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Arthur W. Hummel 1972-1975 Deputy Assistant Secretary, Washington, DC

Howard H. Lange 1973-1975 Office of Pacific Islands, New Zealand, and Australia, Washington DC

Andrew I. Killgore 1974-1977 Deputy Chief of Mission, Wellington

Theresa A. Tull 1975-1977 Analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Islands, Washington, DC

John E. Hall 1976-1980 Commercial Officer, Wellington

John Edgar Williams 197?-1978 Consul General, Auckland

John H. Holdridge 1977-1978 Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, DC

Edward Hurwitz 1977-1978 Australia/New Zealand Desk Officer, Washington, DC

Theresa A. Healy 1977-1980 Deputy Chief of Mission, Wellington

William Bodde, Jr. 1977-1980 East Asia Bureau, New Zealand and Pacific Islands, Washington, DC


Charles H. Twining 1978-1980 Deputy Director, Australia/New Zealand Desk, Washington, DC

Anne Martindell 1979-1981 Ambassador, New Zealand

Paul F. Gardner 1981-1982 East Asian Regional Affairs, Washington, DC

John J. Helble 1982-1985 Political Advisor, CINCPAC, Hawaii
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<td>James H. Morton</td>
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<td>Phillip R. Mayhew</td>
<td>1988-1989</td>
<td>East Asia Bureau, Australia and New Zealand Affairs, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Samuel Vick Smith</td>
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<td>Franklin E. Huffman</td>
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**THEODORE ACHILLES**  
Liaison Officer  
Washington, DC (1941-1945)

*Ambassador Theodore Achilles was born in Rochester, New York on December 29, 1905. He served in Washington as Chief of the British Commonwealth Division in the State Department from 1941 to 1945. Afterward, he was involved*
in the NATO Treaty and also the NATO Council Discussions. After the Korean War, he became the United States Ambassador to Peru in 1956-1960. Ambassador Achilles was interviewed by Richard D. McKinzie on November 13, 1972.

Q: Let me ask you if you could add a little more detail to some of the things? One of the first things that occurred during Mr. Truman's administration with which you were affiliated was the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and you mentioned that you first encountered President Truman there when he came out for the signing. I wonder if you do recall, though, any of the substantive issues with which you had to deal when you went out to the Conference, and how you felt at that time about the prospects for the U.N.? You mentioned that you'd read Clarence Streit's Union Now, and I wondered if you had any hope that this might be one step toward the achievement of the kind of postwar world that he had advocated? So that's two questions, I guess. One, was if you recall anything about the substantive work, and two, how you felt about the U.N. as an instrument?

ACHILLES: On the substantive side my job was liaison officer with the British Dominion delegations other than Canada. That is, primarily Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Our principal arguments with them were over the veto. The Australians and New Zealanders in particular—[Herbert Vere] Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister, and [Peter] Fraser, New Zealand's Prime Minister, were bitterly opposed to the veto. I think a good many of us on the U.S. delegation in our hearts also opposed the veto. We thought it was basically wrong. We would have been happier without it. However, Senators Connally and Vandenberg of the delegation were insistent that it was absolutely essential to get the Charter ratified by the Senate. We believed that, and, therefore, we went all out trying to convince the other delegations that whether or not the veto was a good idea—no veto, no U.S. membership in the United Nations; therefore, they'd better support the veto.

I remember spending between two and three hours one night alone with Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand expounding our theory. Ordinarily I can say anything I've got to say in ten minutes. By the time I got through that length of talking my throat was practically dust.

As to whether we had hopes for the U.N., yes. I think we all had a feeling that the League of Nations would have worked if the U.S. had been a member. We were hopeful that the U.S. would be a member of the United Nations and that it would work. We were already skeptical on Soviet intentions. They had begun to act badly in Poland; I believe that by the time the San Francisco Conference convened they had arrested or at least detained in the Soviet Union most of the members of the Polish Government. There were different signs that the Russians would be difficult. Chip Bohlen kept reminding us that the Russians were also fighting the Germans, but in no other sense were they really our allies. Despite that we still hoped it would be possible to work things out and that the U.N. would basically contribute towards a new era.

JOHN S. SERVICE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Auckland (1946-1948)

John Service, a missionary’s son, traveled to many places in his youth. He was brought up in China but went to college in the United States. He originally began his college education at the University of California at Berkeley but decided to transfer to Oberlin College where he majored in economics. His first post was at Yunnanfu where he served as a clerk. His studies in Chinese affairs made him an embassy specialist on Chinese Communists. Mr. Service was interviewed by Rosemary Levenson in 1977.

Q: You left Japan and got back to California in September, 1946, right?

SERVICE: Picked up the family, had a short vacation and then went out to New Zealand on the ship Monterey. It was a very pleasant voyage. The ship had been semi-reconverted from wartime use. We had triple-decker bunks in our cabin, which was very handy because it gave a lot of place to throw things, nine bunks and only five slept in. Because of our children we had to eat at the first sitting, which was inconvenient, eating at 4:30 p.m.

New Zealand was an idyllic interlude in our life. It was a lovely country, a very friendly and congenial people. It was getting the family together for the first time in six years. We'd had short vacations and leaves, but the period of a few months in Washington in '45 had been hectic, upset of course. So, this was getting acquainted and settling down as a family.

Q: Did you feel at that point that you were set for a conventional Foreign Service career?

SERVICE: Oh, yes, quite so. It was getting back into the groove of conventional Foreign Service work. The ambassador, Avra Warren, I think was not, shall we say, overjoyed at my being assigned. He'd expected someone else to come, someone whom he had known, to be his deputy chief of mission, DCM. But, the State Department had to find a spot for me, so the other man got pushed aside.

After a short while I think Warren decided I was okay, that I could be trusted. He was a very active person, who loved hunting, fishing-limitless energy, rushing around the country. He liked to give speeches and talks.

When we got acquainted and he had sized me up, he was quite content to let me run the office. He lived out in the country about forty-five miles from town over a mountain range, narrow, windy road. He came into the office very seldom.

There was one thing that he insisted on, that he have all communication, all direct personal interviews and communications with the prime minister, Peter Fraser. Fraser was also the foreign minister, a nice, avuncular, elderly man, leader of the Labor party, who'd been a preacher in his youth.
In Chungking, Gauss had wanted to have someone along to write the memoranda of conversation, but Warren's tactic was to come charging into my office after one of his meetings with Fraser, walk up and down, and relate the conversation. "I said this," and "he said that." Then Warren would say, "Well, write a telegram," and he'd take off for the country. He wouldn't see the telegram until the next time he was in town which was several days later. He never objected. He always accepted what I had written. This didn't happen, of course, every day. It was only an occasional thing.

The New Zealand government people were nice to deal with, very congenial. They were just starting in external affairs. They were quite inexperienced, but we could talk very freely and frankly.

Q: What was America's policy toward New Zealand?

SERVICE: There were a lot of trade problems, mainly New Zealand wishes to ship more lamb and cheese, diary products into the States, which our farm lobbies were very active in keeping out. We were anxious to export to New Zealand, motor cars and things like that, machinery. They had Imperial Preference, so they were pretty well tied to the United Kingdom. But UK couldn't take all their dairy products, and so they obviously wanted to expand their market.

We were interested in weaning them away from the United Kingdom. They felt themselves to be the most loyal of all the dominions, prided themselves certainly on their loyalty and ties to the homeland. I think our policy was, "Well, this is a new day and age, and we should establish closer ties out in the Pacific." I was Chargé for eight months, between Warren's departure and the next man's appointment.

Q: Were you then acting ambassador?

SERVICE: Yes, for eight months. During that time a young man in the Foreign Office, whom I got to know very well, said to me one day that he thought that New Zealand was beginning to be able to think of the same kind of relationship that we were thinking of. This was something appropriate for a personal letter to the State Department desk officer despatch, because it was given to me very informally.

Later on we got the ANZUS Pact, the Australian-New Zealand-U.S. alliance and security pact in the South Pacific, which isn't as strong now as it was, but it's what we relied on really to pull New Zealand and Australia in to support our own intervention in Vietnam. It came to its full flowering in the Dulles days. I may have had some part in it, telling the American government that there was a possibility of this alliance.

Q: Did the Antarctic enter into American policy thinking?

SERVICE: Not very much. Americans had an expedition down to the South Pole led by Admiral Byrd. They came through New Zealand. We put them up. It wasn't a particularly hot topic.
We were also trying in those days to organize the South Pacific Commission to bring in all the Trust Territories and the Trust powers in that area, the French in New Caledonia, Australians in their Trust Territories and so on. That was started during that period.

We also signed one of the first Fulbright agreements with New Zealand while I was there, for exchange of scholars and professors. There was some surplus money from Lend-Lease that was used.

We were trying very hard to purchase some properties for residents' use. It was a fairly busy office, and a very congenial and a good staff. Marshall Green was the junior man in the office at that time. He was just beginning as a Foreign Service officer.

As I mentioned in my speech to the Foreign Service Association, the first chore I had was a report that he had written trying to analyze and predict the forthcoming general elections. Warren handed this to me, fresh off the boat, for me to advise whether or not we should send it in to Washington.

I knew nothing at all about New Zealand politics. Green had done a very systematic and thorough job, quite largely because he had a very good New Zealand woman in the office who was working as a typist-stenographer, in the political section. She really knew New Zealand politics.

Anyway, they predicted Labor would win by four seats, [chuckling] and they won by four seats! But Warren almost didn't send it. He didn't want to send it because, as he said, "Everyone I've talked to tells me National is going to win." Of course, his friends were mostly huntin', shootin', fishin', and the mayor of Wellington. The various people that he knew, upper crust social people, and so on, were all Nationalists.

But we did send it in, and Marshall Green went on to greater glory. He was quite annoyed though, [chuckling] poor fellow, at my being given the decision about what to do about his report since I was, as I say, completely uninformed and ignorant.

I got a lot of letters of sympathy and offers of help on job hunting from all sorts of people. Some people sent checks. I could have gone to New Zealand, but we didn't want to go. I don't think any of us wanted to leave the U.S. That was the point.

Sevareid's broadcast brought in an offer by somebody who had a small boat supply business. He was a dentist, and he ran this as a sideline. He decided that he didn't really want it, so he asked Sevareid to offer it to me. But it didn't seem a very likely thing.

The husband of one of Caroline's aunts who had a secondhand book business in Providence, Rhode Island, which was not making any money, offered that to me.

Various friends knew people. Avra Warren, who had been the American ambassador in New Zealand, my old boss, was a friend of Nelson Rockefeller's. Various other people I had known knew fairly high people in General Motors, some corporations, foundations, and so on.
So I did a lot of running back and forth from Washington to New York talking to people, but it always boiled down to the consideration that I was a controversial character.

WINIFRED S. WEISLOGEL  
Student  
Dunedin (1949-1951)

Winifred S. Weislogel was born in New Jersey on August 8, 1927. She received a bachelor's degree from Barnard College and a master's degree from Otago University in New Zealand. She entered the Foreign Service in 1956. Her career included positions in Geneva, Tripoli, Tangier, Rabat, Lome, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on September 24, 1992.

Q: So you went in 1949?

WEISLOGEL: I went in '49 and I worked for the summer. It was a permanent job and I expected to stay there but also while I was a senior in college I had applied for a Fulbright Grant. They had announced grants available for Belgium and New Zealand. They had just signed the Fulbright agreements with those countries, and they were opened later than the others which had been in existence for a few years. So I decided to apply for New Zealand. In part because I figured it was so far away that I probably would never be able to afford to get there on my own money, but secondly because my professor, Professor Pierdon, whom I respected very, very much at Barnard, was my principal advisor, his field was British Commonwealth, so I had a kind of a tie in there. He talked a lot about it. So I applied for a grant, and I wanted to study New Zealand external affairs since 1919 -- since the First World War, and how it evolved from dominion status into full-fledged nationhood. So I wrote a little proposal around that idea, submitted it, and I got a call one day from the State Department. In those days the State Department, not USIS, was running the exchange programs, and I was offered the grant. So I quit my job at the council, and I went off to New Zealand on about three weeks notice. They said you've got to get there by the beginning of the school year which was September, they said. I said but no, it's the other side of the world, "down under," and their school year is different. But they insisted that I be there for the beginning of the school year in September, so I went. I got down there to find myself, naturally, in the third term with most people preparing for their final examinations and the summer vacation coming up.

Q: At which university were you?.

WEISLOGEL: Tago University in Dunedin.

Q: How did that work out?
WEISLOGEL: It worked out fine. They didn't have a department of international relations but they had a history department and I enrolled in the history department with the idea of just taking courses and doing some research on my subject. But then I discovered that if I enrolled the following year and just continued in the regular course of study, I could get my masters. So I did that, and I applied for an extension and received it. So that's what I did, I got my masters in New Zealand and wrote my thesis on the subject.

Q: What was your impression of the New Zealand system of government at the time you were there?

WEISLOGEL: It's asking me to go back for so many years, I don't really remember too much about it. Of course it was famous as a country that took care of people from cradle to grave. They had a very, very good social program, social services, welfare, of course they only had two million people. It was a very, very small country. Also it was like a time machine, you were going back to the way the United States probably had been maybe in the early 1920s or even before the First World War. I mean in terms of its culture, its outlook on life, the lack of crime -- it just practically didn't exist. There were so many things that were quite different. They were a very homogeneous population with the exception of the Maori people, the native New Zealanders, most of whom were in the North Island anyway. I used to say, you walked down the street and everybody was pink and white. You never saw people who were obviously Mediterranean or black. That's something I rather missed about the United States. I discovered how nice it is to have a population that's varied and an atmosphere that's cosmopolitan.

PHILIP C. HABIB
Economic Officer
Wellington (1951-1955)

Born in Brooklyn, New York on February 25, 1920, Phillip Habib graduated from the University of Idaho with a B.S. degree in 1942 and then received a Ph.D. degree from the University of California in 1952. During World War II, Mr. Habib served as a Captain with the U.S. Army overseas. He has served in many countries including Korea, New Zealand, and Spain. His interview was conducted by Edward Mulcahy on May 24, 1984.

HABIB: Then we went to New Zealand where I was economic officer. It was a two man economic section, and I was the chief economic officer. I think I did 99.9% of the reporting. I had a lovely fellow for a boss. He was the commercial attaché, a sweet man, but he let me do a lot of the work.

Q: He was my DCM in Athens.

HABIB: That's right, he was DCM in Athens, he was ambassador to Korea. He stopped in Washington and changed my assignment and took me with him to Korea as political counselor. And then, of course, years later I did him a favor. I had something to do with Vietnam, and I saw
to it that he got sent as deputy ambassador to Vietnam in the last days of the war. But Sam was a very marvelous fellow.

(Gap in tape)

But one thing I did in New Zealand which was very beautiful later on. I learned how to speak in public. I gave a lot of speeches, Rotary Club, Chambers of Commerce, from one end of New Zealand to the other, and I belonged to the Royal Economic Society. As a matter of fact, I was the first foreigner ever elected to the council. I was very active in the society, went to all the meetings, and that's how you get to know people. I knew hundreds of New Zealanders up and down the coast, from one end of the country to the other. I traveled all the time in New Zealand when I had a chance. You could get around, you'd get in a car and you could drive the whole north island, or else I'd go south. We'd didn't leave the country for our vacations. I remember we took a vacation and drove to the south island, Mount Cook, and all around. Interesting things happened to you. I remember we were traveling and we kept running into this couple, a young American woman and her husband, they were just married and sort of taking the same route that we were taking. We'd run into them at each hotel. This was in the 1950s. Well, ten years later, lo and behold, I met the same guy and the same American wife, he was a New Zealander. He, at that time, was administrator of the island of Antigua in the British West Indies when I was stationed there, and we renewed our acquaintance. But I did a lot of speech making, and I did all sorts of things. I used to go to rugby matches every weekend with a civil servant, the senior civil servant. The only club I belonged to was the Civil Service Club where the senior civil service would go to drink beer and play pool, and amuse each other.

Q: Well, that was a small enough post.

HABIB: Oh, as active as we wanted. We made a lot of friends, people we still see to this day. You know, 32 years later and we still write to them, and they write to us. Some of them we met stationed elsewhere, guys we met stationed here in Washington that we knew when we were young in New Zealand. One of the New Zealand ambassadors here later was one of my best friends, years later. He was ambassador here in Washington. When I was in New Zealand as second secretary, he was a junior officer in the foreign ministry. I did a lot of speech-making.

Q: Was there housing?

HABIB: We started out in a rented flat, and this went on for a while, and then the ambassador approached me one day - there was a nice house that the military attaché lived in, and the military attaché was being transferred. And the ambassador said, “I don't see why we should give that house to the military, we'll give it to you.” The government leased it and it was a lovely house, magnificent grounds, small but beautiful and my wife was crazy about gardening and we made it a show place, because we'd built gardens all over the world. That was the first real garden that we built. We had flower beds—I still have pictures of it, it was magnificent, and we did it all at our own expense, nobody gave us money in those days. But we liked to do it. We had maybe 15 or 20 flower beds, rose bushes, a vegetable garden, everything. Well, that was the last year. A baby was born there, the oldest child was born there. In those days they insisted you spend two weeks
in the hospital. My wife spent two weeks in the hospital, and I think the whole thing cost something like $28, because they had socialized medicine. I remember I used to go to the drug store to get medicine, there they didn't pay for prescription drugs. I used to insist on paying, I said but I don't pay taxes, I think I have to pay. It was more bother to them than just putting it on the books.

I did another thing there which I was always very proud of. The famous Milford Track Walk. I walked the Milford Track which is a three day walk over the mountains in the southern tip of New Zealand. Beautiful, beautiful scenery. I got some magnificent photographs that I took.

Q: Back packing?

HABIB: Yes. Well what you did was if you backpacked, you went from one...they had huts built at one day intervals. You started at a hut, you walked all day, spent another night in a hut, walked another all day, spent another night in a hut, then you walked down into the fjord. There were 27 of us in the group, a bunch of New Zealanders, very, very outgoing, lovely people. A couple of Britishers, a couple of Australians. Years later, I remember the British couple that was on the trip, an elderly couple, he was a lawyer, a solicitor. Years later when I went to England, we went out to visit them in their home in the suburbs of London. We looked at pictures all over again of the famous walk. It is a beautiful walk, beautiful country up over a pass and down into the fjord, South Island.

At any rate, I traveled New Zealand from end to end, and I knew people in every corner of New Zealand, was widely acquainted in the city itself. So I got around a lot.

Q: Did you get into sailing down there?

HABIB: No. What I got into in New Zealand in all my spare time in the right season was hunting birds. I used to hunt pheasants with the deputy director of agriculture. The Foreign Agriculture attaché had a great place up country, and then I would go down and I would hunt quail and ducks with a sheep farmer down in the South Island who had a most beautiful place right on the lake, a small lovely home. But you know, everything in New Zealand was simple. Nobody lived high on the hog down there. I remember we had a housekeeper-nurse for the baby, a lovely retired English nurse. She was actually a nurse, and she loved the baby, and she took great care of her. It was a simple life, very pleasant, lovely people, and I learned a lot about the business, did a lot of writing, did a lot of speech-making. Whenever anybody wanted somebody to go to speak in some small town in New Zealand they'd ask me.

JAMES T. PETTUS, JR.
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Wellington (1957-1960)

James T. Pettus, Jr. was born in Missouri in 1919. During World War II, he first
served as a lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Air Force and then as a colonel in the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Pettus entered the Foreign Service in 1954 and was posted in Manila, Wellington, Rangoon, London, and Canberra. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on May 30, 1990.

Q: A lovely spot.

PETTUS: Oh, it's a garden spot. Everybody said, "You're crazy! Why didn't you go up there? Is it just because you got..." I said, "No, I'm not going to do it." Anyway, Ferguson left and time ran out, and I went to New Zealand. I didn't take home leave. I had some small children by that time, and I went to New Zealand and spent a very, very interesting and pleasant time down there. As USIS, I was the PAO. I had an American secretary, and we had a very, very small program, and it was an interesting bit of learning. I also had very pleasant relationships with the newspapers down there.

I could indulge in a thing which I love to do, which was trout fishing, and it's the world's best down there. It just so happened that the editors of almost all of the New Zealand papers were fishermen. So I spent a lot of time, four or five days, up at various lakes or rivers with the editors of the bigger papers, the Dominion or the Evening Post or the Truth and so forth. I'd bring the booze and then we would sit around a campfire at night, and I figured this was a good way to make--certainly this was where the power of the press lay, in the owners. And these were absolute owners, and they were all basically friendly to the United States, although some of them supported the labor government, which was in part of the time. In fact, when I got there, Walter Nash was the prime minister, who was a very fine old man and a labor prime minister.

Q: You would say, then, that your principal duties there were to cultivate the press, and that you didn't have serious themes that you had to promote on behalf of the United States? Or did you?

PETTUS: We had some serious things. As I recall, we didn't have any terribly serious problems. What we were mainly after was the support of New Zealand in the United Nations on a lot of issues, but we didn't have anything, as I recall, terribly serious problem bilaterally with them. We had a very active program of educational exchange there, and as PAO, I was also chairman of the Fulbright Commission, and it gave me quite a feeling of power to have the vice chancellor of the University of New Zealand at a meeting say, "Mr. Chairman, can I speak?" I'd say, "Yes, Vice Chancellor, go right ahead," especially [since I] had never been to college.

But we did have a very active campaign. There was a lot of--oh, I wouldn't say latent anti-Americanism. It's a very egalitarian society, New Zealand was, and in their labor movement there's a lot of fundamental criticism of the United States. But there was also a tremendous reservoir of good will from the war years, of not only Americans who were, many of them, still there, but when Britain got in serious difficulties, New Zealand and Australia, both, felt that they were left out. The fact that the United States recovered as quickly as it did from the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor and was able to come out and establish defense lines and make them credible, and after the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, of course, the die was cast. But in the early days, there was real concern that the Japanese would predominate. This was especially true,
of course, even more so in Australia than it was in New Zealand.

It's a very interesting country, and it's a country that we had a few trade problems with them, which they felt we were giving them a bad deal on certain raw materials. Wool. Wool was always a big problem. Wool and lamb were the two, of course, great staples of Australian trade. There were also things that were protected very strongly by the United States. Whereas it was the lifeblood of the whole nation there, to us it was a small factor in our entire agricultural picture, but it was very important to them. But we didn't have the serious, major political problems there.

We were trying to get the government to support us, which, by and large, they did. Where they did not support us, of course, was on China. And there was no point in trying to change their attitudes on something like China. They were following the British thing, and the New Zealanders said they didn't have anything to worry about China. But they felt that we were wrong on China, and there was no point in trying to get them to change their mind. I remember hearing the ambassador say, "I'm not going to go in and argue with them about it." (laughter)

But it was a very pleasant time, busy. You had a lot of hard work, and I learned a lot about program problems and how you handle it. I didn't worry as much about people, but the intricacies of the government, which I never did learn, and certain programs and budgets and so forth, I never was a very strong person on that. I had ideas, but I was never very good on management. But it was good training.

After I got home from New Zealand, I got back to Washington and I was told that because I was one of the people who were outstanding mid-career people, I was selected for a mid-career course. Well, it was an interesting period. You can't go wrong learning anything, and we did have quite a number of interesting lectures. But I later found out that virtually everybody who was on a mid-career course was just selected because they were in mid-career and they were available. (laughter)

FREDERICK IRVING
Economic Officer
Wellington (1960-1962)

Ambassador Irving was born and raised in Rhode Island and educated at Brown University and Tufts University. After service in World War II, he worked in the Bureau of the Budget in Washington, DC before joining the State Department in 1951. In the course of his career with the State Department he served in several regional and other bureaus in senior level positions. In 1972 Mr. Irving was named United States Ambassador to Iceland, where he served until 1976. From 1977 to 1978 he served as US Ambassador to Jamaica. His other foreign posts were Vienna and Wellington. The Ambassador was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2013.
Q: Well, what happened?

IRVING: Well, I spent two boring years in Wellington, New Zealand.

Q: When?

IRVING: That was ‘60 to ‘62.

Q: Well, while you were in Wellington did the nuclear issue come up?

IRVING: Yes.

Q: Because later, I mean at some point the New Zealand Parliament would not allow nuclear propelled or nuclear armed ships to come into port.

IRVING: Yes, that was about three years later after I left.

Q: What was your impression of New Zealand?

IRVING: Well, people were wonderful, absolutely wonderful. The country was beautiful. The job was dull.

I’d be making speeches all over the country. You know, and one stupid thing happened. I was invited to go to the South Pole by the New Zealand government. Just as I’m ready to go I get a telegram from Washington that Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson is traveling in the Pacific to try to sell surplus American butter and they’re coming to New Zealand. I should set up meetings between Benson and the government of New Zealand and I should try to smooth the way for New Zealand to buy American surplus butter. And it’s stupid because New Zealand is a major exporter of butter.

Q: Yes! Good God, yes.

IRVING: I had to cancel the trip to Antarctica. I begged the government to please, please, please meet with Benson, talk over butter. Do me a favor. By this time I’d gotten along very well with New Zealand government officials. In fact, we entertained each other. Our children played with each other. I arranged the meeting, but I was embarrassed to be in the meeting trying to sell American surplus butter to a butter exporter.

I finally got out of, out of New Zealand. Again the term “needs of the service” hit me. President Kennedy wanted to build up educational and cultural affairs. Lucius Battle who was special assistant to Dean Rusk who was the Secretary of State was chosen to be the assistant secretary. And he needed a new executive director to help him, because somehow it had sort of fallen down. A lot of money was taken away. And what happened was that the office of personnel saw a place where they could store misfit employees and political appointees. They would load CU with them. So you had a whole crowd of misfits. They wanted Lucius Battle to clean house and
start, in effect, a possible forward looking bureau. They needed a new executive director. So I get calls informing me my new assignment is going to be Executive Director to CU. I said I understood I was in line to be DCM in Malaysia. “Oh, we broke that.”

I said, “What do you mean you broke that? Haven’t I been in exile enough?”

And they said, “Yes, you can rebuild yourself by coming here.”

And I said, “No, I don’t want to come.”

So then the “needs of the service” was tossed my way. So I had to go and become the new executive director. I was beginning to feel that I was being a patsy. It doesn’t pay to have a reputation of being an able guy. That was my conclusion.

DONALD NOVOTNY
Agriculture Attaché
Wellington (1963-1965)

Mr. Novotny was born and raised in Nebraska and educated at the University of Nebraska. After serving in India with the 4H Foundation, he joined the Foreign Agriculture Service and assigned to its Grain Division. He subsequently served as Agriculture Attaché in Tokyo, Japan and Wellington, New Zealand. In 1964 he returned to Washington, where he served as Director of the Grain division until retirement in 1974. Mr. Novotny was interviewed by Allan Mustard in 2009.

Q: So you wound up in Tokyo and they transferred you to New Zealand?

NOVOTNY: Yes, yes. I wasn’t all that enamored with the heavy social schedule and indeed in Tokyo it was extremely heavy. There was every night an important social engagement with Japanese counterparts and cooperators and government people.

Q: Every night?

NOVOTNY: Every night of the work week. And it would go from one gathering to another and to another. Those were also times when the social schedule in the diplomatic circuit was extremely heavy and a great emphasis was placed upon active involvement in that by the senior Foreign Service wives in the embassy. So by the time we were three, four years into that life, my wife and I were not sure we could raise a family in such settings and it’s just not normal life. So when FAS talked to me about going to New Zealand to head the office where there was only one person in the office, I was somewhat ambivalent, and Dorothy as well. But we went and you know it was like being ag representative to the state of Kansas or something.

Q: I remember you making that comment once that it was a lot like Kansas except Kansas was a
whole lot more exciting. (laughter)

NOVOTNY: Yes, anyway. There it was the complete opposite. There was no expansion of trade or export development to work on; instead it was calming the concerns of the New Zealand meat board and New Zealand dairy board, because they were trying to establish markets in the USA and we were not very cooperative because we had import limitations.

Q: Could you talk about that a little bit, about the meat import law and the dairy quotas and what kind of impact that had on your work in New Zealand?

NOVOTNY: Well I mean that was the work, it was to keep current and to find the best face to put on the American domestic and import policies and to try to maintain you know, happy relationships with the people in those industries in New Zealand so that one could do a good reporting job and also be in a position to you know, represent the US each time there was a new development in the US to be able to explain it to them in the best light we could. And also to be able to put New Zealand people from the American side in contact with the appropriate New Zealand counterparts. So useful functions we could perform but they were completely different from those in Tokyo.

Q: Was your reporting mostly competition analysis?

NOVOTNY: Competition not so much because the US was competing with New Zealand products in third countries, at least certainly not commercially; rather it was reporting on the competition in the sense that these are industries here that were trying to ship to the United States.

JAMES K. BISHOP, JR.
Vice Consul
Auckland (1963-1966)

Born in New Rochelle, New York on July 21, 1938 to an Irish family, Ambassador James Bishop, Jr. graduated from Holy Cross College in 1960. His studies concentrated on American history and to some extent, Russian and diplomatic history as well. His career led him to posts in Ghana, Togo, Cameroon, Lebanon, and New Zealand. He served as Ambassador in Liberia and Somalia. On November 15, 1995, he was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You left Public Affairs in September, 1963 and went to Auckland. How did that happen?

BISHOP: One day, Chris Chapman called me. He told me that the President was dissatisfied with the reporting coming out of Vietnam. He was obviously getting reports from the military and CIA, but apparently also wanted an additional reporting channel, which would be set up by a cadre of Foreign Service officers, many of whom would be newly assigned in the next few
weeks. This new group was to attend Vietnamese language training so that it would be sufficiently proficient to provide the President with a different perspective. Chris went on to say that there would be a few new officers who would be assigned to Vietnam almost immediately and who would not get the language training. And then came the bottom line: I was to be one of that group. When I hung up the phone, I told Linc White of my new fate; his first question was: "Who is your replacement?" Since I didn't know, White said that I could not leave the Bureau without a replacement at least being named. That was a battle that White had to take on. Since PER could not come up with a replacement, White squashed the assignment.

So I didn't go off to that part of the Far East. I was subsequently assigned to New Zealand, presumably because it happened to fall geographically in the Bureau that was of interest to me--although New Zealand was not quite what I had in mind when I opted for the Far East. So I served in Auckland from September, 1963 until the late spring of 1966.

Auckland was a classic two-men post. It is located on the North Island on an isthmus between the Tasman Sea and the Pacific Ocean, with the black sand beaches of the Tasman Sea and the white sand beaches of the Pacific. It was the commercial capital of the country. It was also the headquarters of the labor movement as well as the communist party; both institutions became matters of interest during my tour. New Zealanders were extraordinarily grateful to the US for having saved New Zealand and Australia from invasion, pillage and rape by Japanese armies. They believed that they had been spared by our victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea. That victory was commemorated annually on a national-wide basis; the celebration usually featured a four-star American general or admiral, usually from Hawaii. That general would be accorded head-of-state status for the duration of the celebration, which sometimes took as long as two weeks. He would usually arrive with a military band or a large aircraft carrier. So during my tour, Americans were held in high esteem. There weren't many of us around. I think that the entire American community in Auckland was no more than thirty, of whom about twenty-five were former Marines who had married New Zealand girls; the women hadn't liked living in the US and the family had therefore returned to New Zealand. There was also one American Air Force officer who was helping the New Zealand Air Force pilots learn to fly C-130s. Then there were Pan American and Matson Line representatives and one American who was working at a local tire factory, which had some connection to an American manufacturer. And then there were the two of us at the Consulate. So we became quickly integrated into the Auckland society, which really welcomed us.

I mentioned the Labor Party earlier. During my tour in Auckland, the estrangement between that Party and us began; its onset was typically gentle. In 1963, New Zealanders closed their stores on Saturday and Sundays; Friday night was a late a shopping night. It was also the night our courier came in from the Philippines. He would overnight in Auckland. I would go out to the airport, which was twenty-five miles outside the city, pick up the courier and his pouches, return to the Consulate building--the tallest in town, housing many different institutions. It was not long before I would always encounter a demonstration in front of the building. Picketers would march up and down on the sidewalk, but when I arrived, they would make way for me and even hold the door so that the courier and I and the pouches could get into the building. We would then go up in the elevator to our offices and open the courier's bags and do whatever was necessary.
The rare visits of opposition delegations to our offices were always civilized--much more than we feared they would be. Later, this opposition became more strident, with attacks on Americans becoming more venomous and personal. Within the labor movement, there were the same class cleavages and antagonism as existed at the time--and earlier--in the UK. But I got to know some of the most radical leaders in the Trade Union movement; our exchanges were usually in a jocular spirit. Some of the people in our Embassy in Wellington had the good sense to use the Consulate in Auckland as a resource--that was true of the Station Chief and the Labor Attaché. So I wound up doing a lot of labor reporting; I also had the opportunity to be able to offer some of the leaders trips to the US and to conferences in other countries. That helped me cement relationships with the headquarters of the Labor Federation. It gave me access to the President of that Federation and other members of his Board--with whom we quietly conspired on how to deal with the more radical and disruptive elements of their group, with whom, by the way, I also maintained contacts.

In the period we are discussing, New Zealand was led by a National government--the other major party in addition to the Labor Party. As in the UK, the backbone of the Labor Party was the labor movement. The Communist Party, on the other hand, was a different story. Except for Albania perhaps, the New Zealand Communist Party was the only white party in the world affiliated with the Chinese. That made them of some interest to us, particularly as Vietnam become more and more a US concern. We hoped to see what was going on in China through the New Zealand Communist Party. I would always read its publications and attend some of its open meetings. I also worked with the New Zealand security service, reporting to it what I had heard at the meetings I attended. That service was very close to our intelligence services; that is no great secret anymore, particularly after a great scandal broke out five or six years after I left. One of my main contacts, a British intelligence officer, had to leave New Zealand. But I did get to know--not intimately--some of the peace activists, some of whom were members of the Communist Party.

The National Party was the more conservative party. It included some very conservative New Zealanders. I can't really speak about that Party or its members, since my tasks were concentrated on the Labor Party, the Communist Party, the peace movement and the University in Auckland. I did have some contacts with New Zealand business people in terms of commercial promotion; I also wrote some reports on trade opportunities, which brought me in touch with some of the staff of the Chamber of Commerce. But I didn't get involved with national politics with those people. The contacts with the National Party were conducted by the Embassy in Wellington.

I remember that at one time, Inspectors were coming to Auckland. It occurred to someone in the Embassy that I had never been invited to visit the Embassy; it was an "oversight" that had to be taken care of before the Inspectors came. So I was invited to my first and only trip to Wellington. While I was there, the only New Zealand government official I met was the head of the Secret Service, whose identity, as is the case in the UK, was not publicly known. I met him in a private home, which actually was the headquarters of the Service. He thanked me for the work I had done with his staff in Auckland. As I said, he was the only official I met; I guess the Embassy did not believe that I merited any other introductions.
My views of the New Zealand communists—a very small group—varied from member to member. It included some very flaky people; there were members who were taking direction from outside the country. The peace movement included anti-war elements from academia and the clergy—people with a pacifist orientation whose interest grew as the US became more involved. There was an ideological affinity with the British Labor Party, particularly that faction schooled at the London School of Economics. That brand of economics was also very much in evidence among the anti-war movement. There was some concern about New Zealand becoming involved and that heightened the degree of resentment among those who opposed the war. New Zealand ultimately did become involved in the war.

There was another strain that was quite noticeable in New Zealand. The white population was very much concerned about maintaining the homogeneity of its society. As Vice-Consul, I spent a lot of time dealing with visa requests and with Americans who had gotten into one difficulty or another. Eighty-five percent of the visa applicants, when I first arrived in Auckland, would list their nationality as British. Over the course of my tour of two and a half years, that evolved to the point where only one-half would so declare. The other half listed their nationality as New Zealanders. There were many new Zealanders who referred to England as "home", even if they had been born in New Zealand. That syndrome also changed somewhat during the course of my tour.

There was a wide gulf between the white population and the Maori. I never met a Maori in the home of a white New Zealander during my two and half years in Auckland. We did meet Maoris in homes of British or other foreigners, in part because the Maoris themselves were not particularly fond of the white settlers who brought a foreign culture to New Zealand. They preferred their own. There was some concern about the growth in the population of the "islanders"—people from Cook Island, Tonga and the other Pacific islands—who were moving to Auckland in increasing numbers. They became involved with social problems and criminal activities. The Japanese were just beginning to be seen—with considerable trepidation. The first Japanese company established an office in Auckland while I was there; they hired New Zealanders to go out on the streets, while they stayed in their offices developing their strategy and tactics behind closed doors. They were afraid to go on the streets—afraid that potential New Zealand resentment of their war activities could result in violence against them.

The New Zealanders were very ambiguous about their relationships with the Japanese. They recognized that Japan was an enormous market. They were concerned that Great Britain's entry into the Common Market might jeopardize their privileged access to British markets for their traditional exports—butter, mutton and wool. So they tried to develop alternative markets in Japan and other Far East countries. New Zealand did not permit immigration from anywhere outside of Europe. Immigration from Europe was focused on people who wanted to leave the British Islands. They did accept some Dutch from Indonesia; they started civilized eating in New Zealand. They also let some Hungarians in after the Soviets repressed the revolution in Budapest in 1956, which also raised the country's culinary standards, which started at a relatively grim level.
Indonesia was not viewed as a threat—unlike the concerns in Australia which was much closer. On the other hand, the New Zealanders did at times feel threatened by the Australians. The relationships between those two countries was somewhat akin to the US-Canada relationships—with the New Zealanders being the Canadians. I can recall a couple of evening occasions, when we were somewhat rowdy, singing "Waltzing Matilda" as the evening drew to a close and thereby hopefully being mistaken for Australians. Living in New Zealand was not difficult, even on weekends when all commercial activities ceased. Many New Zealanders, even those of modest means, had little places in the countryside to which they would retreat on weekends for fishing, skiing and sailing. We would join them whenever we were invited and had some very pleasant times with some very hospitable people. On those weekends we learned how to sail, a little bit about fishing; I went skiing for the first time in my life. I became acquainted with some recreational activities that I had not enjoyed previously. I also managed through these outings to develop some friendly relationships.

New Zealanders were quite provincial. There were not too many that showed much interest in foreign affairs. One evening, I was invited by the B'nai B'rith young adult group to join a discussion with contemporaries on foreign affairs. They then became my squash partners and social companions; I would visit them and their girl-friends and wives. We had another circle of friends out of the medical community; we went skiing with some doctors.

ROGER SCHRADER
Labor Attaché
Wellington (1963-1966)

Roger Schrader entered the Foreign Service in 1957 without a particular specialty in any field. His first labor assignment after the one in Duesseldorf, Germany was Wellington, New Zealand. It was the first time Mr. Schrader had occupied a constituted labor position. In addition, Roger Schrader also served in London and West Germany. He was interviewed by Herbert Weiner on June 18, 1991.

Q: This is Herbert Weiner questioning Roger Schrader who comes to the labor function at a different point in time, probably about 14 years later. Roger, can you tell us how you got into the labor function, how it was viewed when you got into it and how you viewed it...and what sort of background did you have that you thought would be particularly useful to you?

SCHRADER: I entered the Foreign Service in 1957 as a regular Foreign Service Officer without any particular speciality. After two assignments both of which were in fields that I found not particularly to my liking or interests, one a consular assignment in Frankfurt and an administrative assignment in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs in the Department, I discovered the labor function through a person then labor advisor in the NEA Bureau, Bruce Millen, who told me about the fact that there was a newly instituted training program that the Department had begun just within the last few years. I applied for this. At that time they were
restricting entry to FSO-6's. I was an FSO-7 at the time but with the strong support of my boss then and Bruce Millen and others I was accepted into the program. At that time it was a full year training course and after completion of it with four other junior officers who were in the program I was assigned as an economic officer to the American Consulate in Duesseldorf. There no longer was a labor function at that post. There had been earlier years. It had been eliminated. The fact that the headquarters of the German Labor movement and four or five of the larger unions in Germany were headquartered in the Duesseldorf area, it provided an opportunity with the training I had to engage on the side in some labor reporting and labor contact work which was encouraged by the then Labor Attaché in Bonn who looked with some favor on someone in the Consulate in Duesseldorf who was interested in that and who was willing to do some of the work in the area on his own. So for the time I was in Duesseldorf I managed to get in some labor activity and at the time also Consul General was supportive of this endeavor.

The first labor assignment I had came after Duesseldorf when I was assigned directly from Duesseldorf to Wellington, New Zealand. That was the first time I occupied a constituted labor position, although it was quite a new one. I was only the second person in the Embassy who had ever been assigned to that particular function and because it was new there were some teething problems again about where it belonged in the Embassy, how much time devoted, and what the function was to perform. Wellington was a small Embassy with a two person Political Section, which meant one assigned there had to do a number of jobs which were outside both the political and the labor field and to that extent the fact that having been an administrative officer and a Consular officer in the past came into good use at that particular post. The position that I occupied was the second position in the Political Section which was not even designated as a Labor Attaché job, and this caused some consternation in Washington. Eventually with some persuasion from the Labor Advisor in the Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs the job title was actually changed to Labor Attaché rather than Second Secretary-Political Officer. The role of the Labor Attaché in the Embassy was something that pretty much had to be carved out since there was only the second time that such a person had been assigned there. There wasn't a clear and distinct track that had already been made for any incumbent coming into the job. In addition the Ambassador at the time was an ex-Army General whose perception of the labor movement was pretty limited, although he had superficial interest in what it was all about since it was in a function assigned to his Embassy; but basically there wasn't a great deal of support, and I found myself being pulled frequently into other activities that were more traditional political kind of reporting assignments. But about half way through the Wellington tour the Ambassadors changed and the General was replaced by a former Under Secretary of Labor, an AFL-CIO official in California, John Henning who then brought a whole new perception to the function of labor in that Embassy. From then on there really was no question as to what role the labor officer or labor attaché was going to perform. During this time of course the Vietnam War was in progress and lines were drawn very sharply on political issues with the hard left and the Communists many of whom were in the labor movement. The industrial labor movement, and many on the fringes of the Labor Party in New Zealand were causing considerable problems for American policy and the Embassy's attempt to implement it. So that in this environment the labor function took on a fairly high profile because most or a large number of the contacts I had were people who were anti-U.S. policies in New Zealand, so that in that kind of situation the role of the Labor Attaché was more easily recognized than perhaps it had been at the earlier period when I had first arrived
Q: Roger, let me ask you this. New Zealand seems to be a far away place, at least to most Americans, and yet you were carrying on a very high-profile role there. Could you tell us a little bit about the U.S.-New Zealand relationship at the time or if there were relationships and activities by the AFL-CIO, which had a very strong interest in what was going on in the Cold War, and also why the United States would have been particularly interested in New Zealand?

SCHRADER: Well there were a number of reasons, Herb, that New Zealand took on some importance despite its small size and remoteness. There were two main reasons. One, New Zealand under persuasion from the United States Government committed combat troops to Vietnam, a company of infantry and two batteries of artillery along with support units and so forth. It was in our interest to keep this going in Vietnam despite pressures in New Zealand from the left to cancel this out and to bring those forces home. Secondly, New Zealand was used frequently and on a regular basis by the U.S. Navy to provide R and R for sailors on ships that were on duty in Yankee Station in the South China Sea, and they came in and out of ports in New Zealand on a regular basis, often with protests from leftists in both the trade union movement and in the Communist Party, and in the hard left (i.e. ideological) wing of the Labor Party. So those were two things that we were interested in for American foreign policy reasons, that is to keep New Zealand active on the side of the United States and other allies in Vietnam and to thwart attempts by the hard left and the Communists to cancel this particular relationship. Within this context the labor role took on a highly recognizable function in the Embassy and in the New Zealand political community. Shortly after my arrival on a first trip to Auckland to meet trade union and political leaders in that area, I was identified immediately in an issue of "The People's Voice", which was the national Communist newspaper, as a CIA spy and so forth, which was my first encounter, but not the last, with this particular aspect of serving as a labor officer in the Foreign Service. The AFL-CIO didn't have many contacts at all with the New Zealand labor movement at the time I went out there. The relationships between the New Zealand Federation of Labor, which was their main national federation, and the AFL-CIO were at a pretty low watermark. The FOL in those days was heavily infiltrated at all levels by hard left and Communist trade union officials, which cooled the relations with 16th street. There was an attempt in each year I was there to get some American trade union official to speak at the annual conference of the Federation of Labor which was only partially successful. On one occasion an official from Okinawa who was associated with the AFL-CIO institute in the Asian area was invited to come and speak to the FOL conference but this was the only time that any American trade unionist was included in the official activities. The existence of John Henning down there, however, did create an embarrassment for the Federation of Labor and its leadership because he was so completely popular in the country at all levels and with all segments and institutions in the country. It was quite apparent that the FOL was not providing him with the sort of recognition and honors that other institutions were, and so a number of officials of the Federation of Labor made an effort on their own and outside the existing hierarchy of the organization to publicly make known their regard for John Henning and to shower him with kudos and awards of their own in their own unions and so forth. During this time there was an effort, at least the beginning of an effort, by the AFL-CIO to include New Zealand in the larger context of some sort of Asian-Pacific operation; and a delegation from the AFL-CIO did appear in New Zealand
at John Henning’s invitation and spent considerable time there with Henning and with friends in New Zealand and labor officials who were counted as friends of United States - and they made quite an impact during their stay in the country. This was the only official delegation from the AFL-CIO that ever appeared in the country during the four years that I was in New Zealand. This delegation that came to New Zealand in about 1968 and included a couple of union presidents and staff members from the AFL-CIO was the forerunner of what later became the institute of the AFL-CIO in the Asian-Pacific area AAFLI. These people were on a kind of a ground-breaking trip to look into the possibilities of the AFL-CIO establishing some kind of an organization out there and New Zealand was one of a number of places they visited at the time.

WEINER: Well, Roger, in your experiences, as a matter of fact in both of our experiences, we have had to deal with other agencies, could you tell us a bit about what your relationships were with other agencies since others became involved in labor programs?

SCHRADER: I think that without question the other agency that I had most dealings with was the U.S. Information Service. The posts that I served in didn't have any AID components. They were all in developed countries. So USIS was the main other agency that I had dealings with and I must say very favorable dealings. I found that they were a very, very useful and helpful organization to deal with in carrying out the manifold responsibilities in the labor function. For example in Wellington the Public Affairs Officer and the U.S. Information Service establishment were very helpful in organizing or implementing the International Visitor Program to include labor participants. In addition they were open to suggestions about how we might utilize American labor specialists coming to New Zealand to better influence and assist some of the peripheral areas that segments of labor movement were interested in, for example, trade union education, which had a long history in New Zealand but at the time I was there had become pretty dormant and to the extent that it existed at all was laced very heavily with left ideological leanings. With the assistance of USIS and the encouragement from a new labor institute at Victoria University in Wellington we were able to get a U.S. labor expert out to spend six or eight weeks in New Zealand to help formulate an effective trade union education policy. This was a kind of relationship that I found very useful in later posts with USIS and I always found that they were very amenable to new ideas and suggestions as how to best enhance the role of the labor officer and assist him in carrying out his responsibilities. In Bonn, for example, I was able to initiate a labor trade union information bulletin which was issued on a regular basis and could only have been done with the assistance of, again, the Public Affairs Officer and the U.S. Information establishment there, because I had to depend on them for the printing and distribution of this particular bulletin, and again on moving to London we were able to take that idea and get it accepted by the U.S. Information Service in London and they were very helpful in editing, in printing and in distributing again a news bulletin that we put out on a regular basis. In addition I was able to convince the Public Affairs Officer to integrate into his annual budget and program a NATO trip designed exclusively for labor trade union officials and in some cases Labor Party officials who were closely identified with trade unions. This was a particular venture which they agreed to institute and after its first success continued to incorporate it in the annual USIS budget in all the years that I was in London.

Q: Roger, one of the things I noticed was that when I was in Australia one of the issues that had
evolved as a result of World War II was the change in attitude in Australia towards Asians and Asian countries, which had taken an extreme form in Australia called the "white Australia policy", where Asians were totally excluded from Australia. Australians tended to see themselves as Europeans simply living in the Pacific area and Australia really being a part of Europe. Even in the Department of State Australia was placed bureaucratically within the European area rather than with Asia. Over time, however, as a result of World War II Australia began to see that it had to get along better with Asian countries in the Pacific area and to come to some sort of a modus vivendi rather than trying to shut itself off from the Asian countries. By that I mean not only Japan whom it feared but also Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and so forth. By the time I left Australia, which was in 1953, that issue was just in its embryonic state of change. Had you noticed a similar kind of issue happening in New Zealand and at a later date when your tour in New Zealand took place? What evolution had it undergone?

SCHRADER: There certainly was recognition of this phenomenon during the time I was in New Zealand. I think in honesty, however, it was playing at a later time cycle than it had occurred in Australia. In the mid-60's which was my time in New Zealand from 1965 to 1969, the country still largely considered itself both psychologically and emotionally to be an integral part of the British Isles. In fact even at that late date the population breakdown of New Zealand was virtually identical in numbers of Scots, Welsh, Irish and British as existed in the U.K. itself and most of the people continued to consider themselves British subjects. The constant refrain that one heard all the time of "going home" meant going home to Britain even voiced by New Zealanders who may have been of the third or fourth generation out there. This issue was brought to a head, I think, in large part because of Britain's entry into the Common Market and the establishment of a transition period for in effect the cutting out of New Zealand's free entry into Britain of virtually all its basic products. At the time I left, this was just beginning to take hold and New Zealanders were fearful that this would cause some considerable disruptions in their economic and social life out there. As a result they somewhat quickly began to look at Asia as an area which they needed to find accommodation with what they had not felt was not necessary in the past. It reached the point, for example, that a large promotion campaign was undertaken by the New Zealand Government to teach the Japanese to eat lamb, a product which New Zealand had in plentiful quantities but for which the Japanese market had never been a significant part of New Zealand's exports. This kind of interest in Asia came quite a bit later than it did in Australia; but it had all of the same kinds of consequences and the same motivations for it, namely that the New Zealanders saw that their economic future was going to have to lie elsewhere other than with the U.K.

Another aspect of this turning away from Britain and looking to Asia also had a certain amount of play out with regard for the United States. Ever since the Second World War there had been an ambivalent feeling among New Zealanders about where they owed their destiny. Historically, it had been Britain but at the time of the Second World War with the entire New Zealand Army away from home fighting with the British in North Africa they were totally defenseless against encroachments of the Japanese until American Marines were sent to take up the defense of New Zealand and remained for the rest of the war. This changed the attitude of many New Zealanders about where their future allegiance should lie. As Britain approached membership into the Common Market this looking towards the United States that had emanated from the Second
World War became even greater in many respects because a number of New Zealanders felt that they were being betrayed by Britain. I suspect that some of these same kinds of sentiments must have existed also in Australia, didn't they Herb?

JAMES G. LOWENSTEIN
Economic Bureau
Washington, DC (1964-1965)

Ambassador James G. Lowenstein was born in New Jersey in 1927. He entered the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in France, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), and Yugoslavia, and an ambassadorship to Luxembourg. Ambassador Lowenstein was interviewed by Ambassador Dennis Kux in 1994.

LOWENSTEIN: Now, on the subject of mistakes, let me just give you the other side of the picture. One day Fulbright called me down to his office and said, "I am sick and tired of these other countries supporting the war in Vietnam when politically they don't believe in it. They are supporting it because they are making a lot of money out of it. So, get the facts and give me a speech that I can deliver on the floor." So I prepared a lot of correspondence that went to the Defense Department, the State Department, asking all sorts of questions and figures on exports and all the rest of it. I called the Congressional Research Service and they did their usual superb job of a research document. I got all the facts together and wrote a speech. Fulbright went on the floor and delivered this steaming indictment of Allied behavior in Vietnam.

The next morning I got a call from the Counselor of the New Zealand embassy who asked me where I had gotten the figure that Fulbright had given for the profit that the New Zealanders had made in Vietnam. I described the complicated procedure by which I had arrived at this figure by taking various figures from various attachments and adding and subtracting and multiplying, etc. and assured him that is where the figure had come from. He said that that was what they had assumed since Fulbright had outlined the procedure in his speech and they had done the same thing. However, their figure was 20 percent of my figure.

I checked my figures and called him back and said, "Well, I am awfully sorry. You are right and I am wrong. So what do we do about this?" He said, "Well, it may interest you to know that the Prime Minister made a statement in parliament about two hours ago. The ambassador, in fact, is in the State Department right now delivering a formal protest to the Secretary of State. The only thing that my government wants is a formal apology from Fulbright on the floor of the Senate."

So I went crawling down to Fulbright's office and opened the door and said, "I am sorry, I quit, I am leaving, etc." He said, "Well, what's the matter with you?" And I said, "Well, the matter is that this happened and it is embarrassing you and I will be out of my office by 3:00 this afternoon. All I can say is I'm very sorry." And he said, "Ah, come on, don't be so silly. All right, so they are not making what you said they are making, they are still making a lot. What
difference does it make?" I said, "Well, the difference it makes is that the Prime Minister has made a statement in parliament and the ambassador is protesting to the Secretary of State and they want a formal apology from you on the floor." And he said, "So, they want a formal apology. Do they really want a formal apology?" "That's what they said." "All right, I will give them a formal apology," he said.

THOMAS F. CONLON
Australia/New Zealand Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1964-1966)

Born in Park Ridge, Illinois, Thomas F. Conlon was one of five children. After serving in the Army Air Forces during World War II, he attended and graduated from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1948. Mr. Conlon's extensive career included posts in Canberra, Havana, Australia/New Zealand, Indonesia, France, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. He was interviewed on August 12, 1992 by Arbor W. Gray.

Q: Then you were assigned as Australia-New Zealand desk officer. How did this happen?

CONLON: Dave Cuthell had arranged to have me assigned to the Indonesian desk, with a view to my ultimately being desk officer, since I had an Indonesian background and Ed Ingraham, the desk officer, was due for transfer to another assignment before long. In fact, he was assigned to the National War College in mid 1964. However, Dave had not discussed this assignment with me, and he quickly learned how strongly opposed I was to the established policy of support for President Sukarno. Other people might simply have dumped me at this point, but Dave was a very decent man, and he may have felt bad about not having asked whether I would accept assignment to the Indonesian desk. In July, 1964, the Australia-New Zealand desk became vacant, and Dave assigned me to it.

This was a marvelous assignment. Our relations with Australia and New Zealand had always been very close and cordial, beyond occasional differences on trade matters. Coming after assignments to Vietnam and Indonesian affairs, it was like coming out into the sunlight. I did the usual desk officer jobs--keeping up with the reporting from the Embassy, arranging for calls by Australian leaders on the Secretary and other senior officers in the Department, and getting in three visits to Australia. It was very helpful and agreeable to work with the high quality Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington.

But I didn't escape Vietnam completely. I had gone around giving talks on Vietnam to university and public groups for a couple of years and I continued to do so even after moving over to the Australian-New Zealand desk. In fact, Dave Cuthell told me that he had been instructed "from a very high level" not to object to my continuing to go out on such speaking trips. He never told me what the level was, and I didn't ask him, since he didn't want to explain. He used to refer to these trips as "Tom Conlon's social engagements." Despite his having stuck me on the Indonesian desk
without consulting me, he more than made up for it with the Australia-New Zealand desk. He was a very decent man for whom I always had the highest personal regard, even if I didn't always agree with his views on Indonesia.

JULIET F. KIDNEY
Washington, DC (1966)

Juliet Kidney grew up in Dayton, Ohio and attended Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts. There, she majored in economics and became interested in labor because of a professor there. When she was employed at the Division of Foreign Labor Conditions, she worked on the branch that did substantive research on country studies. She was interviewed by Morris Weisz on May 18, 1993.

Q: That is a very interesting thing in the light of what the International Labor Organization (ILO) looks into: the law and the practice and the difference between the two.

KIDNEY: I went to visit Australia and New Zealand because the person who was doing the studies on those two countries was unable to go. I was the only one really who was available, so I went over and spent two weeks in each of those countries. The labor attaché in Australia was extremely helpful, setting up appointments for me with judges of the labor arbitration courts and other people [such as] labor leaders. I even went out to Perth because of the special situation there between our U.S. Navy base there and the Australian Government.

Q: Who was the labor attaché then?

KIDNEY: Juan de Zengotita. Then in New Zealand, I already had a friend there who had been with the [New Zealand] Embassy here [in Washington] and he was very helpful to me. The labor attaché at that time was Roger Schrader. In New Zealand I had some very interesting experiences, which Roger helped to arrange. One of them involved an electric power plant they were building on a lake in the southern part of South Island. They had to tunnel through the mountains from the fjord on the other side; and they had Yugoslav workers doing the tunneling and living on a hostel ship on the other side in the fjord, and a totally native group of workers handling the building of the electrical plant.

Q: Oh, you mean the native New Zealanders, that is [people of] British [extraction]. When you said natives of New Zealand, I was thinking of Maori.

KIDNEY: Well, there were some but not many.

So there were two different local unions, one working with the Yugoslavs and another one at the electrical plant, and they didn't always agree. And so-I don't remember the details now. I wish I did.-it was a fascinating study and I would have liked to have been able to do more with that.
Then I went down to Invercargill, the very tip of South Island. I talked to a union there, which, as I remember, was going to be very much involved with the electrical output of this plant and the handling of the local distribution of the power. That was one of the major interviews. I also talked to judges of the labor courts and so forth. So after those four weeks, I then went on to India, where Morris Weisz was the labor attaché, and I stayed with him and Yetta and discussed some of the questions we had about the Indian study. From there I traveled to Israel, where the labor attaché...

