arrive after we did, and delighted, so excited, to arrive at this party because on the way they had been stopped by some German car full of tourists to ask for direction. The Dutch would deliberately mislead them, give them the wrong directions. A few minutes later they would arrive at the party and be all excited because they had pulled a trick on these damn Germans. It's unfortunate. I understand their feeling; it's sort of the way Canadians feel about Americans, being overwhelmed by this much larger cousin next door who speaks the same or similar language and threatens to take them over economically or commercially. Unlike the Canadians, the Dutch did suffer a difficult occupation for four years or more.

Rotterdam has a special place in that context, because it was the only place that offered any significant resistance to the German invasion in 1940. Then, as now, the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps is headquartered in Rotterdam, and it had a sufficiently deep channel so that Dutch warships can steam up into the center of the city. When the Germans reached Rotterdam, there was a brigade of Dutch army, the Dutch marines and one or two ships of the Dutch Navy that fought them off, put up some real resistance, held up the German advance for several days. That was when the Germans got annoyed, called up the Luftwaffe, and blew the place to smithereens. The whole medieval city center was wiped out in one day of German raids, and then the Dutch government surrendered, the Queen fled to England and that was the end of it. So the
Rotterdammers have something to be proud of in that connection, but they have a very sensitive attitude toward the Germans that I, living in Germany and Austria for 13 years and having been a POW, which is nothing like the occupation the Dutch went through, never felt. But the Dutch certainly did and I suspect still do.

Q: You had mentioned the differences between Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

SULSER: Amsterdam gets all the tourists and all the congressional delegations. We had, I think, two congressional delegations during my four years in Rotterdam, both of them serious affairs. They were people coming to look at port facilities because they were trying to develop ports in their constituencies in the United States, to see how these things are done in Holland, some of the modern equipment that’s available, that handles ships of tremendous size and loads and unloads them in a matter of hours, etc. We had one other more social CODEL, Tom Railsback, from my home district, then the congressman from Illinois where I was born and raised, came to Amsterdam. He and Henry Hyde, a friend of his, came down to visit us in Rotterdam, which had not initially been on their itinerary, because I knew him. They talked to our police chief about the drug scene. Amsterdam has all the tourists and the CODELs and the trouble that goes with it, such as lost passports, and the drug scene with American citizens in jail. During my four years in Rotterdam we only had one American citizen in jail, and that was somebody who had been arrested and tried and imprisoned in the Amsterdam district but for some reason or other got transferred to a jail in our district. One of our consular officers had to go from time to time to visit him and see that he was being treated all right, allowed to communicate, bring him reading material and such. That is not a problem in Holland; there is plenty of English reading material, plenty of English programs on the television, because it’s not a large enough language area to justify dubbing, so you see the American programs in the original language, unlike Germany where it is dubbed into German.

Amsterdam had repeated violent demonstrations with damage to the Consulate. We never had any damage that amounted to anything. Once, somebody squirted some stuff into the keyhole of our front door so that we had to get a locksmith to open up the next morning; but otherwise no significant damage. In Amsterdam every window in the Consulate was broken many times over...

Q: To what did you ascribe this? You must have sat down with the consulate in Amsterdam to try and figure out why are people in Amsterdam treated this way and in Rotterdam they’re not. Because Amsterdam is renowned within the Foreign Service. We nearly closed the place down one time just because of violence.

SULSER: Yes, Amsterdam was closed for brief periods several times while I was in Rotterdam in order to repair damage and get the place back into operation. One time, Maury Bell, who was the Consul General there during this time, the damage was so bad and he was so fed up with the repeated incidents that he said he was not going to reopen the post until he had the kind of assurances from the local government and the kind of police protection that he felt the place needed to give it adequate security. Whenever Amsterdam would shut down, we’d have to pick up the slack. Rotterdam did all the immigrant visas for the country anyhow, so the consular work that was a problem was the non-immigrant visas, passports, etc. In my four years in Rotterdam I
don't know that we ever had a lost passport case, whereas in Amsterdam they had some every
day and every Monday morning they'd arrive to open the post and find half a dozen people
sitting on their front doorstep. Americans who had lost their passport, been rolled or whatever on
the weekend who needed immediate attention. I think the difference is that sort of drug and
hippie atmosphere in Amsterdam. The red light district in Amsterdam with the women sitting out
in the glass show windows and whatnot. This is a well-known feature of life there. I was
surprised to find there is such a district near the port for the sailors in Rotterdam too. But
Rotterdam doesn't attract the tourists, and the sailors, I guess, know how to deal with these things
without causing so much trouble. While Rotterdam is to some extent also a drug transit place, it
just did not have the kind of violence they did in Amsterdam. They'd send their visa applicants
and their passport applicants and stuff down to us when they were closed. One time it went on
for a couple of months when we were the only consular post in the country. The Embassy in The
Hague has no consular section, and The Hague is in Rotterdam's consular district.

Q: How far away is Rotterdam from Amsterdam by train?

SULSER: Oh, by train, 45 minutes. Nothing is very far in Holland, particularly between
Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam. You get into some of the northeast areas, Friesland and
whatnot, it gets a little more isolated. But the major cities are all very close to each other. You
can get to The Hague in 15 or 20 minutes from Rotterdam, and a half hour from there to
Amsterdam.

Q: Well, you left Rotterdam in 1982, is that right?

SULSER: Yes, in 1982, after four years there. When I got there from London, my predecessor,
Joe Christiano, filled me in on efforts ever since the war to get a building of our own for the
consulate in Rotterdam. The prewar consulate had been bombed out and ever since then we had
been in rented quarters. One principal officer after another, occasionally with an Ambassador's
assistance, tried to find some way to get a building of our own. During the years we had a large
AID program in Holland, some of the counterpart funds were used to acquire a site from the city
of Rotterdam right in the center of town, on one of the main harbor inlets, on which the consulate
was supposed to be built. But money was never appropriated to build it. We had this prime piece
of property at the bottom of the main business street in Rotterdam, where it meets the river.
Christiano had worked out a scheme with a local builder to put up an apartment house there. We
would lease him the land at no cost, he would build the apartment house, sell or rent the
apartments, and give us the three lowest floors to house the consulate. The U.S. would get a
consulate to which it would have title at no cost. Just for making the land available. The
Department had not yet approved this proposal, but Christiano said maybe I could get the
Department to approve it. I went to Rotterdam on direct transfer because the deputy there was
going on home leave the same time Christiano was being transferred to Tokyo. Three months
later, when the Deputy came back from home leave, I got orders for consultation in Washington.
While I was there, I managed to get the Department to approve this scheme. Before anything
could be done, the housing market collapsed in Holland and the builder was no longer interested
in going ahead.

During my last year there, through the contacts I had in City Hall, I learned that the city was
planning to build a maritime museum on the adjoining property. I went to the official responsible and said, "I understand you're going to build this museum next door, and you can have a much nicer building if you incorporate our property as well and give us a corner of the thing." He thought that was a great idea, because he thought the city-owned space wouldn't be sufficient for the kind of museum he contemplated. He got the architects to design a new museum that would have a corner for us, had models built, and then discussed it with his colleagues on the City Council. All this was at the time of El Salvador and the violence in Amsterdam and peaceful demonstrations in Rotterdam, and his colleagues on the City Council didn't think it would be a good idea under these circumstances for the city to do such a public thing for the United States as to give us a corner of a public building. But by that time he was so keen on having our property for his museum he said if we can find a building somewhere else in town that would meet your needs and buy it for you, would you give us that piece of property. I said, in principle, sure, why not? The search began. The City had real estate companies looking for office buildings that were for sale. Every time they'd find one I'd get the DCM, the Admin. officer or whatever from The Hague to come down and look at the property. "No, this wouldn't suit us; No, that wouldn't suit us." We were being very picky because the city really wanted to have our property.

Eventually they found a building that was large enough and in an accessible location that would meet our needs. FBO sent somebody over from Washington, did a survey of the thing. The city spent about a million dollars to acquire the property for us. FBO and SY between them spent about another quarter of a million adapting the property to our use. It wasn't quite ready for occupancy when I left, unfortunately, so I didn't get to enjoy the benefit of my lobbying with the city government to get this thing done. Don Junior, who was my successor, came out of my old job in Senior Assignments, incidentally, got to move into the building. About three years later the post was closed. My proudest achievement in Rotterdam in the end came to naught.

Q: Let's move to your last assignment. This was in '82 and you went where?

SULSER: I had decided I would retire after Rotterdam. A few months before I left, a big pay raise came through and it took me only a moment with paper and pencil to figure how much good this would do to my annuity, to hang on another couple of years -- which was all I had. While I was in Rotterdam, the Senior Foreign Service was established and I was moved into it at the Minister-Consular level, but because of the years I had spent already in class 1, I had only four years. The transition was done in 1980 and I had only til '84. I could serve only two more years, but it made a big difference. But I had no assignment. I came back on home leave, for the first time in my career as one of those over-complement people I had tried to draw to the Department's attention when I was in Senior Assignments. For the period of my home leave I was over complement, and then the Senior Assignments people asked me if I'd be interested in detail to the Pentagon. I said, "Sure, anyplace where I can work, so I don't have to walk the halls," which I hadn't done yet because I was on home leave. They told me the job was Soviet/East European desk officer in the office of the Secretary of Defense, which appealed to me because that was my original interest when I came into the Foreign Service. I had done Russian and Balkan history at Wisconsin and wrote my Master's thesis on U.S.-Albanian relations, but of course that background played no part in the assignment whatsoever, because that was ancient history. When I went over to be interviewed by the Brigadier who was acting chief of Europe-NATO affairs at the time, he said, "You're kind of senior for this position, aren't
“... And I said, “Yes, I am. But I don't mind. It's an area I'm interested in and unlike you guys, we don't wear our rank on our sleeve or our shoulder-boards. So it's okay with me.” With their consent, the assignment went through.

**WILLIAM J. DYESS**  
Ambassador  
Netherlands (1981-1983)

*Ambassador William J. Dyess joined the Foreign Service in 1958 after serving with the military in Germany. His career includes positions in Belgrade, Copenhagen, Moscow, Berlin, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to The Netherlands. He was interviewed by Charles Taber in 1989.*

**Q: How did your position in public affairs come about?**

**DYESS:** I think I told you earlier that I loved American politics. I was a frequent speaker. I went on the circuit a lot, speaking all over the country. I was looking for a place to go. I said to myself, "What is it you really like to do?" I had been in the European bureau all my career, and I needed an assignment out of bureau. I decided this is what I ought to do -- public affairs.

I consulted some people I had worked for, and most of them advised me against it saying that it would be the end of my career. I talked to one or two others, one of whom said, "No. Henry Kissinger thinks this is very important. He's put Carol Laise over there to rejuvenate the place and then he put John Reinhardt to follow on, and they've gotten some very able Foreign Service officers there and they want some more. You might find it very useful. Also, the job that you would go to is director of plans and management and it is a very good job."

So I went there and it was almost double or triple the area of responsibility in terms of supervision. I loved it. I was Director for about a year or so, then I became an acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, then the DAS, then the senior DAS. When Hodding Carter left, I became Assistant Secretary. I was appointed under President Carter and then when Reagan came in, he didn't accept my resignation and I stayed on. Then I was Department spokesman for a while for Al Haig, though I was told that I could not continue in that job. The White House was very up-front with me about it. I have no complaints whatsoever. They said, "Even though you are career, you played too prominent a role in the previous Administration."

I had made about 2,000 speeches on various subjects. Most of them were on SALT, and I was on television a lot. They said, "You just can't do that. We have no objection to the work that you're doing as spokesman, but we can't have it. You pick where you want to go."

It wasn't quite that clear, but that was almost what it was. I was told by State that I should pick five countries with the hopes that I would get one of the five. I decided I wouldn't do that. I picked only one. That was where I wanted to go -- The Netherlands.
Q: You picked that? That was my next question. How did you get there?

DYESS: Oh, I picked The Netherlands because my wife and I felt it was about the best post in Europe. Life was the most pleasant, most enjoyable, and the Dutch were into everything. At that time they were the largest investors in this country. Now the British are, but they then were the largest investors. They are into everything. They were in the Sinai and various peace-keeping forces. They were in the UN. They were on the Security Council, the Common Market. You name it, the Dutch were in it. It just looked like a very good place to be. I thought that it was not possible for me to get London, Bonn, Rome or Paris. After those four, obviously, the best one is The Hague. That's the one I pushed for and I had to work at it, because a lot of folks were after it, including a lot of political types. At the very end, it was the political folks that I had to beat out because all the career people had given up. They thought it was going political, so they just gave up.

I made sure my base in State was all right. I went to Larry Eagleburger and I said, "Larry, if I can get this, do you have any objection?"

He said, "No, Bill, I don't think you can get it, but if you can, I have no objection."

Of course, I had Haig's backing. Then I got the backing of Judge Clark (William P. Clark), the Deputy Secretary of State. I went to see him and I said, "Listen, the biggest issue that we have now with the Dutch is the deployment issue, the deployment of INF. What you need is someone there who has credibility when he speaks about the Soviets. I speak Russian. I've lived in the Soviet Union. You need somebody who knows public affairs, someone who can appear on television, who can make a speech, who is tireless in getting out and moving and running for county sheriff, because you've got to stop a negative decision."

That's the first thing you've got to do. Stop a negative decision. The way we were getting, the Dutch were going to say no. In fact, one of the first pieces of advice I had when I got there was advising me to forget about it and go on to other things because the cause was lost.

Anyhow, that convinced him. Over at the White House I ran into a problem because there were a couple of guys over there that said my wife and I were very good friends of the Mondales. Now I had never met Mrs. Mondale. I had never formally met the Vice President. My wife had never been in the same room with either of them, but that would just not go away. People wanted somebody else to have the job, so they were trying to find a way to disqualify me.

Clark said, "Listen, Bill, I'll tell you what I'm going to do. I want you to go over there and have a meeting with Lynn Nofzinger. You can have ten minutes. You go over there and you tell him your situation. Tell him your story and tell him you are not bosom buddies with Mondale."

Which I was not. I later met Mondale and told him about this. He thought it was very funny.

I went to see Lynn Nofzinger and we both sat there. I love cigars and he did, too. We both smoked a cigar. Instead of ten minutes, the meeting went on for nearly an hour. He said, "Bill, I'm with you. I'm going to see what I can do."
He went to Meese, who was the one who was sitting on my nomination over there, and he got him to move on it. It moved right through and I had no problems. That's how I got there. It wasn't easy. The biggest thing was having to beat out the political appointments.

In fact, one of them came by to see me later when I was in The Hague. He said, "This is the post that I thought I was going to get." He was very nice about it, but . . .

Q: You had this INF problem there in The Hague --

DYESS: Yes. When I got there, the prevailing view was that it was a lost cause and that we should forget about it and go on to other things. It was a thorn in the side of U.S.-Dutch relations and we shouldn't keep beating a dead horse. There were one or two who said, "The best we could possibly do -- it was really in the U.S. interest -- was to push hard and try to postpone a decision."

I said, "Don't do anything until I have a chance to survey it."

I looked at it carefully for three months. Then I decided that the odds against an affirmative decision was no worse than 65-35 -- 65 against, 35 for. So I said, "We're going to go for an affirmative decision."

That was not appreciated by some members of the embassy, but the thing is, if you're the ambassador, only one vote counts. I had the backing of two people, Peter Koromilas and Dixon Bocks. "We think you're right."

That's the way we pitched. To make a long story short, in the end the Dutch did come up with an affirmative decision, and that may have been the straw that broke the camel's back for the Soviets and caused them to give up the ghost.

I worked at a long, detailed argumentation for both government and public. I presented these every opportunity I had. I have never had to talk to any foreign government official the way I once had to talk to the minister of defense in The Netherlands. I was doing it under instructions. I was sent these instructions and the meeting would take about 20 minutes. The first ten minutes was going to be very, very rough. The last ten minutes was to try to repair the damage.

He had to go out to a meeting which I didn't know about, so the meeting lasted only about ten minutes. He only got the negative part and we really got off on the wrong foot, although later we became fast friends.

I worked with all parties except, finally, the socialists. I could see they were a total loss. I instructed the staff, "Stop wasting time with them. We've got work to do. You map it out so you spend your time with people who might support us, either in the organizations outside in the society, inside a government, or in the parliament. Don't waste your time."

Some of the Foreign Service officers had never seen an American career person who was so
willing to become involved in the domestic scene. I was quite willing to do it.

Oh, God, we had threats, demonstrations, attacks against us in the newspapers. These didn't bother me. We had to be careful the way we did it because we were foreigners, we did represent a foreign government or a friendly government, but we had a very legitimate point of view, one which represented the interests of our own country, the Alliance, and also The Netherlands. I felt that the opposition was coming from all different sides. They

We had to be careful [because] you can wear out your welcome and you can do things that are inappropriate. I do believe, however, that we do have the right -- and it is appropriate for us -- to express our point of view. If we find the forum -- and I found the forum -- then we should do it. I was usually treated politely although I was heckled quite a bit. Heckling didn't bother me.

Q: You were addressing groups?

DYESS: Yes, at universities. I visited every university in the country at least once, and sometimes more than once all on this issue. I got a lot of heckling, but as I say --

Q: You had big rallies, 400,000 or more in Amsterdam.

DYESS: Oh, yes, in Amsterdam and in The Hague. It doesn't necessarily mean, though, that they have the majority of the country on their side just because they can turn them out. The very fact that we had conservative governments . . .

What really turned the tide there, though, was when the very able man who was the Prime Minister, stepped down and Ruud Lubbers became the Prime Minister.

Q: Did he step down or did the government fall?

DYESS: No, he stepped down and Ruud Lubbers became the Prime Minister. They were both extremely able people but their personalities clashed. The only reason the personalities clashed was because their ambitions clashed. They tended to agree with one another a lot and they are both very able, although I think that Ruud Lubbers was probably the better politician.

Ruud came up with a device which turned the argument around. This is what we had been waiting for and this was after I left. It was taking place as I left, but it's what won the day. He said, "All right, we don't plan to deploy. However, we are going to watch what the Soviets do. If they continue to deploy their SS-20s, then we are going to deploy. If they will stop now, we won't."

This is telescoping it too much, but that was it in essence. What he did was to focus public attention away from The Netherlands and away from the United States, Germany and Britain and the other host countries and onto the Soviets. Of course, the Soviets didn't stop. They couldn't stop because they had this thing going and they simply couldn't bring it to a halt. We had pictures, etc., showing -- then the Soviets decided to deploy.
Q: You deployed all the troops, USIS, the attachés, everybody who was working on this thing, I suppose, in one way or another.

DYESS: Yes, in one way or another. I did most of the speaking because I was used to appearing before the public.

Q: The attachés must have been working on that one, the military leaders. I'm sure the Agency was working on it.

DYESS: Yes, they were all for it. We had the left all against it. Some left were for it but most of the left was against it. We had most of the government for it, the military, intelligence, etc. The battleground was this undecided middle and the public and that's who I went after. I kept up the steady representations with the prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister, members of parliament. I just kept pushing them.

Q: I picked up a New York Times item saying, "The U.S. Ambassador Is About To Be Removed For Pushing Too Hard." Do you recall that? What happened?

DYESS: Yes. It was not true. We get into personalities here, and I'm not sure that this is the place for it. There was an individual back here who was having to move out of the job he was in. He had been promised something. About the only way the promise could be fulfilled was for him to get the job in The Netherlands. They made some other promises, too, and they were removing ambassadors after two years -- same in East Berlin -- only career people and no political types.

I was very shocked when I heard about this. I raised some objections and the people in the White House didn't like it either. The deal was already cut and made before I knew anything about it. When I objected to it, then some things began to be leaked out from State. We don't know who, but obviously the only people who had an interest in doing it were the ones going to benefit from this move. This was one of the things that was said, that Dyess is too hard on the Dutch. Did you know that the foreign ministry released the statement saying that that was not true? They did -- a written statement. The prime minister had a question planted in his press conference so he would have a chance to comment on it, and he said it wasn't true. The Queen said it wasn't true, but privately, rather than publicly. But if two say it publicly, you know there's no problem. The only people who ever would say that would be -- certainly, it was not the former defense minister with whom we had become fast friends. It was only the left, people who did not have our interest at heart. It served the interest of someone else. You could never find out one of the unnamed sources.

Q: How about Queen Beatrix? Did you have contact with the royal family? Did you have contact with Bernhard?

DYESS: Yes, I had a lot of contact with her as well as with Bernhard. I admired them very much. They are remarkable people. I think it's the right sort of government for The Netherlands. She is a very gracious, noble, and distinguished monarch. She's just the right person for the job.

Q: That switch came about while we were in The Hague.
DYESS: Yes. Her mother is, as far as I know, still alive.

Q: Bernhard, of course, always thought of himself as more of an American than anything else.

DYESS: Yes, he did. He's very Americanized. The contact that you have with the royal family is primarily social. All the business that you do is with the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister, or members of parliament.

Q: As you pointed out, Dutch-U.S. commercial relations are really vast and broad.

DYESS: Yes. At the time the Dutch were the leading foreign investor in the U.S. -- direct foreign investment.

Q: Did you get a lot of pressure from U.S. business interests in any way?

DYESS: No. I spent a lot of time in the business community. In fact, one of my senior career Foreign Service officers told me -- because I invited the embassy officers to sit around and tell me, privately or in a group, what they thought I could be doing differently to improve my effectiveness. One of them told me I was spending too much time with the business community. I didn't feel that way at all, because I felt it was very important since we are the largest foreign investors in The Netherlands, and at the time, they were the largest foreign investors here. We also had a favorable balance of trade with them. The business community there was quite large. I had 70- to 80-hour weeks. I spent a lot of time in the business community as well as with the military. I would visit the military posts regularly. I would go to church there, or watch ball games, or attend ceremonies, etc.

I flew an F-15 and broke the sound barrier twice while I was there. I didn't take off and land. I took over the controls only after we were in the air, but it is the sort of thing I would do with the military.

Q: Susteberg?

DYESS: Yes, Susteberg.

Q: Were you bugged by a lot of congressional delegations?

DYESS: Yes, we had a lot. I developed two approaches for handling visiting delegations, whether they were congressional or gubernatorial -- we had those, too. We would have a working breakfast in which we would include the wives at the residence. We would have separate tables. We could seat 50 or 60 people in the main dining room. We would have the key officers of the embassy come and brief the Americans before they went to meet with the Dutch.

This made sense for two reasons. First, we would give them the briefing before they went. Second, we wasted very little of their time because you have to eat breakfast. We would serve them a Southern breakfast with grits, ham and eggs, etc. Then we would do the briefing. We had
it down until it was almost scientific. We would give them a chance to ask their questions, etc., plus we included the wives. It was their opportunity to be in -- the briefings were unclassified. We would have a separate briefing if it was classified. We did have a lot of congressional visits.

The other thing I worked out for distinguished visitors, and we had several of those, is I would have a stag dinner. Women might be there but it was not spouses. After dinner, we would go into the main living room and the distinguished visitor and I would sit side by side. He'd be there and I'd be here, the fireplace is in-between, nice roaring fire if it was wintertime. We would start off chatting. I would have three or four things, fairly provocative enough to start the thing going. Then the other eight, ten, twelve, fourteen people sitting around would chime in. This worked out beautifully. The thing would go on for an hour and half or two hours.

One of the most successful was Sam Nunn. We had people from both the government and the legislature. I won't name individual ones.

I will name two more visitors we had. We had George and Barbara Bush, and Dan and Marilyn Quayle. I had never met Bush before. I hadn't been around him 15 minutes before I said to myself, "I have misassessed this guy."

My only impression of him was from television. I became a fast and firm supporter of his after his visit. He was there for two or three days. I saw him deal with the Dutch. He was very effective. He's easy to be briefed. He remembers what he's told. I was really impressed.

Also, when people were attacking Danny Quayle for not being on the ball and bright, etc., people asked me and I said, "Well, any guy who can talk Marilyn Quayle into marrying him has to have something on the ball, because she is a very bright lady, very, very bright."