**IDAR D. RIMESTAD**

**Advance Team Member for Presidential Visit**

**Wellington, New Zealand (1966)**

*Ambassador Idar Rimestad was born and raised in North Dakota. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included assignments in Moscow and Paris, and an ambassadorship to Switzerland. Ambassador Rimestad was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1990.*

RIMESTAD: I didn't know anybody in the White House until I was asked by Bill Crockett to go to New Zealand to advance President Johnson's visit to that country. In late 1966, the President went on a long journey throughout South East Asia. Some posts like Wellington needed help when it came to major events such as Presidential visits and Crockett asked me to be the control officer. I got Bill's call about three weeks before the President was scheduled to arrive in Wellington. So I hurried to New Zealand.

There were about 400 people expected to accompany the President. Two-thirds of those were either communicators or from the media. Where would we house such a large contingent in a small city like Wellington? The racing season was on at that time and the most we could find was twenty-two rooms in a hotel. That was the maximum. I was sitting in the Ambassador's office looking out on the waters and I saw a ferryboat. The Ambassador said that it traveled to and from the South Island on an overnight voyage. I asked whether it had sleeping room? He said: "Yes. You can sleep two-hundred and fifty people on it". The light came on. I asked him whether we could get hold of the ferry operator to do some business. Fortunately, the company was just bringing in a boat which needed rehabilitation, which would then be sent to Hong Kong to ferry passengers and cars there. So we made a deal with the ferry boat owner. We rented the boat, although for longer than we wanted because their union contract required it. The operator put sheets on the beds and fixed it all up. The guests were a little surprised when they found they had to sleep on a ferryboat, but they did. Marvin Watson, who was President Johnson's chief honcho for these trips, called me and told me that he thought the ferry rental was brilliant. He said that back in Washington, people didn't think we could pull off something like this and that all hell would have broken loose when the President arrived in Wellington. He had heard that everybody was to go to an Army barracks. Watson said: "You know what would have happened if the media had to be put in Army barracks!". The visit went well and it had its interesting moments. I got a call one night--about midnight. It was from Bill Crockett, asking me if had the wreath for the
next day's ceremonies. I said: "Yes. I asked my supply officer to get it". Bill asked: "Have you
seen it? Please go see it and then call me back". So I went to the supply officer and got him out of
bed. He said: "I don't have it. It will be delivered at eight o'clock in the morning". I told him I
wanted to see it now. He answered that I should tell the Presidential party that that couldn't be
done. I told him to get out of bed and get that wreath right then and there because it had to be at
the site at 7:30 in the morning. So the wreath-maker was awakened and he made the wreath and
delivered it that night. That was my first lesson in Presidential visits: never take anybody's word
for anything--verify it yourself.

JOHN H. KELLY
Advance Team, Presidential Visit
Wellington (1966)

John H. Kelly was born in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin in 1939. He received a
bachelor's degree in history from Emory University. Mr. Kelly entered the Foreign
Service in 1964. His career included positions in Adana, Ankara, Bangkok, and
Songkhla. This interview was conducted by Thomas Stern on December 12, 1994.

KELLY: The Department had designated two junior officers in Ankara to help out and we were
instructed to leave for Wellington, New Zealand within 48 hours. The other junior officer--Bob
Blaise--and I would work for the advance team.

So the two of us left for Wellington to help the Embassy, which was very small, and the advance
team to get ready for Johnson and his entourage. We flew thirty-six hours to get there. Willy
Woodward, a political appointee, was in charge. Idar Rimestad was the senior State Department
representative and we worked for him. I didn't know the first thing about Presidential visits or
about New Zealand, as a matter of fact. When we arrived, we were housed on a ship because
Wellington only had a few hotels that were all booked up. The ship was an inter-island ferry,
named the SS Hinomoa--better known as the Tilting Hilton. The ship was tied up to the pier, but
it rolled enough to make one Secret Service agent very sea sick. I slept for about twenty hours
catching up on what I had lost on the way from Ankara. I then reported to the Embassy, where I
was told that I would be in charge of airport arrivals and departures and the motor pool. These
were not subjects with which I had much experience, but I plunged in and did what seemed
sensible to me. It was an interesting and, in retrospect, a fun experience which gave me
something to do contrasted to Ankara.

LBJ must have been in Wellington for 36 hours at the most. It was very exciting and I enjoyed
that experience. I figured out that there was a pecking order on a Presidential trip. I learned that it
was very important to figure that out. I also learned that White House staffs were mercurial and
that in the case of LBJ, it reflected the personality of the President. LBJ did outrageous things; I
remember one night, at 3 a.m., Johnson wanted something to eat. He wanted beef salad,
strawberries and red wine. It was the sort of whim that only despots get. But people did get up
and went shopping, looking for stores that might have the desired goods. Then they woke up the
owners, asked them to come from their beds to the store and bought the food. And sure enough, LBJ’s wishes were satisfied that night. Of course, the President traveled with his own chef and a huge larder of foods--Texas steaks, hamburgers and all of his favorite foods. But I think, just to be devilish, he ordered things in the middle of the night that he knew had not been brought on his plane. In any case, not many of us go much sleep during that visit. A lot of my colleagues were appalled by the antics; I was fascinated.

Idar must have thought that I had done a reasonably good job because before leaving Wellington, he asked me whether I wanted to go to Australia to support that visit. I did that and then Idar sent me to Bangkok to work on that advance. The other junior officers had all returned to their posts; Idar must have thought that I had some talent or that I was a real glutton for punishment. Bangkok had a large Embassy, run by Ambassador Graham Martin. No one at the Embassy could figure out why this young whipper snapper, junior officer named Kelly had been sent. But since they had received instructions from Idar, they put me to work. In retrospect, I did learn a lot of trivia about Presidential visits, but as anyone who has had any experience with them knows, trivia is what makes or breaks Presidential visits.

DEAN RUSK
Secretary of State
Washington, DC (1966-1969)

Secretary of State Dean Rusk was born on September 2, 1909. He went to David College, receiving a B.A. in 1931, and later received a M.A. as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University in 1934. After college, he joined the U.S. Army from 1940-1946. He joined the State Department in 1946. His interview was conducted in 1987.

Q: Did you have any hint that he was going to add that last paragraph on his own?

RUSK: Yes, he talked to me about this the previous year and left me with a very clear impression that he was very seriously considering withdrawing from public life at the end of his first full term. He will have covered this in his book by the time this recording is available, but he had talked to me about the fact that no Vice President had ever succeeded to the Presidency and then run for two full terms.

He had had his own views on the matter, so I was not surprised when I was told on my way to New Zealand for a meeting that his speech was going to have in it a final paragraph that would be of interest to me.

I think the most concern we had over Indonesia had to do with the confrontation with Malaya. They got into a situation where they were sending guerrillas not only into the offshore parts of Malaysia over in Borneo, but also in Malay proper, and we were concerned because Australia and New Zealand had security commitments to Malaysia and had forces there. Under the Anzus
Treaty, if New Zealand or Australian forces were attacked in the treaty area, and Malaysia was in the treaty area, that could very likely bring up the obligation of Anzus and involve the United States and our commitment to Australia and New Zealand. We tried to point that out to Sukarno in an effort to cause him to pause. Fortunately with the change in government in Indonesia, the confrontation came to a close; and that was a major step forward in the general political security situation in Southeast Asia.

Another thing that made a considerable difference in this matter was the new attitude of Australia. Australia and New Zealand had traditionally held themselves more of less aloof from Asian affairs. They looked upon themselves as a member of the Commonwealth but Australia began to accept its roles as a Far Eastern country-and to take an active part in these regional discussions among Asian countries. This was a very marked development in Australian policy and, was very wholesome in terms of encouraging the Asians to get together on a more realistic basis on their own affairs.

Now, bear in mind that New Zealand is a long way from Southeast Asia. I've been told that New Zealand is further away from Saigon than Saigon is from Paris. I think you'd have to take some measurement on that, but in any event they're not all that close in. They geographically have the capability of being more or less aloof, but they've decided not to be aloof, and they've taken an active part in the discussions among the free countries of Asia.

JOHN N. HUTCHISON
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Wellington (1968-1973)

William E. Hutchinson was born in Iowa in 1917. He graduated from high school in 1928 and then went to the University at Fayetteville and got his degree in journalism. Entering active duty with the Army in 1941, Mr. Hutchison was a Lieutenant Colonel by 1944. His career with USIA included foreign assignments in Japan, Pakistan, Libya, Nigeria, and Hong Kong. He was interviewed by Jack O'Brien on August 10, 1989.

HUTCHINSON: I left there when the PAO Wellington died of a heart attack. I can't remember his name at the moment, Jerry somebody. He was somebody I hadn't known personally.

Q: Somebody I knew, too, and I can't think now.

HUTCHINSON: I never actually knew him. I met him once at a PAO meeting somewhere. When I heard that post was open, I wrote back to Dan Oleksiw, who was then head of East Asia and Pacific Area, and told him I would like to go down there, and I wrote back to Jim Thomas. I'd been his supervisor for years, and at this point he was my supervisor when I was at RSC Manila. I wrote to Jim. So Jim and Dan worked it out, and I went down to New Zealand for two tours, four years in all.
Some curious things happened in the agency that I think are worth mentioning. They are negative, but I think they belong in something like this. You may recall that the agency produced a film called "The Silent Majority."

Q: Yes.

HUTCHISON: This was sent to us in New Zealand, and we were under instructions to get the widest possible distribution and so on. I had to look at it in our little viewing room with a couple of my local employees. It was a patchwork of old documentary stuff designed to show that the American people really did support the Vietnam War, in spite of everything you've heard. It was so patently fake, that after we ran it, I said to this gal who handled broadcasting (we were supposed to get this on NZBC), "Do not under any circumstances take that up there. We'll just be ridiculed out of town. Don't do anything with it. Put it on a shelf." And we didn't do anything with it. We never let it see the light of day. I thought it would be a disaster.

You might remember this. Jack Zeller, who lives over here in Santa Rosa, reminded me.

Q: He was my executive officer in Thailand when I first went out.

HUTCHISON: Jack was at the meeting, because he remembers the meeting that I'm talking about, and I don't remember the year. It seems to me it might have been later than '70. I think so. (It was. Either in 1971 or '72.) It had to be later, because that picture hadn't been made in '70. I think it must have been '72.

At one of the alumni luncheons here recently, like the one at which you spoke, Jack Zeller, whom I never knew, introduced himself. He reminded me of the incident at the PAO meeting in Manila. I didn't know Herschensohn from Adam's house cat. He initiated a discussion around the room, asking each country, each PAO, how he had used the film. When it came to my turn, I said, "I took a spade and buried it in the alley."

I don't remember how long later, some time later, I got a letter from Henry Loomis, when he was deputy to Shakespeare, telling me that I was going to be separated from the agency unless I shaped up. I forget what the language was, but that's what it amounted to. It really jolted me, because I had an absolutely unblemished record with USIA, and plenty of commendations to vouch for it. I really was shaken and furious. I didn't connect it with the Manila meeting. I didn't know what had happened. I hadn't the foggiest idea what could have triggered this.

I had been through a State Department inspection, in which they also inspected USIA as a kind of corollary, got a glowing report, I'd had a fine report on my last USIS inspection in Manila, a glowing report. So I had nothing in the record that I knew about that could have caused this, and I didn't connect it with Manila at all. I didn't know what the inside was at Washington at the time.

Kent Crane was, had for a while, replaced Oleksiw as Director for East Asia and the Pacific Area, including New Zealand and Australia. Kent Crane came in to Wellington. I remember we
were kind of joggled when he was appointed, because he had no apparent qualifications for this, and he came out of the Spiro Agnew organization. So we were all really kind of disturbed when we heard he'd been appointed. I'm still not sure that he had any great qualifications for the job. But he came through, he was very nice. We got on fine.

Q: A very intelligent fellow.

HUTCHISON: Seemed to be.

Q: Extremely right wing.

HUTCHISON: I suppose so. Crane was on a kind of inspection tour of his own, and I set up some meetings for him in Wellington. In fact, I set up a big party for him, at which he met every important person in New Zealand, because my contacts were very good. I took him down to Christ Church to meet editors and so on, on the south island. I thought, "Well, I can't fight this thing from here. I don't know what to do. Here Crane is my superior in this hierarchy. I'll just take my file along."

On the plane I handed him the file with that letter from Loomis on top of it. I handed him my file of commendations, which was really good, solid documentation. And in the hour or so it took us to fly down, he read through this whole thing very carefully, and he said to me, "I don't understand this at all. I don't see how it could happen on the basis of your record as you've got it right here." He didn't promise anything, but he gave me the impression he would look into it when he got back to Washington. This must have been in 1972.

About six months later, I was given a superior award, a silver medal, the usual diploma from Shakespeare. (Laughs) Now, how do you...

Q: He never ordered you separated after that.

HUTCHISON: No! No. I can't attribute this to anybody but Kent Crane. He's the only person I took it up with. I can only guess or assume that he did take this back to Washington and said, "Let's do some justice here." (Laughs) I don't see any other answer.

Q: The reason that I thought it might have been 1970 is because at that time, Henry Loomis had apparently been told by Shakespeare that the agency was overstaffed, and I don't know whether Henry was the originator of the project, or whether he was doing it on the orders of Frank Shakespeare, but they set out to separate about 150 people from the agency. A committee was established on which were sitting Ken Bunce, Barbara White and I've forgotten who the other members of the committee were. They were asked to review every file of every senior officer in the agency, and they came up, finally, with a list of about 80 people that they thought might be separated because their records weren't quite as good as others, although they still were good records, but the committee had to find a certain number of people. They submitted it to Henry, and I'm advised by someone that they were told this was not enough, and to go back to the drawing board. This happened a second time, and the ultimate result was that about 150 people
were selected out on the basis of this review, many of them with very excellent records. A few of them appealed, without success. Finally, one of them, Fred Dickens, spent six years preparing his case, presenting it, appealing it, and finally the agency was forced to reinstate him. He got all his back pay! He got his annuity increased as if he had been employed all through those years, and they had to pay him everything back from the time of his separation to the date of his restoration. But he's the only person who ever won a case like that. I remember that I testified on his behalf when he was bringing the case. Since I knew about this enforced "selection out" process going on in 1970, I thought your problem might have occurred at that time.

HUTCHISON: I don't think so. This was later. This had to be later. It had to be. I must say I had known Henry when he was in the Voice, when I was heading IPS and so on, and although we never were close in operation or personally, we always got on well. This was a very legalistic letter, which said, in effect, "Either shape up or ship out," as if I had to correct things I was doing wrong, and yet I had excellent relations with -- I had no supervisor in Wellington who could have complained about me. I was on good relations with the embassy itself, we got on well. And I'm quite confident that there was nobody operating against my interests in the embassy. I have no suspicion whatever.

Here's this very involved language that seemed to have been devised carefully by the agency lawyers or something, you know. On the bottom of it, in a little handwritten note, Henry wrote, "I'm sorry about this, Hutch." The inference I took from that was that this was a perfunctory document which he had to sign just because he was the signing officer, and it certainly suggested that he regretted it and that he hadn't has a part in it himself. It wasn't a personal letter; it was a very legalistic letter.

Q: What were your main program thrusts in New Zealand?

HUTCHISON: New Zealand is a country that is very responsive to the American culture and American objectives. Forget this nuclear hassle that's going on now. To put it in simplest terms, so friendly, that it didn't seem to me that a contrived country plan was suitable to the job in New Zealand. It seemed to me the thing to do in New Zealand -- this is what I acted upon all the time I was there -- was to introduce New Zealanders as much as possible to what's going on in the United States and what Americans are like, and if you accomplished that, that in itself was a country plan. I traveled that country from hell to breakfast. I made hundreds of speeches, I showed films, I developed all kinds of homemade programs which had as their real purpose, not the program itself, but the introduction of Americans and American thought to New Zealanders. So my principal interest was in devices which would establish more and more of this contact. I think I succeeded in it.

Dean Koch succeeded me. I think he really was astonished. He came down to take over while I was still there. (I think that's something the agency ought to strive to do as often as they possibly can. It doesn't always happen, but it should any time it's possible at all, assuming that the incoming guy and the outgoing guy are compatible or reasonably polite.) So when Dean arrived, I put on, in effect, a reception for him that really, I think, kind of knocked him out, because he met every important person in Wellington at that thing. I think I had developed relationships with
them that were almost on a family basis. It's that kind of a country. People like to say New Zealand is a country built on a human scale, and that's a very good description of it. Everybody knows everybody else.

I said, "There are three gentlemen over here I want you to meet," all elderly men sitting against the wall, not the kind of people that feel like getting up and circulating, nor did they have to. I can't remember their names at this point, but one was a former air marshal of the New Zealand Air Force; one was the head of their scientific establishment and world renowned scholar; and one was a retired high court judge. And every one was a knight. They were all "Sir this" and "Sir that," you know. So I took Dean over and said, "These are three people you must meet." They were really topnotch gentlemen as personalities and really distinguished New Zealanders. So I introduced him to all these people.

Later on in the evening, one of these men, with whom I was especially good friends, a very dignified old boy, he said, "I'll bet your friend never had three knights stand up for him before." (Laughs)

It was a very satisfying post, and I think in that kind country, there's an attitude that doesn't fit anywhere else that I can think of.

Q: Where you have factions that are either pro-communist or anti-U.S.

HUTCHISON: Yes. So I wouldn't recommend that way to operate anywhere else I can think of, but I think that was the way to do it there. It's a homey country. At the same time, they are sensitive to any feeling that they're being propagandized, and quick to recognize it. It's a highly literate country.

Q: Communications have placed Washington so close to the field, that both the ambassador and the head of any of the programs under the embassy have to look over their shoulders at Washington much more carefully than they did then. So I think we've lost some of that free-wheeling, enterprising spirit that we had, and with it, I think we have lost some of the esprit de corps. But maybe I'm wrong.

HUTCHISON: I think you're right. I remember in Wellington, we got this instruction, this must have been about 1971, '72, we got an administrative instruction which required us to keep these elaborate records on all of our budgeting and programs, big long tables that you filled out and so on. I sent a message back to the agency, pointing out that we were only two Americans. We only had seven people. And that this was a tremendous burden in terms of our time, to maintain this kind of record and attempt to allocate budget when all seven of us knew exactly where every nickel went, and that this kind of programming for a post of that size didn't seem to me to be efficient or useful. I said in these words, "I would request that a post like ours be allowed to continue to fly by the seat of its pants."

I got back a very cold instruction which said, in effect, "Get on with it. Do it like we told you." So we had to. But I think in an earlier day, there would have been a little better tolerance. Of
course, it's a part of bureaucracy. It's often difficult for bureaucrats to depart from their regulations.

HENDRICK VAN OSS
Deputy Chief of Mission
Wellington (1968-1970)

Hendrick Van Oss was born in 1917 in Pennsylvania and graduated from Princeton University. He joined the Department of State in 1942 and the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Austria, Uganda, Mozambique, New Zealand, the Congo, and Washington, DC. Mr. Van Oss was interviewed by Lillian Mullin on February 8, 1991.

Q: Continuing the interview of Hendrik Van Oss reporting his experiences in his assignment to Wellington, New Zealand, from July 1968 to November 1970.

VAN OSS: I was assigned to the American Embassy in Wellington, New Zealand in 1968 as Deputy Chief of Mission after having completed the Senior Seminar course at FSI. I was, therefore, refreshed and full of vim and vigor. I arrived there in July 1968. My Ambassador was John Henning, who was a Democratic Party political appointee. He had been Assistant Secretary of Labor. He had been a prominent official with the AFL-CIO. His orientation was labor union. But he was one of the best political appointee ambassadors I have ever served with and as far as New Zealand was concerned, probably one of the most effective American Ambassadors ever to have served there.

New Zealand was a wonderful country to be in. It is a beautiful country as everybody knows. For anybody who likes hiking, athletics, outdoors, beautiful scenery, a pleasant climate, it is an absolutely perfect spot. As a Foreign Service assignment, professionally, it is not all that interesting. There was no warfare, no adversaries to worry about, no political upheavals, no communist threat.

Our main concern in New Zealand was with the unfavorable balance of trade. New Zealand sold us more than we sold them. New Zealand's main exports to the U.S. were wool, dairy and meat products, and later on of course Kiwi fruit, although the last had not yet arrived on the scene...we were eating it in Wellington but they had not started exporting it in any great quantity when I was there.

Instead of security matters, the main thing to worry about was whether New Zealanders were going to export too much cheddar into the United States and thus exceed the quota limits that we had imposed upon such imports. This led to a rather interesting bit of activity. The New Zealanders would develop a new cheese that was just like cheddar, except that it had certain ingredients that were not in our quota's definition of cheddar...just enough to take it out of the cheddar nomenclature.
Q: Would they give it a new name as well?

VAN OSS: Yes, of course. They would call it something else and send it to the United States. U.S. officialdom would eventually cotton to this, would analyze the new cheese and find that it actually was just like cheddar with these very, very minor variations. We would then alter the regulations so that the new cheese would fall under the cheddar quota limitations. Whereupon New Zealand would start all over again with yet another "new" cheese with a few different elements in it that took the new product out of the cheddar designation, and the U.S. would in turn widen the definition of cheddar, and so it continued.

Also we ran into problems with beef. We had worked out a system with the New Zealanders whereby if they came within 110 percent of a certain limit to the quantity of beef exported to the U.S. this would trigger a situation in which the U.S. would automatically apply quotas on the amount of beef New Zealand would be allowed to export to us. They always kept their beef sales under that limit to avoid the imposition of quotas.

The export of young New Zealand lamb to the U.S. was not under any quota, although our own American sheep producers were anxious to limit lamb imports, so New Zealand could send us all the lamb we could take, without the risk of falling under a quota.

New Zealand, is a beautiful country. It has more sheep per capita than any other place in the world. Its human population has remained fairly steady around 3 million, and the sheep population ranges anywhere from 30 to 60 million. You are talking about 10 to 20 sheep per capita.

The climate in New Zealand is so mild, even in the winter, that grass grows all year around. They grow grass everywhere in the North Island, including the tops of high hills. So, wherever one walks one finds grass, and wherever one walks one finds sheep.

New Zealand is where I learned how to "right" a "cast" sheep, if you know what that is. A "cast" sheep is a pregnant ewe that falls, gets on its side and can't get up. If somebody doesn't help it get up it eventually dies from starvation. The sheep are not tended daily, they are rounded up every couple of months or so. So, whenever you were walking and saw a cast sheep, the gentlemanly thing to do was to get it on its feet.

New Zealand has every conceivable type of scenic beauty. On the North Island there are verdant hills, a couple of volcanoes and thermal springs. It has windy weather...Wellington is one of the windiest places in the world. I would say an average wind during a typical day is about 40 miles per hour. The winds can get so strong that they knock you off your feet if you are on top of a hill. On the South Island there are mountains and glaciers much like Switzerland. It is closer to the Antarctic so the weather is much colder than on North Island, being very similar to that of Scotland.

It is a truism to say that New Zealand is one of the more British of the British Commonwealth
areas. New Zealanders consider England their home. They are patriotic New Zealanders at the same time, but they still look to England as their mother country. The women curtsy to the Governor General's wife and all that sort of thing. And, yet, they are very democratic, admirable people in every respect. They are plain spoken, don't accept tips, or didn't while I was there, except maybe in some of the tourist hotels. They are very informal, don't like pretense, are easy to get along with, love to be talked to and to talk.

A foreign diplomat, if he allowed himself to do it, could easily be invited to speak every day of the week. Every type of club exists in New Zealand: Lions, Rotary, etc. My experience was that whenever I was asked to speak...let's say at a Lions Club...I would typically be told in advance that my speech was to be no longer than 20 minutes. After I arrived, we would have dinner and then the audience would start off and get completely involved in their own club activities...levying fines on members who had done something they shouldn't have done, cracking jokes, or making references to local business...so that by the time it was my turn to speak, the chairman would say, "Now, Mr. Van Oss is here to give us very brief remarks," and then stage whisper to me, "No longer than seven minutes." So I would have to compress my 20 minutes into 7. My audience always accepted whatever I said very amiably and I was always given a thank you speech in return which often tended to be longer than the abbreviated speech I had given.

As I say, New Zealand was not terribly interesting professionally. The politics were quite unremarkable, although there was a lively adversarial relationship between the National (Conservative) Party and the Labor Party.

Q: The Conservatives were in when you got there, weren't they?

VAN OSS: That is right. The Nationals were in and Keith Holyoke was the prime minister. A very fine man, very unpretentious. He had a rather pompous way of talking, but was really a very humble person. He had no servants, for example, in his house. His salary was something on the order of $17,000 a year, practically nothing as such things go. When he entertained, he did so in his own house, and his wife did the cooking. It was a very relaxed situation.

It was easier to get to know New Zealanders and get on friendly terms with them than in any other place I have served.

As I have indicated, in John Henning we had a very fine political ambassador who was a superb public speaker and a very quick learner. He was not well versed in the ways of the Foreign Service, so his DCM had to run the daily operations of the Embassy, although the Ambassador kept a sharp eye on everything and was a working ambassador, not someone who stayed out of things.

Basically, as DCM, I saw and initialed all outgoing messages except the most routine ones; administrative stuff and the like. I was busy because I knew the ropes having been in charge of various posts and having been deputy chief of mission before. Henning was a very sympathetic and pleasant ambassador to work for.
The work was not terribly difficult. The political situation was easy. Developments were not very profound or complicated and we had able officers both on the economic and political side. There were no consular problems that caused much of a stir. We had an able USIS and a CIA station, which mainly was there to exchange information with its opposites in New Zealand intelligence. So far as I was aware it did not engage in clandestine activities as such. It had a very close relationship with the New Zealanders. As you recall New Zealand was one of our allies in the Vietnamese war. They had sent a medical unit to Vietnam, so in return we gave them all of the information we had on matters pertaining to Vietnam.

Henning was extremely popular with the New Zealanders. He was a great fan of rugby, the national pastime. He went to a rugby match every weekend and afterwards would go down into the locker room and join players and fans. He didn't drink anything alcoholic, but managed to mask that successfully in the beer drinking environment of a rugby locker room. He would say a few appropriate words, and was accepted as one of the gang. In fact, he was so much a part of New Zealand life that he was asked to give the main speech on ANZAC Day, the anniversary of the Gallipoli disaster during World War I. He gave a great speech which was broadcast throughout the country. He was an orator of the old school. He spoke without notes, memorized everything that he was going to say but gave the impression of speaking extemporaneously. He was really a highly successful ambassador in every respect.

His successor was appointed after the election of Nixon. You recall that Johnson didn't run in 1968 and Nixon and Humphrey ran a close race. Shortly after Nixon's succession to power, Henning was replaced by a young man from Kentucky named Kenneth Franzheim. A nice young man in his early 40s, if that old. He had inherited a fortune from an architect father and his grandfather who had owned a well-known Kentucky stable of race horses. He had augmented his fortune considerably by dealing in oil real estate. So he had a considerable personal wealth.

He came with a very glamorous wife who had been editor of Vogue magazine. A startlingly good looking, black haired lady who dressed in the latest fashion and created quite a stir because of the insufficiency of some of the garb that she wore on several formal occasions. It didn't cover as much as some of the more conservative New Zealand ladies thought proper.

Franzheim was on the opposite end of the spectrum from Henning as ambassador. He was a nice man and did his best, but he had had no experience in the public arena. He never made a public speech, and was not a particularly good reader, so we couldn't expect him to read a speech effectively.

One of the things he did expertly was buy race horses. He got along well with the racing crowd. He also bought a lot of antiques, and was criticized by some for throwing his money around. I don't think this was anything he did ostentatiously, but he just was used to spending a lot of money. Since I left before he did I do not know how he was regarded ultimately by New Zealanders, but I can say with pretty complete assurance he was not as popular as his predecessor.

It was an entirely different experience working with Franzheim because it was like having to
break in a new Foreign Service officer, except that he was in charge. This was not as easy as it might have been.

The things that interested me as much as New Zealand itself were some of the adjuncts to what we had to do in New Zealand proper. The Ambassador was also accredited to Western Samoa, an independent island country that had formerly been under New Zealand mandate since right after World War I. I was fortunate in making several trips to Western Samoa, which fascinated me. First of all because of its association with Robert Louis Stevenson, who lived there in Vailima, as his house was called, and who is buried on top of a hill (Mount Vaea) right behind Vailima. In fact, I visited his grave. I got to know Tanumafili Malietoa, the president of Western Samoa, who was the hereditary head of state. The Samoans were very nice people and I was their main American contact in Wellington, so I had the pleasure of going there several times. I stayed at the famous hotel of Aggie Gray, a very colorful old lady of considerable fame who was still very much alive. She was probably in her seventies, but in her day during World War II she had run a boarding house establishment for U.S. Air Force and other officers. Some people claimed that she was the model for Bloody Mary in Michener's "Tales of South Pacific." But I don't believe it, because Bloody Mary was a sort of half caste islander and procurer, whereas Aggie Gray was a very dignified lady, well dressed, seemingly well-educated, well-spoken certainly. To be at her hotel was the essence of South Sea Island living. Just a delight, and still is from what I hear.

We also had watching briefs on other islands, Tonga and the Cook Islands. I never got to the Cook Islands but did get to Tonga and Fiji. That was always fun.

Another thing that we did in New Zealand...Christchurch was the headquarters of the U.S. Naval force that ran our operation in the Antarctic. One of my duties was to help take care of problems that arose between our forces on the Antarctic and the New Zealand government. This was not any great diplomatic feat. It usually amounted to trying to get certain naval personnel out of jail for having done something in an inebriated moment, trying to persuade the New Zealand authorities to go easy on them without offending their sense of sovereignty. And that sort of thing.

The Antarctic itself was a highly fascinating place and I was lucky to be invited to go down for a week by the commanding officer, Admiral Kelly Welch. I stayed in his quarters along with the Admiral's brother who was visiting also at that time. We were the only two guests so I was privileged to have a real Cook's tour of the Antarctic, which is one of the most fascinating places in the world. In fact, so fascinating that I was sorely tempted to resign from the Foreign Service, join the National Science Foundation and try to get myself down there. But one of the things that kept me from doing this apart from my eternal love for the Foreign Service, was the fact that I knew nothing about science and didn't think I could learn quickly enough to be of any great use on the ice.

Q: Later on the New Zealanders became very active in anti-Vietnam war stance, especially the young people. What was the climate like when you were there between 1968-70?

VAN OSS: Well, remember that during my entire tour the National (Conservative) government
was in charge. Keith Holyoke was prime minister and he and his cohorts were very much in favor of our intervention in Vietnam and as I told you we had an extensive exchange of intelligence on Vietnam matters. However, the beginnings of anti-Vietnam sentiment were coming into evidence, particularly in the universities, among the younger people. Also, to a lesser extent, among some of the Labor Party ministers. While the National Party had the majority of the ministerial posts, there were a number of Labor Party ministers as well. One of them in particular was very vocal in his opposition to American intervention in Vietnam. So much so that when the New Zealand elections approached as I was ending my tour, it occurred to some of us that if the Labor Party won, we might have to rethink our policy of exchanging highly classified information with them because of their attitude towards our activities in Vietnam. Fortunately this question did not come up during my stay there.

However, this business recalls to mind the visit to New Zealand, after the election of President Nixon, of Vice President Agnew. I think this is worth a word or two. I was on leave in the South Island and planning a hike with my family on the Milford track, one of the most famous hikes in the world which takes several days and nights. You take a plane from Queenstown, then hike over a mountain track for several days sleeping in huts and end up at a beautiful fjord, Milford Sound. We were just about to start on the trek when I got a telegram at our motel in Queenstown saying, "Return to Embassy at once. Vice President Agnew is arriving on such and such a date." So I had to leave my family, who carried on with the Milford track hike, and return to Wellington to prepare for Agnew.

Let me tell you, preparing for a presidential or even vice presidential visit is no bed of roses. First of all the White House sends out an advanced party of security men, who are unsmiling, down to earth, ruthless, lacking in sense of humor individuals, obsessed with the safety of their chief.

Q: And never to be pleased.

VAN OSS: Yes, never to be pleased. They make demands that no self-respecting sovereign nation will ever accept, but they make them nonetheless. Even to the point of insisting that Agnew ride in his own armored vehicle, which, of course, the New Zealanders would not have accepted had I brought the matter up with them.

Anyway, Agnew arrived and actually was quite a success. He made some very good speeches, was very calm and well-behaved. He didn't make any untold demands and the New Zealanders were quite impressed with him. In fact, they called him back to the podium again informally after he had made his prepared remarks.

He brought Bill Rogers with him, who was then Secretary of State, and at the dinner in Agnew's honor one of the New Zealanders asked Rogers whether Jack Henning couldn't remain as ambassador...whether Nixon would confirm that he would remain as ambassador. Bill Rogers said, "Well, no, we are going to appoint somebody who will be even better than Jack Henning." That wasn't a very polite thing to say because Henning was right there during the whole business.

Apart from that, Agnew was a great success but I still will never forgive him for having disrupted...
my Milford track venture because I never had a chance to make the trek after that. I would still like to do it some day.

Q: Didn't the Queen come to New Zealand while you were there?

VAN OSS: Yes, she did. She made a visit with Princess Anne, but I must confess I am very hazy on this. I don't think it made too much of an impression on me then and I certainly don't remember much about it now.

One thing I would like to talk about though is the Maori. The Maori, of course, are the indigenous people of New Zealand, although they are not all that indigenous. They came there themselves only in the 11th century, if I remember correctly. A great deal of material has been written about how they arrived...in large canoes bringing with them the dogs, rats and other mammals that didn't exist on the islands before that time.

The Maori, I suppose, could be likened to the American Indians. They are a small minority, probably several hundred thousand. They are a strong, warlike Polynesian group. Where they originally came from is not absolutely clear; some think from the neighborhood of Samoa, others think they may have come all the way from the Hawaiian Islands. The New Zealanders considered themselves experts at dealing with the Maori. Of course they had pitched battles as recently as the late 19th and early 20th centuries, comparable to our Indian wars. The Maori were thoroughly conquered but never completely absorbed.

They inhibit certain areas of the country...around Rotorua for instance, which is the main thermal spring area on the North Island. New Zealanders consider themselves to be very adept at racial relations. They thought, when I was there, that they had solved the racial conflict, but I can assure you that they hadn't. Their attitude was extremely patronizing..."Oh, the Maoris are good chaps, you know. They are quite intelligent." That type of thing. But they did accept them all over the place. They weren't excluded from any activity. A number of them were in Parliament. A Maori eventually became New Zealand High Commissioner in London and a number of them were knighted. I have in my library some books by Maori authors.

I got to know one of them quite well, Kara Puketapu, who was the son of one of the Maori leaders in the Wellington area clan. He had studied in the United States at the University of New Mexico. While there, through the Ford Foundation he had arranged an exchange of American Indians and Maori. Several years before I arrived on the scene, Maori had gone to the United States, been taken into the various Indian reservations and had seen what they were like. While I was in Wellington about a dozen American Indians came over and were taken through all the Maori areas. This was quite an eye opener for me because what few contacts I had with American Indians up to then (and I had had some contacts because during my assignment in the Senior Seminar I had done my paper on the place of the American Indian in American Foreign Relations). When I had visited American Indian reservations, the Indians had been fairly straight laced, self absorbed, solemn, fairly quiet, not outspoken in any way that I could see. But these 12 Indians from various tribes...there was a Zuni, a Mohawk, etc...entered into the spirit of things with great aplomb and enthusiasm. They turned out to be highly sociable, great wits. They
danced with the Maori, embraced them, sang with them and seemed to be having a wonderful time. They had discussions with the Maori intelligentsia while they exchanged information on their experience in the United States and the Maori experience in New Zealand.

The one thing that struck me was a remark one of the Maori made after a long discussion on culture. He said something to the effect that you Indians have kept your culture in the reservations, whereas our problem is we are so much involved in the schools and life in New Zealand that we don't know when to start injecting Maori culture into our children. That seemed to mark an important difference between the two groups. The American Indians were still immersed in their own culture while the Maori were thoroughly New Zealandized, but trying at the same time to cling to their culture despite that.

The Maori add color, life and diversity to the New Zealand scene. There isn't a celebration in New Zealand that isn't marked with some sort of Maori performance...various types of dances, Hakas, singing, chanting, etc.

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**BEN F. DIXON**  
Australia/New Zealand Desk Officer  
Washington, DC (1970-1971)

Born in North Carolina in 1918, Ben Franklin Dixon attended University of Virginia's graduate school and received his law degree from George Washington University in 1956. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps during the World War II. While in the Foreign Service, he served in variety of positions in the State Department and had tours of duty in Tangier, Karachi, and Bangkok. Mr. Dixon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 31, 1990.

**Q:** Then you came back to the department, where you served from 1970, about a year, to ’71, on the Australia/New Zealand desk. Were there any major concerns at that time?

**DIXON:** Oh, yes. Two of the primary things were buying Australian and New Zealand products, and the air routes. Quantas and New Zealand and I've forgotten which other airlines were going out there, but we had constant fights over this thing. They were mostly aviation people, but I sat-in on all these discussions and tried to keep our aviation people in tow when they got too rambunctious (which they did at times). But the Australians were pretty rambunctious, too. The New Zealanders were much quieter and much better behaved, I thought.

I went up to the UN, before, for the Assembly meeting, and I was the Far East advisor. While I was there, the Chinese were very upset about what was going to happen, and I had no end of consultations with them--conversational therapy--about Taiwan and what was going to happen and so forth. And, in talking to them, I developed an idea about what we ought to do to try to solve this problem.
And I wrote a paper, which I gave to Win Brown, who gave it to what's his name, you know, the wisecracking, red-headed guy who was assistant secretary for Asian Affairs then, Marshall Green. They sort of said, well, you know, they're not letting us in on the game, there's no sense in even sending this paper forward. But I sent it also to the head of UNP, Sam somebody, and he thought it was a great idea, but didn't know whether the Chinese would go along with it. It didn't get anywhere much, because Hitler... [great Freudian slip] I mean, Kissinger and Nixon were deciding the policy then and nobody was getting in it. But, you know, in the end, they did more or less what I suggested doing. I don't know that they ever saw the paper, but it was the only sensible thing to do.

What I suggested was that they get Taiwan to give up the Council seat, keep a seat in the UN, and tell the Communist Chinese we were willing for them to become a member and take a Security Council seat.

I had a long talk while I was up there with Ernie Gross, who was our representative at the UN when the Chinese decided not to join the UN back in '49. And I had a lot of discussions with him about this. He was very knowledgeable about the background on these things.

But when I first got back, they wanted me to write up some papers on this, which I did. And I wrote a number of papers about Chinese affairs and some other things that came up.

We had been pressed very hard by Israel to support them about a number of things. And they were pushing me hard to get the Asian delegations to support Israel. We had a varied success with that.

One of the funniest was the Philippine foreign minister, Romulo, who was a real joker. Well, I can't tell you some of the things he said, which were pretty below-the-belt, so to speak. He was very helpful, but a great joker, if I ever saw one.

The one that I thought was going to be helpful was a guy that I had dealt with when I was in Thailand, who was their ambassador to the thing. He felt that we were sort of making him a patsy for the United States, and so he was pretty careful not to do what we wanted to do—even if it made him look bad.

But I'd say, in large, the main problems we had were Asia and China. This carried over. I got back, and then Win Brown said they were terribly short-handed in the Australia-New Zealand and would I help there until I got another assignment. And I said I'd be pleased to, so I went there.

Then, again, all the people in our area were trying to model their policies on China based on ours. We had no end of communications from the Australian prime minister, the New Zealand prime minister, and the new Fiji people about what we were going to do and so forth, and they'd write letters to the president. I'd write the response for the president to send back, they'd take it over to the White House, and never let me see what finally went out. We'd get another letter from the Australian prime minister, forwarded to us. Finally, I had a friend in the security advisor's office,
I'd go over, he'd pull the files out, get the letter, and I could see how they had changed what I had done. (And they always changed it some, always for the worse.) So I could use that, you see, and then would try to follow up the correspondence. But they wanted me to do it simply by answering the letter straight away. I could see that they weren't really giving them a very full view of what our point of view... the president sent.

I tried, in conversations with the Australians... Of course, the embassy knew about these things. I tried, as best I could without crossing what the president said, to sort of tell them to take it easy, that they hadn't made up their minds yet, and that these things were still pretty fluid--hoping they wouldn't get themselves too tied in.

But, of course, they did. And when they pulled that recognition of China, the Australian prime minister, I think it was one of the prime things that caused him to lose out, because he had claimed to be such a great fighter, and they turned around and just did absolutely the opposite from they had been telling him.

To a certain extent, that was true in New Zealand. The Fijians were sort of mad about it. But, of course, we had a terrible time with Japan, and all over Asia with this whole business. And if we could have, very carefully, clued them in to this, I think we could have avoided that. We lost a tremendous amount of influence in that area.

Anyway, I left there and went to the Coast Guard. The Australians were after us a lot. Two prime ministers came over. The New Zealanders had not gotten into the Common Market then, and they were very anxious to get their trade things up. And I saw a lot of their commercial guys, who came in constantly to talk about things they wanted to do.

Carl Edward Dillery
Defense Exchange Program
Washington, DC (1970-1971)

Carl Edward Dillery was born in Seattle in 1930, and received a B.S. degree from Seattle Pacific University. Much later in his career, he completed an M.S. degree from George Washington University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1955, where his overseas posts included Japan, Belgium, Vietnam, England, Cyprus, and Fiji. Mr. Dillery was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: What about port visits? What were some of the considerations that came up? I can think of a couple. The New Zealand situation comes to mind. Was that a problem at that time or not?

DILLERY: New Zealand was not a problem at that time, but the problem that we now have with New Zealand was precisely the main issue we faced then. The particular issue is our "neither confirm nor deny" policy. Remember Admiral Rickover -- the father of the nuclear navy -- was still alive and kicking. The question was access to other countries ports by US Naval vessels of
all kinds. There were two problems here, nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons. Everybody knew which ships were nuclear propelled because that was not a secret, but on nuclear weapons we had a policy to "neither confirm nor deny" whether there were nuclear weapons on a ship.

Q: I am sure there were plenty of times when you would want to say, "Well, Hell, we don't have anything on this destroyer," but you couldn't get into that because that would weaken our position.

DILLERY: Exactly. And under RickoverNCND was holy scripture and there was no deviation from it. Even the slightest deviation would cause problems. Even in those days the New Zealanders were among those who were pressing us to...well, they weren't saying that we couldn't come and not too many countries had actual legislation that prohibited nuclear visits, which came later in New Zealand. But that was kind of the main element of the ship visit issue. There were others. Sometimes there was a question of an immediate political problem. Do you have a ship visit during a time of internal political turmoil or is this seen as something in those days as a counter to a Soviet action and would have some kind of political impact. We had to deal with those kinds of issues but they were secondary to the nuclear question.

Q: Do we have fleet visits to those places?

DILLERY: We do. That was another major area of interest and that is to try to preserve access as much as possible...this developed later on. During my stay New Zealand established its policy of no visits by ships that were either nuclear powered or which might carry nuclear weapons. Of course, as you know, we have a very strict policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons so that effectively shut New Zealand out of our ship visit program. It was our job to try to keep the other places in the area open for ship visits. We managed to accomplish visits to all of them.

Q: Well, with those fishing agreements, I would think this would be something you would want to do in coordination with some other powers like Australia, New Zealand.

DILLERY: No, we didn't. It was just between us and the island countries. The Australians and New Zealanders don't have tuna fishing industries. Japan is another country that does have a tuna industry but our relationship with them on that is not one of cooperation. So in this negotiation, we in the area assisted our chief negotiators from the Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science in their dealings with the islanders. In the end we got an agreement that satisfied all parties and our fishermen were able to use the waters around the island nations.

The other thing that developed at that time was an international effort to fight against drift net fishing. In this form of fishing, nets several miles long are deployed and allowed to drift -- almost all fish get caught in the nets and the result is bad for the fish populations and for the ocean environment. We were on the side of the gods on that one because we were against drift net fishing and they wanted us to be stronger on that.

We finally came to a conclusion on this, by the way. There are two regional organizations, the
South Pacific Bureau for Economic Coordination, which is kind like their inter-island group including Australia and New Zealand organization that tries to coordinate economic things. It has become kind of a political forum as well. Then there was the South Pacific Conference, which was a conference for the coordination of aid projects for the whole area. That was headquartered in New Caledonia. The French, British, Australians, New Zealanders, Japanese, US and all the island countries were members of the Conference. That was another forum that I worked in as representative of the US.

The other major thing that came up which related very much to the ship visit issue was that the political forum of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Coordination, came up with the idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ or "Spinfizz"), which the US opposed. But there was a great debate in the United States as to whether we should go along with the island nations. They tried to modify their nuclear free zone so that it wouldn't affect our ship visits but our policy on this point was so strong that we could not. Spinfizz really was aimed at the French to get them to stop nuclear testing in French Polynesia. That was another big piece of our business there. The Fijians were very big in that. Our embassy got in some controversy over this issue because we recommended that the US sign the treaty and the non-signers won out in Washington. I note with some amusement that one of the policies of the Clinton Administration is to sign the treaty now.

**ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, JR.**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary**

**Washington, DC (1972-1975)**

Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. was born to American parents in China in 1920. He received his master’s degree from the University of Chicago. His career with USIS included assignments in Hong Kong, Japan, Burma, and Taiwan. He served as the ambassador to Burma, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. Ambassador Hummel was interviewed by Dorothy Robins-Mowry on July 13, 1989.

**Q:** Before we leave this period completely, were there any particular problems with other countries? You mentioned that you also oversaw relations with Australia and New Zealand. Did New Zealand attitudes toward our nuclear policies present a problem?

**HUMMEL:** No. That came very much later, when I was stationed in China. I accompanied Kenneth Rush, who was Deputy Secretary of State, on a trip to a SEATO, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization meeting in Australia. We visited New Zealand at the same time, the first time I had ever visited that country. I had been to Australia before. I have a private view of New Zealand. I found it extraordinary that the New Zealand cabinet met with us, including cocktails and dinner. They were a group of people who were exceedingly ignorant about world affairs. They were the country cousins of the English-speaking world. Their views were naive, uninformed, and parochial, but they were pleasant people. There wasn't a broad based brain in the whole bunch.
HOWARD H. LANGE
Office of Pacific Islands, New Zealand, and Australia
Washington, DC (1973-1975)

Howard H. Lange was born November 4, 1937 and raised in Nebraska and attended the University of Nebraska. After college, he joined the Air Force and served in Taiwan. After a time at the University of Washington, Lange entered the Foreign Service in 1969. His posts included Vietnam, Taiwan, China, and Malta. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

LANGE: After the economics course I took a desk job in the department in the Office of Pacific Islands, New Zealand and Australian Affairs.

Q: You were there from when? ‘72 or ’73?


Q: What particular slice of the cake did you have of island affairs, Australia, New Zealand?

LANGE: I was doing economics for Australia, and I was desk officer for New Zealand and for the Pacific Island states. I was action officer for something called the South Pacific Commission, which was a great experience. I was the expert because no one else cared very much.

Q: What was the South Pacific Commission?

LANGE: The South Pacific Commission had been created in probably the early post-WWII period when almost all of the region consisted of colonies, but it was in transition certainly by the ‘70s. Many states had already become independent, and more were on their way to independence. While I was there Papua New Guinea became independent. There was another fellow in the office, John Dorrance, who was devoted to the Micronesia status negotiations. So I didn’t really get involved in that. But the Commission was a small effort at development of the South Pacific nations and dependencies. The development aspect interested me, and it got me out to the area a couple of times.

Q: What was there to work with? I’ve been to the Federated States of Micronesia. Outside of putting our money into pick-up trucks and beer, there doesn’t seem to be anything to work with.

LANGE: That’s true; there is little on which to build a successful economy. To grossly oversimplify, there are three models. What you saw in Micronesia and what I saw in Guam, when I went to my first South Pacific Commission meeting, is one model. That involves massive injection of funds from the metropolitan powers - in those cases, the United States. Guam was a strange mixture. The economy was supported by U.S. military spending and Japanese tourists. At that time it was a favorite destination for Japanese honeymoon trips because it was fairly near to
Japan and it could be done on a shoestring budget. But it was a dispiriting place in terms of the indigenous culture.

So what happened in many other places in the South Pacific – a second model – was the export of native inhabitants to whatever country it was most closely associated with. In the case of the Cook Islands, which was the location of the second South Pacific Commission meeting I attended, it was New Zealand. There were more Cook Islanders living in New Zealand than in the Cook Islands, even though to an outside observer, the Cook Islands was a Polynesian paradise. It was really beautiful and they had made a creditable effort at preserving Polynesian culture and art. But to Polynesians, it was boring and didn’t represent much in terms of a future. Development was quite difficult. Even to develop fisheries seems a natural, but you had competition from highly developed fishing fleets from Taiwan or other countries. So the most promising people emigrated. In Tonga, where I visited, which is one of the larger countries and which has been independent throughout and has a very strong culture, nevertheless the common aspiration was to get out and leave. Either to Australia or New Zealand or to some other developed country. Many Samoans have come to the U.S., most of them from American Samoa.

Q: The Japanese came in and took over the Micronesian fishing.

LANGE: Yes, small-scale artisan fishing is no competition for fleets of trawlers and factory ships. You don’t have economies of scale for almost anything. Handicrafts could only go so far. So it was quite difficult. The higher standards of living in the region were in New Caledonia, where the economy was based on nickel mining, and in the tiny country of Nauru, which presented the very odd circumstance where they were mining the island and it was literally disappearing. They exported guano, i.e., accumulated bird droppings, to the rest of the world for fertilizer. So apart from those examples of extractive industry, it was tough. Papua New Guinea was certainly large enough and had enough resources to be viable, but it had other problems of governance because it lacked infrastructure, education levels were low, and there was little in the way of a national identity.

A third model of development emerged somewhat later in the Northern Marianas, then a part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, now in a commonwealth relationship with the U.S. When I visited in the mid-1970s, there was little going on economically. Now, there is a degree of prosperity, but it is based on casino gambling and a garment industry based on foreign contract workers and “made in the U.S.” labels. There have reportedly been social costs – exploitation of the garment workers, many of whom are imported from low-wage countries like China, and all of the ills that accompany casino culture.

Q: Was this a joint effort by, on this commission, of the Americans, the French, the New Zealanders, the Australians?

LANGE: It was established by the colonial, or in our case, recent colonial powers. The principal contributors were the U.S., Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. Almost all of the territories and countries in the region participated. I can’t think of any exceptions, although there were a few, such as Tokelau or the Pitcairn Islands, that couldn’t even afford a ticket for
someone to attend the annual conference. The Commission, like most multinational institutions, had its own internal problems. It was an education for me because I also learned about Washington bureaucracy. I spent a lot more of my time concerned about managing our delegation to the commission and our policy positions (e.g., French nuclear testing) than about the development problems that faced the South Pacific Commission.

Q: Was this just a political plum that was handed out or was there a rationale behind those who were appointed as U.S. representatives?

LANGE: It was a mixture. The commissioners when I first arrived, during the second Nixon Administration, had Republican Party connections, presumably as donors. Two were from Hawaii, and they had ties to the South Pacific. The senior commissioner was a retired Air Force colonel and an arms salesman for McDonnell Douglas. One of my accomplishments was to help engineer his replacement by one of the senior people at the Department of the Interior who was responsible for Guam - Stanley Carpenter, who was on detail from the State Department. He served for a couple of years as senior commissioner for the U.S. We argued for appointing someone who had a professional and policy connection to the South Pacific. We also secured appointment of a commissioner who was the director of the Bishop Museum in Honolulu, an academic who had done work on Polynesia. As you can imagine, selling to the White House the idea of giving up a couple of patronage appointments was not very easy. In the end, in retrospect, I don’t think these appointments made a whole lot of difference in terms of making the Commission more effective.

Q: There really wasn’t much to work with?

LANGE: There wasn’t a big budget for the commission to begin with, and a lot of it was chewed up in a permanent secretariat operation located in New Caledonia, which is about the highest cost of living place in the South Pacific. So the French picked up a big part of the tab just to keep the secretariat there. But it was kind of a sleepy, not terribly effective organization.

Q: My experience was the fishing was taken care of by the Japanese; they ate canned tuna more or less. Outside of government structure, which we were supporting, there was damned little. With the best will in the world, in a way we basically destroyed the island culture. But with pickups and drinking beer and a few paved roads around, a lot of those islands don’t have the infrastructure to support a real tourism industry. It’s very expensive to go out there. A plane trip on Continental is very expensive. It’s hard to figure out what you can do.

LANGE: The commission was doing some development and some basic maintenance like health care. What to do about alcoholism was something that the authorities on most of the islands had to worry about, and it was especially evident in what was then the Trust Territories; i.e., Micronesia. I saw public intoxication, for example, at midday on Truk, and I understood that it was not unusual. It is a complex issue, no doubt tied to the fate of traditional culture under attack by Euro-Americanization. Parallels with the plight of Native Americans are impossible to avoid.

Q: How did the French play in this because in so many cases the French either run it all
themselves or they play dog in the manger? Were they pretty active participants in this group?

LANGE: They were active, but they were also always on the defensive because they were conducting their nuclear tests, which was such a highly emotional topic. And even though the commission nominally didn’t have very much business discussing the nuclear tests, it always came up, and it always overshadowed the session. There was a senior French foreign ministry guy – or maybe he was from their colonial office, I’m not sure – that had been coming to the meetings for years. Everybody knew him. A lot of the islanders disliked him, because not only was his job to defend what the French were doing, but he was rather glum and officious, qualities that did not travel well in the Pacific islands. The French put a lot of money into the commission and into their colonies – French Polynesia and New Caledonia - and they couldn’t be ignored. They were the remaining colonial power in the area. The British had gradually divested themselves of empire in the Pacific. The Australians never really were colonials, apart from a strange arrangement in the New Hebrides, which was a condominium shared by Australia and France at that time. This is now the independent country of Vanuatu. Our interests were centered in the northern part of the region – Micronesia and Guam to the west, the colony graduated to statehood of Hawaii to the east. The French, though, were the most focused and organized of the so-called “metropolitan” powers.

Q: Moving on to New Zealand, did you get involved in nuclear ship ban and all of that sort of thing?

LANGE: Not much. There was another fellow on the desk who was doing political military affairs. He was much more engaged in that. But of course the whole EAP Bureau was in a sense mobilized by that issue.

Q: Basically it meant that New Zealand was almost frozen out.

LANGE: It became a clear choice, or at least it was so framed by Bill Brown, the EAP DAS with responsibility for New Zealand. He said it was a clear choice that the New Zealanders had made and we had to make. Were they an ally or weren’t they? If they were, it meant that they had to agree to our ground rules. But the political situation in New Zealand was pretty clear. The populace wasn’t really comfortable accommodating our nuclear-armed ships, and the political leadership would accept only a clear declaration. We could not give that without compromising our long-standing policy of “neither confirm nor deny.” It was an issue I was to revisit nearly 20 years later when I was in Malta.

Q: As an economic officer - I imagine we trade beef, butter, lamb, maybe wool - those things must have ranked very high in a way on our major items in our relations with these countries. So you must have gotten into those.

LANGE: Trade in dairy products was an issue with New Zealand especially. Trade in meat products was a problem with both Australia and New Zealand. The sugar quota was a big deal with Fiji. That was an annual exercise to settle on the import quota and how much various countries got, in order to prop up the price of sugar. That occupied a lot of time and effort and
representation and briefing papers and so forth as the Fijians made their case for more sugar and as the New Zealanders made their case for doing away with quotas on dairy products. These issues are still with us.

Q: With New Zealand for example, I wouldn’t think that we would have been receptive to almost anything outside of not trying to be nice to New Zealand.

LANGE: The New Zealanders made the reasonable case that theirs was the only country in the world that did not subsidize dairy products. They weren’t very happy that we on the one hand professed belief in fair trade and on the other protected our dairy interests with import quotas. We did our best to square the circle.

ANDREW I. KILLGORE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Wellington (1974-1977)

Andrew I. Killgore was born on a farm in Alabama and graduated from a small teacher's training college in Livingston, Alabama. He entered the Foreign Service as a Wristonee, initially working as a service staff officer. He has served in Jordan, Baghdad, Iran, and Qatar. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 15, 1988.

Q: From Tehran, you left in January 1974, and you went in May 1974 to New Zealand as deputy chief of mission. Why this?

KILLGORE: I had a short interim assignment down in Bahrain as chargé d' affaires. I was supposed to become ambassador there, I thought. This was again a not unusual type of U.S. Government screw-up. What happened was that CIA had reported that Qadhafi in Libya, come January 1, 1974, was going to require Americans to get their visas and passports as well in Arabic. This was the false story. So the State Department thought, "Now, how to handle that?" In the first place, it was a damn lie, there was nothing to it. You know how it is, the CIA picks up, like a vacuum cleaner, scraps. So the Department thought, "We'll move out all the people who are due for reassignment, and we'll get an entire new staff in there anywhere near reassignment before January 1, 1974." So they moved Bob Stein from Bahrain to replace Harold Josef in Libya. Then they popped me down to Bahrain to replace Stein. I stayed only four months.

Then something called GLOP, that we referred to earlier, Global Assignments Policy, came up, and I was sent to New Zealand. They got me.