In fact, whenever she came into the room, I'd say the level of the conversation rose. It's not that he wasn't bright. The only criticism that I had of Quayle -- he's a very nice fellow -- he didn't seem to be all that serious. She was serious, and he would defer to her a lot of times on the weightier matters. I didn't detect any lack of intelligence or lack of brightness. His purpose was just not as serious as other senators that I had seen come through. We had a lot of senators coming through.

Q: How were press relations in The Hague, both the Dutch press and American press?

DYESS: I got along well with the American press with the exception of the New York Times. The reason I didn't get along well with the New York Times was because we were having some trouble with leaks. I told the staff, "Listen. You are big people. You are grown, adult, experienced officers and I'm not going to tell you what you can and can't say or whom you should and should not meet. So we're going to have this rule. You can meet with anybody you want to, and you can say anything you want to -- assuming it's not classified. There has to be a ground rule. The ground rule is that, if whatever you say is used, it is used for attribution and you are identified as the source of the statement."

You could have heard a pin drop. So that's the rule that we had and it stopped the leaks.
The only problem we had was with Johnny Apple, a reporter with the New York Times. He wrote in the New York Times that I had gagged the embassy. I sent off a cable stating what the policy was, that they were free to speak with anyone. The only thing was, they couldn't speak off the record. They had to speak on the record for attribution. They had to be identified. The New York Times did not see fit to print my little rejoinder. I had a lot of trouble with the New York Times. It's not a paper that I admire.

Other than that, the relations with the American press was good. Relations with the Dutch press was exceptionally good with the exception of the (Inaudible).

Q: That was the Catholic paper, wasn't it?

DYESS: No, it was the Socialist paper. I had some trouble with him. In fact, I had an exchange of letters with him when I left. He gave me some advice and I gave him some. It was nice, civilized. I didn't step back for them. If they wanted to tangle, I tangled with them. If they didn't want to tangle, it would be fine. Pieces would come out about me in a magazine and I wouldn't bother to read it. My wife would read it in Dutch. She could read Dutch. The people would find out that I hadn't read it, so they would translate it and send it to me. I still didn't read it. You get to the point you don't worry about those things. If you do, you don't sleep well. When any of the little left-wing intellectual types would attack me, I'd just ignore it.

Q: Were you satisfied with the way your consulates worked? You had Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

DYESS: Yes. I felt that, even though it was a small country, we should continue both. They wanted to close one or both and I felt that we should continue. I said, "Rotterdam is the largest port in the world. You cannot not have a consulate in the largest port in the world." It's about two and a half times as large as the next largest port, which is Kobe, Japan. The Soviets are dying to get in there.

Amsterdam is the intellectual, financial and commercial capital of The Netherlands. I said, "The only reason we are here is because this is where the seat of government is, but we need consulates for these other reasons." They kept them there and I was happy that they kept them.

Q: I know that there was a threat to close one or the other when I was there.

DYESS: They closed one. They closed Rotterdam. They tried to close one or both when I was there, but I fought it. I think it was useful for us to be represented in both places.

Q: That brings us to 1983 when you left The Hague. Was that your idea that the tour was up?

DYESS: No. I left to make room for somebody else. I was recalled. When the President called me up and asked me if I would go, he asked me if I would serve for his term, which at that time was almost four years. I said, "Yes." I made plans on that basis. I saw him later and Reagan did not know that I was being recalled. I would have like to stay another year because my son was in
the twelfth grade. I had to find a school for him to graduate from high school -- one year. Financially it was very bad. There were some things that I wanted to see through. I had laid the groundwork for the deployment of the INF thing and I wanted to see that through, but this other person was walking the halls and creating a great deal of trouble and pressure. So they said, "No, you've got to come."

Q: Is there anything that I've missed about The Hague?

DYESS: I don't know. I could talk about The Hague for the next two days. [Laughter] There were so many wonderful experiences that I had there.

Q: Do you make an annual trip to Leiden for the Thanksgiving Day affair?

DYESS: Yes. I opened I don't know how many museums or special exhibitions, the flower shows, played tennis.

One thing I might mention, I had to move around in an armored car.

Q: In The Hague, of all places?

DYESS: Yes. Not long before I got there, the British ambassador was assassinated. The Turkish ambassador's son was assassinated. They think they mistook him for the Turkish ambassador. The French embassy had been occupied for three or four days by terrorists. While I was there, the French ambassador who lived directly across the street from me got a threatening letter from Carlos. He signed it with his thumb prints. There was an attempt on another Turkish diplomat while I was there.

The problem is that the country is wide open. You don't worry about the Dutch. You worry about the foreigners coming in and getting out scot-free.

So I had an armored car and two security drivers. They switched off. In front, the one security driver and one plain-clothed policeman armed. Behind me was a second armored car with three plain-clothed men in it. That was my normal to-ing and fro-ing. If I went to a public event and it was announced ahead of time that I was going to be there, then quite typically we'd be met on the outskirts of The Hague by another police armored car. I just didn't think about it. That's why I haven't mentioned it before. I think it bothered my wife some and bothered my son a bit. I had associated with several secretaries of state and they had heavy security, so it was not foreign to me.

Q: What do you feel was your greatest accomplishment in your Foreign Service career?

DYESS: I suppose the best one is getting the Dutch on the right track on the INF. I did some other things in Berlin that I thought were useful. I revised the port security regulations and got inter-agency agreement on that and had it as the basis for negotiations with the Soviets. That was significant at the time. I've rescued people who were in dire straits when I was a consular officer.
Q: On the other side of that coin, what was your greatest disappointment or frustration?
Dyess: I guess the greatest disappointment I had was leaving The Hague a year earlier than I had planned. It was terribly inconvenient.

Q: That's right. When you brought INF that far along, you wanted to see it through.

Dyess: Yes. They were not the usual frustrations of moving. They'd say three moves were equal to one fire, losing furniture, losing paintings, etc. I thoroughly enjoyed my Foreign Service career. I was in for 25 years. I was in military intelligence for three years, so I had 28 years of government service.

The reason I got out was that there were things that I wanted to do with my life while I still had good health. If I had worked these 60- to 80-hour weeks on up until I was 65 or I had a coronary, then I wouldn't be able to do what I wanted to do.

What I want to do now -- I have to work some because my annuity is not enough to pay all the bills -- is to study physics, energy physics. I want to know as much as I possibly can know. I'll never know all the answers, but I want to know as much as I possibly can know about how creation came about, the first three minutes. This is how I got into it -- the first three minutes. I've expanded into some chemistry and biology, but primarily it is still high-energy physics. My math is weak. I have no science background. I'm self-taught. I have read now about 50 or 60 books on it by the seminal thinkers, close to Nobel Laureates, etc. Most of them I can get through. There are one or two that I have had difficulty with. I've had some difficulty with the James Glick's book on chaos. That is a bit difficult.

Also, I find it easier to accept quantum theory, quantum mechanics, than I do certain aspects of relativity. It was the longest time before I could see how space and time cannot be separated. They are really the same thing. It took me forever before I-

Lewis D. Junior
Consul General
Rotterdam (1982-1986)

Lewis D. Junior was born in Kansas and joined the Foreign Service in 1950 after serving in the U.S. Air Force during World War II. His career included positions in Nigeria, Italy, Germany, Ethiopia, and The Netherlands. Mr. Junior was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: In Washington, where you were from '60 to '63, what were you doing?

Junior: We worked NATO Affairs almost exclusively, and it was the most interesting, challenging, productive, and significant workload I've ever had in my life. We were working such things as renegotiating the jumble of individual bilateral agreements for the maintenance of our nuclear facilities in Europe, renegotiating an overall common treaty for NATO Europe. We
were working on various kinds of relationships with NATO as a whole, or NATO countries, for example, to base the so-called BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning systems) in England and elsewhere. And in the end, I turned out to be the leading oar when it came to all kinds of infrastructural problems. I also had responsibility for negotiations such as, for example, the effort to make a Dutch advanced research facility into a NATO facility. They did that, and I found it interesting, when I was back in Rotterdam on my last tour, to visit it, and all that business about when it had been Dutch rather than NATO had already been lost in the mists of history. And I was involved in the establishment of an Italian port as being a multilaterally funded infrastructural facility for submarines in Italy. On the infrastructural side, it was I who tried to work out the methodology for reducing the percentage that the U.S. paid into NATO infrastructure funds.

Q: Now we come to your final assignment. You served for four years in Rotterdam, from 1982 to 1986, as consul general. Was that an assignment you sought, or was this sort of luck of the draw?

JUNIOR: It was largely luck of the draw, and certainly not a gem to be sought after. As I recall, I got into the bidding fairly late in the game, because I had assumed, up to a certain point, that my second daughter, who was just going into her second year of high school, would not want to go abroad until she got out of high school, so I was thinking about finding a domestic assignment. And I found I was wrong, that she wanted to go abroad. (It turned out that she was talking about Paris, but I didn't know that at the time.) But Rotterdam offered one thing primarily, and that is, an excellent American school in The Hague, which was readily available from Rotterdam which is only a half-hour away. And that worked out very well; she graduated from that school and learned a lot.

I noted, when I was briefing in EUR to go to the job, a certain a lack of interest, on the part of people in the bureau, in Rotterdam and anything that had to do with Rotterdam, and very little news about any reporting coming out of Rotterdam. CA (Consular Affairs) knew a lot about the consular activities in Rotterdam.

Q: CA being Consular Affairs.

JUNIOR: Consular Affairs. And what I was seeing then, but didn't identify, was a certain lack of interest, in the bureau, in Rotterdam because "nothing ever happens there." I mean, their politics were predictable, their economics were predictable. The biggest thing in Rotterdam, of course, was the world's largest, busiest port. But, you know, so what?

Q: Yes. And really, in Consular Affairs, it no longer plays much of a role at all.

JUNIOR: No.

Q: It's all taken care of by agents.

JUNIOR: The old shipping problems, you know, I didn't have any shipping problems. In all four years in Rotterdam, there was not one, not one case when outside of office hours I had to respond
to a shipping problem. Not one.

In fact, the eventual closure of Rotterdam was a mistake, in at least one sense. Some inspectors came to Rotterdam (in retrospect it seems to me quite evident that they came in order to develop a rationale for closing the post), and they ran up some numbers on the back of an envelope which were intended to illustrate that it would be economical to close Rotterdam and shift some of the functions to the embassy in the Hague and some to Amsterdam. And even though the ambassador, Jerry Bremer, and I agreed that those numbers were wrong, fallacious, he perceived, and did not want to fight, the fact that the bureau wanted Rotterdam closed, and there was no point in trying to argue the numbers. So he gave up before I did, and of course when he gave up, I had to fight the good fight and try to keep Rotterdam open.

The reason the numbers were fallacious was that when you shifted your consular burden to Amsterdam, you shifted more work there, and you shifted the staff there. And the staff had to be paid as they were in Rotterdam. Moreover, in the larger staff structure there, you created the requirement for some new American jobs there and more senior positions among the locals, who were more expensive.

But that was all irrelevant. The bureau wanted Rotterdam closed, and we closed it.

A year before, we had moved into a building which had been given to us by the government of Rotterdam in return for our ceding a prime site on the inner harbor of Rotterdam, which they wanted, in part, for a park. Part of the deal was that once we had agreed on the building identified to us, they would rehab it, and that we, the U.S. government, would do the necessary internal security building, the hardwalls and so forth. So a good part of the time I was in Rotterdam, I was overseeing the work on the new consulate. We moved in there; a year later they closed us down, and that building is still the property of the U.S. government, because there is no way to get rid of that because nobody wants to move in there and spend the money necessary to tear out all that steel structure, in a not-very-desirable section of town, for, let's say, a bank. That was part of the fallacy of the numbers the inspectors worked up, because they said, "Well, we'll sell the building; it's worth about $500,000."

Anyway, have I diverged too far?

Q: No, not at all. This was a period of time, or maybe a little later, that our consulate general in Amsterdam was being egged, and there were continual demonstrations against it. I guess it was Central America at the time, but whatever it was, there seemed to be a very volatile group in Amsterdam. Now, Rotterdam was a different world?

JUNIOR: It's extraordinary, they are almost like in two different countries. Rotterdam is quiet, phlegmatic, hard-working, hardly sophisticated. Within a very small segment of the country, developed something like twenty, twenty-five percent of the gross national product. Has culture, has art, but nothing to the extent of Amsterdam. Amsterdam and Amsterdammers are effervescent, artistically inclined, liberal in their outlook, inclined to take in refugees. This has been true throughout history; when the Huguenots were driven out of France, a great many of them went into Amsterdam and were welcomed there. How long that will continue, I don't know, but during
four years I didn't see any change in the balance. Amsterdam is bubbling; Rotterdam is not.

Q: There were serious considerations given to shutting down our consulate in Amsterdam at one time because of the constant demonstrations. Was there any talk about having Rotterdam pick up Amsterdam because we were getting harassed, in sort of a slap at the Amsterdam government for not controlling the situation?

JUNIOR: Well, we did close the consulate general in Amsterdam for quite some time. We just went out of business there for a while, until the Dutch authorities said, "Okay, well, we'll do the necessary to protect," and then we went back into business.

And of course the Rotterdammers were delighted that Amsterdam had egg on its face, so to speak, by having not protected the consulate general there, and by having people come from all parts of the country to Rotterdam to get consular services.

But so far as I know, there was never any really, really serious question about closing down Amsterdam. Amsterdam replaces seventeen passports lost or stolen to every one that Rotterdam used to replace, because it's sin city, and that's where people go for fun, and they tend to get rolled and to lose their passports and get their money stolen and need all kinds of attention from a consular officer.

Never happens in Rotterdam, to speak of. As I mentioned before, I never had a complaint from anyone, private or governmental, in my consular jurisdiction, about a drunken sailor. A sailor would wreck a bar, the agent would come down, write out a check, and the police would roll these guys up and put them on the ship, and off they would go.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover in Rotterdam?

JUNIOR: Because there was little interest, in Washington, in Rotterdam, it would have been easy just to sort of sit there. When I first arrived, the ambassador was Bill Dyess, who did not use his subordinate posts at all well. As far as he was concerned, if we showed up at the staff meeting every week, that was all he really expected of us.

A little while ago, you were mentioning the demonstrations in Amsterdam about Central America and so forth, and that was indeed the cause, but the big cause of civil unrest in the Netherlands at the time was the plan to put Hawk missiles into southern Holland. Bill Dyess was sent to the Netherlands with instructions to facilitate that emplacement when the time came.

He went about his business in such a way that my understanding is the word was quietly passed from the Dutch back to Washington that Mr. Dyess might better make his contribution elsewhere. So Dyess was replaced by Jerry Bremer. Dyess would have been able to maneuver much better had he assessed what was happening and how people were reacting to his initiatives and so forth by asking the constituent posts to measure the temperature and velocity of political movement in the constituent areas. But he didn't. He was a one-man show, and he didn't use us for economic or political reporting or assessment.
Q: I might mention that Dyess was a professional career Foreign Service officer.

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: So this was not an amateur doing this.

JUNIOR: Well, if you look at his record, you might want to question that slightly. Because, as far as I knew (and I never read his file), he had a not-very-distinguished career until he got into the job as deputy spokesman, and then spokesman, for the Department. And apparently he did so well in defending the interests of the incumbent administration that they felt that he should be awarded with an ambassadorship. I don't think he'd ever really been tested in that sense, as a Foreign Service officer, before.

Q: What was Jerry Bremer's background?

JUNIOR: This is the Paul Bremer; he's called Jerry. Somebody might want to research this some time. Jerry Bremer is arguably the smartest guy I ever met, certainly one of the two smartest guys. He's got all sorts of computers going in his head: current problems, past history, advance problems, anticipating problems. He was totally on top of that embassy within six months after he moved in. He was ahead of everybody.

Q: What was his background?

JUNIOR: Well, he had not been much of a manager previously. He had been DCM in Tanzania at one point, I think DCM Oslo at another point -- relatively little foreign experience. But this is the point I think needs researching: I think there has been no person in the Foreign Service who has been, in effect, special assistant to four different secretaries of state. He was so smart and personable and poised and well-presented, that every time he came back to Washington, and before he ever went abroad in the first instance, he was sucked up to the Seventh Floor and became very close to the incumbent secretary of state, including Henry Kissinger.

Q: Where is he now?

JUNIOR: He's working for Henry Kissinger in New York, he's a deputy to Kissinger. Eagleburger left Kissinger and came back to the Department, and Bremer, in effect, took his place.

Q: From your vantage point, how did you see him work sort of the Dutch scene regarding, particularly, the Hawk missiles, and other matters?

JUNIOR: To be clear, but unfair to Bill Dyess, his problem was that he is ham-handed, and he handled this problem ham-handedly. And the Dutch, who don't pretend to be sophisticated, really are quite sophisticated, and they did not appreciate Dyess's public speeches which endeavored to tackle this problem and to enlist Dutch public opinion on the site, by right. He was much too unsettled.
Bremer, when the history of the Hawk emplacement is written, will get very high credit, because he worked invisibly. He worked behind the scenes with the Dutch leadership, understood what they were trying to do, never made life more difficult for them, and let them take the lead in finally getting the problem and to approve it — under very risky circumstances; the whole thing could have gone down the tubes, given one false move. So Bremer was brilliant in the job, but invisibly so.

Incidentally, before the assignment, Bremer had never spoken a Germanic language, although I think he did speak some Norwegian. Before he left Holland, he was doing live interviews in Dutch on TV, on issues of the day.

Q: **Good God!**

JUNIOR: And he did that by studying his Dutch every morning intensely, when he wasn't running the embassy and when he wasn't running marathons. He was a marathon runner. A remarkable man.

Q: Well, you left Rotterdam in 1986, is that right?

JUNIOR: That's about right, yes.

Q: And then you came back for a relatively short tour in the department again.

JUNIOR: When I went to Rotterdam, I had an indefinite future when I came back. I was approaching a point where, "Let's give him a limited career extension." I would be forced out of the Foreign Service. So I thought, briefly, that probably I should look forward to maybe moving to California. But I didn't intend to do that until I came back here and saw what the job prospects were. They were very dim indeed, and I had just about decided that I would wait until the good weather of spring arrived before I retired.

But I got a telephone call from an acquaintance (not a friend), Mark Dionne, who was senior deputy in the International Narcotics Bureau, who asked me to come see him and his boss, Anne Wrobleski, a politically appointed assistant secretary in INM, about a job that had just been created.

In short, that job was to be an interim job, a short-term job, highly challenging, but not one that would occupy my attention over the longer term. It was highly classified; it had to do with intelligence matters. And my job was to get an intergovernmental structure together and to make it work.

I did that, and when it came time for me to retire, they had no one to staff it on behalf of Ms. Wrobleski, no one with the seniority and the clearances and the time to do that, so they asked me if I'd like to do it part-time. Because it was a part-time job. I retired and stayed on as a consultant, or, when-actually-employed person. And I stayed in that until the new team arrived. Wrobleski and Dionne left, and new people came in, and they didn't share my interest and enthusiasm, so I thought it best that I not simply hang on for the sake of hanging on. So I
conveyed that to them and actually retired.

L. PAUL “JERRY” BREMER, III
Ambassador
Netherlands (1983-1986)

L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer III was born in Simsbury, Connecticut in 1941. He graduated from Yale University in 1963. He received his MBA from Harvard University in 1966 and then continued his education at Le Institut d’études Politiques de Paris. In 1966 he entered the Foreign Service and was sent to post in Kabul, Afghanistan as a General Services officer. He went onto Malawi in 1968 until 1971. During the ‘70s he held various domestic posts for the State Department including one as an assistant to Henry Kissinger from 1972-1976. He went to post in Oslo, Norway as DCM before returning to the States and serving in various capacities. He was appointed Ambassador of the Netherlands in 1983 and Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism and Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1986. He retired from the Foreign Service in 1989. In 2003, he was appointed by President Bush as Presidential Envoy to Iraq under which he worked for Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in June 2008.

Q: We are coming to the time when you became ambassador to the Netherlands. How did this come about? This is usually a political appointment.

BREMER: I had made the transition from Vance to Muskie to Haig to Shultz and was working as Shultz’s special assistant and executive secretary in 1982 and 1983. At this time I had the background of having served in Europe in Norway and spoke Norwegian. The assistant secretary for Europe, Rick Burt, approached me with the idea of going to Europe as an ambassador. Shultz also spoke to me about it and he initially focused on Denmark because I spoke Norwegian. But as I looked into it and talked to both the secretary and Rick Burt, Rick argued that the Netherlands would be more important because of the problems we were having getting the Dutch to accept the deployment of Cruise missiles.

The strategic context was that in the mid-1970s the Russians had begun deploying intermediate range, or theatre, nuclear missiles, the SS-20s, in the Warsaw Pact countries. The deployments threatened our European allies and raised an important question about the credibility of the American “nuclear umbrella” over our allies. That is, would America be prepared to respond with our strategic nuclear forces in the even the Soviets attacked an ally with theatre, or tactical, nuclear weapons. Thus, it was an issue that went to the heart of the NATO Article V commitment of “one for all”. That is no doubt why the Soviets deployed the SS-20s, as a way of breaking NATO.

In 1978, NATO took the so-called “two track decision” which called for counter deployment of American intermediate range missiles, Pershings, onto selected NATO counties. The decision
also declared the Alliance’s willingness to negotiate with the Soviets the reduction or elimination of both sides theater or intermediate nuclear forces (INF). Five NATO countries agreed to station the Pershings on their territory. By early 1983, four of the five countries “deploying countries”, as they were called in Europe, had gone along and agreed to take these missiles. The Dutch were the only deploying country holding out. It was a key issue for American policy and I felt it looked like a more challenging place to be than Denmark. So it came about that on Shultz’s recommendation the president nominated me for that position in the spring of 1983.

Q: Did you have any feeling that you were nudging aside some starry eyed aspirant for the job?

BREMER: There may have been some campaign contributors angling for the job but I never heard anything about other candidates. I was succeeding another Foreign Service officer, Bill Dyess, who had been the State Department spokesman at the beginning of the Reagan administration. The way it looked from Washington, Bill was pushing rather too openly for the deployment of missiles. There’s no question we wanted them to take the missiles, but he was doing it in a way that was viewed by people in Washington as counterproductive because the Dutch are notoriously touchy. Shultz’s seemed to want to have a steady pair of hands in the Netherlands for what was becoming more and more important as an issue.

Q: This shows when the going gets tough, you go to a professional. It makes sense.

How did you prepare to go there?

BREMER: First Francie and I started studying Dutch. It turned out Norwegian was an advantage in doing that. I read briefing papers, talked to all the former American ambassadors to the Netherlands that I could lay hands on; Bill Middendorf -- who had been Nixon’s Ambassador -- others. I did the usual round of talks with people in the CIA, Pentagon, Treasury and preparing for hearings.

Q: Were there any interest groups that were particularly important? Not just on the defense side, but Holland, Michigan people or something?

BREMER: There were a number of groups representing the Dutch American community. There was the Netherlands America foundation based in New York. The American business community had important interests in the Netherlands. At this time, the United States was the largest foreign investor in the Netherlands and the Netherlands was the largest foreign investor in the United States, largely because of the holdings of Shell Oil and Phillips. Already in the ‘80s the Dutch were investing tens of millions of dollars of pension funds into American real estate much of it in Atlanta and Florida. So there was a very strong business connection between our countries. I spoke to a number of businessmen, both American, Dutch-American and Dutch before I went over there and that turned out to be a very important part of the job.

Q: Other than the missile thing, were there any other areas that were areas that were simmering or a problem?

BREMER: On the economic side of U.S. - European relations, we were still feeling our way
about how we related to the European Community as it was then called. The Dutch were founding members not only of that, but of the European Coal and Steel organization back in the ‘50s. The Dutch along with the British were by far the most liberal -- in the classic economic sense of the word -- governments inside the EC. The Dutch were an important source for indirect American influence into the EC because they were willing to talk about what was going on in the EC. We and they shared a general liberal outlook on economic policy, open economic trade and in general the principles of a liberal order. The Netherlands is a trading country, it has been for centuries. In addition to the American/Dutch commercial relationship, there was an important economic relationship that involved our ability to talk to the Dutch in a very frank way, confidentially, about what was going on behind the scenes in the European Community. Those were the three main things; Cruise missiles by far the most important, then the U.S. - Dutch commercial interaction and then U.S. - Dutch economic relations. Those were the three areas.