In any case, rock on along to the tail end of 1976, the very first months of ’77, Phil Habib visited Wellington, New Zealand, where I was DCM, on this ANZUS thing, Australia, U.S., New Zealand business. He cabled ahead, saying, "My first assignment was down in New Zealand, and somebody please give a dinner party and invite some of my old friends." The ambassador said,
"Andy, you do it." We had a lovely dinner, a lovely talk, lots of good Scotch, champagne, good food, a grand time, nice fireplace, nice fire. I didn't really say anything to Phil very much, except that I would like to get back to NEA. I tried not to tell him any tale of woe, which I was tempted to do, but I think tales of woe are kind of boring, generally.

In any case, as Phil Habib was shaking hands with me at Wellington Airport, leaving, he said to me in a low voice, "Andy, I'm going to try to help you." Now, I knew from what someone else had said from talking to Phil, my name had been coming up on ambassadorial lists for about three or four years, but never number one; number two or number three. Always, of course, I didn't get the job.

Another thing, I think that Roy Atherton, who had told me when I went to Bahrain for that ill-starred four month assignment, that he was going to try to make me ambassador, I think Roy felt a little bit guilty that I was shot off down to New Zealand. He wasn't able to swing it for me. I think the combination of Phil Habib and Roy Atherton got me the job, for which I am ever more grateful. But it was a fluke. If Phil Habib had not visited, if Phil hadn't come to Wellington, New Zealand, when he did, I think that would essentially have been something like the end of my career.

THERESA A. TULL
Analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, and Pacific Islands
Washington DC (1975-1977)

Theresa A. Tull was born in New Jersey in 1936. She received her bachelor’s degree from the University of Maryland in 1972. Her career included positions in Brussels, Vietnam, Washington D.C., Philippines, Laos, and ambassadorships to Guyana and Brunei. Ambassador Tull was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November 2004.

Q: Were we at sort of the nuclear impasse with New Zealand at the time?

TULL: Yes.

Q: Did this mean we were sort of dismissing New Zealand in a way?

TULL: It’s so long ago, I honestly can’t remember. If you hadn’t mentioned it it would have escaped me. Yes, I think we excluded them from things because we had no ship visits as I recall because they insisted that we would have to certify that there were no nuclear weapons on board and at that time we would neither confirm nor deny, I think was our policy, the presence of nuclear weapons. What was interesting at that time, and I would have to say where I put a lot of my focus was on ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. I got to be somewhat of an expert on that.
John E. Hall was born in Niagara Falls and was educated at Kenyon College. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and has served in a variety of posts in Switzerland, New Zealand, Liberia, and Canada. Mr. Hall was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

Q: Since you did come back later on as the Deputy Chief of Mission why don’t we leave Switzerland aside at this point as you may have some reflections that cover both periods of your assignment, and go on to where did you go from Bern? That was about 1976.

HALL: We were three and a half years in Bern and then were transferred to Wellington where I was the sole commercial officer, and simultaneously the sort of number two in Econ… That was a particularly unusual transfer for us because we were going to the Southern Hemisphere from the Northern. And I was replaced in Bern in the summer of 1976, but the person whom I was replacing was not leaving Wellington until the turn of the year.

Q: So you overlapped

HALL: I overlapped for several weeks, but then I had an opportunity to do something that is very rare in this business, and that is an opportunity to actually use home leave. My family and I probably used about two months of home leave in that period. As well as some sort of makeshift little assignments in Washington to fill some of that time, as well as overlaps on both ends. But then in our business you’re usually rushing to get to a vacant job, and here I was slowing down not to get to a job that was already covered.

Q: And not to get there too soon. I hope you enjoyed it, because as you said, it’s very rare.

HALL: I certainly did.

Q: And you went by boat from San Francisco?

HALL: From Frisco to Tahiti, and then flew from Tahiti to Wellington.

Q: This was 1976; probably one of the last transfers by sea.

HALL: I shouldn’t be surprised, yes.
Q: What was New Zealand like for a commercial officer at that time? It seems like the market must have been somewhat small.

HALL: The market was small, and very much centered on Europe, as I suspect it remains today to a considerable degree. Quite honestly, there was not a lot to do there. In commercial work, like the other forms of our work, you can easily fill up time if you try. Realistically, I don’t think there was much chance for the U.S. government to intervene productively on behalf of U.S. suppliers to New Zealand customers. As a result, we undertook at least one initiative which worked out very well. That was the promotion of tourism. New Zealanders travel extensively. They are a relatively isolated country geographically and they are psychologically aware of that isolation. A New Zealand youth of 18, 19, 20 years invariably makes a long overseas tour. The pattern had been that you make a tour to the mother country and then from the mother country make sorties into the rest of Western Europe. Then a year or so later, you come back home and settle down. So the phenomenon of overseas travel was quite normal: everybody did it. So we went in and managed to get support of U.S. Travel Service and various elements of U.S. travel industry to take some interest in tourism from New Zealand, which worked out well. There was a lot of press attention, to what extent we had a local press. We introduced into that small market some U.S. suppliers that would never have thought of it. And we gave publicity to the idea that there is somewhere other than the U.K. that is interesting for travel.

Q: Did U.S. airlines serve New Zealand at that time?

HALL: It’s been an on-and-off thing. American has been in and out, Pan Am has been in and out, United has been in and out. I think, at the time I was there Pan Am was in. But Air New Zealand cooperated with us in this venture, Qantas cooperated with us, and we got some of the domestic carriers in the U.S. to hook up, too. We had pretty good support once we had established our identity. And combined with the more classic forms of commercial work, that made for a satisfying assignment. And, as I say, in addition I was helping out with the economic work, which was fun.

Q: Did you do a lot of economic reporting?

HALL: Sort of filling in gaps that the senior economic officer wasn’t interested in or didn’t have time for. We had an agricultural attaché there as well, so in fact there was a lot of reporting capability for that very small country. And I was certainly the least experienced of the three in reporting, so I tended to get bits and pieces, but that was fine.

Q: Did you have any regional responsibilities at that time, beyond New Zealand?

HALL: The embassy at that time covered Samoa and the Cook Islands. I got one trip to Samoa and Tonga, but with those island-states there was really very little to our bilateral relationship at
all. There were of course connections between American Samoa and Western Samoa, but they didn’t need someone in Wellington to administer them. Otherwise these were very small states, and the ambassador would visit a couple times a year, and subordinate staff might go occasionally, but there was not really very much business.

**Q: How about Antarctica?**

HALL: I did not get down there, some members of the embassy staff did. Those operations were based in Christchurch, and they worked quite independently of us which is probably the correct way to do it. Their working relationship with New Zealanders and others was very, very good, they didn’t need us to run interference, and we had no formal responsibility for them.

**Q: And how long were you in New Zealand?**

HALL: That again came to be three and a half years, and then back to Washington once more, where I went again into PER, followed that up with a tour in AF’s Regional Economic Office. That, in turn, led to Monrovia.

**JOHN EDGAR WILLIAMS**

**Consul General**

**Auckland (197?-1978)**

*John Edgar Williams was born in South Carolina. He graduated from the University of North Carolina, Yale University and Victoria University. He has served in a variety of posts in England, Spain, Argentina, Italy, Uruguay, New Zealand and Canada. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Dr. Anne R. Phillips in 1995.*

Q: So you were in New Zealand at that time?

WILLIAMS: Yes, at that time.

Q: Was there much flack about what happened?

WILLIAMS: Oh yes. There was a lot of commentary. Could this ever happen in New Zealand? Some people said, "Well, yes, I guess it could." There are, and I guess there always have been, a few people in New Zealand who advocate making it a republic and taking it out of the Commonwealth but, nobody really paid much attention to this.

Q: So, as you went there you knew your duties would be ceremonial?
WILLIAMS: They would be partially ceremonial.

Q: But, also with the economic business involved?

WILLIAMS: Yes. Also, there was another aspect to my job, which was Public Affairs in another sense: dealing with the newspapers and the television stations. The editorial comment and the news stories and so on showed very much of a leftist influence. In other words, anti-American. I noticed this very soon after my arrival, of course. It was hard not to notice it. So I started collecting clippings and I would put them in three piles. The ones that were favorable to the United States, formed a little, thin pile, I'm talking about after five or six months.

Q: Quarter inch, maybe?

WILLIAMS: Yeah. Tiny, tiny. Then there were those which were more or less neutral, a little bit bigger. And, those that were unfavorable, about like this.

Q: Oh my, yes, two or three inches high. That's a lot of clippings.

WILLIAMS: Yeah. So then, I invited to lunch the editors of the two major newspapers in Auckland, separately. I told them that I had noticed that overall, the commentary and news stories were presenting largely unfavorable aspects of United States life or United States policy or United States culture or whatever. And, there were very few that reflected favorably on the United States, and I asked: "Why is this?" The answers that each one gave separately were very similar. "Oh no, it's nothing like that at all." And I said, "Well here, let me show you." So, I brought out envelopes with my three clippings collections. I said, "Just take a look. This is your newspaper over the past four or five months." They thumbed through them and then each of them told me: "I did not realize that this was true." I said, "Well, why do you think it's true?" They said, "Well, the reporters that we get, this is what they're writing. This is what they think to be important stuff or newsworthy things." I said, "Well, why is it that they think there are so many more unfavorable things that are newsworthy than favorable things?" Well, most of what I got was head scratching, I don't know. I said, "Well, these young guys come out of universities with these anti-American attitudes and they mix with others here who are also academic types or university types who are the same way and its a vicious circle. I said, "Don't they ever get into the business community, the economic world?" They said, "Well, they probably don't." Anyway, I did notice some improvement after these lunches, but not a great deal. Both of the editors told me, "We can't go around telling these people what to write or what not to write every day. If we tell them they can't write this, or must write it in a different way, they are going to go and work for someone else." There was just a constant problem. Even after that, even though there was some improvement, every now and then when there appeared a particularly egregious example, I would clip it and send it over to the editors who were both friends of mine; they were both members of the Ruder Club and so on; and fellow members of the ?? Club, a distinguished club, you know. So, I would send the clipping over and say, "Look, what about this?" I'd point out some ways in which was slanted or tilted. Sometimes I would get an answer back and sometimes I wouldn't. Sometimes I would get the answer: "Well, I've called this to the reporter's attention and I've caught errors in fact or slants that shouldn't be there." But, anyway there was just a
constant problem I kept having to deal with over the entire time that I was there. That was a very important thing. The same thing with the television. It was harder because we didn't have VCRs, we couldn't record things. I would take notes, but it is very hard then to go down and say, "Well look, this is what the person said. These are my notes on what the person said." It was more difficult, you know what I mean? Anyway, I felt that was pretty important too. I would try; then when I would go out and make a speech, if something particularly egregious had appeared in the press in the preceding week, I would say in my speech, "Now last week, the Auckland Star said this about us and that is just not the case." Something to that effect. I would say, "The Auckland Star has slanted it this way or has made this error or whatever, or the Auckland Herald has done this." Speaking of the Auckland Herald, the publisher, Joe Wilson, was from the old family that had owned it a hundred years. Now who was the movie actor that played the doctor on T.V.?

Q: I don't know.

WILLIAMS: Oh it was Robert Young. Anyway, he was often there, and as we were talking about celebrities earlier, I often had dinner or drinks with him, his wife, and the Wilsons.

Q: It wouldn't be Marcus Welby, would it?

WILLIAMS: Yeah, Marcus Welby, yeah. I remember him.

Q: Yeah? So what was he like?

WILLIAMS: Well, not like a movie actor. Not like you think of a movie actor. Just a very friendly guy, he and his wife. When we would have lunch at Joe Wilson's house who lived in the outskirts of Auckland, overlooking a beautiful bay and a beach. He had something I've never seen in a private home. It was a revolving, pedestal on which the dining table and chairs were placed. So, while we were having lunch, there was a beautiful picture window there and we would be revolving slowing around. Just like on the top of a --

Q: Top of the Holiday Inn?

WILLIAMS: Yeah, right. That was really something.

Q: So you got this view?

WILLIAMS: Yes. But, then there were a lot of beautiful views around Auckland. The city is built on a series of old volcanic cones, most of which are believed to be extinct. "Believed" in quotes. A friend of mine, who was it now? I believe it was Colin Maiden, the Vice Chancellor of the University. Down there, the Vice Chancellor is really the Chief Executive. The Chancellor is a ceremonial position. So, Colin was the Vice Chancellor. He lived on the side of one of the volcanic cones. He told me he was out mowing his lawn one day and he felt the ground warm beneath his bare feet, and he had not felt that before. So, he was a little worried there for a while, but nothing happened. The official residence, where I lived, was on the top of a bluff overlooking Auckland Harbor. It was a very elegant street, by the way, and I understand the U.S. Government
has just sold the house for something like a couple of million dollars. We looked out over Auckland Harbor, a beautiful view, and out there, right in front is a lovely, symmetrical volcanic cone: an island. That one is not known to have erupted since the Europeans came in the late 1700's but, it erupted during the recent ancestral memory of some of the Maoris who were alive when the Europeans came. Of course, geologically you can tell that it erupted within the last several hundred years. Some geologists say seven hundred years ago, others say four hundred years ago. Anyway, when I used to take visitors to the island and we climbed up into the crater, we were thinking about that four hundred years, thinking it may be time for another one. It's a very volcanic area. The whole North Island of New Zealand is volcanic and the South Island is not.

Q: So the dirt or the ground really looks like what?

WILLIAMS: Volcanic soil, black volcanic ash, most of it. The Senior permanent British official in New Zealand was called the High Commissioner and he was the same as an Ambassador, except that he couldn't be called that, since an Ambassador is the personal representative of one head of state to another, and both of these countries had the same head of state: the Queen. So, the position is called a High Commissioner rather than an Ambassador. But, he ranked the same as an Ambassador. There was also an Australian High Commissioner there, a Canadian, and so on.

Q: You may have said this before. Your actual title was?

WILLIAMS: The Consul General of the United States.

Q: How many other people were in the post?

WILLIAMS: I had about fifteen people altogether. It was a relatively small post. The Consul General in Hong Kong, for example, would have had many more people; and, some busy European posts, like Frankfort, Germany, would have had a lot more people than that. Like maybe a hundred people. I really don't know.

Q: For the people under your direction there in New Zealand, were those people hired at the post or had they come recently to the country?

WILLIAMS: Now, when I say fifteen I mean both kinds of people. New Zealanders were hired locally, but the Americans were people who were just like me, that is, career Foreign Service, and were there for a tour of duty. I had tried to make their work more interesting, as well as more productive. For example, I'll tell you about one young man who was one of my Vice Consuls. I didn't think that I could do personally a very good job of looking closely at what was happening in both of the major political parties. During most of the time I was there, the National Party was actually in power. When I first arrived the Labor Party was in the majority, but they very soon lost an election and the National Party came to power. It was a more conservative party. I told this young man to go out and learn all he could about the Labor Party. To meet people in the Labor Party, both members of Parliament and union officials and others who were closely
concerned with the Labor Party, to become our expert on the Labor Party. Oh, he found that work absolutely fascinating. I didn't need him to actually do full-time Consular work, but he did some of the Consular work too, such as issuing visas, and renewing or issuing passports, and doing all the other thousand and one things that a Consular Officer has to do. He very much enjoyed his work and decided he wanted to continue to do it after he left there, after completing a two-year term of duty. He then applied to become a Labor Attache at an Embassy in South America. So, that was what he adopted as his line of work. There was another young man there whom I assigned to go out and learn all he could about certain industries, particularly the ones that I did not already have close contacts in. Forest products, for example, fertilizers and maybe petrochemicals. He did a very good job with that. In fact, he did such an outstanding job. When he was about to leave, I learned that they wanted to send him as Vice Consul to Ouagadougou, and I thought this would be a waste of his talents. So, I called up some friends in Washington and ended up getting him a job as an Aide to one of the Assistant Secretaries of State, and his career prospered.

Q: Where?

WILLIAMS: An Assistant Secretary in the Department of State. That is a big job in the Department of State. Each Assistant Secretary has two or three Aides, personal Aides and this guy ended up being one of those.

Q: I hope he appreciated your help.

WILLIAMS: Well, I certainly hope he did. He is now the Deputy Chief of our Mission to NATO in Brussels.

Q: Well, I was thinking, not only your ceremonial work and making speeches, and taking care of economic interests, but writing reports; you always did that?

WILLIAMS: Yes. I had an advantage in certain respects over the Embassy in Wellington who were also writing reports on the political situation, as well as the economic situation and so on. Several of the more important Ministers of the government during most of my tour of duty there were people and members of Parliament from the Auckland area, including the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, in fact, was the Member of Parliament from the area that I lived in. He lived about three-quarters of a mile down the road from me, so I got to know him before he became Prime Minister, before the National Party won the election and came to power. He was then just a Member of Parliament. His name was Rob Muldoon. So, Rob and I would get together sometimes at my house and sometimes at his on weekends, because when Parliament was in session, of course the Ministers would go from Monday to Friday and the regular members would go from Tuesday to Friday, then they would go home on weekends wherever their home was, whether it was in Auckland or Christchurch or Dunedin or wherever. So, Rob Muldoon would come home to Auckland and I would be able to talk to him there on an informal basis. If the Ambassador wanted to see the Prime Minister in Wellington, he would have to call up, get an appointment, go in to his office, sit on one side of the desk, the Prime Minister on the other side of the desk and so on. When I wanted to see the Prime Minister, I could call up and say, "Rob,
how about coming over and having a drink?” No desk between us. There were several fairly influential Members of Parliament whom I could see on an informal basis there on weekends. I got a fairly good view of what was going on and sometimes it was a somewhat different view from that taken by the Embassy. As a matter of fact, very shortly after I arrived -- you see, I arrived in March of ’75 and the elections were in November of that year. I was looking around and talking to people and figuring out how this election was going to go. The Labor Party had a very large majority in Parliament. The prevailing opinion was that they were going to lose some of their majority, but they would stay in power. After analyzing all of the Parliamentary seats in my Consular District, the northern part of New Zealand, or the northern part of the North Island I should say, the North and Central parts, I came to the conclusion that, X number of seats in that area were going to go National. Of course, I couldn't report on all of New Zealand, but I sent in a report saying that I believe the following seats are going to go to the National Party and if this trend persists throughout New Zealand, then the National Party will win the election and be in power. The Embassy was reporting that the Labor majority would be reduced. Perhaps they would only have a majority of three or four seats, or something like that. Anyway, I turned out to be right and the Ambassador wasn't too happy. The Ambassador wants to be right when he sends out something over his name, even if its written by someone else. The Ambassador was a political appointee.

Q: I was going to ask you about that also, the political versus non-political appointee and how that worked and how rampant political appointees were throughout?

WILLIAMS: Well, let me put it like this. The number of Ambassadorships that are in the hands of political appointees is usually somewhere between a fourth and a third of the total. The rest are career people. Right now the number of political appointments is higher than it has been during the past twenty years. There have been a lot of payoffs. For example, there was this loud-mouth Congress-woman out in Los Angeles who got up and said, "Los Angles is going to burn down again unless you give us more money." Her name was Maxine Waters. Her husband, whose name is Williams, was working at a Mercedes dealership out there. He used to be a professional football player, but he is now Ambassador to the Bahamas as a big payoff to Maxine. Well, you see, what they usually do is that they try to find places where they can send such a fellow where he can't do much damage. So, they figured this guy couldn't do much damage in the Bahamas. Well, that's been the general feeling about New Zealand. No matter who we send out there, he can't do too much damage if we give him a career man as a Deputy Chief of Mission. And, that gripes the New Zealanders in a way, although, sometimes a country will be pleased to have a personal friend of the President's, but they recognize the difference between a personal friend who is a political appointee and a payoff political appointee, a sheer, political payoff. You can't quite say corrupt, because its not corrupt in that sense, but still it is a payoff for services rendered to the party. Many countries do resent it, but New Zealanders, I guess, are kind of used to it. If the personality of the Ambassador is reasonably pleasant, and the one I worked for, Armistead Selden, he was a reasonably pleasant guy; formerly a Congressman from Alabama. Most of the time we got along O.K.

Q: It still seems that your diplomatic skills were tested to the fullest, the speeches and ceremonies, doing homework, doing research and figuring out many situations. That would call
for many diplomatic skills, some of your best diplomatic skills.

WILLIAMS: Well, let me put it like this. I never felt like that I was useless or figure-head or anything like that down there. I felt that whatever talent I had was being called upon and being challenged, frequently. I really wanted to meet as many New Zealanders as possible and to convey a favorable impression of the United States, to be friendly and match their friendliness. This included Maoris, as well as the Pakehas, which is what the Maoris call the Europeans. I tried to bring Maoris in and have them over to my house for receptions and so on, but it wasn't all that easy. There weren't many Maoris in positions that I would normally come in contact with. I remember one incident that you might like.

When my wife and I first arrived there, our household effects, including some furniture, trunks and everything, were unloaded out of a container. There was a N.Z. Department of Agriculture guy there to inspect everything very carefully, to make sure that we weren't bringing in anything that was going to introduce some kind of a pest to New Zealand. They have enough pests there now. Gorse was imported from Scotland and has practically taken over the country. Thorns and prickles, you know. Anyway, this fellow inspected all of our stuff and we got to be friends, because he and I were fellow hunting enthusiasts. I would go hunting with him fairly often. He was just a regular employee with the Department of Agriculture, but he got to be one of my better friends. We would socialize with each other too, not just hunting. I remember the first time we went hunting down to the north central part of the North Island, the wildest part of the North Island. It was where the last Maori rebellion took place in the 1870's, maybe early '80's. The so-called Hau Hau rebellion. It's really wild country. There aren't any roads through a lot of it. The only way we could get to the place where we were to do our hunting was on horseback. We would drive to this little, tiny Maori village and my friend would hire some horses from the local Maoris and then we would ride ten or fifteen miles up in to the Urewera, which is a river valley. There was not another human, except the odd hunter, for miles. The first time we went there, my friend introduced me to some of the local people who are all Maoris. He introduced me first to the village head man. I don't know what he had told the people about who I was. He must have told them that I was some big-wig or foreigner or something like that, but I have no idea who they thought I was. But, when I met the head man, I put out my hand to shake hands and he took my hand and sort of curtsied and kissed my hand. I thought, jeez! I tried to act very dignified as this was going on and not to let him see that I felt this was unusual in any way. But, that kind of impressed me. Their English, back here in this little village was very, let me put it like this, it was very "country." You could tell that it was not their main language. This was probably one of the few places in New Zealand where they would speak more Maori than English. Anyway, they were nice people. We would sit around with some of them at least and drink a beer in the evenings, but they never came hunting with us. Our party would maybe be three or four guys. They would just rent us the horses and we would go up country and hunt and then come back with whatever we had found. That was a kind of interesting thing, I thought.

Q: They had their own village life and style?

WILLIAMS: Oh yeah, sure.
Q: What were you hunting?

WILLIAMS: Deer and wild boar in that particular area. There were other areas where we would hunt pheasant and quail and then still another area in which we would hunt ducks. But, the pheasants there, gosh. You know I told you I lived along a high bluff overlooking the harbor. It was not really a vertical face, but it was like eighty degrees or seventy-five degrees or something like that, but there was vegetation down on this fairly steep slope. One time I was looking out my bay window at the road running right along the edge of the bluff, and walking along the other bluff side of the street one evening I saw this family of pheasants walking along. And, here we were inside the city of Auckland. Pheasants were really good eating.

Q: When you brought things back did you cook or prepare anything there?

WILLIAMS: Most of it we would take home, but before returning home, we would have a sort of feast; maybe a leg of a wild boar or a piece of deer loin or something like that.

Q: At the village?

WILLIAMS: At the village, yeah.

Q: As a matter of thanks, or celebration, or what?

WILLIAMS: No, just because, well, we had to eat supper. But, we would come back to the village one afternoon and we'd start back home the next morning, and we wanted to eat supper, so we'd just fix supper and invite some of the locals.

Q: Did you prepare it or did they?

WILLIAMS: No, I didn't prepare it.

Q: Well, who fixed it?

WILLIAMS: I think it was a cooperation between my friend, the Ag. man, who was a good country boy, as expedition cook, and some of the locals.

Q: I see. It sounds as if they maybe enjoyed that celebration.

WILLIAMS: They did. We did too.

Q: And the beer, where did you get the beer?

WILLIAMS: Oh, it was standard brew from one of the big breweries. It was not locally made. The Maoris did have some kind of drink, let's see what was it called, Hockanui, I think. I'm not sure what it is, but it was not like the Samoan Kava. I really don't know what it was, but I drank it ever now and then.
Q: Was it strong? What did it taste like?

WILLIAMS: Yes, fairly strong. It tasted more like a not terribly strong liquor or gin or something like that.

Q: What did they make it from?

WILLIAMS: You know, I don't really know what they made it from. Some of the local vegetation. I should have found that out.

Q: Well, this was not in my list, but I want to ask you a little bit about your wife's activities in Buenos Aires. Did it seem more natural for her to be at a post with you in Uruguay or in Buenos Aires than in New Zealand?

WILLIAMS: Ah, yes. Well, about that. She had worked all of the time we were in Washington. Before that she had worked as a secretary in an industrial company in Montevideo before we were married. She worked all the time in Washington, and when we went to Buenos Aires, she would work as a temp at the Embassy there when they needed a temporary secretary. I think I said she was a very good bilingual secretary. Therefore, she was in demand when one of the American secretaries would be transferred and her replacement wouldn't arrive maybe for three months. Loreta would fill in when they needed an extra secretary in some office; she would often be asked to do temporary duty. She was a PIT, part-time intermittent temporary. Then, when we went to New Zealand, I told her that I didn't think it would be appropriate for the Consul General's wife to be working, any more than it would be appropriate for the Ambassador's wife to work. She agreed with this. So, what she did was take courses at the local Junior College or, as they call it, the Technical College. As I told you, she did not have a college degree. So, she enjoyed taking these courses and that led her into later doing a college degree when she was back in Washington, by taking evening courses.

Q: That would have given her a chance to see, I was going to say a lot of the locals, just people every day.

WILLIAMS: Oh, yes. She met people there that I would have not met. I always like to mix people up at our gatherings, so she would have some of her college friends there with our regular diplomatic and business and government and other friends.

Q: That would have been an interesting mixture I think.

WILLIAMS: Oh, yes.

Q: And a happy mixture.

WILLIAMS: Sure. It was always interesting. The New Zealanders are not all that formal, you know. So, there wouldn't be too much of a question of class or anything like that. Indeed, I think
her college friends and my hunting friends got along especially well.

Q: Right. That's reasonable. Did you know that you would be leaving there when you did leave? Did you feel that you were accomplishing what you wanted to accomplish?

WILLIAMS: Yes, I did. While I was there I became Dean of the Consular Corps, which came about because of the sudden departure of one Consul General who was senior to me, and the death of another who also had more seniority. "Senior" is in terms of time in Auckland, because when you're talking about Dean of a Diplomatic or Consular Corps in a particular city, you're talking about length of service in that capital or that city. So, I became Dean of the Corps, and this was interesting. My duties were simple any time the Consular Corps as a whole needed to approach the government, whether the city government or the national government, it was up to the Dean to do the talking. The other thing that I had to do was to appear at all the National Day parties, or cocktails or lunches or whatever, and give the toast to the Head of State and to the country. I would have gone anyway.

Q: You have to be a good thinker and a good speaker to think on your feet. Whether you had a prepared speech or not you still have to think.

WILLIAMS: Oh, I forgot to mention my Fourth of July parties. I'd have a party every Fourth of July and invite a lot of people! The first year I did it at the residence, but there were too many people. It was obviously over-crowded. So, from then on I did it at one of the local establishments which catered to party functions. That was fun too. I got to invite a lot of people. I think I mentioned this before, we entertained a lot! We had these standard fourteen- person dinners at home. A table for eight and a table for six in two different rooms in our house. At some point during the dinner we would change places. I would start at the table of eight and Loreta would start at the table of six and then we would switch places at some point. Between the last course and the dessert, perhaps. I enjoyed that part and so did Loreta. She really enjoyed it.

Q: I was going to ask you about that.

WILLIAMS: She enjoyed it. She was a good hostess. She really enjoyed everything to do with having a party, having people in.

Q: I think it would be much easier to be in the post to do those jobs if you enjoyed it, if you liked it. You would really have to enjoy it. What else about your being there did you like, or not like? What were any unusual circumstances?

WILLIAMS: Well, I think I've covered just about everything I can think of. In general, I enjoyed the job. I felt that maybe I should try to get a job from then on as a Consul General at a bigger post, but that didn't work out. I just felt that, in general, I was pleased with the work that I had done there and my accomplishments. But, still I felt that neither the job that I did nor the country as a whole was enough appreciated by Washington.

Q: It sounds as if not, because after all you had the economic training, the academic training,
but also you had been there. Also, you made it your business to find out what made people tick and what people were thinking. To make connections, I see you as an enabler and you took on those roles willingly and well.

WILLIAMS: It's all very flattering, but I think it's all true. I'll have to say its all the truth. But, I think as a country of three and one-half million people, and thirty million sheep, I think probably Washington just really didn't feel like this was a terribly important place. I tried to raise their consciousness about Auckland as a commercial center, and to some degree I think I succeeded, but not to a great degree. As far as they were concerned, Auckland was more similar to Perth and Brisbane than it was to Sydney. I felt that was unfortunate, because I thought it had a lot of potential. For a country of three and one-half million people it had a lot; it was a relatively high income country. I felt it had a lot more potential in general than Washington (and I'm lumping together the Department of State, Department of Commerce, S.T.R. and so on) was willing to or able to realize. But, its really hard not just to change Washington's mind about anything, but to bring things into their consciousness, to get something on to their radar screen. It's very difficult.

Q: I'm thinking perhaps in many or all walks of life it may be very hard to disabuse people of certain ideas if someone's bent on thinking a certain way. It's very hard.

WILLIAMS: One thing that happened while I was there, which I just remembered, was the nuclear controversy. The entire Left in New Zealand was on to this idiotical anti-nuclear kick. At that time the extreme Left, the Communists in New Zealand supported Labor because the political Communist Party there had little chance of winning a seat, or maybe more than one seat, in Parliament. So, they supported the Labor Party. But there were two wings of the Communist Party. There was the Chinese wing and there was the Soviet wing. The Labor Party in general was not that far Left. Of course, they were always being attacked from the Left for not being far enough Left. But, oh this nuclear thing, the far Left was able to convince a lot of people from the moderate Left that everything nuclear was bad. This was part of the unilateral disarmament drive that was being conducted here in the United States under the auspices of the Soviet-dominated U.S. Peace Council, which was a branch of the World Peace Council, which was a Soviet tool, propaganda tool. And they were pretty effective. Their branch in New Zealand was quite effective. "Everything nuclear is bad, except of course the Soviet Union, but then we don't want to talk about that." Anyway, there was a move on foot to try to keep American nuclear-powered navy vessels out of the ports. Later, this was successful, but not while I was there. For example, we had a visit from the cruiser Long Beach which is nuclear powered and, of course was nuclear armed, although we never admitted it. We would not admit publicly whether any particular ship carried nuclear weapons or not. We would neither confirm nor deny. That was the policy. But, when the Long Beach was coming in, the Labor members of the City Council wanted to forbid them to enter the port of Auckland. I had to go around and do some lobbying with some members of the City Council to convince them that this was just not the way to go, and explain what the effect would likely be on U.S. policy towards New Zealand across the board. The Mayor, Sir Dove- Meyer Robinson was very much against the idea of banning nuclear or any other kind of ships from the harbor, because there was absolutely zero indication that there was any danger to anyone from the presence of a nuclear ship. The Leftists were saying, "Well, if the American nuclear ships come here, there might be a leak, or it might cause the Soviets to target us if a war
came along, and blah, blah." Anyway, a bunch of little boats got out there and tried to block the entrance to the harbor, but without success, and there was a lot of hoopla about that. Then when the cruiser came in, all the seamen who were going to be able to go on leave signed up at a little booth down on the dock. They all signed up saying, if invited, they would like to go to a home. Well, I think there were about two thousand seamen and there were four thousand invitations. I mean, the people just opened their arms to this big group of sailors coming in there. It was just overwhelming -- the hospitality with which they were greeted by the ordinary New Zealanders. I think that a lot of these were probably members of the Labor Party who at that time at least didn't agree with their leaders. But, then after I left, the Parliament passed a law forbidding the entry of naval vessels unless the government of that country would guarantee that it was not nuclear armed and that it was not nuclear powered. This was a sort of sop thrown by the main stream Labor Party to their extreme left fringe. I guess they figured they had to do something for these idiots off there in the fringe. So, that was the sop that they threw them and it is still in effect and it really had a bad affect on U.S.-New Zealand relations for years. We said, first of all we would no longer be able to continue treaty relations in the ANZUS Treaty with New Zealand if they were not going to allow our naval vessels in there. So, instead of the ANZUS Treaty, it became the Australia-U.S. Treaty. The Australians were angry at them too. Then the U.S. Government declined to receive any high-level visitors from New Zealand in Washington while this was in effect. We said we were not going to send any high-level people to New Zealand, because New Zealand had broken our treaty; had disregarded the good relations that had persisted since World War II; New Zealand had forgotten about the Coral Sea, etc. etc. Anyway, only recently has our policy changed. We are now receiving high-level visitors from down there. This caused a real interruption in good relations with New Zealand. I was very sorry to see it happen.

Q: About how long was this after you'd left?

WILLIAMS: I think it was maybe a year or two after I left that this happened. But, you know, the sheer idiocy of this policy was illustrated while I was there. I remember Colin Maiden, the Vice Chancellor of the University, told me that they wanted to set up a laboratory to do some experiments on nuclear isotopes that are used in medicine.

Q: I was thinking of radioactive.

WILLIAMS: Radioactive, yes. Anyway, the academic community went up in arms: "This nuclear, oh God, this is nuclear! This is atomic! We can't have that." So, their research in this area of the use of nuclear isotopes in medicine was completely stopped, because these Left wing idiots felt that this would undermine their whole anti-nuclear concept.

Q: There are hospitals that have partly nuclear medicine. I can remember seeing that on doors in hospitals when I was doing some work in Baltimore and there was nuclear medicine.

WILLIAMS: Sure. This was just ideological idiocy, that kind of thing.
Ambassador John H. Holdridge was born in New York in 1924. He graduated from the US Military Academy in 1945 and served as a 1st lieutenant overseas until 1948. He joined the Foreign Service in 1948. His overseas posts include Bangkok, Beijing, Hong Kong, Peking, and Singapore. He was the ambassador to Singapore from 1975 to 1978 and to Indonesia from 1982 to 1986. Ambassador Holdridge was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 20, 1995.

Q: What about the other power in the whole Asian area, Australia and New Zealand? How did you deal with them?

HOLDRIDGE: The way we dealt with them was just in fact to keep in touch with them and hold their hands. I saw quite a bit of the Australians and the New Zealanders, regarded them as friends and allies. At that point, there were no differences between us over this whole nuclear issue as concerns New Zealand, and they had been doing their bit in the Vietnam operation. There was a Commonwealth brigade, I believe, somewhere in the central part, somewhere near Da Nang. You were there.

Q: I know there were some Australians near, it was called Vung Tau, the old Cape Sanshang between Saigon and the sea and they may have been somewhere else, too.

HOLDRIDGE: Well, the New Zealanders had an artillery battery. Vietnam was such a feature of our policy that as long as these countries were cooperative in keeping their flags flying we didn't want to roil the political waters any. We kept in touch with them. I didn't really visit New Zealand or Australia until I became Assistant Secretary of State. Actually when I was NIO, I attended an intelligence conference in Canberra and flew out there. And I did fly through on other occasions, but nothing of substantial importance.

Q: By doing this, was this sort of on your part a shot across the bow of the People's Republic people, saying cool it fellows you keep this up and maybe we'll just...?

HOLDRIDGE: Well, I knew he would report back our concern over what the Chinese were saying. What I think really broke the log jam was George Bush. Have I mentioned this before? Well, George Bush, who was Vice President at the time, around April or May 1982, was going to make a tour of East Asia which would take him to Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. I was to accompany him along with my wife, since Barbara Bush was also going on this trip. Barbara Bush I guess needed a little bit of reasonably high level support for her meetings with Presidents' wives or Emperors' wives and things of that sort. It was also thought that it would be a good idea if maybe George Bush could stop in China. We contacted the Chinese and suggested that George Bush make a trip to Beijing, and of course the item that would be discussed would be the whole question of arms sales, not to mention the general relationship between China and the United States. We didn't get any answer from the Chinese, so
George went charging off and we stopped in Japan and Korea, saw Chun Doo Hwan, had lunch with the Emperor of Japan, and met the senior people all along the line in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and in Australia and ending up in New Zealand. When we were in New Zealand we got the word that the Chinese had agreed. Here we were, the farthest we could possibly get from Beijing on this trip, which may have been a deliberate ploy on the Chinese part, I have no idea. But they agreed that George Bush should come to Beijing. We had written some letters which we carried with us in the event that the Chinese said okay, to Deng Xiaoping and the Chairman of the National People's Congress. The last minute we didn't know if he would meet the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, we frankly didn't know who George Bush was going to meet.

Q: This was not during your time?

HOLDRIDGE: I was Ambassador in Indonesia when this happened. There was a very strong anti-nuclear sentiment building up, even when I was Assistant Secretary. One of the things that Haig did after having been first in China in July 1981, then went on to Australia for a brief visit, and then on to New Zealand for an ANZUS Council meeting, and I was with him and at that time, the Prime Minister of Australia and the Prime Minister of New Zealand both were good friends of the United States. So we didn't see any immediate problem. I'd called on Marshall, the leader of the opposition party along with Haig in New Zealand, and he was very anti-nuclear.

Q: There was a strong element of the left wing of the British Labor Party there, wasn't there?

HOLDRIDGE: Yes, a lot of these people had come from the left wing of the British Labor Party and had been in New Zealand long enough to become members of the New Zealand Parliament.

EDWARD HURWITZ
Australia/New Zealand Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1977-1978)

Ambassador Hurwitz was born in New York City in March 1931 to a rather typical Jewish middle class family. He went to Jamaica High School in Queens and then won one of the New York state scholarships and went to Cornell, entering in 1948. He had always had a great interest in foreign affairs. He took government and graduated from Cornell in 1952. After serving in the army from May 1953 to May 1955, Ambassador Hurwitz came into the Foreign Service in September 1956. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 15, 1996.

Q: So, you moved on to the Australian /New Zealand desk. In a way this must have seemed like cold potatoes or something like that after your previous jobs.

HURWITZ: Well, it was, but it was a new area entirely and sort of interesting. There were a lot of things going on. Our relations with the South Pacific were developing. It was hardly front page
news, of course, but it did get me a trip out there to Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Samoa. The issues involved with Australia and New Zealand was New Zealand not letting US naval ships pay a port of call unless we specified that they didn’t have nuclear devices or anything aboard. That finally evolved into New Zealand leaving ANZUS, I understand. Is that right?

Q: Was the Carter administration trying to be more flexible with New Zealand on this nuclear issue?

HURWITZ: Yes, I think so. That was the bedrock of policy, you know, you don’t negotiate for hostages, which we probably do, and you don’t acknowledge the presence of nuclear weapons. We didn’t deal in a cavalier way with New Zealand.

THERESA A. HEALY
Deputy Chief of Mission
Wellington (1977-1980)

Ambassador Theresa Healy was born in New York in 1932 and received her BA from St. John’s University. Her postings include Naples, Milan, Bern, Brussels and Wellington with an ambassadorship to Sierra Leone. She was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin on May 10, 1985.

Q: After that, then you got to...

HEALY: New Zealand. Ambassador Laise felt very strongly that I should go out as a DCM, but of course she faced, as did I, the fact that very few men, for many reasons, would feel comfortable with the idea of a deputy, an alter ego, who is a woman. Not to speak about what their wives might say about that. I knew or I found out, after the fact perhaps, that Ambassador Selden, who'd already been three years in New Zealand, had been through that summer and had interviewed a number of people for the job, and had not apparently been terribly persuaded to offer the job to anyone. So it is entirely thanks - and the previous comments I made about not having any mentors, if I had one, Carol Laise was one, because it was only through her action that I was recommended to Ambassador Selden and that Ambassador Selden accepted me sight unseen.

Q: That is certainly a compliment to you.

HEALY: I think it's a great credit to him. I think it's a great credit to him and a great credit to his wife as well.

Q: Do you think there's more problems with the wives in situations like that?

HEALY: I haven't the faintest idea, but I was lucky. I'm quite sure that a wife [might] say to her ambassador husband, "Dear, I really don't like the idea of your working that closely, day after
day, with a woman. Find yourself a nice young man." I'm quite sure that is a possible reaction on the part of some women.

Q: Of course.

HEALY: But it didn't happen in my case, and I was always very grateful to Carol Laise and to the Seldens.

Q: Did you enjoy New Zealand?

HEALY: Very much. It's very far away. Oh, very far away. But I enjoyed the country very much. I made some friends there. There was tennis. There was even a bit of skiing. I enjoyed the work very much indeed. Ambassador Selden was a good ambassador to work for. Perhaps it's just that we were compatible types, but I have heard stories of DCMs who said they never had a chance to do anything because the ambassador did everything. On the other hand, I've heard of DCMs who said that they spent half their time trying to prevent the ambassador from doing dumb things. None of that ever happened to me. So it was a very easy working relationship and one that I enjoyed very much. I learned a great deal from him. Ambassador Selden is a non-career ambassador, but he'd been in congress for many years and he had been by the time I came he'd already been ambassador three years. So I knew I had a lot to learn from him. He was five years there all told.

Q: Was he really? Did you have a very heavy schedule of social things you had to go to?

HEALY: Not as much as I would in a European assignment, perhaps. But enough, because you had the Commonwealth connection, you had lots of visitors from Britain, you had visiting royalty, if you can believe it. Ambassador and Mrs. Selden were active socially.

I was very fortunate though, enormously, enormously fortunate. Ambassador Selden called me in shortly after my arrival to explain that he had found it necessary to make other arrangements at the official residence. The Swiss couple who had been working there, the man had reached the age of retirement and both had elected to retire at the same time, so he had made other arrangements. I've forgotten what they were. I think it involved somebody from Malaysia or Hong Kong or Singapore or something. Very, very good arrangements but of course he also had his wife, who was terrific. She worked very hard in that house. But what he was saying to me was that while the man, who had previously served at the residence, was retired, he was considerably older than his wife. Why didn't I take on the wife as my housekeeper part-time? I had a very easy three years. Oh, it was a wonderful, wonderful opportunity. So Maria [was my] housekeeper for three years and did everything. I'd simply say, "Maria, I have to give a dinner party for twelve next Thursday. Are you free?" Because she was doing catering and I had to be sure that she was free to take care of my things. She would say, "Yes." I would say, “Fine, would you lay it on? She would lay on the waiters, buy the food, offer me the menu, do everything.

Q: Marvelous.
HEALY: Oh, was I lucky!

Q: One of those jewels that you always hope you will find.

HEALY: I couldn't believe it. In all aspects I had a very, very enjoyable and successful and happy three years in New Zealand.

Q: That's wonderful. The last six [months] of it I believe were under Ambassador Martindell?

HEALY: Almost the last year. I think of it as two years with Ambassador Selden and one year with Ambassador Martindell. But she was a bit late getting there. There was a gap, I think, maybe of a couple of months. Then she was away, I think, for a month at Christmas time. So all I guess in all we weren't together a year, a calendar year, yes, but with gaps in there.

Q: I understand.

HEALY: That was also a very, very happy association. Ambassador Martindell had never been - of course she'd never been an ambassador before. So things were quite new to her and yet our relationship was comfortable enough that I felt that I could offer her advice at any time. And that worked out very happily as well. I think she stayed on for another two years. No, let's see, I guess she would have left... Well, since she was a Carter appointee, I guess she would have left when the Reagan administration came in. But I'm not positive about that. I think she may have stayed on maybe another six months past the changeover and left in the summer of '81.

Q: I see.

HEALY: I think. I'm not really positive.

Q: It must have been very interesting to you to see the difference in styles between two different people, one very experienced and one who was new to the job.

HEALY: But it's inevitable because there is no such thing as a single way for an ambassador to operate. It will be different from one person to the next, inevitably and always. So when people talk about an ambassador who did this or an ambassador who had a habit of doing this, you're basically speaking about individuals. There may be no way you can sort of synthesize a list of ambassadorial traits or characters. I think it's been tried. I think I've seen such lists, but it's very hard to do because everything depends upon the personal predilections of the individual, the background he or she brings to it, the interactions within the office, the demands of the job, the culture in which you're operating. You can go on forever as to why each ambassador is unique.

Q: Exactly, yes. But all of this must have been wonderful training for you, because your next assignment was to be an ambassador yourself.

HEALY: This is the classic example. This is the way it's supposed to happen, that as DCM you learn how to be an ambassador and then you get to be an ambassador. It doesn't always happen
that a DCM ends up as an ambassador.

Q: No, I know.

HEALY: It was a surprise to me. It was nothing I'd asked for, nothing I expected at that point. It happened.

WILLIAM BODDE, JR.
East Asia Bureau, Australia and New Zealand Affairs

William Bodde was born in Brooklyn and raised in Long Island. He served in the US Army in Korea and attended Hofstra College. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and served in Austria, Sweden, and German. He was also ambassador to Fiji, Tuvalu, Tonga and the Marshall Islands and served as EE/MP to Kiribati.

Q: The pieds noirs.

BODDE: Yes, so they were very unwilling to be kicked out again. Noumea, the capital of New Caledonia, had been a major staging area for the United States in World War II. That’s where we had our South Pacific headquarters commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. The five-sided wooden buildings, rotting when I was there, were called the little Pentagon and are now the headquarters of the South Pacific Commission (SPC). The SPC is a regional organization that includes the former Pacific colonies, the French and American territories, as well as Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., the UK and France. In fact, Noumea, which looks like you dropped a French provincial city into the middle of the jungle, still has sections that kept their American military designations such as the motor pool or the staging area. During the war the city was full with thousands of American troops. It is pretty clear that the independence movements in the Pacific colonies were an unintended consequence of the massive Americans presence there in World War II. We were there to protect Australia and New Zealand from invasion, drive the Japanese out of the islands, and eventually to conquer Japan. We were not there to foster independence movements against our wartime allies the British and the French.

The indigenous peoples saw American troops, including African Americans, who were armed, who were powerful, and who were empowered. This, combined with the generally more democratic open sort of view of the Americans, had an enormous influence. Up until then the only people in the islands who wielded real power were white people. Only white people owned guns or commanded armed people. Well, all of a sudden they observed dark skinned people who looked like them were armed and had power in their own right. This impressed the indigenous people and they began to demand control over their own destinies.

The French, unlike the British, held on to their territories very tightly. They incorporated New Caledonia and French Polynesia into metropolitan France and they gave them seats in the
national parliament. They’re now changing their status in name if not in reality. Just recently they’ve changed their designation to “overseas countries,” even though they remain a part of France. As a consequence, even though the French territories were part of the consular district of the U.S. Embassy in Fiji, the ambassador in Suva was not accredited to them. The American Ambassador in Paris was accredited to the French Pacific territories. We issued thousands of visitor’s visas to French civilians and military families to transit the U.S. and visit Disneyland etc. At one time we had a U.S. consul in Tahiti but over time, we stopped staffing it. Then the French moved their nuclear testing from North Africa to Tahiti and, low and behold, a U.S. consul shows up in Tahiti. The French officials suspected that the new consul was a CIA officer. De Gaulle personally issued a command ordering the U.S. consul out of Tahiti. For the last 20 years or so the local Tahitian authorities have been lobbying for the U.S. to reappoint a consul. They want more convenient consular services. Now they have to do it by mail or go to Suva, Fiji.

I would get a very warm welcome when I visited Tahiti because the locals wanted me to arrange for an honorary consul and the French wanted to know what I was up to. The first time I went, I was put up at the French Governor General’s house - he was away - and provided with a car and driver. Wonderful treatment, but it meant they knew my every move. What are these Americans doing there? Was I there to give support to the independence movement? In reality I was just interested in learning about the political situation and visiting with the local American business people. There was a small American community in Tahiti, including the son of the Rutgers family of Rutgers University in New Jersey. He was married to the daughter of one of the co-authors of the Mutiny on the Bounty trilogy.

Yes, the French were certainly a factor to deal with in the South Pacific. As I mentioned earlier, the victorious allies set up a regional economic organization after the war called the South Pacific Commission - it’s now called the South Pacific Community - and the headquarters is in Noumea. It used to consist of the so-called metropole countries: France, the UK and the U.S., and their colonies and territories as well as New Zealand and Australia. As the colonies became independent they belonged in their own right. It was set up to do non-political things such as health, education, small-scale economic development, environment, etc. The French remained adamant that the organization couldn’t discuss any political issues because they didn’t want their territories having a voice in political matters. Basically, the metropolitan powers together with Australia and New Zealand paid the bill, and the islands decided on the programs within the budget. Eventually, the independent islands, along with Australia and New Zealand, formed another organization to deal with political as well as economic issues called the South Pacific Forum. The French are willing to pay a lot of money to keep the South Pacific Community headquarters in Noumea and are building a new headquarters for the organization. So between 1978 and 1982 I went to Noumea at least twice a year, first as a member of the U.S. delegation and later, when I was ambassador to Fiji, as head of the delegation.

Q: While we’re still on this, what about the role of Australia and then New Zealand in this equation, during the time you were dealing with this?

BODDE: The South Pacific is their backyard or even, front yard and they take a close interest in what is happening there. One of the things I remember was when I got the assignment I had a talk
with somebody in the embassy in Bonn. He told me that it was important to remember that in that part of the world, Australia is the big guy. Well, that’s certainly true. The Australians and the New Zealanders are the major aid donors to the islands so they’re major players. I had more problems with the New Zealanders than with the Australians. The reason for that is that New Zealand is a small country. It’s a tiny country, basically, but here’s a place where they’re important and along comes the United States. To them the U.S. is a bull in a china shop, and they weren’t particularly happy that we were becoming more active in the region. They would like us to give money to the region but they don’t like us down there competing with them. So there was a certain amount of tension with the New Zealand bureaucrats. I mean, the New Zealand people obviously don’t have such negative feelings about the United States. Some of the New Zealand government officials are like the Canadians in that sense. The Canadian officials vis-à-vis the U.S. They both resent the U.S. being so big, rich and powerful.

Q: But also, if I recall, correct me if I’m wrong, there is quite a strong British Labor Party influence on people in New Zealand, which is left-wing and essentially kind of theoretically hostile to American capitalism.

BODDE: Well, I think there had been the labor mentality of post-war England. Ironically it was a class-conscious party in a classless society. Later the Labor Party was out of power for a long time and in the 1990s New Zealand embraced the free market system with a vengeance. Actually, the Conservatives were in power when I was working with the Pacific islands and Muldoon was the prime minister. But anti-Americanism was not based on ideology. The officials during the Conservative government resented the enhanced U.S. presence in the South Pacific as much as the Labor Party. The Labor Party was responsible for banning U.S. nuclear ships from New Zealand, a move popular with the public, which led to cool relations with the U.S. and the break up of the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-U.S.) alliance.

What I resented was that they thought they were the only people who understood the Pacific islanders. In reality they often didn’t know what the islanders were thinking any more than we did. That said, to be a South Pacific expert in the New Zealand foreign service or the Australian foreign service was a good career move and many of their best people were involved with the islands.

I really came across a turf problem with the Australians and New Zealanders when I was director of Pacific island affairs. At the time, the U.S. decided to settle the long-standing issue of disputed claims to 25 islands in the South Pacific. The disputes had originally been between the U.S. and the UK, but sovereignty over some of the British colonies such as the Cook Islands and Tokelau eventually devolved to New Zealand and others such as Kiribati and Tuvalu were about to become independent. It would have been a political embarrassment for the U.S. to have a dispute over sovereignty with tiny, independent island nations. Our claims were primarily based on the Guano Mining Act of 1856. Guano is bird-

Q: Birdshit.

BODDE: Yes, which is a natural phosphate and, until they found artificial phosphates, was the
major source of fertilizers in the world. So back in the 1850s and ‘60s it became very desirable for countries to discover guano islands and mine them. For example, Nauru was an Australian-controlled island rich in guano. For some years after Nauru became independent it was *per capita* the richest country in the world because of guano exports. Unfortunately, they squandered the money and now that the guano has run out, Nauru is just another poor South Pacific country.

Anyhow, there were 25 islands in dispute. The largest number were in Kiribati, which before independence was called the Gilbert Islands. The Kiribati claims included Canton Island where we had a U.S. Air Force missile tracking station and Christmas Islands where we and the British had tested nuclear bombs. Others were in Tuvalu, formerly the Ellis Islands. Still others were in the Cook Islands and some others were in Tokelau. The Cook Islands were in free association with New Zealand, and the Tokelau Islands were a New Zealand territory. With independence of Kiribati and Tuvalu just around the corner, the U.S. decided to give up our claims provided U.S. strategic and fishing interests could be satisfied. One of the reasons the list was so long is that it was part of the Lend-Lease negotiations with the British before WWII involving the destroyers we leased to them.

Q: Yes, 15 destroyers and all that.

BODDE: Yes, before we entered the war, I guess in 1940, we were negotiating Lend Lease with the UK and the dispute over these islands came into it. I saw a State Department memo, which I should have copied because, given the lackadaisical record keeping system of the State Department, it may no longer exist. The memo had a notation from President Roosevelt instructing the State Department to include any islands where we had the slightest claim to use them as bargaining chips. In the case of some of the islands, the U.S. position was strong but others were dubious. We had a strong claim to Canton Island and for years we had a base on Canton. We had worked out an arrangement with the British in which both sides agreed that the dispute wasn’t settled but that in good faith the U.S. would pay rent, which they in turn gave to the local Gilbert Islands government. First we used Canton Island as a refueling place for the old flying clippers, and then we used it to track satellites and missiles. We pulled out of that base on Canton Island when Kiribati became independent. Christmas Island was another strong claim with the UK and we used it for testing nuclear weapons.

As I said there were a couple of islands where our claims were strong because we had what the lawyers call “perfected” the claim by doing things there. In other cases it was doubtful whether we ever mined guano on them or who was the first to do so or even cases where there were inhabitants on them when they were “discovered”. The first memo that was circulated in the interagency process proposed that the U.S. keep Canton and Christmas islands and we would give up our claims to the others in Kiribati and Tuvalu. Just when I took over as director, the British Embassy came back to us with a rejection of our proposal. They maintained that it was unacceptable for them to relinquish claims to islands that were going to be a part of a newly independent country.

I went back to the other agencies and worked out a new proposal. We finally reached consensus on a new proposal. This was a minor miracle because inter-agency negotiations can be even more acrimonious and duplicitous than international negotiations. For example, one time when I led
the delegation to Hawaii for negotiations with Tuvalu I met with our delegation in the morning before a 10 o’clock negotiating session with Tuvalu’s prime minister. The Defense Department representative opened my meeting with the statement that he had gotten a message during the night informing him that DOD no longer supported the previously agreed U.S. position. Christ, I’m going in there in an hour and he is telling me that crap. I avoided commitments to the Prime Minister and went back to Washington to get the Defense Department on board.

Anyhow, the interested agencies finally agreed that I could negotiate treaties with Tuvalu, Kiribati, The Cook Islands, and New Zealand (for the Tokelau). The treaties would include provisions that in a case of a crisis the island nations would favorably consider the reentry of the U.S. military forces. There were people in Washington who seemed to believe that Japan someday would try to re-conquer the islands. Anyhow we needed such language to satisfy the conservatives in Congress. Our renunciation of our claims was forever but the other provisions were subject to renegotiations after ten years if either side requested. To my knowledge they have never been renegotiated.

Q: Keep the Japanese out for at least that long.

BODDE: Right. The other provision we needed was more important. We needed a commitment from the islands that they wouldn’t discriminate against U.S. fishing boats. This was a sensitive issue because the U.S. tuna fleet had moved to the Western Pacific because of the problems they had in Latin American waters. The American tuna boats didn’t want the Pacific island countries to pass laws banning purse seining, which in effect would have banned most of the American boats. The U.S. eventually solved the fishing problem by signing an agreement with the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Organization. Under the agreement the United States pays about $8 million a year, which is divided up among all the Pacific islands, including the Micronesians, depending on the size of the catch in those islands. This allows our ships to go into the 200-mile economic zones of the member nations.

I found the disputed island negotiations to be very educational. I learned how politically powerful the U.S. tuna industry was. If we did not have them on board, the U.S. Senate would never ratify the treaties. Even after the tuna fishermen’s main protector, Senator Magnuson, died the tuna industry still was very powerful. I kept representatives of the industry informed each step of the way and they knew I had their interest at heart. If we didn’t have some sort of security language in the treaties the conservative senators would have stopped ratification. The negotiations taught me a lot about how to deal with Congress.

I also learned that the Constitution notwithstanding, the U.S. state governments and other people who have legitimate interests should be included in the process. We may have a federal system and the Constitution empowers the federal government to be solely responsible for foreign relations. However, when you’re dealing with Pacific islands it is a good idea to consult with the political leaders in Hawaii and American Samoa. After the first set of negotiations with Tuvalu I stopped by to brief the governor of Hawaii on what had transpired. I did so simply as a courtesy and I thought I was being really magnanimous to do so. I walked into the room, and there were at least 25 people in the room. In addition to the governor there were the key U.S. Senate and
House staff members from the Hawaiian delegations in Congress and other Hawaiian state officials. Governor Ariyoshi really chewed me out. He asked how I could dare negotiate away American territory that belonged to Hawaii without consulting with Hawaii beforehand? He said this was typical East Coast arrogance - the Western states and Hawaii don’t know anything and anyhow they don’t count anyhow. Well, I walked out of that meeting saying to myself, “That was really smart, Bodde. Here you are a mid-grade bureaucrat and you are fighting with a Democratic governor in a Democratic Administration.” You could be sure who was going to win that fight. I called my friend, George Chaplin, who was the chief editor of the Honolulu Advertiser and also the appointed U.S. representative to the South Pacific Commission. George was very well plugged in and a wonderful guy. He said Bill, you’ve got a problem and I suggest you do some political fence-mending. I spent the next couple of years cultivating the Hawaiians. It was well worth the effort.

Q: When you say “fence-mending,” what did you do?

BODDE: I put a Hawaiian representative and an American Samoan representative on my delegation. I never went through Hawaii without stopping by and seeing the governor and keeping him in the loop. I worked closely with Hideto Kono, who the governor has appointed to monitor the negotiations. I knew Hawaiians were interested in Canton Island for a fishing station and transshipment installation. I also knew that it cost the U.S. Defense Department $15 million a year to maintain an installation on Canton Island and that Hawaii wasn’t going to spend $15 million a year on such an installation. Their eyes were bigger than their stomachs or at least bigger than their ability to pay. I arranged for the military in Hawaii to fly down a Hawaiian delegation to look at Canton. The delegation came to the same conclusion. That is, unless the federal government was going to underwrite a fishing station and transshipment installation on Canton. Hawaii could not afford to underwrite the project. The same was true for American Samoa. We put some language in the treaties about fostering closer economic relations between Samoa and these islands.

So essentially I did a whole series of things, all of which should have been done in the first place. It makes sense to consult with people and institutions outside the federal government who have a legitimate interest. Later my office proposed to the White House staff that they appoint Governor Ariyoshi to represent President Carter at the Kiribati independence ceremonies and they did. In any event, my fence-mending paid off. Later when I was ambassador to Fiji the Hawaiian state legislature passed a joint resolution commending me for my work in the Pacific islands. I made a lot of friends in the process.

We negotiated the first agreement with Tuvalu, and then with Kiribati. The Kiribati tale is sad. Kiribati is like most Pacific island countries that are overpopulated and to make matters worse often suffer from severe lack of rain. When the U.S. left Canton Island, we left millions of dollars of facilities or equipment that could not be moved or were uneconomic to move, including a desalination plant. I was authorized to give equipment left behind to Kiribati as part of the negotiations. But the U.S. Senate took four years to ratify the treaty. The equipment and installations were not maintained during this period. During this period the islands were under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior who made American Samoa responsible for
Canton Island. The governor sent over a few men to “protect American interests.” It was really something out of a Peter Sellers movie. The British sent an Englishman with some people from Kiribati “to protect UK/Kiribati interests.” Relations between the two groups were poor. Both sides insisted on driving on “their” side of the road. It was just lucky that there were no head-on collisions. The tragedy was that millions of dollars worth of equipment that might have been used by Kiribati to resettle people went to waste.

We got the treaties negotiated. We got them signed. I signed the treaties with Kiribati and Tuvalu, and our ambassador in New Zealand, who was responsible for the Cooks and for Tokelau Islands, signed those treaties. Then they sent up on the Hill, and ran into a problem with Jesse Helms and some of his ideological soul mates. The Senate became Republican but fortunately Helms did not become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Q: He went to the Agricultural Committee.

BODDE: Fortunately, Helms chose to be chairman of the Agriculture Committee and Senator Lugar became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After the Reagan Administration reviewed the treaties, it decided to go ahead with ratification even though they had been negotiated in the Carter Administration. Later the political-appointee ambassadors in Fiji, New Zealand and Australia came in with telegrams saying this is important to our relations in the region to get the treaties ratified as soon as possible. The Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors also lobbied for ratification. I am convinced that had the Democrats still controlled the Senate, the treaties would not have been ratified. The Reagan Administration endorsement undercut the opposition from Helms and other conservatives. As it was, the Democrats supported the treaties to be nice to the islanders and the Republicans supported them because good relations with the island states enhanced U.S. national security. Senator Frank Murkowski of Alaska was floor leader for the treaties, which finally passed 92 to 4. Helms and his friends had held them up for four years.

Well, I started telling you this because you asked me about working with Australia and New Zealand. Dealing with the Australians and the New Zealanders on these treaties was an eye-opener. The New Zealanders were particularly difficult. Part of the problem stemmed from not consulting with the New Zealanders or Australians before we began negotiating with Tuvalu and Kiribati. But that was just part of the problem. The two ambassadors demanded to see Holbrooke and we set a lunch for them with Holbrooke, my boss Deputy Assistant Secretary Evelyn Colbert, and me. The ambassadors objected to the security language in the treaties and accused us of militarizing the islands. According to them we were introducing the Cold War into an area that previously had been free of Cold War tensions. Holbrooke, in his typical political manner - and I have great respect for his intelligence and political skills, turned to me and said, “Bill, they are right. Take care of it.” He then left the lunch. Well, no matter what Holbrooke said, we were not able to change the security provisions, which were very mild in any event. At least not if we ever wanted to get the treaties ratified. We worked on the Australians and after a while they came around, and we finally convinced the New Zealanders. But it was not easy.

When I went down to Wellington to negotiate with the New Zealand foreign ministry. Herb
Hansell who was State Department legal advisor wouldn’t let me take a lawyer. He objected to Department lawyers traveling too much. So there I was, negotiating a treaty in the New Zealand Foreign Office without a Department lawyer on the delegation. Fortunately, Dick Dols, the political counselor at the U.S. Embassy, had a law degree. Of course, I would not be authorized to sign any document until it was cleared with the lawyers in the Department. In reality these treaties were not complex legal documents but expressions of general political intent. You don’t have to be a legal wizard to write them and, of course, I vetted them back in the Department. For their part, the New Zealanders presumed they knew everything about the islands and what the islanders think so they found no need to have any islanders on their delegations. I really enjoyed tweaking them. I always had an American Samoan on my delegation. When we sat down I would ask the New Zealand head of delegation, “Is there anybody here from the Cooks? Is there anybody here from the Tokelau?” He would reply, “No we will take care of their interests.

After we met in Wellington, two New Zealand diplomats and I went over to the Cook Islands to see if there was enough common ground with the Cook Island Government to bring out a U.S. team to the Cook Islands to negotiate. Well, the Cook Islands’ relationship to New Zealand is a lot like the Micronesians’ relationship with us. It’s a kind of love-hate relationship. The Cook Islands get a tremendous amount of money from New Zealand, but they resent it. No one likes being the supplicant. In the company of the New Zealanders the Cook Island officials told me that they saw no need to negotiate a treaty about their sovereignty over their islands. I was disappointed, but as I was boarding the plane their foreign secretary came rushing up to tell me that they were ready to start negotiations in two weeks. I called Washington when I got to Tahiti where I was attending a South Pacific Conference and asked the delegation to meet me one week later in Tahiti and we would go together to the Cook Islands.

The delegation included Buzz Busby, who was head of the fisheries office then, a lawyer, Dave Colson, one of the few people in the world who’s been a Marine and a Peace Corps volunteer, and a representative from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, Richie Shamora. Brownie Tuiaosopo represented America Samoa and Dick Dols and his secretary came over from our embassy in Wellington and rounded out the delegation. We got off to a rocky start because of tensions between New Zealand and the Cook Islands. At the first meeting the New Zealanders, on behalf of the Cook Islanders, put forward their position. We came back after lunch and were told by the Cook Islanders that we should disregard what we heard in the morning because New Zealand did not speak for them and they would speak for themselves. Before we sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification we insisted on a diplomatic note from New Zealand stating that under their free association agreement the Cook Islands had the legal authority to negotiate and sign a treaty with the U.S.

We reached agreement within a few days. I remember working on the final text with the U.S. delegation at a snack bar during a recess in the negotiations and Colson admonishing us not to get catsup on the treaty! Not quite the Congress of Vienna but it got the job done. For some reasons the New Zealanders were smarting from the experience.

A couple of months later there was an ANZUS meeting in Washington. ANZUS was the Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. mutual defense treaty. Later New Zealand dropped out because
they wouldn’t accept U.S. ships that had nuclear weapons on them in New Zealand waters. For some time after they left ANZUS, U.S.-New Zealand relations were quite cool. Anyhow, at the ANZUS meeting in Washington, the New Zealand foreign minister complained to Secretary of State Vance that Bodde and his delegation had gone to the Cook Islands and poisoned the well, turning the Cook Islanders against New Zealand. So suddenly I was summoned along with my boss, Evelyn Colbert, Busby, and Colson to the Secretary’s office. That was the only time I had ever talked to Secretary Vance. He was eating a sandwich between meetings. “What is this all about?” So we explained to him what we had negotiated and said we were not trying to damage their relationship in any way. It was clear he wasn’t even aware of the treaties and taken aback when the Kiwis complained to him. He listened to our explanation and said, “Okay, I’ll speak to them.” That was the end of it. Holbrooke supported me as well and I must say that Holbrooke was wonderfully supportive of my work.

Holbrooke did something as assistant secretary that no other assistant secretary did. Once a month he would invite a congressman or a senator over to his office for coffee and donuts with his deputies. Then he would bring them into the weekly bureau staff meeting. There the congressmen would get a chance to give a little speech about their view of the world or whatever. Then Holbrooke would conduct a regular staff meeting. This being the East Asia Bureau, he would usually ask the country director for China to say a few words. Then he’d might cover China-Taiwan or Japan or Southeast Asia. Almost every time he would ask me to tell the meeting what was happening in the islands. Well, my colleagues from much more important places would groan. I remember once after a meeting, the country director for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos grabbed me and complained, “God damn it, Bodde, I have a war going on, and we’re spending our time in these meetings talking about Tuvalu! What’s going on here?” I replied, “Look, what am I supposed to do? The assistant secretary asks, ‘Bill, what’s going on in the islands?’ What should I say, ‘Dick, you don’t want to talk about that.’ Don’t you want to talk about some place more important?”

He really knew how to work the Hill. He got Glenn out there and we could always depend upon Glenn to give us support. The senators and congressmen loved attending the meetings. They felt they were learning the secrets of the temple. Most of all they thought their ideas were being taken seriously by the State Department. One of the great ironies of Washington political life is that we think the Department is weak and that Congress is omnipotent. In contrast the Hill thinks that the Department is powerful and out of control. To my knowledge, no other assistant secretary in any administration has done such a thing.

RICHARD J. DOLS
Political Counselor

Richard J. Dols was born in Minnesota in 1932. He attended St. Thomas College and later, he went to law school at the University of Minnesota. With a major in political science and a minor in history, he decided to join the Foreign Service in
1961. His career included positions in France, Canada, New Zealand, and Swaziland. Mr. Dols was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: You went to Wellington where you served from 1977-81. How did you end up there and what were you doing?

DOLS: I took the junior officer program job because I was widowed and I had just recently remarried. That was a way to stay in the States two more years. As I was just finishing that program up they had a sudden vacancy because of a medical in Wellington. It looked like a nice place to take a family and I had inherited a new wife with four of her children in addition to my three. So you can see why I wanted Wellington. I had the impression that I was going off to England in the South Pacific, but that wasn't it. It is a fascinating country though.

It wasn't just New Zealand, it was all of Polynesia and Antarctica because we had the main operating base program at Christchurch, New Zealand. So we had two almost equator to pole activities in addition to New Zealand politics. That was great.

Q: What were our interests in that area including the whole business?

DOLS: We were, of course, ANZUS allies at the time. We wanted on the ANZUS front to open as many ports...well we had a worldwide port access problem with nuclear powered and armed ships and we wanted to make sure that we opened as many ports as we could worldwide, but particularly in that region. We saw possibilities there.

We had problems even with the new National Party government that took over there in 1975 getting renewal of warship visits, but we did it. It was an acrimonious kind of thing with sort of annual battles of the straits going into Auckland...small boats trying to interfere with passage of huge submarines, etc. We have had port access problems in Micronesia or in Polynesia and generally through even Melanesia where we had 26 island claims from the previous century that we had to resolve.

We had declarations of 200 mile zones by the new island states. We had on the other hand the Magnuson Act which had established a 200 mile fishing zone for the US but excepted from our claim any jurisdiction over highly migratory species which turned out was true by definition. We had an injunction from Congress to go out and negotiate regional fishing agreements that would deal with this tuna problem, but not bilaterals. We couldn't do bilateral agreement because the theory was that the fish are highly migratory and go through everybody's waters and you can't biologically control stock unless you have everybody in the agreement.

The islanders thought very much in the terms of just extending their national territory seaward and they saw bucks. They weren't going to give an inch on that one. So we were at logger heads on that. But we did decide that we had to clear away as many of the obstacles to our relations as we can. So that is why we went to work on the island treaties.

We had quite a few problems after the first three. One on the Cook Islands and one on Tokelau.
The Tokelau group tended to hang up. The New Zealanders were very conscious of their kind of their tutelage role for those two areas and they didn't want to do anything that the islanders didn't want to do. In fact they were holier than the Pope on the subject.

On the other hand we were anxious to settle them all. Finally I decided to push really hard on the Tokelau thing by putting a little pressure on and finally got the agreement. When I went to sign the agreement, I was kind of appalled at myself. These poor people, did I rob them in the process? I felt a little bit sheepish for having been so hard-nosed. They were so appalling poor.

Q: Back to the New Zealand side of things. I have never served there. I have the impression that the New Zealand Laborites are the type of people who got together in circles and sang the Red Flag Forever...the British leftist got transported there.

DOLS: There were a lot of those people, sort of extant, British trade unionists who lead New Zealand unions. The New Zealand Communist Party, The Socialist Unity it was called, was a real minion of Moscow. It took funding directly and it's marching orders, etc. Their principal objective was to break the ANZUS Alliance if they could. Their vehicle was the post access thing. The Labor Party in New Zealand operates like the Labor Party in Britain. One week in May the Federation of Labor meets for its annual conference and they pass a whole lot of resolutions on international affairs and of course it is bar nuclear power and armed warships and that kind of thing.

Were these Auckland stevedores, the Indians and that kind of stuff, in those days directly SUP controlled (Soviet Communist Party)? The labor movement itself was largely kind of apathetic really. The only really activists were these Liverpool expatriate, trade unionists who came to Auckland to form a longshoreman's union, whatever. So the FOL (Federation of Labor) would pass these resolutions. Then the following week the party would meet for its annual meeting. These things get boilerplated into the party policy platform. So there it is, a very small activist group makes party policy and that is what we were dealing with.

We argued to Washington that things are find now. The National Party have opened the ports again, but one day they are not going to be in office. We have to do something about this because one day the ports are going to close. Well, we tried a number of different acts to deal with the problem. We could get absolutely no support in the Department at all. It was not important.

Q: The Department is dealing with a lot of things and this is the sort of thing that could have been dealt with at the Desk level anyway.

DOLS: Well, we needed the Department's support in a couple of ways. We had been told in effect to stand down and not be too activist. So we used a basic change that way. We needed support by bringing out visitors who said the right things. We needed not to play into the hands of the then National Party Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, who tended to use our port visits as his own political vehicles to stir up problems with the Labor Party. For example, during the school holiday period, the New Zealanders all flood to the South Island. But the only way that you get to the South Island is by ferries from Wellington. They have to get their cars on the ferry,
etc. They book six months ahead. The ferries are jammed and operating 24 hours a day. They are huge ships really. Muldoon would want a nuclear armed warship visit right during school holidays. Why did he want it? Because he knew that the port unions would shut down the ports and then there would be chaos. Then he could come to the rescue, calling in New Zealand's C-130s to fly these poor stranded tourists in their cars across the strait and beat down the trade unionists, the Labor Party people. Unfortunately we had Ambassadors who let him get away with that tactic.

**Q:** We had two political ambassadors there. The first one was Armistead Selden. What was his background?

**DOLS:** He had been a Congressman for 17 years and lost in a race for the Senate. Then he went over to ISA as Assistant Secretary at the Pentagon and eventually to New Zealand.

**Q:** Did he pay much attention to what was going on or was this more of a social appointment?

**DOLS:** He saw the relationship with Muldoon and the National Party people as being very comfortable. He was a southern Democrat but ideologically on the right side of the spectrum. So he found common ground with Muldoon. Muldoon was a tremendously shrewd politician. He could con the shoes off anybody and he certainly did con the shoes off Ambassador Selden.

**Q:** Then you had Anne Martindell, who was from New Jersey.

**DOLS:** From Princeton. A very nice woman, a loveable woman really, but not exactly cut out for this kind of work. She gained some kind of local fame by being elected to the New Jersey Assembly as an anti-Vietnam candidate. She was a large contributor to the Democratic Party and became the head of the Emergency Preparedness Organization within AID. Then she came to New Zealand. She then made the usual mistake and fell into the arms of political alikes. The alikes being the Labor Party people.

**Q:** Perhaps the anti-Vietnam things struck a responsive cord?

**DOLS:** Oh, it did. Also they simply saw her as being on the liberal side of the spectrum and she felt comfortable with them. So to both of them we would preach, "Look we can not afford to become too cozy with any government in power because it is going to change tomorrow."

Poor Anne Martindell never even got within speaking distance of the government. Before she left Washington she was invited to the New Zealand Embassy for a dinner at which Muldoon was present. They sat next to each other. Muldoon liked to tipple a little heavily. Somewhere in the conversation he told Anne, who was somewhat of a feminist, "I don't like lady politicians." She was highly offended. What did she do but tell some stringer for some newspaper in New Jersey who then wrote to the "New York Times" that little episode. Muldoon reacted, of course, vehemently because Labor than began castigating him in parliament by saying, "Here you are ruining our relationship with our closest ally by your imprudent kind of remark, etc."
So Muldoon in effect let it be known that he was going to have nothing to do with her, period. And he kept that promise.

**Q:** What did that do with you all at the working level?

DOLS: That made us, in effect, surrogate ambassadors, because the political and economic counselors had to pick up the slack, if you will. That was good because we had unusual access.

**Q:** Because business had to go on.

DOLS: Right. One of the most telling disasters in the Martinville/Muldoon relationship was...you remember we had the boycott on the Moscow Olympics in 1980, and it wasn't going very well. One day we got a circular message from the Department instructing us to go in to see our local head of government and make these arguments. Ann came in to me and said, "I am going to see him this morning and tell him what I think. I am going to tell him that Carter is going to win the nomination and the election, Ted Kennedy is not going to succeed, and he has a long memory." I said, "Ann you had better smile if you are going to say something like that." I didn't think she would do it. Well, she had been so insulted by his unwillingness to even see her, invite her or do anything. The only time he would see her was on an instructed demarche.

She had a terrible time remembering her lines so I would prepare an Aide Memoire in advanced and say, "Ann all you have to do is in effect read it like a speech and give it to him in the end. Don't worry about it you don't have to learn lines." I took a younger officer as a notetaker and Ann and I went up to see Muldoon. She delivered the spiel from the Aide Memoire and then without an ah, yes or no, she switches to the domestic political situation in the United States saying Carter was going to get the nomination over Ted Kennedy and Carter was going to win and he has a long memory. I thought, "Oh, no!" I could just see this junior officer who had been taking notes seriously up to that point and his pencil was just posed in the air looking wide eyed.

Muldoon just leaped down her throat and said, "I won't be threatened," and then proceeded to take her apart. You can imagine what kind of relationship we had. It was disaster. We just couldn't penetrate with him at all.

**Q:** Did we try to moderate our ship visits to New Zealand?

DOLS: The Navy wanted as many as possible. Muldoon wanted them at opportune political times. I wanted them on a cool wintry day with a gale blowing across the harbor that would keep every small boat out. Finally I got one of those. But it took a lot of fighting to get them at the right time.

**Q:** You were talking about the flash in the sky.

DOLS: That is interesting. Maybe we will know some day. I had developed a good relation with a New Zealand journalist who was a stringer for AP among other things. About 1:30 am in the morning the phone rang and he said, "I am just writing a story about a nuclear explosion in space
that has been found by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (the organization in New Zealand that does all the scientific stuff)." My ears really perked up. I asked him what he had and he told me. What he wanted was certain background things to understand what he had heard better.

It just happened that the Permanent Secretary of that Department was also a fellow I knew very well. So as soon as I got off the phone I got on the phone with the Permanent Secretary and asked him about it. He said, "Yes, it is true, we have detected some kind of radiation fall off and we are not quite sure what we got, but it looked pretty strong." I decided to pick up the phone as I felt there was no time to send telegrams as it would be on the morning news programs and in the papers. I called the Operations Center and said, "Heads up you got a nuclear high explosion in space story coming. Get ready. Alert people. Here is basically the story."

It set off then a whole series of investigations. We had all kinds of military and scientific types trying to figure out was going on. The Agency got involved. And of course they looked at tapes and whatnot and saw that there was some kind of phenomenon. That bounced around for years. It is still kind of an open subject. But the theory was that it was some kind of South African/Israeli explosion. Who knows. Maybe it was just nature acting in funny ways. What happened with the New Zealand investigations was that eventually the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research put out a statement that they were mistaken, that their test tubes, or whatever, were contaminated. I always smelled a rat there, but there it was. I don't think we will be told the truth for some time as to just what that was.

CHARLES H. TWINING
Deputy Director, Australia/New Zealand Desk

Charles H. Twining was born in Maryland in 1940. He received his BA from the University of Virginia in 1962 and an MA from the School for Advanced International Studies in 1964. After entering the Foreign Service in 1964 his assignments included Tananarive, Dalat, Abidjan, Bangkok, Cotonou, Douala, Ouagadougou, and Honolulu with ambassadorships to Cambodia and Cameroon. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Ambassador Charles H. Twining in 2004.

Q: When you got out of there, whither?

TWINING: Coming out of there, I was all set to take a job in the State Department dealing with, I thought, Southeast Asia. I found none was available. I became the desk officer, the deputy office director for Australia/New Zealand in the East Asian bureau, still under Assistant Secretary Holbrooke. That was a good two years.

Q: From when to when?
TWINING: 1978 to 1980. It was an interesting period of time. It not only gave me the chance to work on two countries that had very important alliances with the United States, but it also gave me a bit of a backseat to continue to look at Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. It gave me a chance to offer advice, for instance following Vietnam’s overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime. What was striking about working on Australia in those days was just how intense the relationship is in so many different areas. You would go from following scientific exchanges to intelligence exchanges. You would deal with trade questions. The Australians would become very tough when it came to issues involving entry of their lamb into the United States, or sales of Australian wheat, for example. They were hard negotiators. It kept you on your toes, and increased your understanding of your own national interests. New Zealand was a bit less forceful. In those days, before the strains developed in our relationship in 1985 with the banning of U.S. nuclear powered war ships from New Zealand ports, that alliance was also very strong. Indeed, then as now, we could not do so much in Antarctica within New Zealand’s support and assistance.

Q: What about multilateral issues?

TWINING: Our consultations with both countries on major developments in the world, particularly in Asia, were constantly ongoing and intensive. Remember that, with Australia, we were just emerging from the dip in the relationship from the early 1970s with Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s opposition to the war in Vietnam. With Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister, our consultations regained the intensity they had had during the 1960s. With the Muldoon government in New Zealand, we also saw eye-to-eye politically. Thus, it was normal that we consulted closely with both on developments such as the evolution of the situation in China, the Chinese-Vietnamese relationship, and events in the countries of Indochina and in Indonesia. I have to note that both Australia and New Zealand kept top flight diplomats in Washington who did not miss a trick. From the point of view of status, we had two politically well connected envoys in Canberra and Wellington, Philip Alston and Anne Martindell, respectively. During my time, I believe there is nothing we did that caught our two allies unaware. Both governments wanted to see us move ahead to a more realistic position of that relationship in 1979.

Q: How did we see the New Zealand government at the time? Was it one that was more conservative, and less labor oriented? I’m using labor in the British term.

TWINING: Absolutely. You’re exactly right. The Muldoon government was a conservative government. Although it kept tariffs high, which we felt was self-defeating, it was very easy to work with the Muldoon Government, politically. With both Australia and New Zealand, then and now, we have so many common interests that regardless of who runs the government, we can always find ways to work together.

Q: How did you deal with issues like lamb, or wool or wheat? Were these bilateral or multilateral issues?
TWINING: The main contentious issues were primarily bilateral in nature. They centered around access to our market with their often cheaper products, and sometimes vice versa, and that of our agricultural subsidies, which they felt gave us an unfair advantage in the world market. What we tried to do was to get our experts together, to talk to one another and see if we could work things out. Aviation negotiations were another area that with both Australia and New Zealand were very tough. They had their interests and we had ours. It was always important to get the experts together and keep in mind our overall relationship.

Q: What about the outer possessions, the islands and all, of both these countries? Were these of interest to us?

TWINING: Yes, we compared notes a great deal on the South Pacific, where Australia and New Zealand were far better informed than we. I suppose what was of most interest to us was Papua New Guinea. The Australians had controlled Papua New Guinea, almost up until that time. Papua New Guinea is the largest of the South Pacific island nations. No one knew whether a country with a third to a quarter of the world’s languages, rugged topography, and a reputation for violence, could hold together as a nation.

Q: Were the Australians making news about East Timor then?

TWINING: East Timor had basically come and gone as an issue, by that time. Indonesia invaded Timor in 1974-75. By 1978, 1979, 1980, East Timor had really gone down on everyone’s radar screen.

Q: What about our joint monitoring facilities? We had a lot of these things in the outback, I guess, of Australia. Was this a point of friction at all, particularly with the newspapers, the left, of Australia?

TWINING: Some of the newspapers on the Australian left were always trying to create controversy over shared facilities, in particular that at Alice Springs, Australia. The Australians and we tried to coordinate, very carefully, how we would handle such controversies with the media. Our coordination was good. So, while some journalists might do their mudslinging about whether the U.S. was putting Australia in danger with these facilities, we both found common interest in supporting them. We were both able to manage the public affairs aspects.

Q: Did the Australians sort of have a special “in” with our government? Were they able to get things done, Congressional contacts, or anything like that?

TWINING: The Australians and the New Zealanders were very good diplomats. They were very good both with the Congress and with the administration. The good feeling extending from World War II had not disappeared. An Australian foreign minister wanting to see the Secretary of State had no trouble whatsoever seeing him or talking with him on the phone. The atmosphere among our three governments was very good.
ANNE MARTINDELL
Ambassador
New Zealand (1979-1981)

Born in New Jersey in 1914, Anne Clark Martindell entered the state senate in 1973. She served until 1977 when she was appointed to be Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance by President Carter. Two years later, she received an ambassadorship to New Zealand. There she served for three years. Ambassador Martindell’s career also included an ambassadorship in Western Samoa. She was interviewed by Lillian P. Mullin on January 8, 1991.

Q: I know Dick Imus well and he certainly is very, very good. When you arrived in New Zealand, you had as you say two days of training?

MARTINDELL: I did work with the desk officer some, Frank Bennett, and he was sharp. I liked Frank; he thought I was a great mistake. I suspect he did not think a woman could handle the job.

Q: It seems to me that my recollection is that we, the inspectors, came in November 1980 before the election and my recollection is that you were very well-known in the community and had a wide circle.

MARTINDELL: By then I did. I took Carol Laise's advice. That came up at the time of the ambassadorial board, she was explaining to the Board (she was the head of the Foreign Service at that time) that many ambassadors would stay in the capitol and go the social rounds with other diplomats and never get out into the country and therefore not know what was going on, and what the people were thinking. So I figured that I had a pretty good staff in place. Healy was competent, but it was just that our relationship was not good. So I did not have any worry about leaving Wellington and I knew that the two Dicks were very good so that it really was not necessary for me to be there every day. I made a point every time anybody asked me to make a speech I would accept the invitation. Sometimes I would stir them up. I got around the country a lot. I got to know a lot of people. My aunt wrote home that I had a facility for putting people at ease right away, laugh and joke and make them feel comfortable. You need that in New Zealand, they do not feel very comfortable talking with Americans. There was latent anti-Americanism at that time, and I think that if I had not traveled around as much as I did I would have not been aware of it. That latent anti-American feeling, which has increased since the anti-nuclear ship ban.

Q: The ship thing--the nuclear energy thing--was not quite at the surface when you were there?

MARTINDELL: No, it wasn't, but it was there. I was shown a film shortly after I got there of a submarine coming into Falkland harbor, it was terrifying, little boats going right across the bow, one crazy woman with a baby in her arms in a little boat. They say the captain's face was the color of milk. He was only going four knots an hour to avoid the protesters.
Q: *This was a protest?*

MARTINDELL: A protest. They also told me, that Muldoon, who was then the prime minister and was very close to Selden, who was my predecessor, would go to Selden and say, "I need a ship, I need a ship". He wanted one so he could send the police out to clobber the protesters. This would build up his constituency, which was basically the men sitting around drinking beer in a bar. 'Oh, he's tough." Some citizens thought he did it on purpose. Nobody dared say it out loud, but he did it. The result was that the peace movement in New Zealand was so successful, that was the reason. I remember going with Dick Dols to a Labor conference. They had a "remit" that was what it was called a resolution. They passed it. It said that New Zealand "would not allow any nuclear ship in New Zealand ports, New Zealand would be nuclear free". I remember Dick being worried about it, but at the time I sort of discounted it. He was right to be worried because then it really grew and grew.

Q: *At the same time, as you said, you were seeing a weakness in the U.S.-New Zealand relationship.*

MARTINDELL: I did, but I did not think it would happen as soon as it did. I was given two assignments. The important one was to get to know the members of the Labour Party because Selden had given orders that no one was to speak to a member of the Labour Party because "they are all communists". Dick Dols did not have to pay that much attention, he would have to sneak around to see anybody in the Labour Party, and that was probably obvious to later Prime Ministers. So instituted lunches at the chancery, the place where we worked, so we had to bring in food from the residence. My chauffeur, Joe Breen would bring in food and serve it very elegantly. We would have six or eight people and I made sure that we would have at least once every single member of the Labour Party. And then we had, of course, members of the National Party, with whom we had no problem in those days. They were not anti-nuclear.

Q: *The south island is a big island.*

MARTINDELL: It does not have as much population. One third of the population is in Auckland. It is quite top-heavy. I decided I was going to study Maori and Dick was going to study it with me, we did not learn much. I had a speech all ready and I went up to my teacher's Marae for the weekend. I took my children, and my son-in-law who is a professor at Ann Arbor and very versed in talking to ethnic people. They stayed up quite late talking to the visiting tribe that was there, and because I was there I could not make my speech, Dick did, because in their culture they could not have me talk to them. I was okay with my teachers who were university types. They were young students from Waikato University and they talked to my son-in-law at length over beer and it was the first time I became aware that there was trouble between the Maoris and the Pakeha, or Europeans."

After Alan talked with these types I was really worried and thought that it was going to be a repeat of our civil rights situation in the South. It did not prove to be, and that was a plus for the Labour Government when they came in. They handled race relations much better than the
National Party. So tension had diminished, but in 1980 it looked like it might flash up. So I told all this to Henry Kamm. He said, give me a week and I will do some investigating and I will be in Auckland and we can have lunch. So we had lunch, and he said, "In the last two days I have spent time visiting islanders, and Maori. This morning I had coffee with a Maori family, and let me tell you about them. The father was out of work, the mother was out of work, there was an eighteen year old daughter who had worked briefly, but she was out of work. They had the three "government dole" salaries--there were several younger children--but I grew up in Queens, New York in a middle class family. I asked these people what their income was from the government, and how much they paid for groceries, for rent and so forth?" He said, "They ended up with what would be a middle class income in Queens. What are they complaining about?" He said there is not going to be any trouble. Well there was some trouble, but it was not based on economics, but more on attitudes.

Q: Now the National Party did win one more time.

MARTINDELL: They did win, and then... It was really very bad when that happened in 1984, the Reagan administration made a very unfortunate choice when they sent Monroe Browne there as ambassador. He was Southern Californian, even more right wing than Selden; he really passionately believed that Labour people were out and out communists and out to do us in. We had planned to have the ANZUS meeting there, it was New Zealand's turn. It had been planned before Muldoon had called the election, and when it appeared clear it would be in June just around the time of the election it was suggested to Monroe Browne that he postpone the meeting but he went ahead. What happened was that the ANZUS meeting was to start on Monday after the Saturday election but the new government did not take over for five days and so the old government was a lame duck government. The people who came to the meeting were not the people who were to be in charge. In other words, it was a mess, there were all sorts of misunderstandings. Shultz did see Lange and it is reported that Lange said, "Don't send any ships for six months, I think I can work it out with my caucus." There are very conflicting stories about what happened. I do believe that he said that. I believe that he was less gung ho on the anti-nuclear thing than he became later because it became a useful politically. Lange liked dancing on the world stage. He became much stronger on that issue than when he started out. He had to have known that it was going to cause terrible problems for New Zealand, he is not dumb.

It could not have been worse. Then Secretary of the Navy Lehman would make anti-New Zealand remarks and there would be big headlines in New Zealand--I suppose that anybody who has never lived outside the United States does not realize that the slightest breath said here gets exaggerated when it gets overseas. It just got worse and worse and I don't know if we will ever work our way out of it.

Q: Did you have the feeling that when you were there that the anti-American feeling had to do with something to do with more than the nuclear thing?

MARTINDELL: Oh, Vietnam. There is no question, and that is why I was very popular there because it was well-known that I had been anti the Vietnam war. I had a hard time reaching the young people, anybody my age and social circumstances, and our officer, John Williams, who
was that age was sent out, but he was very conservative, so that did not help. We should have been reversed—he should have been the ambassador and I should have been the young person going out. Anyway, I only made one speech which was at the very end of my tenure, which Charlie was very nervous about, it was a pro-peace, anti-nuclear speech in a way. I made it to Waikato University, which I think is largely Maori. [The speech was to warn them not to follow Milton Freidman philosophy.]

Skipping back to when I visited the Maori, what you do at night is you sleep mattress to mattress on the floor and I put my shoes by my pillow. When I got up in the morning I could not find them. I asked the students who were cleaning up if they could keep an eye out for them, but they never found them. I did have another pair. I heard from my teacher that they are now enshrined in a glass case in Waikato University. As you see, I do not have Cinderella-sized feet and I am a little embarrassed. I have never seen them.

Anyway, that is where I made the speech. I don't know what I said that Charlie was so nervous about. He thought I would be recalled. I would not have been recalled two weeks before I was due to leave anyway. He would not distribute it, but I thought it was a good thing for me to say that as I was leaving, to leave the feeling that there were some Americans who weren't so conservative, and did not endorse the Reagan philosophy, a revolt of the rich against the poor.

Q: I read that in 1981 the U.S. Department of Agriculture sold 220,000,000 pounds of butter to New Zealand. Do you remember that strange little incident?

MARTINDELL: No. Really.

Q: I read that 220,000,000 were sold, this is just before you left in 1981. I had never seen anything like that before. New Zealand could sell the butter to a third party whereas we couldn't.

MARTINDELL: I certainly don't remember it. That does not mean it did not happen. That is amazing because they were having so much trouble selling their own butter. I left in May.

Q: This could have been in the summer after you left. I think it was, in July or August. While you were there wasn't Haig Secretary of State and didn't he come out to New Zealand once?

MARTINDELL: He may have, but not when I was there. I was lucky because my husband had known Haig, he had raised money for him when he was thinking about running for president. Ambassadors got the two week telegram— everybody but me, got the two week telegram right after inauguration saying "You have to be out of your post by February 15th." I heard about that and so called Jackson, my husband, saying I really would like to stay for a couple of reasons, one was that my son had started a Seattle- Christchurch Sister City Committee, and Speaker O'Neill was bringing a CODEL.

I think that telegram had killed Barbara Watson, she had just gotten out to Malaysia and she died shortly thereafter, it was terrible. You could not be polite, you could not make your final calls. Dave Newsom told me that not only did they do that, which he tried to talk them out of, but they
had on the desk of every political employee, there were two thousand or so of them in the State Department, on the desk of each one of those was placed an order saying "you are to clear out your desk in twenty-four hours". Two days after inauguration.

Q: Were there any demonstrations when this CODEL came, or was it quiet. They did not connect the nuclear ship issue with the representatives?

MARTINDELL: No, as long as they were not carrying bombs in the suitcase. The inconsistent thing about the New Zealand stance is that in Christchurch, which is heavily dependent on the Antarctica operation, there is nothing said about the U.S. planes that land there, which do not carry bombs, but they could. Labour's argument is that they don't want anything that could carry nuclear weapons such as ships. So when it is to their advantage, they keep quiet.

Q: I was going to ask you about that base.

MARTINDELL: Recently there was a CODEL that came there, it was headed by Bob Rowe of New Jersey, Chairman of the Science Committee for Technology, which is why they were focusing on Christchurch. Malcolm Ott had talked to some of them, it was a bipartisan group too, and they just had the Secretary of Agriculture testify before them, and he had said either in the meeting, or in informally talking to them, "We are going to have an agricultural surplus and we would be less eager to fight for New Zealand in the GATT talks. If those talks fail New Zealand will become an LDC. It will really ruin New Zealand which is marginal anyway."

Q: That Antarctic base will be even more important than it is now? I remember seeing a whole slew of Japanese tourists or scientists all in a single line getting into the bomb bay door of one of these huge planes for a trip.

MARTINDELL: They must have been scientists. Officially nobody else goes. Oh, yes, it is terrible, just recently you can pay $25,000 and land at the South Pole.

Q: The other planes that were going were only circling and coming back?

MARTINDELL: Tourist flights don't go to the Antarctic any more. One of my first experiences down there was in 1979 when that Air New Zealand plane crashed. Lange has written a book in which he said the only time he was asked to the American embassy was the night they knew that the tourist plane crashed. The dinner broke up. Naturally we were very upset. Sometime before, the Navy captain had come to me, he was the captain in charge, and he said, "Please Ambassador, will you go to the highest level of the government, something dreadful is going to happen, and we will have to rescue the victims." I think it was three months later that the crash killed 257.

Q: It was a sightseeing DC-10 that crashed on November 28th. It was already the third fatal crash of 1979 in Antarctica. The others must have been smaller planes.

MARTINDELL: They canceled the tourist flights after that, and then there was a cover up. A
judge called it an "orchestrated litany of lies."

Q: *Had you left before the problem with the South African rugby team?*

MARTINDELL: Just before. I remember when I said goodbye to the dean of the cathedral of Christchurch, he was going out to march in protest. And they turned out an enormous crowd. It was another Muldoon thing, he was stubborn about that. He was a rugby fan, he wanted them to come. I can't remember if they actually came, did they?

Q: *Yes they did. I remember the reports all through that summer, of course it was winter down there, you often don't see in Canada a lot of New Zealand news, but I remember seeing headlines saying "Worst riots of the century" or something like that.*

MARTINDELL: Actually they were more violent than the peace demonstrations, they had the core of the same people, the peace people, and people that you never would have thought, like the dean of the cathedral, would get out and march with them.

Q: *Is that right?*

MARTINDELL: So he probably figured that he would win an even bigger majority if he did that.

I signed a treaty dealing with thirty some islands when I was there. It was not a treaty that had been negotiated by us. We relinquished claims to all but one of the islands, and that was called Jennings Island, which was off American Samoa. I put in my book that my grandmother’s name was Jennings and she did have an ancestor who was a ship captain. I did meet one of the descendants, a Polynesian, and I wondered if the ship captain had stopped by. We kept that island but the others we gave up and that is why we had that treaty and the signing. I can’t now remember, I will have to check, why we had to sign it in the Tokelau Islands. The islands are three tiny little islands a day’s sail north of Samoa. It was a protectorate of New Zealand so the foreign affairs people arranged for me to go up there. They are tiny little atolls around a lagoon. You can’t take an airplane—you could take a seaplane—and there is one boat that goes once a month. It is an old tin tub. So they lent me, for the trip, one of their frigates called the Atago. We got on it, Dick Dols and I, and the permanent head of foreign affairs in Wellington, Frank Corner, and we sailed all night. They gave me the captain’s cabin, I protested, but they said “We can’t have a woman, even if she is the American ambassador, going down to the head with all the men”. It was the only private bathroom on the ship. They also told me that I was sleeping on the sheets that Princess Margaret had, the only other woman to have sailed on the ship. I felt very honored.

We sailed all night and got to the first island about six in the morning. I did not have to get up to welcome the chief, but I did. He came on the ship with an entourage, elders and so forth and seventeen women—I don’t know what they did about those women and the head—they just sat around in the passage way. We got to the next island and it was the same procedure. And then we got to the last island, it was called Atafu, about nine in the morning. The only way you can land is to get on a little boat off the ship because of the huge waves. They said, “Don’t worry about
that, the strong men of the island come out and they catch the boat in the waves so it won’t overturn.” They sent the communications team first and they overturned. Somehow or other they did not mess up all their equipment, it was encased. After they landed they got on the radio and said, “We don’t think the ambassador should come and go through what we did.” So that was relayed to the chiefs on the ship and somebody suggested that maybe we will declare the deck of the ship to be Tokelau territory and we can sign it here. That did not suit them at all. There were discussions that went on and on, finally so Frank Corner said, “I don’t care what you decide, but you have got to decide. We can’t just sit here all day.” So it was finally decided that I would go. I was awfully glad that I did. They had taken so much trouble, they had raked the paths, they had hung beautiful baskets on the trees and so forth. Well I was standing on the top of the ladder before getting on the boat when one of the officers said to me, “By the way Ambassador, can you swim?” I laughed and said “What if I couldn’t”. I do swim quite well, but nobody offered me a life jacket, and I was in my sixties. I did get in the boat and they did catch us. I wore pants to get in and changed to a dress later. We had speeches. Frank Corner spoke and it was translated, then I spoke and it was translated, and then the older chief from the first island got up and spoke. Apparently he spent the first half complaining that we had taken too much of his time, he was angry. I did not know what he was saying until later. Then we had the signing. Then we had the feast. A Polynesian feast has to have a roast pig. The pigs on those islands are fishing pigs, they go out on the rocks and sort of paw for shell fish, so the pigs taste quite fishy. We were just getting on with the feast when the captain radioed to his communicators that he could see on his radar a big storm, and I was to be brought back immediately. Well, immediately in Polynesia is quite a long time, and with all the politeness it was an hour before I could break away and get into the little boat. It was then really very rough, and we made it to the side of the ship—we were in a wooden fishing boat, and to ensure my safety they lashed the boats together and I would walk across their decks and jump to the ladder so I got that far and they called to me and said, “When we say jump, you jump!” They were very firm. When they said jump, I didn’t. I could see this wall of water many, many feet above my head and I drew back. Which was a damned good thing because where I had been standing was a little cockleshell of a boat crushed against the side of the frigate and I would have broken maybe both legs, certainly one. They did not have a doctor on board, it would have been a mess. By the time I did jump and made it and climbed up to where the captain was waiting he had been obviously concerned thinking about how he could explain if he lost or injured the American ambassador.

There are two main Pacific organizations; one is the Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation which is PBEC and the other is, I can’t remember exactly, the PCEC. Brian Tallboys was the head of the first one, the PBEC for quite awhile, he is very interested in it and thinks that is very important for New Zealand, which it is. It includes them in whatever goes on in the basin, because they are so far away and isolated.

Q: Do you recall when the Soviet ambassador was expelled?

MARTINDELL: I remember that extremely well. I have a wonderful story about him with my aunt. They accused her of having a flirtation with him. I observed them at the Chinese embassy, he was raising his glass across the crowded room. She said it was not an enchanted evening, however. He was a charming man. I liked him, he was humorous. In fact there was a lunch party
which the Egyptian ambassador gave in which he got up and made a toast to the superpowers. Ambassador Sofinsky was there. So I leaned across the ample bosom of the high commissioner of Samoa and shook hands with Sofinsky and said, “Hi superpower.” The rumor was reported in the papers, although the government always denied it, that he was the head of the KGB in New Zealand. A New Zealand official said that they never have the ambassador as the head of the KGB, it is usually the chauffeur. I don’t think he was KGB. He made a response to the toast that had been made by our host, by saying, “As the head KGB I salute you.” Then I got up and said, “As the head of the CIA, I also salute you”. He was a very funny man. He was born in Kiev. I think he came from a distinguished family. I invited him and his wife for tea one day, which made my CIA very nervous. I had a picture of my family from an earlier time, my mother and her sisters in the very pretty dresses that girls wore in the early years of the century. He asked who they were, and he said nothing further. He became very sentimental, and his eyes almost filled with tears after seeing that picture. I figured he came from the kind of family whose little girls would have been dressed up in pretty dresses like that. I think he came from a sort of aristocratic family. His brother, his twin brother, was very high in the Soviet hierarchy, not the KGB. So he was very well-connected.

After I left, when I was back on a visit, I ran into the DCM from the USSR at a party and I said, “What happened to Ambassador Sofinsky? Is he in disgrace, having been thrown out?” He said, “No, he is a hero. He was then posted to Geneva.” The claim was that they had observed him, however the spooks do it, handing $10,000 to—at that point there were only three known Communists in New Zealand, and one of them was a fellow named Anderson, who was the head of a labor union—he was very leftist, there is no question about that—they claimed they saw him getting $10,000 from this guy. So Muldoon threw him out. I was always a little skeptical. Our CIA guy claimed it was true.

Q: It seems to me that you have a good opinion of the career Foreign Service officers that you did meet as well as their wives.

MARTINDELL: I thought they were swell. There was one exception, and he was not Foreign Service, he was USIS, he really retired on the job. The next man who came out—I had fussed about it because of the anti-nuclear business and anti-Americanism, I really worried about that aspect. I just saw him quoted in the paper. His name was Charles Bell he was magnificent. That was really my main contribution that I got a lot of coverage in New Zealand. That story that you probably heard about Muldoon the Prime Minister and how he greeted me. I met him at the embassy in Washington. I noticed later, that he was very uneasy socially, especially with women. I was sitting next to him at dinner, he was just sitting there, he was not a man for small talk, so I said, “I have been reading about your legislature, I used to be in the legislature in New Jersey.” He looked sort of quietly in space and said, “I don’t like lady politicians.” It was a great welcome. It was off the record, but it was too good a story. When interviewed, I told a New York Times reporter so it came out in New Zealand when I made a “secret” trip, and Frank Bennett and Teresa Healy thought I was going to be canned. Because it came out in the paper, Muldoon was angry. But subliminally I thought he needed to know that I was angry. But I had not anticipated that anything the American ambassador said could cause headlines. He did not like me, and Teresa Healy said that “Half your job is getting along with the Prime Minister.” However, I think
he respected me more than he would have otherwise, so it all worked out all right in the end.

Paul F. Gardner was born in Texas in 1930. He received a bachelor’s degree in 1952, and a master’s degree in 1956, both from the University of Texas. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956 and was assigned as an intelligence analyst in the Department. His career included positions in Madagascar, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Turkey, and an ambassadorship to New Guinea. Ambassador Gardner was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Gardner: Partly because of what happened in the Pacific islands, we came to realize we had some serious problems. Ship visits, for example. New Zealand, of course, had this thing about nuclear weapons. New Zealand would not receive our vessels unless we told them whether we had nuclear weapons on board. Our policy is to neither confirm nor deny. There are military reasons for this and I certainly agree with them and disagree with the New Zealand position. But, nevertheless, New Zealand were allies and they lost a great deal by this policy. But Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands were not allies and were even more concerned about nuclear matters because they had been educated by Australian and New Zealand leftists, who have had a great influence on the education of the Pacific islanders. A lot of the expatriate staff members in the universities out there in Fiji and Papua New Guinea are leftists. The Pacific islanders were also worried about nuclear weapons because of what happened in Bikini next door to them. They felt that the Pacific is used as a testing ground. The French were testing out there. This was a big issue. This was the second issue...nuclear weapons after tuna.

John J. Helble was born in 1934 and raised in Appleton, Wisconsin. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin with a degree in international relations. He was influenced by his father to enter Foreign Service. He has served in many places including Venezuela, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. He was interviewed by Thomas F. Conlon on April 5, 1996.

Helble: Particularly during the period when Admiral Crowe was CINCPAC, one of the issues which had become acute was U. S. naval visits to New Zealand. Tom, you'll remember that issue from your time on the Australia-New Zealand desk. As the political forces moved to the Left in
New Zealand, the New Zealand government adopted increasing support for the concept of a "nuclear free zone" in the South Pacific. The New Zealand government did not want any U. S. Navy ships visiting a New Zealand port unless we declared that there were no nuclear weapons on board. This was in conflict with a policy which we had "set in concrete," in the sense that we declined to confirm or deny whether there were any such weapons on U. S. Navy ships. This issue had major implications for other areas of the world which were much more important to us than New Zealand. If we broke the rule in the case of New Zealand, we would have to do so elsewhere. So we were at loggerheads with New Zealand.

Throughout this "dialogue" with New Zealand, if you can call it that, and while I was still in Honolulu, Admiral Crowe and I spent countless hours discussing this issue with New Zealand political and military officials, both in New Zealand and in Honolulu. This was an issue on which I could "help" Admiral Crowe as much as anyone because it was more "political" than anything else. That was one of the interesting things that I got involved in. Ultimately, that issue was frustrating. In the final analysis, for all intents and purposes, it brought an end to the "ANZUS" alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the U. S., as we had known it.

RICHARD W. TEARE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Wellington (1983-1986)

Richard W. Teare was born in Ohio in 1937. He received his bachelor’s degree from Harvard University in 1948. His career includes positions in Barbados, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, New Zealand, and Australia. Mr. Teare was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in July 1998.

TEARE: Well, by this time I had lobbied around and managed to get myself assigned as Deputy Chief of Mission to Wellington, New Zealand. There I succeeded my War College classmate, Charlie Salmon, who was there from ’80 to ’83. The ambassador was a Reagan appointee named H. Monroe Browne. The ‘H’ stood for Herbert, but he didn’t want that publicized.

He was a strong ideological supporter of Governor Reagan, not all that close personally I gathered, but he was a Californian and he had made money in the cattle business and then in construction. He also had some pretensions to intellectual status. He was President of something called the Institute for Contemporary Studies in San Francisco, a think tank that I know and knew little about. It was essentially way over on the conservative end of the spectrum.

Browne had come to New Zealand, I think, in ’81…probably the first batch of Reagan ambassadors. Among other things he liked it because horse racing is big in New Zealand and he, and more particularly his wife, owned a few horses and liked to race them. He liked nothing better than to go to one of the provincial race meetings in New Zealand on the weekend and become friendly with the racing crowd. He had even arranged with the New Zealand Racing Authority for his wife’s…because the horses were in her name and I think she even chose
them…colors to be used by her jockey to race. They were, I don’t know vertical stripes and New Zealand has horizontal stripes or something. It was a special concession that he worked out.

They owned two or three horses, one of which got so far as the Caulfield Cup in Australia, one of the big races over there. It finished third, I think it was. This was probably 1985. By virtue of that it qualified automatically for a place in the Melbourne Cup, which is the biggest race in the whole Southern Hemisphere. It is run on the first Tuesday of November every year. Unfortunately this horse was a sprinter, not a distance runner. The Melbourne Cup is a longer race than the Caulfield Cup is. I think it’s a mile and a half or something. So the horse, Lack of Reason, finished 19th in a field of 23 in the Melbourne Cup. Not so successful!

The horse’s sire was named Alack and its dam was named Sound Reason, I think. So the colt was named Lacka Reason…an anagram of Alack and Reason from Sound Reason. But later on when we get into the nuclear capable ships question people used to say that the name of the Ambassador’s horse reflected his policy…lack of reason!

Q: With New Zealand one almost immediately thinks of the nuclear issue.

TEARE: Right.

Q: In the first place you were in New Zealand from ’83 until?

TEARE: ’86.

Q: ’86. Before we get to the nuclear side, were there any other points of concern between the United States and New Zealand?

TEARE: Very few. It was I think a pretty harmonious relationship in most respects. I think that was probably particularly true during the Conservative government of Sir Robert Muldoon which was still in office when I got there in 1983 and continued until ’84. He had come into office in ’76, I think, I would have to check that. But anyway he’d been in for several years.

There were some issues on the agricultural front. New Zealand complained that we had quotas of one sort or another on beef and on butter. We had a problem over lamb. Of course New Zealand produces a lot of that and it was something about the difference between frozen and chilled. I’ve forgotten. But anyway the effect they thought was to deny access to our market for their best lamb. They could deliver it chilled but we would only take it frozen or something like that.

So there were relatively minor disputes in the area of agricultural trade but fundamentally the two countries saw eye to eye on most international policy matters. New Zealand had sent a small troop unit to Vietnam in the ‘60s or early ‘70s although I think they had pretty well repented of that. But basically it was a fairly easy relationship until ’84 when Muldoon and the National Party were turned out of office and a Labor Government, headed by David Lange, was elected and came into power.
Q: Would you describe the Labor Government there as reflecting sort of the extreme labor types of Great Britain of pre Margaret Thatcher? Sort of ideologues of the extreme social side or not?

TEARE: I think so although I’d qualify it a little bit. From what little I know of the British Labor Party there were still people in it who had come up through the trade unions and had worn cloth caps and carried lunch pails to the job and had served as union organizers and worked their way up that way. Although I think increasingly by the ‘80s the Labor Party in Britain was becoming more middle-class, there were more people who had not served apprenticeships but had gone to University and so forth. I think if anything the New Zealand Labor Party at this period was even a little more bourgeois than that.

But at the same time it had more in the way of academic Leftists, people who had picked up their ideology at University and who were critical of the arms race, for example. They would say a plague on both your houses…the Soviet Union and the United States…but the Soviet Union is obscure and hard to influence. The United States is close at hand and speaks our language and is more susceptible to influence so let’s concentrate our effort on the United States…why haven’t you disarmed? Why haven’t you signed the Test Ban Treaty? Why are you going so slowly in SALT Talks; it has been long enough? So we got a certain amount of that.

But it was I would say a Left of comfortable middle class circumstances rather than a proletarian hard Left.

The ruling party when I got there, the National Party, was again maybe not much like the Tories of Margaret Thatcher, but more a mix of country squires and farmers and small businessmen and so forth. The Foreign Minister, for example, Warren Cooper, had been a sign painter originally. Muldoon himself, I don’t know, he had been in politics forever, that was his life.

But it was not a particularly talented government that Muldoon had and by the time I got there in ’83 it was clearly on the ropes as a government. It had introduced price and rent controls that were very unpopular and a very un-Tory thing to do.

Marilyn Waring, MP, had a public split with Muldoon and thereby I think further endangered his majority. Muldoon himself was drinking and behaving erratically. The country was running a serious trade deficit and its currency was under challenge. He wasn’t doing anything about it. One night in late May or early June of ’84 while drunk he decided to go to Government House, see the Governor General and request the dissolution of Parliament and a new election.

Now the election was due later that year anyway but Muldoon decided to speed it up, advance the date. The day he chose was the 14th of July, a Saturday, and the ANZUS Council was due to meet in Wellington starting on Monday, the 16th of July. They had George Shultz coming for it and Bill Hayden, then the Foreign Minister of Australia. This was an annual event and I’m sure Muldoon had not given any thought to that when he set the election date.

Meanwhile a Labor Government had come into power in Australia in 1983 and a lot of people thought of this as handwriting on the wall for New Zealand. The New Zealand Labor Party had
had a number of or at least a couple of changes of leadership and its last – the guy who had led it in the ’81 election, Sir Wallace Rolling, known as Bill, had lost the leadership to an upstart named David Lange. I think it was because Rolling had failed to win an election that was winnable but what had perhaps prevented the Labor victory in that election was a series of riots over the visit of a South African Rugby Team, Springboks. A lot of New Zealanders thought that Springboks should not be allowed to play in New Zealand because they came from a nation whose government practiced apartheid. Muldoon said no, by God, it’s sport and they are going to play! And so demonstrators had appeared at the stadium where they played and there had been some violence.

I think Muldoon managed to frighten a lot of people into voting for him thinking otherwise there would be wider unrest if Labor took over. I don’t know. I was not there at the time in ’81 but Muldoon got another term of office in ’81. So Labor changed leaders and got David Lange.

Lange was a lawyer from Auckland who had specialized in defending criminals, often indigent cases. He has an enormous gift of gab. According to a biography of him, he sort of talked his way into the nomination for an open seat in I believe 1978 when he was totally unknown. But his oratory was such that he appeared late in a field of expected candidates, would-be candidates, and just wowed them. He was very clever, a good debater and so he became the leader. He was only forty-one at the time in ’83 when he took over the Party and by ’84 he led it to a resounding victory although I think almost anyone in Labor could have pulled off a victory in ’84. People were fed up with Rolling and with the harsh economic policies and the way the country seemed to be going down hill. Inflation, unemployment, minimum price controls, loss of population through emigration, things like that.

So it was a very strange period because Muldoon lost the election. The results were known very quickly that evening. George Shultz was already in Australia and on his way to New Zealand. I think he telephoned over I think from the Lodge, the Prime Minister’s official residence in Canberra where he was having a social evening with Bob Hawke and he spoke with Ambassador Brown about the way things were shaping up there.

Muldoon, of course, had sobered up and realized the ANZUS Council was coming and after some little discussion it was decided that we should go ahead with the ANZUS Council no matter what. So the Council meeting was held with the Foreign Minister of the by then lame duck government, Warren Cooper. But Shultz had a meeting with David Lange on the Monday or Tuesday, the newly crowned Prime Minister. Except that Muldoon would not relinquish office immediately and would not take policy steps that his own Ministers were convinced were necessary to save the economy.