Q: Norway was not in the European Community?

BREMER: No.

Q: What were you getting from your contacts and talking about this not early but middle period of the European Economic Union or European Union? Was there concern, just quiet anticipation of this as being maybe either a great thing or a commercial and perhaps political rival to the U.S.?

BREMER: At that time I think views in Washington were mixed. I think it was generally viewed as being in America’s strategic interest for the Europeans to be united because our main problem in the early ‘80s was countering the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It was generally understood it would be useful if our partner, Europe, had both political power and an economic dimension. The economic dimension being some kind of unity in the European Community as it was then called. At that time there were a couple of concerns: one was as the European Community developed its mechanisms and institutions, they might progressively exclude the United States from their deliberations. This became more of an issue in my next job when I came back as ambassador at large for counterterrorism.

The second concern was actually quite interesting as we talk in 2008. There was a legitimate concern on the part of the American government that the Europeans were too eager to do large scale commercial deals on energy with the Soviet Union. In 1982, before I went to the Netherlands, the president was concerned enough about this to ask Ambassador Galbraith, our ambassador to France, to make a trip around Europe to try to point out to the Europeans the potential danger of becoming too reliant on Soviet energy sources, particularly gas. The Europeans didn’t take kindly to that view. I must say, now looking back 25 years later, I think they should have thought more carefully about it because they are certainly much more dependent on Russian gas now than they ever were on Soviet gas.

Q: How did your Senate hearings go?

BREMER: They were fine. I don’t even remember them, they were so quick. I think there were probably two senators there. It was not a controversial appointment.
**Q:** You were in the Netherlands from when to when?

BREMER: July of 1983 until late August of 1986.

**Q:** What was sort of the political situation in the Netherlands when you went there in 1983?

BREMER: It was extremely complicated as it always is in the Netherlands. The Dutch have legitimate claim to being one of the oldest representative governments in the world. They can’t quite go back as far as Magna Carta but they go pretty close to it. They are a rather contentious lot so that there are lots of parties. It reminded me of the political situation in Israel where you have lots and lots of parties. There were 8 or 9 parties in the Tweede Kamer, the lower house of parliament when I got there. It was a coalition government. The prime minister was from the Christian Democratic Party and they were in coalition with the liberals, the Dutch Liberal Party, the VVD as it’s called. The VVD was solidly in favor of NATO and of deploying the cruise missiles. But the Christian Democrats were deeply divided on this key issue. They were split into at least two factions. One faction represented by the foreign minister, Hans van den Broek, was very strongly pro-Atlanticist, pro-NATO and very much in favor of making this extremely controversial decision to deploy Cruise missiles.

The minister of defense, Job de Ruiter, was from a softer wing of the Christian Democratic Party. They were in favor of NATO, but opposed putting in the cruise missiles. Then there was the prime minister, Ruud Lubbers, whose position was never entirely clear as to which of these two courses he favored. These three men were the key decision makers though there were lots of others.

**Q:** The prime minister was?

BREMER: Ruud Lubbers. One of the things I learned very quickly was that the Dutch system is quite different from other parliamentary systems. The Dutch prime minister has no direct authority over the other ministers and explicitly not over the foreign minister. This became a problem at some point because Washington kept sending letters from the president to the prime minister about cruise missiles. The first time this happened, I delivered the letter to the Prime Minister and as a courtesy, gave a copy to the foreign minister. The foreign minister took several layers of skin off me the first time pointing out that, under the Dutch constitution, he was personally responsible for foreign policy, not the prime minister, which is true. I had to explain this to Washington. I don’t think I ever fully succeeded explaining that fact to Washington. From then on I always delivered the original letter to the foreign minister, and copies to the Prime and Defense Ministers.

**Q:** Looking at how one deals with a different bureaucracy, could the president write to the defense minister or the foreign minister? Would it be Shultz writing to the foreign, how did?

BREMER: We didn’t use written letters that often. What we finally wound up doing is I would call on the foreign minister first and tell him what was going on and then tell him, unless he had some objection, I intended to inform the prime minister and as necessary, the defense minister. I
basically handled it that way, whether my instructions told me to or not.

Q: You really had to keep running from stool to stool to keep everybody informed.

BREMER: Yes, and beyond that, those three were just the top of a very complicated lay down of MPs, mayors, governors throughout the country, politicians who were taking sides on this. This was a very hot political issue all over the country. Francie was reminding me this morning that shortly after I got to the Netherlands, The Hague was the site of the largest peace demonstration in European history. I think even to date, no demonstration has been bigger. We had anti-Cruise missile, anti-nuclear, anti-American demonstrators bused in from all over Europe, 750,000 of them, who mustered in a big park in central The Hague and then marched past the American embassy. It took something like 8 1/2 hours for all these people to march past the embassy, all of them opposed to deploying the Cruise missiles. Fortunately it went off peacefully.

Again, the strategic context was that four of the five deploying countries had agreed to take the missiles, so effectively, the Russians had made the decision they could break apart the unity on this issue, and perhaps even more broadly on NATO, by persuading the Dutch not to deploy cruise missiles. Our job was to say to the Dutch, “You have a responsibility as a NATO member. You are protected under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty by America, our troops and our weapons”. Unlike Norway, we had American troops stationed in the Netherlands. “They are here to defend you and part of your responsibility is to accept the NATO decision which was made years before to deploy these missiles.”

In addition, the Dutch were on a sensitive NATO group called the NPG, the Nuclear Planning Group, a small group of NATO members who dealt with the most sensitive issues dealing with nuclear weapons. Our private message to the Dutch was “You can’t very well expect to stay in the Nuclear Planning Group if you are not willing to meet your responsibilities.” So it was a very difficult issue and we had to play a quiet but firm game of hardball with them.

Q: You arrived at the embassy. Who was your DCM? I would have thought you would have had some problems in that the Netherlands sounding like a good place to put good old Joe or good old Mary. I have been in personnel. We did this. It was such a vital issue and such a complicated government, the two don’t quite square off.

BREMER: I was lucky. I told my predecessor’s deputy that I was going to bring my own deputy. In those days in the Foreign Service, the ambassador effectively could choose his deputy chief of mission -- that was about all you could do by way of choosing your staff. I asked a good friend of mine, Art Hughes, who had worked with me in the secretariat years before. Art had been a special assistant to the under secretary for management when I was special assistant to the secretary of state. In 1983, he was serving as deputy chief of mission in Copenhagen in a very difficult situation. He had a difficult ambassador.

I called Art in Copenhagen and asked him if he would be willing to come down and be my deputy. He was delighted to be free of what was a very difficult situation in Copenhagen. He had the right experience in Europe; he’d been in a NATO country. He was what I needed as a deputy which was the exact opposite of me. He was a real inside guy, he really knew how to operate
with people, and he was very, very good. And he never hesitated to tell me when I was wrong. I inherited a strong political section and a strong economic section. I was lucky. I wound up with an extremely strong embassy, largely through luck, except for my choice of DCM.

Q: Let’s stick to the cruise missile thing. What was, we are talking about the ‘80s and this is long past the time when the Soviets pushed the peace button as in Helsinki and in other places, there were tremendous demonstrations. What was causing this?

BREMER: As the files have become more available with the fall of the Soviet Union, it has become clearer that the Soviets were funding many of these peace movements in Europe, particularly in Germany. The ostensible organizers of first this major demonstration -- and we had them all the time -- were the peace movements in the Netherlands, and Germany but also in some of the other countries as well. The Soviets, I think from their point of view, clearly saw an opportunity to try to break, to fracture NATO over this issue, particularly the Dutch.

Again the strategic context here is under President Carter NATO had agreed to the 1978 Two Track decision about the cruise missiles. Carter had started a defense buildup in the late 70s; Reagan had continued it. Reagan by then had announced the Strategic Defense Initiative which I think concerned the Soviets greatly, as documents have shown since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Q: This was the so-called ‘Star Wars’, anti-missile defense.

BREMER: Anti-ballistic missile defense. At that time the Soviet leader was Andropov. Eventually Gorbachev seems to have understood how weak their economy was. They may have had a better understanding than we did. We don’t seem to have understood it until it fell apart.

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Q: This is one of these things one wonders about our intelligence.

BREMER: I think a lot of the people who were against the cruise missiles were legitimately and sincerely opposed for whatever reasons. I think they were wrong but I don’t question their motives. I met frequently with the leaders of the Dutch peace movement. They were decent, well-meaning men and women. Just wrong about the Soviets.

Q: Were these the same people who had made life hell for our people in our consulate in Amsterdam?

BREMER: Sometimes the peace movement held demonstrations in Amsterdam. But the most active demonstrations there, the ones that occasionally attacked our consulate, concerned Central America. This issue boiled along the entire time we were in the Netherlands. The Sandinistas had taken over in Nicaragua in 1979. In the 80s America was supporting the government of El
Salvador in their efforts to stop the Sandinistas in their efforts to overthrow the government in El Salvador. This became a very big issue on campuses and universities of the Netherlands, for reasons that aren’t entirely clear. My predecessor said one memorable thing about why the Dutch could get so exercised about Central America: “Afghanistan is too far away. Poland is too near. Nicaragua is just right.” I thought that was a very good way of describing the Dutch attitude.

We had demonstrations and sometimes attacks on our consulate in Amsterdam and demonstrations at the Embassy in The Hague every Friday. These were our weekly proSandinista and anti-American demonstrations. There was probably some overlap between those people and the people in the peace movement; but it was another issue. Sometimes the demonstrators would come over the wall in Amsterdam, the police would fire tear gas and a number would be arrested and then let go. We finally had to put bigger fences up in Amsterdam. The demonstrations in Hague rarely got violent, but they were very regular.

Q: I assume these were mostly students or were they sort of the people hanging around the drug scene?

BREMER: In Amsterdam you could never really tell the difference. I think most of the people who were into serious drugs probably couldn’t have gotten themselves anywhere on time, and unlikely get over our walls. I think it was mostly students.

I went to the Free University in Amsterdam where I had been invited to give a lecture of some kind to a class. I was protected by Dutch security, and my security guards found people sitting in the hall outside and refusing to let us past into the hall. Matters became rather heated and the students started shouting anti-Americanisms through a loud speaker. When one of them took a breath, I asked to borrow the loudspeaker myself and I said to this group of students, “This is a country that has prided itself on its open and liberal approach to ideas and trade for 400 years. It’s rather discouraging that you won’t let me come and present my case to you.” I added that I was disappointed to read that the Free University had just decided to become a partner with the University of Managua, which was at that time run by communists and which could by no reason be assumed to share these historic Dutch values.

This little speech did not have a calming effect on the students. My security detail was increasingly uncomfortable with the rising tension, so they said we had to leave. We ended up leaving under a hail of stones thrown at the car. This was the kind of thing that was going on. But this dispute over Central America was a sideshow; the real question was the cruise missiles.

Q: You’ve got this thing. How did you find your line of attack?

BREMER: One thing I quickly learned as I talked to the Dutch, both before I went and after I got there, was that the Dutch have an expression, they say “we Dutch have very long toes.” It’s very easy to step on their toes. Despite the fact that the average Dutchman or woman won’t hesitate to tell you what’s wrong with America or Europe, they do not take well to being lectured themselves. The advice I got was to be careful about what you say publicly about cruise missiles. In the three years I was in The Netherlands, I never once publicly said, “The Dutch should deploy the cruise missiles.” My predecessor said it all the time and it appeared to have been
I planned our campaign with my political team. It was to work quietly behind the scenes, particularly on the soft part of the Christian Democratic Party. The Labor Party, the PVDA, which was in opposition, was dead set against the cruise missiles as labor parties were in most of Europe. So there was not much chance we were going to turn the PVDA in favor. Therefore the question was going to depend on this soft part of the Christian Democrats. The liberals were with us and the strong part of the Christian Democrats, represented by the foreign minister. The key question was going to come down to the minister of defense and people in his part of the Christian Democratic Party.

We approached them in a number of ways; I used one on one private meetings, usually lunch at the residence, no note takers on either side, just one on one. I usually kept it light, just talk through Dutch history, Dutch American relations, our NATO alliance, etc. There were lots of buttons you could push. America and the Netherlands have the oldest unbroken diplomatic relations between two countries in the world. We had liberated the Dutch in September of 1944. There is a huge cemetery with almost 9,000 Americans, one of these beautiful battle monuments at a place called Margraten in the south. There is a residual sense in the Dutch about the importance of the American relationship quite apart from the NATO part.

The principal argument to these people, including the minister of defense, was to try to make a case that Dutch security was threatened by the Russian deployment of the Russian SS-20 missiles; that NATO had to respond to protect their people including the Dutch, and that it was a responsibility of a NATO member, including the Netherlands, to carry out the decision that had been made by NATO back in 1978 to deploy these missiles. Moreover in 1983, the Netherlands was the only country of the five deploying countries that hadn’t made the decision. So an effort to embarrass them on not playing a full alliance role.

Q: The other countries being Italy, Germany and?

BREMER: The UK and Belgium. We recognized this was an extremely difficult decision for the Dutch. Dutch public opinion polls showed strong opposition to deployment. But we reminded the Dutch that the opinion polls had been very strongly against the decision in Germany until Helmut Schmidt took the decision and then he won an election. So one of the arguments we made to the Dutch politicians was, “we understand the political difficulties you face, but you have to show leadership. Yes, the opinion polls are against it but leadership involves making tough decisions and explaining them to your people.”

Q: Wasn’t the SS-20 menace, I mean it was so obvious what this was.

BREMER: It wasn’t so obvious to people who didn’t want to deploy them. Or it was obvious and they discounted it. One of the things we did, as did our embassies in other deploying countries in Europe, was to arrange for highly sensitive briefings of the leaders by people from our intelligence services.

Some members of the peace movement actually argued that we had made the whole thing up,
that there were no SS-20s. The second argument was we were exaggerating the numbers of missiles. A way to take away that argument was to have a team of photo interpreters with their photographs and the other intelligence come and share it with selected Dutch government members and members of parliament. This strengthened the hand of those like the foreign minister who wanted to deploy these missiles.

Q: Was the Soviet hand apparent, was it heavy or light?

BREMER: No, it wasn’t heavy, except that shortly after I got there, the Russians changed their ambassador and sent a guy who was almost out of central casting, I don’t remember his name but he was one of these guys with a pork pie hat. He spoke only Russian, maybe some Polish. He really had no way of moving around and being effective with the Dutch. So he turned out to be, to us, a blessing because he was so crude and so oblivious in what he was trying to do.

In The Hague, as in most posts, when you are a new ambassador you call on the other ambassadors who preceded you in presenting credentials. The tradition in The Hague was this was done by couples. So as a new Ambassador you and your spouse would go to the other ambassador’s residence. When Francie and I went to call on the Italian ambassador we went to his residence for tea. Most of the ambassadors there were effectively in a retirement post. They had been rewarded. The Italian was an older man who had a droopy eye and as we sat drinking tea at 4:30 in the afternoon, he literally started falling asleep as he was talking. I was tired. I started to fall asleep until a spoon dropped off his teacup on the hard wooden floor and woke all four of us up. Francie said after that, “That’s the last time I am going to one of these things. It is a waste of time for me. From now on, you go on your own or see them at the office.” I said, “Fine.”

So the new Russian Ambassador had to call on me and I said, “Come to the embassy. I am not doing it at my house.” He came with his interpreter and I had our political counselor as note taker. The Russian started with one of these traditional diplomatic niceties along the lines of “we hope while we are together in The Hague our relations that were so historically so good between our two countries could develop further”. I stopped him and said, “Mr. Ambassador, let me tell you something. My first assignment was in Afghanistan, 15 years ago and you guys have now invaded Afghanistan.” This was 1983, so they had already been mucking about for four years. They were already beginning to run into trouble. I said, “Let me tell you something. I don’t know who made the decision in the Kremlin to invade Afghanistan but they obviously hadn’t studied Afghan history because if you had studied Afghan history, you would know it is the only country which in the 19th century twice beat the British army and held back the forces of people trying to come in from outside. Our relations, U.S.-Russian relations, will not improve until you get out of Afghanistan.” Well, that was the end of that short “courtesy call.” He left after ten minutes and I never had another meeting with him.

He turned out to be, at least in terms of what he did overtly, pretty ineffective. I don’t know what he may have been doing behind the scenes.

Q: How about our USIA operation there because this should have been quite important at that point.
BREMER: We had a good PAO, a part of the team I inherited, a very active cultural attaché, and a good IO as well.

Q: Information officer.

BREMER: Yes, he was very good with the press. It was important. We did a lot with them both in terms of exposing the Dutch to NATO through NATO tours, using the important visitor program. I had a substantial battle over the Fulbright program, not with my staff but with the Fulbright board. In fact, I had need to fire the entire board and start over because it had drifted off course.

Q: Had it drifted toward the reward as opposed to the opinion?

BREMER: I described earlier how I had been uneasy with how the IV and Fulbright programs had been run in Norway. When I got to The Hague, I asked to see list of the last three years of Fulbrighters -- their background. I found that the board members who were largely from Dutch universities were rewarding colleagues. I have nothing against 50-year-old men, but these were 50 or 60-year old economists going on Fulbrights. I took a look at the law that established it and at our guidance from USIA and it was clear we were off base. The program in the Netherlands is governed by a bilateral commission in which the American ambassador and the Dutch minister of education are the ex officio chairmen of the board. I went to the minister of education, Wim Deetman, who was a very able guy and said, “Wim, here’s the situation with Fulbright. We have a real fight on our hands because we are going to have to change the whole board to make the program more effective. I can’t do it without knowing you are going to support me because all these universities”, there are 22 universities in the country, “are going to start squealing like hell.” He said, “Let’s do it”. So we fired the board and appointed a new board. He and I met them and gave them clear directions to look for younger people who would help develop the Netherlands.

It was much the same problem with the IV program which I already mentioned addressing in Norway. I found the same problem in the Netherlands. This program had been used, in this case, by embassy staff to reward their friends and friends of their friends. But that’s not how I saw the purpose and value of the IV program, which was to identify young leaders and send them off to the United States to do whatever they wanted to do on the assumption that America sells itself. So we turned the IV program around, too.

On the whole, the USIA staff was good. The Dutch take culture very seriously. One of the concerns I had was we seemed to be spending American taxpayer funds on cultural events which didn’t strike me as a good use of our money because American artists, musicians, writers go to the Netherlands all the time on regular commercial ventures. I didn’t think that was a very good use of American money, nor did I think having a reading library was a good use of our money. First of all, the Dutch have the highest English language capability of any country in the world, except perhaps Israel. They all read. There are more books published in English in the Netherlands than in Dutch. They all read books; they have read books for 400 years. Why should the American taxpayer support a library with people coming off the street, with all the attendant
difficulties and costs of security?

I felt that we had a little bit of an “old USIA look” in terms of promoting culture in a country, where after all, they knew American culture. We weren’t going to be able to compete with American television and American movies which regrettably are a part of American culture. We weren’t going to be able to bring artists except on a very exceptional basis because they came as a matter of course anyway. So we had to reorient.

Our general public posture was complicated by the fact that I concluded that I would not say anything publicly about cruise missiles. I could give speeches and I did all the time But in those I talked in general terms about our long bilateral relations, about the alliance and various political things but I would not say in public “You must deploy the cruise missiles.”

Q: What happens if you have an eminent journalist who is talking to you? He or she obviously is going to ask about the cruise missiles.

BREMER: I would say that this is a Dutch decision to make and we understand it is a very sensitive one for them. They gave up asking at a certain point. We had visitors come through, government officials, the vice president visited. He stayed three days and had a variety of meetings with people.

Q: George Bush?

BREMER: Yes. I don’t think that he said anything about the missiles publicly. The most interesting statement that was made publicly was made by the French president who was a socialist, Francois Mitterrand. He came on an official visit to the Netherlands I think in 1985 and spoke to the Dutch parliament. He bluntly told them they should deploy the cruise missiles. It was really quite a moment. To have a French president, a leftist, tell them they had to take the cruise missiles. Rather embarrassing for the Dutch Labor Party which stood foursquare against deployment. And brave of Mitterrand.

Q: How did your political section work?

BREMER: The head of the political section, Mike Habib, was married to a German and had served already a number of years both in Germany and in Austria. He had good Dutch. So did his wife. There were two or three other people in the embassy who had good Dutch. I studied Dutch every morning and got to a point I could get along in Dutch pretty well. Mike was an excellent political officer. He was the kind of guy who got around, talked to people, understood what questions to ask, used his entertainment money well to get at people who were in that gray area we were trying to influence. It is not that we ignored the people who were our supporters or the Labor Party; we had regular discussions with the Labor Party too. But we knew in the end the Labor Party was not going to vote in favor of the cruise missiles when it came before parliament. Though I should add that there were some Labor party members who privately told us they supported deployment. But it would have been political suicide to admit it publicly.

Q: During the time there, how did things develop, vis-à-vis, the cruise missiles?
BREMER: It was a very long and in effect, difficult negotiation that took the better part of three years. We had ups and downs, largely related to the internal debates within the Christian Democratic Party. We found that it was important to try to help strengthen Hans van den Broek, the foreign minister who was in favor of the deployment. In the fall and winter of ’85–’86 we started having secret meetings with him in Brussels. I believe it was the assistant secretary for Europe, Rick Burt, who came up with the idea of having conversations with him away from The Hague where van den Broek would be a little bit less constrained by what was going on and could perhaps speak more openly about how to resolve their political problem.

We arranged a series of meetings through van den Broek’s special assistant, a fellow named Jaap de Hoop Scheffer who happens today to be NATO secretary general. At that time, his uncle, also called Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, was the Dutch ambassador to NATO. So the meetings took place at the Dutch ambassador’s residence in Brussels. Van den Broek and I would proceed down to Brussels separately and have a meeting, usually before or after dinner at the Dutch ambassador’s house, and then drive back to The Hague. The purpose was to try to get some sense from van den Broek about how he saw the internal situation within the party and how we could help get the right decision out of the government. These meetings took place, I think there were five or six of them, in the winter of late ’85 and winter of ’86.

Q: In a way, you say the process but basically was it a yes or no or three missiles here and two there?

BREMER: It was going to be a yes or no. What we tried to do in the broadest sense was to remind the Dutch of the importance of the Dutch-American relationship and not talk about the cruise missiles publicly and then have the discussion of cruise missiles take place within a broader context. So for example, I traveled all over the country. I visited all 15 provinces and called on the governors. Every time I went to a provincial capital, USIA would line up meetings with the press. We would meet with the American business community, the Dutch business community, and go do the tourism and get lots of press attention to that. All of that would be in the broader context of U.S.-Dutch relations. We always looked for opportunities to remind the Dutch of the depth of these relations.

Every year, for example, on Memorial Day, there is a large celebration commemorating the liberation of the Netherlands at cemetery I mentioned, in Margraten, in the south. Almost 9,000 Americans killed in World War two are buried there. Very often the Dutch prime minister or one of the top cabinet ministers and the American ambassador would go. It was an occasion again to invoke the long U.S.-Dutch relationship going back to the loan they made to John Adams that got us through the Revolution, the first recognition, and the longest relationship. In other words, it was important to stress, as I did in my speeches, the importance of our economic relations, each other’s largest investor, talking to businessmen to put the kernel of the immediate issue, the cruise missiles, into a broader context. That was a large part of our public strategy and USIA played an important role in that.

Q: Was anybody looking at the whole cruise missile versus the SS-20 and seeing this at the time and saying, “Well, one will eventually cancel out the other and the Soviet Union is getting
weaker.” Was this ever part of it?