So finally Muldoon was cajoled or deceived or whatever into doing what had to be done. I think I am probably glossing over a lot here because I’ve forgotten many of the details. But there was even a New Zealand television docu-drama done on this period of events. Somebody later sent it to us and I had a chance to look at it. It didn’t do enough to refresh my memory obviously but the upshot was that after about 10 days Muldoon was gone and Lange was in office with a comfortable majority.
The real point of contention is what Lange did or did not tell Shultz during their meeting on the 17th of July 1984. The lowest ranking person in the room on the American side was Paul Wolfowitz who was the Assistant Secretary for Asia. Shultz was there. Ambassador Brown was there and one or two others with Shultz. But the understanding that the rest of us got on the American side was that Lange was going to look for ways to preserve access to the New Zealand ports by nuclear capable ships of the United States Navy. Despite the fact that his Party platform said that anything nuclear, nuclear weapons, nuclear propulsion systems, for that matter nuclear reactors for power generation, were anathema. New Zealand had none and wanted none of any of the above either permanent in the form of reactors or temporary, even transitory ships with possible weapons aboard. Of course our policy was neither to confirm nor to deny the presence or absence of any nuclear weapon on any ship or aircraft.

Nuclear propulsion was a different story. Everybody knew and the Navy was quite prepared to say which ships were nuclear propelled and which were not. And furthermore argued that nuclear propulsion systems on naval vessels are about the safest thing there is in the world. Well what happened then was that we went into a sort of limbo for about five months, mid July to mid December 1984, during which attempts were made to figure out if there wasn’t some way that we could continue ship visits. Ship visits that were not important by the way to the Navy. It was out of the way. It was extra distance, extra fuel required to steam down there. But we wanted to preserve the principle that U.S. ships, nuclear capable included, could call there because after all this was a Treaty ally. We were obligated under the ANZUS Treaty to defend New Zealand and we needed to use everything in our arsenal to defend it, or might need to.

Q: Well we were also thinking of the presence of Japan, I would imagine.

TEARE: Oh, very much so. Japan and a couple of Scandinavian countries. Denmark in particular. Definitely so.

Q: Was this a clear issue that was sort of how the Labor Party almost defined itself?

TEARE: Yes. Well put. We knew it was going to be an issue. In fact in early ’83 before I got there Lange had, soon after taking over the Party leadership, said something to the effect that he thought nuclear reactors aboard ship were pretty safe. The whole Left wing of his Party sniped at him so he lowered his head on that. So it was clear we were going to have an issue. Everybody knew it. The question was whether or not it could be handled in some fashion or other.

Over that period in the second half of ’84 there was a lot going on beneath the surface. Both Ambassador Brown and I were in frequent conversation with four or five people in the New Zealand Government. These were career officials for the most part who had carried over. They didn’t change with an election. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervin Norwich, who had been Ambassador to Washington. The equivalent of the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, Gerald Hensley. The Secretary of the Ministry of Defense was Dennis McLain who later became Ambassador to Washington. The Chief of the Defense Force was Air Advisory Marshall, Sir Euan Jamison.
There were a few others as well but more junior policy advisors. These guys, the career New Zealanders, were given some latitude at least, not specific instructions, from Lange to go ahead and see what could be worked out in the way of a compromise.

Jamison, the Chief of Defense Forces, made a couple of unannounced visits to Honolulu to discuss the situation with Admiral Crowe, Commander in Chief of the Pacific. The direction that they were going was for the United States to find an innocuous looking ship that would nevertheless be nuclear capable. It would be advanced by us as the candidate for the first port call under the Labor Government and would be accepted by the New Zealanders without any public question or comment. But the New Zealanders would be able to say to themselves that it was an old rust bucket that wasn’t bristling with weapons, its last deployment was not anywhere where it would have carried nuclear weapons in all probability so it was probably safe.

The idea was that once we had brought in one ship we could then bring in subsequent ones periodically with no great rush that would be less innocuous. So we would preserve the tradition and everyone would be happy. Specifically there would be no repercussions for Japan.

Now the Japanese state publicly that they don’t want nuclear weapons in their ports and therefore they assume that the United States is not bringing in nuclear weapons on the ships that are home-ported there or call there. And that’s it. It is essentially a Kabuki play, I guess, is the right word for it. Or it is really a they don’t ask so we don’t tell sort of situation. And that’s fine. That level of theater or ambiguity works in Japan. But it would not work in New Zealand because there everything is up front. You lay it out on the table. There is nothing hidden. It is all transparent and has to be.

So clearly this was not going to be easy to arrange. But the American career officials and Ambassador Brown and the New Zealand career officials nevertheless went plugging away in good faith towards some sort…I wouldn’t call it a compromise. We would not have been compromising the NCND principle. But something innocent looking.

Our understanding was and the New Zealand career officials’ understanding was that Lange was going to take care of the political side. He was going to convince the Labor party caucus, that is his fellow Labor MPs, that this was okay and if need be he was going to go on and convince the larger Labor Party and indeed the whole public of New Zealand that it was okay. Now how he was going to do that was never made clear and if I would have given it more thought I suppose I would have concluded that there was no way he could do that. But I was caught up in the enthusiasm of the moment, that we had something here and were going to make it work. And so we trudged along into December and by that time we had pretty well decided, that is Admiral Crowe and Air Vice Marshall Jamison had decided, on the specific ship that would be nominated. We were relatively optimistic.

Ambassador Brown had gone off on leave for Christmas so I was already to deliver the Note requesting clearance for our ship. I had made a call to, I’ve forgotten whether it was Wellington or Auckland, on some date in early 1985. I think it was to have been in March. So I was all set to
deliver the Note about the middle of December when I got a call from the Foreign Secretary
telling me to hold that off. They were a little worried, and the Prime Minister himself was
worried, that if that document was sitting around Foreign Affairs over Christmas when the whole
Southern Hemisphere, at least New Zealand and Australia, take off, that it might leak. They felt it
would be better if it were held until January when they started to build back up toward the new
Parliamentary and academic year. So I reported that to Washington and Washington said sure.

I know that the Australian DCM in Wellington picked up on what we were doing. That was okay
because we had by then got authorization to discuss it fully with the Australians and the
Australian consul general in Honolulu who was alert to things had become aware of at least one
of Jamison’s visits. So the Australians had put two and two together to figure out what was going
on. And they didn’t mind with this one exception that the Labor Government had come into
power there in ’83 after some bruising internal battles. It was committed to the ANZUS Alliance
and to port access for nuclear capable ships even though it was highly unpopular with the Labor
Left Wing over there.

So the Australian Labor Government’s position was that however it worked out it was fine,
provided that New Zealand did not pay any lesser price than Australia itself had paid. That is if
Australia was going to accept nuclear capable ships then so should New Zealand. And if New
Zealand would not accept nuclear capable ships than there had to be some price in it for New
Zealand. This was a position that found favor in Washington.

So in December or early January the Labor Party, Lange’s own people in New Zealand, began to
get worried I think. They started putting pressure on him through letter writing campaigns
threatening consequences if he were to cave on the matter of the ships. And at the same time
there were positive inducements nominating him to the, what is it the Norwegian Parliament for
the Nobel Peace Prize? Because of what he had already done in coming to power as I guess the
first Government in any Western country fully committed to ending nuclear weapons and making
his own country nuclear free! So these pressures were mounting on Lange.

Then he went off on an incommunicado holiday with, I think, his two sons. He took them up to
the Tokelau Islands which is a New Zealand dependency. It is out of television range and maybe
even telegraph range. He was gone for several days in the latter part of January while all of this
was going on. His deputy prime minister, Geoffrey Palmer, had not been briefed on any of this
and was giving out bland assurances that there was no possibility that this could happen.

I think other people within the Labor Government, the more conservative part of the Labor Party,
might have supported Lange had he chosen to do something, in my view, courageous. They were
not clued in either. So by the end of January, Lange came back to New Zealand. The last part of
his trip was by air and a staffer had gone up with a bunch of newspaper clippings because more
and more things were leaking, or at least suspicions were arising. So the New Zealand media had
it.

By the time that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs said they were finally ready to receive the ship
as requested the atmosphere had changed significantly. It had become poisoned against it and
quite militant. And so I guess it was Ambassador Brown with me who delivered the request. Then Lange called us in a day or two later. With all the people I’ve mentioned present - Norwich, McLain, Jamison and Hensley - he said in effect that he had hoped that the ship would be ambiguous enough for New Zealand to be able to state its conclusion that the ship was not nuclear armed and that they would not dispute that conclusion publicly. They would not dispute it, but they would have to make it public. That would be a political necessity. He realized that because he didn’t want us to have to say anything publicly, but it would be New Zealand that would make the determination. Well we had told him that we didn’t want anybody making determinations about our ship because that would open up larger problems.

Maybe this was two meetings down; I’m telescoping the two of them. But anyway he finally said could we, the United States, nominate some other ship instead of the one we had proposed. I immediately began shaking my head because I knew that was a non-starter and I think everyone else in the room knew it was too. But Ambassador Brown said he didn’t think so but he would indeed report the matter. That was the correct thing to say. And so he checked it with Crowe I think right away by telephone because it was still working hours in Honolulu the previous day. Crowe said no and we sent word back that we could not substitute the ship.

So technically speaking New Zealand never did deny us clearance for the specific ship but they asked us to substitute. That of course we couldn’t do and I think they knew we couldn’t do... wouldn’t do. And so it has stuck there ever since. No U.S. naval vessel has called at a New Zealand port since the last one, pre-Lange, which I think was actually in ’83. The change of Government was ’84. This episode was in January ’85.

But then the recriminations began immediately. Publicly. One of the most outspoken people calling for trade sanctions again New Zealand was a Republican Senator named William Cohen.

Q: From Maine? Now Secretary of Defense?

TEARE: Yes and I found this rather hard to fathom because Maine is about as far away from New Zealand as you can get and Cohen had the reputation of being a liberal Republican and so forth. Why would he get so exercised about it? I learned only in 1997 that he had been traveling in Asia and had stopped off in Honolulu and had a briefing on this subject from Admiral Crowe, and that accounted for his knowledge of the subject and I guess for his indignation.

But back in Washington others were getting very steamed up, Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, above all. But a lot of people were unhappy and or felt they had been betrayed. Just about everything you can imagine.

Q: When you get angry you want to beat up on somebody small rather than big!

TEARE: Well, yes that’s true. But it was a very unequal combat because Lange was very glib, very clever, an excellent debater who knew how to play to the press. He would hold a couple of press conferences a week, one on a Monday and then one on Thursday plus others as needed. And Lange didn’t have to clear his remarks with anybody so he would twist our tail in lots of
different and clever ways. We would have to report his remarks back to Washington and wait for Washington to come up with some sort of retaliation and get it cleared. By the time we got it and used it Lange was into a couple of news cycles later and was doing it all over again! We never caught up and he gave us quite a pasting in the New Zealand media. It quickly died out as a topic in the United States I believe but it went on for a long time in New Zealand.

Q: I thought we might stop at this point and we’ll pick this up. We’ve already talked about events leading up to the rejection essentially or non acceptance of American ships and how Lange afterwards was able to beat us up in the press and all that. But maybe we want to talk a little about the atmosphere for doing other things around January of ‘85 or so?

TEARE: Correct.

Q: Okay, we’ll pick it up then.

Today is the 24th of September 1998.

We talked about the press the last time in New Zealand. Did you find the American reaction unhelpful? I mean I would assume people were sort of shocked and annoyed and there would be all sorts of articles in the American press which then would get replayed page 20 in the Boston Globe and page one in the Wellington Journal or something like that.

TEARE: Yes. The reaction by people back in the States was strong and up to a point that didn’t bother me because I wanted the New Zealanders to be aware that they were letting down the side. I think I mentioned last time though that this came during a period when the Soviets had walked out of the disarmament talks in Geneva as a means of putting pressure on the Dutch and the Italians over the stationing of Pershing cruise missiles on their soil. Here was New Zealand of whom nothing else was being asked at all, just to continue business as usual, refusing to do so at a time when the Dutch and the Italians and others were taking the heat in NATO. So to that extent certainly the New Zealanders to my mind deserved to be told that what they were doing was damaging to the Alliance in our view. And it was that.

Some of the reaction on the other hand I think became too extreme particularly the proposal idea that New Zealand should be punished in the trade area for what it had done in the defense area. We had always tried to keep those separate and indeed I devoted a lot of time in the next two years in Australia trying precisely to keep them separate for other reasons. So I think that reaction was too strong to the point of being really irrational.

I don’t know if I mentioned last time that one of those who called for trade sanctions, at least consideration of them against New Zealand, was then Senator Bill Cohen of Maine.

Q: Now Secretary of Defense.

TEARE: Cohen put out a proposal for trade sanctions. There were a lot of angry people. Weinberger and some of his staff in the Pentagon particularly. What happened essentially was a
decision on our part that we would suspend most military to military relations with New Zealand and high level contacts. That policy was codified in a couple of different iterations and it became all the more entrenched after New Zealand enacted its policy into legislation. That happened after I left. I think it was in ’87. This was done for the very clear reason in the minds of those in the Labor party who didn’t altogether trust David Lange that it would be much harder to alter and indeed that proved to be true. That is the case down to the present time.

Q: From a pact point of view what was the role of New Zealand defense wise to the United States at that point?

TEARE: It was small in terms of actual current contributions. In fact I think you could say that in most respects in terms of hardware, operational capacity, interoperability, New Zealand derived far more from the arrangement than the United States did. We would send ships to visit New Zealand a couple times a year. When they did they would customarily exercise with New Zealand ships briefly. But a lot of New Zealanders came to the United States to take training courses at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Bragg, all across the map. We occasionally exercised on the ground in a tripartite manner with Australia also.

The whole benefit in those terms flowed to New Zealand because they were keeping up with the outside world. They were getting access to technology that they could not have developed on their own and couldn’t buy anywhere else. It was not terribly advanced. It was a small force then and smaller today. But from our standpoint what counted I think was to have New Zealand on our side. They were one of the flags in Vietnam. They had fought with us in Korea and earlier in World War II we had made extensive use of New Zealand as a base of operations against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. So the importance for us was much more symbolic.

Our Navy should be able to go anywhere in the world in our view and suddenly it couldn’t go or wouldn’t go to New Zealand anymore because of the policies adopted there. And yet the concept was that if New Zealand ever came under attack, from what quarter it would be hard to imagine, but nevertheless that is what the Treaty said, who would ride to the rescue? Why we would! And yet our ships were not welcome there. So that was the real rub.

Q: I would have thought that the New Zealand military, the professionals, must have been pissed as hell about this.

TEARE: At their own Government?

Q: Yes.

TEARE: Exactly. And here is another irony, the people hurt most by the sanctions we adopted were precisely the career uniformed military of New Zealand, the people who least deserved it, if you will. But that was seen as, and I agree, the only realm in which we could legitimately retaliate.

Q: How about the Australians? What was their reaction to this?
TEARE: I think the Australians were rather dismayed because they had gone through some of the same domestic debates themselves and had come out on the side of preserving the Alliance. For the Australian Labor Party, by then in power since early ’83, it was a particular problem because they did not want to see a Labor Government in New Zealand pay any lesser price for continuing the Alliance. So long as that didn’t happen and New Zealand was appropriately punished, the Australian Labor Government was satisfied, if you will, in equity terms. But at the same time they were conscious, indeed a lot of people in Australia were conscious, that without New Zealand the Alliance was somewhat weaker at least. Cooperation with the United States on the one hand and continuing with New Zealand on the other but never with the two simultaneously, Australia was going to have a much more difficult time of it in military terms. That proved to be true.

Q: Was there, particularly because of wartime alliances, matrimonial alliances and all, was there a sort of New Zealand lobby in the United States or anything like that?

TEARE: Not a noticeable one, no. There were certainly some matrimonial alliances. We would occasionally meet such people but I don’t think the numbers approached those of Australia and there were certainly dwarfed by the UK. That accounted for a little but I don’t think there was any strong pro New Zealand lobby in the United States. There was more approval I think of New Zealand’s policies from certain anti nuclear groups, including a woman named Helen Caldicott who is in fact an Australian by birth but was I believe on the faculty of Harvard Medical School at that time. She lectured and traveled widely and helped to keep the drums beating for Lange and Labor Party policy in the U.S., Australia and New Zealand.

Nasty though the rhetoric sometimes was it never seemed to translate into bad personal relations. We were able to get things done on other fronts with the Government of New Zealand without any significant disruption I would say. There were problems over access to the U.S. market for their beef and lamb. There was a question of chilled lamb versus frozen. The chilled lamb of course would be better because it had not been frozen and U.S. producers were trying to keep chilled lamb out, confine New Zealand to frozen lamb. That sort of thing.

It never got personally difficult.

Q: I was wondering on something like chilled versus frozen lamb and all. Here you are the American Ambassador in a small country that really depends on this. Did you find yourself taking the role of the American lamb producers as opposed to the New Zealand lamb producers or try to present it? I mean I would think this is where you could easily get caught up in trying to help this country because we had other things we were interested in.

TEARE: I was DCM not the Ambassador but the policy issues are the same. I would say I generally believed in what the U.S. was after or the individual U.S. companies or the beef producers made sense. I think New Zealand had taken a terrible hit when Britain joined the Common Market and eventually Common Market quotas began to apply to New Zealand exports, butter, cheese and so forth. That really undercut New Zealand faith in the British. They
felt betrayed by that but they had never had any comparable access arrangements with us so there was nothing that great to be lost. They were rather seeking to gain.

Furthermore in that era and later, too, all of us, that is the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, were trying to get into the Japanese market. The U.S. was the spearhead on that and frequently our efforts...they didn’t succeed all that often but when they did as on beef...served to open the door also for other producers so in my view New Zealand and Australia should have been grateful to us. Of course gratitude is not a plentiful commodity under those circumstances.

I don’t know if we covered before though what actually happened and didn’t happen in the way of relations with New Zealand.

Q: Why don’t we cover it and we can always eliminate it if we have it.

TEARE: Okay. Just in essence. The visible military cooperation ship visits ended and so also did exchanges above the Assistant Secretary level in the international arena. But what continued was rather interesting too. First of all the signals intelligence business predated the ANZUS Treaty and if only for that reason was considered to be exempt. So it was not affected and cooperative arrangements continued.

Also the Antarctic Program continued and that relied on U.S. Naval aircraft flying in cooperation with the Royal New Zealand Air Force. We would do the flying in the early part of the Antarctic season because we had the planes with skis and then New Zealand would do the flying in the later part of the season when they could only use the land runway and wheeled aircraft. The Antarctic Treaty says everything South of 60 degrees South, or South of the Antarctic Circle I guess is a nuclear free zone. We had subscribed to that Treaty long before these problems came along. The New Zealanders therefore assumed, and correctly of course, that we were not introducing nuclear weapons into the Treaty area. Therefore it was okay for those U.S. military aircraft that flew to Antarctica and back to do so. Similarly Air Force planes would come through Christchurch, New Zealand, which was the Antarctic support base periodically and drop things off and go on to Australia and on around the world. Channel flights they’re called. The New Zealanders did not object to that. Of course there were no nuclear powered aircraft and the cargo was assumed to be benign and civilian, and it was.

So the Antarctic Program continued and the Signals Intelligence Program continued. Those were not casualties of the rift. Then eventually after New Zealand passed legislation we came forward and formally declared that because our ships could not visit New Zealand we were unable to meet our obligations to the defense of New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty and therefore those obligations had to be suspended. That is the way things remain to the present day.

Q: Technically or whatever you want to call it, New Zealand does not fall within any defense arrangements?

TEARE: Not of ours. Australia covers it. They have a bilateral defense agreement and I think the Australians would consider that they are still bound to the defense of New Zealand under the
ANZUS Treaty but technically there are no U.S. treaty obligations for the defense of New Zealand now in force.

Q: Did this stand cause any...you mention on the political side the Labor Party in Australia but how about military to military, Australia to New Zealand...any sort of rifts there or lessening?

TEARE: I think the Australian military leadership was rather sympathetic to the New Zealand military leadership and quite disgusted with the New Zealand politicians. It did make Australia’s life more difficult in the sense that instead of preparing for one annual Tripartite exercise they might have to prepare for one with us and a different one with the New Zealanders. It cost more money, staff time, and everything else.

Also there is a sense in Australia, and this persists to the present day, that by cutting itself off from the United States New Zealand is falling farther and farther behind the modern military world. Indeed as its force shrinks and its technical lag increases, New Zealand becomes more and more of a drag on everyone else and may in fact be approaching the point of irrelevance as a military actor. So from that standpoint the whole period now of fourteen years...thirteen years...has been one of decline. It worries the Australians.

Furthermore the Australians have counted on New Zealand to help in procurement of major capital items, the biggest one being frigates. In the late ‘80s Australia decided to build some frigates and it wanted New Zealand to help by buying some. New Zealand finally committed to buying two with an option for two more. The last I heard New Zealand was going to stand at the two, was not going to exercise the option for the third and fourth. I saw the first one. I stood on its deck in fact in Wellington in August of ’97 when it made its first call at Wellington. It’s called the Tekaha. Aboard that evening was the then Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jim Bolger, who is now here as Ambassador to the United States.

So that’s the biggest single example but there have been others, including training. Australia offered to train New Zealand’s pilots. Today, 1998, New Zealand wants more modern aircraft and indeed has talked about US F-16 or FA-18. The Australians have the FA-18, which would get the New Zealanders back closer to interoperability. But it’s a real question whether New Zealand can afford any current generation aircraft at all. The answer may be no. And they certainly can’t afford both that and a third and fourth frigate. Their manpower is reduced. I think they are down to about 8,000 people in all the services combined so they are heading toward footnote status.

Q: Well in a way one can say okay, New Zealand military looking where it is, who cares? But doesn’t this also have in today’s world certain political consequences because we are talking about more and more joint efforts to bring peace and stability around? New Zealand in a way would be treated the way we treat Fiji or something like that, or like Samoa as a sort of nice or interesting component in one of these peace things but it really isn’t very important.

TEARE: In Fiji you chose an interesting example because in fact Fiji has been supplying troops to UN peacekeeping missions in several parts of the world for several years as a means of earning
revenue as well as getting experience for its people. One of the problems, and I remember hearing this in New York at UN sessions where I was a note taker, Fiji is aggrieved because the UN and specifically the US behind it, doesn’t always pay Fiji’s emoluments on time. But there is value to us, yes, in having participants like New Zealand in multinational operations.

You remember the many flags in Vietnam of which New Zealand was of course one. And we still like that sort of thing. Just this year, 1998, the matter arose when President Clinton was looking for people to join us in facing down Iraq in the Gulf. One of those who answered the call -- one of the few this time -- was New Zealand. New Zealand sent twenty special air services types and an aircraft or two and once there I’m told not only exercised and practiced with the Australians but also with us, our special operations people who were waiting around in Kuwait. In the end they didn’t have to do much except show force. But the real point is that when Clinton was looking around for help and called the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jenny Shipley, he got an affirmative answer from her and that boosted New Zealand’s stock in Washington by several points.

Q: Have we covered pretty well the New Zealand period do you think?

TEARE: I think we have, yes.

Q: If there is anything else you can always obviously insert it into this. So you left New Zealand when?

TEARE: In March of 1986 on direct transfer to Canberra.

WILLIAM LENDERKING
Public Affairs Officer, USIA

A native of New York, Mr. Lenderking graduated from Dartmouth College and served a tour with the US Navy in the Far East before joining the Foreign Service of the US Information Agency in 1959. As Public Affairs, Press and Information Officer, he served in posts throughout the world and in Washington, D.C., where held senior level positions in USIA and the Department of State dealing with Policy, Plans and Research. Mr. Lenderking was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: I was just talking to somebody yesterday dealing with the Panama Canal, and you know, the reversion of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians was the same thing; if we stayed too long with the Panamanians it could make the canal unusable. Anyway, what were the major issues in East Asia during this period that you had to deal with?

LENDERKING: There was one perennial, and that was the adamant refusal of New Zealand to
have anything to do with, or permit any contact with, nuclear vessels or weaponry or anything like that. That means that U.S. nuclear ships couldn’t call at New Zealand ports. We couldn’t conduct naval exercises with New Zealand ships if any of our ships were nuclear powered, and so on. It meant, in effect, that New Zealand had opted out of the very close mutual security relationship we’d had with them. It was a serious problem, for them and for us, not just a disagreement among friends.

Well, they stuck to their guns, and we still have a problem with them, but they sky didn’t fall. New Zealanders are marvelous people and they have a lovely country, but they also tend to be a little self-righteous and they saw themselves as leading a crusade to keep nuclear weapons away from the South Pacific, and beyond. One might say, “well, good on them,” but our immediate concern was our security relationships and we had good reason to feel the New Zealand position jeopardized our security. The Australians agreed with us. Our policy, to this day, is that we neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons anywhere. We also feared that the New Zealand attitude would undermine our fragile working arrangement with Japan, which still had a strong nuclear allergy. Now, we and the Japanese eventually figured out a way to finesse this issue, and with New Zealand, we felt we had no choice but to exclude them from military cooperation operations and there was considerable cost to New Zealand.

Q: Well you know, we talk about it but New Zealand is a small country in a relatively remote part of the world, and we no longer fear Japanese militarism there as we did during World War II, and that issue was settled in 1945. So what was the fuss?

LENDERKING: The great fear was that okay, here is this little country and it defies us and then before you know it our ships and especially the nuclear submarines, the carriers that were nuclear powered and the ships that might or might not have been carrying nuclear weapons could not go anywhere because other countries would take up the cudgels and then we would have our navy crippled. So it was a key issue and the New Zealand and Australian press particularly were very aggressive about hammering on that issue and I spent probably more time on that than anything else. But in any bureau I think you usually have at least one issue a day, at least, and I thought it was a great job. I got to know all the correspondents who covered the State Department. Some of them had been covering the State Department for years and had better contacts in the building initially certainly than I did and were also extremely well versed in American foreign policy. A few of them, like the senior guys for the Washington Post and New York Times, could usually get an interview or a comment directly from the Secretary of State or his senior deputies, so they performed at a level above my pay grade, to use the old saying. I’m thinking of people like Don Oberdorfer of the Washington Post who has written authoritative books on Korea and other subjects, and now retired, is the head of the Asia Society in Washington. The State Department press corps was quite aggressive as a whole, and the regulars were highly professional and very knowledgeable on the issues. They differed in interesting ways from the White House press corps, in that they tended to have greater subject expertise and were much less interested in being flamboyant and becoming on-camera celebrities. The White House press corps was very closely attuned to US domestic politics. It was the different natures of their jobs that made them that way – they weren’t like that to start.
Q: Well, let’s talk about New Zealand and Australia. You know, Murdoch came out of Australian and represents – I hate to use this word – the “gutter press,” but my meaning is something close to that.

LENDERKING: Yes, I’d not dispute that. But we have to admit he’s been extraordinarily successful, one of the most powerful media moguls of all time. Like him or not, and I’m very wary of his power drive and ambition, he’s an extremely shrewd businessman.

Q: You know, he trades in the sensational, sex, the lower depths or whatever, and his tabloid style and substance are basically irresponsible. Was he a model for Australian and New Zealand newspaper and media journalists?

LENDERKING: I think not so much but I think the Australian press, those papers like “The Sydney Morning Herald” and “The Melbourne Age” and respectable mainline papers certainly had a critical approach to the United States and American foreign policy, which I think they continue to this day. If Americans read the Australian mainstream press regularly, they’d start to wonder whether Australia is really a friendly country and whether Australians actually like us at all. Now, of course Australia is a very friendly country, and key ally, and there is still a lot of respect and admiration for the United States, but it’s not unalloyed admiration and we often make the mistake of taking it for granted. Right now, there is a lot of popular opposition in Australia to our Iraq policy, but the Government is foursquare with us.

Q: Well, what about this? You have this kind of ambivalence -- I have talked to people who have dealt with New Zealand who say you know, this anti-nuclear stand is not a foregone conclusion. It may be the policy of a particular government and that could change; or the papers might be opposed to certain things but this really does not represent Australian political opinion in general.

LENDERKING: That’s true, and I suppose it applies to any democratic government. Policies can change. I have made a number of trips to Australia on business and pleasure, and my wife is Australian and comes from a moderate conservative family and most of her friends are professional people who probably are more conservative than not, and still I think there is certainly a basic friendliness towards the United States but also there is an underlying feeling that you sense very quickly, even among people who are extremely cordial and polite and friendly, that there is something wrong with the United States. We are too big, too brash, too vulgar, too bullying; our policies often go wrong and we drag other people in like the Australians and that sort of thing. Obviously, there are also a lot of people who are enthusiastic and gung ho about being a very close ally of the United States. After all, we have really provided very generously and confidentially for their defense. They have tied their whole national defense to the United States and we give them access to information and weapons technology that we share with no country except the UK.

JAMES H. MORTON
James H. Morton was raised in Illinois and graduated from Monmouth College and the University of Chicago. He joined the Foreign Service in 1964. His career included positions in Luxembourg, Greece, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Washington, DC. Mr. Morton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 18, 1993.

Q: After you finished this in 1984 what happened then?

MORTON: I got an assignment as political counselor to Wellington, New Zealand. On the way out I got to Honolulu to consult with the POLAD, the political advisor at CINCPAC. I walked in and he said you really are going to be busy down there. Of course, I knew there were going to be elections scheduled for November and this was July. I say, "Yeah, but I have some time to get my feet on the ground." He said, "Well, the election is in three weeks." The Prime Minister had called what they call a snap election. Everyone knew the Labour government was going to win and they were the ones who were going to institute this anti-nuclear policy which would mean that US ships could not visit which would mean a confrontation between ANZUS partners. And indeed that happened. I got off the plane and went to an election rally. They have mercifully short elections in New Zealand, three weeks. Everything is done in three weeks unlike the Americans who stretch it out well over a year. Before I knew it there we were with that new government which began to implement this new policy. So that is where I ended up.

Q: What was he doing and what were you doing?

MORTON: Well, this was a fascinating dynamic. First of all he really did refuse to accept reality, that this had happened. It would be some months before push came to shove that we would request a ship visit and that the government would be in a position of saying, "No, we have a popular mandate." The polls showed that 80 percent of the New Zealand people were "anti-nuclear". I was the primary reporting officer at the post. He would just not let any reporting go in that showed that there would probably be a crisis in no time.

Q: What were you getting from our military people? Did they really care a damn about this?

MORTON: I'll tell you the real problem. No, no one gave a damn about New Zealand. When I
was having my briefings before I went at the Pentagon they said that they send a ship or two down there once or twice a year just for alliance purposes. The real problem was something they called the New Zealand disease. They were afraid that this precedence of an alliance partner selectively not wanting to accept the responsibilities of partnership in the alliance could spread to Norway or Denmark and other places. So it was the precedent angle that got the United States hung up. I happened to agree with this thing. We had certain things to do. We had this "neither confirm nor deny" (NCND) thing.

Q: Will you explain what that is?

MORTON: The way we got into the real problem with New Zealand was that they did not want a nuclear propelled or armed ship to come in. It was against the anti-nuclear provision of the Labour Party. What New Zealand really wanted was to continue to accept our ships here but not one that is nuclear armed or propelled. Well it is easy to tell a nuclear propelled ship but not easy to tell a nuclear armed ship. When does it have a nuclear tipped missile or a conventional tipped missile? And we don't want to tell them. That was the "neither confirm nor deny." When a given ship at a given time was going to a given port, we didn't want the Soviet Union to know that at that point in time it was not nuclear armed because it takes so long to get a ship re-provisioned and the Soviets would have an advantage. New Zealand was asking us essentially, "Can't you just send us a clean ship?" and we are saying, "We can't tell you we are sending a clean ship or not." That was the nub of the argument. We understood that. This eventually got to the point of New Zealand being "expelled" and we withdrew our security guarantee. In other words ANZUS fell apart.

My whole problem with this was that diplomacy failed and much more scar tissue was created than was necessary, when the two interests of these countries who had been friendly for 150 years clashed so dramatically. I think probably the New Zealanders had to go their way and we had to go our way, I understand that. But we had people like Cap Weinberger in Washington, H. Monroe Brown in Wellington issuing outrageous statements when quiet diplomacy would have gone so far. Editorial in the papers..."The Americans are bullying us." This is a little country and here is Uncle Sam just laying all over them. The same thing would have happened, but there is no reason for all this scar tissue. And there was fault on both sides, by the way.

Q: Were you able to do anything?

MORTON: Personally, I think yes. And there were some other people who felt the same way. We worked very closely with our New Zealand colleagues. We respected each other as diplomats. Here is this culture working again. I would come in with the Ambassador and I would read the demarche out and the Ambassador would screw it up and then I would clean it up afterwards. We would kind of look at each other and almost wink. We kept up extremely close and good relations with the Foreign Ministry. I was able in the height of the contact to go in and see the Pacific Affairs officer and they would turnover their reporting files from their embassy so that I could report on events in some of the islands in the Pacific. Our horns were locked in this battle.
So, I think some of us, and people said that when I left there that the trust was there and that we never during the worst of these things lost our professional relationship and courtesy. I was very close friends with a lot of journalists who said the same thing at least at the working level of the American embassy. H. Monroe Brown was a laughing stock of the place. I will tell you one very funny story. Yes, I think we did do something, but at the official level, scar tissue and it shouldn't be there.

Q: But again this often happens, at the official level you have to keep your cool while the political people, you might say, sound off.

MORTON: Yes, and again a good diplomat on either side understands the institution with which they are dealing. They knew about H. Monroe Brown and why he was there. They knew what Casper Weinberger was like.

The Prime Minister at that time was David Lange, a fascinating character. There have been books about him. He was one of the most witty men I have ever seen and also one of the best debaters which is why he rose to the top in New Zealand politics. Their parliament is strictly hard nose debate. In a press conference one time he was asked about H. Monroe Brown's latest outrageous statement. The guy just shot from the hip. A little background. H. Monroe Brown was a cattle rancher, but he was also a horse breeder and he had a horse that he ran in the Melbourne Cup, which is one of the biggies in Australia. The horse's name was "Lack of Reason." Back to the press conference...some one said, "Prime Minister Lange, what do you think of H. Monroe Brown's latest comments about your comments on such and such?" He said, "Well, what do you think about a guy who names a horse after his country's foreign policy?"

Q: Was Brown there the whole time?

MORTON: No. H. Monroe Brown finally left, he didn't want to go. He was replaced by a career Foreign Service officer, Paul Cleveland.

Q: Did you get any feeling why Paul was sent?

MORTON: I am not sure why he was sent. People in the embassy had some problems with Paul as well. We were so happy that a career guy was coming. However, we felt we got a whole new set of problems because Paul came and felt that he could solve the problem, that it had not been worked properly. We, in our opening briefing said, "Hey, there is a real problem here. We don't think it is going to be easy to switch the people of New Zealand around no matter what kind of public education problem we use." I think Paul later on realized that we were speaking the truth and there wasn't much to be done until there was a change of government or the Cold War melted down. Now NCND is dead. Bush has declared an end to that. But in many ways the problems with New Zealand still remain because they still have the law on the books that the Labour government passed.

Q: Did we just not send ships there?
MORTON: We never sent a ship in.

Q: Did we cut out anything else?

MORTON: Oh, we cut out a lot of things. One time, shortly after we slapped them in the face and said they were no longer in ANZUS, the Canadian government was celebrating, I think the 50th anniversary of their Navy and Australia and New Zealand sent ships. The Australian ships docked in the Navy place in San Diego and got refueled. The New Zealand ships went to the commercial port and paid going commercial rates. It was just that kind of thing. And, of course, that kind of pettiness just drove the Kiwis wild that Uncle Sam was doing this. There was never anything terribly serious. They couldn't participate in maneuvers, they didn't get a cut rate on ammunition and all that kind of stuff. By that time New Zealand said that it was foolish for this country way down here in this corner of the world with 3 ½ million people to have armed forces anyway. So that played into the hands of Labour.

JOHN DAVID GLASSMAN
Country Director, Australia and New Zealand Affairs
Washington, DC (198?-1987)

Mr. Glassman graduated from the University of Southern California and Columbia University. He served in numerous posts including Madrid, Moscow, Havana and Kabul. He was named ambassador to Paraguay in 1991. He was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 1997.

Q: Then you were suddenly without a job.

GLASSMAN: Yes, we disbanded Stone's office and I was then asked by a political fellow who was going to be named Ambassador to accompany him as Deputy Chief of Mission. This became impossible because at that point I was under rank for a senior officer’s position. Secretary of State Shultz, however, said, “Well we can’t break the system, can’t make him a DCM but we should do something for this fellow.” So they made me Country Director for Australia and New Zealand, which was thought to be a nice quiet backwater, but, fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, New Zealand at this point launched its so-called "nuclear ships policy" under which they prohibited the entry into New Zealand of either nuclear armed or powered ships. This was a big challenge to the United States Navy because in terms of weaponry at least at that point, we followed a policy which we did not declare whether ships had nuclear weapons on board. "No confirm, no deny policy," I think it was called. This was a challenge to the United States Navy because of our neither confirm nor deny policy which allowed the Navy to maintain access in states such as the Scandinavians, Japan and others which would not permit entry of declared nuclear weapons. New Zealand had an importance to the United States particularly the Navy that went beyond its locality. It was a question of our global ability to project power with ships which might have on board nuclear ammunition, mines, torpedoes, bombs.
What happened was an effort to negotiate New Zealand back from this ban. New Zealand sent to Washington Ambassador Wallace "Bill" Rowling, who had been a former Prime Minister. We developed with him a possible negotiated settlement under which we would try a gradual return to access allowing less difficult ships in first. That is, ships that clearly didn’t carry nuclear weapons and then building up step by step. There was a sense that the New Zealand Government might accept this and we dispatched a ship to New Zealand called the USS Buchanan. The New Zealanders appeared ready to accept but Prime Minister Lange, after dispute with the Labor Party caucus, turned it down. So at this point, we were in a state of confrontation with New Zealand. Later Lange was brought to Washington, where he met with Weinberger and Shultz. Weinberger particularly pressed Shultz to be very hard. Again the lower level bureaucracy was willing to do a step by step type of approach, but Shultz, at Weinberger’s urging, was tough. (Although Shultz and Weinberger fought on many occasions they were of one mind.) Shultz said, "No way - we're not going to accommodate you at all.” At this point, decisions were made to undertake sanctions against New Zealand. The reason this was interesting and controversial was New Zealand and Australia were allies of the United States - a defense Alliance which had existed since the beginning of the Cold War years, part of the chain of alliances circling the globe. They cooperated with us very closely. We shared most of our intelligence with them, at the same level as closest allies such as Britain. We had defense exercises with them. They were an integral part of the Western defense community. So before invoking these various sanctions, we had a secret meeting with Prime Minister Lange. With me was a Foreign Service Officer named Bill Brown who later became Ambassador to Israel. He and I went to Los Angeles and met with Prime Minister Lange at the home of the Consul General of New Zealand. We read off to him the sanctions that would be taken against New Zealand if they persisted in their policy - including comprehensive cut-off of intelligence, an end of all defense cooperation, joint exercises and sharing of defense technology. While we were there Lange kept staring over our heads, we couldn’t understand what was happening. Lange was a very fat man, he probably weighed about 250-300 pounds and we couldn’t figure out why he kept staring over our heads. We turned around and there was a plate of pastries on the shelf. Lange was very dismissive of these sanctions. He said that, if he didn't get intelligence, it’s more time to read the comic paper when he is sitting in Parliament. He said these things don’t interest him at all. Meanwhile back in Washington they brought in some people from the Prime Minister’s office in New Zealand who had been involved in the intelligence exchange. The Agency brought them over and one man whose name now escapes me, when told about the sanctions, began sobbing. These senior New Zealand people had been very much involved from the beginning in inter-allied cooperation.

It was felt at that time, however, that the sanctions had to be spelled out very clearly, not so much because of New Zealand’s policies, but to give a lesson in Europe and Japan about what happens if they precluded the entry of the so-called nuclear ships. Finally the meeting we had out in California with the Australians; we reached an agreement with the Australians who were pushing us very hard to take action against New Zealanders because the Australian Labor Party felt that this could be very contagious within their own party if New Zealand policy was allowed to stand without sanction. It was agreed that we would suspend New Zealand from the ANZUS alliance. I think it’s probably unique in the history of the broad Western alliance system. At the meeting it was decided that New Zealand was suspended. All the sanctions went into force and held for over a decade.
Q: Must have been traumatic for you.

GLASSMAN: It was interesting, there was a sense that with the embassy here in town we had a relationship working to solve this. Ambassador Rowling was really trying to solve it. Had the Labor Party been as it was before, it would have been solved, but a radical group had taken the party. Lange himself had been an anti-Vietnam war activist, there were people who were very radical and someone who had been tied up with Soviet front organizations who had taken control of the Labor Party. At that point Lange himself was not leader, he felt he had to bend to his own caucus.

WALTER J. SILVA
Inspection Corps
Washington, DC (1986)

Born in Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1925, Walter Silva was accepted at Harvard University after high school. During his first term there, World War II was under way so he decided to take the examination for the naval program. He was in the armed forces until the end of 1945, when he returned to Harvard. He graduated with a degree in Comparative Literature in 1949. Mr. Silva was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 23, 1995.

SILVA: I did the South Seas, Papua-New Guinea, the Solomons, Fiji, New Zealand. We did all those funny little islands and New Zealand while the other half of the team led by Bob Barber did Australia. Again, I thought I lucked out and had by far the better part. Far more interesting.

Q: Did you get into the Soviet area, the bloc area at all?

SILVA: No. We did the Embassy in New Zealand, a beautiful, modern building, well done, suffering from the surfeit of security that afflict many posts. The Ambassador, a first-rate guy, Paul Cleveland, doing a great job, was very upset because members of the New Zealand government were frisked on the way in to visit him. They couldn't park their cars inside the walls in the parking lot, which was intended for that purpose. Under the new rules they couldn't do that. And then they went through metal detectors, all that sort of thing. It was as though New Zealand were Moscow, or worse. That was a major problem, I thought. But I don't know how you fine-tune things like security, because nobody is willing to take the risk of reducing security. There was an interesting and unusual issue in New Zealand. The Embassy was no problem. We had a rather good sized consulate in Auckland, the North Island capital town. Their problem was the perennial problem of space. It was in an office building and it was not obviously designed for our purposes. So the consular work was hampered considerably, it was a terrible, terrible operation. But they were dealing with it and it worked. The interesting place was Christ Church. We had had a Consulate in Christ Church years before. In one of these economy moves, we closed it. So what we had left in Christ Church was a consular agent, a local businessman who
was given the commission to represent us in some ways. And we had USIS library. USIS was there for a couple of reasons, not the least of which was the fact that the U.S. Antarctic expeditions all go out of Christ Church, and the U.S. Navy had a substantial installation there. Even at the time of year we were there, which was not the ideal time for exploration in Antarctica, and there was nothing going on, they had this rather large installation and a complicated bureaucracy with other countries involved. It seemed to me that we ought to be represented there more formally than we were. Because this was another case of an American, the USIS guy, not accredited to the government. He was not assigned to the Embassy and couldn't be residing in Christ Church. So he didn't have a title or diplomatic or consular status down there in Christ Church. Again, he could have ended up in jail on a traffic ticket. At the same time he was supposed to be there partly, at any rate, as a referee in the fighting between the U.S. Navy and this U.S. Committee, the Antarctic Group. They were always at loggerheads and he was supposed to be there to calm things down. On the other hand the consular agent was a very efficient guy, did a good job for us, we were paying him a few thousand dollars a year, but we were also paying for his secretary. It seemed to me that if we could do away with his job and give the secretary to the USIS guy. She was doing the traditional work of a consulate anyway, the recording of requests, transmittals to the Embassy. We could save the honorary consul's salary and commission the man from USIS a Consul, which would have thrilled him to death, and give him the status he needed to deal with the local authorities and the Antarctic people. When we got back to the Department you would think that I had recommended the destruction of the Statue of Liberty. USIS was up the wall. They didn't want their man down there doing State Department work. I reminded them that I had just seen what their man was doing down there. He had a library run by locals and he didn't do much of anything anyway and he would have loved it. As a Consul he could increase the number of contacts he had in town. It would have been much to his benefit and to the benefit of USIS if they had let him do this job. The Department didn't like it, mostly CA, the Consular bureau didn't like it because they didn't want to give this guy a commission as a consular officer on the pretext that he had not had consular training. All that stuff. So in the end, nothing happened. If anything I think by now USIS has closed the office. But we're paying something, certainly then and probably now too, paying for more than we needed to by having this consular agent. Effective as he may have been it was more money than we needed to pay. And we didn't have anyone there with any clout to deal with these Antarctica people, who were, some of them, rather flaky.

PAUL M. CLEVELAND
Ambassador
New Zealand (1986-1989)

Paul M. Cleveland was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1931 and raised in New York and Washington, DC. He received a bachelor's degree in English from Yale University in 1953. Afterward, he entered the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Cleveland's Foreign Service career included positions in Australia, Germany, Korea, New Zealand, and Malaysia. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on October 20, 1996.
Q: In 1986, you were appointed as Ambassador to New Zealand. How did that occur?

CLEVELAND: Dixie Walker, I believe, was the catalyst. He did not have an overly enthusiastic view of the incumbent Ambassador--Monroe Browne--who was very, very conservative. I think that Monroe Browne probably tried his best, but he may in some part have aggravated some of the problems we had with New Zealand at the time. Dixie had met Browne at some of the Chiefs of Mission conferences and used to return muttering that if anyone thought that he, Dixie, was conservative, they had not heard of Monroe Browne. Browne had been in Wellington for three years and it was time for him to leave, even though he was very reluctant to leave. In the final analysis, I think I was chosen as a replacement because I was a professional Foreign Service officer and the US needed someone experienced to handle a growing political problem revolving around the question of keeping New Zealand nuclear free and the visits of US ships. That issue had gotten out of hand and I think the administration felt that a professional was required to deal with it...or to be seen dealing with it. In fact, I think I was the first Foreign Service officer to be appointed Ambassador to New Zealand since the late 1940s, and there weren't many before that.

I left Seoul at the beginning of November, 1985 and arrived in Wellington on January 8, 1986. The processing and confirmation of my appointment was unusually rapid. I had no problems with the Senate or any other part of the process. Monroe Browne was not a happy man; he came to Washington but refused to see me for a while. He finally "granted me an interview" during which he stared at the opposite wall throughout our conversation. This meeting took place in his suite in the Madison Hotel. There was no question that he was hurt by his recall and may also have resented being replaced by a Foreign Service officer. He had not been offered another mission; in fact, he told me that he had had greater ambitions than being Ambassador to New Zealand--he originally (in 1982) was shooting for Japan or China. Since he did not get either of those posts, he had hoped to use Wellington as a podium to comment on issues that touched on the whole of East Asia and hopefully to influence US policy in that region of the world.

While in Washington, I was briefed on the nuclear ship issue. I was told that the New Zealand Labor Party, then the governing party, had decided on strictures that made it impossible for us to bring our Navy vessels into New Zealand ports. The Party had said--and was in the process of translating into specific legislation when I arrived--that the Prime Minister had to decide whether there were nuclear weapons on board any vessel docking or sailing in New Zealand waters. We had determined on the other hand that we could not answer any questions concerning our armaments as a matter of national security. We had for a long time taken the position that we would not confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on any of our ships. And we could not have a Prime Minister doing that for us. When we refused to divulge that information in 1985 at the time of the visit of the destroyer Buchanan, the government turned us down. Later, we informed the New Zealanders that if they insisted on putting the Labor Party policies into law, it would present us with a serious dilemma. Under those circumstances, if we decided to bring a ship into New Zealand waters, we would either act contrary to our own policy or New Zealand law. We would could not do either. That would leave us with only one answer and that would be to avoid New Zealand waters entirely. That in turn meant suspending our defense commitment.
Secretary of State, George Shultz, was upset with the New Zealanders as was the whole Department. DoD was upset. In fact, I think the Washington view was almost unanimous both in the Executive and the Legislative branches. Congressman Steve Solarz, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on East Asia, was certainly unhappy with the New Zealanders as were most members of Congress. I think Washington felt that the New Zealanders were just going too far. Not bringing our ships to New Zealand was probably not a military problem; we were much more concerned with the precedent that the New Zealanders were establishing. That point had been made repeatedly to the New Zealanders; our real concern was with Japan where our security position in East Asia could be seriously damaged if that country were made to follow the New Zealand lead. Beyond that region, the same issue had arisen in Denmark--in fact, later on after I arrived, it was a very close call there and Denmark almost followed New Zealand.

Shultz told me personally before I went to Wellington that he had talked to Prime Minister Lange about the Labor Party policy; he thought that Lange had not lived up to his promise to avoid confrontation over nuclear ships. Wolfowitz, the Assistant Secretary for EA, told me specifically that Lange had promised Shultz that he would do his best to convince his fellow Labor Party members to accept a nuclear ship visit policy that we could live with. Lange, as far as we knew, had not done anything along those lines. He had gone to the Tokalu Islands at the time the critical decisions were being made by his Party regarding the Buchanan, and upon his return he accepted the decisions made by the Party, which had been propelled primarily by the left-wing members of the Party.

My instructions were essentially to try to do the best I could to calm the passions while at the same time making it clear to the New Zealanders that we would not change our policy and that if they persisted in putting the Labor Party policy into legislation, then we would be forced to suspend our defense commitments as spelled out in the ANZUS treaty. If we could not make visits to New Zealand ports and could not navigate their waters, we could not then fulfill our commitments under any defense arrangements. As Congressman Solarz said: "We can't get the stuff there in jeeps!" I did try in my first six months to convince them not to pass the legislation, which had been drafted in damaging terms, but it was a vain attempt, as Shultz had predicted to me it would be.

Why did this happen? I think some New Zealanders--particularly the ideologues--had become quite uncomfortable with the ANZUS alliance. New Zealand had more than its share of pacifists and military alliances were just not philosophically acceptable. Then there was the general nervousness about nuclear weapons. Thirdly, there was a hangover of Vietnam resentment. Finally, I think many, if not most, New Zealanders saw no threat to their national survival in the world of the mid-1980s. In fact, many did not really see any military threat in the world and felt that the US had hyped the Cold War. Many had forgotten WWII when without us they could have easily become a Japanese colony. So there were a number of reasons expressed, both singly and together, which led many New Zealanders to see the world through a prism entirely different from ours and most of the rest of the world. It was quite clear that a majority of New Zealanders did not want our ships in their ports.
On the other hand, roughly 66% of New Zealanders wanted to maintain in the ANZUS alliance. In fact, they were never able to resolve the conflict between belonging to an alliance and not abiding by its provisions or at least taking unilateral actions that were detrimental to that alliance. I believe that it was the philosophical view of the left wing members of the Labor Part that drove the debate. At the same time, there were domestic political requirements, such as the necessity for economic reforms, which contributed to the decision that New Zealand took on the nuclear ships. I always felt--although none of the participants would ever admit this directly--that essentially the right wing of the Labor Party, whom one might expect would be more concerned about maintaining ANZUS, was actually neutralized by the promise it received from the left wing that economic reform, as outlined by the right wing, could proceed. That reform called for a fairly sharp turn towards free enterprise and a market economy for New Zealand. Left wing Labor leader Helen Clark confirmed the trade-off in conversations with me in 1996. The left wing would not stand in the way of economic reform as supported by the right wing in exchange for the right wing's acquiescence to the left wing nuclear ship visit policy. Whether or not there was an explicit deal, I don't know for certain--I doubt it was put in writing--but that is what actually happened. The speculation that such a deal had been made became almost conventional wisdom in New Zealand. It is entirely true that New Zealand turned from being one of the most centrally controlled economies in the free world--functioning about as well as the Soviet economy--into an almost unimaginable free market economy, which has become an incredible success.

I should note that a couple of wives of our officers sympathized with the New Zealanders. I believe that the American staff itself, basically supported the US view and positions. We had considerable discussion within the Embassy on the nuclear war ship issue and I never heard otherwise. In light of that debate, we changed our rhetoric somewhat after I arrived. In our statement of goals and objectives, we moved the objective of "promoting the best possible relations with New Zealand" from first to second place. The first objective became support to the maximum extent of US security interests, including specifically insistence on the US Navy's "neither confirm nor deny" policy. I don't recall that we had any fundamental internal controversy; as I said, I think the staff was in full support of our efforts.

When I arrived in New Zealand in January 1986, even after hearing Shultz' prediction, I was hopeful that I could reason with the New Zealanders. I didn't know whether I could turn them around, but as the new boy on the block, I certainly had some hopes of having some positive effect on the situation. I had the highest respect for Secretary Shultz and knew that he was a very good judge of situations. So my optimism was certainly tinged with reality. The first question that I had to address was what I would say about the warship issue; would I just mouth the usual line or should and could I put a little more positive spin to our position. I concluded that neither of those tactics would be at all useful. So, after getting off the plane, I answered the expected press queries by saying that I had just arrived and that I first had to listen to the views of the New Zealanders before expressing my views on the situation. I promised that after having learned all I could, I would then comment. I think that approach was well received and bought me some time. But that is all.

As things developed, the New Zealanders passed the highly restrictive legislation in December,
1986. We never formally withdrew from of ANZUS. To do so, would have created more problems for us: 1) we would have difficulties coming to new bilateral arrangements with Australia--the atmosphere was much different in the late 1980s than it had been in the 1950s when ANZUS was formed; and 2) it would have shut the door for New Zealand to reenter an alliance. By keeping ANZUS going--even in an emasculated form--it left open the possibility for a reemergence of the alliance without further negotiations. We were hopeful that New Zealand would eventually revoke the legislation it had passed and rejoin the alliance. So six months after I arrived, we just suspended our defense commitment to New Zealand.

When I returned to Washington for consultations in June, 1986, I expressed the view that New Zealand should not be booted out of ANZUS and opposed suspending the defense commitment until New Zealand first took actions that would justify some reaction on our part. I wanted to keep the monkey on New Zealand's back. But I didn't consider my point to be critical, so that when Shultz took a different tack in Manila a few weeks later, it didn't upset me particularly. After Shultz had a bilateral meeting with Lange in Manila, after the ASEAN meeting, he talked to the press and much to Lange's surprise, said that the US remained friends with New Zealand, but no longer allies. Under the circumstances, the US could not continue its defense commitment to that country. I was not in that meeting, although I had requested Washington approval for me to go to Manila, but the Department felt that the precedent of only US ambassadors to ASEAN countries attending should be maintained.

I think Lange did not expect Shultz to suspend the defense commitment at that time. In fact, it is my understanding that there was no discussion of such action in the private Shultz-Lange meeting. So not only did the decision catch Lange by surprise, but he was also surprised by the public announcement. In fact, there is some controversy about the accuracy of the memcon of that meeting on another issue as well. The US version had Shultz saying that Lange should recognize that an American warship might well enter a New Zealand harbor at some point carrying nuclear weapons. The Shultz statement was conditional; i.e. it "might" happen. He didn't state categorically that it would happen; Shultz just conjectured that it might happen. The New Zealand record indicated that Shultz stated that the US would definitely send such a ship. New Zealand's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Merv Norrish, who did participate in the meeting, was absolutely sure that the New Zealand record was correct; he was certain that Shultz had said that New Zealand had to face the fact that sooner or later the US would send a warship with nuclear weapons aboard into a New Zealand port. That phraseology was just unacceptable to Lange. Lange later in Bangkok publicly blasted the Secretary for his comments. I believe that in fact the difference in the records was not crucial. I think any mention of nuclear-armed warships in New Zealand ports was just unacceptable. I don't think that whatever Shultz said made any difference to the policy positions of either country. It only became an issue because Lange let fly a broadside against the Secretary and US policy. He tried to place blame for any damage to US-New Zealand relations on Shultz' back.

In retrospect, I would say that we were right in doing what we did. We really didn't have any options because of the precedent problem. After all the Chinese were letting our ships dock in their ports without questions being asked. The Indians were doing the same thing. I was disgusted when Rajiv Gandhi later came to Wellington, embraced Prime Minister Lange and said
that the Indians admired the New Zealand's nuclear policy. It was disingenuous at best because while praising Lange's policy, the Indians were allowing our ships into their ports without asking questions. What hypocrisy! So I think we were right and we never tried to soft-pedal our stand. Even Lange admitted that Shultz had been quite clear all along about our position. We gave the New Zealanders lots of warnings about the consequences of their policy and did exactly what we said we would do.

If I have a reservation about our actions it is that at the beginning of the debate we might have made a greater effort to convince them of the desirability of maintaining an alliance, which required the docking of warships in New Zealand harbors without questions asked, we might then have averted the rupture of the military alliance. We also were not helped when we were essentially forced by Prime Minister Muldoon to bring the destroyer Truxton, to New Zealand in the early 1980s. He in effect ordered us to bring that ship into New Zealand as a show of contempt for the "peaceniks". We brought the ship into Auckland, although we had serious reservations about the wisdom of doing so. Of course, the appearance of that ship brought a major outcry in the country, which became a major catalyst for the political success of the Labor Party and the eventual election of Lange. It is not entirely fair to look in retrospect with 20/20 hindsight, but I do believe that a more attentive policy vis-a-vis New Zealand might have averted the later rupture.

Nevertheless I think our policy was correct; it was not directed towards New Zealand; it was a global policy intended to bolster our security. We would just not "confirm or deny" whether nuclear weapons were aboard a naval vessel. No other country in the world has ever raised the issue the way the New Zealanders did and that gave us very few options.

Lange was not the easiest guy to get along with and furthermore, he had his domestic constituency to worry about. We never trusted him. He was brilliant, but as a lawyer, it was said of him that he would perform at peak efficiency if he could figure out the case in the five minutes it took him to walk down the corridor to the court room. You could not expect Lange to give an issue any sustained and prolonged review. He had "attention deficit disorder."