BREMER: No. Again, I was in the Netherlands until late ’86 and I don’t know whether there were people at that time beginning to get the sense that the Soviet Union was weaker than we thought at the time. I just don’t know. It was not clear to me in the Netherlands, anyway.

Q: Were there any strong voices in the Netherlands, natives there of supporting us? Or was this the sort of thing nobody wanted to get too involved in?

BREMER: There were very few people who wanted to get involved in it. There were some leaders of the Dutch Liberal Party, the VVD as it is called, who publicly made the fundamental points we were making. The SS-20s posed a threat to Dutch security: the Dutch had a national reason to want to respond and they had an international obligation to respond as members of NATO. There were a few people in the Dutch think-tank world who felt that way and said so. But there were not a lot of people who were going to get out and say so publicly. Most of the public discussion was from the opponents to the cruise missiles. There was one newspaper, the De Telegraaf, the largest circulating a broadsheet, that favored the deployment of cruise missiles. But the Volkskrant which was the Labor Party’s paper, was adamantly against it. Algemeen Dagblad which was in the middle only at very end came out in favor. The NRC Handelsblad which was the most respected, rather like the Financial Times, took an ambivalent position. The national television, of course, was basically opposed. So it was a hostile media environment.

Q: I would see reports here about the Dutch contribution to NATO and it wasn’t sort of weekend warriors; in fact, just the reverse, that the navy would come in on a weekend and everything would shut down. It came back that it didn’t seem to be a very effective force. Was there diminution in support of NATO?

BREMER: The Dutch are basically a naval power. They had been at sea for 500 years; they were pretty good in their golden age, the Gouden Eeuw, before the British took them on. The Dutch military, in particular the navy but also the army were an important part of the equation and supported the deployment quietly. But of course, they could not take a political position and they were rigorously non-political.

As for their effectiveness, about two weeks after I arrived there was the annual large scale NATO exercise, with many Americans involved, which in those days took place every September in the south of the Netherlands -- a couple of divisions moving around with the Dutch in a big exercise. I told my defense attaché I wanted to attend it. As usual it was pouring rain. I needed something to wear to the exercise and so they got me a Dutch private’s outfit. I remember SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) was there and we were watching a pontoon bridge be thrown across a raging stream for troops to move across. Somebody brought him over and introduced me to him as the American ambassador and he looked at me in this Dutch private’s outfit and he said, “What?”

He and I then got to talking about the capability of the Dutch troops. If you looked at them -- they all had ponytails and rings in their ears -- and you think, is this serious? He said, “I will tell you something. These are among the best troops in NATO because they are very well educated.”
It was a conscript army so everyone had to go in, “They are very professional. They get in a foxhole or take their position and they know exactly what their area of responsibility is. They know how they are going to defend it. They have good ideas, they take the initiative. They are wonderful troops.” So looks can be deceiving.

**Q: I heard later during the Balkan crisis that the Dutch air force, particularly the women fighter pilots were superb.**

**BREMER:** Another example of the Dutch culture came to me from the American business community’s experience. Something like 1,100 American companies that had their European headquarters in the Netherlands; that’s a lot, more than in any other country at that time. It is partly explained by the country’s central location and good transportation, but also liberal economic policies, light and open regulations and a light tax regime. But beyond that it was productivity. I remember visiting on one of my provincial trips a Xerox factory down in the south near Margraten, south of Maastricht. We went through this factory where they were assembling Xerox machines. The director of the factory, a Dutchman, told me he was very proud because their factory had the lowest unit cost of any Xerox manufacturing plant in the world. This is in a country where at that time the average Dutch wage was already above the average wage in America, and on top of that you had the social cost -- the burdens, the taxes and so on.

We estimated the average wage really worked out to almost 50\% more than the average American wage but their productivity was better than anybody. I said, “How can that be?” He said, “Because they are extremely well educated and they are forthcoming with ideas. So down on the factory floor somebody says, well, why do we move to our right to get that gizmo when we could have had it done the other way?” And that’s a classic way to lift productivity.

It was in many ways typical of the Dutch; very highly educated, very outspoken. They were never afraid to tell you if they thought you were wrong; or if they thought the machine was put the wrong way -- they would tell you. A lot of that also came through in their fighting forces, that same “we know how to get this job done well -- we could maybe even do it a little better.”

**Q: Was the cruise missile situation resolved by the time you left or was it still ticking?**

**BREMER:** No, it was resolved. In the spring of 1986 we finally got to a point where the prime minister, who had been reluctant most of the time to do it, believed that he had the votes in parliament to get the formal parliamentary approval for the cruise missiles. So he put it to the parliament. There was a very long, almost all night session of parliament. I decided it would not be appropriate for me to show up in parliament for such a politically sensitive vote. The Prime Minister had to be able to make his case without obvious American pressure. I sent the Mike Habib, the political counselor and asked him to call me. We had a pre-positioned telegram ready to go at the embassy. The debate went on until 2:30 or 3 in the morning and they passed it, and we sent a message back to Washington.

**Q: Were you there when this mass demonstration or was that before you got there? How did you handle it?**
BREMER: As mentioned, the big demonstration, the largest in European history up to that point, took place a month after I arrived in 1983. My security detail said they didn’t want me at the embassy that day because they didn’t know if it might turn violent. So I stayed at the residence. We had staff at the embassy that day. So it was pretty gentrified. We reduced the Embassy profile in order that we not have a lot of people coming and going. I stayed regular telephone contact with the DCM, Art Hughes, who was at the embassy. We just watched it go by. But Francie left the residence on a bicycle and rode down to check out the demonstration. She came back and said the crowd was full of families, with women pushing baby carriages. There was no violence.

Q: *What do demonstrations do for foreign policy? We are always having these things and everybody participates. Any effect or not?*

BREMER: I think this one probably encouraged the opponents of NATO because it wasn’t just against the cruise missiles and particularly in the Netherlands. It was a very big show of force. It was well organized, well-disciplined and had had the effect of emboldening the peace movement in the Netherlands which got a lot of bump out of it; they helped organize it. Obviously, the demonstration got a huge amount of press, not only in the Netherlands but throughout Europe. This demonstration was unlike the weekly violent demonstrations about Nicaragua, which I don’t think had much effect at all. But I think these big peace demonstrations helped to shape the political environment.

We were, after all, trying to do the same thing. We were trying to shape the political environment through our constant emphasis on U.S.-Dutch relations, the Dutch responsibilities to NATO, NATO’s commitment to the Netherlands.

At one point Art Hughes and I were talking to a Dutch politician over one of these small luncheons at our house and the guest expressed some doubt that the United States would really come to the defense of Europe. That was always another problem; would we really in fact defend Europe? “How can we be sure,” he asked, “that Americans were willing to defend Europe?” Art replied “Go visit the air force base at Soesterberg”, where we had F-15 squadron, “you will see over a billion dollars and 3,000 American lives which are a clear marker of our intention to defend the Netherlands.” It was a very good remark that shut the guy up fast. There was always the question, even among the people who wanted to deploy cruise missiles, about whether we would be willing to use them. So you had a separate side of the argument you had to make. We are prepared to defend the Netherlands but you Dutch have got to be prepared to carry your responsibilities.

Q: *By this point was there much sympathy for the Soviets, you know, seeing the future?*

BREMER: No, not much. There was a little bit on the far left. But it was more that there was a fair amount of anti-Americanism. President Reagan was much derided in the European press as an uneducated cowboy. I was there during the 1984 election -- Reagan versus Mondale. The pollsters were very active in the Netherlands and the polls before the election showed that if the Dutch had been asked to vote, they would have voted 92% for Mondale and 6% for Reagan and 2% undecided. Some of that was anti-American, most of it anti-Reagan. But I don’t think it
would be right to assume that there was much attraction, except on the far left, for the Soviets. The Dutch have been free for a very long time -- for centuries. They had been under German occupation and so had an active memory of how intolerable it was to live under an authoritarian government. Like the Norwegians, they had made the mistake in the First World War, assuming that neutrality would protect them; and like the Norwegians had found in the Second World War, neutrality wasn’t enough. So, like the Norwegians, they joined NATO after the Second World War. Part of the argument was just a sense that the alliance and particularly America was overreacting to the Russian SS-20 deployments. Some of them thought that the SS-20s didn’t exist; some of them thought there were fewer than there were; some of them thought they weren’t really a threat; some of them thought that they were a threat but that America, in fact, would not defend NATO or the Netherlands when the chips were down. So there was a panoply of arguments. I don’t think the Soviets had much attraction.

Q: Were there pretty good reports coming back about the Soviet Union and life there?

BREMER: No. It was not a factor.

Q: How about life in the United States, racial problems? You mentioned Reagan was unpopular. Particularly this was the first term of Reagan, sort of feeling his way. Later I assume it probably changed somewhat because well, the situation changed. Were there news documentaries of poverty in the United States and the racial situation?

BREMER: Yes, there was a lot of that, particularly on television. We export a lot of negative culture ourselves from television and movies and there is nothing we can do about that. We tried in ways we could, using the IV program, Fulbright and other things to try to expose people to the better sides of the United States. I have always argued, I did in Norway, that the United States sells itself. Let the IV visitors go for three weeks, let them decide what they want to see and let them go see whatever they want.

Q: Was this sort of the designated place where the Dutch students would go for master’s degrees or not?

BREMER: Not as much as we would have hoped because the Dutch system did not recognize American advanced degrees. So if you had a law degree from the United States, you couldn’t practice law in the Netherlands without then getting a Dutch law degree; same with other professions. Because there is a large Dutch American community, a lot of Dutch people visited the United States. There were quite a few students going both directions. We tried to do more but here wasn’t as much as you would hope.

Q: On the economic side, his main problem was KLM landing rights. Did that come up or not?

BREMER: No, these were days before we got to the open skies discussions. On general economic matters, the Dutch were the easiest place to do that kind of business with. For example, by the time I got there we had had for decades American Department of Agriculture people doing inspections of plants under American law, in Dutch territory, for the export of flowers. They were pre-inspected in the Netherlands, which in effect was an assertion of
American law inside the Netherlands, to enable them to export their flowers to the United States which they did and still do. During our time in the Hague, the Netherlands was either the first or second country—the British might have been first, to agree agreed as terrorism picked up to have pre inspection by American customs and immigration people for people taking flights from the Netherlands to the United States on American carriers. I think at that time we had TWA, I don’t remember whether there were others. The travelers went through American immigration in a foreign country. You had American immigration officers in American uniforms basically clearing people’s passports and visas before they got onto American carriers.

There were some difficult issues. The Dutch had a much more liberal attitude towards drugs and pornography than the United States did or does and those were difficult issues which often became very contentious with the Dutch government. But on the trade issues, the Dutch were very open.

*Q: Let’s talk about drugs. You had Amsterdam; did you find, was the care and feeding of Americans there, protection or getting out of trouble over Americans?*

BREMER: Yes, the consulate in Amsterdam had its hands full. Part of the problem was that very few people ever got put in jail for using drugs. The drug laws were lax and at least in terms of hashish and marijuana essentially not enforced.

While I was there it became obvious that the Dutch were beginning to have a hard drug problem, most of it heroin coming out of Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle in Burma. The trade took advantage of the fact the Dutch airport, Schiphol, was one of the major transit points for that traffic and the Dutch began to arrest people there. The Dutch did not take kindly to hard drugs; they were certainly very soft on marijuana and hashish. One of our constant points of friction was the argument by American officials that if you were soft on soft drugs, eventually the soft drugs were a path for people to use hard drugs. The science on this is ambivalent but, in any case, that was our argument. Certainly the Dutch did not like the fact of hard drugs.

As you would expect, from time to time Americans ran into trouble with drugs, and high on either drugs or alcohol, some wound up breaking up bars. We had a Marine break up a bar once in the night somewhere and I had him shipped out the next day.

*Q: What about relations between the Dutch and the Germans at that time? Did we play, I mean here are two of our allies and they obviously they weren’t on the greatest of terms.*

BREMER: The Dutch had an even more vivid memory of German occupation than I had found among the Norwegians even though our stay in the Netherlands was ten years further from the war and the occupation.

*Q: As you mentioned in Norway, I won’t say benevolent; it never is but I mean it wasn’t of the same nature.*

BREMER: Except for a few Norwegian cities in April of 1940 and in Narvik a bit later, there wasn’t much military action involved in the occupation of Norway. On the other hand, the
Germans basically destroyed Rotterdam and overran the whole country in the Netherlands and then they sat very hard on the Dutch people.

The German government had an extraordinarily able ambassador, Otto von der Gablentz, -- a career German diplomat who came about the same time I did. He was a little bit older than I was but still fairly young, learned and spoke very good Dutch, had a warm and outgoing personality, handled himself very well. He did not carry a high profile, which I think was appropriate, but he got around and talked to lots of people. Otto was from the Social Democratic Party, so he had some appeal to the left in the Netherlands. He supported the deployment of Cruise missiles, as his government did. His was a very good face for Germany and he handled his post very well.

South of the Rhine in the Netherlands is the area where the largest battles of liberation took place. The liberation of the south started in early September of 1944 and then Operation Market Garden which in the end failed, A Bridge Too Far, which took place a few weeks later with the allies fighting all the way up to Nijmegen. This area of the Netherlands was really fought over pretty hard. It was the only area of the Netherlands where I remember being welcomed as the American ambassador with crowds waving flags. It is the most Catholic part of the Netherlands. So it is a more conservative area.

Q: Were the Dutch when you would meet them talking about too many German tourists? Was this sort of a theme that ran along?

BREMER: No, not so much. There were still sensitivities about the Germans, certainly.

Q: How about in Belgium? You had the Walloons which I am told is basically Flemish. Did that overlap? Was that strictly confined to Belgium or did the Dutch play any role?

BREMER: No, they didn’t play any role. It’s really more of a dialect. The Dutch spoken in the Netherlands is slightly different than the Dutch or the Flemish spoken in Belgium and there are regional accents inside the Netherlands as well. By the way, Frisian is still spoken in the northern islands a little bit.

Overall the Belgians did not involve themselves much in Dutch matters. The only connection was the tax regime. The personal income tax regime was such that if you lived in Belgium and commuted to the Netherlands, you ended up paying less tax. So some businessmen who worked in the Netherlands south of the Rhine tended to live in Belgium and then come across the border to their work place.

Q: Did the French play much of a role?

BREMER: No, although as I mentioned, Mitterrand gave an extremely important speech on the cruise missiles when he came on a visit. The French and American embassies were side by side. And I saw the French ambassador often. I established a tradition of the French, German, British and American ambassadors having lunch once a month to discuss the cruise missiles to try to find out what each of us knew about what was going on. The French, although they were not in the NATO military part of NATO and although they were obviously not a deploying country, nonetheless, supported the deployment of the missiles.
Q: Why?

BREMER: I think Mitterrand understood the threat of the Soviet Union. Despite having had communist sympathies when he was young -- or perhaps because of that -- Mitterrand was a real Gaullist; he took a very hardheaded view of Europe and didn’t want the Soviet Union to gain strength.

Q: Did you find yourself engaged in a lot of discussion trying to deal with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and El Salvador?

BREMER: To me it was largely a distraction. As I said, I agreed with Bill Dyess; Afghanistan is too far away, Poland is too close, Nicaragua is just right. If you are a left wing Dutchman, that just covers everything.

We did have the regular demonstrations but I didn’t spend a lot of time on it. We had speakers come from time to time and they would go around and talk about it with no evidence success.

Q: How did you find the socialists? Were these sort of really committed to socialism or was this just a left wing party?

BREMER: I would think it was more of a left wing party. The Netherlands then had and had had for a long time a pretty active private sector. There really were very few companies in the Netherlands owned by the government. So it was not socialist in the classic French sense of the word where you nationalize big sectors of the economy.

I have a vivid impression of the first luncheon I went to after I got to the Netherlands. Maybe ten days after I presented my credentials, I was invited to a lunch by an important Dutch business organization in Amsterdam. I was surprised to find the prime minister and three cabinet members at this lunch. It said to me, “these people take business seriously.” It was a lunch for businessmen; it wasn’t about politics. It was about “how we promote business?” I guess I was invited because the organizers figured, correctly, that US-Dutch commercial relations were important to both countries. The government ministers were not from the Labor Party, but it showed a certain business orientation that goes through Dutch society. The Labor Party was not about to go out and do something rash. As in Norway, the Dutch had a responsible labor movement, not like the radicalized movement in France.

Q: What was the role of the royal family?

BREMER: The royal family has enormous respect in the country. They have had now three successive queens for a period of over a hundred years. The present queen’s mother, Wilhelmina, fled the country at the German invasion and lived in exile in England. She sent most of her family to Canada during the war and just as King Haakon had done for the Norwegians, the Queen rallied the Netherlands to the resistance to the Germans. She returned as a genuine heroine at the end of the war. Her daughter, Beatrix, the current queen, was educated at the Free University. She graduated in 1964 and married a German diplomat, Klaus von Amsberg, who
had a successful diplomatic career, had served in Africa. Once he married her, he became like a Japanese emperor’s wife. He had to give up his diplomatic career and almost literally follow three steps behind her, which I suspect became a considerable psychological strain for him as the years went by. Beatrix succeeded to the throne some years before I became ambassador. In the Dutch tradition, the queen’s authority is limited on paper but more real behind the scenes. All conversations with the queen are considered privileged and, therefore, conversations are not to be talked about in public.

She had graduated at a time of considerable leftist agitation in Dutch universities in the ‘60s. Her general political inclination was clearly to the left though naturally she didn’t speak publicly about political matters like cruise missiles. I never talked to her about cruise missiles. I would often talk to her about the importance of the U.S. relationship and the alliance. But from what I heard from other people who knew her well, the Queen was, at a minimum, skeptical about the cruise missile issue which gave an additional dimension to our problem.

It became very clear when we had a visit one day from Jesse Jackson.

Q: He’s a well-known African American politician.

BREMER: Jackson at the time held no elected office but was clearly and outspokenly against the cruise missile plan. He was on a trip through Europe to major NATO countries. He had been in London the day before he was to visit the Netherlands. That morning International Herald Tribune had a picture of him on its front page standing with the American ambassador to Britain and denouncing the entire proposal to deploy cruise missiles, denouncing Reagan’s administration. I could not imagine that the American Ambassador was pleased, and I certainly did not look forward to the same treatment.

I was scheduled to meet Jackson at the airport when he flew into the Netherlands later that morning. I said to our public affairs officer that I was not going to allow myself to have my picture taken and put on the front page, splashed on the front pages of Dutch papers, with Jackson who was denouncing cruise missiles and denouncing the administration. So we had to figure a way to not have the press around when I met with him. We arranged for the VIP room at the airport. I happened to have another meeting that morning in Amsterdam which was the reason we gave for my not going out and greeting him at the gate.

So Jackson came into the VIP room. We had no cameras and no press. I briefed him on the sensitivity of the cruise missile issue, because he was going to call on the queen. I reminded him that all the conversations with the queen were. I encouraged him to say whatever he wanted to in the meeting, but to remember by long-standing Dutch protocol, all conversations with Her Majesty are off the record. Oh, yes, he understood that. So he and his party went off. No one from the Embassy accompanied him on any of his meetings and by late afternoon he had already left the country for a visit to Germany. In late afternoon a wire service ran a story based on a statement he had released to the press after his meeting with the queen -- and after he left the Netherlands -- saying in his meeting with the queen she had expressed her opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles.
You can imagine what hit the fan. The Chamberlain of the royal court called me saying, “This is outrageous, don’t you Americans understand that conversations with Her Majesty are privileged?” I called on all my diplomatic experience and groveled. Our PAO got hold of Jackson’s staff guy in Frankfurt and told them they had to publicly clear up the mess that they had left behind. I think in the end Jackson’s spokesman -- not Jackson -- put out a wishy-washy apology, trying to cover it up by saying that he’d been misunderstood or some such political dodge.

It was painful because I suspect it was the truth; I never asked but I suspect she probably did tell Jackson she opposed deployment. Certainly it was out there on the record which was a problem because she was extremely popular.

**Q: Why would he get to see her?**

BREMER: I don’t know. He organized the meeting through the Dutch embassy in Washington. I don’t know what they told the Palace. Someone said she should see him and she probably wanted to see him. Anyway, it was not a happy circumstance. It caused lots of problems. I was very disappointed in his behavior.

**Q: I don’t know but I have watched pictures of Jesse Jackson. He has the longest neck I have ever seen which in any pictures seems to come up out. He obviously is somebody who likes the press and wants his picture taken.**

BREMER: That’s the way it happened. It was not a comfortable situation for us because it allowed people who were doubtful about the cruise missiles or opposed it to invoke the queen’s name in their private discussions. I mean that while people didn’t go out and talk about the Queen’s alleged opposition to deployment, it clearly played a role. She was an important, influential and well informed monarch. Her usual main political role comes after an election when she gets to choose the person who tries to put together the next government. She has a lot more latitude than the Queen of England has in those circumstances. So she is a substantial figure, politically.

**Q: Before we move on, is there anything else?**

BREMER: There are a couple of things I think are worth mentioning.

During our time in The Netherlands, America witnessed the growth of terrorism, the bombing of the Marine barracks and the embassy in Beirut in late 1983, followed by the bombing of the Berlin disco in 1985 and a lot more attention being paid by the State Department to security. The secretary of state sent a message to all ambassadors after the bombing of the embassy in Beirut. I hold you, the ambassador, personally responsible for the security of your employees and the Embassy. You must do everything you can.

We did an assessment of our embassy in The Hague and found that we were vulnerable to a possible truck bomb coming down a side street that could plow into the embassy. So I went to the mayor asked him to help us by either blocking that side street or giving us some protection.
against attack all around the perimeter. He said, “Oh, it’s going to be very hard and it’s going to take a long time to get the planners’ permission.”

I went back to the embassy and asked the post security officer to locate some of those big dumpsters, preferably unsightly and rusty and put them on all sides of the embassy. We were on a very beautiful street in The Hague, Lange Voorhout, not far from one of palaces, a very pretty part of town. Out go these 40 foot long dumpsters.

Q: You might explain what a dumpster is.

BREMER: It’s a big container for garbage, 40 feet long, 8 feet tall. He found some good rusty ones so we put them out. Needless to say, the mayor called me a couple of days later and said, “What the hell is going on over there? People are complaining that it looks awful” I said, “Well, you know, you say you wouldn’t protect us. I am responsible for protecting this property which is American government property. I am going to protect it.”

The resulting negotiation was rather quickly over. The city council somehow cut through all their red tape and we very soon were able to install some very large bollards, large containers for flowers and planted them with flowers. It was certainly much more attractive than dumpsters.

Next to the embassy was a restaurant and as part of this effort at enhanced security, we wound up blocking a road that went right in front of the embassy but also right in front of the restaurant. The owner was understandably unhappy because he worried that his customers cars would have park across the street. He came over one day and complained. about it. I said, “Well, look at it this way. You can now say you are the safest restaurant in the Netherlands.” He said, “Well, that’s an idea, maybe I can get some business that way.” We ended as good friends and neighbors.

As a result of the terrorist attack on the Embassy in Beirut the secretary of state appointed Rear Admiral Bobby Inman to do a study of embassy security. His commission came up with a series of recommendations about the mandatory offset for embassies. As I recall it was 100 feet in every direction. The Commission recommended that where such an offset could not be provided to an existing Embassy location, a new one should be found. Our Embassy was, as were so many in Europe then, right in the middle of the capital city.

I asked our Admin officer where in The Hague we could find a location for an embassy with 100 feet of offset on all sides. We finally got aerial photographs of the Hague. He came up to my office one day and laid out these photographs and said, “I found the place. It’s right here.” He pointed and there was a big green area. He said, “There’s only one problem.” I said, “What’s the problem?” He said, “It’s the queen’s palace.” It was typical of the problem we faced trying to carry out the Inman commission. That issue was not resolved during my time there. We talked earlier about drugs and its effect. One of the effects of the drug trafficking was to greatly increase the non Dutch population in Dutch prisons. Even as early as 1984, ‘85 more than 50% of the prisoners in the Netherlands were not Dutch; they were from outside the Netherlands because they were being picked up, largely for drug trafficking, some of it from North Africa, a lot of it from the Middle East and Asia. The Netherlands is a very open country. It has been open
historically to people coming from other countries. But it was clear that sooner or later they would have to address this question of open borders. There was really no effective border control between the Netherlands and Belgium and very little between the Netherlands and Germany.