Another description of him came from Sir Robert Muldoon, the previous Prime Minister and Lange's arch rival. Both were quite plump. When I asked Muldoon what he thought of Lange, he said that "Lange was a fat boy at the age of three, unloved by his mother, who developed his wit as a defense, but never developed anything to defend." I think that was a brutal but probably accurate description of the man. Lange did not have any core principles which were sustained over any length of time. He had a squishy love of the poor and the downtrodden, which is commendable, but it was not clear that this was a fundamental principle with him. Many liked him, but very few trusted him, especially those who had to deal with him. I used to go see him quite often; I always felt that diplomats must get out of their offices and talk to the leaders as well as the people to the country to which they were accredited. As time went on and as the nuclear issue receded, I would go to see Lange to chat to him about New Zealand politics and his views about world events. I would then report his views to Washington. Lange and I got along alright; he was always funny and pleasant to me. I wouldn't say we were friends, but we got along and our meetings were pleasant enough. He didn't hold me personally responsible for US policy.
In a book he wrote after he ended his Prime Ministership, he did berate my predecessor at some length. He mentioned me in a sentence or two, as Monroe's successor. He did say I was a "harder case"; to this day, I don't know what that meant. Nothing good, I suspect. As a matter of fact, I don't remember being berated by any of the Labor Cabinet officers, except for Mike Moore, who was one of my favorite Cabinet officers. He was the Trade Negotiator and he periodically took me to task for US trade positions and policies. I was never personally attacked by anyone in New Zealand during my tour, even though US-New Zealand relations had seen better days. In fact, the damage to US-New Zealand relations had already taken place by the time I arrived. The last ditch effort I made to try to get the law revised was in vain; so I turned my attention to the future. I made every effort to present the US as a reasonable friend in the hopes that I could calm the waters. I readily admitted that we couldn't change our policy for New Zealand--on disclosure of what our warships were carrying--because of the precedent it would establish--but I emphasized wherever I went that there were many positive aspects to our relationship. I think that this approach, after three years, had some effect on stopping the deterioration of the relations. I don't remember that either I or the US was ever attacked in personal or venal ways; we were severely criticized for our policies by some ideologues periodically, but it was mostly done in an unoffensive way. Sometimes we would be mentioned for our racial problems; we would be derided occasionally. I think that these criticisms stemmed probably from the New Zealand hurt and anger about the suspension of defense commitments. We did have a couple of tiny demonstrations in front of the Embassy by opponents of our nuclear policy. When I made my first speech, three months after my arrival, to the New Zealand Foreign Policy Association--a preeminent group in Wellington--there were demonstrations which forced me to enter the building through the back door. Some of the demonstrators filtered into the building and began to shout. The moderator told them that if they wanted to participate, they would have to join the association. Some paid the dues and then heckled me from the back row. But that was the exception. I really received very little public condemnation.

I talked about our cooperation in Antarctica and the benefits of trade between our two countries; I emphasized the positives whenever I could. There is always some dissatisfaction about trade. The discussions sometimes get pretty heated; in Australia, some farmers dumped a couple of truckloads of wheat on our Ambassador's lawn; that never happened to me. We did receive some criticism on our dairy support policies, meat quotas and restrictions. But I don't think we were subjected to any more criticism in New Zealand than we were in other countries.

Nor do I think our commercial relationships changed much during my tour. There was some concern, especially in the New Zealand business community, that the nuclear ship issue might have some adverse effect on trade. I think Shultz and others as well as I, tried to make it clear all along that we would not mix economics and politics. We would not invoke sanctions because of the nuclear ship policy. When the New Zealanders finally enacted their restrictive legislation, we did stop dialogue at high political levels on political and security matters and suspended our defense commitments, but we did not suspend high level meetings on trade issues. We took no trade retaliatory measures; there were no non-tariff barrier actions taken, such as anti-dumping suits which might have been interpreted by some as mere retaliation for the New Zealand's nuclear stand. In fact, trade between New Zealand and the US grew steadily in the three year period I served in Wellington.
As we had for some time, we did impose some restraint (VRA) on meat imports as we did with Australia. But these actions preceded the nuclear issue and therefore could not have been viewed as a retaliatory measure. We also imposed some restraints on dairy imports. None of these trade issues became much of a political issue for us; in part because they were an old story and in part because most of the restraints came as part of negotiations which took place in Geneva where most of the trade issues were being handled. This is not to say that we were not given a stream of complaints by the New Zealand Ministry for Trade or Foreign Ministry or Agriculture Ministry, which we duly reported, but it never was the cause for any political problems. The farmers were undoubtedly unhappy about our policies, but in general, I think the New Zealanders accepted them without rancor. I went on many trips to the countryside and found almost a universal pro-American feeling. Trade with the US was not a particularly large part of the New Zealand economy.

I did not spend as much time as I might have on commercial issues. There was no question that a change of emphasis in our relations was underway as it was elsewhere at the end of the Cold War. That is, we were moving from security concerns to commercial matters. In retrospect, I probably should have been more active in the commercial area, particularly since I was not making any headway on security issues. That is not to say that I neglected the commercial side; I did do a lot of work in that area. We moved the Commercial Office from Wellington to Auckland, which was the commercial center of New Zealand. I kept one New Zealander in the Embassy to handle commercial matters in Wellington, but our principal focus became Auckland. I spent a fair amount of time speaking to Chambers of Commerce, seeing businessmen from both countries, drumming up US-New Zealand trade. I was sure that there was room for trade growth and we did work on that. As I said, the late 1980s was the beginning of the change of US emphasis from security issues to commercial ones around the world. It was also useful for me to work on commercial issues in New Zealand because that was a positive aspect of our relationship which is what I wanted to emphasize rather than the nuclear ship issue.

As far as I could tell, all the opposition to US policies was domestically grown; I don't think there were any foreign influences at work. There was a certain amount of competition between the Soviet Ambassador and myself; we did appear on TV and other forums sequentially to discuss the Cold War issues of the day. I did not have a head-to-head debate with him because I think that would have been a poor idea. My whole effort in the three years in New Zealand was to calm the waters; I certainly was not interested in stirring up controversies even if they were not directly related to New Zealand. Some New Zealanders may have played up the "Super Power" differences, but it was not in our interest to do so in that country. I got along with the Soviet Ambassadors increasingly well because glasnost was well under way and they were becoming more and more open with me. I enjoyed talking to both Soviet Ambassadors, who spoke excellent English. But as I have said, my main objective was to calm the waters.

While in Wellington I sent three speeches back to the Department which saw fit to publish them in its "Bulletin". In each I tried to be clear on our positions, without increasing the heat of the debate. The three speeches showed the progression in our relations.
While I was Ambassador, there were a number of attempts made in Washington to be "tougher" on the New Zealanders than I thought warranted. There may well have been some people who wanted to invoke economic sanctions, for example, but Shultz took that issue off the table almost from the beginning of our controversy with the New Zealanders. But there was an effort made to close our post in Auckland. That got me into a serious disagreement with Washington. I think that these ideas came from the Director of the Office for Australia-New Zealand Affairs, John Glassman, probably supported by Jim Lilley, the EA Deputy Assistant Secretary.

One day, I received a questionnaire about closing the Consulate General in Auckland. I almost immediately responded with a strong negative answer. The post had existed for 130 years, I said, it was a busy place for both commercial and consular work. To close the post would only mean moving all the functions to Wellington because they could not be eliminated. We would be far more inconvenienced ourselves than would be the New Zealanders. In any case, I thought that it would be a poor political decision because it would be perceived as an anti New Zealand act, regardless how we might paint it. It would just give the Labor Party extremists further fuel for their fire; we would be painted as a "big bully" without gaining any benefit.

Then came another questionnaire, which seemed rather odd to me. It was more detailed than the first one. We filled it out and submitted it again indicating our strong opposition to the closing of the post. I am not sure what happened next, but I do remember that on one of my trips back to Washington for consultations, I was sitting in Mike Armacost's office--he was then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. In the middle of our conversation about New Zealand matters, he asked me whether I really wanted to close Auckland. I was stunned. My reply was not only "No", but "Hell, no!" I told Mike that I had made it as clear as I could in my messages that I strongly objected to the proposal. Mike didn't say anything for a few moments and then said that he had not understood that that was my position. Mike didn't say anything for a few moments and then said that he had not understood that that was my position. The Director for Australia-New Zealand affairs--Glassman--was in the meeting and said absolutely nothing. I never discussed that exchange with him subsequently. I should have. But is was clear to me that my position had been perverted by the EA Bureau in some report to Armacost. I don't know how else Mike would have gotten the idea that I wanted to close Auckland. As far as I know, the post closing idea did not stem from budgetary pressures; those were the days when the Department could still operate at a relatively effective level. So I assume that the rationale for closing Auckland was strictly political--retribution for a New Zealand policy which we found abhorrent. In the final analysis, the post was not closed, which was obviously the sensible decision.

But I must say that this episode made me more leery than ever of the support I was receiving from Glassman. I think he was a supporter, if not instigator, of a very hard line policy toward New Zealand. My view was that we had pushed New Zealand as hard as seemed profitable; I saw no reason to continue the pounding. It wasn't going to change the New Zealand position on nuclear warships. We weren't going to change ours--and rightly so--but I thought the time had come to agree to disagree and let it go at that. No further recriminations were in order, nor would they have accomplished anything positive. I always had the feeling that Glassman wanted to punish the New Zealanders; that seemed to me to be a misguided policy. Any negative action we might take would only have played into the hands of the Labor Party's left wing which would have used any excuse to berate the United States as the "big bully." The left did berate us
whenever it could, but without any major US action, its position did not resonate through the country.

Otherwise, I think I received good backstopping from Washington. After having been in Wellington for a few months and after the New Zealanders passed the legislation that we wanted stopped or amended, I lobbied Washington to develop a public relations campaign. I wanted as many top level Americans as could be found. I wanted them to speak in New Zealand about US policies towards East Asia. People who had sufficient credibility to explain our actions and views. For example, Harry Harding—an outstanding China scholar—came out, Jonathan Pollard from Rand came. We tried to get American participants to foreign policy conferences held in New Zealand. It was a stepped up effort that I really pushed. The Department supported us in this effort.

We did have one unfortunate development, however, as part of this effort. I wanted an authoritative American to come to explain our policy about reducing nuclear weapons around the world, which the Reagan administration had pushed publicly. I wanted to combat the propaganda that some New Zealanders were spreading to the effect that we were the monster that was driving the nuclear arms race. I thought that some education about our position and our actions was in order. We finally managed to get the head of ACDA to agree to come. But at the last minute, we got a message indicating that he had cancelled the trip. I was dismayed. I found out later that the reason for the cancellation was because during one of the Secretary's staff meetings, our ACDA Chief had mentioned that he was planning to go to New Zealand and Australia and he would be discussing our efforts on arms limitations in Auckland. The Secretary immediately told him to cancel his stop in Auckland; he didn't want anyone at that level to go to New Zealand to discuss nuclear weapons issues. It was his policy that senior officers of the US government were not to talk about nuclear and security issues in New Zealand. That view was consistent with Shultz' long held policy that we would not conduct any kind of public dialogue on security issues with New Zealand by anyone above the assistant secretary level. But I think it was a self defeating decision.

Most of the UN issues were handled in New York. The Embassy may have been engaged on a couple of occasions, but New York was the focal points for discussions of UN issues.

I would not wish to leave the impression that we in the Embassy were at odds with Washington. I have mentioned the couple of occasions when we might have worked at cross purposes, but those were rare instances. The policy that I was pursuing in Wellington had been pretty well outlined to me and others by Shultz; so there really wasn't any debate about our strategy in New Zealand. Whenever I returned for consultations, once or twice each year, I would see Armacost. I think that all substantial issues, of which there were very few, reached at least Armacost. We never had any differences; we had known each other for many years. So I cannot complain about the support I received from the Department; the Bureau accommodated my request as best they could. My only reservation, as I have already mentioned, was with Glassman.

I also think that New Zealand was not very high on either the Assistant Secretary's priority list nor the Under Secretary's. Once the ship issue was resolved, no top level people spent time on the
subject. That was alright with me because I really didn't have any major issues on my plate that needed their attention; my actions were basically ministerial, taken to implement a policy that was well established. My major function was simply to explain to the New Zealanders our positions, and I spoke frequently to audiences throughout the country. I put the best possible spin on our position on nuclear warships; it was important that we not be seen as a hard-nose bully who didn't really care about anyone else except ourselves.

The press was relatively objective. They of course had their differences on the nuclear ship issue. The "Evening Post" in Wellington was pro-American; it had a very conservative publisher and editor with whom I got along well. "The Dominion" was somewhat less pro-American, but not provocative. The Auckland "Herald" was pro-American; the Christchurch "Press" which was a very good paper, was reasonably balanced. No newspaper was in the pockets of either of the parties or any factions thereof. I spent as much time as I could with the media because that was a good conduit for our message. I was interviewed many times; I appeared on TV several times; I appeared on radio shows. One time, I went to a small town and appeared on the local radio show. One elderly lady called in and said: "What a nice man Ambassador Cleveland is." That made my day! I was very pleased with that reaction because it showed that we could project an image of a decent country and people. My line was always that I understood the New Zealanders' problem and all I asked in return that they recognize that the US also had a problem. As I said, I spoke as often as I could; I had no shortage of invitations for which I was very thankful.

Whenever I went into the countryside away from the major cities, where I knew we had some sympathy because farmers are innately conservative and those people were chafing under the economic reforms instituted by the government--it had taken away all the agricultural subsidies. I would often start my speeches with the line; "Friends, I want you to know that I have some good news and some bad news. The bad news is that I am from the government and I am here to help you." (groans and hisses). "The good news is that I am not from your government." (loud cheers). I didn't always use that line because it obviously ran some risk of displeasing the Labor government, even though Lange had a good sense of humor, he did not like humor at his own expense. But I enjoyed using that line whenever I could.

I should make it clear that I did not always try to be a nice guy. On the Wellington waterfront, there was a small monument donated by the 2nd Marine Division, which had come ashore during WW II between its engagements on Guadalcanal and Tarawa--two very bloody battles. The division stayed in Wellington for some length of time and left this monument which said: "From the 2nd Marine Division: We will always be here when you need us." The monument got knocked down one day by a truck--accidentally, I believe. It was rebuilt through donations from the 2nd Marine Division veterans. We then planned a ceremony which would be attended by a representative group from the Division. It was all set for a Saturday morning. As I got into my car to drive to the ceremony, I heard the following on the radio: "The Agricultural Minister, Colin Moyle, said today on his return from Tehran that he didn't understand why there was such a fuss about Iran. He found that country to be grand and as far as he could see, was a democracy." That blew my mind. At the monument, I found about thirty US Second Division veterans and their wives, plus some senior New Zealand military officers. So in my remarks at the rededication
ceremony, I included a few unkind words about that radio report. I deplored the thought that any senior representative of a democratic government would go to Iran and declare it a democracy. I found that unbelievable and offensive. I said I thought it was a very sad day for true democracy. My comments got wide and immediate dissemination through the media. I was delighted when Lange later chewed Moyle out publically. It was obviously unacceptable for any member of the government to make such remarks in light of the facts known to the whole world.

I mentioned Antarctica earlier. By treaty, we had cooperative arrangements with many countries that had some interest in that area of the world. Many countries had made territorial claims on Antarctica, but without surrendering the rights we claimed, we agreed not to pursue them. All the signatories agreed to free passage on Antarctica to all peaceful traffic. The US itself has never claimed any specific part of Antarctica, although we have at times suggested that we could claim the whole area.

We also had specific agreements with New Zealand because we used Christchurch as the take off point for our planes that were resupplying our base in Antarctica--McMurdo. We had a small resupply base in Christchurch. Those arrangements had worked well for many years and continued while I was in new Zealand. While planes carrying nuclear weapons were theoretically not allowed to land in New Zealand without the PM's decision as to whether they carried Nukes, there was never any prohibition on our flights for Antarctica; it was in every one's interest to have that operation continue. Lange made it very clear that he was not going to raise any questions about our air traffic in Christchurch. He said that everyone knew that neither the US or anyone else would put nuclear weapons in the "veggies"; i.e. the food stuff and scientific material we were shipping to Antarctica. As far as he was concerned, that was the end of any potential problems about using Christchurch as our resupply point. So we continued to have full cooperation with the New Zealanders, sharing planes and other operations. Their base was near ours in Antarctica, so that there was a synergy which made cooperation very sensible.

In short, our Antarctica arrangement was always a good one and continued without problems--until one day when John Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy arrived. He was a very conservative man, who does not stand very high in my esteem--didn't then and doesn't now. Lehman came loaded for bear. There had been some suggestions made in the past to move our antarctica supply base from Christchurch to Tasmania. The Governor of Tasmania was very anxious to have that happen because the Australians already had their supply base in Tasmania and he thought it would be a dandy idea to have the Americans collocated there. But I didn't think it was a very practical idea; in any case, we had had this long standing arrangement with New Zealand that had worked well for many years and I was strongly opposed to any such move.

Sometime before the Lehman visit, Secretary Shultz had ruled out any move of the re-supply base out of Christchurch; he did not want Antarctica--a scientific endeavor--tied to a political issue like the nuclear warship visit one. But Lehman came; he was determined that he would find some way to bypass the Secretary of State and move the base. He wanted to punish the New Zealanders for their position on "his" Navy's port visits.

I flew to Christchurch to have breakfast with him. New Zealand's Secretary of Defense Dennis
McLean also came and we used his plane to fly to the South island. I was told later that, after
breakfast, Lehman sent a message back to Washington reporting that he had had breakfast with
McLean and Cleveland; he said that the Secretary of Defense was easier to get along with than
the American Ambassador, which was probably true. I told Lehman loud and clear that I was
strongly opposed to moving the supply base out of New Zealand because it was not consistent
with our foreign policy and the explicit directions of the Secretary of State. Lehman left
Christchurch without saying anything about the re-supply base, went to Antarctica and returned
still saying nothing about the re-supply base. Then he went on to Australia and Tasmania, where
he had a meeting with the Governor. After that session, he announced that the US would consider
moving the Christchurch operation to Tasmania. After my breakfast with Lehman, I had issued
special orders to the staff to alert me to anything that he might say on his trip. So, within five
minutes of Lehman's statement, I was called and immediately issued a press statement which
flatly contradicted Lehman's comments--that had been drafted ahead of time as a contingency
item. We said that the Secretary of the Navy does not make foreign policy; that is the
responsibility of the Secretary of State who had already given assurances that the Christchurch
base would not be moved. Fortunately, this internal US squabble only got page 6 coverage,
saying that "US Ambassador refutes comments by US Secretary of the Navy." Fortunately it did
not draw much attention in New Zealand and that was the last we ever heard of moving the
Christchurch base. By giving it our immediate response, the story became a non-story, thereby
denying the left a new issue to batter the US. That enabled us to move on the path we had set: get
along with New Zealand and cool down the rhetoric that our differences on nuclear warship visits
had created.

I did visit Antarctica myself. The US Ambassador to New Zealand had some special
responsibilities for that area, although it was practically no work load whatsoever. I was
designated to sign on behalf of the US a protocol to the Antarctica Treaty, that placed some tough
environmental restrictions on operations in Antarctica. Most of the other countries did not sign it;
so that the protocol was never promulgated.

In general, I found a competent American staff in New Zealand. A post like Wellington does not
attract the cream of the crop, but I was satisfied with my staff. The DCM when I arrived--Dick
Teare--was a good officer; he was replaced by Al LaPorta, who was was an exceptional manager
and I felt very comfortable having him run the Embassy on a day-to-day basis leaving me time to
do the public relations business and the high level contacts. In between those two, I had a DCM
for a short period of time--John Penfold. He was an economic officer; I don't think he was very
happy in Wellington, and he left after about a year to go to Honduras. Most of the people from
the other agencies were also quite satisfactory. There were some minor problems, but they were
very minor. We didn't have any "stars", but I think the staff was quite good. I was very pleased
when we were inspected--I think this was 1988. As a result, I got a letter from the Secretary
saying that Wellington was one of the five best posts of one hundred or so that had been
inspected that year. I already felt good because the inspectors before leaving for their next post
had told me informally that morale in New Zealand was among the best they had ever seen. I
credit that to several factors: 1) I was the first professional Ambassador in many years and I spent
a lot of time walking around the Chancery talking to both American and local employees. I think
that was well received; 2) I used to go out with some of the local employees to sporting events;
that was also appreciated; and 3) the substantive and rhetorical approach we took was effective.

I should comment a little about New Zealanders' views of the world. They are simultaneously global and provincial. New Zealand is a small country located at the edge of the map. Just that situation alone explains why they viewed the world differently than we did. An Australian historian once wrote about the "tyranny of distance." That meant that in the beginning, because they were distant, Australia and New Zealand clung to England--the motherland. Neither country developed its national identity until after WW II, when it became clear that England could no longer protect the "colonies." Both countries tried to turn to the US but we were not psychologically inclined to play the "mother protector" role that England had. So New Zealand was left to its own devices, far away from the rest of the world. It then developed its own sense of nationalism, which became the foundation for its independent policy on nuclear weapons. New Zealand also wanted to be recognized at the same time as an important global player. This posed a real dilemma for New Zealand. It wanted to be important but it was "off the map." One of their policy decisions which tried to accommodate their situation was the "nuclear free zone" concept they promoted. More broadly, New Zealand took a highly responsible global approach. It sends more troops to support UN peace keeping operations than almost any other country. It has observers as part of the Observer Force in the Sinai. It sent troops to Somalia, Bosnia and many other places where peacekeeping was required. So along with their provincial "nationalism," New Zealanders have a sense of global responsibility, rooted in a real sense of where they are geographically. They will sacrifice for the maintenance of peace throughout the world, in part on the assumption that if they need help at some time, the world will repay them. I think that their policy on nuclear warships was an exception to their general willingness to participate positively in world affairs.

**ALPHONSE F. LA PORTA**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  

*Ambassador La Porta was born and raised in New York and educated at Georgetown and New York Universities. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965. During his career the ambassador had several assignments in Washington in the personnel and administrative field. His foreign assignments include Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, New Zealand, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission, and Naples, Italy. In 1997 he was named Ambassador to Mongolia, where he served until 2000. Ambassador La Porta was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.*

**Q: From '87 to?**

LA PORTA: ‘87 to ‘91. There was a little window in there when one of the efforts of the personnel bureau was to lengthen tours of duty. This was something that everybody pretty much applauded. For about a year or a little more in 1986-87 people were being assigned at the senior
levels, counselors of embassies and DCMs in the “developed countries for four years instead of three. Tours were lengthened as well for hardship tours in non-security sensitive locations generally to three years instead of two except for more junior officers and staff personnel who continued to have two year rotations. New Zealand was an interesting kettle of fish at that time because most people don’t associate New Zealand with a lot of emotion or activity, but in 1985 a Labor government was elected to power and David Lange became the prime minister, thereby beginning the battle over nuclear policy.

Consequently New Zealand said no, I’m sorry, unless you have a policy which tells us whether you have nuclear weapons onboard your ships or whether your ships are nuclear powered. That is a declaratory policy, not just “neither confirm nor deny” (NCND) or whispering in their ears. Without some degree of ambiguity, we would not allow U.S. warships or military aircraft to come to New Zealand. That led to a brouhaha to suspend the ANZUS pact insofar as New Zealand was concerned. Today this is still a very serious matter between the United States and Australia on one hand and New Zealand on the other.

Q: Could you give us a brief description of the Embassy staffing when you arrived?

LA PORTA: Wellington was a typical middle-size embassy with four functional State sections (Pol, Econ, Cons, Admin/GSO), a commercial attaché, an agricultural attaché, and a defense attaché office with two military officers (Navy and Air Force). We had a consulate-general with three officers, mainly for consular work in Auckland, New Zealand’s largest city, and a consular agent in Christchurch on the South Island, mainly to take care of visa inquiries and assistance to U.S. tourists. Paul Cleveland, a career officer (one of the rare ones to New Zealand), was chief of mission in 1987-89 and he was replaced by Della Newman, a real estate broker from Seattle, in 1990-91.

Q: From what I gather I was talking to somebody rather recently on one of these interviews who was dealing with East Asia and was saying that New Zealand is almost off the map as far as timing on military things and all that.

LA PORTA: Well, it is except, and there are always exceptions, New Zealand has contributed special forces troops to Iraq, they had several hundred special forces troops at one time in Afghanistan, and they have supplied aircraft, ships and specialists, like medical and telecommunications personnel, for the Gulf patrol force. This was after the 1991 Gulf War and later. They have tried to do things to oblige us in areas that skirt around the nuclear policy; this was true under Labor governments as well as the National Party which was openly pro-U.S.

Q: It’s becoming embedded in its political, its politics, no party can play with that. Is that right?

LA PORTA: New Zealand beginning in the ‘60s fancied itself as “clean, green and nuclear free.” We used to say, only half in jest, that New Zealand was the westward extension of the protest movements in California. If all the leftists in “la la land” wanted a nice haven to go to, they’d just go to New Zealand. There were in fact several hundred of war resisters during the ‘60s and ‘70s who did go to New Zealand. Many academics took up residence there because of their difference
of opinion with successive U.S. administrations on war issues and during the Reagan years as there is today under President Bush, George W. Bush, a real hatred of the United States. This ameliorated somewhat under Papa Bush, George H. W. Bush, because he was seen as an eminently reasonable person.

In 1991, soon after my departure from Wellington Bush basically threw out the “neither confirm nor deny” policy by saying that we’re removing all nuclear weapons from warships, thus ending the nuclear weapon programs on our warships, except for nuclear powered warships. The cause celebre, let’s put it that way, largely disappeared, but it was too late. The estrangement had already occurred. New Zealand does stand up rather well, however, even despite the rhetoric of the leftist Labor governments there and the current Prime Minister Helen Clark. They also have expertise in intelligence areas that are significant, if not important, to us. For example, they do a good job in intelligence and in the analysis of information pertaining to the Pacific Islands. They also have some technical intelligence assets that are significant to us.

Although they’re very lacking in some capabilities because the defense budget is very low, the armed forces do have a very high standing in training and expertise. So the New Zealanders said there are some things that we can do that you don’t want to do or find it politically inconvenient such as interventions or peace monitoring in various kinds of situations. They did participate in the peace monitoring in East Timor. They have brokered political stand-downs in Vanuatu and Papua, New Guinea and also in the Solomon Islands, but yet they remain politically estranged from us and from the Australians. The paradox is that beginning in the late ‘80s there was a determined campaign to promote New Zealand’s economic interrelationships with Australia. Today there is a virtual common market between the two. Now fast forward to 2004, the United States signed a free trade agreement with Australia and now New Zealand is kind of an appendage of that. The question is when and whether the United States is going to have a free trade agreement with New Zealand itself to cover all the other areas where there is important trade to us. This is nearly 20 years later and the question of NCND and the nuclear policy still bedevils U.S. attitudes in that many of the people in the George W. Bush administration today were in the second Reagan administration or the George H. W. Bush administration and they remember the wrangling on the political level with New Zealand and don’t have a good taste for it.

Q: Well, let’s go to 1987. When you went out to New Zealand, what was the status at that time and what were you doing there?

LA PORTA: The status at that time is that the United States had formally suspended any security obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty. Mil-to-mil relations were suspended in almost all respects although there were certain aspects of a liaison relationship that did survive, especially in the intelligence area. There was from the New Zealand point of view an “agreement to disagree” on the issue of nuclear policy. We never accepted that there was an “agreement to disagree” and Ambassador Cleveland and to a lesser extent his successor, a political appointee from Washington State, Ambassador Della Newman, were determined to maintain the United States position, together with the Australians, against the New Zealand nuclear policy. Paul Cleveland, who is a good and close friend to this day, very often took a strong public line and
disagreed. There was a lot of public wrangling with the likes of David Lange and other leftist politicians.

This also ran up against the New Zealanders’ sense of nationalism and independence. As an almost cast-off from the empire, colonized by very stalwart Scots and English settlers from the North of England, these people had a very independent strain and self-reliance. Indeed they deserve credit for basically turning very inhospitable and remote islands into a place that is extremely livable.

Q: I understand there is a very strong strain that came out from that area of the Labor movement, the British labor movement with sort of a Tony Benn labor types. If you’re labor class, that’s what you are and anyone else are capitalists and they’re your enemy.

LA PORTA: Yes, I think that the original settlers of New Zealand were either small holders, the landless sons of the minor gentry, or were people who were just simply landless like coal miners. In New Zealand they met the Maori population which made it very interesting. My wife was an attorney and she worked with the law firms that did a lot of work on Maori land and similar issues. All in all, it’s a place that prides itself on its rectitude in a very Scot’s Presbyterian way. New Zealanders are wonderfully opinionated. They’re not easily led in any direction. They just have this fierceness of spirit that maybe you find among small countries that are fairly isolated. New Zealand in a lot of these respects estranged themselves from the Australians. There’s a lot of Aussie bashing that goes on. This has been ameliorated only a little bit by the Closer Economic Relations agreements between the two and a lot of cross investment, but the Australian character is very different is very different from the New Zealand character.

Q: I remember hearing just about this time the Australian ambassador came to DACOR House and gave a talk. He made one remark almost to the side, well, we don’t want to make the same problem with immigration that the New Zealanders have and not get a bunch of pro-left wing laborites coming there. They sort of screw the country up.

LA PORTA: That may be an Australian conservative party position; yes, I can see that being said, but Australian laborites certainly would not agree with that. I think also the New Zealand’s isolation or relative encapsulation as a little island country also allows its intelligencia to indulge in flights of fancy that may not appear to be real world from the U.S. point of view or perhaps an Australian point of view. The Australians made a threshold decision roughly in the 1980s that they were going to live in Asia. The New Zealanders are still undecided about where they live. Their immigration policies – these were the years when you had Cambodian refugees, Vietnamese refugees and all kinds of immigration from other places in Asia – were very “pro-white” and they accepted only those people who had superior intellectual skills, occupations that were needed, or had lots of money to bring. I think that there was an attitude in New Zealand, that we don’t want our society to change too much, and they are proud of this little bit of arrogance. I may be overly critical because we had wonderful associations there and it was a fabulous place to live. We enjoyed every minute of it and, with the exception of Naples, we had the nicest housing and living and working conditions.
Q: I understand Sundays can be a time of boredom living there.

LA PORTA: It used to be that Sundays, all shops but the little dairy stores were closed. The dairies were little 7-11 type shops. Many of them were run by Indian immigrants. No supermarkets were open in 1987 when we arrived. The pastry shops also were closed. You have to scrabble around if you wanted to go out for dinner on a Sunday evening and only a few places were open during the day. There was no alcohol at all after 11:00 in the evening. Even the bars until 1985 used to close at 9:00 pm. All of that really changed during the period that we were there, so along about 1989-91 greed set in. Super market chains arrived. Big shopping malls began to appear and so people said, there’s money to be made on Sunday. All of a sudden life in the major cities changed.

Now, life out in the small towns today is still just as it was in the ‘80s and as it was in the ‘50s, but I think that the globalization of communications, the media, easy availability of telephone communications, etc. made an enormous difference in New Zealand because people just became connected. Once they became connected, they wanted to do what everybody else did. They wanted to watch the same movies; they wanted to enjoy the same kind of lifestyles, etc. So today in the small towns and the rural areas, life is much the same as it was even in the ‘50s. In the cities there is a lot of ferment and change as modern merchandising and the consumer economy have kicked in.

Q: Well, Al when you were there were the New Zealand young people taking their year and gong to Europe and the United States because the Australians were certainly doing this in spades.

LA PORTA: It’s called the OE, the overseas experience, indeed that still is a tradition today. They take usually the post university year or they’ll take a year off between the first year in college and the second year. The immigration laws in Europe, not only the UK, but also the EU in general allows them to do that. It’s a little bit more difficult for the U.S. because we’ve tightened up so much.

Q: But at the time you were there they were able to come to the United States?

LA PORTA: Yes, except that our visa laws did not easily allow people to work. I remember the case of a daughter of a friend of ours who was quite a wealthy well known businessman. She arrived somewhere on the West Coast and the immigration officer said, where are you going young lady? Well, I’m going to go to Vail or Aspen to work as a ski instructor. Oops, she was sent back.

Q: You were there during ‘89, ‘90 and so on when the Soviet Union fell apart and Eastern Europe did and you mentioned that the universities, from what you were saying I gather that there was a strong leftist Marxist element among the faculty and all that. The Marxist god pretty well died at that time.

LA PORTA: They were very unhappy about it because there was a lot of what I would call fashionable leftism, if not arrogance, that was manifested in intellectual circles in New Zealand.
It was very interesting that all of a sudden, and not only because of Gorbachev and the great world events, but the Russian embassy even began to become accessible. They decided that they wanted to be loved. They had an ambassador who spoke pretty good English and who had been the secretary of Andre Gromyko, so he had considerable international experience. Gromyko had died. He died suddenly.

*Q: He ended up as the president of the Soviet Union.*

LA PORTA: Yes, for a short while, but I think the ambassador had joined the foreign ministry by then. He was a nice man, but I think he looked around and said, Glasnost! I better get out and meet people. The Russians began to be friendly where they hadn’t been friendly before. Interestingly the Chinese also began to loosen up. All of a sudden the Chinese were giving dinners for Americans or for New Zealanders they were never open to before. Our embassy, in addition to that what we did in Wellington and our consulate general in Auckland, also was responsible for Samoa and several other of the Pacific Islands. Our embassy in Fiji was responsible for Tonga, but we were responsible for Western Samoa and the Cook Islands and Niue, which is a tiny bit of New Zealand protectorate.

*Q: Like Guadalcanal and the Solomons...?*

LA PORTA: In the Solomons, we had a one man embassy there at that time, to the extent that there was involvement in the Solomons, the lines went more to Australia or Papua New Guinea where we had an embassy. Samoa, the Cook Islands and these other bits of places provided another window to the world or window to another world. We enjoyed our association with Samoa. The ambassador was accredited to Western Samoa. I would go up twice a year and the ambassador would go up twice a year. Other officers would go up once or twice a year and we maintained a reporting program on domestic developments and multilateral affairs. Finally we established a one-officer post there that was responsible to us. It was branch embassy, we called it. As DCM I was responsible for setting up the branch post, dealing with the officer that we had stationed there. Supporting the little post, which had classified fax and telephone communications, was a challenge. We provided most of the material and administrative support for Samoa.

*Q: Did it have another name before? The Pacific battles, I never heard, I’m familiar with most, the Pacific war battles. Where is it located?*

LA PORTA: I particularly found the cultures of the islands interesting and you had this Maori-Samoan overlap. We became very fond of Hawaii for a lot of those same cultural reasons. The Cook Islands were fascinating. They were little bit of islands that decided to become an offshore financial haven. They got into trouble of course as all such places do when they try to make a quick buck. It was a tight little island with a missionary-based culture, very straight-laced, but there were very interesting things there. In Samoa we had particularly good relations with a couple of the prime ministers. We paid what attention we could. We got the military involved with disaster relief. There was always some disaster going on in the Pacific because of storms or drought or other kinds of bad things. I continued my interest in Pacific
Island affairs when I was asked to do some work with the Asian Development Bank to set up economic reform regimes for Micronesia, Palau and the Marshall Islands.

Q: I take it that New Zealand was a friendly place to be, or did anti-Americanism come up from time to time?

LA PORTA: Anti-Americanism was certainly an annoyance, every couple of weeks or so it seemed that someone was raising some kind of issue. Either a controversy brewed up in parliament or something provoked by the government. Prime Minister David Lange, party leader Helen Clark, or another leftist minister wanted to stick it in our eye. That always required a response and public opinion management. Upon my departure the prime minister presented me with an original drawing of a man about to jump out of an open window into an abyss and there was a little kiwi nudging the person on. The person in the window looked a lot like me, but from the back, and it was pretty clear as to who it was. By that time New Zealand had a conservative prime minister, Jim Bolger, and I can tell you it was some frustration even when the government changed and the National Party came into power after the Labor government wore itself out. The election was in 1990 and the National Party came to power; Jim Bolger who in retirement later became ambassador to the United States, became prime minister. We had expectations that now is the chance to change the anti-nuclear policy, to get some other basis of dealing with New Zealand and to find a pragmatic way to bring the relationship back together. It was four years after the battle over the anti-nuclear policy, but the National Party found itself unable to really change the policy. We were able to incrementally resume some aspects of defense cooperation; then by the time of the Gulf War in 1991, the New Zealanders did commit ships and did send several aircraft in conjunction with the Australians. The New Zealand Air Force provided air crews to Australia to fly Australian planes. They sent a telecommunications unit to serve with the United States on the ground in the Gulf. Those were really major developments on the part of the National government and they stepped up to the plate.

Q: Was there opposition from the labor side?

LA PORTA: There was indeed. I think that their calculation was that their opposition wasn’t fatal in terms of suspending all relations, so later on when Afghanistan came around, even the Labor government found it in its own interest to make a contribution to the coalition. It took a lot of dialogue with the New Zealanders to try to do things that were pragmatic and reasonable. In terms of the intellectual acumen of the people that we were dealing with, even people with whom we disagreed violently, they were always pretty good. I used to love to go to universities and get into a good wrangle over globalism, what’s going on in the world and changes in the Soviet Union. I liked to do a lot of speaking and I did that as well as the Rotary and Lions clubs.

Q: Did CINCPAC make any visits?

LA PORTA: No. One of the consequences of the anti-nuclear policy was that CINCPAC would not come. It took another 15 years for CINCPAC to decide to make a visit to New Zealand. We also had another challenging and interesting area of cooperation – Antarctica. The National Science Foundation and the U.S. Navy programs in Antarctica had support bases in Christchurch.
on the South Island. Now Antarctica has been totally civilianized and the Navy is no longer involved. I went down to Scott Base in 1988 and had a fascinating experience. We had a lot to do with the policy level of the National Science Foundation and other agencies back here in Washington. As DCM I was the “point person” for the working level contacts with the scientists and the U.S. Navy logistical support people.

Q: Was Greenpeace doing things?

LA PORTA: Oh, yes.

Q: Because that’s where the French actually blew up a Greenpeace ship, didn’t they?

LA PORTA: Yes, the Rainbow Warrior.

Q: That wasn’t during your time was it?

LA PORTA: No, that was earlier. That was in 1984.

Q: What were they doing? Was that a problem for us at all?

LA PORTA: Not really. It was a French problem and it estranged the New Zealanders from the French for a long time. Whether it was Green Peace, Amnesty International, or any of these people, they were rabidly anti-nuclear, so they all sided and aided and abetted the New Zealand leftists. Greenpeace sent annual expeditions to Antarctica and they made a specialty of criticizing the U.S. Navy and anybody else they could find for having contributed to the environmental degradation of Antarctica. All of that was total 100% grandstanding. These people would sneak over to Scott Base at night. They would come into the snack bars and use the U.S. Navy facilities. The Navy’s view was not to antagonize them unduly and allowed them to use some facilities, they brought their own trash from their campsites and it was dumped in the U.S. Navy facilities. Tell me who was doing what to whom down there.

Q: What about lambs and wool?

LA PORTA: Love lambs and wool. I still love New Zealand lamb to this day. Meat exports are always and still are an issue. New Zealand farmers – I think this goes back to their doggedly independent nature – were fiscally tight, going back to England in the mid 19th Century where most of them came from. They are incredibly efficient farmers, whether its wool or sheep meat, dairy products, or kiwi fruit. New Zealanders invented the commercial cultivation of the Chinese gooseberry known as the kiwi fruit. When they did it, they did it superbly and they also produced other kinds of unique produce.

The green lipped oyster industry began on the South coast of the South Island of New Zealand. Very cold, very deep cultivation of the green lipped mussels which are now a significant export to the United States. They’re in our restaurants. New Zealanders are very good at these kinds of things. They’re clever, they’re efficient, they’re scientifically sound, they know how to do it. Of
course this compares with the vastly less efficient system of agricultural subsidies and vastly less efficient market systems that we have in the United States, so that the New Zealand meat board and the New Zealand dairy board run circles around even the best United States companies in agricultural marketing. The New Zealanders of course have always had the potential of greatly increasing their meat and dairy exports to the United States except for the limitations that we place on them.

What’s happened over the decades since I served in New Zealand is that these restrictions have been loosened considerably although still fairly tight limits still remain on the importation of sheep meat or lamb of various kinds. This is why New Zealand lamb in most restaurants or in the supermarkets costs considerably above the American product. I always used to maintain that the two products were vastly different because what the American lamb producers are selling as leg of lamb comes from essentially a two year old animal. What the New Zealanders are selling as leg of lamb comes from less than a one year old animal. There’s no comparison between the two.

Q: Was this a battle that you were having to fight at the embassy?

LA PORTA: Not necessarily a battle. My neighbor was an official of the meat board and we used to find ways to cooperate and collude. Basically we all had to contend with the protectionist forces in the United States. I think that we over the years I think that the State Department and the embassies have done a good, pragmatic job of trying to bring people closer together. If and when we do get around to negotiating a free trade agreement, meat and dairy exports to the United States will be front and center.

Q: How about what we were exporting from the United States. Were there tariffs or controls?

LA PORTA: In terms of U.S. exports?

Q: Were we selling stuff?

LA PORTA: Well, we did butt heads in the beef market in Japan and Korea. The New Zealanders also exported significant quantities of beef, about one-fifth of the quantity of Australian beef that went into the Asian markets. What you had was the U.S. exports of beef butting heads against the Australian exporters of beef in Northern Asian and Southeast Asian markets, too, because McDonald’s hamburgers were very much in demand in Bangkok, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. The question was: was that product going to come from Australia or from the U.S.? Very little of it came from New Zealand because New Zealand produced higher quality range-fed beef. Those issues still remain because U.S. producers aim at the domestic U.S. market not over there. When they do, they want to export highly specialized high quality products.

Q: Kobe beef?

LA PORTA: Kobe beef to Japan. This farmer’s company in Arkansas is now stymied by the U.S. Department of Agriculture because they’re prohibited from testing each animal for mad cow
disease.

_Q: How did you find the media there? I was thinking the British media especially, it is pretty irresponsible compared to ours._

LA PORTA: We always felt they were pretty irresponsible. But they were no more irresponsible, I suppose, than anyone else. I think the media, generally speaking, was inward looking. The anti-nuclear policy was the one delight that they had and international news largely took a back seat in terms of their newspaper reporting. On the other hand this has changed with the globalization of communications, including the internet and television.

I would say that with regard to the media and the quality thereof, I think that the television and to some extent the newspapers improved in the late '80s and in the early '90s because of the globalization of the media and the fact that New Zealanders, whether they liked it or not, were being drawn into the world more fully than they had been before by the worldwide events that they were able to see.

_Q: I would imagine that the Gulf War and the hour by hour coverage of it would be a major almost event in the country, wasn’t it?_  

LA PORTA: During the Gulf War, we had a CNN feed and I used to have a good friend who was the special assistant to the prime minister, Jim Bolger. I knew they were having their staff meetings at 8:30 every morning and I would call him about 8:15 and say, Rob, here’s the latest thing I’m seeing on CNN on the Gulf War. This is what’s going on and you can tell your boss during the morning meeting. It took them a bit to fully wire the New Zealand government offices for global TV, but we were very lucky that we had access to CNN right away and BBC right in our office. I could sit at my desk and watch it all live, talk to my friend on the phone and give him the latest news that they would probably get in another hour or so anyway.

_Q: One last question on this unless you think of something else you want to talk about. How about these two cities, Wellington and Auckland on the same Northern island. How did this play for running an embassy?_  

LA PORTA: We had the consulate general in Auckland and as DCM it was my responsibility. Almost 80% of its functions were American citizens protection, visas and similar consular issues. Auckland was at one end of the Northern island and Wellington at the southern end. I used to go to Auckland frequently and had a good relationship with the consul general and folks there. We used to visit the universities in the north because most of them were either in Wellington or around Auckland or a little bit West of there. We had a consular agent in Christchurch.

_Q: That’s on the southern island?_  

LA PORTA: On the South Island. At one time we had a consulate in Christchurch and then it was reduced to a USIS post and then we closed that out and we had a consular agent. The South Island has about 30% of the population of New Zealand the bigger land area than the North
Island. It has some of the most wonderful resorts that you’d ever want to visit, like Queenstown, the Milford Trek and Fjordland. A lot of these areas are becoming well known now because of Lord of the Rings.

Q: Movies like Lord of the Rings that shows that magnificent scenery.

LA PORTA: Yes. It truly is magnificent. We enjoyed traveling anywhere in New Zealand, the South island, East Coast, West Coast; all over the North island. It was just a wonderful place just to get out and tramp in the wilderness or go up to a little park area, spend a day or a couple of days. It was really superb and “clean and green as well as nuclear free.” My wife also found it professionally rewarding there. She was admitted to the New Zealand bar. She took the New Zealand bar examination and she became a licensed attorney and she worked on some land cases for the Maori, privatization of railway housing and other environmental issues that were very interesting. It got us well into the legal circles as well with the Waitangi Tribunal which is the indigenous peoples court.

Q: Was there any problem or criticism about the white only immigration policy because this is a time that you mentioned before of great movement because of the wars and changing in Asia. You had Indochina heading out and you had Chinese trying to get out of Hong Kong and a lot of this stuff going on.

LA PORTA: The New Zealanders rationalized it in two ways. Number one, their annual intake of immigration from Asia, i.e., non-white, was about 1,200 a year. Later on that went up to maybe 1,700 a year. There was still free immigration from the UK, but there was nil immigration from Europe. I mean you’d have an occasional German or you had someone who had a family member, or an Israeli even who had a family member, in New Zealand. The only other significant source of immigration was from South Africa. People really feared the instability post-apartheid and maybe 50 or 100 South African families came every year.

Q: They weren’t trying to fill up their country the way the Australians were essentially trying to build up their country.

LA PORTA: Not at all. I think the New Zealanders felt that in order to maintain the standards of their society and the social system, they could not afford to take in large numbers of migrants annually. They wanted to make sure that the migrants that they took in, except for some humanitarian cases, were largely people who could pay or could contribute in a real way to New Zealand society. That included some Americans. We had American family members of people who were in New Zealand who migrated to New Zealand and had to pass the same tests and occupational requirements as anybody else. It’s hard to say whether you look at the New Zealand experience as excessively protective, but maybe for the small size of the country and population it may have been a prudent measure.

On the other hand, the New Zealanders were extremely aggressive and generous in doing humanitarian things with refugee populations elsewhere or humanitarian relief in Timor or anywhere where there were issues. Let’s say the humanitarian impulse with New Zealanders to
go elsewhere and do good was certainly great in proportion to the size of its population.

Q: Did you by any chance get involved in the case of from our area here there was an American, you know the case I’m referring to. Could you tell what it was?

LA PORTA: I’ve forgotten the lady’s name. This was the case where a woman basically kidnapped her child and spirited her to New Zealand and the child lived with the grandmother and grandfather in Christchurch.

Q: The child’s father was alleged by the wife to have been sort of like a pedophile, which was never proved.

LA PORTA: Never proved.

Q: It smacked of family problems.

LA PORTA: His alleged mistreatment of her was never adequately proved in court and she lost on several appeals in the courts here in DC. She just simply spirited the child off and the child lived undercover in Christchurch and then finally the mother joined them in New Zealand and they came out into the open. Basically the child was under the protection of the New Zealand courts. As soon as it became evident what was going on, the New Zealand courts stepped in and, to their credit, they took an absolutely impartial stance and said, we have no interest in this affair except for the interest of the child. New Zealand law, in terms of protection of children’s rights, is very clear. I mean there’s no wiggle room in it and the court in all of its procedures in Christchurch acted with absolute impeccability. The New Zealanders just did everything right and said this is fundamentally not our problem. If you’ve got a legal problem in the United States, the legal problem is there, not here. The United States had no grounds on which to request that the child be returned to the United States, etc. and I’m not sure as to the ultimate consequence.

Q: The child is back here now.

LA PORTA: The child is back here and I think is now a teenager.

Q: Did that involve the embassy at all?

LA PORTA: It did only tangentially only because the New Zealand laws and legal procedures were crystal clear. There were no grounds for the U.S. courts or either parent to try to compel the return of the child to the United States, so the question simply didn’t arise. We filed consular reports on the case and our consular officer under New Zealand law had controlled access to the child. Their attempt was to shield the child from any kind of public involvement. The whole thing was very discreet. Our consular officer did have complete access to the courts’ lawyers who were acting on behalf of the child and we had a very good relationship. It was good testimony to our consular officer, Rob Callard, who did it very well.
Q: In many posts the DCM is the senior personnel officer. Did you take a strong hand in filling Embassy positions as they came open?

LA PORTA: During my four years in Wellington, I had a hand in virtually every personnel action, whether U.S. or FSN (Foreign Service National). It was important at a relatively small post like ours that each officer or staffer pull her/his weight and be compatible with others. We also wanted people who were really motivated to work in New Zealand which was not really a high-profile place.

Q: Well, then is there anything else we should discuss about New Zealand?

LA PORTA: Well, other than it was a superb place to be and it was a great privilege.

PHILLIP R. MAYHEW
East Asia Bureau, Australia and New Zealand Affairs

Philip R. Mayhew was born in California in 1934. He graduated from Princeton University in 1956 and served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1957-1959. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961 and served in Laos, Congo, Vietnam, Thailand, Jordan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Mayhew was interviewed on May 26, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Then what did you do?

MAYHEW: I was country director for New Zealand and Australia for a year. Dan O'Donohue, who had become ambassador to Thailand and whom I had worked with before, said that he would like me to take over the Thai desk if I could. So I was only on the Australia/New Zealand desk for a year.

Q: That would be ’88 to ’89.

MAYHEW: ’88 to ’89, then I took over the Thai desk. In ANZ it was a quiet period. A visit by Hawke to the US had taken place just before I took over.

Q: Hawke was the Prime Minister?

MAYHEW: Hawke was the Prime Minister of Australia. Relations with New Zealand were as relations with New Zealand have been for a long time, friendly, but on a security level still rather acerbic.

Q: Prickly.
MAYHEW: Prickly, yes. At that time the New Zealanders had not really been forgiven, particularly by the American military, for their anti-nuclear policy. It was one of those cases where the New Zealanders had been such close friends that their subsequent attitudes were really taken as a betrayal by many people. And, of course, you had the situation where people in the USG thought that they had been lied to by Mr. Lange, which is yet another complication. You still had people in the US government then that had been involved in negotiations with Lange.

Q: Lange was Labor?

MAYHEW: Lange was the Labor Prime Minister.

Some people involved thought that Lange was not only a rather nasty piece of work, but a man who did and would lie to them. I don't know the truth of this because I wasn't around for it. It was before my time, but I do know people who felt very strongly. I think probably external circumstances have now made New Zealand's nuclear attitude less important.

Of course the real importance of New Zealand attitudes was the possible influence on attitudes in Australia. The Australians were more concerned about what we might do vis-a-vis New Zealand than anyone else.

KEITH P. MCCORMICK  
Political Counselor  

Keith P. McCormick was born in California in 1944. He attended the University of California-Berkeley, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy as well as the University of Geneva. He served in the US Air Force before joining the Foreign Service. Overseas McCormick served in Luxembourg, South Africa, Thailand, and New Zealand. McCormick was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Wellington. You went there in '91, and I guess maybe it has gotten a little better, but our relations weren't the greatest with New Zealand at that time were they?

MCCORMICK: They were terrible at that time, unfortunately. Historically, of course, they had been very close, but they had been strained badly by the dispute over ANZUS and nuclear ships.

Q: Who was our ambassador at that time?


Q: How big was our embassy at that time?
MCCORMICK: It was a great deal bigger than it is now. The political section had five or six people. That was driven mostly by the perceived importance at the time of the ANZUS (Australia / New Zealand / U.S. Treaty) question, though we also had a lot of work to do because of the extensive scientific contacts that we had, including cooperation in Antarctica. Most U.S. operations in Antarctica go through New Zealand and we do them jointly with New Zealanders. Ironically, since the U.S. Navy supported that, we had political/military work to do coordinating that at the same time we had cut off every other sort of military contact because of the nuclear flap. New Zealand was also president of the U.N. Security Council at that time, and very active in UN affairs. I shouldn’t think it would be anything like that size today.

Q: What was the political situation in Wellington when you arrived?

MCCORMICK: New Zealand was in the midst of a very difficult experiment in radical economic reform. It had always been an almost Scandinavian social democracy. Very high living standards; an extensive welfare system. That all came to a halt in the ‘80s after the European Union started cutting back on Britain’s ability to give preference to New Zealand exports.

Q: You’re talking about butter and-

MCCORMICK: Butter, lamb, these kinds of things. A very trade-dependent country. So the New Zealanders were simply running out of the money to fund this extremely generous social system and this very comfortable and stable society. They decided on a radical transformation of their economy. They abandoned all their subsidies and began to privatize everything. It was very much like Newt Gingrich’s “contract with America.”

Q: My understanding was that New Zealand had a lot of people who came out of the labor side from the British Isles and they brought labor class war, and workers’ take-over of industry.

MCCORMICK: They had a very important labor movement. When I was there we had a fulltime labor officer. But there wasn’t the labor militancy that you might find in Australia. New Zealand and Australia are extremely different. There are virtually no class differences in New Zealand, it’s the most egalitarian country I have ever seen, completely unlike the United States with our extremes of wealth and poverty. There’s also little of the Australian sense of wanting to prove they’re just as good as anyone. Minimal class distinction, job security, generous social services – it was rather a matter of taking these things for granted than of fighting for them, because they already had them. So things worked very well while there was enough money coming in, but the global terms of trade were turning against them and they also found that as a First World country in the Third World South Pacific, too many foreigners were coming in to take advantage of free services. Their hospital system was being swamped by South Pacific islanders who came there for free medical care. They called a sudden halt to all of this, ended a lot of their subsidies cold turkey, and began a radical experiment with free market theories. Ironically, although U.S. conservatives were so interested in it, this experiment in New Zealand was begun by the Labor Party.

Q: This was just before you got there?
MCCORMICK: This was just before I got there. When we arrived, they were on the downside of the curve. There was a lot of unemployment, a lot of worries. By the time we left they were enjoying the upside. It had all worked out very well. New Zealand had reformed its economy. They had paid off their external debt; they were prospering.

**Q:** When you got there, what was the American policy toward New Zealand and New Zealand policy towards the United States?

MCCORMICK: We were in a bitter dispute over what we called our policy of NCND – that we would neither confirm nor deny whether U.S. warships carried nuclear arms when they would dock in a friendly port. That formula was a very subtle and important thing in places like Australia and Japan, because it allowed host governments whose people were very anti-nuclear to sort of look the other way. You can imagine how some Japanese would feel if we acknowledged that a ship in Tokyo harbor carried atomic bombs. New Zealanders are a little too blunt and honest to appreciate that kind of subtlety, and they kind of made themselves the skunk at the picnic by insisting on knowing one way or the other. They required all ships to declare that they had nothing nuclear, and the U.S. was unwilling to do that and unwilling to guarantee it would defend New Zealand if it couldn’t set the rules for sending its ships there. The Navy feared that if New Zealand got away with this not-in-my-back-yard approach, arrangements in Japan could really come unraveled. So New Zealand was suspended from the ANZUS alliance and we cut off all high level political and military contact.

**Q.** What did you think about this?

MCCORMICK: I thought the estrangement was outdated and absurd. By the time I arrived, it wasn’t important any longer to be able to send our ships into New Zealand harbors. The Cold War had ended, President Bush had taken the nuclear missiles off our ships. I was concerned that the whole thing had degenerated into an argument over pride, over which side would acknowledge first that we didn’t really need to keep on feuding.

**Q.** How did it start?

MCCORMICK: I’m afraid my hero, Secretary Shultz, mishandled it. Before this all blew up, we used to have regular consultations with the Australians and New Zealanders. Worked with them very closely. When Shultz arrived for those talks in 1986, New Zealand had just elected a Labor government, and Shultz was pushing them to promise that they wouldn’t change their policy on this NCND issue. It was just the wrong moment to do so. They had just come into power and they were completely preoccupied with an internal crisis of their own because they were facing a sudden and major foreign currency crisis, and it was exactly the wrong moment to push them to make a complex foreign policy decision like that. But we did, and they got their backs up and said no, and we reacted badly and it all went rapidly downhill. Looking back later, we wondered why in the world we hadn’t just let it wait for a better moment. There had never been any problem; there was no indication that we would face one. But once we insisted, it became an issue and all sorts of matters of face and pride became involved. We ended by completely cutting
off all high level military, diplomatic, and political contact in order to force them to back down.

Q: When you were there, what were we doing?

MCCORMICK: We had two different views inside the embassy. The military wanted to press the New Zealanders harder to see sense. They saw them as irrational on the nuclear issue and unwilling to carry their weight in the common defense. But they had no real plan for changing anybody’s mind, and anyway they didn’t really care about New Zealand, they cared about the effect of New Zealand’s defiance on other countries like Australia and Japan. So their real policy recommendation was to isolate New Zealand “pour encourager les autres” (to encourage the others). My job, on the other hand, was to get us past this situation. There were a lot of things we needed to talk to the Kiwis about and couldn’t. They knew more than we did about the Pacific islands. They could talk to a lot of countries whom we couldn’t, like Iran. We needed their help in the Security Council. We needed their help as one of the few democracies in Asia. And so forth. So the issue wasn’t to make them bend the knee about some Cold War policy, it was to get us past this issue and resume cooperation. And I thought more pressure was a crazy way to try to walk a very proud, small country back from an overstatement.