The Dutch put their head in the sand about that for a long time. It eventually has become more of an issue in the Netherlands. I remember visiting a Dutch jail at one point because I wanted to see what it was like. The Regional Security Officer, Francie and I visited the biggest one which was in Amsterdam. As we went through the gates, they disarmed my security guards who were Dutch policemen. Francie pointed out it meant I was in the most dangerous place I could be in with no security. The Dutch prisons were pretty comfortable. All the prisoners were in single rooms; each one had bathroom and a television set. I suppose these days they have internet. It was a pretty comfortable place. I was told by the guard that one prisoner had escaped a couple of weeks before on a Friday night. He’d gone home to visit his wife and then come back on Monday to report himself. There is no penalty for escaping so it didn’t extend his jail term. The whole thing struck me as a little bit lenient.

Q: Were we at all looking at the immigrant population, particularly concerned with militant Islam. Was that at all a factor?

BREMER: No. We were concerned about terrorism. The British ambassador just before I got there had been assassinated by the IRA at his residence just down the street from ours. We had intelligence suggesting the Libyans were moving around and casing places including our residence at one point. Libya at that time was very actively involved in terrorism. We had a number or threats against me. One time somebody found out about a flight Francie and I were scheduled to take to Geneva, and phoned the airline that morning that there was a bomb on the flight. They didn’t find a bomb but the flight had to be canceled. At one point the foreign minister called me in to tell me he had looked at the expense of my security detail, which was provided by Dutch police. He had concluded it was too expensive and proposed to provide no protection on weekends when they had to pay overtime, I said to him, “Here’s the problem. I go to church, the same church at the same time and the same place every Sunday. Are you telling me that I can’t go to church anymore?” We kept the security detail.

Q: Speaking of terrorism and all, how did the bombing of the café in Berlin and the bombing in Libya, how did that play there?

BREMER: It was quite dramatic because the deputy secretary, John Whitehead, was asked by the president to travel around Europe. I think the bombing was in January or February of 1986. Whitehead came in February or March and had meetings with the top Dutch, the foreign minister, the prime minister, at which he told them, in effect, “Look, we want NATO to put together some kind of sanction, some political/economic response to the Libyan attack.” Like most of the Europeans, the Dutch said, “No.” They were whining and looking at the floor and Whitehead, I remember very distinctly, said, “You must understand that we have just about exhausted all peaceful means of responding.” He used the same phrase, “all peaceful means”, I noticed, in the reporting cables from the other NATO capitals. So the European allies were on notice that unless they did something, something was going to happen and it wasn’t going to be “peaceful.”
The day of our bombing in Libya Ambassador Bob Oakley, who at that time was running the
counterterrorism office in the State Department, was on an official visit to the Netherlands. I had
a luncheon for Bob and the foreign minister, Hans van den Broek at the residence. By
coincidence the Dutch were in the presidency of the European Community those six months, so
van den Broek was not only foreign minister of the Netherlands, he was the top foreign policy
guy in the European Community. Since the Whitehead tour around the allies, Van den Broek had
been struggling to get the European Community to respond to this clear warning that Whitehead
had made.

Well, that was the day we bombed Libya. While we were at lunch, the Embassy delivered a
message to Oakley telling him about the bombing. He told me that the cable announced we had
bombed and asked “What do we do?” and I said, “We have to tell van den Broek right away.” I
remember the scene in the living room at the residence. We told van den Broek. Van den Broek
went pale because he felt it pulled the plank out from under the efforts he was still making with
the European Community to have them do something. I reminded the foreign minister that he
had been clearly warned by Whitehead not long before. I got the clear impression that Van den
Broek was not comforted to be reminded.

That bombing was in April in ’86 and we were coming soon to the vote on the cruise missile
vote in parliament, which was scheduled for in May. So the bombing was very dicey for us
because it put our lead man on the missiles, Hans van den Broek, in an extremely difficult and
embarrassing position. The public reaction in the Netherlands was very strong against the
bombing raid in Libya. We got through it but it was very tough. I supported the operation. I was
only sorry we didn’t get Qadhafi.

Q: The European Community at that time, I am told the American ambassador has to work extra
hard when the presidency of the community falls to his country because all of a sudden you have
an in with what is happening in the European Community. How did this work?

BREMER: Well, yes, that’s true, although it was less of a dramatic change in the Netherlands for
reasons I talked about earlier because the Dutch were always an open window for us into the
Community’s thinking. Except for the British, the Dutch the most open about what was going on,
telling us what was going on and the most open to receive our ideas about how our interests
could be looked after in the European Community. So yes, it was extra workload for us. But it
wasn’t as dramatically different as it might have been in another country. It simply emphasized
what was already there which was very close working relations with the Dutch.

Q: Were we concerned at that time about the European Community becoming a rival? This has
always been sort of our real policy for since the time of the end of World War II. In a way, it was
the culmination but maybe was there the feeling you might get what you wished for?

BREMER: I don’t remember that being an issue in the ‘80s. Again, one has to remember the
strategic context of American foreign policy at that time was to counter and contain the Soviet
Union. A united Europe was a very important part, geopolitically, of that strategy. A united
Europe meant, first of all, a united NATO which is why the cruise missile was so important. It
certainly was understood that a strong economic Europe, which could or could not be united, was more likely to be strong if it was united. That fit in the grand strategy of the United States. I don’t remember this being a problem, certainly not by the time I left the State Department in the late ‘80s.

Q: How did you find the hand of Washington on what you were doing?

BREMER: It was interesting. A lot of people were already saying that the role of the American embassies has been greatly diminished by vibrant modern communication -- people talking to other officials on the telephone; the secretary of state can just pick up the phone and she talks to so and so. Yes, that’s true but we were dealing with a very sensitive and important issue in the cruise missiles. So I felt that if our Embassy could be better informed than anyone in Washington and if our analysis was the best quality, then by our reporting we could shape Washington’s approach to the issue. That could make our embassy in The Hague a vital arbitrator in U.S. Dutch relations on this issue. So we set out to be and I think we wound up being the best informed embassy in the Netherlands certainly and one of the best in Europe in terms of what was going on. I had a good relationship with the secretary of state because I had worked for him but I never once talked to him directly while I was there that I remember, except when I went back on consultations. We basically played it by the book. We were well enough informed that we could shape the debate in Washington though there were occasions when Washington tried to get around us. I’ll give you an example.

At my first staff meetings I established as a rule that that anytime some visiting US official came and wanted to call on a minister or deputy minister they must be accompanied by either the Ambassador or the DCM. The purpose was to be sure that we at the Embassy were kept fully informed about what visitors were saying, especially if it concerned the cruise missile issue.

Maybe three weeks later the defense attaché came with a request for “country clearance” for Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. In those days any government official who came had to get the approval of the embassy before they came on official business. I knew from my Washington time Perle was locked in a battle with Assistant Secretary Burt at the State Department over a lot of issues and, in particular, on how to approach the Europeans on the cruise missile issue. So Perle wanted to come, without a State Department official, to talk to the Dutch Defense Minister.

Q: Burt represented the extreme right wing.

BREMER: Perle did, not Burt. My analysis was the Perle would likely follow the path of my predecessor which was to bash the Dutch until they agreed to take the cruise missile. Anyway, he was asking for country clearance to come have a meeting with the defense minister, who, as we have discussed already, was the most sensitive member of the cabinet. The minister was on the left wing of the Christian Democratic Party that we needed to bring on board; he was a nice man with soft views. But he was really the key. I told the defense attaché, “You can send back a message saying he has clearance but the Assistant Secretary must understand I or my deputy will accompany him on his meeting with the defense minister.”
About the next day, I got a call from the acting secretary of state who told me that Secretary of Defense Weinberger had just called, raised hell and told him that I had refused to let Richard Perle come in and see the defense minister. I told the acting secretary that was incorrect. What I had said was that if Perle came, under our standing rules, I or my deputy would accompany him to any meeting with the Defense Minister. As it happened the date Perle had proposed, I would not be in The Netherlands. Therefore my deputy, who would be the Charge, would accompany him. The acting secretary said that Weinberger was “raising hell and threatening to take the issue to the President. I replied, “Well, fine. If somebody else has a different rule, you can send out him out here as ambassador. I don’t need this job. I’ll be on the next plane home.” That’s the last we heard of that visit.

ARTHUR H. HUGHES
Deputy Chief of Mission

Ambassador Hughes was born in Nebraska and attended the University of Nebraska in 1961. He entered the Foreign Service in 1965 and served in Germany, Venezuela, Denmark, The Netherlands, Israel, and Yemen. In addition, he held several posts within the State Department. Ambassador Hughes was interviewed by Ray Ewing in 1998.

HUGHES: I was being transferred to become DCM in The Hague with another officer. But we had the Vice President coming, and both the Ambassador and Washington thought it would be useful if I were there during that visit, so I took early home leave, came back to the States, and then went back for the Vice President's trip.

Q: Which was around the Fourth of July?

HUGHES: Yes. And then shortly thereafter, a Sunday morning, my wife and I threw our luggage in the car and drove to The Hague. That’s a very civilized way to have a transfer. I recommend it highly.

Q: That sounds like a good way. It probably only took, what, seven or eight hours?

HUGHES: Well, one day.

Q: One day to drive.

HUGHES: Easy day, easy one-day drive.

Q: You took a ferry?

HUGHES: Yes.
Q: So, you were DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission, in The Hague, and who was the Ambassador then? This is in '83.

HUGHES: Jerry Bremer, whom I had worked with twice before actually. We were in the Ops Center together. He had just come back from Africa, and I had just come back from Venezuela. It had been toward the end of my time. Well, I guess it was the last year. In the Secretariat, he was one of the Deputy Executive Secretaries. He had been DCM in The Netherlands, DCM in Norway, and he had found it harder to come back and be one of the Deputy Executive Secretaries. Jerry had been a special assistant to Henry Kissinger early on, so he knew the seventh floor very well. And he was being named Ambassador in '83 to The Netherlands. Actually he had a mutual friend call me and ask me if I would be interested.

Q: So he was already there when you arrived?

HUGHES: No, I arrived first.

Q: You got there before he did.

HUGHES: I arrived first. In fact, we worked it out with the Ambassador and the DCM there if they minded if I would come down on the QT [quiet] a little bit, come down to The Hague and work with the DCM a little bit.

Q: This was what, in the spring?

HUGHES: No, this was in July. But the Ambassador, the sitting Ambassador, didn't want to leave for a little while. And they said, "Well, okay, come on down. Be cool and..."

Q: And so your predecessor was still there?

HUGHES: So I overlapped for about a week, I guess.

Q: And then that person left?

HUGHES: Then he left, the Ambassador left, and then Jerry came in.

Q: And you were the chargé for a couple days?

HUGHES: A couple days was all. Well, Jerry and I were still very close personal friends. We knew each other very well. We had a great staff. He'd pick people very carefully, not only the front office folks but elsewhere in the mission. But he was so young and looked so young that he presented copies of his credentials straight away as soon as he'd go to work. The first event - I think it was a Brazilian national day - so we went up together, and we went in, people said hello. Jerry's the type, he would not come in and say, "I'm the American Ambassador." He'd just say, "Jerry Bremer. Hello." I kind of circled back around him, and I said to the Brazilian, whom I had not met before either. I had only been in the country then about ten days or so. I introduced myself as the Deputy and said, "You know, my Ambassador is so happy he was able to get
copies of his credentials so we were able to come to your National Day." And the Brazilian's jaw dropped. He said, "The American Ambassador is here?" "Yes, we just came through the line." It was kind of funny.

Q: How many times has there been a career Foreign Service officer serving as chief of mission to The Netherlands? Probably not all that often.

HUGHES: Not very many times. Also, Denmark was seen as a place where you can send a non-career person. They like to go to those places, and some very good people have gone, non-career people too. Well, actually Jerry's predecessor was a career person.

Q: He was also a career person? Who was that?

HUGHES: He'd been spokesman for the Department.

Q: And Bob McCloskey was there too at one point.

HUGHES: Early on. Well, the main issues there were really the same - the national security policy, NATO, INF modernization, and US-EC relations, U.S. access to EC [European Community] market.

Q: And like Denmark, the bilateral relationship was healthy and noncontentious, noncontroversial.

HUGHES: On the economic side, Dutch and American economic interests were very much in parallel. I think one of the interesting things there was: I oftentimes went down to see the Dutch and inform them of what the EC Commission was doing which the EC Commission had not informed the member states about. Again, the Dutch were very efficient agriculture producers and also a very important role as economic entrepot to the rest of the EC. They wanted it; they lived on trade. They could compete very well with nonproduction. Also, the Dutch were very interesting in a couple of ways. They saw themselves as the leader of the smaller states in the EC. They are serious people and extremely capable and competent people. I think that probably Prime Minister Lubbers is the smartest person I've ever met in my life - I've met President Clinton, by the way - and also a very decent man. Hans Vodenbrook, who was the Foreign Minister, was also extremely capable, and other people in the government. And the Dutch will speak out. So, on the economic side it was interesting, it was fun. You were usually on the same philosophical lines, although their membership in the EC had to take them in different directions on occasion. On defense policy it was the Dutch who had made a formal reserve on INF modernization in NATO. So our main objective was to get the Dutch reserve lifted, and that took the majority of Jerry Bremer's time. Managing the mission was obviously also very important. First, we had very good people.

Q: The only thing about The Netherlands is that The Hague is the capital, I guess an important city, but Amsterdam, Rotterdam, certainly in terms of business and cultural life, were far more important and not very far away.
HUGHES: Of course, The Netherlands is probably the most densely populated country in the world, about 15,000,000 people, and all three of those major cities - of course, the capital is in Amsterdam, the government is The Hague, and Rotterdam at that point was the biggest port in the world. But because the country is so compact, it really lent itself to a lot of travel, which I enjoyed very much. Picking up on some things I did down in Venezuela, we'd go off and arrange a little trip overnight, maybe a loop somewhere, a couple of towns or cities, and try to hit university, editors, labor leaders, local politicians, city officials, business leaders; have lunch or dinner with a small group, and talk to them about what American policy was about, what we were trying to do, ask for their views. It was just really fun and interesting, and that's the fun work. Remember the line from Animal House: "road trip"? Well, this became kind of a joke. I was working in the embassy and I'd be managing the mission and all kinds of stuff. "Time for a road trip. Let's go off and have some fun, have some good traditional Foreign Service fun, do some field work."

Q: In a country the size of The Netherlands, you could also take a road trip and come back and not even spend the night.

HUGHES: That's right. Well, in that regard, one of the most marvelous experiences that I had - and I think Jerry also would say he had and others in the embassy - was the 45th anniversary of the liberation. Of course, it was preceded by the 45th anniversary of Market Garden [military operation in World War II] too far. Jerry decided that we would refuse no invitation to participate in any event connected with those celebrations, so he and I divided up most of them and also asked other people from the embassy to participate so that the officialdom in the United States was represented in everything that happened that we were aware of or invited to. It wasn't about us, of course, but it was about the veterans and the people. How many conversations we witnessed or we heard about people, airmen, Allied airmen, dropping food in the western Netherlands which the Germans had sealed off, dropping food, and the people on the ground talking about how they were there. They remembered one at the racetrack north of The Hague which they used as a dropping zone, but people kept swarming out as the planes would come in, and they couldn't drop the stuff, and they would go back around and then they'd say, "Try to get people off the infield of the racetrack." Or during Market Garden, the Allied troops had been dropped by gliders, and they had these little boats, and they came across the river and were trying to attack a German position and stand there where there was a monument and where the German position was. In daylight these guys came across this river in little boats, and some of them made it, but, of course, it was a total disaster.

Q: And, of course, many of the veterans were able to be there for these various events.

HUGHES: And many of them, of course, were on in years and understood that maybe they were not going to make it to the 50th so they'd better come now. And then on the major issue then, the INF modernization, the Dutch government was able to work out a way to do that in spite of a lot of local opposition. On one Saturday morning, we had over a million Dutchmen march by demonstrating in front of the embassy. The only damage was a cracked windowpane on a basement window along the sidewalk.

Q: So they were not destructive; they just wanted to be heard and seen.
HUGHES: They wanted to be heard. But one of the fascinating things about it: we kept trying to work this issue, work this issue, work this issue, and the way Prime Minister Lubbers and his government did it was in a way that none of us had imagined that he would be able to do it. He was able to finesse it in the parliament and get the votes that he needed. I remember we all felt a sense of accomplishment and elation when it finally happened, and Jerry said to me, "Okay, how do we make sure it can't be reversed?" And half jokingly I said, "Go out to Voonsdreck and cut down trees." Voonsdreck was where the INF base was to be, the ground cruise missile was to be. Only The Netherlands and Germany were to be the deployment places, and we knew if the Dutch would not deploy, then the Germans would not deploy. They would not be the only one. So I said half jokingly, "Go out to Voonsdreck and cut down the trees," half jokingly, because in The Netherlands cutting down a tree is a very serious issue. In fact, you need a permit to cut down a tree in most places. But that would show determination, that would show that the process had already begun in real terms.

Q: Right, and couldn't be reversed.

HUGHES: Couldn't be reversed.

Q: It was properly authorized.

HUGHES: But again here this was a case where the policy was criticized in many quarters around the world and in the United States as being overly confrontational. It did have the right result, and that was the Russians, the Soviets, decided that they did not want to get in a race. It was a losing proposition, so they withdrew the FF20s [Soviet missiles] and the ground launched cruise missiles were not deployed and the FF20s were dropped. I think there Roz Ridgway, as Assistant Secretary in EUR, and Paul Mitsa deserve the lion's share of the praise - the way that they worked that issue, the intelligence that they put into it, insights, persistence, just absolutely incredible. I hope someday that the full story and credit to those two people is publicly given.

Q: It's also an area where diplomatic representatives, but Defense Department representatives as well, everybody worked together, and Ambassador Bremer and others in Europe also should get some credit too.

HUGHES: Oh, absolutely. I think that their management of the overall issue of security relations within NATO and security issues with the Soviet Union was awfully important, because the image that President Reagan had at that time in so much of Europe was almost insuperably negative, almost insuperably negative, and even hostile and Paul Mitsa came to Europe very frequently, came to The Netherlands very frequently to meet with small groups. I can remember I hosted a lunch one day. I jammed as many people as I could in the dining room, very, very senior Dutch politicians and government officials and editors. His credibility was just overwhelming, and the same way with Roz Ridgway and, of course, Dale Ruthers, too. But those were the main ones as far as it played out in The Netherlands.

Q: Was Jerry Bremer there the three years? You were there together?
HUGHES: Yes, we were there the whole time. In fact, I left just a little bit earlier than he did. He went back. Secretary Schultz asked him to be the anti-terrorism coordinator.

Q: In ’86?

HUGHES: In ’86. He went there, and I went to Israel.

JOHNNY YOUNG
Counselor for Administration

Ambassador Young was born in Georgia and raised in Georgia, Pennsylvania and Delaware. He was educated at Temple University and entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Before being named Ambassador, Mr. Young served in a number of embassies in the administrative field, including Madagascar, Guinea, Kenya, Qatar, Barbados, Jordan and the Netherlands. In 1989 he was named US Ambassador to Sierra Leone, where he served until 1992. He subsequently served as US Ambassador to Togo (1994-1997), Bahrain (1997-2001) and Slovenia (2001-2004). Ambassador Young was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Well, then you went to The Hague from when to when?

YOUNG: We were in The Hague from 1985 to 1988. I will just add a little note before we get to The Hague. Just before I left I remember Skip Gnehm talking to me and he said to me, “You’re going to go to The Hague. The ambassador and I are worried about you.” I said, “Oh, really? What about?” He says, “You’re going to be there with Jerry Bremer. We’re afraid that Bremer is going to eat you alive. You’re too nice of an admin officer. We’re afraid that this could be a problem for you.” I said, “Well, thank you very much, but I can’t change now. I’ll just deal with it the best I can.” I left and after home leave and those kinds of things we arrived in The Hague. We were initially placed in a temporary flat until we could get an apartment or a house that was set aside for us and that all worked out very nicely. We met Bremer. At the time the DCM was Art Hughes and it was quite a dynamic change I must say. We had heard about Jerry Bremer and what a dynamo he was. Within minutes of meeting him it was clear, he was a dynamo. I mean he was a man who demanded that things be done and done well and fast and now. He was just incredible. People had to produce or he had no use for them.

Now, in The Hague we had one burning issue at that time and Jerry was sent there to take care of it. It was basically to get the Dutch to deploy the cruise missiles. Everybody else in NATO had signed on except the Dutch and our goal was to get the Dutch to sign on.

Q: This was part of a basic strategy the Soviets introduced the SS20 intermediate range threatening Europe and we had, our idea was to sort of break Europe off from the United States
and we had countered by putting in both cruise missiles and the Pershing missiles which are also medium range as a counter to this. It was very controversial.

YOUNG: Yes. The Dutch were dragging their feet on it. They hadn’t committed and it was Jerry’s job to get them to turn around. He was I believe 43 years old at the time, certainly the youngest American ambassador ever assigned to The Hague. As a matter of fact he tells the story of how one Saturday he went on a bike ride with his family and they stopped at a little village not too far form The Hague. They went into this store and asked, they bought something, I don’t know if it was water or what and the fellow asked him if he was American, he said, yes. He asked him, well, what do you do here and he says, well, I’m the American Ambassador here. The merchant nearly laughed him out of the shop. He was incredulous. He couldn’t believe that such a youngster would be the American ambassador and dressed in jeans and what have you. He looked even younger than he was and he is a good looking fellow. There’s no question about it. He’s like movie star good looking. Jerry said he vowed from that day on that he would wear a suit as often as he could to help basically with the image. Jerry was also very athletic and a great jogger. As in his drive to run and direct the mission he was the same way with his own physical health and he was an obsessive runner and a great runner. The marines couldn’t even keep up with him. I mean he was just unbelievable. His discipline, his drive. Talk about achievement oriented. He was the shining example of an achievement oriented type A personality.

Well, we had a good mission there, good people, not the kind of security concerns and challenges that we had in the Middle East, but nevertheless we were having them and they were beginning to manifest themselves more and more. Missions in Europe and elsewhere were beginning to get instructions, go to your host government and get their cooperation to do this and that and on and on. Our problem with dealing with the Dutch was that the Dutch felt that we were always overreacting in terms of our security concerns, that we were too excitable on these issues and they had everything under control and don’t worry about it. They really dragged their feet in helping us. We were trying to put barriers around the mission and that sort of thing and they resisted us on this and that and mind you they had had some pretty serious problems, security problems in The Netherlands. A British ambassador had been assassinated there. A Turkish ambassador had been assassinated. The famous Carlos the Jackal was held up in the French Embassy which was literally across the street from our embassy in The Hague, so they had seen some problems over the years, but nevertheless they believed that, well, we have it under control and you Americans are overreacting.

In January of 1985 the Dutch received intelligence that a terrorist action was going to be carried out in The Netherlands. For the first time the Dutch reacted to a security threat with a kind of vigor and seriousness and swiftness that we had all hoped for. I mean they moved into action. They went public. They just about closed down the airports throughout the country as they tried to investigate this information. Tourism went down. I mean it was an incredible move on the part of the Dutch. People were calling us from all over the place. Should I come to The Netherlands? Should I do this, should I do that? So, they really got serious at that point and that was a good thing because we could then ask for their help. We were able to move then to get some barriers around the mission and get flower pots put around and get fences. We were on a main street and on a big sort of plaza in a very old historic plaza and the Dutch didn’t want to upset the historic significance of this plaza. They didn’t want to do any kind of modernization or anything that
would take away from the old pristine way that it had been for literally centuries. But, anyhow,
they were cooperating more with us and that was very good.