Q. Did you succeed in changing anything?

MCCORMICK: Well, the New Zealanders had gotten themselves pretty worked up about all this. They saw it as David and Goliath. The new prime minister wanted to solve the problem if he could – Jim Bolger, who is now the New Zealand ambassador to Washington – but didn’t want to lose an election for it. Most New Zealanders strongly supported the anti-nuclear stance. They had very unwisely written it into law and not just policy, which would have been easier to change. By now our navy’s nuclear missiles were gone, so the question was really the safety of our nuclear reactors. We knew they were safe, but New Zealanders didn’t. So we decided to work very closely with people in that new government, we and the British, to see if New Zealanders couldn’t assure themselves that these ships were safe. Not just take the U.S. word for it. The Navy wouldn’t share with anyone, even New Zealand, enough of the information on how the nuclear powered ships worked to reassure them, so the solution was a commission of New Zealand experts who would study this and come to their own conclusions about how safe it was. At the same time, we had to do an immense amount of personal diplomacy, very labor-intensive, and also a lot of public diplomacy. I worked very hard to develop some personal credibility with them, which you could only do by acknowledging some of their concerns. I must have met with every member of Parliament they have, and of course they are extremely appealing and likeable people so that was a pleasure, but it was a matter of slowly walking back suspicions and you couldn’t do it unless you understood or even shared a little bit of their world view which is so remote and different from, say, what you see at USNATO or Berlin. Eventually we managed to reduce the temperature enough on both sides that we were able to go back to normal political contacts. Bolger came to Washington, saw the President, and we began to reestablish a very valuable exchange of information. But we never did make them repeal their law.

Q: From your observation, how did - who was our ambassador again?
MCCORMICK: Della Newman.

Q: How did she work?

MCCORMICK: She was actually quite an effective ambassador. Knew nothing about foreign affairs at all, but she was a very gracious person, and endearing to the New Zealanders. She was smart enough not to interfere very much in the running of the embassy. She went around the country giving speeches about how we were such similar countries, with common values and a common English heritage, and everybody should relax. It turned out to be the right message.

Q: Well, a particularly gracious woman would be non-threatening at that time, when you were trying to say the United States was not trying to bully them. It could work very well.

MCCORMICK: It did.

Q: Who was the DCM?

MCCORMICK: Well, I was acting DCM for a lot of the time out there because we didn’t have an ambassador, but the DCM was David Walker. He was very good, because he communicated openly and well with everyone. His successor was not a successful DCM, because she did not. Sylvia Stanfield. Very secretive and mysterious, always closing doors and whispering. Morale went down because everyone thought something terrible was up. It wasn’t; that was just her way.

Q: What type of government was in when you were there?

MCCORMICK: When I arrived, a conservative government had replaced a labor one. Until then, New Zealand had been politically stable. It was extremely civilized and running very well. But they decided it wasn’t fair that people who supported smaller parties were in a way disenfranchised because of the two party system, so they talked themselves into a constitutional change to adopt proportional representation. I thought it was a terrible idea. They would wind up like Israel or Italy where there are more parties than you can count and sensible policies are held for ransom by some tiny party you have never heard of. But they went ahead and changed to a very idealistic system which now suffers from instability.

Q: The Clinton Administration came in shortly after you were there. Did the ambassador change?

MCCORMICK: Eventually, a new ambassador did come out, after some rather unseemly scuffling over who would get this plum post and when. Most policy didn’t change. The Clinton people brought a more aggressive emphasis on commercial promotion.

Q: Was there good dialogue between you and your New Zealand counterparts?

MCCORMICK: Extremely good. New Zealanders are appealing people, and their diplomats were very professional and sophisticated. Their foreign ministry was also very efficient. They were
always well informed. They don’t have the kind of interagency rivalries we do in Washington, so when a meeting was held they would send off a very quick, short, cable and all their people would know the next day what the essential points were. Meanwhile, we would draft a longer and more detailed cable which would be held up while people argued over what it ought to say – not about what the other side had said, but about what we had said, to make sure that we looked good and were loyal to the party line. The New Zealanders always knew more than we did about what was going on in other areas of the world, though we knew more about any one particular issue. I suppose it was the lateral vision which you need as a small and trade-dependent country where it really matters a great deal what is going on in diplomatic circles in the outside world. Compared to them, a lot of the energy we expended was internal. So much of what goes on in the U.S. Government is isometric.

Q: Was New Zealand trying to insert itself, or was already there, within the Pacific area?

MCCORMICK: Already there. The Pacific islands all looked to them. They were generous with assistance and unthreatening. Their knowledge of the culture and the area is good. There was also a very romantic strain in the Kiwis in which they pictured themselves and the South Pacific as a kind of idyllic haven of peace and goodwill in the world. This went down well in UN circles. New Zealand used it to win a carefully planned election to the Security Council. This was during a period where there was a huge increase in interest in peacekeeping. It was going to be a New World Order, after the Cold War, where the UN was going to blossom into a worldwide peacekeeping force. We were working closely with the New Zealanders on that, and it made it even harder to stick to the policy of not exchanging any intelligence with them. In Somalia, for example, it would have been crazy. So eventually we set that policy aside.

Q: How about immigration? I would think it would be such a small country that there would be concern about immigration from the islands or from China.

MCCORMICK: There was a lot of concern about it. More about the islands than from Asia. The closest thing to a slum you could find in New Zealand - and it wouldn’t be very close - would be populated by Pacific island immigrants. On the other hand, they were very anxious to increase their trade with Asia, and there was a lot of romanticism about multiculturalism since the country is so homogeneous – it must be at least 90% British – so the elites and the government supported immigration even though most ordinary people probably deplored it. I wouldn’t call it a major problem. Much more serious was the issue of the indigenous Maori population. They had been a tiny percentage of the population until New Zealand decided to compensate them for the fact that so much of their land had been taken by settlers, and the terms were extremely generous and applied to anyone with as much as four or five percent of Maori blood. So the number of people who saw themselves as Maori suddenly went up ten or twenty times. There was also a burst of nastiness from Maori radicals who thought perhaps it was time to reclaim the entire country and rename it Aotearoa. But on the whole, I would say that race relations were remarkably good and peaceful, and if anything New Zealanders had trouble understanding just how serious these problems are in the rest of the world.

Q: Were there any problems with the New Zealand government over American activities in
Antarctica?

MCCORMICK: Well, there could have been because New Zealand, unlike other countries, actually claims sovereignty over its portion of Antarctica. That could be a major problem. But they agreed to suspend those claims in the interests of the international treaty on Antarctica, which created a regime designed to allow scientific work there but demilitarize the continent and preserve it. The New Zealanders also had a very romantic and progressive view of Antarctica, the clean white South which they would help preserve as a pristine wilderness where all countries could cooperate for science. There was a lot of practical work for us because of that. The treaty partners decided it was no longer acceptable to dump any garbage in Antarctica and the impact of that decision on our operations was enormous. How do you get the tonnage of garbage generated by a program the size of the American program off the continent? But in general we worked very closely and well with them.

Q: When you were looking at relations between Australia and New Zealand, I would imagine these would have been very close and very strained.

MCCORMICK: They were close and they were strained. On the political side, Australia did not appreciate New Zealand’s nuclear stance, and thought New Zealand was allowing Canberra to carry an unfair share of the burden of their mutual defense. Economically, they had a very successful common market, but New Zealand had embarked on these radical free market policy reforms we talked about, while Australia was still a protectionist and traditional economy. Obviously, you can’t have both of those – you either have to harmonize your policies or stop trying to be a single market – and there was a lot of tension over which to do. Eventually, it seemed to work so well for the Kiwis that Australia also began to get rid of its subsidies and tariffs and adopt a more free market stance.

Q: Did you find yourself sitting down with your Australian colleagues from time to time and trying to figure out what was going on - us against them in a way on some things, or not?

MCCORMICK: On the nuclear issue, yes. That was very much a joint, British-Australian-American approach, trying to convince the New Zealanders that they were the odd ones out. They always pointed to the Canadians, who remained a respected, dependable ally even though they also had renounced nuclear weapons after being part of the original production of the atomic bomb in World War II. On economic issues it was the U.S. and New Zealand against Australia. We were very careful never to surprise the British or Australians with any of our attempts to get around the nuclear issue with the Kiwis.

Q: How did you feel you were supported back in Washington? Was New Zealand sort of a place for a politician or someone in the State Department to kick once in a while because of the nuclear thing?

MCCORMICK: A bit of that, especially in the Pentagon. But the basis of our policy was the fear that if New Zealand could get away with not having to share in the risks of defending the West, then others would refuse to share them, too. A very unfortunate basis for a policy but there it
Q: *How about the Japanese, were they fairly aggressive in their policy there?*

MCCORMICK: Not on the nuclear issue, but New Zealand is very active in international environmental diplomacy. The Wellington convention limiting drift net fishing shows that kind of interest. And the Japanese were always on the opposite side. New Zealand is a country with a small and wealthy population which wants to preserve the world’s environment. Japan is an overcrowded country that says it can’t afford not to exploit resources. Relations between the two were sometimes tense.

Q: *I know Australians, and I assume with New Zealanders that most people, when they graduate from university, take a year off and wander all over the place. Was there much knowledge of the United States there?*

MCCORMICK: There was a great deal. As you say, they all like to do this “overseas experience.” It didn’t create any consular problems that I knew about, because they were generally so well behaved and went home again. But Japan reminds me of one thing I wanted to mention. When the 50th anniversary ceremonies of World War II came around, it was assumed in Washington that New Zealand would have no place in them. They were no longer an ally, and they didn’t have any great World War II battles in New Zealand, so they were completely excluded from all the plans. It turns out, though, that hundreds of thousands of American troops were stationed in New Zealand in World War II. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the New Zealand army was off in Europe and New Zealand itself was defenseless. Rather than bring the New Zealanders back to defend their own country, and weaken the allies overall, the U.S. sent its troops to be trained in New Zealand and defend it while they were there. It was an extraordinary demonstration of mutual trust – can you imagine letting somebody else take over your country and defend it? – and it worked extremely well. People in Auckland and Wellington had very fond memories of them. The embassy insisted that this should also be commemorated, and it helped enormously in getting us past the nuclear dispute. Man for man, the New Zealanders were the finest fighting forces in the Second World War, and we had helped defend their homes for them while they were off defeating Rommel. These celebrations gave us a chance to convey to them the great respect and admiration which we had for them as allies, and what we got back in return was an enormous and unanticipated outpouring of affection for the U.S. in New Zealand. It was quite an extraordinary thing around the entire country, and it was a crucial step in restoring good relations.

Q: *Then you left there in ’94?*

MCCORMICK: I left there in ‘94 to come back to Washington.

**DAVID E. REUTHER**

International Security Agency, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand Desk

David E. Reuther was born in Washington in 1942. He received a BA from Occidental College in 1965 and entered the Foreign Service in 1970. His assignments abroad include Udorn, Bangkok, Songkhla, Taipei, Beijing, Khartoum, and Kuwait. Mr. Reuther was interviewed by Raymond C. Ewing in 1996.

Q: After you left the Iran/Iraq office, you went to the Department of Defense on an exchange assignment, I believe?

REUTHER: Yes, that’s right. It was an excellent opportunity to see how our colleagues in the Department of Defense operated. Having been overseas with members of the uniformed services and having worked with DOD representatives in interagency groups, I thought it would be a good education to see issues from the other side. This exchange program was a long standing one that placed Foreign Service officers in the military commands and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s International Security Affairs (ISA) Bureau while uniformed officers had tours in the State Department’s regional bureaus and the Bureau of Political Military Affairs.

I see a strong need for DOD and State and have such exchange programs. After a series of frustrating meetings, and I have forgotten the subject, I was asked by my ISA colleagues why State was so difficult. With a little exploration we determined that the difference in approach to the issue at hand was that State was concerned about the impact of proposed U.S. moves on the domestic situation in the country in question. State was looking for a solution that supported the reformers and blocked the conservatives. DOD was pushing for a solution parallel to the way the U.S. would handle the issue, regardless of the domestic consequences in the target country. DOD and State are players on the same team and such insights help teamwork. Of course, these off-line programs are expensive for the sending agency and they always are under threat of shrinkage from budgetary considerations. As I was winding up my tour, I failed to receive a short extension because State’s Seventh Floor reduced and realigned the program.

Q: What particularly did you work on?

REUTHER: I was assigned to ISA, which is often called the Pentagon’s mini State Department. ISA provides policy guidance to the Secretary of Defense on a regional basis. So there is a Latin American office, an Asia-Pacific office, etc. Given my background I sought the position in the Asia-Pacific office. In the Fall of 1993 my first major assignment was to support the one-person Korea Desk in the Asia-Pacific office. The Secretary of Defense was scheduled to attend the annual Korean-American defense consultations. In addition to organizing the briefing books for the traveling party, I also accompanied the group. It was a busy week. There were formal calls, the conference, and a simulation exercise for some of the delegation members. I took the opportunity to visit Panmunjom on the border, the U.S. Army’s 2nd Division - the primary U.S. force on the Korean Peninsula, and the U.S. Air Force facilities at Osan. Once the Secretary’s visit was completed, I was permanently assigned to handle Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand affairs. I often joked that if it had water around it I was responsible for it.
Q: This was from 1993-95 and you were working not only with the civilian side of the Department of Defense, but also with the Joint Chiefs on the military side, and I suppose to some extent with the State Department as well.

REUTHER: Oh, absolutely. Only this time when I went to interagency meetings I was the “them.” In Asia-Pacific we worked closely with the Joint Chiefs staff, especially with J-5. New for me, we also worked closely with the Defense Attaché office of the respective embassies of our countries. I thoroughly enjoyed liaison with the Australian and New Zealand attaché offices.

I had worked with colleagues from Australia and New Zealand overseas, but this was a first opportunity to look closely at our bilateral relations. From the DOD perspective these are the most intimate security relationships we have in the post-WWII era. The Anglo-Saxon immigrant bond was strong. The AUSCANZUKUS countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, and U.S.) constituted a special inner circle in the American security relationship. I was surprised, therefore to find a significant bilateral problem in our security relationship with New Zealand.

Q: Relating to port visits by U.S. nuclear ships?

REUTHER: Exactly. At issue was a series of policy moves in New Zealand when the Labour Party came to power in the mid-1980s. The country immediately fell victim to economic problems that Labour handled via policies that might best be associated with its opposition, the conservatives. To burnish its credentials with its electorate, Labour indulged its anti-nuclear wing that was upset with French atomic tests in the neighborhood. And the French endeared themselves to New Zealand by blowing up a nuclear-test protesting Greenpeace ship in Wellington Harbor. I believe someone was killed in that incident. As a consequence the new Labour government publicly announced that it would challenge the U.S. Navy’s nuclear ‘Neither Confirm Nor Deny’ policy. Not only did Labour want to ban nuclear weapons, but also nuclear power. To demonstrate the emotionalism of the issue, there is a very famous Wellington newspaper cartoon at the time that pointed out that one receives more radiation from the anti-cancer ward of the hospital than a visiting nuclear powered vessel.

Be that as it may, what Labour’s policy meant was that New Zealand effectively opted out of its ANZUS treaty obligations. By the end of the 1980s rather than find a workaround so that both domestic and treaty obligations might be satisfied, Labour enshrined its anti-nuclear policy into legislation. So, you had an alliance partner who said that he would not allow you to perform your full functions as an alliance partner and he would not perform his full alliance role. New Zealand’s policy shift took place against the background of the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan and the increase in Soviet naval presence in the Pacific. The Reagan Administration decided that New Zealand was no longer an alliance partner.

New Zealand’s stand, of course, presented difficulties for the alliance, not only for what New Zealand did, but also for the precedent it set. Had Japan or some of the European powers taken the same stand, the U.S. alliance structure would have been fatally wounded. Punishment for New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stand was withdrawal of intelligence cooperation, loss of access to
latest military equipment, a ban on military to military training and a lowering of the level of contacts. Over time New Zealand’s government also cut back on military budgets. American and New Zealand policies combined to leave the New Zealand military in worsening shape.

In the mid-1990s we praise the idea of the ‘democratic peace,’ that something inherent in democratic states prevents them from falling into conflict. New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy does not contradict this paradigm. Yet, I think the paradigm missed the point that for domestic reasons the Labour Government created a problem in its foreign relations. A problem that it was unwilling to resolve by devising a workaround so that it could maintain its international responsibilities and satisfy domestic audiences. My observation is that any country, including the United States, that is only willing to fulfill domestic demands and turn its back on its larger international responsibilities will in time create grave problems for the larger community.

At the time I was in the Pentagon, the New Zealand position was that no government had the ability to repeal the anti-nuclear legislation. Nevertheless a Conservative Government was in power and it signaled that it wished a closer, but perhaps not alliance, relationship. Part of Wellington’s epiphany was that during Desert Storm, New Zealand volunteered warships to the coalition for Gulf duty but realized that its vessels experienced difficulties coordinating with the other Anglo-Saxon navies because New Zealand’s tactics and equipment were out of date. So, the Conservative Government probed for readmission to the inner core. We went through an interagency policy review. Was there some way we could encourage New Zealand to abandon its anti-nuclear position either in de jure or de facto that would then allow us to repair the relationship? There was little support for rehabilitating New Zealand without some contrition or some mutual excuse so that other countries could not use New Zealand’s position as a precedent. The Navy was most adamant on the issue.

As I said, the NSC initiated an interagency review of our policy, in approximately 1994, I think. Our options were limited. New Zealand may have wanted to be reinstated in the Anglo-Saxon security world, but in the interviewing years it had allowed its military to atrophy. The single exceptions were the ANZAC frigates being jointly built with Australia. And it wasn’t certain whether New Zealand would fulfill its obligations to this program. Otherwise, what equipment New Zealand had had not been updated in recent years.

Q: What did Australia think about the problems in American-New Zealand relations?

REUTHER: Since the coves of Gallipoli in World War I, Australia and New Zealand have had a unique and close relationship. On this issue, however, Canberra, was unsympathetic to Wellington. A Labour Government also came to power in Australia in the mid-1980s and maneuvered around the pressures of its own anti-nuclear faction. So, it was not sympathetic to New Zealand Labour’s handling of the issue. On the other hand, Australia sought to soften New Zealand’s fall from grace. As a result Australia was very interested in U.S. policy on New Zealand and we fully shared our thinking about our policy options. We would not have changed our relationship with New Zealand without consulting Canberra.
As I mentioned, an interagency policy review under an NSC chair was launched in January 1994. We would have liked to find a workaround. Consensus formed around the idea of increasing the level of contacts. That is, reversing our policy of only allowing mid-level contacts. As down payment on the new policy, CINCPAC Admiral Larson made a trip to New Zealand. I provided inputs to his talking points. A CINCPAC trip was fitting, because it was the U.S. Navy’s ‘Never Confirm, Nor Deny’ policy that Wellington challenged. Admiral Larson made a number of speeches and received good coverage in the New Zealand media. We saw Admiral Larson’s and other trips as responding to the New Zealand leadership’s desire that we make our case to the New Zealand public and hopefully begin to give the government some leeway on these issues. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord followed Admiral Larson in August 1994, the State Department’s Deputy Secretary included New Zealand in a January 1995 trip and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, who happened to be an FSO, Kent Wiedemann, accompanied Talbott. The next American move following these trips was to extend an invitation to Prime Minister Bolger to call on the White House.

One of the symbolic ways of expressing our isolation of New Zealand since the mid- 1980s was to lower the level of official contact. We assumed that because a PM- Presidential meeting was a significant unilateral gesture, it would allow the current government to take some step that we could use to declare New Zealand’s isolation ended. We had in mind an action such as repealing the legislation on visits of nuclear powered vessels. These power plants had proven their safety and the number of American nuclear powered ships in the categories that might visit New Zealand were declining. On the contrary when New Zealand’s invoked anti-nuclear power legislation in the 1980s, the percentage of nuclear powered ships in the U.S. Navy was increasing.

Prime Minister James Bolger came to the U.S. in late March 1995. On that trip he called on the Secretary of Defense, met with the President, and lunched with the Secretary of State. As the DOD New Zealand Desk officer I produced the scope paper, talking points and background material for the SECDEF’s meeting with PM Bolger. I also attended the session. The Prime Minister’s visit was a major attempt to change our security relationship with a country I had been associated with since my early tours in Thailand. Like my counterparts at the New Zealand embassy, I had high expectations for this meeting. Unfortunately, the New Zealand leadership pocketed this meeting and was unable to provide any substantial reason for us to restore the previous security cooperation. At the time we were sending these positive signals to New Zealand, parliamentary elections were not far off. Some believed that Wellington would have to respond to us before the elections, because they would be held under a new electoral system that made it unlikely that any party would be a majority party. Skeptics voiced the thought that the Conservatives were using us to bolster their electoral prospects. By the time I left Asia-Pacific Affairs, nothing came of our effort to construct a new relationship that would allow the restoration of New Zealand’s place in the AUSCANZUKUS security circle.

Q: This was by now the Clinton administration, 1993-95. I suppose New Zealand is also important to us in terms of access to Antarctica?

REUTHER: Yes, but that was one of the programs that we continued because it wasn’t part of
the alliance relationship. It was strictly scientific.

SAMUEL VICK SMITH
Economic Counselor
Wellington (1993-1995)

Samuel Vick Smith was born in California in 1940 and graduated from New Mexico State University. He served in numerous posts including Nairobi, Vietnam, Madagascar, Tokyo and New Zealand. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You were in Wellington from ‘93 to when?

SMITH: ‘95.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

SMITH: Well, for the first eight months or so we didn't have one. President Clinton was elected in ‘92 and became president in ‘93 and I got there in ‘93 and I think one of his original choices to be ambassador to Wellington had fallen through for some reason. By the time I got there the Kiwis were beginning to get unhappy that they didn’t have an American ambassador. They got more and more unhappy as time went on, but finally in the spring of ‘94 Ambassador Josiah H. Beeman came. He was a Democratic Party activist both from California and from Washington, DC. The Kiwis were very happy when he finally arrived. Most of what I did was economic reporting. We had a separate commercial officer up in Auckland and he had an office in our embassy, too. I cooperated with him because I’d been a commercial officer before and I didn’t see any reason for there to be any competition. So I tried to stay out of their way or help them if I could. The officer up in Auckland was a local hire. The Commerce Department had had one of their FCS people there and then to replace that person they hired locally this man who was the husband of an American college professor in Auckland. He was very good. He did a good job. They eventually sort of semi-regularized his status. He did such a good job that a year or two ago they changed their mind again and sent a career FCS person there and he was out of a job. Not fair, but that's the way the world runs. I was doing economic reporting, the monthly report on the statistics of the economy in New Zealand and then a commentary on it. While that was an important part of my job, the main part of my job was the daily representation to the New Zealand government on whatever issue the telegram of the morning requested we make representations to them on. That was one of the reasons it got to be such a big job for just one person to carry out because it’s very easy for some officer to sit in EUR and write a cable which instructs, “all OECD posts.” They get a clearance in the regional office in the East Asian Bureau, and Tokyo and Canberra and Wellington also get the cable. Or, “all APEC,” Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was becoming very popular then and that would be my job, too. In fact this meant that in November of ‘93 I was sent back to Seattle to be liaison between the New Zealand delegation and our hosts for the APEC conference in Seattle which was the first
one to have a leaders meeting also. That was very interesting and a lot of hard work.

Q: How did you find the APEC work? I mean, what were you doing in that?

SMITH: It was much like all the other places. It was going to the New Zealand foreign ministry and saying, this is what we are thinking about this. It could be the issue of whether we are going to have new members, how many new members, and which new members, or it could be what we should do on this issue or that issue.

Q: What type of government was there in New Zealand when you were there?

SMITH: That's a good question. When I was there it was a conservative government. That party is called the National Party. They had come into power in 1990, if I’m not mistaken, and right after I arrived in ‘93 they had the next big election. It was a very close election and it wasn’t decided immediately, much like our election this last fall of the year 2000. Their election wasn’t decided for several days after the election day, as they recounted ballots in some of the closer constituencies. So much so that when I left for Seattle to help host the New Zealand delegation to APEC, it wasn’t certain who would lead that delegation. This was only decided after I got to Seattle. It was a close election, but in the end P.M. Bolger became the Prime Minister once again. Something else happened in that election that at least for the close foreseeable future will much affect the politics of New Zealand. They chose a new election system. Up until and through the election of 1993 they had a system, I think, just like the one in Britain. They had, I believe, 99 constituencies. Whoever got the most votes in any one of those constituencies was elected to parliament, even if they didn’t get a majority. So, if there were 10,000 votes and the candidate from the National Party got 4,500 and the candidate from the Labor party got 4,000 and the other 1,500 were split amongst somebody else, the candidate from the National Party was that member. Just as in England, and even here sometimes, the third parties complain that this isn’t fair because it means that they rarely or never get into the parliament. This was happening in New Zealand and I think this had a resonance in New Zealand because New Zealanders are a fair people and they wanted to be fair. I think this prevented the two major parties from forthrightly saying, “wait a minute, this is crazy, we don’t want to be like the Netherlands and Germany with lots of little parties. We’d like to keep the two party system.” So, they didn’t oppose the idea, especially when somebody came up with a proposal they called “mixed member proportional.” It expanded the parliament to one hundred-twenty seats, reduced the number of constituencies from ninety-nine to sixty, and said the other sixty seats will be based on proportional representation. What wasn’t clear, I think to many people, was that really the whole makeup, the whole one hundred-twenty is based on proportional votes. In a second ballot, if you have a constituency where let’s say there’s 20,000 votes- the National Party gets 9,000 and the Labor party gets 8,000 then from that constituency, the National Party candidate goes to the parliament. So, he’s got a seat in the parliament, that’s the only thing that’s sure. When it’s all over for the whole country, they count up the number of votes for each party in the second ballot and if in the whole country the National Party got forty-five percent of that vote, they’re going to get forty-five percent of the parliament. That candidate that’s already been chosen will be part of the forty-five percent and a lot of people didn’t realize this. When they go into the voting booth they get two votes. One vote is for the candidate from their district; the other vote is for their party preference. The party
preference vote is the one that determines the party makeup of the parliament and includes the
candidate they just voted for. So, if that guy that they voted for wins in their district he’s in, but
that doesn’t increase his party’s standing in the parliament. It’s very much like the Dutch system.
The way it works is each party has a list of one hundred-twenty candidates. The top candidate on
the list is a shoo-in unless his party gets no votes at all, and the bottom candidate on the list will
never make it. The only difference is that because they have a mixed member proportional
system, the mixed means that they do have these constituencies where the candidate who wins
the vote gets in. At least you have a M.P. you can write a letter to and say, you’re my member of
parliament from ‘X’, and I want you to vote this way. I used to ask the Dutch about this and they
didn’t even know who their member of parliament was because theirs was done completely on
the list. They had a list of one hundred-fifty for each party. The top candidates on the list always
got in, the bottom candidates never did.

Q: So, they had no particular ties to America?

SMITH: Yes. This meant that when the next election occurred in ‘96 no party got a majority and
so coalitions were formed and for a while Prime Minister Bolger was able to have a right-wing
coalition, which he led. Then his own party sent him here as ambassador and then that coalition
fell apart and now there’s a Labor Party coalition.

Q: Did this have any particular influence on New Zealand American relations?

SMITH: Yes, but it all happened after I left. The election that chose this new system was in ‘93,
but the first election to use the new system wasn’t until ‘96 and I left in ‘95. The only effect I
could say it had while I was there was that since the party in power was in power only by a
fingernail, they were only holding on to a small majority, they couldn’t make any great political
moves away from what you might call consensus.

Q: How did you view the New Zealand economy at the time you were there?

SMITH: When I was there it was very exciting. This National Party which had come in, as I said,
at least in 1990, it may be before, was introducing all sorts of reforms into the economy to make
it a market economy and having some success. As I was leaving there they were really doing
well. The unemployment rate was dropping and economic growth was increasing and budget
deficits were being paid off and it was really looking good and I was very happy for them.

Q: Did we have any issues between ourselves, major issues?

SMITH: The major issue was the political issue that to my knowledge still exists although my
knowledge isn’t that great anymore having left there six years ago. That is the issue of nuclear-
powered and nuclear-armed U.S. navy vessels. Previously there had been the ANZUS treaty -
Australia, New Zealand and the United States—a three-part defense treaty where any one of the
three was sworn to help the others if they were attacked. It was an old and valued treaty. Finally, I
believe it was during the presidency of George Herbert Walker Bush, we had had to tell the New
Zealanders that we no longer could feel bound by that treaty because they wouldn’t let our
nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels come in to New Zealand ports. By this time President Bush had removed tactical nuclear weapons from all of our navy surface ships. The only navy ships that had nuclear weapons were the ballistic missile submarines. As you know, most of our big aircraft carriers are nuclear-powered, but the New Zealanders wouldn’t let these nuclear-powered ships come to New Zealand. We had to tell the New Zealanders that we weren’t willing to have two different navies, one for them and one for the rest of the world. This was troublesome to us and very troublesome to the New Zealanders. They wanted some way to get around it and I know Ambassador Beeman and his political officer were working very hard to try to find some solution, as many people were. Admiral Larsen who was the commander in chief for all U.S. forces in the Pacific came down and talked with the New Zealanders and was open to new ideas, but nothing came of that, as far as I know. Although there was a lot of hard work put into it, and for all I know we might have come close, but we didn’t succeed. That was the main political issue.

Prime Minister Bolger very much wanted to have an official visit to Washington and after Ambassador Beeman arrived that was finally worked out and he did have an official visit to Washington to meet President Clinton. That improved relations a lot. Following on from that it was hoped that something could be done about the ships, but it was not possible.

Q: How did you see the New Zealand economy as it was poised to enter the next phase of world economy because it was much more vulnerable?

SMITH: They very much were looking toward Asia as a market. Their traditional market of course had always been Europe and they were trying to make Asia another important market. We are an important market for their goods. At that point, in the early 1990’s, many Asian economies were expanding rapidly. Even economies that were still considered developing countries had developing middle classes who were even tourists. There were Malaysian and Korean tourists and other Asian tourists coming to New Zealand. I think, as a wide-open, empty, beautiful country-entirely different from their crowded existence in their cities back in Asia. It was an attractive destination. They were happy to visit this place, and it was inexpensive.

Q: How did you find living there?

SMITH: It was good. The climate in Wellington isn’t very good. It’s rainy and windy most of the time, but it was good.

Q: It was something these people used to talk about I think in earlier days about the long, long, long weekends there. Everything would shut down on the weekends.

SMITH: It wasn’t as bad as Amsterdam was in the early 1980s. It never seemed to bother me. I think probably part of this economic restructuring had caused these things to be open when they probably had been closed before. That’s probably the difference.

Q: That’s probably it.
SMITH: I mean there's one thing people used to tell me. New Zealanders, when I got there, said, “remember, this is a country where eight years ago (so that would have been 1983), you couldn’t buy margarine without a doctor’s prescription.” The Dairy Board was the most important commercial entity in New Zealand and they had worked the law so that margarine was a controlled product.

Q: Well, I’m old enough to remember after World War II.

SMITH: Me, too.

Q: When you used to get margarine in a plastic thing with a little capsule you’d break to color it because Senator Humphrey and other people from Minnesota and Wisconsin and all made sure that they made it as difficult as possible to buy margarine.

SMITH: Yes, I remember my mother coloring the margarine. I always thought that was a state law though.

Q: It was doing that in Maryland.

SMITH: Maryland had a dairy industry, didn’t it?

Q: Yes, maybe, maybe it was a state law.

SMITH: I was living in a dairy state, Washington State at the time. That’s true, but in New Zealand it was more than that. You couldn’t even buy it without a doctor’s prescription. These things had all changed. There had been vast changes and that’s why it was so exciting economically. It was a country that was doing very well by adopting good economic principles.

Q: When they do it, the Australians of course had broken open and were accepting immigrants. What about New Zealanders?

SMITH: My impression was they were accepting immigrants, but except for refugees, they were only accepting immigrants that could benefit the economy. I don’t know how many other countries do this, but their immigration department was part of the labor department. That’s the way it was looked at.

Q: Well, then in ’95 you left there and whither?

SMITH: Back here to retire.

JOSIAH BEEMAN
Ambassador
New Zealand (1994-1999)
Josiah Beeman was born and raised in San Francisco in 1935. He became involved in local politics, holding several offices. In 1992 he served as then-Governor Bill Clinton’s California strategy advisor. He then became Ambassador to New Zealand. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You were Ambassador to New Zealand from 1994 to 1999. Can you talk a bit about how one gets ready?

BEEMAN: The State Department puts on what I call “the ambassador school” which is really terrific. I felt I learned a lot about how to run an embassy - the role of the administrative officer, the role of the DCM, and the others. The school was for only a week but it was an intense week. They taught you how to make a speech, which was no problem for me since I had been on television; I had testified before Congress; I had been on radio, so I took to that very quickly. I felt well prepared after the school. I set out to make myself a public figure in New Zealand, and ignored the cautious advice of the PAO (Public Affairs Officer) initially. I know the Department, especially with political appointees, says to keep you in a box so you don’t muck it up. Well, I’m a hands-on manager and it took about 6 months after I got there to convince the Embassy people that I was going to run the place. I listened to their advice and built up a terrific staff who were really first-rate, but I was going to be intensely involved until I could have confidence in the people who worked for me. You know, trust is built. In cases where trust wasn’t built, that person had to move on.

Q: Before you went out there you talked to the Desk. What did you take with you in your briefcase about things that needed to be done both administratively at the embassy and more particularly between American and New Zealand relations? What were the issues?

BEEMAN: We’ve always been friendly with New Zealand, despite our differences over the anti-nuclear legislation which has been a burr under the saddle for a long time; it sticks in our throat and it sticks in their throat for a different set of reasons, and it is still there. Now they have a different kind of government that is not as interested in having warmer relations with the United States right now; it wants good relations, but isn’t interested in warm relations. That was the number-one objective, and my general path was to see if we could take that and if we couldn’t change it – to fence it off so we could enhance New Zealand’s capabilities to be supportive of our foreign policy in an international global crisis. That was really my charge. We didn’t have any really hot trade issues.

Q: Beef, butter-

BEEMAN: They had more issues with us than we had with them, and still do, because they are a small country and depend heavily upon their agriculture exports, and we still create problems for them. I had very few issues that I had to go out and change. So the defense issue was the biggest problem. I basically fenced it off. You know, the Secretary of State does not get up every morning and ask how things are in New Zealand. With a terrific deputy in Strobe Talbot; Stan Roth and Win Lord, the two assistant secretaries I worked with, both liked the Kiwi people, liked
their attitude, which is very can do, not pretentious; they are down to earth and like Americans and we like them. I have always said that an American could drop into Wellington or Auckland and feel like you were in Los Angeles or San Francisco very quickly. The only difference was they drive on the left hand side of the road. An American culture really prevails in New Zealand and taken over, so the country was already shifting from its traditional allegiance to the Queen and to the United Kingdom towards the major power in the Pacific - the United States. I walked into, basically, a good climate and I think we turned it into a great climate in five-and-a-half years.

Q: *Getting a DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission), which is quite important, how did that work out for you?*

BEEMAN: I inherited a DCM, who should remain nameless, that I had a very difficult time with, who was a terrible manager of personnel, and also thought that she was the ambassador.

Q: *She had been Charge for awhile.*

BEEMAN: She had been Charge for a year and a half.

Q: *That can ruin-*

BEEMAN: Well, it does. I remember one particular incident very clearly. I said I wanted to meet with Sir Geoffrey Palmer, who was a former Prime Minister who used to teach law at the University of Iowa six months a year. She said, “Oh, no, you don’t want to meet with him.” When I asked why not she said he was a lobbyist, he’s in private business.

Q: *She hadn’t done her homework.*

BEEMAN: Boy, she sure hadn’t done her homework. But then, I would give particular instructions in a particular case, and she would call down and countermand the instructions. That was really a no-no. I called her in and said “Hey, you countermanded my instructions. Don’t ever do that again or you will be on the next plane out of here.” The Director General advised me to discuss the situation with her. Finally, she did it again, and I told her this was not working out and I felt that she should leave. I reminded her that I could send her home or she could ask to curtail. She had a curtailment on my desk in an hour or two, and the DG backed me 100%. I had done everything I should and it just didn’t work out. I had three DCMs while I was there. The second one was good. He had a little bit of “I should be running the show” attitude, but he was good. He served his whole three years, then he went on to be the Political Counselor in London.

Q: *Who was your third DCM?*

BEEMAN: Terry Miller, who is now doing diamonds from Sierra Leone in Liberia, so he has a lot of action going on where he is now.

Q: *Was the Department of State dealing with the problems of trying to curtail rebel forces?*
BEEMAN: Right, financing the rebel forces by the sale of diamonds, is a major issue. He is just a great guy, and he and I could not have hit it off better. He knew exactly what he could and should do and he knew when he needed to come to me and separate out those kinds of issues in a way that was helpful. He took the time to build trust so that I felt comfortable that he would come to me when he knew there was something I was interested in. I was always interested in what color they were going to paint things around the place. I hated embassy white, so we painted the offices and corridors different colors and everybody loved it, but if it had been up to the Administrative Officer they would have been embassy white.

Q: Let’s talk about the people you were dealing with. The New Zealand government. You had been dealing with the California legislature and our government, so how did you find dealing with the New Zealand government?

BEEMAN: Terrific. I think diplomacy is applied politics, basically trying to get somebody to do what you want them to do. That being – doing what the United States wants them to do. So it was to the great envy of my colleagues that I built a personal relationship with the Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, who subsequently became their ambassador to Washington, and also with his chief of staff. If I wanted to see the Prime Minister I would call his Chief of Staff and tell him I need to see Jim about such-and-such. He would say “how about 3:00 o’clock tomorrow?” I didn’t go through the Foreign Minister or 18 bureaucrats or put a request in writing. If I wanted to know what was going on in a negotiation, I would have lunch with the Chief of Staff and he would brief me on what was going on. It was interesting because the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was basically an unfriendly guy. The United States was the big bully who was pushing all the little guys around – clear foreign service guy. The Foreign Minister was a pro-American guy, and I remember the permanent secretary introduced me to an American, who was the Deputy Director of the World Trade Organization at that time. When he introduced me to him, whose name I have forgotten now, he said, “This is Joe Beeman, the American Ambassador. Now Joe doesn’t like to come to us in the foreign ministry. He prefers to deal with the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister directly.” I didn’t quarrel with his introduction because somebody once told me “go to the horse’s head, not the horse’s ass.” I went to the guys who made the policies, not the people who recommended them. So the relationship we built was incredible. Because of their anti-nuclear legislation, no New Zealand Prime Minister had been invited to the White House since 1984. So I told Jim I was going to get him into the White House, which was something he wanted to do. So when I went to them about the multi-national force in the Gulf, they sent one-third of their Navy. They steamed all the way from New Zealand out to the Gulf to help with the interdiction against Iraqi shipping. He did a lot of other things for us, too, and in 1997 he said he would like to go to Washington and see the President. I was able to tell the President that New Zealand had done everything we had asked them to do. The approach I’ve always taken has been to try to script both sides. I would tell the Kiwis what they needed to say and do to make Washington look upon them favorably, and I would tell Washington what they needed to do to make the Kiwis cooperate. So Bolger got his visit with the President.

Q: Sticking to the anti-nuclear issue, was it imbedded in concrete by this time that no American
warships could come into port with nuclear weapons? Was this something you just had to work around?

BEEMAN: No. I continued to plug away at that and made lots of speeches on the subject, but I took a slightly different tack. We were assisted by the fact that then-President Bush, Bush 1, had taken all nuclear weapons and nuclear capability off of our ships in 1992. That really wasn’t an issue any more but it was in New Zealand law, and the U.S. Navy had never forgiven them for it and didn’t want a U.S. ship to visit there until they changed that law. But they weren’t going to change that law. Even the conservative National Party, which was in power during the time I was there, was afraid to change that policy, because this was really embedded in their psyches now so it wasn’t an issue. So I would work on the nuclear propulsion issue. The second part of the legislation barred any nuclear propelled U.S. ship, and of course 40% of our fleet is nuclear propelled and there has never been an accident in our history. So I talked to them about the logic of their policy and the fact that that logic has kept New Zealand out of ANZUS. So I made speeches on it, but not to attack them; I just pointed out this policy lacked logic and I got good press and correspondence on it, but it really didn’t move the government to tackle the issue. That’s why I said we should just fence this issue off because they were not going to change. I asked one of the Admirals who was briefing me before I went out if we had any desire to send ships into New Zealand and he said “none whatsoever.” So we worked on the other things that we really cared about.

Q: In talking to people who dealt with New Zealand early on, I understood that for some time New Zealand had had a significant immigration from the United Kingdom of blue collar, or labor people, who brought all the prejudices of the left-wing labor types. Had that dissipated by the time you got there?

BEEMAN: Yes, that had pretty well dissipated; in fact, the current Labor Government has been very careful to steer the middle-ground. But if you put the New Zealand political beliefs in the spectrum of the United States, it is definitely to the left. There is no comparison even with the National Party, which is supposed to be the equivalent of our Republican Party. They would be kind of moderate Democrats there, and the Labor Party would be to the left of them. The whole political spectrum is to the left of the United States and the people that came were, as you said, from the lower classes. They are more bourgeois now; they are more middle-class with two cars and TVs, and they look at things differently. But the whole spectrum is to the left of what it is in the United States. And they are also very egalitarian. If the Prime Minister of New Zealand ever rode around in a limousine, or some big black car - he would be in deep, deep trouble. The Prime Minister’s car is a Ford. And that is what the ministers ride in, too. You would get your head handed to you if you got too pretentious. That is just not their style.

Q: Did you find this made any difference in how you operated?

BEEMAN: Well, yes and no. We had a big Chevy and that was as fancy as we ever got. It was a big Chevy and low security, no armor in it at all (there is now), but there was none then and of course it was a big black American car so everyone knew where I was at any given time of the day. If I stopped at a market on the way home at my wife’s request, someone would say the next
day they saw me shopping in Johnny Lee’s market. I think it is important to preserve a little mystique around the office, so I was never embarrassed to put the flags out on the car when I was going to a formal function. People would say, “Oh, there’s the American Ambassador.” All of that effort served to make me a public figure in a thousand different ways. When my daughter was born, she was the first child ever born to an American ambassador in New Zealand. Most ambassadors my age don’t have babies in the country they are in, so when my daughter was born she had a press conference on her first day back from the hospital because she was the most famous baby in New Zealand. They all wanted a picture of her, so I said we would do it all at once with a press conference. She was on the front page of every paper in the country, and people all over the country sent her presents, knitted hats, blankets, and sweaters, etc. But the government knew when we got to the lamb crisis, which was the biggest crisis in years, that if it wanted to come out against the United States on some issue, I could get equal time access and I would be right there rebutting their charge against the United States. They knew that for domestic consumption purposes they could not attack the United States and not have the United States defended. At the same time they went to the press in time for the evening news, they would make the charge and I would be right there rebutting it with equal time.

Q: Did you find that the New Zealanders kept an eye on Australia? In Australia we had listening stations and we had secret installations and this was always a subject of attack by the left-wing. I was wondering if this was picked up in New Zealand?

BEEMAN: Absolutely. All through the time I was there we had the closest kind of inter-relationship with New Zealand. It is called AUSCANZUKUS, that is Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and Britain. That has been preserved. It was always maintained during the nuclear flare-up in ‘84. It has always been a steady and on-going relationship, and even the current Labor Prime Minister has said she has no intention of changing the nature of that relationship. There have been those attacks from the left, such as the two listening posts called Whenuapai on the south island, big white domes that are frequently in the paper because some mudslinger will charge they are spying on the people of New Zealand. It is all part of our agreement that we will not conduct covert or overt intelligence gathering in those five countries. That’s the deal. But these protestors would charge that deal was being violated, either by their own intelligence authority or by the United States. It is on-going and flares up from time-to-time and some members of Parliament would go down and get themselves arrested climbing over the fence. A couple of guys did climb over the fence one night, and the drapes in the building had not been drawn completely together so they took pictures of a computer screen. There was nothing on it, and there was a booklet lying on the desk next to it and of course that was all over the evening news. It got a good laugh, and that shows you how seriously New Zealand played the security game as opposed to the United States. But the Australian relationship; the fact is that Australia has always had this very cozy relationship with the United States. Australia has almost always had its own special relationship.

Q: After World War II, particularly after the battle of the Coral Sea, when Britain more or less absorbed their army and lost a good bit of it in Singapore, then the Australians realized they were alone except for the United States. That really changed everything.
BEEMAN: You are absolutely right. That is exactly what happened. They looked around and said, “We are all alone, Britain cannot help us. The only people that are going to help us are in the United States.” The same happened with New Zealand for the same reason. Older men who had been around during World War II would come up to me with tears in their eyes and say, “Thank you for saving us from being invaded by the Japanese.” Of course the Japanese had plans to invade New Zealand and already had currency printed. It is part of that fact that the South Pacific looks to the United States as the guarantor of their security and peace and freedom in that area, regardless of whatever disputes we may have over nuclear legislation, or whatever. At the end of the day they look to us to be their guarantors.

*Q: A big day in Australia, which Americans often forget, is Coral Sea Day. Is that a big day in New Zealand, too?*

BEEMAN: No. The big day in New Zealand is Anzac Day, and it is interesting how young people are now coming out to Anzac Day. It used to be the old folks. We used to laugh because State always had difficulty producing high level Americans for Coral Sea Day and the Aussies would be insulted if you sent them a DCM or the Ambassador. You always had to send somebody special from the U.S., and it was always a big wrestling match to get them there.

*Q: When Lyndon Johnson came to Australia, he said, “I really don’t have time to go to the Coral Sea monument.” And either the PAO [Public Affairs Officer] or the DCM said, “Mr. President, you’ve got to, this is not a matter for dispute.” It is so hard to tell a President “you have to” but sometimes there are things you have to say.*

BEEMAN: If you didn’t go there, you might as well not come to Australia. But the Australia-New Zealand relationship is really a fascinating one, because there are about 3.5 million people in New Zealand now and the population is really pretty static. It went up about 50,000 my last year. So low birth rates, low immigration rates. Lots of elderly Kiwis move to Australia - to Queensland and Gold Coast where it is warm weather all the time. I think there are about 250,000 Kiwis living in Australia. In New Zealand, the weather is distinctly cool most of the time, and wet and damp a lot of the time. But the relationship between the two of them is very important. They have a close economic relationship with complete free trade between the two countries, and the Aussies give their social benefits to the Kiwis who move into Queensland without any trade-offs. Obviously, the Aussies spend a lot more than the Kiwis do as a result of that relationship. There is also an intense rivalry - there is nobody New Zealand would rather beat in rugby than the Aussies. So the Aussies have New Zealand jokes, and New Zealand has Aussie jokes, but at the end of the day they are always going to come together.

*Q: Did you ever find that the United States got between the two?*

BEEMAN: Not deliberately, no. Occasionally they would do something really nice for Australia and then the Kiwis would whinge about it. I would tell them there was no point in complaining. The Aussies do X, Y, and Z. If you (New Zealand) did it you would be the beneficiaries, too. But it was never done publicly, it is just part of their rivalry. We are still negotiating a free-trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand, and maybe Singapore and Chile. The new USTR
(U.S. Trade Representative) is working on that - the old one worked on that, and every time the Australians would try to get a separate bilateral deal between Australia and New Zealand, the Kiwis would go ballistic.

**Q: Tell me about the lamb problem.**

**BEEMAN:** In my view, retrospectively, this was a blatant protectionist measure on the part of the United States. We have fewer sheep in the United States than New Zealand does. Our industry is extremely weak and getting weaker, and the Kiwis have an aggressive marketing operation for lamb, butter, and dairy. Dairy is the big money earner but lamb is a major one. When the U.S. lamb industry got the FTC (Foreign Trade Commission) to slap a duty on New Zealand lamb because the Kiwis were marketing it very aggressively. The charge was dumping, but that wasn’t what they were doing. When the U.S. Government slapped these tariffs on them for several years, that was the most contentious issue I had the whole time I was there. The Kiwis were outraged, and in my view they had a right to be outraged because it was a protectionist measure on our part. They took it to the WTO (World Trade Organization) and they won. We were found to be protectionists. There had been an interesting little controversy over the origin. New Zealand has a little toy called the “buzzy bee,” which is a little bee on wheels that they pull around, and all children in New Zealand have one. They gave one to Prince William when he came to New Zealand as a baby with Prince Charles and Princess Diana, and there is a picture of them on the lawn of Government House. William is pulling this little buzzy bee along. Well, it turned out that apparently the buzzy bee was invented in the United States. They interviewed the widow of the man who had marketed it in New Zealand and she said, “Well, of course it came from the United States.” This was kind of like losing your national identity, and losing it to the United States to boot. It was a major deal and that had happened about two days before the lamb deal came. There were government ministers all over the place and I was right there, as well as all three TV networks. I said “I am here today to tell you that the United States is taking New Zealand to the World Trade Organization for the violation of the intellectual property agreements because of your theft of our buzzy bees.” The press cracked up and then I said “now, lets get down to the serious business” and we went on to the lamb deal.

**Q: Well, how did you explain it? What did you do?**

**BEEMAN:** I said several things. First of all, I said I understood how they felt. I said that, first of all, we should put it in perspective. Because American lamb production is diminishing and New Zealand’s is increasing, I believe the lamb farmers and producers will not be any worse off under this tariff than they are now, and indeed will be better off because the price of lamb will rise, which by the way, turned out to be right. They suffered no losses whatsoever. Secondly, I said we have very good lawyers that looked into this, and I am sure that whatever they have done is consistent with WTO rules, which turned out to be wrong. So that is the way I handled it. I said we should put all of this into perspective in terms of our overall trade relationship. We had a very favorable balance of trade with them and we still do. I tried to dampen down the deal, but it was a really big deal. I got floods of letters asking how we could talk about free trade and do this? We would answer them forcefully, but I spent all my energy trying to keep it under control and got lots of jabs about it wherever I went.
Q: What about trade promotions? Did you get involved in trade promotions of American products?

BEEMAN: Yes, we did a lot of that, but there was less than most of my colleagues would have gotten involved in because New Zealand was a really a very free market with a couple of exceptions - shoes, women’s clothing, and cars which they eliminated while I was there. They had 25% duties on to protect local industry. They took the 25% off on cars, then agreed to lower the others over the years. We didn’t sell them a lot of shoes and women’s clothing. We really didn’t have that many problems. I would get various companies - California summer fruit did a terrific promotion there, but the most bizarre one was when Jim Beam was introducing a new label and they asked me to put on a little promotion for them, which I did at the residence. Then Jim Beam’s grandson came over.

Q: Jim Beam being-

BEEMAN: The bourbon whisky - his grandson and his wife and a friend of theirs came, and we had a bourbon tasting at 11:00 AM at the residence on a week day. I don’t drink bourbon in the first place, but all of us were there - my DCM, my Political Counselor, and all the liquor people in New Zealand showed up - about 20 people serving liquor. I would take a little sip and I made sure there was a plant near by that I could pour the rest of it in. It was kind of a fun event, one of those things you laughed about afterward.

Q: Did you get involved in-

BEEMAN: By the way, New Zealand has the highest per capita bourbon consumption in the world, which I didn’t know before.

Q: As a true foreign service officer, I used to drink bourbon before I came in but I found it was hard to get and soon I moved to scotch, which I couldn’t take, and now I won’t touch bourbon because I’m a scotch taker.

BEEMAN: I was always a scotch drinker and never a bourbon drinker.

Q: Did you get involved in pushing, promoting, and defending American tobacco?

BEEMAN: No. There were other issues like that that I really got involved in, which are still ongoing, but never tobacco. Never heard from the tobacco companies. New Zealand had a couple of its own tobacco companies and they both went out of business. It was too small a market to get uptight about. The big issue was pharmaceuticals. New Zealand has a purchasing agency for all pharmaceuticals. So basically it buys about 70% of the pharmaceuticals that are used in New Zealand. It, of course, really hammers the pharmaceutical companies down to incredibly low price levels compared to what we pay here in the United States. Only one company ever pulled out and they are all making money anyway, even though they moan and complain that their rights are being violated. There are a few kinds of companies I’ve found it hard to feel sorry for -
pharmaceuticals, banks, and insurance companies. I did my duty, but the Kiwis from the far left to the far right were not going to budge an inch on this. They are not that big a country; they were not about to open the doors of their treasury to the pharmaceutical companies and say to come in and take what you want. So there was nobody across the political spectrum who favored changing that method of buying their drugs. A couple of other countries have now followed. I think South Korea and a couple of others have followed the Kiwis way of doing business. They put things out for bids, then hammer you down for more, so there was really tough bargaining and the pharmaceuticals didn’t like that at all. Big problem; still ongoing; but the Kiwis are never going to budge.

Q: Was there much of a immigrant community? You mentioned it was low, but I was thinking of Australia which is going through quite a metamorphoses with Asians coming in. What about New Zealand?

BEEMAN: Similar type of experience. It was interesting that a kind of Xenophobia arose. When it really started getting serious, a lot of Asians came in from Singapore and Korea and bought land, but there were not an enormous number buying land. I think there was still a hangover of racism - it’s okay if an American, Brit, Aussie, or German comes in and buys land, but we don’t want Asians coming in and buying up our country. I would find people on the left who felt they should stop that. I would tell them that I had lived in the United States through three major land scares. One was when the Saudis came in and were going to buy up the United States. Well, we got past that - they didn’t buy up the United States. Then the Taiwanese came in and were buying up California. Well, they didn’t buy up California. Then the Japanese came in and were going to buy up the United States. So I told them they should use the strategy we used which was when we sold the Japanese the Rockefeller Center for about umpteen billion dollars, then we let the land values collapse and bought it back for about 10% of what we sold it for. I told them that was good strategy that they might think about. Basically, it eased off, but they did pass legislation which restricts the amount of land that foreigners can buy in New Zealand to about 10 acres in urban and semi-rural areas and a little larger amount of acreage in extremely rural areas. That is the long answer, but I think that has all died down. Singaporeans came in and invested in industry - motels, resorts, etc. They did it very quietly.

Q: I interviewed Tex Harris, who was the Counsel General in Melbourne, who said during one of our crises in Yugoslavia or Kosovo that there were a bunch of Yugoslav immigrants who came and attacked the embassy. Did the events in Yugoslavia and our getting involved there affect anything?

BEEMAN: Well, yes, but it was really more publicity in the papers. There would be a few Yugoslav immigrants to New Zealand who would go to the newspapers or get on television saying this was terrible, etc. I think they had very little impact and were certainly never any threat to the embassy. During my time there I can only remember two times when the embassy was picketed. One was when we bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and ten Chinese students came down from the University in Paunerston North and had a short demonstration outside the embassy and handed in a letter for me. As I looked out my window I saw that all their signs were facing the TV cameras rather than the embassy, so I don’t know what their signs said. Then the
other time was on the lamb deal, when a bunch of farmers and politicians came up and had ten sheep in a little mini-corral outside the embassy and were marinating lamb chops. The press asked why I had not come out to talk to them and I told them that someone on my staff had received their letter, but on the other hand if they had told me they were grilling lamb chops I probably would have come out and joined them. It was all very friendly. We never saw any violent protests - no, I’ll take that back. Actually, it wasn’t against us, but during the French nuclear testing in the Pacific there were real attacks on the French embassy and on the residence and on the British High Commission – people climbing on the roofs. The New Zealand government did absolutely nothing about it in spite of its treaty obligations to help protect these embassies. They let them run riot. They dumped manure on the French Ambassador’s front steps, but not a lot of damage was done. I made very clear to the Foreign Ministry that if the demonstrators tried to come over our walls that we would defend the embassy. We were not going to let them invade the embassy nor come onto the grounds. A lot of my colleagues in the diplomatic corps said the same thing. They were very upset with the Kiwis. But that is kind of the way the Kiwis react - they wouldn’t wade in like we do with plastic helmets, shields, and batons. They kind of let them go and let the steam out.

Q: The Rainbow Warrior thing had happened long before this. Was it when the secret service knocked off a Green Peace ship?

BEEMAN: Yes, the French sunk a Green Peace ship and killed a couple of people. They were apprehended and subsequently turned over to the French. To show how vulnerable New Zealand is, the French threatened to totally shut off New Zealand trade with France if they weren’t turned over to the French authorities to be dealt with, and the Kiwis gave in. That was the Labor-left wing government that did it, not a right wing government. The Kiwis came and turned them over, and of course they never served a day in jail. That’s one of those benchmark events in New Zealand history.

Q: Did Yugoslavia, Kosovo tragedy and the events there play much in New Zealand?

BEEMAN: It played, yes, and got pretty good coverage. Of course, they participated in IFOR at our request. That was one of the other things we asked them to do and they did.

Q: Could you explain what IFOR was?

BEEMAN: It’s intervention. I used to know what the initials stood for, but now I have forgotten. Basically, it was the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intervention force into Bosnia and Herzegovina to stop the genocide that was going on, and it was very successful in doing that. The Kiwis participated in that at our request. New Zealand received a number of refugee families as a result of that. There were a few Serbs in New Zealand who tried to back-fill on the issue, but I think they were totally drowned out in the New Zealand media by sympathy with the Albanians who were the principle subjects, but not exclusively, of the ethnic cleansing. It got good coverage and there was no quarrel with the United States role in that, that came to my attention.

Q: Well, moving from the tragedy of Yugoslavia to the high comedy of the United States, how did
you feel about dealing with the Monica Lewinsky affair with President Clinton and the impeachment trial? This must have been difficult for you.

BEEMAN: It was incredibly difficult. I was embarrassed for myself and my country. But I will say this: the Kiwis, after the initial rounds of jokes in which we all participated, were very genteel about it all. They could have had a field day at our expense, but most of them did not. The prime minister and the cabinet ministers would all kind of make a sympathetic note, because I think they really did not like to see the United States’ reputation in the world besmirched by the President’s antics. From the left to the right, they kind of went silent on it and didn’t ask me what I thought of it. I appreciated that, because I got so tired of trying to explain and defend it.

Q: At a certain point though, did you find yourself getting into the nitty-gritty of it, explaining the constitutionality and the problems?

BEEMAN: Yes, and at one interview I gave I said, “Look, I think the American people are sick of all this, I do not think the President is going to be impeached, and it is time to move on.” I remember the Washington Times picked up what I said off of some news service and said it was time for me to be called home because I had lost touch with the immorality of the President and I was a lousy spokesman for the United States. Any time the Washington Times attacks you, your stock goes up about 10 points with the White House, so I knew I wasn’t going home.

Q: The Washington Times is the paper founded by the Reverend Sung Yung Moon of the Unification Church, and is a right-wing paper.

BEEMAN: The best part about it is hardly nobody ever reads it.

Q: By the time you got out there in ‘94, the election had moved the Senate and the House into the Republican side with a very conservative, isolationist view. Did this affect your work?

BEEMAN: Not really. In my first several years I had exactly three members of Congress who came out on a study delegation. One of them was subsequently defeated, one is still there, and one retired from Congress, but it was the first time that anyone had made a political visit to New Zealand in years. Al Gore and a couple of Senators had come out and gone to Antarctica, which was part of my responsibility. But these three guys came out - there was a moderate Republican, a very conservative Republican, and a moderate Democrat. Nobody else showed for awhile. When the Republicans took control of the Senate, all of a sudden - between ‘94 and ’97 - I had 15 Senators, or 15 % of the United States Senate, come out to New Zealand. Some of them twice. The Kiwis would give me an air force plane to fly them around the country. The Speaker of the House came with a huge delegation.

Q: What were they doing? Was this for fun?

BEEMAN: Well, you wouldn’t expect me to say this was for fun - they were there on official business.
Q: I might, for the record, say that Ambassador Beeman has kept a very straight face at that remark.

BEEMAN: Well, they were generally in transit to Australia or Indonesia for some purpose. They would come for a day, or maybe two days, but they would have a terrific time. The Kiwis just knew how to do things right. Strobe Talbot is a scuba diver and when he came, the police diving squad in Wellington took him for a scuba dive in the harbor, but it wasn’t planned. One of the most conservative right-wing members of Congress from California arrived in New Zealand and, before I even had a chance to talk to him, he gave an interview saying that we should forget New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy. They loved the place. At the dinners I would give for them, I would tell them their trip there created a tremendous amount of work for both the embassy and the United States government, and ask them to please go back and tell all their colleagues what a lousy place New Zealand was. Of course that would get a big laugh and they would go back and tell them what a great place it was.

Q: When the government shut down in 1995, you must have been caught up. How did that go? How do you shut down an embassy?

BEEMAN: You just don’t pay any bills, and some people showed up at work and some people stayed home. They actually created that essential and non-essential list, and that was a lot of fun going around and telling a person “you’re non-essential,” and the person at the desk next to them is essential. Almost all of our people showed up anyway. At the end of the day they knew they would get paid somehow or other. It wasn’t too bad but it was embarrassing. We didn’t answer the phones, closed the consulate, didn’t give people visas. People would look at you and say “boy, what a screwed up country you’ve got, when the United States has to close its overseas offices because Congress can’t agree to give them money to fund them.”

Q: How about the islands? Did you have any representation with islands?

BEEMAN: Yes. I was cross-credited to Samoa, so I was also ambassador to Samoa, and I also covered the Cook Islands, with whom we don’t have diplomatic relations because of an interesting legal anomaly where they are still considered part of New Zealand for our purposes but not for New Zealand’s purposes. New Zealand kept saying they didn’t want to represent them. Ask what the foreign ministry thinks about this matter affecting the Cook Islands, and the foreign ministry would say they didn’t know about it and they didn’t want to know about it. I spent a lot of time traveling around to Samoa and the Cooks. I remember one time I went to Samoa, and the teachers college there wanted all the four or five hundred students to give me a greeting. I was seated on a big throne up on the stage while the girls and guys were doing dances and on and on and on. Then the president of the student body stated they could really use two SUVs with 4-wheel drive at the school. The principal of the school leaned over to me and said, “Of course you don’t have to say yes.” And I said, “I have no intention of saying yes.” I enjoyed the islands and got really got some interesting things done there. Nuie was another piece of my turf.

Q: This is in New Caledonia?
BEEMAN: It’s not far away from there. It’s about half-way back to Hawaii from New Zealand. It is this incredible coral atoll that comes right up out of the sea on very steep cliffs of coral. So when you want to go deep sea fishing, you go about 25 feet out from the shore and you are in deep sea waters. There is no slope. They have no economy, it’s all coral. They can grow a few bananas and coconuts and pigs. They are desperately poor. I got the Navy to build a wharf so ships could berth at the wharf rather than having to off-load on lighters. Then the wharf was so high up out of the water because of the depth of the water, everything had to be lifted up by crane. So they would lift your boat up, put it on a trailer and drive away. There was no place to tie boats up. The local guy kept telling the Navy guys this didn’t look good to him. The first storm demolished the whole wharf, just washed away like it had never ever been there. A quarter of a million bucks. Before I left, I was trying to get them to rebuild it and do it right this time. But I really enjoyed the natives. Hospitality, again, was the key. You had to be careful and not say “Oh, isn’t that a lovely piece of furniture” because you would wind up with it. And they were poor.

Q: Did they have an Antarctica station there? You were in a support position, weren’t you?

BEEMAN: Yes, but Christchurch, New Zealand, was our launching pad for Antarctica so my staff had to do all the negotiating with the government of New Zealand over import questions and licenses. It was a very important manifestation of the U.S. presence in New Zealand because at Christchurch. Before the Navy gave it up, we would have 400 guys in U.S. Navy uniforms down in Antarctica. So that was really one of the highlights of my time there, and of course I got two trips to the South Pole. It was a tough place, a very tough environment, so I didn’t go there once a year to get the sun. Two highlights of my stay in New Zealand - one was the 40th anniversary of the New Zealand Scott Base - so the Prime Minister invited me to go along with him down on the New Zealand plane for this 40th anniversary ceremony. Ed Hillary, who has become a very good friend of ours, was going along us.

Q: The mountaineer.

BEEMAN: The first man to ever climb Mount Everest, and a terrific human being, by the way. So I took Ed Hillary and Jim Bolger, the Prime Minister, to the South Pole on an American plane. That was an incredible experience having Ed there and having all these young Americans who work at the South Pole during the summer - having him autograph New Zealand $5.00 bills which has his picture on it. I told the prime minister he made a terrible mistake; he should have put his picture on the $100.00 bill because all those bills are going out of circulation and they would have made a terrific amount of money out of this. That was a real highlight. I guess the other highlight for me was the President’s visit. Which was just before I left.

Q: How did that work?

BEEMAN: That was absolutely fantastic.

Q: Was he the first president to come?
BEEMAN: No, Johnson had stopped there one day - he didn’t stay overnight - just during the daytime on the trip back from Australia, which you referred to earlier. So 1967 was the first president, and then 1999 was the second presidential trip. Clinton just had a ball and spent a whole day playing golf. The Kiwis did a fantastic job of rolling it all out. He did a lot of motorcades and we sent the motorcade through the district of one of the most left-wing members of the New Zealand parliament in Christchurch. Thousands and thousands of people turned out on the streets.

Q: Was there a little malice aforethought?

BEEMAN: I don’t know why we would do that kind of thing. But ever since then, he has really toned down his attacks on the United States. He actually said something nice about the United States recently. He was then leader of the major left-wing party in parliament. The Clinton people told me later that was the greatest trip they had ever had. One of the highlights for me was when my wife, Susan, and daughter, Olivia, who was about 4 months old, were in the receiving line. My daughter had a sweater with an American flag on it and was holding a little American flag in her hand, which I had taught her how to wave. Just as the president was coming down the line, she started to eat the American flag, so I had someone run down and tell my wife to stop her because I felt sure that was a federal offense. Clinton stayed three days. APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) was meeting in New Zealand at the time and he was the big hit of APEC, of course.

Q: What was your observation of how New Zealand fitted into the Pacific associations?

BEEMAN: New Zealand views itself as a player in the South Pacific, with the island communities, so they take a very preeminent role and provide a lot of financial support for development. That’s where all their aid goes - to the Pacific Islands. It is really Australia and New Zealand together who have to look after the South Pacific. We do zip there. We have a Peace Corps in Samoa, but that is about it, and we have no foreign aid nor aid of any kind that goes into the Pacific Islands. They are desperately poor. They have no industrial future; they have little agriculture; they can’t really sustain themselves.

Q: A couple of years ago the Federation States of Micronesia. And yet they are living on American handouts right now and those are going down. They have even lost the ability to fish in their traditional way of life.

BEEMAN: It’s tough. There is nobody who cares about them, no interest in them. They are not of any strategic importance to anybody. The Chinese will come in and build a building but it is way too fancy. That’s what they did in Samoa, and the Samoans couldn’t pay the air conditioning bill. It’s a desperate situation and I can see no easy way out of it.

Q: What about the situation of the Maoris in New Zealand as you observed them?

BEEMAN: Let me start by saying that I think New Zealand has done the most fantastic job that
I’ve ever seen of recognizing the problem and trying to affirmatively and aggressively deal with the problem of Maoris. First of all, there has always been inter-marriage, from the very first time white settlers came to New Zealand. You can see blond, blue-eyed Maori. They are handsome people but, like blacks in the States, they are about 75% of the jail population, 75% of the welfare rolls. They are not integrated into the culture and society to the extent that they should be. They are only 12% of the population of New Zealand but New Zealand really does try to address and attack the matter very aggressively. New Zealand has had a Maori governor general; it has Maori seats in parliament. I’m not sure that’s such a good idea, and lots of Kiwis are not sure either. There is a Maori electoral roll whereby the Maori can be, if they want to be, on their own separate roll and elect a certain members of parliament off that roll. I think they are doing a terrific job dealing with it; it is a very difficult problem. And it isn’t just money that does it. They operate as tribes and are very poor. They are proud of their identity and are getting greater pride and being more aggressive in asserting their rights, basically without violence. It’s a problem that is going to be around for a long time.

Q: When you left there in ‘99, did you leave any issues, such as the lamb problem?

BEEMAN: The lamb problem took care of itself because what I said came true. They did very well on lamb. It is almost a non-issue. The nuclear propulsion question is still outstanding; I’m sorry it didn’t get resolved. If we were going to do it we had to do it in one blow and make sure it worked. That opportunity just didn’t present itself.

Q: What have you been doing since you came back?

BEEMAN: Well, I retired February 1st of 2000 and about a month later I got a phone call from the chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which runs Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, asking me to be their first Chief of Staff since they became an independent agency last year. I said I would take it for a year, because I’m not sure how long I want to continue to work full time. That year is up and they asked me stay for another 4 months. I told them I’m going to retire from there at the end of August 2001. Then my former business partner called me and asked me to go back into a business partnership, because he had a terrific program and needed somebody with my political skills to manage it. I said I didn’t want to work full time; he said that wasn’t a problem; so I may be going back into business again. I have to raise money for my baby’s college education. It never ends, but I like doing something rather than just sitting around the house.

Q: Okay, well, we’ll stop at this point.

BEEMAN: I could not end this memoir without expressing my deep felt appreciation to my wonderful wife Susan and our beautiful daughter Olivia. Susan approached our stay in New Zealand with some trepidation, wondering if she was up to the task of being an ambassador’s wife.

I must say that she did a brilliant job. She quickly became beloved by the other diplomatic and embassy spouses and was a roaring success with the New Zealand public.
The fact that our first child - Olivia - was born in New Zealand was a serendipitous bonus. Every time I got on a plane, the flight crew would ask how Olivia was. I mentioned earlier what a wonderful outpouring of baby gifts and cards and letters we received when she was born in 1999. On our first return trip to New Zealand in 2002, we got together with all the families in our parenting class for a reunion.

Susan and Olivia made my stay in New Zealand a joy and some of the happiest days of my life.

MORTON R. DWORKEN, JR.
Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Dworken was born in the District of Columbia and raised in Ohio. He was educated at Yale University and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Entering the Foreign Service in 1968, Mr. Dworken served abroad in Taipei, Saigon, Phoac Long, Vientiane, Athens, Port Moresby, Ankara, Canberra, Wellington and London. In several of these assignments he dealt with Political-Military Affairs. In his several assignments at the State Department in Washington, DC, he also dealt primarily with Political-Military Affairs. Mr. Dworken also served on Capitol Hill as a Congressional Fellow. Mr. Dworken was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2008.

DWORKEN: When the end of my tour in Australia was approaching, I looked again at New Zealand, but the position was occupied and wasn’t coming open in the right sequence. My bids were focused on a range of things, mainly overseas, and I centered on political counselor to Jakarta. I was paneled into that job preceded by language studies. Had I gone to Indonesia, it would have been during a presidential election that was the center of a lot of attention. (This would have meant a spike in Washington’s attention -- as in Australia when Keating ousted Hawke and then defeated John Hewson. Political sections really come alive when there is a national election in a country Washington has an interest in.)

How shall I put this? The ambassador in New Zealand became ‘disenchanted’ with his DCM and sent her home abruptly; this should have been a signal to me, but I saw it as an opportunity. I bid on the job and since we’d periodically gone over to New Zealand from Australia for family visits, I went over for one and it just happened to involve going into the embassy and meeting the ambassador. I also had an interview with him at his residence with his wife. (He later sent his wife home, too; he married another woman, but that’s another story.) And the ambassador selected me as his new DCM.

Q: This was ambassador who?

DWORKEN: Josiah Beeman, may he rest in peace, who was a political appointee. He’d been a
California Democratic Party political operative. He’d also been in Washington as a lobbyist for
democrats interested in the state of California. I think he had a labor union connection as well; he
also was a lay leader of his church and involved in Northern Ireland peace talks through that. All
in all, a very politically savvy individual who, through his political connections and in the
substance of his work in Washington earlier with the Democratic Party, had been nominated and
confirmed as ambassador to New Zealand. He selected me as his deputy, so I broke the other
assignment.

Q: Before you started language training?

DWORKEN: Before I started language training, we were direct transferred from Australia to
New Zealand.

Q: You had mentioned 1995?

DWORKEN: In July 1995. A little story: The staff at the American Embassy in Canberra did not
know how to get me, my family, our household effects, and our car from Australia to New
Zealand because in their recollection, no one had ever gone from Australia to New Zealand in a
direct posting. I was setting a new pattern. We ended up putting our household effects in one part
of a shipping container and our car in another part of the same container and sending it to Sydney
and by ship to New Zealand.

Q: Well, why don’t you talk a little bit about your experience there, particularly in the initial
period? I think you mentioned a little bit about the context and Ambassador Beeman, but maybe
you want to talk a little bit more about that and what you did there. Generally we know what
DCMs do, but what was particular about that assignment?

DWORKEN: Well, from an internal embassy point of view, I guess what was most particular
was that, although it was a comparatively small embassy, it was newly designated as a ‘special
embassy program’ post, a SEP post, so my time there was a time of adjusting to that. There were
some things that had already been decided by the ambassador and had occurred, but there were
also other transformations to the staffing and the workload that occurred during my time there. It
was becoming even smaller because the State Department was under pressure from Congress to
reduce operations and maintenance costs. As part of that, there was an effort to cut back a
number of posts overseas.

My understanding was that the Secretary decided that in order to prove his mettle, he would go
one better than Congress and show the Senators and Congressmen who were interested in
cutbacks that he could really take a hard look at things and cut even more. We were under
tremendous pressure in New Zealand to reduce. We were given a quota that effectively was a cut
of 20 to 25 percent, which Washington thought was most easily accomplished by closing our
constituent post completely. That was the Consulate General in Auckland, the largest city in New
Zealand and very much the gateway to the rest of the country for trade and finance, culture,
media, travel, and tourism. It had the largest American citizen presence in the country.
So we were struggling with that reduction. Ambassador Beeman had decided that we should try to keep Auckland open, a stance I very much agreed with, since we did not want to be party to hauling down the U.S. flag in Auckland. However, we still had this quota of cuts to reach and so we appealed to the East Asia-Pacific Bureau in Washington. They turned out to be unsympathetic to our argument that the cuts ought to be somewhere else. When that failed, we had to take the cuts internally. We cut Auckland from a consulate general to a consulate and stripped staff there down to essentially the consular function. Some staff took over non-consular activities as additional duties, and there was a contract arrangement made to cover commercial services. But more importantly, we closed all other consular activities in the rest of the country. Auckland became a concentrated consular operation for the whole of New Zealand, both the northern and the southern islands.

Q: So the Consular Section of the embassy in Wellington was...?

DWORKEN: …closed; it was the only way to reduce enough American and Foreign Service National positions to keep Auckland open. The embassy also cut back: the protocol assistant was fired, various other locally engaged staff were cut back, USIS was made smaller. We closed the Consular Agency in Christchurch, our only embassy representation on the South Island of New Zealand. I’m emphasizing North Island and South Island, because what we are really talking about after these changes was servicing American citizen concerns countrywide from the other end of the country, from the northern end of the North Island. There was a large American presence in Christchurch, and there still is, in support of our activities in Antarctica; then it was the U.S. Navy and now it is the National Science Foundation. I can talk more about that, because that was transformed as well during my time.

This downsizing was a major change. The embassy had also lost its Marine guard detachment before I arrived, which was a great blow to morale. It greatly increased the average age of embassy staff when the Marines left, and the loss of the Marine house negatively impacted morale-building activities.

Q: We might just note that the Secretary of State in this period was Warren Christopher, and of course Madeline Albright came in also, I guess, while you were in New Zealand.

DWORKEN: That’s right, Albright came later, but it was Christopher’s directive in effect that we were carrying out.

Q: Let me just ask you: in general, with the consolidation of the passport functions to Auckland and the 20% downsizing that occurred and so on, would you say there was a significant loss in service to the public, both the American and New Zealand customers, or was it basically that Auckland could continue to provide that kind of service that was necessary and expected under the law?

DWORKEN: In a minimalist sort of way, a reduced Auckland was able to fulfill all that was needed to cover the whole country from one place. We learned a great deal about how to communicate quickly back and forth with courier pouches and commercial arrangements, and we
instituted a lot more in the way of outreach activities to make sure people knew that the services were available, just at the other end of the country. But when personal visa interviews became more of a requirement, those people were forced to travel, so we learned a whole new way of making appointments ahead of time and confirming and keeping those appointments. There were some admirable efficiencies that were imposed and learned, so in the final analysis that was probably a good thing. But the reduction in the presence of Americans at least in the capital city of Wellington, who were therefore able more easily to get to the South Island, meant that the emergency response time to get a trained consular officer on scene went way up. It took much longer, and prison visits and such were therefore much more difficult. The regular outreach activities of an embassy and its constituent post -- I guess that’s the thing that got hurt the most. We simply were more stretched and less able to be out there doing the persuading, the representing, the diplomacy, the influencing that we’re paid to do. We had to cross-train officers to have consular-like responsibility, all our duty officers had that added burden. It couldn’t be deferred to someone at the other end of the country in emergency circumstances. So there were adjustments and, I guess, on balance, they were worth doing, but the process was incredibly trying.

Q: Okay, do you want to talk about the responsibilities not only for New Zealand but for some other countries or do you want to talk about Antarctica or other issues?

DWORKEN: Well, I should mention one other thing in the special embassy program, which is that it did relieve us of workload in terms of some of the routine reporting. We also had no station, we had a tiny USIS, and our externally available library resources under the previous method of operation of USIS overseas had been reduced to an in-house resource center that could be contacted from outside. That outreach activity was re-purposed and that area was reduced. Without Marine guards, we had a “lock and leave” embassy, so we had additional security requirements laid on American officers and American staff along with more complications about getting in and out of facilities, especially after duty hours.

There were also small things that I think reduced our prestige and presence. One of the good things about those routine report burdens that were lifted from us was that they required people in the embassy to get out and gather information and to base their influence activities on some of the information and contacts built up over time, and there was less of that. We were smaller, so we ended up being inside the embassy more. I found myself even more embassy bound, although naturally the DCM is more of an in-house manager and the ambassador is more of a public diplomat and outreach person. There were other small things. The residence I lived in was no longer going to be, after my departure, an official residence, so there would no longer be ‘official residence expenses.’ Those were cut back during my time there, which reduced representational activities. My predecessor had a car and driver, and I did not; there were all kinds of little economies imposed on us that had their plusses and minuses -- enough on that I guess.

Q: That’s great. I don’t know the current status of this special embassy program but at a certain point, I think early on, maybe even before the period you are talking about, I think one of the characteristics of a small (special) embassy post was that it had no DCM position or that the political officer or whoever, the admin officer, would also be the DCM. Was that ever
considered?

DWORKEN: I’m not sure that was ever considered. What we did have was a combined political-economic section where we had one counselor for political and economic affairs and a combined section. All the officers in the section had a mix of domestic and foreign policy political and economic aspects to their portfolios. Actually that leads to one of the activities that we all concentrated on in the economic area.

New Zealand had only recently opened itself up to trade, in a fantastic way really, and had opened its eyes to the world, reduced its tariff barriers, and expanded its export activities. It always was an exporting country of agricultural products, but more recently they had gotten into international financial activities and had become in their own small way a catalyst for a whole range of very positive economic and financial activities. When they opened up themselves, privatized state-run activities, and became a welcoming recipient of foreign investment, they were minded to be very active in the international economic arena, and they took on a lot of responsibilities to lead trade liberalization efforts.

Q: Globally.

DWORKEN: Globally and regionally. They also, of course, were focused largely on getting agricultural subsidies reduced, so they could further expand their market penetration but also so they could encourage less-developed countries to expand their agricultural production and thereby raise their standard of living. It was both high-minded and very locally oriented. We worked very closely with them. The United States was also quite interested in liberalized trade globally and regionally. They saw the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation – I hesitate here, because there never was another word after APEC. There were just the four letters of an acronym in pursuit of a noun. APEC was a meeting, an assembly, or a grouping, but it was not an organization. We ended up using the term, ‘forum.’ I recall Ambassador Mel Sembler, who had been present for APEC’s creation in Australia, saying that the great success of that first set of meetings -- here he would shake his head in wonderment, coming from the business community - - in fact, the only success of those first meetings was that they agreed to meet again. As it turned out, that was important.

APEC has become not only an economic engine for a whole range of development, liberalization, and other activities of an economic nature, but it has provided a venue, and this may be its greatest accomplishment, for meetings on the side that have focused on issues of political, military, and strategic importance in the Asia-Pacific. These were not so much under the cover of an economic topic but around the margins of serious economic discussions with great impact on people’s lives. Such things as the activities in Cambodia for a peaceful settlement of that conflict and then in later years the conflict in the South Pacific related to the rebellion in Bougainville, as well as much larger issues related to Japan, China, and Korea have all been dealt with in one degree or another on the margin of these meetings. APEC has also become, along with the ASEAN regional security forum, woven into standard parts of the annual calendar of meetings of leaders and ministers, even though there still is not an APEC organization as such. That’s the hope, anyway.
In the embassy, we were specifically engaged in preparing for all those APEC meetings, working very closely with NSC and East Asia Bureau staff. New Zealand was, as was Australia, very mindful of the fact that neither of them alone, nor both of them together (because they had their own special economic relationship), would necessarily have enough weight inside APEC or in Uruguay Round or World Trade Organization (WTO) talks to get anything that they wanted done. But if they could pull the United States out of wherever its current position of opposition or passivity happened to be, and bring us closer to their position, then they would have real weight. There were times they saw it in their interest to do that, and there were also times when we saw it in our interest to pull together. And sometimes, they led and we followed, so there was and still is substantial collaboration focused on trade liberalization.

We did not have ministerial meetings hosted in New Zealand during my time. Having enjoyed so much being control officer for the President’s visit to Australia, as we talked about earlier, I was happy to miss out on Bill Clinton’s visit to New Zealand -- great success though it was.

Q: *It was after your time?*

DWORKEN: It was after I left, in 1999, and I left in 1998.

Q: *And one presidential visit was probably enough in any career.*

DWORKEN: I agree.

Q: *Military sales were something else you got involved with more bilaterally?*

DWORKEN: Yes, it was bilateral. It is something that I guess still rankles with me, and it still rankles with some New Zealanders that a particular sale didn’t actually occur.

If you recall when Pakistan violated American law related to nuclear weapons, testing, and all of that, the United States was in the process of arranging the sale of F-16 aircraft. They had not been delivered, and the sale was frozen. Those aircraft were sequestered in the expectation that they would eventually go to Pakistan, which had already paid several hundreds of millions of dollars from their own funds and from American foreign military sales credit. It was a contractual Gordian knot that left us with a political problem with Pakistan.

Well, after many years, the United States and Pakistan both concluded that the sale was never going to be fully accomplished. They weren’t going to stop their nuclear weapons activity, and we simply could not legally ship the aircraft to them. We did not want to repay Pakistan and still keep the aircraft committed to them, so we worked out a deal between ourselves and Pakistan, so my understanding goes, that relieved each of us of the obligations to the other. They did get enough of their monies back so that they were content, and we retained possession of the aircraft.

By this time, F-16s had been further developed into Cs and Ds, and I think Es and Fs were on the drawing board, so these A and B aircraft were not top of the line fighter-bombers. However, they
were still active in the NATO inventory, and they were in brand new condition, so they had a full
life ahead of them. When I was chargé, we made an offer to New Zealand. I remember personally
going to the secretary of defense and the chief of the air force to offer these aircraft at ‘bargain
basement’ prices, brand new with all equipment, spare parts, and servicing -- the whole package,
if you will. New Zealand had A-4 aircraft, modernized over the years but so old they were really
good for training and exercises and that was beginning to be about it, but certainly not capable
enough to be deployed and survive in a modern air defense environment. New Zealand was very
interested in acquiring those F-16 aircraft, and effectively the government agreed to purchase
them, subject of course to decisions by their parliament.

Even with a troubled U.S.-New Zealand military relationship dating back more than a decade,
related to policy differences toward nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships (an issue that
other oral histories have covered to a great degree), we were prepared at that time to offer them
these front-line aircraft. They expressed strong interest and began to marshal the political effort
necessary to get it through their parliament. However, the National Party in power was facing an
election, and there was the real possibility that they would not survive or that it would be a near
run thing with the Labor Party. The purchase of these aircraft became an issue, so it was taken
out of the run-up to the election, if you will, and given to a select committee for study. And the
committee did a long and detailed study which came down to an ‘on the one hand, on the other
hand’ kind of result that raised enough doubt about the purchase that, when Labor did win the
election, the new government shelved the aircraft transaction and instituted a new strategic study
of defense policy.

As I say, it still rankles that the change of government in New Zealand and the resultant change
of defense policy indicated the absence of a desire to quicken again the alliance relationship and
have New Zealand be a visible contributor to that alliance. The decision not to do any of that and
instead choose a different direction was the death knell for this particular sale. I was sorry to see
that happen, because I had hoped it would be a catalyst for another approach to our broad defense
and security relationship that I believed would be in both countries’ interests.

Q: You mentioned that U.S.-New Zealand defense relations have been the subject of many oral
history interviews, the problem relating to nuclear ship visits and nuclear weapons. Do you want
to say maybe just a few words about the state of defense relations in the period you were there?
Did you have a defense attaché, were you doing things together, or was not much happening at
all?

DWORKEN: We did have a defense attaché, a Navy captain, and one senior enlisted person in a
very small defense attaché office, constrained in many of the normal attaché things that it could
do. These were constraints on interaction that went back to the military rupture in 1984. We did
have military-security and intelligence-sharing relationships with New Zealand, some that had
persisted over time and some of an ad hoc nature that grew over the period that I was in New
Zealand. A few of us in the embassy had political-military responsibilities. The ambassador was
obviously the leader. I was involved to some degree, and so were the head of the political-
economic section and the defense attaché.
When Prime Minister Jim Bolger approached the election earlier in 1990, his judgment was that, while the National Party position was that the alliance relationship with America should be made right again, and that meant decisive steps in the nuclear area, he needed first to be sure that he got elected. The way to ensure that was to change the National Party position from what I just described to one that was accepting of the codification in law of the anti-nuclear policy. So he agreed to change National Party policy, and we believed he felt constrained by that change. When Jenny Shipley took over from him as party leader and prime minister in 1997, that policy remained in place. Then she lost the 1999 election to Helen Clark of Labor, who is currently prime minister and very strongly in favor of maintaining the anti-nuclear policy, so there has been to date no major policy or legal change.

What we sought in the embassy was to take advantage of a changed circumstance brought about by President Bush (41). He had ordered all nuclear weapons off all surface ships, including aircraft carriers, as U.S. declaratory policy. However, he kept the ‘neither-confirm-nor-deny’ policy as to whether any specific ship, aircraft carrier, or attack submarine at any particular moment carried nuclear weapons, and he reserved the right to put the weaponry back on board such ships or boats should national exigencies and the strategic situation require. Nonetheless, it became common knowledge very quickly that not only could you look up in Jane’s which ships were nuclear powered (that was not a secret), you could also conclude, if you wished to, that there were no nuclear weapons on board a given ship at a given time. This was because, over time, the Chief of Naval Operations had testified in public before Congress and stated that generally there were no nuclear weapons on board surface ships.

Unfortunately, the New Zealand government could not bring itself to allow a conventionally powered ship to enter New Zealand waters or a New Zealand port without first asking whether nuclear weapons were on board, in order to determine affirmatively it complied with New Zealand law. They could not, like other countries, draw on public U.S. statements and tell themselves the answer to that question without asking us. The answer they would get from us then wouldn’t be satisfactory. Other countries could ask themselves that question, tell themselves the answer, and live with it and thus allow the ship, aircraft carrier, or attack submarine -- on the surface, of course -- to come visit.

Instead, we tried to shape the environment for a more receptive approach through public diplomacy and private conversations. The ambassador was very much out there speaking about the safety record of our navy and our declared policy. We were hopeful that we were moving closer on that particular aspect of it. We had absolutely no hope of getting the government formally to overturn the anti-nuclear law, since the attitude was so demonstratively engrained in New Zealand’s national identity. Its self-projection to the world of what it was and what it stood for meant that there wasn’t any hope on that score. We realized that we would never meet the top-line requirements of those in Washington who remembered how they felt sorely done by New Zealand in 1984 when the government publicly rejected a U.S. ship visit request.

Meanwhile New Zealand, on its own and also with our encouragement, was very active on the international scene; it had troops deployed well over the horizon into places like the conflict in the Balkans. It had joined in proportionately many peacekeeping efforts for a small military force
from a country of three million people. They had sent a major combatant ship, one of the only three they had, to the multilateral force that patrolled in the Arabian Sea and the northwestern Indian Ocean. They were regular participants in a whole range of collaborative activities. They had active maritime patrol aircraft. They had weapon systems that involved our two countries. Also, the intelligence relationship, both from a defense point of view and from an intelligence community point of view, had been maintained over the course of the previous difficulties. They were granted more access to particular tactically related intelligence when they had forces deployed in a particular area, although when they rotated their troops out from a particular activity, that window closed again.

So, the relationship had its ad hoc, case-by-case aspects. Nonetheless, it was very close. New Zealand has remained one of our closest political-military partners, if you will. And that incrementally improved over time, as we in the embassy made our arguments and as CINCPAC weighed in from Hawaii, showing how from a practical point of view a closer relationship made sense. That in turn led to higher-ranking visits, such as those by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Director of the National Security Agency. There were other high-level visits, such as the U.S. Trade Representative for ministerial meetings and Congressional delegations. Many of them focused on security and economic issues, such as trade policy and our import restrictions on sheep meat, dairy products, and beef, plus other trade issues that bedeviled our two countries. The quickening set of visits led Prime Minister Bolger to pay an official call on the President in the White House and host a subsequent visit by President Clinton. So, the relationship had been steadily improving and that continued to today, but the nuclear policy has remained an impediment to the full re-establishment of the closest military and intelligence relationships.

Q: You mentioned being chargé a couple of times, was that an important part of your assignment the three years you were there, or did that happen infrequently?

DWORKEN: It happened infrequently. The ambassador did travel around the country, so I was in charge while he was somewhere in the country but not formally chargé. He traveled outside a bit: he went back to Washington for consultations and a surgical procedure, and he was also accredited to Niue and Cook Islands, so he made trips there.

Q: Did you go there or get involved much with that?

DWORKEN: Niue, no; Cooks, I did go. I went once to join the U.S.-based delegation to post-South Pacific Forum talks, combined with a short vacation. And I also went to focus on a particular money-laundering issue. But no, there wasn’t all that much opportunity to be chargé.

Q: How about Antarctica?

DWORKEN: That was a special plus about duty in New Zealand. I think I was aware beforehand that there was something called Operation Deep Freeze, but I never realized how much America had invested in the South Pole Station, the station on McMurdo Sound, and the whole range of scientific and strategic activities in which we engaged in Antarctica. It has become even more
important these days. Some of the best data about global warming is from the pristine environment in Antarctica. New Zealand had its own station also in McMurdo Sound that they supported as well; they were one of the major participants in Antarctica exploration. That whole U.S. activity was supported from a base alongside the airport in Christchurch, in the middle of the South Island. The practice was that every year the ambassador to New Zealand gets two seats on the various scheduled military aircraft that go down to McMurdo and the South Pole as a perk and to recognize that the ambassador had general influence over that activity. I got one of those seats once, and the PAO and I went down together.

I should explain: During the winter, there are very few people at McMurdo and even fewer in South Pole Station, but in the Antarctic summer (beginning late in our calendar year and ending in February or early March), there are hundreds and hundreds of scientific and support personnel who flood down to Antarctica. Most of that goes through Christchurch. Most of the aircraft pass through Christchurch as well, because it is a seven-and-a-half or eight-hour flight by C-130 to get there; these are special C-130s that have skis on them. While there is a Coast Guard icebreaker that goes down once a year, and there is a military contracted naval ship that brings heavy cargo in after that icebreaker arrives, a lot of the cargo work is done by aircraft. At that time, they were C-141s, the big cargo aircraft, and a lot of C-130s. C-141s could land on a giant ice runway, but the C-130s had to go down first in order to arrange things for those larger flights. There were only two squadrons (I think) of C-130s in the U.S. inventory that had skis and extreme cold weather experience; one was part of the New York Air National Guard, and the other was part of the U.S. Navy out of the U.S. west coast. The New York unit supported Arctic activities, and the Navy aircraft supported Antarctica. The Navy concluded this was uneconomic, and in one of their downsizing and reapportionment operations, they decided to give up this specialty aircraft. Mind you, these specially built C-130s were equipped with skis that had wheels embedded through them, and each ski cost over $1 million. They break from time to time, so it was a big investment. That changeover from the Navy to the National Science Foundation, along with all of its associated personnel and equipment, and a new contract with the New York Air National Guard to cover both the Arctic and Antarctica led to a massive change in our footprint in Christchurch. This was a downsizing, again, money saving in one sense but also expense shifting.

Q: That happened while you were there?

DWORKEN: Yes. Part of the reason the PAO and I went on that orientation trip was to gather information that we could use to describe the changes to the New Zealand government and public. We were concerned that there would be all this employee turbulence, downsizing, and shifting around. We also gave advice on how to make that appear as smooth as possible. In the event, it was a very smooth transition, one of the smoothest I’ve ever seen for that kind of multifaceted change.

A couple of things about Antarctica: It was an amazing trip to an amazing place, and the people who are down there are very special in their willingness to be in this small isolated community. They seemed to have tremendously high morale, very much mission oriented, both civilian and military, and very much imbued with the idea that they are in an environment that needs
protection. The emphasis on protection of that environment was fantastic. Things in that cold environment last forever, because it is an icebox even in the summertime. A generation ago, we just threw everything away or buried it in the ice, so there were still things there from the original explorations, like the original huts and their contents that Scott and others had set up. Now, there is a great recycling effort. I had never seen so much care taken to divide cardboard from regular paper, to divide colored glass from white glass, to divide plastics refuse into different categories, and to separate all that, package and preserve it, and then ship it out.

The South Pole Station, which is mainly a dome partially buried in the snow and ice, was beginning to fail. It started out sitting on top and over time, it had become partially buried and encrusted with ice and snow. It was also deemed insufficient for the exploration and scientific work projected to be done there. So there were initial plans, which later came to pass, for building a new station up on stilts above the ice. Whatever snow that blew against it then would go under and around it rather than pile up.

We stood at the actual South Pole as well as the VIP South Pole for photos. The latter is a candy stripe thing which is right next to the runway, so you can land right alongside it. The C-130 has to keep at least one of its engines running at all times so the oil and petrol don’t freeze up. You run out of the back of the C-130, run over to the ceremonial candy stripe South Pole, get your picture taken, and run back into the airplane, because they don’t stay around very long. We spent the better part of a day there.

Q: The better part of the day at the South Pole Station?

DWORKEN: Yes. Our aircraft left, and another one came in and picked us up later, after briefings and a tour inside the dome. That was fascinating. We also spent, I think, four nights, maybe five nights at McMurdo, including some time with the New Zealanders at their separate station there.

Q: In terms of the American station at McMurdo Sound, there’s a big contract support operation in addition to the scientists, and at the time you were there, the military operators of aircraft were going back and forth, correct?

DWORKEN: That’s correct. There was a large contingent of electricians, construction people, cooks and librarians, but there was also significant clerical and laboratory support to the scientists, and a significant number of scientists. There also were helicopter pilots and crews to get around. We went on a helicopter trip into the Dry Valleys, where we spent part of a day with a scientist. There is no snow there, and living things freeze over and then thaw, but the valleys are dry. There also were experiments planned and underway in terms of drilling, measuring ice cores, and looking at the statistics on warming. There was also an effort to determine the rate of change of the ice pack. That’s how they know where to put the marker for the actual South Pole, since the marker pole moves during the course of every given year. They have to retrieve it and put it in a different place because the ice pack moves.

Q: What about American tourism, was that going on during the period you were there?
DWORKEN: Yes, but it wasn’t launched from New Zealand; it was from Chile. But I also recall there was in Wellington a New Zealand-led annual effort to reach an agreement with the Brits, Americans, Chileans, and a few others on the numbers of tourists and tour boats that would come during a given time, in an effort to maintain the Antarctica ecology. As I mentioned, everything is preserved there, but things are very fragile. You can still see those huts of the earlier explorers. Shackleton’s hut, for example, has sealskins on it and in the summer, you can see moisture pooling as the skins begin to thaw, but then they freeze over again. I guess over time they will deteriorate. It has been since the early 1900s, almost a century now, and inside those huts are the original glass jars with the snap tops on them and the little rubber ring sealants. The labels can still be read, but they are fading now.

Q: There is an Antarctic treaty or convention going back to the 1950s, I think. Were you involved in any aspect of that or do they have annual meetings?

DWORKEN: New Zealand hosted one treaty session while I was there. There is a periodic review of the Antarctic Treaty, which set up a non-exploitative regime for at least 50 years, and there were a variety of treaty regulatory types of activities. There was a strong multinational effort to keep Antarctica separate and “preserved.” Some countries could no longer pay the high cost for exploration, and closed their stations, but most countries involved in scientific activity are continuing. Because of its polar situation, with an ozone hole generally above, it was open for all kinds of scientific research and measurement that cannot be performed anywhere else in the world. We saw the various sensing arrays that are placed out on the ice. I know from my earlier days in political-military affairs about the impact of solar flares on international communications, both civilian and military, and that we are observing this activity very closely.

Q: Okay. Anything else you want to say about your time as DCM in Wellington?

DWORKEN: When I was mentioning earlier the countries the ambassador was accredited to, I omitted by mistake Samoa. We did have a small one person, one officer post in Apia, Samoa. It is now called Samoa, and was formerly Western Samoa.

Q: And the one person post in Apia reported to the ambassador?

DWORKEN: Well, yes, but also reported to the DCM, I guess, since I wrote his efficiency report.

Q: Did you go there?

DWORKEN: No.

Q: Did he come to you ever?

DWORKEN: He did; he came a couple of times. This was another case when the ambassador made the site visit. This was another example demonstrating that Ambassador Beeman was a
very controlling ambassador, almost emasculating in many respects, and he made those visits, I didn’t. There weren’t big issues related to Samoa that I can recall. Whenever you have one officer or a very small post (I think he had locally engaged staff part time), there were housekeeping and administrative issues that would take as much as 40-60% of an individual’s day. He was quite involved with the dilapidated state of the housing and office spaces and whether resources could be put toward something new. I think we were on the verge by the end of my tour of getting more money for improvements to the housing and office spaces, but any more than that, I frankly cannot recall.

Q: In your notes, that I am looking at, you mentioned -- changing the subject -- encouraged settlement of the secessionist dispute of Papua New Guinea. Is that something you did because you had served there previously or was that because New Zealand was quite involved, or what was that all about?

DWORKEN: I think it was mainly because New Zealand was involved, but I had background in it and an affinity for that kind of issue, plus I knew some of the New Zealanders involved in the peace talks from my earlier time in PNG. Bougainville was a geographic part of the Solomon Islands chain, with different people from Papua New Guinea’s ‘mainland,’ and yet in colonial times they were put together. The Bougainvillians were on separate islands, with a great copper mine resource and a significant port. They had all the complaints of a minority group that thought they were being disadvantaged and in effect they sought to secede from PNG. The New Zealanders, because they had no previous colonial connections like Australia or Great Britain, were able to offer themselves up as honest brokers. They exercised great diplomatic skill and took advantage of a moment in the secession when the violence had begun to subside -- primarily because Bougainvillian women had told their men to stop the killing after many years -- to invite the parties to come to New Zealand and negotiate. The resultant agreement kept Bougainville inside PNG but gave it greater autonomy, more economic benefits, and other incentives, some of which still have not been fulfilled. That whole negotiation process was something that I watched and encouraged from afar on behalf of the U.S. government as one of my responsibilities. We were not parties to the negotiation in any sense, but we were very much in favor of it.

Q: Okay, anything else?

DWORKEN: Yeah, I’m afraid there are a couple of other things I should mention.

Q: Sure.

DWORKEN: Another one of my activities as DCM was to be a member of the U.S.-New Zealand Educational Foundation Board of Directors, the Fulbright activity. These activities have just celebrated their 60th anniversary. They were one of the first participants and have been very active for such a small country, with hundreds of alumni exchanged in each direction. Even with their older connections to Great Britain and the Rhodes scholarship program, the Fulbright program has great prestige in New Zealand. The PAO and I were members of the Board, and the ambassador was an honorary co-chair along with the New Zealand prime minister. There were other Board members from the Foreign Ministry and the Education Ministry, along with a
number of New Zealand and American business people and representatives of cultural and educational activities. The Board was an effective public-private partnership, able to attract needed funding from the private sector as government funds shrank. It was for me a wonderful experience; it was the first time I had been that closely engaged with the program. I’ve continued to be a minor supporter at least from afar since then. The New Zealand Embassy here just commemorated the 60th anniversary of these bilateral exchanges, and former Prime Minister Jim Bolger was the keynote speaker. Harriet Fulbright, Senator Fulbright’s wife, participated. She made a visit to New Zealand while I was there to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the program -- another sign of the significance of New Zealand’s participation.

I would also like to add a personal note: In my view, New Zealand is one big small town, and there are many ways of getting to know people. New Zealanders are an open people for Americans, and we share a common language obviously and fundamental values, and although we’ve had our issues, those all rest on a very close friendship. But New Zealand is the only place I have ever been where they have been so open and friendly. I mentioned earlier in our discussions that my wife is a New Zealander, now a New Zealand-American, and I must tell you that New Zealand is the only place I have walked down the street and had people say hello…

Q: …To you or to her?

DWORKEN: To her; they were complete strangers to me. I don’t know how else to describe it other than to say it is small enough so that people seem to know each other throughout the country. It was a great family post for us. It was an opportunity for both of our children to connect with all their aunts, uncles, and cousins. I have more family in New Zealand now than I do in the United States, so that was very good. In addition, my wife worked while she was in New Zealand. I should have also mentioned, when we were talking about Australia, that she worked there as well; she worked at each of our posts on contract and PIT work.

Q: When you say she worked in New Zealand, in the embassy or outside?

DWORKEN: In New Zealand, where you’ll remember we had no consular section in our embassy, she was a locally engaged visa officer for the Australian High Commission. She also did some work on a personal services contract for the sole administrative officer. Actually, part of the reason for that contract work was that the ambassador had abolished the Community Liaison Officer position. Not only to save a slot and money, but because he had determined that it was a waste of time and an interference to have a spouse of one of the American employees go around from time to time and talk to employees and family members. I was never able to get it re-established; it was a great negative for morale inside the embassy and in the larger American community. My wife picked up some of the CLO-type activities on contract, which the ambassador permitted grudgingly. My wife had been the CLO for two years in Canberra, and she’d done lots of volunteer work both there and in previous assignments, so it was a very familiar role for her. She also volunteered in schools and the community. I wanted to say a little about that as a personal footnote.
SuZanNe SekeraK ButCher
Australia and New Zealand Affairs

Born in 1948 and raised in Pennsylvania, Mrs. Butcher was educated at Allegheny College and American University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1970, she had assignments in Venezuela, Poland, Mexico, and Canada, where she served variously as Political and Consular Officer. Her Washington assignments included Policy Planning, Cultural Affairs, Staff Secretariat, International Organizations, and Scientific and Environment Affairs. Mrs. Butcher also served on Capital Hill as Assistant to Congressman Solarz. Mrs. Butcher was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Well, you moved over, and you were dealing with Australia and?

BUTCHER: Australia and New Zealand.

Q: During this last year, 1997-1998 period, how were relations with New Zealand? We had gone through this no-nuclear thing, were we still kind of distant from them?

BUTCHER: No, we had a very good relationship with them, more for economic reasons, because they had really gone to a much less socialized economic system than they had had before. They were seen as the darling of the free traders. There was a bit of that old tension still around, and particular restraints on what we could do with military cooperation. We were doing a lot of sessions about where we were headed with all of this. Of course, now with the new government, I haven’t kept up with what has happened. I suspect that the relationship is not as easy as it was. While I was there, the relationship focused on...

Q: What type of government did they have? Was it essentially a Tory sort? I’m told that the Brits who emigrated to New Zealand in the 1930s were coming right out of the left wing of the labor party, and they gave it that cast.

BUTCHER: On the whole, yes. Just like with the Canadians. When you talk about conservative Canadians, conservative Canadians would be, maybe centrist Democrats in the United States. I think that is probably true with the New Zealanders as well. Then again, when you get to health care and the role of the government in the economy, they had made a 180 on the role of the government in the economy. They were not leftists at all, in that sense, during the time I was there.

Q: Did you find, also, that the Australians and New Zealanders had effective embassies? Same embassies, work broadly, including the other departments and Congress, and the media and all. Others try to deal just with the State Department. It doesn’t work very well.

BUTCHER: The Canadians, of course, are so good at working the whole U.S. government, the
Australians and the New Zealanders also. The Australians and the New Zealanders also worked with the Pacific islanders’ embassies here. The islanders had a hard time. Their people generally didn’t have a lot of experience. The new Fiji ambassador was really trying to work with the Hill on sugar and things like that, which was good. On the other hand, you always worry about them getting ripped off by the so-called “lobbyists.” The Micronesians end up spending so much on consultants, lobbyists and so on.

FRANKLIN E. HUFFMAN
Counselor for Public Affairs
Canberra (1997-1999)

Franklin E. Huffman was born in Harrisonburg, Virginia in 1934. In 1955 he graduated from Bridgewater College and immediately joined IVS. From 1967 to 1985 he was a Professor of Southeast Asian languages and linguistics at Yale and Cornell. His second career was as a Foreign Service Officer with USIA where he was posted to London, Rangoon, Marrakech, Paris, Washington, Phnom Penh, and Wellington, with subsequent WAE tours to N’Djamena (Chad) and Phnom Penh. Mr. Huffman was interviewed in January 2006 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Where did you go then?

HUFFMAN: I went to New Zealand.

Q: Now that’s a cultural change.

HUFFMAN: Yes it was. And interestingly, it was not high on my list of priorities to go to New Zealand. The reason I went to New Zealand, I was 63 so I had two years before I would have to quit. You have to resign at the end of the month in which you turn 65; there are no exceptions. From a personnel point of view they should not send a guy to a four-year post who has to quit in two years. But the director of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs was being pressured by budget cuts to close a certain number of posts, and he felt that to have someone in New Zealand who had to leave at the end of two years might provide him the rationale for closing the post if he had to. So I was fortunate that, even though I couldn’t serve a full term they were still willing to send me to New Zealand, because I didn’t want to serve out my last two years in Washington.

Q: Well, what were you doing in New Zealand? This would be ’97 to ’99?

HUFFMAN: Yes. Well, I was the Counselor for Public Affairs. (That’s “Counselor,” not “Consular.” It’s disgraceful that even some diplomats don’t understand the difference; they say “Consular” when they mean “Counselor” and vice versa; that works OK until you have to say “Counselor for Consular Affairs.” But I digress.) I had an excellent staff there. They were just, you know, tip top. My Kiwi cultural assistant was the equivalent of an American CAO. We had a library that was state-of-the-art and we had an administrative assistant who was so good that the
agency in Washington kept sending him here and there around the world to participate in training seminars, training other Foreign Service Nationals. I had worked 12 hours a day seven days a week in Phnom Penh, and was determined to avoid that in New Zealand, and in fact my staff told me that if I was in the office after 5:00 o’clock, it was my own fault, as they were perfectly capable of running the program, and had done so in the gap before my arrival.

Actually I was pretty stressed at that time about my wife and daughter, who had remained in Phnom Penh for an additional six months so my daughter could finish the school year and my wife could finish her contract as director of a University of San Francisco training project. They were still there when heavy fighting broke out in July 1997 between the supporters of co-Prime Ministers Hun Sen and Ranariddh, in which Ranariddh had to flee the country. Thousands of expatriates were trying to get out of the country, and hundreds had taken refuge in one of the large hotels. I didn’t know if my family had gotten out before the airport was closed down by the CPP. When I called the hotel she was scheduled to stay in in Bangkok, they simply told me that they had no such guest, so that was inconclusive; I finally woke up friends in Paris where she was supposed to stay, and they told me my wife and daughter were there and were sleeping. I broke down and cried with relief in front of all my staff.

The thing about New Zealand was that, while New Zealand of course is an extremely beautiful country and a pleasant place to be, I didn’t join the Foreign Service to go serve in a country that was very much like our own in terms of its Western cultural heritage. Both countries have a colonial history, both are immigrant societies with English as a unifying language, and both are democracies based on the rule of law and human rights. While New Zealand has historically taken an anti-nuclear stand, they have fought alongside the U.S. in every major war. At least half of the some 24 cabinet members, and one-third of the members of Parliament have participated in our International Visitor Program. But in spite of this rosy picture, there is an undercurrent of anti-Americanism, concern about American pop culture, and opposition to what they see as American military hegemony and support for globalization. It can be argued that the job of USIS is more challenging in New Zealand than in less similar countries, since public diplomacy must be quite nuanced and sophisticated to be effective.

But the truth is that it was just not terribly exotic, and my family, interestingly, really liked Cambodia much better. My daughter had been in her early teens and she had found Cambodia fascinating, with people from all countries and cultures. Her class of 14 students in the French Lycee had students from 12 different countries.

Q: Oh how wonderful.

HUFFMAN: And of course she spoke French and a bit of Cambodian. Another thing that appealed to her was that there were no rules except those imposed by her parents and she and her friends were able to go out to clubs and dancing and so forth at night and ride around on motor scooters, which the Embassy frowned on as a security matter, but everybody did it. In fact, there were no taxis in Phnom Penh so the only way to get anywhere if you didn’t have your own transportation was to hail a motor scooter – they called it “moto-dup” -- no trip cost more than a dollar. By contrast with all this, in New Zealand my daughter had to then go to an all girls’
school where she had to wear a uniform and where they had never heard of Phnom Penh, and I think she found all of these rosy-cheeked, blonde shepherdesses a little bit boring. So my family, and I most admit I as well, found New Zealand much less exciting than places like Cambodia and Morocco and Burma.

Q: Yes, I understand. But New Zealand is considered quite a desirable post, isn’t it?

HUFFMAN: Yes, of course it is. It was a lovely place to be. On a clear day the bay around Wellington just sparkled in the sun, the pastel colored houses stood out against the green mountains, and the sky was like an inverted blue bowl. You’ve got the attractions of the charming English look-alike city of Christchurch, and Queenstown on the South Island, and the marvelous glaciers and mountains and valleys and outdoor sports and all the rest. I was surprised to learn that the country is slightly bigger in area than Great Britain but it only has three-and-one-half million people – maybe five percent of the population of Great Britain. There are more people in Auckland – about a million -- than on the entire South Island. So when we’d drive down to Queenstown, the roads were quite good but you’d have one-lane bridges. An indication of how few people there are is the fact that a one-lane bridge on a main highway causes no backup at all. You can drive for hours and you don’t pass a car. It was extraordinary.

But of course there were some public diplomacy challenges too. Our biggest issue was the anti-nuclear stance that New Zealand took in the mid 1980’s prohibiting nuclear-powered ships from coming to New Zealand, which pretty much torpedoed the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-U.S.) Defense Treaty.

Q: I thought that in a way it almost disappeared because we didn’t challenge it. Or was it still around?

HUFFMAN: Well, it was very much a sub-current all the time, more so among the general population than on the part of the New Zealand military, who would really like to have had closer security cooperation with the Americans. The ambassador liked to tease the Prime Minister Jim Bolger; he would say “Would you like to have a visit by the president?” When they would answer, “Oh yes indeed,” he’d say, “Well what if he comes on a nuclear powered ship?” We thought their position was rather head-in-the-sand, since New Zealand after all enjoyed the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the Pacific.

About the only unpleasant aspect of my tour in New Zealand was the imminent merging of State and USIA. This actually took place after my departure, at the beginning of the fiscal year 2000, that is October 1, 1999. But we were having to make all kinds of changes in preparation for this merger which we all felt was a shotgun marriage. The idea of course was that you’d get efficiencies from combining your admin staff and information technology staff and your drivers and all the rest. But we all felt that USIA had been a very efficient operation because it was small and because it didn’t have all the levels of hierarchy that you had in the Department of State. So there was a good deal of resistance to the change but we knew that it was coming and we had to accommodate. But the conflict was of course in the personnel. You had highly qualified local personnel who had been with USIS for 20 years who were going to be required to change jobs;
they were going to have to go work in admin and BNF and the other sections of the Embassy, and they didn’t want to. On the other hand I had my marching orders to cut down my staff and the result was that they tended to feel that I was not being supportive enough of them if I failed to protect their positions. If you could claim that this person or that was essential to our programs then we could keep him or her in the USIS section. I made the case for a number of employees in certain areas where I knew we could operate more efficiently with people who were familiar with our operation. I ultimately failed to prevent some people from being cross-walked, as they called it, but my attempts to salvage what I considered to be the more sensible parts of our programs put me at loggerheads with the DCM who had recently arrived and didn’t really know where the bodies were buried, so to speak. But he got so furious with me that he said, “Huffman, if you keep opposing me on this thing I’m going to ruin you.” And I laughed and said, “Well, you know, I’m almost 65, and if I’m not ruined by now it’s a bit late.” But the whole thing was very unpleasant.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

HUFFMAN: The ambassador was Josiah Beeman. He was a political appointee and I enjoyed working with him. He had a good sense of humor and a realistic understanding of the importance of his job in the overall scheme of things. But I think he was extremely effective. He was indefatigable in attending social events and entertaining. He was busy almost every night either entertaining at the residence or attending some other function, such as government reception or a wedding of the cousin of some minister, and he knew them by name — their cousins and sons and children. My predecessor apparently had been a speechwriter for him so I inherited that job and I was extremely busy writing speeches. I must have written dozens of speeches for the ambassador while I was there. I remember once writing four versions of a Fourth of July speech for four different venues. So that was one of the major activities that I was responsible for there.

Q: How did you find dealing with the press there?

HUFFMAN: Basically we had very good relations with the press. They were very friendly and relatively pro-American and we sent a lot of them to the States on journalistic exchange programs. I can’t say that that was a strenuous part of my job in New Zealand. There was mild anti-Americanism there over the nuclear thing and so on and so forth. But you know, New Zealand had changed enormously from the early days when they opposed the nuclear ships and when they were a quasi-socialist government with a cradle-to-grave welfare system. When they realized they couldn’t afford it, they had to go through a major revision of their policies in the 1990s where they slimmed down and cut out benefits and became much more committed to free trade. In other words, they had to make many of the same reforms that other countries, especially in Europe, had to make to become more competitive in the world market. But there was still this feeling, a kind of moral superiority over the nuclear issue and opposition to genetically modified foods, because they could afford to be. Some of our State Department colleagues like to retire there, but you know the place is really isolated. When I first went to New Zealand to attend a CAO conference a few years earlier, I thought it was an island off the coast of Australia. But no. When you get to Australia you’re already way down under and you still have 1,500 miles to go to get to New Zealand, so you don’t get many people stopping through. Although, surprisingly, two
of my brothers and their wives decided that if they were ever going to visit Frank abroad before he retired they’d better get on the ball and do it so they came all the way out to New Zealand and visited us. It would have made much more sense to have visited us in Paris or Morocco or even Cambodia, but they just never got around to it.

End of reader