In the meantime, the financial situation in the State Department was not very good and the
Department began looking at closing missions, closing consulates and they selected the consulate
in Rotterdam for closure. That consulate had been open for over 200 years and they decided to
close it. The Western Europe office fought it but the Department remained firm and it was
closed. Ambassador Bremer told me, “It’s your job to close it up. But whatever you do, I want
everyone to the extent that we can, the local employees, placed in other jobs. There’s one
employee there that you must find a place for, no matter what.” That was a guard, a guard by
the name of Ollie. Ollie was an extraordinary guard. He manned the entrance of the consulate in
Rotterdam and he was so extraordinary because he had so much personality. He had such an
effective way of doing a patdown. Dutch officials and business people frankly resented coming
into the mission and being frisked basically. They didn’t like it at all. They thought it was an
affront to their dignity and they didn’t want anything to do with it. They would come into that
consulate and the ambassador had observed this many times and that’s why he valued Ollie so
much. Ollie would say to them, “Good morning, Sir, how are you?” He would go pat, pat, pat,
and before the person knew it they had been patted down, brought into the building and they
would leave and comment, “That is a really nice guard that you have there.” Ollie had just done
it all so brilliantly and he would do it over and over again. He was really an invaluable asset
because we wanted to keep a positive image of the mission despite the fact that we had an
obligation to carry out the security check before letting people in the building. I began to work
on a plan to try and find places for these people in the consulate and succeeded in getting them
positions either in filling openings in The Hague, filling openings in Amsterdam and some of
them decided that they didn’t want this and they would just leave the mission and look for
something elsewhere.

Matters were complicated because the Netherlands like many countries in Europe has very
complicated labor laws. You can’t just close a building. You can’t just declare bankruptcy. You
can’t just say, well, I don’t have any profits and I’m going to close this baby down. You can’t do
that. You have to continue to pay your employees. Cuckoo labor laws. We had to pay huge sums
to people although they didn’t want to continue on. They didn’t want to be transferred. We had
to pay them and we paid substantial sums I must say. I remember one fellow, this is in 1986, we
paid $100,000, a huge amount of money at that time, but we had no choice. We had to comply
with these Dutch labor laws. They really do handcuff you and restrict what you can do. We
finally closed the consulate. We sold the beautiful residence there. One of the prettiest residences
I think I’ve ever seen. Not in terms of size, but in terms of setting on a little lake with a beautiful
windmill in the background. It was just spectacular. A fellow by the name of Don Junior was the
consul general at that time. I know it was heartbreaking for him to leave that and it certainly was
for me to close it because there was so much history there. We had to do it and we did it and we
moved on.

One other important thing that I worked on with Ambassador Bremer was a bilateral work
agreement. This agreement would allow the wives of our diplomatic personnel to work in the
Netherlands and vice versa for the spouses of Dutch diplomats in the United States. Now, in
1986, there were not many of these agreements in Europe, and we were the pioneers in trying to
work one out. We needed some examples of successful agreements in Europe which we could then use in encouraging other European governments to sign on. We worked and worked on this agreement. The Dutch can be very stubborn when it comes to something that they consider a principle that should be upheld. On the question of immunity they were so afraid that if they signed the agreement along the lines that we liked that some spouse working in a bank could rip off the funds of the bank, declare immunity and never be prosecuted for that kind of crime. We gave all kinds of assurances that this would not be the case, but they wouldn’t budge. So, we tried all kinds of different formulations in order to retain the immunity provision in the draft treaty and at the same time address the concerns of the Dutch. In the end we agreed that if there was a problem we would consider a waiver of immunity and at last that satisfied the Dutch. We got the approval on the U.S. side; we got the approval of the Dutch side. I remember the ambassador and I going to the foreign minister, Hans van den Broek, and all of us signing this bilateral work agreement or bilateral treaty, that was a major achievement for the mission. That treaty in turn served as one that we used in encouraging other European governments to sign it, so that worked out very nicely.

Bremer was a very highly respected ambassador in the Netherlands. In fact people said he was probably the best that they had ever had. He had learned Dutch and I can’t tell you how popular that was. Mind you this was in a country where the people are probably the best speakers of English in Europe other than maybe the Danes. They were just unbelievably good with their English. They were very proud that an American ambassador had made the effort to learn Dutch to the point where he could go on television and be interviewed in Dutch and he did it all the time and did it very effectively. Because he was so good and had such a good relationship he was in fact able to get the Dutch to reverse and to sign on and to implement that request that we had for them to deploy the cruise missiles.

Q: Did you have problems at our consulate general in Amsterdam? After the Vietnam War, they had sort of a perpetual demonstration as to it. I would have thought that the, this is the last great surge of what the Soviets were able to get at Western Europe. Were you concerned that you would have more of the demonstrations?

YOUNG: We had our share of demonstrations. We would have them in The Hague and we would have them also in Amsterdam where there was a lot more activity than in The Hague, but as someone said the Dutch are fair weather demonstrators. When it’s very cold and what have you, they don’t come out too much, but when the weather’s good, its springtime and young folks are in the streets, they would come out more then. Yes, we had lots of demonstrations, but nothing that stopped anything of any importance. We would alert the police or the police would alert us and we would tell people, well, be careful there’s going to be a demonstration today and don’t go out for lunch at a certain time, wait, etc. No great problems as a result of that.

We had some funny things also that happened. One night we had a new marine on duty. At night it gets rather lonely in the mission and I guess this fellow just wasn’t used to it all. He was being very conscientious. He was doing his inspection and he came up the stairwell. There was a long corridor as you came up the stairwell and at the end of it there was a window. He came up the stairwell on this particular night and he looked down the hall and he saw someone moving. He didn’t realize it was himself and he pulled out his gun and fired.
Q: Oh no.

YOUNG: Yes. It was unfortunate, but the poor fellow of course paid a price for that and was removed, but that was one thing that happened.

One spring day the marines were going through one of their exercises, one of their internal hostage things. Someone had left a window that faced the square open. Someone was passing at that point and heard, “Don’t shoot him!” and, “Don’t do this and that and hold him and this and that and call the police.” It sounded like a real hostage situation. The person who overheard this on the outside called the police right away and the police came screaming to the embassy ready to break in and rescue this hostage and on and on.

Another time we had a technician who had come to repair some equipment and he was working late at night. No one knew that he was in the embassy. Suddenly the marine hears screams coming from a really far away part of the embassy, so he traces to where this is coming from. He goes to the person screaming and there’s the technician, blood dripping from his hand. He had gotten his fingers caught in the cross-cut shredder.

Q: Oh no.

YOUNG: Yes. So, they called the police and this cross-cut shredder was in a classified area. The police came. The ambulance came, took the fellow out, took the piece of finger out and took him to the hospital and they were able to reattach it. That was the good part. The sad thing was he was written up, the marine was written up for having allowed the medical personnel to come in and have access to this fellow. Well, we took exception to that and did get the marine off the hook on that particular one, but you can see sometimes these problems that can crop up.

Well, Jerry Bremer completed his assignment there.

Q: Did you ever get cross to Jerry Bremer?

YOUNG: I didn’t, but I have watched when he has been cross with others. Should we go into that?

Q: Yes, it’s all part of the web and wolf of how we conduct our foreign relations.

YOUNG: Well, I remember one country team meeting he asked someone for a report and the person didn’t have it and Jerry said, “Well, didn’t I ask you for this before?” I think the person said yes. He said, “I’m going to ask you one more time and if you can’t do it then I think I’ll ask someone else to take care of it for me.” I mean just boom, shot him down just like that. The incident I really remember the most involved the senior commercial officer, a fellow by the name of Stan Harris. As I said, Jerry wanted us to close down the consulate in Rotterdam as smoothly and as quickly and efficiently as we could and particularly take care of the people. I give him credit. He wanted us to take care of the people. He had asked Stan if he had made arrangements to take care of his commercial person in Rotterdam. Stan had not moved as quickly as Jerry had.
liked and this meeting took place in Jerry’s office. It involved me and Stan Harris and Jerry wanted to know why was the delay because all of the other people had been taken care of. Do you want to stop there?

Q: Oh, no.

YOUNG: Stan said, “Well, I wanted to wait to see this and I wanted to do this” and Jerry was really furious at what was clearly delay on Stan’s part. He said, “Stan I told you what I wanted to do and I thought maybe you would have this done by now.” Again Stan resisted Jerry’s entreaties for him to move swiftly on this. Jerry said, “No, I want this done now and I want you to do it.” Literally, physically threw Stan out of his office. Grabbed him by the seat of his pants and threw him out of the office. I was speechless. I could not believe what I was seeing. Stan was considerably older than Jerry. Stan was in his ‘60s and Jerry wasn’t even 50, he was just still in his ‘40s. He threw him out and he said, “Now, I want this done and I want it done by such and such a date.” Stan said, “Jerry I can’t believe you just did what you did. Jerry, I can’t believe it.” In the meantime, Jerry is getting him out the door. He got him out the door and we both left at that point. Stan turned to me and said, “Johnny, can you believe what you’ve seen?” I said, “Well, what can I say? You know he has asked you to move on this quite a bit and you’re not there yet.” He said, “That’s true, but I can’t believe he did what he did. I’m an older man. I remember Jerry when Jerry was a baby basically.” That happened. About three hours later Stan called and he said, “I just want you to know Jerry came down to my office and he apologized and he told me he was sorry. That it was over the top. He had crossed the line. He was very sorry. He didn’t mean it, but he knew that he’d been pressing for action on this particular item and that he wanted me to do something about it. I accepted his apology and it’s fine.” Stan was also getting ready to move on to another assignment. He was going to go to London. A couple of months later before Jerry left, Jerry had a very nice farewell dinner for Stan and they remained good friends. I saw a side of his temper at that point. We got along beautifully and he wrote me just a wonderful efficiency report together with Art Hughes and I’ll never forget it. It was the report that frankly did the trick in getting me promoted into the Senior Service.

I’ll never forget when I got word about that. It was a Friday night. It was September or October of 1986. My wife and I were getting ready to go to bed, it was about midnight, and the phone rang. I picked it up and I said hello and the person on the other end said, “Hi Johnny, this is Mary Ryan.” I said, “Oh, hi Mary, how are you doing?” She said, “We just returned from the White House with the Seniors list.” I said, “Oh, that’s very nice. What does that have to do with me?” She said, “You’re on it.” I said, “Me?” She said, “Yes, you’re on it.” Again I think I said, “Me?” Because I didn’t think it was going to happen. She said, “Yes, welcome to the Seniors club.” Then she extended congratulations and best wishes. My wife and I just could not believe it.

Anyway, Art Hughes and Jerry Bremer moved on. Jerry moved on to become the director for counter terrorism in the Department. Then we got an interim DCM, John Hyman, and his wife was Judy Hyman. They were a team and Judy was on leave without pay and John was the DCM. They had been in The Hague on two previous assignments. They were basically kind of returning home, both fluent speakers of Dutch. That was an easy transition for them. They were good folks. They sort of held things together for a while.
So, Hyman was in an interim role. He had come in to await the appointment of a new ambassador. We finally got word that John Shad, who had been the head of the Securities and Exchange Commission, would be visiting several European posts in order to find out which one he liked the best in order to be assigned as ambassador. He would be coming out with his wife who was ill and confined to a wheelchair. He visited Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands. I made all the arrangements to receive him and take care of him and he looked all around and asked lots of questions. In the end he decided that the Netherlands was his post of choice. Before he arrived, we received a 25-section message with all of his holdings. It was my job to check to see if there was any conflict of interest in his holdings and the U.S. Embassy relationship with the various companies and organizations listed in the stocks and bonds that he owned. There was none. At the time he was considered to be the richest man in the Reagan administration. He was very wealthy.

John Hyman decided he would retire. In his place they sent John Rouse. Rouse became the DCM to John Shad. John Shad arrived. We got him settled in his new house and it became very clear to us right away that this was no skilled diplomat. That this was someone who would require a lot of handholding, a lot of direction if he was going to be seen in a positive light. Mr. Shad was quite a character, to say the least. He would fall asleep at meetings, public meetings, I don’t mean just in the embassy. He would fall asleep in the embassy meetings, but he would fall asleep in public meetings. I’ll never forget my next door neighbor who was a Frenchman said to me one evening, “Oh, I just met your ambassador at the Chamber of Commerce meeting. Oh, he fell asleep at the head table.” That was the kind of start we were off to.

Q: Was he elderly?

YOUNG: He was in his ‘60s at that point. I don’t think he’d reached 70 at that point, maybe late ‘60s. Could have been early ‘70s as well, but he was an elderly gentleman. His wife was terminally ill. She had cancer of the esophagus. A very nice lady. A woman who had achieved in her own right. She had become sort of the first attorney in whatever state or college or whatever it was that made her unique, but she’d been the first in something and a very nice lady, but she had her problems. The residence had to provide special care for her because she couldn’t eat regular food. She was fed through a tube and things like that. He would push her wheelchair for example if it were public, but if it were not public, if they were just in the house, he wouldn’t have anything to do with it and he treated her very dismissively and not very nicely. He would say to the staff, you push her, I don’t want to push her, that sort of thing. They had separate bedrooms in the residence. We attempted to install some sort of elevator so that she could go up and down and that worked out. He didn’t really want much to do with substance. A little bit, but not too much. Mind you the big work and the heavy lifting had been done by Bremer beforehand, but he had to maintain the relationship and keep it productive. The Dutch frankly didn’t have much high regard for him. He certainly had the access that he needed as an ambassador. My relationship with him was strained, very strained and I thought that frankly he was going to bring an end to my career. He was very wealthy, but very cheap. He was the cheapest man I’ve ever run into. He wanted all kinds of things to be paid for by the U.S. government and they were illegal and I couldn’t do it. Here we go Christmas cards once again. I said, no, we can’t do those kinds of things and I’m not going to do them. I told him, I said, look when I go to jail you’re not going to bake cookies for me. The only one who will bake cookies
for me will be my wife and no one else and I’m just not going to do it. He didn’t like that at all. He didn’t like the fact that he considered me negative and I wouldn’t agree to all of these things. He wanted us to buy all kinds of little trinkets and what have you. They get hung up on these things. There’s just no money for that and he had lots of money. He could buy trinkets and what have you with his own money, but he was really tight with his own money.

The staff at the mission had to write out everything for him. He had to have everything on a card. He read everything. He couldn’t do anything extemporaneously. It was really quite a sad state of affairs I thought. Anyhow, efficiency report time came around and I got a wonderful report from John Rouse, a beautifully written report. I was very happy with it in every sense of the word, didn’t want to change a word, then it went to the ambassador for his review and I thought well, this is it because I knew what was coming. Anyhow the report came back and it had one sentence. I have nothing further to add to this report which suited me just fine. I couldn’t have been happier because any panel would know that there was something there, that clearly when an ambassador puts that on a report something must be wrong, but at least he didn’t say anything negative. I accepted that and we called it quits. I want to just tell you a couple of things. He had an obsession with video games and Pac Man. He would go down to the local arcade and play Pac Man with all of these kids. The DCM and I said we can’t have the ambassador down in the arcade playing Pac Man with these kids. We would go down there and rescue him out of the arcade and take him back to the residence. Then we had to find a Pac Man machine that we had to put in the residence.

Q: An early computer generation.

YOUNG: Yes, oh, everybody knows Pac Man. Yes, that’s true, it was one of these computer generated. P-A-C M-A-N, like Pac Man and Pokemon and whatever else they had at that time. We couldn’t believe it that here’s a man filthy rich and would indulge in this kind of activity with no sensitivity to his position whatsoever and would be caught doing this kind of thing. Well, I said to the DCM, I can’t believe it. Here I am making sixty some thousand dollars a year which was a lot of money at that time running around town here trying to find out where I can buy a Pokemon or a Pac Man machine to put in the residence to keep the ambassador confined to the residence instead of running downtown to an arcade. We did that. Then one night while he was playing Pac Man in his drawers, in his underwear, he locked himself out of the residence. We had to deal with that mess to get him back into the house and what have you. Oh, crazy stuff, just crazy stuff.

Q: What was there about him that made him so wealthy?

YOUNG: Oh, he made a fortune in stocks.

Q: He was good at this.

YOUNG: He was a genius. I mean he made a fortune. Another thing that happened concerned that the Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldridge. He was killed when he was thrown from a horse. Well, before the body was warm Shad sent a cable to the president saying that he wanted that position to replace Baldridge because he only took his ambassadorship as a kind of
consolation prize because there was nothing else at the time. Well, he did the message and then he left the copy on his desk. He had sent it classified. Since I was the admin counselor the marine brought it to me because they issued him a violation. I saw the message and I couldn’t believe that literally, within hours of Baldridge’s death, that he sent this message to Reagan asking that he be appointed. Well, he never was appointed to that position. He basically sort of hung around in that position for the remainder of his time there. I stayed with him until my assignment was concluded in 1988 at which time I received a message saying that I had been selected for the Senior seminar and that’s where I was going to go.

LEONARDO M. WILLIAMS
Information Officer, USIS

Leonardo Williams was born in Alabama. He was raised in Alabama, Washington, D.C and Minnesota and was educated at St. John’s College (MN), University of Wisconsin and Georgetown University. After joining the Foreign Service in 1968, he served as USIA Public Affairs and Information Officer in India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia. His Washington assignments dealt primarily with operations of USIA. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

WILLIAMS: Then I went to Dutch language training for six months. Then in summer of ‘87, I went to the Hague as information officer.

Q: You were there from ‘87 until when?

WILLIAMS: ‘91.

Q: How did you find Dutch?

WILLIAMS: It was pretty easy compared to what I had to deal with before. It was not a particularly melodious language, at least not as spoken by foreigners, and some of the Dutch accents are pretty strong. It wasn’t particularly difficult. I’m not a good linguist anyway, so I have to work in any language. One of the benefits has been that it’s helped me understand a lot of German, at least in written form.

Q: In ‘87, you were the information officer doing what?

WILLIAMS: It was essentially the press attache job. I did stuff like prepare the daily press summary for the Dutch press for the country team meetings. I was the embassy spokesman. I did a lot of contact work with Dutch journalists, responded to their questions. I also directed the American Documentation Center, a variation on the old USIA library pattern. Also, we had a small audio visual program and I administered that. That was the one that was the USIA television network. That was basically it.
**Q:** Who was our ambassador? This was during the Bush administration.

**WILLIAMS:** The ambassador when I got there was John Shad. He was there for about two years. He was replaced by Howard Wilkins. John Shad was the former head of the Security and Exchange Commission. Wilkins was a Wichita businessman.

**Q:** How did these two gentlemen work?

**WILLIAMS:** Having both come out of business (Shad had previously been in one of the Stark companies), their focus tended to be on obviously the government but also they were very strongly working with the business community. This made sense considering the Netherlands at that time when I got there was the second largest foreign investor in the United States. I think they got bumped down to third in that time. So, their dealings tended to be directly with the government and they had access to the highest levels fairly easily and certainly at a high level all the time. The Dutch were very forthcoming. All the diverse elements of the government, the parliamentarians and ministers, etc., were fairly accessible to the ambassador and his deputy. I didn’t see a particular approach to the embassy. The routine of the embassy was pretty much as one would expect. Shad was different in that he had a staff meeting every day and a country team meeting every morning. I don’t recall if Wilkins did or not because I stopped going to them at one point.

**Q:** How did you find the Dutch media? It became quite a critical period of time because it saw the change in Germany, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe.

**WILLIAMS:** I had been told before I went out there to expect a rough time, but I guess things had calmed down a little bit. The major issue had been the one that had been the most recently difficult for the embassy to deal with, and that was getting the Dutch to agree to placement of intermediate range missiles, Pershing IIs, in Holland. There was a whole big debate about how we were going to put this new missile into Europe. That was rather a bruising debate. By then, the Dutch had accepted it and we were actually in the process of building the infrastructure to receive it. Then they would negotiate it off the table, so everybody was... They were a little less hard-hitting than they might have been otherwise when I got in there. Of course, the issues were different. There weren’t such bad issues. But I generally found them very professional. We didn’t always agree. I didn’t always agree with what they wrote. They didn’t always believe what I told them. But I enjoyed working with them.

**Q:** For years, we had had these demonstrations in Amsterdam during the ’60s and ’70s particularly against the Vietnam War but they had other overtones of left-wing groups. Was Amsterdam seen as a problem or had that died out?

**WILLIAMS:** I don’t remember that being a major problem, an overwhelming sense of anti-Americanism. There was definitely a strain there. That was never going to go away. But it wasn’t at the movement stage anymore. They didn’t have the huge demonstrations. The issues that came up tended to be rather focused and short-lived. I’m trying to remember if the Gulf War even
provoked any kind of reaction. I’m sure it did, but in terms of large scale...

**Q:** *Most of Europe pretty well went along... I rather think that the Dutch put a couple mine layers or something like that into the...*

**WILLIAMS:** Yes. They were represented. But I mean in terms of just a posture toward war in the Gulf. I think Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait-

**Q:** *It really galvanized the...*

**WILLIAMS:** Yes. So, that was an issue. We tended to get into little sideline things like the treatment of gay American soldiers. One was court-martialed. That got people’s attention. In contrast to us (at that time it was grounds for dismissal from the Service), the Dutch had a gay soldiers union within the military. So, those kinds of issues tended to be for capital punishment. There was some soldier that murdered and dismembered his wife. He was arrested by the Dutch police. Whether or not he would be extradited to the United States became a rallying issue for some because he would be liable for capital punishment. Those kinds of things tended to...

**Q:** *How were the Dutch reacting to the events of ’89 leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, which the Dutch had never been wild about having a powerful Germany on its border, and here you had a more powerful Germany. Did you get any feel for the reaction?*

**WILLIAMS:** Not one that would necessarily be accurate. I think it was the same sense of euphoria initially when the Communist regimes began to unravel. Everyone was watching CNN and everybody recognized it as a good thing. They had the same public discussions that we had, about the advisability and the benefit of having Germany reunited so quickly. I think there were people in the U.S., too, who would have preferred two separate Germanies competing. The Dutch must have had that as well. But I think the general feeling was that anything that buried communism deeper had to be good, even if you had reservations about some aspects of it.

**Q:** *Was there much flow of young students to the U.S.?*

**WILLIAMS:** Yes. There were so many that there was no way to track them. The Dutch had the money. For instance, they funded more than half the Fulbright program, which was our formal exchange. Given the nature of the relations between the two countries, there were all kinds of informal student exchanges that were going on around us. English was widely spoken. Two examples of that. One of the universities, the University of Leiden, had a formal proposal - and I think they may have implemented it to some degree - that classes be conducted in English rather than in Dutch. They had a very pragmatic attitude toward language, as they do toward other things, the Dutch in general. The second thing is an anecdote. (End of tape)

I was home on home leave and one of the U.S. networks was going a week of programming from Holland. I was sitting at the breakfast table one morning watching this. The American journalist was interviewing a guy who was the gardener at the Princess’ palace, one of the Queen’s palaces actually, with really elaborate formal gardens. He was talking to him about the work that he did
there. I said to my family, “You know what’s really remarkable about this interview?” They said, “That he’s doing it in English?” I said, “Well, that, but also he’s a gardener doing it in English.” That said a lot about the society and the status of English there and our relationship.

Q: Tell me about the change in communications. When you started out, things were rather traditional, but now we have CNN, a commercial network which is on a worldwide basis where an awful lot of people get the news events. You have the WorldNet and e-mail. How would you say this was changing things?

WILLIAMS: You mean in general?

Q: Yes, for your type of work.

WILLIAMS: It means that people have a lot more sources of getting information and getting it faster. That means that we now are competing with other sources in order to get information that you feel is important and that address your concerns. To some extent, we use those tools, too. Now you can get materials to people via e-mail with an e-mail attachment. WorldNet went away as a network and has been reestablished on a smaller scale as American Embassy TV. But given CNN and other networks that have gotten into the act, that’s a hard one. What you end up doing is trying to find your niche and find a way of presenting yourself to that niche market in a way that will get their attention long enough to deliver the message. The tools have made things easier, but they’ve also made it much more competitive.

Q: I would think something like CNN would in some ways complicate the issue because it’s episodic. It depends where the cameras are. It’s short, as all TV is. But the problem is that this is the only game in town, the only one reporting out of Somalia or something like that. Did you find you had to watch CNN and respond to CNN?

WILLIAMS: Oh, yes. That’s become more pronounced now with what happened in Afghanistan. Everything since 9/11 has, if anything, maybe it needed to be done sooner, but certainly it appears the Department’s found a different model for the way it handles rapidly evolving news in those far flung areas in terms of public affairs. What we found there was that the headlines were hitting the papers in the Eastern Hemisphere before we had a chance to get our perspective into it. We were always chasing the story with our viewpoint. By then, the impression is already formed. We were more conscious of that. I expect that to be a future feature of public diplomacy, public affairs support. We’re still very much concerned with the long-term views and the image of the United States. It’s one of the things that is going to extend into the future that we’ll have this bifurcated or two pronged role to deal with the breaking news and the impressions formed by that but also we have to be careful that doesn’t get lost or that we don’t lose those long-term efforts to build the confidence and deep understanding of society that often will help you get through those times.

Q: One of the problems I think we’ve had over the years in Europe has been that in many countries, the people learn about the United States through movies and TV and there really isn’t much in the way of American studies at the universities. Educated Americans get a pretty good dose of European history, at least they used to, but I’m not sure that most Europeans are getting
a good dose of American history. Were we trying to do anything about that or was the Netherlands a different game?

WILLIAMS: The Netherlands is a special case because they did have a strong American studies awareness. There were American studies programs in the universities. We wanted to help make them stronger and broader and so we worked in doing that. But their American studies programs are at the level with the... The head of the American Studies Association of European Universities was a Dutch person. So, they had been very active in developing and promoting it. But in general, yes, you’re right. It isn’t as strong as we would like to see it. It’s something that USIA was working toward building and continues today, although I think we don’t have as many resources to devote to it.

Q: How did the two ambassadors in the Netherlands use the public diplomacy branch of the embassy?

WILLIAMS: Ambassador Shad used it primarily as a source of information to keep track of opinion as reflected in the Dutch press. He worked more closely with the public affairs officer in doing representational things that would enhance the embassy’s image. Wilkins used it in very much the same way, but he was also very much interested in promoting the image of the ambassador as an active figure in the country. He was very interested in having things that would feature him as a reflection of American interests in the country. So, he appeared more frequently.

Q: Was the Dutch royal family a target of interest?

WILLIAMS: We saw the Dutch royal family in the perspective that they were a revered institution and one that had certain constitutional responsibilities or at least claimed to. But the real power lay in the democracy and in the constitution. We had a realistic posture toward them. It was respectful and the royal family played a role and yet we recognized the limitations of their power.

Q: Did we see any fractures in Dutch society as one could always see in Belgian society, for example?

WILLIAMS: Not to that extent. Holland is pretty much a homogeneous country. You don’t have a separate language group. But there are differences, like any country. Even though that’s a small one, it has a number of states and there are different cultural characteristics in the different regions. But those didn’t necessarily translate into the kind of political tensions that you see in some places.

Q: You mentioned the Dutch being ambassadors to the United States. I know they own right now the major grocery store here in the Washington area, Giant. My wife is always cursing the Dutch if they don’t have whatever she wants. Were the Dutch making any investments in the communications area - newspapers, television?

WILLIAMS: I don’t recall that. I remember some big takeovers of food companies.
Q: **In other words, there wasn't any concern on our part about Dutch influence on the public media.**

WILLIAMS: No. I don’t recall any concern about any Dutch investment. It was kind of “the more, the merrier.”

**Q: Did the collapse of the Soviet rule have any effect on operations in the Netherlands?**

WILLIAMS: No, it was always a very free environment. We could do anything that we wanted. I don’t recall ever not being able to do something. That continued through.

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**JOHN ALLEN CUSHING**  
Political Officer  
The Hague, Netherlands (1990-1992)

*Mr. Cushing was born in New York City and raised in New York and Hawaii. He graduated from Reed College and continued studies at a variety of institutions in the US and abroad. After service in the Peace Corps, he held a number of positions as English language instructor before joining the Foreign Service in 1988. Mr. Cushing served abroad, variously as Consular, Political, Economic or Public Affairs Officer, in the Dominican Republic, Korea, Benin, Papua New Guinea, and Trinidad & Tobago. In Washington, Mr. Cushing served as Korean Desk Officer. Mr. Cushing was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.*

**Q: You were in The Hague from when to when?**

CUSHING: I was there from the summer of 1990, got there just after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Had a Dutch language course the first half of 1990. I finished a 24 week course in 19 weeks. I got a 3/3plus. We lived in an apartment in Ballston so I’d walk down the hill to Rosslyn for my classes. I had Dutch language from late January for about 19 weeks and then we eventually ended up in The Hague in August.

It was at the time of the first Iraq war. The ambassador was a political appointee of George H. W. Bush who had donated $200,000 to his campaign. He was 53 years old, divorced with five children and spent most of his time dating 20 year old Dutch girls. He made his fortune in the pizza business. His parents, when he graduated from Harvard had given him a bunch of Pizza Huts and he had expanded those and so he was extremely wealthy and had been a generous donor to the Bush campaign and so was made ambassador to the Netherlands.

We got to The Hague during the time of the first Iraq war. The political section had a political counselor, an external political officer, a pol/mil officer and an internal political officer. It was way overstaffed. There was work for two people and there were four people there so I had a very thin portfolio and very little to do.
Q: You were in the political section?

CUSHING: Yes, I was in the political section there. I did as much as I could. I was in charge of overseeing Dutch relations with Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. It was a fairly low profile thing and I wrote the human rights report and went out and spoke to student groups and so forth.

My first EER was…

Q: That’s the employee efficiency report.

CUSHING: My first employee evaluation report was not very well done, although I guess my boss thought it was OK, but I got a notice in October of ’91 that I had been denied tenure and was going to be given a fifth year. I called my CDO and said, “What’s going on there?” He said, “Well, you got very good employee evaluation reports all the time you were in Santo Domingo. It talked about what a diligent officer you were and how enthusiastic you were and so forth but it did mention that you got really upset when you were screwed out of your position in Osaka Kobe and then your employee efficiency report from The Hague was very mediocre and so what it looks like, what the committee said was ‘well, we can’t give this guy tenure because he started off like a rocket and then he leveled off,’ so if you had gotten a mediocre series of evaluations in the Dominican Republic followed by a mediocre evaluation in the Hague, you would have gotten tenure because they would have said, ‘Well, here’s a mediocre guy and he’s still mediocre and let’s give him tenure’ but because you showed so much potential in the Dominican Republic and you did not realize it in the Hague, that’s why they denied you tenure.”

I said, “OK, let me get this straight. If I had gotten nothing but mediocre evaluations I would have been tenured by now but because I got excellent evaluations in my first post and a mediocre evaluation in my second post, I am now being denied tenure.”

“Yes, that’s right.”

So here I am, 46 years old with a son about to go into college and I had been denied tenure. That made a very stressful situation.

Coupled with that, between Santo Domingo and The Hague, I had talked to Mark Minton, the deputy director of the Japan desk who said, “Well, I don’t know what happened to your assignment but if anything ever comes up, if I can ever be of any help to you, just give me a call.” So I called him from The Hague because the position in Osaka Kobe was becoming open again, I called him. He said, “Yes, what can I do for you?” I said, “Well, I am calling about the position in Osaka Kobe and he said, “Jesus Christ. We are in the middle of the Iraq war. We are trying to get Japan to help pay for the war. They won’t send any troops. I am really busy. Who the hell do you think you are to be calling me like this?” He screamed at me for about two minutes. And then he said, “If you want something, send me a letter.” This is the same guy who had previously said, to call him if he could be of any help, and I guess later I found out he was known as what they call a ‘screamer’. He had previously said, “Well, I am sorry stuff didn’t work out for you but if I can ever be of any help to you, give me a call.” So I called him up and he screamed at me for wasting his time in the middle of the Iraq war. Mark Minton.— now the
ambassador to Mongolia.

Virtually my entire second year in The Hague was kind of under a cloud. I could not bid on another foreign post because I had been denied tenure and given a fifth year. I thought it an extremely unpleasant situation.

ARTHUR S. BERGER
Public Affairs Officer, USIS

Mr. Berger was born and raised in Rhode Island and educated at Yeshiva and Howard Universities. He joined the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1970. Serving primarily in Cultural and Public Affairs, Mr. Berger served abroad in Kampala, Addis Ababa, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Tel Aviv and the Hague, where he was Public Affairs Officer. In his Washington assignments Mr. Berger served at USIA Headquarters as Director of Publications and at the Department of State as Spokesman for the Near East South Asia Bureau. Following retirement Mr. Berger worked with the American Jewish Committee before becoming Director of Communications of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. Mr. Berger was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

BERGER: That following summer, the summer of 1990, I was asked if I would accept the position of PAO in the Netherlands, at The Hague. I didn’t think very long about that because I had never had a European assignment and the Netherlands was a great place. I felt that this was a fantastic opportunity, so I took it. I spent five months studying Dutch and learning about the country and some of the issues that Europe faced. I had been dealing with other parts of the world Middle East, Latin American, arms control issues and Europe was very different. U.S.-European relations are on a very different plane, not only historic, but also some of the tension that we have – on trade issues - I had never dealt with. So I had a lot to learn.

Q: Also, didn’t you arrived just about the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed?

BERGER: That came later. Then in January of 1991, I went out to The Hague to be PAO.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

BERGER: At the beginning, the ambassador was Howard Wilkins, a political appointee who had made a lot of money in the fast food restaurant business, Pizza Huts and the like. He was appointed by President Bush because of a lot of work that he had done in raising funds for the senatorial campaign committee. Bob Dole was one his big sponsors. And he was replaced right before the election that Bush lost in November 1992. He had wanted to go back. He had been in the Netherlands for three years that point and wanted to go back to work on the campaign. And he did. [Editor’s Note: Ambassador Wilkins presented his credential in July 1989 and departed post July 1992. FSO Thomas Gewecke became Chargé from July 1992 to July 1993.]
It was an interesting experience working with Howie. He really did not believe in some of the niceties of diplomacy. He had his own views that he followed. Most of them were young with long blond hair. He was divorced. But one of the things that I found was very good about him was that he usually followed my advice in giving him suggestions to do various things, host various things. We had some wonderful experiences.

One of them I will relate. Every year the Danny Kaye Children’s Program for UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) came to the Netherlands to film a program. It was an annual fundraiser for UNICEF. And Dena Kaye, Danny Kaye’s daughter, would come out there. Smith-Hemion Productions from Los Angeles would film it in a major theater in The Hague. And the year after I arrived I was approached by someone from UNICEF who said, “We’ve never done this before, but we’ve invited people from the embassy to come and watch the filming. Do you think there is any possibility that the ambassador might host something?” I said: “I think there is a great possibility that he would do something. Please give me a list of who is going to be coming.” Well, it was Gregory Peck and his wife, Audrey Hepburn and her boyfriend, Nipsey Russell, Larry King, Roger Moore, a dozen top entertainers were coming, volunteering their time for UNICEF. And when I saw that list I said: “We’ll do something, I don’t know what, but we’re going to do something.”

I ran right into the Ambassador’s office and said: “We’ve got an opportunity that really is unique in the Foreign Service. Would you want to host something for UNICEF, perhaps a black tie affair.” He said, “I’d like to something really informal. How about a BBQ, an American BBQ? We’ll do it on the back lawn of the residence.” Well, the problem in the Netherlands is that you never know if it’s going to rain. But this was during the summer. I think it was mid-July, which is usually the best time. That summer turned out to be magnificent. Very warm. We had about six weeks of magnificent weather with no rain. I was going with my wife to Paris for our anniversary. A friend of mine who has an apartment there loaned it to us for a week. We came back a day early just to be there for the event.

I had arranged everything before hand, and we invited the top level of the Dutch Government. We invited every minister, a few senior members of parliament. And just about everyone – unless they were traveling somewhere out of the country- came with spouse, including the foreign minister, who drove himself. And we invited the captains of industry, people like Freddy Heineken, the chairman of KLM, Philips. You name the major Dutch corporations and they were there. We had about 35 or 40 Dutch and 15 Americans, a few from the embassy, a few from the American business resident in the Netherlands. It was an incredible evening. And the night before, the ambassador really wanted to make sure that everything was perfect, because this is something that would impress everybody. And he had a feel for these kinds of things. He had imported food from the States – beef from his home state of Kansas – and he had his chef do a trial run the night before. So he had the steaks on the grill and shrimps on the grill and salmon from the North Sea. It was an incredible meal. About half a dozen of us from the embassy were invited to test it out the first night and then the next night we went to the full thing.

Q: It was a tough job, but somebody had to do it.
BERGER: Exactly. It was rough. That was fun, really fun.

Q: How was the media there?

BERGER: Media was generally quite serious. The media was unlike the media anywhere else in the world. Television and radio, for example, were divided up according to confessional communities. So you had a broadcasting spectrum for the Catholics, one for the mainstream Protestants, one for the Evangelical Protestants, another one for the Dutch Lutherans, and so on down the line. Everybody had airtime. With newspapers you had all of these communities plus a number of secular newspapers as well. And everything was in some way subsidized by the government. It was very much a country where everybody had their representation. Almost unique.

As PAO I got to know the editors and some of the top broadcasters and the heads of these different companies. Also from the major universities. It was an easy place to make friends because the Dutch are so much like Americans in many respects. Except, they will say to you: “Lets have lunch.” They don’t mean maybe someday if we ever bump into each other again we’ll talk about having lunch. When they say it they take out their agenda and find a date.

When we moved into our house - it was right within walking distance of the embassy – a neighbor from across the way knocked on the door after one day and said “I know you are Americans and I found something that can make you feel right at home. Haagen-Dazs ice cream. They had just begun selling it in the supermarkets there. And we became close friends and we still are today all these years later. It’s an unusual country. It’s a wonderful country for Americans to serve in. I arrived during the Gulf War.

And the Dutch felt allied with the United States. Thousands of Dutch people brought bouquets of flowers to the embassy. Because they felt that this was something that was close to them. They needed to support America. They remembered – unlike some Europeans – very clearly what it was like to be under the yoke of Nazi Germany, how much they suffered, how their various communities – including the Jewish community- was decimated, and that they owed the United States a debt of gratitude that they would never forget.

I remember that every year we had a program at Margraten, which was the American military cemetery to which President George W. Bush just visited a couple of days ago on his trip to Europe. At that cemetery there are eight-thousand plus graves of Americans who died trying to liberate the Netherlands. The Dutch of the communities nearby made a pact that different families would adopt graves at that cemetery, so that every single grave site is cared for by a Dutch family. And this is being passed down now to a second generation. I don’t know of anywhere else in the world where this takes place. But they keep to it. Every week somebody goes and puts flowers on the grave, they make sure it is being taken care of. We have the American Battle Monuments Commission that is paid to do this. But the families feel that they must do this because these young soldiers died for them.

We went every year, one year the Queen came. In 1994, the anniversary year of the Normandy landing, we went down there with some visiting friends for the ceremony. We went out the night
before to a restaurant that was right on the border between the Netherlands and Belgium. An old Belgian man was in the restaurant. I don’t remember if it was on the Dutch side of the border or the Belgian side, but in that part of Europe people really feel the same about Americans. They feel deeply indebted to Americans. And this old man, who had no teeth, looked like he must have been about 85 years old, and he heard us talking English. He turned to me and asked if I spoke French. I said yes and he saluted me and said, “Je vous salue, les Américains.” And he then explained that he was a young kid in this village and the American soldiers came through there and he felt so proud that he was there and that they saved his community and his family. And he said: “I’ve never forgotten it.” And he said that every year since then he and his family go on the American Memorial Day to the cemetery.

Q: Did they commemorate the Arnhem...?

BERGER: Operation Market Garden. Yes. And in fact in 1994, which was my last year there, there was a big celebration of that and a lot of American paratroopers who had landed in Operation Market Garden came back. If you remember the history, they didn’t get too far north.

Only the southern tip of the Netherlands was liberated. The rest of the country had to wait until the following May for liberation. It is interesting that we are talking about liberation and we just commemorated the 60th anniversary of liberation. And I was there for the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the southern part of the Netherlands. But each year – and they still do this in the Netherlands – on May 4th, they have a memorial day. May 5th is liberation day because that’s when the whole country completed its liberation. On May 4th, it’s almost like a day of mourning. At 8:00 pm they have, not only in Amsterdam and The Hague, Utrecht, but in every city and town in the country, the sirens go off. And everyone in the country stops what they are doing and stands for a moment of silence, to remember. And the following day is Liberation Day and there are parties and everything like that. But the liberation is preceded first by memorial day and they really take it seriously.

One year I was at a conference on a small island in the North Sea. And even there – there was a British military cemetery there – on this little island, at 8:00pm the siren went off. We were walking to dinner with some people and suddenly everybody stopped and they paid attention for two minutes while the sirens went off. There is only one other place in the world where I have ever seen that happen like that, and that was in Israel.

Q: Who replaced the ambassador?

BERGER: K. Terry Dornbush [Editor’s note: ambassador from March 1994 to July 1998]. And that’s another story that is very interesting. When Howard Wilkins left to go work on the campaign and raise money for Bush’s campaign in ’92, the White House tried to appoint somebody to replace him. Another good party supporter. The problem was this person had been born in the Netherlands, left after university, went to the United States, when to graduate school, changed his name and became a very wealthy real estate developer in the mid-west. The problem, they say, is that when he was going before (Senator) Sarbanes and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he was proud of his financial donations to the election of the president, number one. And he also had an interview with a journalist and he talked about this as, not only...
that he had given this money, but he was proud that he gave so much and therefore the White House was going to give him this ambassadorship. Nobody told him you don’t do that kind of thing.

The other part of it was – as I said – he was born in the Netherlands and he changed his name from Berrenhouse to Alexander, I believe. One of the reasons why he changed his name and he forgot to mention – or didn’t want to mention – that to the FBI was that his father was the mayor of a town in the Netherlands during the German occupation. And his father was a senior member of the NSB, or the Dutch Nazi Party. And after the war was interned in jail for years as a war criminal and died in prison. So I think the son tried to get beyond that history for whatever reason. But neglected to mention that. And a journalist in the Netherlands found out this history and it became a very big headline and the White House pulled his nomination.

So the next ambassador did not come for twenty months. During those twenty months it was kind of embarrassing for all of us because the Dutch people and the Netherlands are our closest friend since revolutionary times. Even before the French. The Dutch like to talk about the time when Dutch ships saluted the revolution. And the relationship has been very special ever since. Dutch loaned money to the revolutionary war efforts. John Adams of course went there. And George Bush Sr. was the first U.S. president to come to the Netherlands since John Adams. And then he came back a second time while I was there. Interesting period. [Editor’s Note: President Bush first visited the Netherlands in July 1989 and last visited the Netherlands in November 1991 to attend the European Community summit in The Hague.]

But during those twenty months when we didn’t have an ambassador, there was a U.S. ambassador to the European Union in Brussels, Stuart Eizenstadt whom I had known a little bit. Stuart and I would keep in touch. And he would ask, “Is there anything that I can do since you don’t have an ambassador.” So I brought him up to the Netherlands a number of times and he would give speeches, we would set up meetings, interviews with the media. This was a way of having a senior American presence in the Netherlands even though we didn’t have a resident ambassador. So Stu really helped us a lot with that.

Then we got Terry Dornbush who was a businessman from Atlanta appointed by Clinton. A very nice person. He and his wife came out. I remember his presentation of credentials on March 16, 1994 because I as invited to go along in the coach. In the Netherlands when the ambassador presents credentials, the Queen sends several of her coaches to the residence to pick up the ambassador and member of the staff who are invited to come to the Queen’s palace. They block of the traffic a little bit. You are led by the white horsemen. It is really quite a spectacle. And we get to the residence of the Queen and the chief of protocol takes us inside. There is a whole protocol to go through, as you would imagine, with a Queen. The Ambassador says, “I have the honor to present my letters of credence to your Majesty. She takes them and says to him, “Ambassador Dornbush, I’m glad you are here, finally.” She was a little upset that the United States had not sent an ambassador in such a long time.

Q: We run into these hiatus between ambassadors and very seldom does it have anything to do with the politics toward the receiving country. It’s our domestic politics.
BERGER: That’s the things. One president is leaving office and another one in coming into office, so it take a particularly long time. Even when you have the re-election of the president as we have today in 2005 with George W. Bush, there are a number of embassies that are vacant right now because ambassadors have finished their three years and they have left and nobody has been appointed to replace them yet. And this is really because of our own unique political calendar. It takes a long time.

Q: Who was your deputy chief of mission?

BERGER: The first one was Tom Gewecke and the second was Michael Klosson [Editor’s Note: who served as Chargé from July 1993 to March 1994]. They were professionals in the Foreign Service and really kept the embassy running. It was not a bad job for anybody to have because the Dutch employees were so competent that they helped make us look very good.

Q: Had the whole business about the SS-20s and our response, our Pershing missile . . .

BERGER: That was way before me. That was when Jerry Bremer was ambassador.

Q: The whole problem with that had gone by the time you got there?

BERGER: Yes. In fact, there were no hotly contested issues while I was there. So it was a matter of really taking a look at what we could do more cooperatively together in the education field, the political field, the information field. And the Netherlands is a very sophisticated country and we brought out some specialists who were really good. In fact, Stu Eizenstadt before he got his position, was volunteering for the Clinton campaign and he came out and we hosted something in our home for him to talk to a number of Dutch editors and heads of universities about the Clinton campaign. And a short time afterwards Al Haig was out there. I knew somebody who worked for him and I asked her if she could get him to come and do something for us. And he did as well. So we were able to get some high level people to come out there both before the election, during the campaign, afterwards. And there were a lot of people who would come through the Netherlands on their own private business and sometimes we would be able to pick them up as well.

Q: Was the European Union an issue at all? Were there concerns about this new relationship?

BERGER: There were a couple of things. One had to do with the rapid deployment force. Another had to do with trade issues, which we didn’t always agree with. It doesn’t matter if it’s a Republican or Democratic administration. Issues like that do come up all the time. There was something that we worked very closely together with, and I worked closely with, that was called the Atlantic Council of the Netherlands. And that was to take advantage of the changed that were taking place in central and eastern Europe and helping to bring and get to know some of the young political leaders, or soon to become political leaders, of Bulgaria, Romania, Germany, Czech Republic, the Baltic states and bring them to the Netherlands, which became a real center for the Partnership for Peace program. In fact, one of the first people that I met that we worked to bring to the Netherlands is now the foreign minister of Bulgaria, Solomon Passy. So those kinds of relationship are very important.
Q: How did the Dutch feel about the unification of Germany? They had a very bad time during the war. And now suddenly it’s a unified country. Was that a concern?

BERGER: It was. Certainly during the years that I was there you could feel that there was no love from the Dutch to the Germans. Even though most Dutch did not blame the Germans of today for the Germans of the national socialist period, at the same time there was something about Germans that bothered a lot of Dutch. And part of it was the big country to the east who was dominating the economy of the period. Although, when you take a look at the Dutch economy, it’s one of the largest in Europe – sixty or seventy billion dollars of Dutch investment in the United States. A huge trading partner. A huge industrial base. And so they didn’t have to worry about competition from Germany. They knew what they did and they did it very well.

A lot of Germans would come to the Netherlands on vacation. And it was almost like you were reading The Ugly American. Trade the name for the ugly German. The guys were coming in shorts and plain shirts and drinking lots of beer and being very loud and coming in with wads of bills into the tourist shops raising the prices. The Dutch would complain with those same kind of stereotypes that people in Europe used to complain about the Americans. So that’s one thing.

The other was that in some of the resort communities where a lot of sailing takes place, because the Netherlands has a lot of water. A lot of Germans would come in that same way with these big yachts. The Dutch would kind of resent that. You know, it wasn’t that all the Dutch resented all the Germans, but it was a fairly widespread feeling. I think that some of it came out of what they perceived as an arrogance from another time frame, but that was still rather present in some of the Germans who came to the Netherlands.

Q: Were there any issues or problems that caught you up while you were there?

BERGER: There really weren’t. It was an unusual period. It was after the cruise missile issue. And it was certainly before international terrorism. We worked very closely with the Dutch on a number of stings. DEA and Customs. A lot of drugs went through the Netherlands to the United States. The Dutch had their own view of the harmlessness – what they perceived as the harmlessness – of soft drugs. I think they are changing their mind a little bit about some of that.

There is also the whole issue of multi-cultural societies and pluralistic societies. We always like to talk about that in the United States and the Dutch would talk about a monotheistic society and a society that is very much one language, one people, one ethnic stock. And today, just ten years after I have left there, the country has changed dramatically.

Q: They are getting quite a backlash against immigration too, aren’t they?

BERGER: There is today. In 2005 there is. You didn’t feel it then. And part of it was that it was during the Yugoslav civil war, Yugoslavia’s breaking up, and a lot of refugees came from there. And the Dutch really opened their hearts, their homes, and their pocket books to help settle many from the former Yugoslavia in the Netherlands.
Q: How about Srebrenica?

BERGER: That took place while I was there. But at the same time the fallout from it took place many years later.

Q: You might want to explain what that was.

BERGER: Srebrenica was the community in Bosnia where Dutch U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops were supposed to be protecting the community and they had them in one area and then the Serb militia came in and said: “Give us these men.” Very much similar to what many of the German army or the S.S. did in various communities. And the Dutch soldiers who were undermanned and didn’t have strong weapons decided not to protest and just gave up these men and about seven thousand were murdered by the Serbs. And this became know as the massacre of Srebrenica. Many years later the Dutch Government – not the same one, but another Dutch Government – after a committee of inquiry, recognized that the Dutch commander was at fault and the government fell because of that. They had new elections called. Even though they weren’t responsible for it at the time, the government that was in power at the time took full responsibility for it and resigned.

Q: What was your reading there of the politics of the Netherlands and the role of the royal family?

BERGER: It was coalition politics; generally a little bit left of center. But even the right of center, did development a more right wing group that is more powerful today. But the right of center and usually the left of center would have coalitions. The queen was very much a figurehead. But a beloved figurehead. There were stories that – I never saw her riding a bicycle around town – but a number of members of the staff would say: “Gee, I bumped into the queen shopping this morning.” And for a long time she would come on bicycle. You know, have a security guard or two with her, but would ride her bicycle. I think by the time I left, if she would go anywhere it would usually be by car. I didn’t see her ever on a bicycle.

Q: So this was a pleasant tour of duty and I gather quite productive too?

BERGER: It was a wonderful tour. It was very productive. One of the things that we did was we recognized that the Dutch lived in a very wealthy country. Even though we invited a lot of people on international visitor grants, we thought that there was a way to get more out of them. And we took our allocation and we told the Dutch that we would invite you on an international visitor grant and we will take care of you once you reach the shores of the United States, but you have to be responsible for your international air travel. And every single Dutch IV visitor paid his or her international airfare. So we got an extra eight-hundred or a thousand dollars from each trip. And together, when you take about twenty-five IVs, we were able to get an extra six or seven IVs every year. At that time, we were the only European country that did that. I think today there are a bunch of others. I used to talk about it at PAO conferences. Unfortunately, my tour of duty was up in January of 1995 and we left the Netherlands.
Ms. Raven-Hamilton was born and raised in New York and educated at Rosemont College and the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. After working in the Visitors Center in New York City, she joined the Foreign Service in 1957. Shortly thereafter she was required to resign her commission upon marriage to a USAID officer in 1957. Mrs. Raven then accompanied her husband on his assignments to New Delhi, Beirut, San Francisco and Paris. In 1974 she rejoined the Foreign Service and was posted to Teheran, The Hague and Belfast, where she served as Consul General. She also served several tours at the State Department in Washington, DC. Ms. Raven-Hamilton was interviewed by Edward Dillery in 2009.

Q: What did you do next?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: In 1993, I was due for re-assignment, and I was asked if I wanted to be a Labor Officer. After a very good six week Labor Officer training course, I went to The Hague for four years as Labor Officer.

The Dutch labor management structure is different from what we have here. Until World War II, Dutch society had traditionally been organized in three parts or pillars, broadly speaking along religious or political lines -- Catholic, Protestant and Socialist. People had certain kinds of jobs, belonged to certain unions, and read certain newspapers, etc. depending on whether they were Catholic or Protestant or Socialist. During the war, much of the Dutch leadership had been imprisoned together by the Nazis, and many Dutch decided that the pillar divisions should not be sustained in a post war Netherlands.

The FNV, a federation created largely from Catholic and Socialist unions, and some small Protestant ones, is today the largest labor union federation. It was the one I worked with the most, but I also worked with the other important union federation, the CNV, created mostly by more conservative Protestants. Management had also been divided into the three pillars, so you also had Catholic, Protestant, Socialist management groupings -- like three Chambers of Commerce or National Associations of Manufacturers.

Labor, management and government meet together for bargaining every year to set wages and reach agreement on what we would describe as labor-management issues. The government, unions, and management negotiate in the context of national budget preparations and economic conditions. This system is not without pitfalls, but it does ensure that the major forces in the national economy come together annually to address economic issues and bargain together.

You asked about relations between the Dutch and American unions. They were good but seemed to be based mostly on personal relations established among union leaders active in international labor affairs, who met with each other periodically. The embassy had had little high-level contact.
with Dutch unions for some time, when I arrived in The Hague. Then, the Ambassador invited
the head of the FNV, the largest union federation, to lunch at the embassy. This was the first time
a union president had been a guest of honor at the embassy, as far as we knew. We had a
“tripartite” guest list -- union, government and management. The Dutch all spoke English well
and connected with the Ambassador, who had been a businessman. Conversation around the
table flowed easily, and people had more in common than they might have expected.

Closer relations between the embassy and the FNV helped when the AFL-CIO was trying to
have a well-respected Indonesian union leader, imprisoned by the Suharto regime for his union
activities, released from prison. I was asked to see if a prominent member of the FNV, who was
my good contact and a friend of the imprisoned Indonesian, would go to Indonesia to work with
our embassy and others to get him released. Finally, through the combined efforts of the
American and Dutch unions and our embassies, the Indonesian was freed from prison and was
able could go abroad for the medical care he needed. The Dutch and American unions had had
reason to fear that he would be murdered in prison.

To a certain extent, despite obvious differences in scale and the impact of the European Union on
the Dutch economy, the Netherlands and the United States faced many of the same problems.
These include relatively high unemployment, the impact of globalization, and the need for
extensive technological training because of demand for a more highly trained, tech-savvy
workforce.

The Dutch unions were strongly supportive of globalization. International trade has been a
mainstay of the Dutch economy for over 400 years. Broadly speaking, Dutch unions argued that
if jobs were outsourced abroad, they were usually jobs that Dutch workers didn’t want. Dutch
workers were confident they could raise their level of technological expertise and could find
better jobs if their jobs went overseas.

The most obvious place where this view did not hold up terribly well was in Rotterdam.
Rotterdam was rapidly becoming a highly automated and major container port with far less need
for the physical labor of stevedores. They needed computer skills, not muscles, and a higher level
of education than such jobs had demanded in the past. Poorly educated dockworkers, who lost
their jobs, were unlikely to be able to retrain for jobs, for example, with computers in one of the
expanding sectors, such as the financial sector.

Q: Stevedores don’t do that kind of work.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Exactly. So, Rotterdam had a high level of unemployment. Some
younger workers might have been able to retrain for tech jobs, but many liked the manual labor
they had always done and did not even want to be retrained. I reported a lot on the Dutch
approach to the economic change wrought by technology and globalization. It provided a
different point of view for American labor unions and others in the field of labor-management
relations.

Q: Who at that point....
RAVEN-HAMILTON: „„were fighting the movement of jobs overseas.

Q: The Americans were.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: The Americans were. I realize that what more or less worked in a small country like the Netherlands could not be transferred to the scale of the U.S. or to our culture, but ……

Q: Did you have contact with the American unions directly?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, some. Mostly during our training in Washington, but I had contacts I could call from The Hague. I usually was in touch with the unions indirectly through the Department of Labor. I was in close contact with the Dutch unions and management federations and frequently met with people from the Ministry of Labor. I reported extensively on labor, and this meant meeting often with union officials, management and government and keeping them briefed on information we were receiving from the U.S.

When the Labor Officer function was established after World War II, the focus had been on countering communism, which had been gaining support among workers in the difficult post-war period. So, there was a history of European unions working with American unions, but it had not been as active a relationship in recent years.

Q: I remember that, in the past, Labor Officers had a very close relationship with American unions. Well, they weren’t working for the unions, but they knew people in the union movement, and the union people were able to let them know what they wanted in terms of reporting.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, they did that. In our six week training course, we had met with officials from the unions, Chamber of Commerce and other management representatives, and with people from the Department of Labor, all sorts of people involved in the labor movement, management and government.

Q: Where you in the political section?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: No. The Hague is one of the places where the labor portfolio is in the embassy’s economic section. My position gradually became a labor and most global issues portfolio. I first became responsible for environment issues, and it was decided I should follow narcotics and transnational organized crime too. In the end, I handled, with the help of my highly capable Dutch colleague, Mieke Gronheid, narcotics, transnational organized crime, environment, EU space programs, science, population, technology, health, and social issues plus labor.

This was manageable except when the Dutch had the Presidency of the European Union. Mieke and I were inundated because of Dutch activism on international issues. We were physically incapable of covering all the international conferences the Dutch had organized. Sometimes, we were supposed to cover several meetings at the same time, and we had to ask the American delegations to the meetings for notes on the meetings, so we could report to Washington. The
Ambassador later told me that, during this six month period, most of the embassy’s cables were written by Mieke and me.

We cooperated with the Dutch on many environment issues, especially on issues in multilateral fora, like climate change. We also had a formal cooperation agreement with the Netherlands to implement Vice President Gore’s GLOBE project that brought together school children in many countries to do basic collection of weather and other data in their own countries and enter the data on computers. This data was accessible world-wide. For example, young children might be taught to measure rainfall and temperatures every day. Older students might measure how acid rain was affecting small lakes and ponds in their area. They all entered their data, which had been collected all across their country and not just from airports, into computers. I went several times to watch the children gather data from The Hague. They were so enthusiastic because scientists all over the globe were using their data. The program ended shortly after the 2000 election.

Q: Talk about your narcotics portfolio.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: The Dutch attitude towards drugs was not appreciated very much in the United States, although their approach was actually largely based on the recommendations of American experts in the 1970’s that were not implemented in the U.S. At least one U.S. commission had recommended decriminalization of marijuana and treatment and harm prevention over prosecution…

Q: So marijuana was legal there?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: No, it was not really legal.

Q: Not legal but it is easily accessible.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes. Marijuana is not actually legal. Trafficking is definitely illegal, and the Dutch are party to the international narcotics treaties, as well as partners in our anti-trafficking efforts. The Dutch divide drugs into “soft” (marijuana) and “hard” (cocaine, heroin etc.).

Buying small amounts of marijuana and using marijuana is tolerated for Dutch citizens over 21, who can only buy small amounts in what the Dutch call “coffee shops.” But larger amounts, which would obviously be needed to stock “coffee shops” in order to provide small amounts for their customers, is, in theory, against the law. This poses a quandary for “coffee shop” operators -- what is illegal at the back door is not illegal at the front under certain rules. So, the strict rules for selling marijuana put “coffee shop” operators and law enforcement in a tricky position.

Interestingly, I compared Dutch and American rates of drug addiction over the years and found that they were about the same in the United States and the Netherlands. I did a lot of reporting on Dutch drug policy and treatment of people convicted of “serious” drug offenses.

The Dutch had extensive treatment programs in society and in prison. However, they had found
that someone addicted to drugs for twenty years was highly unlikely to get off drugs. So, to reduce the threat of crime, the Dutch started supplying small amounts of drugs under very strict controls and supervision -- heroin and cocaine and other hard drugs -- to people considered hopelessly addicted.

Then we had the XTC (Ecstasy) scene -- the rave parties that were so alluring and dangerous for young people who spent nights dancing and taking XTC. There were rave parties in the Netherlands, the UK and the U.S. and probably elsewhere.

Do you remember that? No? You just weren’t traveling in the right crowds.

Q: No, I am sorry.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Young people would rent some really big place, and set up strobe lights. They would dance the night away and keep the action going by taking XTC pills, which might be cut and mixed with something else to increase the supply. This could be fatal if the pills had been adulterated badly or if the young people were not drinking copious amounts of water, which they often did not do.

The Dutch knew trying to stop these “house parties” probably would not work, so they insisted on controlling the circumstances under which these parties could take place. Dutch police were at the parties and actually examined all pills to be certain they had not been adulterated. If they had not been and were “safe,” the police would return the pill. If they had been adulterated, the police would confiscate the pills. Another instance of “harm reduction.”

Q: It was something you had to report on.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, I reported a lot on that because it was also a big craze in the United States.

Q: Yes, and because it was a whole different approach to solving the problem.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, because it was killing young people in a number of countries. They would overdose or take something adulterated or not drink water, and it would kill them. So that is harm reduction.

I also worked on transnational organized crime and money laundering. Illegal funds can be transported across borders increasingly easily. There was even a sort of credit card on which you could put money that could be sent even by telephone. There were special phones on the receiving end that could receive the money or transfer it to another card. So you could move things along.

Q: Launder money.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, and money is usually why people commit crimes!
Toward the end of my tour, the embassy nominated me for the new Christopher award for my work on global issues, but the award was supposed to go to someone who did outstanding work in one area. I had…

Q: A lot more than one area.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Right, so I couldn’t compete. Then, after four years in The Hague, we left to return to Washington.

WILLIAM P. POPE
Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Pope was born and raised in Virginia and educated at the University of Virginia. After serving in both the US Army and the US Navy, he joined the Foreign Service in 1974. Mr. Pope served several tours in the State Department in Washington, dealing, notably, with Counterterrorism. His overseas posts include Gaborone, Zagreb, Belgrade, Paris, Pretoria, Rome, and the Hague, serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in the latter two embassies. Mr. Pope was interviewed in 2006 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Well, this would be ’95 to ’96. What happened, where’d you go?

POPE: After that I went to the- that was before I did the Serbian sanctions, I believe. Yes, I think that was before I was the head of the Serbian sanctions task force, which I did for about a year. And then from that was chosen to be the DCM in The Hague in the Netherlands.

Q: Okay. Well, let’s just put on the record here, if we have not covered the Serbian sanctions, when you do review we’ll just make a point of having another session to cover that.

POPE: Sure.

Q: Well you went to The Hague and you were there from when to when?

POPE: From ’96 to ’99.

Q: Who was the ambassador? How’d you get chosen for this because I’m sure this is a fairly significant job? I mean, because usually a professional is, a Foreign Service officer is usually there and a political appointee, some of real quality and some not end up as ambassador. How was it in your time? How’d you get the job?

POPE: Well, I applied for it, of course, and got short-listed by the DCM Committee, which I was grateful for and got chosen by the Ambassador, who was a political appointee, a Democrat, of course, a businessman from Atlanta. And he was one of the ones who the President could be
proud of. Both parties can send some real turkeys, to be honest with you, and he was terrific, smart.

**Q:** Who was this?

**POPE:** His name was Terry Dornbush. He was a businessman from Atlanta; I believe he was in real estate. But very smart, well read, a very serious ambassador, worked hard, he was always there, read everything. You know, everything a good ambassador should be.

**Q:** How would you say the state of relations were between the Netherlands and the United States?

**POPE:** Excellent. There was nothing more we could have asked. I mean, there was obviously one little thing that rubbed Barry McCaffrey wrong and that was the drug business because they had this real dichotomy where they were really with us on almost everything and they really didn’t want to hear it on drugs because they had these open coffeehouses as they called them in Amsterdam and The Hague and other big cities where you could just walk right in legally smoke marijuana. But in terms of international law enforcement, of course, they were a good ally in terms of that. It’s just some people made a bit of a noise about the open smoking of pot. But otherwise in terms of our alliance, for example, part of NATO, before they restructured, the NATO central command was there, we had pre-positioning of stocks, military stocks there, they were with us in the Persian Gulf, enforcing sanctions on Iraq, for example. They had destroyers in the Persian Gulf. So they were excellent allies, couldn’t ask for more.

**Q:** I’ll come back to that in a minute but just on the drug thing, I’m sure, of course, we were looking with if not aloofness or disdain or whatever it is to this open drug market that was allowed in a few places but how did we evaluate in the long run, I mean, what was the general consensus, how this thing was working?

**POPE:** When you say this thing was working what do you mean?

**Q:** Well I mean in other words maybe this thing’s maybe not the right word but in other words I mean we as a government, as a people do not believe in allowing the use of marijuana or anything like that.

**POPE:** Right.

**Q:** And here was a country which very in many ways a system that’s somewhat similar to ours and having this and there have been thoughts about legalizing marijuana.

**POPE:** Right.

**Q:** I mean, it’s a fairly movement in the States so I assume we were looking at this. I mean, during your time what was your impression on how the system worked?

**POPE:** Well the Dutch were convinced that by allowing regulated and open sale and use that it
would keep criminal elements out of it, it would keep people from going farther. And of course there were people who were very convinced in the United States and some elsewhere in Europe, by the way, who were convinced that this is the road to perdition, that you start down this road, then it’s another drug and another drug, eventually you’re hooked and your life is ruined by starting in these legalized coffee shops. So we never really came to a consensus. But in terms of international law enforcement against smuggling of drugs into the United States, they were good allies and we shared information and that kind of stuff.

Q: Were there problems of Americans, particularly younger but maybe not necessarily younger, going there to partake in the-


Q: And did they overdo?

POPE: Not just Americans and some did.

Q: Because this is often the case of kids who are allowed to do one thing they'll always do more.

POPE: Right.

Q: I mean, if it’s been forbidden.

POPE: Right. And not just Americans but from all over. Yes. But I don’t remember that it was an epidemic, anything like that, but of course there were Americans of all stripes, tourists and older people who’d have a heart attack and younger people who’d step in front of a car and get hit and people who were coming just to smoke marijuana and never really got in trouble and others who overdid as you said. It was a real mixed bag.

Q: Was immigration much of a political issue? Because right now the Dutch government is fallen because of immigration.

POPE: It was already, yes. Mostly from the Caribbean and from South America.

Q: What were the problems?

POPE: I don’t really remember all of the details of it but it was because of their colonies, Surinam and their colonies-

Q: Aruba and-

POPE: Yes, exactly, and people who had citizenship or were asserting their right to citizenship and they were starting to have pretty sizeable immigration. Then you had various alleged groups that were going to do bad things if more immigrants weren’t admitted. So you had that, that’s the immigration piece of it. But you also had a lot of, now that I recall, of people from the former Yugoslavia. And I remember there was some concern about them as we joined into the wars in
that region that, for example, even though the majority of the Serbs, as I recall, who lived in the Netherlands were considered to be anti-Milosevic, the assumption was that somewhere within that larger group, for some reason the number 70,000 sticks in my mind, that within that larger group there would be a smaller group that would have perhaps pro-Milosevic sentiments, so the Dutch were very alert on that group. And then you had Iraqis and Kurds like you had in most of the European countries.

Q: Did the ones from Indonesia, had they been by this time pretty well absorbed in the system?

POPE: I think so. For example, I don’t recall lots of native kinds of Dutch food. When people would say let’s go out and have Dutch food they meant with rijsttafel and different dishes from Indonesia. A little bit like if you lived down in the Southwestern United States, let’s go out and get a good old American meal of nachos and tacos. It was that kind of thing. I don’t remember problems from the Indonesians. You remember there had been the Malaccans who had taken over a train?

Q: Yes, I remember that.

POPE: But I don’t remember a lot of problems with that while I was there.

Q: Did the Dutch follow- were most of them, people you dealt with, pretty knowledgeable about American politics?

POPE: Very. They were knowledgeable about everything. Spoke excellent English, super smart. Had been everywhere, highly educated, very sophisticated. Not only the diplomats, of course, but politicians and businesspeople.

Q: Did you have a problem at that time, I’m not sure where the scandal about Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky was, but the impeachment and also from ’94 or ’95 and on sort of the almost war between Congress and the presidency, was this of concern to the Dutch?

POPE: It would come up in conversation sometimes, particularly his escapades with Monica Lewinsky and sometimes people would snicker a little bit, but I think most people were generally favorable towards the United States, towards the Clintons. They would snicker about this other business a bit but it kind of fit into the pattern, not so much their pattern. The Dutch are pretty straight up, but there’s all the stuff that goes on in France and people have mistresses and all of that. So certainly in the European context this wasn’t so unheard of.

Q: Well you were there I guess during the Kosovo flare up, weren’t you?

POPE: I guess. I mean, I remember the Kosovo flare up but that might have been, I can’t remember the timing on that, whether I was in Rome by that point.

Q: It might have been close. Anyway, it didn’t, the fact that we started a bombing campaign and all, Serbia didn’t-
POPE: Not too much. As I say, they were very strong allies. I mean, they didn’t agree with us on every single thing but they and the Brits were probably the closest to us sympathetically, ideologically of anybody in Europe. So it made it a pleasure to serve there.

Q: Was there a residue of, I don’t know, guilt or concern about what had happened in Srebrenica during the-

POPE: Yes, they were very traumatized.

Q: -the Dutch battalion basically, facing a very difficult situation, I’m not, but still, at the same time, I mean, they were military soldiers there and they let stepped aside and let happen what happened. And was that something that was a part of the concern at the time?

POPE: It was bubbling and it was a frequent issue. And they were very traumatized by it. Unhappy about it, embarrassed, defensive, whatever adjective you want. I remember talking to them, I said, you were only something like 225 men against thousands of Serbian fighters. And I said I understand the position you were in and I just don’t understand how you could have expected to defend those people with 200 and some soldiers if you’d gone into an all-out fight. And there are people who are really gnashing teeth and wringing hands and were so upset that this had happened on their watch.

Q: But in our action later I understand particularly the Dutch air forces were particularly quite good, I mean, a good reputation.

POPE: All of them, all Dutch forces, air force, their navy. As I say, they had frigates in the Gulf, as I remember, destroyers, frigates and destroyers in the Gulf and they were really very solid militarily and every other way. They were just small; they had a very small everything.

Q: How were relations between particularly France and the Netherlands and Germany and the Netherlands?

POPE: At one level it was the EU, because the EU by this point already you’d had Maastricht and was already moving towards being something beyond just an economic organization. Already the economic piece of the three pillars had, like a spider throwing out more and more webs of silk, had thrown out so many that they were all really ensnared and there was a lot of debate going on about the new currency, the Euro and should everybody really be in it and had some cheated to make their books look right and there was a lot of debate about that, France included. Because the Netherlands had what was considered the strongest currency in all of Europe at that point and there was lots in the papers about the Dutch were at one point the sick man of Europe and had the weakest currency and we worked hard and sacrificed. Now they had their house completely in order and the strongest currency and then there are others who are meeting the so-called targets with smoke and mirrors and maybe we shouldn’t do this and others were saying we absolutely should because we are good Europeans. And it was an interesting debate. And France, I remember, was in the smoke-and-mirrors camp, as were the Italians, from the Dutch point of view. The Germans at that point were the tough guys. They also had a strong currency and they were insisting that there be accountability and that countries actually be
punished if they breached certain norms, if the Euro ever actually came into being. And of course they’ve gotten way away from that now, but then they and the Dutch were the strong people about that.

Q: I assume our role was to encourage greater connectivity to the European Union?

POPE: Sure, absolutely. We had from the end of World War II, before the end of World War II and we were still doing it. There were people who would say or stories written in the paper that the U.S. doesn’t really want a strong EU and wants to pick us off one at a time and those kinds of things, but that was never borne out by the facts.

End of reader